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Subsections
Man’s Original State
Reformed Natural Law vs. Aquinas
Contra Medieval Theology
Reformed vs. Aquinas
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Order of Contents
Obediential Potency 6+
Historical 3
In Romanism 1
Latin 2
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Articles
2000’s
Feingold, Lawrence – Talk 1, ‘Man’s Supernatural End’ in Series 9, Man Elevated to Share in the Divine Life in Association of Hebrew Catholics Lecture Series: The Mystery of Israel & the Church (Fall, 2011) 7 pp.
Feingold is Romanist seminary professor who follows Thomas and who has a historical theology book on the topic (below).
Feser, Edward – ‘David Bentley Hart’s Post-Christian Pantheism’ (2022) at Public Discourse
Feser is an Analytical Thomist. Hart is an Eastern Orthodox theologian who wrote a book in “alarm at this Thomistic resurgence”.
“Hart’s second main objection is that any rational creature would, just by virtue of being rational, desire to know the very essence of the first cause of all things, so that such knowledge would be its natural end. There is a sense in which the premise is true, but the conclusion does not follow. To borrow an example from the philosopher Thomas Nagel, consider that there is an obvious sense in which a human being might desire to know what it is like to be a bat—to fly through the air the way a bat does, to get around via echolocation, and so on. Yet there is also an obvious sense in which it is simply not part of our nature to do these things, so that human beings can live complete lives as the kind of creatures we are without doing them. For that reason, our curiosity about what it is like to be a bat does not entail a sense of deprivation or loss in the way that, say, a missing limb would.
In an analogous way, had human beings been created in a state of “pure nature,” without a divinely imparted orientation toward the supernatural end of the beatific vision, they might in a sense nevertheless wish that they could have a direct knowledge of God’s very essence. But they would also judge that this is simply no more possible for them than it is possible for them to know what it is like to be a bat, and thus they would not feel this impossibility as a deprivation of something they were by nature made for. The indirect knowledge of God that they are capable of would suffice.”
Garris, Zachary, Sean McGowan & Stephen Wolfe – ‘Nature & Grace’ in Report on Reformed Christian Politics (2026), pp. 24-28
Corley, Brandon – ‘The Natural End of Man’ (2026) at American Reformer
Corley covers a large number of the issues regarding nature and grace, especially as relevant to Adam, the Covenant of Works and the beatific vision, with a high degree of clarity. He critiques at a bit of length Harrison Perkins’s Righteous by Design. Perkins, according to the provided quotes, sees the supernatural orientation and promised supernatural revelation in the Covenant of Works as (merely) an epistemological issue, whereas Corley, following Medieval Scholasticism in general, albeit reformed in pertinent ways, sees in such (in addition to a difference in epistemology) a fundamental a metaphysical divide.
Perkins affirms Adam was righteous by nature (with the Reformed) and denies Adam had supernatural grace (donum superadditum, contra Romanists); Corley affirms Adam was righteous by nature and had supernatural grace, quoting in support Francis Junius, Johann Gerhard, Jerome Zanchi and Lucas Trelcatius Jr. (albeit not always with full references).
Corley: “There are two senses in which one can speak of a ‘natural desire’ for the beatific vision: a strictly natural desire, and an elicited natural desire. A strictly natural desire would imply that man’s nature is itself proportioned to the beatific vision and longs for it as its own intrinsic end. In this sense, I deny that Plato [previously quoted] desired the beatific vision.
An elicited natural desire, on the other hand, occurs when man, coming to knowledge of the First Cause through its effects, reasons that, if it were possible, it would be desirable to have an immediate intellectual sight of the First Cause. Importantly, this desire is conditional. Apart from divine revelation, man has no way of knowing the beatific vision as an attainable option for him. Nor would such a desire leave man unfulfilled in the state of pure nature precisely because of its conditional nature.
On analogy, man may reason that, if it were possible, it would be desirable to fly. Nevertheless, lack of flight does not prevent man from attaining the happiness of his natural end. In this sense, I affirm that Plato desired the beatific vision.”
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Books
1500’s
Prime, John – A Fruitful & Brief Discourse in Two Books: the One of Nature, the Other of Grace, with Convenient Answer to the Enemies of Grace, upon Incident Occasions Offered by the Late Rhemish Notes in their New Translation of the New Testament, & Others (London, 1583) 211 pp. ToC
Prime (c.1549-1596) was a reformed Anglican clergyman and Oxford scholar.
