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Order of Contents
Articles 6+
History 3
Contra Skepticism 4
Body-Soul Relationship 16+
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Articles
1600’s
Perkins, William – sect. 1, ‘The Body / Soul Relationship’ in The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience… (d. 1602; Cambridge: Legat, 1606), bk. 1, ch. 9, pp. 188-99
Corbet, John – ‘Of Certainty & Infallibility’ in The Remains of the Reverend & Learned Mr. John Corbet… (London: Parkhurst, 1684), pp. 77-100
Corbet (1620-1680) was an English, congregationalist puritan, friends with Richard Baxter.
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1700’s
De Moor, Bernard – Continuous Commentary, ch. 3
section 7, ‘Is Universal Doubt Necessary for the Knowledge of God?’
Universal doubt as a starting point for theology was a novel tenet of Cartesianism. They also limited what can be known to clear and distinct perception, and used this to eliminate much traditional theology.
section 8, ‘Is Clear & Distinct Perception Necessary for the Knowledge of God?’
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1800’s
Alexander, Archibald – 1. ‘Philosophy of the Mind’ in God, Creation & Human Rebellion: Lecture Notes of Archibald Alexander from the Hand of Charles Hodge (1818; RBO, 2023), pp. 34-46
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2000’s
Haines, David
‘Biblical Interpretation & Natural Knowledge: A Key to Solving the Protestant Problem’ in Reforming the Catholic Tradition: The Whole Word for the Whole Church ed. Joseph Minich (Davenant Press, 2019)
‘Descartes & Epistemological Metaphysics’
“The purpose of this paper is to explain Descartes’ views on Metaphysics. It is my thesis that one of the ways in which he influenced not only modern philosophy, but the way in which we do philosophy even today, is by turning metaphysical inquiry into an epistemological enterprise. That is to say, he made the critique of knowledge necessary prior to any consideration of existence, and what may or may not have it… I will attempt to show that Descartes’ view of Metaphysics, in spite of the fact that he used familiar scholastic metaphysical terminology, actually turned Metaphysics into what is today termed Epistemology. Descartes, not Kant, was the first to perform a true critique of knowledge, and to make that critique a necessary preliminary to all questions about what exists outside our minds.”
Johnson, Charles – ‘The Confused Nature of Van Til’s Epistemology’ 2020 24 paragraphs
This clear, helpful, documented and persuasive article examines the first chapter in Van Til’s A Survey of Christian Epistemology. Johnson proves and concludes that:
“…Van Til fails to communicate clearly, and at times clearly equivocates, regarding three points at the heart of his system of philosophy: [1.] whether man must know everything to know anything, [2.] whether knowledge is true if it corresponds to God’s knowledge, or on the contrary, [it is] only [true] if he consciously refers it to God, [3.] and whether this referring to God is [to] be sufficient, or whether one must be regenerate and possessing a saving faith of God in order to possess ‘true knowledge’.”
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History
Historical Theology
Book
eds. Abraham, William & Frederick Aquino – The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology Pre (Oxford University Press, 2022) ToC
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On Reformed History
Article
Sytsma, David – ‘Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology: the Argument & Sources of his Principia of Science [in his Reformed Dogmatics]’ in Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, ed. John Bolt (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon, 2011), pp. 1-56
Abstract: “Bavinck draws heavily on Aquinas’s treatment of the powers of the soul as he argues for a realist via media in contrast to modern trends of rationalism and empiricism.”
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Book
Sutanto, Nathaniel Gray – God & Knowledge: Herman Bavinck’s Theological Epistemology in T&T Clark Studies in Systematic Theology Buy (T&T Clark, 2021)
Amazon: “…what he considered to be the two most important aspects of epistemology: the character of the sciences and the correspondence between subjects and objects. Writing at the heels of the European debates in the 19th and 20th century concerning theology’s place in the academy, and rooted in historic Christian teachings…
This volume explores archival material and peripheral works translated for the first time in English. The author re-reads several key concepts, ranging from Organicism to the Absolute, and relates Bavinck’s work to Thomas Aquinas, Eduard von Hartmann, and other thinkers.”
