“As for God, his way is perfect.”
2 Sam. 22:31
“Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?”
Job 11:7
“Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.”
Mt. 5:48
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Order of Contents
Articles 10+
Books 6
Quotes 6+
What Perfection Is 1
Historical 1
Latin & French 8+
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Articles
500’s
Boethius – The Consolation of Philosophy III, 10
Here Boethius states an axiom stronger than Augustine’s (below), that God is such that nothing greater than Him is even conceivable.
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1000’s
Anselm
Monologion, chs. 1–3, 15
Anselm “at first based his perfect-being theology on Augustine’s axiom, that God is the greatest actual being (Monologion, chaps 1–3). To fill out the concept of God, Anselm directed, ascribe to God all attributes F such that whatever is F is better than whatever is not F (Monologion, ch. 15). Thus Anselm’s Monologion recaps Zeno’s theological programme. In his Proslogion, Anselm switches to Boethius’ axiom, and suggests filling out the concept of God by many arguments of this form:
(10) Nothing greater than God is conceivable.
(11) If God is not F, something greater than God is conceivable.
(12) So God is F.” – Leftow, ‘3. Perfect-being theology’
Proslogion
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1200’s
Aquinas – Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1
ch. 28, ‘Of the Divine Perfection’
ch. 29, ‘Of the Likeness of Creatures’
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1500’s
Viret, Pierre – ‘Of the Creation & Fall of the Angels, & how that God in the same has declared the difference that is between the Creator and the Creature, and how it is only He that is perfect and unchangeable’ in A Christian Instruction… (d. 1571; London: Veale, 1573), The Exposition of the Preface of the Law
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1600’s
Baron, Robert – 8. ‘Whether, this being posited, that all perfection is of the essence of God [which it is], it follows that personal subsistence is of his essence? [basically No, but it is distinguished] and whether God, insofar as he is communicable to the three persons of the Trinity, is a person, as Cajetan states [not properly, but may be called such improperly; but this is not advisable]’ in Philosophy, the Handmaiden of Theology: a Pious & Sober Explanation of Philosophical Questions that Frequently occur in Theological Disputations 2nd ed. trans. AI (1621; Robinson & Davis, 1658), 1st Exercise, pp. 33-35 Latin
Baron (c.1596-1639) was a Scottish minister, theologian and one of the Aberdeen doctors.
Becanus, Martin – Summa Theologiae Scolasticae (d. 1624; Leiden, 1683), First Tract on God & the Divine Attributes tr. Michael Lynch
ch. 3, ‘Divine Perfection’
ch. 5, ‘Infinity of God’, pt. 2
Becanus (1563-1624) was a Romanist Jesuit and professor of theology.
Ussher, James – ch. 2, ‘Of God & his Attributes, Perfection, Wisdom & Omnipotence’ in A Body of Divinity, or the Sum & Substance of the Christian Religion Buy modified by Hastings Robinson (1645; London, 1841)
Le Blanc de Beaulieu, Louis – ‘On the Perfection & Infinity of God’ in Theological Theses Published at Various Times in the Academy of Sedan 3rd ed. tr. by AI by Colloquia Scholastica at Discord (1675; London, 1683), pp. 194-99 Latin
Le Blanc (1614-1675) was a French reformed professor of theology at Sedan.
van Mastricht, Peter – 21. ‘The All-Sufficiency or Perfection of God’ in Theoretical-Practical Theology ed. Joel Beeke, tr: Todd Rester (RHB, 2018), vol. 2, Faith in the Triune God, pt. 1, bk. 2, pp. 453-69
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1700’s
Venema, Herman – Translation of Hermann Venema’s inedited Institutes of Theology tr. Alexander W. Brown (d. 1787; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1850)
5. God (Names of, Names of Essence, Proper Names, Appellatives, Aleim, Jehovah, El-Shadai, Adonai, Jah, Nature of God, Perfect, Spiritual, Independent Cause of All, Attributes of, Essence & Life, Simplicity) 119
6. Attributes of God (Independence, Eternity, Immutability, Understanding, Knowledge, Object of, Extent, Manner, Will, Object of, Acts, Perfection) 138-61
Abernethy, John – Sermons 6-7, ‘The Divine Perfections Incomprehensible’ on Job 11:17 in Discourses concerning the Being & Natural Perfections of God, vol. 2 3rd ed. (London: Whitridge, 1757), pp. 219-81
Abernethy (1680-1740) was reformed and was an Irish, presbyterian minister.
De Moor, Bernard – Continuous Commentary, ch. 4, ‘On God’
14. God’s Spirituality Argued from His Perfection
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18. Infinity & Perfection of the Divine Being, pt. 1, 2
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35. Perfection of God’s Knowledge
35. Perfection of God’s Knowledge Asserted from Hebrews 4:13
35. Perfection of God’s Knowledge Asserted from Romans 11 (by Voetius)
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2000’s
Leftow, Brian – ‘God, concepts of’, version 1 in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy online
Article Summary
1. ‘The logic of ‘God’
2. ‘Data and methods’
3. ‘Perfect-being theology’
4. ‘Limits of perfect-being theology’
5. ‘Intuitions about perfection’
6. ‘Classical theism’
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Books
1700’s
Howe, John – ‘The Attributes & Perfections of the Divine Being in Nine Lectures on Mt. 5:48’ in The Principles of the Oracles of God in The Works of the Rev. John Howe, Complete in Two Volumes, vol. 2 (New York: John P. Haven, 1835), Lectures 17-25, pp. 1,103-1,132
Howe (1630-1705) was an English dissenting minister.