ToC
Book 1
1. Adam’s Fall and original sin 1
2. Blindness of man’s understanding 4
3. Frowardness of his will 6
4. Sin of concupiscence yet remaining even in the regenerate 9
5. Free-will, and of the natural man’s impossibility to observe the Law 15
Book 2
1. Freeness of the Lord’s gracious love and favor 41
2. Against curiosity in the search of unsearchable mysteries 43
3. Election, vocation and reprobation, and of a contented knowledge therein 46
4. Justification, the fullness, freeness and comfort thereof 61
5. Righteousness by imputation, and of inherent justice 64
6. Of the regenerate man’s imperfection to fulfill the Law exactly 75
7. Merits: there is no deserving at God’s hands 95
8. How only faith does justify 115
9. Most comfortable doctrine of the certainty of salvation by faith and hope, to be in every man particularly touching himself 141
10. Sanctification and the means thereunto 176
11. Glorification in the life to come, and of due sobriety in questions therein 192-211
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1600’s
Pareus, David – Against Bellarmine on the Grace of the First Man (Heidelberg, 1612) 98 pp. trans. AI by Onku Latin
Pareus (1548–1622) was a German Reformed professor, theologian and reformer.
ToC
Lecture 1, On Robert Bellarmine, Jesuit 14
Lecture 2, Argument & Title of Bellarmine’s 4th Tome 20
1. Whether the first man was created with some supernatural
gift 22
2. That man was not created in the beginning such as he is now
born, but much more blessed 27
3. Whether the first man received grace that makes one
pleasing [to God] in creation 33
4. Whether the first man in the state of innocence needed
special help to be aroused to do good or to avoid sins 38
5. Whether the righteousness which the first man received in
creation was a supernatural gift 43
6. Bellarmine’s arguments for the supernatural gift are
proposed and examined 49
7. The arguments against the preceding opinion are refuted
and vindicated 59
8. Whether Adam and his posterity could have died if they had
not sinned 62
9. Whether the immortality of the first man was supernatural
or natural 68
…
16. What were the Cherubim guarding paradise 92
17. Why a certain tree was called the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil 93
18. Whether the tree of life could have conferred perfect
Immortality 95
19. The arguments for Augustine’s opinion are resolved and
vindicated 99-100
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2000’s
Perkins, Harrison – Righteous by Design: Covenantal Merit & Adam’s Original Integrity in Reformed Exegetical Doctrinal Studies (Mentor, 2024) 384 pp.
Blurb: “a thorough historical investigation of medieval and counter–Reformation theology, exploring sources that have seldomly if at all been treated in Reformed literature. At the same time, it is also a theological case that original righteousness was natural to Adam before the Fall and that Adam could have merited everlasting life according to the covenant of works.”
Perkins: “The relationship is not as if [the] covenant [of Works] was divinely bolted onto creation, as if it were adding a more extravagant spoiler onto a sportscar. Rather, creation and covenant relate more like a shoe and its laces: the shoe and laces are not identical with one another as if they can be conflated, but shoes and laces exist for one another. A shoe is not fully formed and functional unless its laces are threaded into the holes, which were crafted into the shoe’s design precisely so that laces would fit it.
In like manner, the covenant laces up humanity’s created order, not as an extrinsic addition but as that which pulls together the features of creation to make them functional toward the ends for which they were designed.” – p. 241
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Quotes
Order of
Alting
Ward
Rutherford
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1600’s
Johann H. Alting
The Scriptural Theology of Heidelberg, vol. 1 (d. 1644; Amsterdam: Jansson, 1646), Locus 5, ‘On Creation’, trans. AI at Confessionally Reformed Theology
“For because He executes some things by general and common operation in Nature, other things by particular and proper action in the Church, hence works are accustomed to be distinguished into those of Nature and of Grace. They are not, however, called ‘works of nature’ as if God works them by nature, seeing that outside Himself He acts not by necessity of nature but by the liberty of His will, Ps. 115:3; Eph. 1:11.
Now the works of Nature are the works of Creation, Conservation, and Governance. For these proceed from God’s common action, Gen. 1 throughout; Mt. 5:45; Acts 17:24ff., are occupied in common nature, and constitute the common principles of natural things. Which is the cause why in order of explication they are premised to the works of grace.”
