.
Subsection
No Rational Human Actions are Indifferent
.
.
Order of Contents
Articles 4
Quotes 4
Westminster
Necessity of Benefit may Justify Circumstances in Worship
.
.
Articles
1200’s
Aquinas, Thomas – pt. 2, pt. 1, question 18, ‘Of the Good & Evil of Human Acts in General’ in Summa
3. ‘Whether man’s action may be good or evil from a circumstance?’ [Yes]
Gillespie largely follows Auinas on this issue.
“In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial form that gives it its species since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color and the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result.
So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.
…
Circumstances are outside an action inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents thereof…
Every accident is not accidentally in its subject, for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals…
Since good and being are convertible, according as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and in moral actions.”
8. ‘Whether any action may be indifferent in its species?’ [Yes]
“…every action takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms to a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what belongs to another.
But it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.”
9. ‘Whether an individual action can be indifferent?’ [No]
“Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): ‘An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious utility.’ But an idle word is an evil, because ‘men… shall render an account of it in the day of judgment’ (Mt. 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good or bad. For the same reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.
…It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And the reason of this is because a moral action… derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end.
For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.”
10. ‘Whether a circumstance may place a moral action in the species of good or evil?’ [Yes]
“Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad.
…
And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
…
It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil, since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason.”
“More and less do not change a species. But more and less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it in a species of good or evil.”
.
1600’s
Gillespie, George – English-Popish Ceremonies (1637)
pt. 3, ch. 7, sections 5-7, pp. 112-15
See Bannerman below for a summary. For Gillespie’s discussion of things that are not ‘circumstances,’ but are purely indifferent, see the Fourth Part of his work.
pt. 4, ‘Against the Indifferency of the Ceremonies’ 47 pp.
Rutherford, Samuel – Intro, section 1, pp. 1-6 of The Divine Right of Church Government… (London: 1646)
.
1800’s
Bannerman, James – pp. 354-58 of The Church of Christ, vol. 1, Division II, Chapter II, ‘Rites and Ceremonies in Public Worship’
Bannerman, of the Free Church of Scotland, in his classic work on the Church, summarizes the three principles of George Gillespie in what defines a ‘circumstance’. Circumstances in worship must:
1. ‘only be a circumstance of divine worship, and no substantial part of it–no sacred, significant, efficacious ceremony;’
2. ‘be such as are not determinable by Scripture;’
3. be those for the appointment of which she is ‘able to give a sufficient reason and warrant.’
.
.
Quotes
1500’s
Theodore Beza
A Clear & Simple Treatise on the Lord’s Supper (RHB, 2016), p. 143
“First of all, I hold that it is proper for the ceremonies in the church to be absolutely as few and as pure as possible. For besides the fact that we must now worship the Lord in Spirit and truth, even plain experience, that teacher of fools, ought to warn us not to imitate the example of those who–while setting no limit on their ceremonies–do not increase the worship of God, but completely undermine it. And so we determined that we should take thought how to do away with ceremonies rather than establishing them.”
.
1600’s
George Gillespie
English-Popish Ceremonies ([1637]), pt. 4, ch. 3, pp. 6-7
“When we measure the goodness or the badness of a human action, we must not only measure it by the object and the end, but by all the circumstances which accompany it. Fed. Morellus upon those words of Seneca, Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi, etc. says that without those circumstances of things, persons, times, places, facti ratio non constat [it does not consist with reason of fact]. Circumstances sometimes constituunt rerum earum quae aguntur speciem [establish those things which direct the species], say our divines, meaning that circumstances do make an action good or bad. Humani actus [a human action] say the Schoolmen, non solum ex objectis, verum ex circumstantiis boni vel mali esse dicuntur.
It is not every mans part, (says one of our opposites) to judge de circumstantia, quae reddit actionem vel bonam vel malam. Some circumstances says another of them, are intrinsical and essential to actions, and specially making up their nature. The principal circumstances which here we speak of, are comprehended in this versicle:
‘Quis, Quid, Ubi, Quibus auxiliis, Cur, Quomodo, Quando.’ [‘Who, what, where, by what means, why, what way, when.’]”
.
Samuel Willard
The Sinfulness of Worshipping God with Men’s Institutions, as it was Delivered in a Sermon (Boston, 1691), pp. 7-8
“Though these [circumstances of worship] also, when they have a religious respect put on them, are made essential, and come under the things our Saviour here refers to [Mat. 15:9]. But a thing may then be said to be made a part of worship, when it hath such an holiness put upon it, as to be reputed a medium of our communion with God. And this is not to be judged of by what men say of it, but by the necessary consequence of the usage of it.”
.
2000’s
Matthew Winzer
‘The Constitutional Principle of the Scottish Reformation: 1547-1648’ in Scottish Reformation Society Historical Journal, 2012, vol. 2, pp. 1-42
“This comprehensive application of the [Scriptural] rule [articulated by Rutherford] was necessitated because the advocates for human ceremonies had argued that such things might be justified as circumstances of worship. It was maintained that circumstances which were not forbidden were lawful if they were edifying. Their reformed opponents quickly saw that this argument effectively created a class of religious actions which were beside the Word in matters of faith and worship.
Their response was clear and concise: any action which served as a means of worship was a moral action and required the warrant of God’s Word. To the point, Rutherford asserted, “In actions or religious means of worship, and actions moral, whatever is beside the Word of God is against the Word of God”. (Divine Right of Church Government, 1646, [Intro, section 2], pp. 19-20)”
.
.
Westminster
Confession of Faith
.
.
Not an Absolute Necessity Alone, but a Moral Necessity of Benefit may Justify Circumstances in Worship
Articles
Gillespie, George – English-Popish Ceremonies (1637)
pt. 3, ch. 7, section 7, point 3, pp. 114-15
pt. 4, ch. 3, pp. 17-18
.
.
.
Related Pages