

Comparisons of the Teaching of St. Thomas and Scotus, With the Differences Between the Two

COLLATIONS
OF THE TEACHING OF
ST. THOMAS AND SCOTUS,

With the Differences Between the Two:

With the Texts of Both Faithfully Presented, and the Sentences Subtly
Examined,

With the Commentaries of the Interpreters CAJETAN above all, and LICHETUS
carefully sifted out,

And of nearly all other Schools, especially the Jesuit ones, with Suarez and
Vasquez as Authors, with the Controversies Aptly Brought Forward.

*A work compiled with great care and vigilance, and prepared for the study and use of all
scholars.*

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Volume I

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Minorite of Lusitania, Jubilate Lector, Public Professor of Padua, Venetian
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WITH PRIVILEGE

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DEDICATORY EPISTLE TO HIS MOST SERENE, AUGUST, ROYAL HIGHNESS OF SAVOY

As God is in Heaven, and His majesty is argued from that place, so the place where one dwells is evidence of majesty — and no prince surpasses in dignity the one who dwells closest to Heaven. Rightly therefore, Royal and Most Serene Duke Carlo, you claim by this title the prerogative of Highness. Where Europe swells most augustly, rises most nobly, and towers most sublimely upon itself, you place your seat near the stars, entrusted to the palace of the Sun, separated from Heaven only by pure air — upon which the dewy stars lavish their obedient favors.

Still mortal, you are situated on the border of the immortals, and carry on commerce of eternity with those above. Your foot presses down upon the Alps more deeply; at its kiss, those enormous ridges bow themselves down and willingly accept the yoke. The jutting crags guard you with their rocky escort. The chained rocks, bound by stony links, profess immovable servitude. The deep valleys are proof of most humble obedience. The peaks of the mountains feel the lightning, so that those struck from Heaven venerate their princes with greater reverence. The snows, melted by the Sun, flow into bright offices and, dissolved, obey most tenderly...

(The epistle continues at length praising the House of Savoy — its genealogy from Saxony, its crusading history, its pure bloodline mingled with emperors and kings, its guardianship of Italy, and finally the presence of the Holy Shroud in Turin as a sign of divine favor. It concludes by presenting this theological work as a gift from the author, a Portuguese Franciscan, connecting the Houses of Savoy and Portugal through royal blood ties.)

TO THE CURIOUS READER

You have taken up a book made to your taste. You ask the reason for undertaking this work? Hear it. It is twofold.

Complaints from my own people; disdain from the Thomists.

My own complained of me — that I, a Scotist, was teaching and writing in the Thomist manner. I appeased them by offering the excuse that one who teaches publicly outside the house by mandate of princes was bound to follow St. Thomas as a matter of duty — and to some extent I satisfied them; I certainly suppressed, if I did not entirely remove, their complaints.

But I could not remove the disdain of the Thomists. Some of the leading ones accused me of deserting Scotus, taking it badly that I was operating in their camp. "Why," they said, "do you, a man of the Scotist profession, play the Thomist? Drop the mask. Return to your own." I complied.

What happened to me is what I remember happening to Suárez — whom I recall hearing as a boy when he was publicly teaching at that illustrious Academy of Coimbra and commenting on St. Thomas as was his custom — when the Thomists told him either to stop departing from St. Thomas, or to stop commenting on him. He replied: "I will henceforth stop commenting." And so he did — he abstained from commentaries thereafter.

Mindful of this outcome, I returned to the camp of Scotus. I fight for Scotus. I will say to the Thomists, if anyone turns this into a grievance: *You forced me to it.*

That, Reader, is the cause. Now for the plan.

My purpose is to set out the disagreements of Scotus from St. Thomas, and to produce the places where they are contained — not for the sake of reconciling them (which would be insipid), but for the sake of sustaining and confirming the reasons for the disagreements. Since this cannot be done without collating the passages and finding the differences, I therefore entitle the book *Collationes cum Differentiis* — *Comparisons with Differences*.

On method: Texts are brought forward, the texts adduced are set against one another, compared, and weighed. The principal interpreters are employed so that the faithfulness of Scotus may first be established; the arguments are examined so that it may appear that Scotus is strong in reasoning. Authors are brought in both from each opposing school and from other diverse sources — chiefly Gregory, Bacon, Suárez, Vásquez — so that it may appear which of the two each follows. But in every controversy above all, **Augustine** holds sway.

Finally, after the question has been thoroughly aired, I interpose my own judgment, and, with whatever authority I carry, I decide the matter in favor of Scotus. It is sometimes right to restrain the pen, however, when a controversy has been entirely resolved, or when nothing can be added without impertinence.

Regarding citations of authors: I chose to be thorough and careful with them, certain that the votes of authorities carry great weight in deciding these controversies. I have therefore read

them in their own clear sources and present them pure and clear, reproducing both the passages and the opinions with the utmost fidelity. And lest I cause you trouble, wherever I place testimonies I indicate the locations — so I do not force you to go back and search for citations left far behind, sometimes omitted through negligence; indeed, where in other authors citations are wrong or perverse, I correct them and restore both place and fidelity. From this you will infer my diligence in reading and citing.

I came to Scotus late, but I weigh his doctrine seriously and present it sincerely. I use the Lyon edition of the year 1639, which is clear and marked with numbers. In disputing, I study truth alone, which has always been the aim of my commentaries.

I write far from pretense, far from ambition — every hope of honor not merely set aside but lost. The last things of truth are not sought, but sacrificed.

It fell to me to boast in the school what another boasted on the battlefield:

"Learn, reader, doctrine from me, and the true labor — Fortune from others: for my Pen, dedicated to Minerva, will lead you to no rewards."

For the rest, I would have you warned from Bernard: *"Some judge, and afterwards approve."* As for the drink — whether it is sweet or bitter — I will not judge before tasting. Farewell.

EULOGY OF ST. THOMAS, THE ANGELIC DOCTOR

How great is Thomas, who contains the Sun? God, immeasurable, the Sun contained — *"In the Sun He placed His tabernacle."* Is Thomas greater than the Immeasurable, in whom the Sun placed His tabernacle? You may judge. We read of an Angel standing in the Sun; here we behold the Sun standing in an Angel!

How wise — he in whose breast the Sun dwells in place of a heart! How radiant — he whose entire being is the Sun, which is part of his light!

As an infant he swallowed the Angelic Salutation in written form, and from that food he became an Angel. In the mouth of Thomas is the root of the Dominican Rosary. Thomas received that *AVE MARIA* from an Angel. With his mother's milk he drank the Virgin's doctrine; and the Angel gave it back as milk when he bound his breast with the girdle, and utterly extinguished Cupid. The Angel, like a man, was girded at the breast with a golden belt; the man, like an Angel, was girded at the breast with a white belt. Hence he paved the way from the white to the pure doctrine.

What has the Thomas-Angel to do with a smoking firebrand — with which he drove the demon from the harlot? What has he in common with the smoking coal of the Seraphim — with which he cleansed the mouth of Isaiah? That one took a coal from the Altar; this one made an Altar from a hearth. At this Altar he sacrificed to Christ two twin sister-brides.

How can he be an Angel, if he was an Ox? Indeed — for he who was an Ox in the chariot of the glory of the Lord (*Ezekiel 1*) was also a Cherub in the same prophet's chapter 10. Having professed silence, he was silent in school, like the Divine Word: which, before it spoke, kept silence — *"While a deep silence held all things, the Almighty Word came."* After long silence, the all-knowing Word taught.

You will not find in the Scriptures when and where the Angels were created. You will find in the writings of St. Thomas that Angels are made there by doctrine. Learn in this school — be an Angel.

The doctrine of St. Thomas is celestial, from Divine Wisdom, when it savors the Heavenly Bread. *"You have written well of me, Thomas"* — he heard this from the Divine Eucharistic Bread.

Christ *did all things well*; Thomas *wrote all things well*. The things made through the Word, God saw *that they were good*; the things written by Thomas, Christ saw that they were good. *"He spoke, and they were made."* Thomas wrote, and they were confirmed. God uttered a good word; Thomas described it well on paper. The tongue of God is *"like the pen of a ready writer"* — namely, of Thomas. The pen of Thomas is like the tongue of God.

Christ spoke — He did not write; He dictated to Thomas what to write. If Christ were to write, He would write as Thomas does. Christ took for Himself a tongue; He gave back to Thomas the pen. "*To him was given a reed like a measuring rod*" — indeed he writes as a Censor, correcting, and through which other things are corrected. The pen of Thomas is a living Censure.

He wrote rightly, who possessed knowledge in its parts. A wondrous thing! Those parts are the whole. Little enough — since *the whole is greater than its part* — yet these parts are greater than any other whole. The doctrine of St. Thomas has parts, but not middle ones — for in them the knowledge is entire, not partial.

But the Angelic Doctor made his doctrine not spiritual, but corporeal. It consists of parts, has a body, is divided into articles. Is this Angelic? Nay — it is Divine. To transmit celestial doctrine so clearly and openly that it can, as it were, be handled, and become tangible to readers. Hence he wrote *Against the Gentiles*, who according to Paul "*sought God, if haply they might feel after Him.*" Thomas says to them: "*Handle and see*" — as John said: "*Our hands have handled of the Word of Life.*"

Thomas the Didymus believed by touching; Thomas the Angelic taught by touching.

With an angelic soul he treated of the Eucharistic Body of Christ. To this Body corresponds the body of the question; the articles follow, as accidents cling to the Eucharistic Body. To these resounding articles he sang the Eucharistic Hymn. O beautiful! O worthy of cedar! Did he receive it from Christ, when after the Last Supper He sang a hymn and went out to the brook Cedron? Worthy is that hymn that Christ might have sung first.

Rightly did Thomas compose the *Summa Theologiae* — in which all was supreme. He was himself a *Summa* — a compendium of virtues and doctrines. He composed this Summa, complete in every number. To it the treasures of wisdom are reducible. Countless commentators have commented on this Summa — but none have equaled the Summa.

He composed the *Catena* from the Fathers, so that, chained by them, he might serve them. He wrote on Matthew, as if playing the role of an Angel for him. He wrote on Paul, as one "*a little lower than the Angels.*" He wrote above the Master — and to the Master's rule that "*the disciple is not above his master*" there was a just exception, since he was above the Master. Nor is it an injury to the Master — for Thomas, who is placed before him, is an Angel.

This Angel God set over the paradise of theological doctrine, to guard it like a Cherub with the *flaming sword* of his genius. In the way of St. Thomas is the *way of the tree of life*. May this Angel guard us on this way.

Other Angels always behold the face of the Father; this Angel always beholds the face of Truth. Other Angels are angels of little ones; this is the Angel of doctors. Others free from terrors; this one from errors. Others make wayfarers along their paths; this one, on his way, makes those who comprehend. Individual men need individual guardian Angels — but all the learned need *this* guardian Angel.

Blessed the Order of St. Dominic the Father, which bore him as a son — Lord of the Sciences! Happy the Order of Preachers, which feeds brothers who preach to all — and brought forth this brother, who is praised by all.

Io, triumph!

EULOGY OF SCOTUS, THE SUBTLE DOCTOR

He spoke too little of Scotus who called him merely *Subtle*. He would speak justly if he said *Subtlety itself*. In others you find sharp minds; in Scotus you find the very cutting edge — indeed, he is himself entirely sharpness. And whoever knows Scotus will become subtle.

Exaggerate — nay, invent — subtlety. You will not equal Scotus. Whatever you imagine falls short of the truth.

When Nature gave birth to Scotus, she hesitated over her offspring, uncertain whether she was bearing a Spirit. She rendered his origins ambiguous. She would believe him fallen from Heaven, did she not fear to assign a fall to Scotus. She would not name his homeland until she saw him hurling arguments like lightning. She heard, in thunder, that the clouds of Hibernia had begotten Scotus.

Perhaps Caledonian forest bore this monster of genius — for Africa alone did not bear a monster of genius in Augustine; Scotland bore Scotus, the equal of Augustine.

Britain claims Scotus as her own, since she is "*divided from the whole world*," almost another world — just such a world as Scotus devised with his own genius, before Columbus, who added a New World of lands to the old parts of the world. This Scottish Eagle enlarged the old parts of the theological world with a New World of theology.

This bird knew nothing of the beaten path; it found the Milky Way among the stars, in the sign of the Immaculate Virgin. He clearly demonstrated with certain arguments that her Conceived Origin was free from the stain of sin. The Virgin, crowned with stars, clothed with the Sun, with the Moon beneath her feet, as though all Heaven approving the doctrine of Scotus, returned grace for grace to Scotus.

She bowed her marble head and in Scotus revered the truth. To Ildefonso, defending her virginity, she had announced through the mouth of Leocadia: "*Through you my Lady lives*." To Scotus, asserting her innocence, she said by the nod of her own head: "*Through you my glory lives*."

The doctrine of Scotus must be pure — for it asserted the purity of the Immaculate Virgin.

But *Scotus* in Greek means *Darkness* — yet truly, "*the divine light shines in darkness*." "*As his darkness, so also his light*." The shadows of Scotus are lights; indeed, other lights are but darkness compared to Scotus.

How great the light of Scotus, whose disciples were called *Illuminated*! Mayron, the Doctor Illuminated, says to Scotus: "*You, you are my night — my illumination*."

That was enough for that night — "*Night unto night showeth knowledge.*" But for Scotus, not enough — "*Night unto light showeth knowledge.*"

The doctrine of Scotus is like Faith — the latter is obscure, the former is deep. Rightly did the Tribunal of Faith in Rome pronounce concerning the doctrine of Scotus: that whatever Scotus had demonstrably said could not be condemned.

But why did Scotus depart from the way of the Angelic Doctor? Clearly — so as not to appear to need a guardian Angel. Why did he withdraw from the Seraphic Doctor Bonaventure? So that no one would think he needed a Seraph to carry a torch before him.

Elsewhere you find Eagles; in the Franciscan school you find the Phoenix — Scotus. The Order had prepared the Altar: Francis the wood of the Cross and the ashes; Anthony the spices; Bonaventure the fires. The Phoenix was lacking while Scotus was not yet there. When he came, straightaway there was a Phoenix — born not in Arabia, but on the holy Altar.

But Scotus bears the Moon upon his breast — in the sense that: "*The Moon shines among the lesser fires.*"

He wrote on the four Books of the *Sentences*, so as to place his doctrine *in a foursquare* equal to the Empyrean Heaven. He was arbiter beyond the Master in the *Sentences*. As interpreter and judge, he pronounced sentence upon the sentences. He added the *Reportata* — a word of triumph — signifying that as many sentences as he utters, so many victories does he carry off.

He taught at Oxford, Paris, Cologne. He had chairs more certain than homelands. From Cologne he went straight to the Celestial City. Tenant of the earth, citizen of Heaven.

He lived but briefly. His own subtlety harmed Scotus — the threads of his life were so fine and subtle that, in the fingers of the spinning Fates, they snapped from their very fineness. Scotus lived more by knowledge than by soul. Briefly he completed the entire course of learning. He quickly reached the finish line — of both knowledge and life. Where he ceased to know, he ceased to live.

Alexander wept because there were no more worlds to conquer in war. Scotus wept because there were no more worlds of doctrine remaining for him to master by understanding.

Before Scotus, the captains of theology fought in orderly fashion — by distinctions, by parts, by members, by articles, by paragraphs, by numbers, ranks preserved. Scotus, disregarding ranks, introduced the art of artillery, and with arguments discharged like cannon blasts, scattered the battle lines.

Most fierce in life as a disputant, he wished to debate even with Death. And Death feared the Subtle one, and Scotus made Death ambiguous. Death, for fear

of him, could not hold itself together. All things of Scotus and in Scotus were certain — except one: Death.

There he flew — where is Eternal Wisdom? With her, he shall be eternal. She alone will give Scotus infinite matter to understand. She alone will satisfy that immense mind.

To know, for Scotus, is the same as to be blessed — and it will be part of beatitude for the blessed to hear Scotus disputing.

Whoever wishes to be greatest in knowledge — *"let him become like this little one."* Whoever has risen greatest in knowledge yields to Scotus. For though he may be greater in the order of the greater, *he who is lesser in the Order of the Minors is greater than he.*

Applaud Scotus!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATORY EPISTLE TO HIS MOST SERENE, AUGUST, ROYAL HIGHNESS OF SAVOY	3
TO THE CURIOUS READER	4
FIRST COLLATION, FIRST DIFFERENCE	29
On the Necessity of Supernatural Doctrine for Attaining Salvation	29
Section I	29
How Scotus Attacks the Argument of St. Thomas	29
Section II	31
The Same Argument of St. Thomas Is Attacked in Another Way	31
COLLATION I, DIFFERENCE II	33
On the Truth of St. Thomas's Response	33
Section I	34
Scotus's Argument Is Proven	34
COLLATION I, DIFFERENCE III	38
On the Diversity of Habits	38
Section (Single)	39
Scotus's Attack Is Examined	39
COLLATION I, DIFFERENCE IV	41
On the Subalternation of Theology	41
Section (Single)	42
Scotus's Attack Is Explained and Defended	42
COLLATION II, DIFFERENCE I	45
On the Natural Receptive Potency for Supernatural Things	45
Section I	46
Scotus's Position Is Examined and Proven	46
Section II	47
That Scotus Agrees with Augustine	47
COLLATION II, DIFFERENCE II	50
On the Natural Appetite for God as Ultimate End	50
Section I	51

The Arguments of the Thomists Are Set Forth.....	51
Section II	51
The Arguments of the Scotists Are Presented	52
Section III.....	52
The Opposing Arguments Are Resolved	52
COLLATION II, DIFFERENCE III.....	58
On St. Thomas's Argument Against Avicenna.....	58
Section I.....	59
Scotus's Attack Is Proven	59
COLLATION II, DIFFERENCE IV	61
On the Question: In What Sense Is Theology a Science?.....	61
Section I.....	62
Whether Theology in Itself Is a Science	63
Section II	64
Whether the Beatific Vision Is a Science or Not	64
Section III.....	65
Whether Our Theology of Wayfarers Is a Science.....	65
Section IV.....	67
What Is the Subject of Theology?	67
COLLATION III, DIFFERENCE I	69
On Theology as Speculative or Practical	69
Section I.....	70
At the Beginning of the Question, the Definition of Praxis Is Examined	70
Section II	73
Whether the Theology of Wayfarers Is Practical.....	73
Section III.....	75
Whether the Beatific Vision Is Speculative or Practical	75
Section IV.....	77
Whether the Science of God Is Practical	77
Subsection 1. Whether the Theology of God within Himself Is Practical.....	77

Subsection 2. Whether God's Necessary Science Is Speculative or Practical.....	79
Subsection 3. Whether God's Science Called "of Vision," or of Future Things, Is Practical	80
Subsection 4. Judgment.	83
COLLATION III, DIFFERENCE I	88
On the Formal Distinction of the Divine Essence, Relations, and Attributes.....	88
Section II	93
Scotus's Formal Distinction Is Confirmed by Three Original Arguments of the Author	93
Section III.....	100
Scotus's Distinction Is Asserted to Be Safe and Sound.....	100
Section IV	109
The Arguments of the Thomists Are Answered.....	109
SECTION V. It Is Shown That the Scotist Distinction Is Necessary for Upholding Divine Truth.....	115
FINAL SECTION. The Common Responses of the Scotists Are Set Forth and Applied to Solving the Chief Argument of the Thomists	122
COLLATION III. DIFFERENCE II. ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: Can the Divine Essence Be Seen, by God's Absolute Power, without the Persons, and One Person without Another?	127
SECTION I. The Opinions of Saint Thomas, Scotus, and the Schools Are Set Forth	127
SECTION II. The Thomist Arguments Against Scotus Are Resolved ..	131
JUDGMENT	135
COROLLARY I. Can One Attribute and One Relation Be Seen without Another?	137
COROLLARY II. Can the Relations and Attributes Be Attained and Seen without the Essence?.....	138
COLLATION III. DIFFERENCE III. Concerning the Proposition "God Exists": Is It Self-Evident or Not?	139
SECTION I. The Objection Against Scotus Is Set Forth and Examined	139

COLLATION III. DIFFERENCE IV. Concerning the Argument of Saint Thomas for Proving God's Infinity.....	142
SOLE SECTION	142
JUDGMENT	143
COLLATION IV. DIFFERENCE I. On the First and Adequate Object of Our Intellect.	146
SECTION I. Whether Scotus Judges Rightly and Impugns Justly.....	146
SECTION II. The Position of Scotus Is Set Forth and Arguments Against It Are Resolved.....	149
JUDGMENT	152
COLLATION IV. DIFFERENCE II. Concerning the Vestige of the Trinity.	153
SOLE SECTION	153
The matter is small; but in small matters there is subtlety.	153
JUDGMENT	157
COLLATION IV. DIFFERENCE III. Concerning the Conservation of Intelligible Species in the Intellect. On <i>In I Sent.</i> , d. III, q. VI of Scotus; and <i>Summa Theologiae</i> I, q. LXXIX, a. VI of Saint Thomas.....	157
SECTION I. The Opinion of Avicenna Is Examined	157
SECTION II. Is the Reason of Saint Thomas, by Which He Intends to Prove That Intelligible Species Remain in the Intellect after the Act of Understanding, Adequate?	161
SECTION III. What Is to Be Held About the Conversion to Phantasms?	164
COLLATION IV. DIFFERENCE IV. ON THE QUESTION: Does the Intellect Bear Itself Purely Passively in Understanding, or Not? The Texts Are Set Forth. The Opinions Are Reported.	167
SOLE SECTION. The Position of Saint Thomas Is Refuted	170
COLLATION V. DIFFERENCE I. Concerning the Production of the Word: Is It Formally Intellection or Speech?	173
The Texts Are Adduced and Compared.	173
SECTION I. The Opinion of Saint Thomas Is Set Forth and Indeed Proved	175
SECTION II. Scotus's Position Is Explained and Asserted	178

SECTION III. The Arguments Advanced Against Scotus's Position Are Resolved	181
JUDGMENT	184
COLLATION V. DIFFERENCE II. Concerning the Power or Formal Principle of the Notional Acts, Which Scotus Calls the Power of Generating	189
SECTION I. The State of the Question Is Opened and Set Forth.....	189
SECTION II. To What Extent Scotus Agrees With and Differs From Saint Thomas	192
JUDGMENT	193
COLLATION V. DIFFERENCE III. ON THIS: Is Any Creature Simple? ..	194
SECTION I. Saint Thomas's Position Is Set Forth; Whether Scotus Agrees With It Is Asked	194
SECTION II. To What Extent Scotus Dissents From Saint Thomas, Who Impugns Him?	196
JUDGMENT	198
COLLATION V. DISTINCTION IV. On the Argument by Which St. Thomas Proves That God Does Not Fall Under Any Genus.....	200
SECTION I.....	200
SECTION II. On the Univocity of Being	204
JUDGMENT	207
COLLATION VI. DISTINCTION I. On the Sense of Damascene Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son.....	209
SECTION I. Damascene is shown to be free from censure and untouched by error.....	210
SECTION II. Testimonies of Damascene in Favor of the Latin Position Are Brought Forward	214
JUDGMENT	216
COLLATION VI. DISTINCTION II. On the Question Whether Mutual Love Is the Reason for Spirating the Holy Spirit, Such That Without It the Procession of the Holy Spirit Cannot Subsist	218
SECTION I. Testimonies of the Holy Fathers Are Adduced in Favor of the Position of St. Thomas.....	220
SECTION II. The Same Position Is Urged by Reason	222

SECTION III. The Position of Scotus Is Proposed, Expounded, and Defended	224
SECTION IV. That the Arguments of Scotus Are Invincible Is Shown from the Various and Discordant Solutions of the Thomists.....	228
SECTION V. Arguments and Authorities and Reasons Adduced against Scotus's Position Are Resolved.....	232
JUDGMENT.....	235
COLLATION VI. DISTINCTION III. On the Argument of St. Thomas by Which He Proves That It Should Be Said: "Two Spirating" and "One Spirator"	236
COLLATION VI. DISTINCTION IV. Whether if the Holy Spirit Did Not Proceed from the Son He Would Still Be Really Distinguished from Him	242
PREFACE.....	242
SECTION I. Whether, Insofar as It Contributes to Proving the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, That Scholastic Question Is Useful: Would the Holy Spirit Be Distinguished from the Son If He Did Not Proceed from Him?	244
SECTION II. The Position Denying That the Holy Spirit Would Be Distinguished from the Son If He Did Not Proceed from Him Is Proposed.....	246
SECTION III. The Contrary Position Is Presented, Affirming That the Holy Spirit Would Be Distinguished from the Son Even If He Did Not Proceed from Him.....	250
SECTION IV. Judgment Is Delivered on the Said Positions, and Each Is Shown to Be Safe and Probable	251
SECTION V. Scotus's Position Is Preferred to the Other and Confirmed by Many Arguments	258
SECTION VI. That Scotus Thinks with Scripture and the Fathers	262
Section VII. Anselm's Mind Is Carefully Investigated, Expounded, and Shown to Stand with Scotus.	268
Section VIII. The Arguments of the Opposing Position Are Answered.	276
Section IX. The Aforesaid Position of Scotus, Transmitted by the Author and Defended Against Objections, Is Vindicated Against the	

Calumnies of Father Gabriel of Saint Vincent, a Discalced Carmelite Theologian.....	282
Collation VII, Difference I. On the Procession of the Holy Spirit: Whether It Proceeds Freely or Naturally?	297
Section I. The Sense of Scotistic Liberty Is Expounded.	301
Section II. Does Scotus Speak Correctly or Incorrectly in Saying that the Holy Spirit Proceeds Freely Through the Will?	304
Judgment.	314
Collation VII, Difference II. On the Distinction of the Processions of the Begotten Son and of the Holy Spirit Who Is Not Begotten but Spirated.	315
Judgment.	321
Collation VII, Difference III. On the Increase of Charity: Whether It Occurs Through Greater Rooting or Disposition in the Subject, or Through the Addition of Degree to Degree.	324
State of the Question.....	324
Section I. The Position of Saint Thomas — That the Increase of Charity Does Not Occur Through the Addition of Degrees to Degrees of the Same, but Through Greater Rooting or Drawing Out in the Subject — Is Attacked by Scotus.	326
Section II. Scotus's Position on the Addition of Degree to Degree Is Confirmed, and Various Difficulties Pertaining to It Are Removed.	329
SECTION III. What Is the Nature of These Degrees — Are They of the Same Kind or of Different Kinds?	334
First Opinion — Suárez	335
Second Opinion — Vásquez	336
Response to the Arguments.....	337
Judgment	339
APPENDIX. Exposition of the Text of Aristotle	340
Judgment	344
DISPUTATION VII, DISTINCTION IV	344
On the celebrated question of the constitution and distinction of the Persons, with reference to <i>ST</i> I, q. 40, a. 2, <i>In I</i> , d. 26, a. 1 of Saint Thomas, and Scotus, <i>In I</i> , d. 26, q. un.; d. 28, q. 3; and <i>Quodlibet</i> IV.....	344

Prologue	344
SECTION I. What Are Those Absolutes by Which, in the Opinion of Ripa — Which Scotus Sustains as Probable — the Persons Are Constituted and Distinguished? The First Way Is Set Forth.	350
SECTION II. The Second Way of Defending the Opinion of Ripa Concerning Absolute Properties Is Proposed.....	357
SECTION III. Arguments Against the Opinion of Ripa as Explained According to the Mind of Scotus Are Proposed and Resolved.	364
SECTION IV. A Further Discourse and Exposition Concerning the Opinion of John of Ripa, Which Scotus Calls Probable.	372
SECTION V. The Common Opinion About Relative Properties Is Proposed; and in What Scotus Agrees and Disagrees with Saint Thomas Regarding It Is Explained.....	375
Judgment	383
DISPUTATION VIII, DISTINCTION I.....	386
Whether the Divine Relations Are Formally Infinite Perfections?	386
Prologue	386
SECTION I. The State of the Question Is Proposed.....	386
SECTION II. Whether Every Perfection Given in the Divine Is Simply Simple, and Whether Any Perfection Falls in the Relation.....	388
SECTION III. Whether and in What Way the Divine Relations Are in Some Manner Infinite.....	394
Judgment	402
DISPUTATION VIII, DISTINCTION II	403
On the Relations of God and the Creature to Each Other, Referring to ST I, q. 13, a. 7 of Saint Thomas and Scotus, <i>In I, d. 30, q. 1 and 2</i>	403
Judgment	409
COLLATION VIII. DISTINCTION III. On the Notion of the Unbegotten, or Innascibility.....	410
SECTION I. In what respects the Angelic and the Subtle Doctor agree, and in what they differ.....	410
SECTION II. What authors hold in this controversy.....	413
SECTION III. The opinion of St. Thomas on the Innascible and the Unbegotten is proposed, expounded, and examined for its truth.	420

SECTION IV. The opinion of Scotus on the Unbegotten is expounded more fully and defended.....	424
SECTION V. One objection drawn from Augustine is resolved and he is shown to agree with Scotus.	429
SECTION VI. The mind of Scotus on the Unbegotten is shown to be true and fully doctrinal.....	432
SECTION VII. Whether Scotus rightly attacks the arguments of St. Thomas by which he proves that there cannot be two Unbegotten or Innascible beings.....	436
SECTION VIII. Whether Inspirability is a sixth notion, and what Scotus thinks of it.	439
JUDGMENT.....	443
COLLATION VIII. DISTINCTION IV. On the Order, Identity, Equality, and Similarity of the Divine Persons.....	444
SECTION I. Whether, and to what extent, there is order in the Divine realm.....	444
SECTION II. Whether and what relation of identity, similarity, and equality exists among the Divine Persons.	453
SECTION III. Whether the relations of equality in God are real or of reason.	459
JUDGMENT.....	464
COLLATION IX. DISTINCTION I. On the question whether the Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit.	466
SECTION I. The opinion of St. Thomas explained above is effectively and rightly attacked by Scotus.....	468
SECTION II. This proposition — "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit" — is shown to be true in Scotus's way.	473
SECTION III. What is to be thought of the proposition "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom," and what Augustine thought of it.	476
SECTION IV. What Augustine thought of the proposition "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit," and whether it can be sustained in an Augustinian sense.	479
Section V. Whether the Father and the Son Can Be Said to Love Creatures through the Holy Spirit.....	482
Judgment	486

Collation IX, Distinction II. On God's Knowledge of Creatures in All Its Ideal Character.	488
Antilogism.....	488
Section I. Whether Scotus Correctly Understands the Position of Saint Thomas on Formal Ideas, and Whether He Rightly Attacks It	489
Section II. How God Knows Creatures on the Way of the Subtle Doctor	494
Section III: The Scotist Method of Knowing Creatures through God Is Defended and Established	498
Section IV: That Known, Produced, and Diminished Being of Scotus Is Constituted, Explained, and Defended in the Divine Essence of Creatures	504
Section VI: Whether Distinct Ideal Reasons Are Necessary for Distinct Cognition of Creatures	515
Judgment	517
COLLATION IX, DISTINCTION III	519
On the Question: Whether God's Being Present Everywhere According to Power Implies His Being Everywhere According to Essence — That Is, Whether Omnipotence Implies Immensity.....	519
Section I: Whether the Position of St. Thomas Is Rightly Proved by Him.....	522
Section II: Whether Scotus's Attack on St. Thomas's Position Is Just or Unjust	523
Section III: That God Is Not Everywhere through His Operation but through His Immensity Is Shown.....	525
Section IV: Objections Raised against Scotus's Position by His Adversaries Are Dissolved.....	527
Judgment	533
COLLATION IX, DISTINCTION IV	537
On the Cognition of Future Things: Whether They Are Known by God as Present in Eternity.....	537
Section II: St. Thomas's Position on Actual Presence and Coexistence of Things in Eternity Is Proved	539
Section III: The Position Denying the Physical and Real Coexistence of Things in Eternity with God Is Proposed and Proved.....	542

Section IV: Arguments of the Contrary Position Are Answered	545
COLLATION X, DISTINCTION I	548
On the Necessity of This Existence of Things as a Means for Knowing Future Contingents	548
Section I: The Affirmative Part Is Proved.....	548
Section II: The Negative Part Is Established and Its Defense Offered	549
Section III: Contrary Arguments Are Dissolved.....	552
Section IV: The True and Proper Account for Knowing Future Contingents Is Adduced and Proved.....	555
Section V: Some Doubts Are Resolved	557
Section VI. How Human Freedom of the Will Coheres with These Free Decrees, and How Those Decrees Operate in Determining Events	562
Collation X. Difference II. On the Root of Contingency.	569
Section I. The Texts Are Compared and Explained, and the Opinions Are Elicited.	569
Section II. Whether, if God Operated Necessarily from an Intrinsic Principle, There Could Be Any Contingency in Creatures? The Affirmative Position Is Set Forth.	573
Section III. That, with God Operating from Necessity, There Would Be No Freedom or Contingency in Secondary Causes — Demonstrated Together with Scotus.....	575
Section IV. The Arguments of the Contrary Opinion Are Answered, and That Opinion Is Accurately Refuted.	578
Judgment	581
Collation X. Difference III. On Divine Foreknowledge.	587
Section I. The Ground of the Controversy Is Opened.	587
Section II. The Foreknowledge of God According to the Mind of Augustine Is Set Forth — That Which Is Called the Foreknowledge of Possibles, or Necessary Foreknowledge.	588
Section III. On the Knowledge of Futures, or Free Knowledge.	591
Collation X. Difference IV. On Conditional Knowledge.....	594
Section I. The Origin of Conditional Knowledge and Middle Knowledge, Together with the Statement of the Question.	594
Section I: Statement of the Question.....	596

Section II. Whether in God There Can Be Conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of Conditional Things?	598
Section III. That Certain and Infallible Knowledge of Conditional Futures Is Shown to Exist.....	601
Section IV. On What Augustine Thinks Concerning the Knowledge of Conditionals	612
Collation XI, Difference I. On Middle Knowledge.....	622
Section I. The State of the Question Is Proposed and Explained.....	622
Section II. The Middle Knowledge of the Jesuits Is Confirmed by Arguments.....	627
Section III. The Middle Knowledge of the Jesuits Is Confirmed by Authority.	629
SECTION IV. The opposing view regarding conditional knowledge grounded in the Divine decrees is set forth and defended by argument.	634
SECTION V. Which authors defend this position?	639
§. I. On three distinguished authors of the Society who hold against Middle Knowledge.	640
Father Henry Henriquez, a Portuguese.	640
Robert Cardinal Bellarmine.	641
Gabriel Vazquez.	643
§. I. What was Saint Thomas's view concerning Middle Knowledge?	649
§. II. What is Scotus's position on Middle Knowledge?.....	652
SECTION VI. It is shown that Middle Knowledge is wholly foreign to the doctrine of Saint Augustine.....	653
§. I. From the comparison of mutually opposed documents.	653
§. II. From the aims and effects of Middle Knowledge as opposed to the doctrine of Augustine.....	657
§. III. From examples foreign to Middle Knowledge.	659
Jacob and Esau.....	659
Pharaoh.	661
Ahasuerus.	663
Saint Peter.	664

Saint Paul.....	665
SECTION VII. From the constitution and purpose of God the predestinator it is gathered that Middle Knowledge is rejected by Augustine.....	668
SECTION VIII. From what Augustine teaches about the discrimination of the elect from the reprobate, it appears that he was averse to Middle Knowledge.....	675
SECTION IX. Two celebrated Scripture passages — one from Wisdom concerning one who was taken up lest evil alter his understanding, and the other from the Gospel concerning the Tyrians and Sidonians — refute Middle Knowledge most of all.	678
SECTION X. Three objections of the opponents are set forth, and from the solution of them it is proved that Middle Knowledge has no foundation in the doctrine of Augustine.	681
SECTION XI. A most celebrated passage of Augustine is brought forward and explained — the passage on which the adversaries most rely to defend their position with his authority.	688
SECTION XII. The escape route of the adversaries is blocked, and a subtle question is resolved.....	693
SECTION XIII. Middle Knowledge is attacked by its own proper arguments of the author.....	699
SECTION XIV. The opposing arguments are resolved.....	707
SECTION XV. Responses to the testimonies of Augustine adduced for Middle Knowledge.....	709
COLLATION XI, DISTINCTION II.....	714
On the Agreement and Disagreement of St. Thomas and Scotus Regarding Predestination	714
THE TEXTS OF BOTH AUTHORS ARE PRESENTED	714
Section I: Whether and in What Respect Scotus Differs from St. Thomas	715
Section II: Whether Scotus's Position is the First, Which is the Angelic Doctor's? Or the Second, Which Henry Propounds? Or Some Middle One Between the Two?	719
Section III: The Positions of St. Thomas and Scotus on the Causes of Predestination and Reprobation Are Compared	724

Section IV: Whether Predestination is an Act of the Intellect or of the Will?	728
COLLATION XI, DISTINCTION III	733
On the Name, Matter, and Doctrine of Predestination	733
Preface.....	733
Section I: Etymology and Definition; the Subject Matter of Predestination	736
Section II: The Definition of Predestination is Proposed and Explained	740
Section III: What is This Foreknowledge Placed Before Preparation in Augustine's Definition?	743
COLLATION X, DISTINCTION IV	747
Whether Predestination was Made Before or After the Foreknowledge of Merits?.....	747
Preface.....	747
Section I: The First Opinion of Predestination After and on Account of Foreseen Merits is Proved by Authority.....	748
Section II: The Same Position is Urged by Reasons.....	752
Section III: By What Weights of Authority is the Second, Opposed Position Supported?	754
Section IV: Arguments for This Second Position are Set Forth	757
Section V: The Arguments of the Contrary and Opposing Position are Resolved	760
Section V: What Does Augustine Think in This Controversy?	764
First Document of Augustine: That the election of the predestined was made not only without foreseen merits, but on the contrary from foreseen demerits, through the mercy of the liberating God.	764
Second Document: Just as Christ was predestined freely before foreseen merits, so too the other predestined.	767
Third Document: Our merits are the gifts and donations of God. ..	768
Fourth Document: The discrimination of the predestined is God's work, not made through their merits.	769
Fifth Document: No one is permitted to glory in his good works in himself, but only in the Lord.	770

Sixth Document: Prayers and petitions for obtaining the gifts of grace, and thanks rendered for those received, exclude the foreknowledge of merits.	771
Seventh Document: The manner in which grace operates in us not only gives the power to act but the very willing itself — this is opposed to the position that posits the foreknowledge of merits.....	773
Eighth Document: All means conducive to salvation are effects of the predestining will of God and come from his affection.	775
Ninth Document: The election of the predestined is referred to the free and gratuitous will of God.	777
Tenth Document: The whole mystery of predestination, both as to end and as to means, pertains to the grace of God, to the exclusion of justice.	779
Corollary: These ten documents are confirmed by the example of Jacob and Esau, which Augustine frequently employs.	781
FINAL SECTION. The Testimonies of Augustine Adduced in Opposition by Father Gabriel Vázquez Are Explained.....	783
COLLATION XII, DISTINCTION I. On Reprobation.....	793
Section I. The Sense of the Question Is Proposed and Explained.	793
Section II. The Mode of Negative Reprobation Is Proposed.	797
Section III.....	801
Original sin as the motivating and just reason for both forms of reprobation — adequate in the case of infants, inadequate in the case of adults — is demonstrated.....	801
A response is given to the objection of Father Gabriel Vázquez.	807
Section IV.....	809
On the source from which the permission of sin arises.	809
Section V.....	812
Whether the view of Scotus is consistent with the doctrine of Augustine.	812
Section VI.....	814
How positive reprobation is brought about.	814
Final Section.....	823
On the causes and effects of predestination.....	823

The Author's Judgment on These Collations and Distinctions Concerning Conditional Knowledge, Predestination, and Reprobation.	830
Collation XII, Distinction II	841
On the general will of God concerning the salvation of all men, according to the Apostle's saying (<i>1.Tim.2</i>): "God wills all men to be saved."	841
Section I.....	841
The texts of both are adduced.....	841
Section II	842
The sense is weighed and the views are set out.....	842
Section III.....	845
Whether Augustine admitted this general will to save all men in God.	845
Section IV	848
The testimonies of Augustine on the meaning of Paul's passage (<i>1.ad Timoth.2</i>): "God wills all men to be saved," are adduced.	848
Section V.....	851
What was Augustine's view on God's general will to save all men?	851
Section VI	854
What reasons moved Augustine to restrict the passage of Paul — "God wills all men to be saved" — to a narrower sense.....	854
Section VII.....	859
Whether, and how far, Scotus agrees with Augustine on this general will for the salvation of all.	859
Section VIII.....	869
What Saint Thomas and his school hold on this general will of God concerning the salvation of men.	869
COLLATION XII. DISTINCTION III.....	873
Whether and How God Provides Sufficient Aids to All People.....	873
SECTION I.....	873
The Affirmative Position Is Set Forth.....	873
SECTION II	883

The Doctrine of Sufficient Aids Is Applied to the Special States of Persons	883
§. I. On the State of Infants	883
§. II. What Scotus Thought	893
§. III. What Saint Thomas Thought	896
JUDGMENT	899
COLLATION XII. DISTINCTION IV	901
Whether the Predestined Can Be Damned; Whether Predestination Is Within the Power of the Predestined	901
SECTION I	901
Various Opinions Are Set Forth	901
SECTION II	903
The Opinion of Scotus Is Set Forth	903
SECTION III	908
Whether It Should Be Said Absolutely That Being Predestined or Reprobated Is Within Our Power	908
JUDGMENT	913
COROLLARY	914
FINIS	925

FIRST COLLATION, FIRST DIFFERENCE

On the Necessity of Supernatural Doctrine for Attaining Salvation

On question 1, I, part 1, of St. Thomas, and question 1 of the Prologue of Blessed Scotus, book I.

Concerning the arguments of St. Thomas for proving that another doctrine beyond the philosophical disciplines is necessary for human salvation: in substance, Scotus agrees; in the arguments, he differs.

The argument of St. Thomas, article 1, runs as follows: Man is ordered to God as to a certain end that exceeds the comprehension of reason. But an end must be foreknown to human beings, who ought to direct their intentions and actions toward that end. Hence it was necessary for man's salvation that certain things be made known to him through divine revelation — things that exceed human reason. Even as regards those things about God that can be investigated by human reason, it was necessary for man to be instructed by divine revelation, because the truth about God investigated by reason would come to only a few, over a long time, and mixed with many errors; and yet the whole of man's salvation, which is in God, depends on the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that salvation might come to human beings more fittingly and more certainly, it was necessary that they be instructed about divine things through divine revelation. It was therefore necessary, beyond the physical disciplines investigated by reason, that a sacred doctrine be had through revelation.

Scotus attacks this argument as follows (question 1 of the Prologue, nn. 18 and 19): It does not seem efficacious. It would be efficacious if it were proven that man is finally ordered to a supernatural cognition — the proof of which belongs to the questions on beatitude. And if, along with this, it were shown that natural cognition does not sufficiently dispose one, in the present state, to supernatural cognition.

Section I

How Scotus Attacks the Argument of St. Thomas

I observe first that it is Scotus's habit, where he agrees on the substance with St. Thomas, to attack his arguments if he judges them less probable and fitting. Therefore, in his usual manner in this place, since he does not disagree on the matter itself, he dissents on the proof. He dissents because the argument of St. Thomas presupposes what needed to be proven — namely, that man in this life is ordered to a supernatural end. This is indeed difficult to prove in the case of those barbarous and unbelieving people to whom no proclamation of the faith has been made and who are plunged in the deep darkness of ignorance. In the case of other people who are ingenious and cultivated in natural learning,

nothing is found except the natural light, by which alone they cannot arrive at knowledge of the supernatural end, as the Holy Doctor himself supposes in his argument. Hence, both to these learned and to those unlearned people, a suitable and fitting means must be offered for having knowledge of that supernatural end to which man is said to be ordered, and accordingly they must be drawn out of the natural state. But this means is not the science of theology, because those first barbarians are not, on account of the rudeness of their intellect, capable of any science, and those second ingenious and learned persons cannot suddenly become theologians. It is therefore necessary to have some light of faith infused by God for knowing that one is ordered to a supernatural end. When the intellect is illuminated by this light of faith, it is placed in a supernatural state through the light of faith, which, since it is more perfect than the theological light, before one possesses that science which St. Thomas requires, one will be more perfect than a theologian. And indeed, that St. Thomas speaks of theology and not of infused faith when he says "doctrine" is commonly held by Thomists along with Vásquez (disputation 1, chapter 1, nn. 7–9).

Furthermore, this argument of St. Thomas does not seem to reach the proposed target. For the aim here was to prove the necessity of that supernatural doctrine — true, proper, and without which that end could not be obtained. But it proves only a necessity in a qualified sense and for a better state of being. And St. Thomas himself acknowledges this when he says: "In order, therefore, that salvation might come to human beings more fittingly and more certainly, it was necessary." This is not necessity in an absolute sense, but in a qualified sense, for a better state of being.

But you will object: St. Thomas set down two truths, one supernatural and the other natural; for the first he requires absolute necessity, not for the second. And indeed Cajetan here seems to hold this view. Yet St. Thomas, in the title and in the conclusion of his argument, posits absolute necessity, speaking of both truths, when he says: "Whether it is necessary" and "hence it was necessary." Where "necessary," as Javellus acknowledges in his commentary on this passage, sounds like absolute necessity. Nor could or should the Angelic Doctor have spoken in Cajetan's sense of a necessity for a better state of being, lest he favor that necessity of grace which Pelagius posited, according to Augustine (Epistle 106), and his followers the Pelagians, according to the same Augustine (Sermon 13 on the words of the Apostle), who said: "God gave his grace to human beings for this purpose, so that what they are commanded to do through free will they might more easily fulfill through grace. That is, more easily — yet even without it, though with more difficulty, one still arrives; just as one travels more easily by horse and with more difficulty on foot, but one still arrives on foot." Augustine attacks this necessity in those same passages, establishing necessity in the absolute sense and determining that the help of grace is necessary, without which the work of grace worthy of eternal salvation absolutely cannot be done.

Therefore, if St. Thomas, on Cajetan's authority, introduces no other necessity than that for a better state of being, he held, absolutely and simply, that without that cognition and supernatural doctrine the end he proposes could be obtained. And what is this other than to hold such a view of the necessity of supernatural doctrine as the Pelagians held of the necessity of supernatural grace? From which opinion St. Thomas is most devoutly and most learnedly remote. Therefore Cajetan's opinion is not to be admitted. And Scotus perceived this (n. 27), attacking the second solution of St. Thomas, understanding him as speaking of necessity in the absolute and unqualified sense — which Vásquez also saw (disputation 1, chapters 1 and 2), who interprets it in terms of absolute and unqualified necessity. Retaining this interpretation, therefore, St. Thomas's argument does not conclude about absolute necessity but only about qualified necessity, for obtaining the end more certainly and more fittingly.

Section II

The Same Argument of St. Thomas Is Attacked in Another Way

St. Thomas assumes in that argument that natural cognition is not a sufficient disposition for knowledge of the supernatural end, and that through it no science of divine things is acquired; and from this it follows that supernatural light is necessary because without it perfect cognition of that supernatural end cannot be had. Against this, Scotus objects as follows: this is asserted without proof, when it needed to be proven. The argument, he says, would proceed correctly if it were shown that natural reason does not sufficiently dispose one in the present state to attaining supernatural cognition. Let someone deny this assumption of St. Thomas — how will he conclude with it denied? The philosophers knew many things about God naturally — for example, Trismegistus, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle — and these things certainly seem to contain a sufficient knowledge of him. Indeed, some authors hold that God can be demonstrated by natural reason, whether physically, as the Commentator thought (*Metaphysics*, book 12, text 5, and *Physics*, book 8, final text), or metaphysically, as Avicenna held (book 1 of his *Metaphysics*, chapter 1, and book 8, chapters 1 and 3), and Alexander of Aphrodisias (*Metaphysics*, book 12, text 6). That God can be demonstrated at least a posteriori, none of our authors denies, and St. Thomas himself acknowledges it (*Summa contra Gentiles*, book 1, chapter 13, drawing on Damascene, book 1 of *On the Faith*), and Suárez shows this at length (*Metaphysical Disputations*, disputation 29, section 2, from Scripture, the Fathers, and the Scholastics). Suárez also maintains as probable that God can be demonstrated a priori from an attribute, and for this he uses the reasoning of the same St. Thomas (*Summa contra Gentiles*, book 2, chapter 15, and chapter 41) and the authority of Augustine (*Tractate 105 on John*).

Hence an argument is formed against St. Thomas's reasoning as follows: God is naturally demonstrated at least a posteriori; but this knowledge sufficiently disposes one to cognition of the supernatural end; therefore no other

disposition is required. The minor is proven from the doctrine of St. Thomas, against whom we argue *ad hominem*. He teaches that by the powers of nature, someone doing what is in himself can dispose himself for grace and obtain it. So he says in the *Sentences*, book 2, distinction 28, question 1, article 2, *quaestiuncula* 4, where he asks whether man can prepare himself for grace without any grace, and in the body he says: "It must be said that for having sanctifying grace, man can prepare himself from free will; for by doing what is in himself, he obtains grace from God. This alone is in us, namely what is established in the power of free will." And what is more to the point, in the response to the fourth objection: "It must be said that even for having faith, someone can prepare himself through what is in natural reason. Hence it is said that if anyone born in barbarous nations does what is in himself, God will reveal to him what is necessary for salvation, either by inspiration or by sending a teacher. Hence it is not necessary that the habit of faith precede the preparation for sanctifying grace; but man can simultaneously prepare himself for having faith and for the other virtues and grace."

This doctrine certainly does not cohere well with the assumption in the present argument, for it teaches that natural science acquired by the powers of nature is sufficient for attaining faith, and through it sanctifying grace, and union with God the supernatural end — contrary to what he teaches here. It is true that Vásquez denies that St. Thomas held this view, and attacks Cajetan for taking St. Thomas's words in that sense, and holds that St. Thomas speaks of preparation made through habitual grace — so that the sense is that habitual grace is not necessary for preparing oneself for grace, but not that the help of transient grace is unnecessary, since this is a necessary disposition for habitual grace. So he holds in disputation 91 on the first part, chapter 10, n. 63. But Vásquez is entirely wrong and attacks Cajetan badly, because St. Thomas speaks of preparation through the help of an actual motion that does not proceed from habitual grace but disposes one for having it, as is clear from the words in the body of the article. Let whoever wishes read it and will find it so. And indeed it would be absurd to presuppose habitual grace in order to prepare oneself for that same habitual grace. Therefore Cajetan rightly understood the passage in his commentary on question 109, article 6, of the *Prima Secundae*, where Cajetan seems to admit some natural disposition in a man who does what is in himself by the powers of nature; and Soto (book 2 of *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 3) posits a remote disposition. Nor does St. Thomas teach this opinion only there, but also in the *Sentences*, book 2, distinction 5, question 2, article 1, in the body, and question 14 of *De Veritate*, article 1, where he adduces the example of a boy raised in the forests, and in *Summa contra Gentiles*, book 3, chapter 149 — by which Vásquez's opinion about St. Thomas's meaning is refuted. And Suárez agrees against Vásquez, citing St. Thomas in the sense of Cajetan for the opinion of a natural disposition to grace (*Summa*, book 2 of *On*

the Cause of Predestination, chapter 18, n. 1). Thus it is clear that the argument of St. Thomas put forward here is rightly attacked *ad hominem*.

Judgment. Let anyone consider the argument brought by St. Thomas and Scotus's attacks: he will find that the former does not conclude and that the latter entirely convince. And I am amazed that Cajetan did not respond to these, being occupied instead in disputing what that sacred doctrine is and of what kind — maintaining that it is neither faith as distinct from theology, nor theology as distinct from faith, but a certain middle doctrine revealed by God. And I am even more amazed that Cajetan says there, concerning this part, that Scotus disagrees neither with the conclusion nor with the argument, but only with the cause why that end is naturally hidden from us — which is plainly false, since it is clear from Scotus's text, which we have produced, that he disagrees with St. Thomas's argument. The same thing happened to Javellus, though he comes closer to the difficulty by distinguishing those two positions on necessity — absolute and qualified — although he does not respond to Scotus and is occupied with the same question of sacred doctrine along with Cajetan, determining to separate it from faith and theology. I do not wish to dispute about this with them; I wish only to examine the positions of St. Thomas and Scotus. Moreover, they acted prudently in passing over Scotus's attacks, because they saw them to be so efficacious that they could not be refuted. Other Thomists will excuse this negligence or thoughtlessness on the ground that they did not wish to labor on slight matters; but in these theological matters nothing is slight. Indeed, those things that seem slight are subtle and show ingenuity. And if we grant them to be slight and thin, I respond: "*In tenui labor, at tenuis non gloria*" — the labor is on a fine subject, but the glory is not small. Let it be noted in conclusion that Suárez cites St. Thomas in favor of the opinion of a natural disposition to grace through natural acts according to the maxim "*doing what is in oneself*" — in the *Prima Secundae*, question 89, article 6, where there is nothing relevant to that opinion. Indeed, St. Thomas in the later parts of the *Summa* always departed from that opinion, as can be seen in question 109, article 6, and question 112, article 2, and there in the first passage Cajetan observes this.

COLLATION I, DIFFERENCE II

On the Truth of St. Thomas's Response

This concerns the response to the second argument of article 1, namely that a diverse mode of knowability induces a diversity of sciences. St. Thomas puts forward the objection in article 1 as follows: "Furthermore, doctrine can only be about being. For nothing is known except what is true, and truth is convertible with being. But all beings are treated in the philosophical disciplines, and even God; hence a certain part of philosophy is called theology or divine science, as is

clear from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics*, book 6. Therefore it was not necessary, beyond the philosophical disciplines, to have another doctrine."

To this argument, which directly proves the sufficiency of one natural doctrine and excludes the necessity of another supernatural one, St. Thomas responds as follows: "To the second it must be said that a diverse mode of knowability induces a diversity of sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astronomer and the natural philosopher — for example, that the earth is round — but the astronomer demonstrates it through a mathematical medium, that is, one abstracted from matter, while the natural philosopher demonstrates it through a medium considered in connection with matter. Hence nothing prevents the same things treated by the philosophical disciplines from being treated also by another science, insofar as they are known by the light of divine revelation. Hence the theology that belongs to sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is posited as a part of philosophy."

Scotus attacks this response as follows (question 1, n. 27, section "Against this"): If concerning the knowable objects in theology it is possible for cognition to be given in other sciences, though in a different light, then theological cognition about these objects is not necessary. The consequence is clear from his own example: one who knows through a physical medium that the earth is round does not need the cognition of this through a mathematical medium as something absolutely necessary.

Section I

Scotus's Argument Is Proven

Scotus is entirely correct. For the solution of St. Thomas does not respond to the argument, because the argument proves one thing and the solution contains another. This is clear from the argument, whose intention is to prove that no other science besides the natural one is necessary, and for this it uses the following middle term: the science of being embraces all beings, including God; therefore there is no need to introduce another beyond it. It attacks the necessity of any other science whatsoever.

But St. Thomas, passing over that necessity which he ought to have defended against the argument presented, moves on to the diversity of sciences, showing that the natural science of being would be different from the other supernatural science that would treat the same being, including God, because it would proceed through a different mode — just as physics and mathematics, through different demonstrations, conclude that the earth is round. This response is not to the point of the argument, which was attacking the necessity of theology, not its diversity. For the argument posited metaphysics and natural science as sufficient for knowing God, since they treated of God and had no need of another science — caring nothing at all about the nature and diversity of theology, which it entirely excluded once natural science was posited. To this

intention the solution does not respond, introducing two sciences about the same object and affirming them to be diverse on account of the diversity of their medium — something about which the argument was unconcerned. Therefore, it defends the diversity of sciences, which the argument was not attacking, and does not defend the necessity, which the argument was attacking.

I add that St. Thomas's solution actually strengthens the argument and, by strengthening it, concludes against his own position. For when he establishes that the same thing demonstrated by two sciences is sufficiently proven by either one, he concedes that one suffices for knowing the essence of the thing, and therefore the other is not necessary. This is clear from St. Thomas's own reasoning. The truth that the earth is round is proved by both physics and mathematics — the former through a physical medium, the latter through a mathematical one — but each is content with its own medium and does not need the other. Therefore, if the natural science of being gives knowledge of all that exists in being, including God, through its natural media, it does not need another supernatural science for the same knowledge. And by this reasoning the response is turned against St. Thomas, who attempts to establish the necessity of another science. The argument against him runs as follows: You say that the physicist sufficiently demonstrates through his own medium that the earth is round, and that the mathematician likewise sufficiently demonstrates this through his own medium, and that neither needs the other. Therefore you are bound to say that the metaphysician, having natural knowledge through a natural light and medium about all being, does not need another theological science showing the same thing through another, supernatural light and medium. And thus Scotus's attack is confirmed and St. Thomas's response refuted.

Section II

Whether St. Thomas's Response Can Be Sustained in Some Way

Cajetan saw the force of Scotus's argument and sets it out in his commentaries as follows: "Scotus criticizes this response on the ground that according to it the necessity of theology is not preserved — which the argument intended to undermine. He proves this as follows: From this response nothing else is obtained except that the same things are known through theology and through other sciences, albeit in a different mode — just as through astronomy and physics it is known that the earth is round. Therefore the necessity is not preserved, but only the distinction of theology from them. The consequence holds from the proportion you assigned: since from the fact that the conclusion 'the earth is round' is known through one of the sciences, the other is not necessary with respect to it for knowing the conclusion, even though it is distinct." Cajetan set out and explained the force of Scotus's reasoning excellently.

Let us hear the response: "The answer is that the diversity of the mode of knowing accompanies the diversity of the object taken formally, or of the formal character of the object, while being compatible with the identity, in some way, of some conclusion if the account is adequate — or at least it accompanies a diversity of many knowable truths if the account is inadequate. Hence the same things, taken under diverse modes of knowing, induce a diversity of knowable objects. And therefore, by saying that there is a diverse mode of knowability, he implicitly indicated also a diversity of knowable truths, which he had already expressed in the first conclusion. And on this account the antecedent is denied, because from this response, although the diversity of the mode of knowing is not obtained explicitly, the diversity of knowable objects is obtained implicitly."

I observe here that Scotus's argument is far more perspicuous than Cajetan's response to it. I understand what Cajetan wants to say, and I will say it more clearly. From that diversity of sciences, their necessity is gathered, because when one is joined to the other, it always brings with it some greater clarity or a new mode of knowability in the object which the first one alone did not bring. Therefore, that diverse science contributes to this superabundance. Then: even though natural science knows God and the divine predicates, it will know them less perfectly than if the supernatural science were joined to it. This is what St. Thomas meant, and likewise Cajetan, and likewise Javellus, who responds with the same obscurity as Cajetan. If St. Thomas and his interpreters had solved it in this way, perhaps Scotus would have dissented less. But St. Thomas did not apply his response to the necessity of the second science, but to its diversity. For he says: "A diverse mode of knowability induces a diversity." There it is — diversity, not necessity. Then he adduces the example of the astronomer and the philosopher, and draws the same conclusion of diversity: "Hence nothing prevents the same things treated by the philosophical disciplines from being treated by another science." And finally he infers: "Hence the theology that..." belongs as a part of philosophy. Therefore St. Thomas's response brings nothing but diversity, which the argument was not attacking. What the argument was assailing was the necessity of another science introduced by St. Thomas. Scotus disproves this on the ground that it is not to the point of the argument, which denied that another science is necessary. But Cajetan and Javellus try to elicit necessity from that diversity in order to preserve the truth of St. Thomas's response. They do so acutely and in a friendly manner, but they do not thereby sustain the response; rather they alter and adjust it to satisfy the objection. St. Thomas's response certainly does not come willingly but is dragged reluctantly and twisted with groaning.

Moreover, even granting that: the truth is present in the response only materially, and from a material conjunction necessity is deduced from diversity. But this is not admissible in formal and logical argumentation, which Scotus as an excellent dialectician requires in St. Thomas's reasoning — reasoning that

formally concludes only about diversity. Nor indeed does this diversity, against the solutions of Cajetan and Javellus, imply necessity in the absolute sense, which was what the argument and St. Thomas's text were about, as we observed above. For that science joined to philosophy does not argue absolute necessity, since nothing is taken away from the former; indeed, the former is left in its own being, demonstrating through its own media the object. From this it only follows that the other science, joined to the first, adds greater clarity and new media for knowing the same object — which is a necessity for a better state of being and in a qualified sense; absolute necessity is not introduced or deduced thereby, as is clear. In a word: a new science arrives, but the old one is not taken away.

Judgment. From the reasoning presented, it is clear that Scotus was right to attack the second argument of St. Thomas, because the opposing argument assails necessity while the response employs diversity — which both its construction and its example demonstrate. On this point Javellus himself says: "The example of the astronomer and the physicist is adduced precisely to declare the distinction, but not to declare the necessity." Therefore the example also supports the reasoning of Scotus's attack. Hence Javellus says without merit that Scotus's argument concludes nothing — which he repeats twice in this commentary. And not content with Cajetan's first solution, which he also adopts in his own name, he devises a second, which is as follows: that St. Thomas determined two conclusions, and in the first concluded that sacred science was absolutely necessary from its end, while in the second he concluded only that it was useful, not necessary. Thus St. Thomas in his first response to the argument sustained necessity, and in the second, diversity, against two arguments. But Javellus assumes something false, because both arguments attack absolute necessity, as is clear from the text. Furthermore, the first necessity from the end was not absolute necessity if it could be supplied by another science; for if through the media of two sciences the end could be obtained, the absolute necessity of one of the two would cease. Nor was the second necessity mere utility, against which the second argument was not directed — for it assumed that philosophy was sufficient and concluded that sacred doctrine was not necessary in these words: "It was therefore not necessary, beyond the philosophical disciplines, to have another doctrine." This conclusion does not argue against utility but against necessity. Let Javellus therefore cease saying that Scotus's argument concludes nothing. For it not only concludes against St. Thomas's argument but also against Javellus's own defense.

COLLATION I, DIFFERENCE III

On the Diversity of Habits

At the same passage, I, part 1, question 1, connected with another at I–II, question 54 of St. Thomas, and at question 1 of the Prologue, section "To the second," n. 28, of Scotus.

This concerns the passage of St. Thomas at I–II, question 54, articles 1 and 2, which Scotus adduced here on the occasion of the response to the second argument — a response that concerns the diversity of the habits of the physicist and the mathematician demonstrating through different media that the earth is round. St. Thomas places the principle of this distinction in that passage (I–II, question 54, articles 1 and 2), which Scotus then transferred here because of its connection with the present passage (I, part 1, question 1, article 1). And rightly so, since there St. Thomas teaches the principle of distinction of habits generally and specifically of those of the physicist and mathematician regarding the roundness of the earth, while here he applies it. Here is St. Thomas's text as cited by Scotus (question 1, n. 27): "The said response" — namely to the second argument, which we just examined — "is explained as follows: A habit is both a habit and a form. Insofar as it is a habit, it has distinction from its object; insofar as it is a form, it can be distinguished by its active principle. With respect to scientific habit, principles are the efficient cause. Therefore, even though where there is the same knowable object — for example, that the earth is round — there is no distinction through objects, there is nevertheless a distinction there through the principles by which the mathematician and the physicist demonstrate this, and thus there is a distinction of habits insofar as they are forms."

Scotus states this well as regards St. Thomas's meaning. But it is better to adduce St. Thomas's own words. Therefore, at I–II, question 54, article 2, in the body, he says: "I respond that it must be said that a habit is both a certain form and a habit. Therefore the distinction of habits according to species can be taken either according to the common mode by which forms are distinguished in species, or according to the proper mode of distinction of habits. Forms are indeed distinguished from each other according to diverse active principles, since every agent produces something similar to itself in species. But a habit implies an ordering to something; and all things that are said according to an ordering to something are distinguished according to the distinction of those things to which they are referred. Now a habit is a certain disposition ordered to two things, namely to the nature and to the operation that follows upon the nature. Thus habits are distinguished in species in three ways: in one way according to the active principles of such dispositions; in another way according to the nature; and in a third way according to objects differing in species" — as is

explained through the responses to three arguments, the second of which contains the example of the demonstrations about the earth being round.

Concerning this doctrine, Scotus says in the passage adduced here (question 1, n. 28): "Against this: Form is common to habit, because every habit is a form, but not conversely. But it is impossible for some things to be distinct in the account of the superior and not to be distinct in the account of the inferior. Therefore it is impossible for some things to be distinct in the account of form and yet to be indistinct in the account of habit. Furthermore, he supposes that principles are distinctive in a genus of cause other than as efficient principles, which is also false, because if they have any account of distinctive cause with respect to those habits, they have only the account of efficient cause."

Section (Single)

Scotus's Attack Is Examined

It is more difficult to philosophize here, because St. Thomas's text is less clear, and Scotus's attack seems to rest on an interpretation foreign to the mind of the Angelic Doctor. And therefore Cajetan in his commentary on question 54, article 2, at the beginning of the article, says that Scotus introduced the words of this article in a distorted exposition. And below, in the section beginning "To this it is said," he affirms Scotus's interpretation to be false. Nevertheless Scotus's attack stands, and Lychetus upholds it here in his commentaries.

St. Thomas distinguishes two accounts in a habit: that of form, which is common to all forms, and that of habit, which is specific and proper to habit. He says the first is distinguished by active principles, that is, the media or premises of conclusions; the second is distinguished by objects. But when the object is one, the scientific habit would be one; and so they would be distinct in the account of form but not in the account of habit.

Against this, however, Scotus's argument is unanswerable, as follows: A habit is essentially a form; as a form, it is distinct from another of a different form; therefore it must be a distinct habit from another that is distinct through another different form. Therefore it cannot be one and the same with it in species of habit. And on this argument, thus explained, Lychetus says (n. 2 in his commentaries): "These — that is, the Thomists — cannot respond to this argument unless they explain St. Thomas's response differently."

Therefore Cajetan responds that St. Thomas did not intend, indeed did not even dream of, responding in that way, but intended to say that habits, since they are forms and habits, can be distinguished in both ways — as form and as habit — and therefore both by reason of the principle and by reason of the object. I refute him as follows: St. Thomas, in I, part 1, question 1, article 1, in the response to the second objection, teaches that one and the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astronomer and the physicist — namely, that the earth is

round. But for the same conclusion there is one and the same habit. Hence it follows that they are not distinguished by objects but only by efficient principles — contrary to what Cajetan affirms.

Given that assumption of St. Thomas in this passage (I, part 1, question 1, article 1), Scotus's argument against him is convincing, in this way: You say there is one habit in the account of habit (I, part 1, question 1, article 1), and again you say it is diverse in the account of form (I–II, question 54, article 2, body). Therefore you affirm them to be distinct according to form and indistinct in the account of habit — that is, to be distinguished in the superior and not distinguished in the inferior, which is what Scotus pointed out and showed to be impossible. And Cajetan and the other Thomists referenced by Lychetus are entirely refuted, and Scotus's argument remains undefeated.

This covers the first part of Scotus's attack. I come to the second. Scotus denies that habits are distinguished by objects as a formal extrinsic cause, as St. Thomas posits (I–II, question 54, article 2, body), referring to question 1, articles 2 and 3, and as Cajetan explains. Against both, Scotus affirms that they are distinguished efficiently. And rightly so. For an object as object is only the terminus of a cognition already distinguished through efficient principles; it is not a principle of distinguishing. This is clear because the object does not move the faculty immediately but through species and principles of knowing, which are the efficient causes of cognition — just as the end, which does not move except as known, and therefore efficiently through the species and principles by which the affected intellect tends toward the material object, terminating its cognition at it. Therefore no other cause of distinction of habits is given except the efficient one, and that so-called formal extrinsic cause is entirely fictitious, since the object contributes in no other way than by sending in species and principles of its cognition, which are active media, not extrinsic formal causes.

And indeed St. Thomas himself acknowledges in that passage (I–II, question 54, article 2, response to the first) that in the distinction of habits what must be considered is not the material object but the account of the object differing in species — which difference comes to it through the media, which are active. Therefore this alone is the distinction habits have, and no other, as Scotus teaches, who in this passage (question 1 of the Prologue, n. 28) calls the very objects that distinguish "principles," as Lychetus also observes. For Scotus saw that the formal objects themselves, as they are in our mind, are the same as the principles and media that distinguish efficiently. Indeed, I could never grasp that genus of formal extrinsic cause, because I saw that formal cause conflicts with the extrinsic. For how can a formal cause, which is entirely intimate and inherent or intrinsically informing, exist and operate extrinsically? Therefore, however the object contributes to the distinction of habits, it will contribute only in the genus of efficient cause — that is, by virtue of and through the operation

of its species and principles existing in the intellect. And accordingly this second attack of Scotus remains established, and this entire difference explained.

Judgment. Scotus is subtle and cautious. When he attacks St. Thomas, he reads and compares passages in which he treats the same matter, and when he sees them not cohering, he argues from one passage to the other. And so when he saw the passage at I, part 1, question 1, article 1, response to 2, corresponding to the other at I–II, question 54, article 2, he went there, and having reviewed both, he found that one did not cohere with the other and refuted one from the doctrine of the other, for the reason we have laid out — nor would he otherwise have found the discrepancy, nor could he have attacked it with his own deduced argument. He was far more skilled than Cajetan, who in his commentaries on the first part did not remember the other doctrine of his Doctor in the *Prima Secundae*. But when he there encountered Scotus's objection, he strove to refute it by referring it to the present passage of the *Prima Secundae* — but without comparing it with the other passage from the first part, which he ought to have remembered in order to properly refute Scotus, an acute and vigilant man. I therefore concede to Cajetan what he says about St. Thomas — that the latter never even dreamed of such a response — but I do not pardon what he imputes to Scotus, namely that he distortedly exposed St. Thomas's doctrine. For it is clear that Scotus both understood it correctly and reported it faithfully, as Lychetus had affirmed before us, and we confirm after him — approving both his exposition and his attack.

COLLATION I, DIFFERENCE IV

On the Subalternation of Theology

At question 1, article 2 of St. Thomas, joined with the passage at II–II, question 1, article 5, response to 2, and question 3 of the Prologue, n. 30, of Scotus.

This concerns the subalternation of the theology of wayfarers with respect to the beatific vision of the comprehensors — St. Thomas affirming, Scotus denying. St. Thomas's text is at article 2, body: "It must be said that sacred doctrine is a science. But it should be noted that there are two kinds of sciences. Some proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect, such as arithmetic, geometry, and the like. Others proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science, just as optics proceeds from principles made known through geometry, and music from principles known through arithmetic. And in this way sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, namely the science of God and of the blessed. Hence, just as music believes the principles delivered to it by arithmetic, so sacred doctrine believes the principles revealed to it by God."

He intimates the same position in II–II, question 1, article 5, as Cajetan notes, and here Lychetus as well.

Against this, Scotus (question 3 of the Prologue, n. 30): "Against this it is argued as follows. They hold that science cannot stand together with faith. But now they say that what is subalternated stands together with faith. Therefore, according to them, it both stands and does not stand — and so they contradict themselves. Furthermore, the science of God can only be one. Therefore none is subalternated. Furthermore, science in the account of cause depends only on the object, or the subject, or the light. But with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer, the vision of the blessed has no account of cause; therefore, etc. Furthermore, the subalternating and subalternated sciences are not primarily about the same truths or predicates that are known. This is clear because where the subalternated begins, there the subalternating ends; but our theology can be about the same things as the science of the blessed; therefore, etc. Furthermore, one who has the subalternated science can have the subalternating one, and conversely; but in the present case both are impossible. First, because one who has the principles about the conclusion can know the conclusion. The second is likewise clear, because the principles of the subalternating science are more universal, and thus in the order of intellectual cognition are known first — but here, according to this, they do not proceed from what is more known but from sense. The minor is also clear regarding both members: just as the wayfarer cannot clearly see, so the blessed cannot have faith."

Section (Single)

Scotus's Attack Is Explained and Defended

Scotus argues copiously and efficaciously, so that nothing seems capable of being added to his arguments. Lychetus weighs them carefully and refutes the responses of Cajetan, whom he reproaches for having taken them in large part from Capreolus. Vásquez also refutes Cajetan (I, part 1, disputation 6, chapter 2, n. 10) and is so persuaded that theology is not a science subalternated to the science of the blessed that he denies St. Thomas held this opinion, and attempts to free him from it.

Two things must be proven by us. First, that the conditions St. Thomas proposes in his text are not found in the theology of wayfarers with respect to the blessed. The first argument of Scotus supposes that St. Thomas teaches that science cannot stand together with faith. Cajetan admitted this in his commentaries when solving Scotus's last argument against the first part of St. Thomas's position. Given this, Scotus's minor follows. Cajetan responds that in the case posited, faith and science are not simultaneously about the same object, because faith is about articles while science is about conclusions. But this response does not resolve the matter, because all the truths that faith attains, science also attains, and they concern the same things. For we believe the articles as much as the conclusions — for example, "Christ is God and man" is a conclusion from those premises of faith: "Whoever has two natures, divine and human, is God and man; but Christ has those two natures, divine and human; therefore Christ

is God and man." All of these are matters of both faith and theological science. Therefore Vásquez rightly rejects Cajetan's solution (disputation 5 on article 1, chapter 2, n. 10), although he does not apply it to Scotus's intention.

Scotus's second argument: The science of God can only be one; therefore none is subalternated. The antecedent is proven because the science of God must proceed through discourse that occurs through believed principles — but this occurs only in our theology, not in the beatific science, which is an intuitive vision of God and entirely incapable of discourse.

Third: Science in the account of cause depends only on the object, or the subject, or the light; but with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer, the vision of the blessed has no account of cause; therefore, etc. This argument is unassailable, because our theology does not receive principles from the beatific vision, nor does it depend on it in any way. Indeed, it conflicts with it — in terms of the light, in terms of the subject (which is the wayfarer), and in terms of the state (which is that of the journey). How then is it subalternated to it? This is confirmed because the beatific vision cannot contribute to our science, which is obscure; and even given that it were evident, it is evident only through inference, and this evidence would be entirely absorbed and extinguished by the beatific light. Finally, the principles of our theology are propositions of faith, or certainly one of faith and another natural; therefore it cannot receive principles from the beatific vision, which excludes both premises — those of faith and those of nature — and conflicts with them.

Fourth: The subalternating and subalternated sciences are not primarily about the same truths or predicates that are known. The major is common and contained in St. Thomas's own doctrine. The minor is certain, because theology deals with the things of faith. But faith believes all the obscure things that the blessed clearly see — as is evident in the first object, which is God, one and triune, which is believed by faith. The same holds for the attributes and mysteries. The consequence follows.

Fifth: One who has the subalternated science can have the subalternating one, and conversely; but in the present case both are impossible; therefore, etc. This proceeds clearly and entirely settles the matter. The major is established because the subalternating science knows the principles of the subalternated and can therefore hold the conclusions of the same; and the subalternated science, from its conclusions, can know the principles into which they are resolved. In a word: one who knows the cause can know the effect a priori, and one who knows the effect can know the cause a posteriori. Nor does the difference that comes to the subalternated science obstruct this — for example, musical number — because this relates materially to the truth of the principles, which conclude in every matter. Furthermore, that difference is an object knowable by any studious wayfarer. Nor is it repugnant for one person to know what is known by another — which cannot happen between the wayfarer with respect to the science of the

blessed, nor the blessed with respect to the science of the wayfarer. These so conflict with each other that it is impossible for them to be conjoined, since faith and the intuitive vision of God cannot simultaneously stand together — which is the doctrine of the assumed minor. Hence the consequence necessarily follows. Thus all of Scotus's arguments conclude.

The second thing I undertook to prove — that the conditions required for subalternation by St. Thomas are not found in this subalternation — is clear from examining those conditions. They are reduced by St. Thomas himself to principles known by the light of a higher science and made known in the prior science, as arithmetic makes them known to music. Two things are included here: that they are known first by the higher science rather than the lower, and that they are received by the lower from the higher. But both are lacking in our subalternation. For the truths of faith that the wayfarer believes were not first known by the blessed; indeed, on the contrary, the wayfarer believed before becoming blessed. And if you object that the object of the blessed is prior to the object of the wayfarer, I respond that we are not speaking here of the object in itself but as it is known to this or that science. The vision is not prior to faith, nor does faith succeed the vision; rather, faith immediately and of itself attains the object without dependence on or precedence of the vision, whose light cannot coexist with the obscurity of faith. Hence St. Thomas's argumentation and example collapse. For the principles of the wayfarers' science cannot be received from the science of the blessed on account of the diversity of the light, just as they are received from music with respect to arithmetic on account of the identity of the natural light — especially since faith proceeds through divine authority, which is an extrinsic and obscure medium, while the vision arises from the very intrinsic and intuitive presence of God, which are entirely different and incompatible by reason of their diversity in principles. Therefore in St. Thomas's argument there seems to be an internal conflict, and in the example a dissimilarity.

Judgment. What Aristotle teaches about the subalternation of sciences (Posterior Analytics, book 1, chapter 10) and what the interpreters observe there in no way cohere with this position of St. Thomas, which posits the subalternation of theology with respect to the beatific vision or the science of the blessed — as we have shown with Scotus thus far. The conditions required by Aristotle are carefully expounded by the Conimbricenses in their Logic on that chapter (question 2, through three articles). And they observe (article 2) that St. Thomas, in his commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate* (question 2, article 2) and in I, part 1, question 1, article 2, along with his followers, holds that the principles of the subalternated science are held by mere human faith, inasmuch as the subalternated science believes them to be certain and demonstrated by the subalternating science — which they refute there. And they observe that in this position the proper mode of knowing "that" (*quia*), which belongs to the subalternated science, is not maintained — just as knowing "why" (*propter quid*)

belongs to the subalternating science. For how will the subalternated science know "that" if it merely believes the principles of the subalternating science and entirely lacks their evidence? And from where will the conclusions of the subalternated science get their evident certitude if they derive it from principles? Therefore the subalternated science, resting on obscure principles, entirely collapses — and with them, it is utterly precipitated.

As regards the nobility and dignity of the science of the blessed, this contributes nothing to the subalternation, which is not constituted by the excellence of the light in itself but by the connection of the light and the dependence of one science on the other. For metaphysics too is more excellent than every other natural science and seems to give them laws as their ruler; yet it does not on that account have them as subordinated and subalternated sciences, as Suárez shows (*Metaphysical Disputations*, tome 1, disputation 1, section 5). But if metaphysics is not subalternating with respect to the lesser sciences — to which it nevertheless supplies many principles of knowing — much less will the science of the blessed be subalternating with respect to the theology of wayfarers, which receives nothing from it as such. For no light from it falls upon theology to illuminate it. They deal only with the same object, which both attain in an utterly different manner — the former by clear vision, the latter by obscure cognition. Hence theology is rather subalternated to faith than to the science of the blessed.

COLLATION II, DIFFERENCE I

On the Natural Receptive Potency for Supernatural Things

This collation will not be with St. Thomas directly, but it will not be foreign to him, since it concerns a dispute between Cajetan and other Thomists on one side, and Scotus and the Scotists on the other. Scotus, in question 1 of the Prologue, section "To the second," n. 12, admits that God is the natural end of man, though not naturally attainable but supernaturally. He concedes a natural desire for this end. And in support of this position he adduces Augustine's passage from *On the Predestination of the Saints*, chapter 4: "To be able to have faith, to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of human beings."

Then at n. 20 he teaches: "A receptive potency is compared to the act it receives, or to the agent from which it receives. In the first way, the potency itself is natural, or violent, or neutral: natural if it is naturally inclined; violent if it is against the natural inclination; neutral if it is inclined neither to this form nor to the opposite. In this comparison, nothing is supernatural."

From this the Thomists take occasion to say that Scotus excluded obediential potency for supernatural forms and indeed denied supernatural forms altogether. That he denied supernatural forms is entirely false, and that imputation is a calumny. This is clear from the passages abundantly cited by the

author of the Scholium on this text of Scotus before n. 20, so that I need not perform the same task again.

Section I

Scotus's Position Is Examined and Proven

That Scotus did not admit an obediential receptive potency, I concede, and I affirm he was right to think so — which is against Cajetan's commentary on article 1, question 1, section "For the evidence." I show this clearly.

First: this receptive potency, through its own immediate nature — in no way elevated or changed — actually receives any supernatural form whatsoever. Therefore it is natural with respect to them. The antecedent is clear, for if it did not receive immediately through its own nature, it would receive through some other intermediary. I prove this proximate minor of the dilemma: that intermediary is either natural or supernatural. Neither can be the case. Not natural, because through something natural the capacity of nature to receive the supernatural is not conferred. Not supernatural, because for receiving this very supernatural intermediary another supernatural intermediary would be required, and thus an infinite regress would follow. Hence the proof stands complete.

Second: Prime matter has from its nature the capacity and natural aptitude to receive substantial forms, even spiritual ones; and accordingly, though material, it naturally receives immaterial forms and constitutes one thing per se with them. Therefore, in the same way, a natural receptive potency naturally — that is, through its own immediate natural aptitude — receives supernatural forms. This is confirmed: if there were some supernatural substantial form, it would certainly be received in matter naturally, without any prior supernatural disposition received in the matter, as is clear from the first argument about the infinite regress. Therefore a natural receptive potency through its very own entity immediately receives any supernatural forms whatsoever.

Third: Reception is not an action or operation; it occurs within the receptive potency by the agent operating and introducing the form, with the potency contributing nothing of either power or work but only subjecting itself to the introduced form. But this is entirely natural; therefore nothing above nature can be acquired or understood in it. This is then proven by the examples of grace, which is received immediately, according to the common opinion, in the substance of the soul; and of faith, which is received in the intellect; and of charity, which is received in the will — with no other intermediary intervening, which we have shown to be impossible. And this is the distinction between active and receptive potency: the active potency needs a supernatural principle in order to operate supernaturally, since it goes forth into act through action; but the receptive or passive potency remains within itself and into its own

natural bosom receives the incoming forms without movement, without any motion or action.

And this is, I believe, the truest opinion — the one Scotus teaches, who always speaks of the receptive potency. You will object that Scotus adds to this potency an inclination and desire, which seems to involve something active. I respond that Scotus speaks of an innate inclination and appetite, which is a certain aptitude for receiving all forms of which it is capable. Furthermore, he also admits a certain natural elicited desire for the reception of that supernatural form of which it is capable by nature — but this desire does not terminate immediately at the supernatural form in the abstract, but at the reception of it, that is, at the concrete form received. This act is natural, follows that natural potency and aptitude for receiving, and is proportioned to it.

But that this potency of which we speak — the receptive one — should be called obediential and constitute a new category of potencies, as Cajetan wishes in that article: this certainly does not seem right to me. For obediential potency is taken in relation to acting, not to receiving, because one who acts supernaturally has a supernatural principle through which he is placed in first act for acting, and equipped with it he goes forth into the second act of operating. Hence he does not produce supernatural action except as elevated. Or it will be a question of terminology — whether that receptive potency for supernatural form should be called obediential or natural. Let others say what they wish; Scotus and I prefer to call it natural.

Section II

That Scotus Agrees with Augustine

I now come to Augustine's passage, which Scotus adduced in his favor and which Cajetan wants to take away from him. Scotus uses it correctly. For that "being able" of which Augustine speaks refers to the natural potency of man, not to the obediential potency, as Cajetan claims.

This is established because in that passage (chapter 5) Augustine was disputing against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians who confused grace with nature. They said, and wanted to infer from the fact that human nature was capable of faith and grace through itself and had the potency for it, that it could also actually operate through itself. They therefore took nature as natural potency, not as obediential. Augustine conceded to them that this "being able" belonged to nature and was in human nature, but he denied that from it the actual act of believing and operating could be deduced as existing in that same human nature.

Let us hear Augustine: "Who makes you to differ? And what have you that you have not received? For it belongs to nature to be able to have faith; but surely not also to have faith? For not all have faith, even though being able to have faith

belongs to all." And he adds: "Accordingly, to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of human beings; but to have faith, just as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful." Here he opposes grace to nature — therefore to nature taken in the natural sense, not the obediential sense, to which grace is not opposed; indeed, it coheres with it.

He adds: "That nature, therefore, in which the possibility of having faith was given to us, does not distinguish one person from another. But faith itself distinguishes the faithful from the unfaithful." He maintains the same sense of nature as capable of having faith, which he just before had opposed to grace. Therefore that "being able" of which Augustine speaks in that passage is to be referred to natural potency; for the Pelagians were speaking of this, and they had no thought of obediential potency — just as Pelagius, according to Augustine (*On Nature and Grace*, chapters 7–20 and 45–53), placed the possibility of sinning and not sinning in nature — certainly not in obediential potency but entirely in natural potency. This is especially clear since Augustine in that passage on Predestination opposes this potency of human nature to the potency of the nature of animals, as the former is rational and the latter irrational — which removes every occasion for doubt.

Nor does Cajetan's subtlety avail, distinguishing between a potency of nature and a natural potency, and from this affirming that Augustine did not say "natural" but "of nature." This subtlety is certainly that of one who is fleeing, not one who is overcoming the difficulty. For "the nature of man" is the same as "human nature," and "the potency of nature" is the same as "natural potency." Nor did Augustine leave room for this distinction when he said that being able belongs to the nature of man — attributing the potency to nature and fixing it to nature as distinguished from the nature of animals, to which obediential potency is absurdly referred.

Let Cajetan therefore stand convicted by this argument: Augustine conceded to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians a potency of nature for having faith and charity, in the sense in which they understood nature; but they did not understand it in the obediential sense but in the natural sense; therefore Augustine accepted it in the same way. Then: Scotus agrees with Augustine; therefore Cajetan and Javellus disagree with Augustine.

Judgment. To make Scotus's opinion more probable, I observe that St. Thomas agrees with Scotus not only on the natural reception of supernatural form but also on the natural and innate appetite for it. From this it manifestly follows that what is naturally desired is naturally received, for nothing is desired except in order to be had, and it is had by receiving. Therefore St. Thomas (I, part 1, question 12, article 1, and *Summa contra Gentiles*, book 3, chapter 50) seems to admit that in the rational creature there is a natural and innate appetite for seeing God. For in article 1, body, he says: "In God himself is the ultimate perfection of the rational creature, inasmuch as it attains its own principle.

There is in man a natural desire to know the cause when he beholds the effect, and from this wonder arises in human beings. If therefore the intellect of the rational creature could not reach the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain in vain."

He has something similar in the cited passage of the *Summa contra Gentiles*. I focus on the passage from the first part. St. Thomas here speaks of the rational creature left to its own nature — not of the faithful person who knows God supernaturally, for about this there was no controversy. Who would doubt that such a person desires the vision of God? The argument also persuades this, drawn from one who knows effects and desires to know the cause, which is properly natural. And those words signify this: "There is in man a natural desire to know the cause when he beholds the effect, and from this wonder arises." All of these are entirely natural and arising from nature. That word "there is in" suggests something innate, not elicited. Another expression — "a natural desire to know the cause" — is likewise through nature, since it is grounded in the curiosity of knowing from the effect, which is also naturally connected with the cause. The phrase "if it cannot reach the first cause" remains within nature according to natural potency; for a supernatural potency can reach it, since it has powers above nature. Finally, the closing phrase — "the natural desire would remain in vain" — manifestly declares what kind of desire this is: namely, an appetite of nature, which would be deprived of its natural end. Therefore everything contains an innate appetite, like a weight of nature.

I know that Cajetan, in his commentary there (section "For the evidence"), and Javellus in the same section, understand the passage of St. Thomas differently — and with them Vásquez (whom I find surprising) in his commentary on the article — explaining it as referring to man elevated to the supernatural state, to whom God is already known by a supernatural light. But their conjectures do not persuade me, since they are in no way grounded in the words of the text, which are clear and consonant with the other passages from the *Summa contra Gentiles*.

I add that St. Thomas, at the end of article 1, in the response to the fourth objection, admits a proportion in the created intellect for knowing God — which proportion must certainly be natural, since its cause is the relation to God as effect to cause and as potency to act. Therefore, at least for the reception of supernatural form, according to St. Thomas's own authority, a natural potency must be posited in the creature.

There is furthermore another very strong argument for this natural receptive potency, drawn from the fact that it contains material causality, which is entirely foreign to God, who cannot contribute in that genus of cause. The reason for this is that it is unworthy of God and impossible for him to receive anything in himself. Hence it is argued that this receptive power is incapable of supernaturality, which belongs to the divine order. For if anything in it were

supernatural, it would be proportioned to God, and God could contribute materially — which Fonseca held. But that the assumption is true — that God cannot exercise the role of material cause — Suárez proves against Fonseca, with many others (Metaphysical Disputations, tome 1).

COLLATION II, DIFFERENCE II

On the Natural Appetite for God as Ultimate End

On the Question: Whether in the rational nature there is a natural inclination or innate appetite for God as the supernatural end, clearly seen.

This arises from the preceding discussion, because if the rational nature has a natural receptive potency for forms that are supernatural in their entity, it follows that it has some appetite and natural inclination toward them. Since these forms are participations of God in the supernatural order, by an intrinsic argument it follows that in the recipient nature there is an inclination and appetite for God as he is in that state — the ultimate supernatural end.

St. Thomas denies this in I, part 1, question 1, article 1, when he says in the body: "It was necessary for human salvation that there be a certain doctrine according to divine reason, beyond the philosophical disciplines which are investigated by human reason. First, because man is ordered to God as to a certain end that exceeds the comprehension of reason, according to Isaiah 64: 'Eye has not seen, O God, besides you, what you have prepared for those who love you.' But the end must be foreknown to human beings who ought to order their intentions and actions toward the end. Hence it was necessary for man's salvation that certain things be made known to him through divine revelation that exceed human reason." And shortly after: "The whole of man's salvation, which is in God, depends on the knowledge of this truth."

From this passage, Cajetan, Javellus, and the Thomists generally deduce that St. Thomas's position is negative. Vásquez agrees (in his commentary on this passage, and in II–II, disputation 22, chapter 5), and Suárez (book 2 of *On the Attributes*, chapters 7 and 8).

Scotus, however, affirms (question 1 of the Prologue, n. 9), where he proposes arguments in favor of the position of philosophers who say that the ultimate supernatural end can be known naturally. Although he solves these, he appears nevertheless to concede an innate and naturally inclining appetite for it. Hence at n. 14: "I concede," he says, "that God is the natural end of man, though not naturally attainable." He teaches the same clearly in the *Sentences*, book 4, distinction 49, questions 9 and 10 — and the Scotist school acknowledges this, as do the Thomists who attack him, and Vásquez, who follows them (tome 1 on I–II, disputation 22, chapter 1).

St. Thomas is followed by Cajetan and Javellus in I, part 1, question 1, article 1, and his school generally; and by Vásquez on question 12 in I–II, question 5, article 2, response to 5.

Scotus's followers adhere to him, as do Durandus (Sentences, book 4, distinction 49, question 8), Paludanus (question 7, article 1, conclusion 1), Maior (question 6), and the distinguished Thomist Soto (Sentences, book 4, distinction 49, question 2, article 2, and On Nature and Grace, chapter 4).

Section I

The Arguments of the Thomists Are Set Forth

The Thomists' arguments are as follows.

First: The ultimate supernatural end is outside the sphere of nature, which is circumscribed by natural limits. But no potency in any way extends beyond its sphere; indeed, it has a repugnance toward this, not an inclination. Therefore the rational nature, within its natural limits, entirely lacks that inclination and appetite.

Second: Whoever has an inclination toward the end also has one toward the means; and whoever does not have one toward the means does not have one toward the end. But unelevated natural nature does not have an inclination toward faith and grace because they are supernatural. Therefore it cannot have a natural inclination toward the end.

Third: If a natural appetite for attaining the supernatural end were present in the rational nature, there would be in it a certain inchoate grace, and this would be in some way due and connatural to it, demanded by the appetite, which God would be obliged to fulfill. But this is the destruction of God's grace and an occasion for the Semi-Pelagian error. Therefore that innate appetite and natural inclination cannot be affirmed.

Fourth: Toward that which can in no way be naturally known, there can be no natural inclination that moves by way of appetite. But the supernatural end cannot be known through any natural knowledge. Therefore neither can it be desired in any way by nature.

Fifth: If that natural inclination toward the supernatural end and God clearly seen is present in nature, then it will also have an inclination and appetite toward the hypostatic union and other similar mysteries that God can accomplish through his divine power and that nature can obtain through God's grace. But this is absurd; therefore that inclination and appetite is superfluous and unfitting.

These are the arguments for the Thomistic position against the Scotist one.

Section II

The Arguments of the Scotists Are Presented

Scotus's position is supported as follows.

First: Toward a form for which there is a natural reception, there can be a natural inclination in the receiving subject. But in the rational nature there is a natural potency for receiving supernatural cognition and fruition. Therefore there is also a natural inclination. The major and minor have already been proven in the preceding difference. The consequence holds.

Second: Toward beatitude there is a natural inclination. But the clear and perfect vision and fruition of the supernatural end is true beatitude. Therefore toward it there is a natural inclination. Nor does it help to say that the inclination exists toward beatitude in general but not toward a particular beatitude — because an inclination toward the genus involves an inclination toward the species as well. Just as from the fact that prime matter desires form in general, it follows that it desires any form included therein, so also from the fact that the rational nature tends toward beatitude in general, it rightly follows that it tends toward it in particular.

Third: Because the rational nature is capable of the highest good, by which alone it is satisfied, and accordingly tends toward it by an innate appetite. But that highest good is nothing other than God clearly seen and perfectly possessed. Therefore it is naturally inclined and drawn toward him. This is confirmed: if nature were to attain another felicity, it would not be satisfied in it but would always be desiring further until it arrived at the vision and possession of its supernatural end.

Fourth: The inclination of nature toward its ultimate end is like a weight toward its center, according to St. Augustine: "My love is my weight; by it I am carried wherever I am carried." But the center is nothing other than rest in the highest good, which is God clearly seen and enjoyed. Therefore that weight of nature tends toward it, even though it does not actually know him. This is explained according to the same Augustine: "You have made us for yourself, Lord, and our heart is restless until it comes to you." Therefore the rational nature is not at its center until it possesses the clear vision and fruition of God.

Fifth: That which nature, as soon as it is shown to it, desires with an elicited appetite and willingly embraces, is present in nature. Such is supernatural beatitude, which as soon as our nature recognizes it through faith, it immediately loves and embraces. Therefore it has within itself that innate appetite for it — implicitly held wrapped in its bosom, which cannot be unfolded except when cognition is given, and which it would always unfold if it could.

Section III

The Opposing Arguments Are Resolved

The first is resolved by denying that natural potency extends beyond its sphere. For the ultimate end clearly seen is within the sphere of the intelligible object; it differs only in the mode and medium of understanding. Under this reduplicative aspect it cannot be attained by a natural potency, yet absolutely it is attainable. Just as the infinite God is not outside the sphere of the intellect — because even though under that precise aspect he cannot be attained by a finite natural intellect, he can nevertheless absolutely be attained through some mode of elevation. For an object is outside the sphere only when it is in no way and through no medium perceptible — as God seen by the corporeal eye is, because it involves a contradiction for the corporeal eye to see a spiritual thing. From this difference between the eye and the intellect, it is clear that the ultimate end, God clearly seen, is within the sphere of the intellect, even though it is outside the sphere of the corporeal eye.

The second is resolved by denying the inference from the end to the means. For it does not follow that whoever desires the end desires all the means — many of which can be inconvenient to nature and contrary to appetite, as is evident in medicine, where health is a desirable end, yet not a few treatments are harsh and painful, which the sick person hates and does not wish to accept, even though they conduce to health. The end is one and lovable for its own sake; the means are many and diverse. It is not necessary to desire or employ all of them. Thus nature tends toward its end as toward its center and is incapable of distinguishing means that it does not know, nor does it desire them through an elicited appetite but through weight and inclination. Certainly it would be unfair to oblige an intelligent being who wills the end to choose harsh and bitter means, and to deny that he loves the end — for instance, health — because he does not wish to apply arduous and painful remedies. And if such a person would be unfair, how much more unfair would be one who denies nature's inclination and propensity toward the ultimate end clearly seen, because nature does not naturally tend toward supernatural means that neither can nor should be shown by it.

The third argument tries to frighten us with the specter of the Semi-Pelagian error, which posited a certain beginning of merit in nature. But we are far both from the error and from the fear. For that inclination and weight of nature is not some morally good natural habit or act, such as the Semi-Pelagians posited, by which one would merit grace *de congruo*. Nor is it some elicited appetite for a supernatural form, but only a certain natural inclination toward the supernatural end — not as something to be attained naturally (which nature does not distinguish, since it is carried by its weight, not acting through an act). Just as nature is capable of grace, so it is apt and inclined toward it, prescindendo from the mode of obtaining it, which it does not know and does not attend to.

And even if we conceded to the argument that there is a natural propensity toward grace, the danger of error would not follow from this — because there

can be no merit in that propensity, which is not an act and entirely lacks freedom. Moreover, if St. Thomas, along with many in both his own and other schools, held that a man doing what is in himself by the powers of nature through morally good natural acts would obtain grace from God in view of those works — and yet did not thereby fall into the danger of error because he excluded the account of merit from those acts — what danger will there be in asserting that propensity of nature toward the ultimate supernatural end, which is entirely incapable of merit and disposition? Those morally good natural acts certainly seem to induce a kind of appearance of merit, yet they do not actually do so, and their authors explain them without danger — authors whom Suárez cites in great number (I, part 1, book 2 of *On the Cause of Predestination*, chapter 18).

Therefore, arguing *ad hominem* against the objection: If the opinion that holds grace to be conferred by God given morally good natural acts could stand without danger of error, then Scotus's opinion, which says that a certain inclination and weight toward the ultimate supernatural end and grace exists in nature, can stand without any shadow of danger.

But to the objection that grace would be in some way owed to that nature, I respond directly by denying the consequence. For that inclination is not a merit, nor a disposition, nor does it in any way oblige God to give grace; nor is God bound, in the rival opinion, to render grace to man who works well through the powers of nature. Grace cannot be owed to nature, since it is of a higher order and freely conferred by God without any claim. Nor is there any right in nature, but an inclination, which God is not bound to follow — otherwise he would be bound to fulfill the appetite of prime matter, which desires all forms and is satisfied by none. But if God is not bound to fulfill the natural appetite of prime matter, even as the author of nature, much less will he be bound to satisfy nature's inclination toward supernatural forms, which are not owed to it — especially since he is the author of grace. And thus the argument is resolved.

The fourth is answered by denying that actual knowledge of the end is required for that weight and inclination of nature, because it is not some elicited act, which alone requires actual cognition. Nor is that nature, as rational nature, capable of actual cognition of it, but only of the rational grade in which it is constituted, and by reason of that grade it is inclined toward the end suited to the rational creature — as Vásquez shows (I–II, disputation 22, chapter 2, and III, part 1, disputation 34, chapter 2).

Furthermore, the rational nature is not so destitute of knowledge of that ultimate supernatural end that it does not have some inchoate light in the intellect, which emits certain sparks through the knowledge of the immortality of the soul and the knowledge of God as first cause and ultimate end — as we proved in the judgment we made nearby about the superiority of Scotus's

position. In a word: that inclination is by way of weight toward a center, grounded in nature. Who would require actual cognition for it?

The fifth is both resolved and turned back against the opponents. For what it infers is false: there is no nexus or connection between the two. For the hypostatic union is vastly different — outside the order not only of nature but also of grace, devised in the hidden treasures of divine wisdom and drawn forth for the manifestation of God's power, glory, and mercy. The ultimate end of beatitude clearly seen, to which every rational creature is referred by reason of its creation, is common to all and each individual — which the Incarnation is not. Who would desire the hypostatic union in particular? Or who could obtain it by merits? Whereas the ultimate end can both be desired by all and acquired by merits. That union, as it is ineffable, so it is incomparable, and there exists neither proportion nor natural inclination toward it. Indeed, nature itself does not desire it, because it presupposes the loss of one's own subsistence, which must be relinquished if one is assumed to a divine person. Hence many hold that the human nature of Christ the Lord has a natural appetite for its own subsistence and is not satisfied through that union — as I hold with Father Gabriel Vásquez (*On the Incarnation*, disputation 34, chapter 2) and others, against Cajetan (commentary on part 3, article 2).

Hence the argument is turned back, because it takes as its middle term something that is repugnant to its inference. For to the rational nature, whatever it may be, that hypostatic union is rather repugnant than fitting, since it is contrary to its natural appetite for its own subsistence. Therefore the argument takes a middle term contrary to itself. For to prove an appetite for union, it uses something that is repugnant to appetite.

Furthermore, it is turned back as follows: from what the argument posits — that nature desires the hypostatic union and other extraordinary prerogatives — it follows that there are two kinds of appetites in nature: one determinate and certain, the other indifferent and neutral. For toward the ultimate end, God clearly seen, there is in nature a certain and determinate appetite. Toward the hypostatic union and similar things there is only a capacity and indifference — which confirms Scotus's position on natural and neutral potency, which we established above. Hence the argument rebounds on the opponents: that appetite which you attribute to the rational nature with respect to the hypostatic union is neutral and indifferent, and much less than the one we posit toward God clearly seen. Therefore the latter is a certain and determinate appetite, distinct from the former. Therefore it is neither indifferent nor violent, and consequently natural.

I press further, lest they take refuge in obediential potency. The rational nature has an obediential potency for the hypostatic union, but this potency is not similar to the one that nature has for the beatific vision, as we have just shown. Therefore it is not an obediential potency. But it cannot be anything other than

natural. Therefore it is natural. And thus it stands concluded that the potency given in nature for the vision and fruition of God is a natural propensity, not an obediential subjection.

Judgment. I hold that Scotus's position should be preferred to the opposing one. For beyond the arguments adduced, there are other very strong ones.

I am moved first because toward the impossible there can be an elicited appetite; indeed, there actually was one in the angels with respect to divinity, which in the common opinion they desired, at least with an inefficacious will. But it is far more difficult to desire the impossible with an elicited appetite than to desire the supernatural with an innate one. Therefore the rational nature can entirely have the latter. The major as regards doctrine is from Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, book 3, chapter 2), Gregory of Nyssa (On Philosophy, chapter 4), Damascene (On the Faith, book 2, chapter 22), and other holy fathers — Nazianzen (Oration 27), Elias of Crete (on the third Oration of Nazianzen, which is the first against Julian), Ambrose (on the Psalm "You have rebuked the proud"), Chrysostom (Homily 3 on the words of Isaiah), Gregory the Great (Moralia, book 34, chapter 27, alias 14), and Isidore (On the Highest Good, book 1, chapter 12, sentence 8). From the Scholastics: our Scotus (Sentences, book 2, distinction 6, question 1), Gabriel (there, question 1, article 3, doubt 2), Maior (question 1), Bassolis (question 1), with the Master (Sentences, book 2, distinction 6, chapter 1) and the Gloss on Psalm 68 to the verse "What I did not steal, I was then paying back" — whom Father Gabriel Vásquez follows (tome 2 on I, part 1, disputation 234, chapters 2 and 3, and tome 1 on I–II, disputation 42, chapter 5). The minor is certain; the consequence holds.

I am moved second because natural reason dictates that God exists, that a first cause exists, that it is above nature, and that it is the ultimate end. In this knowledge there is implicitly included the supreme perfection of the highest being, which savors of supernaturality. For what else is it for God to be above nature than to be a supernatural being? Therefore, at least roughly and in an inchoate manner, this supernatural end is known — and in this there is a certain innate appetite toward him thus known, desired, and enjoyed.

I am moved third because the immortality of the soul is known by the natural light and at least probably established (I say "at least" lest someone object that it cannot be naturally demonstrated). But to one who knows the soul's immortality, there will consequently be known a beatitude congruent with that immortality — which cannot be merely natural beatitude, entirely imperfect and temporal, corresponding to a corruptible and mortal nature.

I am moved fourth, and strongly. Because the natural light could and did dictate to many Gentiles that God is a rewarder of the good and a punisher of the wicked, and accordingly they recognized and admitted glory and punishment after death — as is evident from Cicero (The Dream of Scipio) and Virgil

(Aeneid, book 6, where the commentators discuss this eruditely and copiously). But from this there arises a certain confused knowledge, at least of the supernaturality of the ultimate end, from which is deduced through good reasoning a consequent knowledge of the supernatural end, clearly seen and perfectly possessed through supernatural fruition. Therefore it can be desired by a natural inclination and desire.

The minor is proven carefully. A Gentile who worked well naturally, knowing that God who is naturally knowable, and loving him with a natural love, would after death receive a fitting recompense for his virtue and love. But this would be nothing other than the vision of God — which would not be obscure or abstractive, and therefore would be clear and intuitive. And this would necessarily be supernatural. Therefore, by good deduction, one arrives connaturally from natural things to supernatural things. Nor should you object that this cognition would be of God and the ultimate end in a natural, not supernatural, sense — for the clear and intuitive vision of God taken naturally cannot be separated from the supernatural character. For whoever would see God clearly and intuitively would see him as he is in himself, and therefore as supernatural — just as he is seen today by the blessed.

And if you deny that this man who naturally knows and loves God in this life would see him clearly and intuitively, but rather abstractively and obscurely, you will be refuted by the fact that an obscure and abstractive vision would not beatify that man — indeed, it would torment and torture him for all eternity, and would not give him fruition and rest but torment and restlessness. Nor would that vision then differ much from the cognition of this life and way, although it might be somewhat clearer and more lucid — which would not be fitting or suitable for a blessed man established in the ultimate end.

Therefore, moved by these and other arguments I have adduced for Scotus's position, I judge it to be preferred to the Thomistic one — especially since a new argument supports it, which I wish to adduce and develop. In the very vision of God and love of the ultimate supernatural end, there is something natural and proper to the rational nature that does not conflict with the light of glory, nor with charity and grace — indeed, it perfectly agrees and is intimately conjoined with them. This is the vitality of those acts, which, since it is proper to nature and to the natural potency, is found in that supernatural entity. Why then, by reason of this natural actual vitality, should there not be in nature — from which it immediately arises — an appetite and natural inclination?

Nor should you except that in St. Thomas's opinion the vitality in the act of vision and love does not remain natural but passes into the supernatural. For I turn this around: if that account which is natural agrees so well and so aptly unites with the supernatural that it passes into it and is converted, this is a sign that there is a great association and connection between the two. I press further: the intellect contributing actively to that vision through a supernatural

concurrence remains natural in its entity and rooted in the soul, which is nature. Therefore in it the principle, which is the rational nature itself, is connected with the supernatural object and end and tends toward it by a certain natural inclination — the sign of which is that actual vital concurrence internally emanating from the principle of nature. If nature were not carried by its own weight toward that object and end, it would either remain natural and indifferent, or it would resist and oppose the agent elevating its vitality to the supernatural state.

These arguments persuade me of Scotus's position, and I do not doubt that I will persuade my readers — provided they are not among those who bring with them a prejudged opinion when they come to read. And the position will shine forth more clearly when the opposing arguments are resolved, to which it will be easy to respond.

COLLATION II, DIFFERENCE III

On St. Thomas's Argument Against Avicenna

Avicenna held (Metaphysics, book 9, chapter 4) that every being is ordered toward its productive principle and rests in it, adducing the example of an intelligence produced by another and turning toward it and resting in it. St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas both attacked this opinion of Avicenna, but with different arguments. Setting aside Bonaventure's, Scotus reports St. Thomas's argument as follows (Sentences, book 1, distinction 1, n. 1): "Others," he says, "argue against Avicenna's reasoning as follows: The soul is immediately created by God; therefore it immediately rests in God."

Scotus refutes this as follows: "The antecedent of this argument is merely a matter of belief and would be denied by Avicenna, because he holds that the soul is immediately created by the last intelligence. Likewise, the consequence is invalid, just as a similar consequence drawn in favor of Avicenna's opinion would be. It is also true that in the same being the account of first efficient cause and the account of end are conjoined; but one does not come to rest in it insofar as it is an efficient principle but insofar as it is the most perfect object. Otherwise, the sensitive soul, which is created by God (according to one opinion), could not rest except in God."

St. Thomas's argument against Avicenna's opinion is found at I, part 1, question 12, article 1, where he asks whether any created intellect can see God through his essence. The argument runs as follows in the body of the article: "In God himself is the ultimate perfection of the rational creature, in that it is his principle of being. For each thing is perfect insofar as it attains its own principle; and the same is also beyond reason. For there is in man a natural desire to know the cause when he beholds the effect, and from this wonder arises in human beings. If therefore the intellect of the rational creature could not reach the first

cause of things, the natural desire would remain in vain. Hence it must be simply conceded that the blessed see the essence of God."

Avicenna is not named here, nor is his argument set forth; but the opinion of the last intelligence is refuted, as we said above. Therefore Cajetan denies that St. Thomas is here attacking Avicenna, and, stinging Scotus, says: "Those who report this argument from St. Thomas as directed against Avicenna are mistaken." Accordingly, he affirms that St. Thomas is concluding among the faithful. The particle "which is foreign to the faith," preceding the attack, supports Cajetan, for it manifestly posits what is foreign to the faith. Therefore he was dealing with the faithful, not with Avicenna, who was a Gentile.

Let us first free Scotus from Cajetan's calumny. Scotus was right about St. Thomas's attack. This truth is established as follows. First, because he cites Bonaventure (Sentences, book 1, distinction 1, article 1, question 1) as if Bonaventure also attacks Avicenna. Second, because St. Thomas in that article argues partly from principles of faith and partly from principles of nature; and in the part that contains the argument against Avicenna, a natural argument is brought — namely, the one drawn from the return to the principle and from the desire to know the first cause, lest the natural desire remain in vain. Certainly that portion of St. Thomas's text — "In God himself is the ultimate perfection of the rational creature, in that it is his principle of being" — manifestly targets Avicenna. And as for Cajetan's affirmation that St. Thomas is dealing with the faithful, this does not prevent him from dealing also with unbelievers. Therefore in the first part of the body he teaches the faithful; in the second he refutes the Gentiles. What then is Cajetan complaining about?

Let us examine St. Thomas's argument and Scotus's critique of it.

Section I

Scotus's Attack Is Proven

First there is Scotus's refutation of St. Thomas's argument, both as regards the principle it assumes and as regards the inference it draws. For that principle — that souls are created by God — would not be admitted by Avicenna, nor is it believed except through divine faith, since many have held various views about the origin of souls. The Epicureans and Sadducees held the soul to be corporeal and material, and thus propagated through seed. This was also the error of Tertullian, about which we have written at length (tome On the Keys of Peter, On Original Sin, chapter 15). The Manichaeans placed two souls in each individual, one from a good principle and another from an evil one — an error condemned by the Eighth Ecumenical Synod (Action 10, canon 11). The Messalians thought that angels were the authors of souls, as the *Historia Tripartita* narrates (book 7, chapter 44) — and they agreed with Avicenna. What of Galen (On the Affected Parts, book 3, chapter 6, and book 1 of On the Fact That the Temperament of the Mind Follows That of the Body), who seems to

have held that the soul is the temperament of the primary qualities? On which see Toletus (On the Soul, book 2, text 11, question 1) and the Conimbricenses (Treatise on the Separated Soul, disputation 1, article 2). If this is true, the principle of the soul comes from the generator. Setting aside the Pythagorean transmigration of souls returning to prior bodies in a cyclical fashion — from all of this it is clear that Avicenna could not have been convinced by the truth of the antecedent adduced, since he used only natural reasoning. It was therefore futile to try to convince him with the supernatural truth of the adduced proposition, which rested on faith alone. Therefore Scotus rightly refuted that middle term of the argument against Avicenna.

As for the other argument drawn from the first cause, Scotus rightly refutes it because it does not follow that because God is the first author and maker of the soul, he is therefore the ultimate end and terminus of its rest. For to act belongs to the active principle, which is far distant from the terminus of fruition. Indeed, action seems to be opposed to it, because action is the principle of motion and the extrinsic terminus from which. But the terminus has the opposite character and remains on the side of passion, which is intrinsic to the produced effect and identified with it. Hence the principle of motion from which and the terminus to which are incompatible. This truth is clear by induction from the elements, which tend toward their center because of movers, yet do not look to the agents but yearn for the termini in which they rest. Who does not see that a stone, whoever throws it, is carried toward its own center? The account of the efficient cause and of the terminating end is therefore different.

Scotus acutely observes that it is accidental that these two accounts are conjoined, not per se. For sometimes in the terminus there can be an active power drawing the effect and recalling it to itself, as happens with the magnet and amber. But this is not precisely by reason of the efficient principle, but of the power conjoined with it. Therefore in God, who is both author and end, these two accounts are conjoined because of his infinite perfection, which faith teaches when we say that he is "the beginning and the end, the Alpha and the Omega," as in the Apocalypse — which was unknown to the Gentiles.

Indeed, it should be noted that Sacred Scripture deliberately expressed both accounts explicitly, lest anyone doubt that God is the end of every creature, by expressly saying "Alpha and Omega, beginning and end" — inculcating the doctrine of faith and teaching that God performs both roles, to remove doubt. For if the account of beginning were sufficient to infer the account of end, Scripture would not with such emphasis say "End, Omega." But because it saw that the one was not connected with the other, it brought forward and commended both. Therefore it was not sufficient to say "Beginning," which pertained to acting, to infer "End," which pertained to terminating and enjoying.

Judgment. Although God is the first and total principle of being and the ultimate and total end of resting and enjoying, these two accounts are not so connected that one follows from the other by deduction. For the principle pertains to the extrinsically efficient cause, in which there is power; the end pertains to the final cause, which is the good, and under that account it moves the will metaphorically, according to the doctrine of the same St. Thomas (I–II, question 1, article 1, and *De Veritate*, question 22, article 2), who took this from Aristotle (*On Generation*, book 1, chapter 7). Now the accounts of the good and the efficient are entirely diverse, since the latter is taken from power and potency, the former from goodness and enjoyability, according to St. Thomas (I–II, question 1, article 1, and more fully *Summa contra Gentiles*, book 3, chapters 2 and 3). Hence it is gathered against him that the account of first cause and ultimate end are very different. And indeed, if we separate by the intellect in God the account of first efficient cause from the account of ultimate end, we will correctly conceive that one does not follow from the other. For from the force of the efficient cause, final goodness is not gathered. And if, per impossibile, there were another first efficient cause distinct from God, it would order creatures to God as their ultimate end. And this is clear from the fact that the final cause presupposes knowledge of itself in the creature, according to St. Thomas (I, part 1, question 82, article 4, and I–II, article 4, question 3, and question 5, article 1). But the knowledge of the efficient cause is neither required nor can be had by the created thing, which comes after the action of the Creator and must be known by the Creator, not by it. Therefore there is absolutely no connection and dependence between these accounts of efficient cause and end. And Avicenna's argument and Scotus's attack stand confirmed.

COLLATION II, DIFFERENCE IV

On the Question: In What Sense Is Theology a Science?

We place this question after the others, though it might seem prior, because in it is contained the cause for the resolution of the previous matter. For the medium by which St. Thomas proves that theology is a science is taken from subalternation; and once we have ascertained whether this is true or false, it is clear whether theology is a science or not. We note this lest anyone criticize the order as inverted.

St. Thomas, question 1, article 2, says in the text: "I respond that it must be said that sacred doctrine is a science." Then, after interposing the text already adduced above in the preceding difference on the subalternation of sciences, he says: "In this way, sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds from principles known by the light of a higher science, namely the science of God and the blessed."

Cajetan here distinguishes between theology in itself and theology in us wayfarers. He says that in itself it is a science subalternated to the science of the

blessed and proceeds from principles known per se by the beatific light. In us, however, it is improperly a science, equivocally, and he says this is what St. Thomas holds.

As for the subject — to include this also in the question so that nothing is lacking for the doctrine — St. Thomas says at article 7: "I respond that it must be said that God is the subject of this science. For a subject relates to a science as an object does to a power or habit. Properly, that is assigned as the object of a power or habit under whose account all things are referred to the power or habit — as man and stone are referred to sight insofar as they are colored, hence what is colored is the proper object of sight. Now all things are treated in sacred doctrine under the account of God, either because they are God himself or because they have an ordering to God as to their principle and end. Hence it follows that God is truly the subject of this science. This also becomes clear from the principles of this science, which are the articles of faith — and faith is about God. Now the subject of the principles and of the whole science is the same, since the whole science is virtually contained in the principles." So far St. Thomas.

Scotus's position on the character of this science is gathered from various places. In question 4 of the Prologue, n. 26: "I ask," he says, "whether theology is a science? I say that science strictly taken includes four things: that it is certain cognition, that is, without deception and doubt, of a necessary knowable object, caused by a cause evident to the intellect, applied to the known through syllogistic discourse. These appear from the definition of knowing in the Posterior Analytics. Now the last condition — namely, the causation of science through discourse from a cause to what is known — includes an imperfection on the part of the science, namely that it is an equivocal effect, and also potentiality on the part of the receiving intellect. Therefore theology in itself is not a science as regards the last condition; but as regards the other three conditions, it is a science in itself and in the divine intellect."

From this text, and from another in the Sentences (book 3, distinction 24, question unica, n. 13), where he posits the same conditions of science, it is clear that Scotus holds that theology in itself and in the divine intellect, as regards those first three conditions, is a science, but not as regards the last. As for our theology, Scotus thinks otherwise, as stated in the nearby passage of the Sentences (book 3, question unica, n. 5, and question 4 of the Prologue), where he denies it is a science — for the reasons adduced above in the question on subalternated theology, which, since it cannot be subalternated to the beatific vision, cannot be a science. He also urges these arguments in the Reportata (question 2 of the Prologue), and Lychetus and the other commentators have thus explained him. But in order for the truth of Scotus's position to become clear, we must propose and examine the questions individually.

Section I

Whether Theology in Itself Is a Science

Scotus affirms this on the following foundation: A certain and evident knowledge of necessary things, had through a cause known evidently as true, is science. Theology in itself is of this kind; therefore it is a science. The major is proven because those conditions distinguish science from opinion and faith; therefore the character of science remains. And if you object that the knowledge of principles is of this kind and yet is not science, I respond that the situation is different with principles, because principles are known immediately and from their terms and look to the consequences that are inferred from them. But theological truths are known in an infused light and are not ordered to those consequences except per accidens. Hence they are not premises of other items of knowledge but remain known in themselves, without any relation to conclusions. Indeed, premises are parts of a syllogism in order to compose a science, which involves a certain imperfection. If you object again that this account of science is contrary to Aristotle's definition, we easily respond that here we are dealing with the knowledge of science stripped of human imperfections, taking science in itself in a higher state from which those imperfections contracted through earthly corruption are absent — just as theologians think of the divine attributes, which should be immune from mortal and perishable conditions.

This is what Suárez wisely observes in arguing that there is true justice in God, against Vásquez and his followers. He also observes the same point in establishing an absolute subsistence in the divine nature that completes the divine essence in that genus antecedently to the relative ones (tome 1 on part 3 of *On the Incarnation*, disputation 2, section 3, and I, part 1, book 4, chapter 2, against the same Vásquez). By the same reasoning, we must with Scotus remove from theological science in itself those imperfections that accrue when it is contracted to us; for in its pure concept it does not have these, and it subsists in a state of sublime abstraction — which is Scotus's doctrine in the passages cited.

From this it is deduced that the theology of God, or divine science concerning necessary things, has the true character of science — with imperfections removed — because it is most certain, most evident, and most perfect. And by this name it is usually called by the Scriptures and Fathers, who, without regard to the common definition of science, bestowed this name upon it. And it is in this sense that Suárez speaks of it (book 3 of *On the Science of God*, chapter 1). Let us hear the eminent theologian (n. 4): "That divine science is most simple, without composition, without discourse, or any similar imperfection. Because neither is the infinite capacity of the divine essence capable of such imperfections, nor does the simplicity of the object admit them, when it is known as it is in itself and in the most perfect mode." His equal, Vásquez, agrees (I, part 1, question 14), who wisely observes that if some Fathers avoid this term, they take science in the sense of imperfect knowledge, in the common and

customary sense. But he agrees with us in the notes to articles 1 and 2, where he says: "It should be observed, according to the doctrine of Dionysius, that the Fathers, when they deny wisdom, understanding, and other things that pertain to the intellect to God, signify that all these things are not found in God in the mode in which they are in us, but in a far more eminent manner — yet in such a way that they cannot be explained or understood by us except through what we see and experience in ourselves. For in God the science of him is nothing other than his substance, which, receiving no change in itself, is variously named by us according to the variation of things."

From the fountainhead of the great Augustine these two distinguished theologians drew. I indicate Augustine's passages (tome 3, book 15 of *On the Trinity*, chapters 13 and 14, and book 12 of *The City of God*, chapter 18). Let whoever wishes read them and will find in them the springs from which those authors channeled their doctrine into their books. What wonder — since the Master too (*Sentences*, book 1, distinctions 35 and 36, chapter 1, and distinction 38, chapters 1 and 4, and distinction 39, chapter 1) drew from those same sources? Therefore Augustine stands with Scotus.

Section II

Whether the Beatific Vision Is a Science or Not

It is clear from the preceding. It is entirely a science, with the imperfections of wayfaring science removed. For it is evident, intuitive knowledge, illuminated by the beatific light, demonstrating things to the mind. The only thing lacking is formal discourse and inference, which is proper to human science and which Scotus excluded. I say "formal" because virtual discourse is admitted by Scotus in the beatific vision, through which by a single intuition — not simple but complex — the essence and properties are attained. For example, the blessed person knows that Peter is a rational animal and risible, and that one is the cause of the other — in which there is a virtual inference sufficient for science. For as Scotus says (question 14 and the fifth lateral question of the Prologue, n. 27): "Discourse does not require a succession of time, nor an order of time, but an order of nature; and in this way it produces a causal reasoning."

Augustine does not oppose this position (*On the Trinity*, book 15, chapter 16): "Perhaps there will not be our rolling thoughts going from one thing to another and returning, but we shall see our knowledge in a single intuition." This passage, beyond the two or three ways of explaining it that Scotus proposes and Lychetus approves there, favors Scotus's position. For it excludes the shifting and progression of diverse formal cognitions — that is, true and formal discourse — but not virtual discourse, which we admit with Scotus. And Augustine signified this by the phrase "in a single intuition." He did not say "simply" but "single," which can be complex and virtually composite — as is clear from the fact that Augustine said our knowledge is seen by it, which since it is

formally discursive, requires a single intuition that is not simple but virtually complex.

Therefore there is nothing to fear from Augustine's passage, which favors rather than opposes Scotus's position — especially since Augustine there wished to distinguish our word from the word of God, which is entirely simple, as he calls it. But he would not have distinguished them if that single intuition of the blessed were not complex and composite. This is clear, for he says after speaking of the single intuition: "It will not be equal" — namely, that intuitive cognition — "to that simplicity." This supports Scotus's position, as does the opinion of serious philosophers who hold that the intellect, even in this state, can assent to a whole demonstration through a single concept — a view the Conimbricenses propose (*Logic*, *Posterior Analytics*, book 1, on chapter 1, on precognitions, question 4, article 5), attributing the affirmative part to Gervasius (*On Cognitions*, part 2, question 2, doubt 2) and other more recent authors. This question was debated in my time at Coimbra, with many distinguished masters affirming it, among whom I was not a contemptible baccalaureus. Such an assent, if it existed, would entirely be scientific on account of the virtual discourse.

Section III

Whether Our Theology of Wayfarers Is a Science

I presuppose that this must necessarily be discursive, as Scotus taught above along with the common doctrine. We need not linger here, because in the preceding discussion on subalternated theology we excluded it from the number of sciences. But by another argument as well we reject it, as follows: That is a science which, from per se known principles, evidently draws its conclusions. But theology is not of this kind; therefore it is not a science. The major is clear from the commonly received definition of science. The minor is shown because theology does not proceed from per se known principles but from ones revealed through faith, which are obscure — as Scotus teaches (in the cited question of the Prologue, and in *Sentences*, book 3, distinction 24, question unica, article 1), and Ockham (question 3 of the Prologue), Durandus (there, question 1, n. 49), Gregory (question 1, article 4), Argentinas (question 2), Marsilius (question 2, article 3, conclusion 7), Mayron (question 14), Bassolis (question 5, article 1), Maior (question 4), and the Antissiodorensis (*Summa*, book 2, treatise 29, chapter 1, question 1), Vázquez (I, part 1, disputation 4, chapters 6 and 8). The consequence is also gathered on St. Thomas's own authority, who in the *Sentences* (book 3, distinction 33, question 1, article 2, quaestiuncula 4) says: "If there were a science that could not be reduced to naturally known principles, it would not be of the same species as other sciences, nor would it be considered science univocally but only equivocally." Since therefore our theology proceeds in this way, deducing its conclusions from revealed premises, it is to be excluded from the number of sciences, and no further proof is needed.

But someone will object that in theological arguments one premise is often natural and per se known and evident, as in this syllogism: Every rational animal is risible; Christ is a rational animal; therefore he is risible — where the major is per se known by natural evidence. I respond that this syllogism and similar ones do not contain an evident conclusion but an obscure one, because one premise is of faith and obscure; and therefore it cannot generate an evident assent, on account of the contribution of the obscure premise, according to the axiom: "The effect follows the worse part of its cause" — not that faith is worse than science, but that it is obscure and lacks evidence, which in its genus is better than obscurity, since evidence arises from intrinsic principles of nature, while obscurity relies on extrinsic revelation of the object.

This is confirmed by the fact that the theological conclusion and its assent, insofar as it is inferential from the force of the premises, is not supernatural — as the assent of divine faith is — because that theological assent is grounded in the natural mode of arguing and discoursing, from the force of the premises placed in form. And therefore it is not infused but acquired and natural. This is common doctrine, which Vásquez teaches (I, part 1, disputation 4, chapter 8), and it is consonant with Scotus (Sentences, book 3, distinction 24, question unica, n. 1, toward the end).

Here a small question about contingent truths should be appended — how theology deals with them, whether that which is in itself, and divine, and of the blessed, and ours. Scotus clearly says in the second lateral question of the Prologue that theology essentially contains both necessary and contingent truths, and that all those truths are theological. And therefore "God is triune and one" and "The Son became incarnate" are both found within the bounds of theology; but the difference lies in the mode of being. For necessary truths are present necessarily and before the free determination of the will; contingent truths are present contingently and after the free decree of the will. Hence the former are necessarily connected among themselves; the latter contingently. But all are seen in themselves.

As for our theology, he teaches that necessary truths belong to it per se. Contingent truths, because they belong to no natural science, also pertain to it and are known by the infused light of faith. Therefore the two integral parts of theology are necessary truth and contingent truth.

One thing is worth noting here: contingent truth is attained in its principle through the assent of faith. For "the Son became incarnate" is an object of the act of faith and is believed. But the consequent truths are necessary by supposition of that principle — for example, "The incarnate Son is Christ in two natures, is God and man, is risible, is passible" — which are necessary truths and terminate necessary assents grounded in natural principles that generate natural assents. These assents are nonetheless theological because they are reduced to faith, which they presuppose and upon which, as a foundation, they rest.

Section IV

What Is the Subject of Theology?

Scotus treats the subject of theology broadly, extensively, variously, and with his customary acuteness, and draws and refutes different opinions from various quarters. For us, from such a prolix and intricate disputation, only what concerns his disagreement with St. Thomas needs to be extracted — namely, in defining the account of the subject taken generically and in applying it to the particular subject of theology.

The two think differently about the definition. St. Thomas (question 1, I, part 1, article 7), as Cajetan and Javellus explain him in their commentaries, says: "It must be said that God is the subject of this science. For a subject relates to a science as an object does to a power or habit. Properly, that is assigned as the object of a power or habit under whose account all things are referred to the power or habit — as man and stone are referred to sight insofar as they are colored. Hence what is colored is the proper object of sight. Now all things are treated in sacred doctrine under the account of God, either because they are God himself or because they have an ordering to God as to their principle and end. Hence it follows that God is truly the subject of this science."

St. Thomas's meaning is that the object of a science is taken in the formal account of the knowable — not in the account of the thing as it is materially, from which in reality the properties proceed. So Cajetan and Javellus explain.

Scotus thinks differently, as follows, in the second lateral question of the Prologue, n. 4: "The account of the first subject is to contain in itself virtually and primarily all the truths of the habit to which it belongs. I prove this first because the primary object contains immediate propositions, since the subject of these contains the predicate and thus the evidence of the whole proposition. But immediate propositions contain conclusions. Therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of that habit. I prove it second because primacy here is taken from the first book of the Posterior Analytics, from the definition of the universal, according to which it indicates adequation. But the object relates to the habit as cause to effect. It is not an adequate cause unless it primarily contains virtually the whole effect; therefore."

He then explains: "What I said — 'primarily virtually' — means this: just as that is the first being which does not depend on another but others depend on it, so 'to contain primarily' means not to depend on others in containing, but that others depend on it. That is, if, per impossibile, everything else were set aside and only its intelligible content remained, it would still contain — and nothing else contains except through its account."

Scotus then proposes two objections for St. Thomas's position, and resolves them by asserting a difference between the proportion of object to power —

which is that of mover to moveable — and that of cause to effect. The difference between the two therefore consists in this: Scotus wants the subject, God, to be taken materially as the thing is — as a cause of all the truths that it contains in itself virtually, as in a subject where they inhere and from which they flow as properties. St. Thomas prefers God to be the subject of theology not in himself and subjectively but in the formal account, that is, of the knowable or revealable, and denies that all truths are contained in him virtually as properties; and therefore he posits the example of sight with respect to the colored, toward which the visual potency tends under the formal account of visibility. Cajetan explains this difference against Scotus, and Javellus against Scotus and Aureolus, in their commentaries on article 7 of question 1.

Judgment. Scotus's position is to be preferred, because the account of the formal object is not the account that is attained as an object, but the account under which the subject is attained. For the knowable in science and the visible in the eye are not attained in themselves, but the things placed under them — namely, being or color — are what the faculties are directed toward and terminate in. So in theology, God is considered by faith or science not qua revealable or qua knowable, but qua God — as constituted in his divine being. Therefore he is known as a thing subjected, just as he is in himself — and therefore in the account of deity.

Nor does the example of sight and color seem apt, because sight does not tend toward color in common but toward a certain individual color, since it is a corporeal power that extends only to singulars. Hence it does not fit the present matter, where the subject of science must be entirely common and contain other things eminently. A more fitting example, drawn from Scotus's position, would be mobile being, which is the subject of physics, toward which that science tends under the account of the knowable, reaching toward its nature as it is in reality materially and as it is a principle of motion, rest, and the properties resulting therefrom — which that subject, mobile being, contains in itself virtually.

Furthermore, the account of object to power and habit is not that of an efficient cause, as the subject is with respect to habitual science, which it causes through its principles assumed in premises that truly flow in efficiently and are causes of conclusions from which habits are generated. It therefore appears that there is a manifest argument against the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, and of Cajetan, Javellus, and — more ancient than they — Capreolus, from whom those two borrowed their subtleties, though they accomplished nothing against the most subtle Doctor.

As for the other part — concerning the virtual containment of all truths in the subject — this is clear by running through all the subjects of sciences, whose material subjects contain properties emanating from their intimate essence and those that follow from them. This is also naturally connected with those things,

and therefore all are virtually contained in that first subject as in the root of a tree, with the trunk, branches, leaves, and fruits bursting forth and sprouting in their due times. This can be seen in the subject of man, which is rational animal. Do not the properties of being discursive, capable of wonder, risible, and other human passions inhere in it, joined by the bond of natural consecutiveness? So indeed in God, as he is in himself, as in a subject (pardon the expression), all divine attributes and predicates inhere virtually like properties — around which theology revolves, so that there is none that does not proceed from the deity and is not traced back to it. Let it therefore stand that the subject of theology is God under the account of deity, in which all divine attributes and predicates are virtually contained. Nor can a doubt be raised about contingent truths, for these also depend on God's free will and are seen in the decree.

COLLATION III, DIFFERENCE I

On Theology as Speculative or Practical

At question 1 of St. Thomas, article 4, and question 4 of Scotus in the Prologue, n. 31.

This consists in assigning the account of speculative and practical in the science of theology and in disputing whether it is speculative, practical, or mixed. St. Thomas affirms that it is both speculative and practical, but for the greater part speculative. Scotus holds the contrary.

St. Thomas's text: "I respond that it must be said that sacred doctrine (as has been said), being one, extends to those things that pertain to diverse philosophical sciences, on account of the formal account it attends to in diverse matters — namely, insofar as they are knowable by the divine light. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, sacred doctrine nevertheless comprehends both under itself — just as God knows both himself and the things he makes by the same knowledge. But it is more speculative than practical, because it deals principally with divine things rather than with human acts, about which it treats insofar as through them man is ordered to the perfect knowledge of God, in which eternal beatitude consists."

Scotus's text: "To the little question, then, I respond that since the elicited act of the will is most truly praxis — even if no commanded act accompanies it (as is clear from the first article) — and the extension of practical cognition consists in conformity to praxis and in aptitudinal priority (as is obtained from the second article), it follows that that cognition is practical which is aptitudinally conformed to right volition and naturally prior to it. But the whole of necessary theology in the created intellect is thus conformed to the act of the created will and prior to it. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: because the subject of theology is virtually conformed to right volition — since from its account are taken the first principles of rectitude in volition. It also determines the created

intellect to knowledge of the determinate rectitude of praxis itself, with respect to all necessary theological matters, naturally prior to any created will willing (otherwise it would not be necessary). Therefore, from the first subject there follows both the conformity and the priority of theology to volition — and thus the extension to praxis, from which extension cognition is to be called practical."

This is confirmed: since the first object of theology is the ultimate end, and the principles in the created intellect taken from the ultimate end are practical principles, therefore the principles of theology are practical; therefore the conclusions are also practical.

Section I

At the Beginning of the Question, the Definition of Praxis Is Examined

It is appropriate to examine the definition of praxis given by Scotus in the same question 4, n. 3, which is as follows: "Praxis is an act of a power other than the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, apt to be elicited in conformity with right reason so that it may be a right act."

The first part — that it is of a power other than the intellect — is challenged by many who deny that this axiom is found in Aristotle; indeed, they affirm that neither he nor any other celebrated author whose authority would be adequate teaches this. Among these are Molina (I, part 1, question 1, response to 3), Suárez (Metaphysical Disputations, tome 2, disputation 44, on habits, section 13, nn. 21 and 22), Hurtado, Soto, and Vásquez, who (I, part 1, disputation 8, chapter 1, n. 3) says that Scotus spoke without foundation. I want to carefully do the opposite, because I see our Scotists have been less diligent in this matter than was appropriate. For Lychetus accepts the saying as if it were Aristotle's. Others, alerted by the opponents, saw that the text is not found and tepidly defend Scotus, saying that it is Aristotle's and commonly thought to be his, and that Scotus spoke in the common sense. Some saw the text and try to show that the axiom can be deduced from it. Therefore I take upon myself the studious labor, and wish to do our Scotists a welcome favor, by freeing Scotus from all calumny.

First, Scotus was not the first to introduce this axiom as Aristotelian. Before him — and this is remarkable — St. Thomas showed and proved it. This is the very author whom Molina, Hurtado, and Vásquez venerate. He, in I, part 1, question 79, article 11, body, says: "But against this, it is said in book 3 of *On the Soul* that the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension." And Cajetan accepts this there. And again at the end of the body: "Hence it is that the Philosopher says in book 3 of *On the Soul* that the speculative differs from the practical in its end." By this he signifies that to differ in end and to become practical by extension are the same thing. The Angelic Doctor relies on this in *De Veritate*, question 14, n. 4: "The practical intellect is the same as the operative intellect. Hence extension to work alone makes the intellect practical." So Suárez judges of St. Thomas (Metaphysical Disputations, tome 2, disputation 44, on habits,

section 13, nn. 21 and 22, and n. 48), expressly stating: "St. Thomas draws the same opinion from that axiom: 'The speculative intellect becomes practical by extension,' from Aristotle, book 3 of *On the Soul*."

If therefore St. Thomas before Scotus required this condition for praxis, relying on the very text on which Scotus later relied, Scotus is entirely free of the reproach that Molina, Hurtado, and Vásquez inflict upon him — a reproach that they themselves do not escape, rashly judging so great a man. However the text may stand, certainly the two princes of theology understood and explained it thus — an argument that it was so accepted and celebrated in their time at Paris, the most noble academy.

But what were those two great theologians Molina and Vásquez doing when they were reading and interpreting St. Thomas and yet did not see that text at I, part 1, question 79, article 11? Let them say, who wish to be — and to be seen as — his careful commentators. I am amazed that they either did not see the passage before they judged Scotus unfairly, or, having seen it afterward, neglected it lest they retract their judgment.

Let us come to the truth of Aristotle's text. It is in book 3 of *On the Soul*, chapter 10, commentary 49. I have seen the passage and read many versions of it and collected them, and I am not ignorant of the Greek language, which I am learning in my old age. In Averroes I found an entirely faithful version and his apt interpretation. But nowhere did I find that axiom in those exact words commonly cited: "By extension it becomes practical." I found, however, equivalents that bear that interpretation.

First Aristotle says: "The operative intellect differs from the speculative in its perfection, or end." Where Averroes comments: "For the end of the speculative is only to know; but of the operative, to act." Then Aristotle adds: "Every desire is for something; for desire is not the principle of the speculative intellect, but that other thing is the principle of the intellect." Where Averroes comments: "Because every desire is for something — that is, desire is not the motive principle of the operative intellect, but that thing desired moves the intellect."

Aristotle continues: "Therefore it necessarily appears that these two are movers — namely, desire and thought applied to action. For desire moves, and thought moves because it is desiderative." Where Averroes comments: "When the intellect desires, then man is moved — namely, by both the desiderative power, which is the intellect, and the imagination."

Both speak obscurely, but it sufficiently appears that there is a certain extension of the operative intellect to appetite and to work. The Conimbricenses, learned in Greek, call this a "progression" in their commentary on book 3 of *On the Soul* on that text: "Aristotle establishes that the practical intellect and the appetite are principles of the motion of progression, and he notes that by the name of that practical intellect the imagination is also comprehended, because they agree in

their function." And they conclude: "He proves this assertion because both the appetite and the intellect look to some end to be obtained through the motion of progression."

There it is — that progression of the operative intellect contains the extension proposed by Scotus, by which it goes out beyond itself and passes to the appetite. In this sense Augustine Niphus writes in his commentaries on the same text. He raises Philoponus's doubt: "It does not seem that the practical intellect alone is for the sake of something else, since the speculative is also for the sake of something else." Then he responds: "Both the speculative and the practical are for the sake of an end; but the practical is for the sake of an extrinsic end — for example, navigating or healing. The speculative, however, is for the sake of an intrinsic end and for the sake of truth, which is a perfection of the soul. But because the internal is hidden and the external is manifest, the speculative is thought not to be for the sake of an end, while the practical is so — because the end of the speculative is hidden, while the end of the practical is manifest."

Here the Scotist extension proper to the praxis he defined is clearly contained — an extension that is entirely outside the intellect and exercised in other powers. So much so that every operation of the intellect, whatever it may be, even the productive operation of science, remains within speculation and does not pass to praxis.

Therefore Dandinus, in his commentary on the same text, not ignorant of Greek, says with Aristotle's text added and explained: "We, however, take 'operation' to signify the operation of a power other than the intellect. Hence that common saying in the schools: The intellect becomes practical by extension, when it does not consist in mere cognition alone but progresses toward directing the act of another power. Moreover, 'praxis' signifies an action diverse from the intellect, as Aristotle testifies: 'The practical differs from the theoretical in its end'; and again: 'The practical is referred to work.'"

From this it is clear that the axiom in the Scotist sense is found in Aristotle. Indeed, Soncinas approves Scotus's definition (*Metaphysics*, question 2). Let the opponents therefore be ashamed of their unfair censure. The description of praxis given by Scotus is to be maintained — and is accepted and vigorously defended by the acutely Thomist Complutenses (disputation 1, prooemial question 6), who at n. 58 assign it to St. Thomas and consider it Angelic, and would not have accepted it unless it were of this kind — for thus they take their oath. Therefore those vehement Thomists favor us Scotists. Let whoever wishes read them. We will only adduce that passage (n. 18): "Second, it is proved from St. Thomas (I–II, question 57, article 1, response to 1), where he says: 'The practical or operative, which is distinguished from the speculative, is taken from the exterior work to which the speculative habit has no ordering, but only to the interior work of the intellect, which is to speculate about the truth.'" And they add in conclusion: "From these passages (for they had adduced others), Conrad

rightly infers that the act of the intellect is not praxis, but the exterior work — that is, an act of another power, falling under election and counsel." They cite many from the Dominican family of Thomists in favor of this, and add that it is the common opinion of theologians. Javellus received it (question 1, article 4 on I, part 1).

Let Scotus's opponents see that they must contend not only with him and the Scotists, but also with St. Thomas and his school. And here I warn Mastrius, Cameranus, and Pontius not to hold that any act of the intellect, even one commanded by the will, can be praxis — since this is against Scotus's doctrine, both as generally taught and as expressly emphasized in this question 4 of the Prologue (n. 4): "When therefore it is said 'intellection is commanded by the will, therefore it is praxis,' it does not follow." The Doctor forbids his followers from holding the contrary. I know they have patrons, but in this matter those patrons have shown themselves opponents of Scotus. I am indeed an old man who has come to interpret and defend him, but I will not allow myself to depart from him, and I compensate for my tardiness with fidelity.

Now to the question: Whether theology is a speculative or a practical science? To proceed more distinctly, I will divide the material into parts, as it is both complex and intricate, involving both uncreated and created science.

Section II

Whether the Theology of Wayfarers Is Practical

Scotus affirms this, speaking of theology that deals with necessary truths. He proves that the whole of it is practical by this argument, which we cast into syllogistic form: Every intellectual knowledge apt by nature to direct and regulate the will and actions — both those of the will and of other powers — in relation to the ultimate end, is practical by its nature. Such is the theology of wayfarers. Therefore it is a practical science.

The major is proven from the definition of praxis, which is an operation of another power regulated and directed by the intellect — and is per se evident. For what else is being practical than tending toward praxis, since through this it is distinguished from the speculative?

The minor is shown because theology teaches truths about God and divine mysteries that are apt by nature to direct the operations of the rational creature toward God and to regulate, promote, and advance them toward attaining the ultimate end. The consequence holds.

Indeed, theology is not only apt by nature to accomplish this, but was also instituted by God so that man might act rightly and live in conformity with right reason, and that by those known truths he might be kindled to the love of God and the observance of his commandments. Hence it follows that theology is in fact entirely practical.

This argument is drawn from a very lofty principle: God by his nature is supremely good and communicable, and therefore had to make himself known to creatures and give himself to them to be known and enjoyed. It was therefore necessary to find a mode for this communication, which occurs only through the science that reveals him and through the will attracted to loving him. Hence arose the Incarnation, Redemption, and other mysteries and means instituted for eternal salvation. This reasoning relies both on the light of faith and on the impulse of grace, which Augustine employs in many places (Epistles 3 to Volusian, 95, 105, 106; On the Predestination of the Saints; the books of Meditations and Soliloquies; and books 1 and last of The City of God). Hence the author of On the Knowledge of True Life: "It is certainly established that the rational nature was made for this alone: that it might understand its maker God, and understanding him love him, and loving him live eternally and blessedly in him who is eternal life." There is Scotus's argument expressed.

Nor should we be surprised that the whole of theology is practical, because just as the intellective principle is necessarily referred to the volitive, with which it is connected by a hidden bond, so every theological science is ordered toward directing the acts of the will toward God the ultimate end. Nor does it matter that many truths in God seem to be solitary and to consist in pure speculation — such as "God is one," "God is triune," "The essence is absolute," "The persons are relative." For these very truths, once known, move the will to venerate and love God, and accordingly do not stop at speculation but extend further to inflaming the will.

All of Scotus's subtleties in this very weighty question converge here. Whoever weighs it well will judge it to be not far from a demonstration.

But someone will object: By this reasoning no natural science whatsoever will be speculative, since every science is apt and suited to direct and regulate the will and our operations toward the ultimate end — at least this is not repugnant to it. Therefore metaphysics, physics, and astronomy, which most seem to be contemplative, will be nothing of the kind and will pass over to the practical sciences.

I respond by denying the consequence. For these sciences are purely natural, not instituted by God as he is the supernatural end; they do not proceed through a supernatural medium, nor do they have any commerce with Christ the Redeemer. For as Augustine says: "Christ did not die for us so that we might be mathematicians, or philosophers, or rhetoricians, but so that we might be just and live rightly according to virtue." Nor is our nature, furnished with these natural gifts and sciences, the grace of which the Scriptures speak — Scriptures that contain and teach the doctrine of our salvation — as the same Augustine excellently explains (Epistles 105, 106, and 95, and especially in the Epistle to Volusian), where he praises sacred doctrine abundantly and affirms that it comprehends whatever is taught in the natural disciplines.

These sciences, then, which are not primarily or directly ordered to attaining the ultimate end and without which it can be obtained, can remain in contemplation — although in a Christian person, by virtue of faith and commanding grace, they can in a certain way become practical and be ordered to eternal salvation as means. For they are indifferent to receiving that direction. But from this arises another objection: Therefore such speculative sciences cannot be speculative and belong entirely to the practical sciences, according to Scotus's mind and reasoning — for they are apt by nature to direct and regulate the will toward attaining the ultimate end.

I respond by denying the inference and the parity. For these sciences do not *per se*, primarily, and by their nature tend toward this, but are drawn from elsewhere and contribute *per accidens*. Nor is that indifference and non-repugnance sufficient for the practical account; rather, a certain positive aptitude and capability is required — such as is in sacred doctrine. This is Scotus's meaning, entirely in conformity with Augustine in the passages cited, especially in the books *On Christian Doctrine*, which are the instruments of this position of Scotus. Thus explained by us, the position is free from all opposing arguments — both those of Scotus himself and those of Gregory and Ockham, which Lychetus adduces and carefully resolves.

Section III

Whether the Beatific Vision Is Speculative or Practical

Vásquez (I, part 1, disputation 8, chapter 5, n. 20), when consulted about Scotus's mind in this controversy, judged as follows: that Scotus holds the beatific vision to be practical because from it delight follows. He declares this in these words: "Third, it should be noted that for an act of the intellect to be called practical, it is not sufficient that praxis follows from it, even by some natural consecutiveness. And therefore Scotus was deceived when he said that every act of the intellect from which love or delight follows is practical. For from speculation itself delight can arise."

I am amazed that a man both acute and learned should pronounce so inept a judgment about Scotus and sting him with the sharp word "deceived." He did not see Scotus's express text in this question 4, n. 23, where Scotus teaches the contrary: "What is added about delight is nothing to the point, because delight is a passion naturally following upon perfect operation; and whether it is delight about speculation or about the speculated object, no cognition is made practical on account of the extension to it, because this delight is not properly praxis."

Which of the two was deceived is evidently clear — namely Vásquez, whom this clear passage of Scotus escaped. It suffices to read it to deny what Vásquez rashly affirmed about Scotus. Suárez acted more prudently (I, part 1, of *St. Thomas*, book 3 of *On the Attributes*, chapter 4), who, although he disagrees with Scotus

and refutes his reasoning, nevertheless refrains from censure and even tries to bring Scotus over to his own opinion.

Yet the question is not thereby superfluous. For since the beatific vision can cause many effects in the blessed person and affect the will in various ways, and since beatific love and fruition arise from it, anyone might ask whether there is room for praxis in the acts of the will of the blessed — since they are not deprived of freedom and can so accommodate the vision to free acts that those acts take on the character of praxis.

The ground for doubt is furnished by Scotus in the same text, where he adds these words: "But to love or desire a known object — and this in such-and-such circumstances — is truly praxis, and does not naturally follow upon apprehension but is freely, rightly or not rightly, elicitable."

The solution depends on the doctrine Scotus transmits there: that love and necessary delight, which cannot be freely exercised by the will, are in no way praxis and cannot be so called; but free and regulable love and delight can be.

And indeed, in the opinion of St. Thomas and Henry — which Scotus sets out (Sentences, book 1, distinction 1, question 4, n. 3) — asserting that fruition is connected with vision by a necessity so great that they cannot be separated even by absolute divine power, it must be entirely denied that fruition is praxis, for the reason Scotus gives. But in Scotus's own opinion we must see what should be held. For Scotus denies that the act of love and fruition is necessary and affirms it is free, because it proceeds from an intrinsically free principle — namely, the will. Hence, even though the beatific vision is necessary, it does not follow that fruition is necessary and inseparable from the vision — which he efficaciously shows there against Henry and St. Thomas.

From this it seems to follow that fruition is capable of the character of praxis, since it is free. Yet this must be denied, on the principle adduced against Vásquez. For however that account of freedom may stand, fruition proceeds from the vision by a certain connatural consecutiveness, and accordingly it flows like a natural property from the will moved by the proposition of God clearly seen — which is the condition that, according to Scotus, excludes praxis. Otherwise, no delight of the will, even in natural things, would fail to be praxis — since every operation of the will proceeds from a free power.

That Scotist freedom in the beatific fruition is not contingent, nor regulable at pleasure by the intellect, but connaturally follows upon the intuitive cognition and arises from it. I call it connatural because even though both the vision and the fruition are supernatural acts, there is between them a fitting and quasi-natural connection, which, though it is of the supernatural to the supernatural, does not change the character of consecutiveness of one from the other after the manner of a property — especially since in the vision and fruition themselves, which are acts of intellect and will, there is a vitality and natural operative power

that operates simultaneously with the elevated principle. By reason of this vitality, that connection naturally exists between both the powers and the operations.

However, there still remains a way of establishing praxis in the beatific vision, if one considers the circumstances that can arise. For through the beatific vision many future contingent things can be known that are capable of direction and rule — for instance, if the blessed person sees that his parents or children are in a state of need, he can then excite acts of his will to procure help and assistance for them and to seek it from God. In this way the vision will become practical, and the act of will commanded by it will be praxis according to Scotus's superior doctrine (n. 23) about the circumstanced object, as he calls it.

Or if from their goods known through the beatific vision he rejoices and takes delight — because that delight is not about the highest good and accordingly does not naturally follow the vision but freely, as Scotus teaches in nn. 23 and 24. And later at n. 41 he concludes in favor of the practical vision: "For this vision is by nature apt to be conformed to fruition, and naturally prior to it in the created intellect, so that right fruition may be elicited in conformity with it." From this it follows that it must be held absolutely with Scotus that the beatific vision is practical.

Section IV

Whether the Science of God Is Practical

With Scotus, a threefold science must be distinguished here. The first is God's science of himself within himself, which he calls the theology of God (n. 33 of the same question 4). The second is about possible and necessary creatures. The third is about free and contingent ones. We shall treat each and arrange them in separate articles for the sake of clarity.

Subsection 1. Whether the Theology of God within Himself Is Practical

Scotus proposes two diametrically opposed positions. The first affirming, the second denying. The former from nn. 33 to 36, the latter from nn. 36 to 37. He leaves both as probable.

He proves the affirmative as follows: The divine cognition is apt by nature to direct and conform the will to itself, and it precedes volition itself. Therefore it will be practical by nature. Both parts of the antecedent are true. The consequence holds.

Only three objections remain to be resolved.

First: This derogates from the rectitude of the divine will, which needs no direction, and from its freedom, which would be taken away through that determination and application of the intellect. Therefore that praxis should not be admitted.

Second: If that cognition were practical, it would be so because from it there would be love and delight in the will. But the love and delight of the divine will would connaturally follow from that cognition; therefore it would not be praxis, according to what was said just above.

Third: A directing and regulating knowledge must precede and cause praxis. But divine cognition neither precedes volition as future nor causes it. Therefore it cannot be practical.

The response to the first, with Scotus, is as follows regarding the first part: divine cognition is of itself apt by nature to direct and regulate the will — if the will were capable of that direction — which suffices for the character of practical knowledge. Regarding the second part: the will is not necessarily determined by the intellect, because the will is not determined to the love of God from outside itself but by itself upon seeing the object, which demands that love. The determination comes from the objective goodness represented by the intellect as showing the object, not as either commanding or efficiently causing the act — which by its nature, being a volition, requires the presentation of the object as a condition showing it, not as a determining cause.

The second is resolved by saying that this is true of the act of complacency, which is entirely connatural to the vision showing the proper good — but not with respect to love, which can have circumstances. Or that the cognition about itself is apt to regulate affections if the divine will were capable. And this suffices for praxis, as has often been said above.

The third is answered by conceding that the cognition neither precedes in any time nor in any way causes the volition, but that by its nature it implies the volition, which presupposes cognition — though not conversely. The direction is not a cause but only a reason that persuades regulation and conformity with the rectifying knowledge.

So Scotus sustains this part, and indeed sufficiently probably. Mayron follows Scotus (on the first distinction 48, question 1).

He proposes and proves the contrary position as follows, with a single but, in my judgment, adequate argument: The divine will, of itself and by its nature, has every kind of rule and rectification and is incapable of alien direction. Therefore the divine cognition, by directing and regulating, can accomplish nothing around it. The antecedent is established because otherwise the divine will would be defectible from the good if it were regulable and directable toward it — especially since it is the supreme law of the moral good, commanding good and prohibiting evil. The consequence holds.

In response to the contrary argument, a single solution is given: that aptitude of the divine cognition with respect to the will is not directive but ostensive —

grounded in the connection of cognition with volition, which cannot tend toward the unknown — not in the need for direction or regulation.

This too is probable. Scotus admits both. Which is more probable, let the reader judge. To me the first seems more acute and solid. Therefore I hold that the theology of God within himself is practical, not speculative, and should be so called.

Subsection 2. Whether God's Necessary Science Is Speculative or Practical

Scotus did not determine this question in express terms. But from what he said above and in distinction 35 (question unica) and distinctions 38 and 39, certain authors took occasion to hold that Scotus denied this science to be practical. One of them is the distinguished author Vásquez (disputation 69 on I, part 1 of St. Thomas, chapters 1 and 2), by whom he is vigorously attacked.

Indeed, I see that Scotus expressed his mind less clearly on this point. I only find that he clearly denied the science of contingent things — which they call the science of vision — to be practical. Hence it seems possible to deduce that he considered the science of necessary things — which they call the science of simple intelligence — to be entirely practical. This argument supports this: God's science with respect to his own divine and necessary volition is practical; therefore with respect to possible creatures, which are necessary, it will be practical. The consequence is proven because these creatures are rectifiable and regulable by divine science; therefore they are praxis. This is clear because necessary science is the cause of things, according to Augustine (*The City of God*, book 15, chapter 13, middle): "He did not know all creatures, spiritual and corporeal, because they are; but they are because he knew them." St. Thomas brings this passage at I, part 1, question 24, article 8, to prove this very point. And Augustine again (*On the Trinity*, book 6, final chapter): "There is a certain art of the omnipotent and wise God, full of all the reasons of living things, immutable." Scotus uses this in distinction 38, question unica, at the beginning, adding: "Art is a practical habit." And again (83 Questions, question 46): "Ideas are the accounts according to which everything formable is formed." These authorities persuade that there is praxis in the science of possibles. For it is about this that we are inquiring in the question.

Therefore, since the divine intellect knows all possibles and is apt by nature to direct and regulate them, it seems to be practical in Scotus's opinion — yet not taking that science as Ideas, because Ideas, as Scotus says (distinction 38, question unica), are secondary objects known, and do not include any dictating knowledge about operating or not operating. And this is true in Scotus's opinion, which holds that Ideas exist objectively in God, and accordingly regulate nothing, but are inspected by God through a science terminated at them. Hence they are objects secondarily known, not primarily, since the primary one is God — and then the possibles, which, since God knows them in

themselves, remain images and Ideas of secondary things. They regulate or dictate nothing, however; for this is proper to the divine will, which applies them to the making and future existence of contingent things.

Therefore we must distinguish possible creatures in their possible being as related to science, and in their makeable being as related to omnipotence — if this is distinguished from the will. For Scotus rather indicates that they are not distinguished in that question unica, distinction 38, n. 5.

In the first way, the science proposing possible things to the will represents them in a possible mode for making, in this or that way, to the will, determining nothing about the making or future existence. It is practical science according to Scotus's principles.

In the second way, it neither is nor can be practical, because the determination to making or future existence belongs entirely to the divine will, which precedes the vision, as we will say shortly.

Because Vásquez did not see this distinction — a man otherwise subtle and acute — he strayed from Scotus's mind, saying in the passage cited by us at the beginning that Scotus denied the necessary science of simple intelligence, or of possibles, to be practical. Citing Scotus's passage in distinction 38 (question unica), which we have explained, he thought Scotus was speaking there of necessary things under the name of "makeables," a term Scotus uses — taking "makeables" as possibles. This confused him, for there "makeables" are taken in relation to future existence and are contingent things that are referred to and depend on the free divine will for their future existence. These are manifest points; let whoever wishes read.

Nor was Vásquez deceived only in this, but also in citing Scotus (question 4 of the Prologue, section "The third article") in favor of his opinion, as if Scotus teaches there that no science of God about things outside himself is practical. But Scotus does not say this there, nor indeed can he say it consistently with his own doctrine.

A consolation for Vásquez will be the noble and learned interpreter Cajetan, who imposes a similar charge on Scotus (I, part 1, question 14, last article) — about which Lychetus remonstrates with him in his commentaries on distinction 39 (question unica, section "Item at the end").

Subsection 3. Whether God's Science Called "of Vision," or of Future Things, Is Practical

Scotus expressly and repeatedly denies that it is practical, and admits only this one as speculative in God. He treats this ex professo in question 4 of the Prologue from nn. 37 to 43, and had indicated it earlier at n. 35. Again at length and clearly in distinction 38 (question unica) under the title "Whether God's science with respect to makeable things is practical."

First he establishes that practical science within the same supposit is where the intellect directs one's own will and one's own actions — not where one supposit moves the will and powers of another. He sets down this condition in question 4 of the Prologue, n. 37.

Second, he supposes that divine praxis — that is, praxis within God — is the divine volition alone. He also teaches this in distinction 38 (question unica). Understand this, however, of proper and genuine praxis; for improperly and in a broad sense, there will be praxis with respect to another agent.

Taking praxis in this way, Scotus denies it is practical, because the future contingent things around which the science of vision revolves antecede that same science, since they are decreed by God's free will, which cannot be directed and regulated by a science posterior to itself. Hence that science is merely a pure and speculative intuition of those future contingent things whose cause is the divine will. This argument seems to be a demonstration — and Scotus uses it, variously, densely, and intricately proposed, relying on his subtle profundity, both in question 4 of the Prologue and in distinction 38 (question unica, n. 13).

No other arguments are needed. For this one, reduced to form, convinces — in my judgment, demonstratively — as follows: Every operation of the will, in order to be praxis, must be posterior to the cognition that directs and regulates it. But the operation of the divine will, which is the decree about future contingent things, is prior to the vision of them. Therefore this vision cannot be praxis.

This doctrine is intimated by the Master (Sentences, book 2, distinction 1, chapter 3) and taught by Richard (on book 4, distinction 49, article 1, question 8). Mayron follows (on book 1, distinction 48, question 1).

And lest anyone think that Scotus, who extensively and profoundly discussed this matter and admitted an improper praxis with respect to other supposits (as I noted above), thinks otherwise, I confirm the said position with a valid and fitting example. The divine Ideas, which in Scotus's opinion are entirely necessary and prior to every operation of the will — because they do not move or direct it to operate — lack the character of practical knowledge. Therefore, a fortiori, the science about makeable things that are future by a preceding decree of the divine will will lack the character of praxis.

One objection remains here. If every divine science — and the necessary science that concerns God, the most noble of all, and the beatific vision — is practical, it follows that the nobility of speculative science is lacking in God and the blessed, and consequently the less noble kind of science, namely the practical, belongs to them. For it is agreed both among philosophers and among theologians that the speculative kind of knowing is far nobler than the practical, because it is for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, and it rests in contemplation,

which far excels production. But this is absurd; therefore this kind of practical science should not be admitted, either in God or in the blessed. From this it further follows that the free science of vision, about future contingent things, would be nobler than the necessary science of simple intelligence and of possibles.

To this objection I respond as follows. I acknowledge that the common opinion holds thus, viewed from the standpoint of the contemplative end, which seems to be purer and nobler. But for a long time I have doubted this common opinion, and I confess it has never pleased me.

I bring forward a reason that I consider adequate, on my own authority. Practical knowledge has in itself whatever speculative knowledge has, and adds direction and regulation, losing nothing of its speculation. But this regulation and direction is a noble and imperious act toward other powers. Therefore it is nobler than the speculative. For it tends in a despotic manner, not in a servile and base one, to directing the acts of other powers — in the manner of a queen commanding, not serving. Nor is it for the sake of something else as something superior and more excellent that would perfect and govern it; rather, by its nature it tends toward that thing from abundance, to direct and perfect it and render it subject and obedient to itself. This mode contains fecundity and nobility. Otherwise, because the king is ordered to governing the people, he would be less noble than a private citizen; and because the cause tends toward the effect, the effect itself would be nobler.

Speculative science rests in the leisure of contemplation — sterile and infecund — and like a private maiden stays at home, not apt for ruling and commanding. Practical science, knowing whatever the speculative knows, begets a distinct and regulative knowledge, extends its jurisdiction, and commands other powers, prescribing to them as mistress what should be done. It therefore does not fall from its throne but from it extends its scepter and commands. How then will it be less noble than the speculative, which in the manner of the crowd sits idle and grows old in sedentary contemplation?

If the praxis were sordid, as in the mechanical arts, then practical science would be obscure and ignoble. But those are not sciences but humble and base arts — commercial and servile to the doctrines. Of these the philosophers were thinking when they placed contemplative sciences above practical ones.

However this may be in natural things, in supernatural and divine things practical knowledge is nobler than speculative. For it is fecund and communicates itself from abundance, just as the divine essence itself, which, being of infinite perfection, requires communication to the persons through productions ad intra and to creatures through omnipotence ad extra. Just as the divine essence, because of its infinite perfection, is fecund and from its fecundity demands those productions, so also divine science, because of its

perfection, is fecund and apt by nature to direct and regulate the operation of the divine will. Therefore divine science follows the divine essence, and just as the latter brings forth persons from its most fecund bosom, so the former emits praxes from its womb — not from a deficiency of knowledge but from abundance.

This reasoning conforms to Scotus's doctrine (question 4 of the Prologue, n. 42), where, responding to arguments for the nobility of speculative science against the practical, he teaches that the science which is for its own sake — that is, the speculative — is nobler than the practical only when the latter is for the sake of some act inferior to itself. But not when the practical is for the sake of another act that is superior and nobler than itself; for then it is not less noble than the speculative. Since therefore practical theology concerns the acts of the will, which is a nobler power than the intellect according to Scotus, it will be nobler than the speculative. And as Lychetus notes there, citing the same Doctor in distinction 40 of book 4, indeed from this principle of Scotus it follows — as I had assumed — that generally speaking, every practical science is nobler than every speculative science, because every practical science is ordered toward directing and regulating the will — and therefore toward something nobler and higher than itself.

Subsection 4. Judgment.

Having set forth and weighed Scotus's arguments, St. Thomas's position cannot stand — insofar as he denies that God's science is for the greater part practical. For it is established that in necessary things it is practical, and only in contingent things is it speculative.

Nor is the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor to be attacked only from the impossibility of the mixture of practical and speculative in one simple habit, as Scotists commonly argue (which is an argument from the absurd consequent), but from the nature and definition of praxis — which St. Thomas admits along with Scotus — and from that aptitude and capability of directing and regulating the divine will. These are principles that, in my judgment, are evident, through which Scotus's position could be demonstrated a priori and St. Thomas's doctrine refuted.

But lest we repeat what has been said, the arguments presented above must be called upon here and brought forward against St. Thomas's position, so that it may be refuted a priori and more nobly. From here let us proceed to the common mode of attack, taking St. Thomas's first principle: that science is one simple habit in human affairs, and in divine affairs is one most simple knowledge, without any distinction, either real or formal.

Then the argument runs: That science either contains the accounts of speculative and practical formally, or eminently. It contains them in neither way; therefore it cannot be partly speculative and partly practical, as the Angelic

Doctor teaches and the Thomists accept. I set out the argument, which seems to be Scotus's in this question 4 of the Prologue (n. 30), and which is strong and well formulated: "Whenever something common is first divided by opposed differences, it is impossible for both differences to be found in any one thing contained under the common genus. But science in common is first divided into practical and speculative. Therefore it is impossible for these differences to be found simultaneously in any one science."

The major is manifest: "Because if the dividing differences of some common genus could be compatible in some content under the common genus, then the same body could be corporeal and incorporeal, and the same animal sensible and insensible, and the same man rational and irrational — which are absurd." The minor is clear "through Avicenna (Metaphysics, book 1, beginning), the Commentator (Ethics, book 1, commentary 1), and Gundissalinus in his division of sciences. Likewise, contradictories would follow about the same thing — namely, to extend and not to extend — and many other absurdities."

If this argument were properly Scotus's, it would be valid. But that it is not his is clear both from the fact that it appears in an addition in a different character from the text, and because it contains a doctrine contrary to Scotus's legitimate text in the same question 4 of the Prologue, n. 7: "From this second point it is clear that practical and speculative are not essential differences of science or knowledge in common — which is a certain absolute thing — because practical implies a twofold relation of knowledge to praxis as a terminus, aptitudinal and natural. But the speculative denies that twofold relation; and neither the relation nor its privation belongs to the essence of an absolute thing. Rather, it is like a division of a genus by the proper properties of its species — as if number were divided by even and odd, or line by straight and curved. But to some knowledge the practical belongs per se and in the second mode, from an intrinsic cause of the predicate in the subject; and to some, the speculative." He teaches the same in Quodlibet 13, as Lychetus notes.

It is indeed true that the addition to the text here posits an essential distinction and from objects as extrinsic causes — which reveals the addition as suspect. For Scotus does not admit that essential distinction through objects in the genus of formal extrinsic cause, as we showed above (Collation 1, Difference III, near the end).

There is, however, a third passage of Scotus (same question 4, n. 44), where he says: "Speculative and practical are accidental differences of the intellect, though they are essential differences of habits and acts." This is sufficient for proving against St. Thomas that they cannot come together in the same habit. But since, as Lychetus observes there, Scotus is not to be understood as speaking of true differences, I abstain from this argument. I will examine the passages later.

However, Aureolus (in Capreolus, question 2 of the Prologue on the Sentences, book 1) uses this argument against St. Thomas's position, holding that practical and speculative are essential differences of science in common.

Since Scotus's mind is less clear, we must use another argument. We will formulate it from authority — first from the Philosopher, by whom the accounts of speculative and practical are distinguished not only by habit but also by faculty. For in *On the Soul* (book 3, text 53): "It is clear that those who divide the parts of the soul must concede, if they divide the powers themselves, that they are many: the nutritive, sensitive, intellective, deliberative, and appetitive." There are intellection — that is, speculation — and deliberation — that is, consultation in order to act. He distinguished them just as the other faculties he lists there, which are entirely diverse.

Then in the *Magna Moralia* (book 1, text 35), speaking of the parts of the soul, he enumerates the practical and speculative as distinct. More clearly in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (book 6, chapter 2), he teaches that the practical and speculative differ in genus, according to the version and interpretation of Theodorus Zwinger.

To this Aristotelian authority a rational argument is added. However the practical and speculative relate to science, both those accounts cannot formally be present in a habit. Therefore, contrary to St. Thomas's position. The antecedent is proven: When two forms or quasi-forms (I am not speaking of physical forms) formally conflict with each other, they cannot in any way be in the same indivisible subject. But the speculative and practical are so related; therefore, etc.

The major is clear by induction: The light of science and the light of faith, certitude and fear with respect to the intellect, the necessary and the free with respect to the will — these can in no way come together because they are forms or quasi-forms that are incompatible.

The minor is proven: The speculative imports the negation of the practical, and the practical of the speculative. For the former does not tend toward work, the latter does; the former rests, the latter is in motion; the former excludes operation, the latter admits it. They are therefore incompatible forms that consequently introduce contradiction: tends, does not tend; is moved, is not moved; is ordered to work, is not ordered — which certainly cannot stand simultaneously. So much so that they can coexist in one habit neither formally (as Vásquez wants) nor eminently (as Cajetan wants in his commentary on I, part 1, question 1, article 4) — just as neither the light of science and the light of faith, nor the other things we adduced, can be present in a simple habit either formally or eminently.

This argument holds regardless of the question whether they are essential differences of science or not.

I did except physical accidental forms — for instance, cold and heat — because these do not conflict in the extreme; they only positively exclude each other and are present in a material subject that is merely receptive. And therefore they naturally come together in a third thing in remitted degrees. Those metaphysical forms are different: they function like properties and have their unalterable being and import contradictory negations. Certainly, moved by this reasoning, Gregory (question 5 of the Prologue, article 3) said: "It is impossible for the same cognition and knowledge to be practical and speculative." The same should be said, in its own way, of a habit that inclines to such an act, is generated from an act, and follows its nature.

This is confirmed by an apt example. The same knowledge cannot be simultaneously intuitive and abstractive, however these accounts relate to science; therefore it likewise cannot be simultaneously speculative and practical. The antecedent is clear: it would be both clear and unclear, through proper species and not through proper species, of a present thing and a not-present thing. The consequence likewise holds for the speculative and practical — and although the account of the intuitive and abstractive may seem deeper than that of the speculative and practical, the argument holds because it preserves a similar account of contradiction following from the positing of incompatible forms. Just as the intuitive and abstractive cannot coalesce into one third thing — that is, an eminent one — so neither can the speculative and practical.

Hence that subtle construction of Cajetan collapses — the opinion that they are eminently contained in the science — which Vásquez disapproves (disputation 9, chapter 2) but does not actually attack. We will do so accurately, because that construction was erected with great effort by Cajetan and received with wonderful assent and applause from the Thomists, and Javellus approves and commends it.

Cajetan says that many things are united in higher faculties that are incompatible in lower ones — as sight, hearing, and the other senses, diverse in themselves, are united in the common sense. Similarly, the accounts of speculative and practical, which in our lower and finite science are distinguished, are united in the higher, infinite divine science, in which they do not conflict because they are not differences or properties of it, but only of finite science in which they conflict. Therefore, just as the diverse sensations of the senses come together in the common sense and are present in it eminently, so the accounts of speculative and practical — diverse in finite science — are eminently contained in infinite science.

But this subtlety of Cajetan is refuted as follows. The principle he takes — that unity exists in the potencies or faculties that are the subjects and principles of forms, but not in those forms that are born from them and are subjected in them (such as habits and acts of intellect and will) — does not apply to the latter. For these are not capable of that eminent containment, since they are already

constituted in a determinate species and form, and having gone forth from those potencies and faculties, they consist in their own accounts.

Therefore the intellect is a potency capable of both accounts — speculative and practical, intuitive and abstractive, free and necessary. These accounts do not conflict within the potencies themselves, since there they are in potency, not in act. And this is clear from the example Cajetan adduces — namely, the common sense. For this contains in itself eminently the other senses, which are not in it actually and formally but potentially.

The situation is different with habits and acts that have been produced by the potencies and actually exist outside the bosom of the potency, having their own life and determinate account. Such is any habitual science, which is not a potency but presupposes it, is subjected in it, and obtains actual existence. This science therefore cannot contain eminently those diverse accounts but must contain one or the other formally.

Hence the account of infinite science, insofar as it emanates from the intellect, is something actual, certain, determinate, and therefore not indifferent to diverse accounts. The intellect that preceded it contained those accounts. Therefore science — even infinite science — must be either intuitive or abstractive, speculative or practical, and must accommodate itself to its objects and media for tending toward them.

Therefore the example fails, because science is not something higher that embraces those quasi-incompatible differences or quasi-differences or properties of the speculative and practical. And in this way that subtle construction of Cajetan is demolished — which Vásquez disapproved but did not attack. Scotus's position remains safe and fortified — denying that simultaneity of practical and speculative, whether formally or eminently — because those accounts are diverse among themselves and impossible on account of the assigned incompatibility of diverse object and diverse end.

There remains only a doubt about Scotus's mind: whether he teaches that the speculative and practical are essential differences or properties. And how his texts cited above in this question (n. 7, where he denies they are essential differences, and n. 44, where he calls them accidental, and again in the same number affirms they are essential differences of habits and acts) are to be understood. Lychetus denies that they are essential to habits and acts, but holds them to be properties necessarily following the essence of habits.

For my part, I think Scotus held that with respect to the intellect, as it is a potency and faculty, they are not essential differences but accidental ones, because they are accidental to the intellect, which abstracts from them — in the manner of a genus, which does not include in its generic account the specific differences, but only receives them as adventitious and sends them to the species, which it constitutes through them by contraction. But with respect to

the habits and acts that the intellect elicits, they are essential differences, because those acts of knowing are determinate and certain — and therefore either speculative or practical. For they are not indifferent and neutral, or composed of both. And since habits are generated from these acts, they will be of the same account as the acts — and therefore either speculative or practical.

Indeed, I persuade myself of this on account of Scotus's principal reason, who denies them to be essential differences of the intellect because the intellect is absolute and those accounts of practical and speculative are relative — which reasoning does not apply to the habit and act of science, which are referred to the object and end, and hence are capable of those differences.

This is the interpretation of Scotus's mind, which contains a doctrine similar to what we taught against Cajetan.

At the conclusion, it is worth marveling that two distinguished theologians of their age, Suárez and Vásquez, had a less than clear understanding of Scotus's mind in this difference and twisted it to foreign senses. For both deny, in conformity, that Scotus admitted any practical science of God concerning creatures. Suárez does so in book 3 of *On the Divine Attributes*, chapter 4, n. 6; Vásquez in disputation 69, chapters 1 and 2, on I, part 1 of St. Thomas — which is entirely foreign to Scotus's mind, as we said above in question 4. Again, neither understood Scotus speaking of the science of makeable things in distinction 38 (question unica). For there Scotus, in accordance with what he had taught in question 4 of the Prologue from nn. 37 to 43, denies it to be practical. They both think he is speaking of the science antecedent to the future existence of things, rather than of the other science of vision posterior to the decree — confusing the necessary science with the free one and attacking Scotus as if he denied the necessary science to be practical. But Scotus there manifestly speaks of the free science of vision, posterior to the decree of the will, which he said is speculative, not practical — which is most true, because it presupposes the decree of the will, which it cannot direct and regulate since it follows rather than precedes it, and accordingly is carried into the speculation of those things in that future state after the decree. And indeed, enough of these matters.

COLLATION III, DIFFERENCE I

On the Formal Distinction of the Divine Essence, Relations, and Attributes

I first observe that some theologians, already in the time of Gregory of Rimini, thought Scotus introduced no distinction from the nature of the thing that was formal, but only one through reason — and in that sense they interpret him, preferring to think they are dealing kindly with Scotus. So Gregory of Rimini reports (*Sentences*, book 1, distinction 8, question 1, article 5). They gathered Scotus's mind from the text in book 1, distinction 1, question 7, section "I

respond, it is not properly real" (n. 43, at the end): "In another way it can be called a virtual difference, because that which has such a distinction does not have in itself thing and thing, but is one thing having virtually or eminently, as it were, two realities." These words seem to introduce a distinction of reason, which is otherwise commonly called virtual.

For this reason Suárez (I, part 1, book 1, On the Essence of God, chapter 10, n. 2) says: "The sense of Scotus is uncertain; his words can be drawn to a better sense" — as if the better sense were to deny the formal distinction. Vásquez likewise wishes to free Scotus from that sense, if the Scotist school would permit. In this, as it seemed to him, he agrees in purpose with Suárez; but he differs from him in holding that Scotus cannot be so interpreted, and concedes to Gregory that Scotus posited a formal distinction from the nature of the thing.

I consider it necessary to show that Scotus is the author of this formal distinction from the nature of the thing, prior to the intellect, and that the Scotists are right not to allow their master to be understood otherwise.

In book 1, distinction 2, question 7, section "But there remains" (n. 41): "But there remains a further difficulty: for it does not seem intelligible that the essence is not multiplied and that the supposits are many, unless some distinction is posited between the account of the essence and the account of the supposit. And therefore, to preserve the aforesaid impossibility of joint assertion, it is necessary to see about that distinction." Then: "And I say, without assertion and without prejudice to a better opinion, that the account by which formally the supposit is incommunicable and the account of the essence as essence have some distinction preceding every act of created and uncreated intellect."

What could be more manifest? The same is clear from the proof up to n. 48, where he again says: "Second, it is necessary to see what kind of distinction this is, which is posited as preceding every act of the intellect." Then in the section "From these it is concluded": "Some distinction prior to the act of the intellect is concluded." Next: "But is this distinction to be called real? I respond: it is not properly real in actuality — understanding 'real in actuality' as is commonly said, namely the distinction of things that is actual — because in one person there is no distinction of things, on account of divine simplicity. And just as it is not real in actuality, so it is not real in potentiality, because nothing there is in potency that is not in act."

"But it can be called a distinction of reason, as a certain Doctor says — not meaning 'reason' as a difference formed by the intellect, but taking 'reason' as the quiddity of the thing insofar as the quiddity is the subject of the intellect. Or in another way it can be called a virtual distinction, because that which has such a distinction does not have in itself thing and thing, but is one thing having virtually or eminently, as it were, two realities — because to each reality, as it is in that thing, there belongs its own proper attribute, which belongs to such a

reality as if it were a distinct thing. For thus this reality distinguishes, and that one does not distinguish, just as if one were a distinct thing from the other."

Then: "Is any distinction therefore permissible? Briefly I say, setting aside those words about distinction of reason and virtual distinction: I say that in the divine essence, prior to the act of the intellect, there is entity A and it is not entity B, and this one is not formally that one — so that the paternal intellect, considering A and considering B, has from the nature of the thing the ground for this composition to be true: 'A is not formally B' — not precisely from some act of the intellect."

There is the formal distinction inhering in the thing, even with respect to the divine intellect. Finally, in the same text below: "There is therefore non-identity of the relation to the absolute in the divine." And after a few words: "One of them is not of the formal account of the other, but outside it, and consequently is not formally identical to the other." He adds: "And yet from this it does not follow that there is simply diversity or real non-identity."

To this text of Scotus I add another from *Quodlibet* 5, section "Concerning, however." After reporting the opinion of St. Thomas and Henry affirming that Spiration and Paternity differ only by reason, and that this suffices for one not to be predicated of the other, he says: "Another says — namely Varro — more reasonably, it seems, and to the point, that the properties in the same person differ from the nature of the thing, beyond the consideration of the intellect, because for this it suffices that there be disparity, even if they are not opposed. And on this account the predication of one about the other in the abstract is not true."

What is there to doubt? The entire question 4 of distinction 8 in book 1 of the *Sentences* is full of this kind of doctrine about the formal distinction of the attributes among themselves and from the divine essence. Let whoever wishes read it. Indeed, the very beginning of the question contains it: "Fourth, I ask: whether some distinction of essential perfections can stand together with the simplicity of God?" To remove all doubt, let one read the sections "To the question I respond" and "This does not seem" and "But this non-identity" and the responses to the arguments beginning from the section "I respond: The body is animated."

I add the interpretations of Lychetus and other Scotists, and the common understanding of the schools.

I have said these things more fully lest anyone, because of the authority of Suárez (which is great) saying in the cited chapter 10 that the sense of Scotus is uncertain, should doubt it. Now to St. Thomas. He denies that the relation is distinguished from the essence from the nature of the thing, but affirms they are distinguished only through the intellect, in these words (I, part 1, question 28, article 2, end of the body): "It is manifest that the relation really existing in God

is the same as the essence according to the thing and does not differ except according to the account of understanding — insofar as in the relation there is implied a respect to its opposite, which is not implied in the name of the essence. It is therefore clear that in God the being of the relation and the being of the essence are not different, but one and the same." And in the same question and article, response to the second: "It does not follow that in God, beyond the relation, there is something else according to the thing, but only considering the account of the names." And again at question 39, article 1, body: "I respond that for those considering the divine simplicity, this question has a manifest truth. For it has been shown above that the divine simplicity requires that in God the essence and the supposit are the same — which in intellectual substances is nothing other than the person." And he continues with a long passage establishing that in God essence and person do not differ in reality but only in account.

So St. Thomas on the formal distinction between essence and relations, which he denies. On the other distinction between essence and attributes he treats specifically in *De Veritate*, question 7, article 6, and *Opusculum* 9, questions 1, 2, and 3, and in the *Sentences*, book 1, distinction 2, question 1, article 2, and I, part 1, question 13, articles 3 and 6 — where he affirms that the attributes in God are the same as the essence and differ only by reason.

I bring express passages from the *Sentences*, book 1, distinction 2, question 1. One is from article 2, body: "It must be said that in God there is wisdom, goodness, and the like, each of which is the divine essence itself, and thus all are one thing in reality. And because each of them is in God according to its truest account, and the account of wisdom is not the account of goodness as such, it remains that they are diverse in account." And immediately in response to the first: "It must be said that the plurality of attributes in no way prejudices the supreme unity, because those things that in others are many are in God one; and there remains only a plurality according to account, which does not oppose the supreme unity in reality."

Furthermore, article 3 of the same question: "I respond that it must be said that, as was said above, wisdom, goodness, and all such things are entirely one in reality in God, but they differ in account."

St. Thomas is cited at this point, beyond the Dominican Thomists, by Vásquez (I, part 1, disputation 16, chapter 4) and Suárez (I, part 1, book 1, *On the Essence of God*, chapter 12). There is also a singular passage at I, part 1, question 3, article 3, where St. Thomas says in the body: "It must be that God is his own deity, his own life, and whatever else is so predicated of God." And in response to the first: "What is called deity, or life, or anything of this kind as being in God is to be referred to the diversity that is in the reception of our intellect, and not to any diversity of the thing."

All of the doctrine in that question, where the simplicity of God is asserted and composition removed, is relevant here. So too is what he teaches in question 13 on the divine names, especially articles 4 and 5. St. Thomas's interpreters and commentators — both domestic and external, Vázquez and Suárez, whom I have just cited, and the Salamancans in the passages of St. Thomas cited above, especially on the first part — understand him in this way.

After the passages and opinions of these Doctors, their arguments must be examined. No one proposes them better than the authors and leaders of their schools. Nearly all of St. Thomas's arguments are drawn from God's simplicity and reduced to it. Nearly all of Scotus's are taken from the multiplicity of predicates that are said of God — not really but formally. They agree that God is most simple in reality and act. They differ in that Scotus wants those multiple predicates, really the same, to be formally — in their formal account — diverse prior to the operation of the intellect. St. Thomas does not want those predicates to be distinguished from the nature of the thing formally, but only through reason — not reasoning reason without foundation, but what they call reasoned reason, which has a foundation in the thing.

St. Thomas found it difficult to admit the diversity of predicates because of God's supreme simplicity. Scotus found it harsh to exclude the diverse formalities in the interest of maintaining the truth of those predicates. He saw in Sacred Scripture that God is called just, merciful, and powerful in the manner of adjectives, as though attributes were added to God posed as a substantive — like properties placed in the possessive case, being "of God" and "in God," not standing on their own in the nominative. For one frequently says "the science of God," "the mercy of God," "the justice of God" — but not "science is God," "mercy is God," "justice is God," except rarely, to show that those predicates belong to God but are not formally God.

As for the relations, he found them expressly distinct — among themselves really, and from the essence formally — because the essence was the principle and ground of agreement while the relations were the ground of difference. According to the relations it was said: "In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," and "The Father is greater than I," and "The Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name," and "Whom I will send to you from the Father" — which pertain to diversity. According to the nature and essence it was said: "I and the Father are one," "Whoever sees me sees the Father also," "All things have been delivered to me by my Father," "I am in the Father and the Father is in me" — which certainly contained undivided unity in the nature and divided Trinity in the persons. This diversity, which could not arise from one essence (to which it was repugnant), just as unity could not arise from the persons, could not be maintained without a formal distinction of this kind.

He thought it could scarcely be possible to sustain these diverse predications, to proceed so that what Athanasius said would be true: "Neither confounding the

persons nor separating the substance" — preserving the unity of nature and removing the confusion of persons.

To this he called many excellent statements of the Fathers, especially of St. Augustine, which he adduces in question 8, distinction 8 of book 1 of the Sentences. And he brought forward Augustine's dictum (On the Trinity, book 5, chapter 9, and book 7, chapter 4): "Aliud est esse Deum, aliud esse Patrem" — "It is one thing to be God, another to be Father." And (book 7, chapter 2): "Verbum non est eo verbum, quo Sapientia" — "The Word is not Word by that by which it is Wisdom." Where that word "aliud" — "another thing" — carries with it diversity from the nature of the thing.

Furthermore, he noted remarkable propositions about God within the same supreme simplicity, which seem incapable of being reconciled without a formal distinction. For example: "The essence does not generate" is a negation that is most true, while "God generates" is true and "God does not generate" is false. Again, "The essence is communicated" is true, but "The essence is generated" is false. "The essence is undistinguished" is true; "The person is distinct" is true. The contradictories of these are false.

Furthermore: "The Father generates" is true; "Paternity generates" is false — even according to St. Thomas (I, part 1, question 32, article 2, response to 2). "Deity is nascible" is condemned by the First Council of Toledo; "The Son is nascible" is approved. "God is three persons" is accepted; "The Father is three persons" is rejected. "The Father is God" is conceded; "The Father, precisely as Father, is God" is denied — according to Augustine (On the Trinity, book 7, chapter 2).

Finally, the attributes are not of the concept of the essence, nor is one of the concept of another — so that formally or essentially they are mutually predicated of each other — which even the Thomists affirm: Capreolus (Sentences, book 1, distinction 8, question 14, article 3, with others), Gregory of Rimini (Sentences, book 1, distinction 8, question 2, article 2), and Vásquez shows (I, part 1, disputation 119, chapter 2). From this it is manifestly deduced that there is a formal distinction from the nature of the thing between the essence, the attributes, and the relations. For otherwise the truth of these propositions does not seem capable of being preserved.

Therefore Scotus, most devoted to the truth, in order to preserve it, admitted that distinction — which was the cause of his position.

Section II

Scotus's Formal Distinction Is Confirmed by Three Original Arguments of the Author

I do not here set out Scotus's arguments, because they can be seen in his works — and they are indeed many and solid. Nor do I presume so much as to hope I

can add anything to them. But from what he devised and brought forward, I have formulated three arguments that move me most and introduce a certain appearance of novelty for the reader.

The first argument. Whenever in an object there are distinct accounts that the intellect, apprehending them, forms entirely diverse — indeed, even opposed — apprehensive concepts, without any discourse or reasoning about them, then those accounts are in themselves formally, from the nature of the thing, distinct. But the attributive and relative accounts in God, the object, are so related. Therefore they are by nature and formally distinct.

The argument concludes in *Darii*; it must be proven in its major and minor. The major is persuaded as follows: Apprehensive concepts presuppose the object and fall upon it naturally, and insofar as they are naturally representative without any affected work of discourse or reasoning, they cannot imagine anything in the object that is not in it. They only conform themselves to it, as they find it, and take their representation from it. Therefore, the representation that results in them proceeds immediately and adequately from the object left to its own nature.

This is confirmed because simple apprehension is a necessary and natural image of the thing it apprehends — similar to an eye, which can see nothing in an object that is not in it, seeing it in the way it is, through a simple and natural intuition, without any art and affectation.

The minor is clear because it is contained in the greater universal, of which it is a particular. The consequence is in form.

Let God show to an unlearned, ignorant, and naive person two things to be known: the essence as absolute through one natural concept, and paternity as relative through another. These two apprehensive concepts will exhibit entirely diverse — indeed, opposed — representations from the force of the objects that are by their nature thus distinguished. But those two concepts are formally diverse and opposed, and are natural images of the objects. Therefore the objects are also formally diverse in themselves.

Convinced by this syllogism from my boyhood, when I was studying philosophy at Coimbra, against the common opinion of the masters teaching there — which Suárez, whom I knew personally, commended by his authority — I embraced Scotus's position. And indeed for me this argument is a demonstration.

The second argument. In this distinction there are various and diverse grades of inequality, so that those objective accounts are more and less distinguished. These grades cannot come from cognition, nor from the material object or foundation, which is God according to his real being. Therefore they come from diverse formal accounts inhering in the object; and from these arise the diverse grades of greater and lesser distinction.

The major is clear from comparison: for the relations are more distinguished from the essence than the attributes are among themselves and from the essence. For the latter agree in the absolute; the former differ by their whole being, since they are toward another and have nothing in common with the absolute. Hence many authors who do not follow Scotus in the opinion of a distinction between essence and attributes do adhere to him in the opinion of a distinction between essence and relations — such as Gabriel (Sentences, book 1, distinction 2, question 1, article 1, notes 3 and 4, and article 3, doubt 3), Ockham (question 1), Marsilius (I, part 1, question 6, article 2, conclusion 4), and Durandus (Sentences, book 1, distinction 33, question 1). Nor do the Thomists deny these grades of greater and lesser distinction. For Vásquez says of them (disputation 121, chapter 5, beginning): "All the Thomists acknowledge that the relations differ more from the essence through the intellect — and the essence from the attributes — than the relation differs from the person."

From this the proof of the minor is deduced: the mode of knowing cannot be the mode of distinguishing, since it presupposes the objects and does not distinguish them. And moreover, if it did distinguish them, it would distinguish them in the same way. But the foundation is God himself in himself, in whom there is no distinction, since he is one and the same most simple thing. Therefore the distinction must be taken from some intermediary between the divine thing and cognition — and this can only be a formality inhering in the thing. Therefore from it the unequal distinction — greater or lesser — is taken, according to the quality of the formalities.

Vásquez himself was compelled to acknowledge this in disputation 121, chapter 5, n. 18, where he says: "It should be noted that although every distinction has its foundation in our mode of understanding and in the things whose distinction we conceive, but not in the thing itself that we distinguish, nevertheless one distinction of reason can be greater than another, and sometimes of such a nature that it prevents one from being predicated of another. For some things differ in the manner of diverse forms, of which one is not included in the other as the common is in the particular; and this is the distinction than which none can be greater. And it is the distinction between the attributes among themselves, between the essence and the attributes, and between the essence and the relation."

What is this other than to be distinguished formally from the nature of the thing? The opinion of so great an author comes to the same result. Therefore the second argument convinces.

The third argument is in a way a retorsion *ad hominem*, and in my judgment is forceful. This Thomistic distinction of reason is not taken from cognition precisely, but with a foundation in the thing. But this very foundation in itself is nothing other than those forms or quasi-forms that inhere in the foundation.

Therefore this is itself Scotus's formal distinction, from which the Thomists do not differ.

The major is conceded to us by the opponents. The minor is proved as follows. That foundation in the thing is not our cognition coming to the foundation; it is not the reality of the object, which is entirely one and simple and does not furnish the foundation for distinction. Therefore it is something between reality and cognition, toward which cognition is immediately directed — something distinct from reality that grounds the distinction in cognition.

This is confirmed because that cognition presupposes its object and represents it as it finds it; but it represents it as distinct; therefore it finds it distinct — not in the thing, therefore in something else inhering in the thing.

Then the minor follows: This cannot be anything other than something after the manner of a form, as it were inhering, toward which that cognition is immediately directed. Therefore it is the foundation of distinction in cognition. By this argument the Thomistic opinion collapses and coincides with the Scotist position. For what the latter calls a distinguishing form, the former calls a distinguishing foundation — placing it on the side of the object. Since the foundation cannot ground the distinction in reality, it must ground it in another being intermediate between reality and cognition, which can only be something inhering in the reality after the manner of a form.

Indeed, when I consider this mode of distinguishing with a foundation in the thing, I see it cannot be other than the formal distinction, and the authors who propose it differ only in name, not in substance. They agree with us in reality but disagree in terminology. And I observed this in the Angelic Doctor himself in the Sentences (book 1, distinction 2, question 1, article 2, body), where, speaking of the attributes, he says: "It is necessary that all the nobilities of all creatures be found in God in the most noble mode and without any imperfection. And therefore those things that in creatures are diverse, in God, because of his supreme simplicity, are one. Thus it must be said that in God there is wisdom, goodness, and the like, each of which is the divine essence itself, and thus all are one in reality. And because each of them is in God according to its truest account, and the account of wisdom is not that of goodness as such, it remains that they are diverse in account — not only on the part of the one reasoning, but from the property of the thing itself."

There it is — the property of the thing, and the property in the thing, and as many properties as there are attributes. There is the distinction of cognition founded in those properties, which are in God according to their truest account, whose account in one is not in another, because the account of wisdom is not that of goodness as such. Therefore diverse modes — and what are these diverse modes other than those diverse quasi-forms that Scotus posits in the attributes?

Again, the same Angelic Doctor (same distinction and question, article 3) removes from God only the real distinction such as belongs to the divine persons, and expressly in response to the sixth objection says: "Concerning another kind of distinction, he does not labor much" — and says in the response that the accounts of the attributes are founded in the divine essence as regards the firmness of their truth. And he says this does not conflict with the divine simplicity. St. Thomas would not have said this unless those attributes in themselves, and in themselves from the nature of the thing, were foundations of distinction, and consequently sufficiently distinguished among themselves to ground the distinction in cognition. Hence again in the body at the beginning he said: they differ "not only on the part of the one reasoning but from the property of the thing itself" — which words sound like the Scotist distinction from the nature of the thing. For "from the property of the thing" and "from the nature of the thing" are, I think, the same.

Furthermore, there is a passage at I, part 1, question 28, article 2, that supports our position. For there St. Thomas, treating the distinction of the relation from the essence, says that the relation, as it exists in God according to its being of "in" (esse In), is one and the same with the essence; but according to its respective being toward another opposite, which is the being of "toward" (esse Ad), it is distinguished according to the account of understanding. But he expresses this account of understanding as follows: "The relation really existing in God has the being of the divine essence, entirely identical with it. But in that it is said toward another, it does not signify any relation to the essence, but rather to its opposite." Hence it follows that they are not entirely the same — therefore in some way diverse: "Because in the relation there is implied a respect to its opposite, which is not implied in the name of the essence."

What could be clearer? Therefore the distinction he calls one of reason he makes into a distinction from the nature of the thing.

He said this even more clearly in the Sentences (book 1, distinction 33, question 1, article 1, response to 1): "The account of Paternity, by which it is referred to another, is different, and the account of essence is different." And in response to 2: "Paternity has something in which it is not united with the essence — namely, the account of Paternity, which is other than the account of the essence." And in response to 3: "When it is said that the account is other and other for Paternity and essence in the divine, 'account' is not taken according to what is only in the one reasoning." And then: "The account which we say is other and other in the divine is not in a thing, but in the thing something corresponds to it in which it is founded — namely, the truth of that thing to which such an intention is attributed."

There is the foundation of distinction from the nature of the thing, in which cognition is founded — another and other account found between essence and relation.

I add a third passage of St. Thomas (I, part 1, question 32, article 2), where, treating of the notions, he says: "It was necessary to have certain abstract names by which it could be answered that the persons are distinguished. Therefore the essence is signified in the divine as what, the person as who, and the property as by which." Then: "One person is found to be referred in the divine to two persons — namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." And below: "In the Father there must be a real relation by which he is referred to the Son and to the Holy Spirit."

Let us come to article 3 and see how those two relations in the Father — to the Son and to the Holy Spirit — are distinguished: "It must be said that since only relative opposition makes a real plurality in the divine, several properties of one person, since they are not relatively opposed to each other, do not differ really. Nor, however, are they predicated of each other, because they are signified as diverse accounts of the persons."

Here we have the notions called properties, and they are predicated as "by which" in a mode diverse from the essence and persons. Furthermore, they are predicated and signified as diverse accounts of the persons — which is the same as saying they are predicated and distinguished in the manner of properties and forms, and hence are formally distinguished.

Cajetan acknowledged this here in his commentary on article 2, section "To the first doubt": "Since the person of the Father has two relations, such that each one claims for itself its own proper attributes, as if they were actually two distinct things in reality, therefore it is necessary to posit the two relations in the abstract as two notions of the Father. Otherwise one could not answer someone asking by what the Father is Father and by what he is Spirator, since it is established that as Father he is related to the Son, and as Spirator to the Holy Spirit. But for the proposed purpose it would suffice to affirm that they are distinguished formally."

Cajetan has given me what I would not have dared to ask from him. Let the reader not doubt, nor think these words are invented by me. They are Cajetan's; let him read and he will find them. Why then the quarrel with Scotus? They agree. What Scotus said — "they are distinguished formally" — Cajetan likewise says: "they are distinguished formally."

I add another passage of St. Thomas adduced by Javellus in his commentary on I, part 1 of St. Thomas, question 28, article 2. There Javellus says: "Scotus's distinction in the second sense we concede, and St. Thomas calls it in the Sentences, book 1, distinction 3, a distinction of reason from the nature of the thing, which is reasonable." Certainly this mode of speaking seems to contain Scotus's meaning. For what is a "distinction of reason from the nature of the thing" if not one founded in the nature of the thing? Especially since Javellus says in his commentary on question 4, article 2, of the *Secunda Secundae*,

section "As for the first point": "They are distinguished by reason, not only on the part of the intellect, but on the part of the thing."

Therefore these two noble interpreters of St. Thomas speak and think almost like Scotus. Let us add to them Vásquez, whose words we adduced in the preceding section, and Father Aegidius, the Portuguese, (book 2 of *On the Attributes*, treatise 6, chapter 10, n. 4), who says: "The fundamental distinction of the divine perfections belongs per se and primarily to the divine essence, without an ordering to creatures. This is taught by St. Thomas (*Sentences*, book 1, distinction 22, question unica, article 3, response to 3), where, speaking of goodness, wisdom, and the others, he says: 'And the diversity of these is not taken according to an ordering to creatures; indeed, the reverse, because from the fact that the account of goodness and wisdom differs in God, in creatures goodness and wisdom are diversified — not only in account but in reality.'" That word "in account," as appears from St. Thomas's passages, signifies a distinction from the nature of the thing, meant here to be opposed to the real distinction in creatures. Hence it follows that it is not merely one of reason but one of real formality.

Again, the same Aegidius (n. 7): "The fundamental distinction is a certain property of the divine perfections, founded in the plenitude of the divine being itself, and of its own nature prior to the notional account."

Aegidius fears to say "formal," and therefore calls it "fundamental." But under that name the formal distinction lies hidden, and it reveals itself by its effect. Let us hear an excellent Portuguese author, more ancient than Aegidius, from the same Society of Jesus — Fonseca (*Metaphysics*, book 5, chapter 6, question 7, section 3). Let us accept his judgment: "Because Scotus, consulting clarity, began to call the distinction that the intellect alone makes a distinction of reason — against Scotus certain more recent Thomists, as though settling this controversy, began to explain the distinction of reason in such a way that they thought the one that is made by the operation of reasoning reason alone should be called a distinction of reason; while the one that arises from the very condition of things should be called a distinction of reasoned reason, as though to say 'confirmed by the nature of things' — which Scotus himself had called a distinction from the nature of the thing. By this means, therefore, the two-membered division of the ancients can be retained, even though the superior division that Scotus makes into three members is more illustrious and more adapted to use."

Fonseca — a great man and master of Molina — judged correctly that there is no difference between Scotus's distinction from the nature of the thing and St. Thomas's distinction of reasoned reason, except in name. And indeed Scotus speaks better than the Thomists, who call it a distinction of reason — thereby confusing it with the other distinction of reasoning reason, when they wish to distinguish them. They ought rather to have called it "from the nature of the thing," since it induced in the object accounts that were distinct on the side of

the thing and that distinguished the reasoning. For what else is a reasoned distinction other than a distinction through the object, not distinguishing the object?

And if the Thomists reject Fonseca's judgment on the ground that he is not one of theirs and in this matter follows Scotus, admitting the formal distinction, I object with one sharp and fierce Thomist whom I cited shortly before — Javellus (Metaphysics, book 12, question 19, section "I say to the second"), who says: "I say that this distinction of reasoned reason is called a distinction of reason on the part of the thing, which the Scotists seem to call a distinction from the nature of the thing." From this it is clear that Fonseca's judgment is Thomistic, not alien, and our — the Scotists' — own; and our third argument persuades what it assumed.

I add another adoptive and noble Thomist: Gabriel of St. Vincent, a Discalced Carmelite, who in disputation 35 on the first part, doubt 3, pressed by certain arguments of mine (in which I prove in my Schools of Positive Theology that the Holy Spirit, even if he did not proceed from the Son, would nevertheless be distinguished from him), willingly or unwillingly admitted a formal and most formal distinction in the divine. For in his response to my fourth argument: "I respond by distinguishing the consequent. It follows that the Holy Spirit, by virtue of his procession alone (for from there I had taken the argument), is not opposed to the Son really — conceded; is not opposed formally and virtually — denied." Good. Gabriel gives me a formal virtual distinction. What that mixture is, I do not care; I accept the formal element found in that mixture.

I add another passage from that disputation, n. 66, where Gabriel, to whom I had referred my argument, says: "Those two processions do not have most formally the same properties, but really and identically they do." Therefore, if they are not the same most formally, they are most formally diverse. But if they are most formally diverse, they are formally diverse, since the superlative contains the positive. Nor is this a quibble arising from negation, for his affirmation — "only really and identically are they the same" — signifies that in other ways they are not the same. One of these ways is formally. Therefore formally they are not the same. If they are not the same formally, then they are distinguished formally. And Gabriel is ours — a Scotist made from a Thomist, as will appear later when I respond to him from his own premises.

Section III

Scotus's Distinction Is Asserted to Be Safe and Sound

I cannot deny that some theologians, both ancient and modern, have gravely criticized and censured this Scotist distinction. Adam (Sentences, book 1, distinction 6, question 1, conclusion 3) seems to have been the original author of the harsher censure against the pure conception of the Scotist mind, saying there: "The saints cry out against it." Adam did not hear or understand the saints

well; perhaps he heard the serpent. Bacchonus (Sentences, book 1, distinction 2, question 2, article 3, beginning) says: "Scotus's opinion is against the saints." But Bacchonus is accustomed to raging violently against Scotus. Marsilius (Sentences, book 1, distinction 12, conclusion 3) says: "The saints commonly teach against Scotus." Marsilius seems to be withering here — more a Massylus than a Marsilius. Molina (I, part 1, question 28, article 2, argument 1) pronounced it not sufficiently safe; but Molina in his Mill does not always grind wheat, and sometimes produces misshapen millstones. Zumel (I, part 1, question 4, article 2, question 3 of his own) judged that it does not sufficiently accord with the faith; but Zumel was then thinking of a chimney. I am grieved that Vásquez, an author I love and esteem, takes on Scotus more harshly than was appropriate, and contends with great force (for he is vehement) to show that Scotus fell into the error of Gualterus and Gilbert. More gently, Vásquez — otherwise a vessel of erudition, but here not a vessel of election.

Let us see Vásquez's foundations, as so great a theologian, in disputation 116, chapter 2 of I, part 1. He presents the error of Gualterus through Niphus, asserting a real distinction of the attributes among themselves and from the divine essence, and there he reports that some think Gilbert Porretanus held the same error, though he frees Gilbert while condemning Gualterus. About Scotus, in chapter 3, he holds that between the error of Gualterus and the common opinion of theologians, Scotus devised a certain middle opinion about a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, which he frees from the charge of Gualterus's error. But in chapter 5 he insinuates that it does not entirely exclude composition and therefore savors of Gualterus on this score. He adjoins the error of Gilbert and reports that Scotus participates in it. And the arguments that St. Bernard brought against Gilbert, he says, militate against Scotus — and does not allow Scotus to be excused in any way. Again in disputation 120, he resumes the same matter, and with his immense erudition narrates the errors and refutations of Gilbert in chapter 1, and brings his condemnation at the Council of Rheims in chapter 2, and attacks Durandus. In chapter 4 of this disputation 120, he confuses Scotus's position with Gilbert's and refutes it with the texts of the Council of Rheims and the Council of Florence and the arguments of St. Bernard, and entirely insists that Gilbert and Scotus were involved in the same error. He also involves Durandus in it, and produces the Lateran Council against him, and obliquely strikes Scotus with that weapon — which he does not release throughout the rest of the disputation, which contains six chapters.

With Vásquez wanted to agree his faithful Achates, Alarcon (treatise 5, disputation 2, chapter 6), Recupitus (book 3 of On the Attributes, question 4, chapter 2), and not far distant are Arrubal (disputation 100, chapter 2) and Ruiz (disputation 11, section 3).

Let us free Scotus from Vásquez's censure and show his position — which we wish to be ours — to be safe and sound. First, let us argue from the authority of those who teach, against Vásquez, that Gilbert's error was very different from Scotus's opinion. Gilbert posited a proper real distinction of thing from thing, not Scotus's formal one from the nature of the thing. This is taught by Alexander of Hales (*Summa*, part 1, question 68, member 5, article 3), Henry (Quodlibet 5, question 7), Bonaventure (*Sentences*, book 1, distinction 33, question 1), Richard (article 1, question 2), and St. Thomas (I, part 1, question 28, article 3, and question 39, article 6, where he says that Gilbert posited relations as attached and assisting the essence, not intimate and immanent), and Prateolus (under the entry "Gilbert"). So Suárez judges — Vásquez's just adversary — in the *Summa* (I, part 1, book 4 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 2), and the *Salamancans* (treatise 6, disputation 5, doubt 1 of *On the Trinity*), and *Granados* (tome 3 on I, part 1, treatise 3, disputation 3, section 1).

I prove this same point evidently against Vásquez from the acts of the Council of Rheims, which he himself adduced. The dogmas of Gilbert, reported in disputation 120, chapter 2, are as follows.

First: That the divine nature, which is called divinity, is not God, but the form by which God is — just as humanity is not man but the form by which man is.

Second: That when Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are said to be one, they are understood to be one only by one divinity — and the converse cannot hold, so that one God, or one substance, or one something, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit might be said to be.

Third: That the three persons are three by three unities, and distinct by three properties that are not the persons themselves but are three eternal things, differing in number from each other and from the divine substance.

Fourth: That the divine nature was not incarnated.

The third one contains the nub of the matter. Gilbert manifestly posits three eternal things differing in number from the divine substance. Numerical distinction is that of individual from individual, and is real. Therefore it is not formal.

This is confirmed from the second error, which held that the three persons cannot be said to be one thing — because they really differed from the essence, which was another thing, really different from them, and constituting something else. Does this follow from the formal distinction, which posits entirely one thing? From it follows the opposite of Gilbert's error — namely, that the three persons are one thing with and in the essence.

Therefore St. Thomas rightly said, as cited above, that Gilbert posited the three persons as assisting and attached to the essence, not intimate and immanent. Let Vásquez weigh the words of the creed he adduces in section 3: "We believe and

confess that only God — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — is eternal, and not any other things whatsoever." There it is — "things." Gilbert's error was therefore about thing and real distinction, not about the formal one. The formal distinction, that of Scotus, excluded. Bernard was attacking that distinction, which was of thing from thing and real, not any other — about which at that time no one was speaking. For the first inventor of it was Scotus, as is clear; and therefore the Carthusian (Sentences, book 1, distinction 2, question 2) called it a novelty.

Furthermore, I argue against Vásquez from Anselm's dictum, which he brings in disputation 120, chapter 1, n. 7. In Anselm's time, before Gilbert, a certain cleric hit upon Gilbert's error — conceived and born in this way: "If in God the three persons are only one thing and are not three things, each by itself separately — like three angels or three souls, yet so that in power and will they are entirely the same — then the Father and the Holy Spirit were incarnated along with the Son."

He denies one thing — that is, the essence and deity — and from it wants there to be three distinct things, three persons, lest from the fact that they are one thing it follow that the divine nature in which they are really and actually one — in the Father and Holy Spirit, who are one thing with the Son — was incarnated, and accordingly the Father and Holy Spirit incarnated along with the Son.

Let Vásquez and Recupitus note those words: "ut omnino sint idem" — "so that they are entirely the same." That is, in every way — intentionally, formally, and really. He refused identity in reality by denying every kind of identity and admitting every kind of real distinction. Gilbert spoke in this sense, as is clear from the testimonies cited above. And Vásquez is bound to acknowledge this, since he attributes the same error to Gilbert (disputation 120, chapter 1, n. 7).

Scotus did not hold this. He always said, catholicly, that the three persons are one thing in reality.

And this is the key to the entire defense of Scotus from the calumnies of his opponents: Scotus's distinction does not remove identity with the thing and of the thing — which Gilbert, Gualterus, and that cleric of Anselm removed. Hence those men denied the absolute truths: God is his deity, his mercy, his justice — because they did not acknowledge real identity. And since the denial was of a malignant nature, it removed every mode of excuse. But Scotus conceded all those propositions absolutely, because he admitted real identity, according to which he could not deny that God is his deity, his mercy, his justice. For to deny them, it was necessary to remove every identity — because of the malignant nature of the denial. But when Scotus said "God insofar as he is just is not merciful, and conversely," he limited the negation to the particular and formal sense, which was permissible. Indeed, from the fact that he spoke thus, it followed that in another, absolute sense he conceded — the distinction being well understood: really I deny, formally I concede.

And by this reasoning we neutralize all the arguments Vázquez brings from Bernard and those that Recupitus importunes us with from other sources — with which there is no need to fill pages. Let the Scotist use this distinction as a sword sharp on both sides, and he will cut down whatever objections are thrown at him.

Furthermore, why does Vázquez press us so hard with the authority of Bernard, whom it is established to have composed that confession of faith at the Council of Rheims without consulting the Cardinals present with Pope Eugene III — and to have been reproached for it? This is established from the history of the same Council, and Vázquez himself, from whom nothing erudite is hidden (chapter 2, n. 11 of the same disputation 120), testifies to it. I have read the acts of that Council carefully and do not find any approval of that confession. I do not say this to detract from Bernard's authority, but to observe that his doctrine is not the Council's — with which some wish to frighten us.

For first, it contains nothing against us Scotists, who are far removed from the error of Gilbert, which we detest. Second, even if it did contain something, nothing would be established against us, because the censure was that of a private Doctor, Bernard, not of the Council — which was not universal but particular and was in no way approved by the Supreme Pontiff.

I know that Pope Eugene III condemned the article containing the error about divinity positing it as the form of God — because it was the source of the others and destroyed the very divine nature by separating in it the account of God from deity and introducing subject and form, as though a composite of both. But this error has nothing in common with Scotus's doctrine, which posits no distinction or composition in the essence and nature — which he acknowledges to be entirely one and undivided. It is only between the constituted and perfected essence in its being, and the attributes and relations that come to it as quasi-properties and intrinsic emanations, that he introduced a formal and proper distinction.

The second objection Vázquez raises is the Lateran Council under Innocent III, whose decree is found in the chapter *Damnamus*, on the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith. By it the opinion of Abbot Joachim is condemned, asserting that in God three persons are one not by unity of thing or essence but by collection and multiplicity — so that it would follow that three Gods result from this. But how foreign this error of Joachim is from Scotus's position is clear, because Scotus constitutes one reality and real unity and makes them one and the same in the thing of the essence and nature. He only says that between the thing, which is one in the three — the essence — and entirely absolute, and the relations, which are respective and toward another, there is a formal distinction, with nothing diminished from the real identity in essence and nature.

The third thing Vázquez adduces is the Council of Florence. First he urges the testimony of John the Latin Theologian disputing with Mark, Bishop of Ephesus, the Greek Theologian, who in session 18 said: "The divine substance and the person are indeed the same in reality; but according to the mode of our understanding, they seem to differ." To which Vázquez adds: "Mark, for the Greek Church, agreed before the whole Council."

I could respond with Suárez (book 1 of *On the Trinity*, chapter 2, n. 11): "A certain theologian named John said this, not the Council." But because I know from extensive reading of Councils that this man was the most distinguished theologian of his time, chosen by Pope Eugene to represent the Latins in that Council against the Greeks, I prefer to call him more honorably by name — especially since I see he held the office of Provincial and was addressed by the Fathers themselves with the title of Reverend Father. I acknowledge that this eminent Dominican theologian spoke thus. But would not a Thomist speak so? He followed his own school as a private disputant, in a context where there was no occasion to debate such a scholastic subtlety.

I set forth what is sufficient against Vázquez. John proposed two common distinctions — real and of reason. But in such words as not to have denied the third member of the Scotist distinction. For when he said "according to the mode of our understanding," that mode is capable of Scotus's distinction, which since it is not real, is traced back to the mode of understanding — with a foundation in the thing — which comprehends the formal, according to the Scotist mode of understanding.

Therefore John wanted to understand, by that member of his division, a distinction less than real. Furthermore, he did not say absolutely "they differ" but modestly "they seem to differ" — perhaps looking to Scotus's opinion, which he did not wish to disapprove by that word "seem."

Moreover, he was responding to the mind of the questioning Mark about the distinction and about the agreement in real identity — for the Greek had known no other distinction in his schools. Finally, he said the essence is communicable and the persons incommunicable, and that this happens from the force of the relation — by which words he indicated Scotus's formality, having admitted that force on the part of the relation, that is, from the side of the thing, not from our understanding.

Hence it appears that by his distinction "according to the mode of understanding" he comprehended that distinction from the force of the thing, from the side of the thing, from the side of the relation, from the nature of the relation — and what is this other than from the force of the relative thing?

Now as for what Vázquez adds — that Mark agreed with John's opinion before the whole Council for the Greek Church — this is not entirely true. Indeed, Mark so agreed that he seemed to favor Scotus's position. Let us hear Mark in

that same session: "Just as the divine substance and the persons differ among themselves, it is not necessary in the present context to say, especially since perhaps in these matters we do not at all disagree." He appended "perhaps." And what he himself thought he immediately explained: "It is established that they differ simply, as the common differs from the proper, and just as the human substance seems to differ from its person — as I believe you also think."

I turn this against Vázquez. Mark holds that the person differs from the nature in God just as it does in man. But in man it differs at least as a real mode — so not by reason alone. Hence it follows that in Mark's and the Greeks' opinion it is distinguished in God from the nature of the thing. Not therefore could Mark have agreed with John, who distinguished them by reason alone.

Hence if Vázquez proves his opinion in Mark, he is bound to agree with Scotus and concede a formal distinction in God. For since there cannot be modes in God, there must be posited forms; and accordingly the person will be a quasi-form with respect to the nature and will be formally distinguished from it.

It is remarkable that John did not refute Mark's statement — as if it could be maintained with Scotus.

Therefore the passage that Vázquez objects to us confirms the Scotist distinction and is turned back against him.

I come to the second objection from the same Council. Vázquez says (chapter 4, n. 17): "Andrew, Bishop of Colossae, in the same Council at session 7 (actually session 19), wishing to reconcile the dispute between John and Mark, said: 'It greatly matters whether one says simply the divine substance or the substance of the Father and Son; but one should not think they differ in reality, since they are believed to differ only by reason or understanding.'"

First, this should be corrected: not session 17 but 19, for the number in Vázquez is erroneous. Moreover, the passage does not press, for the same reason we gave above about the Latin theologian John. Andrew of Colossae speaks in the common manner outside the school, omitting scholastic subtleties, and under the name of reason and understanding he wraps another distinction that is not real. Yet Mark of Ephesus did not entirely consent to him, since he responded: "This is believed to happen sometimes, but not always and necessarily."

Finally, it should be noted that Andrew modestly does not affirm but resorts to opinion when he says "they are believed to differ" — *creduntur*. He did not say "they differ" — *differunt* — but "they are believed" — that is, they are thought to differ.

And lest anyone suspect that the word *creduntur* pertains to divine faith (which I observe for the sake of the simple), it is taken by Andrew in the same sense as it was taken by Mark of Ephesus there, when he added "is believed to happen necessarily" — that is, "is thought to."

The third objection of Vásquez is taken from a certain confession of faith of the Latins sent to the Greeks, which is at the final session, in which it says:

"Moreover, lest we seem to divide the identity and conjunction of the divine substance and to believe the substance itself differs from the hypostases and persons in reality, and not by reason alone."

Vásquez adds: "Where the Council, and the whole Latin party, considers it unfitting for there to be a greater distinction between person and essence than one of reason and intellect."

I recognize the words of the Latins, but not of the Council, as Vásquez says — who speaks rather improperly when he says "the Council and the whole Latin party." How does he first say the Council and then a part of the Latins? If the Council, then the part of the Latins was already comprehended in it. If the whole part of the Latins, how the Council, which comprehended the other part — the Greeks? He does not speak aptly either in meaning or in substance.

This noted in passing: to the objection I say that the Latins indeed said so in the final session, shortly before the middle. I recognize the words, often read and reviewed by me and produced in my Schools of Positive Theology in the Controversy on the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Yet they do not oppose Scotus's position. For they exclude the real distinction by which the essence would be divided into three parts — and division introduces real distinction.

This is clear from the words that follow: "Lest in three parts one should mentally conceive that single divine substance to be divided." The argument was against the Greeks who denied the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, inferring from that denial a division of the divine nature into three parts: one that would be in the Father producing the Holy Spirit, another in the Son not producing, and a third in the Holy Spirit produced by the Father alone and not by the Son. This was a real division. For it would follow that the essence in the Son, which would lack the power of producing, was distinct from the essence of the Father having the productive power, and from the essence of the Holy Spirit, which was not united to the Son, from whom it did not receive its nature. Therefore nothing is posited there against Scotus. For what is denied is that distinction which implies division into three distinct essences — which is not the Scotist one, which does not operate within the essence and denies that it is in any way distinguished within itself, much less really. It only operates outside the essence, comparing it with the attributes and relations.

The Latins clearly said "in reality, not by reason" — opposing reason to reality, that is, to the real distinction, taking "of reason" for every distinction that is not real. I add: even though this were the mind of the Latins in their profession, it is not the mind of the Council. For the Greeks accepted only the doctrine containing the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, as is clear from the

passage of the final session near the end: "Therefore the assembly of the Greeks came to this opinion: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as from one principle and one substance, by one spiration and procession, through the Son, as consubstantial and of the same nature."

This was the opinion of the whole Council, in which the only matter treated is the unity of the divine nature — affirming it to be unique in the three, not diverse — comparing the persons insofar as they were the same and one in essence, but not comparing the essence to the persons and asking about their distinction from them. For the Greeks were not thinking about this. Therefore they omitted that particular clause about the distinction of the essence from the persons by reason alone. Having embraced the truth about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son and the identity of nature in the three persons, they cared nothing about the rest, as though it were irrelevant to the question.

Let us bring the words of Pope Eugene in the Letters of Union: "The Greeks asserted that when they say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, they do not intend thereby to exclude the Son; but because it seemed to them, as they say, that the Latins assert the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles and two spirations, they therefore abstained from saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Latins, however, affirmed that they do not say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son with the intention of excluding the Father from being the font and principle of the whole deity — namely, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit — or that what the Son has regarding the Spirit's procession the Son does not have from the Father, or that they posit two principles or two spirations; rather, they assert there is only one principle and one spiration of the Holy Spirit."

In this definition and proper narration, no mention is made of that distinction of reason, because the mind of the Council was to define the truth of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, united together by reason of one essence as one principle, without any partition of the essence. Whether and how the essence and the persons are distinguished from each other — that was another question, provided they were not really distinguished. Therefore only this much passed from that profession of the Latins into the Council. The rest remained with the private Latin Doctors, and the Pope did not define it in the Council.

Let Vásquez cease frightening us by assuming the persona of the Council. For we have stripped it from him, and discovered behind the mask, he has retreated.

Against those who have more harshly censured Scotus's position — especially Molina, Zumel, Ruiz, and Arrubal — let us set the judgment of the wisest man, Father Fasoli (I, part 1, question 7, article 2, doubt 12): "Indeed I think those who refrain from censure act more cautiously and prudently, out of respect for the

authority of the most subtle Doctor and his entire most illustrious Scotist school, which has rendered the greatest service to theology."

Before him, the same judgment in favor of this position — which he defends as probable and entirely safe — was given by a most distinguished man, the light of the University of Coimbra, the Didymus of his age, the same man and the Augustinian eagle: Aegidius the Portuguese (book 5 of *On Beatitude*, question 5, articles 1 and 2), where with his immense erudition he fortifies Scotus's position and attacks Vásquez and the other opponents.

Section IV

The Arguments of the Thomists Are Answered

All the Thomists' arguments come down to proving that Scotus's distinction is incompatible with divine simplicity and introduces composition. They think this argument cannot be countered and accept no response yet devised by the men of our school. I will endeavor, as is my duty, to satisfy the Thomists according to the doctrine of St. Thomas himself.

First I observe that just as the Scotists think the Thomist position cannot stand with divine truth, because through it contradictories are affirmed about God — and to remove them the distinction of reason does not seem to suffice — so the Thomists think Scotus's doctrine, because it introduces diverse quasi-formalities into God, cannot coexist with divine simplicity. Now I prepare myself to defend divine simplicity. And I will be less prolix than the Scotists usually are.

First, let us see how composition occurs according to St. Thomas (I, part 1, question 3, article 7), and from the mode of its occurrence let us extract the definition of the composite and of composition.

"Everything composite," he says, "is posterior to its components." Then: "Everything composite has a cause uniting those things that of themselves are diverse." He speaks of an efficient cause, adding: "God has no cause, since he is the first efficient cause." Then: "In every composite there must be potency and act." Finally: "Everything composite is something that does not belong to any one of its parts." He proves this with examples: "In dissimilar things: no part of man is man, nor is a part of the foot a foot. In similar things: a part of water is not the whole water. For it does not follow: if the whole water is two cubits, then its part is also two cubits." So far St. Thomas in the body.

Therefore that will be a composite which is made from parts prior to itself, caused by an efficient cause uniting diverse parts, which consists of parts that relate as potency and act, and which is the same as its parts in such a way that what belongs to the part belongs to the whole. And that will be composition, in St. Thomas's account, which brings with it all those conditions.

Whether all are required for a composite, St. Thomas did not say. They all seem to be required, at least for a true and rigorous composite. For whatever lacks any condition will not be a true and proper composite. He speaks of the composition that is incompatible with divine simplicity, which he treats there, establishing it through the exclusion of these conditions, which he removes from God — and by removing them he proves the simplicity of God.

Three things should be noted. First, in the second condition he posited "things that of themselves are diverse" — as though some things could exist that were not diverse, from which he distinguished those diverse things proper to the composite. Second, in the third condition he took potency and act — as though other things existed beyond potency and act that would not make a composite. Third, in the fourth condition: "which does not belong to any one of its parts" — as though another whole could be found where it would belong. These terms certainly signify that St. Thomas supposes there can be a whole that is not a composite, due to the lack of those parts proper to the composite. For if no other whole consisted of parts, it would suffice to say: "Everything composite is that which has parts"; and "Everything that has parts is composite." But St. Thomas did not exclude parts universally but only the quality of those parts, and said that such parts make a composite, and the composite is such because it is made from such parts.

This is confirmed from the words of the first condition: "Is posterior to its components." Why was that word "posterior" necessary if there were no other whole that consisted of parts but was not posterior to them? For if there were no such whole, it would suffice to say: "The composite is that which consists of components," and the word "posterior" would be superfluous. Hence it appears that St. Thomas supposes not every plurality or multiplicity of parts or quasi-parts in a whole makes a composite, but only that which has those conditions and qualities.

To summarize: According to St. Thomas's doctrine, it is not incompatible for there to be a certain simple whole that has a multiplicity of quasi-parts that are not prior to it, nor diverse of themselves from it, nor relate as potency and act in it, and that so belong to the simple whole that each one is the same as it and it with them. Such a whole is God — and it is not composite but simple, because it is not composed of parts proper to the composite. Nor is that a multiplicity but a concurrence of perfections in the manner of parts.

From this doctrine follows a clear solution to the Thomists' argument. Let us state it clearly. Composition is incompatible with God, who is most simple. But given Scotus's distinction of formalities, there is composition. Therefore it is incompatible with God, who is most simple.

I respond most clearly: I concede the major and deny the minor — with St. Thomas, against whom the Thomists will not resist. And I give the reason: none

of the conditions required by St. Thomas is found in the positing of Scotus's formalities. Not the first, because they are not prior to God. Not the second, because they do not have an efficient cause or one that unites them as diverse things. Not the third, because they are not potency and act. Not the fourth, because each one is one and the same with the essence, and the essence with them. Hence it appears that there is no composition.

Thus, in form, I respond to the argument from St. Thomas's doctrine and in accordance with Scotus (Sentences, book 1, distinction 8, question 4, and distinction 5, question 2, and Quodlibet 5) — with whom St. Thomas agrees on this point. Hence the Thomists, if they reject my solution, necessarily fight against St. Thomas.

They will object one thing against my response: that I assume those formalities are not diverse, both among themselves and from the essence, when from the nature of the thing they are distinct. I respond that this objection destroys St. Thomas's own supposition, who in his doctrine admits quasi-parts in a simple being — but not the kind found in a composite. Therefore those formalities are quasi-parts and should not be compared among themselves or with the essence to which they inhere insofar as they are formalities, but with God, from whom they are not diverse in reality but one and the same with him and he with them. For if the distinction of formalities is removed, the formalities are removed and nothing remains in the manner of parts, and there is no room for the question whether they compose or not — because they do not exist. For what does not exist cannot be asked whether it composes or not. Therefore the formalities must remain, and about the remaining ones we must ask whether they are components of the essence or not, and whether they are the same as the nature and it with them or not. But since they are the same, they are not diverse, and consequently they are not components. And the argument collapses along with the objection, and the solution stands.

I add that the word "diversity" — *diversae* — imports in its sense a distinction greater than the formal, namely one of thing from thing, a real distinction. And St. Thomas meant to signify this in that passage, where he always used examples of things that differ from each other really — for example, the quantitative parts of matter and form, the parts of man to his integral parts, the parts of the foot to the foot, the parts of two-cubit water to a smaller part. And where he did not adduce material examples — as when he said "nature and supposit" — he introduced the word *Aliud* ("another thing"), which in the divine context especially implies diversity of thing from thing and an entirely real distinction.

By this reasoning and observation, my solution remains, in my judgment, unassailable.

I know that many things are collected by the Scotists here, and I am acquainted with the responses of both ancient and recent authors, and with the long,

learned reasonings of Mastrius and Pontius — indeed, even their subtle and sharp skirmishes. Setting all of these aside, I have briefly responded to the troublesome argument, and I believe the Thomists are satisfied by this response, which is plainly Angelic. And since they are accustomed to opposing Scotus with the Fathers in great force, I wish to show that his distinction conforms to the sense of the Fathers.

First, many of those who held that angels are composed of matter and form held this view because they thought that if they lacked this composition, they would be simple and similar to God. And consequently they judged that other compositions besides this one did not pertain to simplicity and did not destroy it, because they were outside the nature and essence.

These Fathers were: Origen (*Peri Archon*, book 1), Caesarius the brother of Gregory Nazianzen (in the first Dialogue, found in tome 2 of Nazianzen), Elias of Crete (on the first Oration of Nazianzen), Tertullian (*Against Marcion*, book 2), Hilary (*Commentary on Matthew*, chapter 5, where he wants all created things to be corporeal in their substance), Cassian (*Collation 7*, chapter 13), Augustine (*On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*, book 3, chapter 10; *On the Divination of Demons*; *On the Trinity*, book 3, chapter 10; *The City of God*, book 1, chapter 23 — where he attributes bodies to demons; *Epistles 111 and 115*; on *Psalms 85 and 145* — where he assigns airy and subtle bodies to angels). Bernard agrees (*On Consideration*, book 5), and Rupert the Abbot (*On the Trinity*, chapter 1). And what is more remarkable, the Seventh Ecumenical Synod seems to have held this view, for under Tarasius, Patriarch of Alexandria, as presider, it approves the opinion of John, Bishop of Thessalonica, affirming angels to be corporeal.

Among the more recent: Cajetan (on chapter 2 of *Ephesians*), Eugubinus (*On the Perennial Philosophy*, book 8, chapter 27 — asserting that demons are composed of matter and form). Of this opinion was Michael Psellus (*On Demons*) and Luis Vives (*On Angels*, commentary on book 15 of *The City of God*, chapter 23, of St. Augustine).

In this vein Augustine said (*The City of God*, book 12, chapter 10), where he affirms God alone to be simple: "He is the good that is alone simple; on that account alone immutable — which is God. By this good all good things have been created, but they are not simple; and therefore they are mutable. Created, I say — that is, made, not begotten. For what is begotten from the simple good is equally simple." Here he shows he is speaking of simplicity and composition through nature.

Therefore Alexander of Hales (*Summa*, part 1, question 20, member 2), Bonaventure (*Sentences*, book 2, distinction 3, part 1, question 2), and Richard (article 1, question 2) posited in angels a composition from a certain potential matter and a certain actuating form — about which matter it was not clear

whether it was univocal with our corporeal and visible matter. Henry also (Quodlibet 4, question 26) teaches that angels, even though they lack matter and form, nevertheless consist of potency and act — lest they be simple by nature and thereby become similar to the simple God.

Therefore the composition that is incompatible with simplicity is the one that occurs in the very nature, with those conditions St. Thomas required — according to the mind of the Fathers and Scholastics, whom we have therefore carefully surveyed.

It remains to see whether the cause was reasonable for positing that composition of matter and form in angels, and whether, with that composition excluded, it rightly follows that they would escape and become similar to God in simplicity of nature. The reason for the cause and the force of the inference are clear from St. Thomas's doctrine (I, part 1, question 50, article 2), where he asks whether angels are composed of matter and form. He sets out the third argument for the affirmative side as follows: "Form is act; therefore what is form alone is pure act. But an angel is not pure act (for this belongs to God alone). Therefore it is not form alone but has form in matter."

There in this argument is the reason for asking and the inference about participating in the simplicity and purity of God. This reason and inference are further confirmed through St. Thomas's response: "To the third it must be said that although in an angel there is no composition of matter and form, there is nonetheless act and potency in it. This can become clear from the consideration of material things, in which a twofold composition is found. The first is of form and matter, from which some nature is constituted. But a nature so composed is not its own being; rather, being is its act. Hence the nature itself is compared to its being as potency to act. Therefore, with matter subtracted and positing that the form itself subsists without matter, there still remains the comparison of the nature to being itself as potency to act. And such a composition is to be understood in angels. And this is what some say — that an angel is composed of 'that by which it is' and 'what it is,' or 'of being' and 'that which is,' as Boethius says. For 'that which is' is the subsisting form itself; but being itself is that by which the substance is — as running is that by which the runner runs. But in God there is no difference between being and what is, as was shown above. Hence God alone is pure act."

This entire response works in our favor. Let us apply it. St. Thomas acknowledges that the first composition in the angel — that is, of the nature in itself, which is form — does not exist. But the second does exist — that of potency and act — that is, the angel's being is such that it is potential to the being that it is. Namely, because the angel's nature is not necessarily and from itself — which does not apply to the being of a creature. For if that being which it has, uncomposed, did not depend on another, it would indeed be its own being, and therefore pure act, just like God. But because the creature is not from

itself but from God, it is therefore in potency to its own simple being of uncomposed form.

Therefore recourse must be had to another composition — of potency and act — lest it appear to be entirely simple and therefore God.

Now let us apply this again to our position. God is simple, with the first composition of matter and form excluded — as is evident. Furthermore, he is simple with the second composition of potency and act excluded, because he is from himself and necessarily. Therefore he is entirely simple and pure act.

Therefore, in both St. Thomas's and Scotus's opinion, God is most simple and most pure by the fact that he lacks these two compositions. Since Scotus excludes both, it follows that he posits God as simple and pure — even though he posits distinct formalities in him. St. Thomas did not concern himself with those formalities because they did not introduce composition. He excluded only two compositions — one of matter and form, the other of potency and act — and for that reason affirmed the angel to be uncomposed and lacking the first composition. But the angel is not entirely simple, nor pure act, because it includes the second composition of potency and act, which cannot stand with complete simplicity. But if the angel lacked this second composition, it would be not only simple but also pure act. For no other composition remains, according to St. Thomas's doctrine — which is remarkable. For although he could have resorted to the composition of substance and accident (of which the angel is capable), he did not concern himself with it, perhaps because he saw it follow from the second composition of act and potency. For wherever the latter exists, it brings the third along with it.

Therefore Scotus rightly, having admitted his formalities in God for the purpose of sustaining the truth of diverse statements about God, excluded composition and retained simplicity.

What then do the Thomists object to us from those passages of the Fathers where they teach that God is simple — and especially Bernard, who in *On Consideration*, book 5, calls God: "Merum simplex, unum, et si dici potest, unissimum" — "sheer simplicity, one, and if it can be said, most one"? Such Scotus asserts, and we his disciples establish along with St. Thomas — and indeed, what is perhaps more remarkable, not only one but pure act, and what can be said, most pure.

The Thomists press further that Scotus should not have used the name "formalities" nor the name "formal distinction." I repel this. He should have — since St. Augustine, the apex of theologians, said (83 Questions, question 40) that Ideas are "principal forms contained in the divine understanding." St. Thomas brings forward and approves this word (I, part 1, question 44, article 3). On whose authority we defend Scotus from the Thomists' attack.

Again they press: But we posit multiplicity in God. I respond: But not a multiplicity that imports imperfection, and one that does not harm unity or simplicity — such as Augustine established (On the Trinity, book 6, chapters 4, 6, and 7), where he spoke of "simplex multiplicatio et multiplex simplicitas" — "simple multiplication and multiple simplicity." We speak with Augustine. Let the Thomists therefore cease attacking us. On this point we agree with St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

And if hereafter they wish to assail us, I warn them that we must be reached through the body of St. Thomas, and we cannot be struck by any weapon of arguments without first piercing the shield of St. Thomas that we hold up. No Scotist need fail to acknowledge this debt to me: that I have fortified Scotus's distinction with the authority of St. Thomas and set before the Thomists a barrier they dare not attack. While St. Thomas's doctrine stands, Scotus's distinction cannot fall.

SECTION V. It Is Shown That the Scotist Distinction Is Necessary for Upholding Divine Truth

We respond in kind to the Thomists. They say that our distinction harms divine simplicity; we reply that theirs harms divine truth. To uphold that truth, the Scotist distinction is necessary. Let us begin with the distinction that is primary in Scotus, namely that between the essence and the attributes.

The following predication is certain, formal, and correct: "God is God through his Divinity, through his nature, through his essence." From which it follows by force of the form: "God is his Divinity, his nature, his essence." But a different predication is this: "God is God through his knowledge, through his mercy, through his justice," which are attributes — and this difference arises from the distinction among the predicates, that is, among the attributes. Therefore it arises from their own nature that there is this diversity of predication.

The difference consists in this: Divinity, Nature, and Essence are predicated in the mode of "what" (*quid*) and in the manner of something subsisting, while Mercy, Justice, and Eternity are predicated in the mode of "such" (*quale*) and in the manner of something adjoined. Hence when one asks, "Who is God?", the direct answer is: his Divinity, his Nature, his Essence. When one asks, "What is God like?", the answer is: knowing, merciful, just.

Hence Augustine, in *De Trinitate* XV, chapter VI, says: "If I say: eternal, immortal, just, good, Spirit — of all these that I have placed last, Spirit seems to signify the substance, while the rest signify qualities of that substance." Augustine recognized the diversity of predication arising from the diversity of the things predicated. For "Spirit" is said in the mode of "what," as something subsisting; the rest in the mode of "such," as things adjoined. Change the mode of predication and you will depart from accuracy. "Who is God? Eternal, merciful, just" — this you would say wrongly. Again, "What is God like? Divinity, nature, essence,

Spirit" — this you would say in altogether inverted fashion. This arises from the force of the nature predicated; therefore from it is derived the diversity of predication. For the formality of substance is one thing, and that of quality, or of something in the manner of a quality, is another. In God there are no qualities in the strict sense. Therefore, to uphold the truth of these predications concerning God, these formalities are necessary.

Damascene admitted these formalities together with Augustine. For Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa* I, chapter IV, says: "If you say 'just,' or 'good,' or anything of the kind, you do not speak of the nature of God, but of what surrounds the nature." That passage cannot deny real identity; therefore it denies formal identity. It therefore implies a formal distinction.

Secondly, I argue from the divine intellect and will. If they are in no way distinguished from one another by the nature of the thing, but only by reason from the essence, then the opinion of Durandus (*In I Sent.*, d. VI, q. II) cannot be condemned — namely, that the Son does not proceed in the divine persons through the intellect, nor the Holy Spirit through the will, but that both proceed proximately from the divine essence itself, even though the production of the Son is appropriated to the intellect and that of the Holy Spirit to the will. For what difference does it make whether they proceed from the nature or from the intellect and will, if there is in reality no distinction among them? Certainly in reality it makes no difference whether it is one or the other. Why, then, does it matter so greatly which one you say — so that to deny the processions through intellect and will is an error (indeed it is the Alogian heresy), while to affirm it is Catholic truth? For if they differ by thought alone, how can so great an error in reality be committed? Certainly there can be no error in reality concerning what is conceived by thought alone, without any harm to the thing conceived.

But you will say: in reality there is a foundation. I deny this; for the foundation is the nature, from which the intellect and will arise. But in your position nature is not in reality distinct from the intellect and will. Therefore in the foundation there is no foundation for the distinction — rather there is only a foundation for identity. Therefore if there is any distinction in your position, it comes from the side of the intellect and will, which stand in the manner of a form with respect to that foundation of nature. Durandus sinned against these formalities; for since they are formally distinct from the nature, the formal productions ought to be derived from them.

Hence arises a third argument. If the intellect and will are not distinguished from each other by the nature of the thing, but only through reason, how is the intellect the ground of the production of the Word and the will the ground of the production of the Holy Spirit — with so great an opposition that the former is generation and the latter procession, and each imports the negation of the other, so that it is altogether heretical to say that the Son is spirated and the Holy Spirit is generated? It is remarkable that thought alone should produce this

repugnance, indeed this contradiction. Would it mean that the Word proceeds through intellection and the Holy Spirit through volition because our cognition distinguishes them thus, and not because the nature and condition of things so requires? The Thomists may say what they will; I for one will not believe it.

They return to the foundation in reality. But I return to my line of objection. The foundation of nature is one and the same, and is the principle of agreement. How then do we seek in this foundation a distinction among things that are altogether the same in their foundation, and do not seek it in the formal things themselves, which provide and introduce the distinction? The distinction in the productions results from this. For the intellect differs formally from the will by its own nature: the intellect by its nature produces by understanding, the will by loving. Intellection, by its nature as speaking, is generation and not spiration; volition, by its nature as willing, is spiration and not generation. Hence it is that the Word is the Son and the Holy Spirit is not the Son. The Son is the image, the Holy Spirit is not the image. Spiration by its own nature brings it about that the Holy Spirit is love and gift, which the Son cannot be. Whoever removes the formal distinction seems to remove all these things.

I come now to the clearer distinction of the essence from the relations. And first: the truth that the essence is altogether absolute and communicable, while Paternity is something relative and incommunicable, exists in the reality of the Trinity — and this truth cannot be preserved except through a distinction from the nature of the thing, since being absolute and being relative are opposed in reality itself, and communicable and incommunicable contradict each other.

Second: the essence is not the ground of the distinction of persons; the relation is the ground of distinguishing the persons. This is clear because the essence is the principle of agreement, union, and identification — according to that text: "I and the Father are one" (*John* X). But the relation is the principle of distinction, difference, and separation, on account of the mutual relative opposition. Now to distinguish and not to distinguish are contradictories; therefore to remove these contradictories some distinction from the nature of the thing is necessary among those things of which they are affirmed, since a mere rational distinction does not suffice.

Third: if this distinction is removed, that truth of Augustine collapses (*De Trinitate* VII, chapter V): "It is not in the same respect that the Father is Father and God, nor in the same respect that he is God and Father." For unless there were a real distinction, it would follow that the Father is the Son and the Son the Father — just as it follows that the Father and Son are God — by arguing thus: the Father as Father is God, and as God is Father; but as God he is the same as and undistinct from the Son; therefore as Father he will also be the same as and undistinct from the Son.

Fourth: another truth present in the Trinity is removed. The Son is another (*alius*) from the Father, but not another thing (*aliud*) from the Father — another by relation and person, not another thing by divinity and essence. Therefore they agree in essence and differ in person and relation. But these imply a distinction from the nature of the thing, through agreement and difference. Therefore such a distinction is altogether necessary to uphold this truth.

Fifth: from the side of reality it is true that the Father and Son are two distinct and opposed persons, and thus really diverse — and yet these two are one single principle of the Holy Spirit by reason of the one fruitful nature in which they agree. But these two grounds, so diverse from each other, cannot come from one and the same formality; therefore they come from distinct ones. Those distinct things are nature and relation; therefore these two are formally distinct.

Sixth: the predications of "unbegotten" of the Father, "begottable" of the Son, and "spiratable" of the Holy Spirit are themselves present in the persons not by reason of the essence but of the relations. Therefore they hold as distinct from the nature and from the essence.

Seventh: these truths — the Father is from himself, the Son from the Father, the Holy Spirit from both — are not derived from the nature in which they entirely agree and are the same. Therefore they are derived from relations that are distinct from the nature by the nature of the thing.

Eighth: the orders of origin among the persons, and the diversity of the productions, are not in the essence and nature but in the relations; and accordingly they entail a distinction from the nature of the thing between nature and relations. The same argument applies to essential and notional predicates, which are certainly distinct in themselves and must proceed from principles that are distinct from the nature of the thing and diverse.

Ninth: that truth which Augustine sets forth (*De Trinitate* VII, chapter I) — "Every essence that is spoken of relatively is something besides the relative" — joined with that other statement: "The Word is not said in the same respect as Wisdom, because the Word is not said of itself, but only relatively of him whose Word it is, as the Son of the Father" — introduces altogether a distinction from the nature of the thing between the absolute and the relative. For the absolute is one in itself and looks to itself, not to others — indeed even while sustaining what looks to others. Such is the essence of God, in which the relations inhere; the essence contains them in itself with no respect to others, and yet those relations are themselves respects to others, just as the Son is to the Father: insofar as he is something according to being, he inheres in the essence; insofar as he is something relative according to being directed toward another, he is distinguished from the nature of the thing from that in which he inheres — and he inheres in the essence. Therefore he is distinguished from the essence. Hence

Augustine (*Against Maximinus* I, at the end): "He is one, he is another, and he is yet another — but all together they are one Lord God."

Let these arguments suffice for this distinction, which is altogether necessary for upholding the truth of propositions about God. I wish to conclude this section by proving, in general terms, the distinction from the nature of the thing in God, by means of an argument of Saint Augustine — one that contains the truth of this distinction and teaches us that unity and divine simplicity are compatible with it.

Augustine was disputing against Maximinus in *Against Maximinus* III, which is found in volume VI. Maximinus was an Arian and denied the true divinity of the Son, because seeing that he was really distinct from the Father, he could not grasp how the Son could be one and the same God with God the Father — still less did he believe that the Holy Spirit was one and equal with God the Father. And so, following the Arians, he held that only the Father is God, using this argument: if the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are multiple persons and really distinct from the Father, were one God with him, they would be parts of God, since each would participate in the divine nature, and by so participating would divide the Divinity.

To refute this argument, Augustine took a proposition conceded by Maximinus himself and turned it against him. The proposition was this (*Against Maximinus* III, chapter VII): "God," he says, "begot God as Lord; God begot God as Lord; the Good begot the Good; the Wise the Wise; the Merciful the Merciful; the Powerful the Powerful" — understanding this of the Father. For this reason alone he made him God.

Then Augustine said: "Why do you not say: the Omnipotent begot the Omnipotent? You wish to say instead: the greater Lord begot a lesser Lord; the greater God a lesser God; the greater King a lesser King; the greater Creator a lesser; the better the good; the wiser the wise; the more merciful the merciful; the more powerful the powerful. Why do you not say: equal?" And afterward, in chapter X: "Do you think that God the Father cannot be one God together with the Son and the Holy Spirit? You fear that the Father alone may not be one God, but only part of one God, since he is constituted from three." And again at the end of the chapter: "You said that one God is not composed of parts." And because he wishes this to be understood of the Father, he says: "He, who is unbegotten power, is simple."

Here I pause. The meaning of Augustine is this: you deny that the Son and the Holy Spirit are one and the same God with the Father, because you fear that by participating in his nature — which you say is simple — they would divide it into parts, and so the Divinity of the Father would be dissolved. From this it follows that Maximinus thought God the Father to be altogether simple and therefore not to be divided into parts.

Taking this concession of Maximinus, Augustine presses him from the conceded premises. "In this simple power, see how many things you have enumerated." He argues against Maximinus *ad hominem*: "You said that this power of the Father is manifold, but just now called it simple; therefore it has a mode by which it may be divided. For if it is manifold, it has parts which the Son and the Holy Spirit can participate." "The preceding words," he says, "are yours: 'God, God; Lord, Lord; Creator, Creator; King, King; good, good; Wise, Wise; Merciful, Merciful; Powerful, Powerful.' Why, then, in a simple power did you not fear to enumerate so many powers?"

Augustine perceived that Maximinus, in positing these powers in God, ought to posit them as distinct. "Are goodness, wisdom, mercy, and power parts of the one power which you said is simple? If you say they are parts, then a simple power consists of parts, and this simple power, by your definition, is one God. Therefore you are saying that one God is composed of parts. You do not say this. Then they are not parts, and yet there are four of them, and they are one power — the very same that is simple." Let us see what he concludes:

"If therefore in the one person of the Father you find many things but no parts, how much more are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit one God — and because of the individual Divinity one God, and because of the propriety of each one three persons, and because of the singular perfection not parts of one God."

Now let us reason with Augustine. Those perfections which you, Maximinus, admit in God the Father are many indeed — many, but not therefore parts — and thus they do not destroy the simplicity that is incompatible with parts, but is not incompatible with many things that are not parts. It follows that Augustine conceded to Maximinus that those four perfections — that is, Goodness, Wisdom, Mercy, and Power — exist in God, and yet are not really distinct parts, and that through them simplicity is not destroyed, which is entirely destroyed by real parts. Therefore Augustine admitted a distinction of perfections, but not a real one as of parts; therefore a formal one, as of formal perfections. Therefore Augustine is on our side.

But you will object that Augustine is speaking of perfections distinguished by the intellect and by reason. I respond by denying this; because a distinction of reason was nothing to be feared by Maximinus, since it can coexist perfectly with simplicity — indeed it is posited in God precisely so that it may coexist. Therefore Maximinus was positing some other kind of distinction, one that posed a threat to divine simplicity when posited — and it was of this that Augustine was speaking when he refuted Maximinus, showing that only a distinction of parts, which is real, destroys simplicity.

Otherwise Augustine would not be properly refuting Maximinus, who posited plurality. For if he understood that plurality to exist only in the intellect, it was easy for Augustine to concede everything to him and to say that the plurality

was not real but only a thought of plurality — and he would have refuted him with a single word, by denying that those four perfections are really plural, since they are distinguished by reason alone, and would have avoided that lengthy disputation. Surely Augustine was speaking of that formal plurality. In sum: Maximinus feared that God, a simple nature, would be divided if the Son and Holy Spirit participated in the Divinity. Augustine argues against him by saying that Maximinus himself posits the Divinity in the Father as distinguished by several perfections, and yet when those are posited he does not fear a division of the Divinity in the Father. Therefore, says Augustine, there is no reason to fear that the Divinity of God would be divided if it were communicated to the Son and the Holy Spirit.

The conclusion of Augustine — which I repeat once more — is this: "If therefore in the one person of the Father you find many things but not parts, how much more are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, because of the individual Divinity, one God — and because of the propriety of each, three persons — and because of the singular perfection, not parts of one God?"

Let us apply this to our point. Augustine acknowledged that many perfections are posited by Maximinus in the Divinity of the Father, and he did not deny this to Maximinus — therefore he admitted it. But those perfections were not distinguished by reason alone, since they were many — not parts, that is, not really distinct. Therefore when Augustine admitted many perfections and denied that they were parts, he was transparently conceding every other distinction that was not real. This distinction from the nature of the thing was not real; therefore Augustine admitted, before Scotus, a formal distinction from the nature of the thing.

Let the Thomists now proceed and continue to impugn Saint Augustine.

The Thomists nevertheless resist and object that the contradictions in the propositions we have adduced are not fully resolved by the formal distinction of Scotus, because a greater distinction — namely a real one — is required; and therefore the intellect does not fully acquiesce in the Scotist distinction, since the difficulty of conceiving those predicates as apparently contradictory in God still remains.

I respond: they should be congratulated for recognizing the difficulty of reconciling those different predications. Then it must be denied that the argument has force, because since no greater distinction than the formal can be given in God, this one alone is to be employed. Third, it is to be regretted that they are unwilling to use the more effective remedy for healing those defects of predication, because since those defects are much better removed by the formal distinction than by a rational one, they ought to reject the latter and accept the former. Certainly if the defects cannot be resolved by the former, much less can they be resolved by the latter. Let them therefore apply what physicians do — a

more effective remedy rather than a weaker one — when the present and evident one does not appear.

Finally they object that the opinion of Saint Thomas is almost common in his own and in other schools, and celebrated everywhere; while with Scotus only a few Scotists hold his view, and it is a private opinion seized upon by his followers alone.

I respond that I do not count authors but weigh reasons, and that schools are to be valued by weight, not by number. Not that I deny the Thomist school to be distinguished and most serious, but in order to repel the objection. In order to satisfy it more fully, I wish to adduce certain independent authorities from among those who embrace Scotus's position.

Fonseca, a Portuguese Jesuit author and master of Molina (*Metaph.* IV, chapter II, q. XLV, §§ III and V; *Metaph.* V, chapter VII, q. III, §III), posits a distinction from the nature of the thing intermediate between real and rational, but with the proviso of excluding it from divine things. Albertinus, also a Jesuit (*Ad aliquid*, q. XII, dub. I), admits a modal distinction in the category of relation. Franciscus Marca del Monaco, a Regular Clerk (*Metaph.*, part V, disp. un., §§ I and II), embraces the same, with limitation to philosophical matters.

The following accept it absolutely as formal, both in natural and in supernatural matters: Petrus a Candia (cited by Carthusianus, *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. II); Aegidius a Praesentatione, an Augustinian from Portugal, primary lecturer and rector of the University of Coimbra (*De Beatitudine*, bk. V, *De Visione*, q. V, a. IV); Joannes L'Alemande (*Disput. de Ente*, part II, *Clypeus* IV, in the *Decisio* of Guilelmus Camerarius, *Congreg. Orat.*, in *Disput. Philos.*, part II, q. II, who cites Piccolominus, *De Metaph.*, bk. I, chapter X, and Archangelus Mercenus in his commentaries); Joannes Canon (*In I Phys.*, q. VII, cited for the same view); Buccaferreus (cited by Faber, *Theoremata* II, chapter LXXIV); Paulus Venetus (cited by Tellez, vol. II, d. LII, part III, §V); Aegidius Mauretus of the Minims (cited by Joannes L'Alemande, d. III, *De Ente*, part II, *Clypeus* IV, in the *Decisio*).

To these I myself, if I count for anything, ought to be added — I who, before going over to Scotus, held this opinion while being taught at Coimbra by my teacher, whom I name with honor: Benedictus a Gouvea, a Jesuit, a most learned man, then lecturer in Philosophy and afterward in Theology at the University of Évora — whom I adduce as a fit authority for Scotus's position. I am surprised and grieved that my co-disciple Telesius departed from him in the passage I cited just above.

FINAL SECTION. The Common Responses of the Scotists Are Set Forth and Applied to Solving the Chief Argument of the Thomists

Although I had thought somewhat less about presenting the common points that other Scotists had brought forward before me and that are commonly said

in the schools, certain teachers who are close to me asked me nevertheless to weigh the common response and to accommodate it to scholastic use — lest by passing over it I should seem to neglect it, especially since they hoped I would say something new in expounding it. Their request I could not refuse. I take up the matter.

First, I observe, with Vulpes (*De Princ.*, vol. I, part I, d. VI, a. ult.) and Posnanensis (*In I Sent.*, d. VIII, q. IV, d. I, concl. IV) and Mastrius (*In Metaph.*, d. VI, q. XII, n. CCXXXVIII), that Scotus acknowledged and received those three common kinds of distinction — distinction of reasoning reason (*rationis ratiocinantis*), distinction of reasoned reason (*rationis ratiocinatae*), and distinction from the nature of the thing prior to all reasoning — and that he set these out distinctly in *In I Sent.*, d. VIII, q. IV, §*ad quaestionem*, n. XVII. It is indeed true that in that passage he was unwilling to concede that the second kind of distinction — which he calls that of formally different objects in the intellect — is altogether different from the third; as we set out above, and as is clear from the reason there appended by Scotus: because, as was argued earlier, this distinction is never present in intuitive cognition unless it is present in the intuitively cognized object. Therefore the third distinction — prior to the intellect in every mode — is present there. Nor does it follow, against what we have assumed, that the second is not to be distinguished from the third in Scotus's view, because he denied this only in intuitive cognition, in which no reasoned distinction can be present that does not arise from the nature of the thing in the object. Otherwise, Scotus does not deny that second distinction.

With this observation made, I now set forth the Thomist argument: if the attributes were formally distinct from the divine essence, there would be composition from them and the essence; therefore they are not formally distinct. The assumption is proved because those forms, or quasi-forms, of the attributes would accrue formally to the nature as nature, actualizing and perfecting it under a formal character that is not itself the formal nature — especially since the nature would stand in the manner of a recipient and sustainer of those accruing quasi-forms of the attributes; from which would result in the nature the character of potency and in the attributes the character of acts; and true composition would follow.

The Thomist argument cannot be put more clearly. Let us see the Scotist response. Scotus responds there by denying the assumption and its proof, even with the formal distinction admitted. The reason for the denial is that the non-formal identity is compatible with God's simplicity, because through it the supreme identity in and with the nature is not destroyed. This is clear because the attribute neither accrues to the nature, nor is it a part in relation to it, nor an act of it. It does not accrue to the nature because it inheres in the nature and is the same thing as the nature — hence it is not a part of it either. That it is not an act is clear from the fact that the simply infinite nature cannot be perfected,

since it contains every perfection; moreover the attribute itself possesses simple infinity, since it is the same reality as the nature. Therefore the argument does not succeed.

Furthermore, the additional claim that the nature would stand in the mode of a recipient and sustainer is false, because the divine nature is the principle and root from which the attribute springs — which relation is rather that of an effecting power than of a receiving potency; and whatever perfection exists in the attribute comes from the nature, to which it does not accrue but from which it proceeds and emanates. Thus the argument is resolved on all counts.

What remains is only that formal distinction of the quasi-form — for example, of Wisdom — which distinction does not constitute composition. For not everything that is distinct composes; indeed the ground of distinction cannot be the ground of composition. And this is clear in the case of the divine relations, which, though really distinct, do not produce composition with God or in God. Therefore, much less do attributes that are formally distinct produce composition.

All our Scotists place great weight on the notion of Infinity in resolving the Thomist argument, as Mastrius (*d. VI, a. II*) notes and approves — and rightly so; for it is by this consideration that Scotus resolves the difficulty in *In I Sent.*, d. V, q. II, n. XIV, where he says: "The perfection of identity excludes all composition — which identity exists on account of infinity — and yet infinity does not formally remove the formal characters, so that one is not formally the other." This same consideration he also expressly sets forth in *In I Sent.*, d. VIII, q. IV, and in *Quodlibet V, §Tertio*, n. XV.

We must, however, defend this infinity and fortify it with other arguments, as we have done just above in responding — removing other objections that may be raised from a different quarter. One such objection, newly emerging, is this: there is no perfect identity where there is not complete identity; but between the attributes and the essence there is not complete identity; therefore there is no perfect identity. The major is certain; the minor is proved because between the attributes and the essence there is non-formal identity but only real identity; therefore there is not complete identity.

I respond to this objection from Scotus himself. I deny the major, that such identity must be composed of real and formal together — because there can be no formal and real identity, but only real identity alone. This is clear because if the identity were also formal, the matter of the question would be removed: for one could not ask whether the attribute is identical with the essence, since the attribute could not be taken as something distinct that was altogether the same as another — and thus the matter of the question would be abolished. Nor may you object that the terms remain in the intellect as distinguished by reason; for if that rational distinction is of reasoning reason (*rationis ratiocinantis*), it does

nothing but feign; if of reasoned reason (*rationis ratiocinatae*), it already presupposes a form about which the same reasoning applies as about our formal distinction.

The reason why a formal character must be retained in an attribute with respect to the divine nature is this: Wisdom and Goodness, for example, have their own ultimate and most formal actuality, which they cannot set aside — and this, taken precisely, differs from the essence in its own formality; and in this they cannot be the same. Otherwise the predication "God is wise; Divinity is wisdom" would be absurd, since in this concept Wisdom formally abstracts from Divinity and is thus repugnant in that precise concept to being the same as Divinity. Therefore those extremes are not capable of formal identity, but only of real identity — which cannot be greater or more perfect.

Nor is it necessary always to seek what is strictest in its kind; for the unity and simplicity of God would be greater still if the relations in it were not distinct — and yet they are not therefore to be abolished. Just as, then, supreme simplicity of the divine nature is compatible with the real distinction of relations — which is so much greater than formal distinction — so too will supreme simplicity be compatible with the distinction of attributes from one another and from the essence.

I have in fact found that Mayronis, the most vigorous asserter of this formal distinction, fittingly uses this example of the relations in support of our formal distinction, as is recorded in his *Commentary on I Sent.*, d. VIII, toward the end, where he repeatedly uses the real distinction of the relations from each other in defense of the formal distinction of the attributes without composition, on account of the diversity of the predicates. Let us hear him: "I say therefore that with the supreme simplicity of God a distinction from the nature of the thing among the divine attributes can coexist — among the attributes, I say, among themselves, and of the attributes from the essence — without any composition or aggregation. Nor do I see any reasons that do not tell equally against the Trinity of Persons as against this distinction." And he grounds his position on the identity of infinity and reality, which is one and the same with the nature and in the divine nature. This identity he affirms to be compatible with formal distinction, and he says toward the end: "Although the divine entity comprises all things identically, it does not follow that it comprises them formally. Therefore I say that such a distinction is not incompatible with divine infinity — just as the distinction of Persons is not; because just as in the three persons there is posited one numerically identical Divinity, so in the attributes there is one numerically identical infinity."

A little earlier he had joined to this the argument from reality in the following way: "With the distinction of attributes it is established that they have supreme unity: for they have the unity of the essence, which is supreme, and of infinity and reality, which are altogether undivided."

I add something from my own resources. This formal distinction of attributes belongs to the divine nature — which, since it is supremely fruitful, had to burst forth into certain quasi-forms and quasi-absolute properties, and to bring them forth, as it were, from the divine bosom; so that it would not only produce the relative persons through the intellect and will, but would also directly and of itself bring forth the attributes in the absolute order. By reason of this infinite fecundity, all those attributes remain identified with the essence; which essence, since it is infinite and necessary, communicated itself wholly to each individual attribute — for that fecundity of the divine essence was natural, and therefore it necessarily burst forth into those quasi-offspring of the attributes, to which it communicated itself alone.

From this new foundation is drawn a new proof of identity: for into each individual attribute that whole fecundity poured itself; and accordingly in each and every one of them the whole Divinity inhered. Otherwise it would be sterile, if it did not give itself equally and completely. That fecundity of the nature is absolute — bringing forth those forms (or better, those quasi-forms) absolutely, and communicating to them an infinity that is likewise absolute and simply simple, of a kind that the relations cannot formally possess, since they are formally opposed and therefore infinite only in their own proper and determinate order — as Scotus teaches in *In I Sent.*, d. V, q. II, and d. VIII, q. IV, §*Ad argumenta principalia*, and *Quodlibet* V, nn. XIII, XIV, XV, excellently.

Thus the argument about composition remains resolved — by denying that composition follows from the formal distinction, and by affirming that for simplicity it suffices to have real identity together with the infinity necessarily communicated on account of the natural fecundity of the divine nature, which bursts forth by bringing forth what it contains. But it contains infinity, and therefore communicates it to the attributes with supreme identity; which identity also removes aggregation, which cannot stand with that supreme identity of infinity — as Scotus likewise observes in *In I Sent.*, d. V, q. II, §L, n. XIV: "The same perfect identity excludes all aggregation, because the same is not aggregated with itself." And when one objects the distinction of forms or quasi-forms, we respond that aggregation does not arise from them; and we turn the objection back on the objector by convincing him through the example of the divine relations, which, though really distinct from each other, do not introduce aggregation — which cannot coexist with that supreme identity and infinity.

At the close I note that Pontius, who does not sufficiently acquiesce in the common solution here, is rightly refuted by Mastrius (*Disput.* VI, q. XI, nn. CCXXXIII and CCXXXIV).

COLLATION III. DIFFERENCE II. ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: Can the Divine Essence Be Seen, by God's Absolute Power, without the Persons, and One Person without Another?

SECTION I. The Opinions of Saint Thomas, Scotus, and the Schools Are Set Forth

There are three passages in Saint Thomas where he teaches the negative position. The first is probable; the second evident; the third appears express. The first is *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XII, a. VII, ad II, where he denies that total comprehension follows from a total vision of God: "God is not called incomprehensible because there is something of him that is not seen, but because he is not seen as perfectly as he is visible." And ad III: "He who sees God through his essence sees in him that he exists infinitely and is infinitely knowable." And distinguishing between *totum* (all) and *totaliter* (in a totally complete manner), he affirms that God is seen as a whole but not totally, that is, with respect to the mode of seeing: "Totally," he says, "speaks of the mode of the object; this infinite mode does not belong to the one seeing." And though he is speaking of the actual situation, he seems to presuppose that by the nature of the infinite object it cannot happen that God is not seen as wholly in himself from the nature of the object.

The second, evident passage is in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. II, a. VIII, where he says: "The supreme goodness of God, according to the mode in which it is now understood, can be perfectly understood without the Trinity of Persons; but according to the mode in which it is understood in itself, as it is seen by the Blessed, it cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons."

The third, express passage is *Summa Theologiae* III, q. III, a. III: "The intellect bears upon different things in two ways: in one way so as to know God as he is, and thus it is impossible that anything should be circumscribed by the intellect from God while something else remains."

Scotus manifestly affirms the contrary in *In I Sent.*, d. I, q. II, n. V: "As to this article: by God's absolute power I see no contradiction, on the part of the intellect and will, in the possibility that the act of each should be terminated by the essence and not by a person, or by one person and not by another. Suppose that the intellect sees the essence but not the person, or one person and not another, and that the will enjoys the essence but not a person, or one person and not another." And there he confirms his position with many strong arguments and overturns the contrary position.