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Samuel Ward
‘Negative Infidelity [of the Gospel] Condemns No One [due to Invincible Ignorance]’ in Theological Determinations in Works of Samuel Ward, ed. Seth Ward (d. 1643; Gallibrand, 1658), p. 57
“Be it so that God rewards the right use of natural things with an increase of natural goods, but not with the collation of supernatural ones. For this would be “to cross over into another kind” (metabainein eis to allo genos). For it
is as if someone said that God promised good health to one who makes good use of honors.
It is certain that the natural does not have an order of causality to the supernatural, because they are distant by a whole kind; nor can the seed of nature ever rise into the fruit of grace.”
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Samuel Rutherford
Lex Rex... (1644; Edinburgh: Ogle, 1843), p. 30
“It is true that people, through corruption of nature, are averse to submit to governors ‘for conscience sake, as unto the Lord,’ because the natural man, remaining in the state of nature, can do nothing that is truly good, but it is false that men have no active moral power to submit to superiors, but only a passive capacity to be governed.
He [John Maxwell] quite contradicts himself; for he said before (ch. 4, p. 49) that there is an ‘innate fear and reverence in the hearts of all men naturally, even in heathens, toward their sovereign;’ yea, as we have a natural moral active power to love our parents and superiors (though it be not evangelically, or legally in God’s court, good) and so to obey their commandments, only we are averse to penal laws of superiors. But this proves no way that we have only by nature a passive capacity to government; for heathens have, by instinct of nature, both made laws morally good, submitted to them, and set kings and judges over them, which clearly proves that men have an active power of government by nature.
Yea, what difference makes the Prelate betwixt men and beasts? for beasts have a capacity to be governed, even lions and tigers; but here is the matter, if men have any natural power of government, the Popish Prelate would have it, with his brethren the Jesuits and Arminians, to be not natural, but done by the help of universal grace; for so do they confound nature and grace. But it is certain our power to submit to rulers and kings, as to rectors, and guides, and fathers, is natural;”
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On Obediential Potency
Order of
Intro
Article 1
Quotes 5
Historical 1
Latin 1
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Intro
Quote
Brandon Corley
‘The Natural End of Man’ (2026) at American Reformer
“For our purposes, what is relevant here is passive obediential potency, which [the reformed] Senguerdius defines as:
‘[That] whereby a subject can receive an act beyond its nature, that is, to which it is not ordained by nature and would not naturally receive, such as the potency obediential passive given in stones to become sons of Abraham, or in water to be turned into wine.’
The idea here is simple. There is a sense in which you and I are perfectly capable of performing miracles. By this, I do not mean that we currently possess the active and formal power to perform miracles. Nor do I mean that we can affect them by our own natural powers. I only mean that you and I are the sort of beings that have the capacity to be raised by an agent superior to ourselves to perform miracles.
…
In this sense, man’s ordering to the beatific vision is an end superadded to his nature. When we speak about something being “supernatural,” strictly speaking, we mean that it is above the power of all created nature. The beatific vision clearly belongs to this category, since, as Thomas argues, no created effect of God is proportionate to his essence. Therefore, the beatific vision cannot be man’s intrinsic and natural end. Nevertheless, man’s rational nature entails an obediential potency for this vision, since his intellect and will make him the sort of creature capable of enjoying it, should God will to grant it.
This is not because man’s nature is proportioned to that vision by nature, but only because it is not intrinsically repugnant to it as, for instance, would be the case of a stone, which lacks even the obediential potency to enjoy the beatific vision inasmuch as it is irrational. Thus man’s nature is not ‘closed off’ to grace even though it is not naturally ordered to it.”
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Article
1900’s
Wolter, Allan B. – ‘On Obediential Potency’ in Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), ch. 6, ‘On Act & Potency’, pp. 52-53
Wolter was a Scotist.
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Quotes
Order of
Aquinas
Baxter
Holtzfus
Wolter
Feser
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1200’s
Thomas Aquinas
Commentary on the Sentences
bk. 1, dist. 42, Power of God, quest. 2, art. 2, ‘Whether God can do things that by nature are impossible’, reply to obj. 4
“God has implanted two accounts [rationes] in the first matter, namely, causal or obediential principles whereby all things are naturally apt to obey God, such that whatever might please him would come to be from them. He has also implanted seedlike principles—that is, active principles whereby natural effects are brought about; and he is sometimes said to act contrary to these in the miracles that he performs. But properly speaking, even then he does not act contrary to them, but alongside them, or above them.
