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**David Pareus (1548-1622), Against Bellarmine: On the Grace of the First Man**

# On the Grace of the First Man

## *A Critical Explanation and Refutation of Robert Bellarmine's Work*

By David Pareus

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### Let the Errata be corrected thus:

- **Page 27, line 7:** for *adiungere* read *coniungere*.
- **Page 27, line 24:** read: *non potuit non esse gratus accepturus*.
- **Page 43, line 5 from the end:** *gratia bene*.
- **Page 47, line 7:** *Blaspheme igitur*.
- **Page 85, line 11:** *trahitur*.
- **Page 89, line 7 from the end:** *Si nec:* and on the following line *nihilominus: si bonum*.
- **Page 90, line 5 from the end:** *quis sit*.
- **Page 92, line 20:** *fuit ante*.
- **Page 104, line 16:** *dictum dico:.*
- **Page 115, line 18:** *Fretum*.

- **Page 122, line 20:** RESPONDEO.
- **Page 123, line 16:** after *iterum*.
- **Page 125, line 1 from the end:** *aeternum*.
- **Page 136, line 7 from the end:** *certissimos*.
- **Page 137, line 8 from the end:** *leges dude movet, & solvere conatur, sunt*.
- **Page 147, line 10:** *in integritate*.
- **Page 148, line 20:** *μορμολύκειον*.
- **Page 149, line 3:** *ignem*.
- **Page 149, line 13:** *Rupertus*.
- **Page 152, line 13:** *inquam*.
- **Page 155, line 7:** *quem*.
- **Page 157, line 14:** *Hacet*.
- **Page 157, line 21:** *inque*.
- **Page 158, line 5 from the end:** 3000.

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OF ROBERT BELLARMINE

A POLITIAN OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS, THEOLOGIAN & CARDINAL:

One Book

ON THE GRACE OF THE FIRST MAN

Explained and corrected.

LECTURE I. October 28, 1611.

**Preface to the Auditors.**

It is my intention, Auditors, having set aside for a brief time the ordinary interpretation of the Pauline Epistles, to unravel the fourth Tome of the *Disputations* of Robert Bellarmine, the Jesuit. I am undertaking to clean the Augean stables. For into this volume, as into a most foul sewer, that author, with huge effort and singular artifice, has diverted and heaped up the entire filth of theoretical Scholastic Theology—that is, of subtle, inane, and captious questions, definitions, distinctions, quibbles, sophistications, depravations, calumnies, and lies concerning matters of faith, against the salutary doctrine of the sacred letters and the orthodox faith of the Evangelical Churches.

I confess that I undertake this project against my own will, beyond my age and strength, and outside my ordinary profession. Your own vows and desires, Auditors, have imposed this province upon me. The reason you had for asking is deservedly the same reason I have

for assenting: for nothing is of higher or greater priority to me than to aid your studies and promote your interests.

Eighteen years ago, ROBERT BELLARMINE, an Italian, Doctor of Jesuitical Theology, wrote and published his *Disputations on the Controversies of the Christian Faith against the Heretics of this Time* (for so he maligns the Evangelicals), first divided into three Tomes, and afterwards into four. This is held by the Papists to be a divine and invincible work, by which the heresies have been uprooted and lie prostrate; they boast that the wounds of the beast have healed, and that their Babylon, which was once tottering and near to ruin, now stands unshaken and firm against the heretics. The author has won celebrity for his name among us, and immortal glory among his own; he has snatched the palm from all the associates of his flock, and from Pope Clement VIII he has duly earned the red hat and purple. For with such probability, such a semblance of truth, does he disguise and support the false and mostly impious dogmas of the Papists, and refutes and eludes the contrary truths with sophistries, that he has imposed upon not a few unwary readers, and has been the cause of voluntary apostasy for many ambitious minds, an occasion for passing from the Gospel to the Papacy, from Christ to the Antichrist. Thus that cyclical Disputator has triumphed among his own until now.

Several outstanding theologians from our side have opposed him with learned and solid writings, in which they have refuted his sophisms and rebutted the calumnies and lies, which are all too familiar for him to use against us. From the English, GWILHELMUS WITAKERUS was the first to take him on, followed by MATTHIAS SUTLIVIVS, JOHANNES REINHOLDUS, ROBERTUS ABBATTUS, and other most learned theologians, who have solidly demolished various parts of his *Disputations*. From the Frisian academy of Franeker, the celebrated theologian SIBRANDUS LUBBERTUS—whom I remember being honored with the insignia of the Doctorate in this our school twenty-six years ago—has, in not a few published books using the analytical method, wiped away the cosmetics of this Disputator and most skillfully dissipated the smoke. From the French, two most celebrated theologians, LAMBERTUS DANEUS and FRANCISCUS JUNIUS, have, in notes both learned and brief, shaken the armor of this Goliath not lightly.

But they will retort that these writers have achieved little by their writing; that Bellarmine's mindset (Φρόνημα) has been no more conquered than an enemy's castle should be thought overcome by one who has merely shaken the pinnacles of the towers and cast down a few roof tiles. They say that others, having attacked other small parts of the controversies, have only struck lightly. That in all the years that have passed since its first publication, no one has yet been found who has attempted to assail the whole of Bellarmine. And that everyone has deliberately abstained from and abhorred the fourth, irrefutable Tome in particular. Such are the triumphs of the Jesuits that are heard and read everywhere.

To these individual points I respond thus in brief: our writers, with God's help, have achieved more by their writing than the Roman Pontiff would wish or be pleased with. Our writers have not yet boasted of conquering and overthrowing the castle of the Antichrist, for whose gates this warrior delights to bear arms. For the hour of the destruction of Babylon, the great city, the great harlot, has not yet come, *whose flesh ten kings will devour and burn with fire, when God puts it into their hearts* (Apocalypse 17:16). But let them not say that scarcely the pinnacles of the towers have been touched, and only a few tiles have been cast down by our writers. The matter speaks for itself, and the Jesuits speak of it whenever they are among themselves. All the bulwarks of Babylon, its walls, all its ramparts, have been so shattered by the engines of the divine word, that its very foundations are shaken and disjointed.

So that now on all sides, with gaping cracks, all things give way,  
And, prone to fall, top and bottom hasten their fated ruins.

Are not the principles of the Roman superstitions the apocryphal books, the feigned traditions of the Apostles, the decrees of Pontiffs, the edicts of Councils, which Bellarmine contends are of equal authority with the written word of God in his four books *On the Word of God* and two books *On Councils*? This vanity has been solidly confuted by WITAKERUS, SIBRANDUS, DANEUS, and others. Is not the foundation of Roman power the succession of the Roman Pontiff to the seat of Peter, whom he claims was designated by Christ as the Monarch of the Church, that he sat as the first Pontiff in Rome, attached the monarchy to his see, and left it attached for his successors, and that from this the Roman Pontiff has the absolute right to create, depose, exalt, and cast down bishops, princes, kings, and emperors? The same Bellarmine plausibly contends for this in his six books *On the Roman Pontiff*. But that this pretended see of Peter, this feigned succession of the Pontiff, this monarchy, this fabricated jurisdiction in spiritual and temporal matters, and that the Pontiff occupies the seat of the Antichrist in the temple of God and is the Antichrist, has been evidently demonstrated by the same WITAKERUS, SIBRANDUS, DANEUS, CHAMIERO, SUTLIVIOUS, ABBATTUS, POYNET, and others.

Bellarmino, in his entire second Tome, has argued that the Catholic Church on earth is a university of particular churches, arranged by Christ's institution after the manner of a terrestrial kingdom. Its head and King is the Roman Pontiff; its upper members are the clergy and monks; its inner members are the laity—Emperors, Kings, Princes, nobles, citizens, and farmers. He argues that in purgatory there are souls who have died without mortal sin, but not without venial sin, to be redeemed from there by the benefit of Papal indulgences from the treasury of the Church, amassed from the merits of Christ, Mary, and the living and dead saints. In heaven, there are the spirits of the departed, canonized by the Pontiff, to be cultivated and adored with religious veneration as our mediators with God.

He has argued, I say, that the Catholic Church is thus constituted in earth, purgatory, and heaven. But this masked Church, with its head, members, parts, purgatory, and impious cult, these same writers have so utterly routed that there remains no great question as to whether our writers have achieved anything by writing against Bellarmine. The Jesuits would be ashamed of such empty trifles, if they had not already lost all shame.

That those men, and others who wrote against the Papacy before them, have achieved a great deal, Bellarmine himself may come forth as a witness, admitting, in his third book *On the Roman Pontiff*, chapter 22, that since the Pope began to be called the Antichrist by us, his empire has not only not grown, but has ever more and more decreased.

As to why the entire hodgepodge of Bellarmine has not yet been refuted by a single person, I do not know whether I should ascribe it to the negligence of our Princes or of our Theologians. If they had concerted their plans in a timely manner, as they ought to have, and distributed the work, we would long ago have accomplished what is desired. Be that as it may, our adversaries have nothing to wonder at or boast about. Bellarmine, excusing his Pontiffs before Clement VIII in the preface to his fourth Tome, addressed to the Pontiff, for the fact that it was not given to any of them to overthrow the heresies (as if Pope Clement VIII and Cardinal Bellarmine have now overthrown them all!), transfers the cause of this to their advanced age or their affected health. We can more rightly adduce the same reason: that for most of our Theologians, besides their various occupations and distractions, infirm health, advanced age, and a life cut short too quickly by death have been an impediment to completely overthrowing Bellarmine's quibbles, heresies, and trifles. But what of it? Bellarmine spent a minimum of twenty-two years compiling his work, writing down, arranging, and dictating materials compiled from the registers of his associates and the desks of their colleges. Is it a wonder, then, that within fewer years, this warrior has not yet been laid entirely prostrate by some one person destitute of such great resources?

Although I have no doubt that Doctor SIBRANDUS, whom the Lord has preserved unharmed to this day as one of the first antagonists, has long since completed his *Theological-Scholastic Disputations* against Bellarmine, which he happily began twenty years ago, or has brought them nearly to their conclusion. Indeed, I believe he would have published them in their most finished form long ago, had not the heresy that has been secretly creeping about everywhere—against whose author, Socinus, he recently published a most erudite Commentary—as well as the unfortunate Arminian schism, brought delays. Therefore, let the adversaries cease to boast that the fourth Tome has been irrefutable thus far, and that there has been no one to touch it. For those strong athletes who now rest in the Lord would certainly not have shrunk from refuting it, if a longer enjoyment of the light had been granted to them. Indeed, Doctor SIBRANDUS would undoubtedly have given it to us fully refuted, had not Satan thrown in his path the obstacles I mentioned.

Meanwhile, the studious youth lack this so necessary refutation. And they desire, not without reason, to know what should be thought of Bellarmine's sophistries concerning the doctrine of the grace of the first man, the first sin, original sin, grace, free will, and the concurrence of both; the uncertainty of predestination, of grace, of faith, of justification, of perseverance; of habitual, actual, formal, and material justification, and quibbles of that kind. They want to know what solidity there is in the atrocious calumnies against our Doctors concerning the cause of sin, the providence of God, free will, justifying faith, imputed righteousness, etc. These things, Auditors, I confess, were no light reason for you to ask, and for me to assent, so that (having obtained permission from the honorable Dean) I should undertake for your sake this work of unraveling these Disputations—a work by no means light or pleasant, but indeed thorny and troublesome.

Another cause is added, no less serious: that new, but not newly erroneous, theology which by the cunning of certain Doctors is now being brought back everywhere into the Evangelical Churches and Schools, is colored and defended by quibbles drawn from this very fourth Tome of Bellarmine, concerning original sin, Grace and free will, conditional Predestination, faith, etc., as will be seen in our progress. It is therefore of interest for the studious youth to know and have the means of dissecting the Pelagian sophistries of Bellarmine, lest they be imprudently ensnared by the embellished writings of those Doctors, and being ensnared, be led astray, and being led astray, be subverted.

I have explained the reasons for my undertaking. To approach it more closely, I would not have you, Auditors, expect lengthy refutatory Commentaries from me. I will not treat of Commonplaces, nor will I propose questions on topics to be debated on both sides. I will follow in Bellarmine's footsteps most strictly, so that I may demonstrate to you by the analytical method what truth and falsehood each chapter contains, assert true opinions and reasons, and refute false ones. And this I will do with as much brevity as is permissible, so that generally I may absolve single chapters, and sometimes even two, in single lectures, and the whole (which numbers 384 chapters) within the course of one year, if the Lord extends to us our strength and life for so long.

FIRST, however, you must be advised in general about the method of disputation which Bellarmine observes and which we shall follow. It is twofold. ONE is Demonstrative. By this, he asserts his own cause as best he can, diligently gathering everything that serves to establish the Papacy. Baldwin Junius, a Minorite monk, recently compiled this into a compendium under the name *Demonstration of the Catholic Faith*. The other is Elenctic. By this, he refutes and eludes the doctrine of the Evangelicals, whom he everywhere accuses of being heretics, in such a way that he spares neither the holy Fathers, nor Popes, nor Councils, nor Scholastics, nor Pontifical Doctors, nor even his fellow Jesuits; he wields his rod equally against anyone, so that all may rise for Bellarmine alone.

In both methods, he fights for his cause and against us with five kinds of weapons. The first kind are the testimonies of SCRIPTURE. He uses these very sparingly, and only according to the old Latin version, which is generally corrupt, and for the most part from the Apocryphal books, understood according to the sense of certain Councils, Pontiffs, Fathers, and his own. Since, however, he feels he has little support in these, in the second place he implores the decrees of COUNCILS. In the third place, he summons the edicts of the Roman PONTIFFS to his aid, attributing to them certainty and authority equal to the Canonical Scriptures (Book 2, On Councils, chap. 12). In the fourth place, he accumulates the authorities of the FATHERS with such a heaping up that he sometimes fills almost entire books with them. Lastly, he opposes us with ARGUMENTS drawn from reason.

For us, who are preparing an ANTIDOTE for the reader, our primary care will be in vindicating the testimonies of Sacred SCRIPTURE to their own integrity. We will not dwell on scrutinizing the authorities of Councils, Pontiffs, and Fathers, because this kind of proof, from human testimonies, is of little strength in Sacred Theology, although our adversary has filled more than half of his Disputations with it. The books of the COUNCILS, as Bellarmine admits (Book 1, On Councils, chap. 1), are considered most corrupt, teeming with many faults; and even if they were most complete, they cannot be a principle of faith, since it has been demonstrated by our Doctors that very many general and particular councils, both Greek and Latin, have erred from the truth and established manifest errors and idols.

To make PONTIFFS witnesses, actors, and judges in their own cause is futile, since by a general rule of law, no one can be a witness in his own cause, or pronounce judgment for himself. In the authorities of the FATHERS, he finds little support for himself and against us. He himself, whenever he pleases, casts aside and refutes their opinions, fabricates truths, and sets them against each other, as we shall see in our progress. But even if this were not so, no more authority can be attributed to the Fathers than they themselves wished to be attributed to them. For this is the constant opinion of the Fathers: that no more faith should be given to their words than we find can be proved from the sacred Scriptures. "I would have no one," says AUGUSTINE (Book 2, On the Perseverance of the Saints, chap. 21), "so embrace all my writings, except in those things in which he has perceived that I have not erred." JEROME says (Against the errors of John of Jerusalem): "I know that I hold the Apostles in one way, and the other writers in another. The former always speak the truth; the latter, in certain things, err as men." The same author (Commentary on Matthew 23) hands down a rule to be observed concerning human authorities in matters of faith: "Whatever does not have authority from the sacred Scriptures, is scorned with the same ease with which it is proven." BIEL expressed this thus (On the Canon of the Mass, Lect. 41): "Whatever does not descend from the mountain of Scripture, is rejected with the same ease with which it is approved." Elsewhere (in 1 Sent., d. 14): "The authority of the holy

Fathers compels no one to assent to their words, unless it is founded on the divine Scriptures or rests on divine revelation."

ARGUMENTS from reason are sophisms, which, when reduced to syllogistic form, lose all their force. We will therefore frequently recall them to that form. To refute and elude our arguments, besides sophisms, he employs calumnies and lies all too often. Finally, we will show in our progress that the entire work teems with contradictions against the Fathers, Pontiffs, Scholastics, and Bellarmine himself, which, as everyone knows, is an argument of a bad cause.

These, then, are the things I wished to state for the present concerning the reasons for my undertaking and concerning the method of disputation, both of my adversary and of myself. To which I add this at least: that I neither wish nor am able to defend any and every saying of our Flacians or Ubiquitarians. Now let us come to the Controversies of Bellarmine.

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## LECTURE II. October 29, 1611.

### **On the Argument and Title of the Fourth Tome of Bellarmine.**

The third, now fourth, Tome of the *Controversies*, published in the year '93 of the previous century and dedicated to CLEMENT VIII, Roman Pontiff, Bellarmine distinguished into three general controversies.

The FIRST, on the grace of the first man, he completes in one book.

The SECOND, on the loss of grace and the state of sin, he treats in six books.

The THIRD, on the reparation of Grace, he subdivides into three principal controversies; of which one disputes of Grace and free will in six books; another of the justification of the impious in five books; the third of good works in particular in three books.

Thus the whole volume is on Grace, so that you might think Bellarmine here a renowned preacher of Grace. But it is a sham. He everywhere establishes with great effort the powers of free will against Grace, and human merits against faith. Therefore, what he had begun concerning Grace, he concludes with human merits.

He calls them DISPUTATIONS against the heretics of this time. More rightly, SOPHISTICATIONS against the Holy Scriptures, the Orthodox Fathers, the saner Scholastics, and the Pontifical Doctors. He should have said, against the Evangelicals of all times. For he declares war on all of them. We shall soon have a sample of this in the first

book. There, against the Scriptures: "God made man right" (Ecclesiastes 7:30); "in true holiness and justice" (Ephesians 4:24); "the wages of sin is death" (Romans 6:23); "the imagination of the human heart is evil from its youth" (Genesis 8:21), etc., he contends that rectitude was not of the nature of integral man, but was a supernatural gift, added as a remedy for native languor and a bridle for the rebellion of the flesh; that Death is from nature as from a cause in itself; that the corruption of nature consists not in some evil quality, but in the sole loss of a supernatural gift. He will dispute against Lombard that the first man was created with grace that makes one pleasing [to God] and could have merited eternal life. Against Augustine, that Adam could not die, instead of, could have *not* died, if he had not sinned. Against the same Augustine, Thomas, and all the Scholastics, that the tree of life could have brought absolute immortality to man. Against almost all the Fathers, Scholastics, and Pontifical Doctors like Eugubinus, Pererius, etc., he will argue that Paradise still survives in some land remote from the commerce of sinful men, that is, in Utopia. Likewise, in other controversies, he will in a tribunician manner condemn and scourge the Fathers, Doctors, Scholastics, Pontifical writers, and Evangelicals, whomever does not speak to his taste. All this, so that he alone may be wise and reign. This will be his way of disputing against the heretics of this age. Let us see the title of the first book.

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## ON THE GRACE OF THE FIRST MAN.

### First Book

In the word GRACE lies a deceit. Scripture knows nothing of the Grace of man; it knows and preaches only the Grace of God, of Christ: "By the grace of God you are saved" (Ephesians 2:8). "My grace is sufficient for you" (2 Corinthians 12:9). "Not I, but the grace of God that is with me" (1 Corinthians 15:10). "Through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, we believe that we shall be saved" (Acts 15:11). This man trumpets the grace of man; for what purpose, I will soon say.

The Grace of God signifies two things in the Scriptures. I. The gratuitous mercy, love, and favor of God towards men. This is grace immanent in God, by which we are justified and saved. II. The operation (*ἐνέργεια*) of God's mercy, which Augustine calls a movement of mercy (Book 3, *Hypognosticon*). This is grace operating in men to justify and save them. It is called "help" by the Sophists, about which more below. Of the former it is said: "By the grace of God you are saved" (Ephesians 2:8). Of the latter: "The grace of God that is with me" (1 Corinthians 15:10). Of both: "My grace is sufficient for you" (2 Corinthians 12:9). In Greek it is everywhere *χάρις θεοῦ*, the grace of God.

The effects, or habitual gifts of grace in us, Scripture does not call *χάρις* (grace), but *χαρίσματα*, *δώρημα*, *δωρεάν τοῦ χάριτος* (gifts, a free gift, the free gift of grace, cf. Romans 5:17).

Because the old version improperly rendered this as *Gratiam, Gratias* (Grace, Graces), a homonymy of Grace arose in the Schools. From this, the Sophists, in the business of justification, supposed that with God's grace favoring and moving, there are human gifts, habits, acts, and works. They clothed the powers of free will with the mask of Grace and shamefully imposed upon the Church (cf. Lombard, 2 Sent., dist. 24; Thomas, 1a-IIae, q. 95). Hence Bellarmine, following the Sophists, disputes here *On Grace*, instead of *On the Gift* of the first man, sophistically confusing *χάριτι* and *χάρισμα*, grace and the gift of grace, cause and effect. But to what end? To be sure, so that he may secretly lay a foundation and a path for the dogma of inherent justice and human merits. For just as the first man was just with an inherent justice, so he imagines that a sinner is justified by an inherent grace which was lost through sin and recovered through CHRIST. That the matter is otherwise will be taught in the course of this work.

THEREFORE, the title of the book, and indeed the entire book, does not seem to be of great moment. But in truth, it will become manifest at the end of the first chapter that the hidden seeds of all the following controversies are contained therein. The whole thing is atheological. It does not touch with a finger the doctrine of the Image of God in man, from which it ought rather to have been named, but buries and depraves it. It constitutes the Original Justice of man chiefly in the restraining of the flesh, and incidentally in the subjection of the mind to God, than which nothing is more frigid. He wears out the greater part of the book with a disputation on Paradise, raising and asserting mostly curious, uncertain, fabulous, and false things, contrary to the opinions of the Fathers and of the saner theologians, even the Pontifical ones. Of which, more in its proper place.

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## ON THE GRACE OF THE FIRST MAN, FIRST BOOK.

### CHAPTER ONE.

Whether the first man was created with some supernatural gift?

1. He divides the matter of the book concerning the threefold grace of the first man. §. *Igitur*.
2. He proposes the question of the Grace of the soul. *Ibidem*.
3. He sets out three opinions on it. §. *Pelagiani*.
4. He shows how the opinion of the Pelagians and the Lutherans stands. §. *Erroris*.

### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

1. He makes the Grace of the FIRST MAN threefold. Of the SOUL, original justice. In the question he will call it a supernatural gift; again in chapter 3, grace that makes one pleasing [to God]. How these agree will be said there. On this he writes in

chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Of the BODY, immortality. On this, in chapters 8, 9. Of the PLACE, Paradise. On this in chapters 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.

Everyone understands that Paradise is improperly called a Grace of man. He should have at least distinguished Grace into intrinsic (of the soul, of the body) and extrinsic (of the place). But he wished to drag Paradise in here by the hair, so that he might fill pages with his trifles about it, lest the book stand thin and meager in the front line.

2. THE QUESTION: *Whether the first man was created with some supernatural gift?* is sophistical, on account of the homonymy of "supernatural." For according to how you understand this, the question will be truly affirmed or denied. He ought, therefore, to have explained before all else what is natural and supernatural; which he will do below in chapter 5, too late and wrongly. We will do it here.

NATURE signifies one thing to Physicists, another to Ethicists, and another to Theologians.

- To Physicists, nature in man is the principle of motion and rest.
- To Ethicists, it is the natural inclination towards virtue or vice; in which way the Philosopher (Ethics, Book 2, chap. 13) disputes that virtue is in man by nature, insofar as reason "rightly and for the best things calls."
- To Theologians, the nature of man is both the substance of man and his native qualities, affections, and operations, both good and bad, in either state. For they distinguish nature into integral and corrupt. Integral nature was in the state of creation before the fall; corrupt nature is in the state of sin.

NATURAL, in the state of creation (which alone we are now discussing), was to man:

1. That which constituted his nature. Thus, all essential things were natural to man: soul, body, the powers, faculties, and native acts of both; and among these, free will.
2. That which belonged to his constituted nature by creation itself. Thus, the endowments of perfection were natural to man: rectitude of soul, body, powers, movements, and acts; immortality; and felicity. For creation was man's nativity in his integrity. But what is from nativity, is natural.

SUPERNATURAL is that which is in man above the principles of nature or his native endowments, for his perfection. Thus, man had nothing supernatural in his first state. For he had nothing above the principles or endowments of integral nature, but had all things native from creation according to his integral nature. But in the state of grace, all the *χαρίσματα*, the gifts of grace, are supernatural to man.

Different from this is PRAETERNATURAL, which is in man beside the principles and endowments of nature, for his imperfection or destruction: such as sin, misery, diseases, death, etc.