Saint Thomas is followed by his own; Scotus by ours. Of others who follow Saint Thomas: Vázquez (*In I*, p. I, d. XLVIII, cc. II, III, and IV); Suárez (*In I*, p. I, lib. II, *De Attributis*, c. XXIII); Molina (*ibid.*, a. VIII, d. IV); Becanus (c. IX, q. XII);

Machinus (d. XIX); Lezana (*Tract.* III, d. III, q. II); Amicus (d. IX, §XVIII); Zumel (d. II, *In I p.*). Of those who adhere to Scotus: Salas (*In I-II D. Thomae*, q. III, *Tract.* II, d. IV, §II); Granado (*I p.*, vol. I, *controv.* I, *Tract.* V, disp. VII); Hurtado (*In Metaph.*, d. VI, §V) — even though he does not admit the formal distinction, which Aegidius the Portuguese does admit, so it is no wonder that after a long disputation he judges Scotus's position to be more true.

Before proceeding to the arguments of either side, I observe that Vázquez (*In I*, d. XLIX, cc. I and II) is of the opinion that these differing positions are based on contrary opinions concerning the formal distinction from the nature of the thing — so that those who deny the formal distinction consequently deny this exclusive vision, while those who affirm it assert it. There he proves the negative position chiefly on the ground that the supreme simplicity of God, which tolerates no distinction from the nature of the thing, equally does not tolerate such an exclusive vision. Suárez, however (*lib.* II, c. XXIII, nn. III and XIX), although he holds the contrary, affirms that it is chiefly on this ground that the Thomists confirm their position — from which the connection between these two questions appears. But Suárez judges better in this matter, since that reason is not compelling; and indeed not a few of those who agree with Saint Thomas in denying the formal distinction agree with Scotus in affirming the exclusive vision.

I observe secondly that in actual fact the essence, attributes, and persons are seen simultaneously, and that there is no question about this — since Scotus plainly admits it. For in that same distinction, q. II, n. XI, he says: "I say that in actual fact there will be one fruition and one vision of the essence and of the three persons" — indeed in n. IX he had already said: "That the intellect by its natural power could not see the essence without seeing the persons." The question therefore is only about absolute power, as he says there at n. V: "By God's absolute power I see no contradiction." With these observations made, we proceed to the arguments.

Cajetan (*In II-II*, ad q. II, a. VIII) draws two considerations from the doctrine of Saint Thomas. The first is from the nature of the object, as follows: the vision of God shows him as he is in himself; but in himself he is One and Triune; therefore he cannot be seen otherwise. This is shown by an analogy: a creature in reality cannot be separated from its suppositum, which it necessarily requires; therefore neither can it be in vision, which bears upon the being of the thing. This is confirmed because the nature of Socrates cannot be seen without the suppositum of Socrates.

The second consideration is from the force of Beatitude. Beatitude is the acquisition of the supreme good with rest and altogether perfect fulfillment; but it cannot be such without knowledge of the persons; therefore the persons are necessary for the constitution of beatitude. The major is certain. The minor is clear because the intellect cannot rest in the vision of the essence alone, when

the persons still remain to be seen — which the intellect desires, in order that it may rest. For just as the nature without them is not fully terminated, so the vision without them is not perfected.

The third consideration is a complex one drawn from an objection against Scotus taken from the Beatitude of God and the relation to the creature. God cannot be beatified through knowledge of his essence alone — against Scotus — and therefore neither can the creature be beatified. The antecedent is proved because the Beatitude of God must be comprehensive of himself; but it cannot be such without knowledge of the persons. The consequence is rightly drawn, because if God is not perfectly blessed except through comprehension of himself, neither will the creature be perfectly blessed except through non-comprehensive intuition of him — of which it is not capable; therefore through intuition of the persons, of which it is capable. These are Cajetan's arguments.

Vázquez uses one argument advanced in d. XLVIII, c. II, n. VII — one that he calls, as he says, evidently compelling. In God, on account of his supreme simplicity, the essence is altogether the same as the persons and as the attributes (he joins all of them), so that from the nature of the thing there is no diversity or distinction, not even the smallest; and the vision of God, by which the Blessed behold God, is the vision of the simple God as he is in reality. Therefore it must represent the persons, who are altogether one and the same with the nature. Otherwise that vision will not be a quidditative concept of God, if it is an exclusive vision of the persons.

Suárez (*lib.* II, c. XXIII, nn. XX, XXI, and XXII) argues at length. I condense it thus: unless the divine essence could be seen without the relations, this would happen either through the same vision by which the Blessed see today, or through another. By neither; therefore it cannot happen. The first part of the dilemma is proved because that vision, if it is the same, must remain the same and therefore representative of the same object; but the object is the essence together with the persons; therefore it must see and represent the same. The second part — that there cannot be another vision — is shown as follows: it would be neither specifically nor numerically distinct from the beatific vision as it now is. Not specifically distinct, because there would be no principle distinguishing it specifically; and not numerically, because it would see an object not numerically identical — since it would see the essence alone, which is at least numerically a different object from the persons — and therefore it would not be distinct in number only. Then Suárez presses the matter further with that common argument about intuitive vision, which bears upon the object as it is; and therefore even by divine power it cannot abstract from the persons, for otherwise it would not be an intuitive vision.

To all this are joined all the arguments of the Thomists, drawn from the identity and simplicity of the object, from the nature of intuitive vision, and from the notion of a beatitude that satisfies desire. Saint Thomas stated these briefly, as

Cajetan observes in his commentary on that article, q. II, a. VIII, n. XXII. As an authority there is adduced that passage from *John* XIV: "Philip, he who sees me sees also my Father" — from which it is clear that neither can one person be seen without another, nor the essence without the persons. For from the unity of the persons in the essence and with the essence, Christ argues when he says: "Because I am in the Father and the Father is in me." Vázquez (*cap.* III, n. XI) notes that some Thomists use this passage against Scotus, and Suárez is moved by it (*c.* XXIII, n. XVI).

No one proves Scotus's position better or more fully than Scotus himself. In d. I, q. II, n. V, he sets out what he takes as his aim to prove — namely, that the intellect sees the essence without a person, or one person without another. The same applies to the will with respect to fruition.

The first argument is as follows: any act that has a primary object upon which it essentially depends, and a secondary object upon which it does not essentially depend but tends toward by virtue of the primary, can tend toward the primary without tending toward the secondary. This is evident from the example of that same vision, which is directed toward God and toward creatures: by divine power it can abstract from the vision of creatures. In the vision of God, the essence is the primary object and the persons the secondary; therefore by absolute power a vision of the essence can be produced without a vision of the persons.

The second argument: the Father, prior by origin to his begetting of the Son, is perfectly blessed; therefore through the intuition of the essence alone he is blessed. But this is sufficient for uncreated beatitude; therefore *a fortiori* for created beatitude — which means that a blessed soul, by seeing the essence alone, could be beatified. The assumption in the major is proved because the Father has no perfection from the produced Son.

The third argument: in the Father when he generates the Son, every simply simple perfection must be present; but beatitude is a simply simple perfection; therefore he has it without connection to the Son; therefore it follows from the essence alone.

The fourth argument: the Father is blessed from himself; therefore through the essence, without awaiting the persons. Therefore perfect and formal beatitude consists in the vision of the essence. From this it follows that it can be communicated without the vision of the persons.

The fifth argument: the intuitive vision of God has its complete and adequate object in the existing God; but God does not exist through the persons but through absolute existence; therefore the vision can be completed and terminated by the existing God, with the relations set aside, and accordingly with the persons excluded.

These are the proper arguments of Scotus in that place, q. II, d. I, which appear to remove all the implications alleged by the adversaries and to suffice for establishing this truth — and in the judgment on the controversy we will adduce those implications that can arise from the same doctrine.

Here I note that exactly the same must be said about the vision of one person without another, and about the vision of the essence without the attributes, and of one attribute without another. For the arguments are common to these questions, and those conclusions are deduced from what has been said by a right and necessary inference. For this reason all the Scotists admit them, with some qualification however that Scotus introduced and that we will weigh in the judgment.

Now let us proceed to the resolution of the arguments.

SECTION II. The Thomist Arguments Against Scotus Are Resolved

Before I respond, I observe that Vázquez (d. XLVIII, c. III, nn. IX and X), while only responding formally as a theologian, concedes that given the formal distinction from the nature of the thing among essence, attributes, and relations, the essence could be seen without the attributes and persons even without a miracle — if we can use the light of glory freely and at our own will, which indeed Scotus himself denied. Therefore *a fortiori*, given our formal distinction from the nature of the thing, it does not involve a contradiction that under absolute power and through a miracle things should be so seen.

Now to the first argument of Cajetan: we concede the major — namely, that the vision is intuitive of him as he is in himself — and likewise the minor, that he is One and Triune; but we deny that it necessarily follows that One and Triune must be seen through the same vision. The reason is that there are diverse formal characters in the object, distinct from the nature of the thing, of God One and Triune; and just as they are distinguished in reality, so they can be distinguished in vision — especially since the vision is through the light of glory, which God freely gives to the one seeing. Why, then, cannot God concur with that light to the seeing of the nature while withdrawing his concurrence to the seeing of the persons, since these are distinguished from the nature of the thing from the essence? Therefore the consequence of Cajetan's argument against Scotus's position does not hold, and Vázquez himself opposes it when the formal distinction is admitted.

Prescinding, however, from such a formal distinction, and conceding complete identity, I respond secondly with Suárez (*lib. II, De Attributis*, c. XXIII): even so, one could still be seen without the other, because that identity does not prevent the essence from being communicated without the relation of the Father being communicated to the Son; therefore it will not prevent the essence from being seen without the relation.

Furthermore, because that vision need not negate the existence of the essence without the persons or attributes, but only abstracts from them and rests in the essence, not beholding the persons.

Third, because the Blessed, notwithstanding that identity, do not see all things that are in God — otherwise they would comprehend him. Just as, therefore, identity does not cause many things to be seen that are altogether identical with the essence, neither does that identity compel the persons to be seen on account of their identity with the nature. So Suárez against Vázquez, n. XIX — and I follow him against Cajetan.

This solution proceeds from the nature of the essence considered in itself; and if to this is added omnipotence, the response will be altogether irrefutable.

As for the analogy of seeing the nature of this individual Socrates: I respond first by affirming that it does not involve a contradiction to see his nature without his suppositum, because the suppositum is outside the definition of the nature, whatever it may be — whether a negation or a positive mode; and just as in Christ our Lord the human nature was seen in itself when the natural subsistence was set aside, so by God's absolute power it could be seen without its proper subsistence.

I respond secondly by denying with Cajetan that it can be seen, and by asserting a different reason: because the human nature has its subsistence from need, it cannot therefore be wholly separated from it. Furthermore it is a limited and finite thing; besides, it is absolute, not relative, and therefore does not carry the character of a different object. But this divine relation exists from abundance and fecundity, and is something infinite and relative; and accordingly it is constituted in a different genus and takes on the character of an object different from the divine nature. Let the reader choose which he prefers; I find the first response more satisfying.

Cajetan's second argument, concerning Beatitude, is easily resolved by saying that essential beatitude consists in the vision of the essence, which is the primary and altogether absolute object, and it fully satisfies the desire of the one who sees it — namely, the Father — because just as that nature is in itself essentially perfect, so nothing is lacking to it for the perfection of beatifying, since otherwise something of perfection would be lacking to it, which cannot be said. For the attributes and relations flow, in a manner, from the essence itself — from its abundance and fecundity, not from need and want. Hence it suffices for itself for its own being and beatifying. Nor does the objection about Quietude hold, because to him to whom nothing is lacking in perfection, nothing further is needed for his own perfection — otherwise he would not be perfectly complete — and consequently nothing will be lacking to him to satisfy the desire of beatitude. And so the attributes and relations are those things that rather desire the essence, from whose abundance they arise as from a source;

but the essence does not desire them, since it is their principle. Thus those rest in the essence, not the essence in them.

Otherwise it would have to be said that the essence needs the ideas of possibles, the knowledge of creatures, and is not perfect or blessed without them if one abstracts from them — which is altogether absurd and false. Thus this argument of Cajetan is fully resolved.

Third, satisfaction is given from the same doctrine by saying that the intuition of the divine essence is the most perfect comprehension of the beatifying object, since it is the comprehension of the supreme Good to which nothing of good is lacking and from which all good flows — and whatever accrues to it does so not from need but from abundance. Hence it already abounds when it is seen; just as when rivulets flow from a fountain, we should not say that the fountain lacks them, but that it has them gathered within itself — not yet flowing and unfolded. So the divine essence has all things within itself and abounds in all things; and whoever sees it will desire nothing in the seeing. For the vision of the attributes and relations is rather a kind of unfolding of the vision, just as their emanation is not a new perfection but a kind of exposition of the perfections that arise from the essence.

As for the fourth argument, which belongs to Vázquez: I respond that it rests on complete identity, which we deny — and therefore it has no force against us. Furthermore, even granting identity, it concludes nothing, because with supreme identity from the nature of the thing, a diversity both of effects and of cognition can coexist. For the essence is not referred; the relation is referred. Likewise: the essence is communicated, the relation is not communicated; the essence does not terminate the hypostatic union, the relation terminates it. Just as, therefore, supreme identity admits these distinctions in being, so it will admit similar distinctions in seeing.

And arguing against Vázquez: he denies that the inclusion of the attributes and relations in the essence, and of the essence in them, and mutual predication, follow from the divine identity — and he denies this against Suárez (*I*, p. I, d. CXIX). Therefore he is also bound to deny mutual vision. Hence if it does not follow that the essence is included in the relations so as to have one and the same concept, neither will it follow from the cognition of one that there is cognition of the other.

I press further: those things which generate different concepts can be known by different cognitions; but by Vázquez's account the essence and the relation generate different concepts; therefore they can be known by different cognitions, even granting the identity of the objects. I press again: that vision which was of the essence and of the relations together, once the relations are set aside, would retain the same numerical character with respect to the essence — altogether the same and unchanged. Nor may you object that the image and

representation would be different, because those are intentional characters that do not alter the essence of cognition and vision. Also because that is only a different termination with respect to objects, not an intrinsic change in the subject.

The fifth argument, which was Suárez's, is resolved as follows: I say that it is fluid and not precise, and less apt because it applies to all kinds of things. For the same argument applies to every case of exclusive cognition of one object from another, and will be a general argument. Let us apply the reasoning with a given example. Whoever knows a rational animal, then abstracts cognition from the rational element, resting in cognition of the animal alone — does he thereby produce a specifically or only numerically distinct cognition? Then let us infer with Suárez that this abstraction is impossible, because that exclusive cognition is distinct from another neither in species nor in number.

Indeed by the same reasoning of Suárez it is proved that it is impossible to see one thing without another. For if someone sees a multicolored thing, and accommodates his eye so that he sees only one color — or if the other colors he was seeing are covered and only one is shown — it will be denied that this can happen, for that reason of Suárez's. For that vision of one color would be of neither kind of distinction — neither specific nor numerical — and therefore it would be no vision at all, and thus impossible. From this appears the defect of Suárez's argument from the overabundance of its proof.

We respond first that, however his dilemma may stand, that inadequate and exclusive vision is possible — just as that cognition of animal abstracted from rational is possible, and that vision of one color among the diversity of colors is possible — because experience teaches us this. Lest we seem to be evading the question, we respond that that cognition would differ specifically and numerically from another, because the object "rational animal joined with rational" is different from "animal taken alone," and the vision of only one color differs from the vision of all — and this arises from the nature of the image, which follows the nature of the things represented. Hence the image of only one color cannot be of the same species as the image of all colors; nor can the cognition of one simple thing be the cognition of things distinct in species or quasi-species.

I would thus respond in line with common philosophy. But since Scotus in *In I Sent.*, d. I, q. II, second arg., n. VI — as Suárez notes in *lib. II de Attrib.*, c. XXIII, n. XX — indicates or supposes that the vision of God without attributes and relations would be numerically the same as the vision of the essence together with them (for he says: "The same vision could not remain unless it were of the same essence; but it can remain without those things being seen in it — retaining the primary object, setting aside the secondary"), I must respond differently.

I concede that the exclusive vision of the essence from the attributes and relations would be numerically the same, because with the primary object remaining — which contained it in its principal formal representation — the vision is considered to remain numerically the same; it does not perish through the subtraction of the secondary object. Just as the vision of one color would remain the same on a canvas on which there were together with a white color some shadows added by a painter to intensify the whiteness — if someone covered those shadows and left the color intact, the same vision would remain. So also in that vision which was simultaneously of the essence and of the relations, once the relations are abstracted, the same numerical character with respect to the essence would remain — altogether the same and unchanged.

Nor may you object that the image and representation would differ, because these are intentional characters that do not alter the essence of cognition and vision. Furthermore because that is only a different termination toward objects, not an intrinsic change in the subject.

But so that the reader may be completely at rest, and so that Suárez may fall silent — I say finally that Scotus did not expressly state whether that vision would be specifically or numerically the same; he only said that it would remain the same, whether in species or in number. And in whichever way it would be, this is irrelevant to the doctrine, as I noted at the outset. I have dealt at greater length with Suárez because he is accustomed to treat matters more diffusely.

JUDGMENT

The position of Scotus is valid. This is clear from the force of the arguments proving it and from the resolution of the objections attacking it. Let me add from my own resources some not inconsiderable points.

First: those relations and attributes generate, from their own nature, formally different concepts from the essence, as we showed in the proximate difference; therefore they can be abstracted from the vision and concept of the seen essence. If the adversaries deny this, I persuade them thus. The essence is one with itself, wholly of itself and unto itself; the attributes are from it and look to other things — Eternity to duration, Immensity to place, Omnipotence to possibles, Mercy to miseries, Justice to rewards and punishments. Of the relations there is no need to speak. By this reason they engender from their own nature diverse cognitions — according to which cognitions it does not involve a contradiction that, by divine power, they should be attained and seen separately in an exclusive vision. For if by abstractive cognition they are in actual fact separately known by us, why would it involve a contradiction for them to be seen separately and apart by divine power — especially with God freely conferring the light and concurring with the vision as he wills?

Second: the light of glory, in the position of our adversaries, is the rule of vision, so that in accordance with its power and degrees — the natural power of the

intellect being set aside — the vision is diversified among the Blessed, some seeing more, others less perfectly, according to the intensity and remission of the light. Hence something will be hidden to one that will be apparent to another, and yet both will intuitively see the simple God. Therefore even now in actual fact God is not altogether adequately attained through beatific vision. Why, then, would it involve a contradiction that the light of glory should be so accommodated that the persons are hidden while the essence is apparent? For those things in God that are hidden to the less blessed are no less identical with those that are apparent to the more blessed — and yet this identity does not remove this diversity of seeing. Therefore the identity among essence, attributes, and relations will not prevent one person from seeing them separately and another seeing all together through God's absolute power.

Nor may you counter that the diversity would lie in the mode and not through subtraction of something in the object. For I object that that mode involves within itself the thing from which the diversity of mode arises. Furthermore, what will that mode of seeing God more imperfectly be, except some subtraction of things in the object? I show this as follows. It is not an obscurity of the light, which is clear and concurs with intuitive vision; it is not a defect in the vision, because it is not abstractive. Therefore it is an abstraction of things in the object — from which it follows that that mode is seated on the side of the object; and however it be, it always flows back into the object: whether it proceeds from diminished light, or from a defect of cognition, it ultimately reaches the object — or proceeds from the object, which is not perfectly known through the intuitive vision.

Third: the relations, considered in terms of their nature, produce many effects that the essence cannot provide — such as being referred and directed to each other relatively, and terminating the essence respectively, and constituting the persons, and hypostatically uniting to themselves a created nature — which certainly do not and cannot fit the essence. This is clear in the Incarnation of the divine Word, to whose suppositum human nature was hypostatically united — an effect which the nature cannot produce. Therefore to that to which these different effects belong, a distinct cognition can belong; and accordingly just as in reality the person terminates the union immediately and apart from the essence, and the essence does not terminate it, so they will be separately known through a beatific vision terminated to the essence but not to the persons. Let God show to some intellect that Mystery: this intellect will see the essence not immediately united to human nature. Let the vision remain there; it will not tend toward the terminating person. Therefore it will now behold the nature alone, abstracting from the person — in whatever way the latter is distinguished from the former.

Fourth, and probable: the relations, from their own nature, do not express any perfection. Therefore they are not required essentially and necessarily for

Beatitude. The antecedent is probable, as will appear in its proper place. The consequence is clear because what lacks perfection is not necessarily required for beatifying. For beatitude, which is the comprehension of perfections, is not completed by what is not by its own nature perfect and cannot perfect its possessor. All beatitude therefore rests in what is perfect — such is the essence, not the relation. Therefore the nature alone beatifies, not the relation.

The Thomists are most pressed by this argument — as even Suárez testifies — since they more frequently accept the assumption in the first antecedent and agree with the Scotists in denying perfection to the relations; as is seen in Capreolus (*In I Sent.*, d. VII, q. I, concl. I, concl. II) and Cajetan (*I p.*, q. XXVIII, a. II, *circa sol.* q. III *un.*) and Durandus (*In III Sent.*, d. I, q. III, n. XIII). For these reasons and those adduced above I am moved to judge that Scotus's position on the exclusive vision of the essence from the attributes and relations is considerably more probable than that of Saint Thomas.

Now I turn to the other lesser questions connected with this principal one.

COROLLARY I. Can One Attribute and One Relation Be Seen without Another?

The Scotists disagree among themselves on this question, and it must therefore be treated carefully. Pontius (*d.* IV, n. LI) denies it from the nature of the relative, and says it is altogether necessary that when one is seen, the other is seen as well. Mastrius holds the contrary (*q.* VIII, a. I) and refutes Pontius. Let us see what Scotus thinks.

He clearly thinks that one can be seen without another by God's absolute power. For he says in *In I Sent.*, d. I, q. II, §*quantum*, n. V: "That the intellect sees the essence but not the person, or one person but not another." This is manifest, and Lychetus reports it (n. I). The Doctor does not, however, specifically prove this — from which it appears that it rests on nearly the same foundations as the principal question. I adduce what is sufficient.

First: those relations are distinguished from each other and are really distinct as objects; therefore they can be known separately. Second: the relation of the Son terminates the hypostatic union; therefore it alone can be known. Third: if anything were an obstacle, it would be the respect of the relative to its correlative; but this is not an obstacle; therefore the conclusion follows. The minor is proved because a non-mutual relation can stand without the correlative term; therefore it can also be known without it. From this it follows that even where the correlative is present, the mutual relation can be known without it. The inference is proved because the termination of the relation to the correlative is something extrinsic to the relation; therefore the cognition of the relation can stand without the cognition of it. The example is clear: we know someone to be a father in the absence of the son, and a son in the absence of the father. Fourth: let God reveal to someone the termination of the hypostatic

union to the person of the Word; this person will then see the person of the Word, abstracting from the other persons. Therefore the vision of one person without the vision of another does not involve a contradiction.

These foundations, in my judgment, settle the matter. The same, I think, should be said concerning the attributes compared among themselves according to their formal and distinct characters — even though in this regard the mind of Scotus, which we ought to derive by a kind of inference from what he has said regarding the principal conclusion, does not appear clearly.

COROLLARY II. Can the Relations and Attributes Be Attained and Seen without the Essence?

I do not find this treated by our authors. I say first: the attributes cannot be seen without the essence being seen. The reason is that even though they are formally distinguished from the essence, they are nonetheless, as it were, its proper attributes — and they cannot be taken in abstraction from it but only in concretion; otherwise they will not be divine but indifferent. For if Justice were known apart from the divine essence, it would appear as abstracted from God; therefore not divine, and hence not a divine attribute.

Second: because each and every one of them includes infinity, which is altogether divine. Therefore when they are known intuitively, their infinity is attained, and therefore also the divine character from which they cannot be abstracted. For although higher things can be known without lower ones — as animal without rational, and rational without risible — yet lower things cannot be known without higher ones, because they presuppose and include them. Therefore although the essence can be seen without the attributes, the attributes cannot be seen without the essence — because the essence is as a superior with respect to the attributes, which are as its proper attributes; and the attributes stand as inferiors with respect to the essence.

I say second: the divine relations cannot be intuitively seen without the essence. The proof: although the relations are formally different from the essence — and more so than the attributes — they nevertheless inhere in the essence as regards their being, according to the common teaching of all and the private teaching of the Doctor. Therefore they cannot be abstracted from the essence. This is clear because proper predicates cannot be known without the common predicates included in the proper ones; but that character of inherence is common to all relations; therefore they cannot be known without it. The major is certain, because a man cannot be understood without rational animal, nor can Peter without the same. The minor is Scotus's. The consequence holds, and there is no need to dwell further on this.

In summary: the essence can be seen through beatific vision by God's absolute power without the attributes and persons; and one attribute without another,

and one relation without another; but the attributes and relations cannot be seen without the essence.

As for fruition, there is no need to speak of it separately, since the resolution follows from this matter: as we have defined regarding cognition, so is it to be defined regarding fruition, since fruition follows cognition.

COLLATION III. DIFFERENCE III. Concerning the Proposition "God Exists": Is It Self-Evident or Not?

The question is debated between Saint Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. II) and Scotus (*In I Sent.*, d. II). Saint Thomas says in article I of the body: "I say therefore that this proposition, 'God exists,' is in itself self-evident, because its predicate is the same as its subject — for God is his own being; but because we do not know what God is, it is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by means of things more known to us and less known by nature, that is, through effects."

Then, *ad primum*: "To know that God exists in some general way, obscurely, is naturally implanted in us — insofar, namely, as God is the beatitude of man; for man naturally desires beatitude." And afterward, in q. II, a. III: "Whether God exists? I respond in the body: 'God exists' can be proved by five ways — from motion, from the notion of efficient cause, from possibility and necessity, from degrees found in things, and from the governance of things."

Scotus in *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. I, *§ex his patet*, n. III, says: "No distinction between 'self-evident in itself' and 'self-evident to us' is valid, because whatever is self-evident in itself is self-evident to any intellect, even if not actually known — yet insofar as it proceeds from its terms, it is evidently knowable if the terms are conceived." Then below, *§ex his ad quaestionem*, n. IV: "The proposition 'God exists' is self-evident, which joins these extremes: 'to be' and 'the divine essence' — as this: 'God exists' means that existence is his own proper being."

Furthermore, in proving that God exists — that is, that there is a God who exists in reality — in answering the question "whether God exists," they differ in certain respects which we will dispute afterward.

SECTION I. The Objection Against Scotus Is Set Forth and Examined

Scotus impugns that distinction of a proposition that is self-evident in itself from one self-evident to us — or, as he puts it, self-evident and knowable — and he does so well, by the following reasoning: a self-evident proposition is clear from its own terms; but the terms are not changed by an external hearer; therefore it is always self-evident. For it will be accidental if it is not understood by the hearer. Otherwise we will destroy all other truths by introducing that mode of distinguishing. For then "Man is a rational animal" will not be self-evident in itself, because it is not known to those of us who understand less —

and thus we would say: "Man is a rational animal" is self-evident in itself, but not to us. The same will apply to similar truths that are not known to everyone. We ought not therefore to consider another's ignorance and measure truths by it. What is once by its nature such, always remains such. Therefore a proposition that is self-evident from its own terms is always self-evident — and we need not estimate its nature from alien ears.

Furthermore, it is remarkable that Saint Thomas proposed one thing in the title and course of the question and answered another in the body and resolution of the question. This is clear because the question was "whether God exists" — that is, as regards existence — and this he proposes, and he treats it with arguments, and applies to it the passage from *Psalms* LII: "The fool has said in his heart, 'God does not exist.'" And again in the title: "Whether God exists?" But the answer in the body concerns "what" — namely, what God is; that is, that God is his own being. Let us look at the response in the body of article I: "I say therefore that this proposition, 'God exists,' is in itself self-evident, because the predicate is the same as the subject — for God is his own being."

This response is different from the question. The question was: "Whether God exists?" in the title; and the fool was saying of this: "God does not exist." The response concerns what God is — namely, that God is his own being. This is therefore not responsive to the question; nor does it satisfy to say that the other question is contained in this response. I deny this, and rightly. For granted that God is his own being, it does not follow that God exists in the nature of things. For one might say: "If God is given, he will be his own being; but it is not established whether he exists." Let us first ask "Whether he exists?" Then we will ask "What is he?"

The fool denies that God exists, and consequently denies that he is his own being. Therefore it must first be proved that God exists — that is, that there is a God, that God exists — against the fool. Then it must be shown what this God is, who from the side of reality is given and exists. Scotus foresaw this, and therefore distinctly stated in *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. II, *§ ex his, ad quaestionem*: "The proposition is self-evident which joins these extremes: to be and the divine essence, as this: 'God is his own proper being'" — where he expressly distinguished God's being in himself in relation to his own being (which was the "what" of the question) from the other existence of God, which pertained to the other question "whether he is" — to which he then responds in its proper place, and rightly, because here Scotus was only treating of the self-evident proposition concerning God's being; and the only self-evident one was this: "God exists through his own essence in himself, including existence in the concept of Deity," as Scotus teaches (*Quodlibet* I, and VI, and here d. II, q. II, in I).

Yet it is true that Saint Thomas afterward in article III responds to this proper question, proving that God exists in the nature of things, under the title "Whether God exists."

SECTION II. A Second Objection of Scotus Is Adduced and Weighed Against Cajetan

Scotus again impugns that inference of Saint Thomas in the response to the third objection of *Summa Theologiae* I, q. II: "That truth exists in general is self-evident, but that the first truth exists is not self-evident to us." The reason for the impugnation is as follows: from the fact that there is no truth, the proposition "It is not true that some truth does not exist" does not directly follow, but rather "It is not true that some truth exists" — because there is a transition from a negative proposition having two grounds of truth to an affirmative proposition that is one of them. That is: the proposition "No truth exists," to be universally true, must negate its own truth. For it contradicts itself — if it is true, and this is a fallacy committed in the consequent — because it does not follow from the fact that there is no truth that it is true that some truth does not exist, since that very proposition is some truth.

How then is there no truth, if there is some truth in this proposition that denies that truth exists?

Cajetan here denies to Scotus what he assumes — that it follows rightly from the negative "No truth exists" that this negative also follows: "Therefore it is not true that some truth exists" — but denies that this follows: "Therefore it is true that some truth does not exist." Thus Scotus in *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. II, n. VIII. And Cajetan errs in two ways.

First, because he attributes to Scotus a proposition that Scotus did not state. For Cajetan in his commentary on *Summa Theologiae* I, q. II, a. I, *§ad hoc*, states it thus: "No truth exists; therefore that no truth exists is true." But Scotus did not say this; rather he said: "It is true that some truth does not exist." Some, not none. This is Cajetan's first error: attributing to Scotus what he did not say.

The second error is saying that Scotus unknowingly conceded what he should not have — namely, by denying that proposition in the mode: "It is true that some truth does not exist." The eagerness to impugn Scotus misled Cajetan. Let us show him the subtlety and truth of Scotus.

That proposition is most true, posited that universal: "No truth exists" — namely: "It is not true that some truth exists." This is clear because if there is no truth in general, there is no truth in particular — and accordingly it is rightly said: "It is not true that some truth exists," since it is false that some truth exists. For to affirm that some truth exists, with that universal posited — "No truth exists" — is a contradiction: "None exists; some exists." Hence from that universal negative it follows: "It is not true that some truth exists."

The affirmative proposition after that universal — "No truth exists; therefore it is true that some truth does not exist" — is not true. This is clear because in this affirmative proposition the word "some" limits the universal negation to some

particular truth, denying truth in the particular in some cases, not in all. In this way "It is true that some things are not true" — which mode of speaking signifies that some things are also true. For whoever posits that some things are not true presupposes that some things are true. Therefore from that universal negative "No truth exists," this particular affirmative does not follow: "It is certain that some things are not true" — since it should have been said: "It is certain that nothing is true."

For he who says "No man is a stone" does not leave room for saying "It is certain that some man is not a stone" — for from the latter it would follow that some man is also a stone. But it must be said: "It is certain that no man is a stone," or "It is not true, or it is false, that some man is a stone." Here you see that the word "some" in an affirmative proposition is equivalent to a particular, and in a negative to a universal — so that to say "It is not true that some man is a stone" is equivalent to saying "No man is a stone." Not so in the affirmative "It is true that some man is not a stone," where "some" leaves room for others to be stones — and accordingly it is not equivalent to the universal "No man is a stone."

So great is the difference that Cajetan missed between an affirmative and a negative mode. Let Cajetan seek his defenses and cease pursuing Scotus: he called that most learned eagle one who does not know. These things are subtle and proper to the subtle doctor — I do not deny that Cajetan is subtle; I know the man's acuity — but Scotus is nonetheless considerably more subtle than he. Cajetan was more cunning, for in order to impugn Scotus he invented the proposition on which his impugnation rests — namely: "It is certain that no truth exists." This was not Scotus's proposition; his was: "It is certain that some truth does not exist." Scotus rejects the latter, not the former, as is clear from my analysis. Nor could Scotus have argued otherwise against Saint Thomas, who said in his response to the third objection: "That truth exists in general is self-evident; but that the first truth exists is not known to us" — arguing from the universal to the particular. Hence Scotus similarly argues from the universal to the particular — and well, as we have shown. And so we withhold our judgment here.

COLLATION III. DIFFERENCE IV. Concerning the Argument of Saint Thomas for Proving God's Infinity.

SOLE SECTION

Saint Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. VII, a. I, argues as follows to prove God's infinity in the body of the article: "Something is called infinite from the fact that it is not finite. Now something is made finite in one way by matter through form, and in another way by form through matter. Matter is made finite by form insofar as matter, before it receives the form, is in potency to many forms; but when it receives one it is terminated by it. Form is made finite by matter insofar as form in itself is common to many things; but when it is received in matter, it

becomes the form determinately of this thing. Now matter is perfected by the form through which it is terminated; and therefore according to what belongs to matter, form has the character of the imperfect — for it is as matter not yet having form. But form is not perfected by matter; rather through matter its amplitude is contracted. Hence the infinite, which stands on the side of form not determined by matter, has the character of the perfect."

Saint Thomas takes the root or principle of infinity from the negation of material limitation — or, as Scotus puts it, from immateriality.

Against this, Scotus in *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. II, §*ultimo ostenditur*, n. XXXIII, says: "It is shown" — referring the position of Saint Thomas — "that what was proposed, namely God's infinity, arises from the negation of an extrinsic cause, because form is made finite by matter; therefore what is not by nature in matter is infinite." He continues: "This argument is of no force, because according to them the angel is immaterial; therefore by this reasoning it will be infinite in nature. Nor can they say that the being of an angel limits its essence, because according to them being is an accident of essence and naturally posterior; and thus in the first moment of nature the essence, considered in itself as prior, seems to be intrinsically infinite; and consequently in the second moment of nature it will not be finable through being."

Then Scotus presents his own argument, properly and aptly proving finitude and infinity: "Every entity has intrinsically its own degree of perfection — by which it is finite if it is finite, or infinite if it is infinite. If therefore it is finite, it is not made finite by something else." And he concludes: "Briefly I state one proposition: that whatever essence is absolutely finite is in itself finite, as it is prior to all comparison of itself with another essence."

JUDGMENT

Scotus is right both in his impugnation and in his own position. For the argument drawn from the negation of finitude and infinity relative to something else does not prove but rather presupposes finitude and infinity in themselves. Cajetan was afraid here, and therefore in his commentary he made a subtle sub-distinction. And to Scotus's argument he responds obscurely and in my judgment unsatisfactorily.

For Saint Thomas clearly argues for infinity from the negation of material limitation when he expressly says: "Form is not perfected by matter but rather through matter its amplitude is contracted. Hence the infinite, which stands on the side of form not determined by matter, has the character of the perfect." Behold — form in itself, not terminated by matter, is of such amplitude as to be infinite. Hence Scotus rightly argues that the angel would be infinite, since it is an immaterial and incomposite being according to Saint Thomas, and therefore unterminated and infinite.

Nor does it help to say that in article II of the same question it is taught that matter is infinite in a qualified sense. For this is no wonder, since matter is a part and imperfect, and does not in itself subsist or exist according to Saint Thomas. From which it follows that form would be infinite in another way, since it gives being to matter and does not receive it. And although Saint Thomas afterward says in the same article II that angels are infinite in a qualified sense, this does not resolve the difficulty — because he departs from the principle of immateriality he had posited, moving to another new principle about being that does not exist of itself or through itself but is limited — which raises the question anew. What limits and terminates it, if it lacks both matter and form, which were in the first article the principles and causes of termination and limitation?

That principle therefore collapses. I press with Scotus: in article I, the ground of finitude was drawn from the termination of matter by form and of form by matter — through which its amplitude is contracted. But the angel lacks both terminations, since it lacks matter, and form is immaterial and self-subsisting; therefore nothing is lacking to it for infinity according to that doctrine.

Now, however, in article II another ground is posited — namely, that it has being and is not its own being. Therefore the first was not adequate or sufficient. Furthermore, I argue as follows: Saint Thomas here in article II says that matter and form in themselves are infinite in a qualified sense, and he adds that angels are also infinite in a qualified sense. But this seems difficult for two inconvenient reasons.

The first: the angel is much more perfect than matter and form, but these are infinite in a qualified sense; therefore the angel should be infinite in a simple and unqualified sense. For there is no other way to express his perfection beyond matter and form in themselves, which is inconvenient. The second: the angel would have two infinities — one by reason of lacking matter, another by reason of lacking form — and would thus be doubly infinite, which is equally inconvenient.

But the Thomist will say: there will be one perfect and total infinity. Then I rejoin: therefore infinite perfectly in its own order. From which it follows that by its own nature the angel is infinite — and thus simply so in that order — and the inconvenient conclusion follows of admitting an angel that is by nature infinite in its being.

Moreover the doctrine of Saint Thomas does not seem expedited when he says that the angel, being a subsisting created form which is not its own being, has its being received and contracted to the proposed nature. For here I pause at that way of saying that being is received and contracted to a terminated nature. For how is it received if in the angel there is no matter? And how, if the nature of

itself, prior to its existence, is immaterial and unterminated, can it be said to be a terminated nature?

This is what Scotus argues — and I would add that the nature, through the received existence, would be limited and terminated just as matter is through the received form. Therefore existence is not contracted to a terminated nature; rather the unterminated nature, like matter, is contracted to existence received in the manner of a form into the nature. The matter seems involved, not explained.

But the sharp Thomists — angels among men — will say that the Angelic Doctor has sufficiently explained himself in article I toward the end of the body, when he excepted God from these modes of improper infinities by saying: "That which is most formal of all is being itself (*ipsum esse*). Since therefore the divine being is not being received in something, but he himself is his own subsisting being, it is manifest that God himself is infinite and perfect." From this appears the difference of divine infinity from its excellence of being — on account of which he is infinite and infinitely perfect.

This, however, does not weaken the difficulty, because the phrase "most formal" does not exclude other formal things, even if they are less formal than it. Therefore it does not exclude the angels — who are quite formal — from an infinity proper and proportionate to them; such as is the infinity of a relation in the divine persons, which, while not as infinite as the essence, is nonetheless in its own proper order relatively infinite according to the Thomists.

I press again: the argument for the infinity of this most formal being is that it is not received in anything. But this argument applies to the angel, whose being is not received in anything — since it is self-subsisting, as is stated in that second article at the end of the body. And if this being signifies only the being of existence, the earlier inconvenience returns: existence cannot terminate the nature that was presupposed to be terminated — and accordingly it will be both a terminating and a non-terminating ground; and Scotus's argument resurfaces: "They cannot say that the being of the angel limits its essence, because according to them being is an accident of the essence and naturally posterior; and thus in the first moment of nature the essence, considered in itself as prior, seems to be intrinsically infinite; and consequently in the second moment of nature it will not be finable through being."

I confirm this doctrine with the following example: the person of the Word is in himself and antecedently infinite, and through the hypostatic union with what is finite does not lose his infinity, which he previously had. Therefore neither can the angelic nature, which antecedes existence, be made finite and limited by it.

Finally Scotus shows his acuity by impugning the inference drawn from that principle: "Since form is limited by matter, therefore if it is not related to matter, it is not limited." This is the fallacy of the consequent. "A body is limited

by a body; therefore if it is not related to a body it is infinite; therefore the last heaven will be infinite." This is the sophism of *Physics* III — because just as a prior body in itself is finite before it is made finite by another body, so a finite form is first made finite in itself, because such is the nature of those beings that are made finite, before it is made finite by matter. For the second finitude presupposes the first and does not cause it. Therefore in the first moment of nature the essence of the angel is finite; therefore it cannot be made finite by being; therefore in the second moment of nature it is not made finite by being.

This manner of arguing plainly convinces and shows the fallacy of that consequent. It is therefore established that all created things are by their own nature finite and limited in themselves, because they are effects of that infinite Creator God, on whom they depend and from whom they are — through definite and limited actions — and are actualized as individuated and finite, drawn from nothing, from non-being to being, freely and contingently by God. And for this reason they require a definite and limited existence, which follows the limitation and finitude of created nature. In a word: because they are such created natures, they are absolutely finite before any reference to anything else — finite from themselves and intrinsically; just as they are also intrinsically and of themselves mutable and defective.

As for how infinity is established in God, Scotus proves it extensively and subtly in that *In I Sent.*, q. II, d. II — the sum of which he makes in §*Ex praedictis*, n. XXXIV, from the triple primacy of being: efficiency, finality, and eminence — because it is the first efficient cause, because it is the first knowing, because it is the ultimate end, because it is the most eminent. And he concludes by arguing thus: "Some being triply first among beings exists in actuality; that which is triply first among beings is infinite; therefore some actually existing infinite being exists" — and in this it has been proved that it is about God. Therefore God is infinite.

COLLATION IV. DIFFERENCE I. On the First and Adequate Object of Our Intellect.

SECTION I. Whether Scotus Judges Rightly and Impugns Justly

Two things are to be examined. First, whether Scotus faithfully reports the opinion of the Angelic Doctor. Second, whether he impugns it rightly and justly. The reason for doubt about the first is that Saint Thomas did not state the question under those precise terms. Second, because in Scotus's text a passage is cited at *Summa Theologiae* I, q. V, a. II, where nothing of this matter is treated. Hence whoever consults that passage will rightly wonder whether Scotus justly attributed that opinion to the Angelic Doctor.

Therefore other passages must be adduced — which I now provide.

Saint Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XII, a. IV, in the body says: "Therefore it is connatural to us to know those things that have being only in individual matter — because our soul, through which we know, is the form of some matter. This soul, however, has two cognitive powers. One that is the act of some corporeal organ — and to this it is connatural to know things as they exist in individual matter; hence the senses know only particulars. The other cognitive power of the soul is the intellect, which is not the act of any bodily organ; hence through the intellect it is connatural to us to know natures, which indeed have being only in individual matter — yet not insofar as they are in individual matter, but insofar as they are abstracted from it by the consideration of the intellect. Hence through the intellect we can know such things universally, which is beyond the power of sense. But to the angelic intellect it is connatural to know natures not existing in matter."

Again, in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXXXIV, a. VII, in the body: "But the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things, it even ascends to some knowledge of invisible things. Now it belongs to the definition of this nature that it should exist in some individual — which cannot be without corporeal matter; as it belongs to the definition of the nature of a stone to exist in this stone, of the nature of a horse to exist in this horse, and so of others. Hence the nature of a stone, or of any material thing, cannot be known completely and truly unless known as existing in the particular. But the particular we apprehend by sense and imagination. And therefore, for the intellect to understand its proper object, it is necessary for it to turn toward phantasms, so as to consider the universal nature existing in the particular. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form, or if the forms of sensible things subsisted apart from particulars as the Platonists hold, it would not be necessary for the intellect always, in understanding, to turn toward phantasms."

Quite similar — indeed clearer — things are found in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXXXV, a. I, in the body.

Scotus in *In I Sent.*, d. III, q. III, n. II, says: "On this question there is one opinion, which says that the first object of our intellect is the quiddity of material things; the reason given for this is that a power is proportioned to its object. Now there are three kinds of cognitive power. One is wholly separate from matter both in being and in operating — such as a separated intellect. Another is joined to matter both in being and in operating — such as an organic power, which perfects matter and operates only through an organ from which, in operating, it is not separated, any more than in being. Another is joined to matter in being but does not use a material organ in operating — such as our intellect. To these correspond proportionate objects. For to the power wholly separate, as the first, there should correspond a quiddity wholly separate from matter; to the second,

the purely material singular; to the third, therefore, corresponds the quiddity of material things — which, though it exists in matter, is nevertheless known not as in singular matter."

He then objects: "This cannot be maintained by a theologian, because the intellect existing as the same power will know the quiddity of immaterial substance — as is clear according to faith concerning the Blessed Soul. But a power remaining the same cannot have an act regarding something that is not contained under its primary object."

Thus Scotus reports the opinion of Saint Thomas and begins to attack it. As for the first — that he reports it faithfully — he acted well and faithfully; nor do I know of any Thomist who has reproached him for this. For although Saint Thomas stated the question in his own terms rather than Scotus's, the sense is the same. For from his positing of those two modes of knowing — the human intellect knowing through matter and abstraction from individual matter, and the angelic intellect knowing through independence from matter and immediate tendency toward immaterial objects — it follows that the first and adequate object of our intellect is the quiddity of material things, since immaterial reality in itself pertains immediately to the angel alone. This is more clearly established from the second passage, where he distinctly states: "The proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter."

And although he does not say "adequate" but only "proper," from this it rightly follows, since it is proper in the fourth mode — as appears from the examples adduced of the nature of stone and of horse — and moreover those limits of individual matter and the recourse to phantasms do not allow the intellect to go beyond them; and thus they constitute material being as the adequate object of the intellect. If the intellect cannot exceed it, it is certainly adequate to it.

The same is clear from the third passage, q. LXXXV, a. I, where from the proportion of object to power he deduces: "It is proper to the human intellect to know form existing in corporeal matter individually — yet not as it is in such matter, abstracting the form from individual matter, which the phantasms represent." And he says that angels know material things through immaterial means. And: "It is therefore necessary to say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from phantasms, and through material things so considered it arrives at some knowledge of immaterial things."

This is confirmed by the fact that there he refutes Plato, who — considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not the fact that it is in some way united to a body — posited separate ideas as the object of the intellect. It is therefore clear from these passages that Saint Thomas held the first and adequate object to be the quiddity of material things. First, because the intellect immersed in matter receives species from the senses and immediately knows

material things. Adequate, because although it knows immaterial things, it knows them only by abstracting from the matter in which it is engaged — and is therefore straitened and confined within the prison of matter.

The reason why Saint Thomas held this is that it always seemed to him that there was a necessary proportion between the mode of being and the mode of knowing — as appears from these passages, and as Scotus notes here a little later, which we are not now treating but will treat in its proper place.

The position of Saint Thomas having been set forth, let us proceed to Scotus's impugnations, which I will summarize. First: the human intellect, by its own nature immaterial, connaturally knows the quiddity of immaterial substance — indeed, as is clear through faith, it knows God; and although it is elevated through the light of glory, this takes nothing from the power, which is prior to it, since every habit naturally presupposes the power. The recourse to phantasms does not change the nature of the intellect, which naturally desires to know what is proportionate to it. That is a contingent bond for the knowledge of immaterial things, which it desires to know from their effects.

Second: our intellect in the way of wayfaring knows being in general, under which the material is contained. Therefore its first object will be being in general, under which the other is contained — otherwise Metaphysics would be nothing, or would be no more transcendent than Physics. Then Scotus concludes: "Speaking of the nature of the power, the opinion of Saint Thomas is to be rejected." So far Scotus.

His arguments are attempted to be resolved by Cajetan in his commentary on *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XII, a. IV, and q. LXXXIV, a. VII, defending the opinion of Saint Thomas from the same foundations.

SECTION II. The Position of Scotus Is Set Forth and Arguments Against It Are Resolved

Scotus is right. This status of the wayfarer does not hinder the intellect from the connatural knowledge of immaterial things, nor does the intellect know them by the aid and power of material things — but by its own proper and natural powers proportioned to the immaterial object and demanding its knowledge. If I am right, Scotus judged correctly. That I am right I prove as follows.

The nature of the intellect is wholly spiritual and immaterial, and by its own nature demands knowledge proportioned to itself — which is the knowledge of spiritual and immaterial things. Therefore it naturally desires and does know them. The major is certain in both parts and conforms to Saint Thomas, who always requires proportion between essence and intelligence, power and object. The minor is clear, both because a spiritual and immaterial nature corresponds to spiritual and immaterial objects, and the consequence is formal.

Objection: the status in which the intellect exists, dependent on the senses and addicted to phantasms, does not allow it to understand in its own natural mode — as the Angelic Doctor and Cajetan with the rest of the Thomists argue.

I respond first: the objection is of no force, because the senses and phantasms do not hinder the intellect from its natural cognition — rather they serve it and aid it by providing through their servile work the sensible species from which the intellect elicits its spiritual cognition. Therefore the intellect is not subject to the senses and the phantasm for understanding; rather it is served by them as by subjects who minister the instruments of knowing. Nor does the intellect turn to the phantasms with dependence and servitude, but with domination and command — bidding them minister what is necessary for it to understand spiritually and immaterially. In a word: it uses the work of those servants as a lord, and does not understand by their aid and power as a subject.

Second: because the intellect rejects, not receives, those sensible and material species, and from them abstracts and forms immaterial intelligible species — leaving those aside, retaining these, and understanding immediately through these. Therefore it does not turn to the phantasms so as to depend on them; nor is this a conversion but an aversion from matter and a rejection of material things, and a conversion to immaterial things, which it immediately attains and knows.

Third: because therefore the agent intellect is given in the soul — to separate the material from the immaterial, and to produce an object proportioned to the passive intellect, which by its own nature requires an immaterial principle for knowing an immaterial object. This response has greater force in the position of Saint Thomas and the Thomists, whom the Complutensians cite and follow (*de intel. agente*, n. X), positing the agent intellect as really distinct from the passive and instituted for this alone — to elicit those phantasms, in order to produce together with itself an immaterial intelligible species, which it injects into the passive intellect so that through it the passive intellect understands universals and immaterial things. From this the objection is turned back against Cajetan and the Thomists: so far is the intellect from dependence and recourse to phantasms that it is altogether opposed to them, and receives nothing from them — rather it has as its minister the agent intellect, wholly distinct from itself, to supply immediately the immaterial intelligible species, diverse from sensible and material ones.

Therefore the intellect is not determined to the quiddity of material things — since both in reality and in representation it is alien from them. And if indeed the agent intellect is given in the separated soul, as the common opinion holds, it is manifestly clear from its own nature that the intellect knows without any dependence and recourse to phantasms, and that that status of association with matter takes nothing from its perfection or from the natural mode of knowing. Therefore its object is not the quiddity of material things but the quiddity of

universal and immaterial things; nor is material reality the medium or reason for knowing immaterial reality — rather, on the contrary, immaterial reality is both the medium and the reason for knowing material things, as in the angel, who through the power and work of immaterial species understands material things.

For in the probable position the agent intellect is given in the angel — whether distinct from or the same as the possible — just as in the human soul. Therefore just as the angel naturally and immediately understands spiritual and immaterial things, and from them material things, so also man through his intellect knows immaterial things, and through them material and sensible things.

Finally: the cognition of the object occurs through proportionate media and species; but in the intellect there are no material but immaterial media and species; therefore through these all objects are known by the intellect. They represent immaterial things to it; therefore these are contained in the object of the intellect — and primarily so, with material things secondarily. Material things are therefore not the first and adequate object of the intellect.

Indeed I consider that no other difference exists between angelic cognition (setting aside the nobility of being) and human cognition than that the angelic species are infused by God, while the human ones are acquired. This is clear because since the intellect of each is wholly spiritual and immaterial, it is not capable of material and sensible species — from which it results that that is the only difference, that the angelic are infused and the human acquired. This reasoning I believe to be true and solid, and it demonstrates that the arguments of Scotus are adequate.

Cajetan objects most recently (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXXXIV, a. VII, §*ad primum dictum*) that Scotus — constrained by the truth — says that the quiddity of the sensible is the object of our intellect in the present state in the character of the motive, though he speaks less philosophically, denying this in the character of the terminative. To this objection Lychetus responds in his commentary on that passage of Scotus (*In I Sent.*, d. III, q. III, n. VII) — and well. But I will perhaps speak more aptly and briefly: Scotus spoke of the character of the motive — that is, of the primary motion from the side of the senses, which move proximately and immediately by inserting sensible species into the imagination, moving the intellect through them remotely to understand all things, both immaterial and material, terminatively — that is, objectively — attaining all these things adequately by knowing them. Hence Scotus spoke philosophically, not speaking of the extrinsic or formal motive ground of understanding, but of the intrinsic motive ground from the side of the senses, which give the intellect occasion to know insensible and immaterial things. And his use of the word "terminating" was proper. For what else is it for the intellect to be terminated to an object than

to know the object? What else is it for sight to be terminated to the colored than to see the colored?

Thus Cajetan's objection is dissolved and Scotus's mode of speaking is defended.

But I report back in kind what should sting him. Saint Thomas, in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. V, a. II, disputing whether the good according to reason is prior to being, held that the first thing conceived by the intellect is being — and accordingly the first object of the intellect is being. Indeed he calls it both proper and adequate. The words are clear in the body: "Being, according to reason, is prior to the good. For the notion signified by the name is what the intellect conceives of a thing and signifies by a sound. That then is prior according to reason which first falls in the conception of the intellect. Now that which first falls in the conception of the intellect is being — because according to this each thing is knowable insofar as it is in act, as is said in *Metaphysics* IX. Hence being is the proper object of the intellect, and thus is the first intelligible, just as sound is the first audible."

How this opinion coheres with the proximate opinion of the same Saint Thomas affirming that the object of the intellect is the quiddity of material things — this I do not see, nor did Cajetan see it. For in his commentaries on that passage, explaining the mind of Saint Thomas concerning this priority, he says that his reasoning concludes that being is prior in reason not only to the good but to all other things — and he raises the difficulty about God: whether it is also prior to God. For here he seems to affirm it; elsewhere he seems to deny it — namely in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. III, a. I, where it is said in the text, as Cajetan notes, that "nothing is prior to God, either in reality or in understanding" — which seems to conflict with what he said in q. V, a. II.

Cajetan saw this opposition in statement about being and about God, but did not see this one which I have perceived — about being in general and about material being; which latter opinion seems to conflict with those two about being and about God. For according to this most recent passage in q. LXXXIV, a. VII, material being is the prior and more proper object of the intellect than being and than God. Thus three diverse opinions about the object of the intellect remain in Saint Thomas — namely, that it is being in common (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. V, a. II), that it is God (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. III, a. I), and that it is material being (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXXXIV, a. VII). I doubt that the Thomist angelic theologians explain this difficulty; but while they extricate themselves from it, let my judgment stand.

JUDGMENT

Scotus is right both in impugning the opinion of Saint Thomas and in confirming his own, which even as set forth and explained shows itself to be true — nor is there need to advance the judgment further, since from the resolution

of the arguments it is established both that Scotus judged well and that I have judged rightly.

COLLATION IV. DIFFERENCE II. Concerning the Vestige of the Trinity.

SOLE SECTION

The matter is small; but in small matters there is subtlety.

Scotus is not satisfied with the definition of a vestige, nor with its exposition, nor with its application to the Trinity. Let us see what he says in *In III Sent.*, d. III, q. V, §*quantum ad primum*, nn. I and II: "As to the first it is said that a vestige is an impression left by the passing of something over an empty or flat surface, imperfectly representing it — imperfectly because a vestige represents something confusedly and under the character of species; an image perfectly, because under the character of the individual. For through a vestige a horse is distinguished from an ox; one knows that the passing thing was a horse and not an ox; but this horse is not distinguished from that one. But an image distinguishes under the character of the individual, because the image of Jupiter does not represent Caesar."

Saint Thomas says in *In I Sent.*, d. III, a. I: "A vestige is taken metaphorically, by similitude to what is properly called a vestige — which is a certain impression leading confusedly to the knowledge of something, since it does not represent the thing itself except in part, namely the foot and the lower surface alone." And in a. III he admits the assumption in the first argument: "The similitude of vestige is divided against the similitude of image." And in q. III, a. I, openly in the body: "Image differs from vestige in this, that a vestige is a confused similitude of something, imperfect; but an image represents a thing more determinately according to all its parts and dispositions, from which even something about the interior of the thing can be perceived."

In *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XLV, a. VII, in the body: "Every effect represents its cause in some way but differently. For some effect represents only the causality of the cause, but not its form — as smoke represents fire; and such a representation is called a representation of vestige. A vestige demonstrates the motion of something passing but not what kind it is. But some effect represents the cause with respect to the similitude of its form — as fire generated represents the generating fire, and the statue of Mercury represents Mercury; this is the representation of image."

From these passages collated with one another, Scotus derived that opinion of Saint Thomas, composed from the definition, the difference, and the application. Scotus's words contain the sense without counting words. Let us hear how Scotus disapproves. In *In I Sent.*, d. III, q. V, §*contra illud*, n. II: "Against what is said in the first member: if there were only one animal, so that no other

were possible in the universe, still its vestige would not be its image — because even then the vestige would not be a similitude of the whole but of a part; yet an image is a similitude of the whole. And then it would not represent the thing confusedly, that is, under some character common to it and to others." And again at n. III, *§quantum ad hoc*: "An expressed similitude of a part is not a similitude of the whole, because it is neither according to the character of the whole in itself, nor is the whole immediately known through it, but only arguatively." Then: "It does not seem that the first difference posited between vestige and image is true, because no creature represents God except through common concepts and not through special concepts, that is, of the most specific species; therefore there is no difference of creature from creature in the character of common and non-common."

Nothing satisfies Scotus. Not the definition of vestige, because a vestige can be given that represents not only specifically and confusedly the thing of which it is the vestige, but distinctly and individually — which appears in the example of the one man who alone would be possible; for then it would represent one definite numerically distinct individual, not the species confusedly.

I adduce an example from actual fact — lest anyone say that this subtlety of Scotus is contrived and forced in order to impugn Saint Thomas — one that is fitting and probative. Suppose that in some community there is one giant and one dwarf: where they pass they will leave imprints by which they can be certainly and individually recognized. Therefore, as Scotus insists, the doctrine of Saint Thomas about the vestige is deficient, since he assigns to it only common knowledge — whereas there are cases in which it generates certain and determinate knowledge.

These things are small and trifling, I admit. But a logician is occupied with these small and trifling things — indeed with even more trifling ones, such as beings of reason. Nothing should be hidden from the dialectician. Yet Saint Thomas was speaking in the common manner, while Scotus was speaking philosophically. It was permitted to him to probe these things subtly and reduce them to the standards of dialectical reason. Let the Thomists say what they will. The examples convince that that definition of vestige is not tenable. Resting on that misleading vestige, the doctrine stumbled on the failing vestige. This is the first thing that displeased Scotus.

The second thing to displease him is that difference of image from vestige — which partly collapses once it has become clear that a vestige can be given that is similar to an image, insofar as it leads to the certain and determinate knowledge of an individual person. For just as the image of Mercury designates Mercury to me, so that vestige of a giant signifies the giant to me — and in this respect agrees with the image, though it differs in other respects.

Indeed we read in Greek histories that Hercules was recognized from the impression of his foot imprinted, which then served as well as an image. Therefore Scotus was not rashly in doubt about the opinion of Saint Thomas, since experience has refuted it.

The third thing that displeases Scotus is the application of the doctrine of the image to the Mystery of the Trinity, because no creature possesses a true image in the created order, as Saint Thomas defines it in those passages, of the Trinity. That overly precise and subtle definition of the image proved harmful to the doctrine it was intended to convey. For in defining so exactly, it removed the image further from God. For the lesser proportion between the created image and the uncreated nature appeared in the application. Hence Scotus argues excellently: "No creature represents God except through common concepts and not through special concepts of the most specific species." Therefore that character of image, which is handed down by Saint Thomas and proposed with its own proper and expressed examples, does not apply to God as represented by a creature.

For the similitude is different, as is clear, between fire and fire and between the statue of Mercury and Mercury — in which nothing is dissimilar — from that which obtains between the creature and God. In fire there is posited an image of the same nature; in a perfect and complete statue, a perfect representation of the person — which characters are in no way found in whatever images of the Trinity there are. Therefore the character of image as described by Saint Thomas reduces to the character of vestige and is entirely confused with it; and what the definition had gained, the application loses. For in the definition there appeared a noble and lucid character of image, engrafting and engendering proper, integral, and most expressed knowledge of the thing signified. But in the application there is used only a confused and common representation, which is far from a clear and certain knowledge of the divine Trinity, of which it generates an imperfect and obscure concept.

Therefore no created image represents God as fire represents fire, or as the statue of Mercury represents Mercury — which Saint Thomas attributes to the image in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XLV, a. VII, in the body; nor does it express God determinately according to all its parts and dispositions, or quasi-parts and quasi-dispositions — which the Angelic Doctor himself required of the image in *In I Sent.*, d. II, a. III, in the body. From this it follows that the creature, whatever it may be, has fallen short of the character of image and has been reduced to the condition of vestige.

But you will object that Saint Thomas followed the phrasing of Sacred Scripture, which in *Genesis* I three times said that man was created in the image of God; and in *I Corinthians* XI it is said that man is the image of God — and in the sense of Augustine in many passages, whom Saint Thomas himself cites at the end of q. III in *In I Sent.* — and there he says that the created image represents in a

qualified and imperfect manner, which he deduces from Augustine himself. Therefore Scotus argues wrongly against him.

I respond that Scotus does not affirm that Saint Thomas held or said that the creature perfectly represents God and expresses him in the manner of an image, nor did he argue with him about this — but rather that from the exact definition of image, and from the distinction from vestige, and from the application to the Trinity, he was by force of argument bound to assert that the creature is a true image representing God in the manner of an image.

For what was the point of distinguishing and separating the image so subtly from the vestige, unless it was to conclude — when applying its representation to God — that the creature represents properly and expressly by affirming it? Otherwise, if the image did not represent as an image, there was no need to distinguish it so exactly from the vestige, but rather to leave it within the breadth of the vestige. Thus Scotus was not censuring the doctrine but rather the inconsistency in the doctrine.

Augustine is far from this. For although he had taught from Scripture that man is the image of God, he always diminished the character of image in representing God, and observed that man is said to be created "in the image" of God, not "the image" of God — so as to teach us that man is not the true and proper image, since this belongs only to the Word and Son of God, who was the living, true, and expressed image of the Father. Hence Augustine called the human image distant far and wide from God (*De Civitate Dei* XI, c. XXXVI), and founded this acutely and solidly in that mode of speaking (*Quaestiones* LXXXIII, q. XI): "Nor without point," he says, "is it distinguished that one thing is the image and likeness of God — who is also called Son — and another is made in the image and likeness of God, as we understand man to have been made. For there are those who do not readily understand that two things have been said — 'in the image and likeness' — when if it were one thing, one name would have sufficed." And then clearly to our point: "Every image is similar, but not everything that is similar is also an image properly — though perhaps abusively it can be called so."

If Saint Thomas had explained his sense in this way, he would not at all have been impugned by Scotus — though Scotus does not impugn him for actually thinking with Augustine at the end (which I said just above at q. III), but for the fact that while thinking correctly, he wanted to apply to the Trinity the true and genuine definition of image, as he had distinguished it from vestige — as appears in that passage (*In I Sent.*, d. II, a. III, q. III, in the body): "Image differs from vestige in this, that a vestige is a confused and imperfect similitude; but an image represents the thing more determinately according to all its parts and dispositions of the parts, from which also something about the interior of the thing can be perceived." He then applies this understanding of image, different from vestige: "And therefore in those creatures alone is the image of God said to

exist, which by reason of their nobility more perfectly imitate and represent him." Behold — the proper and true representation of image in that proper and distinctive sense of image from vestige.

Differently Augustine — found in Scotus, *In I Sent.*, d. III, q. V, §*contra*, from *De Trinitate* VI at the end: "We must therefore, seeing the Creator through those things that were made and intellectually perceived, understand the Trinity — whose vestige, as is worthy, appears in the creature." He reduces the whole character of image to that of vestige. And here I note in passing that Scotus, to prove his position, adduced the true and genuine text of Augustine from the work *On the Trinity*, while Saint Thomas, to explain his meaning in *In I Sent.*, q. III, a. I, at the end, cited a testimony from an uncertain author (though it appears among the works of Augustine) — namely from the book *On the Ten Chords*, about which it is rightly questioned whether it is Augustine's.

JUDGMENT

Scotus aptly left in this vestige the expressed marks of his genius. No one will move him from the position he has taken. He stands firm in his stance; whoever would impugn him will slip on the failing vestige.

COLLATION IV. DIFFERENCE III. Concerning the Conservation of Intelligible Species in the Intellect. On *In I Sent.*, d. III, q. VI of Scotus; and *Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXXIX, a. VI of Saint Thomas.

SECTION I. The Opinion of Avicenna Is Examined

Three things are treated here. First: what Avicenna held and whether he held it as Saint Thomas attributes it to him — for though it matters little what he held, it is nonetheless important for truth to know whether he held it as attributed to him. Second: since Scotus agrees with Saint Thomas on the substance of the matter, whether the reason Saint Thomas gives for proving it is adequate. Third: whether the conversion to phantasms in the human intellect, posited by Aristotle, is rightly explained and proved by the Holy Doctor or not.

On the first — Avicenna's opinion — Saint Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXXIX, a. VI: "The first thing to be considered is whether intelligible species can be thus conserved in the intellect. For Avicenna held that this is impossible. In the sensitive part he taught that this happens, insofar as those powers are acts of corporeal organs in which species can be conserved without actual apprehension. In the intellect, however, which lacks a corporeal organ, nothing exists except intellectually. Hence it is necessary that whatever species exists in the intellect should be understood in act. And so according to him, as soon as someone ceases to understand a thing, that thing's species ceases to be in the intellect. But if he wishes to understand that thing again, he must turn toward

the agent intellect, which Avicenna posits as a separate substance, so that intelligible species flow from it again into the possible intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning toward the agent intellect, there remains, according to him, a certain facility in the possible intellect of turning toward the agent intellect — which he called the habit of science. According to this position, therefore, nothing is conserved in the intellective part that is not actually understood; and thus he does not posit memory in the intellective part in this manner."

So far Saint Thomas. Furthermore in his commentary on *De Anima* III, lecture VIII, he attributes the same opinion to Avicenna, without citing the passage in Avicenna, and says there that on this point Avicenna disagrees with Aristotle. He then impugns this mode.

Scotus, concerning this opinion of Saint Thomas about Avicenna, says in *In I Sent.*, d. III, q. VI, §*dicunt quidam*, n. XXIV: "Some say that this was the opinion of Avicenna — that no species remains in the intellective part after the act of understanding; which seems to follow from *De Animalibus* VI, part V, c. VI, where he says that the species is conserved in the organ of sense after the departure of the sensible — and this alone, because the organ is not by nature apt to know the object; but the intellect is not an organic power, and therefore is disposed of itself to receiving, not to conserving — because in it no impression of any kind can be made, but only intellectual change. His mode is that he posited an order in the intelligences and said that the last intelligence flows into our intellect: so that just as Plato posited that through the conversion of our intellect to the idea, so Avicenna posited that through conversion to the naturally influent intelligence, we have knowledge of the thing toward which we were disposed by sense to think."

He continues: "If it were said against him that according to this we would never have a habit of science — since the species did not remain in our intellect except in actual consideration, which was only in the actual conversion to that intelligence — he would respond (as is attributed to him) that from frequent conversion to that intelligence a certain facility is generated in man, through which he was prompt and capable of converting, and consequently of the act of consideration according to science."

Scotus adds: "Whether Avicenna held this or not I do not care; yet he could be well excused." But before we hear Scotus's excuses, we wish to inquire carefully whether and to what extent Avicenna held this — lest we seem to excuse or condemn a man whose case has not been heard.

Therefore, having inspected the text of Avicenna carefully, I find these things relevant to the case. (I read Avicenna in a very old volume — hence the citations will be unfamiliar to those accustomed to reading him in recent editions.)

In part IV, c. I, he says: "The treasury of what the sense apprehends is the imaginative power, whose location is the front part of the brain. The treasury of what apprehends the intention is the custodial power, whose location is the rear part of the brain." And below: "The treasury of the intellect is memory, which retains the intention." In c. II, speaking of the species of a celestial thing: "That form," he says, "will be fixed firmly in memory as it is." And something similar at c. III at the beginning; but this memory he is speaking of here is corporeal and common to every animal, to which all these passages pertain.

A better passage follows in c. III, a little after the beginning: "Memory belongs also to animals; but recollection belongs only to man. To know that one had something that was afterward lost is only the function of rational power." But this does not prove that memory is in the intellect; for he says a little later: "For memory a material is necessary from which it is difficult to erase what has been impressed on it." He is speaking of men learning sciences — testimony that favors Saint Thomas; and what is said in that place at c. III, litt. C, about forms described in the corporeal part of the imagination and the estimative faculty, also favors Saint Thomas.

So far Avicenna on sensible things, as he affirms at the beginning of part V of *De Anima*, c. I. He then proceeds to intelligible things. In c. II, litt. B: "The recipient of intelligible forms is some substance from us that is not corporeal." In c. III: "The human soul is aided by the body in acquiring the first principles of assent and understanding. Then, when it has acquired them, it will return to itself."

Passing over such passages, I come to the central passage in c. VI, part V, *De Anima*, litt. C: "In our pure intellect there is no multiplicity in any manner, nor any order of forms; for it is the principle of every form emanating from it into the soul. You must also hold similarly that the condition of the separated ones is purely in that they understand certain things. For our intellect is an intellect understanding forms and creating them — not one whose nature it is to be a form or, because it is in the form of the soul, to form; for the forming of the soul of a wise man, insofar as it is soul, is nothing other than forming in an ordered and distinct manner. Hence the soul itself is not altogether simple. Every apprehension of intelligibles is a certain similitude to a form separated from matter and from its material accidents. But the soul has this from the fact that it is a substance receiving impressions from it. The intelligence, however, has this from the fact that it is a principle and a creating and acting substance."

Then, speaking of the sensitive and material powers, which he calls powers of the soul and says are the places and treasuries of species, he expressly says at litt. C near the end: "We said that the body of those powers, and what depends on the body of them, is not worthy of this, nor is it worthy to be the subject of intelligibles — because it is not worthy that understood forms should have location; but the conjunction of them with the body causes them to have location; if they were in a body having location they would not be intelligible."

And soon after: "The soul is as a mirror for them — while those very things are as external things that sometimes appear in it and sometimes do not."

These things seem to suggest that the soul not only receives but also conserves the species impressed on it. Yet speaking sincerely, Avicenna denied that intelligible species are conserved in the intellect and soul after intellection. This is clear because at the end of c. VI, part V, litt. D, after a long hesitation, he concludes thus: "It is impossible to say that this form — that is, the intelligible species — is in the soul in perfect act, and not understood by it in perfect act; for sense-knowledge of the fact that it understands it is only because the form exists in it. Hence it is impossible for a body to be its treasury, and impossible for the essence of the soul to be its treasury."

These words do not allow us to doubt Avicenna's meaning — which I understood from a long and laborious reading and consideration of his entire treatise on the soul. Saint Thomas therefore truly said that Avicenna posited this to be impossible — a term that Avicenna himself used, as appears from the text I have adduced. Hence Scotus was unwilling to deny it absolutely, but only attempted to excuse it — because in the rest of the work he speaks obscurely and confusedly.

However, the reason of Avicenna does not seem to be what Saint Thomas gives — because Avicenna nowhere mentions the corporeal organ, nor did he say that this was the reason why species remain in material powers but not in the soul: namely, that those powers are organic and the soul is not. Rather, he said that the sensible powers have the power of apprehending and retaining, but the soul and intellect have only the power of apprehending and understanding — not of retaining in the accomplished state and conserving. This is clear from his words in that passage, litt. D: "It is impossible for the essence of the soul to be its treasury — for what is a treasury is nothing other than that the understood form exists in it; but apprehension of a form is not thus. For to apprehend belongs to one faculty, but to retain to another."

Lest anyone say in favor of Saint Thomas that this difference comes from the organic or non-organic condition, I preempt this by observing that Avicenna recognized this difference in the very material powers that have an organ. This is clear from c. I, part IV, litt. C, where he treats of sensitive memory, and at litt. A at the end, where he says: "What receives is not what retains." And more clearly in that passage, part V, c. VI, litt. D: "That forms are in memory in someone is not sensing those forms, just as that sensible forms are in something is not sense-perception; hence bodies in which forms of sensibles are present are not apprehending. But apprehension, insofar as it is the power of apprehension, necessarily occurs from that from which the form is usually impressed by some mode of impression. But in the memorial and formal faculty, forms are not impressed except in those things that are instruments, having a body retaining those forms proximate to the bearer of that apprehending power — which is as

imagination and estimation — so as to regard them when it wills, as retaining the sensed form near sense so that sense may seek it when it wills; but this is possible in the memorial and formal faculty, not in the soul; for an understood form being in the soul is the same as its being apprehended."

This passage contains the matter and perspicuously excludes the reason of Saint Thomas founded on the organic or non-organic condition. Hence Scotus, when he cared less what Avicenna thought, entirely omitted that organic or non-organic disposition — as if he saw that from this the distinction between material and immaterial power should not be sought.

The true reason of Avicenna's distinction is that the material power is not always in act, while the intellect is always in act. Therefore the former is receptive and conservative — or as he says, custodial — while the latter is receptive of the species for operating, not for conserving alone.

SECTION II. Is the Reason of Saint Thomas, by Which He Intends to Prove That Intelligible Species Remain in the Intellect after the Act of Understanding, Adequate?

The reason of Saint Thomas is as follows in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXXIX, a. VI, in the body: "What is received in something is received in it according to the mode of the recipient. Now the intellect is of a more stable and immobile nature than corporeal matter. If therefore corporeal matter holds the forms it receives not only while it acts through them, but also after it has ceased to act, much more does the intellect immovably and inerringly receive intelligible species — whether taken from sensibles or flowing in from some superior intellect."

Scotus impugns this as follows in *In I Sent.*, d. III, q. VI, §*respondeo*: "Not valid. For the act is a more noble thing than the species, and is received in the intellect; therefore it does not follow from the intellect remaining in itself." Note that in the text there is an error: it reads "not remaining in itself," which overturns the sense and the author's intention — who wants to prove *ad hominem* that the permanence of species does not follow from the argument from the nobility of the permanent thing, since permanence of act does not follow from the nobility of the act.

Scotus could have impugned Saint Thomas's argument in three ways. First, by denying the first assumption as a certain principle — namely that what is received in another is received in it according to the mode of the recipient — since that principle is not indubitable, and indeed perhaps the contrary is true, as we will show below. Second, by denying that the intellect is of a more stable and immobile nature than corporeal matter — which seems less true than the opposite. Third, by denying that from these it follows that intelligible species remain, since acts do not remain.

He omitted the first two and preferred the third — because it convinces *ad hominem* and bears immediately on the proposition affirmed by Saint Thomas.

Let us begin with this. The argument of Scotus is effective, because if that reason stands it is general with respect to all forms that enter into the intellect — one of which is the act or concept generated by the species and the intellect. But this does not remain; therefore that reason does not convince that the species will remain.

If you respond that this comes from the nature of the act, which is not permanent but comes to be and passes away and depends in its conservation on the intellectual action — which by its own condition consists in coming to be and passing away with its term — Scotus presses that this is a new reason, not the first, and therefore the first is not valid, which was drawn from the nobility of the form and the stability of the intellect.

Then you might say that from the act something remains — namely, the habit that is generated from acts. Scotus will return and rejoin that he is speaking of the act and not of the habit, and that it is enough for him to prove that the act does not remain — as Saint Thomas's reason requires. For if it were true, it should apply in the case of the act. Not applying in that case, it entirely collapses.

Furthermore, the response presupposes what is false — for not every act generates a habit, but only many ordinary ones or one heroic one; I speak also of the will. Therefore no individual and ordinary acts, before they have introduced a habit, generate habits. Therefore the example of habits is of no avail — indeed it is turned back. An act, being a more noble and perfect form than a species and apt to generate a habit, nonetheless does not generate one except after repeated practice. Therefore that argument drawn from the nobility of the form and the subject is not true.

I add: in the intellect many forms produced in it fail and cease to be; therefore its stability and the nobility of the form do not entail permanence — and the intellect will be similar to matter, which admits and loses received forms. The assumption is clear in the case of the habits themselves, which cease through opposition of contraries and through disuse; and it also appears in infused habits, because faith is lost through the habit of heresy; and in acquired habits, the habit of opinion is excluded — at least after a long time — by the habit of science; and I think that some number of intelligible species very often perishes through long oblivion. In the will, it is certain that habits of virtues and vices are frequently lost. It follows that the reason of Saint Thomas is not effective, and therefore it is rightly impugned by Scotus.

I come to the first mode. Let me examine that principle of the Angelic Doctor: "What is received in another is received in it according to the mode of the

recipient." The contrary seems true — indeed, it is received according to the mode of the thing received. I ask what Saint Thomas means by "mode."

If he means mode in the sense of the capacity of the recipient, I concede it; if he means it in the sense of disposition toward the form and proportion with it, I deny it. Then I argue: that capacity does not seem to be a mode, because it is one and indifferent to all forms absolutely, and in itself is not changed or varied — whereas "mode" implies diversity and variety. This is confirmed: because according to that character of capacity, it maintains the same mode toward all forms; therefore there is no ground for arguing from that capacity.

If he means the nature to which a form is not repugnant — for example, that corporeal matter should not receive a spiritual form, or a spiritual nature a corporeal one — in the first place this is not true in the reception of the rational soul for composition with corporeal matter, but only in the reception of accidental forms. But this does not seem to be a mode, since it cannot be varied or changed, and coincides with capacity.

If however he means the nobility of the receiving subject, which receives only more noble forms — this is not true of prime matter, which has natural appetite for all forms whether noble or base, and by its nature does not desire one more than another. In other receiving subjects, such as spiritual ones, the reception of spiritual things is rather a natural condition than a mode. Furthermore those subjects receive equally both more and less noble forms that befall them — with equal capacity and propensity — that is, species, acts, habits, and whatever other spiritual forms there are. Therefore in the same mode; nor is this mode nobler than in prime matter, which is the subject of all substantial and spiritual forms — which are much nobler than many accidentals.

Hence it follows that the mode of receiving forms is derived from the forms themselves — and accordingly reception occurs according to the mode of the thing received, not of the receiving subject. For the form of fire is received differently from the form of water in matter. The former is received with dispositions different from the latter, and without them they cannot be received in matter — which in receiving remains in itself the same nature and capacity. But in it the dispositions vary, which the natures of the forms require; and since these are diverse, they are introduced and received in a diverse manner. Who does not see this? Therefore the diverse mode of receiving comes from the forms to be received and received — not from the part of the receiving subject.

And that foundation collapses on which the argument rested. And by this argument of mine it is refuted. The form of water and the form of fire and the rest are received in matter in a diverse mode; but that diversity of mode does not come from the part of the receiving matter; therefore it comes from the part of the received forms. The major and minor are clear from what has just been said. The consequence holds.

I proceed to the third: in which it is assumed that the intellect is of a more stable and immobile nature than corporeal matter. This does not seem true. For matter is a substance, in the genus of subject, and always stands and is not moved; and at the motion and change of forms it is not changed or varied, remaining in itself the same and constant. But the intellect, in the common and Thomistic position, is a power — accidental and active and operative — and therefore is less stable and immobile than matter, which is a pure subject and incapable in itself of act, such as motion and act.

If it is said to be changeable and mobile on account of the changes of forms that it receives and loses, the intellect also varies by receiving species and acts and habits, and by losing them. Therefore it is not more changeable than matter — indeed it is more constant, because matter often remains for a long time under one form and conserves it, while the intellect is in continual change as it understands — which cannot happen without reception of species and conception of various things and production of diverse acts.

I now prove summarily that matter is no less stable and immobile than the intellect. The matter of the heavens is corporeal, and yet it is altogether immobile and constant in informing, and makes with the form of the heaven one indissoluble and eternal composite. Therefore it is not less stable and immobile than the intellect. The antecedent is the doctrine of the same Saint Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXVI, a. II, and *In II Sent.*, d. XIV, q. I, a. II) where he teaches that this is the opinion of Aristotle, which he says he follows. Therefore the consequence holds, and the argument adduced by the same Angelic Doctor is refuted.

I add: even sublunary prime matter is created by God as incorruptible, and therefore by its own nature stable and immobile. I note this on account of an objection that some sharp Thomist — and all of them are sharp — might form by recurring to the spiritual nature of the intellect, forestalling it with this observation: that very matter, though corporeal, has attached to it those two properties of immobility and incorruption by nature, and thus can be put on a par with spiritual things — indeed the intellect surpasses it in that matter is directly created by God, while the intellect is not properly created but is drawn out from a pre-existing quasi-subject.

SECTION III. What Is to Be Held About the Conversion to Phantasms?

This question was almost settled in the preceding difference, which concerned the first and adequate object of our intellect. But since Scotus here takes up the question deliberately and treats it with many arguments, impugning Saint Thomas, it is necessary to treat it more carefully.

The necessity of conversion to phantasms is posited by Saint Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXXXIV, a. VII, grounded — as we said in that place — on the connatural object of the intellect, which is the quiddity of material things, in the

following way: "It is impossible for the intellect in the state of the present life, in which it is joined to a passible body, to understand anything in act without turning toward phantasms. This appears from two indications. First, because since the intellect is a power not using a corporeal organ, it would in no way be hindered in its act by an injury to a corporeal organ, if for its act no act of a power using a corporeal organ were required. But the senses and the imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part use corporeal organs. Hence it is manifest that for the intellect to understand — not only when it receives new knowledge, but also when it uses knowledge already acquired — there is required an act of the imagination and of the other powers. For we see that when the act of the imaginative power is impeded through injury to the organ, as in lunatics, and similarly when the act of the memorative power is impeded, as in lethargics, a man is hindered from understanding in act even things whose knowledge he had already received. Second, because anyone can experience in himself that when he tries to understand something, he forms for himself certain phantasms by way of examples, in which he as it were inspects what he is trying to understand. And hence it is also that when we wish to make someone understand something, we propose to him examples, from which he can form phantasms for himself in order to understand. The reason for this is that the cognitive power is proportioned to the knowable. Hence the intellect of an angel, which is wholly separate from a body, has as its proper object an intelligible substance separate from a body, and through such intelligibles it knows material things. But the human intellect, which is joined to a body, has as its proper object the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter, and through such natures of visible things it even ascends to some knowledge of invisible things."

This text of Saint Thomas contains everything — the necessity of this conversion, the mode, and the cause of it in his position.

Let us adduce Scotus's passage in *In I Sent.*, d. III, q. VI, *§ad hoc respondent*, n. XXVII: "Some respond that the conversion to phantasms is required because the proper object of the conjoined intellect is the quiddity of material things — which exists only in this singular or that one — and therefore is not perfectly known unless existing in this or that particular or singular. But the phantasm is of singulars; and therefore it is necessary that for the intellect to understand its object it should turn toward the phantasm, so as to behold the universal nature existing in the particular. But this response is nothing — because either it first knows the singular or the universal. Not the singular, because it knows the singular only through reflection according to them. If the universal, then I argue thus: the universal can never, according to its total indifference, be known in an inferior, whether as in the object or as in what represents it. Furthermore: granted that it were true that the quiddity of material things is the proper object of the conjoined intellect — which however is false, as was shown above — yet its reason is not true. For according to its reasoning, an angel, since it perfectly

knows the quiddity of material things, would have to look at it in a phantasm — which is false. Furthermore, the species of the angel, or the angelic quiddity, exists no less in the suppositum of its species than the quiddity of material things in the individual of that species. If therefore the angel does not abstract, in no way does it understand the quiddity of its species under the character of universal. Although therefore a quiddity does not exist except in a suppositum or singular, it can nevertheless be understood by the intellect without understanding that it exists in it — so it is false to assume that a quiddity cannot be understood unless it is understood as existing in the singular. For it does not belong to the quiddity, as quiddity, that it should exist in the singular — though it does not exist in reality except in it."

I have said before what I hold about this conversion. Now I say what Scotus properly holds. He rightly disapproves of Saint Thomas on the following ground: the conversion to phantasms is not necessary for knowing objects — both universals and immaterials. Therefore Saint Thomas's reason is not adequate. The antecedent is proved three ways.

First: the intellect understands through immaterial species sent to it by the agent intellect — species that do not have the power to represent the material and the singular as the phantasm does. Therefore they do not lead to knowledge of the individuated material quiddity, which is not directly represented to the intellect by the immaterial species introduced by the agent intellect into the passive intellect. Therefore the passive intellect is not directly borne upon the singular material — but knows it reflexively, according to the same Angelic Doctor himself. Therefore it is *ad hominem* established that the intellect, when it first understands, does not understand the material singular — otherwise the immaterial species would represent the singular that the phantasm represented, and just as the phantasm cannot represent the universal, so the intellect could not know it. For whence would it have an instrument and principle for knowing universal and immaterial things?

Now the doctrine of Saint Thomas is that the universal is known by the intellect prior to and directly, while the singular is known reflexively and indirectly — as is clear.

Second: if the reason for knowing the material thing in the particular or in common were that material quiddity of the object received from the imagination, then even the angel itself could not know it — since it lacks imagination. But the consequent is manifestly false; therefore so is the cause of the consequent. Nor does it help that the angel is altogether spiritual. For here we are not treating of substance but of cognition — which in the intellect is altogether spiritual, just as it is in the angel. The only difference lies in the principle causing the species, which in man is composed of the material phantasm and the immaterial agent intellect, while in the angel it is altogether

spiritual — whether God alone is the cause, or God together with the agent intellect as concurring first cause.

Third: the angel, though immaterial, yet exists in an individual — and nonetheless knows the quiddity of its species by abstracting from the individual. Therefore man also, though in an individual material thing, can abstract the common immaterial species without recourse to the material individual. Otherwise, if the knowledge of the specific nature of the angel were necessarily connected with the individual, it could not abstract the universal. Something else it is to exist, something else to be known. The material quiddity does indeed exist in the individual suppositum; but it is known by abstracting from it — as appears in the knowledge of the universal. Therefore that reason for the recourse to phantasms, which represent singulars, does not hold. Both because the intelligible species is not of singulars; and because the object of the angelic quiddity in common is known by the angel without dependence on any phantasm; and because angelic cognition of the quiddity of its species abstracts from cognition of the individual suppositum.

Scotus also conveys the same doctrine briefly and nervously in his *Reportata Additions*, *In I Sent.*, d. III, q. V, n. IX.

Pontius occupied in his commentaries (n. XXII, *In I Sent.*, a. III, q. VI) the point of my studious attention — namely, that this argument of Saint Thomas which Scotus impugns was not adduced or even indicated by the Complutensians, those most vigorous Thomists, despite their contract of association against their pledged faith to defend the whole doctrine of Saint Thomas and to prove it down to the last little reason. I praise their ingenuity. They saw it was less adequate and too weak to be sustained, and therefore passed it over wrapped in silence. On this matter the Complutensians can be consulted in their *Logica*, in the preface to Porphyry, q. V, where, as is their custom, they acutely and learnedly set forth the principles of this controversy.

COLLATION IV. DIFFERENCE IV. ON THE QUESTION: Does the Intellect Bear Itself Purely Passively in Understanding, or Not? The Texts Are Set Forth. The Opinions Are Reported.

Scotus affirms that Saint Thomas holds that the intellect, when it understands, receives intelligence from the species or from the object present in itself — bearing itself only as material, informed by that species or object supplying the role of species. So in *In I Sent.*, d. III, q. VII, §*quinta opinio*, n. XIV. The text of Scotus is: "The fifth opinion posits that the species of the object in the intellect, or the object itself present in itself, is the generator, or the reason for generating, actual knowledge in the intellect — the intellect itself bearing itself only as

material, or informed by that species, or through the object supplying the role of species."

Then, having adduced passages in favor of Saint Thomas for proving this, Scotus says: "From all these it is concluded that the intellective power with respect to the intelligible is purely potential; but what is purely potential cannot be an active principle of any act unless informed by some form — and then the formal principle will be the form."

The text of Saint Thomas is found in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. LXXXV, a. II, as follows: "The intelligible species bears itself to the intellect as what the intellect understands — which is clear as follows. Since there are two kinds of action — one that remains in the agent, such as to see and to understand; another that passes into an external thing, such as to heat and to cut — both occur according to some form. And just as the form according to which action tending into an external thing proceeds is a similitude of the object of action — as heat in the heating agent is a similitude of the thing heated — similarly the form according to which action remaining in the agent proceeds is a similitude of the object. Hence the similitude of the visible thing is that according to which sight sees; the similitude of the understood thing, which is the intelligible species, is the form according to which the intellect understands."

And afterward ad primum: "The intellect is in the one understanding through its similitude — and in this way it is said that the intellect understood in act is the intellect in act, insofar as the similitude of the understood thing is the form of the intellect."

Saint Thomas compares that intellective form — that is, the species — to the form of fire heating and of iron cutting. These two forms act altogether in subjects that are purely passive, or bear themselves altogether materially. Therefore the species also bears itself toward the intellect in which it is received, generating knowledge alone, with the intellect bearing itself materially and passively.

Similarly, in his commentary on *De Anima* III, Saint Thomas says for the same position, commenting on the text of Aristotle: "With this second act, the intellect comes to know in a qualified way; for just as matter is compared to form, so is the possible intellect to the intelligible species." He distinguishes the agent intellect from the possible, which is potency, and says: "It differs from the possible intellect, which is potency according to its substance, but is in act only according to the species received." Behold Scotus's phrase — "bears itself only as material." Further below: "The operation of the possible intellect is to receive intelligibles."

This opinion of Saint Thomas is proved first by the authority of the Commentator (*De Anima* III, c. V, beginning): "The intellect bears itself toward universal forms as prime matter toward individual forms." Again: "Our soul is

infinite in the genus of intelligibles, as matter in the genus of beings." And *De Anima* III, comment. II: "The intellect before the habit is essentially in potency, as matter before form." And *Physics* VIII, comment. XXII: "The intellect is nothing of the things that exist before understanding." And again in the same comment. V on *De Anima* III: "The definition therefore of the material or possible intellect is: that which is in potency to all the intentions of universal material forms, and is not in act any of the beings before it understands them."

It is proved second by the argument from Scotus here: "That the form which is the principle of acting is a similitude of the object — because just as doing is formally through the form by which the agent is assimilated to what is done, so the action seems formally through that form by which the agent is assimilated to the object; so that similitude will be the formal reason of acting."

It is proved third, in the same Scotus: "An undetermined agent cannot act in a determined action or with respect to a determinate object unless it is determined. The intellect of itself is undetermined with respect to every intelligible, with respect to every intellection; therefore in order to understand something, some determination is required; that determination is only through the intelligible species; therefore that species is required as the determining principle."

Scotus adds furthermore an argument by which he proves that this is Saint Thomas's meaning in what he says in the sixth opinion. The sixth opinion — which is that of Aegidius — returns to the fifth, which is Saint Thomas's. For Aegidius (*Quodlibet* III, qq. XII and XIII) holds that actual knowledge generated — whether in sense or in intellect — is a species. For just as the formal reason for generating the actual species that is called actual knowledge is the reason of the object or the species of the object in memory — so when the object is present in itself, the species proceeds or is generated from it, which is the intellection. But when it is not present in itself but through a species in memory, then through that species or by virtue of that species another species is generated, which is the intellection. Clearly Aegidius agrees with Saint Thomas, whose disciple and faithful follower he was.

Furthermore Aegidius appears to hold the same view in *Quodlibet* III, q. XII, where he treats of the intellectual soul — not in the other question where he treats of the vegetative, which is placed under the same question number XII before that other one on the intellectual. I note this lest the number confuse anyone, as it confused me when reading it. For I was reading a very old volume in which those two questions are placed under the same number XII.

Therefore in the posterior q. XII on the intellectual soul, Aegidius says: "From the phantasm the intellection itself — that is, the act of understanding — cannot be caused immediately; rather the intelligible species is first caused, and through the mediation of the intelligible species, the intellection or act of

understanding." And then he says: "The species, unless joined to the intellect in act of understanding, does not cause us to understand except habitually — taking understanding habitually broadly as designating a certain remiss act." Therefore just as the species alone generates a habitual mode of understanding, by which it contains the act of understanding at least remissly, so it generates an actual one.

This position of Saint Thomas and Aegidius rests on that celebrated axiom of Aristotle: "To understand is a kind of undergoing" — which is found in the same *De Anima* III with the same Saint Thomas, lectures VII, IX, and X.

SOLE SECTION. The Position of Saint Thomas Is Refuted

First: if the intellection were from the species, it would be its equivocal effect; but it cannot be such. Therefore it is not from the species. The major is clear because the intellection is of a different nature from the species, and indeed more perfect — since it is a vital and formal and expressed representation. The minor is shown because an equivocal effect cannot be more perfect than its cause, as is clear — and for this very reason it degenerates from it. But the intellection is more perfect than its species, as is clear from the major. The consequence holds.

Second: that species cannot represent all the things found in intellection — such as discourse, reflection, inference, composition, relation, abstraction — since the species is a certain simple similitude and image of the object, of which it is the vicar.

Third: it would follow that that species is more intellective than the intellect itself, just as heat is more calefactive than matter. Furthermore the intellection itself would not be an act of the intellect — just as calefaction is not an action of the heated wood, which even if it has heat in itself is not the cause of heat in itself but accidentally, by reason of the form of heat received in it. For it would not be made hot were there not the action, but it is not formally made hot through the action.

Fourth: because no more or less intense cognition could occur — since species does not have degrees, as heat or cold does, but is a simple intentional similitude incapable of degrees; but cognition is remitted and intensified; therefore it is from a different principle than the species.

Fifth: the possible intellect, though it is a receptive power of species, is not pure potency like prime matter — but is active and operative of its own acts, since it is spiritual and living. Therefore it ought actively to concur with the principle of the species in the production of its cognitions. And so Aristotle expressly says in *De Anima* III, text-comment VIII: "When the intellect becomes each thing, just as the knower is said to be the intellect in act — and this immediately happens, since it can operate through itself." And earlier, text-comment V: "I say the

intellect by which the soul opines and understands is nothing in act of those things that exist before understanding; but the intelligible species was one of those things before intellection. Therefore the soul opines and understands not only through the species, which existed before intellection, but by concurring with it in understanding or opining."

The cause of this activity Aristotle gives in the same book, text-comment XVI: "The power of the intellect is without matter." Hence when he says "To understand is a kind of undergoing," he signifies that it is not passive simply — that is, entirely lacking action — but a kind of undergoing: a certain determined mode of undergoing, insofar as it receives species as a subject, and insofar as it also receives within itself the expressed word produced by a productive action, and by receiving it formally and properly understands through that same expressed form — which is the word of the mind or concept. And in this sense Aristotle says "a kind of undergoing," as Scotus explains in *Quodlibet* X, §ad secundum, n. XII.

It is indeed true that to understand is a kind of undergoing — because for the intellect to understand is nothing other than to receive the intellection, for which reason those also explain it who think that the intellection formally is the very expressed quality in the mind, as Vázquez proves (*In Ip.*, vol. II, d. CXLI, c. IV, nn. XVI and XVII) — who wrongly denies that this is Scotus's position, since it is altogether his, as we will show afterward. But the proper action of the intellect is always required — or the production of that quality that is the expressed image of the object it knows, which is its formal cognition or intellection.

This is what Augustine teaches, as Scotus cites in *Quodlibet* XV, from *De Trinitate* IX at the end: "From both is born knowledge — from the one knowing and the known." So that there is always production and action from it, as from a cause together with the species. Hence again Augustine, *De Trinitate* II, c. II or V, cited by the same Scotus: "From the visible and the seer, sight is generated." And it is clear from an adequate and, in my judgment, invincible argument: intellection is something vital, not inanimate. But this it cannot have from the intelligible species alone, which is not vital. Therefore necessarily it receives this from the intellect, which is a vital power — so much so that in the beatific vision itself the vitality as such is to be attributed to the elevated intellect, which cannot receive it from the light of glory — which is not vital. Therefore the action of the possible intellect in intellection is always required, beyond the concurrence of the species.

As for whether that action enters into the character of intellection or not — that is another question to be ventilated in its proper place.

JUDGMENT

The first thing to be judged is the truth of citing Saint Thomas for that position. For some — as the scholiast of Scotus on this passage (*In I Sent.*, d. III, q. VII) observes — seem to deny that he is its author. On this point I judge that Saint Thomas held the view as I have just carefully shown. I confirm this with a fresh and strong argument.

Saint Thomas teaches that the vision of God occurs through the union of the essence of God with the created intellect in the role of intelligible species, without any expressed word. He compares that vision of the essence to the mode of an intelligible species. Therefore the created intellection also occurs through the impression alone of the created intelligible species received in the intellect. The assumption is established from *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XII, a. V: "When the intellect sees God through his essence, that very essence of God is the intelligible form of the intellect." And in a. II of the same question, ad ult., and *Summa Contra Gentiles* III, c. XV, and *In IV Sent.*, d. XLIX, q. II, §II, ad VIII, he teaches that the divine essence is what the blessed understands and through which he understands, and that it supplies the whole character of species with respect to all the concurrence of the object. That no expressed word is given is held by the Thomist school, as we will say in its proper place. From the assumption the consequence is deduced — nor do I need any further argument.

Yet there is against my judgment and Scotus's position a strong argument. Saint Thomas manifestly affirms that through our intellection a word is produced — that is, an expressed concept through the intellect. Suárez observes this (*lib.* II, *In Ip.*, c. I) and Cajetan in his commentary on q. XXVII, a. I — which passage Suárez cites as express. And it seems manifestly clear from Saint Thomas's own words in the body of the article: "Whoever understands, from this very fact that he understands, proceeds something within himself — which is the conception of the understood thing, coming from the intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge. This conception, which the voice signifies, is called the word of the heart, signified by the word of the voice." This testimony seems irrefragable.

I respond, however, that it is one thing for a word to be produced, and another for the intellect to understand by producing the word, so that the very production of the word would be the formal intellection itself. Saint Thomas teaches the first, not the second — rather he teaches that from the intellection already completed in its own kind the word is born or generated. This Cajetan himself grants in that passage, *§ad primum dubium*: "An immanent action does not have a product — because it is not ordered in itself to some product; but if it sometimes has one, that is ordered to it, and this happens in the proposed case, because neither does understanding necessarily produce the concept, nor when it does form it is it ordered to the concept, but on the contrary it is ordered rather to the perfection of the understanding itself." And afterward he

manifestly says that the word is produced not necessarily but permissively, and is not of the essence of intellection, speaking absolutely.

From which it is clearly concluded that intellection is not effected through it, nor is to understand formally to produce a word — for if it were so, the word would be altogether necessary whenever intellection occurs. Hence Cajetan again in the same article, §*ad IV dubium*: "Saint Thomas expressly holds below, q. XXXIV, a. I, ad I, that the concept is something other than the act of understanding." And Saint Thomas here also expressed this sufficiently enough when he said: "proceeding from its knowledge." For knowledge — that is, the intellection — already existed before the word; and the word was not precisely necessary for intellection in the genus of understanding.

Therefore the argument remains resolved from the doctrine of Saint Thomas himself according to the exposition of Cajetan — indeed also of the Complutensians (d. XXI, q. III), who report that the word is a quality really distinct from the act of intellection — and they attribute this to Saint Thomas (*Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, c. XI) and to Cajetan, Nazarius, Torro, and Cano, and others on *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XXVII.

Scotus's position having been asserted, and my judgment of its truth given, it is sufficiently clear from Scotus's arguments against Saint Thomas's opinion that the opinion of Saint Thomas on intellection through the reception of the intelligible species — with the intellect bearing itself altogether passively toward it — can scarcely be sustained. This is especially true from the last argument, which seems to me insoluble — because intellection is something vital, which can in no way come from the species, but only from the intellect, which is the vital power and infuses life into the intellection, and therefore the intellection cannot subsist without it. To this is added the argument from the greater and lesser intension of the act of understanding, which cannot arise from the species but from the intellectual power — and these two things persuade me of the truth of Scotus's refutation.

COLLATION V. DIFFERENCE I. Concerning the Production of the Word: Is It Formally Intellection or Speech?

The Texts Are Adduced and Compared.

Scotus in *In I Sent.*, d. VI, q. un., §*aliter*, n. IV, holds that it is not intellection but speech. "Otherwise," he says, "a certain Doctor" — that is, Saint Thomas — "says that the intellect, as intellect, has that act which is to understand; and second it has that act which is to speak insofar as it is already made into act through understanding. But that was disproved in d. II, where it was argued that that first act of understanding is not the reason for generating the word." And soon: "The divine intellect has one act corresponding to our intellection — through which

act the intellect of the Father formally understands — and also has an act corresponding to an act of the genus of action, through which it expresses the Word."

And in d. II, q. VII, *§objicitur contra*, since the passage is very long (n. XXII): "Intellection, which is the operation of the Father, and speech, which is the production of the Father, are understood to have a certain order with respect to the generated knowledge — yet not such an order that the intellection of the Father is the cause or elicitive principle of the speech of the Word. Rather, intellection is understood as more immediately quasi-produced by the fruitful memory of the Father than speech or the Word is produced by the same. There is therefore no such order there as the prior opinion" — that of Henry — "posits in the character of the presupposed object or in the character of the formal principle of acting, but only the order of a prior quasi-product to a product, with respect to the same common principle — as opposed to a quasi-product and a truly produced."

These are the two express passages of Scotus. I do not add others from *In I Sent.*, d. XXVII, qq. I and II, and *Quodlibet* II, so as not to be prolix, since I am keeping within the limits of this first book of the Sentences. I note, however, that our scholiast appended to the margin of d. VI, q. un., *§aliter quidam*, a citation of Saint Thomas — as if our subtle Doctor were there naming or indicating him — whereas it is clear from the text that it is Henry, against whom he had written in *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. VII, *§objicitur*. Yet it is indeed true that Scotus wanted to refute him as well.

Lest anything reproach me for not taking up that prior matter in d. II, I open my plan: because that disputation was closely bound to this one on intellection, which should follow it. For since this one turns on the particular intellection and speech, it was as a kind of consequence of the universal question about the formal character of understanding — in which, namely, that formal character would consist.

Before I produce the text of Saint Thomas, I note in advance that he recognized and posited these two denominations or characters — understanding and speaking — as is clear from *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XXXIV, a. I, ad III, and q. XXXVII, aa. I and II. Yet he did not wish to admit another reason for producing the word than through intellection, as the Thomists of his own and other schools commonly expound him, and some Discalced Carmelites and others who adhere to them — such as Vázquez (d. CXII, *In Ip.*, cc. II and III) and Suárez (as cited above, and *lib.* IX, c. III) — whom I name as principal authorities.

And although the passage of Saint Thomas commonly cited for this position against Scotus is *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XXVII, aa. I and II, I prefer to change the order and first adduce the more express passage.

Therefore *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XXXIV, a. II, in the body: "I respond that the Word, properly so called in the divine persons, is taken personally; it is the proper name of the Person of the Son — for it signifies a certain emanation of intellect. Now the person who proceeds in the divine persons according to the emanation of intellect is called Son, and this kind of procession is called generation, as was shown above." (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. XXVII, a. II is cited at the margin.) "Hence it remains that only the Son is properly called Word in the divine persons." And *ibid.*, ad IV: "The Word is knowing, not as producing a word, but as a word proceeding — insofar, namely, as in God the Word proceeding does not really differ from the divine intellect."

In article I of that same question, in the body: "When it is said that the Word is knowledge, knowledge is not taken for the act of the intellect knowing, or for some habit of it, but for what the intellect conceives in knowing. Hence Augustine says that the Word is begotten wisdom, which is nothing other than the very conception of the wise one — which can in the same way be called begotten knowledge. And in the same way it can be understood that the saying of God is the beholding of thinking — insofar, namely, as in the beholding of divine thinking the Word of God is conceived."

Now in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XXVII, a. I, in the body, Saint Thomas says: "Whoever understands, from the very fact that he understands, proceeds something within himself — which is the conception of the understood thing, coming from the intellective power and proceeding from its knowledge. This conception the voice signifies." And a. II: "The procession of the Word in the divine persons has the character of generation; for it proceeds by the mode of an intelligible action, which is an operation of life, and from a conjoined principle, as was said above. And according to the character of similitude, because the conception of the intellect is a similitude of the understood thing, existing in the same nature — because in God to understand and to be are the same." (*Summa Theologiae* I, qq. XLIII, a. IV, and XIV, a. IV are cited at the margin.) "Hence the procession of the divine Word is called generation, and the Word itself proceeding is called Son."

Relying on these passages of Saint Thomas, his interpreters and commentators maintain that the Word is formally produced through intellection and not through speech. They impugn Scotus who holds the contrary. Let us hear both sides — first Saint Thomas speaking through the voices of his interpreters and followers.

SECTION I. The Opinion of Saint Thomas Is Set Forth and Indeed Proved

In God there are given intellect and will as secondary principles and as it were in first act for producing; and therefore there are two processions — one through the intellect, which is intellection, the other through the will, which is volition; the former is the production of the Son, the latter of the Holy Spirit.

Thus the Son is generated through the intellect and is posited in the character of Son and image, by reason of the similitude in the nature of the Father — which is the Divinity communicated through understanding, whose nature it is to produce the image in the Son, who is produced from the force of the same act as the expressed and substantial and consubstantial image of the Father, from whom the understanding one produces him. For the divine intellect — or fruitful memory — bursts forth, or as the Holy Doctor says, emanates into that intellection through which begotten Wisdom, as Augustine calls it, is generated; and although on the part of the term there are respects or characters of the begotten Son and the produced Word, these are distinguished only rationally and not from the nature of the thing. Thus it is in itself the same intellection that generates the Son similar to the Father in essence — with a respect toward the same insofar as it is a word, which is the term toward which it is referred as speech — yet in such a way that it is altogether the same intellection insofar as it puts forward the word of the mind, such as the Son is. For it is not a word uttered outward but inward — and it is the Son of God and the expressed likeness of the Father, and accordingly the proper offspring of the divine intellect through intellective generation.

This is the genuine meaning of the Angelic Doctor, gathered and produced from his various passages. To this everything converges that Suárez teaches most diffusely (*In Ip.*, vol. III, lib. I, cc. VI, VII, and VIII; lib. VIII, cc. II and III) and Vázquez (*In Ip.*, d. CXII, cc. II, III, and IV; d. CXLI, throughout) and Cajetan and Canarensis on qq. XXVII, XXXIV, and XXXVII, and the more recent Thomists: Báñez, Nazarius, John of Saint Thomas, and the Salamancans; and Gabriel of Saint Vincent, who endeavored to imitate those of the Carmelites. This doctrine having been thus proposed, they argue against Scotus's position in various ways. I reduce them to three heads of objection.

The first: Scotus's position is not necessary. The second: it is not probable. The third: it is difficult and absurd.

The first is shown as follows: whatever Scotus attributes to speech also belongs to intellection and is found in it. Therefore speech is superfluous and unnecessary. The assumption is clear: Scotus builds up speech as distinct from intellection from the nature of the thing because it is something personal and notional; but intellection in and from the Father as productive has this — therefore speech is not necessary. The minor is proved because that intellection, as it is in and from the Father, is made notional and proper and has the character of a productive principle as such. The consequence is gathered because the reason Scotus posits speech is so that intellection — which from its concept is essential and absolute and common to the three divine Persons — may be rendered notional and productive in the Father, which is surely accomplished through intellection explained in this way. Hence the necessity of speech ceases.

This is confirmed by the example of the spiration of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son — which is nothing other than the love of the Father and Son as they are in the Father and Son in the notional state, not the common, relative state, not the absolute one; nor is there anything there similar to speech to which Scotus might have recourse. Therefore the same holds in the production of the Son — since through the intellection of the Father as proper to the Father, the Son is generated in such a way that no other reason for producing is needed, which would be a reason of speaking. Hence that is not necessary.

The second head — that it is not probable — is urged because speech is either prior to intellection, or posterior, or concomitant; but none of these holds; therefore there is only intellection. The major is proved by enumeration and exclusion of the parts. It is not prior, because speaking is notional according to Scotus, and notionals are posterior in origin to absolutes. It is not posterior, because then it would already presuppose the produced intellection and accordingly the produced Son and Word. It is not concomitant, because then they would concur equally in producing the Word and would be as two partial reasons with respect to it — which certainly cannot be admitted in the divine persons.

Furthermore, how could those things coexist concomitantly which mutually exclude each other in Scotus's position — since intellection is common and absolute, while speech is notional and respective — and these cannot come together as the proximate productive ground? For intellection, since it is in the manner of action, goes out into act; and speech likewise. Therefore they cannot stand concomitantly.

Furthermore, if those two acts of understanding and speaking, distinct from the nature of the thing, are admitted, the question is posed to Scotus: does that intellection operate and produce something, or not? If it produces nothing, how is it action, or in the manner of action? If it produces, what else does it produce than the production of the word? Therefore Scotus's opinion, from which one of these follows, is not probable.

The third head — that it is difficult and absurd — is shown as follows: that speech which Scotus posits — is it an act of the intellect, or not? If not, how through it is the word produced, and how does it proceed from the intellect? If it is an act of the intellect, how is it distinct from the nature of the thing from intellection? — since the divine intellect is not a principle except of intellection, and consequently a principle of intellection. Therefore if the divine Word proceeded through that speech without understanding, neither would it be the Son nor the image of the Father — since the Son has this only through intellection.

Furthermore, because if the Word were produced by speaking without understanding, the production of the word would not be formally generation

but only concomitantly and materially — which is the greatest absurdity. That this follows from Scotus's position is proved because his position distinguishes speech from intellection; hence it is not formally intellection, and therefore not formally generation. From this the thesis proposed at the beginning of this section I is gathered: Scotus's position is neither necessary nor probable but difficult and incongruous.

So argue Cajetan, Canarensis, Vázquez, and Suárez — though less formally than we have done, since we have preferred to reduce what they object to a syllogistic form.

SECTION II. Scotus's Position Is Explained and Asserted

Scotus, in the cited passages, argues as follows: in the Father there is fruitful memory of the divine object — which is the formal *quo* principle of understanding, as it were in first act. He himself calls this the operative principle in the Father (*In I Sent.*, d. II, q. VII, n. XXII) with respect to intellection, which is something absolute and operative, and speech, which is something notional and relative to the begotten Son presupposing intellection; and through the former the Father is rendered formally understanding, through the latter formally producing. So that speech as productive is formally distinguished from intellection as operative — with the result that intellection is something common and absolute of itself, while speech is something notional and relative, through which the Father by speaking produces the Word his Son.

The necessity of the distinction is that the intellect — just as the essence and memory from which it proceeds as second act — is absolute and common to all divine Persons. But speech, which is in second act a production, is notional and of the Father alone with respect to the Word or Son, to whom intellection is communicated; for it is not repugnant to intellection to be communicated, whereas it is repugnant to speech.

Scotus presents a suitable example in *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. VII, §*ad secundum*, n. II: "Suppose in a luminous body that to shine is an operation and to illuminate is (as it is) a production of light — certainly to shine will not be formally to illuminate, because to shine is an absolute operation remaining within the luminous and communicating itself to all parts of the luminous without producing anything outside the luminous. But illumination is a production in another and toward another, tending and terminated there. Therefore that action of shining would not formally be the communication of light — but the retention of it within the luminous; while illumination would be and is communicative and productive of light." Nothing can be imagined easier or more accommodating than this example. This manner of explaining Scotus's position seems certain and adequate; its proof shines and gleams so brightly of itself as to illuminate the minds of readers.

Let us nonetheless prove Scotus's position with arguments and report back to the Thomists in kind — showing that it is altogether necessary, certain, and fitting.

The first argument is as follows: intellection alone in the divine persons cannot be a production; therefore speech is necessary. The antecedent is proved. Intellection from its concept is something absolute and immanent with respect to the very one who understands, in whom it remains and whom it affects — especially in the divine persons, where there is one being and one understanding through one nature and one act. But what is one, absolute, and immanent is not formally notional and productive of another person. Therefore intellection alone does not suffice — indeed it alone cannot produce a Word really distinct from the understander, who is the Father. Therefore speech, which is the production, is altogether necessary.

This is confirmed: because the form that is the principle of agreeing cannot be the principle of differing. But intellection is the principle of agreeing in understanding for all persons; therefore it cannot be the principle of differing. Surely the Father in understanding agrees with the Son and the Holy Spirit; but does not agree in producing. Therefore a form distinct by its own nature from intellection must be sought; this is speech; therefore speech is altogether necessary.

As for what Vázquez says (d. CXII, c. III) — that a notional intellection is given, constituted through the relation of production — this is neither apt to the matter nor worthy of so sharp and subtle a theologian. For how can the character of this notional intellection be constituted in the relation? Both because the character of intellection is always by nature and signifies something absolute, not respective; and because that new relation in God is distinct from Paternity and active spiration — which alone are given in the Father. Nor does it help to say that this relation is not distinct from Paternity — because this antecedes Paternity, since the character of notional intellection must be prior to the character of production, and accordingly prior to Paternity, which is the correlative of Filiation and presupposes the producing principle — which was said to be that intellection completed through the relation constituting the producing person.

I proceed to the second argument. Scotus's position seems not merely probable but certain — because all agree that understanding and speaking are distinct actions; but they doubt whether really or only rationally. With that distinction posited, it seems to follow that intellection cannot be the production of the Word; therefore speech alone is it. About the distinction of those two, no one doubts, as far as I know — since Saint Thomas expressly teaches it in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XXXIV, a. I, ad III, and q. XXXVII, aa. I and II, and Suárez acknowledges it (*In Ip.*, vol. III, lib. I, c. VI): "That in God those two — Speaking and Understanding — are distinguished rationally, Saint Thomas himself

taught" — citing the passages. And it is proved sufficiently by the argument of Scotus and Durandus. Vázquez agrees (d. CXII, c. III, n. IX) affirming that they are distinguished rationally — yet not as two partial characters, like the attributes, but as the including and the included, the exceeding and the exceeded, as man differs from animal, and as the essence from the person — since a person includes the essence. And he concludes: speaking includes understanding within itself as its notional essential.

Let us take what those two distinguished theologians give us, and argue thus: through what the production of the Word formally occurs must be what is formally notional; but intellection by your account is not formally notional; therefore the Word is not produced through intellection. The major is certain. The minor is conceded to us by them. The consequence is formal in Darii.

Hence *ad hominem*: through speech formally taken, the production of the Word occurs; therefore not through intellection formally. This is enough for Scotus. For what kind that distinction is — that is another question. It is enough to convince the Thomists that, as they are distinguished, one is not production and the other is. Hence it follows that, according to the opinions of those who distinguish them, those characters of understanding and speaking differ. He who distinguishes them rationally gives them as rationally distinct; he who distinguishes them from the nature of the thing gives them as distinct from the nature of the thing. And so in every position they have distinct formal concepts — and the concept of speech is not the concept of intellection, and vice versa.

Therefore it is always true to say: through speech the Word is produced, not through intellection. Just as it is true to say: the Son is generated, the Holy Spirit is not generated; the Son proceeds through the intellect, not through the will; the Holy Spirit proceeds through the will, not through the intellect. For these truths a merely rational distinction between intellect and will suffices in the Thomistic school. In the same way it will be true to say: the Son or Word proceeds through speech, not through intellection — notwithstanding that between the two there is only a rational distinction. And just as it cannot truly be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the intellect by virtue of a merely rational distinction, so neither can it be said that the Word is produced through intellection by virtue of a rational distinction — because a rational distinction suffices for composing and maintaining those contrary propositions.

I press: if in God a greater distinction than rational were possible in your position, speech and intellection would be distinguished by it. This is enough for us — if by the distinction of which God is capable they are distinguished. Hence you posit the rational distinction; we posit from the nature of the thing — consistently with our respective positions on the breadth of distinctions. And just as you distinguish the essential from the notional and the absolute from the relative, so you ought to distinguish speech from intellection. From which it follows that just as you do not affirm that the essence is the relation, nor that the

essence is incommunicable — and this may not be done — so neither can you affirm that intellection is speech and is production, which is not permitted through the formal concept; even though in other respects there is between them only a rational distinction.

Scotus's position is therefore certain — and as certain as it is certain that the essential is distinguished from the notional, and that one cannot be affirmed of the other in whatever mode they are distinguished — whether from the nature of the thing or by reason; and Scotus's position seems true.

There is no need to prove the third point — that it is superfluous to show that what is true is fitting. Yet its fittingness is briefly shown: from the fact that intellection, which is common and absolute, cannot have the character of production, which is notional and relative — such as speech, to which alone the character of production is fitting. Furthermore if it were fitting to the produced intellection, it would be fitting for the three persons in the same way as for the Father — because it belongs no less to the Son and the Holy Spirit, since it is an essential and absolute perfection. But this is false. Therefore it is fitting only to the Father through speech — which is a notional character that imports a production fitting to its character.

And just as production is fitting to speech in substance, so the position that asserts and affirms that fittingness will be altogether fitting and suited to theological reasoning.

SECTION III. The Arguments Advanced Against Scotus's Position Are Resolved

Although those three heads of objection against the proposed doctrine have been attacked, they must nonetheless be cut off lest they perhaps grow back — by responding accurately to the individual arguments of the same, produced in order.

To the first head, which challenged the necessity of distinguishing speech from intellection on the ground that through the latter all that Scotus attributes to the former is supplied: I deny the antecedent — because intellection, as such in its own proper and distinct concept, cannot be production, since it is not something notional but essential. Therefore it cannot be production, as we showed just above. As for that argument by which it was endeavored to induce that respect in the Person of the Father: I deny that it is fitting to intellection as such; indeed the notion — which is the proper notion of speech — conflicts with it, and in its own proper formal concept is distinguished from intellection according to the common doctrine of Saint Thomas and the Thomists who admit the distinction between them rationally and according to formal concepts with a foundation in reality that mutually excludes them.

To the confirmation I respond: that it favors Scotus's position. For the production of the Holy Spirit — who is the produced love — occurs not formally through love or charity, which is something common and essential; but through spiration, which corresponds to speech and is notional and respective, from which the Holy Spirit takes his name. Hence the argument from the confirmation is turned back upon the adversaries — because just as in the production of the Holy Spirit, who is Love proceeding from the will, there are given Love or Charity and Spiration — and yet his production is not called Charity or Love, because these signify something essential and absolute and common to the three divine Persons, but Spiration, which is notional and respective — so also the production of the Word should not be called intellection, which is absolute and essential and common, but Speech, which is notional, proper, and respective.

To the second head: we come to it — which intended to prove the improbability of Scotus's position by that argument through enumeration and exclusion of parts. We easily resolve this by saying that understanding is prior in God to speaking, because understanding is essential and common, while speaking is notional and proper to the Person of the Father. This is Scotus's doctrine in *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. VII, §*ad secundum*, where he teaches that understanding is more immediately related to the fruitful memory of the Father than speaking, and that the latter pre-requires the former — and he explains this with the example of light, in which shining is prior to illuminating. And in *Quodlibet* II, §*de secunda ratione*, he teaches that in us speaking is not distinguished from understanding but is altogether one; while in the divine persons it is not so, since understanding is communicable while speaking is not.

Hence the author of the *Conciliations* at the end of the volume of *Quodlibet* (*Ad Concil.* II, *Quodlib.* II) says: "He teaches that all created intellection is accomplished through speech; otherwise in the divine persons, where intellection is essentially prior to speech" — which he also says in *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. VII, §*ad II dubium*, n. XXII. And that author demonstrates there that the passage in *Quodlibet* I, a. II, §*Tertia Conclusio* does not present an obstacle. Therefore that whole machinery of the argument — which appeared to have the appearance of great difficulty — collapses.

The addition to the argument seems somewhat more difficult, which asks what intellection does in the Father if it does not produce anything. Or what Scotus means when he calls it operative — indeed an operation. I respond that that intellection is an absolute act of understanding proceeding from fruitful memory, through which the Father is actually the productive principle through speech — which presupposes intellection, just as illumination presupposes the shining act. And accordingly in God there are distinct characters: intellection and speech, as we have just taught from Scotus.

Nor is this difficulty only against Scotus but also against the Thomists, who necessarily must posit a common and absolute intellection — which is not the notional production of the Son and Word — distinct in whatever mode from the production of the Word. Therefore as they have explained the difficulty, so will I explain mine.

The third head contains an argument difficult in appearance. But I respond perspicuously and remove the difficulty. That Speech is the way and, as it were, the action of the Father through which he communicates to the Son his Word his essential and absolute intellection — and therefore it is not formally intellection but speech, production, and way of communicating. I clarify the matter with an example. In heating there is heat, the flow of heat, and the way to heating the subject. Heat is the form, the heating is heat in flux; but the way is the production, which occurs from the agent into the patient, in the category of action. Hence neither the permanent heat, which is the form, nor the flux as it is warm, is the production; but the action and way precisely as it is from the agent. And in the view of many it is received in the agent.

Which example excellently clarifies the position of our Scotus. The understood essence is in our mode of conceiving as a quasi-form; intellection is as the quasi-form in flux; speech is the way and action or production corresponding to an action — which does not include the form or quasi-form, whether permanent or communicated, but retains its distinct character of production. Therefore just as through the calefactive action the whole character of heat is communicated — which is received in the patient — yet the action is not communicated, since it belongs to the agent; so also in the production of the Word, the essence and intellect and absolute intellection are communicated through speech, but speech is not communicated — since it is the notion of the Father.

The intellection, however, remains in the Word, through which it is notionally Wisdom and Son and Word; while speech, being the way and production, does not remain — because it does not pertain to the form or essential perfection but to the production, which proceeds from the speaking Father and is that formal speech. Therefore the argument wrongly gathers that the Word is only materially and not formally rendered Wisdom, because it is not produced through intellection as such. For Speech is not a form or a perfection formally intellective, but an action communicating it, ordered to this: that the Word may be generated as Wisdom and Word most formally wise through intellection communicated to it. Just as one would wrongly argue who denied that the patient becomes and is formally warm, because the action and way of communicating heat are not formally heat or the form keeping warm. For through the action precisely, as it is action, the patient is not formally made warm; that action is the act of the agent as agent, not the form of the warm

patient, which would not become warm unless there were an action — but it is not formally made warm through the action.

And by this reasoning all the heads are cut off, and the arguments weakened, and the difficulties removed.

JUDGMENT

I judge Scotus's position to be superior to the opinion of the Angelic Doctor and of the Thomistic school. So I am persuaded by Scotus's reasons — and I see nothing that can be objected to me that I have not already adduced and occupied, indeed anticipated.

Yet I want to weigh more carefully the fittingness of this doctrine — asserting the production of the Word through speech from the very nature of the Word itself and from the mode of speaking of Sacred Scripture and of the Saints, especially Augustine — so that it may appear to readers that nothing more apt and accommodating can be found for explaining the proper nature of the divine Word.

And first I assert that common saying of theologians: the Word is said personally — which Saint Thomas himself teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XXXIV, a. II: "The Word properly so called in the divine persons is taken personally; it is the proper name of the Person of the Son." And *ibid.* ad III, he cites Augustine as the author of this — and rightly so. For even if Fathers earlier than Augustine taught this — Athanasius in his oration against the followers of Sabellius, Nazianzenus in his fourth oration on philosophy, Hilary in *De Trinitate* II, and others whom I cited in my *Positive Theological Schools*, school I, c. I — yet no one showed it more accurately and copiously than Augustine, as we will demonstrate in this section.

But the source of this truth is Scripture, where the Son of God is called by the proper name Word. *John* I: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word." And below: "The Word became flesh." As Augustine observes in his commentary on John at those passages. And *Apocalypse* XIX, n. XIII: "His name is called the Word of God." The same in his own Epistle, c. I, n. IV: "Word of life" — which agrees with that saying of the Gospel of John, c. I, n. IV: "What was made in him was life." The same is indicated in the same John in the Gospel, c. VIII, n. XXV: "Who are you? The beginning, who also speaks to you." Nor are there lacking testimonies in the Old Testament that signify this. For *Psalms* XXXII says: "By the Word of the Lord the heavens were established." And more clearly *Psalms* XLIV: "My heart has uttered a good Word" — which the Fathers commonly interpret of the Son of God, and among them Cyprian (*lib. II Against the Jews*).

To almost all these passages Augustine relates that the Son of God is properly called the Word. This was so received among the first parents and doctors of our Catholic Church that those heretics who denied the Son of God to be the Word

were called Alogians — that is, "without the Word" — as Epiphanius narrates (*Haeresis* LI) and Augustine (*Haeresis* XXX). And so on this matter Cyril of Alexandria (*Thesauri*, lib. VII, c. I) says most aptly: "The name Word was chosen because it is most proper and signifying of the Divinity and of the proper procession of the Second Person." Therefore the procession of the Son is more fitting to speech, as the proper production of the Word, than to intellection — which is common and absolute.

Augustine most celebrates this name of Word as the genuine attribute of the Son. I select the clearer testimonies that contain the matter.

Therefore *De Trinitate* VII, c. II: "The Father and Son are together one essence and one greatness and one truth and one wisdom." Behold intellection — common and absolute. "But the Father and Son are not together one single Word — for the Son is referred to the Father, not to himself, when called Word, as also when called Son, he is referred to him whose Word he is. Then: the Son is Son in virtue of being Word, and Word in virtue of being Son. Since therefore Father and Son together are not one Son, it follows that they are not together one Word. And therefore not in the same respect is he Word and Wisdom — because the Word is not said of itself but only relatively of him whose Word it is, as the Son of the Father. But Wisdom is so called in the respect of essence, and therefore since there is one essence, one Wisdom." Therefore the Son is not generated by understanding — which is to be wise in common — but by speaking — which is to produce notionally.

Augustine continues: "Since the Word is also Wisdom, but not in the same respect as Word is Wisdom — for Word is understood relatively, Wisdom essentially — what we are to accept when Word is spoken is 'born Wisdom,' so that he may be both Son and Image. But he cannot be born through intellection, because birth is notional and proper to the Son — who is the Word and image insofar as he is Word and image — and not common and absolute as intellection and wisdom are."

Let us hear Augustine a little later: "Although the Father is himself wisdom — because that Wisdom was to be commended to us and imitated, in whose imitation we are formed" (that is, Christ of whom it is said "the Word became flesh") — "the Father says it so that it may be his Word." Behold: he says with Scotus. And he adds: "Not as a sounding word is uttered from the mouth, or thought before pronounciation." He opposes the Word spoken by the Father to our word and teaches thereby that he is spoken and generated by speaking. He continues in the manner of Scotus — as if he had foreseen it and was informing it: "If this word, which we utter, temporal and transitory, shows both itself and that of which we speak, how much more does the Word of God, which so shows the Father as he is Father — since the Word itself also is what the Father is, according to essence. For according to what it is as Word, it is not this which the Father is — because the Word is not the Father. The Word is said relatively, as

the Son — which the Father certainly is not." Note this for Scotus: "Then the Son is called Word and Word the Son, as he is called Word in virtue of being referred to him. And the Father and Son together are not one Word."

Then: "Since the Word is also Wisdom — but not in the same respect as Word and as Wisdom, for Word is understood relatively and Wisdom essentially — let us take what is to be meant when Word is spoken, namely 'born Wisdom,' so that he may be both Son and Image."

Now: "Although the Father is himself Wisdom — for that Wisdom was to be commended to us and imitated, in whose imitation we are formed — the Father says it so that it may be his Word." See: *he says* is placed by Augustine as equivalent to *he generates* — and he used Scotus's term long before Scotus, supplying him the word by which to signify the production of the divine Word, which was speech and not intellection.

Those therefore who repudiate the word of Scotus repudiate the word of Augustine. I adduce another testimony of the same, prior to this one, found in the same *De Trinitate* VII, c. — which carries great weight in confirming Scotus's position: "The Father by speaking the Word which he begot is speaking, not by a word which sounds and passes away, but by the Word equal to himself, which was with God. Speaking therefore by that coeternal Word, the Father is not understood alone but together with the Word itself — without which he certainly does not speak." And below: "It is manifest that Father is said not of himself but of the Son relatively, and therefore Father because a Son is given to him."

I add a third testimony, clearer still, from *De Trinitate* XV, c. XIV: "The only-begotten Word of God the Father, the Son of God, in all things similar and equal to the Father: God from God, Light from Light, Wisdom from Wisdom, Essence from Essence — is in all things what the Father is, yet is not the Father, because this one is Son, the other is Father. And therefore he knows all things that the Father knows. But his knowing is from the Father, just as his being is; for knowing and being are one in him; so for the Father, just as being is not from the Son, so neither is knowing. And therefore, as it were speaking himself, the Father begot the Word equal to himself in all things."

Is it Augustine speaking, or Scotus? "The Father speaking begot." When speaking of the Word as Wisdom — Wisdom from Wisdom — that is, intellection, knowledge — he speaks of knowing, and then of knowing again. And when he seemed about to return to the intellection of the Father and seek in it the production, Augustine on the contrary returned to Speech, using the word *speaking* — and to that he annexed the genuine and proper production of the divine Word, not to intellection. Surely Scotus would not write otherwise. But Augustine, I believe, dictated these things to Scotus — and Scotus received them

from the one dictating. The phrase is Augustinian: he used it first and before Scotus. Why then is Scotus impugned? — since he learned it from Augustine.

Vázquez objects two passages of Augustine where he says the Word is begotten through intellection — one from *De Trinitate* XV, c. X, and another from *De cognitione verae vitae*, c. XIV, where he teaches that thinking is the same as speaking. For in the first passage from *De Trinitate*, having adduced the text of Sacred Scripture from *Wisdom* II: "They said among themselves, thinking" — and *Matthew* IX: "They said within themselves: this man blasphemes" — he weighs Christ's response: "Why do you think evil in your hearts?" Augustine says: "What is 'they said within themselves' except thinking?" And again: "Certain thoughts are words of the heart." In the book *De cognitione verae vitae* there is another stronger testimony, which I produce here from c. XIV because the Thomists press hard on it: "He himself said, and they were made. For the Son or Word of God is nothing other than his thinking, or art, or wisdom — namely, when we think of some thing, we form the image of that thing in our thinking. So God when he thought of himself formed an image similar to himself in all things. For this reason this Word is called the image or likeness of God."

Behold, the Thomists say: he thought, he formed — by thinking, not by speaking; through intellection, not speech.

I respond that these testimonies are of no effect. I begin with the second. This book *De cognitione verae vitae* is not a work of Augustine — for that reason rejected by the Louvain editors to the end of tome IX, and indeed rightly placed there. And this very fact shows it is not genuine: that Augustine holds and speaks the contrary in *De Trinitate* XV, c. XVI, where he says clearly to our purpose: "That Word is so spoken that God's thinking is not said." How then does the testimony of the book *De cognitione verae vitae* — which said that God formed the Word by thinking — stand with this one from *De Trinitate*, where it is denied that the Word is called thinking?

Let us hear the rest. After removing our thoughts from the mind of God he concludes thus: "The Son of God therefore is not the thinking of God but the Word of God. For our thinking, arriving at what we know and formed from it, is our word; and therefore the Word of God should be understood without thinking — so that the simple form itself may be understood." Do you see how Augustine rejects the word Thinking from God on account of its imperfections? How can the author of that book so readily admit that word repudiated by Augustine? Certainly that shows him to be different from Augustine, as is in truth found to be the case.

By this passage is refuted another adduced by Vázquez from *De Trinitate* V, c. X. For that passage contains nothing against Scotus's position — since it only teaches that certain thoughts are certain words of the mind, and that the mind where these are formed is as an inner mouth — from which, going out into the

external mouth, they manifest the thoughts of men to those without; as whoever will read those things will easily perceive. Thus Scotus's doctrine remains intact and confirmed.

As for what Vázquez says — that Scotus is bound to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds through spiration and not formally through love, and that just as the Word is produced through speech and not through intellection, so this is the case — this is most true. And Scotus expressed this in *Quodlibet* XIV, *§hic intelligendum est*, n. XV: "The first notion is to speak, or as it were to speak, intellection in the paternal intelligence; and to this proximate is to generate the Word. Here is the common and absolute intellection in the Father and the generation of the Word through notional speech. This is clarified by what follows, which contains similar doctrine on the procession of the Holy Spirit: 'This is as it were the motion of the will; and this is as it were double — namely toward loving, and spirating; toward also the proceeding love — this double motion of the will corresponds to the double natural motion said to exist in the intellect: toward understanding and toward speaking.'"

Indeed I add against Vázquez by arguing: the customary name of the procession of the Holy Spirit is spiration, not love or charity. Hence the Holy Spirit is commonly called not Love relatively — with respect to the spirating Father and Son under one character of spirator, not with respect to lover or one who loves — so that we are taught that the Holy Spirit properly and formally proceeds through spiration and not through love. And this most of all confirms the position on the production of the Word through speech.

I note, however, that Suárez (*In I p.*, vol. III, lib. I, c. VI, n. II) agrees with Vázquez in saying that Scotus holds the same view on those two characters of loving and spirating as on the others of understanding and speaking — and both cite the passage from *Quodlibet* XIV that I just adduced. But a great controversy arises for me with Suárez about Scotus's mind on the priority and order of these characters among themselves.

For Suárez, impugnig Scotus (*lib.* I, c. VI, n. X), says that Scotus denied all order and priority — whether real or rational — between them, and affirmed them to be, as it were, concomitantly from the fruitful intellect in first act. And he adds that on this point the position of Scotus is rightly rejected — because it cannot be understood either in us or in God.

Suárez wrongly attributes this position to Scotus — from whom those two characters are not only distinct from the nature of the thing but also ordered and subordinated, as appears from the aforecited passages in *In I Sent.*, d. II, q. VII, and in *Quodlibet* XIV and II.

Yet I do not wish to use Scotus's own testimonies — but those of Suárez himself, who is refuted by his own words. For he affirms — which is remarkable — in two passages clearly that Scotus posited order and priority between those two acts of

understanding and speaking. Thus in *De Trinitate*, vol. III, lib. I, c. VI, n. I: "Scotus says, however, that to understand is in some manner prior to speaking — because it is prior for a thing to be perfected in itself than to be communicated to others; and understanding is only for the perfection of the understander, while speaking is for communicating to another." What could be more evident for priority and order of these acts?

Again the same Suárez, same chapter VI, n. XIV: "Essential things according to the order of reason are prior to notionals. Also because the Father is first conceived as perfectly constituted in his own being before being conceived as actually producing; but he is constituted in his own being through his understanding — because for God to understand in act is to be God; and the Father thus constituted is understood as most perfectly God. Hence even Scotus himself acknowledges that to understand, as it is the perfection of the Father, is prior to speaking."

How then did Suárez attribute to Scotus what he had not said, and impugn him as if he had said it? I grieve that this happened to so great a theologian — who to refute needs no testimony other than his own. So far on this question.

COLLATION V. DIFFERENCE II. Concerning the Power or Formal Principle of the Notional Acts, Which Scotus Calls the Power of Generating.

SECTION I. The State of the Question Is Opened and Set Forth

This question — treated by Saint Thomas in *In I Sent.*, d. VII, q. I, ad I, and *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XLI, a. V, and by Scotus in *In I Sent.*, d. VII, q. un. — is most complex and thorny, both concerning the mind of each and concerning the doctrine given on that basis.

Both agree that this Power exists. What it is and in what it consists — neither does Saint Thomas seem consistent with himself, nor does Scotus seem to agree with Saint Thomas.

For Saint Thomas in *In I Sent.*, d. VII, q. I, ad II, says that the essence as it is Paternity is the power of generating; but in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XLI, a. V, he teaches that it is the essence absolutely taken, with no mention made of the relation — which Javellus observes in his commentary on that question I of the *Summa Theologiae*, where together with Hervaeus he attempts to expound the Holy Doctor and reconcile the passages.

Scotus takes the opinion of Saint Thomas in the altogether absolute sense — teaching that the essence in itself is the power without any respect to the relation. And Vázquez observes this (d. CXLIV, *In I p.*, c. II) in reporting the third position, and it appears in Scotus in *In I Sent.*, d. VII, q. un., *§hic est opinio talis*, n. II — who there proposes and impugns it.

Furthermore, as to Scotus's mind, it seems ambiguous to those Thomists — because in impugning he seems to differ from Saint Thomas, and in proving his own position he seems to agree with Saint Thomas's opinion. Indeed he himself at the end (n. XXII) acknowledges that some of his arguments made against Saint Thomas's position also tell against his own — and therefore he resolves them.

Cajetan in his commentary on that *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XLI, a. V, indicates that Scotus did not rightly understand Saint Thomas and fully agrees with him, differing from him in no way; and therefore he omits Scotus's arguments and does not resolve them — because he thinks they are not against Saint Thomas's doctrine — while he resolves others from Bonaventure, Henry, and Durandus.

Suárez in setting forth Saint Thomas's position (*In I p.*, lib. VI, c. V, n. VI) cites Scotus for the same view in *In I Sent.*, d. VII, q. un. Vázquez takes Scotus's position differently in that d. CXLIV, *In I p.*, c. II, n. VIII, when reporting it — affirming that Scotus held that the power of generating is indeed an absolute essence, but with a condition for producing on the part of the relation, without which it cannot be constituted in a complete and adequate power for generating.

In such great complexity it is necessary to adduce the genuine texts — so that it may be established what Saint Thomas and what Scotus held; then to see in what they agree or differ.

Therefore Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XLI, a. V: "Every producer produces something similar to itself according to its action, in proportion to the form by which it acts; as a begotten man is similar to the begetter in the human nature by whose power the father can generate a man. That therefore is in the generative power of some generating thing by which the generated is assimilated to the generator. But the Son is assimilated to the generating Father in divine nature. Hence the divine nature in the Father is the power of generating in him. Hence Hilary says in *De Trinitate* II: 'The birth of God cannot but hold the nature from which it is perfect — for neither does anything subsist other than God that does not subsist from God.' Thus therefore it must be said that the power of generating principally signifies the divine essence, as the Master says in d. VII, §I — and not the relation alone. Nor even the essence insofar as it is identical to the relation, so as to signify both equally. For even though Paternity as the form of the Father is signified, it is nevertheless a personal property having itself toward the Person of the Father as an individual form toward some created individual. But the individual form in created things constitutes the generating person and is not that by which the generating generates; otherwise Socrates would generate Socrates. Hence neither can Paternity be understood as that by which the Father generates, but as constituting the person of the generator; otherwise the Father would generate the Father. But that by which the Father generates is the divine nature, in which

the Son is assimilated to him — and according to this Damascene says that generation is the work of nature, not insofar as nature generates, but insofar as nature is that by which the generating generates. And therefore the power of generating signifies the divine nature directly; but the relation obliquely."

Here no mention is made of intellect and will, but only of the divine nature. Yet Cajetan in his commentary (§*circa*, the author) writes: "The author does not here take divine nature as it is distinguished from intellect and will, except perhaps in a qualified sense, because according to him even though the divine nature is the first *quo* principle of generation, it is not so alone — but it is itself the first *quo* principle, while the intellect is the proximate *quo* principle." And immediately: "Therefore it makes no difference, as far as the proposed matter is concerned, to speak of divine nature and of whatever absolute essential thing."

"For which reason the Scotistic arguments are to be omitted" — as if Scotus wanted to impugn Saint Thomas's position on the ground that by positing the divine nature he excluded the intellect and will. About which Scotus certainly never thought — as his own arguments show, and as we will make plain when we weigh them below.

The sense of Scotus was quite otherwise, and it will appear from the text, which is as follows (*In I Sent.*, d. VII, q. un., n. I, §*hic est opinio talis*): "That by which the Father generates is the essence — for this reason: because the generating assimilates the generated to itself in the form by which it acts. But the Son is assimilated to the Father in the essence and not in the property; therefore" — and the reason is explained — "because just as in creatures the individual property is not the reason for acting but the nature in which the individuals agree, so in the divine persons the personal property — which corresponds to the individual property in creatures — will not be the reason for acting or generating."

This is how Scotus understood Saint Thomas — not as Cajetan reported it; nor indeed in his six arguments which he adduces against Saint Thomas is there anything that impugns that separation of nature from intellect and will. Rather he agrees with Saint Thomas in those arguments that hold that the *quo* principle is absolute and not relative — as is clear from the whole course of the disputation, and especially from §*ad formam autem quaestionis*, and more manifestly from §*quia autem*, n. XXII, where he acknowledges that the arguments made against Saint Thomas also tell against himself.

Therefore from that absolute *quo* principle, each drew from the side of the absolute the same presupposition. They disagreed only in this: Saint Thomas said that absolute was in itself the complete and adequate power of generating on the part of the principle; Scotus denied this. And against this sense of Saint Thomas all his arguments proceed.

SECTION II. To What Extent Scotus Agrees With and Differs From Saint Thomas

Let us weigh this difference and the concordance of each. They agree in saying that the power of generating, in itself and taken by itself as *quo* principle, is something absolute and not relative — and both prove this with their arguments.

They differ in this: Saint Thomas holds that the nature completely and adequately is the power of generating, with the concepts of the relations set aside from it; while Scotus judges that power of generating to be completed through the relation — not as through a co-principle, but as through a certain condition required for generating.

This appears from what he teaches in the resolution of the arguments, §*quia autem*, nn. XXII and XXIII — and Vázquez saw it (d. CLXIV, c. II, n. VIII).

Therefore that is the difference: Saint Thomas posited in God the power of generating as a perfect *quo* principle, looking at the relations only obliquely; while Scotus required the relation as a necessary condition. I explain the matter.

Saint Thomas did not distinguish between proximate and remote power, and indistinctly said that the essence is the formal *quo* principle — that is, the divine nature directly. Scotus, however, acutely distinguished between remote and proximate power. The remote he said is altogether absolute without any respect to the relation; the proximate he said involves respect to the relation. This is clear from §*ad quaestionem igitur*, n. VII of this question, where he adduces passages from Aristotle to prove it — and Lychetus comments excellently there: "The distinction of power as foundational, proximate, and remote, is taken from the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* IX, text-comment X."

For there it is expressly stated. Let us set out Scotus's own words, §*secundo modo*, n. VIII: "Asking what is the absolute thing that is the proximate foundation of this relation" — that is, power — "and then always speaking precisely of active or productive power, of which we are now speaking: I further distinguish of power taken denominatively — which is sometimes taken for its foundation precisely, and sometimes for itself together with all other things that concur for this, so that it may be able to elicit the act, which are required for the character of the proximate power — such as in creatures are the proximity of the patient and the removal of impediments." And of that proximate and complete power again toward the end, §*cited Aristotle*: "He wants to say that certain things pertaining to the definition of active power, as power, exclude the impediment. Therefore active power there is taken according to him together with all things concurring for the proximate possibility of acting."

Then it is proved from another text of Scotus, §*hoc etiam arguitur*, n. XII, where he says that generation is distinctive and assimilative. And §*cum arguitur*, n.

XXIV: "But this power or formal principle of generating cannot be assimilative according to the essence in God unless it is also distinctive according to the relation. Therefore Scotus altogether required the relation for its complete and adequate constitution, which Saint Thomas did not demand but only connoted by saying obliquely."

Now Scotus fiercely attacks that position of Saint Thomas with six arguments a little after the beginning of this sole question, *§hic est opinio talis* — which there is no need to adduce since they can be seen in him. I will adduce only the first, which is altogether valid. "Every form sufficiently elicitive of some action, if it is by itself, acts through itself by that action. Example: if heat is the sufficient calefactive cause, separated heat would calefact. Whiteness also by itself has the power to disperse — and therefore when it exists by itself, as in the Sacrament of the Altar, it disperses by itself. Therefore if the Divinity is the generative power, and it is clear that it is sufficient, it follows that if the Divinity exists by itself, it will by itself generate."

"But the Divinity is in some manner prior to itself than it is understood to be in a person — because the Divinity as Divinity exists by itself, so that the three persons are through the Divinity by themselves, not conversely. *De Trinitate* VII, c. IV: 'Every creature subsists by itself; how much more God.' And below: 'For God, to be is the same as to subsist.' Therefore in that first moment of nature, in which the Divinity is understood in itself, before it is understood to be in a person, it will generate."

This argument is certainly invincible against that opinion of Saint Thomas — but not against Scotus's, as is apparent from Scotus's own resolution of it placed near the end of the question, *§quia autem*, n. XXII: "Just as in creatures proximity of the patient or removal of impediments is required, so in the proposed case it is said that a fitting suppositum for acting is required — especially since this action takes place between distinct things, not by reason of the communicated nature, which is altogether the same in the generating Father and the generated Son, but by reason of the producing and the produced person," as Scotus says in his resolution of the second argument in the same §, n. XXIII.

It is therefore established about Scotus's mind, and what is the difference between him and Saint Thomas. They agree in holding the principle or power of generating to be something absolute. They differ in that Saint Thomas indistinctly said "absolute"; while Scotus distinguished between proximate and remote power, and said that the remote is altogether absolute without any respect to the relation — while the proximate by no means so, but is altogether completed through the relation.

JUDGMENT

There is no doubt that Scotus's position is valid — since it holds on one side that the power of generating is in itself and fundamentally absolute, precise of all

relation and perfect in its own character in that state, and common to all the divine Persons, since it is the very Divinity itself; and on the other side it affirms that the same power, as it is proximate and complete in first act for acting, requires the relations as necessary conditions for the producing and the produced — which, since they are really distinguished and only through relations, involves in its concept the relations altogether, not as *quo* principle, but as *quod* principle — terms which Scotus uses in this question, §*ad aliud*, n. XXIII.

Saint Thomas proceeds differently: since he does not distinguish those two characters, he is pressed by the arguments with which Scotus attacks him — and they appear invincible. These Scotus easily avoids by his adequate and fitting distinction.

Yet it is indeed possible to reconcile both sides by expounding the mind of Saint Thomas on that power taken remotely and proximately, and applying the word "obliquely" to the complementary function of the relations — in which sense Scotus in his *Reportata* on this passage (q. I, nn. IV and V) reconciles Henry with Saint Thomas and explains it. And Scotus's acknowledgment that some arguments against Saint Thomas's position also tell against his own — and therefore he carefully unravels them.

COLLATION V. DIFFERENCE III. ON THIS: Is Any Creature Simple?

SECTION I. Saint Thomas's Position Is Set Forth; Whether Scotus Agrees With It Is Asked

Scotus in *In I Sent.*, d. VIII, q. II, setting forth the question agrees on the substance with Saint Thomas, but does not approve his reason. Two things are to be examined here. First, whether Saint Thomas held the position and held it for that reason which Scotus attributes to him. Second, whether that reason is well attributed to him by Scotus.

On the first, three passages are cited by our scholiast: *Summa Theologiae* I, q. III, a. IV; q. L, aa. II and III; and *Summa Contra Gentiles* II, c. XLIX.

In the first passage, q. III, *Summa Theologiae* I, those two reasons are set forth for removing all potential being from God, and for removing being by participation — both of which belong to creatures, not to God. Yet the adequate and formal reason is not asserted there, as is clear from what is said in the body and in the responses to the arguments.

Article I of that question could have been cited for the first reason of composition from act and potency — when Saint Thomas proves that the first being cannot be so composed. And similarly article II signals the same reason when it is asserted that God is pure act, alien from all potentiality whatsoever.

This is more clearly and distinctly found in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. L, a. II, which I wish to produce, in the response to the third objection. For in the response to the second objection nothing appropriate is found. "Although in an angel there is no composition of matter and form, yet in it there is act and potency — which can be made clear from consideration of material things, in which a double composition is found. The first is from form and matter, from which some nature is constituted. But the nature thus composed is not its own being; and being is its act. Hence the nature itself is compared to its being as potency to act. Then: taking away matter and positing that the form itself subsists not in matter, there still remains the comparison of form to being itself as potency to act — and such composition is to be understood in angels."

Yet the second reason — about participated being that Scotus posits in his text — is not adduced here. The text of Scotus is as follows in *In I Sent.*, d. VIII, q. II, *§hic dicitur*, n. I: "Here it is said that every creature is composed of act and potency — because none is pure potency, since it would then be nothing; nor pure act, since then it would be God. Therefore every creature is composed of act and potency. Furthermore, every creature is a being by participation; therefore it is composed of participant and participated."

So Scotus — but this second proof does not seem to be contained in the text of Saint Thomas. Therefore some are doubtful about Scotus's faithfulness in reporting his position.

Yet there should be no doubt, if all testimonies of Saint Thomas are weighed. For he says in q. III, a. IV, *§tertio*: "Just as that which has fire and is not fire is ignited by participation, so what has being and is not being is a being by participation. But God is his own essence." Behold: he distinguishes God from creature by the fact that the creature is not being by participation. And he gathers: "If therefore it is not its own being, it will be a being by participation and not through essence." Therefore it will not be the first being — which is absurd.

I add another testimony, article VII of the same question IV, *§tertio*, in the body: "Every composite has a cause — for things that are separately diverse do not come together in something one except through some cause uniting them. But God has no cause" — which though it does not seem to contain the matter, I add another in the same article, ad I: "The things that are from God imitate God as caused things imitate the first cause. Now it is of the definition of a caused thing that it be in some way composite — because at minimum its being is other than its quiddity." This is participated being — for he then adds: "than what it is." That is, besides its own proper being, it has another alien being — namely that of the cause, which it participates. From this Scotus faithfully deduced Saint Thomas's position.

SECTION II. To What Extent Scotus Dissents From Saint Thomas, Who Impugns Him?

Let us come to the impugnation, which since it is brief, must be set out in Scotus's own words. "Against this conclusion I argue thus: because if in every composite there is composition of thing and thing, I take that thing that composes, and ask: if it is simple, the thesis is held; if composite, there will be infinite regress in things."

Here arises the question: whether Saint Thomas posited the composition from act and potency as from thing and thing, or not? For on this sense depends the reason for the impugnation. For as Lychetus comments here: "If Saint Thomas means here that every creature is composed of act and potency as from diverse things, then the argument of the Doctor against Saint Thomas is valid. But if he means that it is composed of act — that is, from some entity — and from potency — that is, from the lack of another entity — then the argument of the Doctor does not conclude against Saint Thomas."

"The Doctor argues therefore against this — that it is composed of diverse things." Lychetus therefore leaves in doubt Scotus's faithfulness in expounding Saint Thomas's mind, and consequently the reason for impugnation — indeed he also weakens the force of the arguments.

I would rather that Scotus had more rightly understood and expounded Saint Thomas's position than that he rightly impugned it. For the former pertains to the truth of judgment; the latter to the acuity of genius. Therefore I wish first to assert his faithfulness, and then to strengthen the arguments.

Saint Thomas understood by the name "composition" in that passage *Summa Theologiae* I, q. III, a. I, and q. L, a. II, a composition of thing and thing — things diverse from one another by their own nature. And accordingly Scotus truly understood his mind. The assumption is clear because Saint Thomas posits two compositions, both of which he excludes from God in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. III — I speak of physical compositions — one from matter and form, the other from act and potency. The first is clearly of thing and thing. About the second the question is asked.

Yet that it is of thing and thing is clear from q. L, a. II, where, removing from angels the composition from matter and form, he admits the composition from act and potency. But that this is real is clear from the terms of form and its own being — that is, of substance and existence, so that the nature is one thing and the existence of the nature another — so that in every creature there is composition from essence and existence. Saint Thomas explains this in the response to the third objection there: "the comparison of form to being itself as potency to act remains" — that is, of essence to existence. Hence the angel is composed of "what it is" (*quo est*) and "which it is" (*quod est*), or of being (*esse*) and what is (*quod est*). And he cites some authors and Boetius, to whom he conforms;

and he explains further that "the form itself is subsisting; but being itself is that by which the substance is." Then: "In God there is not one thing being and that by which it is — that is, essence and existence or subsistence."

Now no one is unaware that in Saint Thomas's opinion the essence and existence or subsistence are really distinguished from the nature of the thing — not through reason alone. Therefore from things. And from this reason Scotus faithfully understood and reported Saint Thomas's position, and Lychetus should not have doubted it — who, being a faithful interpreter, finds us more faithful on this point.

Now to the force of the argument — which, as Lychetus says, is altogether convincing, as reading the argument makes liquid clear. I set it out. Saint Thomas affirms that no creature is simple — for this reason: because every creature is composed of act and potency. But this argument is not valid; therefore the assumption is not rightly proved.

About Saint Thomas's reason it is clearly established. That it does not seem to hold I show with Scotus. Act and potency are two things really distinct — namely essence and existence, indeed three — and subsistence. But each of these singly is simple: essence is simple, existence is again simple, subsistence is simple. Therefore there are already given three simple creatures — and Scotus's argument is valid.

If it is denied that each is simple, the argument returns: they are therefore composite. And if composite, there is infinite regress in this manner: if they are composed of thing and thing, those things, if simple — the thesis is held; if composite, there is infinite regress. The same reasoning will always return. Therefore Saint Thomas's reason seems to collapse.

Scotus's position therefore is valid — which I wish to put in his own words, since they are clear: "No creature is perfectly simple without in some way being either composite or composable. Composite — because it has an entity with the privation of some degree of entity, and lacks some perfection that is apt to belong to an entity in itself. As a mole is said to be blind because by the character of an animal it is apt to have sight — not by the character of a mole. According to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* V, c. on privation. Therefore it is composed not from things and positives, but from a positive thing and a privation."

This composition is thus shown — from form and from the privation of a perfection capable of being present, of which it is capable. Another reason for composition is also manifest: because every creature is in potency to receive new accidental perfections — with respect to which it is composable from its own created finite and perfectible nature. Therefore no creature is simple, since it is always apt to receive certain new forms that can accrue to it.

And Scotus adds: nothing is simple except pure act which is God; besides God, nothing is pure — since some degree of actuality is lacking to it. Just as there is no pure light that lacks some degree of light — though with that impure light no privative entity is mixed. Therefore from that lack, and from that potency to receive perfectable accidents, arises that character of composable with exclusion of simplicity.

So far on the first reason of Saint Thomas. Regarding the second reason, passing over the subtleties of Scotus distinguishing relations of part to whole and of container to contained, it is clear that it is adequate: namely, that God alone is infinite and can participate or receive perfection from no one, and is therefore simple and pure, neither composite nor composable; while creatures, which are finite and limited, both actually participate and can participate in further perfection from God, and are from themselves perfectible. This reason coincides with Scotus's reason of composability, and is therefore excellent — and ultimately approved by Scotus.

JUDGMENT

I conclude that Scotus judged more aptly about the simplicity of God and the composition of the creature — that he understood and expounded Saint Thomas's position well, rightly rejected the first reason, accepted the second, clearly declared his own mind, and proved it acutely and solidly.

Yet two things remain to be noted. First, the composition from form and privation does not seem to be a true composition, because privation excludes rather than composes. I respond that this is true in the first concept of privation — but false in the second. For from the privation a composition is gathered, which is owed to the subject by reason of the privation. I explain the matter. Privation is the principle of natural things because it brings with it the aptitude and exigency of form in the subject, in which there is capacity and exigency for a further form — future or possible — the sign of which capacity and exigency is the privation, which is a negation in an apt subject, conjoined with aptitude. Taking this as presupposed, I apply it to the matter at hand.

That privation of entity which Scotus posits in the creature, though it is a negation, is not an exclusion of composition but an exigency of it — bringing with it the capacity and aptitude in the creature to receive new perfections from the Creator. And in this way it involves forms and composable parts — and Scotus's position remains safe and stable, so that no one can impugn it.

Second: if Scotus's composition is true, it follows that the divine relations are not perfect, because all of them lack some other perfection. The consequent is proved because Paternity, insofar as it is a being, can receive a perfection that falls upon being, and of which being in its common character is capable — as is clear from the example of the mole, which in the character of an animal is capable of sight and therefore is said capable of that perfection, because it has in

itself the degree of animal to which sight is owed — even though it otherwise conflicts with the specific difference of the mole. To this argument Lychetus responds: that Paternity — and the same holds for the other relations — does not express perfection; which, being Scotus's doctrine, the argument does not prove.

An apt response, but it seems to smell of evasion rather than solution. Therefore I respond differently. Granted that it does express perfection, I deny the consequent — because that being which is found in the relation is only in the quasi-subjective genus, since it is being-in and ordered from itself toward being-toward-another, which is the formal character of the relation. Hence it does not seem to be being absolutely and simply — for which reason it does not have the capacity for any perfection absolutely. Just as prime matter, which is the most imperfect being and only in the subjective genus, is incapable of all further perfection. So that being-in of the relation — since it arises from the fact that the relation needs a subject, or quasi-subject, in which it inheres — is not of itself a perfection; indeed in creatures it is an imperfection. And thus it is incapable of further absolute formal perfection — setting aside of course all imperfection. But in the genus of the relative — as being-toward-another, that is, toward its term, for instance Filiation — another relative perfection is repugnant to it; which if it were new and added to another, would destroy the relation, not perfect it.

This response is valid and holds in every position — both in that which admits perfection in the relation (which is rather common), and in that which excludes it (which is Scotistic, as we will see in its place). As for the example of the mole, I respond that there is a great diversity in it — because the animal in the mole is perfect in its sensitive genus and capable in that genus of all perfections of an animal, such as sight; and if the mole lacks it, it is rather privation than negation. For sight does not conflict with that animal; and if sight were granted to the mole, it would not conflict to see — as it would conflict with a stone or wood and other non-sentient things. Because the mole is a sensitive animal — a reason not present in stone or wood.

There is also another objection against the same composition of Scotus, over which Lychetus labors and expands at length. It goes thus: from that composition it would follow that the divine essence is composite — because even though it expresses infinite entity, yet insofar as it is a being it is capable of all perfections of creatures, which God altogether lacks — for instance, of angel, man, wood, stone.

This is easily resolved by saying that these perfections are relative to created things and exist in created things, and taken formally and as creatures with respect to God the Creator — they are imperfections. And therefore God is not deprived of them — rather is altogether incapable of them. For whatever is, or can be, or can be conceived of perfection — all of this is given in God in all

ways, infinitely perfectly. And accordingly there is no imaginable perfection of which he is deprived or lacks. Indeed from him flow all perfections of creatures in whatever genus they may be.

I add that not even in creatures does the argument hold. For not all perfections of other beings fit man, for example — but only those of which his nature is capable and which are perfections with respect to him. Otherwise it would be fitting for man to be of stone and of wood and of brute — which is absurd. Hence the objection is of no force, and many absurdities would be posited in God if all particular perfections of created beings were posited in him. Thus the objection is resolved with less effort, turned back, and Scotus's position asserted and fortified.

COLLATION V. DISTINCTION IV. On the Argument by Which St. Thomas Proves That God Does Not Fall Under Any Genus

SECTION I

Scotus agrees with St. Thomas on the conclusion but disagrees on the proof. For in *1. d. 8. q. 3. §. Aly probant quarto modo n. 20*, Scotus writes: "Some prove in a fourth way that God does not belong to any genus, on the ground that He contains in Himself the perfections of all genera; but this argument does not hold," and so forth. I note here that Scotus does not attack the other arguments of St. Thomas drawn from act and potency or from the nature of quiddity, but only this one argument as proposed in that passage — and it is this one alone that we, together with Scotus, put forward and examine.

First, as is our custom, let us inquire whether St. Thomas actually stated the argument in the way it is attributed to him. In the question cited in the margin — that is, *3. 1.p. a. 5* — it is not found explicitly but is indicated obscurely in these terms: that God does not belong to any genus by reduction as a principle is evident from the fact that a principle which is reduced to some genus does not extend beyond that genus; but God is the principle of all being, and therefore is not contained in anything as a principle. He also explains what he understands by this extension beyond genus in *q. 44 in 1 p. a. 1. In corp.*: all things other than God do not have being as their own, but participate in being, and therefore it is necessary that all things which are diversified according to their diverse participation in being, so as to exist more or less perfectly, should be caused by one first being which exists most perfectly. The argument of Scotus is more clearly contained here. It is set out most conspicuously and lucidly in *1. d. 8. q. 1. a. r.*, where we read: the first is, as it were, the principle of the others, containing in itself all the aforesaid attributes — that is, all participations — united in a certain manner. And thus God is the divine principle, and all things are one in Him. Here is the true argument of St. Thomas as cited by Scotus, which is

further confirmed by what is said in *art. 2* under the heading: Whether God is the being of all things, where St. Thomas writes in the body, after the objections: nothing has being except insofar as it participates in divine being, since He is the first being, as it were the cause of all being; but everything that is participated in something is in it after the manner of the participant.

All these passages could, however, be taken in a somewhat different sense than Scotus proposes. I must therefore establish one passage that no Thomist can contest, and which I believe alone moved Scotus to attribute this argument to the Angelic Doctor. I take it from *ar. 2. q. 4. d. 4. in 1. sent.*, where he asks whether God belongs to the predicament of substance. He denies it there, chiefly for this reason: whatever belongs to a genus has its being determined to one genus; but the divine being is in no way terminated to any genus — on the contrary, it comprehends in itself the noble perfections of all genera, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say in *5 Metaph.* — therefore God does not belong to the genus of substance. And again at the end of the body, or in the reply to the objections: the fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine being, which gathers together all the noble qualities of all genera. Here is the genuine argument of Scotus: "He contains in Himself the perfections of all genera." This is the passage that our scholiast ought to have cited in order to give credibility to our Scotus.

Since, therefore, the mind and argument of St. Thomas are clear, let us see how Scotus reports it. He writes: "This argument does not hold, because whatever contains something contains it after its own manner; for substance, which is now the most general genus insofar as it is taken to include all inferior species, virtually contains all accidents, in such a way that if God were to cause only the individual substances, those substances would have in themselves the power from which they would cause all accidents; and yet for this reason created substances are not denied to belong to a genus, because they contain accidents virtually, after their own manner, not after the manner of accidents. Therefore, from the sole fact that God contains the perfections of all genera, it does not follow that He does not belong to a genus."

This argument of Scotus does not seem to prove its point, as Lychetus notes in his Commentary, where he writes: "But it seems to me that it does not resolve St. Thomas's argument, because from the fact that substances cause the accidents of other genera, they are therefore not placed in the genus of accidents. So likewise in the present case: if God contains all genera virtually, He will not belong to any genus." And indeed to a first-time reader it will seem to tell against Scotus rather than against St. Thomas.

Lychetus does, however, resolve the objection he has raised in three ways. But setting aside those solutions that contain less of the substance of the matter, I offer one solution that I regard as adequate. It is not Scotus's intention to compare the genus of substance with accidents, as Lychetus seems to suppose —

for in that case Scotus would be arguing ineptly and indeed against himself, since accidents are not placed in the same genus as substance, nor in the predicament of substance. What Scotus is comparing is substance in general with its own species into which it is contracted — species which have in themselves the power to produce accidents, just as the individuals of those species also have that same power — yet this power does not prevent them from agreeing with one another and being placed in the genus of substance together with substance, in which all that power is contained as in a common principle. And so, by comparing those species which have this power in themselves, he affirms that they are placed in the genus of substance, because those accidents are not present in them in their proper accidental genus but virtually or eminently. They therefore do not conflict with the power to be placed in the predicament of substance. Nor is it incompatible with the predicament of substance that it should contain all the substantial grades of its own species, since all those species have in themselves a distinct and specific being by which they are placed in that predicament, even though they are contained virtually in the principle of substance.

I prove that my interpretation of Scotus's meaning is correct, because he specifically mentions individuals. For he says: if God were to cause only individuals, those individuals would have in themselves the power from which they would cause all accidents — as if he were arguing from this that all those individuals should still be placed in a genus, since that power of universal containment would be common to them all. And I confirm this with the apt example that Lychetus himself offers: the sun contains virtually many things that it produces, and a man likewise contains many things that he generates — namely little creatures, lice, fleas, and the like — and yet for this reason neither is excluded from the predicament of substance; rather, both are placed in the same genus along with their effects. Therefore God too, even though He contains and holds all the perfections of all beings, can still be placed in a genus along with them, since no argument from the notion of principle stands in the way — for that notion does not exclude the sun or man from the genus of their effects, because the being that is communicated to those effects is not numerically the same being that is in the effects, but is something entirely different, which in the cause is had after its own manner, in itself and as it were eminently.

For greater clarity, I add the following. The argument of St. Thomas was drawn from the containment in God of all things and all genera, such that from this containment alone it would follow that He cannot be placed in any genus, because one who holds in himself the perfections of all genera gathered together cannot be reduced to or limited to any one genus. This is manifestly contained in the argument of St. Thomas at *a. 2. q. 4. d. 8. in 1 sent.*, which we cited last: whatever belongs to a genus has its being determined to one genus; but the divine being is in no way terminated to any genus — on the contrary, it

comprehends in itself the noble perfections of all genera — therefore God does not belong to the genus of substance. Note that the argument is directed at one genus, namely substance, not at the other genera of accidents, which by their very nature are incompatible with God. Therefore the formal and precise reason for excluding God from that one genus of which He is by nature capable is precisely the reason that His being contains all genera.

Scotus attacks this in the following way: if this argument were valid, it would follow that substance could not be placed in a genus, because it contains in itself all the genera of accidents, which arise from it and which it underlies; and yet from this universal containment substance can still be drawn and limited to the one genus of substance. Therefore the argument does not hold. It is not, then, Scotus's intention to say that substance can be placed in the genera of other things — that is, of the accidents it contains — but in its own determinate proper genus. Likewise, St. Thomas does not intend to prove that God cannot be placed in the other genera or in some one of them of which by nature He was not capable, but in the genus of substance, as he expressly states. Hence no one will hereafter be able to doubt the force of Scotus's argument, which is confirmed further by the fact that he takes up and refutes an objection that someone might have raised on behalf of St. Thomas, in this form: God has in Himself all the perfections of all genera; therefore because of that multiplicity He is excluded from any one genus, which requires unity in its being and univocal predication of its inferiors — a unity which God would not possess because of His comprehension of all genera. To this Scotus responds admirably: that containment is not formal but eminent, and is after His own manner, not after the manner of the things contained; and so it does not conflict with the unity and simplicity required for a genus — just as the virtual containment of all accidents in substance does not conflict with its being placed in its own proper genus of substance. Hence Scotus always spoke of the proper genus and not of a foreign genus, and his meaning is plainly evident.

As for Scotus's argument drawn from the simplicity of God, which excludes composition out of genus and difference — this is indeed clear as regards the second point stated, drawn from infinity, and it needs no proof that it is excellent and evident. For Scotus demonstrates and confirms it so lucidly and forcefully in *S. Teneo a n. 16. ad 20* that nothing further could be desired. And because in section XVII he adds another proof drawn from the necessity of divine being, I wish briefly to set out both arguments.

The infinite in an absolute sense comprehends every perfection without qualification, and cannot be conceived as less perfect or as needing to be perfected; but what belongs to a genus stands as an imperfect part needing to be perfected by its difference — and this overturns the notion of the absolutely infinite. But such is God; therefore He cannot belong to a genus.

Scotus adds an argument drawn from the necessity of such a being: what necessarily exists is always in ultimate act, and nothing can be lacking to it; such is God; therefore nothing in His adequate concept of being can be lacking to Him. But if He were in a genus, the difference would be lacking to Him; therefore He cannot belong to a genus.

Finally, from this there arises a most lucid argument: God is pure act; but pure act is incompatible with genus; therefore God is incompatible with genus. The major premiss is established. The minor is proved: pure act is incompatible with potentiality; but in a genus there is potentiality — therefore pure act is incompatible with genus. The major is clear. The minor is evident from the nature of genus, which is in potency with respect to the difference it awaits in order to be actualized and perfected, and therefore has potentiality. By these arguments the entire matter is settled and it is demonstrated throughout that God cannot be placed in any genus.

SECTION II. On the Univocity of Being

I join here these two distinctions because one is bound up with the other, and Scotus's second teaching on the univocity of being is opposed by the Thomists as inconsistent with the first — for what is lacking to a univocal to make it a genus? Since it seems to be one and the same thing to be univocal and to be predicated univocally, and thus predicable as a genus.

Hence Vasquez argues against Scotus in *1 p. d. 22. c. 5. n. 9* at the end, having recalled his teaching in *c. 3. n. 6* and left it pending in the middle of *c. 5*: "I do not see how what Scotus teaches in the cited passage is coherent — namely, that something is univocally common to God and creatures, while God is not placed in any predicament."

Therefore St. Thomas in *1 p. q. 13. a. 5* writes: "It must be said that it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and creatures," and later, speaking of a name: "nothing is predicated univocally of God and creatures." Scotus, on the other hand, in *1. d. 3. q. 2*, does not deny that there is a univocal concept of being common to God and creatures. For in *§. secundo n. 5* at the beginning, he does not assert this positively but says: "Not asserting it, because it is not in accord with the common opinion, it can be said that God is conceived not only in an analogous concept but in some concept univocal to Himself and to creatures." And in *d. 3. q. 3. §. Ad quaestionem n. 6*, he places what he had said non-assertively into a positive position, and while he removes from being univocity of every kind — that is, together with differences and properties — he admits it as between God and creatures. Finally in *d. 8. q. 5. Teneo opinionem meam n. 16*, he plainly says that being is univocal to God and creatures: "It is compatible with the simplicity of God that there should be some concept common to Him and to a creature, though not common as a genus." He teaches the same in *de Anima q. 21*. By common concept he means a univocal one, as all

Scotists understand — as the context makes plain, and as the exception confirms, since he excludes only the community of genus.

The Thomists attack this same univocity as contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas: Ferrara in *1. cont. gent. c. 34*, Cajetan in *1. p. q. 13. a. 5* and in *de ente et essentia c. 2. q. 3*, and Soto in *Praedicament. c. 4. q. 2*, and others commonly, together with the Complutensians in *Logica d. 11. q. 5*.

The principal foundation of Scotus is taken from the equality of participation in that precise notion of being in its first and most formal concept of entity, which abstracts from created and uncreated, finite and infinite, being-of-itself and being-from-another — these features destroy that equal participation and consequently the univocity. But in this precise concept of real being there can be no diversity in participating, since in God and in creatures there is true real entity. In this respect nothing proper to either is included. There is therefore a common concept of being, and consequently univocity of being as between God and creatures.

Against this there is the forceful argument drawn from the aforesaid doctrine of Scotus, which denies that God is placed under a genus — something Scotus absolutely denies, as we have seen — yet this does not seem to be able to stand alongside univocity. Therefore either both must be affirmed or both denied — which was Vasquez's objection against Scotus.

Three of our authors labor in responding: Rada, Pontius, Mastrius. Rada in *Controversia 21*, after *art. 2*, in response to the arguments placed at the beginning of the controversy, responds by admitting a certain predication of being of God and creatures that has the character of genus — namely, of superior to inferior — and says: "Just as we concede without inconvenience that being is superior to God in predication, so we can concede without inconvenience that being is prior according to its nature in the manner already explained." Rada expounds this priority with Aristotle from the Postpredicaments, which does not convert in terms of subsistence — because although this is valid: "Man is an animal," this is not valid: "An animal, therefore, a man." So being can be said to be prior as regards consequence. Accordingly he admits: "God is being," provided it is not admitted: "This is being, therefore it is God." Pontius thinks much the same in *d. 18. p. 3 of his Course, q. 3. n. 34*. Mastrius, however, teaches the contrary and attacks Pontius for this view. The truth is that he labors and struggles considerably over the univocity of being, and does not seem perfectly to admit a univocal, perceiving acutely the difficulty thereby raised of placing God in a genus once full univocity is admitted. And so he admitted something analogous, as he had already admitted in *Log. d. 5. q. 1. a. 2. n. 26*, and *d. 2. q. 5. from n. 112 to the end*. Moreover, he did not respond accurately, as is his custom, to the argument drawn from the univocity of being, content merely to deny that God is placed under a genus — referring on this point to *Logic q. 7. a. 1*, where he does indeed prove it, but does not there introduce or resolve this argument about the

univocal concept of being as it applies to God and creatures. Indeed he says there at *n.* 8: "If we wish to abuse the term and accept genus in so broad a sense as to mean the same as a univocal predicate, in this sense we would not deny that God falls under a genus."

I now set out my own view. I grant a concept — both formal and objective — of being that is entirely univocal, precisely equal, and fully similar as between God and creatures. I deny, however, the notion of genus and the predication of superior over inferior, and I affirm that the former does not entail the latter. I prove this by philosophical reasoning, first in the following way.

A univocal is attended to according to its own notion, abstracting it from those things in which it existed on the part of reality, through pure abstraction without any composition or contraction, and being is placed in a precise state with all admixture excluded. The intellect then compares the things from which it was abstracted, not with that precise notion but with one another, and sees in them an equal and similar agreement — indeed an identity — in that precise notion of being. And it does nothing more and makes no composition regarding the subjects, so to speak, from which it abstracted that common notion purely as belonging to God and to creature. Therefore that univocal concept is only comparative and precise, affirming nothing of God and creature other than that they agree in it.

But the placement in a genus proceeds in a different manner — namely, by operating upon that being thus made precise and applying it as a superior to the inferiors from which it was abstracted, and predicating it of them by contracting that common notion to particulars, descending from that common state, and changing a purely precise and similitive concept into an applicative and contractive one — not comparing the equality of particulars in that notion, but converting the common notion as something eminent and superior toward the particulars constituted below it, and predicating the precise notion of them as of inferiors. Now this application and predication is unworthy of God, who cannot have the nature of an inferior with respect to any being whatsoever, since He is superior in every way to any entity or concept whatsoever. Therefore it is an injury to God to predicate a genus of Him, but it is no injury to admit univocity of being with Him. In this way the notion of the univocal is preserved and the notion of a genus is excluded.

I argue secondly against that generic predication tolerated by Rada and Pontius, in this manner. God is being both in reality and in conception prior to any concept of being whatsoever, for He is the first and supreme being and the idea and source of all being, and no being either exists or can be conceived whose exemplar and author God is not. But a being of this kind cannot presuppose another being for its concept — which has no being, nor can it be formed or exist without Him as author and exemplar. Therefore He cannot come into consideration as an inferior with respect to being, over which He is superior in

every consideration and reason. And so I hold that our conclusion regarding the denial of genus is roundly proved, and the response of Rada and Pontius is rejected.

JUDGMENT.

This judgment will be common to these two controversies. In both, Scotus reasoned correctly: he established with full right the univocity of being as between God and creatures, yet at the same time closed off the way to generic predication — and I set this out afresh and confirm it.

First, I reconcile the univocity with that superiority of being in God. The notion of being communicated to creatures, and grasped by both from the side of the notion of being, is one and common to creatures — otherwise God would not communicate the true and proper notion of being to His creatures. Therefore all creatures agree with God in what they truly and properly received from Him. Nor does the distinction of participant and participated stand in the way, for it does not harm univocity in the thing communicated, but only involves the independence of the cause and the dependence of the effect — which does not remove univocity in the nature of cause and effect.

I illustrate the matter with what I take to be an apt example. A spring from which several streams flow is their cause, yet agrees entirely with them — the reason of cause notwithstanding — and in all of them there is water of the same kind as in the spring. Again, Adam is the cause of all generated men and agrees completely with them in human nature. From all these a common and formal univocal concept is elicited, the notion of cause notwithstanding — for a precise concept of univocity can be formed on account of similarity in nature, even though it exists in a different manner in cause and effect, which similarity is then not under consideration and is set aside.

Do not object again that this univocal concept of being, presupposing the communication of being, being abstracted, can have the nature of a genus with respect to God and creature, by turning my examples of the spring and of man back against me — for in spite of the relation of cause and effect, they agree in specific nature, and from them a common concept of species is abstracted; so it might follow against me that from the entity of creatures communicated by God there could also be abstracted a universal concept of genus applicable to God and creatures, which would be truly and univocally predicated of them.

I respond that the objection does not hold, because God is infinitely and in every way superior to creatures, in whatever way they are taken or understood, and therefore can never have the nature of an inferior with respect to a superior. Hence if we imagine that being in common were given in reality separately from its inferiors, that being itself would be inferior to and dependent upon God, and therefore could not be predicated of Him as a superior. For the notion of the predicable requires the notion of the subjectible, and God is not capable

of the latter; therefore He is not capable of the former either. In creatures the matter proceeds otherwise, for they are finite and limited, and therefore although they precede in one respect they can follow in another and be made subject.

This may perhaps seem novel to scholastics, but it is not on that account either improbable or inept, since it contains a doctrine befitting the divine perfection and omnimoda independence — which I always study to affirm and teach in my writings, whether in matters of nature, morals, or grace. And indeed whoever seriously weighs what God is cannot fail to approve what I am saying.

I note furthermore that we need not fear so greatly this argument for placing God in a genus on the ground that genus is potential and implies imperfection — for this consideration does not apply to God, in whom there is no imperfection or potentiality. Hence that precise concept similar to a genus is far removed from God, because whatever seems to accrue to Him does not accrue but rather emanates from the necessity and fruitfulness of His nature. In a genus there is need and therefore imperfection and potentiality; but in God, under whatever abstraction is made, there is no need but fruitfulness and perfection — just as when the divine nature is conceived precisely without its attributes, it is not considered as needing them but as abounding in fruitfulness toward them.

And so I confirm Scotus's doctrine by this my way of philosophizing, for he draws his argument for excluding the notion of genus from God from simplicity, from necessity, and above all from infinity, as is clear from this passage, where after attacking the argument of St. Thomas in the manner we have described, he places his own case in this threefold reason — which has, in my judgment, been both rightly understood and clearly explained by me. Henceforth, if the Scotists are willing to agree with me, they will not quarrel so fiercely among themselves as Pontius and Mastrius do, and Vasquez, cited in *that d. 22, c. 5*, will cease to wonder how, among us, the univocity of being stands alongside the denial of genus and predicament under which and in which God might be placed. I say no more on this matter, for though brief I have spoken without obscurity.

For the benefit of beginners, however, I set out the argument formally and provide the formal solution. The Thomists argue: Scotus posits a univocal concept of being with respect to God and creatures; but this is to posit a concept of genus; therefore God is placed in the genus of univocal being.

I respond by granting the major and denying the minor. The reason is that for the notion of genus, univocity is not sufficient — there is also required a certain priority and superiority on the part of the univocal predicate. But this cannot exist in being with respect to God, since God is prior in every way and superior to being taken in any sense whatsoever, nor can He have the nature of an

inferior and a subject — from which it follows that He cannot be placed in a genus.

COLLATION VI. DISTINCTION I. On the Sense of Damascene Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son

On this truth of the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son there is complete agreement between the Angelic Doctor and the Subtle Doctor, both of whom confirm it with many and great arguments — the former in *1 p. qu. 36*, the latter in *1 d. 11. q. 1*. Each reports the discord between the Greeks and Latins on the matter and attempts to reconcile or resolve it. They differ, however, in their judgment of Damascene, whom some believe to have thought otherwise. Indeed Marcus of Ephesus — that most vehement defender of his own error and its public champion at the Council of Florence — introduced Damascene as a chief patron of the Greek position denying the procession. As we shall say below, this is reported and refuted by Bessarion in his Oration for Union, which appears after the Council, where he joins Damascene with Maximus and attempts to draw both to his own side.

Setting aside the opinions of others regarding his meaning, we shall inquire only into the judgment of St. Thomas and Scotus. St. Thomas in *1 p. q. 36. a. 2. ad 3* writes: "It must be said that the view that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son was first introduced by the Nestorians, as is clear from a certain symbol of the Nestorians condemned in the Council of Ephesus. This error was followed by Theodore the Nestorian and many after him, among whom was also Damascene. Hence in this matter his opinion is not to be followed." Not only here, but also in *q. 10. de potentia, a. 4. ad ultimum*, he thinks and affirms the same in these words: "This opinion of Theodore was afterwards followed by Damascene, although the doctrines of that same Theodore were condemned by the Fifth Council. Hence in this matter the opinion of Damascene is not to be followed."

Some have followed the judgment of St. Thomas, among whom is Clichtoveus in *c. 11. lib. 1. de Fide*, who says Damascene was misled by ignorance, and Banez in his commentary on this question of St. Thomas. Indeed Cajetan here admits that some have attacked these words of St. Thomas, on the ground that they imply Damascene was a heretic. John of St. Thomas therefore wrongly denies that St. Thomas held this opinion, in *q. 33. in 1 p. d. 15. a. 3. n. 2*.

Against this, Scotus in *1 d. 11. q. 1* at the beginning sets out three testimonies of Damascene commonly cited in support of the Greek error — the first and second from the *Book on the Faith* and the third from the *Epistle on the Trisagion* — and in that question at *n. 2*, responding, says: "In this question the Greeks are said to disagree with the Latins, as the authorities of Damascene appear to

sound. But concerning this disagreement, Lincolniensis says in a certain note near the end of the Epistle on the Trisagion, that the opinion of the Greeks is that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son but does not proceed from the Son, only from the Father through the Son." He adds that this controversy is not about the thing but about the name. "If two wise men," he says, "one Greek and one Latin, each a true lover of truth and not of his own expression, were to inquire together into this apparent contradiction, the contradiction itself would at length be seen to be not truly real, as it is verbal; otherwise, either the Greeks themselves or we Latins are truly heretics. But who would accuse this author — namely John of Damascus — and the blessed Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Cyril, and the other Greek Fathers of heresy?" By this sound reasoning Scotus seems to suggest that St. Thomas was condemning Damascene for error. From this it is clear that the judgment of Scotus — who exonerates Damascene — and that of St. Thomas — who charges him with error — are different. Cajetan, who attempts to excuse St. Thomas, agrees with Scotus here, as does Thomas of Strassburg in *1. d. 11. q. 1. a. 1*, Valentia in *1. p. d. 2 generali, q. 10, de persona Spiritus Sancti puncto 2 in fine*, Suarez in *lib. 10. de Trinit. c. 1. n. 13*, Vasquez in *1 p. disp. 147. c. 7*, Diego Ruiz de Montoya in *disput. 67. q. 9*, Bellarmine in *lib. 2. de Christo c. 25 and 27*, and many of the Greeks, among whom is Bessarion in *orat. 6* at the end of the Council for union, Gennadius Scholarius in the tract on the five chapters of the Council of Florence, and Joseph Bishop of Methone in his response to the libel of Marcus of Ephesus, which appears after the Council of Florence, and in the Apologia written before the Council in defense of Damascene.

Let us now see on what basis St. Thomas affirmed that Damascene denied the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, while Scotus said he affirmed it — and why the former condemned him while the latter exonerated him.

St. Thomas cites one passage from *Book I of the Orthodox Faith, c. 11*, where Damascene says: "We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father, and we call Him the Spirit of the Father. But we do not say the Holy Spirit is from the Son; we call Him however the Spirit of the Son." This is the testimony St. Thomas places as the third argument in favor of the Greek position.

Scotus cites three passages. The first is from *Book I of the Faith, c. 8*: "We say the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and resting in the Son." Likewise in *c. 11*: "We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father." Furthermore, the same in the *Epistle on the Trisagion to Jordan the Archimandrite*, at the end: "Father, and Word, and Holy Spirit" — and he adds: "from the Father indeed, of the Son, and not from the Son, but the Spirit of the mouth of God." St. Thomas, moved by one passage alone, cited Damascene for the Greek error. Scotus, unmoved even by three passages in the contrary direction, exonerated him. Which of the two judged better, and judged more correctly of Damascene, is what we must inquire.

SECTION I. Damascene is shown to be free from censure and untouched by error

It will seem remarkable to the reader that St. Thomas freed Maximus from the slander of the Greek error in a common cause, yet did not vindicate Damascene. For it was customary for the Greeks to adduce these two in support of their position. They adduced Maximus above all in his *Epistle to Marinus*, which is recorded as cited against the Procession from the Son by the Greeks at the Council of Florence, and is reported by Bessarion in his Oration for Union, which appears after the Council, where he links him with Damascene and attempts to draw both to his own side. Gennadius and Joseph of Methone do the same, demonstrating with many testimonies that Maximus and Damascene are in fact on the Latin side, pleading the cause of both and refusing to allow one to be separated from the other.

St. Thomas saw things differently and preferred to support Maximus over Damascene. Let us see how he exonerates Maximus, since we see how he abandoned Damascene. In his *Opusculum against the Errors of the Greeks*, c. 32, he numbers Maximus among the Greek Fathers — Athanasius, Basil, Cyril, and others — who hold the correct opinion on the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, relying on a passage from the *Book on the Candlestick and the Seven Lamps*, which Gennadius also commends in his work on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, and which Diego Ruiz de Montoya indicates in *disp. 67. sect. 7. n. 7*. That testimony reads: "The Holy Spirit, just as He exists by nature from God the Father according to essence, so from the Son according to nature and essence He truly subsists, as proceeding from the Father through the Son." He is understood to be, and is, from the Father, proceeding thus from Him.

But the Greeks at the Council of Florence said that Maximus was on their side, producing the *Epistle to Marinus*, in which he appeared to think against the Latins in this fashion. The Romans say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son — and they immediately brought together the consonant positions of Greeks and Romans, as well as those of Cyril of Alexandria from his sacred commentaries on John. By these they demonstrated that they were not asserting the Son to be the cause of the Spirit, but that they hold the Father to be the one cause of the Son and of the Spirit — of the Son by generation, of the Spirit by procession. Thus Maximus speaks of the Latins, as if unwilling for them to hold that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son just as from the Father, lest they err by so thinking — explaining them in the sense that they were saying only the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit. This testimony, combined with others in the same passage, carried so much weight with the Greeks that at session XXIII they asked the Latins whether they wished to accept the letters of Maximus, as if they believed that by this author they would win their case.

But perhaps St. Thomas had not seen this Epistle, and therefore freed Maximus on the basis of the testimony from the *Book on the Candlestick*. Let us therefore examine the passage from Damascene and consider it carefully.

Damascene therefore in *Book I of the Orthodox Faith*, at the end of *c. 11*, writes: "We should know that we do not say the Father is from anything, but we call Him the Father of the Son. We do not say the Son is causeless or without a Father; we say He is from the Father. We call the Holy Spirit both from the Father and the Spirit of the Father. But we do not say the Holy Spirit is from the Son; we do, however, call Him the Spirit of the Son, as the divine Apostle says, 'if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His'; and we confess that He was made manifest to us through the Son and delivered to us. For He breathed and said to His disciples: 'Receive the Holy Spirit.' Just as from the sun there is both the ray and the splendor — for the sun is itself the source of both the ray and the splendor — yet the splendor is bestowed upon us through the ray, He Himself it is who illumines us and is participated by us. Furthermore, we do not say the Son is the Spirit, nor that He is from the Spirit."

This is the passage that moved St. Thomas to abandon Damascene. But there is in it something that exonerates Damascene, for he only denies that the Spirit is from the Son, but does not deny that He is through the Son. He presses the force of excluding the preposition "from" — but not the preposition "through" — in the sense that the Father is the source and principle as being from Himself and not from another, since He is prior in origin to the Son, who, being from the Father, does not properly claim that "from" for Himself but only "through." And so the Son is not excluded from the Procession but from the mode of Procession. And this is how the Latin Fathers at the Council of Florence expounded that Greek phrasing, as appears from the last session. And Bessarion stated it clearly in relation to our question — namely that of Damascene and Maximus — in his Oration for Union: "The common usage of the Greek language, since it signifies the principal cause by the preposition 'from,' compelled Damascene to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds not 'from' the Son but 'through' the Son, and Maximus to hold that what the Romans say — 'proceeding from the Son' — means the same as 'proceeding through the Son.' For although he says the Romans assert the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Son, the preposition 'from' signifies the principal cause; yet they do not say this in order to signify the Son as such a cause. Damascene grants that the Spirit is certainly not 'from' the Son, but 'through the Son' is conceded. For the Father alone is the cause of such a kind, namely such as the very preposition 'from' signifies; therefore they deny the Son to be such a cause. But to the Son they attribute the preposition 'through,' by which He is signified together with the Father to be a cause or principle of the Holy Spirit."

Damascene and Maximus are therefore in the same boat, and both should be exonerated — not one vindicated and the other abandoned. Hence Bessarion concludes: "Maximus and Damascene signify that the Son is not the principal, nor the proper cause; for this reason they deny, out of caution, that the Son is a cause in that sense — which is most true doctrine, delivered and received and approved by the consent of the Fathers in session XXIV and session XXV." And

Joseph Bishop of Methone clearly expounds Damascene in the same sense in his response to the libel of Marcus of Ephesus, which appears after the Council of Florence, and he himself acknowledges that he had already previously delivered the same in his *Apologia* on the five chapters and had expounded Damascene in that correct sense.

By this reasoning Damascene is freed from censure — as he is also freed by Gregory the Hieromonach, who in a long disputation written after the Council of Florence refutes Marcus of Ephesus, who was abusing that testimony of Damascene which St. Thomas uses to censure him, in order to draw him to the Greek side. He therefore wrenches it from Marcus's hands like a club, and, adding other passages of Damascene and comparing them with that passage from *Book I of the Faith*, c. 11, he shows that Damascene's entire intention was that the Son should not be the primordial and principal principle of the Holy Spirit — as only the Father is, who is from Himself and the source of the divine being communicated, unproduced and unbegotten. This disputation of Gregory against Marcus of Ephesus is found in the edition of Severinus Binius, which I used, at pages 704 and 705.

What I observe above all is that Maximus and Damascene are both joined together in this one cause, so that both should be freed from the slander of the Greeks who cited both in support of their error. This had already been accomplished by Veccus, the older Patriarch of Constantinople, whose excellent *Oration II on his unjust deposition* is a defense of Damascene and Maximus. Nor only in that passage, but also in his *Epistle to Theodore*, in his *Book to Constantine*, and in his *Observations on Camateros* and in the *Epigraphs*, he argues strenuously and learnedly and completely exonerates both from the suspicion of that error. To these add Constantine of Miletus in *orat. 1 and 2*, Gregory Metochites against Maximus Planudes against Manuel the Cretan, Maximus Chrysoberges in his *Oration to the Cretans*, and Demetrius on the Procession of the Holy Spirit.

And lest anyone doubt about that way of expounding the prepositions "from" and "through" — assigning that principal "from" to the Father and the other "through" to the Son — let him hear that distinguished theologian John the Thomist, the chief defender of Latin truth at the Council of Florence, speaking thus at session XXIV: "We confess one cause of the Son and of the Holy Spirit — the Father — so that the Son principally from the Father produces the Holy Spirit." And then, after citing *John c. 15*: "The word 'send' — what else does it signify but that something is sent from someone? What one sends, therefore, one sends as one's own, and what is sent is from the sender — for example, when a prefect acts by command of the emperor, he does not act of himself but by the emperor's command. So too the Son does not of Himself produce the Holy Spirit, but having received this in His generation from the consubstantial Father, and having in Himself the paternal and natural power, He too produces

the Holy Spirit — not principally as the Father, for He is the root and source of the Godhead."

Thus at the Council, John agrees with the Greeks on that difference in producing, in order to reconcile them with the Latins and to join the Fathers who differed somewhat in their manner of speaking. What is more, St. Thomas himself follows this way of expounding it and approves the manner of thinking and speaking of the Greeks maintained by John, his theological disciple. I adduce a striking passage from *q. 36. a. 3. in corp.*, from which John seems to have derived his own position: "This is what some say: this preposition 'through' sometimes denotes authority in the direct case, as when it is said 'the king operates through the bailiff'; sometimes in the oblique case, as when it is said 'the bailiff operates through the king.' Therefore since the Son has from the Father that the Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit through the Son, or that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, which is the same thing." St. Thomas approves this manner of speaking, as appears immediately in the solutions to the objections, and above all in the reply to the second, where he concedes that Damascene in that place...

"One and the same power in number is in the Father and the Son, and therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds equally from both; although sometimes, according to the aforesaid relation, He is said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father."

St. Thomas was therefore able by this reasoning to free Damascene from the Greek error, just as he freed Maximus.

SECTION II. Testimonies of Damascene in Favor of the Latin Position Are Brought Forward

Although the Angelic Doctor is graciously given the passage in *Book I of the Orthodox Faith*, c. 11 as favoring the Greeks, there are nevertheless other passages whose testimony proves the truth of the Procession from the Son, which the Greeks on our side carefully collected and faithfully recited at the Council of Florence, or after it, against their adversaries. We recalled those authors in the preceding section.

First I observe that in the same *Book on the Faith*, c. 18, Damascene says: "The Image of the Father is the Son, and the Image of the Son is the Holy Spirit" — which cannot be understood without procession from the Son, and indeed without that production by which He communicates nature to what is produced. I do not now dispute whether this is said strictly — since image properly belongs to the Son, who proceeds through intellect, not to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through will. I take what is mine — namely that Damascene by these words signified the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, from whom, if He did not proceed, He could not be His image.

I note furthermore that a little further on in the same passage, Damascene says: "God the Holy Spirit, the mediator between the Unbegotten and the Begotten, united to the Father through the Son." This manner of speaking suggests procession from the Son — for He would not unite the Holy Spirit to the Father unless He were from Him. Otherwise, if He proceeded immediately and adequately from the Father alone without any intermediary, He would be united to the Father immediately, just as the Son is united to the Father immediately through generation.

Furthermore, from the same passage Bessarion adduces the following sentence of Damascene: "Through the Son the Holy Spirit is conceded to exist." And again: "He proceeds from the Father through the Son." What does "through the Son" mean, if not that He does not proceed immediately and adequately from the Father alone — who, even though Damascene speaks thus, is the sole cause of the Son, that is, the principal and self-derived principle, yet does not exclude the Son through whom He also proceeds as from a principle generated from the Father and not from itself — which separates the mode, not the thing? As Bessarion expounds it there: "He is not the first nor the principal cause, but He is a cause" — using the Greek manner of speaking — "or principle" — in the Latin manner — "one and the same with the Father."

These testimonies were likewise adduced by Gennadius Scholarius in his tract on the five chapters of the Council of Florence, from whom another is cited, at *c. 13 of the Theological things, the beginning of which is: The Godhead*. "He Himself indeed is the mind — that is, the Father — the unfathomable depth of the Son, the begetter of the Son, and the producer manifest through the Son." That is, as I interpret it, the producer manifesting through the image. For Damascene had therefore called the Holy Spirit the image of the Son. Furthermore, in the same place a little after: "The Holy Spirit, the power of the hidden Godhead of the Father, proceeding from the Father through the Son manifestly, as He Himself knows." Here is that preposition "through," which does not separate but joins the Son with the Father in actively spirating the Holy Spirit.

Whoever wishes more may consult those two most learned men of their nation, Arcudius and Allatius, who defend Damascene with deliberate study and demonstrate clearly that he was free and immune from that error. Certainly had the Angelic Doctor seen those passages and their interpretation, he would have vindicated Damascene from every mark of error together with Maximus. But at that time these things had not been so thoroughly investigated, nor was St. Thomas at the Council of Lyons, having been prevented from attending by death, and he preceded the Council of Florence by many years, indeed by two centuries. Hence he is not to be reproached for his judgment on Damascene.

It is all the more to be admired that Scotus, not far removed from him in time, freed Damascene from every suspicion of error, and acutely perceived the difference between the prepositions "from" and "through," and thus rightly

characterized the controversy between the Greeks and Latins as not being about the thing of the procession from the Son but about the mode of proceeding from the Father and the Son, and therefore aptly called it not a real but a verbal disagreement — and by this reasoning reconciled the Greek Fathers with the Latins.

Hence he concludes aptly in *1. d. 11. q. 1. §. Sed pro dictis verbis contrariorum contrariorum Sanctorum sententia discors*: "The sentence of the contrary words is discordant in a multiple sense — just as 'this of this,' so 'this from that or by that' — which multiplicity, once understood and distinguished, would show the non-discordant sentence of the contrary words." Scotus seems to have anticipated what was said toward the end of the Council of Florence by the Greeks already convinced and confessing the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, of whom one — the Bishop of Mytilene — said: "When I carefully examined what the holy doctors had handed down from memory, I perceived that they were all very consonant and harmonious, although the Westerners expressed it more clearly and explicitly in writing than the Easterners. For the Easterners used the words 'deeply,' 'emit,' 'spring forth,' 'draw,' and other similar terms, and set forth the Holy Spirit as proceeding through the Son. But the Westerners clearly committed to writing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle — whose footsteps I, wishing to follow, etc." Here in this author a diversity in manner of speaking is found, together with an identity of meaning regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit.

JUDGMENT.

Although the question involves a matter of fact and does not seem to bear much on doctrine whether one thinks correctly, nevertheless, since it concerns the opinion of one holy Father, on whose authority the adversaries relied in denying the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, the decision is not to be despised, which brings with it the suffrage of so great a Father. Therefore in this Scotus excels, in that he took Damascene away from the Greeks and gave him to the Latins, with his reputation intact and free from all suspicion of error.

What is more, from this judgment of Scotus something greater follows — namely, knowing the foundation of the discord between the Greek and Latin Fathers, which resided not in the thing but in the manner of speaking, and having established that there was no difference except in words — which contributes greatly to stabilizing the common doctrine concerning the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. And indeed Scotus fittingly anticipated by his teaching the oracle of Eugene IV set out in the letters of union, where, concerning this discrepancy of Greeks and Latins in words and agreement in sense, he says: "Having proved from the divine Scriptures and the very many authorities of the holy doctors both Eastern and Western — some of them saying the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and others from the Father through the Son, all looking toward the same understanding

under different words — the Greeks indeed asserted that when they say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, they do not say this with the intention of excluding the Son, but it seemed to them — as they said — that the Latins were asserting the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as from two principles and two spirations; and so they abstained from saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Latins, on the other hand, affirmed that they do not say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son with the intention of excluding the Father from being the source and principle of all Deity — of the Son, that is, and of the Holy Spirit — or that what the Holy Spirit receives from the Son the Son does not have from the Father, or that they posit two principles or two spirations; rather they assert one principle and one spiration of the Holy Spirit, as they have always asserted. And since from all this one and the same meaning of truth is drawn, they at length unanimously agreed and consented in the holy, divinely beloved union written below, with one mind and one spirit." These things are entirely coherent with what we have just cited from Scotus.

Here I observe that what is said about the Father spirating the Holy Spirit principally is most safe and certain when taken in the sense that the Procession is from the Father as from the source and principle from Himself — as Augustine says, not from another — whereas the Son is not, and does not have from Himself, a principle, but from the Father. For thus in *lib. 15. de Trinit. C. 17*, Augustine writes: "Not without reason in this Trinity is not only the Son said to be the Word, and not only the Holy Spirit said to be the Gift of God, but also He from whom the Word is born and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds is none other than God the Father." He added "principally," because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son — but this too the Father gave to Him.

This passage is cited and approved by the Master in *1. sent. d. 12. 1. 2*, and from him received and handed on by St. Thomas, by whom it is approved. Elsewhere, however, Augustine said "principally" in that other explanatory sense — namely in *lib. 15. c. 26. de Trinit.* And indeed from the same source and from the same Master, Jerome is said to hold that the Holy Spirit proceeds properly from the Son. And the Master again says Hilary thinks the same, in the sense of showing authority in the Father — and as St. Thomas comments in *1. d. 12. ar. 2. ad 3*: "The Holy Spirit is said to be principally from the Father because in the Father is the authority of spiration, from whom the Son also has the spirating power."

All these sayings of the saints — Augustine, Jerome, Hilary, and the scholastics — Scotus learnedly gathers in *q. 2. d. 12* at the beginning, weighing them carefully and expounding them for the use of theological doctrine.

But Suarez — and I marvel at this — in *lib. 20. de principio Spiritus Sancti c. 3. n. 10*, reproaches certain doctors for saying the Holy Spirit proceeds "more principally" from the Father, when it would be enough to say "principally" with

Augustine. He names Bonaventure, Scotus, Durand, Gabriel, and Marsilius in *1. d. 12. q. 2*. But Suarez ought to have named Alexander in place of Scotus, whom he cites wrongly, since Scotus holds the contrary opinion and disapproves of that manner of speaking "more principally" — which he attributes to Alexander, not approving it. Indeed, in responding to the last argument drawn from causes, which attempted to introduce a certain greater principality in divine things with respect to the Procession, he distinguishes in this manner in order to repel that more principal power in spirating: "To the last, I say that this proposition is true of cause and caused, because in ordered causes there is another and more principal power of causing in the prior; but not in a principle that is not a cause, because there is no other power of being a principle there — and so it is in the present case, and therefore the first principle is no more a principle than the second. Just as neither would a superior cause cause more than a second cause, if it were to cause with the same causative power as the second cause."

Let Suarez see that Scotus thought otherwise than he supposed, and that he wrongly attributed to him a foreign and opposite opinion, to which Scotus in fact contradicts. And here I urge the reader to consider the doctrine of Scotus on the Holy Spirit; he will find it to be outstanding, for while he excels in every theological subject and yields to none of the others, in this subject of the Holy Spirit he seems — contending with himself — to surpass himself. The reason that I find agreeable is that Scotus was the chief author and defender of the grace of the Blessed Virgin's Immaculate Conception, who is the original spouse of the Holy Spirit — on which account the Holy Spirit, who is the Gift and the author of grace, illuminated him with a special light for writing about Himself. Just as the Divine Word said to St. Thomas: "You have written well of Me, Thomas" — so the Holy Spirit too seems able to say to Scotus — with reverence — "You have written well of Me, Scotus." And I observed this carefully in his writings, for while he treated the other Persons acutely, gravely, accurately, and copiously, of no Person did he write more subtly, more gravely, more accurately, and more copiously than of the Person of the Holy Spirit.

COLLATION VI. DISTINCTION II. On the Question Whether Mutual Love Is the Reason for Spirating the Holy Spirit, Such That Without It the Procession of the Holy Spirit Cannot Subsist

Texts are produced and opposed to one another.

St. Thomas affirms this in *1. p. q. 36. a. 4. ad 1*, and *q. 37. a. 1. ad 3*, and in *1. d. 11. q. 1. 1. 4*, and *d. 29. q. 1. a. 4. ad 2*. I adduce his words from *q. 36. a. 4. ad 1*, which I cited first: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are several. For He proceeds from them as the unitive love of two." And in *q. 37. a. 1. ad 3*: "It must be said that the Holy Spirit is said to be the bond of Father and Son insofar as He is love — because since the Father loves Himself and the Son

with one love, and conversely, the relation of the Father to the Son and conversely, as of lover to beloved, is implied in the Holy Spirit insofar as He is Love. But from this very fact that the Father and the Son mutually love each other, the mutual love which is the Holy Spirit must proceed from both."

"According to origin, therefore, the Holy Spirit is not the middle but the third Person in the Trinity; but according to the aforesaid relation, He is the middle bond of the two, proceeding from both." The Thomists follow their Doctor: Cajetan in *1. p. q. 33. a. 4*, Capreolus there, Torres, and commonly others, Ferrara in *4. contra Gentes c. 25*, Capreolus in *1. d. 12. q. 1. concl. 4*. From others: Henry, Vasquez in *d. 150. c. 2*, Alarcon in *tr. 5. d. 9. c. 4*, Ruiz in *d. 71. f. 1*.

Against this, Scotus in *1. d. 12. q. 1. §. Confirmatur n. 6* writes: "The Divine Essence is formally infinite. The Holy Spirit will therefore be spirated more by the will insofar as it is of the Divine Essence, which is an infinite object, than insofar as it is of the Father as Father or of the Son as Son. Hence: the Father does not spirate the Holy Spirit primarily insofar as He loves the Son, nor does the Son do so insofar as He loves the Father; but the Father and the Son do so insofar as they have the Divine Essence present as the primary object of their will. Similarly they spirate insofar as they have the essence present, and not insofar as it is loved by act, but insofar as it is lovable, presented by act to their intellect."

"Furthermore, an equally perfect principle in one suppositum as in two is equally a principle of acting in one as in two, because for action nothing seems to be required except a perfect principle — both the quo and the quod, namely the perfect acting suppositum — but the will is equally perfect in the perfection required for the acting suppositum as it is in two; therefore the will can equally be a principle of producing in one as in two, so that that mutuality is not any reason for producing on the part of the productive principle. The first part is proved because the principle quo does not receive its fitting perfection from the suppositum but gives it to the suppositum, because the suppositum is perfect so that it can act; therefore such a principle is not more perfect in several than in one, when it is the same principle in several and in one."

Thus Scotus — where he not only proposes and expounds his own position but also proves it with valid arguments, which compelled Father Suarez, a theologian of such great name, to say in *that lib. 10. c. 6. n. 5*: "The arguments of Scotus seem to me to convince what he himself wants." His followers agree with Scotus on this point, as does Suarez, whose words in that passage are these: "First I assert that for the production of Love, or of the Holy Spirit, a plurality of persons is not necessary in itself." Suarez cites in favor of Scotus the same Gabriel in *1. d. 12. q. 1. a. 1*, and Durand in *d. 11. q. 3*, although they do not agree with Scotus in all points. But examined more carefully, they agree with Scotus on the point of the question. For Gabriel in *d. 12. q. 2. a. 1. nota 2* affirms that the Holy Spirit would have proceeded in the same way even if the power of spirating were in only one suppositum. Durand likewise plainly affirms in *1. d. 11.*

q. 3 that the power of spirating is equally perfect in both, and accordingly abstracts from one or from many — which is nothing other than to think with Scotus. Scotus is followed by two eminent Jesuit theologians: Bellarmine in *tom. 1. lib. 1. de Christo c. 27* and Molina in *1. p. in q. 36. a. 4. disp. 5*; and in part Arrubal on the same question in *disp. 130. c. 3*. Alarcon also cites Ockham and the Nominalists in favor of Scotus in *d. 9. c. 4* — not without reason, for although Ockham in his customary manner disagrees with Scotus in some points, in the case itself he adheres to Scotus, as Tataretus observes in his commentary on *d. 12*, who agrees entirely with Scotus.

Let us set out the point of the question clearly. It is much like the question about a supposed impossible condition. For it presupposes the truth of the matter of fact — namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two supposita, the Father and the Son, through the will as from one formal principle *quo*. And it asks: given this truth of faith, prescindng from it — if the Father alone were to exist or operate through the will without the Son, would the Holy Spirit even then in that metaphysical case proceed from that one person? Admitting the hypothesis, St. Thomas with his school denies it. Scotus with his school affirms that the Holy Spirit would still proceed.

Thus the present question concerns what constitutes the principle *quo* — whether it essentially requires two persons. And it is entirely similar to another celebrated question that we shall raise shortly: whether if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would still be really distinguished from Him — which is raised by theologians with the aim of better seeing what is constitutive and distinctive of the Holy Spirit. St. Thomas with the Thomists says the Holy Spirit necessarily requires the mutual Love of the persons and that without it the procession cannot subsist. I adduce another passage, from *de Potentia q. 10. a. 2. ad 15*: "It must be said: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are several, if regard is had to the spirating supposita. For since the Spirit is mutual love and the bond of two, it is necessary that He be spirated by two."

SECTION I. Testimonies of the Holy Fathers Are Adduced in Favor of the Position of St. Thomas

The first argument is taken from the authority of the Fathers. For Jerome in *Ps. 17. init.*, on the words "I will love You, O Lord": "The Holy Spirit is neither Father nor Son, but the love that the Son has for the Father and the Father for the Son." Ambrose in *Symb. Apost.*: "One is the Lover of him who is from Him; one is the Beloved by Him from whom He is" — the former is the Father, the latter the Son — "the one love of both is the Holy Spirit." Anselm in *Monolog. c. 48 and 49*: "From the Father and equally from the Son proceeds the Love of the supreme Spirit." "The Father loves Himself, the Son loves Himself, and each loves the other." Bernard in *serm. 8 in Cant.* says of the Holy Spirit: "As the untroubled Peace of Father and Son, the firm glue, the indivisible Love, the indivisible

unity" — where he calls Him the kiss of both. In *serm. 3 de Trinit.* he calls Him the indivisible bond of the Trinity. In the same author in *de Amore Dei c. 7 and 8*, the Holy Spirit is called the Love of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father, and it is said: "so great is this Love that it is unity." The same is the view of Prosper in *lib. sentent. sent. 371*, Fulgentius in *Telet. q. 4. ad Ferrandum*, Isidore in *3. Etymologiarum c. 3*, Guthmund Archbishop in *Confess. de Trinit. t. 6. Biblioth.*, the author of the book on the knowledge of true life among the works of Augustine, *t. 9*. The Eleventh Council of Toledo also concurs in its Confession of Faith.

Indeed Augustine in many places introduces this mutual love: in *lib. 5. de Trinit. c. 17 and 19*, and again in *c. 27 and 28*, and in *lib. de Fide et Symb. c. 9*, and in *Tract. 105 in Joannem*, and in *lib. 15. de Trinit. c. 7 and 17*, and *lib. 6. de Trinit. c. 5* at the beginning: "Whether He is the unity of both, or holiness, or love, or unity because love, or love because holiness, it is manifest that He is none of the two, but He by whom both are joined — He by whom the Begotten is loved by the Begetter and loves his Begetter — and they preserve the unity of Spirit in the bond of peace not by participation but by their own nature and as their own gift superior to all." Hence he concludes: "The Holy Spirit therefore is something common to Father and Son, whatever that is." From Augustine this doctrine was received, beyond Prosper, Fulgentius, Isidore, Anselm, and Bernard, by his eminent disciples Richard and Hugh, both of St. Victor. The former indeed most frequently holds the Holy Spirit to be the mutual Love of Father and Son, and above all in *lib. 3. de Trinit. c. 3, 7, and 11*, where he demonstrates at length and teaches that perfect Love consists in the bond and union of two, which he says is above all sweet and delightful. And in *c. 16* he says that the fullness and perfection of wisdom can be in one person alone, but not the fullness and perfection of Love. Hence since the Holy Spirit is divine and therefore perfect Love, He must necessarily have proceeded from the love of both. Hugh, on the other hand, in his *Epistle to Bernard* plainly shows the Holy Spirit to be mutual and reciprocal Love.

The Greek Fathers agree. Nazianzus — as cited by St. Thomas in the *opusc. against the Errors of the Greeks* — says: "The Holy Spirit proceeds so as to be the mediator between the Unbegotten and the Begotten," by which term "mediator" mutual love and the bond of love is understood. Chrysostom in *homil. 2. in Symb. Apost.* at the end: "The Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son is joined together by love." Epiphanius in *Ancor. col. 7* says "the Spirit in the middle of Father and Son, from the Father to the Son." Damascene in *lib. 1. Fidei c. 18*: "God the Holy Spirit, in the middle between the Unbegotten and the Begotten" — how, if not through the bond and chain of love?

These and similar things are taught by St. Thomas in the present question *q. 26. art. 4. ad 1*, and in *de Potent. q. 10. a. 2. ad 15*, and *1. sent. dist. 1. q. 1. a. 2*, and *a. 4. ad 2*, and *dist. 29. q. un. a. 4. ad 2*. Albert in *1. p. q. 31 membr. 1 ad 3*, and *membr. 2. ad 10*

— although he seems to dissent in *ad 3* near the end. Alexander in *1. q. 43. membr. 3. a. 3*, and *membr. 4*, and throughout *membr. 5*, and *q. 46. membr. 5. solut. 3 and the last*. Richard in *1. dist. 1. a. unico q. 3*. Gregory in *q. unica a. 2* after the middle, and the single question of *dist. 12*. Henry of Ghent in *a. 54. q. 6. ad 7, 8, 9, and 11*, and *ar. 60. q. 6* in the body at the end. Strassburg with other authors in *1. d. 10. q. 1*. Capreolus in *d. 12. q. unica. concl. 4*, col. 2 and 3. Ferrariensis in *4. cont. gentes c. 25* at the end. Cajetan and the other commentators commonly on the present *q. 36. a. 4*, where the Canariensis in the third part of the Commentary, final difficulty. Valentia in *1. p. sua q. 10. puncto 5* at the end. Vasquez in *disp. 150. c. 2*. Marsilius inclines to this in *lib. 1. q. 15. a. 3*, and more clearly in the last column when responding to the second argument for the negative part. St. Bonaventure finally favors this in *r. d. 11. a. unico. q. 2. ad 2*, and again in the last reply. Montoya on the Trinity in *disp. 70, 71, 72* treats this at length. All these I wished to accumulate here, although some were cited above.

SECTION II. The Same Position Is Urged by Reason

Let us come to the arguments of reason. The first is this: the divine Love that is to be the principle of the Holy Spirit must be perfect Love; but this cannot be solitary love, which is not friendship and lacks the correspondence of one who loves in return; therefore it must be mutual and corresponding — between Father and Son as Lovers and responding-Lovers. From this it is necessarily concluded, and from the intimate nature of Love, that the Holy Spirit cannot proceed from only one person.

The second. Mutual and reciprocal Love, as Richard of St. Victor testifies in *lib. 3 de Trinit. c. 3, 7, and 11*, is most perfect and sweet. And he adds in *c. 16* that wisdom can be in one alone perfectly; Love cannot, because it is the bond and union of two. Therefore Love in God must be mutual and reciprocal; otherwise it will be imperfect and will not beatify.

The third is drawn from what is inconvenient. If the Father alone were to produce love for the Son, and the Son were not to produce it for the Father in return, it would follow either that the Father is not lovable by the Son, or that the Son, if the Father is lovable, is ungrateful toward the Father in not corresponding in Love. But both are false, as is clear; therefore, just as the Father loves the Son, so the Son loves the Father. This Augustine teaches in *lib. 6. de Trinit. c. 5*: "It is manifest," he says, "that He is not either of the two but that by whom both are joined, by whom the Begotten is loved by the Begetter and loves His Begetter."

The fourth is drawn from the absurd. Given that the Father alone were to produce Love and were to love only Himself, from this love the Holy Spirit would proceed — which is absurd. The assumption is proved because that love of the Father alone is love of Himself, and thus a love of concupiscence, which is both ignoble and imperfect, and therefore foreign to divine things.

The fifth appears from the nature and condition of gift, which clearly belongs formally to the Holy Spirit — from which it follows that a Gift cannot subsist without two persons, since the notion of Gift is entirely communicative; hence if the sources of communication are removed, its essence is removed and the nature of the Holy Spirit overturned.

By these arguments it seems to be established that the Holy Spirit necessarily proceeds from the Son by virtue of His own nature, which is mutual and reciprocal love, the bond of both Persons.

This doctrine is confirmed from Augustine, who in inquiring into the reasons why the procession of the Son is generation but that of the Holy Spirit is not, always grounds those reasons in the fact that the Son is the Word, and as such proceeds from one Father alone and in no way can proceed from two; but the Holy Spirit is Love and Gift, which absolutely requires two to whom it may relate itself by binding, coupling, and moving — which we showed at length and accurately in our *Encyclopaedia* in the articles of St. Augustine, citing *lib. 5. de Trinit. cap. 14* and *lib. 9. de Trinit. c. 12* and *lib. 15. de Trinit. c. 27* and *Tractatu in Joannem 99* and *lib. 3. contra Maxim. c. 14*, and weighing Augustine's solemn phrase of calling the Holy Spirit the Communion of Father and Son — which he uses in *lib. 6. de Trinit. c. 5*, cited above, and shortly after, and in *lib. 9. c. 3* and *serm. 38. de Tempore*.

By this reasoning we said that in this position it comes about — according to the same Augustine — that this proposition is true: "Father and Son love each other through the Holy Spirit," as St. Thomas notes in *1. P. q. 37. a. 2*, and the interpreters there. Augustine delivers it in *lib. 6. de Trinit. c. 5*, followed by the Master in *1. disp. 37*, and there Bonaventure, Scotus, Gabriel, Capreolus, and Marsilius, and in agreement with St. Thomas in *1. p.*: Cajetan, Banez, Nazarius, Zanardus, Valentia, Zumel, Vasquez, Montoya, and Suarez in *Sum. lib. 11. c. 3*, and Floravanius on the Trinity *lib. 2. tit. de nomine Amoris*.

The truth of this proposition rests on the fact that — to use the words of St. Thomas in *1. p. q. 27. a. 2* — "Father and Son are said to love through the Holy Spirit, because 'to love' taken notionally not only imports the production of a divine Person but also the produced Person — through the mode of Love, which has a relation to the thing loved."

Hence the saying of Hugh of St. Victor in his *Epistle to Bernard*: "If you are rightly said to love with the love that proceeds from you, why are not Father and Son said to love with the love that proceeds from them?" And again: "If the Holy Spirit were the love of your heart and of the Father's and the Son's, who, I ask, could deny that you love through the Holy Spirit, that is, through your love?"

St. Thomas uses to persuade this the example of Fire in the heating of what heats, and of a Tree flowering with the flowers of the one that flowers — these being productions that carry with them a form and thus denominate the cause

and the principle. This is admirably explained among others by Vasquez on *1. p. D. Thomæ q. 37, disp. 151. c. 3.*

Hence the reason appears why it is not properly said: "The Father is Wise by begotten Wisdom." Which proposition, although Augustine had once admitted in *lib. 83. quæst. q. 23*, he later frequently retracted in *lib. 6. de Trinit. c. 1 and 2*, and *lib. 7. c. 1, 3, and 16*, and *lib. 1. de Retract. c. 26*. Athanasius also excludes it in his *Oration against the followers of Sabellius*, and Anselm in *Monolog. c. 43*, and the theologians commonly disapprove it together with St. Thomas in *1. p. q. 37. a. 2.*

By these arguments the adversaries prove that the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of both Father and Son, their reciprocal and corresponding love — that by this they are properly loved, bound, and coupled together, and therefore He necessarily proceeds from both by virtue of His own production. But whether these and similar arguments are valid, we shall dispute in their proper places.

SECTION III. The Position of Scotus Is Proposed, Expounded, and Defended

Before I fulfill my promises, I establish that Scotus in fact, against the Greeks, places the necessity of spirating through the will that is second by virtue of essential and absolute Love — of the Holy Spirit from the Son together with the Father — as is clear from innumerable passages of Scotus. With this established, the question turns on this: whether for this Procession of the Holy Spirit through the second will, the Person of the Son is so necessary that without it there would be no procession and thus no Holy Spirit in the Trinity.

Scotus denies this degree of necessity and affirms, from an impossible hypothesis, that if the Father alone were to produce, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone would nonetheless follow, and the Holy Spirit would entirely proceed through it. The foundation Scotus offers is solid, composed thus by him in *d. 12. q. 1. §. secundo*: "A principle equally perfect in one suppositum as in two is equally a principle of acting in one as in two; but the divine will is equally perfect in the Father as in the Father and Son together; therefore from Him alone, if He alone existed, or were spirating alone, the Holy Spirit would entirely have proceeded."

The argument is a valid syllogism in Darii. The major, which is the universal affirmative, seems evident and cannot be doubted by anyone. The minor is considered thus: the divine will in the Father is most perfect in its own nature, fruitfulness, and productive power, and receives nothing from the Son, who is posterior in origin to the Father — indeed the Son receives it, as thus being second and productive, from the Father. Therefore it is equally in the Father as it is in the Father and Son. Nor should you object that the will in the Father is indeed perfect and fruitful, but not productive without the Son — because this is false. For the very thing that makes it productive the Father communicates to the Son, since it is the proximate power of spirating, which is common to both. It is therefore entire and complete in the Father alone, and for this reason also

productive in the Son. That it is in fact given to the Son comes from abundance, not from any need of the Son for producing.

Indeed from this it may be gathered how perfectly fruitful it is in the Father, since it must necessarily be communicated to the Son — bearing with it, together with the communicated nature, that same fruitfulness when communicated to the Son. Otherwise the Father would have need of His Son, who is later in origin, and would not produce of Himself but from the Son — which is contrary to the sense of all the Fathers and the whole Catholic Church.

In this it must be noted in favor of Scotus that the Greek Fathers generally used the expression "through the Son" rather than "from the Son," lest they appear to admit any need on the part of the Father for the Person of the Son, whom they placed as the productive principle in such a way that this very thing was his from the Father. Thus the suppositum of the Son does not give the power of producing to the suppositum of the Father — it receives it from the Father from whom it is generated — and if that power extends to the Son, it is not because the Father needs the Son but because it is so abundant that it also communicates itself to the Son along with the communicated nature and will.

Hence the Greeks were able to conceive that perfect fruitfulness and spirating power in the Father alone, without the participation of the Son — to such a degree that, going too far, they denied the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. In this they erred, but in erring they showed the independence in producing of the Father from the Son — and in denying the procession from the Son, they affirmed that the Father does not need the Son. By attributing too much to the Father they strayed from Catholic truth, but they did distinguish between the necessity of the Person of the Son — for which the Father as fruitful had no need — and fruitfulness: this they recognized in the Father, which was so great that by its own nature it was sufficient in the Father to spirate the Holy Spirit without the Son.

If only they had added: that the Father, in begetting the Son and communicating to Him essence and will, necessarily had to communicate the same power of spirating, by which the Son together with the Father would spirate the Holy Spirit — and so they would conclude: that from that abundance of the second fruitful will in the Father, the Son is also made fruitful and powerful to produce the Holy Spirit together with the Father.

This argument of Scotus, thus armed and expounded, seems to settle the matter plainly, and there is no need of another argument. It certainly persuades me, as it persuaded that outstanding theologian of our age, Father Francisco Suarez — who, so great a man, having weighed the arguments of St. Thomas and Scotus in *lib. 10. de principio Spiritus Sancti c. 7*, says at *n. 5*: "First I assert that for the production of love, or of the Holy Spirit, a plurality of persons is not necessary in itself. The arguments made on behalf of Scotus's opinion seem to me to

convince this, as also does what was said above about the arguments for the second opinion."

And he adds: "This also seems to me to be supposed by St. Thomas, Scotus, and all those who ask: if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, would He be distinguished from Him? For they suppose in that hypothesis a procession conceived from the Father alone, understanding that it comes from one person only." He continues: "That in God the procession of Love is from two persons is not formally and precisely because of the perfection of love, but because the Word produced is perfect, personally subsisting, and loving with the same will as the Father. What I just said — from abundance, not from need — Suarius takes from Scotus."

Now indeed in responding to the principal arguments for St. Thomas, Suarez says they do not convince, and applies Scotus's solutions, which he approves. He says that in fact the Holy Spirit does indeed proceed from mutual love, and that the authorities of Augustine and Richard prove this — but not as regards what is possible and given the stated hypothesis of the principle. He says: when Augustine said the Holy Spirit is the bond, he did not say that this denomination applies to Him under that formality or per se, but only that in fact it is so. "Nor does it formally pertain to the notion or perfection of love: for the love of the Father insofar as He loves the Holy Spirit is no less perfect than the love of Father and Son insofar as they mutually love each other. Therefore if the Father, the first Person, could love Himself without the Son, He would be no less productive through Love, as far as the perfection of Love is concerned." In Suarez it is Scotus who speaks — and therefore since I cited him not for the opinion of St. Thomas but argue in favor of Scotus:

First. That Love which is the principle quo of the Holy Spirit is something essential and absolute, and thus antecedent to the concept of the persons; therefore it cannot be the mutual Love of Father for Son and Son for Father, which entirely presupposes the persons. This is confirmed, because mutual Love of Father and Son thus includes something notional, which cannot be in the Holy Spirit, who includes nothing notional of Father and Son.

Second. If by the impossible the Father were not to produce through the intellect but had the second will as He now has it, He could produce Love which would be the Holy Spirit; therefore the fact that He now produces the Holy Spirit not alone but with the Son is not because that concomitance of the Son is required, but because that fruitfulness is communicated to Him from abundance.

Third. If by its own formal nature the Person of the Father could not produce the Holy Spirit without the Son, it would follow that from the two together there would be composed one total principle — which cannot be said; therefore. The consequence is evident, because one person would concur partially with the

other, since one alone would not be sufficient for producing. The minor contains absurdities — both because individual persons would be partial causes out of which one integral one would be composed, thus introducing composition in God, and because there would be a different power of spirating in one than in the other, since one alone would not suffice — and as Scotus says it would follow that the Father and the Son would be like two people dragging a boat.

Fourth. If that mutual Love were required, the mutual knowledge of it would also be required — for nothing is willed unless it is first known. But given this, the Father and Son in loving each other in return and recognizing themselves as loving would produce the Holy Spirit both by loving and by knowing — which is foreign to the Holy Spirit. Therefore that mutual Love is not necessary. Indeed it conflicts with the Procession of the Holy Spirit.

Fifth. If that mutual Love were the principle quo of the Holy Spirit, an inconvenience would follow. The assumption is proved because this Love presupposes the love of the essence in the Father, which in origin precedes the Son — which love the Son also has, as preceding the Holy Spirit in origin. Therefore either that Love is sterile, or it produces the Holy Spirit before the Son's production, and thus there are two Holy Spirits.

Sixth. If the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit by mutually loving each other, they love each other mutually by some love; this is either the Holy Spirit Himself or some other love. It cannot be the Holy Spirit, because He proceeds through that love as is supposed; therefore it is some other love prior to the produced Holy Spirit, from a new other principle — and it follows that there are two Holy Spirits.

To these arguments are reduced nearly all those that Scotus makes in *that q. r. d. 12* for his own position against the opposing one, and they are rounded and invincible. I add that they have greater force if one considers what we said above about the mind of St. Thomas, who says the divine nature is in itself the adequate and complete principle quo. For from this it follows that it does not include in itself that relative concept of the supposita. Hence by arguing from the adversary's own position, it is manifestly proved that the mutual distinction of persons is not necessary from the intrinsic nature of love.

I said above "nearly," because there remains one excellent argument for Scotus against St. Thomas and the Thomists, which I wish to adduce last — as it is found in Scotus in *d. 12. q. 1. §. Secundo proba. n. 6*: "The Divine Will having the first object present to it is the reason for producing an adequate Love more perfectly than if it has a secondary object present, or at least not less perfectly; therefore since the Divine Essence is the first object of the Divine Will — not the Father as Father, nor the Son as Son, because then the Father would formally be happy in several distinct objects — the will having the divine essence present to

it, whether as lovable or as loved, is more the principle of producing adequate Love for it than insofar as it has the Father as Father or the Son as Son, or at least not less. And so since the will has the essence prior as object to having the Father as Father, the Holy Spirit will be spirated prior by the will as it is of the Divine Essence as primary object, than by the will as it is of the Father or Son as secondary object."

This argument has supreme force from the fact that no goodness or lovableness can be lacking from the absolute Essence, since it is in every way and infinitely perfect and lovable — from which it follows that the relations add nothing to it in respect of the formal notion of divine lovableness, and therefore do not enter into the formal reason of the principle quo of the formal love required for spiration and the production of the Holy Spirit, which is formally distinguished as a production from the act of loving, as we said about the act of speaking the Word in relation to the act of understanding.

The force of the argument increases further from the fact that in the position of Scotus, the Scotists, and perhaps of St. Thomas and the Thomists, Relations precisely speaking express neither goodness nor perfection. Hence all perfection and lovableness is reduced to the essence, which remains the perfect, adequate, and perfecting principle quo. Hence with the condition and complement of the suppositum of the Father added, nothing is lacking for the production of the Holy Spirit.

SECTION IV. That the Arguments of Scotus Are Invincible Is Shown from the Various and Discordant Solutions of the Thomists

This proof does not originate with me; it was supplied to me by a grave and acute theologian who on this question acts very much as a Thomist — Gabriel Vasquez. He, in *d. 150. c. 2 and 3*, after having proposed Scotus's arguments and recounted the solutions given by the Thomists one by one, complains that they responded badly and gave no satisfaction. Thus in *c. 2. n. 9* he writes: "Some Thomists wrongly concede to Scotus that the Holy Spirit would proceed in the same way if the Divine Will, which is the principle of spirating, were in only one person." He adds at *n. 10* that those who concede that the power of spirating requires more supposita, on the ground that since the procession of the Holy Spirit is a notional operation of the will, it necessarily presupposes the production of the Word as well, which is a notional act of intellect — these do not well explain the position of St. Thomas which they are trying to defend, but fall back into the position of Scotus explained in the second chapter. And both of these — what was placed at *n. 9* and what was gathered at *n. 10* — Vasquez demonstrates with a certain argument, which I omit however lest I become tedious.

Furthermore, at *c. 3. n. 11* he presents a response which seems more apt on the part of certain Thomists, together with Ferrariensis in *2. cont. gent. c. 25* near the

end, which is as follows: that from the fact that the power of spirating is equally perfect in two supposita, it does not follow that the Holy Spirit proceeds by nature from one alone — on the contrary, He necessarily proceeds from two, since the perfect power is in two in the same way. On which Vasquez says — and I give the words of Vasquez because they serve the cause of Scotus:

"But this solution does not dissolve Scotus's argument. For he does not contend that the Holy Spirit does not in fact proceed from two, nor does he deny that He necessarily proceeds from two, just as he also does not deny that creatures necessarily produced by three persons are produced with omnipotence necessary in three persons; but he contends that the plurality of supposita is not required per se in the fourth mode on the part of the principle, although it is necessarily conjoined with the principle — because each suppositum contributes nothing peculiar to the spirating power equally perfect" — hear, reader, attentively and weigh this — "in one as in two supposita. For indeed, if on the supposition it is understood to remain in the same way in one alone, it would spirate in the same way — just as because omnipotence is equally and in the same way in one as in all persons, if only one person remained it would create in the same way."

So Vasquez, whose response let us see. At *n. 12* he responds thus: "The power of spirating is the same, but it would not be in the same manner in one as in two, because the required condition for producing the Holy Spirit as the bond of mutual love would be lacking." Against this solution, which seems to be that of Cajetan in his Commentaries on *art. 6*, there are three arguments.

The first. Because if two really distinct Persons are necessarily required as such, it would follow that there are two spirators and not one.

The second. Because it would follow that spirating does not occur through love but formally through spiration — which is against St. Thomas, and against Vasquez and Cajetan himself, who deny Scotus's claim that the Son is produced through locution and the Holy Spirit through spiration. The consequence is evident, because Love is absolute and essential and entirely one — and cannot bring about those different operations; therefore if the production is from two as two that are necessary, it must be through spiration formally distinct from love.

The third, because that power of spirating which is in the Son and in its concept includes the Son would come into composition with another — for how can they be united, since they are different as persons, Father and Son?

Cajetan saw this third objection, and Suarez in *c. 8. n. 7* — who devised another manner of speaking because he feared falling into these difficulties. Therefore in *lib. 10. c. 7. n. 5 and 6* he distinguishes between the Holy Spirit absolutely and this individual Holy Spirit, and says that for the Holy Spirit to be produced absolutely in the class of love, a plurality of persons is not necessary — but for

this individual Holy Spirit it is necessary. Against this I argue: the Holy Spirit who would proceed from the Father alone would be Spirit and love essentially and properly, and would be individually the Holy Spirit, such as He is now — who then would be different from this one? He will say: the co-principle of the Son, from whom He was not spirated, was lacking. Against this: since that co-principle, being extrinsic and required as a condition, cannot vary the nature which He receives entirely from the Father and through which He is constituted in His being — He would therefore be the same Spirit that is now.

I press Suarius with an example. Christ the Lord is a perfect individual in human nature, although only the Virgin concurred in His generation and is the perfect and complete principle of Him, since He received human nature in the singular from her alone, by means of divine power — and for this reason she is called "father" by some, though that terminology is less pleasing to me. Just as Christ, generated from one principle alone, receives the nature of this individual without another co-principle — so too that Holy Spirit would receive from the Father alone that being of love in His own proper nature of this Holy Spirit — notwithstanding the absence of the other co-principle, which would only stand in the production as an extrinsic condition not included in the notion of the principle quo, which is entirely something absolute, as the adversaries themselves confess.

Nor should Suarez object that Christ, who now is from the Virgin alone, would be different if He were begotten in the common way — for given the same generating power, I would deny it. Moreover the case is not similar, because a human father concurs with a distinct power, which is not distinct in Father and Son but one and the same in both.

Furthermore, I refute the adversaries with this argument: they concede to Scotus that for the production of creatures, which is in fact a common action of three persons, one of them is sufficient, and it is not necessary that the concurrence of all be given, because in each one the perfect power of creating is present, and that creature which would be produced by one would be absolutely the same as if produced by three — which Vasquez admits in *d. 150. c. 3. n. 11* and Suarez in *lib. 10. c. 7. n. 7*. Therefore a plurality of persons is also not required for the production of the Holy Spirit.

Both, however, deny the consequence and assert a disparity, because omnipotence of creating, says Vasquez, is one in all and the creature proceeds from three not as they are three but as they agree in one power. But the power of spirating is necessarily in two, so that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two insofar as they are two. But I press Vasquez: about this very thing I ask the reason — why the power of creating in three persons is sufficient in one, but the power of spirating is not sufficient in two, since it is one as omnipotence is? For the difference cannot be taken from the unity of the power but from its diversity.

And I press Suarez in the same way, for he answers thus: "For producing the Holy Spirit, it is not sufficient that this God subsist, but the necessary condition is that He subsist incommunicably through His personal property; therefore the terminus of the procession of the Holy Spirit is the Person or Persons from whom He immediately proceeds, and He is per se the principle of that procession. For producing a creature per se it suffices that this God subsist essentially, who through His essence is distinguished from creatures — hence toward Him as such the relation of creature terminates per se, and therefore for that production the Trinity of Persons is not per se required."

What I asked of Vasquez I ask of Suarez: why is that power sufficient without a multiplicity of persons in creation but not in spiration? For both proceed from one power. They will respond that they have sufficiently explained this in what precedes — namely that that power was mutual love and bond from each person, which necessarily requires a distinction of spirators.

Against this: omnipotence is also by its nature linked with all the persons and therefore they are one omnipotent — therefore that argument does not hold. Again: those two spirating Persons produce not as diverse but as united in the same power of spirating, and the Son does not concur there as He is the Word, nor the Father as He is the Begetter, but as Lover and Spirator in one and the same Love. Hence from two there is made one principle and one spirator. Therefore the production does not come as from two but as from one. Why then is distinction and plurality of persons required, where there is such unity in Love and in one principle?

Whence those Persons as diverse stand materially with respect to that production, of which they are one formal principle quo. Otherwise there will not be one spirator but two. Finally I argue in this manner. If these two individual persons, Father and Son, are required for their own proper reason for the production of the Holy Spirit, it would follow that the Holy Spirit must be referred to those persons through distinct and proper relations. Hence in the Holy Spirit there would be three Relations — one corresponding to the principle quo, that is the spirator united in one and the same power of spirating, and two others to the two spirating actively as distinct. This is clear, because the Holy Spirit cannot be referred through the same relation to them as they are one and to them as they are different. Therefore two other relations are necessary: that of the spirated to the Father and that of the spirated to the Son.

And accordingly in divine things there would be three subsisting relations constituting Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as really distinct — and four other real but not really distinct ones: two active spirations in Father and Son with respect to the Holy Spirit, and two in the Holy Spirit — one toward the Father and one toward the Son as spirated — and thus there would be seven, not five notions in the Trinity.

But if they deny this because Father and Son produce and spirate not as diverse but as they are one in the principle quo of producing, then let them take away that necessary plurality of persons as distinct for the production of the Holy Spirit. Otherwise they will be compelled to admit a plurality of relations. Since the Thomists, being acute men, see these difficulties, they are pressed and distressed and forced to devise various solutions — rightly and fittingly indeed. For in introducing the diversity of persons from the intimate nature of Love for the production of the Holy Spirit, they must also introduce a diversity of responses.

SECTION V. Arguments and Authorities and Reasons Adduced against Scotus's Position Are Resolved

To the authority of the Fathers — of whom we adduced very many on behalf of the position of the adversaries — a single word in response suffices: they speak of the actual state of affairs, not of what is possible, leaving aside the Procession of the Holy Spirit as it exists in the Trinity on the part of reality, in which the mutual love and bond of Father and Son truly exists — which Scotus and his school entirely admits and acknowledges. There is no controversy whatsoever about this state and sense, which changes when the state is changed, introducing a very different sense — one that the Fathers did not speak to, which Scotus proposes, and which earlier theologians proposed before him. It is hypothetical — ordered nonetheless toward the metaphysical truth to be sought in the state in which things now are, as we have been disputing.

The point is to know: whether it belongs to the intrinsic nature of the Procession of the Holy Spirit that He proceeds from two Persons as distinct, in such a way that without them neither the Procession can stand nor be understood. Or on the contrary, given that one person alone — say, the Father — existed, would that one person alone by virtue of His own second fruitful will produce the Holy Spirit? This manner of inquiring is indeed foreign to the sense of the Fathers, who certainly thought little about it. Therefore this question is a purely scholastic one, and abstracts entirely from the doctrine of the Fathers, nor does it in any way neglect or offend it. It admits mutual Love, once the Persons are admitted. It affirms that the Holy Spirit is bond and communion — as Augustine says — of both. By abstracting from the plurality of persons, it asks what would happen with this Love: would it exist in one person and proceed from that one person, with the necessity of the other person loving in return ceasing? From which something is derived for the present state of truth — namely knowing what is the formal reason for proceeding that belongs to the Holy Spirit: is it nature and the Divine Will in loving in the Father alone His own Essence and absolute Attributes? Or does it entirely require further a plurality of persons, so that without it that will would be sterile and unproductive of the Holy Spirit?

But I respond more certainly and fittingly: some of those passages of the Fathers favor Scotus's position. First, in the saying of Nazianzus cited above, it must be

observed that the phrase "He proceeds so as to be the mediator between the Unbegotten and the Begotten" means: because He is the Mediator He proceeds — the sense being: from the fact that He is the Mediator He proceeds; but He first proceeds, and is the Mediator afterwards: Love is understood first, and bond second. He proceeds as Love by virtue of the fruitful absolute will, and this Love terminates by binding Father and Son, so that from one principle Love proceeds and extends by loving to two, in which Love is prior to bond — for how could there be a bond unless Love were supposed? Damascene as cited speaks in the same way.

St. Gregory the Great in *homil. 30. in Evang.*: "The Holy Spirit is Love" — that is, in His first concept — and in His second He is bond. Unless He were Love He would not be bond. Thus Love comes first; bond follows. The testimony of Augustine is of outstanding excellence: in *lib. 15. de Trinit. c. 19* he says: "The Charity of the Father which exists ineffably simply in His nature is nothing other than His nature and substance." Therefore it is fruitful in the Father — if it is fruitful, from Him and in Him it would spirate the Holy Spirit. And indeed Augustine seems to teach this when he says the Holy Spirit is produced principally from the Father, as in *lib. 15. de Trinit. c. 17*, where he added: "because this too the Father gave to Him." And in *c. 26* where he said absolutely: "from the Father principally." For if from the Father principally, and in the sense that He communicated to the Son — certainly He communicated to the Son because He could give to the Son what He Himself had. Why then if the Son did not exist could He not communicate to the Holy Spirit? Would He have, so as to give to the Son who proceeds through intellect, and not have, so as to give to the Holy Spirit who proceeds through will?

Let this reasoning be carefully considered — for in my judgment it has weight for persuading. I argue from Augustine: the Father had from Himself by origin, before the Son, the power of spirating through the second will — independent of the Son, and therefore principally — and that power was fruitful for producing, with the love of the Son set aside. Therefore the subsequent reason of His loving the Son was not necessary for the productive fruitfulness of the Holy Spirit — according to the position of Augustine. And so our Augustine, who was cited against us, is on our side.

Now to the arguments of reason. As for the first: I respond that if by solitary Love it means sterile and unfruitful love, the minor is to be granted. But this is not verified of God, in whom Love would always be fruitful and abundant. If it means the lack of more persons, as if Love is perfected by their company — it is to be denied. Because the Divine Essence does not need the company of more persons, who emanate from it as from the source of all perfection. Therefore Divine Nature is as perfect in one as in three persons. Hence that Love, being absolute and essential, could not be perfected by persons.

Furthermore, that Love which would be in the Father alone would be communicated to the Holy Spirit and would admit His company and exclude solitude — from which the second part is resolved, because loving in return is required in creatures because of the imperfection of the creature, whose love is finite and depends on the correspondence of another's love. But divine Love, being of infinite perfection, contains also the responding love and whatever perfection of mutual charity it contains, nor can it receive anything new from the responding lover — especially since it would produce the Holy Spirit, who would be the formal love of friendship.

The second is resolved by saying with respect to Richard's argument: that it proceeds well for creatures, from which Richard and Hugh of St. Victor took it and transferred it by similarity to divine things. And so that sweetness of mutual love moved them to posit the same sweetness of love in God — which cannot grow or increase the love of absolute and essential Love, which is infinitely sweet and pleasant, and has no need of another person to complete its sweetness and pleasantness. Moreover in that Love the Person of the Father would not be lacking, who would spirate the Holy Spirit and from Whose company, if it were necessary for sweetness, would love more sweetly and be loved in return. I add that this argument proceeds *de facto*, which we in no way deny — namely that there is a mutual and sweet corresponding love — whether it belongs to the perfection of divine love or not. However in this fact we deny the necessity of that imaginary sweetness, which sweetly deceives those who contemplate the pleasantness that would thereby arise. Certainly there is nothing beatific, from whatever source it comes, that is not found in that absolute and Essential Love. Especially in Scotus's position, which holds that the beatific vision and fruition can consist in their most perfect nature without knowledge and fruition of the persons.

The third is dissolved by denying that the Love of the essence in the Father would be love of concupiscence and imperfect — since it should be love of His own infinite goodness and worthiness, which would be loved infinitely, and this would be most perfect because most just. As for what the argument assumes — that this is love of concupiscence because it is love of Himself — this is to be excused as the weakness of human reason, which attributes our imperfections to God. Among us love of oneself is concupiscence, because it draws other goods to itself and makes itself as it were the end of other goods — in which there is imperfection and injustice. But God, being His own and supreme goodness and the last End and infinitely perfect, cannot but love Himself and draw all things to Himself as to the true ultimate end. Hence the act of loving Himself is an act of supreme virtue, because He is infinitely lovable by His very nature and finds no goodness outside Himself.

To the fifth it must be said: from the fact that the Holy Spirit is a Gift, it necessarily follows that He would proceed from the love of the Father alone —

because since Love was in the Father and Love is communicative, He could not but proceed from the Father and be a gift of the Father. Thus the argument is turned back. Every gift proceeds from Love; the Holy Spirit is a gift, and in the Father there is Love; therefore He must necessarily proceed from Him. As for what it is a gift's nature to look toward another to whom it may be given — that will be a consequence of the nature of gift, not antecedent. Moreover, there is no lack of one to whom it may be given: for it is given to the Father by returning through Love to Him from whom it proceeded.

Thus the adversaries' arguments are resolved.

JUDGMENT.

Indeed, after having expounded, weighed, and compared the positions of the Angelic and Subtle Doctors with each other, I judge the Scotist position to be far more probable than the Thomist one. Moreover, this position of ours is so surrounded and fortified on every side with its walls and bastions of reasons that it leaves absolutely no access for attack. On the other side, it attacks so diligently and forcefully with arguments that it scatters and breaks through all the earthworks and barriers of the adversaries.

Looking at the matter more deeply, Scotus's position builds up the perfection and independence of the Divine Essence from the Persons — who terminate and complete it, not however out of need but because of the abundance and fruitfulness of the Essence perfect in every way and infinite — and thus it demands those Persons, but is not constrained by that necessity so that, if one were lacking, it could not communicate its absolute and essential Love to the Holy Spirit. And this Love, dwelling in the Father from Himself, is communicated to the Son along with the same fruitfulness that was in the Father. And accordingly the Son also agrees with the Father in the production of the Holy Spirit — not on the ground that the Son is necessarily required on the part of the principle in such a way that if He were lacking under the stated hypothesis there would be no spiration in the Father, but because since that power is communicated to the Son as fruitful, just as it is in the Father, it must necessarily be communicated once the Son in divinis is admitted.

Therefore mutual Love and bond are given in fact, and indeed necessarily given the Son — and from Him and the Father the mutual Love and bond, the Holy Spirit, proceeds, the communion of both, as Augustine says. But it is not constrained by the law that if that Son did not exist, the fruitful divine Love in the Father would be lacking. Thus in fact the truth of procession from both is given, and in the notion of what is possible the decorum of essential and absolute Love is preserved — with no invincible necessity of a plurality of persons imposed upon it.

The greater perfection indeed of that Divine Love — and ineffable — is to be released from that obligation, as far as its own nature is concerned, and to

communicate itself from the abundance and fruitfulness intrinsically residing in it, than somehow to await a plurality of persons without which it cannot exercise the act of communicating. Nor is it fitting to say that the Love which, existing in the Father, is communicated to the Son, who is produced and generated through intellect — having by the impossible the Son removed — would lose that fruitfulness and abundance of His, and would be sterile and unproductive of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through the will as the loving and loving Person. Let the Thomists think to the contrary and say what they will — no arguments, if there are any capable ones, will compel me to disagree with the Subtle Doctor.

COLLATION VI. DISTINCTION III. On the Argument of St. Thomas by Which He Proves That It Should Be Said: "Two Spirating" and "One Spirator"

On 1. p. q. 36 a. ult. and 1. d. 11. a. 4 and q. 39. a. 3. Scotus in 1. d. 12. q. 1. §. Iuxta questionem n. 13.

On the substance of the matter there is agreement. On the reasoning there is disagreement. The question may seem minor, but in this subject every minor point has its weight. The matter is this: when the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit, they are one principle and not two. Yet it can be said: "Two Spirating" — but not "Two Spirators."

The argument of St. Thomas, by which he proves this, does not please Scotus. The argument is found at St. Thomas in the cited passage *1. p. q. 36. art. ult. ad solut. ult. arg.* at the end: "It seems better to say that since 'spirating' is an adjective and 'spirator' is a substantive, we can say that the Father and Son are two spirating on account of the plurality of supposita, but not two spirators on account of the one spiration. For adjective names have number according to supposita, but substantive names from themselves according to the form signified."

Scotus attacks this argument as follows: "This argument does not seem to suffice, because a numerical term places its signified around the signified of the determinable. But the signified of a substantive and an adjective is the same — they differ only in the mode of signifying. Therefore it seems that a numerical term primarily places its signified around the same thing, and so if the numeration of a form of the determinable is signified on one side, it is also on the other side — and not because of that adjacency to the suppositum, which applies not to others by reason of the signified but by reason of the mode of signifying, can there be truth or falsity in the other."

Cajetan sustains the argument of St. Thomas and responds to Scotus's objection in his Commentary on *a. 3. q. 39*, and attacks Scotus's argument — which Scotus presents in the same place in *1. d. 12. §. Iuxta questionem l. 14*: "Every dependent

depends on something entirely and simply independent. For the dependence of anything is never sufficiently terminated except at something entirely independent. And so when two things depend, neither is such as to terminate the other, but both depend on a third independent thing. The adjective is dependent on the substantive. Therefore when an adjective is added to a substantive, it finds at least an independent thing on which its dependence terminates. But when two adjectives are added mutually to each other, neither depends on the other, because neither terminates the other, just as neither terminates the dependence of the other, but both depend on some third thing which sufficiently terminates the dependence of both. Therefore when a numerical term is added to a substantive — as if it were said 'two spirators' — the numerical adjectival term immediately has the substantive terminating it, because the adjective determines the thing that terminates its dependence; and so the signified of its substantive is denoted to be numbered. But when it is added to an adjective — as when it is said 'two spirating' — each is dependent, and therefore neither determines the other, just as neither determines the dependence of the other; but both depend on a third that terminates their dependence."

Before examining the arguments, I note first that this question about the multiplication of substantives and adjectives is not proper to this place, and therefore Cajetan did not treat it here but referred it to *q. 39*, and there on it Vasquez in *d. 155* and other interpreters and commentators, and in *3. p. q. 3. a. 7* and in *1. d. 11. a. 4* and in *3. d. 2. a. 5*.

I take therefore only what is proper to the passage. I note secondly that "spirator" can be taken in two ways. First, for the common principle of spirating in Father and Son, prior in our manner of understanding to their actual spirating — in which sense it is something absolute. Second, for the term as it were resulting after the act of active spirating in the persons of Father and Son, through which both are referred to the spirated one, that is the Holy Spirit — in which sense it is something relative. These modes of distinguishing are set out by Suarez in *lib. 10. c. 4. n. 6* and Vasquez in *d. 138. c. 2. n. 5* and *d. 157. c. 10 and 11*. We speak in the second sense.

And here I observe that St. Thomas held a different position in *1. d. 11. in corp.*, where he thinks the same about the name "spirating" and "spirator" and says "two spirating" and "two spirators" should be said — although the act by which they spirate is one. And in *ad 1* he replies: "It must be said that although the act is one, nevertheless when it is signified as an act proceeding from several supposita, it must be signified in the plural. For act draws its number from the supposita." Hence Suarez in *lib. 10. de Principio Spiritus Sancti c. 7. n. 3* says St. Thomas retracted his position in *1. p. q. 36. a. 4. ad 7* — and rightly. Indeed Cajetan acknowledges it in his Commentary on that *q. 36* at the end, and adds again in the Commentary on *q. 39. a. 3* that St. Thomas in that passage is

reproving the opposite opinion he had held regarding such multiplication in 3. d. 1. q. 2. a. 5.

With these preliminaries I approach the attack on St. Thomas's argument made by Scotus. I say it is an excellent one. I prove it: the intention of St. Thomas was to show that the term "spirating" is multiplied numerically in Father and Son, but the term "spirator" is not. The argument for proving the intention was drawn from the adjacency of the form falling upon those two supposita, which are numerically two substantives per se. From the adjacency of spiration to both after the manner of an accident there arises multiplication on the part of the spirating action, which stands adjectivally with respect to those two substantives — therefore the spirating ones are multiplied on account of their adjectival signification.

Not so with the term "spirator" — for this term by its own nature imports something substantive, not adjectival, and accordingly does not admit a multiplicity of number, because it does not admit a multiplicity of adjacency, since spirations, which happen to the spirator, are taken substantively, as appears from the mode of signifying of "spirator," into whose nature and mode of subsisting per se those spirating reasons introduce themselves. This is illustrated with the example of creator. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are called three creating ones but not three creators, but one creator — because "creating ones" is said after the manner of an adjective, "creator" after the manner of a substantive. Thus St. Thomas proves what he had proposed to establish.

But this argument does not convince Scotus, because it is drawn from the mode of signifying alone and not from the nature of the thing signified, which always remains the same under that mode of signifying. Therefore if the thing signified is not changed, it will always retain its own unity and multiplicity on the part of reality, which is a property of being. Hence if the forms adjacent are three, they will always in the same way be three and will be called three. But the assumption is plain because the mode of signifying does not vary the nature of an accident, which however it is signified does not change its being — as is clear in creative action, which whether it is in flux or in rest is always present and denominates its subject as creating. Hence by virtue of adjacency precisely, it will not lose its numeration — because since it is a being, it follows the nature of being; it is always a being both when said after the manner of an adjacent thing and when said after the manner of a subsisting thing. Therefore it does not lose on account of mode the fact of being adjacent and numerable.

Now as applied: "spirating" is said in the participial manner; "spirator" in the verbal manner. This mode does not remove the adjacency of spiration, which whether in "spirating" or in "spirator" is always adjacent and not per se. Hence in Father and Son, whether they are called "spirating" participially or "spirators" verbally, by virtue of adjacency those spirations always rest and are subjected in them. Therefore if they are one in the genus of entity, they will be one in the

genus of adjacent things; if two in the genus of entity, they will be two in the genus of adjacent things — for they do not change their nature because they change their mode of signification. It is therefore necessary that nature be first considered, then number — and from these unity and multiplicity be derived — before the mode of signifying is accommodated to them. Hence by virtue of St. Thomas's argument, it does not follow that there would be one spirator and two spirating ones, but it follows that there would be two spirators or two spirating ones — because in "spirator" and in "spirating" only the mode of signifying varies, and the nature of being adjacent does not change. For spiration is adjacent in both "spirating" and in "spirator," because it does not lose its adjacent being. It will indeed be in "spirating" after the manner of flux, in "spirator" after the manner of rest — but it will not therefore change the nature of what is adjacent, whether it flows or rests. Say the same of "creating" and "creator" against the force of St. Thomas's argument.

This is my own way of expounding and amplifying Scotus's attack, which if a studious Scotist compares with what is in the commentaries, he will find it, unless my own opinion misleads me, much clearer and more readily accessible. And once understood, I have no doubt that he will easily dismiss all the objections of Cajetan and the Thomists.

Cajetan indeed attempts to respond to Scotus at *art. 3. q. 39*, but he does not respond precisely to Scotus's argument drawn from the nature of the thing and the mode of signifying, but denies Scotus's principle about numerical signification, saying that a concrete substantive follows — which we do not doubt, since Scotus does not deny it. Rather Scotus, and we with him, deny that it follows by virtue of St. Thomas's argument — which Cajetan should have noticed. But it is well that he there, in responding to the first doubt, concedes that St. Thomas did not fully explain his own meaning, because it was not necessary to express everything here. The praise belongs to Scotus, that he expressed everything that needed to be declared.

Now to Scotus's argument, by which he proves that two spirating ones can be said, but not two spirators but one spirator. Vasquez sets it out distinctly in *1. p. q. 155. c. 4. n. 15*. I form it in my own way, faithfully according to Scotus's mind, as follows.

When adjacent forms proceed in such a way that they are in flux, dependent on each other and indeterminate — because one cannot be terminated at another, since it is of the same adjacent and subject-dependent nature — then they have numerical multiplicity and are spoken of in the plural. But when they rest and are terminated in one third substantive independent of themselves, at which they themselves depend, they then pass from the state of flowing to that of rest, from the indeterminate to the determinate, from the dependent to the independent, and after the manner of the substantive they cohere and subsist. Hence since "spirating" expresses flux and thereby termination and dependence

of the action or form in becoming, it preserves its natural numerical distinction and is spoken of in the plural. But when it is in the state of having been accomplished and rests in the substantive terminus of the spirator, it takes on the nature of that terminus and receives numerical unity from it. Hence the spirator is and is said to be one, not two — taking unity from the terminus.

The matter goes the same way with "creating" and "creator." Which is indeed — judging without prejudice — an excellent and acute argument, and I marvel that it did not satisfy Father Vasquez, an acute man and a Scotist of the Jesuit order as I usually call him, having been versed in his writings from boyhood. But whatever he says in that chapter, Scotus's argument convinces me, and I honor it for its truth and admire it for its subtlety.

I add, captivated by love of it, that in participial forms such as "creating" and "spirating" there are found two notions — namely imperfections and dependencies — on account of which they can in no way be said substantively: namely the notion of something adjacent and flowing. As adjacent they are dependent and imperfect because of the nature of what arrives and is an accident to a subject; as flowing they are dependent and imperfect because of the way and tendency toward a terminus. They are therefore entirely different from subject, terminus, substantive, and they cannot in any way be said or denominated substantively, terminatively, or independently. But when they are in the state of having been accomplished and rest in the subject from which they are received, they entirely lose one of those two imperfections — namely the flux and way — by passing to the state of rest and terminus, remaining in the state of having been accomplished, and acquire anew the consistency and ultimate station in the proper and accommodated subject for resting. Who does not see the subtlety and solidity of this Scotist argument?

If this doctrine is applied to the questions about adjectival and substantive multiplication — which will afterwards be treated in their proper places — it will resolve all difficulties. But now it is not necessary to reduce it to act; it is enough to posit it as a principle from which the remaining conclusions are deduced.

For the benefit of those who are learning, I explain the difficulty touched upon in the title of the distinction and remove it. No theologian denies two spirating ones, even though they are one principle. The schools think otherwise about the spirator — whom, with few exceptions, they say is not two but one. The reason is sought. It is this: the active spiration, which in the Person of Father and Son, by reason of the persons, ought to be twofold, is one by reason of the spirating power in which they agree — and is said twofold of Father and Son actually spirating, whom it denominates as spirating, because that form, as it happens and flows in those persons, does not have independence or consistency while it tends and is borne toward its own terminus and subject, so to speak, on which it depends and which it looks to as ultimate — and stands as a way, entirely

adjacent and indeterminate, and thus loose and twofold in that flowing and loose respect.

But when it arrives at its own terminus and rests in the spirator, it is quiet and terminated, and takes on the nature of the substantive to which it was tending, on which it depended, and constituted in it as in a center, it coheres and subsists. From this it appears in what sense I have taken up and treated this question — namely in the second sense which I proposed at the beginning of the question in the second observation — taking "spirator" in the relative sense, toward which as toward the achieved state those relations of the spirating Father and the spirating Son are terminated, being as it were the becoming and flux of that achieved state, imitating the notions of flowing and proceeding accidental forms toward that at which they terminate in the achieved state.

In this sense the difficulty moves and St. Thomas's and Scotus's argument runs. Although Scotus in the cited passage at *n. 15, 16, and 17* seems to speak of "spirator" as a principle, nevertheless above he expressly said: "In the present case, the spirating supposita are distinguished, and the spirator follows from the spirating suppositum, but that consequent is not distinguished nor numbered by the numbering of the antecedent; and so the inference: spirating, therefore spirator; two spirating, therefore two spirators, is the fallacy of the consequent, arguing from the distinction of the antecedent to the distinction of the consequent."

From this it appears that Scotus was speaking with the term "spirator" accepted as the relative consequent following from the active spiration — as we have been disputing throughout, and in which sense alone the difficulty resides. For in that first notion of the principle constituted in the spirating power antecedent in its own manner to active and actual spiration, which is something common and absolute in nature, no one has ever posited a relative distinction, and accordingly no one has ever been permitted to say "two spirators." But according to that second relative notion, consequent and as it were resulting from the active spiration of the spirating ones, certain theologians thought it possible to say two spirators as well as two spirating ones. Of these Scotus says in the cited passage in *1. d. 12. q. 1. §. Iuxta quaestionem n. 14* at the end: "If sometimes there is found in the Doctors that the Father and Son are two spirators, their authorities must be expounded and soundly understood. For many authorities of the saints, which are not true by the force of the expression, must be expounded according to the Master in *d. 12.*"

One of those Doctors was the Angelic Doctor St. Thomas, who in *1. sent. d. 1. q. 1. in corp.* concedes that "two spirating" and "two spirators" can be said, although the act by which they spirate is one — and later in the reply to *ad 3* says: "Because Father and Son are referred by one relation to the Holy Spirit, therefore they are said to be one principle of the Holy Spirit, but not one

spirator" — which, as we observed above together with Suarez, he retracted in the later parts.

COLLATION VI. DISTINCTION IV. Whether if the Holy Spirit Did Not Proceed from the Son He Would Still Be Really Distinguished from Him

Scotus proposed this most celebrated question in 1. d. 11. q. 2: Whether if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the real distinction of Him from the Son could stand.

PREFACE

I changed the place of the questions: I treated first the one that is later in Scotus and St. Thomas, because I found it in order to be prior to the other — since what pertains to the constitution of the Holy Spirit must be inquired into before what pertains to His distinction. Note, reader, that both are hypotheticalal. But in the first question, which I treated first, it is asked: whether if the Son were removed, the Holy Spirit would exist — for He seems necessarily to require the Son for His constitution, since He is together with the Father the one principle. In this question, which I now raise, it is asked: whether with the Son retained but the real procession from Him set aside, the Holy Spirit would be — as He now is, distinct — distinguished from the Son. This pertains to the distinction. I therefore think I acted rightly in changing the order of treatment and disputing first what was second in place, but in the order of reason is held to be prior — by reason of cause, not of position.

Moreover, since this was going to be a much longer and more careful disputation, it was to be handled last. You should know, reader, that I place here this kind of question as I had formerly taken it up and composed it in my book on the Schools of Positive Theology — for these reasons. First, because almost all those books were lost through the fraud of a certain man who, in order to do a favor to certain theologians to whom that disputation was displeasing because it was rather sharp, tore it out and discarded it, leaving the books incomplete. Second, since a certain noble Discalced Carmelite theologian — *Gabriel of St. Vincent* — urged by those same adversaries of mine, had written against me and attacked at length what I had said there, I had to respond to him, and it was necessary to bring forward the same disputation so that both the reasons for attacking and the reasons for defending might appear. Third, because I added some new points by which, without altering the order and style, I both augmented and embellished the constitution of the question.

Accept this, therefore, with a good and fair mind. And first, what I had not done before, I shall provide — the passages of Scotus and St. Thomas where each delivers his own position, which is my duty in this work: to produce them so that the faithfulness with which I report and dispute may be made plain.

St. Thomas in *1. p. q. 36. a. 2* says in the body: "I answer that it must be said: it is necessary to say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. If He were not from Him, He could in no way be personally distinguished from Him — as is clear from what was said above" — where *q. 27. a. 3* and *q. 30. a. 2* are cited in the margin. "For it is not possible to say that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to something absolute, because it would follow that the essence of the three would not be one. For whatever is said absolutely in divine things pertains to the unity of essence. It remains therefore that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by relations. But relations cannot distinguish persons unless insofar as they are opposed. This is clear from the fact that the Father has two relations — one by which He is referred to the Son and another by which He is referred to the Holy Spirit — which, however, because they are not opposed, do not constitute two persons but pertain to the one Person of the Father alone. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Spirit there were only two relations by which each is referred to the Father, those relations would not be opposed to each other — just as the two relations by which the Father is referred to them are not mutually opposed. Hence just as the Person of the Father is one, so it would follow that the Person of the Son and the Holy Spirit would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical, since it destroys faith in the Trinity. It is therefore necessary that the Son and the Holy Spirit be referred to each other by opposed relations. But there can be in the divine no other opposed relations except the relations of origin, as was proved above" — *q. 18. a. 4* is indicated.

The mind of St. Thomas is clear, which all Thomists understand such that that formal opposition must be directly contrary and opposed in a relative way — so that a disparate opposition, which I do not know whether St. Thomas considered, does not suffice. But Scotus, having considered it, acutely discovered it, subtly weighed it, and accurately examined it, judged thus in *1. d. 11. q. 2. §. Contra istam opinionem 1. 6*. Having proposed the position of St. Thomas just cited, he says: "Against this position there are arguments drawn from two means. The first means is from the formal reason of the constitutive; the second means is from the distinction of emanations."

"From the first of these one argues: whatever formally constitutes something in being, by that same thing it is distinguished; but the Son is constituted in personal being by Filiation — therefore by that same thing He is formally distinguished from every other person; therefore through the possible or the impossible, with whatever else and especially what is posterior to Filiation removed, He will remain distinguished personally by Filiation from whatever Person."