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1900’s
Sontag, Frederick – Divine Perfection: Possible Ideas of God (NY: Harper, 1962) 150 pp.
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2000’s
Rogers, Katherin A. – Perfect Being Theology Pre (Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 163 pp. ToC
Richards, J. Wesley – The Untamed God: a Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Immutability & Simplicity Pre (IVP Academic, 2003)
Nagasawa, Yujin – Maximal God: a New Defense of Perfect Being Theism Pre (Oxford University Press, 2017) 210 pp. ToC
Speaks, Jeff – The Greatest Possible Being Pre (Oxford University Press, 2018) 173 pp. ToC
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Quotes
Order of
Augustine
Becanus
Bates
Baxter
Charnock
Wolter
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400’s
Augustine
Christian Doctrine, I, 7, 7
“When we think of… God… thought takes the form of an attempt to conceive something than which nothing more excellent or sublime exists.”
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1600’s
Martin Becanus
Summa Theologiae Scolasticae (d. 1624; Leiden, 1683), First Tract on God & the Divine Attributes, ch. 5, ‘Infinity of God’, pt. 1 tr. Michael Lynch Becanus is a Romanist.
“3. He [the Arminian Conrad Vorstius] first says that ‘Scripture does not call God infinite.’ This is false. For Scripture thus says in Psalm 144:3: “Great is the Lord, exceedingly praiseworthy, whose magnitude has no end.” And Baruch 3:25: “It is great and has no bounds, immeasurable and highly-exalted.” These witnesses are not able to be interpreted as about magnitude of mass or quantity, which is not in God. But [it must be interpreted] as respecting his magnitude of perfection or virtue. Therefore, this is the sense: God is so great in virtue and perfection that he does not have an end or terminus of his virtue and perfection.
From this, I reason thus: just as the end in virtue and perfection is that which has an end or terminus of its virtue and perfection, so on the opposite side, an infinite in virtue and perfection is that which does not have an end or terminus of its virtue and perfection. But God does not have an end or terminus of his virtue and perfection. Therefore, he is infinite in virtue and perfection. What shall Vorstius say at this point? The major premise is per se known by implication. The minor premise is openly expressed in Scripture. The conclusion is legitimately inferred.”
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William Bates
in The Morning Exercise Methodized… by several Ministers of the City of London… (London: E.M. for Ralph Smith, 1660), Sermon 2, ‘God is’, p. 31
“First, in the Creation; his essence and attributes are clearly revealed, his absolute power, unerring wisdom, and infinite goodness are discovered to every capacity; therefore the apostle urges this as the most proper argument to convince the heathens, Acts 14:15, ‘That they should turn from their vanities, to the living God which made heaven and earth, and sea, and all things that are therein.’
To this they must naturally assent, as shadows represent the figure of those bodies from whence they are derived; so in the world there are such traces of the divine perfections that it is easy to infer there is a Sovereign being which is the cause of it; all the creatures and their various excellencies are as so many beams which reflect upon this Sun, or lines which direct to this Center; nay, the meanest being carries some impression of the first cause, as the image of a prince is stamped upon a penny, as well as upon greater money; the beasts will instruct, and the mute fishes teach the atheist there is a God; and though he is not discerned by the outward sight, yet the understanding will as certainly discover him as it does an invisible spirit in a living body…”
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Richard Baxter
Catholic Theology (London: White, 1675)
sect. 1, ‘Of our Knowledge of God as here Attainable’, pp. 1-3
“3. We neither have, nor can have here in flesh, any one proper formal conception of the Divine nature that is formally suited to the truth in the object, but only metaphorical or analogical conceptions borrowed from things better known.
4. Yet nothing beyond sense (at least) is so certainly known as God, so far as we can reach, though nothing be less perfectly or more defectively known, or less comprehended. Even as we know nothing visible more certainly than the sun, and yet comprehend nothing visible less.
5. It is not true, which many great metaphysicians assert, that the quiddity of God is totally unknown to us: for then it could not be life eternal to know Him; nor would a mere negative knowledge cause in us a sufficient positive love or joy or trust, etc. But to know that we cannot know Him would but infer that we cannot love Him: for we love not an unknown good.
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7. God is here seen in the glass of His works, with the revelation of His Word and Spirit. And from these works we must borrow our conceptions.
8. Therefore, though the thing intended when we speak of God be transcendently and only in Him, and not in the creature, yet the first use of the words is to signify something in the creature. And therefore the creature is the famosius analogatum [the better known analogue], though nothing to God.
9. In the use of these notions we must still profess that we apply them to God no farther than to signify his perfections. And all words must be as little as may be used of Him in strict disputes which imply imperfection, when better may be had; but the highest are to be preferred.
10. And we must still profess that we take none of these words to be formal, proper, univocal terms, lest the concealed metaphor or impropriety occasion false conceptions of God and unworthy of Him, and also tempt men to run them further by false inferences.