These things being premised, it is clear that both the affirmation and the negation of the question can be true or false. For by understanding a supernatural gift as that which is above corrupt nature, as it is now, the affirmation is true and the negation is false. But by understanding supernatural as that which is above integral nature, as it was in the first state, the affirmation is false and the negation is true. So much for this sophistical question.

3. In his exposition of the opinions, he says that the Pelagians and the Lutherans proceed from one and the same principle into contrary and conflicting opinions. The latter part is true. For we truly disagree with the Pelagians in our opinions. The former part is false. For we do not agree on one principle. They deny that there was anything in the first man above corrupt nature as it is now. We deny that there was anything above integral nature as it was then; we by no means deny that there was something above corrupt nature as it is now. It is therefore false, what he says here and will repeat later (§ *Contra*), that we agree with the Pelagians on the same principle.

What he expounds as the false opinion of the Pelagians—that men lost nothing at all through sin in Adam, and that they were then such as they are now born—has nothing to do with us. He himself wallows in the same mud with the Pelagians. The Pelagians say that man lost nothing at all. Bellarmine says that man lost nothing of his natural qualities. Both mean the same thing. They say that men were then such as they are now born. Bellarmine says that men would have been such as they are now born, if God had created them in a state of pure nature. Both mean the same thing, except that the Pelagians are more ingenuous. For they speak of the man who was created by God and now exists in the nature of things; Bellarmine trifles about a phantom of a man, which could have been, but never was, nor will be—that is, about a Platonic Idea. All of which will become more clear in the course of this work.

In his exposition of our opinion, one thing is true: that we hold it for certain that through the fall of the first parent, man was made worse. Other things are false: that we contend there were no supernatural qualities in man; that in this we agree with the Pelagians. The falsity is clear from what was said before. The whole Image of God in integral man was above corrupt nature, which now is; the Pelagians by no means acknowledge this. Man could have nothing above integral nature unless it were angelic or divine, by which man would not have been man, but either an angel or God, which is absurd. Finally, that statement is sophistical or false, that we say something natural (namely, free will) is now lacking in the nature of man. For if "natural" is understood in the second sense, concerning

the native endowments of man from creation, this is true: because the goodness of free will, which was then in integral man according to his integral nature, and was natural, is now lacking in the corrupt nature of man, which we feel and lament all too much. For Scripture itself complains, "the thought of man's heart is evil from his youth" (Genesis 8:21). And as Augustine confesses, "man, by abusing his free will, destroyed both it and himself." But if "natural" is understood in the first sense, concerning the essentials of nature, it is false. For we do not say that any essential part, power, or operation, proper to the nature of man, is now lacking even in his corruption; not even free will, insofar as it is a faculty or proper act of an intelligent and willing nature. For man, even now in his corruption, has the faculty of freely willing, not willing, choosing, and rejecting an object shown by reason. However, he by no means has the free faculty of willing and choosing the spiritual good; both because the will of man after the fall is utterly turned away from the spiritual good and is depraved, inclined only to evil at all times, and because to a will so averted and depraved, a blind reason does not show the spiritual good.

Regarding the opinion of his own side that he reports: they hold one truth—that through Adam's sin man was truly made worse. All the rest is sophistical and false.

1. That Adam was adorned with many supernatural gifts: this is true, concerning gifts surpassing corrupt nature; it is false, concerning those surpassing integral nature.
2. That he did not lose free will: this is true, concerning the freedom of the will to choose an object; it is false, concerning the freedom to choose the spiritual good.
3. That he lost no other natural gifts: This is also true, concerning natural things in the first sense; concerning natural things in the second sense, it is false and repugnant to the first truth, that the whole man was truly made worse.
4. That he lost only the supernatural gifts: And this is true, concerning gifts surpassing corrupt nature; concerning those surpassing integral nature, it is most false, for he had no such things. Since, however, Bellarmine follows in all these things the sense which I have shown to be false, his entire opinion is false.
5. §. Erroris. The demonstration of the error of the Pelagians from Augustine (De Haeresibus, chap. 88, and Epistle 106 to Paulinus) has nothing to do with us. The lie about the principle common to us and to them has been refuted before. Yet he contends he can show this from Luther, in two articles condemned at Rome, and from Calvin. But in vain.

LUTHER, in the place alleged (Commentary on Genesis, chap. 2), says: "Wherefore, let us establish that justice was not some added gift, separate from the nature of man, but was truly natural, so that it was the (integral) nature of Adam to love God, to believe God, to acknowledge God." Nothing is truer. The two articles, badly condemned by Popes Pius V and Gregory XIII, say: "The sublimation and integrity of human nature was its natural condition, not a supernatural one." And this is most true. For they understand it was natural to man in his nature as it was then, integral.

But that it was natural as it is now, corrupt, is not from the mind of Luther and the articles, but from the calumny of Bellarmine.

CALVIN, in the place alleged (Institutes, Book 1, chap. 15, §.8), neither called it natural nor denied it was supernatural. What sin, then, did he commit? But Bellarmine proves that he meant it was natural with an argument that, if formed, would be this: "Free will is natural to man, as Calvin confesses. The integrity of the first man consisted in free will, as the same author confesses. Therefore, the integrity of the first man was natural." Calvin would not deny the conclusion in the latter sense. But he would say that both premises are false. The major is false, because it is false that Calvin confesses that "it was rightly judged by the philosophers that man would not be a rational animal unless he had free choice of good and evil." The words of Calvin are: "*The philosophers argue rightly so far, IF there had been no change in man: which change, however, was hidden from them, etc.*" What Calvin granted conditionally, *if there had been no change*, Bellarmine has taken categorically. What candor is this? The minor is also false, because Calvin only says that man in his integrity was endowed with free will. Therefore, he acknowledges it as a part of integrity, he does not make free will the whole of integrity.

Finally, what Bellarmine says, §. *Neque*, that "original justice, according to our opinion, coerced the rebellion of the flesh, and pertained to the natural constitution of man," is doubly false. We acknowledge no rebellion in integral man, since both the mind was subject to God, and the will and sensuality were subject to the mind in concord from the perfection of nature. We say original justice was natural, not in the first sense in which things that constituted nature are natural, but in the latter sense, in which the native endowments of integral nature from creation are natural. From these things it is clear that Bellarmine, right in the first chapter, contrives a false dogma and impudently joins our Doctors with the Pelagians and slanders them. From the claw, therefore, we recognize the lion, and from the vestibule, the entire remaining structure of the *Disputations*.

"But what need," you ask, "of so many words? What does it matter whether grace is called natural or supernatural? Is this therefore an empty war of words (λογομαχία)?" Not at all. The hinge of the following controversies on Original Sin, free will, cooperation, and merits turns here. This question is therefore most extensive. The adversary imagines that the nature of man, such as it is now (with guilt excepted), was created by God subject to the rebellion of the flesh, to infirmities, and to death; but that it was adorned with the supernatural gift of justice, like an extrinsic garment, as a bridle for rebellion and a remedy for death. From this fountain the Sophists have derived all the impious Pelagian dogmas that follow: that man, through sin, lost nothing but the extrinsic garment of a supernatural gift; that he preserved his integral nature and his integral natural qualities; that the corruption of man, which is Original Sin, is nothing but the loss of this external garment;

that diseases, miseries, and death are a consequence of nature in itself, and a penalty of sin only by accident; that man in a state of pure nature has free will, integral and uncorrupted, equally for good and for evil; that he can therefore perform merits of congruity, prepare himself for grace, cooperate with prevenient and operating grace, and resist it; that he can render sufficient grace efficacious; and finally, that he is justified by an inherent supernatural grace, just as he was just in the beginning. You see, reader, that this is not a war of words (*λεγομαχία*), but that the Sophists weave a long web of their dogmas from this supernatural grace. This web must therefore be cut at the warp.

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### LECTURE III. October 31, 1611.

#### CHAPTER TWO.

That man was not created in the beginning such as he is now born, but much more blessed.

1. Against two, as he calls them, contrary errors, he sets forth four propositions to be proven. §. *Nunc adversus*.
2. He proves the first proposition, which is common to both sides, against the Pelagians. §. *Prima igitur*.

#### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

1. He had said that the Pelagians and the Lutherans had departed into contrary and conflicting opinions. This is true. Now he calls them two contrary errors. This is true concerning the opinion of the Pelagians; concerning ours, it is false. Our opinion is not an error, but a truth: that the integrity of integral nature was natural, not supernatural, that is, it was *according to* not *above* integral nature; for it was co-created with, and native to, the nature of man. Man could have nothing above integral nature, unless it were angelic or divine, by which man would not be man, but an angel or God, as we have shown.

Of Bellarmine's four PROPOSITIONS, only the first is true, which we also defend against the Pelagians. The second is sophistical, of which in chap. 3. The third is false, of which in chap. 4. The fourth is sophistical, of which in chap. 5.

He proposes the FIRST in the title of the chapter thus: *That man was not created in the beginning such as he is now born, but much more blessed*. This is rather obscure. He ought to have added: but much more excellent and blessed. In the text, he explains it more fully: *Man was not created such as he is now born, prone to evil, weak, ignorant: but he was created*

*upright, just, wise, without concupiscence and the difficulty which we now constantly experience in ourselves.* Here you would desire nothing, provided that "concupiscence" is understood as the inordinate kind, as it is now, and "difficulty" as the misery of sin, death, and other passions adverse to nature. It should be observed, however, that this first proposition overthrows his fourth and establishes our opinion. For if proneness to evil, infirmity, ignorance, concupiscence, and difficulty were not of the nature of man, then they are now in him praeternaturally. Therefore, their contraries—rectitude, justice, wisdom, felicity—were in him according to nature, natural and not supernatural. For it is manifest that when the contraries of certain qualities are present praeternaturally, those qualities themselves are rightly said to be present according to nature, and to be natural, not supernatural.

2. Bellarmine's arguments for the first proposition are all indeed true, but languid.

The FIRST is from Genesis 1:27 (this should be 1:26 or 1:27): God created man in his own image and in his own likeness. The image, he says, by the common exposition of the Fathers, refers to the nature of intelligence and will; the likeness refers to wisdom and justice. Therefore, man in creation received, besides his nature, the ornaments of wisdom and justice. If formed into a syllogism, it would be:

He who was created in the image and likeness of God, received in creation, besides an intelligent and willing nature, also the ornaments of wisdom and justice.

Man was created in the image and likeness of God.

Therefore, etc.

The minor premise is from Moses. He proves the major with the authorities of ten Fathers: Irenaeus (Book 5, chap. 8), Cyprian (Sermon on the Goodness of Patience), Ambrose (On the Dignity of Man, chap. 2), Basil (Hexameron, Homily 10), Jerome (Commentary on Ezekiel 28), Chrysostom (Homily 8 on Genesis), Augustine (Against Adimantus, chap. 8), Eucherius (On Genesis, Book 1), Damascenus (On the Orthodox Faith, Book 2, chap. 12), and Bernard (Sermon 1 on the Annunciation), who interpret the Image of God as referring to the nature of man, and the likeness to virtues. It is not our task to demolish this argument. But, good God, how many things would heretics find lacking?

First, he cites the words of Moses improperly, which are thus: *God created man in his own image; or, in his image.* There is nothing there about likeness, but in the preceding verse Moses joined image and likeness. Second, the whole force of the argument rests not on the authority of Scripture or of Moses, but the sense of Scripture is built upon the Fathers, not the Fathers upon Scripture, which is preposterous. He ought, therefore, to have proved the major premise not from the gloss of the Fathers, which heretics do not admit, but from Scripture. Third, scarcely three or four of the Fathers distinguish image and likeness in the

said manner. From the rest, the distinction cannot be had. And even if it could be had from all of them, it would be neither firm nor true. For in Hebrew it is: *Let us make man* בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כְּדְמוּתֵנוּ (b'tsalmenu kidmutenu), *in our image, according to our likeness*. And these two are joined not as different things, but exegetically, meaning: *Let us make man in our image, which may be most like us*. The particle כ (as, like) shows the exegetical force, and it is confirmed by the fact that Scripture sometimes includes likeness under image (as there in verse 27, and Genesis 9:6), and sometimes image under likeness (as in James 3:9). Above all, the exposition cannot be proved that we have the image from God, but the likeness from our own will; and that through sin not the image, but only the likeness was lost. If this were true, the image would not need reparation through CHRIST. But I omit these things for the present, because we have explained them in our Commentary on Genesis, page 116.

For the argument to be effective against heretics, it must be formed from Scripture in this way:

To be created in the image of God is to be created in the true knowledge of God, wisdom, and justice.

Man was created in the image of God.

Therefore, etc.

The minor is from Moses. The major is evident from Ephesians 4:24 and Colossians 3:10, where the Apostle interprets the image of God as knowledge, justice, and holiness: *Put on the new man, who κατὰ θεὸν (kata theon, i.e., according to the likeness or image of God) is created in true justice and holiness*. And: *Put on the new man, who is renewed εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτὸν (eis epignōsin kat' eikona tou ktisantos auton), unto knowledge, according to the image of him that created him, that is, of God*. This argument solidly constrains the heretics.

Yet Socinus attempts to elude this in his *Praelectiones Theologicae*, which a certain scoundrel recently published as if dedicated to our Academy. He denies that the image of God is justice and wisdom; otherwise, he says, *man would have been immortal and impeccable, just as God is, and the image of God would no longer be in man after the fall*. But, he argues, man was mortal, and the image of God is said to be in man even now, in Genesis 9:6 and James 3:9. Therefore, he does not want the image of God to pertain to the soul, but to signify dominion over all things, especially inferior ones.

But he wickedly tears apart connected things and snatches a part for the whole. To the image of God in man pertained both wisdom, justice, and holiness, and also dominion; which the heretic himself would be forced to confess, willy-nilly, by saying that *without that wisdom, justice, and holiness, dominion could not have been exercised, nor can it be*. This

being established, I ask: what were the wisdom, justice, and holiness in man exercising dominion, if not the image of God?

The heretic's objections are frivolous. Man was immortal, in soul and body, and would never have died if he had not sinned, about which in chap. 8; although he was not immortal as God is, who simply cannot die. He was also impeccable, infected with no sin; although not impeccable as God is, who cannot sin. For a "like" thing is not the "same" thing. He had a purity and justice not of God, but proportionate to God; but he had it mutably, so that he could stand or fall if he wished. The image of God is said to still be in man in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*), by reason of his rational, willing, and immortal soul.

For in these three, the image of God consisted. In **nature**: because man was endowed by God with a spiritual, intelligent, willing, and immortal soul. This remains after the fall. In **rectitude**: because in the mind of man there shone a light rightly acknowledging the nature, will, and works of God; in his will, heart, appetites, and all his conduct, a supreme conformity with God and a most peaceful harmony with the law of nature held sway. Finally, in his **Status**: because man, in God's stead, held dominion over the other creatures, with a supreme abundance and felicity of spiritual and corporeal goods. These latter two, having been lost through sin, are repaired for us through Christ. Enough on the first argument.

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### The Second Argument

The SECOND is from Genesis 2:25: *And they were both naked, and were not ashamed*. The Fathers, he says, assign the cause of this to the fact that the first parents, before sin, lacked that shameful rebellion of the members, on account of which we are now ashamed if we are seen naked. He cites Augustine (Book 14, *City of God*, chap. 27), Bernard (Sermon 1 on the Annunciation), and many others. If formed into a syllogism, it would be this:

- Now there is a shameful rebellion of the members, of appetites and motions against reason. *I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind* (Romans 7:23).
- But the parents lacked this shameful rebellion, because being naked they were not ashamed.
- Therefore, the parents were not created as men are now born.

Or thus: All adult, healthy men are ashamed of nudity, on account of the baseness and rebellion of the members. The parents, being adult and healthy, were not ashamed of nudity. Therefore, they lacked the baseness and rebellion with which men are now born.

Socinus objects (Praelectiones, chap. 3, pg. 8): If there had been no conflict between appetite and reason, men would not have sinned. But they did sin. Therefore, there was disorder (*ἀταξία*) in them. This is a fallacy of arguing *a secundum quid* (from a qualified sense). The major premise would be true if there had been no disorder in the parents *simply*, neither in potency nor in act; that is, if they had been so confirmed in rectitude that disorder neither was, nor could befall them. But they were righteous *mutably*. Therefore, rebellion was not in them in act, but it was in potency. For rebellion could bubble up in them, by which they would deprave themselves, as in fact happened.

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### The Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Arguments

The THIRD is from Ecclesiastes 7:30, Sirach 17:3, and Wisdom 2:23: *God created man right in the beginning, and clothed him with strength according to himself, and made man for incorruption* (*ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ*), for immortality. But after the fall, men are by no means born upright, but are all by nature children of wrath. Therefore, they are not born such as they were created.

The FOURTH can be gathered from Genesis 2, that the life of the parents was most blessed, because they lived in Paradise, a place of felicity, with the greatest abundance of things, without diseases, troubles, misery, or death. Bellarmine introduces Augustine as a herald of this felicity (Book 14, *City of God*, chap. 10). But now we all experience such great misery of body and soul that the Apostle exclaims: *O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?* (Romans 7:26). Therefore, men are not born such as they were created.

We add, *ex abundantia* (from abundance), two other arguments, which Socinus (Praelectiones, chap. 3, pg. 9) attempts to elude.

The FIFTH is from Genesis 1:31: *God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good*. Therefore, man was very good. He responds: 1. That this praise does not pertain to man, but to the other works of God. This is false, because it is stated immediately after the creation of man. Therefore, it pertains most of all to man. 2. That "good" does not signify rectitude, but fitness for that which God had previously proposed to himself. What could be more inept than this quibble? Concerning all things there, "good" signifies formal rectitude. Therefore, also concerning man. And if all things were very good, how could man alone, for whose sake all things were made, not be very good? 3. That God did not see that man himself was good, but that it was good that man had been created by him such as Moses had described. What kind of talk is this? God saw not only that his operation was good, but also that his work was good. Indeed, Moses speaks of the latter, not the former. For he does not say: "God saw that he had operated well," but "he saw that the things which

he had made were good". Nevertheless, this is fine: God saw that it was good that man was created by him such as Moses described. But he described him as created in the image of God, very good. Let the insolence of the heretic therefore depart.

The SIXTH is from the same source: The perfection of man is justice. God created man perfect. Therefore, just. He responds that the perfection in man is voluntary justice, not natural. But he is playing games with the state of man. Now, it is only voluntary for the reborn through grace, because natural justice has been lost. For the first man, it was both voluntary and natural, just as it is for God and the angels, analogously (ἀναλόγως). Rightly, therefore, the heretic at last confesses that "the natural perfection of man is that he was wanting in every vice and stain; he was created integral and incorrupt". But what is a just man, if not one who is "integral of life and pure of crime"?

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### Socinus's Objections

The same heretic has certain objections against the original justice of Adam: they are sophistical and greatly distorted, which I will briefly arrange syllogistically:

1. The original justice of Adam was either impeccability or the inability to sin, such as is in the Angels; or it was that Adam did not sin before he sinned. It was not the former, because he sinned; nor was it the latter, because it is ridiculous that someone did not sin before he sinned. Therefore, there was no original justice.  
RESPONSE: The first part is true, the latter is false. For it is only ridiculous to a heretic that Adam did not sin before his first transgression. But neither is the enumeration of the major premise sufficient. For it should be added that it was the natural, formal rectitude of Adam.
2. If Adam was just before the first transgression because he had not previously committed any other sin, that justice was not original, but actual.  
Who would not laugh at such ineptitudes? It was both. Original: because it was a co-created rectitude. Actual: because he actually exercised it as long as he stood, by loving God, his neighbor (his wife), governing the animals, etc.
3. Adam was just before committing the first transgression either because he transgressed no other command of God given to him, or because he committed nothing against his own conscience. But neither is true. Not the former, because he had no other command from God; therefore, he could transgress none. Therefore, he was not just for that reason. Nor the latter: because, he says, they will never prove that Adam committed nothing against his own conscience before that transgression. Therefore, he was not just.  
RESPONSE: This is to petulantly insult our first parent and to insolently oppose the conscience of an integral man to the command of God. But let it be so. 1. The

enumeration of the major premise is insufficient, because besides both of those, there is the co-created justice by which Adam was just. 2. In the minor premise, the first part is false. For man had, besides the command about the tree, the inborn law of nature, by the transgression of which he also would have sinned. The latter part is an impious reproach against God and against our parent. We deny that Adam committed anything against his conscience before the first transgression, because for that long he stood in the likeness of God. The burden of proof for the contrary falls upon the heretic who affirms it.

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## LECTURE IV. November 4, 1611.

### CHAPTER THREE.

Whether the first man received grace that makes one pleasing [to God] in creation?

1. He posits the second proposition; he touches on the dissension of the Scholastics concerning it. §. *Sequitur*.
2. He confirms the proposition with authorities from Scripture, Councils, and the Fathers, up to §. *Ex his*.
3. He raises and resolves doubts from Augustine, up to the end.

#### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

1. He posits the second PROPOSITION in the title of the chapter and in the text: *The first man received not just any rectitude of mind, but even grace itself that makes one pleasing [to God]*. The proposition is obscure, superfluous, and sophisticated.
  - **Obscure**, because he does not explain what he means by "grace that makes one pleasing". Thomas calls it the grace by which man is joined to God. Bellarmine will later define it as "a supernatural gift given without any debt, chiefly for the personal salvation of each individual". Whether this is right will be examined there. At the least, he disputes preposterously, teaching later what should have been first.
  - It is **superfluous**, because he has taught before (chap. 2) that man was created upright, just, wise, in the image and likeness of God, without concupiscence or rebellion of the members. Such a man could not be displeasing or unaccepted by God, which was to have grace that makes one pleasing. Hence, the whole chapter is superfluous and nugatory, intended to fill pages.

- Finally, it is **sophistical**, because it is ambiguous, having both a true and a false sense. For if "grace that makes one pleasing" is understood as the Image of God co-created in man, it is true. For by it, man was pleasing to God. But if understood as a supernatural gift, different from the Image of God, and meritorious of eternal life (as Bellarmine wants), it is false. This is clear, both because it was shown before (chap. 1) that all the gifts of the first man were *according to*, not *above*, his integral nature, and were thereby natural, not supernatural; and because man neither should have, nor could have, merited eternal life from God, about which more below (Book on Justification).
- 2. Intending to explain the dissension of the Sophists, he says that some (Lombard, Scotus) separate the original justice granted to the first parent in creation from grace that makes one pleasing. They teach that Adam indeed received a certain habit that subjected the lower part to the higher, but did not receive the grace that makes one pleasing, which makes friends of God and which is necessary for meriting eternal life. Others (Thomas and Albertus Magnus) so join original justice with grace that makes one pleasing that the obedience of the lower part depended on grace that makes one pleasing as from a root and fount. He says he follows these latter. But he explains the opinion of neither correctly, does an injustice to both, and follows neither; instead, he invents a peculiar and uncertain opinion of his own. LOMBARD, discussing the grace of the first man, in no word separates original justice from grace that makes one pleasing; indeed, he names neither. Rather, he says two things: 1. That man, through that help of grace, was able to resist evil, but not to perfect the good. The first of these is true, the latter is false, at least in some respect. 2. That through it he was able in a certain way to live well, that is, without sin, but not to live spiritually without another aid of grace, by which he might merit eternal life. The first and last parts of this are true; the middle part is ambiguous, about which in the next chapter. In these statements, there is nothing about a habit ruling the lower part, nothing about grace that makes one pleasing, nothing about its diversity from original justice; these are chimeras of Bellarmine. THOMAS, also, in the said place, neither separates nor joins nor names original justice and grace that makes one pleasing. He speaks much more openly than Bellarmine explains his meaning. He himself says that some indeed say that man was not created in grace, but that grace was later conferred on him before he sinned. But that the authorities of many attest that man in the state of innocence had grace, and that the very rectitude in which God had made man requires this (Ecclesiastes 7:30). For this rectitude consisted in the fact that reason was subjected to God, and reason subjected the lower powers and the body to the soul. Therefore, he calls the grace of the first man the very rectitude of man. He places rectitude in the harmonic subjection of reason, the lower powers, and the body to God, which was truly the original justice of man. And although these things are said obscurely and meagerly

by Thomas (for the rectitude of man extended much more widely and is explained more clearly by our Theologians), yet it is apparent that what Bellarmine says is false: that Thomas thinks, and he with him, that grace that makes one pleasing is a part, or the root, or the cause of original justice, since he himself is in doubt as to which it is. We more rightly say that original justice is related to the image of God as a part to the whole.