"The assumption is plain, because the Son is not constituted in personal being by active spiration, since that is common to Father and Son; there are no other

positive properties in Him than active generation, passive generation, and active spiration; therefore etc."

"From the second mode of emanations, after a short interval, Scotus argues at n. 8: Generation is distinguished from spiration — this, with everything other than the notion of generation and spiration removed by the impossible, or at least with this removed: that active spiration would be from the Son, while the distinction of the principles of generating and spirating still stands. Therefore with whatever such thing removed, the distinction of the Son and the Holy Spirit would stand. The proof of the consequence: it is impossible for one person to receive being by two total productions. For nothing receives being by one production such that, with that production removed by the impossible, it would receive being any less. But if by this and by that production something were to receive being, and each completely — since each would be perfect — then with both removed, it would have its being perfectly through each, and so neither and yet each would receive being."

Here we have both Scotus's mind and his explanation. The same is found in Scotus in *1. d. 13. q. un. §. ad quest. n. 18*. I omit the other arguments of Scotus. Let us now proceed to treat the question at length and carefully — for it is important and rich in doctrine.

SECTION I. Whether, Insofar as It Contributes to Proving the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, That Scholastic Question Is Useful: Would the Holy Spirit Be Distinguished from the Son If He Did Not Proceed from Him?

It is first certain that this supposition contributes greatly to establishing the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son — namely that if the procession were removed, the distinction of the Persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit would be removed. For if in order for the Holy Spirit to be the third and distinct Person it is necessary that He proceed from the Son, it follows entirely that He does proceed from the Son. From this it already appears how important this question is, which some have thought useless and others altogether inept and from which nothing can be established with certainty. The leader of these was Gotfredus who, as Scotus attests in *1. d. 11. q. 2*, thought such a question, being from an impossible hypothesis, was superfluous and absurd. Gregory agreed with him in *1. d. 11. q. 1. art. 2*. Torres nearly concurs in the present *q. 36. art. 2. p. 2*, saying it bears little on the theologian.

Surely certain petty Masters of Theology, through their own thoughtlessness and perhaps through fear of the arguments — in order to escape them — remove the question, and in responding with a frivolous response render it useless and ridiculous. For given that impossible hypothesis that the Holy Spirit would not proceed from the Son, they confuse Son and Holy Spirit with each other and so mix both together that they remove the persons from the middle and overturn the state of the question. And so they respond to the arguments of

those asserting that both remain distinguished by denying also the other part of the hypothesis on account of which the question is raised — extinguishing the persons so that the basis of the distinction does not appear. And so they concede that the Son would proceed through will and the Holy Spirit through intellect, unwilling to sustain the architecture of the controversy, most aptly devised for this purpose: to show whence the proper and formal notion of each person comes along with their distinction from each other.

They do this because they fear Scotus's arguments as strong ones from which they cannot extricate themselves, except by overturning the question that is most rightly supposed about the root of distinction. I attack these as follows: the Greeks in fact deny the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, and yet admit that the persons are distinct. Therefore they were able to distinguish between those two things — the denial of procession and the affirmation of the distinction of persons. Why then do these people, under the condition of the hypothesis, not admit what the Greeks affirm absolutely — that the persons are distinct? Let them learn from Scotus in *p. 1. d. 12. q. 1*, and from Durand in *d. 9. 3* after the middle, and *d. 12. q. 2. n. 8*, and Ockham in *d. 12. q. 1*, and Gabriel in *d. 12. q. 2. art. 1*, and Aureolus in *d. 12. q. un. art. 1 and 3*, and Bellarmine in *tom. 1. lib. 2. de Christo c. 27*, and Molina in *1. p. q. 36. art. 4. d. 5* — who hold that the Person of the Holy Spirit, if He were to proceed from the Father alone by virtue of His own formal procession, would be of the same nature and properties as He now has when He proceeds from both Father and Son. This second supposition about Persons is therefore not removed by that first impossible hypothesis of the Latins — namely that He would not proceed from the Son.

The foundation on which Gotfredus relies is empty. He says from the impossible the impossible follows — and therefore since it is impossible for the Holy Spirit not to proceed from the Son, given this it follows that the Holy Spirit both is distinguished and is not distinguished from the Son. But that assumption is entirely false. For if you say: given that God by the impossible were to lie, He would sin — it does not follow that both parts of a contradiction follow, namely He would sin and He would not sin. It will always be true to say He would sin, since lying is a sin.

Again, when you say: if a man had wings he would fly, it does not follow that he would fly and would not fly. Third, if you say: if there were several gods, the ordered and right administration of the world could not be maintained — it does not follow from this that both parts follow, namely that it would be rightly administered and that it would not be rightly administered.

Furthermore, if that argumentation from an impossible hypothesis were absurd and inept, the doctrine of Aristotle would fall — which approves this kind of arguing. Then many questions that are usefully proposed in the schools of theology by the same Masters who remove this question would be removed. What would happen if God were to operate from the necessity of nature? Would

contingent effects be removed or would they be posited, and would sufficient provision have been made for human affairs? — two questions so usefully proposed that from the first, God's liberty is proved, and from the second, His providence. Therefore Gotfredus argues ineptly against this question — which, unless it were very useful, would not be raised by Henry, St. Thomas, Scotus, and the whole theological school.

The usefulness consists in this: that it may appear what is the formal constitutive and distinctive of the two persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Moreover if it is true, as theologians commonly teach, that with the procession from the Son removed the real distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son would be consequently removed — the opinion of the Greeks, denying the procession from the Son, would be evidently convicted of error, since from it would follow the denial of two distinct persons and thus the mystery of the Trinity would be overturned.

Among the authors who argue for the usefulness of this question, the chief ones, as far as I could ascertain by reading, were the Salmanticians, who think they are arguing the case of St. Thomas, who before Scotus raised and treated the matter. They do this most carefully in *tom. 2. in 1. p. d. 14. dub. 2.* We have, I think, said enough concisely.

The state of the question, therefore, is: whether the root of the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son is the very generation by which the Son is constituted and the very notion of the Word produced through the act of intellect by the Father. Or is it the active spiration with respect to the Holy Spirit, by which the Son is constituted as spirator? For if the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by this, then if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from Him, He would in no way be distinguished from the Son. But if He is distinguished not by this but by Filiation, then even if He did not proceed from Him, He would be really distinguished from the same Son.

And indeed the state is perspicuous. For in order for the Son to produce the Holy Spirit together with the Father, He must already be constituted in the nature of the Son, and thus is already a Person distinct from the Father. The question now is: whether the Holy Spirit, given that He proceeds from the Father alone and not from the Son already constituted, would be different and other than the Son from whom He does not proceed.

SECTION II. The Position Denying That the Holy Spirit Would Be Distinguished from the Son If He Did Not Proceed from Him Is Proposed

St. Thomas teaches this in *1. p. q. 36. art. 2* and *lib. 4. contra Gent. c. 24* and more fully in *de Potentia q. 10. art. 5* and *opusc. 1. contra errores Graecorum c. 32. §. 30 and 31.* Alexander in *1. p. q. 43. n. 4.* Albert in *1. p. q. 21. m. 3.* St. Bonaventure in *1. d. 1. art. 1.* Aegidius in *ar. 1. q. 3.* Hervaeus in *q. 1.* Strassburg in *d. 11. q. 2. ar. 2.* Capreolus in *q. 1. ar. 1.* Marsilius in *1. q. 15. ar. 3.* Ferrariensis in *4. cont. gentes c. 24.*

The commentators of St. Thomas on *q. 36. in 1. p.*: Cajetan, Javellus, Nazarius, Zanardus, Molina, Salmanticians, Vasquez in *d. 147*, Montoya in *d. 68*, Suarez in *lib. 10. de Trinit. c. 2*, other theologians on the first part of St. Thomas.

The principal proof of this position is taken from the principle: in divine things all are one where the opposition of relation does not intervene. This seems to be commonly accepted from the doctrine of the Fathers. And from it, it is deduced that with the opposition of relations removed there is no foundation for real distinction.

That principle is delivered in the Council of Florence in *sess. 18* after the middle §. *Dico equidem*, and in the §. *Quoniam divina substantia*. And the Council of Toledo XI in its Confession of Faith, where the Council of Worms also has it — three councils cited by Montoya in *d. 68. f. 4*.

From the Fathers: Nazianzus in *orat. 37 and 39*, Cyril in *lib. 2. Thesaur. 3* and *lib. 7. c. 1* and *lib. 11. c. unico*, Gregory of Nyssa in *ad Ablabium lib. Quod non tres dei* and *lib. 1. con. Eunom.*, Augustine in *de Trinit. c. 8 and 11* and *lib. 7. c. 2 and ult.* and *lib. 8. c. 1* and *lib. 1. c. 10* and *serm. 38. de temp.*, Boethius in *lib. de Trinit.* at the end, Anselm in *lib. de Incarn. Verbi c. 3* and *Epist. de Proceff. Spir. San. c. 2, 3, and ult.*, Isidore in *lib. 2. de differ. Spirit. c. 2*, Bernard in *Epist. 190. ad Innocent.*

Contributing also are other Fathers who recognize no other constitutives or distinctives of persons beyond relations, or origins according to the relation of principle and of what proceeds from principle — as the Latins speak — or of cause and caused — as the Greeks speak. These are Dionysius in *de divin. nomin. c. 2*, Basil in *hom. 28. contra Sabellian.* and *lib. 2. contra Eunom.* and *Epist. 43. ad Greg. Nyssenum*, Athanasius in *dial. 1. de Trinit.* and *quest. de natura Dei cont. Anomaeae. q. 2*, Nazianzus in *orat. 1. nu. 71* and *orat. 23. in laudem Heronis* and *orat. 23. ad Arianos. nu. 52* and *orat. 29. de dogm. et constit. Episc.* and *orat. 32. ad centum et triginta Episcopos* and *orat. 37. 5. de Theolog.* and *orat. 39. in Sancta lumina ante nu. 24*, Cyril of Alexandria in *Dialog. de Trinit. lib. 1. inter med. et fin.* and *lib. 3. Col. 1.* and *lib. 2. col. 5* and further *lib. 6. col. 4* and *lib. 7. prope med.*, Sophronius Patriarch of Constantinople in the Sixth Synod *Act. 11*, Theodore in *dialog. Immutabilis* and *lib. 2. de Princip. col. penult.* and *comment. ad Hebraeos 1. ad illud: Figura substantia eius*, Anastasius Sinaite in *lib. de recta Fidei dogm.*, Isidore of Pelusium in *lib. 2. Epist. 42*, Damascene in *lib. 1. c. 9* and *lib. 3. c. 5, 6, and 7* and *Epist. de Trifagio* and *orat. de Nativit. B. Marie* and *lib. de duabus Christi voluntatibus* and *lib. de decretis prim. instit. c. 1 and 3*, and in the Council of Florence, Marcus in the name of the Greeks in *sess. 29* says: "Persons differ through their properties." And properties are opposed relations.

These are the Greeks. The same is the doctrine of the Latin Fathers: Ambrose in *ymb. Apostolorum c. 10* and *de fide ad Gratianum lib. 1. c. 12* and *lib. de Incarnat. Dom. Myst. c. 9*, Hilary in *lib. 1. de Trinit.* near the beginning and *lib. 12. in the middle*, Augustine in *lib. 3. cont. Maximin. c. 10* and *serm. 38. de temp.* and *lib. 83. quest. q.*

69, Fulgentius in *de fide ad Petr. c. 1* and in response to the first objection of the Arians, John Pope I in *lib. de duabus natur. cont. Eutych.*, Cyprian in *lib. de Cardinali Christi operibus cap. de Nativit.*, Bernard in *lib. 5. de consider. ad Eugen. and Epist. 190. ad Innocent.*

John the Theologian at the Council of Florence in *sess. 18* most clearly delivers this position, proving from the opinion of the Greek Fathers that incommunicability comes by virtue of relation — the relation of that from which something comes and that toward which something is directed, that is, the producing principle and the produced terminus. The same concludes against the Greeks: "Among all Greek and Latin Doctors, relation alone multiplies the divine Persons through procession, so that no person differs from another in any other way than by relation." He speaks of the relation opposed by reason of active and passive procession according to the doctrine of his Thomist school, and by this argument attempts to convince the Greeks who denied the Procession from the Son.

Greater force is in the passages of Bessarion. In his first *orat. pro unione c. 6*, he teaches that the divine Persons are constituted principally by those relations that are founded in origin or procession, and had previously adduced for that purpose the passage of Gregory of Nyssa in *ad Ablabium*: "The Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son by this — that He is through Him" — as if to say: since both are from the Father, they would not be sufficiently distinguished unless one were through the other. Thus Bessarion understood the mind of Nyssa, and he further shows that "being through him" means the same as "proceeding from the Son." And indeed Bessarion touched on the mind of Nyssa, for the latter in the same *lib. ad Ablab.* near the end — as Montoya notes — says: "That by which alone we apprehend one being discerned from the other, namely that we believe one to be cause and the other to be from the cause and from what is cause."

The said words of Bessarion are known to have pleased the Council. Therefore this position seems nearly defined by the Fathers of that Council.

Montoya calls this argument drawn from authority a reason, and places it first in order. He forms a second from the words of Bessarion and John the Theologian at the Council of Florence. He calls a third the principal one, and it is of this kind: the active spiration does not constitute a third person really distinct from the Father and Son for this reason — that it is not opposed to them in a relative way. But if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be opposed to Him in a relative way; therefore He would not constitute a Person really distinct from the Son. This argument was first formed by Durand, and received and expounded from him by Vasquez in *d. 147. c. 6*.

Another is offered by the same, which Montoya places as a confirmation, and it reduces to much the same principle — namely: where there is no relative

opposition there is no real diversity of persons — and it revolves around a different example from the first, drawn by comparison, which Montoya proposes thus: there is the same proportion between active and passive origins. But the active origins of spiration do not produce real distinction between the spirating Father and Son; therefore neither will the passive origins on the part of the Son and the Holy Spirit be distinguished — for the same reason that they are not opposed in a relative way.

Vasquez adds that since it is certain that the Son is really distinguished from the Holy Spirit, this certainty cannot rest on the uncertain principle of Scotus — that they are distinguished by relations that are not opposed but merely disparate. And so the distinction must absolutely be founded on relative opposition, which is certain and undoubted in the Church.

These two or three reasons, which Montoya and Vasquez set out with such effort, are clearly and perspicuously adduced by St. Thomas himself in *1. p. q. 36. art. 2. in Corp.* I wish to cite them in his own words, for nothing more apt can be said.

"I answer: it must be said that it is necessary to say the Holy Spirit is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no way be personally distinguished from Him. For it is not possible to say that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to something absolute, because it would follow that the essence of the three would not be one. For whatever is said absolutely in divine things pertains to the unity of essence. It remains therefore that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by relations. But relations cannot distinguish persons unless insofar as they are opposed. This is clear from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is referred to the Son and by the other to the Holy Spirit, which, however, because they are not opposed, do not constitute two persons but pertain to the one Person of the Father alone. If therefore in the Son and in the Holy Spirit there were only two relations by which each is referred to the Father, those relations would not be mutually opposed, just as the two relations by which the Father is referred to them are not mutually opposed. Hence just as the Person of the Father is one, so it would follow that the Person of the Son and the Holy Spirit would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical, since it destroys faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit must be mutually referred by opposed relations. But there can be in the divine no other opposed relations except the relations of origin, as was proved above. The opposed relations of origin are taken according to principle and according to that which is from the principle. It remains therefore that it is necessary to say either that the Son is from the Holy Spirit — which no one says — or that the Holy Spirit is from the Son — which we confess. And this is consonant with the reason of each procession. For it was said above that the Son proceeds through the mode of intellect, and the Holy Spirit through the mode

of will as Love. And it is necessary that Love proceed from the Word. For we love nothing except according to the conception of the mind by which we apprehend it. Hence also according to this it is manifest that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son."

Certainly what others say at great length is here seen collected in summary by St. Thomas — and from this one source of St. Thomas all drew, and drew the doctrine into streams.

SECTION III. The Contrary Position Is Presented, Affirming That the Holy Spirit Would Be Distinguished from the Son Even If He Did Not Proceed from Him

The author is Scotus — not because he was the first to deliver it, but because he proved it more firmly, defended it more forcefully, and treated it more accurately. He therefore proposes and follows it in *1. d. 11. q. 2*, where all of Scotus's disciples agree. Henry had taught it earlier in *quodl. 5. q. 9*, and Bacon thought with him in *1. d. 13. q. 1*. Aureolus largely follows it in *1. d. 1. q. 1. art. 2*, and Gabriel in *dist. 11. q. 2. art. 2. concl. 1*, and Gregory in *1. d. 1. q. art. 2* — although they disagree with Scotus in some points. Richard leans toward it in *art. 1. q. 2* and the Carthusian in the same *q. 2*.

It rests on the authority of the Fathers who teach that persons are constituted and distinguished by hypostases constituted by virtue of their diverse processions — which, being through intellect and will respectively, the one being the Generation of the Word and the other the Procession of the Holy Spirit, assert a real distinction. Thus Nazianzus in *orat. 39. in Sancta lumina* around the middle and after *nu. 24*, Athanasius in *dial. 1. de Sancta Trinitate contra Anomaeum* between the middle and the end, Augustine in *lib. 5. de Trinit. e. 14*, Damascene in *lib. 1. de Fide cap. 7, q. 10, 11, and 18*, Anselm in *lib. de Processione Spiritus Sancti cap. 2 and 3*.

The principal foundations are drawn from reason. The first is a priori in the following way: the principle by which a thing is properly constituted is also the distinctive mark from another which is not constituted by it. But the second Person, the Son, is constituted by Filiation proceeding through intellect, which does not belong to the Holy Spirit proceeding through will. Therefore Filiation is the principle constituting and distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit. This argument is in Darii and seems to conclude, if it is applied. And it is applied thus: if by the impossible the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, there would still remain in the Son the notion of procession through intellect and the very Filiation by which He is now constituted and distinguished from the Holy Spirit. Therefore there would still remain a sufficient principle of distinction, by which, even though the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would still be distinguished from Him.

A second argument also a priori. Nothing can be distinguished substantially and in its own being from another by what accrues to it already substantially and constituted in its being. But the relation of active spiration accrues to the Son already substantially and constituted in His own being; therefore by that He cannot be substantially distinguished from the Holy Spirit. The major and minor are established. The consequence is formal.

A third. Even though the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, there would still be two emanations — one through intellect and one through will — distinct in their own nature and disparate, whose distinction would pass into the terms they produce, which are the Word and Love — that is, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore both would be distinguished by their proper nature in a disparate way, just as the emanations also are.

A fourth. Let us imagine the Holy Spirit not proceeding from the Father; given this, He would still be distinguished from the Father. Therefore by the same reasoning, if He did not proceed from the Son, He would be really distinguished from Him. The assumption is shown, because the Father would be from Himself and not from another, and would generate the Son — which the Holy Spirit would not do, since He is Love. Therefore the Father would be distinguished from the Holy Spirit, not by relative opposition but by disparate distinction.

A fifth also a priori: when the proper constitutive of one thing has annexed by its substantial and formal nature the negation of another thing, this is an argument of the real distinction of the former from the latter. But the substantial nature of the Son and Word and Image, by which He is constituted in being, has annexed to it the negation of the Holy Spirit, who cannot be a Word, an Image, or a Son — since He proceeds through love and is notional Love. Therefore the Holy Spirit and the Son are really distinguished through the notions of Love and Word.

Hence Scotus concludes that not only the distinction of direct relative opposition is real in God but also the disparate real distinction. He therefore concedes that in fact, Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished in both those ways — both by the relative opposition of spiration with respect to the Holy Spirit and by the disparate distinction of Word and Love.

SECTION IV. Judgment Is Delivered on the Said Positions, and Each Is Shown to Be Safe and Probable

As regards the first — which has St. Thomas as its author — it has prevailed so much in the schools that by the common consensus of theologians outside the Scotist school it is both received and sustained, and is held to be the position of the Fathers, adapted to confuting the Greek error. Hence it has come about that some of its sectaries, more boldly than was fitting, undertook to censure the opposing position of Scotus more harshly, as akin to the Greek error and less in accord with the doctrine of the Fathers and of the Council of Florence.

For my own part — I who am accustomed to cast my vote without love, without hatred, without envy, and without ambition or partisanship — I judge thus: the position of St. Thomas is gracious and fortunate in that it is so widely received and dominates in the schools. For I observe that, just as among men some are fortunate and gracious while others are unfortunate and disliked — apart from merit and without any service or injury — so it happens with positions, which are sometimes approved or disapproved more or less according to human preferences and judgments, being welcome or unwelcome to them. I think these two opposite positions of St. Thomas and Scotus are among these — both being probable and perhaps equally plausible, yet of different fortune: the one of St. Thomas pleases many, while Scotus's is approved by few. And indeed if you look at authority, St. Thomas's position far surpasses Scotus's; if you weigh the arguments, Scotus's position yields nothing to it — indeed it surpasses it. For that principle which is assumed as certain and undoubted — that there is no real distinction in divine things except where there is direct relative opposition — has no older author than Anselm, as we shall see in the next chapter. And whether he delivered it is not well established, for two eminent theologians, Vasquez in *d. 147. cap. 4* and Suarez in *de Trinit. lib. 10. cap. 2. n. 7*, sincerely confess that Anselm more favors Scotus's position, and produce apt passages for that. Although Montoya opposes this saying that in those passages Anselm speaks from another's point of view, he accomplishes nothing against such great men.

Thus the whole matter comes back to the school, which unless it proves this by arguments, that principle will not be at all well established. But principles are neither accustomed to be nor can they be proved by reason — especially since all arguments rest on and are derived from that one principle. So that with it denied — which can be done without sacrilege, since it is not sacred — all arguments are weakened.

Moreover, if the arguments are examined, a large portion of them displease the authors of the same school, as can be seen in Vasquez in *c. 5*, who produces certain ones from Cajetan and Durand. As for what he himself presents in *c. 6*, they reduce to two — which reveal their own weakness and will be resolved by us without difficulty in their proper place. Those proposed by Montoya and others will by no means deter us from defending Scotus's position.

This much is certain: with that principle denied — which is attributed to Nyssen and Anselm — nearly all the arguments collapse. And indeed with Scotus's disparate distinction brought in, like a battering ram brought up, the alleged principle crumbles.

The position of St. Thomas is venerable, however, by reason of the authority of the one who holds it and of his many and great followers, and because it is more opposed to the Greek error it gained favor from that. As for Scotus's position, some receive it badly — about whom Vasquez rightly complains in *disp. 147. cap.*

3 — that they attempted to charge it with error and danger in faith, relying on a passage of the Council of Florence which they themselves fashioned according to their own judgment and presented to Scotus malformed or deformed. Vasquez treats this at length in that chapter, and Montoya briefly in *disp. 78. sect. 2* — the latter to attack Scotus, the former to defend him.

Let us see in Vasquez what passage of the Council is at issue. He says it reads thus in *sess. 25. in Confess. Fidei* made in the Council and sent to the Greeks: "For those who believe the Holy Spirit does not proceed even from the Son must necessarily understand that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and consequently that there is no Son. But those who say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the sole Person of the Father, these beyond doubt separate substance from hypostasis and speculate idly about a division of the divine substance, which is very remote from reason."

These, says Vasquez in *c. 3. n. 11*, are the words found in all the copies as they now stand. But those theologians, in order to charge Scotus's position with error or danger, devise some emendation of this text, which they say is corrupt in all the codices, if you please. Thus they say it should read: "For those who believe the Holy Spirit does not proceed even from the Son must necessarily understand that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, and consequently that He is the Son." By which words, if they were the sense of the Council, Scotus and Henry would clearly be condemned.

But what does Vasquez think? Let us hear. "But these are frivolous things, so that the position of Henry and Scotus ought to be judged not only as not improbable but not even dangerous in faith. For who does not see how ridiculous it is to emend the words of the Council, which are contained in the same way in all Greek and Latin codices, so that we charge Scotus's position with error? Rather, those who so gently devised this emendation are themselves to be noted — since an innocent meaning can be gathered from the said words from another direction." So Vasquez, who produces the innocent meaning of the words thus: when the Greeks teach that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, they consequently teach He proceeds from the Father alone — and accordingly that the Holy Spirit, namely, is not the Son, so as to establish the Trinity as defined in the four General Councils, to which the Greeks assembled at the Council of Florence deferred as to the four Gospels. The Council of Florence therefore does not infer against the Greeks that absurdity which those theologians of ours attempt to infer against them and against Scotus — namely that the Holy Spirit would be the Son if He proceeded from the Father. But it rather wished to establish what the Greeks according to the true faith ought to assert — namely that if the Spirit does not proceed from the Son, at least He proceeds from the Father and is distinguished from the Son, lest they confuse the Trinity.

For which we are grateful to him for his zeal in defending Scotus, to whom, as he resembles him in acuity and subtlety, he was by a certain right bound to protect him and free him from slander.

But I desire two things in Vasquez. First, faithfulness in citing the passage of the Council. Second, reason in expounding it. To begin with the latter: if the text of the Council is as Vasquez presents it, it certainly does not much favor Scotus's position if understood in Vasquez's sense — for that sense does not seem apt. For those words, "they must necessarily understand the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Father alone, and consequently that He is not the Son" — I do not know whether they admit the exposition of Vasquez. For that particle "consequently" disturbs it — since from the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, it does not follow that the Word is the Son. On the contrary, it follows that the Holy Spirit is the Son — for one who proceeds from the Father alone is a Son. Therefore given that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, the consequence is that He is a Son — as the theologians enemies of Scotus were emending the text, relying on that particle "consequently." But let us admit that "not" — so that the sense is: it is necessary that those who deny the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Son understand that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. This is certain — for if He does not proceed from the Son, He proceeds from the Father alone. But how will what is added be true: they must understand consequently, that is from the fact that He proceeds from the Father alone, that He is not the Son — how is this deduced as a consequence? namely that He is not the Son who is from the Father alone? since the opposite is rather the consequence, namely: one who is from the Father alone is a Son.

And indeed that particle "consequently" is not placed in the way Vasquez says — namely: when the Greeks teach the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, they consequently teach He proceeds from the Father alone. But it is placed: "and consequently that He is not the Son" — so that "consequently" does not fall upon "from the Father alone proceeding" — for this was evident and the same by the same — but rather it is a consequence from something else. For who does not see that it is one and the same thing, for those who concede "proceeding from the Father alone" and deny "proceeding from the Son" — not to proceed from the Son and to proceed from the Father alone? Therefore "consequently" falls upon what follows — namely that He is the Son — so that the sense is: from the fact that He is from the Father alone, it follows that He is the Son — as those theologians emending the text were saying. Therefore that "not" cannot stand with that particle "consequently."

Furthermore, the Council in that passage was not instructing the Greeks nor praising their faith in retaining the Son, while the procession of the Holy Spirit from Him was still denied — but was attacking them, as appears from the text and is established from the adjacent words: "But those who say the Holy Spirit

proceeds from the sole Person of the Father, these beyond doubt separate substance from hypostasis and speculate idly about a division of the divine substance." This is manifestly inferred against the Greeks. Therefore that other too — that He is not the Son, or that He is the Son, as it reads in that manner — was against the Greeks.

These matters will be plain to those reading that passage and the subsequent ones of the Council. Hence Ruiz de Montoya, retaining that "not" with Vasquez but expounding it against him, said the intention of the Council was to attack the Greeks who said the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone — because from this it followed that the Person of the Son was entirely removed. That is: it necessarily follows that the Son does not exist, because He would not be consubstantial — as is explained in the same paragraph, namely in the words I have just cited: "they separate substance from hypostasis and speculate idly about a division of the divine substance."

Montoya adds: "More clearly in §. Quoniam Graeci nos calumniantur" — in those words: "they would conceive in mind that the divine substance is divided into three parts." For this follows if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. For then the Son would not exist of the same substance as the Father, but another Son of different substance would exist, and likewise another Holy Spirit. Certainly this, in my judgment, is the sense of that passage — if it is so contained in the Council — which Montoya holds. For I see that the Latin Fathers in that part of the session wished to free themselves from the slanders of the Catholics attacked by the Greeks, and to blunt the same arguments against them — showing that those Greeks erred in their position denying the Procession from the Son.

Against them therefore two absurdities were inferred. One: that by that reasoning the Son is removed, because since He lacked the power of spirating He would not have the same essence and consubstantiality with the Father. The other: that the substance of the Trinity is divided, because in the Father was the power of spirating which was not in the Son actively, nor in the Holy Spirit passively — for if the Son did not produce Him, He communicated nothing to Him. And therefore the Holy Spirit was receiving a divided and partial power from the Father alone. Thus by admitting that error, in the Son was an essence divided from the Father's essence because He was not receiving the power of spirating, and in the Holy Spirit was that spirating power communicated by the Father which was in no way in the Son. And this is the genuine understanding of that passage as presented by Vasquez and Montoya.

But the reader must hear a remarkable thing, to which I want him attentive. This text, which Vasquez and Montoya and other theologians cited at Vasquez present, is not found in the Council of Florence. For when I sought it — as I am accustomed to go to the sources — and consulted all the exemplars that I was able to find, I could not find that text. Therefore neither in the Roman edition,

nor in the edition of Severinus Binius, nor in that of Stephanus Paulinus is that passage found — as anyone can verify who does not wish to take my word.

I cannot but greatly marvel that these two most learned men cite these passages in such a way, since they are not found in these exemplars of such great authority. I do not care about Arriaga, who cites the same passage, because he cites only on the authority of Vasquez and touches on this difficulty with a light hand, sufficiently indicating that he has not consulted the exemplars of the Council. So great is my reverence for those two authors that I do not doubt their good faith. I believe they came upon some exemplar that contained those texts. Indeed I am also persuaded that certain older exemplars had them exactly as Vasquez reads them — for I see him affirming that those words are found in all the codices as he cites them. My judgment is this. Those exemplars were corrupt — ours are emended — especially since I see that the Greek sources lack those words. I consulted the Greek sources and found them in agreement with our Roman, Binian, and Paulinian ones, which contain things differently from how Vasquez and Montoya adduce them.

I adduce the passages I found. In the Council of Florence, *sess. 25. §. Sed quoniam suspicantur*, it reads: "For indeed those who deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son plainly declare that He proceeds from the Father alone. If from the Father alone, therefore there was a time when there was no Son. But if they say that from the sole Paternal hypostasis, they in fact separate substance from hypostasis, and so through them the substance will be cut into parts — which is absurd."

This is the legitimate text, which the Greek entirely corresponds to. Here there is neither "consequently," nor "not," nor "Him." Yet the passage contains the matter as Montoya expounded it. For two absurdities are brought forward here by the Latins against the Greeks. One: that it would follow there was no Son — "there was therefore a time when there was no Son" — that is, when the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father alone. The other: if there was a Son when the Spirit proceeded from the Father, the power of spirating was divided — in the Father who had it, and in the Son who did not. And thus there was not the same and integral substance of divinity in the Son. These two things are clearly stated in our text.

The other exposition of Vasquez is entirely excluded, and the third of those theologians emending the text has no place. Yet that first argument is capable also of another sense — namely that there was a time when there was no Son, in which sense the Arians said of the same Son: "there was a time when He was not" — that is, He was a creature — just as if the Son did not exist when the Holy Spirit was and proceeded from the Father. I see however that this sense is more remote from the mind of the Council, and therefore the two prior ones seem apt.

From this there arises an argument against Scotus: because the Council seems to condemn his position, as those theologians whom Vasquez refutes wished. For if from the fact that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son it follows that both the Person of the Son is removed and the substance of God is divided — in every supposition these two follow from the nature of the thing, and therefore from Scotus's position these errors follow.

I respond, however, that these two passages harm the Greeks but do not injure Scotus at all. The reason is that the Greeks were denying the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son in fact, both material and formal, and did not think they were erring in this. Hence it was necessary to show them the absurdities that followed from this — namely that He would not have the complete nature of divinity, nor be the Son of God, since there would be no consubstantiality with the Father who is God. Moreover the divine essence would be divided in the manner we just described in the three Persons. These errors the Greeks did not see and were in fact following from the denial of the procession, which is in fact the case.

But Scotus, with the mystery of faith and the procession from the Son admitted, was making a supposition from what is impossible — and speculatively asking what would happen if, with the Son remaining as Son, the notion of spirating being set aside, He would still be from the force of generation distinct from the Holy Spirit. This is only a speculative question for seeing the predicates of the Begotten and the Spirating. Therefore Scotus was not overturning the nature of the Son, but retaining it entirely and wanting it to remain fully under the same notion of Begotten from the Father through intellect — and speculatively asking whether this would be sufficient for the distinction of the Holy Spirit.

In this surely there could be no error — since even in that supposition He wanted the Person of the Son to remain, also as distinct from the Holy Spirit, whom He also supposed to proceed through the will of the Father alone from His love alone, and asked about Him: whether He would be distinguished from the Son insofar as He was a Son, begotten through intellect.

Indeed from this it appears that Scotus thought the Son so necessary in divine things that even with the power of spirating removed by the impossible hypothesis, he would not deny that He is the Son — thinking that there are two reasons for constituting and distinguishing the Person of the Son: one from the generative procession of the Father, the other by reason of active spiration toward the Holy Spirit.

By this reasoning Scotus more firmly establishes and confirms the Person of the Son than the authors of the opposing position, who wish to distinguish Him from the Holy Spirit only by one active spiration — and with that removed speculatively, they destroy the Person of the Son, since He is not constituted in the being of a Person through active spiration but through the relation of Son,

to which the relation of active spiration accrues after the Person of the Begotten is constituted.

What, I ask, is here not safe, not ingenious, not fitted to the doctrine of truth? We are in the school with Scotus. We confess Catholic truth. We condemn the error of the Greeks who denied in fact the procession from the Son, and consequently were overturning the Person of the Son as He now is — which cannot be without that power of spirating, which being removed in Him, the nature of Son collapses. We condemn this error with Scotus in the Church and in the school. But when, having made that impossible supposition, we consider the Person of the Son abstracting from that active spiration, and examine whether He would still be a distinct Person from the Holy Spirit — we commit nothing that can be reproved. Indeed if we find a reason by which we can sustain even with the notion of spirating set aside the Person of the Son, we are to be congratulated rather than blamed. For two bonds are stronger — one from the force of generation by which the Son is produced from the Father, the other from the active power of spirating by which the same Son spirates the Holy Spirit — than that one bond of active spiration alone, on which alone so great a matter would depend. Therefore Scotus deserves praise, not reproof.

SECTION V. Scotus's Position Is Preferred to the Other and Confirmed by Many Arguments

I shall show three things in this chapter. First, that Scotus's position is supported by arguments. Second, that it is more in accord with Sacred Scripture and the doctrine of the Fathers. Third, that the arguments adduced against it, whether from authority or from reason, do not harm it. And then I shall conclude that it is altogether to be preferred to the other.

And this I profess first of all: from the time I began to devote myself to theology, the doctrine of Scotus which I now follow has always pleased me, and the more I weigh it the more it appeals to me.

That Scotus's position is supported by arguments is shown by the fact that the arguments made for it, being valid and strong, compelled the adversaries to divide into factions and gather responses from here and there, which since each proposes his own, hardly any one pleases its own author without displeasing others. This can be seen in Vasquez, who not only refutes the arguments of the Thomists but also their solutions to the arguments, and in Arriaga, who undermines the solutions adduced by Vasquez. Since these are common to other eminent theologians of the Society of Jesus, if they are not apt there will be no apter ones. Certainly those that Arriaga adduces are trivial and far less to be approved than those of Vasquez. Nor do I think I am doing an injury to Arriaga in placing before him Vasquez — a man of the keenest intellect, most grave judgment, and supreme erudition.

Furthermore, many of Scotus's principal principles are received and approved by the more learned adversaries — about which others, I do not know whether equally learned, remonstrate with them. Such as that of the double mode of distinguishing: through relations according to their proper relative nature from the opposed relation, and according to the disparate nature from others to which they are not formally opposed — which indeed pleases two great theologians, Suarez and Vasquez, and a third equal to them, Montoya.

Of these, Vasquez in *disp. 147. cap. 5. n. 2* receives and confirms this doctrine against the most illustrious Thomists Cajetan and the Canariensis, teaching both by reason and example that Relations are distinguished from each other both relatively and disparately. "For Paternity," he says, "not only differs from the relation of the Son but also from similarity and others." And he convinces Cajetan who confesses: if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Father, He would nevertheless be distinguished from Him. Therefore, says Vasquez, Paternity now distinguishes the Father from someone other than His relative opposite — and likewise Procession. And this reason of distinguishing disparately in the relation itself Vasquez proves in many ways, and Montoya in *disp. 168. sect. 4. n. 16*. And since they admit the principle, I do not see how they can deny that the Son can be distinguished from the Holy Spirit both disparately by reason of Filiation and relatively by reason of active spiration.

Now another principle about the two emanations really distinct — one through intellect and another through will — from which two really distinct relations follow, namely Filiation and passive Spiration — from which it is manifestly gathered that Son and Holy Spirit must be distinguished precisely because the former emanates through intellect and the latter through will — is admitted by several Thomists, whom Vasquez vehemently attacks in *c. 6* because, having admitted those two really distinct emanations, those two Persons are really fully distinguished. Hence he says those Thomists carelessly concede this to Scotus — with which conceded, they can scarcely maintain that there would not be as many relations of the produced and two produced Persons.

Yet who will dare deny that those emanations are sufficiently distinct, since they are origins and relations in becoming, and therefore really carry into their terms — which are the Word and Love, that is the Son and the Holy Spirit — of which the one is produced through Generation by understanding, the other proceeds through Procession by loving? Otherwise Vasquez will remove the diversity of Processions, which theologians set out and defend with such effort, in order to establish that there are more Persons in God. From this the force of Scotus's arguments and principles appears — which reduce the adversaries to straits, and force them to quarrel among themselves and undermine received principles of theology.

I add this. Let whoever wishes read attentively the solutions that the Thomists apply to Scotus's arguments, and he will find them in no way firm and solid. I

read one of them — the noble author Ruiz de Montoya — with the greatest care in order to see how he responds to Scotus's arguments. I marveled that a man so ingenious and learned was unable to devise other ways of escape. All those ways seem to be loopholes, and he barely proposes them before he departs and refers himself to things said before or to be said later — as can be seen in *sect. 6 and 7* in which he responds to Scotus's arguments.

Furthermore, the solutions suffer from the defect that they come to overturning the supposition made in this question — namely that the Son remains precisely in the nature of the Word and Son, and is compared thus with the Holy Spirit as He is Love and Gift. Montoya, an acute man, in responding often attempts to overturn this supposition because he sees that the arguments cannot otherwise be resolved. And indeed to the first argument in *sect. 6* he responds by destroying the supposition and referring himself to what was said above. He resolves the fifth in the same way and leaves nearly untouched the testimony of Damascene cited against him. He disputes at great length about the mind of Anselm in the sixth argument, against Suarez and Vasquez — who judge Anselm to favor Scotus — which is a great argument for Scotus to have Suarez and Vasquez as supporters. This benefit we owe to Montoya.

Now the remaining arguments which he resolves in *c. 7* — and there are five — Montoya resolves them in such a way that they remain intact, and at the end concludes that the Holy Spirit would be distinguished even if He were not actually produced — and admits the distinction by reason of a potential relation. This is certainly a strange way of distinguishing — by feigning potential relations — and that principle collapses: that in divine things no real distinction is given unless direct and formal relative opposition intervenes. But this occurs through real and formal relations. For those potential ones, being within the absolute divine nature, how could they really distinguish Persons?

See to what Scotus's arguments reduce the adversaries. Come then: let us press them. First, by denying that the Son is distinguished by His own Filiation precisely from the Holy Spirit, they consequently deny that Procession through intellect, by virtue of being such, is the reason for distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit. But from this it follows that the reasons for the two diverse Processions are removed — which St. Thomas strives greatly to establish for the first part. The consequence is plain: for if Procession through intellect is not of itself distinctive and not distinct from Procession through will, it cannot be proved from it that there are two Processions — and falsely from that doctrine would it be deduced that they would be two Processions.

Then if the precise reason of Filiation is not the reason for distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Holy Spirit from the force of His own Procession is not opposed to the Son — and accordingly it would not be incompatible with Him to have the nature of the Begotten and Son — indeed even of the Word and Image — which is against faith. The consequence is plain,

because if the whole distinction comes from active spiration, none comes from production through generation, which is entirely presupposed for active spiration. And accordingly between Generation and Procession there will be no distinction.

Third: because the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is from the Person of the Son — therefore from one distinct from Him. But He is not yet spirating in second act; therefore before this act of spirating, the Son is already distinguished from the Holy Spirit. Otherwise the Holy Spirit proceeds from Himself, if He is not distinguished from the one proceeding.

Fourth. The Person of the Son is produced by generation and is the formal terminus of that generation, but active spiration is not yet understood. Therefore with that set aside, the notion and Person constituted remain. Therefore also distinguished. How therefore can a distinctive reason accrue through active spiration?

Fifth. The Son is not constituted either in the being of God or in the being of a Person through that notion of active spiration. Therefore He does not receive from that either constitution or distinction. The antecedent is proved as to the first part because that power does not pertain to the being of God; as to the second part it is shown because the Son cannot be constituted through what is common to the Father. Therefore the consequence is established.

Finally, if anyone considers in the Son the notion of Word and Image — which He receives through generation — and in the Holy Spirit the notion of love and gift, he will find that it is precisely through the former that the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit. But these are presupposed in the Son for spirating actively — therefore they already make Him distinct from the Holy Spirit.

Then who will say that Word and Image are intrinsically distinguished through the active spiration of Love, and are distinguished from Love produced by actively loving? Furthermore, how will the Son be distinguished from the Holy Spirit by that through which He is not constituted, and not by that through which He is constituted?

There are several reasons of distinction in the Son: one that He spirates actively, which is a disparate opposition; and finally — how will the Son be distinguished from the Holy Spirit by that alone which is common to Him with the Father, and would He not be distinguished by what is proper to Him and through which He is distinguished from the Father? Surely if He is distinguished only by this, He is not distinguished by what properly constitutes Him in His being as Son. Who would assert this? Let us therefore give one and another distinction — both that disparate one and this relative one — just as it must necessarily be conceded in the Father, who would be distinguished not only from the Holy Spirit if He proceeded from Him alone by that active spiration, but also by His

own personal character of Paternity, which — though directly opposed to the Son — nevertheless distinguishes the Father in a disparate way from the Holy Spirit. Cajetan did not dare deny this, and Vasquez therefore compels him to confess that by the same reasoning the Son is also to be distinguished.

SECTION VI. That Scotus Thinks with Scripture and the Fathers

As many and as great passages in Sacred Scripture as speak of the Son of God as Begotten, Word, and Image — in all of them the Person of the Son is signified as altogether distinct and diverse from the Person of the Holy Spirit. And indeed it is remarkable that there is not one passage in Scripture in which that diversity from the Holy Spirit is mentioned by reason of active spiration alone. Therefore the root of the distinction rests on the terms signifying the Procession of the Son from the Father through generation and the notions consequent upon it.

David first sang: "You are my Son, today I have begotten you" in *Ps. 2*. "In the splendors of the saints from the womb before the morning star I begot you," in *Ps. 109*. Paul adduces the former passage in *Heb. 1*. Then Isaiah in *c. 53*: "Who shall declare His generation?" And Proverbs *c. 8* under the name of Wisdom: "Before all the hills I was brought forth" — this pertains to generation. Here also: "I was already conceived." *Ecclus. 24*: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn." *Heb. 1*: "When He sent His firstborn into the world." But that passage of John *c. 1* is the most illustrious: "The Only Begotten who is in the bosom of the Father." And: "the glory as of the Only Begotten from the Father." Shining also is another, *c. 3*: "In the name of the Only Begotten Son of God," and *c. 4*: "God sent His only begotten Son." Always generation is attributed to the Son as a characteristic property by which He is constituted and distinguished. I pass over those passages in which He is called Son — which are innumerable. This is never said of the Holy Spirit, that He is not generated nor can be generated, nor can He be a Son — since He proceeds through love and is notional Love. Hence He is neither Image nor Word — for these are proper attributes of the Person of the Son alone, and by them He is constituted and distinguished. Thus John in *c. 1 of the Gospel*: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word." And: "And the Word became flesh." And in *1. Canon. cap. 5*: "Father, Word, and Holy Spirit." The Word is placed as distinct from Father and Holy Spirit as He is the Word. "There are three who give testimony in Heaven" — three distinct by relations and constituted by their own notions of the Persons of Father, Word, Holy Spirit. The Father by what He is Father, the Word by what He is Word, is distinguished from the Holy Spirit. They are three — not because another distinction arising from the notion of spirator is denied, but because this one is established from Paternity and Filiation, which is the primary and properly personal distinction.

By this reason of Son and Word, He is the Image of God — as is said in *Heb. 1*: "The splendor of the paternal glory, the Figure or Image of His substance," and *2. Cor. 4*: "Who is the Image of God," and *Sap. 7*: "The Mirror without stain, the

Image of His goodness." Hence in *John 14*: "Whoever sees me, sees also my Father." From these testimonies the Church deduces that the Son alone is the Image, and in no way the Holy Spirit — because He is not the Son, nor the Word.

"For what," says Athanasius in *orat. 4. contra Arianos*, "is like unto God except His own offspring?" And Basil in *homil. 16. in Joannem cap. 7. ad illud: In principio erat Verbum*: "Because He is the Image of the Begetter, showing the Begetter wholly in Himself."

The Fathers affirm this proper and distinctive reason: Nazianzus in *Apolog. 1* — which is *orat. 1* — and *orat. 35* — which is *3. de Theolog.* — and *orat. 36* and in *Carm. arcano* after the middle, Chrysostom in *homil. 74*, Cyril of Alexandria in *lib. 3. cap. r. thefaur.*, the Council of Ephesus after the middle in the Confession of Faith — which is the tenth among the Epistles of Cyril, Clement of Rome in *epist. 1. ad Jacobum*, Felix I in *epist. 1. ad Benignum*, Evaristus in *epist. 1. ad episcop. Africanos*. And nearly all the Fathers who wish the notion of Image to be so proper to the Son that it does not belong to the Holy Spirit — which nearly all theologians approve together with St. Thomas in *1. par. qu. 35*, and Bonaventure in *1. d. 31. 2. par. art. 11. q. 1*, following Augustine in *lib. 3. de Trinit. cap. 2 and ult.*

And the eminent words of Nyssen are these, from *lib. de differ. essentiae et hypostasis ad finem*: "The hypostasis of the Son is as it were the form and face by which the Father is known, with the property considered in them for the distinction of Persons remaining." And in *lib. de Trinit. ad Eustachium*: "Nor otherwise," he says, "may the hypostasis or Person of the Father be seen, unless one looks into the character of Him: but the character of the Father's hypostasis or Person is the Son."

From these testimonies it is clear that Scotus's position is most in accord with the Scriptures, in which also as often as the Holy Spirit is said to be sent from the Father and the Son, the Son is always supposed to be constituted in the nature of the Son — as when it is written in *John 15*: "Whom I will send to you from the Father." And again in *c. 14*: "Whom the Father will send in My name." And when in *c. 20* it is said: "He breathed and said: Receive the Holy Spirit." By which it is signified that before the Holy Spirit is understood to proceed, those two Persons are already constituted — which if constituted, therefore also distinct from their own proper formal reason.

Let us come to the Fathers. Certainly all those who establish those two Processions, which must necessarily be established through intellect and will against Durand, agree with our Scotus. For they are distinct because one is by understanding and speaking, the other by loving and spirating. In this there is a distinction which cannot be in the divine nature and essence considered in itself — and for this reason Durand's rash position is rejected.

These are Irenaeus in *lib. 2. advers. haeres. cap. 48*, Nazianzus in *orat. 36* — which is 4. *de Theolog.*, Chrysostom in *orat. 1. on that Evangelical oracle: In the beginning was the Word*, and in *tom. 5* near the end in *orat. 9. on that passage: Put your hand upon my thigh*, Basil in *homil. 16. ad illud: In principio erat Verbum*, Nyssen in *orat. Catechet. cap. 1* and *epist. contra Apollinarem* after the beginning, Athanasius in *contra gregales Sabellii* and in *orat. 1. contra Arianos*, Dionysius of Alexandria as cited by Athanasius in the *Epistle on the opinion of Dionysius of Alexandria against the Arians*, Theodore Bishop of Ancyra in the Council of Ephesus in *tom. 6*, Cyril. *cap. 10* at the beginning, Cyril of Alexandria in *lib. 6. in Joan. cap. 5* and *lib. 1. thefaur. cap. 5* and *6* and *Dialog. de Trinit. lib. 2*, Theodoret in *Epitom. Divin. Decret. cap. 2*, Damascene in *lib. 1. Fid. Orthod.*, Theophylact in *Joan. 1*, Ambrose in *lib. 1. de Fid. ad Gratianum cap. 5*, Augustine in *lib. 15. Trinit. cap. 6, 13, 14, 15, and 27*, Fulgentius in *lib. 3. ad Monim. cap. 7*, Anselm in *Monolog. cap. 46*, Isidore in *Etymolog. lib. 7. cap. 2* and *lib. 2. de different. cap. 5*, Hugh of St. Victor in *lib. 7. erudit. Theolog. cap. 21*. I omit the Master of the Sentences in *2. d. 5 and 39*, confirming the same truth from the doctrine of Augustine.

These Fathers we cite with greater right for Scotus's position than those whom Ruiz de Montoya cited for the position of St. Thomas — as will appear below.

Now indeed those who distinguish generation from spiration and say the Son alone is begotten and not the Holy Spirit — what else do they do in teaching this, but deliver Scotus's pure and unmixed doctrine? For they assign the diversity of Persons to generation and Procession of both, seeing from this that the Son is such as is begotten through intellect, and the Holy Spirit is not the Son from the fact that He is spirated through will. This is clear from the Athanasian Creed and from the Councils of Toledo I and II in their Confession of Faith. Thus Basil taught in *lib. 3. contra Eunom.* and in his single *lib. de Spiritu Sancto*, where he says: "The Holy Spirit, coming from the Father not through generation as the Son does, but as the Spirit of His mouth" — and later: "He says not naturally begettable." Therefore distinguished by that.

Athanasius in *Dialog. 3. de Sanctiss. Trinitate contra Macedon.* says the Son is the Only Begotten and denies that the Holy Spirit is such, because He proceeds — and he writes more extensively in *lib. 3. de Trinit.* whose title is *de assumptione hominis*, and in *orat. 3. contra Arianos*, and in *epist. 2. ad Serapion.*, and in *Dialog. 7. de Sanctis. Trinit.*, and in *Dialog. 1. contra Macedonium*, and in *Dialog. 1. contra Anomaeos*, and in *lib. 4. contra Urbicum Potentii*, and in *quest. de Nativit. Dei. qu. 15*. Epiphanius in *haeresi 62* and *haeres. 69 and 73 and 76. ad cap. 29 Actii*, and in *Ancor. col. 7*, where: "The Holy Spirit not begotten, not created, not a brother, not uncle, not great-grandfather, not Father." Even more clearly other Fathers speak — who not only deny that the Holy Spirit is begotten, but further distinguish Him from the Son by the very reason of proceeding — namely that the Son is the offspring of intellect, while the Holy Spirit is the love of will, and in this they

say lies the reason for distinguishing one from the other. This is indeed the very doctrine of Scotus himself.

Thus teach among the Greek Fathers: Justin in the exposition of faith at the beginning and middle, Ephrem the Syrian in his opusculum on his own reproof, later part, Anastasius Sinaite in *lib. 1. de rectae Fidei Dogm.*, Theodoret in *Epitom. divin. decret. lib. 5. cap. 3. de Spiritu Sancto*. Furthermore, St. Damascene in *lib. 1. de Fid. cap. 10*.

Let us produce some of the more illustrious testimonies. Let Justin's be this: "Unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding are not names of essence but of existence. Now if we contemplate those things that are differences, one is said to obtain the attribute of effect, as the Unbegotten; another as the begotten; and another that proceeds. Again: the Unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding itself do not declare essence but signify subsistences. For they are sufficient for us for discerning the Persons, and for indicating the proper subsistence of each of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."

Theodoret in *lib. 5 Epitom.*, having proved in *c. 2* that the Word is begotten from God the Father, in *c. 3* says: "Therefore we say the Holy Spirit has His substance from God and the Father. But the mode of substance is neither like that of a creature — for the Holy Spirit is uncreated — nor like that of the Only Begotten Son. For no one has called the procession of the Holy Spirit a generation." Theodoret certainly favors Scotus.

Damascene clearly in *lib. 2. de Fid. cap. 10*: "The Son is from the Father by way of generation. The Holy Spirit also is from the Father, but not by way of begetting but by way of proceeding. And indeed it is established that generation and procession differ from each other. The generation of the Son from the Father is, and the procession of the Holy Spirit is." See how Damascene assigns generation and procession — not now disputing whether he denied it from the Son, which we treated above — and places the reason for differing in generation and procession.

The same Damascene teaches in *c. 11*. The same St. Ephrem the Syrian in his *lib. de fui reprehens.*, assigning to the Father both the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, says: "He produced the Son and the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit is not begotten but proceeded from the substance of the Father." Here there is no mention of Procession from the Son, and yet the distinction is established according to the mind of Scotus.

From the Latins this same is taught by Ambrose in *Symb. Apostol. c. 3* after the middle, Hilary in *lib. 12. de Trinit.* in the penultimate column, Gregory of Baetica on the Trinity near the end, Augustine in *lib. 1. de Trinit. cap. 14* and *lib. 9. cap. 12* and *lib. 15. de Trinit. cap. 6 and 27 and ult.* and *tract. in Joann. 99* and *lib. 3. contra Maximin. cap. 14* and *serm. 38. de temp.* — which is *3. de Trinit.* — and *serm. 125. de*

temp., Fulgentius in *de Fid. ad Petrum cap. 1 and 2*, Anselm in *epist. de Processione Spiritus Sancti contra Graecos cap. 2*.

From these, most clearly Ambrose in that *c. 3. Symb.*: "The Holy Spirit is truly Spirit proceeding indeed from Father and Son, but He is not Himself the Son, because He is not begotten, nor the Father because He proceeds from both — not begotten, not unbegotten, not made." Scotus could not say it more clearly.

Hilary near the end of *lib. 12*, speaking with God the Father, says: "My religion toward Your things is great — because knowing You alone as Unbegotten and the Only Begotten born from You, I am nevertheless not going to call the Holy Spirit begotten." Less clearly than Ambrose, but sufficiently for Scotus's position.

Fulgentius in *de Fid. ad Petr.* more clearly: "Hence God the Father, who begot one Son: the one Holy Spirit, who alone essentially proceeds from Father and Son. For neither, as follows below, is it proper to the Father alone in that Trinity that He is not begotten himself but begot one Son; nor proper to the Son alone that He did not beget Himself but is one true being from the Father's essence; nor proper to the Holy Spirit alone that He is neither born nor begot, but alone proceeds from the Father and Son." He indeed establishes the procession from both, but places the distinction on the side of generation and procession.

I could adduce more — but leaving them aside, I chiefly claim two for myself: Augustine and Anselm.

Augustine in the passages just cited expressly distinguishes the Word and the Holy Spirit from the nature of the Processions — namely that the Son is begotten through intellect as born, while the Holy Spirit proceeds through will as given. Therefore in *lib. 5. de Trinit. cap. 14*: "This becomes less clear — what moves many: why is not the Holy Spirit also Son, since He too proceeds from the Father, as we read in the Gospel? For He proceeds not as one born but as one given — and therefore He is not called Son." Here is the whole reason for distinction on the side of the processions from the principle with all other respects set aside. That is: the Son is generated, He proceeds through intellect; the Holy Spirit proceeds through will. This he teaches even more clearly in *lib. 9. cap. 12*, expounding how the Son, Wisdom of the Father, is Offspring and Birth of Mind, while the Holy Spirit is the Love of the offspring born from mind — which Love, he says, cannot be called Offspring or Born — and concludes: "There is a certain image of the Trinity. The mind itself, that is the Father, and the knowledge of it which is its Offspring, that is the Son and Word; and the third, Love, that is the Holy Spirit. And these three are one and one substance."

Here three are distinguished on account of the diversity of origins, with that reason of active spiration from the Son set aside — of which there is absolutely no mention for the constitution and distinction of the Persons.

The third passage is invincible. Augustine, seeking in *lib. 13. cap. 6 and 17* why the Holy Spirit is not the Son but other than the Son, after distinguishing both from the Father — that He is Unbegotten and not from another — affirms of the Son and Holy Spirit that neither is the Father because they are not unbegotten and from themselves as the Father is. Then he proceeds to distinguish the begotten Son and the proceeding Holy Spirit. And teaching that the latter proceeds from both Father and Son, he does not place the reason for distinguishing in the fact that He proceeds from the Son, but in the fact that since He proceeds from two, He does not proceed from them as begotten, nor as Son — whom he denies can be produced from two as Father and Mother. "Therefore," he says in *c. 6*, "He is not begotten from both, but the Spirit proceeds from both. And in *c. 27*: Why is the Holy Spirit said not to be born but rather to proceed? Because if He also were called Son, He would be called Son of both." And he concludes: "But far be it from us to suspect anything of this kind between God the Father and God the Son — as the son of man does not proceed simultaneously from father and mother — for when he proceeds into the mother from the father, he does not then proceed from the mother; and when he proceeds into this light, he does not then proceed from the father. But the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the Son and from the Son proceeds to sanctify the creature, but proceeds simultaneously from both, although it is the Father who has given to the Son that just as He proceeds from Him, so also He should proceed from the Son."

If the reason for distinction were to be taken from elsewhere, Augustine should have adduced it here when he was properly treating the Procession of the Holy Spirit from both. But he did not seek it from elsewhere, except from the mode of proceeding which could not be generation. And in affirming the Person of the Holy Spirit, he denies He can be a Son or be begotten — as if, were He the Son, the Holy Spirit could not be — since the Holy Spirit can in no way be a Son and begotten. From this it appears that Augustine recognized this disparate distinction of Scotus taken from generation and non-generation, and having posited this, signified that the Persons must be entirely distinguished according to those processions.

The testimonies of Anselm are so clear that to read them is to see the matter. And so Suarez and Vasquez — two theologians of such great name who follow the Thomist position — when the Thomists attempt to draw Anselm to their side, they completely release him and concede him to Scotus. And Vasquez concludes in *disp. 147. cap. 4. n. 20* that the common axiom attributed to Anselm — "in divine things all are one where the opposition of relation does not intervene" — has no foundation in his authority. But since Ruiz de Montoya thought otherwise in *that disp. 68. sect. 6*, contending at length that Anselm teaches the position of St. Thomas, and that what is brought against this from Anselm he said in another's sense and not his own — it is necessary to treat the passages, review them, and explain the whole matter carefully.

I first note as a preamble that the question about the mind of Anselm is old among authors — going back to Scotus's own time — with some understanding him differently from others, as appears from Scotus in *dist. 11. q. 2. §. Autoritas adducitur Anselmi*, whom he himself adduces in his favor at the end of the question. The Carthusian agrees with him there. So it is not only recent theologians who contend about him.

Having therefore read that Epistle of Anselm most carefully, and with all private feeling set aside as I always do — I found that he manifestly delivers the doctrine of Scotus, admitting both kinds of distinction: relative, both of direct opposition between principle and what is from principle, and oblique diversity of the disparate kind — so that either both together occur in the same relation, or one of them per se stands without the other. I believe moreover that I shall show this to my readers, provided they are among those who do not come to reading with a mind preoccupied by feeling.

He disputes — and indeed in the manner of Augustine, whose disciple he is — and this Anselm here acts most densely against the Greeks who deny the Procession from the Son, in such a way nevertheless that what they rightly deliver from common doctrine he approves and confirms. He therefore begins more deeply in this manner...

Section VII. Anselm's Mind Is Carefully Investigated, Expounded, and Shown to Stand with Scotus.

The Epistle can, for the sake of clarity, be divided into four parts, which are distributed across eighteen chapters. The first part contains only two chapters. In the first, Anselm sets forth the doctrine concerning the Trinity that is common to both Greeks and Latins regarding the unity of God and the multiplicity of Persons, setting aside for the moment the question disputed with the Greeks concerning the Procession from the Son. In the second chapter he treats the mode and ground of unity in essence and multiplicity in Persons more fully and precisely, attributing the ground of divine essential unity to diversity in Relations, and proving that this unity does not destroy the difference of relations, nor do the relations abolish the unity of nature. He still sets aside the question of whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, so that what he establishes in that chapter may stand firm regardless of how those points bear on the question. This is the first part of the book.

The second part begins at chapter three and ends at chapter nine, containing six chapters. In chapter three he now begins to inquire which proceeds from which — does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son, or the Son from the Holy Spirit? He had already indicated the reason why one must proceed from the other in chapter two, and in this third chapter he sets it forth and presses it. The reason is this: since the ground of the Son's procession from the Father is the Deity as it exists in the Father, and since this Deity is one and the same in the Father and in

the Person who proceeds from the Father, it is necessary that the third Person, whoever it may be, proceed from the Father and from that second Person. He therefore establishes that, since it is of faith that the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. He argues for this in chapters IV and V by means of the principle of identity in the divine nature, which, being one and the same in the Father and the Son — whom he already presupposes on the basis of the Gospel not to proceed from the Holy Spirit — must be a single principle of the Holy Spirit in both; and thus the Holy Spirit cannot proceed from one alone, but must proceed from both. He presses the same truth in chapters VI and VII by means of passages and testimonies from the holy Gospel of John, which we cited above when we treated that subject. In chapter VIII he proposes an objection drawn from the analogy of the sun, its light, and its heat — namely, that just as in the sun heat does not proceed from brightness nor brightness from heat, but both from the sun, so neither does the Son proceed from the Holy Spirit nor the Holy Spirit from the Son, but both proceed from the Father as from a sun. Saint Anselm answers this excellently, pointing out that in the sun its own brightness is not identical with the sun itself, from which as from a single source heat proceeds; whereas in God the Father and the Son there is one and the same essence from which the Holy Spirit proceeds.

The third part is contained in six chapters, from chapter nine through chapter fifteen. Chapter nine presents the response of the Greeks, who say that the Holy Spirit is through the Son, not from the Son. Anselm attacks this in that chapter by the following dilemma: the procession is either from the Deity or from a Relation. It cannot be from the Deity, because the Deity of Father and Son is the same and does not flow from the Father into the Son, nor from the Son into the Holy Spirit, since it remains the same and undivided in all three. Nor can it proceed from the Relation of the Father and the Son, for there can be no communication or flowing of the Deity from Paternity and Filiation, which stand in opposition to each other. Then another Greek response is dissolved — namely, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son in the same way that all things were made through the Son. This Anselm refutes on the grounds that what was made through the Son for the external world was made by the whole Trinity, not through the Word but from the Word. Finally he produces another response, that it is through the Son as through a river from a source flowing into a lake, as it were. This he refutes in that chapter and in chapter X, convicting it manifestly of falsity. In chapters XI, XII, and XIII he dissolves the objection taken from the Gospel text of John XV, "who proceeds from the Father," which words appear to signify, by their silence regarding the Son, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. He responds to this with ingenuity and learning, arguing that it does not follow from the naming of the Father alone that the Son is excluded, and he shows that it is the custom of Scripture for one Person to stand for all, such that where the action of one is stated, the others must be understood as

well, which he demonstrates by many excellent examples. He further notes that nowhere is it denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Chapter XIV presents the complaint of the Greeks regarding the addition of the phrase "from the Son" to the Creed, and dissolves it.

The fourth part comprises four chapters: XV, XVI, XVII, and XVIII. Chapter XV contains a summary of what has been said. It concludes that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son insofar as they are one and converge into a single principle, and teaches that both spirate the Holy Spirit equally and immediately. If it is sometimes said that the Father spirates principally, this is said only in the sense that the Father spirates from himself, whereas the Son spirates from the Father. The same is pressed in chapter XVI, where he shows that among the divine Persons there is nothing greater or lesser, prior or posterior — only origins and relations intervene, and it is by these alone that they differ. He then concludes the necessity of Procession from the Son just as from the Father, and further proves this by pointing out that the Holy Spirit is affirmed to proceed from the Father, with whom the Son is identical, and that it is nowhere denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. In chapter XVII, preserving throughout the distinction he always wishes to hold secure between Generation and Procession, he proves by the following dilemma that the Holy Spirit is either from the Son or the Son from the Holy Spirit — not the latter from the former, but the former from the latter. From this he deduces that the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, namely because it proceeds from him. He then compares the Persons with one another and inquires in what they differ. He ultimately establishes six differences among them — that is: to have a Father and not to have a Father; to have a Son and not to have a Son; to have the Holy Spirit proceeding from oneself and not to have the Holy Spirit proceeding from oneself. From these it follows that each Person has one property by which it differs from the other two, and two properties that are held in common in such a way that the one shared with another is the point of difference from the remaining one. For example: the Father, by having the Son, differs from the Son and the Holy Spirit; by spirating the Holy Spirit he agrees with the Son and thereby differs from the Holy Spirit itself; by not having a Father he agrees with the Holy Spirit. The Son, by having a Father, differs from the Father and the Holy Spirit; by spirating the Holy Spirit he agrees with the Father and differs from the Holy Spirit; by not having a Son he agrees with the Holy Spirit and differs from the Father. The Holy Spirit, by proceeding, differs from Father and Son; by not having a Son it agrees with the Son and differs from the Father; by not having a Father it agrees with the Father and differs from the Son. Finally Anselm observes that each Person is related to two others — the Father to the Son and the Holy Spirit as to those who are from him; the Son to the Father because it is from the Father, and to the Holy Spirit because the Holy Spirit is from the Son; the Holy Spirit to Father and Son because it proceeds from both. He concludes that this diversity of Persons is consistent with the unity of God.

He pursues the same theme in chapter XVIII, upholding throughout the unity of nature and the diversity of Persons in such a way that neither conflicts with the other, but each guards and accompanies the other. This is the summary of the Epistle.

From it one first gathers that Anselm taught that relatives in God are opposed in two ways — disparately as well as relatively, or, to put it another way, obliquely as well as directly. He so taught in chapter I: "In one way is the Son understood to be from the Father, and in another way the Holy Spirit. For the Son is from the Father as from his own God who is his Father; the Holy Spirit, however, is not from God as his own Father, but only from God who is Father. This therefore is the sole cause of plurality in God, so that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit cannot be said to be from one another, but are others proceeding as it were from one another, because in these two ways aforesaid something is said to be from God — which taken as a whole can be called Relation. For in the way that the Son exists from God by being born, and the Holy Spirit by proceeding, it is by this very diversity of Nativity and Procession that they are referred to one another as diverse and other from one another." He says this on the basis of his own position and that of the Greeks, with whom he agrees on this point, setting aside the Procession from the Son and considering only the ground of generation and procession. In chapter II he affirms this distinction with greater force, saying: "The Father from whom the Son is cannot be that one who is from himself. But the Holy Spirit, who exists from the Father by proceeding, is not that one who is from the Father by being born; and immediately: neither can the Father from whom the Holy Spirit is be that one who is from himself — that is, the Son — nor can the Son, who exists from the Father by being born, be that one who is from the same Father by proceeding, that is, the Holy Spirit." This is proved by Anselm, who holds that the Father is distinguished from the Son by the fact that the Son is from the Father, just as the Son is thereby distinguished from the Holy Spirit — even without presupposing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Anselm doubtless acknowledges and admits this distinction, even with procession from the Son set aside. It is therefore without justification that Montoya denies that these things are said on Anselm's account. For if that position were not true, how did Anselm maintain it? In chapter I he said that he was setting forth first those things that are held as most certain, and in chapter II he said plainly: "These things that have been stated we believe and confess equally — both we who say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and the Greeks who do not agree with us on this matter." Father Montoya appears not to have seen these passages. Suarez and Vazquez, however, had seen them, and the latter above all. Anselm therefore also receives back what he had said at the end of chapter I, which reads as follows: "The Son, moreover — to give for the time being another reason, since it is not yet established that the Holy Spirit is from him and proceeds from him, and therefore is not the Holy Spirit — nor is the Holy Spirit the Son, because the Son has being from the Father by being born,

but the Holy Spirit not by being born but by proceeding." What could be plainer? These matters are received back in chapter II. "With these premises established," he says, and then immediately: "These things that have been stated we believe and confess equally." Montoya therefore does not reason well. Again in chapter III, alternatively chapter IV: "They both have being from the Father, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit, but in a different mode — one by being born, the other by proceeding — so that they may be others from one another by virtue of this. And therefore, when one is born, that one cannot be born along with him who by this very fact is other from him, because he is not similarly born but proceeds. And when one proceeds, neither can that one simultaneously proceed who by this very fact is other from him, since he does not similarly proceed but is born. And therefore this unity does not have the force of entailing a consequence, because a plurality intervenes that arises from nativity and procession. For even if the Son and the Holy Spirit were not distinct from one another in any other respect, by this alone they would be diverse." This testimony is irresistible and cannot be denied by anyone who reads the passage attentively. I marvel that Montoya ventures to obscure this light by saying that Anselm is speaking on the presupposition of the Greeks' principle. He certainly has not read it carefully. For in that passage, when Anselm was arguing against the Greeks that it was altogether necessary either that the Son be from the Holy Spirit or the Holy Spirit from the Son — in order thence to conclude that the Son cannot be from the Holy Spirit but the Holy Spirit from the Son — he used the following argument: the Father and the Person who is from him are entirely the same God; therefore the Person who proceeds from the Father must also proceed from that other Person who is from the Father, because that Person is the same God as the Father. Therefore, he says, it is necessary either that the Holy Spirit be from the Son, if the Son is already from the Father, or the Son from the Holy Spirit, if the Holy Spirit is already from the Father. He was not yet drawing the consequence that the Son, by virtue of being begotten by the Father, is the one from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds; rather, he was positing the premises of this consequence — namely, that wherever there is unity of the divine essence, there will be a principle of Procession. Against this he places an objection in the following manner: someone will say that since the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are one God, it follows that if the Son is from the Father, he is also from the Holy Spirit; or that if the Holy Spirit is from the Father, since the Father and the Son are the same God, the Holy Spirit is also from the Son; or that if the Father begets the Son, he must also beget the Holy Spirit together with him, because the Son and the Holy Spirit are one and the same God; and that if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father by virtue of the same unity of Deity with the Son, the Son also proceeds — but this unity of Deity in the Son and the Holy Spirit does not carry that entailing force, so that both are similarly begotten and proceeding, and it appears that it does not follow from the fact that the Father and the Holy Spirit are one God that the Son is from the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit from the Son, on account of the same identity. To this

objection Saint Anselm responds in the same place: "To which I reply." The substance is this: that the unity of God presents no obstacle in the first case to the production of the third Person; but in the second case, which is adduced as a parallel, the opposition between generation and procession — which cannot be held in unity — does present an obstacle. Hence he says: "This unity does not carry the force of entailment, because a plurality intervenes that arises from nativity and procession." What could be more evident in favor of Scotus's position? Did Montoya read this? Let whoever wishes read it — in Anselm he will find Scotus.

But lest the same objector, or anyone who agrees with him, object that these things are said by Anselm before the doctrine of Procession from the Son is established — though the objection is impertinent — I adduce other passages from after that doctrine has been set forth. In chapter VII Anselm posits the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son in such a way as to presuppose that the Son is born from the Father, and so constitutes another Person for the procession of the Holy Spirit. And toward the end of chapter IX he says: "We assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds in its own way not as if from two sources, but truly from one source — yet in such a way that the name of Nativity is not lost to the Procession of the Son, nor received by the procession of the Holy Spirit." And in chapter X: "In the Father is understood the Unbegotten; in the Son, the Begotten; in the Holy Spirit, proceeding in a singular and ineffable mode." And in the same place further on: "Just as we do not believe there to be one God the Father from whom the Son is, and another God — Father and Son — from whom the Holy Spirit is, though each is from the same God, that is, from the same source, one by being born and the other by proceeding — but in a singular and ineffable mode this procession is understood: for procession is said in many senses, and this one is understood uniquely, just as the Nativity of the Son is known to be unique." Even after the Procession from the Son has been established, Anselm always retains the distinction in terms of the oblique relation of the Son's Nativity from the Father and of the Procession without Nativity of the Holy Spirit. In the final chapter he recognizes these same things again when he says: "We have from the true Faith that God is from God by being born, and God from God by proceeding." And he maintains this distinction throughout that entire chapter, so that alongside the direct relative relation to the Principle, he retains this oblique one pertaining to disparate relations.

What is above all to be observed is that he uses almost no other argument to prove the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son than the fact that the Son is presupposed to share one and the same Deity with the Father, and to be with him one principle — proving Procession from the Son more from the unity of both Father and Son than from the diversity between the spirated and the spirating. Now if this argument was so effective for proving that the Holy Spirit must necessarily proceed from the Son, because otherwise it would not be distinguished from him, what argument could be easier or more obvious than

this one? Why then does Anselm not use it? It can only be because he saw it was not required — namely because there remained another ground of distinction from the Son, that is, Nativity and Procession. I do not deny that Anselm also used that other argument drawn from the principle that whoever proceeds from another must be distinguished from the one from whom it proceeds, as we shall say shortly. But it is one thing to say that one thing is distinguished from another in one way and also in another; it is another to affirm that it is distinguished in one way only and to deny the other. There are passages that prove, in Anselm, that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son directly and in the proper sense by virtue of the opposition between spirating and spirated; but far more numerous are those proving that they are distinguished obliquely, by the disparate relation of Begotten and Proceeding; and there is absolutely no passage in which only the one is affirmed and the other denied. And thus we refute the objections of Montoya, who contends that Anselm posited only that directly relative distinction and eliminated the disparate one.

Montoya will further object to us that passage in chapter III where Anselm says: "But when it will appear that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, it will then also be plain that for this reason the Son cannot be the Holy Spirit, nor the Holy Spirit the Son." We concede and acknowledge the passage, but deny the consequence drawn from it by Montoya, who wishes through it to exclude the other distinction so often adduced — which he candidly acknowledges — from Anselm. For Anselm does not deny the other distinction; he affirms that by the one now introduced, of the proceeding from the spirating, the diversity of both is evident — a diversity so obvious that no one can doubt it, whereas many have doubted the other disparate distinction in opposition to the Greeks — which is less evident than this direct relative one, because it is founded in the principal distinction and the distinction from the principle, which no one has ever denied in the divine things. Nor do we deny that this one appears — to use Anselm's word, that is, is seen — but we do not exclude the other once this one is posited: that other Anselm also retains, and we affirm and defend both. And to refute Montoya completely, let us oppose to him another passage where Anselm clearly posits both in chapter I: "The Son, moreover," he says, "to give for the time being another reason — since it is not yet established that the Holy Spirit is from him and proceeds from him — is therefore not the Holy Spirit; nor is the Holy Spirit the Son, because the Son has being from the Father by being born, but the Holy Spirit not by being born but by proceeding; nor can the Son be his own Spirit, nor can the Holy Spirit be that one whose Spirit he is." This passage is of the greatest importance, because Anselm says "another reason" for the distinction, "for the time being," while he is not yet deciding the question of whether it proceeds from the Son — thereby signifying that there are several grounds for the distinction, not just one. Of these he sets forth one in the meantime, drawn from Nativity and Procession, and for the time being omits the other, reserving it for its proper place, without however passing over it

entirely, since he adds: "Nor can the Son be his own Spirit, nor can the Holy Spirit be that one whose Spirit he is" — thereby signifying the ground of direct relative distinction, by which it comes about that neither the Son from himself, nor the Holy Spirit from itself, can exist, and which requires that one be from the other.

Having expounded Anselm's doctrine, which in my judgment is beyond doubt, it likewise follows that what is held in the Thomist school as a first principle — "In the divine things all is one where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way" — was not handed down by Anselm in the Thomistic sense, which restricts the words to the direct relative opposition alone. For this sense is foreign to Anselm's mind, who also acknowledged and posited a disparate opposition among relations. And this is proved from the very passage that the Thomists themselves cite. For Anselm's words are: "Unity must never lose its consequential force where no opposition of relation stands in the way," where the word "some" does not restrict but rather broadens the signification to include other distinctions beyond the single relative one. Anselm's dictum therefore stands: distinction in God is always grounded in the Persons constituted through relations, not in the nature and absolute essence, which is entirely one, the same, and undivided. Hence whatever distinction there is is taken from that which is a relation; and if a relation is directly opposed to another relation, so that it is the relation of producing and produced, the opposition is direct and formal; but if it is taken from the fact that one Person is begotten and another not begotten but proceeding, the distinction is oblique and disparate — and therefore, according to Anselm, a certain kind of opposition.

I am again astonished that Montoya says so confidently in (*disp.* 68, *sect.* 6, *n.* 12) that Anselm by right conveys the Thomistic position and that the maxim used by the Thomists belongs to him, and quarrels about this matter as though victorious with the gravest theologians of his own order — namely Vazquez and Suarez — who, on a matter where they agree (and they agree rarely if it is doubtful), must be considered as having established it as certain and settled. I myself was unwilling to believe either them or Montoya until with my own eyes I read the Epistle, carefully weighed it, and investigated the mind of Anselm. I have no doubt that I have reached it, and I have vindicated the trustworthiness of Suarez and above all of Vazquez. In Montoya I observe that he cited that maxim less faithfully, for he deleted the word "some," on which the force depends. He also cites another passage in chapter VI — in my edition section 2, *n.* 14 — where he says: "For if the Holy Spirit is from the Father, it is from God; and if it is from God, it is from the Father, since no aforesaid Relation stands in the way." This passage certainly does not favor him, for between "God" and "Father" there is no distinction of relative to relative, but a conjunction of the absolute with the relative — from which the sense of the Principle concerning direct relative opposition does not follow, since that passage admits both

distinctions, both the relative and the disparate, both of which are signified by the name of relation. For this reason the passage proves nothing. And in order for it to prove anything, it would have been necessary to presuppose some distinction of Person to Person that, being only disparate, would leave no other to be understood except the relative. Thus the sense is not that no Relation stands in the way where the absolute concurred with the Person. On the contrary, this passage is on our side, for from it is deduced the following: whatever opposition there may be between Relations, it stands in the way of unity — since the one that stands in no way operates not between relatives but between absolutes, and is therefore no opposition at all.

I close by observing that Anselm, in the very question of fact he was disputing with the Greeks, did not hesitate to admit two grounds of distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit, such that once Procession from the Son is established, both oppositions are preserved — one the direct relative opposition of spirating and spirated, the other the oblique opposition of Begotten and Proceeding — and that he never in that disputation convicted the Greeks by the argument that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, it would not be distinguished from him, because he saw that another ground of distinction remained. Scotus, however, did not raise a question of fact but, given a fact and on the supposition of an impossible condition, speculatively setting apart one ground of distinction from another, inquired what would remain of the other disparate ground derived from the oblique opposition of relations if the one direct relative opposition were removed; and he affirmed that it would still remain in each Person, which he held to be constituted in its being as a distinct Person — one by Filiation, the other by Procession.

Section VIII. The Arguments of the Opposing Position Are Answered.

Since Saint Thomas collected them all, and we set out what he collected in that question (*q. 36, art. 2, in the body*) by citing his text in the manner it appears there, it will be worthwhile for us to resolve them in that form.

First, as to his assumption of that common Thomistic Principle — that no distinction is given in the divine things except through directly opposed relations — we deny it, and we have shown it sufficiently and more than sufficiently by asserting the oblique and disparate distinction.

As to the example adduced by Saint Thomas, and from him by Vazquez, Suarez, and Montoya, of the two Relations of the Father — one to the Son, and the other to the Holy Spirit — which are not distinguished in the Father: we respond easily that not all disparate relations distinguish one another, but only those which by their very nature cannot come together in one and the same Person, such as the Relation of the Begotten and the Relation of the Proceeding, which are opposed in their nature and mutually exclude each other, since one arises from generation through the intellect and the other from procession through

the will, and therefore cannot converge in one Person. But the relation of active spiration is compatible with the Son who spirates, and therefore these are not opposed to nor exclude one another. Hence there arises a different consideration. I add that these two relations accrue to Persons already constituted and therefore cannot distinguish them, since they do not constitute them. But the relations of Begotten and Proceeding primarily constitute the Persons and distinguish them, for that which is the formal constitutive is also the distinctive.

As for the second example or confirmation, drawn from the argument that if the Son and the Holy Spirit were referred to the Father by two relations that were not relations of origin from him, they would not thereby be distinguished from one another, and would be one and the same Person — just as the Father, who is referred to Son and Holy Spirit by two relations, is nonetheless one and the same Person — we answer more easily by denying the parallel, because the example fails in two respects. First, in that the Father is already only one Person constituted in his being and cannot be made into a double or triple Person by those accruing relations. But the Son and the Holy Spirit are two Persons already constituted who are presupposed to be referred to the Father; since they are two, even if other non-mutually-opposing relations accrued to them by which they were referred to the Father, they would not thereby be distinguished from him — just as the Father and the Son, already constituted, are not distinguished by the accruing relations of active spiration. Second, the argument fails in that it presupposes, when the Holy Spirit and the Son are referred to the Father, that they are not referred by opposed relations, such as Begotten and Proceeding, by which they are constituted and distinguished, but by other relations that are in no way opposed to them. We, however, speak only of relations that are mutually opposed, constitutive and distinctive of the Persons — namely the relations of Proceeding and Begotten. Hence the example proves nothing. For if the objector wishes these relations to be those by which they are referred to the Father, then necessarily by these relations they are also distinguished from him. But if he wishes that they be referred to the Father by other additional relations that are neither constitutive nor distinctive, we concede that they are not to be distinguished by those. But in this way the argument and the example prove nothing.

As for the testimonies, we must respond. Regarding the testimony of Anselm and the Fathers concerning that Principle — "In the divine things all is one where the opposition of relation does not intervene" — we admit it in Scotus's sense and deny it in the Thomistic sense, as we have shown sufficiently. Nor does Gregory of Nyssa in the letter *To Ablabius* stand against us, as our opponents inappropriately object. For when he says: "By which alone we apprehend that the one is distinguished from the other — namely that we believe one to be the cause, another to be from the cause, and from that which is from the cause" — he is speaking of the evident distinction which is manifest to

all, as the word "apprehend" indicates. We applied this same solution above to the passage in Anselm that uses the word "appears." And this is how Bessarion understood it in his *Oration for Union*, chapter VI, in those words which Montoya adduces against us, when they actually support us: "By this," says Bessarion, "does the Holy Spirit differ from the Son, namely because it is through him" — as if to say that since both are from the Father, they would not be sufficiently distinguished unless one were through the other. The word "sufficiently" contains the total and adequate distinction, complex from both the disparate and the relative — especially since Nyssa is speaking of the actual situation, which we certainly do not deny. For we admit two modes of distinction, both relative and disparate, and we grant both of them for the actual situation. But on the supposition that the relative mode were absent, we say that the other mode of separate distinction would still remain, which our opponents utterly remove.

We also note that Bessarion did not insert into the testimony of Gregory of Nyssa that exclusive particle "alone" — excluding the other distinction — which Montoya added. For Bessarion cites it thus: "By this the Holy Spirit is distinguished" — not "by this alone," as Montoya asserts. And Bessarion is, I think, more to be believed than Montoya. The other Fathers cited in great number by Montoya held a very different view, as we accurately showed above in producing and weighing their passages. Let us hear the judgment of Father Alarcon, an outstanding Complutensian teacher, against Montoya, from his *Treatise on the Trinity*, *disp. 9, c. 3*: Father Vazquez (*d. 147, c. 4*) and Suarez (*lib. 10, c. 2*), like the Carthusian in (*1 d. 11, q. 1*), openly concede that Anselm held the position and opinion in which he perhaps favored the Greeks — appearing to assent to Scotus, who in no way erred with the Greeks, from whom Scotus is entirely alien.

I come to the Councils. The first is the Council of Florence. There I observe that neither Suarez (*lib. 10, c. 2*), Vazquez (*d. 147*), nor Montoya (*disp. 67*) dared to cite that Council in favor of Saint Thomas's position: they only bring forth the testimonies of John the Dominican, who was acting in that Council in the role of a private disputant, and of Bessarion in an oration delivered for the Union, who was likewise a private doctor and orator, not the voice of the whole Council. And although the Salamancans, who are Thomists to excess, cite John's words in the name of the Council, allowance must be made for their bias, though it cannot be entirely excused — for there is a great difference between who is speaking: not whether it is Davus or a Hero upon the stage, but whether it is John speaking, or the entire Council.

In this connection it is certainly above all to be noted that while the sole business of the occasion was to persuade the Greeks of the Procession from the Son, the Fathers refrained from this argument, or treated it only in passing — which I say on account of a passage I cited above and about which I shall speak again below. Now if this argument is as strong as the Thomists hold, why did the

Council not press it with full force and hammer it home repeatedly? I have read the Council often with this very question in mind and was astonished at the Fathers' silence on the matter. My astonishment grew when I saw them disputing with the Greeks who denied the actual Procession — in which case that argument was precisely the one to be pressed. For the issue was not a subtle school-debate with Scotus, who accepts the actual Procession from the Son as Catholic and is scrutinizing the matter with fine exactness, but an open contest in the field against the Greeks who denied that actual Procession. Against them this Achilles should have been brought forth. But the Fathers saw fit otherwise. And among so many great men gathered there, only one was found — distinguished indeed, and a Thomist — who adduced it, and that not even with much confidence; and if Bessarion followed him, there were at most two of them. We do not find that the others agreed with them, as if they cared nothing for these school subtleties.

Indeed Alarcon, who is Vazquez's own man, says in *Tract. 5 on the Trinity, disp. 9, c. 13*, that the Council of Florence is no obstacle whatsoever to Scotus — which he had already shown in *d. 8, c. 5*, to which he refers back, since he had established it more fully there.

As for the Eleventh Council of Toledo, which Montoya cites (*d. 68, sect. 4, n. 3*) in the Confession of Faith: nothing is found there that serves the Thomistic cause, and there are some things that serve the Scotistic cause. For what is there offered for the Thomistic side is only the Council's profession that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son — which is a Catholic truth, not a Thomistic one. And the reason given proves it from Charity or Holiness being recognized as common to both, which, since it is deduced from unity and not from distinction, favors us more than the Thomists. Moreover it is said that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished in that the Son is begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeding, and that they thereby mutually exclude one another. The Council of Worms, which Montoya likewise cites, proceeds in the same way: it establishes that doctrine concerning the Procession from the Son, but nothing relevant to the controversy follows from it. And so I believe that Vazquez, a diligent and learned author, refrained from citing these for the same reason — he saw that nothing of weight for his position could be drawn from them.

There remains, however, one weighty objection from the Council of Florence, drawn from that passage which we examined above together with Vazquez, Montoya, and certain anonymous Thomists. Because it is difficult on account of the understanding of the text, I wish to set it out precisely. I note first that it is valid against the Greeks who in fact deny Procession from the Son, and not against us who admit it — though we too are indirectly targeted by it. It will therefore be worthwhile to dissolve it completely.

In Session XXV there is a certain confession of the Latin Fathers sent to the Greeks, with the following words added to refute the Greek error: "For those

who deny that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son manifestly declare that it is from the Father alone. But if from the Father alone, then there was a time when the Son did not exist. But if they say that it is from the paternal hypostasis alone, they thereby in fact separate the substance from the hypostasis, and thus by their own hand the substance will be cut into parts, which is absurd." This is how it is read today in all copies following the latest emendation — not as it used to be read at the time when Vazquez and Montoya wrote, which we noted above.

The sense of the first part is difficult — the part that assumes that once the Procession from the Father alone is affirmed, the existence of the Son is denied. This is the key point: "But if from the Father alone, then there was a time when the Son did not exist." This inference seems implausible and forced upon the Greeks, for the Greeks, in affirming that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, were not denying the existence of the Son. How then did the Latin Fathers draw this conclusion from the Greek position? What is the force of this necessity: from procession from the Father alone it is concluded that the Son does not exist in the divine things? One must not suppose that the Latin Fathers drew the inference ineptly or argued absurdly.

I therefore say that this was the argumentation of the Latin Fathers — which had been Anselm's — as follows: the Procession of the Holy Spirit occurs from that which is God, and through the very Deity of God, which, being one and the same wherever it exists, must actively spirate the Holy Spirit. Therefore, if the Person of the Son already exists, who is the same God as the Father, that Person must, through the same Deity which it shares with the Father, spirate the Holy Spirit. If it is denied that he spirates, it is denied that he exists — which is a sound and complete argument. For it follows from his not spirating that he is not the same God as the Father; and therefore it follows that he does not exist with the Father, for if he existed with him, he would certainly spirate with him.

This reasoning is confirmed by the second part of the declaration: "But if they say that it is from the paternal hypostasis alone, they separate the substance from the hypostasis in the very act, and thus by their own hand the substance will be cut into parts." The sense is as follows: if the Greeks refuse the first inference and respond that they do not deny the existence of the Son when the Father alone produces the Holy Spirit, but rather say that even with the Son existing, the Father alone spirates by virtue of his own hypostasis and paternal Person — once this response is accepted, the Latin Fathers draw another absurdity from it. By this manner of resolution, they say, the Greeks are separating the Divinity from the hypostasis of the Father; for if the Deity is not then the principle producing the Holy Spirit but only the hypostasis alone, then the hypostasis alone would act without the Deity, acting separately and by separation effectively asserting this. And from this another absurdity would follow — namely, the cutting of God's substance into parts — which can be

understood in two ways. First, because since the Father is God including his Person, whoever separates the Person from God also separates and cuts God, and divides the divine substance. Second, because if the Deity is not communicated to the Holy Spirit through itself but through the hypostasis, then the personhood or hypostasis must itself be the Deity — and therefore different from the Deity of the nature, which is not communicated; and in the Holy Spirit there would be only a divinity communicated through the hypostasis alone, which is not the absolute divine nature. From this it follows that the divinity in the Holy Spirit is not the same as that which is in the Father and the Son, since the latter produced nothing. And if it had produced, it would have produced in the Father as well as in the Son, but it did not produce in the Son, as the Greeks say, nor could it produce in the Father without him — which even they conceded. Therefore the divine substance is cut into parts in this manner, and it is an excellent argument.

This same argument with respect to the second part is set forth shortly thereafter by those same Latin Fathers in the same Session XXV: "But lest we divide and disunite the identity and unity of the essence, and lest we assert that the essence is not really different from the hypostases but only rationally and by act of understanding, and lest there be any suspicion that the Holy Spirit is from the Father alone, and that the one substance of the three, which is unique, may appear to anyone to be cut into three parts, we pronounce the phrase 'from the Son' in the Symbol, and therefore we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from a single principle."

From these two things we deduce. First, that the Latin Fathers had regard not for that Principle of distinction from opposed relation, but for the Principle of union in the one Deity of Father and Son. Second, that they said nothing against Scotus's position, but against the Greeks who in fact denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son — the Catholic truth which Scotus and his school both embrace and defend.

If the authors wished to consider Scotus's position seriously and without partisan bias, and to weigh carefully what we have said here at length and in full, I have no doubt that they would then prefer it by far to the other Thomistic position. My duty has been to set it forth as I received it from Scotus and understood it through him, candidly and clearly, and to confirm it as far as possible by the authority of the Fathers and the weight of arguments, and to refute in abundance what others are accustomed and able to object against it.

At the close I note that Hugh of Saint Victor favors Scotus's position in *lib. 6 on the Trinity, c. 11*, and from chapter XVIII through XXI, where he proves that the Holy Spirit is not the Son by hinting at the disparate distinction in the manner of Saint Anselm.

All of this that we have said we learned from Scotus. By him this question was treated with the greatest precision and settled perspicuously in *1 d. 11, q. 2*, supplemented by what he has in the same distinction *q. 1* and *d. 12, q. 1* and *q. 2*, and particularly by what he teaches in *d. 13, q. 1*, under the title: "Whether the Holy Spirit is begotten?" where he treats the two processions through intellect and will and their distinction on this account — which he handles exactly, in the body of the answer. To these are added what he teaches in *d. 26, q. 1*, and *d. 27, q. 2*, and *d. 28, qq. 2* and *4*, and *d. 22, q. 2*. I add what he had taught before in *d. 2, qq. 4, 5, 6*, and *7*. When I read all of these with greatest attention and compared them with each other most carefully after reading, I found a remarkable harmony of doctrine and interconnection of ideas — having weighed and formed this assessment in my own mind, I derived much both of learning's fruit and of pleasure. I freely confess that in this declining age in which I now live, I have profited not a little from reading Scotus.

Section IX. The Aforesaid Position of Scotus, Transmitted by the Author and Defended Against Objections, Is Vindicated Against the Calumnies of Father Gabriel of Saint Vincent, a Discalced Carmelite Theologian.

A preface is needed. In my volume of *Schools of Controversial Theology*, this disputation is densely argued and extremely precise in favor of the Scotistic position concerning the Distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from him, against the Thomistic position. Because it was seen as sharper and more vigorous than could easily be refuted, it displeased the Thomists, and on account of it they brought me into ill repute among them. And since they were unwilling to take issue with me directly, and wished to dissuade me, they availed themselves as a pretext of their outstanding theologian — as I regularly call him — John of Montenegro, Provincial of Lombardy, who was allegedly dishonored by me in that I called him a Davus, that is, a dull-witted servant. And so they stirred up Father Gabriel of Saint Vincent, a noble Discalced Carmelite theologian, who was also grieved that in that disputation I had refuted the Salamancans' claim that the Council of Florence had handed down the Thomistic position against Scotus, and had evidently convicted them of the error of having put forward John, a private disputant theologian, in the name of the whole Council. So the Salamancans had John thrust upon them in place of the whole Council, so that he would write against me. Gabriel took up the cause of the Thomists and the Salamancans, being invited and baited by the Thomists — for what reason I prefer to remain silent rather than reveal — as his closest friend, and wished to avenge both what he described as the injuries done to his Salamancans and to John the Dominican, and to refute my position on the Distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son with Procession set aside.

He begins with John the Theologian. I shall cite his words, in faithful service to that truth which I always serve. (*1 p. d. 35, dub. 3, addition to the doubt, p. 629*):

"Macedo objects in the passage cited, chapter 5, section 4, saying: observe that neither Vazquez nor Montoya dared to cite that Council" — namely the Council of Florence — "in favor of Saint Thomas's position: they only bring forth the testimonies of John the Dominican, who was acting in that Council in the role of a private disputant, and of Bessarion in the oration delivered for the Union, who was likewise a private doctor and orator, not the voice of the whole Council. And although the Salamancans, who are Thomists to excess, in *Tract. 6 on the Trinity, disp. 10, dub. 3, § 1*, cite John's words in the name of the Council, allowance must be made for their bias, though it cannot be entirely excused — for there is a great difference between who is speaking: not whether it is Davus or a Hero upon the stage, but whether it is John speaking, or the entire Council." I acknowledge these as my words, to speak with Augustine against Julian. Then Gabriel proceeds thus: "I do not wish to rebuke Father Macedo for calling John of Montenegro — who fought strenuously for the Holy Spirit in the Council and through whom the union between Greeks and Latins was accomplished — a Davus, by which name Terence, who first used it, understood a servile, dull-witted, and entirely witless person. Others may do so, whose concern for preserving reputation, even among the unlearned, is greater."

I would not bother with this slander, arising from Gabriel's ignorance of Latin, had I not discovered — to my astonishment — that the Dominican Fathers understood those words in this sense and on account of it frequently remonstrated with me at the Minerva in Rome. I wish to exonerate myself before them. I deny that I called Father John of Montenegro, an outstanding theologian, a Davus; indeed I affirm that I denied he is a Davus. And this is precisely what my words genuinely mean. I say: "There is a great difference — NOT whether it is Davus or a Hero upon the stage, but whether it is John or the Council speaking." That word NOT removes every semblance of slander. The sense is: we are not in a theater, nor are we watching Davuses or Heroes. We are in a sacred proceeding, where it is John who speaks, and the Council. Just as I deny that proceeding is a stage, so I deny that John is a Davus, and the Council a Hero or a master. What could be clearer? If I had said: "There is a great difference whether Davus speaks or a Hero — that is, John and the Council" — then I would be calling John a Davus. But by prefixing the word NOT, I deny that he is a Davus. Any elementary student will understand this. My intent was to signify that we were dealing with something serious, weighty, and sacred, in which the person speaking was to be carefully noted — not something theatrical and playful, where it matters less who speaks and what is said in the play.

Moreover, if there were some other sense to those words, I would deserve more blame for calling the Council a Stage than for calling John a Davus. For if I said the latter, I would be liable to be brought before the tribunal of the Holy Office on a charge of blasphemy. I would also sin by calling the Council a Master or a Hero. I therefore marvel at how the Dominican Fathers and Gabriel, understanding my words perversely in this sense, did not prosecute me for that

more serious charge — namely that I called the Council a stage and a scene of fable, and the very ecclesiastical assembly itself, that is, the Church with its head the Pope, a Hero speaking theatrically and fictionally. But they were unconcerned with the injury to the Council and only concerned with the affront to John. From this appears the malicious spirit of my enemies, more hostile to me than devoted to the defense of religion. They erred in understanding, failing to grasp the meaning; they erred in feeling, lamenting John while neglecting the Church's injury. If I were to be condemned for calling John a Davus, I certainly should not have been acquitted for calling the Council a stage and the Fathers a Hero or a master.

I who know and write Latin know what I said, and I said it truly and elegantly. Let Gabriel weigh that word NOT and see what it does. It removes the entire stage and the entire play. That is what I intended, and that is what I signify to those who know Latin. Let Gabriel admit that when he understood it as he did, he did not know Latin. But if anyone asks why I said it in that manner, I reply: because I am accustomed to use such elegant turns of phrase, since I write against heterodox persons who delight in them, and by this means draw them to read, and having drawn them, I convince them. I gild the vessel and season it with sugar to offer it to drink. But it has sometimes happened that the less learned among Catholics criticize me for it — just as I recall being attacked by some because I often call my sacred arguments, when they are strong and solid, an Achilles. For the same reason, they say, I use fabulous names, and Gabriel wished to follow their example when he stumbled over that Davus — whom he certainly does not know, since he calls him a dull-witted servant entirely lacking in mental capacity, whereas Davus was a servant indeed, but exceedingly clever and shrewd, not dull, not lacking in mental capacity, but entirely in full possession of it, saying many sharp and subtle things. Let him read Terence's *Andria* and the commentators, and the interpreters of Horace's *Ars Poetica*. But Gabriel, in order to bring me into ill repute, chose to amplify what he thought was my wrong, heeding neither conscience nor learning. He ought not to have danced out of the chorus, nor to have inserted himself into the circle of the learned. He even writes "Ædipum" instead of "Oedipum" in that passage. However that may be, neither he nor those who incited him against me hit the mark; indeed they wronged that clever and cunning Davus by calling him dull-witted and lacking in mental capacity, and turned against Davus himself the very calumny they intended for me. Let them learn what Horace meant by that poem, the intent of which was to argue for preserving the distinction of characters on the stage, without wronging Davus by stripping him of his proper character — which Gabriel failed to observe.

As for my own conscience, I call God to witness that I said those things in good faith and had no intention of disparaging John, whom I hold in as high esteem as perhaps anyone else, as can be seen in my *Schools on the Holy Spirit*, chapters IV and V, where I cite him in six hundred passages — that is, very

frequently, lest Gabriel twist that phrase "six hundred passages" and serve me notice of suit on account of it — and almost always with praise, and in chapter IV I call him an outstanding theologian. How then could I have wished to disparage one to whom I had paid such tribute? That would surely be to contradict myself. On the contrary, I am accustomed to say both in private and in conversation that among the Dominican family there are three supreme men named John whom I admire and honor: John of Torquemada, John of Ragusa, and John of Montenegro, about whom we are speaking. And I remember that I more than once discussed him with Leo Allatius, a most learned man, pressing him because he neither fully knew nor sufficiently praised John. But Allatius, being a Greek, did not take much delight in Latin scholars.

I believe I have satisfied my readers on the matter of John. As for my esteem for the Dominican family, those who know me are well aware of it, and those who read my books will understand it perfectly. I have given them no just cause for complaint.

I now come to the Salamancans. What I said was true, and I am not ashamed to have said it. They put forward John's testimonies in place of the Council's testimonies. I rightly call that a matter of conscience. A private doctor was not to be cited in place of the Council. He was a great man, but he was not to be equated with the Council.

Gabriel charges me and wishes to uphold what his Salamancans said. He argues that John in the Council was not his own person but belonged to the Council — indeed to the Supreme Pontiff himself. Well, but that does not make him the Council, nor the Supreme Pontiff. He continues: for he was speaking in the name of the Pontiff and as his instrument. I am puzzled about what this is supposed to mean. If by "in the name of the Pontiff" he means acting as the Pope's vicar and assuming his person, I deny it; if he prefers to mean by his order and commission, I concede it. But that does not make him the Council, nor does the authority of the Council or the Pope reside in him for that reason.

The word "instrument" I examine. What kind of instrument? If one through whose mouth the Pope spoke by dictating his position, I deny it; if by permitting him to say what he thought and commanding him to teach because he had a good opinion of him, I concede it. But this is not the Council speaking, nor the Pope; it is John speaking according to his own private opinion. Gabriel explains his intent by citing the beginning of that session, where John says: "Most eminent Fathers, it is at the command of the Most Blessed Father that I am about to speak on the procession of the Holy Spirit." What follows from that? It is not an infusion. And that papal command conferred no authority of a public Council on him. This is evident from the words that follow: "If in my inexperience I should say anything ambiguous or contrary to reason, I am prepared to be corrected and amended then by the Most Holy Father himself, who holds the seat of the Blessed Peter and cherishes and defends true religion,

and thereafter by you, most distinguished in theology." I am astonished that Gabriel did not see himself stabbed by his own sword here. One who fears lest he say something ambiguous or contrary to reason in his inexperience is not speaking as the Council, nor as the Pope — indeed such an attribution would be an injury to them if they so spoke. But it was John's humility. A perverse humility, which attributed inexperience and the fear of erring to the Pope and to the Council. Furthermore, if he was speaking truly and infallibly, how could he ask to be corrected by the Pope — by whom he was speaking and on whose behalf? No one is corrected except one who errs. If then the Pope was speaking in John, neither could that person err nor be corrected. Or if he could err and be corrected, then the Pope was not speaking through him, nor the Council — only John.

Finally, his request to be corrected by distinguished theologians manifestly indicates that John was speaking as a private disputant, not as the Council, nor the Pope, who cannot be corrected or amended by private theologians of any rank whatsoever. And so Gabriel is impaled on his own weapon.

But I wish to press him with my own arms. If a theologian sent by the Pontiff and commanded by him to speak in the Council does so as the mouth of the Pontiff, then only one such person should have been sent, not several — for one would suffice for infallibility, and more would be superfluous. Moreover, the sending of several shows that they speak as private persons, for they often contradict one another — as at the Council of Trent, where there were Thomist, Franciscan, and Jesuit theologians, of whom the latter asserted the Immaculate Conception while the Thomists denied it, from which arose that intermediate position of the Council of Trent. Did the Scotists agree with the Thomists in all their disputation at that Council?

But let us enter this Council of Florence. There were in it other theologians of the Pontiff, besides two Cardinals — Nicholas with the title of the Holy Cross, and Julian with the title of Saint Sabina — namely Andrew, Archbishop of Colossae, and the Bishop of Forlì, and one or two other monks, who are named at the beginning of the Council after the question on Purgatory. All of these were speaking at the Pope's command. Therefore they had the same authority as John and could not err — especially Andrew, who in the third session was the first to contend for the Roman Church, as is said there, against Mark of Ephesus, the principal antagonist.

Gabriel will not deny this, I believe. This great man affirms in that session that Pope Sylvester was present at the Council of Nicaea. But lest Gabriel object that he was present through legates, let him read the full text: "Did not that supreme Pontiff Sylvester attend the Council of Nicaea in person? At other General Councils when the supreme Pontiffs were absent, were their Legates ever lacking? Yet Sylvester did not attend the Council of Nicaea." How could Andrew have affirmed this? Let Gabriel respond. I would easily say that it is no wonder a

private man erred. But Gabriel will object that this is a factual error. I press further: it was not a factual error to say that Angels are corporeal and should therefore be worshipped. For even if the first part concerns a matter of fact and is perhaps not an error — as Gabriel himself notes in (*1 p., disp. 41, dub. 1*), following Father Vazquez in the same place — it is still an error to say that they are to be worshipped on account of their bodies. Yet John, Bishop of Thessalonica, said this at the Seventh Synod.

But Gabriel will rejoin that John the Dominican explicitly said that he was speaking at the command of the Most Blessed Father, and that therefore he alone had this special prerogative — as is stated at the beginning of Session XVIII. I grant this to Gabriel. But what if I show that John said some things that cannot be approved, to put it mildly? First, he conceded to Mark of Ephesus that Pope Zosimus had taken up the question of appeals with the Fathers of Carthage and had sent to the Sixth Council of Carthage canons of the Council of Nicaea concerning that matter — which Mark of Ephesus was calling spurious. But this was not true of Zosimus at all, because this question of appeals and the dispute about the canons of the Council of Nicaea occurred not in his time but in the time of Celestine. This was certainly a very great piece of ignorance in ecclesiastical history — especially since Ephesus had confused Cyril with Zosimus, and the Council of Ephesus with the Sixth Council of Carthage, in a perverse reckoning of chronology. It was a matter of fact, but nonetheless fitted to expose the ignorance of Ephesus and was relevant to the overall outcome of the disputation and the reputation of the Latin name.

Moreover, in the same session he accepts and cites the apocryphal letters of Athanasius and Mark, and the acts of Liberius, which lack credibility — things that bespeak lesser erudition than was proper in so great a man. I do so reluctantly, only to refute Gabriel. But at that time these matters had not yet been so clearly established. I concede this, but a man who was the equivalent of the Council should have known them. Gabriel will excuse historical matters. I adduce things that pertain to doctrine. In the same session, shortly after the beginning, John says: "The word 'Procession' in Sacred Scripture is said not only of the Holy Spirit but also of the Son, and is attributed to both." This is not true of the Word. For nowhere is the word "to proceed" or "Procession" applied to the Son; it belongs to the Holy Spirit alone. The sense of the word is applied to that passage in John XVI, "I have gone out from the Father," which John the Theologian himself notes and which Mark concedes — though Mark observed more carefully that Procession belongs especially and most properly to the Holy Spirit, and incidentally corrected John, who had adduced the word "I have gone out" to prove that Procession belongs to the Son, saying: "'I have gone out' is not the same as the word 'to proceed' but appears to signify something different." Which of the two spoke better on this point I leave to Gabriel.

Furthermore, in Session XXIX, shortly after the beginning, Andrew of Colossae is not greatly pleased with the statements of both, despite the praiseworthy substance of the matter, on account of the ambiguity, when he says: "You appear to me to be moving in equivocation and ambiguity." Added to this is the fact that in the same session John introduces three genera of substance in God — which is admittedly rather harsh. I know it can be defended, but it is not standard terminology. Let these remarks suffice to show that John spoke as a private man and not as an entire Council.

And to stop Gabriel's mouth, let me adduce the words of the great authority Francis Suarez, who in a similar controversy concerning the Formal Distinction — when others cite this same John the Theologian at the Council of Florence as defining against it — himself distinguishes him from the Council in these words: "John, a certain Latin theologian, said these things — not the Council." So in *lib. 1 on the Trinity, c. 2, n. 11* — where he calls him with not very much honor "a certain theologian." I receive it more honorably. Gabriel remains to dispute with Suarez, who is in my judgment a far better theologian than himself; and yet Suarez denies that John was speaking as the Council. If Gabriel condemns Suarez, I prefer to be condemned with him rather than to hold with Gabriel.

I had not yet seen Suarez when I wrote those remarks. I am gratified to see so great a man holding, against the Salamancans, that it was not the Council but only the private John the Theologian who set forth that position on virtual distinction. The way now cleared, let us proceed to the capital question. Come, let us engage.

Gabriel boastfully objects to me a testimony of the Eleventh Council of Toledo in the Confession of Faith — the very same passage that I had myself objected against myself in the form of an objection from Montoya, that most learned Jesuit, in *School 5, c. 5*, and to which I denied that anything in it serves the Thomistic cause. I had seen and weighed the passage in its source, as is my custom. The passage is: "This holy Trinity, which is one and true God, neither withdraws from number nor is contained by number. For in the relation of the Persons number is discerned; but in the substance of the Divinity what might be enumerated is not comprehended. Therefore by this number alone they suggest what they are in relation to one another, and in this number they lack what they are in themselves."

Then Gabriel says: "I ask Father Macedo what those words mean — 'by this number alone they suggest what they are in relation to one another, and in this number they lack what they are in themselves'" — and he thinks he has won.

I respond calmly and clearly. First: the Council is speaking of the actual situation, which we also acknowledge. For in the actual situation it is thus, that they are referred to one another — that is, they are relatively opposed — and differ only in this respect from the nature, which is not so referred. But the

Council does not deny that they can differ in this way alone, which is the question about what is possible — a question that never entered the Council's mind. Second: that phrase "in relation to one another" does not equivalently mean "they are referred to one another in complete direct relative opposition," but rather "in relation to one another" — that is, toward another — in the sense in which it signifies a relation. In this sense the Holy Spirit too is referred in relation to one another — to the Father by direct opposition, and to the Son disparately, inasmuch as it is not begotten but proceeds. For if the Council had absolutely wanted to say "in relation to one another" through relative opposition, it would not have used the word "are" but "are opposed." Indeed that word "are" signifies being placed in a relative being, and being constituted as a distinct Person through relation itself — not through the opposition of the relation of producing and produced.

The sense therefore is: in God, what makes number is what is in relation to another — that is, what is relational to another, not what is absolute. That this sense is appropriate is evident from the saying of Saint Anselm, who thus interprets "in relation to one another" without including the contrary opposition by reason of spirating and spirated, but rather of the disparate generation and procession. Let us hear Anselm in his celebrated Epistle, chapter I: "In one way is the Son understood to be from the Father, and in another way the Holy Spirit. For the Son is from his Father — that is, from God who is his Father. The Holy Spirit, however, is not from God as his own Father, but only from God who is Father. This therefore is the sole cause of plurality in God, that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit cannot be said to be from one another, but are others proceeding as it were from one another, because in these two aforesaid ways something is from God — which taken whole can be called Relation." Excellent, in support of my case. Let Gabriel burst apart. I feel that I stand with Anselm, who is even more forceful: "For in the way that the Son exists from God by being born, and the Holy Spirit by proceeding, it is by this very diversity of Nativity and Procession that they are referred to one another as diverse and other from one another." If I wished to invent words accommodated to my own meaning, I could not conceive more fitting and clear ones. Behold "in relation to one another" applied to the diversity of generation and procession, with the opposition of spirating and spirated set aside. Behold "by this number alone," the sole cause of plurality, without any mention of producing and produced.

Anselm confirms this in chapter II: "The aforesaid opposition of Relation, which arises from the fact that God is from God in the two aforesaid ways, prevents Father, Son, and Holy Spirit from being said to be from one another, and prevents the proper attributes of each from being attributed to the others." He applies the opposition "in relation to one another" to that diversity arising from the manner of being born through generation in the Son and of proceeding through spiration in the Holy Spirit — without any regard to active and passive spiration. Receive, Gabriel, the meaning of those words — not from me but

from Anselm, who agrees with the Council and explains the mind of the Council. It is for this reason that those great men Suarez and Vazquez, as I observed in my School 5, c. 4, section 3, do not cite Anselm in favor of their own Thomistic position. For they saw that he belongs to us, as I showed most studiously and at great length in that School 5 — and as was also observed (whom I had not yet seen when I first wrote these things) by the Capuchin theologian Zamoro, in his *Disputations on the One and Triune God*, tract. 10, q. 9, who also receives and expounds the words of the Council of Toledo in my sense. Let Gabriel be persuaded that what I produce is not said rashly — though where Anselm's meaning is so perspicuous I need no other authority. But in the eyes of Gabriel, who has read the ancients less in their sources, the testimony of a more recent author will carry weight — and all the more because he is a Capuchin, whose habit corresponds to that of the discalced, which lends great weight in convincing Gabriel.

I continue going along with Gabriel as he attempts to dissolve my arguments. He states the third as follows: "Thirdly, Macedo argues. By first denying that the Son is distinguished precisely by his own relation from the Holy Spirit, they consequently deny that procession through the intellect, insofar as it is such, is the reason for distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit. But from this it follows that the grounds for the two diverse processions, which Saint Thomas endeavors greatly to establish (*1 p. of the Summa*, q. 27), are destroyed. The consequence is evident, because if procession through the intellect is not of itself distinctive from procession through the will, then from that doctrine the multiplicity of two processions cannot be proved, and it would be falsely deduced from it that there are to be two processions." I recognize my own argument. Let us see what Gabriel answers.

Gabriel responds by conceding the major: namely that Thomists deny that the Son is really distinguished from the Holy Spirit by his relation of Filiation — for by this he is distinguished from the Father alone. Likewise it is conceded that Thomists deny that procession through the intellect precisely is the reason for distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit. For in the case in which the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, procession through the intellect and through the will would not be distinguished really, but only virtually, as treated in the preceding doubt, n. 60. Nor does the Holy Doctor intend anything else. For with opposed relations set aside, the said processions are only virtually distinguished, in the same way that intellect and will are distinguished only in this mode.

Come here, reader. First, this is a narrative, not a solution. Gabriel narrates by conceding my major and minor — reporting what the Thomists hold — but in the narrative commits an error when he says: "It is conceded that Thomists deny that procession through the intellect precisely is not the reason for distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit." Notice the lapse in that double

negation. They deny that it is not the reason for distinguishing — therefore they affirm that it is the reason for distinguishing: for two negations affirm. The Thomists therefore agree with Scotus in affirming that it is a ground of distinction, not with Saint Thomas who denies it. Gabriel stands convicted of Scotism and betrays his own cause. But let us excuse a man in too much of a hurry and not thoroughly enough a Latinist. It was a slip of the pen with the second "not," creeping in on someone moving hastily. He denies, with the Thomists, that it is the reason for distinguishing. The major and minor having been conceded to me, how does he respond to the consequence in the conclusion? If they are not distinguished, they are not two in number, nor is there any ground for proving this number — the number, I mean, of processions, which precede and posit in act, so to speak, the produced Persons. To this conclusion Gabriel does not respond, and therein lies the entire force of the argument. For how can they be two in number if they are not really distinguished in themselves and taken precisely? For they are precisely and in themselves two in number from the side of reality — therefore they are also really distinct. Here Gabriel is dumbstruck; he only mutters that they are only virtually distinct, and that this is what Saint Thomas intends.

This I attack and deny is true, whatever Saint Thomas may wish. I look for Saint Thomas's reason, not his will; and I prove that the will is unwarranted, and that Gabriel answers badly with an argument to the man. A little earlier Gabriel was pressing me with the passage from the Eleventh Council of Toledo, opposing the number and arguing from it that what is three in number is really distinct. He was speaking of the Persons, introducing: "By this number alone they suggest what they are in relation to one another." And indeed he argued well in this — that from number real distinction is inferred. From this I, accepting the number that was objected, showed the distinction on the part of the relations proceeding through the diverse processions, because I saw that this necessarily follows from the number that was objected. How then can Gabriel, when I posit the number of two diverse processions, deny me real distinction from the side of reality and leave me only virtual? If virtual distinction is sufficient in his opinion to ground number, then he argued badly earlier against us — drawing from number to extort a real distinction.

My argument therefore remains intact and awaits its solution. I press and pursue here. The two processions are two in number; number requires distinction from the side of reality; therefore those two processions that are two in number are distinct from the side of reality. Let Gabriel return and respond a second time. For when he responded the first time, he did not satisfy.

I continue. "Fourthly," says Gabriel, "Macedo thus argues. If the precise reason of Filiation is not the reason for distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Holy Spirit by virtue of its own procession is not opposed to the Son, and therefore the character of Begotten and of Son — and indeed of Word

and Image — is not repugnant to it, which is contrary to faith. The consequence is evident because, if the entire distinction comes from active spiration, none comes from the production through generation, which is wholly presupposed to active spiration; and therefore between generation and procession there will be no real distinction."

Gabriel responds by distinguishing the consequence: it follows that the Holy Spirit by virtue of its own procession precisely is not opposed to the Son really, if it did not proceed from him — and this is conceded; but not formally virtually — and this is denied. For in that case the character of Begotten, of Son, of Word, of Image would not be repugnant to the Holy Spirit really, since they would be really the same and the same Person really; and thus in that case procession and generation would be distinguished only virtually. See n. 60 and below.

Before I show the weakness of the solution, I note Gabriel's thoughtlessness. What was he thinking when he wrote "in that case" — positing time where there is eternity, and such an eternity as to admit, according to Saint Thomas, no priority whatsoever, not even of instants or antecedence, but only of order? I excuse a man running fast, however; for he writes so much to produce so many volumes.

I pass on. What is that term "formally virtually"? I find a distinction mixed from the Scotistic "formally" and the Thomistic "virtually." The force of the argument compelled Gabriel to this. When he saw that those characters of Word and Love, Image and Gift, Son and Spirated, Begotten and Proceeding could not be consistent with virtual distinction alone, he admitted the formal — and lest he seem to defect from the Thomistic school, added "virtual," making himself a theologian mixed of Scotist and Thomist. We have a full Janus here; and aptly, for he marked times — which Gabriel, as a future Janus in eternity, had already placed.

Now to the solution. How inept it is is apparent. For it is founded on the very principle under debate. The question is precisely this: whether the distinction is to be taken from the active spiration of the Son and the passive of the Holy Spirit. I argue against this from the distinction of the Personal Properties, which is so great as to surpass virtual distinction and to induce real distinction. Gabriel responds to me by affirming his own foundation, which I am attacking. He says they are distinguished only virtually, because real distinction is drawn only from the opposition of spirating and spirated. The question was about this very thing, and he uses the question as a solution, and sends me to n. 60 and below. I went there and found nothing that gave satisfaction — indeed I found something that favored me. For he says: "Those two processions do not have formally the same properties, but really and identically." From which it is established that they are formally most distinct. Therefore more than virtually; and since he would admit

only two genera of distinctions — virtual and real — if it is formal in the highest degree and not virtual, it will be real.

Moreover, in nn. 66 and 69 he attacks the solutions of Vazquez and Suarez responding to this very argument, which, being the solutions of such great men, if they do not solve the difficulty, Gabriel's will solve it less — and so I found. For he says in n. 70 that the Holy Spirit is inadequately distinguished from the Son — which is enough for me, who want it to be distinguished disparately, not directly relatively. He adds moreover in n. 71 that the Son is distinguished from the Father by Filiation in the character of an incommunicable person in order toward the Father; and in n. 72 he says that it suffices for the distinction of the Son from the Holy Spirit that it proceeds from the same property according to what is incommunicable to the Holy Spirit. But the character of Word, Image, Begotten, Son is incommunicable to the Holy Spirit; therefore by it the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit. Why then did he send me to those passages? I now in turn call him to his own *Disputation 27, dub. 9, n. 94*, where he says: "It is established that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and is other than the Son." This is remarkable — without any mention of Procession from the Son, he affirms that that procession from the Father, because it is through the will, is other than the Son, and adds: "and therefore proceeds by a different procession from the procession of the Word, namely through the will." And he is speaking precisely by virtue of the processions, which I had been treating in my argument. But the terms "other" and "different" in the divine things suggest a distinction greater than virtual — therefore, among Thomists, a real one. For they fall upon supposita and are taken from them, on the authority of Saint Thomas (*q. 31, a. 2*), following Augustine whom he cites in the same place. Our man is therefore a Scotist, whether he will or no, Gabriel of Saint Vincent — as will become more manifestly apparent.

I proceed. Again Gabriel: "Fifthly, Macedo argues, because the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is from the Person of the Son; therefore from one distinct from him — but the Son is not yet spirating in second act; therefore before that act of spirating the Son is already distinct from the Holy Spirit. Otherwise the Holy Spirit proceeds from itself, if it is not distinguished from the one proceeding."

Gabriel responds by distinguishing the antecedent: "The procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is from the Person of the Son really distinct from the Holy Spirit antecedently to the production of the Holy Spirit — and this is denied; virtually — and this is conceded. For since the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinguished really except by reason of opposition, it follows that before the said opposition and procession are understood, no real distinction is understood; and thus the Son is understood as a Person really distinct from the Father, but not from the Holy Spirit for that prior instant."

This response is not to the point. For it improperly occupies a space that should have been properly addressed later — abruptly introducing the distinction of Persons when my antecedent, "the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is from the Person of the Son," is most certain and therefore to be conceded; and what should be denied is the drawn conclusion, "therefore from one distinct from himself" — so that good form in responding might be observed. Next a response should have been given to the other part: "but the Son is not yet spirating in second act" — which is likewise most certain — but Gabriel says nothing to it, nor to the following: "Therefore before the act of spirating the Son is already distinct from the Holy Spirit; otherwise the Holy Spirit proceeds from itself if it is not distinguished from the one proceeding." Not a word from Gabriel on this; he clings like a polyp to a rock, adhering to his relative opposition, which is what the controversy is about.

The entire force of the argument thus remains intact. For if the Son is in his complete being — which cannot be denied, since the Father in that sign is already understood to exist, and therefore the Son, who is the correlative term of the Father and must be posited simultaneously — then as such, either the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit or not. If he is, then he is certainly really distinguished, since he is a complete Person having the power of spirating before he actually spirates, and we establish real distinction. Or he is not really distinguished — and then he is identical with the Holy Spirit, and therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from itself. This is the argument that Gabriel has not satisfied, and I think will never satisfy.

He continues arguing. "Sixthly," Gabriel says, "Macedo argues. The Son is constituted neither in the being of God nor in the being of a Person by that character of active Spiration; therefore he does not receive from it either constitution or distinction. The antecedent is proved as to the first part, because that power does not pertain to the being of God, since it is not in the Holy Spirit, who has the entire being of God; as to the second part it is urged because the Son cannot be constituted and distinguished by what is common to the Father."

What does Gabriel respond? "He responds by pointing out that although the Son is not constituted in the being of God by the relation of active spiration — because in this mode he is constituted by the divinity — nor in the being of a person — because in this mode he is constituted by the relation of Filiation — he is nevertheless constituted in the character of spirating and therefore of one opposed to the Holy Spirit." Not even this argument does Gabriel solve well. For what is this "spirating character"? It is certainly not an act — and this is what Gabriel holds in *d. 35, dub. 6* — but a power. If it is a power, it does not distinguish the Son from the Holy Spirit, because that power is not the relation of spirating which alone, in Gabriel's position, distinguishes really. Therefore Gabriel said badly that it is opposed to the Holy Spirit, and saw poorly in responding.

If however we admit that through that spirating principle it is opposed, as Gabriel says, to the Holy Spirit, then we already have the Son, before he spirates, being really distinguished from the Holy Spirit — and therefore not through the relation of active spiration, contrary to what the Thomists hold and Gabriel had held earlier. For he is distinguished by something antecedent to active spiration, which is precisely what Scotus and we Scotists contend. He tends toward the seventh. Thus: "Seventhly, Macedo argues. If one considers in the Son the character of Word and Image, which he receives through generation, and in the Holy Spirit the character of Love and Gift, he will find that precisely through these the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit. But these are presupposed in the Son for active spirating; therefore they already make him distinct from the Holy Spirit."

Gabriel responds by distinguishing the antecedent: "If one considers, etc., he will find that precisely through these the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit — virtually, this is conceded; really, this is denied. For real distinction is drawn from opposition alone." Macedo's argument convicts Gabriel, because when Gabriel considered all those things, he acknowledged real distinction. This is evident from *disp. 27, dub. 9, n. 93*, where he says: "It is established that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and is other than the Son, and therefore proceeds by a different procession from the procession of the Word." Those terms "other" and "different" induce real distinction — which Gabriel himself at that time of eternity (I say aptly with reference to Gabriel's phrase "in that case" in eternity) acknowledged and admitted when he was weighing all those things. And so Father Macedo's argument is true and solid. Let Gabriel read about these terms in that other Gabriel — I know not whether a better theologian than him — namely Vazquez (*d. 131, cc. 1 and 2*), and he will learn from him that real distinction is induced.

Gabriel brings forward the eighth argument: "Macedo argues in the eighth place. Who will say that the Word and Image are distinguished intrinsically through the spiration of love, and that they are distinguished from the produced love only by loving? Moreover, how will the Son be distinguished from the Holy Spirit by that through which he is not constituted, and not by that through which he is constituted? There are in the Son several reasons for distinction: one, that he spirates actively — which is relative opposition; and another, that of Generation and Filiation — which is the opposition of the disparate."

Let us hear Gabriel: "I respond," he says, "that all Thomists, and we with them, say that the Word and Image are distinguished really through the spiration of love, and that the Son by actively loving is distinguished from the produced love." I interrupt here. He responds by conceding what I am attacking. What is this? He concedes to me what I am taking as an absurdity — let him respond that it is not absurd, or let him deny it. For it is indeed absurd that the Word and

Image should be distinguished by spiration, to which they are not formally opposed, and should not be distinguished by that to which they are formally opposed and which has the negation of Word and Image — namely the very character of Love and Gift communicated by virtue of procession through the will. Gabriel responds nothing to this.

Now that statement — "the Son is distinguished from produced love only by loving" — Gabriel admits, when I was attacking it, and gives me his admission as a solution. This is what I am attacking, my dear Gabriel, not what I am asking about. And I speak not of the Son, but of the Word and Image in the most formal sense — characters that are directly and formally opposed not to the Father, to whom the Son is opposed, but to Love and Gift. You, however, seize upon "Son," which I did not give you, and speak of something else in your response. These are subtleties, Gabriel, that cannot be seen by one moving in haste.

I proceed to the other part: "Nor is it true that the Son is really distinguished from the Holy Spirit by that through which he is not constituted in the character of the Spirating and opposed. For he is constituted in the character of spirating and of one opposed to the Holy Spirit through active spiration, and through this he is really distinguished from the Holy Spirit. But through Filiation he is constituted in the character of Son and of one really opposed to the Father, not to the Holy Spirit." A vain response: for I am arguing about the constitutive of the Son as such, in the character of Word and such a Person — not about the spirating character, which is not constitutive of the Son, nor distinctive of him, since it is common to the Father and is present in the Son already constituted. By this argument I prove that this ground of distinction — which is outside the constitution — is absurd; with this argument we Scotists torment the Thomists greatly.

The response is therefore not apt. As for what he adds: "It is true that there are said to be in the Son several grounds for distinction — namely of Filiation, and of active Spiration — but by the former he is distinguished from the Father alone, by the latter from the Holy Spirit alone." This is beside the point. For I did not speak of distinctions in respect of the Father and the Holy Spirit — I spoke of the grounds for distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit, which according to us are two: one taken from the opposition of processions, which we call disparate; and the other taken from the opposition of producing and produced, that is, spirating and spirated. According to the Thomists there are not two but only one — the last of these two. But who denies that in the Son there are diverse distinctions with respect to diverse Persons? Gabriel pays insufficient attention to what I had said, and therefore speaks beside the point — as he also does when he inappropriately adds: "For if disparate relations as such distinguished Persons really, then since in the Father there are Paternity and active Spiration, the Father would be distinguished from himself insofar as he is

Father and insofar as he is the Spirating one — which all Catholics deny." Why this, Gabriel? Nobody tells you that all disparate relations are really distinctive; but some are — namely those that are mutually opposed, such as those two of Filiation and Procession, which exist in different lines, as you yourself say in *disp. 27, dub. 11*, and distinguish them sufficiently enough to show that the one is generation and the other is not.

And do not say that you only distinguish them virtually. For in chapter IX, at the beginning, you state: "From which it is established that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and is other than the Son, and therefore proceeds by a different procession from the procession of the Word, namely through the will." Is this not a distinction from the nature of the thing, which makes another Person and another procession? And is it not therefore Scotistic and disparate?

I have already said that Gabriel is a Janus, and on the point of Eternity about which he writes, he has two faces — one of a Scotist, the other of a Thomist. Read, my dear reader, whoever you may be, that disputation 27 — you will find Gabriel a Scotist. Read this disputation 35 — you will find him a Thomist.

Finally Gabriel concludes: "Macedo argues in the last place. How will the Son be distinguished from the Holy Spirit only by that which is common to him with the Father, and not be distinguished by what is proper to him and by which he is distinguished from the Father? Certainly if he is distinguished only by this, he is not distinguished by that which properly constitutes him in his being as Son — which who would affirm? Let us therefore grant both the one and the other distinction — both the disparate and the relative."

At this point I do not care what Gabriel responds — since we already have him as a Scotist, having defected to us from the camp of Saint Thomas. For this we give him our greatest thanks — and indeed we owe them, since he brings with him significant weight of authority. For he was an outstanding Thomist, and all the more because, among the Thomists who move in the Angelic School and wish to be called Angels, he bore the name of the Archangel Gabriel.

Collation VII, Difference I. On the Procession of the Holy Spirit: Whether It Proceeds Freely or Naturally?

I intend to show, in setting forth the formula of the question, what its sense is for Scotus — which because many do not grasp, they are astonished that Scotus said that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely, as if in saying so he had made an error, as the common run of people think. Others dismiss the question as if it were merely verbal — among whom is the weighty theologian Vazquez in (*1 p., q. 41, a. 2, d. 141, c. 2*). Both attitudes arose either from negligence or carelessness in reading — on the part of those who either did not see all of Scotus's passages, or if they saw them all, examined them less carefully, or having examined them understood them less, or understanding them expounded them poorly.

I shall see to it that henceforth no one who is willing to read me will either have a poor opinion of Scotus's position or think it slight or merely verbal.

Saint Thomas in (*1 p., q. 41, a. 2, ad 3*) says: "It must be said that the will, insofar as it is a certain nature, naturally wills something — just as the will of man naturally tends toward happiness; similarly God naturally wills and loves himself. But with respect to other things besides himself, the will of God is in some sense indeterminate, as stated" — he is cited in the body of the article and in (*q. 19, a. 3*) principally — "The Holy Spirit, however, proceeds as Love insofar as God loves himself; hence it proceeds naturally, although it proceeds through the mode of will." Upon this passage of Saint Thomas, the Thomists ground their position together with Cajetan in the commentary on this article, and Capreolus in (*1, d. 6, q. 1*), and Iavellus in (*1 p., q. 41, nn. 2, 82, 3, 1*), and Vazquez and the Salamancans in this question, and Suarez (*lib. 6, cap. 3* and *4, in summa, 1 p., a. 1*) — according to which both processions, of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, are natural and necessary, not free, entirely denying liberty in the procession of the Holy Spirit and criticizing Scotus's position on this score.

Scotus for his part expounds his mind concerning such processions in (*1, d. 13, q. un., § Against this, n. 12*), where attacking those who posited the essence as an altogether undistinguished principle of production, he argues from the fact that it would follow that the production of the Holy Spirit would not be free, either in itself or in its principle — which he considers an absurdity. His words are: "In the divine things the production itself, as already posited in being, does not seem to be formally free; but liberty seems to be precisely in the Principle of this production, insofar as it is of such a kind. But if no distinction precedes the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the first distinction — which belongs to this production and to that one — exists as they are posited in being by that principle. Therefore there is not one production in the divine things through the mode of intellect or of nature, and another through the mode of liberty, because no principle precedes that of itself stands differently with respect to this production than to that one; those productions in which the distinction comes first are altogether uniform in their naturalness, as already posited in being."

Let the reader observe — since while citing Scotus's passages I intend to expound his mind and dispel calumnies — that Scotus acknowledges the procession to be necessary in act; but in its principle, that is, in the will from which it issues, it is free — because in every state the will is always a free Principle. The same point is found in Scotus's response to the arguments: "Such a distinction is required by free and natural production, because for that there cannot be a first distinction; rather, some distinction in the principles is required beforehand — principles that in some mode have the function of principiating naturally and freely the divine Persons."

Note that the distinction is sought from the principles — natural and free, that is, intellect and will — from which the processions derive. Hear the excellent

interpreter Lychetus on this passage. "Scotus assumes that the Holy Spirit, according to the Saints, is produced freely, and the Son naturally, or through the mode of nature. Further: the Spirit is produced freely, not as if from the essence, because the essence is not a free productive principle. Moreover, if the Son and the Holy Spirit were immediately from the divine essence, it does not appear how one Person would be said to be freely produced and the other naturally." Note that here there is no mention of the necessary. Lychetus concludes from Scotus: "Those potencies, intellect and will, stand thus: the intellect produces through the mode of nature, and the will through the mode of liberty." You see? It always comes back to the principles.

Scotus therefore posits liberty in the will — a liberty that is incompatible with naturality, not with necessity — from which it follows that that will, which is free, can impart necessity to the act, but not naturality. Thus the Procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary, proceeding necessarily from a free will, and not naturally. I come with Scotus to the Processions explicitly in (*Quodlibet* 16, § *This division, n. 14, at the beginning*): "The intellect has its own mode of principiating through the mode of nature. Hence compared to its own proper act, it is nature. Just as the Son in the divine things is produced through the mode of nature, although his productive principle is memory." And then in n. 15: "The will, however, insofar as it is will, is an active principle that acts freely."

And that this liberty in the principle — that is, in the will — does not remove but rather posits necessity in the production of the Holy Spirit, so that it is altogether necessary from a free principle, is shown from Scotus in (*1, d. 10, q. un., § On the second doubt, n. 9*): "Concerning necessity it is clear from the same argument: a perfect productive principle can give its product every perfection that is not repugnant to it. An infinite will is a perfect productive principle; therefore it can give its product the perfection fitting to it — and necessity is not repugnant to it; on the contrary, it necessarily belongs to it, because no infinite being can be possibly non-necessary. Therefore that principle, which is the infinite will, will be a sufficient principle for giving necessity to this product. And if it is a principle by which necessity can be given to the product, then it is given — because nothing that is not necessary can receive necessity from itself. And further: if it is a principle by which necessity is given to the product, then it is also given to the production; for the product receives its being through production, and it cannot receive being through a non-necessary production." It is therefore established that the production and procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary.

Scotus adds: "This argument seems to conclude necessity of production quasi a posteriori, from the necessity of the produced. Then" — he inquires "the reason a priori, or cause — what it is by which this will gives necessity to this production." Scotus inquires diligently and precisely into the necessity of the produced Holy Spirit, so as to establish altogether that its procession is

necessary. Thus: "I respond that neither the infinite will by itself alone gives necessity to the produced Love, comparing itself to any object whatsoever; nor does the sole loved object, which is the end, compared to any will whatsoever, give necessity to the act of willing or to the production of Love. I prove the first, because the will is not a necessary principle of producing some love of some object, unless it is a necessary principle of loving that object. But the infinite will is not a necessary principle of loving a finite object, because then God would necessarily love every creature — indeed every lovable thing — and therefore is not a necessary principle of producing its love, comparing it to any object whatsoever." Scotus argues beautifully and perspicuously.

Hear his conclusion a little further on, n. 10: "And so I say that the necessity of this production of adequate Love, just as the necessity of the love by which the one having the will formally loves, is from the infinity of the will and from the infinity of the goodness of the object, because neither without the other suffices for necessity. Now these two suffice in this way: because an infinite will cannot fail to be upright, nor can it fail to be in upright act, because then it would be in potency. Therefore it is necessarily in upright act." And manifestly to our purpose: "An infinite will having such an object as is in itself rightly to be loved, perfectly present, is the reason for necessarily both willing that good and spirating the love of that good; such a will having such an object present is a principle of communicating the divine nature, because it is a principle of producing infinite produced Love. For such produced Love is proportioned both to the potency and to the object; but this is not so when the infinite will regards a finite lovable good, because there, although the act is infinite on the part of the divine will, it is not infinite on the part of the object." Therefore the production of the Holy Spirit is necessary — and not only necessary but also demonstrated necessary evidently — while retaining nonetheless that essential liberty of the will, without in its place introducing naturality.

What could have been said more truly, more acutely, more manifestly? I wish to bring forward a striking passage from (*Quodlibet* 16, § *Here are three things to be seen*, n. 2): "I say that in the act of the divine will there is necessity in the absolute sense — and this both in the act of loving itself and in the act of spirating the proceeding Love, namely the Holy Spirit." Thus there can be no doubting Scotus's mind — it is this: the Holy Spirit is produced necessarily, and proceeds necessarily; and those who commonly think otherwise against this have not read Scotus. I do not say they have not understood him — because he speaks so clearly that to anyone who reads him, whoever he may be, it is altogether evident that he posited a necessary procession of the Holy Spirit.

Therefore Cajetan had no right to say in the *Commentary on q. 41, a. 2, § Concerning the distinction of the will*, that Scotus in (*1, d. 2, q. on the number of productions*, and *d. 10* of the same, and in *Quodlibet q. 16*) holds that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely — and then toward the end, in § *For clarity*, distinguishing

against Scotus as if rebuking him: "A simply necessary act, which is what is under discussion since the Holy Spirit proceeds necessarily, is incompatible with freedom." As if Scotus held the contrary — when Scotus manifestly teaches in those passages, and especially in that last one cited by Cajetan, (*Quodlibet* 16), "In the act of the divine will there is necessity in the absolute sense." What are we to make of this interpreter, and of the others who follow him? I am astonished that Cajetan, so great a man — having apparently read Scotus, as it seems — judged Scotus's position so wrongly. Unless perhaps he received Scotus's passages from another's citation and spoke on another's authority, which sometimes happens to men who write much in haste or are too preoccupied.

Suarez conducted himself better in this matter. Even though he opposes Scotus on the mode of speaking, he grasped his meaning when he said in (*lib. 6 of the Summa, Tract. 3, c. 4, n. 13*): "Scotus expressly acknowledges that the production of the Holy Spirit is a necessary act, although he affirms it is called free and not natural." And Vazquez in (*d. 161, c. 2*) reports Scotus's mind more faithfully and at greater length, setting forth his position and arguments in apt terms, and in n. 4 says: "Scotus affirms that the Procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary even from the side of the principle, so that the Holy Spirit cannot not be produced, and adds: he proves it to be necessary. First, because God necessarily loves himself, and by loving produces love. Second, also because the Holy Spirit is necessarily God, so that it cannot not exist — for those things that are within God are supremely necessary." So says Vazquez, a learned and subtle man, akin to Scotus, who both understood and expounded his mind on this point.

Section I. The Sense of Scotistic Liberty Is Expounded.

Having surveyed the passages of Scotus, two things are elicited from them. First: that the intellect in God produces the Son naturally, both by virtue of a principle naturally constituted and acting, and by mode of acting in second act which is also natural, and by virtue of the act itself which is a natural act; whereas the will does not produce naturally, neither by virtue of a principle not naturally constituted, nor by mode of acting in second act which is not natural, nor by virtue of the produced act which cannot be natural. The second is that the will by its intrinsic character is free, and free also in its mode of operating, but its act can be either free in God and in creatures with respect to limited and finite goods, or necessary with respect to infinite goods and goods represented as infinite — which act is not in itself free, but free in mode and in principle of operating.

On the first point there is dispute between Saint Thomas in the cited passage (*1 p., q. 41, a. 2*) and Scotus in all the passages adduced. Saint Thomas takes the will in a certain sense of nature and says in the reply to objection 3 that "the will, insofar as it is a certain nature, naturally wills something." Scotus, however, excludes all naturality from the will — in mode and in operation — and therefore entirely denies that the Holy Spirit proceeds naturally in any respect.

Hence Saint Thomas does not altogether and adequately distinguish the Production of the Word from the Procession of the Holy Spirit in this respect of natural proceeding, since he says both are produced naturally — as appears there. For in that article, reply to the second objection: "God naturally understands himself, and according to this the conception of the divine Word is natural." And in the reply to the third: "The Holy Spirit proceeds as Love insofar as God loves himself; hence it proceeds naturally." Two great theologians agree with Saint Thomas: Suarez (*lib. 6, c. 4*) and Vazquez (*d. 141, c. 3*), where I note that Saint Thomas saw the difference and diversity of each faculty when in that article, reply to the third, he added at the end: "although it proceeds through the mode of will" — by which he signifies that there is some difference between those two naturalities of operating between intellect and will, which I do not know whether those who oppose Scotus noticed — for they would oppose him less if they had.

Let the conclusion be stated. Scotus seems to have sensed and spoken more aptly concerning this natural mode than Saint Thomas in this passage (*1 p., q. 41, a. 2, ad 3*), and the Thomists who follow him. This is proved because, although the procession of the Holy Spirit is necessary, it is nonetheless not from a potency necessary by its nature, nor does it arise from it through the mode of nature; since the will is a free potency, not natural, not naturally determined to one thing from itself — as a natural potency would be. Therefore the necessary act proceeds in a different mode from the will than from a natural potency, because from the latter it receives necessity in every respect — from the principle and the intrinsic force necessarily, from the natural and necessary mode of acting, and from its own natural and necessary entity. But an act can well be necessary — whether in itself and through its entity it is necessary — and yet not be necessary from a principle necessary in itself, but from a free one not operating through the mode of nature but through the mode of will, insofar as it is distinguished from nature; and therefore it is not in every respect like another natural act.

We do not deny that that act can be improperly denominated natural insofar as it is not violent but voluntary, and conforms to the will from which it proceeds not violently or by compulsion. For in this sense Scotus does not deny the act to be a natural necessary act as opposed to violent. He only denies it to be through the mode of nature, because it is not from a natural potency, which is of its nature intrinsically necessary.

What then if Saint Thomas himself said the very same thing expressly in another passage — to which those who contradict Scotus must necessarily also contradict? Let us hear Saint Thomas agreeing with Scotus in the *Questions on Power, q. 10, a. 2, in the reply to the fourth objection*: "This argument would make the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father naturally as a Word. Just as the Son proceeds naturally from the Father as Word, so the Holy Spirit would proceed

from him naturally as Love; yet the Holy Spirit does not proceed through the mode of nature. For that is said in the divine things to proceed through the mode of nature which proceeds as those things produced in creatures by nature and not by will. Thus therefore there is a difference between being produced naturally and being produced through the mode of nature. For something is said to be produced naturally on account of the natural relation it has to its principle, from which it proceeds; but something is said to be produced through the mode of nature which is produced by some principle producing in the way that nature produces." Saint Thomas agrees with Scotus.

He says two things here: the Holy Spirit proceeds naturally and yet not through the mode of nature. The same is said by Scotus above in *(1, d. 10, n. 10)* — only the vocabulary varied. For Saint Thomas says "proceeding naturally on account of the natural relation" — that is, proportion — which it has to its principle, from which it proceeds as Love, which conforms to the will as the principle from which Love proceeds. This very thing Scotus says in that passage, n. 10, at the end: "the produced Love is proportioned both to the potency and to the object." Behold the relation of Saint Thomas, the proportion of Scotus. On account of it that act is called natural by Saint Thomas; the same is called necessary by Scotus in vocabulary. At the same place where he put the word proportion in place of relation, he said "necessarily" in place of "naturally" when he says: "The will is the reason for necessarily both willing and spirating" — the word "necessarily" containing the word "naturally," with only the vocabulary changed. Therefore in this they agree — Saint Thomas and Scotus, when they speak of the spiration of the Holy Spirit. Thus they agree in affirming that it proceeds naturally; and they agree much more in the other point, namely in denying that it proceeds through the mode of nature. Saint Thomas clearly: it does not proceed through the mode of nature — which Scotus transmits everywhere. And principally in *(1, d. 13)*, where he says that the processions of Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished because the Son's is through the mode of intellect or nature, and the other of the Holy Spirit through the mode of liberty. And in *(d. 10, q. 1, n. 10)* attacking the position that it proceeds not freely but through the mode of nature, he used the same words as Saint Thomas — "through the mode of nature" — and denied the same thing as he did. Indeed they also agree on the reason why the Holy Spirit does not proceed through the mode of nature. Scotus says repeatedly that it does not proceed through this mode because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will through the mode of liberty, and because liberty is in the principle of this production. Thus expressly in *(1, d. 13, § Against this, n. 12)*. Saint Thomas says from the will in *(1 p., q. 41, a. 2, ad 3)*: "through the mode of will." And a third time in that *Questions on Power, a. 2, in the reply to the fifth*: "freely, therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father."

He had said above: "It proceeds as Love." What more do we want? Scotus speaks with Saint Thomas. The Subtle Doctor agrees with the Angelic Doctor altogether

in this spiration of the Holy Spirit. It seems the Holy Spirit himself inspired them in this, lest they disagree and differ among themselves. It was fitting that when they were treating of Love, they should converse in a friendly manner.

Section II. Does Scotus Speak Correctly or Incorrectly in Saying that the Holy Spirit Proceeds Freely Through the Will?

This is the principal reproach that is cast against Scotus by the scholastic Thomists — that he harms the necessity of the divine Person, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit proceeds not necessarily but freely, and therefore contingently. This is imputed to him by Cajetan, Iavellus, Suarez, Vazquez, the Salamancans — all who wish to be and to be called Thomists — of whom some who speak more mildly in his regard censure in Scotus his mode of speaking. Let us free Scotus from this censure, which arose either from carelessness in reading, or from drowsiness in understanding, or from thoughtlessness in interpreting, or from perversity in expounding, or from malice in traducing, or — which I am deeply persuaded of — from a preoccupied judgment and bias in forming opinions. They come to Scotus imbued with the contrary opinion and condemn in Scotus what appears to them novel and unfamiliar, unwilling to hold as true what they had not previously conceived.

Let us show Scotus to be innocent, and to have spoken without harm, and that it is not without harm that the censure is affixed to him. I propose first what I stated above, and at which those censorious Catos marvel: that nowhere in Scotus is the procession or spiration of the Holy Spirit found to be free; it is always said by him to be necessary. He does indeed say that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely, is produced from a free principle, proceeds from a free will through the mode of liberty — while the word and signification of "free" always pertains to the potency, not attending the act of procession, so that a necessary procession issues from a free principle. Let Scotists and non-Thomists note this carefully. Here is the hinge of the whole matter. With this established, there is nothing for them to strive further against, nor for us to fear — indeed, for us to glory.

I bring forward first a capital testimony from Scotus that is as it were the foundation of the entire edifice I am constructing. In (*Quodlibet* 16, § *Here are three things*, n. 2): "I say that in the act of the divine will there is necessity in the absolute sense — and this both in the act of loving itself and in the act of spirating the proceeding Love, namely the Holy Spirit. This is thus evident, because God is necessarily blessed; therefore he necessarily sees and also loves the beatific object. Similarly, the Holy Spirit is God, and consequently supremely necessary in being; therefore, since it receives being by proceeding, that act by which it proceeds is simply necessary." And both conclusions are proved formally thus: "An infinite will stands toward the most perfect object in the most perfect mode of standing; the divine will is such; therefore it stands toward the highest lovable good in the most perfect mode in which it is possible

for any will to stand. But this would not be so unless it necessarily and by an adequate act loved it and also spirated its adequate love — because if any one of these were lacking, it could be understood contradictorily that some will stands in a more perfect mode toward the object: because that mode could be understood as more perfect, that mode does not include a contradiction because it is no contradiction that an infinite will have an infinite act regarding an infinite object, and therefore a necessary act, and also necessarily, because if it could fail to have such an act regarding such an object, it could be deprived of the highest perfection. Similarly if the adequate love of the object is spirable, as we believe, this belongs above all to an infinite will as the principle of spirating it."

From this testimony, set down in this way, it evidently follows that Scotus posited the necessary Procession of the Holy Spirit — indeed demonstrated it, and added that that act of Procession is so necessary that the necessity is drawn from the very notion of the Deity of the Holy Spirit itself. For it is spirated as necessarily as it is necessarily God. By this testimony, opponents are compelled to admit that Scotus considered the Holy Spirit to be not only necessarily produced but proceeding with the same necessity — and with that necessity by which it is God. With this established, it remains to see: for what reason did Scotus say that the Holy Spirit is freely spirated, and did he say so rightly or not?

It is evident that he did not say this in the sense that by the word "freely" he meant contingently — that is, that it proceeds freely because it could not proceed, and thus could fail to be God. God forbid. Therefore Scotus's sense is: the Holy Spirit proceeds freely insofar as the word "freely" is opposed to the word "naturally" — as is derived from the perpetual teaching of Scotus, who posits this as an evident axiom in (*1, d. 2, q. 7, § I say now to the question*): "that nature and will are altogether opposed productive principles and have opposed modes of principiating, which can never converge into one" — and confirms this in (*d. 10, q. 1*) where he says "naturally and freely primarily distinguish active potency," and in (*Quodlibet 16*) proves the same from Aristotle.

And indeed it is manifest that Scotus established the necessity of that Procession, and henceforth no one who reads me will be permitted to doubt it.

Now I come to the other part. Does he speak correctly in saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds freely? For this mode of speaking seems to signify indifference to being produced or not produced, to existing or not existing — in which the notion of liberty is constituted. Therefore when Scotus says the Holy Spirit is freely produced from a free potency, he seems to signify that it proceeds in such a way that it can proceed or not proceed — but what proceeds in this way does not proceed necessarily but contingently, since it can be otherwise.

I respond that this doubt arises from the preoccupied intellect and feeling of the opponents, who think liberty consists purely in that indifference to either side

— whether of contrariety or contradiction — and that the notion of free is placed in this alone, so that where there is no such indifference there can be no liberty. Let them set aside their own opinion for a while and hear Scotus. Liberty is not only that indifference but encompasses other forms as well, just as necessity is not only that determination to one side of contrariety or contradiction. There is also liberty from coercion and from servitude, which deny those necessities of coercion and servitude and abstract from that determination to one of the aforesaid sides — about which we have disputed fully and perspicuously in our work *The Curtain of Augustine* and another *On the Mind of Innocent*, and in the *Sacred Chest of Augustine* on the occasion of Jansenist and anti-Jansenist doctrine. We there set out the questions on the Liberty of God, the Liberty of Christ, the Liberty of Angels, and Human Liberty considered in itself precisely by nature — in the state of pure nature if such were granted, in the state of ruin after Adam's sin — and showed that liberty in its first concept is something common and quasi-generic. And I had not yet seen Scotus at that time; having now read him, I have perceived more distinctly and penetrated more deeply into the will.

Therefore: the Will is a potency distinct from the natural, which is not carried by an innate weight and impulse, nor driven nor capable of being driven by some other principle distinct from itself, but is by nature able to operate with a certain dominion and proper arbitrium, altogether self-possessing and self-commanding — and whatever mode it may operate, it never loses this. For it always operates through the mode of an uncoerced, not a servile will; a mistress, not a handmaid; spontaneously, not by compulsion; voluntarily, not naturally — retaining the liberty of the potency even in the highest necessity of acting, always freely and not indifferently — which is the ultimate species of liberty.

Thus we distinguish the free from the indifferent in the first of those acceptations of forms to which that general notion of Liberty is contracted before it reaches the indifference by which it is and is called indifferent. Hence new forms of freedom result, participating in that liberty — denoted by the removal of contrary forms. Namely: liberty from weight, from servitude, from coercion, from impression, from necessity. The first may be called erect, not inclined; the second mistress, not slave; the third spontaneous, not coerced; the fourth voluntary, not compelled; the fifth indifferent, not determined. All those four prior forms therefore prescind from this last of indifference and subsist in their own notion for themselves, whether the determination to one in operating is supposed or not supposed.

Granted this — which cannot be denied — there is not only the liberty of indifference that is liberty; but setting that aside there are other forms of liberty from which the true and proper denomination of the free is taken. This denomination is in conformity with the common teaching of Sacred Scripture and the Holy Fathers, with whom I have spoken in this sense. In *John VIII*, Christ

says: "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed." And Paul in *Galatians IV*: "With the liberty with which Christ has made us free." And in *Romans VI*: "Being freed from sin, you were servants of justice." And *James I*: "But he who looks into the perfect law of liberty" — these are not said in the sense of indifference by removal of necessity, but of dominion and power with the exclusion of servitude, as Augustine expounds in the *book On Nature and Grace*, *cap.* 66, along with that determined necessity to one side. The same liberty Augustine posited in *On Rebuke and Grace*, *c.* 12: "The first liberty of will was to be able not to sin; the last will be not to be able to sin." Certainly this is not the liberty of indifference, about which the same Augustine speaks at length and perspicuously in the same *On Rebuke and Grace*, *cc.* 11 and 12, and *lib.* 1, *Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians*, *c.* 2, and in the *Enchiridion*, *c.* 105, and *On Grace and Free Will*, *c.* 15. For it prescends from indifference and is liberty from sin, from misery, from necessity — the species of which Bernard enumerates in his *book on Free Will*, following Augustine, whom also the Master follows in (*2 Sentences*, *d.* 25).

Let us bring examples from Scotus, which are excellent. In (*Quodlibet* 2, *q.* 2, *q.* 1, § *Against the same*), toward the end he cites that passage of Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, *c.* 105: "It was fitting that man should first be so made as to be able to will both good and evil; but afterwards he will be so made as to be unable to will evil, and yet he will not therefore lack free will. For the free will will be much freer when it will not be able to be a slave to sin." Behold: with indifference to sinning and not sinning removed, a certain supreme other liberty remains in the will. And if you object that it is then no longer proper liberty, nor on account of it should the will be called free, Augustine responds in the same place: "For neither is the will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, nor is it to be said to be not free, with which the blessed so will to be blessed that they not only refuse to be wretched but are wholly unable to will it." Which Augustine likewise teaches in *On Free Will*, *c.* 7 — a testimony used by the Master of the Sentences in (*2, d.* 25) and irresistible in favor of Scotus's position. From this Scotus himself argues in that passage, (*1, d.* 10, *q.* 1, § *That is disapproved*, *n.* 10) — wishing to say that that will by which we will beatitude is free. And I add that Augustine is there speaking of the will of the Blessed, who can absolutely not sin nor be enslaved to sin, and of his free arbitrium in the state of obtained beatitude. It is about this that Augustine speaks when he says: "The arbitrium will be much freer when it will not be able to be a slave to sin."

Therefore, on Augustine's authority, without any indifference to sinning or not sinning in the Blessed, along with the supreme necessity of willing and acting well, there remains a more perfect liberty — such as is given in beatitude. And lest anyone object that a will so determined to one side is not free and therefore not a will, or at least is disordered and culpable, Augustine added: "For neither is the will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, nor is it to be said to be not free." Affirming by another example of the determined and necessitated will to will

Beatitude that in the supreme necessity of the beatific state of not sinning, liberty is preserved in the will — for in the man necessarily desiring Beatitude there remained a free and upright will with its integral liberty, which was a will, and right, not depraved, not culpable, and altogether to be called free, even given that necessity of willing what he could not not will, and which he therefore necessarily willed. Nor was it to be blamed, nor was it not a will, nor was it to be said to be not free — for those two negations affirm: both that that necessary will is upright and is a will, and that it is a free will to be called. Thus neither the nature nor the liberty of the will is destroyed by necessity and determination to one thing — from which it manifestly appears that with the power and liberty of indifference removed, another proper genus of liberty is given.

That Scotus spoke of this is evident when he said: "The Holy Spirit proceeds freely" — and he spoke altogether correctly and properly, together with Augustine, as appears from that passage and others.

Section III. The Objections of the Opponents Are Set Forth, Partly Refuted, Partly Retorted.

The opponents commonly object the acceptation of the free as the indifferent, and contend that Scotus ought to be speaking of this. We, together with Scotus, deny it — because we are outside the matter of merit — and we object and press three testimonies from Scripture and the Fathers, and above all three from Augustine. We press them either to say that Scotus agrees well with Augustine, or to deny that Augustine thinks and speaks correctly. Therefore both Scotus and Augustine are in the same position — and indeed such is Augustine's authority that they dare neither censure him nor abandon him. Therefore they strive to twist his testimonies and try to receive them in an alien, or rather, less proper sense.

The principal passage of Augustine, namely *Enchiridion*, c. 104: "For neither is the will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, nor is it to be said to be not free" — they alter, reading the second-to-last phrase thus: "or it is to be said to be free" — removing the word "not," which affirmed liberty, since placed at the beginning with the word "neither": which conjunction with "not" makes an affirmative sense — "neither is it to be said to be not free" meaning "it is to be said to be free." So that they might deny liberty, they remove "not" and read "or it is to be said to be free," so that "neither" would be constructed with the affirmation and would therefore produce a negative sense: "Neither is it to be said to be free." On this matter I had a long and vexatious dispute in Paris at the time of the Jansenist controversy with certain theologians, who wishing to put that passage of Augustine to their own uses would remove "not" and affirm that it is thus read in certain editions of Augustine — and to these, for love of truth and of Augustine, I vigorously opposed myself and maintained the genuine passage of Augustine with the retention of "not." And to prove my fidelity I searched through the principal libraries of Paris, and the manuscripts which are many and suitable in

them, and in all I found the particle "not." I recall carefully searching for it in the celebrated library of Saint Victor, and afterward in London, in Westminster, and in both places recognizing the same word. This I confirmed by the testimony of many who were present and with whom I had shared the matter.

One of those who cites the passage of Augustine without that particle "not" is Cajetan in the *Commentary on q. 41, a. 2, § Furthermore*, where citing Augustine on Scotus's behalf — as if he were adducing it for himself — he says: "He brings forth on this behalf the authority of Augustine: 'Or it is not a will, or it is to be said to be free.'" Cajetan cited the words badly. For in Scotus in the passage I produced in (*1, d. 10, q. un.*) it reads: "Neither indeed is the will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, nor is it to be said to be not free." Cajetan nonetheless captured and retained the sense of Augustine when he set it forth affirmatively: "Or it is not a will, or it is to be said to be free" — as if liberty is so affirmed that one must either posit it or, once it is removed, overturn liberty. To this testimony Cajetan gave absolutely no response, though he refuted Scotus's other arguments — which I find remarkable, for the whole force was in that passage. Perhaps, being acute, he feared its force, drew back, and departed without saluting Augustine.

But I am even more astonished at Vazquez — so great a theologian — that in the zeal to attack Scotus, having faithfully cited the words of Augustine when setting out Scotus's doctrine from that source, he perverted both the words and sense of Augustine in attacking it. And I wish to refute him precisely, and to show his lapse, lest it should be able to harm Scotus through his authority — which in that man is supreme.

Therefore Vazquez in (*c. 2 of disp. 161*) — having cited the passage from the *Enchiridion*, *c. 105* and adducing the other connected passage — says thus: "Augustine subjoins: 'Neither is the will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, if it is not to be said to be free' — replace 'or' with 'if' — 'with which the blessed so will to be blessed that they not only refuse to be wretched but are wholly unable to will it.'" Then Vazquez draws the conclusion on Scotus's behalf: "Therefore according to Augustine's position, the will is also free when it operates necessarily." So Vazquez, setting out Scotus's position. But then attacking in chapter IV and solving Scotus's arguments taken from the testimonies of Augustine: "I respond to the first: the reason Augustine says that our free arbitrium will be more free when it cannot sin is that beyond the liberty of indifference — which it will have regarding particular good — it will be free from the servitude of sin; therefore it calls it more free not because it is more indifferent but because it will be free from sin." This part of the response is retorted against Vazquez: therefore however it may be, Augustine called free a will necessitated to not sinning. Therefore liberty stands with necessity — not the liberty of indifference, but another — and therefore when Scotus posited this he agreed with Augustine.

But notice Vazquez's subtle fear: he added to Augustine from his own source what Augustine does not have — "beyond the liberty of indifference which it would have regarding particular good." As if Augustine wished to retain that liberty of indifference to one side of contrariety only, for that blessed will which he was positing. Certainly nothing was further from Augustine's mind when he said this, as will be plain to the reader — he was thinking only of the impossibility of sinning, which was necessary; otherwise Augustine would be arguing ineptly in that passage, where he wished to establish liberty from servitude from the impossibility of sinning, not from indifference to the good act along with remaining liberty. Otherwise the whole argument for liberty from the servitude of sin would collapse. One would say: that will is not free from the impossibility of sinning but from indifference to the good. Moreover the words of Augustine exclude Vazquez's interpretation: "The free arbitrium will be much freer which will be altogether unable to be a slave to sin." Therefore there was liberty from servitude, which prescinds from indifference.

Furthermore Augustine says "it will be so," that it cannot will evil, and Augustine, along with this impossibility of not being able — as Cajetan says — composes that liberty of not serving. Therefore he is treating of the liberty from servitude of sin alone, thinking nothing of indifference — which Vazquez, willing and unwilling, admitted, when adding in the same chapter IV: "It is said by Augustine that the arbitrium is more free when it cannot sin, because he seems there to be explaining of what genus of liberty he is speaking — namely not of indifference, which is our subject, but of another different one" — and in this he speaks with Scotus, whether it be from coercion, as Vazquez here signifies, or from servitude, as I think more likely and as Vazquez does not exclude; which I do not care about, provided only the genus of indifference is excluded.

I proceed further in expounding with Vazquez the second passage of Augustine. He adds: "Moreover, although we may call this mode of operating free, and so we could call the spiration of the Holy Spirit free, it should nevertheless be called natural" — this conflicts, O Vazquez, with Scotus and with the Aristotelian distinction of natural from free — "for it is always called natural from that necessary mode of operating which is proper to nature." This is certainly not true, for there is a great difference between the necessary mode of operating of nature and of will — otherwise Saint Thomas would not distinguish well, as we said above, "through the mode of nature" from "through the mode of will," even admitting natural necessity. In this Vazquez differs not only from Scotus but also from Saint Thomas.

He continues speaking. Here I wait for him in order to refute him. And indeed Vazquez continues: "Augustine immediately subjoins: 'Or it is not a will, or it is not to be said to be free, with which the blessed so will to be blessed that they not only refuse to be wretched but are wholly unable to will it.'" Stop, Vazquez: you are corrupting the passage. Where is that word "neither" placed at the

beginning of the testimony, which marks the affirmation? Augustine said: "Neither indeed is the will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, nor is it to be said to be not free" — so that "neither" governs those three phrases so as to affirm liberty and will, not to negate them. I appeal to yourself, Vazquez. You yourself cited in chapter II "Neither indeed." Why do you now remove "neither"? Therefore you pervert the sense when you infer: "Augustine therefore concedes it is not free" — understanding liberty of indifference, "although only in the mode for specification, in accordance with what we said in the preceding chapter." It is remarkable that this could happen to Vazquez, an acute and vigilant man — that he would say in so evident a passage that Augustine denied liberty. Let whoever wishes read Augustine's words and compare their sense with what precedes, and he will find that Augustine composed that liberty with that impossibility of sinning in the Blessed, and to prove that liberty adduced another example of the natural Desire for beatitude with the free will.

He truncated Augustine's authority by removing that capital particle "neither," and read affirming "or it is a free will" — against the faith and sense of the Author. Cajetan and other Thomists conducted themselves better — they understood the passage and saw that Augustine was speaking in this sense, affirming that in those cases the will is free with liberty from coercion and from naturality.

Moreover Vazquez contradicted himself. For earlier he had said: "Augustine sensed that our arbitrium will then be more free when it cannot sin, because beyond the liberty of indifference it was free from the servitude of sin." In that passage, on Vazquez's authority, Augustine gives two liberties — from servitude and from necessity in the will — and then afterward, on the same Vazquez's authority, Augustine denies that the will is free, when with another adduced example he intended to prove the same liberty he had posited.

Scotus cannot be attacked without Augustine, with whom he agrees, being also attacked.

But the opponents object that Scotus does not speak correctly, as Suarez says (*lib. 6, c. 3, n. 6, at the end*). I deny it, because he speaks with Scripture and the Fathers, and above all Augustine. But he does not speak, they say, with the Scholastics. Again I deny it. For he speaks with the Master in (*2, d. 25*) where: "Those who now live happily with the Lord, so that they cannot be turned toward evil either by willing or being able to, are not lacking in free arbitrium." And citing two passages of Augustine, he adds from the same: "For the free will will be much more free which will be altogether unable to be a slave to sin. Neither is the will to be blamed, nor is it not a will, nor is it to be said to be not free, with which the blessed thus will to be blessed," etc. He then says from himself: "By these words it is evidently established that after the confirmation of beatitude there will be in man a free arbitrium by which he will not be able to sin. For the further anyone withdraws from that servitude of sin, the more freely

he has judgment in choosing good. Hence the free arbitrium seems more rightly called free because without coercion and necessity it is able to seek or choose what it has determined by reason" — where by "necessity" understand servitude.

I accept the objection of the Scholastics, however. But I ask: who are those Scholastics with whom Scotus does not agree? Those, namely, who know only the liberty of indifference and reject others. I reply: but these reject other forms of liberty that Scripture and the Fathers acknowledge. Moreover, what is this liberty of indifference? For not even those Scholastics agree among themselves on it. Let them tell me. There is given indifference to the two sides of contrariety and contradiction; and there is given another indifference to only one side, which Vazquez admitted just now regarding particular good with determination toward the common good — which is distinct from the first total indifference. And such was in their position the liberty of Christ the wayfarer, in whom with the power of sinning removed there remained only the power and indifference to particular good or to the circumstances of good. About which of these are the Scholastics speaking?

Furthermore, speaking of indifference adequate to either side of contrariety and condition, one kind was Adam's in the state of innocence; another is in the state of ruin. The former was upright before original sin and integral; the latter inclined, and attenuated, and weakened — as the Council of Orange and the Council of Trent say — as we showed accurately in our *Curtain* and the *Mind of Innocent*, and in the *Euchological Harmony* at the end. Moreover in the state of pure nature, if such were given, there would be a different form of indifference than that which is given today in the state of fallen nature: that would be without original sin and without grace; this one composed with original sin and conjoined with the gravity of inclination toward evil.

Finally I ask: is that liberty of indifference in a state of equilibrium, constituted with equal power toward good and evil? Or is it inclined and weighing more toward one side than the other — as in one holy and just man more toward virtue than vice, in a sinful and impious man more toward vice than virtue? For I do not think they will say that in an equal balance for sinning and not sinning, Saint Lawrence was disposed to denying Christ and his torturers to confessing him — and yet the one, so prone to faith, was free to merit, and those, so inclined toward hatred of Christ and perfidy, were free to demerit.

What then was the liberty of indifference in those so diverse wills? When they have expounded this, let them proceed to attack Scotus's position concerning liberty and that genus of spirating freely of the will. But about these things we shall deal elsewhere with Scotus and in a more proper place.

I vindicate this: that Scotus has both sensed and spoken most correctly — and has no need to speak with certain Scholastics who are in no way superior to him.

He is the Author and Prince of his School: he has the power and authority to speak, gives laws to his own followers and does not receive them from strangers. He speaks with the Master and the Fathers: he is not bound to accept or observe those norms dictated to him by lesser men.

But in order to stop the mouths of all these Scholastics so that they no longer contradict Scotus, I affirm that Saint Thomas holds the very same position as Scotus and speaks in the same mode as he does. Hence both have the same cause in common, so that neither can be censured by the Scholastics without the other. Let the reader see a remarkable passage in the *Disputed Questions on Power, q. 10, a. 2, ad quintum*: "It must be said that natural necessity, by which the will is said to will something necessarily — such as happiness — is not incompatible with liberty of will, as Augustine teaches in *lib. 5, On the City of God*. For the liberty of will is opposed to violence or coercion. But it is not violence or coercion for something to be moved according to the order of its nature; rather, it would be violence if the natural motion were impeded — as when a heavy thing is prevented from descending to the center. Hence the will freely desires happiness, although it necessarily desires it. And so also God with his will freely loves himself, although he necessarily loves himself. It is necessary for him to love himself, inasmuch as he is good, just as he understands himself only as much as he is true. Freely therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father — though not possibly, but of necessity." Behold Scotus's genuine and authentic position. "Freely" therefore in both authors, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and necessarily without contradiction — in the same sense of liberty from coercion and violence, with the possibility of existing or not existing removed — in which consists the entire liberty of indifference and contingency, which both remove from the Holy Spirit.

I cannot here fail to marvel at Arriaga, a self-important man, who admits in both the production of the Word and of the Holy Spirit a necessary part and a contingent part by reason of knowledge and love of future things. Let us hear him in (*Tract. on the Trinity, d. 53, sect. 4, sub-sect. 4*): "The Word," he says, "as expressive of necessary things, just as knowledge itself is necessary, is prior to the contingent." And below: "I say: the Word absolutely speaking is not contingent; yet as expressive of future things, it can be called contingent." In the same place, n. 3: "You will say: therefore there are two partial words — one essential, another contingent — just as there are two knowledges, and consequently one can no less say there are two Words in God than there are two knowledges." And "this objection concerns the mode of speaking." And in the same place, n. 37: "Since therefore the nature of the Holy Spirit is the same as that which is in the Father, and which determines itself to love, the Holy Spirit formally speaking is free, although its personhood could not impede that Love or have it from itself." So speaks Arriaga — and no one censures him, though he reasons and speaks wrongly. For it is not the same for the Word to be about contingent things and to be contingent; nor should it be called in any way

"partial Word" — nor is this a question of name but of thing. Nor does the Word become partial because it encompasses a part of future things; that denomination of part cannot affect the Word, because it encompasses a part of the future. Otherwise a man knowing what beasts are would be a beast, and the Word that knows creatures would be a creature.

As for what Arriaga says — that the Holy Spirit in the sense in which he speaks is most formally free — this would serve Scotus's cause if Arriaga were among the number of those he usually attacks. And so we do not attach much importance to his reckoning.

We set more store by Molina — vehement and excessive asserter of human liberty — who nonetheless in (*1 p., q. 141, a. 2, d. 1, § 2*) says: "It must be noted that 'free' is sometimes taken as equivalent to 'spontaneous' or 'voluntary' in the broad sense, and is distinguished from 'coerced.' In this sense the Love by which God loves himself is called free and truly is free, although it is natural, necessary, and without the faculty for the opposite."

Judgment.

Scotus saw most acutely that the Procession of the Holy Spirit in itself is altogether and in every mode necessary; and in its cause — that is, in the will — and in the mode of proceeding from it, it is free with that generic liberty by which it is voluntary and spontaneous, free from coercion and impression and servitude, with full dominion and integral power of the will — in which dominion the liberty of the divine will is principally situated. This is in accordance with what we taught in the *Curtain* and the *Mind of Pope Innocent*, where we reduced all those forms of liberty, as to a root, to that dominion of the will over its own acts — of which it is mistress, and which it holds in its power, operating always as their mistress, by no one either coerced or compelled or commanded. This is the highest and most perfect mode of liberty, of which Scotus makes a splendid mention in this passage on the Procession of the Holy Spirit — a passage I had not at that time seen — where he makes a distinguished mention of dominion and authority of will: namely in (*Quodlibet 16, § These reasons, n. 4*), citing that celebrated passage of Augustine (*1, Retractions, 9 and 22*): "Nothing is so much in the power of the will as the will itself" — both regarding its own proper acts and regarding the acts of other potencies. And in the same quodlibet, in the addition, where he posed the question: in what does the intrinsic notion of liberty consist? He brings forward two things: one, that liberty consists in indetermination toward acting; the other, that it consists in domination with respect to its own act — using the same word we adduced, of Domination derived from Dominion, by which is signified the most noble liberty of the will, most distinctly different from naturality.

In this Citadel and Apex of liberty (outside the question of merit and toward that and the liberty with indifference which is not the subject here), Scotus — an

eagle of genius — pronounced that the Holy Spirit is freely produced and proceeds from the divine will, not naturally but freely operating. And he taught that with the supreme necessity of the procession, the liberty of producing is altogether consistent. In this he sensed and spoke correctly. Those who think otherwise and censure him do so maliciously in both thinking and speaking, and cannot in any way be compared with Scotus, who agreed and concurred with Scripture, the Fathers, the Master, and Saint Thomas. He is the Subtle Doctor, Author and Prince of his most subtle school, and in it he reigns and holds dominion like the will. Let those Scholastics go now — lesser birds certainly — and prescribe to the soaring Eagle rules and norms of flying, which he, flying far more aloft, mocks and scorns.

Collation VII, Difference II. On the Distinction of the Processions of the Begotten Son and of the Holy Spirit Who Is Not Begotten but Spirated.

(Addition to 13 of Scotus in 1 and Saint Thomas, q. 27, a. 4, and q. 36, a. 2, in the reply to the last argument which Scotus cites, q. un., § In another way, n. 3.)

"In another way," says Scotus, "it is posited that these productions are distinguished by the fact that one production is from one Person, the other from two Persons." And below, § *In yet another way, n. 6*: "In yet another way it is said that these emanations are distinguished by opposed relations — namely of prior and posterior — because one is prior to the other." And there he attacks both of these sharply.

Cajetan denies, regarding the first, that Saint Thomas is to be understood as Scotus affirms. For thus in the *Commentary on q. 36, a. 2, § In the reply to the seventh*: "Note that from these words it seems to be elicited that for Saint Thomas the divine emanations are distinguished by the fact that one is from one, and the other from two — as Scotus stated in (1, d. 13). But in reality what is said and what Scotus stated are as different as heaven from earth. To say that the difference is because one is from the Father alone, the other from Father and Son" — regarding the second, he objects nothing to Scotus concerning the understanding of Saint Thomas's mind. He only affirms that Scotus disagrees with Saint Thomas on the primary ground of distinction. He says (*in the Commentary on q. 27, a. 4, at the end*): "It is evident that Scotus in (1, d. 3, d. 1) disagrees with Saint Thomas in this — that he holds these processions are distinguished by themselves primarily, so that they agree in nothing."

Let us bring forward the words of Saint Thomas and afterward examine whether Scotus faithfully both cited and understood them, and weigh Cajetan's censure.

Saint Thomas in (*q. 36, a. 2, in the reply to argument 7*) says: "It must be said that the Holy Spirit is personally distinguished from the Son in this, that the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other. But the very difference of

origin is this — that the Son is from the Father alone, but the Holy Spirit from Father and Son. For otherwise the Processions would not be distinguished, as was shown above." This is the first reason for the distinction of processions drawn from the distinction of supposita.

The second is found in (*q. 27, a. 4, ad primum*), where the Angelic Doctor says: "From the side of this unity there cannot be taken the proper reason of this or that procession, by which the one is distinguished from the other; rather, the proper reason of this or that procession must be taken according to the order of one procession to the other. This order is attended to according to the reason of will and intellect." Here is the order of priority in that one is through the intellect and the other through the will, which by its nature is posterior to the intellect.

As for the first, let us defend the trustworthiness of Scotus and free him from the calumny of Cajetan. Let us examine the passage of Scotus as he cites the words of Saint Thomas: that they are distinguished "by the fact that one production is from one Person, the other from two." The force is in the number of Persons. This is what Saint Thomas intended when he said: "Distinguished by the fact that the Son is from the Father alone, the Holy Spirit from Father and Son." Behold the number — unity in the Father and duality in Father and Son — and this is the principle of distinction, as Saint Thomas adds: "For otherwise the processions would not be distinguished, as was shown above." Therefore he falls back on the unity of the Son in generation and the duality of Father and Son in the Procession or spiration of the Holy Spirit. And this is evident from the passage to which he refers back with "above" — namely, this very (*q. 36, a. 2, in the body*), where the Holy Doctor says: "It is necessary to say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son; for if it were not from him, it could in no way be personally distinguished from him," and he adds the reason: "For whatever in the divine things is said absolutely pertains to the unity of essence. It remains therefore that the divine Persons are distinguished from one another only by Relations."

And once again clearly for Scotus against Cajetan: "Hence just as the Person of the Father is one, so it would follow that the Person of the Son and the Holy Spirit would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. He requires therefore for distinction the duality." And again: "It is necessary to say: either the Son is from the Holy Spirit — which no one says — or the Holy Spirit is from the Son — which we confess." By these words of Saint Thomas, the duality of Persons is established — not as of such Persons, as Father and Son, but as of the plural, by force of number, since the Holy Spirit too is named in the plurality, and is not adduced as such but as another by number. Moreover from the question about the spirators and spiration, and about the multiplicity of concretes and mutual love, it is established that in Saint Thomas's position the plurality of Persons is altogether required, and that from it is taken

the reason for distinguishing and plurifying or uniting principles and productions.

From this Cajetan is convicted, who mocked the distinction attributed by Scotus to Saint Thomas, saying: "For there the sole difference between the unity and plurality of supposita is given as the cause, which is ridiculous, against which Scotus also labored." This part of Cajetan's position is refuted by what Saint Thomas said just above, and by the teaching of those questions which we explained. Nor is that ridiculous — it is rather most serious and suited to our purpose.

I proceed to the other part of Cajetan's position. "But here the order of origin between them is given as the cause." May I not live if Cajetan did not lapse and confuse heaven with earth — to repay him in kind. He confused and mixed up the cause of distinction, because we are asking for the cause that distinguishes the very origins and processions themselves, which Saint Thomas and Scotus both acknowledge to be distinct. Saint Thomas then says that the cause comes from the fact that one is from the Father alone and the other from two — Father and Son. Let the reader attend to what Saint Thomas says and he will see Cajetan's lapse.

Thus, in the reply to argument 7 in article 2, q. 36: "It must be said that the Holy Spirit is personally distinguished from the Son in this, that the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other." Behold: the processions are distinct. Let us inquire by what they are distinguished — and this is what Scotus labored at, to use Cajetan's phrase. Let us hear Saint Thomas: "But the very difference of origin is this — that the Son is from the Father alone, the Holy Spirit from Father and Son. For otherwise the processions would not be distinguished." What are we to do with Cajetan? He, thrown into confusion by Saint Thomas and by himself, disagrees. For he himself, reverting to Scotus's position, says: "The reason of origin cannot otherwise be preserved unless one is from Father and Son." What is this, Cajetan, if not saying with Scotus that the reason for distinguishing is taken from the two supposita? Where is that distance of heaven from earth? And where is that ridicule that you ascribed to it? In heaven are the Angelic Doctor and with him Scotus. Everything there is acute, ingenious, subtle — nothing is ridiculous there, except for what happened to Cajetan. We have vindicated Scotus's trustworthiness.

Let us look at the arguments. The first coincides with what Scotus adduced against Saint Thomas in (*1, d. 12, q. 1*) to prove that it is not intrinsic to the procession of the Holy Spirit to be spirated from two Persons — as we said in that question of mutual Love, and showed it to be convincing.

Scotus adds here an excellent example of whiteness, which by the fact that it is one and the same form always retains its own property of disbanding sight, and does not vary in itself with the positing of diverse subjects. Therefore if the

formal principle is one and the same in itself, it does not take its distinction from the divine supposita — in a case where it is distinguished — just as whiteness is not distinguished by the man and the stone in which it inheres while remaining the same in itself. Therefore when a distinction is given between forms, it must be taken from elsewhere than from the subject; and similarly generation and spiration ought to be distinguished from elsewhere, not from the supposita — since moreover these are distinguished by the origins from which the distinction results in the Persons which they constitute. For the reason the Son is the Son is because he is generated through the intellect; and the Holy Spirit is Love because it proceeds through the will.

The second argument is new and acute: given that ground of distinguishing through Persons, it follows that there is no repugnance for an infinite number of Persons in the divine things. For a third Person could posit a fourth, and a fourth a fifth, and there would be no sure reason for the Trinity if there were no other distinguishing reason preventing the Persons from being plurified. I explain the argument. Numbers in themselves are infinite and infinitely enumerable. Hence from the nature of numbers there arises, in things with no other repugnance removed, a progression to infinity — as appears in arithmetic numbers, which unless terminated by consonances and musical considerations will exist infinitely in the counting. So in the plurality of Persons, if their multiplication and distinction presents no obstacle from elsewhere — insofar as they are diverse in number alone — they will proceed to infinity.

The third argument of Scotus is: every distinction is reduced to certain things that are primarily diverse, which differ from one another according to themselves and by their formal concept. Such are not supposita and Persons according to their notion and formal concept; therefore another principle must be sought by which they are distinguished and placed in the character of such and distinct Persons — just as in animals, diversity is not to be sought in the character of animality in which they agree, but in the differential character of rationality, which, being diverse from opposed irrationality, distinguishes and diversifies animals. So the matter stands in the distinction of Persons of Son and Holy Spirit, to whom the notion of Person in its concept is common and the same — which is not the distinctive notion in other notions which they entirely contract among themselves, notions diverse in their concept.

By these arguments it is urged that the reason for distinguishing from number is not sufficient — number only imports individual and numerical diversity, not formal and natural diversity. Thus the first reason for distinguishing, produced by Saint Thomas, is attacked.

I proceed to the second. It is drawn from the fact that one production and relation is prior to the other, and the posterior presupposes the prior — that is, spiration presupposes generation. This reason is equivalent to order, by which name Saint Thomas and Cajetan call this distinction. This order cannot be the

principle of distinction: for of this order a cause must be given as to why one is prior to the other; therefore in that cause, not in the order, the distinction is to be posited — and this is Scotus's first most powerful argument.

The second is: subsisting relations are not distinguished primarily and through themselves from the relations of prior and posterior accruing to them, which already presuppose them as constituted in their being — nor does this pertain to the producing and the produced, as is the case with the relations of origin, but rather between the very relations of origin already constituted and distinct. To this second argument I add a third. The notion of order according to prior and posterior does not by itself induce the reason for distinguishing — and this is plain: for in the Father there is the relation of Paternity and the relation of Spiration, and in the Son similarly the relation of Filiation and of Spiration, from which there is one relation of the spirator — which are posterior to the others; and yet they are not distinctive of them.

From this it appears that Scotus rightly attacks the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor concerning the reasons for distinguishing Persons through order and number. His own he sets out in the same place, (*d. 13, q. un., § To the question, n. 18*), in these words: "I respond that the productions are formally distinguished by themselves. For Generation formally in itself is Generation, and Spiration formally in itself is Spiration. And from their formal notions it is impossible for Generation to be Spiration, with anything else whatsoever circumscribed by the impossible." He proves this by the authority of Augustine, and rightly. For once the concept of generation and spiration is known and penetrated, the distinction will appear — just as once the notions of rational and irrational are penetrated, the diversity of those differences will become plain.

This is further proved because there is not found, with these origins and processions themselves set aside, any other cause of distinction in the divine things. Therefore they are the causes distinguishing. This is clear: for whatever is before them is essential and absolute in God and their formal principle — and this is altogether one and common to the three Persons. Whatever is after them is distinguished and constituted by them — such as the Son, begotten, and the Holy Spirit, proceeding: the former by virtue of generation, the latter by virtue of procession. Therefore all distinction comes from them, with anything else set aside and, as Scotus says, circumscribed.

But Cajetan objects to Scotus in the *Commentary on article 4, q. 27, at the end*, when he expounds the distinction handed down by Saint Thomas, that Scotus said these two processions are distinguished by themselves primarily, so that they agree in nothing, and yet gave no argument to prove this. Cajetan concedes that according to Saint Thomas they are distinguished — but not by themselves primarily; rather by the differences accruing to them, which are intrinsically included in their definitions — namely proceeding through the mode of likeness and through the mode of impulse.

Before showing the weakness of Cajetan's response to Scotus, I note an inconsistency on Cajetan's part. What is this "formally virtually"? He says one thing: "they are distinguished formally by themselves," namely by the mode of likeness and the mode of impulse; he then says another thing: "they are not distinguished by themselves primarily." But "distinguished formally by themselves" and "distinguished primarily by themselves" are the same thing. Therefore he contradicts himself — or returns to Scotus's position which he is refuting.

First we acknowledge that Scotus — as we have just said — holds that these processions are formally and primarily distinguished by themselves, and we have proved this. We deny to Cajetan that Scotus held poorly or failed to prove it. The first is clear from the fact that what is "primarily" distinctive is that before which there is no other distinctive — but before these processions of generation and procession there is no other distinctive; therefore they are the primary ones that distinguish. The major is certain. The minor is proved by repeating what was said. Before these processions what exists in God is the divine nature and absolute predicates — these do not distinguish, since they are one and the same; therefore they are not distinctive. Those things that agree and cause agreement cannot be principles of distinguishing. Cajetan opposes intellect and will. But against this: intellect and will in the essential state are something absolute and common to all Persons. In the notional state they are posited through the very origins or processions themselves; therefore they do not precede their positing, nor their distinction.

Therefore the processions themselves remain the primary distinctives, having this from nothing else — just like ultimate differences. Cajetan objects again that they agree with each other in many quidditative predicates — such as: being a procession of a divine Person is immaterial. This objection proves nothing, because we are not treating here of their agreement among themselves in their essential predicates. For they must exist in order to differ. For how would they differ and distinguish unless they existed? They therefore exist, and in the fact that they exist they agree. For they are not nothing: but given their being they differ and distinguish. For ultimate differences are differences, and they agree in this, yet they differ by themselves while constituted and distinguishing.

But they are immaterial — let them prescend from this, just as ultimate differences do too. Nor does this destroy the notion of ultimate ones, which prescend from all agreement. Otherwise if Cajetan's doctrine were true, there would be absolutely no ultimate difference and there would be an infinite regress. For it is asked whether those ultimate differences agree in their differential and immaterial being — and having received the answer that they do agree, it is asked again: if they agree, they agree by something, and in that very thing in which they agree they must differ, and in that in which they newly differ they again agree, and so on to infinity. And so Cajetan's objection

collapses. In one word: they are differences and they differ and primarily distinguish, and in distinguishing and differing they agree — but this does not harm the distinction, because they prescend from those things in which they agree.

Now I object to Cajetan the censure rashly imposed on Scotus when he charges him with not having proved it. For Scotus proved it so clearly that when he said "the productions are formally distinguished," he immediately proved it saying: "For Generation formally in itself is Generation, and Spiration formally in itself is Spiration, and from their formal notions it is impossible for Generation to be Spiration, with anything whatsoever circumscribed by the impossible." This is Scotus's proper proof. But Cajetan will rejoin that this is not proving but eliciting the same from the same.

I respond first: distinctive things cannot be proved in any other way. For if they were proved in another way, they would not already be primarily distinctive. It would be inept for Scotus to prove through another middle term — for then he would contradict himself in proving. I give an example and refute Cajetan's objection. First principles are not proved, and it would be inept for anyone to demand proofs: it is enough to know and penetrate the terms, and they need no proof. And if it were given, they would not be first principles but conclusions. So the primarily and through themselves distinctive things cannot be proved through other distinctive things — otherwise they would not be primarily and through themselves distinctive. It is enough to penetrate and know their nature and notions so that those things may appear to be primarily distinctive. Scotus foresaw this most acutely in that passage when he said: "It is not necessary to ask by what they are distinguished, because the total formal notion of the one is not the same as the total formal notion of the other." And so he foresaw and forestalled Cajetan's objection long in advance.

As for Scotus's saying in § *I respond, n. 19*: "ultimate differences are by their whole being primarily diverse and agree in nothing at all" — this does not contradict the doctrine we have handed down. For Scotus does not deny that they have being and nature in their genus: for if they were not, they would not distinguish. Therefore he calls them processions and by calling them so presupposes that they are processions and agree in the fact that they are processions — but he does not care about this agreement in being what they are; he considers what they constitute and distinguish formally through themselves, not through something else outside them or in them, taken as something formally included from elsewhere.

Judgment.

The matter here requires sharp and mature judgment. It is established that Scotus both rightly understood and faithfully set out the position of Saint Thomas, and powerfully attacked his two arguments; and that he conceived and

fortified his own position splendidly. It is also clear that Cajetan unjustly criticized Scotus — both because he did not understand Saint Thomas well, and because he attacked him badly — while Scotus did both correctly, in interpreting and in arguing. This appears from our reasoning.

But what is to be thought of the distinction introduced by Saint Thomas and explained by Cajetan must be expounded perspicuously. For there is some difficulty in Cajetan's exposition. He places it in the *Commentary on article 4, q. 27, at the end*, as follows: "They are distinguished for him formally by those particles or differences intrinsically enclosed in their definitions — namely through the mode of likeness and through the mode of impulse — about which I strongly doubt whether it is true; and granted it is true, I powerfully attack it."

I take up the first point. Saint Thomas seems to hold variously and diversely on the distinction of these processions. For in the *Questions on Power, q. 10, a. 2*, he denies that they are distinguished by themselves, as Cajetan says; but in (*q. 27, a. 4, in the body*), on the same Cajetan's testimony, he affirms that they are distinguished by their own proper notions. Which, says Cajetan, is the same as being distinguished formally by themselves. And here I find difficulty — not only because of the contradiction affirmed by Cajetan, which the Thomists should take up with him, but because of the expounded reason for distinction.

For if they are distinguished by their proper notions, that is, formally by themselves, how does Cajetan a little later say they are not distinguished primarily through themselves, but through differences included in them? — and thereby refutes Scotus for saying they are distinguished primarily by themselves. For if they are distinguished through differences included in themselves, they are not formally distinguished by themselves as Cajetan says. Just as it cannot be said that man and horse are formally distinguished by themselves, since in themselves they include animal, through which they agree, not differ. Therefore it is not the same thing, as Cajetan wants, to be distinguished by themselves and to be distinguished by included differences. Hence Cajetan does not expound Saint Thomas well — nor does an acute man, sufficiently trained in philosophy, speak properly or aptly in terms of philosophy. Whether he says one or the other, he says it inaptly. For if he says they are distinguished by differences, he does not aptly say "by themselves." But if he says they are distinguished by themselves, he falls back into Scotus's position, which he is refuting — and affirms that they are distinguished primarily and through themselves, since those things that formally by themselves differ do not differ by some other prior difference than themselves, and therefore are distinguished primarily and through themselves.

This was the difficulty in my mind regarding Saint Thomas's position as expounded by Cajetan, which I judge to remain intact — and that the distinction of the origins or processions is not sufficiently established. I come to the second difficulty, which is much greater and more complex.

The doctrine handed down by Saint Thomas and received by Cajetan (*at art. 4, q. 7*) cannot be consistent with what is found in (*a. 2, q. 36, a. 7*). For here Saint Thomas teaches that the Origins or Processions themselves are distinguished by the fact that the Son is from the Father alone and the Holy Spirit from Father and Son — which doctrine is contrary to the one handed down above. For if the reason for differing is taken from the fact that one origin is from the Father and the other from both Father and Son, that reason for distinguishing formally through differences enclosed in the processions and origins themselves — namely through the mode of likeness and through the mode of impulse — which is taken from the diverse principle of intellect and will does not hold. And so it is handed down in (*a. 4, q. 27*) by the Angelic Doctor. Given the latter, that necessity of the other — from the Father alone and from the two, Father and Son — is not necessary. And I do not dare to resolve this. I refer it to the Thomists. Let them explain it to me — for I do not see how those doctrines can stand. They are distinguished because one is from the intellect with the notion of likeness, the other from the will with the notion of the mover and impulse, or through the mode of likeness and through the mode of impulse, as Cajetan says. And again: they are distinguished by the fact that one is from the Father alone, the other from the two, Father and Son.

The difficulty is increased because even these two distinctions and reasons for distinguishing are not sufficient. For Saint Thomas says (*a. 2, q. 36, in the body*) that another reason for distinguishing is required through the divided opposition between the Relations of Producing and Produced — without which, Saint Thomas says, no real distinction of Persons will be possible. For he uses this argument to prove that the Holy Spirit is really distinguished from the Son — because it is relatively opposed to him; otherwise it would not be distinguished from him. From this it follows that there are three Thomistic reasons for distinguishing. One on account of the mode of likeness and impulse taken from intellect and will; another on account of the unity and plurality of supposita; a third on account of the direct opposition of Relations. Therefore this distinction comprises three genera of differences — and the distinction of relations and Persons is not of one kind but of triple reason.

Scotus was content with one and rested, not multiplying differences without cause. Saint Thomas admitted a threefold one — each consequent to his own position. Saint Thomas, because he saw a difference in the mode of proceeding through the mode of likeness and impulse, posited the first distinction. Then, because he thought both were required through an intrinsic place for the production of the Holy Spirit as a Person and for their mutual love, he posited the second from the plurality of Persons. Thirdly, because he wished Persons to be distinguished only by having a direct relative opposition among themselves, he posited the third from the real opposition of the producing and the productive.

Scotus, because he held the contrary concerning the necessity of these reasons of mutual production and mutual intrinsic opposition, was content with that first and unique distinction of generation and spiration — without however denying the other that followed from it, the distinction of mutual opposition, which nonetheless was not considered necessary through an intrinsic place for the distinction.

Collation VII, Difference III. On the Increase of Charity: Whether It Occurs Through Greater Rooting or Disposition in the Subject, or Through the Addition of Degree to Degree.

State of the Question.

Scotus proposes this question in (*1, d. 17, q. 5*) under other words, and at the beginning proves it in accordance with the mind of the Angelic Doctor, and below, § *Opinion*, expounds it from the same as follows: "The opinion resting on the arguments made for the first part seems to say that, prescinding the form from the subject, there is no more and less in the form considered in itself through added reality; and because according to the authorities of the Saints more and less must be preserved there in some way, more and less must be posited there according to the inhering of the accident in the subject itself, which inhering is its being, and so the greatness of the accident, as regards the inhering, is attributed either to greater disposition of the subject or to greater removal of the opposing indisposing." (*Cited in the margin: 1, 2, q. 52, a. 1 and 2; and 2, 2, q. 24, art. 5 and 7; Metaphysics 2.*)

His own he declares in the same place after the arguments made for Saint Thomas, in this way: "On the contrary: if greater Charity had no more reality than lesser Charity, then the Charity of any blessed person would be equal in the nature of Charity to the Charity of Christ; and since according to Augustine (6, *On the Trinity*, c. 7): 'In incorporeal things to be greater is the same as to be better' — the Charity of any blessed person would be equally good and meritorious as the Charity of the soul of Christ; and thus any person would be equally essentially Blessed with Christ, because the essential reward corresponds to the quantity of Charity, which is impossible." So Saint Thomas according to Scotus, and Scotus in (*p. d. 17, q. 5*).

But because there are certain weighty theologians who have a less than clear perception of Saint Thomas's position and call it into doubt, and strive to draw it toward the contrary position, which is common to the schools — among whom is Vazquez in (*1, 2, d. 82, c. 2, n. 7 and c. 4, n. 18*) — it is necessary to prove diligently that he held the position for which he is commonly cited. For although the Thomists constantly affirm it and consider it unquestioned in their school, and it is enough that Scotus attributed that opinion to him, yet Vazquez's authority should not cause disturbance. I wish deliberately to show this.

In (1, *Sentences*, q. 17, q. 7, a. 2), therefore, having proposed the question "Whether Charity is increased by addition," he manifestly denies it, and affirms that it is increased according to the approach to the term and disposition of the subject, which the Thomists expound through greater rooting in the subject. Clearly, Saint Thomas proposing two positions selects the second on approach and approach toward the term, and refutes the first in these words: "This position arises from a false imagination, because they imagined the increase of Charity in the manner of bodily increase, in which an addition of quantity to quantity occurs." And he says: "I say that when Charity is increased, nothing is added there." And toward the end of the body he establishes that "the increase of grace occurs by the fact that the infused act is drawn out from imperfect to perfect." And he proved this by the example of heat and light, which insofar as they are drawn out through the action of an agent into greater perfection and assimilation of the agent — "according as the subject potency is ordered to the act, which indeed as far as in itself it is ordered to many things, is more and more terminated by that act."

Then in (1, 2, q. 52, a. 2) treating of the increase of habits in the body: "It has been said," he says ((*art. 1*) is cited), "that the increase and decrease in forms that are intensified and remitted occurs in one way — not from the side of the form itself considered in itself, but from the diverse participation of the subject; and therefore the increase of these habits and other forms does not occur through the addition of form to form, but by the fact that the subject more or less perfectly participates in one and the same form — just as through an agent that is actually hot something becomes actually hot, as if newly beginning to participate in the form, not as if something were being added to the form." And he attacks this powerfully, and in the reply to the third objection: "That which is not yet white is in potency to the form itself, as not yet having the form — and therefore the agent causes a new form in the subject. But that which is less white or warm is not in potency to the form, since it already has the form in act, but is in potency to the perfect mode of participation — this it acquires through the action of an agent."

Moreover in (2, 2, q. 24, a. 5) asking "whether Charity is increased by addition," in the body he denies it and concludes by proving: "It remains therefore that Charity can in no way be increased through the addition of Charity to Charity, as some posit. Charity is increased solely by the fact that the subject more and more participates in Charity, according as it is more reduced to act by it and more submitted to it. For this is the proper mode of increase of any form that is intensified, because the being of this form totally consists in inhering in the subject; and since the greatness of a thing follows the being of the form itself, for a form to be greater means for it to inhere more in the subject — and not for another form to come. He adds: Charity is increased by the fact that it is intensified in the subject, and this is for it to be increased according to essence — not by the fact that Charity is added to Charity." He hands down the same in

(*q. 1, on virtue, a. 11*) in these words: "Some supposed that Charity, or any infused virtue, is increased through the addition of Charity to Charity, or of virtue to virtue, or of whiteness to whiteness — which cannot stand at all."

From these passages it is manifest that Saint Thomas held: the increase of Charity does not occur through the addition of its degree to degrees of the same — as he thinks concerning the universal genus in (*lib. 7, Metaphysics 2*) — and thus Cajetan understands and expounds it in the *Commentary on article 2, q. 52, 1, 2*, and on *articles 4 and 5, q. 24, 2, 2*, where thus: "It is plain that intensification does not occur through addition of degree to degree, but through greater drawing out of the form from the potency of the subject, or something proportionate; and therefore in the text it is said that for a form to be greater is for it to inhere more in the subject, and therefore at the close of the article it is said that intensification does not occur through the addition of a new form." With Cajetan all the more recent Thomists agree, and before him Aegidius in (*Quodlibet 7, q. 14*), Capreolus in (*1, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, Conclusions 3, 4, 5*), Hervaeus there and (*Quodlibet 6, q. 1*), and Soncinas (*lib. 8, Metaphysics, q. 22*), Iavellus in the same place, Medina, Martinez, Zanardus in the same *Metaphysics 2, q. 6*, and the Complutensians in *Physics, d. 4, q. 9*, Conrad in (*1, 2, q. 52, a. 2*), Medina in the same place, Soto in (*4, Physics, text. 84*), Martinez in (*1, 2, q. 52, a. 2*), Zanardus in (*8, Metaphysics, q. 10*). Vazquez also cites Diego de Astud in (*lib. 1, On Generation, q. 9, § These having been supposed, I hold*). Thus all schools of Thomism defend this position, and I have often seen it handed down and maintained by all Thomists in discussions. It is only that they change the terms of Saint Thomas — approach, nearness, drawing out, disposition — which I find in him, into the term greater rooting in the subject, with the same meaning however preserved inviolate. Nor do the conjectures which Vazquez adduces militate against so perspicuous an assertion. Therefore let it stand that Scotus faithfully set out Saint Thomas's position as received by his school.

Section I. The Position of Saint Thomas — That the Increase of Charity Does Not Occur Through the Addition of Degrees to Degrees of the Same, but Through Greater Rooting or Drawing Out in the Subject — Is Attacked by Scotus.

The common school of nearly all Philosophers and Theologians abandoned the above-related and expounded opinion of Saint Thomas and the Thomists. Thus Albert the Great before Scotus in (*1, d. 17, a. 10*), and Saint Bonaventure in the same (*p. 2, q. 1*), Henry in (*a. 1*), Richard in (*q. 2, a. 2*), and Henry in (*Quodlibet 8, q. 5*) and (*Quodlibet 4, q. 15*) held the addition of degrees. After Scotus: Ockham in (*q. 6*), Gregory in (*q. 4, a. 1*), Gabriel in (*q. 4, a. 2*), Marsilius in (*2, q. 1, a. 1*), Niphus in (*8, Metaphysics, disp. 5, 6, and 11*), Toletus in (*1, On Generation, c. 3, q. 4*), Vazquez in (*1, 2, d. 82, cc. 3 and 4*), Suarez in (*Metaphysics, d. 46*), Hurtado in (*Physics, d. 5, ec. 4 and 5*), Aversa in (*q. 23, sect. 6 and 7*), Rubeus in (*On Generation, c. 4, tract. q. 5*), Arriaga in (*On Generation, d. 3, sect. 1, sub-sect. 3, n. 17*), Granado in (*1, 2, cont. 4, d.*

38, *n. 1*). The contrary position on addition of degrees to degrees they hold and prove, and they attack the Thomistic position of greater rooting in the subject.

Before bringing forward Scotus's arguments, it is necessary to understand well and explain the mind of Saint Thomas, so that the objections may proceed better. That greater rooting of a quality — for we are in the sphere of Philosophy — in the subject has always seemed difficult to me. And this is plain from the diverse modes of expounding it that were devised by the Thomists themselves, which Vazquez sets out carefully and as usual in (*d. 82, c. 2*), among which there is great variety.

The reason that moved me to doubt it was this: either that rooting is a greater penetration into the subject — so that heat, for example, first produced enters more deeply and inheres more intimately — or that it removes the impediments of the subject and by removing them more and more disposes it, granting it greater effect — which Cajetan says — or that it is more eminent through a more perfect drawing out from the subject. For nothing else can be devised, once the addition of degrees is removed. These modes, however, have their own difficulty — which I used to encounter while reading Saint Thomas most attentively, using the example of light which he uses in the passage we cited above (*1, d. 17, q. 1*). For we see that light in crystal or other purest subjects is much more intense than in other dense and obscure and impure bodies, so that the same solar ray striking a crystalline and polished body illumines far more than when received by an impure and muddy body. But this does not come from the addition of degrees, since the solar ray is entirely the same. Therefore that greater force and intensity of light comes from elsewhere — namely from the better disposition of the subject and greater rooting of the light in it and removal of impediments to receiving and giving back light.

And this ratiocination certainly renders probable Saint Thomas's explanation, which I formed for myself, received from no Thomist, and referred to the mind of the Angelic Doctor. With this expression left in the middle, let us come to Scotus's objections.

The first: we experience qualities being intensified and remitted — and the intensified ones do not admit others equally intensified, while the remitted ones do admit them; and those in the same subject cannot be, while the remitted ones can be. How does this come about? Not from the side of subjects — therefore from the side of forms, which bring with them that impossibility.

The second: through change something is acquired; the intensification of a produced quality is a change — therefore something must be acquired; not a form that was already produced — therefore some new degree of it.

The third: with the agent — such as fire — continuing its heating, the subject becomes more warm, not through itself, nor through something else that is not warm — therefore through a new degree of heat produced in it.

The fourth: that greater perfection and more intense form in the subject is not the disposition of the subject, because the subject susceptible is from itself disposed to the reception of the form which is induced antecedently to it — therefore after it is received, the subject is not now being disposed but perfected by the induced form. And if not, let it be asked by what it is newly disposed and perfected — nothing presents itself except the form. To this argument I add from my own stock: that it is disposed toward some form it is disposed toward; therefore the subject that was being disposed toward it before the form — the form having been received, if it is newly disposed — is disposed toward a new degree of the form.

The fifth: either this disposition is from the remiss to the intense, or from the intense to the remiss; it cannot be from the intense to the remiss, because intensification does not dispose toward the remiss but toward the more intense; but if it is from the remiss, by what does this disposition occur if not through the demand of the remission in the form? — which demands from itself both intensification and perfection, with the subject behaving passively toward the disposition and the new degree of the form coming.

The sixth militates against the removal of the contrary impeding the perfection of the induced form. Given a pure and polished subject, there is in it no contrariety, no impediment to the form — therefore in it there is no place for the removal of impediment. This is shown by the example of the Angel in the state of innocence. There was no impediment to Charity, and yet some loved more or less and grew in charity. Therefore the argument taken from the removal of impediment does not hold.

The seventh: against greater rooting in the subject. Either that rooting is some absolute form or a relative one. If absolute, it is in itself greater and lesser — and we have the intensification. If relative, it cannot be made greater or lesser unless through the more and less in the foundation — therefore recourse must be had to the more and less of the form.

The eighth: a form less rooted in the subject can be greater and more intense than a more rooted one — therefore the intensification does not come from there. The assumption is plain from the example of redness arising from shame, suddenly arising greatly — it is greater and more intense than the redness that is innate to the rose. Therefore greater rooting is not the cause of greater intensification.

To these are reduced Scotus's arguments, which are certainly effective and attack all the modes devised by the Thomists to defend Saint Thomas's position, and seem to undermine it.

There remains that example of light that I brought forward from Saint Thomas and adapted to his use. I refute it in this way: that force and intensity of light in crystal or a mirror does not come from greater rooting in the subject — on the

contrary, it comes from the repulsion and rejection of the subject, which reflects back the light, causing its refraction, by reason of which the light operates more strongly. Indeed this is where the argument is retorted — because without rooting and deeper penetration of the subject, the light is rendered more vigorous and more intense, and the less it is in the subject the more intensely and vigorously it operates.

There remains one particular and special argument against Saint Thomas's mode of speaking in the subject matter of Charity, which Scotus places here (*q. 5, § On the contrary*), and it is as follows: "If greater Charity had no more reality than lesser Charity, then the Charity of any person would be equal in the nature of Charity to the Charity of Christ. And since according to Augustine (*6, On the Trinity, c. 7*): 'In incorporeal things to be greater is the same as to be better' — the Charity of any blessed person would be equally good and meritorious as the Charity of the soul of Christ; and thus any person would be equally essentially Blessed with Christ, because the essential reward corresponds to the quantity of Charity, which is inconvenient."

Section II. Scotus's Position on the Addition of Degree to Degree Is Confirmed, and Various Difficulties Pertaining to It Are Removed.

I am accustomed to use an argument found by myself that is suitable for proving this common Scotistic position. The accidents that remain after the consecration in the Holy Eucharist without a subject cannot receive intensification and remission on account of it, and yet they are capable of remission and intensification — therefore this comes from the increase or diminishment of the form, according to addition or loss of degree.

The assumption is plain from evident experience. And as regards remission it is more manifest, since Whiteness through continuation becomes more obscure with its brightness diminished and disbands the sight less. As for intensification, it is not found in this case, because through continuation over time Whiteness is not intensified but remitted. But the same reason applies for remission and intensification insofar as proving that degrees there is a multiplicity in quality. And Vazquez uses this similarity (*d. 8, c. 4*). Nor does there fail to appear in the consecrated Host an intensification more through degrees. For the host is colder in winter than in spring, and warmer in spring than in winter. Therefore intensification too is detected — which cannot be on account of the subject, therefore on account of the form itself.

But they will respond: this occurs through diverse rooting in quantity, which removed from matter remains sustaining accidental qualities in itself. But I refute this. Because quantity is not properly the subject but the substance; otherwise the Eucharistic accidents would be said to be in a subject — which no theologian acknowledges. Second, and more forcefully: because quantity itself undergoes changes according to itself. For sometimes it is softer, sometimes

harder, sometimes more rare. Therefore quantity itself without change on the part of the subject is affected and changes in varied ways — receiving not now losing quantitative parts, but receiving in them new and varied qualitative affections, which, although they are not additions of proper degrees of quality, nonetheless preserve proportion and similarity to them, and at least overturn that argument drawn from rooting, disposition, and drawing out of the subject.

On the basis of this Eucharistic example, Saint Thomas's position is refuted, and from it the objection about Individuation — which he wishes to be taken in order to matter or the subject, and from which the Thomists draw an argument against Scotus that those accruing degrees are nothing because diverse ones cannot be in one subject — is refuted. For they are refuted by the example of the accidents in the Eucharist, which lack a subject and have distinction and a certain individuation; and if those accidents there can be remitted and intensified, those degrees that newly come are distinguished by themselves, not through the subject which is altogether nonexistent after the consecration.

Since therefore in this principal foundation of Individuation the fabric of the Thomistic opinion of rooting and drawing out from the subject consists, with it collapsing the edifice of that position falls — since Individuation is not taken from it but from the entity itself of the form, which can only be produced in the singular and in a singular action, and therefore is individuated by its own constitution.

Then this common position on the intensification of quality through degrees is proved; because from Aristotle in the *Categories*, quality takes on more and less, and through it the subject is said to be more such — but this cannot occur through the essence, which is not increased or diminished, nor through deeper inhering and greater rooting in the subject. For in that case quality would be said to be more such from the subject, not the subject from the quality. It is therefore necessary to establish those degrees newly coming for that axiom to be verified.

Those degrees, moreover, are apt for composing one among themselves — just as in the accretion of quantity, parts that come to it compose and by themselves make it greater through the addition of parts of the same kind; and just as flesh added to flesh and water added to water does not change the species or alter the nature of the flesh or the water to which it is added, but only increases it; so degrees of quality newly coming to a produced quality do not overturn or pervert the quality to which they accede by composing, but intensify and increase it with new degrees successively accruing — without losing the proper individuation, but with new perfection acquired.

In the case at hand concerning the intensification of Charity, that which in its own substance, so to speak, is supernatural, grows and is increased through new degrees — whether it be act or habit. For one who elicits an act of remiss love,

and gradually with increasing divine help in himself intensifies it, feels himself kindled and inflamed more and more until he blazes. But how this can occur through greater rooting in the subject — which I do not see how it can be felt — nor how that rooting in a spiritual subject can be perceived? For what deeper introduction and more profound inhering can be conceived there, where the subject is indivisible?

Moreover: that ardor of charity which sometimes affects the body and produces wondrous effects in it — of ecstasy, rapture, elevation — how does it through that greater rooting and inhering reach to what only bursting flames can reach? And indeed that greater rooting seems to conflict with greater drawing out. Since rooting signifies depth, descent, and immersion in the subject — but drawing out signifies emergence and ascent from the subject to prominence, not pertaining to depth.

Nor should the Thomists object that celebrated passage of Aristotle in the *Predicament on quality*, where he says: "For qualities also receive intensification and remission. For one thing is called whiter, and one thing is said to be more just or less just than another; but this occurs in most cases, not in all qualities. For whether justice is more or less justice is a question, and the same happens in other affections." And so on.

From this it appears that not all qualities are intensified and remitted as material ones are; because spiritual ones, as justice is, did not receive more and less — since by it no one became more or less just; but this came from the mode of existing in the subject, from which that denomination would arise from the verb to be and to exist — that one is more just than another — just as from the verb there arose the statement that one is in better health than another. Which, although Aristotle did not say from his own position, he nevertheless did not disapprove the opinion of those who so thought.

I respond nonetheless: first, we have from Aristotle that material forms, such as Whiteness, are intensified and remitted in themselves and through themselves — from which it follows that through these things someone is called more or less such and qualified. About immaterial things, however, some other philosophers held the contrary — with Aristotle neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Therefore nothing against Scotus is gathered from that text.

Father Gabriel Vazquez — from whom nothing learned is hidden — brings forward this text and notes that the translation of the cited text is not adequate, namely Perionius's; in place of which he substitutes a better one by Argyropylus and Boethius, in accordance with which he says Aristotle favors the common position. Vazquez is right in this, that Perionius's translation — which is the one commonly found through addition of degrees — is less conducive to the Scotistic intensification than the Boethius version. And his observation pleases me. For Boethius with Argyropylus translates thus: "But the qualities themselves

receive degrees, and are called more such and less." These are far clearer than Perionius's: "Qualities also receive intensification and remission" — with no mention of degrees.

Furthermore that part of Perionius's translation: "that justice greater or lesser, or health health, ought not to be said" — is not accurate. For it should read: "they are uncertain whether justice can be said to be more or less, or whether health can be said to be more or less." For Aristotle uses adverbs "more" and "less," not the adjective-comparatives "greater" and "lesser" — as in Greek it is *mallon* and *iton*, which Argyropylus and Boethius used. Therefore aptly Vazquez, and I agree with him — knowing from assiduous reading of Aristotle that Perionius sometimes drowsily translates his texts and does not altogether render his sense — about which Lambinus often remonstrates with Perionius in the interpretation of the *Ethics*, and Theodore Zwinger agrees with Lambinus: whose translation I use when expounding the *Ethics* in Padua as I write these things. Indeed the same Theodore notes that Saint Thomas, in adhering to his interpretation, sometimes deviates from Aristotle's mind. That this is true I have gathered from long and careful reading. On this point I have some dispute with Vazquez and my Complutensian teachers about the mind of Aristotle, who receive and expound it with Vazquez thus — saying that Aristotle denied that justice and health in the abstract are more and less justice and health in the essential sense, not the gradual sense: that is, that one remiss Justice is not less justice than another in its essential notion, nor is one intense justice more than another in its essential notion. And so the gradual sense is not excluded. One can say greater and lesser justice according to degrees of intensification and remission, but not more and less justice according to the nature and essence of the quality.

From this it is established that Perionius interprets Aristotle wrongly in this part in translating and interpreting. The Complutensians teach in (*In the Predicaments, ad cap. 8, On quality*) that quality does not receive more and less logically, but does receive more and less physically.

However, with all respect to the Complutensians and Vazquez, Aristotle's meaning in that passage is different. For Aristotle there is not speaking in the sense of nature and essence — in which it is altogether certain that not only justice and health, but absolutely no material quality either can receive more and less. For no sane person, let alone philosopher, could have doubted this. But in the other properly gradual sense — that of greater or lesser intensification — and in this he places the difference among qualities: that some receive more and less through intensification and remission of degrees, while others do not at all.

Therefore Aristotle's position was the same as Plato's and the other philosophers of the same period, as Alexander and Boethius relate on this text, and Albert the Great in the *Treatise on Quality, c. 9*: the abstract of certain qualities does not in itself receive more and less — as justice and health — but in the concrete it does,

and renders subjects more and less such in the concrete sense. And this is what Aristotle says on the opinion of others: "Some contend about such things — that justice ought not to be said to be more or less justice, or health more or less health." And immediately: "Yet those things that are called such by these receive degrees without controversy — they are called more and less such." What could be plainer?

Nor does Aristotle speak here only from the opinion of others but from his own — for immediately after the examples of triangle, square, and circle he subjoins: "Therefore not all qualities receive degrees, so that they are called more such or less." Therefore Aristotle always spoke in the physical sense, not partly in the logical and partly in the physical sense — since the logical comprehends absolutely all qualities and does not admit this difference.

So much for the interpretation and sense of Aristotle's text. Now let us come to the argument from it against our position on the addition of degree to degree. For if that is the sense of Aristotle's passage that we proved, the argument holds. For Aristotle, by denying the addition of degrees to justice and health in the abstract, seems to deny the same in the concrete — for this follows through an intrinsic place. A quality that lacks degrees in itself cannot give them to the subject to which it accrues. Justice lacks degrees in itself — therefore it cannot give them to the subject. This argument convinces: for the intensification and remission must be taken from elsewhere. And there is nothing else from which it can be taken except from the subject and its greater affection toward it, or greater rooting in it — and thus we revert to Saint Thomas's position.

I respond: the truth of the interpretation of Aristotle's passage is consistent with the truth of Scotus's position, and both agree excellently. Because Aristotle considered justice and the other virtues not to be simple qualities but complex ones made up of many acts and habits — just as he also judged sciences to be. Therefore in themselves they do not have degrees more or less intense, as simple qualities do; but they are composed of diverse acts and habits, whose unity is not one but ordered, and from these a collection in the subject is made — through this collection one person is made and called more or less just. And this is plain from the example of health, which is not one and simple quality but multiple and complex, resulting from the proportion of humors to the temperature of justice collected, through which a man is made healthy and healthier without addition of degrees.

This is also confirmed from the example of Grammar which Aristotle uses — which, being an art, is not simple but composed of various cognitions, and therefore lacks gradual intensification, as other sciences do. Although Saint Thomas thinks that sciences are simple qualities in (*1, 2, q. 54, a. 4*) and his school follows him in this, the common doctrine of the Scholastics denies this with Scotus in (*lib. 6, Metaphysics, q. 1*) and with the Nominalists in the *Prologue to*

the Sentences, and the Complutensians teach (*In Logic, at lib. 2, Post., c. 23, q. un., a. 2*) together with Toletus, Fonseca, and Suarez, who are of the same position.

Added to this is that Aristotle subjoined the example of triangle, square, and circle — which are figures, and therefore from the genus of quality. Yet they are not capable of gradual intensification and remission. Therefore such qualities make their subjects specifically such, but not more or less such — as Perionius translates — because in themselves they do not have, nor bring with them, those degrees of simple qualities; but through the plurality of diverse acts and habits, which if it is greater makes the subject greater, from which the denomination of more just and more wise will grow, and they will receive more and less in the concrete — which they cannot have in the abstract.

Therefore they will not be called more or less justice and science in the abstract; but in the concrete the men in whom they are will be called more just and more wise. This is the genuine mind of Aristotle, from which Perionius, if he so understood it, did not err in this part in translating and interpreting.

But the Thomists will again object: therefore Charity is not intensified through degrees, since it is a virtue — and thus a conclusion against Scotus is drawn. I deny the inference, because Charity and the other two theological virtues are each simple qualities, not complex. The reason is different — because, as the Complutensians aptly note in that single article, n. 3, Charity and Faith (the same is to be said of Hope) regard a unique notion and motive of tending toward God, which unity those other virtues and sciences do not have. And therefore they fall away from the notion of simplicity and exclude gradual intensification, which those three theological virtues admit. And thus the emerging objection is solved, and Scotus's doctrine stands firm.

SECTION III. What Is the Nature of These Degrees — Are They of the Same Kind or of Different Kinds?

This question remained to be addressed for the sake of completeness, and it is genuinely difficult. Suárez and Vásquez make it more difficult still by holding contrary positions, as they usually do. Vásquez treats the matter at length in his commentary on *I–II, disp. 82, ch. 6*; Suárez does the same in his *Metaphysics, disp. 46, sect. 1, n. 33*. The first opinion holds that the degrees of intensity are dissimilar and of different kinds — heterogeneous, as they say — such that they differ in their entitative perfection, stand in a relation of order and dependence upon one another, and each presupposes the one before it. This is the view of Suárez, with whom agree Aretius (*lib. 1 de generatione, q. 26*), Hurtado (*disp. 5 de gen., sect. 6*), and formerly Fracastoro (*libro de sympathia et antipatia, cap. 6*). The second opinion holds that these degrees are entirely of the same kind — similar and homogeneous, as they say — differing only by individuation. This is the position followed by Vásquez, who cites in its support Nyphus (*8 Metaph., q. 11, cap. 14*); it is also held by Suessanus (*8 Metaph., disp. 11, cap. 4*), Rubius (*tract. 3, q.*

5), Forliniensis (*tract. de intensione, cap. ult.*), and Aversa (*tom. 1, q. 23 de qualib., sect. 7*). Scotus is cited in favor of this view at *In I, dist. 17, q. 4*, a passage on which we shall pass judgment later alongside the Scotists, as Poncius himself notes in following them (*3 p. sui Cursus Philosophici, d. 2, q. 4, concl. 37*). Yet the question must be decided here, because the Thomists press us with the following argument: the degrees of addition within the same quality are either of the same kind or of different kinds; they are not of the same kind, nor of different kinds; therefore they do not exist at all. They then prove each limb of this dilemma using our own arguments, exploiting our internal disagreement to turn our own weapons against our common position. It is therefore necessary to resolve the dispute and remove the occasion for contradiction by establishing the more probable side.

For my part, I see clearly that the truth of our position does not depend on the prior question of what kind of degrees these are, and it is a clumsy manner of arguing to deny a thing merely because we are ignorant of its mode. On this point Augustine speaks excellently (*tom. 7, lib. 4 de Anima et eius origine, ad Vincentium Victorem*), where he demonstrates that many things in nature exist and occur whose modes and causes we do not know. I shall content myself with two examples before turning to the question. What is more obvious than vision through the eyes? And yet, if this manner of arguing has force, vision could be called into doubt in the following way: either vision occurs by the emission of rays or by the reception of species; it occurs by neither mode; therefore vision does not exist. Again, what is more certain in philosophy than that there are supposita among human beings and persons in the Godhead? If someone were to argue against this in the same way we have just described, that certainty would be rendered doubtful. Created subsistences either consist in something positive or in something negative; they consist in neither; therefore they consist in neither; therefore they do not exist, since there is no third possibility. This is the case for human beings. In the case of divine persons: either a relation expresses a perfection or it does not; neither is established; therefore it is uncertain that there are persons in God. All of this is entirely absurd, because the truth of the things in question is prior to that of the modes which follow upon them, and that primary truth does not depend upon the secondary one. The same applies in the present case. It is acknowledged by all Scotists and nearly all others that there are degrees in qualities. What kind of degrees they are is not acknowledged, because it is not clear in the same way that the first point is clear, nor does it rest on the same grounds; and it pertains to the mode that follows upon the asserted reality. Even if that mode is unknown, it in no way damages the truth of the matter. We should therefore labor over this less for the necessity of proof — which is none — and more for the sake of thoroughness and the perfection of the question we are undertaking to explain.

First Opinion — Suárez

The first opinion, that of Suárez, holding that the degrees are of dissimilar and different kinds, is proved as follows. First, if it were true that degrees of qualities are homogeneous, it would follow that a like can act upon a like, which is contrary to the common axiom of the philosophers. The inference is clear, because heat at two degrees, acting upon heat at two degrees, would receive from it one and two degrees of entirely the same kind, and so would be acted upon by a like — since that second heat would individually introduce its first degree into the patient in which there were already two similar things, that is, two degrees. Indeed, it would follow that the agent and the patient are entirely the same thing.

Second, because one degree of one contrary form can coexist with seven degrees of the opposite form — for example, one degree of heat in a subject that is cold to the seventh degree — therefore it expels only one opposing degree and tolerates the remaining degrees alongside itself. But if all degrees were equal, there would be no greater reason why it should tolerate seven degrees alongside itself and yet expel an eighth, unless the eighth degree were dissimilar to the others and on account of that dissimilarity stood in a special kind of opposition to that first degree of the contrary form. It is therefore necessary to assert that all degrees are dissimilar — and also because there is no greater reason why the last degree should be expelled before the first.

Third, because in the beatific vision the perfection of vision increases through degrees of entirely different kinds, terminated toward different creatures, whence results a greater or lesser perfection in the vision and a diversity among the degrees arising from that greater or lesser perfection.

Fourth, because if degrees were homogeneous it would follow that a luminous body at four degrees could produce in illuminated air at four degrees its own four degrees — since those degrees do not conflict with those already produced, it could add them to the others — and thus from all of them together a more intense light would be composed. These arguments support the opinion of Suárez.

Second Opinion — Vásquez

The contrary opinion of Vásquez is proved as follows. First, augmentation among substances and accretion in quantities occurs by homogeneous parts — for example, water to water, line to line — therefore addition in alteration also occurs by degrees of the same kind, and no different reason can be assigned. Second, homogeneous degrees are ordered toward composing a quality within one and the same genus of entity — for example, heat composed of heat, cold of cold. But if they were heterogeneous, they would compose something different, and just as there would be diversity in the degrees, so there would be conflict in the entities, and the quality would not hold together. Third, the teacher of all things, experience, shows that in the intensification of heat the process is such

that the intensification occurs uniformly, with no observed diversity beyond the greater power of the agent. Let someone place a cold hand near a fire: he will feel heat entering gradually and in the same manner, insinuating itself into the hand with complete similarity throughout, until it reaches burning heat, the warmth increasing so uniformly that no diversity whatsoever is detected beyond the addition of degrees. Fourth, and more forcefully: if the degrees of intensification were different, and stood in that order and dependence upon one another, with greater power and perfection, no quality could naturally be overcome by its contrary, nor consequently be expelled by the patient — but this is most absurd; therefore the degrees of qualities are not heterogeneous. I demonstrate the assumed inference as follows. Let the patient be cold to the eighth degree, and let heat at eight degrees be applied to it. That expulsion must take place through one degree of heat — the first — which must act against the last, eighth degree of cold, which is stronger and more perfect than that first degree of cold, and far more than that degree of heat which is beginning to act, and is stronger and more powerful; therefore it cannot be overcome or expelled by it, and the cold subject will remain inviolate and undefeated. Fifth, we see that when a second lamp equal to the first is brought into a room where one lamp is already burning, the light is augmented through the light of the newcomer — and we experience this daily with candles brought one by one into the same room. But those lights are of the same kind and produce an effect of the same kind, since they come from different luminaries. Why then should it be surprising if within the same luminary the degrees of light are of the same kind and entirely the same in nature? Finally, whence comes this supposed necessity of order and dependence among the degrees? How can it be understood or assigned in a quality that is entirely similar and intensifying itself by what is, in a certain sense, one and the same flux and uniform action? In truth, even the authors of the contrary opinion do not dare to identify it, hidden as it is in the treasures of nature — and for that reason, that necessity seems to them scarcely probable, and introduces novelty and perplexity.

I observe that our authors respond to the opposing arguments in various ways, not altogether consistently and not with full solidity — and, to speak freely, not with full sufficiency, as can be seen in Arriaga and Poncius. I shall therefore endeavor to respond clearly, perspicuously, and completely.

Response to the Arguments

I resolve the first argument by observing that the axiom "a like cannot act upon a like" is not universally true. For if two lamps of equal light and equal activity in shining and illuminating are brought into the middle of a room and applied to the same subject, they will certainly both produce their effect and double the light. Let the first lamp — luminous to two degrees, as we said — be brought in: it will produce light to two degrees. Let another be brought in: it too will produce light to two degrees, and the total light will be at four degrees; and

however many lamps or candles you introduce, you introduce that many degrees of light. I further observe that the axiom, as it appears and is commonly taken — "a like does not act upon a like" — is not so certain. For if it means that a like does not intensify the light of another similar luminary within itself, I concede this; a lamp's light at two degrees will not intensify the light of another lamp at two degrees. But if it means that in a patient or subject which has light at two degrees, the light is not augmented to two degrees by the union of the first light with itself, I deny this. In a third thing, those two similar lights unite and augment and intensify the light. But that is not acting upon a like, but acting together with a like upon a third thing, and in this sense the axiom does not apply — only in the first sense does it hold. For this illumination, or addition of light, is indeed a succession of light to light, but not an action of one luminary upon another. The legitimate sense of the axiom is that a like cannot act upon a like, that is, upon a subject in which there is a quality contrary to that of the agent in a degree equal to the degree of the contrary quality of the agent. For example, if a cold subject has two degrees of cold, a hot agent at two degrees will not be able to act against it and expel a like quantity of cold, since action must come from the one that overcomes. It is therefore necessary that the agent be dissimilar in degree of contrary quality, and definitely stronger and more vigorous, in order to act against the contrary agent, overcome it, and prevail — and this is how I understand and expound that axiom.

With this observation in mind, I respond to the first argument by noting that the contrary opinion faces the same difficulty — indeed a greater one — because, as we said in our fourth argument, even a hot agent at eight degrees cannot act upon a cold subject at eight degrees, since one degree — the first — proceeding from the agent cannot act against the last and most robust eighth degree in the patient; nor can an agent at two degrees ever act upon a patient at seven. The argument is therefore turned back against the opponent. Beyond this, I respond directly: it is not always true, as appears from the example of the lamps. With regard to the objection about heat, I say that it is indeed true that a hot body at two degrees cannot intensify heat at two degrees — not because the similarity of the degrees is an obstacle, but because the agent does not have sufficient power to produce an effect in a patient that is already assimilated to it and equal to it, since another axiom stands in the way: action proceeds from the one that overcomes. But if the active power were to grow by the addition of another degree, placing the body in the state of heat at three degrees, then by reason of that added greater power it could overcome the contrary, or the resistance, or the receptive capacity of the patient. Therefore that incapacity arises not from the similarity but from the weakness of the power in an equal degree in relation to producing an effect in a subject equal to itself. In this way the first argument is perspicuously resolved — the argument which Poncius considers the strongest against our view and over the dissolution of which he labors excessively. Vázquez responds better, but grounds his response in the

mode of production, which cannot proceed further because of the assimilation found in the patient. That solution, however, does not fully satisfy, because the reason for this must be given — which we have located in the weakness of the power — and we have had recourse to the other axiom. Whether rightly or wrongly, the readers shall judge.

As for the remaining arguments — the second and the fourth — they are resolved by the same response. The third, concerning the beatific vision, proves nothing, because that vision, being terminated toward different objects, is varied according to those objects and is more or less perfect accordingly; whence the greater or lesser intensity is drawn from the diversity of the objects, and not from the precise nature of the degrees of quality.

Judgment

To confess the truth, as regards the capital question of the intensification of qualities, I have never been able to grasp the Thomistic position, and the more carefully I examine it, the less I understand it and the more difficult I judge it to be. If I could free Saint Thomas from it, together with Vásquez whom I cited above, I would gladly do so. But when I return to myself and see the great unanimity of the Thomists in maintaining it, and their constancy in defending it, I fear that this may be attributable to my own limited ability of mind — and I would think so, were it not that I have found nearly all the masters of all the other schools to reject it and hold the contrary. I shall set out what particularly moves me to reject it, and I lay these things before the Thomists, whom I love and honor intensely, so that when they have seen and read these points, they may refute them and relieve me of the horror I have conceived for that opinion.

First: a quality produced in a patient is not merely preserved there by a continuous action but is also intensified — something even the Thomists concede. Then I argue thus: that action does not abandon its term but is always present to it and turns about it. For example, heating that educes heat from the patient does not withdraw from it but affects it continuously, and by affecting it, intensifies it. But how does it intensify it except by augmenting it with new degrees of the same heat received from the agent? And how does heating fail to produce heat, if it is the act of heat — heat in the process of becoming — added to heat already present? The Thomists say that by inhering in the heat, that action impresses it more deeply and profoundly into the subject and roots it more and more within it. But I ask: does this rooting occur by adding new heat, or merely by preserving the heat first produced and immersing it into the patient? If the first, I have what I intended. If the second, then that action produces nothing but merely immerses the thing already produced — and that immersion is not a production of heat, and thus it is not a process of heating, and it could occur through a different action with the same heat already produced. Furthermore I press the point: that immersion of the same heat will rather remit the heat than intensify it, because one and the same heat affecting

the subject more and more, occupying its parts and diffusing itself through all of them, will be less unified and robust. For in communicating itself to parts that do not already have it, it must necessarily be weakened and diminished; and the more it insinuates and communicates itself, the less strength and power it will have — and so it will be remitted, not intensified.

Second, I find the greatest difficulty in supernatural qualities. For if this is true, how does one just person become more just than another, if the grace is entirely the same and unchanged? For a greater or lesser rooting of the same grace in the soul (I speak in Thomistic terms) and of charity in the will does not seem to be a greater grace. Accordingly, in that opinion no one who is just can be said to have greater or lesser grace, but only more or less deeply rooted grace. Yet the Fathers, the Councils, and Mother Church speak differently, and they speak of an increase of faith and grace and charity, saying "increase faith, hope, and charity," and the Church in particular speaks of an increase of faith, hope, and charity, placing the increase in the supernatural form itself — a manner of speaking that cannot be squared with the rooting of the same form. Certainly the common sense of the Church does not conform to the Thomistic position.

Third, as I touched on earlier: if the soul and the supernatural faculty in which these supernatural qualities inhere are indivisible, how can that greater rooting take place if they lack parts? Where there is no place for rooting, there can be no rooting. Therefore the first production of grace will be a total and complete rooting. For if it is not complete, it does not equal its whole subject, and there is something in which it is absent — which cannot happen in an indivisible subject.

Fourth, it seems to me unworthy of Christ the Lord and of the Blessed Virgin — whom those authors so greatly venerate — to equate other just persons with them in the measure of grace and to attribute nothing more to them than to other just persons so much their inferior. I cannot therefore understand how the same equal grace in its entity could be present in the last of the just as is present in Christ the Lord and the Blessed Virgin, and I marvel at how that supreme grace of each is reduced by such immense additions to a matter of mere rooting.

APPENDIX. Exposition of the Text of Aristotle

It remains to pass judgment on one capital text of Aristotle, over which Father Gabriel Vásquez, that excellent doctor of Alcalá, and the Discalced Carmelites of Alcalá are engaged in great controversy. Saint Thomas cites a text of the Philosopher in support of his opinion, and Vásquez wishes to wrest it from him. The Complutensians rush to its defense and contend sharply with him. It will be fitting to set out this dispute and examine it, so as to offer the reader something welcome and pleasing in this dense and wearisome question.

Saint Thomas in *In I, dist. 17, art. 2* says: "The Philosopher says in *Physics IV* that something becomes more white, or more hot, not by the addition of some whiteness or heat, but because that quality which previously inhered is intensified according to its proximity to the terminus." He does not quote Aristotle's actual words; at the margin is placed *text. 84*. Again, the same author in *I–II, q. 52, art. 2*, having raised the specific question whether habits increase by addition, produces in the *sed contra* the text in the following form: "The Philosopher says in *Physics IV*: from hot is made more hot, nothing in the matter being made hot that was not hot when it was less hot." He endeavors thereby to prove that intensification does not occur by the addition of degrees in a quality. The marginal note has *text. 84*, as in *In I, dist. 17, art. 2*. Concerning the words of Aristotle contained in this text, Vásquez (*disp. 82, cap. 5*) raises a dispute with Saint Thomas, and this man of keen intelligence will not tolerate the citation or the interpretation; at number 22 he writes — these are Vásquez's words — "The testimony of Aristotle which is adduced last in support of the second opinion is neither faithfully cited nor does it in any way conflict with our position." In order to establish his claim, Vásquez produces the text as follows: "just as from cold is made hot and from hot cold — because both were in potency — so from hot is made more hot, with absolutely no part of it emerging as hot which was not already hot when it was less hot." He adds: "What Aristotle teaches here is in order to show that the same subject underlies contraries, and that each contrary does not bring with it its own proper matter. In the aforesaid words he does not say that what is more hot is made from what is less hot with no added heat, but with no newly made hot thing — that is, no new part of matter arriving that was not already hot — but that the same subject entirely becomes more hot."

But behold, the Complutensians, fierce defenders of Saint Thomas, come against Vásquez the Complutensian Doctor and drag him before the tribunal, accusing him of asserting that Saint Thomas did not faithfully cite the text or grasp its sense. They say that the text cited by Saint Thomas, even if it is not drawn from the translation of Argyropylus, is nevertheless drawn from an earlier and more accurate one, and they rebuke Vásquez for raising a new dispute against him on the intensification of quality and censure Rubius for agreeing with Vásquez. They then produce the text of Aristotle as follows: "From hot is made more hot, nothing in the matter being made hot that was not hot when it was less hot" — in precisely the same words that Saint Thomas had used. And below: "Something becomes more white, or more hot, not by the addition of some whiteness or heat." So the Complutensians (*disp. 4 de alterat., q. 4, § 2*).

To settle this controversy it is necessary to examine the texts adduced and others newly brought forward, and to draw the sense from them. I have consulted and reviewed various translations which I shall present. The common Aristotelian version of, I believe, Severinus Boethius, in the Basel folio edition of 1542, reads as follows: "For just as from cold is made hot and from hot cold — because both were in potency — so from hot is made more hot, with absolutely

no part of it then emerging as hot which was not already hot when it was less hot." These are the same words found in Vásquez. In another text of Aristotle illustrated with commentaries by Marcus Antonius Zimara, published at Venice in 1560, it reads: "For just as from cold hot and from hot cold, the same thing being so because it was in potency, so from hot more hot, nothing being made hot in the matter which was not hot when it was less hot." In yet another version published in 1566, the reading is precisely the same as in the text cited from Zimara, with no alteration whatsoever. All other versions I have seen agree with these and are equally concordant.

As for the other text which Saint Thomas appended to the first — "something becomes more white, or more hot, not by the addition of some whiteness or heat, but because that quality which previously inhered is intensified according to its proximity to the terminus" — I have never been able to find it in Aristotle; I do not know where it could be, nor am I persuaded that it exists. For if that text existed, no philosopher would dare to hold an opinion contrary to the explicit statement of Aristotle, since the matter would be entirely settled by that testimony. Indeed, it would not even have been necessary to use that other passage — dubious, ambiguous, certainly entangled and obscure — to rule out the addition of degrees, when this one defines the matter so perspicuously. Furthermore, it would have been cited by many, and it would not have escaped Scotus — a vigilant and acute man — nor others who advanced the addition of degrees and located the intensification of qualities therein.

I come now to the dispute raised by Vásquez against the Angelic Doctor and by the Complutensians against Vásquez and Rubius. I take Vásquez's side and adjudge the dispute in his favor. First, the wording of the text cited by Saint Thomas and defended by the Complutensians is not the genuine one. This is clear because in all versions, whatever they may be, the particle "as" or "just as" (*ut*, that is *osper* in Greek) is found, indicating a comparison and carrying great weight for the question of intensification — and it is found in all versions, as is clearly evident from the Greek manuscripts. Saint Thomas, however, has removed this particle from his text, and the Complutensians do the same in theirs, which certainly should not have been done. Furthermore, the text of Saint Thomas is truncated, because it does not express "the same," nor "in potency," nor "when it was less hot," in which particles there is great force, as will appear in its proper place. It is therefore no wonder that, with the text less faithfully cited and another substituted that is found nowhere, the mind of Aristotle was distorted.

Let the Complutensians attend carefully, and they will find that the text of Aristotle does not favor them but favors us — that it is against them, not against us. The sense is clear. The mind of Aristotle in the chapter where text 84 is found is to prove that there is always one and the same matter amid such great diversity of forms, and that it is in potency toward them, being drawn out of it

by agents; that it is not changed, augmented, or diminished in itself, but is placed in act with respect to them from potency — which are the words of Aristotle in that chapter, as I now see while commenting on and reviewing his text. Aristotle then says: just as from cold is made hot and from hot cold, because there was the same potency, or because the same potency for both was in the matter, so from hot is made more hot, nothing in the matter being made hot — that is, this increment of heat not yet existing in the matter — which was not hot — that is, the matter being devoid of this supplement of arriving heat, because it was in potency toward it, not yet actuated by it — when it was less hot — that is, at that time when the matter did not yet have that first produced heat. This is the true and genuine sense of the passage, and it is entirely Scotist and far removed from the Thomistic sense. In summary: just as a subject becomes hot and cold in the first production without the matter already being actually hot or cold but in potency toward both, so it becomes more cold or more hot not through itself in act but through an increment of cold or heat which it did not previously have — and the comparison runs on the basis of the particle "as" (*ut*, Greek *osper*), the removal of which overturns the entire force of the argument. For just as when cold and heat are first produced they are not in act in the matter, so also when each is intensified it is not in act in the matter, but is newly actuated by their addition.

I found my interpretation, grounded in that version of Aristotle's text, confirmed later in the ancient Greek Simplicius and in the modern French scholar Du Val, a distinguished interpreter, who reads thus at *Physics IV, cap. 4*: "For just as the same matter from cold becomes hot and from hot cold because it was in power, so also from hot it becomes more hot, when no part of the matter becomes warm that was not already warm when there was less warmth."

Readers owe me thanks, and in the first instance the Scotists and the followers of Vázquez owe me the explanation of this passage, for it is troublesome and obscure and has long tormented and vexed me. If they are willing to trust me, they will be freed from that trouble and tedium.

I had proceeded thus far when, in order to exhaust the entire difficulty, I wished to discuss the whole matter with several most learned men of the Greek nation. The Greek College was nearby. I went to them, we met, we consulted the Greek texts, examined, reviewed, compared, and weighed the force of Aristotle's words, and compared them with my interpretation. We found it faithful and genuine, and we judged that Aristotle had not and could not have meant anything other than this. The chief among them was Arsenius Calludius of Crete, Rector of that College, a man most learned in the Greek and Latin languages, who confirmed this conclusion with his own judgment.

And so: Scotus adheres to the Philosopher; Vázquez is free from censure and victorious in the cause; the text is vindicated; the Complutensians are corrected; the whole matter is laid open and entirely concluded.

Judgment

This will be brief: the opinion of Scotus is the common one, and it is therefore unnecessary to examine the arguments more carefully or to multiply them. All the schools converge on the principal point of the question — the addition of degrees — and on this same point those two most illustrious and most divergent minds, Suárez and Vásquez, agree. This is a sign that what they do not quarrel over is true. They would indeed quarrel over it if they found any probable reason in the contrary position of Saint Thomas — but since they descended voluntarily into the same arena and there disagree with each other over the nature of the degrees, having found occasion for dissent. Moreover, alongside Scotus, the text of Aristotle and the commentaries of the interpreters agree, and that rooting in the subject has no firm roots of its own. It is therefore rather arid and bears fruit only within the single Thomistic school — in which the Complutensians must be counted — while the Scotistic tree of addition spreads and extends itself to nearly all other schools.

DISPUTATION VII, DISTINCTION IV

On the celebrated question of the constitution and distinction of the Persons, with reference to *STI*, q. 40, a. 2, *In I*, d. 26, a. 1 of Saint Thomas, and Scotus, *In I*, d. 26, q. un.; d. 28, q. 3; and *Quodlibet* IV

Prologue

Here there is an immense forest of things. Nowhere has Scotus disputed so densely, so profoundly, and so copiously — which has made his mind ambiguous for those who, either deterred by the variety of the disputes, have read him less diligently, or overwhelmed by the subtlety of his arguments, have not penetrated what they read, or absorbed by the profundity of his doctrine, have become entirely mired in the shallows. Hence arises the diversity of views regarding the mind of Scotus and the uncertainty concerning his positions even among the most learned theologians, who take him in different ways and interpret him each according to what he has conceived in reading.

For my part, having come to reading Scotus rather late and wishing to compensate for tardiness with diligence, I set myself to read him attentively and carefully with all the diligence I could muster, applying myself to investigating his mind and drawing out his sense, carefully comparing and maturely weighing the passages in which he treated this kind of question. By this method — having first set out what he has brought forward (and he brings forward everything that anyone before him ever wrote, and seemingly anticipates everything that others who would write after him were going to say) and having set out what he has judged about what he brought forward — I shall separate out what falls outside

the Thomistic dispute, set it aside and omit it, and select only what pertains to my purpose.

In *In I, dist. 26, q. un.*, having raised the question whether the divine Persons are constituted in personal being by relations of origin or by some absolute attributes, Scotus first adduces the opinion of the ancient Doctor Praepositinus, followed later by Gregory, who holds that the Persons have no constituent whatsoever but are constituted and distinguished by themselves. Scotus refutes this opinion there with four arguments of his own — proper and apt — and with one more which belongs to Hervaeus, less apt and therefore rejected by Scotus.

Then at *Respondeo*, n. 2 through the § *alia opinio*, he sets out the opinion of Saint Thomas — which Scotus calls the common opinion — that holds that the Persons are constituted by relations. He there proves it by the authority of Augustine, Boethius, Damascene, Richard, Anselm, and confirms it with many arguments. He then explains and propounds the explained opinion from n. 8 to 10 by a fourfold way. The first way proceeds by comparing the relation to what is related, and advances three arguments from n. 10 to 13. The second way proceeds by comparing the relation to its origin, and offers two modes of attack: one containing four arguments, the other two, from n. 13 to 15. The third way proceeds through the proper reason of the constituent itself and employs four sufficiently strong and extended proofs from n. 15 to 22. The fourth way proceeds through the testimonies of Augustine, Richard, and Anselm, and runs from n. 22 to 25. This is the second opinion in order regarding relative constituents. The third is found at § 3, the opinion that places the Persons as constituted by absolutes, held by John of Ripa and in part by Saint Bonaventure, who in *In I, dist. 26, q. 3*, said that they are distinguished by origins — which Scotus expounds as meaning that relations distinguish them principally. This is proposed from n. 23 to 25. Scotus refutes that of Ripa with many arguments, principally from testimonies of Sacred Scripture and the Apostles' Creed and the Canons, which he nevertheless briefly undermines in solving them from n. 25 to 31. Then at § *ad illa, q. secundo*, from n. 31, he systematically dissolves all the arguments previously produced for the second opinion regarding relative constituents and distinctives, which oppose this third one that posits absolutes. First from n. 31 to 33 he responds to the testimonies of the Fathers; second from n. 33 to 41 he resolves the contrary reasons — and indeed so subtly and accurately that he seems to be following and presenting this opinion himself. This almost persuaded Lychetus, so great an interpreter and so learned a man, as he himself indicates in his commentaries on this passage for the third opinion of Ripa and Bonaventure, and as the scholiast and marginal annotator of Scotus contradicts him, denying that the Doctor attributed that opinion to Saint Bonaventure. Finally, holding the second opinion, Scotus resolves the arguments against it — arguments produced against Saint Thomas's opinion, the common opinion — proceeding through the ways in order and one by one undermining and dissolving them in a continuous movement from n. 41 to 52,

which is the last; and those that were sought from authority and the remaining arguments drawn from it, he dissolves at the end of the question from n. 52 to 57, which is the last.

Both of these — the opinions concerning absolute and relative constituents — he leaves in the middle, declaring which he follows, except that he says the second, concerning relatives, is the common one and that the other faces a disadvantage, namely that it does not accord well with the faith. He makes his own mind sufficiently clear, however, preferring to be the author of the former. But in *dist. 28, q. 3*, disputing about the constituent of the Person of the Father in his proper being as first Person, he rejects the opinions of Henry, Saint Thomas, and Bonaventure — who, though in different ways, affirm the supposit in those who posit the constituent and distinctive in relation — in such a way that he gives the appearance to readers of adhering to the opinion of Ripa, since he proposes it last and argues specially in support of it, maintaining the absolute against the relative. Although he says it cannot be argued against as heretical — a phrase that does not greatly favor Ripa — and adds that he will pass over the arguments he made against it in d. 26. Hence it is clear that Lychetus saw much more than Rada, who in *controv. 23, a. 2*, not only rejects it as false but affirms in three conclusions that it is rash and close to error — whereas Scotus called the same opinion probable and plainly endeavored to render it such. Our school likewise considers this the case together with Scotus, and the Scotists defend it publicly in formal disputations as a probable opinion without censure or harm — disputations which I have frequently attended at the Convent of Aracoeli and at which I once argued against it when I was acting as objector, and which I defended the previous year at Venice.

Nevertheless I do not agree with Lychetus in thinking that Scotus is the co-author of Ripa's position. Both went too far: Scotus did not prefer it to the other, common Thomistic one, nor did he attach any note of censure to it; on the contrary, by his most acute arguments he freed it from popular condemnation. I prove both parts of my position from what Scotus taught in other passages, which I shall presently cite. First and foremost: *Quodlibet IV*, where he examines the matter broadly and subtly. It is worth setting out the sequence of that question in order to vindicate my credibility and to show Scotus entirely free from suspicion. In that place he inquires: "Whether, if the relation of origin were removed or abstracted, a divine Person could remain constituted and distinct?" And at § *In hac quaestione*, he says: "In this question, which presupposes a certain common position — namely, that a Person is constituted by a relation — which position is not to be examined here, because it is more difficult than what is proposed, but is in these questions to be taken as commonly received: this question does not ask in general whether a divine Person can be constituted by a relation, but specifically about the First Person, because there seems to be a special difficulty about it on account of its priority over the others." The entire subsequent disputation is then aimed at concluding that the relation is the

formal constituent and distinctive of the First Person, setting aside the other precise reason of the unbegotten (*Ingeniti*) which Bonaventure wanted, or the generative which Henry preferred, or the property which Saint Thomas chose — with Scotus firmly asserting that the original, active relation of Paternity constitutes the First Person. He conceives and names it in this term in *Quodlibet* IV, § *Ad argumentum*, n. 36, with no inclination whatsoever toward the aforementioned opinion of Ripa about some absolute attribute, which he entirely passes over there, wholly intent on the relation and by no means admitting any account of an absolute. When Scotus therefore advances and confirms the opinion of Ripa, he is only trying to show that it can be held safely and probably and is free from all reproach. This was astutely observed by Suárez (*lib. 7, c. 5, n. 1*) and Vásquez (*d. 158, c. 3, n. 10*). Cajetan similarly indicates the same (*comment. in I p. q. 40, a. 2, initio*). Therefore Scotus agrees in substance with Saint Thomas and holds together with him the common relative constituent. He differs, however, in the manner of accepting it — as we shall say below — and in that he thinks it can be held probably and safely that it is an absolute, which Saint Thomas entirely rejects.

Let this be the first distinction in this matter: whether it is probable that a Person is constituted by something absolute?

Saint Thomas in *I p., q. 40, a. 2, ad 2* says: "The divine Persons are not distinguished in the being in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only according to what they say in relation to another; and therefore for their distinction a relation suffices." And in *In I, dist. 26, a. 1, in corp.* he says: "Nothing absolute is distinct in the divine, but only what is relative." And shortly after: "A divine hypostasis signifies a subsisting thing distinct by a relation, because no other distinction can exist in the divine." And *ad quartum*: "A Person is not distinguished in the divine by reason of nature or by reason of being itself, but only by reason of properties." And *ad sextum*: "The name 'person' signifies something distinct in the divine." In *art. 2, in corp.*: "It is impossible that there be any distinction in God except what a relation causes. Hence, if relations were mentally removed, the very notion of distinction would be simultaneously removed."

Scotus at n. 1 of *dist. 26, q. un., § 3 opinio*, from n. 23 through § *tenendo*, propounds as probable the opinion that holds that the divine Persons are absolute, and then resolves the arguments that are customarily made against it by adversaries and confirms it with many arguments of his own. And at § *ad tertium*, n. 30, at the end, he says: "in this way someone might say that nothing is found contrary to the aforesaid opinion." He therefore considers it free and renders it free from all censure. Whether he follows it or not is another question, which we have decided in the negative above. The Subtle Doctor is therefore contrary to the Angelic Doctor in this matter.

Before setting out the arguments of Scotus in support of it, and before resolving the objections against it, we note that it was held by John of Ripa in *In I, d. 25* and 26, and is principally attributed to him. Whether Saint Bonaventure held it, the views of authors diverge; we shall set out our own view below.

We must first dissolve the charge laid against Scotus by Cajetan in *I p., q. 40, a. 2, init.*, who censures Scotus for attributing this opinion to Saint Bonaventure, denying that he adhered to it, and citing 26, *d. in I*. Cajetan refutes Scotus with censure, objecting that Scotus invented what Bonaventure never dreamed of, and says: "It is very surprising that this is attributed to Bonaventure, since at the end of that article he expressly says that the Person of the Father cannot be abstracted from paternity while preserving his personality — and what could be clearer?" Cajetan is imitated by the marginal annotator of Bonaventure, who at the end of that article writes in the margin: "From these things it is clear that Scotus falsely attributes to Saint Bonaventure the view that Persons are constituted by absolutes, d. 26, q. un." Indeed, Lychetus in his commentary on this passage at § 3 *opinio* favors Cajetan, saying: "It is the view of Saint Bonaventure and John of Ripa" — to which the scholiast of Scotus and the marginal annotator of the same contradicts, denying that the Doctor attributed that opinion to Saint Bonaventure, but only that he affirmed that distinction of the double meaning which the name "substance" carries in the divine — namely, according to *quid* and according to *aliquid*: as *quid*, it signifies common substance; as *aliquid*, it signifies a supposit. This distinction was previously taught by Richard of St. Victor, to whom Scotus assigns it.

Yet to me, reading Bonaventure carefully and comparing his words with the opinion of John of Ripa, it seems that Bonaventure partly agrees with Ripa and partly differs from him. He agrees in that both posit something beyond the relative; he differs in that Ripa introduces something more absolute than Bonaventure does. For Bonaventure posits only something initiatively and principiatively absolute — that is, origins, which are as it were the ways toward the relations, and as it were the becoming of them. This opinion of Bonaventure regarding origins is his own and special. He presents it clearly in *In I, dist., a. 1, q. 3*, where he establishes that in the divine Persons there is both a relation and an origin, and that a property constituting and distinguishing them is composed of both. He says these two are so ordered according to reason that the first is to originate, then being is understood in those which have being from another, and then to stand in relation to another; whence generation denotes origin and paternity denotes relation. And shortly after *ad primum* he says: "To the objection that the relative is reduced to the absolute, it must be said that to be reduced to something is of two kinds: either as to a principle, or as to a terminus. The property of origin is reduced to the absolute in both ways." And more clearly in his *responsio ad 2*: "To the objection that relative being gives only relative being, it must be said that this is true of the relative that expresses only relation, but it is not true of the relative that expresses origin." From which it is clear that he

distinguished between origin and relation, since a relation is a pure habitude and a mere respect that is not reduced to an absolute, whereas an origin does not include the account of a respect and habitude, since it is reduced to an absolute.

Scotus saw this most acutely in expounding Bonaventure: origins, he says, do not formally distinguish the Persons but do so principiatively, so that origin is related as a way toward the formal relations — which are habitudes and respects that formally constitute and distinguish — while not excluding origins, which principiatively, that is effectively, constitute and distinguish. As for what Cajetan and the marginal annotator of Bonaventure say, that at the end of the article Bonaventure expressly says that the Person of the Father cannot be abstracted from paternity while preserving his personality, this does not establish that origin does not intervene, but only that it is not included in the formal concept of the relation. That removing one and consequently removing the other only establishes a consequence from one to the other, not a distinction — just as if you were to remove risibility from a human being, you would consequently remove rationality, but you would not thereby prove that both have the same formal account. Abstracting paternity from the supposit of the Father therefore consequently removes origin; but origin is not thereby paternity.

I refute Cajetan by the words of Bonaventure in that passage: "If paternity were abstracted from the hypostasis of the Father, or conversely, it would no longer have anything special that is the principle of understanding it, and thus it would be considered under a general and incomplete account." See — in the hypostasis of paternity a concept is posited as distinct from the concept of hypostasis, and a mutual abstraction of each from the other is posited, and once one is abstracted there remains a general and incomplete account — by which vocabulary is signified that neither paternity alone nor hypostasis alone completes the constituent and distinctive of the Person, which comes formally from paternity and principiatively from the hypostasis or origin. Cajetan is subtle, but he expounded the passage less subtly; for Bonaventure did not say that when paternity is abstracted the constituent and distinctive is removed, but that when the properties are abstracted no distinction remains, either in reality or in the intellect — and therefore both are in some manner the ground of distinction. Properties are not, in Bonaventure's opinion, bare and naked relations alone, but relations together with origins. Cajetan ought to have examined this more carefully in order to find the truth, and he would not have taxed Scotus — who is far more subtle than he — in the slightest. Indeed, in the very last line of the last question, responding for Bonaventure, he concludes: "In the divine there is distinction only by origin." I ask Cajetan: where is the relation? Certainly in the word "origin" the relation is contained. Thus in Bonaventure both origin and relation constitute and distinguish — principiatively origin, formally the relation; the relation is toward another and is

not reduced to an absolute; origin on the contrary is not formally a relation and is reduced to an absolute.

Father Vásquez saw this opinion of Bonaventure, as explained by us and transmitted by Scotus, more acutely than Cajetan did (*disp. 158, c. 4, where at n. 15 he writes*): he holds that the divine Persons are constituted by relative properties not insofar as they contain only the order of one to another but insofar as they are origins — for he thought Bonaventure included both in the concept of property. Here therefore is a property composed, so to speak, of origin and relation, with constitution and distinction arising from both — against Cajetan, who in order to attack Scotus dissented from himself in this matter. For he then attacks Bonaventure, as does also the Canarian at the same article 2, q. 40, together with Saint Thomas — who, if he thought the Persons were constituted and distinguished by relation alone, should not have been attacked. Bonaventure therefore thought otherwise than Cajetan believes. Suárez also differs from him (*lib. 7, cap. 6*), asserting Bonaventure's opinion explained in the same way we have explained it. That Scotus in this sense attributed to Bonaventure the opinion of John of Ripa about an absolute is clear from Scotus's own text in that *dist. 26, q. 1, § ad hoc*, n. 24, as we established above from the testimony of Scotus.

SECTION I. What Are Those Absolutes by Which, in the Opinion of Ripa — Which Scotus Sustains as Probable — the Persons Are Constituted and Distinguished? The First Way Is Set Forth.

I do not find this question treated accurately by anyone, even though the entire controversy depends chiefly upon it. I therefore undertake this burden and shall speak of it clearly. In God we can consider four things that are pertinent to the matter. First, the absolutely absolute nature, taken in and by itself. Second, the same nature as the principle of emanations and origins according to Intellect and Will, which are the immediate principles of the processions. Third, the emanations or processions themselves, which are the origins. Fourth and finally, the formal relations, which are as it were the terms of those origins and which in the common opinion formally constitute the Persons.

Among these four there is an apparent order. For the whole nature consists in and rests in an absolutely absolute account. The Intellect and Will, however, already in some manner go out and spring forth from that self-subsistent and undivided nature, and they are constituted in the account of a proximate principle whereby (*quo*) with respect to the processions emanating from them according to the manner of understanding and willing — in a manner, of course, that is diverse and comparatively ordered toward distinct processions. From these the origins proceed in conformity with their principles: the one, generation, precisely through the Intellect; the other, spiration, precisely through the Will — which terminate in formal subsistent relations, that is, Persons, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are produced by them.

And so the nature is absolutely absolute and in no manner relatable to another. Intellect and Will are indeed absolute, yet they respect as principles their own emanations or origins; these in turn are immediately from those absolute principles and are reduced to them, and they are ways toward the subsistent relations, which are entirely respective. There yet remains one more account beyond these four to be considered — namely, the account of hypostasis or person, which is compared to the nature as a term completing it in the order toward operating through those principles, Intellect and Will; this account is toward another and is formally respective, yet in such a way that it has its *esse in* situated in the divine nature itself — which *esse in* is common to every relation, even in the divine, and is received throughout all philosophy and theology. Hence it is that in a relation two things are considered: one pertaining to the thing subsisting in the nature to which it inheres, and the other pertaining to its respect toward another, that is, toward the terms produced. This latter is entirely relative; the former, however, is in some manner absolute, since it is subsisting and inhering in the nature. From this follows the doctrine of Richard concerning the double signification of "substance" in God: in one way according to the common nature, of which *quid* is said; in another way according to the substance that indicates a certain and distinct supposit, of which *aliquid* is said — for example, "Father," as Scotus expresses it in citing Richard and Bonaventure. The nature in the first sense is not relatable to another; in the second sense it is relatable, since it is affected in a different manner by the relation inhering in it.

Now is the time for the question: by what is a Person constituted? Is it by something absolute alone, or by something relative alone, or by a mixture, so to speak, of both? It is established that a Person is not constituted by the nature, nor by the Intellect, nor by the Will. There remain those two accounts, Origin and Relation, together with their full account of *esse in* and *esse ad*. Origin, since it is the becoming of the formal relations and is in via, cannot be the constituent of a Person, which consists in something fixed and permanent; and moreover, it presupposes a principle from which it arises, for the originating principle is prior to the origin. Therefore only the relation remains; and within the relation, since those two accounts of *esse in* and *esse ad* are present, it must be seen whether the constitutive and distinctive account of a Person consists in one alone or in both.

It seems to me that Ripa together with Scotus placed the account of personhood in both, when they posited it in an absolute and called the account of *esse in* an absolute — insofar as it was a mode of inhering in the nature. They understood that account to be the true hypostasis or subsistence, according to which the Persons would be taken in their formal concept, and from which origins and formal relations in *esse ad* immediately arise — which are in reality entirely the same thing. Thus in the Father, the account of *esse in* and *esse ad* complete the constituent and distinctive in such a way that the account of *esse in* forms the hypostasis and the account of *esse ad* formally and adequately distinguishes. The

account of *esse in*, being absolute, seemed to them so because it is on the side of the nature and inheres in the nature, and expresses the account of the subsistent better than either Origin or Relation, and preserves anteriority with respect to origin and relation. For that account of *esse in* is not by its own concept *esse ad aliud*. On this account, taken as absolute, that opinion not only lacks grounds for reproach but in my judgment is highly probable and cannot be attacked by any suitable argument; and in it the solutions of Scotus run without obstacle — both to the authorities and to the arguments — which do not in the least proceed against this kind of absolute, which is not proper to nature but is of a relation inhering in its foundation and holding itself from the side of the latter in the manner of something subsisting and self-subsistent after the likeness of a person.

Scotus signified this in his response to Anselm at § *Ad Anselmum*, n. 32: "All things are one and the same where real opposition does not stand in the way — either formally, as one relation opposes a correlative, or as being referred by an opposite relation — and in this way persons, if they were absolute, would be distinguished, because in them there are relations that originate." They do not originate, however, except through *esse in*, which is antecedent to the formal relation through which they mutually respect each other, and which are correlatives, simultaneous, and mutually said according to the nature of correlatives. Nor does it matter that Scotus in the solution of the arguments indicates that he is speaking of this absolute property as of a thing distinct from the relation, because he is speaking of relation insofar as it is formally toward another, not insofar as it is toward the nature, under the account of *esse in*. In this way it holds itself as a quasi-act and form inhering in the divine nature, and in this sense he resolves the arguments about composition and added perfection to the nature, and distinguishes the account of originating and of referring; and so all the solutions of Scotus are to be taken according to these two accounts, *esse in* and *esse ad*.

There is, however, one thing in Scotus that seems difficult for my exposition. In his response to the confirmation of the major of the third argument, at n. 39, he distinguishes the account of *esse in* from the hypostatic property, saying: "If the major were true, it must be understood of *esse in* as an act is in what it informs. But the minor is not true. A property, however, is not in the essence as informing it, but as constituting a supposit in it." From which it appears that *esse in* must inhere in the manner of an act, and hence must inhere in the essence rather than subsist in itself.

I respond that what Scotus says there does not harm my position but confirms it. For Scotus there resolves the confirmation of the third argument, which assumed in its major that many things of the same species cannot be in the same subject — as those absolute subsistences would be, which, since they cannot be of different kinds in their absolute being, would be entirely of the

same kind, and hence could not exist in the divine nature. This argument had been proposed in that *dist. q. un.*, n. 7, to which Scotus then responds at n. 39: first, that the major is not true; then, that in the case where it were true, it militates against the account of *esse in*, but concerning which the minor of the argument is false, because that account of *esse in* is not an act informing the essence but constituting the supposit. From this it is clear that Scotus confirms my position by calling the account of *esse in* what constitutes the supposit. Nothing could be said more clearly; and thus the account of *esse in* is the account of hypostasis, because it inheres in the nature as something subsisting and completing it in the genus of the subsistent — it does not supervene as a form or act perfecting it, as Scotus perpetually teaches in *Quodlib. 3* and in the *Reportata*, *lib. 1, dist. 5, q. 3*.