11. God’s nature is most simple, undivided; and so must an adequate conception of Him be. But man can have no such conception of Him, but must know what he can know of this one God by many partial inadequate conceptions.
12. Yet must we be very careful that these inadequate analogical conceptions be orderly, and not—as (I will not say how commonly) it is done by some—a confused heap. For the mind that so conceiveth of Him greatly injures itself and Him; and the tongue and pen that so describes Him dishonors Him…”
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sect. 3, ‘The several inadequate conceptions which in order make up our knowledge of God’, p. 3
“21. By the knowledge of our own acts we know our powers and the nature of our own souls (though imperfectly). And by the knowledge of our souls, we know the nature of other intellectual spirits. And by the knowledge of ourselves and them, and the Scripture expressions of his attributes, we know so much of God as we can here know. And accordingly must speak of Him, or be silent. For we have no higher notions than such as are thus analogical, expressing that which is in God in an inconceivable eminency and transcendency, by words which first signify that which is formally in the soul (as is said).
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28. Though God has no real accidents, we are forced to conceive of Him with some analogy to accidents: where, 1. The universal conception is perfectio [perfection], which comprehends all. 2. The divine principles considered in perfectio denominate God, 1. Potentissimus [most powerful], 2. Sapientissimus [most wise], 3. Optimus [best].”
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Stephen Charnock
Several Discourses upon the Existence & Attributes of God (London: 1682), “Discourse on God’s being a Spirit”
p. 124
“That command which forbade corporeal images would not indulge carnal imaginations, since the nature of God is as much wronged by unworthy images erected in the fancy as by statues carved out of stone or metals:”
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pp. 125-26
“3. Though we must not conceive of God as of a human or corporeal shape, yet we cannot think of God without some reflection upon our own being. We cannot conceive Him to be an intelligent being, but we must make some comparison between him and our own understanding nature, to come to a knowledge of him. Since we are enclosed in bodies, we apprehend nothing but what comes in by sense, and what we in some sort measure by sensible objects. And in the consideration of those things, which we desire to abstract from sense, we are fain to make use of the assistances of sense and visible things: And therefore when we frame the highest notion, there will be some similitude of some corporeal thing in our fancy; and though we would spiritualize our thoughts, and aim at a more abstracted and raised understanding, yet there will be some dregs of matter sticking to our conceptions; yet we still judge by argument and reasoning, what the thing is we think of under those material images. A corporeal image will follow us, as the shadow does the body: While we are in the body, and surrounded with fleshly matter, we cannot think of things without some help from corporeal representations: Something of sense will interpose itself in our purest conceptions of spiritual things; for the faculties which serve for contemplation, are either corporeal, as the sense and fancy, or so allied to them that nothing passes into them but by the organs of the body; so that there is a natural inclination to figure nothing but under a corporeal notion, till by an attentive application of the mind and reason to the object thought upon, we separate that which is bodily from that which is spiritual, and by degrees ascend to that true notion of that we think upon, and would have a due conception of in our mind.
Therefore God tempers the declaration of Himself to our weakness, and the condition of our natures. He condescends to our littleness and narrowness, when he declares himself by the similitude of bodily members. As the light of the sun is tempered, and diffuses itself to our sense through the air and vapors, that our weak eyes may not be too much dazzled with it: Without it we could not know or judge of the sun, because we could have no use of our sense, which we must have before we can judge of it in our understanding: So we are not able to conceive of spiritual beings in the purity of their own nature, without such a temperament, and such shadows to usher them into our minds.
And therefore we find the Spirit of God accommodates himself to our contracted and teddered capacities, and uses such expressions of God, as are suited to us in this state of flesh wherein we are: And therefore because we cannot apprehend God in the simplicity of his own Being, and his undivided essence, he draws the representations of Himself from several Creatures and several actions of those creatures: As sometimes he is said to be angry, to walk, to sit, to fly; not that we should rest in such conceptions of Him, but take our rise from this foundation, and such perfections in the creatures, to mount up to a knowledge of God’s nature by those several steps, and conceive of him by those divided excellencies, because we cannot conceive of him in the purity of his own essence.
We cannot possibly think or speak of God, unless we transfer the names of created perfections to Him; yet we are to conceive of them in a higher manner when we apply them to the Divine Nature, than when we consider them in the several creatures formally, exceeding those perfections and excellencies which are in the creature, and in a more excellent manner: as one says, “Though we cannot comprehend God without the help of such resemblances, yet we may without making an image of Him; so that inability of ours excuses those apprehensions of Him from any way offending against his Divine Nature.” These are not notions so much suited to the nature of God as the weakness of man: They are helps to our meditations, but ought not to be formal conceptions of Him.
We may assist ourselves in our apprehensions of Him, by considering the subtilty and spirituality of air; and considering the members of a body, without thinking him to be air, or to have any corporeal member. Our reason tells us, that whatsoever is a body, is limited and bounded; and the notion of infiniteness and bodiliness, cannot agree and consist together: And therefore what is offered by our fancy should be purified by our reason.”
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1900’s
Allan B. Wolter
Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), pt. 1, article 2, pp. 17-18 Wolter was a Scotus scholar and writes from that perspective.