ORIGINAL JUSTICE was the rectitude of all the powers, inclinations, appetites, motions, and actions of the first man. That is: in the mind, a shining light, rightly acknowledging God—a true wisdom of divine and human things; in the will, the love of God and neighbor, a conformity with the will of God in true justice; in the heart, a harmony of all affections, appetites, and motions with right reason—a true holiness. Besides this, the IMAGE of God comprised man's spiritual, intelligent, willing, immortal nature, according to the soul; and also dominion over all creatures, with the highest felicity of communion. For we just showed from the Apostle's declaration in Ephesians 4 and Colossians 2 that the image of God consisted in these things.

So much for the first part of the chapter. In which three things are to be noted: First, that Bellarmine does not report in good faith the opinions even of his own side.

What, then, will he do to us? Second, that the Pontificals falsely boast of the consensus of their Doctors in matters of faith. For Bellarmine confesses that two of the highest Doctors, Lombard and Thomas, dissent on an article of the highest moment, concerning the grace of the first man, and he himself dissents from both. Third, that Bellarmine shamefully conflicts with himself, both above (chap. 1) and here. For there, he called the grace of the soul "original justice". Here, he makes it a part or cause of original justice. This will become more apparent shortly, when he will openly separate original justice from grace that makes one pleasing (chap. 5).

3. He confirms the PROPOSITION with two testimonies of Scripture, the authorities of two councils, and the opinions of ten Fathers. We, understanding the proposition in the true sense, concerning the image of God and rectitude, which was truly then the grace making man pleasing to God, easily admit the confirmation. But understanding it in Bellarmine's sense, concerning a supernatural gift meritorious of eternal life, the confirmation is null and void.

From the FIRST passage, of the Apostle in Ephesians 4:24, *Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who is created according to God in the holiness and justice of truth*, it can be gathered thus: Those who are ordered to be renewed were once new men. We are ordered to be renewed, etc. Therefore, we were once new men created according to God in true holiness and justice. This follows. If he should proceed to say that this grace was supernatural and meritorious of eternal life, it does not follow, because then the major premise is false.

He gives two reasons why we are ordered to be renewed in the spirit of our mind. 1.

That we may understand that in Adam not only the flesh, but also the mind was vitiated, that is, obscured, through the loss of grace. This is true. 2. Because in this world we are not renewed to that innocence which was in the flesh of the first man, but only to that which was in the mind. This is false and against the Scriptures. For the regeneration of the Spirit, which is begun in this life, is as much the mortification of the flesh as it is the illumination of the mind, although it is not perfected in this world. *Glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are God's* (1 Corinthians 6:20).

From the SECOND passage, Colossians 3:10, *Lie not one to another, stripping off* (in Greek, ἀπεκδυσάμενοι, having put off) *the old man with his deeds, and putting on the new, him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of him that created him*, it can be gathered thus: That to which our mind is renewed by the grace of Christ, the first man had. Our new man, that is, our mind, is renewed by the grace of Christ unto knowledge according to the image of God. Therefore, the first man had knowledge of God according to his image. But this was grace that makes one pleasing. Therefore, he had this. The whole thing follows, in the aforesaid sense; otherwise, the major premise of the pro-syllogism is false.

From the Council of ORANGE II (held under Theodosius the Younger), canon 19, it can be gathered thus: What we recover through the grace of Christ in justification, that we lost in Adam. We recover grace that makes one pleasing through the grace of Christ, from the said Canon. Therefore, we lost this in Adam. Therefore, Adam had it. The conclusion is true in the aforesaid sense, but false in Bellarmine's sense, because the minor is false. For the canon makes no mention of a supernatural, meritorious grace that makes one pleasing, but says against the Pelagians: *since man without the grace of God cannot keep [the law], how without grace will he be able to recover what he has lost?* This is most true, but has nothing to do with Bellarmine's point.

From the Council of TRENT, session 5, decree on original sin, he concludes that Adam in Paradise was just and holy, and had the Holy Spirit. But the Council does not say that this was grace that makes one pleasing, supernatural, and meritorious of eternal life. If it did say so, it would not be true.

The authorities of the FATHERS have nothing about grace that makes one pleasing; they do not even name it. For the Sophists' grace that makes one pleasing, which overturns the grace of Christ, was unknown to the Fathers. IRENAEUS (Book 3, chap. 37) says that Adam had and lost the "stole of sanctity". CYPRIAN (Sermon on the Goodness of Patience) says he did not keep the "divine grace" he had received. BASIL (On the Holy Spirit, chap. 16) says God imparted to man a portion of His "own grace". AMBROSE (Book 6, Hexameron, chap. 7) says Adam received "garments of spiritual grace". NAZIANZEN (Oration on Easter) and CHRYSOSTOM (Homily 16 on Genesis) say he was a "terrestrial angel". AUGUSTINE (On Correction and Grace, chap. 10)

says he received "great grace". CYRIL (Book 2 on John, chap. 3) says he did not keep the "grace of the creator" while the Holy Spirit was inhabiting him. LEO (Sermon on the Nativity, Dec. 20) says we are repaired to the image of God by the "grace of the Savior," since what fell in the first Adam is raised up in the second. GREGORY (Book 5, Moralia, chap. 14, para. 31) says the soul in Adam died through sin, not so as to not exist, but so as to not be blessed. All of these things are true, but irrelevant to Bellarmine's point (ἀπροσδιόνυσα). He will rehash these same things in chapter five; we will see them there.

It should be noted in passing, regarding the authority of CYPRIAN, that Bellarmine, without judgment, scrapes together from the Fathers things true, false, certain, and uncertain, in order to fill pages. He proves his point from Cyprian's epistle to Pompey, where he interprets the passage from Genesis 2, *He breathed into his face the breath of life*, as concerning the grace of the Holy Spirit infused by God into the soul of man. But the context of the history repudiates this sense, and Augustine refuted it (Book 13, *City of God*, chap. 24).

4. He describes three doubts from Augustine, taken from Thomas (I-II, q. 95, art. 1).
  - Doubt 1. Augustine says (On Grace and Correction, chap. 11): God so created the angels and man, that he might first show in them what free will could do, and then what the benefit of grace could do. Therefore, it seems man was not created with grace.

He responds that Augustine means that free will in the first man was indeed aided by grace, but was not confirmed in grace, as it is later in the state of grace. (For so I understand Bellarmine). But this is an evasion. Augustine absolutely opposes the free will of the first state to the benefit of the grace of the third state. Therefore, he is speaking of a grace which the first man lacked. But he did not lack (according to Augustine) the habitual grace of the image of God. Therefore, the grace which he attributes to the third state, he understands not as habitual, but as Evangelical, which is the gratuitous remission of sins through Christ. Bellarmine chose not to observe this homonymy of "grace".
  - **Doubt 2.** From Augustine (*Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, q. 123): He denies that Adam received the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it seems he denies that he received spiritual grace. Bellarmine, cutting the knot, denies that Augustine is the author of the book. The reasons may be seen there, and in the censure of Erasmus on that book, from which our author took them. Whether it is Augustine's or not matters little to our point. That it is ancient and explains many things usefully cannot be denied. Among these is that in q. 7, according to the received division of his time, he numbers four precepts on the first table of the Decalogue, and six on the second. Thomas interprets the author's mind more tolerably, saying that he does not absolutely deny that

Adam received the Holy Spirit, but only that he received him copiously, as we do. That he meant this is probable from the fact that he also denies the Holy Spirit to other Fathers before Christ, based on the saying of John: *For the Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified* (John 7:39), which, it is established, was said concerning the copious effusion of the grace of the Holy Spirit reserved for the glorification of the Messiah.

- **Doubt 3.** In the same book, same question, that passage of the Apostle is alleged: *The first man was of the earth, earthly; the second man is the Lord from heaven* (1 Corinthians 15:47), and *a quickening spirit* (v. 45). Therefore, spiritual grace is denied to the first, earthly man. Bellarmine is ashamed of himself. He therefore mutters something obscurely. Thomas responds more clearly that Adam was earthly according to the body, not earthly according to the soul. This is sufficient. For the Apostle only teaches that there is an animal body, the body of Adam, needing food and drink; and there is also a spiritual body, not subject to nourishment, the body of Christ and of the blessed after the resurrection in glory.

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## LECTURE V. November 5, 1611.

### CHAPTER FOUR.

Whether the first man in the state of innocence needed special help, by which he might be aroused to do good, or to avoid sins?

1. He posits the third proposition. §. *Ut melius.*
2. Its explanation. §. *Haec propositio.*
3. The application of the explanation to the first man. §. *Iam igitur.*
4. The confirmation of the proposition. §. *Quarto dono.*

#### **EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION**

This whole chapter is thorny, inanely verbose, containing more empty ostentation than useful doctrine or solid truth. The matter could have been resolved in a few words. But Bellarmine wanted to fill many pages and show off his acumen. He posits the proposition in the title and in the text in these words: *The first man, adorned with original justice and the habit of grace that makes one pleasing, did not need special help by which he might be aroused to do good and to avoid sins.* The assertion is proud, contemptuous toward God, and false. He imagines the first man to be a kind of Ajax, or a Homeric Cyclops, who could conquer

even without God; that is, who was sufficient unto himself to will and to perfect, and did not need God to persevere. What madness is this? *In him we live, and move, and have our being* (Acts 17:28); *He giveth to all life, and breath*, not only by general, but also by special help. *Without me you can do nothing*, etc. Therefore, he disputes here blasphemies against God and the Scriptures. The falsity will be clear in the examination of the confirmation. Meanwhile, observe that he separates original justice and grace that makes one pleasing as two different things, which in chap. 1 he had made one, and in chap. 3 had joined; now he pulls them apart. So consistent is this disputator with himself.

2. He says that four gifts of God can be considered in man: 1. the habit of grace, 2. the conservation of the habit, 3. the cooperation of God with man, and 4. the motion of God through exciting help, etc. All are captious and sophistical; most are obscure, incoherent (*ἀσύστατα*), and false, which I will show thus.

You say four gifts are to be considered in man. In which man? In what state? Is this not obscure and captious? If in the first man, the whole following application is an empty tautology. If in the state of sin, it is false that these gifts are found in man. If in the state of grace, he is wasting his effort, because the gifts of creation and of reparation are by no means similar. Man then operated from one set of principles, and now operates well from another. Then, all things were natural from the creation of an integral nature; now, all things are supernatural from the regeneration of a corrupt nature.

He also calls them "gifts" improperly. For properly, those things are gifts which inhere habitually in man from grace, for him to use them freely; in Greek, *χαρίσματα*. But the conservation, cooperation, and motion of God do not inhere habitually in man as *χαρίσματα*; rather, they are extrinsic actions of God, which are more rightly called works or benefits of God than gifts of man.

Only the FIRST is properly a gift: the habit of grace. If in the first state he understands this as original justice, it is granted; if as a supernatural, meritorious gift, it is denied. In the third state, we call it the illumination of the mind and the begun renovation of the will, heart, and sensuality. Let them by all means call it a habit of grace by which the lower part is subjected to the higher, and the higher to God, as long as they do not impose on their readers. But if this habit was perfecting the nature of the first man, as Bellarmine confesses, then it was natural to the first man, or else the first man was not perfect and integral.

The SECOND he calls the divine conservation of the habit. This conservation is twofold: universal, by which God conserves universal nature, and special, by which he conserves special graces. But the habit of grace was and is a special grace.

Therefore, the first man needed not only general, but also special conservation, which is contrary to Bellarmine's proposition.

The THIRD he calls divine cooperation with man through general help in natural

works, and special help in supernatural ones. The entire fifth and sixth books on grace and free will are consumed with this cooperation. I will therefore defer it to there. He imagines free will operating within, and the help of God coming to man from without, cooperating in a good work, as when another horse comes to cooperate with a horse struggling to pull a chariot. This is, to be sure, so that the glory of goodness may be divided equally between man and God. But Scripture refutes this sacrilegious cooperation and division of the good, whenever it ascribes our entire willing and perfecting in good things to the grace of God alone. Meanwhile, the third point cancels out the FOURTH, which he calls a certain motion of God exciting man's free will to use the prior gifts. For either this is the same as the third, or it leads to an absurdity. For what can the cooperation of God with man be, if not a motion of God in the will of man, rousing it to will and to do good? For before this motion, no operation of the will, no cooperation of God can be imagined, without supposing pure Pelagianism. Nor should they say that a habit of grace is presupposed. For by a habit of grace they understand free will itself, clothed in the mask of habitual grace, as can be seen in Lombard (Book 2, dist. 24). Or else, a cooperation without motion is imagined, which is absurd. So that you may understand the philosophical speculation of the sophists on this motion, by which they exalt themselves as dung heaps against God, they imagine that in fallen man free will is integral in its powers, but asleep because of sin, and must be excited and moved by grace, just as a strong but sleeping horse must be excited by the charioteer and spurred on and moved by goads. A fine grace indeed! But more on this below.

He continues: the first three do not enable man to operate, but only to be able to operate, if he wishes; the fourth finally makes him operate. But this is incoherent (*ἀσύστατα*). For if in the third there is cooperation of God with man, then there is in turn an operation of man with God. Therefore, there is an operation of man without the fourth. It is therefore false that the first three do not make man operate.

Augustine's simile about food is alien to the matter, as an inspection of the places shows (*City of God*, 14.27; *On Rebuke and Grace*, 11). Indeed, it works against Bellarmine. For this is what Augustine means: just as it is not in our power to live in the flesh without the help of food, but it is in our power not to live in it; so, to live well without the help of God, even in Paradise, was not in man's power, although it was in his power to live badly. It is therefore false what Bellarmine contends, that to live well without the help of God was in man's power, so that he did not need special help from God.

In the application of the simile, "So also God," let the deceit be observed. Instead of what he should have said in the third point, "and because he cooperates with man," he says, "and because he is ready to cooperate". As if these were the same: "God cooperates with man," which he said before, and "God is ready to cooperate with

man," which he now says. He saw, therefore, that the motion of God is included in cooperation, the fourth in the third; that the cooperation of God presupposes the operation of man; and thus it is false that by the first three, only the *ability* to operate well is given, and not the actual operating well. He saw, I say, that that cooperation is either the motion and grace itself (which Augustine calls a "movement of mercy," *Hypognosticon*, Book 3), or it is a fiction, and he is imposing on the reader.

3. So much for the explanation of the proposition. Now follows the application of the explanation to the first man. He says that the first man had the first three [gifts]. So be it. That he did not need the fourth, nor did he have it. The latter is true: for if he had had it, he would not have fallen. The former is the point under judgment (*κρινόμενον*), and is false. For he needed that, without which he could not stand in temptation. He continues, that we after the fall need all of them, and obtain all of them by the blessing of God through the merits of Christ. Both are true, but captious.

The reason he gives for why Adam did not need, and we do need, the fourth benefit is sophistical on both counts. In Adam, indeed, there was a harmony of all faculties without rebellion; but it does not follow that he did not need a special grace preserving that harmony, which could be disturbed by his will. What he says about us—that grace first subjects the mind to God, but not the flesh—is true concerning perfect subjection, which belongs to the next life; but it is false concerning the begun subjection, in proportion to regeneration in this life. For the grace of regeneration is not only the illumination of the mind, that it may subject itself to God, but also the renovation of the will, heart, and the entire sensuality, so that the flesh may begin to submit itself to the spirit. Nor is the doctrine of Augustine different, to which the adversary appeals, and laboriously proves what no one denies: that man needed the first, second, and third gifts. The fourth is the point under judgment (*κρινόμενον*). Let us see what the adversary's confirmation of this will be.

4. That the first man did not need the FOURTH gift, which he calls exciting and internally persuading help (and which we call preserving, directing, and confirming grace), he has nothing from the sacred Scriptures with which to prove it. He feels, therefore, that he is now wandering entirely outside the Scriptures. He implores as patrons of his error Augustine and the Scholastic Theologians. He does an injustice to Augustine; we are not concerned about the Scholastics. Again, he mixes truths with falsehoods. He says: Adam lacked special help. This is true. He adds: he did not need it. This is false. Did man not need that, which because he did not have it, he fell?

Thus I constrain the adversary: To say that man did not need that, for want of which he fell, in order to avoid the fall, is insanity. For sound reason dictates that if one

does not have that, without which he cannot attain the good and avoid the evil, he needs it. For want of a special grace directing and preserving the will of man, man fell. For if he had had it, he would not have fallen. Therefore, to say that man did not need special grace to avoid the fall is an insanity equal to saying that a bird does not need wings to fly. This one argument, which, alas, the event has made all too valid, is enough to overturn the audacious fiction of the adversary.

If he were to inspect more correctly the passages of AUGUSTINE which he alleged for the third gift (Epistle 106; On Nature and Grace, chap. 26; On Rebuke and Grace, chap. 11; City of God, 14.27), he would understand that, in Augustine's opinion, man could not persevere without the general and special help of God. To this pertains what follows (Enchiridion, chap. 107): *Man was made upright, so that he could remain in that rectitude, but not without divine help.* Here we must understand special help, because without general help man could not even exist, let alone remain in rectitude.

He objects from Augustine (On Rebuke and Grace, chap. 11), that Adam did not need the help that we do, who say: *I see another law, etc.* But what kind of argument is this: he did not need the help that we do, for subduing rebellion; therefore, he needed none for avoiding the fall?

He objects from the same author (On the Good of Perseverance, chap. 7): that in man there were powers for persevering before he fell. But was it for persevering without the help of God? Or for persevering in every temptation? The adversary adds this from his own invention. Man could persevere if he willed; but he did not have it in him to will constantly without special grace. Therefore, he needed it. He could have not sinned, if he willed; whether he had it in him to never will to sin, is the question. The event speaks for itself, that he did not. It is false, therefore, what he adds, that Augustine means, *not indeed that Adam could have persevered without any grace, but that the very grace, without which he could not have persevered, was in the power of his free will.* But what is this, if not to enslave God with his grace to the power of man, to make grace itself, God himself, dependent on free will? To make Augustine a patron of such great impiety?

Concerning the consensus of the Scholastics, to which he finally points, as I have said, we are not concerned. Lombard, the Master of them all (2 Sent., dist. 24), does not help the adversary. He says that help was given to man for remaining, *if he willed.* He does not say that it was given to him so *that he would will.* Indeed, he says that man, through the help of creation, could not live spiritually; which, although it is false, is nevertheless adverse to Bellarmine.

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LECTURE VI. November 7, 1611.

CHAPTER FIVE.

Whether the righteousness which the first man received in creation  
was a supernatural gift?

1. He posits the fourth proposition. §. *Propositionem*.
2. He explains the same, supposing three hypotheses. §. *Sciendum*.
3. He expounds the opinion of both our side and his own dissenting side. §. *Iam igitur*.
4. He contends that his own opinion is the more common one. §. *Primum igitur*.

**EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION**

He boasts that he has proven three propositions against the Pelagians. Let the latter two stand against them as much as they can. We have shown them to be full of sophistications. He levels the fourth against the Lutherans, equally sophistical, which in the title and in the text reads thus: *That rectitude with which Adam was created, and without which men are born after his fall, was a supernatural gift.*

I have called it sophistical. For it is true with respect to corrupt nature, above which we confess the rectitude lost in the first Adam and recovered in the second to be. It is false with respect to integral nature, about which alone the question is. For it is denied that that rectitude was above this integral nature.

2. The HYPOTHESES which he lays down for his explanation are all false.  
FIRST: In man, who consists of body and spirit, there are naturally two contrary propensities: one of the body toward corporeal and sensible good, through sense and appetite; the other of the spirit, toward spiritual and intelligible good, through intelligence and will. From this he will infer that the struggle of contrary propensities is natural to man. This is entirely false, whether you consider integral or corrupt nature. There is no third nature. It is false that in integral nature there was a struggle of propensities. For man was borne in an orderly manner toward both goods, without rebellion of the flesh and spirit, which the adversary confessed above (chap. 2, § Deinde). Indeed, it is false that the propensities are contrary. They are disparate; they are not contrary in themselves; they have become contrary by accident, through sin. For just as the body and soul are not contrary in themselves—otherwise they would repel each other and not coalesce into the one nature of man—so the animal and corporeal propensities are not contrary in themselves, because they did not repel each other in integral nature. Concerning corrupt nature, it is not true that the soul is borne toward the spiritual good, except in a very homonymous sense: for the natural man receiveth not the things of the

Spirit of God (1 Corinthians 2:14). Whence it is a false inference that he makes here and below (chap. 6, § Ratio Prima), that the struggle of the two propensities is natural to man; by which opinion God would be openly accused as the cause of sin. For those things which are natural in themselves, God is their author, because he is the author of nature. If, therefore, the rebellion of the flesh and spirit (which is sin, Galatians 5) is in nature in itself, it must be from God, the author of nature, which the adversary himself will strongly deny a little later (chap. 6, § Secunda ratio); so nowhere is he consistent with himself.

**SECOND:** *God in creation, to apply a REMEDY to this DISEASE and LANGUOR of human nature, which arose from the condition of matter, added to man a supernatural gift, original justice, by which, as by a GOLDEN BRIDLE of Bellerophon, the lower part was contained in subjection to the higher, and the higher to God.* This also presupposes the falsehood that nature was created initially morbid, languid, and rebellious to itself and to God, and that original justice was bestowed on man as a REMEDY for this disease and languor, as a BRIDLE for this rebellion. Who has ever heard of such a fiction? Who that has read the history of creation even cursorily could patiently bear it? The whole thing is a false and blasphemous fiction against the author of nature, God, who created man neither morbid nor rebellious, but, as the adversary confesses (chap. 2, prop. 2), upright and integral, needing no bridle, no remedy. For there was not yet any disease. What need of a remedy? There was no rebellion. To what purpose, then, a bridle? *By no such strife, says Augustine (On Rebuke and Grace, chap. 11), was he tempted and disturbed by himself against himself in that place of beatitude; he enjoyed peace with himself.* Does he think that the nature of man was created unbridled and untamed? Far be this madness from Christian minds. And let him not tell us that man would have been so, if God had not added original justice as a bridle. He might as well say that he would have been an ox, if God had not bestowed reason and speech. What is this, if not to confound and abolish the natures of things based on a false hypothesis?

**THIRD:** Natural is said in four ways, supernatural in two. Both are false. There are indeed various modes of "natural," but in this question, only two. Of "supernatural," there is only one, as was shown above (chap. 1). Let us see Bellarmine's four modes. I. Natural, he says, is what is derived from nativity, as by nature we are children of wrath. From this it follows that what the adversary imagines—man in pure naturals without corruption and guilt—is false. For we all derive this most of all from nativity. On the contrary, what we say is true: that rectitude was natural to the first man. For man derived this from creation, which was his nativity. Whence Augustine did not hesitate to call original rectitude a "GOOD OF NATURE" (On the Spirit and the Soul). Bellarmine sensed this knot. He therefore concedes that, in this way, original justice can be called natural. What, then, does he contend? But, he says, this signification does not pertain here. Why so? Because this "natural" is not opposed to

"supernatural". You are mistaken. Is not natural corruption opposed to supernatural regeneration?

II. Natural, he says, is what is consonant with nature, and which does not destroy it, but adorns and perfects it, as when the Apostle says that the Gentiles do by nature those things that are of the law (Romans 2:14). He says that this also does not pertain here, because this "natural" is also not opposed to "supernatural". Which reason is not true. For the natural knowledge of the law is opposed to the supernatural revelation of the law, written on tablets or in hearts.

III. Natural, he says, is what helps and perfects nature. But how is this different from the previous one? Did not that one also adorn and perfect nature? But he concedes that even in this sense, original justice is rightly called natural. In this sense, therefore, he concedes his own proposition is false, and our assertion is true. What remains? We have a twice-confessing defendant. The limitation he adds is not consistent with itself: that it helps and perfects nature only in its natural operations, but does not elevate it to supernatural works. For if original justice was grace that makes one pleasing and was supernatural (which he said in chap. 3), how did it not elevate nature to supernatural things?

IV. Natural, he says, is what is either a part of nature, or flows from the principles of nature, like the soul, body, and the proper faculties and operations of both. He wants the question to be about this signification alone. But this is false. We could indeed maintain that, even in this signification, the justice of origin, as a "good of nature" as Augustine calls it, was natural to the first man, no less than the faculty of sensing, seeing, etc. As was alleged from Luther above (chap. 1): for from an illuminated mind came illustrious knowledge of God and divine things; from a just and holy will and heart, as from a most limpid fount, gushed forth just and holy operations, no less naturally, although through the medium of free will, than vision from the eye, etc. But it is not necessary to press this. I say, what was natural to Adam was, first, whatever constituted his nature or flowed from the principles of his constituted nature in itself; second, whatever belonged to the principles of nature for its perfection in itself, and without which nature was not originally created in its principles. For from where shall we estimate the nature and natural qualities of man, if not from the first creation of nature? Will our adversary call us here from Moses to Aristotle, who is ignorant of the creation of nature? Whatever was co-created with the heavens, the stars, the fish, the birds, all the brute animals—that this was bestowed on them naturally by God, the author of nature, no sane person doubts or denies. And shall we not estimate the nature of man from his first creation? Shall we not say that the rectitude co-created with him was natural? Whence it appears that the question is not about Bellarmine's fourth mode, but about his first and third, and our second. The adversary therefore perverts the state of the question. He says SUPERNATURAL is one thing in itself, another by accident. In itself is that

which by its kind is not apt to flow from the principles of nature, like the ascension of Elijah, the strength of Samson, etc. By accident is that which is sometimes obtained by a divine miracle, although it otherwise is wont to flow from the principles of nature, like sight in the blind man in John 9. He could have said in a word that all and only miracles and prodigies are supernatural. But this would hurt his own case, because original justice was not in the first man by a miracle, but by nature, because it was through creation, which was man's nativity. Thus also the gifts of grace would not be supernatural, because they are not miracles.