That that account of *esse in* constituting the supposit with the nature is a certain thing and is absolute, Scotus expressly affirms in *Quodlib. 3, § de 1, dico*, n. 4, where after dividing being into three modes and having placed absolute things in the second, he numbers a relation according to its *esse in* among beings in the second mode, that is, absolute things, and says: "Concerning the first I say that a relation, as it is compared to the essence, is a thing." He proves this thus: "When things distinct in any manner whatsoever constitute a third thing, they do not constitute it except insofar as they are in some manner disposed toward each other or in some manner united — as is apparent from extrinsic causes, which never cause unless they in some manner concur in causing, and still more from intrinsic causes, which do not constitute a supposit unless they in their own way are united. But essence and relation, according to all, constitute the Person, whatever account of a principle they may have; therefore this is insofar as they concur, which cannot be unless the relation is in the essence." See the explicit account of *esse in* subsisting and concurring with the essence toward constituting the supposit. He continues: "From this I hold that essence and relation constitute a Person — and not otherwise than insofar as the relation is in the essence." And lest you think he is speaking of the account of *esse ad*, he adds: "But for the relation to be in the essence is for the relation to have a comparison to the essence of the most genuine kind that it can have, apart from any consideration by the intellect; therefore the relation does not constitute except as compared to the essence. But it does not constitute a Person except as a thing; otherwise the Person as formally constituted would not be a thing. Therefore the relation, as compared to the essence, is a thing." And lest you object that the account of *esse ad*, which is entirely toward another and entirely respective, harms this subsisting account of *esse in* that concurs with the essence in the manner of a supposit, at the following § he says: "Second, because the comparison to the essence is either entirely the self-same relation, or something supervening — whether real or conceptual, I do not care for the present purpose. If it is entirely the self-same, it is clear from the first article that it is a thing, and since the self-same is the comparison to its own essence; therefore it itself as comparison to

the essence is a thing. If it is the second way, no habitude arriving in any absolute or respective thing destroys it, but rather presupposes it." And immediately: "Therefore the reality of the relation is not destroyed by the fact that it is compared — and consequently the intention is clear."

We must note, however, that a relation — for example, Paternity — is a thing both insofar as it has the account of *esse in* and insofar as it has the account of *esse ad*; of this second no one doubts, since Paternity is entirely substance and subsistent, with a real and proper relational entity distinct from the other relations. Furthermore, in our position it is distinguished from the essence by the nature of the thing (*ex natura rei*), where it has its account of *esse in* — which Scotus clearly teaches in *Quodlib.* 3, § *ex istis*, and § *ex hoc*, n. 9. Indeed, it must be noted that according to the account of *esse in*, insofar as it is related to the essence, it is distinguished from the essence by reason alone and not by the nature of the thing. Whence Scotus says that a relation, insofar as it is toward another, is entirely a thing but not an absolute; insofar however as it is *in*, compared to the essence, it is something absolute in that genus, but not a thing — rather a conceptual entity — because it is distinguished from the essence by reason alone. So Scotus says expressly: "As compared to the essence, this comparison imports a conceptual respect." And then he adds that it is also a thing, so that it is both a thing and a conceptual entity, with a virtual distinction from the essence.

He then adds at § *De tertio*: "Paternity compared to the essence is a conceptual entity in itself, and a real entity toward another." He speaks of the relation insofar as it is in the essence, and then at § *ad formam*, n. 14, he says that the relation is in the essence. And he finally adds that it, compared to the essence, passes over into the essence.

In accordance with this doctrine he says in *Quodlib.* 4 that our intellect can abstract a certain concept in the relation of the Father from the formal relation of Paternity — a concept that is of the First Person under the account of the First Person without consideration of the Father — and that this concept can be of a form that is absolute and indifferent toward the relative and absolute form, abstracting from both. Starting from his two conclusions at n. 29 he says: "Yet with the relation of origin to the second Person abstracted according to any account thereof — whether with respect to indifference or indetermination, or with respect to actuality or aptitude, or with respect to anteriority — perhaps still without contradiction someone could be understood as incommunicably subsisting. But if the question is asked, by what would he be formally understood to be incommunicably existing? I reply: by the relational incommunicable concept itself. And from that absolute incommunicable form, a concept more indifferent could perhaps be abstracted — namely this incommunicable form or entity — and what is proper to this Person in its singular proper being could be understood as that by which the

incommunicability of this Person exists, even if it were not understood in a singular of some lower concept in my intellect; just as I sometimes understand not only a being but this being, or this substance, without definitely conceiving in my intellect the singular of some inferior — such as this animal or this stone. Just as when I see something from afar I first apprehend that it is a body before an animal, and an animal before this animal. And this more indifferent concept of the incommunicable form was perhaps what that person conceived who conceived the supposit in the divine — without determining in his intellect whether that supposit is absolute or relative." Indeed, the account of Person as such is absolute, not relative, from the doctrine of Augustine (*lib. 7 de Trin.*) where he proves that Person signifies toward itself — which Vásquez presents and expounds (*In I p., disp. 130, cap. 3*).

I note moreover that Scotus says this even in holding the opinion which takes the supposit to be entirely a relation, as he professes at the beginning of that question. From all this it follows that in this account of *esse in*, taken and abstracted in this way, John of Ripa could have posited the formal constituent of a divine Person as something absolute. If he meant this, he certainly meant it probably. Nor do I think it differs greatly from the common opinion, which inquires within the very formal account of Paternity itself for a certain anteriority on the side of the Person as constituted, as it were, in first act before the production and the formal relation insofar as it is a habitude and respect — which is simultaneous by nature and by knowledge. So Cajetan (*in art. 4, q. 40, ad secundum dubium*), who constitutes the Person of the Father in the account of a Person under Paternity insofar as it does not exercise the function of a relation. Capreolus teaches much the same at the same article, as does Ferrariensis and the Canarian, insofar as they say that the Father is constituted in the being of a Person under the concept of a hypostatic form. So the Canarian at this place in the first part; Capreolus in *In I, d. 26, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1*; Ferrariensis *4 cont. Gentes, c. 26*. Cajetan attributes this opinion to Saint Thomas in this question 40, art. 4. Vásquez (*disp. 159, cap. 1*) and Suárez (*lib. 7, cap. 7, n. 11*) think the same and say they agree with Saint Thomas in this, and Suárez uses that term "hypostatic form" under which he locates the Person in the relation.

And therefore if Ripa and Scotus mean this, and located the Person under a formal concept of the relation distinct from it insofar as it is toward another, they said in reality exactly the same as the common opinion. They differed only in name, calling "absolute" what others call "respective." And this entire controversy, which torments the minds of theologians, will reduce to a question of vocabulary. If the question arises anew, Ripa speaks no less properly — nor does Scotus defending him — than those who attack them. For the account of Person imports something absolute in its primary signification, as Vásquez shows (*d. 130, c. 3*), whose words I wish to adduce here because they are those of a most learned man whom I customarily hold in very high esteem: "That account of personhood by which the common account of personhood is

contracted is in itself essentially absolute, even though it is denominatively said of a relative person — which is what Augustine signifies (*lib. 7 de Trin., cap. 6*) where he proves that a Person is signified toward itself, not toward another." Suárez, a most erudite man to whom I defer equally with Vásquez, and who has treated that question in the same way, holds the same thing, so that they both seem to have communicated their findings to each other. Let whoever wishes read both and he will find that I am speaking the truth.

Let me cite the words of Suárez (*lib. 7, c. 7*), which are greatly in our favor and confirm our reasoning. In that *lib. 7* and *c. 7, n. 7*, attacking the opinions of Capreolus and Ferrariensis concerning the account of Person as antecedent to the formal relation, he says: "This opinion seems to me no less difficult than the preceding one" — that is, Cajetan's and the Canarian's — "for when they posit the relation as subsisting, with *esse ad* set aside, I ask: what kind of form is that by which the subsistent is conceived? Is it relative, absolute, or abstracting from both accounts? They cannot say the first — for when the ultimate contracting difference is removed, the form is no longer conceived in such a species; and *esse ad* itself is as it were the ultimate difference constituting the relative form, therefore with *esse ad* removed, the concept of the relative form does not remain. The second they do not say either — indeed in that they contradict themselves" — I think it should read "agree" — "with Scotus, who affirms together with Ripa the absolute. The third, concerning the account abstracting from absolute and respective, is attacked by some from the doctrine of Durandus (*In I, d. 23, q. 1*) — because there is no common concept abstracting from relative and absolute." And after the refutation of these, he posits two conclusions, of which the second is: "When a divine Person is conceived by us not as related to another, it is not conceived with a proper and distinct concept, nor according to its expressed and formal constitution, but with a confused concept together with some negation or connotation." He says this with respect to the relation to the Father, and regarding the Person of the Father adds: "Because in human beings, the Person of the Father is prior to generating, and generates prior to being Father; to this order we adapt our manner of conceiving the eternal Father. And therefore we do not then distinctly conceive his constitution, nor do we form an altogether positive concept of him according to which he is prior to generation — but we conceive him only in the account of the First Person, and consequently conceive him only as constituted by the first personality."

I ask whether Suárez does not feel the same as Scotus and as we do. I question him and press him with interrogation, just as he pressed Capreolus and Ferrariensis: that constituted thing thus conceived as the first personality — what is it and of what kind? Absolute, relative, or abstracting from both? It is certainly not relative, and not abstractive; therefore it is absolute. And we compel Suárez by his own argument to concede what he was unwilling to and what we together with Scotus are willing to — and, with his permission, we shall

argue better. For he was proving that that account of subsisting is not relative, because with the ultimate difference removed the form is no longer conceived in such a species. I grant this: it is true. The relation does not remain. Therefore what remains is absolute. For the ultimate difference of that constituted thing — made up of personality and relation — was the relation; and with the relation alone removed, not the constituted Person remains relative, but the Person remains. Just as in a human being, when the difference of rationality is removed, animality remains. I do not know how Suárez, so great a man, did not see from the principle he assumed — that with the ultimate difference removed the relative form does not remain — it follows that there still remains a part of the constituted thing that is antecedent to the difference, from which it is deduced against him that with the relative form removed there remains the account of Person, which is superior to and broader than the relative account. He would argue better if he were to say the contrary: that when a superior is removed, the whole is entirely removed — just as when an animal is removed, rationality is also removed. So if the account of Person were removed, the relative account presupposing and contracting it would also be consequently removed — not conversely. And so I turn the argument back against Suárez.

The Person is the constituted thing arising from that confused concept of Person and the expressed relative account of *esse ad* contracting and expressing it. Then I press: let us remove this second relative account; still the first confused one remains, superior by its nature and common to absolute and respective — in which all inferior subsistences agree, contracting it in the manner of a difference toward the absolute and the relative. Whence we have Suárez as our patron, willy-nilly; and adding him to Vásquez, and having engaged both as defenders of our opinion, we fortify the first way with confidence. For where these two agree let this be the bronze wall.

SECTION II. The Second Way of Defending the Opinion of Ripa Concerning Absolute Properties Is Proposed.

Our Rada gnaws and nibbles too hard at Ripa and, as I noted earlier, cannot in any way tolerate his opinion, judging it harshly and — not being a fair critic — stirring up trouble at the place where Scotus had established his position. In *Controversy 23, art. 2*, he calls it false and rash, close to error, in three conclusions — forgetting decorum, forgetting his sworn fidelity to Scotus. Mindful of both, I investigate the reasons by which, together with our Doctor, we may render it probable. And I have no doubt that by the way we have opened, we have rendered it not only probable but nearly certain and common, so that it remains safe, secure, and almost beyond doubt. Let us now see whether that first way is genuine and accommodated to the mind of Scotus, and whether there remains another way that is uncontroversially Scotist and probable in his opinion.

I am open and wish to appear so. That first way is not transmitted by Scotus perspicuously but is indicated sufficiently, while he seeks to reduce to it the way

of origins of Saint Bonaventure; and it rests on that celebrated distinction of Richard between substance taken commonly in itself, as *quid*, and substance reduced to *aliquid* and relatable to another. Yet I confess that Scotus took a way different from the proximate first way, because he does not seem to posit that absolute of Ripa in the relation according to *esse in*, but in the nature itself taken in a second manner — that is, extracted from the common account of common nature, which as communicable cannot have the account of a supposit, and contracted in some manner to the account of *aliquid*, to which there is added that determination to formal relations really distinct from each other by their inherent respective opposition.

So in the cited *In I, dist. 26, q. un.*, which is the chief passage in this matter, I am moved first because Scotus acquiesces in that distinction and bases upon it, in accordance with the mind of Ripa, that distinction of origins — always holding the nature itself taken in that second manner, while in the meantime treating nothing about the relation by the mode of existing *in* and *ad*, on which the first way is founded. I am moved second because Scotus in the same passage mentions realities (*realitates*) — a name he manifestly uses to exclude those accounts of *in* and *ad*. For he says: "According to this, it would be posited that divine Persons are distinguished by certain incommunicable absolute realities — not however in such a way that these constituents and distinctives are absolute in the first way, but in the second way, because even if they were not formally relations, the things constituted by them would be relatable." It is clear from these words that relations, in whatever concept they be taken, are excluded from that acceptance, because that absolute holds itself on the side of the relatable nature through the relations themselves. This is confirmed by what he objects to himself: "How will the common opinion of the saints — who say that the Persons are distinguished by relations — then be preserved?" And by what he adds at the end of § 3 *opinio*, n. 24: "Relations are not less preserved, but more, as it seems, if some absolutes are posited that can be related, than if no such absolutes are posited to which that distinction is adjoined." He then says: "By these two statements — the first about a double absolute, the second about the distinguishing origin corresponding to the first effective principle in creatures, not the formal one — many authorities that seem to say the contrary can be explained."

These objections do not militate against that first way of the relation according to *esse in*, since this *esse in* is included in the very relation itself and does not go beyond it. Taking therefore substance in the sense in which it is distinguished from every concept of relation, and as something relatable through the relations themselves — as the account of *esse in* is not — the question is what is absolute in the divine nature that is relatable by the relation? For as we said at the beginning of the first section, in God nothing is found beyond the nature and the relation; of these the nature is absolute and common, the relation respective and incommunicable. How then can there be found in the nature, under whatever

manner it be taken, that account of the Person that is incommunicable and relatable by relations? For the other things we enumerated before — such as origin and the account of *esse in* — are not the nature and cannot come under the name of nature. Therefore we must come to the concept of nature in itself and prior to origin, and abstracting precisely from the relation — both in *esse ad* and in *esse in*. I would wish that Scotus explained this, showing in the individual what this would be. Hence this question seems to proceed rather indeterminately and as it were precisely — not as a question about the actual state of affairs in the absolute, but about the possible and the conditional, inquiring on the supposition: whether if the Persons were constituted by something absolute and this were affirmed, something contrary to faith and to reason founded upon it would be said. Saint Thomas raises the question in this sense (*art. 3, q. 40*): "Whether, if relations are abstracted by the intellect from the Persons, the hypostases still remain?" But Ripa speaks of the actual state of affairs, and Scotus takes him so in all that dense and acute disputation, and considers it probable because of many valid reasons which the subtle author Vásquez sets out distinctly and sweats over dissolving (*disp. 158, cc. 6–7*). And therefore it is necessary to show what that absolute on the side of the nature is, by which the supposit is constituted antecedently to the relation.

Nevertheless, let us for the moment suspend the pen regarding this and prove with Scotus that the divine Person consists in an absolute. The first foundation is the authority of Sacred Scripture, *Proverbs 30*, where Solomon asks about the divine Word: "What is his name, and what is the name of his Son, if you know?" From which it is argued that the Son of God is indeed known by the relation of sonship, but not sufficiently — since there yet remains another account hidden in him that ought to be known. But that was not the relation of Son; therefore it was an absolute of nature. The second testimony is Augustine (*lib. 7 de Trin., c. 4*) where he says: "Every substance subsists in relation to itself." Therefore absolutely. And indeed Augustine there is speaking of the divine supposit, not of the essence or existence, since he opposes substance to the nature of relation — as Scotus notes in the same passage. The third is the first argument of Scotus against the common opinion on relations in that *dist. 26, q. un., § circa istam conclusionem*, n. 10, grounded in the authority of the same Augustine (*eodem lib. 7 de Trin., cap. 2*): "Every relative is something besides the relation," and at the beginning of *cap. 3*: "If the Father is not something in relation to himself, there is nothing to be referred." Then the argument runs: A Person refers, but a relation does not refer; therefore a Person is not a relation but something absolute. Confirmation: because a relation is posterior to what is related; but what is related is the Person; therefore it is absolute. Whence it is concluded that if a Person first refers, it is antecedent to the relation; but nothing is antecedent except an absolute nature; therefore a Person is absolute.

Fourth: every real relation presupposes its extremes really constituted and distinct; therefore it does not cause such distinction. Therefore the relation

between Father and Son presupposes them already constituted and distinct, and it runs as something assumed between both. The proof of the assumed antecedent comes from the Philosopher (*5 Meth., c. de eodem*), where Aristotle denies that identity is a real relation, because it does not presuppose a real distinction of the extremes.

Fifth: if the Persons were not absolute but primarily relative, then for the Father to originate the Son would be nothing other than to have the Son as correlative. But this is absurd, because the originator precedes the originated in the absolute sense; for the originator and the originated are not simultaneously by nature, nor are they in the first instance correlative to each other; and accordingly the formal relation is not the originating supposit, since it is simultaneous by nature and by knowledge with its formal correlative. Confirmation: because a relation cannot originate except from some presupposed absolute; therefore that absolute will be prior to the relation; and thus the Person or supposit.

Sixth: the constitution of a supposit in a nature makes something essentially one with that nature, and is primarily the same with it. A relation is not of this kind, since it is something different from the absolute nature and does not engender the same concept, nor is it primarily the same with the nature — which is absolute — as a created supposit is with a created nature. Therefore a Person is not something relative but absolute. For it truly does not seem possible that something essentially one and altogether the same in the account of a supposit be made from an absolute essence and a relation.

Seventh: to subsist is something in relation to oneself, not toward another; therefore it cannot be provided by a relation, nor come to be through it. For how will a relation — which is toward another — provide it effectively or quasi-formally, or be it formally, when it is not what it is? Therefore a supposit or person cannot consist in it.

I pass over that other argument of Scotus, that a relation is referred to an absolute — which being posited, Father and Son are mutually referred to each other according to the nature, which, being absolute, is presupposed to the relations — because that principle of Scotus is not accepted by those against whom we are arguing. Some of them, though admitting it to be true in creatures, deny it in all cases in the divine, as Vásquez reports (*disp. 159, cap. 5*) in responding to this argument of Scotus, by whom all the arguments of Scotus are also set out and resolved. Whether sufficiently so is another question. That they are valid is apparent from the various Thomists laboring over their responses — as Vásquez himself observes in the same *disp. 159*, and he no less than they labors over them, and, in my view, does not fully dissolve them.

Now I come to the proposed question and begin thus. In God there are certain absolute attributes which are notional in a certain way and hence not altogether common in that account — for example, the active power of spirating in the

Father and the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit. This is certainly absolute, because it is common and one in the Father and the Son; yet it is notional with respect to the Holy Spirit, in whom that active power of spirating is not given. If it were entirely absolute, as is the nature, it would be in the Holy Spirit. Let another example be the divine Intellect and Will, which are considered under two accounts: one entirely absolute, in which they are common and one with the essence; and another in a certain way notional, in which they are the proximate principles whereby (*quo*) of diverse emanations — of generation and of active spiration — and taken in this way they are distinguished by diverse modes of concurring, namely nature, which is proper to the Intellect, and liberty, which is proper to the Will, as we said above from the opinion of Saint Thomas and all others except Durandus alone, who is commonly censured for having said that the processions of the Persons are immediately from the nature — as is apparent from what the Thomists themselves dispute at q. 27 of the first part, and the Scotists at *d. 2, q. 4 in I* and *quodlib. 2, art. 2*. And so the Intellect insofar as it is the principle of the generation of the Son, and the Will insofar as it is the principle of the spiration of the Holy Spirit, have their distinct accounts — and one is not the other; otherwise the procession of the Holy Spirit would be a generation. Let us hold this and direct our attention to the Intellect and Will.

These operative principles in God are not relations, since they are antecedent to the relations, as are their origins as well. They are therefore absolute. And yet they are not like the divine nature, within which there is no distinction — neither in itself nor as considered in itself — and hence no capacity for distinction; on the contrary, they are principles of distinguishing, since from that diverse manner of operating in the manner of nature and will, distinction among them is inferred, and diversity in the operations. Therefore within the absolutes in God there is given a proper and notional account, since the manner of operating of the Intellect is so proper to it as to be foreign to the Will, and conversely the manner of operating of the Will is so proper to it as to be diverse from the Intellect.

Then: therefore there are in God absolute properties — for where there is what is proper, there is a property. Whence the account of Person can inhere in these, not insofar as they are a relation but insofar as they are absolute. Nor should you object that the divine Intellect and Will are not supposits, and indeed require a supposit in order to operate, and therefore cannot be Persons. For I am not now taking them in that way, but only wish to show that there are in God certain absolutes that are proper and notional, yet are not formal relations. This is enough to demonstrate that prior to the relations there are conceived in God accounts that are as it were absolute and distinct and distinctive, and indeed principles of distinguishing the origins and relations. For it is because the Intellect operates in the manner of nature that the generation of the Son — and not of the Holy Spirit, whose procession conflicts with generation — takes place.

With this established — which cannot be denied — I open my position and say it is probable that through these absolutes the divine Persons can be constituted, and indeed distinguished at least inadequately, in the following manner. The Intellect in the proximate power of operating in the manner of nature demands and begets the Father as generator, not as spirator, and from its intrinsic account demands and claims this; whence emanates the account of Father in the concept of generator, which account joined with the Intellect seems able to constitute a Person in some way antecedently to the production of the Son. The Son, in our manner of conceiving, necessarily presupposes the Father — prior in origin — as understanding, before the Son is constituted in his formal relative property. So that the paternal account is not the account of distinguishing the Intellect from the Will, but the very account of the Intellect as such is the distinctive of the generator and of generation, and therefore it is not the relation that distinguishes the proximate absolute principle, but this principle distinguishes the Father and the generator — who, if he did not operate through the Intellect, would not exist as Father. And so the distinction proceeds from the source of the absolute demanding Paternity, not from Paternity distinguishing the antecedent Intellect in its own concept, still in the absolute.

The same must be said of the divine Will, which from its own proper mode of operating voluntarily demands Persons operating in the manner of will — a mode it does not receive from them but communicates to them as they spirate and love by the force of the proximate principle of the Will. And so from the Will and the account of spirator in the concrete there comes to be a spirator — not one who confers on the Will the account of willing and loving voluntarily, but who receives it from the Will itself. Therefore that proximate principle — for example, the Intellect — receives concretion from the one understanding and generating, because in the abstract it cannot understand or generate; it does not, however, receive its distinction from the understanding and generating person, a distinction that it has intrinsically and carries with itself and communicates to the understanding, generating person — antecedently to generation and filiation. This is the second way of sustaining and expounding this opinion of Ripa and Scotus, devised and formed by me and reduced to the definite account of a supposit.

There are, however, two difficulties. The first concerns the Person of the Son, the second the Person of the Holy Spirit. For the Son is not constituted as a Person because he concurs with the understanding and generating Intellect, but because he is produced and generated by the Intellect of the Father — therefore he is now constituted not by an absolute but by his very own account of the begotten and the Son.

I respond that in the Son there are two things: the nature communicated in the manner of the Intellect, and the relation by which he is referred to the Father and received through generation. According to the first he is the Person of the

Word, that is, according to the nature communicated in the manner of the Intellect, which formally constitutes him as the expressed Word of the Father, insofar as the Father understands; and this is the absolute account corresponding to the paternal Intellect as the principle whereby (*quo*) he is produced and generated. According to the other he is the Son and formally corresponds to the Father as his correlative — so that he directly corresponds to the Father after the received nature of the Word. For the Word is understood precisely speaking prior to the Son; for the Word receives the nature immediately from the understanding one, and by expressing the concept is generated and placed in the intellectual degree, which carries with it the account of the expressed Word, and consequently the Son is constituted; whence in our manner of understanding, receiving the nature comes prior to being the Son. For the account of received nature is conceived absolutely, and then it is completed by the account of Son, which refers him, after the received nature, to the Father.

This reasoning is clarified by the example of human generation. For in generating, it is first to become a human being and then a son; nor would he be a son unless he were a human being, since the common degree is prior to the singular, and the communication of nature precedes the relation which presupposes human nature, according to which one is referred to the generator — who by generating produces the son, who once produced and constituted in nature is referred through the supervening relation of the generated to the Father. Nor in this comparison is there any other discrepancy except that a created relation is an accident, whereas a divine one is a substance.

Therefore the Son of God in the account of Word is a Person, and thus is as it were absolute; in the account of Son he is a relation, presupposing the constitution of the Person in his absolute being. Yet that relation is not an accident but a substance, and hence completes the Person of the Word and pertains to his subsistence and constitutes the Person adequately.

In this way the first difficulty concerning the Son is resolved. The second, which concerns the third Person, is resolved in similar fashion. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Spirator as breathed love, receiving love through the Will spiratively, not generatively; insofar as he receives the nature in this way he is constituted in the account of supposit; and he does not yet refer, and the breathed Person is completed by the relation, which being completed relatively, the account of Person constitutes the Holy Spirit adequately in the account of the absolute and relative.

And so the constitution of the Person of the Father is in one way, and that of the Son and the Holy Spirit in another, because that of the Father is immediately and wholly active and goes forth into the production of the other Persons as the font and principle of the Godhead — by which name the ancient Fathers and theologians commonly call the eternal Father. The constitution of the Son and

the Holy Spirit, however, is not active but passive, through the reception of the divine nature and the relation somewhat consequent upon it — which in the Son is Filiation and in the Holy Spirit Spiration. That the Son also concurs with the Father in the active spiration of the Holy Spirit posits nothing in the Person already constituted through the absolute account of the Word and the relation of Son adequately. From this it is clear that for the account of Person in the Son it suffices that there be passive generation; nor is the Son constituted or distinguished from the Holy Spirit through active spiration as one Person from another — but only as a producing principle from the produced. Otherwise the Holy Spirit would not be as perfect and adequate a Person as the Son; since the Spirit alone in the Trinity does not operate by producing a Person, for the entire fecundity of the divine nature is complete through those two processions of the Intellect and the Will, and hence the Holy Spirit is not productive of a Person.

SECTION III. Arguments Against the Opinion of Ripa as Explained According to the Mind of Scotus Are Proposed and Resolved.

Scotus did not conceal the arguments that can be raised against this opinion. He carefully collected and resolved them; let us follow in his footsteps. He does this in *dist. 26, q. un., § contra istam opinionem*, n. 25, and in the same *§ ad illa*, and *§ ad rationes* as follows.

First, from *Matthew*, last chapter: "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." And from *1 John, c. 5*: "There are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." He notes that Sacred Scripture, whenever it speaks of the divine Persons, always expresses them by relative names; whence, he says, it seems that to posit them as absolute contradicts Scripture. This is confirmed, because the same is the manner of naming in the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene, the Chalcedonian, and in the one composed by Athanasius, and in others — and in the writings of the holy Fathers and in ecclesiastical and canonical usage, as is clear from *dist. 15, Sancta Ecclesia Romana* — from which it follows that this opinion about the absolute is contrary to faith and to the Church.

I respond to these authorities from Scotus there: they certainly affirm relative properties, but they do not deny absolutes. The reason for affirming them is that it was easier to understand the relatives than the absolutes. Scripture and the Church thus accommodated themselves to our understanding by passing over in silence the absolute names, which are more hidden — of which *Proverbs 30* speaks perspicuously: "What is his name, and the name of his Son?" — where the Son is named relatively, yet another, absolute name of the same one is sought. And thus John in the Apocalypse said: "His name no one knows but himself" — that is, the absolute name, such as would be the Word of God, by which the Son is also called without the expressed concept of a relation to the Father but to God: Word of God. Here it must be noted that "Word" is sometimes taken as a name of the nature absolutely, not relatively; whence it is almost always

conjoined in the sacred letters to God, not to the Father. For it is not commonly said "Word of the Father" but "Word of God" — which I have carefully observed. Hence in John in the Gospel, *ch. 1*, Word is joined with God: "The Word was with God, and God was the Word. This was in the beginning with God." Here there is no mention of Father. But afterward, when he said "the only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father," he refers the only-begotten to the Father, but not the Word to the Father. Furthermore: *Epistle to the Hebrews ch. II, 1 Peter 1, 1 John 1, 2* — "Word of God" is said. But that is the illustrious passage fitted to the matter: *Apocalypse 19*, in which this doctrine seems manifestly to be delivered. For when John there at n. 12 had said "having a name written that no one knows but himself" — which is our very question — he adds at n. 13: "And his name is called the Word of God." Here is a genuine and forceful response in favor of Scotus.

I am not unaware that this name is said by Augustine to be relative, and I taught this from him in my volume *de Scholis Theologiae positivae, Schola 1, ch. 1*, producing many of his passages. But I now take it for granted in comparison with the name "Son," that it is less relative and is rather posited absolutely, and refers mostly to God and not to the Father in that absolute sense — and in this I dissent neither from myself nor from Augustine. From this it is clear that the second Person is said in Scripture in both ways: relatively to the Father as Son, and absolutely to God as Word.

And I conclude that it is not an effective argument that the Persons are named by those relative names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, since they are also called by other names — namely the name of God (the Father), while the Son is named "Word of God," that is of the Father; and while the Son is called "Word" and while the Holy Spirit is called Love, Gift, and Grace — by which names the Holy Spirit is designated in the sacred letters, as Augustine teaches, who affirms that the name of Love and Charity is proper to the Holy Spirit (*lib. 15 de Trin., cap. 17*). He affirms the same about the name Gift (*lib. 4 de Trin., c. 20* and *lib. 5, c. 1*), as Scotus (*In I, d. 18, q. un.*), Saint Thomas (*I p., q. 38, art. 2*), and Bonaventure (*In I, d. 18, q. 2 and 4*) note. Indeed, Father Vásquez says from Augustine that the Holy Spirit is better expressed by the name Gift than by the name Spirit (*disp. 154, c. 2, n. 4*). And indeed Augustine (*lib. 5 de Trin., c. 11*) says that the relation of the Holy Spirit does not appear in that name. Therefore it is not so fully true, as the objection runs, that the Persons are called only by relative names, since in the name "Holy Spirit" the relation, on the authority of Augustine, does not appear.

Scotus adds excellently in that *q. un., dist. 26, n. 29*: that the Persons are expressed by the names of relation does not remove the fact that they are in themselves absolute — and we speak thus of created things as well, when we name the Pope, King, Bishop, we subtract nothing from the absolute of the person.

But if someone inquires more subtly why Scripture and the Fathers preferred to use relative names rather than absolute ones, I respond that they did so for three reasons. The first is that relations presuppose the Persons and complete them adequately and signify diverse processions, and hence contain everything perfectly and ultimately — which is not found in the names of the absolute Persons, which are antecedent to the relations and are not entirely complete or adequate. The second is that relations signify the equality of the divine Persons among themselves — for they are simultaneous by nature and by knowledge and entirely equal. And this had to be expressed most of all because of the priorities of origin and procession of one from another; for if they were named separately by absolute names, it would provide occasion for error regarding the equality of the Persons. The third is that opposed relations produce distinction and real opposition, which neither is nor appears in absolutes — and therefore, in order to express that diversity which necessarily had to be established, relative names were introduced and employed.

Second, other testimonies of the Fathers are adduced, who expressly say that all distinction in the divine occurs through the opposition of relations, and all identity is posited through and in the absolute. Boethius is cited (*de Trin.*, at the end): "Substance contains unity. Relation multiplies the Trinity." This is resolved, however, by saying that Boethius is speaking of the substance of the divine nature taken antecedently to the Intellect and Will insofar as they are proximate principles whereby (*quo*) in the order of production in first act; and he is speaking of relations insofar as they are also initiative and not complete, not only insofar as they are formal and correlative.

Augustine is also adduced (*lib. 5 de Trin.*, *cap. 8* and *lib. 11 de Civ.*, *c. 10*), where he teaches that in God the one common thing is what is said of God and about God substantially, and that God is what he has — except that what is said of one Person in relation to another is not itself. It is responded in the same way: Augustine is speaking of the divine substance as it is in itself altogether one and absolute, not of it as it is relatable — that is, as the principle of producing in the Intellect and Will, which have diverse modes of producing and initiating relations. For in this sense the absolute already begins to respect another and to originate another — namely the Intellect generating, the Will spirating, which are diverse processions and relations in the process of becoming.

Damascene is cited (*1 de Trin.*, *ch. 1*) where he says: "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one in all things except innascibility, generation, and procession." The same in *ch. 5* and *10, lib. 3*. It is responded that Damascene by "innascibility" understood a personal property, as he called it in *lib. 3, ch. 5*; and these two words signify something before the formal relation by which he is formally Father — and hence something absolute, by which the Person is constituted — and the same must be said of the Son and the Holy Spirit. For he calls the Son "causable" and "fiable," and the Holy Spirit "causable" and "proceedable" —

words that indicate something before the actual procession and relation, and hence something absolute.

Richard is additionally cited (*lib. 3 de Trin.*) where he says that Persons are not distinguished by different modes of possessing the same nature. It is responded that this saying of Richard favors our opinion; for those modes are the ones by which the Son is produced in the manner of nature and the Holy Spirit in the manner of will, as we said above — and not the relations, which are not modes but relational realities.

Finally Anselm is opposed (*de processione Spiritus Sancti*) saying: "In God all things are one and the same where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way." It is responded in the words of Scotus in that *q. un., dist. 26, § ad finem*, n. 32: "either formally, as one relation opposes a correlative, or as being referred by an opposite relation; in this way Persons, if they were absolute, would be distinguished, because in them there are relations that originate."

Thus far concerning authority. Let us come to arguments drawn from reason. The first is: if the Persons were absolute, there would be composition from essence and from them; but this cannot apply to God; therefore Persons are not to be posited in an absolute. It is responded with Scotus, denying the inference. For just as a relation does not create composition, still less will absolute Personhood — since it is more intimate with the nature than a relation is, and belongs to the same absolute genus as it. The same is proved by the suitable example of a creature, which has no composition from its nature and subsistence, even though a relation in creatures creates composition with its foundation. If therefore a relation in the divine, because it is substantial, creates no composition with the nature, by no means will a subsistence or absolute Personhood create it. Furthermore, we have already above overturned and excluded that composition in the divine. Now we additionally say that composition does not occur when perfections emanate from the nature as from their principle and source; for composition arises from potency and act, not from act and perfection — as is apparent in a human being, who, already composed of animality and rationality, bursts forth into absolute properties, for example the capacity for wonder, discursion, risibility; nor on account of these thus emanating is there composition, since it is a kind of diffusion into innate perfections, which do not come to a human being as to something in potency toward them, but proceed from that perfected nature as from a most perfect act bursting and emanating into them. Scotus also adduces the example of divine attributes, which do not create composition with the essence — as he shows acutely and solidly both in this place and above at *dist. 8, q. de attributis*, which he cites. And those attributes are absolute, not relative. If therefore those exclude composition, a fortiori Personhoods will exclude the same. And in the formal response to the example of relations — which remain and yet pass over — it is responded that absolute properties also pass over into the essence through real

and total identity with it, yet remain in themselves and among themselves according to their formal accounts, in whatever manner they be distinguished from each other and from the essence, as is the case with attributes. The Intellect and Will, therefore, insofar as they are principles of operating in diverse ways in the manner of nature and will, and originate diverse origins through those diverse operations — which carry relations really distinct from each other — remain in themselves formally constituting and inadequately distinguishing the Persons without any composition, which if it does not arise through relatives, will by much less arise through absolutes.

The second argument with Scotus: the divine nature in absolute supposits must be distinguished in them, and hence lose its unity; which does not happen in the case of relatives, because relations can be many in one and the same subject. But absolute properties, since they are absolute, draw the essence along by dividing it; and this is clear because if one supposit is distinct from another, then their nature, which is absolute, will be distinct and divided from itself insofar as it is in a diverse absolute supposit.

It is responded that that division does not follow in the absolutes, just as it does not follow in the relations, because the divine nature does not cleave from itself when it is in diverse supposits — since it is one and simply infinite, and indeed in itself really unites and identifies everything however diverse it may be, just as it does in relations, in which it is one and the same. Furthermore, just as the divine nature is not divided from itself even though the power of spirating, which is in the Father and the Son, is not in the Holy Spirit — and yet the Spirit does not have that active power of spiration — so also the divine nature is not cleft if one absolute Person is formally distinguished from another, since by reason of its infinity it includes all those formalities. Finally, those absolute Persons are not as absolute as the essence, because since they are proximate principles of operating in different ways, they already originate diverse origins and processions, and are distinguished in their own manner according to various operations from the essence. Yet no one admits cleavage or division in the altogether absolute essence from the fact that it inheres in distinct things and is identified with them — because the divine nature or essence, by reason of its infinity, identifies and unites all things even diverse ones with itself. It cannot therefore be divided and cut, since it is the very ground of uniting and identifying.

The third argument: from positing these Persons in an absolute, two things follow. First, that the divine relations supervene as it were accidentally upon the Persons already constituted. Second, that those relations cannot be real but only conceptual — just as the relation of God to the creature is of reason alone, since it supervenes upon creating God. Furthermore it follows that then one Person would not depend upon another according to its personal being, and therefore the relations that would supervene would be altogether conceptual, not real.

To this argument we satisfy with Scotus by saying that the first absurdity does not follow — as is clear from the example of the relation of active spiration: which, since it presupposes the Persons constituted, nevertheless supervenes upon them as it were accidentally, yet is real, even though it is not really distinct from them. Indeed, in the Son that relation is so necessary in the school of the Thomists that by reason of it the Holy Spirit is really distinguished from the Son — which I add, Scotus omitting it. Just as therefore that relation supervening upon the Person already constituted in the being of Son is real, so also relations supervening upon absolute Persons will be real, not conceptual. Nor likewise the second, because there is a great difference between the relation of Creator and these divine relations: for the former is altogether contingent and is not anything substantial, nor does it arise from the intimate principles of nature, as do the relations of Filiation and Spiration, which are altogether necessary in God and substantial, encompassing the absolute account of the Persons, which cannot subsist without them. For that fecundity of the divine nature necessarily has those emanations and processions, which are the becoming of those relations. Therefore the essence cannot be sustained with these removed — it would be sterile and infecund without them, by which it is completed in its adequate being by the relations; not that those are the Persons, but that they are from the Persons and the complements of the Persons and the fruits of divine fecundity — just as in their own way the risible and the discursive are neither the human nature nor the human supposit, yet are inseparable properties and effects of the subsisting nature.

The fourth argument proceeds thus. This absolute Person, if it were in God, would not be there merely virtually, as creatures are in God, but actually; but this cannot be; therefore it is not in God. The major is certain and conceded by Scotus. The minor is proved, because what is actually there is an act; if an act, it perfects; therefore that Personhood will perfect the divine nature, which is false. Then it follows that it cannot be in God, because it cannot perfect God. Therefore there is no absolute Person in God.

This argument is resolved by denying the first assumption — that what is actually there is an act. For prime matter is actually in the composite and is a part composing it, yet it is not an act. Then, granted that the Person is an act — which is true — it does not follow that it is a perfection; because such an act does not come to the nature as to a potency, but emanates from the most perfect nature and only terminates and completes it in the hypostatic genus. For a hypostasis according to its account does not give being or perfection to the nature — even when it comes to it — because it only renders the nature complete and incommunicable. And this is clear from the example of the Person of Christ, in whom is the divine supposit, completing and terminating the human nature without any greater perfection of the same nature, which if it were released from the Word would be no less perfect than when it was in him. For this reason the human nature in Christ still seeks its own connaturally

proper subsistence, as we said together with Vásquez and others — which it would not seek if it received greater perfection in its being. From this the just resolution of the argument appears, from the sufficiently accurate response of Scotus in that *q. un.*, §§ 4, 5, 6, nn. 34 and 36, of which I have made a summary.

Scotus also notes that this argument militates against relative Persons as well, since a relation can be in many people's opinion an intrinsic perfection — and indeed probably, on the authority of Augustine (*lib. de quantitate animae, c. 7*), who says that the relation of equality is more perfect than the relation of inequality, and the relation of cause seems more perfect than the relation of effect. Therefore if the argument is valid against the absolute Person, it is also valid against the relative one.

The fifth argument: those absolute Persons are either of the same kind or of different kinds; they are neither; therefore they do not exist. The major is a proper dilemma. The minor is proved. Not of the same kind, because one is diverse from another — namely Paternity from Filiation, and both from the Holy Spirit — as is clear from the diverse modes of producing of nature and will, and from the altogether diverse relations. Not of different kinds, because all agree in the same absolute hypostatic account, which cannot be diverse before the relations, which alone are diverse in God. Whence the absolute account of a Person collapses.

It is responded that those Persons are primarily diverse, just as individual properties are. That they are primarily diverse is clear from the fact that they immediately, of themselves, and from themselves mutually repugn each other — for one is unbegotten and originates from none of the others; another is begotten in the manner of nature and originates from another; the third proceeds in the manner of will and originates from two. Therefore they are primarily diverse. Nor should you say that all of them agree in the common account of absolute Person, and hence are not primarily diverse — because not every agreement removes diversity. The categories agree in the common account of being, yet they are primarily diverse; and all individuals agree in being individuals, yet are not thereby under a genus or species; and indeed the divine relations themselves agree in the account of a relative Person and are nonetheless primarily diverse. The same will hold for absolute Personhoods. Only that agreement posits or removes a species which is generic and comes about through a true and proper contraction of genus and difference — which is not the case in the agreement mentioned above. Hence the argument proves nothing.

The sixth and last argument runs as follows. Those absolute Persons either proceed through origin or spring up from the essence. If the second is granted, it follows that all the Persons are in the same nature, which — being the same — cannot differentiate the Persons, and hence they will be entirely identical among themselves and will in no way be distinguished. If the first is granted, it follows

that origins are prior to Persons, which implies a contradiction; for a Person makes the origin and originates another; therefore it is not made through origin, and an infinite regress follows — because if a Person becomes a Person through origin, it must be from another Person, and that Person too becomes so through origin, and so on to infinity.

It is responded: not all the Persons, nor they altogether, come to be through origin; nor do they spring from the essence; and therefore the argument does not prevail. I explain the assumption. The Person of the Father springs immediately from the essence, which demands and gives birth to its complement, fully requisite in order for it to communicate itself. Hence the Father lacks an originating Person, since he is the first originating Person. The Person of the Son originates from the Father and springs from the essence through the Intellect as the principle whereby (*quo*) in the manner of nature — and is thus constituted in the absolute account of Person, as we taught above. Hence no absurdity follows from what the argument inferred. For the Son is produced by one Person already constituted and originating and producing through the Intellect in the manner of nature; and therefore, although he is in the same nature as the Father, it does not follow that the relation of Father and Son is the same, because the agreement is in the nature — which is entirely the same — not in the mode of producing, which is diverse: both by reason of the producing to the produced, and by reason of the diversity of the mode of producing in the manner of nature through the Intellect. And so the Person of the Son originates from the Father through the Intellect, not immediately from the nature. Whence it is clear that even in this he is differentiated from the Father — because the Father springs immediately from the nature, the Son however from the Intellect. This must be carefully considered for the exact distinction of the Son from the Father; for the Son does not seem to be distinguished from him only because he is produced by a producing one through proper and formal generation, but also because the Son does not spring immediately from the essence but from the Intellect, whereas the Father springs immediately from the essence and is from himself, and is the font of deity. The argument therefore proves nothing against the Persons of Father and Son, nor similarly against the Holy Spirit — because the Spirit springs through the Will as the proximate principle whereby (*quo*) and in the manner of will, and originates from the Father and the Son already constituted in their personal being; and he is distinguished from them both because he is produced by them, and because he proceeds through the Will, proceeding immediately from it in the manner of will. Therefore the argument fails.

And if by objecting it proved anything, it would greatly harm the relative Persons, against whom it militates more strongly than against the absolute ones. For if the Persons are solely relative, it follows that principles and origins on the part of the producers are removed — since a relation is simultaneous by nature and by knowledge, and in no manner antecedes the produced, which cannot

coexist with anteriority and origin. Therefore among relative Persons there would be a mutual and equal relation and correlation with simultaneous habitude, which excludes the account of a Person originating and producing; whence those who are authors of the contrary opinion face the same difficulty — or a greater one — from the argument.

From these matters treated broadly and perspicuously it is established that the opinion of Ripa, which Scotus says and makes probable, merits no note of error — indeed it seems safe, probable, and conformable to theology. One thing remains: that studious people read and weigh our disputation attentively and carefully, with unaffected mind and unprejudiced spirit.

SECTION IV. A Further Discourse and Exposition Concerning the Opinion of John of Ripa, Which Scotus Calls Probable.

Having proposed this opinion and having identified the definite and individual account of that absolute which constitutes the divine Person, and having considered the objections adduced against it and weighed their resolutions, I am astonished that it is condemned so harshly by the Thomists and by those who prefer to think with them — so much so that some, like Báñez, dare to call it heretical.

For my part, I hold together with Scotus, Lychetus, and the other ancient and noble interpreters, commentators, and followers of Scotus, that it is not only free from censure but also probable. Saint Thomas (*q. 40, art. 4*) seems to adduce this opinion and pass over it as harmless. Let us hear him in the body of the article: "I respond that according to those who say that properties do not distinguish but only manifest hypostases already distinct and constituted, it must be said absolutely that relations according to the mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts." Here Saint Thomas says nothing against that opinion, which does not place hypostases in the relations but antecedently to them, and hence in absolutes; and he touches on the argument usually adduced against it — that in that opinion relations only manifest Persons but do not constitute them — yet he neither reproves this nor censures the opinion, but leaves it untouched in the middle. Why then do the disciples stigmatize and condemn it? The Angelic Doctor does rightly indeed — who speaks of the constitution of the Persons in such a way that he seems to include something absolute in it, and hence inclines toward the opinion of Ripa, and dares not condemn it lest he condemn his own as well.

Lest it seem that I judge rashly about Saint Thomas, I wish to adduce the words of Cajetan in which my judgment is contained. For in his commentaries on *q. 40, I p., art. 4*, he says: "The doubt is confirmed and increased, because from Saint Thomas we have four real predicates by reason of which the constituting of a Person is attributed to a relation. The first is the divine essence. For in *q. de potentia, q. 8, art. 3, responsio ad 7*, he says that relations constitute hypostases

insofar as they are the divine essence. The second is 'divine.' For in *In I, dist. 26, art. 2, ad 1*, he says that a relation as divine distinguishes the hypostasis. The third is 'subsistent.' For in *art. 2 of this question, responsio ad 4*, he said that a relation, if it is subsistent, carries with it suppositional distinction. The fourth is 'the Person herself.' For in the aforesaid article he said that relations constitute and distinguish hypostases insofar as they are the Persons themselves subsisting. From all of these there arises ambiguity: whether in the mind of Saint Thomas the relativity of the relation and its condition constitutes the Person while remaining within the latitude of the relative, or insofar as it is identified with some absolute. For there are straits on every side. For if it constitutes while remaining within the relative latitude, the cited passages from the aforesaid places collapse; but if it constitutes as being identical to some absolute, it follows that personhood in the divine is formally absolute — the opposite of which we have confessed." There also come the arguments of Auriol at Capreolus in *dist. 26, d. 1*, especially against that saying taken from the questions on the power of God; and again against the third saying taken from *art. 2 of this question* — namely, that the relation insofar as it is subsistent constitutes — asking what the phrase "insofar as it is subsistent" imports, and briefly inferring that this is nothing other than that the same constitutes itself, or that the constituent as constituted constitutes.

I am glad that Cajetan saw these passages and frankly confessed the difficulty — which I had seen before I came upon his commentaries, and for this reason had fully persuaded myself that Saint Thomas had constituted the account of a Person in the absolute, at least inadequately; and I was indignant at the Thomists for censuring so harshly an opinion into which their own master had fallen.

Nor did Cajetan extricate himself from the difficulty, though he subtly devised a mode of interpreting, which is as follows: in a relation, for example Paternity, two things are found: a connotation of the essence as the root, and a formal respect toward another. Through the first, the hypostasis is constituted; through the second, the relation — which does not have the account of a hypostasis. And he adds: "Just as with the logicians a relation is signified in two ways — namely as conceived and as exercised — and yet it is one and the same relation, so in the case at hand: Paternity as exercised follows upon the act of generation; and in its very self under the expressed account of Paternity it precedes generation and constitutes the hypostasis." And below: "Paternity as it precedes generation constitutes and distinguishes the relative Person of the Father in its hypostatic relative being really and formally, but not in the relatively exercised being — and therefore it is called Paternity not as relation but as constituent. But as it follows upon generation, it constitutes and distinguishes the same Person — not in hypostatic being, but in relatively exercised being — and therefore it is called Paternity as relation; so that there are not two relative beings in the Father, but

only one given by Paternity formally before generation as hypostatic, and afterward as exercised."

I hold Cajetan in his straits while I see him philosophizing thus. For how does that relation of Paternity as conceived constitute the hypostasis? Is it through the sole operation of the intellect? If he says this, how does it constitute the Person formally and really? But if it constitutes in reality, how is it conceived, not exercised? Furthermore: if by connoting the essence as root it constitutes, that connotation of the essence is not the relative concept of Paternity, because this tends toward the correlative, not toward the absolute. Moreover, how does that conceived Paternity, if it precedes generation, pass into the relative of the Father — since the Father is said relatively to the generated one? Furthermore, if that conceived relation is precisely the hypostasis, and is not the formal exercised relation itself, that concept will be absolute as being hypostatic, since it is not a formal relation. Finally, Cajetan concedes to us that exercised Paternity is not constitutive of the Person, and that the Person precedes the relation — and hence is something absolute; all of which appears clearly in the words of Cajetan, who rightly called his own subtle mode of interpreting an imagination, when he said at this place, *q. 40, art. 4, § ad evidentiam harum*: "In the matter at hand, I imagine."

And lest anyone think me hostile to Cajetan — which I deny — for I have always held him in high esteem, I wish to avoid that suspicion by adducing the judgments of the most weighty theologians concerning his imagination. I produce two. The first is Suárez, who at *lib. 7, c. 7, nn. 3 and 4*, attacks at length this opinion concerning the relation as conceived and exercised, as did Ferrariensis, whom many moderns followed. And then at n. 5 he refutes the opinion of Cajetan with two difficulties objected against it, and attacks it in such a way as to refute it together with that of Ferrariensis and others of the Thomists; and at n. 7 he forms an argument of his own which he proposes at n. 9 and pursues to the end of the chapter; and he interprets Saint Thomas differently, in accordance with Vásquez (*d. 159, c. 2*) where he says: "Cajetan, with his accustomed subtlety in the resolution of this question, seems to have labored with more heat, I do not know whether so fruitfully." He then teaches in *art. 4 of this question, ad 2 dubium*: "Paternity is taken in two ways: one way, as conceived under the expressed concept of Paternity, not as exercising the function of a relation — and in this way, Cajetan says, it constitutes the Person of the Father in God before it is understood to generate and to have a Son, because the relation as conceived in Cajetan's opinion does not require a term; the other way, it is considered as exercised — that is, as now exercising the office of referring; and in this way it requires a term in act and in the term the filiation; in this way it cannot constitute the Person of the Father, as the arguments of Scotus plainly show." And shortly after, at n. 5: "Ferrariensis mentions this opinion of Cajetan (*4 contra gentes, c. 26*, at the verse 'but this interpretation'), who, though he calls it subtle, nevertheless affirms that it is neither true nor according to the mind of

Saint Thomas." The same Vásquez at n. 4 reports the opinion of the Canarian, which he says is related to Cajetan's and is attacked by the same arguments. Let us await the judgment of Vásquez — and so at n. 6, after refuting the arguments of both, he concludes: "The distinction of Cajetan and of the Canarian is therefore fictitious." I am pleased that Vásquez, an acute and learned man, does not approve of Cajetan's subtle distinction — lest anyone object to me, as a man of lesser acuity, a tardiness of mind. I do not approve, however, of the word "fictitious," being content with the word "imagination."

I confess that I cannot understand Cajetan's subtlety in distinguishing Paternity into conceived and exercised, because as soon as I hear Paternity and conceive it, I immediately conceive the relation to the Son; and I cannot separate these two correlative concepts of Paternity and Filiation — just as when I hear Filiation, immediately Paternity comes to mind. I rightly understand a producing Person without Filiation, but not a Father without generation and without Filiation. If Cajetan was able to do so differently, he will be so much the more subtle in conceiving that his subtlety passes into imagination — not to say, with Vásquez, a most subtle man, into fiction.

My judgment therefore is this: whoever separates in a relation the account of personhood or hypostasis from the formal relation and habitude, falls into the opinion that holds that it consists in an absolute — such as Cajetan, the Canarian, Ferrariensis, Capreolus, Marsilius, and others, of whose view Vásquez says as much (*d. 159, c. 3, nn. 9 and 10*) — whether they distinguish the constitutive account from the distinctive or not. Indeed, the same Vásquez (*eo, n. 9*) says that some Thomists do not hesitate to concede that a relation under the concept of hypostatic form is formally absolute. Furthermore, I consider Saint Thomas himself not to be alien from that same opinion. For I always see him separating the hypostatic account from the formally relative account — as we shall see in the following section.

Suárez and Vásquez, however, not content with the Thomists' solutions and devising others to answer Scotus's arguments, and thinking they satisfy them, profit less than they themselves think; and each willingly or unwillingly falls back into the opinion of Ripa. Vásquez above all, because he boldly says (*d. 158, c. 3, n. 13*) that John of Ripa and Scotus manifestly erred in asserting the distinction among divine Persons from absolute properties — forgetting that by force of his own words he falls into the same opinion which he criticizes in them. His acuity availed him nothing in not falling into that same opinion.

SECTION V. The Common Opinion About Relative Properties Is Proposed; and in What Scotus Agrees and Disagrees with Saint Thomas Regarding It Is Explained.

There is no need to repeat in what places Scotus taught this opinion, since we have carefully enumerated them above. We need only see what Scotus judged

about this opinion when he proposed it, how he transmitted it, and whether he agreed with Saint Thomas in transmitting it.

And first, it is a matter of wonder that Father Vásquez, a most learned man, does not adduce Scotus in support of this opinion — as if he had not transmitted it at all, but had only commemorated the opinion of John of Ripa; and indeed as if Scotus had attacked this opinion as being Saint Thomas's, as can be seen in his *disp. 158, c. 6*. The same thing I see happened to his equal Suárez, who when he proposed the question in *lib. 7, c. 7* almost omits Scotus and attributes the opinion of Saint Thomas on relative properties to him alone entirely. I grieve that two such distinguished theologians of their age either did not read Scotus or, having read him, passed him by.

Scotus therefore, as we said, at *In I, dist. 26, q. un., § alia est opinio*, n. 4, distinctly proposes the opinion about relative properties and proves it most accurately; and lest anyone say he does not transmit it as his own, he then at *§ ad primum et secundum*, n. 44, most diligently examines all the arguments made against it and resolves them. Then in *Quodlib. 4* he presupposes the same common opinion about relation and disputes against various modes of understanding and explaining it, without however abolishing its principal sense. He does the same in *In I, dist. 28, q. 2*, dealing with the Person of the Father in his own being as the constituted first Person. Moreover in *In III, dist. 1, q. 1 and 5* he refers back to what was disputed in *In I, dist. 26*, since there he disputes about the Personhood of the Word terminating the human nature. What misled those great authors was that Scotus does not like the mode of expounding those properties proposed by Henry, Saint Bonaventure, and the Angelic Doctor — whom he attacks — and brings forward another mode, with which the common opinion can be maintained. This will appear clearly in this section instituted for this very purpose.

Let us set out the opinion of Saint Thomas conceived and expressed in his own words. First in *I p., q. 40, art. 2, sed contra*: what Boethius says in the book on the Trinity — that relation multiplies the Trinity of divine Persons — and consequently in the body of the article he says: "I respond that in whatever plurality of things some common element is found, it is necessary to seek something distinctive. Whence since the three Persons agree in the unity of essence, it is necessary to seek something by which they are distinguished in order that there may be many of them. But in the divine Persons two things are found by which they differ — namely origin and relation." And below: "In a divine Person there is nothing else to understand but the essence and the relation or property; whence since they agree in the essence, it remains that by means of the relations the Persons are distinguished from one another." And then *ad quartum*: "A relation presupposes the distinction of supposits when it is an accident; but if a relation is subsistent it does not presuppose it but carries it along with itself." Furthermore, *art. 3*: "Since it is the relation that distinguishes

the hypostases, as was said, it constitutes them — whence, with personal relations mentally removed, the hypostases do not remain." And again in the same place: "Relations distinguish and constitute hypostases, as was shown" — and *art. 2* is cited.

Cajetan observes in his commentary on *art. 2* that Saint Thomas several times says simultaneously "property" and "relation." That the Angelic Doctor rejects the absolute is clear from *art. 2, ad 2*: "The divine Persons are not distinguished in the being in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only according to what they say in relation to another; and therefore for their distinction a relation suffices." And indeed in this place Vásquez (*disp. 158*) and Suárez (*lib. 7, c. 6, n. 6*) cite Saint Thomas in support of this opinion, and all Thomists — both interpreters and commentators — explain and defend it here.

In this part, insofar as Saint Thomas holds that relations constitute and distinguish Persons, Scotus agrees with him, transmitting and proving the same opinion and resolving the arguments adduced against it. So in the places cited by me just now, and in this sense he calls it the common one. But he departs from Saint Thomas in that the latter, in constituting Persons through relation, proceeds in such a way as to distinguish in the relation two quasi-component accounts: personal property and relation. Let us hear Suárez on this matter (*lib. 7, c. 7*): "In this difficulty Saint Thomas labors in *q. 40, a. 4* and finally concludes that a relation can be considered in two ways: first as a personal property, second as a relation; and in the first way he says it constitutes a Person, in the latter way it merely refers. This distinction is attacked with all their power by Durandus (*In I, dist. 26, q. 1*), Scotus (*dist. 28, at the end*), and others; but the Thomists defend it steadfastly." Vásquez likewise expounds the mind of the Angelic Doctor (*disp. 159, c. 5, n. 21*), adducing a passage from the first part, *q. 40, a. 4*, and citing another from the same author at *q. 42, a. 3* — from which he proves that he distinguished those two accounts and located the hypostasis or person in the first.

Both do so rightly; for so entirely Saint Thomas teaches in that *q. 40, a. 4*. For in the body he says: "The personal property of the Father can be considered in two ways. In one way as a relation — and thus it again presupposes the notional act in the order of understanding, because a relation as such is founded upon an act. In another way according as it is constitutive of the Person — and thus it is necessary that the relation be understood prior to the notional act, just as the acting person is understood prior to the action." And *ad primum*: "When the Master says that the Father generates because he is Father, he takes the name 'Father' according as it designates the account only, and not according as it signifies the subsisting Person; for in the latter sense it would be necessary to say conversely that because the Father exists he generates." And there is another testimony of the same distinction in this *q. 40, art. 2, in corp.*: "Relations or properties distinguish or constitute hypostases or Persons insofar as they are the

Persons themselves subsisting — just as Paternity is the Father and Filiation is the Son, because in the divine the abstract and the concrete do not differ." And immediately: "This name 'Father' signifies not only the property, but also the hypostasis." And *ad primum*: "The Persons are the subsisting relations themselves." And *ad quartum*: "A relation, if it is subsistent, does not presuppose, but carries with it the distinction. For when it is said that the relative being is to have a relation to another, by 'another' is understood the correlative, which is not prior but simultaneous by nature." That notable passage is in *In I, dist. 26, q. 2, a. 2*, where he says that a relation insofar as it is divine distinguishes the hypostasis. Cajetan ponders this among others in his commentary on the first part, *q. 40, a. 4*.

Scotus proposes this opinion of Saint Thomas so explained in *In I, dist. 28, q. 3, § hic communiter conceditur* in these words: "On account of the difficulty of the prior argument, a distinction is drawn in the relation itself constituting the first Person: in one way it can be considered as a property, in another as a relation. As a property it precedes generation; as a relation it follows. And then, according as it constitutes the First Person, it is not necessary that the second simultaneously exist with the first — although as a relation consequent upon generation, it is necessary that the second simultaneously exist with it."

It is also clear in what Scotus agrees and in what he differs from Saint Thomas. He agrees in that he holds together with the common opinion that Persons are constituted and distinguished by relations. He differs in denying those two accounts of the antecedent hypostasis and the consequent respect that follows the hypostasis; for Scotus posits the self-same formal real relation as constituting and distinguishing the Persons, without that account of a subsisting property distinct from the relation. He argues against Saint Thomas's distinction as follows. First, because that property as property is some entity; therefore it is either toward itself or toward another: if toward itself, it is something absolute and constitutes an absolute Person — which Saint Thomas denies; or it is toward another, and then it will be a relation and will constitute a relative Person. Second, arguing against the man: Saint Thomas (*q. 42, a. 3*) does not admit an order of prior and posterior in the divine; but with this account of the property anteceding the formal respect adopted, there is given a kind of order of priority in the divine — and therefore that account is to be excluded. Scotus also adduces an example to refute the distinction of Saint Thomas, who endeavors to avoid the difficulty of the absolute included in the Person, and shows by arguing that that absolute must necessarily be included in the subsisting relation. He uses this example: whiteness, when it formally whitens, also communicates to the subject the account of quality which it includes in its specific account; so likewise a relation, when it constitutes and distinguishes, includes within itself that account of the subsistent, always carries it with it, and communicates it to the Person — but that account is not precisely relative but absolute; therefore through an absolute the Person will also be constituted.

Pressed by these arguments, the Thomists devised various escape routes, as we said above in our judgment — routes which, divided into factions among themselves, have been closed off to them. There remain the solutions of two distinguished theologians, Vásquez and Suárez, who agree in saying that this constitution is of reason, not real — which Vásquez endeavors to show at *disp.* 158, c. 2 and *disp.* 159, c. 5, and which Suárez presupposes at *lib.* 7, c. 4, n. 5 and c. 7, n. 10. With this accepted — in which they think there is great weight — they say that this first account is taken in a certain concept with the addition of some negation or connotation. The words are Suárez's (*lib.* 7, c. 7, n. 1): "This concept," he says, "is the concept of the first Person" — for he is speaking of the Father, where there is greater difficulty. And he adds there that that constituted thing by the first personality is called by Saint Thomas the relation as a hypostatic form; and he subjoins: "Thus therefore the first Person can be understood prior to being related — which does not prevent it from being constituted of itself and properly through a relation."

Vásquez (*d.* 159, c. 5, n. 18) writes: "It must be observed that this constitution of Persons by properties is only by reason." Then at n. 19: "If Persons are conceived by us with a distinct and expressed concept, it is correctly understood that they are constituted by certain relative properties under the expressed and formal account of a relation. For so the three Persons are conceived as mutually distinguished by their relations." Then speaking specially of the Father he adds: "It must be said that the Person of the Father can be conceived before it is understood as actually generating — not however under the concept of Father, for that is incompatible, because Paternity is founded in generation — but under the concept of the innascible and fecund toward producing." Then: "When I say that the first Person is conceived by us in that way before it is understood to generate, I do not assert that it must then necessarily be understood as constituted — but only that it can be apprehended by a simple concept. Since this constitution is only by reason, it is not necessary always to apprehend the Person as constituted." Vásquez concludes at n. 10: "If the Father were constituted really, in whatever way he were understood by us prior to generating, he would have to be conceived as at least confusedly constituted by a real property."

This opinion of Vásquez and Suárez thus expounded has no less difficulty than the others. Let us first examine what value that observation about a constitution of reason — not real — has. It can be understood in two ways: first, as one that reason forms with no foundation in reality — which is not true; for it is not imagination or fiction. Second, as one that has a foundation in reality but is formed from things that are distinguished from each other by reason alone — and this is true; for the relation and that concept of the first Person, for example, are not really — nor in their view formally — distinguished. But what this evasion profits I do not see; for the constitution from two things virtually distinct remains — just as the constitution from the relation of Paternity and

Filiation with active spiration remains, and the constitution of the essence with the relations. Indeed within God all constitution is of reason among things that are distinguished by reason — since only relations are really distinct among themselves. But these relations as such do not create a constitution among themselves, since they are entirely diverse and opposed to each other — but with the essence, with which they are identical and from which they are distinguished by reason alone, in the way of the Thomists along which both Suárez and Vásquez walk. Therefore all constitution in God is only among things distinguished by reason. That evasion therefore profits them nothing.

For just as we ask what the relation of Spirator is when it supervenes upon the relation of Paternity, and what agrees or differs between them, and how the constitution of Spirator in the Father comes about — so we ask what is that concept of the first Person to which the other of Paternity supervenes. For these concepts do not remove the things conceived but presuppose them, and fall upon them; and we raise the question about those things as they are conceived. And so that constitution of reason does not remove the constituted things — just as the concept of the relation of Spirator, which is distinguished from Paternity by reason alone, does not abolish the constitution between them.

Nor does it help to say that between the essence and the relation there is in reality a real constitution — since the essence is an absolute thing and the relation is respective, and these two are not formed by reason — and therefore it is not a constitution of reason, that is, introduced by reason alone. For granting this — that I do not deny: that the constitution of the nature and the relation is different — nevertheless the difficulty does not cease. I ask how and through what reason constitutes the Person and Paternity. Not that there is such a great distinction there as between the essence and Paternity — but that that lesser distinction does not abolish things distinguished by reason; and I apply the more suitable example.

The relation of active Spiration and the relation of Paternity are both relative, yet they constitute something in their own genus — that of the spirator — with a lesser distinction than that between the essence and the relations. Therefore, similarly, that personality in confused being — whatever it may be — and the expressed personality of the Father will constitute the Person in expressed being. For I ask what those concepts apprehend and what they bring along with them toward constituting — for they do not come empty-handed. What then are those objects that the concepts bring, and which by being conceived and conjoined are united toward constituting? Certainly that concept of the confused first Person precisely abstracts something from the account of expressed Paternity through the concept of that latter. I take this something, and I inquire what it is. Nor am I misled by Vásquez's examples of animal constituted from living and sentient, and of the same from body and soul as constituted — for even though the former constitution is metaphysical and of reason, and the

latter is real and physical, nevertheless even that first metaphysical one is a constitution, about which the question is asked what animal is and what rational is; and it appears, and indeed is such, that it repugns God, because it comes from genus and difference, even though it is through reason.

Furthermore, this constitution of the first Person as such, and of expressed Paternity, is given in the thing itself — even though it is not really distinct from the side of the thing — for indeed the account of Person joined with being from itself, unbegotten, and innascible, is truly in God, before the Father generating formally is understood, and before he is constituted in the being of Father through the generation of the Son. Therefore the argument runs always against Suárez and Vásquez, whom I interrogate: what is that account confusedly conceived of the first Person, before the formal generation of the Son begins — not yet expressly set forth as Paternity? For that is established to be formally a relation. About that we ask what it is while it lies hidden under those covers of a confused concept — what they call the first Person abstracted from the formal account of expressed Paternity. Let them name it for me: is it absolute, relative, or mixed from both accounts? They will not say mixed; they deny it is relative — for it is not formal Paternity; therefore it is something absolute. Therefore the account of Person is absolute — which they were horrified to say, and which they were being compelled to say by the arguments of Scotus, which press them no less than the Thomists, who quarreling among themselves over the difficulty of their opinion — seen and objected by Scotus — do not respond rightly and do not satisfy the difficulty, which remains entirely intact. So much so that a new way must be devised.

Scotus opens it with his most acute genius. For after attacking the Thomistic position, he proposes and fortifies his own way as follows. The formal relation of Paternity itself — without that distinction of the hypostatic and relative accounts of Saint Thomas, without that imagination of the conceived and exercised of Cajetan, without that confusion and expression of Suárez and Vásquez — through itself constitutes the Father in the genus of Person.

Let us hear Scotus (*dist. 28, q. 3, § ad quaestionem*, n. 8): "It can be said, holding the common way — presupposing that Persons are relative and that the first Person is constituted by a positive relation to the second Person — because by nothing else, as was argued to the opposite through the way of division; nor is it necessary to distinguish in what way that relation is considered as constitutive." Thus he removes all those modes we have recounted of sustaining the constitutive account of a Person. Then he comes to the difficulty which moved them toward devising those modes: "Nor is there any other difficulty than how it requires the second Person simultaneously with itself, even though it precedes." See the difficulty that terrified all. Scotus removes this as follows: "I say briefly that the simultaneity of relatives is indeed in them, and yet alongside that simultaneity there stands a priority of origin: that one is from another." By this

reason he removed the difficulty and satisfied it. For if alongside that simultaneity priority stands, we have the constitution of the first and second Person. That it stands is clear from the reason Scotus appends: first, because under Paternity is formally understood the priority of the Father according to origin, which the very name "Father" involves — since it signifies active origin, as filiation signifies passive. Second, because alongside the simultaneity of the relations there could stand a priority in perfection, if there were a capacity for perfection in the relation — because it is of a different kind from relational simultaneity. Both are clear from the relation of cause to caused, on the testimony of Avicenna (*6 Metaph.*), which, since it is simultaneous with its caused, nevertheless carries with it priority and dignity with respect to the caused. From this Scotus argues, with due respect, to the relation of the Father — who, not having the account of a cause or dignity, yet retains the priority of origin with respect to the Son. Scotus concludes at n. 10: "The first Person is constituted in personal being by a relation to the second, and conversely; and it is impossible that they exist without each other; yet the first Person constituted in such being is prior in origin to the second Person — so that the first Person constituted in such being is the one from whom the second has originated; and thus the priority of origin is not incompatible with the simultaneity of relatives."

Scotus speaks so clearly that no commentary is needed — which Lychetus saw, and therefore refrained from commenting; which Poncius chose to do instead, expounding at length what Scotus said more briefly and clearly. I understood the matter better in the text of Scotus than in the commentaries of Poncius, and I consider the difficulty entirely removed. Who does not see that in the Father, by the very fact that he is and is called Father — even relatively — there is a certain priority with respect to the Son, and in the Son a certain posteriority with respect to the Father in origin — so that the Father is the origin of the Son, and not the Son the origin of the Father? Without any other added confused concept of the first Person antecedently to the Father — a concept which, certainly confused, seems to me unworthy of this constitution of the Father, who since he clearly says and expresses origin, excludes that obscurity of confusion.

For my part, when I hear Father and Son, I feel them to be mutually related — but in such a way that in the Father there is the priority of the originating to the originated, and through this priority of the generating to the generated I constitute the Person of the Father, and through that posteriority of the generated to the generator I constitute the Person of the Son, and through the same I distinguish them from each other. Nor do I need another constituent and distinctive. By what, I ask, is the Son constituted in the account of Son, except that he is begotten and is from the Father? By what else is the Father constituted in the account of Father, except that he begets the Son? They have the same nature and are the same God; but the Father is from himself and the Son from the Father, and by the fact that one is Father and the other Son they are

distinguished from each other. Therefore in that account and priority of origin — which Paternity formally includes and expresses — consists the account of the first Person.

Let me be permitted to use this example. When I hear cause and caused, I understand relations; but in them I perceive the account of prior in one and the account of posterior in the other — expressed by the very names of cause and caused, which do not abolish the priority while retaining the simultaneity. So in their own way in the relations of Father and Son I acknowledge the simultaneity of referring and the priority of originating in the Father as Father, and in the Son as Son the posteriority of the originated. If therefore we find in the very formal relations themselves the priority of the first and second Person — why do we seek them outside the relations? If the account of first Person is clearly apparent in the expressed concept of the Father, why do we seek it as if latent in a confused concept? We find it in Paternity — so that we need not have recourse to what Paternity is not.

Judgment

From this lengthy but, I believe, solid disputation, the sense of Scotus in proposing and approving the opinion of John of Ripa concerning the constitution of Persons by absolutes is clear. He does not approve of it altogether and follow it — but he tries to show the manner in which it can be held and defended without rashness and outside the danger of error, while retaining the other common opinion about constituents through relations. This we have asserted after diligent and subtle investigation and discussion of the mind of Scotus. Whence we judge that he is not the author of that opinion of Ripa in the sense of transmitting it, but its defender — lest it be condemned. And this is fully established from what we have said, drawn from *In I, dist. 2, q. 3* and *dist. 28*. For there he proposes, defends, and teaches as his own the common opinion of the constitution of Persons through the relation alone — as we shall plainly show below when we treat of the unbegotten.

Furthermore, he transmits the same opinion in the *Reportata* on that same *dist. 26, q. 1*, clearly resolving the arguments which he himself had proposed against it in *In I, dist. 26*. He is certainly the secure author of the same in *Quodlib. 4*, where he distinctly proposes and asserts the constitutive account of the Person of the Father to consist in the very relation itself — with the priority of origin. And indeed I observe that with greater rigor and propriety Scotus constitutes this relative constitutive account in the formal relation than does Saint Thomas — for he does not admit those distinct accounts of the antecedent hypostasis and the formal respect; but he excluded that distinction, because it was not purely relative and smelled of something absolute, certainly not a purely genuine relation. Wherefore Scotus places a much purer relative concept than Saint Thomas, who by distinguishing in Paternity the hypostasis and the respect

somewhat blunts the relative concept — as we saw in asserting his opinion from the diverse senses of his interpreters, together with Father Vásquez and Suárez.

And so concerning the mind of Scotus, no one can doubt that it is about the constituent through relation — in accord with the common sense of theologians — but more acutely and carefully accommodated to the formal relation. He did, however, free the opinion of Ripa about the absolute from censure, and by defending it rendered it probable, and dissolved the objected arguments so aptly and subtly that to less careful readers he seems to follow it, on account of the excellent effort expended in vindicating and holding it harmless.

Thus much concerning the sense of Scotus. Our own position is clear: together with that same Scotus we are authors of the same common position about the relative constituent. We feel exactly what he felt. In expounding and explaining the proper account of that constituent we labored greatly in devising the proper absolute concept in which it would consist. We tracked it down, brought it out, proved it, formed it, and fitted it to the sense of the question; and lest it be thought new and unusual, we accommodated it to the position of Scotus and the doctrine of the common school.

And lest that division of the accounts *esse in* and *esse ad* in divine relations be objected to us — and the doctrine founded upon them about the antecedence of one from the other, and the constitutive account as quasi-absolute through the account *esse in* — beyond what we said above, we must fortify ourselves with the support of two most weighty theologians.

One of them is Father Suárez, who at *lib. 8 de Trin., c. 1, n. ult.*, says toward the end: "It is understood in the second way how this property — not only according to *esse in* or according to some other common account, but also according to every proper account insofar as it is in reality — is antecedent in origin to the Son himself; because it is immediately conjoined per se with the very essence such as it is; but the procession of the Son is not, nor can be understood, until the essence is terminated by this first property, because the procession must be from a Person or from the essence."

Vásquez speaks more clearly (*disp. 114, c. 2, n. 7*): "It must be observed that the account *esse in*, which divine relations intrinsically include in their concept, is not the whole essence and substance of God. For if we include the substance and essence of God, the result is already the integral Person. But a relation is not the whole Person, but the account constituting the Person." How it constitutes the Person let us see in the same Vásquez (*disp. 121, c. 2, n. 9*): "Relation and essence are apprehended as two toward the constitution of a Person. Therefore if both are conceived distinctly, and the Person, the relation too is diverse in our concept from the Person; and the Person includes the essence, which the relation does not include." Let us conclude therefore that in the concept of a divine relation the essence of God is not comprehended — even if the relation,

besides the account *esse ad*, also has the account *esse in* — because that *esse in* is not something absolute in the same way as the essence.

What then is it? Let us hear him (*c. 3, n. 10*): "That account *esse in* is not absolute, as Henry falsely supposes, but either abstracts from the absolute and respective, or — what I think truer — is the same as the account *esse ad*." And immediately: "A divine relation is conceived as something inhering in the essence — and hence it is said to have the account *esse in*." Here he manifestly distinguishes the account *esse in* from the account *esse ad*, since the concept *esse ad* is entirely toward another, while the concept *esse in* is toward the essence — whence it follows that it is understood in the manner of an absolute. This account *esse in* is so highly esteemed by Cajetan and the Canarian that they say in the common relation *esse ad* is not real, but abstracts from real being and being of reason, whereas the account *esse in* is real — as both teach at the question 28 of Saint Thomas, *art. 1*; about which Vásquez (*disp. 114, c. 1, n. 4*) censures them. From this it follows that if divine relations are considered according to *esse ad* precisely abstracted from *esse in*, they are not real, but common to real and to being of reason — which, though neither Cajetan nor the Canarian expressly asserts, nevertheless seems to follow from their principles. The disciples of the Angelic Doctor will therefore not be able to reprove anything in our doctrine transmitted above — since we have spoken about those accounts *esse in* and *esse ad* in ways far milder and more probable, I think, than they have.

These things give me hope that the Thomists will henceforth judge this opinion less harshly than Báñez and the Canarian have done. The subtlety of Scotus is in any case worthy of admiration — who, flying on eagle's wings intrepidly through the dense clouds of objected difficulties and the obscuring fog of the censure of those more learned than he, perceived the way by which the opinion of Ripa could be sustained, and keenly saw whatever probable light there was in it, and labored in demonstrating this lest it lie exposed to the calumnies of adversaries. Certainly whatever had been and could in future be objected against it from any quarter, he dissolved all of it in such a way that it is subject to no shadows or calumnies. You could desire no greater proof of Scotus's genius than the resolution of those objections which seemed to many to be incapable of resolution. When I weigh them I consider him placed beyond every gamble of intellect — to whose subtlety no one dares aspire. Truly you would call him an eagle, whose flight I first admired and then, following as closely as I could, endeavored to imitate — adding what my own slender ability supplied toward resolving this most serious and most difficult question. But I fear that as a slow and degenerate late offspring of so great an eagle (at my age), I shall fail. I shall console myself, however, with the fact that I wished to follow the eagle, whom I shall never cease to admire. Nothing more ingenious than that man, nothing more subtle, nothing more acute, nothing more perspicacious, in my judgment, can be found. Only he who does not read him may deny this; whoever reads him will agree with me.

DISPUTATION VIII, DISTINCTION I

Whether the Divine Relations Are Formally Infinite Perfections?

Prologue

I judged it necessary, in order to complete the doctrine concerning the Persons and to resolve the scruple I introduced for our Scotists above in Disputation III, Distinction I, Section last — when I said that relations are infinite only in their own and determinate genus — to insert here this question. And although the negative opinion of Scotus is not alien from the mind of Saint Thomas, who treated it less, and although many noble Thomists agree with Scotus in thinking that Saint Thomas agreed with him in this matter, the thing itself demands that we not pass it over, but that we diligently investigate the mind of Scotus, sustain our own judgment about that determinate infinity, and explain it.

SECTION I. The State of the Question Is Proposed.

This question wanders broadly throughout the schools and has dispersed its patrons on both sides. Those who affirm are the Nominalists: Ockham and Gabriel (*In I, dist. 19, q. 1*), Auriol, Rubion (*dist. 33*), Bacon (*ibid., q. 1, a. 1*), Suárez (*lib. 3 de Trin., c. 9 and 10 and tom. 1 in 3 part., disp. 11, sect. 4*), Vásquez (*disp. 122 in I p.*), Valencia (*ibid., q. 2, punc. 1*), Granada (*tract. 3, disput. 5, sect. 2*), Ruiz (*disp. 29, sect. 2*), Rubius (*disp. 105*), Alarcón (*tract. 5, disp. 3, c. 3*), Fonseca (*4 Meth., c. q. 7*), Albertinus (*tom. 2*), Fasolus (*part. 1, q. 28, art. 2, dub. 5*), Arriaga (*disp. 49, sect. 3*), Lesana (*tract. 5, disp. 2, q. 4*), Amicus (*disp. 19, sect. 8*), Aversa (*p. 1, q. 28, sect. 3*), and others who hold against Scotus.

Those who deny are for the most part Thomists: Capreolus (*In I, dist. 17, q. 1, art. 2, ad 3*), Cajetan (*I part., q. 28, art. 2*), Ferrariensis (*2 cont. Gentes, c. 9*), Durandus (*In I, dist. 13, q. 2*), Ricardus (*disp. 24, q. 3, ad p.*), Nazarius (*I p., q. 28*), and the Salamancans there; among the Jesuits: Molina (*I p., q. 4, art. 6, disp. 2*), Bellarmine (*tom. 1, lib. 2 de Christo, c. 12*), Becanus (*tract. 2, c. 2, q. 6*); among others: Argentinas (*In I, disp. 4, q. 1, art. 1*). Among our Scotists, nearly all — whom Mastrius diligently cites (*d. 7 de Trin.*). Poncius our own chose to sing outside this choir (*disp. 9, q. 6*), alleging that the question is about a name — but he should have followed the Nominalists in it.

Let us come to Scotus. He is cited for this opinion by Mastrius above, *Quodlib. 5*, where he proves at length and accurately that a relation is not formally infinite, nor a perfection simply simple. But it could be questioned whether these two — infinite and perfect — are so conjoined that one follows from the other. For it can be doubted whether the account of the infinite as such is a perfection, since infinity is an intrinsic mode of being, not a property — as Scotus frequently teaches there and elsewhere — it is antecedent to the account of the Quantity

and the Good, and abstracts from quantity and perfection; and hence it seems to say neither goodness nor perfection. Furthermore, because it does not seem that perfection follows from infinity for another reason — namely, because that mode of infinity is rather a condition of nature than a perfection. For if there were an infinite evil, it would not be perfect on that account — indeed it would be incompatible with being perfect and good. And this is apparent in the moral sphere, because in the common opinion sin has infinite malice, and in the Thomistic opinion infinite simply. Will that infinity on that account be a perfection? Whence we can argue to physical beings — and better and more forcefully in that opinion which grave Thomists attribute to Saint Thomas, which posits the account of sin in something positive. And so it does not seem that the account of infinity convinces, since it is not a formal perfection.

Furthermore, Scotus there treats of the perfection simply simple, and rightly denies it of the relation — because in truth the omnimodal infinity is a perfection simply, since it includes absolutely all genera of perfections; and this infinity Scotus calls formal, attributing it primarily to the essence and secondarily to the attributes — which, being absolute, participate in all that infinity and perfection of the divine essence. And indeed this account of formal infinity and perfection does not fit a relation, nor can there be a question of it concerning a relation — but only of a limited and genuine infinity proper to the relation in its own genus, namely the relative, as the authors of the contrary opinion insist upon. They do not wish the relation to be a perfection simply simple, nor like the divine nature primarily — which Scotus here calls a sea of perfections — nor like the attributes secondarily on account of their formal absolute account; but only in its own relative and limited genus. Just as if God were to create an infinite line, it would not be simply infinite, nor infinite formally in Scotus's sense — for it would not therefore have the perfections and infinities of all other beings, nor indeed of other species of quantity, that is of surface and body. Nothing therefore seems efficacious to be deduced from this passage to convince the adversaries.

Let us investigate other passages in Scotus — at *In I, dist. 2, q. 7* and *dist. 8, q. 4*, and especially *Quodlib. 2 and 5*. In *Quodlib. 1, q. 1*, at the beginning, where comparing essentials with notionals as to perfection, Scotus affirms that essentials have the perfection simply simple, but notionals do not. He gives the reason for this difference at n. 1: "Essentials," he says, "are perfections simply; notionals are not." He proves the first part from Anselm (*Monol. 15*): "A perfection simply is that which in any being is better itself than not itself. But a notional is not of this kind" — in the text the word "not" is missing — "because since each Person lacks some notional, it would lack something which in any being is better itself than not itself; and so each Person would not be simply perfect, which is inconvenient."

Let us hear here the excellent interpreter Lychetus, whom I have deliberately reserved for this point as a mark of honor. "All essentials in the divine," he says, "which formally express perfection are perfections simply; because there every perfection is formally infinite, as was evident in *In I, dist. 2, §9, penult.*; and such a perfection is more immediate to the divine essence, as was evident above in *In I, dist. 8 and 28*. But a notional, from its formal account, expresses no perfection — because then some perfection would be formally in one Person that would not be in another; and also because if it formally included some perfection, that perfection would be formally infinite — the opposite of which the Doctor disproves below at *q. 5*." But I observe that Lychetus joined infinity with perfection — as if one followed from the other by a certain connection — which Scotus does not express in his text here. I further observe that he spoke of perfection simply, in accordance with the definition of Anselm — in which sense it is certain that a relation is not formally a perfection; as it is also certain that it is not formally infinite, as appears from the passages cited by Lychetus.

Nevertheless it does not follow from this that a relation is not a perfection in its own and determinate genus of the relative. And so Lychetus presupposed what he thought Scotus had felt, and by no means distinguished between infinity and formal perfection simply simple, and between perfection and infinity in a determinate limited genus — such as would be the infinity of a line.

The question about the mind of Scotus can therefore be raised: what did he deny, when he denied that relations are perfections? And can it and should it be understood as being of the perfection simply, or also of a determinate and limited perfection? For my part, I see that Scotus recognized no other perfection than formal and simple in the divine — about which he always spoke when he denied it to relations. Whence he can rightly be cited for the negative opinion. But whether Scotus rightly and deservedly denied another perfection in the determinate genus of the relative — this remains to be more carefully inquired.

SECTION II. Whether Every Perfection Given in the Divine Is Simply Simple, and Whether Any Perfection Falls in the Relation.

Let the conclusion be: no perfection can be given in the divine except the simply simple. And in this Scotus judged rightly. First, because perfection is an absolute property of being, following the nature of being within itself in no order or habitude toward another; therefore in God there cannot be a limited perfection in a determinate genus, but every one must be formal and simply simple and omnimodal. The assumption is proved, because perfection is something toward and in itself, not tending outside itself toward another, not respective — accompanying being taken in itself, and indeed making everything else other than itself more perfect by communicating to them the perfection in which the perfect abounds; so that its innate proper perfection is by nature apt to perfect, not to be perfected. The inference is clear — for if in God there were a determinate and limited perfection, it would not be divine but unworthy of

God, which is to be in no way admitted; and for this reason: either that form would be capable of that infinite and simply simple perfection, or it would not. If the first — since the being of God is altogether necessary and infinitely communicable, it would necessarily perfect that quasi-form omnimodally, which is within the divine essence and nature. If the second, it would be entirely outside the divine nature — which is supremely and must be perfect; indeed it would be incompatible with God, who is most perfect and contains all perfection.

Second, because in God everything absolute is simply perfect; that perfection is something absolute; therefore it is omnimodal and simply such. The antecedent is established. The inference is clear, because from its proper concept perfection says an absolute thing.

Third, because Perfection in its primary concept is not incompatible with another perfection, but only with imperfection. Therefore since in God there is no imperfection, there is no reason that limits and restricts his perfection — for that limitation is imperfection.

Fourth, because that restriction of perfection to a determinate genus is proper to the creature, whose being is limited; therefore it is alien from God. The assumption is proved from the very account of the creature, which cannot be capable of the whole of being but begs it from God, by whom it is created through a determinate and singular action, through which it is placed in the individual.

Fifth, because if in God there were not omnimodal perfection, it would follow that there is in him something in the mode of potency toward act — but this is absurd. Therefore in him there is omnimodal, not limited, perfection. The inference is clear, because that form — so to speak — which would be of limited perfection would be in potency toward that degree of perfection which it lacks and would desire to be perfected by it. The consequence is valid.

By these reasons the intention is supported, drawn from the doctrine of Scotus, who perpetually teaches that no relation can be a perfection simply; nor can essentials in any way include a respect toward the outside, because this is devoid of perfection; and that omnimodal proper perfection belongs to the absolute nature and divine essence — as he teaches in *Quodlib. 1*, from n. 7 to 15, and in *In I, dist. 2, q. 7*, n. 39, where Lychetus and the scholiast observe this. And that Scotus said excellently in *Quodlib. 5, § 2 ratio*: "No perfection simply is formally incommunicable." Whence two things follow. One: that relations are not perfections simply, because they are formally incommunicable. The other: if they were capable of perfection, they would entirely receive it from the divine essence — from which since they do not receive it, the argument is that they are not capable of it.

Why moreover a relation or respect in God says and can say no perfection, Scotus proves in this place: because that perfection, if it were given, would not be in the other opposed relation — and so each Person would not be simply perfect. And I observe that this reason of Scotus is grounded more deeply, and asks for a principle: why does a determinate and limited perfection not befit a relation — such as the authors of the opposite opinions attribute to it from the adduced example of a line, if it were in its genus extended to infinity as it seems not to be incompatible? I respond anew from the doctrine of Scotus in this *Quodlib.* 5, § *respondeo primo*, where he says: "To a personal relation there belongs by essence to be toward another; and a proper intensive infinity does not belong to it, because it is not capable of such quantity — just as it is not capable of communicability." These words of Scotus seem to contain the a priori reason for the matter. For a relation from its proper concept is entirely toward another and consists entirely in that respect, which, since it is not in itself and toward itself, has no subsistent being tending outside itself — it seeks its term in another, and consists in a kind of wandering; it is as if abandoned by itself and sent elsewhere. Whence it abstracts from the account of being that is in itself and toward itself, that is consistent with itself, adheres to itself, inhabits itself, subsists within itself.

And so Paternity insofar as it is a relation is entirely toward the Son, and Filiation is entirely toward the Father precisely — and one seeks the other, and they mutually correspond to each other by tending from one to the other by mutual respect, which in its formal concept does not include and does not involve another account. For if it included or involved this, it would lose its proper formal relational being. For indeed if you conceive in a relation a perfection, you lose the concept of the relation; for in admitting another account with itself that is not a relation, it loses itself and by acquiring another is lost.

Yet there stands against this the objection that it seems impossible to separate the account of relation from the account of divine being, good, and perfect — especially since that relation is substance and subsistent, and hence perfect in that determinate and limited genus, namely the relative. Before I respond to this argument — which is the Achilles of the adversaries — I observe that there is among the Scotists a great controversy concerning the perfection of a relation according to itself.

For Rada (*part. 1, controuv. 26*) denies that a relation taken as common and indifferent toward created and uncreated says a perfection; and in that state denies it to be a quantum being. Against him Scherius rises up, from whom Mastrius (*disp. 7 de Trin., q. 2, n. 55*) endeavors to free him; but in truth he censures Rada in asserting that he affirms it says no perfection, and corrects him by amending him in this manner — wanting him to say that in that state it is neither a perfection nor an imperfection, that is, that it abstracts from both. But Vulpes (*d. 38, art. 9, n. 15*) concedes that a created relation is not a quantum

being, nor a quidditative being. Mastrius however refutes Vulpes, saying against him that a created relation is contained under quantum being and altogether says a perfection — whereas an uncreated one does not; and he says the opposite is against Aristotle (*1 Eth.*, c. 6) where he says: "Being, Good, and in substance is said, and in quality, and in what is toward something."

In this controversy I first say that Mastrius cites Aristotle at *lib. 1 Eth.*, c. 6 when he should cite c. 4. Then: he interprets Aristotle according to his own genius, not to the mind of Aristotle, who in that passage intends to refute the Platonic ideal Good and to show that the Good is not common in an Idea — as something universal — but from the side of reality in substance, in quality, in the relative toward another; just as he attacked the Ideas of universal things which Plato posited or feigned separated from the side of reality from singulars — as the Coimbricans observe (*in Logica, in praefatione Porphyrii, q. 1, art. 3*). Hence Aristotle's mind is not to posit the Good in those three categories, as Vulpes and Mastrius imagined together with him — but to say that the Good exists from the side of reality, not in Platonic Ideas. This is clearly evident, because Aristotle after saying "But Good is said in substance, and in quality, and in what is referred to something" posits the Good in all the categories; for the Good, he says in that book (c. 4), "is said in as many ways as that which is. For in substance it is said — as God and Mind; in quality — as virtues; in quantity — as the mean; in those that are referred to something — as the useful; in time — as the opportune; in place — as a dwelling or lodging. And so on in similar things. It is clear therefore that there cannot be some one common Good." Whence it is clear that these authors did not touch the mind of the Philosopher, understanding and interpreting him concerning the Good as a property of being in common and in the logical mode — but about the real and physical Good in particular. Whence he did not say: the Good is in God and in the mind, as a predicate and property of them — but: God and Mind. Furthermore, because Aristotle in that passage was treating only of the Good in relation to Beatitude, and hence thought nothing at all about that property of being in common; indeed he would then seem to Platonize by positing the Good as common and universal in an Idea. Moreover, when he speaks of the subject toward something, he was thinking nothing about the relation contracting as a being the property of Good, nor did it occur to him to think of that metaphysical and transcendental perfection which these theologians imagine. He was treating of the Good accommodated toward beatifying — and it appears evidently from the text, for where he said "in those that are referred to something" he gave the example of the useful Good — which in Greek is *chrèsimon*, that is the useful — and in quality he gave virtues, and in quantity the mean, which are physical and moral goods ordered toward beatifying a human being. And so these Scotists of ours fight more subtly in the air — either because they did not see the text at its source, or because having seen it they passed it

over, and prejudiced by metaphysical feeling, imposed their own understanding upon the text. Aristotle therefore favors them not at all.

Let us come to the matter and to Scotus whom they cite. As for the matter, I say that a relation in common, insofar as it says *esse ad*, imports and has no perfection — whether created or uncreated — and in this I agree with Rada. Indeed I say even more: that a relation in common is not capable of perfection as to that account *esse ad*, and I agree with Vulpes in denying perfection to the created relation, for the reason I assigned and explained above. And I say nothing against the mind of Scotus. If I show this, I shall please the school.

I show it thus. Scotus in *Quodlib. 5, loco cit.*, n. 26, at the end, speaking of divine Paternity, concedes "that finite and infinite divide being before it descends to the ten genera." "When you argue," he says, "from the immediate division of being in this — also before it descends to the ten genera — I grant this correctly; those do not divide being as it is already contracted to a genus." Therefore being abstracts from that division and is indifferent — therefore there can be a given entity that is neither quantum nor perfect, inasmuch as being in its account of entity does not include the quantum. He had already taught this in *In I, dist. 8, q. 3, § sed tunc est dubium*, n. 18. Such a being will be the relation in its account *esse ad*, which is not perfect in the account of entity. Whence Rada has a sound sense: it is neither a perfection nor an imperfection, and it abstracts from the quantum and non-quantum.

Nor does the objection of Mastrius against Rada stand, that Rada ought to have said indifference — that is, neither perfection nor imperfection — and abstraction from both. For what else did Rada say when he said a relation in common as indifferent toward created and uncreated does not say perfection, except that it abstracts from it? For in positing the qualification "as such" he does not exclude another state in which it could be such a quantum being — just as if we say that an animal insofar as it is indifferent toward rational and irrational is not a human being, because as such it is not rational, we shall rightly say so; for what we most truly say is that in not denying it to be human in that abstraction, we do not deny that after that abstraction it may be human in the state of contraction of the animal by the rational. Let us apply Scotus's doctrine to the relation in common, so that it does not say a perfection. He says in *Quodlib. 5, loco cit.*, n. 26: a quantum being is that which says a perfection. The words are: "Finite and infinite, as properties of being, belong precisely to quantum being, having within itself some perfective quantity." Let us now see whether a relation is quantum and perfective. It will then be perfective when it is either total or partial, as Scotus teaches there. But a relation under the account *esse ad* is neither a whole nor a part of a whole — as is clear; therefore it is not a perfection. This is proved from Scotus who in the same place says that divine Paternity is not quantum — that is, perfect — because it cannot be either total or partial. And he

demonstrates this by comparing it with the essence and concludes that for this reason it is not finite or infinite.

And lest anyone say that Scotus speaks only of the divine relation — of which he also says there that in the account of hypostasis it is not finite or infinite, because quantity, he says, befits only a quidditative entity, which the hypostatic account is not — I observe that Scotus there also adds: "In the third way it can be said that virtual quantity does not belong except to an absolute entity" — from which principle it follows that no relation is quantum or perfect, since it is by no means an absolute entity.

It is true that Scotus adds these two responses — not propounding them as if they were his own, concerning the distinction of the divine relation as to quiddity and hypostasis, and concerning every relation, that it is therefore not a perfection, because virtual and perfective quantity does not belong except to an absolute entity — conceding some doubtful things, namely that they do not have virtual quantum — that is, perfective — quantity. Yet he does not thereby refute the doctrine previously given, which he had so firmly established in all of n. 26, nor did he retract it anywhere. And so I confidently affirm that no relation, insofar as it is such — that is, not as absolute — imports a perfection. Whence I always used the qualification "as to the account *esse ad*," which is most formally relational — and this is confirmed by what was just said from Scotus: that the relation insofar as it is a hypostasis is not a perfection; whence it follows a fortiori that insofar as it is most formally a relation it is not a perfection. For it does not follow that that hypostasis is something absolute, but included within the relation itself — even though it is not under the expressed concept that can be referred.

Therefore if Scotus denied it to be a perfection under that hypostatic account, a fortiori he will deny it to have that perfection under the precise concept of the relation. I therefore assert that the created relation of Father to Son and of Son to Father, insofar as they are formally toward another, excludes perfection — and neither excels the other. Wherefore if there is any perfection in them it will be in the absolute, not however in the relative. I think I have opened a new way for our Scotists; and if someone opened it before me, I do not contend. I certainly had no guide other than Scotus.

Therefore in responding to the contrary argument, we must deny that a relation as such is a quidditative and quantum being — in accordance with Scotus in another place: *In I, dist. 8, q. 4, § ad argumentum principale*, n. 20, at the end, where he says: "The personal account does not reach quidditative perfection." And when the adversary insists asking what it then is, the answer must be: it is a respective formality. Then if it is again asked whether it is real or of reason, the answer is: real — because it is given in a being from the side of reality, in the absolute, and it refers that absolute to another most formally; it is the same in reality with it, but is not formally the same as it — just as the ultimate

differences with respect to being, and indeed the properties with respect to the same, which we taught above from that same Scotus of ours.

And lest anyone be astonished, let us interrogate those philosophers: what is a possible being? What is sin? — in their opinion, those who posit these two in something positive. Let us ask: is that possible thing a real being, or not? Is that sin in the nature of things, or not? Certainly they will no more quickly free themselves from our questioning than we from theirs.

In this way we satisfy the argument of the adversaries — which seemed to be the Achilles — and we respond to the difficulties arising from it with our Scotists, so that there is nothing that either domestics or outsiders can oppose.

SECTION III. Whether and in What Way the Divine Relations Are in Some Manner Infinite.

Scotus everywhere denies that they are formally infinite: in *In I, dist. 8, q. 3, § teneo opinionem meam*, n. 16; and *dist. 4, § ulterius probo*, n. 14; and *§ ad argumentum principale*, n. 26; and *dist. 13, q. un., § respondeo*, n. 16; and in *In II, dist. 22*, n. 21; and *Quodlib. 5* throughout. The Scotists follow the master, together with Lychetus on those passages. From others, Vásquez (*disp. 122, c. 7*) teaches the same, acknowledging only one infinity — and that absolute — in God; and Alarcón, his faithful Achates (*tract. 5, disp. 2, c. 13*). Whence they are wrongly cited by our people for the contrary opinion.

For Vásquez at *disp. 122, c. 2, n. 29* denies that attributes — the same applies to relations — are formally infinite, but only by reason of the essence with which they are identical. Formally in themselves they are considered neither as finite nor as infinite — which Alarcón says the same. And Scotus feels and speaks in this manner about relations, as we shall see.

All of them, however, seem to think that perfection and infinity are equivalent — and they judge that there is no difference between them. But I find in Scotus a distinction between perfection and infinity. For I see Scotus positing two genera of infinities.

One is in the essence — which is supreme and most perfect and primary, and hence infinite in every way; such is the essence, which he calls a sea of perfections from Damascene (c. 7) — cited in *Quodlib. 5, § de primo*, n. 4, and in *In I, dist. 8, q. 4, § ad quaestionem*, n. 18. The Doctor describes this infinity there and calls it first, proper, primary, fundamental — from which all things emanate, both essential and notional ad intra, and created ad extra; and he explains the sense of the sea of Damascene, from which all rivers arise.

The other genus is what belongs to the attributes, which — being absolute — are also formally infinite in themselves, and receive this infinity from the essence, with which they are in reality the same and are not mutually conflicting and are compossible with the whole essential infinity. So Scotus there perspicuously and

in *In I, dist. 8, q. 4*. Whence he says that this predication is true: "The Godhead is Goodness, the Godhead is Wisdom, the Godhead is Mercy" — because on both sides there is formal and absolute infinity. He says there at n. 26: "The infinity remains not only in one extreme but in both, since in both extremes there is given an infinite simply and formally." These are the two genera of infinities according to Scotus.

Let us come to the relations. Scotus denies that they are infinite in this manner. This is clear regarding primary infinity, which is proper to the nature. It is also clear regarding the second, because a relation is not something absolute, and one is incommunicable to another — since they mutually repugn and exclude each other, which is alien from infinity. Whence Scotus excellently says in *In I, dist. 8, q. 4, n. 26*: that between Godhead and Paternity there is indeed identity — but not by reason of both extremes, but only of one, namely the Godhead, which alone is simply infinite, whereas the relation is not. He also notes from this lack of infinity that this proposition is not true: "Paternity is active spiration in the divine" — either formally or by identity — because they lack formal infinity; whereas this one is true: "Paternity is Godhead" — because the Godhead is formally infinite, even though Paternity lacks infinity. Differently this: "Wisdom is Goodness" — though not true formally, is nonetheless true identically because of the formal infinity of both extremes.

From this doctrine it follows that there is some difference between perfection and infinity. Since Scotus did not make such a distinction in perfection. Furthermore, when he treats of the infinity of relations, he speaks in a different way than about perfection. For he attributes to them a certain infinity, which I shall endeavor to explain — so that what I said above in Disputation III, Distinction I, in treating the formal distinction at the last section, and in comparing relations with attributes, may become manifest. I said there that relations lack formal infinity because they are formally opposed, and hence are infinite only in their own and determinate genus.

And first I observe: Father Vásquez — whom on account of his acuity and subtlety I am accustomed to call the Jesuit Scotus — argues against him (*disp. 122, c. 2, n. 3*) as if he badly proves that the attribute of Mercy differs from the attribute of Justice — because infinity does not draw it out of its genus, even if it is infinite; and thus each remains infinite only in a determinate genus, and one infinity does not include the other. And going further by this argument, he tends to deduce against Scotus that Paternity can similarly be infinite in its genus without participating in the infinity of Filiation; and hence that Scotus did not argue well in denying Paternity to be a perfection — because it ought to be infinite, and hence contain the perfection of Filiation. But with Vásquez's permission, neither did he touch the mind of Scotus, and badly in reprehending him he cast his vote.

For Scotus did not say that attributes differ from each other because they are infinite in a determinate genus, and because one infinity does not include the other — as Vásquez at this place and at *disp. 122, c. 2, n. 3* imputes to Scotus, and had already imputed at *disp. 116, c. 3, n. 9* which he cites and to which he refers in this latter *disp. 122*. Rather, he said the contrary — namely, that notwithstanding the simple infinity which they quiddatively participate and in which they are identical with each other and with the essence, they nonetheless differ formally by their own nature. And so both in the assumption and in the reason Vásquez has been deceived. In the assumption: by affirming that those have a determinate and distinct infinity in their genus — whereas their infinity according to Scotus is in reality on account of the essence simply. And in the reason: by bringing as a reason the distinction and diversity of infinity — which is none — but identity, since attributes agree in it. What is certainly surprising in so acute and learned a man.

He brings as the reason for differing what Scotus brings as the reason for agreeing. Scotus says: notwithstanding the identity of infinity, they are nonetheless formally distinguished. Vásquez says: they are therefore formally distinguished, because their infinity is diverse — which is contrary to what Scotus teaches. And so Vásquez places as the cause of distinction what Scotus removes — because it hinders distinction.

Let us hear Scotus (*In I, dist. 8, q. 4, § contra istam solutionem*, n. 24): "To the third I grant that the account of Wisdom is infinite, and the account of Goodness; and for that reason that account is that one by identity — because the opposite is not compatible with the identity of the other extreme. Yet that account is not formally that one. For it does not follow: it is the same in reality as another; therefore formally the same as the same." See the identity in infinity and the distinction in formality — contrary to what Vásquez understood. Again, at the same place, *ad secundum*, n. 23: "Goodness, Magnitude, and other things of this kind" — that is, attributes — "are the same, as it were by mutual identity, because each is formally infinite. By reason of which infinity each is the same as the other." What could be clearer? The infinity of attributes is not in a determinate genus according to Scotus, but simply — and by reason of that infinity the attributes are identified, not diversified. I am astonished that Vásquez did not see this, since Scotus expresses it so many times, as we said above.

But I suspect that Vásquez read only the passage he cites — which is indeed obscure and difficult — which I wish to adduce so that it may appear that Vásquez, implicated in it, misunderstood Scotus. First, Vásquez also erred in this — that he cited *dist. 8, q. 3*, when this is 4 — not 3. There Scotus, proving that Wisdom is formally distinct from Goodness, says at n. 17: "Wisdom in reality is not formally Goodness in reality. This is proved: for if infinite Wisdom were formally infinite Goodness, then Wisdom in common would formally be Goodness in common. For infinity does not formally destroy the account of

what it is added to; because in whatever degree some perfection is understood to be — which degree is however of that perfection — the formal account of that perfection is not removed on account of that degree. And so if Wisdom does not formally include Goodness, as in common, nor as in the infinite, infinite."

This is the passage that misled Vásquez. Let him hear the explanation of it in Lychetus, lest anyone say I am doing injustice to Vásquez whom I love greatly. For thus Lychetus at this passage of Scotus, *In I, dist. 8, q. 4, n. 17* of Scotus, in his commentary: "The Doctor therefore intends here to prove that they are distinguished as two formal objects beyond every work of the intellect. He proves therefore that Wisdom in reality is not Goodness in reality. He proves this: because if infinite Wisdom were formally infinite Goodness, then Wisdom in common would formally be Goodness in common. Note first that the Doctor here wants that infinite Goodness be formally distinguished from infinite Wisdom, because the formal account of infinite Goodness is not part of the formal account of infinite Wisdom, nor vice versa. Therefore they are distinct formal objects, existing formally distinct in the divine essence by the nature of the thing. And note that the intrinsic degree — namely the infinity of goodness — is not the reason of distinguishing goodness from wisdom, nor vice versa the infinity of wisdom. This is clear: because the intrinsic degree presupposes the quiddity contracted of which it is the degree, and does not express formality properly; indeed such infinity is the reason why whatever is by nature apt to be said of an infinite being is really identified with it — but not formally. This is clear from the divine essence, from its infinity. The reason therefore why one attribute is formally distinguished from another is not the infinity, but rather the quiddity of which such is the infinity. Just as this whiteness intense at eight is distinguished from another intense at eight: that intensification is not the reason of distinguishing one from the other, but the haecceity of this — which the intensification follows as an intrinsic degree — is the reason of distinguishing. For the intensification of each presupposes them to be in themselves distinct. So in the present case: the infinity of the attributes presupposes them to be distinct according to their proper quiddities. This is clear, because an intrinsic degree comes to the quiddity without varying its formal account — as is clear from the intensification of whiteness at eight, which coming to it does not vary the formal account of whiteness. Different is the case with a specific degree, which coming to a specific quiddity varies its formal account — so that if a specific degree came to a human being, the human being would no longer be, but would be another species. If therefore infinite Wisdom were formally infinite Goodness, it would follow that the formal account of Goodness in common would be formally Wisdom in common itself — since the infinity of each does not vary their formal account."

I had understood this before seeing Lychetus — but I did not dare oppose Vásquez, a distinguished theologian; and therefore I went and consulted Lychetus, so that by the authority of so great an interpreter I might convince

Vásquez. What shall we do with these authors who censure and stigmatize Scotus when they have either read him hastily or having read him, have not sufficiently weighed him? Scotus is an acute and deep author, interconnected and coherent, similar to Augustine — of both of whom I am accustomed to say that unless they are read in their entirety, they can scarcely be understood.

But I come to the infinity of relations. Scotus perpetually denied formal and simple infinity to them. The true reason is: since Scotus acknowledges in God only infinity simply and formal, and that cannot be in a relation, he attributes no true and proper infinity to it. For a respect toward another is not capable of either perfection or infinity, since it is not a quidditative entity — which is as it were the a priori reason. The other is taken from the absurdity: for if a relation were infinite in its genus, it would conflict with another infinity — just as a respect conflicts; for if Paternity were infinite in the genus of Paternity, it would conflict with Filiation; and in God three real infinities would be distinguished corresponding in number to the Persons, and one would not be communicable to the other, and they would be primarily diverse. These reasons of Scotus, if Father Vásquez had considered them, he would not argue against Scotus from the example of attributes — as if there were an equal reason in both — because in attributes there is identity in infinity, not however in relations, if they were infinite. Whence in attributes there is diversity only according to formalities; but in relations, given infinity, there would be diversity according to formalities and also according to infinities. And so in a relation, as Scotus says in the cited places, there is given identity only in the infinite nature — which is the only identity. The rest differ.

But attributes have identity with the divine nature and among themselves because of the account of absolute infinity; whence Wisdom is Goodness and Goodness is Wisdom because of the infinity they have in themselves, simply and formally. But never will it be able to be said: Paternity is Filiation — as is said: Paternity is Godhead, by identity with the Godhead. And so in attributes there is one identical predication and another formal one — both true. "Godhead is Wisdom" — and "Wisdom is Goodness" — the first by reason of identity with the essence, the second by reason of identity with the attribute of Goodness, which are affirmative. There is also a third formal one: "Such Wisdom is Goodness" — which is false in the formal sense. Whence Scotus excellently in *In I, dist. 8, q. 4, § contra istam*, n. 23: "Goodness and Magnitude" — the same applies to Wisdom and Goodness — "are the same, as it were by mutual identity, because each is formally infinite; by reason of which infinity each is the same as the other." In the relations, however, there is only one identical proposition and one formal one. Identical: "Paternity is Godhead" and "Godhead is Paternity" — which is true. Formal: "Paternity is Filiation" — which is altogether false; as the same Scotus teaches there; and at n. 25 he adds an example of greater weight, when he denies this proposition: "Paternity is active spiration" — even though both relations are in the same Father. The same doctrine Scotus transmits in *Quodlib.*

5, from n. 15 to the end; and at n. 14 he has: "No perfection simply is incommunicable." But the infinity of attributes is a perfection simply and formal, as we have often said following the mind of Scotus.

Two things remain to be seen. One: why Scotus does not admit in the divine a formal infinity in the relational genus alone? — which is the disadvantage: that Paternity is infinite in its genus and Filiation in its own — just as Vásquez was arguing. And I press the doubt, because Scotus seems to admit a quantity infinite in its own and determinate genus of quantity — as Lychetus observes (*Comm. in I, dist. 8, q. 3, ad textum § aliquando*) in his commentary at n. 8, while Scotus — whom he cites (*dist. 8, q. 3, § sed contra*, n. 20*) — says that the straight in a line does not conflict with the infinite: "to the account of the straight, infinity is not repugnant." I respond that the example of the line assumed is false. For Scotus does not admit a possible infinite line; indeed he entirely denies it in the same place — but only says from Aristotle that to the account of the straight, the infinite is not repugnant, since to the line itself, he says, infinity is repugnant. And again: "The Philosopher does not say that an infinite line can be in a genus, but that to the account of the straight the infinite is not formally repugnant." And Lychetus in his commentary: "the straight, by reason of itself and formally, is not repugnant to the infinite; and if it is repugnant, it will not be by reason of itself, but by reason of its subject — namely of the line — which is formally repugnant to the infinite."

But granted that there were a creature which could be infinite in its genus — such as a line — I still deny that standing on Scotus's principles, a divine relation can have a proper infinity. I am moved: because infinity is a property of quidditative and absolute entity, not of a respective formality — which properly is not a quidditative entity, but is founded in it, terminates it, and renders it incommunicable. And that account of term and incommunicability is surely incompatible with the infinite. I am grounded in Scotus above, when he says (*Quodlib. 5, § secunda ratio principalis*, n. 13): "Every perfection simply is communicable. Every infinite intensively is a perfection simply. Therefore." Then: "no personal property is communicable, because it is the formal account of existing incommunicably; therefore no personal property is intensively infinite." Certainly, since the account of the infinite lacks a term and tends to infinity in communicating itself, incommunicability is incompatible with it — which reason he broadly develops and subtly amplifies from n. 13 to the end. Now that the account of term or subsistence with the negation of communication is incompatible with infinity, Scotus transmits in the same place (*§ ad argumentum principale*, n. 26, at the end): "It could be said that virtual quantity belongs only to the absolute quantum. But this entity, though it is in itself in some manner quidditative" — note "in some manner," not properly — (and the talk is of divine Paternity) — "nonetheless, as it is such, is only hypostatic." By which word he signified the account terminating the divine

nature incommunicably through subsistence in the account of a supposit; and in it he founded the incompatibility with infinity.

The second and principal question: whether the relations have some account of infinity? For we said above in Disputation III, Distinction I, in treating the formal distinction, at the last section, and in comparing relations with attributes, that relations certainly lack formal infinity because they are formally opposed — and hence are infinite only in their own and determinate genus. This must be explained so that no one may think we are affirming against Scotus that relations have some proper, positive, and true infinity.

I respond: I deliberately said "in their own and only." By this I denied positive and true infinity, and hence admitted only a negative one — and in some manner respective; in one word: that they are incomprehensible to every created intellect and are not finite. This is a respective and negative infinity. These two species of infinity Scotus assigned to the divine relations.

The first in this manner (*In I, dist. 8, q. 3, § teneo opinionem meam*, n. 16), where he divides what is said of God and the creature into infinite and finite — that is, God and the creature — and adds a third member: neither finite nor infinite, on account of the divine relation. Since he says it is not finite, he attributes to it a negative infinity, removing from it the created infinity. Again in *Quodlib. 5* he steadfastly affirms that divine Paternity is neither finite nor infinite formally — at n. 26; and adds the reason why it is not finite: namely because it cannot be exceeded, nor can it be a part or have the account of a part. This is certainly negative infinity — for what cannot be exceeded is infinite, since it is outside the account and limitation of the finite. Nor does it matter to say that it is not infinite — because "infinite" according to Scotus in these places signifies the formally and intensively infinite, such as the simply infinite; whence it does not exclude the account of another infinite that is not limited — that is, to which an end and term is altogether repugnant. Such is in its genus the divine relation — not so infinite as God is, but less finite than a creature is — that is, in no manner terminated or terminable.

The second species of infinity is in some manner respective, and is taken in relation to the incomprehensibility of the created intellect, which the relation altogether exceeds. This Scotus proposes in *Quodlib. 5, § respondeo poffet dici*, where responding to the argument first trying to prove the infinity of Paternity from its incomprehensibility, he says at n. 22 with respect to the created intellect and the adequation with the infinite intellect, which alone can comprehend it: "It could be said that what is comprehensible to a finite intellect is necessarily finite; what is incomprehensible to that intellect is not thereby finite." And immediately: "generation as generation, is incomprehensible to a created intellect; and thus according to its proper entity and incomprehensibility it is not finite."

Scotus grants me too much and makes me achieve my wish — for I wished to find a way in which that relation is in its determinate and proper genus infinite. He gives me that it is not finite according to its proper entity, and concedes that it is not finite according to its proper incomprehensibility. Whence I draw: from this incomprehensibility it follows, by an intrinsic locus, that that entity — as Scotus calls it — is in its genus infinite. For why is it not comprehended? Why does it exceed every capacity of the created intellect? Why is it comprehended by God alone? Surely because such is its nature that it exceeds every created capacity. But what else is this than being in that genus, in which it exceeds other finite things, infinite? Whence it appears not improbable, in the way of Scotus, to say that a relation is not only negatively but also in its genus of relational entity — as we intimated in that Disputation and Distinction on the formal distinction — infinite.

Yet you might object: Scotus in this place *Quodlib. 5, § Respondeo* at this very n. 22 teaches Paternity or generation to be finite. For after saying "according to its proper entity, incomprehensibility, it is not finite," he immediately added: "but from this it does not follow that it is infinite. Which will be touched in the response to the principal argument." Let us turn there. There (§ *ad argumentum principale*): "The finite," he says, "has the account of a part; the infinite the account of a whole." And applying this he says Paternity has neither the account of a whole nor of a part, and hence is neither finite nor infinite. And he concludes: "I say briefly that Paternity is neither formally finite nor infinite." He had assigned the cause: that the nature of God alone was the whole, and therefore formally infinite. Therefore Scotus denied only this infinity to the relation — namely the omnimodal one — not one in its own determinate genus.

This is confirmed: for the same Scotus seems not to deny a quantity infinite in its own and determinate genus of quantity — as Lychetus observes (*Comm. in I, dist. 8, q. 3, ad textum § aliquando*) in his commentary at n. 8, while noting that an infinite quantity, if it were given, would nonetheless be under a genus. The words of Scotus — which he cites (*dist. 8, q. 3*) — are: "Though there were an infinite quantity in the account of quantity, since quantity is not a perfection simply, it would not follow that it is an infinite being — because it does not follow that it is a being that cannot be exceeded in perfection. Therefore an infinite line would be in the genus of quantity — because it would be a limited being simply and exceeded simply by a more perfect being. But an infinite being simply cannot be in a genus; and the reason is that the first infinity does not remove every potentiality which the account of genus requires, but only posits infinity according to something of some imperfect entity, in which as it is, composition can well obtain in whatever degree it is posited; but the second necessarily removes every potentiality." From which it appears, as we noted above, that Scotus recognized this infinity. And if he recognized it, since he did not expressly exclude it from the relation, he seems tacitly to have admitted it — and only removed that infinity which is simply and formal and intensive.

Judgment

These are the things that from much and accurate reading of Scotus I was able to find about the infinity and perfection of relations — from which much has been ingeniously devised, subtly weighed, and solidly proved, so that no one has disputed about these things more accurately and copiously than he.

Nevertheless, to confess the truth, having well and thoroughly examined the mind of Scotus: he admitted no true and genuine infinity in the relation — just as he also excluded every genuine perfection — for those reasons we assigned above. The chief of these is that a relation does not have the account of a quidditative being, but the account of the *esse ad*, which is incapable both of infinity and of perfection. There is also that argument drawn from the fact that it would follow that in the three divine Persons there would be diverse and mutually conflicting infinities and perfections, which would mutually conflict and exclude each other.

And so the resolution remains: the divine relations are neither finite nor infinite positively, in any genus of infinity; but only negatively and incomprehensibly in respect of the created intellect — which is sufficient for the divine relation to have its own and determinate genus of infinity, as we said in that place on the formal distinction. Nor did we wish to say anything other there; and therefore we distinguished between attributes and relations together with Scotus, asserting the difference of identity in the divine nature — that the identity of attributes was from both sides of the extremes mutually, since on both sides there was mutual infinity; not so from the side of the relations, because the sole ground of identity was the infinity of the divine absolute essence, since the relations lacked that infinity which the attributes brought with them.

Whether, however, this negative infinity — or non-finiteness — says a perfection or not: this is a question worthy of a Scotist, to which I respond that it is enough that it does not say an imperfection. And it says none. I feel this and speak in accord with Scotus in *In I, dist. 28, q. 2*, raising the same question about the unbegotten and feeling thus at n. 7: "The unbegotten, as it signifies not having a begetter, is a property of the Father, and sufficiently imports dignity — that is, non-indignity. For this suffices for a personal property: that it not be an indignity; just as personal things in the divine are not said to be imperfections, though not perfections simply." And immediately he adds: "And if an altercation is made altogether, that the property must altogether say a dignity — not absolute, but personal — it can be said that the unbegotten, insofar as it negates having a begetter, says a personal dignity in the divine. Because just as it is a dignity in the second Person to have an originating principle, so it is a dignity in the first Person not to have one; yet that dignity need not be formally the dignity of some positive proper thing connoted by the unbegotten. Whence a negation can be said to be of dignity in something, inasmuch as it would be an indignity if the opposite affirmation were posited in it." And then in the response

to 3, n. 9: "It does not seem necessary for a property or notion to say a dignity properly."

For the same reason I respond to whoever asks whether non-finiteness is a perfection: in the relations there is no perfection and no imperfection — they are incapable of either, because they are not quantum quidditative beings but are respects toward another, to which perfection does not belong, but only non-imperfection. Whence that non-finiteness is truly a negation of positive finiteness, but not therefore a perfection — because it does not inhere in a subject capable of perfection. And so a relation from the side of reality is not finite, or is non-finite by reason of itself — yet not therefore is it a perfection, which is something positive by its concept; that positive thing cannot be founded on the negation of finiteness.

Finally I observe — and appropriately for the question — that to a relation, which is a habitude toward another, there befits that infinity similar to itself; that is, in respect of another — namely that it is incomprehensible by another, that is by the created intellect; whence in the relational genus it has a relational infinity.

DISPUTATION VIII, DISTINCTION II

On the Relations of God and the Creature to Each Other, Referring to ST I, q. 13, a. 7 of Saint Thomas and Scotus, *In I, d. 30, q. 1 and 2.*

In this question, which Scotus proposes in these words (*q. 1*): "Whether any relation is said of God from time?" and Saint Thomas (*ibid.*): "Whether names importing a relation to creatures are said of God from time?" — both are almost in agreement on the matter; Scotus differs from Saint Thomas in the reasoning and mode of proving.

For Scotus (§ *aliter*, n. 8, *ad 2. q.*), referring to the position of Saint Thomas, says: "Whether there can be any real relation of God to the creature? It is said" — namely by Saint Thomas — "that no such relation can be real, because a real relation is not without order. But God does not have a real order toward the creature because he is above order." Saint Thomas (*I p., q. 13, a. 7*, in the body) says: "Since God is outside the whole order of the creature, and all creatures are ordered toward him and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really referred to God himself; but in God there is not any real relation of his to the creatures, but only according to reason, insofar as creatures are referred to him." From which it appears that Scotus cited the passage and opinion of Saint Thomas accurately and faithfully. Though Cajetan here at § *and since this question says*: Scotus, as is his custom, raised a question about Saint Thomas's relations. He certainly could not reproach him on this point; indeed afterward at § *to the objections, therefore of Scotus* he says that the equivocation is labored under — and by this he shows that Saint Thomas's text is not perspicuous or easy, and hence

is subject to the difficulty which Scotus saw and therefore attacked with his objections. These are of this kind.

The reason that is posited seems to beg the question and to commit the fallacy of assuming the consequent. He shows the first, because since God is prior to the creature with a manifold priority, he seems to have an order toward it — extending the name of order not only to what is said of the later ordered toward the earlier, but also of the earlier toward the later, though in another way; and it would be necessary to prove also that that priority — which can be called order — is not a real relation in God. This therefore is begged, and does not follow from that known fact that God is above order, taking order as what holds of the later ordered toward the earlier — from this it follows only that he is not the later; and from this it does not follow that he does not have order in the general sense of taking order.

By this reasoning Scotus makes true the first part of his objection — namely that Saint Thomas begged what was to be proved. For in order to deny that there are in God real relations toward the creatures, he assumed as a principle that God does not have order toward them — which was to be proved; since that principle is not known per se, as the reason of Scotus proves. Not rightly therefore did he prove the matter when he took what needed proof.

For it can be, and indeed is, the case that there is order in God toward the creature — not as of the later toward the earlier, but as of the earlier toward the later. And it is not valid to say that that order is not real, because Saint Thomas did not say this in his reason; whence the precise order returns: which precise from that reality proves nothing. But if it is said that the same is included in the concept of divine order, this is denied; and it was to be proved against one denying it — as Scotus argues. Indeed, it seems to convince; for if anyone responds to the argument: "God has order" — let a distinction be made: of reason, I grant; real, I deny. Then against Saint Thomas: therefore already order is not enough to be said, but real order — which is a new term added to the precise and indifferently taken order; Saint Thomas ought therefore to have posited real order, and not order alone, in order to prove the assumption sufficiently. But he did not prove this.

Scotus then proceeds to the second attack — namely that the reason of Saint Thomas commits the fallacy of assuming the consequent: because from the fact that God lacks order, it concludes that he lacks a relation; since this does not follow from that. For, he says in the same place: "order is a certain relation, but not every relation is order." To argue therefore from the negation of order to the negation of relation is to argue as if first the antecedent were denied and then the consequent. In this there is a fallacy — as Lychetus comments here: "He commits," he says, "the fallacy of the consequent, arguing from the negation of the inferior to the negation of the superior; for it follows well: every order is a relation, and not conversely; but it does not follow in some case: because in

something there is no order toward the creature; therefore there is no relation. It does not follow — just as it would not follow if one were to argue: in Francis there is no whiteness; therefore there is no color." Both are right — Scotus argues and Lychetus interprets. These are logical things, in which the acuity of Scotus is marvelous, so that when he falls upon these subtleties he absolutely convinces.

Let us see how the subtle Cajetan — whom Vásquez is accustomed to call subtle, and he is himself an author — attempts to counter these reasons of Scotus in his commentaries on this *q. 13, a. 7*. To Scotus's objections, he says: "In an equivocation we are laboring." This particle is in favor of Scotus. Cajetan indeed admits that Saint Thomas spoke equivocally, and hence that he did not declare himself sufficiently; whence his reason does not run expeditiously. He continues: "For in the text the speech is not of order formally, which is a relation, but of order fundamentally. So that to be of the same order is nothing other than to be of the same account as regards the cause of the relation, and to be not of the same order is to be of a different account. So that among those only is there a relation on both sides in which the same is the cause of referring one to another." But this happens in many ways — which he then reports and explains through the three genera of relations. Then he says: "Whence it is clear that this does not beg the question. For it is not the same to say: in God there is no cause for being referred to the creature — although in the creature there is a cause of referring it to God — and to say: in God there is no real order toward the creature; but the former is the cause of the latter, and therefore that process is from cause to effect." He continues: "Nor does it commit the fallacy of the consequent, because he does not speak of order formally, but fundamentally — which also in equiparant relatives must hold: for two whites of the same account are so, simply and with respect to this — as causing in each other relations. But this is to be of the same account." So Cajetan; and he stops there, nor does he respond anything else to the arguments of Scotus.

But with Cajetan's permission, this doctrine is not a resolution. I affirm that this doctrine does not contain a resolution of the arguments of Scotus. First: that distinction of order formally and fundamentally does not help for the resolution, because whether that order is fundamental or formal, it is always taken in relation to the formal relation which follows the foundation. If the foundation is real, such will be the relation; if of reason, such likewise will be the relation. Then Scotus asks whether the foundation of the relation of God toward the creature is real or of reason — to which Cajetan must respond: which he does not do. Furthermore, Saint Thomas does not speak only of fundamental order but also of formal order — that is, relational; for he says in the title: "Whether names importing a relation toward creatures are said of God from time?" And at the beginning of the body, after the arguments, he says from Augustine that the appellation "Lord" comes to God from time, which he did not previously have; but these are formal ones.

I come to the order; Saint Thomas removes it from God — but not only the fundamental one, but also the formal one, that is the relation. Whence he manifestly says in the body: "Creatures are ordered toward him, and not conversely; and it is manifest that creatures are really referred to God himself." See the formal order from the relations on the part of the creatures. Let us see the same from the part of God: "but in God there is not any real relation of his toward the creatures, but only according to reason." See the relational order with respect to God; and this is still clearer from what he adds: "Nothing prevents names of this kind importing a relation toward creatures from being predicated of God from time — not by reason of any change in him, but by reason of a change in the creature. Just as a column comes to be on the right side of an animal without any change in it, but the animal having been moved." Here the order is expressed through the relational reason — which is altogether formal and the work of reason alone. Then even more clearly *ad sextum*: "The consideration is not of the order of the things about which the relatives are said, but of the significations of the relatives themselves." Then: "Therefore, though God is prior to creatures, because however in the signification of 'Lord' is included that he has a servant and conversely, these two relatives — Lord and servant — are simultaneous by nature. Whence God was not Lord before he had a creature subject to him." See: prior to creatures in the fundamental order and in the Scotistic sense; and likewise in the formal order — because that priority which is founded in it is a relation, according to which God is called Lord with respect to servant, which, though it is not a fundamental order, is nevertheless a formal order.

Nor does it matter to say that in that relation there is not priority but simultaneity of nature — because that is insofar as it is a relation, not insofar as it is an order; because one is ordered toward another, and in the very account of Lord with respect to servant a certain priority is imported with the order of precedence, which can coexist with simultaneity of nature — as we see in the relation of King to subject, Superior to inferior, Father to son, Lord to servant.

But however this matter stands, Cajetan wishes to reduce all relations to one genus of order — which overturns all of Aristotle's doctrine about the threefold genus of relations. For he affirms that to be of the same order is the same as to be of the same account; and not to be of the same order is the same as to be of a different account; from which it follows that all relations are only of the first genus — that is, of unity and diversity. And by saying that this happens in many ways, he contends to prove that there is no other mode of referring than that — and he conflates relations of action and passion, and the measured with the measure, and does not note that there is no order of the knowable to knowledge, and that there are many non-mutual relations and hence in no way ordered. But let us grant Cajetan all these things.

How does he respond to the argument in form? Scotus objects to Saint Thomas: you say that that order — whatever it is — is not in God toward the creature. Prove this to me. For I see that insofar as he is Wise, insofar as he is Omnipotent, insofar as he is Creator, insofar as he is Lord — he says an order toward the creature known, possible, created, servant. By what right therefore do you affirm that there is no order in God toward the creature? Let Cajetan respond formally. He falls silent and digresses to alien doctrine, from which no categorical response can be elicited. But finally he says: "It is clear that it does not beg the question; for it is not the same to say: in God there is no cause for being referred to the creature — although in the creature there is a cause of referring it to God — and to say: in God there is no real order toward the creature. But the former is the cause of the latter, and therefore that process is from cause to effect."

This was not what Scotus was objecting — whether it is the same to be a cause and to say a cause, and to be ordered and to have order — but whether it would suffice for denying the relation to deny the order in God, and how that would be proved. Nor was Scotus asking what that relation would be, but what the proof for denying it would be. Now moreover Cajetan posits the foundation of the relation in the cause, and says that the relation of the effect to the cause is in the creature toward God. Let us examine the words of Cajetan: he says there is no cause in God for being referred to the creature, and hence it follows that there is no order in God toward the creature. I do not think this is true; on the contrary, I think the contrary is true. For in God there is a power and act of creating, from which there seems to be given in God an order toward the creature — for from the fact that there is in God a creative principle and action there arises an order of cause to effect. How therefore does Cajetan deny that? However it stands, neither Saint Thomas nor Cajetan proves in God the absence of order; which Scotus attacks — to whom Cajetan does not formally respond. For though he says there is no cause of referring in God — but only in the creature — he does not prove this; indeed from the fact that God creates it follows that there is a cause — and of a cause to effect there is a relation and order.

Now as to what he says — that it does not commit the fallacy of the consequent — let us see how he excuses this. Because he does not speak, he says, of order formally, but fundamentally — which also in equiparant relatives must hold. For two whites of the same account are so, simply and with respect to this — as causing in each other relations. But this is to be of the same account. What is this to the purpose? Scotus was objecting the fallacy of the consequent — which ran thus: to collect from the negation of order the negation of relation in God — because since not every relation is order, though every order is a relation, this consequence does not follow: there is no order; therefore there is no relation. For the argument proceeds from the negation of the inferior to the negation of the superior; and Scotus adduces the example of white — which when denied, the negation of color does not follow. For the subject not white can be colored

— for example red. So it is possible for there not to be order, and yet for there to be a relation — since order extends less broadly than relation. How does Cajetan respond to this? Let the reader judge. He leaves the argument entire and has recourse to the fundamental order — which I do not know whether and how far it helps him — and adduces the example of the equiparant two, which are of the same account; when Scotus's example would have required him to respond in another way, namely: how the negation of the inferior does not infer the negation of the superior. Of which not a word from Cajetan.

Cajetan, however, argues against Scotus for a certain failing at the end of his commentary on this seventh article in these words: "Here you have the failing of Scotus in *In I, dist. 30, q. 1*, believing that God is called Lord from the sole relation which is in the creature; for he posits the formal effect — namely being Lord — without a formal cause — namely the relation of lordship — which is not intelligible."

First I respond: if this is a failing of Scotus, it is also a failing of Saint Thomas, who is in the same position. I adduce a passage from this *art. 7, q. 13*, in the body: "It is manifest that creatures are really referred to God himself; but in God there is not any real relation of his toward the creatures, but only according to reason, insofar as creatures are referred to him." What could be clearer? Saint Thomas said the same as Scotus. Compare the words. Scotus said: God is called Lord from the sole relation which is in the creature. Saint Thomas says: in God there is not any real relation toward the creatures, but only according to reason, insofar as creatures are referred to him — lest you think there is a relation inhering in God. Therefore if Scotus failed, Saint Thomas also failed. But neither failed. The failing was Cajetan's — who when commenting on this passage of Saint Thomas did not see another passage of his that we adduced as similar to Scotus's passage.

Yet what does Scotus think about this relation of Lord? Let us look. Therefore in *In I, dist. 30, q. 2, § absoluten.*, n. 11: "Absolutely I say that on account of the termination of the relations of creatures from time toward God it is not necessary to posit any relation in God — neither new nor old — which is the reason for terminating the creature's relation. But in God there can be posited some relation — not new, as that which is caused in him by the act of our intellect considering him." Then at n. 12 he raises the objection, anticipating Cajetan's objection: how that can happen without some relation posited in God. "It seems doubtful," he says, "how God is said to be Lord, according to Augustine (*lib. 5 de Trin., c. ult.*)" And he responds: "From the sole new relation which is in the creature toward him, he himself is denominated Lord — not indeed because in the creature there are two opposed relations one of which denominates him, but only one — which is toward him as toward an absolute; and because of the fact that thus the absolute is the term of that relation, he is denominated as if there were in him a new corresponding relation; just as a work made by a man is

called human — not because of something of humanity that is formally in the work, but because of the humanity that is formally in the man, toward whom the work has a habitude."

Shortly after Scotus adduces the authority of the Master in this place: "The appellation by which a creature is called relative to the Creator is relative and notes a relation which is in the creature itself. But that appellation, by which the Creator is called relative to the creature, is indeed relative but connotes no relation which is in the Creator." He adds: "And this Augustine seems to say (*lib. 1 de Trin.*, c. 16) according to the way the Master cites him — that he begins to be called Lord in time, what he was not called before. It is clear he is said relatively — not however according to an accident of God, that something has befallen him — but plainly according to an accident of that of which he begins to be called Lord relatively." Scotus has all of this. Let whoever wishes to know all, read it — he will desire nothing. Cajetan cannot rightly attack him. Scotus feels together with Augustine, feels together with the Master — and what bites Cajetan: he feels together with Saint Thomas.

Judgment

It is clear that Scotus did not undeservedly tax the reason of the Angelic Doctor — because it did not prove the proposed position denying in God a relation, on the grounds that God lacks order. Both because he assumed what was doubtful and hence to be proved — for it could be questioned whether God lacked order; and because granted that the assumption were true, the negation of relation does not follow from the negation of order — because the argument proceeds from the negation of the inferior to the negation of the superior. As if someone were to deny whiteness in a subject and from that deny the subject to be colored: the inference is not right — because colored is superior to white; whence a subject can be non-white and yet be green or red.

As for Cajetan's opinion of Scotus — that he seeks occasions to reprehend — this is pure calumny. For Scotus inquires into the truth and disputes about it; and where he finds it, he agrees; where he does not find it, he dissents and attacks what does not seem to him to be true. And he does so no more in the writings of Saint Thomas than in the books of others — as appears from Henry, Varro, and indeed from Bonaventure. And what else does Cajetan do? He frequently reprehends Scotus and stings him — which Scotus, a most modest man, does not do.

As for the failing that Cajetan objects to him — that by denying that God is referred to the creature by a proper relation, he posits a formal effect without a formal cause, which is not intelligible — this is certainly not said logically. For here there is no place for formal effect or formal cause, but only for a denomination coming from outside to God with respect to the creature. This is not a form but a certain moral denomination, which does not need a formal

cause. For what is lordship? Certainly not something physical, but something moral.

COLLATION VIII. DISTINCTION III. On the Notion of the Unbegotten, or Innascibility.

Referring to Question 33, Part I of St. Thomas, art. 4; Question 40, art. 3, reply to the third objection; in I Sentences, d. 13, q. un., aa. 2, 3, 4; d. 28, q. 1, aa. 1, 2; and to Scotus in I Sentences, d. 2, q. 7; d. 28, qq. 2 and 3; and in the Reportata, d. 28, q. 2.

SECTION I. In what respects the Angelic and the Subtle Doctor agree, and in what they differ.

As regards the formal character of the negation conveyed by the term "Unbegotten," both agree. They teach that "Unbegotten" signifies a negation. They differ somewhat, however, over the foundation of that negation, as will appear below, and they differ entirely over the manner of proving that the Father alone is, and can be, Unbegotten, so that it is impossible for there to be more than one Unbegotten.

I observe that both proceed with remarkable agreement and learning in proposing, explaining, and applying to the Unbegotten the various kinds of negations and privations. As regards the difference in the mode of proof just noted, Cajetan perceived it acutely in his commentary on Part I, Question 33, article 4, and, as is his custom, converted Scotus's dissent from St. Thomas into a grievance. He writes as follows: "Nevertheless, Scotus, in I Sentences, d. 2, q. 6, criticizes this second argument of St. Thomas on the ground that the middle term is not better known than the conclusion." After citing Scotus's argument, he concludes at the end of the article: "But Scotus seems to have spoken in a fit of passion, which he was about to vent in the twenty-sixth distinction."

Cajetan is right about the difference between St. Thomas's argument and Scotus's dissent from it, but wrong about the grievance. I grant that the argument of St. Thomas displeased Scotus. But I deny that Scotus rejected it from passion; for in the very passage Cajetan cites, Scotus argues also against Henry, whose positions in the whole of that distinction he attacks, as is plain from the text. Cajetan therefore invented the passion he attributes to Scotus; and if any such passion existed, it is chiefly against Henry that it is expressed.

I further deny Cajetan's claim that Scotus attacked only one argument — that is, the second, which is St. Thomas's own. Scotus attacked both: the first, which is common to St. Thomas and Henry, and the second, which belongs to St. Thomas alone. I therefore find Cajetan first wanting in truthfulness, since Scotus attacked not one but both arguments; and second, negligent in reading St. Thomas, for he failed to see that St. Thomas himself placed both arguments in his reply, in the following way. At Part I, Question 33, article 4, reply to the fourth objection, St. Thomas says: "Just as in every genus there must be posited

one first principle, so in the Divine nature there must be posited one principle that is not from another, which is called the Unbegotten. To posit two unbegotten beings is therefore to posit two Gods and two Divine natures. Hence Hilary says in the book *On the Synods*: 'Since there is one God, there cannot be two unbegotten beings.' This is especially so because, if there were two unbegotten beings, neither would be from the other, and so they would not be distinguished by relative opposition. They would therefore have to be distinguished by diversity of nature." Here are two arguments. The first is drawn from the unity of the first principle within one nature, which must be only one, lest that one nature be multiplied; and so to posit two unbegotten beings in God would be the same as to posit two Gods, which is confirmed by the authority of Hilary. This argument is common to St. Thomas and Henry. The second is that, given two unbegotten first principles, neither would be produced, and therefore neither would be distinct, because distinction arises from the opposition of producer and produced, which opposition would be removed by the unbegottenness of both, thus eliminating the cause of distinction. This second argument is proper to St. Thomas, not to Henry, who holds the contrary position.

Now against Cajetan's truthfulness: Scotus attacks not only the second argument but also the first; nor is that second argument the only one belonging to St. Thomas, for the first is his as well. How then could Cajetan say that Scotus reproaches the second argument of St. Thomas, when he also reproaches the first? He plainly sought occasion to complain of Scotus, as though Scotus had criticized only St. Thomas's own proper argument. Cajetan acted unjustly. Scotus acts justly. He attacks what he does not think true, out of love for truth, not out of hatred or personal envy. He does not care by whom something is said. He cares what is said and to what extent it is true.

So much for the first difference. I note a second difference in the principal teaching on the Unbegotten or Innascible. St. Thomas, in *I Sentences*, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, reply to the third, says that if Paternity is removed by the intellect from the Father, no hypostasis remains, and that what the text says remains — namely, the Unbegotten — is to be understood as regards the common notion shared by the Unbegotten and the Father, because they are found separately in different beings, not insofar as both are posited as proper properties of the Father. Nevertheless, even with Paternity removed, the Unbegotten would remain in God: not as a property or notion of any person, but as an attribute of the essence, like "immense" or "uncreated." He gives the same teaching in *Part I*, Question 40, article 3, reply to the third. From this it seems to follow that the Innascible or Unbegotten is not founded precisely in the relation of the Father, nor is it the Father's proper notion, and that it savors of something absolute, being in the nature of a predicate common to both the essence and the person.

It further follows, from the example of "immense" and "eternal," that the Unbegotten is not a negation or privation, any more than immensity and eternity are negations or privations. This is entirely contrary to Scotus's doctrine. Scotus insists that Innascibility and the notion of the Unbegotten is a negation founded in Paternity without any absolute concept, so that, with Paternity removed by the intellect, the entire notion of Innascibility and the Unbegotten vanishes. I will cite an explicit passage from Scotus in the Reportata, I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2, (*Respondeo*, n. 13), where he recalls and confirms the doctrine he had previously set out in I Sentences, d. 28, using these precise words, setting aside the lengthier passages: "The Father, because he is Father by Paternity, is therefore Unbegotten; for that one is truly Father who has no Father, just as that one is truly Lord who has no Lord." Hence Damascene, in book I, chapter 9, holds that the name of Father is not transferred from creatures to divine things, but belongs first to God the Father — as the Apostle is cited to say in Ephesians 3: "I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth takes its name." Hence Christ did not leave us other names that truly express the Divine Persons and were previously given to them, and so the names Father and Son truly express those Persons, as was said elsewhere at d. 22, q. un.

From this the difference between the two doctors on the meaning of the notion of the Unbegotten is clear. Scotus situates it in a pure negation consequent upon Paternity, so grounded in Paternity as in the subject of the affirmation from which that negation arises. As he says in the same place (*Sed quomodo*, n. 18): "It is true that the Father is not Father because he is Unbegotten, so that the cause of being-in-itself is denied to the Unbegotten in the first mode of per se as regards Paternity"; and presently: "The negation conveyed by 'Unbegotten' follows upon that affirmative notion in the Father as a property follows its subject." Therefore, with Paternity removed, the Unbegotten is entirely removed and does not revert to the nature, because it is entirely grounded in and arises from Paternity — contrary to what St. Thomas holds in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2, a. 4.

It is therefore established that the Angelic and Subtle Doctors agree in holding that the Unbegotten signifies a negation. They differ, first, in that St. Thomas holds that this negation precedes Paternity, is presupposed to it, and is founded in the relation not under the express concept of Paternity but under that of hypostasis, subsistence, and first principle — from which it follows that with Paternity removed as such, the Unbegotten remains insofar as it is something more common, reverting to the essence as immensity and eternity do, as we shall explain more fully below. Scotus, by contrast, judges that the Unbegotten follows upon and does not precede Paternity, that it is precisely the negative notion of the Father, and that with Paternity removed by the intellect it ceases to be. They differ, second, in the manner of proving that there cannot be two Unbegotten beings; because St. Thomas attempts to prove this by two arguments, one shared with Henry and one proper to himself, neither of which

satisfies Scotus, who, having attacked both, offers other arguments of his own and proves the point.

SECTION II. What authors hold in this controversy.

Before setting these two leaders of opposing schools against one another, it will be worth knowing what other authors hold on this grave and difficult question, and recognizing which have joined either side and which have departed from it.

It should be noted first that the Arians abused the terms "Unbegotten" and "Begotten" to clothe their heresy, by saying that the Father alone is God because he is Unbegotten, that is, Uncreated; that the Son is not God because he is Begotten and Created, and therefore a creature. This strategy frightened certain Fathers away from these terms. They include Dionysius of Alexandria in his letter to Paul of Samosata; Athanasius in the Dialogue of the Orthodox and the Anomoean, who notes that the Arians accepted the term in this sense, (*Oration II against the Arians* and *Letter on the Decree of the Council of Nicaea*); Basil, who holds the same term suspect (*Against Eunomius*, book IV); and Nazianzen (*Oration XXXIX*). Ambrose was likewise displeased by it (*On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation*, cc. 8 and 9), as was Idacius Clarus (*Against Varimadum*).

Yet with a sound and true meaning, the Fathers, Councils, and Scholastics received the term "Unbegotten" by common consent as a notion of the Father in relation to the begotten Son. Pope Damasus in his exposition of the Faith; the Fathers of the Council of Antioch in their letter to Paul of Samosata; the councils of Toledo VI and XI and of Worms in their confession of Faith; Justin Martyr in his exposition of the Faith; Athanasius in the *Letter on the Synods of Ariminum and Seleucia*; Basil in books I, II, and IV of *Against Eunomius*; Nazianzen in Orations XXIII and XXXVI; Nicetas on Oration XXXVIII; Cyril in book I of the *Treasury*, chapters 2, 3, 4; Anastasius Sinaita in book I of *On the Right Dogmas of the Faith*; Damascene in book I of *On the Faith*, chapter 9; Hilary in books IV and IX of *On the Trinity* and in *On the Synods*; Augustine in book V of *On the Trinity*, chapters 6 and 7, and book XXV, chapter 26, and book LXXXIII, question 2; Fulgentius in reply to *The Seven Objections of the Arians*; Jerome is cited by the Master in I Sentences, d. 13, and by St. Thomas in Part I, q. 33, a. 3, reply to the second. John the Theologian uses the term at the Council of Florence, Session XVIII. From these sources the following Scholastics drew, yet they held varying views on the meaning and channeled that tradition through different streams into their own schools.

The first opinion was held by certain authors cited by St. Bonaventure in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, who said that the Unbegotten formally signifies a relation opposed to the notion of begetter, a real relation similar to the relation of inequality to equality, which is universally rejected in the schools: because if that relation held between real extremes, there would be at least five real relations in God; because that relation would have no real term, since "unbegetter" and

"ungenerating" are not something real; and because negation itself is a lack of a relation, so how could it be a real relation?

The second opinion is that of St. Bonaventure in I Sentences, dd. 27 and 28, who holds that the Unbegotten signifies a privation generically but a negation formally, and connotes something positive including a dignity that is a kind of fontal plenitude or fecundity of the principle constituted in the Father. This is how Scotus understood him at d. 28, q. 2, (*De secundo*, n. 6), and it seems to be how St. Thomas understood him at Part I, q. 33, a. 4, reply to the first; Vasquez affirms this of him in Disputation 140, chapter 3, n. 12; and Suarez does not dissent, excusing Bonaventure in book VIII, chapter 2, n. 6. Alarcon also acknowledges this opinion is attributed to him at Tractate V, Disputation 7, c. 1, n. 80.

Regarding the opinion of St. Thomas, it is remarkable what Vasquez says at Disputation 140, chapter 3, n. 11: that St. Thomas agrees with Bonaventure in I Sentences, d. 28, qq. 1, 2, and 3, and in Part I, q. 33, a. 4, reply to the first, and that he is followed in this by his disciples Capreolus, Cajetan, the Canarian, and Durand — so that what is formally signified by the Unbegotten is a negation or privation, while what is materially signified is the notion of the first principle together with some dignity. But I do not see how this can be true, since Vasquez himself at n. 12 of the same passage acknowledges that St. Thomas attacks the opinion about that positive fontal principle, which is indeed true. For St. Thomas in that passage, Part I, q. 33, a. 4, reply to the second, attacks the opinion of Bonaventure, which Vasquez himself had proposed as distinct, saying that St. Thomas at a. 4, reply to the first, cited in favor of Bonaventure's position the fontal plenitude of principle, which he then refutes. How then can St. Thomas in the same article and question both follow Bonaventure's opinion and attack it?

Suarez understood and explained the matter a little better at book VIII, chapter 2, nn. 8 and 9, where he opposes St. Thomas's opinion to Bonaventure's and says that both agree in the formal signification of the negation but differ in the material signification, since Bonaventure posits that fontal principle whereas St. Thomas establishes Paternity, either alone or together with active spiration. Yet Suarez too speaks somewhat inconsistently. For at chapter 2, n. 6, having proposed the opinion of St. Thomas and Scotus and saying they agree on it, he says that Bonaventure is customarily cited in opposition, but undeservedly, which implies that all three do not disagree. Yet at n. 8 he attributes the opinion concerning the plenitude to St. Bonaventure, and immediately at n. 9 he opposes to it the opinion of St. Thomas, saying: "The opinion of St. Thomas is, however, far more true."

With all due deference to these most eminent theologians of our age, I think neither has accurately investigated the mind of St. Thomas. For St. Thomas did not found the negation of the Unbegotten precisely in Paternity, as Suarez

would have it. Nor in a worthy and fontal principle, as Vasquez prefers, as we have just noted. For that opinion in Suarez is Scotus's own, and the second is Bonaventure's; but as regards St. Thomas, his position is that the foundation of the Unbegotten is in something that precedes formal relation in the Father, as we have said, drawing on his express words from I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, reply to the third, which we will cite again below. Nor does he say the contrary in Part I, q. 33, a. 4, for there, at the reply to the first, he excludes the notion of principle-of-others and fontal plenitude; and although at the reply to the third of that same article he says that "according to the relation insofar as it is the relation of the Son is denied of the Father," he is speaking of the negative distinction from the Son, not of the material constitution of the Unbegotten. Indeed, at the reply to the second he says that the privation which the Unbegotten formally signifies imports a negation in the genus of principle spoken personally, not expressing the Father but the suppositum and Person. Hence he places the foundation of that privation in something preceding Paternity. But we will deal with this more fully below.

Let us now look at the opinions of Suarez and Vasquez. Suarez sets out his opinion clearly. It has two parts: the first on the formal signification, the second on the foundational or material signification. On the first, at book VIII, chapter 2, n. 6, he says: "We must say that what is formally signified by this word 'Unbegotten' is solely the privation of every real origin." Thus St. Thomas at Part I, q. 33, a. 4, and I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, reply to the first; and Scotus holds the same at I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2. This part is easy and commonly held. He then turns to the foundation and, passing over difficulties, at n. 9 establishes as the foundation nothing other than Paternity, or at most Paternity together with active spiration. He says he agrees in this with St. Thomas, passing over Scotus, with whom he more truly agrees. In explaining his own opinion and that of the Thomists, he proceeds by saying that in the Father there is nothing beyond the essence and Paternity; the essence cannot be the foundation, because it is incapable of that denomination; therefore the foundation is the relation of the Father alone, which, he says, exists prior to any origin, because it constitutes the principle of the first origin.

Yet in the following chapter, n. 3, explaining how the Father is principle and source of the Godhead, he denies that the Father is principle taken in the general sense and affirms that he is the first principle in the order of processions; and in this sense he vindicates Bonaventure's statement about fontal plenitude. From this arises a new difficulty: whether this notion of principle is a formality of Paternity or of the Person or Hypostasis — two notions that St. Thomas and his school discern within that relation, as at Part I, q. 40, a. 4, as we noted above. Suarez accepts and proves this doctrine at chapter 7, n. 11, where he says that persons are understood as constituted before they are related. This persuaded him that the notion of Hypostasis or Person is conceived in the relation prior to origin and its term. It therefore follows that

his opinion on the foundation of the notion of the Unbegotten, which he placed in formal Paternity, cannot stand; for the foundation must lie in the notion of hypostasis or Person, which, as Suarez himself teaches in book VIII, chapter 7, is presupposed to Paternity.

I therefore ask him: is the foundation of the notion of the Unbegotten the relation of Paternity? He affirms it. I then ask: since within that relation there are two notions — the hypostasis and formal Paternity — which of them is the foundation of the notion of the Unbegotten? Not Paternity as such, because that is neither first nor adequate as the principle of the Unbegotten; not first, because the hypostasis precedes it; not adequate, because Paternity is not the principle of the Holy Spirit but only of the Son, to whom it is formally referred.

Therefore the foundation must be that hypostatic notion, and so it cannot be formal Paternity as Suarez had said. He therefore does not correctly establish the foundation of the notion of the Unbegotten in formal Paternity. For that hypostatic notion, conceived beforehand, is capable of the negation or privation of the Unbegotten, especially since Suarez himself admits that saying of Augustine from book V of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6: "If the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent him from being called Unbegotten," as is clear from what he says in book VIII, chapter 2, n. 10.

Vasquez's opinion is more entangled. His faithful companion Alarcon labors greatly to set it out, clarify it, and defend it, devoting the whole of his Disputation 7, chapter 3, Tractate V on the Trinity, to this task. Let us see what Vasquez holds in his own sources. There are three passages: Disputation 137, chapter 5; Disputation 140, chapter 3; and Disputation 159, chapter 7, all faithfully cited also by Alarcon. The sense of all of them — to bring together in summary what he treats at length — is that the Innascible or Unbegotten formally signifies a negation of procession from another, which is the common view; but materially it signifies a certain positive mode of dignity under the notion of first principle, which in the Father as Father is not apparent, yet is truly contained in the relation of Paternity, though not expressed in its concept, since that notion of first principle is distinct from formal Paternity, which precisely tends toward the Son. Asked what this notion of first principle is, and how it is constituted and distinguished from Paternity, Vasquez replies that it is not a real relative thing but a relation of reason added to the real relation. I cite his words from Disputation 137, chapter 3, n. 18: "I reply that the positive signification of this term is Paternity under the peculiar concept of first origin, a concept that adds not a new real relation but a relation of reason, since no new real relation is given to a real relation." He says there that this positive notion of the Innascible is understood before the Person is understood as actually generating. It therefore precedes formal Paternity. He then asks whether this notion of first principle is something absolute or relative, and refers himself to Disputation 140, chapter 3, and Disputation 159, chapter 7.

He explains the matter in the same way at Disputation 140, chapter 3, n. 14, where he says: "The reply is that this negation does not arise from both relations of the first Person — that is, of Father and Spirator — but from Paternity alone under the notion of first principle." He then again asks whether this notion is something absolute or relative, and again refers back to Disputation 137, chapter 5, whence he had sent us here. There he had posited a relation of reason, as we saw; and being stung by the difficulty, at the final n. 18 of that chapter he says: "It is a great question whether we understand it as constituted by something absolute or something relative, and whether the Innascible as we constitute it can be comprehended under an absolute or a relative concept, a difficulty that surely demands further discussion and must be examined in Disputation 159." We turn there. At chapter 7, n. 31, he says: "I reply that what we conceive through Innascibility is a property conceived relatively. For by that term we signify fontal plenitude or the first principle of proceeding." And presently: "We do not multiply relations; we conceive the same one in different ways." Then: "Nor does it matter if we say that the property of the Innascible and of the source is expressed by us through a relation of reason; for since this constitution is by reason, it is no wonder that the same fecundity, conceived in different ways, makes the same Person apprehended as constituted in different ways." He therefore denies that this notion is something absolute. Yet again at n. 33, the final article of the same section, he does not quite dare to deny it, for he says that Innascibility, conceived in this way before actual generation, is not entirely absolute in our concept, and there he numbers it among the notional relations of reason.

If you further ask what the foundation of this relation is, he replies: "The Person itself, conceived in the mode of a fecund being, which fecundity is indeed the same as the relation of Paternity itself; but in our manner of conceiving, it is then considered under the aspect of being able, not yet actually generating." So Vasquez. His faithful disciple and interpreter Father Alarcon labors to set this out and defend it, and in his Disputation 7, chapter 3, Tractate V on the Trinity, he gravely complains of certain recent authors who, like dogs — so he calls them — have bayed at Father Vasquez, branded him, and severely criticized his opinion. Among them he names Suarez and wonders how Suarez could have called this same opinion an improbable evasion and inconsistent with itself.

Now Father Suarez, at the passage cited by Alarcon, book VIII, chapter 2, n. 11, having set out Father Vasquez's opinion without naming him, as is his custom, says: "It is, however, an improbable evasion and inconsistent with itself." He then attacks it vigorously, though without invective.

Placed between these two chief theologians of their age, both of whom I have chosen since boyhood as my masters and whom I use and delight in greatly, I wish to examine and treat the matter carefully, and to interpose my judgment with all the more caution and deliberateness because I am about to deal with

Alarcon, a man once very dear to me and most devoted to my Portuguese nation, with whom I enjoyed close friendship in Madrid and Alcalá, to my great satisfaction and pleasure.

We should certainly congratulate Vasquez for having obtained so ardent a champion and defender as Alarcon, by whom his meaning has been so aptly understood and explained that, as presented by Alarcon, it seems to be free from all censure. Nevertheless, it is entangled and difficult, and rightly attacked by Father Suarez.

I say, first, that Father Vasquez subtly sought to avoid incurring something absolute by introducing that first and fontal principle. For since it precedes the formal notion of the relation of Paternity, it cannot be a relation; and since it is something positive, it will be something absolute. He therefore devised that relation of reason, which would neither be the real relation following upon that notion of first principle nor something absolute, and he made that relation of reason the foundation of the negative Innascibility. This reasoning of mine is evident from the words of Vasquez I have cited. For in order to escape the absolute he retains the relation; and since in his view it cannot be the real Paternity, he substitutes for it a relation of reason. Hence Suarez rightly called it an evasion — rightly as regards the name. It remains to see whether it is truly improbable and inconsistent, as Suarez also calls it. This seems indeed true for the three reasons Suarez offers, briefly. The first is that a relation of reason does not express greater perfection than a privation. If therefore he denies the privation on grounds of dignity, why does he posit it in a relation of reason? Then, if he says that not the relation of reason formally taken but its foundation pertains to dignity, the question recurs about that foundation: is it Paternity alone or something else real? Vasquez does not admit the latter. If the former is said, the correct conclusion is that the Unbegotten has for its foundation nothing beyond Paternity. Finally, that relation of reason is either to the other Persons — which is not the case, since the Unbegotten as such is conceived as abstracting from respect to the proceeding Persons — or it is to a prior Person; and in that case the relation presupposes the negation of the prior one, so far is it from being able to be its foundation. These arguments of Suarez seem apt and valid. I could wish that Alarcon had responded to them formally. But he is entirely occupied in expounding Vasquez's opinion and freeing it from censure; and although he responds to Suarez obliquely and by implication, he is less than satisfying for not following the logical form of reply.

I add to Suarez's arguments one or two of my own formally. The first: no relation, whether real or of reason, can exist without a foundation and a term; but that relation of reason lacks both; therefore it cannot exist. The major is certain. The minor is proved. It lacks a foundation in Vasquez's view, because it is neither something absolute nor something relative, and therefore is neither. The first part is plain, because Vasquez does not want to concede any positive

absolute hypostatic element in that relation, lest he admit that a hypostasis or subsistence in the Divine consists in something absolute; and for this reason he introduced this relation of reason. The second part holds because that relation of reason cannot have its foundation in Paternity, since Paternity is posterior to that relation of reason, which Vasquez wants to precede formal Paternity in the notion of principle. The minor therefore stands, and the consequence follows by the logical force of the form as regards the foundation.

I proceed to the term and prove it lacks one by this argument. The term is either something absolute or something relative. There is no absolute except the essence, since Vasquez does not want a hypostasis. There is no relative except the relation of the Father as Paternity, and this is the term only of Filiation, not of another relation. Therefore it has neither an absolute nor a relative term. Nor can you object that it is terminated to the Father as principle of the Son, because in that case the notion of principle will not be the relation of reason itself, which carries with it that concept on Vasquez's authority. It therefore follows that there are two principles: one that is the relation of reason, another that is the notion of principle in Paternity.

The second argument: this relation is posited by Vasquez to signify the positive notion of fontal and fecund principle together with communicative perfection in first act. But these cannot be provided by it; therefore it must be removed. The major is Vasquez's doctrine, as is plain from his text. The minor is shown, first, because it is a work of the intellect, while the principle is real; second, because that fecundity is in God and is not conferred through a relation; third, because it is presupposed to the relation and is afterwards regarded as referred through it; fourth, because a relation of reason is incapable of such great perfection; fifth, because if it were capable of it, it would be more perfect than the relation of Paternity, which succeeds it and lacks all that fontal fecundity and perfection, presupposing it to be included in the relation of reason; sixth, because this one relation of reason would carry more weight than all three real relations, which lack that fontal plenitude found in this relation of reason.

If Vasquez replies that it is not the relation of reason that produces these effects but its foundation, I then press: what is this foundation and of what kind? If a relation, the same question recurs about it. If something absolute, then an absolute notion is already posited against Vasquez in the first Person, and the notion of the suppositum will be absolute, which he denies. If he says it is indeed something absolute, but that it brings about all those effects not immediately by itself but through the relation of reason, the absurdities we have just noted follow. Therefore that relation is to be expelled, for it complicates rather than resolves the question.

As for Alarcon's explanation, it does not resolve the difficulties. For that principle which is a transcendental and secondary-mode relative, and which is fecund and fontal — what, I ask, is it as explained through that secondary or

rational relation? Is it in itself something absolute or something relative? Not relative, since it precedes the concept of Paternity and is presupposed to it. Therefore it is absolute, which Vasquez and Alarcon himself should deny. The difficulty therefore remains. Although the constitution is by reason, this does not prevent its foundation from existing in reality, which is what we ask about; for if that whole relation gives the intellect occasion to form two distinct and different concepts — one of a first fecund and fontal principle, another of a formal relation — and the second remains expressed, why will the first not remain? Since it has another notion of producing first principle, as though complete and perfected in first act. What therefore is that which generates a concept different from the concept of Paternity? Since Paternity is toward the Son alone, another notion of the first concept tends toward all the relations with respect to which it is called and is a principle. And so against Alarcon: that secondary relation presupposes the being that it expresses. I now ask what and of what kind is that being expressed by that relation? Alarcon is therefore required to disclose and make manifest what he conceals in that notion, in order to cover Vasquez's opinion with that specious cloak.

Alarcon therefore accomplished something for show and display, but nothing, in my judgment, for defense. In this matter therefore I agree with Suarez, as will be more clearly apparent when I open up Scotus's meaning and explain his doctrine; and since Alarcon incidentally criticizes Suarez in that chapter 3 of Disputation 7, as though Suarez alone denied that first principle capable of generating as though in first act in the Father antecedently to the expressed concept of Paternity, he does an injustice to that eminent theologian, since not Suarez alone denies it — if indeed he denies it — but before him Scotus and his school, who place the proximate and adequate principle of generation in Paternity alone, as we said above.

SECTION III. The opinion of St. Thomas on the Innascible and the Unbegotten is proposed, expounded, and examined for its truth.

Whoever collates the place of St. Thomas in I Sentences, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, reply to the first, and a. 4 in the body, and in d. 28, q. 1, a. 1 in the body and replies to the first and fourth, and a. 2 throughout, with the place in Part I, q. 33, a. 4 throughout, will find him teaching that the Unbegotten is constituted by a negation of principle from another, founded in the notion of principle toward another. Hence Cajetan rightly says in his commentary on Part I, q. 33, a. 4 — speaking of the fourth division of the Unbegotten — "The Unbegotten in the genus of principle is proper to the Father." And the ancient Thomists understood him thus: Hervaeus in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1; Capreolus there against Aureolus; and Javelli, who numbers among the relevant articles of Part I, q. 33, a. 1, that article commonly numbered as the fourth.

There is however some difficulty in the text of St. Thomas, because in Part I, a. 4, q. 33, reply to the first, he denies that the Unbegotten imports both notions. For,

having set out the opinion of those who say that Innascibility, that is, the Unbegotten insofar as it is a property of the Father, is not called such merely negatively but imports either both together — namely, that the Father is from no one and that he is the principle of others — or universal authority, or indeed fontal plenitude, he adds: "But this does not seem true, because in that case Innascibility would not be a distinct property from Paternity and active Spiration but would include them as the proper is included in the common." And he immediately adds: "We must therefore say, according to Augustine in *On the Trinity*, book V, that 'Unbegotten' imports the negation of passive generation, removing the notion of principle toward another and retaining only the negation of being from another," and continues accordingly: "Augustine says that the term 'Unbegotten' is equivalent to 'not Son.'"

Yet in I Sentences, d. 13, q. 1, a. 4 in the body, he manifestly includes both. For dividing the sense of the Unbegotten as negation, he says: "or in the genus of principle in the Divine nature, and thus it belongs only to the Father; and then it will be the Father's notion." He says the same at I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, reply to the second, where he says: "In the notion of principle is the notion of the Father." And more clearly at a. 2, reply to the third: "What is said in the text — that what remains after Paternity is removed is the Unbegotten — is to be understood as regards the common notion of the Unbegotten and the Father, because they are found separately in different beings, not insofar as both are posited as properties of the Father." By these words he indicates that both notions — of not being from another and of being principle of another — are conveyed by the term Unbegotten.

Finally, returning to Part I, q. 33, a. 4, reply to the second, explaining how the Unbegotten can be said of the Holy Spirit, he says: "Hence, for it to be proper to the Father alone, we must understand by the name Unbegotten something that belongs to a Divine Person which is the principle of another Person, so that it is understood to import negation in the genus of principle spoken personally in the divine realm." By these passages we should interpret that passage which seemed to deny this in a. 4 in the body of q. 33, reply to the first, cited first above; in which St. Thomas disapproves of the opinion of those who say it encompasses both notions — the negation of being from another and the positing of the principle of others — in the sense that the negation is formally signified by the Unbegotten, while the notion of principle is materially and foundationally, as the Holy Doctor himself expounds in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, reply to the second, where he says: "Whatever dignity a negation has, it has from the affirmation upon which it is founded; and therefore Innascibility, which is founded upon such a Paternity, pertains to dignity." Here Paternity is the foundation of that negation, signified by the term Innascible or Unbegotten materially and not formally, since that term formally signifies the negation of being from another first principle — in which sense the Thomists we cited have

spoken, and especially Capreolus in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, and Javelli in his commentary on Part I, q. 33, a. 3.

John of St. Thomas, however, has a different judgment on this positive notion at q. 33, a. 4, Disputation 15, article 1, where he entirely denies that it is a relation in the sense of being a principle of another, and affirms instead that it is the relation of Paternity in the notion of a subsistent being in itself, to which it is repugnant to be from another. This is how he concludes after a long disputation at n. 20 — in which he certainly departs from the older Thomists, who placed both notions, that of not being from another and that of being the principle of another, as the foundation of the Unbegotten.

St. Thomas therefore, on whatever interpretation within his school, does not place the foundation in formal Paternity as Scotus did, but either in the notion of a fecund principle joined to dignity, or in the hypostatic notion of a being subsisting in itself, antecedently to the respect toward the Son — that is, formal Paternity. He therefore agrees with Scotus on the concept of negation but disagrees on its foundation.

I prove this accurately: St. Thomas could not have placed the negation of the Unbegotten in formal Paternity. First, because that opinion seems to conflict with the doctrine he delivered on the constitution of the Person of the Father at Part I, q. 40, a. 4, where he distinguishes within the Person of the Father the notion of hypostasis that constitutes the Person from the formal relation to the Son, and says the former precedes and is presupposed to the latter. And at q. 41, a. 4, he places the power and principle of generating with respect to the act of generating, that is, with respect to actual generation; and so in his doctrine the notion of principle precedes formal Paternity, which is received by his school, as we showed above in discussing the opinion of Ripa, and as Vasquez acknowledges in his note on Part I, q. 40, a. 3, and in Disputation 149, and Alarcon at Disputation 7, chapter 3, where he says all Scholastics — meaning the Thomists — teach this; and Suarez says the same at book VIII of *On the Trinity*, chapter 7, and cites the Thomists as constantly defending it together with St. Thomas.

From this it follows that the notion of principle does not fit into the formal relation of the Father, since it must be taken antecedently to that relation and the foundation of the Unbegotten is in it insofar as it is the notion of the first fecund principle — indeed, from it generation and filiation arise, and since these are simultaneous in reality and in name with Paternity, the Unbegotten follows and is already founded in that notion of the first hypostatic principle, which precedes Paternity. But the Thomists will reply that St. Thomas should be explained as speaking of Paternity by taking that concept of hypostasis as subsistent, not precisely as relation. Against this, however: St. Thomas explains the term Innascible or Unbegotten through the negation of a relative begotten, so that the Unbegotten in the notion of first principle according to hypostasis

cannot be opposed to that begotten, for it is not opposed to the Son or to the begotten. Therefore that formal relation cannot be the foundation of the Unbegotten. And I press those who respond thus with these words of St. Thomas, Part I, q. 33, a. 4 in the body, in Augustine's name: "The term 'Unbegotten' is equivalent to 'not Son.'"

Then that notion of the Unbegotten is posited by St. Thomas with dignity in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, reply to the second: "Whatever dignity a negation has, it has from the affirmation upon which it is founded; and therefore Innascibility, which is founded upon such a Paternity, pertains to dignity." But this dignity does not fit formal Paternity, which lacks that dignity, since it is a pure respect and is not a perfection or dignity — otherwise it would be nobler than Filiation. Therefore it cannot be founded in Paternity as such. Furthermore, that notion — as we argued above regarding the constitution of the Persons through absolutes — if it is hypostatic, savors more of the absolute than of the relative.

Hence St. Thomas in that same a. 2 of d. 28 says that with Paternity removed the Unbegotten remains as regards the common notion of the Unbegotten and the Father; and if this is something common, it is something absolute, not relative. I press further from another principle of St. Thomas's at Part I, q. 41, a. 5 in the body, which we adduced above in Collation V, Distinction II, on the principle or power of generating, which he constitutes formally in the Divine nature. For he says: "The Divine nature in the Father is the power of generating in him," and again: "The power of generating signifies the Divine nature formally and directly, but the relation obliquely." With this doctrine that teaching on the Unbegotten seems utterly incompatible which places the notion of the first fecund principle in the person and hypostasis, which stands only obliquely with respect to the notion of principle and does not enter into it, since it is formally situated in the nature. How then does the principle stand directly with that hypostasis, which is required only obliquely and by way of condition at most for the actual communication of nature?

Nor can you object that the Father is commonly called principle by the Councils and Fathers, and indeed Font of Divinity, as the Council of Florence terms him, and the councils of Lyons, Worms, Toledo VI and XI, and Dionysius the Areopagite in *On the Divine Names*, chapter 3; Augustine in book IV of *On the Trinity*, chapter 2, and book IX, chapter 2; Cyril in book I of his commentary on John, chapter 1; Chrysostom in homily II on John; Ambrose in book II of *On the Faith*, chapter 5 — because the name of Father contains the nature and the hypostasis, and is an integral Person in its complete notion, constituted from essence and Paternity. Hence it is true to say that he is the principle and font of Divinity, since he includes the nature, which is the formal principle whereby of actual communication of the same, with the personality concurring as a required condition, as we explained above. The relation thus completes that principle and gives it concreteness, but does not enter into the formal notion of

the principle. When I say nature, I understand the nature in proximate power immediately productive through intellect and will, as we noted above with Cajetan in Collation V, Distinction II.

It is therefore established that the foundation of this notion — insofar as the Unbegotten is a negation — is not the formal relation itself but the Person insofar as it encompasses nature and relation as a hypostasis in St. Thomas's view, and as a complete principle from which others proceed, and as principle-that. Finally, St. Thomas cannot hold that the Father as Father is the foundation of the Unbegotten, because he would contradict Augustine, who says in book V of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6: "If the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent him from being called Unbegotten." St. Thomas's position cannot cohere with this if it affirms that the Unbegotten is founded in Paternity; for it would follow that if the Father had not begotten, and were not Father, the Unbegotten could not be said of him. This will be more clearly apparent, as it is in Augustine's stated view: "It is not the same thing to say Unbegotten as to say Father, because even if he had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent him from being called Unbegotten. And if anyone begets a Son, that one is not for that reason Unbegotten." And presently: "Therefore no one is Father because Unbegotten, nor Unbegotten because Father."

Now this saying carries greater force in that the same holy doctor admits it and cites it as Augustine's opinion when replying to the third argument of Part I, q. 40, a. 3. He is therefore required to deny that the formal relation of Paternity is the foundation of the negation of the Unbegotten, on the authority of Augustine. Scotus is not so required, for he first doubts the interpretation of that text, then is uncertain whether it is Augustine's, and finally, to prevent it from working against himself, provides an explanation, as we shall see in the following section.

I cite the words of St. Thomas, lest anyone think he denies or calls into question Augustine's saying. He accepts that saying, put against him in the third argument: "It is not the same thing to say Unbegotten as to say Father." He replies: "We must say that Augustine's intention was not to say that the hypostasis of the Father remains Unbegotten with Paternity removed, such that Innascibility would constitute and distinguish the hypostasis of the Father. This cannot be, since the Unbegotten posits nothing but is said negatively, as he himself said." St. Thomas therefore, with Augustine, denies that the foundation of the Unbegotten is the formal notion of Paternity.

SECTION IV. The opinion of Scotus on the Unbegotten is expounded more fully and defended.

In the first section above we cited an express text of Scotus from the Reportata. Now from the Quodlibeta let us cite another to be confirmed: that the Unbegotten, which formally signifies the negation of being from another, is

founded in the relation of the Father as Father — which we there said is the genuine opinion of Scotus.

Thus in *Quodlibet* IV (*Iuxta illud*, n. 4): "The first incommunicable positive property is the constitutive property of the first Person." And at n. 5, in reply to the objection that the Unbegotten is posited, he says this term formally signifies a negation, and that since a negation must be founded in an affirmation of something positive, that positive must be sought as the foundation of the negative predicate of the Unbegotten. So at n. 7. Then at n. 9 he says, according to the teaching of Damascene, that under "Ingenerateness" Paternity is comprehended. And thereafter at n. 14 he sets out the opinion of Henry, which holds that the notion of the generating is the notion of the first and unbegotten Person, which he refutes from n. 13 through n. 16, resolving Henry's arguments and maintaining that the notion of the first Person, which is the foundation of the Unbegotten, consists precisely in the actual generation through which the Father is constituted most actually. Then at n. 12 he sets out the opinion of St. Thomas, which situates this foundation in the constitutive of the Father insofar as it is a property, not insofar as it is a formal relation; and he refutes it from n. 12 to n. 19, then refutes it again understood in another way from n. 19 to n. 21, and determines that that foundation is entirely Paternity as it denominates the Father and is directly related to the Son.

But let us go to the source. In I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2 (*In proposito*, n. 5): "I say therefore that the Unbegotten, in the use of the Saints, insofar as it signifies the negation of the begotten in the most general sense — that is, of the produced — while connoting a subsistent being in the Divine nature, belongs to the Father alone." He explains this further below, so as to make plain that that subsistent being is not something preceding formal Paternity. He first refutes the opinion of St. Thomas, who posits in Paternity the notion of hypostatic property prior to generation, as we say he attacked in *Quodlibet* IV; and the opinion of Bonaventure, who situates it in origin. He does this at q. 3 of that distinction 28, nn. 2 and 3. Then at n. 4 he attacks the above-mentioned opinion of Henry on the power of generating, which Scotus wants to be most actual, as he calls it at n. 5. He then proceeds to refute the opinion of Ripa, who places the foundation of the Unbegotten in an absolute prior to formal Paternity, beginning at n. 6; and finally resolves at n. 8 that the Father is constituted as Unbegotten by formal Paternity itself, through which he is related to the second Person.

From this it is plain that that subsistent being which Scotus posited at n. 8 as connoted by the Unbegotten is the formal relation of the Father under the proper concept of Paternity; for with the fontal principle of Bonaventure, the hypostatic property of St. Thomas, and the generating power of Henry all set aside, nothing remains but formal Paternity in which the Unbegotten is founded and which it connotes as its positive foundation. This is further plain from the fact that he removes from that subsistent being the notion of perfection and

dignity, on the grounds that if a personal property were to express dignity in the simple sense, the other Person which does not have it would not have every simple dignity, which is incongruous. This is the third argument of Scotus at d. 28, q. 2, n. 6, against the formal principle of St. Bonaventure in I Sentences, d. 21, q. 2, and d. 28, q. 1.

And from the conclusion there placed by Scotus at n. 7 this is yet more clearly apparent, for he says: "It seems that the Unbegotten under its proper notion, insofar as it signifies not having a begetter, is a property of the Father, and sufficiently imports dignity — that is, non-indignity — just as personal properties in the Divine realm are not said to be imperfections." And at most he concedes a certain kind of dignity, though not formal: "For it is not necessary that by reason of being Unbegotten there be a formal dignity of some positive proper thing." So at n. 7. In this also he differs from St. Thomas, who admits dignity in the connotate of the Unbegotten, as he says in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, a. 2, reply to the second; and as Capreolus explains in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 7, conceding to Aureolus that the Unbegotten implies dignity in its foundation, and Javelli, agreeing with Capreolus in his commentary on Part I, q. 33, a. 3.

In sum: the Unbegotten formally signifies the negation of the begotten or produced — a negation explained through "innascibile" — while connoting the relation of the Father as such, generating the Son, with no perfection or formal dignity, but only with every imperfection removed. And thus it agrees with the opinion of St. Thomas in asserting the negation as the formal signification, but differs in adducing Paternity alone as actually related to the Son, with the notion of hypostatic property removed — a notion St. Thomas introduced antecedently to formal Paternity. This Lychetus understood and explained excellently in his commentary on *Quodlibet* IV, n. 18 of his own numbering (*Ad secundum*): "I grant that the Unbegotten is a property of the Father, and I grant that it formally signifies a negation — namely, not being from another; and likewise I grant that it presupposes something positive and proper in the Father; but I say that this positive element is Paternity itself, or active generation, which belongs to the Father prior to that negation. This is plain because Paternity is such an entity to which it is formally repugnant to be from another, and such repugnance, as is plain, is founded in Paternity itself."

That all Scotists hold this opinion Pontius states in his supplement to the commentary on I Sentences, d. 28, q. 4 (*Ad quaestionem*, n. 8 of his own numbering, n. 12). Pontius did not see Rada, the noble Scotist, who departed from Scotus and — remarkably — preferred to follow the contrary opinion, which is more closely that of St. Thomas. For Rada, at Controversy 21, *On the Divine Notions*, a. 2, in the fifth conclusion, says: "The formal foundation of this negation — the Unbegotten — is not Paternity under the notion of Paternity but under the notion of hypostatic entity, so that the adequate and precise notion that formally founds that negation is the incommunicable individual first

entity." So far with St. Thomas. He adds that this is not Thomistic, indifferent as it is to the absolute and the relative. He proves his conclusion by two passages from Augustine. But in place of Rada, who defected from Scotus, I substitute Suarez, who entirely adheres to Scotus at book VIII, chapter 2 — whose words we cited in the preceding section — although he thinks the same opinion is St. Thomas's.

Scotus's position is proved by the exclusion of other opinions. For in the first Person, who is the Father, there is no positive element besides the absolute essence and the relation (we follow here the common opinion with Scotus on the Person constituted through something relative). The essence cannot be the foundation of the Unbegotten, which is notional. Only the relation remains; and within it, although certain inadequate notions can be distinguished by reason — of first principle with respect to the Son and the Holy Spirit, of hypostasis, of the subsistent being — these notions are in reality entirely identical with the formal and actual relation, and therefore cannot in reality produce anything distinct, such as grounding the negation of the Unbegotten, which cannot be separated from the relation of Paternity except by reason. And when so separated, what is taken apart is either absolute or relative: if absolute, the Person itself in the genus of Person includes something absolute, which the adversaries deny; if relative, then it is none other than formal Paternity. Therefore that is the foundation of the Unbegotten, as we hold — or else we arrive at the relation of reason, which Vasquez introduced and which all disapprove, including Scotus himself, whom nothing escapes, who attacks it in *Quodlibet* IV, n. 18, where he says: "Paternity as property — since there is there only a certain relation of reason — will always have the same formal notion of it, and that will be precisely the formal reason for whatever predicate is said of the subject. And so if Paternity as Paternity is a relation, Paternity as property will be a relation. For if 'as' were understood properly as causality, the inherence of a real predicate in the subject — as this is false: 'Paternity as property is a relation to the Son' — so this would be false: 'Paternity as property is a real relation, but thus it is a relation of reason, because what it is to be a property is not the formal reason for the inherence of any real predicate, since it itself formally signifies a relation of reason.' Especially with regard to real constitution outside the mind, no such 'as' is helpful, because what formally constitutes something real must be real as real." Hence this argument is formed: the Unbegotten has a true positive real foundation in the Father. But in the Father we distinguish by reason two things: the hypostasis and the formal relation. Therefore that distinct notion, taken in its concept, is a relation of reason as such; but as such it cannot constitute a real foundation. Therefore the real relation alone as real is the real foundation — an argument Scotus uses against Henry and St. Thomas at *Quodlibet* IV (*Contra eandem*, n. 13) and (*Aliter dicitur*, n. 19).

Then Scotus's position is proved by the best argument: because the Unbegotten, from its concept, directly and formally and relatively is opposed to the Begotten

— as Augustine concludes after a long discussion in book V of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6, at chapter 7, where he finally says: "We must see that what is signified by 'Begotten' is what is signified by 'Son'; hence he is Son because Begotten, and because Son, surely Begotten. What then is 'Unbegotten' if not 'not Son'? But 'Begotten' and 'Unbegotten' are suitably said; 'Son' is said in Latin; but 'not-son' is not admitted by usage. Yet the intellect loses nothing if we say 'not Son,' just as if we say 'not Begotten' instead of 'Unbegotten' we say nothing else." And a little later: "Let us no longer say 'Unbegotten' but instead say 'not Begotten,' which amounts to the same. Therefore we say nothing other than 'not Son.'" And he then shows that both are said relatively, and concludes: "In the same category, which is called the relative, both significations are contained." From this the following apt argument for Scotus's position is formed: the Unbegotten and the Begotten are correlatives. The Begotten formally signifies the Son in the notion of Son. Therefore the Unbegotten also, when taken positively, will formally signify the Father. Therefore the Father as Father is Unbegotten.

Nor should you object that Augustine in that passage takes the Unbegotten negatively — that is, as "not Begotten" — not positively, that is, as Father. For although this is true, it does not harm Scotus's doctrine, because Augustine did not want to take the Unbegotten in a positive sense lest he appear to favor the Arians, who took the Unbegotten in the absolute sense with reference to themselves, not relatively, in order to confirm their heresy — namely, that the Father is the true God and greater than the Son because he was Unbegotten before the Son by substance, prior to being Father by relation. As is plain from chapter 6 of book V of *On the Trinity* by Augustine, where among other things he says they claim the Unbegotten is said absolutely; they argued in this way: "They say: if something is said of the Father with reference to himself, which cannot be said with reference to himself of the Son, and whatever is said of something with reference to itself is said according to substance, and 'Unbegotten' is said of the Father with reference to himself, which cannot be said of the Son, therefore 'Unbegotten' is said according to substance, and since it cannot be said of the Son, he is not of the same substance." He calls this a sophism to which he replies: and so on. He calls this argument a sophism, and in order to refute it Augustine denied that the Unbegotten signifies anything positive, lest the Arians abuse that positive element and turn it into an absolute nature. Hence the objection is turned against Scotus's adversaries. If Augustine denied that the Unbegotten signifies the Father even as Father, lest the Arians thereby seize occasion to claim that that sense pertains to the nature, he would far more strongly deny that the Unbegotten signifies a hypostasis, or a positive property not formally relative from its concept, as Scotus's adversaries say. For from that they would more aptly infer that that positive element pertains to essence and nature, since those authors would add that the Unbegotten in the Father imports a principle and positive dignity. Hence Scotus's position is confirmed, for it takes the term Unbegotten entirely and purely and formally in a relative sense when it is taken

positively. This sense, if Augustine had admitted it, he would not have hesitated to place precisely in the pure and formal relation of the Father.

Indeed, Augustine himself in that same chapter 7, opposing the Generator to the Begotten and the Father to the Son, sufficiently indicates that beyond the negation on the part of the Unbegotten there is no other positive element to be found except Paternity and Generation; for in his view nothing mediates between the essence and Paternity, as Scotus holds. From this it appears that Augustine ought not to have assigned anything positive to the Unbegotten except pure and unmixed Paternity.

SECTION V. One objection drawn from Augustine is resolved and he is shown to agree with Scotus.

A troublesome argument is brought against Scotus's position; it runs as follows. Augustine says in book V of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6: "It is not the same thing to say Unbegotten as to say Father, because even if he had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent him from being called Unbegotten." From this it follows that the foundation of the Unbegotten is not Paternity, as is plain. Therefore Scotus erred in positing formal Paternity as its foundation. For this argument Rada, at Controversy 7, conclusion 5, abandoned Scotus, adducing this passage from chapter 6 and another from chapter 7 of Augustine, which he should not have done, since Scotus fully satisfies this argument in the *Reportata*, I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2, from n. 16, providing a twofold explanation of those testimonies of Augustine.

First, by saying that Augustine spoke conditionally and disputatively against the Arians who took the Unbegotten for substance in the sense just described. And indeed what is set out in the argument is what Augustine proposes in the name of the Arians in that chapter 6. Therefore nothing against Scotus's doctrine is concluded from that testimony, since Augustine is not speaking from his own position. Let us examine Augustine's text. From chapter 3 he proposes the error of the Arians comprised in these words: "Whatever is said of God is said not according to accident but according to substance. Therefore that the Father is Unbegotten is according to substance, and that the Son is Begotten is according to substance. But to be Unbegotten and to be Begotten are different. Therefore the substance of Father and Son is different." To this argument of the Arians, after refuting that error at length, Augustine replies in chapter 5 by distinguishing absolute and relative predicates, and thus concludes that chapter: "Therefore, although to be Father and to be Son is different, the substance is not different; because these are not said according to substance but according to the relative — which relative is not, however, an accident, because it is not mutable."

Then in chapter 6 the Arians rise up and use this argument: "It is not the same thing to say Unbegotten as to say Father, because even if he had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent him from being called Unbegotten." And they add:

"Even if someone begets a Son, he is not for that reason Unbegotten himself, because begotten men beget from other men and themselves beget others." They say: "Therefore the Father is said in relation to the Son, and the Son in relation to the Father. But Unbegotten is said with reference to himself, and Begotten with reference to himself." And they concluded as above: "If whatever is said with reference to itself is said according to substance, and to be Unbegotten and to be Begotten are different, the substance is therefore different." Thus that proposition is put forward by the Arians to prove from it that the Unbegotten is and signifies substance.

Scotus saw this most acutely in the Reportata, I Sentences, d. 28, n. 16:

"Conditionally," he says, "and it is plain that this is not said by Augustine except in recounting the sophisms of the heretics" — and he says "conditionally" three times. I praise and admire Scotus's diligence in reading Augustine. For there is hardly any other author who does not attribute that saying to Augustine and take it as primarily stated and reported by him. Thus this common and less accurate reading misled Rada. This is the first resolution of the argument.

But since not everything the heretics assume is false, and Augustine entirely grants that the Father is not Father because Unbegotten, nor Unbegotten because Father — as we said shortly before, citing passages from chapters 6 and 7 of the same book, which Scotus also notes — there must therefore be another solution, which Scotus gives there at n. 18, saying that this proposition is true: "The Father is not Father by reason of being Unbegotten, nor Unbegotten by reason of being Father" — taking it in the first mode per se, that is, formally, as though the one and the other were the same thing, or as though one were within the formal and essential concept of the other; in which sense it is not true, just as "man is an animal" is true in the first mode per se, but in that sense this proposition is not true. It is, however, true in the second mode per se — that is, as a property and passio arising from its subject, as this is true: "rational because man." Therefore Augustine speaks of the first sense, denying it to be true in the formal and first-mode-per-se sense, not of the second.

And it should be noted that Scotus makes the Father the subject of the Unbegotten, not the Unbegotten of the Father, because he wants the Unbegotten to be a passio with respect to the Father and to follow upon the Father, as the risible arises from man and follows man — in order to declare his position on the Unbegotten, namely that it is founded in the positive element of Paternity.

Allow me, a man formed in Augustinian learning and a disciple of Augustine, to bring from my own store another solution, one that especially corroborates our Scotus's position. Augustine's aim throughout that entire five-chapter argument in book V, from chapter 3 to chapter 8, against the Arians was to undermine the middle term they assumed to prove that the Son is not of the same substance as the Father. That middle term was the Unbegotten, which they made something positive and substantial, arguing thus: "Where there is a different substance

from another, that one cannot be consubstantial with the other. But in the Son there is a different substance from the Father, therefore he is not consubstantial with the Father." The major was certain. They proved the minor by assuming this middle term: "The Unbegotten and the Begotten are of different substance, since one signifies the negation of the other; but the Son is Begotten, the Father Unbegotten; therefore they are of different substance." Augustine denied that the Unbegotten is a substance in reply to this argument. Indeed, he denied it is anything positive. Thereby the Arian middle term entirely collapsed.

He said moreover that the Unbegotten is the negation of the Begotten, and so signifies "not Begotten" or "not Son," and that there is nothing else positive in the Father besides the absolute essence — which was one and the same substance in Father and Son — and the relation of Paternity, which was different from Filiation and so constituted the Father as relatively different from the Son, as Generator from Begotten; while the Unbegotten imports nothing beyond the bare negation of the Begotten. So he wrested from them the middle term as a club from their hands, saying at the end of chapter 6: "When the Father is called Unbegotten, it is not said what he is but what he is not." This was against the Arians, to whom he granted that the Generator is something positive but relative to the Begotten, as the Father to the Son, with the name changed but the sense retained: that those two correlatives exist, mutually respecting each other; and he concluded at chapter 7: "As the Son is to the Father, and not-Son not to the Father, so the Begotten must be referred to the Generator and the Not-Begotten to the Not-Generator." So he overcame the Arians, always retaining the example of the Begotten as positive correlate to the Generator, and said: "As the Begotten is not said with reference to himself but as one who comes from the Generator, so when Unbegotten is said, it is not said with reference to himself but it is shown that he does not come from a Generator."

He therefore never conceded to the Arians that the Unbegotten signifies something positive. Scotus saw this acutely, and I marvel that others did not see it. Hence Augustine did not assume what theologians commonly attribute to him: "Because if he had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent him from being called Unbegotten." Nor the other: "Even if someone begets a Son, he is not for that reason Unbegotten himself." For however that might be the case with respect to a God outside of the Trinity, in God it certainly could not be the case that he would be called Father without generating, and therefore the Father is Unbegotten only because he begot the Son — the kind of Father he could not be otherwise. The reason was that in God there is necessarily a Son, and only one Son, and that Son necessary, and so one Father necessarily and the same Father necessarily not a Son, which is otherwise in creatures, where there can be many Fathers and many Sons. Therefore that connection of Father with Son is not necessary there. And since "Unbegotten" is taken in another and broader sense, a man can be called Unbegotten even if he does not beget a Son, and it is not necessary to beget a Son in order to be Unbegotten. Likewise it is not

necessary to be Unbegotten in order to beget a Son; indeed, no man can be Unbegotten when he begets a Son, except Adam, who alone begot while Unbegotten. All men after him who were begotten begot in their turn. Therefore Augustine ought not and could not use that example, because he was speaking about God, where there was one Only-begotten Son, necessarily begotten by the Father, who could not be begotten by another Father. Hence he entirely ignored that example and assumed the truth of there being one Father and one Son in the Divine realm, where there was a necessary connection of Generator with Begotten, of Father with Son, and of Unbegotten with Not-Begotten.

This discourse responds to the argument made against Scotus by saying: it is indeed true that Augustine made no mention of the Unbegotten in a positive sense, but always placed the Unbegotten in the negative, because he was arguing against the Arians who wanted to take it in a positive sense in order to draw it toward substance. And in this sense the objection works equally against all other theologians who affirm that it signifies something positive in some way. Against these Augustine's authority runs in placing it in a pure and simple negation; and it appears that Augustine himself favors Scotus, in that he so binds the Unbegotten to the Father that he refers both to one and the same category, as he says at chapter 7 of that book V: "Unbegotten, then, what is it but Not-Begotten? Therefore there is no departure from the relative category when 'Unbegotten' is said." From this it is established that Augustine agrees only with Scotus, because Scotus alone founded that negation signified by the name Unbegotten in formal Paternity. For just as Scotus says the Unbegotten presupposes the Father and is founded in the Father, with no other notion considered in the Father — neither of principle, nor of hypostasis, nor of a relation of reason — so Augustine concedes nothing in the Father except the negation of the Begotten, reducing it to the same category of the relation in which Paternity is placed. And so what is said positively as Father is said negatively as Unbegotten. But since negation presupposes affirmation and is founded in its positive element, it follows that the Unbegotten, which is a negation, presupposes the affirmation of Father and is founded in this positive element — which is the genuine and authentic position of Scotus.

SECTION VI. The mind of Scotus on the Unbegotten is shown to be true and fully doctrinal.

I note first that Scotus, by placing the Unbegotten as founded in formal Paternity together with Augustine, made this denomination proper to the Father, so that it can neither be attributed to the essence nor to the Holy Spirit except improperly. For since the Unbegotten is opposed to the Begotten as to a negated form, it belongs only to the Person who can actively give that form, not receive it passively. Therefore, since the Father alone makes and posits, so to speak, that form in a subject, he will properly be called Unbegotten — which does not fit the Holy Spirit or the essence: not the essence, because neither the

essence immediately nor the Holy Spirit in any way is capable of begetting, and so they can only improperly be called Unbegotten. And indeed the essence neither begets nor is begotten nor is produced in any way nor can be, and so it is not only Unbegotten and unproduced but entirely incapable of any personal action and is outside the genus of Person, and most remotely and most improperly can be called Unbegotten and unproduced. But the Holy Spirit, although he is a person whose common notion does not exclude active production — since the Persons Father and Son produce, and the Son is produced by the Father — is nonetheless incapable of the predicate of the Unbegotten, because he is in another order entirely disparate from begetting, since he proceeds through will and the Son is begotten through intellect; the Son is generated naturally, the Holy Spirit proceeds through will — indeed, freely in Scotus's view.

Hence it is most true in that Augustinian position that the proper negation must be reduced to the category of the negated form, just as blindness is reduced to the category of visual action, darkness to the category of luminous quality, and the Unbegotten to the category of the relation of the Son or of the Begotten — so that not only do the relative forms positively oppose each other, but even the negations of the forms oppose each other quasi-relatively. This manner of opposing is aptly suited to declaring the proper negative and indeed privative opposition. Other affirmations of negations are inapt and disparate — as when we say "spirit is non-luminous, non-colored, non-sonorous, non-flavored." These affirmations of negations are indeed true, but they are disparate and inapt, differing from spirit by the whole of heaven and by the entire category. So it stands with this negation of the Unbegotten when applied to the essence or to the Holy Spirit, who, though a person, has nothing in common with generation or the Begotten, from which he is entirely alien, being in a different line — that of will. Hence the Unbegotten cannot properly be predicated of him. And indeed Scotus rarely mentions the Holy Spirit when dealing with the Unbegotten, because he saw that term properly belongs only to the Father.

It is indeed true that in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2 (*In proposita*, n. 5) he says in the middle that the Unbegotten, insofar as it signifies the lack of what is properly signified by "Begotten," belongs to the Holy Spirit because he is not Begotten. But note that he calls it only a lack — a vague and extraneous word. Hence he always applies the Unbegotten to the Father properly and correlatively to the Son, together with Augustine, as we noted above. Let us cite some passages from Scotus. In I Sentences, d. 26, q. 2, n. 7: "It seems we should say that the Unbegotten under its proper notion of 'In,' as it signifies not having a Begetter, is a property of the Father." In the Reportata, I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2 (*Respondeo*, n. 13): "Because the Father," he says, "is Father by Paternity, he is therefore Unbegotten." And there he calls the Unbegotten a *passio* of the Father, and compares it to the risible with respect to the animal, at nn. 12 and 18, where at

the end he says: "the negation conveyed by the Unbegotten follows upon that affirmative notion in the Father as a property follows its subject."

I note, second, that since Inspirability as well as Innascibility is found in the Father, yet "Inspired" with respect to the Holy Spirit is not formed in the Father as "Unbegotten" is formed with respect to the Son — which could be objected against Augustine and Scotus, who called only the Unbegotten a property of the Father — the reason is that the power of spirating is not the proper constitutive notion of the Father, because the Father is already presupposed constituted prior to it, and furthermore it is common to the Son who spirates the Holy Spirit together with the Father. Scotus presents this perspicuously and precisely in *Quodlibet* IV (*Iuxta illud*, formal part, n. 4): "According to the common opinion, nothing can be incommunicable there except a property pertaining to origin; and consequently in the first Person there is nothing incommunicable except the sole property pertaining to the first origin. For what pertains to the second origin is communicable, because it belongs to two producing Persons; but what pertains to the first active production is opposed to what pertains to the first passive; for as the Son has the first property pertaining to being generated or expressed, so the Father has the first incommunicable property pertaining to expressing or begetting, because it belongs to the Father insofar as he has a fecund intellect, which intellect is the first productive notion in the Father."

Then there is another reason: if the Father were to include the Inspired as a peculiar and constitutive notion, he would then not be a single suppositum but a double one — a reason used by Scotus in the same *Quodlibet* IV (*Contra secundum*, n. 8). Nor can you say it includes some notion abstracted from both — Paternity and Spiration — for accepting this, from it would arise a Person different from the one that now exists, as he there argues against fontal plenitude.

Furthermore, that Inspirability cannot pertain to the Unbegotten, because it does not indicate or connote the formal nature that the Father formally contains and communicates to the begotten Son through fecund intellect — which is natural production and production in the mode of nature, with respect to which the Unbegotten is said relatively to the Begotten — which does not fit the Inspired, whose term indicates and connotes the Spirator through will, a procession that is not of nature or in the mode of nature, and therefore does not pertain to the Begotten or to the Unbegotten, as we said above when dealing with the procession of the Holy Spirit and comparing it with the production of the Son through intellect and in the mode of nature, which the procession of the Holy Spirit is not, as is established in the schools.

Finally, that Inspirability follows upon the Unbegotten, which is prior in origin to the Inspired; and therefore it cannot include the notion of the Unbegotten, nor even stand concomitantly with it, in terms of origin. Therefore the sole relation of Paternity founds the Unbegotten, and not the relation of active

spiration, which, presupposing the Begotten and the Son, is entirely outside the notion of the Unbegotten.

From this it is gathered that the Unbegotten is the proper and genuine notion of the Father as Father. For if the Unbegotten belonged also to the Holy Spirit, it would not be the Father's proper notion but one common with the notion of the Holy Spirit — which no one among either the Fathers or the Scholastics ever dared to say. And this is worthy of note, for not even the Arians themselves, who disputed at length and in various ways about the Unbegotten, attributed the Unbegotten to the Holy Spirit — as is plain in that subtle disputation in Augustine, cited by us repeatedly from chapter 3 to chapter 8 of book V of *On the Trinity*. They always held tenaciously to the Unbegotten and the Father, as though that notion, whatever it might be, was dedicated to the Father alone; and Augustine constantly maintained that same sense, so that neither he nor others attributed the Unbegotten to any one but the Father.

For them, therefore, to be Unbegotten and to be Father were equivalent; and they were so persuaded of this that it did not even occur to them to transfer it in any way to the Holy Spirit. And while the Arians babbled much about this Unbegotten with regard to the Father, there was profound silence among them about the Holy Spirit. Let it therefore stand that the Unbegotten is the proper and genuine notion of the Father alone — for this reason Scotus concluded in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2 (*Ad ultimum*): "This term properly and primarily belongs to the Father." Understand: primarily with respect to the Inspired, which does not belong to the Father either properly or primarily; not properly, because it also belongs to the Son; not primarily, because the Inspired presupposes the Unbegotten, which introduces the natural notion and is attributed to the Father through the generation of nature proper to the Father, while the Inspired is not a denomination drawn from nature but one that follows it, drawn from will, which is neither nature nor operates in the mode of nature.

And in the same manner Augustine refutes Felix, likewise an Arian, in the disputation held with him, which is found in volume six of Augustine's works. Nor does it matter that Augustine acknowledges only the negation of the Begotten and admits nothing positive, while Scotus, beyond the negation, also admits a positive foundation — because Augustine did not explicitly treat the foundation of the negation: rather, he assumed it, namely the relative Father exclusively, with substance excluded; and in this Scotus did not deviate from him, for he placed the foundation of the negative Unbegotten in a pure and relative concept, with all absolute notion excluded, retaining formal Paternity — which, as we have seen, was Augustine's aim: to cut off all occasion of error from the Arians, who from every direction seized upon it to introduce a diversity of substance between Father and Son, making the Father a greater God than the Son. For this too was an Arian error: making the Son a God lesser than the Father, as is plain in Augustine's disputation against Maximinus, who from the

name of the Unbegotten — which he wanted to signify something positive and substantial — argued that the Son is a lesser God than the Father, and consequently deprived the Son of the Godhead by removing consubstantiality of nature. In order that Augustine might avert this heresy, he always denied to Maximinus the positive and substantial signification of the Unbegotten and reduced it to a negation, as appears in those books, especially books I and II, where Maximinus frequently intrudes that erroneous signification of the Unbegotten, which Augustine stubbornly and constantly denies throughout.

SECTION VII. Whether Scotus rightly attacks the arguments of St. Thomas by which he proves that there cannot be two Unbegotten or Innascible beings.

At the beginning of this question we proposed the difference between the Angelic and the Subtle Doctor on this point, together with Cajetan's complaint about Scotus. Let us now inquire into the cause of Scotus's difference from St. Thomas; and once the cause has been examined, it will appear whether Cajetan's complaint about Scotus is justified or not.

In Part I, q. 33, a. 4 of the Angelic Doctor, there is a fourth argument against the Unbegotten as a notion of the Father, to prove it is not a proper notion — which runs as follows: "What is proper is what belongs to one alone. But since there are several in the Divine realm who proceed from another, nothing seems to prevent there also being several who do not exist from another." To this argument St. Thomas replies by denying the assumption, as we said in Section I, for two reasons. First, because to posit two Innascible beings is to posit two Gods, on the authority of Hilary. Second, because if these two were given, they could not be distinct, since they would not be opposed by relative opposition; and so, if they were distinguished, they would be distinguished by diversity of nature, and there would be several Gods. Hence the two arguments seem reducible to one: namely, that there would be several Gods.

Cajetan, however, makes them two, saying in his commentary (*In responsione ad quartum*): "Scotus criticizes this second argument in I Sentences, d. 2, q. 6," as we spoke of above. Scotus at I Sentences, d. 2, q. 7, n. 6, as Cajetan cites, attacks both arguments in this way: "They do not seem sufficient. The first is not, because the unity of God is proved from the fact that the Divine Infinity is not divided into several essences. But it is not so manifest that the notion of the Unbegotten or Innascible cannot be in several supposita: first, because the notion of the Innascible does not express some perfection in the simple sense, from which perfection in the simple sense the unity of the Innascible could be concluded, as from infinite perfection the unity of the Divine essence is concluded."

Let us pause here. This argument seems most true to Scotus, nor does St. Thomas's argument prove the consequence: that several Unbegotten beings entail several Gods. This is plain: because the Unbegotten is something personal, to which multiplicity is not repugnant, as appears from the plurality of Persons,

which stands with the unity of essence. Therefore multiplication of the essence does not follow from the plurality of a personal predicate. The Unbegotten is such. Therefore from its multiplication the multiplication of the Godhead does not follow. A thoroughly sound proof. The principle of which is drawn by Scotus from a higher source. The unity of the Divine essence is proved from the fact that it is simply infinite, and therefore does not admit diversity and plurality, since it contains all things in itself and embraces them in that infinity, nor can anything be thought or conceived that it does not contain. Therefore it is one because it is all things. But personality is not simply infinite, nor even in any way infinite or perfect: from which it follows that it can admit another personality, which it neither includes nor comprehends. I add: the essence is so one by reason of its infinity that it provides unity of essence to really distinct Persons — so that, although these are formally opposed to each other, they are united in the essence — and therefore even if there were infinite Persons, really different among themselves, the essence would not thereby be multiplied; indeed it would always remain one by reason of its infinity. Hence it appears that from a plurality of Innascible Persons the Godhead would not be multiplied and diversified; indeed it would always be one, however many Persons might be multiplied, since that nature is simply infinite and contains all things in its unity.

Scotus proceeds to attack the middle of the second argument insofar as it assumes that several absolute persons cannot exist in the same nature. "How," he says, "is this more known than the conclusion? For whoever would posit several persons would not say they are constituted by some relations; therefore to take against him that there cannot be several absolute persons does not seem to take something more manifest than the conclusion." You wish to prove, says Scotus, that there cannot be two Innascible beings, and you take as middle term that they cannot be absolute, to convince me who says they can be several. But that middle term is not better known than the conclusion. For the conclusion is: "they are not distinct unless one arises from another according to the notion of producer and produced." But the middle term is: "there cannot be several absolutes." This middle is more difficult and obscure than that conclusion. This is plain because this is not a self-evident principle: "If supposita are absolute, they are entirely the same" — since Ripa denies it and denies it probably, as we showed above. Therefore that middle — "absolutes cannot be distinct" — does not evidently entail that conclusion: "they will only be distinct relatively by opposed relations."

Scotus then proceeds to undermine the other part of St. Thomas's second argument, which assumes that these two unproduced beings are impossible, namely because real distinction in God is entirely founded in mutual relative opposition of producer and produced. These two unproduced beings cannot be two because they cannot be different, with the distinguishing principle removed. From this principle St. Thomas and his school deduce that the Holy Spirit, if he did not proceed from the Son, would not be distinguished from him — as we

saw in the preceding Distinction. But Scotus does not admit this principle, says it needed to be proved rather than assumed as certain, and since it is uncertain, it does not serve the conclusion, which is not proved by this argument.

How Cajetan can say this attack arose from passion in Scotus I truly do not see, since that Thomistic doctrine does not hold in the Scotistic school, which affirms that the Holy Spirit, if he did not proceed from the Son, would still be distinguished from him. Therefore St. Thomas's arguments do not satisfy Scotus. But lest Scotus seem, by attacking the arguments, to deny the thing — affirming that there can be two unproduced beings — with his own fresh arguments he proves them to be impossible, arguments which are indeed excellent.

The first: because if there could be two unproduced beings in God, of necessity there would be infinitely many unproduced beings, which is absurd. The consequence is proved: because when the producing agent is of infinite power and the produced is something indeterminable and capable of infinite number, and both are necessary, there must be infinite products, so that that infinite and necessary productive power may exercise its fecund necessity. But the Divine nature is necessarily infinitely fecund, and the unproduced, if it could be doubled, would not be determinate but indeterminate; therefore it would necessarily be infinitely multipliable to correspond to the infinity of the producing agent.

The second: because there is no necessity to posit two Unbegotten or two Innascible beings; therefore there is only one. For in God nothing ad intra exists except what is necessary.

The third: because one actually existing essence from itself and immediately does not seem to have several modes of existing. But if there were several Innascible supposita, it would have different modes, because it would be otherwise in one and otherwise in another from natural requirement, which is repugnant to unity. Nor should you object that two produced persons exist, therefore also unproduced; for the parallel is denied. For produced ones can be two and must be two because of the diversity of the proximate formal principle — intellect and will — of which the former produces in the mode of nature, the latter in the mode of freedom. But the Unbegotten or unproduced emanates immediately from the essence, which, being absolutely one in that genus, cannot have different modes of existing in the first and immediate producer, to whom it is communicated per se and primarily as it is one. Hence it appears that Scotus's argument is apt and effective; and this argument seems to be a priori.

The objection is raised against Scotus from the authority of Hilary cited by St. Thomas and Henry: "Since there is one God, there cannot be two Innascible beings." To this Scotus himself replies at I Sentences, d. 2, q. 7 (*Contra*, n. 35): "The authority of Hilary says that it is so, but does not prove it to be so." Take

this as follows: it is indeed so in fact and in faith, and we believe there is only one Innascible being; but by what reason this is proved we do not see, and this is what needs proving. Hence Hilary's saying is believed by itself; the second point — the reason — is not proved by it, pertains to metaphysical argument, which Hilary was not treating. So, acknowledging the truth of the thing, Scotus asks for the proof.

Lychetus resolves it in a different and freer way: "It is not enough to say it unless one proves it. Therefore a place from authority is weak, and especially when the doctrine of some Doctor is not entirely approved by the Church, so that whoever contradicts it in fact contradicts the determination of the Church." I do not much approve of this solution of Lychetus; it is too free and less conformable to Scotus's modesty, who is most observant of the holy Fathers, especially Hilary, whose authority is great in the matter of the Trinity. Therefore his doctrine should not be absolutely denied, but the reason for it should be examined. Nor did Scotus deny the doctrine, but made a qualification, as though distinguishing a matter of faith from a doctrine of the school, and saying it is so in keeping with faith — but asking for the argument suited to the purposes of the school.

SECTION VIII. Whether Inspirability is a sixth notion, and what Scotus thinks of it.

Scotus raises this question in this article, n. 9, replying to the third argument, and in the Reportata on the same distinction, q. 4 (*Sed hic est dubium*, from n. 3 to the end). St. Thomas says nothing special about it in the parts. He only denies in q. 32, a. 3, that there are more than five notions, and in q. 36, a. 4, reply to the fifth, says: "The property of the Father insofar as he is not from another is more signified by the removal of the nativity of the Son than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Spirit." And he adds that from not being Begotten it follows that he is not proceeding. He speaks more distinctly in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1, where he puts a fourth argument for the notion of the Improceivable or Inspirable — so called, as the Unbegotten is so called — and in replying to this argument denies the parallel.

Scotus agrees with St. Thomas on this question in that he absolutely affirms the Inspirable to be a notion, just as the Unbegotten is. But he differs in not entirely agreeing on the reasons for denying it, and so admits a count of six notions and does not think this is incongruous; yet he does not hold it firmly, but if someone affirms it he does not criticize them. I will show both points.

First, that Scotus does not hold it absolutely. For to the third argument seeking to introduce it, put forward at n. 1 of I Sentences, d. 28, q. 5, which ran as follows: "If Innascibility were a property of the Father, then Inspirability would be a notion of the Father and Son, and thus there would be six notions, which is commonly denied," Scotus replies below at nn. 9 to 13: "It is said that the

Inspirable does not express any dignity, as the Unbegotten does; therefore it is not a notion." But this argument does not satisfy Scotus, and he rejects it, because a notion does not import dignity. Hence he brings a different argument, which he finds more acceptable: "It can be said differently that the Unbegotten means 'not produced,' and in this way the Inspirable, because it is contained in it, is not a different notion from it: for 'not produced' follows; therefore 'not Inspired.'" But he does not entirely approve even this second argument. For he immediately objects: "Against this: Ingenerateness is only in the Father; Inspiration, however, is in the Father and Son; therefore this notion is not that one." And he adds as though distrusting the solutions offered: "But if this consequence must be conceded, there will be six notions, unless another reason is assigned why Inspiration is not a notion." From this it appears that Scotus allowed and tolerated that sixth notion; and this was the second thing I undertook to show, appearing more clearly still because he adds: "If it seems absurd to posit six notions, because they are not commonly posited in such number, one could say that the argument from authority does not hold negatively." So Scotus in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2, at the cited number.

Hence certain Thomists and other commentators on St. Thomas, reading these things, thought Scotus conceded Inspirability to be a true notion and posited six. To these I add that Scotus brought those solutions forward in the name of others — indeed, as I suspect, in the name of St. Thomas, from whose doctrine they are drawn, because St. Thomas wants the Unbegotten to be a dignity while Inspirability is not — which is Scotus's first argument at reply to the third, where he says "it is said," not "I say," and there rejects it, thereby indicating he is not saying it. And likewise the Holy Doctor at the place I just cited, Part I, q. 36, a. 4, reply to the fifth, says that Inspirability follows Innascibility, which was the second response — where also in Scotus we find "it can be said differently," not appropriating the response to himself.

Therefore, in disapproving those solutions, Scotus seems to accept the opinion of a new and sixth notion called Inspirability; and thus those Thomists attribute it to him. Among them is Vasquez at Disputation 137, c. 1, where he says: "Scotus does not hesitate to assign a sixth notion to the Son, which he calls Inspirability." He cites the place I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1, reply to the second; and Suarez at book V, chapter 10, n. 7: "Scotus posits a sixth notion in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 1." Cajetan, however, and Javelli understood this better in their commentary on Part I, q. 32, a. 3. Of them, Javelli says: "Scotus seems to lean toward the affirmative," and Cajetan in his commentaries — on this question — says: "Scotus as if wishing to introduce a sixth notion does not dare, however, to oppose himself against the torrent of Doctors." John of St. Thomas, speaking of Scotus, raises a scruple for him but does not attribute the opinion to him with regard to Part I, q. 32, commentary on St. Thomas. Among our own, Rada at Controversy 25, a. 3, (*Probat*, n. 1) seems first to attribute this opinion to Scotus. But then at conclusion III he expressly says: "The Subtle Doctor does not hold absolutely

that Inspirability is a sixth notion, but with qualification." Cavellus in his Scholia on the Reportata, d. 28, q. un., at n. 3, "seems to wish," he says, "that it is not." Lychetus has nothing at this place. He only says the rest is plain.

What Scotus thinks I will state clearly. And first I admonish Father Vasquez that Scotus, when treating Inspirability, spoke not of the Son alone but of both the Father and the Son, as is plain from the text at I Sentences, d. 28, q. 2 (*Ad tertium*, n. 9). Having warned Vasquez, I proceed to the question. I am astonished that these authors did not read Scotus's Reportata but, content only with the doctrine in book I of the Sentences — the Oxford writings — judged Scotus's meaning from those alone. Having consulted both places, Scotus's meaning has become clear to me. In the Oxford writings at the cited place, I Sentences, d. 28, Scotus suspended his judgment and remained undecided until better arguments should arise. He only noted that the multiplied number of six notions is safe in the faith — and rightly so, for nothing is against a definition — and that if ratio is consulted it is difficult to find a disparity between the Unbegotten and the Inspirable.

This appears from Father Vasquez at that Disputation 137, where he sets out many opinions of the Thomists, disapproves all of them, brings forward his own opinion, which is assuredly not better than those he had refuted. Goaded by that scruple — to speak with the Lisbon Thomist John of St. Thomas, an eminent theologian of distinguished name whom I knew as a youth at Alcalá — as by a spur stinging the mind, Scotus strove to find a new argument which he would ultimately embrace to pull it out. And having found it in the Reportata, he laid down his doubt and formed a firm opinion. I read Scotus diligently, and read him in the spirit of one who suspected I would discover something new by which to free Scotus from calumny. Wherefore, going there all the more eagerly, having attained my wish, I congratulated myself on my suspicion. Therefore Scotus there, in the common opinion, holds that Inspirability with respect to the Father and Son is not a sixth notion, adducing a new and proper reason. Let the reader listen. I Sentences, d. 28, q. 4 (*Ad hoc etiam respondeo*, n. 3, holding to the common opinion that there are only five notions): "It can be said that Inspirativeness is not a notion." Do not waver when you hear "it can be said" — continue to the paragraph and read the argument through to (*Ex hoc sequitur propositum*, n. 5) and you will be fully confirmed. For there: "From this it follows as proposed: that Inspirativeness is not a notion." And at the end he says: "Therefore Inspirativeness cannot be a notion in the Father and the Son." And finally, having resolved all objections at n. 3 in this manner: "Therefore to that doubt: Inspirativeness is not a notion." Here Scotus's meaning is clear, without scruple or cloud of ambiguity. This is the fruit of my diligence that I gathered. I confess, however, that Scotus did not depart from himself: for he retained the former opinion of the Oxford writings as is plain at n. 3, and likewise accommodated himself to the common view.

Let us examine the argument carefully — it deserves consideration, since it persuaded Scotus to defend what seemed difficult. I reduce to a summary what is set out at length. The disparity to be assigned is as follows. Innascibility in the Father follows upon the positive property of the Father by which he is constituted as Father in personal being. But not so Inspirativeness, which precedes the actual spiration of the spirating Father and Son. Hence it follows that the negation of the Begotten, which must be founded in something positive, is posterior to the Father; whereas the negation of the Spirated, which precedes rather than follows the notion of spirating in the Father and Son, is found antecedently in the Person of the Father and Son as Inspirative. In one word: the Father and Son are per se Inspirable prior to spirating the Holy Spirit; therefore they cannot be denominated Inspirable from the Holy Spirit.

This is most true. But the reason for the consequence is not apparent: why from this it follows that Inspirativeness cannot be a notion. The consequence is proved in this way: a notion is found in order to distinguish the Persons; but the Persons of the Father and Son are already constituted in their being and distinguished, nor do they receive anything new from the Spirated, since they already have in themselves the spirating power; therefore they cannot receive from the Spirated a notion that precedes in them.

Then Scotus posits an excellent principle: when one of two opposites is a property with dignity, the other lacks dignity. But the procession of the Holy Spirit from the spirator actively is a dignity in the Holy Spirit; therefore it cannot be a dignity in the opposed spirator. Nor should you object that the Begotten in the Son is a dignity, which in its opposite the Unbegotten admits perfection — because I reply that the Father expresses dignity not precisely because he is opposed to the Begotten, but because he is opposed to the Begotten as to the produced; and therefore as unproduced he has dignity. This is confirmed because in the precise negation of the Begotten even the Holy Spirit is Unbegotten. Hence Innascibility, says Scotus at n. 6 toward the end, "is opposed to every procession from another, and so is a notion of the Father with dignity." So Scotus there, and he concludes that Inspirativeness is not a proper notion, and every scruple — both one's own and others' — is removed.

I add to these arguments another thought out by me in accordance with Scotus's mind. A notion is immediately grounded in the relation which is the distinguishing and properly notional reason, as is plain in the Innascible and Unbegotten. But that Inspirativeness is not immediately grounded in the relations of the Father and Son, but in the power of spirating, which is common to both, through which they both spirate not divided but united. Hence those two Spirating ones coalesce into one Spirator. Therefore it is not a fitting foundation for a notion, because it is not a distinguishing but rather a uniting reason — so much so that it unites two really distinct Persons among themselves. Nor can you say that with respect to the Holy Spirit they are diverse,

because this diversity is not immediate, nor is it true opposition of relations between which the spirating power intervenes as intermediary — a power that is not a person but is in the Persons.

To this may be added that the notion of the Unbegotten arises immediately from Paternity directly, formally, and relatively opposed to Filiation, through which primarily the Person of the Father is both constituted and distinguished. But that active spiration of the Father and Son presupposes them constituted in the notion of Persons — that is, completely notionally — from which they cannot newly be distinguished and identified by what in no way constitutes them. For if — per impossibile — the Father and Son did not spirate, they would still be Father and Son, really distinct one from the other; and so affected by these notions: the Son Begotten, the Father Unbegotten.

This argument seems to me apt — if my judgment does not deceive me — for drawing a sufficient distinction between Innascibility with respect to the Son in the Father, and Inspirativeness in the Father and Son with respect to the Holy Spirit. Since therefore we have found a suitable argument to deny that notion, it must be entirely removed, and so the sixth notion is to be rejected.

JUDGMENT.

In this lengthy question, I believe we have omitted nothing of our duty. We have compared the opinions of St. Thomas and Scotus, collated the passages, examined in what they agree and how they differ, established Scotus's opinion on the constitution of the Unbegotten through a negative notion, and referred it to the mind of St. Augustine — whom Scotus always rightly understands and faithfully expounds. With him Scotus agrees completely in the doctrine of the Unbegotten: namely, in that the Father as Father founds the negation of the Begotten, that is, the Unbegotten — so as to remove from the Arians every occasion of error. For the Arians situated the Unbegotten in substance, not in the relative — in the order of nature between Father and Son — so that the Father as greater God would be greater than the Son. For this too was the error of the Arians: making the Son a God lesser than the Father, as is plain in Augustine's disputation against Maximinus, who from the name of the Unbegotten — which he wanted to signify something positive and substantial — argued that the Son is a lesser God than the Father, and consequently removed from the Son the Godhead by taking away the consubstantiality of nature. That Augustine might avert this heresy, he always denied Maximinus the positive and substantial signification of the Unbegotten, and reduced it to negation, as appears in those books, especially books I and II, where Maximinus frequently introduces that erroneous signification of the Unbegotten, which Augustine stubbornly and constantly denies throughout.

COLLATION VIII. DISTINCTION IV. On the Order, Identity, Equality, and Similarity of the Divine Persons.

Referring to Question 42 of the First Part, and to I Sentences, d. 12, a. 1 and d. 20, a. 3 of St. Thomas; and of Scotus in I Sentences, d. 12, qq. 1 and 2; in II Sentences, d. 1, q. 1; and in Quodlibet IV, n. 14.

SECTION I. Whether, and to what extent, there is order in the Divine realm.

I join these two questions together because they are connected and can be treated more expeditiously together. Let us begin with order. Both Doctors admit order, and both situate it in origin; but St. Thomas excludes all priority, while Scotus admits and proves it.

St. Thomas says at q. 42, a. 3, Part I, in the body: "We must say that order is always spoken of in relation to some principle. Hence, just as principle is said in many ways — according to place, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of a demonstration; and according to each of the causes — so also is order. In the Divine realm, principle is spoken of according to origin without priority, as was said above. Therefore there must be order according to origin without priority." Cited in the margin is q. 33, a. 1, reply to the third, where he says: "Although the name 'principle' seems, as regards what it is imposed to signify, to have been taken from priority, it does not however signify priority but origin." He says the same in the places cited above in I Sentences, which need not be repeated.

Scotus, on the contrary, says thus in I Sentences, d. 12, q. 2 (*Respondeo*, n. 2): "Of these orders — whether of origin or of nature — and of the many orders of priority and posteriority, it is said elsewhere." In that second work, which Scotus himself points us to, the matter is accurately treated in II Sentences, d. 1, q. 1 (*Quantum ad hoc*, from n. 13 to n. 20). But more clearly, on my authority, in *Quodlibet* IV at the beginning, where he distinguishes between the order of origin and of nature, and says that simultaneity of nature can stand with priority of origin — a priority he calls order at nn. 3 and 4 — and again at n. 6 calls them "signs of origins," lest anyone think that priority introduces something posterior in nature. Thus at n. 3: "The simultaneity opposed to essential order can stand with the order of origin." Then: "The order of nature or essential order necessarily includes imperfection in one of the extremes — namely in the posterior. But the order of origin requires only that this be from this; and this being from this does not necessarily include that the proceeding is more imperfect in nature than that from which it proceeds." He pursues this doctrine throughout that whole question, and Lychetus expounds it there. He places the same order of priority in *Quodlibet* VIII, n. 18.

Hence that position of the first question, I Sentences, d. 12, q. 1, n. 2: "The Father possesses, prior in origin, the act of fecundity of intellect than of will. In that

prior moment the same fecundity which is in the Father is communicated to the Son." And he then calls these priorities "signs of origins" at the same number. Nor is it necessary to cite more passages, since the vocabulary of prior and posterior in origin frequently occurs in Scotus wherever he treats the Trinity.

Therefore it is established that St. Thomas and Scotus agree in positing order in the Divine realm, and both call it of origin; but they differ in that St. Thomas excludes the vocabulary of prior and posterior while Scotus admits it. They therefore agree on the thing and disagree about the terms. This question might seem to someone of little moment, since it concerns a word. But how great the importance of words in the mystery of the Trinity appears in many questions excited over words, of which the schools of theology are full. This present one is therefore not to be despised, on which the Thomists agree with their Angelic master and the Scotists with their Subtle one.

Among others, agreeing with the Angelic Doctor: Bonaventure in I Sentences, d. 2, a. 2, qq. 1 and 2; Durand in I Sentences, d. 20, q. 2. Agreeing with the Subtle: Gregory and Gabriel in I Sentences, d. 19; Marsilius, q. 13, a. 2; Aegidius of Lisbon in *On Beatitude*, book V, q. 14, a. 4; Vasquez at Part I, Disputation 167, c. 2; Suarez in *Metaphysics*, Disputation 22, Section 1; Amicus in his course of philosophy, vol. I, Disputation 22, Section 1. And what is more remarkable: two perpetual followers of St. Thomas — Zumel at Part I, q. 42, a. 3 — and Torres, called the Canarian.

Cajetan is subtle, and subtler still when arguing against the subtle Scotus, against whom he often brandishes his acumen. At this place in his commentary on Part I, q. 42, a. 3, he wants to deter us from the vocabulary of priority of origin by raising the objection of the authority of the holy Doctors who, as he says, did not use these terms; and as though the Scotists were using them, he warns them to hold the opinion but restrain their tongue.

We are not so obtuse as not to see what Cajetan is doing: since he cannot overcome us with argument, he wants to remove us from arguing by raising the scruple of religion, lest we overcome him with arguments. Let us first set aside the scruple and strip away the pretense made from it. The holy Fathers said something more about the Divine Persons than "prior" and "posterior" in origin. Therefore we are not afraid to say what is less and milder. The assumption is plain: because the Fathers said "Cause" and "Caused," attributing the name of Cause to the Father and of Caused to the Son, and yet said it without danger. Thus Basil in books I, III, and IV of *Against Eunomius*; Nazianzen in the oration on the constitution of bishops, which is Oration XXIX; Gregory of Nyssa in the short work titled *That We Must Not Say There Are Three Gods*; Chrysostom in homily II on chapter I of John, volume III — whom St. Thomas alone cites in I Sentences, d. 29, q. 1, a. 1, reply to the second; Damascene in *On the Faith*, chapter 8; Theophylact on chapter I of I Corinthians, chapter 8 and 11 — and the same St. Thomas observed this in his work *Against the Errors of the Greeks*, and

Bessarion acknowledges it in his oration for union, final session of the Council of Florence. Indeed even John the Dominican, a distinguished theologian in the debate with the Greeks in that same council, used those names; and although Cyril abstained from that term in his letter to Hermias, he did not condemn it.

As for the claim that only the Greeks used it, argued from the example of Hilary who denies in book IV of *On the Trinity* that the Father is the cause of the Son — this did not deter Augustine from saying at *Book LXXXIII, Questions*, question 16: "God is the cause of eternal wisdom," and at book VII of *On the Trinity*, chapter 1: "What is to God the cause of being, is also the cause of being wise." Moreover, divine Jerome, in his commentary on the letter to the Ephesians, said that God is the origin and cause of his subsistence. To these should be added Richard of St. Victor, who in book V of *On the Trinity* did not hesitate to introduce this vocabulary at chapter 7 into the Trinity. Furthermore the word "author" is, I think, harsher than the word "prior in origin." Yet Hilary calls the Father the author of the Son in book IV of *On the Trinity* — as the Master reports at I Sentences, d. 29, without disapproving — and St. Thomas, commenting on the Master in that distinction, approves it at the end by saying: "The name 'author' adds over 'principle' the fact of not being from another; and therefore only the Father is called Author." Cajetan and the Canarian heard this word in Part I, q. 33, a. 4, and because it was their teacher's, they bore it and approved the sense. If Scotus had said it, I suspect the Thomists would not have borne it. Let them therefore bear "the Father is prior in origin to the Son" when they tolerate "author" — and let them not frighten us, as Cajetan does, by saying that word "prior" is unaccustomed among the Fathers, when it is far gentler than "author" and "cause," which the Fathers did not fear to use: especially since Scotus always appends "of origin," so that he does not place it absolutely and alone, but introduces it softened by that addition.

And indeed this origin makes the Father called the first, the Son the second, the Holy Spirit the third Person — numbers that involve priority and posteriority. It also makes the Father called "principle without principle," the Son "principle from a principle." It makes the Son called the middle between the Father and the Holy Spirit by Basil and Epiphanius — which John of St. Thomas acknowledges at Disputation 16, a. 4. It even caused certain Greek Fathers to think that in that sense the Father could be called greater than the Son, from the text of John 14: "The Father is greater than I." Namely Nazianzen in Oration XXXV — that is, the third on Theology — Basil in book IV of *Against Eunomius*, Damascene in book I of *On the Faith*, chapter 4, and others, whom we cited in our schools of positive theology, School 1, on *The Word of God*, chapter 4. Among whom we numbered Athanasius in Oration II against the Arians, who did not shrink from admitting that the Father is greater, not in nature but in property — that is, in origin — on which the reader may consult Maldonatus in his commentary on that place.

I say these things not because I approve all those modes of speaking — indeed in that place I cited I criticized Clichtoveus on chapter 1 of book I of *On the Faith* of Damascene, who admits in the Father a greater perfection on account of this principle of origin, since others who take their origin from him, as he says, take it from him. But I say them to refute the art of Cajetan and some Thomists with him, who form and raise that scruple to dissuade us from the opinion of priority, while those Fathers whom Cajetan cited said far more. What do we say that the Fathers did not say? Let us hear Basil in book I of *Against Eunomius*, past the middle: "In these we say that the cause is prior, and that which is from it is posterior." He designates the Father as cause in the Greek manner and the Son as "what is from him," and calls the former prior and the latter posterior; and the truth of the passage cannot be denied when he adds: "We do not separate these one from the other by interval, but conceive the cause as prior to the caused in thought. For the word 'interval' signifies a duration of time, which there is none; but the word 'thought' does not remove priority but removes duration." Hence he immediately adds: "By what pact therefore is it reasonable to deny order in those things in which there is prior and posterior — not by our positing but by a certain natural consequence?" This is a just argument for Scotus against St. Thomas. Where there is order, there is prior and posterior; but if there is no prior and posterior there is no order: therefore whoever removes prior and posterior removes order. But St. Thomas denies prior and posterior; therefore he is also required to deny order.

John of St. Thomas saw this testimony at Disputation 16, n. 10, cited by Father Vasquez along with others from Nazianzen and Epiphanius, and denies that it is understood of prior and posterior, saying that the Fathers spoke of numerical order, saying that the Son is middle between the Persons. That may be true of Nazianzen and Epiphanius; but I deny it of Basil, who expressly, as is plain, names prior and posterior in the order of origin, and from natural consequence concludes that priority and posteriority in the order of origin. Now how great the authority of Basil is, let him discover from that other John the Theologian in the Council of Florence, who convinced the Greeks chiefly by his testimony; and therefore in this matter we should believe Basil, whom those two great theologians, disciples of Augustine — Richard and Hugo of St. Victor — followed: the former at book I of *On the Trinity*, chapter 7, where he says: "What cannot be prior temporally can be prior causally." Richard savors of the Greek manner. Hugo speaks more clearly and mildly at book VI of *On the Trinity*: "By prior and posterior here we wish to understand not the succession of time but the order of nature or of origin."

Concerning the master of both — Augustine — two distinguished Scotists, Rada and Mastrius, assert and cite him from the book *On the Triple Dwelling*; but that is not Augustine but another pious author, who did not deceive Vasquez, a vigilant man, who cites him in this way: "The author also of the book on the triple dwelling that is among Augustine's works." So Vasquez at that Disputation

167, c. 2, n. 7 — and rightly so, since those are not Augustine's words. But because they are from an ancient and pious author, he deserved to be thought Augustine; I want to cite them and add his weight to Scotus: "What difference is there between being born, which pertains to the Son, and proceeding, which pertains to the Holy Spirit, except that the one was born from one and the other proceeded from two? And how the Father did not precede the Son in time, but in origin; nor the Holy Spirit."

I frankly acknowledge that I do not find in Augustine words of prior and posterior of this kind, and indeed I knew I would not find them — since it would hardly have befitted a man disputing against the Arians, who said the Son was posterior in nature and lesser than the Father, and denied he is coeternal with the Father, and uttered that impious phrase "There was a time when the Son was not," to use the vocabulary of prior and posterior, lest he appear to wink at them. This was also the mind of Athanasius. Therefore these two, whom the Thomists customarily cite against us, we excuse in this way: they ought to have spoken thus, because they spoke in the sense of eternity and duration, not of origin. Hence the testimony of Athanasius drawn from his Creed does not press us. For when he says "And in this Trinity nothing is before or after, nothing greater or lesser, but all three Persons are coeternal and coequal to one another," he himself declared sufficiently that he spoke in the sense of coeternity, and excluded only the priority of time and that which would entail inequality in nature; and therefore he expressly said "coeternal."

But Augustine, when he likewise said in book III against Maximinus: "For the sent ought not to be the one who begot, but the one begotten by the begetter; yet this is not inequality of substance but order of nature — not in which one is prior to another, but in which one is from another" — he spoke aptly and for his purpose. For he was refuting Maximinus, who argued from the paternity of the Generator that there is priority and anteriority of eternity and nature in the Father as superior and greater than the Son, as though he had begotten him lesser in nature and duration. So in that sense — since his opponent was a heretic — Augustine denied the notions of prior and posterior; and those two testimonies of Athanasius and Augustine contain nothing against Scotus's position. I add that this kind of negative argument does not convince: "They do not say it, therefore they contradict it." They are silent, but silence is not contradiction.

There is, however, no lack of a passage from Augustine in Scotus's favor, say the two Scotists just cited — Rada at Controversy 5, conclusion 6, and Mastrius at Disputation II, n. 112. Rada thus cites at the place cited Augustine, book I of *On the Trinity*, chapter 1: "No thing at all generates itself so as to be; the reason for this is that it would be before it had being." He does not distinguish these words but pronounces them in one continuous delivery, so that it is not clear what is Augustine's; and he infers: "From this it follows that the Father, who generates

the Son, is prior in origin than the Son." This consequence is Rada's, deduced from Augustine's prior testimony. Mastrius, for his part: "No thing generates and produces itself: because it would then be prior to itself, as Anselm says in the *Monologion*, chapter 1." He then infers: "Therefore by Augustine the producing agent is prior to the produced, at least in origin."

Rada cited Augustine's words faithfully, Mastrius did not. For thus at book I of *On the Trinity*, chapter 1, Augustine says: "No thing at all generates itself so as to be" — and no more. Hence the clause "the reason for this is that it would be before it had being" is Rada's gloss. And likewise the gloss attributed to Anselm by Mastrius — "because it would then be prior to itself" — is attributed to him, because it is not Anselm's; and Mastrius shows this by clumsy phrasing.

Certainly where Mastrius cites, it is not to be found. Therefore this passage does not press. It only contains that the same thing cannot beget itself. From this it only follows that the Begotten is begotten by another, so that the Begetting is one and another from the Begotten, who is from it; it is not however deduced that one is prior to the other or the other posterior to the former.

I affirm that Augustine is not contrary to Scotus. For he manifestly declares in the cited passages and others to be cited that he excluded only the priority of time, in order to establish eternity, and consequently equality in the Persons. Thus in book XV of *On the Trinity*, chapter 26: "In that supreme Trinity which is God, there are no intervals of time by which it can be shown, or at least sought, whether the Son was first born of the Father, and the Holy Spirit afterwards proceeded from both." You see "first" and "afterwards" with only the exclusion of time. Again in the same chapter, having posited the generation of the Son by the Father and the procession of the Holy Spirit from both, in order to retain eternity — because he saw it was difficult to believe that where there are two such processions there is no prior and posterior — he says near the end: "Let no times be thought here which have before and after." Therefore he removed prior and posterior only in that sense. Yet there he attributes to the Father what presuppose priority of origin, attributing to the Son and Holy Spirit what signify posteriority. For he had said: "That he thus eternally begot the Son, so that the life which the Father gave to the Son by begetting is coeternal with the life of the Father who gave it"; and presently: "That he thus gave to the Son that the Holy Spirit proceeds from him, and both without time; and so it was said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, that he understand that it also proceeds from the Son, having from the Father." Here note that the Father is said to have given in the past with priority; while to the Son a word is applied with the signification of the future — "that the life may be" — and the same word is applied to the Holy Spirit in the same signification, "that he may proceed" — so that the Father appears prior in origin to the Son, and the Father and Son prior in origin to the Holy Spirit, not in time.

Perhaps he said this same thing more clearly in the same book, chapter 14, on the Son: "He is all that the Father is, yet not the Father, because this one is Son and that one Father. And so he knows all that the Father knows; but to him knowing is from the Father — as being is from the Father — for to know and to be are one for him; and therefore as to the Father knowing is not from the Son, neither is being." Here you have the clear notion of prior in origin in the Father and posterior in the Son, not expressed in words but in sense. Therefore Augustine favors Scotus and does not oppose him.

So much for authority. I come to the arguments, and prove to the man that St. Thomas ought to admit order of origin with priority, in this way. St. Thomas in the Divine Persons distinguished two concepts: one of hypostasis or property, another of formal relation — as is established from the doctrine he delivered at Part I, q. 40, a. 4, in the body and replies to the second and third, as we showed many times before and all his school acknowledges. Given this, an order follows from this doctrine between the notion of the complete Person — namely hypostasis — and formal relation, according to the concepts of hypostasis and relation; for the latter presupposes the former, and the former abstracts from the formal respect which is not simultaneously conceived with the concept of hypostasis and property; but this itself is for one to precede the other: therefore one is conceived prior to the other. Furthermore, that prior conception of one over the other corresponds to the foundation conceived; therefore in that foundation there is some notion grounding that priority and posteriority in the concepts — and this suffices to persuade the Thomists of priority of origin — namely through the distinction of reason with a foundation in reality.

Nor can they reply that here there is simultaneous relativity: for these two concepts were introduced precisely in order to virtually distinguish the hypostasis from the formal relation through precissive concepts. Taking this example and explaining it thus, I argue against the Thomists: if within one and the same Person of the Father there is this order between hypostasis and respect, with the antecedence of one over the other, then a fortiori there will be an order of prior and posterior in origin of one Person from another, which are really distinct from each other. And although that first order between hypostasis and formal relation within the Father is not of prior and posterior — because it is within one and the same person — there will at least be order of prior and posterior between two really distinct Persons, of which one originates from the other. With this one argument *ad hominem* I am content and pass over other common ones.

Indeed, when I consider these arguments drawn from the order of first, second, third Person, I do not see how the order of prior and posterior according to origin can be removed. For what, I ask, is it to be called first, second, third, except what the words signify and all who hear them understand — namely

some priority, which since it cannot be of dignity or of eternity must certainly be of origin?

Finally: to arm myself with St. Thomas's authority, I want to investigate whether he tolerated this priority of origin in the Divine realm. At Part I, q. 40, a. 2, a third argument is put as follows: "The absolute is prior to the relative. But the first distinction is the distinction of the Divine Persons; therefore the Divine Persons are not distinguished by relations." To this argument St. Thomas replies in a way that tolerates that first part of the assumption — "The absolute is prior to the relative" — and does not deny it.

Then in I Sentences, d. 31, q. 3, a. 2, in the body, he compares the Father to unity, because in him primarily is unity; the Son to the binary, because in him primarily is the equality of two; the Holy Spirit to the ternary, because in him is found first the connection of three — which indicates priority. And returning to q. 40 in the reply to the third: "The more prior a distinction is, the closer it is to unity, and therefore it must be minimum; and therefore the distinction of the Persons must not be except by what minimally distinguishes." Here is "prior." In the same question, a. 4, in the body: "Origin, as signified, is prior according to intellect than the relation of the Person originating." Here is manifest priority, nor does the phrase "according to intellect" hinder us, because in St. Thomas's view there is no distinction on the part of reality except real relative — and for us Scotists that priority suffices for us to enjoy the authority of St. Thomas. For in his position the Angelic Doctor cannot admit any other kind of priority.

Furthermore there is another argument that Scotus uses at I Sentences, d. 28, q. 3 (*Hic communiter*, and *Praeterea iste dicit*, n. 2), which I wish to present in the words of Javelli, commentating on q. 42, a. 3 (*Primum dubium*), lest anyone think I attribute something to St. Thomas he did not say: "The first doubt," he says, "is from Scotus in I Sentences, d. 28, q. 3, for Scotus says that St. Thomas contradicts himself: for above, at q. 40, a. 4, he says that Paternity as constitutive of the Father is understood prior to the act; but active generation is understood prior to the Son; therefore the Father from whom active generation is is understood prior to the Son. And so at least according to intellect one Person is prior to another: the opposite of which he says here. Therefore he contradicts himself."

Scotus spoke more modestly than Javelli reports; for Scotus says there at n. 2: "Furthermore, this one says elsewhere that in the Divine realm there cannot be order, because neither of essence to relations nor of relations among themselves — since relatives are simultaneous in nature. If property could be considered in the way in which it were not a relation, and in this way it would not be necessary that it have a correlative simultaneously in nature, their argument would not hold." Scotus does not say he contradicts himself, which Javelli attributed to Scotus; he only says "says elsewhere," which Capreolus at I Sentences, d. 6, q. 1, and Cajetan at Part I, q. 42, a. 3 (*Ad evidentiam*), resolve by saying St. Thomas

speaks of the mode of conceiving at q. 40, a. 3, according to concept, not according to reality — a solution anticipated and rejected by us.

This solution is moreover attacked by another argument which Javelli cites there (*Secundum dubium*): "St. Thomas does not seem to have sufficiently proved that there is no priority among the Divine Persons; for he only proved it with regard to correlative Persons by reason of the simultaneity of the relations and the unity of nature. But it happens to assign Persons not taken correlatively — as Father and Holy Spirit — therefore nothing prevents between them, so taken, being priority, since the simultaneity of relations ceases." To this Javelli responds in the same way — namely that that priority is through concepts and modes of understanding, as the Father is understood prior, not is so. This response is refuted in the same way: for that pre-understanding is founded in something; therefore it is with a foundation in reality. But for us Scotists that distinction of virtual priority is enough; nor does St. Thomas admit greater.

But let us cut off all evasion for the Thomists with a passage from St. Thomas cited in I Sentences, d. 9, q. 2, a. 1, reply to the third, where treating the question whether the Father is prior to the Son he places a third argument: "The principle is naturally prior to that of which it is the principle. But the Father is the principle of the Son; therefore, if not in time, at least in nature he is prior to the Son." To which he replies thus: "We must say that principle can be considered in two ways: either as the being that is principle — and this is naturally prior to that of which it is the principle — or according to the relation of principle; and thus it is simultaneously in nature with the principiated."

I accept this. Then I argue: the Father is considered as principle in the notion of principle, from q. 40, a. 4; therefore he is naturally prior in that way. Note the words of St. Thomas: he places the consideration with natural priority, nor does he remove the reality of priority by our conception. "It can be considered in two ways: either as the being that is principle" — so that this notion may be conceived, and this thus conceived and considered "is naturally prior to that of which it is the principle." Hence it stands to be naturally prior while being considered as prior — just as to be thought and to be are the same. Nor is the difficulty removed by what St. Thomas adds: "Therefore if there were someone having from the same source both that he is someone and that he is to someone, he would be entirely simultaneously in nature with what he would be said to be; and since in the Divine realm the Father has from the same source both that he is someone and that he is Father, he is simultaneously in nature with the Son, not only insofar as he is Father, but simply."

For this is refuted in two ways. First, because St. Thomas here shifted the supposition from consideration to being: for he says "if there were someone." And before he had said "considered" — as the being that is principle — and into that being a different consideration falls; therefore there is something distinguished by priority. Second, because it follows that between the Father and

Holy Spirit there is priority, because the Father is not "someone" through spiration but through Paternity, nor "to someone" — that is, to the Holy Spirit — through Paternity but through active spiration; therefore through what he is "someone" — that is, Father — he will be prior to the Holy Spirit.

Javelli attempts to reply to this objection, but in my judgment less well: first because he founds the reply on the distinction of reason between Paternity and active spiration, which does not resolve the difficulty, since it in no way removes the Father constituted for spirating; and second because he admits a certain priority of reason, which is certainly founded in origin, and is sufficient to infer against the Thomists a priority of order among the Persons. I laughed moreover at reading in Javelli the following, in the same article 3 (*Ad hoc dico*): "You should know therefore that this doubt so bound the intellect of one of our Bachelors that, concerning the mind of St. Thomas, he conceded priority of nature among the Persons taken non-correlatively." A delightful observation from Javelli, apt for seasoning this long disputation on order for the palate of readers. Certainly this Bachelor, so bound, deserves better in my estimation than Javelli freely resolving the argument. For the bound one served truth, from which Javelli freely dissents. If I were presiding at the Academy where that Thomist received the grade of Bachelor, I would confer the doctorate on him so bound, for his frank confession, and would bid him, crowned with laurels and triumphing in these honorary bonds, to follow Scotus — and would put chains on Javelli which, however, for the sake of the golden name of Chrysostom, I would gild.

SECTION II. Whether and what relation of identity, similarity, and equality exists among the Divine Persons.

St. Thomas treats this question at Part I, q. 42, a. 4, and in I Sentences, d. 19, qq. 1 and 3, and in I Sentences to Hannibal, d. 31, q. un., a. 4; and Scotus in I Sentences, d. 19, q. 1, and d. 31, q. un., and *Quodlibet* VI, a. 2, and in the Reportata on the same distinction and question.

On these matters both Doctors agree, and the schools agree as well; and since those who wrote before me have already covered the ground, and the rationale of my plan requires that I take up for disputation those matters in which Scotus and St. Thomas disagree, I think it superfluous to dispute here. But if I treat something in common, I will try to make it distinctive by adding new observations.

The first difficulty seems to be: how a relation of similarity fits the Divine Persons, since they are consubstantial, not similar, and therefore entirely identical among themselves in one and the same essence, not similar through participation in the essence. Hence one species of Arian heresy was the affirmation of similarity between the Word and the Father, relying on the single letter changed between *Homoousios* and *Homoiousios*. The first word signified consubstantiality; the second, only similarity, not consubstantiality. I could

express this difference of words more precisely with Greek characters, but we lack them here. I note, however, that when Father Suarez saw this difference and wished to express it in Greek characters, he was deceived by the printer, who printed *Omoufios* for the sense of the Arian text when that word *Omoufios* signifies "consubstantial" in the Catholic sense; in Suarez's place *Omiufios* — that is, "of similar substance" — should have been printed, not *Omoufios* — that is, "consubstantial." This heresy was proper to the Semi-Arians, not the Arians as Suarez says — as we noted in our schools of positive theology, School I, chapter 2, *On the Word of God*.

This scruple, however, must be met: that word is already today in the schools free from horror and can safely be used among Catholics; and Athanasius himself in his letter against the Synod of Sirmium and Ariminum did not entirely reject it, since it can be taken in a sound sense by Catholics, as it is accepted by the Scholastics. And indeed Scotus takes similarity as agreement in Attributes, which are after the manner of qualities in human things, as he says in I Sentences, d. 31, q. un. (*Confimiliter*, n. 5). St. Thomas no less clearly distinguished equality from similarity, as appears at Part I, q. 42, a. 1, using the example of heat in the reply to the second; and in the reply to the third he expressly admits the relation of similarity, and in I Sentences, d. 31, q. 1, a. 1, in the body, he agrees with Scotus, and his interpreters understand him thus when they enumerate and distribute the genera of relations according to Aristotle, as can be seen in Hervaeus in I Sentences, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1; Capreolus and Cajetan at Part I, q. 42, a. 1; and Javelli there; and John of St. Thomas, Disputation 16, a. 4, n. 16; Vasquez, Disputation 166; and Suarez, book IV, chapter 15.

Note, however, that the Holy Doctor in I Sentences, d. 31, a. 2, takes the similarity of persons in another mode with Augustine and the Master there, namely through the attribution of some Attribute that seems proper to a person — for example, power is appropriated to the Father because he is a principle without principle; Wisdom to the Son because he proceeds as the Word; goodness to the Holy Spirit because he proceeds as love — but this is not the genuine notion of referring through similarity that the schools posit, founded on the similarity of one participated quality, from which similarity results in the participants, so that they are similar in Wisdom, in Omnipotence, in Mercy, in Justice, in Immensity, in Eternity. Such is not this similarity of appropriation to a Person, which is rather a distinction of Person from Person and of Attribute from Attribute than similarity and agreement among themselves; for they differ through these properties and do not agree, and so they are dissimilar, not similar. The Person will indeed be similar to the essence according to the absolute, and between the Person and the absolute there will be similarity; but not between Person and Person. The Father will be similar to omnipotence, the Son to Wisdom, the Holy Spirit to goodness — but they will not by that become similar among themselves; indeed they will differ as the Attributes differ. Therefore this is not the reason for founding a relation of similarity among the

Persons themselves, which is drawn from agreement and unity in the absolute Divine Attributes, in which they are mutually similar, just as they are equal in the mode of participating. Therefore this manner of comparing attributes expresses distinction, as the Master notes, and the title of the preceding section.

With these observations made, a difficulty arises in the question itself against those relations of similarity: because where there is identity of nature, similarity is excluded — as Scotus himself objects to himself in I Sentences, d. 31, q. un. (*Oppositam*, n. 2), from Hilary at book II of *On the Trinity*: "Similarity is not to itself." To this difficulty Scotus replies perspicuously and directly at n. 5 from the doctrine of Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith*, chapter 5: that identity is founded in essence, but similarity in quality or in what holds the mode of quality — as in God the Attributes are such, which express not nature but what is around nature; hence there is a different relation founded in identity of essence and in similarity in the Attributes, which hold the mode of quality, from which the relation of similarity results among the Persons participating in them, among which, says Scotus, "similarity is given according to all the attributes which are quasi-properties of this nature."

This doctrine is found no less clearly in St. Thomas. For it is contained in that article, Part I, q. 42, reply to the first and second, insofar as he distinguishes the relation of equality from the relation of similarity through the different mode of participating. He also posits it in I Sentences, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, where in the third argument a power in the genus of spiritual quality is named, which St. Thomas admits in the solution. And in the body he says more expressly that there are in God certain species of quality according to their proper notions, as regards the constitutive differences. Note furthermore that similarity can stand without equality, but equality cannot stand without similarity — which St. Thomas holds in I Sentences, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, reply to the third.

That distinction in the Thomistic school between the relations of similarity seems difficult to assign, because since they do not distinguish the nature except virtually from the Attributes, no sufficient diversity of essence from Attributes seems able to be given in order to found distinct relations of identity and similarity. Especially since St. Thomas says at Part I, q. 42, a. 1, reply to the fourth, that the relation of equality imports both — the distinction of persons and the unity of essence — and that unity does not seem able to provide the foundation for diversity. And indeed the Thomists labor on this ratio of diversity to assign, as appears in Javelli in his commentary on q. 42, a. 1, replying to Aureolus. In the reply to the first: "Note that St. Thomas grants that the Divine Persons can be called equal and similar as they agree in the Divine perfection." Against this Aureolus argues thus: "Similarity and equality are distinct relations; therefore they require distinct foundations. The Divine Essence founds Identity; therefore it cannot found equality and similarity." To which Javelli replies from Hervaeus and Capreolus: "Aureolus does not notice that whatever distinction we

place in the relations, we place it in the foundations. For because in creatures those relations can be really distinct, distinct foundations can be assigned to them — namely subject, quantity, quality. But because in God those three relations are distinguished only by reason, therefore the essence differently conceived suffices to found them." But it was necessary to say how one simple substance could be so distinguished that it would be after the mode of substance, after the mode of quality, and after the mode of quantity — which Javelli does not provide, nor had he provided it at the beginning of his commentary, where he refers to Hervaeus; for he only says the essence is conceived after the mode of quality, and how can the essence undergo that mode?

We must therefore have recourse with Scotus to his Attributes; for these can undergo that mode, being after the manner of properties and quasi-qualities. Father Vasquez saw this better after Scotus, who at Disputation 166, c. 1, n. 1, says: "In the Divine essence we consider the being of substance giving existence, and from this arises the relation of identity; then we consider the same through the mode of quality, namely through the mode of truth and wisdom, and from this arises the relation of similarity. Finally we consider in the Divine essence a certain notion of quantity, insofar as we say God is great, and in this is founded the relation of equality." This is a clear and apt declaration of Scotus's mind regarding the distinguishing foundations, and the true solution of Aureolus's argument and our objection against Javelli.

Let us now properly reply to what is asked in the title of the article, from the doctrine both of Scotus and of St. Thomas and of the schools. Three species of relations are found in the Divine Persons, founded in unity. Concerning which Scotus says thus at I Sentences, d. 19, q. 1 (*Hic primo videndum*, n. 2): "The Philosopher in Metaphysics V, chapter on relations, distinguishes three relations founded on one: namely, identical, similar, equal." And presently: "Identity is appropriated to substance, equality to quantity, similarity to quality." And he adds: "The proximate reason for founding is the unity of such a thing." Then he explains what is meant by "quantity" and "quality" according to Aristotle: "Because identity is over whatever being insofar as it is something; and equality or inequality is over whatever being insofar as it has some magnitude of perfection. Similarity, however, or dissimilarity can be founded over whatever being insofar as it is of a certain quality."

The same thing St. Thomas expressly says in I Sentences, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, citing Aristotle, and says: "Although in the Divine realm there is no quality or quantity in the common sense of the genus, yet there are certain species of quality and likewise of quantity." And having given examples he says: "Therefore by reason of them, equality and similarity are said in the Divine realm." With the species of relations distinguished and the propriety of the name of identity regarding essence and similarity regarding attributes established, the only remaining

difficulty concerns the name of equality, which cannot fit God, since it signifies bulk of quantity, of which God is entirely devoid. Nor can he be equal or be called such unless he is quantified.

Both Doctors, Angelic and Subtle, meet this doubt by saying that quantity is often taken in a metaphorical sense for the magnitude of perfection of things, and so is applied to spiritual things; hence what is quantum of bulk in bodies is quantum of perfection in spirits, from which arises a proportion and equality not of bulk but of perfection. And although Aristotle seems to say the contrary at chapter 6 of the *Categories*, where he says: "What is most proper to quantity is equality and inequality; for things that are not quantities will not appear equal or unequal at all," distinguishing there between similarity and equality, and concluding: "Therefore it will be most proper of quantity to be called equal and unequal" — which passage Augustine in the *Categories* (a work found in vol. I) calls also "even and odd" — nevertheless the same Aristotle placed the equal and unequal before and apart from quantity, when he said at book I of the *Metaphysics*, text comment 1, that "the same being differently compared is equal or unequal." In this sense seems to be understood another saying attributed to Aristotle: "quantity is the measure of substance." This is attributed to him by St. Thomas in opusculum 52 and by Albert the Great at Tractate VIII, chapter 1. But how will it be the measure of substance in general, which abstracts from corporeal bulk, since it precedes body? But these are rather conjectures; that just argument is from book V of the *Metaphysics*, chapter on quantity: "Great and small, greater and less, as said of themselves and in relation to each other, are passions of quantity in itself. These names are also transferred to other things." This passage is cited by Scotus at *Quodlibet* VI (*De tertio*, n. 5). Aristotle therefore recognized the metaphorical signification, which St. Augustine used in his *On the Quantity of the Soul*, volume I, where, discussing the nature of the soul and teaching it to be incorporeal and spiritual, he nonetheless calls it quantified in spiritual perfection — as is plain from the context of the work, and as he himself attests at book I, *Retractationes*, chapter 8, where he says: "How great the soul is — this was carefully disputed, that we might show, if we could, that it is not of corporal quantity, and yet that it is something great."

Here I note in passing that Augustine is a most ardent defender and vindicator of the spiritual soul — contrary to what a certain recent French theologian, John Adam, has rashly attributed to him in his work *Destroyed Calvin*. I will deal with that bold man in his reproaches of Augustine at another time. This passage on the quantity of the soul I wished to cite because I see it barely cited by other authors — perhaps because it escaped them — and so, being such an illustrious passage, I wanted to make it public.

Moreover, Scotus and St. Thomas accepted equality in the Divine realm in this sense, together with the common consent of the Fathers and older Scholastics — as is plain from the passages cited at the beginning of the question. And indeed

both use the authority of Augustine, of whom Scotus cites many testimonies both in I Sentences, d. 31, q. un., and in *Quodlibet* V, and in the Reportata on the same distinction 31. The most apt is cited by Scotus in *Quodlibet* VI, n. 1: "God is great without quantity," and that other, common to St. Thomas and Scotus, found in book VI of *On the Trinity*, chapter 8: "In those things which are great not by bulk, to be greater is the same as to be better" — cited by St. Thomas at q. 41, a. 1, in the body, and by Scotus in *Quodlibet* VI, n. 5 at the beginning, and in I Sentences, d. 31, n. 2, where he puts the formal words of Augustine: "In those things which are not great by bulk, this is to be greater — namely to be better." Two other notable passages from the Master at d. 31 and accommodated to our matter are from book V of *On the Trinity*, chapter 6, and from book VI, chapters 4 and 5 — the first of which Scotus uses greatly in I Sentences, d. 31, q. un., n. 1, and *Quodlibet* VI, n. 23, and in the Reportata, q. 1, n. 1. There is a third place from book III against Maximinus, chapter 13. The author of the book *On the Faith to Peter* is also cited under Augustine's name by both Doctors — Angelic and Subtle — in I Sentences, d. 31, q. un., n. 7, believed at that time to be Augustine, when in fact it is Fulgentius.

All these passages and others from the Fathers rest on the authority of Scripture in which this equality of the Son with the Father is affirmed: John 5: "Making himself equal to God"; Paul to the Philippians 12: "He did not think it robbery to be equal to God." Hence Athanasius in the Creed, cited by St. Thomas at Part I, q. 42, a. 2 after the arguments: "All three Persons are coeternal and coequal." And the Church at the Feast of the Trinity, Antiphon I at Vespers and Lauds: "Glory to you, Trinity equal." And in the Preface of the Mass: "In the essence unity, in the Persons property, in the majesty equality is to be adored."

With equality posited in the Divine Persons — which certainly cannot be denied according to the sense of Scripture, the Fathers, and the theologians, with the Master also as a worthy author at d. 31 — since equality expresses a disposition and relation, in which St. Thomas and Scotus agree, it remains to ask whether that relation is distinct from the relation of similarity, so that a proper discussion distinct from that one may be held of it. On this too both Doctors agree. For the Angelic Doctor at q. 42, a. 1, reply to the second, says: "Where equality is attended to according to virtual quantity, equality includes in itself similarity, and something more: because it excludes excess. For those that share in one form can be called similar, even if they participate in that form unequally — as if air is said to be similar to fire in heat. But they cannot be called equal if one participates in that form more perfectly than the other." And Scotus in I Sentences, d. 31 (*Ad primum*, n. 6): "There can be similarity without equality, as a remiss white is similar to an intense white, though not perfectly; but not conversely can there be equality without similarity, in that form in which others are naturally apt to be assimilated. Equality seems to determine similarity and the foundation of similarity." Hence Suarez praises Scotus for acutely seeing that similarity does not always require equality but does not exclude it. "Scotus," he

says at book IV of *On the Trinity*, chapter 15, "has well noted" — I inserted the number to satisfy the reader, as it is missing in Suarez.

For this reason the Fathers in this question valued equality more than similarity, because they saw that equality expresses an altogether equal magnitude and perfection, and one that cannot be greater, such as must be in the Divine Persons. Thus Athanasius, who after saying "nothing greater or lesser in the Trinity" immediately added "coeternal and coequal." And the Council of Toledo VI in the confession of Faith: "Since they are of one nature, the Persons are equal, because that nature does not admit more and less, nor can it be communicated except whole." As Suarez observes at book IV of *On the Trinity*, chapter 15.

SECTION III. Whether the relations of equality in God are real or of reason.

This is the chief head of the controversy, on which St. Thomas holds that such relations are not real but of reason — and he manifestly teaches this in I Sentences, d. 31, q. 1, in the body, with these words: "If equality is considered as regards the relation, then equality in creatures posits something real in both extremes; but in the Divine Persons nothing except according to reason." And at Part I, q. 42, a. 1, reply to the fourth, having produced the foundation of the essence, which is entirely one, and the relation and subject of the relation — that is, the Persons — he concludes: "Therefore equality, similarity, in the Divine Persons is not any real relation distinct from personal relations." And presently: "For this reason the Master says that in these the name only is relative."

Scotus judges the contrary — that they are real — in I Sentences, d. 31, q. 3 (*Oppositum*, n. 2), where he places the conditions required for a real relation and then applies all of them to such relations, proving they are fitting, and therefore that they are real, and resolves the arguments. He had given the same teaching at d. 19, q. un., but shows and confirms it much more clearly and forcefully in *Quodlibet* VI, speaking of the relation of equality, giving the conditions of real relation that he had stated above in the cited place of I Sentences. The chief force is in the (*De secundo articulo*, n. 19) and expressly in the (*De tertio articulo*, n. 31): "I say that this relation inheres by the nature of the thing." And below at n. 33: "It follows that this equality will be a real relation — more so than any other." But he proves and shows it most manifestly and accurately in the Reportata on d. 31, q. 3 (*Hanc ego opinionem*), in which place, repeating those conditions necessary for a real relation, he resolves that all three relations of identity, similarity, and equality are not of reason but real, and places the conclusion at n. 23: "I reply to the question. Identity, similarity, equality are most truly relations in God." And he adds, lest this seem new, securing the path to proving it — which he does most exactly from n. 26. And at n. 27: "All these conditions (namely of a real relation) are found in the common relations in the Divine realm." And there: "It is remarkable that the relations of origin are granted by some to be real on account of the distinction of supposita, but not the common

relations — since those presuppose more distinct things than the relations of origin."

Following St. Thomas are his disciples together with the Salmanticensian commentaries on q. 42, a. 2. Among others: Henry (whom Scotus attacks in I Sentences, d. 31, and in the Reportata) in *Quodlibet* V, q. 1; Durand in I Sentences, d. 31, q. 1; Marsilius in I Sentences, d. 33, a. 2, conclusion 2, note 8; Suarez at book IV, chapter 15; Vasquez at Disputation 166, chapter 2.

Scotus is adhered to by his disciples; and the weighty author Bacconus in I Sentences, d. 31, q. 1, aa. 2 and 3, who however differs from Scotus in thinking the relation of equality is the same as the relation of identity. For the rest he affirms it is a real relation and proving Scotus's arguments adds a fourth condition from the part of the term at a. 3, which however does nothing against the doctrine on the reality of the relation.

Let us weigh the force of the arguments. Two capital ones are brought from the Thomists, drawn from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the places cited above. The first: because for a real relation a real foundation and a real term with a real distinction of extremes does not suffice; there is also required a distinction in the foundation in which it is immediately founded. Hence since in God there is one and undivided nature, and one notion of similarity and equality, it cannot found a real relation. This is confirmed because if in two subjects there were one and the same whiteness, the relation of similarity would be only of reason, not real, because the foundation would be one.