He acts above them when he brings about an effect to which nature can in no way reach, like the form of glory for the glorified bodies. He acts alongside them when he produces without the service of natural causes an effect that nature can bring about, like when in John 2 he converts water into wine. But he does not act contrary to them, since he does not make it that an active natural cause, while remaining the same in species, has a different essential effect, such as that a fire, while remaining a fire, might cool something, just as it cannot simultaneously be the same thing and different.
But he can indeed destroy one nature and make another, remove one form from matter and induce another; for in this way fire acts contrary to the nature of air when it corrupts it.”
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bk. 2
distinction 18, Creation of Woman, quest. 1, art. 2, I answer that
“However, God’s activity differs from an artisan’s activity in two ways.
The first way is on the part of the matter. For since an artisan does not produce matter but rather works with a given matter, he does not confer on the matter the potency to receive the forms that he introduces to the matter, nor can he put this into the matter. But God, who is the author of the entire thing, conferred not only natural forms and powers on things but also the potency for receiving that which he would make in the matter.
The second way is on the part of the form, because the forms that the artisan introduces do not reproduce themselves; for a couch that putrefies does not sprout into a couch but into a plant, as is clear from the Physics 1. But natural forms [of living things] can reproduce themselves. Thus, they have the property of a seed and are called ‘seedlike.’ Now, the forms of things as existing in the divine art are called ‘primordial’ because they are, simply speaking, the first principles of things to be produced. The potency that has been implanted in things for receiving into themselves that which the will of God decrees is called ‘obediential principles’ by some, based on which matter has the ability to become what God wills it to be. Finally, the actual powers placed in matter, which give rise to natural effects, are called ‘seedlike principles.'”
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distinction 19, Immortality in the Original State of Man, quest. 1, art. 5, Whether the immoratlity of Adam was the same as the immortality of the resurrected, I answer that
“I answer that immortality indicates a certain potential to live forever and not die. But this potential is not found in human nature on the side of the body, except imperfectly, as if by obediential potency alone, since everlasting life cannot be had through the principles of nature. Rather, the completion of this potency comes from a divine gift gratuitously conferred.
And so, immortality can be considered in two ways: either with regard to incomplete natural potency, and in this way, there is one and the same immortality just as there is one and the same nature; or with regard to the gift of grace, which is like the formal element completing the aforementioned potency. And in this way, we find a difference between the two immortalities and impassibilities, since the first was through the grace of innocence whereas the final will be through the gift of glory.
For in the first state the soul’s dominance over the body was such that nothing in the body could happen that would be adverse to the soul. But in the last state the dominance will be greater, inasmuch as the properties of the soul will in a certain way overflow into the body such that the body will be rendered agile, bright, and spiritual, as well as impassible.”
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bk. 3,
distinction 1, Incarnation, quest. 1, art. 3, Whether God would have been incarnate if man had not sinned, Reply to obj. 4
“The capacity of a created thing can be understood in two ways.
The first is according to its natural potency, which pertains to its seedlike principle. In this respect, God does not leave empty any capacity of a created thing, generically speaking, although the capacity of some particular created thing may not be fulfilled, due to some impediment.
The second is according to its obediential potency, whereby anything created is able to become what God wills it to be. And in this respect, in human nature there is a capacity for this dignity: that of being assumed into the unity of the divine [Second] person. Nor must every capacity like this be fulfilled, just as God need not do whatever he is able to do, but rather what befits the order established by his wisdom.”
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distinction 3, quest. 2, art. 1, Whether the Virgin actively contributed anything toward Christ’s conception, Reply to obj. 1
“In Christ’s conception there were two miracles: one that a woman conceived God, and another that a virgin begot a child.
As to the first, then, the Blessed Virgin was involved in the conception only according to an obediential potency, and yet one much more remote than was the man’s rib as that from which the woman was formed. Now, in such matters the act and the potency toward the act are given together, as far as this may be said to be possible.
