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Order of Contents
Time & Eternity
Quotes 1
Past 1
Historical 5
Latin 2
God’s Eternity
Articles 10+
Quote 1
Outside of Time 3+
Latin 6
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On Time & Eternity
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Quotes
1900’s
Allan B. Wolter
Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958) Wolter was a Scotist.
Ch. 1, p. 20
“Beings of reason strictly speaking, they [Scholastics] say, are divided into founded and non-founded, insofar as some foundation of understanding for forming them is found in things or insofar as they are fashioned without such foundation by the mind. Time and space, they say, are beings of reason with a foundation in reality; but a chimaera lacks such a foundation in reality.”
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Ch. 3, pp. 33-34
“Our own personal experience teaches us the reality of transient being; for experience the fact that many things that once did not exist now exist, as, for example, our present thoughts, sensations, and their objects. Further, we have experience of continuity from one moment of time to another, for our conscious life is not a mere succession of discrete instants but is something flowing and truly continuous, so that the last part of the past coincides with the first part of the future.
However, this fact of continuity that we experience cannot be explained unless something from prior experience remains or endures in present experience. In other words our conscious life, although it is a whole that is continually changing and flowing, nevertheless contains within the whole certain elements or parts that are constant. But such constant things, even if their endurance is brief, have a true relative permanence…
It also seems that the reality of the relatively permanent can be directly inferred from the essence itself of the transient. For if the transient were not also relatively permanent, it ought to begin and cease to be without any interval of duration. That which begins to be and that which ceases to be are simply opposed as to existence, so that a contradiction would be involved if they existed simultaneously. Therefore, in order to have something truly transient, there must be at least two instants of time one after the other. But these two instants are either separated by an interval or are so immediate to each other that there is no interval between them. But no instants of time are so united that one exists after the other without interval, and if there is some interval of time between the beginning to be of some being and its ceasing to be, then we have got something relatively permanent.
Now whatever may be said about this argument, it certainly seems that a being which begins to be from nothing and then immediately afterwards altogether ceases to be, without any interval at all of duration, if it does not simply involve a contradiction, cannot exist in time at any rate and cannot naturally be known by us.
Moreover, if such instants of immediate annihilation after production be multiplied even endlessly, they can never explain the experience of continuity that we in fact have. For just as a line is not the mere addition of points infinite in number, so neither is a continuous period of time the mere addition or sum of instants that lack, in themselves, all duration in time.
This reasoning is confirmed by the fact that existence or being, namely the being we experience and which is the starting point for our metaphysical speculations cannot be conceived without duration. On the basis of this concession I argue as follows: although beginning to be or ceasing to be are said to happen in an instant or a moment, one may not argue that therefore we can have creation followed immediately afterwards without any duration by annihilation, just as neither may one argue: a point is the end of a line and as such lacks all dimension, so there can be two points so close together that no distance intervenes between them.
Accordingly we can say that beginning to be cannot be had without duration, not precisely because a beginning directly includes duration (for it happens in an instant), but because beginning to be is impossible without existence and because existence involves duration. The like must be said of ceasing to be, or ceasing to be thus.”
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ch. 3, article 2, p. 36
“On Eternity & Time
According to Boethius “eternity is the total and perfect possession of unending life simultaneously” (Consolation of Philosophy 5.6). He expounds this definition as follows: “Whatever lives in time, proceeds in the present from the past to the future; for nothing is constituted in time that can embrace the whole extent of its life, but it does not yet grasp tomorrow and has already lost yesterday…”…
For time is defined by Aristotle as “the number of motion according to before and after” (Physics 4.2.219b1). So it is motion as measured or numbered. To the extent that what is measured is the enduring of a changeable being, time can be defined as the duration of that which is simply changeable.