The second: because one real relation cannot be founded in another, because hence there would follow a process to infinity, since given any relation a new one of similarity or dissimilarity could be founded upon it. These two arguments the Thomists amplify. I find them briefly and nervously proposed by St. Thomas at Part I, q. 42, reply to the fourth: "Equality imports both — the distinction of Persons (because nothing is said equal to itself) and the unity of essence, because from this the Persons are equal to one another, because they are of one magnitude and essence. Now it is manifest that the same is not referred to itself by any real relation." This is the first. The second runs thus: "Nor again is one relation referred to another by some other relation. For when we say that Paternity is opposed to Filiation, the opposition is not a relation intermediary between Paternity and Filiation, because in either mode the relation would be multiplied to infinity." You will see these spread out and expanded in Capreolus, Cajetan, Vasquez, John of St. Thomas, and others, but not more clearly or effectively expressed.

Scotus's position is sufficiently proved by a single argument. These relations are of unity. Here all the conditions required for them to be real concur; therefore they are real. The major is certain. The minor is shown: the foundation is the unity of essence, the unity of the Attributes, and parity in participating; these

unities are real, in the extremes — that is, the Persons — which are really distinct from each other; and so there are distinct extremes and real terms both as regards the foundation and as regards the extreme. Therefore no condition required for a real relation is lacking; therefore all conditions concur. This demonstration seems to hold if no other condition is required. I show this by replying to the contrary argument.

That assumption about the necessity of distinction of foundation is therefore denied, for it is falsely assumed: for it has neither authority nor argument. As for authority, this is plain because the Philosopher at book V of the *Metaphysics*, text comment 16, says that relatives of identity, similarity, and equality are several according to nature, because their nature is one — he does not say "whose nature is distinct." Therefore they do not require distinction in the foundation but unity. The Commentator adds, expounding, of the proportion in each extreme, which is the same and one. Therefore unity always follows, not distinction. As regards the argument, that seems evident for unity. For that is the reason a relation is in the genus of unity, because the foundation is one; therefore the greater the unity, the greater the reason of foundation for unity. Hence if the unity is specific, there will be necessary unity in species; if numerical, there will be necessary numerical unity, provided this can be found in different subjects. But in God it is found; therefore with it a real relation of unity stands.

For why, or how, will unity destroy the disposition of unity? Or who will ever require in a univocally participated form diversity for the relation of unity? This would overthrow unity and remove the relation of unity, and in its place posit diversity. When with this unity of form there stands a distinction of extremes, there can exist between them a real relation of unity between distinct extremes. Hence in God there can be a most perfect real relation of unity of the Persons among themselves, over the foundation of one and the same nature in numerical unity. Indeed this will be the most perfect relation. So much so that even if the Philosopher required that distinction in created things, that condition would not be accepted in the Divine realm, because the natural philosopher could not imagine a real distinction in extremes with numerical unity of form. He therefore could not conceive any unity except specific. But we who believe that in God there stands with the real distinction of Persons a numerical unity of nature must a fortiori grant that in it can be founded a relation of unity. Hence I marvel at those authors who, for a relation founded in unity and which is formally one of unity, require distinction in the unity of form. Let them require real distinction in the extremes, as there is between the Divine Persons, and let them take nothing away from unity.

For what philosopher has ever required for a relation of specific unity a distinction in the species of the form? Indeed for this specific unity, and the relation founded in it, only diversity in individuals is required, and given this, a

relation of specific identity is founded in the individuals. Likewise, given numerical unity of form, if the individuals are really diverse, no distinction in nature should be required but in the extremes which participate in it. Hence the Thomistic argument is turned around. The same to itself has no relation of identity, because there no conceivable diversity exists either from the part of the form or from the part of the extremes. But between Persons there is given real distinction; therefore between them and regarding them there must be given real distinction.

Likewise the example of a single whiteness in three subjects, brought by Vasquez at Disputation 166, c. 3, n. 8, does not proceed. For we must say that there is a real relation of numerical identity to be posited among those three subjects having the same whiteness by reason of the form, and I press with the example seized: if God placed one whiteness in the abstract in three places outside a subject, there would then be no relation between that whiteness so produced, because no distinction of subjects would be given. Therefore with three subjects posited and one whiteness, there will be a relation among them by reason of the extremes, which are really distinct from each other and are denominated white through one numerical whiteness.

Scotus's argument is confirmed by the fact that the relations of origin are really distinct from each other, not through the essence which is one and the same in them — though it is the principle whereby of the productions, and only through it does the Father beget and the Father together with the Son spirate — and not except through the Persons already really distinct. Therefore even if the relations of equality have the same principle whereby of being referred — the essence — they are nonetheless not distinguished from each other, but will take real distinction from the extremes already really distinct. Nor should you object that relations are distinguished by reason of the relative opposition of one with another — of producer and produced — because the objection is turned around in this way: these two — producing and produced — are by nature the same, nor does this prevent the extremes from being distinct; therefore the notion of extremes is the principle of real distinction. Nor is it another objection to say that the essence is taken as producing not as it is one but as it produces through intellect and will; for the essence even as it produces through intellect and will does not bring with it real distinction, but the Persons have this from themselves and introduce it; therefore from them real distinction comes.

Then if St. Thomas's argument is true, as he and Cajetan explain it, and Vasquez proves at Disputation 166, c. 3, n. 7: because foundations are what are first referred — it follows that those relations cannot be distinguished even by reason, since the same to itself cannot be given any relation, whether real or of reason. Furthermore, if St. Thomas finds in his position a foundation in reality for a distinction of reason between similar and equal Persons, Scotus finds a similar one in his doctrine for positing them as real. For Scotus distinguishes

those foundations from the nature of the thing, from which Vasquez aptly notes at the same place n. 8 that in Scotus's position more real relations must be posited in God; and although he attacks Scotus from other grounds, he acknowledges that Scotus speaks coherently. Moreover, that relation of equality in the position of the adversaries imports some perfection: how then will it be a relation of reason? Certainly we see that the Fathers, from Sacred doctrine, teach this equality as a necessary and supreme perfection — not only fundamental, which properly is not equality, but also formal, which properly is equality. Therefore they should induce real relations.

Finally, the function of relation is to refer an extreme to a term in another extreme, not foundation to foundation. For what are referred are those that are denominated relatives; but foundations are not denominated. For who will say that whiteness is referred to whiteness, and human nature to human nature? White stones and human individuals are referred among themselves, which are the extremes, not the foundations. But in the Divine realm, the Persons are said to be relatively equal among themselves, not the Divine essence said to be equal to itself; therefore the Persons are what are referred among themselves; and since they are really distinct from each other, they demand real relations. This is confirmed by the testimony of Aristotle at book V of the *Metaphysics*, chapter on relations: "Those are called equal whose quantity is one." He speaks of the extremes, not of the quantity which is one and which does not admit "of those" — a word referring to the material extremes which are called equal.

As for the second argument about the sequel of a process to infinity, I am astonished that Rada says nothing of it in his Controversy, nor Lychetus at this place, and that it is little heeded by our Scotists — even though it is one of the two arguments of St. Thomas and the one most pressed by the Thomists, as we indicated above. Perhaps they did so because Scotus did not place it in that locus — namely in I Sentences, d. 31. He has it however in *Quodlibet* VI (*De tertio*, n. 18). But not even there does Lychetus respond. Since they omitted it, I must reply exactly and clearly. More briefly however, since this is a matter of Metaphysics treated by Scotus in *Quodlibet* q. 14, and II Sentences, d. 1, q. 4, and IV Sentences, d. 6, q. 10, nn. 5 and 6, and something of the same is touched in I Sentences, d. 19, q. 1.

Therefore for the place I deny the assumption of the process to infinity, together with Scotus explicitly at *Quodlibet* VI (*De tertio*), with the counterexample from the proportion in Euclid at Geometry book V, who thus defines proportionality: "It is the similarity of two proportions." Similarity, says Scotus there, "formally signifies a relation, and it is of proportion and proportion, as of two similar foundations; but proportion manifestly imports a relation" — a response and example he again applies to St. Thomas's argument against the relation of character at IV Sentences, d. 6, q. 10 (*Secunda ratio*, n. 5). Yet Scotus does not much press the example of Euclid in the *Quodlibet*. He

passes on saying "whatever may be said of this," and admits a process to infinity in relations of reason, as he also admits in other places. But here we are treating real relations of identity, similarity, and equality. Therefore first the sequel is denied — namely that from one relation being founded in another a process to infinity arises — because it is false in Philosophy.

For as Scotus says excellently at the cited place IV Sentences, d. 6, q. 10, n. 6: "Some relation can be final." Just as in accidents, which are in another by their nature, from their being in another a process to infinity does not follow; for there is given one final accident which cannot be the subject of another accident, and therefore it does not follow: "If accident can be in an accident, a process to infinity will be given in accidents." So in relations, to which can also be applied the example of the ultimate difference, which finally terminates in itself and is not diversified by another.

Specially moreover in the present matter: even granted that in accidental relations a process to infinity could be given, it does not follow it can be given in Divine relations; because these are substantial, nor can they have accidental dependence, but consist by their nature. Hence there is a different reason for accidental created relations and for substantial ones. In created things this will be treated more widely elsewhere.

JUDGMENT.

In this two-part question, on the order of priority of origin and on the relations of identity, similarity, and equality, I find that when Scotus departs from St. Thomas's doctrine, he does not depart without just cause, and when he places his own view, he does not dissent from his own settled positions — which is the supreme virtue in a Doctor, not to be discordant with himself but to adhere to himself tenaciously. Therefore on the order of prior and posterior, Scotus seems to have happily dissented from St. Thomas, since almost all theologians outside St. Thomas's school agree with Scotus; and indeed order can hardly be understood without some priority: otherwise order will dissolve into confusion. Especially since order in the Divine realm is in number — first, second, third Person — and in position, so that the Son is called middle between the Divine Persons, and in production, with the Father being principle without principle, the Son principle from a principle, and the Holy Spirit not a principle *ad intra*; which modes of speaking certainly involve and express order with some priority. Nor is there any shadow of danger in affirming order of prior and posterior in origin — a word by which temporal and natural priority and any other suspected priority is excluded. And so in this sense the Scotistic position seems preferable to the Thomistic one.

As for the other question on the relations of identity, similarity, and equality in God, both Doctors almost agree; but they differ in that St. Thomas holds those relations to be of reason, while Scotus affirms them to be real, though not really

distinct. Each speaks in accordance with his own position. Let us come to Scotus. In his school three things are sought. First: whether those relations are posterior to the relations of origin — that is, Paternity, Filiation, passive Spiration? To this it is replied that they are posterior and presuppose the Persons constituted; for a Person already constituted is referred to another; and so Scotus teaches in I Sentences, d. 31, q. un. (*Secundum principale*, n. 4), where he says the proper relations of origin are pre-required for these common relations of identity, similarity, equality: "which cannot spring up in the essence, unless the relations of origin already pre-exist in it." And in *Quodlibet* VI (*Dico ergo*, n. 30) he says: "I say therefore that equality fundamentally imports the essence, but pre-requires the personal relations," and Lychetus explains this there.

Second: how these relations are distinguished from each other and from their foundations. There are certain Scotizers, as Rada calls them at Controversy 26, conclusion 9, who want to distinguish them really. Their foundation is that these relations are not formally infinite; hence they have no principle of really identifying themselves, and so are really distinguished. But these are dreamers, not Scotists. For Scotus manifestly teaches the opposite, and distinguishes them only from the nature of the thing, which Tataretus also affirms in *Quodlibet* VI, q. 6. Scotus's passage is perspicuous, for he has thus in I Sentences, d. 31, q. un., n. 7, reply to the second: "It can be granted that as many as there are perfections in God in the simple sense, so many also are magnitudes and equalities; yet as all of them are simply one reality, so the equalities according to them are simply one reality." Where Lychetus: "Because the essence and all attributes and the magnitude of all of them are simply one reality; therefore in the Father according to all of them there will be one equality to the Son in reality, though there are several formally distinct ones." Which Rada also affirms at the cited conclusion 9. The argument of the Scotizers or dreamers is easily resolved, because those relations are really identified by reason of the essence in which they agree, since they are in the genus of unity and are not immediately founded in the relations of origin; and this is made clear by the example of the relation of active spiration, which is only one in the Father and Son spirating, through which they are rendered not merely two spirators but one, because that relation is immediately founded in the power of spirating, which is one and common to Father and Son, and therefore there is only one spirator, not two. Let those Scotizers therefore stop dreaming and remove entirely that real distinction, which I judge to be dangerous.

Third: it pertains to the number of those relations. The Canarian cited by Vasquez at Disputation 166, c. 3, raises the multiplication of these relations against Scotus. Vasquez, however, rightly says that Scotus, in accordance with his principles, does not fear to posit as many such relations in God as there are Attributes, and these formally distinct from the nature of the thing, as the Attributes are with real identity. It is true what he adds — that this is frivolous and against the common Scholastic doctrine. To both I reply: Scotus rightly

admits, in accordance with his principles, as many real relations as there are positive Attributes — just as St. Thomas and his school in their principles must admit more relations of reason, which in their principles are equivalent to Scotus's relations, who posits them as real where St. Thomas posits them as of reason, since these are posited with a foundation in reality, which foundations in Scotus's view, before any act of thought, are formally distinct from the nature of the thing — otherwise how could they induce distinct relations by reason? Therefore it seems fitting and consonant with truth to posit them as formally distinct from the nature of the thing.

I said above "positive Attributes" on account of the question whether there are negative Attributes in God — such as eternity seems to be — on which there will be discussion elsewhere.

COLLATION IX. DISTINCTION I. On the question whether the Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit.

Referring to Question 37 of the First Part of St. Thomas, article 2; and to I Sentences, d. 32, qq. 1 and 2 of Scotus. The texts are cited and examined.

In this most celebrated question, St. Thomas affirms and Scotus does not deny. Yet in the mode of understanding and expounding they differ greatly. For St. Thomas understands and expounds it thus at the cited article 2, q. 37, in the body: "For the clarity of this it must be known that since a thing is commonly denominated by its forms — as the white by whiteness, man by humanity — everything from which something is denominated has in that respect the relationship of form. As if I say 'this one is clothed with a garment,' that ablative is construed in the relationship of formal cause, though it is not a form. Now it happens that something is denominated by what proceeds from it — not only as an agent by action, but also by the term of the action itself, which is the effect, when that effect is included in the notion of the action. For we say that fire is heating by heating, though heating is not heat, which is the form of fire, but an action proceeding from fire. And we say that a tree is flowering with flowers, though flowers are not the form of the tree but certain effects proceeding from it. According to this, therefore, when 'to love' in the Divine realm is taken in two ways — essentially and notionally — taken essentially, the Father and Son do not love themselves through the Holy Spirit, but through their essence. Hence Augustine in book XV of *On the Trinity*: 'Who dares to say that the Father loves neither himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit except through the Holy Spirit?' And according to this the first opinions proceed. According to the notional sense, to love is nothing other than to spirate love, just as 'to say' is to produce the Word, and 'to flower' is to produce flowers. Therefore just as the tree is said to be flowering with flowers, so the Father is said to say with the Word or Son himself and all creatures. And the Father and Son are said to love with the Holy Spirit proceeding, both themselves and us."

Contrary to this, Scotus says at I Sentences, d. 32, q. 2 (*Contra*, n. 5), after having set out St. Thomas's position in his own words as we have done: "Against this: just as 'to build' distinctly imports the term which is the building, yet it is not granted that the builder builds by the building, so in the present case spirating also more distinctly imports the Holy Spirit than does loving, and yet it is not granted that the Father and Son spirate through the Holy Spirit. Also even if such a predication were granted, nevertheless not as conversive over the agent, because it would not be granted about fire that something is said of it that terminates in the fire itself as in something produced by itself." And presently: "Furthermore the example on which they rely is not to the purpose; for 'to flower' is a neuter verb, not active, such as 'to love' and 'to love' are, and signifies not formally a production of something. For every neuter verb signifies one and the same as the corresponding adjective noun would, except that the noun signifies in the mode of habit and rest, and the verb as it were in becoming, just as 'hot' signifies the same as 'to be hot' in the mode of rest, and 'to be hot' as it were in becoming. And just as such a denominative noun could be said of something with an ablative denoting that from which the subject is denominated by such denomination, so a neuter verb could be construed with the ablative in the same relationship of a denominating form. For so it is granted that fire is hot with heat, just as it is warm with heat, and both are in the relationship of form from which that denomination comes — in the mode of rest in one and in the mode of becoming in the other. This form in something is sometimes inhering, as a quality; sometimes it holds the mode of an extrinsic denominative form, as with the genus of habit, or the mode of clothing, and in either mode denomination can occur. And just as something is denominated not only from form but sometimes from something extrinsic, so the denominative could be said of it with that extrinsic in the ablative; and this whether that denominative is signified notionally or verbally: for just as one could say 'this one is adorned with a garment' insofar as 'adorned' signifies something of the genus of habit, so one could say 'this one shines with a garment' or with some other neuter verb that signifies the same as that denominative — namely to be adorned. And so it is in the present, because 'to flower' does not formally signify the tree producing the flower. For if one placed an active verb signifying the same — say, 'to florify,' if that word were in use — this would be false: 'the tree florifies with flowers'; but this would be true: 'the tree flowers with flowers,' because by that neuter verb something is signified that denominates the subject as if in the mode of habit, because although in inanimate things there is not properly habit — since properly habit is only in animate beings — they can nonetheless be denominated by something adjacent, which insofar as it is in some manner an ornament or covering of them can be reduced to the genus of habit. And then just as one would say 'the tree is in flower with flowers' and the ablative would be construed in the notion of that from which the subject is denominated according to such a denomination, so 'with flowers' is construed with the verb 'to flower' in the same manner." So far

Scotus against the mode of understanding and expounding that affirmative proposition: "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit."

SECTION I. The opinion of St. Thomas explained above is effectively and rightly attacked by Scotus.

These arguments of Scotus are so effective that Torres — whom Vasquez customarily calls the Canarian — otherwise a most sharp defender and most faithful follower of St. Thomas on Part I, q. 37, acknowledges them to be indissoluble, and therefore defects from St. Thomas to Scotus and entirely judges that the proposition "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit" must be denied, just as that other one: "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom" — since the reason is the same for both. Suarez notes this of Torres at book XI, chapter 3, n. 3. Cajetan wonderfully tortures himself in replying and devising an evasion, as appears in his commentaries on the text of this question, and with him the rest of the Thomists are tormented, including the Salmanticensians among them.

Scotus's arguments come down to showing that no agent who, by acting, produces an effect can be formally affected by it, nor be denominated by it as affected. This is plain from the fact that since the effect is from the agent as from a principle, and thus is the term of the action, it cannot be dragged back and referred to its principle from which it proceeded. Since therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son as from one acting and spirating principle, and presupposing them in the genus of loving and spirating notionally, and is the term of love or active spiration, it cannot denominate the lovers as itself — those from whom it proceeded as from a loving principle.

In order to evade the force of this argument, St. Thomas devised a certain genus of actions that could pour the term back into its principle and denominate it — because such an effect somehow brings the principle with itself and affects it by denominating it. This appears in fire, which by heating carries in that very action of heating the heat in the subject heated, and as it is hot it heats, and by heating acts and produces the term of heat, from which it is called heating, never abandoning the heat which the heating always retains. He offers the same other example of a tree emitting flowers, which, as germinating and emitting them as a principle, is said to be flowering with flowers. So therefore the Father and Son, producing the Holy Spirit by loving, carry with them, as they speak, notional love, communicating it to the Holy Spirit; hence they draw it to themselves and are denominated by it.

That genus of actions is entirely distinct from another, in which the effect passes into something else distinct from its principle, not carrying it with the action but leaving it in the subject or patient — as is building, which is so from the builder that it wholly tends and passes to the building, so that in no way can it be

drawn back or denominate the builder; for of this it cannot be said: "he builds by the building."

Cajetan, not content with St. Thomas's solution — who had not foreseen all of Scotus's arguments — devised another way of replying. For having set out Scotus's arguments in order, he supposes and notes two things. First: in the act of producing the Holy Spirit two verbs intervene — "to love" and "to spirate." Of these, "to love" includes something more in its meaning than "to spirate," since the latter is entirely notional and the former expresses the notion less. Second: in two ways the act or effect of an action is enclosed in the meaning — one by determining the quality of the action, as "to heat" and "to whiten" pertain to heat and whiteness; the other by joining the effect to the action, as in the produced element to its production — as in "to say," taken vocally, the vocal word is enclosed, since "to say" is to utter a word; and in this way the verb "to love" is taken in the present.

This observation of Cajetan is not well placed nor well applied to the question. Not well placed, because it is not true nor in conformity with St. Thomas. It is not true because every action is joined with its effect, and every effect joined to its production, and much more that one which never leaves the action and carries it with itself, as heating and whitening. It is not in conformity with St. Thomas, because St. Thomas admitted as an example of loving oneself through the Holy Spirit the action of heating, which Cajetan excluded because it is a specifying and determining action only — of the first genus he proposed and rejected, not of the second he accepted and approved. It is not well applied to the present because "to love" and "to spirate" are actions joined with their produced effects, just as other actions he cites: for no one loves except through love, no one spirates except through spiration, just as no one says except with words, no one narrates a history except with narration. Therefore there is an entirely equal reason for all actions; hence nothing apt for resolving the proposed difficulty was brought by Cajetan. Certainly St. Thomas spoke much better and more clearly, and is more easily understood than Cajetan expounded him.

Cajetan also wrongly joined together examples of three verbs as though they were of the same reason in signifying: "to heat," "to whiten," "to build." Let the reader look at Cajetan. But this is false, since the first two carry form with them, the third does not at all — for no one builds by the building. Hence Scotus uses the verb "to build" to attack St. Thomas's position, against which Cajetan objects by equally admitting the verb of building with the verb of heating, which St. Thomas adduced in defense of his own position; and he would not have adduced it unless he thought it had a different meaning from the verb of building. Therefore I cannot free Cajetan in interpretation, any more than in the solution of the arguments.

On this Lychetus thus expostulates with him: "When he says that a conversive construction can be made over itself — as 'John says himself' — namely with a word, it is plain that this response is manifestly false by the force of the words, nor is it granted that someone says himself with a word, as 'to say' imports an action; just as we do not grant that fire is hot with itself — that is, heats with heat. And when he says that it is true when the object of the act can be the agent itself, as happens in the present — I ask what he means by 'object of the act.' If it is the producing itself — say, that such an act terminates in it, as when I say 'I say myself with a word,' because that very saying terminates in me as the object concerning which — in this way it is not true, for when we say 'the Father loves himself through the Holy Spirit,' loving does not terminate in the producing Father, but terminates only in the Holy Spirit. Yet if some object is given, concerning which — that can only be the Divine essence; but that is not the producing, spirating, loving notionally." So Lychetus, to whom I add more explicitly: "Peter says himself with his word" can have three senses. First: he declares himself with his own word — that is, with the sound of his voice declares by words that he is Peter. Second: he affirms with words that he is Peter, and then Peter is the object of his saying. Third: the word and voice is the instrument of the one saying he is Peter. The first sense is most certain, but in that sense words are taken as voices and natural signs, not as significative words — and it does nothing for the purpose of the question. The third sense likewise profits nothing, because there the word is the instrument of saying he is Peter, not a production or effect of a producing cause.

About the second sense there is doubt, because Peter, by affirming and saying, manifests that he is Peter, and Peter thus manifested returns to himself manifesting by saying. In the first mode he is the object of himself, in the second he is the agent and producer. And in this third sense Cajetan seems to philosophize; let us now see whether aptly or inaptly. Certainly inaptly. Because when Peter says he is Peter he does not produce Peter in the genus of the manifested, nor is Peter the effect of himself, but only produces words signifying Peter, which by declaring him to be Peter do not return the object to the agent but propose its signification — and here there is no true production nor true effect, except the uttering of sounds, whose signification is a being of reason and by institution. Therefore the example is inapt, for the object does not return to the agent — which is impossible — but only the uttered words signify that the agent is Peter. But in our case there is an agent and lover, producing, which through production — which is love — produces love, which is the Holy Spirit, distinct from the producer, through which love — or Holy Spirit — the Father is said to love himself. So here everything is true and real; otherwise in Cajetan's example, which is concerned only with words and significative denomination, from which it follows that it is not suitable or to the purpose of the proposed question.

There remains the example of the verb "to flower" in the tree, of which it is said that it flowers with flowers — which Scotus attacks acutely, truly, and really, because that verb is neuter, not active, such as "to love" and "to love" are, and therefore contains nothing real. For it presupposes the production of flowers, about which the argument should proceed if it is to conclude anything — namely, "the tree produces flowers, already in flower and flowering produces the flowers, and with the flowers produced flowers," which is entirely false. And indeed Cajetan, because he saw Scotus's argument, said in his commentary something that is not true: "Sustaining the example," he says, "we say that 'to flower' truly signifies to emit flowers, as is plain from the use of speakers" — where he put the active verb "to emit flowers" in place of "to flower," which no Latin speaker would have said, nor is such the use of speakers. Certainly St. Thomas did not dare to say that; he only posited the denomination, abstracting from the neuter or active verb, because he foresaw the difficulty. As for Cajetan, he too had foreseen it; for he said: "To the things adduced in the fourth place against the example of flowering, it can easily be said that we posit examples not that it is so." He was afraid to admit the example of flowering, knowing it was neuter in signification, not active, such as was needed for proving. Certainly St. Thomas frankly said in the reply to the second: "we do not say that the tree produces the flower with the flower" — entirely denying the active signification.

Vasquez, however, brings the best example for refuting Cajetan at Disputation 151, c. 2, n. 6, where he agrees with Scotus about the verb "to shine," when someone is said to shine with gold, gems, and pearls — as the Church sings in the hymn of All Saints: "The gates shine with pearls" — which however are not produced by it; and he notes with Lychetus in the commentaries: if the flowers were from God, not produced by the tree, the tree would nonetheless be said to flower; and so the signification of the verb "to flower" is neuter, not active.

Yet Vasquez speaks this less Latinely and less aptly. If some verb signified the action of producing those flowers — say, if we imagine the verb "to florify" — certainly it would not be said "the tree florifies with flowers." For that verb "florify" does not properly render the active signification, but the verb "to florify" does. Perhaps Vasquez wrote this, and the misprint crept in so that "florify" was written instead of "florify." Scotus and Lychetus better placed "to florify" actively. It is established that to the subtle author Vasquez the subtleties devised by Cajetan in this place do not commend themselves, and so Lychetus concludes: "From these it is plain how that new expositor poorly expounds St. Thomas and worse defends him."

A different mode of expounding and defending is proposed by Father Vasquez in the name of others at Disputation 151, c. 2, n. 9, who say that the terms of immanent actions are reflected upon the agents because they remain in them and within them after the manner of an informing form, and therefore can both bring about and denominately affect them — which does not happen with

transient actions. But Vasquez refutes this with two arguments. The first: because in some transient actions the same happens as in immanent ones, as when fire heats wood. The second: because not all immanent actions have this property, for generation and spiration are immanent actions in God, and yet they do not affect and denominate the generating and spirating. For it is not said "the Father generates himself through the Son, nor do the Father and Son spirate themselves through the Holy Spirit." And although with the same theologians he replies that such immanent actions are called after the manner of transient ones, since generation and spiration tend outside the principles and do not draw the term inside to remain, Vasquez nonetheless refutes that response because the Holy Spirit produced through notional love is a term really distinct from the Father and Son; hence the consequence does not hold — just as it does not hold: "The Father begets wisdom ad intra, therefore he is wise with begotten wisdom," which those theologians do not admit.

And so Vasquez agrees with Scotus. Suarez, in order not to agree with Vasquez, finds another response. He acknowledges the difficulty of St. Thomas's position, and does not approve the examples of fire heating and the tree flowering with flowers, at book XI, chapter 3, n. 9; but at n. 10 he says that this denomination — of those loving themselves through the Holy Spirit — can be of a certain affective union; for those who love one another are united in affection, and therefore can rightly be said to be united and by that love itself, as though by a union and produced term in which they are united. He says moreover not informatively but terminatively: in which sense, he says, the Fathers call the Holy Spirit the bond and unity of Father and Son, and because that affective union is, it is rightly signified by the verb of loving. Suarez is right in this, but not according to the mind of St. Thomas nor of the Thomists, who posit that love after the mode of informing, not terminating, and for this reason produce the example of the flowering tree and the heating fire — actions that not only terminate in flowers and heat but carry those terms with themselves and reflect them back to the tree and fire.

Furthermore I attack that mode of speaking by Suarez, because that is not union to the term but production; and that love is a notional act which induces diversity, not identity, in the formal term of the Person — which is the third Person, really distinct from the Father and Son spirating through that active love — that love and, so to speak, passive love, which as it is produced and constituted is notional love that imports distinction, not union. What is called bond and union of Father and Son comes from the force of the procession, which is from the Father and Son united in one principle of producing love — that is, the Holy Spirit — who, thus produced by the two and being one, has with them a bond and union of essential love, which is common to all. He is moreover called union and bond because, since the Father and Son are fecund for the production of love in first act, they do not exercise that fecundity except

when united they produce the Holy Spirit, whom if they did not produce they would be sterile and solitary, divided from each other, not bound and coupled.

And so Scotus's position remains most true in attacking the sense and examples of the Thomists who, with their Angelic master, posit a certain notional love after the manner of a form drawn back and reflected to Father and Son, by which they are denominated as loving themselves — and this sense is shown to be improbable and unable to stand with the truth of notional love.

And lest any scruple remain in dissenting from St. Thomas and his Angelic school, I wish to bring a new argument from my own store for the truth of the Scotistic position, which seems to me effective. It is of this kind, reduced to the precise logical form. Everything that is proper and notional in God is incommunicable both after the mode of an affecting form and after the mode of a perfecting act, and is entirely without active denomination resulting in another. But such is the love by which the Holy Spirit is constituted. Therefore that cannot be communicated in any of the three modes assumed in the major. The syllogism is in form. The major is most certain, and by this the relative is distinguished from the absolute, the common from the notional. The minor is the doctrine of St. Thomas and his school, which teaches that just as the Son is produced through intellection, not through saying, so the Holy Spirit proceeds through love, not through spiration — notional love, I say, and formal, of which kind is also the intellection through which the Word is begotten. The consequence rightly follows.

This is confirmed because St. Thomas and the Thomists deny that spiration is communicative of love, because it is entirely notional and the proper production of the Holy Spirit, which cannot at all be reflected back and poured onto the Father and Son, denominating them as lovers through produced love. But the notional love which is formally the production of the Holy Spirit stands in its concept just as spiration does in Scotus's view; therefore that notional love is entirely incapable of any common notion and denomination over the loving and producing Persons, between whom there is necessarily opposition, not similarity and communication. Content with this argument, I rest and close this section.

SECTION II. This proposition — "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit" — is shown to be true in Scotus's way.

Since this proposition is admitted by the holy Fathers, received by theologians, and celebrated in the schools — as we shall say in its proper place below — Scotus's marvelous genius devised a way in which it could be true, and it was necessary to find this new way, since the one St. Thomas had opened seemed less suitable and less expedient, as we have shown by many arguments and some authors. Scotus therefore found it and laid it out at the cited I Sentences, d. 32, q. 2 (*Ad istam quaestionem soluendam*). He first sets out the doctrine on saying, and

in it first shows the mode in which this proposition is true: "The Father says himself and all creatures by the Word" — so that by this example he may demonstrate that it can likewise be affirmed: "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit." For if in the Word — which is notionally produced by saying — the truth of the proposition "the Father says himself by the Word" holds, a fortiori in the Holy Spirit, who proceeds by loving, the truth of this proposition "the Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit" will hold.

Scotus places this principle at the cited question 2 (*Ad istam quaestionem soluendam*, n. 6): "The concept of our intellect formally declares and represents its object; but the person understanding and producing that concept declares and represents through it effectively, since it is the cause of that concept representing and declaring." He explains this moreover by example. If someone produces a mirror, and images are reflected in it, the mirror indeed formally declares and shows the images; but the one producing the mirror declares and shows effectively. This is most true. Then Scotus applies it: the Divine Word is expressed and produced by the saying Father quasi-effectively — the Word which formally represents the Father and the Essence and everything knowable. Hence it comes about that the Father principiatively says and declares by the Word everything that the Word says and declares. From this it follows that the Father says himself by the Word, because he begets the Word which formally represents the Father. And by this reasoning he reconciles the diverse authorities of Augustine and Anselm, which seem to teach contrary things, yet are rendered harmonious and concordant when expounded in this way.

I cite Scotus's words because they are apt and perspicuous, taken from that (*Ad istam quaestionem soluendam*, n. 7): "The Word declares all declarable things and itself by itself formally; and of this speaks Augustine, book VII of *On the Trinity*, chapter 3: 'If this word which we utter, temporal and transitory, both shows itself and that of which we speak, how much more the Word of God through which all things were made.'" In this sense, says Scotus, the Word is essential. Then he adds that the Word can signify the relationship of the one declaring, insofar as it belongs to someone not formally but principiatively, and in this way it is said of the Father that he says by the Word — and in this sense speaks Augustine, book VII of *On the Trinity*, chapter 1, that the Father says by the Word. In this manner also speaks Augustine, book XV of *On the Trinity*, chapter 14: "The Father, saying himself, begot the Son equal to himself in all things" — where he takes "to say" as principiatively to declare.

Scotus further notes that this proposition does not belong to the Holy Spirit — "The Holy Spirit says by the Word" — but only to the Father, because the Holy Spirit does not produce the Word nor is its principle, as the Father is. And indeed all of this Scotus says acutely and truly. Nothing more subtle can be conceived.

Let us now apply this way to the Holy Spirit, and show the proposition to be true: "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit." At (*Ad aliam quaestionem de Spiritu Sancto*, n. 1), he says that our love formally loves the objects proposed to it; but the person loving and producing that love also loves through it principiatively all the loved objects — including among them the producing lover himself. For when the lover produces that love, he principiates love for all things, and that love formally and essentially loves the loving producer himself. Thus the Father and Son, producing by loving the Holy Spirit, who is the formal love of all lovable things — among which are the Father and Son themselves — love themselves principiatively, insofar as they produce that love by which they are formally and essentially loved and cherished. Which is most true. No less true that other doctrine: that the Holy Spirit cannot say himself by the Word, but the Son can love himself through the Holy Spirit; because the Holy Spirit is not the principle of the Word — only the Father is; but the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit together with the Father, and therefore can be said to love himself through the Holy Spirit principiatively, as one who produces him.

Father Gabriel Vasquez perhaps perceived this way in Scotus at Disputation 151, c. 3, where, having abandoned the position of St. Thomas as too difficult, he proposes another which at the end of that chapter n. 14 he attributes to Scotus — but far more difficult than the Scotistic one. For he posits certain actions which refer the denomination of form back to the agent, such as heating and love. But insofar as Vasquez deduces that formal denomination from the term back to the agent, his position cannot be proved for me. For who would grant what he affirms: that fire heating and a man whitening receive denomination from the heat poured into the wood and from the whiteness induced in the wall, and are through it denominated as heating themselves or whitening themselves? This Vasquez needed to prove — he who wanted to find a new way by retaining actions and inferring from their distinction and diversity that some are reflected back through their terms to agents and others are not, sustaining formal affection and denomination communicated to agents through terms — which he himself previously disapproved, and which in no way can be brought about. He should therefore, departing from St. Thomas's sense, have followed Scotus's sense and understood him more rightly, in order to follow him faithfully — as he seems to have wanted at the end of that chapter, when he said: "Let us therefore conclude with Scotus, loc. cit." — that is, in I Sentences, d. 32, q. 2, (*Ad aliam quaestionem de Spiritu Sancto*) — "from which this reasoning is clearly gathered. But let us examine the argument."

"Just as in God love has order not only to the produced term but also to the thing loved, and saying, intellection, to the thing said or understood, in the same way the love itself produced through love regards the beloved thing, and the Word the said thing; and therefore they denominate the agents through the respect to the thing understood or loved." Vasquez does not reach Scotus's mind, while attributing to him that the Father and Son are denominated loving

themselves through the notional love of the Holy Spirit as formally accepted from them; for the passive term cannot actively affect the producers — although it is referred to them by a relation that itself indicates their activity, not their passion. For heating wood is never said to heat itself, nor does whitening a wall whiten or whiten itself through heat produced in the wood or whiteness induced in the wall. From this it is plain that the Father and Son are denominated as loving themselves through the Holy Spirit only principiatively, insofar as principiating love itself they produced that by which they are formally loved and cherished.

For fuller doctrine Scotus notes: the Word or concept of ours has two relations — one of the begotten to the begetter, or produced to the producer, which is mutual; another of the declarer to the declared, which is not mutual. Then in the Divine Word there is a real relation to the producing and begetting Father, and another of reason of the declarative to itself and to all other things it declares. Furthermore he adds that "to say" is taken in two ways: essentially and notionally. Anselm took it essentially in the *Monologion* when he said: "Nothing else for the Holy Spirit is to say than to see by thinking." And in this sense all Persons say and understand. Richard of St. Victor took it notionally at book VI of *On the Trinity*: "The Father alone," he says, "says." And Augustine: "The Father says the Word in which he disposed all things."

Scotus then passes to the question on the Holy Spirit and says that love in us has a real relation to the producer — one, and perhaps mutual — and another to the object, not mutual; and that so the matter stands in Divine love. Hence it is that the producer can be denominated by that same relation or disposition of the produced principiatively. And according to those relations and denominations, partly essentially and partly notionally it proceeds. Hence just as "to say" is not merely essential or merely notional, so also "to love" is not merely essential nor merely notional according to the common meanings and senses in which it is taken. Love when it encompasses all Persons is taken essentially; when it only affects and denominates the Father and Son, love is taken notionally and principiatively. And similarly the matter stands with the vocabulary of "saying" and "to say" in the divine realm: when the Father and Son and Holy Spirit say, "to say" is taken essentially; when the Father alone is said to say, it is taken notionally. And so the whole question is resolved.

SECTION III. What is to be thought of the proposition "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom," and what Augustine thought of it.

Since Scotus at this place treated this question accurately and diligently investigated and perspicuously expounded the mind of St. Augustine — denying that the proposition adduced in the title is true — I think it will be worthwhile to set forth what Augustine thought of it in various places.

The common opinion is that Augustine first approved it and afterwards disapproved it, retracting himself upon better consideration. This is the case. Let us cite the passage in which Augustine said this at book LXXXIII *Questions*, question 23: "When God is called wise, and is called wise by that wisdom without which it is unlawful to believe either that he was at some time or that he is, he is not called wise by participation in wisdom, as the soul — which can be and not be wise — but because he himself begot the Wisdom by which he is said to be wise." Here is the perspicuous passage in which the Father God is said to be wise with begotten wisdom. Let us now see how he retracted it at book I of the *Retractations*, chapter 26: "At q. 23, on Father and Son, where I said that he himself begot the Wisdom by which he is said to be wise; but this question we treated better afterwards in the book *On the Trinity*." He does not disapprove the saying but refers himself to that place of *On the Trinity* where he says he treated it better; but he could have treated it better without retracting his position — that is, more clearly, more fully, more meticulously.

Let us go there. In book VII of *On the Trinity*, chapters 1 and 2, he proposes the question and in the first chapter says: "Let us ask whether the Father is so wise by his wisdom that he is wise by the Wisdom he begot." And below: "This discussion arose from what is written: that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God" (II Corinthians 1, n. 24). Then after a long reasoning about absolutes and relatives in God he says: "If to be here is the same as to be wise, the Father is not wise by the wisdom he begot; otherwise not he, but she, begot him." For he had assumed that to be is the same as to be wise for God, and that the Father is the origin and begetter of Wisdom. Then he adds: "What else do we say when we say 'to be here is the same as to be wise' unless this is what is, that he is wise — so that wisdom may be essential in the Father, not relative and notional?" Then he adds: "The Father himself is wisdom; so the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father as he is called the Light of the Father — that is, that just as light from light, and both are one light, so wisdom from wisdom, both one wisdom; therefore also one essence: because to be there is the same as to be wise. Therefore the Father is not wise with begotten and notional wisdom." For "the Father," he says at chapter 2, "and the Son together are not both one Word, because they are not both together one Son; for he is Son because Word, and Word because Son; and therefore not Word because wisdom, because Word is not said with reference to itself but only relatively to him whose Word it is, as Son to Father. But wisdom is said because of essence, and therefore because there is one essence, there is one wisdom. Therefore the Father is not wise with begotten wisdom but with essential wisdom, which he communicates to the Son whom he begot, just as the essence is communicated to him."

Hence both together, he says at the same chapter 2, are one wisdom and one essence. Again at book XV of *On the Trinity*, chapter 7, he argues thus: "In that Trinity who would dare to say that the Father neither understands himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit except through the Son, or loves except through the

Holy Spirit, while through himself he only remembers himself or the Son or the Holy Spirit; the Son likewise neither remembers himself nor the Father except through the Father, nor loves except through the Holy Spirit, while through himself he only understands — both himself and the Father and the Holy Spirit; similarly the Holy Spirit through the Father remembers both the Father and the Son and himself, and through the Son understands both the Father and the Son and himself, while through himself he only loves both himself and the Father and the Son — as if memory were the Father — of himself, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit — understanding the Son — of himself, of the Father, and of the Holy Spirit — and the Holy Spirit the love — of himself and of the Father and of the Son? Who would presume to think or affirm this in that Trinity?"

Let the reader pay close attention. For if only the Son there understands, so as to be the understanding for himself and for the Father and for the Holy Spirit, it leads back to that absurdity: that the Father is not wise by himself but by the Son, nor has wisdom begotten wisdom, but the Father is called wise by that wisdom which he begot. "For where there is no understanding, neither can there be wisdom; and hence, if the Father does not understand himself but the Son understands for the Father, certainly the Son makes the Father wise, and this is for God to be what it is to be wise, that essence of his is wisdom — not the Son from the Father, which is true, but rather the Father has his essence from the Son, which is most absurd and most false." He concludes that this absurdity was in book VII refuted and rejected with certainty.

"Therefore God the Father is wise by that wisdom which is itself his own, and the Son is the wisdom of the Father from wisdom — what the Father is, from whom the Son was begotten." These passages were largely gathered and cited by the Master at d. 22 of this distinction, to examine whether it can be said that the Father is wise with begotten wisdom. There are other places of Augustine in which he gives the same doctrine. But let these suffice, and that one in book VI of *On the Trinity*, chapters 1 and 2. And indeed by these testimonies convinced, authors deny that proposition can be sustained — among them St. Thomas at I Sentences, d. 32, q. 2, a. 2, and Scotus here q. 2 (*Ad secundum*, n. 9); and Gabriel and Durand; moreover Capreolus and Cajetan in his commentary on St. Thomas; Lychetus and other interpreters of Scotus; Vasquez at Disputation 142, c. 2, and Disputation 150, c. 6; and Suarez at book XI of *On the Trinity*, chapter 3, who also notes that Augustine retracted this after admitting it at that question 23 of book LXXXIII *Questions*.

I note however our scholiast on this passage of Scotus ad litteram C of the Master in I Sentences cited the place from book VII, chapter 3, when he should have cited chapters 1 and 2 as we did. But I diligently note that Augustine retracted his opinion in that sense from which it followed that the Father was wise through the Son in such a way that he was not essentially wise himself — and therefore did not deny that, given he is essentially wise, he can in some way

also be called wise through the Son, which I see observed by no author; and that sense is very different from the first, which Augustine rightly retracted. For that the Father would not be wise by himself and in himself, but only wise through the Son, receiving wisdom from the Son, is not only false but also heretical doctrine, which Augustine would never have handed on in that book LXXXIII *Questions*. Hence there still remains safely and intactly another question: whether, given that the Father begot the Son as wisdom, and so the Son is the wisdom begotten by the Father, he can denominate the Father as wise. Just as in the present question we ask whether the Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit whom they produce, and given that they produce him and spirate him by loving.

In that sense I think Augustine spoke in that question 23, in which he retracted himself less than, speaking ambiguously, referred himself to the books *On the Trinity*. I clearly perceive that it matters not a little between those two states of the question, and that Augustine denied that proposition which excluded from the Father the ingenerate and essential wisdom which he communicated to the Son. But I also see the connection of both senses: for from the fact that the Father can receive wisdom from the Son and be wise through it, it follows that the prior and essential wisdom is destroyed — since if the Father can receive wisdom from the Son and be wise through it, it follows that he is not wise by himself and in himself, but by the Son; and so he loses the nature of Father by receiving wisdom from the Son, to whom the Father gave it from himself. And from the Father giving it, it passed into the Son receiving it; and consequently the Father ceases to be, since he is not wise from himself, nor God. Or certainly, if this does not follow, it follows that the Father is wise in two ways: in one way from himself, in another from another — that is, from the Son — and for that reason he will be at once Father and Son. For the Father is presupposed wise from himself; the Son is presupposed to be made wise from another. Therefore by no means should that proposition be admitted: "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom" — not in the first sense, which is entirely false and heretical, since it presupposes the Father not to be by himself and in himself wise but only wise through the Son and consequently not to be the Father; not in the second, which is less to be censured, but nonetheless not safe on account of the consequence. For it follows from it that the Father is wise from himself and communicates wisdom to the Son, and in turn is wise from another — that is, from the Son who had received wisdom from the Father.

SECTION IV. What Augustine thought of the proposition "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit," and whether it can be sustained in an Augustinian sense.

Although from the cited and examined passage of book XV of *On the Trinity*, chapter 7, the same reasoning seems to hold entirely for Augustine regarding both propositions — since Augustine expressly said: "Who would dare to say that

the Father neither himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit loves except through the Holy Spirit?" — the common opinion nevertheless holds that Augustine spoke differently of love and admitted this proposition: "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit."

Thus the Master at d. 31, lit. L: "It is said that the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father. Therefore the Holy Spirit is rightly called the bond or concord of Father and Son; through him all things are connected." Hence Augustine at book V of *On the Trinity*, chapter 13: "The Holy Spirit is a certain consubstantial communion of Father and Son." The same at book VII of *On the Trinity*, chapter 3: "The Holy Spirit is the highest love, joining both and binding us below." And at d. 32, lit. A: "It is asked whether the Father or Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit." And lit. B thus: "We reply what Augustine seems to signify: namely, that the Father and Son love each other and maintain unity, not only through their own essence but through their own proper gift." He says therefore at book VI of *On the Trinity*, chapter 5: "It is manifest that that one of the two is not he through whom he who is born by the lover is loved, and he who loves his begetter, keeping not by participation but by their own essence the unity of peace — not by the bestowal of some higher being but by their own proper gift." Here he says they keep unity through their own essence and through their own proper gift.

The same at book XV of *On the Trinity*, chapter 7: "Who would dare to say that the Father neither himself nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit loves except through the Holy Spirit?" Here he openly shows the Father not only loves through the Holy Spirit; yet he does not simply say the Father does not love through the Holy Spirit. The Master, on the other hand, thinks differently about the other proposition: "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom." For there at lit. C he concludes from Augustine: "From this it is clear that the Father is not wise with begotten wisdom but by his own ingenerate wisdom."

Scotus moreover at I Sentences, d. 32, q. 1 (*Contra*, n. 1) cites an express passage from book VI of *On the Trinity*, chapter 5: "The Holy Spirit is the one through whom the Begotten is loved by the Begetter and loves his Begetter." The same passage is cited by St. Thomas at Part I, q. 37, a. 2; and Vasquez cites only this passage at Disputation 151 and refers to Disputation 150, c. 3 — which should have been the second. Suarez at book XI, chapter 3, says he finds only two passages of Augustine that favor this position: that one from book VI of *On the Trinity*, chapter 5, and another adjoined to it: "Not more than three are: the one loving him who is from him, the other loving him from whom he is, love itself." The others we cited with the Master Suarez seems either not to have seen or to have neglected. But he cites several theologians approving the proposition, who are founded, he says, on Augustine's authority, whose that locution they believe was. Richard of St. Victor in a certain treatise on various difficulties to Bernard

agrees with them. Indeed Bernard himself indicates this position at Sermon III on Pentecost, Sermon VIII in the Song, and *On the Love of God*, chapters 7 and 8.

Many Ancients treated these two questions on love and saying in accordance with St. Augustine: Alexander of Hales at Part I, q. 67, n. 3, a. 7; Aegidius of Rome; Mayronis; Argentinas; Gabriel. But none more accurately than St. Bonaventure in I Sentences, d. 32, q. 1, who cites the testimonies of the Fathers and first of all those of Hugo, whose excellent opinions he cites, which Suarez likewise uses — which I think he received from Bonaventure. I do not want, nor can I, deny that the greater part of those authors think Augustine admits the proposition: "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit" — but not that other one about the Father being wise with begotten wisdom, and that they refute Godfrey who says Augustine retracted both at the same time, as appears in Scotus and others.

I clearly see some distinction between the two: not the common one drawn from the different nature of wisdom and love, but another arising from the different mode of speaking. For in the first — "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom" — the form is placed in quiet being and in completed being; but in the other — "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit" — the love is placed in becoming and not in the mode of rest but in action, which somewhat varies the signification and diminishes the difficulty in loving. For the mode of signifying action and form in becoming can more easily draw the sense from the effect and term to the agent and principle than the mode of signifying form after the action in its state of permanent rest.

I therefore say that Augustine did not retract this proposition "The Father and Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit" as he retracted the other — "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom" — not because he thought it denominates formally the Father and Son as loving themselves through the Holy Spirit, but because its sense — since it was concerned with action — could principiatively pertain to the Father and Son producing by loving, as we said above about the Word: "The Father says himself by the Word"; which does not hold with our proposition "The Father is wise with begotten wisdom," which does not include action and therefore is not drawn back to the agent. Hence there is greater reason for one than the other.

But as regards the formal sense, I do not think Augustine admitted that proposition, any more than that other one about the Father saying himself through the Word, in such a way that the Father and Son — who are the principles of loving — would be formally denominated by the notional love of the Holy Spirit, lest the same incongruity follow: that the Father and Son would receive love from the Holy Spirit, which they had produced and communicated to him by producing him. And indeed the reason is the same for both.

To this I add my argument on the notional predicate, which cannot be common with others. Such is that of loving formally oneself through the Holy Spirit, as he is the third Person. Therefore it cannot be common to the Father and Son. There remains therefore only Scotus's mode of loving oneself principiatively from the part of the action — or rather, to speak better, of the production: by reason of which, concurring in the production of love, they draw to themselves the produced, and whatever the produced brings with itself — that is, the Holy Spirit, who since he is formal love of both Father and Son pertains to them also insofar as they produce him, and by producing principiatively love themselves and are denominated loving.

And I close with Scotus in that question (*Ad aliam*, n. 11): "To the other question on the Holy Spirit we must proceed in the same way as in the preceding question." And in both cases — of saying and spiration, of notional intellection and notional love — entirely the same must be thought. For in the Thomistic school intellection and saying, love and spiration are equivalent in this sense of production, since in it the Son is formally produced through intellection or the Holy Spirit through notional love.

Section V. Whether the Father and the Son Can Be Said to Love Creatures through the Holy Spirit

Saint Thomas affirms this in *q. 37, art. 2, ad 3*, in these words: "To the third objection it must be said that the Father not only loves the Son but also loves himself and us through the Holy Spirit, because, as has been stated, 'to love,' taken in its notional sense, does not only signify the production of a divine Person, but also the Person produced by way of love, which bears a relationship to the thing beloved. Hence, just as the Father expresses himself and every creature through the Word he begets — inasmuch as the Word begotten represents the Father and every creature — so he loves himself and every creature through the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit proceeds as the love of the first goodness, according to which the Father loves himself and every creature. And in this way it is also clear that a relationship to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the love that proceeds, as it were secondarily — namely, insofar as the divine goodness and truth are the principle of knowing and loving every creature."

Scotus, by contrast, denies this in (*1. d. 32, § ad ultimum, n. 14*), saying: "There is no need to concede that the Father and the Son love the creature through the Holy Spirit in the same way as they love themselves through the Holy Spirit. For this mode of loving, taken in its principiative sense, seems to belong primarily to that object of love whose love it formally is by reason of being principiated. To love an object in this sense is to originate a love that is formally the love of that object. But the Holy Spirit, by virtue of his origination, is not — either primarily or concomitantly — the love of the creature, because the creature is loved by God only contingently. And although by virtue of his procession the

Holy Spirit is the essential love, he can nevertheless be said concomitantly to be the love of the Son, because those Persons are primarily loved of necessity by reason of that nature. On this basis one might concede that the Father does not love the creature through the Holy Spirit in the same manner as he loves the Son, because he does not produce a love that, by virtue of its origination, is the love of the creature. Indeed, once the necessary production of that love is complete, it remains contingent whether this love is the love of the creature — this lies in the power not only of the one producing this love but also of the love itself once produced, because the Holy Spirit loves the creature just as contingently as do the Father and the Son."

Scotus is entirely correct, and his argument is so compelling that Torres, also known as Canariensis, was persuaded by it to abandon the position of Saint Thomas and side with Scotus. As Vásquez notes (*d. 152, cap. 1, n. 3*) and in his commentary on *q. 37* of Saint Thomas, Torres even dared to say that the proposition "The Father and the Son love creatures through the Holy Spirit" is, taken in those terms, false, though it can be sustained in some less proper sense — a sense which Vásquez, having set it out, proceeds to refute. Suárez (*lib. 17, c. 3*) concedes a great deal to Scotus's argument while still defending the position of Saint Thomas, saying that the formulation used by Scotus, Canariensis, and Vásquez is not as proper as the preceding one, and should not easily be employed without sufficient clarification.

Vásquez attacks the argument of Lychetus on behalf of Scotus, which Lychetus sets out briefly in his commentary. There was no need to elaborate on it, since Scotus himself had composed it excellently, nor did Vásquez succeed in weakening it when he took it up in his *disp. 157, cap. 1, n. 1*. He refutes it, however, on two grounds. First, because possible creatures, according to Scotus, are loved by God with a love of complacency necessarily, and future creatures are likewise loved — whatever love they may be loved with — according to what he had said in *d. 79, cap. 2, n. 1*, which he says he follows on that point (*n. 3, d. 33, q. un. princ.*); from which it follows that possible creatures are loved through the Holy Spirit, just as it also follows that they are known by the Word — necessarily as possibles, contingently as future. Second, Vásquez claims that Scotus falsely asserts that the Father and the Son under their personal properties are secondary objects with respect to the divine love from which the Holy Spirit proceeds, and that the essence alone is the primary object. On this basis he refutes Scotus's position.

I refute Vásquez in the following way. First, he contradicts himself in reporting Scotus's position. In *d. 79, cap. 2, n. 1* he says that Scotus, in *3. d. 32, q. un.*, asserts that God loves creatures with a love of complacency not freely but necessarily; yet in *d. 152, cap. 1, n. 2* he says that the same Scotus he had cited in that *d. 79* did not say that this love of complacency is necessary. This is a kind of contradiction in Vásquez's own statements, and to resolve it we must produce Scotus's own

words and let him speak for himself. In the passage cited by Vásquez, namely (3. d. 32, q. un., § *ex isto*), Scotus writes: "A second consequence follows, because no simple perfection is proper to any one Person — for this is proved otherwise: if it were proper to some Person, it would be proper to the Holy Spirit, and thus either the Holy Spirit would not proceed necessarily, or God would love something other than himself necessarily." Scotus therefore denies that creatures are loved necessarily, contrary to what Vásquez had said in d. 79. He then continues: "Nothing other than God in whatever being it may have is necessary of itself; therefore no relationship to anything other than God in whatever being it has is absolutely necessary; therefore it cannot be intrinsic to any divine Person insofar as that Person possesses the divine nature in a determinate mode of having it." At this point Lychetus adds: "But if it is said that God loves the creature necessarily, then another inconvenience follows — namely, that God necessarily loves something other than himself, which is simply impossible, as the Doctor makes clear in (*n. 1, d. 8, q. ult.*)."

Therefore Vásquez was wrong in (d. 79) to say that God loves creatures with a love of complacency necessarily according to Scotus's view, and he was right to deny this same point in d. 152.

Now, in response to the objection or solution of Vásquez, I reply that nothing follows from it, because since the Holy Spirit does not proceed from that love of creatures which is not necessary, he cannot contain it in the formal character of his love. This is plain. The instance adduced by Vásquez concerning the Word representing the creature is easily resolved: because creatures, even though they exist not necessarily but contingently — for it is of such creatures that Vásquez speaks — must nevertheless be known necessarily by the Word, since the Word tends toward its object necessarily and by way of nature, and any truth whatsoever is the proper and necessary object of that Word, which cannot fail to know it, since it is capable of divine knowledge and is in itself knowable. Creatures, by contrast, are not necessarily loveable by the divine will, which does not tend by way of nature but by way of will and freedom, which is free to love or not love whenever objects are presented to it by the intellect. Accordingly, God does not love necessarily but freely, whatever finite and created object is set before him for loving, because he is in no way necessitated toward love of any creature whatsoever. The divine intellect, on the other hand, when any knowable object is presented, tends toward it naturally and necessarily, because it is not free to refrain from knowing — indeed it must know, since there would be an imperfection in it if it failed to know. In this way the argument and instance of Vásquez, drawn from the example of the divine Word knowing all things necessarily, is refuted — for it does not hold with respect to the free will in its loving of whatever is proposed to it for loving outside God, since the will is not necessitated toward love of any created object, whose goodness and lovability are finite and cannot oblige God to love.

As for the point concerning the Father and the Son — whether they are absolutely required as primary objects with respect to the love of God from which the Holy Spirit proceeds — we denied above, following Scotus, that both are required, and therefore the argument carries no force. It would indeed be valid on Vásquez's own position, which holds otherwise; and so he concludes nothing by his argumentation, and Scotus's position stands firm in denying that this proposition is true: "The Father and the Son love creatures through the Holy Spirit." It cannot be defended either formally or principiatively: not formally, because the Holy Spirit is not formally the love of creatures, since such love is contingent and may not exist in God; not principiatively, since the Holy Spirit is not produced from that love.

Let the following complaint of Lychetus serve as an appendix to this question. It is found in his commentaries on this passage at *q. 2, d. 32, § nota tamen, n. 4*. Lychetus there raises a serious objection against Cajetan, who, having cited Scotus, attributed to him the view that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of the essence alone in such a way that it proceeds as the Word of a Person only concomitantly. I set out Cajetan's words from his commentary on *q. 34, p. 1, art. 3*: "Scotus, in *2. d. 1, q. 1, art. 2* and *Quodl. q. 14, art. 2*, holds that the Word of God does not proceed from knowledge of creatures but from the divine essence. And again from *d. 32, q. 1, ad ultimum* of the same work it is gathered that he holds that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of the essence alone in such a way that it proceeds as the Word of a Person only concomitantly — so that he imagines the Father, by virtue of knowing the divine essence, to produce the Word, which by virtue of its production expresses the essence, while the divine Persons are expressed concomitantly as things necessarily united to the essence; creatures, on the other hand, the Word represents only after its own production is complete." Cajetan goes on to say: "The foundation of his position is that he holds in *35. d. 1* that creatures are produced by God in known being, and therefore imagines that the divine essence first moves the paternal intellect, as it were, toward the production of the infinite term — that is, the Word — and then toward the finite term — that is, creatures in their known being. And thus the Word cannot be produced from knowledge of creatures, which exists in the second instant of nature." Then, in his critique of this position of Scotus under the heading on "Scotistic imaginings," he writes: "It is easy to respond to the Scotistic imaginings. For it is plain that the primary foundation has no force, because that production of creatures is chimerical and introduces a dangerous doctrine. It follows that the glorious God cannot exist without creatures existing in diminished being — which seems ridiculous in philosophy and scandalous in the faith."

To this Lychetus replies as follows: "I say to this commentator that he misunderstands Scotus when he attributes to him the view that the Father does not produce the Son from known creatures because he produces them in known being in the second instant and after the production of the Son. For this is not

the fundamental reason of Scotus, as is plain from him in 2. d. 1, q. 1." And then: "When he says concerning the known being of creatures that if they were produced in such being by the divine intellect, then God would not be glorious without them — what a remarkable argument. For the Father is not blessed in the Paternity, nor in the Filiation, nor in the equality, and such like, which are nevertheless known necessarily. For he is blessed in the fruible object — that is, in the truly beatifying object, which is the divine essence alone and the simple perfections, though the divine essence is chiefly the origin and foundation of all perfection, as is plain from Scotus in 1. d. 1 and in 4. d. 49. One must therefore find other and better arguments. And when he says that to posit such a being in known being is ridiculous to philosophers — that is true for those who do not understand the Philosopher, as has been shown above in d. 2, q. 1, d. 35, 36. And that it is a scandal in the faith — that is true for those who deviate from the true Catholic faith and understand little of what belongs to faith. For faith does not teach one to speak so calumniously against a true Doctor commended by all sound minds, not the least of whose statements has been shown to have been condemned by the universal study of Paris. Nor is it surprising that this new commentator says such things, because in this he shows himself to be truly a new commentator — since he departs from the footsteps of the ancient Fathers. From this the refutation of this commentator is evident."

This is a grave and sharp protest from Lychetus, yet it may seem just if the cause is weighed carefully, since Cajetan had attacked Scotus so harshly. Both of them should have imitated the modesty of Scotus, who, though he disputes with the greatest acuity, is accustomed to dispute without barbs — and rightly so, for he has acuity enough in disputation and has no need of another sting with which to strike his adversaries. But the whole of this question we shall reserve intact for its proper place in 2. d. 1, q. 1.

Judgment

In this lengthy and intricate question the divine genius of Scotus shines clearly. First, he saw that the common position of Saint Thomas affirmed that notional love of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son. Next, he subtly distinguished the meanings of transitive and intransitive verbs. Moreover, he aptly refuted the example of the word *foreo* that had been adduced. Furthermore, he acutely examined what the difference is between speaking and loving, and carefully investigated how the meanings function in both propositions — the verb *Dico* and the verb *Diligo*. And he correctly and soundly refuted the position of Saint Thomas in the sense of understanding it as referring formally to the Persons of the Father and the Son producing the Holy Spirit through love, by which they would formally love themselves — showing that this cannot be understood as formal love, and producing a fitting reason for this and confirming his own negative position with an invincible argument.

He did not, however, fail to devise a way of upholding the truth of the proposition "The Father and the Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit" — a proposition that, being common and in conformity with the doctrine of the Fathers, ought to prevail and be defended in the schools. He investigated a proper and fitting sense for it, so acute and so subtle that it seems divinely inspired to a man of the most gifted intellect, devised to reconcile the piety of the Fathers with the rigor of scholastic method. For who would not admire that position concerning love taken principiatively on the part of the producing Persons, discovered so that the proposition might proceed in a true, simple, and harmless sense? Once this mode of interpretation was found, those propositions can stand excellently, as they should: "The Father expresses himself through the Word," and "The Father and the Son love themselves through the Holy Spirit" — and, what is remarkable, without any difficulty in thinking or speaking, with the truth of the position preserved together with the propriety of expression.

How ingeniously he introduced the example of the mirror representing images of things; how aptly he applied it to the expression of the divine Word; and how fittingly he adduced the denomination of the one producing the mirror — so that one who could not formally be denominated by the representation might draw the denomination to himself effectively and be said to do so principiatively. How subtle is that twofold relationship of the Word to its producer: one of the begotten to the begetter, another of the one declaring to the thing declared — and how apt its application to the doctrine. Likewise in love there are two relations: one of the produced to the will, another to the beloved and loved object — of which the first two, of the begotten to the begetter in the Word and of the produced to the producer in the Holy Spirit, are mutual and real; but the third is of reason, because no divine relation to things known and loved can be real.

How true, solid, and well-suited to removing all difficulties is that distinction between essential and notional love — such that notional love, considered as such, cannot be reflected back upon its principle, though it can be by reason of its essential character. From this arose in Scotus that principal distinction between the primary object and the connoted object, so that we understand that the notional act cannot in itself denominate its own principle, though it can by reason of the essential love. Thus the love is reflected back in an essential sense — essentially and really — but not in the notional sense, which was connoted by the essential love.

Finally, how skillfully and consistently with his own position he denied that there is any ground on which it can be affirmed that the Father loves himself and creatures through the Holy Spirit: because since the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the love of those creatures, there is no basis either for formal denomination or for principiative denomination. Having weighed all the

subtleties involved in such a question, it is clear that Scotus gave proof of his remarkable genius in handling and resolving it.

Collation IX, Distinction II. On God's Knowledge of Creatures in All Its Ideal Character.

On the single question of d. 35 and 36 in 1. Scotus, and on q. 14 and 15 of the first part of Saint Thomas.

Antilogism

Rarely has a question been disputed more at length, more densely, or indeed more tediously by either Doctor and their respective schools. And the matter is indeed very extensive and very difficult. In many respects these two princes of the schools agree, but then in a number of other points they differ — and even on those on which they agree they diverge to some degree. I must therefore proceed in a different manner in this question.

First, both Doctors agree that God knows both himself and all things other than himself — that is, both his own essence and whatever is in the essence and necessarily united with it, and also creatures, which are distinct from the essence and properties of the divine being. Second, they agree that God knows all creatures in whatever state — possible, future, or actual. Third, they agree that all creatures are in God as in their first universal cause virtually and eminently, and as in the first intelligible in accordance with their ideal being. So Scotus in (*q. un. d. 35 and 36*) and Saint Thomas in (*q. 14, art. 5 and 6*) and (*q. 15, art. 2 and 3*). Fourth, they concur that the divine essence is the primary object of divine knowledge, while creatures are the secondary object. So Scotus in (*q. 3, prol.*) and in (*1. d. 3*) and (*d. 39*) and (*Quodl. 14*) and in this passage; and Saint Thomas in (*1 contra gentes, c. 48 and 49*) and (*De veritate, q. 2, art. 3*). Fifth, they agree on Ideas — namely, that they exist in God, as appears from this question of Scotus (§ *ad ista, n. 1, 2*) and above in (*d. 2, q. 1*) and (*d. 39 and 45*), and from (*q. 15*) of Saint Thomas at great length. And indeed all interpreters acknowledge that the two completely agree on these points.

They differ, first, in that Scotus holds the divine essence to be the reason for knowing creatures through itself and in itself, without those ideal relations to creatures taken individually and singly which Saint Thomas posits in (*q. 14, a. 6*) and (*q. 15 throughout*) — which Scotus denies in this (*q. un., § contra opinionem primam, n. 7*). They differ, second, in that Scotus places the Ideas in the objective concept of creatures, whereas Saint Thomas places them in the formal concept expressing those known objects, and does not distinguish them from the essence but rather constitutes them in the essence, as appears in (*q. 15 on Ideas*) in Saint Thomas and in (*q. un.*) in Scotus. They differ, third, in that Scotus attributes to creatures a certain known being, which he calls diminished, and even produced in that genus of known being through the divine intellect — so Scotus

in many passages in (1. d. 35 and 36) and in (2. d. 1, q. 1) and in (4. d. 1); whereas Saint Thomas did not introduce this known being, and the Thomists attack it with great force. On all these differences we must treat in individual sections.

Section I. Whether Scotus Correctly Understands the Position of Saint Thomas on Formal Ideas, and Whether He Rightly Attacks It

Cajetan, in his commentary on (*art. 5 and 7 of q. 14, p. 1*) in the response to the third objection, seems to deny that Saint Thomas posited those relations which Scotus attributes to him, and to hold that Scotus's attack is groundless because there is nothing to attack. Cajetan's words are in (*a. 6, resp. ad 3*): "It is plain that according to Saint Thomas, for God to understand all things according to their proper characters through the understood essence, the eminent perfection of the divine essence suffices — since it presents to view all and each of the perfections of all things that imitate it in diverse ways, and more besides — nor is it required that any relations be posited for this purpose, as is said in the second opinion reported by Scotus in 35. d. 1. Therefore the arguments which Scotus makes against those relations are not against Saint Thomas in this matter." So Cajetan.

Let us see what Scotus says, and compare his words with those of Saint Thomas, so that it may appear which of the two judged better — Scotus or Cajetan. Scotus writes thus in this (*q. un., § ponuntur, n. 3*): "There are therefore posited eternal relations in God toward the other things known by simple intelligence — that these relations are in the essence as the reason for knowing, because nothing is the reason for knowing many things unless that reason is in some way appropriated to those many known objects. This is also confirmed by the fact that knowledge comes through the like; therefore the reason for knowing must have some proper character of likeness to the known object itself. Through this determination and this assimilation of the reason of knowing to the object, eternal relations are posited as determining the essence as the reason of understanding, by which the essence itself becomes distinctly similar to the known objects." By "names of relations" Scotus understands Ideas, for in the same place (*§ tertia opinio, n. 4*), after mentioning the opinion of Henry and distinguishing it from the opinion of Saint Thomas, he says: "The third opinion posits Ideas or such relations." For Scotus, therefore, Idea and relation amount to the same thing — and this already begins to refute Cajetan. Furthermore, Scotus holds that in the opinion of these authors the relations are not real but of reason, for as he says below (*§ contra Conclusionem, n. 5*): "These opinions agree — namely, that relations of reason must necessarily be posited in God, distinct in character, in order for creatures to be distinctly understood in God as objects." So Scotus.

I come to Saint Thomas. First, in (*q. 14, art. 11*) at the end of the body he writes: "For since he knows other things through his essence insofar as it is the likeness of those things..." I proceed gradually. Here we have the essence representing

known things according to their likeness. In (*art. 5*) of the same question, in the body toward the middle, he says: "It is necessary that all things be in God in an intelligible mode." And at the end of the body: "God sees other things not in themselves but in himself, inasmuch as his essence contains the likeness of other things." And in the response to the second: "Inasmuch as God contains the species of them." And in the response to the third: "In God's essence all the species of things are comprehended." And (*art. 6, ad tertium*): "The divine essence is something exceeding all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper character of each and every one, insofar as it is participable or imitable in different ways by different creatures." Here the foundations of those relations which Scotus posited in the position of Saint Thomas shine clearly — relations which Cajetan denies in his commentary on (*article 7, ad tertium*). Even so, Cajetan is not yet fully convicted, nor does Scotus entirely prevail.

Let us therefore go to (*question 15*) and Cajetan will be convicted by Scotus. In this question Saint Thomas posits Ideas — and indeed multiple, even infinite, Ideas in the divine essence. Let us see how he designates them. If he uses a relational term, Scotus wins; if by another term, Cajetan wins. Let us hear Saint Thomas in (*art. 2, ad 3*): "To the third it must be said that these relationships by which Ideas are multiplied are not caused by things but by the divine intellect comparing its essence to things." And again (*ad 4*): "The relationships that multiply Ideas are not in created things but in God — yet they are not real relationships like those by which the Persons are distinguished, but relationships understood by God." Not only does Scotus prevail — he triumphs over Cajetan. Scotus spoke entirely correctly, understood Saint Thomas accurately, and reported him most faithfully. Cajetan misunderstood Saint Thomas and unjustly criticized Scotus, carelessly passing over his arguments, from which he subtracted the matter of response in order to avoid being compelled to reply.

And I now rise again against Cajetan on fresh grounds. Cajetan contradicts himself. For in (*Comment. 3 on art. 6 of q. 14, ad 3*) he writes: "Nor does Saint Thomas require that any relations be posited for this purpose, as is said in the second opinion reported by Scotus in *35. d. 1*; therefore the arguments which Scotus makes against those relations are not against Saint Thomas in this matter." Hold these words of Cajetan and compare them with what he says in his commentary on (*art. 2 of q. 15, § in responsione, ad 2 and 3*): "Third, note that these relationships that distinguish Ideas, since they also constitute them, do not follow upon the act of the divine intellect understanding Ideas, but come about through the act of the divine intellect understanding its own essence comparatively."

The reader is astonished — and rightly so — that Cajetan says this, for he seems to both affirm and contradict himself. But Cajetan explains himself in that passage on (*q. 15, art. 2*) by saying that he does not deny those relations but only the mode and manner of positing them, and the necessity of them for

knowledge — and that this alone was what he intended to say in his commentary on (*art. 6 of q. 14*). I grant that this is one way of escape for Cajetan. For in that passage (*a. 6, resp. ad 2 and 3, near the end*) he says: "One must not imagine that the essence is first understood as imitable and then the ideal relation follows; rather, the very understanding of the essence as imitable is the constitution of the ideal relation. From this, however, you gather that the ideal relations are not required in order for God to understand creatures" — which is how interpreters seem to read it.

So Cajetan does not deny those ideal relations but says they are not the reasons for knowing creatures. For it is clear that the perfection of the divine intellection does not borrow from relations of reason, but they are posited as necessarily constituted from the perfection of divine intellection. Since Scotus therefore says that these Ideas are necessary for the express knowledge of creatures according to the mind of Saint Thomas, he neither followed his thought nor attacked it with his arguments. And so Cajetan once more at the end of his commentary adds: "The Author said that because God most perfectly understands his own essence, he therefore understands it as imitable in so many ways. For this is what it is to constitute multiple ideal relations and to understand multiple Ideas as the characters of other things, and to know creatures distinctly in the divine essence presented to him" — and noticing this he says: "If you have contemplated this well, you will laugh at the objections of others, which I have not set out because they do not fight against the meaning of Saint Thomas as I have expounded it." He alludes to Scotus, whose arguments he had passed over before. So Cajetan, who entirely denies that Scotus touched the mind of Saint Thomas and therefore attacked him in vain.

Nonetheless Cajetan's distinction profited him nothing — on the contrary, it entangled the mind of the Angelic Doctor, which Saint Thomas himself had stated clearly, and which Scotus truly understood. Indeed even Cajetan himself falls back into the same understanding as Scotus. Let us consult Saint Thomas in (*q. 15, art. 1, title: Whether Ideas Exist*): "It must be said that it is necessary to posit Ideas in the divine mind — either to serve as the exemplar of that whose form is said to be, or to serve as the principle of knowledge of it, insofar as the forms of knowable things are said to be in the knower. And with respect to both it is necessary to posit Ideas." This is what Scotus affirms of the mind of Saint Thomas in the cited place, and what he attacks. Afterward the same holy Doctor says (*ad 2*): "Although God knows himself and all other things through his essence, yet his essence is the operative principle of other things but not of himself; therefore it has the character of an Idea insofar as it is compared to other things, but not insofar as it is compared to God himself." He then calls these, in (*art. 2*) in the body following Augustine, the reasons of all things, and proves that they are not incompatible with divine simplicity.

Cajetan cannot deny that they are the reasons for knowing creatures in the divine essence; for Saint Thomas says explicitly in the same (*art. 2*) in the body: "Multiple Ideas are in the divine mind as understood by God himself," and adds: "Each creature has its own proper species insofar as it somehow participates in the likeness of the divine essence. Thus, insofar as God knows his essence as imitable by such a creature, he knows it as the proper character and Idea of that creature. And so it is clear that God understands the several proper characters of several things, which are several Ideas." How then can Cajetan deny that they are, as understood, the actual Ideas of creatures? And again in the same article (*ad 2*): "Just as an artisan, while understanding the form of a house in matter, is said to understand a house, yet while understanding the form of the house as conceived by himself — by reason of which he understands that he understands — he understands the Idea or character of the house; so God not only understands many things through his essence, but also understands that he understands many things through his essence. But this is to understand the several characters of things — or for several Ideas to be in his intellect as understood." Why then does Cajetan, with his distinctions, entangle and obscure the mind of Saint Thomas, who speaks so plainly? God, by understanding his essence as imitable by creatures, forms their characters or Ideas, and in forming them knows the creatures. This is the pure truth of Ideas in Saint Thomas, whatever Cajetan may try to envelop in his distinctions. Unless perhaps Cajetan wishes, as Vásquez notes, to distinguish Ideas according to direct and reflexive formal concepts, and to place Ideas in the reflexive — which Vásquez does not approve in (*1 tom. in p. part., d. 73, de Ideis, c. 2*). Saint Thomas himself anticipated this by saying: "God not only understands many things through his essence, but also understands that he understands many things through his essence" — in which that reflexion appears which Cajetan, on the authority of Vásquez, wished to introduce.

Be that as it may: the Ideas in Saint Thomas are relations by which Ideas are multiplied, caused by the divine intellect comparing its own essence to things — so (*q. 15, ad 2*). And they are the proper characters of the intellection of creatures, through which their images are both formed and known. It is this ideal character that Scotus attacks in the said (*1. d. 35, q. un.*). And Saint Thomas presents this doctrine on Ideas not only in the first part (*q. 14 and 15*) but also in (*De veritate, q. 3, art. 6*) and Scotus in (*1. d. 39, q. 1, art. 2*). And it is expounded with him by Aegidius in (*1. d. 36, art. 2, q. 2, ad secundum*), Ferrariensis in (*1 contra gentes, c. 54*), Capreolus in (*d. 36, q. 1, art. 1*), and Vásquez in (*d. 72 and 73*), and commonly by the Thomists together with the Salamancans — who are counted among the best commentators — in (*tract. 2 de Visione, d. 7, dub. 1*) and (*tract. 3 de scientia Dei, d. 7, dub. 7*).

This position of the Angelic Doctor Scotus attacks, and since Henry also held it insofar as he asserted that the essence, as compared to creatures, is the ideal character of known creatures, Scotus argues against both of them in (*q. un., dist. 35, n. 5*) as follows. First, by asking through what these diverse comparative

characters are knowable: whether through themselves or through other characters. If through other characters, the process runs to infinity, for those will be no more sufficient for knowing than these proper characters. If through themselves, then the divine essence needs them in order to know and the bare essence does not suffice — which is absurd, since then the divine essence would be diminished by needing those determining characters for its knowledge of creatures, especially since they are relations to creatures, and it is unworthy to think and assert that the divine intellect is moved by creatures. Therefore these cognitive real relations are to be rejected.

Second, the divine essence through itself, without that determination of Ideas and participation, can be the determinate reason for knowing all creatures individually; therefore it does not need those determining forms for knowledge of them. The antecedent is plain: if the divine essence were of itself limited to only one creature, it would be the certain and proper reason for knowing that creature. But being unlimited and infinite does not remove from it the power to determine itself according to its own proper virtue — otherwise it would be imperfect. Therefore, with those ideal relative characters set aside, it will be the determined reason for knowing, and will not need those relations.

Third, for one operation one must posit one principle and one object that is per se one; but the divine operation is most eminently per se one; therefore it must have one principle and one per se one object. But if those ideal relations are posited, there is no principle nor object that is per se one. Therefore they are not to be admitted. The major premise is certain regarding God, who is wholly one and simple. The minor is proved because from the divine essence and that ideal character there cannot be constituted one principle that is per se one, nor can there result in the object the requisite unity — which is compounded of many relations. Therefore those ideal relations are not to be tolerated as necessary for knowing.

These arguments proceed against both the position of Saint Thomas and that of Henry. Scotus then poses further arguments specifically against the position of Saint Thomas, as follows (§ *contra primam opinionem*, n. 7): it follows that those relations are real, because the reason for understanding naturally precedes the act of knowing, and therefore those relations are not made or caused by the intellection but rather cause it; but what causes intellection cannot be a being of reason, therefore it is something real. Furthermore, if under the ideal character there is the reason for knowing stone, that relation is not produced in the essence through the intellection of stone; therefore it is presupposed in the essence; therefore it is real, since in the essence nothing can be of reason. Moreover, if this were so, it would follow that creatures are known immediately in themselves, because that relation of reason which is the reason for knowing is terminated at its object, and therefore that object is immediately known in itself

and not in the essence — which is absurd. For all possibles and intelligibles are contained and known in the divine essence.

With these arguments Scotus attacks that ideal character of the Angelic Doctor, and when Cajetan sensed their force, he devised a way of escape by removing the matter of the difficulty — but to no avail, as we have shown. I weigh especially that argument which moves me most to depart from the position of Saint Thomas: that if the ideal characters are those forms and relations, they cannot but be real, because they are truly within God and have true expression and representation — which cannot fit a being of reason. Therefore they are entirely real, which Saint Thomas denies in (*art. 2 of q. 15, ad tertium*). This truly does not seem correct, nor consistent with the teaching of the same Doctor who asserts that Ideas are necessary in God and are perfections — which is wholly foreign to a being of reason and proper to a real being. And indeed the Salamancan Fathers saw this while disputing in (*tract. 2 de visione Dei*) on the question of whether those who see God see all that is formally in him. They set out the arguments of Henry, Godfrey, Victoria, and Ferrariensis who deny this — arguments that are grounded in the vision of ideal perfections — and reply to them not by denying that these are infinite in God, but only by denying that they are actually distinct, from which it follows that they are not of reason but distinct by reason, in the way that the divine attributes are — which are both infinite and distinct by reason according to Saint Thomas, and are not on that account perfections of reason but real ones, just as the relation of active spiration in the Father and in the Son is real but distinct by reason from Paternity and Filiation. It therefore follows, on the position of Saint Thomas, that those ideal relations are real perfections and not of reason — which is exactly what Scotus inferred against him, and it is plain that Scotus both correctly understood the mind of Saint Thomas and justly attacked it.

Section II. How God Knows Creatures on the Way of the Subtle Doctor

Father Rada, in (*art. 1*), complains gravely and bitterly about a certain new commentator on Saint Thomas who, having cited Cajetan reporting that Scotus held the view that God knows things in his own essence and in themselves, declared — as if charging Cajetan with falsehood — that he had never found in Scotus the statement that God knows things in his essence, but rather in themselves. And Rada complains with reason. For if there is any author who affirms that creatures are known entirely in the divine essence and not in themselves, that author is most certainly Scotus — that distinguished defender everywhere of the divine dignity, jurisdiction, dependence, and subjection of the creature toward God. Scotus, therefore, always plainly and consistently asserted that creatures are not known by God in themselves but in his own essence, and for this he employed that argument which shows he could not have thought otherwise — namely, that the divine intellect would be diminished if it borrowed the characters of its knowledge from other objects. So in (*q. 4, Prol. §*

ad secundam quaestionem, n. 22) he says: "The divine intellect would be diminished by reason of its being acted upon by something other than its own essence." And he adds in (*d. 3, in 1. q. 3, § alia est opinio*, n. 5): "The divine essence alone moves the divine intellect toward knowing itself and all other things knowable by that intellect." And in this (*d. 35, q. un., § hoc videtur*, n. 5) in the middle he says: "This seems to diminish the divine intellect, because it would then be passive with respect to other known objects." And in (*Quodl. 5, q. 5*): "From this it follows that the first object — namely, infinite being, as it is the divine essence — is the first object by primacy of adequation, because, as has been shown concerning the divine intellect, the divine intellect does not have an adequate common object by abstraction from all objects, but rather a commonality of power with respect to all objects per se — otherwise its intellection would be diminished, since it could be changed by a finite object." And in (*3 sent., dist. 32, § ex isto*, n. 4), denying in the Word a relation to the creature, he uses this argument: "Then the reason for moving the infinite intellect to express the Word, as belonging to it, would be that the finite moves the infinite intellect — and thus the infinite intellect would be diminished." This argument admits of no doubt whatsoever.

Let it therefore be settled in the minds of all who read Scotus that he could not in any way have held that knowledge of God is outside his own essence and in the creatures themselves. Indeed, I am accustomed to prove from this that Scotus could not have admitted middle knowledge — what they call mediate knowledge — as Molina and his followers posit it, since the attaining of those truths in themselves is contrary to the cardinal and unquestionable principle of Scotus: namely, that if God were to know anything created immediately in itself and not in his own essence, his intellect would be made base. As we shall show in its proper place.

The new commentator on Saint Thomas about whom Rada complained is thereby abundantly refuted. With this established, it remains to see how Scotus posits the divine mode of knowing — with those ideal relations in the essence set aside — as knowing creatures through his own essence. Scotus sets this out carefully and subtly in various passages, but chiefly in (*d. 35, q. un.*). When all of these are gathered and compared, there appears a new but true, learned, and subtle account, full of dignity, which I wish the reader to attend to and weigh carefully so as to admire the most subtle genius of Scotus.

The great difficulty at the outset lies in conceiving the reason for knowing in the bare essence those creatures lacking that medium, since the essence through itself alone does not seem capable of being sufficient for knowing other things existing outside itself and different from it. But Scotus, having removed the Ideas or relations of Saint Thomas and the common position, left nothing in which knowledge could be grounded. What would have terrified others spurred him on; no one but Scotus would dare to wrestle with so great a difficulty and

find in the bare and pure essence principles for knowing things other than itself. Yet such was the power of genius in this subtle man that he dared to search for and find them, and having found them to publish and make them manifest.

Scotus therefore begins his line of reasoning, which I form and set forth as follows. First, Scotus posits a twofold object of divine knowledge: one primary, the other secondary. So in (*the first question of the second distinction*). The primary is the essence, which is known first and is the reason for knowing the rest, as he says in (*q. 3, prol.*) and (*1. d. 3, q. 3*) and (*Quodl. 14*) — and in this he agrees with Saint Thomas in (*1 contra gentes, c. 48 and 49*) and (*De veritate, q. 2, art. 3*), which is the common position. The secondary are creatures, according to the same Scotus in (*1. d. 1, q. 2*) and (*2. d. 1*) and (*Quodl. 14*) — and this object is known by virtue of the first. Thus the first divine intellection is the knowledge of the essence without any relation, either real or of reason; the second is the knowledge of creatures in the essence immediately, with no intervening Idea or relation, whether real or of reason.

This second part is proved by Scotus in (*d. 35, q. un., § potest dici ad quaestionem, n. 9 and 10*), because the divine intellection relates to creatures in the manner of a measure, of which there is no relation to the measured. The divine intellect knows its own essence, and from that knowledge the secondary object — that is, creatures — without any dependence on them, and so attains them through no intermediate relation on its own part; such that the known creature is first known in the essence and by reason of the essence, and thereafter that same creature, once known, is referred to the essence which remains immutable. Here the mode of knowing becomes apparent.

God first gazes upon his own essence as it is formally and absolutely in itself; within it, creatures are contained virtually and eminently, but they are not expressed by that first knowledge. They therefore remain in the essence but are not declared, do not stand forth. Then in what I might call the second intellection, they are attained, expressed, and appear in the essence which previously contained them within itself without having declared them. This expression in the essence is an intelligible production, through which that creature which was in it virtually and eminently is placed actually represented and formally within the essence. Thus that manifestation and representation by the divine intellect is a kind of production in the declarative genus, through which the creature receives being in the character of the intelligible.

And this being Scotus calls being produced in that genus of the intelligible — and rightly so, for beforehand it did not appear, did not stand forth, lay concealed and contained virtually in the essence, where it was, as it were, buried beneath the lights of the formal essence which did not allow it to appear. When it was excited and declared by knowledge, it began to stand forth and be manifested — which standing forth and manifestation is a kind of production, from which there arises known being, what was before unknown, as Scotus also

calls it when he says that creatures have in the divine essence a certain known being communicated to them through that cognitive production, which drew them out and put them forth. From this it follows that the divine intellect, with no medium employed, knows creatures through the essence, with no intervening medium of knowing, with no recourse to ideal relations — all of which that knowledge precedes.

It is indeed true that from this declaration of creatures there results in creatures a relation to God as knowing and bestowing upon them that known being, which is a relation of dependence upon the producing intellect — which Scotus likewise calls diminished in (*d. 36, q. un., § ad secundum dico*). These relations, however, are grounded in the known creature and in the known being produced after the act of knowledge is complete. Nonetheless, Scotus does not deny that in a third instant of reason the divine intellect can compare its own intellection to the thing known and produced in known being, grounding a relation of reason in itself toward the known creature — a relation of the third kind, of the measuring to the measured — which Scotus himself calls the third instant. And lastly he admits that God can also in a fourth instant reflect upon that relation caused in the third instant, and then that known relation of reason will exist — which are the words of Scotus here in (*§ hoc potest poni sic, n. 10*).

From this it is plain that the divine intellect reaches all those infinite creatures contained virtually in the essence through a single and undivided knowledge — through a single knowledge undivided in itself and terminated solely at those creatures. This is a far greater perfection than what the Thomist way offers, which, with those relations introduced, makes the knowledge on God's part multiple, corresponding to the various and infinite modes of assimilation and imitation. In that Thomist way, the essence appears affected by those relations and through them somehow divided and multiplied, with a mutual relation to the corresponding creatures in turn, since they are known by means of those formal and ideal characters. But on Scotus's way, the absolute essence appears free from all antecedent and mutual relation to creatures — their sovereign and prince, exciting them and drawing them forth through its knowledge, as their creator bestowing upon them known being through cognitive production, with the supreme dignity of divine knowledge and the greatest dependence of creatures upon the knower.

I marvel at the subtlety and solidity of this doctrine, and in reading it I take the deepest delight. I have seen nothing more ingenious, nothing more acute, nothing more subtle, nothing more clear. Let us hear Scotus here in (*§ ad secundum, n. 14*): "By the fact that the divine intellect is in act through its own essence, as it is the reason of understanding, it has the first sufficient act for producing everything else in known being, and by producing it in known being it produces it as having dependence upon itself, or toward the intellect, and by

the fact that the intellection is its own, that thing depends upon this intellection." Scotus teaches the same in the passages I cited earlier.

Section III: The Scotist Method of Knowing Creatures through God Is Defended and Established

This method of knowing, discovered by Scotus, provoked the Thomists — whether because they regarded it as novel and unusual, or because they neglected to understand its pathways, or because they wished to obstruct its light lest it prevail. They accordingly laid three charges against Scotus. First, that he had abolished the Ideas so celebrated among the Fathers and Scholastics. Second, that he had posited some new kind of being in creatures as produced and absolute — namely, a real and actual being prior to their existence. Third, that the method of knowing creatures is incoherent, neither in God nor in the creatures themselves, since both options face grave difficulties in Scotus's view. We must therefore respond to these objections and entirely remove these three charges, which are for the most part advanced by Cajetan (*1 p. q. 14. art. 5. §. secundo ad finem*).

Nothing is more celebrated, in both philosophy and theology, than the Ideas, which all thinkers — ancient and modern alike — have received with unanimous consent. That Plato was virtually their originator is affirmed by Aristotle (*Eth. lib. I. c. 4.*), Cicero (*lib. 3. de Oratore* and *lib. de Claris Oratoribus ad Brutum*), Augustine (*lib. 83. quaestionum q. 46.*), and Apuleius (*in dogmat. Platonis*). Indeed Justin Martyr (*in Pargnet. ad Gentes*) testifies that Plato received them from Moses. Plato discussed the Ideas in the *Timaeus* and placed them in the Divine Mind, as Augustine reports (*lib. 12. de civ. c. 6.*). It is true that Socrates introduced them before Plato and imbued his disciple with them, as Eusebius writes (*lib. 11. de preparat. Euangel. c. 1.*). From him, among Latin writers, Cicero received them (*lib. 3. de Orat.* and *lib. de Claris Oratoribus ad Brutum*, as we just noted), as did Seneca (*epist. 66.*). Let us hear Cicero on them: "Plato," he says, "calls the Ideas the forms of things; he denies they are generated and holds that they always exist and are grasped by reason and intellect, while everything else is born, perishes, flows, and slides, and does not remain in one and the same state." And Augustine (*lib. 83. quaestionum q. 46.*): "Plato is said to have been the first to use the name Ideas. They are certain principal forms or reasons of things, stable and unchangeable, which are not themselves formed, and on this account are eternal and always remain in the same condition, being contained in the Divine intellect." In the Ideas, accordingly, Plato located Beatitude, as we showed from the lecture-chair in our Padua courses on Aristotle's *Ethics*. The Fathers thereafter celebrated them, received in a more sacred sense and better understood: Dionysius the Areopagite (*de Divinis nominibus c. 5.*), Clement of Alexandria (*lib. 4. Stromatum*), Augustine (*lib. 83. quaest. q. 46.* and *lib. 65. quaest. q. 29.*, *lib. 7. de Civit. c. 28.*, *lib. 11. c. 10.*, *lib. 9. c. 22.* and *29.*, *lib. 12. c. 17.*, *lib. 4. de Genesi ad litteram c. 22.* through *c. 35.*). Thence they passed to the Schools:

Thomas (*1 p. q. 15.*), Scotus (*in 1. d. 35. q. un.*), Bonaventure (*disp. 39. art. 2. q. 1.*) with their interpreters.

Scotus appears to have abolished these Ideas; for since the Ideas are forms of things, species representing them, exemplars, and reasons for making them — and since Scotus, taking them in this sense, excluded them from the Divine mind — he seems to have abolished them entirely. Scotus himself saw this objection clearly (*in 1. d. 35. q. un. §. contra istud arguitur n. 10.*) and cited against it Augustine (*lib. 83. quaest. q. 46.*), where he says: "Indeed, so great a force is attributed to the Ideas that without understanding them no one can be wise." The same text says that the vision of the Ideas makes the soul most blessed, and Scotus adduces against himself two further arguments, to which he replies below (§. *ad ista n. 12.*).

The resolution depends on this question: in which concept does the formal notion of an Idea consist — in the formal concept or in the objective concept? The first position holds that an Idea or exemplar consists in the formal concept, not in the objective. I am speaking of the Idea or exemplar taken in its common sense, according to its own proper account, prescinding from uncreated and created, in which sense it is also customarily sought by the philosophers. This position is followed by the Thomists with Cajetan (*D. Thom. 1 p. q. 15.*), among whom the more senior follow Cajetan, along with Bagnez and Nazarius; and the moderns follow Nazarius and John of St. Thomas; Valentia (*disp. 1. q. 14. punct. 2.*); Suarez (*in 1. part. tract. 1. lib. 3. c. 5.* and *in Metaph. disp. 25. sect. 1.*); Tellez, a distinguished author and formerly my fellow student of great learning (*in 2. p. Phys. d. 8. Sect. 2.*) with others whom he cites. Their arguments reduce to one, which is formed as follows. An Idea is a form or exemplar conceived in the mind expressing an image of the thing to be made, not the thing to be made itself. This form is the concept that expresses and represents the thing to be made and contains its rule, not the thing itself which is the object of the concept and about which it is concerned. Therefore the account of an Idea and exemplar must be located in the formal concept. This argument pertains to proving that the Idea, considered in itself abstracting from created and uncreated, is constituted in the formal concept. Speaking however of the uncreated and Divine Idea, the demonstration seems more evident still, because the Idea in God cannot be the thing-as-object, since in that case the created thing would be an exemplary cause for God, into which God would gaze and from which he would take his direction — which is absurd. Therefore it is the formal account expressing in the Divine intellect the image of the thing-as-object, from whose direction the making of a creature depends by way of guiding and applying. This argument is so compelling that many of those who hold the objective concept to be the Idea in created things philosophize differently about the divine case — among them the Coimbricans (*in physicis lib. 27. q. 3. a. 2.*) and Vasquez (*disp. 72. c. 2. ad primam part. D. Thom.*), who deny that Ideas in the created mind are placed in the formal concept and affirm they are placed in the objective; yet in God they do not dare

philosophize in the same manner, and accordingly hold that the Ideas consist formally in the Divine intellection as it expresses the images of created things.

The second position holds that the Ideas of things, whatever they are, must be constituted in the objective concept, not the formal. The reason is: an exemplar is that upon which the craftsman gazes in order to fashion a work similar to it; but the craftsman does not gaze upon the expression of his concept, but upon the thing expressed by the concept and represented through it, from which he immediately produces the work without any reflection back to the concept and deviation from the concept toward the thing to be made. For who among those who paint, fashion, cast, or construct thinks of his concept? This is apparent in someone who copies an image from a seen image and transfers it by reproducing it from panel to panel: he sets before himself only the image of the thing as his Idea and exemplar, and gazes only upon that. Furthermore, if someone formed no concept of the thing-as-object but gazed upon it either in another's concept or directly in the thing itself, he would no less be imitating the exemplar and rendering it on the panel than if he had cast his mind's eye upon his own concept. This is confirmed in the position of those Thomists who deny that the Blessed express a Word through the Beatific Vision; for even without such expression, they will not deny that the Blessed can have an Idea and exemplar of things — and it will certainly not be a formal one, therefore it must be an objective one. For this reason this opinion is followed by Ockham (*d. 35. q. un. in 1. sent.*), Durandus (*ibid. q. 3. art. 3.*), Gabriel (*q. 50.*), Aliabacensis (*q. 6. art. 3.*), Bachon (*quodl. 2. q. 2.*), Bassolis (*d. 35. q. 2.*); and among the moderns, Arriaga (*trac. de scientia Dei. disp. 23. de Ideis Sect. 4. n. 22.*) and Thomas del Bene (*disp. 5. q.*). It was also taught by St. Thomas (*de veritate q. 3. art. 2.*), which is why Thomists cannot inveigh against it. All these agree with Scotus, with the exception of Vasquez and the Coimbricans, who are more timid than they should be, since they ought to affirm the same of both created and uncreated Ideas.

That accusation or objection — that Scotus abolished the Ideas — must therefore be removed. He did not abolish them; he transformed them. Where other theologians before him had placed the Ideas in the formal expressive concept, he placed them in the objective: so that the ideal reasons, the relations terminated toward creatures, are not the Ideas of those things that such reasons presuppose, but the things-as-objects of that Divine knowledge which, by its own act of cognition, awakens and brings them forth in their known being — these are the Ideas and exemplars of those things with respect to their production, both possible and actual, and to them the truest account of Idea properly belongs. Understood in this sense, whatever the philosophers and Fathers had held about the Ideas, Scotus applied to them. This is clear from the doctrine of this unique question (*d. 35*). That this ideal account placed in the objective concept is more probable than the alternative located in the formal concept, Scotus argues as follows, taking up Augustine's position: "An Idea is an

eternal reason in the Divine mind, according to which something is formable externally, each according to its own proper account." This proposition is placed as the major premise; the minor then follows: a creature in its known being is an eternal reason, imitable and producible externally, just as an ark in the mind of the craftsman, upon which he gazes as he works — therefore this is an Idea of things to be made and produced. And do not say that the formal concept of that creature is the Idea, for you will be refuted by the example of Plato's Ideas, who posited Ideas as existing externally and by themselves, and was accordingly criticized by Aristotle — which argument shows that the Ideas were placed in the object, not in the concept. But perhaps Aristotle imposed that reading on Plato; and since Plato was the first author of the Ideas, the account of ideation should be drawn from him. I therefore argue as follows: Plato placed the Ideas in things-as-objects, not in formal concepts; therefore Ideas are things-as-objects, not intelligible forms. This is confirmed by Augustine, who freed Plato by saying that he had not placed the Ideas outside God but in the Divine mind — from which it is clear that Augustine judged the Ideas to be things-as-objects together with Plato. For while the Ideas that Plato placed outside God according to Aristotle — who reproached Plato for this — Augustine himself placed within God, and rightly understood Plato: the ideal content was retained, not placed outside God but within God; the thing-as-object was retained, with only the location changed. Plato said the thing is an Idea from the side of the thing, placed outside God according to Aristotle who condemned Plato; Augustine, admitting the Idea, denied that Plato had placed it outside God and affirmed he had placed it in God, thereby freeing Plato; therefore all three — Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine — placed the Ideas in the objective concept, that is, in things-as-objects, not in concepts.

It is proved secondly because things to be made correspond to things known, and when the craftsman makes them he intends to realize in act what he saw in known being; therefore the things-as-known are themselves the Ideas and exemplars, not their formal mental conceptions. It is proved thirdly because those Divine expressions of known things presuppose them as known, and therefore draw their representational character from those things; hence the sources of the exemplars are the creatures themselves as known. And if formal Ideas can cause (so to speak), they can also cause things in their producible being. It is proved fourthly because from Augustine (*lib. 83. quaestionum q. 46.*) it is clear that a horse and a man were not made according to the same account — and this difference does not arise immediately from the account of the essence but from the account of the things-as-objects contained in it; therefore these are the Ideas and exemplars from which the diverse account of ideation is drawn.

The adversaries cite the Fathers, and chiefly Augustine, as if they held the contrary view — but those Fathers are speaking of Ideas that must necessarily be posited in God; how they are posited, and in what they formally consist, the Fathers do not determine. Augustine, as Scotus astutely observes, admitted them

in Plato's sense, who placed them in things-as-objects. The two sentences of Augustine that the adversaries cite against Scotus, Scotus solves and explains excellently. One is: "Such force is attributed to the Ideas that without understanding them no one can be wise." The other: "It is through the Ideas that the soul is made most blessed." Both sentences occur in (*lib. 83. quaest. q. 46.*). To the first Scotus responds in this question (*q. un. d. 35. §.*) by granting it, saying that knowledge of the Ideas, or of creatures, completes God's wisdom extensively as its secondary object. Indeed the argument is turned back on the adversaries, because those ideal relations in God do not pertain to wisdom but presuppose it and are drawn from the objects; they are not primary objects, nor properly understood, but rather follow from the act of intellection and are referred to the objects understood and known — so they do not constitute God as wise but refer his wisdom to its objects. The second sentence is explained so that those objects in their known being pertain to the completion of total Beatitude, as Scotus calls it — just as Divine science in its totality embraces the object of creatures. Note also that Augustine is speaking of created beatitude, for he says the soul is made most blessed, using the superlative to indicate he is speaking of beatitude most perfect in every respect, both with regard to primary and secondary objects, both intensively and extensively. Moreover, this very point proves that Augustine takes the Ideas in their objective signification: for no one has ever placed Beatitude in the vision of formal relations, but in the vision of creatures in God in their known and possible being. Therefore the Ideas that pertain to Beatitude are not those formal relations but objective ones, according to the mind of St. Augustine. On this basis Scotus's position is established, which seems to me far more probable than the alternative. It ought certainly to be considered probable and free from all reproach — and those Thomists who tax it do so without justification. I set against them the testimony of the great theologian Vasquez (*1 par. disp. 71. c. 2. n. 5.*): "Recent Thomists not only say the Idea is the Divine essence itself, but explicitly affirm that creatures existing objectively in the Divine mind, as Scotus asserted, cannot be Ideas, and they brand Scotus's opinion as rash, claiming it contradicts the common consent of the Holy Fathers and Doctors without reason. Yet they judge it too harshly, both because not a few Scholastics, whom we listed in the preceding chapter, followed it, and because not many testimonies of the Saints can be adduced against it, as we shall see in this chapter; and also because the authors in question advanced this opinion with a measure of probable foundation, nor do the three arguments put forward lack their own plausibility and force, as will be evident in the following disputation." If Vasquez judged thus before seeing these commentaries of ours, I believe that, having inspected them, he would think far more highly of Scotus's position.

I add in its confirmation one argument, perhaps pleasing to the reader, devised by myself and strengthened by the authority of John's Gospel and of Augustine. John, at the opening of his Gospel, says that what was made, in him was life (*Jn.*

1); this text is about the Divine Ideas, as is clear from Augustine's commentaries on that passage. I ponder the phrase what was made — that is, the creature produced in actual existence outside its causes, outside God, in this world, in time, through action; this very creature was life in the Word itself. Retain the creature that was made: it was itself life in the Word; therefore the thing-as-object, known by the Word in that known and diminished being, is the Idea — not its formal expression, which is not precisely the creature as known but its image and formal expression. Hence John is manifestly speaking in this Gospel passage of the creature as object of the Divine intellect, not of its formal concept. He is speaking of the Idea; therefore with God the Idea is not a formal conception expressed in the intellect and by the intellect, but the creature itself in its known being in God, brought forth and produced through intellection. Let us hear Augustine interpreting the passage and favoring Scotus's interpretation: "Every creature," he says, "was made through him, greater and lesser were made through him, heavenly and earthly, spiritual and corporeal. What was made, in him was life. If therefore all things are in him, and what will be made in him is life, then the earth too is life, the wood is life, the stone is life." And shortly after: "Pronounce it thus: what was made — here make a distinction — and then add: in him was life. What does this mean? The earth was made; but the earth itself that was made is not life. Yet in Wisdom itself there is spiritually a certain reason by which the earth that was made is life. Therefore what was made, in him was life." Note: "The craftsman makes an ark: first he has the ark in his art. For if he did not have the ark in his art, he would have nowhere from which to bring it forth by making it. But the ark exists in the art in a way that is not the ark itself which is seen by the eyes. In the art it exists invisibly; in the work it will exist visibly." Nowhere a likeness, nowhere a concept of the Ark — always the Ark itself, that is, the thing-as-object. Again: "Consider the Ark in the art and the Ark in the work. The Ark in the work is not life. The Ark in the art is life. Then you see the Earth. The Earth is in the art. You see the Heaven; the Heaven is in the art. You see the Sun and Moon; these too are in the art." Augustine always retains the Idea, and always as object — that is, the objective Idea. He therefore placed the account of the Idea in the objective concept, not the formal, in Scotus's sense. This is how Scotus would comment on this passage of John's Gospel. I want our Scotists to owe me this passage: let them use it henceforth, and let them know that Scotus's doctrine on the Ideas is Augustine's own. I have no doubt that Vasquez and the Coimbricans, had they weighed this passage, would not have feared to place the account of the Idea in the divine case in the objective concept, just as they place it in created things, and would have agreed with us entirely. I also commend Father Tellez, a man of acuity and learning, who, though he taught in the *2. Part. Physics* that the exemplar consists in the formal concept (*d. 8. sect. 2. n. 6. and 7.*), yet afterwards in *n. 10.* extends his doctrine to the objective concept as well, not venturing to exclude it, citing in favor of that position Granado (*tom. 1. in 1. p. ad q. 15. tract. 7. d. 2. 1. 3.*).

Section IV: That Known, Produced, and Diminished Being of Scotus Is Constituted, Explained, and Defended in the Divine Essence of Creatures

I would call this the stumbling-block against which the Thomists, blundering with insufficient care and skill, stirred up resentment against Scotus and charged him with error. It is astonishing that not only Thomists calumniate Scotus but even some others, along with Gabriel (*in 1. d. 35. q. 1. art. 3.*), from whom I shall remove the occasion for calumny, proceeding from the beginning.

Regarding the manner in which creatures exist in the Divine Essence, there was an old and bitter controversy, since that containment was genuinely difficult to understand. From this arose the error of Wycliffe, who — according to Waldensis (*tom. 1. from c. 1. through c. 9.*) — asserted that every creature exists in God, lives in God, and is co-eternal with God. This had been taught before him by Manichaeus, as Fulgentius indicates (*in lib. responsionum ad Ferrandum Diaconum q. 3.*), and by John Hus before the Council of Constance (*sess. 15.*). From this followed another proposition: every creature is God — which Wycliffe, though he did not explicitly concede, was bound to admit by implication, and his disciple John Hus did in fact admit it. This error would easily be removed if one added "according to intelligible being and in the Divine Ideas," for the meaning would then shift from the material state of the thing existing in itself in act to the immaterial and ideal state of the thing as represented in the Divine Essence — just as we said in Scotus's and Augustine's sense. Vasquez (*disp. 70. c. 1. and 2.*) handles this well with Waldensis cited, where he also frees Scotus entirely from any suspicion of error, and reproaches those who, through a distorted understanding of Scotus's teaching, imputed Wycliffe's error to him. How they distorted it is clear: reading his writings carelessly they failed to grasp his meaning and perverted it entirely, interpreting Scotus as if he had said that the known and produced being brought forth by the Divine intellect as it extrudes and presses out creatures virtually and eminently contained in God passes into some actual and existent being — which Scotus never intended. He in fact reproached Henry for positing in creatures a certain true being of essence and existence, and attacks him principally with the argument that it would follow that things would not be made from nothing when produced in time by God, and that therefore creation would be abolished, since every creature would be transferred from that first being of existence to a second. This is what Scotus argues (*d. 36. §. contra, from n. 3. to the end*). Nothing could be more evidently adduced in Scotus's defense — and it is truly astonishing that the Thomists did not see this. I observe that few Thomists have penetrated Scotus's position, and I congratulate John of St. Thomas, an eminent Thomist, for both understanding and freeing Scotus from all calumny (*1. part. q. 15. de Ideis art. 1. disp. 1.*). The worst interpretation of all comes from that recent Thomist cited by Rada (*controverf. 29. c. 3. in 2. quaesito*), who calls this account of being invented by Scotus chimerical, little consonant with the faith, a pure fiction, and close to Cajetan in smacking of Wycliffe's error. Even Cajetan, whom this surprises me,

understood Scotus less well. For in his commentary (*in q. 14. art. 5. §. circa conclusionem*) he reports Scotus as positing a certain represented being distinct from the real being of things in nature — not of essence only, but in a qualified sense of both essence and existence. He does not take such being to be relational but absolute, though only in a qualified sense, and founding a relation; and in such being he places all things other than God as produced by the act of the Divine intellect, and so understood in themselves and not only in the Divine essence as in a cause. This being, Cajetan calls chimerical according to St. Thomas (*q. 21. de veritate*) and wonders how those who reason thus can stumble into plain daylight. He then attacks that known being: first, because it is an extrinsic denomination, not by any formal being — how also would a known chimera be said to have known being, which he says is false. He adds that such known being is entirely superfluous, since a relational and represented being suffices in its place. He further argues a contradiction in Scotus: it follows that the stone has being prior to its being understood by God. He adds: "It does not sit well with the faithful to say that God necessarily, not freely, produces from himself things other than himself into absolute being, albeit in a qualified sense." This is finally contrary to the philosophy that holds God understands nothing outside himself, not only formally but also objectively — because whatever he understands he understands through his own essence as intelligible form, and in his own essence as the object; nor can he divert his gaze elsewhere, as these thinkers imagine.

From all this it is clear that Cajetan did not carefully read these passages of Scotus, did not grasp his meaning, and did not report it faithfully, as will be evident from what follows.

Let us first remove from this known being the errors of others, then set it forth pure and sincere as Scotus establishes it. We shall proceed clearly through conclusions.

The first conclusion: Scotus posited no real being of essence in the creature as known by God in that known or produced or diminished being, as he calls it. This is evident from the doctrine of this question (*q. un. d. 36.*), which is entirely against Henry, who posited that the creature from eternity possessed being according to essence. I cite the precise words (§. *Contra ista n. 3.*): "First: creation is production from nothing; but if the stone pre-possessed true real being, then when it is produced by an efficient cause it is not produced from nothing" — and then: "Fifth: according to the same path, the production of a thing according to that being of essence is most truly creation. For it is purely from nothing as the terminus a quo, and to a true being as the terminus ad quem; and this production according to them is eternal, therefore creation too is eternal." And: "Sixth: according to the same path, by contrast, concerning annihilation, it follows that nothing can be annihilated: for just as it is produced from a being according to essence, so it seems to return to a being according to essence, and

not into nothing." This is how Scotus attacks Henry, and this attack is a just proof of the first conclusion, which is apparent from the whole course of the question, as Lychetus notes, who also attacks Mayronis for partially agreeing with Henry. See *the Commentaries n. 8*.

The second conclusion: creatures in their known being are nothing at all — neither in essence nor in existence. This is proved first from the fact that in (§. *ad secundum argumentum n. 13.*), in regard to the proposition set out in *n. 14.*, Scotus denies that man in eternity has any being at all, and that the chimera is not a real being. Then in (§.) he says of man in eternity that it belongs to him not to be something, and of the chimera that it is not something. Both therefore are nothing, and this was sufficiently proved above in Section I when we proposed and explained that known being. Yet in order that all the conclusions may answer to one another, let us set forth Scotus's express testimonies. Let the first be from (*d. 35. q. un.*), where Scotus says: to man it does not belong, as to the chimera, that the affirmation of being is repugnant to him; rather only negation attaches to him, on account of the negation of act or of a cause not placing him in being. To the chimera, however, it is repugnant, because no cause can cause being in it. Which is tantamount to saying: both are nothing; but the chimera is nothing with impossibility, since being is repugnant to it. But the man is nothing in a non-impossible sense, since being is not repugnant to him. Scotus concludes: "Therefore this negation of nothingness attaches differently to the man in eternity and to the chimera, and yet on this account one is not more nothing than the other." What could be clearer?

The third conclusion: the known being — whether produced or diminished — is being objectively in the Divine intellect. So Scotus teaches in the same (*q. un. d. 36. §. ad secundum n. 10.*): "I say that this production is in being of another character from all being simply; it is not of relation alone, but also of absolute foundation — not according to being of essence or existence, which is true being, but according to diminished being, which is being in a qualified sense even of absolute entity, though a relation of reason accompanies it." The example: "If Caesar were annihilated yet a statue of Caesar still existed, Caesar would be represented through the statue. That represented being is of another character from all being simply, whether of essence or existence, but of the whole Caesar and of his being; and in himself according to that qualified being there can be some relation to the statue." And he concludes: "Although a caveat may be entered about the example, it does not apply in the same way to the proposed case of intellection and object — such that the whole object, even according to its total diminished being, has being in the intellect." This conclusion is thus evident.

The fourth conclusion: that known, produced, or diminished being is expressed and represented being in Divine cognition as it awakens and formally declares what was eminently and virtually in the Divine essence — which was the

primary object of the Divine intellect — and this expression and representation is the production of that creature in intelligible being. This is clear from (*q. un. §. hoc potest poni sic. Deus in primo instanti*): "God in the first instant understands the essence under the aspect of mere absoluteness; in the second instant he produces the stone in intelligible being and understands the stone." And then (*§. quod nunc 1. 15.*): "In the first instant the intellect is in act through the essence as merely absolute, as in a first act sufficient for producing anything in intelligible act. In the second instant he produces the stone in understood being, such that this term both is, and has a relation to the Divine intellection; while there is no relation in the converse direction in the Divine intellect."

Finally, in (*d. 43. q. un. §. aliter dico, n. 5.*): "Although God's power with respect to himself is in God in the first instant of nature, yet through it the object that is first possible does not have its possibility; but it has it through the Divine intellect producing it in the first instant in intelligible being. And the intellect is not formally the active power by which God is formally called omnipotent; then the thing produced by the Divine intellect in such being — namely intelligible being — in the first instant of nature is through itself possible in the second instant of nature, because through itself it formally is not repugnant to having necessary being of itself." And below he concludes: "If, however, the thing is understood to be possible before God through omnipotence produces it, that is true — but in that possibility it is not simply prior, but is produced by the Divine intellect."

I cannot pass over another passage of our Doctor (*in 1. d. 3. q. 4. §. ad quaestionem n. 18.*): "On account of the words of Augustine it is necessary to concede that infallible truths are seen in the eternal rules. All intelligibles by the act of the Divine intellect have intelligible being, and in them all truths about themselves shine forth. Those things, insofar as they are secondary objects of the Divine intellect, are truths, because they are conformed to their exemplar, namely the Divine intellect; they are light, because they are manifesting; and they are immutable there and necessary; and eternal in a qualified sense, because eternity is a condition of what exists, and these do not have existence except in a qualified sense. So therefore we can first be said to see them in the eternal light — that is, in the secondary object of the Divine intellect, which is truth or eternal light." This passage is distinguished and weighty, and it refutes Cajetan who calls this manner of philosophizing chimerical and says those who hold it stumble into plain daylight — whereas this is pure truth, no chimera; and one does not stumble into daylight but runs into noon. It also appears false what he argues — that Scotus says God knows creatures outside himself and in themselves — since it is manifestly clear that all intelligibles are in the Divine intellect, are known there, declared there, produced there in intelligible being, and all of this is consistent with faith, with the dignity of the Divine essence, knowledge, and omnipotence. It seems Cajetan had not read Scotus, for one needed only eyes to see and perceive this light.

I observe moreover that these things are so true that no theologian can deny them. Indeed I believe that St. Thomas and his school differ from Scotus and his school on this matter in nothing but words — and I prove this by adopting the position of Father Arriaga, who thinks the same (*Tractatu de scientia Dei disp. 23. de Ideis Sect. 4.*). For one finds almost nothing different. We all admit that distinction of primary and secondary object. We all grant that creatures are known by God in his essence as secondary object. We all affirm ideal reasons in God. We all say creatures have no being whatsoever — neither of essence nor of existence — by reason of that cognition in the Divine essence. We all distinguish between that expression in the Ideas and the making of creatures. We all acknowledge that creatures are necessarily known by God, but are not necessarily ordered to existence. We all agree that they are represented and seen in the Divine essence. We differ only in this: that the Scotists with Scotus say that known being by God is a certain intelligible and diminished being, and that those reasons are objective reasons, not formal ones. The second point, though it imports some difference in itself, does not matter much to the cause. So we dispute about words, we contend over vocabulary, but in the substance we agree. Why then do the Thomists take such offense and calumniate Scotus so unjustly? There is nothing in this manner of philosophizing that can be censured.

As for what Cajetan frequently and tediously objects to Scotus — namely, that Scotus affirms God knows creatures in themselves and outside the Divine essence — he certainly assumes something false and imposes it on Scotus, as I have plainly shown above. We do not see what is behind us. That is what Cajetan himself affirms with the rest of his school, in which that position is celebrated which places things actually present in eternity and coexisting with God, so that all things are present there and are known in themselves — about which he should have remained silent, since he admits it. We shall raise the question about this in its proper place.

The Thomists will nonetheless ask me: what kind of being is that known being devised by our Scotus — is it real or rational? I respond by first asking them what kind of being the possible being of creatures is in that state — is it real or rational? — and in asking I warn them that the difficulty about this Scotistic known being is not peculiar to it alone, since the same difficulty attaches to possible being. Then, setting aside the occasion for criticizing this known being by adducing the example of creatures in their possible being, I say — in Scotus's words (*in 1. d. 36. q. un. §. ad secundum n. 10.*): "This production is in being of another character from all being simply, and is not of relation alone but also of absolute foundation." From which it follows it is not merely rational being, nor a second intention, as Rada wishes (*Controversia 29. a. 3. in secundo quaesito in quarta conclusione*). This is proved: because that known being is capable of essence and existence, and accordingly is possible in the second instant; therefore it is not a second intention, nor rational being — only a relation of reason, as Scotus there says, accompanies that diminished being. This is noted by Lychetus, who also

observes that the produced being — which Scotus says that known being is — does not fall under relations or rational beings. I add against Rada that those creatures so known objectively are the Ideas in Scotus's view, who denies they are rational relations. Therefore that being is not a mere rational relation but its absolute foundation.

What then is it? I respond: it is something intelligible, contained virtually and eminently in the Divine essence, awakened and represented by Divine cognition, which has the possibility of existing and being — and this is an absolute account. But I am pressed: is that account real or rational? If you take "real" to mean actual being, either of essence or existence — I deny it. If you mean something possible, virtual, and eminent — I grant it, as having capacity for being in actual and positive being. With this answer I fear no objections from the Thomists, and I defend myself by the example of possible creatures, whose being in that state is most difficult to understand and explain, yet cannot be denied; therefore, just as that possible being relates to omnipotence, so this known being relates to knowledge. This will appear more clearly in the following section.

Section V: Various Incidental Questions Are Decided and the Whole of Scotus's Teaching Is Illuminated

The first question is: whether objective Ideas in Scotus's position satisfy the doctrine of the Fathers — and especially Augustine — who affirm that creatures exist more perfectly in God than in themselves? If that known being is a rational being and a second intention, as Rada wishes, that doctrine cannot be sustained. For who would say that a rational being of whatever kind and manner is more perfect than a real being actually produced in reality? Hence Rada (*Controver.* 29. a. 5.), explaining the position of the Subtle Doctor, says: things in the Divine intellect by reason of Divine cognition are more perfect than in themselves, because the known thing is said to have the same being that the cognition itself has. Yet he affirms that the stone is more truly a stone in itself when it exists than when it is represented in the mind of God. He cites Scotus (*in 4. d. 1. q. 1.*) for the first proposition. Both statements however encounter difficulty. First: if the object is not more perfect in itself, nor by reason of itself but only by reason of cognition, then Scotus's position collapses into that of the Thomists concerning formal Ideas — since the Ideas, being images of things and not things themselves, are more perfect insofar as they are images of the things-as-objects in the formal concept, not in the things-as-objects themselves which are the ideal reasons in Scotus's view. Second: because the Fathers attribute altogether a better and more perfect being to creatures in God as known than in themselves; nor can those words of John (*Jn. 1*) — what was made, in him was life — be rightly explained otherwise, as we considered above and as will appear more clearly when we treat the matutinal and vespertine knowledge of the Angels.

Hence Rada's opinion does not seem to satisfy, nor does it satisfy Scotus's doctrine either, since the things-as-objects of the Divine intellect are taken in their objective being, which is indeed diminished and qualified — by Scotus's own admission — and accordingly imperfect and inchoate, far inferior to what they have when they exist in act and in their proper real being. Therefore either it must be said that the Ideas do not consist in the objective concept, or if they do, it is impossible to affirm of them that greater perfection which the Fathers attributed to them.

Yet it must be said — retaining Scotus's position — that those objective reasons suffice for retaining that received doctrine of the Fathers, in the following way. Those things-as-objects are not known immediately in themselves, nor do they terminate the Divine cognition in a bare manner as if they antecede it already constituted as objects — as the Thomists with Cajetan (*comment. ad quaestionem 14. and 15.*) seem to think. Rather they are known in the very essence itself and through the essence; and accordingly not in created and perishable being but in Divine and immortal being, which they possess within God. And they are one and the same really with God, with all created entity excluded — which entity they antedate — and through this cognition they are produced in intelligible being and become as it were an offspring and fruit of Divine cognition, within which they remain and live. Therefore they are far better and more perfect than in their own real being; and of them it is truly said: what was made, in him was life — and whatever Augustine expounded in that passage. Accordingly, the attack on Scotus's doctrine arises from a distorted understanding of him, as if he had posited things-as-objects as knowable in themselves and outside God — which is utterly foreign to his thought. Let us hear Scotus (*in 1. d. 35. q. un. §. ad ista n. 12.*): "God forms singulars by their own proper reasons — not however by reasons outside himself, therefore by reasons in his own mind. But nothing in his mind is other than immutable; therefore everything that can be formed can be formed according to its own eternal proper reason in his mind. But nothing of such a kind is posited in his mind except the Idea, according to this description. Therefore it seems that the stone as understood can be called an Idea, just as an ark in the mind can be called the reason with respect to the ark in matter, and is the proper reason according to which the ark in matter is formed; this reason is eternal in the Divine mind, as the known in the knower, through the act of the Divine intellect." And later: "This seems to harmonize with what Plato said, from whom Augustine took the name Idea; for Plato posited the Ideas as the quiddities of things existing of themselves — badly, according to Aristotle, but well according to Augustine, in the Divine mind. Hence he speaks of the intelligible world according to him (*loc. lib. 1. retract. c. 3.*). Just as therefore the Ideas according to Aristotle's attribution were posited as quiddities of things, so according to Plato they seem to be posited as quiddities having known being in the Divine intellect."

More deeply in (1. d. 3. q. 4. §. *ad quaestionem n. 18.*): "All intelligibles by the act of the Divine intellect have intelligible being, and in them all truths about themselves shine forth. Those things, insofar as they are secondary objects of the Divine intellect, are truths, because they are conformed to their exemplar, namely the Divine intellect; and they are light, because they manifest, and they are immutable there and necessary." And below: "The Divine intellect contains these truths, which it holds in the Divine intellect, as that saying of Augustine says (*de Trinit. lib. 14. c. 15.*) that these rules are written in the book of eternal light, namely as containing the object." And a little after (*n. 19.*): "In uncreated light we see, as in the proximate cause by whose power the proximate object moves. Hence it appears that those things-as-objects also appear to us, not in themselves, but in the uncreated light of the Divine essence there, as in the proximate cause of the object in itself: for the Divine intellect produces these in act in intelligible being by its act, and by its act gives to this object such a character and to that object such a character, and consequently gives them such an account of object, through which account they primarily move the intellect toward such certain cognition."

From this it appears that creatures both exist and are seen in the Divine essence, not in themselves — and hence are seen both more truly and more perfectly in that objective being than in themselves, since in the Divine essence they have Divine being. Scotus concludes in that passage (§. *et isto ultimo modo n. 23.*): "Therefore cognition of all things, both speculative and practical, through principles drawn from the eternal light as known, is more perfect, purer, and more eminent than any other cognition drawn from principles in their proper genus."

In this doctrine of Scotus is contained what pertains to the matutinal and vespertine knowledge of the Angels, which we reserve in its entirety for its proper place.

The second question: why and in what sense does Scotus call that known being — as pure and perfect as he himself describes it — diminished, and only in a qualified sense rather than simply? I respond that Scotus speaks comparatively: first with regard to the primary object, which is the Divine essence, in relation to which the known being is a diminished and qualified entity; second with regard to the object in actual being as existent, insofar as it is real — for known being, like possible being, is ordered to real and actual being. Not because the actual is more perfect than the known being, but because it is the end of that known being, without which the known being is inchoate, diminished, and accordingly as it were incomplete. Scotus seems to have spoken in both senses. Regarding the first (*d. 35. q. un. §. ad secundum, n. 14.*), he calls the more perfect being that of the Divine absolute essence compared with that known being in the essence as produced by the Divine intellect, because the latter has dependence on the former, and says: "In producing in known being he produces it as having

dependence on himself." And then (*n. 15.*): "Because nothing having more perfect being in any genus depends on what has less perfect being in that genus." And afterward: "In the first instant the intellect is in act through the essence as merely absolute, as in a first act sufficient for producing anything in intelligible act. In the second instant he produces the stone in understood being, such that this term both is and has a relation to the Divine intellection." And (*d. 36. q. un. §. ad propositum n. 8.*): "That known being is called diminished." And (*§. ad secundum n. 10.*): it is called diminished and qualified — "this qualified being," he says, "is reduced to some being simply, which is the being of the intellection itself; but that being simply is not formally the being of what is said to be in a qualified sense, but is that which terminates or originates it, such that to that true being this qualified being is reduced." And he adds: "Through the simply being of the Divine intellect, these objects have being in a qualified sense — namely objective being — in terms of which they move our intellect toward knowing sincere truths; and because of their moving it is said that the intellect is moved by them, just as they have their qualified being through the simply being of that intellect."

It is therefore evident that this known being is called diminished and qualified by comparison with the being of the Divine essence and intellect, upon which it depends and by which it is produced in intelligible being — with respect to which it is known and produced-through-understanding; and because it is known, it is diminished and qualified, not simply. In the second sense, comparatively with respect to real and actual being, Scotus speaks in the same (*d. 36. q. un. §. et quinto n. 3.*), where he calls real being — in which the creature is placed through creation — true being, and the created thing a true entity. And (*§. ad primum principale n. 11.*): he calls something firm being if it has true and firm being, whether of essence or existence, and this comes from the efficient cause from which it has true being both of essence and existence — which does not belong to the known or diminished entity. And again there: "When you say it is never a firm entity unless it is produced — I concede this: and when it is produced as existent, therefore it is never a firm entity unless it is existent — I concede this. This is the true and proper firm entity, which is not diminished nor qualified, and that being and the denomination of firmness belongs only to the entity from the side of things and existing outside causes." By contrast there is another firm being in an improper and broad sense, which includes that other known and diminished being — about which Scotus says there: "Or a firm entity is called that which is first distinguished from a fiction — namely, that to which true being of essence or existence is not repugnant." In this sense it fits the known and qualified and diminished being. From this appears the distance and excellence of that true and proper actual and existing being over the other known and diminished being: the latter is separated from a fiction by possible being, while the former is not merely possible but also actual — and accordingly is true and perfect being.

The third question: how Wycliffe erred in this ideal matter, and how alien Scotus's position is from that error. Wycliffe — as I said above from Waldensis — held that creatures have a certain true and real being in God and according to it are not nothing; they are in fact God himself, and God is truly and really predicated of them; and thus all these propositions are true: "A stone is God; an ass is God; Bucephalus is God; a dog is God" — and conversely. This is established from Waldensis (*tomo primo lib. 1. art. 1.*) and especially from the condemnation of these and similar propositions which John Hus, disciple of John Wycliffe, affirmed before the Council of Constance (*first session, at the beginning*), where a catalogue of Wycliffe's errors is produced, from which Hus had received them; among these are enumerated these three propositions: "Everything is God; every creature is God; everywhere every being is, since every being is God." What Vasquez says (*disp. 70. c. 1. n. 1.*) — that these propositions are counted among the errors of John Hus, disciple of Wycliffe — can be sustained, though there they are properly attributed to Wycliffe and listed in the catalogue under Wycliffe's name. For there are two catalogues: one of Wycliffe's errors, the other of John Hus's. But because Hus also approved the errors of his master, Vasquez therefore said they are counted among the errors of John Hus without mention of Wycliffe. Yet Vasquez (*disp. 70. c. 2. n. 9.*) denies that Wycliffe erred so disgracefully: "No sane mind," he says, "could admit that." He maintains he erred only in manner of speaking. I however judge otherwise: first because Waldensis could not have taxed him if he were speaking of intelligible being — since Waldensis himself holds with Scotus concerning known being, as is clear from chapters one, two, and three; he could not therefore condemn those propositions as thus delivered. Second because we see that Henry, so great a doctor, held that creatures in God have a true and proper real being of essence (*in summa art. 2. q. 23. and 25., quodlibeto 8. q. 9., quodlibeto 9. q. 1. and 2., quodlibeto 11. q. 3.*) — in which sense Scotus attacks him (*d. 36. q. un. §. contra istud primo n. 3.*). But that Scotus is very far from Wycliffe's error and far distant from Henry's opinion is clear from the entire argumentation; and Vasquez cited there, and Waldensis who adheres to Scotus, free him excellently from all attack. How could Waldensis condemn his own position as Wycliffe's error?

The fourth question asks whether that position of formal Ideas, which commonly seems so easy and unobstructed, actually runs without stumbling. Certainly I hesitate and trip over it. Let me explain the matter. Those Ideas or formal conceptions, taken from the side of the concept and not from the side of the object, represent that object exactly. I accept this, and ask: what is that which is represented? Either nothing, or something. If nothing, then the Ideas do not exist. If something, then either it is a real being or a rational being — and one falls back into the very question they were raising against Scotus, and they are bound to answer it just as he does, and cannot answer it any better. Thus the difficulty that appears immediately in Scotus's objective Ideas is found

mediately in St. Thomas's formal Ideas. For since the formal Ideas are images of objects, they must represent the nature of the object. But what that nature is, and how it is expressed in the concept, is then asked. Further I ask: in what sense is that formal Idea an Idea? When it first tends toward and knows the object? Or when, having known it, it reflects back upon its own concept? The first cannot be said, because then it is merely an expression of the object and does not refer it toward imitation — in which relation the ideal and exemplary account consists, as no one fails to see. Therefore it does not become an Idea through that direct attainment, which is mere cognition of the object. There remains another reflexive cognition upon the direct cognition, in which the intellect, bending back upon it, gazes upon the image of its own concept — which reflexive concept is the concept and image of that first concept. Then: this reflexive concept applies that expression of the first concept as Idea and exemplar to the thing exemplified and Ideated. From which it follows that this second reflexive concept is not the formal Idea, but what gazes upon and applies the Idea of the first — which first was not an Idea, and through the second it becomes an Idea. And accordingly the Idea would necessarily be a certain composite of two cognitions, one direct and one reflexive. But against this reflexive cognition I press again. This is not cognition alone. For that is an application of the representing form to the thing to be exemplified; and this is not formally cognition but something else, since application of cognition is achieved through some third thing that applies it. Just as what applies a mirror is not the mirror but something else distinct from the mirror. Therefore we now have the concurrence of two cognitions and of some third thing applying the cognitions as a mirror for Ideating and exemplifying. Furthermore: that formal expression of the known object of the first concept either bears upon it already posited through mere termination, or through the effecting and causality of that expression. Neither is the case; therefore that concept is not a formal Idea nor apt for the question. The first part — tending to mere termination — is false, because then God would presuppose an object to himself, and this object would precede and degrade the concept and Divine intellection. The second is scarcely intelligible. How could intellection of the object cause it, if it merely expresses and represents it? For cognition is not the production of an object but its representation. How therefore can representation — which by its own genus is foreign to production — be a production? It presupposes an object, but does not make an object. For every objective being precedes formal being. This manner of Ideating is truly difficult and obstructed.

Finally I tangle it further still. How will it be true to say of that formal concept what was made, in him was life? That is: how will objects live and be perfected in that expression, and will they be in it better than in themselves when they are in true and real and actual being? Because that expression in the concept does not give being to the thing but expresses what it has — faithfully expressing and representing the natures of things; and if things-as-objects were represented

better than they are, that conception would be charged with infidelity, because it would not represent the thing as it is but otherwise than it is. The foundation likewise fails from another angle, because it does not seem that a thing is made better and nobler by being represented more nobly — otherwise a stone represented by an Angelic intellect would be nobler for that representation than it is in itself. The nobility of things is not derived from the nobility of cognition. Nor does the fact that creatures are known and represented in God's cognition transfer them into Divine being. Why then do the Thomists wish to deter us and make a show of the object of their formal Ideation through concepts and expressions — which suffer so many difficulties?

Section VI: Whether Distinct Ideal Reasons Are Necessary for Distinct Cognition of Creatures

For a welcome variety, I shall treat in this section the capital question between St. Thomas — who affirms — and Scotus — who denies — in the notable words of the distinguished Master John Bachon, the Doctor Resolutus (*comm. in dist. 36. lib. 1. sent. q. un.*), where he asks how God understands things other than himself, and proposes three things. First: whether a plurality of Ideas in God can be proved. Second: whether this plurality belongs to the account of the Idea itself, or only attaches to it as a consequence. Third: whether it is necessarily required as a precondition for distinct representation and distinct cognition of creatures. Regarding the first, he sets forth the position of St. Thomas (*quaest. 3. de verit. a. 1.*) that many Ideas must necessarily be posited in God. Then he produces the position of Gerard, who inferred them as consequences and denied they are relational. Third he proposes the position of Hervaeus, who denies that a plurality of Ideas is required as a precondition for distinct cognition or representation of the creatures that are known. Finally he expounds his own position, holding with Scotus in that distinction and question (*36. a. 3. §. 3.*) that a plurality of Ideas is not required for distinct cognition of the creatures known — and proves it with Scotus's arguments (*in 1. d. 35.*) as follows.

Whatever that through which a limited external object is represented is that through which that limited external object can be distinctly known, without any relation pre-understood in that limited representative. Therefore if what through which the external object is represented is unlimited, the unlimited can also be distinctly known externally, without the unlimited being pre-understood as diversely imitable or under diverse relations to creatures. He proves the antecedent: when I know whiteness through the species of whiteness, the species of whiteness does not need to be first understood as related to whiteness before I know that whiteness — because then I would not know whiteness unless I first compared its species to it, and the reflexive would always precede the direct. He proves the consequence: because the unlimited and the limited differ only by precision and non-precision; for the limited represents this precisely and nothing else, while the unlimited represents this and anything else. But removal

of precision from what represents in an unlimited manner — since it is a matter of perfection — does not remove from it the ability to represent equally perfectly those things toward which it is unlimited, just as what represents only one thing represents that one thing perfectly. Therefore just as one limited representative representing something perfectly represents it without a relation pre-understood in it to that thing, so the unlimited representative, representing perfectly, will represent distinct representeds without diverse relations co-understood toward them.

Likewise: an equivocal cause on its own side is a more perfect reason for knowing its effect than a univocal cause, because the equivocal cause is the cause of the whole species while the univocal cause is only the cause of the individual and is not the proper cause in relation to the effect, since the order of causes is essential and the essential order of causes and the perfection of the universe consists in the species, not in individuals. But a perfectly known univocal cause can be the distinct reason for knowing its effect without any relation pre-understood of it to the effect — because by nature it represents its effect, and therefore when its nature is perfectly known, the effect is immediately known without further negotiation by the intellect. Likewise: a finite equivocal cause can produce many things distinctly without a distinct relation to them. Therefore an infinite equivocal cause can produce many things distinctly without distinct relations to them, and consequently can know them distinctly without distinct relations to them, since it produces by knowing.

Likewise: that something containing many things cannot represent them distinctly without many determinables in it, or at least understood concerning it, is due to its potentiality and confusion. For this is the reason why that does not apply to God: because universal knowledge contains its known objects in potency, but the Divine essence contains them most actually; therefore it can represent all things most distinctly without any determinations of any kind in it or understood concerning it.

Likewise: if in God distinct ideal relations must be pre-understood for distinct cognition of ideal things, then those relations are knowable by God, since they are certain entities; either therefore through themselves — which is false, because then the Divine intellect would be degraded — or through other relations, and then there is a process to infinity; or through the unlimited essence, and the proposition is had.

Finally: if such relations exist, either those relations are principles of distinct acts of understanding — which is not the case, because a relation is not an active principle — or the essence is, and the proposition is had; or essence with relation — which is false, because relation with essence does not form something essentially one. The first option does not hold, that is clear; nor the second, because then the relation would follow the nature as a property and would be a real relation. With these arguments thus elaborated, Bachon proves

his own position and Scotus's. These arguments are drawn from Scotus's doctrine.

Bachon then proceeds (§. 4.) and says a plurality of Ideas is not required in order for the Ideated to be produced. First: because if the essence suffices for representing distinctly, it suffices for producing distinctly — and he proves this more fully (*d. 39. a. 2. concl. 5.*). Second: because the power of an agent, being one in the agent, produces distinct effects; nor is so great a diversity required in the cause as is found in the effects — as experience teaches (§. *Quinto*). He proves that a plurality of Ideas is not required for distinct things to be produced in distinct being, for the same two reasons just adduced; and there he resolves all the arguments of St. Thomas (*de verit. q. 3. a. 1.*). The resolution is evident from the arguments already made.

It is true that in (§. 6.) Bachon posits from the side of the creatures known and represented a plurality of Ideas, and proves this from the condition of things in the account of the artificial and from the authority of St. Augustine (*lib. 83. quaest. q. 46.*). But this is also consonant with Scotus, who posits the Ideas in the objective concept — as Bachon also posits them (*quodlibeto 2. q. 2.*). Hence he differs in nothing from the doctrine of Scotus, as is evident from (*d. 39.*) to which he refers in this (*d. 36.*), whose whole doctrine conforms to the entire argumentation hitherto concerning Scotus's doctrine. This is certainly great commendation both of Scotus's fidelity in reporting St. Thomas's position and of his right in refuting it — that Bachon, a severe and independent author and called the Resolute on that account, agrees with him. I wished to set out his entire passage so that the Thomists may know they have to contend not only with Scotus alone and his school but also with Bachon and his, and since he so carefully and minutely refutes St. Thomas's arguments, he clearly agreed fully with Scotus.

Judgment

Whoever reads this sufficiently dense and careful disputation will clearly find — on my authority — that Scotus's position on the entire ideal account seems considerably more sound and solid than the Thomist one. For the Ideas are posited in the objective being of creatures, which creatures are declared through Divine intellection and placed in intelligible being, perspicuous and expressed; and what previously existed eminently and virtually in the essence is in some way drawn out, awakened, and shown as produced openly through that expressed cognition of the Divine intellect. This being — so brought forth and manifest — is called known and intelligible, produced in relation to the cognizing and intelligibly-producing cause. That being is not real being of essence or existence, and from the side of things it places nothing actual in creatures; it is being of representation and diminished being compared with the true and Divine uncreated being, and compared with proper actual being existing in the nature of things. Thus that account of the being of things known

is, in its foundation, something absolute and intelligible not repugnant to essence and actual existence, and founding possible being — which possible being consists in a certain disposition and capacity for receiving true existing and actual being. These objects so formed through Divine intellection are in their own proper objective account the Ideas and exemplars of all possible things; these ideal reasons are entirely necessary and prior to every act of the free will, since they are concerned with necessary intelligible and possible accounts of being — which precede the free acts of the Divine will. From these accounts of intelligible and possible being the Divine will draws, according to its freedom, what beings it will that are capable and fit for essence and actual existence, to be placed outside their intrinsic and Divine causes, where they were contained virtually and eminently. So that in these Ideas there is in God the highest unity of Divine knowledge in itself, together with the multiplicity of things-as-objects — with greater dignity than in St. Thomas's position, which by placing the Ideas in the formal act and expression of intellect multiplies in the Divine intellect itself cognitions and images in relation to the things-as-objects as they are distinct — in infinite formal Ideas each individually expressing and representing singular objects — while in Scotus's position the multiplication is found in and belongs to the objects, and the unity is on the side of knowledge. That knowledge, through its single cognition and most fruitful gaze, brought to birth and delivered those infinite things intelligibly in their objective being; and since these are related to it through many and infinite relations, yet it is related to them not at all as a measuring and wholly independent and superior cause; and just as there is one intellection on God's side and one most simple gaze, so through a single intellectual birth it brought forth into intelligible light that plurality of Ideas.

This, it seems, St. Thomas does not achieve in his own position. Nor does he retain that nobility and perfection of things expressed in the Divine formal Ideas — since the formal Ideas, being only images and not the objects themselves, retain their own intimate perfection but do not pour it back into the objects. Those Ideas are indeed Divine — indeed they are God himself — but they do not communicate to creatures that account of Divinity. For in representing it they rather participate and assume than communicate and return it. For this is how the account of understanding is distinguished from the account of willing: the account of understanding draws objects to itself and transforms them in itself, claiming them for itself and not generously imparting to the objects; whereas the account of willing breaks out and tends and is carried in some way outside itself, and is communicated to the beloved things. Therefore that generosity of nobility and perfection is not aptly accommodated to the formal Ideas of the things-as-objects, since it does not go forth from that embrace and bosom of the intellect where things are understood and expressed — since the intellect draws to itself the understood things and claims for itself whatever is in them through their image and representation.

The situation is otherwise in Scotus's position, in which the Divine intellect, having known the essence as the primary object, knows creatures as the secondary object, awakening and pressing them out, providing them with known and expressed being — since they are eminently and virtually in the essence — and in some manner brings them to birth, giving them intelligible being through which they remain within the very known essence itself, with which they are really identical in their foundation; and in the power of that foundation they are God himself, and God communicates himself to them, imparting to them Divine nobility and perfection. In the Divine essence and through it they live, shine, and are eternal — the essence communicating itself to them, not participating in them. What could be more subtle than that known being? What more ingenious than that produced being? What more acute than that diminished being? These things are new, and scarcely known in the Schools before Scotus. Everything had been common, everything well-worn and ordinary. Good things, but not marvelous. Safe, but not subtle. Fitting, but not brilliant. Solid, but not acute. Scotus arrived, and with his Divine genius added to good things their admirable quality, to safe things subtlety, to fitting things brilliance, to solid things acuteness. He raised up what was lying low, brought forward what was hidden, illuminated what was dark — and in imitation of the Divine intellect, which awakened and declared things that were only eminently and virtually in the essence, and brought them to known being, Scotus with his most subtle genius dug out, brought forward, illuminated, and reduced to Scholastic use and exercise what was hidden in the recesses of theology.

COLLATION IX, DISTINCTION III

On the Question: Whether God's Being Present Everywhere According to Power Implies His Being Everywhere According to Essence — That Is, Whether Omnipotence Implies Immensity

Under which title Scotus places the question in 1. d. 37. q. un., and St. Thomas in: Whether God Is in All Things? 1 p. q. 8. a. 1.

Scotus is clear, and clearer still in the text we shall presently examine. We encounter difficulty right at the outset, since Cajetan (*in quaestionem et articulum S. Thomae*) says that Scotus did not understand this title in (2. d. 2. q. 1.) — about which however he does not wish to dispute there but defers it to later. Scotus saw perfectly well what that simple title contained, and he explicitly manifested the latent doctrine in his own title — which St. Thomas had wrapped and covered in his own — and immediately opened it in this article in the body of the text, where he says: "God, wherever he works anything, is there; but God works in all things according to that text of Isaiah, *All our works you have worked in us, O Lord* (Isa. 26:12); therefore God is in all things." The sense of this is different

from what is contained in the simple title: *Whether God is in all things*? From which no one could have expected this other sense to be wrapped within it: whether it is from God's operation that his presence is inferred. Let us see the rest, and let St. Thomas's intention and position appear. "I answer: it must be said that God is in all things, not as part of their essence, but as an agent is present to that in which it acts, and touches it with its power. Hence in 7. *Physics* it is proved that the moved and the mover must be together. But since God is being itself through his essence, the created being must be his proper effect, as igniting is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are conserved in being: just as light is caused in the air by the sun for as long as the air remains illuminated. As long therefore as a thing has being, so long must God be present to it according to the being it has; but being is what is most intimate to each thing and what is deepest in all things, since it is formal with respect to everything that is in the thing, as was shown above (q. 7.). Hence God must be in all things, and intimately so." From this it appears that God cannot establish or conserve creatures unless he is present to them as an assistant operating. It is further clear from the reply to the first objection: "God," he says, "is in all things, as causing the being of all." And to the second: "God is in things as containing things" — namely by operating, establishing, and conserving, as if it could not be otherwise.

Let us hear the same holy Doctor in a. 2. on the title: *Whether God is everywhere*. In the body thus: "It must be said that since place is a certain thing, to be in place can be understood in two ways: either after the manner of other things, that is, as something is said to be in other things in any way at all, as accidents are in their place; or after the proper manner of place, as things located are in a place. In both ways, according to something, God is in every place — which is to be everywhere. First, in this way he is in all things, giving to them being and power and operation: so also he is in every place, giving to it being and locative power. Also, things located are in a place insofar as they fill the place; and God fills every place — not like a body, for a body is said to fill a place insofar as it does not admit another body with it; but by the fact that God is in some place, it is not excluded that others are there; indeed through this he fills all places, because he gives being to all the things located, which fill all places." Thus the account of being everywhere is the account of operating everywhere. More explicitly to the first: "It must be said that incorporeal things are not in place by contact of dimensional quantity but by contact of power." And to the second — having given examples of God, an Angel, and the soul: "Such an indivisible," he says, "is not applied to the continuum as a part of it, but insofar as it touches it with its power. Hence according to the extent to which its power can extend to one or many things, to a small or great thing, so it is in one or many places, and in a small or large place." He beyond doubt posits the account of being in place in the account of acting and operating.

Scotus therefore understood what that title question carried with it and what was wrapped in those simple words, as Javellus also saw in attacking Cajetan (*comment. in hunc art. q. 8.*): "If this is reserved to God alone (that is, to operate) on account of the illumination — read, unlimited character — of power, therefore God can act upon something distant, which is false, since he would not necessarily be in all things — the opposite of which St. Thomas holds." And again in (§. *quantum ad tertium*): "I say that Blessed Thomas intends to conclude the second thing, namely that the substance of God is infinitely present to all, from the fact that he operates in all. And a little later: Therefore Blessed Thomas holds the substance of God to be immensely present to all, but not from itself, but from operation. And this proof," as we said, "is a priori." In this sense Vasquez (*disp. 28. c. 2. and 3.*) and Suarez (*in Metaph. d. 30. and lib. 2. summae in 1. p. c. 2.*) and generally others received the holy Doctor.

Let us come to Scotus. He, in (*q. un. d. 37.* at the beginning), says: "I ask one thing: whether God's being everywhere according to power implies his being everywhere according to essence — that is, whether omnipotence implies immensity?" Then, that it does: "Every agent is present to the patient according to the Philosopher (7. *Physics*)" — indicating St. Thomas using that passage in the cited article (*1 part. q. 8.*) — "and this immediately, if it can act upon it immediately; or mediately, if it acts upon it mediately; but the omnipotent can act upon anything immediately." Then he begins to attack the opposite: "The opposite is argued; for he can cause something outside the universe, yet he is not there through his essence, therefore etc." Scotus states this position of St. Thomas more explicitly (*in 2. d. 2. q. 6. §. contra conclusionem*). "It is argued first," he says, "that whoever holds this contradicts himself, because in the question *Whether God is everywhere?* he proves that he is, through this — that according to the Philosopher (7. *Physics*) the mover is together with the moved, and God is the prime efficient, and therefore capable of moving every moveable — from which he concludes that he is in all things and present to all. I ask what he intends to conclude from this? Either to be present to all — that is, to be moving — and then this is a begging of the question, because the premise and conclusion are the same, and this is nothing to the purpose, since he intends to conclude God's immensity, according to which God is present to all. Or he intends to conclude that presence that befits God insofar as he is immense; and then from operation somewhere it follows according to him that that presence which pertains to Divine immensity follows — which is God's insofar as he is God, so that naturally he is first present insofar as he is immense, before insofar as he is operating; and this is concluded from his being in all through operation as from a posterior. Therefore, similarly, in the case proposed, it is naturally prior for the Angel to be present to a place according to essence than to be present according to his operation" — this whole passage Cajetan cites (*in comm. ad a. 1. q. 8. §. circa sensum conclusionis*), saying Scotus fabricated and was deceived in what

he fabricated — namely in the acceptance of presence. We shall remonstrate with Cajetan about this later.

Section I: Whether the Position of St. Thomas Is Rightly Proved by Him

The argument of the Angelic Doctor can be twofold: first a priori, second a posteriori. First concerning the first. God is the first universal cause of all things; but the cause must be intimate and present to the effect; therefore God must be intimately present to all things; and accordingly the very account of operating and causing is the account of Divine presence, and from that perfection of the all-powerful cause arises the necessity and account of existing presentially in things. Suarez explains this argument (*in Metaph. d. 39.* and *in lib. 2. summae tract. 1. c. 2.*) in this manner: "Whether the inference rests on this, that no cause acts at a distance, or on this, that the most perfectly acting cause is also perfectly present to its effect and holds it conjoined with itself, so as to have perfect dominion over it" — and he admits that in this way immensity can be inferred from the action of God. Suarez finds this argument acceptable. Vasquez judges differently, for in (*d. 28. c. 3.*) he says: "God's presence in things is not sufficiently shown from the propinquity of agents." But let that argument stand; let us not raise an objection against it now. Capreolus (*in 1. d. 37. q. 1.*) and Javellus (*in comment. ad hunc articulum primum q. 8.*) confirm the same: from the fact that the agent is in some manner the act of the patient, and the patient is in some manner in potency to the agent, and act and potency by their nature are not distant — hence it is repugnant to the proximate agent, as proximate agent, to be distant from its immediately patient thing. Javellus indeed defends this as the argument and adds that it proceeds a priori from the formal account — which can also be confirmed from this: there is no other account for being in a place, since with all creatures entirely precluded God himself cannot be understood to be in a place. For through what else will he be located, if he is incapable of place — both because he is pure act and because he is infinite? Therefore neither through the whole of eternity before creation of the world was he in a place, nor would he be afterward, if he had annihilated the world. For outside God there would be absolutely nothing; and in nothing, how could anything be? From which it appears this is the formal and a priori account of being in a place, which is the account of operation. St. Thomas speaks moreover of the presence not only of power but of the suppositum; otherwise he would have proved nothing concerning local presence, as Javellus rightly notes against Cajetan. For then it would follow that he could act upon something distant, from which, while distant, he neither operates nor exists. And accordingly St. Thomas's argument is proved.

So much for the argument a priori. As for the argument a posteriori, it is more manifest: because it is rightly deduced from the fact that something acts and operates upon its patient by immediacy of the suppositum conjoined and together with it. This argument is more forceful and evident in God, who is

most intimately in things, conserves and moves them — of which it is most truly said (*Acts 17:28*): *In him we live and move and are*. From this a posteriori the argument holds: God operates in creatures, establishes them, conserves them, governs them; therefore he is immediately conjoined with them and present to them — a consequence no one will deny, whether Thomist or Scotist. Hence that other saying: "He is not far from each one of us." So from the motion of the celestial Sphere we infer the closeness of the moving Intelligence with propinquity of suppositum. These arguments Cajetan, Capreolus, and other interpreters of St. Thomas try to sustain — who poorly receive Scotus's attacks, especially Cajetan and Javellus, who oppose themselves to his arguments, which we must set out and compare with St. Thomas's arguments.

Section II: Whether Scotus's Attack on St. Thomas's Position Is Just or Unjust

Scotus attacks this thesis as follows. First he denies that principle: "A created agent cannot act where it is not." The ground for denial is that there are active causes that act at a distance — as the Sun, which is fixed in the Heaven of its sphere (so to speak) and yet acts in the bowels of the Earth producing metals there, which it cannot produce present by its substance. Nor through accidents, because in Scotus's position accidents cannot generate substance, neither in their own power nor in that of another substance, as he teaches (*in 4. d. 12.* and *in 2. d. 18.*); therefore there is an agent that operates upon what is remote, and St. Thomas's principle falls.

Then regarding God — about whom the argument is concerned — that rule does not hold. For if omnipotence is the will of God, from whose willing the being of a thing follows, certainly the will can will to act both near and far; hence if it were possible — per impossibile — for God to be in one certain and determinate place, and he wished to operate elsewhere without moving there, he would nonetheless operate there, because he could will to operate. Third: before the creation of the world no vacuum is to be imagined in which God would exist before he produced the world; therefore God could not produce it as present somewhere; just as therefore the presence of immensity was not required prior to power as power, indeed power had its term before presence, so there is no need to understand God as present somewhere in order to cause — he is rather understood as capable of causing independently of presence. All these arguments tend to destroy that necessary connection of presence with power and causality — which two do not follow by intrinsic locus. Scotus deduces this (*in 4. d. 10. q. 2.*).

Hence the principal refutation of St. Thomas's position is contained in this argument of Scotus (*in 2. d. 2. q. 6.*) which we touched on above. Taking St. Thomas's principle for proving God to be everywhere — that every agent or mover is together with the patient and moved — is equivalent to saying: because God is an efficient cause, he is everywhere present to all. The question is: what does he intend to prove from that principle? Either that God is mover and cause

of all everywhere — and this is a begging of the question; or that God is everywhere present from the fact that he acts everywhere — and then immensity follows from operation as from a posterior sign. Therefore it follows that he is first present through immensity than through operation; and contrary to what was intended is inferred; and furthermore this consequence is against the doctrine about the place of Angels (*q. 52. a. 1. 1. part.*), where the holy Doctor proves that an Angel is in a place through operation.

This argument tormented Cajetan, who to resolve it (*comment. in a. 1. q. 8.*) says many incongruous things. First he says the question is about presence pertaining to immensity, but not about that which Scotus fabricates as prior to all contact — but about the presence that follows upon immensity. How does it follow upon immensity? Then immensity precedes operation. Then he says the question concerns presence of immensity indistinctly, and that the presence of immensity coincides with presence through operation. How then is one inferred from the other, and one given as a medium for the other? This Cajetan here openly concedes, and adds that this is a process from the inferior to the superior affirmatively. I do not see how that indistinction of the two can stand, when one is proved from the other. Moreover: if it is from inferior to superior, then the inferior will be on the side of operation toward immensity, and thus immensity will be prior to operation — from which, as from something inferior, the argument is drawn — which is what Scotus intended: that presence of immensity is a posteriori; therefore Cajetan responds badly.

Furthermore, from Cajetan himself — indeed from St. Thomas — this position is refuted, because in (*q. 52. p. part. a. 1.*) Cajetan with the holy Doctor affirms that Angels are so in a place through operation that they are first through a certain order, application, and readiness to operate. But this order, application, and readiness presupposes in the Angel being and the Angel's substance before operation; therefore local presence through substance is prior to operation, and the account of existing in place is different from the account of operating. The major is evident from St. Thomas's words (*q. 52. a. 1. in corpore*): "By the application of the Angelic power to a place, in whatever way it is said, the Angel is in that corporeal place." Let us hear Cajetan (§. *quoad secundum ad finem*): "Augustine taught that in spiritual things order does what position does in corporeal things. Therefore, just as the approach of agent to patient in bodies is taken according to position, so in spiritual things it is according to order." From this it follows that this order precedes operation, and accordingly the Angel is in a place through it, prior to operation and with operation excluded. Cajetan there: "It remains that only the presence of order can be understood as preceding operation." He calls this presence, and shortly after says that presence of approach coincides with presence of order; and again (*in §. quoad quartum*): "Presence of order is not distinguished from presence of operation, just as habit from second act." Therefore it is prior, and is placed in a place before it operates. Then, fearing lest he say something against St. Thomas, at the end of the section

he says: "But note: do not impute to me that I said Angels are located in St. Thomas's view through presence of order alone, for this has not yet been established." I deny this to Cajetan: for it is established in substance though denied in words. Let us hear the rest: "Whether such presence suffices for the Angel to be said to be in a place, I believe it should be distinguished: in one way completely, and so the presence of order does not suffice; in another way incompletely, and so it suffices. For when there is only the presence of order, the Angel's presence to the place is indeed begun but not complete." We now have therefore, even admitting this distinction, that the Angel is in a place through something other than operation alone — and indeed St. Thomas said, as Cajetan there testifies, that order precedes operation, and the *Quodlibeto* 6 is cited. I then press Cajetan from his concessions. Let the Angel apply himself through order to something: he will be incompletely in the place. Then let him cease to operate, whether voluntarily or involuntarily at God's command. He will then be in the place or not? Certainly he will be in the place incompletely, and will be in it without operation. Cajetan granted this to us (*in §. quoad quartum near the end of the commentary on a. 1. q. 52.*) where he says: "There are two ways in which Angels can be present to a place through operation: one way, because they actually touch bodies by exterior operation; the other way, because they actually attend and are vacant." Vacant? Therefore without operation, yet in the place. Therefore through order alone. Cajetan — a candid and generous man — concedes this: "In this way," he says, "Angels guarding men and presiding over provinces and places are said to be there" — and yet they do not operate throughout all those provinces and places. Thus ceasing, doing nothing, operating nothing, they are in the place; and Cajetan agrees with Scotus. The arguments of Scotus brought him here — arguments that seem entirely to convince against Thomistic doctrine. Certainly whoever reads what Cajetan responds in (*§. secundo, arguing with Scotus's arguments*) will clearly recognize that the solutions contain certain things that appear absurd — such as: Angels need not be in a place; and they are in the Empyrean Heaven metaphorically, not truly — or as he says, abusively; and we do not know what they do in Heaven and thus do not know how they are there, unless perhaps through a certain relation, which mode does not please Cajetan. Read it: you will see him strangely afflicted and ill at ease. His torment gave pleasure to me, a Scotist. Read again, I beg, at the end of that commentary on (*a. 1. q. 52.*): I greatly wonder that he says it is easy to respond, when he labors, sweats, and groans in responding. Certainly Vasquez (*d. 188. in 1. p. c. 4. n. 18.*) says the manner in which Cajetan wants the Angel to be in a place is not possible.

Section III: That God Is Not Everywhere through His Operation but through His Immensity Is Shown

From that most celebrated question — whether God is in imaginary spaces — it is manifestly gathered that philosophers and theologians who raise and admit it confess that God is not everywhere through his operation. This is evident

because in imaginary spaces there is nothing but vacuum; no creatures are there, no things exist there — just as they did not exist before the world was established in those spaces. The Stoics raised this question before Augustine (*lib. 11. de Civit. c. 5.*), who conceived of infinite spaces of time before the world just as they conceived of infinite spaces of place in which God would exist. Indeed some Fathers affirmed that God is in those spaces through his immensity: Athanasius (*in Epist. Synod. Nicen.*), Hilary (*lib. 1. de Trinit. on the words of Isaiah 66*), Jerome (*commenting on the same words*), Basil (*homil. 16.*), Nazianzus (*trat. 32. that is, Theolog. 2.*), Philo the Hebrew (*lib. 1. allegoriarum ante medium*), and St. Augustine himself seems to convey the same (*7. confess. c. 5.*), teaching that the world should be compared to God as a sponge in the middle of a sea surrounding it on every side — by which he signified God's immensity outside the world. What bears most on our point: that most ardent defender of St. Thomas himself, Cajetan, in (*c. 12. Joannis on the words I have come as a light into the world [Jn. 12:46]*) concedes that God was in the whole imaginary space before the creation of the world, and admits that if there were a vacuum within the world, God would entirely be there. Cajetan was not remembering at the time of writing that passage, this controversy with Scotus about the presence of operation. Perhaps Cajetan would not be troubled to respond that God at that time was not idle from thinking about making and establishing the world — and this was enough for being in a place, namely being idle from work but not from thought. But this answer will not please the Thomists.

So many Fathers and authorities, and Cajetan himself bearing witness, I confirm Scotus's position: God is in imaginary spaces, and he operates nothing there; therefore the account of ubication is not the account of operating. I deliberately refrain from the testimonies of Aristotle (*lib. 1. de Caelo c. 9.*) and Plato in the *Phaedrus* and the Stoics who place the Intelligences outside Heaven, because perhaps they will say they placed them there as God so that they might rotate those celestial Spheres after the manner of potters, as Tertullian reports of the Stoics (*lib. adversus Gentiles cap. 40.*).

Beyond this argument — pertinent to me and directed ad hominem against Cajetan — there is an effective argument drawn from the difference between the intimate presence in causing and the actual presence in locating. For the concept of the first cause operating in things and the concept of something existing in a place are certainly entirely distinct from each other, nor are they joined by intrinsic connection. Wherefore that account of operating in created things befits God as the first and universal cause of all things; but that account of ubication applies only in relation to local presence. Hence that account of operating is intimate, tending toward the being of the created thing; but the account of local presence is not intimate but detached from the being of the thing, and only tending toward the place wherever it is, whether it be capable of operation or not. Otherwise, if the whole account of existing in place were operation, many absurdities would follow. First: place would vary according to

the accounts of things established; in substance it would be substance, in accidents accident — because God operating in substance would have substantial place, and operating in accidents would have accidental place. Second: existence in place would admit of more and less according to the intensity and remission of operations. Third: with local presence invariable, the locations would vary, since the agent standing at the same point could operate in diverse ways. Fourth: location would have the differences of actions, and would be luminous in the sun, dark at night; it would be different in vision, hearing, taste, smell, and touch; and like Proteus or Vertumnus it would put on and put off various forms. Finally the term of acting and of being located would be one and the same. Thus when one operation ended, one location would cease; when another ended, another would cease — the same order and propinquity to the patient being retained. All of which seem absurd and contrary to reason. And if with so many and such diverse operations a single location still persisted, then the account of local presence would no longer depend on the operations, and would be something permanent and invariable and accordingly constant — corresponding to habitual power and prior to every actual operation. Certainly no one fails to see that it is one thing for God to be immense in his presence through relation to place — which is not in motion nor in action — and another for God to be efficient cause and operating in perpetual succession of actions.

Moved by these and other arguments, Ockham (*in 1. d. 37. q. un.*), Gabriel (*q. un. a. 3.*), Bassolis (*q. un.*), and Vasquez (*d. 28. in q. 8. S. Thomae c. 1. ad 5.*) have abandoned St. Thomas's position and adhere to Scotus, whose arguments Vasquez rightly sets out; and along with most others he affirms that the attribute of immensity belongs to God not by reason of operation but proximately from the root of his substance — as Bassolis holds here (*qu. un.*) and our Scotists with Lychetus and Cavellus, as Rada affirms (*1. p. controverf. contr. 28. and in 2. p. contr. 6.*).

Section IV: Objections Raised against Scotus's Position by His Adversaries Are Dissolved

The first is taken from the passage in Acts chapter 17, where Paul infers God's being from his propinquity and operation. The words are clear: *He is not far from each one of us: for in him we live and move and are* — which form a just argument. God exists, and is not far from us, because he acts upon us and acts in us, moving in the moved. St. Thomas used this example (*1. p. q. 8. a. 1.*) drawn from the Philosopher (*7. Physics. Textu 10.*).

I respond: in that passage God's immensity is not proved — which was not the subject of discussion — but God's existence. For Paul was speaking with idolaters; namely, that God exists in the nature of things, and is not immense. Furthermore Paul proves from that passage that God is present to us, because those Gentiles were seeking a God similar to themselves and corporeal. "To

search for God," Paul says there, "perhaps to feel after him" (*Acts 17:27*). Therefore, to accommodate himself to them, Paul said God is not a body, yet is close to us and intimately operates in us, so that if he cannot be felt and seen by the eyes, he can nonetheless be sufficiently understood from effects. From which nothing against Scotus is deduced — as is gathered from another passage: *For we are also his offspring* (*Acts 17:28*). With this Paul persuades them of God's existence from the resemblance in intellectual nature. Hence no mention is made here of immensity. Why would Paul, addressing idolaters worshipping an unknown God and seeking him by touching and feeling, demonstrate that God is immense? Vasquez responds somewhat differently and aptly; but our response seems more apt and expedient. The other Scripture passages that Vasquez adduces favor Scotus more than harm him, as will be apparent on reflection — and Vasquez himself expounds them well (*disp. 28. c. 4.*). In a word I say: those passages treat of immensity independently of all God's operation — namely, wherever one flees, one will find God there, because he is everywhere. Heaven and earth I fill (*Jer. 23:24*) through immensity, not through operation. That is inept — to infer God's action from the passage: *Even there your hand shall lead me and your right hand shall hold me* (*Ps. 138:10*). For that action does not prove that God is there by reason of operation, but that it is necessary for someone led there to know that God is there; for how would he know God is there, unless someone led him there? Therefore it must entirely happen that the person is placed in that place where God was, so that the man might experience that God is there. Otherwise the argument would be inept: it would prove that the man and God are both there at the same time — when God could not be there without the man. This I add for Father Vasquez, who does not weigh this point at all. The passage of Aristotle (*7. Physics*) about the necessary contact of mover and moved, agent and patient, at most holds for corporeal things — and not entirely even in them, since many corporeal agents exist that act not by immediacy of suppositum but by immediacy of power, such as celestial bodies (*as Cajetan noted in commentary*, which Javellus reproaches him for, as if this undermines St. Thomas's argument). Further: although this were true in a corporeal agent, it does not conclude in God who is an infinite object, because he does not depend on body and can operate where he wills.

Even granting this — that God necessarily operates wherever he is — the other part does not follow: that he cannot be where he does not operate. For this is a different consequence, as is apparent from the terms. The first says he is necessarily where he operates; the second: he does not necessarily operate where he is. This does not follow from the first. For why must he operate in a place in order to be in that place? He will be able to be in a place in repose. For repose is not incompatible with ubication. Therefore let God be where he operates; let him also be where he does not operate — for location imports both motion and rest. Indeed it is true that Scotus denies both, saying it does not follow from operation that he is present — since God, if per impossibile he were

not in some place, could nonetheless operate there (as he holds *q. un. d. 37. n. 4.*); and that it does not follow from his being at rest that he is not locally present. But in responding we wished to show the inconsistency of the adversaries.

Scotus is moreover reproached here for denying that principle about the contact of agent and patient, and for saying that the Sun generates metals in the bowels of the earth — as if he said something unusual and implausible. First I ask those who reproach: does the Sun operate there? They will certainly concede it does. Then: therefore where it is not. They will respond: where it is not by reason of suppositum, but where it is by reason of power. I infer: therefore there is no contact by immediacy of suppositum; which is enough for me to gather that even in corporeal things the immediate presence of suppositum is not required in what operates and what is operated upon. I proceed: what is that power through which the Sun operates there? Light? There is none in those underground passages and caverns where metals are generated. Heat? That does not reach or penetrate those coldest bones of the earth, which by its nature is cold and has impenetrable rocks and crags there. Through what power therefore does the Sun operate there? They will say: through an occult power sent through the medium from the sky. Therefore they act on faith, not on reason. Scotus does not believe this, nor do we Scotists, when people tell us. We dispute here by reason, we do not believe on faith. I argue for Scotus: how many material causes are there that operate without this vicinity and contact? Let them consult sympathies, of which there is great force and abundance. Let them say whether these need propinquity or not. If they deny it, we win; if they affirm it, we convince them by undoubted experiments, which we omit since they are commonplace. The magnet alone suffices to refute them.

Another objection drawn from God's omnipotence — that since it is infinite it must necessarily operate everywhere — confuses the terms of immensity and omnipotence. We grant God to be infinitely omnipotent; we deny that immensity follows from this. For it is one attribute — immensity, which by its nature regards place and expresses presence to it abstracting from omnipotence — and another — omnipotence, which expresses a relation to possible creatures. Therefore the argument accomplishes nothing, as Vasquez also observes (*disp. illa sua cap. 5.*).

I come now to the complaints and quarrels against Scotus, whom the interpreters Cajetan and Javellus accuse of imagining and fabricating what did not exist and of philosophizing badly in this question. First I repel the calumny of Dionysius Carthusian (*d. 37. q. 1.*), who attacks Scotus for saying that God is enclosed and circumscribed in a singular place yet operates at a distance. He interprets Scotus as if he thought God could be confined to one place. He did not understand Scotus. For Scotus did not say this could happen to God, but that if per impossibile God were restricted to one place, he would still operate in other places where he was not — under that impossible hypothesis. Let us set

out Scotus's words (*in §. confirmatur. 4.*): "It is not necessary to understand God as prior in some part of the universe in order to cause something there; but rather the reverse: he is first there according to power, in order to cause something there. For even if per impossibile he were not there first according to essence, he could nonetheless cause there." Scotus clearly posits this per impossibile. Where was Carthusian when he read this? Where was he afterward when he wrote?

I turn to Cajetan's commentaries. He in this article (§. *in titulo, at the beginning*) says Scotus did not understand this title. Whether he understood it and attacked it, we said at the beginning of the question. He understood it, saw where it was heading, and discovered that something different had been proposed and something different intended, and that the title did not cohere well with the body of the question. But in (§. *Ad evidentiam*): "On account of this double presence," he says, "Scotus labored so much, imputing to St. Thomas both parts of a contradiction — both that he posited the first presence in this article and that he denied it in the matter about the place of Angels." That Scotus labored not at all, and that Cajetan sweated in vain over that distinction of presences — which was easy and obvious to all — is clear from what we said in Section II. For Scotus always held those two presences — through immensity in place, and through operation in things — and with these observed and retained, argued effectively against St. Thomas that he held differently for God (*d. 37. q. un. and q. 12. a. 1.*) and for Angels (*in 1. p. q. 52. a. 1.*).

Again Cajetan (§. *ad secundum vero*): "It is said that the reason why natural agents cannot act at a distance without first acting on what is near does not apply to either of those causes, but is due to an imperfection by negation pertaining to active power insofar as it is limited; and for this reason this is reserved to God alone. This reason," he says, "we have taken from the senses; but Scotus fabricated those others." Two things must here be objected to Cajetan by me. First: that Scotus's arguments coincide with Cajetan's own, and accordingly both held the same thing in substance. Whoever wishes to read those two arguments of Scotus (§. *respondeo q. un. d. 37.*) will find they distinctly contain that argument of Cajetan drawn from the limitation of power. Nor does Scotus differ at all from Cajetan, because he spoke of the imperfection of the agent, which is a deficiency of active power in the manner of operating thus or thus, and then says God operates in the most perfect manner because his omnipotence is the most perfect active power; and accordingly God can do what a creature cannot. Thus in substance he concludes the same as Cajetan. I do not however deny that Scotus holds differently from Cajetan in saying that the Sun and some created causes act at a distance — which Cajetan denies. But granted that they do not act (which sometimes happens), he assigns the reason taken from the imperfection and limitation of power, from which he frees God as Cajetan does. He therefore agrees with Cajetan in the argument. If Cajetan did not fabricate it, neither did Scotus.

The second thing I observe is that Cajetan departed here from his own Angelic Doctor, because he conceded that God can operate where he is not. For in placing the distinction between God and a creature — that the creature has limited power in acting while God is infinite and of unlimited power — it follows that the creature necessarily requires propinquity, while God does not require it. And accordingly the creature cannot, but God can, operate at a distance. This conclusion is contrary to St. Thomas. I cite Cajetan's words: "That a natural agent cannot act at a distance without first acting on what is near is due to an imperfection by negation pertaining to active power insofar as it is limited; and for this reason this is reserved to God alone." This is expressly against the doctrine of St. Thomas. Behold where Cajetan's zeal for attacking Scotus led him — to depart from his own master in attacking him! I wished this to be my own observation, but I found it afterward in Javellus. Having found it I was partly grieved, partly glad. I grieved because I did not see it alone — for one might suspect I took it from Javellus. I rejoiced because I found a Thomist companion in my observation against Cajetan, and because no one could doubt concerning that Thomist when I produced a notable Thomist witness. Javellus therefore on this article says: "But against this," says Javellus, "if this is reserved to God because of the unlimited character of his power, therefore God can act upon something distant — which is false, since he would not necessarily be in all places, the opposite of which St. Thomas holds." Will Thomists believe this of Cajetan? They must believe it if they read; indeed they will see Cajetan departed from St. Thomas. I wonder that Lychetus, a man with lynx-eyes, did not see this. He reproaches Cajetan but does not convince him; we convince him without reproaching.

I turn to Javellus, by whom Scotus is censured for attacking St. Thomas's argument about the necessity of propinquity of agent to patient, and who says: "It is clear that Scotus was not a good Metaphysician." But he assumes this gratuitously and does not prove it — which he should have done as a Metaphysician. Scotus proved what he said, as is clear from our disputation.

Then in (§. *quantum ad secundum*) he criticizes Scotus for positing a double presence in abstracta: first, substantial or according to substance prior to all application of power; second, virtual, by which the abstract substance is conjoined to the effect on account of the application of power, which can exist without the other presence according to operation — and he calls this distinction of Scotus and the doctrine founded on it a false imagination and says Scotus was deceived by this imagination.

Let us see whether it is false. That these two types of presentiality exist is common doctrine when they are taken in their formal account, on which Suarez can be consulted (*in summa lib. 2. c. 2. de immensitatem*). Nor do St. Thomas and the Thomists deny them; they say only that one is inferred from the other. Which is prior, or which is independent of the other, is disputed among them.

Therefore in this Scotus did not imagine falsely. Perhaps however he was deceived in the manner. Not at all; it is Javellus who is here deceived. For Scotus did not say that the first presence of essence or immensity is absolutely prior to the other — the operational one in God — and indeed appears to have said the opposite: namely, that God operating in time and creating the world did not have a prior presence of immensity than that of power. Thus (§. *confirmatur nu. 4. q. un. d. 37*): "Before the creation of the world no infinite vacuum is to be imagined as if God were there first present according to essence before he produced the world. Indeed power there first had its term before there was presence according to essence. Thus it is not necessary to understand God as prior in some part of the universe in order to cause something there; but rather as if the reverse: he is first there according to power, in order to cause something there." The opposite of what Javellus attributes as Scotus's imagination. Where here is the essential or substantial presence preceding that presence of power or application of power to the patient, which Javellus imputes to Scotus? Indeed Scotus says the application of active power of potency is prior in God to having that presence of essence. Javellus therefore fabricated what Scotus did not say. Scotus did not fabricate in distinguishing the presences, for St. Thomas and the whole Thomist school also distinguish them — only they want the presence of essence to be proved from the presence of power. Here too Javellus is deceived, saying Scotus teaches that presence of essence can exist without presence of power — saying nothing about the other, as if Scotus thought differently about it. Scotus said of both that one can stand without the other: that propinquity of substance is not necessary for operating; and that operation of the operator is not necessary for existing. Finally Javellus reproaches Scotus for arguing badly against St. Thomas in (2. d. 2. q. 6.), inferring a contradiction in St. Thomas's statements (q. 8. and q. 52. 1. p.) about the operation of Angels — about which we spoke above. And he says St. Thomas concluded the presence of essence from the proof of power, which is, he says, the formal account of the other. Here however Javellus contradicts himself in attempting to free St. Thomas from contradiction. This is clear because Javellus first posits two presentialities, as if one follows from the other and is a medium for proving the other; and afterward denies there are two, and affirms there is only one — which is a manifest contradiction. Let us hear Javellus: "St. Thomas intends to conclude the second, namely that the infinite substance of God is present to all, from the fact that he operates in all. I deny that this concludes a posteriori; indeed the proof proceeds from the formal account. For just as dimensional quantity is the formal account by which a body is in this or that place, so in abstracta operation or application of power plays the same role. Hence although as regards entity quantity is posterior to substance — similarly in abstracta, operation — yet as regards presentiality or locality it is prior: for it is the account of presentiality. This proof, as we said, is a priori." Here you have, reader, both in the argument and in the examples two distinct things: the presence of power and of essence, of which one is the a priori account of the other. Now attend: "I deny therefore

to Scotus," says Javellus, "the consequence: therefore naturally he will be first present insofar as he is immense than insofar as he is operating. For he believes there are two presentialities, of which one is according to substance and the other according to operation, posterior to it. But this is false, because there is there only one presence and account of presentiality, which is derived from operation. Hence there are not two proper presentialities, just as the stone here is not present to this place according to substance and according to quantity: for 'according to substance' names the thing located, and 'according to quantity' names the locating account." Javellus is mistaken: nor is the example apt. For if above he said one presence follows from another, how does he now deny there are two? And the example brings with it two — indeed more. For substance and quantity are both placed in place, which are two things located, one substantially and the other accidentally. Furthermore: dimensional quantity is not the location itself, but the cause of it; nor is quantity located through quantity, but through the location superadded from the category of location — which are distinct accounts. Furthermore: if substance were separated by divine power from quantity, it would have its presence distinct from the one proper to quantity. Therefore neither the argument holds nor does the example conclude; and Javellus badly concludes that Scotus did not understand St. Thomas.

I observe however that this whole discourse of Javellus is against the distinguished theologian Father Suarez, who (*in summa lib. 2. c. 2.*) says God's immensity is prior in its own account and independent of operation, with an appropriate argument adduced: because immensity, being an attribute of God, precedes and does not depend on creatures; so that before any concept of external operation, God is immense through the attribute of immensity, independently of all operation and relation of operating toward creatures. He adds that the presence of operation is an argument a posteriori with respect to immensity — all of which is contrary to Thomistic doctrine.

Judgment

Scotus argued admirably. He asserted his position on God's presence, making it independent of operation, and distinguished between the account of operating power and of existing essence. He knew that it is one thing in God to exist through presence and another to operate. For if creatures exist in place through their own entitative presence and operate through active power, they show that these two accounts are diverse and that one is not necessarily mixed with the other. Certainly the divine attributes accommodated by theologians to God in the Schools carry this distinction with them: the account of operating is one thing, the account of locating another; the latter expresses an order to place, the former to operation. Therefore neither does place depend on action nor action on place in such a way that one cannot be separated from the other. One is deduced from the other, but they are not one and the same. Which is prior is the question; but that there are two cannot come into question. Scotus showed

this with his arguments, which compelled the adversaries to divide into factions and disagree among themselves. We dissolved their arguments, refuted what was objected, repelled the calumnies. Such are Scotus's arguments, that they cannot be opposed — and this is apparent from the diversity and weakness of the responses. We set them out faithfully, weighed them diligently, examined them subtly, and I believe aptly refuted them — indeed turned them back against those who raised them. To persuade that Scotus's position is true — about the independence of presence through essence from presence through power — that proof taken from imaginary spaces is in my judgment sufficient. Whether it is true that God exists there or not, from the very question *whether he is there* it is clear that authors generally considered that God, without any exercise of power, is immense and can exist through his essence where he acts nothing. For he acts nothing in imaginary spaces. Cajetan is bound to confess this — who placed God in those spaces in his commentaries on (*c. 12. of John*). Whether it is true that God is present in those spaces, authors are divided. St. Thomas, as Vasquez observes (*disp. 29. c. 2.*), must deny it, since he operates nothing there — with which Capreolus, his faithful interpreter, agrees (*hic q. un. a. 3. ad Scoti 4.*), and Carthusian (*d. 37. q. 1.*) with many others whom Vasquez cites, who subscribes to them (*ea disp. c. 2. and 3.*). But not for that reason of St. Thomas, which does not please Father Vasquez — since it proves Scotus's position on local presence independent from the presence of operation, as appears from (*Vasquez disp. 28. c. 4. and 5.*), where he resolves the arguments for St. Thomas's position drawn from authority and reason; and although at the end of *c. 5.* he seems to adduce some appropriate argument for the Thomistic position drawn from the Hypostatic Union, Vasquez himself immediately undermines and refutes it.

Since however those authors who place God as present in imaginary spaces hold Scotus's position in this controversy, I wish to list them more carefully. From the Fathers: Nazianzus (*Orat. 34.*), Philo (*lib. 1. Allegoriarum*), Basil (*Homil. 16. on In principio erat Verbum*), Isidore (*lib. 1. de summo bono*). About Augustine there is doubt. For the Coimbricans (*in Physica lib. 8. c. 10. q. 2. a. 3.*) affirm he held God to be outside the world in imaginary spaces and cite (*lib. 11. de Civit. c. 5.*); Vasquez denies it and interprets this passage differently (*disp. 29. c. 4.*) and cites other passages for the negative side. The matter therefore seems uncertain; we shall adduce other authors meanwhile and reserve Augustine for last.

From philosophers: Aristotle seems to teach this (*lib. 1. de Caelo c. 9.*), Ficinus (*lib. 2. de immortalitate animae c. 6.*), and Eugubinus (*lib. 4. de perenni Philosophia c. 1. and 2.*), Antisidorensis (*lib. 1. summae c. 16.*), Ferrariensis (*in lib. Physicorum q. 4.*), Major (*in 1. d. 37. q. 1.*), Zumel (*in 1. p. q. 8. a. 2. q. un.*), Valentia (*ibid. p. 2.*), Molina (*a. 1.*), Aversa (*sect. 4.*), Arriaga (*d. 14. Phys. sect. 4.*), Amicus (*in 1. p. sect. 3.*), Suarez (*in Metaph. d. 30. Sectione 7.*), Coimbricans (*lib. 8. Physic. c. 10. q. 2. a. 2.*) and others cited by Mastrius (*disp. Theologica 2.*) and Livio Montursio (*lib. 8. Physic. d. ultima, q. ultima*).

I come to Augustine, whose authority is supreme, and both sides try to protect themselves with his patronage. Let us examine the passage and establish his meaning. The passage is in (*lib. 11. de Civit. cap. 5.*), where Augustine disputes with those who ask why God established the world in time and not before. To respond to this question Augustine raises another: why God placed the world in this place rather than another. And he says: "If they think of infinite spaces of time before the world in which it seems to them that God could not have ceased from work, let them similarly think of infinite spaces of places outside the world, in which if anyone says the Omnipotent could not have been at rest, will not the consequence be that they are forced to dream of innumerable worlds with Epicurus?" Up to this point we have nothing certain of Augustine's mind, for he is working with others' thoughts, obliging them to confess they equally posited God as able to establish infinite worlds in the infinite spaces outside the space in which the world was established — just as he could have established infinite worlds in infinite times before the time in which it was established — pressing the adversaries with their own argument. "For we are dealing with those," he says, "who both hold God to be incorporeal, the creator of all natures." He proceeds to press them with the same argument; but more closely for our purposes and for Augustine's position: "Or perhaps they will say that the substance of God — which neither encloses, nor determines, nor extends through place, but which they already confess, as is worthy to think of God, to be incorporeally present everywhere in its totality — is absent from those great spaces of place outside the world, and is occupied in that one and incomparably tiny place where the world is?" This passage contains the substance; for it signifies that Augustine's view is that God's presence is real in the imaginary spaces outside the world. He signifies this in this manner: the people who confess God's presence to be, as is worthy, incorporeal and total — that is, indivisible — when confessing this, it is amazing if they deny his presence in infinite spaces and bind and restrict it to the one world established by him. Thus Augustine manifestly declares his own mind in their person, when he says that those who hold God's presence to be not corporeal nor limited, as was worthy, would not deny presence outside the world. For if they denied it, they would be empty talkers and absurd. He adds: "I do not think they will proceed to such vain talk" — namely to deny the immensity of presence in those infinite spaces outside the world, and to confine it to the world, when it is incorporeal, infinite, and total.

This is confirmed by the example of eternity — which cannot be denied to be infinite and to have existed before the time of the created world, and this was their argument, to which Augustine responds with the example of immensity. This would be of no force if God were not outside the world when he established it in a certain and determined place. I therefore judge that Augustine clearly declared his position on God's immensity in this passage, and held that he is as present outside the world through immensity as he was eternal outside

the time in which he created the world. The Coimbricans therefore understood Augustine's passage rightly; Vasquez however evades it and cited another passage of Augustine which did not really contain the matter of immensity — and did not cite this proper passage, which was manifest for the presence in the spaces outside the world. He acted acutely and cleverly, because he saw it would not favor him in denying. Why Vasquez did this I will say plainly. He saw Suarez his rival affirming this presence of God and adducing Augustine for his view. He therefore wished to contradict him in his customary way and wrest Augustine's authority from his hands. So he suppressed the appropriate passage and substituted another inept one — which we first adduced up to the point about Epicurus — in which there was nothing relevant; then made no mention of this second testimony that followed, and proposed that other truncated one which seemed suited against Father Suarez. The Coimbricans however prudently omitted that first passage as irrelevant and cited this proximate, germane, and proper one.

Lest anyone be troubled by the fact that at the end Augustine writes: "But if they say the thoughts of men are empty — those who imagine infinite spaces, since there is no place outside the world — the answer is made to them in this way that men equally imagine idly previous times of God's leisure, since there is no time before the world" — these words contain nothing against immensity, any more than they contain anything against eternity. Indeed they confirm both; for just as God was eternal before all time, not through sensible and material time, so he was also immense outside sensible and material place. This testimony is confirmed by that example of Augustine (*lib. 7. confess. c. 5.*), where he compares the world to a sponge in the middle of the sea — signifying by the sea God's immensity outside the world.

I say these things not because I think Scotus held this position, who seems less to favor it (*in hac d. 37. in 2 ratione §. confirmatur n. 4.*) — but so that it may be clear from it that authors generally held concerning immensity against St. Thomas's position and for Scotus. And there is no present intention to dispute about it. I refer readers to our distinguished Scotist Father Livio Montursio, who treats it elegantly, as is his custom, (*in Physicis lib. 8. d. ultima, q. ultima*).

I add however to Scotus the vote of the grave theologian and early writer John Bachon, who (*in 2. d. 30. a. 3.*) teaches that Angels are not in a place through operation, and signifies the same for what is to be said of God, since (*in 1. d. 37.*) he refers himself to that place of the Second (*d. 3.*) — as if the same account of local presence is to be held for God and for Angels. Whoever wants more can read the grave authors Rada (*controversia 38.*) and Mastrius (*d. 2. sua Theologica*).

COLLATION IX, DISTINCTION IV

On the Cognition of Future Things: Whether They Are Known by God as Present in Eternity

This is a most celebrated question, argued with great ardor in the theological Schools, about which some doubt what St. Thomas's position is — indeed deny that this is his position, and affirm that the Thomists, holding it themselves, defended it under the name of their Angelic Preceptor to sustain their own interpretation. Against the opinion of those who deny it, Scotus's position — which attributes it to St. Thomas — holds. Let us therefore show, by producing express testimonies of St. Thomas himself, that he is the author of this coexistence of things in eternity.

In (*1 p. q. 14. a. 13.*) St. Thomas says in the body: "But God knows all contingents, not only as they are in their causes, but also as each of them actually is in itself; and although contingents come to be in act successively, yet God does not know contingents successively as they are in their being, as we do, but simultaneously, because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also his being. But eternity, existing all at once, includes all time, as was said above (citing *q. 10. a. 3.*); hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only in the sense that he has the accounts of things present to him, as some say, but because his gaze is borne from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingents are known by God infallibly, insofar as they are subject to the Divine gaze according to their presentiality; yet they are future contingents when compared to their own causes."

Again in the same article the response to the second objection: those which are reduced to act temporally, are known by us successively in time, but by God in eternity, which is above time. Hence to us, because we know future contingents as such, they cannot be certain; but only to God, whose understanding is in eternity above time. As the one who walks on a road does not see those who come after him; but the one who from some height surveys the whole road sees simultaneously all those passing along the road.

This doctrine is confirmed by what St. Thomas has (*q. 10. a. 2.* on eternity *ad quartum*): "It must be said that words of different tenses are attributed to God insofar as his eternity includes all times, not that he himself is changed through present, past, and future." And in *a. 4.* in the body: "Eternity is all at once; but in time there is before and after." And then: "The difference will remain between eternity and time, as Boethius says (*lib. de Consolatione*), from the fact that eternity is all at once, which does not befit time, because eternity is the measure of permanent being, while time is the measure of motion." And at the end: "Eternity is all at once, but not so with time."

The other express testimony of St. Thomas is found (*q. 57. a. 3.*): "God sees all things in his eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time and includes it. And therefore the one gaze of God is borne over all things that happen through all time, as if present, and he sees all things as they are in themselves" — as was said above when treating of God's knowledge. There is no need to fill pages with citations. So numerous are the testimonies on this matter. I shall cite the passages: *c. 66. lib. 1. contra Gent. rat. 6.; in 1. d. 38. q. un. a. 5. in corp.; q. 2. de verit. a. 12.* — where he says: "A thing is known as future when between the knowledge of the knower and the occurrence of the thing there is found the order of past to future. But this order cannot be found between Divine knowledge and any contingent thing; rather the order of Divine knowledge to any thing whatever is always as present to present." And he adds: "The difficulty in this arises from the fact that we cannot signify Divine knowledge except after the manner of our own knowledge, signifying the differences of tenses. For if it were signified as it is in God's knowledge, it should more properly be said that God is present to this being than that he knows the future, since to him things are never future but always present." Other passages are cited by Capreolus (*in 1. d. 38. and d. 36. a. 2.*) — all so express that I wonder anyone could doubt St. Thomas's meaning. And much more so that Cajetan should say: that passage of (*q. 14. a. 13.*) on the presence of things and their cognition in eternity is considered obscure, full of contradiction, and that it lay hidden from him for perhaps fifteen years — and that the day before writing those commentaries the meaning of St. Thomas was illumined for him through God's help, as if a miracle were needed to understand him. This Cajetan confesses in his commentaries on this passage (*q. 14. a. 13. §. ad has obiectiones*). Lychetus reproaches him for this tardiness. Certainly Scotus understood St. Thomas quickly, and I think whoever reads these texts of St. Thomas attentively will understand him. I confess I am not as acute as Cajetan, yet when I read him his meaning became clear to me. Nor do I think it appeared obscure and hidden to the Salmanticans — for they expound and illuminate it in their treatise (*de scientia Dei disp. 8.*) in such a way that they seem to have easily understood him.

Let us approach Scotus. He (*in 1. d. 39. q. un. §. aliter ponitur n. 8.*) proposes St. Thomas's position thus: "Otherwise it is posited that God has certain knowledge of future contingents through this: that the whole flow of time is present to eternity, and all things that are in time. This is proved through this: because eternity is immense and infinite; consequently just as the immense is simultaneously present to every place, so the eternal is simultaneously present to every time." And he explains it by an example: "One is of a staff fixed in a river, beside which staff, even though the whole river flows successively and thus the staff is successively present to all parts of the river, yet the staff is not immense with respect to the river, because it is not simultaneously present to the whole." Therefore in the same way, if eternity were a certain standing thing like a staff, beside which time would flow such that it were never simultaneously

present to itself except one instant of time — just as the staff is simultaneously present to only one part of the river — eternity would not be immense with respect to time. "This is also confirmed, because the now of eternity as it is with the now of time is not made equal to it; therefore as it is with this now it exceeds it; but it would not exceed it unless as it is with this now it were simultaneously with another. This is also confirmed, because if the whole of time could simultaneously be outside the now of eternity, it would be simultaneously present to all that time. But although time is repugnant to being simultaneous on account of its succession, nothing of perfection is thereby removed from eternity. Therefore eternity itself is now equally present to all time and to each thing existing in time. This is also confirmed by another example of the center in a circle: if time flowing were posited as the circumference of a circle and the now of eternity as the center, however much the flow in time, yet the whole flow and each part of it would always be present to the center. So in the proposed case, all things having existence in whatever part of time — whether they are in this now of time, or are past, or present, or future — all are present with respect to the now of eternity; and thus what is in eternity sees them presentially because of such coexistence, just as I can see presentially what in this instant I see."

Scotus faithfully reported and perspicuously expounded St. Thomas's position, with less difficulty and prolixity than Cajetan in this article and the Salmanticans in their long (*Tract. 3. de scientia Dei disp. 8. dubio 2. and 3.*) — and in brief compass said what they diffuse in a wide circuit. Like eternity, in that he comprehends in a brief period of words what they wrote in the longest span of time.

Section II: St. Thomas's Position on Actual Presence and Coexistence of Things in Eternity Is Proved

First, by testimonies of Sacred Scripture. Job 14: *The number of his months is with you (Job 14:5)*. That passage signifies a presence of number common to past, present, and future — and thus Gregory the Great expounds it (*lib. 12. Moralium cap. 1.*): "With omnipotent God even fleeting things stand." Ecclesiasticus 39: *The works of all flesh are before him; from age to age he beholds (Sir. 39:19)*. He clearly says before him now, and knows from eternity to eternity as present set before him. Romans 4: *He calls things that are not as things that are (Rom. 4:17)*. It is the same for him who calls past things as it is to call them present; to whom all things are at hand.

This is Augustine's own position: (*lib. 83. quaest. q. 17., lib. 4. de Trinit. c. 17., lib. 5. c. 16., in Ioannem tract. 99., and lib. 2. ad Simplicianum q. 2.*) clearly — which passage Vasquez cites and commends (*disp. 64. c. 2. n. 7.*). Those words are most clear (*lib. 5. de Trinit. c. 16.*): "With God past things have not passed away, and future things are already made." Gregory the Great holds the same (*lib. 20. Moralium cap. 23.*), Ambrose (*lib. 1. de Fide ad Grat. c. 7.*), Basil (*in c. 2. Isaiae*), Hilary (*lib. 10. de Trinit.*),

Prosper (*de vocat. gentium* c. 34.), Boethius (*lib. 5. de consolatione prosa ultima*), Isidore (*lib. 7. de summo bono, cap. 6.*), Anselm (*de casu Diaboli* c. 22. and *lib. de concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis* cap. 1.), Bede (*in 8. Tomo lib. quaest. q. 13.*), Peter Damian (*Tomo 3. Biblioth. Epist. 4. c. 8.*), Hugh of St. Victor (*in sum. sent. Tract. 1. Ber C. 12.*), Bernard (*serm. 8. in Cant.*), Richard of St. Victor (*lib. 2. de Trinit. c. 3.*). The Prince of Scholastics held and defended and expounded it — St. Thomas, as we saw. And we greatly wonder that grave theologians Vasquez (*disp. 64. c. 5.*), Valentia (*hic puncto 5.*), Arrubal (*disp. 41. c. 4.*), and Herice (*disp. 6. c. 4.*) — with the older ones Deza, Heruveo, Silvester, and Aegidius — denied that St. Thomas is the author of this position, when it is so manifest; while Capreolus (*in 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. and d. 36. q. 1. a. 4.*), Ferrariensis (*1. contra Gentes c. 66.*), Corduba (*q. 35. disp. 8.*), Cajetan (*in hanc quaestionem 14.*) and other commentators here, and the Salmanticans (*tract. 3. de scientia Dei d. 8. du. 2. and 3.*) attribute it to him. And indeed Scotus and his followers, who attack St. Thomas on that account, would be enough. Indeed as received and expounded by St. Thomas in relation to the knowledge of future things, all the Thomists just cited follow it; and from others: Abulensis (*super Matthaeum c. 18. q. 36.*), Fonseca (*lib. 6. Met. c. 2. q. 4. 1. 2.*), Gilius (*tract. 10 de aeternit. c. 16.*), Granado (*tract. 5. de scientia Dei disp. 5. sect. 2.*). Above all the Salmanticans defend it most vigorously, and lest there be doubt about St. Thomas's meaning, they expressly affirm that future absolute contingents were from eternity, and now really and physically are present in the measure of eternity.

To authority let us join arguments. The first: no repugnance is given for this coexistence; indeed the greatest congruity of it with eternity appears, and from it dignity accrues to God on this opinion. Therefore this coexistence must be posited. The assumption is proved by explaining this position, which if rightly understood will be found verisimilar and worthy of God. Eternity is God's proper duration, in its account all at once, indivisible, and infinite, which comprehends in itself all the differences of time whatsoever as they flow successively, and contains them in its embrace and circuit. Hence just as God is infinite and embraces all imaginable perfections of things, so his duration — eternity — comprehends all the successions of times, so that none happens outside eternity. Not that future things in the state in which they flow correspond to the whole eternity or coexist with it, but that eternity — being present and comprehending that thing within itself — by its infinity coexists with it in that difference of time.

I declare this with an example. Just as the immensity of God corresponds to all located creatures wherever they may be, yet not every creature located in its certain and determined place coexists with the whole immensity; so individual creatures, for the time they endure successively, are within the circuit of eternity, and eternity comprehending all of them coexists with them in their certain times — while those creatures in turn do not equal the whole eternity in coexisting with it. And so the nature and dignity of Divine duration is best

explained by the example of immensity: just as immensity is present to all located things because it comprehends all the places to which it is present, while those things are not in all the places that immensity comprehends as present — since they are certain and limited — so things present to God in eternity do not equal that infinite duration by coexisting with it for the whole eternity; rather eternity itself, which simultaneously contains and comprehends in its infinite circuit all things flowing successively, coexists with all of them on account of its infinity.

This is more easily understood for permanent things and with more difficulty for successive ones. Yet whoever truly knows what an infinite duration and eternity is — which is all at once — will not find it difficult to conceive this inclusion of successive things in eternity, and the correspondence and coexistence of parts with that infinite eternity. Hence those flowing things are not eternal, nor coeternal with God, since they by no means equal eternity — but they flow within it, which extends all at once and contains those infinite durations within the bosom of a permanent eternity.

With the argument thus explained, the intellect seems to rest without any conflict of reason with the thing as understood. I confess that the examples of a staff in a river and a point in a circle do not seem adequate, because the staff is finite and remains limited and bound to a certain and determined place in the river, nor can it be present to the river, nor does it contain the river — rather it is contained within the river. The same must be said of the point with respect to the circle, because the point does not contain the circumference of the circle — rather it remains fixed and limited within it. A more apt example is the sea, through whose vastness ships move while the sea remains unmoved, containing and enclosing all of them, and being present to all navigating to whatever part they sail, and comprehending all in its bosom. Hence the sea coexists with all the ships, while individual ships sailing within its circuit in determined places are contained.

This argument as explained seems not merely to demonstrate that this presence of things in eternity is not repugnant, but that it is entirely true and that the infinite duration of eternity cannot be understood otherwise than as including all future durations in its circuit. Hence Antichrist, for example, who today does not exist in time, if he is to exist after many ages, is nonetheless already present in eternity, which reaches to that difference of time in which he will be future. For to God nothing is awaited, nothing is future; time does not run for him. That one will indeed come in the succession of time with respect to us who are in time; but that same flow of time is already present to eternity, and God who endures through eternity coexists with it. And the same must be said of past things, which are also present to God in eternity. They have passed, certainly, if you attend to the succession and flow of time; but if you consider eternity, they remain in its bosom, nor have they passed with respect to God.

This doctrine is then proved by arguments. First: eternity in God would be vain if it were limited by the courses of things and things flowed through it in successions and were not always actually present. For then God's duration would be successive like ours, in which things pass and go and succeed one another, and are thus known. Which is most unworthy of God.

Second: objective presence does not suffice for saving perfect eternity, because it confuses it with time; yet eternity must be distinguished and separated from time, and God must be given what is permanent and perfect, while to creatures must be left what is perishable and mutable. Hence objective presence introduces variety and inconstancy both in things and in knowledge of things — which are certainly alien to God.

Third: unless future things existed really and physically in eternity, they would not be distinguished from possibles. But this is absurd; therefore they must be actually and physically present. The proof of the consequence of the major is clear, because future things receive nothing in their future being except the free termination of Divine decree — which, being within God, places nothing physical and real in the thing; therefore they remain in the same state in which they were possible, without any change in themselves, until they become actually present through the Divine action.

Fourth: if future things are not actually present in eternity, they are present only objectively — but this is false; therefore etc. The minor is urged: because that objective being cannot stand with the Divine decree on the futurity of things, which — since it is the effect of the decree — must through it be actually placed in the thing, lest the Divine act be frustrated. For if the thing remains in possible and objective being, there will be no decree. Nor can the free will of God stand without change made in the thing — since the will does not change in itself, but only the object changes. Therefore if through this decree concerning the future thing nothing is placed in act, there is no decree, which does not change in itself nor exist unless a change is made in the creature.

These are the arguments for this position of St. Thomas on the coexistence of things — which seems both congruent with Divine dignity and appropriate to the condition and state of creatures. Hence, since no repugnance can be assigned, it seems true and to be followed, supported as it is by both authority and reason.

Section III: The Position Denying the Physical and Real Coexistence of Things in Eternity with God Is Proposed and Proved

This position is also supported by many testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers. First, the Sacred Scriptures make God alone eternal and everything else transitory and temporal — which occurs everywhere. We find it in Hebrews *c. 1*, in Psalm and Genesis 1: *In the beginning God created (Gen. 1:1)* — and Psalm 89: *Before the mountains were brought forth, and the earth and the world were formed, from*

age to age you are God (Ps. 89:2) — from which we learn that God alone is eternal and prior to every creature, which he himself established; as is said copiously and elegantly in Proverbs c. 8: *The depths did not yet exist; the springs of water had not yet burst forth* — and the rest that precedes and follows there. All of which can scarcely be true if things are physically and really present to God in eternity — since in coexisting they must be eternal. The Council of Nicaea, condemning Arius, transmitted this truth when it condemned this proposition of his about the Son of God — *There was a time when he was not* — which made the Divine Word a creature and denied him eternity. From which it is concluded that no creature can be eternal or coexist with God in eternity.

From the Fathers: Augustine (*lib. 12. de Civit. c. 25.*): "If he were to withdraw his formative power — so to speak — from things, they would not exist, just as before they were made they did not exist; but I say before in eternity, not in time." Gregory the Great (*lib. 9. Moralium c. 26. or 25.*), where having said that God sees all things present to him, he adds: "For whatever things exist are not therefore seen from eternity because they exist; rather they therefore exist because they are seen." By which he excluded that real coexistence in eternity and affirmed only the objective one. From the Scholastics there is a great number: Alexander of Hales (*1. p. q. 23. in 4. 1. 3.*), Durandus (*in 1. d. 38. q. 3. n. 12.*), Gabriel (*q. 1. a. 2.*), Ockham and Aureolus (*ibid.*), Gregory (*ibid. q. 2. a. 2. circa finem*), Marsilius (*in suo catigat. ad hunc articulum D. Thomae*), Hervaeus (*ad d. 38.*), Deza (*ibid.*), Sylvester (*in confat. 1. p. q. 14. a. 16.*), Aegidius (*in defensione Divi Thomae ad hunc art.*), Valentia (*in comment. ibid. puncto tertio*), Suarez (*lib. 1. de scientia futurorum absolut. c. 7.*), Vasquez (*in 1. p. d. 64. c. 3.*), Arrubal (*disp. 41. c. 4.*), Herice (*disp. 6. c. 4.*), Alarcon (*tract. 2. d. 2. c. 6.*), Molina (*disp. 14. in hanc quaest.*). Finally Scotus (*in 1. d. 39. q. un.*) with his school. Scotus supplied the arguments, and recent authors habitually use them, as can be seen in the Vasquez cited. Therefore Scotus in that (*q. un. d. 39. §. contra istud n. 9.*) first refutes the example of immensity: "God's immensity, granted it were infinite in imaginary spaces, would not be a reason for coexisting with any place in any now except if it existed; for God through the immensity of himself does not coexist with something in a place unless what is in that place exists, although he can cause a place outside the universe, and then through his immensity he would coexist with it. If therefore immensity is not a reason for coexisting with a place except an actual one — because what does not exist cannot coexist with anything — by equal reasoning eternity will not be a reason for coexisting with anything except what exists, because to coexist expresses a real relation, but a relation is not real whose foundation is not real."

Second: that future thing which is posited as being in act with respect to God at that point of eternity is simply in its being; therefore it is already produced and placed in act before that time succeeds in which it will be in act; therefore it is impossible for it afterward to be placed in act.

Third: the future Antichrist (given St. Thomas's position) already now has actual being in eternity, and is future; therefore at the point at which he is future he will have another being, and accordingly will be produced twice and will have double being; therefore the creature will be multiplied in its being, and will exist twice — once through being in eternity, and again through being in time.

Fourth: what in itself is as yet nothing and has no proper being or proper duration cannot coexist with a foreign measure or duration; for coexistence includes mutual existence, but future things from eternity were nothing and never endured; therefore they cannot coexist with God in eternity.

Fifth: the duration of eternity is God's duration; therefore it is not congruent to a creature; yet it would be congruent if the creature coexisted with God in eternity — since what coexists must necessarily endure.

Sixth: it is unintelligible how a future thing in successive time — which is not simultaneous and cannot be, prior to that difference of its time which according to succession is future — is actually present to God; because that succession is not simultaneous with God's eternity, for it is not now but will be in that eternity. Therefore it cannot coexist, since it has no presence whatsoever in eternity.

Other arguments are accumulated by the authors of this position. All reduce to this: either the future thing will exist twice and be produced twice, or it cannot — being future and successive in a temporal difference — correspond to eternity. One argument however I cannot pass over, which Vasquez urges most strongly (*disp. 64. c. 3.*): the age is a duration all at once; but Angels endure through the age; therefore they will contain in the age future contingents and coexist with them. The major and minor are the positions of the Thomists. The consequence holds, which is indeed absurd; for those things will be really and physically present to the Angels just as future creatures are to God, and accordingly the Angels will see and know them intuitively as present, before they exist in their temporal differences. By this argument, Vasquez says the Thomists are most tormented; and the diversity of solutions shows it. For Cajetan (*comment. in hunc articulum §. ad tertium*) responds that whatever the Angel's duration may be, cognition is not measured by the age but comes in time anew — which cannot stand with the positing of the age. For if the age contains the duration of future things, it necessarily renders them present to the age, just as is said of eternity; therefore if they are present and coexisting with the Angel, as such they are known by him. And the response is turned back: if the reason for coexisting in the age is not for the Angel the reason for knowing presentially and intuitively, neither will the reason for knowing God in eternity be such; and accordingly that necessity of inferring the cognition of things actually present in eternity will collapse.

Others, convinced by the argument, deny that presence in the age or eternity is conjoined with infallible cognition of creatures — but with intuitive cognition; and accordingly that they can be known infallibly but objectively, but not intuitively, because they are not actually present. But this solution overturns the whole doctrine of St. Thomas on the necessity of coexistence in eternity, which must arise from a more solid principle in Thomistic thinking — namely from the nature of eternal duration, which, being one, indivisible, and all at once, must embrace all times and actually correspond to all of them.

This is what Lychetus asks in his commentary (§.) and adds (*his n. 26.*) concerning Cajetan — rightly, because he who is setting out Scotus's objections calls them childish. For Cajetan in (*comment. in art. 13. qu. 14. §. ad probationem autem*): "Superfluous," he says, "is the reply" — so childish does the objection of Scotus seem to him, about which Cajetan speaks, whereas it is grave and solid. For Scotus (*d. 39. q. un. §. Praeterea ista positio*) argues thus: "The future session, about to be produced, either has certainty or not; if it has it, it is not therefore certain as present but as future — and it is foreknown as future through something, not through existence in eternity; if it is not known as future, it is therefore produced by one not knowing it, who will however know it certainly when it will be produced. Whence it follows that he knows in a different manner, and would have known it as future — then he infers: therefore it is known otherwise when made than when going to be made, which is against Augustine." Then: "The Divine intellect would be degraded by waiting for the existence and presence of the thing and drawing its certainty and infallibility from it. And accordingly Divine science would as a suppliant beg its certainty from the presence of things. For the session does not move his intellect; therefore things before they actually exist are understood by God in their future objective being." This is Scotus's argument. What could be more subtle? What more solid, what more mature? Yet Cajetan calls this objection childish — with childish, not mature judgment. It is mature and senatorial — which is tantamount to saying, Scotistic. Certainly it is proved by grave and ingenious authors who hold the opposite position to Cajetan, as will appear presently.

Section IV: Arguments of the Contrary Position Are Answered

The first is resolved by saying that the succession of times is on the side of creatures, which can endure in no other way, being imperfect and transitory. Indeed if they existed in eternity and coexisted with God, the inconvenience that the argument imagines would follow. Thus God alone is eternal; the rest are fluid and temporal, arising and perishing according to the doctrine of Sacred Scripture. And just as they have certain and determined places in which they are located and subsist when they exist, so they are bound to certain times in which they exist and endure; and just as no created thing corresponds to God's immensity, so none coexists with God's eternity.

The second is dissolved by affirming that objective presence suffices for Divine cognition, because an object does not require actual presence to be known — as appears in possibles, which in that state are known by God and cannot be known otherwise. There is therefore no imperfection on the side of Divine cognition in attaining things in their states as they are, as they exist in possible, future, and actual state; nor do these differences change the Divine cognition, which is always the same and invariable — just as the Divine will is also the same when it decrees future things, since all the change is on the side of creatures. Therefore that imperfection of the things-as-objects does not affect the Divine cognition, which draws no principle of knowing from things; rather just as those things receive being from omnipotence, so they receive being-known from the intellect; and just as omnipotence does not depend on creatures which it establishes, so neither does the intellect depend on objects it knows.

Third: that inconvenience is nothing, because the future thing when it is not in act, adds over the possible state nothing but the termination and relation arising from it to the free decree of the Divine will — which places nothing of actual existence in the future being; and accordingly it must retain that middle state between possible and present, which terminates the free Divine decree on the future existence of things without any actual presence. And in that state it is known through free knowledge, which is called knowledge of vision; and just as the thing passes from possible state by the force of the free decree to the future state, so the knowledge that was necessary about it as about a thing in possible state passes to free knowledge of vision in the future state, without any intrinsic change in itself. Therefore in form the argument must concede that nothing happens to the entity of the object from its futurity except actual position from the side of the free Divine decree; but on the side of knowledge there is added the relation of the knowledge of vision of the object that appears as future, terminating in that genus the free knowledge — and certainly if there is any difficulty here it is also found in the position of the Thomists, who also distinguish these knowledges: necessary knowledge of possibles and free knowledge of future things. Just as they therefore explain the difficulty, so do we.

The fourth argument touches on the account of futurity — what it is, and what force there is in the free decree by which futurity is decreed — and tries to frighten us with the common difficulty that asks how futures are decreed. If the argument proves anything, it proves too much and overturns all future things. This is clear, because if they cannot be decreed except by something really impressed upon and placed in them by the free act of the Divine will, they must really be placed outside causes and become present — as the argument contends. Hence the Thomists, who do not deny futures, are also pressed by the same. Hence a solution must be found, which we apply thus. God through his decree wills that a possible thing pass from possible to future state; and for this it is not necessary to place something positive in the possible being beyond the

reduction to the future act — but to it the decree says a certain relation of reason of habitude to that thing, in which relation of reason, according to the common position of theologians, the account of the free act consists. Nothing therefore new and real comes to either the thing decreed or to the divine act of decreeing, beyond that habitude which founds the relation of reason.

It is also false that when the Divine free will wills something, it always places something in the object — because in God there is an inefficacious will, which is a certain affection of benevolence without any effect placed in the thing. And this inefficacious will the universal School of theologians admits, distinguishing in God two wills: efficacious, and inefficacious. Through this distinction: the efficacious will is always conjoined with an effect and places something in the thing; the inefficacious lacks an effect and places nothing in the thing, and merely consists in a simple affection of benevolence. From which is deduced the response to the argument.

I reserved for the last place the testimonies of Scripture and the holy Fathers, since great weight is attributed to them and some of them seem difficult to explain. As for the first passage of Job, I respond that it is to be understood of the number of months as objectively present, and that this suffices for the sense of the passage — because God alone knows what the successively future times will and contain, while men can count only the present. And the same account applies to interpreting similar passages — as that of Ecclesiasticus *from age to age he beholds*: namely objectively, not presentially. So also that word *before him* is taken for objective presence simultaneously without succession — which, since it belongs to flowing things, is nonetheless entirely present before God in the gaze of cognition. In this sense Paul said: *He calls things that are not as things that are* — that is, absent to us, as if they were present to us; because what we call present, he calls both present and future. In this manner are the Fathers to be understood when they deny those differences of tenses — past, present, and future — before God, because all those are eliminated by that objective presence with respect to God's knowledge, which from eternity sees all things in a single gaze; and although those things in reality succeed in time, yet in eternity they are seen as if simultaneously joined, because simultaneously and together they are known. In this sense Augustine said: "With God past things have not passed away, and future things are already made" — which is tantamount to saying: all past and future things are objectively present to God, since he does not see them successively but simultaneously in a single act of knowledge. And indeed God sees those successions of times — firm and permanent in his eternity — as they come and are, nor does he change or confuse the existences of things, but sees them distinctly as they succeed, yet always present in his cognition — with no interruption, no succession on his side, immobile and constant in his eternity.

This is illustrated by the example of one founded on the highest tower in the middle of a river who sees the flowing waves — those that have passed, those

that are passing, and those that will pass — neither moving from his place nor varying his gaze, but simultaneously viewing all the currents of those flowing and succeeding waters.

COLLATION X, DISTINCTION I

On the Necessity of This Existence of Things as a Means for Knowing Future Contingents

Section I: The Affirmative Part Is Proved

The question is: whether this presence in eternity is necessary for the certain and infallible knowledge of future contingents, such that without it they cannot be known with certainty and infallibility? St. Thomas affirms this in the passages cited above, and Scotus so understood it, as did the Thomists — especially the Salmanticans (*tract. 3. de scientia Dei disp. 8. dubio 2. and 3. and dubio 4. §. 2.*), where they pose this conclusion: "It must be said first that for the infallible cognition by which God knows future absolute contingents before they are actually present quoad nos in their proper duration, it is required in every way that the Divine being in its operations be measured by eternity as its proper and adequate measure; and accordingly, if per impossibile they were measured by an age defectible of itself, God could not have that cognition about them before they were quoad nos" — thus St. Thomas in the passages cited in *dubio 2.*, and commonly his disciples. And they more clearly say there (§. *dicendum est secunda n. 133.*) citing St. Thomas (*in art. quaest. praesentis 14., q. 2. de verit. a. 12., q. 57. 1. p. a. 3., diff. 38. q. unica, a. 5. in corpore, and 1. contra gentes c. 16.*) and adding Gonzales (*in praesenti disp. 43. sect. 4.*), Alvarezius (*lib. de auxil. disp. 9.*), Cajetan (*in comment.*), Nazarius (*contr. 3.*). Only Scotus needs to be cited as author — who in this (*d. 39. q. unica illo §. aliter ponitur n. 8.*) expressly attributes that position to St. Thomas and attacks it, as we saw.

The first argument: future absolute contingents can be known only in themselves, or in their causes — namely the Divine decree, or secondary causes. But unless the Divine being and its operations and accordingly the decree were measured by eternity, they could not be known in any of those. Therefore this coexistence in eternity is necessary. The major is evident from enumeration of parts. The minor regarding cognition in themselves seems evident, because before they are quoad nos, they cannot be known in themselves except from presence in eternity, since eternity, extending to them and embracing them, renders them actually present to the Divine cognition. By this reasoning the other created causes of those futures are removed — which, since they are created and future things, drag with them the same difficulty. About the Divine decree it is shown thus: because if it is not measured by eternity but by the age or time, it would be defectible and variable; therefore however much God might know his decree, he could not through it certainly and infallibly know future

things. The assumption about the defectibility of the decree is clear, because if it were not measured by eternity it would be variable and could change; and accordingly could not be unshaken and invariable.

The second argument: given that future things are not present in eternity, even though the Divine cognition at that time knew them, yet when they were produced in time, that cognition would change from abstractive to intuitive. Then God would have some new cognition that he did not have before; but this is most repugnant to Divine immutability; therefore it must not be admitted. This is confirmed by an example: if God were to will something new, or were to change a previously willed thing through a free act in time, he would also be changed — indeed much more through cognition than through volition, since cognition is the expression and image of the object, which volition is not.

To these two arguments all others accumulated by the Thomists — and among them primarily the Salmanticans — are reduced. They say in that (*Dubio 4. under the title corollarium*): from this is drawn the account for reconciling the certainty of God's knowledge with the freedom of free will, and they use for proving it the passage of St. Thomas (*1. contr. gentes, c. 67. and de veritate quaest. 2. a. 12.*) where the holy Doctor says: "Just as our sight does not err in seeing contingents as they are present, and yet from this it is not removed that they happen contingently — so God infallibly sees all contingents because they are not to him future, but he inspects them as being at the time when they are. Whence from this it is not removed that they happen contingently." Which the Salmanticans apply thus: "Just as the contingency of Peter's sitting is not removed by the fact that we see him sitting when he sits, so the contingency of things is not removed by God's knowledge, which is terminated at things as they are really present to him." And they add: "Through the same existence through which things are in time they coexist with God from eternity in the measure of his Divine cognition; therefore through that same coexistence the contingency of things is not removed — indeed that coexistence is the sufficient account for the concord of the infallibility of God's knowledge with the very contingency of things; because through their contingent production through which they come to be in time they coexist with God through relation to the now of his eternity, and are subject presentially to his Divine knowledge."

From this it is gathered that absolute future contingents are known through this single medium and account — since they are known neither in themselves before the decree of their futurity, nor in their created causes, nor in the decree itself about those futures as future. This is what the Salmanticans believe themselves to have demonstrated in their very long commentaries on (*q. 14. Tract. 3. disp. 8.*).

Section II: The Negative Part Is Established and Its Defense Offered

I am not now discussing the manner in which God knows these future contingents — which I shall treat presently — but I deny that they are known in that coexistence with God and in his eternity, and again deny that necessity of coexistence for their cognition.

And first I observe: it is far more certain that these futures are known by God certainly and infallibly, than that they coexist with God as present in eternity. We should therefore not assume what is in doubt to prove what is entirely beyond doubt. Having observed this:

I argue first: that coexistence of things seems to be invented; therefore it is useless for proving. The assumption is clear from the preceding treatment. The consequence holds.

I argue second: that coexistence is not necessary — even granted it is possible — for certain knowledge of future contingents, since there are other easier and more certain means; therefore that necessity-positing is not valid. The assumption will be evident from what shall be said in the following section when we adduce the true medium.

I argue third: if that necessity were true, God could not know those futures otherwise; but this is unworthy of God, making him dependent on the presence of things and debasing his cognition by giving it a necessary principle of knowing founded in creatures; therefore that necessity must not be admitted.

I argue fourth: given this presence in eternity, are those futures known in their future being or not? If not, all knowledge of futures is abolished and only present things are known; if they are known as future, therefore there is no need for presence.

I argue fifth: before the actual presence of things in eternity there was in God the free decree to create them, terminated at their future being; therefore that decree was to be known by God, and its object as future; but this Divine cognition was certain and infallible; therefore there was already in God knowledge of futures without intuitive vision of existence.

The assumption is clear because God knows three states of things — possible, future, and present — and accordingly we first conceive him as seeing things in possible being, then in future being, third in present being; and all Divine cognition is certain; therefore also the cognition of the future.

I argue sixth, and in my judgment effectively. A thing does not pass from possible state immediately to present, but to future through the mediation of God's free decree on its futurity. Then: that decree has its truth, and the thing also which is decreed through it; therefore there is a distinct truth from the truth of actual production and existence. If there is a distinct one, and it is one of the future, distinct from actual present, it constitutes a proper knowledge of the future thing even in the Thomists' own position; therefore their doctrine

cannot avoid cognition of future things which — being certain in that genus — destroys that necessity of coexistence for certainty of cognition, since knowledge of futures can be had without it.

I argue seventh: God can reveal a future thing to a man, and this revelation will be certain, and the human knowledge had through revelation is also certain; but it is of a future thing, not present. Therefore presence is not necessary for certain and infallible cognition of the known future thing. Nor does it help to say that God reveals to me a thing which he sees as present, because that revelation does not make the thing present to me — since God reveals to me a future thing, which is future to me and yet certain. If therefore I can have certain cognition of a future thing, why can God not have it?

If Thomists deny the state of future things and say things pass from possible state immediately to the present in eternity, this will seem absurd; for it will follow that that middle state of futures, received by all Fathers and theologians, is entirely abolished; and further it will follow that all entities necessarily exist, just as they are possible — since actual existence is eternal; for why eternal if not necessary? Furthermore they assume something arduous and difficult, because those present things — since, as they confess, they are contingent and could not have existed — required some Divine decree before they were placed in actual being. But this was about their futurity; which being removed, and futurity abolished, the thing results as present without a medium for placing it in actual present being; and thus it will not be contingent; or it will be simultaneously contingent and necessary — necessary because it is immediately of itself eternal; contingent because it is supposed to be. Which certainly seems difficult.

Finally I argue thus: let us conceive things in the future state, with that coexistence in eternity presupposed; I ask the adversaries: whether those things under the account of future are knowable or not? They will certainly not deny it, since we daily ask and dispute about them, and investigate their truth, and it is true to say of them "it will be" or "it will not be." Affirming this I press thus: therefore they have some medium of knowing through which when applied they will be known in that state. But they will respond: they have indeed a medium, but uncertain and fallible. I press at least this: those futures that will be necessary will certainly be known — as "fire will burn tomorrow if applied" — they will agree. Now therefore we have this: some necessary futures are necessarily known. Let us take these contingents, which can be and not be, and lack a certain medium, and therefore seem unable to be known by God; but on the contrary: we know them probably, and often divine them. Why therefore will God not know certainly and infallibly what man knows probably? Possibles that lack existence do not lack a medium; necessarily future things do not lack it; why then will contingents lack it? If God can decree them, he will be able to know them certainly in his decree, as we shall say below.

Others will respond — whom Vasquez mentions without naming (*disp.* 64. c. 3. n. 22.) — that the necessity of this coexistence arises from the fact that God must know those things intuitively, which he cannot do without actual presence, absolutely required for intuitive knowledge. But Vasquez rightly refutes this response there: both because it suffices for them to be known certainly and infallibly — as possibles are known; and because for intuitive knowledge by its own account actual existence and presence are not required, and he cites (*disp.* 134.) where he shows this. Indeed Scotus in God places another account for intuitive knowledge that does not require actual presence of things, nor exacts actual presence from God, as Rada observes (*controuv.* 30. a. 3. in the explanation of the position of the Subtle Doctor toward the middle). About this we shall treat in its proper place.

Section III: Contrary Arguments Are Dissolved

The first, from enumeration of parts — since it correctly enumerates the media of knowing — yet unjustly excludes the Divine decree, which is the necessary and sufficient medium for knowing those futures, as it is equally the cause of their being; as we shall show in the following section.

As for the proof — which says the decree must be commensurate with eternity — this is freely asserted and falsely assumed, proving the decree to be of itself mutable and receiving its immutability from commensuration with eternity. For the Divine decree, even though it is free and not necessary, once made is nonetheless immutable of itself; nor does it in any way depend on eternity, which is an account of the thing not changing its nature but presupposing it. Hence the Divine decree, which is from the Divine will, has from it its being and its condition of being. What the argument assumes — that the decree can vary if it were not in eternity — proves nothing. For given per impossibile that God could make a new decree in time, it follows also that the decree could vary. But speaking absolutely about God's free decree, since it is Divine and eternal, it is impossible for it to change. Furthermore it must be observed that the argument confounds the commensuration of the decree with that of the thing decreed with eternity — when it should entirely distinguish between the two. For the eternity of the decree does not entail the eternity of the thing decreed; for there can be a decree about a temporal and future thing, and accordingly the thing is temporal — which is proper to the creature — and the decree is eternal — which is proper to God. Therefore the argument does not conclude, since all Divine decrees are eternal and immutable once made; nor do they receive this from the eternity of things — otherwise God's decree would depend on the creature.

The solution to the second argument is easy: denying that God, if he knows futures, will change when he knows present things. For knowledge of futures is like knowledge of present things; nor does cognition change from abstractive to intuitive, as the argument supposes. For God's cognition is invariable in itself, nor does it follow the state of things — because it does not take its knowledge

from things; the change is on the side of the creature, not on the side of God knowing. This appears in knowledge of possibles and futures, whose objects are more distinct than future and present; yet no change takes place in God's knowledge as such. And if any did occur, as the objection contends, it would follow also that in the cognition of past, present, and future things God's knowledge would change — which no one has yet ventured to say. Furthermore that vision of future and present things is not borne toward times but toward things and objects. Therefore although these undergo that change of times, the knowledge of God does not undergo it.

To the example it is responded that it is not apt, because it supposes a true mutation in the decree, which consequently entails another. But in knowledge there is no mutation; and the example deceives with a false condition assumed. What it infers is also false, because it takes the knowledge of futures to change through knowledge of present things — when the opposite is true; nor does the cognition of the object change with the change of the future and present state, since cognition is not drawn from the state of things nor from the things — from which, if the condition of knowledge were drawn, the Divine intellect would be degraded, as Scotus is accustomed to say.

As for the corollary of the Salmanticans — which they prize and exaggerate, calling it noteworthy and saying it is for reconciling Divine foreknowledge with human freedom — I wonder it could have pleased learned men so greatly; for it in no way contains the matter, as I show thus. That cognition of things present in eternity harms rather than helps Divine foreknowledge and human freedom; therefore it is of no use for their concord.

I prove the assumption: because foreknowledge is of future things; but this cognition is only vision of present things — therefore foreknowledge is not posited. Then: the presence of things removes the state of futurity and of indifference for being and not being; therefore it removes rather than posits freedom.

The antecedent is clear, because those things are already outside causes in actual and present state; therefore determined and existing, not undetermined and indifferent. How therefore is foreknowledge — which is none — reconciled with freedom and indifference — which is also none?

Let me clarify: foreknowledge by its signification denotes knowledge of things before they are in act and exist; but in this state of presence and coexistence in eternity they are present to the Divine cognition; therefore this does not precede them but supposes them; therefore it is not foreknowledge but post-knowledge.

I press: human freedom does not exist when things are actually in act and operations are actually happening — for they are then determined, not indifferent to being and not being, since they are taken in the compounded

sense. Therefore in that state of actual presentiality of all things the matter of freedom is removed, nor are there extremes to be reconciled.

But the Salmanticans will say they establish the concord not of foreknowledge with freedom, but of presence with freedom — since knowledge not preceding things does not determine them but supposes them as determined, and accordingly does not affect their freedom. But against this: they expressly say that foreknowledge is reconciled, and the infallibility about future absolute contingents. But here there are no future absolute things — all are present. They add that certainty with the freedom of our free will is reconciled. But here there is no freedom of free will, but determination of free will; not a future operation, but a present one; not contingency indifferent to being or not being, but certain presence and existence in second act. Therefore there is nothing to reconcile.

Nor do I attack that part which says this knowledge does not harm freedom and contingency — since in that state there is no freedom of the will, but determination; not a future operation but a present one; not contingency indifferent to being or not being, but certain presence and existence in second act. Therefore there is nothing to reconcile. Nor do I attack the part that says this knowledge does not harm freedom and contingency, which is none in that state; but the part that asserts through it the infallible cognition of knowledge is reconciled with the contingency of things, and that this is the account of concord between the two. For this is not true: seeing things concordant is not the cause of concord. Concord exists between knowledge and the object already present: it is therefore presupposed, not caused. Then there is no account for reconciling contingency. For here nothing is contingent but certain and present, and that antecedently to knowledge; therefore knowledge is not the account of reconciling. Furthermore in this concord there is no distinction between necessary and contingent effects and things, because the state of present and actual existence induces necessity — for what is, in the second instant is necessary; therefore all things in that state of actual presence do not have the state of contingency or freedom, but of determination and necessity. Finally the Salmanticans adduce nothing to the purpose; for they do not remove the difficulty — which is between contingency and foreknowledge of future things, which was to be removed — but leave it, and proceed to prove that the contingency of present things stands with their vision. Who denies this? But what does this have to do with the common difficulty — how the foreknowledge of contingent things coheres with their contingency, and how they can be reconciled with one another? This is the pivot of the controversy that turns on futures and their foreknowledge — not that other case about which there is no controversy, namely that the Divine vision stands with the presence of things without abolishing their indifference and contingency. About which there is no difficulty.

In sum: in St. Thomas's position, either there is no Divine foreknowledge of future things — since there is with God only knowledge of actual things and things present in eternity, and all question of contingency and freedom is abolished — or there remains room for foreknowledge of futures antecedently to that presence in eternity; and then the question remains entire: whether and how future contingents are known by God? To which question the Thomists seem to leave no room, because in positing all things as present and coexisting with eternity they abolish the futurity and contingency of things. To this question we shall attempt to respond from the doctrine of Scotus, who admits the futurity of things and the foreknowledge of futures — along with the common position of both philosophers and theologians.

Section IV: The True and Proper Account for Knowing Future Contingents Is Adduced and Proved

Setting aside the position of the Nominalists — Ockham (*in 1. d. 39. q. 1.*), Gabriel (*ibid. q. 1. a. 2.*), Gregory (*q. 2. a. 2.*), and Marsilius (*q. 40. ante primum articulum quaest.*) — who deny any account can be found by us for knowing these future contingents; and setting aside Bonaventure's position locating it in the representation of the Ideas, which Scotus attacks and from him Vasquez (*d. 65. c. 1.*) — since it does not pertain to our purpose, namely the difference from Thomistic doctrine — I propose our Scotus's way and prove it.

He therefore in this (*d. 39. q. un. §. iuxta predicta*) perspicuously posits the entirely true manner in which God knows future contingents; but in the preceding section (§.) he notes three things. First: in God the free will is not toward opposite acts but toward diverse objects and effects, as he said (*d. 2. q. 1.*) — because if it were toward opposite acts, it would be imperfect like the human will, which because it is finite and limited cannot without change tend toward diverse objects — which the Divine will can, being infinite and unlimited. Second: our will is considered in three ways: as productive of an act, as receptive of the same, as operative; but the Divine will is neither productive nor receptive of its act, but only operative with respect to the object — and in this its freedom is constituted. Third: the Divine will necessarily wills nothing except the Divine essence and what is intrinsic to it; other things it wills contingently.

Having noted these things, he thus proposes his position (§. *Viso de contingentia n. 22.*): "Having seen regarding the contingency of things as to their existence, considering this with respect to the Divine will, it remains to see the second principal question: how with this the certainty of his knowledge stands. This can be posited in two ways. One way: through this, that the Divine intellect sees the determination of the Divine will — namely, that this will be for A, because that will determines it to be for it. For it knows that will to be immutable and unimpedable. Then he adds: because this way seems to place a certain discourse in the Divine intellect from intuition of the determination of the will and of its immutability, concluding that this will be; it can be posited another way. That

the Divine intellect either presents simples, whose union is contingent in the thing; or if it presents a complex, it presents it as neither true nor false — and the will, choosing one part — namely the conjunction of these for some now in the thing — makes it determinately true. This will be for A. Now this, being determinately true, the essence is the account for the Divine intellect to know that truth — this naturally, as far as it is from the side of the essence." And a little later: "Just as the Divine essence is the account for knowing simples, so also such complexes. But then those contingents are not true, because there is nothing through which they have determinate truth. But given the determination of the Divine will, they are now true, and this will be the account for the Divine intellect to know them."

Therefore the account for knowing future contingents is the Divine decree — in whatever way Scotus's paths are presented, they are sufficiently explained in one word: they are known in the decree. This I judge to be the one and complete account through which all such futures are known, nor do I require any other — contrary to others who, not content with it, add supports; like Father Vasquez who, after a very long contention of studies (*disp. 65. c. 4.*), says he found it in Scotus, whom he had diligently read out, but added some things to it that Scotus does not endorse. I therefore am pleased with that alone and acquiesce in it alone — along with Durandus, who affirms it is sufficient (*in hac diff. q. 3. n. 9.*).

I show this thus. Between cognition of the thing in possible state and cognition of the thing in future state nothing mediates except this decree, through which the possible thing is extracted into future state; therefore that alone suffices for knowing the thing in such state. The antecedent is clear: because the thing in possible state is necessarily known and as such in the essence — since it is drawn from there and brought to future state; that change happens through the free decree of God, by which he determinately wills that possible being to be in time. Hence it is the free cause — free indeed, but immutable — of that future production, of that state placed in the free decree. The Divine intellect sees it placed outside that will in the decree and recognizes it there; and since the will freely wills it, and contingently presents the same to the knowing intellect as it is free and contingent in the decree. This is clear, because to the possible thing nothing comes except the extraction from that necessary being in itself and indifferent respectively to being or not being in future state, through the free and contingent decree of the Divine will. Therefore through that alone and in it alone it is known by the intellect, which, just as it formerly knew the possible thing in the essence, so now knows it in the same essence affected by the free and contingent decree in future state. Nor should one doubt about that decree, as if it did not attain all singularly future things — as those who imagine the will to tend indistinctly and confusedly to futures think. For this is entirely false, since the Divine will tends distinctly toward all singular things, willing and determining them in singular, without multiplication of acts on its side — of which it is neither productive nor receptive, as Scotus observes — but only

operative and terminative of its volition toward many and diverse objects in singular. Without which distinction providence — which concerns singulars, as is clear — neither stands nor can stand. Therefore singular things with all their proper properties and circumstances are decreed by God through his free will, which freely and contingently terminates toward future things — which are also contingent and free, just as the decree through which they are decreed can be and not be as it operates the futurity of things.

And although those futures have their future being as objects to the intellect in the decree, they are nevertheless known not in themselves immediately but in the decree mediately — as Scotus notes (*ibid.* §. *vifo. n. 23.*): "They are true, not that those truths move the Divine intellect, nor even the terms of them for apprehending such truth — since then the Divine intellect would be degraded because it would suffer from something other than its essence — but just as the Divine essence is the account for knowing simples, so such complexes." Scotus allows no other account for knowing creatures in themselves immediately, because the whole account for knowing is the decree, or the essence affected (so to speak) by the decree; and this, since it freely wills the object and contingently, gives contingency to the object, just as after it is determined to its future being it gives certainty and infallibility. Scotus perspicuously adds that the will immutably determines the thing, and the intellect immutably and determinately knows it — because both will and intellect are immutable (*from d. 8.*). "And yet with these the contingency of the known object stands, because the will willing this determinately, wills this contingently." So both contingency and infallibility of the object arise from the contingency and immutability of the decree.

Scotus also rightly observes at the end of the question that contingency is a positive mode of entity, just as necessity is another mode; and every positive thing that is in the effect is principally from the prior cause — "not like the deformity of the act, which is from the secondary cause and not from the primary cause; indeed contingency is primarily from the first cause rather than the second: because of which no caused thing would be formally contingent unless it were contingently caused by the first cause, as was shown." By which reasoning it is manifestly shown that the knowledge of a contingent thing cannot be derived from the thing itself — because since the mode of contingency is something positive, its author cannot be the creature before the Divine decree. Therefore it cannot be known in the creature; it is known in the Divine decree. From which Bachon (*in 1. diff. 40. a. 3. §. 7.*) is refuted, who with Gilton affirms against Scotus that contingency is not derived from the side of the Divine intellect and will, but from the side of contingent things, and from them its cognition is drawn.

Section V: Some Doubts Are Resolved

The first doubt: whether propositions about the future contingent are determinately true or false — which is a greater question than is commonly thought; and although it belongs to logic and is Aristotelian, it must briefly be decided here from Scotus's doctrine.

Aristotle (*primo de interpretatione* c. 8.) concludes the negative part. For he teaches that neither part has determinate truth distinctly — and Catherinus (*opusc. de verit. enuntiat.*) and Aureolus (*in 1. diff. 39. q. 1. a. 1. concl. 1. and 3.*) follow him, and indeed the Salmanticans prove at length that St. Thomas is author of the same position (*Trac. 3. de scientia Dei disp. 7. dub. 6. §. 2.*). Some Thomists therefore seem to posit the presence of things in eternity so that there can be determinate truth of contingent things. The Salmanticans prove this with many testimonies and arguments — to which I gladly subscribe, since it is also the proper position of Scotus, who holds that in the decree alone the truth of those things is determinately known. This position is manifestly deduced from the doctrine hitherto treated: for things are not extracted from indeterminate and indifferent possible being to certain and determined future being except through that decree; therefore with it excluded, they neither are nor are known certainly and determinately. This argument seems convincing. This is confirmed: because the future thing is not through itself the cause of its own being, since it is a creature; but when it is in possible being it is not determined for future being; therefore of itself neither in future nor in possible state does it have determinate truth — indeed it has determinate falsehood in affirmation: for the proposition "the thing is future" will always be false, because it cannot be future except through the decree; therefore with it excluded it will not be; so it will always be true to say it will not be, as long as nothing is decreed about it.

Let us hear Scotus (*in 1. d. 39. q. unica §. vifo de contingentia n. 23.*): "The Divine intellect either presents simples, whose union is contingent in the thing, or if it presents a complex, it presents it as neither true nor false — and the will, choosing one part, namely the conjunction of these for some now in the thing, makes it determinately true." And comparing those complexes and simple entities of things with the cognition of Divine knowledge in the first act of its cognition before the decree, he says: "Just as the Divine essence is the account for knowing simples, so also such complexes" — still in possible being and neutral — that is, indeterminate and indifferent for future. He adds: "But then those contingents are not true, because there is nothing through which they have determinate truth." Behold indetermination without any foundation of certain truth of either part — for they are in a neutral state, indifferent to being and not being. Therefore he says: "But given the determination of the Divine will, they are now true; and this also will be the account for the Divine intellect that was in the first act of knowing those things, which are now true in the second instant and would have been known in the first instant if they had been in the first instant." Scotus clearly denies determinate truth to those futures before the absolute decree — whatever they are, and however taken. Therefore

Aristotle rightly judged those propositions not to be determinately true, attending to the account of things according to themselves without any determining cause — as is clear from the preceding reasoning of Scotus. Hence Aristotle is unjustly reproached by the Coimbricans (*in Logica ad eum locum c. 8. Lib. 1. de interpr.*) and by Vasquez, who attacks him very sharply (*d. 66. c. 1. and 3.*). I certainly consider this doctrine of Scotus most certain, and reduce it to the form of an argument: What does not have determinate being cannot be determinately known. But no entity before the Divine decree has determinate being; therefore none, with the decree excluded, can be determinately known.

The second doubt: is there another mode for knowing futures? Three can be adduced. About the first — presence in eternity — we spoke in the proximate question. Two remain: the first concerns cognition in their proximate disposed causes. This pleases Molina (*in locum 1. partis disp. 4. concl. 1. rat. 2.*) and Becanus (*Tomo 1. summae theologiae c. 10. q. 9.*), who assert that in the comprehension of the cause before all decree God knows the future contingent with certainty — which position does not please the other Jesuit Fathers, and is briefly refuted, because the cause is contingent and undetermined in first act, and is thus known by God; therefore in it a determined and certain effect cannot be known; nor does comprehension help at all, because the very indetermination of the cause is comprehended by God, not changed or determined.

The third mode is knowing futures in themselves, as they are and are represented before the absolute decree. For once the contradictory proposition is posed — "this future will be or will not be" — it follows that one part will be true even before the decree; therefore in themselves before it they are determinately known. This mode is commonly proved by the Jesuit theological Fathers: Suarez (*opusc. de scientia Dei lib. 2. c. 2.*), Vasquez (*in p. 1. disp. 66. c. 2.*), Valentia (*ibid. p. 5.*), Turrianus (*in selectis q. 4.*), Alarcon (*disp. 4.*), Arriaga (*disp. 20. sect. 4.*), Herice (*tract. 1. disp. 6. c. 7.*), Amicus (*disp. 22.*), Fasolus (*p. 1. quaest. 14. art. 13. dub. 12.*), Ruizius (*disp. 23. sect. 2.*), Peres (*disp. 23. sect. 2.*), and from others Pennottus (*in propugnaculo lib. 3. c. 18.*) — whose foundation is that these futures outside their causes are knowable objects, certain and determinate; therefore they can be known by God certainly and determinately independently of the decree, which although presupposed for them is not however the account of knowing them. But because we shall treat this question *ex professo* when we deal with conditional knowledge, we refer this resolution to that question. We note however that not all Jesuits affirm that propositions about a contingent object are determinately true or false — for Bellarmine (*tomo 2. de gratia et libero arbitrio c. 4. and 15.*), Toletus (*ad caput 8. perihirmenias*), Fonseca (*lib. 4. metaph. c. 7. in the explanation of the text*), and Henriquez (*de ultimo fine hominis c. 4.*) deny this.

The third doubt: how and in what manner are sins known by God? The reason for doubt is that sin cannot be decreed by God; therefore neither can it be

known. This question will be treated more conveniently elsewhere; now briefly with Scotus I respond (*in 1. d. 41. q. un. §. praeterea n. 13.*): "Therefore Scotus says: God foreknows that he will cooperate with Lucifer for the substance of the act that will be sin. This he foreknows because he wills to cooperate with him, if it is a sin of commission; or he foreknows that he will not cooperate for some act, if he does not will it — and this if that first act is a sin of omission. Knowing that he will cooperate for such substance of the act without due circumstances, or that he will not cooperate for the necessary act — consequently which he will omit — he will know that one will sin; so that he knows that person will sin, not only because he knows he will permit it, but also because he knows he will cooperate with that person for the substance of the act not circumstanced; and consequently that one will commit it; or that he will not cooperate for the necessary act, consequently that one will omit it." With these words Scotus briefly but perspicuously satisfied the doubt; nor could I have said it more clearly. For sin is either of omission or commission; if of omission, it is known in the negation of concurrence; if of commission, it is known in the provision of that concurrence for the substance of the act, which is permitted in the illicit thing prohibited by God foreknown. Thus the account for knowing remains always certain in the decree — either of not concurring for the omission, or of concurring for the substance of the prohibited act.

The fourth doubt: how this determination of the decree and certainty of foreknowledge is reconciled with freedom? Which is the supreme difficulty, and in explaining which authors labor intensely. We shall define the matter briefly and solidly from Scotus. He in this question (*§. tertia propositio n. 11. and 12.*), having proposed St. Thomas's position (*1 p. q. 14. a. 13.* in the response to the first — that although some things with respect to Divine knowledge are necessary, it does not follow that they are not contingent), and having adduced Boethius (*5. Consol.*) confirming this, teaches that no contingency can causally produce its effect unless the first cause has a contingent relation to the proximate cause or to its own effect. From this doctrine I draw the resolution of the question thus: as the determining cause is, so also the determined effect. The Divine decree is the contingent cause of the created will's effect; therefore the latter is contingent. This is clear because that effect — for example my future reading — could not have been posited, and accordingly was posited contingently, following the nature of its contingent cause. Just as my free and contingent will elicits its act — as the cause is free and contingent, so the act is free and contingent — so if the cause were necessary the act would be necessary; and in the same will this appears: if it were necessary and necessitated to acting in first act, the second act would also be necessary. Since therefore my future reading tomorrow is the effect of a contingent decree that could be and not be, held indifferently, my reading too, which the decree placed in future being, will be free and contingent — conforming itself to the free and contingent cause. For it will be as it was

decreed; and it was freely and contingently decreed; therefore it will be free and contingent.

And let no one say that determination destroys freedom, which is conjoined with indetermination and indifference. For the response is that there are two kinds of determination: necessary and free. The first destroys contingency; the second does not — as appears in the determination of our free will, which in determining itself does so not necessarily but freely, and elicits a free and contingent act. Therefore not every determination brings and induces necessity, but only that which is antecedently necessary.

From this follows the resolution of the other question on foreknowledge: whether it abolishes the freedom of our free will. In this Wycliffe erred before the Council of Constance (*about the ultimate action*, as found in Waldensis *tom. 1. lib. 1. a. 1. c. 21, 23, 28.*) affirming that God's foreknowledge conflicts with the freedom of free will — whom many of our writers refute at length and almost tediously, like Waldensis and Vasquez (*dif. 68.*); and in my judgment it is easily and lucidly refuted from the fact that God's knowledge did not precede God's free decree but presupposed it. Therefore it cannot abolish the freedom that it follows. But when this argument is taken from that knowledge: "God foreknew my future reading; but God's knowledge cannot change; therefore my reading also cannot change, and accordingly is not contingent" — this argument does not conclude, because, as Scotus excellently said in that question (§. *ultimo n. 35.*): "Contingents related to Divine knowledge are only necessary with the necessity of consequence — that is, this consequence is necessary: if God knows those things to be future, they will be. Yet they are not necessary with absolute necessity, nor with the necessity of the consequent." With this response the whole question is removed. For foreknowledge presupposes the contingent thing and knows it to be such and contingently future. Hence since it is posterior, it cannot make it necessary. The argument moreover argues only the necessity of consequence: God foreknew, therefore it will be. It will be — but not because God foreknew, since that foreknowledge would have preceded. It will be, however, given the supposition that it is foreknown, as from a posterior sign and from necessity of consequence — which does not harm freedom.

If the decree — which is the cause of the contingent thing — does not abolish freedom and contingency, since it antecedes and causes contingency; much less will foreknowledge abolish it, which supposes and follows it. Hence the argument about the decree must be resolved in another way: saying that the reason the decree does not abolish contingency is that just as the decree is contingent, so it makes the thing contingent. For just as the decree could be and not be — which is to be contingently — so also the thing it decrees future could be and not be, which is entirely to be contingently. From which it is deduced: if the decree — which is antecedently the cause of the contingent thing — does

not abolish its contingency, much less does foreknowledge abolish it, since it is not a cause and neither precedes the decree nor the contingent thing.

And the Salmanticans say many fine things to this purpose (*in tractatu quarto de volunt. Dei d. 10.*), where they present Scotus as agreeing with St. Thomas. What however our Scholiast and Philip Faber (*d. 54. c. 5.*), going astray, seem to hold to the contrary — we shall examine later.

The last doubt: whether that principle we assumed is true — that a free and contingent cause, which can will and not will and unwill and will the object, transmits its freedom to effects that will arise from the fact that they proceed from a free principle. For this seems false, since God freely and contingently wills fire to be future, yet the effect of fire is necessary; and the same holds of other causes that operate necessarily, with whose effects God freely concurs, since they are necessary.

I respond: the principle is true in this manner. The existence of fire will always be free and contingent, just as God decreeing it is free; for he freely and contingently decrees the future fire, which will also be contingently. But the effects of fire — since they are natural and necessary to it — are not decreed by God as contingently future, but also necessarily, given the necessary cause of them. Therefore the principle always remains true: a free and contingent cause operates contingent effects. For where it terminates toward necessary ones, it already passes from free cause to necessary one, because it necessarily wills what will be necessarily future. Therefore the first cause accommodates itself to the natures of things. Hence when causes are contingent and free — like the human will — God freely and contingently wills both their existence and their effects contingent and free by their own nature and condition. Especially since God, as Scotus says, does not have in himself diverse acts and diverse free decrees which he elicits, but in a single act and free decree tends freely and contingently toward the future existences of things — which on that account are freely and contingently, because they are decreed contingently and freely. Their effects in turn are decreed according to their nature: if necessary, necessarily; if free, freely. The Divine decree assigning being to them according to their natural being, which the intellect had seen in possible being.

Section VI. How Human Freedom of the Will Coheres with These Free Decrees, and How Those Decrees Operate in Determining Events

This question is great enough and has been explained well enough, and it now torments minds for a reason. Although we have said a little about it above, it will be necessary to treat it carefully in accordance with the mind and sense of Scotus.

I observe first that the Thomists have labored at this question when they hardly seem obliged to do so. For if they, in order to free themselves from this question, posit things as existing in eternity, and say this is the unique and

necessary means of reconciling freedom with divine foreknowledge, how do they find themselves entangled in the question of future contingents? Nevertheless they are to be excused, since in that state of presence and coexistence of things in eternity they see that the antecedence of the decree which draws things from a possible state into the future can still stand. Thus the question of that antecedence remains for that prior moment. However that may be, these authors attribute so much to the decrees of God that they say the future occurrences of contingent things and acts have their antecedent causes in the decrees, and that they will therefore occur because they have been decreed by God — indeed, singularly and efficaciously predefined in an absolute sense. So they hold together with St. Thomas (*1 d. 32, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, 3; and Prima Secundae, q. 80, a. 1*). Cajetan makes these decrees concomitant (*1 p. q. 14, a. 13*). Ferrariensis (*d. 45, q. 1, concl. 5*), Alvarez (*lib. 3, de Auxiliis, contra Gentes, c. 85*), the Salmanticenses (*tract. 4, de voluntate Dei, d. 10, dub. 2, §. 2*) affirm most joyfully that inviolate freedom stands alongside these decrees (*ibid., dub. 4 and following*). Among others: Carthusianus (*d. 39, q. 2*), Durandus (*in 1, d. 40, q. 1, n. 7*), Driedo (*opusc. de Concordia liberi Arbitrii, et praedestinationis, 2 p. c. 3, ad 1*). The Fathers of the Society of Jesus deny decrees of this kind as antecedent in an absolute sense, and hold that freedom is destroyed by them; and in order to uphold and vindicate it, they introduce that conditional and middle knowledge of theirs, of which we shall speak later, as may be seen in Molina (*comment. in rep. D. Thomae, q. 14, a. 13; and in Concordia*), Bellarminus (*lib. 4, de gratia et Libero Arbitrio*), Suarez (*lib. 1, 2, de Concursu Dei, tom. 1, de gratia, Prologomeno 2, c. 8*), Vasquez (*1 p. d. 99, c. 3 and 4*), and others whom we shall cite in their proper place.

Let us see what our School holds together with Scotus. I would not want the Scotists to vary and disagree on this matter. But they have preferred otherwise. With the Fathers of the Society, Faber (*in 1 sent. d. 39, disp. 54, c. 5; and disp. 55, c. 2*), Corduba (*in suis quaestionibus, lib. 1, q. 55*), and Pontius (*in suo cursu Theologi, eod. disp. 5, q. 7*) agree on middle knowledge, as does Cavellus in his Scholion on the contingency of things, where he says it is probable, comparing himself now to the same doctrine he intends to transmit in his manuscripts on sins. Almost all the others, having denied the Jesuitical middle knowledge, have admitted those decrees of Scotus regarding future contingents and, following Scotus — who teaches perspicuously — have placed in them the ground of certainty and infallibility. Lychetus (*in comment. ad hanc quaestionem unicam dist. 39*), Smiling (*tractatu tertio, disp. 2*), Sghemma (*2 physic. digress. 18, q. 3*), Rada (*controversia 30, a. 3 and 6; and most expressly in solution of arguments at the end of controuv.*), Vulpes (*d. 30, a. 7, 8; and d. 31*), Mastrius (*d. 3, de Divin. intel., qu. 3, ar. 4, n. 114*). But even these do not agree among themselves. For Mastrius (*q. illa 3, n. 8*) rejects antecedent decrees regarding the future and posits concomitant ones, and cites in his favor Joseph of Naples, a Sicilian from Drepano, whom he calls the first author of this position.

For my own part, I understand the decrees of Scotus as simply antecedent, and I am not deterred by the difficulty of reconciling them with freedom, which caused those who preferred concomitant decrees to waver. I seek the mind of Scotus and set forth what he held. Certainly I find in him nothing but antecedent and causative decrees regarding future things; nor do I approve of those concomitant decrees, and I judge them to be incompatible with his teaching.

I prove first that the Scotist decree is antecedent and causal with respect to future things. I set forth the words of Scotus and propose them to certain more recent Scotists, and especially to Mastrius, a learned man and, I believe, a candid one. Let him see whether they are perspicuous in this distinction (*d. 39, q. un., § iuxta, n. 21 and 22*): "The will," he says, "can tend toward any willed objects by a single, simple, unlimited volition. It tends toward an object contingently, in that at the same instant it can tend toward the opposite object — and this both in logical potency and in real potency, which is prior by nature to its act." Hence from the tendency toward an object there follows an antecedence arising from the priority of the will compared to the act, and from this there follows the priority of the divine will over the willed object. And who would deny that the will is antecedent to its act? Hence one cannot deny that the decree of the divine will is antecedent to its object. For just as the human will stands in relation to its acts, so the divine will stands in relation to its objects — nor does the divine will have distinct acts, as Scotus teaches there. I proceed to other, clearer texts. In the section (*§. viſo de contingentia, n. 22, in fine*): "The divine intellect sees the determination of the divine will — namely that this thing will be for A — because the will determines that it will be so. For it knows the will to be immutable and unimpedable." Behold the determination of the future by the will, and the certainty of knowledge arising from that determination, which is plainly antecedent. And although Scotus does not approve the argument itself, he approves the rest. It follows in (*n. 23*): "The will choosing one part — namely the conjunction of these things for some now — in reality makes it determinately true." And shortly thereafter, denying that future contingents are determined through the divine essence prior to the decree of the will, he says: "Then they are not true contingents, because there is nothing at that point by which they may have determinate truth." But once the determination of the divine will is posited, they are already true for that second instant. "And this same thing will be the reason for the divine intellect to understand these things, which are now true in the second instant. This is the act of the determining will." He adds: "And they would have been known in the first instant" — that is, when they were in possible being within the essence — "if they had been in the first instant, that is, within the essence containing them prior to the determination of the will, in a possible state." In (*n. 24*): "The will cannot determine without the intellect apprehending determinately what the will determines, and immutably, because both will and intellect are immutable, from dist. 8. And this concerns

the first three questions. Yet with these things there stands the contingency of the known object, because the will in willing this determinately, wills this contingently." Behold antecedent determination together with contingency. I pass over the entire reasoning concerning the possible and concerning being from (§. *a*, in the arguments to the principal questions, n. 26 to n. 35), which supports our teaching. Finally I produce the section (§. *ad aliud*, at the end of the question): "I say that contingency is not merely a privation or defect of being, as deformity in a secondary act is a sin; rather, contingency is a positive mode of being, just as necessity is another mode. And every positive thing that is in an effect is principally from a prior cause. Therefore contingency is not like deformity, which belongs to the act from the secondary cause and not from the primary cause. On the contrary, contingency is from the primary cause before it is from the secondary — for which reason no caused thing would be formally contingent unless the primary cause caused it contingently." It seems one should read "would have been caused" rather than "caused," and this is how it is read in the ancient manuscripts, and correctly so; with the other reading the sense does not hold. This passage contains the substance of the matter, because it deals with a contingent thing already brought into actual existence among creatures, and yet says it is caused by the primary cause. Therefore it is clear that the divine decree determines a future contingent thing antecedently and causally. Lychetus understood and expounded this teaching (*in suis comment. ad textus Scoti*, n. 1, *comment. ad §. ad argumenta primae quaestionis*). And regarding this last text which we have just cited, and in the responses to the arguments of Ockham (*in comment. ad §. viso de contingentia*), indeed the very arguments of Ockham there proposed and solved by Lychetus, they clearly show that Scotus held that the divine decree causes future contingent acts — since one of the principal arguments is that on this view human freedom could not stand. Let whoever wishes read (§. *item arguit*, n. 4) and consult the other texts cited there by Lychetus, and will find without doubt that Scotus posited an antecedent and causal decree of future occurrence and contingency. Scotus transmits the same teaching in the *Reportata*, d. 40, q. *un.*, perspicuously.

That this decree cannot be concomitant I prove from that firm and invincible principle of Scotus: because the concomitant decree is posited so that the divine will may not harm the freedom of the created will; and accordingly it must conduct itself in such a way as to determine nothing unless the created will has first determined itself, with the contingency of the created will concurring simultaneously as a co-cause. This is how Mastrius explains it from Vigerius (*a Scotist interpreter*, n. 172). But this reasoning overturns the certain and manifest teaching of Scotus; therefore that concomitance is not to be admitted. The minor is evident from this: that from concomitance it follows that the divine will and intellect are degraded by waiting upon the creature as a co-principle of their act of willing and knowing, as if the reasons for determining and knowing a future contingent thing had to be begged from creatures. For if the divine will

cannot determine a contingent thing without the creature's concurrence, it is certainly needy and dependent, and is utterly degraded. Moreover, omnipotent will is diminished, and too much is attributed to the weak and infirm created will — because since contingency, according to Scotus, is a positive mode, if all that contingency does not derive from the divine will, and if the created will concurs as a co-cause of it, then the divine will is not omnipotent, because it cannot posit the total contingency, and the human will would be equally powerful with the divine, since it posits on its own one part of that contingency which omnipotence cannot posit without the creature as a co-cause. Beyond this, the created will would glory in having something in itself — indeed in conferring something upon God — which it did not receive from him. Furthermore, if this contingency arises from the divine and human will together as from a complete cause, with both concurring either as indifferent or as determined — if as indifferent, they will determine nothing, because an indifferent principle cannot be the cause of determination; if as determined, by what are they determined? If by a determined principle, the intended conclusion is obtained; if by an undetermined one, there is an infinite regress. Therefore this concomitance is not to be admitted, and far less in the School of Scotus, where no contribution from the creature is tolerated, because — as Scotus says — God would be degraded. Lychetus rightly says (*in fine comment. d. 39*): "No caused thing would be formally contingent unless it were contingently caused by the primary cause," and he refers to *dist. 41* and to *2, d. 37*.

To the texts adduced against this by Mastrius, the reply is easy: that in the execution of these free acts the created will does indeed cooperate with the divine will, but as moved by it, without any antecedent necessity having been introduced — because the divine will decreed from eternity to premove the will in such a way that it would follow the decree by freely corresponding to the divine will. Nor does the antecedent divine decree destroy the native freedom of the will; on the contrary, it preserves the same freedom by retaining what is proper to the creature, which is freedom. And this is the genuine opinion of Scotus, which is attributed to him not only by the ancient Scotists, but also by authors of other Schools: Alvarez (*lib. 3, de Auxiliis, d. 22, n. 13*), Suarez (*lib. 1, de Auxil., c. 5, n. 5 and 6*), Vasquez (*1 p. 1, d. 65, c. 2, n. 5*), the Salmanticenses (*tract. 4, de volunt. Dei, d. 10, c., dub. 3, n. 56*), and most recently Perez (*d. 3, c. 4, §. 8*), where, speaking of the opinion of Scotus, he says that the Scotists embrace this opinion of antecedent decrees against Faber and others, yet do not posit physical predetermination, as we shall see later.

From all this it is clear what must be answered to the other question: whether this decree is efficacious and absolute. The answer must be affirmative — yet it does not necessitate or compel. The reason is that this decree posits the thing in act and with execution. But in this consists absolute efficacy; therefore it is efficacious. And in this Scotus agrees with St. Thomas, and our School does not differ from the Thomistic School. We do not, however, posit — nor should we

posit — that physical quality of predetermination, which seems difficult and troublesome in reconciling with the freedom of the human will, and which is alien to the teaching of Augustine and Scotus. This we have shown clearly in our many works on Grace that we have published. But because Mastrius (*cited at n. 172*) says that Scotus is wrongly cited in favor of this opinion about antecedent efficacious decrees, I wish to produce other texts which he cannot deny, and to overwhelm him with a multitude and brilliance of passages, and to compel him to agree with me. Therefore Scotus (*d. 41, q. un., §. sed contra istud*), refuting Henry who held predestination to arise from the foreknowledge of the good use of free will, says: "Against this it is argued first: because God does not foreknow that this man will make good use of free will, except because he wills or preordains that this man will make good use of it — for as has been said in *d. 39*, the certain foreknowledge of future contingent things comes from the determination of the divine will. So then if two men equal in natural endowments are offered to the will, I ask why he preordains this one to make good use of free will and not that one. It does not seem to belong to this question," he says, "to assign a reason other than the divine will." What could be clearer, even in a matter so profound and difficult as predestination? And he adds: "This is the first distinction between them, which in itself entails election or reprobation — namely the determination of the divine will for this one and not for that." Then: "Therefore in the first distinction pertaining to predestination and reprobation, the sole reason is the divine will." Who does not see that this testimony both contains and persuades to the matter of the antecedent decree? I would yield to this if I were of the contrary opinion. And in the *Reportata* Scotus confirms this teaching, since he refers himself there to this passage. I adduce a third testimony from (*quodlibeto 14, §. completo, n. 16*): "A contingent motion follows. The principle of that motion must be placed in the will, and a contingent motion of this kind proceeds ordinately, first to what is within: because unless the will itself is determined in itself to willing one part, it will never determine anything outwardly. First, therefore, it determines itself to willing determinately that this will be. Second, from this the intellect, seeing this infallible determination of the will, knows that this will be in the future." And below: "The entire motion, therefore, is contingent, and consequently immediately from the will itself as its principle." Where is the concomitant human act to be found here in Scotus? The antecedent decree occupies everything, fostering contingency rather than removing it antecedently. I add another text from (*4 sent. d. 49, q. 6, §. ad formam ergo, n. 15*), which is most clear: "It is not against the nature of the will to be determined by a superior cause, because with this it stands that it is a cause in its own order." Behold the will remaining determined by God, and yet contingent in itself and in its own order. And Scotus resolves the objection, which is of this kind: "If the superior cause determines, then the will is determined in its own causal order; therefore it is not contingent in the causal order." This seems to be the objection of Mastrius together with Faber and others who agree with the Jesuit Molina, to whom

Scotus replies thus: "I reply that on account of this determination in its own order there is equal contingency" — that is, the contingency of the will is preserved — "because the divine determination is contingent in its own order, and therefore the contingency of the secondary cause is not removed by the contingency of the primary cause." Scotus does admit, however, that if the will were determined antecedently by a creature, it would not remain in its own order but its freedom would be taken away — because a creature cannot accommodate itself in determining another's will, as God the primary cause knows and is able to accommodate himself to the contingency and freedom of the creature, fostering and preserving it, as Lychetus (*the commentator, in my judgment a considerably better Scotist than Faber and Mastrius*) notes there.

Scotus also treats this neatly in the *Reportata*, d. 40. I set forth his text in (*q. un., n. 7*): "Supposing that contingency exists in things, it must be seen where the primary reason for contingency lies. I say that the primary reason for contingency is in the divine will, as compared with other things." He proves this: "Because if it necessarily conducted itself in causing other things from itself, nothing would be contingent in reality — for there would be no secondary cause, and no evil in things." Having stated this truth, he proceeds in (*n. 8*): "The primary reason and cause, therefore, of contingency in things is the divine will itself. And then one can say further that some things are contingent with a twofold contingency from the side of their causes — such as our willing, whose primary cause is God and secondary cause is our will, and each causes contingently." Then (*n. 11, on the second question proposed, on the position of St. Thomas*) — that God necessarily foreknows this future contingent thing — (*n. 12*): "I say otherwise: that God not only knows future contingents, but knows future contingents contingently." And in (*n. 13*) he gives the reason: "That which presupposes a contingent is not necessary. But for God to know something contingently will be, presupposes that it is willed by God — because before the first act of the will, it is known by the divine intellect only as neutral. But the act of the divine will regarding a contingent is contingent. Therefore, etc."

Let us unfold the argument and the manifest truth will appear. Scotus teaches, against St. Thomas, that God knows a future contingent contingently — taking contingency on the part of knowledge — so that the future is contingent and the knowledge of it is also contingent. This arises because the contingency of the object rests upon the free decree of the divine will, which also wills contingently that the object — say, Antichrist — should be; Antichrist, prior to the free decree determining his future occurrence, was a neutral and indeterminate object and was not known determinately by the divine intellect. But with the intervention of God's free and contingent decree, the object — that is, Antichrist — is determined toward being future; and then Antichrist is contingently future, and divine knowledge of him is contingent, because he could not have been. All here is contingent, and nothing is posited necessarily. The free will is contingent and decreed freely and contingently the future contingent — that is, Antichrist —

while retaining its contingency; the divine will is the contingent cause of this, not taking away but rather bestowing contingency upon him. The knowledge of this object is likewise contingent, because whereas before it was neutral and indeterminate — just as the object was — it now contingently becomes certain and determinate, because it follows the contingent decree which contingently determines that future occurrence of the future contingent object. Hence this knowledge, which is knowledge of vision, is called free in the Schools.