But as to the second miracle, the Virgin did have a passive potency, although a natural one, which could be brought into act by a natural agent. Whence, as to the first he [Lombard] says, ‘a power receptive of the Word of God’; but as to the second he says, ‘but at the same time a power to beget the Word of God’. For the power of the Holy Spirit brings both potencies into act.”
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bk. 4
distinction 8, quest. 2, art. 3, Reply to obj. 4
“No creature can do those things that are above nature as principal agent; however, it can cause a motion by uncreated power as instrumental agent: for as there is an obediential potency in creation, so that whatever the Creator has disposed happens in it, thus also so that it happens by means of it, which is the definition of an instrument.”
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distinction 48, quest. 2, The Renewal of the World, art. 1, Whether there is going to be a renewal of the world, Reply to obj. 3
“God is said to have ceased from creating new creatures on the seventh day in that nothing has later been made that did not previously precede in some likeness in genus or species, or at least in seedlike principle or even as in obediential potency.
Therefore I say that the world’s future renewal did pre-exist in the works of the six days in a kind of remote likeness, namely, in the glory or grace of the angels. It also preceded in obediential potency, which was then implanted in creation for the reception of such a renewal by God as agent.”
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1600’s
Richard Baxter
A Second Admonition to Mr. Edward Bagshaw… (London: Simmons, 1671), section 56, pp. 139-40
“Edward Bagshaw, p. 18: ‘His own free-will has not the least power to receive the things of God. [1 Cor,. 2:14]’
Richard Baxter:
1. What not sanctified free-will?
2. What! not a receiving obediential power? A receiving power is a passive power (as it is strictly taken). Has a free-agent less power to receive grace than a marble to receive the engraving of the workman? Does no man ever receive grace? Or do they receive what they cannot receive? Has a man no more receptive power than a block or stone?
I know it’s said ‘The natural man receiveth not, etc.’ [1 Cor,. 2:14], that is, understands not, believes not, and loves not in sensu composito [in a combined sense]: But its never said that, ‘Our free-will has not the least power to receive.’”
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1700’s
Barthold Holtzfus
‘Theological Dissertation on Creation’ (Frankfurt: Steppinus, 1706), trans. AI Latin
“XIII. The matter from which, of the first creation, there was none, but the omnipotent Creator produced all things from nothing, either negative, which signifies a pure negation and absence of pre-existing matter; or privative, which denotes a privation or indisposition, and therefore matter indeed, but indisposed, unsuitable, and by its nature inept for the production of the term, in which only an obediential potentiality, or non-repugnance in order to the first cause, acting with infinite power, is given.
And the first, or immediate, creation [Gen. 1:1] was from negative nothing; but the second, or mediate, creation of the following days [from that which was without form and void, Gen. 1:2] was from privative nothing.”
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1900’s
Allan B. Wolter
‘Allan Wolter’s Conclusions respecting Reality, Proving God’ (1958), ‘Conclusions respecting Reality’
“41. Potency involves some imperfection if it is understood in the sense of subjective or objective potency (potential being) [see pp. 51-52] or of passive or obediential potency [see pp. 52-53]; but not if it is understood as: the possible is opposed to the impossible.
The point is plain from the definitions of these potencies; for all these potencies adduced before agree in that they express the capacity of receiving some real perfection, and so that which is said to be in this sort of potency is in itself perfectible and hence in some way imperfect.
Actual being on the contrary does not involve imperfection. The same must be said of the logically possible and of active potency¹ [that these do not involve imperfection].
¹ [The importance here is because the First Cause (i.e. God) has no passive potency, or capability to be acted upon or effected, but has all active potency, that is, to act upon others. This is not special pleading for God, but is plainly necessary for what a First Cause must be. See ‘On the Distinction Between Passive Power (Denied) & Active Power (Affirmed) About God’.]”
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2000’s
Edward Feser
Scholastic Metaphysics (Editiones Scholasticae, 2014), 1.1.3, ‘Divisions of act and potency’, p. 44
“…we can distinguish between natural passive potency and supernatural or obediential passive potency. A natural passive potency points to an outcome that can be realized given only a thing’s natural capacities, and can be actualized by some agent that is itself a mixture of active and passive potency. A supernatural or obediential potency points to an outcome that cannot be realized given only a thing’s natural capacities, and requires as an agent a purely actual divine cause. In human beings, potencies for eating, sleeping, walking, talking, thinking, willing, writing poems or doing science, and even coming to know the truths of natural theology and natural law are for the Scholastic all natural potencies; whereas the capacity to attain the Beatific Vision is an obediential potency.”
