On the Grace of Union, the Logos Assuming an Impersonal Human Nature, its Manner of Subsisting, Communication & Existence, & of the Personal Sustentation

“And the Word was made flesh…”

Jn. 1:14

“…and took upon Him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men…”

Phil. 2:7

“For verily He took not on Him the nature of angels; but He took on Him the seed of Abraham.”

Heb. 2:16

.

.

Order of Contents

Intro
Grace of Union  4
Difference between Assumption & Hypostatic Union  3
Assumption, & that of an Impersonal Human Nature  20+
Language of Addition  2
The Human Nature as Particular & Individual  8+

Christ’s Personality Not Properly Communicated to the Human Nature  16+
Manner of the Subsisting of the Human Nature  10
Manner of Christ’s Existence  12
“Unity of Person”  2
Personal Sustaining  5


.

.

Intro

It is sometimes argued that the Incarnation of Christ contradicts the unchangeability of God, for if a divine Person became a man in time, then some change must have occured in the divine Person.

Traditional Christianity, however, has held that God, by definition, is able to act on others without changing.  In the divine Logos taking to Himself a created, human nature, there is no change in his divine Person, but rather a human nature is brought into a new relation with Himself.  Hence by the Incarnation there is no change in the Divinity, but only a change in the creature.

As in every single point of theology, these things are far deeper than we realize, and in fact, are ultimately unsearchable in their depths.  Learn more about your glorious God here.


.

.

On the Grace of Union

Articles

1200’s

Aquinas – Summa, pt. 3

question 2, ‘Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate’

article 10, ‘Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about by grace? [Yes]’

article 11, ‘Whether any merits preceded the union of the Incarnation? [No]’

This article is very much worth considering though Aquinas also speaks of Christians meriting, which part can be safely ignored.

article 12, ‘Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ? [in a sense, Yes]’

question 7, ‘Of the Grace of Christ as an Individual Man’

article 13, ‘Whether the habitual grace of Christ followed after the union? [Yes]’

.

1600’s

Owen, John

pp. 227-8  in ch. 18, ‘The Nature of the Person of Christ…’ in Christologia  in Works  (NY: Robert Carter, 1850), vol. 1

p. 28 (4.)-(5.)  in Exercitation 26  in An Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews…  vol. 2  ed. W.H. Goold  in Works  (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1862), vol. 19, Preliminary Exercitations

van Mastricht, Peter – section 11, ‘2. The grace of union in the human nature’  in Theoretical Practical Theology  (RHB), vol. 4, bk. 5, ch. 4, ‘The Person of the Mediator’

.

Latin

Zanchi, Jerome – On the Incarnation of the Son of God, in Two Books, in which the Whole of this Mystery is Solidly Explained...  (Heidelberg: Harnisch, 1593), bk. 2, ch. 3

Q. 11, What consequences follow from the union 332 opposite things are to be predicated of Christ 333 names of the person and natures 334 the man, not the humanity is properly called God 337 what the grace of union is 341 Chemnitz and the Book of Concord do not badly define the communication of properties 347 in that which they err 348 how and by what gifts the human nature is endowed or deified 351 by which supernatural things 353 the habits of grace and the gifts of the Spirit which are given to Christ 354 places of Scripture, so Isa. 11, ‘The Spirit of Jehovah rests upon Him…’ explained 355 Lk. 2, ‘The child increased…’ 356 in what way He advanced 357 the sayings of the Fathers are not able to be taken of the real communication of divine properties 359 whether in the soul of Christ there was faith or hope 360 or love 362 of the threefold knowledge of the soul of Christ  362 whether by uncreated wisdom He saw God 364 whether He saw the whole essence of God 366 whether He saw all that is in God 367 whether the soul of Christ maintained equality with the wisdom of the Logos, reasons for the negative 371 it is not properly omniscient 372 the objection of the Ubiquitarians 373 whether through infused knowledge He knew all things 373 whether the infused knowledge rose above the angels 375 why habitual knowledge is so-called 376 the habitual knowledge of Christ is multifold 377 the kind of the acquired knowledge of the soul of Christ 378 whether He advanced or learned from angels 379 whether and what from men he learned 380 all He learned pertains to the perfection of the human intellect 381 of the power of the human Christ 382 what power and omnipotence is 383 howsofar Christ the man is omnipotent 384 the testimony of Lombard 385 the arguments of Thomas Aquinas 387 his response to that place, ‘All power is given unto Me’ [Mt. 28:18] 390 how great is the power of Christ’s soul 391 habitual graces, so they differ from the grace of union 393 of those testimonies of the Fathers, the simile of a grain ignited, the simile of the body and soul 394 this union made Christ the perfect Mediator 399 the office of the Mediator 401 Christ is the one Head of the Church 402 of the actions of Christ 405 what are the completed effects (apotelesmata405 in the one movement [agente] there are two principles of action 407 John of Damascus contra the Monothelite arguments 408 what energy is 409 the differences of the actions 411 the completed effects (apotelesmata) are threefold 412 the soul is the principle agent 413 miracles were of the divine nature, not the human 414-16 reasons for the double actions of Christ 418 exception one, according to Apollinarius 421 Christ-incarnate worked up to this point with the Father 423 exception two of the Monophysites 425 the plurality of actions does not infer plural persons 426 the simile of an ignited sword works against the Ubiquitarians 429 other arguments for the plurality of actions in Christ 432 the cause of the error of the Monothelites 437 their arguments 441 what theandric actions are and why they are so-called 444 how the actions of one nature are common to the other nature 448,455 the words of Leo, ‘Each nature works with the other in common,’ this is rightly explained contra the Ubiquitarians 457 Christ is the natural Son as God and man 462 Mary is the God-Bearer 464 from what is the efficacy of the blood of Christ? 465

Q. 12, Of what they [Ubiquitarians] call ‘real communication’ 466 what communication is and in what ways it occurs 467 properties, essentials, naturals or personals 472, which properties may be communicated: not personal but natural ones 472 the true state of the controversy 475 Ubiquitarians concede things out of which they are convicted 477 they are Monothelites 480 they contradict themselves grossly 480 a real communication is everted, the first argument: because it is not given in Scripture 483 by what sort of sayings they seek to confirm Ubiquity 484, they are examined, so Jn. 1, ‘the Word was made flesh’ 485 the hypostatic union does not infer such a communion 488 Jn. 17, ‘Glorify Me with that glory…’ 490 the interpretation of Augustine 492 of Cyril, to glorify through the glory to be revealed 495 a twofold glorification of Christ 495 Col. 2, ‘In whom dwells all the fulness of the Deity bodily’ 497 the simile of a glowing iron 500 ‘In whom are all the treasures of wisdom…’ 502 Mt. 28, ‘All power is given unto Me’ 506 2 Cor. 10, ‘the weapons of our warfare are mighty’ 512 a certain grace of union and certain habitual grace has been given to Christ 515 Jn. 5, ‘Has given Him power to execute judgment because He is the Son of Man’ 518 places on the anointing of Christ 520 Jn. 5, ‘and I work with the Father simultaneously’ 524 Jn. 5 on the resuscitation of the dead 527, the proper life of God is not communicated to the flesh of Christ 530 multifold-life is in Christ 532 vivification is attributed to each nature, but in a diverse respect 536 Jn. 6, ‘He who eats my flesh has life’ 540 1 Jn. 1, ‘The blood of Christ cleanseth us from sins’ 542 Mt. 9, ‘But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power to forgive sins 544 places on the exaltation of Christ, so sitting at the right hand 546 the judgment of Chemnitz 546 that sitting is unto nothing according to the Ubiquitarians 549 what sitting (the session) is, is explained out of Heb. 1 and other places 553 the judgment of John of Damascus on the sitting (session) 558 the false consequences of the Ubiquitarians shown forth 560 the inconstancy of Chemnitz & others 563 of what sort the glory of Christ was in Mt. Tabor [the mount of Transfiguration] 567 places on the vision of God and Christ, so Jn. 14, ‘Who sees me sees the Father’ 568 of the worship of the man-Christ 571 the second argument against the Ubiquitarians from the testimonies of the Fathers 576 Chemnitz alleges Fathers for himself, but perversely 578 his scope, defects and frauds 582-87 predications of Christ proper or improper 589 communion is a unity, not a real communication 592 the testimony of Leo evidenced 594 whether all given to Christ in time are given to the humanity 597 the 6th [Ecumenical] Synod and the sayings of Justin, Cyril, Athanasius, Sophronius against the Ubiquitarians 606 the Ubiquitarians badly cite the 6th Synod and its fathers, Athanasius, Euphem., Sophronius 609 the 7th Synod 612 Justin 613 of the coming in of Christ with the closed doors 618,671,716,724,729,743 Tertullian 620 Origen 621 of the simile of the glowing iron 624 the judgment of Basil on it, and why it was used by him [pp. 626-39 are repeated after p. 629] 630 the judgment of John of Damascus on this simile 638 the judgments of Athanasius and Cyril on the same 640 the saying of Esuebius of Caesarea 647 a man so is said to have been deified 652,694 Athanasius to Arius (and in another place he condemns the Ubiquitarians) does not support 656663 Eustath. 668 Hippolytus 669 Amphiloch. 670 Cyprian 671 Hilary on the glory of Christ, Jn. 17 674 Emisen., Didymus, Gregroy of Nyssa 689 Basil 691 Gregory of Nazianzen 693 Epiphanius 698 is opposed to the Ubiquitarians [after p. 707, pp. 704-07 are repeated] 709 the heresies of the Dimaeritites on ubiquity 710 Ambrose is the enemy of ubiquity 710 Jerome 716 Augustine 719 Chrysostom and Theophylact 725,729 Ecumenius and Aretius 727 Cyril opposes the ubiquitarians and is explained [after p. 729, pp. 716-29 repeats] 730 Paul Emisen 766 Theodoret 768 Primas. 776 Leo the Great 778 Vigilius 786 Cassiodorus 787 Sedulius, Nicephorus 788 the Golden Chain 788 Severian. 788 the Agnoets which were 789 Gregory the Great 789 Bernard 790 John of Damascus is examined 791 the third argument: a real communication fights with the Scriptures, it is proved by multiple testimonies, so on the union 811 of the properties of the natures, of actions 819 of the passion 822 the fourth argument is from the consensus of the Fathers against a real communication 828 proofs out of the 6th Synod 828 by Justin, Tertullian, Origen, Basil, Cyril 829 Eusebius, Athanasius 830 Ambrose 834 Cyril 834 Theodoret 837 Leo 838 Vigil 842 John Damascus 844 Fulgentio 855 Ignatius 862 Irenaeus 863 Clement of Alexandria, Severian, Eustathio 864 Epiphanius 865-75 Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory Nyssa, Didymus of Alexandria, Jerome, Cassiodorus, Gregory, Niceta, Bede, Gelasius, Justin, Lombard, Thomas, Bonaventura


.