Therefore it remains evident and manifest: the decree of God regarding a contingent and free thing is the antecedent cause of that contingent thing, and is so far from removing contingency and freedom from it that it bestows them upon it and preserves them when bestowed — and this is the true and genuine teaching of Scotus, which will appear even more clearly in the following Collation.

Collation X. Difference II. On the Root of Contingency.

On q. 14, D. Thomas, a. 13, q. 19, a. 8, in the 1st Part; and on dist. 2, q. 2; d. 8, q. 1; d. 39, q. un. in 1st Part; and in the Reportata of Scotus.

Section I. The Texts Are Compared and Explained, and the Opinions Are Elicited.

Cajetanus in his commentaries on (*a. 8, q. 19, 1st Part*) acknowledges that in this matter Scotus agrees with St. Thomas — namely in holding that God is the root of contingency — but differs entirely in this: that Scotus holds the contingency of the divine will to be the cause of all created contingency, while St. Thomas on the contrary holds the efficacy of the same divine will to be the cause of contingency. And indeed St. Thomas (*1 p. q. 19, a. 8, in corpore*) says: "Since the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that those things occur which God wills to occur, but that they occur in the manner in which God wills them to occur. He wills some things to occur necessarily, some contingently, so that there may be order in things for the completion of the universe. And therefore to some effects he applied necessary causes which cannot fail, from which effects necessarily result; to some he fitted contingent and defectible causes, from which effects result contingently. Therefore the effects willed by God do not result contingently because their proximate causes are contingent, but rather because God willed them to result contingently and prepared contingent causes for them."

Despite Cajetanus' acceptance, this passage of St. Thomas clearly yields a completely different doctrine from that of Scotus. For St. Thomas in this passage plainly presupposes that God does not produce necessity and contingency in causes themselves, and that his efficacy consists in applying them to their effects, with necessary causes acting necessarily and contingent ones contingently. Hence St. Thomas says: "He wills some things to occur

necessarily, some contingently; and therefore to some effects he applied necessary causes which cannot fail, to some he fitted contingent defectible causes." In this passage the words "applied" and "fitted" presuppose that the causes are of such a nature and condition by their own constitution, not that they are made so by God. Therefore the root of necessity and contingency in things lies intrinsically within them and is not drawn from God as conferring contingency anew. And again: "Because God willed effects to result contingently, he prepared contingent causes for them." What does "prepared" mean except that he chose those causes which were by their own condition contingent and naturally disposed to make effects similar to themselves, that is, contingent? Therefore God is not, according to St. Thomas, the primary root of contingency, but the condition of the creature, which God uses efficaciously to produce his effects in that manner. Cajetan himself intimates this in the same article when he says: "We say that this condition is the supreme efficacy of the divine will. But Scotus says that it is the contingency of that will, and he clings so firmly to this opinion as to say that nothing could occur contingently if the omnipotent God did not cause it freely." Cajetan denies this in the way of St. Thomas. From which it follows that in St. Thomas the divine will, however it may be understood, is not the primary root of contingency, since it would not be destroyed if God operated necessarily, but would still remain in things. Scotus therefore differs from St. Thomas in his opinion on the root of contingency. Let us hear him in (*1, d. 2, q. 2, §. item tertio arguitur, n. 20*): "Something," he says, "causes contingently; therefore the primary cause causes contingently. Therefore it causes by willing." He proves the first inference: "Every secondary cause causes insofar as it is moved by the primary cause; therefore if the primary cause moves necessarily, every cause moves necessarily; therefore if some secondary cause moves contingently, the primary cause will move contingently, because the secondary cause does not cause except in virtue of the primary cause, insofar as it is moved by it." Hence that principle stands clear: the root of contingency and necessity in created things is the contingency — or freedom — and necessity in the operation of the primary cause, that is, God. And in (*d. 8, q. 5, §. secundo arguo*): "In all causes proceeding in order, nothing will be contingent if the primary cause causes necessarily." And (*§. item, n. 20*): "Every cause acting necessarily acts according to the ultimate capacity of its power, because just as it is not within its power to act or not act, so it is not within its power to act more or less intensely. Therefore if the primary cause causes necessarily, it causes whatever it can cause. But it can from itself cause everything that can be caused, as I will prove. Therefore it causes everything causable; therefore no secondary cause causes anything." Scotus says even more than this: not only that everything would occur necessarily, but that everything to be created and produced would be necessarily, simultaneously, and from eternity, if the cause were infinite and caused necessarily — because it would cause as much as it could, and with an infinite power, and would therefore produce all things necessarily, and all things would be necessary and

simultaneous from eternity, because that infinite power could not be contained or regulated. He cites himself here in (*1, d. 2, q. 2*), both in the passage cited above and in (§. *ad primum dicendum est, and following, n. 21*). See there Lychetus holding the same view as Scotus and expounding it aptly. Furthermore, in (*1, d. 39, q. un.*), where Scotus is commonly cited, he says (§. *supposito ergo isto, n. 14*): "No causation of any cause can preserve contingency unless the primary cause is posited as immediately causing contingently, by positing in the primary cause perfect causality." And shortly after: "This contingency must be sought in the divine will or in the divine intellect — but not in the intellect. Therefore the primary contingency must be sought in the divine will."

It is further apparent that Scotus and St. Thomas held substantially different views, and that Cajetan was altogether mistaken in saying that they agreed on the root of contingency because both placed it in God — for this is entirely false. For St. Thomas, as I have begun to show above, placed it in creatures, not in God. Let us listen to Scotus disputing this matter in the last passage (*d. 39, q. un., §. tertia propositio, n. 11*). He here sets forth the opinion of St. Thomas: "The third proposition," Scotus says, "states that although some things with respect to divine knowledge are necessary, it does not follow that they cannot be contingent with respect to proximate causes." And immediately: "For this it is also argued that an imperfection can be present in the being of an effect from the proximate cause, though not from the remote or prior cause — just as deformity is in an act caused by the will, but not insofar as it is from the divine will; hence sin is not reduced to God, but is only imputed to the created will. Therefore, although from the side of God, who is the remote cause, there would be necessity in things, from the proximate causes there can still be contingency in them."

Scotus presents this proposition as St. Thomas's, and then subjoins: "Against this it was argued in *d. 2*" — which passage we cited above from *n. 20* — "where it was proved that God is intelligent and wills other things to exist contingently through the contingency of things, because no contingency can exist in the causation of any cause with respect to its effect unless the primary cause is contingently disposed toward the proximate cause near it, or toward its effect." Scotus then proves his own position anew. But before we prove it with his own reasoning, let us see whether St. Thomas actually held, as Scotus attributes to him, that the root of contingency is placed not in God but in creatures. Let us go to St. Thomas in (*1 p. q. 14, a. 13*) and consult him. He says there in reply to the first: "Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect can nonetheless be contingent because of the contingent proximate cause — just as the germination of a plant is contingent because of its proper contingent cause, although the motion of the sun, which is the primary cause, is necessary."

Nor should Cajetan object to Scotus that St. Thomas is there speaking of God's knowledge and not of God's cause being contingent with respect to creatures;

for it follows: "And similarly, things known by God are contingent because of the proximate causes, even though God's knowledge, which is the primary cause, is necessary." For this does not remove the cause of contingency; rather, it confirms it — in that those contingent things are known to be contingent in their proximate causes, that is, in creatures, and not in the primary cause. They would be known in the primary cause if it were the root and cause of contingency. Therefore it remains proved that, on the authority of St. Thomas, contingency is derived from creatures and not from God, and its root is created, not uncreated. Hence if God operated necessarily, there could still be contingent effects in created things — just as Cajetan argues against Scotus there, and Cajetan is convicted of an interpretation foreign to the mind of his own Doctor, which Scotus understood far better.

Now let us see how Scotus attacks that position in the same passage (*§. quod nunc probatur, n. 12*): "From the fact that a moving cause, insofar as it is moved, if it necessarily moves, it necessarily causes: every secondary cause, therefore, which produces something insofar as it is moved by the primary cause, if necessarily moved by the primary cause, necessarily moves the proximate cause or produces its effect. Therefore the entire ordering of causes down to the ultimate effect would produce necessarily, if the relationship of the primary cause to the proximate cause near it is necessary." He continues: "Furthermore, the prior cause by nature respects its effect prior to the posterior cause; therefore in that prior moment, if it has a necessary relationship to it, it will give necessary being to it. But in the second instant of nature, the proximate cause cannot give it contingent being, because it is already understood as having from the primary cause a being that is incompatible with contingency. Nor can it be said that in the same instant these two causes give being to the effect, because upon that being there cannot be founded a necessary relation to that cause which gives complete being, and a contingent relation to some other cause. Furthermore, whatever is produced by posterior causes can be produced immediately by the primary cause, and then would have the same entity that it now has, and would then be contingent just as it now is contingent. Therefore it has its contingency even now from the primary cause, and not only from the proximate cause." With these arguments Scotus attacks the opinion of St. Thomas — arguments which would not proceed against Scotus himself unless he held that the contingency of things is not derived from divine freedom but from created freedom and contingency. And if Cajetan denies that Scotus is arguing directly, he is no more right in denying it than he was in affirming that St. Thomas agreed with Scotus on the root of contingency.

I conclude this part with a clear testimony for the opinion of Scotus from (*lib. 2, sent. d. 1, q. 3, not far from the end, §. ad illud quod additur de Philosophis, n. 14*): "It can be said," he says, "that they conceded many latent contradictions — for example, they generally denied there to be any first principle causing contingently, but said the primary cause causes necessarily, and yet said that there is contingency

in beings and that some things come about contingently. But contradiction is involved in something coming about contingently among beings and the primary cause causing necessarily, as has been deduced in *dist. 8 of the first book*, and *dist. 2* and *39* of the same, and somewhat in the preceding question." So certain did Scotus consider this teaching that he judged the opposite position to involve contradiction.

Section II. Whether, if God Operated Necessarily from an Intrinsic Principle, There Could Be Any Contingency in Creatures? The Affirmative Position Is Set Forth.

This is a serious and difficult question. When I was a young man at Coimbra studying philosophy among the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, it was greatly celebrated and disputed with divided and opposing intellectual loyalties among the professors, though more of them inclined toward the affirmative position. Among these was my own teacher, Father Benedictus a Goa — whom I name out of respect — an ingenious and learned man, who held the view contrary to Scotus. I imbibed that teaching and retained it thereafter, and could not be drawn away from it until I found the Scotist doctrine in its own sources and drank it in. From that point I changed my opinion. The arguments that moved me I shall state in the following section; now I set forth the foundations of the affirmative side.

First, this position is strengthened by the authority of Cajetanus (*in comment. ad quaest. 19, a. 8; and q. 14, a. 13*), with whom Bartholomeus Camerarius agrees (*cited by Father Vasquez in his catholic Dialogue, 2 p. c. 3*), and Vasquez himself (*in 1 p. disp. 100, c. 3*), where he solves the arguments of Scotus, which in (*c. 1*) he calls weak and less consistent with the same doctrine — which the opposite, he says, had taught (*in 2, d. 37, q. 1, §. ad solutionem; and in 4, d. 49, q. 6, §. dico ergo*). The first argument is: that necessity of operation in God would posit nothing necessary in the created will by which its freedom would be removed — for either that would be something from the side of the proposed object that necessitates, like the vision of God, or from the side of God's concurrence operating in such a way as not to allow it to operate freely, or through some antecedent premotion compelling it to action. None of these would be the case; therefore it would remain free. The first part is proved because God as a necessary primary cause would not necessarily exhibit himself to be seen clearly; for what would compel him to this? There is no other object by which the will would be necessitated. Therefore that first mode collapses. As for the second, it is shown that God would concur as primary cause with the secondary cause, and the secondary cause likewise cooperates with the primary — for concausation of two would not be eliminated; but concomitant concurrence does not impair freedom or contingency. Therefore the secondary cause would remain free. There remains the third: that something entirely prior would be impressed upon the will, compelling it against its will to operate. But this is gratuitously asserted, because

it is not naturally required for operation, nor would a necessary agent observe this for the purpose of destroying freedom, nor would it change or destroy the nature of the will by compelling it in that manner; therefore it would not introduce necessity but would leave freedom in place. And by roughly this reasoning Vasquez argues. I say "roughly" because in the third member he posits predefinition rather than the premoting motion, which is less pressing — and I am surprised that Vasquez, a keen and vigorous disputant, was content to rest with that one reason alone.

I use another argument which was my teacher's. The primary cause that would operate necessarily would be intelligent, and would know what and how it acts, and would distinctly know the natures of created things. Therefore it would accommodate its concurrence to their condition and demand, and would preserve the differences of causes and of contingent and free effects.

I add another from my own store. Contingency in things would not be absent because of that necessity of the operating primary cause; on the contrary, it would increase — contingency would not be removed but augmented. This assumption is proved because, with God operating necessarily, there would be no providence and no disposition of things, and so many things would happen beyond his intention and foreknowledge: for he would act in a blind fashion, unable to prevent all things or reduce them to a certain order; everything would occur randomly and inconsistently, and thus many things would come about by chance, unforeseen and beyond the intention of the operating cause, and contingency would accordingly be multiplied, not removed.

I add the reasoning of Cajetanus (*comment. in artic. 13, q. 14, 1 p., §. Nec sustinendus*). God, even operating necessarily, would admit causes and would not destroy them; but in admitting them he would leave them free and contingent. Therefore he would not necessitate them in their operations. He proves the assumption, and in doing so refutes what he calls the Achilles of Scotus — that is, the argument drawn from the fact that the secondary cause acts moved by the primary cause: necessarily, if the primary is necessary; contingently, if the primary is contingent. Against this Cajetanus argues thus: "Either you demonstrate the precise cause or the co-cause. If the precise cause, this proposition involves a contradiction in terms: for if the secondary cause is a cause, it therefore does not move precisely because it is moved, but also contributes something from itself; and if it moves precisely because it is moved, it contributes nothing from itself, and so it is not a cause. If however you mean a co-principal cause, the assumption is denied: because it stands that it is necessarily moved, and yet does not necessarily move something else; because the motion of the prior cause is modified in the secondary cause according to the mode of the secondary cause itself, and so although the secondary cause is necessarily moved by the primary, the motion received in the secondary cause, if the secondary cause is imagined as contingent, is modified by the contingency

of the recipient." Vasquez revives this argument of Cajetan (in *disp. 100, c. 1*) and cites Gabriel and Corduba as partly agreeing and partly disagreeing with Scotus, as appears in (*c. 2*). I note that not a few errors have crept into the citations of Scotus both in Cajetan and in Vasquez, which disturbed me considerably when I found cited passages to be inverted and uncertain in the places where Scotus treats this question of freedom and contingency, so that a large portion of the reference numbers is corrupt. I say this not because I think it happened through the inattention of these authors, who are learned and accurate in citing, but rather because it occurred through the negligence of copyists, the carelessness of printers, or the indolence of correctors. However that may be, I was pleased to note this and to warn readers about it, so they would not be troubled as much as I was in comparing, reviewing, and correcting the mistaken citations. And so that they may be freed from all difficulty, I confirm that I have reported the passages with the utmost fidelity. Therefore when they read them alongside mine, let them have no doubt about the references — for all of them are certain and fixed; let them place confidence in a man who is studious and painstaking in citing authors.

Section III. That, with God Operating from Necessity, There Would Be No Freedom or Contingency in Secondary Causes — Demonstrated Together with Scotus.

The arguments of Scotus are so refuted by Cajetan and Vasquez in setting them forth that they are weakened. They cut their nerves so that they seem enervated, indeed exsanguine. Therefore it is no wonder if Vasquez calls them weak, and if Cajetan does not fear the Achilles of Scotus, since he disarms him by cunning. Let us consult Scotus and hear from him his own arguments as he formulated them in his own mind. First let us weigh the one which Cajetan calls its Achilles (*in art. 13, q. 14, §. Nec sustinendus*): the secondary cause causes when moved by the primary; but the primary moves necessarily; therefore the secondary is moved necessarily, given the supposition that God operates necessarily. This argument of Scotus is invincible. I say "given the supposition," because without it one can doubt both the major and the minor, as Cajetan doubted; the right of which we shall see. Now given the supposition, neither the major nor the minor can be denied. For since God would be the primary cause, and would be infinite and necessary, he would necessarily move the secondary cause, to which he necessarily gave being and operation; therefore he would have to flow into it by a kind of natural influx and power, and move it to operate by preoccupying it necessarily, without waiting for the cooperation of the concurring partner. Nor would he operate according to a contingent and indifferent intellect and reason, in accordance with the natures and modes of causes, which he would neither care about nor await, accommodating his influx and concurrence to them. Hence he would remove all accommodation, because he would rush and impel in a necessary and blind manner. And thus he would move necessarily. The assumed major therefore stands invincible. The minor is

evident; the inference follows because the secondary cause would be moved by the primary premover without any accommodation, without moderation, without limitation of its power — which, being supreme and infinite, could not be resisted; therefore the secondary cause would be compelled and driven necessarily by the primary to operate. For how shall the secondary created, finite, subordinate, inferior cause resist the uncreated, infinite, prior, superior primary cause necessarily exercising and applying its necessary and infinite power to action? Had Cajetan and Vasquez weighed this argument correctly, they would have found it robust, valid, and truly Achillean. But they paid insufficient attention to the state in which that primary cause was posited, and they sustained the ordinary mode of operation of the primary cause. In that state the freedom and mode of the concurring primary cause would be altered; it would rush with blind impetus, abolish all distinction among causes, and violate and pervert the reasons and laws of concurrence. For what else is it to operate from the necessity of nature, if not to rush spontaneously and to care for nothing that stands in the way — to seize, grasp, and carry everything along with itself, with the order of things disturbed and perverted, driven by an innate infinite power that, with all restraints of moderation and temperance shattered, could not contain itself within the bounds of right reason? Scotus understood this, and I, following him and together with him, see it clearly. And so he truly said (*d. 8, 1, q. 5, §. secundo arguo; and §. item*): that God would then act according to the ultimate capacity of his power — that is, not freely, not moderately, not temperately, not contingently, but necessarily, vehemently, invincibly, and inflexibly, pouring forth his infinite power and causing whatever he could cause, carrying all causes with him, and in virtue of his inborn necessity in operating, suffering none to be free or contingent. The necessary and infinite primary cause would not then allow Cajetan and Vasquez freely and attentively to form those thoughts of theirs and leisurely to weigh those moments of reasoning, and more carefully to examine the foundations adduced by Scotus, and to reduce God's concurrence to a certain mode. That infinite force would seize them, overwhelm their intellect, and take away their freedom, and would not permit those slow and lengthy consultations. And let the reader not rebuke me for having been so prolix in this argument. For since Cajetan was attempting to strip the Scotist Achilles of his arms, it was necessary to clothe him with others and adorn him so that he might stand strong and resplendent in battle. This will be a diversion for you in so laborious and wearisome a forest of disputes, so that you are not wearied by it. I add: this Achilles of Scotus compelled Ferrariensis, a noble Thomist, to assent to Scotus, as Herrera notes (*in 1, disp. 4, q. 3, §. quarto est notandum*).

I add to the Achilles of Scotus his Antilochus and Meriones — that is, the minor arguments.

The first: the secondary cause, even in this present state where the primary cause operates freely and contingently with it, causes nothing except

dependently upon that primary cause, as subordinate and inferior to it, according to Aristotle (*2 Met. c. 2, Text. 5*); indeed as the same teaches (*8 physicorum c. 5, Text. 41*), and the author of the book *De Causis* in the first proposition: the prior and independent cause moves more and more efficaciously than the posterior. Therefore from its own nature the secondary cause would be far more subject and dependent upon the primary in that state of necessity, and would accordingly be determined and drawn by the primary.

The second: to remove the freedom of the will, either inadvertence or a vehement passion suffices, and it is very easy for freedom to be lost and necessity to be induced. But in that state where God operates necessarily, his influx and concurrence would disturb the mode of operation of the free cause, and would vehemently affect and agitate it intrinsically; therefore it would necessitate it to operate.

The third: God is intimately present through his essence, power, and presence to the will, preserves its being, and at the same time acts and operates with it through one and the same action. But this intimate presence of God in the will would, in that state, induce such an efficacy as to necessitate it; therefore it would not leave it free.

The fourth: when two causes — even secondary causes — concur toward the same effect, the stronger and more powerful one draws and drives the other. But in the concurrence of the necessary primary cause and the contingent secondary cause, the necessary would be stronger and more powerful, because it would be determined and infinite, while the other would be free and finite. Therefore the latter would be drawn by the necessary, determined, superior, and more powerful cause.

Finally, I argue *ad hominem* — validly, I believe, and effectively. In the opinion of St. Thomas and the Thomists, secondary causes — free and contingent indeed — are premoved by God before they operate through a physical and intimate impression upon the causes themselves, by which they are incited and predetermined. Therefore they cannot deny the principle of Scotus — that a cause does not act unless moved antecedently by God — and consequently cannot deny the argument deduced from it: that in that state, and all the more so, with God operating necessarily and with all his infinite power, the secondary causes would have to be necessarily premoved by the primary, and, having received from the primary cause operating necessarily, they would operate entirely necessarily, not freely or contingently. The assumption about the physical premotion of the secondary cause belongs to St. Thomas (*1 p. q. 105; and in 1 secundae, q. 109, a. 1; and de potentia, a. 7*), Capreolus (*in 2, d. 1, q. 2*), Ferrariensis (*contra Gent. c. 70*), and virtually everyone. And who is not acquainted with the physical predetermination of the Thomists? By what right, then, do they deny Scotus this principle when he argues against the contingency of the secondary cause in that state where God would operate from the necessity

of nature — when they themselves, in the state where God operates freely and concurs with secondary causes, maintain that physical predetermination which almost all other Schools outside the Thomistic hold to introduce necessity — rightly so or not, I do not here determine.

Section IV. The Arguments of the Contrary Opinion Are Answered, and That Opinion Is Accurately Refuted.

To the first argument, which Vasquez constructed from an enumeration of parts, the answer is easy: the reason for the necessity of operation in the secondary cause is to be taken from the side of God operating necessarily from an intrinsic principle, because given that intrinsic necessity in the primary cause, from its infinite power it would remove and impel the secondary cause to operate, with all indifference, contingency, and freedom entirely removed. And with that antecedent impression, the secondary cause would be swept along and could not resist the impeller, and would consequently follow its force and power. Nor need one have recourse to the representation of an infinitely good object such as God clearly seen, since a necessary influx from the side of the principle suffices. I add however that with God operating from the necessity of nature, all those things which are contained in his infinite power would follow: namely a clear vision of himself, the efficacy of omnipotence, and the communication of supernatural gifts — so that nothing would remain hidden, nothing retained; for where that necessity was, all things would flow forth lavishly, so that nothing would be kept closed and guarded.

The second is resolved by saying: although God would then be intelligent and willing, he would do nothing prudently, nothing moderately; rather from that mode of necessarily operating, all things would proceed in a disorderly and violent manner, without weight, without order, without measure — for given that hypothesis of God acting from the necessity of nature, there would be no prudence, no consultation, no moderation.

The third is dissolved by admitting that there would be no providence, while denying that there would be contingency — namely freedom and indifference in the free secondary causes. Hence we distinguish chance and fortune from rational freedom and contingency. The latter we deny would exist; the former we concede — for chance and fortune stand alongside confusion and disorder in things and in causes, while freedom does not, since it arises from prudence, consideration, and order, which would be entirely destroyed by that intrinsic necessity of operation. Therefore there would be room for chance, rashness, and fortune, but not for reason and freedom.

The argument of Cajetan is disposed of by saying that the premoting primary cause does not remove the concurrence of the secondary — which Cajetan, who together with the Thomistic School admits physical predetermination, is obliged to maintain — but that it destroys freedom and contingency of

operation in the secondary cause if it seizes it necessarily and with a vehement impulse, just as many theologians hold that the Thomistic predetermination destroys freedom. Hence the solution is clear: granted that physical predetermination in the opinion of these theologians destroys freedom, one can still infer that the secondary cause can be moved by the primary in such a way that its operation is not removed but becomes necessary. For it is one thing not to concur, another to concur necessarily. Those secondary causes, premoved and predetermined by God, would concur with God the premover and predeterminer, but not freely — necessarily. And if Cajetan says he denies this, because he is a Thomist and reconciles freedom with it in the divided sense, I ask him to admit that in that state of necessary operation from the side of the primary cause, there would be a greater force of impression that would destroy freedom. Once this is admitted, he will find that the operation of the secondary cause can stand alongside the premoting primary cause with necessity through the most vehement impression of the premover. Hence it appears false what Cajetan assumes: that a cause necessarily moved by a necessary primary cause can be moved contingently — for this is incompatible when the primary cause would be of infinite power, would observe no limit or order, would operate as much as it could, with an insuperable and inescapable power impressed upon causes which could not modify and moderate the incumbent. And thus necessary operation in the secondary cause would follow. Nor is it in any way credible that the necessary primary cause, which could not moderate or contain itself, would otherwise consult, deliberate, and operate freely — so that here would be true that saying: power without counsel collapses by its own weight.

Ferrariensis therefore rightly approves this part of Scotus's teaching (*art. 1, contra gent. c. 67*), which Herrera cites (*d. 4, q. 3, §. Tertio; and §. 4, notandum*). He rightly says that Scotus rightly said that the philosophers tacitly conceded two contradictories by saying that some things come about contingently and that the primary cause causes necessarily. I confidently oppose this to Cajetan, who is roughly his contemporary.

But since Cajetan was pleased to quarrel with Scotus on that question (*q. 14, a. 13*), let us quarrel a little with Cajetan on (*q. 105, a. 1 and 4*). And so that he fears us, let us use the words of St. Thomas himself, which tell against him and in favor of Scotus. Therefore the Holy Doctor, raising the question in that first article — whether God can immediately move matter to form — proposes the second argument of the negative side, namely that the divine power, being the universal cause of all things, cannot produce any particular form; and responds that this proceeds if God were to act from the necessity of nature; but because he acts through will and intellect, which knows the proper reasons of all forms and not only the universal ones, it follows that he can imprint this or that form determinately upon matter. St. Thomas presupposes that if God were to act from the necessity of nature, he would not act through will and intellect, would

not know the proper reasons of forms and things, and would accordingly operate in a blind and disordered way — which is what Scotus holds. Therefore St. Thomas agrees with him, and it is Cajetan who disagrees with St. Thomas. Let him say what is to be expected from a cause operating necessarily without deliberation, without counsel, without discernment, except that all things would be confounded and perverted.

Furthermore, since Cajetan disapproved of that antecedent motion of the primary cause upon the secondary which Scotus posited, let us consult St. Thomas on this in (*a. 4*) of the same question (*105*), and we shall find Cajetan there agreeing with Scotus. St. Thomas, in the title: "Whether God can move the created will?" — and after teaching that he moves it as an object — says in the body: "Similarly the power of willing is caused by God alone. But to will is nothing other than a certain inclination toward the object of the will. But to incline toward universal good belongs to the first mover." And lest one think this is only in an objective sense, he says: "It is proper to God to move the will, but most of all in the second manner, by inclining it inwardly." And more expressly in reply to the first: "God in moving the will does not compel it, because he gives it its proper inclination." And in reply to the second: "To be moved voluntarily is to be moved from oneself, that is, from an intrinsic principle; but that intrinsic principle can be from another extrinsic principle, and so being moved from oneself is not incompatible with being moved by another." He said this more clearly than Scotus. Let Cajetan turn his argument against St. Thomas. Let us now hear Cajetan. He was silent in his comment on (*a. 1*), but speaks on this (*a. 4*): "To move from within is communicated to no one. For God alone can enter into the free will, since he alone made and preserves it." And on (*article 5*) of the same question he proves what St. Thomas teaches: "God operates in every operating thing in such a way that the things themselves have their own proper operations." Therefore the argument made above by Cajetan against Scotus — from the motion of the primary cause upon the secondary, either it moves so that the secondary cause operates nothing (which counts for nothing in the opinion of Cajetan, for the secondary cause can and must operate when pre-moved by the primary, and operation stands together with pre-motion) — collapses. What then does Cajetan contend against Scotus on (*q. 14*), if on (*q. 105*) he agrees with him? Ferrariensis dealt better with Scotus (*in that passage, 1 contra gent. c. 67*), understanding St. Thomas as we here explain him, so that both St. Thomas and Scotus appear to agree in this question — as a competent Scotist, Herrera the Spaniard, had noted before me (*d. 4, q. 3, §. quarto est notandum*). The conclusion, therefore, with Scotus, must be: that all the freedom and contingency of creatures arises from the fact that God is free and powerful to will and operate contingently, and that in him the root and source of all the freedom and contingency participated by creatures has been established. Hence if he were to operate from the necessity of nature, no freedom or contingency would exist in creatures, but all things would flow and rush necessarily.

Judgment

I deliberately suspended judgment on these three preceding questions and reserved it for this point, because they were interconnected and cohesive and it was not fitting to break their thread. Therefore there will be one judgment for the three.

And indeed in the first matter — the presence of things in eternity — Scotus judges most aptly that this is neither true nor necessary for certain and infallible knowledge of contingent things. This is the common view of the Schools apart from the Thomistic, and the wonderful theologian Antonius Perez rejects coexistence (*d. 3, §. 1*), saying it belongs to the Thomists (*and d. 6, a. 13, c. 6*), while Herrera attributes it to St. Thomas (*d. 15, q. 7*). As for the first, it is clear because, in the opinion of Scotus, the objective presence in the divine decrees suffices — or in the things themselves, given a decree determining their future occurrence. Indeed, not even that positing of things as coexisting with God in eternity is reasonable. For it can hardly be understood how an eternal thing should have in its produced actual being an existence prior to the time in which it must exist as a creature. If therefore it is produced in time, how is it produced in eternity? Nor indeed can it exist without being produced. Nor does it avail to say that this pertains to God's perfection, that since he is eternal he must contain all times and whatever will successively exist in them in his eternity. The reply is that this is true, but it suffices for this that when things are present and created in time, he comprehend them in his eternity and coexist with all of them — so that nothing produced in its own time fails to exist within eternity and to be contained in it. Just as God is immense, and yet from this it does not follow that he simultaneously has creatures present with him in place before they are produced; it suffices if, when they come to exist, they are in place and correspond to his immensity, which by virtue of its infinity contains all things located, when they are, but does not anticipate things to be located before they are — which is altogether impossible. As for the knowledge of God, this does not need that actual presence for knowledge of things, since he knows all things within himself in his essence and decrees, and as he is present in all things and intimately assists them — containing and encompassing all things, so that nothing exists outside him, is moved or perceived — he can know nothing outside himself. For what are said by us to be produced outside God and to be actually existing are not indeed within the divine essence as they are in God as ideas and possibles; but they are not outside God as if torn away from God and as if they existed and operated by themselves and without him. He is present in all things, governs, animates, and rules all things. Therefore whatever things exist in whatever state, God knows not as outside himself, but either within himself when they have eminent being prior to actual being, or when they have actual being, in themselves — that is, intimately and immediately — by preserving, cooperating, promoting, and drawing back to himself all things which he knows. Nor does he borrow from creatures the principles of knowing,

lest his intellect be degraded. And just as he gives them being, so he bestows upon them the quality of being known. Nor should you say that that actual presence in eternity is necessary for the intuitive knowledge of God, who cannot know them intuitively in objective being — because that actual presence is not necessary to God for knowing creatures intuitively, since he abounds with light in his essence, in which he knows them better and more clearly than in themselves. Just as the sun illuminates other things and is for them the reason of their being seen — nor would it receive light for seeing from them if it could see with eyes — so God, when he beholds created things, brings light to them so that they may be seen by them in him, and does not receive light from them in order to see. This is what Scotus himself taught, who, while requiring the actual presence of things absolutely for created intuitive knowledge — so that the creature can know nothing intuitively unless that thing actually exists and is present to it — nevertheless wills that God be free from this law and does not require that actual presence for his intuitive knowledge, on account of the infinite abundance of his own light. As he teaches (*in 1, d. 10, in fine*), disputing the knowledge of the Holy Spirit by the Father and Son: "Just as the Trinity," he says, "knew the creature intuitively even before it was produced, because its own essence, which it beholds, is the most perfect reason for knowing all other things, and consequently is the reason for knowing intuitively whatever is knowable, even if none existed in itself." And (*d. 39, §. Auctoritates omnes, n. 35, final*): "All the authorities which seem to say that all things are present to eternity are to be understood of presence in the character of the knowable — and not only of the knowable as if in abstractive cognition, just as a non-existing rose is present to my intellect through a species; but in true intuitive cognition: because God does not know things that have been made differently from things to be made, and so perfectly are things to be made known presentially by the divine intellect as things already made." And therefore from this quarter too there is no lack of a reason for knowing future things most perfectly in an objective manner in eternity, since in that precise actual presence God knows the future intuitively. I do not deny that God knows creatures as they are present in themselves, but I deny that he borrows or begs from them the principles of knowing.

But what is especially to be noted: the Thomists, who say it is absolutely necessary for certain and infallible knowledge of future things that they coexist in eternity, are less consistent with themselves when they say that future things are known certainly and infallibly in the divine decrees. For if they require actual presence from necessity, how do they assert that future things are known in decrees? From this it follows that actual presence is not altogether necessary. Moreover, how does that eternal coexistence stand with the futurity of the same things? For prior to the eternal presence of things, there can be no futurity; they are eternal and exist in eternity; they are therefore present, not future — since what is future does not yet exist, and there it is actually present, which excludes

being future. Therefore God does not know in eternity in any way future things, since he beholds present things. But if he beholds them as future and in that state knows them infallibly and certainly, actual presence of things in eternity is not necessary for certain and infallible knowledge.

Now the mode of knowing future things themselves through the divine decree, as introduced by Scotus, is most fitting, because since the free decree of God is the cause of a future thing's existing, it is likewise for that same thing the cause of its being known — so that from that from which the reason for existing contingently is taken, the reason for knowing infallibly is also taken. Hence prior to the decree they are neutral — that is, indeterminate — and of no certain and determinate truth, as Herrera demonstrates among others (*d. 15, q. 8, concl. 1 and 2*). The possible thing is surely drawn from the state of possibility by the free decree and placed in the state of the future; and the decree becomes the root of contingency in things, which is also free and contingent in God, and communicates to things its own condition — that is, it is free, capable of being and not being, for that decree has this condition and is not necessary in God, because it can not-be. Although indeed it is immutable when it exists, this it holds through the necessity of the consequent. This freedom and contingency is participated by free and contingent things, which can be and not be and exist contingently. But once they exist and are, they become infallible and immutable, like the decree, by the same necessity of the consequent — which does not remove contingency or take away freedom. The antecedent decree cannot harm this, since that decree is free and contingent absolutely, and bestows upon things a similar contingent and free being — namely that they exist contingently, just as the decree exists contingently. Hence it does not change or pervert the natures of things in decreeing them contingently and freely; for just as the decree is free and contingent in itself, so freely and contingently it decrees that creatures exist and subsist freely and contingently, with no necessity introduced. The reason is: because that which proceeds freely from a free thing is free and not necessary; just as an act of will produced freely by the will operating freely is free because it proceeds freely from a free principle, so likewise a creature decreed freely through a free decree exists freely and contingently; and if by its nature it is free and contingent, and operates freely and contingently, its own natural mode of operating is not taken from it by virtue of the decree positing it, since that decree is both free and posited freely and contingently — because it communicates what it is itself to the decreed thing, leaving it as it is — free and contingent, as the decree itself is free and contingent.

I do not deny that God through his free will can posit a necessary effect; for he can necessitate the will if he wishes. But then he would posit something that introduces necessity and is neither a contingent nor a free principle — such as, for example, some physically predetermining quality antecedently compelling and driving the will necessarily: the greater and more vehement Thomistic one.

For then the will, free and contingent in itself, would be necessitated through a mediated and necessary impression, and its mode of operating would change from contingent to necessary. Hence Scotus keenly saw that if God operated from the necessity of nature, nothing would be contingently future, because from the infinite necessary intrinsic primary principle and cause, all actions would have to be necessary, and consequently nothing produced would be free and contingent, since nothing could be in the effect that was not in the cause — especially with that cause exerting all its power, which would be infinite, against which nothing could stand, nothing resist. And accordingly everything would then be necessary, like the principle, cause, and power from which they would proceed. On the contrary, proceeding from a free cause and principle which allows things to operate according to their own nature and condition, accommodating itself and applying concurrence proportionately and temperately according to the demands of those things — Scotus knew excellently that the decree, retaining its own freedom and contingency, communicated freedom and contingency to effects — freely and contingently — taking nothing away from, nor detracting anything from, their contingency and freedom. Hence the antecedence of the decree imposes no necessity upon contingent things, since they were decreed contingently and were permitted to exist and operate contingently, with their condition not altered but their free and contingent nature preserved. And so the contingency of decreed things stands alongside the infallibility and immutability of the decree, and freedom is joined with their infallibility.

Therefore Scotus rightly did not fear to admit antecedent decrees, because he understood that they in no way harm the freedom and contingency of things. He further saw that concomitant decrees, introduced out of fear of harming freedom, cannot stand with truth. For against these a valid argument presses, which is as follows. Those concomitant decrees either operate something regarding the future thing which they accompany, or they do not. If they operate nothing, then the future contingent thing contributes some being beyond the decree that accompanies it; and if it accompanies it, it already exists — for otherwise it could not be accompanying — therefore independently of the decree, therefore it already exists of itself apart from the decree. Again, if it operates, it operates before it accompanies; or it operates independently of the accompanying decree, therefore it operates antecedently, therefore it does not stand in a concomitant relation but in an antecedent one relative to the decree. The adversaries will respond, however, that both concur simultaneously — both the decree and the future thing. But this response does not hold for two reasons. The first is that the decree on one side is contingent, and on the other side the future thing is contingent, and each is an indifferent principle. From where, then, will determination come? Not from the decree, which does not determine; not from the thing, which does not determine; therefore it will never be future. In the conjunction and concomitance of two indifferent things, nothing new

accrues that would be a principle of determining. For what each lacks individually, the combination cannot supply. This is the first reason. The second: because if they concur concomitantly, they already exist when they concur, and therefore the future thing is antecedent to the concomitant decree and receives nothing of futurity from it. This is confirmed because in that concomitance there is some reason for determining something; therefore if there is anything, and it does not come from the decree, it comes from the creature; therefore the creature does something without God. This confirmation we shall press below in treating of conditional knowledge and predestination. However this concomitance is taken, it always follows that the future is not totally from the decree and incipiently has being from itself — which is altogether intolerable, and far more so in the School of Scotus, where no contribution from the creature is tolerated, because — as Scotus says — God would be degraded.

In confirmation of his teaching on the contingency of things and the freedom of operations, together with the whole of our reasoning, I wish to produce a most weighty author of my nation, the teacher of Father Suarez and of the same Society with him. He is Henricus Henricius, who in his book *De fine hominis*, c. 5, says: "The concordant opinion of theologians rightly teaches that God has an efficacious predetermination of good acts proceeding from providence established from eternity, in which and through which as through a reason, he certainly knows all things." And in (c. 6) he proposes and solves the most potent argument of the contrary opinion in these words: "Some object: if there is an efficacious presupposition from which the effect infallibly follows, and this is already posited in act, nor was it ever in my freedom that the effect should or should not happen — predefined antecedently by God's will and to be executed through efficacious preventing grace — how can the effect now remain in the freedom of our will?" To whom he replies first that the antecedent is the cause of the thing — not just any cause — but of the thing together with its free mode; and thus it entails a free effect: otherwise God would not attain the mode which his providence and sweet motion intends, namely that the effect in its exercise come about freely through the proximate cause.

Now it is so well established that this is the opinion of Scotus, that besides others the Salmanticensian Fathers cite him for it (*tract. 3, de scientia Dei, disp. 10, dub. 8, §. 1*), where they say: "Among those who are outside the Dominican Family, Scotus teaches it in (*1, d. 39, from q. 1 to q. 5, and especially in the §. Viso de contingentia rerum*), where he teaches that propositions about future contingents are not determinately true prior to the act of the divine will, but as it were neutral; but the divine will choosing one part makes it determinately true, and from that point they are certainly known by God. This does not apply to necessary propositions, which because they are true in that first instant prior to the determination of the divine will — since their truth does not depend on the divine will — are therefore known by God in that first instant." And Scotus adds:

"But in that first instant, contingent propositions are true, because there is nothing at that point by which they have determinate truth. But once the determination of the divine will is posited, they are now true, namely for that second instant. And this same thing will be the reason for the divine intellect to understand those things which are now true in the second instant." And therefore this same opinion must be maintained, as in fact all true disciples of Scotus maintain it — such as Bassolis here, and Mayron, Andreas of Novum Castrum, Antonius Andreas, Lychetus, Orbellis, Nicolaus, Aquila, Rubionis, Tataretus, Rada (*contr. 30, a. 3, n. 6*), Poznan.

Therefore John of St. Thomas, a distinguished Thomist (*q. 19, de volunt. Dei, d. 5, a. 4, n. 17*), rightly says that Scotus in this matter agrees with his School and with St. Thomas. Finally I note that Mastrius appears to have dissented from himself in the matter of predestination. For in (*d. 5, q. 2, n. 228*), maintaining his own opinion — which is Scotus's on predestination prior to the foreknowledge of merits — and posing to himself the argument drawn from the injury to freedom, he responded in such a way that, having attacked other solutions, he says with Augustine: "The predefinitions of free acts are to be reduced to the infinite power of the divine will in the character of a free power and the first free being, by reason of which it has more in its power the wills of men than they themselves have their own." That is Augustine's opinion. And he adds: "The infinite power therefore of the divine will in the character of the first free being is the precise reason why, prior to any foreknowledge — whether absolute or conditional — of a free act to be freely performed by my will, it can from eternity determine whatever it is going to will in time." And below: "It can efficaciously intend some end and predefine it to be executed even through the intervention of a free cause, prior to foreknowledge at least of the absolute free use of it." Behold an antecedent and efficacious decree of God with respect to a free act of the human will, with its freedom and contingency unimpaired — the two things which Mastrius had denied above. And he refers himself to Augustine, by which he manifestly shows that he follows the antecedence and efficacy of the intention or divine decree. For Augustine in this manner (*lib. de Correptione et Gratia, c. 14*) says: "God has the most omnipotent power of inclining the hearts of men whichever way he pleases." And giving the reason why he can do this without violence and without injuring freedom, he says: "Because he has more in his power the wills of men than they themselves have their own." This is the antecedent and efficacious will of God. Mastrius adds: "Just as therefore we act freely whatever we do, because we have our wills in our power, so by the same reasoning God will be able to predefine from eternity what we are going to will in time." Mastrius has at last returned to Scotus, and preferred to dissent from himself rather than from Scotus. Thanks are owed to Augustine for this, by whose authority he was moved to transfer himself to Scotus — from whom he had departed — lest he appear to depart from Augustine. This is enough on this matter. For later we shall argue again with

Mastrius on the disputation about conditional knowledge. He is an excellent Scotist; I wish to bring him back to Scotus, and to draw him away from the positions of Faber, who are not competent on predestination.

Collation X. Difference III. On Divine Foreknowledge.

Section I. The Ground of the Controversy Is Opened.

It was necessary to set forth this difference here, in which there was no disagreement with St. Thomas, so that the following teaching on predestination, which involves foreknowledge, might become clearer. And because Scotus adheres to Augustine, and Augustine treated this mystery briefly while the latter treats it most copiously and accurately, I thought I would be doing something worthwhile if I employed Augustine in place of Scotus — being certain that if he were alive, he would thank me for it. And I do not doubt that the School of my Scotists will gladly embrace the teaching of Augustine, which I have drawn from his own pure and uncorrupted sources, since it is especially to be adapted to the positions of Scotus — so that what he wrote and held, I show to be in conformity with Augustine; and what he did not write or expressly state, I shall take from Augustine and present it to show that Augustine, were he to write, would hold it no differently. And so that I may make the things I have said credible, I shall adduce distinguished interpreters and commentators on Scotus who will support my opinion, so that it will appear that in expounding Augustine, I seem to be commenting on Scotus.

First on the foreknowledge of possibles and futures, which is both familiar and treated by Scotus. Then on conditional knowledge, which is less — just as it is less expressly stated by Scotus and the other ancient Scholastics. Finally on the reasoning and mode of predestining in the way of Augustine, which is most certain and established, and which Scotus nearly entered, I shall treat accurately.

I premise two things. First, that the Master of the Sentences in these distinctions relating to predestination used only the sentences of one Paul and one Augustine, by whose authority he wished this matter to be entirely settled — citing Fulgentius only once from among others, as the genuine disciple of Augustine and indeed the Augustine of his own time. Second, that the teaching of Augustine on predestination and grace has been approved by the Church, by twelve Roman Pontiffs, and by common consent — as I showed in my *Concentus Euchologicus* recently published at Venice, where I enumerated them with their testimonies cited. Hence Father Vasquez speaks excellently of him (*in 1 p. D. Thomae, disp. 89, c. 2*): "Augustine," he says, "as I have said, in the matter of grace and predestination shines among the other Fathers of the Church as the sun shines among lesser stars." And Suarez (*1 tome, de gratia, Prologomeno 6*) says: "Prosper says that Augustine wrote apostolically — either because he drew his teaching on grace principally from the Apostle Paul, or because he wrote so truly and faithfully about grace that the Apostolic See made

the teaching of Augustine on those matters pertaining to dogma its own and approved it." Hence the Society of Jesus established by public decree that in its schools the teaching of St. Augustine on predestination and reprobation should be transmitted. I placed that decree in the relevant tome of the *Concentus Euchologicus*, p. 450.

Section II. The Foreknowledge of God According to the Mind of Augustine Is Set Forth — That Which Is Called the Foreknowledge of Possibles, or Necessary Foreknowledge.

The opinion of Augustine on predestination is such that either it includes foreknowledge, or certainly it relies so closely upon foreknowledge — both as it is intended and as it is exercised — that unless an exact and careful prior cognition of the same foreknowledge precedes, predestination cannot be understood. Hence it is necessary to transmit the teaching of Augustine on this matter separately, so that the entire question may be more easily resolved. Yet in transmitting it, one must attend not so much to the nature of divine foreknowledge in itself as to an understanding of it that is known and differentiated for us, so that it may be adapted and fitted to our intelligence and may receive the different concepts and states by which it is customarily divided, distinguished, and differentiated. But this is nothing other than to pour back into divine knowledge the differences of objects, which are certainly diverse, and to attribute to knowledge — which is one and most simple — the character of diversity which is in the objects, as Augustine notes (*lib. 1, ad Simplicianum*). And of divine knowledge itself he said (*1 retract., c. 5*) in this sense: "God has knowledge of all things, in which there is also foreknowledge of future things." This knowledge is twofold: the necessary knowledge of possibles, which is called knowledge of simple intelligence, and the free knowledge of futures, which is called knowledge of vision. Augustine proposed both in (*lib. 6, de Genesi ad litteram, c. 16 and 17*), where he says: "Hidden is that reason by which this can be." And afterwards: "But if it is not in the world but in God, and they are truly future — for many things are future according to lower causes, but if they are truly so and are truly future in the foreknowledge of God." First he posited the reason why this can be, and then the reason why the thing is future. First, therefore, that this knowledge of necessities and of possibles — which is the cause of things — is in God, is transmitted by Augustine (*lib. 5, de Trin., c. 13*), where he perspicuously says that God knows all spiritual and bodily creatures universally, not because they exist but in order that they may exist. This same doctrine he taught (*lib. 3, Academicarum quaestionum, c. 17*), proving the opinion of Plato on the intelligible and sensible world, which he drew from the sacred font of John the Evangelist (*c. 1*) at those words "what was made in him was life," and which Augustine comments upon in this sense — to reveal the knowledge of possibles that is the cause of things, so that the intelligible world was the ideal reason of divine wisdom, while the sensible world, founded in time by God, was the effect and image of divine wisdom. He also said this in passing (*lib. 1, de ordine, c. 11*;

and lib. 2, c. 18 and 19), where he says: "In that intelligible world, every part, insofar as it is a whole, is wholly beautiful and perfect. For the reason of the world, as I said above, is immortal — that is, in the mind of God." Retracting this passage (*lib. 1, retract., c. 3*), he transmitted the same teaching in these words: "Nor did Plato err in this, that he spoke of an intelligible world — if we are willing to attend not to the term, which is not customary in ecclesiastical usage for this matter, but to the thing itself. For by the intelligible world Plato named that eternal and unchangeable reason by which God made the world; whoever denies this exists, consequently says either that God made what he made irrationally, or that when he was making it or before he made it, he did not know what he was making, if the reason for making it was not present to him. But if it was present, as it was, then Plato seems to have called this the intelligible world."

The author of the book *De praedestinatione et gratia*, found among Augustine's works, appears to have borrowed this passage, saying (*c. 5*): "The world, although according to the time when it was made it had a beginning, could have had no beginning in that divine light of foreknowledge in which it was to be made. And however many men have been born from Adam down to the present day, or after our time will be propagated by the succession of generation and will be born, are already born in God and have passed through the whole course of their life's time, remaining nevertheless in the light of that divine regard." And shortly after: "Whatever things at all exist, which are agitated by the motions of times — from that beginning in which the Word was, and the Word was with God, and God was the Word — they exist even to the end of all ages." Expressed in these passages is the doctrine of the divine ideas, of which we spoke above with the angelic morning and evening knowledge, which Augustine devised by his divine genius. For the morning knowledge is nothing other than that cognition which the angels had of things created by God, gazing at the divine ideas, in which was the exemplary reason of all things to be created. The Theological Schools received and celebrated this division of knowledge from Augustine, among which is ours, from the teaching of Master Scotus (*in 2, d. 3, q. 9*) — whether it is to be distinguished from the beatific vision or not, which we do not now dispute. That this knowledge of possibles is necessary is clear, because it concerns possibles which are necessarily possible, abstracting from futurity, since there is no contradiction in their being, and they are contained in the divine omnipotence. Therefore that knowledge precedes all free decrees of God, and the will itself insofar as it is free to create, so as to be as it were its rule and model. Hence necessity arises from two sources: one from the side of the perfection of divine knowledge, to which nothing can or should be unknown; the other from the side of the free will for creating, which must necessarily have set before it by that knowledge what and how it must act, so that it may rationally will and be able to operate. Augustine uses both sources as arguments in that passage cited above (*lib. 1, retract., c. 3*) on the intelligible world. The first,

from the perfection of knowledge, he expressed in those words: "Whoever denies this exists, consequently says that God did not know what he was making." The second, when he says: "Consequently God made what he made irrationally." And he concludes that both follow "if the reason for making was not present to God." And thereby he shows it to be altogether necessary, since that knowledge is itself the reason for understanding and making.

Whether this knowledge of possibles is speculative or practical? According to Augustine and Scotus, it has the character of practical knowledge; but with a due distinction made — for it does not attain possible things precisely by knowing them as certain essences expressed in the divine essence, but insofar as they are possible and makeable; and in this state it represents them to omnipotence or to the will, in which lies the reason for divine practice. Hence it always implies the character of the cause of things. For although not all are to be made, all are makeable; and as such they are represented before any decree of the free will, which is also the teaching of Scotus above (*d. 35 and 39*). Hence Augustine (*lib. 3, Academ. quaest., c. 17*): "Plato held there are two worlds — one true, the other verisimilar and made after the image of the former. The former he called the intelligible world, the latter the sensible, toward which the former was directed by ordering, and to which the latter referred." Again (*lib. 13, Confess., c. 38*): "We therefore see these things which you have made, because they are; but you see them because they are. We see them without because they are, and within because they are good; but you see them there made where you saw them to be made." Perspicuously (*lib. 11, de civit. Dei, c. 10*): "There is one wisdom in which are the immense and infinite treasures of intelligible things, in which are all the invisible and unchangeable reasons of things — even visible and unchangeable things — which were made through it, since God made nothing unknowingly; which cannot rightly be said even of any human craftsman. Moreover, if he made all things knowingly, he made those things which were not, unless they could be known." He explains this more carefully (*in Ioannem, c. 1, tractatu 1*), at that passage "what was made in him was life," where he calls the knowledge of practical possibles, which he says is in the Divine Word, the wisdom of God. "What is not made in him? For he himself is the wisdom of God, and in the Psalm it says: 'You made all things in wisdom.' If therefore Christ is the wisdom of God, and the Psalm says: 'You made all things in wisdom' — just as all things were made through him, so in him they are made." And shortly after: "If all things are made in him, all things are true. But in wisdom itself there is spiritually a certain reason by which the earth was made, which is life." He adds that the wisdom of God, through which all things were made, contains all things according to art before it makes all things; hence what is made through that art does not immediately become life, but whatever was made — life is in him. He clarifies with the example of the ark: "The ark in the work is not life. The ark in the art is life, because the soul of the craftsman lives, where all these things are before they are brought forth." And afterward (*tract. 3*): "What was made in him

was life; and before it came to be, life was there. What was made is not life; but in the art, that is, in the wisdom of God, before it was made, it was life." Thus Augustine on the necessary knowledge which is the ideal knowledge of possibles, which he treats specifically on ideas (*lib. 83, quaest., q. 46*), where he introduces the ideas of Plato, proves them when correctly understood, calls them reasons, and says: "For the ideas are certain principal forms, or stable and unchangeable reasons of things, which are themselves not formed, and therefore eternal and always remaining in the same mode, which are contained in the divine intelligence." And shortly: "All things were created according to reason; not by the same reason is a man created and a horse. Therefore individual things are created by their own proper reasons. But where are we to think these reasons exist, except in the very mind of the Creator? For he was not contemplating anything outside himself as his own model. Through participation in these, whatever exists in whatever way exists." Then: "They are true because they are eternal; they remain immutable." And shortly before he had said: "So great a power is established in them that no one can be wise unless he understands them." Scotus reproduced all this wonderful harmony of Augustine in (*d. 35, q. un., §. ad ista*), where he sets down the definition of idea, and the idea in the divine mind as unchangeable, which is the reason of things to be made. He adds the example of the ark and the term "eternal." He cites the ideas of Plato as posited by him in the mind of God. He proves his intelligible world and makes a summary of Augustinian teaching.

Section III. On the Knowledge of Futures, or Free Knowledge.

So much for the necessary knowledge of possibles, which is the cause of things. Now let us come to free knowledge, which is of vision and of future things. Of this there is frequent mention in Augustine, and indeed in (*lib. 1, retract., c. 5*): "God has knowledge of all things, in which there is also the foreknowledge of future things." And in (*lib. 1, ad Simplicianum, q. 2*): "What is foreknowledge, if not knowledge of future things?" By this he signified the difference of this free knowledge from the first — the necessary knowledge of possibles — adding also, lest anyone think that this free knowledge was lacking to God, that it belonged to him. He transmits it openly (*lib. 3, de libero arbitrio*), disputing with Evodius, who doubted the harmony of the foreknowledge of future things with freedom. "It moves me unspeakably," Evodius says, "how it can be both that God foreknows all future things and that we sin by no necessity. For whoever says that anything can turn out differently from how God foreknew it, endeavors with the most insane impiety to destroy the foreknowledge of God." To which Augustine responds by showing that freedom of will stands alongside the foreknowledge of God. And so in (*c. 3*) he concludes: "Since he foreknows our will, he foreknows the will that will be. Willingness therefore will exist, because he foreknows willingness. And will cannot be will if it is not in our power. Therefore he foreknows the power too. Therefore through his foreknowledge my power is not taken from me. The power will therefore be more certain to

me, because he whose providence does not fail has foreknown that it will be present to me." By the same reasoning he defends and explains this foreknowledge (*lib. 5, de Civit., c. 9*), against Cicero who denied the foreknowledge and prediction of future things. "For to confess that God exists and to deny that he foreknows future things is manifestly insane." And below: "We are not afraid that therefore we do not do by will what we do by will, because he whose foreknowledge cannot be deceived foreknew that we would do it — which is what Cicero feared, so as to attack foreknowledge." He adds: "Cicero holds that both cannot stand together; but if one is confirmed, the other is destroyed. If we choose the foreknowledge of future things, free will is destroyed; if we choose free will, the foreknowledge of future things is destroyed. And so from these two he chooses free will. And to confirm this he denies the foreknowledge of future things; and so, wishing to make men free, he makes them sacrilegious. The religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and confirms both by the faith of piety." And below: "He who foreknew the causes of things certainly could not have been ignorant of our wills among those causes, since he foreknew them to be the causes of our works." And in (*c. 10*) he concludes: "Nor does a man sin because God foreknew that he would sin; nay it is not doubted that he himself sins when he sins, because God, whose foreknowledge cannot fail, foreknew that he would sin. One who does not wish to sin certainly does not sin; but if he does not wish to sin, God foreknew this too." He makes mention of the same harmony (*lib. 14, de Civit., c. 27*), speaking of the foreknowledge of the fall of man and the angels. Furthermore, in the books *De praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *De Dono perseverantiae* the truth of divine foreknowledge is established, which the Massilian adversaries themselves conceded, as is clear from the letters of Prosper and Hilary — but with this difference: that these founded foreknowledge upon the free acts of men operating according to their own free will, not from the decree of God thus willing, so that at least a natural beginning in the human will would precede. As those words of St. Prosper contain at the beginning: "That God foreknew before the foundation of the world those who would believe, and those who would remain in that faith which is subsequently to be aided by the grace of God, and predestined them to his kingdom — those whom he freely called, foreseeing that they would be worthy of election and would depart from this life with a good end." Augustine, however, located it in the divine will's antecedent decree relative to the free wills of men, holding that this decree both provides certainty and preserves freedom. He transmits this teaching from (*c. 9 to c. 19*), and in *De bono perseverantiae*, *c. 22*; hence he says there: "God fulfilled all things which he predestined." He expounds and makes clear this opinion resting upon the foreknowledge of futures grounded in his own decree, in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, at the passages I cited above. I cull a few. "By predestination God foreknew those things which he himself was going to do. Hence it is said: 'He made the things that are to be.' But he can foreknow even those things which he himself does not do, such as all sins." And shortly after, having adduced the

testimony of Paul to the Romans (4): "When therefore God promised Abraham in his seed the faith of the Gentiles, saying: 'I have made you the father of many nations' — whence the Apostle says: 'Therefore it is of faith, so that the promise may be firm for all the seed, not from the power of our will, but from his predestination.'" And he adds: "Not thus did Abraham believe God, but he believed, giving glory to God: because what he promised, he is powerful to do — he did not say to predict, he did not say to foreknow; for he can also predict and foreknow the deeds of others; but he said: he is powerful — and therefore the deeds are not another's, but his own." He asserts foreknowledge proceeding from the decree of the predestining God. All the adversaries with Augustine admitted foreknowledge, but they grounded it upon human industry, while he grounded it upon the divine will — which, however, would stand perfectly with freedom. He rejects another kind of foreknowledge grounded in the powers of nature, not in the virtue of grace, as he says perspicuously in the same book (*De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, c. 17): "He chose them out of the world before the foundation of the world. This is the unchangeable truth of predestination and grace. He chose them in him. They were chosen before the foundation of the world in that predestination in which God predestined his own future works. He chose those who would believe, but in such a way as, by choosing them, to make them so — lest, contrary to the sentence of truth, they be found to have first chosen Christ, to whom Christ says: 'It was not you who chose me.'" He admits foreknowledge of future things, but from grace, not from natural merits. The same holds in (*lib. de correptione et gratia*, c. 7), where he distinguishes these two foreknowledges and adds that which concerns the reprobate: "He so knew them that he foreknew they would fall." And on the same matter (*lib. 6, contra Donatistas*, c. 1): "According to the foreknowledge of God, as many sheep wander within, so many wolves lurk without." He pursues the same argument (*lib. de unitate Ecclesiae*, c. 9), concluding with these words: "Therefore there was certain prediction of these things, because God foresees even the future wills." The same teaching appears (*lib. 2, contra duas Epist. Pelagian.*, c. 7), and (*lib. de anima et eius origine ad Renatum*, 1, c. 12, at the end), and (*lib. 3, de eadem re, ad Vincentium Victorem*, c. 10), and most clearly and manifestly in those places where he treats the foreknowledge of sins — showing that this is not the cause of sin and teaching that sins will not be sins because God foreknows them, but that he therefore knows them because they are future. Such are (*lib. 3, de libero Arbitrio*, from c. 1 to 8; *lib. 5, de Civit.*, c. 9 and 10; and in *Ioannem*, tract. 53), where he says: "We answer that God, foreknowing future things, foretold through the Prophet the unbelief of the Jews — yet foretold it, not caused it. His foreknowledge cannot fail; they sin, those whom God foreknew would sin. The Jews committed sins, which he who has no pleasure in sin did not compel them to commit, but he who knows nothing hidden predicted them as about to be committed."

In (*lib. 1, ad Simplicianum*, q. 2) Augustine sets forth many things on both kinds of foreknowledge, from which the author of the book *De praedestinatione et gratia* (c.

6 and 15) drew. And in the *Enchiridion* there are illustrious testimonies of this truth. I draw one from (c. 4), speaking of Adam: "Since he foreknew that Adam would make bad use of free will, that is, would sin, he prepared his own will for this rather, to do good from the evil doer." In (*lib. de Genesi ad litt.*, 6, c. 17) he openly posits foreknowledge in these words: "Those things are truly future which he foreknew. For according to lower causes they are future; but if they are truly so in the foreknowledge of God, then they are future: if however they are otherwise there, then they are rather future as they are there, where he who foreknows cannot be deceived." And although Augustine there says that what was foreknown was necessarily future, he understands the necessity of the consequent, as we stated above with Scotus (*d.* 39), and as Augustine himself explained (*lib. 3, de libero arbitrio, to Evodius, c. 2 and 3; lib. 6, de Civit., c. 9 and 10; and lib. 14, c. 27*). I omit other passages of Augustine which it would be endless to adduce. I indicate some: *In Psal. 105, ad versic. et vidit cum tribularentur; lib. de Genesi ad litt. 11, c. 3; lib. contra duas Epist. Pelagian., c. 7; lib. 26, contra Faustum, c. 4; lib. de bono perseverantiae, c. 18.*

This manner of transmitting the knowledge of future things, as if receiving it from Augustine, Scotus expressed in (*d.* 39, *from §. viso de contingentia to the end*). Let us adduce his words (*n.* 23): "Once the determination of the divine will is posited, future contingents are now true; and this same thing will be the reason for the divine intellect to understand these things." Here appears foreknowledge resting upon the decree of Augustine. Scotus adds at the end of the paragraph: "The contingency of the known object stands: because the will willing to determine this thing, wills this contingently." He adduces the free decree of God in which the freedom of future things is grounded. And the infallibility and certainty of foreknowledge from the supposition of the decree — which necessity we just now posited from Augustine — with whom Scotus agrees entirely.

Collation X. Difference IV. On Conditional Knowledge.

Section I. The Origin of Conditional Knowledge and Middle Knowledge, Together with the Statement of the Question.

This knowledge, as treated in the Schools, called Conditional or commonly Middle, began to be celebrated from roughly one hundred and twenty years ago. It had a noble and certain native land, an illustrious family, and distinguished but disputed parents. Its native land was Portugal, its family was the Society of Jesus. Molina and Fonseca made its father uncertain. Which of them it was is disputed. Molina was more commonly held to be the one, and he boasted of that name, until Fonseca, envying him that glory which had been seized from himself and desiring it for himself as a rightful avenger, produced himself as its author. I, who lived long in that Society and received many things from the older Fathers by more curiously asking and inquiring about this matter, will make the truth known. Father Peter Fonseca, a man most skilled in

all branches of learning, from the province of Beira, the teacher of Molina, first conceived it in his mind at Coimbra — the principal academy of Portugal — and then transmitted it by word and in writing to his students at Évora, the other distinguished academy of Portugal, among whom was Molina. Molina made it his own from Fonseca, and first published it in that Concordia of his, which proved to be an apple of discord, in the year 1588 at Lisbon, the royal city of Portugal, with great expectation and applause. Thus three principal cities of Portugal, all royal, claimed this noble offspring for themselves. Favorable domestic stars shone upon it at its birth; outside stars were adverse. Scarcely born, it was immediately exposed to both fame and envy, praised and censured alike. But envy was within glory's reach. And so splendor overcame the shadows which adversaries were preparing to cast. Roused by this, Fonseca saw himself deprived of his honor, and indignant at his student — to whom he had transmitted it twenty-eight years before, that is, in the year 1560 — wished to reclaim from Molina whatever glory there was, and in his *Metaphysics*, which was an outstanding work he had prepared, he set forth the matter as it was and professed himself its author, as is clear in (*lib. 6, Metaphysicae, c. 2, q. 4*). But Fonseca sought the praise for himself too late, since Molina's book was flying through the entire Scholastic world, and he was being everywhere celebrated by the name of the inventor of middle knowledge. And indeed Molina, having as it were received an unformed cub of a bear, had by licking it into shape formed it for himself, and by nurturing and clothing and adorning it sent it out into the light — so that he seemed to exercise his right in appropriating to himself the offspring which he had received, raised, clothed, and adorned. Therefore Molina is to be pardoned for having produced himself as the author and parent of that offspring which he had found as it were exposed. And although Molina's native city was Cuenca, situated in the middle of Spain, he was sent to Portugal for the sake of his studies, applied himself to philosophy and theology there, and thereafter taught them there and published middle knowledge. Fonseca, drawn away to other cares of governing the Province — which charge unfortunately diverted him from the pursuit of studies and deprived him of that scholastic glory — though he afterward wished to recover it, could not reclaim it since it had long since been occupied by Molina, a most keen disputant and outstanding doctor who had set more store by genius than by authority. As for Portugal, where that knowledge was born, it found kind hearers and able patrons and lived there honorably and gloriously. Things went differently in Spain, where it began to be carped at and agitated by many theologians of that age who held it suspect: both because Molina boasted that it was new and invented by himself, beyond the mind of the Fathers and against the teaching of Augustine — whose authority in the Church and School was supreme and indeed prejudged — and because he said it was the sole means of reconciling the efficacy of grace with the freedom of free will, and therefore called the book in which he transmitted it the *Concordia*. Thus it was happy at home; outside it was unhappy. Nevertheless, in view of its good fortune, the

Society — which is free and independent in its thinking, teaching, and speaking, and is not accustomed to swear by the words of any master — nearly all went over to the opinion of Molina, and made his teaching in this matter its own and public, so that scarcely any writer is found among them who does not embrace middle knowledge. I say "scarcely," because I always except the illustrious theologian and distinguished author of that era, the teacher of the great Suarez, Henricus Henricius — to whom this knowledge could not be acceptable, although he was Portuguese. This judgment — for he was a man of weight — deterred not a few from approving it. He was a reader of great authority at Salamanca, very well versed in Augustine and the Fathers, and loved solid doctrine, which Molina then publicly resisted, nor was he ashamed to admit it; indeed he arrogated to himself what the ancient Scholastics had not been able to achieve on equal terms, did not hesitate openly and consistently to oppose Molina, and frequently challenged him on that opinion; nor did he fear to criticize him in his treatise *De Fine hominis* — a work that is both ingenious and erudite. With Henricus, nearly all the other doctors of Spain agreed, and especially the Thomists, who, after reading Molina's *Concordia*, said they had found many things in that book which differed from the ancient teaching of the Fathers and especially of Augustine. But enough of this.

Section I: Statement of the Question

Since it is agreed among all philosophers and theologians that there are two states of things — one in possible being, the other in future being — and that there is in God a twofold knowledge of them: one necessary or of simple intelligence, the other free or of vision, it remains to know whether there is another intermediate conditional state, into which things pass from that necessary possible state into another future state under a condition posited. In this manner: this possible thing — say, Antichrist — in that state, if placed in these or those circumstances in which he can act in either direction, what certain and determined thing will he do? This state, with those conditions posited, passes into a conditional and free future. For it is one thing to say: the thing is possible, which is something entirely necessary and indifferent to either being or not being, acting or not acting; another: will this thing be or not, if this possible and indifferent thing is placed in this or that occasion and circumstance, which is now limited to one side of the contradiction by that added condition? One thing is to be noted here: this conditional state belongs more properly to actions than to things. For it is not said that this possible thing, once a condition is posited, will or will not be in terms of actual existence — because for having the being of existence it depends only on God's will to be or not to be in the future, as we stated above. Therefore the thing is supposed to be produced in its being antecedently to that conditional state, in which it is asked what it will do — which pertains to actions and effects that are to emanate from it. Just as therefore operation follows upon the being of a thing, so the conditional state follows upon the being of the possible thing, which is supposed

in the act of existence, for the purpose of seeing what it will operate in this or that occasion, in these or those circumstances. Then, corresponding to agents in that conditional state of things to be operated or not operated under those conditions, there is a knowledge which knows what those things will or will not do if placed in such an occasion and circumstance. This does not seem to be the necessary knowledge of possibles, which concerns the possibility and non-repugnance of things abstracting from all their futurity. Nor is it knowledge of vision, which tends toward a thing absolutely future after the absolute decree of the divine will, drawing it from a possible state to the future state of existence. Rather it is another intermediate knowledge, which, given that possible state, considers what that thing will do if placed by God in a future state in such circumstances. Hence therefore two questions arise. One concerning the existence of the operation or effect to emanate from it: will the operation be future or not? The other concerning the cognition of that object: whether and how that condition is known, and whence that operation is going to be future, and to which knowledge that cognition belongs? This is the genuine statement of the question as proposed and received by all. To it pertains the number and quality of conditions and their division.

Some conditions are disparate; some are connected. Disparate, such as: "If Socrates disputeth, Alcibiades will fight." "If Marcus Tullius pleads the case, Pompey will defeat the enemy." Connected: "If Caesar crosses the Rubicon, war will be brought to the fatherland." "If Brutus is defeated, he will kill himself." All of these are in the genus of contingents and can pertain to the question. There are other necessary conditions which do not enter into controversy — such as: "If the sun shines, it will be day." "If fire is applied to an apt fuel, it will burn it." Since this kind is necessary, it is outside the question, as there can be no doubt about it. Therefore it is inquired only about those which are contingent: either probably connected, or fortuitously disparate. This is the commonly admitted statement of the question by all who have disputed about this among the theologians.

With this presupposed, various difficulties arise which we shall set forth in order. First I note that it is one thing in my view to have knowledge of conditional futures, and another to have conditional or middle knowledge. For to know conditional futures does not specify a certain mode of knowing, but is indifferent to knowing them either given a decree or not; and in the first manner, hardly anyone denies that they can be known by God. But conditional or middle knowledge specifies another mode of knowing them in themselves through their own immediate truth and connection — not in virtue of antecedent decrees — and it is in this second sense that the Fathers of the Society who are its authors and adherents introduce it, and in the same sense the other Schools of theologians generally deny and attack it.

Section II. Whether in God There Can Be Conditional Knowledge, or Knowledge of Conditional Things?

It seems that such knowledge cannot exist in God because there is no object for it. For there are those who deny that conditional futures exist in that state precisely considered in itself — that is, those which will never be absolutely future. Of this opinion seem to have been Jansenius, Bishop of Ghent (*in sua Concord. Evang.*, c. 47), Curiel (*contr.* 7, n. 62), Ledesma (*lib. de auxiliis, disp.* 2), and Cabrera (*3 p. q. 1, art. 3, disp.* 1, §. 22), and Navarrete (*controuer.* 56, §. 2), and others — whom Alarcon calls a few and obscure theologians (*disp.* 4, c. 4, n. 4). This opinion can be grounded in these arguments.

The first: because conditional futures are neither possible nor future, therefore they do not exist at all. This is proved because between the possible and the future there is no middle; therefore there are no conditional futures.

The second: if those conditional objects existed, great confusion would arise from them, for one could imagine infinite modes of conditions; and if these are posited and removed from objects, as many truths will result as there will be those conditions, and one will proceed to infinity by infinitely repeating and altering conditions at the will of those imagining conditional objects.

The third: if those conditional objects are given, disparate, vague, and fortuitous ones without any connection, order, or dependence among themselves would also be admitted — as well as others that are impossible. But this is absurd; therefore conditional futures of this kind cannot be admitted.

The fourth: conditional futures which were not going to be future remain within the limits of possibles; therefore it is not necessary to distinguish them from possibles.

They then prove from the authority of the Fathers. Augustine (*lib. de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, c. 14), expounding the passage of Wisdom (4): "He was taken away lest wickedness alter his understanding," says: "This was said according to the dangers of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God, who foreknew what was to be, not what was not to be." Augustine denies that beyond absolute futures there is another genus of future things. In (*lib. 1, de Anima et eius orig., ad Renatum*, c. 12): "Foreknowledge itself is entirely emptied if what is foreknown will not be. For how is it said to foreknow a future thing if it is not future?" Moreover, in the other passages cited above in the previous sections, no other knowledge appears than that of possibles and future things.

Let the faithful disciple Prosper be added to Augustine, in his Letter to Augustine prefixed to the work *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, where in rebuking the opinion of the Massilienses — who affirmed that conditionally foreseen merits were the cause of the predestination and damnation of infants — he says: "To such a degree do they subject the election of God to whatever fabricated

merits, that — since past ones do not exist and future ones are not going to be future — they fabricate future things which are not going to be future. And in a new kind of absurdity with them, both what is not to be done is foreknown, and what is foreknown is not done." He calls those merits in a conditional state absurd not only because they were inept in the genus of merit but also because they were absurd in the genus of beings and contrary to futures as distinctly defined. Hence Prosper altogether disapproved of those futures in a conditional state distinct from the absolutely future state.

I add a valid and apt testimony from Damascenus in his Dialogue against the Manichaeans, where, satisfying the doubt: "Why did God create evil angels and men whom he foreknew would fall?" he says: "How could he foreknow what was not going to be? For if he foreknew someone as a sinner and had not created him, that foreknowledge would not be foreknowledge but an imposture. Just as knowledge is of things that exist, so foreknowledge is of things that are certainly future." He admits foreknowledge of futures, but rejects cognition of others which are not going to be future — calling it, and the creation based on it, an imposture. Which part excludes knowledge of conditional things that are never absolutely future.

I conclude the testimonies with the authority of Augustine (*lib. 26, contra Faustum*): "If I hear that something was going to be, but God brought it about that it should not happen" — behold the conditional — "I shall most faithfully reply that what God did was rather going to be, not what would have happened if this had not been done. For God knew what he was going to do, and therefore at the same time knew that the future he was going to prevent was not going to be." I add a passage from (*lib. de bono perseverantiae, c. 17*): "The gifts of God, if there is no predestination which we defend, are not foreknown by God." Therefore nothing can in any way be knowable except what is decreed to be absolutely future. Thus Augustine makes clear his own opinion: that there is no other genus of future except the absolute. Therefore what he foreknew, he foreknew as not going to be, as he says (*lib. 2, contra duas Epist. Pelagian., c. 7*), speaking of the damnation of children dying without baptism: "How did he foreknow them as future, those who, dying in infancy — since his foreknowledge cannot fail — he rather foreknew as not future?" Therefore he admits no futures which are not absolutely future. Since therefore no conditional futures of this kind exist, he entirely excludes them.

If you object those passages of Scripture in which God seems to know conditional things of this kind — which we shall cite below — such as "If the men of Keila would deliver me" (*1 Reg. 23*), "if in Tyre and Sidon" (*Matthew 11*), and similar ones, the reply is: that Scripture spoke according to our manner and accommodated itself to our sense, in the same way that God is said to assume our affections — so that when he is said to be angry, to grieve, to repent, it is not because he is truly angry, grieves, or repents, but because he speaks according to

our sense and manner. And this they confirm with many testimonies of the Fathers.

The second opinion belongs to others who find certainty of knowledge about conditional futures unpersuasive, and therefore hold that they can be known only by conjecture — nor do they consider this absurd, since they are not capable of other knowledge. Thus they deny knowledge of them and affirm conjecture. So says the same Ledesma (*lib. de auxiliis, disp. 2*), Catharinus (*opus. de Praedestinatione, par. 2*), Cabezundo (*3 par., q. 2*), Cabrera (*3 p., q. 1, art. 3, disp. 1, §. 22*), Verdus (*Comment. in 1 p., q. 14, art. 13, dubio ultimo*), Ripa (*1 par., q. 14, art. 13, dubio ultimo*), and Zumel (*ibidem, disp. 8, concl. 3*), though he afterward retracted. Curiel (*controuer. 7*) and Cornelio (*disp. 3, dub. 2*) hold it probable; to whom Philip Faber Faventinus from our own School seems to assent (*disp. 55, c. 2*), admitting in Scotus's teaching that God before the decree knows future things in some manner, but not certainly and determinately, only after the decree.

They prove this opinion first from the manner of speaking of Scripture, which signifies conjecture: "Now lest perchance he put forth his hand" (*Gen. 3*); "lest perchance you be deceived" (*Deut. 4*); "if in Sodom the mighty works had been done which have been done in you, perhaps they would have remained" (*Matthew 11*). This word "perhaps" signifies a chance event, of which there can be no certain knowledge but only conjecture. They prove it secondly by reason: because the truth of these propositions cannot be determinate, and therefore neither infallible nor certain. The assumption is evident from the fact that there is neither a decree about them nor a principle of knowing outside a decree — since from themselves they are not determinate futures, nor are they determined to one side by any decree. Therefore they are altogether indifferent to whatever condition and mode of operating under it; for they do not exclude any state or condition. And this condition added to them is contingent, and is added to a contingent thing both as possible and as existing. Therefore in that object there is no principle of determination — neither intrinsic nor extrinsic. And in this state, just as they are dubious and fallible, so they are represented to the divine intellect, which attributes no certainty to them since knowledge presupposes an object. Therefore it knows them only conjecturally. Nor is there any imperfection in the knowing intellect; on the contrary, it is a property of that intellect conforming itself with the nature of the objects which it understands. They confirm this from the fact that it is a greater inconvenience for God to have a contingent knowledge which can be and not be, like the decree, than to have a probable and conjectural knowledge of contingent things which can be and not be. But in God there can be a free and contingent decree, capable of being and not being, and a free and contingent knowledge which follows and rests upon the decree; therefore all the more will there be in God a knowledge of those contingent conditional futures that is uncertain and conjectural, corresponding to a free and contingent object. And indeed the

Salmanticenses judge this opinion probable (*tractatu 3, de scientia Dei, disp. 8, dub. 2, §. 2, in fine*).

Section III. That Certain and Infallible Knowledge of Conditional Futures Is Shown to Exist.

Nearly all the theologians of all the Schools — though they differ on the mode of knowing — embrace the affirmative opinion by a kind of common consent when speaking of connected and mutually dependent contingents. But before we come to the proof, let us remove the scruple that arises from the division of contingent propositions into disparate and connected ones. Disparate propositions are those which have no order or causal connection among themselves, as we touched upon above — such as: "If Peter sleeps, John will dispute." The question is whether propositions of this kind are true. There is great disagreement among authors here. On the affirmative side are cited: Alvarez (*lib. 2, de auxiliis, disp. 7, n. 7*), Suarez (*in Opusc. lib. 2, de scientia conditionata, c. 6, n. 4; and c. 7, nn. 5 and 13*), Mendoza the Augustinian (*q. 7, scholastica, n. 17*), Curiel (*controuer. 7, in c. 4, Sap., art. 3*), Fonseca (*3 tom. Meth., lib. 6, c. 2, q. 4, sect. 10*), Ruiz (*disp. 78, sect. 2*), Herice (*disp. 7, c. 10, n. 61*), Lezana (*trac. 4, disp. 2, q. 4*), Salmanticenses (*tract. 3, de scientia Dei, disp. 9, dub. 4, §§. 2 and 3*). On the other side Ledesma (*lib. de auxil., disp. 2*) denies it altogether; and Vasquez seems to deny it (*disp. 67, cc. 3 and 4*), Alarcon (*tract. 2, disp. 4*), Fasolus (*1 p. q. 14, art. 13*), Lessing (*lib. de auxil. c. 19, n. 3*), Amicus (*disp. 12, sect. 3, n. 253*), Arriaga (*d. 21, sect. 7*). But I judge the controversy to be about manner of speaking, and it can easily be settled by distinguishing the senses of this question, which are two: one of concomitance, the other of connection. The first is as it were fortuitous, the second causal. Therefore, if those propositions are taken in the sense of the fortuitous concomitance of one with another, God can know that concomitance — for as Suarez observes, God knows what will be the case when Peter sleeps, as to John's disputation: that is, when Peter sleeps, will John dispute or not? Certainly in this sense God will know those disparate futures concomitantly. But when the propositions are such that there is no nexus, causality, or dependence among them, they cannot be known from the force of connection and causality among themselves. And in this sense Vasquez and others rightly deny that they are known by God. And thus the entire controversy is resolved. One thing however is to be noted: some propositions can be merely fortuitous and disparate, and yet can be known as connected and dependent on each other — such as that proposition found in (*4 Reg. 13*): "If you had struck five or six or seven times, you would have struck Syria even to its destruction." Here the objects are disparate and disconnected without any causal nexus, and yet from one the other was known — namely from the will of God connecting and joining them to each other, not by reason of the objects which were disparate, but by reason of the divine will disposing the nexus and conjunction so that one would follow from the other. With this scruple removed, let us approach the question.

The common voice holds that conditional futures are known by God certainly and infallibly, and the Schools agree on this, differing on the kind of knowledge through which they are known.

Proof I. It is proved first from the authority of Scripture. Many passages contain and indicate that knowledge. One celebrated passage is (*lib. 1, Reg. 23*): when David, a fugitive who had sought refuge at Keilah, was uncertain whether he would be safe there, he consulted the Lord and said: "If the men of Keilah will deliver me into his hand?" — that is, Saul's — "and if Saul will come down, as your servant has heard, declare to your servant." And the Lord said: "He will come down." And David said: "Will the men of Keilah deliver me and the men who are with me into the hand of Saul?" And the Lord said: "They will deliver you." David asks, not knowing what would happen, and God answers what would be the case in a conditional matter. "If they will deliver." Therefore he certainly knew it in that state. Surely it would be unworthy of God to be questioned and to answer without knowing, and there would be no difference between man and God. For David, uncertain, was asking what he could foresee by conjecture; if God had not known certainly what was going to be future, it would have been the same as David. Therefore he was altogether certain of the conditional future event; and David thus believed, and God answered with certainty.

The other passage is about the Prophet Elisha (*4 Reg. 13*), teaching King Joash from the number of arrow-shots about a future victory in this manner: "If you had struck five or six or seven times, you would have struck Syria to its destruction; but now you shall strike it three times." That truth was conditional and depending upon the number of arrow-shots, which God had foreknown and revealed to the Prophet. Nor does it matter to say: that future was not intrinsically connected with its effect, nor known from natural consequence, but from an extrinsic decree of God so ordering it — for this does not hinder the proof; on the contrary, it confirms it, since God instituted the conditional thing in his decree, and knew the thing once instituted. Hence it is clear that he both willed conditional things and knew them.

The third passage is at Jeremiah (*c. 38*), predicting to King Zedekiah what would happen under a condition: "If you go out and surrender to the princes of the king of Babylon, your soul shall live, and this city shall not be burned with fire, and you shall be saved, you and your house." This safety of the king and city depended on that condition of going out and of entreating those princes; if the condition were not met, the king and city would perish; if it were met, they would escape. There are other similar passages where God forbids the Hebrews to marry foreign women, which often occur. I adduce that one in (*3 Reg. 11*): "You shall not enter into them, nor shall they enter into yours; for they will surely turn away your hearts to follow their gods." Upon that condition of entering depended that idolatry foreknown and predicted by God conditionally.

These are from the Old Testament. I come to the New Testament, where there are many and illustrious testimonies. The first is found in (*Matt. 11 and Luke 10*): "Woe to you, Chorazin; woe to you, Bethsaida; for if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which have been done in you, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes." Behold a future event proceeding from a condition, of altogether determinate truth — which cannot be undermined by the interpretation of Jansenius of Ghent (*c. 47, of his concordia*) or of Curiel (*controuer. 7*), who answer that it was said by hyperbole, which is sometimes found in the sacred letters, as Ribera observes (*in Amos, c. 2, nn. 19 and 24*), and Martinez (*lib. 9, Hypotypos.*), and Maldonatus (*at the last chapter of John*). Nor does Augustine deny it in his books *De doct. Christ.*, because this figure of speech does not fit this passage, in which Christ categorically affirms a particular certain thing — that the Jews are to be confounded by the example of others. This is apparent from the adjoining words: "But I tell you it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment than for you." These confirm that one part is certain, concerning the condemnation of the Jews, since the Tyrians were to be punished more mildly because they had sinned less gravely than the Jews, who sinned more seriously in having acted contrary to what they had heard and seen. Nor should you deduce from this that the Tyrians and Sidonians would suffer less because of that conditional merit of repentance — rather because in fact they were less blameworthy, since they were ignorant of the law of Christ and lacked his preaching and miracles during his lifetime, which the Jews had in abundance and, having them in abundance, lived badly. For no reward or punishment is rendered for conditional merits. There is also that appendix about the comparison of the city of Capernaum with the city of Sodom: "And you, Capernaum, will you be exalted to heaven? You will be brought down to Hades; for if the mighty works had been done in Sodom which have been done in you, it would have remained to this day." Although the word "perhaps" here seems to introduce conjecture, it nonetheless detracts nothing from certainty — nor is it in that sense in the sacred letters, but as the Interpreters observe in that passage, and as is the Patristic teaching, especially Jerome (*in Psal. 50*) and Augustine (*tract. 37, in Ioan.*); and Abulensis notes it in this passage. Hence the certainty of the thing that would occur under the condition is confirmed: for if that condition of Christ's preaching and miracles were posited, repentance would certainly and infallibly follow.

Another testimony is (*Luke 16*), in those words of Abraham to the rich Dives asking that Lazarus be sent to his relatives to instruct them — which request being granted, Abraham replies: "If they do not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they believe if someone rises from the dead." Furthermore (*John 4*), Christ says: "If you knew the gift of God, and who it is who says to you, 'Give me a drink,' you would perhaps have asked him, and he would have given you living water." And (*John 5*): "If you believed Moses, you would perhaps believe me also." The same is contained in that text (*John 6*): "Jesus, when he knew that they

intended to come and make him king, withdrew again to the mountain by himself alone." That seizure and assumption to kingship was not and was not going to be absolutely, and yet Christ saw it would be future conditionally unless he had fled. I add another passage of Paul (*1 Cor. 2*): "For if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory."

In deeds there are many things pertaining to this matter. Three I adduce. Why did God expel man from Paradise? Because he saw that if he remained in it, he would stretch forth his hand and take also of the tree of life and eat and utterly perish (*Gen. 3*) — which was conditional. Why did he crush the earth with a flood? Unless because he foreknew that if the world had persevered in that state, great sins would have been committed by men (*Gen. 6 and 7*). Why did he impede the building of the Tower of Babel? Unless because he saw that it was to be carried up to the heavens (*Gen. 11*). Who does not see that God knew all these things conditionally, and having known them, forbade them? Therefore God knows conditional futures — and this truth seems to be established as a matter of faith. And so both the Fathers and the Scholastic Doctors embrace it.

Proof II. Let us enumerate the Fathers. Let Athanasius be the beginning (*sermon 3, contra Arianos*). Positing the objection of the Arians, he says: "God could, even if the Savior were a creature, dissolve the curse of Adam." He responds thus: "This same could be urged by someone else: he could have dissolved the curse without any coming of Christ. But we must consider what is useful for men, not what is within the power of God." Behold a perspicuous conditional object — the redemption of the human race in another manner than through Christ, if God so willed and operated according to his absolute power and divine strength.

Nyssenius (*in lib. de iis qui acerba morte extinguuntur, near the end*): "It is probable," he says, "that he who knew what was future as much as what was past, in order to prevent the progress of a child's life to maturity, prevents what in his foreknowledge has been noticed as evil in one who would have lived in this way — and prevents life from becoming material for vice and wickedness to one who would have lived by his own will and choice." What could be plainer than this testimony, and by which those who said God had guarded against letting children whom he foreknew would gravely and finally sin if they grew up live long, and had therefore taken them away by premature death, most relied upon.

Chrysostom (*super Matthaeum, c. 19*): "But why did he not call all at once? He would have wished to call all from the beginning; but if all did not arrive at the same time, this difference resulted from the will of those who were called; and for this reason some are called at dawn, others at the third hour, others at the sixth, others at the ninth, others at the eleventh — because then they would obey. Which Paul also signified openly, saying: 'When it pleased God, he set me apart from my mother's womb.' For he was available even from his earliest days, but since he knew that he would resist, he willed to call him when he knew the call would penetrate his mind. And similarly when he later called the thief. He

could have called him before, but the thief would not have obeyed if called before." Here the conditional foreknowledge of God in the conversion of Paul and the thief appears manifestly — they were not called before because before they would not have come. But once God, foreknowing they were going to come, called them contingently.

Cyril (*in dialogo de Trin., before the middle*): "I will say, not caring if it seems less decorous now, since it was necessary for the falls of men and our sins that the Only-begotten should suffer. Let him receive the greatest gratitude. But let it be known that the crimes of humanity were the occasion of his divine glory. For if we had not sinned, neither would he have become like us, nor would he have endured the cross; and if he had not died, he would not have attained to be adored by the saints." A perspicuous testimony — for the word "if" involves a condition and signifies that if sin had not occurred, the Incarnation would not have been. For this it was necessary to know from God what would be future if man had not sinned; but that future was not absolute but conditional. Again the same Cyril (*lib. 9, in Ioannem, c. 10*) raises various questions: "Why does God, who foreknows the future, do this or that?" These can be understood only of conditional foreknowledge. The first: "If Christ is believed to know all things, why did he choose Judas, who was to be a traitor?" — whence he says: "What will prevent us from accusing God and saying: 'Why did you choose Saul as king, whom you knew would forfeit your grace? Nay, why did you form the first man from the earth, whom you did not fail to know would not keep your commandments?' Let this discourse ascend to higher things. Why did you create the nature of angels, when you as God foreknew the future rebellion of some?" To these questions he responds not by denying but by presupposing such knowledge in God from free will and other causes, rendering the reason for divine Providence.

Nemesius (*lib. de natura hominis, c. 44, §. Euripides in fine*) openly teaches that God uses this knowledge for perfect providence, for he says: "Providence administers human affairs not only from what is noted by the senses, but also from its own proper foreknowledge. For since God knows that it is expedient for a good man to be poor, and that his mind, if riches are given him, will be corrupted, he usefully allows him to live in poverty; and the one who is rich, if he would often become more insolent or attach his mind to other grave deeds, he permits to possess riches." And he concludes: "For we, foreknowing nothing of what is to come and expecting only what is immediately present, do not rightly judge those things which occur in human affairs. But from God even future things are as present."

Damascenus, in the Dialogue against the Manichaeans, when they object: "Why did God, who foreknew that the Devil would be evil, create him?" responds thus: "Some singular and outstanding goodness was the reason he created him. For he conversed with himself thus: Since this one will be evil and will waste all the

good things with which I endow him, shall I therefore also despoil him of good entirely and destroy him? By no means. But although he will himself be wicked, I will not so punish him as to exclude him entirely from participation in my good. Rather I will bestow one good upon him — my own presence in reason — so that by this very thing he may come, even unwillingly, to partake of my good." By these words he evidently demonstrates that God had conditional foreknowledge of the sin of the angels before he had the decree of creating them.

So much for the Greek Fathers; whoever wishes to consult more may see Suarez (*1 tome, de gratia, Prologomeno 2, c. 3*) and Ruiz (*d. 65*). Let us adduce some Latin Fathers. Tertullian (*lib. 2, adversus Marcionem*), when Marcion posed the question: "Why did God allow the first man to be circumvented by the Devil and to fall into sin and death?" — replies among other things: "The author of all things, ordering his universal foreknowledge by foreknowing, ordered by foreknowing. Certainly that very transgression, which unless he had foreknown he would not have created under the fear of death." And in (*c. 5*) he has similar things (*c. 7*). Ambrose (*lib. de Paradiso, c. 8*): "Did God know or not know that Adam would transgress his commands? If he did not know, that is not an assertion of divine power; if however he knew, and nonetheless knowing he commanded things to be disregarded, there is no point in any God who superfluously commands. But he commanded Adam superfluously, since he knew he would not keep them — to what end?" Jerome (*Dialogo 3, contra Pelagium*), posing the question about the creation of evil angels and the foreknowledge of their sin, responds: "God judges from present things, not future, nor does he condemn from foreknowledge one whom he knows will later displease him." Bede (*4 tome, in expositione Geneseos, on the temptation of the first man*): "It is asked why God permitted man to be tempted, whom he foreknew would consent to the tempter?" And he gives the reason thus: "Some are moved concerning this temptation of the first man — that God permitted it as if not seeing that the entire human race would be ceaselessly tempted by the wiles of the Devil." Anselm (*in elucidario, column 9*): "Why," he says, "did God permit man to be tempted, knowing he would be overcome? Because he foreknew how great goods he was going to make from his sin." Rupert (*in Matthaei, c. 26, lib. suo 13*) presupposes that God foreknew the evil permitted by himself, and says: "It seems to follow that God willed evil to be done, since it was done with his knowledge or foreknowledge." He responds however, denying the will of evil while conceding foreknowledge of the same. These are enough from the Latin Fathers; Ruiz will supply more (*tome de scientia Dei, disp. 65, from sect. 1 to 6*), and Suarez (*Prologom. 2*). I intentionally abstain from citing the testimonies of Augustine, whom I wish to cite distinctly and separately.

Proof III. Whether the Angelic Doctor Recognized Knowledge of Conditional Things?

The answer must be affirmative. Let us hear him in (*3 p., q. 1, a. 3*), in the title of the article, which is: "Whether if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?" This question is about a conditional object. He answers by affirming the truth, according to his own opinion, which is altogether conditional, in the body of the article: "If man had not sinned, the Son of man would not have come." He proves this from the authority of Augustine. The conditional foreknowledge of the object is expressed in those words: "Even without sin existing, God could have become incarnate." Let us hear him again in the same question (*a. 5*): "Whether it would have been fitting for God to become incarnate from the beginning of the world?" where in the statement of arguments he proposes the second: "Furthermore, in (*1 Timothy 1*) it is said that Christ came into the world to save sinners. But more would have been saved if God had become incarnate from the beginning of the human race; for many who perished in their sin out of ignorance of God would have been saved if God had become incarnate from the beginning of the human race. Therefore it would have been more fitting that God had become incarnate from the beginning of the human race." He continues with the reply to the second: "Augustine answers this (*in lib. de sex questionibus Paganorum, dicens, q. 2*): that Christ willed to appear to men and preach his doctrine among them at the time and place where he knew there would be those who were going to believe in him. For in those times and in those places he foreknew that such men were going to hear his preaching as would not indeed all of them, but yet many of them, be like those who in his bodily presence, even with the dead raised by him, would not believe in him. But Augustine was disowning this response in (*lib. de perseverantia*): 'Can we say that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have refused to believe with such mighty works among them, or would not have believed if they had occurred, since the Lord himself bears witness to them that they would have done great penance and humility if those miracles of divine virtue had been done among them?' Therefore, as he himself resolving subjoins: as the Apostle says, 'it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God who showeth mercy' — who aided those whom he foreknew would believe in him if those miracles had been done among them, while not aiding others — of whom in his predestination he judged secretly indeed but justly otherwise. Thus let us believe without doubt his mercy in those who are liberated and his truth in those who are punished." Here the knowledge of conditional things appears manifestly, as will be plain to the reader.

There is another passage which also contains the matter of this knowledge, (*q. 24, de verit., a. 14*): "All external motions are moderated by divine providence according to what it judges someone to be aroused to good by these or those actions." The Holy Doctor treats of the providence which God has with respect to good acts by arousing creatures to them — which providence rests upon the foreknowledge of this or that arousal, from which will follow these or those

good actions. This foreknowledge is certainly not of absolute futures but of conditional ones, which precedes the decree of future things.

Furthermore, St. Thomas's teaching perspicuously presupposes foreknowledge of things in a conditional state. This is clear because in (*3 part., q. 3, q. 7, a. 3, ad 4*) he says predestination presupposes foreknowledge of future things, which cannot be other than that of conditional things — for in St. Thomas's opinion foreknowledge of absolutely future things follows predestination, as he holds (*1 p., q. 23*). Let us bring the passages together and compare them with each other. Therefore in (*3 p., q. 1, a. 3, ad 4*): "Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things." This is a manifest authority for knowledge of conditional things. The other is contained in (*q. 23, 1 p., a. 1 and 3*). For St. Thomas says in the body of the first article: "It is fitting for God to predestine men. For all things are subject to divine providence. But it belongs to providence to direct things toward their end." Then, having posited a twofold end — one natural, the other supernatural — he says: "To that which something cannot attain by the force of its own nature, it must be directed by another — just as an arrow is directed to a target by the archer. Hence properly speaking, the rational creature, which is capable of eternal life, is directed to it as it were sent by God." He continues: "The reason for this sending preexisted in God, just as in him there is the reason for the ordering of all things toward their end, which we said is providence. But this is the force of the argument: for the reason of providence precedes the future ordering; but that reason is not foreknowledge of future things, which it precedes; therefore it is foreknowledge of conditional things, which precedes that future sending, followed by knowledge of vision." Hence St. Thomas says: "The reason for something to be done existing in the mind of the author is a kind of pre-existence of the thing to be done in him. Hence the reason for the said sending of the rational creature to the end of eternal life is called predestination." To this is added the sentence from the body of (*article 3*): "Providence, like prudence, is the reason existing in the intellect prescribing the ordering of certain things toward an end. But nothing is prescribed to be ordered toward an end unless the will of the end precedes. Hence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes by reason that God wills their salvation." These words settle the matter. For if the decree of the predestining God precedes knowledge of vision — which is most certain in St. Thomas's opinion — then plainly that reason of providence existing in the mind of God is the knowledge of conditional things, which belongs to the knowledge of possibles and proposes and shows to the free will the modes of ordering the predestined to eternal life. And accordingly it is prior to foreknowledge of future things and entirely distinct from it. And this indeed Cajetan taught (*in comment. ad q. 1, Tertiae p., a. 3, §. in responsione ad quartum*): "Certainly that proposition is false: 'predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things.' For predestination of Peter does not presuppose foreknowledge of Peter's predestination or salvation; on the contrary, foreknowledge of Peter's

salvation presupposes his predestination — as is clear from the fact that God knows Peter is to be saved because he predestined him, and did not predestine Peter because he foresaw him as to be saved." And afterward he transmits this far more manifestly in the section distinguishing the two orders of future things and the two orders of knowledges — which are certainly those of conditional things and of absolutely future things, and knowledges of the same. From all this the mind of St. Thomas on conditional future things and the knowledge of them as known and admitted appears clearly.

Proof IV. What Scotus Holds on the Knowledge of Conditional Things.

While Scotus affirms that the Divine Word was to become incarnate even if Adam had not sinned, as he holds in (3, d. 7, §. *sed hic sunt duo dubia*, n. 3), he manifestly admits a conditional thing; for it imports a condition foreseen by God before the absolute state of the Incarnation: one state is that of the Word to be incarnated if Adam had not sinned — which state never occurred — another that of being incarnated after the foreknown sin — which state occurred and was foreseen as absolutely future. Therefore Scotus recognized the state of conditional things and grounded that celebrated question upon it. Furthermore, Scotus disputing in (3, d. 20, q. un.), "Whether it was necessary for the human race to be repaired through the passion of Christ," admits another possible mode of redemption if this one were not necessary — which is altogether a conditional thing. From this that question returns: "Whether, if Christ had not suffered, the human race could have been repaired and redeemed from sin?" But this question involves a condition. Hence Scotus says perspicuously (§. *Tunc ad quaestionem dico*, n. 10): "I say that all things done by Christ for our redemption were not necessary, except presupposing the divine ordination by which he so ordained them to be done. From which it follows that if he had not so ordained, they would be otherwise in the future." But what is this, if not to return to the conditional state? Concerning which it can be asked: if that ordination did not exist, what would have been future? Moreover, that question (d. 21, q. un.): "Whether the body of Christ would have putrefied if the resurrection had not been hastened?" is altogether conditional. And the example Scotus there gives of the death of Hezekiah, which Isaiah announced and which did not follow, is contained in the same state. I adduce the words of Scotus on putrefaction as accommodated to our matter. At the end of the question, on that passage of the Psalm in opposition: "You will not allow your Holy One to see corruption" — "It is true regarding the fact, because just as by eternal will he willed that body to be united to the Word, which was a miracle, so also he willed that that inanimate body should not putrefy, even if the resurrection had been prolonged." Behold an open condition constituting a conditional object. Finally there are many other questions in Scotus involving the same state — such as that in (2, d. 29, q. un.): "Whether in the state of innocence we would have had immortal bodies? And whether Adam would have died in that state?" There likewise those other three questions posed in (d. 20) concerning the sons of Adam in the state of

innocence: first, "Whether they would have been confirmed in justice?"; second, "Whether those who are now elect would have been saved?"; third, "Whether they would have grown in body and knowledge as now?" Furthermore in (4, d. 1, q. 3) on the necessity of sacraments, the question pertains here: "Whether there would have been sacraments in the state of innocence?" And others in the *Quodlibets: quodlibeto 21* and the last: "Whether one positing the eternity of the world could maintain that some being is universally well-fortunate?" — which is most manifest. And no less that question in the *Reportata* (d. 44, q. 1): "Whether God could produce things otherwise than according to the order disposed by him? And whether God could make better things than he made?" For all of these are hypothetical and involve a conditional object.

All these are certainly suitable examples. But I want to adduce something more certain and explored which no one can deny. In (3, d. 14, q. 2, §. *contra distinctionem illam*, n. 12), attacking the opinion of St. Thomas who denies that the soul of Christ sees all that the Word sees, he says: "The intellect of Christ's soul could know in the Word some possible future thing that will never come to be." And what is this other than a conditional thing? And he distinguishes knowledge of it from the knowledge of vision; for he adds: "Therefore a limit is not precisely set to him in the knowledge of those things which God knows by the knowledge of vision." Therefore that cognition is conditional and pertains to the knowledge of conditional things. Another passage is cited by Mastrius (*disp. 3, de Divino intellectu, q. 4, a. 1*), which he calls express, found in Scotus (4, d. 16, q. 2, §. *respondeo hic primo*). But with all due respect to that learned Author, the passage is not suitable. For it presupposes an absolute future — for example, a man — and proposes the acts of this existing and operating, sinning and doing penance, and inquires how God stands toward those acts: whether and how he wills to punish if he is in sin, and to absolve if he is in grace. Therefore these acts are not between the possible and future state, but rather in the absolutely future and present state. Hence this does not bear on the case. For the absolute will of God punishing and absolving with the changed state of sin and grace is posited within the absolute state of a sinning and penitent man — and the condition falls on those diverse states within the absolute state. Let whoever wishes read the passage of Scotus and will find it to be so. The passages we have mentioned suffice and contain the matter, and especially that last one which removes all doubt.

Proof V. The Authority of Scholastic Doctors.

It would be endless to enumerate Scholastic Doctors. And first, Father Didacus Ruiz de Montoya (*de scientia Dei, disp. 61, sect. 2, n. 2*) denies that any theologian denies knowledge of this kind; he excepts Paul of Burgos, however, whom he nearly asserts to have been of the contrary opinion. And so: nearly all Thomists admit conditional knowledge and only remove the Middle from the middle — which is proper to the Jesuit Fathers. It is true however that Ledesma, with a few

others, seems — as we said above — to repudiate this knowledge, among whom Navarrete (*1 p., q. 18, cont. 56, §. 2, from concl. 6*) can be numbered, who formally denies it to be in God and affirms it to be there eminently. The other principal Thomists and those who usually follow St. Thomas concede this certain and infallible knowledge of conditional things in God: Alvarez (*lib. 2, de auxiliis, disp. 7*), Nazarius (*in controuer. on that matter, 1 not. and concl. 1*), Gonzales (*disp. 44, sect. 2*), Ripa (*in presenti dubio, c. ultimo*), Zumel (*lib. 3, de scientia condit., disp. 5*), Salmanticenses (*tractat. 3, de scientia Dei, disp. 9, and following*) — who also cite their Complutenses — Cornelio (*disp. 3, dub. 3*), Lezana (*tract. 4, disp. 2*). It is not necessary to enumerate the Jesuit Fathers, since they testify themselves to be the authors of conditional knowledge — indeed they glory in it — and accordingly presuppose conditional objects. Our Scotists embrace it: Mauritius Hibernus (*quaest. de praescient. et rer. contin., a. 3, prop. 23*), Faber Faventinus (*disp. 54, 55, 56*), Smilingh (*tract. 3, disp. 2, q. 5*), Sghemma (*2 Physicor. digress. 18; and opusculo de scientia et voluntate Dei, q. 12*), Vulpes (*d. 31, a. 1, ar.*), Pontius (*disp. 5, q. 6, n. 23*), Mastrius (*disp. 3, de Divino intellectu et voluntate, q. 4*), Cavellus (*sect. 1, and following*), who cites Cavellus in his manuscripts, of which we shall speak later in their proper place.

Proof VI. The Opinion of Conditional Things Is Proved by Reasons.

Few are needed. First, because those conditional objects are knowable, just as possibles and futures are; therefore they are known by God. The assumption is clear because the condition is possible; indeed future things were previously seen by God in a conditional state — for he foreknew that they could be placed in this or that state, in these or those circumstances which were not incompatible with them, and he decreed to place them as he had foreseen. Hence a conditional truth participates in the character of both possible and future truth, and from the conditional possible arises the absolute future.

Second, because that knowledge of conditional things is absolutely necessary in God for proposing to the free will, from among the many and infinite possibles, what it may wish to do — which, being represented to it in many modes indifferent as to being and operating, the free will of God chooses what pleases, omits what does not please, according to its free power.

Third, because we men discourse and reason about conditional futures, asking what would come about and result under this or that condition, and we make a conjecture about it. Therefore God will have knowledge of that object — otherwise we would think and recognize something more than God. With the difference however that we proceed by conjecturing ambiguously and by reasoning, while God proceeds by knowing certainly and infallibly.

Fourth, because this knowledge pertains especially to the perfection of divine knowledge — for it is infinitely infinite and worthy of God, who most perfectly comprehends all things. For knowledge of futures is restricted to future things,

which are finite and limited; knowledge of possibles, although also infinite from the side of the object, does not however express of itself all those modes and ratios of the conditional state, which can be infinitely replicated from every side. But from these foundations the conclusion is clear, and to the arguments proposed above the reply is easy.

Section IV. On What Augustine Thinks Concerning the Knowledge of Conditionals

It matters greatly what the great Augustine thinks on this subject, especially since both opposing schools — the Dominicans and the Jesuits — have chosen him as their arbiter and decreed, as the Salmanticenses assert together with many others in *tract. 3. de scientia Dei disp. 10. dub. 3.*, that his judgment must stand in the celebrated controversy over grace before Clement VIII and Paul V. As I have also shown in the book entitled *Mens Innocentii*, it will be necessary to inquire diligently into his meaning regarding the knowledge of God concerning future conditionals, setting aside for now the question of the kind of such knowledge, which we defer to the following disputation. We ask here only this: whether Augustine acknowledged and admitted such future events in a conditional state, and a certain and infallible divine knowledge of them.

There were those who said, in order to bring the science of middle knowledge — or conditional knowledge — into disrepute, that it had been an invention of the Semi-Pelagians, and that this was established on Augustine's own authority, since in his writings that knowledge is found adduced by the Semi-Pelagians as an argument for conditional merits. With respect to those merits, God either saved or damned infants on account of foreseen merits or demerits that they would have had if they had lived, as we shall relate below with passages from Augustine. But this was a stratagem of those who sought to reproach the authors of middle or conditional knowledge with novelty, in order to deter them from introducing it. For Augustine, as we shall explain, did not reject knowledge of future conditionals, but rather the abuse of it introduced by the Semi-Pelagian adversaries regarding merits or demerits of a conditionally future kind — namely the claim that God saves or damns men on the basis of foreseeing such things — since that was entirely false. For it is not conditional merits or demerits — what someone would have done had he lived — that bear upon this, but rather the absolute merits that someone was actually going to perform.

With these observations in mind, my view, and one that is thoroughly examined and verified, is that Augustine acknowledged and admitted in God a certain and infallible knowledge of future conditionals. I demonstrate this with the following clear arguments.

First, because when Augustine heard the opinion of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians — who held that men are judged on the basis of foreseen conditional merits — he did not immediately reject it as improbable and incredible, as he

certainly would have done if it assumed something impossible, such as knowledge of things future under a condition. Instead, he accepted it as though such cognition were possible, and rejected it solely on the grounds that it asserts those merits to be sufficient for merit and demerit — since it is wholly absurd that anyone should be judged on the basis of what he would or would not have done if he had lived, given that none of those things would have been absolutely future. Augustine teaches this in many places of the following sort: *lib. 2 contra duas Epist. Pelag. c. 7*; *lib. de Anima et eius orig. ad Renat. c. 12*; and especially in responding to Prosper and Hilary, who reported that error in their letters — *lib. de praedestinatione Sanctorum, cc. 12, 13, 14*; and *lib. de dono perseverantiae, cc. 9 and 10*. In these places he refutes the error of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, who claimed that grace is given on account of our merits, and who assigned as the reason of this distinction the fact that God had seen what each person would do if placed in such-and-such a state, before he foreknew those works as absolutely future. The Semi-Pelagians in Gaul made use of the example of infants to press this error — some of whom depart this life having been baptized, others not, without any merits or demerits of their own. They said that those who would be lost were foreseen by divine knowledge as they would have been in their adult years had they survived to old age, as recorded in the letter of Prosper to Augustine. Hilary likewise reports the same Semi-Pelagian error. Augustine refutes that error in such a way that he never denies that God foresaw merits or demerits that are conditionally future, for had he denied this, the whole question would have been dissolved. He only shows that it is utterly absurd for anyone to be punished or rewarded on account of works that were never going to be absolutely future.

He sets out one passage from *lib. de praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. 12* as follows: "How it entered the minds of such men I do not know — that future merits of infants, which are not going to be future, should be punished or honored"; and below: "But that anyone should be judged not according to the merits he had while he was in the body, but according to the merits he would have had if he had lived longer in the body — I am astonished and stupefied that men whose intellects your letters show not to be contemptible could have thought this." And in *c. 13*: "But if they perhaps say that sins are remitted to the penitent, and therefore those who die without baptism in infancy are not baptized because God foreknew they would not do penance if they lived, while those who are baptized and die as infants are those whom God foreknew would have done penance if they had lived" — let them attend and see: if that is so, then it is no longer original sin that is condemned in the unbaptized infants who die, but their own future sins if they had lived; and likewise it is not original sin that is washed away in those who are baptized and die in infancy, but their own future sins if they had lived, since they could not sin except at a more advanced age — but some are foreseen as going to do penance and others as not, and that is why some leave this life baptized and others not.

Augustine does not deny God's foreknowledge of a conditional matter, but rather the merit and demerit of a thing known in a conditional state. And he concludes that chapter by saying that for men, future events that are not going to be future are doubtless no merits at all. Note that he says "future events that are not going to be future" — he did not say those events are nothing at all, but rather that they are no merits, thereby denying the character of merit to those conditional future events.

From these and similar testimonies on the same subject, it is established that Augustine considered those conditional future events to be indeed objects of divine knowledge, but not subjects of divine justice.

Second, no less clearly is this proved from another doctrine of the same Augustine, frequently taught: that premature death in the predestined is a benefit of God and an effect of predestination, because by its intervention damnation — foreseen on account of future sins they would have committed had they lived longer — is entirely avoided, according to *Wisdom 4*: "He was taken away lest wickedness should change his understanding." On this passage Augustine regularly relies as canonical, despite the protests of heretics, as is evident from the letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine. For this doctrine expressly holds that sins conditionally future are foreseen and foreknown by God, since he forestalls his elect by death lest they commit those sins. What could be more certain or evident in favor of knowledge of conditionals?

Augustine advances this doctrine in *lib. de Correptione et Gratia*, c. 8, where from the cited passage of Wisdom he proves that a bitter and untimely death — by which a man is snatched away lest he sin — is a gift of God, which God in his will gives to some and not to others. "They are compelled to admit that it is a gift of God," he says, "that a man should end this life before he changes from good to evil." He had said the same in passing in c. 7 of the same book, and also in *lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 23. He taught this same point more explicitly and at length in c. 12 of *lib. 1 de animae Origine ad Renatum*, in order to refute the error of one who said that a person could be judged for sins he would have committed if he had lived. He says: "If sins which a man would have committed if he had lived, though they were never actually committed, are still condemned in the dead man, then no benefit was conferred on him who was snatched away lest wickedness should change his understanding, since he will be judged according to the wickedness that was going to be in him, and not according to the innocence that was found in him."

A corresponding passage is found in *lib. 3 de anima et eius origine ad Vincentium Victorem*, c. 10. The doctrine of c. 14 of *lib. de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, of which we spoke just above, is of the same import. The notable testimony placed there from that same scriptural passage — "He was taken away lest wickedness should change his understanding" — which proceeded from the lips of Cyprian, is significant. The entire teaching of that chapter serves to show that it is a singular

benefit of God that a person is taken away by an untimely death in order to avoid sins which he was foreseen to be going to commit had he lived longer. There Augustine commends and vindicates the book of Wisdom and expounds that testimony admirably, saying among other things: "How greatly and supremely would it benefit a man who has fallen and miserably ends this life in that same fall and goes to the punishments such things deserve — how much would it not profit him to be snatched away by death from this place of temptation before he falls?" And coming afterward to infants he says: "This grace appears most plainly in infants, of whom some end their life baptized, others not, thereby sufficiently indicating mercy and judgment — free mercy on the one hand, deserved judgment on the other. For if men were judged according to the merits of the life they did not have, having been prevented by death, but would have had if they had lived, it would profit nothing for him who was snatched away lest wickedness should change his understanding; it would profit nothing for those who fall and die, if they died before their fall — which no Christian will dare to say." The knowledge of conditional merits and demerits is manifest here and cannot be denied by any obstinacy.

The third argument appears no less clear, because in it this truth subsists in what Augustine teaches about the difference in the callings of grace in *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum*, q. 2. For having distinguished between the calling to which the one called submits and that which the called person resists, he teaches that the latter, if called in a different manner, would come; and that there is no will so perverse and obstinate that God cannot move and draw it, if he calls it by another fitting and certain calling — of which there are in God various, wonderful, and efficacious modes by which the human will yields and obeys freely, yet infallibly. This doctrine is founded on knowledge of conditionals, and teaches that according to the modes and manners of calling, if applied in one way or another, the will shall or shall not consent. Let us cite and set out the sentences. In the midst of the question he writes: "The effect of God's mercy cannot be in the power of man, lest he should show mercy in vain while the man is unwilling; for if he wanted to show mercy even to them, he could call them in such a way as was fitting for them, so that they would be moved, would understand, and would follow." And he adds: "God, even if he calls many, nevertheless shows mercy to those whom he calls in such a way as is fitting for them to follow." And he adds further: "He who has mercy calls him in the way he knows to be fitting for him, so that he will not reject the one calling." Behold the effect of the knowledge of conditionals: for God, wishing a particular person to come, resolved first to call him fittingly and congruently so that he would come. But in order to will this, he had to foreknow the ways and modes by which he could call him that were congruent with his consent. These, however, can only be known by means of a knowledge antecedent to the decree of calling — and the knowledge that follows the decree is already knowledge of an absolutely future

calling, coming after that conditional knowledge which preceded both the decree and absolute, visionary knowledge.

And again, speaking of the reprobate Esau, he says: "Who would dare to say that God lacked the mode of calling by which even Esau would have applied his mind to that faith and joined his will to it in which Jacob was justified?" And finally: "When God abandons in this way, not calling in such a manner as could move one toward faith, who would say that the mode of persuading him to believe was likewise lacking to the Almighty?" These testimonies certainly prove, on Augustine's authority, the foreknowledge of conditionals.

Fourth, the same truth is drawn from another doctrine of the same Augustine — repeatedly taught — on grace freely given by God, not returned to man's merits, and on the distinction of the predestined from the reprobate within that condemned mass on account of original sin. This is perpetually taught by Augustine against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, who sought merit and the beginning of merit in nature, and in a certain residue of theirs attributed it to conditional merits, as we said above. For in this doctrine he presupposes that the distinction is not made on the basis of any foresight of the use of free will, nor of merit or demerit conditionally future, but rather from the mercy and grace of God who wills to exempt his elect from that condemned mass and predestine them, leaving others in it as a demonstration of justice.

He uses for this purpose the example of the Tyrians and Sidonians, which Christ the Lord adduced in *Matthew XI* to rebuke the Jews, as Augustine says in *Enchir. c. 95*: "Then — that is, on the Day of Judgment — will appear what is written in the Psalm: 'I will sing of mercy and judgment to you, O Lord'; because unless it is through undeserved mercy that anyone is liberated, and unless it is through deserved judgment that anyone is condemned, it will not then be hidden what is now hidden: why of two infants one was to be taken up through God's mercy and the other left behind through judgment — in which case he who is taken up should recognize what was owed to him through judgment, had not mercy come to his aid — why the one rather than the other was taken up when both had the same condition; why miracles were not performed among certain people which, if they had been performed, those people would have done penance, while they were performed among those who were never going to believe. For the Lord says openly: 'Woe to you, Chorazin, woe to you, Bethsaida, because if in Tyre and Sidon had been performed the miracles that were performed in you, they would long ago have done penance in sackcloth and ashes.'" The words "the Lord says openly" make it manifest that Augustine had no doubt about that penance as conditionally future, affirming that Christ foresaw with certainty and infallibly that it would follow. Thus Augustine excludes conjectural knowledge and admits certain and infallible knowledge.

He teaches the same doctrine more at length and more clearly in *lib. de Dono Perseverantiae, c. 9*, where, proving by divine authority that the cause and reason

for distinguishing the predestined from the reprobate is not drawn from the works and merits of our nature, nor from the foreseen use of our activity, and cutting off all avenues of escape, he at last comes to that final and well-worn position of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians regarding conditionally future merits, and refuting that error as follows: "Are we to return to the point of debating once more with what great absurdity it is said that the dead are judged even for those sins which God foreknew they would have committed if they had lived? This is so abhorrent to Christian — or indeed to any human — sensibility that I am ashamed even to refute it. For why should it not be said that the Gospel itself was preached in vain with so much labor and sufferings of the saints, and is still preached in vain, if men could be judged even without having heard the Gospel, according to the stubbornness or obedience which God foreknew they would have had if they had heard it? And the Tyrians and Sidonians would not be condemned, though more leniently than those cities in which unbelievers saw the Lord Christ work miraculous signs, since if those signs had been done among them, they would have done penance in sackcloth and ashes — so the words of truth have it, in which words the Lord Jesus revealed to us a deeper mystery of predestination." And a little below:

"Otherwise the Tyrians and Sidonians would not be paying penalties according to what they actually did, but would rather obtain salvation according to what they were going to do, if in their midst those evangelical miracles had been performed, through great penance and through faith in Christ." That this knowledge was most certain, and was considered such by Augustine, is evident from the very context of the disputation, and those words in *c. 9* plainly signify it: "Can we say that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have refused to believe, given such miracles performed among them, or that they would not have believed if they had been performed — when the Lord himself attests that they would have done penance with great humility, if the signs of those divine powers had been done among them?" Behold the infallible certainty of that conditional object, which Augustine affirms and pursues both there and in *c. 10*.

The same mind of Augustine regarding future conditionals as certainly and infallibly known by God also appears — this being in fact the fourth point — in the doctrine he delivers concerning the creation of angels and men and their state on the way, in which state Adam was established before his fall. For Augustine joins Adam with the angels, because in the state of original innocence, on Augustine's authority, Christ was neither foreseen nor decreed — which same Augustine holds that Christ would not have come if Adam had not sinned, as I showed with many passages of his in the first and chief conclusion of my *Cortina*. On this state Augustine discourses in *lib. de Correptione et Gratia, cc. 10 and 11*. Namely, that God foreknew what was going to befall angels and Adam if he had left them to their own free will — that is, if they had acted with the help of indifferent grace, placed within the power of the will — and with that grace he foresaw that many angels would fall, and that Adam with his posterity would fall

and form a condemned mass. And having foreknown this, namely conditionally, that both natures would fall in this way, he nevertheless preferred to create them, so that in the falling angels he might show his judgment, and in the fallen men his mercy and justice — mercy by becoming incarnate for them and predestining those he chose, justice by leaving and condemning the rest on account of the sins which he absolutely foresaw the wicked were going to commit. This discourse certainly contains conditional knowledge regarding what the angels and Adam would do, before he decreed to create them — since he foreknew those sins and that fall, yet preferred to create them rather than not to create them.

Thus Augustine writes in *c. 10* of that book *de Correptione et Gratia*: "Wherefore we most healthfully confess what we most rightly believe: that God, the Lord and creator of all things, who made all things very good, foreknew and knew that evils were going to arise from good things, and that it pertained more to his most omnipotent goodness to bring good even out of evils than not to permit evils — and so he ordered the nature of angels and men, in order that he might first show in it what their free will could do, and then what the benefit of his grace could do, and finally what the verdict of his justice." He then presents and weighs the judgment in the ruin of the angels and his providence regarding men, tempered by mercy and judgment. Moreover, concerning Adam he frequently teaches that God foreknew he would sin if he had been created in the manner in which he was created — yet did not refrain from creating him on that account, because he foreknew what he was going to do. So in the same *lib. de Correptione et Gratia, c. 12*: "God foreknowing what he would unjustly do, yet not compelling him, but at the same time knowing what he himself would justly do with him." He speaks in the same manner in *Enchiridion, c. 104*: "Because he foreknew that he would make bad use of his free will — that is, that he would sin — he prepared his own will for this, so that he himself would bring good even out of the man acting badly; so that the good will of the Almighty should be fulfilled nonetheless, not be made void by the bad will of man." Concerning the falling angels he thinks the same, and expresses it in *lib. 22 de Civitate Dei, c. 1*, where he also mentions the fall of Adam in a manner fitting to our view on conditional matters — as also notably in *lib. 14 de Civitate Dei, cc. 26 and 27*.

Fifth, there is an outstanding passage of Augustine in *Epist. 49 ad Deogratias Presbyterum, q. 2*, against Porphyry, which he himself cites in *lib. de praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. 9*. There, responding to the question why Christ came after so long a time, he says: "Let them not reproach Christ with the fact that not all follow his teaching. What will they answer if, leaving aside that height of the wisdom and knowledge of God where perhaps another divine counsel far more secret lies hidden, and setting aside without prejudice other possible causes that prudent men may investigate — for the sake of brevity in debating this question we say only this: that Christ chose to appear to men and have his teaching preached among them at the time when he knew and where

he knew there were those who would believe in him. For in those times and places where his Gospel was not preached, he foreknew that all would be such as — not all of them indeed, but yet many of them — were in his bodily presence, who refused to believe in him even with the dead raised by him; just as even now we see many who, with so great a manifestation of the prophecies concerning him being fulfilled, are still unwilling to believe and prefer to resist with human cleverness rather than to yield to so clear and transparent, and so sublime a — spoken sublimely — divine authority." And then: "What wonder, then, if Christ knew the world in earlier centuries to be so full of unbelievers that he deserved not to appear or to be preached to them — those whom he foreknew would not believe either his words or his miracles?" And below: "For what is more certain than that Christ foreknew who, when, and in what places would believe in him?"

The mind of Augustine regarding the certainty of the knowledge of conditionals is plain here. He establishes it as a settled truth that Christ knew who would or would not believe in him if he came at one time or another. He permits no ambiguity about it. But what the Semi-Pelagians extracted from those words to support their error with a different meaning — namely that this good or bad use of freedom in believing is the reason for God's choosing and reprobating those who would or would not believe — Augustine qualified: he conceded the foreknowledge, but denied that it is the cause of election or reprobation in that conditional state of the future or non-future use of human free will. For God did not choose the predestined because he foresaw them as going to believe in those circumstances by the power of natural free will — which is what the Massilians inferred from that foreknowledge — but foresaw those who were going to believe from the gift of his grace thus moving and stirring the will so that they would believe, who were in those circumstances going to believe.

Thus he admitted the foreknowledge of faith that was going to be future in that condition and state of affairs, but excluded the error of those who deduced from the foreknowledge that such future faith would not be a gift of God's grace but a fruit of natural freedom. Let us hear the Massilians erring thus in Hilary's letter to Augustine, printed before the book *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*: "But when it is asked of them why the truth is preached or not preached to some, or in some places, or is now preached to what were almost all peoples but now to only certain gentiles, they say that this is a matter of divine foreknowledge, so that the truth was or is proclaimed at the time, place, and to those people among whom it was foreknown that it would be believed. And they claim to prove this not only by the testimonies of other Catholics, but also by your own holiness's earlier disputation. Yet in that same earlier work you taught the same grace with no lesser perspicuity of truth, as in what your holiness said in the question against Porphyry on the time of the Christian religion: 'that Christ chose to appear to men and have his teaching preached among them at the time when he knew and where he knew there were those who would believe in him.'" These are

the words we cited above from Augustine, which the Massilians twisted to their own erroneous meaning — for they did not distinguish between the foreknowledge of faith conditionally future and the cause of that same faith as future, as Augustine distinguished, as he says in the cited *lib. de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, c. 9: "You see that I chose to say this about the foreknowledge of God — without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God or other possible causes — that seemed sufficient to convince the infidelity of the pagans who had raised this question. For what is more certain than that Christ foreknew who, when, and in what places would believe in him? But whether they would have faith in the Christ preached to them by their own effort" — which was the Pelagian error — "or by God's gift" — which was the Catholic truth — "that is, whether God merely foreknew them or also predestined them — I did not think to inquire and discuss. And so what I said — 'that Christ chose to appear to men and have his teaching preached among them at the time when he knew and where he knew there were those who would believe in him' — could equally be said thus: that Christ chose to appear to men and have his teaching preached among them at the time and place where he knew those who had been chosen in him before the foundation of the world were to be found." Thus, while preserving the gratuity of grace, he retains the foreknowledge of faith conditionally future. And he immediately subjoins: "What I said — that the salvation of this religion has never been lacking to anyone who was worthy of it, and that it has been lacking to no one who was unworthy — if this is scrutinized and examined as to how anyone is worthy, there are those who say by the human will: we however say by grace or divine predestination."

That this foreknowledge is not absolute but conditional is evident because it preceded the decree of Christ's coming. This is evident from the state of the question, for the question was why Christ decreed to come at that time, to appear in those places, and to preach to those people. And the reason given is because he foresaw that there would be believers there — which foreknowledge preceded the absolute decree of coming and preaching. Since the cause of decreeing was that foreseen future faith before the decree, it was certainly conditional. And so this is a clear and inescapable passage, one which Vázquez notes in *in primam partem disp. 92. cap. 2. n. 7 and 8* against the Massilians, writing thus: "It can rightly be said that God, in the predestination of his grace and the giving of it, had knowledge of our consent that was going to come from grace. Moreover, this was not only fitting and consonant with reason, but also necessary, because the infinite knowledge of God could not fail to foreknow all those future events even under a condition, as was established in *disp. 67*, and since his predestination is the preparation of congruent and efficacious grace, he could not in predestining fail to know the effect it would have in us. But on account of such use he constituted or defined nothing at all, but rather, so that we might have such use, he prepared us from himself, and in foreknowledge and in time gave the first grace — for he did not call us because we were going to

be holy, but so that we might be, as we noted in that same chapter from Jerome and Augustine." Vásquez grasped and expressed the genuine sense of this passage.

I add that Augustine frequently raises questions that contain conditional future events — both those raised by Catholics and those raised by heretics — which he accepts in that sense and resolves, and thereby shows what his view is on the foreknowledge of conditional matters. In *lib. 1 de peccatorum meritis et remissione*, from cc. 2 to 6, he disputes whether Adam, had he not sinned, would have died or not, and sets out the opinion of the Pelagians who affirmed he would have died, which he refutes by denying it. This question is a conditional one. He treats the same in *lib. 2 de peccatorum meritis et remissione*, cc. 21 and 22 and the following, where he also teaches that the concupiscence of the flesh was entirely absent in the state of innocence and would not have come about unless Adam had lost his innocence. He teaches the same in *lib. 1 de nuptiis et concupiscentia ad Valerium*, cc. 16 and 21; and *lib. 2*, cc. 30 and 35; and *lib. 3 contra Iulianum*, cc. 12 and 25; and *lib. 2 contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, c. 17.

Again, in *lib. 1 de peccatorum meritis et remissione*, c. 37, he inquires: if the first parents had not sinned, would they have had children who could use neither tongue, nor hands, nor feet? There is also a notable conditional doctrine in *lib. 2 de peccatorum meritis et remissione*, c. 29, regarding Christ, whom he believes would have been consumed by old age and would have died naturally had he not been taken away by a violent death. Augustine's words are: "But because in him there was the likeness of sinful flesh, he willed to undergo the changes of age, beginning from infancy itself, so that that flesh might seem to have been able to arrive at death even through aging, had he not been killed as a young man." This position involves that conditional question: would Christ have died naturally from his human constitution, if he had not been crucified and killed?

There is also the doctrine in *lib. 5 de civitate Dei*, c. 26, containing the matter that Augustine teaches — that in the state of innocence women would have conceived without corruption of virginal integrity. This bears on the question: would conception of offspring have occurred then while virginity was preserved? I cite Augustine's words: "In such ease of things and happiness of men, far be it from us to suspect that offspring could not be begotten without the disease of lust, but those members would be moved by the will in the same manner as other members; and without the alluring stimulus of passion, with tranquility of mind and body, the husband would be united to the bosom of his wife. For just because experience cannot prove it, we are not therefore to disbelieve it — when those parts of the body would be set in motion not by turbulent heat but by voluntary power applying them as need required. In the same way it would then have been possible for the seed to be introduced into the womb of the spouse with intact integrity of the female genital as now it is possible for the menstrual blood to flow from the womb of a virgin with the

same integrity preserved. For by the same passage by which the one can be ejected, the other could be injected; and as to give birth the groaning of labor would not relax the female organs but the impulse of maturity, so to impregnate and conceive it would not be the appetite of lust but the use of will that would unite the two natures of husband and wife." These are two conditional objects: the first, which I have stated as the principal one — virginity of those conceiving; and the second, which I now add and which he also indicated — freedom from pain in those giving birth — if those first human beings and their posterity had remained in that state of innocence.

In *lib. de vera Religione*, c. 48, Augustine says the following, which is fitting for conditional knowledge: "For we would not have those kinds of ties that arise from birth and death if our nature, remaining in the precepts and image of God, had not relapsed into this corruption." Behold the manifest condition. And in reconsidering and correcting this passage in *lib. 1 retractationum*, c. 13, he provides a new object of conditional knowledge: "I entirely disapprove of that meaning, which I had already disapproved in *lib. 1 de Genesi contra Manichaeos*. For it leads to the conclusion that those first spouses would not have generated posterity had they not sinned — as though it had been necessary that mortal beings should be born if they were begotten from the intercourse of male and female. For I had not yet seen that it could have come about that the non-mortal should be born from non-mortals, if human nature had not been changed for the worse by that great sin — and thus if both in parents and in children fecundity and happiness had remained, men would have been born up to the fixed number of the saints which God predestined, not to succeed their dying parents but to reign together with the living ones. There would therefore have been even those family relationships and connections, if no one had sinned and no one had died." Here we have conditional truth regarding the propagation of the human race in that state of innocence. As often as Augustine treats of this state, he reinforces this argument as many times. To avoid prolixity I indicate a few passages: *lib. 1 de Genesi contra Manichaeos*, cc. 18 and 20, and *lib. 2*, c. 26; *lib. 1 contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, c. 17; *lib. 1 retractationum*, c. 19; *lib. 3 contra Iulianum*, cc. 18 and 25; *lib. de origine Animae ad Renatum*, c. 12.

By these testimonies, broadly and clearly, I believe, the mind of Augustine is demonstrated — he who acknowledged and affirmed that there exists in God a foreknowledge of conditional things, of which he is beyond all doubt the author, and whom Scotus followed, as clearly appears from the passages cited above.

Collation XI, Difference I. On Middle Knowledge.

Section I. The State of the Question Is Proposed and Explained.

Just as there is almost no one who denies divine knowledge of conditional objects, so all are in doubt about the reason and mode of knowing them, and raise the question through what kind of knowledge they are known. On

necessary things no question is raised, since these are of their very nature determined and require no other medium in order to be known, beyond being posited in act. Fire, if it is created, will produce heat; water, coldness. The discussion is therefore about free and contingent things, and especially human acts, to which the controversy instituted on their account is referred. On this there are three opinions.

The first is the ancient opinion of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, who said that the reason for knowing the free meritorious conditional acts is the freedom of the human will, natural and stripped of grace — either in general, as the Pelagians held, or specifically with respect to the beginning of faith, as the Semi-Pelagians maintained. This is clear from their heresy: for the Pelagians, saying that nature by its own natural faculty is sufficiently capable of living rightly, observing the divine precepts, and thereby obtaining eternal salvation, and that it does in fact live virtuously, observe the precepts, and attain beatitude, consequently affirmed that God knew in a conditional state — which they admitted — what the human will would do if placed in these or those circumstances, by the force of its natural freedom, without the aid of divine grace, as we said above in reviewing the testimonies of Augustine, especially the last — the fifth one — where we produced this Massilian heresy from Saint Hilary's letter to Augustine, preliminary to the book *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, and in Augustine's response in the same book, c. 9. I recall those words of the letter of Prosper: "God foreknew before the foundation of the world and predestined to his kingdom those who would believe, and those who, being freely called, would be worthy of election, and would pass from this life with a good end, being those who were going to persevere in the faith which is to be sustained through the grace of God." And below: "They say that those will be lost and those will be saved such as divine knowledge foresaw they would be in their adult years, if they had been preserved to the active age." And immediately: "They say that this foreknowledge of God regarding human merits is that according to which the grace of the one calling operates." And he adds: those foreknown by the Lord as going to believe, and to each nation the times and ministries of teachers so dispensed that the good credulity of wills would arise.

These are the merits they assigned as the reason for knowing conditional future things. In the letter of Hilary it reads: "They say that it is a matter of divine foreknowledge that the truth was or is proclaimed at that time and place and to those people among whom it was foreknown that it would be believed." And a little later: "Moreover, they maintain that foreknowledge, predestination, and purpose are of value to this end — that God foreknew, predestined, and purposed to choose those who were going to believe." This knowledge was certainly in a conditional state, since it preceded the purpose or absolute decree of choosing — given that the reason for choosing was that they were going to believe by their own will, in the opinion of the Massilians. The same is proved

from Augustine in that cited *c. 9*, whose words need not be repeated. Justly, however, I take others from *c. 18*: "Pelagius foreknew," he says, "who would be holy and immaculate through the free will of freedom, and therefore chose them in his foreknowledge before the foundation of the world — those whom he foreknew would be such. He chose, then, before they existed, he says, by predestinating those sons whom he foreknew as going to be holy and immaculate — which holiness and immaculacy he foreknew not as something he himself would make, nor as something he was going to make, but as something they themselves were going to have." Thus Pelagius according to Augustine. From this it is evident that the Pelagians held that the reason for knowing good conditional future works is the determination of the free human will, naturally capable of acting well without the aid of grace, and capable of acting without it if placed in that conditional state. This opinion is a manifest Pelagian heresy and is therefore to be rejected and condemned.

Let us come to the Catholic opinions, which presuppose grace and admit no meritorious work without it.

The second in order, and the first among Catholics, is that of the Jesuit school, affirming that these things are known — setting aside all divine decree — in the cooperation of human free will with grace in such-and-such a circumstance, constituted in accordance with an indifferent offered aid of grace. The Jesuit Fathers explain it this way: God sees that Peter can be placed in these circumstances with this prepared aid of grace for acting well; he sees further the opportuneness and congruence of that aid with such a will, so that the one part of the contradiction — "he will act" or "he will not act" — is truly so in those circumstances, prior to any decree of the divine will. Therefore he will know the conditional future in itself, given the congruence and connection of indifferent grace with the human will, without waiting for any antecedently determining decree of the will. They add that such a decree is incompatible with the freedom of our will — for if action follows from it, and the will is not going to act otherwise except because God decrees that it act, then it is determined from without, and thus not from its own innate freedom. It is necessary, therefore, that the will determine itself from within together with that indifferent aid of grace offered to it, so that it freely acts. They add that this knowledge is entirely necessary for directing the divine will in decreeing what is going to be absolutely, for unless the intellect proposes to the will what the will is going to do or not do, God will not be able prudently and firmly to decree what is going to be absolutely future. And so they give two reasons for affirming middle knowledge: one, that God may prudently and with certainty provide for future things; the other, that he may not injure the freedom of the will, which would be entirely removed by that antecedent decree of the divine will.

This is the genuine nature and form of conditional — which they call middle — knowledge as held by the Jesuits, which they say was invented and formulated

by them for the purpose of establishing the providence of God in predestining and the freedom of men in acting toward the effect of predestination and reprobation. I myself both received it thus from them when they were my teachers as a young man, and later, grown older, learned it from those who were writing about and defending it in their public theses.

But why is it called middle? To those who ask, they respond thus: it stands between necessary knowledge of possibles and free knowledge of future things. For beyond necessary knowledge, it adds the conditional futurity of those possibles that remained within that precise state of possibility without any order toward future existence; yet it does not advance to absolutely future existence, which belongs to free knowledge. And this reason seems just for applying to it the name "middle," since it participates from necessary knowledge the antecedence to the absolute decree, and from free knowledge the determination to one part of existence, posited on the congruence and appropriateness of grace as conditionally future. This opinion is far removed from the first — for it entirely excludes its error by admitting divine grace and cooperation with it, to such a degree that it does not even posit anything initial of faith or merit without it. It only excludes a conditional decree on God's part, in the power of which the will placed in those circumstances would act — and it considers, if this is granted, that freedom is removed. Accordingly it holds and affirms that will with the congruent offered aid of grace in these circumstances to be a sufficient and total principle of acting. All the Jesuits without exception, as certain of their authors say, and many others from other schools follow it — and indeed there is a great and remarkable agreement among the Jesuits in defending it. It is properly their own, born, grown, and propagated among them. They embrace, defend, cherish, nurture, clothe, adorn, and enrich their offspring, and do not expose or abandon it. This has been so from a century past and more — that is, from the year 1560, in which Father Pedro da Fonseca, Molina's teacher, discovered and taught it in the Portuguese schools, as he himself attests in *lib. 6 Metaphysicae, c. 2, q. 4*. It flourishes and grows in the Society and is daily strengthened with new arguments. Father Luis de Molina was the first to commit to print this doctrine transmitted by his teacher both orally and in writing, in the year 1588, and he acknowledges himself as its author and inventor — having confirmed it in his commentary on *1 p. D. Thomae q. 23, art. 4 and 5, disp. 1*. And although nearly all agree in accepting and transmitting it, they nonetheless disagree vigorously among themselves as to its antiquity or novelty — which is tantamount to doubting whether it is the proper and legitimate offspring of the Society or something belonging to the Fathers and Scholastics. On this they contend. Some, with Suárez *tom. 1 de gratia in Prolegomenon 2, c. 1, n. 12*, affirm that it was born at the time of Saint Augustine and has perennially flourished in a continuous series from him to our own age, having been handed down by the Fathers and Scholastics, and that the contrary opinion is surpassed both in authority and in antiquity. Others, with Vásquez —

Suárez's antagonist — *in commentar. in 1 p. q. 14, disp. 67, c. 4*, at the end, *n. 27*, deny that it is ancient and known to the Scholastics, yet do not on that account hold it to be reproachable for novelty. On this point there are those who reconcile the contenders as follows: if the knowledge of conditionals is considered in the manner we examined above, it is plainly ancient, Augustinian, and the doctrine of other Fathers and Scholastics — and in that sense Suárez is speaking. But if we consider the mode and reason for knowing those conditional future things in themselves by the force of the will determining itself together with the congruent and opportune aid of offered grace, prior to the decree of the divine will, it was entirely new and unheard-of to the ancient Fathers, and first and foremost to Augustine and the Scholastics — and in that sense Vásquez is speaking.

Hence it is true to say that absolutely all the Jesuits without exception transmit conditional knowledge, if the discussion is about the first cognition of future conditionals — for no one denies it. But if the discussion is about the second sense, not all Jesuits without exception follow it, as we saw above in the case of Henrique Henriques, a distinguished theologian and teacher of Suárez, by whom that knowledge was rejected. Whether other Jesuits have likewise rejected it in that sense I shall make public when I set forth my own judgment on it.

The third opinion is nearly common to all schools other than the Jesuit — Thomists, Augustinians, Carmelites, and lay academics presiding over public chairs in universities (with a few exceptions, whom I shall name in the appropriate place). This opinion teaches that conditional knowledge is not derived from the conditional objects themselves, nor founded in them by virtue of their future cooperation in these or those circumstances if they were placed in them with the offered aid of grace, independently of any decree of God. Rather it rests on a certain antecedent conditional decree of this form: "If I place Peter, for example, in such circumstances with the offered aid of grace, and will that he act rightly, he will indeed act rightly, depending on my freely and conditionally included decree." So the reason for seeing the future operation of the will placed in such circumstances — a will that is free and undetermined toward acting — is not the immediate determination of the created will itself, independent of the divine decree, but rather that very decree freely determining in that state the created will, which is indifferent together with the indifferently offered aid of grace — so that the reason of acting is the decree, and the action arising from the decree is the object of conditional middle knowledge. Accordingly, a will placed in the state of such-and-such circumstances, in which it remains indifferent and free with the likewise indifferently offered aid of grace, cannot be known to be determinately and certainly going to act, except by a free divine decree that freely and contingently — yet antecedently — determines it.

This is as the case stands with absolutely future things, which unless they are determined by God and placed in the state of being absolutely future cannot be known by God through the knowledge of vision — that is, absolute knowledge. Nor is freedom thereby removed, since the primary authors of the Society themselves acknowledge that absolutely future free acts are not violated in any way by absolute pre-defining decrees, as we also showed above from the doctrine of Scotus. They add that this knowledge is not necessary for establishing divine providence and ordering predestination, since without it God through the knowledge of possibles sees what he can do regarding a creature, what he can ordain concerning it and provide for its acts, and knows the power and efficacy of his own will, on the disposition of which everything depends. They further add that that mode and reason of knowing conditionally future acts of creatures — as necessary for providence and predestination — is unworthy of God, because it makes God dependent on the creature and makes the creature give God the rule and principle of acting, removing from him the reason and dignity of first cause and attributing it to the creature. Wherefore the mystery of predestination and divine providence is overturned — in which God can do nothing of himself and efficaciously, but whatever he disposes, ordains, and determines is all reduced to the freedom of the human will. And finally the entire fabric of divine predestination rests on the foundation of human freedom.

These absurdities are removed by the contrary opinion, which preserves the independence of God and the dignity of the first cause, and retains the certainty and infallibility of the determination of future acts together with the truth of things and the seemliness of God, whose omnipotence and efficacy of will is established without any injury to created freedom. To that freedom God, as the wisest and most powerful cause, accommodates himself through the concurrent action which he foresees as possible for it. That this is entirely the opinion of Augustine and the other Fathers, of Saint Thomas, Scotus, and other Scholastics, is established by fitting arguments both from antiquity and authority.

Section II. The Middle Knowledge of the Jesuits Is Confirmed by Arguments.

The first is drawn from necessity: without it God cannot with certainty provide for absolutely free future things, nor prudently act with respect to them. This is proved because unless God foreknows in what state the will is to be placed and in what circumstances it is to be located, and what aid is to be offered to it and what proportion that aid has to the will, he will not be able to know the determination of the will toward acting, nor to decree the future free operation. Therefore conditional or middle knowledge — which shows all these things to God — is absolutely necessary; otherwise he will act rashly and, as it were, blindly.

The second is from the preservation of human freedom: because if God antecedently through his decree determines the will toward acting, he will

remove from it its indifference and freedom, since by virtue of an efficacious decree it will perform what God determinately decrees — not what it itself wills to do from its own indifference and free will. For it will cooperate as constrained, not as free; as compelled, not spontaneously; as necessitated, not freely; bound by a decree from the authority of which it cannot free itself as from a chain.

The third is from the harmony of efficacious grace with the freedom of human free will: because this is preserved by means of middle knowledge, which shows the mode in which the free will cooperates freely and sweetly with grace, responding to a congruent and opportune calling offered in those circumstances in which it is foreseen to act spontaneously and willingly, with its intrinsic power and innate freedom retained, without external determination — grace and will connecting themselves so that action arises in the highest conformity with freedom.

The fourth is from the equity and equality of God toward his creatures, toward which, as Creator of all and first cause, he ought to conduct himself equitably and equally — preserving to each its freedom and communicating grace that stirs and aids them to act, with which all can be saved. He chooses from among them those whom he sees will respond to such-and-such a calling, without respect of persons; he reprobates those whom he sees will not respond — just and equitable in both: in saving the good and in condemning the bad. The contrary follows from the opposing opinion, in which God's will alone is the cause of election and reprobation — at least negative reprobation — prior to the foreseeing of merits in that conditional state.

The fifth is from the removal of the complaints of the reprobate against God: because if election is not made on the basis of that foresight of merits conditionally future in these or those circumstances — with those merits regulating the decree of choosing and predestining, so that the reason of choosing is the decree of the divine will choosing men independently and antecedently — then the rest, who are not chosen, will justly complain against God for not choosing them or placing them in the state of eternal salvation as he did the other elect and predestined. For if God himself had willed it, they would have acted rightly and been saved. This complaint ceases once middle knowledge is posited, for through it God sees those who will make good use of the grace offered to them and those who will not — and so election is made according to foreseen good free merits.

The sixth is from the despair induced in men and the impossibility of salvation: because if election depends on that divine decree imbued in that placement of the will in these or those circumstances — which state is not within man's power, and in it he follows the decree of God determining him to act — he will do nothing from his own free will, nor will salvation be in his power. Indeed, exhortations and corrections and preaching will cease, and every reason for

confidence in obtaining the end toward which man was created and directed by God will be removed, and despair will be induced — since thereafter no room will remain for industry, labor, or one's own freedom — from which a kind of fatal and inevitable necessity will follow.

The seventh is from the denial of sufficient aid to be offered and presented to all: because God does not extend that antecedent decree of his to all, but only to those whom he wishes to save, and for them prepares the means to salvation. For he does not attend to the common nature of all, nor to freedom in acting, nor does he follow the foreseeing of merits; rather he decrees these things for those to whom he will, and thus does not consult the universality of men who are capable by their nature of grace and who require it by reason of their ordination to a supernatural final end. And consequently that commonly received principle of Paul — "God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth" — wavers, since its truth is reduced to the free will of God rather than to human need and necessity — to which conditional knowledge provides, since, foreseeing all the future free acts of free causes, it provides for all in common the means according to their need, and according to their future use either predestines or reprobates.

The eighth and last is from the knowability of those conditional propositions: which of themselves have determinate truth and falsity, setting aside all antecedent decree. For given contradictories — "he will act or he will not act" — it necessarily follows that one of them is true and the other false. For whoever says "Peter will act in these circumstances, or he will not act" sets out two contradictories, of which one will be true and the other false, since both cannot be true or both false. Therefore prior to and independently of any decree of his own, God sees that Peter either will or will not act, and therefore knows those objects in themselves without waiting for a decree, since in themselves they have determinate truth and falsity. And so there remains in God an antecedent and decree-independent conditional knowledge of free acts. Since, therefore, those propositions are knowable by their own terms and in themselves, knowledge of them cannot be denied to God — and from this the truth of the middle knowledge of the Jesuit Fathers is established.

These are the foundations of this opinion, in which are contained all the arguments that the authors who favor it customarily accumulate, and to which all others are reduced. You may find them set out more broadly and elaborated more profoundly among those authors, but not, I think, more vigorously, solidly, and clearly presented. I value fidelity, order, and clarity — and especially in setting out and establishing this opinion, which I imbibed in the Society almost with mother's milk, held for thirty years, and most vigorously defended in my public disputations, before I had thoroughly mastered Augustine and presided over public chairs.

Section III. The Middle Knowledge of the Jesuits Is Confirmed by Authority.

This opinion, as so expounded, is taught and followed by Fonseca, *lib. 6 Met. c. 2, q. 4, sect. 8 and 9*; Molina, the principal author, in the *Concordia, disp. 17 on a. 13, and 1 p. q. 14, a. 13, dispp. 17 and 18*; Valentia, *1 p. q. 14, a. 13, puncto 1*; Suárez in the *opuscula lib. 2 de scientia conditionatorum, cc. 6 and 7, and tom. 1 de gratia, Prolegomenon 2*; Lessius in the *opusc. de auxiliis et de efficacia gratiae, cc. 19 and 20*; Arrubal, *dispp. 44 and following*; Albertinus in his corollaries on *q. 3 Theologica III*; Ruiz de Montoya, *de scientia Dei, dispp. 61 and following to 81*; Hurtado de Mendoza, *1 p. disp. 7, from c. 2*; Becanus, *tom. 1 summ. c. 10*; Francisco de Lugo, *lib. 1, disp. 3*; Fasolus, *tom. 2 in 1 p. q. 14, a. 13, from dub. 11 to 22*; Arriaga, *de scientia Dei 1 p. disp. 21*; Alarcón, *tract. 2 de scientia Dei, disp. 4*; Amicus, *disp. 22*; Antonio Pérez, *disp. 6, c. 8, a. 13 de scientia Dei*, and again *disp. 3 de providentia Dei, from c. 1 to disp. 6*; Tanner, *d. 2, q. 8, dub. 5, assert. 6*; Ragusa, *3 p. d. 29, § 4, concl. 1*; Aegidius Coninck, *3 p. q. 61, a. 2, at the end*; Tellez, *in 1 p. Log. d. 15, l. 4, and in the Appendix*. All the antagonists of Jansenius likewise earnestly transmit it: Annatus, Antonius Richardus, Antoninus Moralines, Thomas Augustinus — that is, Campius — Martinonus, Bagocius, all of whom I cited in my *Scrinium Augustini*. Bellarmine is also cited, *tom. 3, lib. 2 de amissione Gratiae, c. 17, and lib. 1 de Gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 12, and lib. 2, cc. 2 and 14*; and Vásquez, *1 p. d. 67 and d. 98, cc. 6 and 7, and d. 99, cc. 7 and 8*. Ruiz cites the former in *d. 67, l. 9, n. 1 and 2*; Alarcón cites the latter in *tract. 2, d. 4, c. 4, n. 7 and c. 6, n. 9*, where Ruiz places Vásquez outside the order and Alarcón omits Bellarmine — more safely omitted, as I shall say presently, than cited. Henriques is produced by no one, since he holds the contrary. As for the other Jesuit Fathers who published commentaries on Sacred Scripture, I note that they admitted certain and infallible conditional knowledge of conditionals, but not expressly middle knowledge — since they deal with the mode of knowing such future things only tangentially and in themselves, without treating the mode in which they are known. These are: Salmerón, *in Epistolas Pauli lib. 1, p. 2, d. 1 de praescientia; tom. 4 in Evang. p. 3, tract. 14; and in c. 8 ad Rom. d. 20, at the end, and dd. 21 and 27*; Toledo, *c. 10 in Lucam, annot. 18, and in c. 5 of the same Evang. annot. 54, and in Epist. ad Rom. 8, annot. 32, and of the same epistle c. 9, annot. 18 and 19*; Pererius, *in Genes. lib. 16, c. 11, n. 95, d. 7 generali, and in Epist. ad Rom. 8, d. 23, and in cap. 9, d. 8*; Maldonatus, *comment. in c. 11 Matthaei*; Barradas, *in Evang. tom. 3, lib. 2, c. 1*; Emmanuel Sà, *Matth. 11 and Luc. 10*; Cornelius, *1 Corinth. 4, vers. 7, and 2 ad Timoth. 2, n. 109*; Justinianus, *Rom. 8, vers. 29*; Lorinus, *in Act. Apostol. c. 2, vers. 23; c. 17, vers. 27; c. 22, vers. 18; Ps. 32, vers. 15*; Ribera, *in Ioel. c. 2, nn. 22 and 23*; Ionaë, *3, n. 31*; Sophon. *1, n. 44*; Blaise Viegas, *in Apoc. c. 12, com. 1, f. 14*.

From among others, those cited as certainly favoring middle knowledge are: Mascarenhas, Bishop of the Algarve, *tract. de Auxiliis, d. 2, p. 3 and d. 3, p. 4*; Diotalevi, *opusc. de hac scientia, from c. 5*; Pesant, *d. 5, concl. 4*; Pennoto, *in Propugnaculo, lib. 3, cc. 28, 29, 30*; Thena, *ad Hebr. 4, differ. 9*. Stapleton is referred to, *Antidoto in Matth. c. 11 and ad Rom. 9 and 11, and lib. 4 de Iustificazione, c. 8*; Tapia, *3 p. q. 2, a. 3*; Zumel, *tom. 2, var. dub. 5*; Lorca, *1. 2 tom. 2, d. 21, and in*

concordia libert. cum efficacia grat. § 1 and 3, d. 10, memb. 2, n. 27; Curiel, *contr. lib. 1, contr. 7*; Basilio Ponce, *1 p. var. disp. q. 6 scholast. c. 6* — though there is dispute about Lorca, Curiel, and Basilio, just as there is also about Soto, whom Suárez claims as his own and Álvarez as his own. Curiel and Basilio are known to have changed their opinion, as I shall say below. Among the Scotists, Corduba sides with the Jesuit Fathers in *Quaestionum lib. 1, q. 55, dub. 10*, conceding too much to freedom, as Vásquez reports in *d. 99, c. 5*; Faber Faventinus, *in 1 d. 41, dispp. 55 and 56*; Pontius, *d. 5* — from whom those are not far removed who have devised Concomitant Decrees against the mind of Scotus and the ancient school, among whom are Vulpes and Mastrius. With these, besides what we said above, we shall seriously remonstrate below.

Nevertheless the Jesuits differ among themselves. For Molina, *q. 14, art. 13, disp. 17*, says that God knows these things through his super-comprehension — or rather infinite comprehension — of free will, incumbent upon which he so surrounds everything knowable from every side as to constrain and complete it, together with an omniperspective penetration of the secondary cause operating freely and contingently. With him agrees Becanus, *tom. 1 summ. c. 10, q. 9*, who in that way and no other affirms that contingent and free future things are known by God.

Other Jesuits think differently. Suárez, *Prolegomenon 2 de scientia conditionatorum, c. 8*; Hurtado de Mendoza, *here d. 6, c. 2, n. 30*; Alarcón, *tract. 2, disp. 4, cc. 3 and 8*, citing Vásquez, *disp. 67* — these deny the principles of Molina who denies that they are known in themselves and affirms that they are known in the cause so infinitely comprehended, as we said. Finally, among those just cited, Suárez admits certain actual decrees in God pre-defining the future free acts — not pre-determining them, but nevertheless pre-defining them as future; and Ruiz de Montoya thinks nearly the same with him in *disp. 71, sess. 8*. On this account Alarcón remonstrates vehemently with them in *tract. 2, disp. 4, c. 6, nn. 7 and 8*, reproaching them for having gone over to the Thomist side. Arrubal is not far from their position in *disp. 45, c. 4*. Nor does Vásquez — whom Alarcón cites in his favor — agree with him; rather he departs greatly from the common opinion of the Jesuits affirming that conditional future things are known in themselves, as we shall show afterward, denying that Father Vásquez assents to them and indeed holds the contrary view together with Scotus.

Finally, the French Fathers antagonists of Jansenius who adhere to Molina refute Suárez and his followers, calling them "pre-definers" with reproach, as I showed in my *Scrinium*. And so the agreement among the Jesuit Fathers regarding this middle knowledge is less than is commonly supposed and as certain of their own writers boast — as is a matter clear and verified to me as a man who has known them from within, as I observed in my *Scrinium Augustini* in response to certain recent Jesuit theologians in France who were finding fault with Augustine.

I come to the authority which they endeavor to adduce in their favor — that of Augustine. That Augustine knew and approved knowledge of future conditionals, I both know and showed above. But on the mode of knowing: whether, as the authors of the Society maintain — that they are known in themselves, not in a conditional decree concerning them and dependently on it — Augustine also thought this, is what I now inquire of them, with eagerness and solicitude.

Molina, therefore, nearly the originator of this knowledge and plainly its foremost proponent, in his *Concordia*, q. 23, art. 4, disp. 1, in the final member, acknowledges that it was unknown to Augustine and first devised by himself — as Alarcón writes in *disp. 4, c. 11, n. 7*. But since in the second edition and in other places he says he found it in the Fathers — for example *1 p. q. 14, art. 13, disp. 18, memb. 2, § auctores*, and in the new *Concordia q. 14, a. 13, disp. 50, § "quae ut fortasse"* — where he openly names Augustine; and since the other originator of that knowledge, Fonseca, affirms the same in *lib. 6 Metaph. c. 2, q. 4*, it is necessary to examine the testimonies of Augustine in which that middle knowledge proper to God — known antecedently and independently from knowledge of conditional decrees, with the notion derived from the conditional objects themselves — is found. This is the particular sense of the question.

By my own diligence in studying Augustine, I find four passages which seem to favor the proposed opinion of the Society.

The first (I follow the order of the books) is found in *tom. 4, tract. expositiones quarundam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos, c. 8*, on those words "those he called, he also justified" — in *cc. 5 and 6* thus: "A question may arise as to whether all who are called are justified; but elsewhere we read 'many are called but few are chosen.' Yet since the chosen themselves were assuredly called, it is manifest that none are justified except those called — though not all the called, but those called according to purpose, as he said above. But the purpose of God is to be understood, not that of men. He himself explains what it means to be called according to purpose, when he says: 'those whom he foreknew and predestined, conformed to the image of his Son.' For not all who are called were called according to purpose — for this purpose pertains to the foreknowledge and predestination of God; nor did he predestine anyone except one whom he foreknew would believe and follow his calling — these he also calls chosen. For many do not come, though called; but no one comes who was not called." This testimony contains the matter. For what could be said more plainly than that the reason of the purpose — in which election and predestination consist — is the foreknowledge of one who will believe and follow the calling? That this foreknowledge is conditional is clear, because it precedes the purpose, which is God's decree of predestining. Nor can it be said that a conditional decree should be understood to be pre-intellected — one that is the cause of believing and following in the one who is going to believe and follow — for Augustine makes

no mention of such a decree, and he is dealing with those who do not come and do not believe, for whom there can be no decree or purpose, but only bare foreknowledge of the sin of not coming and not believing.

This testimony seems so clear that Fasolus most vigorously presses it against the Thomists in *1 p. q. 14, art. 13, dub. 17, n. 313*, and especially against Álvarez, whom he says denied that this passage is Augustine's and attributed it to John Arboreus — as Mastrius notes in *d. 3, q. 4, n. 259*, who speaks ambiguously, uncertain whether it belongs to Arboreus or Augustine. Yet it is entirely established to be Augustine's. I see that Father Álvarez, whom I consulted, having read and verified the passage, cites those words in the name of Arboreus in *lib. 1 respons. c. 1, n. 4* as though they were proper to him — yet he does not deny they are Augustine's in that place, but is entirely silent about Augustine, and below, *n. 36*, says: "To the passage of John Arboreus adduced above, the reply is" — from which it seems he did not recognize Augustine as the author of that opinion. And so I am surprised that this befell so great a man, since he could easily have seen that passage in its source. Nor was there need to be frightened by it, as Mastrius says — as will appear when I reply to it. Let it stand, then, that the testimony is Augustine's, and that John Arboreus uses it and produces it as his own — which perhaps misled Father Álvarez into thinking it was Arboreus's, not Augustine's. Arboreus cites it in *tom. 1 Theosophiae, lib. 4, c. 11*.

The second, no less forceful testimony, is drawn from *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum*, beginning from that passage, *q. 2*, after the beginning, where Augustine writes: "Many are called, but few are chosen" — namely those who did not disdain the one calling, but followed in faith, and assuredly believed willingly." And a little later: "Why was Esau found guilty before he was born — he who could neither believe nor despise the one calling, nor do anything good or bad? If by God's foreknowledge of his future evil will, why is Jacob not also approved by God's foreknowledge of his future good will? For once you have conceded that anyone can be approved or disapproved on the basis of what was not yet in him but which God foreknew was going to be, it follows that he could have been approved on account of works which God foreknew were going to be in him." And below, more clearly: "Or perhaps those who are called in this way and do not assent could adapt their will to faith if called in another way, so that both this would be true — 'many are called, few are chosen' — and also that though called in one way they nevertheless, since not all are disposed in one way, only those follow the calling who are found suitable for receiving it; and this would be no less true — 'Therefore it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy' — since God called them in the way that was fitting for those who followed the calling?" And still more plainly: "If he wanted to show mercy even to them, he could call them in such a way as was fitting for them, so that they would be moved and would understand and would follow." And again: "Those chosen who were congruently called; those however who did not conform and were not adapted to the calling, not chosen because they did not

follow, though called." And then: "He who has mercy calls him in the way he knows to be fitting for him, so that he will not reject the one calling."

In a word: whatever Augustine here contributes and suggests regarding congruent calling, all of it aids the opinion of the Fathers of the Society.

The third is contained in *lib. 83 quaestiones, q. 68*, where Augustine writes: "He shows mercy to whoever he wills, and hardens whoever he wills. 'What does he still complain about? For who resists his will?' But this will of God cannot be unjust. For it comes from most hidden merits, because even among sinners themselves, who by reason of their common sin form one mass, there is nevertheless no lack of diversity. Something, therefore, precedes in certain sinners by which, though not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification; something likewise precedes in other sinners by which they are worthy of hardening." And below: "God does not show mercy — he who calls to peace — unless the will has preceded, because on earth peace is to men of good will." He adds: "And so those who came should not attribute this to themselves, since they came because they were called; and those who were unwilling to come should attribute this to no one but themselves, since they were called by their own free will that they should come. Calling, therefore, before merit produces the will."

Although there is no mention here of foreknowledge, it is nevertheless presupposed with respect to the calling, which foresees the will of man as going to consent or not. And those words "most hidden merits" indicate that the distinction which God makes through election is based on merits antecedently foreseen of human free will — foreseen, indeed, not through any other knowledge than conditional knowledge, which finds those most hidden merits in those who are to be distinguished and predestined.

The fourth and last is in *lib. de Dono Perseverantiae, c. 14*, where Augustine treats of the knowledge of conditionals: "Will anyone dare to say that God did not foreknow to whom he would give the grace of believing?" And a little later: "From which it appears that some have in their very intellect a naturally divine gift of understanding, by which they are moved to faith if they hear words or behold signs congruent with their minds." And then after a few words: "Therefore the eyes of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded, nor their hearts so hardened, that they would not have believed, if they had seen such signs as those others saw." This passage contains the matter: for by the natural gift of understanding they would have understood, would have been moved, would have come, and would have believed. Therefore prior to and independently of any decree.

So much for the testimonies of Augustine and the argument drawn from authority in favor of the middle knowledge proper to the Fathers of the Society.

SECTION IV. The opposing view regarding conditional knowledge grounded in the Divine decrees is set forth and defended by argument.

The first argument is drawn from the dignity of the first cause, both in being and in operation. That dignity demands the foremost role both in being and in acting — a role it cannot hold if one posits Middle Knowledge grounded immediately in the determination of the creature as self-distinguishing and self-applying to action. For that distinction and application is an act of the created will, which is foreseen to occur independently and antecedently to the Divine decree, thereby supplying God with the reason for decreeing what shall come to pass. The first rule of Divine predefinition is therefore the determination of the created will.

The second argument is taken from the servitude of necessity imposed upon God, whereby he would be unable to decree or ordain anything except what he had foreseen the creature would do — and his will would consequently follow rather than precede in determining. For once Middle Knowledge has shown what the created will shall do and to which side it will determine itself, the Divine will, if it is to settle anything definite, must follow the foreseen determination of the human will and trail after the creature. Not because the Divine will could not choose otherwise, but because whatever it chooses, it must in every case follow the rule of the previously foreseen human will that is presented to it through Middle Knowledge. And so, even while remaining free, it will serve the creature antecedently and independently of any Divine decree determining itself.

The third argument is taken from the disorder in being and operation that results from placing the creature before God and setting it above him, since the root and principle of all free being would be the created will. That will precedes conditional knowledge, since it is its object; yet the Divine will presupposes knowledge as prior to itself. It follows that the first root of all free and moral being is the created will, and that the creature in some fashion shares with God so that God is the author of all physical being while the creature is the principle of all moral and free being — which is entirely unworthy of God.

The fourth argument rests on the incompatibility of this knowledge with the depth of the mystery of predestination, the sublimity of God's wisdom, and the secrecy of the Divine judgment — all of which collapse once Middle Knowledge is posited. For, as its authors say, through it the entire account of foreknowing and predestining is most readily understood, discharged, and completed: those are predestined who are foreseen to make good use of their own free choice with respect to the grace offered them in such circumstances, while those are not predestined who, through the freedom of that same free choice, fail to respond to the grace offered them. As a consequence, all the difficulties and obscurities of predestination are dissolved by the force of free choice, and nothing remains hidden, concealed, or admirable in the divine judgments.

The fifth argument arises from the fact that through this knowledge the basis of mercy and of Divine discrimination from a motive of piety in predestination is

removed. This is proved as follows: given Middle Knowledge, nothing appears except equity and justice, since the one who is foreseen to be worthy is predestined and the one who is foreseen to be unworthy is reprobated. There is therefore no place for mercy where no one is predestined who is unworthy. Furthermore, discrimination on the basis of Divine piety is eliminated, because where there is a foresight of merits and demerits and where the election of the good and the reprobation of the wicked takes place in accordance with it, there is no room for free discrimination on the part of a merciful God — which discrimination is already supposed to be made on the basis of conditionally foreseen merits — and so distinction and difference vanish entirely.

The sixth argument arises from the confusion of sufficient and efficacious grace. Middle Knowledge is introduced precisely in order to preserve intact the indifference of free choice and the perfect equilibrium of freedom as between the two alternatives, with the grace offered equally and indifferently left in the power of free choice, which by its freedom either responds or does not respond to the one calling it — as its authors themselves acknowledge. From this it follows that grace is of itself indifferent and common, and therefore not efficacious; and that it becomes efficacious through the use and cooperation of free choice. Grace therefore will not receive its efficacy and power of operation from God but from the human being who takes hold of it, operates with it, and reduces it to act.

The seventh argument is deduced from the inverted account of predestination that this knowledge introduces, which is wholly contrary to Paul — who at *Ephesians* I set forth the true and genuine account: he chose us before the foundation of the world that we should be holy and blameless, not because we were holy and blameless, as Augustine explained (*de praed. Sanct.* c. 18). Yet if that knowledge is admitted, people are chosen because they have been foreseen as holy and blameless in the conditional state; and as they were foreseen, so they are chosen. But when they were foreseen, they were foreseen as making good use of grace, not bad; under which foresight they were holy and blameless; and hence exactly as they were in that state they were transferred to the state of the future. They were therefore always holy and blameless in every state. They were therefore chosen to remain holy, not to become and be made holy and blameless.

The eighth argument is derived from a certain hidden form of conditional merit and demerit that follows from the manner in which Middle Knowledge is posited. For that foresight of the good conditional use of free choice, represented to God, possesses a certain goodness, and is therefore an object lovable by the Divine will — as the bad conditional use of free choice is not. It follows that it has some character of a motive before God, so that the one foreseen as about to make good use is predestined and the one foreseen as about to make bad use is reprobated. This is confirmed by the fact that God

conforms his decree to his knowledge by decreeing what he had conditionally foreseen and decrees it as he had foreseen it — but why does he do this? Only because he is moved to do so, and is moved rationally. There can be no other motive than the loveliness of that good conditional use of free choice foreseen. But what is this motivating reason if not a conditional reason for meriting? Surely he who would not have chosen had he not foreseen seems to have chosen precisely because he foresaw. For why did he not choose the others?

The ninth argument is drawn from the impossibility of knowing objects of this kind independently of the Divine decree. Just as absolutely future things neither are nor can be known as future before the decree concerning their futurity, so too conditional things in that state cannot be known without a decree on the part of God conditionally determining them, since the reasoning is parallel with respect to both states relatively to their respective modes of existence.

Theologians commonly grant this for absolutely future things; the same reasoning applies to conditional things. They therefore do not have of themselves a certain existence, nor can that existence be known. For if before the decree they are not future, how can they be known as future? Indeed, on a strict dilemma the negative side — that is, non-existence — would be the knowable part, since when we say "it will be or it will not be" before the decree, the second part, "it will not be," will always be true. In this sense Augustine said acutely and truly that God does not foreknow what is not going to be — and Scotus agrees, as we proved above. Conditional future things with the decree set aside are precisely of this character: they are in no way future.

The tenth argument is drawn from a deficiency of this Middle Knowledge, which does not embrace a universal providence over all human beings, since it cannot extend to all of them. This is shown to be so because it fails with respect to infants dying within their mothers' wombs, who are incapable of being placed in the state of indifference and freedom, or of any congruity or suitability, in which they might be foreseen as about to act or not to act — for they are foreseen as destined to exist in a state incapable of operation and therefore to perish without any exercise of their own freedom. How then is provision made for them through this Middle Knowledge? The same applies to many who are congenitally mentally incapacitated and are foreseen to persist in that state and to die in it, for they do not possess the full exercise of freedom, nor do they have the capacity to act freely in either direction, or indeed in any direction at all. What then does Middle Knowledge avail them, since they are excluded from all congruity and suitability?

The eleventh argument is extracted from the incompatibility of this knowledge with the inequality of grace bestowed upon human beings, who receive it from God in very different measure. Some receive it in the highest and most excellent degree, as did the Apostles and Martyrs; others receive a lesser though still great and outstanding grace, as did the Patriarchs and Doctors of the Church; others

receive an ordinary and more attenuated grace; others still receive it so hidden and so slight that it hardly appears and we can scarcely grasp how it is given to them — such as those who are born and live in the midst of barbarism. This diversity is certain and cannot stand with that equality of Middle Knowledge, which is posited precisely so that the entire indifference of freedom may be preserved together with the equality of sufficient grace necessary and required for good operation, in such a way that the will is placed in immediate readiness to act or not to act, with no change being made either in the will or in the grace, the whole change falling on the side of the circumstances in which that sufficient and indifferent grace is given. This indifference and sufficiency does not sit well with those decrees and the varied kinds of grace that God destines for certain persons rather than others — not unjustly, but in keeping with equity. The Divine will therefore does not follow or wait upon what the indifferent will placed in this or that circumstance of opportunity is going to do; on the contrary, by seeing from the outset the power of the grace it is about to bestow, it thereby foresees that the will shall in such or such a way, at such or such intensity or remission, act or fail to act. For it would be unworthy to suppose that external circumstances would cause an Apostle or a Martyr to act much more perfectly and excellently than other lesser saints.

The twelfth and final argument is drawn from a passage in Augustine, *de praed. Sanct.* c. 15, and the final chapter of *de Dono Perseverantiae*, and is formed from an example as follows. Christ is the model and light of all the predestined — and I add that the Blessed Virgin his Mother is likewise. But these two — Mother and Son — could not have been predestined by the power and assistance of Middle Knowledge, and were in fact predestined without it; therefore the other elect were predestined without it as well. The major premiss is true and rests on Augustine in those passages with respect to Christ, and is certain with respect to the Virgin his Mother. The minor is proved because Jesus was not predestined to the Hypostatic Union, nor the Blessed Virgin to the dignity of Motherhood, because they were foreseen as about to merit these things if placed in such or such circumstances; for those two elections could in no way have depended on the good use of their free choice, since they are the fountainheads and principles of merit in Christ and in the Mother Mary — which everyone acknowledges. Therefore, with only the possibility of the mystery posited, God chose Jesus as Son and Mary as Mother — the one for the Hypostatic Union and the other for the Divine Maternity. From which it follows that Middle Knowledge was not and is not necessary for the election of the other predestined. And just as those two elections, entirely independent of conditional knowledge, did not impair the freedom of either in acting and meriting, so too the elections of the remaining predestined could be effected without the assistance and work of Middle Knowledge. God could therefore predestine the remaining human beings to eternal salvation with their freedom unimpaired.

We shall set forth the doctrine of this argument more fully and clearly below. And let this suffice on these matters.

SECTION V. Which authors defend this position?

Just as the opposing view is common to virtually all Jesuits and those who follow them, so this one is found to be that of nearly all Thomists and their adherents. These men with unanimous agreement deny the Jesuitical Middle Knowledge: Catharinus, *opusc. de Praedest.* p. 2; Bannez, *in 1.p.* q. 14, ar. 13; Alvarez, *lib. 2 de Auxiliis* disp. 7, and in *Responf.* lib. 1; Ledesma, *lib. de Auxil.* disp. 2, concerning this Middle Knowledge, *in 2.p.* of the same work; Nunno, *3.p.* q. 62, ar. 5, q. 2; Navarrete, *1. tom. controu.* controuers. 56; Nazar., *in 1.p.* quaest. 14, art. 13; Ripa, Zanardus, and Gonzales in the same place; Matthew of Rispulis, *lib. 1 de Auxil.* q. 1; Cantarellus, q. 22; Martinez, *in 1.2.* q. 9; Joseph of Saint Mary, *lib. de libero arbitrio in com.* qu. 4, a. 5; John of Saint Thomas, *1.p.* q. 14, a. 13. Among others: Zumel, *in 1.p.* q. 14, A. 13, disp. 8, and *2. tom. opusc.* from disp. 1; Cabrera, *3.p.* disp. 1, §. 22, and q. 18, a. 2; Machinus on this article, *1.p.* 13; Cornelius in the same place; Gaspar Ram, *de Divinis praemotionibus* relectione 2 and 3; Jerome de la Rua, *tom. 2 controu.* contr. 7, q. 2, dub. 2; Blaise Verdù in a special treatise on this matter; Leonard Coquaeus, Augustinian, *in comm. ad lib. 12 de Civit. Dei* c. 9; Jansenius of Ghent, Bishop, *in Concordia* c. 47; Roa, *de Provident. et Praedest.*; Andrew of the Cross, *tom. 1 in 1.p.* disp. 92, dub. last; Villegas, primary Professor of Theology, *lib. controu.* controu. 3, disp. 2, c. 2, and disp. 4, c. 1, 2, and 3; John Lallemandet, *1. tom.* disp. 8, *de Deo vno* p. 5 and 6; Zamorus, *tract. 5* q. 4, a. 7, sect. 2; Morandus, *tract. 3 de scientia Dei* qu. 7, from n. 34; Pasqualigus, *de sacra Doctrina speculativa* disp. 26, sect. 2, n. 22; William Estius, *tom. 1 in 1. sent.* disp. 48, §. 10; Francis Sylvius, Professor at Douai, in his commentaries on Saint Thomas. Among adoptive Thomists the same position is held by the Complutenses, *in 2.p. of their Logica ad lib. Perihermeneias*, and the Salamancans, *tract. 3 de scientia Dei* disp. 10, dub. 8. Among our own: Smising, *de Deo uno* tract. 3, disp. 2, q. 5, from n. 155 to 160; Sghemma, *2. physic.* digress. 18, *de Fato* qu. 3, and *opusc. de scientia et voluntate Dei* q. 8; Mastrius, *disp. 3 de Divino intellectu* q. 4, art. 3, from n. 231. These are the certain and established authors.

Four are doubtful: Lorca, Sotus, Curiel, Basilius Ponce. Regarding Lorca and Soto there is a great controversy between Alvarez and Suarez; having examined the passages, I side with Father Alvarez. The Salamancans vindicate Curiel and prove that he retracted his position. Concerning Basilius Pontius the Augustinian I know with certainty that he changed his view and at last agreed with the Thomists.

Great weight is lent to this position by the University of Louvain, which embraced it entirely in its controversies with Lessius, as appears in the censure of that author's doctrine — a fact recalled by the Salamancans cited above.

§. I. On three distinguished authors of the Society who hold against Middle Knowledge.

Among the Fathers of the Society, who are commonly thought to be unanimous on this point, I wish to bring forward three distinguished theologians who dissent from the Jesuit School and agree with the Thomists. The reader will find this remarkable, and the Fathers of the Society will scarcely believe it; but I make the matter plain by producing their testimonies.

Father Henry Henriquez, a Portuguese.

This most learned man teaches, against Molina, that the distinction of the predestined from the reprobate is not taken from the use of indifferent offered grace foreseen through Middle Knowledge before the determination of the Divine will, but from the efficacious purpose of God — as we showed in our own positive schools, School 18. We now demonstrate this more aptly and to the point. In his final book *de fine hominis*, c. 4, n. 2, in the text he writes: It is necessary that in the order of reason we presuppose some free conditional determination of God in such a concurrence of things and circumstances. And c. 5, at the end: The concordant opinion of theologians rightly teaches that God holds from eternity an efficacious predetermination of the good from perfect providence, in and through which as through the reason he knows all things with certainty. No Thomist of the most rigorous sort could have said this differently. He continues at c. 6: Some object: if the efficient cause and the supposition from which the effect infallibly follows has already been placed in act, and this is not and never was in my freedom, how can it be that the effect, an act predefined by God's antecedent will and to be committed to execution with an efficacious prevenient assistance, remains now within the freedom of our will? Those "some" are Molina and his followers, to whom he responds as a genuine Thomist: the antecedent is a cause of the thing not in some loose sense but a cause of the thing together with its free mode of occurrence, and thus produces a free effect — otherwise God would not obtain the mode that his providence and gentle movement intends, namely that the effect in its exercise occur freely through the proximate cause. He holds and emphasizes this doctrine throughout that treatise. Alvarez cites this passage in his *Responsiones*, lib. 1, c. 1, n. 25, without naming the author; the Salamancans name him explicitly in *tract. 3 de scientia Dei* disp. 10, dub. 8, n. 128. I have seen it in the sources, for I have a thorough and complete knowledge of this author's works, and this book in particular — an outstanding work, full of solid and thoroughly Augustinian doctrine, which I am therefore accustomed to praise and admire. If anyone objects that Henriquez, who is known to have left the Society for the Order of Preachers, imbibed this doctrine while he was among them, let such a person know that he had already been imbued with this opinion before he passed over to them as a most learned master of many letters; nor could he have received it from the Thomists, since he spent only a few months among them

doing his novitiate, and then returned to the Society, in which he was consistently the author of the same view. Moreover, he always contradicted Molina — his contemporary — on predestination and grace, as appears from the doctrine of that work, which I set out and examine in that school among my eighteen, *de possibilitate mandatorum* c. 7, as I noted above. The Fathers of the Society themselves know this, which is why they omit him when they cite their own men in favor of this theory of Middle Knowledge — as I noted above. Indeed, Fasolus among them, dub. 17, n. 284, sharply reproaches Henriquez on this account, and in order to diminish his authority says that he wrote against the Middle Knowledge of his confreres in his moral work on the Sacraments. This is in the first place not true. He wrote in a special treatise *de Fine hominis* — a work of the greatest gravity, learning, and solidity, composed expressly for the purpose of establishing the truth concerning predestination and grace. And if he had written among the Sacraments, that position would have had all the greater authority, since it would have deserved more credence on grounds of the religious solemnity of the context, as if it had passed over into a sacrament. And indeed predestination is called a Mystery, which is also the name by which the Sacraments are customarily called — so that the reproach of Fasolus recoils upon his own head, and Henriquez is vindicated from every charge. He was certainly a great man and worthy to be the master of a disciple such as Suarez.

Robert Cardinal Bellarmine.

The second is Bellarmine, a man of such great name and dignity, who, although he admits the knowledge of conditional things in common with his Society, nevertheless excludes foreknowledge independent of the decree and purpose of God grounded in the good use of offered grace — which he denies is the reason for distinguishing the predestined from the reprobate — and grounds the certainty of predestination entirely in the Divine decree and purpose, of which he holds efficacious grace to be the effect. All these teachings overturn Middle Knowledge as asserted by Molina and his followers. Let us consult him, *tom. 4 controu. contr. 3 generali, lib. 1 de grat. et libero arb. c. 22*, beginning from the passage where he writes: The first opinion, he says, is that of those who constitute efficacious grace in human assent and cooperation, so that grace is called efficacious from the outcome, that is, because it in fact achieves its effect — and achieves it because the human will cooperates. These authors therefore think it is in the power of the human being to make efficacious what would otherwise of itself be merely sufficient. This opinion is wholly foreign to the mind of Blessed Augustine and, as I judge, to the mind of the Divine Scriptures as well. For Saint Augustine, *lib. de Praedest. Sanct. c. 8*, says that efficacious grace is that kind which is rejected by no hardened heart, because it softens the heart itself — where you see efficacy attributed to grace, not to the human will. And in *lib. de Spiritu et Littera c. 34*, asking why God persuades one so as to produce conviction while not persuading another in the same way, he does not answer that one consents and the other does not, but exclaims: O the depth of the

riches! He therefore refers to the hidden counsel of the Divine will the question of why one receives efficacious grace and another does not. He then proceeds to prove this doctrine of his and of Augustine from other passages of Sacred Scripture, and subjoins: This opinion entirely overturns the foundation of Divine predestination, which Saint Augustine proved most solidly from the Divine letters. For the certainty and infallibility of predestination rests on this: that God prepared efficacious grace for the elect. For those whom he predestined, those also he called — with that calling, as Augustine notes in *lib. de correct. et grat.* c. 7, according to purpose, of which it has been said: all things work together for good to those who are called as saints according to purpose. Those, however, whom he called according to purpose — which also carries perseverance to the end — those also he justified, and those he glorified. But if efficacious calling did not depend on the purpose of God but on the human will, no place would be left for predestination, only for foreknowledge; nor would the Apostle have said, according to purpose the election of God stands, not from works but from him who calls, because it was said that the elder will serve the younger, as it is written: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated, *Romans IX*. I pass over the fact that it would be an abuse of terms to speak of calling grace as efficacious and to distinguish it from sufficient grace if there were no distinction in the grace itself and the entire difference depended on the human will. Nothing clearer or more forceful could have been said against Middle Knowledge. The entire doctrine on predestination given in *lib. 2*, c. 9, to the end is adverse to the doctrine of Middle Knowledge, since it denies that it was accomplished from a foresight of merits and posits it as gratuitous, with no foreseen use of grace by free choice. I excerpt some passages from c. 14: It is most true that God calls according to purpose those whom he foreknew as about to believe and to be devoted to him; but he foreknew them as about to believe and be devoted because he knew he had predestined them, and had therefore also prepared for them the grace by which without doubt they would believe and be made devout. For Ambrose says in *Lucas lib. 7*: Whom he deigns to call he calls, and whom he wills he makes devout; if he had willed, he would have made the Samaritans devout from being irreverent. And further: God wills for the elect glory before good works as regards intention, for this is why he wills to give them good merits — because he wills to give them the crown of glory. And shortly after: He does not choose for glory on the basis of foreseen merits, but on the contrary chooses for merits on the basis of foresight of glory. Yet as regards the will of execution, which regards glory as the end of merits, God wills to give the elect good merits before the crown of glory. This doctrine is certainly that of Augustine and is adverse to the tenets of Middle Knowledge. Now if in *lib. 4 de lib. arb.* c. 14 Bellarmine seems to favor freedom and to approve the harmony of Middle Knowledge and to reprobate antecedent predetermination, recurring to the congruity of the opportune assistance of grace, this does not overthrow the doctrine stated above, because there he merely rejects physical antecedent predetermination prior to the operation of the cause. This is evident from the

fact that in c. 15 he proposes two modes of exciting and moving the secondary cause — one belonging to Scotus, who teaches that the contingent secondary cause is determined by the first cause antecedently; a mode we discussed above, *Collat. 10, Differ. 1* — and another in c. 16 belonging to Saint Thomas, through application and movement made by God in secondary causes, citing *1.p. q. 105*, and *lib. 3 cont. gent. c. 70*, and *q. 3 de potent. a. 7*, with the physical predetermining quality excluded; and he adds that this mode of Saint Thomas is perhaps the more probable, and adduces words of the same author which contain the matter entirely, *q. 3 de malo a. 2*: It is to be noted that the movement of the first mover is not received uniformly in all movable things, but in each one according to its proper mode. And *1.2. q. 10, a. 4*: It belongs to Divine providence not to corrupt nature but to preserve it; hence God moves all things according to their condition. And further: Because the will is an active principle not determined to one thing but indifferently disposed to many, God moves it in such a way as not to determine it by necessity to one thing, but its mode remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally. While Bellarmine proves these things, he disproves Middle Knowledge. And although afterward in explaining this kind of premotion and application he appears to deviate from the common position of the Thomists in order to distance himself further from the error of Calvin, he does not for that reason draw nearer to Molina. And this I know with full certainty, since I know that Bellarmine wishes only to banish the physical predetermining quality. Nevertheless he admits efficacious grace as such intrinsically and from its own power, and from it he admits moral determination. For he says thus in *lib. 1 de grat. et lib. arb. c. 12* at the end, §. Last argument: Augustine shows whence it comes that grace is efficacious, even though it does not determine physically but only morally by way of persuasion. He therefore adheres to Augustine and hence is far from Molina's doctrine in this respect, and entirely excludes Middle Knowledge as Molina introduced and handed it down.

Gabriel Vazquez.

I shall have stripped Molina of his left hand if I strip him of Vazquez. This second prince of Jesuit theology, equal and peer to Suarez yet unlike him in doctrine — of whom I make great use and take great delight — is opposed to Middle Knowledge. Since many will be uncertain about this, I shall speak at greater length; and it will be necessary to do so, both because the Jesuit Fathers will feel keenly the loss of so powerful a leader on whose arms and support they greatly rely and in whom they greatly trust, and because he seems to have agreed with Molina on this point, and Alarcón, his faithful Achates, does not permit any doubt about him — and there are some passages difficult to explain. Greater diligence and effort is therefore required to vindicate this author.

Let us set forth three certain and indubitable principles of Vazquez. The first is that predestination is not in the power of the predestined. He states this in *1.p.*

disp. 92, c. 2, where, following Augustine, he says that in predestining the elect God did not regard the good use of free choice, although he foreknew it through conditional knowledge. For, he says, he called us not because we would be holy, but that we might be — and so on. From Hieronymus and Augustine we noted this passage, and there: God rather preordained that we should have such use. Note the word preordained. He teaches the same at disp. 95, c. 9, where he affirms that it is not in the power of a human being to be or not to be predestined — and contends this vigorously against certain recent theologians. In these passages he entirely removes from the predestined every cause and condition of their predestination. Hence he says at n. 50 of that chapter: The aim is therefore to show the riches of his grace and liberality, which he employed toward the predestined; for by denying congruous callings to the reprobate, he shows that those same callings by which the predestined were prepared for glory were entirely gratuitously bestowed on them — since they could have been denied them in the same way as they were denied to the reprobate. In this he follows Augustine, who is known to have referred predestination, with Paul, to the free purpose of God, not to human free choice.

The second principle is that efficacious grace is distinguished from sufficient grace not merely by the cooperation of free choice but antecedently to it through the excitation of thought, which he calls congruous — presenting the object more expressly and moving the affection more vehemently toward cooperation — whence it comes about that of two persons equally disposed neither would act more than the other: the one who does act must be moved more vehemently. So the reason for the distinction lies in that congruous thought by reason of its more express and vehement excitation, which produces the cooperation of free choice. He teaches this in *1.p.* disp. 91, c. 14, where at n. 112, §. *Moreover*, he says: Among our scholastics this kind of grace through the determination of thought toward the good side — since the person is of himself indifferent — is handed down by Saint Thomas, *1.2.* q. 109, ar. 2; Capreolus, *in 1.d.* 29, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 4; Deza of Seville, *in 2.d.* 28, q. 1, a. 3, nota 2, 6; and Francis Romeus, *in lib. de libert. et necessit. operum* verit. 14 and 15 — all distinguished disciples of the school of Saint Thomas. He maintains the same at c. 17 and pursues it at c. 18 concerning discrimination on the part of God, excellently and still more forcefully in disp. 92 throughout. He is engaged in the same argument at disp. 97, c. 5 at the end, and c. 6, and especially at disp. 98 under this title: Whether all who consent to the calling are excited by a special grace? Where at c. 3 he resolves that the one who responds to the calling was excited by a greater prevenient grace than the one who resists. He confirms this with testimonies of the Fathers at c. 4, and explains and develops it at c. 6 and 7 — above all at c. 4, n. 26, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas, and at c. 6, n. 38 and 39, and at c. 7, n. 46 and 47. Most aptly to the point in disp. 98, c. 7, n. 45 and 46. He hands on the same doctrine in *1.2.* disp. 189, c. 15, n. 127, where he says that what restrains and deters us from consent is acutely set before us, and he uses the word "more

vehement" and repeats it at n. 129. Also at c. 16. He agrees at disp. 199, c. 2 and 3, and wishes the doctrine he had given in the first part at the cited passages to stand in his explanation of a. 4 on q. 112 of Saint Thomas. And although in several passages he recurs to conditional foreknowledge and congruous opportunity foreseen through it, this does not overturn that doctrine. For whence does that congruous opportunity in the assistance arise if not from the will of God preparing antecedently to the foreknowledge of the assistance that very congruous excitation itself? Unless that excitation were going to be such as it is, it could not be known as such through conditional knowledge. Therefore unless God determining to give that assistance with such vehemence conditionally were supposed, the cooperation of the will could not be conditionally foreseen, nor would that assistance be foreseen as efficacious in cooperation but only in the excitation moving the will toward cooperation. Wherefore the certain foresight is not derived, as Molina and his followers say, from the determining free choice, but from the decree of God determining such grace.

The third principle is that for the election of either ends or means, the will is not free to choose one over another with an equally balanced representation of them; it is entirely necessary that one be proposed more expressly and more vehemently than the other. Hence neither a lesser good over a greater, nor an equal over an equal under such representation, can be chosen by a deliberating will. So Vazquez in *1.2. disp. 43*, c. 1, 2, and 4, citing himself for the same view in his commentaries on *1.p. disp. 98*, c. 7, and in *1.2. disp. 128*, c. 5, where he confirms it by reason and experience. Let us set forth the doctrine of Vazquez in his own words, c. 2 of disp. 43 in *1.2.* at the beginning: It seems to me far more probable that of two means one cannot be chosen when it is proposed as equal to the other or even as less useful than the other. He proves this position by reason, authority, and example, and at c. 3 resolves the opposing arguments. He therefore establishes that in order for one means to be chosen over another, it must be represented to the will as better and more useful; and for an end to be proposed more efficaciously is altogether necessary. Given this doctrine of Vazquez, it follows that Middle Knowledge is not grounded in the knowledge of the cooperation of free choice determining itself at its own pleasure, but in the knowledge of the good proposed to it which is represented to it more expressly and efficaciously according to its representation. This greater expressness and efficacy comes from the Divine will; and consequently the principle of acting is reduced to the decree. For why this or that mode of representation should be used is not the cause of God's knowledge or of the human will, but of the Divine will, in whose free power it lies. There yet remains a stronger foundation for denying that Father Vazquez holds the position, drawn from his own doctrine concerning the foreknowledge of future things. For at disp. 65, c. 2, n. 1, inquiring into the cause of the certainty of Divine knowledge, he affirms that it is derived remotely from the decree of the Divine will, which determines all

future things to be produced in time, and cites and follows Scotus in *1. dist. 39, q. 1, §. contra istud*, and *§. viso de contingentia n. 6*. He confirms that a thing must first in order be future before it is understood to be so, and that it is future by virtue of some particular will and determination of God concerning it — which is Scotus's own genuine position. And this, says Vazquez, is so certain to me that I think it can in no way be denied. At n. 10 he teaches that this decree is in a certain kind of cause prior to the future thing; indeed, that a thing is future because God willed it. And at n. 11 and 12 he adds that with this decree the future thing is so conjoined that once the decree is posited the future thing is known — not in the decree alone taken in isolation, but conjoined with the future thing of which it is the cause. He therefore says the decree is the remote cause of knowledge, because the proximate reason for knowing is grounded in the future thing itself, which depends on and is caused by the decree. Do not infer that the decree is not the cause of the future thing: Vazquez says it is the remote cause not of the future thing but of the knowledge of the future thing. In fact this confirms our argument: that in knowing, the proximate reason is the future thing itself, and it follows that the decree is the proximate cause of the thing known, which is the future thing itself; for the object and effect are known before their cause. That this is the position of Vazquez is evident from c. 4 of the same disp. 65, where he acknowledges that he discovered and formulated this account of knowing first in Spain, and read and found it in Scotus eighteen years later — teaching and defending it there, he says, in the same way, and afterwards hearing that it has been widely adopted by certain theologians of our Society; while among other scholastics he finds no mention of it. Scotus, however, handed it on briefly in *1. d. 39, q. 1, §. viso de contingentia*. As we handed it on in *Collation 10, Diff. 1 and 2*. Again, Vazquez at c. 4, inquiring into the mode of knowing future things in themselves given the decree, says at n. 22: It is to be noted that a future thing is an object of God's infallible knowledge precisely by being in reality future — yet in our mode of understanding it presupposes the decree of God as a cause, before which nothing is understood to be truly future. This is entirely the position of the Scotus cited. At n. 24 this is stated better and more evidently according to the mind of Scotus: From which it follows that the position of certain recent thinkers is false who say that future things, as things of determinate truth, are represented in the divine essence with no decree of the divine will presupposed. And he confirms this with a proper argument. Whence it is plain that for Vazquez, as for Scotus, future things are not of determinate truth before the Divine decree; and indeed I believe that by those "recent thinkers" Molina and his followers are indicated. This appears more plainly from what is found in the same disp. 65, c. 3, n. 17, responding to an objection put to him concerning conditional future things, which do not rest on any decree, where Vazquez responds thus: I answer first that wherever a decree exists, it is perfectly well inferred from it that God knows with certainty all future things he has decreed. He adds: In these future things under condition a decree of God is nonetheless included; for without it nothing is future. Nor

should you object on the basis of the doctrine given at disp. 67, c. 4, where he reprobates the position of those Jesuits who teach that conditional future things are foreknown in a conditional decree just as absolute future things are known in an absolute decree — and note in passing that many Jesuits admitted this decree against Molina. For Vazquez does not reprobate — and I acknowledge this — what cannot stand with the rest of his view: rather, he denies only the possibility of it in his own position, which holds that a decree cannot be anything other than a relation of reason terminating on the creature, which relation cannot obtain in a conditional decree that has no absolute term. But afterward at n. 22 he posits this decree as implicit in the congruous calling that inclines the will toward consent and which that calling from its very nature produces and obtains with complete infallibility. But from what will does this calling that is thus congruous and inclining arise if not from a will that precedes it? For God reasons within himself thus: if I will to give this grace, the operation will follow. Here now is a decree analogous to an absolute one, conditionally causing that congruity and inclining power, which God foresees as conditionally future — and thus the foreknowledge of it is grounded in the antecedent future decree. So the same doctrine of Vazquez holds concerning the conditional decree implicit in the calling, which antecedes the working and the operation of the created will in the order of reason. And so that conclusion of Vazquez, c. 4, n. 12, stands: Therefore when we say "God knows well that with such a calling the free choice will consent," because it has its remote principle of knowing in the decree willing to bestow such a congruous, vehement, and inclining calling.

I can foresee the objection that what Vazquez teaches at disp. 92, c. 2, n. 6 and 7 might be urged against me — where he refers the cause of efficacy derived from the congruity of grace back to our own will. And again disp. 98, c. 8, where he says it is in our power to make the grace of calling congruous and non-congruous. And disp. 99, c. 6, n. 36, where he says that the predefinition of God in the order of cause is not prior to our determination. And disp. 100, c. 3, n. 8, where he denies against Scotus that the secondary cause is precluded by the first, having the latter only as an aid and cooperator — otherwise it would lose its freedom. All these certainly conflict with our view. From which it appears that Vazquez received this Middle Knowledge of the Society and its common usage.

Nevertheless I do not for this reason withdraw from the view I have thus far expressed concerning Vazquez. I had indeed foreseen all these objections and knew them, given the foregoing doctrine of Vazquez's principles; but I prefer to follow that first doctrine which he openly professed as his own together with Scotus in that passage, disp. 65, c. 4, n. 18 and 19 — especially because at disp. 67 he reprehends the immoderate use of Middle Knowledge, as if by it the knots of many difficulties could be untied, of the kind that Vazquez resolves in those final passages, disp. 92, 98, 99. That most recent doctrine does not stand with the first — indeed it overthrows it. What then? Does Vazquez dissent from himself,

withdraw from himself, contradict himself? This is unworthy of so distinguished a theologian. I do not dare affirm it; indeed I entirely deny it, since I know from assiduous reading of his works that he is above all a certain and consistent author, like himself, coherent with himself, and most tenacious of his own views.

I shall therefore say what I think. I suspect that these more recent disputations of Father Vazquez are not entirely genuine but are spurious, and indeed were substituted by others who, grieved that so great a man had departed from the common position of the Society, foisted alien opinions upon him — led by a pious but imprudent zeal — without sufficiently noticing how far they deviated from his true and genuine positions. Nor do I suspect this rashly. I am led by certain indications which I, as a young man at Madrid and Alcalá, received from the most distinguished theologians who were his disciples and intimates — namely from Ludovico Turrian, Salazarius Quirinus, Gaspar Hurtado, and Didacus Alarcon, all of whom I knew and with whom I lived on familiar terms — concerning that outstanding and excellent man, of whom I was then and remain now the most devoted student. I confirm that my suspicions are not idle but old, conceived at that time — though I suppressed them until now because there was no occasion to bring them forward, and I have seized this occasion to offer them to posterity. Let anyone compare, if he has leisure, all those passages I have just cited and others like them — which prudence and the avoidance of prolixity lead me to omit — and he will find that they do not at all cohere with one another and can scarcely, indeed in no way, be reconciled.

I adduce one passage that I consider clear to purge and confirm my suspicion. At disp. 98, in the title of the question, Vazquez asks: Whether all who consent to the calling are excited by a special grace? Having proposed the negative view at c. 1 he rejects it at c. 2; then at c. 3 he proposes the affirmative and proves it there and at c. 4 with testimonies of Scripture and the Fathers, especially Augustine — whose sense concerning the efficacy of grace against the Semi-Pelagians he follows there, the grace that elicits consent from free choice with Augustine as authority. Vazquez's words are there at c. 4, n. 2, where he calls it operative and victorious and therefore greater in the one who consents than in the one who resists, and in the title of the fourth chapter says: That the one who responds to the calling was excited by a greater prevenient grace than the one who resists is proved by the testimonies of Scripture as the more probable view. He explains and follows this throughout to n. 4. But afterward from c. 5 to the end he so attenuates and undermines it, reducing it to circumstances and opportunities foreseen through conditional knowledge — weakening the force of the grace he had placed as powerful and victorious, so that it seems infirm — as can be seen in c. 6 and 7, and especially at c. 6, n. 39, where he introduces the necessity of Middle Knowledge contrary to what he had handed down at disp. 67, c. last at the end. Certainly Vazquez attributes a different power to efficacious grace even given the positing of conditional knowledge in that same disp. 67, c.

4, n. 22: let the interested reader consult it and he will agree with me. Note that the calling which we call congruous is so tempered and suited to free choice as from itself to incline it toward consent — not in such a way that the will cannot resist, but in such a way as to obtain consent from it freely in actual fact. If God were to deny it his concurrence, on which all our operation in act depends, consent would not follow in the will; yet this would do violence to the calling, whose internal impetus and inclination would be denied the concurrence it demanded. Go now and compare this power of grace with that infirmity in disp. 98, c. 6 and 7, and you will find that the one conflicts with the other and that Vazquez dissents from himself.

And lest the reader be troubled by those citations of other passages accumulated to confirm that final doctrine contained in those final disputations: they are contrived, and proceed from fear of being detected in the act of changing position. The suspicion is increased by the frequent mention of Middle Knowledge and the repeated use of it to resolve difficulties arising from the harmony of free choice with grace. This design is foreign to the doctrine of Father Vazquez, as appears from the passage I now cite from disp. 67, c. 4, n. last at the end: I acknowledge that many theologians sometimes abuse this doctrine, thinking they can by it dissolve the knots of many difficulties, when in fact it contributes nothing at all to their resolution.

I am candid; I say plainly what I think. I await the judgment of the Fathers of the Society, and above all of the Complutenses, whom I greatly love and esteem. I have yielded to none of them in devotion and service to that most illustrious theologian, nor shall I yield. Let whoever wishes to refute me do so, for my part he may. But considerable labor will be required, I think, to dispel my reflections. I have been more prolix here than I wished, but so great was the effort required to vindicate Vazquez.

§. I. What was Saint Thomas's view concerning Middle Knowledge?

I shall do in reporting the position of Saint Thomas what Thomists are accustomed to do in recalling the opinions of Scotus — briefly producing testimonies and hastening to hand on the doctrine of their master. Saint Thomas therefore clearly teaches that nothing in God's knowledge is certain and infallible with respect to the futurity of things before the decree of the will, to which all certainty is reduced. Speaking of the Divine Ideas, *q. 3 de verit.* art. 6: An idea can be of something that neither is, nor will be, nor was; yet not in the same way as it is of those things that are, were, or will be produced, which are determined by the purpose of the Divine will — but not of those things that neither are, nor will be, nor were; and so these have ideas in some way indeterminate. Therefore since the idea of itself is indifferent, it will pass over into determinate knowledge when the decree of the will follows. There is another testimony in *lib. 1 Sententiarum*, dist. 39, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5, where speaking of the knowledge of contingent future things he says: To know in accordance with

reason follows the will. And at a. 2, ad 1: Just as knowing itself is subject to the freedom of the will, so also is the Idea insofar as an act of Divine knowledge is terminated on it, just as the knowledge of the craftsman is terminated on the form of the artifact which he thinks out, and thus it is likewise with the Idea and the act of knowing. For just as it cannot be held that the act of knowing is in him and was not in him, so neither can it be designated that the Idea is in him and was not in him; yet with respect to both the freedom of the will can be designated. The subjection of Divine knowledge concerning contingent things to the free choice of the Divine will is plain — speaking absolutely and viewing the nature of knowledge and of the determining decree with respect to every knowable object — which certainly encompasses the truth of conditional things.

Second, the doctrine of Saint Thomas is that contingent future things are not known certainly and determinately in the comprehension of their causes antecedently to the Divine decree, as he holds in *de malo* q. 16, a. 7: Future things are in their causes in three ways. In one way according to power only, because they can equally be or not be — these are called contingents open in either direction. Others are in their causes not only according to power but according to an actual cause that cannot be impeded in its effect — these are said to come about necessarily. Still others are in their causes both according to power and according to an active cause which nevertheless can be impeded in its effect — these are said to happen for the most part. Since each thing is known insofar as it is in act, not insofar as it is in potency, as is said in *Metaphysics* IX, it follows that things open in either direction cannot be foreknown in their causes determinately, but only under a disjunction: for that is the way they have truth. Things, however, that are in their causes as necessarily proceeding from them can be known with certainty in their causes. Things that happen for the most part can be known in their causes not with complete certainty but with a certain conjectural knowledge. He teaches the same in *lib. 1 sent. d. 38, q. 1, a. 5*, where among other things: Things contingent in either direction can in no way be known in their causes. And further: Whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause has only a conjectural knowledge of it. From this follows the necessity of a determining decree. And if the mind of Saint Thomas is verified for absolute contingents, it will be verified all the more for conditional ones, which are more remote and obscure than absolute ones. If therefore these lack certain and determinate truth before the decree, conditional ones will lack it all the more.

Third, which comes to the same point: Saint Thomas holds with Aristotle that propositions about contingent future things do not have determinate truth with respect to one side of the contradiction before the free decree of God. So in his lecture on *lib. 1 Perihermenias*, lect. 13, expounding those words of Aristotle: In those things that are and were it is necessary for the affirmation or negation to be true or false. And the other words subjoined: But in singular future things the case is not similar — where the holy Doctor says: In past and present things it is necessary that one of the opposed statements be determinately true and the

other false in any matter; but in singular things that concern the future it is not necessary that one be determinately true and the other false. And this is said with respect to contingent matter. And afterward expounding other words of Aristotle he hands on the same doctrine. Moreover, in *1. d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2*: A contingent future thing is not determinately true before it occurs, because it does not have determinate causes. The same position is found in *q. 16 de malo*, and in *1.p. q. 16, a. 7*, and *q. 2 de verit. a. 12, ad 1 and 9*, and especially *1.p. q. 14, a. 13* in the body: A contingent thing can be considered in two ways. In one way in itself insofar as it is already in act — and thus it is not considered as future but as present, not as contingent open in either direction but as determined to one alternative, and on this account it can be subject to certain knowledge without error. And shortly after: In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause, and thus it is considered as future and as contingent not yet determined to one alternative, since a contingent cause is not subject to certain knowledge by reason of certainty. And finally there is an excellent testimony that contains the entire matter, *q. 6 de verit. a. 3, ad 4*. Inquiring into the certainty of beatitude, he has in the fourth argument an objection: Every certainty that is with the supposition of something is not absolute certainty but only conditional, just as it is not certain that the sun causes fruit in the plant except under this condition: if the generative power in the plant is well disposed — because the disposition of the sun toward the said effect presupposes the power of the plant as a kind of secondary cause. If therefore the certainty of predestination is with the presupposition of a secondary cause, it is not absolute certainty but only conditional, just as I have certainty that Socrates is moving if he runs and that this person will be saved if he prepares himself — and so there is in Divine predestination no other certainty concerning those to be saved than I have of this, which is absurd. To this objection Saint Thomas responds thus: To the fourth it must be said that the secondary cause which must be presupposed for the effect of predestination to be produced is itself also subject to the order of predestination; but this is not the case with powers in relation to some superior agent. And therefore the order of Divine predestination, even though it involves a supposition of the human will, nevertheless has absolute certainty, even though in the example adduced the opposite appears. This testimony is appropriate: for in the objection an example is furnished suitable for proving Middle Knowledge, which derives its certainty from the condition rather than from an antecedent cause — yet that very example is rejected by Saint Thomas at the end of the argument, where it is said to be absurd to ground certainty in my conditional cooperation, since the certainty of predestination is antecedent to the condition. And again in the solution he says that the cooperation of the secondary cause, although it appears to stand in a conditional relation to predestination, is subject to the order of predestining, which has its certainty from the Divine will and not from the human will — which certainty is absolute, not conditional, and does not depend on a condition. Nothing clearer than this

can be brought against that Middle Knowledge. Thus far concerning the Angelic Doctor.

§. II. What is Scotus's position on Middle Knowledge?

It is plainly contrary. This is established from two certain and indubitable principles of Scotus. The first is that contingent future things do not have certain and determinate truth before the free decree of the Divine will. He expresses this explicitly in *1. d. 39, q. 1, §. viso de contingentia* in these words: Then — that is, before the decree — contingent things are not true, because there is nothing at that point by which they might have determinate truth. But once the determination of the divine will has been posited, they are now true — namely for that second instant. And this same thing will be the reason for the divine intellect (which was in the first instant) to understand those things which are now true in the second instant and which would have been known in the first instant if they had been so in the first instant. They cannot therefore be true as long as they do not exist; and they do not exist before they are determined by the divine will. Scotus proceeds, having posited two modes of knowing objects: It is plain, he says, according to both that the divine intellect is determined toward that existent thing toward which the divine will is determined. He continues: The will cannot determine without the intellect apprehending determinately what the will determines. And immutably — because both will and intellect are immutable. This is a principle of Scotus, as we said above; and Aureolus in *1. d. 38, q. 1*, and Cordoba, *lib. 1 quaest. q. 55, dub. 5, opin. 3*, hand it on — although they do not adhere to Scotus.

The second principle of Scotus is more celebrated and universal: namely that if the divine intellect were to tend first and immediately toward the bare existence and truth of the things to be known, it would be entirely degraded in that knowledge — because it would know a thing it had not determined and would in that knowledge presuppose it and receive from it the principle of knowing. But what is more base and more unworthy of God than to beg from the object the beginning of his divine knowledge? We dealt with this extensively together with Scotus in *Diff. 37, §. 1 and 2*, adducing the passages in which Scotus uses it as a consistently held and certain principle of truth. And there we observed that Scotus on that account would entirely exclude Middle Knowledge, and we promised to show this in its proper place — which is what we are now doing. Setting aside therefore those passages we adduced there, let us bring forward here one apt passage from the same §. *Viso de contingentia d. 39, n. 23*: The divine intellect either presents simples whose union is contingent in reality, or if it presents a complex proposition it presents it as neither side, and the will electing one side — namely the conjunction of these things for some given now in reality — makes that thing determinately true. This will apply to A. And once this exists as determinately true, the divine essence is the reason for the divine intellect to understand that truth. And this naturally, as far as it depends on the

essence. So that just as it naturally understands all necessary principles as if before an act of the divine will — because their truth does not depend on that act — and the essence, known by the divine intellect, would be the reason for knowing them in that prior instant of nature because they are then true, not indeed because those truths move the divine intellect, nor do their terms move it to apprehend such truth — because then the divine intellect would be degraded, since it would be acted upon by something other than its own essence — but as the divine essence is the reason for knowing simples, so it is also the reason for knowing complexes of that kind.

Let us apply this to Middle Knowledge. Middle Knowledge presupposes that conditional objects are from themselves before any divine decree, and that taken in themselves they are true and determinate and constituted independently of the divine essence and will — presented as apt and ready for cognition by the divine intellect. Therefore, by the authority of Scotus, the divine intellect will be degraded, since it will be acted upon by these things, which do not exist before the divine will, and from which it will beg the principle of knowing. No other argument is needed to attack Middle Knowledge in the Scotist school. Hence I am surprised at what entered the minds of Faber and Pontius to prove it and introduce it into our school. Certainly a man foreign to it and a Thomist — though a weighty and solid author — Didacus Alvarez, moved by but a single testimony concerning the mode of knowing in the decree, understood that Scotus had taught the position contrary to Middle Knowledge, and truly wrote in *lib. 1 Responsf. c. 5, l. 21, §. Scotus in this way*: Whence, persisting in the position of Scotus, no Scotist can say the contrary or adduce Scotus in favor of the said first position proposed at the beginning of this doubt. But Faber ceases to be a man of Faenza in favoring Middle Knowledge; he is truly a Faber of a new opinion. And Pontius, abandoning the royal way and leaving the bridge, has strayed and cast himself into the water.

Alvarez did not, however, adduce or weigh this second principle of Scotus — which is the capital one — by reason of the excellent argument drawn from the dignity of the divine intellect and the injury done to it; because being a Thomist he cared less for the reasonings of Scotus and did not wish to enter more deeply into his doctrine, content with the easier and more manifest passage.

Therefore Scotus entirely contradicts that Middle Knowledge, whether or not he knows it by name — for it cannot be consistent with his doctrine.

SECTION VI. It is shown that Middle Knowledge is wholly foreign to the doctrine of Saint Augustine.

§. I. From the comparison of mutually opposed documents.

From the time I began to read Augustine attentively in order to learn from him — and I began in the year 1638, thirty-six years ago — I understood that he had a thorough aversion to Middle Knowledge. I am indeed surprised that Suarez

and other weighty authors of the Society attribute their Middle Knowledge to Augustine; and I praise in this respect the candor of Molina in the first edition of his *Concordia*, where he honestly acknowledges that it is foreign to Augustine and indeed directly contrary to his doctrine. My purpose here will be to show that it conflicts with his doctrine on every point.

It is first established that whatever God conditionally foreknew would come to pass and decreed in accordance with what he had foreseen — that it would entirely come to pass and be reduced to act in time, so that things passed from the conditional state to the future state and from the future to the present. Hence just as they actually come to pass, so were they foreseen conditionally and decreed absolutely. No one disagrees on this. It will now become clear that whatever Augustine taught about predestination and grace in the absolute order cannot stand with Middle Knowledge.

Let us proceed by comparison. Augustine therefore teaches that predestination was effected by God after the foresight of Adam's sin, given his celebrated "mass of the damned"; out of which God mercifully chose those he willed, leaving the rest in that same mass. This state is at odds with Middle Knowledge, which presupposes opportunity and congruity in those to be chosen and seeks in them a reason for discrimination — whereas in the mass of the damned there is nothing but demerit and incapacity, so that God foresees in all of them a reason for damnation, not for beatification. Middle Knowledge introduces equity; Augustine's doctrine introduces mercy. Middle Knowledge foresees the future use of grace for the purpose of meriting election; Augustine's doctrine foresees demerit before any use of grace, lest the elect be said to be predestined from merits — they are predestined gratuitously and out of mercy. Middle Knowledge removes mercy and judgment by choosing only the congruous and rejecting the incongruous, so that election is grounded in their disposition. Augustine's doctrine admits mercy by choosing the unworthy and congruous and mercifully distinguishing them from others who are likewise unworthy and incongruous, according to God's purpose and not theirs. Middle Knowledge foresees those to be chosen as already holy and blameless, not so that they may be holy and blameless; Augustine's doctrine foresees the wicked and sinners in order that they may become holy and blameless. Middle Knowledge so arranges predestination as to supply the reason why one is chosen rather than another, grounded in a plausible account, so as to satisfy anyone asking for the cause of choosing one person and rejecting another. Augustine's doctrine refers every cause and reason for choosing this person rather than that one to the Divine will, which from two condemned persons freely and mercifully elects one and leaves the other in the state of damnation in which he was. Middle Knowledge does not have recourse to the hidden and secret judgments of God, nor does it cry out with Paul, O the depth of the riches!, and it answers easily why one person is elect and not another. Augustine's doctrine takes refuge in the secret and hidden judgments of God, crying out: O the depth of the riches! And it

reproaches the person who wishes to understand loftily, saying: O man, who are you to answer back to God? — because it finds no cause why one is chosen rather than another. Middle Knowledge places the reason for discrimination in the human being and does not ask with Paul: Who is it that distinguishes you? — since it teaches that one human being is distinguished from another by his own works done with the accompanying and indifferent grace. Augustine's doctrine teaches that the reason for discrimination is not drawn from the human being but from God discriminating the predestined from the reprobate in the mass of the damned — whence it asks with Paul: Who is it that distinguishes you? Middle Knowledge investigates the times of congruity and opportunity for the conferral of grace and the calling of God, so that from congruity a fitting is effected for responding to the calling. Augustine's doctrine introduces the calling and bestows grace at the times most incongruous and inopportune — so that upon someone reluctant and resisting it implants the zeal for virtue, which Pelagius objected against him. Middle Knowledge sets forward a state of indifference both of the will and of the assistance, in which God awaits what the human will shall do in order to follow it — so that it is difficult to maintain: all things whatsoever he willed he did, and again: in your will all things are placed. Augustine's doctrine posits a state subject to the Divine will and dependent on it, so that wherever and however God wills, it is drawn thither — yet freely, through his grace prevenient, inclining, and leading it — so that it is truly said: all things whatsoever he willed he did, and again: in your will all things are placed. Middle Knowledge supposes that no one is made willing from unwilling or obedient from rebellious, since it requires persons who are congruous and apt for coming — and leaves hardly any room for that prayer of the Church: mercifully compel also our rebellious wills toward you. Augustine's doctrine admits many unwilling, resisting, and rebellious persons drawn by the power and efficacy of his grace and made willing from unwilling, obedient from resisting, submissive from rebellious — and at his door stands the prayer of the Church: mercifully compel also our rebellious wills. Middle Knowledge, in certain conditions, constitutes congruity and therein invites the Divine will to call, adapting and accommodating it to itself for its own opportunity, which it presents to the one who calls — so that the will does not appear to be made apt by God but foreseen as already apt. The particle in the prayer of the Church, mercifully deign to make us truly apt, is ill received. Augustine's doctrine in whatever circumstances and conditions introduces God making apt and accommodating human wills through the assistance of his grace, and renders true that particle: mercifully deign to make us truly apt. Whatever therefore in the human being is apt and congruous for acting and cooperating is wholly bestowed by God gratuitously and mercifully. Middle Knowledge attributes something to the human being in which he can in a certain way glory — namely that antecedent proportion of the congruous will with the opportune assistance, and that cooperation from the freedom of free choice which is foreseen before the Divine decree — on account of which Molina said that praise and glory

should be attributed to the human being for cooperating with grace on account of the freedom he exercises. Augustine's doctrine denies the human being every reason for glory and pronounces with the authority of Cyprian that there is nothing in the human being about which he can glory — so that he who glories should glory in the Lord. Middle Knowledge teaches that our merits cannot absolutely be called gifts and benefactions of God, because that proposition derogates from human free choice, of which our merits are the fruit. Augustine's doctrine — without denying at all our free cooperation — absolutely asserts that our merits are gifts of God, so as to say to God: what are our merits other than your gifts, other than your benefactions? Middle Knowledge, in affirming that our merits are gifts of God, is apprehensive about freedom and favors human free choice. Augustine's doctrine, in asserting that they are gifts of God, is not apprehensive about freedom and favors grace; it does not admit the contrary, lest we seem to share merit equally with God. Middle Knowledge — with the introduction of that cooperation antecedent to the decree, arising from proper free choice together with indifferent grace — appears to posit something initial that is discriminating and implicit in merit in the very operation itself; for that determination of grace indifferent of itself toward acting before the decree of God appears to assume something independent of God and entirely proper to free choice. Augustine's doctrine entirely denies this and attributes even the free determination itself — with freedom unimpaired — to God, lest it admit anything that is not from God and not received from God, in accordance with that word of Paul: What do you have that you did not receive? — and lest the human being appear to bargain with God in such a way as to take the first part for himself and give the rest to God. Middle Knowledge supplies causes and reasons conformable to natural light, so that it may rest and not recur to hidden causes in the Divine judgments. Augustine's doctrine, not finding the causes and reasons of predestination and reprobation, has recourse to the Divine judgments and cries out: How incomprehensible are his judgments and how unsearchable his ways! Middle Knowledge pronounces that our predestination is a work of God and of the human being — of God who has mercy, but also of the willing and running human being. Augustine's doctrine teaches that predestination does not belong to the willing and running human being but to the merciful God. Middle Knowledge seems to attenuate the prayers and petitions for efficacious grace from God for operating, with which the Missal and Breviary are full — for since the human operation antecedes every decree of God and is not determined by it, but proceeds from the will with indifferent grace which free choice determines, it seems superfluous to have recourse to God in prayer to give the human being what he has in his own power — indeed what he is already supposed to have. Thus it will be necessary for God to pray to the human being to will to act well and to respond to his grace. Augustine's doctrine rests entirely on prayers and petitions, exhorting us to pray to God and to supplicate him humbly that he give us his grace and most efficacious powers for acting and living well — teaching that without him we can do nothing and

that whatever good we do is his gift, to be sought and obtained from him. No one can doubt these comparisons: what we attribute to Middle Knowledge is found in its authors; what we deduce follows from their doctrine. What we affirm Augustine to have taught is evident from his books, the passages from which we shall cite in the course of the work. We refer readers to those works, for what we have compressed here for the sake of clearer contrast in these collations we shall set forth there at length and in detail.

§. II. From the aims and effects of Middle Knowledge as opposed to the doctrine of Augustine.

Where aims are diverse and effects contrary, the same means cannot be used and the same causes cannot hold. Therefore, since the aim of Middle Knowledge was entirely different from the aim of Augustinian doctrine, the means could not be the same, nor the same account of doctrine for obtaining that same aim by arguments. Moreover, since Augustine's doctrine produced effects entirely unlike those produced by Middle Knowledge, the doctrine must have been unlike as well. Let us demonstrate both claims.

First: the aim of the authors of Middle Knowledge — by their own admission — was to oppose Luther and Calvin, who abolished human freedom and asserted a certain fatal necessity incompatible with freedom, introducing an account of predestining and condemning by the mere good pleasure of God without any regard for merit or demerit — choosing and reprobating, compelling toward good, driving toward evil — with the free capacity for meriting and demeriting entirely removed. In order to overturn this heresy, the authors of Middle Knowledge handed on an opposing doctrine in favor of human free choice, positing and retaining it in its state of freedom required for living well and badly, with an indifferent grace introduced that would in no way necessitate free choice and would remain in the power of the will — placing God's predestination on a foundation of justice resting on the foresight of merits and demerits, so that God predestines no one to life whom he does not certainly foresee as about to act well, and destines no one to death except one whom he foreknows as about to act badly, so that death and life would be in the power of each human being acting freely in either direction. This aim was certainly excellent and most praiseworthy — yet far different from Augustine's other aim. For Augustine was fighting against a contrary heresy — namely the Pelagian, which by too greatly exalting human free choice was suppressing grace, asserting the full and sufficient freedom of that same free choice to obtain salvation, removing either wholly or in part the necessity of divine grace, and introducing a predestination entirely or initially dependent on merits natural or wholly or initially proceeding from nature — so that both predestination and grace were either entirely or in part within the power of natural free choice. This is an error diametrically opposed to the former. From which it follows that the two errors must be combated by different kinds of doctrine — the former by

favoring freedom, the latter by favoring grace. It is indeed true that Augustine fought against both, since he attacked the Manichaeans who introduced fate — the forerunners of Luther and Calvin — and refuted the Pelagians who placed free choice above grace — the precursors of Arminius and the Remonstrants. But we are not now concerned with the Manichaean error or the doctrine directed toward its refutation, but with the other doctrine pertaining to the overthrow of the error of Pelagius, which the authors of Middle Knowledge use to establish the same Middle Knowledge.

From this the diversity of aims is plain. Let us come to the effects produced by these doctrines and show them to be entirely different. No better proof of this will be found than to bring forward what effects they produced in Augustine's time. These are first set forth in the preliminary letters to the books *de praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *de bono perseverantiae* — letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine — and in Prosper's four books of responses in defense of Augustine, and in the weighty though uncertain-authored book 4 of the *Hypognosticon*, and in Augustine's own book *de bono perseverantiae* from c. 15 to the end.

The first was the disturbance of simple believers, of which Hilary speaks in his letter: Why was it necessary, he says, for the hearts of those who understand less to be troubled by the uncertainty of this disputation? The second was dissension among the learned, of which Prosper speaks — a dissension so abrupt that Hilary calls it a contradiction at the end of his letter. The third was the rejection of that absolute predestinating purpose of God independent of the use of free choice — of which Prosper speaks at the beginning of his letter and Hilary before the middle of his. The fourth was the sloth and torpor arising from that doctrine, which Prosper notes in the same passage combined with negligence in acting well, and Hilary at the middle of his letter. The fifth was the uselessness of correction and preaching, brought forward by Prosper shortly after the middle of his letter and by Hilary in the middle. The sixth was the apparent injury done to the equity and providence of God in that purpose and constitution of his in choosing some over others with absolute discrimination and without regard for merits — of which Prosper speaks at the middle of his letter and Hilary at the beginning and end. The seventh was the despair to which people are driven if it is not in their power to be saved or not to be saved — which is found especially exaggerated by Prosper throughout almost his entire letter and by Hilary, who clearly writes after the middle: They are moved to say that a kind of despair is being presented to human beings. The eighth consists of various complaints arising from Augustine's doctrine — namely: that it shakes the doctrine that God wills all human beings to be saved; that the number of the predestined is so certain and fixed that it can neither be increased nor diminished; that the zeal for virtue ceases; that eternal life is not prepared for all; that Christ did not die for all; that by prevenient and cooperating grace free choice is impeded — as Prosper records in his letter to Augustine. Furthermore: that perseverance is so

preached that it can be neither humbly merited nor contumaciously lost; that whatever is given to the predestined they cannot lose, or retain by their own will, just as the reprobate on the contrary can in no way change for the better and obtain salvation; that the preaching of gratuitous predestination is useless and unfruitful — as Hilary narrates in his letter. Let us add to these the words of Prosper: that industry is removed, virtues are abolished, a certain fatal necessity is introduced, and the nature of free choice is perverted — if no one can be anything other than what he was made — which was the heresy of the Manichaeans — to all of which, one by one, Augustine responded in *de Bono Perseverantiae* from c. 15.

These effects are foreign to Middle Knowledge, which could in no way produce them in those who hear it — indeed it was devised precisely to avoid them and produce the contrary. To put it briefly: it is affirmed plainly and everywhere by the same authors of Middle Knowledge that it was devised to console people, to provide hope and confidence for obtaining salvation, to shake off torpor, to remove complaints, to achieve the harmony of freedom with grace, to establish the indifference of free choice, to place eternal salvation in the power of human beings, and to exhort people to do what is in their power through their own free will.

§. III. From examples foreign to Middle Knowledge.

Let us examine the examples that Augustine adduces to confirm his doctrine, for which there is no room in Middle Knowledge.

Jacob and Esau.

The first is the case of Jacob and Esau, which is found in *lib. 2 contra duas epistolas Pelagian.* c. 7, and *lib. 1 Retract.* c. 23, and *epist. 105*, and *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum* q. 2, and other passages — for Augustine uses this example frequently. Let us produce the words from *epist. 105*: For who are those who answer God back? Since Rebecca had twins by one act of intercourse with Isaac our father, and when they had not yet been born and had done nothing good or bad — so that the purpose of God according to election might remain, an election of grace, not of desert, by which he himself makes those who are to be chosen, not finding them (note carefully) — not from works but from the one who calls, it was said that the elder would serve the younger. And shortly after: For what did he love in Jacob before he was born and had done any good, if not the gratuitous gift of his mercy? And what did he hate in Esau before he had done any evil, if not original sin? There is here no reason grounded in any antecedent congruity in which Jacob rather than Esau was to be called. He adds: Moreover — when pressed by these straits — into what precipices do they fall while fearing the snares of truth! Therefore, they say, he loved one and hated the other before they were born because he foresaw their future works. Who would not be amazed that such an acute insight was lacking to the Apostle? For he did

not see this when, with an adversary's objection put to him, he did not rather give that brief, clear, and — as these people think — true and absolute answer. For when he had set forth the astounding matter of how God could say of those not yet born and doing nothing good or bad that he loved one and hated the other, and expressing the movement of the hearer through a question put to himself: What then shall we say? he asks, Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. Here then was the place to say what these men maintain. For God foresaw their future works when he said that the elder would serve the younger. Yet the Apostle does not say this; but rather, wishing that what he said should prevail to commend God's grace — so that no one should dare to glory in the merits of his own works — he said: For I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion. Therefore it is not of the one who wills, nor of the one who runs, but of God who has mercy. Where now are merits, where are works, whether past or future, as if accomplished or to be accomplished by the powers of free choice? Nor should you object that he is speaking of absolutely future merits, for we forestalled that above — namely that those absolutely future things had first been foreseen conditionally. Nor likewise oppose the claim that he is speaking of natural works from the power of free choice and not of merits with grace, for Paul and Augustine exclude every merit and demerit and have recourse to the hidden judgments of God. Surely if that solution were true, it would have been easy for Paul and Augustine to have recourse to those merits with grace. Augustine therefore excluded every antecedent merit — especially since those merits with indifferent grace are customarily assigned to free choice, as we show elsewhere in our works on grace.

I do not know whether he stated this more plainly than in that passage, *lib. 2 contra duas epist. Pelag.* c. 7: You are foolish, he says, who, with the truth saying "not from works but from the one who calls," assert "from future works which God foresaw he would do" — behold the conditional or Middle Knowledge — and thus contradict the Apostle saying "not from works," as if he could not say "not from present works but from future works"; but he says "not from works" in order to commend grace. The aim of Middle Knowledge is not this, but to commend freedom. He continues: If it is of grace, then it is no longer of works, otherwise grace is no longer grace — grace indeed, so that through it good works may be done, lest if good works came first, grace should seem to be repaid for works, as if grace were not grace. And indeed this example contains the matter, because it concerns merits foreseen in the conditional state, as appears from question 2 of *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum*; and consequently the authors of Middle Knowledge use it to establish their congruity — not noticing, however, that Saint Augustine in that place, as we shall say later and have elsewhere proved, after a long disputation finally refuted that position concerning congruity for meriting, appealing to the Divine judgment and referring the election of Jacob over Esau to the purpose of God, and drawing the

example thence to predestination before any foresight of merits — as Augustine himself explains in *lib. 2 Retract.* c. 1 in these words: The later question in this book begins from the passage where he says: Not only, however, but also Rebecca having twins by one act of intercourse with Isaac our father, down to: Unless the Lord of Hosts had left us seed, we would have been as Sodom and we would have been made like Gomorrah. In the solution of this question the struggle was over free choice, but the grace of God won. Listen attentively: Nor could it arrive at anything other than that it should be understood that the Apostle said with limpid truth: Who then distinguishes you? What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? This passage we cited and examined in this sense contrary to Middle Knowledge in our tome *de Concentu Euchologico in Harmonia Exercitiorum S. Ignatii et Operum S. Augustini* c. 26. And so the argument is appropriate because where merits under a condition were at issue, Augustine does not have recourse to the foresight of merits but takes refuge in the mercy and judgment of God and cries out with Paul: O man, who are you to answer back to God? And: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how unsearchable his ways! — as can be seen at the end of that second question, where he settles the entire controversy.

Pharaoh.

The second is Pharaoh, found in *tom. 4, lib. 2 Quaestionum super Exodum* q. 18, and *tom. 10, Serm. 88 de tempore*. His hardening excludes the doctrine of Middle Knowledge, which attempts to introduce a state of indifference equally open to both sides of contrariety and contradiction in the human being who is about to act independently and antecedently to the Divine decree. Let us see how different Augustine's view is on the hardening of Pharaoh. In the passage of Exodus c. 18, *lib. 2*: I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, and I will multiply my signs and wonders in Egypt. As if the hardening of Pharaoh's heart were necessary in order for God's signs to be multiplied or fulfilled in Egypt. Therefore God makes good use even of evil hearts for what he wishes to show to the good, or what he is going to do for the good. And although the quality of each heart in evil — that is, the kind of heart it has for evil — occurs through its own fault, which took root from the act of the will; yet that evil quality, so that it moves hither or thither, is produced by causes by which the mind is driven — causes whose existence or non-existence is not in the power of the human being, but come from the hidden, most just, most wise providence of God, who disposes and governs the whole of what he created. So that Pharaoh should have such a heart that God's patience did not move it to piety but rather to impiety — that was the fault of his own vice. But that those things happened by which a heart so malignant from its own vice would resist the commands of God (for this is what "hardened" means — that it did not consent flexibly but resisted inflexibly) — that was a work of Divine dispensation, by which a punishment not only just but evidently just was being prepared for such a heart, by which those

who feared God might be corrected. Where in this hardened Pharaoh is that state of indifference in either direction — free, with equal power of acting on either side? Nor does it help to say that Pharaoh, because he sinned from the free choice of his will, merited that hardening — because the authors of Middle Knowledge always posit in a person, while he lives, that state of indifference with sufficient assistance, and always retain a state corresponding to the conditional one.

How then, with that state retained, were those causes by which the mind was moved hither or thither not in the power of the will, but came from the hidden providence of God? This certainly cannot be consistent with the positing of Middle Knowledge.

Let us consult Augustine at *Serm. 88 de tempore*: What is it, he says, that he said, "I will harden his heart," if not: with my grace absent, let his own wickedness harden him? How does "with my grace absent" stand with Middle Knowledge? He continues: For just as when water is bound by excessive cold, upon the arrival of the sun's heat it melts, and when the sun departs it hardens again — so surely the charity of many grows cold with the cold of sin, they are hardened as if into ice, and when the warmth of divine mercy comes to them again they melt — that warmth of which it is written: none can hide himself from his heat. We recognize that this was also fulfilled in Pharaoh, who as often as the plagues were removed hardened himself against God; as often as he was afflicted, he humbly supplicated. Why, however, does our God not mercifully chastise all in this way, so as to permit none to be hardened against him? Either it must be attributed to the iniquity of those who deserve to be hardened, or it must be referred to the inscrutable judgments of God — which are for the most part hidden, but never unjust. Although the first part may seem to favor Middle Knowledge — namely concerning the iniquity that merits hardening — it certainly does not favor it at all, because that hardening: why is it not removed? Why, with it standing, is the hardened person not equally indifferent in either direction? This is not in conformity with Middle Knowledge.

Let us add a passage from *lib. de praedestin. et gratia* tom. 7 of Augustine's works — which, even if it is not by Augustine, is nonetheless by a weighty author and here is consistent with Augustine's doctrine — containing an excellent and most apt comparison of Pharaoh with Nebuchadnezzar. There at c. 14: Rejoice therefore, O whoever you are who have been enlightened, and acknowledge the grace you did not deserve; groan, O whoever you are who have been hardened, and confess the justice. And further: Do not ascribe the injustice of God to the fault of your hardening, because all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth — so that neither those who have obtained mercy may glory before God from their merits in the judgment of truth, nor those who have been hardened and damned should think they can have an excuse from this, that they obtained no mercy by which they might be converted. And afterward at c. 15: Whence did

Nebuchadnezzar deserve a fruitful repentance? Did he not after innumerable impieties, when scourged, repent and recover the kingdom he had lost? Pharaoh became harder from those very scourges and perished. Any author from Middle Knowledge will answer that this is to be attributed to the good use of the will of one and the bad use of the will of the other, and will extricate himself from the question, because the one merited and the other did not. The author of *de praedestinatione et gratia* answers differently: Let the person give me an account who judges the divine counsel with a heart too lofty, why the same medicine prepared by one Physician availed for the destruction of one and for the salvation of another — unless because Christ is for some the fragrance of life unto life, and for others the fragrance of death unto death? In terms of nature both were men; in terms of dignity both were kings; in terms of cause both held captive peoples; in terms of punishment both were mercifully admonished by scourges. What then made their ends diverse, if not that one, sensing the hand of God, groaned in the memory of his own iniquity, while the other fought against God with his free choice? Here whoever answers that to the one, that he might be changed, divine assistance was present, while to the other, that he might be hardened, it was absent — and contends this to be unjust, on account of which the Apostle, who placed the end of things in the will of God, said "he has mercy on whom he will, and hardens whom he will" — and while the Lord says "without me you can do nothing" — let him understand that all those things are either accomplished with the Lord's help or permitted when he withdraws; yet know that with the Lord unwilling nothing whatsoever is allowed to happen. What could be clearer against Middle Knowledge, what more unanswerable? This author is not Augustine, yet he is Augustinian in thought, and in him Augustine speaks.

Ahasuerus.

The third is the king Ahasuerus, which we examined in our book *Concentus Euchologicus in Harmonia S. Ignatii et Augustini* cap. last. It is found in *lib. 1 contra duas Epist. Pelagian.* c. 20, beginning from the end of chapter 19: He is drawn, says Augustine, by wondrous ways to will, by him who knows how to work inwardly in the hearts of men — not so that men might do what cannot happen, namely be willing while unwilling, but so that from being unwilling they might be made willing. Then at c. 20: We do not suspect this to be true by human conjecture, but we recognize it by the most evident authority of the Divine Scriptures. We read in the books of Paralipomenon: And indeed upon Judah the hand of God came so that they gave them one heart to do the commandment of the king and of the princes in the word of the Lord. By the prophet Ezekiel the Lord says: I will give them another heart, and I will give them a new spirit, and I will remove their stony heart from their flesh, and I will give them a heart of flesh, that they may walk in my statutes and keep my ordinances and do them. He proceeds: But what is it that Queen Esther prays and says: Give a well-fitting speech in my mouth, and make my words clear in the sight of the lion, and turn

his heart to hatred of our enemy? Why does she say this in prayer to God if God does not work in the hearts of human beings the will? But perhaps this woman prayed foolishly. Let us see therefore whether the prayer of the one praying was offered in vain and whether the effect of the one hearing did not follow. Behold she goes out to the king. Not to say much: And because she was not entering in her proper order, compelled by great necessity, he looked at her as a bull in the fury of his anger. And the queen was afraid; and her color changed through faintness, and she leaned on the head of her handmaid who preceded her. And God turned, transferred his wrath into gentleness. What need is there to recount what follows? — where the Divine Scripture attests that God fulfilled what she had prayed for, working in the heart of the king. What else than the will, by which he commanded and it was done, what the queen had sought from him? Which will God — who had already heard that it should come about — changed and transferred with his most hidden and most efficacious power, before the queen who was petitioning had been heard, turning the king's heart from wrath to gentleness, that is, from the will to harm to the will to favor — according to that word of the Apostle: For God is he who works in us the will. Did the men of God who wrote these things — indeed the Spirit of God himself, by whose authorship through them these things were written — attack human free choice? God forbid! But he commended the omnipotent judgment of God over all things, and the most merciful assistance of God. For it is enough for the human being to know that there is no unrighteousness with God. Now how he dispenses these things — making some according to merit vessels of wrath, others according to grace vessels of mercy — who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? If therefore we belong to the honor of grace, let us not be ungrateful, attributing to ourselves what we have received. What do we have that we did not receive?

In this passage there is an Achilles: for the drawing of people to God, so that they will, is brought about with great and powerful force of grace upon the human will, so that the will does not precede the movement. And the example teaches that this is what happened. But it happened as it was foreseen in the conditional state. Therefore that foresight of the will drawn to willing presupposed the drawing prepared through the decree of the Divine will — and therefore did not wait upon this will as to what it would do before the decree, since of itself it would not have come unless it were drawn in that manner. Let us weigh those words: who with his most hidden and most efficacious will turned and transferred the king's heart from wrath to gentleness, that is, from the will to harm to the will to favor, according to that word of the Apostle: God is he who works in us the will. Let the reader who weighs this passage will say that it is a thoroughly conclusive argument.

Saint Peter.

The fourth is Peter converted to penance after his denial through the compassionate look of Christ. Augustine adduces this frequently; I give the more notable passages. *Lib. 3 de Consensu Evangelistarum* c. 6, where: It seems to me that that look was divinely produced so that it came into his mind how often he had already denied and what the Lord had foretold him, and thus with the Lord mercifully looking at him he repented and wept salutarily. Certainly that weeping was the effect of that look; the look however proceeded from mercy and was decreed from that motive — not presupposed in the will before the purpose of looking. Greater force is in the testimony found in *lib. de gratia Christi contra Pelagium et Coelestium* c. 45: The Lord looked at Peter. Inwardly it was done. It was done in the mind. Mercifully the Lord helped secretly. He touched the heart; called back the memory; visited Peter by his interior grace; moved the interior man even to outward tears, and brought forth the feeling. God had foreseen this movement through Middle Knowledge in the conditional state: if Christ were thus to look and visit and knock and move Peter, he would both repent of his sin and wash it away with tears and turn to the Lord. Certainly that excitation — so great and so vehement — was not in the power or free choice of Peter, but in the power and will of God. I add a point from *lib. de Correptione et gratia* c. 5: Who gives this, if not he who looked at the Apostle Peter when he was denying and made him weep? Note the word "made." And a little later: What man is shown to have prayed for Peter so that God might give them repentance, which he knew Peter had denied while the Lord was weeping for him? Note the word "give." And c. 6: I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail. What did he pray for if not for perseverance to the end? To this belong those words at c. 12: Assistance was therefore given to the weakness of the human will, so that by divine grace it might be moved indeclinably and insurmountably — not without freedom, nor overcome by any adversity. And so it was brought about that the weak and feeble will of the human being persevered in the small good still present, through the power of God. And introducing a comparison of Adam in the state of innocence with Peter in the state of ruin: He left the more robust man and permitted him to do what he willed; for the weaker he reserved it that even by his gift they might most invincibly will the good and most invincibly refuse to abandon it. Therefore when Christ said "I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail," let us understand this to be said of the one built upon the rock. From all this it appears that Peter in those circumstances was not left to himself as indifferent in either direction, but was efficaciously moved, drawn, strengthened, and converted by Christ the Lord — with freedom preserved — and was foreseen in the conditional state as he was afterwards to act when placed in the future and actual state: not in order to give God a reason for premotion that God would follow, but in order to receive that reason from God predestining antecedently.

Saint Paul.

The fifth and last — and most luminous — is that of Paul, which of itself in my judgment overthrows the entire edifice of Middle Knowledge. About him first, *tom. 3, epist. 50*: Paul, first Saul, afterward the great builder of his Church but previously its terrible devastator, he not only restrained with his voice but prostrated with his power; and in order to urge that mind raving in the darkness of unfaith to desire the light of the heart, he first struck him with blindness. And further: Let them have Paul the Apostle; let them recognize in him first Christ compelling and afterward teaching — first wounding and afterward consoling. These things were foreseen conditionally; but they fit not at all with Middle Knowledge. He says similar things in *epist. 1 Ioannis tract. 8* and in *Symb. ad Catechumenos lib. 3 c. 5*. Again, *tom. 10, in lib. 50 Homiliar. hom. 17*: Let us see Paul raging, let us behold him furious, let us behold him breathing hatred and thirsting for blood. And shortly after: What did he have in his heart? What if not evil? Give him his deserts. If the deserts, which are of damnation, not liberation. He was therefore going to rage against the members of Christ, going to shed blood, going to be a wolf while destined to be a shepherd. What congruity is here, what proportion? While he walked that way, he thought, he panted for slaughter — anger drives his feet, hatred moves his limbs. While he presses on and walks, the servant obeys his cruelty. Everything incongruous, inopportune, contrary. And behold a voice from heaven, Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? Behold the reason why he said: I obtained mercy that I might be faithful. He was unfaithful — little enough — he was in that very unfaithfulness cruel; but he obtained mercy that he might be faithful. Then to our point: What will you say to God saying, "This is my will"? So, Lord, you deem that man who did such things, who desired to do such things against your saints, worthy of such mercy? This is my will. Or is your eye evil because I am good? This response is foreign to the sense of Middle Knowledge. Read the rest — they are consistent with the foregoing and discordant with the tenets of the authors of Middle Knowledge.

Continuing at *Serm. 74 de temp. c. 2*: While he presses on, while he pants for slaughter, while he thirsts for blood, the persecutor was prostrated by the heavenly voice of Christ, the preacher was raised up. No congruity there, no suitability. Again: He prostrated Saul with one voice, raised up Paul — prostrated the proud, raised up the humble. More forcefully at *Serm. 13 de Sanctis*: He was going, breathing and panting for slaughter. I excerpt here and there: From the persecutor a preacher is formed, from the wolf a sheep, from an enemy a soldier. A wondrous and great thing is done. The wolf is forbidden his savagery. The wolf is led captive to the sheep. Nothing from the will of Paul; everything from the will of God.

Furthermore at *Serm. 24 de temp.*, or *Serm. 1 in Festo Apostolorum Petri et Pauli*, and *Serm. 4* where: Saul went carried by furies, breathed the fire of a hard heart, and thirsting for the blood of the saints was carried through all of Judaea in alien madness to tear apart the members of Christ on earth. While therefore Saul bore the deadly sword against the soldiers of Christ, he received a flash-like

testimony from heaven. While he was marauding he was struck, while he was persecuting the saints of Christ he was blinded by a violent ray of light, and he who was raised up against God was terribly prostrated by the divine voice. And afterward: Suddenly at this divine voice of rebuke, fixed to the ground, he loses both his savagery and his way; he lays aside his ferocity and encounters the blindness of his eyes. Better and more aptly to the doctrine: *lib. 1 contr. duas epist. Pelagian*. c. 19: Tell me, I beg, what good was Saul still willing — he who was still Saul — and was he not rather greatly evil, when breathing slaughter he was going to devastate in horrible blindness of mind and fury the Christians, by what merits of good will did God convert him from these evils to good by a wondrous and sudden calling? What shall I say of what merits? Since he himself cries out: Not from works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us. What of that which I have already recalled that the Lord said: No one can come to me — which is understood to mean "believe in me" — unless it has been given to him by my Father. Is this given for the merits of good will to one who is already willing, or rather is the very will excited from above, as it was in Saul — even though he is so averse to the faith as even to persecute believers? Let the authors of Middle Knowledge respond to this testimony of Augustine.

I produce another more powerful passage from *lib. de grat. et lib. arb.* c. 5: There was merit in the Apostle Paul, but bad merit — when he was persecuting the Church. Hence he says: I am not worthy to be called an Apostle (but those apt and suitable persons are called, say the authors of Middle Knowledge) because I persecuted the Church of God. Since therefore he had bad merit, good was rendered to him for evil — in what he added: But by the grace of God I am what I am. And to show human free choice, he exhorts others to whom he says: We beg you not to receive the grace of God in vain. More to the point: But that he should be called from heaven and converted by such a great and most efficacious calling — that was the grace of God alone, because his merits were great, but evil. Here the axe is laid to the root of that view. I add from *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.* c. 2: Averse from the faith he was devastating, and afflicting it all the more vehemently, he was suddenly converted to it by a more powerful grace — converted, as it was foretold by the Prophet to this very one about to do this: You who are converted will vivify us — so that not only from an unwilling person would he be made a willing one to believe, but even from a persecutor he would suffer persecution in defense of that faith which he had persecuted. I conclude with the testimony from *lib. 1 ad Simplician.* q. 2: What was Saul willing if not to invade, drag, bind, and kill Christians? What a rabid will! What a furious one! How blind! Yet with one divine voice prostrating him — a vision arising, surely, by which that mind and that will, broken from its savagery, was twisted back and corrected to faith — suddenly, from being a marvelous persecutor of the Gospel, a still more marvelous preacher was made. Certainly in this example of Paul everything is present; there is no need of anything except an attentive

and expert reader of both views. I am willing to stand by his judgment; I reject no one, even though he comes with a prejudiced and prepossessed mind. So great do I judge the force in it to be.

SECTION VII. From the constitution and purpose of God the predestinator it is gathered that Middle Knowledge is rejected by Augustine.

Here, as it were, is the hinge of this controversy. In his preliminary letter to the books *de Praedestinat. Sanct.* addressed to Augustine, Prosper presents the position of the Massilians thus: This is their definition and profession: that every human being sinned by sinning with Adam, and that no one is saved by his own works but by the regeneration of God's grace. And after a short interval: That God foreknew before the constitution of the world those who would believe, and those who would remain in the faith which is afterward to be aided by the grace of God — and predestined them to his kingdom, those whom he foresaw as destined to be worthy after being freely called and to depart from this life with a good ending. And therefore every human being is admonished by divine institutions to believe and to act, so that he does not despair of obtaining eternal life, since a reward is prepared for willing devotion. This is the first position, which says that the foresight of merits precedes the constitution and decree or purpose of God — and that the subsequent decree rests upon it — which surely was the foresight of conditional knowledge. Nor, as thus narrated by Prosper, did that knowledge yet contain an error; yet it was against the doctrine of Augustine, who taught that the absolute decree of predestination was governed by that antecedent knowledge and grounded on the foresight of the future good use of free choice, which use would not depend on any other conditional decree antecedent to that foreseen future good use. The Massilians wished that use to be known in itself as future from proper freedom independently of any decree and constitution of God — which was entirely contrary to the position of Augustine, which is immediately added in these words: But this purpose of God's calling — by which the separation of those to be chosen and those to be rejected is said to have been made either before the beginning of the world or in the very constitution of the human race, so that according to what pleased the Creator some are created as vessels of honor and others as vessels of reproach — to take away from the fallen the care of rising and to give an occasion for torpor to the saints, since work is superfluous on both sides if neither the rejected can enter by any diligence nor the elect can fall by any negligence. And afterward: All industry is removed and virtues are abolished if the constitution of God forestalls the human wills.

Here is the hinge of the entire controversy. Augustine says: The constitution of God forestalls human wills. The Massilians say: The constitution of God does not forestall human wills. From which it follows that merits are foreseen as to be accomplished from free choice with accompanying and indifferent assistance — not however from the constitution and purpose of God antecedently decreeing

those merits and conferring his efficacious grace to that end. Again the same thing is contained in the letter of Hilary, where the Massilians say: It is something new and useless to preaching, they say, that certain persons are said to be chosen according to purpose, so that they can neither seize it nor hold it unless the will to believe is given. And a little after: But they contend that foreknowledge and predestination or purpose avail for this — that he foreknew or predestined or proposed to choose those who would believe. This foreknowledge is conditional as the text and the example attached to the text declare. For the text speaks of that foreknowledge that precedes God's constitution — but this is not the absolute foreknowledge that presupposes and follows the constitution, nor does it show God the reasons for predestinating and choosing — since it already presupposes predestination made through the decree and the election of the predestined. Nor is it the possible foreknowledge, which tends not toward futurity but remains fixed in mere possibility indifferent to futurity and non-futurity. It is therefore the conditional foreknowledge, which they call Middle Knowledge — which shows God what the called person would do in such circumstances, and according to the correspondence of coming and cooperating or otherwise, one is chosen over another and predestined through a subsequent absolute decree and Divine constitution. This the words of the Massilians contain as found in Prosper at the beginning of the letter: That God foreknew before the constitution of the world those who would believe, and those who would remain in that faith which is afterward to be aided by the grace of God, and predestined them to his kingdom, those whom he foresaw as destined to be worthy after being freely called and to depart from this life with a good ending. And in Hilary at the beginning of the letter: But when they are told why the gospel is preached here or there, or not preached, or is now preached in a place where it was formerly almost not preached as to certain peoples but is now preached to certain ones, they say this is a matter of Divine foreknowledge — that the truth was or is announced at such a time and place and to such persons when and where and to whom it was foreknown that it would be believed. Moreover they used for the purpose of persuading this the earlier opinion of Augustine himself, in the questions against Porphyry — that is *epist. 49, q. 2* — where he had said: Christ wished to appear to human beings and to have his doctrine preached among them at the time when and the place where he knew there would be those who would believe in him. The example attached declares the same conditional and Middle Knowledge. For pressed by the argument of infants dying without Baptism they respond: Those perish and those are saved whom Divine knowledge foresaw as being of such a character in their more mature years if they were kept alive to an active age. Here is the foresight of conditional merits, which Augustine himself acknowledges and admits in responding to these objections in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct. c. 9* — where he recognizes this testimony drawn from the question or treatise against Porphyry, and having recognized it confirms the conditional foreknowledge of conditionally future faith, yet without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God,

which he immediately adds in order to meet the error of the Massilians who were attempting to abuse that foreknowledge to establish the use of the human will before the constitution of the Divine will. Augustine, on the contrary, wanted the Divine will to precede all foresight of merits, so that the absolute decree should precede absolute merits, and the conditional decree should precede conditional merits. And this was always the consistent doctrine of Augustine, resting on this hinge of predestination that is entirely free and gratuitous, according to the purpose of the Divine will, preceding every use of human freedom.

So in *Epist. 105 ad Sixtum* at the beginning: Because the entire mass is deservedly damned, a contumely is rendered that is a debt of justice; an honor is given that is unowed by grace — not by the prerogative of merit, not by the necessity of fate, not by the rashness of fortune, but by the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God. And shortly afterward to our point: Jesus knew from the beginning who would believe and who would betray him. And lest anyone should think that believers belonged to his foreknowledge in such a way as if the faith itself were not given from above to them — but only their will were foreknown — immediately he added and said: And he said: "For this reason I told you that no one can come to me unless it has been given to him by my Father." And to make a better case he adduces the example he almost always uses — that of infants — adding at the end of the letter: What will those say who, in order that grace might be given, contend that some human merits must precede, lest God be a respecter of persons? What merits preceded here? And having excluded all that could be thought of, he adds: Who are those who answer back to God, when Rebecca had twins by one act of intercourse with Isaac our father, and when they had not yet been born and had done nothing good or bad — so that the purpose of God according to election might remain, an election of grace, not of debt, by which he himself makes those who are to be chosen, not finding them — not from works but from the one who calls — it was said that the elder would serve the younger. And having adduced the passage of Malachi pertaining to predestination he adds: What did he love in Jacob before he was born and had done any good, if not the gratuitous gift of his mercy? And what did he hate in Esau before he had done any evil, if not original sin? He then brings forward the point by which Middle Knowledge is slain: Therefore, say the adversaries, he loved one and hated the other before they were born because he foresaw their future works. Who would not be amazed that such an acute insight was lacking to the Apostle? For he did not see this when, with an adversary's objection put to him, he did not rather give that brief, clear, and — as these people think — true and absolute answer. For when he had set forth the astounding matter of how God could rightly say of those not yet born and doing nothing good or bad that he loved one and hated the other, and expressing the movement of the hearer through a question put to himself: What then shall we say? he asks, Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. Here therefore was

the place to say what these men maintain — for God foresaw their future works when he said that the elder would serve the younger. And so on. And again he returns to infants; and adding to the doctrine admirably: Can anyone say concerning infants who are going to die, that God foresees their future works in order to provide Baptism for one and not the other? For how can things be called future that will not exist at all? He passes to the conditional and adds: If therefore God punishes even evil works that were not committed — let them first attend to how falsely they promise that infants who die without Baptism will not go to condemnation, infants who are not baptized because they were going to live badly — for it is by reason of that very evil life that they will doubtless be condemned, if even the evil they were going to do is condemned.

In these and the following passages Augustine removes every kind of foresight of merits for the sake of which — with the decree and Divine constitution excluded — people are either chosen or rejected. The same doctrine is given in *Epist. 106 ad Bonifacium*, confirmed by the example of those same infants and the twins Jacob and Esau, which it is not necessary to repeat. I adduce some illustrious and brief sentences that demonstrate the matter plainly — namely: The Doctor of the Gentiles testifies that in faith and truth these twins not yet born had done nothing good or bad — so that grace might be commended, so that what was said, "the elder shall serve the younger," might be understood as standing according to the elective purpose of God — not so that the merit of the human being should go before, not so that the election of the human will or nature should precede (for the condition of death and damnation was equal in both) — but the election doubtless of grace, which does not find those to be chosen but makes them. The view that introduces Middle Knowledge teaches the contrary — it finds those to be chosen before the Divine constitution and decree. And afterward: Merits do not precede liberating grace there. Again: Let him who is freed praise the mercy; let him who is punished not blame the judgment. Third: Those whom he predestined, those also he called — and here we must understand: according to purpose. For there are others called but not chosen, and therefore not called according to purpose. But those whom he called — that is, according to purpose — those also he justified; and those he justified, those also he glorified. No antecedent foreknowledge here of merits of whatever kind. The purpose occupies everything, against the position of Middle Knowledge.

In *Epist. 107 ad Vitalem* there are likewise some lights of this truth after the middle of the letter: How, he says, are merits of will said to precede grace even in adults, if grace, to be true grace, is not given according to our merits? And a little later: How does human will merit that Divine grace should be given, if it is given by gratuitous mercy to those to whom it is given — for it to be true grace? How are the merits of the human will weighed in this, seeing that to those to whom it is not given — who in many cases differ by no merit and no will from those to whom it is given, but have a cause similar to theirs — it is nonetheless

not given by the just judgment of God? More apt is what follows: How is it not grace — not only the will to believe from the beginning, but also to persevere to the end — since the end of this life itself is not in the power of the human being but of God. Here the merits are from the purpose of God, not from the human will foreseen through Middle Knowledge antecedently to the purpose. Similar things are found in *lib. 11 de Gen. ad litteram* c. 4, c. 9, and c. 10, and *lib. de spiritu et littera* c. 24 and c. 34. Certain things also suitable are found in *lib. expositionis quarundam propositionum ad Romanos* c. 60 and 61, which in *lib. 1 retractationum* c. 23 are partly retracted and partly explained — from which retraction it is clearly manifest that merits were not foreseen before the constitution of the decree. Consistent with this doctrine is what is found in *lib. de praedest. Sanctorum* c. 3 and 4, where he sets forth the same retraction just mentioned.

From the books *de Civit. Dei* I draw certain things which it would be wrong to pass over. *Lib. 5, c. 9*: In the will of God, he says, the supreme power resides, to which all other wills are subject, since they have no power except what he concedes. Therefore the cause of things that makes but is not made is God. Other causes make and are made — this view is contrary to Middle Knowledge. And no less that which follows: And therefore our wills have so much power as God willed and foreknew they should have. Note: first he posited "willed," afterward "foreknew" — to signify that foreknowledge is posterior to the will. And *lib. 14, c. 26*: To almighty God, the supremely good Creator of all natures, the helper and rewarder of good wills, the abandoner and condemner of evil ones, the orderer of both, there was no lack of counsel by which he might fill with a certain number of citizens predestined in his wisdom from the condemned race of men the city of his wisdom — distinguishing and liberating them not now by merits, since the entire mass is condemned as in a corrupted root, but by grace; and showing through those not liberated what he grants to those who are liberated. Liberation therefore comes from the liberality of the one liberating, not from a foreseen use of freedom.

Of the same character are what he has in *lib. 1 de origine animae* c. 7, and from *lib. 3 contra Vincentium Victorem* c. 10, and from *lib. 4, c. 11*, where: Let the hidden works of God have their secret, with my faith safe. These are: to be predestined to eternal life by the most merciful giver of grace. Therefore after the foreseen conditional merits — which that secret work of God, that is the conditional decree, precedes. Let us consult *lib. 1 contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* c. 7, 19, and 20. We will find there appropriate and express doctrine; but more manifest is what is found in *lib. 2, c. 7*. With the parable of the workers of Matthew XX adduced, referring the business of predestination to the free and gratuitous will of God, he says: The entire justice here is "This is my will" — or is your eye evil because I am good? And afterward: According to the purpose of God one is called, another is not called; to the one called the gratuitous good is given — of which good the calling itself is the beginning; to the one not called the evil is rendered, because all are guilty, from the time sin entered the world through

one man. Where here is that conditional foresight of the good future use of the created will? Nothing of congruity from the creature's side appears; only the Divine will is mentioned. And afterward near the end of the chapter, with the example he frequently uses adduced — Esau and Jacob — thus: Not from works but from the one who calls — by election indeed, where God does not find what to choose made by another, but himself makes what he finds. This view cuts off as with a single stroke all foreknowledge of merits.

There is in this book another excellent passage — c. 10 and last — which I offer to the reader, asking that he read it. He will see that foreknowledge resting on the human will is slain. They think, he says, that the Apostle said: We know that to those who love God all things work together for good, to those who are called as saints according to purpose — that the purpose of the human being was meant, that purpose as a kind of good merit being followed by the mercy of the calling God; not knowing that it was said "who are called according to purpose" in order that the purpose of God, not of human beings, should be understood — who chose before the constitution of the world those whom he foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son. The entire reason of election is referred back to the purpose of God anteceding all foreknowledge of works. There remains another passage from *lib. 4, c. 6*, which seems most apt. With a good purpose on the human side admitted, he says thus: How is there a good purpose of the human being without the prior mercy of the Lord, since that good will itself is prepared by God? Away, Middle Knowledge! Every preparation and aptitude, whether habit, capacity, or proportion foreseen in the good will, arises from and is conferred by God. Therefore the will is not foreseen of itself as congruous but through the will and purpose of God becomes congruous and prepared. This appears from the following words of Augustine: to one previously resistant the calling of God's grace itself procures entry, and then in that very one still resistant the spirit of strength is kindled. Nevertheless in all the things each one does according to God, his mercy goes before him. Middle Knowledge is entirely excluded — it supposes wills that are capable, flexible, and congruous to receive grace. Augustine posits a reluctant will far different from the congruous, capable, and flexible, and teaches that this will is aided and converted by God in his mercy. Those following words are helpful: They wish to give something to God first, so that it may be repaid to them — to give first some thing from free choice, so that grace may be repaid in return as a reward. Note the phrase "some thing" — by which word something preceding on the human side before the will of God is understood. Surely that congruity and capacity foreseen in the human will is some thing which Augustine entirely amputates, lest we give God something first, as it were taking precedence, so that grace should follow as a repayment to us.

I proceed to other testimonies in *Tractatus 26 in Evangelium Ioannis* on chapter 6, where Augustine expounding those words: No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, says: Great is the commendation of grace. No

one comes unless drawn. And he adds: whom he draws and whom he does not draw, why he draws one and not another, do not wish to judge if you do not wish to err; accept it at once, understand it; if you are not drawn, pray that you may be drawn. These things do not rest on foreknowledge but on the antecedent Divine constitution. The one drawn is not supposed in any way to have come before; the one who prays to be drawn does not have in himself the reason and principle of drawing — such as is that congruity and aptitude in free choice foreseen through Middle Knowledge. For such a person, being already congruous, already has in himself what was to be sought and obtained; indeed if he is foreseen as apt and congruous, it is more appropriate that he who calls should pray that he come, rather than that he who is being called should pray God to draw him. Similar things are found in *Tract. 53 and 54*, but those are better that he delivers in *Tract. 83 and 87 and 110 and 111* — which however we pass over, as well as other things contained in *lib. de praedestinatione Sanctorum* c. 9, 10, 12, 14, 17, and 18, where: He chose us that we might be holy and blameless. Therefore not because we were going to be holy and blameless, but so that we might be. And shortly after: In this mystery of his will he placed the riches of his grace according to his good will, not according to ours — which could not be good unless he according to his good will were to come to its aid so that it might become good. But at c. 20 similar things are said, for which reason we omit them.

Let us approach the book *de dono perseverantiae*, in which Augustine is abundant on this matter. At c. 7 he treats the same account of predestination from the purpose of God: according to his good will — who so works that we may come, he works that we may not depart. But the hand that works is God's, not ours. This hand excludes Middle Knowledge. At c. 8, following the parable of the workers of the vineyard, he places everything in this view: "This is my will." And there from Ambrose he concludes: Therefore it is not in the power of human beings but of God that human beings have the power to become sons of God. At c. 9 he adduces the example of infants, in whom that foreknowledge has no place; and he deals with the Tyrians and Sidonians and their future repentance — had the wonders done among the Jews been done among them — showing us more deeply the mystery of his predestination. With this example we shall conclude the argument against Middle Knowledge below. At c. 17: To whomever, he says, God gives, he foreknew he would give, and in his foreknowledge he prepared it. The preparation is God's, antecedent to all foreknowledge. And there excellently: But if he gives these things and foreknew he would give them, he surely predestined them. How, however, this foreknowledge does not favor Middle Knowledge, Augustine declares at c. 18: Predestination is sometimes signified by the name of foreknowledge. As the Apostle says: God did not reject his people whom he foreknew. Then: Nor is that the election by which he chose them in Christ before the constitution of the world, that they might be holy and blameless. He adds: God did not reject his people whom he foreknew. For he

foreknew the remnant, which he himself was about to make according to the election of grace. This therefore is predestination: for he without doubt foreknew if he predestined; but to have predestined is to have foreknown what he himself was about to do. He foreknew his own future deeds. Therefore that foreknowledge always presupposed works of God in whatever state, anteceding the foreknowledge whose certainty depended on the Divine decree and constitution.