“For it is commonly conceded today that a composition in concepts does not argue to a real composition in the thing. For if the formal notion of one perfection (for example knowing, even if the knowing is omniscient) does not include the formal notion of another perfection (for example loving, even if the loving is altogether perfect), then to be sure this fact does not necessarily imply that both perfections have, in respect of the thing (e.g. God), the idea of parts and so the idea of being mutually perfectible. But this condition would be required for having composition on the part of the thing.
If we were able to conclude anything from the conceptual separability of one perfection from another, then some non-identity on the part of the thing would be proved (as a virtual or so-called formal non-identity, which we will deal with in the treatment of the formal distinction). But such a non-identity implies neither composition nor imperfection in the being that has those perfections.
At most, indeed, a reason is to be sought why one such perfection is found in the same thing along with another perfection not included in the formal concept of the first, but I do not know why the only adequate assignable reason for explaining it must be found in a mutual perfectability (a perfectibility after the manner of parts) that those perfections have on the side of the thing. But if anyone wishes to dispute this question, let him do so.”
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‘Allan Wolter’s Conclusions respecting Reality, Proving God’ (1958), ‘Conclusions respecting Reality’
“6. If the transient exists, it is caused, imperfect and dependent [see 2].
It is caused because the transient does not have in itself a reason for its existence and permanence; it is dependent because it is caused; it is imperfect because it does not have its total perfection from itself but receives its perfection from another.
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8. Being is therefore divided into the transient and permanent. That the transient exists is continuously verified by experience; that the permanent exists follows from conclusion 7.
Scotus: “But in the case of disjunctive features [of being]… when the extreme that is less noble is posited of some being, the extreme that is more noble can be proved of some being – just as it follows that if some being is finite then some being is infinite, and if some being is contingent then some being is necessary. For in these cases the more imperfect extreme could not be present in some being in particular unless the more perfect extreme were present in some being on which the former would depend.” p. 21
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41. Potency involves some imperfection if it is understood in the sense of subjective or objective potency (potential being) [see pp. 51-52] or of passive or obediential potency¹ [see pp. 52-53]; but not if it is understood as: the possible is opposed to the impossible.
¹ [See also ‘On Obediential Potency’.]
The point is plain from the definitions of these potencies; for all these potencies adduced before agree in that they express the capacity of receiving some real perfection, and so that which is said to be in this sort of potency is in itself perfectible and hence in some way imperfect.
Actual being on the contrary does not involve imperfection. The same must be said of the logically possible and of active potency¹ [that these do not involve imperfection].
¹ [The importance here is because the First Cause (i.e. God) has no passive potency, or capability to be acted upon or effected, but has all active potency, that is, to act upon others. This is not special pleading for God, but is plainly necessary for what a First Cause must be. See ‘On the Distinction Between Passive Power (Denied) & Active Power (Affirmed) About God’.]
42. Act and potency as constitutive principles involve imperfection insofar as they are mutually perfectible in themselves; for only the imperfect is perfectible.
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46. If something is in subjective, passive, objective, or obediential potency it is causable.
The point is plain from the definitions, at least as concerns the real perfection to which something is in potency.
47. Therefore if something is uncausable, it is not in this sort of potency,¹ but is pure act (from negation of the previous conclusion).
¹ [The importance again, is that the First Cause (i.e. God) can have no passive potency to be acted on (which would be an imperfection), but, in the words of Wolter, has all logical potency, or active potency to cause others (which is no imperfection, but the height of perfection).]
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Part 3, An Infinite, Perfect Being
Imperfect Composites to Pure Perfections
[see pp. 73-74 of the Summary]
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59. Every composite consists of act and potency. For parts have in their formal concept the idea of mutual perfectibility, and so are in potency to the whole.
60. Hence composition is a mixed perfection.
This follows from the preceding conclusion and also from the fact that a composite is caused and dependent on another; for being a dependent being involves some imperfection in the dependent being. Simplicity, on the contrary, involves no such imperfection.
61. Every mixed perfection can be reduced to one or several pure perfections that exist concretely in a limited degree.
The reason is that the imperfection by virtue of which some perfection is said to [be] mixed is nothing other than the lack of being-ness. Therefore in itself formally, imperfection is something negative and not positive; for it is the negation of some positive perfection. Therefore it always involves something else, namely a positive being-ness of which there is a limitation.
This positive being-ness in its formal concept either includes imperfection and hence is a mixed perfection, or does not include imperfection and hence is a pure perfection.
If it is a pure perfection the conclusion is gained.
If it is mixed, the same question will return: Is the positive perfection in which the imperfection of this mixed perfection inheres a pure perfection or a mixed one? So either there would be an infinite regress and so there would be no perfection, or a stand would be made in some pure perfection, which is the conclusion intended.
So, for example, reasoning, which is formally a mixed perfection, can be reduced to understanding, which is a pure perfection. Likewise, the extension of parts beyond parts can be reduced to simples that have a definitive presence in space, etc.
62. No pure perfection is incompatible with another pure perfection.
This is plain from the definition of pure perfection; for a pure perfection or a perfection simply is that whose formal idea does not involve limitation or imperfection. Therefore of itself such a perfection cannot limit the being-ness of the subject in which it is, and so neither can it exclude from its subject other perfections simply.