.

On the Difference Between the Assumption & the Hypostatic Union

Quote

James Dolezal

’Neither Subtraction, Nor Addition: The Word’s Terminative Assumption of a Human Nature’  Nova et Vetera, vol. 20, no. 1  (Winter, 2022), fn. 10.

“It should be noted that assumption and hypostatic union are not the same thing.  Assumption speaks of the action in the agent assuming and the passion in the patient assumed.  Union implies the relationship that follows from this. To be united may be said equally of the divine and human natures in the incarnate Word; but to assume actively is said only of the Word’s divine nature, and to be assumed is said only of the human nature.  It cannot be said of the Word’s divinity that it is assumed, though it can be said that it is united.

Thus, assumption and hypostatic union do not have the same meaning.  Assumption, considered actively and passively, is what establishes the hypostatic union as a consequence.”

.

Articles

Aquinas – Summa, pt. 3, question 2, ‘Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate’, article 8, ‘Whether Union is the Same as Assumption? [No]’

Owen, John – pp. 225 (bot) – 226  in ch. 18, ‘The Nature of the Person of Christ…’  in Christologia  in Works  (NY: Robert Carter, 1850), vol. 1

.

Latin

Martinius, Matthew –  VII, ‘In What Way to Unite & to Assume Differ’, p. 578  in pt. 1, tract 1, ch. 11, The doctrine of the personal union of two natures in Christ, collected in 20 theses, is explained’  in A Theology on the Singular Person of our Lord Jesus Christ in Two Natures…  (Bremen, 1614)


.

.

On the Assumption of the Logos, & that of an Impersonal Human Nature

Articles

1600’s

Ames, William – sections 16-20  of ch. 18, ‘The Person of Christ, the Mediator’  in The Marrow of Theology  trans. John D. Eusden  (1623; Baker, 1997), p. 130

Riissen, Leonard – ch. 11, ‘Christ’, Controversies 1-2, pp. 115-6  in A Complete Summary of Elenctic Theology & of as Much Didactic Theology as is Necessary  trans. J. Wesley White  MTh thesis  (Bern, 1676; GPTS, 2009)

Owen, John – pp. 224-26  in ch. 18, ‘The Nature of the Person of Christ…’  in Christologia  in Works  (NY: Robert Carter, 1850), vol. 1

Turretin, Francis – Question 6, ‘Did the Son of God assume human nature into the unity of his person?  We affirm against the Socinians’  in Institutes of Elenctic Theology  ed. James Dennison, Jr.  (P&R), vol. 2, 13th Topic, pp. 310-17

van Mastricht, Peter – Theoretical Practical Theology  (RHB), vol. 4, bk. 5

ch. 4, ‘The Person of the Mediator’

Exegetical Part, section 2, C

Dogmatic Part

section 3, ‘There are two natures in the one person of the Mediator’

section 7, ‘Regarding the hypostatic union, these are explained: 1. Its nature’

section 8, ‘The uniting is explained, with respect to:’, ‘Assumption’

section 9, ‘This uniting does not argue:’, ‘2. Nor does this assumption imply any change in the one assuming.’

Practical Part

section 32, ‘5. It excites in us a just concern’, ‘Signs’

section 33, ‘6. It dissuades from various abuses. What they are’

ch. 9, ‘The Humiliation of the Mediator’

Exegetical Part, section 2, 2.a

.

2000’s

Mathis, David

‘Anhypostasis: What Kind of Flesh Did Jesus Take?’  (2010)  9 paragraphs  Mathis quotes Donald Macleod and Heinrich Heppe.

‘Enhypostasis: What Kind of Flesh Did the Word Become?’  (2010)  9 paragraphs  Mathis quotes Donald Macleod and Fred Sanders.

Not everything in this article is recommended; compare the material on this webpage from the Post-Reformation era.

Dolezal, James – ’Neither Subtraction, Nor Addition: The Word’s Terminative Assumption of a Human Nature’  Nova et Vetera, vol. 20, no. 1  (Winter, 2022)  23 pp.

Dolezal has written numerous works on divine simplicity, and has been a reformed baptist pastor as well as a professor of Church history, Trinitarian theology and philosophy.

“This accusation [of incoherency against classical theism] is plausible so long as one is compelled to hold either that the divine Word subtracted something from Himself in assuming a human nature or added something to Himself.  But contrary to widespread recent opinion, subtraction and addition are not the only options.

Thomas Aquinas, among others, repudiates both these approaches, expounding instead a doctrine of terminative assumption.  Termination eludes the liabilities of subtraction and addition by requiring neither privation of being nor passive potency in the divine Word in order to account for his becoming man.”

Those who have held to the incarnation of Christ by way of subtraction of certain attributes of his deity, are known at kenotists, holding to kenosis, which is heresy.  Those seeking to uphold orthodoxy have often upheld an incarnation by way of addition.  Dolezal, with some reformed orthodox support, argues against, at least, a certain form of metaphysical addition.  However, in appearing to exclude and disaprove of all language of addition, we do not believe he is wise.

He follows Aquinas in particular in arguing for another option, that of a terminative assumption:

Since drawing to oneself, and thereby supplying subsistence to that which is drawn, necessitates neither divestment nor augmentation, the Word does not subtract or add anything to himself in his assumption of a human nature and so requires no privation of being or passive potency in order to become flesh.  Such are the fundamental claims of terminative assumption.”

Towards the end of the article, in making his concluding arguments, he follows, explicitly and only, Neo-Thomists.  The most helpful illustrations he provides (borrowed from Garrigou-Lagrange, a Neo-Thomist) are in that section, of a point terminating a line segment, and of an object terminating a line of sight.

Two criticisms are able to made of this article:

1. Dolezal defines “addition” very specifically according to one, and only one, metaphysical meaning, namely the divine essence being added to, as an essence, in the assumption.  This he (rightly) denies, but in doing so he seemingly, therefore, considers all language of addition with regard to the assumption to be illicit.

Peter van Mastricht is only one example of a major reformed orthodox theologian who was comfortable using the language of addition in a different sense with respect to the assumption (TPT, vol. 4, ch. 4, section 16).  What possibly could be a strict, metaphysical, definition for “addition” being appropriate to the assumption?  David Tamisiea explains from Thomas Aquinas in this article: ‘St. Thomas Aquinas on the One ‘Esse’ of Christ’  Angelicum, vol. 88, no. 2 (2011), pp. 383-402.

2. Near the end of Dolezal’s article, in support of his thesis, he quotes the Romanist, Neo-Thomist, Garrigou-Lagrange approvingly, saying that:

“Assumption is properly an action by which the human nature is drawn into the subsistence of the Son, so that it may subsist by his subsistence.  Hence this action not only produces in the human nature of Christ a relation of dependence on the Word, but communicates to it the personality of the
Word.”

It is no accident that Dolezal only quotes a Romanist to support this view of his, because the dominant view of the reformed orthodox, contra the Romanists and Lutherans, was that, while the Assumption is terminative in nature in a certain sense, yet the personality, or subsistence (or hypostasis), of the Word is not properly communicated to the human nature.  See this documented in the sections below on this page.

.

Quotes

1500’s

Zacharias Ursinus

‘Of the Office & Person of Christ the Only Mediator’  in A Collection of Certain Learned Discourses…  (Oxford, 1600), p. 244

“VIII. But this person of the Deity alone, which is called the Word, did so assume unto itself the nature of man, that both these natures from the time of conception and after do inseparably remain one person, and the mass of the human nature is carried and supported by the deity.”

.

Jerome Zanchi

H. Zanchius his Confession of Christian Religion…  (Cambridge, 1599)

Observations of the Same Zanchius upon his Own Confession, 12th Aphorism, p. 286

“How then was the human nature taken?  Surely, it was so taken into unity of the same person, that yet it is not made the very person: but rather exists in the person, is born and sustained of the person, and ever depends wholly upon the same.”

.

‘An Appendix to the Eleventh chapter, ‘Of Christ the Redeemer, or of the Person of Christ”, p. 354

“It is diverse and another thing, not to have beginning, and to subsist by a beginning: to die, and not to be able to suffer: yet, as they are both proper unto Christ, so are they both common, not unto him, but in Him.

For if we say, common unto Him: we must needs be urged and driven, to give and show some other, with whom the same should be common unto Him: which necessity of instance, cannot but incline to the impious opinion of Nestorius.