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On Temporal & Eternal Being
A temporal being is a thing to which time or temporal duration belongs. An eternal being, on the contrary, is a being to which eternity or eternal duration belongs. Temporal duration is understood to be what belongs to a thing that is changeable in itself whether essentially or accidentally. Changeable here is better taken in a broad sense, namely as including being that is creatable and being that is annihilable, and in this sense everything transient is in itself changeable. Eternal duration is here understood as what belongs to a being that, in itself, is unchangeable in a broad sense, namely as excluding both the creatable and the annihilable.”
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p. 57
“We spoke above about the transient as to existence; the transient as to essence, on the contrary, is present if the quiddity or essence of the thing is a process or something flowing and becoming, for example time, a melody, organic life, the action of solving a mathematical problem. The permanent, by contrast, has its whole essence at once and not successively, as Peter, a tree, a table, the human soul.”
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On the Past
Quote
On Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358)
Christopher Schabel, “Gregory of Rimini”, 3.1, ‘Foreknowledge & Contingency’ (2022) in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
“One final element of Gregory’s stance on modal matters that deserves our attention is the contingency or necessity of the past.
The opinio communis [common opinion] maintained that the past is somehow necessary in a strong sense, even though it is not absolutely necessary [so far as all creation could be otherwise in some respect]. It seems that Gregory did not go so far as to say that the past is necessary (beyond the normal necessity ex suppositione), but he does make some sort of modal distinction between the past and the future.
Thus we can say that Gregory did not think God can change the past, although there has been some disagreement on this issue (Courtenay 1972–73; Schabel 2000, 271–2). Suffice it to say that the time has come for a long and careful treatment of the modal status of the past in medieval thought, to determine whether any thinker ever really thought the past could be changed. The probable answer is negative.”
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Historical
Whole of History
Books
Chernyakov, Alexei – The Ontology of Time: Being & Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl & Heidegger Pre (Springer Science & Business Media, 2002) 225 pp. ToC
Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) was an Austrian-German philosopher and mathematician who established the school of phenomenology (a transcendental-idealist philosophy). Husserl had delivered lectures on internal time consciousness, which several decades later his former student Heidegger edited for publication. Heidegger’s magnum opus Being & Time was dedicated to Husserl.
According to Wikipedia: “Heidegger believes that time finds its meaning in death… That is, time is understood only from a finite or mortal vantage.”
This work discusses other thinkers besides the three in the title, such as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor and Francis Suarez.
ed. Melamed, Yitzhak Y. – Eternity: a History in Oxford Philosophical Concepts Pre (Oxford University Press, 2016) 300 pp. ToC
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On the Middle Ages
Articles
Courtenay, William J. – ‘John of Mirecourt & Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past’ in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, vol. 40 (Jan-Dec, 1973), pp. 147-74
Cross, Richard – ‘Duns Scotus on Eternity & Timelessness’
Faith & Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, vol. 14, issue 1 (1997), article 1, pp. 3-25
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Books
Dolnikowski, Edith Wilks – Thomas Bradwardine: A View of Time & a Vision of Eternity in Fourteenth-Century Thought (Studies in the History of Christian Thought) (Studies in the History of Christian Traditions) Buy (Brill, 1997) 364 pp.
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Latin Articles
1600’s
Voet, Gisbert – On Time in Syllabus of Theological Problems (Utrecht, 1643), pt. 1, section 1, tract 3 Abbr.
“When was time created? It is explained.
Whether the day was first or night? The latter is affirmed.
Whether the foreknowing of times and similar natural things are able to be predicted from the stars? It is distinguished.
Whether through the inspection of an astrolabe and through an index of the stars it may be sinful to investigate future things? It is distinguished.
Whether an event and actions which depend on the free will of men and are merely contingent by their nature, may be able to be certainly predicted from the stars? It is denied.
Since there may be a twofold distinction for the year of the Old Testament, because there is a twofold entrance and twofold exit, which is better and older? It is explained.
Whether time may be some precise thing understood from every operation? It is distinguished.
Whether time may differ from motion in reality? It is denied with a distinction.”