Be that as it may, the word itself teaches that those things are and should be called supernatural which are *above nature*, or which surpass nature. Concerning these, therefore, the Physicist or natural Philosopher knows nothing, but the Metaphysician and Theologian consider them. But the Theologian does not estimate nature from its essential principles alone—soul, body, powers—like the Physicist, but along with the native endowments of integrity from creation before sin, as it was integral, or with the native defects of corruption from the fall after sin, as it is corrupt. To the Theologian, therefore, not only is that supernatural which is not apt to flow from the principles of nature, but whatever surpasses and exceeds the principles or native endowments of integral nature, or the native defects of corrupt nature. Whence SUPERNATURAL things are now said to be not only miracles and prodigies, but also the gifts of grace, by which corrupt nature is reintegrated. But original justice was not and cannot be called supernatural to man before the fall, because it was not above integral nature, nor did it exceed the native endowments of integral nature.

3. So much for the false hypotheses. Now follows the explanation of the opinions, first ours, then that of the adversary and other Sophists.

In the declaration of our opinion, all things are ambiguous and false. 1. That we say rectitude was natural to Adam in the last mode. This is false. We say it was natural in Bellarmine's first and third modes, and in our second. 2. That it was a certain "DUE HEALTH" of nature. We do not say it was health, which is opposed to disease, but rectitude and integrity, which are opposed to obliquity and corruption. Anselm used "due" to mean "fitting" or "perfecting". We do not speak so. He is preparing a calumny with this word, about which more below (chap. 9). 3. That some natural good is now lacking in man, a calumny dealt with above (chap. 1). 4. That if original justice were now restored to some man, we would say it was a supernatural gift by accident. On the contrary, since original rectitude now begins to be repaired in us by supernatural grace, we say it is simply supernatural.

In the declaration of his own opinion, he posits five points, all false.

- FIRST, he says that rectitude was supernatural to man in itself, because it did not flow from the principles of nature. We have shown this to be false. It

flowed from the native endowments of integral nature. Therefore, it was not supernatural.

- SECOND, he says that the struggle of the lower part with the higher was natural to man, but was impeded by the bridle of a supernatural gift. And we have shown this to be false (hypoth. 1 & 2). Now indeed this struggle is natural to corrupt nature. To say it was then natural to integral nature is blasphemous against God, the author of nature. Rebellion is sin and the tinder of sin. If, therefore, rebellion was then restrained by a bridle and needed to be restrained, it was certainly in integral nature, and it was from God, the author of nature, and nature was not integral, because it was not without vicious rebellion—all of which are false. Nor does it matter what he says, that with the supernatural gift removed, it *would have been* natural. For this is to imagine incoherent things (*ἀσύστατα*): an integral man who is not integral. What he mixes in about the condition of matter is atheological. All corruption of nature is from the sin of man, which Philosophy does not know. Before sin, therefore, the condition of matter was not actually corruptible, but incorruptible, from the internal principle of the soul, about which more later.
  - THIRD, he says: man in pure naturals does not differ more from fallen man than a naked man differs from a despoiled one. But this naked man in pure naturals, whom he imagines, is a phantasm, the like of which God created none in the nature of things. Scripture says fallen man is not only despoiled, but also mortified, dead in sins. These are the seeds of Pelagianism, which are gradually sown in this chapter.
  - FOURTH, he says: human nature is not worse, if you subtract original guilt, nor does it labor more with ignorance and infirmity than it would have been and would have labored if it had been created in pure naturals. A false hypothesis. The nature of man was not, nor was it to be, created in fictitious "naturals," but had to be created either integral or corrupt. There is no third option. It is therefore false that human nature is not now worse, with guilt excepted, and that the ignorance and infirmity of man are from nature. This is Pelagianism and Manichaeism, condemned in Scripture as often as the guilt for blindness and defects is removed from nature and from God, the author of nature, and placed on the sin of man.
  - FINALLY, he says: the corruption of nature consists not in the accession of any evil quality, but in the sole loss of the supernatural gift. This is what his words mean. Which Pelagian fiction he himself will refute below (Book on Original Sin, chaps. 17, 18, 19).
4. So much for the declaration of the proposition and the opinions. What follows to the end is irrelevant to the matter and to us. He says his opinion is the more common

one among the Doctors. He therefore confesses it is not the opinion of all. Whose it is not, we will see below (Book on the Loss of Grace, chaps. 15, 16, 20), where he will refute his own side. This is their divine consensus in all things. He strives in every way to make Thomas his own. He adds Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel, Marsilius, and more recent Sophists like Johann Driedo and Ruard Tapper, and finally Popes Pius V and Gregory XIII, who condemned the article that primeval integrity was the natural condition of Adam. There is no question that all these conspired in error; the question is how rightly they conspired, and how solidly the adversary proves it. Let him see, however, with what face he makes Thomas his own in the fourth and fifth chapters. Thomas confesses (I-II, q. 85, a. 2) that through sin not only were the supernatural gifts lost, but the good of nature was corrupted. Although he there interprets this concerning the good of the natural inclination to virtue being corrupted, a little earlier he defines original sin (which he elsewhere calls a "wound of nature," q. 87, a. 1) not by guilt alone, nor by the loss of a supernatural gift alone, but says it is a habit and an inordinate disposition, proceeding from the dissolution of the harmony in which original justice consisted; that it is not only the privation of that justice, but also a positive, corrupt habit. Bellarmine will openly attack this opinion below (Book on the Loss of Grace). And although Thomas says (in 2 Sent., dist. 30) that after sin the nature of man was left to itself, so as to consist according to the condition of its own principles, it is nevertheless false that, according to his opinion, whatever is now a penalty inflicted for sin would then have flowed from nature and the condition of nature, and that death and the other human defects exist from nature as from a cause in itself. This monstrous idea flowed from the school of the Physicists and of Pelagius, and it makes God, as the author of nature, also the cause in itself of death and human misery, the nature of which will be shown in chapter eight. Nevertheless, Bellarmine will champion this as if it were the Catholic faith in the following chapter. Before we pass to that, the fount of these monstrous ideas should be opened up here a little more lucidly.

Bellarmino disputes concerning the nature of man from the philosophy of Aristotle, not from the theology of Moses, the Prophets, and the Apostles. The Philosophers do not know the integral nature of man, nor do they know the corrupt nature, because they are ignorant of the creation and fall of man. They therefore fabricated for themselves a middle nature, consisting only of natural principles, parts, and faculties, for which all the things now adjacent to corrupt nature (with the exception of guilt, which they do not know) are natural in themselves. Imitating these, the Sophists, as if they had never seen the Sacred Letters nor read anything in them about the creation, nature, integrity, fall, corruption, and guilt of man, also fabricated a middle nature, a man in pure naturals, neither integral nor corrupt, but in the middle, such a one as God never created, and who never was, is, or will be in the nature of things. The adversary, therefore, in this whole disputation, acts not as

a Christian Theologian, but as a profane Philosopher and sophist, foully corrupting Theology from Philosophy in the manner of his ancestors, so that it is deservedly fitting for us to heed here the admonition of the Apostle: *Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men* (Colossians 2:8). How theology speaks of nature and natural things, I have explained above. I will repeat it here as a conclusion, if I can, more explicitly. NATURAL THINGS are partly common to integral and corrupt nature, partly proper to each. Common are all the essential things, faculties, affections, and operations which were in the first man through creation and are in his posterity through generation. Proper to integral nature were the endowments and perfections of the soul and body: the wisdom of the mind, the justice of the will, the purity of the heart, the holiness of the appetite, the rectitude of motion, the immortality of the body, the felicity of the whole man. All these things, co-created with human nature and native to it, belonged to man in themselves—a matter unknown and absurd to Aristotle and all philosophers. Proper to corrupt nature are the defects and imperfections of the soul and body: the ignorance of the mind in divine things, the depravity of the will, the impurity of the heart, the disorder (*ἀταξία*) of the appetite, the rebellion of the flesh, languors, diseases, the death of the body, the eternal damnation of the whole man. All these things are adjacent to corrupt nature in themselves, and are native to corrupt man from sin: *we were by nature the children of wrath* (Ephesians 2:3); *dead in... sins* (Ephesians 2:1). *The malice of the wicked is natural* (Wisdom 12:10). Philosophy is ignorant of these things and laughs at them. Yet Bellarmine dares to rub this scab of the philosophers onto theology.

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LECTURE VII. November 8, 1611.

CHAPTER SIX.

Bellarmino's Arguments for the Supernatural Gift are Proposed and Examined.

1. He proves the fourth proposition with four authorities from Scripture. §. *Primo*.
2. With nine testimonies from the Fathers and Scholastics. §. *Accedit*.
3. With five reasons. §. *Prima ratio*.

#### **EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION**

From the Scriptures, he brings forth four authorities for the supernatural gift, to which a brief response must be made.

Passage 1: Genesis 3:19. For dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.

From this, he argues: He who by nature is dust could not have original rectitude as natural, due to the nature of contraries. Man is by nature dust. Therefore, etc. He proves the assumption with a paraphrase of the words of Genesis 3: because with these words God indicates that although He had, by his kindness, made man glorious, so that he need not fear death, yet since he is dust by the condition of his nature, and by his own fault has fallen back into his natural state, therefore he must return to dust.

RESPONSE: Either the major premise is false—for one who is dust by nature according to the body can naturally have original rectitude according to the soul, like the first man—or it is a fallacy of *secundum quid* [from a qualified sense]. For he who is dust by nature simply, according to all parts of his essence, cannot have rectitude as natural. But man is called dust only *secundum quid*, by reason of his body. Otherwise, one would have to say that the soul also was made from dust and is composite, corruptible, and mortal. 2. The gloss of the assumption is a false cause (a non causa). God threatens man with a return to dust—that is, death, burial, corruption—not because he had fallen back into his natural state, as the gloss imagines, but because he had descended by sinning from his natural state into another, praeternatural one. Because, He says, thou hast eaten of the tree, etc. (Genesis 3:17). He adds an argument from ease and congruity as to why the body must be resolved into dust through death: because it was made from dust.

Passage 2: Psalm 8:6. What is man, that thou art mindful of him? Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honour, etc.

The prophet, he says, marvels that man, by his nature corporeal, mortal, and subject to the affections of other animals, was made by God nearly equal to the angels. Also, glory and honor are something extrinsic to nature. Therefore, original rectitude was not natural to man, but extrinsic and supernatural.

RESPONSE: 1. The first part of the antecedent is false, and a false cause. The Prophet does not marvel that God made man, who in his first nature was mortal, equal to the angels; but that He deigns with his goodness and paternal love to be mindful of man who was once, indeed, by his nature next to the Angels, but is now, by his own fault, miserable, prostrate on the ground, and mortal. For this is what is meant by: that thou art mindful of him, that thou visitest him. This is the true cause of the admiration, not the one the gloss imagines. The adversary therefore assumes what is in question about the first nature and mortal condition of man, which he himself will deny in chapter 8. 2. The latter member of the antecedent is also false. God crowned man with glory within—true holiness, justice, wisdom, which cannot be denied was an internal glory of his nature—and with honor without—dominion over all creatures, about which it says there: Thou hast subjected all

things under his feet, etc. For glory is from virtue, an internal good; honor is from office, an external good. Original justice, therefore, was both the internal and the external proper adornment of integral nature.

Passage 3: Sirach 17:1. (Pareus cites v. 21) God created man of the earth, and clothed him with strength according to himself.

Creation, he says, refers to nature; the clothing of virtue refers to superadded gifts. But this clothing of virtue was original rectitude. Therefore, this was a superadded gift.

RESPONSE: 1. The passage is Apocryphal and proves nothing. 2. The major is false. For with both members Sirach describes the integral nature of man: in the former, the nature of the body, from the earth; in the latter, the nature and endowments of the soul. Otherwise, one would have to say that the entire nature of man, even his soul, was made from the earth.

Passage 4: From the parable of the traveler in Luke 10.

The argument is this: The traveler who was despoiled and wounded did not lose his nature, but only his extrinsic goods. That traveler is the first man, despoiled and wounded by sin. The reason is that many fathers interpret it thus: Ambrose, Bede, Theophylact, Basil, Augustine, Bernard. Therefore, the first man through sin did not lose his natural qualities, but only the external garment of original justice.

RESPONSE: 1. Allegories prove nothing. For as the adversary admits (Book 3, On the Word of God, chap. 3), arguments are effective only from the literal sense, not from the mystical. Therefore, saving the authority of the Fathers, for whom it is all too familiar to pursue allegories that are not solid, the minor is denied. For it rests on no testimony of Scripture, nor was it in Christ's mind in the parable of the despoiled and wounded traveler to explain the state of the first man or the fall and reparation of the human race, but to set before the eyes the doctrine concerning one's neighbor and the duty of love. And so the whole allegory can be repudiated. 2. Even if admitted, however, it will not help the adversary's cause, but will harm it. For he wants man, having lost only the supernatural garment, to have retained all his natural qualities unharmed, and for corruption not to consist in any vitiosity of nature. But that traveler did not retain his nature integral. For he was despoiled and wounded lethally. Wounds are a dissolution of the continuous, a lesion of the integral. Therefore, they do not leave nature integral, but harm and destroy it. Man, therefore, was not only despoiled of the garment of innocence without, but was furthermore wounded to death by an intrinsic lesion of nature within. Whence it follows that all the things the adversary posits from the school of Pelagius are false: 1. That corruption consists in the sole loss of a supernatural garment. 2. That no evil quality arose in the nature of man from that loss. 3. That all natural qualities were left and preserved integral for man. He who is

despoiled is only deprived of external things; he who is also wounded to death loses health, life, and nature. The traveler, therefore, despoiled and wounded unto death, not only suffered the loss of external goods, but furthermore received lethal, intrinsic wounds to his nature, which did not leave man half-dead, as the parable has it, but utterly killed and mortified him, according to the Scriptures: The wages of sin is death (Romans 6:23); when you were dead in your sins (Ephesians 2:1). The adversary therefore twists the parable, not only against Scripture, but also against the Scholastics, Thomas chief among them, who commonly teach that the supernatural gifts were lost through the fall, but the natural ones were corrupted.

2. From the authorities of nine Fathers and Scholastics, an argument of this sort is had: What the Fathers and Scholastics hand down is true. But they hand down that original rectitude was supernatural, and that with its loss the natural qualities were preserved integral, and that corruption consists in the sole loss of it, and in no evil quality. Dionysius, Basil, Chrysostom, Cyril, Ambrose, Anselm, Bernard. Therefore, it is true.

RESPONSE: 1. That the major premise, taken universally, must be denied and is false, was shown above in the preface. 2. Nor is the minor true. For the Fathers do not hold the Pelagian monstrosities that the adversary foists upon them. Let us briefly see the sayings of each.

**DIONYSIUS**, speaking of Demons, not of man, says that the angelic gifts bestowed on them were not changed, but were preserved integral (*On the Divine Names*, chap. 4, Par. 4). What has this to do with the nature of man? He adds the gloss of Ficino, eliciting from it that the nature of man remained integral. What do I hear? It is not, therefore, corrupted. But for us, will the gloss of Ficino, so manifestly false and heretical, be authentic? Above, he conceded that the nature of man was wounded and corrupted. Here, from Ficino, he makes it integral again. What vertigo is this? He evades: he says it is called integral with respect to the state that could have been, if God had created man in pure naturals; but corrupt with respect to the state of sin, in which man now is. These are empty tricks. The dispute is not about the integrity of a fictitious man created in pure naturals, such as never was, is, or will be in the nature of things, but about the integrity and state of the true man, created by God, such as he was in the state of creation and is in the state of sin. Let the Pelagian gloss therefore depart.

**BASIL** also says nothing about the nature of man (*On the Holy Spirit*, chap. 16). He says that angels are not holy by nature, that is, essentially, as the Holy Spirit is. In which way Jerome also says (*Dialogue Against the Pelagians*) that God alone is immortal, because he is so not through grace, like other things, but through nature. This signification of "nature" does not pertain to the present question. That this is the sense is clear from the reason added there, but suppressed by the adversary: *Because otherwise they would have no difference from the*

Holy Spirit. And indeed he is speaking of the sanctity of immutability, which it is true the angels have not by nature, but by grace. *What else, he says, is confirmation, than perfection in sanctity, with the word 'confirmation' signifying constancy and immutability, and firmness in the good?* This also has nothing to do with the adversary's point.

**CHRYSOSTOM** compares the glory of original justice to a garment (Homily 18 on Genesis). But I have taught above that man was clothed and crowned with glory within, with true holiness and justice. The internal garment was therefore of the nature of integral man; when this was lost within, nudity and baseness appeared without.

**CYRIL** says (Book 1 on John, chap. 9/13) that God by his mercy makes a small and abject creature, according to nature, great and admirable. Who does not see that he is speaking of the nature of man as small and abject *after* the fall, and of its exaltation to supernatural dignity through Christ? This has nothing to do with nature *before* the fall, whose integrity Cyril there calls the pristine "beauty of NATURE" and the integral "dignity of NATURE". The adversary's gloss is therefore false and repugnant to the mind and words of Cyril.

**AMBROSE** (On Paradise, chap. 5) and **AUGUSTINE** (Book 12, *City of God*, chap. 13) call innocence a garment with which man was clothed before the fall and of which he was despoiled after the fall. But it was just shown that this garment, co-created within man, was true justice and holiness. Augustine also calls it grace, because God had graciously co-created it for man, although mutably, so that if he should fall away from it, he would lose his integral nature and have a corrupt one. Therefore, in the same place he says that we derive a vitiated nature in our members from birth, which is against the adversary's fiction of a preserved integral nature. Elsewhere, he also expressly calls original integrity a "GOOD OF NATURE" (*On the Spirit and the Soul*, chap. 48). Thus also **JEROME** (Commentary on Hosea 3) calls the dignity from which the demons fell "grace," because they had received graciously in their nature what they lost by sinning.

**ANSELM** says (On the Conception of the Virgin, chap. 1) that man, placed in such a high state of grace, forsook the goods he had received, which is against the adversary. For he had received and forsook the goods proper to his integral nature. But who would doubt that the goods of nature are natural?

**BERNARD** plainly speaks for us, saying (Sermon 1 on the Annunciation) that the image of God was not "sewn on," but was "INBORN and impressed upon nature itself".

He understands it, therefore, to have been natural to man, no less than the law of nature, impressed and inborn, is rightly called natural. The adversary is therefore strangled by his own sword.

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### Bellarmino's Reasons Examined

3. Bellarmine's Reasons are mostly so distorted that it is quite apparent he is laying traps for his readers. I will nevertheless endeavor to illustrate them all.

**REASON I:** In proper form, it will be this:

- That by which the first parents lacked the natural struggle of the flesh and spirit was a supernatural gift.
- By original rectitude they lacked that natural struggle.
- Therefore, it was a supernatural good.

**RESPONSE:** 1. The major premise is false. That struggle, if indeed it had been natural to the body, could have been restrained by the natural excellence of the soul, adorned with perfect wisdom, justice, and holiness. This was truly the cause why the first man was free from rebellion: because the body was informed and ruled by a holy and integral soul. Just as now the disorder (*ἀταξία*) of the lower part does not arise from itself (for it is brute), but its vitiosity flows down into it from the higher part, so much so that a man is not thought to have sinned even with his external members if he does something against the law without his mind, without which neither sense nor any member performs its office. Wherefore the Lord teaches in the Gospel that every sin proceeds from the heart of man (Matthew 15:19). For this reason, I do not know whether the Sophists are to be laughed at or driven out, who rail until they are hoarse against the lower part alone, as if against the sole tinder of sin—namely, so they can slip a bribe to free will, which they place on a royal throne. That is, they accuse one stray sheep of theft so that they may devour them all.

2. The minor premise is also false, that rebellion was natural to the first man. For how was that natural to man which destroyed the integrity of his nature? How, if rebellion was natural, was God, the author of nature, not the cause of rebellion and sin? The proof of the Minor which Bellarmine posits is null. For it only proves that the two propensities of the flesh and spirit were *different*; not, however, that they were *contrary* and *struggling*, as they began to be after the fall, as was shown above.
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## LECTURE VIII. November 11, 1611.

**REASON II:** If the corruption of nature which now exists is not from the sole removal of a supernatural gift, and would not have been in man if he had been created in a state of pure naturals, then the cause of corruption will either be God, or the forbidden apple, or the breath of the serpent, or no other. But God is not the cause of corruption, because *lust is not of the Father, but is of the world* (1 John 2:16), and *Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God* (James 1:13). He also proluxly alleges Augustine to this point, removing the cause of sin from God. Nor can the cause be transferred to the apple or the serpent. No other cause can be given either. Therefore, corruption is from the sole removal of a supernatural gift, and the corruption that now is would have existed in man created in a purely natural state.

**RESPONSE:** 1. The reason, however it may be formed, does not conclude what it ought—that original rectitude was supernatural—but something else: that the corruption of nature is only the loss of original rectitude. This was the fifth member of the adversary's opinion above (chap. 5, § *Nos vero*), aimed at paving the way before its time for the Pelagian dogma (which Bellarmine will defend below by profession against Thomas) that Original Sin consists not in some evil quality, but in the sole loss of original justice. This is not yet the question here, but will pertain to the disputation on original sin. Thus this whole reason wanders outside the flock.

2. The proposition is false. For whether corruption is said to have followed from the removal of a natural or a supernatural gift, and whether corruption consists in that loss alone or not, its evident and certain cause can be given without absurdity.
3. The assumption is also false. For even if neither the apple, nor the serpent's breath, nor God is the efficient cause of corruption, imparting lust and an evil quality to man, yet the adversary himself gives another, but false, cause: the condition of matter. By us, another true efficient cause is given: the malice of Satan, who, like a robber, despoils man of his integrity and inspires the lethal venom of concupiscence and depravity into the heart of man. For the depravity of the human heart has its origin from the Devil, the author of depravity. Another true cause is also given: the free will of man, voluntarily turning itself from God to the Devil and corrupting itself. For just as when a privation is posited in a suitable subject, the contrary habit is posited, so when the turning away from God was posited, a turning toward the Devil succeeded in the mind and the whole nature of man, which is habitual corruption and depravity. As one who closes his eyes to the light becomes blind; who casts off reason becomes mad; who by intemperance loses health, contracts disease; who finally throws away life, induces death; so man, having cast off rectitude in mind, will, and heart, voluntarily induced upon himself contrary evil qualities: for wisdom, blindness of mind; for justice, depravity of will; for holiness,

disorder (*αταξία*) of the heart and appetite, so that there is no need to seek another, imparting cause.

Yet a third, true cause is also given: divine justice, which the adversary himself says despoiled man of the supernatural gift and removed original justice from man. If this had slipped from our pen, we would not be free from the crime of blasphemy according to him. For if God himself removed the supernatural gift from man, if he despoiled man of that gift, how will he not be the author of corruption? Yet we acknowledge this is rightly said. For God is rightly said to have taken away and removed the original endowments from man, and, as our author says, to have despoiled him, as a just judge, in punishment for sin; just as a judge in court is rightly said to take away and remove the life of a criminal for a crime committed.

That he casts the blame on the condition of matter is insipid. For in the schools, no action is given to matter, but only passion; nor could the condition of matter be the cause of sin in man any more than in a brute animal. Therefore, from FREE WILL, which the Sophists extol to the heavens, sin and corruption properly arose, and from there flowed into matter. The consequent being refuted, the antecedent—that corruption consists in the sole loss of original rectitude—falls of its own accord. What he appends to this, that corruption would have been present even in pure naturals, is a Manichaeian chimera, making God the author of corruption, about which more below.

**REASON III:** What effect all other sins now produce, the same and no other effect it seems the first actual sin of Adam could also have produced. But by other actual sins only the good of supernatural grace is lost; a propensity for committing the same sin is acquired; the inclination to the virtue contrary to that sin is diminished; but a principle or any gift of nature is not corrupted, nor is a propensity to all vices acquired, nor is the inclination to all virtues lost. Therefore, through Adam's sin also, the principles and natural gifts do not seem to have been able to be corrupted, nor could concupiscence have arisen in man, unless it had followed from the composite nature of contraries after the gift of original justice was removed.