We therefore better and more catholically say, it is common in Him and not to Him: and so we say better, it is proper to Him, and not in Him.  Therefore it is proper to Him to die, by the nature of his flesh, which is mortal: and it is proper to Him, not to die, by the nature of the Word, which cannot die.”

.

1600’s

Johannes Maccovius

Scholastic Discourse: The Distinctions & Rules of Theology & Philosophy  (1644), ch. 11, ‘On the Person & Office of Christ’, p. 205

“9. In Christ, the person must be distinguished from the enhypostatic adjunct.

Person is only the divine nature.  For one should not think that the person of Christ is a kind of conflation of human and divine nature – as if the person was composed out of parts.  But because the divine nature, which assumed the human nature into the divine personality, is alone person, human nature is an enhypostatic adjunct.”

.

Voet, Gisbert

Tract 2, ‘Of the Person, Offices & States of Christ the Mediator’ in A Syllabus of Theological Problems… (Utrecht, 1643) n.p.

1. ‘Of the Assumption & Union of the Human Nature’  in I. ‘Of the Person of Christ the Mediator’

‘Of the Person Assuming’

“Whether the Person assuming is outside the nature assumed?  It is affirmed with a distinction.

Whether from this it follows that one Word is enfleshed and another is without the flesh?  It is denied.”

.

Subtitle II, ‘Of the Consequences & Effects of the Union’, ‘Of Christ the Theanthropos’

“Whether the human nature holds analogically the principle of a part with respect to the whole Christ, or more so as an adjunct?  The latter is affirmed.”

.

Samuel Clarke

Medulla Theologiæ, or, The Marrow of Divinity contained in Sundry Questions & Cases of Conscience  (London, 1659), ch. 29, ‘Questions & Cases of Conscience about Christ’, p. 294

“Objection:  If Christ as God-man be Mediator, then the divine nature subsisting in the relation of the Son, received the Office of Mediator, and consequently something may be added to God, but nothing can be added to God because He is perfection itself?

Answer: The divine nature received not the office as considered in itself, but in respect of its voluntary dispensation, as accepting of subsistence with the human nature, i.e. Christ received and sustained the Office of Mediatour, not as God alone, nor as man alone, but as God-man: the divine nature in respect of its voluntary dispensation: the human nature properly.  To the divine nature there is not anything added, only a relation: but to the human nature there is added a real change.”

.

Leonard Riissen

A Complete Summary of Elenctic Theology & of as Much Didactic Theology as is Necessary  trans. J. Wesley White  MTh thesis  (Bern, 1676; GPTS, 2009), ch. 11, ‘Christ’, p. 114

“§V. This Son was made man. The divine person assumed a human nature, lacking its own personality (persona), not a divine nature assuming a human nature or person, nor a person assuming a person.  Therefore, Christ remains only one person, a divine one (1 Tim. 3:16).

§VII. This union is not a conjunction of parts, like soul and body, but an assumption of the human nature into unity with the person without change, confusion, division, or separation.”

.

Historical Theology

Ferrara, Dennis M. – ‘Hypostatized in the Logos’: Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of Jerusalem & the Unfinished Business of the Council of Chalcedon’  in Louvain Studies 22  (1997), pp. 311-27

This article and the one below refute F. LeRon Shults, ‘A Dubious Christological Formula: from Leontius of Byzantium to Karl Barth’  in TS 57  (1996), pp. 431-46.

Lang, U.M. – ‘Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers, Protestant Orthodoxy & Karl Barth’  JTS 49 (1998), pp. 630-57

.

Latin Articles

1500’s

Zanchi, Jerome – in On the Incarnation of the Son of God…  (Heidelberg: Harnisch, 1593), bk. 2, ‘Heresies on the Incarnation of Christ are Refuted’, ch. 3

Q. 7, Of the order of the assumption 181 the conception was made in the virgin with consent [or knowingly] 182 Christ assumed to Himself a soul and a body simultaneously, but a soul immediately 184

Q. 8, Of the perfection of assuming the living body 188 it was not formed gradually 189 a twofold union of the Word and of the human nature (soul and body) was in Christ 191 the union of the soul and body proved 193

Q. 9, Of the mode of union 194 the collation of the union of the three persons of the Deity and of the two natures of Christ 195 the explication of the apostles of the mode 196 the Fathers are brought to more accurately explain from the heretics 199 what the union is, and how it is twofold, out of Nyssa, Bernard and Thomas 199 the dogma of Nestorius is refuted, that the union made was by inhabiting, assisting, affection, dignity, grace 203 the union made was not by conversion or comixture, contra Apollinarus, Eutyches, Dioscorus 208 the 6 reasons of John Damascus 211 the cause of the errors of Nestorius, Eutyches and the Ubiquitarians, that He is a quasi-person with the same natures 215 the whole Christ and the whole of Christ are distinguished by the Fathers 216,223 5 other arguments against Eutyches 216-17 the objections of Eutyches 220 of the simile of the human body and soul and of the natures of Christ, how far it ought to be used 222 how far the person of Christ may be said to be composit 224 of the worship of the human Christ 226 of the double will and double operating faculty of Christ contra Macarius and the Monothelites 232 the Ubiquitists are Monothelites 233 the arguments of John of Damascus against the Monothelites 234,247 the distinction of actions & properties does not divide the union 240-44 the will and energy is taken for the power or for the act 244 autotheleton [self-willing] was in Christ 245 as well as a human will besides the divine will 247 nor was one will conflated from the divine and human 250 objections of the Monothelites 254 the Paulicians are refuted 256 two other false opinions on the union 257 Christ put on flesh, but not simply as clothes 261,265 the simile of flesh and clothes explained 262 the union was not made by the mode of an accident 268 objections to the contrary are solved 270 the error of Brentius [a Lutheran] 272 the true judgment of the mode of the union 273 to assume into the unity of the person, what it means 275 the union was made atreptos (unchangeably), adiairetos (indivisibly), asugkutosousiodos 277-78 this is proved out of Phil. 2 280 and other places of Scripture on the Incarnation, as John 1, Heb. 2 & Col. 2 286 in what way the whole fulness of Deity is in Christ bodily 293 Col. 2 is explicated out of the Greek scholastics 295 the saying of Ecumenius that He fills all with the flesh is in no way for the Ubiquitarians 296 the creed of Chalcedon proves this mode of union and refutes the Ubiquitarians 297 the testimony of John of Damascus 300 Adiastatos [without division] what it means, contra Chemnitz 302 the testimony of Justin 303 the simile of the union of the soul with the body explained and accommodated 305 how insofar it is dissimilar 307 the impudence of the Ubiquitarians 308 the simile of Justin and others of primal light, the same of Emperor Justinian, Boethius, Cassian, Gelasius, [Pope] Vigilius, Fulgentius, Rusticus, Maxentius, of the Roman Church, of Lombard and the testimony of the scholastics 310 of Thomas Aquinas 315

.

1600’s

Polanus, Amandus – ch. 15, ‘On the Assumption of the Human Nature’  in A System of Theology  (Hanau, 1609; 1615), vol. 2, cols. 2366-2416

Voet, Gisbert – I. ‘Of the Person of Christ the Mediator’  in Tract 2, ‘Of the Person, Offices & States of Christ the Mediator’ in A Syllabus of Theological Problems…  (Utrecht, 1643)  no page numbers  Abbreviations

Table of Contents
I. Of the Person of Christ the Mediator

1. Of the Assumption & Union of the Human Nature

Of the Person Assuming
Of the Human Nature Assumed
Of the Mode of the Assumption, as far as the Order

Alting, Henry – Problem 10, ‘Whether the human nature of Christ, hence, from the first conception, was anhypostatic, devoid of a proper subsistence?’ [Yes]  in Locus 12, ‘Of the Person & Office of Christ’  in A New Problematic Theology, or a System of Theological Problems  (Amsterdam, 1662), p. 575

.

Historical Theology

On Reformed Theology in the Post-Reformation

Heppe, Heinrich – ch. 17, ‘The Mediator of the Covenant of Grace or the Person of Christ’, sections 3-9 & 13-20  in Reformed Dogmatics  ed. Ernst Bizer  (1950; Wipf & Stock, 2007), pp. 411-21 & 427-35

Muller, Richard – Dictionary of Latin & Greek Theological Terms  (Baker, 1985), pp. 35 & 103

‘anhypostasis’
‘enhypostasis’


.

.

On the Language of Addition

Quotes

Henry Jeanes

A Mixture of Scholastical Divinity, with Practical, in Several Tractates…  (Oxford, 1656), ‘There dwelleth in Christ all fullness’, pp. 146 & 149-50  Jeanes was an English presbyterian.

Durand [d. 1296] distinguisheth of a twofold composition: Hujus ex his [of this out of that], & hujus ad hoc [of this to that] (bk. 3, Distinction 7, question 3 [this distinction is from Aristotle]).

‘There is’ (says he) ‘a second kind of composition, and that is hujus ad hoc, and it is not so properly a composition of a third thing out of the things united, as an adjoining of one of the things united unto the other.  And thus the person of the Word after the incarnation may be said to be compounded.  For hereby, the human nature is added unto the person of the Word and unto the divine nature in the unity of the same person.’

But now, he also subdivides this composition, which he terms hujus ad hoc.  ‘For it is either by inherence of one thing in another, and such is the composition of an accident with its subject: or else by way of a supposital dependance of one thing upon, and relation unto another: so that the one should substantially inexist in the other, and the other should terminate the respect and dependance of the former, which inexists, and after this latter manner the person of the Word is after the incarnation compounded.  Because, whereas before, it subsisted only in the divine nature, after the incarnation, it by it’s subsistence terminated the dependance of the human nature.’  Thus he.