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Contra Skepticism
Article
1700’s
De Moor, Bernard – Continuous Commentary, ch. 3
section 7, ‘Is Universal Doubt Necessary for the Knowledge of God?’
Universal doubt as a starting point for theology was a novel tenet of Cartesianism. They also limited what can be known to clear and distinct perception, and used this to eliminate much traditional theology.
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Latin Articles
Voet, Gisbert – Select Theological Disputations (Utrecht: Waesberg, 1648-1667)
vol. 1, 8. ‘The New Jesuit Skepticism about the Principles of the Christian Faith’, pp. 106-114
vol. 4, ‘Of doubt’ in 50. ‘A Syllabus of Questions on the Decalogue’, ‘On the 1st Commandment’, p. 774
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On the Body-Soul Relationship
Order of Contents
Encyclopedia Articles 2
Articles 3
Book 1
Historical 4
Quotes 7
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Encyclopedia Articles
1900’s
Shaffer, Jerome – ‘Mind-Body Problem’ in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Paul Edwards (Macmillan, 1967), vol. 5, pp. 336-46
Jackson, Frank & Georges Rey – ‘Mind, Philosophy of’ in Routledge Encyclopedia Of Philosophy 10 vols in 1 (Routledge, 1998), pp. 5,521-5,525
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Articles
Medieval Church
Aquinas, Thomas – Contra Gentiles, Bk. 2
49. That the intellectual substance is not a body
50. That intellectual substances are immaterial
51. That the intellectual substance is not a material form
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55. That intellectual substances are incorruptible
56. In what way an intellectual substance can be united to the body
57. The position of Plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body
…
68. How an intellectual substance can be the form of the body
69. Solution of the arguments advanced above in order to show that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form
70. That according to the words of Aristotle the intellect must be said to be united to the body as its form
71. That the soul is united to the body without intermediation
72. That the whole soul is in the whole body & in each of its parts
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90. That an intellectual substance is united only to a human body as its form
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1900’s
Bahnsen, Greg – ‘The Mind/Body Problem In Biblical Perspective’ (Covenant Media Foundation, 1972) 10 pp.
Bahnsen espouses “substantival monism, a material body which is special for reason of its capabilities (not its added substantival ingredient).” (p. 2)
This is largely in contrast to substance dualism, where the spirit and body are each their own substances, which are joined (as in the Platonic and Cartesian traditions). Substantival monism means that the spirit and body together form one substance.
Technically Artistotelianism holds to substantival monism, as the spirit (or form) and body (or matter) make up one substance. However there are significant differences between Aristotelianism and Bahnsen’s view, which has certain, significant similarities to a view of materialism where what may be mental and immaterial about man is fundamentally dependent (or supervenient) on his material nature. Mind appears to be a function or feature of the body for Bahnsen:
Bahnsen: “Properly understood, language referring to ‘mind’ is actually speaking (not of an immaterial substance) of certain kinds of intelligent behavior. ‘mind’ is related adjectivally and adverbially, not substantively, to body. Man is neither a ghost nor a machine; rather he is a complex psycho-physical organism capable of a peculiar and complete sort of behavior called ‘intelligence’ (and I would add, morality).” (p. 10)
Bahnsen’s similarity to, dependence on and synthesis with certain aspects of modern philosophies respecting methodology, epistemology and metaphysics (or the lack thereof) on this subject is evident (which his bibliography confirms; especially Wittgenstein, p. 9). Bahnsen states as the advantages of his view:
“…while my alternative does not render human nature any less mysterious than the official dogma, it has the
two-fold advantage of more properly locating the mystery and alleviating unnecessary philosophical problems which are set forth against the dual substance view in this day.”