63. Everything finite, therefore, is a caused being or a being from-another.
This follows from the two previous conclusions. For a being is finite because it is constituted either from mixed perfections or from pure perfections finite in number or degree. But from conclusion 61, all mixed perfections can be reduced to pure perfections in finite degree. But, from its own definition, no pure perfection contains in itself a reason for limiting itself intensively, nor does it have a reason for excluding other pure perfections from the being in which this perfection is (from conclusion 62).
Therefore if a full and sufficient reason for the actual limitation of a finite being cannot be found in the positive being-ness of the finite being itself, it must be in some other being, namely in the cause that gives the finite being its positive being-ness. In other words, no finite thing qua finite is from-itself, but everything of this sort is from-another.
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67. Being is divided into finite and infinite.
The existence of finite being is plain from experience. But it can be inferred from other things already proved, for example from the fact that being is causable. For a caused being lacks the perfection of from-itselfness. The existence of the infinite follows from conclusions 65 and 66.
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Something is Infinite and has all Pure Perfections in the Highest Degree
[see p. 75 of the Summary]
68. When being is divided through contradictory attributes opposite to each other with respect to being, one of the dividing attributes belongs to a perfection in being and the other to imperfection.
The reason is that one extreme of the disjunction formally involves the negation of the other. But both perfections cannot formally be perfections simply or pure perfections, because, from conclusion 62, pure perfections cannot formally exclude each other.
Likewise, both extremes cannot formally be imperfections or mixed perfections, otherwise no being could be infinite (against conclusion 65). But a true disjunctive should include under one or other extreme every actual or potential being. Therefore one extreme is a perfection (a pure perfection) and the other an imperfection (a mixed perfection).
69. From this follows a general law of disjunction, namely that in disjunct properties of being, when the extreme that is less noble is posited of any being, the other more noble extreme can be deduced about some other being (see Scotus, Oxon. 1, d. 39, q. un, n. 13).
The reason is that the one extreme involves imperfection and is therefore finite, while the other involves perfection simply, or pure perfection. But from conclusion 65, if something is finite, something else is infinite and has all pure perfections in the highest degree.
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Proof of God
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2. Every being from-itself must have every pure perfection in the highest degree and hence is both intensively and extensively perfect.
Every finite being is from-another, because no such thing has in its positive being-ness any sufficient reason as to why it lacks any pure perfection, and indeed in the highest degree. Therefore the reason for its limitation must be found in something else, namely in its cause.
Conversely, no being from-itself can be finite either intensively or extensively.
3. Only one infinite being can exist.
This conclusion involves two things: a) that existing-from-itself belongs to only one nature, because such a being is infinite; b) that a plurality of such from-itself natures is excluded. For Scholastics admit a double unity, namely [1] essential or quidditative [whatness] unity and [2] the unity of singularity.
The first excludes a multiplicity of species within the same genus, or the sort of multiplicity found, for example, in the genus of animal, which includes several species, as man, dog, horse, insect, amoeba, etc.
The second excludes a multiplicity of individuals within the same species, or the sort of multiplicity found, for example, in Peter and Paul, who differ as individuals within the same species of man [is excluded].
Proof of the two parts:
By the first is excluded the possibility of there being several infinite beings diverse in species in this way. To only one nature does it belong to be infinite,
for if several essentially diverse natures can exist, they would have to differ by reason of some essential perfection that was pure. The independence of a being from-itself or infinite being would exclude all reason for limitation. But on this supposition one or the other nature would lack some pure perfection, namely the perfection by which it would differ from another. But the consequent is false; therefore the antecedent is too.
Secondly, one must note that this infinite nature is also of itself individual and singular. The sense is that this nature qua [as] nature is such as to be unable to be multiplied in several individuals, and so no difference contracting this nature to this individual is required. But it is not to be wondered at that this is not immediately or directly perceived in this life.
For, as we said above in the chapter on individuation [pp. 24-29], all our concepts proper to God are derived from creatures, namely by affirming or denying the perfections found in creatures; and so nothing is found in such concepts, constructed or composed of common notions, that is prima facie repugnant to existing in several individuals. Hence the human mind can indeed ask: why cannot there be several infinite beings that differ only numerically?
Nevertheless, the same reason that excludes a multiplicity of infinite species in the same genus, also prohibits a plurality of infinitely perfect individuals, for if there were two beings completely identical in positive being-ness, they would not be two but one being.
But if anything does differ from a completely perfect or infinite being, it would be because it lacks some perfection that is found in the infinite being. Hence there can be a plurality of beings precisely because all beings beside the infinite being are finite.
We can therefore prove this infinite nature to be of itself individual and singular as follows:
Now it is an empty question to ask: What is the positive perfection whereby the infinite differs from the finite and why it cannot be found in several individuals? For as long as we have to form our distinct concepts by comparison with likenesses in other things, so that such concepts, precisely as distinct, are universal or composed of universal features (as, for example, an infinite being is composed positively of the feature of being and negatively of the feature of the finite), we cannot express the ultimate positive difference of a thing distinctly and in a positive way,¹ but only indirectly and in a negative way, for example when we say that one individual must differ from another by something positive that the other lacks.
¹ [See Wolter’s discussion of individuation, pp. 24-29]
So as long as we conceive the individuating reason that is ultimate in the order of singularity, properness, and unicity, it is in vain that through concepts universal, improper, and common alone we seek for a response in some individuating reason why this reason cannot multiply in many things.