A second objection is taken from the completeness of the Word.  That which comes unto a thing already complete and perfect, comes thereunto only accidentally, and makes therewith only an aggregation, and not a substantial union.  But now the person of the Word, from all eternity, was most perfect, and complete.  And therefore the adding or coming of the manhood unto it, is not substantial, but accidental.

For answer:  The major is true only, when one thing is so added, and comes unto another, as that it pertains not to the same subsistence.  And thus a man’s garment is added unto him, and therefore united with him only accidentally; so that homo vestitus is ens unum tantum per accidens.  But now the manhood is so added, and comes unto the Word, that it is drawn, or assumed into a communion of subsistence with the word, and it’s divine nature.”

.

Isaac Ambrose

Looking unto Jesus...  (London, 1680), bk. 4, ch. 1, section 5, p. 129

“The fifth and last, is of the branch and tree into which it is engraffed; as suppose a vine-branch and an olive-tree: now as this olive-tree is but one, but has two different natures in it, and so it beareth two kinds of fruit: and yet between the tree and the branch there is a composition, not hujus ex his, but hujus ad hoc (i.e.) not of a third thing out of the two things united, but of one of the two things united or adjoyned to the other:

Even so Christ is one, but He has two different natures, and in them He performs the different actions pertaining to either of them: and yet between the different natures (the divine and human nature) there is a composition, not hujus ex his but hujus ad hoc, not of a third nature arising out of these, but of the humane nature added or united to the divine, in unity of the same person: so that now we may say, as this vine is an olive-tree, and this olive-tree is a vine: or as this vine bears olives, and this olive-tree bears grapes, so the Son of man is the Son of God, and the Son of God is the Son of Man: or this Son of Man laid the foundation of the earth, and this Son of God was born of Mary, and crucified by the Jews.

This similitude (I take it) is the aptest and fullest of all the other, though in some things also it does fail; for the branch has first a separate subsistence in itself, and losing it after, then it is drawn into the unity of the subsistence of that tree into which it is implanted; but it is otherwise with the human nature of Christ; it never had any subsistence of its own, until it was united to the person or subsistence of the Son of God.”

.

Peter van Mastricht

TPT, vol. 4, bk. 5, ch. 4, section 16

.

Richard Muller

Muller, Richard – Dictionary of Latin & Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology  1st ed.  (Baker, 1985), p. 251

‘proslemma’

“…an addition or acquisition; used by the fathers with reference to the human nature assumed by the Word.”


.

.

The Human Nature as Particular, Individual & Specific

“But now ye seek to kill Me, a man that hath told you the truth, which I have heard of God…”

Jn. 8:40

“Ye men of Israel, hear these words; Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you by miracles and wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you…”

Acts 2:22

“…the man Christ Jesus…”

1 TIm. 2:5

.

Intro

While Christ’s human nature, of itself, is not an individual person and has not its own subsistence (but rather is conjoined to and depends upon the eternal subsistence of the Word), yet nonetheless Christ’s human nature is particular and individual.

The difference is that Christ’s human nature (a human body and human soul) is a particular, individual thing, distinguished and individuated from other things, and must be, and yet it does not subsist of itself, as other things do.  Hence Maresius says that while Christ’s humanity is not a man suppositally, subsisting of and through itself (it depending upon the subsistence of the eternal Logos), yet it is a man specifically.

While more (Lord willing) will be added to this section in time, this was the view of reformed orthodoxy when it was commented on, it having been rightly received from ages past.

.

Quotes

1200’s

Aquinas

Summa, pt. 3, question 2, ‘Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate’

article 2, ‘Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?’

“Reply to Objection 3:  …Yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing.  Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole [of Socates, who has a suppositum].

And hence, too, this is signified by a ‘person’ being defined as ‘an individual substance,’ for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance.  Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word.”

.

article 3, ‘Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?’

“Objection 2:  Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a ‘particular substance,’ as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these.  Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of the Word.

Reply to Objection 2:  Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot [is, as joined to a person’s body].  So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the whole Christ, as He is God and man.  But the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.”

.

1500’s, Romanist

Francis de Sylvestris (1474–1528), a Dominican

Sylvestris, CG IV, ch. 43, printed in Aquinas, Opera omnia, Leonine ed., XV, 146a, as quoted in Richard Cross, Union & Communion, ch. 2.4

“It should be noticed (presupposing…  the opinion of Capreolus) that person adds to this singular humanity something positive in the genus of substance that is the final terminus and final completion (complementum) of a nature, that is signified by the noun ‘personhood’, and is what is intrinsically formally constitutive of a person in personal esse, just as a point is the ultimate terminus and the ultimate completion of a finite line.

Thus, although it is conceded that the humanity in Christ is singular, it is nevertheless not conceded that it is a person, because it does not have that ultimate terminus since it is impeded by the assuming Word.”

.

On the Post-Reformation

Heinrich Heppe

Reformed Dogmatics  (Wipf & Stock), ‘The Mediator of the Covenant of Grace’, section 7, pp. 416-18.  Heppe was in the 1800’s.

“The humanity taken up into the personality of the Logos is, then, not a personal man but human nature without personal subsistence, yet thought of in its full spirit-body essentiality and individuality.  This is why in the incarnation of the Logos it was not a new third thing that arose by the union of the divine and human natures.  It was the human finite mode of being that was added to the eternal and infinite mode of being of the Logos, by the human nature being taken up into His personal subsistence.  The Logos thus exists alike without and within the humanity of Christ.  The Logos is still pre-existent, the Trinity is still complete.  Christ’s human nature had hypostatic subsistence only by its being taken up into the hypostasis of the Logos.

…For the truth of the human nature is to be measured ‘by its matter, form and essential attributes’, and not ‘by its personality’.  Christ’s humanity is therefore to be regarded as a man not suppositaliter but specifically.–Maresius (IX, 23) expresses himself in exactly similar terms.

Hence Christ’s humanity is of course an individuum, an exposition of human nature in individual form.  It has real existence only in the person of the Logos, not in itself.–Zanchius (De incarnat. Filii Dei, p. 152ff.): ‘As a most perfect entity existent per se [through itself] the person of the Son of God drew to itself a rather imperfect entity, lacking any subsistence of its own to make it self-existent.’

The moment therefore ‘the Son of God assumed a true body with a true human soul, together with all the essential and natural attributes of both, and the defects as well, he is not therefore to be said to have assumed either a persona or an huphistamenon [a susbsisting person], but–a nature en atomo, i.e. existing in a fixed individuum, which however has never existed anywhere of itself except in the assumer.’ [so Zanchi]

Keckermann 315: ‘(Christ’s human nature is) an individuum distinct from the divine nature, though not a distinct person.  Concerning this thought we must first of all think accurately that person differs from nature, and so an individuum from a person, yet so that the human nature is not a person, but is meanwhile an individuum, or as the Logicians say, a first substance.

But some one may say: Every substantial individuum subsists per se; if therefore considered by itself Christ’s human nature is an individuum, it therefore subsists per se.

Answer:  Subsistence per se is sometimes opposed to what subsists in something else, and so human nature generally subsists per se, because it is a substance and not an accident, the property of which is to exist in something else.  But if subsistence per se means the same as separate subsistence, outside the union and support of a second things, then it is false to say that the human nature subsists per se.  It is sustained by the Logos to which it is united, so that apart from it it could not exist for a moment.’

So it must be said (Alsted 517) that: ‘He assumed not a person but a nature, and it considered as an individuum.  The reason for the former statement is that Christ’s human nature never subsisted per se but has always been an instrument enupostaton en to logo.’

So the Incarnation is not to be regarded as though by union of two different essences a new third one had arisen, but in such wise that the human mode of being was added to the eternal mode of the Logos by the assumption of the human nature into its personality without altering the latter.”

.

Richard Muller

Muller, Richard – Dictionary of Latin & Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology  1st ed.  (Baker, 1985), pp. 142 & 199

‘idiomata’

“proper qualities; the intimate attributes or properties of a thing that identify it in its individuality, i.e., that are proper to it.”

‘natura’

“…natura identifies the concrete substance (substantia, q.v.) of a species both in essence (essentia) and existence (esse): e.g., not merely humanitas or natura humana as the quiddity of human beings, but natura humana as the substance of a particular human being, such as that nature assumed by the person of Christ…”

.

1500’s

Theodore Beza

Two Very Learned Sermons of Mr. Beza, together with a Short Sum of the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper…  (London, 1588), ‘The First Homily… 1574’, pp. 36-7

“I affirm that such things as be proper to the Godhead may be attributed to man, though not to the manhood.  Wherefore this proposition is true: This man is God, or this: The eternal Word of the Father is man…

Wherefore, whether He be called man, He is yet notwithstanding understood to be God, or whether He be called God, He is like wise understood to be man.  But when we speake of the natures themselves, to wit, either the manhood or the Godhead, by these abstracted names there is nothing else signified or meant but the several natures in and by themselves.”

.

On Zanchi

Stefan Lindholm, Jerome Zanchi (1516-90) & the Analysis of Reformed Scholastic Christology  (V&R, 2016), p. 78

“…Zanchi accepts Damascene’s view of Christ’s human nature as an individual (in atomo), which underscores the independent character of the human nature…

Zanchi is content to claim that the human nature does not have independence, although being an individual; the human nature exists in another (in alio).”

.