Rutherford, Samuel – Metaphysical Inquiries in Treatise on Providence
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On God’s Eternity
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Articles
1500’s
Viret, Pierre – ‘Of the name ‘Eternal’ which is ‘Jehova’ in Hebrew, given to God’ in A Christian Instruction… (d. 1571; London: Veale, 1573), A Familiar Exposition of the Principal Points of the Catechism, The Exposition of the Preface of the Law, pp. 422-23
Zanchi, Jerome – Of the Eternal Omnipotency of One True God, Year 1575 in H. Zanchius his Confession of Christian Religion… (1599), pp. 377-84
Zanchi (1516-1590)
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1600’s
Cheynell, Francis – ch. 2, ‘God is the First, Eternal & Independent Being, the Fountain of All Being & Well-Being, & therefore cannot but Be, Exist & Persist in Being’ in The Divine Trinunity of the Father, Son & Holy Spirit (1650)
Cheynell was a Westminster divine.
Leigh, Edward – 4. ‘That God is Infinite, Omnipresent, Eternal’ in A System or Body of Divinity… (London, A.M., 1654), bk. 2, pp. 142-50
Macedo, Francisco – 4. ‘Cognition of future things: Whether they are known by God as present in eternity’ in Collations of the Teachings of St. Thomas & Scotus, with the Differences between the Two… vol. 1 tr. AI by Vertias (Padua: Frambotti, 1671), vol. 1, bk. 1, Collation 9, pp. 537-48 A more detailed ToC is given at the beginning of the volume.
Macedo (1596-1681), known as S. Augustino, was a Portuguese Franciscan theologian. While exercising independent judgment, he tends to lean original-Scotus. He had a very good knowledge of Aquinas’s works (and of Thomists and their works) through his life (vol. 2, p. 424).
Le Blanc de Beaulieu, Louis – ‘On the Eternity & Immutability of God’ in Theological Theses Published at Various Times in the Academy of Sedan 3rd ed. tr. by AI by Colloquia Scholastica at Discord (1675; London, 1683), pp. 205-9 Latin
Le Blanc (1614-1675) was a French reformed professor of theology at Sedan.
Charnock, Stephen – Discourse 5, ‘On the Eternity of God’ in Discourses upon the Existence & Attributes of God, vol. 1 (Robert Carter, 1853), vol. 1, pp. 276-310
Turretin, Francis – 10. ‘Does the eternity of God exclude succession according to priority and posteriority? We affirm against the Socinians.’ in Institutes of Elenctic Theology, tr. George M. Giger, ed. James Dennison Jr. (1679–1685; P&R, 1992), vol. 1, 3rd Topic, pp. 202-4
van Mastricht, Peter – Theoretical-Practical Theology ed. Joel Beeke, tr: Todd Rester (RHB, 2018), vol. 2, Faith in the Triune God, pt. 1, bk. 2
11. ‘The Eternity of God’ 211
12. ‘The Life & Immortality of God’ 229-51
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1700’s
Venema, Herman – Translation of Hermann Venema’s inedited Institutes of Theology tr. Alexander W. Brown (d. 1787; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1850)
6. Attributes of God (Independence, Eternity, Immutability, Understanding, Knowledge, Object of, Extent, Manner, Will, Object of, Acts, Perfection) 138-61
De Moor, Bernard – Continuous Commentary (d. 1780), ch. 4, ‘On God’
31. Eternity of God
31. God’s Eternity Harmonized with His Other Most Glorious Attributes
31. Defining God’s Eternity
32. Divine Eternity without Succession (against Socinians), pt. 1, 2, 3
32. Answering Objections to God’s Successionless Eternity
33. Eternity Proper to God Alone
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35. God’s Knowledge Eternal & Self-Sufficient
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2000’s
Feser, Edward – ‘Eternity’ in ‘The Divine Attributes’ in Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ignatius Press, 2017), pp. 200-202
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Quote
1900’s
Allan Wolter
‘Allan Wolter’s Conclusions respecting Reality, Proving God’ (1958), ‘Conclusions respecting Reality’
“[See pp. 36-38 of Wolter’s Summary for background to 9-15]