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‘David Bentley Hart’s Post-Christian Pantheism’ (2022) at Public Discourse
“Consider the laptop computer on which you might be reading this. There is an obvious sense in which it is complete all by itself, with its operating system, other software installed in the factory, built-in Wi-Fi capability, and so on. Yet it has the capacity to have added to it all sorts of new software and accessories…
Since software and accessories of the latter sort were not even in view when the computer was designed, they cannot be said to be ends for which the computer was made. All the same, they are ends that might be added to it, because it does at least have the inherent capacity to have such ends added to it.
This is analogous to the notion of an “obediential potency,” and it indicates the sense in which there is indeed a middle ground of just the sort Hart claims is impossible. In what Thomists call a state of “pure nature,” human beings would not have the beatific vision as an end to which they are directed, any more than a computer is oriented toward running some application that did not even exist when it was manufactured. But just as a computer does nevertheless have a capacity to have such applications added to it, so too are human beings made in such a way that an orientation toward the beatific vision might be imparted to them.”
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Historical
On Aquinas & Scotus
Zachary Seals
‘The Beatific Vision in the Synopsis Purioris: Its Medieval Context’ in Reformed Theological Review, vol. 82, no. 1 (April 2023), pp. 3-12
“…the similarities and differences between the conclusions reached by Scotus and Aquinas. Though Scotus became the standard reference point for discussions of intuitive versus abstractive cognition, this does not mean his account of the beatific vision fundamentally differed from Thomas’s regarding the vision of the divine essence.
Both affirmed that the intelligible species could not be creaturely or a created similitude to see the divine essence, both affirmed the necessity of the supernatural agent to elevate the created intellect, and both affirmed a sense in which the beatific vision is ‘natural’ in the creature.
They disagreed on how to define such a natural desire (with Aquinas claiming it is elicited and Scotus it is innate), the status of obediential potency (Aquinas distinguishing it from natural potency and Scotus conflating the two), the necessity of the light of glory, and whether what is natural should be measured merely by passive potencies.”
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Latin Article
1600’s
Rutherford, Samuel – 14. ‘By what sort of power may the good of the glory of God result out of sin [On the part of a sinning creature, by a power merely obediential, not formal]’ in A Scholastic Disputation on Divine Providence (Edinburgh, 1649), Metaphysical Inquiries, that may Perhaps bring forth a Measure of Light to the Doctrine of Providence, pp. 590-91
.
Historical
On the Medieval Church & Following
Book
Feingold, Lawrence – The Natural Desire to See God according
to St. Thomas Aquinas & His Interpreters (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia
Press, 2010)
.
On the Medieval Church
Article
.
On the Post-Reformation
Article
1600’s
Pascal, Blaise – Letter 1 in Pensees – The Provincial Letters in The Modern Library (d. 1662; NY: Modern Library, 1941), pp. 325-35
Pascal, a Romanist, relates a humorous, though sad and sick account of Parisian Jesuit Molinists who conspired with Dominicans (Thomists), through sophistry (through affirming the same term ‘proximate’, yet in different senses, while refusing to acknowledge or expalin the difference), to condemn a (Romanist) Jansenist theologian (who would not affirm the term ‘proximate’ without it being explained to him) over a doctrinal/philosophical point relating to the ability of man to keep God’s commandments proximately, though the end shows all were agreed that man could not keep the commandments without the merciful efficacious will of God.
.
Book
Seung Joo Lee, The Orders of Nature & Grace: Thomistic Concepts in the Moral Thought of Franciscus Junius (1545–1602) Ph.D. diss. (Vrije Universiteit, 2021)
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Latin
Articles
1600’s
Voet, Gisbert – Select Theological Disputations (1669), vol. 5
On Subsequent Grace, pt. 1 716
. pt. 2 726
. pt. 3 733
. pt. 4 741
. pt. 5 749-63
See espeically the first paragraph of pt. 1 for a definition of grace as distinguished from nature. Subsequent Grace was a category used by Romanism in distinction from prevenient grace.
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Book
1500’s
Junius, Francis – Collation on Nature & Grace contra Puccius
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