1800’s

John L. Girardeau

p. 410 in  ‘The Person of Christ’  in Discussions of Theological Questions  (1905)

“Christ was not simply man, but a man, not simply human nature, but a human being.  But this man, this human being, had a personal subsistance in a divine person.”

.

Article

Medieval

John of Damascus – 1st paragraph of ch. 11, ‘Concerning the nature as viewed in species and in individual…’  in The Orthodox Faith, bk. 3  in NPNF2, vol. 9, pt. 2, pp. 54-55

.

Historical Theology / Philosophy

Quote on Boethius & Aquinas

Geddes, L.W. & W.A. Wallace, “Person (in Philosophy)”  in New Catholic Encyclopedia

“History.  The main stages in the evolution of the concept [of Person] are its early formulation by Boethius [d. 524], its adaptation by St. Thomas Aquinas [d. 1274], and its various refinements by later scholastics.

Boethius.  The classical definition is given by Boethius in his De persona et duabus naturis, where he teaches that person is “an individual substance of a rational nature” (ch. 3; Patrologia Latina, ed. J. P. Migne, 271 v., indexes 4 v. [Paris 1878–90] 64:1345).  Boethius uses the term “substance” in the definition primarily to exclude accidents: “We see that accidents cannot constitute person.”

The term “substance,” as Boethius understood it, can be used in two senses, one referring to the concrete substance as existing in the individual and called first substance, the other referring to substance conceived abstractly as existing in the genus and the species and called second substance.

It is disputed which sense of the term was here being used by Boethius.  It seems probable that he prescinded from the technical significations of first substance and second substance, but used the qualifier “individual” to make his meaning equivalent to that of first substance.  Individual, in turn, refers simply to what is undivided in itself; unlike the higher branches of the porphyrian tree, namely, genus and species, it cannot be further subdivided.  Boethius does not seem to attach any further signification to the term, but makes it a mere synonym for singular…

Thomas Aquinas.  The definition proposed by Boethius is not completely satisfactory as it stands, since the words taken literally can be applied to the rational soul of man and also to the human nature of Christ.  St. Thomas Aquinas accepted it nonetheless, possibly because by his time it had become the traditional definition.

The terms in which St. Thomas explained it, however, practically constitute a new definition. “Individual substance” becomes, for him, a substance that is complete, subsists by itself, and is separated from others (Summa theologiae 3a, 16.12 ad 2).  When the remainder of Boethius’s definition is added to this, there are five notes that go to make up a person:

(1) substance—this excludes accident;
(2) complete—the person must have a complete nature, and thus that which is but part of a nature, either actually or aptitudinally, does not satisfy the definition;
(3) subsistent by itself—the person exists in himself and for himself, being the ultimate possessor of his nature and all its acts, and therefore is the ultimate subject of predication of all his attributes;
(4) separated from others—this excludes the universal notion of second substance, which can have no existence apart from the individual; and
(5) of a rational nature—this excludes all supposits that lack rationality.

To the person, therefore, there properly belongs a threefold incommunicability expressed in notes (2), (3), and (4).  The human soul belongs to the nature as part of it, and is therefore not a person, even when existing separately…  The human nature of Christ does not exist by itself alone, but in another, i.e., in the divine personality of the Word; thus it is not a person.  Lastly, the divine essence, though subsisting by itself, is so communicated to the three Persons that it does not exist apart from Them; it is therefore not a person.”

.

Latin Articles

1500’s

Pezel, Tobias – Theses 4, 8 & 10  in Theses on the Hypostatic Union of the Two Natures in Christ & that which follows, the Communication of Properties  (Heidelberg, 1594)

Pezel (1571-1631) was German reformed.

.

1600’s

Keckermann, Bartholomaus – ‘The Canon on the Human Nature of Christ is: that it is a distinct individual thing from the divine nature, except that it is not a distinct person’  in A System of Most Holy Theology…  (Hanau, 1610), bk. 3, ch. 2, ‘On the Person of Christ’, p. 315

* Maresius, Samuel – Locus 9, ‘On the Person & State of Jesus Christ’, sections 23 & 28  in  A Theological Collection, or a Brief System of Universal Theology…  2nd ed.  (Groningen, 1649), pp. 116-18


.

.

Christ’s Personality Not Properly Communicated to Human Nature

Quotes

1600’s

Jeanes, Henry –  in A Mixture of Scholastical Divinity…  (Oxford, 1656)  Jeanes (1611-1662) was an English, clergyman and puritan minister.

p. 33

“But this communication of the subsistence of the second Person unto the humanity is not (as [Robert] Baron,Philosophia. Theol. Ancil., Article 12, and after him Mr. Barlow in the forementioned place, very excellently show) by way of real inhesion, or denomination, but only by way of sustentation: And this is no advantage unto the Lutherans’ communication of divine properties.

Look as when a subject does communicate itself unto its accidents by way of support, it does not hereupon follow that it inheres in them, or does denominate them.  So though the person of the Son do assume, receive, and sustain the humanity of Christ, yet it does not hereupon follow that the subsistence of the Son is formally in the manhood, or that the manhood is a person, as is proved at large by those two mentioned authors.”

.

pp. 134-6

“I lighted upon a passage in [the Romanist] Becanus (Sum. Theol. tome 5, ch. 7, question 3, p. 119) , that merits a little stay and consideration.  Besides that grant above mentioned, which the Orthodox make unto the Lutherans, he gratifies them farther, and yields unto them that the divine attributes are communicated unto the humanity, not only in the Person of the Word, but also in the very humanity itself: Howbeit, not proximè, immediately, and formally, but only mediately, consequently, and identically; for only the subsistence of the Word is communicated proximè, immediately, and formally unto the humanity in itself, and by it the humanity does nextly, immediately, and formally subsist.  But because that subsistence is really the same with the divine essence and attributes, therefore the divine essence and attributes are communicated consequently and identically unto the humanity, not that the humanity is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent by them, but that it subsists by them, as they are really one and the same thing with the subsistence of the Word.

A hint he had of this conceit it seems from Gregory De Valentia: For unto him he refers the reader, and the words which he relates unto are as follows:

‘Agnoscimus & subsistentiam, & etiam divinitatem at{que} perfectionem omnem verbi, naturae humanae communicatam esse uno quodam modo max∣imè reali, ut scilicet in personâ verbi subsistat, primariò quidem per ipsam verbi subsistentiam seu personalitatem, secundariò autem per Divinitatem etiam & perfectiones ejus, quae ab eâ subsistentia re non differunt’ (tome 4, question 2, punct. 3, section 3, p. 131).

‘We acknowledge that both the subsistence and also divinity, and every perfection of the Word, is communicated unto the human nature after one way or manner, that is most real: to wit, that it subsists in the person of the Word primarily, by the subsistence, or personality itself of the word, secondarily by the divinity also, and perfections thereof, which do not differ really from the subsistence.’

Thus you see, that both of them make no bones to affirm that the subsistence, or personality of the Word, is communicated unto the manhood of Christ, so that it denominates it to subsist properly in, or by the Person of the Word.

For confutation of this their opinion, I shall at present allege but two arguments out of [Robert] Baron against it (Philos. Theol. Exercit., pt. 1, article 12, pp. 55-56).

1. If the manhood of Christ subsist any manner of way, then it is a person, or suppositum: for what is subsistence here, but suppositality, and therefore it, and suppositum are reciprocated.

2. To exist in another person, and to subsist, are opposite manners of existence; for to subsist isesse per se, & extra aliud omne suppositum.  But the manhood of Christ does exist in the Person of the Word, and therefore it cannot be said to subsist.  If these men would have consulted their own Suarez, he would have rectified this their mistake, and have told them, how that usual saying, ‘The humanity of Christ subsists in the Person of the Word,’ is to be qualified, to wit, in regard of its termination unto, and sustentation by the subsistence of the Word.  For having propounded this objection, ‘Dices, humanitas Christi non subsistit proprie, quia non est in se, sed in alio,’ he frames hereunto this answer:

‘Respondetur, non subsistere, tanquam id quod subsistit: sed proprie verbum in illa subsistit, & illa dicitur in verbo subsistere, quia illius subsistentia terminatur, & quasi sustentatur.’ (on 3rd pt. of Thomas, tome 1, disputation 8, section 3, p. 231)”

.

Historical Theology

On Beza

Cross, Richard – 7.2, ‘Beza’s Response’, 7.2.1, ‘The Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union’  in Communicatio Idiomatum: Reformation Christological Debates  (Oxford Univ. Press, 2019), pp. 244-7

See especially pp. 245 (bot) & 246 (top), which cite:

Beza, Part 1 of The Response of Theodore Beza to the Acts of the Colloquy of Montbeliard, Published in Tubingen, 2nd ed. (Geneva: Joannes le Preux, 1588), p. 186 ff.

.

Latin Articles

1500’s

Daneau, Lambert

pp. 13-14, 22-25 & 28-29  of A Demonstration of the Antithesis, or of the Repugnance of the Repetition of the Theses & Doctrine of [the Lutheran] Jacob Andrea on the Person of Christ…  (Leiden, 1581)

On ch. 4, pp. 83-84  in An Examination of the Book on the Two Natures in Christ, of the Hypostatic Union of them & of Various Things which follow out of that Union by Communication, written by Martin Chemnitz  (Geneva, 1581)

.

1600’s

Piscator, Johannes – 9 Miscellaneous Questions, 8. ‘Whether it is Rightly Said that the Personality of the Son of God was Communicated to the Body of Christ?  [We deny]’  in Theological Theses, vol. 2  (Herborn, 1606-1607), p. 173

Polanus, Amandus – Period 3  in An Anti-Bellarminiana Collection:  Three Complete Periods of Private Disputations  (Basel, 1613)

Disputation 42, p. 336  Polanus affirms (a certain) communication of subsistence of the Word with the nature assumed.