SECTION VIII. From what Augustine teaches about the discrimination of the elect from the reprobate, it appears that he was averse to Middle Knowledge.

It is established that in whatever the discrimination of one from another is grounded, from that same thing the election of one over another follows — and the reason for discriminating is the principle of choosing. Therefore the foreknowledge of election is taken from discrimination: for before the latter, election is not foreknown. If therefore people are discriminated by their wills placed in these or those circumstances — so that the future good use of free choice is the cause for discriminating them — Middle Knowledge immediately attaining that use, with every Divine constitution set aside, will be the reason for certifying the Divine intellect, and in virtue of it predestination and reprobation will be effected. But if on the contrary they are discriminated only through the Divine will, this will must be awaited for predestinating, and in virtue of it the election of these over those takes place — and before that will there can be no foreknowledge of predestination. From this a syllogism is formed in this way: Whoever knows the cause of discrimination knows the cause of predestination. But according to Augustine, whoever knows the Divine constitution knows the cause of discrimination. Therefore he knows the cause of predestination. The force is in the minor premiss — let us prove it from Augustine's doctrine.

He clearly and consistently teaches that people are in no way discriminated by their own wills but by the Divine and free and gratuitous will of God. For this purpose he posits that mass of the damned which, since it contains all alike as guilty, leaves no room for human discrimination. I shall not be prolix in what is entirely certain and established. I shall indicate all the passages and consider some of the more apt ones.

The entire *Epist. 105* turns on this argument. There: the common damnation from the demerits of all; there: the merciful and gratuitous liberation of some and the just abandonment of others; there: the material for glorying taken away; there: every root of human merit from one's own powers without grace cut off; there: the account of foreknowledge resting on the future good use of free choice slain; there: the complaints of the abandoned, equal in evil to those elected, excluded; there: the acknowledgment of the Divine judgments and turning to them and the cry of admiration; there: the entire glorying of the just in God; there: by the example of Esau and Jacob and of infants without Baptism

and with Baptism, dying without their own merits for eternal death and life, the doctrine of free discrimination is confirmed.

Epist. 106: a great part contains the same truth, and in it the view of Saint Paul in *1 Corinthians IV* is clearly set forth: Who then distinguishes you? with the annexed: What do you have that you did not receive? And: he who glories should glory in the Lord, and: he has mercy on whom he will and hardens whom he will. And the memory of the damned mass is refreshed. Again: Esau and Jacob and infants are brought forward. The same account of discriminating is found in *Epist. 107* — less exaggerated but certainly sufficiently expressed shortly before the middle.

The *Enchiridion ad Laurentium* is full of these testimonies and documents — namely c. 25 to 33, and again c. 94 to 104. And in these passages is described the mass of the damned lying prostrate, rolling in evils and being hurled from evils into evil at c. 27. From which God mercifully liberated some and justly abandoned others. I excerpt that sentence from c. 95: It will not then be hidden what is now hidden — when of two infants one is to be taken up through God's mercy and the other is to be left by his judgment, whereby the one taken up may recognize what was owed him by judgment if mercy had not intervened; why the one rather than the other was taken up when the cause was the same for both. To this secret he attaches another example concerning the Tyrians and Sidonians, which I reserve for their proper place. He does not omit the example of Esau and Jacob; indeed he adds that of Pharaoh at c. 99 and connects it with the statements of Paul.

In *lib. 13 de Trinit.* c. 9, 10, and 15 there are some appropriate but less illustrious testimonies. In *de Genesi ad litteram* lib. 6, c. 9 something also not foreign is found. But entirely proper things are found in *lib. 11*, c. 9 and 10. An illustrious testimony is found at the final chapter of *lib. de Spiritu et littera*, which deters mortals from probing the depths of God: Who has known the mind of the Lord?

Among the *Octoginta tres Quaestiones*, q. 68 — which is long — contains the account of discrimination taken from God, where: Since therefore by the merit of sinning we have lost the right, and with the mercy of God removed, nothing is owed to sinners except eternal damnation, what does the human being intend in regard to this mass, so as to answer God back and say: why have you made me thus? And shortly after: Does the clay say to the potter who has formed it: why have you made me thus? Or does not the potter have power over the clay from the same lump to make one vessel for honor and another for contempt? It is true that afterward some words are interpolated by Augustine that are somewhat difficult, which we shall explain in their place among the objections.

A passage suited to this discrimination is also found in *lib. 4 contra Iulianum* c. 8, which deals especially with infants and argues from them to adults. Another similar one is found in *lib. 1 de peccatorum meritis et remissione* c. 21, where the

same free discrimination of infants by the will of God is posited, and from it at c. 22 the discussion is drawn to the discrimination of adults — with great admiration of the Divine judgments and a certain wholesome horror. The same doctrine is found at c. 18 and 19 of *lib. 2* of that same work. This matter is contained in c. 5 of *lib. de Natura et gratia contra Pelagium*, where the mass of the damned is set forth and in it the merciful discrimination. Something also is found in *lib. 2 ad Valerium de Nupt. et Concupif.* c. 16 and 17.

I proceed to an excellent testimony concerning this kind of discrimination from the mass — as he calls it — of perdition, where he rests upon that genuine passage of Paul, *1 Corinthians* IV: Who then distinguishes you? For, he says, the Apostle says to the human being as if glorying in himself and his own good: Who then distinguishes you? And as if he had answered: my faith distinguishes me, my purpose, my merit — What do you have, he says, that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? That is: as if what distinguishes you were your own? Does he not with these words refute the middle position that posits people determining with indifferent grace of themselves and cooperating with it, so that the first force is from a living and vital power, indifferent and offered, drawing it to itself and reducing it to work and use? Augustine subjoins: He distinguishes who imparts that by which you are distinguished; he distinguishes who, when there were darkness over the abyss, said "Let there be light" and divided — that is, discriminated — between the light and the darkness. For when there were darkness alone, he did not find what to discriminate; but by making light he discriminated, so that in the justified impious it is said: You were sometime darkness, but now you are light in the Lord. Acutely and piously. He continues: He discriminates who, of those not yet born and having done nothing good or bad — so that the purpose of God according to election might remain — not from works but from the one who calls himself, said that the elder would serve the younger, and commending this very thing through the prophet said: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated. This passage is so apt and illustrious, so fitted to the matter, that it seems born for it. Therefore I shall weigh less the others — of which there are many in the following books against the Pelagians, and no less notable — content to point them out: *lib. 4* of that same work, c. 6; *lib. de grat. et libero arbitr.* c. 23; *lib. de Corrept. et grat.* c. 7: an illustrious testimony composed in the weightiest concepts and adorned with splendid sentences, which refreshes me in reading and delights me wonderfully. Indeed almost the entire divine book breathes a certain divine miraculous quality — miraculous in the gratuitous mystery of predestination. This one book read supplies arguments for refuting Middle Knowledge. I indicate chapters 8, 9, 13, 14. The book *de praedest. Sanct.* abounds in excellent testimonies. I designate c. 8, 12, 16, 17, 18. And in *lib. de Dono perseuer.* I indicate c. 8 and the rest through c. 13. In these passages the reason for discriminating the predestined from the non-

predestined is placed not in the foreseen future operation of human beings but in the free and gratuitous will of God who has mercy, calls, prevenes, and draws.

SECTION IX. Two celebrated Scripture passages — one from Wisdom concerning one who was taken up lest evil alter his understanding, and the other from the Gospel concerning the Tyrians and Sidonians — refute Middle Knowledge most of all.

Middle Knowledge rests most of all on the knowledge of conditional things; and by those very passages — according to the exposition of Augustine — Middle Knowledge is plainly refuted. Let us see first where they are produced by Augustine and how he understands and expounds them; then let us demonstrate how contrary his mind and doctrine is to Middle Knowledge.

In *lib. 2 contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* the passage from *Wisdom* IV is brought forward thus: What does it profit those who are taken away from this life lest evil alter their understanding or deceit beguile their soul — if a sin that is not done, spoken, or thought is punished as if it had been committed? Which if it is most absurd, most senseless, most insane, and so on.

Lib. de Gratia et libero arbitrio c. 23: Refer to the hidden judgments of God when you see in one cause — which certainly all infants have, drawing hereditary evil from Adam — that one is assisted so as to be baptized, another is not assisted so as to die in that very debt. That one baptized is left in this life, which God foreknew would be impious; this one however baptized is taken away from this life, lest evil alter his understanding, and do not in these things attribute injustice or folly to God, with whom the fountain of justice and wisdom resides.

Lib. de Corrept. et Grat. c. 8: Let them answer, if they can, why God did not take away from the perils of this life those who were living faithfully and piously at that time, lest evil alter their understanding and lest deceit beguile their souls. Did he not have this in his power, or did he not know their future evils? Surely neither of these things can be said without most perverse and most insane irreverence. Why therefore did he not do this? Let those who mock at us when in such matters we cry out: How unsearchable are his judgments and how unsearchable his ways! — let them answer. For God does not give this to whom he will, or indeed the Scripture lies that says of the death as if untimely of a just man: He was taken away lest evil alter his understanding or lest deceit beguile his soul. Why therefore does God give this great benefit to some and not to others?

Lib. de praedestinatione Sanct. c. 13 sets forth the doctrine concerning the infant taken away by a bitter death lest he should fall into sin when an adult, as foreseen conditionally. The testimony of Scripture is brought at c. 14 at the middle: Those who wish, he says, to be instructed by the opinions of commentators should prefer the book of Wisdom where we read: He was taken away lest evil alter his understanding, before all commentators. And he confirms

that testimony and doctrine by the authority of Cyprian. He treats the same argument in *lib. de bono perseverant.* — though not adducing the passage from Wisdom — at c. 9 of that book; and at c. 11 he reproaches those who refuse to use that example of infants to establish gratuitous predestination, when they acknowledge original sin against the Pelagians. Similar is the passage at c. 13. In *epist. 105* he says thus: What finally is given to the one who is taken away lest evil alter his understanding — if also those things are justly punished that he did not do but would have done while living? He disapproves merits foreseen only under a condition. *Epist. 106* applies the doctrine but does not cite the passage. The same is done but briefly in *epist. 107*. Furthermore in *lib. 10 de Genesi ad litteram* c. 16 a suitable sentence is found against those who have recourse to conditional foreknowledge of sins. And enough has been said of this testimony.

I come to the second concerning the Tyrians and Sidonians, whom Christ at *Matthew XI* and *Luke X* affirms would have believed had they seen in their midst the signs done among the Jews in their time. Concerning these Augustine in the *Enchiridion* c. 95 says most openly: The Lord says: Woe to you, Chorazin, woe to you, Bethsaida, because if in Tyre and Sidon had been done the mighty works that were done in you, they would have long ago repented in sackcloth and ashes. And certainly God did not unjustly refuse to wish them to be saved, since they could have been saved if they had been willing.

Lib. de dono perseverantiae c. 9: It is easy, he says, to accuse of unbelief the Jews whose unbelief arose from free will, who refused to believe with so many mighty works done among them — which the Lord in his rebuke argues and says: Woe to you, and so on. But can we say even of the Tyrians and Sidonians that they were unwilling to believe or would not have believed if such mighty works had been done among them — when the Lord himself attests that they would have done great penance with humility if those divine signs of mighty works had been done among them? Yet they are punished on the day of judgment, though with a lesser punishment than those cities that refused to believe with mighty works done among them. Similar things are found at c. 14 of that book. Enough thus far on the Tyrians and Sidonians.

Now I compare and weigh the passages. In both places there is knowledge of conditional things. In the case of the taken-away ones, future demerits are foreseen under the condition of their living. In the case of the Tyrians and Sidonians, merits are foreseen if they should hear. If Middle Knowledge were to stand, the Divine will would choose the Tyrians and Sidonians and reject the taken-away ones, because the former are foreseen as about to merit and the latter as about to sin. The contrary, however, holds with Augustine and Scripture: for the taken-away ones are chosen and the Tyrians are rejected, as is plain. Therefore I argue first against Middle Knowledge in this way: Middle Knowledge was devised to direct the Divine will so that according to it the will might act — choosing the congruous and rejecting the incongruous. But this

aim is not achieved; on the contrary the opposite occurs, since from the positing of it there arises a greater occasion for choosing the congruous ones foreseen through Middle Knowledge who are rejected — that is, the Tyrians and Sidonians — and choosing the incongruous ones — that is, the taken-away ones — who are elected. The consequence holds.

I argue secondly: From the positing of Middle Knowledge there follows injustice and favoritism, which must be removed from the doctrine of Augustine and Paul. Therefore it must be rejected. The assumption is shown as follows: where there is inequality of merits, justice must conform with the quality of them, rewarding good to the good and evil to the evil. But the contrary follows from the positing of Middle Knowledge, because to the taken-away ones, who were foreseen as future sinners, glory was assigned; to the Tyrians, who were foreseen as future good ones, hell is destined. Therefore injustice is committed; and from this favoritism also follows: for persons are accepted contrary to what the foreseen merits demand. Paul and Augustine avoided this inconvenience by positing the same clay and the same condemned mass, in which all were equal in demerit and therefore none was foreseen as better than others. Hence no injustice was committed and there was no favoritism — but only a place for mercy and judgment.

I argue thirdly: Middle Knowledge does not fit those two texts according to the mind of Augustine in expounding them; therefore it is foreign to his doctrine. I show the assumption: Augustine teaches that the Tyrians would not believe because they were not predestined. The taken-away ones would believe because they were predestined, for whom all things work together for good. Hence he says: To the Tyrians, since it was not given to them to believe, even the source of believing was denied. The contrary provision was made for the taken-away ones, who, being predestined, were given death which would prevent the sins for which they would be condemned. Therefore everything depended on the Divine will, and without it knowledge could foresee nothing with certainty, since whatever it foresaw without it could not be certain. For whence could it know that the Tyrians would believe under the condition — unless a conditional decree of predestination were presupposed? For just as absolute foreknowledge rests on and depends on the absolute decree, so too conditional foreknowledge depends on the conditional decree.

I argue fourthly: Foreknowledge not resting on an antecedent conditional decree could not know the right operation of the Tyrians conditionally future — therefore in the school of Augustine it is useless, as Middle Knowledge is. I prove the assumption thus: The assistance foreseen conditionally and offered to the will was either sufficient or efficacious. If only sufficient, the Tyrians would not believe with it; if efficacious, a special will of God intervened — and therefore the operation was already foreseen in virtue not of Middle Knowledge and its object precisely, but in virtue of the special conditional decree, and the whole

matter was reduced to the Divine constitution, as Augustine wishes. Nor should you object that the argument drawn from the foresight of merits under a condition is inept because it supposes conditional merits capable of moving God — which is against Augustine who denies this to the Semi-Pelagians arguing from it. For the argument does not suppose those merits move God; it only shows the incongruity in choosing those whom God saw as about to act evilly, and not choosing those others who were going to act well — for this is at odds both with right reason and with just equity.

SECTION X. Three objections of the opponents are set forth, and from the solution of them it is proved that Middle Knowledge has no foundation in the doctrine of Augustine.

Two weighty and distinguished adversaries, Suarez, *tom. 1 de grat. Prologom. 2, c. 2, n. 8*, and Herice, *tract. 1 de scientia Dei disp. 2, c. 5, §. 10*, raise three objections.

They first object that the testimonies of Augustine we adduced, and others like them, only attack the abuse of Middle Knowledge introduced by the Massilians in order to assign a reason for discriminating the predestined from the reprobate — for those conditional merits contributed nothing outside the absolute state to predestining or reprobating. But they do not disapprove the right use of Middle Knowledge, nor its positing before the decree.

They second object that Augustine never mentioned a conditional decree — only an absolute one by which God predestined the elect and the foreknowledge by which he marked out the abandoned. For Augustine distinguishes predestination from foreknowledge — when they are opposed — in that media are prepared for the predestined by which, by meriting, they arrive at salvation, while for the abandoned no media are prepared, since they are left in the state in which they were in the damned mass. Hence the former are predestined and likewise foreseen as to be saved; the latter are not predestined but only foreseen as to be damned. This doctrine is handed on by Augustine clearly and consistently. Hence when he attributes to God the foreknowledge of those to be saved he always conjoins it with their predestination; when however he attributes to God alone the mere foresight of those to be damned, he separates foreknowledge from predestination, taking it alone — as appears in the books *de correct. et gratia*, *de praedestinatione Sanctorum*, and *de dono perseverantiae*. Yet never — neither for predestinating nor for foreknowing — did Augustine in the conditional state posit any decree or positive constitution, but only foreknowledge.

Third: they object that Christ the Lord affirmed that the Tyrians and Sidonians would believe from the sole force of vision and the congruity in which they were — not however from any antecedent decree preveining their faith with some destined special assistance through a decree antecedent that foreseen congruity. And this appears from the text: If, he says, in Tyre and Sidon had

been done the mighty works that were done in you, they would have long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes. Which words signify a simple action of what was done and a viewing of the Tyrians in that opportunity.

To these objections I respond thus. To the first: I deny that Augustine disapproved only the abuse in introducing conditional merits through that knowledge, and I affirm that he disapproved also the independence from the conditional decree — in order to remove the occasion for positing some initial discriminating merit in the very will itself — such as the Massilians were introducing under the pretext of conditional merit. This is plain from the letters of Hilary and Prosper, where they adduced certain ancient passages of Augustine for that error, in which he — less well instructed at the time — posited some initial merit, such as the initial merit of faith in nature. Let us hear the words in the letter of Hilary, who puts the matter more clearly: When they are told why the gospel is preached here or there, or not preached — which was once not preached to almost all, as now to certain peoples — they say (note how he attributes it to foreknowledge and not to a decree — which was the annexed error) that this belongs to Divine foreknowledge, so that the truth was announced or is announced at such a time and place and to such persons when and where and to whom it was foreknown that it would be believed. Then they produce the passages of Augustine when he agreed with them or seemed to agree, and Hilary concludes with the cited passage of the exposition of propositions to the Romans which was at number 60 and most pleased the Massilians in this way: And the rest in that same work, which they testify they accept and approve. And in order that it may appear that they are speaking to Augustine in those passages about conditional merit, Hilary adds: But they contend that foreknowledge, predestination, or purpose avail for this — that he foreknew, predestined, or proposed to choose those who would believe. Here is the manifest error they were introducing as a corollary of that abuse. Augustine tried to cut this off in responding to Prosper and Hilary, as appears in *lib. de praedest. Sanct.* c. 3, where he excuses his inattention at that time and recalls the corrections of the error that had then crept in, which were sown in other books. And more manifestly at c. 9 of that book he testifies: That he could say this about the foreknowledge of Christ without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God and other causes — what seemed sufficient to convict the infidelity of the pagans who had raised that question. By which he implies that he would say something more and greater if he were acting against the Pelagians, for the refutation of whose error he says: But whether they would have had faith in Christ preached to them of their own initiative for the merits of good will (here already he guards against the error) or by God's gift — that is (pay attention, reader), whether God merely foreknew or also predestined — I did not then think it necessary to inquire and discuss. The Pelagians said "foreknew" without dependence on a decree. Augustine said "predestined" by preventing the future faith from a decree. He declares his meaning: Therefore what I said — that

Christ wished to appear to human beings and have his doctrine preached among them at the time when and the place where he knew there would be those who would believe in him — could also be said thus: at the time when and the place where he knew there would be those who were chosen in him before the constitution of the world. But because if so said it would make the reader intent on seeking what it is now necessary to discuss at greater length and with more effort by reason of the admonition of the Pelagian error — it seemed to me that what was then sufficient should be said briefly, with the depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God excepted, as I said, and without prejudice to other causes, about which I thought it was not then but at another more suitable time to discuss.

This was sufficient to refute the objection. But those things are clearer at the following chapter 10: What I said in the same place, q. 2 against Porphyry, that the salvation of this religion was never lacking to anyone who was worthy, and that it was lacking to one who was not worthy — there are those who say this is due to the human will. We however say it is due to the grace or predestination of God. The mind of Augustine about a decree altogether antecedent in whatever state is plain; and there he distinguishes predestination conjoined with foreknowledge, of the kind he requires in the predestined, from solitary foreknowledge proper to the reprobate. The former presupposes a decree, as the latter does not. By predestination, he says, he foreknew what he himself was about to do. But he can also foreknow what he does not do — such as whatever sins there are. From this another argument against the authors of Middle Knowledge appears: if its object precedes every Divine constitution, it can know only sins, being solitary without predestination. Therefore through it no merits are known — as those authors affirm — and they hold a view contrary to Augustine, who always requires predestination beyond foreknowledge for merits in whatever state they may be.

Augustine confirms this reasoning in *lib. de Dono perseuer.* c. 9, where he removes every account of conditional merit from the human will before the decree, and excuses that passage against Porphyry — and again at c. 14 refers the entire account of meriting to predestination, saying: Those were left in the mass of perdition, and therefore it was not given to them to believe; indeed even the source of believing was denied to them. So greater concern troubled Augustine — the fear he conceived about the Pelagian heresy grounding the initial merit in nature foreseen before the decree — than that absurd account of introducing merit through the knowledge of works conditionally future. From which it is plain that the first objection of the adversaries is groundless and rebounds on them.

The second objection takes a false assumption when it denies that Augustine made mention of a decree or Divine constitution before the foreknowledge of the conditionally future. The contrary is established from the two letters of

Prosper and Hilary, as we showed in the proximate solution, and as we have now said when speaking about predestination, which either consists in the purpose of God or is conjoined with it. Moreover all that doctrine about the distinction of predestination from foreknowledge rebounds entirely on the adversaries and is rejected by them, as we have just seen. The chapters 10 and 17 of *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.* must be read. The objection is also refuted from the fact that Augustine would have thought differently from Pelagius — whose words are at c. 18 of that same book, where: God therefore foreknew, says Pelagius, who would be holy and blameless through the free choice of their will, and for that reason chose them before the constitution of the world in his foreknowledge — in which he foreknew them as to be such — before they existed, predestining the sons he foreknew as about to be holy and blameless — meaning that he himself did not make them, but foresaw that they would be so. But Augustine there condemns this view, as is fitting, having recourse to the decree of God predestining: not because we were going to be, he says, but that we might be. Even in the conditional state, about which Pelagius was doubtless speaking and against whom Augustine argued: It is certain, it is manifest — for this reason were we going to be such, because he himself chose and predestined us that we might be such through his grace. And shortly after: According to the good pleasure of his will, lest in such a great benefit of God's grace we should glory in the good pleasure of our own will. And afterward: According to his good will, not according to ours — which could not be good unless he according to his good will were to come to its aid so that it might become good. Now Augustine said these things against Pelagius who posited good human will conditionally foreseen by foreknowledge alone — to whom Augustine opposed the constitution of the Divine will and by it refuted that human will and its solitary foreknowledge.

To the third objection, which rests on the same principles just rejected as suspect, and proceeds expressly from the example of the Tyrians and Sidonians and uses a conjecture derived from the manner of speech — as Christ seems to affirm that they were disposed by their nature to faith and therefore foreknown as capable and congruous to believe — it is said that this kind of conjecture savors of the error we have been attacking up to this point. For in matters of predestination and grace no account is taken of merit and natural disposition — which is the doctrine of faith, handed on so many times by Paul and emphasized by Augustine, and specifically in the entire *lib. de gratia et lib. arb.* and *lib. de corrept. et grat.* and in the two books *de praedest. Sanct.* and *de dono perseuer.* — since grace is given freely, not rendered to nature. Those words of Christ therefore cannot be understood of the Tyrians and Sidonians as naturally well constituted and disposed to believe — which Augustine himself at this very passage cautiously and prudently forestalled lest it mislead anyone. For when he had said that it was denied to them to believe because they were not from among the predestined, he immediately subjoins: From which it appears that

some have in their very mind a divinely natural gift of understanding by which they are moved to faith, if they hear words or behold signs fitting for their minds. And yet if by the higher judgment of God they have not been discriminated from the mass of perdition by the predestination of grace, not even those divine words or deeds are presented to them by which they could believe if they heard or saw such things — which matter he refers back to the divine judgments with Paul. From which it is deduced that recourse to the Divine decree is necessary in this way: if they were to have that gift of natural understanding, and if God had chosen them from the condemned mass — for that first natural proportion is not sufficient to ground Middle Knowledge, which cannot and must not be grounded except in the benefit of grace and predestination, to which that natural disposition or capacity contributes nothing.

Concerning this Augustine writes most seriously in *lib. 1 de peccat. meritis et remiss.* c. 21 and 22. For when he was struck with wonder with Paul at this mystery of the election of one over another and cried out, he says: Whence does it happen that a person from his earliest youth is more modest, more intelligent, more temperate, in great part a conqueror of passions, who hates avarice, detests luxury, and rises up more advanced and apt for the other virtues — and yet is in a place where the grace of Christ cannot be preached to him? While another — slow of mind, given to passions, covered with disgraces and crimes — is so governed as to hear, believe, be baptized, and be taken away; or if kept here, lives laudably? Where, I say, did these two contract such different merits? What place here has Middle Knowledge, which seeks congruities and capacities for grace and predestination?

Still stronger and more vehement is that other passage of Augustine, *lib. 1 ad Simplician.* q. 2 at the end: I have nothing to contemplate in choosing people for saving grace, if I am allowed to apply some thought to the examination of this election, except either a greater natural endowment or lesser sins, or both; let us add also, if you please, honorable and useful learning. Whoever therefore is entangled and stained with as few sins as possible (for who can have none?) and is keen of mind and trained in the liberal arts seems to be the one to be chosen for grace. Let such therefore be the Tyrians and Sidonians. Let such be the Greeks — Socrates, Aristides, Phocion, Plato, Aristotle. Let such be the Romans — Cincinnatus, Camillus, Fabricius, Regulus, Scipio, Cicero, Cato. Then: hear Augustine. But when I have established this, he who chose the weak things of the world to confound the strong, and the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, will so mock me that looking at him and seized with shame I should mock many — people more chaste than certain sinners and orators more than certain fishermen. He concludes with the adduced example of Paul, converted by a marvelous calling: And yet what shall we say? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. Why however to this person in this way and to this other not so? You are a human being, whoever you are. If you do not receive your due, you

have reason to be grateful. If you do receive it, you have no reason to complain. His judgments are unsearchable and his ways untraceable. And so the third objection collapses. For the Tyrians and Sidonians were not foreseen as about to believe unless they were predestined, and that congruity, capacity, or natural gift of understanding foreseen conditionally availed them nothing.

Let me continue. It must be noted that Augustine distinguishes between those conditional future things which are sometimes absolutely future — such as the conversions of Paul and Magdalene — and those which are never absolutely future — such as that conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians. And having posited the distinction I observe that Augustine speaks differently about conditional merits that are going to be future and about those that are not going to be future. The latter he entirely denies to be merits, because they cannot be foreseen as future and therefore cannot be foreknown — for they are altogether nothing and fictitious. The former, although he refutes them, he does not deny that they could be foreknown, because they will pass into act.

Certainly he never attacks those acts themselves. Let us consult Augustine in *epist. 105 ad Sixtum*. Having proposed the question why God chose Jacob and hated Esau — and having brought forward the answer of the adversaries saying that the cause was that God foresaw their future works — not by absolute but by conditional knowledge, since it preceded the election — he disapproves it in such a way as to deny it was the cause, and has recourse to the condemned mass and the discrimination of God through mercy and justice. Posing to himself again the objection in the name of opponents: that God could have foreseen the works of those who lived and grew old, he passes to infants and refutes the same opponents by their example — who neither lived nor grew old and therefore could do nothing good or bad in life — adducing this argument: For how can things be called future that will not exist at all? He certainly denies that those are foreknown conditionally which are not going to be absolutely future. But he did not say this about the works of Jacob and Esau; he only said they were not the basis of the discrimination — and called it blindness to posit discrimination from them. Yet he did not deny that those works could be foreknown, as he denied the works of infants to be foreknown. He teaches the same with those same examples adduced to the same end in *lib. 2 contra duas epist. Pelagian. c. 7* in these words: How did he foreknow as future those things which, in infants dying in infancy, since his foreknowledge cannot fail him, he rather foreknew as not future? Although this could be understood of absolute foreknowledge, it yet seems to presuppose that future existence to be so connected with the conditional that when the former does not exist the latter does not exist either — and that only those conditional things are known which are going to pass into the absolute.

Similarly in *lib. 1 de anima et eius orig. c. 12*, dealing with the one taken away lest evil alter his understanding and responding to the objection about his sins

foreseen, he says: Shall we think the Apostate is to be judged on account of God's foreknowledge? And he adds: What? That very foreknowledge is entirely emptied out if what is foreknown will not be. Note the word "entirely" — meaning neither conditionally nor absolutely. For how, he adds, is a future thing rightly said to be foreknown if it is not going to be — that is, in no way future, neither conditionally nor absolutely? There are other similar passages in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.* c. 14. Great force seems to be in this: He was taken away, he says, lest evil alter his understanding. For this was said according to the perils of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God — who foreknew what was going to be, not what was not going to be. That is: what he was going to provide for him through an untimely death, so that he might be removed from the uncertainty of temptations — not that he would sin, who would not have remained in temptation. Here you see that God foreknew with certainty and infallibility only what was absolutely going to be — namely that he was to be taken from a perilous life exposed to sins — but not the sins into which he was going to fall, if he had lived, either absolutely or conditionally. Hence he posits a certain conjectural knowledge according to the perils of this life and in the uncertainty of temptations that are accustomed to befall mortals living long — which is most to be noted in those conditional future things that were not connected with the absolute decree of God, as having in them no determinate truth, but that knowledge is reduced to the possible, which is indeterminate toward either side, and is placed in uncertainty and ambiguity — as Augustine says with express vocabulary.

Notable likewise is the testimony of *lib. de dono perseverantiae* c. 17, where thus concerning the gifts of God conferred on the predestined: Or are these perhaps not said to be predestined? Then they are not given by God either, or he did not know he was going to give them. But if he both gives them and foreknew he was going to give them, he surely predestined them. And at the end of the chapter: These gifts of God, which are given to the elect called according to purpose, if there is no predestination such as we defend, are not foreknown by God. Yet they are foreknown. This therefore is predestination. I do not deny that this speaks of absolute foreknowledge, presupposed on absolute predestination also, in virtue of which God knew those gifts were to be conferred. But from this it follows that even in the conditional state nothing to be conditionally given can be foreknown unless the conditional will of God precede. Otherwise there would be no determinate foresight of those gifts, but they would remain in a state ambiguous and indifferent toward either side. And so where there is no constitution and decree of God anteceding, there will be no certain foreknowledge — relative to the states: absolute foreknowledge of absolute things, conditional foreknowledge of conditional things.

There is however one difficult objection — the repentance of the Tyrians and Sidonians, which most certainly was going to be, as we said above from Augustine, and yet was not going to be absolutely, for they were not converted.

To this I respond that I have not denied that in the special case where God wished conditionally to determine some future thing that thing could have determinate truth — such as was the case of the Tyrians and Sidonians. And indeed I spoke affirmatively as often as I observed above that Augustine placed the hidden counsel and judgment of God in that repentance of the Tyrians — as if signifying some hidden and secret decree concerning penance to be done if the signs done among the Jews were shown to them. I confirm my responses with this observation: Augustine spoke differently about the Tyrians and about the one taken away in youth. For about the latter he spoke conjecturally and considered the possible state of human fragility amid so many perils of this life and the uncertainty of temptations. But about the Tyrians and Sidonians he affirms certainly and consistently that they would have repented, and allows no doubt about it — as we said at c. 6 for the passage of *lib. de Dono perseuer.* c. 9. The cause of this difference is that penance, being a good act and capable of Divine preordination and predestination both conditional and absolute, can be determined by God. But sins, since they cannot be determined or predestined by God, are not capable of certain and infallible knowledge in the conditional state. For this reason Augustine affirmed without doubt and without any ambiguity that the Tyrians would do penance in the conditional state, but did not dare say the same about the person in the same state who was going to sin.

From this it follows that whatever the authors of Middle Knowledge posit as certainly and infallibly future in the conditional state — considering the human will in these or those circumstances left to itself with merely sufficient and indifferent assistance, without an antecedent Divine decree — are all ambiguous and uncertain, located within the state of possibility, and hanging in either direction, since they lack a determining principle according to the doctrine of Augustine.

But lest you object that it therefore follows from this that sins also in the absolutely future state are not foreknown by God, since they cannot be predestined or preordained by any decree — I respond (though this is not the question of this place) that sins are indeed foreknown with certainty in the negation of the decree and from the force of permission — just as reprobation also is known from the abandonment of God in the condemned mass, as Augustine says, who denies that sins are predestined and only affirms that they are foreknown. So in *lib. de Praedest. Sanctor.* c. 10: By predestination God foreknew what he himself was going to do; but he can also foreknow what he himself does not do, such as whatever sins there are — concerning which we shall discuss in their proper place in the commentaries on Scotus.

SECTION XI. A most celebrated passage of Augustine is brought forward and explained — the passage on which the adversaries most rely to defend their position with his authority.

This passage is in *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum* q. 2, which is found in *tom. 4* of Augustine's works. In it he is at great length in expounding that testimony of Paul about the election of Jacob over Esau, *Romans IX*, about which he disputes extensively and densely — on the account of election, whence it is taken, whether it is antecedent to the election, whether it is grounded in the foreseen merits of the person to be chosen, whether it proceeds precisely from the calling of God who calls, whether from the obedience of the called person, whether from the fitting of the calling to the will of the called person. These questions he raises in the course of the disputation and they pertain to conditional knowledge: for they turn on the conditional state — that is, before the absolute election — inquiring into the reason and mode of it. And although Paul says "not from works but from the one who calls," this does nothing against Middle Knowledge, because the "from works" excludes works without grace and before the gratuitous calling of God — not however the cooperation of the called person through grace, to which he corresponds by works. It seems that Augustine attributes the reason for choosing one over another to this: he resolves to choose the one he foreknows as about to obey the calling. Let us bring forward those words of Augustine that contain the matter: How will it be true that "many are called but few are chosen"? Or perhaps those who were called in this way could not, called in another way, fit the will to faith — so that both that is true: many are called, few are chosen, since although many were called in one way, only those follow the calling who are found suitable to receive it — and that is no less true: it is not therefore of the one who wills nor of the one who runs but of God who has mercy — who called in this way in which it was apt for those who followed the calling? But to others the calling came — yet because it was of such a kind as could not move them so that they were capable of receiving it, they could indeed be called but not chosen; and it is no longer similarly true: it is not of God who has mercy but of the willing and running human being — since the effect of God's mercy cannot be in the power of the human being, so that God's mercy is exercised in vain if the human being is unwilling. For if he wished to have mercy even on those, he could call them in such a way as would be apt for them, so that they would be moved and understand and follow. It is therefore true that many are called but few are chosen. For those are chosen who were called congruously; those who did not accord with and were not fitted to the calling were not chosen, because they did not follow, although they were called. It is therefore true that many are called, few are chosen. And it is likewise true that it is not of the one who wills nor of the one who runs but of God who has mercy — because even though he calls many, he has mercy on those whom he calls in the way that is apt for them to follow. It is therefore false if anyone says: it is not of God who has mercy, but of the willing and running human being — since God has mercy on none uselessly; but the one on whom he has mercy he calls in the way that he knows is congruous for him, so that he does not refuse the calling. Here plainly in Augustine's words is the Jesuit theory of Middle Knowledge, which rests on the

congruous and opportune calling by which the predestined are called — and because the reprobate called were not called thus, they are not among the elect. The account is augmented by what follows: Here someone will say: Why therefore was Esau not called in such a way that he would wish to obey? And after a few words: Who would dare to say that God lacked the mode of calling by which even Esau would apply his mind to that faith and join his will to it — the faith in which Jacob was justified? And again: But if even so great an obstinacy of will exists that it hardens in its aversion against all modes of calling, the question arises whether that hardness itself is from Divine punishment. For when God abandons by not calling in the way someone can be moved to faith, can one also say that the mode by which he would have been persuaded to believe was lacking to the Almighty?

The entire account of choosing one over another in this entire discourse is reduced to the congruous calling fitted to the will of the predestined. This is exactly the Jesuit position, to which that condemned mass causes no obstacle. For Esau and Jacob were in it and were called from within it; and Esau did not come out of it because he was not called congruously, while Jacob came out because he was called congruously. This is the Achilles of the Jesuits, by which they think they vanquish all the other arguments that the authors of the opposing view bring forward.

But this Achilles is feeble. I had long ago seen this during my time in France in the period of the Jansenist controversy, and noted it: neither side in those controversies had understood Augustine well enough. I therefore undertook to study this book, read it, and commented on it most carefully — and I recall writing four notebooks, which were afterward taken from me. Hence I shall not labor greatly in expounding the passage.

It must be known that Augustine here disputed about predestination in such a way as first to take the side of free choice, then of grace. For from that passage a little after the beginning of the question: Whence it comes to mind to ask why he said "so that the purpose of God according to election might remain," he begins to raise difficult questions for the human intellect, which could not grasp with natural reason an election gratuitous without any foresight of merits. He adduces various testimonies of Scripture proving that election proceeds from mercy; and asks: why did that mercy not reach Esau? If it had reached him he would have been saved, just as Jacob was loved by God. Then he has recourse to the calling and expounds the passage from Matthew: many are called, few are chosen. He inquires into the various modes of calling and variously accepts the sentence according to them: it is not therefore of the one who wills nor of the one who runs but of God who has mercy. He tries whether it fits or does not fit the various callings adduced. Here however he proposes those congruous callings fitted to the free choice of those called, whom God called in the way apt for them to be called. And he introduces discrimination between the called who

obey and those who do not obey, on the grounds that although they were called in one way, yet because not all are disposed in the same way, only those follow the calling who are found suitable to receive it — those do not follow because they were not apt and suitable when called. So that the cooperation of the former over the latter was the reason for discrimination. Up to this point Augustine is disputing in favor of free choice — both because a cause of Divine election was being given resting on the human will, and because the discrimination was taken from the will of those who obeyed and those who did not, and because God was exploring and awaiting what the one being called was going to do in order to either choose him or not, and finally because that aptitude and capacity for coming was not an effect of preceding election but was antecedent to election — since those were elected after obedience, that is, after the merit of those who followed had been foreseen. All these things are said in favor of free choice. They do not proceed from that most deep and profound mystery of predestination and entirely free election; and the supporters of human free choice use these arguments to prove that Augustine taught Middle Knowledge in this book.

Augustine therefore disputed in favor of free choice up to that passage: But what do we seek in this? From which he begins to remove every kind of foreseen merit from election. For having adduced the example of Pharaoh and the testimony of Paul — God who has mercy and who hardens — he says: Therefore he has mercy on whom he will and hardens whom he will. And he adds: But if this is done with no definition of merits, who will not burst forth into that voice which the Apostle put to himself: You will then say to me: why does he still find fault? For who resists his will? That is, as he subjoins: When he has mercy on whom he will and hardens whom he will? And continuing his discourse to the end of the book, from his own position of gratuitous and free predestination he hands on the doctrine of grace and cuts every root of antecedent merit — turning to the Divine judgments in wonder and admiration. There he confirms the example adduced by Paul from the potter with a similar testimony from *Ecclesiasticus* XXXIII, and affirming that both statements agree, adds: Therefore no intention is held of the Apostle and of all the justified through whom the understanding of grace was demonstrated to us, except that he who glories should glory in the Lord. For who would scrutinize the works of the Lord who from the same lump damns one and justifies another? He confirms this with many apt arguments, of which one is the marvelous conversion of Paul, and concludes: And yet what shall we say? Is there unrighteousness with God — who exacts from whom he pleases and gives to whom he pleases, who demands no unowed thing and gives away nothing belonging to another? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. Why however to this person in this way and to this other person not? You, human being, whoever you are — if you do not receive your due you have reason to be grateful; if you do receive it, you

have no reason to complain. Let us only believe, and if we are unable to comprehend it: here free grace and gratuitous predestination prevails.

Now if any adversary resists and is unwilling to stand by my judgment, I do not contend. I appeal to Augustine, who is the author of the view I have been proposing up to this point. Let him believe concerning Augustine's judgment to Augustine himself. He therefore in *lib. 2 Retract.* at the beginning, recognizing this work, says thus: The later question in this book is from the passage where he says: Not only, however, but also Rebecca having twins by one act of intercourse with Isaac our father, down to: Unless the Lord of Hosts had left us seed, we would have been as Sodom and made like Gomorrah — in the solution of which question the struggle was indeed over human free choice, but the grace of God won. Nor could it arrive at anything other than that the Apostle should be understood to have said with limpid truth: Who then distinguishes you? What do you have that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? This thing Martyr Cyprian also wishing to show, defined the entire point by the very title, saying: Nothing is to be gloried in, since nothing is our own. This testimony contains the matter and relieves my burden of proof. Those words: in the solution of which the struggle was indeed over free choice — pertain to the first part which we identified. Those words: But the grace of God won — pertain to the second part which we indicated and examined.

Augustine so values this judgment that he refers to it in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.* c. 3, where he refutes the initial merit introduced by the Semi-Pelagians and produces that passage from *lib. 2 Retract.* c. 1, and adds: This thing Cyprian the Martyr also wishing to show, defined the entire point by the very title saying: Nothing is to be gloried in, since nothing is our own. And: Here is why I said above that I myself was convinced by this apostolic testimony above all others, even while I thought otherwise in this matter than God revealed to me while I was writing to Bishop Simplicianus as I said. Therefore this apostolic testimony, where to repress human inflation he said: What do you have that you did not receive? — permits no believer to say: I have the faith that I did not receive, and it entirely suppresses with these apostolic words the entire elation of this response.

Nor should you object that Augustine there speaks against the initial merit of faith without the concurrence of grace — which was the error of the Semi-Pelagians — and that it is therefore not surprising that grace prevailed over free choice. For I respond: Therefore that passage of Augustine does not fit well with Middle Knowledge, which being entirely free from any suspicion of heresy cannot be established by it. And so if Augustine in that congruous and opportune calling — as he calls it — from the side of God and in the correspondence and cooperation from the side of the aptly and congruously called human being found some initial merit about which the human being

could glory, those who love the grace of God and shrink from any suspect opinion should abstain from it. Therefore the passage must be abandoned in which — as its author acknowledges — he is attacked and assailed by himself against the adversaries of gratuitous predestination and liberal grace of God, and the decree and purpose of God anteceding all foreknowledge of our merits in whatever way they are taken is established. And in order that it may appear to all that this was the mind of Augustine in that passage — which I understood from him myself when first interpreting him, before I saw what I now adduce — I bring forward a new text born and apt for the matter, from *lib. de Dono Perseuer.* c. 21, where commemorating the books in which he taught against the Pelagians that grace is not given according to our merits, he adduces this same *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum* q. 2 in this way: Let them see, however — those who love me, to whom I should not be ungrateful because of what has come into question, who profess, as you write, to embrace all my writings on its account — let them see, I say, whether in the later parts of the first book of those two which I wrote to Simplicianus the Bishop of Milan anything remains by which the giving of God's grace according to our merits might be called into doubt; whether I sufficiently treated there that even the initial merit of faith is a gift of God; and whether in what I said there it does not appear consequently, if not explicitly stated, that even perseverance to the end is not given except by him who predestined us for his kingdom and glory. Note: in the later parts of the first book — not in the earlier ones, for in those he did not favor grace but free choice. Whence that passage of Augustine *ad Simplicianum* helps no more those who say election and predestination are accomplished from the foreseen use of the will acting well, than do those other passages he indicates there — *de Correct. et Gratia*, and *epist. ad Paulinum* and *ad Sixtum*, and this very *de Dono perseuer.* and others — in which he most powerfully overthrows the opposing position concerning foreseen merits through Middle Knowledge. Let the adversaries therefore henceforth cease to argue from this testimony of *ad Simplicianum* for their Middle Knowledge, since Augustine himself, having seized as it were the club from their hands, crushes their opinion with it. And although I sometimes use the testimonies of the earlier parts of that book, I do so because I wish to conform to the common interpretation and sense and to refute the adversaries with their own arguments.

SECTION XII. The escape route of the adversaries is blocked, and a subtle question is resolved.

As the adversaries are acute and cautious, they observe and object that Augustine, in handing on his doctrine of free grace and gratuitous predestination, argued against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians and other followers who placed merit either entirely in nature alone — as the Pelagians did — or in part, that is the initial merit of meriting in bare nature. He did not however argue against those who attributed at least accompanying grace to free choice about to act in whatever state, and placed nothing of merit in bare nature

— which middle state is between those two extremes: one denying the necessity of supernatural grace for meriting, the other establishing the necessity of efficacious grace antecedently moving and premoting the will for acting well and meritoriously. About this middle state Augustine was silent, and it seems among him there is room for discussion about it — and it is to be subtly inquired: Did Augustine know that middle state or not? For if he knew it, how did he not express it? If he did not know it, how could he disapprove it? And so one follows from the other: he who did not know that middle state did not know Middle Knowledge, since this is concerned with it; and therefore the doctrine of Augustine — which passed over that middle state — also passed over Middle Knowledge. And they conclude it is remarkable that so acute and wise a man did not see so clear a matter: which if he had seen, he would not have turned to disputing toward those two extremes. Hence they think themselves most safely placed in the middle, saying that the human being can neither begin nor do anything meritorious without grace through nature alone — since sufficient grace is always present, which is offered to the human being and cooperates with one who is acting, and concurs with any initial act of meriting — and that they are not at all attacked by Augustine, since they think and speak in a Catholic manner.

This escape route is certainly specious, easy, and convenient in appearance. But we foresaw and blocked it long before — both in the mind of Innocent X concerning the five propositions of Jansenius, and in the treasury of Augustine — and we refer the reader to those books. Nevertheless we shall not entirely refrain from applying the pen to the question, in order to satisfy those who read this present work. What we wrote there at length and copiously we shall say here briefly.

Let the reader versed in Augustine trust us, who interpret him faithfully and religiously. Augustine did not ignore the middle state which they know — with accompanying grace, which he called the "assistantia sine qua non" (assistance without which something does not happen). But he did not distinguish it from the first state, which comprehended that middle state and was contained in the first. What is more, he assigned that state to the Angels and to the first man before the fall, to whom was proper that accompanying grace and the assistance "sine qua non" — distinct from the other grace efficaciously premoting, called by Augustine the "auxilium quo" (assistance by which), as is plain from almost the entire book *de Correct. et grat.* — a division we established and proved in our particular disputation on the grace and freedom of the Angels and in the mind of Innocent, *Comment. in c. 10, 11, 12 lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*, teaching with Augustine that the Angelic and human nature could not merit without assisting grace taken alone and in itself: for the "adiutorium sine qua non" was the condition without which the meritorious work would be done, not by which it would be done. But works done with that assistance — lightly exciting and concomitantly aiding free choice, which was in its power — Augustine in a

certain way attributed to free choice, and works arising from both he called works of free choice, because that assistance was only the condition without which the work would not be done and not that by which it was done. It was committed to free choice, and was in its power, and moved following free choice — awaiting and following its determination. Hence it was not prior but expectant and following free choice; it awaited, ready and indifferent, the determination of free choice. As we showed in *lib. Mens Innocentii* art. 5 in the censure of the fourth proposition, which book was approved and commended at Rome.

This grace thus offered, indifferent, and awaiting the flex and determination of free choice and following it — certain Massilians posited, as is manifestly apparent from that passage of the letter of Prosper prefixed to *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*: Nor do they consider that they are subjecting the grace of God, which they wish to be the companion and not the forerunner of human merits, even to those wills which they do not deny are prevenied by it according to their fancy. Here is a genuine and breathing image of that grace which we just cited and called from Augustine "auxilium sine qua non" (assistance without which it does not happen). That accompanying or concomitant grace is precisely subjected to the will and follows it, since it is drawn by free choice as its leader and determining it. Hence I think there is an error in the word "negant": it should read "negant esse prevenitas" (deny that they are prevenied). And this reading coheres with the text, for those people denied that the constitution of God prevenes human wills, even though I do not ignore that the common reading can be sustained by referring it to the cunning of the Semi-Pelagians who tried to cover their error.

They deny therefore in that letter that the will is excited by prevenient grace, which ought to arise from the Divine constitution. Then, in order to escape the error of Pelagius, they established some initial grace through which, with good use of free choice, they arrive at saving grace — which they join and mix with the natural capacity for asking, seeking, knocking — lest anyone think they entirely excluded accompanying grace while retaining only prevenient and efficaciously moving grace. And so the initial merit they placed in nature they seem not to separate from grace, which they call initial. Let us hear the words of Prosper: That one can arrive at the grace by which we are reborn in Christ through natural capacity by asking, seeking, knocking — so that one receives, finds, and enters because, making good use of the good of nature for that saving grace, he merited to arrive at it through the help of initial grace. Here they call that initial merit of natural capacity a merit, and call the good use of nature the initial grace and assistance and acknowledge assistance in it. I do not deny, however, that certain Semi-Pelagians posited the initial merit in acts of bare nature, as I showed in that passage of the book *Mens Innocentii* art. 5 in the censure of proposition 4 — and I deduced this in addition to the common opinion from that same letter of Prosper, calling those I named mixed with

Pelagians, because with them they agreed on the initial merit, though in other works they disagreed. But other Semi-Pelagians admitted the assistance of accompanying initial grace in the same act they posited as meritorious of further grace — whom I there called pure because they did not entirely exclude grace but admitted the accompanying kind, which would help and simultaneously concur with free choice for a free meritorious act. As I proved there and now, since it is most pertinent here, I wish to show.

Augustine in *lib. de praedest. Sanct.* at the beginning intends not only to attack that error of Semi-Pelagians who with Pelagius held the initial merit of faith to be an act of nature without grace — but also another error of other Semi-Pelagians who more concealed and subtly erred, positing that act of initial faith as joined to accompanying grace. For he wishes God to work in us that first act of faith, and to bring it about in us with his assistance and "auxilium quo." For this purpose he sets forth the doctrine about antecedent grace that flies before that act, and says our sufficiency — with which we begin to believe — is from God. He does this at c. 2 carefully, and says expressly that God works faith in our hearts in a wondrous way — thus acting in our hearts that we believe — and at c. 3 from Cyprian he urges: Nothing is to be gloried in since nothing is our own: which to show, he says, Cyprian adduced the Apostle saying: What do you have that you did not receive? And not content with any kind of accompaniment, he entirely wishes faith to be prevenient by God's grace. And signifying this, having said at c. 3: Is there fear that he cannot do the whole and therefore the human being claims the first part for himself in order to merit to receive the last part from him? — in order to cut off every mode of antecedence he says: See whether anything is done in that way except that the grace of God should be given according to our merits in whatever way. That phrase "in whatever way" contains the matter: for "in whatever way" presupposes there are other ways by which grace of God is subordinated to free choice and made subject to it — beyond that so manifest way of meriting through initial acts of bare nature about which no Catholic could be uncertain. Therefore Augustine was excluding not that alone but any other mode, however more concealed and subtle — and those people introduced it upon him by positing free choice with accompanying grace not prevenient but expectant and following — as the principle from which grace receives efficacy.

And in order that no one can doubt the sense of Augustine thus understood — concerning one and the same initial act elicited by the will simultaneously with accompanying grace — let me give the explicit words in c. 2 cited of that same *lib. de praedest Sanct.*: Resistance cannot be offered to the Divine testimonies, by which both faith — from which the beginning of piety is taken — is shown to be a gift of God: such is the passage: To each one God has distributed the measure of faith, and: Peace to the brethren and charity with faith from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ, and other such texts. Therefore not wishing to contradict these so clear testimonies and yet wishing to have from himself what

he believes, the human being as it were bargains with God: he claims a part for himself and leaves a part to God — which is the further part — and calls himself first before the very one who is first, makes himself prior and God posterior. Although this testimony of Augustine can be understood in such a way that the human being bargains with God so that the first initial act of faith through the first act is entirely from the human being, and the increase through grace, through other acts now with grace is from God and the human being together — and so both share with each other so that the human being says to God: I will give you the beginning, you give me the rest of faith — yet the other more proper sense cannot be denied: that in the very same initial act of believing, because the human being begins through free choice and God accompanies and follows through grace, he bargains with God saying: I make the beginning, determining myself and drawing to myself the indifferent assistance offered at the first point of determination, you accompany and follow me by cooperating. And it fits better in this sense what he says is "of both" — namely when both concur: the human being through free choice and God through accompanying grace. This is properly "of both" when they concur — it does not equally apply to "of both" when the human being without grace through bare nature elicits a natural act of faith in which God does not concur through grace — and so it is not an act of both. And if the adversaries resist and refuse to be convinced, they certainly cannot deny that this can also be expounded in the way I understand it. From which I rise against them with Augustine and repeat for readers: See whether anything is done in that way except that the grace of God should be given according to our merits in whatever way — and so grace is no longer grace.

I confirm this understanding from that statement of Hilarius of Arles in his letter to Augustine placed after that of Prosper, where he says at the beginning: Those testimonies — to each one God has distributed the measure of faith, and similar ones — they wish to avail for this: that one who has begun to will is aided, not also that one is given the gift of willing. Here "aided" is attributed to one who begins to will through the proper capacity of free choice without antecedent and premoting grace — but not without assisting the one who is beginning, nor without following the beginning of the initiated act. And this returns to the position of Prosper stated above: Nor do they consider that they are subjecting the grace of God, which they wish to be the companion and not the forerunner of human merits, even to those wills which they do not deny are prevenied by it according to their fancy. This mode of cooperation of free choice with grace did not escape the great theologian Gabriel Vazquez — where he proposes the position of certain theologians who assert that free choice is by nature prior to its determination to consent, before grace and the will of God cooperate with it — though cooperating at the same time in time. Which position he by no means approves in *1.p. disp. 99, c. 5, n. 31* — and rightly so, because making free choice as prior by nature in acting in a supernatural act

with accompanying grace appears to introduce something suspect: for the reason of determining seems to be taken from free choice determining itself by nature prior to grace — from which it follows what Augustine says: that in whatever way the human being makes himself prior to God. And although Father Vazquez says this position is not the Pelagian error, he acknowledges that it is called by that name by certain theologians — whose judgment I approve, since Catholic authors whom he cites there follow that view, among them Ruard Tapper, art. 7. But Vazquez himself at n. 32 says: This opinion seems to derogate not a little from the grace of God cooperating — for since our will needs not only excitation but also the cooperation of grace in order to consent to the excitation, it will also need cooperation in order to determine itself to consent. How then is it understood to be determined in some prior moment without the cooperation of grace? Therefore that mode of speaking — because I speak God wishes me to speak, not on the contrary; and because I believe, God wishes me to believe, not on the contrary — I would in no way concede, since that very act of believing and speaking is attributed to free choice without the cooperation of grace. Vazquez agrees with Augustine, whose words I repeat cited above from *lib. de praedest. Sanct.* c. 3: Therefore the human being claims the first part for himself in order to merit to receive the last part from him. See whether anything is done in that way except that the grace of God should be given according to our merits in whatever way. From which it appears that those authors not rashly noted that position as erroneous which posits free choice — when it cooperates with grace — as determining itself by nature prior. Yet I note that there is a great difference between this position and the Semi-Pelagian one from the side of the exciting and prevenient grace, because those theologians admit this while the Semi-Pelagians excluded it. So the error is only in the accompanying grace, which is now the cooperating grace with free choice. And for this reason Vazquez did not wish to note it with others as more severely at n. 31 and 32. Although if that exciting grace is only — as its authors of cooperation admit — indifferent in exciting and is determined to operating by free choice from which it receives efficacy, it seems, as Vazquez says, to derogate not a little from the cooperating grace of God. For then it does not harmonize with that saying of Paul: Who is it that distinguishes you? — since by nature the human being distinguishes himself prior; nor does it sufficiently agree with the other: What do you have that you did not receive? Why do you glory as if you had not received it? — since that determination of free choice prior by nature is the initial discriminating element of the human being: and so proper to it that it precedes God in that priority. And therefore of it cannot be verified that certain doctrine of Paul: It is not of the one who wills nor of the one who runs but of God who has mercy — which Saint Augustine in *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum* q. 2 examines so many times, and forbids it to be understood otherwise than that God is the author of the works of grace. Let our modern Scotists learn from this who, in fear of this difficulty, take refuge in the concomitance of the Divine decree with the operation of free choice against Scotus — for it cannot be

sustained in matters of grace, since antecedence is altogether necessary for restoring the natural power to a state proportioned to operating. And without exciting and prevenient grace the cooperation never follows.

Let our authors who introduce the concomitance of the Divine decree with the operation of free choice against Scotus take note lest they fall into this position: for in that cooperation if both causes are indifferent, they cannot be determined — since they have no reason for determining in that mutual indifference — or if one is determined by the other, care must be taken lest the human will be by nature prior as the principle of determining. And I seriously warn Mastrius, the lover and defender of those concomitant decrees: for just as the doctrine proceeds in the decree and operation foreseen, so it must proceed in the execution of cooperation with grace. Then I ask of Mastrius what will be the reason of determining? He who considers this reasoning will find that Augustine did not ignore that middle position between the one entirely removing grace from the beginning of the work by positing bare nature and pure natural operation, and the one granting grace in every operation and being Catholic. For he knew there was another third and middle position that, positing accompanying grace, was nevertheless determined to operating by free choice — receiving from it, as prior by nature, the efficacy in operating.

SECTION XIII. Middle Knowledge is attacked by its own proper arguments of the author.

First: by the argument I publicly used at the Roman College against a Father of the Society — a learned man, then the primary lecturer of the Jesuits — having declared at the outset that I was attacking one of the chief foundations on which that Middle Knowledge rests, namely that God should act rationally and prudently and provide for his creatures through his predestination — which part belongs by common agreement to providence — and testifying that I was attacking only this single point, leaving aside that other one about freedom which I would attack on another occasion. Now, I said, I directly and formally attack your principle in this way. If that foundation stood, the Divine will in predestining would follow the guidance of Middle Knowledge and would be directed by it in providing. But the opposite is true — therefore that foundation of yours does not stand. For the proof of the minor — which he denied — I supposed, or rather presupposed, that God foresees that Peter, for example, if placed in other circumstances, would not be saved, and Judas, if placed in others, would not be damned. Having had this conceded by him, I proceeded thus: Given this, the will cannot be directed by Middle Knowledge to act rightly and with certainty; therefore the opposite is true. The antecedent was denied, which I proved thus: That knowledge dictates nothing certain and determined to the will; on the contrary it awaits and depends on the consent of the Divine will choosing whatever state of foreknowledge it wishes — which of itself is indifferent to the choice of the will. Therefore the determination and certainty

of providence is an effect of the Divine will. The antecedent is most true because the knowledge of itself represents Peter and Judas as capable of being saved in one state and damned in another — but does not direct or lead toward this rather than that, and leaves both equal. Hence the will is absolutely free to determine whatever state it wishes. And the reason for determining is the very freedom of the will, which prefers to choose Peter rather than Judas — placing Peter in those circumstances in which he will act with repentance, leaving Judas in those in which he will not do penance. For if it wished to save Judas and damn Peter, it would change sides — willing to choose Judas where and when it foresaw him to be saved, and leaving Peter where and when it foresaw him to be damned. Therefore that knowledge is rather governed by the will than the will by knowledge. This knowledge, moreover, entangles and suspends the will while it equally and indifferently represents to it two equal and mutually different states — between which the will would remain from the condition of knowledge ambiguous and uncertain unless the will had determined itself to make both an election of states and of persons.

I recall that the lecturer responded to this argument by abandoning its form and diverting to another principle or foundation — the preservation of created freedom. To which I went to meet him, saying that I had at the outset occupied the single point and foundation sought from prudence and providence that I was attacking — leaving aside the other about freedom, which I did not then wish to treat. For I was not attacking Middle Knowledge with two different means simultaneously, which would have been a vicious mode of arguing. Thus he stood on the same ground, since he, moved away from his position, had turned to the freedom solution. I speak the truth. But if he were to respond to me — or if anyone now responds for him — that Middle Knowledge still leads and governs the will toward predestinating, since it demonstrates states and circumstances in which the will can choose whom it wishes, and supposing it wishes to choose this one over that one, to propose means for saving him — for the one who is to be saved will absolutely be saved through those foreseen means — this is certainly far from satisfying. For this is not proper to Middle Knowledge in the order of directing the will toward a determined reason for predestining, since it dictates absolutely nothing nor in any way persuades the will whom to predestine. This is common to every act of the intellect presupposed to acts of the will by its nature requiring preexisting knowledge. But the question here is about the certain and determined account of divine providence according to which God chooses and predestines one rather than another — on which predestination depends. For this purpose Middle Knowledge contributes nothing, since it proposes equally those to be saved and those to be damned indifferently to the free will. Its certain determination both to states and means to be chosen and to discriminating the predestined from the reprobate belongs to the will. From which it appears that knowledge depends on the Divine will and is directed and determined by it to one side.

Indeed knowledge entangles and suspends the will while it represents to it equally and indifferently two equal and equally different states, between which the will would remain from the condition of knowledge ambiguous and uncertain unless it had determined itself to make the election both of states and of persons.

Second: That Middle Knowledge, under the pretext or rather out of the concern for preserving human freedom, overthrows itself — therefore it must not be admitted. I prove the antecedent: God's knowledge must be entirely certain and infallible concerning its object. But given that freedom of the creature in the conditional state, certainty and infallibility concerning the object cannot be given; therefore it cannot be certain and infallible. The major is established; the minor is urged as follows: the object of that knowledge is the human free will in those circumstances placed with entirely indifferent grace indifferent in either direction to acting and not acting — and therefore without any determining principle. Therefore it cannot supply certainty and infallibility to knowledge, which it does not have. For to say that the circumstances are congruous and opportune, and God knows these, and so in them thus arranged with a will about to act, God sees the proportion with it — so that from the force of that constitution he can know with certainty and determination that the operation will follow — this is not true and is not probable in this view. For what do those circumstances contribute to the determination of the will, since they are extrinsic and moving nothing of themselves? For if they move: either they move by their nature, and then they are not grace — which must not be said — or if they move with grace and are supernatural, then grace is already not indifferent: and the integral freedom of indifference which they wished to retain is lost. Therefore either indetermination will remain or the freedom of indifference will be removed.

I argue: This complex made from grace, will, and opportune circumstances is either something indifferent or something determining. If something indifferent, it does not produce determinate knowledge. If something determining, it does not retain freedom — which is indifferent. Therefore either freedom is lost or the certainty of Middle Knowledge is removed.

Third: That Middle Knowledge is introduced by its authors — as they themselves acknowledge — so that predestination may rationally be accomplished with proper discrimination of certain persons over others — and those are chosen who are foreseen as about to make good use of offered grace, and those are rejected who are foreknown as about to do otherwise. And so for this reason the occasion for complaints about God freely choosing some and reprobating others is removed — with favoritism excluded, and the mouths stopped of those who complain about God — since the cause of damnation is to be attributed to them. But this specious aim is not achieved through Middle Knowledge; on the contrary the opposite occurs. For from its positing there

arises a greater occasion for complaints about God and favoritism. Therefore it must not be admitted.

The major is established and greatly exaggerated by the adversaries. The assumed minor I show thus: Through that knowledge God sees various states and circumstances in which persons placed would act well or badly — for example, if Peter is placed in that state he will sin; Judas if placed in that one will act rightly — and on the contrary. Why therefore did God, seeing this, wish to place Judas in the state where he would sin and not in the one where he would act rightly? And why did God wish to place Peter in that state where he would act rightly and not in the one where he would sin? What did Judas demerit so as to be excluded from that state in which if he obtained it he would be saved? And what did Peter merit so as to be taken from that state in which if he remained he would perish, to another in which he would be saved? An occasion is therefore given for Judas to complain against God because he was rejected into a state of damnation when he could have been placed in a state of salvation — and likewise for others damned relative to the elect. I have always judged that this opinion coincides — with the matter changed — with the one it reprobates. For it reprobates the other because it thinks there is an occasion for complaint for those who are not elected by God after denying efficacious grace — with which if he had given it to them they would be saved. The same happens in the opposing view, which says that God did not wish to place the damned in the state in which they could be saved, while he placed others there. And so with the matter changed the occasion for complaints is not removed.

They complain: why did you not give me efficacious grace? Those others complain no less: why did you expel me from the state of efficacious grace in which to be, if you willed, and cast me down to that in which there was no efficacious grace for me? Indeed those foreknown in that state can complain with greater right than in our Augustinian state. This is plain because in the Augustinian state no capacity or proportion for salvation is considered but incapacity and disproportionality by reason of original sin and the privation of grace with demerit. But in the state that Middle Knowledge introduces, capacity and proportion are attended to with the opportune and congruous assistance of grace. From which a certain injury appears to be done to one who was apt in one state by being expelled to a state in which he was not apt. This injury is absent from Augustine's view, which supposes no one to be apt on account of the condemned mass — hence no injury is done to one who is not chosen, for he is not cast into a state but left in the one in which he was inapt and incapable. Here is the manifest difference. In the Augustinian state no one is excluded from a state of salvation to a state of damnation. But in the state Middle Knowledge presupposes, many are ejected from the state in which they were to be saved and are placed in that in which they are to be damned. Let the authors therefore learn and know that the damned are treated worse in their system than in

Augustine's. And let them note that what they think Augustine could not attain in this mystery, they have attained far less themselves.

If they think Judas rightly complains because having original sin he was abandoned while Peter was chosen over him — let them consider with how much greater right he could complain that while he was foreseen in a state of salvation he was rejected and thrust into another alien state of damnation. From which view favoritism at God's side then manifestly follows: because when God saw through Middle Knowledge that all could be saved in certain states if placed in them, and on the contrary — why did he prefer some of them over others by replacing them in a state of salvation, and placed others below by transferring them to a state of damnation? This is certainly favoritism proper — where there is no consideration of demerit: to wish to accept some and not others — from which the distinction is introduced to persons, not to the demerits of persons.

Let the authors of the contrary view weigh this reasoning and they will find that they have devolved to the very place they were trying to escape. Convinced by this I abandoned Middle Knowledge which I had learned from my youth, and with Augustine took refuge in the exclamations of Paul — O man, who are you? And: O the depth of the riches?

Fourth: If that state is attended in which Middle Knowledge foresees what people would do, with will and indifferent grace placed in an indifferent position — certainly either no one will determine himself to either side, or if one does, he will always determine himself to sinning. And nothing else will be done but sin. Therefore recourse to that state is in vain, in which there can be no discrimination of the good — who will be none. The assumption is proved from Augustine, who in *lib. de Corrept. et gratia* ponders that Adam in the state of blessedness, in the greatest peace and tranquility of mind and body, with nothing threatening, no conflict of passions, no discord of appetites, no proneness to evil — with the "auxilium sine qua non," that is indifferent grace without which he could not rightly act for salvation — fell into sin. This is certainly very much to be noted for the present doctrine. For how will human beings placed either in the same or a less happy state — such as the state of pure nature commonly given — with that grace of God left to their own free choice, act well, if Adam acted otherwise?

The argument is especially pressed if people are considered placed in this state of fallen nature — which Augustine describes in that book — subject to concupiscence, exposed to so many miseries of mind and body, with the greatest fragility and with inclination to sin. For in it, speaking morally, they would rightly do nothing for salvation, and consequently with that indifferent grace alone they would do nothing else but sin. Let us hear Augustine; he says thus in that book *de correct. et gratia* c. 11: God did not wish man himself to be without his grace which he left in his free choice; and shortly after: But he abandoned it; it was abandoned. The human being abandoned God and was

abandoned by God. He subjoins the reason: For the assistance was such that it could be abandoned when he wished, and in which he could remain if he wished — not however by which he would be moved to will it. Here is the example of Adam's fall with the sole "auxilium sine qua non" or indifferent grace. Again: He gave an assistance without which in good will he could not remain if he wished — but in order that he might wish he left it to his free choice. He could therefore remain if he had wished, because the assistance was not lacking. But because he did not wish to remain, surely his fault is his. And yet he did not wish and did not remain, as many of the Angels wished and remained.

But the human being sinned in that happy state with that grace. At c. 12 Augustine says: Nothing threatening him — indeed against the commandment of God threatening him, he did not stand in such great happiness, in such great facility of not sinning. How then will people placed in the same or a less happy state — such as the state of pure nature commonly given — with that sole assistance of grace left to their own free choice, act well and rightly for salvation, as the authors of Middle Knowledge foresee? Let us now refer in our mind to another state of human nature which is that of fallen nature in which we now are — which Augustine describes in that book — if the authors of Middle Knowledge speak about it: how with that sole "auxilium sine qua non" and indifferent grace would people act rightly for salvation, left to free choice? As Augustine says, let him say what he thinks in the same passage c. 12: For if in the infirmity of this life — in which infirmity however virtue needed to be perfected through the repression of pride — they were left to their own will so that they might remain in the assistance of God without which they could not persevere if they wished, and God did not work in them that they would wish (that is, through the "auxilium quo" or efficacious assistance) — amid so many and so great temptations the very will would succumb from its infirmity, and they would so far fail to persevere because failing from infirmity they would neither wish, or not wish thus from the infirmity of the will so as to be able to. Here it is to be noted that Augustine speaks of that state of fallen nature still outside actual sin, supposing in it perseverance — which involves and requires the state of grace. In which state however he requires efficacious grace and "auxilium quo": For their will is so kindled that they can therefore because they thus will, and they thus will because God works in them to will. But if in this state even with habitual grace already supposed — which stands with inchoate perseverance — efficacious grace was yet necessary for not sinning: how do the authors of Middle Knowledge wish that people constituted in their own nature with indifferent grace alone are foreseen as going to act rightly? Augustine certainly did not teach this, nor did I learn it from him. Hence with him I must deny that in that state which they form for themselves it will be foreseen that anyone will act rightly.

Therefore when they argue from that dilemma: either God foresees people as about to act well or not — and acts done well — I promptly respond (prescinding from another response about the indetermination of a will entirely indifferent with assistance also indifferent) that the negative part will always be true — that is, that God foresees the will as going to sin. And these arguments have always persuaded me and will always persuade me that the use of that Middle Knowledge is, to say the least, not true and altogether useless for the matter of predestination and grace and for the harmony of free choice with them — or at least that it is not Augustinian, which is what I proposed from the outset to demonstrate.

Fifth: It follows from the positing of Middle Knowledge that some hidden merit is given in that conditional state, in which there is some motivating reason before God for choosing one rather than another — contrary to the common view denying merits in the conditional state. Therefore that knowledge must be entirely expelled. I prove the antecedent — which seems difficult to prove — in this way. What is lovable in an object can move toward choosing it over another that is not lovable. But the will in the conditional state as going to act well of its own freedom, compared with another going to act badly, is lovable — and more lovable than the second with which it is compared. Therefore it is rightly preferably chosen by God over the other, if they were to be placed in the order of things. The major is certain: for even among possible beings, those that are more perfect are more lovable than the less perfect. The minor is proved: because a will foreseen as going to act rightly in such circumstances in which another is foreseen as not acting, when both can equally act, is an object lovable and more lovable than the opposing will. Therefore it is more apt to move God, so that if they are to be placed in the nature of things, the former rather than the latter should be placed. It is certainly more rational that of two wills — one that will hate God if placed in future being, and the other that will love God — the latter should be preferably chosen over the former in the order to futurity, and consequently if both are placed, the latter should be crowned and the former punished. Nor does the conditional state overturn those accounts of lovableness, since they are in the very objects themselves — which from their native freedom will determine themselves, if placed in reality, one to loving God with the offered indifferent grace, and the other to offending him.

This argument will be more convincing in the opinion of those same authors of Middle Knowledge who teach that given two persons with equal grace one can consent and the other withhold consent — and that this in fact occurs. Why therefore will not the one foreseen as about to consent be more lovable than the other who will not consent?

This argument is confirmed from the fact that the adversaries use that conditional state to preserve the freedom of the will about to act in the absolute state, and reduce to the absolute use that foresight of conditional freedom.

Therefore they must by the same reasoning reduce to absolute use that reason for meriting which was foreseen in the conditional state. And just as God in their view is moved in preserving freedom in the absolute state from love of it because it conforms to reason, so also he can be moved to preserve that account of conditional moral goodness in that will going to act rightly under the condition.

Nor let them object that Augustine rejected those conditional merits of whatever kind — deeming them absurd and foreign to the account of meriting — and therefore we wrongly argue against them by introducing conditional merits. For I respond that Augustine rejected that kind of merit not precisely because they were conditional, but because they were conditional in such a way as to precede every Divine constitution. This appears from our present discourse and will appear more below, and is proved from the fact that Augustine distinguished conditional merits never going to be absolutely future from those that are sometimes going to be future. He excluded even the latter from predestination because he saw them to be impossible without a divine constitution preceding — without which they could have neither a reason for existence nor a reason for meriting. And therefore he called them nothing. But those merits which Middle Knowledge introduces are, of themselves without dependence on the decree, altogether going to be future — and therefore are foreknown in that state so that their foreknowledge may serve the Divine will predestining — so that it may proceed rightly and prudently. Therefore they are lovable to the Divine will, since from themselves they have rectitude and do not receive it from the will — supposed as knowing them as already good incipiently, that is with the capacity and congruity for receiving grace and determining it to good use, to which the indifferent grace is to be reduced by free choice. Hence those are not in that consideration gifts of God, since they precede his will. And those things thus preceding are embraced and chosen by the will in Middle Knowledge. If Mastrius had considered this he would have reproached less Vulpes in *disp. 38, a. 3* together with other theologians who held that the authors of Middle Knowledge introduced conditional merits as motivating causes of the Divine will for predestinating. I acknowledge that they deny this; but it is one thing to deny it in words and another in reality and meaning — which we elicit from their arguments and reasonings, and by those very propositions we are forced to acknowledge in some way what they had denied. I do not say I understand them so; but I do not condemn Vulpes and others who so understand them.

But it is not permitted, by Pontifical decrees of which I am most observant, to enter more deeply into this matter and press it more vehemently, lest we fall into the forbidden matter of the controversy over assistances. Therefore we stop, and having gone far less far than Vulpes, Perezius, and Mastrius — who restrained by the same reverence refrained from going further — we sound the retreat and obey and contain ourselves within the limits prescribed by the Most Holy Apostolic See.

SECTION XIV. The opposing arguments are resolved.

We proposed them above. But since they are very far removed from this place, it will be necessary to recall them briefly so that their memory may be refreshed and the solutions may appear.

The first was taken from the necessity of knowledge without which God could not prudently act and therefore could not decree what was to be done. To this the necessity must be conceded; but it must be denied that from this it follows that the mode introduced by Middle Knowledge — of foreknowing conditional future things from themselves independently and antecedently to the Divine decrees as having their determination and truth — must hold. So we admit the thing but deny the mode.

The second — that importunate argument about the harmony of the decree with free choice — has been sufficiently answered in *Collat. 10, Diff. 1 and 2*, where we also satisfied it by saying that the antecedence of the decree does not remove freedom but on the contrary preserves it — determining in the way that befits free power, preserving its freedom. But now specifically in the matter of grace it must be said altogether that the decree must be antecedent, and the concurrence in time rendered is antecedent — nor does concomitance suffice. Because however it may be in natural matters, the matter is otherwise in supernatural operations, to which natural power must be elevated through something supernatural so as to be rendered a proportionate co-principle. But that cannot be accomplished through something merely concomitant which is in second act. And this is plain from the doctrine of exciting grace, which is accomplished in us without us and before cooperation with assisting grace — it prevenes us and touches us antecedently to the free meritorious act which is accomplished by cooperating with that premoting and exciting grace. Already therefore free choice is antecedently moved in the order of cooperating freely — and yet retains its freedom thus excited and touched — which word the Council of Trent uses: God touching the heart of a human being — who can cast away that inspiration. Already therefore the will can be antecedently moved with freedom unimpaired. Return with me, reader, to the decree: that decree determined things as they were brought about in time, but in time the premotion preserved freedom. Therefore also the predetermination of the decree concerning such an operation will preserve freedom. What therefore do those authors fear about that antecedence? And why do our modern Scotists in fear of this difficulty take refuge in concomitance — which in matters of grace cannot be sustained, since antecedence is altogether necessary for restoring the natural power to a proportioned state for operating, and without exciting and prevenient grace cooperation by no means follows?

The third — taken from the account of harmonizing free choice with grace, which it affirmed is taken from the conditional foresight of the use of free choice going to cooperate with congruous grace — is resolved by denying that

the account of harmony can be taken from there, since that mode of harmonizing does not stand with the dignity of grace which we must make prior, premoting, and antecedently leading free choice. This was the aim of our disputation against Middle Knowledge, which we disapproved chiefly on this ground with Augustine as author. The true harmony consists in the decree of God thus determining the work of the will — as it destines for it such grace as prevenes and premotes the will by inclining it to acting with its freedom retained, in virtue of prevenient grace, with supreme efficacious gentleness — which Augustine calls "virtus" (power), as we showed in our works on grace and predestination and afterward found in Basilio Pontius of Leon the Augustinian, most celebrated theologian and primary lecturer in the Salamancan Academy — justly called "Magnus" (the Great) — in *Relect. 1.p. de necessitate gratiae* c. 9, §. 10 at the end, whose words we shall cite later. Surely this harmony pleased our theologians whom we cited above when disputing about contingency in *d. 38* with physical predetermination excluded.

To the fourth — drawn from the equality and equity of God toward his creatures — it is responded that it proves too much. For from it it follows that God must treat all equally, accommodate himself to the nature and condition of human beings, and in a certain way obey them rather than command them, and either save all or damn all. Which is against the freedom and lordship of God over his creatures, especially in matters of grace. Furthermore the argument is refuted by the example of infants in whom that equality and equity has no place — which equity is imagined — and which barely appears even in adults, many of whom are barbarians and dull worshippers of idols, cast out beyond the paths of the years and the sun, who have heard nothing of faith. Others are born among Mohammedans and Jews most hostile to Christ, who cannot even bear to hear his name, and who are very far from us Christians who abound in the assistances of grace. Finally by this reasoning the singular mercy of God and the extraordinary favor toward some outstandingly holy persons is removed, and the inscrutable Divine judgments which Paul and Augustine venerate are taken away.

To the fifth: concerning complaints, satisfaction was given above in the third argument at c. 10 adduced, where we proved that not a lesser, indeed a greater, occasion for complaints is given in the state of Middle Knowledge than outside it. For those foreknown in it are deprived of that congruity in which they could be saved according to their foreseen cooperation, and are rejected by God into those circumstances in which they are foreseen as to be damned without any preceding demerit of their own — from which an occasion and material for complaints and indignation against God arises, who placed others in an opportune state for salvation from which he dislodged those unfortunate ones.

The sixth — drawn from despair and the impossibility of salvation — is resolved and turned back. It is resolved by saying that through the antecedent decree

freedom is not removed, and therefore there is always room for acting well and badly. Nor does anyone know whether he is predestined or not, or whether foreseen or not. Hence all are bound and must act well. For the same inconvenience follows from the foreknowledge of God — with which supposed it also follows that the thing will come about as it is foreknown — and yet despair is not introduced because no antecedent necessity is imposed. It is turned back because the same follows from the fact that one person is placed by God in a state incongruous that is absolutely to be damned, and from the fact that another is placed in a congruous and opportune state that is to be saved. Therefore neither should that one strive or hope, nor should this one fear or distrust.

To the seventh — concerning the necessity and equity of sufficient assistance drawn from the testimony of Paul: God wills all people to be saved — often resolved by us in our works, especially in *Scrinio Augustini* c. 12: Now briefly we say that this was proposed to Augustine himself by the Semi-Pelagians, as is seen from Prosper and Hilary. Not that it is heresy — since it is the common view in the schools — but that with Augustine it must be responded that that assistance is not in Augustine's view extended to all, and is especially denied to infants — which Vazquez affirms in *1.p.* disp. 96, c. 2, n. 5 and 6, and disp. 97, c. 3, 4, and 6 — as will appear in its proper place when we shall dispute about the general will of God toward the salvation of all. I add that even admitting that view of general sufficient assistance, the argument concludes nothing — because God knows that with solely sufficient and incongruous assistances many will not be saved, and yet did not wish to give them efficacious ones, which if he gave by placing them in that congruity and opportunity in which he placed the elect, others would also be saved.

To the eighth and last: it is answered by denying those propositions about contingent conditional future things, as we said above, as having an object determinately true or false from itself. Nor in them can there be determinately true before any decree. Disjunctions are indeed true in this divided sense: this will be or will not be — but from this it does not follow: it will be, since this positive truth depends on the divine decree decreeing. With that removed, nothing will be true except the negative part, since for determinate being God alone has the power. Hence that complex "it will be or it will not be" is true, but that affirmative part "it will be" will never be verified except through the positing of the decree.

Thus far on the resolution of arguments.

SECTION XV. Responses to the testimonies of Augustine adduced for Middle Knowledge.

The first, from c. 56 of the exposition of the epistle to the Romans, where treating of calling according to purpose — which is proper to the predestined —

he said: Nor did he predestine anyone whom he did not foreknow as about to believe and follow his calling — is easily resolved. First, Fasolus wished to press us Augustine's disciples with it in *1.p.* q. 14, a. 13, dub. 17, n. 313, and indicates that Father Alvarez feared it in his *Responsiones lib. 1, c. 1, n. 4* — though citing for Augustine John Arboreus without however denying it to be Augustine's. To this therefore it is responded from Augustine himself in *lib. 1 Retract.* c. 23, where he acknowledges that when he wrote that book as a priest he was less instructed about grace: For I had not yet, he says, inquired more carefully, nor did I yet recall what the election of grace is. And again at the end: Although I there treated less carefully that calling which is effected through God's grace. He therefore retracts and corrects many things there — and above all that Pelagian dogma about the initial merit of faith which he then held. Hence it is not surprising that Augustine used that testimony in that book where he acknowledges himself to have been less expert in matters of grace. Let Fasolus adduce other things to inspire us with religious reverence, but he will not find them in other works.

The second — drawn from the book *ad Simplicianum* 1, q. 2 — has been sufficiently explained and resolved at c. 9, and I see nothing to add. Only the summary of it is added here. The entire first part of that lengthy and dense disputation was placed by Augustine in an arguing and inquiring capacity in favor of free choice — in order to attempt the modes by which free choice could be reconciled with grace, with the force of antecedently premoting and inclining grace efficaciously influencing from the Divine constitution set aside — bringing forward those various modes wherever they could be sought from, partly admitting and partly excluding them, with judgment suspended. Then in the later part of the book he has recourse to gratuitous predestination of God and free and liberal and unowed grace, and venerates the mystery of predestination and establishes it entirely — which he spoke of in *lib. 2 Retract.* c. 1: The struggle was indeed over free choice, but the grace of God won.

The third is more difficult, and I acknowledge that no other passage in Augustine's works gave me so much labor. It is found in *lib. 4 of the Octoginta tres Quaestiones* q. 68, where treating of the discrimination of the predestined from the reprobate existing in the condemned mass, he seems to think and speak differently from other passages — referring it to most hidden merits, which phrase is applied there more than once. And he says expressly: There is some diversity among them, and something precedes in sinners by which, though not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification; and likewise something precedes in other sinners by which they are worthy of obduration. These things are certainly entirely contrary to Augustine's doctrine which we have handed on up to this point, as appears in the series of his passages woven together by us. The Master of Sentences — most versed in Augustine — saw the difficulty in *1, d. 41*, and Henry in *Quodl. 8, q. 5* uses that text for his position concerning the merits of predestination. Scotus noted it in *1, d. 41, q. un. init.*, who also noted the

difficulty of Augustine's testimony — and almost all who with Henry hold against gratuitous predestination before foreseen merits use it to attack it, as we shall see later.

I respond first: This testimony avails nothing for Middle Knowledge, since it does not rest on these most hidden merits — which are hidden in the treasures of God's wisdom and judgments and whose account we cannot render, of the kind Augustine posits here. Middle Knowledge rests on entirely open and most easily understood merits. For this is what Middle Knowledge professes — which has the aim of reconciling the merits of free choice with grace and grounding the reason for choosing the ones who act well from the good use of free choice with grace, which is brought forward and set out through that Middle Knowledge, so that the reason for discriminating and predestining may be plain and visible to all and complaints about God may cease. And so the testimony about most hidden merits does not serve this knowledge; indeed it plainly contradicts it — because those most hidden merits refute those merits introduced clearly and manifestly from free choice through Middle Knowledge.

Before I respond directly to the passage I acknowledge that I labored long but fruitlessly in understanding it, and sought many interpretations both in the books of others and formed for myself. The common one pleased me: that Augustine had retracted what was said, and I had composed a fairly accurate treatise about it and thought I had followed the mind of Augustine — but when I most carefully weighed the text I disapproved my commentary. I found that Augustine retracted nothing and should have retracted nothing. He has altogether consistent and coherent doctrine with the rest of his teaching on grace and gratuitous predestination. And so I found, I believe, a new exposition — one I received from no one except Augustine himself — which I state plainly and clearly.

The meaning is this: that some human beings are justified and live rightly for the purpose of obtaining the salvation of the soul — meriting it through their good works which they do — while others live badly, sin, and withdrawing from God are hardened. And although all were in the condemned mass equally sinners without any good merits, outside it they had diversity in the state of execution — because some have that by which they merit to be justified, while others do not have merit by which they are justified but by which they are hardened. The question is not here about merits before predestination but about merits after it, which are found in those who — although they were in the same condemned mass with other sinners — merited to be justified in execution and to be saved before the others. And seeking the reason for that diversity he says: It is nonetheless true that it is not of the one who wills nor of the one who runs but of God who has mercy, who causes them to repent and justifies them on account of repentance. For while a sinner is compunctious, grieves, and prays, he disposes himself for justification — and that good will which precedes

grace in that repentant sinner is the hidden merit for obtaining it. But that good will is not a human merit but a divine gift: for God works the very will itself, and the calling works the will before the merit, and the calling belongs to mercy. And this, he subjoins, is of high and profound ordering. Here are the most hidden merits resting on the high and profound calling. The meaning moreover appears more clearly from the fact that Augustine adduces the example of Pharaoh and of the Hebrews whom he was afflicting: because Pharaoh with his people was hardened while the Hebrews were corrected — both being sinners and belonging to one mass — yet they were to be treated differently, those who had groaned for one God to come to their aid, and those others who had groaned under their unjust burdens. About these therefore who are justified in time before other sinners Augustine speaks, seeking the causes of the difference in a higher principle — that is, in merits destined by God for those who grieve and pray, which were the most hidden merits since they were merits prepared for them by predestination in intention. From these flowed those merits in time committed to execution — which yet were goods of the merciful God who comes to their aid on account of their good will, which was itself a gift of God: for God works the very good will in us. Therefore from the calling that belongs to mercy arose that calling: which calling works the will before merit. To which belongs the sanctification of Jeremiah and the love of Jacob over Esau. This is the genuine interpretation of the passage — which after long and mature consideration, having rejected the others that had come to my mind, I approved.

There is here nothing contrary to the doctrine of predestination and Augustinian grace. Nor does this passage contain a question about the foresight of merits before the decree of predestining, nor about Middle conditional foreknowledge — nor are those most hidden merits the ones that come into the dispute over foreknowledge and predestination as their motives, but rather those that were predestined for the elect in intention — as they were going to be placed in execution — as they proceeded from that first intention where they were hidden and secret in the high and profound ordering of God, as Augustine says in this place. I therefore set forth this exposition for theologians coming after me, and I deny the common one about retractation which pleased the Master and ancient Doctors and had pleased me. I leave it with my commentaries on it — but do not cast them aside and will present them elsewhere. I find nothing at all worthy of retractation.

Let readers note that Augustine when he said: For merit comes from most hidden things, since sinners themselves — since on account of the general sin they have formed one mass — said "there is nonetheless some diversity among them," did not say "there was" — referring the "is" to the present state of execution — not however to the state of intention when they were elected in the condemned mass, to which "there was" would apply, by which the diversity was signified as not existing through foreseen merits while they were in the mass, so

that in it they were discriminated and diverse from others reprobated by merits. But it arose afterward in time when the execution of merits was accomplished which were diverse in the elect from others not elect. That diversity — appearing in time when made manifest — came from those most hidden merits which God in his constitution and intention had prepared by predestining. And so every scruple is removed and every difficulty resolved.

To the fourth — drawn from *lib. de Dono perseverant.* c. 14, where are those words: That some have a natural gift of understanding by which they are moved to faith if they hear words or see signs fitting for their minds — applied to the Tyrians and Sidonians, from which is deduced that they were foreseen as about to come from the congruity of the assistance with free choice — sufficient response was given at c. 7 at the end. Now briefly we say: That natural talent or gift of understanding avails nothing without the decree and the assistance of grace proceeding from it. And so Augustine said in that passage: that to them was denied even the source of believing, because they were not from the predestined. Therefore in the decree of saving and in the assistance proceeding from it was taken the account of right acting — to which, since it was supernatural, a more ingenious nature contributed nothing. For God follows not the nobility or capacity of nature but his own Divine good pleasure and decree. Hence this passage rebounds on the adversaries: Behold, God is so far from that opportunity and congruity of a nature capable of grace that he did not wish to choose the intelligent and acute who seemed more apt for exercising the works of grace, and preferred to choose others who were dull, gross, and sluggish — to show that the mystery of predestination does not pertain to the excellence of nature but to the liberal grace of God. As Augustine says in *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum* q. 2 at the end: I have nothing to contemplate in choosing people for saving grace, if I am allowed to apply some thought to the examination of this election, except either a greater natural endowment or lesser sins, or both; let us add also, if you please, honorable and useful learning. Whoever therefore is entangled and stained with as few sins as possible and is keen of mind and trained in the liberal arts seems to be the one to be chosen for grace. But when I have established this, he who chose the weak things of the world to confound the strong, and the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, will so mock me that looking at him and seized with shame I should mock many — people more chaste than certain sinners and orators more than certain fishermen. Let these words and what follows to the end of the book stand as a just response to the argument. I ask here of the authors of Middle Knowledge to be willing to read and weigh these things. Let them know, if they do so, that their position is foreign to the doctrine of Augustine. It is enough for me to have persuaded that by certain arguments.

COLLATION XI, DISTINCTION II

On the Agreement and Disagreement of St. Thomas and Scotus Regarding Predestination

At *dist. 40 and 41 of Book I of the Sentences*, where both St. Thomas and Scotus treat the matter; and again St. Thomas at *1 p., q. 23, de veritate q. 6, Quodlibet 12*, and *tom. 9, lect. 2*; and Scotus in the *Reportata, dist. 42, q. 4*, in *2 d. 20, q. 2*.

THE TEXTS OF BOTH AUTHORS ARE PRESENTED

From a collation of these passages it is clear that both the Angelic and the Subtle Doctor agree: that predestination is a gratuitous and free act of the Divine will — setting aside for now the question of foreknowledge — prior to all foreseen merits. This holds with the exclusion, on the one hand, of natural merits such as the Pelagians asserted, and with the precision, on the other hand, of supernatural merits arising together with grace. For although such merits intervene in the execution of the plan in order to attain the end of beatitude, they were in no way the motivating reasons for the act of choosing; they were rather the effects arising from the election of the predestined, as means prepared for them out of the affection of love, through which they would be brought certainly and infallibly to beatitude.

Scotus expressed this clearly in *1 d. 41, q. un., S. potest aliter, n. 11*, in these words: "One who wills in an orderly manner the end and those things that are ordered to the end, wills the end prior to any of the things ordered to it, because he wills other things on account of the end. Therefore, since in the whole process by which a beatifiable creature is led to its perfect end, the ultimate end is perfect beatitude, God, in willing anything of that order for this beatifiable creature, wills first the end for it, and as it were subsequently wills for it those other things that are in the order of what pertains to that end. But grace, faith, merits, and the good use of free will are all ordered to that end, some more remotely, some more proximately. Therefore God wills beatitude for this creature before any of those other things, and wills any one of those things for it prior to foreseeing that it will have any of them; hence he does not will beatitude for it on account of any of those things as foreseen." This argument is both effective and elegant — nothing more forceful or more elegant can be devised. Certainly, as it is drawn from the order of things, it fits predestination precisely, and will entirely convince anyone who sets it out with equal orderliness. Scotus employs it also in *2 d. 20, q. 2, S. Duo, n. 2*; he signals the same point in *3 d. 19, q. un., S. quantum ad 1, n. 6*; and he uses it most aptly in the *Reportata, 1 d. 41, q. un., n. 7 ad fin.*

Let us now hear St. Thomas. He writes in *1 p., q. 23, a. 5*, near the end of the body of the article: "It is impossible that the total effect of predestination in general should have any cause on our part. For whatever there is in a human being that orders him to salvation is comprehended entirely under the effect of

predestination, even his preparation for grace; for this does not come about except through divine assistance, according to that text of Lamentations: *Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted*. Predestination does, however, have in the following sense a reason on the part of the effect, namely the Divine will, to which the whole effect of predestination is ordered as to an end, and from which it proceeds as from a first moving principle." And in the reply to the first objection: "The foreseen grace of a person is not the reason for the conferral of grace except under the aspect of a final cause." And at the close of the reply to the third objection: "Why he chose these for glory and reprobated those has no explanation except the Divine will." Hence Augustine says in his commentary on John: "Why he draws this one and not that one, do not wish to judge, lest you err." He proceeds along the same lines in *1 d. 41, q. 1, a. 3, in corp.*

Section I: Whether and in What Respect Scotus Differs from St. Thomas

Such is the position of each, and on this there is agreement as to the resolution of the principal point. We do nevertheless seek the differences around it. They are few and not especially difficult, but they must be enumerated and weighed.

The first difference is that St. Thomas adheres uniformly to this position and does not admit the opposite, while Scotus attributes this very position to him in the passage cited above (*S. omittendo, n. 4*), where he sets it out and explains it admirably, and then immediately opposes to it the contrary position of Henry of Ghent, who held that the foreseen good use of free will is the cause of predestination. Scotus does not reject this position but defends it as probable; and so he holds himself midway between the two and refers the reader to choose as he pleases. For near the end of the question, at *S. de istis opinionibus, n. 13*, he says: "Let that opinion be chosen which is more pleasing, provided that divine freedom is preserved without any injustice, and the other things that must be preserved regarding God as liberal elector; and let whoever holds the other opinion reply to the arguments raised against it."

It is true that Lychetus says in his commentary following that question, at the beginning of letter B, n. 1, that Scotus follows the first opinion of St. Thomas, which stands, as he says, in two conclusions: *that no reason for predestination is in any way prior, neither on the part of the one predestining nor on the part of the one predestined* — and he proves this with a singular argument. We agree with Lychetus, for with the sole exception of that one place where Scotus leaves the choice to the reader, in all other passages he chooses the first position, rejecting or passing over Henry's opinion, as we shall say below.

The second difference is that St. Thomas establishes formal predestination as an act of providence, and therefore an act of the intellect. For in *1 p., q. 23, a. 1*, in the body of the article, having introduced the example of an archer, he writes: "Properly speaking, the rational creature, which is capable of eternal life, is directed toward it as though sent by God; and the idea of this transmission pre-

exists in God, just as in him there is the idea of the ordering of all things to their end, which we have said is providence. Now the idea of some thing to be made, existing in the mind of the maker, is a kind of pre-existence of the thing to be made in him. Hence the idea of the aforesaid transmission of a rational creature to the end of eternal life is called predestination; for to destine is to send. And so it is clear that predestination, as regards its object, is a part of providence." On this Cajetan remarks: "Note here the difference between the teaching of St. Thomas and that of others, among whom is Scotus at *d. 40, q. un. in 1*. For they consider predestination properly to signify election and consequently an act of the divine will. But here it is expressly said that it imports an act of the intellect, just as does providence, since it is a part of providence."

St. Thomas likewise teaches the same in *q. 23, a. 2*, in the body and in the reply to the second objection; and transparently in *a. 4* of the same question, where he writes: "Predestination by reason presupposes election, and election presupposes love; the reason for this is that predestination, as has been said, is a part of providence. Providence, however, like prudence, is the reason existing in the intellect as the directive norm for the ordering of certain things to an end." This is worth observing with care, because St. Thomas sometimes introduces the will into predestination; let no one be misled or puzzled when reading him, for he takes the will presuppositively, not formally, as is evident in *a. 5* of the same question, in the body, where he writes: "Since predestination includes the will, as was said above, the reason for predestination is to be sought in the same way as the reason for the divine will." This is confirmed by the teaching given by the same St. Thomas in *1 d. 40, q. 1, a. 2*, where the title of the question asks whether predestination pertains to knowledge. Having set out arguments on behalf of knowledge and of will, he says in the body: "Predestination includes providence in its concept." And to the fourth objection: "It is a certain mode of providence." St. Thomas is followed by his disciples, and among others by Zumel, Granado, the Salmanticenses here; by Bellarmine (*tom. 3, lib. 2, de grat. et libero arb., c. 9*); by Carthagenia (*discursu 2, de praedest.*); by Valentia (*in hanc quaest. 1 p., puncto 2*); by Ruiz (*d. 1, de praedest., f. 6*).

Scotus, however, places formal predestination in the will. For in *1 d. 40, q. un., S. ad istam quaestionem, n. 2*, he says plainly: "I say that predestination, properly understood, signifies an act of the Divine will, namely the order of election, through the Divine will, of some intellectual or rational creature to grace and glory — though it can also be taken for the act of the intellect accompanying that election." Hence the difference between the two doctors is clear: St. Thomas admitted the will presuppositively with respect to the act of the intellect, holding that predestination is formally constituted in the latter, while Scotus, having placed predestination formally in the will, admitted the intellect only concomitantly. Moreover, throughout his treatment in *dist. 40*, Scotus always employs the verb "to will" when speaking of the act of predestining. The same is apparent in *d. 41, q. un., n. 11*, where, in presenting that elegant argument which

is the principal one, he says "one who wills in an orderly manner the end," and uses no other verb, repeating it frequently, as he also does at n. 14. He speaks in the same way throughout the *Reportata*, d. 41, q. un., but especially at n. 5, where he restates the principal a priori argument about God willing the end in an orderly manner. There he says nothing about an act of the intellect, as is also the case in 2 d. 20, q. 2, S. de con. 2, where he presses the same argument. Thus Scotus's position clearly belongs to the act of the will, as also taught by Bonaventure, Gregory, Gabriel, Aureolus, and all the Scotists; and among others by Eck (*lib. de praedestinatione, Centuria prima, n. 18*), Suárez (*lib. 1, de praedest., c. 17*), Vázquez (*disp. 82, c. 3*), Lessio (*de praedest. hominis et Angelorum, sect. 1*) — who calls it the more common view — Faber (*disp. 58, c. 1*); Alarcón follows the same (*disp. 2, a. 3*), and the Fathers of the Society of Jesus generally incline that way.

The third difference arises because St. Thomas distinguishes three acts in God — by reason, but with a foundation in reality — namely Love, Election, and Predestination. Of these, Love precedes Election, and Election precedes Predestination. So in 1 p., q. 23, a. 4, in the body: "Predestination by reason presupposes election, and election presupposes love." And below: "Predestination presupposes that God wills the salvation of those involved, which pertains to election and love. To love, insofar as he wills this good of eternal salvation to them — for to love is to will good to someone. To elect, insofar as he wills this good to some rather than to others." Scotus does not draw any equal distinction between these acts; for him election and love are contained within predestination, and he reduces formal predestination to the very act of willing, or the resolve of the Divine will, which is the term used by Paul and Augustine to designate predestination, as we shall say in the appropriate place below, with whom Scotus agreed when he spoke in d. 40, ad 2, of "the resolve of the Divine will," and at the beginning of the same n. 2 he does not divide that divine willing into two acts but simply says "the act of the Divine will." This difference arises from the fact that St. Thomas places formal predestination in an act of the intellect, whereas Scotus places it in an act of the will; hence it was necessary for St. Thomas to distinguish and presuppose those two acts of love and election as prior to predestination, which was not itself an act of will. Scotus, by contrast, because he judged predestination to be an act of the will, did presuppose knowledge for the act of predestining, but abstained from that distinction and from presupposing acts of the will.

The fourth difference concerns the manner of proving the conclusion on which they agree, namely that God predestined before all foreseen merits. For while St. Thomas asserts and affirms many things, he does not proceed in setting them out and proving them with equal orderliness. In a. 1, asking whether human beings are predestined by God, he answers affirmatively, on the grounds that since predestination is a part of providence, to which all things are subject, it belongs to providence to order human beings to God, who is their end; and he turns to proving that God is the supernatural end to which man, beyond the

powers of his own nature, is transmitted like an arrow shot by an archer. Then in *a. 4*, asking whether the predestined are chosen by God, he answers that they are chosen through love and the will of their eternal good and salvation in preference to others. In *a. 5*, asking whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination — which is the principal question — he answers in the body by having recourse to the Divine will, but denies that a reason for it need be sought. He then goes on to ask about the reason on the part of the objects of willing, as to why God wills one effect on account of another; he digresses through various opinions holding that merits are the reason for electing — such as those of Origen and the Pelagians — and, proceeding gradually, arrives at the denial of any cause or reason founded in our merits as deriving from nature. He distinguishes between them as they are effects in particular and in general. After this digression he replies to the second objection as follows: "Predestination has a reason on the part of the effect in general, namely the Divine goodness itself." And to the third he applies and expounds this as follows: "From the Divine goodness itself a reason can be taken for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others. For God is said to have made all things on account of his goodness, so that the Divine goodness might be represented in things." And shortly after: "God therefore willed, with respect to human beings, to represent his goodness in some whom he predestines, by way of mercy through pardoning, and in others whom he reprobates, by way of justice through punishing; and this is the reason why God chooses some and reprobates others." He assigns this cause by appealing to the Apostle at *Rom. 9*: *Desiring to show his wrath, that is, the vindication of justice, and to make known his power, he endured with great patience vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, in order to show the riches of his glory in vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory*. He goes on to amplify this reason with further testimonies from Paul, Matthew, and Augustine, and confirms it by the example of matter shaped by the will of God in one way or another.

Thus throughout this entire treatment of the question there is no proper argument by which it is proved that the election of the predestined is made without any foreseen merits. What one finds is a reason why some are elected and others reprobated, but not whether or how those who are elected were predestined by their merits or without them. One finds that the Divine goodness is manifested in predestining those through mercy by pardoning, and reprobating others by way of justice through punishing. But whether the predestined were elected before or after the foreknowledge of merits — this is not found proved. For this reason Henry of Ghent vigorously attacked St. Thomas's position, as can be seen in *Quodl. 4, q. 14*; *Quodl. 5, q. 5*; *Quodl. 8, q. 5*; and in Scotus at *1 d. 41, q. un., S. contra, n. 6*. For this reason Bacconus adheres to Henry in this passage of the *Sentences*, approving Henry's arguments because he found no valid arguments on the other side.

Scotus appears to have devised a more apt manner of proceeding and proving. He immediately seizes the question and demonstrates by an excellent a priori argument that God predestined human beings before and without any foreseen merits, arguing from the nature of end and means, which are so related to one another that the end is prior in the intention of the agent, moving the will, and destining the means toward obtaining the end in execution, out of love for it. This argument is certainly convincing. For who would doubt that the will is moved by the end and exists on account of the end? And that the end is not on account of the means, but the means on account of the end? As Aristotle teaches in *Metaphysics lib. 7, text 23*, and *Ethics lib. 3, c. 2* — though Mastrius cites it as *c. 8* — and in *lib. 6, c. 12*, whom the doctors follow by common consent, and which we shall demonstrate plainly when we examine this argument below. Certainly Lychetus and Tataretus in their commentaries here employ this argument as if it were the best. And indeed Scotus, content with it, sought no further argument, judging that the one drawn from the end was complete and invincible, and for that reason repeatedly employed it in his works, as we indicated above. Truly, as he proposes and directs it, that argument seems to me a beautiful demonstration. And these are the differences between St. Thomas and Scotus.

Section II: Whether Scotus's Position is the First, Which is the Angelic Doctor's? Or the Second, Which Henry Propounds? Or Some Middle One Between the Two?

The occasion for doubt was provided by Scotus himself when in *q. un. of dist. 41, S. potest aliter dici, n. 11* — having carefully set out both positions and confirmed them with their arguments — he says one may say otherwise, in such a way that he seemed to be bringing forward something new beyond the position of St. Thomas, as though he did not follow it, even though his position appeared to be the same as St. Thomas's. Furthermore, having recalled all three opinions — St. Thomas's, Henry's, and his own which he had made his own — he says: "Let that opinion be chosen which is more pleasing, and let the person holding it resolve the arguments of the other two." From this it is plain that he did not affirm either of the other two, but left them in the middle and suspended his own judgment about them.

I resolve this doubt as follows. Scotus follows the first position of St. Thomas in substance, but modified by him in such a way as to make it in some degree a different and distinctly his own position. This is proved, first, from Scotus himself in other passages where he propounds and proves only this position with no mention of Henry's contrary position — which is the best argument that, while tolerating Henry's position for others, he set the contrary one, that of St. Thomas, as the one to be followed for himself. Let us cite an apt passage from the *Reportata, d. 41, q. un., n. 7*, where he confirms and amplifies the position of predestination before the foresight of merits, referring back to what he had said in *1 d. 41* at the passage we have just treated, without so much as a

word about Henry's contrary opinion. After an excellent discussion in that question about the intention of the first known and willed end with respect to means, and about action and execution in obtaining the proposed end — having adduced the example of health as the first thing intended and last thing obtained through the means applied, in accordance with the teaching of Aristotle and Averroes — he proceeds to another example from charity at *dist.* 17, and says that God is not moved by any created good, but by his own proper good. Thus nothing is required for the divine act except his own essence and power. And in this way, he says, it is certain that God does not predestine on account of merits, nor reprobate on account of them, and thus there is no reason in God for predestining or reprobating; there is therefore nothing on God's side that is the entire reason for predestining or reprobating, except his essence and power. But whether from the part of the effect predestination has some reason or cause — that is, whether God pre-ordained to give the effect of predestination to someone on account of merits — is doubtful. "And as to this I say that there is some reason for reprobation, but none for predestination." There you see him affirming positively that there is no reason for predestination, just as he had stated in *1 d. 41, q. un., n. 1*, which he cites there. "But why," you will ask, "are proofs given elsewhere, and what is the conclusion?" He concludes: "He does not will Peter to be saved on account of merits as a reason for his willing, but rather conversely — because he wills the end to someone prior to anything ordered to the end. Hence in the first instant, after the volition of his own goodness, God wills beatitude, or the predestination of Peter, without any other reason for willing." Behold the resolution of the question with the same argument of the end willed in an orderly manner and of the means on account of it.

Furthermore, at n. 9, he resolves an argument drawn from a passage of Augustine in *lib. Octoginta trium quaestionum, q. 68*, and proves the Master's response, adding: "Merit is more an effect than a reason for predestination" — by which he manifestly signifies that he embraces St. Thomas's first position regarding free and gratuitous predestination before all foreseen merits, the contrary of the second position, which was Henry's, and that in this he does not differ at all from the Angelic Doctor.

There is another suitable testimony of this in *2 d. 20, q. 2*, where, disputing whether in the state of innocence only those who are now elect would have been born, at *S. dico quod soli, n. 2*, he excludes all merits and indeed places them as consequences and effects of predestination, employing the same celebrated argument of one who wills the end in an orderly manner. He thus places God willing beatitude freely for the predestined, and then places grace as the means for obtaining it, and proceeds on this assumption in his other works. All these testimonies, as I read and compare them, have fully persuaded me that Scotus held predestination before foreseen merits. I add that Scotus had no right to depart from this teaching of Augustine, to whom he always religiously adheres.

And if in that first passage in *1 Sent.*, d. 41, he gave readers the option of choosing Henry's second position, he did not on that account abandon his own, but gave readers that option in order that the other might not be considered improbable. Therefore I do not approve of the decision of those Scotists who preferred to follow the second, taking as their pretext the fact that Scotus left each reader free to follow whichever he wished. Such were Pontius, Faber, and Matthew of Veglia, whom Mastrius calls the Epitomist. They ought rather to have inquired more diligently into Scotus's mind in his other passages; had they done so carefully, they would have found it clearly expressed there, worthy of Scotus and of Augustine, as we shall show in the appropriate place. But led by private inclination, since they preferred a different opinion, they used this excuse to withdraw honorably from both authors — and we need not dwell longer on this.

What remains to be inquired is whether Scotus agrees entirely with St. Thomas or not. The reason for doubt is that Scotus divides his discussion into five opinions, whereas he should have numbered only two: St. Thomas's affirming, and the opposite one asserting, predestination after foreseen merits. Moreover, at *S. de istis opinionibus omnibus*, n. 13, the word "all" seems to indicate a number of opinions greater than two; and it is true that Scotus sensed this, for he plainly said at the end of the question "For the fifth opinion" — which cannot stand together with our claim that he agrees with St. Thomas in the position of predestination before foreseen merits. When reading Scotus I myself was uncertain how so many opinions could be contained in that discussion. I shall therefore first set out Scotus's text, explain his meaning, and subtly distinguish and enumerate those five opinions.

The first is that of Augustine at the beginning of his conversion, regarding initial faith, which is propounded by Scotus at *S. circa istam quaestionem*, n. 2, and which Augustine himself repeatedly retracted. The second is that of St. Thomas, found at n. 4: that there is no other cause of the predestination and reprobation of one rather than another except the divine will, because God works everything according to the good pleasure of his will, as Scotus says there in presenting St. Thomas's position. The third is Henry's, holding that the foreseen good use of free will was the cause of predestination, and the evil use of the same the cause of reprobation, so that on both sides there is a parallel: just as the reprobate was reprobated in view of his sins, so the predestined was predestined in view of his merits. The fourth is Scotus's own at n. 11, asserting that the predestined were elected without any cause on their part, but from God's gratuitous liberality; whereas the reprobate were not left without a cause of their damnation — that is, they were abandoned and reprobated on account of their foreseen sins — with that distinction arising from mercy toward the elect and from justice toward the reprobate. The fifth and last is rather an explication of this fourth than a new opinion, and it is placed at n. 12 after the objection beginning "Contra istud," where Scotus introduces, regarding predestination and reprobation, four instants of nature, two negative and two positive, with the

example of Judas, the foreknown, and Peter, the predestined; and there he notes the diverse processes of predestination and reprobation, and resolves arguments against this position, showing that the decree was made antecedently and independently of foreseen merits. This is the true account and just interpretation of Scotus in that question.

Now to the point. Does Scotus differ, and in what respect, from St. Thomas? He appears to differ both in substance and in reasoning. In substance, because St. Thomas referred both predestination of the elect and reprobation of the abandoned to the Divine will, seeking no other reason from the part of the elect or the reprobate. Scotus, however, distinguished between the two: regarding the predestined, he held that he was predestined without any cause or reason on his own part — and in this he agrees with St. Thomas — but regarding the foreknown he judged otherwise, namely that after the foresight of his final sin he was reprobated. Reprobation, then, comes not from the free will of God but from a cause found in the person, namely final sin. This was the difference in substance.

In reasoning, he differs regarding the first part, namely the predestination of the elect. St. Thomas referred this to the manifestation of Divine goodness and as a specimen of free donation, whereas Scotus preferred to refer it to the order of willing the end first and then the means on account of the end. St. Thomas placed the general reason for predestination and for the discrimination of these from others in its primordial source, the Divine will, to which he referred the whole business and concluded with the text: "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (*Matt. 20*). Scotus, however, distinctly separated the reason for predestining the elect from the reason for reprobating the foreknown: on the part of the predestined, merits play no role in the election, because it was a matter of grace and mercy; on the part of the foreknown, the final sin plays a fully determinative role, because positive reprobation was a punishment in justice. In this Scotus acquitted himself admirably; for in gratuitous benefactions no wrong is done to anyone by giving to one and not to another, especially since no one is in a state of merit in innocence, as we proved above with many testimonies from Augustine. But in the infliction of punishments, justice does not permit anyone to be punished without sin. Hence Augustine, though he often uses the text of Matthew about the laborers, always observes that both the predestined and the foreknown are debtors, since they are in original sin within the condemned mass. Hence the foreknown is left in the state of damnation in which he already was, and that damnation is not inflicted positively by the divine will through a positive act of reprobation except after the foresight of final sin, as we shall teach afterward with the same Augustine and Scotus.

From this it follows that Henry and Aureolus — whom Cajetan cites in his commentary on *a. 5 of q. 23, 1 p.* — attack St. Thomas's position as alien to divine justice and equity. And although Cajetan there attempts to free St. Thomas, he

labors in vain; indeed he condemns his own master through inadvertence. For having conceded that to punish is an act of justice, in the exercise of which the free will has no place, so that it is not lawful for a man to act according to his own pleasure but according to another's sin, he affirms, in order to defend St. Thomas, that the text expressly states that God did not punish those he reprobated from his own free will. But I marvel that Cajetan says this is found in St. Thomas's text; having read it carefully and attentively, I did not find this particular regarding reprobation and punishment on account of demerits and sins.

Let us examine St. Thomas's words, lest anyone think I speak rashly. St. Thomas seems to hint at this argument from justice in three places. First, in the reply to the second objection, where he writes: "God willed, with respect to human beings, in the case of some whom he predestines, to represent his goodness by way of mercy through pardoning, and in the case of some whom he reprobates, by way of justice through punishing." These two — to pardon and to punish — have one and the same cause, namely the goodness of God; there is no further mention of sin on the part of the reprobate. You will object that the Doctor implies this through the phrase "by way of justice through punishing" — but this is not explicitly stated in the text, as Cajetan says, and can therefore be denied, since the sole cause assigned for the same thing is God's goodness. Certainly goodness does not seem to combine well with punishment.

In a second place Cajetan seems to be supported by the phrase: "Nor is there on this account any iniquity with God if he prepares unequal things for unequal persons" — where it is implied that the predestined and the reprobate are equal in something, namely in original sin. But this is not expressly stated in the text, as Cajetan says. Moreover, this interpretation is not consistent with the meaning of St. Thomas, who immediately adds: "For this would be contrary to the nature of justice if the effect of predestination were rendered as something owed and not given as grace." Notice that he does not have recourse to the sin of the reprobate, but to the grace given to the predestined; and to the latter he attributes the reason for the discrimination, drawing from it the cause of what was not owed to both. But our question is not about the cause of why no injustice is done in predestining one, but why no injustice is done in punishing the other. This was the place to have recourse to the foreknowledge of sin in the reprobate. But St. Thomas did not express this, content with the reason taken from gratuitous predestination.

In a third place Cajetan perhaps relies on the following words: "In those things that are given from grace, one can give to whom one wishes, more or less, provided one withholds from no one what is owed without prejudice to justice." But these words do not help Cajetan — they in fact greatly harm him — because they deal with giving and withholding gratuitous gifts, which are owed to no one and are dispensed freely and liberally: not with inflicting punishments, which

pertain to punishment; for these are determined not according to the free judgment of the one deciding and punishing, but according to the demerits and sins of offenders. The reprobate do not complain that they did not receive grace, but that they receive punishment. To this complaint St. Thomas did not respond in the text, at least not explicitly as Cajetan says — and this is why his teaching is sharply attacked by Henry, Aureolus, and others.

But the Thomists will complain of me for having argued so minutely and precisely against Cajetan. I would not have done so had he not so often comported himself against Scotus on the most trivial grounds. I give like for like and vindicate my own Doctor, whose case for both parts — grace toward the predestined without any foreseen reason from merits, and justice toward the reprobate on account of foreseen sin — is admirably and clearly defended: as anyone will see who reads that unique question from n. 11 to the end, where Scotus refers predestination to the free and gratuitous will of God electing whomever he chose for glory, and refers the reprobation of the foreknown to divine justice on account of foreseen sins.

Thus in St. Thomas, the reason for both is the will and goodness of God, from which he concludes at *a. 5*: "And this is what the householder says in *Matt. 20*: *Take what is yours and go. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?*" In Scotus, by contrast, different reasons are assigned for predestination and reprobation, one of grace and one of justice. For he says in *S. potest aliter dici*: "The same process is not assigned for predestination and reprobation, by which all goods are attributed principally to God and all evils to us; and thus for God to predestine without reason is fitting to his goodness. But for him immediately to will damnation does not seem attributable to him with respect to an object known in its pure natural state, but only with respect to an object as known in final mortal sin."

Section III: The Positions of St. Thomas and Scotus on the Causes of Predestination and Reprobation Are Compared

It is not my purpose to attack St. Thomas's position together with Henry and Aureolus, as though it contained some injustice, since he is a light of the Church from whom light is to be received rather than shadows cast upon him. My only intention is to observe that he spoke less clearly and perspicuously on this matter, and that he gave those who attack it some foothold which Scotus wholly removed. For I know that in *1 p., a. 3, q. 25*, in the reply to the second objection, he said that reprobation differs in causation from predestination, and there assigns the fault arising from the free will of the one reprobated as the reason why he is deserted by grace. He says the same in the reply to the third objection. He teaches the same in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans *c. 9*, which Cajetan cites at *a. 5, S. ad quartum*. I add the testimony from *1 Sent., d. 40, a. 1*, which Cajetan omitted. I have taken only this much: to vindicate Scotus, who placed his position as distinct from St. Thomas's; and if it is altogether expressed

on both sides — both predestination and reprobation — as Cajetan maintains, then Scotus's position coincides with it, and Scotus was wrong to assert that his opinion differs from St. Thomas's.

But I am raising a new dispute for myself. For if St. Thomas so distinguished between the two causes — of the predestined and of the reprobate — as Cajetan wishes, and as we have said in his defense, then Scotus's cause fails, and we are overcome together with him, and it was pointless — indeed unjust — to have refuted Cajetan. I reply that I am not for the moment examining what is St. Thomas's definitive position on this matter, about which the Thomists dispute among themselves, the majority of whom do not admit this distinction between the causes of predestination and reprobation, as we shall say below. What I am undertaking to show is only that St. Thomas proceeded less clearly and perspicuously on this matter than Scotus, and that from this arose the fact that Thomists pull him toward the meaning that Henry and Aureolus attack, as will appear in its proper place below. I prove this from the very words of the texts. For St. Thomas referred that diversity equally to the same principle of providence and the Divine will, as though these were its primary source. This is apparent because in *a. 3*, in the body, he writes: "God reprobates some, for as was said above, predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit some defect in the things subject to it, as was said above — namely in *q. 12, a. 2*. And therefore, since through Divine providence human beings are ordered to eternal life, it also pertains to Divine providence to permit certain people to fall short of this end." Let the reader now attend: "Just as predestination is a part of providence with respect to those who are divinely ordered to eternal salvation, so reprobation includes the will to permit someone to fall into fault and to inflict the punishment of damnation for that fault." Notice the word "just as," which indicates a certain similarity and equality in referring both of these effects to providence and the Divine will.

Furthermore, St. Thomas's argument is taken from the universal cause governing the world through his general providence, arising from the Divine goodness, so that it may be represented in many ways in things — a multiformity of degrees which God, in order to preserve in things, permits evils to occur lest many goods be impeded, as he holds in *a. 5*, reply to the second objection. But this reasoning seems less sound, because such evils of fault are not intended by God or by the Divine will, nor do they pertain to his goodness. For if monsters are not intended by nature and are beside the order of nature, how will these moral monsters pertain to the Divine goodness and to the order of supernatural providence? Even granting that they do pertain: why did God ordain fewer goods than evils? Far fewer human beings are saved than are damned. This seems to conflict with Divine goodness, which ought to have extended its providence to saving more than it damns.

Moreover, the permission of sin is not the immediate and direct aim of Divine goodness or providence; but rather the positive manifestation of the good, both natural and moral, and the governance of the universe — in which is included the allowance of causes to operate according to their own nature and judgment; from which, if it follows that they abuse that goodness and freedom in their operation, then it pertains to Divine providence not to impede them, and indeed to concur with them in their physical acts according to what is material in the sin, not what is formal. Furthermore, it also pertains to the same providence and goodness to order those evils arising from permission toward the common good of the universe and other ends intended by God — as Augustine customarily says, that he makes goods out of evils rather than permits there to be no evils at all.

Furthermore, that permission of sin in the reprobate is not intended absolutely, but on the supposition that he is found in the condemned mass with original sin, to which is annexed the negation of grace, and consequently the fall into sins, and after the fall, damnation — as Augustine rightly teaches — lest God seem to permit final sin without any antecedent just cause for the permission. Thus the cause of negative reprobation and of further permission of sin does not arise immediately from God's goodness or absolute free will, but from the foresight of the state within the condemned mass; from which it follows, with a kind of connatural consequence, so to speak, that a man left to himself and infected with original sin will come at last to damnation. In the opposite case, Augustine most acutely saw a defect of justice and a grievance of the reprobate: because unless these condemned persons had been thrown into that mass through contracted sin, they could not, without some injustice and grievance, be abandoned and deprived of grace, since they would be suited and fit for salvation, and it would appear that God in that case was an acceptor of persons, choosing one from among the suitable and leaving another — which we showed above from Augustine.

St. Thomas seems to proceed differently in this question. Making no mention of this reasoning, he places predestination and reprobation and refers them both to providence as intending and permitting, and in his own position adopts these words: "Why he chose these for glory and reprobated those has no explanation except the Divine will." He does intend, of course, the state of original sin and the privation of grace, which prevented the reprobate or the abandoned from grace and glory. And though the one who is elected was in the same state, God willed to free him and was unwilling to free the other, who was abandoned — yet he did not reprobate him without cause, since he was in the state of perdition in the condemned mass. He was not in that state through the divine will. Hence the difference is apparent: the will to free came from God alone, but the will to reprobate did not come from God alone, since the state of perdition was presupposed. Thus the will to free placed grace in the elect; but the will to

reprobate did not place the cause of reprobation in the non-elect — it found it there.

It adds to this that the example St. Thomas adduces does not seem apt for explaining this matter, and for this reason Henry and Aureolus attack it, as Cajetan reports. The example is that of Prime Matter, of which a reason can be assigned in natural things — since it is entirely uniform in itself — for why one part of it is under the form of fire and another under the form of earth, as constituted by God in the beginning, so that there may be a diversity of species in natural things. "But why this part of matter is under this form and that one under another depends on the simple divine will, just as it depends on the simple will of the craftsman that this stone is in this part of the wall and that one in another part, although the reason of the craft requires that some be in this part and some in that." These two comparisons do not seem fitting. Not the first: because matter is suited to all forms and by its nature indifferent to all of them. But human beings in the condemned mass were ill-suited and not indifferent with respect to salvation and damnation; hence their being placed in glory and in punishment did not come from the will of God alone. The second is even less fitting, because not all stones are entirely equal or similar in their fitness for a place in the structure, since some are more apt and better than others for occupying this or that position in building; hence the craftsman adapts himself to their shape and hardness, and sometimes shapes them by hand and mallet so that they fit into the building. Finally, as Henry objects, in matter and in a stone there can be no other difference or disposition beyond what they have from nature; but in human beings, since they are rational and free creatures, there can be found — and in reality is found — on their part a diverse proportion and disposition according to their innate reason and freedom. Moreover, a human being is sentient to punishment, while matter and stone are insensible; hence nothing of pain or torment comes to these latter, while to the former comes the heavy and intolerable burden of eternal punishment. Hence a very different judgment must be made of each.

I am not unaware that two replies can be made to me by the Thomists. The first is that examples do not require complete proportion, and that in the proximate cases St. Thomas only wished to accommodate the likeness of free will — both God's in choosing forms for matter and the craftsman's in choosing stones for the building — which likeness does hold with respect to the matter under discussion, namely the free predestination of human beings. But against this reply there stands the disproportion of the examples to the purpose, which must be attended to when positing examples; if they fall short of this, they are inapt. And St. Thomas's purpose was to show that the election and discrimination made by God between the predestined and the reprobate is just and reasonable: but this is not achieved by the examples, because human beings are capable of meriting and demerit, as free agents whose freedom must be taken into account — a purpose that does not apply to prime matter or to

stones, which are neither rational nor free. The second reply is that St. Paul is asserted in support of St. Thomas, in *Romans c. 9*, where Paul uses the example of the potter making some vessels for honor and some for dishonor, with no consideration of human freedom. I reply that this example of the Apostle, which Augustine frequently employs, presupposes the mass of clay representing that condemned mass which, as it lies abandoned, representing the stock of Adam fallen into original sin and destined for punishment by the force of the infecting fault, proceeds rightly — from it one vessel is chosen for honor, another for dishonor. Thus the Apostle is speaking allegorically, understanding by the lying mass the condemned state of human nature, from which God chose some for predestination to beatitude, leaving others unsuited and subject to condemnation, thus doing wrong to none.

The examples St. Thomas adduces are in a different position; since their application differs when their natural and proper sense is retained without a metaphorical one, they cannot be accommodated to a lot so unequal — especially since St. Thomas has recourse only to God's will and goodness. If goodness were the rule to be laid down for predestination, far more would have to be predestined than reprobated, for this would befit God's goodness. But so great a multitude of the damned and so small a number of the predestined bespeak the severity of punishing justice rather than the goodness of liberating mercy.

Section IV: Whether Predestination is an Act of the Intellect or of the Will?

This is the second difference between St. Thomas and Scotus, as we noted above; it is now necessary to inquire which of the two positions is closer to the truth. In order to make this clear without dispute and prolixity, let us adopt the following counsel: we shall deal here only with the mind of Augustine, so that his judgment may be taken as settled in advance, and we shall reserve the full question for another place where it will be treated *ex professo*.

With regard to the act of the intellect, Augustine seems to have placed formal predestination and decided in favor of St. Thomas. This is proved by St. Thomas at *1 p., q. 23, a. 1 and 2*, from the fact that it is a part of providence, and a passage from Augustine is adduced in the third argument: "Predestination is the preparation of the benefits of God." After the argument there is placed another text of the same Augustine: "Predestination is the foreknowledge of the benefits of God." Both are cited from *c. 14 of lib. de Dono perseuerantiae, c. 14, tom. 7*, where Augustine has: "This predestination of the saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God by which those are most certainly set free, whoever are set free." Here foreknowledge and preparation are placed — that is, speculative and practical knowledge, which is the proper and germane character of providence.

Another passage is in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, c. 10, where: "By predestination God foreknew what he himself was going to do." Behold predestination in foreknowledge. Again in the same work, c. 17: "The elect were chosen before the foundation of the world by that predestination in which God foreknew his own future acts." Here again he places foreknowledge in predestination. Furthermore, c. 7 of *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.* joins foreknowing and predestining, adducing Paul's testimony from *Rom. 8*: *Whom he foreknew, he also predestined*. And at the end of the chapter: "The reprobate are not distinguished from the mass of perdition by foreknowledge and predestination." He interweaves both. C. 9 of the same, concerning the elect: "Truly the sons of God are foreknown and predestined." And plainly in *lib. de Dono perseuerantiae*, c. 17: "To dispose his future works in that foreknowledge of his which cannot be deceived or changed — this and nothing else is to predestine." From this the author of the book *de Praedest. et Gratia*, among the works of Augustine, took at c. 5, treating of predestination: "Before he made us, he foreknew us, and in that very foreknowledge, while he had not yet made us, he chose us. To choose in foreknowledge — what is this but to predestine by foreknowing?"

I pass over other testimonies from Augustine, but there is one I cannot omit in support of St. Thomas's position, from c. 18, *lib. de Dono perseuerantiae*, at the beginning: "Sometimes this predestination is signified also by the name foreknowledge, as the Apostle says: *God has not cast away his people whom he foreknew* (*Rom. 11*). From this it is apparent that foreknowledge is sometimes taken by Augustine for predestination.

Of all, in my judgment, the most excellent passage is *lib. de Correct. et grat.*, c. 9, where: "All those therefore who in the most provident disposition of God are foreknown, predestined, justified, and glorified." This seems to contain and clinch the matter. Yet the opposite position is the genuine one of St. Augustine, who constitutes predestination in the discriminating election from the condemned mass, before which all were equal in the state of damnation and so seen by God through his knowledge. Hence in the knowledge preceding this discriminating election formal predestination cannot be placed; nor in that which follows election, since this is the knowledge of vision and absolutely presupposes the elective discrimination. Therefore formal predestination consists in that election between the two kinds of knowledge.

This is clear from Augustine in many passages. I shall first bring forward some that are perspicuous. In *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, c. 7: "God chose in his Son before the foundation of the world through the election of grace. For they were not called in such a way as to be not elect, but they were called according to the purpose." In this "purpose" — which is Paul's term from *Rom. 8* — he constitutes predestination. This purpose is the same as election; this is what Augustine uses six hundred times in that book to signify the discriminating election of the predestined from the reprobate: for he always calls the latter "called but not

according to purpose," and the former "called according to purpose." And that this word "purpose" signifies the will is evident not only from the name itself, but also from what he adds in the same place: "They were called according to purpose, but the purpose was not their own but God's." The word "purpose" here signifies not the knowledge of a human being but the will; for "according to knowledge" does not fit a human being — "according to the will" does. For how can foreknowledge of one's own predestination belong to a human being?

In the same work, *c. 9*, he uses the same phrase many times, saying: "Whom he predestined, he called according to purpose." And he follows Paul: *Called, justified, glorified*. Similar passages are found in the same work, *c. 12 and 13*. He preserves the same formula in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, *c. 16 and 17*, where he says: "By that calling according to purpose" — note "by that," where there is emphasis. By that one, namely, on which everything depends, to which everything is referred, which was prepared from eternity for the predestined and will be manifested in time. Augustine's books are full of this "purpose," as are those bearing his name, such as the book *de Praedest. et Grat.* and the *Hypognosticon*. There is therefore no need to go further seeking passages; they will open themselves to the reader and come without being called.

Let us bring forward additional testimonies. In *c. 10* he says: "Predestination without foreknowledge cannot exist; but foreknowledge can exist without predestination." He then continues: "For God can also foreknow what he himself does not do, as for example all sins." From this an argument is formed: foreknowledge extends even to sins, but the purpose and will of choosing cannot extend to sins, only to goods of virtue and grace. Therefore predestination is not foreknowledge — which applies to sins — but applies to virtues and grace, of which predestination consists in purpose and will. Therefore God does not predestine through that which coexists with sin, but through that which destroys sin. This is the Divine will; therefore predestination is to be constituted in it. Moreover, the efficacious calling of God does not arise from foreknowledge, since foreknowledge is indifferent in itself to choosing and not choosing; hence election and discrimination belong to the purpose of the will alone.

Another argument is taken from a passage of Augustine at *c. 16*, where: "According to election they are beloved for the sake of the fathers." Now surely those enemies themselves are elect and beloved? By no means. Certainly love belongs to the will. Now he is dealing here with the reprobate enemies and the predestined beloved; therefore they are predestined through love, and therefore through the will. This is likewise proved from the converse: just as the reprobate, as sons of wrath and sons of hell, are reprobated through hatred as enemies, according to that text so often cited by Augustine — *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated* — so from this it is clear that predestination is achieved through love and reprobation through hatred.

In the same passage, a little further on, Augustine: "Election followed; it is there that the beloved for the sake of the fathers are to be understood." Then in c. 8 he adduces the excellent passage of Paul to the Ephesians: *He who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ, even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him in love.* Behold — love, the affection of the will. Again: *Having predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will.* The whole of this, as Augustine says, is: "This I will, this is just." He continues with Paul: *to make known to us the mystery of his will.* Then: *According to his good pleasure which he purposed in him.* And a little later: *Having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will.* And below: *According to the good pleasure of his will* — lest in so great a benefit of grace we glory in the good pleasure of our own will; from will, will is derived, and since it is not ours, it must be divine. I omit other passages, which are so numerous in this book and in those following that we would have to transcribe them all if we wished to adduce them here. And though in most of these passages Augustine is endeavoring to prove that election is not from merits but from the free will of God against the Pelagians, yet in proving this he sufficiently expresses that election is not foreknowledge; for if foreknowledge were predestination, an occasion would be given for erring by thinking that predestination is made from foreseen merits, which is a new proof of the same thing. For if Augustine placed formal election in foreknowledge, he would be confirming the error of the Pelagians by saying that foreseen merits are the reason for election.

Foreknowledge is also excluded in another way: because, as we touched upon above, it only shows the various means by which God can save human beings, and so is common to all, and determines nothing — since it proposes reasons apt for saving all, if God wills to use these or those means — as Augustine observes in *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum*. Hence knowledge is by itself indifferent to all; but the will, which determines the knowledge of means and applies them to those it wills and those it chooses and loves, formally predestines. Thus knowledge is not election, but only shows the ways by which the elect attain the end destined for them through the will, which chooses one over another by willing beatitude to one and not to another. Therefore, since foreknowledge conforms to its object, which it knows necessarily and not freely, just as it does not determine itself to one rather than another, so it extends to and pervades all, and awaits what the will is to determine: which, from that common presentation of human beings and means, chooses those it wills according to its freedom, determining those ways by which the elect will attain the glory of their end.

Having seen and observed this, Scotus judged with Augustine that formal predestination consists in an act of the will, not of the intellect.

There is also an excellent passage from St. Prosper for understanding the mind of Augustine; for he certainly understood Augustine's meaning regarding

predestination just as Prosper received it. Prosper plainly holds that predestination consists in an act of the will, not of the intellect. For in his *Responses to the objections of the Gauls*, obj. 14, he writes: "The unbelief of infidels who do not believe is to be referred not to God's constitution but to foreknowledge" — where you see him opposing predestination to foreknowledge and calling predestination a "constitution," that is, a will, which does not determine an evil such as unbelief. And below: "He is equally in error who refers the unbelief of the impious to God's constitution, and he who does not profess God as the author of the faith and righteousness of the saints." Behold "constitution" again, which signifies the decree of the will in predestination, as though it were predestination itself. This is the sense in which Augustine speaks, as Prosper received him.

It is true that Augustine also takes predestination broadly and extensively, as encompassing the whole business of foreknowledge, preparation, providence, direction, and election; and in this way he involves foreknowledge and providence. Nor does Scotus deny this, and to this belong the passages from Augustine produced in support of St. Thomas's position. I observe, however, that in this discussion I have not mentioned the knowledge of vision, because this, as it follows election and the purpose of the will, can in no way be a cause or motivating reason for it, but only contemplates and sees things already predestined and decreed by God, and pertains to the execution of them, knowing as future what God absolutely decreed — while how those merits, absolutely future and foreseen, stand in relation to the divine will as it elects and predestines is a different question, reserved for its proper place.

Furthermore, it is to be carefully observed that the predestined are also said by Augustine to be foreknown, because although they are chosen in preference to others, they are nonetheless also foreknown — once they have been predestined by God, they are also foreseen as going to obtain salvation in preference to others, and this indeed through absolute knowledge, which knows before execution that these will be saved in preference to others; and so they are foreknown or foreknown in two senses: in one, signifying the priority of future time to present time, of prevision to the execution of the thing; in another, signifying the priority of the election of one over another, since this one is foreknown as predestined and not that one.

Whether the predestined can also be called foreknown with respect to the conditioned knowledge antecedent to the decree or purpose pre-determining determinately this person over another, in the second sense of election, is a greater matter of doubt; for that knowledge, as we said, is indifferent in representing and proposing all ways and reasons for calling and saving whomever God wills. Yet the predestined can also be called foreknown in this sense, because he was so elected as he had been foreseen as capable of being elected, since the will so chose him as the intellect had foreseen that he could be

predestined. For he was elected by the absolute decree in the manner in which the intellect had shown that he could be predestined. The predestined are called foreknown in *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*, c. 7 and 9; in *lib. de Dono perseuerantiae*, c. 7 and 8, where, following *Quos praesciuit et praedestinavit* from *Ephesians 1* and *Non repulit Deus plebem suam quam praesciuit* from *Rom. 11*, Augustine defines predestination as foreknowledge, for the reason we have stated.

It is therefore with good reason that Scotus, following Augustine, placed formal predestination in an act of the Divine will and not of the intellect — as does also John Bacconus, a distinguished theologian, in *1 d. 41, q. un., a. 2*, where: "I say that predestination is the effective and eternal willing of God ordering a creature to eternal life."

Nor should the Thomists oppose their celebrated act of command, which they affirm to be in the intellect by way of that which ultimately applies and directs the will, and which they also say is necessary for executing the election of the free will. For this act, even if it is admitted to some extent in creatures, certainly should not be admitted in God, as Vázquez (*1 p., d. 87, c. 3*), Suárez (*lib. 1, de praedest., c. 16*), Arrubal (*d. 63, c. 3*), and Alarcón (*tr. 4, d. 1, c. 3*) show — because the divine will is most perfectly free and omnipotent, and has infinite and complete power over all things by reason of its supreme and most perfect dominion, as the Divine Scriptures signify, attributing to the Divine will this kind of infinite and most perfect power; furthermore, this act of command already presupposes election and the purpose of the will. But we are not at present at liberty to dispute about this matter according to plan; we shall do so at another time more fittingly.

COLLATION XI, DISTINCTION III

On the Name, Matter, and Doctrine of Predestination

Preface

A preface is both necessary and fitting here. Reverence and piety are required. Just as it is true that we must work out our salvation in fear and trembling, so it is likewise true that the doctrine pertaining to salvation must be taught in fear and trembling. This school is remote from the senses of the flesh, says Augustine in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, c. 8, — the school in which the Father is heard and teaches. Similar to it is the school in which Peter, remote from flesh and blood, learned from the Father the divinity of Christ. Each is an arcane mystery, removed from the senses of the flesh: the one containing the generation of the divine Son, the other the adoption of sons through grace.

Augustine cries out again in the same chapter: "This school is very far removed from the senses of the flesh, in which God is heard and teaches." He signifies that the doctrine handed down in it pertains more to revelation than to disputation. The same Augustine signifies this in the same work, when speaking of those who

attempted to comprehend predestination by the human mind: "They grow dark," he says, "in the question of the predestination of the saints. From the flesh comes that darkness." To dispel it, Augustine has recourse to revelation: "God will reveal," he says. And again: "Let them pray to him who gives understanding; he will reveal" — in the same work and chapter.

The sense in which this deep and secret arcanum of God is to be grasped, the same author taught in his letter to Valentinus and the Brothers — which is placed before the *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*: "Then he opened their understanding to understand the scriptures" (*Luke 24*). And he exhorts students to pray: "Pray that you may understand wisely." And again in *lib. de Dono perseverantiae, c. ult.*: "Let them pray that he may be their interior teacher, from whose face come knowledge and understanding."

I carefully observe this in Augustine: that though he was most gifted and most learned, in this question he did not wish to use the subtleties at which he excelled and which he had used in other controversies against the Manichaeans, Arians, and Donatists, but rather convinced his adversaries, the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, solely with testimonies from the Scriptures and the Fathers. For he knew that in the matter of predestination and grace, natural arguments avail nothing; and just as nature contributes nothing of merit toward the gifts of grace, which are given entirely freely by God without regard to the merit of nature, so natural arguments drawn from human understanding and devised by natural ingenuity contribute little toward understanding the mysteries of the same grace. Thus both the gift and the doctrine of predestination and grace do not depend on the disposition or knowledge of nature.

Hence in *lib. de Corrept. et Grat., c. 4*: "Allow me to contend against those who think earthly things — that is, the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians — or rather against human thoughts themselves, for the truth of heavenly and divine grace." And in *lib. 2, contra Iulianum, c. ult.*, near the end, he remonstrates with him, because Julian despised the Fathers and holy men on the grounds that — as Julian said — they cannot judge concerning dogmas according to the categories of Aristotle, as though the truths of the mysteries of grace were contained in them. And indeed Julian wanted natural reason to be applied first to exploring them, as is clear from his words in *lib. 1, contra eundem, c. 7*, placing it before Scripture and the holy Fathers whom Augustine set against him. Certainly whoever consults and heeds nature does not find the truth. Pelagius sought grace in nature, as is apparent from Augustine's writings — especially in *lib. de natura et gratia* and another *de gratia Christi* — yet could not find it there.

The truth of original sin Julian sought in nature, attempting to explore its depths through natural reason and to find the stain of that sin there; and not finding it by natural reason, he cried out in *lib. 2, de Nuptiis et Concupiscentia, c. 18*: "Through what crack does sin pervade the soul?" While Augustine cried out in the same place: "Why do you seek a crack? When you have a wide-open door:

Through one man sin entered the world, says the Apostle." It was in Scripture, not in nature. Truth — I mean this, though the sin was also in nature, where it had its object of doctrine — but the doctrine about the object was not there. In Scripture was the doctrine; hence Julian was going astray from the door, because he did not enter through the door. That truth was not of nature but of Scripture.

This is to be observed with care: the reason that the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians erred was that they wished to reduce the truths of predestination and grace to the accounts of natural reason in a paltry way, and they were deceived in this, because they forced faith to serve natural ingenuity, whereas they ought on the contrary to have taken every thought captive in obedience to faith. Whatever seemed alien to natural reason, they judged to be false. Let us show this more diligently, that it may be clear how truly Augustine said that this school is remote and alien from the senses of the flesh.

What could be more natural than to say that human nature, created and established by God, has natural powers for acting well and holily, and therefore suffices for itself toward salvation? — as Pelagius maintained before Augustine in *lib. de Natura et Gratia*. Yet this was alien to the school of grace. What is more conformable to natural sense than to deny that original sin committed by another is transmitted to posterity who did not yet exist, and that by it the whole of nature is infected and corrupted? — as Pelagius and Caelestius themselves said in that work *de natura et gratia* and in *lib. de peccato originali* before Augustine. Yet this was entirely alien to Christ's school. What is more congruent with natural discourse than to deny the contraction of guilt and to posit instead imitation, and thus to explain the passage of Paul — that all sinned in Adam — because we imitate him by sinning, not because we contract his sin? — as those same heretics affirmed. Yet how remote is this from the Christian school?

What is more fitting to natural reason than to exempt infants from that original harm, to place them in pure or integral nature, liable to no sin, to deny that they are children of wrath, and to refuse to acknowledge them as under the power of the Devil? Yet this was inconsistent with Catholic truth. What is more consonant with human opinion — and the knowledge of God? "O man, who are you to answer back to God?" — *Rom. 9* — than to make concupiscence an innate property of a human being, constituted in its movements according to the natural constitution and in no way repugnant to the higher parts of the soul? This Julian asserted in so many books written against Augustine. Nonetheless this was abhorrent from Church doctrine.

What is more conformable to philosophy than to say that good moral works performed without grace contain a certain honorableness and goodness that disposes one toward grace, and in view of which God would bestow grace on a philosopher or gentile — as Julian wished to persuade Augustine? Yet this was not according to the norm of Christian theology. What is more plausible in secular schools than to hold that in corrupted nature, through the sin of the first

man, the faculty of striving toward supernatural salvation has not been weakened, and that therefore there dwell in us natural powers to posit the beginning of merit in nature, to which grace would be rendered? — which was the position of the Semi-Pelagians, as we find in Prosper and Hilary in their letters to Augustine preceding the books *de praedestinatione Sanctorum* and *de dono perseuerantiae*. Yet this was a manifest heresy alien from the doctrine of grace.

Many such cases exist, which I pass over lest I be too lengthy. These suffice to show that the mysteries of divine predestination and grace are not to be measured by natural reason. These are things higher and more hidden than can be found or comprehended by our intellect, dulled as it is by mortal clay, without the grace of God. Accordingly the schools of flesh and spirit are different; of nature and grace; of reason and faith. The innate light of nature is one thing, that infused by grace is another. In these divine mysteries of arcane wisdom, those things that are and appear easy, light, evident, and clear are full of danger and alien from truth; while those things that are and appear obscure, difficult, dark, recondite, and enveloped in darkness are safe and true and conformable to Sacred Doctrine. Do not think highly of yourself here, but fear, O reader: let yourself not be persuaded that what pleases the senses, what attracts philosophy, what delights the mind, what provokes the intellect, is therefore true and divine. Exclaim with the Apostle: *O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! O man, who are you to answer back to God?* With these and similar utterances, Augustine, the most gifted of mortals, customarily resolves questions about predestination and grace.

Section I: Etymology and Definition; the Subject Matter of Predestination

What in Greek is called *proorisis* is in Latin called *praedestinatio* — predestination — and is customarily taken in various senses. Since it is composed of *Prae* and *Destino*, whatever the verb *destino* signifies is derived into the verb *praedestino*. *Destinare* is used in many ways among authors, both profane and sacred: to deliberate, to constitute, to predetermine, to designate, to assign, to order. It is a word pertaining to the action of the mind by which one determines to do something external. It is never taken by itself for external action alone, except in Plautus, who took *destino* for "to sell" — which certainly is not without force, as it placed the power of predestining in the mind. Hence St. Thomas and those who follow him at *q. 23, 1 p., a. 1* take "to transmit" or "to send" not as meaning external mission or transmission alone, but as conjoined with the deliberation of the one sending — so that it always has regard to the mind of the one destining. Hence a place and a time are said to be destined for a work; hence a man is said to be destined for an office, for a punishment; and what we think, deliberate, and determine to do, we destine in mind and spirit. Paul rendered this sense sacred in *2 Cor. 9: Each one as he has purposed in his heart*. Hence Alexander of Hales at *1 p., q. 28, M, n., a. 1* put it for "to define." Nor did St.

Thomas deny this; for in *q. 6, de veritate, a. 1*, he said: "The name predestination imports the direction of some being to an end." And the same he affirmed in *1 d. 40, q. 2, a. 1*. Scotus likewise took predestination in this signification in *1 d. 40 and 41*, placing it in the purpose of the will for this reason, as we said above; and he expressed this in *dist. 41, q. un., n. 11* by the example of one who wills the end in an orderly manner. About this signification, then, there is agreement.

But since the preposition *Prae* indicates antecedence, and this can be of three kinds — of time, of dignity, and of causality — we must see which of the three it imports. The Salmanticenses wish all three to be imported, in *tract. 5, de Praedest., disp. 1, dub. 1, §* — and they prove this by the authority of St. Thomas. Commonly, however, it is taken for the antecedence of eternity with respect to time, as Vázquez observes at *disp. 87, c. 5, n. 21*, and Suárez at *lib. 1, c. 1, n. 5*, citing Alexander of Hales and Durandus.

Augustine teaches us two things: one common, one distinctive. The common one: that the word predestination signifies the purpose of God choosing from eternity those whom he mercifully willed. About this, in *lib. de Corrept. et Grat., c. 7*: "He chose them before the foundation of the world," and those whom he called in *c. 6* "ordained to eternal life" he speaks of in similar passages using the verb *praedestinare*. And in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, he explains the election of the elect before the foundation of the world with the same verb. He also understands those words of John 14 — *Father, glorify me with the glory which I had with you before the world was* — concerning the eternal predestination of Christ, and refers that text to eternal predestination in the same passage. This is the common point. The mixed point is that this preposition *Prae* implies the antecedence of eternity with respect to time, so that this *Prae* excludes time and posits eternity. The distinctive point is this: that it is taken in such a way that this *Prae* entails the exclusion of certain persons from whom God discriminated the elect whom he destined to glory. This is the germane and proper signification of Augustine, who teaches that God chose from the condemned mass those whom he mercifully willed to save by liberating them, leaving the others in the state of damnation in which they were in that common mass infected with original sin. Hence predestination at once indicates mercy in destining the elect to glory, and judgment in omitting the abandoned. It is on account of this discrimination of these over others that those chosen are called predestined in the properly Augustinian sense — certainly much more aptly than that other meaning which Pennottus brings forward in *lib. 6, propugnaculi, c. 1, n. 6*, where defending Catharinus — attacked by Soto — he says that the name predestination refers that antecedence to the inefficacious will of God common to both predestined and reprobate; for while the latter were willed inefficaciously, the former were chosen efficaciously. This interpretation is certainly alien from his master Augustine, whose meaning he often perverts through excessive zeal for defending freedom. For Augustine did not distinguish those wills.

The true Augustinian sense is that the predestined are so called because they were in the condemned mass, where all were destined for damnation, and were mercifully chosen over others and predestined to salvation. About this, in *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*, c. 7: "They perished — that is, the abandoned — they were not discriminated from that mixture which is known to be condemned. From these the predestined are distinguished, not by their own merits but through the grace of the mediator." And below: "All who by the generosity of this divine grace were discriminated from that original damnation." Behold the predestined — to whom he shortly after applies that text of Paul: *Whom he foreknew, he also predestined* — and henceforward calls "predestined" and "elect" those who were so discriminated. And in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, c. 12: "They are distinguished from the rest, that they may belong to the liberator of humanity." That passage at c. 7 of *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*, toward the end, contains the whole matter: "They are not distinguished from that mass of perdition by the foreknowledge and predestination of God." The meaning of the term is thus established.

The more laborious question is whether predestination is always taken in the better sense and whether it can also be taken in the worse sense. It is certain that it is most commonly taken in the better sense. Nor need we show this; for the predestined are properly called the elect, whereas the reprobate are properly called the foreknown, and they are customarily distinguished by these names among the Fathers. Indeed, in the decree (2 p., *causa* 23, q. 4): "The predestination of God is always in the good, knowing sin committed solely by the will of man either as to be remitted with the praise of mercy, or to be punished with the praise of justice. In our evil works, only the foreknowledge of God is to be understood." Augustine is cited above at *lib. de Praedest. et Grat.*, c. 15. But neither is that author Augustine, nor is that testimony Augustine's, nor is it even to the point. Elsewhere, however, Augustine did so distinguish — in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, c. 10: "Predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge; but foreknowledge can exist without predestination. For by predestination God foreknew what he himself was going to do. Hence it was said: *He made the things that are to be*. But he is able to foreknow even all sins."

It is likewise established that the foreknown is sometimes taken in the good sense and the predestined in the bad, though with this distinction: that the foreknown can be extended to all good things, but the predestined can be extended to evil only in the sense of punishment. For no one can be said to be predestined to the evil of fault without heresy, as Suárez observes at *lib. 1, de Praedest.*, c. 5, from the Council of Orange, and Ruiz at *disp. 1, sect. 2, n. 1*, citing the Council of Trent. Hence the testimony just adduced from *lib. de Praedest. et Grat.* in the decree speaks of predestination to punishment, or to the remission of sin with the praise of mercy, or to its punishment with the praise of justice.

As for the Gloss's claim that predestination applies only to the good and foreknowledge only to the bad — the first part of this is true, because although

the evil of punishment is included in predestination, that evil is a good of justice; the second part is by no means true, since foreknowledge is often joined with predestination and the predestined are called foreknown by God and predestined, as in Paul: *Whom he foreknew, he also predestined* (Eph. 1); and again: *God has not cast away his people whom he foreknew* (Rom. 11). And Augustine speaks this way in *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*, c. 7, in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, c. 15 and 17, and in *lib. de Dono perseuerantiae*, c. 17 and 18 — this last passage, being illustrious, I wish to adduce: "Sometimes this predestination is signified also by the name foreknowledge, as the Apostle says: *God has not cast away his people whom he foreknew*. This which he says, *whom he foreknew*, is not rightly understood except as *whom he predestined*."

The question students customarily ask is whether Augustine — whose pronouncements on this and every matter of grace are oracles — ever took the name of predestination in the worse sense. And I have often been consulted on this, not only by the unlearned but also by the learned and erudite who are nonetheless less versed in his works — and I wish to satisfy them out of my love for Augustine and his students. Nor is this question raised rashly or without probable cause. For there are weighty authors who cite passages where nothing of the kind is found. Hence it is clear that these passages are not easily found; since fictitious ones are passed off as genuine, this fact is itself an indication of the difficulty. In this matter Philip Faber of Faenza stumbled in *1 d. 41, disp. 58, c. 1* of the separate work he inscribed *Theological Disputations on the Predestination of God*, where he says: "Sometimes reprobation is called predestination. Hence St. Augustine in *lib. de praedestin. Sanctor.*, cap. 3, showing that foreseen sin was the cause of the ordination of the sinner to eternal death, has these words: *Predestination under a condition was fixed in God on account of the foreknowledge of the fall of man*. And a little below: *Therefore predestination of this kind is not the absolute cause of death, but sin*. And the same in many other places."

Remarkable, reader! This testimony is not found in that passage, nor in that entire book, nor in any legitimate work of Augustine. Faber fabricated it according to his own taste, not with truth on his side but with erroneous reading. He strayed from Augustine in the word predestination, wishing to stray from him and from Scotus in the matter of predestination, as we shall see in its proper place. And his addition, "the same in many other places," will not persuade those who are aware of this slip. For what trust should we place in him when he cites uncertain passages, when we have caught him erring in a certain one? He ought to have said: "The same rarely elsewhere." It is remarkable that the man never thought of another among the many he asserts, one that was genuine, but came up with one that was nothing.

I proceed. Suárez among other passages produces the *lib. de perfectione iustitiae ad Caelestium*, at *lib. 1, de Praedest.*, c. 5, n. 3, to which the general run of scholars assent. I have, however, seen some who doubt Suárez's good faith here, because

he does not indicate the chapter. Yet Suárez was not mistaken in the passage, nor does that passage deceive us; the testimony is found in that work, *c. 13*, near the end, where Augustine says: "In that race of mankind which was predestined for destruction." Besides this, three other passages are found in Augustine where predestination is placed in the same sense for evil. The first is in the *Enchiridion*, *c. 100*, which is of this kind: "For the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment, and for the salvation of those whom he kindly predestined to grace." Here you have both meanings. The next two passages are both in *tom. 5, de Civitate Dei*: one in *lib. 15, c. 1*, at the beginning: "Of which one is predestined to reign eternally with God, the other to undergo eternal punishment with the Devil"; and again in *lib. 21, c. 24*: "Who, though they are still in this life, are nonetheless predestined to go into eternal fire with the Devil." There are not, I think, more such passages in Augustine. Concerning which you should know: that except for the *lib. de perfectione iustitiae*, he never wished to employ the name predestination in this signification in any of his works against the Pelagian heresy, though he deals with predestination very frequently; he judged it less fitting to apply to evil.

Section II: The Definition of Predestination is Proposed and Explained

By the common consent of almost all scholastics, a religious obligation has been established: those positions of Augustine in matters concerning predestination and grace that are clear and settled may not be departed from, on account of the supreme authority approved by the votes of the highest pontiffs, councils, fathers, and doctors. The Thomists acknowledge this together with their Angelic teacher; the Scotists together with their Subtle one; the Augustinians together with Gregory; the Carmelites together with Baconus. And — what is more remarkable — even that school which is bound by no law or precept of opinion, namely the Jesuit school, has devoted itself to Augustine alone: so that authors who are most discordant and dissenting among themselves in genius and positions agree in approving and embracing his doctrine.

Let us bring forward from each family some authors with indicated passages, so that whoever wishes may read and verify what we set down. From the Thomists: Alvarez (*lib. 5, de Auxil., d. n. 5*); Bañez (*in primam partem, q. 23, a. 5, in coment. init.*); González (*tomo 1, 1 p., d. 44, f. 3; d. 56, l. 2; d. 68, in proc., n. 16*); the Salmanticenses (*tract. 5, in q. 23, 1 p., in praeef.; and tract. de scientia Dei, 3, d. 10, dub. 2, n. 28; dub. 3, n. 8; dub. 4, n. 73*); John of St. Thomas (*d. 8, a. 2, 3*). From the Scotists: Smising (*tract. 3, d. 6, q. 7, n. 384*); Hierinx (*d. 8, de providentia, q. 7, n. 61*); Faber (*d. 58, q. 1, c. 3, n. 25; c. 7, n. 87; and especially d. 60, c. 7, init.*); Laurea (*tomo 4, d. 27, a. 5, n. 202*); Mastrius (*1 tomo, d. 5, q. 2, a. 3, n. 178*). From the Augustinians: Giles of Rome (*tract. de Praedest. et praescientia, titulo de Inferno*); Gregory of Rimini (*in 1 d. 40, 41, 46; and frequently elsewhere*); Argentinas (*in Prolog.; and in 1 d. 41, q. 1; and in 2 d. 28 and 29, q. 1*); Basil Poncius (*in suis Relect. de Gratia*).

Among the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, this agreement deserves more esteem: for they prefer to disagree among themselves rather than differ from Augustine, and in their discord they seek concord with Augustine. This is most evident in those two preeminent theologians Suárez and Vázquez, between whom nothing is more discrepant — in temperament and in thought. Yet when they differ most from one another, they wish to agree with Augustine. And I know not which of the two esteems him more highly or exalts him further. Whoever reads Vázquez in *1 p., d. 40, 86, 88, 89, 91*, and in *1 2 d. 109*, will believe no one has rendered more honor to Augustine. Whoever examines Suárez — both in his *Summa, tract. de Divina Praedest.*, and in his *Opuscula*, and in *1 tom. de Grat., Prolog. 6* — will find Augustine elevated so high by him that he could go no higher. And remarkably, each was called the Augustine of his time, as their respective lives record. The leading figures of the scholastic factions, so to speak, all wanted Augustine on their side. Bellarmine is entirely Augustinian; he commends him marvelously in *tom. 3, lib. 4, de Amis. grat. et stat. peccati, c. 1 and 2*; and in *lib. 6, de grat. et lib. arbit.*, throughout; and in *lib. 1, c. 9, de iustificat.* Henriquez, a weighty and profound theologian and Suárez's teacher, renders him illustrious testimony in *lib. de Fin. hom., c. 11*. Valentia testifies to his adhesion to Augustine in *tom. 1, in 1 p., q. 23, a. puncto 1 usq. ad 6*. The same is confessed by Alarcón (*tract. 4, de Praedest., d. 2, c. 7; d. 14, c. 11*) and Turrianus, an earlier pupil of Vázquez, in his preface to the reader. Granado speaks with Augustine's voice, as is apparent from *tom. 1, d. 1, n. 13; tract. 4, d. 1, n. 7; d. 3, f. 3, n. 20 and 16; tract. 8, d. un., l. 3, n. 39*. Diego Ruiz de Montoya glorifies himself by this name — as he is most versed in the Fathers, his testimonies appear everywhere in his works *de Provid., de Praedest., de Scient., de Trin.* Valentino de Herice, a most acute man, at the beginning of his golden volume calls Augustine the Coryphaeus of masters. Following Augustine in their commentaries are Arrubal, Fasolo, Tanner, Möratz, Arriaga, Sparza. The remarkable theologian Antonio Pérez, in his unique volume, *tract. de Provident. Dei, d. 1, c. 1*, says it is a settled matter among all heretics and Catholics what Augustine holds concerning predestination, and throughout that treatise makes his own doctrine Augustinian and calls it by that name. Benedict Pererius, in his *Comment. in Epist. ad Roman., c. 9, disp. 8, n. 78* — a most learned man of the same Society — defends Augustine's doctrine most vigorously and praises it most lavishly. I pass over others, both doctors of sacred theology and interpreters of sacred letters.

Almost all scholastics therefore embrace the definition of Augustine, following the Master at *this dist. 41, litt. A init.* and *litt. D, ad finem*, taken from *lib. de Praedest. Sanctor., c. 20*, and from *lib. de Dono perseuerantiae, c. 14* — this last contains the true and genuine one, and is of this kind as it appears at the Master, *d. 40, litt. D*: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God by which those are most certainly set free, whoever are set free." For this is what Augustine says there.

Hence St. Thomas in *q. 23, a. 1*, in the body, explains it through the transmission of the rational creature to the end of eternal life — as the Salmanticenses observe at *tract. 5, d. 2, dub. 4, n. 134*, and as we said above with the example of the arrow.

Scotus, however, explained it in *1 d. 40, q. un., S. ad totam quaestionem, n. 2* as follows: "Predestination, properly taken, signifies an act of the divine will, namely the order of election through the Divine will of some intellectual or rational creature to grace and glory."

Each author accommodated it to his own position. For St. Thomas, who constituted predestination in an act of the intellect, said "transmission"; indeed, in order to retain his own position at *a. 2*, in the beginning of the body, he put forward only half of Augustine's definition. "But on the contrary," he says, "is what Augustine said, that predestination is the foreknowledge of the benefits of God" — and he omitted the remainder. Scotus, however, in order to sustain his own position, put "the order of election through the divine will."

And indeed Augustine's definition explains everything contained in predestination, and is consistent with the doctrine of Paul which Augustine had before his eyes — Paul who joined *praescire* and *praedestinare*: *Praesciuit et praedestinavit*. He weaves together both foreknowledge and preparation, and shows that foreknowledge precedes the will by displaying the reason for predestining. Preparation signifies the intention of the will, or the purpose of God ordering and choosing the benefits foreseen for eternal salvation for those elect whom he calls "set free," on account of the condemned mass in which they were, as is clear from what he subjoins to the definition. For he says: "The rest are left in the condemned mass by a just judgment." Hence that salvation was liberation from damnation, and therefore mercy; which is why many authors aptly say that Augustine defines predestination as the purpose of God who shows mercy — which Suárez observes at *lib. 1, c. 17*, and it is found in St. Thomas at *q. 23, a. 1*, where it is placed in the third argument. The marginator noted it at *lib. de Praedest. Sanct., c. 10*, though he should have noted it at *c. 8 and 16*, in which Augustine calls the predestined "vessels of mercy" together with Paul — whereas in *c. 10* he says nothing of this at all. Indeed in *c. 8* he explains that saying, *He has mercy on whom he will*, regarding the predestined. He says the same in *lib. de Corrept. et Grat., c. 7 and 9*. About this we shall speak later at the question on the foreknowledge of merits.

Thus the Augustinian preparation is intimate and eternal in God, not temporal and external — which Scotus aptly called the order of election, as though that preparation were the ordering from eternity. Augustine expressed his meaning in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct., c. 10*: "Predestination is the preparation of grace; grace, however, is the actual donation itself." And again: "Therefore predestination, which is in the good, is, as I said, the preparation of grace; grace is the effect of this predestination itself." The effect is in time; the cause is in eternity, that is,

the preparation. And in accordance with Scotus's view, *c. 17* of the same work: "They were chosen before the foundation of the world by that predestination in which God foreknew his future works." He often repeats *Elegit nos: praedestinans nos* in that work *de Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, *c. 18*.

Nor does the order that Scotus expressed in his definition fail to appear in Augustine; for in *c. 20* Augustine adduces *Acts 3: As many as were ordained to eternal life believed* — to which he joins the word "to direct," explaining it through "to ordain." I give the prize passage from *lib. de Correptione et Gratia*, *c. 9*, speaking of the predestined: "He is so ordained, and therefore given to Christ, that he may not perish but have eternal life." From all this it is clear that Augustine's definition is aptly rendered by Scotus, who both acutely perceived and clearly expounded his meaning.

I do not deny, however, that St. Thomas here acknowledged and posited the order: for in *a. 3, ad 2, q. 23*, he says: "God from eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the ordering of certain persons to salvation." And in *q. 6, de verit., a. 1*: "Through God's providence all human beings are ordered to beatitude; but predestination also regards the outcome or event of the ordering, and hence it applies only to those who attain glory." But St. Thomas locates this order in an act of the intellect — which certainly seems less apt and less conformable to Augustine's mind. For Augustine, in the word "preparation," explained an act of purpose and efficacious will, not of the intellect; otherwise there would be a double knowledge in the definition, namely foreknowledge and this other which is called order or command, and there would be no place for purpose or an act of the will, whence foreknowledge draws its force and power. For foreknowledge antecedent to the purpose of the divine will cannot by itself have or give the determinate certainty of predestining — as the distinguished Thomist John of St. Thomas shows at *d. 7, a. 1, from n. 8, 9 to 15*, against Molina and Lessio; and there he also disproves two definitions of predestination devised by Molina and Alarcón, rightly so — though Alarcón's is a diffuse description rather than a proper definition. He there at *a. 1, n. 2*, however, proves St. Thomas's definition and attempts to accommodate it to Augustine's mind, as I do Scotus's. Let the judgment of readers determine which is better, provided that it remains settled that Augustine's definition is in every way adequate, and that it was received besides the scholastics by Prosper (*ad excerpta Genuenf.*, *c. 8*), Fulgentius (*lib. 2, ad Monimum*, *c. 1*), Bede (*in collec. Roman.* 8), Anselm (*in comment. ad locum Pauli: Quos praesciuit et praedestinavit*).

Section III: What is This Foreknowledge Placed Before Preparation in Augustine's Definition?

Though from what we said above about conditioned knowledge it is possible to understand what foreknowledge Augustine is speaking of, yet because the Thomist and Jesuit schools have made his entangled and impeded meaning

contrary to one another, it is necessary to distinguish the senses clearly and to designate the certain one. The Jesuits, therefore, uniformly understand by that foreknowledge their beloved conditioned knowledge, antecedent to every absolute decree. So Molina (*in 1 p., in q. 23, S. Thomae, a. 2, disp. 2, a. 5, d. 1*; and in *Concordia, q. 23, a. 5, d. 1, m. 9*); Suárez (*de praedestinatione, lib. 1, c. 7*); Herice (*tract. 3, d. 22, n. 57*); Arrubal (*tom. 1, in 1 p., d. 71, c. 4*); Lessio (*de praedest., f. 1, n. 13*); Ruiz (*d. 55, l. 10 and 11*); Vázquez (*in 1 p., d. 99, c. 7*). The Thomists deny this: the Salmanticenses (*tract. 5, de praedest., dub. 4, §. 2, ad finem*) and John of St. Thomas (*q. 23, disputatione 2, a. 1, n. 3 to 15*), who refer it to absolute knowledge — which the Salmanticenses there call "knowledge of approbation," a name which pleases me less, as will appear later.

For my part, to speak the truth, I approve neither position in speaking generally, and I adopt a middle way. I neither wholly reject that middle knowledge nor entirely approve it, as I said above; I admit it temperately, that is, resting upon an antecedent decree. And for my purpose I now omit that argument by which I showed above that that knowledge lacked infallibility, which it receives from the antecedent decree — lest we work in vain. I use another argument as follows: the conditioned knowledge posited by the Jesuit Fathers cannot immediately direct the divine will in predestining; therefore the purpose of God predestining is not founded in it.

I prove the antecedent. That knowledge is indeterminate and indifferent to both sides — of damnation and liberation — and equally proposes means to each; but that foreknowledge which immediately directs the will must be determined to the one side only of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore that knowledge in its breadth cannot be the immediate directive of predestination. The major is clear from the Jesuits' doctrine, which says that that knowledge proposes to God one and the other side: for instance, if Peter is placed in these circumstances, he will be saved; if in other circumstances, he will be damned. Likewise, if Judas is placed in this occasion, he will perish; if in another, he will be blessed. Moreover, Peter, who in this occasion will be saved, placed in another will be damned. Thus Judas and Peter, for the variety of occasions in which they are conditionally placed, are foreseen as going to be saved and damned — and this is what that knowledge shows, indifferently representing both. But in order to direct the will immediately toward predestining, it must be determined to the one side only of salvation.

From where, then, does that determination come? Certainly not from knowledge, which is indifferent to both sides and equally offers to the one preparing diverse and contrary means; since that knowledge which immediately directs the will is determined to the means of salvation which alone it proposes in persuading the one predestining. Therefore there is another elective middle knowledge; between it and the other indifferent knowledge there mediates something that determines the first knowledge to the one side only of salvation.

This, however, can be nothing other than some act of the will, which is followed by the determination of that knowledge to the means of salvation — and this is the act of God's purpose choosing from the condemned mass some over others, and for those so chosen applying that knowledge of means which was previously wandering and indeterminate.

This foreknowledge, therefore, immediately directs the will toward the preparation of the means through which those discriminated by the merciful purpose of God will most certainly be set free; and so knowledge has its determination from the purpose, and thus directs the will predestining the benefits of divine grace, so that those already discriminated may be saved. Therefore this knowledge is prior to this purpose predestining, insofar as it is indeterminate to both sides; and it is posterior to the antecedent purpose, insofar as it is made certain and determined through it. For by this purpose that knowledge is drawn from its indifferent state and placed in a certain and determinate state, still before the knowledge of vision and approbation, which follows the will preparing those means and benefits and willing absolutely the future occurrence of these things, reducing them to a future act in time.

This is the true foreknowledge included in Augustine's definition, which is practical and related to execution, presupposing persons elected through the merciful purpose of God distinguishing them from others in the condemned mass, and ordering them — already distinguished and elected — through the means which it foresaw as certain and determined for salvation. Hence there was the ordering of those persons through those benefits to that end, which it prepared for them according to that knowledge thus determined and certain, foreseeing the means. For why did he say "whoever are set free"? — except that he wished to recall those elect whom he was ordering to life. The discriminated, therefore, were separated from the condemned mass through the purpose; and those so discriminated and liberated from damnation were ordered to obtaining salvation through the prepared means: for unless they were elected, how could they be ordered? Therefore Augustine was dealing with practical predestination, which would prepare future benefits and be certain and determined, so that they would most certainly be set free, according to certain and infallible knowledge and infallible providence.

So it is clear what the reason for predestination proposed by St. Augustine is, and what the reason for the foreknowledge that precedes and directs this predestination is — which Scotus rightly recognized and approved when he said in this passage, *1 d. 40, q. un., S. ad istam quaestionem, l. 2*: "Predestination signifies an act of the divine will, namely the order of election through the election of the divine will, of an intellectual or rational creature, to eternal life." Note that he calls it "order," which as it is relative connotes a creature capable of being ordered; but a creature is not capable of being ordered unless she is distinguished, elected, and liberated. The doctrine of St. Thomas also returns to

this, when he calls predestination "transmission," which wholly supposes the subject being transmitted, that is, the person already elected, upon whom the whole transmission falls — that is, practical predestination — through the means and benefits of grace which God prepared for her from eternity in his certain and determined knowledge.

Therefore this knowledge is neither that of the Jesuits, remote and indifferent, not applied by the divine decree; nor that Thomistic approbation, which supposes the will and the object in its future existence and pertains to the knowledge of vision. And that this is Augustine's meaning is clear, because this foreknowledge does not deal with the election of the predestined person, but with the preparation of benefits in relation to that person. For the person is not prepared but elected, and to the person thus elected that preparation is made, as to the end to whom means are prepared for attaining the glory to which she is directed.

This Augustine teaches clearly in many passages. First, in the very *c. 14 of de Dono perseuerantiae* itself, he says that that preparation is not made for those left in the condemned mass: for having said "this predestination is nothing other than the foreknowledge, namely, and preparation of the benefits of God, by which those are most certainly set free, whoever are set free," he adds: "But the rest, where else are they left if not in the mass of perdition by the just divine judgment?" — affirming that that preparation is not made for them. "Nor are those very things administered to them — neither the words nor the deeds — which were prepared for the elect alone." And in *lib. de Praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. 10*: "Predestination is the preparation of grace." And soon after: "What God prepared, that we should walk in them." Again: "Predestination is that which cannot exist without foreknowledge." He adds: "By predestination God foreknew what he himself was going to do." Then: "Predestination which is in the good is the preparation of grace." For whom did he prepare? Namely for the elect, in accordance with that sentence of *lib. de Dono perseuerantiae, c. 17*: "These gifts of his, to whomsoever God gives them, he without doubt foreknew that he would give them, and he prepared them in his foreknowledge." He adds: "For to dispose his own future works in that foreknowledge which cannot be deceived or changed — this and nothing else is to predestine." And below, in the same chapter: "If they are given, and he foreknew that he would give them, he certainly predestined." Therefore that definition deals with the preparation of benefits presupposing the election of the persons for whom that predestination or preparation was made in the determinate foreknowledge after the purpose of electing them.

An illustrious testimony of this is found in *lib. de Corrept. et Grat., c. 6*, where, having clearly adduced from Paul (*1 Cor. 4*): *Who distinguishes you?*, Augustine adds: "All, therefore, who by the generosity of this divine grace were discriminated from that original damnation." Behold discrimination through

the purpose of God; from which follows predestination or preparation of benefits. "There is no doubt," he says, "that both the hearing of the Gospel is procured for them, and when they hear it they believe, and they persevere in the faith that works through love to the very end, and if at any time they go astray, having been corrected they are amended; and some of them, if they are not corrected by men, return to the path they had abandoned; and some, having received grace, are snatched away from the dangers of this mortal life by the swiftness of death at any age." He finally concludes: "For all these things he works in those whom he made as vessels of mercy — who both chose them in his Son before the foundation of the world through the election of grace." He speaks differently of those who are not discriminated but left in the condemned mass, for whom those benefits were not prepared from eternity nor given in time, as he teaches in the same work, *c. 13*, near the end.

Behold, therefore, the sense of the foreknowledge in that passage of Augustine's definition — which agrees with Scotus's sense, and which differs from that general foreknowledge antecedent to every purpose of the divine will (which is the Jesuit knowledge) and from the other knowledge of approbation, consequent upon the decree of preparing the benefits and means of grace (which is the Thomistic one) — both derived from Augustine and accommodated to explaining his meaning.

COLLATION X, DISTINCTION IV

Whether Predestination was Made Before or After the Foreknowledge of Merits?

Preface

Certain theologians have wished to make this celebrated question similar to that other one concerning middle knowledge, denying that it was either treated by the ancients or at least accurately disputed — thereby hunting for glory for themselves and their masters, as though these were the first authors of the matter. What they gained by this I do not know, except that the same thing happened to the position on middle knowledge: they brought the suspicion of novelty upon it. For when they deny that the position they defend was handed down by the ancients, they confess it is their own invention, and therefore a novelty. And indeed some of those who deny it was treated by the ancients are themselves among those who affirm that God did not choose the predestined before foreseen merits but after their foreknowledge.

One of them is Luis Turrianus, in *opuscul. 6, de voluntate efficaci dandi gloriam, in Selectis*, who wished to confer this honor on Father Gabriel Vázquez, his master, for his singular devotion to him — that he should be regarded as the author of the opinion of election after foreseen merits antecedent to the divine election, as though others had learned it from him. About this Fasolo and Mastrius

remonstrate with him. Yet Turrianus did not speak rashly, since Vázquez indicated this at *disp. 189, c. 2*, at the beginning, saying: "Since this matter has been little contested among the doctors up to our time" — by which he wished to signal that it should be treated by him more studiously, since it appeared little used and almost new. Since Turrianus knew his mind well, it is no wonder he wanted to attribute it to Vázquez as its author. I am more surprised that Alarcón was silent about this; but Vázquez's mind was less clear to him than to Turrianus, who had him as a master, which Alarcón — then a young man — could not claim. I confess that Alarcón was equal to Turrianus in affection and devotion to Father Gabriel Vázquez, whom I saw burning with love of Vázquez in Madrid, conceding nothing to Turrianus, whom I met at the same time. Be that as it may: I believe Turrianus, and I wish to render Father Vázquez this honor — not because he was the first author of that position, but because he greatly confirmed it and strengthened it with the authority of Augustine, of whom Vázquez was indeed most studious and most versed in his works.

I shall not here stir up the question in the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian sense, who, by placing the whole merit in nature or at least the beginning of merit, were overturning the entire gift of gratuitous election. We have said enough about this in our treatment of the mind of Innocent and the treasury of Augustine. We deal now in the theological schools and, setting aside heretics, debate with Catholics who rightly hold regarding merits proceeding from grace.

This question, however, contains two points. The first: whether election was made after foreseen merits and on account of foreseen merits? The second: whether it was made before foreseen merits and not on account of those foreseen? We all agree that no one is saved without merits. We differ in that the first position places merits as moving toward election after the manner of a moral cause with respect to God choosing, and predestining people to glory on account of them. The second holds that merits were not foreseen before the election of the predestined, and in no way moved God toward choosing people for glory on account of them; indeed, merits followed from the election as its effects — without which, however, glory would be obtained in execution. So that merits always intervene, but in different ways: either as a cause moving toward destining glory on their account, or as effects and fruits of election antecedent to them.

The first position seems more congruent with justice, the second with mercy.

Section I: The First Opinion of Predestination After and on Account of Foreseen Merits is Proved by Authority

The first position was taught among the ancients by Henry (*Quodl. 4, q. 19; Quodl. 5, q. 5*); John Bacconus (*in 1 d. 41, q. un., a. 2*); Argentinas (*ibid., d. 41, a. 1 and 2*); William of Rubion (*ibid., q. 7, a. 1*); Aureolus (*d. 40, ar. 1; d. 41, art. 3*); Eck (*opusc. de praedest., Centur. 3*); Pighius (*lib. 8, de liber. arbit., c. 8*); Stapleton (*antidot. and in c. 9*

ad Roman.); Michael of Medina (*lib. 3, de recta in Deum Fide, c. 1*); John of Bononia (*lib. de praedestinat.*); Camerarius (*Dialogo Cathol., c. 5*); Sixtus of Siena (*lib. 4, Biblioth., annot. 251*); Francis Turrianus (*in opusc. de electione*); Molina (*in primam partem, q. 23, a. 2, 3*); Valentia (*1 p., q. 23, p. 4; and in controversiis, lib. de praedest., c. 2 and 3*); Vázquez (*1 p., d. 89, most carefully, and d. 90; and 3 p., d. 23, c. 7 and following*); Luis Turrianus (*opusculo 6, in Selectis*); Lessio (*lib. 14, de perfect. diuin., and de praedest., c. 14, q. 4*); Aegidius Coninck (*d. 20, de Spe, dub. 13, n. 119*); Moncaeus (*in Select., d. 4, c. 4*); Alarcón (*tract. 4, de praedest., d. 2, most extensively*); Pennottus (*in Propugn., lib. 6, c. 21*); Amicus (*tomo 1, d. 15, sectione 4*); Sparza (*lib. 1, de Deo, de praedest., q. 31*). From the Scotists: Pontius (*d. 7, q. 3, in cursu Theolog.*); Faber of Faenza (*in 1 distinct. 41, q. 1, d. 58, c. 4*); Saxius (*in sua Catastrophe, tomo 2, d. 10, q. 3, a. 1*); Matthew of Veglia (*in sua Epitome, ad d. 41 Scoti*).

Let us see the foundations of this position, which Father Gabriel Vázquez strives most vigorously to establish and confirm. This author is too sharp and vehement here, but rarely more sharp and vehement than in building and confirming this position on predestination from foreseen merits. I shall explain the reasons afterward; and there I shall also say something about the ardor of Lessio in defending it. For I find these two more ardent than the rest.

First it is proved by the authority of Scripture. The first passage: *Matt. 25: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world* — followed by the statement of merits: *For I was hungry and you gave me food*, etc. There is the cause of possessing the kingdom prepared. The second: from Paul, *1 Cor. 2*, with the words of Isaiah: *Eye has not seen*, etc., *which God prepared for those who love him*. Behold the reason for the preparation — love, not God's love for human beings, but human beings' love for God. The third: *James 2: Has not God chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom which God promised to those who love him?* The poor and those rich in faith are those who by these virtues merited election; and this is clear from the adjacent term "those who love him." These testimonies are produced by Vázquez at *d. 89, c. 2*. But Lessio, not content with these, adds others which Alarcón refutes, and even those of Vázquez do not please him in *d. 2, c. 6, tract. 4, de praedest., n. 2, 3, and 6* — he concludes that his position must be confirmed in another way. Faber of Faenza thinks differently and proves those three passages adduced by Vázquez, and being content with them proceeds to the testimonies of the Fathers.

I shall add from my own store some that are suitable and that the reader may perhaps not find displeasing. Let one be that of Paul in *2 Tim. 4: Laid up for me is the crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day*. Note the words "crown of justice," which import merit; then the verb "will render" suggests a debt; moreover "just judge" expresses justice — all of which are alien from gratuitous and liberal predestination. Another I take from *Matt. 20: Can you drink the chalice which I am about to drink?* A share in the kingdom was sought, to

be conferred gratuitously as a benefit. Christ diverted to merit, and having heard "we can," as though approving the way of meriting, he added: *It is not mine to give to you, but for those for whom it is prepared by my Father*. He excludes the grace sought by the mother, withdraws himself, and assigns the kingdom to merits before the Father, who will give it to those meriting justly.

Vázquez wishes to rely on the authority of the Fathers. And first he depreciates the testimonies of Origen, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Oecumenius, and Sedulius — whom Sixtus of Siena commended — denying that they spoke about the present question. He also weakens the testimonies of Ambrose, or the Ambrosiaster, in his commentary on *c. 9 ad Roman.*; of Jerome in the *Epistle to Hedibia*; and of Sedulius, whom certain authors of the same position of Vázquez were calling to their defense from among the Latins — and indeed he rejects Sedulius as suspect, as well as Faustus of Riez, convicted of Semi-Pelagianism.

Therefore Vázquez and his followers, though they most wish to rely on authority, being reduced by their depreciation of it to the authority of Augustine alone, want what he prejudged to be accepted as a settled judgment, or oracle. Hence Vázquez at *d. 89, c. 4*: "Although the authority of other Fathers in every controversy ought to be of great weight with all, yet in this present matter, Augustine alone will always be for me as much as many." And Alarcón at *d. 2, c. 8*: "The whole antiquity of theologians has rendered such honor to Augustine in matters pertaining to the grace of God and his predestination, that no other position is to be held than what was the true mind of Augustine." Therefore these authors seek, as it were, a torch in Augustine, by whose light they may hit the mark. Both believe they find it in *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum, q. 2*, where, turning and expounding the words of Paul in *Romans 9 and 11* — *For when they had not yet been born, nor had done anything good or evil* — Augustine seems to favor the position on foreseen merits.

Vázquez at *c. 6, n. 43* of his *disp. 89* quotes Augustine: "Since it was not so — that one would be chosen over another for justification by prior examination of his own good works, so that the purpose of God's justification might stand — since it was not done from the works of free will but from grace, so that the younger would be preferred to the elder, he understands this in the grace of justification." But Augustine concludes in these words: "Therefore the purpose of God does not stand according to election, but the election stands according to the purpose — that is, it is not because God found good works in human beings which he might choose that the purpose of justification stands, but because that purpose stands, to justify believers, that he finds works which he may now choose for the kingdom of heaven. For if there were no election, there would be no elect, nor would it rightly be said: *Who shall bring accusation against the elect of God?* Yet election does not precede justification, but justification precedes election; for no one is chosen except one already distant from the one rejected. Hence what was said, that God chose us before the foundation of the world — I do not see how

this was said except through foreknowledge. And here what is said — not from works but from him who calls — was said not of the election of merits that come after the grace of justification, but through the liberality of the gifts of God, so that no one might glory in works."

The summary of Augustine's teaching according to Vázquez is this: Augustine deals with election to eternal life, which from eternity was ordained according to foreknowledge. Now he says this arose from the purpose of justifying — for this is what he understands, says Vázquez, throughout that question — because God, after justification, finds good works in human beings which he would choose for glory, by virtue of which one becomes distant from another; hence it follows that from the force of this justification human beings were chosen for glory. Vázquez confirms this sense from words at the end of the question, where Augustine says: "If there is any election here, so that we understand by this what was said — *the remnant were saved by the election of grace* — not that an election of the justified be made for eternal life, but that those might be chosen who are to be justified, certainly this election is so hidden that in the same mingled mass it cannot at all appear to us. Or if it appears to some, I confess my weakness in this regard: I do not find what I might observe in the choice of people to saving grace, if I am left to the examination of this election by any thought whatsoever, except either greater intelligence, or lesser sins, or both; let us add also, if you please, honorable and useful disciplines." He excludes everything, and retains only the merits of the justified — and this is clear from the context. "It remains, therefore, that the wills be chosen; but the will itself, unless something occurs that attracts and invites the mind, can in no way be moved. But that this occurs is not in human power." He cuts off the path to every other merit and admits only merits from justifying grace, which are the cause of election to glory.

Briefly said by Vázquez, for the passage seems express, and it is not necessary to dwell longer on it, as Alarcón did; for of itself, as expounded by Vázquez, the testimony is sufficiently manifest. Vázquez confirms the same position from another testimony of St. Augustine in *Sermon 7 de verbis Domini secundum Matthaeum*, where: "He admits that double kind of election, both without examination and with it: God chose, as the Apostle says, both according to his own grace and according to their justice" — these are Augustine's words, which Vázquez explains thus: "He says according to his own grace, because God chose them gratuitously without examination, to give them gifts of grace which he denied to others, for the sole reason that it pleased him. But what is *according to their justice*? — except that he chose their good works which his grace had prepared in them?" — and he corroborates the position from the following words: "I chose those because I saw their minds presuming on me and not on themselves or on Baal."

The third passage is that from *lib. Octoginta trium quaestionum*, q. 68: *God has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens. But this will of God cannot be*

unjust. It comes from most hidden merits, because even sinners, since they have made one mass through general sin, are not without some diversity among themselves. Something, therefore, precedes in sinners, by which, even though they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification. Although this passage speaks of merits before justification and does not accord with another text of Augustine and says too much, it nonetheless contributes most to the matter, because it confirms that election is founded in merits that are prior to election, so that election always supposes a prior distance to make the choice. This, however, is manifestly what Augustine supposes for this discriminating election of one over another — that diverse merits are required — and to this extent the passage and Augustine's sense are to be accepted, though not insofar as they posit merits before grace by justification, which we said above was retracted by Augustine himself.

Although the passage can be so explained without danger: we might say that those most hidden merits can be graces not yet justifying, but inchoate grace, which together with the free will effects in sinners good supernatural works, meriting congruently before justification through sanctifying grace. And these would be those most hidden merits that precede justification in the elect, and they are called most hidden because they are not *de condigno*, and are hidden among mortal sins, and merit only *de congruo*. This passage is not adduced by Father Vázquez. Yet other authors, both modern and ancient, do adduce it. Certainly the Master uses this testimony in this his *dist. 41*, and Henry rests heavily on it; and Scotus mentions it at *1 d. 41, S. circa n. 2 and 3*.

Section II: The Same Position is Urged by Reasons

Let us proceed to the arguments. The first: election before foreseen merits conflicts with the general will, which theologians posit as inefficacious for saving all; therefore it is to be abandoned. The antecedent is proved: because with that antecedent will toward all, the efficacious will toward a few elect cannot stand unless an intermediate reason is given for why that inefficacious will is changed into this efficacious one for the few over the many abandoned. But this intermediate reason can be nothing other than the foreknowledge of merits in those few who are chosen. Therefore this foreknowledge must absolutely be posited. Otherwise God would not proceed rationally in abandoning others under the inefficacious will and choosing these for glory through the efficacious will.

The second: efficacious election before foreseen merits entirely excludes merits; but these intervene altogether and are necessary for the attainment of the end; therefore the foreknowledge of merits necessarily precedes election. The major is clear: because election is a gratuitous and liberal gift of God, which excludes works of justice, since grace and justice conflict with each other. The minor is certain: because glory is wages and a crown, which is obtained only by merits; therefore the foreknowledge of these merits must precede election.

The third: when the end is not absolute but conditional and clothed with some formal character, it is not intended materially but under that formal character. But this is how glory stands with respect to the human being destined toward it as an end; therefore his election cannot be intended except after the formal character of merits. The major and minor are clear, because the kingdom is intended in different ways — as absolutely a kingdom and as conditionally a prize; for when it is hereditary it is not intended as a prize, but when it is obtained by deeds of war it is intended in another way and merits are required for its attainment. Glory is the same: when it is a gift it abstracts from merits, but when it is wages and a crown it requires antecedent merits for its obtaining.

The fourth: if the election of the predestined is not made from foreseen merits, freedom will be taken away from the predestined — which is not to be said. Therefore. The assumption is proved: because then election would be made from the absolute purpose of God, with nothing contributed by the predestined toward it; whence it follows that God would decree predestination without the foreseen concurrence of the predestined, and altogether antecedently to his freedom — and so it will not be in the power of the will to place anything freely from its own part toward predestination. It also follows that God, in order to obtain the end of his decree, must premove and determine the will; hence everything is reduced to the omnipotence of the Divine decree, not to the freedom of the human will.

The fifth: God ordered the end of glory and the means of grace in relation to one another just as he foresaw them as future. But he foresaw means as going to be future prior to the attainment of the end; therefore he intended the application of means prior to the attainment of glory. This is clear because in execution the means of grace come prior to the end of glory obtained; therefore God intended and predestined grace prior to glory. Nor is the argument resolved by saying that the end is prior in intention than the means, even though it is posterior in execution: because this evasion is null, since this is only true when one proposes the end and the means to oneself; for then one intends the end prior to the means. But when another proposes them, the manner of proceeding is changed, because it depends on the arbitrium of the other who proposes. As is apparent in the soldier: if he wants a crown, he first proposes this to himself before battles. But the king can first want the contest and victory in the soldier before the crown, because he is not bound by the law of the end simply, but in accordance with his own administration and utility. Thus glory: though with respect to me it is first to be desired and intended before the means — indeed from its primary intention the means are sought by me — yet God can first will my works and merits through which I may obtain the end, because he does not operate with dependence on that end but from other motives, free and higher. Faber of Faenza is marvelously pleased with this argument, and congratulates himself on Stapleton and Vázquez for having supplied it to him —

at 1 d. 41, q. 1, disp. 58, c. 4, where he proposes it carefully and greatly exaggerates it, but presses and urges it less than Father Vázquez at disp. 89, c. 9.

The sixth: because that manner of choosing the predestined before foreseen merits induces despair and provides occasion for grievances among the abandoned and induces horror in those hearing it, and renders the mystery of predestination most difficult. Furthermore, it brings negligence, idleness, and torpor to the predestined themselves, since their works and labors are altogether superfluous, since there is no need of them to obtain what is already established in God's decree and efficacious will, which is altogether to be fulfilled. Indeed for the foreknown there can be no hope of obtaining glory, so they will despair and rightly complain of God who did not choose them, indeed excluded them from glory. This argument is usually urgently pressed and exaggerated by Molina, Lessio, Pennottus, and others, who when disputing these matters think of the Lutheran and Calvinist heretics, whom they fear and of whom they are afraid, lest these abuse such a doctrine for their own heresies.

Section III: By What Weights of Authority is the Second, Opposed Position Supported?

A far greater number of authors embrace this position. The Master (*in 1 d. 40 and 41*); Albert the Great (there); St. Thomas (*ibid. and 1 p., q. 23, a. 4 and 5; and ad Rom. 9, lect. 3; and lib. 3, contr. Gent., c. 161, 163; and q. 6, de verit., ar. 1 and 2; and super Epist. ad Ephes., c. 1, lect. 1*); Scotus (*in 1 d. 41, q. un., from n. 11; and in Report., expressly, ad eand. d. et q. un., n. 6 to 10; and in 3 d. 32, q. un., n. 6*); Durandus (*in 1 d. 41*); Giles (there, *d. 40, q. un.*); Altissiodorensis (there, *c. 9, q. 2*); Ulric (*in sum., lib. 2, apud Dionys. Carthus. in 1 d. 41, q. 2*); D'Ailly (there, *q. 12, a. 2*); Gerson (*p. 3, lib. 1, de Consolat. Theolog., prosa 3*); Gregory of Rimini (*in 1 d. 41, q. 1, a. 4*); Marsilius (there, *a. 2, concl. 4*); Major (*d. 4, q. un.; and d. 41, q. 2*); Abulensis (*Exod. 4, q. 6, 7, 8; and in Iosue, 4, 79, 80, 81; and in Matth., c. 20, q. 21; and c. 22, q. 115*); Palac (*in 1 d. 41, d. 1*); Rayner (*1 p., v. Electio, cap. 9*); Richard (*ar. 7*); Tapper (there, *de lib. arbitr. contra Luther.*); Driedo (*de Concord. lib. arb. cum Praedest., p. 1, c. 3 and 4*); Eltius (*in 1 d. 41, from §. 1 to 12*); Curiel (*contr. 4, in c. 2, Epist. 2 Petri*); Philip Diez (*v. Praedestinatio*); Villegas (*in suis Contr., contr. 13, §. 4*).

From the Dominican Fathers: St. Antoninus (*4 P., tit. 14, de profund. iud. Dei, c. 12, §. 4*); Sixtus of Siena (*lib. 1, Biblioth., annot. 248*); Viguerius (*inst. moral., c. 10, de Incarn., §. 8*); Horant (*lib. 3, Locor., c. 6*); Ferrariensis (*lib. 3, contr. gent., c. 161 and 163*). Thomists: Hervaeus (*in 1 d. 41*); Capreolus; Deza (there); Soto (*in Recognit. ad 4 Sentent.; and in c. 9, epist. ad Roman.*); Cajetan (*in 1 p., q. 23*); Bañez (there); Ripa; Nazar; Zanard; Machin (*d. 46, f. 6*); González (*d. 73, l. 2*); John of St. Thomas (*d. 8, per totam*); Ledesma (*lib. de auxil., disput. de elect., concl. 5*); Alvarez (*lib. 5, de Auxil., d. 37*).

From the Franciscan Fathers: Richard (*in 1 d. 41, a. 2, q. 2*); Lyra (*in c. 9 ad Rom.; and in Lucam 12, ad illud: Complacuit Patri vestro dare vobis regnum*); Alphonse of

Castro (*v. Praedestinatio; and v. Libertas*); Carthagera (*de Praedest., discours. 10*); Corduba (*lib. 1, Quaestion., q. 59; Opusc. 5, in 2 p.*). Scotist doctors: Lychetus (*comment. in 1 Sent. d. 41*); Mayrón; Bassolis; Bargius (there); Smising (*tract. 3, d. 6, q. 8*); Vulpes (*d. 38*); Mastrius (*d. 5*); Cavell (*in Schol.*); to these I add Tataretus (*in 1 dist. 41, super Scotum*).

From various religious orders: Cabrera (*in 3 p., q. 1, a. 3, d. 1, from n. 172*); Zumel (*a. 2, d. 2*); Corneio (*tract. de Praedest., a. 4, d. un.*); Various (*dub. 2*); Aversa (*in 1 p., qu. 22, sect. 20*); Thomas del Bene (*de Praedest., d. 8, q. 6*); Morandus (*in 1 p., tract. 5, q. 2*); the Salmanticenses (*tract. 5, de Praedest., d. 9, dub. 1, §. 3 and following*); Lezana (*tract. 4, d. 9, q. 5*).

From the Fathers of the Society of Jesus: Francis Suárez — noble and sharp author against Vázquez — in *Summa, tract. de Praedestinat., lib. 1, c. 8*; and *lib. 2, per totum*, especially from *c. 20*; Henriquez (*lib. de ult. Fine hom., c. 11 and 12*); Bellarmine (*lib. 2, de Grat. et lib. arb., c. 10 and 15*); Toledo (*in c. 9 epist. Rom.*); Salmerón (*ad Rom. 8, d. 21*); Pererius (there, *d. 23*); Arrubal (*d. 73, c. 3; and d. 14, c. 2*); Ruiz (*d. 6 to 13, most extensively*); Granado (*1 p., tract. 7, d. 4, §. 3*); Tanner (*tom. 1, d. 3, qu. 5, dub. 4 and 5, per tot.*); Justinianus (*in c. 9 ad Rom.*); Lorino (*in epist. 2 Petri, vers. 10*); Arriaga (*d. 36, f. 4*); Fasolo (*tom. 2, in 1 p., q. 23, a. 1, dub. 3*); Antonio Pérez (*tom. vn., de Provid., d. 1, q. 4, n. 58*); Francis of Lugo (*de Deo Trino et uno, d. 39, c. 2*).

This position is proved by testimonies of Sacred Scripture. The first let be *Rom. 9: When they had not yet been born, nor had done anything good or evil, so that the purpose of God might remain according to election, not from works but from him who calls, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger. As it is written: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated*. That this passage contains the matter of predestination is the common position of the Fathers and scholastics; and though some doubt about the primary and literal sense, nearly all agree about the allegorical sense — so much so that a man of the gravest judgment, Diego Ruiz de Montoya, at *d. 8, f. 2, n. 1*, affirms that this cannot be denied without a note of rashness. By this testimony, works of whatever kind — even foreseen — are excluded from the election of Jacob over Esau, Paul having adopted for this purpose the text of Malachy about the gratuitous election of God's Jacob, who was in the same state as Esau, his uterine and twin brother, who remained abandoned in the state of hatred from original sin, of which both were guilty and partakers.

And that truth about the predestination of all is represented in that example, from the antecedents and consequents, is clear. *Theirs is the adoption as sons* — there now more predestined are expressed. Again: *Children of the promise are the elect; not children of the flesh, they are children of God*. These precede the example of Jacob and Esau. What follows is: *Is there injustice with God?* — by which is signified gratuitous and free election; which if it were from merits would not rightly have the inference drawn: *Is there injustice with God?* — since merits would remove the doubt and complaint. Then: *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will*

show compassion on whom I will show compassion. This altogether removes merits. Now the conclusion persuades completely: *So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy.* These suffice to prove by that testimony of Paul that every kind of merits is excluded from the reason for predestining.

The remaining sentences of the same chapter add to this. This is what that question means: *O man, who are you to answer back to God?* This is served by the example of clay in the potter's hands. The vessels of wrath and of mercy prove election without any foreknowledge of merits. From which that consequence is deduced: *So then he has mercy on whom he wills, and he hardens whom he wills.* The second is from the same Paul, *Eph. 1: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him.* That Paul is not speaking of election to grace and merits as future and dependent upon them for glory is shown by: *Blessed be God who blessed us with every spiritual blessing* — where nothing is attributed to us in that blessing. *Even as he chose us, that we should be holy and blameless:* election precedes holiness through grace — "that we should be," not "because we were." And again: *Having predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will.* The purpose here is presupposed to predestination, which is the preparation of grace and merits. *To the praise of his glorious grace* — that is, of his gratuitous benefit, not owed by justice from which no glory and praise of grace would result. Hence he adds: *According to his good pleasure* — not our merit. He adds: *We also have been chosen as an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will.* Note "by lot" — by which word industry and the labor of merit are removed; and *he works* — lest election be attributed to us as workers. "All things" confirms the matter. In choosing, everything is owed to the God who chooses without our foreseen merits, even though we truly merit in reality and he cooperates with us and we cooperate with him.

The third is *Luke 12: Fear not, little flock, for it has pleased your Father to give you the kingdom.* There is no intervention here of a foreseen good use of grace, about to be made by free will; it is the mere good pleasure of the Father. Nor would the fear of the disciples have been removed otherwise; for if they were left to their own power, they would not be secure about the kingdom. But then Christ exhorts to virtues: *Sell what you possess.* Let your loins be girt — so those virtues and merits flowed from that source of complacency.

The fourth: *John 15: You did not choose me, but I chose you, that you should go and bear fruit.* The subject is gratuitous election born from the affection and divine love; for above Christ had said: *As the Father has loved me, so I have loved you.* But the Father did not love or predestine Christ through his own merits. Nor did he pre-elect Christian human beings through their merits. He loved and chose Christ freely and gratuitously from his affection toward him. *So also I loved you and chose you because I willed; my love is the reason for choosing. And I chose you from the world* —

that is, from those who remain in the common mass of the world abandoned. You did not distinguish yourselves from it by your merits.

To this belongs that other passage from *John 17: I pray for these; I do not pray for the world, but for those whom you have given me*. They did not come to me by their own virtue, nor did they make themselves yours or mine by their merits; but you made them yours and gave them to me. They were yours through election; so that even though it is true that they came through grace and by meriting, that grace was subsequent to your election through which they had been made yours; hence we must always return to it as the source.

The fifth: *1 Cor. 4: For who distinguishes you? And what do you have that you have not received? If then you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?* This passage cuts off every occasion for doubt: for it removes foreseen merits from the middle; for if God predestined you for this reason, that he foresaw you would make good use of the grace conferred on you, then he himself did not distinguish you, but you distinguished yourself, and God found you already distinguished by your own merits and so elected you as such — and you have something, and indeed much, that you did not receive; for this discrimination by merits is a great prerogative, about which you could certainly glory as though you had not received it. This is contrary to what Paul teaches.

The sixth, from *2 Tim. 1*, which fits well in the last place and is indeed the most important — it contains the matter entirely: *Strive according to the power of God, who has saved us and called us with a holy calling, not according to our own works but according to his own purpose and grace*. Behold industry and our cooperation from the power of God, and from it flowing, resting on the mercy of the one liberating us and calling us to holiness — not from our works, whatever they may be, but from the purpose of the caller, through free and gratuitous calling. These are certainly manifest words for proving the second position.

Consistent with this passage is that of Titus: *Not from works of righteousness which we have done*. This closes off the escape of having recourse to the merits of nature — to which the authors of the first position usually flee — by specifying "works of righteousness": so that no works whatsoever may concur antecedently to election, but the motivating cause be the mercy of God and gratuitous calling, without any foreknowledge of merits.

Section IV: Arguments for This Second Position are Set Forth

The first and capital one: glory is the end; grace and merits are means. But the intention of the end by the intellectual operative agent is prior to the election and preparation of means. Therefore in God the intention of giving glory was prior to the will of preparing means. The major is a philosophical and moral principle, clear from experience, which shows the different order of intending and executing: for in intention, prior is the proposal and love of the end; but in execution, prior is the application of means. Hence arose that common saying

which has resulted: what is first in intention is last in execution. This argument, reduced to syllogistic form, seems — as I have often said — a just and elegant demonstration.

The second: that grace destined as efficacious, or as a means for attaining the end, comes from some particular affection of God toward the one to whom it is destined and is destined toward some end for him. Therefore that grace, and the destining of it, is preceded by the election and ordination to the end which is to be obtained through it. This end is glory; therefore the intention of it precedes the preparation of that grace. The assumption is shown: for God does not destine and prepare that efficacious grace for all but only for some; therefore these are already supposed to be distinguished and elected over others abandoned, to whom that grace is not destined.

The third: those means are placed by the adversaries in order that glory may be conferred from justice. But it is not conferred from justice; therefore that foundation falls. The major is the adversaries' doctrine. The minor is urged: because that grace is either the first preventing grace, or the final persevering grace, or the series of all. The first cannot be it, because many after receiving it — indeed after receiving many — perish and are damned. If it is persevering grace, this is not owed from justice; indeed it is liberal and gratuitous: for after many years of continued grace, there is by no means perseverance. Therefore to persevere is a gratuitous gift of God, not a wage of justice. If it is that series of graces, it is not joined by an indissoluble bond with the final one, but very often is interrupted and dissolved. Therefore glory, which is connected with final grace, cannot be the effect of justice, but of grace and mercy — on which grounds Augustine expounds that of *John 1: Grace for grace*. That is, glory, which because it is founded in grace is called grace.

The fourth: all the inconveniences which the adversaries of this second position object to it also follow from their own opinion. This is clear by enumeration. The first was that there is no reason given: why that generally inefficacious will passes to the efficacious. This follows from the first position with respect to the will of giving grace inefficaciously to all: why, then, did that will in the second instant pass to the will of giving efficacious grace to some? The second: that this position overturns the reason of justice in obtaining glory, since glory is entirely gratuitous — this follows equally from the first position: for both the first and the last grace are gratuitous gifts of God; therefore they are incompatible with justice. Indeed that first position mixes and confuses grace with justice in merit, since it admits the first and last grace to be gifts of God and yet wants there to be a reason of justice in these gifts. The third, concerning the conditional end and the clothed formal character, is retorted: for if God gives the first grace in view of future merit, then it already falls away from the character of grace, because it is given on account of the foreseen good use of it; therefore it is also intended clothed with a formal character — and what is more absurd — clothed with a

formal character that is repugnant to and destructive of the very nature of grace itself. Furthermore, the argument assumes falsely that that end of glory cannot be intended absolutely, as something to be given gratuitously and liberally, but only from merits and justice.

The fourth, deduced from the wounding of freedom, is also found in the first position, because even the first efficacious grace is prepared by God without the merit of the one for whom it is prepared, and is produced in us without us, insofar as it is exciting and preventing grace. Nor is the conferral of this grace in our power; it arises from the efficacious decree of the divine will. And again, this will of God makes the connection with the persevering grace antecedently to our power and independently of it. Thus all the inconveniences objected against this second position are incurred also by that first position — as will be clearer from what is to be said.

The fifth: the reason for predestining from merits and on account of merits excludes the reason of mercy and liberality from God, and posits only the motive of justice. But the reason for predestining before foreseen merits admits both — grace and justice: grace in intention, justice in execution. And it preserves the place of God's mercy and liberal grace in predestining, and merit and justice in executing. The first position admits only one form, resting on justice, which does not tolerate the other of mercy and grace, which is altogether expressed in Sacred Scripture.

The sixth: the reason for predestining on account of merits is so unbecoming and almost unworthy of God, because it argues in him a certain mode of avarice — making his kingdom, as it were, for sale and requiring the price of merits, so that it is assigned to human industry and labor and not given except in view of service and payment. This mode is certainly not consistent with the infinite and liberal Divine Majesty, which has no need of our goods. And this mode of predestining seems to argue in him some kind of indigence and casts the Divine Majesty down to making a contract with a creature: "Do ut des" — unless you first give, I will not give. Who does not see that this is unworthy of God? When I think of this, I am ashamed of this kind of thing; for I would not wish to deal with my friends in this way, because it seems unbecoming to me. The other reason for predestining is truly generous and noble: to give freely and liberally, not excluding merits in execution and consequently as following the gift — lest it appear to give rashly and imprudently — but not antecedently requiring them as a merchant requires a price. Especially since there is such a great distance between the price and the reward.

The seventh: that form of predestining reduces the whole structure of predestination to the merit of the created will, and draws from it the beginning and reason for distinguishing and choosing some over others — which is indeed absurd and alien from the doctrine of Paul, which attributes the discrimination and election to God. But if God chooses and discriminates in view of our merits,

he seeks in us the cause and beginning of distinguishing and choosing. Certainly for this reason — as Scotus customarily says — the divine majesty is debased by begging from creatures the reasons and causes of so great a mystery of predestination, which is referred to the absolute and free purpose of God willing, as Augustine teaches — not dependently and conditionally: "if you wish and merit, I will act, I will elect and discriminate, accepting from you the principle of both willing and working; otherwise I will neither elect nor predestine." These are the arguments drawn from general doctrine. Others, taken specifically against Vázquez from Augustine's doctrine, we shall bring forward in the appointed place.

Section V: The Arguments of the Contrary and Opposing Position are Resolved

The first is resolved by denying that that first general and inefficacious will — which is commonly admitted — conflicts with the second efficacious will to save certain particular persons. And if it conflicts with this, it no less conflicts with the other, in the adversaries' own position, as we just said. The first part is clear, because since both wills are free — both the generally inefficacious and the particularly efficacious — God can according to his own judgment both extend and restrict them. Furthermore, the reason for willing through the first will differs from the reason for willing through the second: because the first is founded, as is commonly said, in the goodness and condition of our nature and in love and benevolence toward it — which they call philanthropy — and pertains to general providence. But the second is founded in the dignity of grace, which is not regulated by the motive taken from the condition of nature, to which it would seem to be added and owed if given equally to all. Hence it was fitting to introduce a distinction, not choosing all, not giving efficacious aids to all, so that that gift might appear to be gratuitous and liberal. This seems an excellent and necessary solution for showing the difference of grace from nature, and of particular from common providence.

Then the argument is resolved by retorting it: for the contrary position also posits those two wills with respect to grace, just as the second posits them with respect to glory. Therefore it is also obliged to bring forward the cause of why the first will of giving grace inefficaciously to all passed to the particular will of giving special and efficacious grace to some and not to others. Hence with the object of glory changed to grace, the same difficulty always remains: in the one, why he willed to glorify the few; in the other, why he willed to justify the few. And if the adversaries reply that the reason for discrimination is the good use of that grace, taken from the arbitrium of those cooperating with common grace, they fall into the absurdities we just mentioned: that the beginning of discrimination comes from us; that equal grace is given to all, proceeding from that general will as inefficacious. Therefore the transition of the inefficacious will

to the efficacious is not founded in our merits; indeed on the contrary, that transition cannot be founded in them.

A second reply is: that predestination in the order of intention is gratuitous and liberal — its motives being mercy and love toward those to be saved — which does not conflict with retribution from justice in the order of execution. For God wills glory for his elect in such a way that from this love of the end he provides for them appropriate means — which follow from that love, not precede it. But God is pleased to choose means proportioned to a free creature, namely merits, so that through them glory may be conferred more honestly and gloriously. And although Vázquez does not admit those orders of intention and execution, Father Suárez approves them — and theologians commonly do so together with Scotus, as appears in the *Reportata*, d. 41, q. un., S. *Respondeo secundum praedicta*, n. 7, *in fine*; and in 4 d. 16, q. 4, S. *Si quaeras*, n. 19, where he manifestly posits those two orders by applying them to the infusion of grace and the remission of fault, saying: "Prior in intention, he wills grace to this sinner A who has already sinned over punishing him; but in executing he wills the contrary." And aptly to our matter he adduces the example of predestination: "For just as he wills this person to have merits prior in the order of execution to glory, so he wills in the order of execution that there be no fault in him rather than that there be grace." The distinct orders of intention and execution are clear in Scotus. St. Thomas teaches the same in 1 p., q. 13, a. 5, *in corp.* St. Augustine likewise plainly distinguishes in this matter of predestination the order of intention from the order of execution — both elsewhere and especially in *lib. 83 quaest.*, q. 68, when he speaks of most hidden merits, as we showed just now in expounding that passage at *Collat. I, Difer. 1, Sect. 15, §. Tertium*.

A third satisfaction is given as follows. We say the assumption is false: for the end of God predestining is not justice, nor is it primarily glory as it is a crown. But the end is a gratuitous benefit intended from mercy and love — as we showed by the testimonies of Sacred Scripture. And if glory is called a crown, it is not on that account a wage of justice in the primary sense, but a good and gift freely and liberally destined for the elect. For a crown, absolutely speaking, is indifferent to wages and gift; to honor and reward — since it is also hereditary among us and not always attached to merits. And if Paul calls it a crown of justice, it is for this reason: because in execution it is rendered to those meriting. The example adduced of the king fails in many respects. First, because the king operates for the utility of the republic, which he consults for, not for the good of a private soldier to be rewarded. Second, because he gives in the name of the public and exercises distributive justice. Third, because the means of obtaining the crown are not in his power, and it is necessary to seek those which are connected with that end and depend on the industry of the soldier, with whom he contracts, as it were, in the name of the republic. Fourth, because if a king gives gratuitously at his pleasure to whomever he wills, he will overturn the republic, since no one will labor or fight, the path will be closed to vigorous and

brave men, many will languish in idleness, the door will be opened to vices, to flattery and fraud and other illicit means of obtaining rewards and honors. Finally, kings and princes often give liberally and from grace to their relatives or favorites to show their power — so they often give freely without any mention or regard to service to be rendered, but not excluding future services.

To the fourth the reply is as follows: from that decree of God predestining to glory, freedom is not taken away from the predestined, since God so predestines that he knows the manner of operating and concurring with the will, as we have noted above so many times. Otherwise, no operation of the free will would be future, since there is no operation that does not presuppose an absolute decree of God for its absolute futurity; nor does everything that precedes our free operation by exciting and infusing it necessitate the will — when it does not physically premove it with an indelible quality to which it cannot resist. This is evident in exciting grace, which is produced in us without us before our free cooperation: which grace excites and prevents, yet does not necessitate toward operation; and we experience this in the habit inhering in the intellect and in the will, which inclines the will antecedently, yet does not impose necessity on it.

Furthermore, as I just said, this argument is retorted against the decree destining efficacious grace for the predestined; and whatever inconvenience is found in the decree of giving glory is also found in the decree of giving grace. The fifth is dissolved by denying the assumption, which entirely overturns the right and ordered reason of acting on account of an end — which Scotus calls the "orderly" will. The end, therefore, is always intended prior to the means, which are prior in execution and posterior in intention; otherwise God willed the merits of the Fathers prior to the Incarnation and merit of Christ, because the Fathers existed prior to Christ; and prior to Christ, he intended the Virgin Mother, since she existed first and was in every way to exist before Christ her Son.

We overturn sacred and profane things alike. What physician ever intended medicines before health? And what miser ever intended to sail and incur expenses before growing rich? Let our Faber ask himself what first moved him toward building a ship — was it the expense of procuring supplies, of paying the fare if the ship were another's, or the wares to be brought and the gems to be procured and the riches to be gathered? The avaricious merchant eager for money will laugh at him if asked this, even though the ship must first be built or hired and many expenses incurred. Against the confirmation, we reply that the distinction is a deception. For whether one wills the end for oneself or for another, one always intends it prior to the means for obtaining it; but when a different course is taken, then the character of end is changed and passes to means. For instance: when the king wills to confer a dignity on a soldier for the utility of the republic, then the utility of the republic is the end of that dignity,

which with respect to the contest was the end. Hence that dignity itself is not intended as an end but as a means for preserving the republic and inflaming others toward fighting in hope of dignity, which passes to a means with respect to the republic. In this equivocation the argument labors, striving to introduce confusion in those replying; hence these fallacies in arguing are to be avoided.

In the same way the same thing can be an end with respect to one and a means with respect to another. For instance: betrothal is a means toward marriage as an end, and marriage is a means toward propagating offspring; so in the soldier, the contest is a means toward the prize as an end, and the prize is a means toward defending the republic. But whether the physician heals himself or others, he intends the end of health for himself and others prior to medicines, which are means. Hence the fallacy of the argument is detected, and the solution holds.

And because this objection of the end proposed to oneself and to another is often repeated, it is to be noted that it is in God's hand to employ whatever means he wills toward obtaining the end he proposes for a human being; hence he can never err or fail in intention or execution, as other causes fail. This is clear from the example: a father who destines a doctorate for his son does not have in his power all the means for the doctorate, and so often fails to achieve the end he intends. But God cannot fail, because he is omnipotent and can apply all means so that the end may be infallibly obtained.

However that may be: the objection is refuted, because whether means fail or not, the end is always what is first intended and to which means are ordered. To the sixth we have given satisfaction above by retorting it against the adversaries. But let us also give the proper reply. We deny that through the second position there is brought to the good a torpor and to the evil a despair. For in the first place, no one knows whether he is predestined or reprobate; no one, therefore, ought either to be torpid or to presume. The good are promised perseverance; let the good therefore seek it from God and not omit through prayer and humiliation to obtain it from God. The evil are likewise promised pardon through penance; let these lament their sins to obtain remission from God. Otherwise they will act not only rashly but impudently, surrendering themselves to vices contrary to predestination.

And if they object that occasion is given to people, through this gratuitous predestination, of either trusting too much or distrusting too much — that occasion arises not from predestination alone but also from foreknowledge. For one can say: what God foreknew will come about, and whatever I do I will not change God's foreknowledge; yet from foreknowledge that presumption or despair does not follow. Certainly this reason for predestining more compunctions a person and renders him docile and obedient to God than that other reason drawn from merits, which brings presumption and pride from confidence in one's own powers — which is a greater sin than that torpor and despair.

Furthermore, if we are predestined on account of the future use of grace and on account of our merits, why does God confer that grace on so few — the grace which he foresaw they would have used well? He therefore deprives them of the reason for meriting from justice and does them an injury by withholding efficacious aids, and is obliged in some way to make amends for the damage — just as if a king or commander about to fight with the enemy were to provide for his soldiers in a chance battle weak and frail arms, though he could provide strong and stout ones that he gives to other soldiers; he would act most unjustly, because he armed some badly when he armed others well. By this example the absurdity of the first position is apparent: from it it follows that some are given only sufficient graces and others efficacious ones, whence follows the salvation of some and the damnation of others.

Moreover, if the first position is true, God can neither and should not deny to one who fights well and serves through many years the gift of perseverance — yet many are deprived of it, having before been just, and many are given it who were before sinners. Whence did the thief merit to persevere, and whence did Judas merit to defect? Or, to come closer to the point: whence did that one soldier, one of the forty martyrs, merit — after so many contests, in the pool frozen with ice — to defect and lose the crown? And whence did that other soldier, a torturer of the martyrs, merit suddenly to become a martyr and receive another's crown? Let Molina, Lessio, Becanus, and certain recent theologians who prefer to follow them answer me this, and let them show the cause of this discrimination according to their acuity and singular genius. I am so dull that when I see these events, filled with tears and overwhelmed with shame, I cry out first with Paul and shortly after with Augustine: *O the depth of the riches!* And *O man, who are you to answer back to God?* But if they are affected otherwise, I and many others I know are struck with awe, groan, weep together, and — lest we probe things too high for us — we bow our heads, draw in our shoulders, and with downcast eyes venerate the divine judgments.

Section V: What Does Augustine Think in This Controversy?

Since the authors of both positions commit the matter to Augustine's judgment, and what he prejudged they want to be taken as settled judgment, let us see what he held — so that with his position established we may remove the controversy. We shall bring forward for greater clarity certain documents of Augustine, absolutely indubitable, marked with their own numbers, so that the whole matter may be more evidently clear.

First Document of Augustine: That the election of the predestined was made not only without foreseen merits, but on the contrary from foreseen demerits, through the mercy of the liberating God.

Augustine holds that God, having seen original sin and human beings assembled in the condemned mass of Adam — when he saw all going toward perdition,

moved with compassion, willed to free some and by his mercy discriminated them from that mingled mass, and by discriminating chose them, leaving the rest in the just judgment in the state of perdition in which they were. Hence it is clear that he took the occasion for predestining from foreseen demerits.

This doctrine Augustine sets down in *Enchir.*, c. 24 to 37; and again from c. 92 to 109; *Epist.* 105, *ad Sixtum*, at the beginning; *Epist.* 106, toward the middle — in which passages this doctrine is expressly handed down; and also *Epist.* 46 and 107; *lib. de Trinitate*, c. 10 — where there are illustrious testimonies; *lib.* 83 *quaest.*, q. 68; *In Euangelium Ioan.*, tract. 86, excellently; *In Epistolam primam Ioan.*, tract. 9; in *Ps.* 30, *concione* 1 and 2; *De verbis Apost.*, *sermone* 11, 14, 20; *lib. de peccat. mer. et remif.*, c. 21 and 22; and *lib.* 2, c. 18; *lib. de natura et gratia*, c. 5; *lib.* 2, *de nupt. et concup.*, c. 16; *lib.* 3, *contra Iulianum*, c. 18; *lib.* 4, *contra eundem*, c. 8; and *lib.* 5, c. 4; *lib.* 6, c. 2, 3, 12, 14, 24; *lib.* 1, *contra 2 Epistolas Pelagianorum*, c. 20, *ad finem*; *lib.* 2, *from* c. 5 to 8; *lib.* 4, c. 4 and 6; *lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 6, 7, 8, 13, 23; *lib. de Correptione et Gratia*, c. 7, 8, 10, 12, 13; *lib. de Praedest. Sanctorum*, c. 5, 6, 7, 8; *lib. de bono perseuerantiae*, c. 8, 9, 10, 13. In all these passages that doctrine is handed down. Let the reader trust me and have faith in my eyes.

I select a few, lest I be too lengthy, since I am playing the scholastic. Therefore, in the *Enchiridion* to Laurentius, c. 99: *God has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills — mercy, that is, with great goodness; hardening, with no iniquity. So that neither the one set free should glory in his own merits, nor the one damned should complain about his own merits. For grace alone distinguishes from the lost those whom God had assembled in one mass of perdition from a common cause derived from its origin.* And below: *Let a man see, if he grasps it, the entire human race condemned by so just a divine judgment in the apostate root that even if none were freed from it, no one could rightly blame the justice of God. And those who are freed should have been freed in such a way that, from the great number not freed and left in the most just damnation, it would be shown what the whole mass deserved, and where also the just judgment of God would lead even these, were it not that his undeserved mercy came to their aid; so that the mouth of all those wishing to glory in their own merits may be stopped, and that he who glories may glory in the Lord.*

And lest any scholastic have recourse to the merits of nature, saying that only those are excluded, let him observe where the elect were — namely in the same mass with the damned, and the merits of both were equal, that is, original sin and what followed from it. But I wish to adduce a passage where those evil merits are called by name by Augustine. In *lib.* 13, *de Trinitate*, c. 10, speaking of the merits of Christ our redeemer by which we are freed, he says: "He deigned to enter into our fellowship, in order that without his evil merit he might endure our evils, and thus now to those believing in how much God loves us, and to those hoping — who had despaired — he might bestow on us his gifts without any good merits of ours, indeed with our preceding evil merits, by undeserved liberality." Behold — he said "evil merits" plainly. About these admirably in *Epist.*

106, toward the middle: *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy*. What did he teach us here, except that it pertains not to the merits of human beings but to the mercy of God that anyone is freed from that mass of the first man, to whom deserved death is owed? In *lib. 4, contra Iulianum, c. 8*, he says that evil merits were present in those who became vessels of mercy. And in *lib. 2, contra 2 Epistolas Pelagianorum, c. 7*: "Without merit and freely it is given; he has mercy on whom he wills" — and there more widely and luminously: *Who distinguishes you, namely from the vessels of wrath, from the mass of perdition? He distinguishes you who confers the wherewith to be distinguished: removing deserved punishment and bestowing undeserved grace. He distinguishes you who, when there were darkness over the abyss, said: Let there be light, and light was made, and he divided, that is, discriminated, between the light and the darkness. For he did not find anything to discriminate when the darkness were with the sole abyss; but by making the light he discriminated, so that to the justified impious it is said: For you were once darkness, but now you are light in the Lord. And thus: Let him who glories, glory in the Lord*. Therefore God foresaw nothing but evil merits and the darkness of fault when he chose. This pertains to predestination in intention.

In execution, moreover, when the contrary authors want us to follow the order of time — that God so decreed in eternity as he executed in time — speaking of the conversion of Paul the Apostle in *lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 5*, he says: "The merit in the Apostle Paul was indeed present, but it was evil; and soon: Since he had this evil merit, a good was rendered to him for evil." And below: "But that he was called from heaven and converted by so great and most efficacious a calling was the grace of God alone, because his merits were great but evil." Behold the execution of the most efficacious conversion decreed from eternity on account of evil merits — for the word "because" is causal. He continues: "Commemorating his own merits, but evil, he says, *For we too were once foolish*, etc. What was owed to these so evil merits except punishment?" Finally, *c. 6*: "Let us return to Paul, whom we certainly find having obtained the grace of God without any good merits, indeed with many evil merits — rendering good for evil." And Paul alone is not an example of this mercy freeing from evils, not of justice on account of foreseen goods, but many others, of whom Augustine at *c. 6*: "By these divine testimonies it is proved that the grace of God is not given according to our merits, since we see it given not only with no good merits but with many preceding evil merits, and we see it given and being given daily."

I add a passage from *Psalms 55*, on that verse *For nothing you will save them*: "Saving them with no preceding merits of theirs" — none therefore of Paul the Apostle's good merits preceded; indeed such preceded as he should have been condemned for: "he brought nothing good, and was saved" — that is, your grace was given freely. "What had that thief brought to the cross? From the Senate to the judgment, from the judgment to the wood, from the wood to Paradise."

Second Document: Just as Christ was predestined freely before foreseen merits, so too the other predestined.

Augustine customarily proposes as an idea and example of the gratuitous election of the predestined the predestination of Christ the Lord, and argues from it: just as Christ was predestined entirely freely without any foreseen merits on the part of his humanity, so too human beings to be redeemed by him were predestined freely without any merits of their own. Augustine does this admirably in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, c. 10, where: "There is also the most illustrious light of predestination and grace — the Savior himself, the Mediator himself between God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus, who, in order to be this — what good works, what preceding merits of faith did the human nature in him earn? Let the answer be given, please: how did that man merit that he should be assumed, as the only-begotten Son of God co-eternal with the Father, into the unity of person?" And below: "Therefore just as that one man was predestined to be our head, so we many were predestined to be his members." And finally, admirably: "Let whoever finds preceding merits of that singular generation in our head, also search in us his members for the preceding merits of the generation multiplied."

Where I observe it was impossible for Christ to merit his Incarnation, because this was the beginning of merit, which cannot fall under merit. This is also true in our case: for how can we merit the first grace on account of its future use from grace, since that first grace does not fall under merit? And this holds a *fortiori* in Christ.

There is another excellent passage of this idea or exemplar of the predestined Christ in *lib. de dono Perseuerantiae*, c. ultimo, where Augustine, to remove the foreknowledge of merits, says: "But no more illustrious example of predestination is there than Jesus himself. Whoever is faithful and wishes to understand these things well, let him look at him, and will find both himself and his own case." And afterward: "He who made this just man from the seed of David, who would never be unjust, without any merit of his will — he also made just men out of the unjust without any merit of their preceding will, so that that one would be the head of these and these would be his members." Finally: "Him therefore and us he predestined, because both in him, that he should be our head, and in us, that we should be his body, not merits of ours about to precede, but his own future works did he foreknow." These last words, "His own future works did he foreknow," which attribute everything to God and leave us nothing of those works of which the antecedent foreknowledge could be the cause of election.

Augustine is delighted with this example. Hence in the *Enchiridion*, c. 36, having spoken first of the Incarnation of the Word: "Here," he says, "grace is commended grandly and evidently. For what did the human nature in the man Christ merit, that it should be singularly assumed into the unity of person of the

only-begotten Son of God? What good will, what good purpose, what good works preceded, by which that man merited to be one person with God?" And immediately: "Since there is therefore such great glory for the human nature, with no preceding merits, without doubt gratuitously?" Then he accommodates to our predestination: "So that people may understand that they are justified from sin through the same grace by which it was brought about that the man Christ could have no sin." There Augustine also uses the new example of the Most Holy Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, which will be a welcome and pleasing confirmation for theologians of this entirely gratuitous election. "So also the angel greeted his mother when he announced this birth to her: *Hail, full of grace*. And shortly after: *You have found grace with God* — and she, filled with grace, and said to have found grace with God, so that she would be the Mother of her Lord, indeed God and Lord of all." Acutely and solidly does Augustine, from the word "found," collect that the gift — the election to that ineffable dignity of Mother of God — was entirely gratuitous: for she had it neither of herself nor from her merits, but "found" it with God — from which grace she is called "full of grace," as though nothing of preceding merit had been found in her. Everything she owed to grace.

There remains another most illustrious passage, where this doctrine is reduced to execution, in *lib. 13, de Trinitate, c. 10*: "If the Son of God by nature was made the Son of Man out of mercy for the sons of men — for this is *the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us* — how much more credible is it that the sons of man are made, by the grace of God, sons of God and dwell in God?" Note "by mercy was he made man" and "by the grace of God sons of God are made": so that in both, mercy and grace shine forth, not justice. And then he excludes all causal merits from human beings through those words which I adduced above: "So that he might bestow on us his gifts without any good merits of ours, indeed with our preceding evil merits, by undeserved liberality." He uses the same argument and example in the same *lib. 13, de Trinitate, c. 17*.

Third Document: Our merits are the gifts and donations of God.

So Augustine calls them, and attributes everything conducing to glorification and justification to God, so that the whole glory returns to him from whom everything we receive flows mercifully and liberally. This doctrine Augustine inculcates so often that if the passages were to be brought forward, all the books would have to be transcribed. Let us sip some flowers, as bees do. He calls our merits gifts of God in the passage just cited from *lib. 3, de Trinitate, c. 10*: "What are called our merits" — observe "are called" — "are his gifts." Note again "are." They are called ours, which they appear to be; but in reality they are God's gifts. In *lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 6*: "God crowns his own gifts, not your merits." And soon: "If they are good, they are God's gifts; because as the Apostle says: *Every good gift and every perfect gift comes from above, descending from the Father of lights*." And *c. 7*, at the beginning: "If therefore your good merits are God's gifts,

God does not crown your merits as your merits but as his own gifts." And he proves this from Paul; and we proved it in our *Concentus Eucharisticus* at the prayer of the Holy Mother Church on the sixth Sunday after Pentecost: *God of virtues, whose is everything that is best*. And in the prayer on the second Sunday after Easter: *God from whom all good things proceed*. And in the prayer of the feria following Pentecost: *Now we present, from the homily 14, among the 50*: "When therefore God crowns your merits, he crowns nothing but his own gifts." And in *sermon 8, de verbis Apostoli*, near the end: "*Why? My gifts — forget your merits; for if I were looking for your merits, you would not come to my gifts*." Furthermore, in *lib. 9, Confessionum*, c. 13: "*Whoever recounts your true merits to you, O God, recounts nothing but your own gifts*." Also, *Epist. 105*, before the middle: "What therefore is the merit before grace, by which merit one may receive grace, since all our good merit is not made in us except by grace, and when God crowns our merits, he crowns nothing but his own gifts?" Again, *Epist. 106*, after the beginning: "The very merit of a human being is a gratuitous gift."

From which, first, it is deduced: if merits are gifts given by God, they are given from some antecedent will, and this will is gracious — namely the free and gratuitous election of the one to whom they are destined. Second, if they are gifts, they do not import justice but mercy. Augustine says beautifully in *Psalm 58*, near the end: "My God, my mercy. He who was filled with God's goods found nothing to call his God but his mercy." "O name under which no one is to despair! What is my mercy? If you say, my salvation — understand that he gives salvation. If you say, my refuge — understand that you take refuge in God. If you say, my strength — understand that he gives you strength. What is my mercy? Everything that I am comes from your mercy."

Fourth Document: The discrimination of the predestined is God's work, not made through their merits.

Augustine attributes the discrimination of the elect from the abandoned, of the predestined from the reprobate, before the foreknowledge of good works, to God. So in *Epist. 46, 105, 106, 107*; in the *Enchiridion ad Laurentium*, c. 99; in *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum*, q. 2, near the end; *lib. 1, de peccat. mer. et remif.*, c. 20; *lib. 2, contra 2 Epist. Pelagian.*, c. 7; *lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 6, near the end; *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*, c. 6 and 7; *lib. de Praedest. Sanctorum*, c. 3 and 5. In nearly all of these passages he adduces and expounds in this sense those words of Paul (1 Cor. 4): *Who distinguishes you?* I shall adduce some more notable ones.

Epist. 46, to Valentinus, at the beginning: "For who distinguishes you? — because by this he says that God does not distinguish a person from that mass of corruption proceeding from Adam to make him a vessel of honor, unless it is God himself." And he goes on excluding works: "But since a human being according to the flesh, swollen up, might respond: *My faith distinguishes me, my prayer distinguishes me, my justice distinguishes me* — at once the Apostle forestalls him and says: *And what do you have that you have not received? If then you received it,*

why do you glory as if you had not received it?" In which sentence note that there is no place here for the merits of nature, since St. Paul is speaking even of gifts of grace which a person receives from God — saying "what do you have that you have not received?" — and that these are such that one cannot glory in them as in one's own, abusing the glory or attributing to oneself a divine gift.

The same Augustine teaches in *lib. 2, contra 2 Epistolas Pelagianas, c. 7*: "Who distinguishes you? — and as though someone had answered: *my faith distinguishes me, my purpose distinguishes me, my merit* — And what do you have, he says, *that you have not received? If then you received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?* This is as though it were from you, the wherewith to be distinguished." Note "from you." Therefore it was from God from whom he had received; therefore it was God's good and God's gift and God's grace. And he adds: "He distinguishes you who confers on you the wherewith to be distinguished." Therefore it was not innate merit of nature, but a gift of grace conferred by God. He adduces there an apposite and acute example: "He distinguishes," he says, "who when there were darkness over the abyss said: *Let there be light, and light was made, and he divided* — that is, discriminated — *between the light and the darkness*. For he did not find anything to discriminate when the darkness were with the sole abyss; but by making the light he discriminated, so that to the justified impious it is said: *For you were once darkness, but now you are light in the Lord*." Thus those are refuted who say that the discrimination of the predestined from the reprobate was made through foreseen good works, and that only natural merits are excluded. Certainly every antecedent merit, whatever it may be, Augustine removed from the discrimination. He is consistent with himself in *Sermon 11, de verbis Apostoli, c. 13*.

Fifth Document: No one is permitted to glory in his good works in himself, but only in the Lord.

A frequent and salutary doctrine of Augustine, which forbids anyone from glorying in good works, since — according to St. Cyprian, whom Augustine customarily cites — there is nothing in which we are to glory in ourselves. There would be great matter for glorying, however, if anyone were discriminated and chosen from a foreseen future use of grace, as certain authors of the opposite position themselves concede. Augustine removes this presumption through this document handed down in *Epist. 46, 105, 106, 107, 143; lib. 11, de Gen. ad lit., c. 9; lib. de spiritu et litera, c. 36; in Enchir., cap. 39; lib. 1, de peccat. mer. et remif., c. 22; lib. 2, cap. 18 and 19; lib. de nupt. et concup. ad Valerium, c. 12; lib. 4, contra Iulianum, cap. 8; lib. 2, contra 2 Epist. Pelagianorum, c. 6 and 7; lib. 4, c. 6 and 9*, where he cites Cyprian; *lib. de grat., c. 2, 3; lib. de perfect. iustitiae, c. 15; and lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 6, 7, 12, 18; lib. de Corrupt. et Grat., c. 7 with Cyprian; and c. 9 and 12; lib. de Praedest. Sanct., c. 2, 3, 4 with Cyprian; and c. 5 and 7 and 18; lib. de bono perseuerantiae, c. 8, 13, 14 with Cyprian; and c. 17 with Cyprian; and c. 19 with the same, Ambrose, and Gregory of Nazianzus*. I select certain passages.

In *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, c. 3: "Not thus did that most pious and humble doctor perceive — I am speaking of the most blessed Cyprian — who says that in nothing is one to glory, since nothing is our own." And lest one object that he deals there only against Semi-Pelagians, he repeats this in *lib. de bono Perseuerantiae*, c. 17 and 19, in an altogether absolute sense, and agrees with another similar saying of Ambrose which he cites at c. 13 and 19 of the same work, namely: "Our heart and our thoughts are not in our power." And there he adds other sentences of Ambrose containing that general doctrine, such as those he cites from Nazianzus at the same c. 19.

Another passage is in *Epist. 145, to Juliana and Demetrias, mother and daughter*, where he says many excellent things: "These are gifts of God, and they are indeed yours, but not from yourselves. For you have this treasure in earthly bodies and still fragile ones, as if in vessels of clay, so that the excellence of the virtue may be God's and not from you. And do not marvel that we say both that they are yours and not from you. For we also call our daily bread ours, but we nevertheless add: Give us — lest it be thought to be from ourselves." And below: "God forbid that she should glory in herself and not in him to whom it is said: *My glory and the one who lifts up my head*. For her glory is wholesomely his, when God who is in her is himself her glory, from whom she has all good things by which she is good, will have all things by which she can be better, by which she will be perfect, when she will be perfected not by human praise but by divine grace, for in the Lord shall her soul be praised."

Note, reader, in this testimony "my glory" related to God, and compare with "my mercy" also related to God, which we said above from Augustine at *Psalms 55: My God, my mercy*. And recognize the harmony of mercy in giving on God's part, and of glory to be rendered to God on our part — so that what we receive mercifully from God, we may glory in it not in ourselves but in the virtue of God. He himself my mercy, he himself my glory; nothing is mine, and if it is mine, it is so because I have it from God, it flowed from his mercy, and it is altogether to be referred to God's glory, under the authority of Cyprian. Augustine has similar passages in *Sermon 11, de verbis Apostoli*, and there adduces that fine verse from *Psalms 55: For nothing you will save them*. I conclude with Augustine in *lib. 2, de peccat. meritis et remissione*, c. 18: "That we turn away from God is ours, and this is the evil will; that we turn to God, since only with him exciting and assisting us we cannot do it — this is the good will. What do we have that we have not received? If then we have received it, why do we glory as if we had not received it? And hence, so that he who glories may glory in the Lord: to those to whom the Lord wills to give this, it is his mercy, not their merit." We return to the source, and indeed to the source of mercy, from which all our good things flow.

Sixth Document: Prayers and petitions for obtaining the gifts of grace, and thanks rendered for those received, exclude the foreknowledge of merits.

Augustine hands this down in many passages and joins both petitions and thanksgivings; he argues thus: what is asked is not possessed; it is asked from God; therefore it is not possessed from us. Again: thanks are owed to one from whom things are given for what is rendered in thanksgiving; thanks are rendered to God; therefore they are given by him. So in *Epist. 107*, where: "Paul says to the Thessalonians: *Brothers, pray that the word of God may run and be glorified*. He knows certainly that this is done by the one whom he wants to be prayed to that he may do it." And later: "Therefore God through the prayers of believers makes unbelievers believe, to show that it is he himself who does it." He joins both petitions and thanksgivings in the same passage: "He is to be prayed that he may do it; thanksgiving is to be rendered to him when you do it."

In *lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 4: "What is more clearly shown to be the grace of God than where what is prayed for is received?" And c. 13: "We would in no way ask from the Father if we could accomplish this by the virtue of the human will." C. 14: "The Spirit of grace makes us have faith, so that through faith we may obtain by praying what we are commanded to do." What follows in c. 15 and 16; and *lib. de Praedest. Sanctorum*, c. 8, 11; and c. 20, where: "It would not be prayed for from him unless it were believed to be given by him."

In *lib. de dono Perseuerantiae*, c. 2: "Why is perseverance sought from God if it is not given by God? Or is even that prayer derisory, when what is sought from him is known not to be given by him, but that without his giving it, it is in the power of man?" So far the petition and prayer; now the act of thanksgiving: "Equally derisory is also that act of thanksgiving, if for that reason thanks are rendered to God who did not himself give or do it." He goes on tending toward Cyprian's book on the Lord's prayer, to confirm this doctrine, and continues to c. 8; and after the interruption of a few chapters returns to the same at c. 17 and 19. In c. 20 he relates that brief and effective prayer, and affirms it could not be endured by Pelagius, because it made God the author of grace. That Augustine was accustomed to use it appears from *lib. Confessioun*, 10, c. 37: "*Give what you command, and command what you will*. You know, Lord, from this matter the groaning of my heart to you, and the rivers of my eyes" — by which he indicates the feeling with which he recited it. This prayer marvelously pleased St. Teresa, as is written in her life, c. 13, and we noted in our *Concentus Eucharisticus*, page 457.

The same virtue of praying he proposes at c. 23 in the person of the Church, by whose authority he confirms this his document. Let us hear Augustine on this act of thanksgiving for our purpose, at c. 13, *de bono Perseuerantiae*: "What therefore is said in the sacraments of the faithful, that we should have our hearts above, this is the gift of the Lord; concerning which gift the priest, after these words are said, admonishes those to whom this is said to give thanks to the same Lord God, and they respond that it is worthy and just. For since our heart is not in our power, but is elevated by divine assistance, so that it ascends and thinks of

what is above — where Christ is, sitting at the right hand of God, not what is on earth — thanks are to be given to none other for this than to the Lord God who does this, who by such a benefit chose us from the depth of this world and predestined us." And let us close with that brief and excellent sentence at c. 23 of the same work: "Which goods the Church always prays for, she always believed to be gifts of God."

Let us couple prayers and thanksgivings from *Epist. 144, to Juliana*: "As it is written, *pray without ceasing, give thanks in all things* — you pray that you may have perseverance and progress; you give thanks, because you do not have these from yourselves." The entire *Epist. 95* is full of documents of petitions and acts of thanksgiving, which is the epistle of the African Fathers together with Augustine, under Aurelius of Carthage.

From this document it is apparent that the first contrary position is inconsistent with this doctrine: for according to it, we should rather be the ones prayed to, that we cooperate with grace according to the choice of our will, rather than God being prayed to that he operate in us and for us; and we should rather give thanks that we cooperated with grace according to the choice of our will, than to God who awaits our will to operate.

Seventh Document: The manner in which grace operates in us not only gives the power to act but the very willing itself — this is opposed to the position that posits the foreknowledge of merits.

The manner in which grace gives not only the power to act but also the willing and operating is the proper mode of Christ's grace in this state of fallen nature, according to Augustine — as is apparent from *lib. de Corrept. et Grat., from c. 10 to 13*. This we showed from Suárez, Vázquez, and other authors in our *Concentus Eucharisticus*, and especially in the Harmony contained there of the Exercises of St. Ignatius with Augustine's doctrine, where by comparing many passages of Ignatius and Augustine with the prayers of the Church, we showed that grace operates powerfully in us, excites, acts, moves, governs, draws, impels, and indeed compels us — a word used by the Church and by Ignatius together with Augustine. Indeed Ignatius said in the *Book of Exercises*, page 23 in the Coimbra edition and 25 in the Roman edition, that the will is set on fire and burns and is carried with great fervor.

Augustine expressed this efficacy of grace in *lib. de gratia Christi contra Pelagium, c. 4; lib. 1, contra 2 Epist. Pelagianorum, c. 29 and 20; lib. 4, c. 5; lib. 1, ad Simplicianum, q. 2, ad fin.; Epist. 106, ad Paulinum, near the end; Epist. 107, before the end; lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 8, 11, 21; lib. de Corrept. et Grat., c. 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; lib. de Praedest. Sanctorum, c. 8 and 20; lib. 2, de peccat. mer. et remif., c. 56; lib. de spiritu et littera, c. 2, 9, 11, 12, 28 and 29; serm. 13, de verbis Apostoli; lib. 2, de peccato originali, c. 24; lib. 4, contra Iulianum, c. 8; and lib. 6, c. 5*. I bring forward two testimonies from *lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio*. At c. 15: "It is certain that we

will when we will; but it is he who brings it about that we will the good." And *c.* 16: "God operates in us both the willing and the doing. It is certain that we do when we do, but he brings it about that we do, supplying efficacious powers to the will."

And another from *lib. de Correptione et Grat.*, *c.* 11, speaking of the "aid by which" — that is, the proper grace of the predestined through Christ: "This aid, by which it is given according to grace, not according to debt, is given so much more through Jesus Christ our Lord to those to whom God has pleased to give it, that it not only be present without which they could not persevere even if they wished, but also that it be such and so great that they will, etc." And *c.* 12: "For them — that is, the elect — he not only gives the aid that was given to the first man, without which they could not persevere if they wished; but he also works in them the willing itself: so that since they will not persevere unless they both can and will, both the possibility and the will of persevering is given to them by divine generosity. For their will is so inflamed that they are able to persevere because they so will; and they so will because God works that they will. And after a few words interjected: *Succor was therefore given to the weakness of the human will, so that by divine grace it might be led indeclinably and invincibly.* And finally toward the end of the chapter: "He preserved for the weak that they themselves, by his gift, might invincibly will the good, and invincibly not wish to abandon it."

This manner of the operation of grace is incompatible with that first position on predestination from foreseen merits, which posits grace as indifferent, left to the power of free will, which so responds to it in operating as to accompany the concomitant grace — so as to establish merit from justice — as can be seen in Molina and Lessio. And what I grieve more, in the Scotist Philip Faber, who in the *Theological Disputations on Predestination*, *d.* 60, *n.* 22, responding to the eleventh argument, says: "Grace can be taken with all the circumstances of God giving, together with the concurrence of the free will assenting to it; and in this way I concede — or that grace by which one assents is greater because it is efficacious. But this greater extent and efficacy comes from the free will, which makes it efficacious for itself." How this position coheres with Augustine's doctrine I do not see — there is nothing more discrepant from it, and from the prayers of the Church. Had Faber considered those when he wrote this, he would have abstained entirely from that saying; for to one saying that the greater extent of grace comes from free will, the Church would respond by saying to God: *Give us, we pray, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity.* And to Faber affirming that efficacy comes from the same free will, the Church would oppose that other prayer of the fourth Sunday after Pentecost in the secrets of the Mass: *We beseech you, O Lord, to be appeased by the offerings received, and mercifully compel our rebellious wills also to you.* And against Molina and Lessio, who posit people as fit and congruent in certain circumstances suited to inducing grace, the Church would oppose that particular phrase of the prayer on the

fourth Sunday after Epiphany, where the Church says: *Deign to make us truly fit* — so that they may understand that even that very congruity and fitness of the will is made and provided by God.

I observe, however, that Augustine, though he uses many words to explain the efficacy of divine grace through Christ, never used the word "to compel" — though it has been introduced by some. Yet Origen employed it in the *Book on Numbers*, c. 20, where he says that we are not only invited by God but also drawn and compelled to salvation. Prudently, however, Augustine abstained from the word "to compel," which seems to conflict with freedom.

Eighth Document: All means conducive to salvation are effects of the predestining will of God and come from his affection.

This Augustine expressly hands down. If we show this, we overcome the authors of the first position. For in this is included even the first efficacious grace, which they want to be the beginning, cause, and seed of glory. Therefore Augustine makes the whole series of graces conducting to the glory of the one who is predestined an effect of the purpose of God choosing. And indeed regarding the first grace, the Massilienses understood Augustine this way, grieving that he was removing the beginning of their natural grace by that purpose or constitution of Paul's, from which it flowed. Hence at the beginning of Prosper's letter they say: "This purpose of the calling of God, by which it is said that the discrimination is made, so that according to what pleased the Creator, some are created as vessels of honor and some of dishonor, removes the hope of resurrection and supplies the saints with occasion for sloth." And soon after: "Industry is removed and virtues are abolished if God's constitution anticipates human wills." And in Hilary's letter likewise at the beginning: "They contend that foreknowledge and predestination avail to this — that he foreknew, predestined, or purposed to choose those who were about to believe; and of this faith it cannot be said: *And what do you have that you have not received?*" And below: "And they do not wish to be led to the uncertainty of the divine will, where — as they think — for obtaining or losing, there is some evident beginning of their own will." They struggle about the beginning and recognize that Augustine with that purpose of God from Paul occupies all the aids of grace, even the beginning, so that even this would be an effect of predestination. And indeed Augustine proves that this beginning is given by God in *lib. de Praedest. Sanctor.*, from c. 1 to 10 — which was the genuine mind of Augustine.

Let us bring forward express passages. In *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*, c. 7, having set down the whole series of benefits given in execution to the elect: "All these things," he says, "he works in those whom he made as vessels of mercy — who chose them in his Son before the foundation of the world through the election of grace" — that is, gratuitous, for he adds: "But if by grace, it is no longer from works." And again: "Not of their preceding merits. For they were not called in such a way as to be not elect. But since — here is the force — they were called

according to purpose, they were certainly elected through the election of grace, not of their preceding merits, because grace for them is every merit." He excludes even that beginning introduced by the Massilienses: "We know that for those who love God all things work together for good, for those who are called according to the purpose, since those whom he foreknew he also predestined; and those whom he predestined, he also called; and those whom he called, he also justified; and those whom he justified, he also glorified." All these things descend from that principle "according to the purpose." What follows: "From these none perishes, because all are elect; but they are elect because they were called according to the purpose." And most clearly: "But they were elected to reign with Christ." These words contain the matter — namely that the prior intention was of election to the kingdom and glory.

The same Augustine continues to teach this at *c. 8 and 9*, where those who were about to believe through the preaching of the Gospel: yet before they were going to be, they were already inscribed as sons of God by the indefectible constancy of the Father's memory. He teaches the same clearly at *c. 13*; and in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, *c. 6, 10, 16*, where he aptly applies that: *You did not choose me, but I chose you*; and *c. 17, 18, and 19*, admirably. And in *lib. de bono Perseuerantiae*, from *c. 12* — speaking especially of the gift of perseverance — to the end. The doctrine of *lib. 2, contra 2 Epist. Pelagianorum*, *c. 6, 7, 10*; *lib. 4, c. 6*; *lib. 1, de peccat. mer. et rem.*, *c. 21*; *lib. 13, de Trin.*, *c. 16*; *lib. de grat. et lib. arb.*, *c. 6, 7, 18*; and *Epist. 106*, before the end — where: "The number of the predestined is certain, for whom all things work together for good, for those called according to the purpose, the saints, whom he foreknew and predestined; and whom he predestined he also called" — agrees with this. Here we must supply "according to the purpose," as Augustine declares. For there are others who were called but not chosen. "But those whom he called according to the purpose, he also justified; and those whom he justified, he also glorified." These are the sons of promise, these are the elect.

I add a passage from *lib. 5, contra Iulianum Pelagianum*, *c. 4*: "Lest they should perhaps be thought to be elected before the foundation of the world from works foreknown, he followed up and added: *But if by grace, then no longer from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace*. And lest you take refuge in the merits and works of nature, hear what follows: *From this number of the elect and predestined, even those who have led a wicked life are led by God's benignity to penance, through whose patience they were not taken from this life in the very perpetration of their crimes; from these none perishes at whatever age they die. For let it not be that one predestined to life is permitted to end this life without the sacrament of the mediator*." Therefore that purpose is the source and cause of absolutely all means; and all those means are given in view of the glory pre-intended; nor does grace precede election to glory, since even sinners are called to penance — called not from a state of grace but from a state of sin. And the same truth is proved from the contrary: because those who are not predestined to glory are not given those aids — which is a sign that those to

whom they are given receive them for this reason, because they are predestined to glory. This is clear from Augustine in *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*, c. 13: "Those who do not belong to this number of the predestined are judged most justly for their merits — some more, some less; but all evil, and to be judged with various punishments for this very diversity. For they were abandoned to free will, not receiving the gift of perseverance by the just but hidden judgment of God." And in *lib. de Praedest. Sanct.*, c. 14: "But the rest, where else are they left if not in the mass of perdition by the just divine judgment? There the Tyrians and Sidonians were left, who would also have believed if they had seen those miracles of Christ. But because it was not given to them that they should believe, even the means by which they could believe was denied to them." And immediately: "If by God's deeper judgment they are not discriminated from the mass of perdition by the predetermination of grace, not even those divine words or deeds are administered to them through which they could believe, if they heard or saw such things."

Nothing, certainly, can be more manifest for grasping Augustine's mind and for drawing from this document his position as altogether contrary to the foreknowledge of merits.

Ninth Document: The election of the predestined is referred to the free and gratuitous will of God.

Augustine refers the election of the predestined to the free and gratuitous will of God without any cause or reason from the part of those to be chosen; and when at the beginning he found it difficult — being less experienced in matters of grace — to choose one over another without any distance between them, yet having gone more deeply into these mysteries and having better understood them as illuminated by God, he set aside the doubt and held that in the cause of predestination, where there was no distance or distinction in that condemned mass but all were in the debt of original sin, God chose these over others to reign with Christ from his pure mercy and free will.

This doctrine is entirely opposed to the first position, which posits in merits the reason for choosing. Augustine hands down this doctrine frequently, using the celebrated example of the householder hiring workers from a denarius into his vineyard. About this "purpose" from "complacency" — which are Paul's words — we said enough in showing that election consists in an act of the will. Now let us bring forward those passages in which the equality of debtors is posited, and in that equality the division on God's part — willing to remit the debt to some and to exact it from others, lest there be acceptance of persons. This also is a saying of Paul, whose best interpreter on this matter is Augustine. For where there are guilty parties and debtors, and damnation is owed to all, one who frees one and leaves another does not accept persons; otherwise, if all merit, then in choosing one and rejecting another among those meriting there will be acceptance of

persons — which Paul excludes on this ground of the equality of the guilty and of debtors.

Therefore Augustine employs that example in *lib. 2, contra 2 Epist. Pelagianorum*, c. 7; in the *Enchiridion*, c. 88 and 89; *lib. 1 ad Simplicianum*, q. 2, at the end; *Epist. 105*, at the beginning and near the end; *Epist. 106*, through nearly the whole; *Epist. 107*, near the end, where: "With no merit, with no diversity of will, having similar causes"; *lib. de dono perseuerantiae*, c. 8; *Serm. 59, de verbis Domini*. I select some testimonies.

In *lib. 2, contra 2 Epist. Pelagianorum*, c. 7: "If someone has two debtors and wishes to remit the debt to one and exact it from the other: to whom he wishes he gives; but he defrauds no one; nor is there to be called acceptance of persons where there is no iniquity. Otherwise, to those who understand little, there might seem to be acceptance of persons where the master of the vineyard gave the same to workers who labored only one hour as to those who bore the burden of the day and the heat, making equal in wages those whose labor had been so greatly unequal. But what does he answer to those who murmur against the father of the family about this apparent acceptance of persons? *Friend, I do no wrong to you; did you not agree with me for a denarius? Take what is yours and go. But I wish to give to this last one the same as to you. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?*" And applying the doctrine: "So when another is called according to God's purpose and another is not called, the one called receives a gratuitous good of which the very calling is the beginning; to the one not called an evil is rendered, because all are guilty from the fact that through one man sin entered into the world." And then: "Nor is there any acceptance of persons in two debtors equally found guilty, if the debt is remitted to one and exacted from the other, which is equally owed by both."

In *lib. de dono perseuerantiae*, c. 8: "Let him who is freed love grace; let him who is not freed acknowledge his debt. If in the remitting of the debt goodness is understood, and in the choosing equity is understood, no iniquity is found with God anywhere." And soon: "Let us recall those workers in the vineyard. Did not these also hear from the father of the family — those who murmured — except *This I will?* For thus was his generosity toward some, that toward others there was no iniquity. And indeed both are well situated; yet insofar as justice and grace are concerned, it can rightly be said of the guilty one who is freed: *I will*; and of the one who is damned: *Take what is yours and go; but to this one I will give what is not owed. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?*" In these two sentences what is most to be weighed is *This I will* — by which it is signified that the whole business of predestination is reduced to the divine will, and there is no need for justice in predestination, as the first position wants. Since Augustine applies a double-edged blow to it with those words: "Here is the whole of justice: this I will."

Which sentence St. Thomas expresses at *1 p., q. 23*, where together with Paul and Augustine he establishes that predestination is entirely gratuitous, having adduced the example of the vineyard with the saying of the father of the family: *Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?* And so there in the body he says: "Why he chose these for glory and reprobated those has no explanation except the divine will."

Tenth Document: The whole mystery of predestination, both as to end and as to means, pertains to the grace of God, to the exclusion of justice.

This is an irrefutable and frequent argument in Augustine, expressed clearly. He teaches not only that our merits are gifts of God and rest on grace, but also that eternal life and the kingdom of God and the crown of glory are grace of God. So far is that justice — which the first position tries to introduce — from it.

Let us bring forward illustrious passages. In *lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 8: having said at c. 7 "Since our good works are from God, from whom faith and love are given to us, for this reason the same Doctor of the Gentiles also called eternal life itself grace," he says at the beginning of c. 8: "But there arises, he says, no small question. For if eternal life is rendered to good works — as Scripture most openly says: *God will render to each according to his works* — how is eternal life grace, since grace is not rendered to works but given freely, the same Apostle saying: *And to him who works, wages are not reckoned according to grace but according to debt?*" And again: "*The remnant*, he says, *were saved by the election of grace. And if by grace, no longer from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace.*" How then is eternal life grace, since it is taken from works? Or perhaps the Apostle did not call eternal life grace? He did say so, in fact, so that it cannot at all be denied: for having said *The wages of sin is death*, he added: *But grace is eternal life*. And soon: "I understand that even our good works, by which eternal life is rendered, pertain to the grace of God." And at the end of the chapter: "Therefore if good life is nothing other than the grace of God, beyond doubt also eternal life, which is rendered to good life, is grace; and this is itself freely given, because that is freely given to which it is given. But that to which it is given is grace only for that one; but this which is given to it, since it is its reward, is grace for grace, as wages for justice."

And at c. 9 he expounds that sentence of *John 1: Grace for grace* — that is, eternal life — of which the Apostle says: *Grace of God is eternal life*: "so that from this we might understand that God leads us not for our merits to eternal life but for his own mercy." So in his commentary on that passage of John, *tract. 3*, before the middle, expounding that passage *Grace for grace*: "We receive," he says, "grace for grace when eternal life is rendered to us. Of which the Apostle said: *Grace of God is eternal life*."

He teaches the same in *lib. de Corrept. et Grat.*, c. 13: "Eternal life itself is called grace." He acknowledges: "It is therefore to be confessed that eternal life is for

this reason called grace — because it is rendered to those merits which grace conferred on a human being. For this itself is rightly understood from the Gospel as grace for grace." And also in *Epist. 105*, after the beginning: "This very eternal life is also called grace for no other reason than because it is freely given — not because it is not given for merits, but because the very merits for which it is given were themselves given."

As for glory called the crown — which seems to sound like justice, and which the authors of the second position urge — Augustine reduces it to grace and mercy in *lib. de grat. et lib. arb.*, c. 9, opposing the crown of justice from Paul with the crown of mercy from David (*Psalm 102*): "*Is not the crown rendered to good works? But because he operates good things in those who are good, he therefore said: He crowns you in mercy* — because by his mercy we perform good works for which the crown is rendered." With a beautiful figure Paul says: *The crown of justice which the just judge will render to me*. David sings: *He crowns you in mercy and compassion*. Aptly and elegantly Augustine: "That crown of justice is turned into mercy." Consistent with this is *lib. de Corrupt. et Grat.*, c. 13: "The number of the saints predestined by God's grace to the kingdom" — note "kingdom" — "is brought there complete and kept most complete, with the mercy of the Savior adhering to it, whether they are being converted, whether they are fighting, whether they are being crowned. For even then the necessity of mercy for them is testified by Holy Scripture, where the holy David says of his Lord concerning his soul: *Who crowns you in mercy and compassion*."

He explains his meaning more openly and more elegantly still in *tract. 3, in c. 1, Ioan.*: "*The crown of justice is laid up*. He demands what is owed. *Which the just judge will render to me* — before he received the mercy of the gracious Father; now for the reward, the just judge. And he adds: What prize of immortality he afterwards bestows, he crowns his gifts, not your merits. But God crowns the gifts of his mercy; but if in that grace which we first received we walk perseveringly and with progress."

He speaks admirably on that passage of *Psalm 102*: "*He crowns you in mercy and compassion*. By whose powers? Yours; but ministered by him. For you fight; it is manifest, therefore you will be crowned, because you will conquer. But see who first conquers; see who also makes you conqueror a second time: who in us was conquered, in him we conquered. Therefore he crowns you who crowns his own gifts, not your merits." And he continues: "I labored more than all, says the Apostle. But see what he added: *Yet not I, but the grace of God with me*. And after all labors he awaits the crown, and says: *I have fought the good fight*. Henceforth: *The crown of justice is laid up for me*. Why? Because I finished the course: whence did you contend? *Not I, but the grace of God with me*. Therefore even that you are crowned is his mercy, with which you are crowned in mercy." The same doctrine he hands down in *lib. 14, de Trin.*, c. 15: "What will make her blessed, unless her merit and the reward of her Lord? But even her merit is his grace, whose reward

will be her beatitude. She has received therefore justice, for which she deserves to receive beatitude. Whence is it truly said to her by the Apostle, as to one beginning to be proud of her own good: *And what do you have that you have not received?*" Other passages Augustine supplies to us — excellent ones — in *Sermon 2, de verbis Apostoli*, where he compares the crown of justice with the crown of mercy; and in *Epist. 105*; and *Serm. 107, de diversis*. But enough of these.

Corollary: These ten documents are confirmed by the example of Jacob and Esau, which Augustine frequently employs.

To prove his position on the free and gratuitous election and predestination — apart from any foreknowledge of merits and with the sole foreknowledge of demerit on account of original sin in the condemned mass — Augustine customarily employs the example of Esau and Jacob proposed by Paul at *Rom. 9*, taken from *Mal. 1: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated*. The Fathers generally and the scholastics affirm that this text contains the matter of predestination and reprobation — whether in the primary and literal sense, or in the secondary and allegorical — and the most learned Ruiz de Montoya shows this with his customary erudition throughout three complete sections of *disp. 8, de Praedest.*

Augustine is before us. He uses this example in *Epist. 105*, after the middle, near the end; *Epist. 106*, a little after the beginning; in the *Enchiridion, c. 98*; *lib. de Spiritu et Littera, c. 24*; *lib. 1, ad Simplicianum, q. 2*, through nearly the whole; *lib. Expositionum quarundam propos. epist. ad Rom., c. 60*; *Serm. 7, de verbis Apostoli*, near the end; *Serm. 78, de tempore*; *lib. 2, contra duas epist. Pelag., c. 7*; *lib. 1, Retract., c. 23*; in *Psalmum 46*, on the verse *He chose for us our inheritance*. Cited also by Ruiz at *tract. 53, in Ioannem* — but nothing is there, as there is nothing at *lib. de Praedest. Sanct., c. 16 and following*, which the same Ruiz indicates to us. I wonder that a learned man cited empty passages. Enough are those produced by me; let us see their sentences as they serve our purpose.

Therefore in *Epist. 105*, to exclude every kind of foreseen merit, he says: "The blessed Apostle took a testimony from the Prophet: *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated*, so that it might be understood that this was openly declared afterward through the Prophet, which before those were born was in the predestination of God through grace. For what did he love in Jacob before he had done anything good — except the gratuitous gift of his mercy? And what did he hate in Esau, except original sin?" And soon he answers in the name of those against whom he was disputing: "Therefore they say he hated one, loved the other not yet born, because he foresaw their future works." Then: "Who would not wonder that this most acute interpretation was absent from the Apostle?" And below: "He himself expressing the emotion of the hearer through an objection proposed to himself: *What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? By no means*. This was the place to say what they hold: *For God foresaw their future works*. But the Apostle does not say this; he rather wishes, so that no one might dare to glory in the merits of his own works, that this was said to commend the grace and glory of God."

"For when he had said *By no means*, that there is no injustice with God, as though we were saying to him: from what do you show this, since you claim not from works but from him who calls it was said: *The elder shall serve the younger*? Moses says, he replies, *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show compassion on whom I will show compassion. So then it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy.* Where now are merits, where are works — whether present, future, or accomplished or to be accomplished by the powers of free will?" "Did not the Apostle draw a clear sentence from gratuitous grace — that is, true grace — for commendation? Lest the reader be troubled by those words *accomplished or to be accomplished by the powers of free will* — since even though Augustine said this against the Pelagians against whom he was arguing, yet it holds against all who posit merits from grace as the motive for predestination — it is evident from the fact that he reduces the whole work of election to the mercy of God." "The intention of the Apostle is to be looked at: how for the sake of commending grace he does not want the one of whom it was said *Jacob I loved* to glory except in the Lord; and he adds: let Jacob understand from that original mass of iniquity, where he sees his brother — with whom he had a common cause — deserved by justice to be condemned, that he himself could not be distinguished except through grace."

Then: "That the election of grace is made with no preceding merits, the Apostle shows in another passage: *The remnant were saved by the election of grace. If by grace, then no longer from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace.*" By which he refutes those authors who place in the works of grace something distinguishing on their own part, on account of which they are pre-elected; for this does not cohere with the doctrine of Augustine.