**RESPONSE:** 1. This reason also does not conclude what it ought, but something else: that the natural qualities were not corrupted, and that the cause of corruption is the composition of nature. Both of these are irrelevant, false, and repugnant to sacred Scripture and the received doctrine of the Scholastics.

2. The major premise is false, because the same effect cannot be established for the sin of Adam and for the sins of others, since that was a universal sin, while others are only personal. That one therefore brought in a universal corruption, both with respect to men and to vices, an aversion from every virtue, and a propensity to

every vice. All other sins induce only a personal corruption, a particular aversion from virtue, and an inclination to vices.

3. The assumption is also false through and through. For by the actual sins of the reborn, although the supernatural gift of grace, faith, justification, regeneration, adoption, etc., is gravely shaken, diminished, and disturbed, yet it is not utterly lost so as to vanish in the reborn. For some seed of God always remains in them; some remnants of supernatural grace are preserved, according to the promises: *I will not take my mercy from them for ever* (Psalm 89:34); *I will give my fear in their hearts, that they may never depart from me* (Jeremiah 32:40), that is, as Augustine interprets, *that they may perseveringly adhere to me*. Of which more at length below, where the adversary himself will contend that Catholics, if they fall into fornication, adultery, etc., do not lose faith.

But let us grant that the reborn, when they sin, utterly lose the gift of grace. Nevertheless, all the other things he philosophizes so frigidly about the effect of actual sins are false. For by sins gravely and repeatedly committed, not a slight inclination to the same sins, but a habitual depravity is gradually contracted. It is false that a principle or any natural gift is not corrupted. For by the habit of drinking, lying, stealing, fornicating, robbing, the mind, will, and heart of man pass entirely into these vices. He ought to have learned from the philosophers that repeated vices pass into a vicious habit, into nature itself, and corrupt the principles of ethical actions. Finally, if all the things he assumes were true, the consequence is still null, because of the dissimilarity of the original gift in the state of innocence and in the state of sin. For in the latter, the gift of grace is truly supernatural to a corrupt nature; in the former, it was natural to an integral nature, as has been demonstrated above. This entire reason is therefore vain and null.

**REASON IV:** If human nature, such as it now is, with guilt removed, is evil and necessarily falls into sins, and therefore could not have been created by God without original justice, as the adversaries wish, it certainly follows that a dead man cannot be recalled to life by God unless endowed with original justice. But we read of none in the sacred letters who were raised from the dead—Lazarus, the sons of the widows in Sunam and Sarepta, in Nain—without original justice. Therefore, the creature, such as it now is, with guilt removed, is not evil, etc.

**RESPONSE:** Again the reason wanders outside the flock. It ought to conclude: original justice was supernatural to integral man. It concludes: human nature, such as it now is, with guilt removed, is not evil. This, of course, was the question. But omitting this, I say:

1. Even if the three things which he sophistically joins in the antecedent of the major premise are conceded, the consequence is null. God could raise the dead as he wished. For if he created whom and what he wished, why could he not raise them

how and as he wished? Who has laid down a law for him? That which the adversary tacitly assumes—that God is bound to the same mode of creation and of resurrection—is rash. He, of course, will force the divine omnipotence into the circle of his reason.

2. I say, the three suppositions of the antecedent are not our assertions, but the adversary's fictions. Where, I ask, has he found in our writings that human nature, with guilt removed, is evil? We say that human nature in the state of sin, without guilt, is nothing; in the state of innocence, it was integral and very good. We do not say that nature in a state of pure naturals necessarily falls into sin; for such a nature is fantastical, not falling into sin necessarily or contingently, except fantastically. Nor do we say that nature could not have been created by God without original justice. For shall we set a limit to the divine power? At the least, we say that God, when he created an integral man, could not deny himself by creating an integral man without integrity.
3. What he adds in the reason from the greater case: *If God could join the just souls of Lazarus and the infants to a mortal, animal body, subject to concupiscence and ignorance, much more could He in the beginning have joined souls neither just nor unjust to a similar body. But the former is true, therefore the latter.* This has nothing to do with the matter. Let us grant the whole thing. God *could* have. You conclude: Therefore, he *did*. How insipid! That what you say is false, the history of creation proves. To imagine souls in this question that are neither just nor unjust is atheological and should be left to the new Metaphysicians, the depravers of Theology.

**REASON V:** The first parents were elevated to such a dignity that they were sons of God, and certain Gods. But it is surely most absurd to make a created thing, such as man is, God or the Son of God by nature, because Christ alone is the natural Son of God. Therefore Augustine says: *No one is a son by grace, because he is not by nature* (Against Maximinus, Book 2, chap. 15). Cyril says: *The reason of nature is one thing, that of adoption another; and that of a true son is one thing, that of an adopted son another* (Book 1 on John, chap. 28).

**RESPONSE:** From this it only follows that the first parents were not and cannot be called naturally Gods or sons of God, which is not in question, nor do we say it. For they were Gods neither naturally nor in any other way, except improperly, by a certain metaphor or catachresis. They were sons of God before the fall, just as the angels were: not by nature, as Christ is, understanding "nature" as substance, as Augustine says in the same place it should be understood: *Know that whatever thing is said to exist by substance, this exists precisely by nature*; nor by the grace of adoption, as we are, but by the grace of creation. And although creation was their nativity, and what one has from nativity is rightly said to be had naturally, according to the adversary, yet for the sake of avoiding ambiguity and

error, they should not be said to have been sons of God naturally, because to be a son naturally is to be a son by substance, which does not apply to them. But nothing prohibits saying that they were naturally just and holy, because they derived original justice and holiness from creation as if from nativity. But what is derived from nativity, as the adversary testifies, is derived naturally. From all of which it follows that original justice was natural to Adam, not supernatural.

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LECTURE IX. November 12, 1611.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

Arguments Against the Aforesaid Opinion are Refuted and Vindicated.

**EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION**

The ARGUMENTS which Bellarmine takes up to be refuted are of two kinds. Some prove that original rectitude was natural to Adam. These we acknowledge as ours and will defend. Such are arguments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 13. The rest prove that man in a state of pure naturals, with guilt removed, did not have the corruption and rebellion of the flesh. These are not ours, for we know nothing of a fictitious man in pure naturals, not created by God. They belong, rather, to certain Sophists, with whom Bellarmine has a dispute here. We will therefore let these pass. Ours, which the adversary proposes distortedly in his usual manner, we will vindicate briefly in a more correct form.

ARGUMENT I: If original justice had been supernatural, the concupiscence of the flesh would have been natural. But this is not so, because then it would have been from God, which scripture denies: Concupiscence is not of the Father (1 John 2:16); Paul says he hates it (Romans 7:15); Augustine everywhere proves it is evil and contrary to nature (Contra Julianum, Book 6). Therefore, the former is also not so.

RESPONSE to the assumption: Concupiscence would have been natural, not as a good of nature, but as a defect and disease of nature. But this is false. For if the nature of brute animals was created by the creator without defect and disease, who will believe that the nature of man alone, more excellent than all brutes, would have been with defect, morbid, and more unhappy than all brutes? Therefore, rebellion and concupiscence would have been in man as a sin, because rebellion and concupiscence are a sin, against the precept, Thou shalt not covet. Thus God, the author of nature, would necessarily be the author of sin. But this is false. Therefore, that is also false. The argument therefore stands.

**ARGUMENT II:** From Augustine, where he says that the vices and wounds of the soul are privations of natural goods (Enchiridion, chap. 11), it will be this in form:

- Privations of natural goods presuppose the habit of the same.
- The vices and wounds of the soul in men are privations of natural goods—of original rectitude and justice—according to Augustine's testimony there.
- Therefore, these vices and wounds of the soul presuppose the habit of natural goods.
- Therefore, original rectitude and justice were a natural good for man.

**RESPONSE** to the minor premise by distinguishing natural goods: Vices are privations of natural goods, that is, of rectitude, not of that kind which was in the first man, but of that kind which could have been if man had been created in a state of pure naturals. You see the vain evasion. Augustine is speaking of vices, and of their contrary natural goods, not those which can or could have been, but which truly are and were in created man. Augustine never dreamed of a fantastical man in pure naturals, in whom there is neither justice nor sin, who would be neither alive nor dead. But what foolishness, to imagine a good opposed to vices in a man created without sin and without justice? Thus, being neither good nor bad, how could he have a good opposed to vices? But let us suppose he had it. It nevertheless follows: if a natural good opposed to vices must be posited in a state of pure naturals, the privation of it—the vice of concupiscence—could not be posited in a state of pure naturals. He further implicates himself by imagining that rectitude exists in pure naturals, inasmuch as it has no curvature of vice. For if no curvature of vice is posited in pure naturals, then no corruption can be posited either, because corruption is the curvature of vice. Therefore, either what he says here—that in pure naturals there is a rectitude lacking all curvature of vice—is false, or what he contended in the prior reason—that corruption would have been present even in pure naturals—was false.

**ARGUMENT III:** From Augustine, where he says it is of an angelic nature to adhere to God (*City of God*, Book 12). What he means is obscure. We will therefore state it more clearly:

- Such as is the good of the angelic nature towards God, such also is that of human nature, since both are rational and were created in rectitude to know God.
- The good of the angelic nature was to adhere to God, from the saying of Augustine.
- Therefore, this was also the good of human nature.
- Therefore, original rectitude was natural to man.

**RESPONSE** to the minor premise: It was of the nature of the angels to adhere to God, but not naturally. This is false. For Augustine says there: *Just as sight pertains to the nature of the eyes, so it is suitable for the angelic nature to adhere to God.* But who does not know that sight pertains naturally to the nature of the eyes? Why then would it not be naturally

suitable for the angelic nature to adhere to God? But AUGUSTINE has another thing there, which our author deliberately passed over. *Every vice*, he says, *harms nature, and for this reason is contrary to nature*. From this we argue thus:

- What is contrary to nature, its contrary is according to nature and natural.
- Every vice is now contrary to nature.
- Therefore, the contrary of vices, original rectitude, was for man according to nature, and natural.

**ARGUMENT V:** From the same Augustine, where he says that to approve true things for false, so as to err unwillingly, is not of the nature of man as instituted, but is the penalty of one condemned (*On Free Will*, Book 3, chap. 18). This is also obscure. More clearly, thus:

- That which is not of the nature of man as instituted, but is the penalty of one condemned, its contrary will be natural to man.
- To approve false things for true, and to err, was not of the nature of man as instituted, but is the penalty of one condemned, from the saying of Augustine.
- Therefore, the contrary of this—not to approve false things, not to err, that is, original wisdom and justice—is natural to man.

RESPONSE to the minor premise: Augustine is speaking of the nature of man as it was in the first man, not as it could have been.

COUNTER-RESPONSE: And we are now disputing about the nature of man as it was in the first man, not as it could have been from the fantasy of the Sophists. Augustine therefore is with us, and it remains true that it was of the nature of man as instituted—that is, as created by God—not to approve false things for true, not to err, etc.

**ARGUMENT VI:** From Leo, where he calls the innocence of the first parents natural (*Sermon 12 on the Passion of the Lord*). Innocence was original justice. Pope Leo, who according to Bellarmine could not err, calls this natural to man. Therefore, etc.

BELLARMINE distinguishes, that is, eludes the saying of Leo, that he calls it natural because it was bestowed with nature itself and was to be propagated to posterity in the manner of nature. But this does not solve the knot, but tightens it. For if innocence was to be propagated in the manner of nature to posterity, just as (which Bellarmine adds) original sin is propagated, then it was natural to Adam, that is, according to his integral nature, no less than original sin is now natural to his posterity, that is, according to their corrupt nature.

**ARGUMENT XIII:** From the end of man.

- The natural end of man supposed natural means in man for attaining it; otherwise, man would be more unhappy than all other things.
- Eternal beatitude, according to Thomas, was the natural end of man.
- Therefore, there were also natural means to it.
- But the means were the rectitude and original justice of man.
- Therefore, this was natural to man.

The argument is true and solid. Let us see what BELLARMINE has against it. *It is no small question*, he says, *whether eternal beatitude is the natural or supernatural end of man*. You hear the words of a wavering conscience. He would like to call the minor premise into doubt, but in vain. This is no question, except among the Sophists, the depravers of Theology. For if this is not the natural end of human nature, let him tell us what other natural end there is. He eludes the dictum of Thomas with a distinction: that eternal beatitude was the end of the first man with respect to appetite, but not with respect to attainment. This is a frivolous evasion. For what is an appetite without attainment? An appetite for something impossible to attain is vain. But the appetite of the first man could not have been vain, because a perfect nature was not subject to vanity. Therefore, the end was so not only with respect to appetite, but also with respect to attainment. Eternal beatitude, I say, was an end not only desirable, but also possible, and therefore natural to his integral nature. And thus the argument stands. Many more solid arguments are scattered throughout the treatment above, which for the sake of brevity we do not repeat.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

Whether Adam and his posterity could have died if they had not sinned?

1. He explains two errors, as he calls them, concerning the immortality of the human body. §. *Discernimus...*
2. He proposes his own two-part opinion. §. *Nos igitur*.
3. He confirms the same with some authorities from Scripture and Councils, and also by reason. §. *Quod igitur*.

### **EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION**

1. The common error of the PELAGIANS is that man would have died even if he had not sinned, according to the testimony of Augustine, who says they took this from the Physicists and Epicureans. The same error is defended today by the open and secret Socinians, that death is a consequence of rational nature just as it is of brute nature. Bellarmine rightly disapproves of this, but with what conscience, since he has hitherto posited and defended the principles of the same heresy?

1. He said absolutely in chap. 6 that man is dust. But dust is by nature corruptible, even without sin.
2. He said absolutely in the same place that man is by nature mortal. Therefore, he is not mortal from sin.
3. He said in chap. 5 that death and all defects flow from nature as from a cause in itself. If the cause *per se* is posited, the effect is posited. In man before sin, the cause of death *per se* was posited. Why not also death?
4. In the whole of chap. 6, he contends that corruption, under which death is included, belongs to man in a state of pure naturals, even without guilt. Therefore, either he is speaking of a phantasm of a man that never and nowhere existed, or he thinks with the Pelagians.
5. In the same place, he said that corruption, defects, and death flow from the condition of matter and a nature composed of contraries. But this condition of matter and composition of nature existed before sin. Therefore, before sin man would have been dead, which is what the Pelagians want.

Neither did they have other arguments of old, nor do the open and secret Socinians have any others today for their heresy, than these very ones of Bellarmine. The adversary therefore fights in the same camp with the Pelagians (whatever he may prevaricate), as long as he defends Pelagian principles. Nor should he say that man was by nature mortal, but by a supernatural gift would not have died before sin. For that supernatural gift has been refuted more than enough. And even if a supernatural gift is posited, he stumbles on another stone and is forced to say either that death is not at all an effect of sin, but of nature, or at least that it is an effect of sin by accident. The former he will again have in common with Pelagius; the latter will be false. Then all the Scriptures which testify that death is the effect, penalty, wage, and sting of sin would only be true by accident, and false in themselves. Then it would have to be said that Christ, by dying for our sins, did not free us from the cause of death *per se* (because he did not free us from nature), but only from the cause of death by accident—than which nothing is more false or absurd. Whatever, therefore, Bellarmine will dispute in this chapter about death being the penalty of sin will be nothing but an empty veneer, by which the Pelagianism of the Sophists is covered.

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#### LECTURE X. November 14, 1611.

The latter error, he says, is of those who not only hold that man would not have died if he had not sinned, but also wish that his immortality be called natural, not supernatural. With these words, he assails our opinion and condemns it as an error. He makes two members of

it. The former he holds in common with us against the Pelagians in this chapter. The latter alone he will attack in the following chapter. Yet he reprehends both here as if erroneous. By what cunning of Bellarmine does Baldwin the compendiator tacitly disapprove, having rightly posited only the latter member as our opinion in the controversy?

He says that the latter seems to follow from the opinion previously defended concerning the natural rectitude of integral man. So it is. For if integral man was by nature just, holy, and free from sin, he was certainly by nature immortal, because where there is no sin, there is no death. But omitting the latter for the present, let us see the former.

2. We will demonstrate, he says, first from the Scriptures, from the testimonies of the Fathers, and from reason itself, that death is the penalty of sin, and for this reason neither Adam nor his posterity could have died, unless guilt preceded. Then, that this immortality of the first man should be named not natural, but supernatural; not DUE, but gratuitous; not a condition of nature, but a benefit of grace. I will omit the latter for now, because it is owed to the following chapter. He connects the first two: that death is the penalty of sin, and that man could not have died unless guilt preceded. Neither is consistent with the adversary's hypotheses; the latter is also false.

As for the first: if death is from nature as from a cause *per se*, which Bellarmine wants, it will be a sequel of nature *per se*, which Socinus wants. It will not, therefore, be an effect of sin *per se*, since in the same genus of efficient causes, there cannot be multiple causes *per se*, unless they are subordinated. But neither is nature subordinated to sin, nor sin to nature, *per se*. The adversary therefore comes to this: that death is the penalty of sin only by accident. But this is false. False, therefore, is the principle that death is from nature as from a cause *per se*. Nor does he extricate himself by saying that death is from guilt as from a cause that removes a prohibition—namely, the supernatural gift. For the gift which he calls so was neither supernatural, as was shown above, nor was it given to be a prohibition of death, but to be a perfection of nature. If, therefore, it is true what he will dispute here—that death is properly and *per se* the penalty of sin (for so I take his meaning)—it is necessarily false that death is from sin only as from a cause that removes a prohibition, that is, by accident.

As for the latter, it cannot stand with the same principle. For how could man not have died before sin, if death is from nature as from a cause *per se*? Did man not have a nature before sin? He had it, he says, but with a supernatural gift as a rampart against death. But this fiction was refuted before. Besides, it is false. For if man could not have died before sin, his immortality was an inability to die, which no act of death could have followed. But this is openly false. He ought, therefore, to have said that man before sin was *able not to die*, with Augustine, who says: *It is one thing not to be able to die, another to be able not to die*;

according to which mode the first man was created immortal (Book 6, *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, chap. 25). Bellarmine himself will confess this a little later (chap. 9, § *Tertia*), that it was given to man that he might be able not to die. This is true. The adversary ought to expunge what he posited in the title and the proposition: *that Adam and his posterity could in no way have died, unless guilt preceded*. For a mortal nature preceded guilt, as the adversary confesses. A mortal nature has the potency, not the impotency, of dying. Therefore, the potency, not the impotency, of dying preceded guilt. So much for Bellarmine's proposition. Let us come to the arguments.

3. That death is the penalty of sin, he proves FIRST with seven passages of Scripture. But with these, not only Pelagius's error is refuted, but also Bellarmine's, concerning death existing from nature *per se*.
  - **Passage 1:** Genesis 2:17. *In what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death*. From this, thus: If Adam would have died even without sinning, the threat of death was established in vain as a punishment for transgression. But it was not in vain. Therefore, Adam, by not sinning, would not have died; hence death is the penalty of sin. But 1. Bellarmine does not conclude what he posited in the title of the chapter: that man could in no way have died unless he had sinned. 2. It is easy for the Pelagians to retort to the major premise, denying that God added the threat in vain, even if man would have died without sinning; because He threatened him with death not as a penalty for sin, but as a painful debt of nature. Because death, which would have been natural and without pain for man before sin, would become painful after sin; just as God imposed a painful childbirth on the woman after sin, which would have been without pain before sin. The adversary can by no means refute this quibble from his own principle.
  - What he raises for the Pelagians from Gregory—that this passage should be understood only of the death of the soul, not of the death of the body—in which way Socinus also eludes it today, is easily refuted. For that it is to be understood also of temporal, bodily death, the threat in chap. 3:19 teaches: *For dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return*. With which words God condemns man to that penalty which He had previously threatened him with. Augustine rightly says that God threatened all deaths to sinning man. He posits four deaths: 1. of the soul, when it is deprived of God; 2. of the body, when it is deprived of the soul; 3. again of the soul, when, separated from both God and the body, it is punished; 4. the final death of the whole man, when the soul without God, with the body, will suffer eternal punishments, which will be the last death. Bellarmine restricts it to three: 1. of the soul, through the loss of grace; 2. of the body, through the loss of the soul; 3. of the whole man, through the loss of glory, which will be the last and eternal one.

But that God is speaking of any and every death, and that whatever the human nature now feels that is penal or painful has truly and properly flowed from the transgression of this threat, has been demonstrated at length in our Commentary on Genesis 2:17, and vindicated against the quibbles of the Pelagians and of Socinus.

- **Passage 2:** Wisdom 1:13. *God made not death.* It is Apocryphal, but consonant with Canonical Scripture, rebuking the Sophists and Pelagians equally. For because God did not make death, but did make nature, it follows that nature is not the cause of death *per se*.
- **Passage 3:** Wisdom 2:24. *By the envy of the devil, death entered into the world.* This is similar to the prior one, similarly refuting the principle of the Pelagians and Sophists. For if death entered through the envy of the Devil, it is false that it entered through nature.
- **Passage 4:** Romans 5:12. *By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.* It is not contradictory that death entered by one man, and by one sin, and by the envy of the Devil. For it entered by one man, as through the sinning, proximate efficient subject; by one sin, as through the guilt or demerit; by the envy of the Devil, as through the first, moving efficient cause. Socinus understands eternal death, not corporal. But that the apostle is speaking of this and of every death, the following teaches: *death reigned from Adam unto Moses.*
- **Passage 5:** Romans 6:23. *The wages of sin is death.* That this was said of any and every death, we have demonstrated in the Commentary on Romans, against Socinus. But it follows as much against Bellarmine as against Socinus: Death is the wage of sin, that is, an effect justly due to sin. Therefore, death is not a sequel of nature *per se*.
- **Passage 6:** Romans 8:10. *And if Christ be in you, the body indeed is dead, because of sin.* That this was said of the death of the body, the scope teaches, because the Apostle is consoling the pious against the terrors of bodily death from the fact that they have the Spirit of Christ dwelling in them, who will at last vindicate their bodies from death to life, just as He drove death from Christ himself.
- **Passage 7:** 1 Corinthians 15, v. 22: *In Adam all die; and, by a man came death;* and v. 56: *The sting of death is sin.* That these are to be understood of any and every death, especially corporal, the whole context and scope of the Apostle teaches, since he is there disputing about the resurrection of bodies from temporal death.

SECONDLY, he proves it by the authority of two Councils: of MILEVIS, celebrated under Emperors Arcadius and Honorius, which in Canon I pronounces anathema on the Pelagians asserting that man departs from the body not by the merit of sin, but by the necessity of nature. But Bellarmine says it is by the merit of sin by accident, but by the necessity of nature *per se*. Therefore, Bellarmine incurs the greater part of the anathema. Also, of ORANGE II, under Leo I, which in Canon 2 pronounces anathema on those denying either that the death of the body is the penalty of sin, or that death indeed, but not the guilt of Adam, is transmitted to posterity.

THIRDLY, omitting the testimonies of the Fathers, by which he had said he would prove his proposition in the second place, he brings forth an argument from reason, which in form is this:

- With no mode of death being posited, death itself is not posited.
- In Adam before the fall, no mode of bodily death was posited.
- Therefore, neither could the death of the body be posited, and thus man could not have died.

But it concludes more than it should. It only follows: Therefore, man was not going to die. Otherwise, if he makes the minor: *no mode could have been posited*, it will be false. For some causes could have been posited, although they were not posited, which I note in passing about the conclusion.

He proves the ASSUMPTION, which is the point under judgment (κρινόμενον), by removing the four modes by which man departs this life. Man cannot, he says, depart this life, unless he is either overcome by external force, or fails from hunger and thirst, or is extinguished by disease, or wastes away with old age. But Adam was not to die by any of these. Not by violence, because, being awake, he ruled freely with dominion over all creatures; while sleeping, the eye of divine providence guarded him, lest he be harmed from without. Not by hunger or thirst from a lack of food, for he abounded in these most abundantly: *Of every tree... thou shalt eat*. Not by disease, because there would have been no distemper of the humors in a body perfectly subject to the soul and to God. Not by old age, finally, because either he drew perpetual vigor from the tree of life, so that he would not feel old age and the defect of his powers, or, being affected by old age, he was to be transferred without death into the celestial life. He promises to discuss this alternative in chapter 19.

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## LECTURE XI. November 15, 1611.

### CHAPTER NINE.

Whether the immortality of the first man was supernatural, or natural?

1. He proves his opinion concerning the supernatural immortality of Adam from Augustine, Cyril, the Scholastics, and from reasons. §. *Iam verò*.
2. He responds to three objections. §. *Objiciet*.

#### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

In this whole chapter, Bellarmine disputes confusedly, meagerly, and sophistically.

**Confusedly**, because he does not distinguish "immortal" and "natural," since both are used in various ways. **Meagerly**, because he cannot prove his assertion with any authority from Scripture, and with that of scarcely two Fathers. **Sophistically**, because by positing the body of man for "man," and death for "mortality," he frequently imposes on the reader.

We will premise three distinctions, then confirm our opinion with reasons, and finally respond to his authorities and objections.

- **Distinction 1** is of immortality, which signifies in four ways:
  1. An absolute inability to die, by nature. Thus God alone possesses immortality (1 Timothy 6:16). Thus the Fathers deny, and we deny, that man was immortal by nature.
  2. An inability to die from the grace of creation. Thus angels and human souls are immortal.
  3. An inability to die from the grace of a gift. Thus the new heaven, the new earth, and the bodies of the blessed will have incorruptibility.
  4. A potential not to die, or the negation of the act of dying based on some hypothesis, although in itself it is mortal. Thus man before sin was immortal in body, on the hypothesis of union with a soul that was originally perfect and immortal.
- **Distinction 2** is of nature and "natural". Nature is either integral or corrupt. "Natural" is one thing for integral nature, another for corrupt nature. Immortality was natural to integral nature in the fourth mode of immortality. For corrupt nature, not immortality, but mortality, which is the necessity of dying, is rightly called natural, in the first mode of "natural" taught by Bellarmine above.
- **Distinction 3** is of integral man, and the body considered in itself. We say that immortality was natural to man, not to the body in itself. Far be it from us to say it was "due," that is, not gratuitous, which the adversary foisted upon us in chap. 8. For we acknowledge that the entire being of nature depends, without being owed, on

the grace of the Creator. *Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him?* (Romans 11:35).

Thus we demonstrate our assertion:

1. The whole image of God was natural to integral man, because it was partly essential to man, and partly belonging to him *per se*, perfecting his nature. Immortality was part of the image of God. Therefore, etc.
2. What is a penalty for sin and destructive of nature *per se*, its contrary was natural to integral man. Death and mortality are a penalty for sin, destroying nature *per se*. Therefore, the contrary of death, immortality, was natural to integral man.
3. From the adversary's hypothesis: He for whom no external force or internal principles could cause death was naturally immortal, namely, in the fourth mode of immortality. For integral man, neither external force or famine, nor internal disease or old age could bring about death, as the adversary just now confessed. Therefore, etc.
4. From the adversary's four modes of "natural" in chap. 5:
  - Natural is what one has from nativity, in which way the adversary confessed that original justice was natural to Adam. Adam had immortality from creation, which was his nativity. In this mode, therefore, Adam was naturally immortal.
  - Natural is what is consonant with nature, and does not destroy it, but adorns and perfects it. Thus was immortality in integral man. For it was consonant with nature, not destroying it, but perfecting it. It was therefore in man naturally.
  - Natural is what helps and perfects nature, in which way the adversary also conceded that original justice was natural to man. Immortality helped and perfected the nature of man. Who can doubt this? It was therefore natural to man.
  - Natural is what flows from the principles of nature. Immortality flowed from the principles of integral nature. For the immortal, most pure soul breathed perennial life into the body united to it, and would never have made a separation from the body without the intervention of sin. With that separation never being posited, death was never to be posited, but immortality was to be posited. The body, though in itself composite, material, and corruptible, was nevertheless, by the power of the soul's perpetual harmony of humors and spirits, to be conserved immune from all distemper of diseases, plague, and death. In every way, therefore, the immortality of integral man must be called natural.

To the first saying of AUGUSTINE (*Literal Commentary on Genesis*, Book 6, chap. 25), two points:

1. It is against the adversary, who in the preceding chapter said that man could not have died unless he had sinned. But Augustine denies this, asserting that man was *able not to die*, if he had not sinned. He does not make the immortality of man an *inability* to die, as Bellarmine does, but a *potential* not to die, as we do. It is *one thing*, he says, *not to be able to die*, another *to be able not to die*; according to which mode (not, as Bellarmine depraves it, "according to a certain mode") *the first man was created immortal*. If he was created immortal according to this mode, then according to that mode immortality was natural to him from creation. For creation gave him his nature. Therefore, let Bellarmine either correct his error, or remain contrary to himself and to Augustine.
2. When Augustine denies that man had immortality from the constitution of nature, he distinguishes that he did not have it by nature as God does, who alone has immortality in the first mode, or by nature. But he does not deny that it was co-created with man, inborn, and natural, since he says it was conserved and to be conserved from the tree of life. For life is also natural to us, and yet it must be conserved by food and drink. He calls it a "benefit of the creator," a "mutable grace of God." And why not? For man had received the entire image of God, with nature itself, by a singular privilege and grace of the creator. Shall we not acknowledge the benefit of the creator, the grace of God, that he created us men and not oxen, although we are men by nature? That he was mortal, that is, was able to die, by the condition of his body, we also confess.

That elsewhere he compares the immortality of the first man to the garments of the Israelites in the desert (*City of God*, Book 13, chap. 20) is for us, for it proves it was natural by an argument from the lesser. If God could grant incorruptibility to inanimate footwear, much more could he grant natural immortality to animate man, by the power of the soul and the tree of life. The comparison of man with Enoch and Elijah proves nothing, because it is an uncertain opinion. Finally, that he says the body was mortal in potency, although it would never die, just as our flesh is vulnerable, although it may never be wounded, works for us against the adversary. For it teaches that the immortality of man was the potential not to die, which we say, not the inability to die, which Bellarmine falsely states.

To the passage from CYRIL (Book on Moses, chap. 1), I say that the adversary shamefully corrupts it. For the complete passage is this: *Rational man, therefore, composed of a soul and a mortal flesh, was brought into being by God. Since by his own nature he could not be incorruptible and perpetual (for this belongs substantially to God alone), being signed by the spirit of life, he was constituted in the good of immortality above nature.* Cyril does not deny

immortality to integral man, but to the flesh; nor to the flesh simply, but to the now mortal flesh; nor all natural immortality, but that natural immortality which belongs substantially to God alone, which Bellarmine wrongly omitted. He calls it a good "above nature," namely, of the flesh, not above the nature of integral man; or certainly above the nature of man as it now is, because he had said: "composed of a soul and this mortal flesh".

The Scholastic Theologians and the Master follow Augustine. Therefore, they are with us. The three physical reasons from the nature of the body—that the nature of man was compounded from contrary elements and humors, whence an intrinsic potential for corruption flows; also that it was generable, and therefore corruptible; also that it needed food and drink, etc.—only prove that the body in itself was mortal in potency, although it would never have died before sin, just as our flesh is now vulnerable, although it may never be wounded (as we state with Augustine). They do not prove, however, that immortality, or the potential not to die, from the power of the soul, was not natural to integral man.

2. He obscurely raises and frigidly solves three objections.

- **FIRST** is from the authority of Augustine, who says that the death of the body was inflicted not by the law of nature, but by the merit of sin (*City of God*, Book 1). Therefore, the contrary of death, immortality, was present by the law of nature. **RESPONSE:** According to Augustine's opinion, the necessity of dying which would have followed from the nature of man was taken away by the grace of God and was commuted into a penalty for sin. This is a strange fiction, but false. For Augustine does not say that death or the necessity of dying is incumbent upon us by the law of nature, that is, would have followed from the nature of man, but he says it was inflicted from the merit of sin alone. False, therefore, is what Bellarmine concocts about a commutation, so as to throw dust in the reader's eyes.
- **SECOND** is from the Council of Orange II, Canon 2, and is this: Either life or death is natural to man. Not death, because thus an injustice would be done by God, if he inflicted the death that is the penalty of sin on a nature without sin. Therefore life and immortality. **RESPONSE:** 1. If man had been created in a state of pure naturals, he would have died without any injustice from God, just like the cattle. But this is not the question and is a trifle about "pure naturals," often refuted, into which our author seeks refuge (*κρησφύγετον*) in vain whenever he is stuck. 2. He responds that God converted the necessity of dying into a penalty for sin, and hence an injustice would be done by God if He inflicted death without sin, because a penalty is not given except for guilt. The latter is true; the former is false. For no death would have been in the nature of man before sin, because he himself confessed that man could not have died unless he had sinned. It is false, therefore, that before sin the necessity of dying was in nature, and after sin it was converted into a penalty

for guilt. For how could that which was not at all be converted into something else? Indeed, God would scarcely be free from injustice if He had converted a law of nature into a penalty for guilt, than if He had converted nature itself into guilt. Let the fictions of the Sophists therefore depart; let the opinion of the Council stand; let the natural immortality of man, the contrary of death, stand.

- **THIRD:** An immortal body is suitable for an immortal soul. But the soul is immortal. Therefore, the body is also immortal. **RESPONSE:** He denies the major premise, saying that not an immortal body, but an organic one, fit for carrying out animal functions, is suitable for the soul. But this notwithstanding, what we have said remains: that the organic body, though corruptible in potency, would have remained incorruptible in act in man, by the power of the soul and the tree of life.

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## LECTURE XII. November 18, 1611.

### CHAPTER TEN.

That there was a terrestrial and corporeal Paradise, in which Adam lived in the state of innocence.

1. He disapproves of the allegories of the ancients concerning Paradise. §. *Est autem.*
2. He asserts that it was a truly corporeal place. §. *Igitur.*

#### **EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION**

1. This whole following discussion seems more curious than necessary, asserting many false things as true, and doubtful things as certain, about which, with Augustine as our author, it is better to doubt than to litigate. Add to this that Bellarmine in it does not refute the heretics of this time (as the title of the controversies has it), but flogs the Fathers and harasses his fellow Sophists. And so it would have been permissible to skip over all this with a dry foot and hasten to other things. For the sake of order, however, let us discuss it in a few words.

He treats seven questions concerning the grace of the place, that is, concerning Paradise:

1. Was Paradise a true and corporal place? (chaps. 10, 11).
2. In what part of the earth was Paradise? (chaps. 12, 13).
3. Did the waters of the flood destroy Paradise? (chap. 14).

4. Were men alone, or also creatures lacking reason, to have a place there? (chap. 15).
5. What were the Cherubim placed to guard Paradise? (chap. 16).
6. Concerning the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, whence was it so called? (chap. 17).
7. Concerning the tree of life, what was its power and efficacy? (chaps. 18, 19).

There is none of these that is not clearly explained, as far as can be known of them, in our Commentary on Genesis. Let us nevertheless hear the transalpine wisdom of Bellarmine.

**QUESTION I:** *Was Paradise a true, corporal place, or rather a spiritual, allegorical one?* is not ingenuously proposed. For the question is whether it was a true, corporeal place in the habitable world. The adversary will indeed grant the former, but will deny the latter. He therefore plays games with the ancients, whom he says transformed Paradise, its plants, herbs, and rivers into mere allegories. In which census he includes Philo Judaeus, the heresiarch Valentinus mentioned by Irenaeus, and Origen in his commentary on Genesis, which is not extant. He adds that Franciscus Georgius revived this fiction, whose arguments he will refute in chapter 11.

2. Bellarmine's RESPONSE is that Paradise was a corporeal place, full of real and corporeal plants, and watered by real springs and rivers. This is true, but insufficient. He ought to have added: terrestrial, in the habitable world, which he will deny below, positing a new fiction about Paradise in a land remote from the commerce of sinful men, that is, in Utopia. Of which, more there.

He proves it was a true place, 1. from the history of Moses, and 2. from the Fathers.

From the history of Moses he brings forth:

- I. That God is said to have *planted* Paradise, and to have *placed* man in it. But planting is of bodies, and a true, corporal man had to be placed in a true, corporal place.
- II. A river is said to have gone out of the place of pleasure to water Paradise, which from thence was divided into four heads; the name of one is Phison, etc. These rivers were real, visible, potable, etc. Therefore, the place was also real.
- III. Adam and Eve after the fall hid themselves among the trees of Paradise, and sewed together aprons for themselves from the leaves of fig trees. Therefore, there were in Paradise real trees and real leaves, with which the members of men could be covered.
- IV. Adam is read to have been cast out of Paradise, and the entrance to Paradise guarded, lest man should any longer have access to the tree of life. If this had only been allegorically wisdom, God certainly would not have prohibited man from it.

We accept these arguments, but the first is obscured by the faulty version: *God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning*. Instead of which, in the text of Moses, is: *God had planted a garden in Eden, from the East*. In these words is contained the notation of a certain place. God planted a garden (LXX: παράδεισον, paradise) on account of its pleasantness, because a pleasant, delightful garden in Scripture is a paradise. He planted this garden בעדן (in Eden), which was the name of a certain region, as is clear from Genesis 4:17, and mention is made several times in Scripture of the merchants and sons of Eden. In what region it was, is added: מקדם (from the East). For the Hebrews, מקדם always denotes place: before, in front of, in the presence of; never time. And so Jerome, following not the force of the word, but the error of Aquila, incorrectly translated it as *from the beginning*, from which he fell into another error, that Paradise was created before the heaven and the earth. Paradise was therefore a most pleasant garden in the region of Eden, which was to the east of Palestine and Arabia.

5. After the Scriptures, he brings forth the authorities of five Fathers against Origen: Methodius, Epiphanius, Jerome, Chrysostom, and Augustine, to whom he says the rest agree. But this is a weak proof, because very few of the Fathers were free from the Origenistic or similar fantasy about an allegorical Paradise, so that a certain sense concerning Paradise can with difficulty be elicited from them. Chrysostom and Augustine, more openly than the rest, retained the history of Moses and defended the literal sense of Paradise, whom we deservedly follow.

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## CHAPTER ELEVEN.

### Objections for an Allegorical Paradise are Solved.

1. He solves four objections of Franciscus Georgius. §. *Igitur prima*.
2. He adds two others. §. *Addere possumus*.
3. He defends Ambrose. §. *Primo*.

### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

1. The ARGUMENTS of Franciscus Georgius for an allegorical Paradise which he brings forth are of no great moment. I will recall each to its proper form.
  - **OBJECTION I:** What is nowhere read in Scripture is not to be believed. That Paradise was planted on the earth is nowhere read in Scripture. Therefore, Paradise was not planted on the earth. **RESPONSE:** Although it is not written so, yet it can be gathered from the fact that it is said to have been *planted*. For gardens cannot be planted except on the earth. The major premise must therefore be distinguished: What is not read expressly, nor is evidently

gathered from those things which are read, that is not to be believed. But that Paradise was planted on the earth is evidently gathered from the scriptures. We gather this not from the word *planted* alone, which could be eluded by a metaphor, but more evidently from the circumstances of the place: *He planted in Eden, from the East*, which the old version obscured.

- **OBJECTION II:** If Paradise were terrestrial and corporeal, it certainly ought to have been created on the third day, with the seeds, trees, etc. But it was not created on the third day, but its planting is described only after the sixth day. Therefore, etc. **RESPONSE:** It was created on the third day, although it is described after the works of the six days. That is, he denies the minor. We rightly say that in the whole of the second chapter, Moses describes by *hysteron proteron* the things omitted (*παρλειπόμενα*) from creation, some of which pertained to the third day, like the planting of the garden; therefore the verb *ἔφυτε* is rightly rendered by the pluperfect, *he had planted*, namely, on the third day, on which he had made the earth to germinate and bring forth herbs and trees. Others pertained to the sixth day, like the formation of man from clay, his vivification, his translation into paradise, the creation of Eve from the rib of the man, the institution of marriage, the blessing, the bringing of the animals to the man, and finally, the precept about not tasting of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. These things, done before, are related later by Moses, because he wished to narrate the works of the six days in a compendium, without the interpolation of circumstances, a kind of *hysteron proteron* which is by no means infrequent in sacred history.
- **OBJECTION III:** God does nothing in vain. But he would have made a terrestrial paradise in vain, from which he knew man was soon to be cast out on account of sin. Therefore, it was not terrestrial. **RESPONSE** from Theodoret: it was not in vain, that is, he denies the minor. 1. Because although it was to be occupied by man for a short time, yet the memory of it could thereafter be profitable to man for fleeing sin. 2. Because God granted paradise to man as long as he did not sin. If therefore he had sinned later, he would have enjoyed Paradise longer. 3. Because Enoch and Elijah were to occupy it, which is a fabulous reason. 4. So that in the image of the terrestrial Paradise, we might consider the celestial Paradise. 5. Immortality was not given to man in vain, although he enjoyed it for a short time. Therefore, neither was the brief use of Paradise in vain. It is therefore a fallacy of false cause.
- **OBJECTION IV:** Jerome writes that Paradise was created before the heaven and the earth. But this cannot be, if paradise was terrestrial. **RESPONSE:** Jerome is either relating the opinion of others there, or he means that paradise was created before the heaven and earth were finished. A frivolous

solution. Jerome said openly: *From which it is most manifestly proven that before God MADE (he does not say "finished") the heaven and the earth, He had previously created Paradise.* It is apparent that he is speaking from his own mind, not from another's. If, therefore, Jerome elsewhere thought differently, either he contradicts himself, which I will not say, or many things in the writings of Jerome and other Fathers are read in a depraved state, and thus it follows that the writings of the Fathers cannot be a rule of truth and a principle of faith.

2. **OBJECTION V:** Paul was caught up to the third heaven, and he was caught up to Paradise (2 Corinthians 12:2-4). Paradise is therefore the third heaven. **RESPONSE** from Methodius and Epiphanius: Paul was caught up twice. But he saw this was weak. He therefore adds that there is a twofold paradise: a terrestrial one, of which Moses speaks, and a celestial one, of which Paul speaks there, and Scripture elsewhere, which is the true response. For by a metaphor the Apostle calls the place of celestial felicity "Paradise."
  - **OBJECTION VI:** Ambrose interprets the entire narrative of Moses mystically. Therefore, etc. **RESPONSE:** Ambrose did not deny that the paradise of Adam was corporal; but having posited this, he was occupied entirely in explaining the significations of paradise.
3. He tries to prove this defense of Ambrose with five documents. It is not our place to accuse. PERERIUS, a learned Jesuit, in his Commentary on Genesis, Book 3, responds with these words: *It has not escaped me that there are some who prove that Ambrose held the true opinion concerning Paradise from his commentary on chapter 6 of Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians, because in that place Ambrose says: Just as Jerusalem is twofold, one celestial, the other terrestrial, so paradise is twofold, one terrestrial, in which Adam was placed to cultivate and keep it, the other celestial, to which Paul was caught up. But that proof would have little credit with learned men, who are persuaded by many and not light conjectures that those Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul did not proceed from the workshop of Ambrose.* Thus Pererius. Bellarmine will say that he brings forth his arguments not from that Commentary, but from the book *On Paradise* by Ambrose. Nevertheless, he has the opinion of his fellow Jesuit against him. I wonder, however, that he accepts a few historical words of Ambrose as his opinion, when it is clearer than light that in the whole book he pursues nothing but allegories of Paradise, having scarcely a letter about the letter. The summary of his opinion is in chap. 3: *Paradise is therefore a certain fertile earth, that is, a fecund soul, planted in Eden, that is, in a certain pleasure or exercised earth, in which is the delight of the soul, etc. There was a fount which waters Paradise. What fount but the Lord Jesus Christ, the fount of eternal life? and what follows there.*

Bellarmino says that just as Ambrose composed his *Hexameron* from the homilies of Basil on the work of the six days, so he transferred many things from Basil's book on Paradise into his own book on Paradise. Both are true. For Ambrose made most of Basil's Greek his own Latin and, as it were, transcribed it in the *Hexameron*. What he adds—that Basil most openly writes that Paradise was corporal, but at the same time explains mystical interpretations—he ought not to have said, but to have shown. Those who read Basil's book find mere allegories. *If Paradise, he says, were of common trees, it would be contained in the first generation of plants, and there would have been no need of a select plantation by God, etc.* You see that he removes paradise from the series of creation. I easily exonerate him from the Origenistic opinion. But I can scarcely doubt that Basil, and from Basil, Ambrose, thought of an aerial or celestial, not a terrestrial, Paradise. For it follows: *Paradise is a place excellent beyond all creation, of admirable beauty, situated in an illustrious place, having no darkness on account of its altitude, and which is illumined by the risings of all the stars; illuminated on all sides, having a most pleasant temperature from the seasons of the year, and which is illustrated by a most lucid air; where there is no violence of winds, no immoderation of the times, no hail, no thunderbolts, no whirlwinds, no celestial fires or half-ignited lightnings, no winter freezing, no spring humidity, no summer heat, no autumnal dryness, but a temperate and peaceful concord of the times among themselves, etc.* Now let Bellarmine see how he can prove a terrestrial Paradise from the Fathers (I except Chrysostom and Augustine).

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## LECTURE XIII. November 19, 1611.

### CHAPTER TWELVE.

Concerning the location of the terrestrial Paradise, where was it?

1. He disapproves of the opinion of Josephus concerning the location of Paradise. §. *Altera de Paradiso.*
2. He rejects the opinion of St. Ephrem concerning the same. §. *Alia sententia.*
3. He repudiates the opinion of the venerable Bede concerning the same. §. *Tertia.*
4. He tries to refute the opinion of more recent Doctors. §. *Quarta.*

### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

QUESTION II of Bellarmine is concerning the location of Paradise, and in the title of the chapter he rejects four opinions of others. But from this he has not yet established the title of the chapter: *that the location of the terrestrial Paradise is most remote from human knowledge.* For there are many opinions, and besides those four, he himself brings forth a

fifth. He ought, therefore, to have concluded then that the location of paradise is most obscure.

The FIRST opinion he assigns to JOSEPHUS is that the whole globe of the earth was Paradise, and the river watering it was the Ocean. It is manifest that this is repugnant to the sacred history, which says that man was created outside Paradise, was translated into it by God, and was again cast out of it. Therefore, Paradise could not have been the entire world, because man was not created outside the world, nor translated into the world from elsewhere, nor expelled from the entire globe of the earth after sin.

The SECOND opinion he attributes to ST. EPHREM the Syrian (who they say was an equal and intimate of Basil) is that Paradise was outside this world, beyond the Ocean, in another land encircling the Ocean. But neither does this please him, although he calls Ephrem a Saint, insinuating that saints have sometimes erred, and that it is permissible to dissent from the saints. This fantasy, besides being contrary to the divine letters, is refuted by an inspection of Geography, which testifies that the Euphrates and Tigris, two rivers of Paradise, are rivers of our habitable world and have their origins in the same. Bellarmine says it has been found by navigators that not all the earth is girded by the Ocean, nor is there another earth beyond the Ocean. Whether these things are true, I greatly doubt, since both maps and histories refute them. For our land is seen on maps to be girded on all sides by the Ocean, and beyond the Ocean towards the Antarctic pole, vast tracts of unknown lands have been observed by navigators. Finally, he asserts from Genesis 2:8 that Paradise was situated to the East. Why then, when alleging the passage above (chap. 10), did he prefer to follow the faulty Latin version rather than the Hebrew truth and the Septuagint?

The THIRD opinion he ascribes to the venerable BEDE, that Paradise is a certain sublime place, reaching even to the globe of the Moon. But here BEDE is by no means venerable to him, because he does not venerate his opinion, but pierces it with a spear. And not without cause, because the region near the Moon is air or fire, not earth planted with trees, such as was the Paradise of Moses. And since the Psalm says, *The earth he hath given to the children of men* (Psalm 115:16), it may be asked whether men walked there, or flew, if they were without earth? He tries, however, to excuse it, that the author seems to have used a hyperbole to demonstrate the excellence of Paradise, which hyperbole he also ascribes to Basil, Damascenus, and Rupertus, followers of the same opinion. But with a similar cosmetic he could excuse the hyperbole of those who today imagine mountains, forests, cities, peoples, islands, and seas on the Moon itself. Such hyperboles exceed the truth so much that they deserve to be driven out as the most vain fictions. But who would believe that truth can be illustrated or demonstrated by fictions? What Basil's opinion was

concerning paradise, we have explained in his own words at the end of Chapter X, so that there is no need for cosmetics.

The FOURTH opinion he attributes to certain more recent Doctors: Eugubinus, Oleaster, Jansenius, Vatablus, that Paradise was in Mesopotamia, but was so destroyed by the waters of the flood that no traces of it remained, and therefore there is no need for the custody of the Cherubim. To these should be added Benedictus Pererius the Jesuit, who shows with probable arguments that Paradise was either in Mesopotamia itself or not far from it. But not even this opinion of his colleagues is approved by Bellarmine, although it seems the most probable of all. Let us see his contrary reasons.