Disputation 43, p. 337 (III.)

Disputation 46, pp. 344-5 (14-16)  14. he speaks to how we may speak of addition to the person’ 15. is on the manner of subsisting, which is improper, and on the mode of existence; 16. he acknowledges that there are two modes of existing and an improper subsistence, contra Bellarmine the Romanist.

p. 345 (20)  The mode of subsistence of the flesh of Christ is different than our subsisting, that is, better.

p. 346 (22-23)  That the communication of the infinite subsistence to human nature is only in a qualified way.

Martinius, Matthew – pt. 1, tract 1, ch. 11, The doctrine of the personal union of two natures in Christ, collected in 20 theses, is explained’, pp. 557-60 (IV-VI), 569-75 (V) & 601-6 (XVIII)  in A Theology on the Singular Person of our Lord Jesus Christ in Two Natures…  (Bremen, 1614)

Martinius was German reformed.  This is the most close, in-depth and detailed explanation and defense of the reformed view we have found.

Sachse, Karl – A Disquisition on the Essential Attributes of God, Infinite & Uncreated, None of a Finite & Created Nature by a Participative Communication, Against Balthasar Meisner  (Frankfurt, 1616)

Sachse (1558-1616) is listed as reformed by PRDL, though it is also noted there that this is uncertain.  Meisner (1587-1626) was Lutheran.

Sachse argues against the Lutheran position that the hypostasis of the Word is communicated to the human nature, and that the human nature properly subsists in the divine Person (though it is affirmed that the human nature subsists in the Word in an improper sense).  Meisner argues the Lutheran position in, Disputation 10, on the Communication of the Hypostasis (Wittenberg, 1619).

Baron, Robert – 12. ‘Whether the personal subsistence may be communicated to his human nature; and whether they rightly speak, who say that the humanity of Christ subsists everywhere through the subsistence; likewise that it exists everywhere according to his personal being.’  in Philosophy being a Handmaiden to Theology…  (1621), Exercitation 1, ‘On Being & Essence’, pp. 64-71

Baron (1596–1639) was one of the Scottish Aberdeen doctors who had been a teacher of philosophy at the University of St. Andrews.

Beck, Sebastian – theses 37-38  in On the Person of Christ, our Lord & Savior  (Basil, 1622)  12 pp.

Beck (1583-1654) was a professor of Old Testament and New Testament at Basil.

Alting, J. Henricus – Problem 39, ‘Whether the Personal Union is a Communication of the Subsistence of the Word & of All Essential Properties?’  in The Scriptural Theology of Heidelberg, vol. 2, Theological Problems: Theoretical & Practical (Amsterdam, 1646), pt. 1, ‘Theoretical Problems’, pp. 167-70

Wendelin, Marcus Friedrich – Vindicatory Theological Exercises for Christian Theology…  Opposite the Anti-Wendeliana Collection by Johann Gerhard & Other Festering Writings of Recent Lutherans Against the Orthodox…  vol. 1  (Kassel, 1652)

Exercitation 48, ‘On the Communication of the Hypostasis: the Orthodox Doctrine is Asserted & Defended’, pp. 683-706

Exercitation 49, ‘The Judgment of the Orthodox on the Communion of the Natures, Human & Divine, between themselves, is Defended & Asserted’, pp. 707-12

Wettstein, Gernler & Buxtorf – ch. 10.7, p. 33  of A Syllabus of Controversies in Religion which come between the Orthodox Churches & whatever other Adversaries…  (Basil, 1662)

Notice their close definition and denial of terminavit, contra Dolezal.

van Mastricht, Peter – bk. 5, ch. 4, sections 6, 19 & 21  of Theoretical Practical Theology (RHB), vol. 4

Heidegger, Johann H.

Bk. 2, Place 17, ‘Of the Person of Jesus Christ’, section 35  in The Marrow of Christian Theology  2nd ed.  (d. 1698; Zurich: Henry Bodmer, 1713)

Place 17, ‘The Person of Jesus Christ’, section 59  in A Body of Christian Theology…  (Tigur, 1700), vol. 2

.

1700’s

De Moor, Bernard – section 20, p. 793 (2.), 795 (2.) & 796 (d.)  in ch. 19, ‘Of the Person of Jesus Christ’  in A Continuous Commentary on John Marck’s Compendium…  (Leiden, 1761-71), vol. 3

De Moor, amongst others, cites Hunnius contra Menzer on the Form of the Union, Arnold’s Dissolution of Eckhard, and Heidanus, tome 1, pt. 2, pp. 529-32.


.

.

On the Manner of the Subsisting of the Human Nature

Quotes

On Thomas & Cajetan

Richard Cross, Union & Communion, ch. 2.4; Cajetan, ST III, q. 2, a. 4, § 1 (XI, 31b)

“I noted above the tendency of Thomists to stress the notion of composition in Christological contexts: in particular, composition from two natures…  The first of these is traditional, as we have seen, and Cajetan argues for it on the basis of Aquinas’s observation mentioned above that the one person has two rationes subsistendi, two ‘ways of subsisting’, by ‘subsisting in two natures’.”

.

1600’s

Alting, Henry

A New Elenctic Theology, or a System of Elenctics  (Amsterdam, 1654), p. 484

Deriving this from Phil. 2:7:  “Hence, the reality of a human nature abided in Christ even without personality.”

.

Gisbert Voet

Tract 2, ‘Of the Person, Offices & States of Christ the Mediator’ in A Syllabus of Theological Problems… (Utrecht, 1643) n.p.

1. ‘Of the Assumption & Union of the Human Nature’  in I. ‘Of the Person of Christ the Mediator’

‘Of the Hypostatic Union’

“Whether the union of the incarnate Word was made in the nature, that is, in the essence?  It is denied.

Whether it [the hypostatic union] is made in the Person?  It is affirmed.

“Whether it is made in the suppositum?  It is distinguished.”

.

Johannes Maccovius

Scholastic Discourse: The Distinctions & Rules of Theology & Philosophy  (1644), ch. 11, ‘On the Person & Office of Christ’, pp. 221-3

“45. The personality of the divine nature of Christ is by or in itself; the personality of his human nature is by assumption.

The reason is that the divine and human nature of Christ do not equally constitute the person of Christ, because this would be opposed to the eternity and immutability of the divine nature.  For it is impossible that something that
happened in time, constitutes the existence of something that exists from eternity.”

.

Leonard Riissen

A Complete Summary of Elenctic Theology & of as Much Didactic Theology as is Necessary  trans. J. Wesley White  MTh thesis  (Bern, 1676; GPTS, 2009), ch. 11, ‘Christ’, p. 114

“§VII.  This [hypostatic] union is not a conjunction of parts, like soul and body, but an assumption of the human nature into unity with the person without change, confusion, division, or separation.”

.

Francis Turretin

Institutes of Elenctic Theology  (P&R), vol. 2

Question 5, section 13, p. 309

“The consubstantiality (homoousion) of Christ with us consists in identity of nature and essential properties, but not in the relation of subsistence which was wanting to the human nature.  Therefore, the singular human nature of Christ was complete physically in its substantial being as to its integral parts, but not metaphysically as to the mode of subsistence.”

.

Question 6, section 5, p. 311

“Now although the human nature may rightly be said to be substantial with the Logos (enypostatos Logo) (because it was assumed into the unity of the person and is sustained by it, yet less accurately is it said to subsist with the subsistence of the Logos (Logou) because then the human nature would be a divine person.”

.

Article

Turretin, Francis – section 18  of Question 6, ‘Did the Son of God assume human nature…?’  in 13th Topic  in Institutes…  (P&R), vol. 2, p. 316

.

Latin Articles

1500’s

Beza, Theodore – pp. 74-6  of 3. ‘A Mild & Christian Dispute with Dr. Johann Pappus [a Lutheran], a Doctor of the Church of Strassburg [Germany], on the Hypostatic Union of the Two Natures in Christ & its Effects’  (1574)  in Theological Tracts…  (Geneva, 1570), vol. 3  Beza quotes John of Damascus for support.

.

1600’s

Scharp, John – A Course of Theology…  (Geneva, 1620)

p. 777 lt col, instance 2 & response
p. 779, lt col, top, Objection & Response

Maccovius, Johannes – A Theological Collection of all that which is Extant, including Theological Theses…  (Franeker, 1641), bk. 5, Disputation 5, ‘Of the Personal Union of Christ’

p. 211 (rt col bot)
p. 212 (lt col bot)

Alting, Henry

pp. 163-64  in Problem 36, ‘Whether because Christ is God & Man, He may be a Double Person? [No]’  in Theological Problems: Theoretical & Practical, pt. 1, ‘Theoretical Problems’, pp. 162 ff.  in The Scriptural Theology of Heidelberg, vol. 2  (Amsterdam, 1646)

2nd Calumny: ‘That we even deny the true humanity of Christ, in that the personality should be taken away from it’, p. 484  in ch. 12, ‘Of the Person & Office of Christ’  in A New Elenctic Theology, or a System of Elenctics  (Amsterdam, 1654)

A New Problematic Theology, or a System of Theological Problems  (Amsterdam, 1662), Locus 12, ‘Of the Person & Office of Christ’

Problem 10, ‘Whether the human nature of Christ, hence, from the first conception, was anhypostatic, devoid of a proper subsistence? [Yes]’, pp. 575-6

Problem 14, ‘Under which logical notion is the human nature of Christ in union with the Logos optimally conceived, whether as a part, an adjunct, or lastly as an instrument?’, p. 579

Maresius, Samuel – Locus 9, ‘On the Person & State of Jesus Christ’, section 29  in A Theological Collection, or a Brief System of Universal Theology…  2nd ed.  (Groningen, 1649), p. 118

Wendelin, Marcus Friedrich – section 9 & ff.  of Exercitation 48, ‘On the Communication of the Hypostasis: the Orthodox Doctrine is Asserted & Defended’  in Vindicatory Theological Exercises for Christian Theology…  Opposite the Anti-Wendeliana Collection by Johann Gerhard & Other Festering Writings of Recent Lutherans Against the Orthodox…  vol. 1  (Kassel, 1652), p. 688 ff.  Most of the sections to the end of the exercitation touch on the manner of subsisting.