That this question is indeed vain (“a meaningless question”) surely appears from consideration of this fact. Many individuals exist and are known, as is positively clear from immediate and intuitive experience. Hence individuals are really known in some way. Not indeed distinctly, as is plain from the notion of distinct knowledge (namely through definition or common concepts), along with the fact at the same time that no individual is perfectly known, because our perfect or distinct knowledge of any individual does not point out or explain why it is precisely this and not something else.¹
¹ “…something is not perfectly known unless its opposite is known…” p. 18
Hence the strength of the argument of ours adduced above must not be judged by the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of distinctly conceiving that by virtue of which an individual is precisely this and not something else like it, but [it] must rather be judged by the light of this whole fundamental principle, namely that no individual is conceived in its individuality perfectly and distinctly (that is, by common or universal notions).
Hence, besides what it has in common with other things, one being differs from another being by something positive such that one has what the other lacks.
We can therefore prove this infinite nature to be of itself individual and singular as follows:
1) Principal argument: if this nature were not of itself a this [something in itself singular], and hence were able to exist in several individuals, these individuals would have to differ by something positive, which can be called haecceity [this-ness]. Now this haecceity would be a pure perfection [because it does not reduce to anything else]. Therefore if several individuals existed, they could not be infinitely perfect, because each would lack the haecceity [a perfection] of the other. The consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent.
2) Confirmation from Scotus (On the First Principle, ch. 4, concl. 11): A multiplicable species is of itself multiplicable infinitely; therefore if an infinite being could be multiplied, an infinite multitude of infinite beings would actually exist; for if an infinite being can exist, it must and does actually exist. The consequent is unacceptable and is admitted by no philosopher.
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How Creatures Differ from God
Corollaries
1. Whatever besides God actually exists or can exist is: a) dependent on God as on the first cause, and b) [is] a finite or limited being. For these conclusions follow from the unicity of a being altogether independent and infinitely perfect; for if anything besides God were a being from-itself, it too would have to be infinitely perfect. But there cannot be two infinite beings.
2. No being that we now experience can be God, because everything we experience is transient, finite, etc., and so lacks the perfection that belongs to God.
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5. If all mixed perfections are reducible to a plurality of pure perfections existing in limited degree, and if an infinite being possesses all pure perfections, the consequent is that God in some way possesses every positive perfection that is found or can be found in creatures, and indeed possesses it in unlimited degree.
Accordingly God seems to differ from creatures by something positive not possessed by creatures. Creatures, by contrast, do not seem, in the ultimate analysis, to differ from God by any positive perfection precisely, but rather because they lack some perfection that God has. This notion is also expressed in the theory of participation, according to which creatures are finite or imperfect likenesses of God insofar as any perfection possessed by them is found in God either formally or virtually or eminently.
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Part 2, Divine Life Internally
God is Intelligent & on Divine Knowledge
4. God is intelligent.
The proof is threefold:
1) Intellection is a pure perfection, therefore it belongs to God and does so in supreme degree (from conclusion 2…). Proof of the antecedent:
a) Every mixed perfection can be reduced to a pure perfection (from conclusion 61…); intellection cannot be reduced to any perfection that is not intellection, but [the alternative] is ignorance or irrationality.
b) A pure perfection is better than anything incompossible with it (from the definition of pure perfection); every being that lacks intellection is irrational, and being intelligent is better than being irrational or ignorant; therefore being intelligent is a pure perfection.
c) A confirmation is found in Aristotle, who taught that God, as pure act, is subsistent intellection.
2) Intellection can exist (as is plain from our own inner experience); but God, as supreme cause of everything outside himself, must have [in himself] the perfection of his effects either formally, or at least virtually. He does not have intellection merely virtually, because a being that is formally unknowing cannot be the sufficient reason of anything formally knowing, otherwise the effect would be more perfect than its cause; therefore he has intellection formally, which is [the] proposed conclusion.
3) The two preceding arguments are confirmed by this persuasive reason: once the existence of the external world and the validity of our spatial perceptions has been conceded, we must admit that there is some order and finality in the nature of things [which presupposes an intelligent efficient cause].
Divine knowledge can be considered in three ways: first on the part of the objects known; second formally; third in relation to the divine essence.
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11. God’s knowledge is really the same as the divine essence.
Plain both from the physical simplicity of God and from the infinite perfection of the divine essence, which is perfectible neither accidentally nor substantially (conclusion 2). [A difference between the divine essence and its knowledge would be a difference between substance and accident.]
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16. Therefore God is personal.
“A conclusion certain enough: God loves himself.” p. 100
Proof:
1) A perfect being’s love seems to be a pure perfection; therefore it belongs to God and indeed in supreme degree. The proof of the antecedent is:
a) If love of this sort were not a pure perfection formally, it could be reduced to one or other pure perfections that were not formally love. But I do not see how such love could be reduced to something that was [not] formally love.
b) To love seems to be better than not to love; therefore love seems to be a pure perfection, because it is better than what is incompatible with it (namely not to love). The proof of the antecedent here is: a distinction must be drawn between love of friendship (benevolence) and love of concupiscence.
The former is love of an object for its own sake, that is, because of the object’s intrinsic perfection, and this love does not seem to involve imperfection in the lover.