Yet Bahnsen is seriously weak on death and the intermediate state (if his view can even adequately explain these things, which it is not clear it can):
“…death can be seen as the loss of ‘life-breath’ (=”spirit”; e.g. Ps. 104:29), and the dead can be affirmed to still have self-conscious life by being called ‘spirit’ (though very infrequently in scripture to be sure), but nowhere does scripture imply that man is a dual substance which divides as he dies (unless you read the Bible through Cartesian glasses).” (p. 12)
“Man is a personal body created in God’s image. The Bible makes quite clear that man’s hope is in resurrection of the body, not release from the body (John 2:19-22; Lk. 24:40; Rom. 8:23; 1 Cor; 15:3-4, 44, 48-49; 2 Cor. 5:1-5; Isa. 26:19; 66:22-23; Dan. 12:2). Moreover, it is embodied existence which is the criterion of future judgment (2 Cor. 5:10; Heb. 9:27). We may not know all the answers with respect to the intermediate state…”
The reformed orthodox, drawing on the Aristotelian philosophy of the Medievals, do a much better job carefully delineating how death is unnatural to the constitution of man, and yet how the human spirit may exist as incomplete apart from the body. Bahnsen is not recommended on this subject; the reformed orthodox are.
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2000’s
Feser, Edward – ‘Inventing the mind-body problem’ in ch. 5, ‘Descent of the Modernists’ in The Last Superstition: a Refutation of the New Atheism (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2008), pp. 184-199
Feser is a Romanist, Neo-Thomist professor of philosophy.
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Book
Feser, Edward – Philosophy of Mind: a Beginner’s Guide (1999) 270 pp. ToC
Feser is a Romanist, Neo-Thomist.
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Historical
On Aquinas
* Feser, Edward – ‘Hylemorphic Dualism’ in ch. 4, ‘Psychology’ in Aquinas: a Beginner’s Guide (OneWorld, 2010), pp. 138-47
“…to take a simple bodily action as an example, the intellect and will constitute the formal-cum-final cause of the action, of which the firing of the neurons, flexing of the muscles, and so on are the material-cum-efficient causes. That it is a bodily action is due to its matter and the way the bodily parts interact; that it is a bodily action with a certain specific end in view (rather than an involuntary reflex or an unconscious robotic movement) is due to its form and final cause.
There are not (as there are for the Cartesian dualist) two substances with events going on in each that are somehow mysteriously correlated. There is one substance and one set of events having both formal and material, and final- and efficient-causal components.” – pp. 141-42
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On the 1600’s – 1700’s
Goudriaan, Aza – ch. 4, ‘The Human Being: His Soul & Body, Special Status & Conscience’ in Reformed Orthodoxy & Philosophy, 1625–1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus Van Mastricht & Anthonius Driessen Buy (Brill, 2006) See especially pp. 252-59 on Driessen.
If body and spirit form one substance, as matter and form respectively, per the Aristotelian/Thomist hylemorphist view of Voet and Mastricht, there is little difficulty in conceiving that the spirit can affect the body. If however, per Descartes, the body and soul are two different substances of a completely different kind, then the issue of how the two can interact at all becomes pressing.
Driessen was very much influenced by the growing Cartesianism of the day. Upon such a paradigm, three main views could be conceived as to how the body and soul related: (1) Physical Influence; (2) Occasional Causes; (3) Pre-Established Harmony. Driessen argued for the first option. Goudriaan explains and surveys them all.
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On the 1600’s
Sutton, John – ‘Soul & Body in Seventeenth-Century British Philosophy’ in ed. Peter Anstey, The Oxford Handbook of Seventeenth-Century British Philosophy (Oxford UP, 2013), pp. 285-307
Garber, D. & Wilson – ‘Mind-Body Problems’ in eds. D. Garber & M. Ayers, The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, I (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 838–867
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Order of Quotes
Calvin
Beza
Zanchi
Rogers
Perkins
Mastricht
Shedd
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Quotes
John Calvin
Commentary on Zech. 12:1
“Nor is it yet a small matter when he adds, that God had formed the spirit of man; for we know that we live; the body of itself would be without any strength or motion, were it not endued with life; and the soul which animates the body is invisible…
By saying “in the midst of him”, he means, that the spirit dwells within; for the body, we allow, is as it were its tabernacle.”
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Theodore Beza & Anthony Faius
Propositions & Principles of Divinity Propounded & Disputed in the University of Geneva by Certain Students of Divinity there, under Mr. Theodore Beza & Mr. Anthony Faius… (Edinburgh: Waldegrave, 1591), 15. ‘Of the Faculties of the Soul of Man’, p. 34
“5. Yet inasmuch as the soul, in bringing forth the effects of these proper qualities, does use the instrument of the body, whereunto it is personally united: in this respect also, man (wholly considered, but not in part) may be truly held to be created after the image of God.