Buxtorf, Johann – The First Theological Disputation, on the Form of the Personal Union of the Son of God with an Assumed Human Nature  (Basil, 1657)  12 pp.

Buxtorf (1599-1664).  Buxtorf defines the reformed view of personal sustentation on p. 11, with that of the Lutherans following.  At the end Buxtorf says he will treat the Lutheran view in another disputation shortly following, which is here.

Turretin, Francis – section 18  of Question 6, ‘Did the Son of God assume human nature…?’  in 13th Topic  in Institutes…  (NY: Robert Carter, 1847), vol. 2, p. 278


.

.

On the Manner of Christ Existing as God & Man

Intro

If the three Persons of God have one existence, then existence must not follow person, but the nature of a person.  This then is true for Christ’s human nature, especially, since it is created, it must also exist in a manner contingently like all created things, in contrast to the divine existence which is necessary and not in any way contingent.

Nor can the divine existence, by the simplicity of God, be separated from its properties, or attributes.  If the existence of the Son is properly communicated to his human nature, then the eternal attributes must be communicated to his human nature, which is destructive of Christ’s human nature.

The follows of Thomas tended to insist that Christ has only one existence, though Thomas can be defensibly interpreted as allows some form of two existences.  The reformed trajectory of Christ having two existences reflects the metaphysical tradition of Scotus.

.

Articles

Aquinas

‘Whether there is not only one being (esse) in Christ?’  in  Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 3, Distinction 6, Question 2, Article 2

This text, and the three immediately below argue that Christ has one being (esse).

Questions on Quodlibet, 9, Question 2, Answer 2

Compendium of Theology, pt. 1

210, ‘Exclusion of Two Supposita in Christ’

211, ‘One Suppositum & One Person in Christ’

212, ‘Unity & Multiplicity in Christ’

Summa, pt. 3, question 17

1, ‘Whether Christ is one or two?’

2, ‘Whether there is only one being in Christ?’

‘Disputed Question: Concerning the Union of the Word Incarnate’, article 4, ‘Whether there is Only One Being in Christ?’

Aquinas in this text, while arguing that Christ has one being (esse), yet then distinguishes that there is a “being following”, namely the being of Christ as it includes his humanity, which must be distinguished from his being as it is divine.  On the interpretation of this text, see the article by Tamisiea, who argues that this text and all those referenced above are consistent with one another.

.

On Aquinas

Tamisiea, David A. – ‘St. Thomas Aquinas on the One ‘Esse’ of Christ’  Angelicum, vol. 88, no. 2 (2011), pp. 383-402  Published by the University of St. Thomas Aquinas

In the first four of the Aquinas articles above, from throughout his career, Aquinas argued that Christ, as Mediator, divine and human, has one existence (or esse).  In ‘Disputed Question: Concerning the Union of the Word Incarnate’, near the end of his career, Aquinas argues for and upholds the same position, but also appears to allow for a secondary, subordinate sense of an ‘existence following’ with regard to Christ’s humanity.  Historically this has caused a stir, such a notion being rather unpopular, or even condemnable.

While numerous theories have been put forward to harmonize this data in various ways, some dismissing that Disputed Question, Tamisiea’s article argues persuasively that the controverted teaching is consistent with Thomas’s larger teaching throughout his career, and that it even shows up in that material.  After introducing the issue and then explaining the terms and concepts, Tamisiea explains the rational and arguments for upholding that Christ fundamentally has one existence.  Existence is argued to follow Person rather than nature (however see Voet below).  Tamisiea then seeks to harmonize Thomas’s teaching of a subordinate ‘existence following’ with that.

“St. Thomas makes clear he does not mean to refer to a second supposital esse, but rather is speaking analogously of the divine esse inasmuch as it actualizes Christ’s human nature.  Thus, from the vantage point of the human nature, it does in a certain manner of speaking have its own esse or ‘act of being’ since Christ does begin to exist the instant it is assumed by the Word.  But, as St. Thomas puts it in the De Union and in his other works, truly and properly speaking, Christ has only one substantial esse, the divine esse of the eternal Word.” – 402

.

Quotes

On a Fundamental Problem of Thomism

Richard Cross, Union & Communion, ch. 5, p. 82

“But they [the Thomist Salamanca theologians of the 1600’s] differ from the Jesuits in at least one crucial way: they adopt the standard Thomist view on the relation between subsistence and esse [existence] (the nature–subsistence–esse ordering [that existence is logically primary to subsistence, or personhood], not the Scotist nature–esse–subsistence ordering of the Jesuits [that personhood is logically primary to existence]).

It is fair to say that the attempt to respond to the worry that the union logically presupposes the existence of the human nature formed the central problem for the accounts of all Thomists…”

[The problem here is that rather than the existence of the human nature being fundamentally dependent upon its union to the eternal Word, it would appear from the Thomistic paradigm that the human nature has some existence logically independent from that union.]

.

1200’s

John Duns Scotus

as trans. Richard Cross, Union & Communion

p. 14, from Ord. III, d. 6, q. 1, n. 26 (Vatican ed., IX, 240)

“A part coming to a whole does not give esse [existence] to the whole, but receives it, because it is perfected by the form of the whole.  For if it remained distinct, as before, it would not receive the esse of the whole, but would either have proper esse or none.

But the human nature united to the Word is not informed by the Word, but remains simply distinct.  Therefore it either has no esse [denied], or [a] proper [esse of its own, affirmed].”

.

p. 15, from Ord. III, d. 6, q. 3, nn. 74–5 (Vatican ed., IX, 257–8).

“The person of the Word subsists in two natures: in one, from which he has first esse, and in another (as it were adventitious) from which he has second esse, just as if Socrates were said in some way to subsist in humanity and whiteness.

But…  it is not generally held that the person of Christ is composed, speaking properly of composition, that is, from act and potency (as from matter and form), or from two potentialities (such as are those things which are called by Aristotle elements that integrate a whole nature).  Therefore the authoritative texts of Damascene, which speak of the person as composed, should be expounded by saying that both divine and human natures are as truly there as if they were to compose a person, but without confusion, so that there is no third thing from them, since they do not make a composition.”

.

On the 1300’s

Richard Cross, Union & Communion, ch. 2.4; Peter Auriol, in sent. III, d. 6, a. 2 (MS Sarnano, Biblioteca communale, E. 92, fols. 36rb–7va); Capreolus, Defensiones III, d. 6, q. 1 (V, 113b)

“…the Franciscan Peter Auriol’s (c. 1280–1322) view that the Christ’s human nature must have its own esse, since divine esse cannot actuate a human nature—a position reported in Capreolus…”

.

1500’s – 1600’s & 1800’s

Heinrich Heppe

Reformed Dogmatics  (Wipf & Stock), ‘The Mediator of the Covenant of Grace’, section 7, pp. 416-18.  Heppe was in the 1800’s.

“The humanity taken up into the personality of the Logos is, then, not a personal man but human nature without personal subsistence, yet thought of in its full spirit-body essentiality and individuality.  This is why in the incarnation of the Logos it was not a new third thing that arose by the union of the divine and human natures.  It was the human finite mode of being that was added to the eternal and infinite mode of being of the Logos, by the human nature being taken up into His personal subsistence.  The Logos thus exists alike without and within the humanity of Christ.  The Logos is still pre-existent, the Trinity is still complete.  Christ’s human nature had hypostatic subsistence only by its being taken up into the hypostasis of the Logos.

…For the truth of the human nature is to be measured ‘by its matter, form and essential attributes’, and not ‘by its personality’.  Christ’s humanity is therefore to be regarded as a man not suppositaliter but specifically.–Maresius (IX, 23) expresses himself in exactly similar terms.

Hence Christ’s humanity is of course an individuum, an exposition of human nature in individual form.  It has real existence only in the person of the Logos, not in itself.–Zanchius (De incarnat. Filii Dei, p. 152ff.): ‘As a most perfect entity existent per se [through itself] the person of the Son of God drew to itself a rather imperfect entity, lacking any subsistence of its own to make it self-existent.’

The moment therefore ‘the Son of God assumed a true body with a true human soul, together with all the essential and natural attributes of both, and the defects as well, he is not therefore to be said to have assumed either a persona or an huphistamenon [a susbsisting person], but–a nature en atomo, i.e. existing in a fixed individuum, which however has never existed anywhere of itself except in the assumer.’ [so Zanchi]

Keckermann 315: ‘(Christ’s human nature is) an individuum distinct from the divine nature, though not a distinct person.  Concerning this thought we must first of all think accurately that person differs from nature, and so an individuum from a person, yet so that the human nature is not a person, but is meanwhile an individuum, or as the Logicians say, a first substance.  But some one may say: Every substantial individuum subsists per se; if therefore considered by itself Christ’s human nature is an individuum, it therefore subsists per se.  Answer:  Subsistence per se is sometimes opposed to what subssist in something else, and so human nature generally subsists per se, because it is a substance and not an accident, the property of which is to exist in something else.  But if subsistence per se means the same as separate subsistence, outside the union and support of a second things, then it is false to say that the human nature subsists per se.  It is sustained by the Logos to which it is united, so that apart from it it could not exist for a moment.’