FIRST, he says it is a new opinion, repugnant to the common consensus of the Doctors, etc. But thus he would also deny the Cape of Good Hope, the Strait of Magellan, Brazil, all of America, Japan, Novaya Zemlya, etc., concerning which the opinion is new and repugnant to the consensus of the ancient Geographers. He therefore assumes a falsehood, that whatever is new, which has recently become known in external matters, is not true. These centuries certainly prove that many things were unknown to antiquity, many true things were denied as false, and false things were believed as true. Let the antipodes be an example, which some of the ancients considered heresy to affirm, others to deny. He ought to have shown a consensus of the ancients. For thus far he himself has produced various dissensions. I would wish the adversary to remember this little reason shortly, when he himself will bring forth for us his own new, vain opinion concerning Paradise, alien to the consensus of the ancients.

SECONDLY, he says: In Paradise itself a river arose, which from thence was divided into four heads, whose names are Euphrates, Tigris, Pishon, Gihon (Gen. 2). But in Mesopotamia no such river arises, nor is it divided into four heads. Therefore, Paradise was not in Mesopotamia.

RESPONSE: The first part of the major premise is false. Moses does not say that the river had its origin in Paradise itself, but that it went out of Eden to water the garden (Gen. 2:10). But that Eden was the name of a region outside Paradise, towards the East, is gathered from Genesis 4:16. Whence it is all too probable that this river was the Euphrates, especially since the adversary does not deny it of the Tigris. I think we need not labor today over the division into four heads. For what has happened to the channels, arms, and names of many rivers since the flood, after such great antiquity, and what could have happened in the flood, reason and history testify. I readily agree with Bellarmine that the division into four heads is not sufficiently established by those who wish that the Euphrates and Tigris join below Mesopotamia, and a little later separate again, emptying into the Persian gulf by two mouths, and thus making four heads. In which opinion I also see the Jesuit Pererius. This is uncertain, and indeed contrary to the most accurate maps of the geographers, which show

the Tigris and Euphrates entering the sea by separate channels. Yet if it were certain, such a conjunction and separation of two rivers would not be four rivers, but two.

Whatever the case of the division, Bellarmine errs in what he asserts from Josephus (whom he just now rejected), that the Pishon and Gihon are the Ganges of India and the Nile of Egypt. For if this is so, the opinion which he himself will soon fabricate for us about Paradise—that it is a place remote from the commerce of sinful men—will be false. For the Ganges and the Indus are in a world not remote from sinful men.

Similar is what he brings forth from Ecclesiasticus 24. There is no mention of the Ganges or the Nile in that apocryphal book. He appeals to Jansenius, whom he here opposes. Jansenius interprets the Pishon and Gihon in that place as the Ganges and the Nile, by a conjecture made from the word "to fill" and from the "inundation at the time of vintage," as if these things do not usually happen to many rivers. That the Pishon and Gihon have dried up proves nothing. After so many ages, what wonder if they have changed their channels and names? The adversary must prove that besides the Euphrates and Tigris in Babylonia below Mesopotamia, no other rivers are found; or he must deny that the rivers of Paradise, the Euphrates and Tigris, are of Mesopotamia.

THIRDLY, he says that according to Basil, Damascenus, Rupertus, and Luther, there was in Paradise a perpetual spring, without cold, hail, heat, rains, etc. Mesopotamia is by no means free of these things. Therefore, Paradise was not there.

RESPONSE: First, the major premise rests on a hyperbolic fiction, which he himself refuted in the third opinion. Second, if it were granted that Paradise was so then, does it follow that the place must be so affected now? Was not the whole creation made subject to vanity by the sin of man? Now, therefore, storms and other meteors affect the air and bodies far differently, and for the most part are adverse, which then did not harm man at all. The perpetual spring of Paradise is sought from the fables of the poets: Spring was eternal, etc. Nor is a different course of the sun needed for this than is now in Mesopotamia. For then, neither the recess of the Sun would have brought too much cold, nor its approach would have brought troublesome heat to bodies that were, before sin, free from adverse affection.

FINALLY, he says that Enoch and Elijah were translated into the Paradise from which Adam was expelled. But they were not translated into Mesopotamia. Therefore, Paradise was not there. He confirms the major premise with the authorities of several Fathers, and of Sirach, chapter 44:16: Enoch pleased God, and was translated into Paradise, that he might give repentance to the nations.

I say the major premise and the opinion of the Fathers are true concerning the celestial Paradise; concerning the terrestrial one, from which Adam was driven, it is fabulous.

Jerome, in his letter to Marcella, not obscurely hints that the fable flowed from the Jews to the Christians. The passage from Sirach is Apocryphal and depraved. In the Greek codex, there is nothing about Paradise; the Latin interpreter added it from his own. Yet Bellarmine wishes the addition of the old version to be retained, on the authority of the Council of Trent. But could the Council add to the Scriptures? Make the false true? Instead of what the Council approved: Enoch pleased God, and was translated into Paradise, that he might give repentance to the nations, the Greek Codices consistently have: Enoch pleased God, and was translated, an example of repentance (having been made) to the nations. You see now, Reader, what the difference is.

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### CHAPTER THIRTEEN.

Reasons for Paradise around Mesopotamia are Solved and Vindicated.

1. He raises three objections. §. *Neque verò.*
2. He responds to the same. §. *Sed respondeo.*
3. He adds another and responds. §. *Est aliud.*

#### EXPLICATION AND CORRECTION

1. For the opinion concerning the location of Paradise around the Euphrates of Mesopotamia, he says the arguments are not of such a kind that they cannot be solved, insinuating that they can be solved, but with difficulty, which speaks for the truth of the opinion. He accumulates three objections:
  - **FIRST:** Eden was a place near Haran of Mesopotamia. This is clear from Ezekiel 27:23: *Haran... and Eden, the merchants...* 2 Kings 19:12: *Haran... and the children of Eden.* Genesis 4:16: *Cain the fugitive dwelt in the land... on the east side of Eden.* Therefore, Paradise was a place near Haran of Mesopotamia.
  - **SECOND:** Where the rivers of Paradise are found, there it is probable that paradise was. In Mesopotamia are found the rivers of paradise, the Euphrates, Tigris, etc. Therefore...
  - **THIRD:** Where there is a pleasantness similar to paradise, there paradise probably was. Mesopotamia is found to be a most pleasant region, similar to paradise. Therefore, etc.
2. To the FIRST, he responds that Eden in the alleged passages indeed signifies a place, but not the one from which Adam was cast out. Why so? Because in Genesis 4 Cain is said to have dwelt in Eden. But let no one be so foolish as to think that Paradise was given to Cain for his exile.  
RESPONSE: This begs the question. If Eden signifies a place, then either it is the one from which Adam was cast out, or let Bellarmine give another from Scripture. The

reason concerning Cain is false, from the text. For he is not said to have dwelt in Eden, not even in the old version, but in the land of Nod, to the east of Eden. He adds: from Eden, where paradise was, a river arose. But it is most certain that no such river arises from the Eden near Mesopotamia. Therefore, etc. The assumption is false. For it is most certain that the Euphrates arises from the mountains of Armenia above Mesopotamia.

Secondly, he denies that Eden in Genesis 2:8 signifies a place, because the Vulgate version, which is authentic, and St. Jerome have: He planted a Paradise of pleasure from the beginning. He denies in vain. The corrupt old version does not prejudice the Hebrew truth, which has: He had planted גַּן-בְּעֵדֶן (a garden in Eden). The particle ב denotes the place of a region. Nor are those two words placed in regimen.

Therefore, they are viciously rendered: a garden of pleasure. Jerome, following the error of Aquila and Symmachus, not only rendered it viciously as of pleasure instead of in Eden, but also from the beginning instead of from the East, which Bellarmine confessed in chap. 12, §. Alia. From this, Jerome derived another error, about Paradise being planted before the heaven and the earth.

To the SECOND, he denies the minor premise, because none of the rivers of Paradise arise in Mesopotamia. But it is enough that the rivers of Paradise, the Euphrates and Tigris, are found in Mesopotamia, although they arise outside it in the mountains of Armenia. For the river is not said to have arisen in Paradise, but in Eden, outside Paradise. Whence Eden is recognized to be either Armenia itself, or a part of Armenia.

To the THIRD, he denies the minor premise: that the pleasantness of Mesopotamia is such as Paradise is said to have been. But what wonder is it, that after sin, after the flood, after such great antiquity, much of its primeval pleasantness has perished? It is sufficient that parts of Mesopotamia and Babylonia are today found to be the most pleasant of all the regions of the world, according to the testimony of historians and experience. The Babylonian region, says Herodotus (Book 1), is all divided by canals, the largest of which a ship can traverse, tending toward the winter sun, its exit is from the Euphrates into the Tigris, another river, near which Nineveh is situated. This region is the best of all we have seen, at least for bearing grain. Pliny says: In Babylon they reap twice, and graze a third time, etc. The Euphrates and Tigris do not bring in silt, as the Nile does in Egypt, nor does the earth itself produce grasses. Yet they are of such fertility that in the following year a crop becomes re-growable of its own accord, etc. From the pleasantness alone, indeed, the conjecture would be weak. But when joined with other arguments about the Euphrates and Tigris, the proper rivers of paradise, it ought not to be held lightly.

He adds an argument about the sources of the Euphrates and Tigris, which are said to be known. Obscurely, so that you do not know what he means, unless perhaps this: The

sources of those rivers are known in the mountains of Armenia. Therefore, paradise is also known from there. He responds from Augustine (On Genesis against the Manichees, Book 2, chap. 7), that the sources are indeed known, but the rivers go under the earth, and after long tracts of regions, have erupted in other places; for who is ignorant that some waters are wont to do this? But what kind of argument is this from a "could be" to a "was"? From a particular to a particular? It *could have* happened thus, therefore it *did* happen thus. Some rivers are thus absorbed and regurgitate, as Solinus relates of the waters of the Caspian. Therefore, the Euphrates also.

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## LECTURE XIV. November 21, 1611.

### CHAPTER FOURTEEN.

#### Whether Paradise Still Survives, and Where It Is According to Bellarmine.

1. He posits the negative opinion with arguments. §. *Tractatione*.
2. He defends the affirmative opinion. §. *Quia vero*.
3. He tries to refute the argument from the flood. §. *Neque argumentum*.
4. He raises and solves three instances, where he reveals his own opinion. §. *At inquires*.

#### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

QUESTION III of Bellarmine concerning Paradise: *Does it still survive?* At the beginning, he posits the negative opinion of Eugubinus, Jansenius, and other Pontifical Doctors: *that Paradise no longer exists, having been destroyed and absorbed by the waters of the flood.* To which we also subscribe. The place perhaps survives around the Euphrates, but the garden was destroyed, either by the flood, by which whatever elegance the world had left from its pristine creation was destroyed and perished by the waters, or by a singular judgment of God, so that after it had been preserved for some time by the watch of the Cherubim, lest men should attempt a return, it was turned into cinders or an inaccessible swamp, which is established to have happened to Sodom, which once flourished like a paradise. To which that saying of Pliny seems to look, that in the plain of Babylonia a certain pool of the size of an acre is on fire. Who knows if a vestige of Paradise, divinely absorbed, is left there?

He brings forth two NEGATIVE ARGUMENTS:

1. From Genesis 7:19, where the waters of the flood are said to have covered all the high mountains under the whole heaven by fifteen cubits. From which it is clear that the flood was most general, over the entire earth, and by it the whole earth was

devastated and destroyed. But the terrestrial paradise was in this our globe of lands, and a part of our earth. It was therefore devastated and destroyed by that flood.

2. The other is from the place: Because where paradise was, nothing of it is seen to remain. But it was either in Mesopotamia or not far from it, around the Euphrates, which region has always been most well-known. Therefore, since no vestige of paradise is seen there, it follows that it no longer survives.

Bellarmino will try to destroy the first argument; the latter he will leave untouched, perhaps because in chap. 12 he seems to himself to have destroyed it sufficiently. But he did it no harm.

2. After this, he strives to defend the affirmative opinion, that the terrestrial Paradise still survives, but timidly and obscurely, as is the custom of those whose mind is conscious of wrongdoing. For he does not openly assert in the text what he has posited in the title: *that Paradise still survives*, but says that he has read in none of the ancients that Paradise was destroyed by the waters of the flood. But is it less true because he has read in none of the ancients that the extremity of Africa, which they call the Cape of Good Hope, is circumnavigable? He continues, that he has indeed read that very many affirm that it exists, such as all the Scholastics in 2 Sent., dist. 17, and St. Thomas, I, q. 102, art. 1, and besides them, the ancient fathers Irenaeus, Jerome, Augustine, Theodoret, Bede, Alcimus Avitus. From which, an argument of this kind: *One should not easily depart from a common and celebrated opinion. That Paradise still survives is a common and celebrated opinion. Therefore, he says, I would not dare to easily depart from it.* For the Assumption, he recites the words of Augustine alone, that this opinion pertains to the Catholic faith.

#### **RESPONSE:**

1. By distinguishing the Major premise: one should not easily depart from a common opinion that is consonant with sacred Scripture. This one is not consonant, but is openly repugnant to Scripture testifying that the whole earth was destroyed by the waters of the flood.
2. To the assumption: it is a common opinion, but a vain one, drawn from a vain tradition of the Elders of Asia, whom Irenaeus calls disciples of the Apostles. Let this be an argument that it was vain: that the same Irenaeus writes that he drew from the same Elders a tradition about the fifty-year age of CHRIST our Savior, which by the consensus of all is false; and another about the thousand-year reign of Christ, likewise vain and false by the consensus of all. The author of both seems to have been Papias, a man indeed religious, but of small sense and lesser capacity, indeed the inventor of very many fables, according to the testimony of Eusebius.

3. The proof from Augustine is null. For he does not say that it pertains to the Catholic faith, but that the Catholic faith does not doubt that Paradise exists. And we do not doubt that paradise exists. The question is about the terrestrial paradise, about which if the Catholic faith does not doubt, why does Bellarmine call it an opinion? Is an opinion the Catholic faith?

Let Pererius respond to Bellarmine: Whether Paradise now exists in the nature of things is one of those matters which can be agitated and treated on contrary sides (saving the Catholic faith). To us, however, it has seemed much the most probable that that terrestrial Paradise was destroyed by the general flood and does not exist at this time. The most learned men of our age have most approved this opinion, etc. And: To the objection, however, drawn from the multitude of Doctors who think contrary to us, we respond in this manner: The consensus of the Doctors (as Vincent of Lérins prudently admonishes, and is certainly true) ought to be diligently observed and religiously followed, not in any and all questions, but in those which pertain to the rule of the Catholic faith. But this question, whether Paradise now exists, by no means pertains to faith; much less indeed than that one, whether Enoch is in that terrestrial Paradise, which Augustine nevertheless teaches can be disputed on either side, saving the faith, either by suspending a definitive opinion, or by conjecturing by human and weak suspicion otherwise than it really is, etc. Then, in debating and judging questions not pertaining to faith, one ought not only to look at who, or how many authors think or say something, but also the weight of the reasons ought to be estimated and examined, and how they argue and prove what they say. Many and most grave authors have said that the terrestrial Paradise now exists. They have said so indeed, and for that sole cause that opinion ought to be not only probable, but also venerable to all. But they have confirmed this with no probable authority of Scripture, or history, or experience, or human reason, or conjecture. Indeed, when they were vehemently urged and pressed by the aforesaid testimony of Scripture from Genesis, chap. 7, they could find no other escape than either by introducing new miracles, or by inventing incredible and absurd things about the altitude of Paradise above the waters of the flood. (But how is an opinion probable and venerable which rests on no probable authority, history, experience, reason, or conjecture, introduces new miracles, and invents incredible and absurd things?) Furthermore, it is fitting to consider to what end or use those Doctors wished Paradise to have been preserved by God with so great a miracle. Certainly, most of the ancients thought that paradise was preserved so that it might be a suitable and worthy receptacle for the holy souls dwelling therein until the day of judgment, which is certainly not only false, but has long since been condemned by the Church. To very many others it has seemed that Paradise was preserved for the habitation of Enoch and Elijah, whom they do not doubt are in that place now. But many Doctors either deny this, or say it is unproven, or hand it down as doubtful

and uncertain, so that it can be either denied or affirmed without any injury to the faith. Therefore, it cannot be persuaded by any probable argumentation that Paradise now exists. Thus far Pererius. Let Bellarmine see what he should respond to him, if he indeed wishes to obtain a name among the most learned men of our age.

Bellarmino's other reason is this: A probable reason makes for a probable opinion. The reason why paradise ought to have been conserved is probable: so that Enoch and Elijah, whom it is certain are living in their bodies, might have a seat suitable to their state, until the time should come when, meeting with the Antichrist, they would exchange life for death. Therefore, that paradise has been preserved until now is a probable opinion. He proves the assumption by the common consensus of the Greek and Latin Fathers concerning Enoch and Elijah being translated into the paradise of Adam and still living, so that they may at last oppose themselves to the Antichrist.

RESPONSE: 1. The conclusion overturns the prior proof. For if the opinion is only probable, as he now says, then what he said before—that it pertains to the Catholic faith—is false, for faith ought to be certain, not a probable opinion. 2. The entire minor premise is denied, because it is uncertain and fabulous, as was shown just now from Irenaeus and Eusebius. Enoch and Elijah were indeed translated living in their bodies, but not into the terrestrial, but into the celestial Paradise, a seat most suitable for them. Irenaeus proves this well, who says they were translated into that Paradise in which Paul also heard unspeakable words. But this was not terrestrial, but celestial, because it is in the third heaven. It is therefore not to be doubted that those saints live there. That they will return from there to contend with the Antichrist and be slain by him is a fable, sprung from the same fount as the prior ones. Papias received it from the Presbyters of Asia; received from him and handed down, it has filled the books of almost all the ancients. A pretext was sought from Apocalypse 11, concerning the two witnesses. But neither do the ancients agree on this, nor does it rest on any probability, which Pererius confesses in the place alleged before. The common consensus, therefore, of the Greek and Latin Fathers in an error does not make a fable true.

3. To dilute the argument drawn from the flood, he says: I. That it is credible that the waters of the flood by no means penetrated into paradise. But this is to opine, not to respond. I say it is more credible that the waters did penetrate there, because the sacred history says that the waters of the flood surpassed all the earth, and even all the highest mountains. If, therefore, paradise was on the earth, the waters necessarily surpassed and destroyed paradise also. II. He says that the words of Moses about the waters surpassing all the highest mountains are to be understood of all the mountains of that land which was inhabited by sinners, and which after the fall was given for the habitation of men. Just as that saying, All men died, and only

Noah remained with those who were in the ark, is understood of all men who were living a mortal life in this common earth, not of all men absolutely, because Enoch did not die.

RESPONSE: This is truly to establish one fiction with another. Both are false: both that besides the common habitable earth there is another land whose mountains the waters did not surpass, and that in that land Enoch was saved from death.

Bellarmino ought to have proved both, not just invented them. And concerning Bellarmine's fictitious land, we will see at the end of the chapter. Now I press this point, that Scripture expressly says that the waters surpassed all the mountains under the whole heaven. Therefore, either those mountains which the adversary excepts were not under heaven, and thus were nowhere, since the heaven covers all things, or they were surpassed by the waters. As for Enoch not perishing in the waters of the flood, the cause was not, as Bellarmine imagines, that he was in a land remote from this common land, but that long before the flood he had been translated into the celestial Paradise.

4. The three instances which are brought for the argument drawn from the waters of the flood are from Benedictus Pererius the Jesuit, who defends them, and has, as it were by profession, refuted this whole chapter of Bellarmine, so that we have no need of another refutation, except that it seems ambiguous which one is refuting the other. Either Pererius is refuting Bellarmine, or Bellarmine is prodding and attacking Pererius. The latter seems more likely, because the first seven books of Pererius's Commentary were published in Rome in 1589, before Bellarmine's work, and were undoubtedly seen and read by Bellarmine, although he seems to deny this at the end of this book.
    - **The FIRST instance is:** If the waters did not touch Paradise, Noah in vain constructed the ark with so much time, labor, and expense. For he could have been preserved with the other living things in paradise. But not in vain, etc. Therefore...
    - **The SECOND:** Miracles are not to be easily fabricated. But since all the mountains were covered by fifteen cubits of water, it is necessary to invent a miracle if paradise is said to have been preserved in the waters or under the waters.
    - **The THIRD:** A universal proposition ought not to be restricted, unless an exception is made in Scripture itself, or a necessary reason demands it. But the exception of Paradise from the waters of the flood covering the whole earth neither exists in Scripture, nor has it been induced by any necessary reason. Therefore, it has no place.
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## LECTURE XV. November 22, 1611.

To the FIRST, Bellarmine responds that Paradise is a place only for those men who are not subject to the common miseries of this life, like Adam and Eve before the fall, and now Enoch and Elijah; but not for those who are still subject to sin and human calamities, such as were Noah, his sons, and their wives. That is, he denies the connection of the major premise. But he says nothing. For Noah was a just, pious, and holy man; he pleased God just as much as Enoch and Elijah. Therefore, God could have taken him into paradise with his family by the same right as he did them. Besides, Enoch and Elijah in paradise are not yet exempt from all human calamities, according to these men. For they imagine them to be mortal, destined to die, to be slain by a miserable death by the Antichrist. The distinction is therefore vain. As for the animals, if it is true, as Bellarmine will affirm in chap. 15, that even creatures lacking reason would have lived in paradise, it was certainly fitting that they should be saved from the flood in paradise with men. It remains, therefore, that it was not necessary to provide for their lives by the construction of a thing of such great mass, labor, time, and expense.

To the SECOND, he says that the miracle is not fabricated by him arbitrarily, but that Scripture compels it so, which affirms that Enoch did not perish in the flood, yet was not in the ark. But this is a vain pretense. Scripture does not compel the invention of a miracle, because it says that Enoch was translated from the earth 700 years before the flood, to be with God. But God dwells in heaven. Therefore, Enoch, although he was not in the ark, could not have perished in the flood, not because he was in a terrestrial paradise remote from the land of sinners, but because he was in the celestial paradise, or in heaven. In vain, therefore, does the adversary imagine that paradise remained untouched by the waters of the flood by a miracle, in the way that, for example, in the Red Sea, with the waters standing like a wall on either side, the Israelites remained untouched. Scripture compels us to believe this miracle; Scripture does not compel Bellarmine to fabricate that one, but a fable about Enoch does. But a fable does not prove a fable.

To the THIRD, he says I. that the exception was induced by an excellent reason: to save Enoch. He saw this was vain, because Enoch was not in danger, living in the heavens with God. II. Therefore, he concedes that the waters penetrated into Paradise, but he invents another thing: that Enoch was saved by God in the midst of the waters by a singular providence, and that paradise was not necessarily destroyed ENTIRELY, but that its trees remained green under the waters, although perhaps Paradise received SOME DETRIMENT. But with this response, he imprudently subverts all his own prior fictions and miracles: 1. that Paradise is a place in a land remote from the commerce of sinful men; 2. that the waters of the flood did not penetrate into paradise; 3. that paradise remained untouched in the waters. For now he concedes: that Paradise is in the land of sinners; that the waters of

the flood penetrated there; that they brought some detriment to the garden, although not total, because it did not change the site of the place, nor the temperament of the air, nor did it eradicate or dry up all the trees. The first two have nothing to do with the matter; the last is either nugatory (for the waters could have destroyed Paradise even if they did not eradicate or dry up all the trees) or it supposes a new miracle, without which the elegance and beauty of paradise could not have been preserved for a whole year under waters that befoul and devastate everything with mud and filth, which even the daily floods of the Roman Tiber, devastating the Paradises of the Pontiffs, Cardinals, nobles, and citizens, could teach Bellarmine. That he objects that a green olive branch was preserved under the waters does not prove that either the other trees remained green, or that paradise remained unharmed under the waters. For the olive, according to Pliny's testimony, is perpetually green and, by the fatness of its leaves, never casts them off; it therefore easily avoided corruption under the waters. Finally, if paradise received SOME DETRIMENT, how did he previously, with Basil, Damascenus, and Rupertus, imagine it immune from all alteration and change, in a place not subject to human chances? Poorly, therefore, are Enoch and Elijah housed and fed there.