9. If there is something transient, there is something temporal.
10. If there is something temporal, something is eternal.
“Whatever has in itself the total reason for its being and remaining such (as a being altogether independent and absolutely permanent, whose existence was proved in the preceding article [conclusion 7]) is also in itself unchangeable, for the changeable, whether taken in a broad sense or a strict sense, is indifferent as between existing and not existing. But what is the total reason for its existing and remaining is not thus indifferent; therefore it is not changeable. But if it is a being in itself unchangeable it is also an eternal being.” p. 37
11. If there is something changeable there is something unchangeable.
“If the changeable [being] is taken strictly [see p. 11], there must be a subject of the change that is relatively permanent; therefore there is something else that is absolutely and independently permanent (from conclusion 2…); therefore there is something that is in itself unchangeable.
If the changeable is taken in a broad sense then either it always existed thus or it did not; if it did not it is transient, and then too the unchangeable must exist. If the changeable always existed thus in fact, nevertheless it could not be altogether independent with respect to its persistence, for otherwise it would not be changeable in the broad sense. Therefore it would be dependent as to its persisting; therefore it would, like the relatively persistent, require a first independent thing existing simultaneously that is unchangeable also in the broad sense.” p. 37
12. An eternal being actually exists, or something actually existing is eternal.
13. An unchangeable being actually exists, or something actually existing is
unchangeable.
14. Therefore being is divided into temporal and eternal (from conclusions 8, 9, and 10).
15. Therefore being is divided into unchangeable and changeable.
If changeable is taken broadly [see p. 11], this conclusion follows from conclusions 8, 9, and 13. If it is taken strictly the existence of the unchangeable follows from what was said above about constant elements of our experience [see p. 33]. The existence of the unchangeable follows from conclusion 13.”
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On God being Outside of Time, or Timeless & not in Time
Order of
Articles 3
Book 1
Quotes 2
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Articles
1900’s
Helm, Paul – ‘Eternal Creation’ Download
“The lecture provides a partial defence of the idea of the timelessly eternal creation of the universe, once commonplace among Christian theologians, but now widely disputed. On such a view God has ontological but not temporal priority over his creation. It is better to stress the negative aspects of divine timelessness than to think of it on analogy with temporal duration. Recent objections to the idea of causation being necessarily temporal are considered and rebutted. Some objections to the idea of God being in time are proposed. Finally, it is argued that the timeless eternity of God fits better with the Nicene doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son.” – Summary
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2000’s
Carter, Craig A. – ‘Denying Divine Eternity: Can Evangelical Theology Resist the Temptation?’ in The Master’s Seminary Journal, vol. 33, no. 1 (Spring, 2022), pp. 147-59
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Book
1900’s
Helm, Paul – Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time Buy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 225 pp. ToC
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Quotes
1900’s
Allan Wolter
Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), ch. 3, article 2, p. 36
“According to Boethius “eternity is the total and perfect possession of unending life simultaneously” (Consolation of Philosophy 5.6). He expounds this definition as follows: “Whatever lives in time, proceeds in the present from the past to the future; for nothing is constituted in time that can embrace the whole extent of its life, but it does not yet grasp tomorrow and has already lost yesterday. That then which comprehends and as equally possesses the total fullness of unending life, and for which nothing of the future is absent and nothing of the past slipped away, is rightly held to be eternal.” In this definition are found the terms: a) ‘unending’, so that not only are beginning and ending excluded but their possibility too; b) ‘life’, so that the most perfect way of existing, namely as living, is expressed; c) ‘total and perfect possession simultaneously’, so that all succession and change are excluded and so that an eternal being is should to possess simultaneously the fullness of life. Such enduring existence, as will be seen later, belongs to God alone.”