Love of concupiscence is love of an object and not for the object’s sake finally but because the object perfects the lover or is a good for the lover. But this love does involve imperfection because the object is wanted precisely because it perfects a lover that is in itself capable of perfection.
2) Blessedness seems to be a pure perfection, and therefore it belongs to God in supreme degree. But love seems to be either the principal element in blessedness, or at any rate intimately connected with the blessedness of an intellectual being.
That blessedness is a pure perfection is clear from the notion of it; for blessedness is nothing other than an intellectual being pleased, that follows upon possession of one’s proper perfection. But God knows himself as infinitely perfect; he seems, therefore, to be blessed; therefore blessedness seems to be a pure perfection.
That this blessedness is not simply intellection, but includes an act of will or love, seems to follow from the fact that there is in God some operation besides what is formally called intellection, for God is formally willing, at least in respect of creatures. (See the next chapter [Part 3] about the proof of free volition in God.) For if God freely creates things outside himself and so has volition, it seems that he also has some act of volition, namely love, toward himself.
3) God is the first cause of all love in us. Hence he has this perfection either formally or virtually. If you concede that the love is better than not to love, God cannot have love only virtually, because the more imperfect does not include the more perfect virtually. Therefore God has love formally.
As was said above about divine intellection, this divine love is not something really distinct from God’s essence. It extends, therefore, to everything that is really identified with the same essence. Hence it can be said that God loves his essence, his decrees, his knowledge, etc. This love is also eternal, unchangeable, non-contingent.
17. God is omnipotent.
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Proof: That God is omnipotent follows from his infinite perfection, and from the fact that he is the first cause of every other secondary producer, whose existence and power of causing are received from God.
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19. God contingently acts externally, or whatever God produces externally he produces contingently.
The sense is that the active power of God is either formally his free will itself, or a power under the command of his free will. Hence this conclusion 19 establishes the existence of free will in God. Proof:
1) Among beings there are some bad things or imperfect beings, as is plain from experience. Therefore God, who is cause of all other things outside himself, contingently causes.
The consequence is plain from the fact that what acts by necessity of nature, acts according to the limit of its power, and so as to every perfection that can be produced by it. Therefore if God, who is an infinitely perfect cause, were to cause necessarily, all secondary causes caused by him would be perfect in their kind and would cause perfectly. Therefore the whole order of causes would cause perfectly, or as much as it can. Therefore no being would lack any perfection that it is capable of having.
The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too, namely that God causes necessarily. If he does not cause necessarily, he causes contingently.
2) Proof from the perfect independence of God.
Every being that is altogether independent and in no way conditioned is such that it requires no other being in order to exist. But if God were necessarily to produce beings outside himself, he would require other beings as conditions sine qua non [wihout which: nothing]. Therefore he would not be altogether independent, which is false.
The major is plain from the definition of a being altogether independent; the minor is proved as follows: A term or thing produced is required for an act that is externally productive. But if production necessarily follows the essence of God, the essence of God cannot be without a productive act or without a produced thing. Hence a produced thing is a sine qua non of the essence of God.
3) From the existence of contingency.
If God were necessarily to act externally when creating and conserving secondary causes and giving concurrence to them, these causes would be necessary both in existing and in operating. For operating is nothing other than a mode of existing.
But the consequent is false, for there is something that contingently or freely causes, as is plain from our own inner experience; for we are conscious that we act freely or contingently. Therefore the antecedent is false too.
4) To cause freely is a pure perfection; therefore it belongs to God and in supreme degree.
If it were not a pure perfection it could be reduced to some perfection that was pure. But both causing and freedom in action are positive ideas and irreducible to anything that is not formally freedom or causing. Hence to cause freely is formally a pure perfection.
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26. In God there is providence.
…Proof:
1) Wisdom is a pure perfection, as is plain from analysis of its notion; therefore it belongs to God in supreme degree. Now it belongs to the wise man to order all things to the proper end [and God is much more than a wise man].
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Conclusions respecting Reality
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29. Every being is good, or being and good convert.
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The appetite, or will, tends to its object either because the object is perfect for it, namely insofar as it has the being-ness and perfection due to it (love of benevolence), or because the object confers perfection on another (love of concupiscence). As far as God is concerned, it is plain that he is altogether perfect and so supremely appetible both to himself and to another.
As far as creatures are concerned, one must say that they are truly loved or willed by God himself, otherwise they would not exist; therefore they are lovable or willable. Further, creatures are also good for other creatures; for example, substance upholds accidents, accidents give further perfection to substance, etc.
30. Evil involves good, or evil exists in a good, for from what was said, evil is privation of good in something good.
Since every being, insofar as it is being, is good, it is plain that evil cannot be anything real or positive, nor can it exist in itself. For it is the lack of good in something good. Insofar as it is opposed to the good for oneself, it is lack of due perfection, as blindness in a man or animal. Insofar as it is opposed to the good for another, it is the lack of relative appetibility, namely with respect to a certain appetite, as unripe fruit, poisonous plants.
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Evil does have an efficient cause, but only indirectly, namely in the producing of some good when the production is, for some reason, imperfect or defective, whether on the part of the efficient cause, or on the part of the matter, or even when a good is badly done, for example blindness from the [accidental] destruction of an eye [while seeking to accomplish some other good].”