Let the reader now observe diligently, I pray, what mystery Bellarmine has opened up for us concerning the unknown location of paradise. The allegories of Origen do not please him; nor the opinion of St. Ephrem about a place outside the entire earth; nor the opinion of the venerable Bede about a sublime paradise; nor can he bring himself to agree with Eugubinus, Pererius, and other Doctors of his own order concerning a paradise around the Euphrates and Tigris of Mesopotamia. He has found a new site for paradise in a new land, remote from the commerce of sinners. You would say a new fiction, which I. rests on no authority of history or sacred Scripture; II. is a new opinion, repugnant to the consensus of the Ancients, which cause seemed sufficient to him above for rejecting a better opinion; III. is repugnant also to Scripture, which expressly affirms that the entire earth was corrupt, and therefore the entire earth was destroyed by an inundation of waters. No land, therefore, no part of the earth, remained incorrupt; none was remote from the commerce of sinners. Scripture affirms in the same place that all the earth under the whole heaven was destroyed. Therefore, the land of Paradise was also destroyed, or it was not under heaven, and was not a terrestrial Paradise. IV. The land of Paradise is either contained within the globe of this habitable earth, or it is outside it. If outside it, the opinion of St. Ephrem, which Bellarmine rejected, will stand. And it will be either in the lower, middle, or upper air, or above it at the globe of the Moon, and thus the opinion of the venerable Bede, which Bellarmine repudiated, will remain; or above the Moon, within or above the other spheres. None of these pleases Bellarmine, nor can be imagined without absurdity. It is therefore contained within this globe of the earth, and in a part of it either explored or not yet known. It is not contained in the former. For wherever the explorers of the globe have made their journeys, whether beyond the equinoctial line, towards the South, even to the

Strait of Magellan, or on this side of the equator, towards the North, even to Novaya Zemlya, nowhere are they read to have found a land remote from the world of mortal sinners. It remains that Bellarmine must show us the land of paradise, remote from the commerce of mortal sinners, in the part of the world not yet known, namely in those vastest regions beyond the Arctic and Antarctic circles, perpetually stiff with cold and night.

But to what end, you ask, were the fables invented of PARADISE being preserved on high or in a remote land; of Enoch and Elijah being kept there, to return from thence, to contend with the Antichrist, and to be slain by him? They had great authors, I confess, if the books are theirs by whose name they are held. Handed down and propagated by them, believed on their authority, they were gradually introduced into the Church, held as Catholic faith, and defended to this day. But it was by a wondrous cunning of Satan, for whom it has long been familiar to transform himself into an angel of light and to impose even on the saints, so that he might add strength to the growing mystery of iniquity and prepare an armistice for the Antichrist, lest the world should recognize him while he was sitting and raging in the midst of the Church. From these fables, therefore, the Antichrist has not yet come, is not yet to be feared, because Enoch and Elijah have not yet returned from paradise, have not yet begun to preach and contend against the Antichrist. But woe to the world! Why do we not hear God saying, *But I say to you, that Elias is already come* (Matthew 17:12), and *If you will receive it, he (John) is Elias that was to come* (Matthew 11:14)? Scripture knows no other return of Elijah. Elijah has long since come; the Antichrist has long since come, sitting in the temple of God, the Supreme Pontiff, commanding the so-called Catholic Church.

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## CHAPTER FIFTEEN.

Whether in Paradise not only men in the state of innocence, but also creatures lacking reason would have lived?

1. He posits the negative opinion of Damascenus and Thomas, and proves it. §. *Solet*.
2. He posits the affirmative, and proves it. §. *At gravior*.
3. He refutes the contrary objection. §. *Neque vero*.

### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

QUESTION IV is concerning the inhabitants of paradise. But the questions are distinct: *Were brute animals in Paradise with Adam?* and *Would brute animals have lived with man in the state of innocence in paradise?* The former is textual and not obscure, because Moses plainly has it that after man was placed in paradise, God brought all the living creatures to

him, to see what names he would give them and to subject them to his dominion. Therefore, he brought them to the man in Paradise. The other is not textual, nor theological, but curious, because it is about that which, by the counsel of God, revealed by the event, neither could nor ought to have happened. But to wish to investigate and define such things is curious, indeed impious. Man indeed could have, as far as he was concerned, not fallen, remained in Paradise, and had the living creatures with him. But God had disposed, for his own glory, that it should not happen otherwise than it did happen. It is therefore a question of that kind about which the Apostle says: *But foolish and unlearned questions avoid* (2 Timothy 2:23). Of which kind you may find innumerable others among the Scholastics: Would children born in the state of innocence have immediately had perfect virtue? Would they have been perfect in knowledge? Would they have immediately had the use of reason? Would conceived offspring have immediately come forth into the light? Would females also have been born then?, etc. It is therefore unworthy to be treated by us. Nevertheless, for the sake of order, let us see it briefly.

He reports the opinion of DAMASCENUS from Book 2, chap. 11 of *On the Orthodox Faith*, where, following Basil, he defines paradise as a sublime place, which Lyra understood as a most high mountain, where man alone would be, with no other animals. The same was thought by Thomas, part 1, q. 102, art. 2, and the Scholastics in 2 Sent., dist. 17.

2. BELLARMINE, however, dissents from THOMAS, whose sworn bondsman he otherwise seems to be, and does not accept Damascenus. Why? *The authority of BASIL*, he says, *seems to be weightier*. But Damascenus was following Basil. He has nothing from Scripture. He plays with the authorities of men as boys do with knucklebones, not knowing which way to turn; it just seems so to him. To Basil he adds AUGUSTINE. But he only says that the other living creatures were with men in Paradise, subject and harmless, which he has from Moses, and which pertains to the former, textual question, not to Bellarmine's curious one. He adds two reasons: One, that it would have been unseemly to see waters without fish, forests without little birds, meadows and fields without cattle, etc. The other, that it was not said in vain by God to men that they should have dominion over the fish, fowl, and other living creatures. To both it is responded that they are valid if all the waters, forests, meadows, and fields were within paradise, and likewise if the dominion of man did not extend beyond the bounds of paradise. Otherwise, not at all.
3. He raises an objection as if from DAMASCENUS: there was a danger that the brute animals would eat of the fruit of the tree of life and become immortal; therefore, they ought not to have been in paradise. **RESPONSE:** He denies the antecedent: it was not to be feared 1. that they would eat, because the fruit of the tree of life was not suitable for brute animals, but for man alone. This is to touch the matter with a needle. 2. that they would become immortal, because the tree of life had the power of conferring immortality not from its own nature, but from the inspiration of a

hidden healthfulness, in which way corporal Sacraments now operate and confer spiritual grace. He proves this from AUGUSTINE, who teaches: *in the other trees there was nourishment, in this one, a sacrament*. He will fill the whole of chapters eighteen and nineteen with the power of the tree of life. Let us therefore omit it for now. That it is the nature of the Sacraments to operate and confer spiritual grace *ex opere operato*, as they say, is demonstrated to be false in the doctrine of the Sacraments. Augustine calls the tree of life a Sacrament, not because by its own power it infused immortality into those who ate, but because it was to be a symbol for man of the immortal life received from God and to be perpetuated, or to be exchanged for a better, celestial life, as long as he did not sin. It also prefigured Christ, in whom Adam and the Angels in their integrity obtained life, and in whom fallen men were to recover their lost life, as can be gathered from Apocalypse 2:7.

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## CHAPTER SIXTEEN.

### What Were the Cherubim Guarding Paradise?

1. He posits an untrue opinion concerning the Cherubim. §. *Quærun*t.
2. His own opinion. §. *Sed hæc*.

#### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

QUESTION V concerning the Cherubim is textual, therefore less curious. Concerning it, Bellarmine reports two false opinions, but they are one, and so he joins them in refutation. The former he makes that of Theodoret and Procopius of Gaza: that the Cherubim were specters or horrible forms of animals, placed to guard Paradise, which would frighten away men attempting to return. The other, of a certain James of Chios, perhaps Palaeologus: that it was a scarecrow (*μορμολύκειον*), a certain image of a man, covered with a horrible form and mask, etc. But that this is contained under that, as a particular under a universal, no one fails to see. Other more inept opinions are found concerning the Cherubim and the flaming sword in the books of the Fathers and Scholastics, which Bellarmine conceals. Some have wished it to signify the site of paradise under the equinoctial and the torrid zone; thus Tertullian and Thomas. Others, that it signified a fire surrounding paradise like a wall; thus Lyra. Others, that it signified purgatorial fire; thus Ambrose, not, however, understanding the subterranean Pontifical purgatorial fire, in which souls are now imagined to be purged from venial sins, but the fire to be passed through by all, both good and bad, at the last judgment.

2. Bellarmine rightly repudiates the opinion about specters as inept and ridiculous, because Adam was not so crude that he could be terrified by an inanimate image. He

states that they were Angels, because "Cherubim" in the divine letters everywhere signifies Angels, and the most grave Fathers understand Angels: Augustine, Eucherius, Rupertus, Pererius. He philosophizes more subtly from Dionysius that it signifies not Angels of the eighth order, but of the lower orders, because Angels of the supreme hierarchy are not sent by God for external ministries, which seem to be pious dreams. We also have interpreted the Cherubim as Angels in a visible form of youths, or another accustomed form (Commentary on Genesis, chap. 3, v. 24), and we have shown that the Hebrews do not yet agree on the word כְּרוּבִים, כְּרוּב.

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## LECTURE XVI. November 25, 1611.

### CHAPTER SEVENTEEN.

Why was a certain tree called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil?

1. He relates two opinions concerning the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. §. *Est alia.*
2. He disapproves of the same. §. *Sed hæc.*
3. He brings forth his own opinion. §. *Vera igitur.*

### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

QUESTION VI is textual, also explained by us in the Commentary on Genesis, chapter two, verse nine: from whence the tree of the knowledge of good and evil got its name. There have been various opinions. Pererius relates four; Bellarmine three. He approves the third, but one different from Pererius. He expounds two opinions that are not true. One, of JOSEPHUS, that the tree was so called because it had the power of sharpening the intellect and increasing prudence. The other, of DAMASCENUS, that it was so called because it brought knowledge of one's own nature, useful indeed for mature and perfect men, but noxious for younger, imperfect men like Adam. He seems to have neither reported them ingenuously nor understood them sufficiently, having followed the Latin versions without inspecting the Greek text. Josephus does not say that the power of sharpness and thinking was in the tree, but τὸ δὲ φυτόν ὀξύτητα καὶ διανοίας ὑπήρχεν (*the plant was [a symbol of] sharpness and reasoning*). He expressed the etymology, following Moses; the reason for the etymology, no more than Moses. He adds that the serpent asserted that the power of discerning good and evil was in the tree. But the serpent's calumny is not Josephus's opinion. He does a more manifest injustice to DAMASCENUS. He did not say that the tree brought knowledge of one's own nature, but allegorically, αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τῆς οἰκειᾶς γνῶσις

φύσεως (for this is the knowledge of one's own nature). It is one thing to bring, another to be knowledge. Nor did he say Adam was ἀτελής, imperfect, but νεοπαγή, recently formed. How solid the allegory is, I do not now dispute.

2. It was therefore easy for Bellarmine to say that the opinions, unskillfully assumed, were improbable: that God would not have prohibited man from a tree which would increase his prudence; that Adam was not crude and imperfect, but was created perfect and wise by God; that he could not have been ignorant of his own nature, who knew the natures of all things. I subscribe to these reasons.
3. He expounds the true opinion thus: that the tree was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil because, when tasted, it brought many evils on account of the guilt of disobedience, and by this men would learn by experience the difference between good and evil, which they had before learned by contemplation alone. Rather obscurely. We, more openly in the Commentary: The tree of the knowledge of good and evil was so called not from its form, as if it were itself rational and knew good and evil; nor from its effect, as if it were knowledge-giving of good and evil in itself; but from the event, which God pre-signified by this etymology of the tree, if man should not abstain from it. Namely, that man, eating from it against the interdiction, would know good and evil, that is, would know by experience what the difference was between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. He would know, I say, that is, he would learn by his own harm, would experience how great a good he had lost, and what evil he had brought upon himself; from what pinnacle of felicity into what profound abyss of misery man had precipitated himself by sinning. Thus also Augustine understood it.

PERERIVS disapproves of this sense, because, he says, if the name had been taken from the event, or from that which followed the eating of the tree, it could also have been called the tree of the opening of the eyes, or of the knowledge of one's own nudity, or of the making of loincloths. Also, because the serpent, in saying, *You shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil*, did not mean an experimental knowledge, otherwise he would not have been lying. Also, God, casting man out of paradise and saying, *Behold, Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil*, did not mean an experimental knowledge, because since it is evil for him who has it, it cannot be suitable for God or the angels. But he says, *He is become as one of us*, that is, like us. He therefore prefers the opinion of Rupert, that the tree was so called on account of the lying words and fallacious promises of the serpent: *You shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil*.

You see, Reader, the clever hair-splitting by which these Doctors show off their intellects, hunting for praise of their acumen if they seem to be able to shake true or probable opinions with some quibbles. But I RESPOND to the first: The tree was named from the

event, not from any particular one, such as were the three he names, and many others, but from the universal one, which was the knowledge of good and evil, that is, the experimental sense of lost felicity and attracted misery. To the second, I respond that the serpent deceived man by a fallacy of homonymy, retaining the words, but not the sense, of God. For God had designated the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in one sense; the serpent assumed this etymology in another sense. The serpent promises divine omniscience to man; God threatens an experimental knowledge of evil and a loss of good. To the third, I respond the same thing. For God either ironically reproaches man for his vainly affected omniscience, and thus it is a homonymy, as before; or, speaking seriously, he objects to him the experimental knowledge, as if to say: "By the persuasion of the serpent, man affected Deity and omniscience, but the wretch now knows to the contrary, he feels in his skin the good that is lost, the evil incurred (ἀδιάσπαστον)". But it is a manifest Irony. Therefore, the former sense is better. The opinion of Rupert and Pererius is absurd. For who would believe that God would have wished to give a name to a most noble tree from that which the Devil was going to do and say with a lie? And thus it still would have received its name from the event, which does not please Pererius.

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## CHAPTER EIGHTEEN.

Whether the tree of life could have conferred perfect immortality?

1. He expounds the opinion of Augustine and the Scholastics. §. *Ultima*.
2. Of the other Fathers. §. *Alter*.
3. He confirms this one. §. *Porro*.
4. He compares both and adds his judgment. §. *Ex his duabus*.

### **EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION**

QUESTION VII, concerning the tree of life (which Bellarmine ought not to have postponed to the prior tree, against the history of Moses), whence it was so called, is also textual, briefly explained by us in the Commentary in the same place. But as it is proposed and treated by Bellarmine, it is curious and uncertain. He asks and disputes about the efficacy of the tree of life, as if he had proven that the tree was so named from its efficacy, when it is more probable that it was so called from its sacramental signification: that it was to be a symbol for man of the immortality he had received, if he did not sin. And this is from the opinion of Augustine, which Bellarmine himself had alleged in chap. 15: *In the other trees there was nourishment, in this one, a Sacrament*.

He therefore relates the opinion of Augustine, whom the Scholastics for the most part follow, thus: that the tree of life was instituted to ward off the death which is wont to

happen from old age, by corroborating the nutritive power and conserving the equable temperament of the radical humidity and native heat in man, until the time of his translation into the celestial life. Thus Augustine in Book 14 of *City of God*, chap. 26, and Book 6 of *Literal Commentary on Genesis*, chap. 28, and Book 8, chap. 5. But this is not the complete opinion of Augustine. He did indeed say that the tree of life was given to man as a remedy for old age, lest his powers should fail and languish with age. But it was to drive away death coming not from old age alone, but from any cause, any distemper whatever. Augustine added that the tree was given to man as a Sacrament of immortality. Bellarmine ought, therefore, to have joined them: that it was given as an antidote to death from whatever internal or external cause, and as a symbol of the immortality to be obtained on earth, and at last in the heavens, if man did not sin. This is truly Augustine's opinion, as a collation of the places teaches.

2. The OTHER opinion he makes that of many of the ancient Fathers: that the tree of life had the power of conferring immortality of every kind, so that whoever tasted it once, even by chance, it would confer on him a perfect immortality, such as we shall have after the resurrection; and therefore it was not to be eaten before men were to be transferred from the earth into heaven. And this not only during the state of innocence, for which he alleges the interlinear Gloss on the words, *Lest perhaps he stretch forth his hand, etc.*, Rupert, Theodoret, and Chrysostom; but also in the state of sin and misery, for which he alleges Irenaeus, Hilary, and Gregory Nazianzen. He says, therefore, that the Fathers mean this: that men, by tasting the tree of life before the fall, would have escaped perfectly immortal in felicity; after the fall, absolutely immortal in misery and torment.

For the confirmation of this opinion, he brings forth a testimony of Scripture and a reason from Scripture, the words of God: *Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life... and live for ever, etc.* God casts sinful man out of paradise, lest he eat of the tree of life, and lest he live forever, that is, lest he become immortal in misery, and thus cut off for himself the hope of reparation, according to the sense of Irenaeus and Hilary. Therefore, it seems to suppose that the tree of life had the power of conferring immortality of every kind in either state.

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## LECTURE XVII. November 26, 1611.

Bellarmino's reason is: because if the tree of life had only had the power of preserving man so that he would not be dissolved by old age, it would have been in vain. But it was not in vain. Therefore, it had the power of conferring perfect immortality. He proves the

connection of the major premise: because if man after losing original justice, in the state of sin, without the tree of life, outside of paradise, in distress, could prolong his life for over 900 years, certainly before sin, in original justice, in paradise, without the tree, he could have lived much longer, until he was transferred from the state of grace into the state of glory. And thus the tree of life would not have been necessary for man. This is the confirmation. Before I respond to it, let us hear Bellarmine's judgment.

4. He says that both opinions are probable and can be defended without danger of error, but that the latter seems more probable. To me, on the contrary, the latter seems false and absurd, in which I have Pererius, likewise Scotus and Thomas, with whom Bellarmine here dissents without cause, as supporters.

The reasons are two. One is SCOTUS's: A finite power does not have an infinite efficacy. The power of the tree of life was finite, because the tree of life itself was finite. But nothing finite is capable of an infinite power. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον (*for nothing finite has infinite power*), says the Philosopher (*Metaphysics, Book 12, chap. 7*). Therefore, the finite tree of life did not have an infinite power. Therefore, the tree of life could not have conferred absolute immortality, that is, extended life for an infinite time. I omit Scotus's other reason, that every physical agent, in acting, suffers and is weakened. Therefore, even in the state of innocence, the native heat of man, in acting, would have suffered a defect and been weakened. This reason is not solid concerning the state of innocence, in which it was not necessary for the acting heat, by suffering, to be weakened and to fail, as it does now. The vigor of nature was then more integral, and if anything had failed, the defect could have been restored by the fruit of the tree.

The other reason, from PERERIIUS, is solid: that if the tree of life had had the power of preserving man's life for an infinite time, that power would have been idle and superfluous. But the power of the tree of life ought not to be stated as idle and superfluous. Therefore, etc. The connection of the major premise is proven: because man, remaining in the state of innocence, was not to live perpetually on earth, but after a defined, though very long, period of time, say 3000 or 4000 years, was to be transferred into the state of eternal glory, according to the opinion of Augustine and the Theologians. But after the translation into the state of eternal glory, he would have had no need of the tree of life to attain perfect immortality. For he would have had this from the translation itself. Therefore, the power of the tree to extend life for an infinite time would have been superfluous. It remains, on the contrary, that the power of the tree was to extend life for a very long, but nevertheless defined, time, which is called the time of the way. Bellarmine calls it the time of merit, from the false hypothesis refuted above in chapter three, that man, through original justice, ought to have merited eternal life from God—because, forsooth, a son ought to merit his inheritance from his father.

Bellarmino also errs in this, that he denies that that time would have been very long, on the grounds that in the Angels it was very short. How long this was is uncertain, since it is not established from Scripture concerning the time of the creation, constancy, or fall of the Angels. And if it were established, the course of man's life would have to be measured not from the case of the Angels, but from the will of God. But these things are *in the knees of the gods*, and are curiously investigated, since by the counsel of God they ought never to have happened. These things suffice to break the first part, concerning the power of conferring immortality in the state of innocence.

THE LATTER part, saving the authority of the Fathers, is more false and absurd. For if the tree of life had made a sinner immortal in misery and death, it certainly would not have been a tree of life, but a tree of death; or not a tree of a blessed life, of which it was given as a symbol, but a tree of a miserable life, for which it was by no means placed.

To the saying of Genesis 3, *Lest perhaps, etc.*, I RESPOND: The sense of the words is far different. The former words, *Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil*, are Ironic from God, not insulting an afflicted man (far be such malevolence from God), but reproaching man for his levity, that having spurned God's interdiction, he had faith in the Demon, and for his pride, that not content with the image of God, he affected Deity and omniscience. But the latter words, *And now, lest he put forth his hand, etc.*, do not have Irony, but a serious reason for his just expulsion from paradise: lest, being left there, man should eat of the tree of life and live forever, that is, lest he should try, against the sentence of God, to extend his life by eating of the tree of life, and should think: "Why do I delay God's judgment? I will live from this tree, whether God wills it or not." Thus man would have sinned anew by contumacy against God. That this might not happen, God said: *Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and eat, so that he may live forever—supply, he must be cast out*. That this and no other is the sense is clear, because otherwise one would have to say that God envied man the prolongation of life or immortality from the tree of life. Nor should you say that God wished to prevent the immortality of man in misery and death. For God is not speaking of a life other than that from which man had fallen, wishing to prevent him from, by a new contumacy, trying in vain to recover it and precipitating himself deeper.

To Bellarmine's reason, I say that the connection of the major premise is null. Nor is the proof valid, because the tree of life was given for prolonging a happy and blessed life, not an unhappy and miserable one. Although, therefore, man after sin prolonged his life to 900 years, the tree of life would not have been in vain before sin, because from it man would have produced not a miserable life, such as was the life of man after sin, but a pleasant one, free from pain and trouble, not for 900 years, but for many more, by the will of God. I speak, however, from the hypothesis of the ancients.

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## CHAPTER NINETEEN.

### Arguments for Augustine's Opinion are Solved and Vindicated.

1. He posits two objections for Augustine's opinion. §. *Objiciunt*.
2. He tries to solve the same. §. *Respondet*.

#### EXPLANATION AND CORRECTION

Concerning the power of the tree of life, since the things that are said are uncertain, there is no reason for us to labor further. For it is better to doubt about hidden things than to litigate about uncertain ones, with Augustine as our author (On the Trinity, Book 8, chap. 5). For the sake of order, however, let us see how he defends his own views against Augustine. He tries to dilute two objections.

- **OBJECTION I:** What was placed in the middle of paradise and was granted to man, from it it was easy for man to pluck fruit from time to time. The tree of life was placed in the middle of paradise (Genesis 2:9), nor was it prohibited to man, but indeed commanded, that he should eat of it: *Of every tree... you shall eat*. Therefore, he was to taste its fruit not just once, but daily, at will.
  - **OBJECTION II:** Man had need of a remedy against death and old age, until the terminus destined for the translation either of individuals or of all the elect together into heaven should come. But there was no remedy, except the tree of life. Therefore, the power of the tree of life was to produce the life of man up to the terminus of translation.
2. To the FORMER, he responds from Rupert that neither Adam nor the Demon knew where the tree of life was. But he saw this was weak. For the tree of life, being visible in the middle of paradise, was doubtless more splendid and beautiful than the other trees. Nor was Adam blind, or ignorant of what God had said: *Of every tree you shall eat*. And he who knew the natures of all the animals, how shall he be thought to have been ignorant of the nature of the tree of life? Granting this, therefore, that Adam knew the tree of life, he says that he would not have taken of it except at his own time, when he was to be transferred from the state of grace into the state of glory. He would have taken it then, therefore. But first, this that he says is uncertain; whence will he prove it? Second, if he was not to taste it before the terminus of translation, the tree of life was in vain, as was shown in the reason of Pererius, since after the end of his life was completed, he would have had immortality not from the eating of the tree, but from the translation and celestial glory. It must therefore be conceded that the tree of life was to be tasted before the time of translation, and thus that it had the power of prolonging life for a long, but finite, time.

To the LATTER, he responds 1. that it is not so certain whether anyone would have been transferred into the blessed life before the number of the elect was complete. But I do not know if Augustine states this, nor does it matter to the point, although it is more probable that individuals were to have been transferred after their own course on earth was happily completed. 2. That it is probable that the time of merit would have been defined by a certain number of years, like 50 or 100 years, which being completed, each one would have been transferred into everlasting glory. But this does not solve the objection concerning a remedy for continuing life without trouble and disease until the pre-defined terminus. Again, he falsely calls that time "the time of merit," because men would by no means have obtained the translation by merits, since the good works in which, as he says, they would have persevered for that whole time, would have been due, not meritorious, from a creature. Finally, that the course of life in the state of grace would have been narrower than in the state of sin is anything but probable. But however long it is stated to be, if not necessary, certainly the use of the tree of life would have been pleasant to man for passing a life without trouble and without defect of nature. I speak again from the hypothesis that man had remained in the state of innocence, which, from the counsel of God, the event has taught, did not happen and ought not to have happened.

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Thus we have examined the Paradise of Bellarmine, to which he himself attributes ten chapters, which was, forsooth, his way of disputing against the heretics of this age.

**To the Eternal Father, Son, and Holy Spirit alone, the one, true, immortal God, be GLORY.**