So it must be said (Alsted 517) that: ‘He assumed not a person but a nature, and it considered as an individuum.  The reason for the former statement is that Christ’s human nature never subsisted per se but has always been an instrument enupostaton en to logo.’

So the Incarnation is not to be regarded as though by union of two different essences a new third one had arisen, but in such wise that the human mode of being was added to the eternal mode of the Logos by the assumption of the human nature into its personality without altering the latter.”

.

1500’s

Theordore Beza

Lutheranism vs. Calvinism: the Classic Debate at the Colloquy of Montbeliard, 1586, ed. Jeffrey Mallinson & trans. Clinton J. Armstrong (Concordia Publishing House, 2017), ‘On the Person of Christ’, Dr. Beza’s Responses to the Theses, p. 248

“Finally, this rule prevails: in this hypostatic union, the natures themselves remain distinct, and each does distinctly what is proper to itself; accordingly the Word [o logos] is distinctly that which is Word [logos], and it does distinctly that which belongs to the Word [o logos].  Just so, flesh remains also distinctly that which is flesh, and accomplishes that which distinctly belongs to flesh.

Hence to make a long story short: just as we can say there are two distinct essences [ousiai], not separate, but nevertheless distinct in number, so there are also two wills and operative functions [energiai], and two operations [energemata] but one end purpose [apotelesma], just as the person is one only.”

.

Zacharias Ursinus

‘Of the Office & Person of Christ the Only Mediator’  (1562)  in A Collection of Certain Learned Discourses…  (Oxford, 1600), pp. 244  This was Ursinus’s disputation at the University of Heidelberg “for his degree of Doctorship”.

“VIII. But this person of the Deity alone, which is called the Word, did so assume unto itself the nature of man, that both these natures from the time of conception and after do inseparably remain one person, and the mass of the human nature is carried and supported by the deity.(k)

(k) Jn. 1, ‘The Word was made flesh.’  Col. 2, ‘In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally’; Heb. 2, ‘He took unto Him the seed of Abraham.’  Acts 20, ‘God purchased unto Himself the Church by his own blood.'”

.

1600’s

Amandus Polanus

Substance of Christian Religion…  (London, 1595), ‘…Now Concerning the Gospel’, p. 64

“The person of Christ, is one, because Christ is one…

There are two natures in the person of Christ, the divine, and the humane nature.

Therefore Jesus Christ is true God, and true man in one person. Rom. 1:3-4; and 9:5; 1 John 4:2; 1 Tim. 3:16; Col. 2:9; Heb. 2:14,16; John 1:1.”

.

Lucas Trelcatius

A Brief Institution of the Common Places…  (London, 1610), 2nd bk., ‘Of the Person of Christ’, p. 176

“Such as is the substance of everything, such also is the manner of being: but there is but one substance of Christ’s body: therefore but one manner of being, which is proper to bodies; that is, circumscriptive: not definitive, which is proper to the spirits, nor repletive, which is proper unto God.”

.

Gisbert Voet

Subtitle II, ‘Of the Consequences & Effects of the Union’, ‘Of Christ the Theanthropos’  in Tract 2, ‘Of the Person, Offices & States of Christ the Mediator’  in A Syllabus of Theological Problems… (Utrecht, 1643)  n.p.

“Whether Christ is one or two?  The prior is affirmed.

Whether Christ is able to be called a composite?  It is denied.

Whether a whole?  It is distinguished.

Whether there are two beings [esse] in Christ, or a twofold existence and individualness?  It is affirmed with a distinction.

Whether a twofold life?  It is affirmed.”

.

Johannes Maccovius

Scholastic Discourse: The Distinctions & Rules of Theology & Philosophy  Buy  (1644), ch. 11, ‘On the Person & Office of Christ’, pp. 221-23

“45. The personality of the divine nature of Christ is by or in itself; the personality of his human nature is by assumption.

The reason is that the divine and human nature of Christ do not equally constitute the person of Christ, because this would be opposed to the eternity and immutability of the divine nature.  For it is impossible that something that happened in time, constitutes the existence [subsistence] of something that exists [subsists] from eternity.”

.

Peter van Mastricht

Theoretical Practical Theology  (RHB), vol. 4, bk. 5, ch. 4, ‘Person of the Mediator’, sections 7, 21 & 28

.

2000’s

Brandon L. Wanless, Universality & the Divine Essence: St. Thomas Aquinas on the Unity Characteristic of the Trinitarian Persons  a Masters thesis  (University of St. Thomas, 2015)

“…for the human mind to catch a glimpse of that profoundly inaccessible mode of essential unity found only in the God whose essence, esse [existence], and supposit are identical…  that mode of existence that is beyond universality where, except for relation, all in God is really common and absolutely one.”

.

Articles

1600’s

Turretin, Francis – section 18  of Question 6, ‘Did the Son of God assume human nature…?’  in 13th Topic  in Institutes…  (P&R), vol. 2, p. 316

.

2000’s

Muller, Richard – Dictionary of Latin & Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology  1st ed.  (Baker, 1985)

‘ens’
‘esse’

.

Latin Articles

1600’s

Polanus, Amandus – Period 3  in An Anti-Bellarminiana Collection:  Three Complete Periods of Private Disputations  (Basel, 1613)

Disputation 46, pp. 344-5 (14-16)  14. he speaks to how we may speak of addition to the person’ 15. is on the manner of subsisting, which is improper, and on the mode of existence; 16. he acknowledges that there are two modes of existing and an improper subsistence, contra Bellarmine the Romanist.

p. 345 (20)  The mode of subsistence of the flesh of Christ is different than our subsisting, that is, better.

p. 346 (22-23)  That the communication of the infinite subsistence to human nature is only in a qualified way.

Maccovius, Johannes – bk. 5, Disputation 5, ‘Of the Personal Union of Christ’  in A Theological Collection of all that which is Extant, including Theological Theses…  (Franeker, 1641)

p. 211 (lt col bot & rt col bot)

p. 212 (lt col bot)

Turretin, Francis – section 18  of Question 6, ‘Did the Son of God assume human nature…?’  in 13th Topic  in Institutes…  (NY: Robert Carter, 1847), vol. 2, p. 278


.

.

On the “Unity of Person”

Quote

Westminster Confession 8.7

“Christ, in the work of mediation, acteth according to both natures; by each nature doing that which is proper to itself:[n] yet, by reason of the unity of the person, that which is proper to one nature is sometimes in scripture attributed to the person denominated by the other nature.[o]

[n] Heb. 9:141 Pet. 3:18
[o] Acts 20:28John 3:131 John 3:16

.

Article

Muller, Richard – Dictionary of Latin & Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology  1st ed.  (Baker, 1985)

‘unity of person / unitas personae’  in ‘persona Christi’


.

.

On the Word’s Personal Bearing, Sustaining & Inhabitance of Christ’s Human Nature 

Articles

1200’s

Aquinas – Article 7, ‘Whether the Union Itself is Something Created? [Yes]’  in Summa, pt. 3, question 2, ‘Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate’

.

1600’s

van Mastricht, Peter – bk. 5, ch. 4, ‘Person of the Mediator’, section 7  of Theoretical Practical Theology  (RHB), vol. 4

This is where van Mastricht postively defines the hypostatic union; it is highly recommended.

.

Quote

Zacharias Ursinus

‘Of the Office & Person of Christ the Only Mediator’  (1562)  in A Collection of Certain Learned Discourses…  (Oxford, 1600), pp. 244  This was Ursinus’s disputation at the University of Heidelberg “for his degree of Doctorship”.

“VIII. But this person of the Deity alone, which is called the Word, did so assume unto itself the nature of man, that both these natures from the time of conception and after do inseparably remain one person, and the mass of the human nature is carried and supported by the deity.(k)

(k) Jn. 1, ‘The Word was made flesh.’  Col. 2, ‘In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporally’; Heb. 2, ‘He took unto Him the seed of Abraham.’  Acts 20, ‘God purchased unto Himself the Church by his own blood.'”

.

Latin

Martinius, Mathew – VIII, ‘Whether the Union was something created? [Yes]’, pp. 578-9  in pt. 1, tract 1, ch. 11, ‘The doctrine of the personal union of two natures in Christ, collected in 20 theses, is explained’  in A Theology on the Singular Person of our Lord Jesus Christ in Two Natures…  (Bremen, 1614)

Buxtorf, Johann – p. 11  of The First Theological Disputation, on the Form of the Personal Union of the Son of God with an Assumed Human Nature  (Basil, 1657)

Buxtorf, Jr. (1599-1664).  Buxtorf defines the reformed view of personal sustentation on p. 11, with that of the Lutherans following.  At the end Buxtorf says he will treat the Lutheran view in another disputation shortly following, which is here.

Alting, Henry – Problem 13, ‘Whether the union is even the bearing and sustaining of the human nature in the Word? [Distinguished]’, pp. 578-9  in A New Problematic Theology, or a System of Theological Problems  (Amsterdam, 1662), Locus 12, ‘Of the Person & Office of Christ’

.

.

.

Related Pages

On the Person & Human & Divine Natures of Christ

The Trinity

On Divine Simplicity

Christ

On the Communication of the Properties of Christ’s Natures

The Grounds of Christ the Mediator Receiving Divine Worship

On the Doctrine of Appropriations

Images of Christ