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On What Perfection Is
Quote
2000’s
Allan B. Wolter
Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), pt. 1, article 1, p. 14
Note. On the notion of perfection: the term ‘perfect’ (from a verb meaning to carry through or bring to finished state) signifies ‘complete’ or ‘fully made’. So perfection is everything that is required for a thing to be called complete or whole.
The complex of all such, whether distinct really or formally or in reason, is called the total perfection of the thing, but singly they are called partial perfections or, simply, perfections of the thing. Therefore whatever it is better to have than not to have is a perfection in whatever has it.
Perfections can be divided into:
1) Positive and negative insofar as what is conceived as perfecting a thing is an entity or being, or a lack of entity or being. So, for example, humanity, capacity for laughter, head, hand, eye, thoughts, affections of soul are positive perfections in man. A hollowed finger (pincers) in an earwig, absence of superfluous weight in a man, and the like are negative perfections.
2) Essential and existential perfections insofar as the perfection is conceived as perfecting the thing in what the thing is, for example simplicity, unity, matter, form etc., or as perfecting it in the way it is, for example independence, actuality, necessity, contingency.
3) Pure or mixed perfections insofar as the perfection, in its precise idea, does not or does include some imperfection. So life, intelligence, freedom include no imperfection while, on the contrary, matter, composition, reasoning do include imperfection.”
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Historical
On the Post-Reformation
Bac, J. Martin – Perfect Will Theology: Divine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as against Suarez, Episcopius, Descartes & Spinoza Pre (Brill, 2010) 555 pp. ToC
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Latin
Articles
1500’s
Zanchi, Jerome – 7. ‘Of the Perfection of God’ in Of the Nature of God, or of the Divine Attributes (Heidelberg, 1577), bk. 2, pp. 169-88 irregular page numbering
Zanchi (1516-1590) was an Italian, protestant Reformation clergyman and educator who influenced the development of Reformed theology during the years following John Calvin’s death.
Ursinus, Zacharias – ‘The Father, Son & Holy Spirit are Equal According to Deity, & All Essential Perfections of Deity’ in Theological Places in Theological Works, vol. 1 (Heidelberg, 1612), col. 501-22
Ursinus (1534-1583)
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1600’s
Voet, Gisbert – (4) ‘Perfection’ in I. ‘Of God’ in Syllabus of Theological Problems (Utrecht, 1643), pt. 1, section 1, tract 2, 4. Attributes of God in Specific, 1st Kind Abbr.
“Whether God is in every way perfect? It is affirmed.
Whether God is universally perfect, as having the perfection of all things in Himself? It is affirmed with a distinction.
Whether creatures are able to be similar to God? It is affirmed with a distinction.
Whether perfection may be a natural property of God? It is affirmed.
Whether because God makes all according to Himself, He is imperfect in Himself? It is denied.
Whether because He uses the works of men and from them requires honor, He is imperfect in Himself? It is denied.
Whether the created perfections are in God? It is denied with a distinction. [contrast this with Becanus above]”
Burman, Francis – 18. ‘Of the Infinity & Perfection of God’ in A Synopsis of Theology, & especially of the Economy of the Covenant of God (Utrecht, 1671), vol. 1, bk. 1, locus 2, pp. 107-8
Burman (1628-1679)
van Mastricht, Petrus – 21. ‘Of the All-Sufficiency & Perfection of God’ on Gen. 17:1 in Theoretical & Practical Theology… new ed. (Utrecht, 1724), bk 2, Of Faith in the Triune God, pp. 219-25
Van Mastricht (1630-1706)
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1700’s
Holtzfus, Barthold – 2. ‘Of the Essence, Definition & Perfection of God’ in A Theological Tract on God, Attributes & the Divine Decrees, Three Academic Dissertations (1707), pp. 15-24
Holtzfus (1659-1717) was a reformed professor of philosophy and theology at Frankfurt.
Pictet, Benedict – 3. ‘The One God & his Perfections’ in The Marrow of Christian Theology, Instructive & Elenctic (Geneva, 1711), pp. 19-35 This is in a dialogue, question and answer format.
Pictet (1655–1724)
Stapfer, Johann – 4. ‘Of the Perfections of God in General’ on Mt. 5:48 in Theology Analyzed, vol. 1 (Bern, 1761), pp. 22-28
Stapfer (1708-1775) was a professor of theology at Bern. He was influenced by the philosophical rationalism of Christian Wolff, though, by him “the orthodox reformed tradition was continued with little overt alteration of the doctrinal loci and their basic definitions.” – Richard Muller
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French
Book
1700’s
Naude, Philippe – La Souveraine perfection de Dieu dans ses divins attributs et la parfaite intégrité de l’Écriture… défendue… contre toutes les objections du manichéisme répandues dans les livres de M. Bayle (Amsterdam, 1708)
Naudé (1654-1729).
“But the divines… have endeavored to answer all difficulties alledged by him [Mr. Bayle]… Mr. Naude, a learned mathematician of Berlin, and Mr. Placette of Copenhagen, eminent for his learning and piety [in his Response a deux Objections de Mr. B. 8 vo. 1707], have answered on the principles of the Calvinists…” – Anonymous, Vindication of the Divine Attributes, p. 7
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