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2000’s
Edward Feser
Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ignatius Press, 2017), ‘The Divine Attributes’, ‘Eternity’
“But God’s eternity… is not mere longevity, but strict timelessness… not merely that God has existed throughout all past time, and will continue to exist throughout all future time. Rather, He exists outside of time altogether. This follows from both his immutability and his simplicity.
If God existed within time, He would constantly be adding new seconds, days, and years to his life; would be acting at one moment in a way that differs from the way He acts at another moment; and… would constantly be acquiring new pieces of knowledge, such as the knowledge that it is now time t1, the knowledge that it is now time t2, and so forth. But all of this would involve change, and God is immutable. Hence, He does not exist within time, but rather timelessly.
Furthermore, if God were in time, then there would be different stages of his life, each of which would be distinct from the others. In that case, He would have distinct parts. But God is simple or noncomposite, and thus without parts. Hence, He is timeless.
Now, I have argued in earlier chapters that the existence of anything at any moment is ultimately caused by God. It might seem that that claim is incompatible with the claim that God is timeless. For if the existence of something at time t1, is caused by God, and the existence of something at time t2, is caused by God, doesn’t that entail that God is acting at time t1, and also acting at the later time t2? And doesn’t that in turn entail that God is in time?
However, this does not follow. In particular, from the proposition that God causes it to be the case that such-and-such exists at time t1, it does not follow that at time t2, God causes it to be the case that such-and-such exists. It is not that at time t1, God causes some object to exist, then at a later time t2, carries out a second action of causing that thing to remain in existence, then at some yet later time t3, carries out a third action of causing it to remain in existence for a while longer, and so forth. It is rather that God, from outside of time, in a single act causes to exist a temporal world in which the object exists at times t1, t2, t3, and so on.
You might compare his action to that of an author who comes up with an entire story in a single flash of insight. He determines, all at the same moment, what the beginning, middle, and end of the story will be. From the point of view of the characters in the story, what happens in the middle of the story follows what happened at the beginning and precedes what happens at the end. But the author himself did not first come up with the beginning, and then later the middle, and then later still the ending. Rather, he did it all at once.”
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Latin Articles
1500’s
Zanchi, Jerome – Of the Nature of God, or of the Divine Attributes… (Heidelberg, 1577)
bk. 2
ch. 3, ‘Of the Eternity of God’, pp. 88-93
bk. 3, ch. 4
VIII. Whether God may will some new thing, or whether whatever He wills, He may have willed from eternity? 336-38
Zanchi (1516-1590) was an Italian, protestant Reformation clergyman and educator who influenced the development of Reformed theology during the years following John Calvin’s death.
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1600’s
Voet, Gisbert – (7) Eternity in Syllabus of Theological Problems (Utrecht, 1643), pt. 1, section 1, tract 2, I. ‘Of God’, 4. Attributes of God in Specific, 1st Kind Abbr.
Maresius, Samuel – 18. ‘Of the Eternity of God’ in bk. 1, ‘Of God & his Attributes’ in The Hydra of Socinianism Expunged, vol. 1 (Groningen, 1651), vol. 1, pp. 171-95
de Vries, Gerard – 8. ‘God-Eternal’ in Rational Exercitations on God & the Divine Perfections new ed. (Utrecht, 1695), vol. 1, Rational Exercitations, pp. 65-73
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1700’s
Holtzfus, Barthold – 5. ‘Of the Truth, Goodness, Primacy & Independency, Infinity, Incomprehensibleness, Eternity, Immensity, & Immutability of God’ in A Theological Tract on God, Attributes & the Divine Decrees, Three Academic Dissertations (1707), pp. 40-55
Holtzfus (1659-1717) was a reformed professor of philosophy and theology at Frankfurt.
Roy, Albert – Of the Eternity, Existence from Himself & Immutability of God (Bern, 1717)
Roy (1663-1733)
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