…
7. …the body, to be short, being framed in a most wonderful decent sort, to yield obedience most readily, and without all wearisomeness unto the soul when it moved the same.”
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Jerome Zanchi
H. Zanchius his Confession of Christian Religion… (Cambridge, 1599), ‘Observations of the same Zanchius upon his Own Confession’, pp. 289-90 The context in point 7 is Zanchi arguing the validity of the extra Calvinisticum, that they person, or hypostasis of the Son exists outside of the human flesh according to his divinity. In point 8 it is the denial of the real communication of properties, via the Person, of the natures (contra the Lutherans).
“7. …Indeed the soul (as is aforesaid) is wholly hypostasis to the head, giving life to it and sustaining it: but where? not in every part of the body, but only in that where the head itself is: and out of the head [the soul] is also wholly hypostasis to the feet, sustaining them too: not where the head is, but where the feet themselves are. Is then the union which the soul has with the head dissolued because out of the head it is wholly also in the feet?
8. Finally, that all things which have been spoken of this personal union [of Christ in two natures], may more plainly be declared, I add these also:
The soul is hypostasis to the eyes: to what eyes? such as they are: namely instruments used for sight, not for hearing: on the other side, to the ears, for hearing, not for seeing. So the Word was hypostasis to the human nature, not to destroy death, which was a property of the Word: but to suffer death, which was a property of the flesh.”
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Nehemiah Rogers
The Fast Friend: or a Friend at Midnight: Set forth in an Exposition on that Parable, Lk. 11:5-11… (London, 1658)
“…as the soul of man is said to be in the head or heart, so conceive of God’s being in Heaven. The soul (we know) animates the whole body of man, and by the presence of it in every member communicates life to the whole: yet by way of preeminency and excellency it is said to be in the head or heart of man, because in these two parts of man, and from thence she exercises her cheifest functions, and derives her cheifest influence.”
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William Perkins
An Exposition of the Symbol or Creed of the Apostles… (Cambridge, 1595), p. 150
“…as in the like case the soul of man is wholly in the head and wholly in the feet, yea wholly in every part: and yet the soul cannot be said to use reason in the feet or in any other part, but only in the head.”
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Peter van Mastricht
Theoretical-Practical Theology (RHB), vol. 3, bk. 4, ch. 3, ‘Actual Sin’, sections 24
“XXIV. It is asked, fifth, whether infants before all use of reason are subject to actual sin…
The Reformed, although they acknowledge that original corruption is actually present in infants, from which by nature they are prone to all actual sins, and moreover bear in themselves the seeds of the same, nonetheless deny that they are properly subject to any actual sin…
Nevertheless they object:… (2) That the human mind consists in actual thought, which can not only be congruent with divine law, but also repugnant to it. I respond: (1) That the human mind is a thinking substance which, with organs adequately disposed, can think, we do not doubt, just as it is a reasoning substance, not because it is always reasoning in actuality, but because it can reason, with necessary things put in place.”
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William G.T. Shedd
Dogmatic Theology (NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888), vol. 2, ch. 2, ‘Man’s Primitive State’, p. 100
“Spiritual substance is distinguished from matter by the characteristic of self-motion, or motion ab intra [from inside]. Matter must be moved from without, by another material substance impinging upon it. But mind moves from within. Its motion is not from external impact, but is self-motion.
Adam was created a spirit. The instant, therefore, that he was created, he had all the characteristics that distinguish spirit from matter. One of these, and one of the most important, is self-motion. But self-motion is self-determination, and self-determination is inclination. The Scripture asserts that Adam was created a ‘living soul.’ Life implies motion; and the motion in this case was not mechanical or material, but the motion of mind. Thus in creating a rational spirit, God creates a self -moving essence, and this is a self-determining will.”
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Latin Article
1600’s
Voet, Gisbert – Of the Union of the Soul to the Body in Syllabus of Theological Problems (Utrecht, 1643), pt. 1, section 1, tract 3 Abbr.
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Related Pages