Similar things he says in *Epist. 106*. And that he excludes the foreknowledge of all merits, he declares in the *Enchiridion*, c. 98: "Paul adduced another prophetic testimony: *Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated*. In which matter, if the future good or evil works of either — which God foreknew — he wanted to be understood, he would by no means say *not from works*, but would say *from future works*, and would resolve the question in this way. But he who said *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy* loved Jacob through gratuitous mercy, and hated Esau through deserved judgment: which being owed to both, in one he recognized the other, that no one should glory in his own distinguishing merits" — where you see every distance of merits removed — "but in the generous liberality of divine grace, because *it depends not on human will or exertion, but on God, who has mercy*, so that he who glories may glory in the Lord." And below: "Grace alone of the Redeemer distinguishes from the lost."

He adds in c. 99: "The same teaches identically in nearly all of the other passages I cited." But he puts there the irrefutable argument against that exception concerning natural merits, where on this occasion of the objection he has recourse to the discrimination of little children who die without baptism. I bring

forward a suitable testimony from *lib. 2, cont. duas Epist. Pelagian.*, where he connects this doctrine about little children with this same example: "You are truly mad, those who say against the truth *not from works* — that you say *from future works which God foreknew* that Jacob was loved. So that every hiding place of your darkness might be taken from you, for this reason I proposed such twins, who could neither be helped by the merits of their parents, and at the very beginning of infancy one baptized and the other dying without baptism, lest you should say, as you say against the Apostle regarding Jacob and Esau, that God foreknew their future works." And soon: "The unbaptized brother asks you in silence: from what was I distinguished from my brother's happiness, why was I punished by that unhappiness?" And he concludes: "To this infant altogether you submit your tongue, to this one who does not speak you have nothing to say." Here I stop. Let whoever wishes read the passages, and he will find that Augustine could not have handed down the first position.

FINAL SECTION. The Testimonies of Augustine Adduced in Opposition by Father Gabriel Vázquez Are Explained.

Against this well-grounded, manifest, and solid truth, Vázquez rises up — a man who defends his own position more sharply than anyone, attacks ours more vigorously than anyone, claims Augustine for himself more confidently than anyone, and drives off those who would reclaim him more forcefully than anyone, so that, as a kind of leader of all, he draws the full weight of the war to himself. And indeed this author carries great authority, for since he is exceptionally well versed in Augustine and extremely keen in argumentation, it will be no small achievement if we wrest Augustine from his hands like a club and turn it against him, undermining the testimonies he has adduced and showing in the end that he has overturned his own principles. I shall make this effort, so that it becomes clear that Augustine cannot be dragged — unwilling, groaning, with his neck wrenched — into the opposing opinion of Vázquez.

There are two passages above all on which Vázquez relies as though they were clear and open, as he himself says in chapter VII of disputation LXXXIX. The first, which is the most critical one, is from book I *Ad Simplicianum*, question II, before the middle — this he establishes as his Achilles. He sets it out as follows in chapter VI of disputation XCVIII. When the two brothers Jacob and Esau had not yet been born and had done nothing good from which one might be chosen over the other for justification after a prior examination of their good works — so that the purpose of justification would thus rest on works — when, I say, the situation was not like that, it was accomplished not from the works of free choice but from grace, that the lesser should be preferred to the greater, and he understands this in reference to the grace of justification. He then concludes with these words: Therefore the purpose of God does not remain according to election, but election according to purpose — that is, it is not because God finds good works in men which he might choose, that the purpose of justification

endures; rather, because that purpose endures, namely to justify believers, he therefore finds works which he may now choose for the Kingdom of Heaven. For if there were no election, there would be no elect, nor would it rightly be said: *Who shall bring a charge against God's elect?* Yet election does not precede justification; rather, justification precedes election. For no one is chosen unless he already stands at a distance from the one who is rejected. Hence what is said — that God chose us before the foundation of the world — I do not see how it could have been said except by foreknowledge. Now where it says: *not from works but from him who calls*, this was said to him, and so on — he wished it to be understood not as the election of merits which come after the grace of justification, but as the liberality of God's gifts, so that no one might boast on account of works.

Having set out this testimony of Augustine, Vázquez deduces: Since he asserts that election arose from purpose, and that men are therefore chosen by God to eternal life because God, after justification, finds good works in men which he might choose for glory; and since he says that Paul in that passage to the Romans IX — *not from works* — is not speaking of the election of merits which takes place after justification; and finally, since he says that no one is chosen unless he is found at a distance from another — he makes it sufficiently clear that God placed this order of prior and posterior in his eternal foreknowledge, and that election to the Kingdom of Heaven was made following a prior examination of merits by reason.

He then adds in section XLV: Next, continuing to treat of the kind of election made among some following a prior examination — the kind of election by which some contended that men are chosen for the grace of God — he produces words of Augustine at the end of the question: If there was any election here, so that we understand in this sense what is said — *the remnant were saved through election* — not so that the election of the justified should take place unto eternal life, but so that those who are to be justified should be chosen, then certainly this election is so hidden that it cannot at all appear to us within that same mass — and so on; for the rest is clear. And Augustine denies this election, as Vázquez goes on to argue, while not denying the election of the justified to eternal life. So that the sense is: there is no election among those at a distance with respect to grace, but there is such an election with respect to glory, because the justified are chosen for it, being at a distance from those who are not justified.

In this passage Vázquez considers his case completely settled, and draws fresh courage from the replies of his adversaries, who, he says in chapter VII, strive with their stratagems to overturn such clear testimonies. He then deploys a second one, which we shall address later.

The first and second solutions are those of certain unnamed authors who say that Augustine wrote that book when he was younger and less experienced, and

therefore placed election along with the distance on the part of the elect, which he later removed when he had become older and more learned — as appears from the book *De Correptione et Gratia* and others — and that accordingly the testimony carries no force. This is Bellarmine's solution (*lib. II de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*). The second is that of others who say that Augustine is speaking here of the order of execution, not of the order of intention, and that both orders are found even in God's foreknowledge: for God first intends the end of glory, then the means; and that he then decreed the attainment of the end on account of those means. They say Augustine speaks of this decree as it is placed in execution in time. This is the position of Suárez (*lib. III de Auxiliis, c. XVIII, n. IV*), whose solutions Vázquez attacks there. The Salmanticenses, however, embrace and defend both solutions (*tract. V de Praedestinatione, disp. IX, dub. II, nn. LXI–LXIV*). John of St. Thomas defends Suárez's second solution concerning the order of intention and execution (*q. XXIII de Praedestinatione, disp. VIII*). Ruiz approves neither and offers other solutions (*disp. X, sect. IV and V*). Mastrius approves both senses but with qualification — and rightly so — and cites Smissingh, Vulpes, Fasolo, and Arriaga with his customary diligence.

Yet the disciples of Vázquez are not content, and I shall endeavor to satisfy them according to my own reading of Augustine, and in my study of Father Vázquez and his disciples Turrianus and Alarcón. I observe first — as I have often noted elsewhere — that in that book Augustine proceeded through disputation in such a way that he seemed to be arguing for free will against grace, until at the end of the book he assigned victory to grace, as he himself acknowledges in book II of the *Retractations* at the beginning, where he says: *The labor was indeed for free will, but the grace of God prevailed; nor could it have reached the point where the Apostle is understood to have spoken with complete clarity: Who sets you apart?* Hence one must read carefully what Augustine is disputing and what he is establishing there — what is to be assigned to the side of free choice, and what is to be received on the side of grace.

With this observation made, I reply that Augustine is there placing distinction at a distance — something that was on behalf of free will. And the distance was that of the justified from the non-justified with respect to glory, to which the former had been chosen from eternity in foreknowledge, while the latter had not. From this it followed, in favor of free will, that men had been chosen for glory on the basis of merits. But Augustine, having admitted this discriminating election based on justification, was refuting the inference — *therefore it is from merits* — by recurring to the divine purpose from which that justification flowed, and was affirming that the election of the justified arose from that gracious and free purpose of God, whose justification was itself gratuitous. And so the purpose of choosing and predestining to glory is not grounded in that election of the justified, but rather in the prior gratuitous election which preceded it and of which that election was the effect. This is the clear teaching of Augustine: *Not from works, but from him who calls; not the election of merits which come after the grace*

of justification, but the liberality of God's gifts — he wished it to be understood thus, so that no one might boast on account of works. This was entirely in favor of grace, and in this respect grace overcame free will.

But this doctrine does not help Vázquez — in fact it refutes him. For it is a doctrine consonant with the rest of Augustine's teaching in his other works, where Augustine establishes that the primary election was to glory, that this election was purely free and gratuitous, and that it was the source of grace and merits, which were themselves gifts of God. The testimony is therefore turned back against Vázquez himself. The distance in relation to glory is not grounded in justification, but in the cause of that justification — and that cause lies in the grace to be given from the elective purpose of the predestined. It is to this that one must recur, for there lies the source and principle of the conferral of justification. Therefore, Augustine says in that very place: *The purpose of God does not remain according to election, but election according to purpose* — that is, not because God finds good works in men which he might choose, does the purpose of justification of those very men endure; rather, because that purpose endures to justify believers, he therefore finds works which he may now choose for the Kingdom of Heaven. What could Augustine have said more clearly on behalf of the cause of grace and gratuitous predestination? This is what he taught continuously in his later books, and it is why in those books he refers back to this one — as may be seen in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapter IX, and in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, chapter XXI.

He speaks to the same effect in book II of the *Retractations*, chapter I. It is therefore so far from the case that this passage favors the position of Vázquez that it entirely overturns it. Even granting Vázquez his distance, his discrimination of the justified, and their prior election over others for grace grounded in that discrimination — all of this flows from the antecedent purpose of God choosing these means to justify and lead to glory those whom he had first chosen in foreknowledge, a glory which he had destined for them by his free and merciful will. This purpose is the cause of that election toward merits. This is the source; that, the stream. From it they received justifying grace. They owe it to God, from whom they received it. They possess it indeed, but they possess it through the mercy and kindness of a God who gives mercifully and freely. They cannot boast in themselves but only in the Lord. Lest anyone perhaps be exalted, he says here — and then toward the end, where he shows that the grace of God has fully prevailed — he recurs to the divine judgments: *Is there injustice with God?* — demanding from whom he pleases, giving to whom he pleases, who by no means exacts what is not owed, by no means gives what belongs to another. Nothing more illustrious for the cause of gratuitous predestination could Augustine have said. This is the genuine teaching he imparts in his later books.

Hear what follows: *Is there injustice with God? By no means. But why to this man in this way, and to that man in another?* See, there is the distance. Let us observe whether, and to what extent, he admits it. *O man, who are you?* If you do not receive what is owed, you have cause for gratitude; if you do receive what is owed, you have no cause for complaint. Where here is that distance of the justified? It is nowhere. It is removed, it is abolished. *His judgments are inscrutable and his ways unsearchable.* Thus this swan sings in harmony with itself, so that it is entirely consistent with the teaching of his other books. This is the true understanding of the passage, setting aside all question of retractation and prescinding from recourse to the orders of intention and execution — though that recourse also has my approval, for Augustine speaks in that passage in conformity with the same passage in the *Eighty-Three Questions*, question LXVIII, and must be understood in the same sense. Hence Vázquez's argument proves nothing.

Now, that there was something lurking in this passage of which the Pelagians might abuse on behalf of free will against grace, Augustine himself disclosed shortly before the end, when he says: *If there was any election here, so that we understand in this sense what is said — not so that the election of the justified should take place unto eternal life, but so that those who are to be justified might be chosen — then certainly this election is so hidden that it cannot at all appear to us within that same mass*, and so on. He exposed the subtle inference of the Pelagians, as if they were saying: It is true that the distance between the justified and the non-justified comes about through grace and sin; but we ask the cause of that distance. Why are some just and others sinners? Surely only because these merited to be justified by their works, and those did not — and so the cause is reduced to free will, not to grace. See the argument for free will. To this Augustine responds that he does not find this cause, as one foreign to Sacred Scripture and the teaching of Paul, and that accordingly one must recur to the divine judgments, as we have shown — since that first discrimination cannot be grounded in the merits of free will; otherwise grace would not be grace. And so one must recur to the free and gratuitous will of God and to his purpose, and thus grace prevails — as he affirmed in book II of the *Retractations*, a victory he always builds upon and confirms in all his other works on grace and predestination.

I close this solution with the following testimony of Augustine in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, chapter XXI: *Let those see — to whom I, loving them, ought not to be ungrateful, who, as you write, profess to embrace all my works on account of the question that has arisen — let them see, I say, whether in the later parts of the first book of those two which I wrote to Simplicianus, Bishop of Milan, there remains anything by which it might be called into question that the grace of God is not given according to our merits, and whether I did not there sufficiently argue that even the beginning of faith is a gift of God, and whether from what was said there it does not follow as a consequence — and if not expressly stated, at least implied — that even perseverance to the end is given by none other than him who predestined us for his kingdom and glory.* Three observations I

make here. First, that there is nothing in this book that could be subject to retraction, since everything is approved and the reading of the book is commended. Second, that the later parts of this book are named as better than the earlier ones, because Augustine argued in the earlier parts more in favor of free will than grace, whereas in the later parts — that is, in the space of roughly two and a half pages before the end — he fought openly for grace. Nor should one object that Augustine understood this of the second question proposed there in relation to the first concerning the Old Law, the Written Law, and so forth, and that for this reason he speaks of later parts of the book as referring to the other question on election. For that question is brief and barely occupies a folio and a half, whereas the other is very long, and *the later parts of the book* cannot rightly be referred to it — but rather to the other part of the book, or the other question. Besides, this second question is unrelated to the subject matter of the first. Third, that the last words refute Vázquez — where it says: *who predestined us for his kingdom and glory* — for these contain the teaching that this is the end of all the gifts of grace and justification, to which all things, as means, are referred.

The second passage of Augustine which Vázquez urges against us in chapter VI, section XLVII, is in the *Sermon on the Words of the Lord according to Matthew*, sermon VII, volume X, where, he says, Augustine already admits that twofold kind of election — one without examination and one with it: *God chose, as the Apostle says, both according to his grace and according to their righteousness. He says his grace, because God chose them freely, without examination, to give them the gifts of grace which he denied to others, for the sole reason that it pleased him; but what is: according to their righteousness? Only because he chose their good works, which his grace had prepared in them — he chose them, I say, for eternal life, where an examination must necessarily precede, as could not be the case in election to grace.* The remainder of the chapter Vázquez spends proving that nothing follows from this against the dignity of grace, and he adds that Augustine never retracted that sermon.

To this testimony, which the adversaries urge with great force, our authors respond as follows. Some say with Suárez (*lib. III de Auxiliis, c. XVIII*) that these two elections refer to the order of intention and the order of execution — a solution that is common and that pleases the Salmanticenses (*tract. V, disp. IX, dub. II, section IV, n. LXIII*), John of St. Thomas (*disp. VIII, a. IV, n. VIII*), and Mastrius (*disp. V, q. II, a. III, n. CLXXIX*). This response does not displease me, because it has its foundation in Augustine. But since the adversaries deny those orders, and some among our own number have doubts about them, I wish to offer a solution with which our authors agree and to which the adversaries do not object, and which most fully captures the matter.

Therefore, the mind of Augustine in that sermon is to show — on the occasion of two men, one of whom offered himself and was rejected, the other of whom wished to be retained — that election is gratuitous and made without merits, in

the manner customary for Augustine. This is evident from the context of the sermon, whose doctrine rests on Paul's passage to the Romans XI: *The remnant have been saved through the election of grace*, compared with the passage in III Kings XIX: *I have reserved for myself seven thousand men* — men whom God preserved as righteous. All of these, chosen as a remnant of others — for the word carries emphasis — Augustine says were freely preferred over others, not by their own merits, lest they should presume upon themselves or boast: for of themselves they had nothing except sin. *Ascribe entirely to his piety*, he says, *the fact that you are just; but ascribe to your own iniquity the fact that you are a sinner. Every crime or sin we commit is owed to our own negligence, and all virtue and holiness belongs to the indulgence of God.* The purpose of the sermon is therefore Christian humility arising from the acknowledgment of God's mercy and grace. Hence the exclamation: *Beware, Christian, beware of pride.* There is nothing in the entire sermon that sounds like justice in the sense of merit. How, then, can the sentence stand: *God chose, as the Apostle says, both according to his grace and according to their righteousness* — words which are not in the Apostle, only this: *The remnant were saved through the election of grace*, which contains no mention of righteousness?

This sentence is, however, written in chapter XI to the Romans, in which Paul imparts the doctrine of the predestination and election of some over others, and concludes: *O the depth of riches!* and so on. It is this testimony that Augustine customarily uses when presenting the mystery of predestination and reprobation, and there is therefore no place here for the righteousness of merits — whether for eternal life, or for the first or the last grace. Indeed, that righteousness of merits is excluded from gratuitous election, and recourse is made, with Paul, to the election of grace. Hence that phrase *according to their righteousness* must be understood differently, and in the sense of their own proper righteousness it cannot stand. The meaning therefore is: he chose them according to his grace and their righteousness — that is, according to the grace which is their righteousness, which righteousness, that is, sanctity, my grace effected in them; which is therefore reduced to grace, and the sense runs: he chose them freely and freely justified them; hence *they were saved through the election of grace*, in accordance with the mind of Paul. The entire context of the sermon, devoted to humility and grace, is harmonious. Do not boast, do not exalt yourself on account of your merit; otherwise grace is no longer grace — sentiments which are certainly foreign to that signification of righteousness.

The only obstacle is the statement: *I chose them because I saw that their minds would presume upon me.* For here is an election presupposing grace already given, which cannot be the election to glory; therefore election to glory is grounded in the merits of grace — which is what Vázquez contends. I reply that here there is no question of election to glory on the basis of the merits of grace, but only of preservation in the same grace once given, namely so that those who had been primarily elected to it should not fall away from it. I found this response

afterward in Ruiz, a most learned man and one extremely versed in Augustinian doctrine (*disp. X, sect. V, nn. I–II*). And it is evident from the context: *You have presumed entirely upon my grace; ascribe it entirely to grace that there should remain grace of God in you — it was not your own merit that accomplished it. If you presume upon your own work, then wages are being repaid to you, not grace bestowed. And unless you were full of grace, would you not have bent the knee before Baal?* By these sentences it is indicated that from one benefit freely received one proceeds to another benefit to be freely received, within the terms of grace. In this way the passage is expounded so that Augustine's meaning stands, coheres with the rest of his teaching, and Vázquez draws nothing from it for his own case.

I observe, however, that in this matter of expounding the testimonies of the Fathers against adversaries, we Scotists ought to follow that rule which Suárez so highly approves that some consider him its author — concerning the order of intention and of execution — because it is set forth expressly by Scotus in the *Reportata*, distinction XLI, sole question, section *Respondeo quod nullus*, from section III to the end, against that foundational and excellent argument concerning the one who rightly wills the end. And though Vázquez and his followers reject it, this is because they fear it: they see plainly that once it is admitted, all their arguments and stratagems collapse. The Thomists indeed commonly receive it and derive it from St. Thomas. I am surprised, however, that our own authors, and above all Ruiz, reject it — though he should not have excluded it, since in (*disp. X, sect. V, n. III*) he expounds this testimony of Augustine in precisely this second way; for there, willing or not, he falls into that very rule. I praise Mastrius for both accepting and confirming it (*in his disputation V on divine predestination and reprobation, q. II, nn. CXXXII*), and for adroitly applying it to the resolution of arguments (*nn. CLVIII and CLXXIX*) — in which he shows himself an interpreter and disciple of Scotus.

But as regards the genuine meaning of Augustine in that passage from sermon VII according to Matthew, permit me to bring something new and to interpret this testimony differently from what is customary — and I believe, in accordance with the true mind of Paul and Augustine. First I observe that I had been content with the explanations I have adduced and had set down the text, but I did not rest, pricked by some scruple I could not name. I felt myself being urged by Augustine, called back to a reconsideration of this testimony, as though I had not at all satisfied him. The reader should know that I am not fabricating this. I returned, therefore, reconsidered the passage, and new light dawned upon me for understanding it differently and truly.

The meaning of Augustine is this: he chose according to his grace and according to their righteousness — namely, the predestined and the reprobate: the former according to grace, the latter according to their righteousness; the former to grace, the latter to punishment, so that the opposition is between grace and righteousness — grace in choosing the predestined, righteousness in

abandoning the damned in that mass of sin. This is the genuine and constant doctrine of Augustine on the discrimination of the predestined from the reprobate in the state of abandonment. I demonstrate this as follows. Augustine is there commenting on the passage of the Gospel concerning the difference between those who are called, and adduces the passage from the Epistle to the Romans, chapter XI, in which Paul speaks of the discrimination of the elect from the reprobate, saying that the remnant are saved through grace — the remnant, of course, of the reprobate people — and concludes by exclaiming: *O the depth of riches!* Nor can there be any doubt about this. To this doctrine Augustine adheres when he says: *Those whom the Lord willed, he chose — those whom he willed according to his purpose, not according to their merit. He chose them, as the Apostle says, both according to his grace and according to their righteousness.* The Apostle, however, in that chapter XI treats of the discriminating election by which grace separated the remnant of the elect from the mass of the reprobate.

This is clear in Paul. *Has God cast away his people?* — namely, through the calling of the Gentiles. He answers: *By no means. For many Jews are saved. And I myself am one, an Israelite of the seed of Abraham of the tribe of Benjamin: God has not cast off his people.* There are those who are saved today. And he adduces the example from the time of Elijah, when Elijah thought that all were idolaters except himself alone, and therefore that the rest were foreknown to damnation — whereupon God warned him of his error, for there were many, that is, seven thousand righteous and faithful men whom God had set apart for himself from the rest as a remnant of grace, and whom he calls by that name because the rest were hardened, obstinate, and reprobate. Paul follows up this meaning in that chapter, taking the Gentiles in place of the defecting Jews — until at last he arrives at the hidden judgments of God, as he is accustomed to do when treating of these mysteries.

Augustine takes the passage in this sense and explains it, and in explaining it adduces that testimony of Isaiah I: *Unless the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a seed, we would have become like Sodom, and we would have been made like Gomorrah* — always maintaining election joined with reprobation and attributing election to the grace of God, as we have examined above, as is clear from the text of Paul and Augustine. There is therefore no place for the righteousness of merits and works, which Augustine and Paul exclude. *If grace is no longer from works* — that is, is not owed to merit — *lest you be exalted.* How, then, could he here admit righteousness from merits, where he utterly excludes it? Therefore the phrase *according to their righteousness* cannot be applied to the just and the predestined, but on the contrary to the abandoned and the reprobate, so that the sense is: God chooses, discriminating and predestining the predestined according to his grace, and according to their righteousness, that is, the exigency of their own demerit — for righteousness is opposed to grace, namely the righteousness of men as opposed to the grace of God — so that he might freely choose the predestined for himself, selecting them from the abandoned, justly, according

to their demerit, which is called their righteousness. Thus the genuine and proper sense stands, and once it is received, the objection of Vázquez and his followers vanishes, and the teaching of Augustine shines forth.

There are, however, two objections to this interpretation. The first is that the word *righteousness* does not fit the state of demerit and sin. The second is the verb *chose*, which is at odds with reprobation, for righteousness does not signify demerit, nor does *to choose* signify *to reprobate*. To the first I say that it is the custom of Paul and Augustine to oppose the righteousness of God to the righteousness of men, so that the former is the virtue taken in a good sense, and the latter is sin taken in a bad sense. Thus Paul to the Romans X: *Being ignorant of the righteousness of God, and seeking to establish their own, they have not submitted to the righteousness of God*. And in this same sense he opposes the righteousness of the law to the righteousness of grace — which appears in the Epistle to the Galatians, and which Augustine observes in his commentary on it. Augustine likewise, against Pelagius, distinguishes righteousness by nature from righteousness by grace, as may be seen in *De Natura et Gratia*. Let these remarks suffice in general.

Now specifically: On Psalm LVII, at the verse *This happened to me, because I sought your righteousnesses* (reading *iustitias*): *Your righteousnesses*, he says, *namely those by which you justify the ungodly, not mine, which never make me holy but only proud. For he was not one of those who, being ignorant of the righteousness of God and seeking to establish their own, have not submitted to the righteousness of God*. See how he agrees with Paul on our point. He likewise calls human righteousness earthly and carnal in the Epistle to the Galatians, after the beginning. In Psalm XCIII, toward the end, he opposes the righteousness of works to the righteousness of grace; and in Sermon XLV on the Words of the Lord according to John, at the beginning, he calls the righteousness of the Pharisees their arrogance and pride; and in Sermon VI on the Words of the Apostle, chapter VIII, he distinguishes between the righteousness of God and our human righteousness, and says: *the righteousness of God, not theirs*. This is most aptly fitted to this passage, where Augustine says *according to their righteousness* — which pertains to damnation.

We have thus satisfied the first objection concerning the term *righteousness*. To the second, concerning the verb *to choose*, I reply that it is joined there with the reprobation of others, and rightly so, because *to choose* signifies not only pre-election according to grace but also destination to punishment — in which sense Augustine said that men are predestined to damnation, as we have shown above. Hence the word *I choose* aptly fits the reprobate insofar as it concerns the punishment which God can intend; and if he can intend it, he can choose for it. I nonetheless adduce an irrefutable passage of Augustine for this my interpretation, which settles the matter, where the verb *to choose* is used in the proper sense of this exposition. In *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapter VII, speaking of the Apostles and Judas: *He chose them to obtain his kingdom; him to shed his blood*.

What could be clearer? He had said just before: *Those we must understand to have been chosen by mercy; him by judgment.*

It is true that in *Quaestiones in Genesim*, question CXVII, Augustine denies that *to choose* fits the wicked — but he said it with qualification: *The name of the elect is not easily found applied to the wicked.* The phrase *not easily* does not deny it absolutely. And even though he afterward says that *election belongs only to the good*, he speaks by excluding the wicked from the evil of fault, not by denying that they are chosen for the evil of punishment. Hence it can be said in Augustinian terms that men are chosen for the evil of punishment, just as they can be predestined to it. And Augustine was there treating of Judas, who was a sinner and a traitor, and therefore rightly denied that he had been chosen to betray Christ, which was a great sin.

That Augustine frequently says the reprobate are predestined to destruction and punishment is evident from his teaching in *De Civitate Dei* XV, chapter I, and XXI, chapter XXIV, and on Psalm XIII — whom his disciples Prosper follow in his *Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum*, responses XIV and XV, and his *Responsiones ad Obiectiones Vincentianas*, responses X and XI; Fulgentius, *lib. I ad Monimum*, cc. VII, XIII, XIV, XXVIII, XXIX; the author of the *Hypomnesticon*, book VI, toward the middle; Bede in his book of questions, question XIII, after the middle; Isidore, *lib. II Sententiarum de Summo Bono*, chapter VI, at the beginning. I therefore have no hesitation in defending this exposition and presenting it to the schools.

COLLATION XII, DISTINCTION I. On Reprobation.

Section I. The Sense of the Question Is Proposed and Explained.

Reprobation, in the common opinion and above all in the Scotist school — which is likewise Augustinian — is twofold, as I observe, because St. Augustine in nearly all his works on grace placed predestination and reprobation on the supposition of original sin. And though Scotus placed reprobation before that sin as foreseen, he never introduces it as complete except after the foreknowledge of sin, as we have noted above and shall say again. In comparing the opinions of St. Thomas and Scotus, we observed that Scotus placed no cause of predestination on our side, but did place a cause of reprobation in *Sentences* I, distinction XLI, sole question, section *potest aliter dici*, n. XI, and more clearly in section *potest dici*, n. XII, adducing the example of Judas — first negatively abandoned before the foreknowledge of sin, then positively reprobated once final sin was foreseen. Here Scotus admits the mass of the damned introduced by Augustine, and likewise in the *Reportata* at the same place, section *respondeo*, n. VI in fine: *I say*, he writes, *that there is some reason for reprobation, but none for predestination.* But the proofs are elsewhere — that is, in *Sentences* I, distinction XLI, sole question, section *potest dici*, n. XII. Hence I am surprised that Father Ruiz, a most learned man, has imposed a contrary opinion upon Scotus (*disp.*

XV, sect. I, n. X), where he cites Scotus at *Sentences* I, distinction XLI, sole question, penultimate column — which passage we have cited for the contrary position.

This twofold reprobation — one negative, of abandonment in the mass condemned on account of original sin, and another positive, arising from final sin, whether original in the case of infants or actual in the case of adults — is admitted by nearly all theologians, following Augustine as their guide. He teaches the first in nearly all his works on grace and predestination, and there is no need to repeat this here. The second is a less fully explored and less thoroughly treated matter among authors. I shall cite the express passages in which Augustine affirms positive reprobation on account of foreseen final sins of adults.

In *De Correptione et Gratia*, chapter VII, speaking of those who when corrected do not amend, he says: *If correction has profited them nothing, but they have persevered in a lost life until death, they are also worthy of eternal divine damnation.* See the damnation — which is the effect of positive reprobation — destined and owed to those who die in final sin. He says the same in the same chapter VII at the end. And most admirably in chapter XIII of the same book: *Those who do not belong to this most certain and most blessed number (such as the abandoned) are most justly judged according to their merits: for either they lie under sin which they drew originally, and depart from this life with that hereditary debt which was not remitted by regeneration; or they have through free will added other actual sins on top of that one — free will, I say, but not liberated; free with respect to righteousness, but a slave to sin, by which they are rolled through diverse lusts, some more, some less, but all wicked, and to be judged with diverse punishments in accordance with their very lust itself. Or they receive the grace of God, but are temporal, and do not persevere — they fall away and are abandoned, released to free will, without receiving the gift of perseverance, by the just and hidden judgment of God.* This passage contains the whole doctrine of reprobation, for it sets out three states of the reprobate. The first is that of those who depart with original fault alone — proper to infants. The second is that of those adults who were always sinners and added actual sins to original sin. The third is that of those who were at some time righteous but returned to sins, did not persevere in righteousness, and died in final sin. All are negatively reprobate, but none are to be damned except after final sin, and hence they are positively reprobated once that sin is foreseen.

The same doctrine is found in *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum*, chapter XIV, where in expounding the text *He was taken away, lest wickedness alter his understanding*, Augustine says: *How would it not have profited a man who had fallen and who was finishing this miserable life in that same state, and going to punishments owed to such men, if he were taken away by death?* He presupposes that such men must be damned on account of the final sins in which they miserably end their lives. And note: *punishments owed to such men* — as though they could not be damned in any

other way. Similar points are made in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, cc. IX–XII, where the doctrine of negative and positive reprobation is transmitted. Augustine treats of reprobation and damnation on account of final sins in the same book, cc. XIV and XXII, and in the *Enchiridion*, chapter XXVI, where together with original sin he joins in adults their other actual and final sins for the suffering of eternal punishment.

And this is established in general: nowhere in Augustine is any mention of damnation to be found without a preceding cause of sin. I have read Augustine with the express purpose of finding anywhere a testimony to the contrary if it could be found, and I frankly confess that I could not find anything indicating that God could punish anyone innocent. Indeed, Augustine always held clearly and consistently in this matter that punishment follows fault — otherwise an injustice would be committed by God in condemning the innocent to punishment. Hence I am accustomed to wonder at those authors who say that just as God predestined some men without cause, so he has reprobated others without cause on their part — whether negatively or positively — as he pleased. And I wonder far more that there are those who wish to impose on Augustine the opinion that God could, by his absolute power, assign an innocent person to eternal punishment.

The first was said by some, as Suárez reports (*lib. V de Reprobatione, c. V*), among whom, he says, it seems St. Thomas may have been (*I, q. XXIII, a. V, reply to the third objection*). And he says they hold a position contrary to Augustine (*ibid., n. IX*), and Henry attacks Thomas on account of this opinion (*in Sentences I, distinction XLI*), as Ruiz observes (*de Praedestinatione, disp. XVI, sect. V, n. VIII*), who holds that opinion (*disp. XIV, sect. I, n. XII*) and in support of it cites Suárez — but not accurately: for Suárez is not speaking of predestination and reprobation according to the opinion which holds that they were determined after the fall of Adam and with original sin foreseen, as may be seen in (*lib. V de Praedestinatione, c. V, n. IX*), where he agrees with Augustine.

I observe, however, that Suárez placed predestination differently from how Augustine placed it, because he holds that the Incarnation of the Divine Word does not depend on the foreknowledge of sin, and that he himself would have become incarnate independently of the sin of Adam — as Scotus teaches. And so when these authors speak of predestination and reprobation, we should not take them in that first state antecedent to the foreknowledge of Adam's sin, but in the second state after that sin was foreseen and the Incarnation decreed from a complete and adequate motive — as we shall say in its proper place, something which Ruiz observed too little. Therefore neither Suárez nor Scotus placed positive reprobation in that state before the fall of Adam, but only negative reprobation — which will become apparent below.

The second matter, concerning Augustine: others have affirmed that he holds that by his absolute power God could condemn an innocent person to eternal

punishments — and the same Ruiz, so great a Doctor, wished to agree with them in the same (*disp. XIV, sect. I, n. XVI*). But he produces no other passage of Augustine besides one from the book *De Praedestinatione et Gratia*, chapter XVI, where it reads: *If the human race, which was first created from nothing, were born without the deserved origin of death and sin, and yet the omnipotent Creator wished to damn some of them to eternal destruction, who would say to the omnipotent Creator: why have you made it so?* and so on. But this book is not by Augustine; and even if it contained no other opinion besides this one — which is foreign to Augustine's mind — certainly on account of this alone the book should be rejected. For it entirely overturns Augustine's doctrine, which absolutely denies that God can punish an innocent person with eternal punishment.

I grieve that Ruiz was attracted to this view and attributed it to Augustine. And I argue against him on his own terms: for he says (*disp. XVI, sect. IV, n. III*): God does not intend punishment because it is bad and harmful to sinners, stopping there as if he wished it out of caprice; rather he wills punishment because in it there is intrinsically dignity and the right reason of justice, through which the attribute of divine justice is displayed. Therefore, if in the punishment of sinners God has justice as his end, not a caprice of punishing — which latter alone lacks dignity — how can God will the punishment of the innocent, in which there is no place for justice or dignity? For to wish to display his omnipotence in such a matter would be to wish to display cruelty. This is the argument Scotus uses to prove that God has not reprobated without a cause for reprobating, that is, without fault: *Because*, he says, *damnation does not seem good unless it is just*. And citing Augustine: *For it seems a cruelty to punish anyone in whom no prior fault exists*. Augustine teaches this expressly in *De Genesi ad Litteram* X, chapter XI: *A most innocent soul, if it is propagated from Adam, how and in what way can it justly go to condemnation?* He does not wish an innocent person to be condemned even to the lightest punishment, as he customarily calls it. And in book XI, chapter XXI: *It is manifestly evident that it is contrary to justice itself that God should damn in anyone, with no preceding merit, the very thing which he himself created in that person*. He speaks against the Manicheans. And in *Contra Julianum* III, chapter XVIII: *God is good, God is just; he can save some without good merits, because he is good; he cannot damn anyone without merits, because he is just*.

Furthermore, the sentence of Augustine in *De Genesi ad Litteram* XI, chapter XI or XXIV is commonly cited by the scholastics: *God is not a punisher before someone is a sinner* — thus Faber, from Scotus (*disp. XLIX, c. I, n. IX*), and Mastrius (*disp. V, q. III, a. I, n. CCXL*), and Suárez (*lib. V, c. III, n. VIII*). But that sentence is not found in that passage. There are, however, similar ones in Epistles CV and CVI; I indicate the places lest less learned readers in Augustine be misled hereafter. In Epistle CVI he says: *If God is believed to damn someone undeserving and liable to no sin, he is not believed to be free from iniquity*. Hence it is clear that Augustine and Scotus are not the authors of that cruel opinion. With them agree Arriaga (*disp. XXXIX, n. IX*) and Mastrius (*disp. V, q. III, a. II, n. CCXXXV*), who refute those who

with Ruiz affirm that God can do this by reason of supreme lordship over his creatures.

God can indeed — with Scotus as authority (*Sentences* II, distinction XXXIII, at the end) — create man in pure naturals without any grace and without any right to glory, by denying him his supernatural goods; but to create him for eternal punishment without fault — with Augustine and Scotus as authorities — he cannot, because he cannot be unjust, and because that punishment is relative to mortal fault, and therefore cannot be inflicted without it. Hence it is that not even the temporal punishments suffered by infants in this life does Augustine wish to be able to be inflicted by God without their original sin. Thus in *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* I, cc. XXV and XXVII, and book II, chapter X; against the Pelagian Julian, cc. I and X, where he says: *But if God is just, he would appear more unjust in inflicting on infants — who contract no sin — such great evils as I am not sufficient now to enumerate.* Whoever denies this principle to Augustine undermines his entire doctrine on original sin. For by that argument he proves that original sin was transmitted from Adam and contracted by us — because infants are tortured by punishments, since otherwise it could not happen without injustice that the innocent should suffer. This appears above all in the books against Julian. I select one testimony, which is outstanding, from book III, chapter XII: *By what justice, I ask, is the image of God alienated from the kingdom of God, from the way of God — an image that has transgressed no law of God?*

Section II. The Mode of Negative Reprobation Is Proposed.

This is entirely Augustinian, and it is investigated by Father Pérez, a wonderful Doctor in the matter of predestination, who inquires into the meaning of Augustine. God therefore, when Adam had fallen and he had seen the mass of his posterity infected with original sin — and therefore all his descendants stripped of grace and right to glory, and subjected to punishment, at least of deprivation, children of wrath and constituted in the power of the Devil — had mercy on the common ruin, and from the merits of Christ chose certain ones from that condemned mass for his glory, and prepared for them the means of attaining it, with the rest left behind in that same mass, where and as they were. This is also the Scotist mode, once the second decree of the Incarnation in passible flesh has been posited — for it is of this that we are now treating. Scotus in *Sentences* I, distinction XLI, section *potest dici*, n. XII, expressed the mass of the damned, which he calls the mass of perdition, and to which passage he refers back in the *Reportata*.

Then in the first moment God discriminated those few from the many who were left behind. But this moment places nothing in the abandoned, and is therefore a positive moment with respect to the elect, and a negative one with respect to the others. Augustine calls it abandonment; Scotus calls it the negation of the willing of glory. And so in this instant there is a mere negation with respect to the reprobate, which properly is negative reprobation — which

Vázquez wrongly attacks (*disp. XCV, c. II, nn. IX–X*), though he proves the matter and the Scotist mode of positing reprobation. Because in that instant there is no act of the divine will strictly concerned with the abandoned, but only with the elect, discriminating them from the rest — as is evident.

In the second instant, Scotus, together with Augustine, places the means of grace for that end of glory previously intended — which divine act, on our manner of understanding, is still concerned with the predestined and is negative, as Scotus says — whom Vázquez again wrongly attacks, because that act too is entirely positive with respect to the means of grace toward the discriminated ones, and arises from that first election to glory, as we said above from Augustine. And so in this point Scotus agrees with him entirely. Nor is there any place here for a positive act, as Suárez notes — who understood Scotus's mind better and rightly approved it (*lib. V de Reprobatione, c. IV, nn. IV–V*), where he defends Scotus against the attack of some moderns — pointing, I think, to Vázquez, who nevertheless could not deny that this mode of reprobating posited by Scotus had pleased many Thomists as well, as he says (*disp. XCV, c. II, n. VIII*) — something Faber also observes (*disp. LIX, q. I, c. I, n. XI*).

John of St. Thomas preferred to agree with Father Vázquez (*disp. X, a. II, n. XXXVIII*), where, in attacking negative reprobation in Suárez (when he could have done so in Scotus, whom he does not mention in that question), he calls it abusive and suspensive with regard to those left behind, because they were still in a state of eligibility for glory — which reason amounts to nothing, since the abandoned were not proximately eligible but were unfit, being children of wrath, infected with original sin, and in the hatred of God. Furthermore, they had not been discriminated by any efficacious act of will — nor indeed by any inefficacious act — in the opinion of Augustine and Scotus, who are not speaking of the common inefficacious will to save all in the singular, as Suárez posits: which is why Suárez said that negative reprobation agrees with Augustine and Scotus, because that negative reprobation is not adequate reprobation, which consists of both negative and positive. I affirm, however, that this division of reprobation into negative and positive is entirely sound, and that by it all those difficulties are resolved which are found in the other opinion that conflates them — and the Thomists absolutely should have admitted it, to free themselves from the severity of the censure which some authors impose on the Thomist position, of which John of St. Thomas bitterly complains (*disp. X, a. I, nn. VI and XIX*), protesting against Alarcón, who in (*tract. IV de Praedestinatione, disp. V, c. I, nn. I and VII*) entangles the Thomist position with the error of the Calvinists — thereby removing the occasion from them, since St. Thomas admits that Scotist and Augustinian sense of twofold reprobation, negative and positive, so that the second is punitive and the first merely one of abandonment in the state of perdition.

For although St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. XXIII seems to concede that reprobation was intended by God for the end of justice in the same way as predestination was intended for the end of mercy, yet in other places he distinguished two acts of reprobating: one of abandonment, the other of damnation. I adduce the testimonies of St. Thomas in *De Veritate*, q. VI, a. I, reply to the last: *For it could be said that reprobation is not directly opposed to predestination, but to election, because whoever elects, accepts one and rejects another, and this is called reprobation.* See the abandonment — differing from the Augustinian and Scotist version only in that he places it in a positive act of rejection. More clearly in *Sentences* I ad Anibaldo, distinction XLI, sole question, a. III: *Against the divine will for the salvation of men, two opposite wills seem to stand: one concerning the contradictory, according to which he wills a person not to be saved; and a will concerning the contrary, according to which he wills to damn someone.* See the twofold species of reprobation: the first concerning the contradictory, negative — *he does not will to save*; the second concerning the contrary, positive and punitive — *he wills to damn*. Furthermore, in the same place, question IV on reprobation, article I, he distinguishes between the providence of predestination and reprobation: the providence of predestination intends, causes, and orders the good; but that of reprobation does not cause or intend, but only foreknows and orders. And he adds: *Reprobation is only the foreknowledge of fault, and not the cause; but punishment, through which fault is ordered, is foreknowledge and cause.* What else is this but to posit positive reprobation and to presuppose negative reprobation? For it intends and orders punishment positively and punitively, but with the foreknowledge and foreseeing of sin presupposed, of which it is not the cause. And in that same article he says that hardening and blinding are permitted and ordered by God. Therefore he admits permission before the ordering takes place. He speaks there of hardening and blinding, whose cause he does not wish to be God except in a permissive way. This, however, is the negative reprobation of Scotus. Therefore St. Thomas agrees with him.

Why then do the Thomists wish to speak and act more rigorously, taking reprobation solely as the intentional and ordering providence of punishment? Why do they omit that prior negative reprobation — which is the negation of grace and glory, and which this second positive reprobation follows? The nature of providence belongs to the second, not the first. And this suffices to sustain the position of St. Thomas, without excluding the first permissive reprobation.

Thus St. Thomas says expressly in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, lecture II at the end: *The foreknowledge of merits cannot be the reason for predestination, because the merits foreknown fall under predestination; but the foreknowledge of sins can be some reason for reprobation on the part of the punishment which is prepared for the reprobate, insofar as God proposes to punish the wicked on account of sins which they have from themselves, not from God.* Against these invincible testimonies, the Thomists want abandonment and permission of sin — before any foreseen demerit — to be an effect of reprobation, which certainly

seems alien to the divine goodness and to the mind of St. Thomas. Other authors therefore censure this position sharply, as is evident in the cited Alarcón (*tract. IV, disp. V, c. I, nn. V and VII*), Herize (*disp. LIII, c. III*), Arrubal (*disp. LXXXVII, c. III*), Suárez (*lib. V de Reprobatione, c. III, n. VI*), who considers it improbable and alien to sound doctrine. I omit the graver censures of Catharinus and Stapleton, against which nearly all the Thomists hold it tenaciously, as Alarcón cites them (*disp. V, c. I*) and Herize (*disp. XXXIII, c. I*) and John of St. Thomas acknowledges (*disp. X, a. II*), and Gonzalez cites (*disp. LXXXVII, lect. IV*), and the *Cursus Carmelitanus* (*tract. V de Praedestinatione, disp. VIII, dub. I, assert. E, and dub. II, concl. un., n. LI*), affirming that St. Thomas so thought — and the Salmanticenses themselves in section V propose and prove it, rejecting other opinions and attacking their foundations, and expressly say: that an exclusion from glory can be given — and not only from grace — before foreseen demerits as the motive for this exclusion; and that God is then said to deny glory as an unowed benefit, and not by way of punishment, so that this exclusion of grace, or non-election to glory, can be intended for the display of justice. And although, he says, this negative exclusion is not positive reprobation if positive is taken in the sense of condemnatory, it is nonetheless positive if taken in the sense of the providence that disposes concerning those who fall away from the highest end — it begins from the will not electing them to glory certainly and efficaciously, for this belongs to the special reprobative providence, or to the principle of such providence, which is taken from the excluded end.

I had thought to reduce this position to the sense of Augustine and Scotus, and to establish, with St. Thomas as authority, on the supposition of original sin, that this is the reason for this exclusion. But John of St. Thomas did not permit me this. For from section VI, nn. VI–VII, he attacks that position — which he nonetheless acknowledges to be Augustine's — and says that it has against it two very difficult objections that can scarcely be reconciled. The exactly identical position is that of the Salmanticenses in the places cited by John of St. Thomas, and on account of the same foundations — to which they added another concerning the reprobation of the Angels, who lacked original sin and yet were excluded from glory and grace. This example John of St. Thomas adduces (*disp. X, a. II, nn. III, XIV, and XXVI*). In which learned and prudent author I am surprised at the thoughtlessness of citing, in support of this his position, Augustine's book *De Praedestinatione et Gratia* — for it is not Augustine's, nor can it be. So many things in it are foreign to his genuine doctrine, and for this reason the Louvain scholars expunged that book from the catalogue of Augustine's works, which that learned man should have noted. Nor does he adduce any other passage as proof, yet he cites that one three times.

It is certainly established that nothing is more perspicuous, more certain, and more frequent in Augustine than that original sin is the foundation of the justice of reprobation — both of that which is abandonment and of that which is

punishment. As for the Angels, Augustine is no less averse to that opinion, as we shall say in its proper place.

Section III

Original sin as the motivating and just reason for both forms of reprobation — adequate in the case of infants, inadequate in the case of adults — is demonstrated.

There is no need to show that this is Augustine's view, since no one doubts it. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that certain Thomists have dared to criticize Augustine — among them Bañez in his commentary (*q.23, 1.p.a.5*). First, Saint Thomas himself, to turn adversaries on their own ground, states in (*q.6 de veritate a.2 ad 9*) that according to Augustine original sin is the reason for reprobation. And he teaches Augustine's view clearly in his commentary on (*c.9 Epist. ad Rom. lect.3*), where he writes: "If someone of two persons equally guilty of an offense forgives one and not the other, he is merciful to one and just toward the other, yet unjust to neither. For since all human beings are born liable to damnation on account of the sin of the first man, those whom God delivers through his grace are delivered by mercy alone. Thus toward some he is merciful, namely those he delivers, and toward others just, namely those he does not deliver — yet unjust toward neither." This is precisely Augustine's own view, which Scotus follows (*in 1.d.41.q.vn. S.poteft aliter dici n.11*), where he refers back to Augustine. And more expressly (*n.12*), where he grounds the distinction between Peter and Judas in the state of the mass of perdition, as we noted above.

With these two leading figures as our starting point, we assert the resolution stated in the title of this section and defend it against its opponents by means of an argument that is our own and drawn from the fountains of Augustine — one that certain theologians have understood less clearly, which is why they have labored in answering the common objection of the adversaries and seem not to have satisfied it fully. The objection, moreover, does not apply to infants who die in original sin without baptism, but rather to those who are damned after having received baptism. It proceeds as follows: original sin is completely removed through baptism, through which grace is conferred and the baptized person is justified; therefore, once original sin has been remitted, it cannot remain the reason for reprobation in adults. The premise is a matter of faith; the conclusion follows.

With this argument the adversaries believe the matter is settled, and our own writers vary and disagree in their responses. I respond clearly and consistently by distinguishing the premise: original sin is removed as to its formal element — I concede the premise; as to its material element — I deny the premise. I then deny the conclusion and explain the solution.

It is indeed true that guilt does not remain and that grace is infused. But concupiscence and the tinder of sin remain, inclining toward further sins; and

this inclination is connected with future sins. For each person is tempted by his own concupiscence, as the Apostle James says (*c.1*), drawn away and enticed; and concupiscence, when it has conceived, gives birth to sin. This sin has its root in the material element of original sin, which has not been removed by baptism. Since therefore in that root and material element there lies the seed and as it were the cause of sin by means of concupiscence — and God, seeing from that root the future sins that would spring from it, permitted them with respect to that same material sin which inclines toward sin, as the Council of Trent teaches — this is also why that concupiscence is called "sin" by the Apostle (*sess.5 in Decreto*), a matter we treat carefully in our work on the Keys of Peter, in the disputation on original sin, chapter XVII.

After the remission of formal original sin — which, according to Augustine, is entirely blotted out (*lib. de peccatorum meritis et remissione, et lib.6 contra Iulian. c.4.5.6. et lib. de Nuptijs et concup. ad Valerium c.25 et 26 et lib.1 retrac.c.15*), and in accordance with the definition of the Council of Trent (*sess.5 S.5*) — concupiscence nevertheless remains; and as long as it remains, there clings to the now-justified person that incentive to sin, on account of which God, foreseeing future sins and permitting them, reprobates the person positively on account of those foreseen sins.

I illustrate the matter by an example. When someone suffers from a dangerous fever and is cured by medicine, the fever is entirely removed and the person is healed, yet there remains in him a languor and a morbid condition arising from mortality, which will ultimately destroy him — not by virtue of the fever now present, for that is gone, but by reason of the diseased state remaining in the mortal body after the fever. Similarly concupiscence in the infected soul is as a kind of languor and affective quality, as Augustine calls it (*lib.1 de nuptijs et concupiscentia c.2.3 et 25 et lib.5 contra Iulianum c.3 q.11*), whom the Master follows (*in 2.dist.30 Lit.G*), calling it the tinder of sin and the weakness of nature from which the diseases of sins arise. The material element of that sin does not perish utterly.

If those theologians who reject this view should ask me whence comes the difficulty of doing good and the proneness to sin — such that we cannot avoid all venial sins taken collectively — except from that concupiscence which is the material element of original sin, then although formal sin cannot be the motivating cause of reprobation in baptized adults, the material element of that sin can be. For from this as from a corrupted root all sins spring, freely committed though they are; and unless that root is extinguished by God or restrained through efficacious grace, it will tempt, tickle, and entice toward sin. Indeed, even in just persons it rages and gnashes and by its impulses spurs toward sin.

This is, in my judgment, the true and clear answer within Augustine's framework, who traced the cause of reprobation back to original sin because he

saw that in it, taken materially, lay the root of all sins. This is why he wisely wrote (*lib.5 contra Iulianum c.15*): "Whoever is free of original sin will also be free of actual sin." Hence in all his works he constantly joined and connected actual sins with original sin, as we have seen above. Let it suffice now to cite that passage (*lib. de Corrept. et grat. c.13*): "Either they lie under sin which they drew from their generation by origin and go hence with that hereditary debt which was not remitted by regeneration, or by their own free will they have added further sins beyond it — a free will not freed, free from justice but enslaved to sin, by which they are rolled about through diverse and harmful lusts, some more, some less, but all evil, and to be judged with diverse punishments corresponding to that very diversity."

Thus original sin not remitted is the reason for abandoning a person in the condemned mass, while original sin remitted — on account of the material element of sin and the concupiscence adhering to us and inclining toward further sins — is the just reason for permitting sin. Had Bañez and those who with him reproach Augustine, and those other Thomists who together with the Salamancans and John of Saint Thomas do not accept this, and certain Scotists as well — namely Faber and Mastrius — who abandon him, had they considered this, they would have desisted from their opinion and followed Augustine, just as those most learned Jesuit Fathers follow him, those who assembled in Rome in the name of the entire Society and drew up the *Ratio Studiorum* — that is, a most select book compiled from the common view — in which there is contained the doctrine of predestination and reprobation as transmitted by Augustine, to be taught in the schools of the Society in these words (*pr. Societ. Iesu*): "The following proposition is put forward and chosen to be defined and taught in all the schools of the Society: Not only was there on our part no reason or condition for predestination, but it is not to be said absolutely that it lies in our power to be predestinated, nor would any be saved unless they were predestined." The following proposition XIII succeeds it: "The cause for which the remaining human beings were permitted to fall away from their ultimate end in reprobation was original sin." And they say this doctrine is that of Saint Augustine, whom they marvelously commend there, that is, under the heading On the Selection of Opinions.

The best Thomists ought to embrace and defend this same position — and indeed the Scotists too, if they wish to interpret Scotus faithfully. I am therefore not surprised that Faber departed from it, since throughout nearly the entire treatise on predestination he wished to depart from Scotus, saying that Scotus was doubtful or merely problematic in this matter (*disp.58.q.1.c.7.num.102 et disp.59.q.1.c.1.n.14*). What does surprise me is Mastrius, who professes to adhere to both Augustine and Scotus, yet chose to dissent from both (*disp.5.q.3.a.4.n.269*). But I leave him to be refuted by others among those who follow Augustine, including Suárez and Fasolo.

Augustine's intent was to establish the justice of God in permitting those actual sins that would follow from original sin, for two reasons. First, because that mass infected with sin was unworthy of God's grace and incapable of demanding it; hence God could justly deny it, and accordingly men could be reprobated negatively. Second, because the permissions of sin that followed did not arise from the mere will of God freely withholding his grace, but from the unworthiness of men and their unfitness for grace, since that nature was infected and diseased even after the guilt of formal sin had been remitted. Once that guilt was deleted, there still remained the root of sinning, which God was not bound to extinguish, since it inhered in a vitiated and infected nature. Therefore the reason for permitting sins was not merely the stain and guilt of formal sin, as those theologians object against Augustine — for since that stain was nonexistent at that point, it could be no cause of permission — but rather that diseased and affective quality still inclining toward sin, namely the tinder of sin. What could be plainer or more evident in support of Augustine's placing the cause of reprobation in original sin?

But since the adversaries take as their pretext the example of the angels and of men in the state before sin, and say that those were reprobated without any infection of original sin and independently of its foresight, and therefore that there is no need to have recourse to that infection of human nature in the mass of perdition — indeed they attempt to weaken Augustine's argument taken from that source by saying that the distinction of the predestined from the reprobate can be understood in terms of a mass of pure nature, because Paul does not attribute it to original sin but to God's power, according to the statement: "The potter has power over the clay, from the same mass" — that is, of human nature regarded in itself, still without fault or sin — "to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor." This is the particular view of Mastrius (*disp. 5.q. 3.a. 4*), who in this respect agrees entirely with the Thomists.

To neutralize this example and remove the pretext, I say first that these theologians have not sufficiently penetrated Augustine's doctrine concerning the grace and predestination of angels and of men before sin — for had they properly grasped it, they would abstain from the example and lay down the pretext. And although this question is not strictly proper to this place, something must briefly be said that will suffice to refute the argument.

The solution depends on that distinction between the "aid without which one cannot" and the "aid by which," as Augustine calls it (*lib. de Correptione et gratia c. 11 et 12*), as appears from the letter of Prosper to Augustine, and as two supreme theologians, Vásquez and Suárez, have recognized. With this distinction introduced, I respond that the angels and Adam before the fall had only that first aid — the "aid without which one cannot" — that is, a sufficient but inefficacious grace left in the power of free will, through which aid, as Suárez says (*tom. 2 de grat. lib. 4.c. 2.n. 10*), it was given to act if one wished. And

immediately: "By such an aid, whatever is necessary for willing is provided." But the angels and Adam did not have the second aid — the "aid by which" — which is proper to the state of fallen nature, and which was greater and more powerful, says Suárez (*eodem tom. lib.5.c.3.n.6*), because through it the effect is that the person wills, and he adds: "Augustine signifies that so great and efficacious a grace was not given to the first man, because at that time free will was so free that it could will good and evil alike; but now, on account of the weakness of fallen nature, an aid is necessary that will make the person will and do good." Vásquez says the same (*1.p.disp.98.c.4.n.22.23 et d.185.c.11 in 1.2.D.Thomae*). That this aid is through Christ is clear from Augustine in those passages (*de Correp. et grat. c.11 et 12*), and from the same authorities Vásquez and Suárez, whose testimonies I have adduced (*in Scrinio Augustini c.4 et 5*). That the first aid "without which one cannot," being sufficient and inefficacious, was not through Christ — this too is clear from the same Augustine and the same authors.

Therefore the grace given to the angels and to Adam in his integrity was in their power to receive its efficacy from free will, and hence merit and demerit were taken from the choice of free will. So Suárez (*tom.2 de grat. c.4.num.18*): "It must be supposed, from Augustine's view, that there is a distinction between man in the state of integral nature and in the state of fallen nature: in integral nature the same aid that was proximately sufficient for observing each precept and avoiding all sins was also sufficient at any time." And immediately: "He had given the aid without which he could not persevere if he wished, so that what was formerly wished was left in his own free will." From this arose the distinction between the kind of election of angels and Adam in the state of integrity and the election of human beings in the state of fallen nature: in the former, it was taken from merit and demerit foreseen beforehand; in the latter it is not taken from foreseen merit but from mercy and a gracious will.

Thus the mode of meriting and demeriting for angels was one thing, and the mode of electing another. Therefore the example benefits those authors who dissent from Augustine — indeed it harms them. For justice was most manifest in the case of angels and Adam, since God preelected them on account of their own foreseen merits as the motivating cause of justice, and reprobated them only on account of their own foreseen personal demerits. Hence the distinction was not derived from power, dominion, or the other ends affirmed by these Thomists and Scotists. And the example is turned back against them: the reprobation of the angels was not effected before personal sin was foreseen, since it was entirely positive, and therefore in their case God exercised an act of justice. Hence God ought not, in the case of human beings, to have omitted the proportionate reason for reprobation appropriate to the state of ruin — from which state, while God mercifully and freely chose those to be saved, he nevertheless chose them not without merits in their execution. The rest he left in the state of original sin, in which they were to be reprobated negatively, and in a further moment to be reprobated positively on account of their final sins.

I cannot here conceal the thoughtlessness of Mastrius, an acute and careful man, who regards the merits of Adam in the state of integrity — which Augustine says perished through Adam along with that state — as merits of nature alone, because he sees that Augustine calls those merits "human," and he rebukes the distinguished theologian Smising for understanding Augustine otherwise. So Mastrius (*disp. 5. q. 2. n. 84*). He was deceived by that phrase of Augustine, according to whom the merits that Augustine calls "human" and that perished through Adam were not achieved without grace — which was that "aid without which one cannot," that is, sufficient and inefficacious grace. This is manifest: Adam required grace to act rightly and could not merit without it, just as neither could the angel. Augustine says expressly (*lib. de corrept. et grat. c. L*): "But if this aid had been lacking to either angel or man, they would certainly not have fallen through their own fault." And lest Mastrius object, let him consider what immediately follows: "But now, for those to whom it is lacking, it is already a punishment of sin" — that is, the aid of grace, not of nature. "But to those to whom it is given, it is given according to grace, not according to debt." Therefore those "human merits" that perished through Adam were not without the grace proper to that state, which nonetheless was different from the efficacious grace of Christ given in the state of fallen nature, of which Augustine says: "Now it is given more abundantly to those to whom God has been pleased to give it, so that not only is present that without which we cannot persevere even if we wish, but it is also so great and of such a kind as to make us willing." Not that sufficient grace is absent in this state of fallen nature, but because in this state no one acts except with efficacious grace, which not only gives the power but also the willing. Therefore those merits are not called "human" because they were of nature alone — for how could they be merits if they were natural in the Pelagian manner? — but because they were not from the powerful and efficacious grace of Christ, such as is the grace given to those who do good in virtue of Christ's blood. And when Augustine says those merits perished through Adam, he does not say that grace perished, but that that mode of meriting perished which consisted in the cooperation of sufficient but inefficacious grace receiving its efficacy from free will, in the power of which that grace operated. I note further that those merits are called "human" because they could not properly be called gifts of God in the way that our merits in this present state are called gifts of God. The reason is that those merits were attributed to free will determining grace and providing it with efficacy, whereas our merits, although accomplished together with the freedom of free will, do not have their efficacy in a determining cause within free will, but the efficacy of grace is referred to God, while the freedom of the cooperating free will is preserved. Let Mastrius not be vexed at hearing these things from me — for I believe he knows I dwell in Augustine — especially since they are said by me in defense of the distinguished theologian Smising against criticism.

A response is given to the objection of Father Gabriel Vásquez.

Here an objection is urged against us from Vásquez (*disp.95.c.3.n.13*) concerning the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, which cannot be preserved on our view. For given the foresight of the condemned mass in Adam and the Blessed Virgin's future membership in that mass, she would seem to be placed entirely infected along with the rest. Nor can she be liberated beforehand through the merits of Christ, whose Incarnation — since it was instituted as a remedy for sin — presupposed sin and sinners, among whom the Blessed Virgin Mary was placed. Therefore she was not preserved from sin already contracted in the mass, but was cleansed through the ordinary redemption common to others. But what some say — that the Blessed Virgin was foreseen in the order of intention but not in the order of execution — does not satisfy Vásquez, who denies those orders in God, as he acknowledges in that passage while citing another (*disp.89*) where he sharply attacks them.

Indeed, many years ago when I was at Coimbra and was beginning to dictate the treatise on predestination in my Scotist school, I confess that this difficulty occurred to me before I came across Vásquez, and it greatly tormented me, because as an Augustinian I did not readily admit that the Incarnation of the Word would have taken place before foreseen sin, which Augustine taught clearly and consistently throughout. For in the view of our Scotus — which I was not then treating — shared also by Suárez, the solution was easy, since the Blessed Virgin was elected by the force of the first decree to be Mother of God before any future sin, and thus was free from all stain, and in the view of some (to which I do not assent) even from any debt thereof.

In the view of Augustine and those who follow him, therefore, the objection has great difficulty. It is not well solved by introducing the orders of intention and execution, because if God intends to save human beings from the condemned mass through Christ's redemption, he already foresaw before that intention all the posterity of Adam as infected. Hence the intention of saving presupposes infection, and the order of intention — which came later — could not remove the infection. Nor could the order of execution, since this order could not take away what was already presupposed in reality antecedently to the foresight of redemption. And execution could not remove that contraction in the mass, which was presupposed as infected; since that sin was nothing other than the contraction drawn from Adam's guilt transmitted by infection to posterity, in which the Blessed Virgin was included and consequently shared the infection. So from the intention execution follows infallibly. A different answer must therefore be given.

Since I follow Scotus by the institute of my profession, I easily unloose this knot: for since Scotus allows that the Divine Word was to become incarnate even if Adam had not sinned, the Blessed Virgin remains free from that infection, as is evident. But because Augustine's view appears contrary, and since Vásquez

follows it — and I embraced it before I followed Scotus — it will be necessary to respond to the argument differently and resolve the difficulty. This can be accomplished in two ways.

The first is by having recourse to conditional knowledge (*scientia conditionata* — knowledge of what would occur under given conditions), by which God foresaw antecedently what would happen, given that particular mode of the Incarnation after foreseen sin, before he absolutely decreed what was to come to pass. For when God had conditionally foreknown, before his absolute decree, that mass arising from original sin and the Virgin consequently to be in it, and that unless he preserved her through the conditionally future merits of Christ she would incur the stain of sin — through the absolute decree following the conditional foreknowledge, he willed her to be free from that stain to be incurred, and thus preserved her from sin by his intention, and willed this to come about through the merits of the Word-to-be-incarnate, whose Incarnation he also foresaw through conditional knowledge. For this reason, neither according to the order of intention nor of execution did the Blessed Virgin contract original sin, since through God's absolute decree — which presupposed conditional knowledge — he had lifted the infection that would absolutely have come to pass, had God not willed to exempt her. Hence, on the Augustinian path, there is no lack of a way to free her from the stain of sin.

The other way, which then came to my mind, seems more expedient and plausible, since it is drawn from the natural sterility of the Blessed Virgin's parents, Joachim and Anne, and runs thus. They were by nature sterile, and no offspring was to come from them according to the natural order of things. Therefore neither was the Blessed Virgin naturally speaking to exist in the nature of things, nor consequently was she to be in the condemned mass; for since she could not exist except through the generation of her parents, and they were sterile, she could not be generated by them. Thus God did not foresee her among the posterity of Adam in the condemned mass. Then, in a second moment, taking pity on that fallen multitude, God willed the Word to become incarnate for the redemption of men condemned in the common mass; and for her greater dignity he willed to give him a Mother not from that fallen stock, but from a miraculous generation — miraculous as regards sterility, though from a natural union — making those parents, Joachim and Anne, who were sterile, fruitful by a singular benefit, and giving them as daughter the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom he decreed newly to be born, and appointed her as Mother to his Son: so that she would not exist unless she were to be Mother, nor would he be the Son unless from such a Mother, who otherwise would not exist in the nature of things. For unless God willed to appoint her as Mother to his Son, he would not alter that order of nature. In this way the original grace of the Blessed Virgin is preserved, and her dignity is greatly increased, since all of it — even with respect to nature — belongs to the order of grace: for in order that she might exist in the nature of things, the cause was the Incarnation of the Divine Word in

her and from her. Therefore the Blessed Virgin would not have been born unless she were to be the Mother of God — than which nothing more honorable could have happened to her. Together with her Son this most blessed Pair was reserved, so that he who was incapable of stain might have an immaculate Mother, and she might be born immaculate on account of her Son.

Yet there remains still that debt in the root of her parents, because if she were to be born according to the course of current nature, she would entirely contract the stain common to all of nature, which she ought to have incurred had she not been exempted, excluded, and freed from it by reason of Christ, whose Mother she was destined to be, and been preserved in the most noble manner, entirely excluded from the contagion of sin.

Nor should one object that it follows from this that others too who were born of sterile parents and were born miraculously — such as John the Baptist and Jeremiah — were exempt from the harm of original sin. I deny the inference. For in their case there was no particular providence of God joined with a decree to exempt them from the common contagion, since there was no reason to grant them that singular privilege. Hence only the will of God concerning their generation and conception and natural birth intervened, together with the annexed effects and obligations of nature, among which was original sin. Wherefore all of them were conceived in original sin with the tinder of concupiscence, with lust, the strife of the soul's parts, and the discord of the appetites — and were accordingly subject to at least venial sins. From all of which the most Blessed Virgin Mary was freed by the singular privilege of God, since she lacked the tinder of concupiscence and admitted no venial sin, in accordance with the Council of Trent (*sess.5 et sess.6 can.13*) and every other kind of filth and stain of this sort, as Saint Thomas of Villanova taught (*serm.3 de Natiuit. circa finem*), writing thus: "It was not fitting that the sanctuary of God should have any stain in itself — which is why, before that most holy soul was infused, that flesh was fully cleansed of every filth and stain, and the soul, when infused, contracted no stain of sin from the flesh." And as Augustine said most weightily and devoutly (*lib. de nat. et grat. c.36*): "Concerning Mary, out of honor for the Lord, I wish no question to be raised concerning sin whatsoever; for we know that more grace was bestowed upon her to conquer sin from every side, since she merited to conceive and give birth to him who is acknowledged to have had no sin." From this testimony Augustine appears to have removed from the Blessed Virgin not only actual but also original sin — he whom our Scotus had as his guide for establishing her Immaculate Conception, and who certainly always agreed with Augustine both in this matter and especially in this doctrine on predestination.

Section IV

On the source from which the permission of sin arises.

I pronounce this newly and confidently: no permission of sin was primarily and of itself intended by God. Rather, since it is the effect of negative reprobation in human beings and the consequence of original sin — in which lies the root and matrix of all sin — every permission of sin arises and flows from it as from its source. This is the true and genuine doctrine of Augustine, in which every permission of sin is an act of justice that looks to the connection between the tinder and sin. If the tinder did not exist, God would not permit sin by his bare free will alone. For since that permission is the denial of an efficacious means to avoid sin, from which the future sin follows, it does not befit God to withhold that aid when there is no impediment or incentive on the part of the person. For God would in some way be unjust and the author of sin. And although grace is not owed to a person, sin is nonetheless inconsistent with nature and with divine providence as regarded from a natural standpoint.

Thus that permission, from which sin follows in whatever way it follows, is rather an effect of God punishing than of God providing. Among the elect this permission is ordered by God toward repentance, but it is not primarily intended by God. Among the reprobate, however, this permission is the just consequence of original sin — whether its formal element — and is ordered toward the punishment that follows from the guilt the corrupted and vitiated person is to commit, which God is not bound to impede since it arises from the cause on the part of the sinner.

From this it follows, in Augustinian doctrine — which is also Scotist doctrine — that the permission of sin is not the effect of predestination but rather of negative reprobation, while its ordering is the effect of predestination. On this Augustine writes excellently (*lib. de Corrept. et Grat. c.9 propè finem*): "For those who love God all things cooperate unto good — and so absolutely all things, that even if some of them stumble and stray, even this he makes to profit them unto good, since they return more humble and more instructed." He pursues and illustrates this with the example of the penitence of David and Peter (*lib. de nat. et grat. c.24.28 et lib.14 de Ciuit. c.3 et in Psal.82*).

I therefore do not approve the common opinion that teaches the permission of sin to be an effect of predestination: among those holding this view are Zumel (*q.23.a.2.concl.7*), Suárez (*lib.3.de Prædest.c.4.n.4 et seqq.*), Ruiz (*d.23.f.1 et 2*), Herice (*1.30.c.6*), González (*d.77.f.4*), Granado (*tract.6.de Prædest. d.5*), the Salamancans (*tract.5.de Prædest.d.6.dub.vn.*), John of Saint Thomas (*d.19.a.6.a.n.5*) — from whom, in their leader Vásquez's footsteps, Alarcón (*tract.4.d.4.c.5.S.2.n.16*) wished to depart when speaking of possibility; in point of fact, however, Zumel, Suárez, Ruiz, Herice, the Salamancans, Granado, and Alarcón hold the same opinion as Vásquez (*n*). I approve, however, the view of those who deny it: Vásquez (*d.93.c.2*), Arruba (*d.82.c.2*), Villegas (*contr.15*), and Lessius (*lib.11 de perfection. diuin.c.6*) — although the last do not speak in our Augustinian sense, except for Granado, who (*tract.8.de Reprob.d.vn.f.4*) agrees with us on the permission of sin,

and is entirely Augustinian. Here I observe that a distinction must be drawn between the permission of sin and its ordering — which perhaps certain other authors noticed less clearly, and for that reason labored more in the solution of the argument by considering the goods that followed from the permission once it had been ordered by God, which goods do not arise precisely from the permission but from God's ordering of evils, as Augustine often says.

Hence it must be asserted: permission is joined with the denial of efficacious grace, from which the sin annexed to it follows, and it is the effect of negative reprobation, not of positive predestination. The ordering of it, on the other hand, already presupposes permission, is therefore different from it, and does not tend immediately toward the denial of efficacious grace; on the contrary, it tends toward grace and justification or other ends intended by God. This is made clearer by observing that the permission of sin is common to the reprobate and the predestined, and therefore grounded in a common cause, which can be nothing other than original sin in whose mass all are mingled. But the ordering is not common but particular and diverse: among the predestined it is ordered toward repentance, while among the reprobate it is ordered toward punishment or toward other ends intended by God in just judgment. On this Augustine writes (*tract.110 in Ioannem propè finem*): "Rightly does he hate another's vice — yet loves his own, whether as the benefit of healing or as the token of condemnation." And immediately: "either healing through mercy, or ordering through judgment."

Otherwise, on my view, the permission of sin cannot be directly intended or willed by God; nor can it be the effect of predestination, since that permission does not arise from predestination but from negative reprobation, being the denial of efficacious grace. The remedy of that permission is indeed directly intended by God, and the elect person is the effect of predestination after sin foreseen as future from the permission. Yet repentance cannot of itself be directly intended by God, as the admirable theologian Pérez has ingeniously shown (*de Prouid. Dei d.5.c.r*), where he weighs the difficulties of this view concerning the permission of sin as directly intended by God, adducing Augustine's doctrine to explain it — to which he always admirably adheres. And although he thinks the permission of sin is an effect of predestination, he nevertheless rejects the common mode of explanation and labors sufficiently in his own construction of the alternative, so that (*n.78*) he says: "God can, without any or with very little supernatural grace, give freedom with respect to this sin." Other theologians do not approve this. For how, without any aid of grace prepared to avoid the sin — which is required in order that someone sin freely — will he sin? The word "very little," however, I find acceptable, because it supposes that in the exciting and assisting grace of God there is given more and less, and that efficacy derives from greater intensity of grace, which is Augustine's view. But how so great a theologian could say either that God can

give freedom to sin without any grace, or how sin could occur without that grace — I should like to hear from him.

Let it stand therefore: the immediate permission of sin is not an effect of predestination but rather of negative reprobation; while its ordering in the case of the elect is an effect of predestination. On this matter, among the moderns none thinks better than Granado (*de Reprob.d.vn.sect.4*).

One will object: the predestined are not negatively reprobated but are always elect, and yet God permits their sins. Therefore this permission is not the effect of negative reprobation. I respond by explaining my doctrine on negative reprobation as follows. All the elect are first foreseen as condemned in the condemned mass on account of original sin, deprived of grace and with the tinder of sin. By reason of this state in which they were foreseen, God permitted even in the elect their sins — not from regard to predestining them. And I call this state, with Augustine, one of negative perdition: because while they were in it, they were neither to be predestined nor to be saved. If this state did not exist, God would not directly permit those future sins. The solution to the objection is thus clear: the predestined were first in the common state of reprobation, from which they were liberated through God's mercy by the merits of Christ out of God's mercy. It is of that reprobation antecedent to election that I am speaking — not of that other reprobation proper to the reprobate, which is abandonment after the election and distinction of the predestined. This is the genuine doctrine of Augustine, which teaches that every permission of sin arises from that infection of vitiated nature; that certain permissions of sin among the elect are ordered toward the good of glory and grace was the result of God's mercy in electing and predestining them and making all things cooperate unto good. But other permissions of sin were ordered toward the manifestation of justice and toward other ends intended by God in just judgment.

If one objects concerning the permission of the sins of angels and of men in integral nature, I respond that this is of a different kind, just as grace and predestination were also of a different kind, as we said above. Hence the permission was made in accordance with the condition of the state: namely, given the foreseen determination of free will misusing sufficient grace for that state — not through the withdrawal of efficacious aid, which was not efficacious of itself, but through the cooperation of the will in whose power grace resided. Hence it was referred to free will and to merit and demerit, with grace offered indifferently to all; and therefore there was no root or matrix of sin in that nature inclining toward sin. Let this suffice for resolving the objection and assigning the difference between the various permissions.

Section V

Whether the view of Scotus is consistent with the doctrine of Augustine.

The admirable Father Pérez, Doctor of the Society, moves me by his reverence for Augustine to the point that I hold his judgment preemptively confirmed. And so I should know whether Scotus's judgment is consonant with Augustine's — not because Scotus must be abandoned by me, but because I am persuaded that he does not dissent from Augustine. And indeed he agrees in all things, differing in one alone, namely in the order God followed in predestining.

For Scotus places the predestination and negative reprobation of human beings (setting aside now that of angels) before the foreseen sin of Adam, entirely consistently with his own view on the Incarnation of the Word. In the passages cited by us earlier (*1.sentent.d.41.S.poteft aliter dici, et in alio Contra iftud n.11 et 12*) Scotus places, before the foresight of original sin, the predestination of Peter and the negative reprobation of Judas in the following way. "Peter and Judas, equal in natural endowments, are willed by God to exist in the moment in which they are presented to the Divine will in their natural existence, as equals. In that moment God primarily wills beatitude to Peter. I ask: what does he then will for Judas? etc." Then in the following section: "It can be said that in this first moment God wills nothing for Judas — but there is only a negation of the volition of glory. And similarly, as if in a second moment of nature, when he wills grace to Peter, there is still no positive act of the Divine will concerning Judas, but only a negative one." He proceeds in this way speaking of the state of predestination and negative reprobation, until he reaches the state of predestining after the foresight of sin common to Peter, who sins, and to Judas, who likewise sins — but the former not finally, the latter finally. Hence Peter the penitent, Judas the finally impenitent — from which the positive reprobation of Judas.

From this it appears that Scotus differs from Augustine in the first state of predestination — if I may so call it — of Peter in its inception and of the likewise incipient reprobation of Judas before the foresight of sin: a state not found in Augustine. But in the second state he agrees, insofar as he does not complete the predestination of Peter, nor the completely negative and then positive derelicting reprobation of Judas, except after the foreseen sin of Adam. Let us hear Scotus: "In the third moment, when he wills to permit Peter to be of the mass of perdition, or worthy of perdition — and this whether on account of original sin or actual sin — he then wills similarly to permit Judas to be a son of perdition. And this is the first positive act uniform as regards both Peter and Judas; yet from this act it is true that Judas will be a final sinner, given those negations, namely that God did not will to give him grace nor glory." This third moment is entirely Augustinian: in it the mass of perdition on account of original sin is placed, into which Peter and Judas fall equally along with all the posterity of Adam. Here you see the permission of Peter as the effect of original sin common to both Peter and Judas; for before it there was at Scotus's account no mention of sin, because this permission was not before sin, as we have just said from Augustine.

The fourth state, in the fourth moment, is likewise Augustinian: in it Judas is presented as a final sinner to the Divine will, and then God wills justly to punish and reprobate Judas. Thus it appears that Scotus, except for that first order posited before sin, departs from Augustine, and in the rest agrees.

I note furthermore the distinction between the permission of the sin of Lucifer and that of Judas, and consequently between the reprobation of angels and that of men, as Scotus places it (*S.Sed adhuc instatur n.13*): for the permission of Judas's sin was grounded, so to speak, in the mass of original sin, which was not the case for Lucifer. For comparing divine foreknowledge of angelic sin with foreknowledge of Judas's sin, Scotus says: "If we speak of a good or evil angel who was not in original sin — from this alone it does not seem that one knows Lucifer will sin." This is the doctrine of Augustine which we have just set out: that in the foresight of original sin is contained the foresight of future actual sin as in a root — which, since it was not present in the angel, another reason for foreknowing future sin had to be sought in his case. We have assigned this from Augustine above: it was sought in the very free act of the angelic will, inclined toward evil sins through its bare and integral freedom without any intrinsic fault, as Scotus expresses (*S.Praeterea: vbi mouet quaestionem, et S.Primum soluitur*), where he says: "God foreknows that he will cooperate with Lucifer regarding the substance of that act which will be a sin." On this matter we will treat in its proper place.

Section VI

How positive reprobation is brought about.

We have already touched briefly on this above. But the matter must be treated from the beginning. It is established that both Augustine and Scotus required and presupposed final sin for positive reprobation. I wished that Saint Thomas would hold the same, and I showed the way in which he might converge on that same view. But since many and weighty disciples of his draw him in a different and opposing direction — those whom Vásquez (*d.95.c.3.n.2*) calls the strict Thomists, among whom we have counted the Salamancans and John of Saint Thomas — let them enjoy the favor of their opinion and dissent from Augustine in it, since he opposes them, as we have judged elsewhere in adducing certain distinguished passages beyond those adduced by other authors. Among those, the one cited by Vásquez (*d.95.c.5.n.27*) from (*lib.6.Hypognoft*) is not Augustine, since that work is not his; nor is that other passage commonly attributed to Augustine and celebrated as "God is not a punisher before man is a sinner," which is usually cited as (*lib.11 de genef. ad litt. c.24*) where it is nowhere to be found; nor equally in (*epist.105*), where Vásquez cites it — I have not found this passage there. But there is entirely found a doctrine entirely contrary to what those strict Thomists attribute to their Doctor.

Augustine therefore establishes three things. First, that the distinction of the elect above others was made without merits, through mercy, from the condemned mass by liberating grace. Second, that in the derelict, justice and judgment have appeared. Third, that there has been no acceptance of persons. He teaches this clearly and constantly, and we have inculcated it almost to the point of tedium. Let it now suffice to cite Augustine's (*epist.105 et 106*) — and first and foremost (*epist.105 ad Sixtum*). From it I gather those three headings.

The first, on the grace of liberation, is found near the middle: "No one liberates those sold under sin except the grace of the Redeemer." And: "He finds nothing just in the one he liberates." Again: "It is then true grace by which a person is liberated, when it is not rendered according to the debt of justice." And later: "What merits, then, preceded?" And there he frequently repeats the election of grace, not of debt.

The second, on the justice of him who abandons and reprobates, is found a little before the middle of the same letter: "If there are vessels of wrath that are perfected for perdition, whose deserved punishment is rendered to them, let them impute this to themselves, since they were made from that mass which God merited and justly condemned on account of the sin of one, in which all have sinned." And below: "For those are not condemned who have not sinned." Indeed: "Destined for punishment on account of vices." And finally: "The guilt is attributed to the human will, to be condemned by none who refuses."

The third, on removing the acceptance of persons, is found at the beginning of the letter: "But as to the fact that they think they make God an acceptor of persons — if they believe that he has mercy on whom he wills without any preceding merits — they pay too little attention to the fact that a due penalty is rendered to the condemned man and an undue grace to the liberated one: so that neither does the former complain of being unworthy, nor does the latter glory of being worthy. And there acceptance of persons is less made, where one and the same mass of damnation and offense encompasses all, so that the liberated person may learn from the one not liberated what punishment would have been fitting for himself too, had grace not intervened." He inculcates the same toward the middle.

On account of these three reasons Augustine denies that God can reprobate and condemn persons without the foresight of sin. These are so many arguments against the opinion that the aforesaid Thomists attribute to the Angelic Doctor. Let us turn those three arguments of Augustine against that opinion.

First: the distinction they introduce without any foresight of a state in sin, but according to nature, is not in conformity with mercy — since it does not liberate from an evil — nor with grace, since where nature is capable and fit it seems rather to be equity than grace. Second: that reprobation of capable and innocent persons, excluding them from glory and consigning them to punishment, is not

in conformity with justice, which forbids condemning the innocent. Third: what else is the acceptance of persons, except when all are capable and fitting and suited to election, and yet without any cause some are excluded from the good to which others are elected?

I conclude against those who think otherwise with those words at the end of the same (*epist.105*), where the example of infants is proposed: "Let them therefore dare to say that an innocent person will be condemned by a just God, if he is bound by no bond of original sin." Apply this to adults, and say: "actual sin." The twin passage to this is (*lib.1 contr. Iulian. c.7*): "Answer, whether a just God cannot deprive his own image — bound by no sin — of eternal life? To say nothing of condemning it to the punishment of eternal fire."

But I proceed to refute that Thomist view by further arguments, though it already remains sufficiently refuted once it is established that it is contrary to Augustine.

First: in that view God seems to intend guilt, at least implicitly, because since the causes of the permission of sin are involved in that exclusion — as those authors themselves acknowledge — and since those permissions are connected with the denial of grace, which is a punishment of sin, it seems directly that God intends the person in the state of innocent nature, with no demerit foreseen in him, to be condemned. Second: the general will to save all is removed — which these adversaries, along with the common body of theologians, posit in God antecedently — nor is there room for it in that view, which at once elects some and reprobates others from equal motives of grace and justice, ordering each toward providence: to which a will to save all is repugnant, since it would remove reprobation. Third: sufficient aid is denied to those whom God has determined to reprobate, since no means for avoiding damnation ought to be assigned to them. Fourth: God is held to procure the condemnation of those persons whom he excludes for the manifestation of his justice, just as he procures the salvation of those he has destined for glory — lest any part of his providence fail. Fifth: it follows from that view that God by his certain and absolute decree excludes persons from glory and grace, which is certainly an unworthy purpose for God. This is evident from a comparison with the other decree, that of predestining: for this decree concerns the conferring of the good of glory and grace in his beloved Son and through the merits of his blood — which is supremely fitting for God both as to its object and as to its motive. But that other exclusive decree, introducing the removal of good and the induction of evil and eternal punishment — what just and fitting motive could it have? Sixth: it follows that God is miserly with his own goods and more cruel than pious, if he communicates his gifts to so very few and withholds them from so many more. We cannot believe that God would have chosen so few predestined and reprobated so many, had there been no unfitness on the part of human beings to account for the reprobation. Seventh: if that exclusion were from

some small good and from it there did not follow so great an evil as the permission of guilt and the destination to the punishment of both damnation and most bitter sense — each eternal — that exclusive decree of God could be tolerated. But since that evil is so great that the damned would prefer nonexistence to existence, according to the saying of Christ the Lord (*Matth.c.26*): "It were good for that man if he had not been born" — as Augustine signifies (*lib.5.contr.Iulian.c.r*) when comparing the damnation of infants dying with original sin alone: "Who would doubt that they will be in the mildest damnation of all? Whatever kind and however great it may be, even if it cannot be determined, I nonetheless dare not say that for them it would be preferable to have no existence than to exist there." By excepting these alone he confirms the rule: that for the remaining damned it were preferable not to have been born than to be condemned in that way.

These arguments seem sufficiently to attack the view of positive reprobation from God's absolute will without foresight of sin — which is utterly foreign to the mind of Augustine and of the Council of Valencia under Lothaire, as is evident from its (*c.3*): "We confidently confess predestination of the elect unto life and predestination of the elect unto death; yet in the election of those to be saved, the mercy of God precedes good merit; but in the damnation of those who are to perish, evil merit precedes the judgment of God."

By these arguments it is proved that the condemned mass must entirely be placed before negative reprobation, so that abandonment may be just; and the foresight of final sin must be placed before positive reprobation, so that damnation may be just. From this it appears that those strict Thomists are wrong to attribute the contrary view to Saint Thomas, thereby providing some authors with occasion to calumniate it as if it conveyed a Calvinist sense, which Calvin then went on to follow. John of Saint Thomas reports this (*d.ro.a.1.n.19*) under the heading "Calvinism objected to this view at its inception," which he clears from the calumny by saying that the objection can proceed only from mere calumny or ignorance. He did, however, cite the view that holds reprobation to pertain to reprobative providence antecedently to all foreseen guilt, excluding from that end on account of one's own glory for the manifestation of justice, or for some similar end.

Granting this, he proceeds to free this view from Calvinism by saying that Calvinism overturns freedom through a decree impelling and prostrating us and our freedom — which is not to deny the doctrine but to disapprove the manner of setting it forth, and to defend our freedom, not to remove injustice from the decree. Certainly, since the Thomists adhere to their physical predetermination, which serves as the reason for determining free will, I do not see how they fully solve the objection. As for the fact, I heard in England Calvinists boasting that they think alike with Saint Thomas, and Arminius affirms as much in his works, defending Saint Thomas from that calumny. It

must be held for certain that Calvin said God moves us toward good and evil in the same way and that both are the work of God — both virtue and sin — which is entirely impious and utterly foreign to Saint Thomas and to the school.

Moreover, Saint Thomas keeps that Calvinist fatal necessity far from our free will (*lib.2.contr.gentil.c.vlt.*) when he says: "It is manifest that predestination and election do not introduce necessity, as was shown above — for divine providence does not remove contingency from things." Furthermore, John of Saint Thomas says (*n.22*) that Calvin in intention and in execution removed the freedom of meriting and demeriting through a decree impelling antecedently and consequently by an ineluctable force impressed on the will — which Saint Thomas does not teach or admit. But this suffers its own difficulty, because execution depends on intention, and if the antecedent decree is impulsive, something impulsive must be placed in the execution; hence that ineluctable force seems necessary to many for achieving its effect, which force many hold to consist in that physical predetermining quality.

It would therefore be much better to say that Saint Thomas did not uphold the foresight of sin before reprobation, as we said above with the production of clear testimonies, and to join Saint Thomas to Augustine — from whom it is not fitting to separate him, especially since Scotus also adheres to Augustine. If these three agree on this point, heretics will be most powerfully refuted, and this simple tunic, as it were, will be hard to rend when a threefold profession of doctrine is intertwined.

The Salamancans were not unaware of this difficulty (*tract.5.d.8.dub.1.S.4 et 5*). They distinguished the will to punish from the will to exclude, and placed the foresight of sin before the former but not before the latter: so that exclusion from the kingdom as an unowed benefit was made before all foresight of sin without any cause on the part of the reprobate, while punishment follows the foresight of sin. But they are not consistent in their doctrine nor do they set it out clearly. For in their first assertion they speak of the will intending punishment after foreseen sin; and in their second they speak of the executing will, which in the order of execution wills to punish. And in the solution to the first they say: punishment is considered in two ways — first, as an evil and penalty for the reprobate; second, as it conduces to the good of the universe and to the manifestation of divine justice, and in this way God wills it independently of sin, and in the other way dependently on sin. Thus the will already intends punishment for the manifestation of God's glory and justice — which, since it is a nobler end, must be intended by God first. Therefore principally God intends to punish before the foresight of sin for the manifestation of his glory and justice — not only in execution, as they had said in their first assertion.

Furthermore there follows another incoherence in their doctrine: that God intends not only the exclusion of the reprobate from the kingdom by denying an unowed benefit, but also under the aspect of punishment, since this pertains

to the manifestation of justice; and since God intends it, he must intend the punishment as well. Moreover, if that punishment, as they say (*S.6.n.29*), conduces to the good of the universe and to the manifestation of divine justice and is intended independently of sin, then the punishment already involves penalty, since penalty is intended by God before the foresight of sin. Therefore not only exclusion from the kingdom as something unowed is intended — for that exclusion pertains more to negation than to justice.

Furthermore it is unclear what they mean by saying that punishment and the will of it depend on sin in the genus of material cause. For what is this material cause? If it is not formal sin, what is it? For sin before formal sin is not sin. But if it is formal sin and is supposed prior to punishment, then punishment cannot be for the manifestation of God's glory but for the manifestation of justice — and indeed then it will be the final cause of punishment, since it precedes the will to punish. Moreover, what sort of priority "in which" is it that is placed there with respect to reprobation? It is not understood. For if that material element of sin precedes it, then since matter is the subject in which form is received, that reprobation is already "in which" and has priority "in which," namely in the material element of sin. But if that priority "in which" is taken from the side of reprobation, then that reprobation is not something material but rather a form coming upon that materiality. Finally, that exclusion from the kingdom cannot be prescinded from punishment. For it is not merely to be left negatively, but positively to be cast aside — what else is it to be excluded? For this reason they call it (*n.24*) a "positive denial," which contains the punishment of loss — the greatest of punishments. And if that is inflicted before the foresight of sin, the reprobate is most gravely punished before his demerit and sin.

From these considerations it appears how difficult that view is, and for that reason Cajetan (*Commentar. in 1.p.q.23.a.5*) wished to remove it from Saint Thomas, as we too have desired. For there are many passages in Saint Thomas that appear to voice the common view of reprobation after foresight of sin. Yet because the testimonies of (*1.partis q.23 et in 1.sentent.d.41.q.vn.a.3 et 5 et in lect.3.a.3 in cap.9.Roman. et 3.contr.gent.c.vlt.*) are express, and the best Thomists — such as the Salamancans (*tract.5.d.8.dub.1*) and John of Saint Thomas (*q.23.d.10.a.1*) — thus understand Saint Thomas as having held that there was no cause of predestination and reprobation on our part (speaking of the order of intention), and since Herice and Aureolus attacked him on this account, let us leave him in this view and allow the Thomists to enjoy their own judgment.

Hence I cannot approve the view of Mastrius (*disp.5.de reprobatione q.3.a.4. an.268*), where — making no distinction between the doctrine of Augustine and Scotus on predestination and reprobation, and treating the state of integral and of fallen nature as equivalent — he says without any foresight of sin negative reprobation was made on the path of Augustine. He refutes Fasolo, Suárez, Pontius, and Faber, who think correctly on this point, entirely removing original

sin from the reason and cause of reprobation and interpreting that mass celebrated by Paul and taken by Augustine in the sense of perdition as a mass of pure nature, from which God out of his freedom and power elected and rejected whom he wished. This interpretation is certainly contrary to Augustine in hundreds of passages perpetually expounding the mass as infected and condemned. Hence Mastrius necessarily contradicts Augustine — and indeed Scotus who assents to Augustine — and agrees with the Thomists.

Nor can that explanation of the mass as a mass of pure nature be sustained: for that mass in Paul presupposes all the children of Adam infected with original sin and natural children of wrath and liable to damnation, according to Paul (*Rom.8*): that from the offense of one all were headed for condemnation, unless God mercifully liberated some from it. Nor does the word "mass" fit pure nature: for this word signifies not virgin and natural earth, but a compound and artificial thing, such as a lump of clay drawn from virgin and pure earth, gathered together and kneaded by the potter forming vessels. Neither therefore does the signification nor the example assist Mastrius, who ought not to have departed from Augustine and Scotus, nor to have interpreted Paul's passage absurdly.

Here one must note diligently that the distinction of the elect from the reprobate contains two elements. The one is the common state in the mass of damnation, where all are equally to be abandoned and condemned, and the cause of this state was original sin, on account of which they deserved to be abandoned and punished by justice — and in this sense it is true that sin is the cause of damnation. The other is the election of one above another in the distinction from the same mass. The cause of the first is not God but the sin that infects nature. The cause of the second is God choosing by his freedom those he willed, without any foreseen merit of the chosen. And the cause of this distinction on the part of human beings was none, which the Angelic Doctor taught most weightily (*1.p.q.23.a.5*), relying on the doctrine of Paul and Augustine, in these words: "The reason why he chose these for glory and reprobated those has no reason except the divine will." Supposing that Saint Thomas is speaking about the state of the condemned mass in which the posterity of Adam stood. In this sense thus understood, Saint Thomas agrees with Augustine, nor does Scotus dissent from them — understanding Saint Thomas also as speaking of negative derelicting reprobation. In this sense, if the Salamancans and John of Saint Thomas and the other Thomists had taken Saint Thomas, they would free him from the calumnies they complain of, and would have freed themselves from the vexatious difficulties that oppress them.

Again I wish to press what I said above. Great weight is given to avoiding the difficulties of reprobation by original sin, in which the primary cause of reprobation is situated, as is evident from what has been said. Those must entirely be rejected who — with Bañez and others — disapprove of Augustine's view. For original sin is the root of all actual sins, from which arises the reason

for positive reprobation in adults, even those to whom it was remitted through baptism, by reason — as I noted — of concupiscence and of the material element of sin, which as long as it remains in us (and it remains as long as we live) inclines toward sin and is the lure and tinder of sin. On which the Council of Trent (*sess.5 in Decreto de peccato originali*) states: "This Holy Synod confesses and feels that concupiscence or the tinder remains in the baptized — which, being left for the combat, cannot injure those who do not consent to it, but who rather manfully resist it through the grace of Jesus Christ, and indeed he who shall have legitimately striven shall be crowned. This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, this Holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin in the sense that it is truly and properly sin in the regenerate, but because it is from sin and inclines toward sin." Following this doctrine, Granado (*tract.8.de Reprobatione.dist.vn.sect.4*), together with the ancient Gregorius of Rimini, Marsilius of Inghen, and Durand — whom John of Saint Thomas cites (*d.10.a.3.n.13*) — has set forth our view.

By this is resolved the objection commonly raised against Augustinian doctrine, which I am surprised so many theologians have found compelling: namely, that original sin cannot be the cause and motive of reprobation because this sin is remitted in baptism. For it appears that even after it is remitted and entirely removed as to guilt, concupiscence remains in the material element of sin — in which God, as in a root, foresaw future sins. Of this concupiscence many Fathers at the same Council of Trent judged that it is not indeed hated by God as formal original sin is, yet it does not please God, since it is as it were the root and matrix of sin: and although its shoots and branches may be cut away, the seedlike force is not removed. Like a mine shaft which, emptied of its ore, yet retains a fertile vein and will produce more if left alone. Hence concupiscence is not held in hatred, but held in displeasure. These words are transferred here from my work on the Keys of Peter, (*lib.4.de Clavi Sacramentorum.disp.de peccato Originali*) printed at Rome with the proper approval not only of the Most Reverend Father Master of the Sacred Palace — who was then the Most Reverend Fr. Raymundus Capizucchus, a man adorned with all the gifts of nature, blood, intellect, and learning — but also at the command of the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, of the Most Reverend Laurentius Brancati (*Laur.*), a supreme theologian of singular learning and the literary oracle of the Roman Curia, held in the highest esteem by three Pontiffs: Alexander VII, Clement IX, and he who now happily presides, Clement X. They approved my sense as thus set out and drawn from the recent writings of Father Sforza Pallavicino (*Sfortia Pallavicini*), a distinguished theologian and subsequently a most deserving Cardinal, in his celebrated work on the Council of Trent, where he disputed on this matter acutely, elegantly, and solidly, as we wrote there.

So great is my trust in this solution — which has hitherto been less known and brought forward — that I not only hope but expect that future theologians will not only refrain from attacking Augustine's view, but will even defend it. Let

therefore that most weighty sentence of Augustine stand (*epist.106*): "If this mass of the human race were so neutral as to deserve neither good nor evil, it would not seem unjust for vessels of dishonor to be made from it." What the kinds of the reprobate are, what they will have done and what they will have suffered — it will be worthwhile to know. Four states of them seem to exist.

The first is that of those who depart with original sin alone and are condemned on account of it alone. The second is that of those who to original sin have added other actual mortal sins and have died together with original and actual sin, none remitted, and on account of these sins go into damnation. The third is that of those who, with original sin remitted, end this life with actual sins alone, who will be punished only for the actual sins. On the fourth there can be doubt: whether there can be those who die with original and only venial sins and are condemned on account of them. This I think must be affirmed entirely, as I once affirmed. The reason is that there are many boys and girls of good disposition among unbelievers who within the years of childhood — say up to the tenth or eleventh year — do not commit mortal sins but commit only venial ones. If these die in that state, they will depart with original sin and venial sin alone, and will be condemned on account of them. This premise is rendered probable by Father Vásquez (*in r.2.disp.141.C.1*), who holds that there can exist a state in adults in which they have original sin without actual sin — a state which in my judgment is more difficult than the one I posit, of original sin together with actual sin, since venial sins are collectively unavoidable.

That premise is also recommended by the doctrine of two Cardinals of the Society: John de Lugo (*Cardinal. Vaq? tom.de Incarnat.d.9.q.12a.6*) and Sforza Pallavicino (*Sfort.Palv in 1.2.d.2.q.2.a.2*), who teach that those who invincibly ignore God, while they are in that ignorance, also ignore what sin is, and are thus incapable of sinning. They rebuke John de Salas, a learned man of their Society, for having held the contrary and for having criticized those of the opposing view. If this is true, it will be easier to admit that unbaptized persons can sin venially only and not mortally. I also think this occurred frequently in the primitive Church, when infants were not baptized in infancy but adults and older persons were, so that someone would die in this state.

With these states and kinds of reprobate admitted, it is established that all of them are reprobated positively after the foresight of final sin, but to be punished in diverse ways according to the quality of their sins — as was defined in a similar matter at the Council of Florence (*ult.sess.*), when it says: "The souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin or in original sin alone descend straightway into hell, to be punished however with unequal punishments." Although it did not expressly mention the other two states, it nonetheless declared sufficiently that everyone is to be punished according to the sins which he contracted and committed and carries with him after death.

Therefore the punishment will be one for those who die with original sin alone; another for those who added mortal sins; another for those who, with original sin remitted, committed only mortal sins; another for those who departed with venial sins alone together with original sin — according to the distribution of punitive justice, as Augustine said (*lib.de Corrept.et Grat.c.13 in fine*): "They are most justly judged according to their merits, for either they lie under sin which they drew from their generation by origin, or by their own free will they added more besides — and they are rolled about through diverse and harmful lusts, some more, some less, but all evil, and to be judged with diverse punishments corresponding to that very diversity." He says the same (*lib.1.de Peccat.mer.et rem.c.12*).

What those punishments are and what their quality is appears from the fact that they must correspond to the quality of sins. And just as in the reward of the just glory is distributed according to merits — according to "In my Father's house there are many mansions," assigned to each in accordance with distributive justice — so too in hell there are diverse mansions for the sins of the damned, where they are tormented according to the condition of their offenses in accordance with the rule of punitive justice. And Augustine expounds and applies to it that sentence of Paul: "You have stored up for yourself wrath on that day when the just judgment of God will be rendered to each according to his works." On the kind of punishments we will speak elsewhere in the proper place.

Final Section

On the causes and effects of predestination.

This will be treated more briefly than the other matters, because in the view of Scotus and Augustine — and indeed also of Saint Thomas — there is no place for causes in predestination. For effects there is some place; so we will speak of these.

Regarding causes, it must be observed that those three great masters and heads of doctrine referred the entire business of election and predestination to the sole will of God, taught by Paul, who repeatedly says "according to the purpose of his will," "according to the counsel of his will," "according to the good pleasure of his will" (*Ephes.1*). Hence Augustine (*lib.de Praedestinat.Sanct.c.18*): "According to his good will, not ours." And (*lib.2.cont.2.epist.Pelagian.*): "This entire justice is: I will this." Saint Thomas (*q.23.a.5.1.part.*): "The reason why he chose these for glory and reprobated those has no reason except the divine will." Scotus (*in 1.d.41.q.vn.S.Sed contra.n.10*), attacking Henry: "Therefore in the first distinction pertaining to predestination and reprobation, the sole reason is the divine will." This is the one voice of the three, received from the one oracle of the Apostle — who would dare to disagree with it?

There is therefore no cause of predestination on our part — no merit; indeed, as we have often said with Augustine's authority, there is demerit. And thus it is a

work of mercy. From this it follows regarding the effects of predestination: all supernatural gifts of God are effects of predestination. This cannot be disputed in our schools. As for the permission of sin — about which theologians usually dispute at length, some denying it is an effect with Vásquez (*d.93.c.1*), others affirming it with Suárez (*lib.3.de effect.Praedest.c.8*) — it is established from what we have just said that it is not an effect of predestination.

As for the natural gifts that belong precisely to nature and inhere in nature — acuity of intellect, goodness of character, maturity of judgment, loftiness of soul, fortitude, appearance, form, and the ornaments that accrue to nature by accident; splendor of lineage, eminence, household, resources, gifts of fortune — these are brought into question and are particularly disputed. Regarding the latter kind of goods it seems established that they are not effects of predestination unless directed thereto by God in a special way, since they of themselves contribute nothing to grace — on the contrary they often turn one away from it and draw toward vices and sins, and incline especially toward pride and arrogance, to which grace is most opposed.

Nearly the same holds for those gifts that accompany the body: beauty, strength, health, comeliness — which are common to the reprobate and contribute little to eternal salvation, often tending toward the ruin of oneself and others, as occasion for sinning and doing harm is drawn from them. There remain those prior gifts innate in human beings and implanted in souls: intellect, character, judgment. We do not ask about what is possible — whether they can be effects of predestination; for it is certain they can be. But in fact, whether they are: Suárez (*lib.3.de Praedest.c.7*) and Vásquez (*d.93.c.4*) are reputed to think and teach differently. Suárez seems to affirm it, Vásquez to deny it. And both dispute on the matter in such a way that each seems to attack the other. John of Saint Thomas (*d.9.de Praedest.ar.5.n.13 et 14*) cites them as mutually contradictory, and Alarcón (*tract.4.de Praedest.c.1*), and the Salamancans (*tract.5.de Praedest.dub.vn.S.1 et 2*), who institute a lengthy inquiry on the matter and lay down a universal conclusion: that the substance of the predestinate and all entities of the natural order are the effect of the predestination of the elect. For this conclusion they cite Saint Thomas with some passages adduced, and Scotus with other citations drawn from the reliable authority of Villegas; together with whom they say Nazarius, Cajetan, Bañez, Galatinus, Campensis, Suárez, Granado, and others agree. For the contrary they cite Gabriel, Ockham, Major, Vásquez, Pesantius, Machinus, Arruba, Herice, Cornejo, González. These say they follow Saint Thomas; John of Saint Thomas also claims to follow him (*d.9.a.4 et 3.n.13*). Ruiz, a most learned man (*d.24*), through many pages contends that all natural gifts are effects of predestination. Alarcón (*d.4*), Arruba (*d.81*), Herice (*d.30*) think diversely. Nor do their princes themselves, Suárez and Vásquez, hold a single consistent view.

Indeed, having inspected the passages of nearly all these authors, I judge them to be disagreeing not about the matter itself but about the sense and manner of speaking, and that they can easily be reconciled by saying what I just hinted: that natural gifts of themselves contribute nothing to salvation but, when ordered by God, do contribute — which is certainly a most true doctrine and will, I think, be denied by no one. But since the matter is obscure and I do not find it treated with sufficient distinctness, as will appear from what is to be said below, I wish to take it up and set it out in conclusions.

Let the conclusion be: the gifts or endowments of nature, taken in themselves as they inhere in nature and are effects of creation, are not effects of predestination and are indifferent with respect to both predestination and reprobation; nor did God have regard to them in predestining. Hence they were, apart from God's intention regarding the work of eternal salvation, incidental. This is drawn from the doctrine of Paul and Augustine, who teach that predestination is a work of God's merciful pity and mercy in predestining from mercy. But natural reason does not pertain to this act of mercy; indeed the gifts of nature are entirely foreign to it, since misery and evils — from which liberation is the matter of mercy — are remote from it.

It is proved first: predestination is the intention of glory and grace, which are supernatural; the gifts of nature are natural; but nature and grace are not connected but disparate to one another. Therefore the excellence of nature was incidental to God's intention in predestining. The major premise is most certain. The minor is proved from Paul (*ad Ephesios 1*): "With spiritual blessing in Christ according to the riches of his grace"; and (*1.Cor.2*): "The natural man does not perceive the things that are of the Spirit of God." In (*Rom.11*) he removes the works of nature as foreign to grace: "Not from works." (*Ad Ephesios 2*): "It is the gift of God, not from works." From which it appears there is no connection — indeed a dissension — between the works of nature and those of grace. Hence it follows that nature's gifts do not come from or find their foundation in grace. Augustine repeatedly inculcates this difference, as it appears throughout his book *On Nature and Grace*, where he does not allow Pelagius to praise nature; and in his book *On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Coelestius*, and especially (*lib.4.c.3*), where he disputes about the virtues of the Romans and their distinguished natural gifts, showing they were not sufficient for salvation, nor is there a connection between them and grace.

Hence comes that doctrine of Augustine against the Semipelagians (*lib.de praedestinatione et gratia et bono perseuerantiae*) — who posited a strong and intact nature and in it a kind of initial merit, which Augustine extinguished, because this was undermining grace.

It is proved second: those gifts in Augustine's view, together with their properties, were in the nature condemned in the mass of perdition, where all were children of wrath. Therefore they were outside the reason for

predestination, the regeneration through grace not yet having intervened — as if they had been made new creatures. Hence Paul: "By grace you have been saved; for we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus." Behold: a new regeneration above nature and its gifts. Hence the predestined are called adoptive sons according to Paul (*ad Ephesios 1*): "He predestined us unto adoption as sons." But adoption is not a work of nature. Hence the predestinate is called a "workmanship" because a workmanship is composed by art, not born of nature. This doctrine Augustine received from Paul and set against Pelagius, who confused creation with grace, arguing that nature was a gift and benefit of God. Augustine does not deny this, but affirms it is a different gift — not owed and attached to nature, but freely given by him. So (*Epist.105 et 95 et ser.11 de verbis Apostoli*) and as we just said on *de natura et gratia*. I present the express testimony of the African Fathers at Augustine (*Epist.95*): "For," say the Fathers, "by some not unreasonable argument, that grace of God by which we were created is called grace, since it was given by the gratuitous goodness of God without the merits of any preceding works; yet there is another grace by which the predestined are called, justified, and glorified, so that we can say: 'If God is for us, who is against us?'" And more neatly and expressly Augustine himself (*Epist.105*): "Let that fallacy be cast away — for the Apostle does not commend at all the grace by which we were created so as to be human, but the grace by which we are justified so as to be just men. For this is the grace through Jesus Christ."

It is proved third: if that acuity of intellect, high character, good temperament, and the other such gifts — as theologians affirm — were effects of predestination, they would be its proper and genuine signs and would be found in those predestined. But the contrary occurs. Therefore they are not effects of predestination. The major is manifest. The minor is from Paul and Augustine. It is confirmed from Paul (*2.Corinth.1*): "Consider your calling, brethren, that not many wise according to the flesh, not many powerful, not many noble — but the foolish things of the world God has chosen to confound the strong, and the ignoble and contemptible things of the world God has chosen, and things that are not, to destroy the things that are." Augustine drew this from Paul, and many of his passages are suited to this purpose. Vásquez (*disp.93.c.7.n.31 et 32*) adduces and weighs one excellent passage (*from lib.1.ad Simplicianum q.2.ad finem*), which we brought forward and weighed above. I will now adduce and weigh another from (*lib.1.de peccatorum meritis et remissione c.21*): "O the depth!" he cries — for we are compelled to cry out — "For how does it come about that a man from earliest boyhood should be more modest (here: character), more gifted (here: acuity of intellect), more temperate (here: temperament), to a large extent a conqueror of lusts, who hates avarice, detests luxury, and should rise more advanced and fitted for the other virtues (here: uprightness) — and yet he should be in a place where the grace of Christ cannot be preached to him? For how shall they call upon one in whom they have not believed? etc." This is tantamount for Augustine to saying that he is not predestined.

Then he proceeds to another: "But another, dull in mind, given to lusts, overwhelmed with disgraces and crimes, is so guided that he hears, believes, is baptized, is snatched away — or if he lives longer, praises lived laudably." Where did these two contract their so different merits? This doctrine of Augustine on the effects of predestination is far removed from the doctrine of those theologians who affirm the gifts of nature to be effects of predestination. For in this testimony it appears that the person who abounded in them is reprobated, and the person who lacked them is predestined.

It is proved fourth: all who are predestined in Christ were chosen on account of his merits of the Passion, so that through his merits they might have eternal life. But Christ, according to Paul and Augustine, was not incarnated or died so that we should be sharp and noble and adorned with gifts of nature, but so that we should be holy and immaculate and free from sins, living justly and devoutly — which is the work of grace, not of nature, and has no dependence on that acuity of intellect and goodness of temperament. Therefore these goods are not effects of predestination. The major is established; the minor is from Paul (*ad Rom.5*): "He was handed over for our offenses and rose for our justification"; and (*ad Ephesios 1*): "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins according to the riches of his grace" — he does not say "according to the abundance of natural perfections"; and (*1.ad Corin.1*): "From him you are in Christ Jesus, who has become for us wisdom from God, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption." And (*15*): "Christ died for our sins." Together with Paul, Augustine writes excellently (*epist.105*): "For Christ did not die for none, so that men might be created, but for the ungodly, so that they might be justified." This passage, joined with others from (*Epist.106 et 91 et 95*), refutes the view concerning natural gifts.

Fifth: if that doctrine were true, an occasion would be given to sharp and gifted persons for boasting that in their nature lay some reason and motive for being distinguished from others who were slow and unlettered — and thus there would be those who glory in themselves and not in the Lord. Which is against Paul (*1.Corint.1*), where, having said that God did not choose the powerful, wise, or noble, he gives the reason: "so that no flesh might glory in his sight," as if that election would bring with it vain glory — which Paul wished to forestall, affirming that God chose the weak, unlearned, and ignoble "so that he who glories might glory in the Lord," as he concludes there. This reason Augustine frequently turns over and amplifies, sometimes confirming it with the words of Cyprian: "Nothing is to be gloried in, when nothing is ours." So (*lib.de praedest.Sanct.c.3 et lib.de dono perseuer.c.14*). This vice must be amputated by denying that those natural gifts are regarded in predestination, and the virtue of humility must be instilled — for nothing is more foreign to divine predestination than that presumption. So much so that Augustine himself observes that God sometimes abandons his own, permitting them to sin, in order to deter them from pride — which he proves by the example of David

(*lib.de grat.et libero arbitrio c.6*) and Peter (*lib.de natura boni c.11 et ser.175 de tempore*), where he says: "The Lord in some way abandoned Peter, so that in him the human race might recognize that it can do nothing without the grace of God." Similarly that distinguished passage (*lib.2.de peccatorum meritis et remissione c.19*): "Let us understand that our Lord God sometimes does not give to his saints the justice of a certain work, or certain knowledge, or victorious delight, so that they may know that not from themselves but from him they have the light by which their darkness is illuminated and the sweetness by which the earth yields its fruit to them."

Finally, let us come to experience. Experience itself, both in reading and in hearing and in seeing, teaches us that God has had no regard for intellect, character, temperament, or other natural goods in the predestination of human beings. Let us survey the world. How many peoples, how many nations were distinguished by great gifts of soul and body, over whom God nonetheless preferred the Hebrews? Were the Hebrews better than the Spartans, Athenians, Thebans, Romans? Where were left those supreme philosophical intellects who founded sects, who opened schools, whose voices rang through the Athenaeums, the Porticoes, the Academies, the Ambulacra, the Gymnasia, the Grounds? Where were those eloquent and elegant orators who with their tongues thundered, lightened, and hurled thunderbolts, and stirred up all of Greece and Italy? Where were those magnanimous, brave, just, frugal, moderate, patriotic kings and emperors, who, having performed many brave deeds against enemies, did nothing base, nothing dishonorable, nothing unjust at home? Where were those wise legislators, who by holding peoples to duty by laws also added examples of manners to those laws and gave living precepts by their own virtues? Where were the most chaste virgins, the most honorable matrons, who not only admitted nothing base but preferred to suffer death rather than admit it, and, if anything was brought upon them by force, washed it away with their own blood lest it should spread?

If regard was had for intellect — where was Pythagoras abandoned, where Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Chrysippus? If for eloquence — where Demosthenes, Isocrates, Demades, Lysias, Aeschines? If for character — where Alexander, Themistocles, Lysander, Epaminondas, Iphicrates, Philopoemen, Agesilaus? If for uprightness — where Lycurgus, Solon, Agis, Cimon, Phocion, Aristides? Where the Catos, the Laelii, the Ciceros, the Catuli, the Scaevolae, the Crassi, the Reguli, the Fabricii, the Fabii, the Curii, the Papirii, the Metelli, the Pauli, the Scipiones, the Pompeii among the Romans? I do not wish to fill pages with names, though fame is not empty of them.

Julian extolled, commended, and opposed these virtues to Augustine (*lib.4.c.3*), and attempted to dull the lights of divine grace with the display of a counterfeit splendor — since he could by no means bear that those whom he judged to be possessed of true and natural virtues should be expelled from the kingdom of

God and entirely reprobated. Hence Augustine in that chapter: "What remains that we should reserve for grace when you have said they abound in such evident virtues — men in whom without the aid of grace there is the good of nature alone, who by the innate powers of free will alone are found merciful, modest, chaste, and sober frequently?" Such was Julian's fiction of them, to whom he attributed true justice without grace and destined the kingdom of heaven on account of those merits of nature — which Augustine thus refutes: "God forbid that he should be truly just who does not live by faith. For the just man lives by faith. Who, then, of those who wish to be held as Christians — or among them perhaps you alone — would call an unbeliever just? Would call a godless man just? Would call one enslaved to the devil just? Let it be Fabricius, let it be Fabius, let it be Scipio, let it be Regulus — by whose names, as if we were speaking in the ancient Roman senate, you thought to alarm me." Augustine did not deny that in them there were as it were natural lineaments of virtues, but since they were not formed and animated by grace, he denied they could contribute anything to eternal salvation. And so he denied that they were predestined. Thus in the same chapter, past the middle: "Certainly they are neither just nor pleasing to God, to whom without faith it is impossible to be pleasing. But for this, their thoughts will defend them on the day of judgment so that they may be punished more tolerably." And immediately: "For Fabricius will be punished less than Catiline — not because the one was good, but because the other was worse, and the rest was divinely composed and written."

From these passages it is clear that in the predestination of human beings no regard was had for either character or uprightness, even natural. This we not only read but hear and see daily: slow, dull, and barbarous-natured persons come to the Faith, and lowly women among the Indians are called and come, while others who are noble, gifted, cultivated, and civil are left behind. How many among heretics are boys and girls of sharp intellect, good character, great nobility, how many of them I myself have seen, of what kind — and yet they are not converted, but die miserably and unhappily in their heresies? We see among ourselves Catholics many who are lowly, rough, uncultivated, truly insignificant people, many humble, obscure, slow, dull women — slaves of nature and the dregs of fortune — and yet they abound in piety, faith, charity, and other virtues and walk straight toward heaven. Surely the kingdom of heaven seems to belong to such little ones. I am therefore persuaded, and I wish others also to be persuaded: God had no regard for this natural perfection, whatever it may be, in predestination.

I do not deny, however, that he ordered those gifts of the predestined toward their glory — as was the case with the intellect of Augustine, Jerome, and other Doctors of the Church who excelled in learning in the Church of God.

But I am surprised that the following passage of Augustine is objected against the view I am presenting by opposing authors (*lib.de dono perseuerantiae c.14*):

"From which it appears that some in their very intellect have a divinely natural gift of understanding, by which they are moved toward faith, if they hear suitable words for their minds or see suitable signs." This passage is cited by Suárez (*lib.3.de Praedest.c.7.n.11*) and Ruiz (*disp.24.sect.3.n.5*), who adduces the complete passage. But it is turned against them, since it elicits the contrary from it — namely, that God neglected such intellects and reprobated them — which is the contradictory of their view and entirely contains our own. For Augustine continues in that chapter, in which he treats of the reprobation of those who are not predestined, and expressly names the Tyrians and Sidonians, from whom the grace of preaching the Faith was withdrawn by a just though secret judgment of God — although there was in them a power apt for understanding and receiving the revealed mysteries. By this argument those who object the passage are refuted. For thus Augustine, after saying: "Where were the Tyrians and Sidonians left, who could also believe if they had seen those miracles of Christ? But since it was not given to them to believe, even the occasion from which to believe was denied them," adds: "From which it appears, etc." on the natural gift of understanding. Now let us see what it contains from what follows: "And yet by the higher judgment of God they were not distinguished from the mass of perdition" — which words contradict the view of Suárez and Ruiz. For those very Tyrians and Sidonians, apt by nature and having the natural gift of understanding, were not predestined — which is an entirely contradictory sense. For this acuity and subtlety is not an effect of predestination. The acute ones — such as the Tyrians, Sidonians, and others like them, who are reprobated — are not predestined, Augustine says, notwithstanding that gift of understanding. For predestination is not the follower of nature but of grace. "The elect are chosen," says Augustine most frequently and above all (*lib.de Corrept.et grat.c.7*): "by election, according to purpose and grace — by the election of grace, not of nature."

Let us consider God as author of nature: even then, in his free will, he distributes the gifts of nature; nor does he wish to be bound by any laws. Hence Augustine says (*lib.de Corrept.et grat.c.8*): "Speed, strength, good health, beauty of bodies, admirable talents, and natures capable of many arts, and what happens externally — such as wealth, nobility, honors, and other things of this kind, which each person has only in the power of God — are not attributed to the merits of wills." How much more will the gifts of grace be free for God as Savior and author of grace, "dividing to each as he wills." For if in nature God does not follow the order of nature, much less certainly will he in grace follow the order of nature.

The Author's Judgment on These Collations and Distinctions Concerning Conditional Knowledge, Predestination, and Reprobation.

When I was a boy and was living in the Society of Jesus — which I had barely entered as a youth — among those most holy and most wise Fathers, and was

stirred by some natural propensity or divine impulse toward knowledge of controversies of this kind, even before I devoted myself to theology, I let no occasion slip of inquiring into and hearing about them. I recall that at that time (the year was 1614) the Bishop of that city, the most illustrious and most learned man Lord Alphonsus Albicaster — a man advanced in years, most deeply versed in the Holy Fathers and above all in Augustine — was frequently visiting the College of Coimbra, where I was, and was disputing sharply and keenly about these controversies with the most distinguished Masters who were then flourishing in that College.

At that time Father Francis Suárez was still living, a man supreme in all sacred learning, recently emeritus professor after twenty years from the primary chair of public theology at that most famous university. Nearly all those Masters embraced his view, except that they inclined more toward Fonseca and Molina, whose memory was still fresh — with whom the Bishop disputed openly in the domestic hall, vigorously and vehemently, as befitted the Bishop's temperament. The affair between them was conducted with heat. All were present, even those studying rhetoric and philosophy — the Bishop permitted this. Indeed he commanded all to be called. The Bishop was of the opposing view to those Fathers: he approved neither middle knowledge, nor congruous grace sought from it, nor predestination from foreseen merits; indeed he could not bear these, and with many arguments endeavored to draw the professors away from them. The matter was conducted not only in disputations but with clamor: for Alphonsus was ardent in disputing and did not easily control himself; he rebuked the disputing parties and refuted those who answered alertly with disdain and indignation. I recall that once, when he had become thoroughly heated in the contention of disputation, he burst out in full flame, and striking the earth with his staff, cried out: "My Fathers: your view is fit for the comprehension of the common people and accommodated to popular sermons. But it is entirely foreign to the doctrine of Saint Augustine." He said more plainly, though less elegantly: "Your view is good for the common people, but it is against Saint Augustine." Moved by these words, I used to ask those venerable Fathers: was the Bishop telling the truth? But they denied it and confirmed me in my doubt, adding: that Bishop was rather too old. What he thought or said was not to be heeded. I then acquiesced in their authority, and afterward, imbued with their precepts and doctrines while I was in the Society, I acquiesced.

But after I devoted myself to reading Augustine and penetrated more deeply into him, and after changing my manner of life I passed to those with whom I now live, and it became permitted me to think and speak according to my own judgment — I found entirely that the Bishop had spoken the truth. I have given him testimony, I believe adequate, in my books of which I have published four on the Augustinian sense, and by bringing out and weighing Augustine's passages clearly, I have shown that he recoils from that doctrine of middle

knowledge and congruous grace. Not that this is the doctrine of all authors of the Society — as is commonly thought — since Henríquez, Bellarmine, and those Fathers who composed the most wise book on the method of studies at Rome, and partly Gabriel Vásquez, dissent from it. But it happened that those Masters who were then at Coimbra and teaching preferred to be adherents of Molina and Suárez — although Suárez thought much better on these matters than Molina and departed less from Augustine.

This, however, must be observed: such was the Society's reverence for Augustine that it ordered Molina's *Concordia* — which had been first printed at Lisbon — to be revised by him, and what had been written about Augustine less honorably to be removed, and the novelty he was boasting of in his doctrine to be referred back to the ancient sense of the Fathers and Scholastics, especially Augustine, as appears in the second printing — which the Salamancans observed before me in their excellent treatise on Middle Knowledge. How deeply that Bishop was versed and learned in Augustine appears from the works of Augustine himself, which he — along with the rest of his very ample and ornate library — bequeathed by testament to the same College of Coimbra of the Society of Jesus: for they all bear the marks of assiduous reading, since all ten volumes are full of notes written in the margins by the Bishop, in which, wherever he found things that pleased him, he marked them with his own handwriting. Those notes survive, formed in capital letters but blunt and obscure (for he did not write neatly), in such a way that the marks corresponded to the senses. For where there was a good sentence it was noted in the margin: *Nota*; where better: *Nota accurate*; where best: *Nota accuratissime*. This was diligently observed by the Fathers, who pointed it out to us as youths with admiration as a sign of his assiduous reading and exquisite judgment. Let the monument of so great a prelate remain in this my work — whom I name out of respect, because he was the prelate of my homeland and adorned it in many and marvelous ways; who confirmed me as a boy and initiated me as a youth in the minor orders; whose judgment I hold in such esteem that I wish whatever I have determined and shall hereafter determine to have been held, as it were, prejudged by him.

From what we have said thus far in both disputations — on conditional knowledge and predestination — it appears that Bishop Alphonsus truly perceived what Augustine meant. And indeed on conditional knowledge we have treated more than sufficiently, showing that the controversy is only about the mode or means of knowing. The Jesuits wish that future conditional things are known in themselves antecedently and independently of the divine decree; nearly all the other Scholastics contradicting this and affirming that their certainty and infallibility flows from the force of the antecedent conditional decree. I observe moreover that each view has its own difficulty, which the various authors on both sides mutually raise against each other. The root of the difficulty is the harmony of freedom of will with the efficacy of grace. For the Jesuit Fathers object to the Thomist Fathers that through that antecedent decree

freedom is removed, since from it a determining principle of the will to act is placed antecedently. The Thomists in turn object to the Jesuit Fathers that efficacy of grace is removed by them and reduced to the determination of free will. How these are reconciled on each view belongs to the material on auxiliaries — which the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, whose holy will must be observed, do not permit us to touch.

I say only this: that great man, the light of the Augustinian Order, Basil Ponce, thought that in Augustine there was to be found a middle way of reconciling freedom of will with efficacy of grace, and that having previously held middle knowledge, he later departed from it. This was indicated to me, when I was preparing this work, by Father Henry Noris (*Henricus Noris*) of Verona, Regent of Studies at Padua, a man of great intellect and exquisite learning, who sent me a note written in his own hand, which runs as follows. Basil Ponce (*1.p.Relec.de gra.c.10*), after saying that middle knowledge is not necessary for knowing future good acts by force of efficacious grace, says: "Although I once defended the opposing view as very probable in public lectures — because, making a comparison with the opinion constituting a physical predetermining quality, I judged it far more probable — yet I did not speak of it in comparison made with this view, which even then I persuaded myself to be Augustine's view, namely that future acts are known in the energy of victorious grace." By this name Augustine calls it (*lib.2.de peccat.merit.et remif.c.19*), using the verb "to conquer" very frequently in the matter of grace, as we noted in the Cortina, Mens Innocentii, Scrinium, and Conventus Euchologicus — before we had heard anything of Basil Ponce. Whom I afterward found, when the book of his Relection was sent to me by Father Henry, to have held that view, and at the end of that same chapter (*10*) he expressly says: "I settle this entire affair with two decrees. The first is to give a victorious thought, which through simple intelligence he knew to be infallibly suited with consent; and the decree of cooperating with the will toward consent given that victorious thought. From the first decree freedom is not injured. Therefore if a victorious thought does not injure freedom, the decree of granting it cannot injure it, etc."

With this excellent theologian the other admirable theologian Pérez agrees, who (*tract.de Prouid.Dei disp.vlt.sect.15.n.102 ad 107*) compares the grace of integral nature with the grace of fallen nature and affirms, in accordance with Augustine's doctrine, that the latter is much greater than the former. He teaches what we said above: if that grace proper to the state of integral nature were given in the state of fallen nature, not one human being would be converted, for it would be a very feeble grace. Therefore in this state a stronger and more vehement grace is applied to us, which is wont to be increased and made most powerful and far more effective than that of Adam — so that it overcomes concupiscence and passions and strengthens the weakness of our powers. This mode was found by me in Augustine long before I came across these authors — namely in the year 1638 — and when I afterward came to France, and in the year

1641 at Paris set it before most learned men, it greatly pleased them. I recall that when it was explained by me in the presence of the most eminent Cardinal de Retz — who still lives, and was then a young man and coadjutor of his most illustrious uncle the Archbishop of Paris, a man excellent in every kind of learning — at the request of his Vicar General (whose name escapes me), that excellent Vicar said openly upon hearing it that this was an outstanding discovery and commended me warmly for it.

In any case, middle knowledge faces many and great difficulties. The first: that contrary to Scotus it establishes the reason for knowing future conditional things even in supernatural matter in the determination of the human will, and compels God to borrow from it the principle of knowledge, from which it follows that the divine intellect is cheapened. The second: that it so joins the human being with God that both cooperate equally in the business of predestination, holding themselves in equal measure and dividing their functions between them, proceeding on equal terms — indeed the creature even seems to supply efficacy to its own author God. The third: that the entire machinery of predestination, grace, purpose, will, and divine knowledge is reduced to the flux of human free will. The fourth: that if so great is the power and capability of our free will, and it is not permitted to God except dependently on us to move and incline us to supernatural good — awaiting our wills — the prayers of the Church seem vain and at least unnecessary, with which we ask God to excite, prepare, move, dispose, lead, govern, rule, compel us: which prayers indicate that we depend entirely on God and not he on us. On the contrary, we are moved by God to pray that we may will, act, think, speak, operate — in the unchanging usage of the prayers of Holy Mother Church. The fifth: great occasion arises for human boasting and self-glorification, when a person sees himself made equal to God in the matter of predestination, so as to co-cause his own salvation on equal terms with God in the same line — working on that noble edifice of his predestination placed in the same row with God; so that while in the matter of natural creation he receives everything from God, in the matter of supernatural predestination God receives something from the human being.

These considerations have always deterred me from that view and still deter me now. And although I see the other side is also difficult on account of the harmony of divine determination with human freedom, yet since this is but one difficulty — and perhaps arising only from our weakness, which cannot scrutinize the depths of God nor grasp the mode by which God could reconcile our freedom with his predestination and his prompting of our free will — I do not find it difficult to free myself from it by having recourse to the omnipotence of God and his infinite wisdom, which will be able and will know how to investigate the mode by which a will preexcited, premoved, and inclined (I do not say predetermined) freely and infallibly acts. Let the adversaries tell me why God could not so move the will antecedently that, when premoved, it responds

to him who calls and draws — with freedom preserved and unimpaired. I am not permitted to proceed further out of reverence for the prohibiting papal decree. Therefore I refrain, and conclude with an illustration. A habit is a permanent quality inhering in the will and antecedently inclining it to act, and yet with this inclination on the part of the habit — sometimes inclining very strongly — the freedom of the will coexists perfectly. Why therefore could not God, through the same habit infused by himself alone, and through something similar, move and incline the will infallibly to act, with the free will's intact freedom preserved? Infinite are the treasures of God's wisdom; in them are contained infinite modes by which God can premove the will without any injury to free will.

As for what the Jesuit Fathers are accustomed to spread about — that they were the first authors of this middle and conditional knowledge, and that through their examples they brought about its recognition and admission to the schools by the Thomists and others, which Alarcón not obscurely and pointedly suggests (*tract.2.de scient.Dei disp.4.c.4*) — I say that before the Society that conditional and middle knowledge was known and transmitted by many from the time of the Fathers older than Augustine, and from Augustine himself, as we showed in the Collation on Middle Knowledge. But now let us show this properly.

Many interpreters of Sacred Scripture treated it in connection with those passages commonly cited, and above all in connection with the passage about the Tyrians and Sidonians (*Matthaei 11 et Lucae 9*). I present one before all others: Alphonsus Tostatus, Bishop of Ávila, who in connection with that passage of Matthew (*q.52*) writes: "It is asked why Christ said 'perhaps' about Sodom, since 'perhaps' implies doubt. One can say in one way that although 'perhaps' by its proper nature implies doubt, yet by usage 'perhaps' is placed where there is no doubt. Thus it is said above: 'Do not throw pearls before swine, lest perhaps they trample them' — and yet there is no doubt that they will trample them; and above: 'Lest perhaps your adversary hand you over to the judge' — and yet it is certain that he would hand him over to the judge. Alternatively, one can say that 'perhaps' here implies doubt — not as regards Christ's knowledge, but as regards the creature's variability. For Christ knew determinately what the Sodomites were going to do if it were preached to them — that is, whether they would be converted or not and, if converted, would remain so until that day. But since to be converted or not converted depended on the freedom of the Sodomites' free will, which had in itself nothing determined but bears itself freely toward either alternative, he said 'perhaps,' so that God's knowledge might not be thought to impose necessity on things." And he cites Remigius in this manner: "Thus says Remigius: for this reason the Lord who knows all things placed a word of doubt at this place, namely 'perhaps,' to show that free will was conceded to human beings; and so that it would be known that God determinately knows the future and not doubtfully, and yet through that knowledge imposes no necessity on them of coming to pass this way or that. He gave two examples: one without the

word of doubt and one with it. For he said about Tyre and Sidon that if the mighty works had been done in them, they would long ago have done penance, not appending 'perhaps' — so that it might appear he certainly knew they would do penance if it were preached to them; but about the Sodomites: 'Perhaps they would have remained until this day.' One could, however, have appended 'perhaps' to both, because the contingent conversion of Tyre and Sidon he would know in the same way as the conversion or non-conversion of the Sodomites. One could also have appended 'perhaps' to both, because the freedom of both Tyrians and Sodomites to be converted or not was equal; but he did not place both without 'perhaps' — lest future things seem to come to pass necessarily because of the divine knowledge — nor did he place 'perhaps' in both, lest future contingencies seem to God uncertain on account of their contingency or freedom. Instead he placed one without 'perhaps' and the other with 'perhaps.' " This passage contains everything, from which it appears that conditional knowledge was known to the Bishop of Ávila before Fonseca and Molina. Nearly the same is the interpretation of our Nicholas of Lyra, who before the Bishop of Ávila knew that knowledge.

As for the question held to be celebrated: whether middle knowledge is to be reduced to the knowledge of simple intelligence or to the knowledge of vision — I answer briefly. In the view that places the certainty of it before all decree, as the Jesuits do, it is reduced to simple intelligence; but in the other view, which places the certainty in the divine conditional decree, it is referred back to the knowledge of vision. The reason is that in this second view the entire certainty rests in the decree, just as the certainty of an absolute future thing does. Contrariwise, the certainty of the first view is taken immediately from the very freedom of the will that will act this way or that independently of the decree. No longer discourse is needed here.

I come to predestination, which we have established in the absolute purpose of the divine will — presupposing, however, the knowledge of conditionals grounded in the decree. And we have taught it to have been made before all foreseen merits, confirming it with many arguments that we adduced and principally with the authority of Augustine. So that the future good use of free will foreseen antecedently was not the motivating cause of it: because then the beginning of predestination, and of being distinguished from the reprobate, would be from ourselves. Thus no reason for predestination is to be assigned or sought on the part of the creature — who was in a state of damnation, from which it could not be freed except by the merciful grace of God.

If any authors think otherwise with Vásquez, they are also bound to provide the reason why this person was chosen for such grace as would be efficacious and efficaciously lead to salvation — which certainly cannot be taken from the side of the predestinate, since before grace only nature is found; in which that grace

cannot be grounded, because then its beginning would be in nature, which was the Semipelagian error.

No other way therefore remains to be held except that which Augustine opened from Paul and entered upon, which since it pleased Scotus and Saint Thomas, it must be entirely approved and embraced: since in it there is place for mercy and judgment, so that in the elect God exercises his mercy, in the derelict his judgment, and in the reprobate his justice. Which two attributes have no place in the opposing view, for it seems to exclude God's judgment by reducing the distinction of the elected from the non-elected to the calculation of human reason — placing the distinction in the use of free will — because this mode of philosophizing agrees with right reason, for that view establishes nothing that is not in conformity with natural light, which indeed perceives what is of the senses but does not attain what is outside the senses and above the senses and exceeds nature. Unless elevated and supernaturally illuminated, it does not know these truths placed outside the boundaries of nature.

From the height of the mystery and the difficulty of penetrating it, it is deduced that something greater is contained in it than can be perceived by natural comprehension. Hence the exclamations of Paul — just and necessary — arose and were received and repeated by Augustine. Now the difficulties and objections raised on the other side confirm the doctrine, which defends itself by its own height and profundity; by which we ought neither to be deterred nor shaken, since that incomparable mystery bears them all. Nor indeed was Augustine surrounded by them led to change or waver from his view — which is entirely Paul's — but stood firm and immovable, cleaving to it entirely and persevering to the end; and with a singular providence of the divine majesty he composed that book on the gift of perseverance on this very matter, and happily died by it. Especially since no objection is brought against his doctrine by the adversaries that was not previously brought by the Massilians.

On this point the testimony of that most weighty man Benedictus Pereira of the Society of Jesus is appropriate, which I wish to reproduce here in full. In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (*c.9.disp.8.n.78*), responding to the objections of Catharinus: "That objection and reasoning against Augustine, finally, seems strong to some. For they say that this view of Augustine drives men to despair and draws them back from acting well: for according to this view everyone is certain and secure that, whether he lives well or badly, he will never change the eternal will of God, by which he has already been either reprobated or predestined from eternity. And Catharinus presses this vigorously against Augustine, who in his commentaries on this letter — on those words in this ninth chapter, 'Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated' — heaped up twenty-five arguments against Augustine's view. But these objections against Augustine are not new, nor recently invented, and were already, when Augustine was still alive, raised against him by the Massilians and other bishops of Gaul (as is clear

from the letters of Hilary and Prosper to Saint Augustine cited, and from Augustine's book *On Correction and Grace*, and others), and yet they did not move Augustine in the least so that he did not constantly defend and perseveringly hold his view to death, nor did he think it necessary to cure the scandals — if any arose from this and happened to some — indicating that they were to be suffered: since they arise from ignorance of truth and inexperience in the divine scriptures." A similar testimony comes from another excellent theologian of the same Society in favor of Augustine's doctrine, Adam Tanner (*tom.1.d.3.de prouid.et praedest.d.4*) — whom God provided in the Society to be set against the other Adam of the same Society, who is most hostile to the holy Father Augustine and customarily barks at him, especially wishing to rebuke his doctrine on predestination and grace, as appears in his pamphlet entitled *Calvinus a seipso euersus* (*P.3.pene tota, ac in primis c.3.pag.584*), where he disapproves certain views of Augustine, and among them this one on predestination before foreseen merits, affirming it to be of little probability and outlandish. He says he does this to forestall all occasion for Calvinists to err from reading Augustine's books, as formerly happened with the Predestinarians — in which that French Adam, as I will demonstrate in another book undertaken against him as a study composed by me, falls shamefully. Let the German Adam Tanner correct him here, who thus writes in the passage cited (*d.3.q.5.dub.5.n.81*): "Nor indeed is it right that out of hatred for one heresy we should incline to the other extreme, especially when heresies are to be found in both extremes, as in the present case: where in one extreme is the Calvinist and Gomarist heresy, in the other the Pelagian, Arminian, and especially the Lutheran heresy from what was said, so that as much as you recede from one, you approach the other." Which I wish to apply also to Pennottus, who for that reason, in order to avoid the Calvinist heresy, often departs from his most holy Father and greatest teacher Augustine — whom the French Adam for this reason says is of his party, in that book cited by me. I grieve that this has happened to Pennottus, whose intellect I esteem. And I am not the first to rebuke him in this respect; Mastrius also does so (*d.5.de praedestinatione ante praeuisa merita*).

Together with Pereira and Tanner, Antonius Pérez thinks similarly (*Perez*), who desires to render his view on predestination Augustinian, professing that if it is established as Augustine's, it entirely stands firm. And this is what is admirable in that Admirable Doctor: that in the title on providence (*d.vlt.per sect.17.de praedestinatione*) he wishes all his doctrine on predestination to be Augustinian. The great Alphonsus Tostatus, Bishop of Ávila, made this same judgment before these authors of the Society — whom we can call a disciple of Augustine in this matter of predestination and reprobation, since he follows his doctrine; and whoever reads him will find this to be true. I cite some of the more illustrious passages: (*in Genesim 25.qu.4.Tomo 1; in Exod.cap.10.q.1 et Exodi cap.32.q.41; Deut.cap.5.q.10; in cap.10.Matthaei q.9 et 76; Matthaei c.18.q.36 et cap.22.q.10, item et*

cap.25.q.42) — in which passages he transmits the genuine doctrine of predestination and grace.

In particular, against those who introduce the foresight of merits to establish God's justice, I will here propose two arguments. The one is taken from infants, with whose example Augustine regularly refutes adversaries. Let these authors say: what good use of free will, what merits, did God foresee in those infants who are saved — and what demerits in those who are condemned? Certainly here the sinews of their arguments are cut and broken: for infants are not capable of reason, much less of merit and demerit. Their principal argument, then, drawn from the saying of Christ to the predestined on the Day of Judgment — "I was hungry and you gave me to eat; I was thirsty and you gave me to drink" — and to the reprobate: "You gave me nothing to eat; you gave me nothing to drink" — collapses, since these little ones could neither do nor omit any of these things, and yet were predestined and reprobated. From this it follows that merit was not the motivating reason for predestination. Unless perhaps, as Augustine argues, they are to be struck from the number of human beings? But they were not capable. Yet they are predestinated and capable of predestination. Therefore merits are not required as the motive for predestination. And so these adversaries are silently convicted by their own infants, as Augustine says.

The other is taken from this: if merits are drawn from the good future use of free will, how is it that so few were foreseen as going to use it well, when in their view sufficient aid is given to all for using it well? This is certainly remarkable. For more ought, left to their own free will and power and with the grace granted to them, to have acted better and been predestined by God. For who does not desire eternal salvation? And for the sake of obtaining it, does not labor, fight, tire himself? Now from those who are predestined — how great is the difference in good works? How great is the distinction in merits? So that the very exceptional holiness of certain persons above others does not seem to proceed from personal industry and the free good use of free will with only sufficient grace.

It therefore seems that God freely gives such or such a grace, by which some act more excellently and holily than others. The least blessed person will therefore be able to complain about that inequality of God in bestowing grace: for if a more abundant and stronger grace had befallen him, he would have obtained more excellent glory. Hence the argument is turned against them: just as God conducted himself unequally in distributing his grace, which he divided according to his will, so he willed from the same condemned mass to choose some freely for glory and to leave others in the state in which they were. But they object that it is absurd for so many human beings to be left in damnation. I retort: it is also inconvenient for grace to be so unequally parceled out, that some receive the greatest, others excellent, others moderate, others very little —

such as those who live among barbarians. Which difference moves me greatly when I inquire how God could have receded so greatly from that general antecedent will commonly posited in God to sustain Paul's saying "God wills all men to be saved" — so that with an efficacious will he wished to provide efficacious aids to so very few. For however that efficacy is derived, God certainly could, if he wished, have all human beings effectively be saved and have saved all in execution. Of which efficacious will there was no reason in us but in him who, being omnipotent, could efficaciously ordain the salvation of all. Why therefore he did not ordain it is hidden in his secret and obscure judgments, which we ought to venerate and admire. Recourse must always be made, then, to the divine will choosing these above those either for glory or for such grace — and one must always cry out: "O the depth of riches!" and say "Who is it that distinguishes you?" as Paul and Augustine do.

Certainly the views of the adversaries are most powerfully refuted by the examples of many sinners who, making bad use of God's grace during life, were saved in the end, and of others who, having acted well throughout their entire life, ultimately failed and were damned — examples of which ecclesiastical histories are full.

Turning these things over frequently within me and considering them profoundly, I am so moved that I tremble; and fully returning to myself, I recognize the difficulty of this mystery and praise that sentence of the Bishop of Ávila (*in caput Genesim 19 ad illa verba "Eo quod Deus parceret illi"*): "This secret not all comprehend, but those to whom it has been given by God: so that, though all wisdom is from the Lord God, the knowledge of predestination is from God in a more special way than all other knowledge; for from this our perdition or salvation takes its beginning. In no matter is error more dangerous than in this." I would choose more to be right in everything else and to go astray in this alone than to judge rightly in all else and deviate only in this. I confess that when I think about it or write about it, I am no less accustomed to reason than to weep, and I am brought back to that counsel of the Bishop of Ávila (*c.5 in Deuteron*), where after writing most profoundly on the mystery of predestination he concludes: "Let us humble ourselves before the Lord." And I am accustomed to interpret that verse of David's Psalm (138): "Your eyes have seen my imperfect being, and in your book all shall be written" — numbering myself among the most imperfect, and for that reason hoping to be written among them: "Days shall be formed, and no one shall be in them" — so that I may understand thus: when you, O Lord, shall have formed and converted to light sinners who are yet something — no one shall be in them; I, who am no one, shall for your mercy's sake be numbered among them.

Collation XII, Distinction II

On the general will of God concerning the salvation of all men, according to the Apostle's saying (*1.Tim.2*): "God wills all men to be saved."

(*Ad d.46.q.1.a.1. in 1. et 1.p.g.19.4.6.ad 1. 1.contra Gent.*) of Saint Thomas; and (*in 1.dist.46.q.un.S.ad primum*) of Scotus.

Section I

The texts of both are adduced.

Saint Thomas writes thus (*art.1 in corpore*): "I respond by saying, according to John of Damascus, that will is twofold: namely, antecedent and consequent." Then: "In each man one can consider his nature and the other circumstances pertaining to him." Then: "If therefore in a man only his nature is considered, it is equally good for every man to be saved, since all share in human nature, and since every good is willed by God, he also wills this; and this is called antecedent will, because according to John of Damascus he wills all men to be saved." He proves this from the effect of ordering man to salvation through means and precepts. Again: "But when all the circumstances of a person are considered, it is not found to be good in every case that someone be saved: for it is good for one who prepares himself and consents to be saved through the abundance of divine grace; but for one who is unwilling and resistant, it is not good to be saved, because it is unjust. And because something is willed by God in the way it is good, and therefore God does not will this man, considered under these conditions, to be saved, but only the man who is willing and consenting: and this is called consequent will, because it presupposes foreknowledge of works, not as the cause of the will but as the quasi-reason of what is willed." And immediately: "To the first therefore it must be said that according to John of Damascus the words are to be understood of antecedent will and not of consequent; but according to Augustine they are understood of the consequent. Hence he expounds them in two ways. In one way, as a distribution accommodated to all who are saved, as is said in the text. In another way, as a distribution for the kinds of individuals, because from every condition of persons he predestined some to life, and not for the individuals of the kinds." So Saint Thomas in (*1.sent.*). Again (*1.p.q.19.a.6.ad 1*): "That word of the Apostle — that God wills all men to be saved, etc. — can be considered in three ways: in one way, as an accommodated distribution according to this sense: 'God wills all men to be saved who are saved.' " Then: "Secondly, it can be understood as a distribution for the kinds of individuals and not for the individuals of the kinds, according to this sense: 'God wills men of every station to be saved: males and females, Jews and gentiles, small and great, yet all of some individuals of each station.' Thirdly, according to John of Damascus, it is understood of antecedent will, not of

consequent will." Then, with the exposition adduced above (*in 1.d.41.q.1.a.3*) and the example of a judge who wills antecedently to preserve the life of a man whom he condemns as a homicide, and wills consequently to hang him — that first antecedent will he calls velleity rather than will. So Saint Thomas.

Scotus (*1.p.in 1.d.46.q.vn.S.ad prim*) writes thus: "I say that although that saying of the Apostle could be expounded of an accommodated distribution for all who are saved, yet it could much better be expounded of antecedent will, thus: that is, he wills all men to be saved and to be made safe, inasmuch as this depends on him, by his antecedent will, insofar as he gave them natural gifts and right laws and common aids sufficient for salvation." And having posited the example of a king who wills all his subjects to live well and peacefully under good laws and ministers, yet does not will any particular person to live that way immediately: "So," he says, "I say in the matter at hand: that even if God does not have a will of good pleasure to save this person, yet he wills him those common antecedent aids to salvation, by which this person can also sufficiently live and be saved." And he concludes: "For which reason it can be said that insofar as it depends on him, he wills all men to be saved." Cajetan adds nothing in his Commentaries on these senses. He only expounds the general doctrine concerning the fulfillment of the divine will. Lychetus, however, briefly comprehends Scotus's statements and says: "He gives two solutions: first, that Paul's saying can be expounded of an accommodated distribution, namely for all who are saved. Second and better, that it can be expounded of antecedent will, and the text is clear."

Section II

The sense is weighed and the views are set out.

On the sense of antecedent will two difficulties occur to me in the text of Saint Thomas. The first: how in the matter of predestination can God have regard for the aspect of nature? For since supernaturals are above the exigency and natural appetite (in the view of Saint Thomas, which we discussed in this work, Collation II, Distinction II), it does not seem consistent to say God took a motive from the aspect of nature for willing to it the supernaturals, which surpass nature — as the Angelic Doctor himself says (*1.p.q.1.a.1*), and there Cajetan and the rest of the interpreters and commentators, against Scotus who posits an innate natural appetite for the supernatural end. Nor does it avail to say that direction toward eternal salvation or glory is something good, so that God wills it for that nature: since God does not necessarily will any created good, and many good things possible to the state of nature are things God does not will even within the genus of nature — such as would be a more perfect world and more perfect natures, and such as would be a state of immortality. Therefore the inference "It is good, therefore God willed it" is not a sound argument: it would only be sound if that good were owed to nature and required by it — for then God would consequently will such a good to nature.

Moreover, the mode of connecting grace with nature is not apt or fitting for the doctrine of the dignity and freedom of the divine will in distributing its gifts from his mere authority and liberality, without regard for merit, disposition, or even natural condition — as the common doctrine of theology transmits and Augustine so often inculcates.

Furthermore, that general will from that motive does not well accord with the view of the same Angelic Doctor, who holds that the predestination of human beings was made after the foresight of the sin of the first parent — in which state that nature was not lovable but odious to God and a child of wrath, not of love. And if the Thomists take refuge in the state of innocence, when human nature was founded intact and uncorrupted, they will easily be repelled: because Paul's passage does not admit that interpretation, since it is to be understood of the present state of ruin, not of integrity.

The second difficulty: how that will to save all and each can stand together with that other doctrine of the same Angelic Doctor, namely that God intended equally the predestination and reprobation of angels and men and ordered them by reason of his providence — so that before the foresight of merit and demerit, some were predestined and others reprobated for the manifestation of his attributes of power, mercy, and justice. This doctrine is attributed to him by the Salamancans (*tract.5.de Praedest.disp.8.dub.1.assert.2 et dub.2.concl.vn.n.51*) and John of Saint Thomas (*disp.10.a.2*) with other ancients whom they cite, and they do not allow Saint Thomas to be understood otherwise. And they take to task others who endeavor to interpret Saint Thomas differently, and some who more harshly censure that aforementioned view, such as Herice (*disp.33.C.3*), Arruba (*disp.87.c.3*), and Alarcón (*tract.4.disp.5.c.n.5 et 7*), which we have treated above.

For if God willed in his creatures to manifest his glory and attributes, this certainly ought to have been the first and principal will, not that other one toward creatures, which are its secondary object. The love of them is not to be compared with that love of God for his own attributes, since that manifestation pertained to providence, which was the more dignified and universal object. It therefore left no room for that will to save all, which conflicts with the other of predestining and reprobating.

Third difficulty: if that will is so reasonable, why does God not retain and preserve it and save all those he sees to be of the same nature? He ought not to have set it aside and changed it into another by which he predestines only a few with the rest abandoned — since he as omnipotent could save all. Certainly if the first will was just and reasonable, it was to be preserved and entirely fulfilled. Perhaps moved by this reason, the Salamancans (*tract.5.disp.5.dub.vn.n.36 et 37*) said that that general will to save was posterior to another will of good pleasure and consequent — which I do not know how it can stand, since that antecedent will is called antecedent precisely because it is or is understood to come before in God than the second will of electing these rather than others, i.e.,

predestination. And Saint Thomas so indicates (*p.1.q.19.a.6.ad 1.S.ad cuius*) when he says: "It must be considered that each thing is willed by God insofar as it is good: but something can be in its first consideration, as it is considered absolutely, good or evil, while considered with some adjunct — which is a subsequent consideration of it." The reason is also manifest: for that antecedent will concerns the common and absolute good of nature, while the consequent concerns the good limited to particular persons and circumstanced and relative to merits and demerits. Who would deny that the common and absolute state is prior to the contracted, relative state? Furthermore: how can God first elect and reprobate, and then will the reprobate to be saved — those whom he had already reprobated? Hence it can in no way be said that that antecedent will is posterior to the consequent — which we will refute more at length below.

Fourth difficulty: that will posited by Saint Thomas is not a true and perfect will but an imperfect and qualified one; and he compares it to the will of a judge who, in the case of a homicide he condemns, wills to preserve life with a conditional and imperfect will — which is more properly called velleity than an absolute will. So (*1.p.q.19.a.6.ad 6 in fine*). Hence it is commonly called a will of sign and opposed to the will of good pleasure, which is always fulfilled — as several weighty Thomists here expound: Cajetan, Bañez, Zumel, cited by González (*disp.56.sect.1*). Against them, however, John of Saint Thomas (*disp.5.a.8.n.12 ad 29*) teaches that this will — while it is a velleity, as he acknowledges against Vásquez — is a will of good pleasure, not of sign. By this reasoning it must be fulfilled, and therefore all must be saved, since it concerns each human being individually, or the principles commonly received must be denied.

These difficulties are not found in Scotus, who places the antecedent will as inefficacious and insofar as it depends on God bestowing by it the common aids, which is likewise a will of sign (as Lychetus expounds there), and calls the consequent will one of good pleasure and the ultimate determination, which produces its effect and is therefore efficacious. Hence Lychetus says it passes efficaciously over its object, according to that passage of Scotus in the same place (*1.d.46.q.vn.S.respondeo enim secundo*): "When the divine will determines itself to placing something in being in the ultimate determination, it will exist." And: "To will something with the will of good pleasure is the ultimate determination." Moreover, Saint Thomas does not declare what he thinks about those interpretations of Damascene and Augustine, nor does he explain which he himself follows — but proposes each and leaves the matter in the middle. But Scotus, with both proposed, declares that he prefers the second, though he does not reject the first. Hence he says: "much better could it be expounded" — note Scotus's modesty and reverence toward Augustine: for since that first exposition was Augustine's and the second Damascene's, he wished to name neither, contrary to what Saint Thomas did in naming both, lest he should appear to

prefer Damascene and his exposition to Augustine and his interpretation. He passed over Augustine's name, to which greater reverence was due.

It must also be observed that both Doctors — both the Angelic and the Subtle — proposed these interpretations of Paul's passage as different ones, and neither of them said that Augustine followed both. Indeed they sufficiently indicated that he took the *omnes* in a restrictive sense, and did not admit the universal sense that comprehends absolutely all and each individual of every kind — as it is commonly understood in the schools — but only for the kinds of individuals, in which sense Augustine understood it, as will appear from his testimonies to be cited below.

Section III

Whether Augustine admitted this general will to save all men in God.

Since Saint Thomas and Scotus, following the Master, take this will of God in the restrictive sense — for those whom he wills to save and who, by his willing, are saved — and attribute to Augustine only this efficacious and consequent will (as appears in the texts just adduced), it must be seen whether it is true that Augustine acknowledged and admitted that general will. And since this question is bound up with the other concerning sufficient aid: whether it is given to all by God — and all those who affirm the universal aid consequently assert the general will from which it proceeds; and those authors who say Augustine posited a general aid are the same authors who say Augustine adduced a general will: who these are, we will say later. Now we only inquire: did Augustine acknowledge that general will, and having acknowledged it, did he admit it?

Both seem established from many passages cited by Ruiz (*disp.19.sect.1 et 6 et disp.20.sect.1 et sequentibus*), Herice (*disp.17.c.3.a.n.65*), Alarcón (*tract.3.de volunt.Dei disp.6.c.3*), of which two appear suited to the purpose. The first is from (*lib.de spir.et littera.c.33*), where, having posed the question whether the will to believe is a gift of God, and why it is not of all — since God wills all to be saved — he responds: "God indeed wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth; yet not in such a way as to deprive them of free will, by the good or bad use of which they are most justly judged. Thus unbelievers act against the will of God when they do not believe his gospel." The second is from (*lib.ad articulos sibi falsò impositos*): the second of which articles was that God does not will all to be saved. To which Augustine responds: "It must be believed and stated with all sincerity: God wills all men to be saved; since the Apostle, whose is that view, solemnly commands what is most faithfully observed in all the churches of the faithful — that supplication be made to God for all men." These two passages as perspicuous are commonly adduced by authors to prove that Augustine not only acknowledged but also approved that general will to save all and each man. So Suárez (*lib.4.de Praedest.c.1*) and the Salamancans (*tract.4.disp.9.dub.3.S.2 et 3*),

with whom Mastrius agrees (*disp.5.q.2*) — adducing and approving these two passages, which seem to contain the matter.

For other passages that are usually cited either do not contain the matter — such as the one cited by Bellarmine (*lib.2.de gratia et libero arbitrio*) and Alarcón (*disp.6.c.3.n.1*) from (*lib.de nat.et grat.c.67 sive 68*) taken from (*lib.de libero arbitrio c.19 sive 18*), which are entirely foreign. Another is cited from (*lib.4.contra Iulianum c.8*) — which is entirely contrary, since in it Augustine refutes Julian abusing that passage of Paul for introducing his heresy about merits through nature. Julian was saying that God wills to save all who are of such a nature as to wish and be able to be disposed to come through their own natural faculty — to which he reduced the entire business of salvation. In a word: God wills to save human beings, but human beings — since they could by their nature, through which they could, yet were unwilling — do not wish to be saved though God wills it. This sense Augustine rejected by adducing the example of infants who were baptized, who certainly could merit nothing through that nature which Julian preached, for they did not come willingly, since they lacked free will. Hence Augustine inferred that Paul's saying was not to be taken in that universal sense — namely, that God wills all to come, since all could come if willing, God willing those who are willing to be saved, but reprobating the unwilling because they were unwilling to be saved. This argument was worth nothing with respect to infants who perish without baptism — for they do not perish from a defect of their own will, just as baptized infants are not saved through their own will, though they are human beings like others and ought to be comprehended under that term "all." Hence Augustine concludes against Julian: that saying of the Apostle is not to be accepted generally of all human beings, since it could not be applied to infants who, though human beings, are neither saved nor perish by their own will — and he concludes the opposite with those words: "Why therefore do we not take it, what is said: 'He wills all men to be saved,' in the way that we also take what the same Apostle said: 'Through the justification of one, to all men unto justification of life?'" Behold the sense narrowed by Augustine to all the justified, who, though they are few, are yet said to be "all." Alarcón and Mastrius therefore wrongly object this passage — who from it wrongly understood (*disp.5.de Praedest.q.1.a.3.n.26*) deduces that God willed to give infants sufficient means for salvation against Vásquez, as we will say below. We now amicably warn him of his thoughtlessness in common with Alarcón. Thus that passage (*lib.4.contr.Iulianum c.8*) is entirely contrary.

There remain then those two passages from *de spiritu et littera c.33* and from *lib.ad articulos sibi falsò impositos*. But not even these two hold up. For that second is not a genuine work of Augustine, since the book of articles falsely attributed to him belongs to another author, thought to be Prosper. Regarding the first we will treat presently. A third passage is produced by Mastrius (*disp.5.de Diuina praedest.et reprobatione q.1.a.2.n.7*) from (*lib.6.Hypognofticon propè finem*). I am surprised it is cited by Mastrius, not only because that author is not who he

thinks — Augustine — but because that passage contains contrary doctrine, as will be evident to one reading carefully and attentively. For having posited the Augustinian doctrine of the gratuitous and free predestination of some elect and others abandoned, with the example both of adults who, having lived well for a long time, ultimately did not persevere, and of those who, having lived basely and wickedly, were ultimately saved — as well as of infants, some of whom die baptized and others depart unbaptized — it introduces the Pelagian adversaries objecting in this manner: "It is therefore false what the Apostle says of God: 'Who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth.'" And it responds: "It is not at all false" — but in the Augustinian sense adduced by the Master (*1.sentent.d.46*): because whatever God wills to do, he can, nor is what he wills altogether prevented by the human will. Then, retaining that same passage, he argues by turning it back on them, showing that the universal sense cannot stand together with other testimonies of Scripture; and concludes: "Therefore all men who are saved are saved by the will of God. For our God is the God of salvation and of the Lord the outcomes of death." Mastrius was deceived by that mode of arguing — assuming Paul's words in the sense of the adversaries as if the author wished to prove the sense adduced by them against the truth of Augustinian predestination. Let Mastrius hear those words: "Tell me, I ask, how you take these passages of the Gospels? Teach what you think here about God who wills all men to be saved? Behold, not all are universally saved, since to some the way to salvation is given, to others it is not." It is perspicuously evident that the author in that passage, citing the adversaries, rejected with Augustine that general will of saving all and each. How therefore does Mastrius cite him for proving his view on the general will and attributing it to Augustine — let him see for himself. Certainly Father Ruiz takes this passage of the Hypognosticon against Mastrius and elicits from it the restrictive sense, thus (*d.19.f.1.n.2*) — to which author I afterward came, having already written these things against Mastrius. Let whoever wishes read (*c.8*) of that book to the end, and he will find true what I write.

There remains therefore from all passages of Augustine one suitable passage from (*lib.de spir.et litt.c.33*), which Bellarmine confidently opposes over and above the rest which I adduced (*lib.2.de grat.et lib.arb.c.5 et 8*). About which, however, there will be a proper and careful disputation in the appropriate place. Meanwhile regarding it we note that the Salamancan Fathers (*tract.4.de volunt.Dei d.9.dub.3.n.20*) say something new and unheard of: namely, that Augustine, warned by Hilary through that preliminary letter to the book on the Predestination of the Saints, that his own explanation of Paul's passage (*1.Timoth.2*) had not been rightly received insofar as it limited that will of the salvation of all — thenceforth allowed the passage of Paul to be expounded in accordance with the same Augustine's doctrine in (*lib.de spir.et lit.*), which admits a formal will in God concerning the salvation of all. This is entirely foreign to the truth: since Augustine, after receiving this letter — indeed in his very

response to it — retained his earlier view on the restriction and limitation of that will to save all, and denied the generality which the Salamancans affirm is transmitted by Augustine in that (*lib.de spir.et lit.*). My statement is proved from (*cap.8.lib.de praedestinatione Sanctorum*), where he adduces the example of the master who is alone in a city: "This master teaches all; not because all learn, but because no one learns except from him; so rightly we say: 'God makes all come to Christ'; not because all come, but because no one comes except thus." And immediately: "All these God teaches to come to Christ: he wills all these to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth." Then Augustine excludes others: "For if he had also wished to teach those, for whom the word of the Cross is foolishness, to come to Christ, they without doubt would also have come." Behold the limitation and restriction of the divine will concerning the salvation of all, and the customary Augustinian interpretation of the Pauline text — after the receipt of that letter of Hilary. Let the Salamancans and their compilers see on what foundation they said Augustine changed his first view.

Section IV

The testimonies of Augustine on the meaning of Paul's passage (*1ad Timoth.2*): "God wills all men to be saved," are adduced.

It will be necessary to inquire carefully into which books Augustine treated this passage, to enumerate them exactly, and to recognize how he interprets Paul's words in them. (*Tom.2.epist.107 ad Vitalem*; *Tom.3.lib.de spir.et lit.c.33*; *In Enchirid.ad Laurentium c.97 et 113*; *lib.de corrept.et grat.c.14 et 15*; *lib.4.contra Iulianum c.8*; *lib.de praedest.Sanctor.c.8*) — these are genuine works of Augustine. I note this because I see others citing the book of articles falsely attributed to him, and the book of the Hypognosticon, which are not Augustine's.

Therefore (*Epist.107 ad Vitalem propè finem*) Augustine entirely denies that Paul's testimony is to be understood universally, and affirms it cannot be understood in that way, since God wills so many not to be saved — which he proves by the example of infants — and he presents the way in which this testimony can be true: "just as what is said: 'All shall be made alive in Christ' — since so many are punished with eternal death — is therefore said, because all who receive eternal life receive it only in Christ; so what is said, 'God wills all men to be saved,' since he wills so many not to be saved, is therefore said, because all who are saved are not saved unless by his willing." And he adds: "And if Paul's words can be understood in any other way, yet so that they cannot be contrary to this most manifest truth, in which we see so many not being saved, the men willing but God not willing."

In the *Enchiridion c.97*, proving God to be omnipotent and his will always fulfilled, he raises for himself Paul's passage (*1.Timoth.2*): "God wills all men to be saved." "For since not all, but far more are not saved, it seems that what God wills to happen does not happen — namely the human will impeding the will of

God." Having adduced the common response that persons are not saved because they themselves are unwilling, he rejects it by appealing to infants, who have no will or unwilling, and acknowledges only the efficacious and absolute will, signifying that God does not will all to be saved, since if he willed it, he would certainly bring it about — since he is omnipotent and his will is always fulfilled. He pursues this through (*c.103*). And there he expounds it thus: "As if it were said: 'No man is saved unless by him who wills it' — not that there is no man among men whom he wills to save, but because no one is saved unless by him who wills it, and therefore he is to be petitioned that he may will, because it is necessary that it happen if he wills."

And he uses the example of another passage (*John 1*): "He illuminates every man coming into this world" — not because there is no man who is not illuminated, but because unless by him no one is illuminated. Then he employs another distributive sense: "that we understand 'all men' as all the human race, distributed through whatever distinctions: kings, private persons, noble, ignoble, elevated, humble, learned, unlearned, males, females, etc." And he presents the example from (*Luke 11*): "You tithe mint and rue and every herb" — that is, every genus of vegetables; so "all men" means every genus of human beings. He employs the same sense (*sermo 107 de diversis*).

In (*lib.4.contra Iulianum c.8*), having rejected Julian's sense — which took it generally for all and each — Augustine restricts it to those alone who are saved, on the example of Paul's passage (*Rom.5*): "Through the justification of one, unto all men unto justification of life." And he applies the testimony thus: "Thus is to be understood what is said, 'He wills all men to be saved,' in the way that it is understood: 'Through the justification of one, unto all men unto justification of life.'" And pressing: "If you say 'all' in (*Rom.5*) is used for 'many,' so 'all men' in (*1.Tim.2*) is used for 'many.'"

In (*lib.de corrept.et Grat.c.14*): "He wills all men to be saved, so that 'all' is understood as 'all the predestined,' since every genus of men is among them — as it is said to the Pharisees: 'You tithe every herb.'" In the same (*c.15*): "It can be understood that God wills all men to be saved, since he makes us will it." And he proves it with another testimony of Paul: "As he sent the spirit of his Son crying Abba, Father" — that is, making us cry. And above he had said: "We ought to be affected with such an affection of charity that we wish all to be saved." And (*lib.22 de Ciuit.Dei c.1*) he indicates that will, though tacit as to Paul's text.

In (*lib.de Praedest.Sanct.c.8*), expounding the words "And all shall be taught of God" and "Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me," he interprets them of all who learn, using the example of the master who alone in the city teaches all: "This master teaches all," he says. And afterward: "God wills all these to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth."

From these passages three expositions are gathered. The first: that God wills all men who are saved to be saved. This is found in (*Epist.107 et in Enchiridio c.97 et 103, lib.4.cont.Iulian.c.8, lib.de Praedest.Sanct.c.8*). The second: that God wills to save some of every genus of human beings — which is commonly said to be "all" placed for the kinds of individuals and not for the individuals of the kinds. This is found in the *Enchiridion c.103* and (*lib.de corrept.et grat.c.14*). The third: that God wills through us all to be saved — that is, that we through preaching pray for all, exhort all, preach to all, as the Apostles did and apostolic men do. This is found in (*lib.de corrept.et grat.c.15*) and indicated in (*lib.de bono perseuer.c.21 et 23*), where he places the prayers of the Church for the salvation of all.

Of these Saint Thomas posited two (*1.p.q.19.a.6*); Scotus posited one (*in 1.d.46.q.vn*), namely the first exposition of Augustine — which Fulgentius embraces (*lib.de Incar.et grat. et lib.2.de remissione peccatorum c.2*), and Prosper (*de libero arbitrio ad Ruffinum — post medium et ad capita Gallorum obiect.4*), and Anselm and Bede on Paul's passage to Timothy, and it is commonly cited and admitted by the ancient scholastics (*in 1.d.46*) after the Master: Albert, Alexander, Saint Thomas, Bonaventure, Richard, Durand, Gregory — and this seems to have greatly pleased Augustine, since he transmits it in several places. And I do not know by what right Vásquez (*disp.83.c.1.n.4*) writes that this does not much please Augustine himself, since Augustine proves and confirms it in other places from (*John 1*): "He illuminates every man" — and from Paul (*Rom.5*): "All shall be made alive in Christ," as we said above.

The second is approved by nearly the same Fathers and Doctors. The third is proved by Hugh of Saint Victor (*in sum.sent.tract.c.13*), and Augustine proves the sense of it though tacit as to Paul's text (*lib.22.de Ciuit.c.1 ad finem et lib.de Corrept.et grat.c.16*). All these senses, negative and restrictive, are proved by Remigius together with the Church of Lyons (*in lib.de tribus Epist.et in Lib.de tenenda verit.scrip.in censura tertij cap.Conuent.Carisiaci*), and by William Estius (*in 1.sent.d.46 et Comment.in Epist.Pauli 1.Timot.2*), and Anselm (*in hoc caput Timothei 2*), and Hugh Cardinal, and Bede — who receive only these and acknowledge no other sense for the general will. Vásquez (*disp.83.cap.1 et 2*), however, disapproves all these senses, and (*n.12*) says that Paul's passage has not been rightly expounded by Augustine in any of those three ways. Suárez rejects them less, but more modestly (*lib.4.de Praedest.cap.1 et Relect.de libertate Dei sect.2.n.9*). They likewise displease Molina (*in sua concordia q.19.a.6.disp.2*) and Philip Faber (*Faentino disp.58.in d.46.1.lib.sent.*) — a supporter of Molina — and they do not please all the antagonists of Jansenius: Annatus, Campius, Martinonus, Bagotius, whom I cited in my *Scrinium*. I am not surprised at these; I am surprised that Father Vásquez disapproves in Augustine what he himself embraces, for in order to defend his view on infants — whom he denies God willed to save if departing without baptism (*r.p.disp.96.cap.2.an.7*) — he denies this universal will of God, restricting Paul's text to adults alone. Therefore he ought not to have disapproved Augustine's senses — although Vásquez, as a sharp man, uses the

pretext of the phrase "and to come to the knowledge of truth," on which we will speak in the appropriate place below.

Those who reconcile Augustine's exposition with the other, contrary one, concerning antecedent will — besides the ancients — are Bellarmine (*lib.2.de grat.et libero arbitrio c.3 et 8*), Herice (*disp.17.cap.3*), Ruiz (*disp.19.sect.8*), Alarcón (*tract.3.de voluntate Dei disp.6.c.5*), John of Saint Thomas (*qu.19.disp.5.art.8 ad finem*), Antonius Pérez (*de prouidentia c.5.q.6*), Philip Faber (*in 1.sent.d.41.q.1.disp.58.cap.5.n.6*) from Suárez, Mastrius (*disp.5.q.1.a.2*).

Section V

What was Augustine's view on God's general will to save all men?

Many authors affirm that Augustine did not deny this will toward all and each man: so Ruiz (*de volunt. Dei disp.19.sect.8*), Suárez (*lib.4.c.1.de Praedest.et tom.2.de gratia lib.4.cap.19*), Alarcón (*disp.6.c.3*), Pérez (*de Prouident.disp.1.c.5.q.6*), Bellarmine (*lib.2.de grat.et libero arbit.cap.3 et 8*), Mastrius (*disp.5.q.1.a.2*), Annatus (*in Augustino vindicato lib.2.ca.4 et 5*), Antoninus Moraines (*disp.25 et 26*), Thomas Augustinus (*in sua defensione lib.2.c.16*).

The foundations are many testimonies of Augustine: (*lib.1.de Gen.ad litteram c.3*) adjoined with (*loc.lib.1.c.10.2*); (*Lib.contra Adimant.c.16*); (*Lib.3.de libero arbitrio c.19*) — which testimony he repeats (*lib.de nat.et grat.c.67*). But these last two are weak. Others are promised by Ruiz (*disp.19.sect.8.n.11*) to be cited in the following disputation, that is (20). But he did not deliver on this; he only says Augustine teaches that Christ died for all, which is another question. Pérez noticed this scarcity of passages (*disp.illa 1.de prouidentia c.5.q.6*) and produces only one from (*lib.de spir.et littera c.33*), which seems to contain the matter. This is why Suárez uses it (*tom.2.de Grat.lib.4.c.19.num.23*) and the antagonists of Jansenius; Bellarmine (*lib.2.de grat.et lib.arb.c.3 et 8*); Ruiz (*disp.19.sect.1.n.1*); Alarcón (*disp.6.cap.3.n.11*); Mastrius (*disp.5.q.1.a.2.n.7*); and the Salamancans (*tract.4.disp.9.S.2.nu.18 et S.3.nu.20*). The passage runs thus: "It is asked whence comes our beginning of believing." The reason for doubt is: "For if this too is God's gift, why is it not of all, since God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth?" Augustine accepts in the objection this universality of will; and below: "God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth; yet not in such a way as to take away from them free will, by the good or bad use of which they are most justly judged."

Others, on the contrary, think that Augustine had absolutely no general will concerning the salvation of all and each — which they call will for each individual of the human race — and indeed constantly denied it. And besides those whom we said above reported and approved Augustine's restricted sense under those three senses mentioned — among whom are Scotus and Saint Thomas — Gregory of Rimini expressly holds this (*in 1.d.46.q.1.a.1*), where he systematically attacks that general antecedent will. Didacus Álvarez (*lib.5.de*

auxil.disp.33), William Estius (*in Paulum et in 1.d.46*), Cesare Vanini (*exercitatione 16*), John Maldonatus (*in 1.c.Ioannis n.9.12.13 ad illud omnia traham ad me ipsum*), Vulpes (*disp.33.a.10.n.5*), Gabriel Vásquez (*1.p.disp.83.c.1*), whose words I wish to adduce (*ibi n.3 et 4*): "Augustine," he says, "never understood the testimony of Paul (*1.Timoth.2*): 'God wills all men to be saved,' as a will of good pleasure really existing in God concerning the salvation of all men, but in three other ways; and he plainly denies that will of good pleasure concerning the salvation of all." And lest you say Vásquez admits the sense of antecedent or sign will, he adds (*n.5*), citing Gregory: "If it is so, God cannot have any will concerning that end — not only of good pleasure, but not even of sign." And he says this is not far from Augustine's mind, who plainly concedes that sufficient aids are not given to some; and (*c.2.n.12*) he denies that Augustine rightly expounded Paul in those three ways, nor does he interpret, expound, or reconcile him with Damascene — on the contrary, he opposes Damascene and Chrysostom to him, whom he understands as speaking of the will of good pleasure.

The same is thought by those who affirm that Augustine held that many infants and adults are not given sufficient aids — such as Remigius together with the Church of Lyons (*lib.de tenenda verit.Scrit.in censura tertij cap.Carisiacî*), Lupus Seruatus (*lib.de tribus quaest.q.3*), Ratramnus of Corbie (*lib.1.de praedest.*), Ruardus Tapper (*in a.2.Roffensis a.26 contra Lutherum*), Driedo (*de Captiuitate et Redempt.Generis humani ad a.5.c.3*), and those same two Maldonatus and Vásquez — the former (*in c.1.Ioan.ad illa verba "Illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum" et in c.12.Ioan.n.39 et 40*), the latter (*disp.97.c.2*). The argument, however, that he thought thus is the authority of Prosper and Fulgentius, together with Augustine, denying that general will: Prosper (*Epit.ad Rufinum*); Fulgentius (*lib.de Incarnat.et grat.c.29*).

From the moment I approached reading Augustine with a laid-down prejudice and a candid mind, it has been clear to me that Augustine neither admitted nor could have admitted — given his doctrine on predestination and grace — that general will of God to save all and each. And I so wrote in my *Cortina*, in *Mens Innocentii*, in *Scrinium Augustini*, in the work on the Keys of Peter, as I showed there most amply with many passages adduced, and I now prove it by this argument.

The sworn enemies of Augustine, the Semipelagian heretics, raised against Augustine that interpretation — that they were of the contrary view on the general will — and therefore it is manifest that Augustine thought entirely contrary to them. The premise is perspicuously clear from the letters of Prosper and Hilary to Augustine, preliminary to the books *On the Predestination of the Saints* and *On the Gift of Perseverance*, where the Semipelagians adduced that general will to save all in God according to Paul's text (*ad Timot.*): "God wills all men to be saved," and opposed it to Augustine who thought otherwise. So from Prosper: "They define the purpose of calling grace entirely as follows: that God

constituted no one to be assumed into his kingdom except through the sacrament of regeneration, and that all men universally are called to this gift of salvation — whether through the natural law, or through the written law, or through the preaching of the gospel — so that those who wished might become sons of God, and those who were unwilling to be faithful would be inexcusable, since God's justice is shown in this: that those who did not believe perish; his goodness: in that he repels no one from life, but indifferently wills all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth." And later: "They will not silence that saying: God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of truth, since those are inexcusable who could have been taught the worship of the one true God by natural reason and did not hear the gospel — because they were not going to receive it." And in Hilary: "Hence it is that they similarly do not receive the view that a defined number of those to be elected and those to be rejected is established, and they do not accept the exposition of that sentence as drawn by you — that is, as meaning only all those to be saved and not all absolutely, so that no one seems excepted."

Behold Paul's passage understood generally by the Semipelagians, and the contrary sense of restriction and coarctation attributed to Augustine and for that reason vituperated. Not only the ancient Semipelagians thought the same, but also modern ones. So Arminius (*in examine Praedestinationis Perckinsianae folio 581*), approving that all men are called to faith and to an indifferent grace which he does not deny but makes reversible according to free will, and in this sense understands Paul's passage "God wills all men to be saved" — and he rejects Augustine's coarctated exposition as restricted to those to be saved, saying: "What else is it to do violence to the Apostolic text, if not this? But Augustine explains it thus. What then? We do not stand by his authority" — agreeing together with Arminius the father, the Semipelagian sons in the dedicatory letter of a book to the Senate of Rotterdam, approving their father's doctrine.

The same view is transmitted by the pure Semipelagian Remonstrants in their Synodal documents, where they reject Augustine's doctrine of predestination as absolute, before foreseen merits, grounded in a constitutive decree, saying that it removes God's universal philanthropia (love of mankind), the effects of his goodness, who wills all men to be saved — and they refute Augustine's restrictive interpretations. And so the adversaries, explaining his sense thus and refuting it, manifestly persuade that Augustine did not understand Paul's testimony as referring to God's general will to save all.

There yet remains the scruple from that passage (*lib.de spir.et littera c.33*), which we entirely removed in (*Scrinio S.Augustini c.13*). We now say that Gregory and Vásquez did not use that testimony because they judged there to be nothing of moment in it for overturning Augustine's restrictive interpretation confirmed by such a mass of authority. To which I respond: first, that testimony ("God wills all men to be saved") is placed in that passage in the objection of the adversaries,

and Augustine responds to the question in their sense. Why is not the faith of all a gift, since God wills all to be saved? It was always true that faith is a gift of God, however that sense stood: which Augustine does not examine there, responding to the main point of the question, and even admitting that sense, it does not follow that all have faith, nor does it follow any less that those who believe are necessitated to believe. For free will remains in them even when moved by God to believe. Hence Augustine does not worry about the supposition, which did nothing against the power of grace and the freedom of the believing will.

Second: that objected passage, as raised by the adversaries, was taken for adults — therefore not in the universal sense that would be understood even of infants. Third: that passage was dealing only with the faithful, not with barbarians who have heard nothing of the Faith. Hence the argument is retorted against the adversaries as follows: that passage pertained only to the faithful believing from grace and their own freedom. Fourth, and more easily: from this response the certain and unquestionable mind of Augustine cannot be gathered, since he was not dealing systematically there with that question — whether God wills all to be saved — but with another, namely the gift of Faith gratuitously given by God and freely received by men, presupposing however the adversaries' objection, which even if it assumed something true, that assumption did not pertain to the point being debated. And just as in Councils and in Sacred Canons, things that are admitted and reported incidentally are not held as defined views, but only what is treated and decided systematically — so in Augustine's doctrine, attention must be paid not to what is admitted incidentally and beyond the systematic intent, but to what is defined deliberately and purposefully. Since, moreover, wherever Augustine treats Paul's passage systematically with undertaken counsel he always restricts those words to the private sense — this must entirely be embraced and followed, nor should one ambiguous passage damage the clear and perpetual expositions; especially since that general sense was proper to the Semipelagians, who were enemies of grace — not because they erred in interpreting it thus, but because they abused that interpretation to confirm their errors.

Section VI

What reasons moved Augustine to restrict the passage of Paul — "God wills all men to be saved" — to a narrower sense.

The first: the intent of Paul in this letter, because Paul was speaking of seeking and procuring through the ministers of the gospel the salvation of all, so that they might be converted and come to the faith of the gospel and live rightly, devoutly, and quietly in it. And since the Jews thought the promise of salvation did not pertain to the Gentiles, Paul therefore employed that term "all" to extend it to the Gentiles, calling himself a teacher of the Gentiles, and for this reason he speaks of the law of grace of Jesus Christ the Redeemer, which had

not previously been preached universally to the Gentiles — reserving it to its own times, that is, after the death of Christ and the mission of the Apostles.

These things did not pertain to all men in all previous ages, nor to individuals who had lived in those times, but to those who were then living, whether Jews or Gentiles. This is evident from the fact that since he had said "all," he commanded prayer for all — namely for kings and magistrates. But what need was there for this, since they were comprehended under that term "all"? Therefore the Apostle intended something special: namely, that prayer should be made not only for Jews but also for Gentiles — such as were the kings and magistrates to whom the Jews were subject — so that it should be clear he was speaking of Gentiles when he said "all." He then gave the reason: "For God wills all men to be saved" — that is, both Jews and Gentiles, to whom the door of salvation has been opened through preaching. And for this reason he added "and to come to the knowledge of truth," by which it appears he was speaking of salvation through the faith of the gospel to be preached in those times of Christ's redemption, when the door was opened to the Gentiles. Therefore that sense of Paul is restricted to the will of God as connected with the preaching of the Faith and Gospel. Therefore that will was not absolute and general, but relative to places, times, and peoples, and to be fulfilled by people through preachers — because God made the salvation of human beings to be willed through preachers. Hence I prove, as more facile, the second and third senses of Augustine from among the three.

That that will of God is not taken absolutely in itself and in the order of the salvation of all, even inefficaciously, is evident from the connection with "to come to the knowledge of truth," which comes about through the preaching of the gospel. For why did Paul not say only "to be saved" — which would have been sufficient if he were speaking of salvation absolutely — but added "to come to the knowledge of truth"? Unless because he wished to signify the preaching of the gospel in those times through his testimony, in which he says he was placed as preacher and apostle — "teacher of the Gentiles." From this the first reason from Paul's intent is clear. Now for the second.

The term "all" in Paul is sometimes taken in a restrictive sense. This is evident from the passage adduced above (*lib.4.contra Iulianum c.8*): "all unto justification of life" — that is, unto the justified, who are here called "all," though few are justified. The same Augustine observes and transmits more extensively and accurately in (*lib.1.de pecc.meritis et remiss.c.15*), having adduced the testimony of Paul (*ad Rom.5*): "As by the offense of one, unto all men unto condemnation, so also by the justification of one, unto all men unto justification of life." Then Augustine: "For this reason too 'all' and 'all' was said — for those who are generated through Adam are not the same as all who are regenerated through Christ. But this is rightly said, because just as no one is carnally generated except through Adam, so spiritually no one is generated except through Christ." And he

adds: "But the same 'all' he afterward calls 'many.'" And immediately: "As that carnal generation has all men, so this has all just men." He notes and weighs the same in (c.28) of the same book.

Another similar passage is in Paul (1.*Corint.13*): "For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive." Augustine cites this (*lib.2.de peccatorum merit.et remif.c.75*), though for another purpose. Yet it pertains here, since those who are made alive through Christ are not all men but a few from among all those who die in Adam. Again, perspicuously, Augustine (*lib.6.contr.Iul.cap.4*), with the first testimony of Paul (*ad Rom.5*) repeated, says: "All unto condemnation; all unto justification. For this reason, he says, both here 'all' and there 'all,' because no one unto death except through him; no one unto life except through this one" — in which testimony the word "all" is taken once in the universal sense and once in the particular sense. Hence the reason drawn from the Apostle's intent and from the signification of the term is apparent.

Now I come to the reasons for which Augustine did not approve the exposition concerning the general will. Gregory of Rimini adduces several (*in 1.d.46.q*), acutely and carefully examining and rejecting that general will, upholding Augustine's sense and attacking the interpretations of others. This Gregory certainly rightly, as is his custom, understood Augustine. Therefore Augustine, standing firm in his view on predestination, could not admit that general will. This is evident because, since he posited predestination after the foresight of original sin through election from the condemned mass — some elected by mercy, others abandoned by justice — there was no room for positing that will toward the abandoned, who were children of wrath and condemned, nor was there any opening through which that will could enter with the door of grace closed.

Furthermore, even if there were room to enter, that general will did not please Augustine. First, because it is introduced on account of the reason of a nature capable and apt for salvation. Augustine does not approve this principle, because he sees from it following a regard for and equity founded in nature with respect to grace — as if there were some natural proportion of nature and grace, so that grace is bestowed from a kind of equity toward nature. This is foreign to the dignity of supernatural grace.

Second: because fallen nature in Adam was incongruous and disproportionate to grace, since it was infected and corrupted by the stain of original sin — so that God could, by the best of right, condemn the entire mass with no grace granted to it, which is the constant view of theologians. Therefore that will toward that state of nature was not reasonable.

Third: because that will is judged by Augustine to be unworthy of God — since it is imperfect and qualified and falling short of its end, and for this reason is

called by many conditional or velleity, which is not a true will but a metaphorical one, as others call it.

Fourth: because that will seemed to Augustine to be frustrating, since it lacks the effect it can produce. Why therefore does he will, if he does not bring about what he wills, though he could? Nor is it sufficient to say: "God, insofar as it depends on him, wills it." For Augustine denies this: for if God does what depends on him, he will be able to do what he wills. Added to this, in this way the divine will would be cheapened by awaiting its execution from creatures — a reasoning Scotus employs, as we said above, to prove that God's knowledge does not take its principle from the creature.

Fifth: that will, if it is a true will, must produce something in reality; but it produces nothing — therefore it is not a true will. The major is true, since in God there is no new position or change but in the creature. Therefore in the creature something must come about from that will. The minor, however, is proved because through that will nothing is brought about or placed in many human beings in the order of salvation — which is evident in infants who everywhere die in their mothers' wombs and in the midst of barbarism depart without baptism, which is entirely necessary for their salvation. The consequence holds. And by this argument Augustine presses Julian (*lib.4.cap.8*); moved by it, Vásquez denied (*disp.96.c.2*) that this will of God pertained to them; indeed he affirmed that God did not will to save them.

As for adults, Augustine holds that faith and grace are not given to all, and that many barbarians and unbelievers lack the aid commonly called sufficient — as many theologians affirm of him, whom we will cite later, including Maldonatus (*comment.in Ioan.c.1.n.9 et c.12.n.39 et 40*) and Vásquez (*1.p.disp.97.cap.3.4 et 6*). Therefore Augustine could not and ought not to have admitted that general will.

What is certain and unquestioned for me, with Augustine as authority, is that there is in God no conditional will, no imperfect will, no inefficacious will, no metaphorical will — by whatever name in the end it is called — because these words signify rather our raw, inchoate, and imperfect conceptions than the will of God. And just as we say God repents, grieves, is angry — so to say he wills conditionally, wills inefficaciously, wills metaphorically, is in our manner of speaking, not by his condition. And when it is read: "He has done whatever he willed" — "Who can resist your will?" — Augustine understands it simply and as the words sound: having done what he willed, always fulfilling his will, and being impeded or able to be impeded by no one.

I find in Augustine God's willing and not-willing efficaciously, or not willing at all. Therefore every will of his is true and efficacious with effect, or is not a will concerning things that lack effect. By this reasoning I see Gregory of Rimini — the genuine interpreter of Augustine (*in 1.d.46*) — as holding this view. And our Vulpes greatly pleased me on this point (*1.dit.46.q.un.disp.33.art.10.n.5 et 6*), where

he says this is Scotus's view against Vásquez and others — for which I congratulated him, seeing him think entirely as I do, who before seeing him had so determined within myself: that concerning the salvation of all, God had only an absolute and efficacious will of good pleasure concerning those to be saved, while concerning those who are not saved he bore himself negatively; and then, after the foresight of final sin, positively and efficaciously willed their damnation. And Scotus thinks this together with Augustine — as we will show in the following section against Mastrius who contradicts Vulpes.

But concerning this doctrine transmitted in general terms we will systematically treat in its proper place in my commentary on Scotus's first *Sentences*. For now it suffices to say that Augustine in his view had to deny that God by his own proper act of volition willed to save all men and each individual. I object: that God willed to give the common means of salvation, from which arises a will of sign — from which it follows that there is in God an inefficacious will to save all, which stands with the use or non-use of persons who according to their own free will may use or not use those means.

I respond by conceding the premise, which is in accordance with Augustine's doctrine — who concedes that many of the reprobate have remedies applied to them, as appears (*lib.de corrept.et gratia*), where he calls "temporal" those who at some time were in grace and received remedies for salvation yet did not persevere. I deny the inference, however, and say that the divine will concerning the institution of means was efficacious and had its effect; but it was not efficacious concerning the application of those means to all and each man. For those to whom they were not applied, there was no will to apply them. Hence there was a negation of will; while for those to whom they were applied, God efficaciously willed their application with the effect of temporal grace — which God also efficaciously willed. Yet he did not will the salvation of those to whom they were applied, but willed to stop at that grace which he gave them, and loved them while they were in grace — but with a different love than the love of salvation. Therefore that will was positive and efficacious concerning temporal grace, but there was none concerning eternal glory.

But you urge: to what end did God apply those means to those to whom they were applied, for temporal grace? Something is indeed the end and something the effect. Augustine gives you a will with effect, that is, grace in existence — and hence an efficacious will. You ask something else from Augustine, namely: to what end God directed that existence. What was that? This is something different from the systematic purpose. The purpose was that every will of God be efficacious. Behold it: efficacious with its effect of temporal grace. The rest of the disputation is not to the point, for it pertains to the end, not to the efficacy. It is certainly established that it was not ordered to the end of salvation. Other ends you will seek from God, not from Augustine. They are indeed known to God, unknown to man. "O the depth of riches."

I illustrate the matter by this example. God commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac his son. With what will? That he should sacrifice him in effect? By no means; but that he should prove the mind of the Father. This was the efficacious will, not the other. You will say to me: why therefore did God command him to be sacrificed who was not to be sacrificed in effect? You have the effect and the proximate end without the remote and ultimate end: namely, the proof and obedience of Abraham. Concerning this there was in God an efficacious will; concerning the sacrifice in effect there was no will in God. So here: you have the remedy applied, you have temporal grace without perseverance, without glory. Know therefore that it was not given for the end of glory, but for the other end of temporal justification. Other ultimate and hidden ends God reserved and concealed for himself and hid them in his treasures. And so Augustine concludes (*eo cap.13 de corrept.et gratia*): "They were dismissed with free will, not having received the gift of perseverance, by the just but hidden judgment of God." I add the testimony of Augustine (*lib.4.contr.Iulianum c.8*): "Let it be profound for both of us: why God wills in the greater and in the lesser to help one and not another." And I conclude with another testimony (*lib.de dono perseuerant.c.8*): "From two infants bound by original sin, why one is assumed and the other is left; from two already of adult age and ungodly, why one is called in such a way that he follows the one calling while the other either is not called or is not called in that way as to follow the one calling — the judgments of God are inscrutable. From two devout persons, why to this one perseverance to the end is given and to the other it is not given — the judgments of God are even more inscrutable." Let that sentence of (*Enchirid.c.95*) be the crowning touch: "Nor certainly did God unjustly refuse to be willing that they should be saved, when they could have been saved had he willed it."

This reason, drawn from Augustine's doctrine, I respectfully propose to theologians for reconciling the controversies over that will to save all — based on that most celebrated passage of Paul, which nearly all revolve around the mode of speaking. By it, as by a thread received from Augustine's divine intellect, we may escape so many windings and mazes of conditional, absolute, inefficacious, efficacious, qualified, simple, indeterminate, determinate, antecedent, and consequent wills. And just as there is in God only one will, so let there be one reason for understanding and speaking of it. In a word: what is and is fulfilled — concerning that was God's will; what neither was nor is fulfilled — concerning that was no will of God.

Section VII

Whether, and how far, Scotus agrees with Augustine on this general will for the salvation of all.

Scotus seems to diverge from Augustine's doctrine both concerning the divine will and concerning the exposition of Paul's testimony. The first part is clear: first, because Scotus in this (*d.46*) manifestly places two wills — one antecedent

and inefficacious, the other consequent and efficacious. He called the latter the "ultimate determination" and opposed it to the antecedent, which is not ultimately determined, and distinctly distinguishes them from each other. Second, because (*n.3*) he proposes their diverse objects and effects: for the objects of the antecedent will are natural gifts, right laws, and common sufficient aids to salvation — which are not the objects and effects of the consequent will, which tends toward salvation in the ultimate determination. Third, because he expresses the diverse affections of the two wills. Through the first he wills the salvation of all insofar as it depends on him — which is a common affection. Through the second he wills only the predestined to be saved in the ultimate resolution — which is a particular affection restricted to the predestined alone — as he teaches (*in 3.d.19.q.vn.n.6 et d.32.n.vltimo*), and he recognizes an inequality of love in God toward the elect and non-elect. From this the diversity of doctrine between Scotus and Augustine appears.

The second part, on disagreement concerning the exposition of Paul's testimony, is evident because Scotus (*hic in 1.d.46.q.vn.S.ad primum, argumentum n.3*) places two senses — one on the will to save absolutely all men, which is antecedent and not the ultimate resolution; and another on not saving all but only the predestined, which is consequent and of good pleasure — and illustrates with the example of a king willing all subjects to live peacefully but not willing any one of them immediately to live thus; so God, even if he does not have a will of good pleasure to save this person, yet wills him the common aids. Finally, having proposed the exposition which is Augustine's — of the accommodated distribution for all who are saved — he says "much better could it be expounded of the antecedent will, so that he wills all to be saved insofar as it depends on him." For which reason it does not seem there is room for the question, since Scotus manifestly dissents from Augustine.

I, however — who am perhaps the first among Scotists to raise this question — judge thus: that Scotus dissents from Augustine in appearance but agrees in doctrine. I persuade myself of this as follows. Scotus placed only one true and efficacious will in God, which is always fulfilled — therefore he agrees with Augustine in substance. I prove the premise thus: Scotus in his doctrine never admitted that common positive antecedent will concerning the salvation of all men individually — therefore he admitted only the efficacious one. This premise is evident from the mode he posits of predestining and reprobating (*in 1.d.41.q.vn.S.contra istud n.12*), where dividing the moments of predestination, he always establishes a positive will applied only to the predestined, not to the reprobate, and says God bore himself merely negatively toward the reprobate, adducing the example of Peter and Judas: "God," he says, "in the first moment, in which he wills beatitude to Peter, wills nothing for Judas — but there is only the negation of the volition of glory." Behold, every will is excluded. He proceeds to the second sign: "In the second moment of nature," he says, "when he wills grace to Peter, there is still no positive act of the divine will concerning Judas, but only

a negative one." Where is that general antecedent and inefficacious will to save all, including Judas? It is nowhere, since a positive and efficacious will to save Peter is always present. Therefore this sole will of saving the predestined is found in God, and none toward the reprobate. Therefore Scotus agrees with Augustine.

Nor need you be troubled by the other two moments, which pertain to the permission of sin and to positive reprobation, since these do not pertain to predestination nor to the will to save the reprobate, but rather to the will of reprobating. And from this our argument is confirmed, since Scotus says in the third moment: "it will be true: he does not will to give grace or glory to Judas." From which it follows that he does not will Judas to be saved, as Augustine says — and this is evident from the fourth moment, in which God wills justly to punish and reprobate Judas.

Everything here that is of positive will with respect to Judas pertains to reprobation, not to salvation. Therefore God had no will to save Judas, nor any other reprobate, but only bore himself negatively toward them. Therefore at Scotus's account that common antecedent will to save all men whatsoever is entirely nonexistent, just as it is nonexistent at Augustine's account.

In the same way Scotus proceeds (*in 3.d.19.q.vn.S.quantum ad primum 1.6*): "First, God understood himself under the aspect of the supreme good. In the second sign he understood all other creatures. In the third he predestined to glory and grace; and concerning others he had a negative act by not predestining. In the fourth he foresaw those who were to fall, etc." Here no positive will intervenes toward the salvation of all, but rather negative reprobation by not predestining.

Nor should you object from Scotus (*in 3.d.37.q.vn.S.ex hoc paret ad finem*), where treating of God's love toward his creatures (*n.6*) he says: "God wills goods to the predestined and to the non-predestined, but not to the non-predestined such great goods as to the predestined." For this establishes nothing against the truth transmitted so far: Scotus does not say God wills them salvation — which is the matter of the question — but other goods, which no one denies. And from this our doctrine is confirmed, since God wills other goods truly and properly with an efficacious will, yet does not will them the good of glory with any will. Hence it is established that whatever he wills, he wills efficaciously.

From this is taken the response to the objections which seemed strong. To what was objected concerning antecedent will for means and aids, it must be said that that will is efficacious of those means and that God truly exhibits means for the effect of grace and temporal justification and for other hidden ends which we indicated above — but not in the order of obtaining salvation for those to whom they are given who are not predestined, nor do they proceed from a desire for their salvation as they proceed in the case of the predestined. Therefore God wills those means efficaciously and exhibits them with an efficacious will for the

predestined — because through them he intends to save them. Therefore for others to whom they are not applied, God did not will to apply them in the order of salvation, and bore himself negatively when he gave and offered to the human race — just as he bore himself when he predestined the elect. But for those to whom means are applied, God willed the use of them for the effect of temporal grace, not for eternal salvation.

And this is made clear because, since in Scotus's view God predestined first to glory before to grace, and does not give grace except from an affection toward glory — for those to whom he did not will glory, he did not will persevering grace. Therefore those gifts of grace do not proceed from a will to give glory, nor from a will to save, but from another will also efficacious. But you insist: Scotus placed distinct wills — antecedent and consequent, inefficacious and efficacious in ultimate resolution and ultimate determination; and the latter is of good pleasure, the former is not — therefore he did not posit only one and sole efficacious will.

First, I do not see in Scotus an antecedent and consequent will, an inefficacious and efficacious one, as contradistinct species; nor do I less find a will in the ultimate determination opposed to a will not in ultimate determination. I find only a will in ultimate determination — which is the will of good pleasure — and this is always fulfilled; but I do not find another will not in ultimate determination, that is, inefficacious, which is not fulfilled. Or else give me that in Scotus; I will yield, but you will not give it in this passage which you oppose. Hence I gather there is only one will given in God, as I said above — of good pleasure and efficacious, always in ultimate determination toward its object and effect which it intends — while with respect to another which it does not intend it bears itself negatively, and is therefore not a will. Hence that antecedent will of Scotus, which does not will single persons to be predestined but wills means and sufficient aids — and with respect to these is in ultimate determination — is of good pleasure and efficacious concerning their use and temporal grace, as Augustine said. But with respect to eternal salvation and glory there is no will, since he bears himself negatively, as Scotus said. Therefore it does not differ from Augustine: for Augustine never denied the will to supply means and aids to the faithful who are not predestined — indeed he always conceded it with its effects of temporal grace — but denied that by it the salvation of all, even of the reprobate, was intended. Nor did Scotus in admitting the same will ever affirm that through it God willed the salvation of all, but only affirmed that through it means and aids were supplied which are ordered to obtaining it if applied — as appears in the case of the predestined. And so both agree in doctrine.

As for the expositions: Scotus did not adduce all those which Augustine employs, but only one — nor did he attribute it to Augustine, as we noted above. Nor did he less attribute the second to Damascene. Moreover, Scotus did not take the antecedent will in the sense of Damascene but in another far different

sense — of that will called a will of sign, which is not a true but a metaphorical will, terminated at means and sufficient aids. In which sense it is not contrary to the will of good pleasure, nor to Augustine's exposition. Therefore Scotus's exposition can stand together with Augustine's, since one does not contradict the other. I state this more clearly. Scotus's exposition would then be contrary to Augustine's if Scotus were taking that divine will as a positive will toward all — but Scotus did not take it in this sense, as is evident. Therefore he does not contradict Augustine, and hence does not dissent from him even in understanding Paul's text. For Augustine understood it of an efficacious will of good pleasure, which concerns only those to be saved, so that it does not extend to the salvation of the reprobate. Scotus never understood the passage as referring to the salvation of the reprobate, concerning whom he said God bore himself negatively, as we showed. That Scotus added that will of sign concerning common means and aids, which Augustine did not add — in this he said something more than Augustine, but in this he did not contradict him.

And from this appears the reason why Scotus passed over the names of Augustine and Damascene: because he did not conceive those wills in diverse senses, such as those two wills have in the sense of those Fathers. Other theologians wish those Fathers to differ from each other, and follow one or other of them as dissenting. But Scotus removed the disagreement in substance and preserved it only in words. He chose the mode of speaking of Damascene — because it is easier and more common in the schools — yet in choosing it he did not abandon Augustine's doctrine, as is evident from Scotus's own texts cited and compared.

This, as it were a new gift, we offer to our Scotists and solicit their judgment — and we observe that the common view of more recent authors is that Scotus departed from Augustine in this matter, with one exception: Vulpes a Monte Piloso, an outstanding Scotist, who — although he proposes the question less expressly — yet in Scotus's doctrine on this will of God toward all to be saved holds that it was neither efficacious nor inefficacious, but only concerning a determined number of predestined. So (*disp.33.art.10.nu.5.conclusionem 1*), and he affirms this to be Scotus's view against Vásquez and others; and then (*n.6.concl.2*) he posits no other will of good pleasure and sign, whether positive or negative, in nearly the same way that I explained shortly above — and he has recourse to Augustine. I confess candidly that I was surprised that Vulpes had anticipated my view and interpretation — for I thought myself the first author of it. Mastrius, however, attacks this view (*disp.5.q.1.art.1*) in his usual way, saying Vulpes is greatly mistaken on this point, and says it does not impede that Scotus describes that will to save all by the act of willing to give sufficient means for salvation, making no mention of the intention of the end; and a little below, that Scotus says God does not have an immediate will of good pleasure to save "this person" — namely the person who is not saved. This does not impede, he says, because that would be to argue from negative authority — which mode of

arguing is incongruous, since even if the Doctor affirms one thing, he does not therefore deny another, etc.

This attacking reasoning does not stand, because Vulpes's and my argument is just and efficacious — proceeding from affirmation and negation. For he affirms Scotus places the will to give means without mention of end; then he adduces the negation of the application of that will immediately to individual persons to be saved. And the argument proceeds thus: that will rests in means and does not descend to the application of them in the individual — therefore it does not will to save all in the individual. What could be more evident? Mastrius is therefore refuted and his attack is repulsed. For here is a manifest negation. He says "God does not have the will." How therefore does he say the Doctor affirms one thing and does not deny another? On the contrary, he denies manifestly and positively — therefore it is the positive authority of a denier, not merely an affirmer. We do not rely only on that affirmation of the will to give means without mention of end — nor do we draw from that affirmation alone that that will does not pertain to all, which would be arguing negatively. We add that Scotus expressly denies that will to descend to particulars and to be applied to individuals. And Mastrius expresses this when he says Scotus says a little below "that God does not have an immediate will of good pleasure to save this person." Therefore Mastrius improperly attacks by saying: "even if the Doctor affirms one thing, he does not deny another." He certainly does deny it — in Mastrius's own text. Mastrius, who in order to argue correctly ought to have removed that negation, should have concluded that the argument proceeds from negative authority. But that negation of Scotus remaining in our argument as assumed, Mastrius's reasoning concludes nothing against Vulpes.

But Mastrius could insist: when there are two wills, with one denied there can still be another affirmed. Here however there are two wills — therefore with one denied, another can still be affirmed. Then Mastrius would argue correctly against Vulpes. But Vulpes does not say this. He speaks only of one will that is a true will — whether efficacious or inefficacious — and says Scotus denies this in God concerning the immediately and determinately willed salvation of all. For the other will of sign is not a will terminated at persons to be saved but at means, which are not applied to all and each — of which Scotus speaks. With this supposition made — which is true — the argument rightly concludes: therefore God had no true positive will; for Vulpes does not admit any other positive will with Scotus. That this will does not concern all and each is taught by Vulpes. Scotus teaches this against Mastrius, who must show us in Scotus some positive will toward the salvation of reprobate human beings — which he will certainly not show, as we showed above from Scotus (*in 1.d.41 et in 3.d.19*), where there is a negation of the divine positive will. For Scotus expressly says: "no positive act of the divine will exists."

But Mastrius objects again (*eodem n.5*) in that will of means, an act is included by which God is pleased with what is willed, that is, that those means extend to all men individually — which he calls an act by which God is pleased with the willed. This, however, conflicts with Scotus's statements: for if it is so, God did not bear himself negatively toward Judas, but willed him positively to be saved. Furthermore, Scotus says so perspicuously in his example that in that will of means there is not included the will to save the individual reprobate — so as to deny it — as is clear from the king: "He wills all subjects to live antecedently, yet does not will any particular one immediately to live thus." And afterward, applying this to God: "Even if God does not have a will of good pleasure to save this person." Hence that will remains within means and aids ordered to the salvation of all if applied; but God wills them to be applied — as we said — only from the will of saving the predestined. To others who are reprobate, if they can entirely lack them, he does not will them to be applied; if they cannot lack them, he wills them to be applied for temporal grace and other ends. Therefore Mastrius goes astray on this point; it is not Vulpes who is mistaken — with whom if this is to be mistaken, I prefer to be mistaken with Vulpes than to see with Mastrius.

But if Mastrius has so great a love of quarreling with Vulpes, I will show him passages where Vulpes fell, so that he can take him there as a fallen fox — namely (*disp.40.a.6.n.6*), in which passage Vulpes manifestly contradicts himself, affirming that God willed to save all men even infants dead in their mothers' wombs, and that he provided sufficient remedies for them, and says Scotus teaches this — and attacks Vásquez who teaches the contrary. Again, the same Vulpes (*num.9 ad finem*) says: "God in the first sign of nature, by a simple affection, wills grace to all — whether infants or adults — as precisely possible to them." Moreover, at the beginning of that sixth article he transmits that Scotus at (*1.d.46 ad primum*) excepts no one from that antecedent will to save all, according to Paul's text: "He wills all men to be saved." And he subjoins: "What is more, Scotus says all are comprehended under that will." Which sense Vulpes explains of special providence, and argues the same a fortiori for adults — and for all of them he proves from Scotus's doctrine on the same passage (*1.d.46*) that proximate sufficient aids flow from that will. He certainly overturns there whatever he had taught in that passage.

I marvel greatly at this in Vulpes; not, however, in Faber, whom I find in matters of grace and predestination too desirous of human freedom — to put it gently. He certainly both (*disp.58 and 62*) holds that that general will to save all in God extends even to all infants, and says Scotus taught this. With whom in this Mastrius agrees (*disp.5.de Praedest.et reprobat.q.1.art.1.nu.4 et 5*) and afterward (*art.2 et 3*) — who, out of fear lest he deprive anyone of sufficient aid, twists Scotus's doctrine transmitted at this point. I remain constant in my view and say: Scotus did not posit in God, with Augustine, a positive will to save all and each — nor could he in his doctrine and order of predestination.

But when Mastrius rebukes Vulpes, let me amicably warn him to review his own response to the fourth argument (*disp.7.q.4.a.2.nu.223*) and accommodate it. For there he writes: "To the fourth, the premise is denied: for the will of which Paul speaks (*1.Timoth.2*): 'He wills all men to be saved,' is conditional, as theologians commonly explain it — and Ambrose there when he says that a condition lies hidden there: 'if they come to him, if they themselves wish.' Similarly the conditional will includes that: 'Turn to me and I will turn to you' — insofar as God wills to turn to the sinner if the sinner turns to him, as the Council of Trent (*sess.6.c.5*) weighs." In which response, first, that "he wills all" — commonly explained by theologians as a conditional will — does not seem true, nor does it cohere with what Mastrius teaches about this same will (*disp.5.qu.1.a.2.n.14 et 15*), where (*n.14 et 17*) he says God positively, directly, and immediately wills the salvation of men, even if many will not have obtained it; then (*n.19*) he affirms that will to be not only of simple complacency but in the mode of an act of pursuit and desire, and as to its existence efficacious in conferring sufficient means — though conditional from the part of the object. Which I do not know how they can stand together: namely, that it be efficacious on God's part and yet depend on the condition "if man wishes." About this (*n.21*) he disputes with Arriaga.

Concerning the second, I note that he cites Ambrose for this view, when that author is not Ambrose but entirely different from him — and suspected of the Pelagian heresy. For this reason he is cited by the learned as Ambrosiaster. I am not unaware that he is cited as Ambrose by some — but less learned and less careful ones, among whom Mastrius ought not to be numbered.

As for the third: the Council of Trent does not speak in the sense in which Mastrius takes it, but in the contrary sense — because Trent in that passage of session 6, chapter 5, teaches that the beginning of conversion is to be taken from prevenient and exciting grace, placing the priority on God's part as the one who converts, not on man's part. So that God converts himself to the sinner before the sinner converts to God before God — contrary to what Mastrius expounds, for the Council says: "When it is said: 'Turn to me and I will turn to you,' we are admonished of our freedom. When we respond: 'Turn us, O Lord, to you and we will be turned,' we confess that the grace of God prevents us." Therefore the Council took account only of freedom on our part, not of priority. On the contrary, it taught that freedom stands after prevenient and exciting grace. But Mastrius inverts the sense and makes God posterior and man prior, when he says: "I will turn to you — insofar as God wills to turn to the sinner if the sinner turns to God" — as if the will of God awaited the will of the man converting himself, so that God might turn to him. This is contrary to the grace that prevents and to the divine will preparing antecedently, by which the will — excited by it — converts itself. And the Council signified this when it said "God touching the heart of man." With which antecedent excitation the Council taught freedom coexists — whose intent was not to bring forward the priority of

conversion from the side of the will, but with that presupposed on God's part, to show that freedom is consistent with it.

I return to the purpose. I maintain that Scotus did not at all posit in God, with Augustine, a general will to save all and each. And I conclude the question with this dilemma for Scotus. When did God have that will to save all? Either before the foresight of original sin, or after? Before it, he did not have it, because he bore himself negatively concerning the non-predestined, with no positive act elicited — so to speak — either of reprobating or of beatifying: not of reprobating, because otherwise God would reprobate before the foresight of guilt, as Scotus argues against the adversaries (*in 1.d.41.n.11*). Not of beatifying, because Scotus truly says there (S): "If beatitude, then he predestines Judas." There is no act of willing to save here — which appears more clearly below, where again: "In the first moment God wills nothing for Judas, but there is only the negation of the will." Let us pass to the second: "Similarly," Scotus says, "in the second moment of nature, when he wills grace to Peter, there is still no positive act of the divine will concerning Judas, but only a negative one." There is no act of willing to save Judas here — therefore before the foresight of sin there was no will to save all, and the first part of the dilemma is established.

Let us weigh the second concerning the state after foreseen sin, beginning from the third moment. In this is the permission of sin common to both Peter and Judas — which state is not one of salvation. Indeed, Scotus says: "from this act it is true that Judas will be a final sinner." And the truth posited concerning the first moment is confirmed: "that God did not will to give him grace or glory." Behold: negation, not conferring. In the fourth moment, however, there is no place for salvation: for Judas is presented, he says, as a final sinner to the divine will, and then God wills justly to punish and reprobate Judas.

When I had written these things, it happened that I came across Father Herrera, an outstanding Scotist and Spanish theologian. He writes (*in 1.sentent.Scoti d.23.q.vn.ad fnem*): "It seems more probable to me to say that the antecedent will is not formally an act of will, but only metaphorically" — which view I put before Mastrius and others who think with him.

You will, however, object two things. First: Scotus spoke of an absolute and efficacious will, not of an act of will by which, Mastrius says (*disp.4.q.5.n.91*), God is pleased with what is willed and approves it — which is the will of means or sign, as Faber (*disp.58 et 63*) and Vulpes (as different from himself, *disp.40.art.6*) posit. I respond that Mastrius assumes what was to be proved — namely, that in this order of Scotus's predestination there was something willed in which God was pleased. But nothing is willed concerning Judas, but only a negation of will concerning him in the first and second moment; while in the second and third moments only the permission of sin and damnation from it are found in Judas. Here too there is no willed object of complacency that Mastrius posits — therefore he freely assumed it. Finally I respond: from the texts it is gathered

that Scotus admitted no inefficacious will concerning the salvation of the reprobate. This is evident because in that division made after the question "what does he will for Judas?" — if damnation, the purpose is had, since then he reprobates without any reason. If beatitude: then he predestines Judas. Both wills are efficacious — both that of reprobating and this of predestining. We are not speaking of the first since it is beside the point. The second will is efficacious and absolute — since to will beatitude is to predestine. Therefore Scotus admitted no inefficacious will in his discourse. For he could have said: if he wills beatitude, he wills it with an antecedent and inefficacious will — but Scotus did not say this; rather he inferred an efficacious will, because he admitted only the will of predestining and agreed with Augustine, as we explained above.

You will object the second from the inconvenient: if these moments are true, there was no room for that will of instituting and supplying means and aids for salvation, which Scotus manifestly posits (*d.46* where we are). But this has no place in that order of moments, though it is to be presupposed — therefore another will also has a place, namely where this one is placed.

I respond that there is a place for that will, and it is manifest in that constitution of moments for predestination, and from its position our doctrine is confirmed. This is evident because Scotus in the first moment places the volition of glory for Peter, and in the second the volition of grace — and in this volition of grace means and aids are included. And then in the third moment he names glory and grace, speaking of Judas: "He does not will to give him grace or glory." Behold grace, and in it means — by which our view is admirably confirmed: that God willed means with an efficacious will, ordered efficaciously from the will of giving glory to the predestined but not to the reprobate. When Scotus says God does not will to give Judas grace or glory — though Judas had grace — Judas did not have it from the intention of God willing to save him, but for other ends, as we said above. But God willed to give it to Peter from an efficacious will to save him. For which reason Scotus judges the will to give means and aids of grace to have been in the order of those to be saved — and therefore efficacious, since it was connected with glory and the intention of it. But for the reprobate it did not flow from any will to save them, but from a will of temporal justification and other ends known to himself. Thus there does not appear an inefficacious will to save — which can be pressed against Mastrius by the example of the precept imposed on Abraham to sacrifice his son. That precept did not flow — either efficaciously or inefficaciously — from a will of sacrifice, but from a will of obedience in Abraham, as Mastrius himself acknowledges (*n.92*). Therefore God was not pleased in the willed object of sacrifice but in the willed object of obedience: which example applied to the will of supplying means shows that that will toward the reprobate did not arise from the intention of saving them, but of temporally justifying them for other ends known to God and hidden from us.

Section VIII

What Saint Thomas and his school hold on this general will of God concerning the salvation of men.

If Saint Thomas and his school wish to defend their view on the reason for predestining and reprobating, and to speak consistently, they must, with Augustine, restrict and coarct that will to those who are to be saved, and interpret Paul's text in the ways Augustine expounded it. I prove the premise. Saint Thomas, as those of his school commonly take him — and as we mentioned above, though reluctantly — teaches that God disposed the predestination and reprobation of angels and men in such a way that in it, as supreme Lord, he proceeded to demonstrate his goodness and justice; and in that demonstration lies his providence. And he did this antecedently to the foresight of sin. So that just as he predestines without merits as a specimen of his mercy, so he does not predestine — that is, reprobates negatively — before all foresight of sin, as John of Saint Thomas among others expounds extensively and lucidly (*q.23.disp.10.a.1 et 2*). This doctrine certainly coincides with Scotus's doctrine on this point — and hence does not posit a positive will of predestining all, nor any other will concerning the salvation of all. From which it follows that that general will to save all must be removed, which does not stand with that demonstration of goodness and justice — which is the nobler and as it were primary end with respect to that other love and benevolence toward the angelic or human nature, which is a secondary end with respect to that primary one.

John of Saint Thomas — an acute man — did not overlook this at the passage cited by me (*disp.10.n.28 ad finem*), where he asks: "How does the antecedent will of giving glory and saving stand with the will of excluding from glory?" And indeed in defending and sustaining it, the Salamancan Fathers (*tract.4.de volunt.Dei disp.9.dub.2 et 3*) labor considerably.

I press the difficulty and ask first of the Thomists: what was this will? True or metaphorical? For Saint Thomas compares it to velleity in his (*q.23.1.p.a.6.ad primum*), and some with John of Saint Thomas (*disp.10.art.1.n.18*) call it inefficacious and as it were conditional. Others with the Salamancans (*disp.9.dub.3.S.2 et 3*) affirm it to be true and formal and in part efficacious. Therefore they do not agree.

I ask secondly: what place do they assign to this will? Before the foresight of sin, or afterward? If before: how did God not provide against Adam's falling, or how — having foreseen him about to fall — did he not decree to free men from original sin, but permitted all to be contaminated by it? So that in their view not even the Blessed Virgin would be immune. If out of love for nature he acted thus, he ought to have exempted that pure nature from so enormous a stain — and this would have been far easier than liberating it afterward from that stain, and that will would have been fulfilled at far less cost. But if after foreseen sin:

how could children of wrath have pleased God so greatly? For according to that kind of will the Salamancans (*dub.2.n.1 in fine*) judged God to have willed men to be saved — who also say through it God showed the bowels of his mercy (*S.3.n.24*). I do not know how this can be true, since this fits rather the predestining will. And if that will opened the bowels of mercy, how so quickly did it close them and shut the bowels — in the following will of reprobating? God foresaw the final sins of men. I object: why, being merciful, did he not prevent them? He gave through it means and sufficient aids. I am not satisfied. Why did he not give efficacious ones? For these flow from the bowels of mercy; the sufficient ones rather look to equity and justice. But from that will the Incarnation followed. I deny this: for the Incarnation was the effect of an efficacious will of mercy, through which all the bowels of our God's mercy were laid open.

Finally: how is that will so merciful, if it is not a will simply of the salvation of men — as the Salamancans themselves acknowledge (*S.3.n.24*) — but only a qualified will, indeed velleity? Therefore the bowels of mercy are closed, not opened.

Furthermore: a new difficulty arises from the position of this will among the Salamancans — arising from the question of where to place it. For they in one place make it prior, in another posterior. And just as they change the place and the will, so they change their view, accommodating it to the will of circumstance. Therefore in their commentary (*tract.4 ad q.19.ar.6.disp.9.dub.1 et sequentibus*) they hold with Saint Thomas that this antecedent will is prior to the consequent one; but in (*tract.5.disp.5.n.36 et disp.8.dub.1.S.6.n.32 in fine*) they hold it to be posterior — which we noted above. Let us see the knot. In that second passage, responding to the argument of the first view — which denies that the predestinate's being and all entities of the natural order are effects of the predestination of the elect, drawn from the antecedence and presupposition of nature with respect to grace — they confirm that reasoning with the example of the antecedent will to save all, which precedes the consequent will of saving these and those individuals. And yet they deny the premise on the priority of the general will to save all with respect to the special will to save the elect, and expressly say this is the prior will. Hence they say: "The antecedent will of saving all men is not called antecedent because it precedes the consequent will of predestining the elect, but for another reason stated in (*tract.4.disp.9.n.* and following)." I went there and found in that place the antecedent will to save all to be prior to this consequent will of predestining the elect — so that it is not even necessary to go to another place to convict them, but only to cite their own words. It would be lengthy to cite all of them. Let whoever wishes read (*dub.1.n.*), where they posit in a certain order the object of this general will before that of the special will — and they say this is conceived according to the "ultimate condition," and they call the will concerned with it "Consequent." And there (*n.2*) manifestly: "The divine will is usually first terminated at the thing in that first

state, then in that posterior state; the former volition is called antecedent, the posterior volition consequent." How therefore is this consequent prior to that antecedent in the same Salamancans at (*question 19.disp.5.n.36*)? And by what right do they refer readers there in order to excuse their second view, if through that reference they incur a new guilt of thoughtlessness?

Let the reader weigh (*n.5*) of the same, and (*dub.2.n.8 et 9*), and (*dub.3.S.3.n.21*), where: "There can be an antecedent will, and moreover a consequent will that comes later"; and (*n.23*) they expressly call the antecedent will prior. The same you will find (*ibidem n.26*).

It is not my intent to accuse the Salamancan Fathers — acute and vigilant men — of contradiction, but to show how great is the difficulty in adducing that will, and how far more expedient is the view of our Scotus following Augustine. In which they are themselves in agreement, they say (*in that disp.9.dub.3.n.10.S*), adducing the first view which the suitable Thomist author Cajetan followed — from whom the Salamancans ought not to have dissented. But Saint Thomas said otherwise. I would certainly deny it: for he called it velleity, as we said above, and a qualified antecedent will — the difficulty of which those same Salamancans increase again (*tract.5.disp.8.S.6 in fin.*): "The will of sending the Redeemer," they say, "does not arise imperatively from the will of saving all, but from the will of glorifying Christ." Which I do not know how it can be consistent with the doctrine of Saint Thomas on the Incarnation of the Word after the foreseen sin of the first parent.

To such straits has that general will reduced those noble theologians the Salamancans.

From another principle I press the Thomists to deny this kind of general will to save all, because many of their illustrious authors deny that sufficient aids are given in reality to all and each individually. Together with which view that will cannot stand — which is by all confession connected with supplying sufficient aids to all and each as its effects. Hence those who deny those aids being supplied consequently deny the will to supply them.

Indeed I see Father Suárez (*tom.2.de grat.lib.4.c.13*) affirming that certain Thomists are authors of that view which denies that sufficient aids are supplied to all by God. The suitable Thomist Father Seville transmits the same (*lib.2.c.2.a.3*). John of Saint Thomas names some distinguished ones (*d.10.arr.3.n.29 et n.33*) — and with reason, for Bañez so holds concerning the obdurate and concerning infants dying in the maternal womb (*in suis commentarijs ad q.23.1p.a.8.dub.3.concl.8*), and González (*ibid.d.77.l.5*) — with whom John of Saint Thomas himself agrees (*n.33*). I add Álvarez, an outstanding Thomist (*lib.11.de Auxil.disp.112.nu.7*). And John of Saint Thomas attributes this view to Augustine and Prosper (*n.34*) — indeed also to Saint Thomas speaking of

infants in the maternal womb who cannot be baptized, and he cites Saint Thomas (*in 4.d.6.q.1.a.1*).

This principle therefore being posited, that true and formal will — as the Salamancans call it — cannot stand. Hence Saint Thomas and his school agrees with Augustine and Scotus.

I add that many Jesuits also must hold the same who, while denying to all the abundance of sufficient aid, thereby remove that will to save all — such as Vásquez (*r.p.disp.96.c.2.3.6*), Becanus (*in sum.c.10.q.6.n.6 et in opusc.9*), and Alarcón (*tract.4.de praedestinat.disp.5.c.9.n.7*) speaking of infants, as we will say below.

From these considerations it appears that the Thomist school, if it wishes to defend the doctrine of their Doctor, must restrict and coarct with Augustine and Scotus that general will of God toward the salvation of all — lest it extend to all and each individually.

And if Saint Thomas seems to hold otherwise and to embrace Damascene's sense, I respond that Damascene's sense should be referred to the third of Augustine's senses which Saint Thomas did not express — which is such that through us God wills all to be saved; and as Mother Church in her prayers prays for all the faithful and infidels, and commands the gospel to be announced to all, sending preachers to them — providing as much as possible and as much as depends on her that knowledge of Christ might reach even the most remote regions of barbarous peoples — so we too, her children, by our prayers, exhortations, and preachings procure the salvation of absolutely all people. By this reasoning Augustine expounds (*lib.de Corrept.et gratia cap.15*): "We do not know who belongs to the number of the predestined and who does not — thus we ought to be affected with an affection of charity that we wish all to be saved." And immediately: "For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, as if God were exhorting through us; we beseech for Christ that you be reconciled to God. What is it to be reconciled, except to have peace with him? To preach peace, of whom it is written: 'How beautiful are the feet of those who announce peace, who announce good things'? To us therefore, who do not know who is a son of peace or not, it pertains to make no exception, to discern no one, but to wish all to be saved to whom we preach — God commands that all be saved, and he himself works this in us." Behold the true and genuine sense of Paul's statement and Augustine's exposition. He continues: "It can also be understood that God wills all men to be saved — that he makes us will it." And he concludes: "This is brought about by God that we wish it." That Saint Thomas holds with Augustine that those sufficient aids are not supplied in reality to all and each is clear from the passage (*22.q.2.a.5.ad 1*), where teaching that man is bound to love God and neighbor, and to believe the articles of faith, but with divine grace without which he cannot, he says: "Man can do this with the aid of grace, which aid, when given to any, is mercifully given; but to those to whom it is not given, it is not given by judgment as a punishment of preceding original sin, as Augustine

says (*in lib. de Corrept. et grat.*)" And in conformity with this view (*eodem tom. q. 10. a. 1 in corpore*), treating of negative infidelity, he admits it among barbarous unbelievers, teaching it to be a punishment of original sin. Which doctrine cannot stand with that general will. On which Augustine and these two princes of the schools hold exactly the same: that it does not pertain to all and each — and hence one of the ways Augustine offers must be used to interpret Paul's text. Of all of which the last is more facile and more plausible: namely, that through us the salvation of all is procured through preachings, prayers, and exhortations. This Mother Church does, and her members — religious orders and congregations, which by their special institute send preachers to those barbarous regions to announce the faith to the most remote peoples and preach the gospel. And Mother Church on Good Friday in the divine office performed that morning prays publicly for every kind of person — even for pagans and Jews — without doubt to fulfill God's will that all men be saved through us. And thus that passage of Paul is to be understood not only by Augustine but also by Mother Church.

COLLATION XII. DISTINCTION III

Whether and How God Provides Sufficient Aids to All People

SECTION I

The Affirmative Position Is Set Forth

This question is bound up with the one just resolved. For if God willed the salvation of all and each, he was obliged to furnish all and each with those aids. If he did not so will, he was under no such obligation. The affirmative position has held such standing in the Schools that it is almost universally received, and in gathering together the testimony of the authorities in its favor one gathers, as it were, the gratitude of nearly all. Scarcely any other opinion has been received with greater consensus — even among those who disagree not merely within the same confession in matters of school debate, but who dissent across entire sects.

Let us begin, then, with the heretics. The Pelagians, under the lead of Pelagius and Julian, admitted a universal grace of some kind (on the question of what kind, more elsewhere), relying on the celebrated passage of Paul: *God wills all men to be saved* — so Pelagius in his commentary on *I Tim.* c. II, and Julian in Augustine, (*lib. 4. contr. eundem c. 8.*). Antoninus Moraines affirms they held this view and denies they erred in it (*d. 26. §. 3.*). John Maldonatus likewise attests this in his commentary on John c. I, n. IX, on the words *He was the true light that illuminates every man coming into this world*, where he says that Saint Augustine, disputing against the Pelagians on predestination in defense of his own opinion that grace is not given to all and that not all are illuminated, etc. That the Pelagians were authors of this doctrine of universal grace is demonstrated from Augustine's letter to Vitalis (107), where in the fourth assertion he says: *We know*

that the merciful grace of God is freely given to those to whom it is given; and in the sixth: We know that to those to whom it is not given, it is not given by the just judgment of God. These assertions were directed against the Pelagians.

The Semipelagians followed them and defended the same grace with great vigor. This is clear from Prosper's letter at the opening, where among their professed tenets one was: *that the propitiation which is in the sacrament of the blood of Christ is offered to all men without exception.* It is no less evident from the letter of Hilary, a passage of which makes plain that they interpreted Paul's sentence in opposition to Augustine — holding that God wills not merely certain specific persons but absolutely all men to be saved, so that none is regarded as excepted. It is unnecessary to condemn this on the authority of others, since no one denies that the Semipelagians held this position.

After them, in the ninth century from Christ, there arose certain men for whom the zeal to attack the monk Gottschalk furnished occasion to slip into Semipelagian tenets. I do not condemn them of Semipelagianism nor number them among heretics; I name them merely in chronological order; nor were they entirely free from suspicion. Rabanus, Hincmar, Pardulus, and those who together with them condemned Gottschalk at the Council of Quierzy — under the pretext of defending God's general will to save all men and the universal Redemption of Christ — introduced a common indiscriminate grace. This is evident from the personal letters of Rabanus to Noting and Eberhard, of Hincmar to Amulo and to Pope Nicholas, and from his book on predestination, and from Pardulus's letter to the Church of Lyons.

Those who came after in the previous century — the Arminians and Remonstrants, renewing Semipelagianism — retained the same universality of grace. So Arminius in his response to the thirty-second article, Part II, art. VIII, and in the *Examination of Perkins's Predestination* (p. 581), where he argues the case at length and confirms it by the testimony of Paul — *God wills all to be saved* — rejecting Augustine's interpretation as understanding it of genera of individuals, and arguing that it should be taken as referring to individuals of every genus, so that no one is without sufficient grace. His misguided children agree with their misguided father in the dedicatory epistle to the Senate of the Republic of Rotterdam, where they attack the opinion of those who deny that all are called to Christ due to a deficiency of sufficient grace. The Synodists followed the Arminians and Remonstrants in their Synodical Articles: in the first, they condemn the decree of absolute reprobation as destroying God's universal love toward the human race and the effect of his goodness; and in the second, they affirm the universal Redemption and God's general will toward the salvation of all, and reject Augustinian interpretations by the same reasoning as Arminius, establishing that each individual is so redeemed and destined to salvation that no one lacks those aids by which the end of Redemption — that is, eternal salvation — can be obtained. They err in the same vein in Articles III and IV on

grace, where not far from the beginning they say: *the administration of calling flows from God's general disposition of mercy toward the human race* — a point Corvinus argues at greatest length against Molinaeus (c. 5. and 31.). They add shortly thereafter: *From the Scriptures we draw the distinction between antecedent and consequent will, the meaning of which is simply that God sincerely and earnestly wills all to be saved.* They repeat the same refrain in the *Apology, Examination of the Censure*, c. XIII; and although they deny (to evade the force of the censure) having taught this position when challenged, they nonetheless affirm — together with Gerard Vossius and Marc'Antonio de Dominis — that all the Fathers of the earliest centuries held it universally; and they ultimately acquiesce in the second assertion at the end of that section. The entire unbroken schools of all these movements embrace such a doctrine with no dissenting voice.

From other sectarian quarters many have drifted into this opinion, including among the chief heretics. Zwingli, in his *Commentary on True and False Religion*, c. on the Gospel, says among other things: *The sum of this passage is that Christ is saving to all men of all nations and kinds. For he himself wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.* And in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*: *The gift of God in Christ is far more abundant than the sin into which Adam cast us. Then: "many are called," that is, all — the entire multitude; so elsewhere he says "many are called," that is, all, through external preaching. By "many," therefore, he understands all and the whole multitude. For the sin of Adam spread and seeped into all.* Bullinger, on Acts X and XIV, affirms that God never withdrew himself from pagan men, but illuminated all, so that having received these rays they could make their way back to him. Pellicanus, in his commentary on Ezekiel c. XVIII.XXIII, writes thus: *The divine will is that all be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth; and he concludes: So that no one perishing by their own choice should have anything to allege in defense of their wickedness, easy access to salvation has been given to all.* Musculus, in his *Commonplaces*, at the locus on the Redemption of the human race, clearly states the same position. Let this testimony stand: *That the reprobate and utterly impious do not receive the redemption is not due to any deficiency of God's grace, nor is it right that on account of the sons of perdition it should lose the glory and title of universal redemption, since it is prepared for all and all are called to it.* He also argues the same in his *Commentary on John* III.XVI.XVII and in many other passages. Bucer is an author of the same mind in *Ps. 130* and in his commentary on *Romans* I and X, writing: *He is the savior of all, of whom he is Lord — that is, of all mortals. He is the God of all and saves all; though as for the reprobate, after they abuse temporal salvation, he justly condemns them to hell in the end.*

Melanchthon was not so much a follower as a teacher and advocate of universal and sufficient grace. Thus in his *Commonplaces*, at the locus on the Gospel: *As it is necessary to know that the Gospel is a free promise, so it is necessary to know that the evangelical promise is universal — that is, that reconciliation is offered and promised to all men. It is necessary to hold this universality against the dangerous speculations about predestination, lest we think that this promise pertains to some few others and does not*

pertain to us, etc. And in his *Explanation of the Chief Articles of Faith*, under the article on faith: *Just as the preaching of repentance is universal, so also the promise of grace is universal, and commands all to believe and receive the benefit of Christ, as he says: Come to me, all*. Even more plainly in his *Commentary on Romans* c. V: *The word "all" is full of consolation, for it offers remission of sins to all; and so all who flee to it and apprehend it by faith are saved, and such universal terms ought to be set against the dangerous thoughts about predestination*. Lavater follows the same path in his commentary on Ezekiel c. XVIII, verse XXIII: *That God does not desire the death of the wicked is apparent from this, that he invites all men to the knowledge of sin*; and he dwells on that argument at great length. Andreas Hyperius agrees in his *Method of Theology*, bk. I, c. on predestination: *No small consolation will be received by one troubled in this matter, if it is further demonstrated to him that the promise of grace is universal*, etc. And in the locus on the will of God, inquiring how Paul's statement — *God wills all men to be saved* — is true, given that many are not saved, he responds almost in the Catholic manner: *The will of God is always fulfilled: but in such a way that some things are accomplished according to his decree by absolute necessity — as we say it is ordained by God's will that all men must die once (I Cor. XV, Hebr. IX) — while others are accomplished by conditional necessity, in which sense we show that Paul's statement, that God wills all men to be saved, is to be understood*. Sebastian Castellio is added, who argues with great force for this general benevolence of God toward all and each and derives from it a universal grace which he shows to be grounded in that will, in his *Dialogue I on Predestination* in various places; and at the end, opposing predestination based on foreseen conditional merits against that based on an absolute decree before foresight, he says: *But if you believe that God created all men for salvation, you will find everything consistent — namely, God's fatherly disposition toward all whom he created, his most liberal mercy, and his precepts in full agreement with his will without any pretense, and so*, etc. He presents the same doctrine in *Dialogue II on Election*, and *III on free will*, and in his *Tract on Predestination*, q. II, and in the book *On Calumny*, c. XVIII, and in his annotations on *Romans* IX.

What more? Even the very patriarchs of the heretics, Luther and Calvin, found favor with this same doctrine of grace common to all and sufficient — these lightest of followers who trailed them as princes of the senate. Luther, therefore, in his *Commentary on Ps.* LI, says that the psalm is to be applied to the general doctrine which pertains simply to all men, with none excepted. And in his *Commentary on Joel*, God ordained his eternal Son as a victim against sin, and wills him to be common to all men. And in another *Commentary on Joel*, Tom. III of Luther's works, on the words *Whoever shall call upon the name of the Lord*, he observes first: *the infinite particle "whoever" — for it excludes no one from salvation, which he freely promises to those who call upon him*. So Luther — that most vain of men, prepared to dare anything, lest there be anything he would not say. Whether he was consistent with himself I do not say here; I will speak to that shortly in its proper place.

I come now to Calvin, a lid worthy of that pot. Although he is a most vigorous defender of absolute predestination, he is nonetheless a strenuous asserter of universal grace. In his *Tract on Predestination* he holds: *It is established that all without distinction are called to faith and repentance; that one and the same Mediator is set before all, that through him they may be reconciled to God the Father.* Likewise in his *Commentary on Romans V: The Apostle makes it common to all because it is set forth for all — not that it actually extends to all. For although Christ suffered for the sins of the whole world, and is offered without distinction to all by God's goodness, not all apprehend it.* Furthermore, in his *Commentary on John III.XVI*, *that whosoever believes in him, etc.: He added the universal term so as to invite all without distinction to share in life, and also to cut off any excuse for the faithless. For to this belongs the name "world," which he used before. For although nothing in the world is found worthy of God's favor, he nonetheless shows himself propitious to the whole world, since he calls all without exception to faith in Christ. For Christ is open and available to all.* Calvin could not have spoken more plainly.

Testardus fights for this opinion, as is clear from the work of his opponent Moses Amyraut, and the testimony of Amyraut himself agrees. Cameron is also added, who acknowledges a conditional decree and defends a common sufficient grace in consequence of it — as these two authors report in recounting his words. Yet no one defends this opinion among the heretics more vigorously or fully than Moses Amyraut in his lengthy work *On Universal Grace*, and especially in the preface, where he opposes to the Synod of Dort — which appears to have defined the contrary (though he denies this) — the Polish Synod, which established the universality of grace; and he even affirms that at the very Synod of Dort some distinguished men from Great Britain either held or conceded, for the sake of peace with the Lutherans, a common sufficient grace. He therefore concludes that this is itself what the Reformed Churches both believe and teach. And so this is the opinion of nearly all heretics of our time, if you except a few of the more rigid followers of the Calvinist school.

As for Catholics, one cannot but marvel that an opinion which has so pleased the heretics should have found such great favor among them. We cannot deny that the Doctors, especially the Scholastics, have embraced it with great consensus. And those who trace the matter further back say that the Greek Fathers were its first authors. Among them were Dionysius the Areopagite (*On the Celestial Hierarchy*, c. IX), Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* bk. II*)*, Chrysostom (*Hom. VII on John* and *Hom. XXVI on Hebrews*), Gregory of Nazianzus (*Oration XXI on the Praises of Athanasius*), Cyril, Theophylact, and Euthymius on *John* c. I, *he illuminates every man coming into this world.* I do not adduce the testimonies themselves, both because they are easy to find and because I will cite the later authors in whom they may be seen: Suarez (*in 1 p. l. 4. de praedest. c. 4. and tom. 2. de Grat. l. 4. c. 11.*), and Maldonatus (*Commentar. in Ioannem c. 1. n. 9.*), who says it is the opinion of all the Greeks who comment on that passage in *John*. And Antoninus Moraines (*d. 26. de Grat. sect. 4.*).

Among the Latins: Cyprian (*Ep. LIX**), Hilary (2. *de Trinit.*), Ambrose (*Serm. VIII in Ps. CXVIII*), Jerome (*Comment. Ep. ad Titum*), Arnobius (l. II *advers. Gentes*), Paul Orosius (*Apolog. pro libertate*). More are cited by Ruiz, that most learned man (d. XXXIX, §§. IV and V)*.

The Scholastics seem to have conspired almost entirely in the same opinion. Saint Thomas (3. *contr. Gent. c. CLIX in fine* and *lect. V c. VI in Ioan.* and *lect. II in cap. ad Rom. X**), Saint Bonaventure (in 1. d. XL a. IV q. II and in 3. d. XXV a. I q. II *ad ult. arg.*), Alensis (1. p. q. XXVIII m. II a. II), Scotus (in 1. d. XLVI q. vn. *ad I arg.*), Adrian (in 4. q. I *de Paenit.*), Capreolus (in 1. d. XLVI q. vn. a. III *ub. III*), Richard (in 2. d. XXVIII a. I q. III *ad IV*), Durand (in 3. d. XXV q. I n. IX), Ferrara (3. *contra Gent. c. CLXIX*), Conrad (12. q. CIX a. IV *ad II* and q. CLXXXIX a. VI), Domingo Soto (*de nat. & Grat. c. XVIII*), Malderus (1. 2. q. XI a. III *dub. V m. I*), Ledesma (*disp. de Auxiliis art. XVI q. vnica*), Driedo (*de Redemp. & captiu. c. III and V*), Andreas de Vega (*lib. XIII in Concil. Trident. c. XIII*), Bellarmine (*lib. II de grat. & lib. arbit. c. V*), Suarez (*lib. IV de Praedest. c. IV and tom. II de grat. c. I*), Pennot (in *propugn. lib. VII c. XXI*), Smisingh (*tr. III d. VI q. IV n. CLXIX*), Faber (d. LXII c. II), Valentia (1. 2. d. VIII q. III p. IV), Lessius (*de Praedest. sect. VI assert. I*), Arrubal (d. IX), Herice (d. XXXV c. II), Brancas (d. XXVII q. X), Vulpes (in 1. d. XLI a. VI), Lezzana (*tom. I tract. IV d. IX q. IV*), Fasolus (161. *dub. I*), Aversa (d. XXV l. III *sublect. III*), Turrianus (*opusc. I d. IV*), Mastrius (d. V *de Praedest. q. I a. III n. LXXVI*)*.

This first opinion is grounded in passages of Scripture, and further in rational arguments. And indeed it is to be understood of absolutely all human beings — both infants and adults, and among adults both the faithful and unbelievers — so that the benefit of universal grace extends to all and no one is excluded from it. This opinion is established first by testimonies of Sacred Scripture, of which not a few are adduced. The chief ones, however, are three. *John I, n. IX: He was the true light that illuminates every man coming into this world* — which almost all the Greek Fathers understand of grace, as we observed from Maldonatus. *II Peter III, n. IX: He is patient for your sake, not wishing any to perish, but all to return to repentance.* And *I Tim. IV: We hope in the living God, who is the savior of all men, especially of the faithful.* One cardinal and celebrated text from the same Paul, in the same epistle, *I Tim. II: God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth.* Other passages are adduced by the cited authors. I have given the more illustrious ones.

The rational arguments are roughly as follows. The first is drawn from the *philanthropia* — the love of humanity — and benevolence of God toward men, which, being infinite, ought not to be circumscribed but extended to all. The heretics make the greatest use of this argument, as may be seen in the Remonstrants, the Arminians, and the single Calvinist Amyraut. The second is taken from the equity of God, to whom it is unbecoming to behave unequally toward men, whose maker he was and whose savior he willed to be; since he imparted equally to them a rational nature, he ought equally to impart grace.

This argument the Scholastics generally employ. The third is drawn from Providence, which would surely be less consistent if God did not provide to all what is necessary to obtain salvation. For who would deny it is unworthy that the one who feeds the birds of the sky and clothes the lilies of the field should deprive men of heavenly nourishment and leave their souls stripped bare of grace? This too the Scholastics press. The fourth: every human being is destined to a supernatural end; but to one for whom an end is proposed, the means for attaining it must necessarily be furnished; therefore no human being can be deprived of the aids of sufficient grace. This reasoning is Scholastic. The fifth: all men without exception have been redeemed by Christ; if redeemed, they have shared in something of that blood, which was not shed in vain. Therefore, some grace — which is the fruit of Christ's blood — reaches all. These five arguments permit no exclusion, not even of infants. All this is from the School.

There remain two arguments for the common grace of all adults. One: to all adults the natural law is proposed, as it were innate in their minds and implanted in their souls; and so they are bound to observe it. But this they either can do without grace or they cannot. If they cannot, grace is necessary; and if necessary, it must absolutely be given. If they can, then it is just that grace be given to those who observe the law, by which they may finally obtain eternal salvation — salvation which cannot be secured without faith in Christ and grace. The other: to avoid all sins it is necessary to have the aid of supernatural grace; if this is absent, men will either not sin or will be excused if they do sin. But they do sin and are not excused; therefore they have sufficient grace to avoid sins.

These two arguments are customarily set forth by the Scholastic Doctors with great amplification and emphasis, since they consider the chief force of the case to rest in them. They regard them as invincible when reinforced by that divine will to save all men taken from Paul — for since this will is universal it pertains to all and allows none to be excluded. And indeed nearly all the Scholastics hold this opinion consistently. On the manner, however, they disagree not a little. For when it comes to pagan barbarians living in some remote corner of nature in beastly fashion, whose natural intelligence is so blunted, whose character so unformed, whose customs so uncultivated, and whose habits so crude that the fire of reason seems smothered — especially when there is no one to arouse and kindle it, and since the light of faith has never penetrated to them — they are truly at a loss as to where to turn, or what to say once they have turned. And when the discussion moves to infants, who have been born either of such unbelievers, or of Turks, or of other peoples who do not use Baptism, greater still is their perplexity, and they find themselves unable to extricate themselves; indeed, the more they struggle to escape, the more they are entangled, like birds that fall into birdlime twigs. And yet so great is their reverence for those scriptural testimonies, so great the weight of those arguments, so great their fear of the difficulties that arise from denying the universality of sufficient aid, that they dare not depart from that opinion. Indeed, they say the contrary opinion is

most harsh, and they heap odium upon it by calling it proper to the heretics, especially Luther and Calvin.

The other opinion, which restricts grace and refuses to make it common to absolutely all men, is approved by far fewer, whether heretics or Catholics. As for the Lutherans: although the adversaries of Jansenius — Antonius Ricardus, Antoninus Moraines, Franciscus Annatus, Thomas Augustinus, and others — affirm that Luther denied universal grace and God's general will for the salvation of all, and that the Lutherans share his view, citing passages from Luther himself, and from Zanchius and others — nonetheless this matter must be weighed more exactly. For I too, imbued in the Society with the opinion I had received there, and persuaded by those passages, used to believe they were authors of that opinion. But after I came to London on a diplomatic occasion and encountered men of the Lutheran sect who were most expert in its doctrines, I changed my mind. For when they came across certain printed sheets from my writing desk, and among them the beginning of Chapter VI in which I said that the Lutherans denied universal grace and universal Redemption by Christ, they reproached me for thinking and writing thus about them, and urged me henceforth to think and say the contrary. When I objected Luther's Article XXXVI from those condemned by Leo — which contained that assertion — together with the Bishop of Rochester and Coccius and those most learned Jesuit Fathers, they replied: even if Luther had initially held that position, he had subsequently departed from it, and what he had finally taught was what his followers held and taught. They asked me not to attach this opinion to them, nor to incur in their eyes the mark of ignorance. They maintained that universal grace and that general will of God for the salvation of all were fully confirmed by themselves together with Luther. I asked for passages of Luther; they mentioned several books but could not furnish the written passages, saying they had not brought those books with them to England, and I was not able to engage with them more thoroughly on the matter.

Yet I knew they had not said this rashly; for when I had read diligently Arminius's work entitled *Declaration of Sentiments*, I found that Luther had abandoned the earlier position he had held on absolute predestination before foreseen merits, and on the election of certain persons in preference to others left behind — which is the Augustinian view — and had embraced instead that of Arminius and the Remonstrants, which affirms the general will of God and conditional foresight of merits and a common grace; and that Melanchthon embraced the same, as do the Lutheran Churches in their profession. I adduce the testimony of Arminius. In his *Declaration of Sentiments to the States of Holland and West Friesland*, at approximately the middle, fol. XCII, he writes:

This doctrine of predestination is disapproved by the greater part of Christians, both in former times and now. To say nothing of what happened in the previous century: the matter itself proclaims that the Lutheran Churches, the Anabaptists, and even the Papists

regard this doctrine as erroneous. Indeed, Luther and Melanchthon, even though they approved it at the beginning of the Reformation, afterward departed from it. That Melanchthon did so is clearly apparent from his later writings. That Luther did the same is affirmed by those who call themselves his disciples, who nonetheless contend that in this matter he rather declared his own view more fully than wholly abandoned his former position. Philip Melanchthon believed this doctrine was not much different from Stoic fate, especially in a certain letter written to Caspar Peucer.

So Arminius. From these last words it is clear what kind of predestination he is speaking of — namely, the absolute predestination of certain elect persons before the foresight of merits, which the Semipelagians, under the name of Fate introduced by Augustine, condemned; and the competing view — his own and that of Arminius — based on God's general will and universal grace, which he contends belongs to Luther, Melanchthon, the Lutherans, and the Anabaptists. It thus appears how rightly we said that Luther and some of his followers were authors of that opinion of universal grace and that general will. Moses Amyraut, recently cited, agrees with Arminius on this point in his preface to the *Work on Universal Grace*, where he twice affirms that all the Lutheran assemblies profess it.

Regarding Calvin and his disciples, let us hear one not unlearned and not inattentive — namely, the same Moses Amyraut. In the preface, he affirms that Calvin taught universal grace and the general Redemption of Christ, and confirms this with many passages. And concerning the Synod of Dort and the Protestant Assembly, he says: *In the Confession of Faith of our Churches and in the Decrees of the Synod of Dort, nothing is openly established on this question of ours — that is, on universal grace — or if something is established therein, it stands on the side of those who defend the universality of Redemption.* I would say that Calvin showed himself variable and inconsistent on this matter. The more rigid and tenacious among the Calvinists have denied the abundance of common grace — such as Pareus, Peter Molinaeus, Kimedontius, Amesius, and others of that kind. The rest have gone over almost entirely to the contrary position, along with the Lutherans, Anabaptists, Arminians, and Remonstrants.

Among Catholics, the ancient and qualified authors who follow the restrictive opinion include Remigius with the Church of Lyons (*lib. de tenenda verit. Script. in Cens. III cap. Convent. Carisiaci* and *lib. contr. III epist. trium Episcop. Galliae*), Prudentius Bishop of Troyes (*in opusc. Parisiensi Synodo oblato*), Lupus Servatus (*ep. ad Carolum Regem*), Amulo (*ep. ad Gotteschalcum*), Ratramnus of Corbie (*lib. I de Praedest.*, citing Augustine in support of it*), Florus Magister (*adversus Ioannem Scotum Erigen. c. XVIII*), Gregory (*in 1. d. XLI and d. XLVI post medium*), Richard (*ib. d. XLVI a. III*), Gabriel (*in 4. d. IV qu. II a. III dub. II*), Driedo (*de captiu. & redempt. gener. humani tract. V c. III*), Abulensis (*in c. IV Exod. q. XII — not however in c. IV Matth. as Vasquez cites, from whom Vulpes and Mastrius took it, but in 4. Exod. q. XII*), Cajetan (*in c. XIX Ioan. super illa verba, Non poterant credere*), Bishop of Rochester (*art.*

XXVI contr. Luther.), Ruardus Tapper (in ar. ar. VII pag. CCLIV), saying it is the opinion more conformable to the doctrine of the holy Fathers, Bañez (commentar. in q. XXIII 1. p. a. VIII dub. III), Gonzalez (ibid. LXXVII f. V), Alvarez (lib. I de Auxil. d. XII nu. VII), John of Saint Thomas (d. X a. III n. XXIX and XXXIII), Vasquez (d. XCVI and XCVII), Caesar Vaninus (in suis exercit. exercit. XVI), Michael Medina (lib. III de recta in Deum Fide. c. I), William Estius (tom. I in 1. lib. sentent. d. XLI §. X and in his commentar. in Paulum on I Tim. II, and on Rom. X, and on I Cor. VII, citing Hugo of Saint Victor in support of this position, and most perspicuously on Titus II, verse XI, and on Heb. VIII, and finally on the Epistle of Jude, where he says it is the opinion of Saint Thomas, agreeing with John of Saint Thomas), Father Becanus (in Summa scholastica c. X q. VI n. VI and in opusc. IX c. IV n. I), Hesseliu (comment. in Paulum), Alarcon, a student of Father Gabriel Vasquez (tract. de Praedest. d. II c. VIII concl. V), Ruiz (d. XLIX l. II and III), Villegas (controuer. XVI disp. II c. III).*

Alvarez calls this the common opinion of the Thomists. And although these authors differ on the conditions in which these aids are not given — some excepting only infants, others excepting also certain adults — they all agree in restricting that general will, so that it does not comprehend all and each in particular. Their arguments are as follows.

The first, capital argument, taken as if from prior principles: grace is not owed to nature; how then shall it follow upon nature and be given in view of nature? The second: human nature in its present state of ruin through original sin was deprived of grace as a punishment for that sin, and consequently God could justly leave it in that state without any grace — an argument well assessed by Bellarmine (*lib. I de grat. & lib. arbitr. cap. IV*)*. Why, then, is this bestowal of universal grace to be posited? The third: experience teaches that infants who die within their mothers' wombs, and those who are snatched away by an untimely death among barbarians to whom knowledge of Baptism has never penetrated, are wholly without that remedy, since it cannot be applied to them. And moreover many adult barbarians are deprived of that sacrament because they have no knowledge of it — how, then, do they have sufficient aids? The fourth: given the universality of assisting grace, one would be compelled to say that God illuminates and teaches all and each through angels or immediately by himself — which is to have recourse to a miraculous mode, and to give those most crude and uncultivated barbarians better teachers than we Catholics, who are taught by human beings. Furthermore, how are those aids applied to infants, who are incapable of such illumination? And to those born mad and dying in madness? The fifth: just as God has left many in the mass of damnation, bearing himself negatively toward them without any injustice, so also without any injury to them — since they bear original sin — he does not furnish them the aids of converting grace, to which he is not bound given original sin. The sixth: as Paul says, *faith is not for all*. But without faith it is, according to the same Apostle, impossible to please God. Yet there are many who, by the common opinion of

theologians, lack all knowledge of faith — for there is a negative unbelief — so how do these have aids sufficient for salvation?

SECTION II

The Doctrine of Sufficient Aids Is Applied to the Special States of Persons

§. I. On the State of Infants

Three distinctions in their condition can be considered. The first is of those who die within their mothers' wombs, whether they be the children of believers or unbelievers. The second is of those to whom, once born, Baptism could not be applied — whether because they die almost immediately after birth in a place where there is no water, if they are the children of believers, or where there is no knowledge of faith or Baptism, or where faith and Baptism are rejected and hated, as among Jews, Turks, and the heretical Anabaptists who deny the necessity of Baptism for infants — people of the sort I encountered in England and with whom I disputed on the matter there. The third is of those born in the midst of barbarism or among these enemies of Baptism who are snatched away by an untimely death before the use of reason. Their condition does not seem to differ except in that in the first case there is an absolute impossibility, which is less complete in the others.

Now, concerning the first case: Father Vasquez, Becanus, and Alarcon say that sufficient aids are not given to them, and that they are not included in the general will to save all — which bears only on adults — and so Vasquez understands Paul's passage as referring only to adults, because Paul said: *God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth*, linking the second clause to the first, so that God wills to be saved only those to whom the faith can be preached. So in (*d. XCVI c. III**)* — which, if true, means that not only infants dying within their mothers' wombs but also others who die before the use of reason are not included in that statement, because they are incapable of preaching and of knowledge of the truth. And Vasquez plainly teaches in (*d. XCV c. VI n. XXXI**)* that God did not have a will to save such infants, and repeats the same in (*d. XCVI c. II n. VIII**), *though he does not say that God positively willed them to be deprived of the remedy — only that it was not by a will of simple affection — and he corrects his own opinion in order to speak more mildly; yet he denies every antecedent will of salvation toward them. Caesar Vaninus (exercit. VI)*, Becanus, Alarcon, Hesselius, and Estius in his Commentary on Paul share his view.*

Against Vasquez, two Scotists of our order protest: Vulpes (*d. XLI a. VI n. VI**)* and Mastrius (*d. V q. I a. III nu. XXVI**), *who, not content with attacking Vasquez's interpretation of Paul's passage — which he understands as excluding infants under the name of "men," a point on which they rightly criticize him — go further and try to prove from a passage of Augustine which they adduce (lib. IV contra Iulianum, c. VIII)* that Augustine taught that the general will extends to infants as well, since God willed to save them just as he willed to save all other men, and they think*

Augustine is arguing against Julian as if with this testimony he wished to prove that God willed to save all and each — including, therefore, infants who come under the name of "men." In this both are entirely deceived. For Augustine contends there for the opposite. Hence I conclude that they did not see the passage in its sources; for if those two distinguished Scotists had read it, they would certainly not have been mistaken on so clear a matter.

In that chapter VIII, Augustine's aim is to refute Pelagius's claim that grace is given on account of our antecedent merits — that we first seek, we knock; that God is always ready to open if we are willing to come; and that coming and knocking are prior, and he was using that testimony of Paul. Augustine says: he sets forth the Apostolic testimony and says that to those who knock it is opened by the one who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth — meaning, as he says, that we should understand from your teaching that the reason not all are saved and come to the knowledge of the truth is that they themselves are unwilling to ask when God is willing to give; they are unwilling to seek when God is willing to show; they are unwilling to knock when God is willing to open. The intention and error of Pelagius is plain — he wanted us to be prior to God in seeking, knocking, coming; and God to wait for us, willing to save all who wish to come. So Pelagius was abusing Paul's testimony, deducing from it that God wills the salvation of all and awaits all who are first willing to be saved.

Augustine, to refute this heresy, turns the argument and Paul's testimony back against Pelagius in this way: *this your interpretation is refuted by those very infants through their silence itself, who neither ask nor seek nor knock*. Augustine's meaning is plain: he refutes Pelagius's error, and the error of Julian, by the example of infants — with respect to whom that meaning could not be verified, namely that God wills to save those who are willing and those who knock — since infants can neither will nor knock; and yet they are saved. Then Augustine, having rejected the interpretation of Paul's testimony constructed by the Pelagians, introduces his own, which he consistently maintains: that it is restricted to those who are saved. *Why then should we not understand the words, "who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth," just as we understand the same Apostle's saying, "through the justification of one to all men unto justification of life"? For God wills those all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth in whom all, through the justification of one, the grace unto justification of life has arrived*. This is the meaning of the Pauline passage as understood to encompass those who are justified and saved, whether adults or infants.

And those words which misled the two Scotists — especially Mastrius: *Surely infants are not men, that they should not pertain to what was said, "he wills all to be saved"*? — are to be understood differently from what they suppose. For they do not affirm that the general will extends even to infants because they are human beings — a sense entirely foreign to Augustine's purpose — but they overturn

that meaning of Pelagius and Julian who said: God wills all men to be saved in such a way that they come willing, first by seeking and knocking. Augustine refutes this meaning by the example of infants, who are saved without being willing, without being able to seek or knock, and yet are to be reckoned in the number of human beings — unless perhaps Pelagius and Julian denied that they were men. He argued from that absurdity: Are these infants not men? They are indeed, and yet they do not come willing, since they lack the act of will; they do not ask, they do not knock, for they lack the use of reason. Therefore that passage — *he wills all men to be saved* — cannot be understood in that manner, since infants are human beings and yet are saved without those conditions.

Augustine states plainly: *If God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, but they do not come because they themselves are unwilling — why do so many thousands of infants who die without receiving Baptism not come into the Kingdom of God, where the knowledge of the truth is certain? Are they not men, that they should not pertain to what was said, "all men"?* Thus Augustine refuted that universality of "all" introduced erroneously by Pelagius and Julian on two grounds: first, by affirming that infants are saved who can neither will nor ask nor knock; second, by denying that they perish because they are unwilling to come, since those infants who do perish lack the will and the capacity to be unwilling.

Nor should one object that Augustine did not deny the universality of the term "all" but only the error arising from it. For that is false: Augustine denied both the error and the universality of signification from which it arose — though he did not condemn that universality as an error, for it contains no error in itself, since many Catholics follow it without error.

Let us hear Augustine in that same chap. II, *lib. IV contra Iulianum*, before the middle: *Thus, then, is what was said to be understood: "God wills all men to be saved" — just as what was said by the Apostle: "through the justification of one to all men unto justification of life." If you think that Apostolic testimony is to be understood in such a way that you say "all" is placed for "many who are justified in Christ" — for indeed many others are not made alive in Christ — the answer will be given to you (that is, to Julian) that likewise where it was said, "he wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth," "all" is placed for "many whom he wills to come to that grace."*

How different this sense is from what Vulpes and Mastrius assign to it! I am astonished that the distinguished Scotist said in (*nu. XXVI a. III q. I disp. V**)* that no more illustrious and explicit testimony in Augustine can be desired on this matter. I wished, out of my regard for that great Scotist, to excuse him on the grounds that he was only speaking to refute Vasquez's interpretation; but I could not, because in attacking Vasquez's interpretation he attributes to Augustine the doctrine of a general will to save all, and stretches the "all" to a universal sense — which is precisely contrary to Augustine.

And so he says there, n. XXVI: *This opinion* (namely Vasquez's) *is rightly rejected as too harsh and severe.* And he adds: *For under that general sentence of the Apostle — God wills all men to be saved — the Fathers either include or at least do not exclude infants, and expressly among them Augustine, lib. IV contra Iulianum, saying: "Surely infants are not men?"* And the rest which I adduced above. And in the same way he understands Prosper to be an author of the same will in (*lib. II de vocat. gent. c. XX**), and could have cited the passage in response to the articles falsely attributed to him in that book — which is not Augustine's but Prosper's, as we noted above. *Vulpes held the same view of Augustine (d. XLI a. VI n. VI)*.* In this, both those Scotists — otherwise excellent — have been deceived.

To refute them, that other passage in *Ep. CVII to Vitalis* would be sufficient: *How, it is said, can all men be said to have been going to receive grace, if those to whom it is given were not going to reject it by their own will — since God wills all men to be saved — when it is not given to many infants, and many of them die without it?* And he proceeds in the same letter to demonstrate by refuting the meaning of the Pelagians and asserting Paul's testimony — *all shall be made alive in Christ* — and among other things says: *It is manifest that those who resist so clear a truth do not understand the manner of speech in which it is said that God wills all men to be saved, when so many are not saved — not because they themselves are unwilling, but because God is unwilling; which is shown without any obscurity in the case of infants. But just as the words "all shall be made alive in Christ," though so many are punished with eternal death, were said because all who attain eternal life attain it only in Christ — so the words "God wills all men to be saved," though he wills so many not to be saved, were said because all who are saved are saved only by his willing; even if the Apostolic words can be understood in some other way, they cannot be contrary to this most obvious truth, in which we see that so many are not saved despite the will of men, because God is unwilling.*

Augustine could not have expressed his mind more clearly. Indeed, that he might express it as fully as possible and refute most aptly and forcefully the Pauline passage, which when taken in the opposing sense is the Achilles of the other side, he said three explicit times that God was unwilling, and unwilling even when men were willing. And lest anyone should evade this by appealing to an inefficacious and conditional will of God — saying that by such a will God willed, as far as in himself lay, the salvation of those who were willing — Augustine, by introducing that most fitting testimony from the same Apostle, restricted the "all" so that it should not extend to all universally. Similar passages occur in Epistles CV and CVI, where the same truth is proved by the same argument from infants — I only indicate them, to avoid accumulating similar ones. Whoever wishes to read them, let him look toward the middle of Ep. CV and the beginning of Ep. CVI, where he will find excellent testimonies and will fully assent to them.

The second testimony, composed from two passages, is found in *lib. I de Peccat. mer. & remis. cc. XXI and XXII.* Because it is long, I briefly collect two sentences

from it and leave the remaining reasoning — which is well suited to the purpose — for the reader. In c. XXI: *Why this grace comes to this person and not to that person can be a hidden cause, but it cannot be an unjust cause.* And shortly after: *It moves [us] less when it is bestowed on the unworthy than when it is equally denied to others equally unworthy.* He confirms this by the example of infants. But in c. XXII, teaching the same of adults, he most carefully dismantles the foundation of the contrary opinion. *How does it come about, he says, that a man from the first years of boyhood is more modest, more capable, more temperate, largely master of his passions, who hates greed, detests luxury, and rises more inclined and apt to the other virtues — and yet is in a place where the grace of Christ cannot be preached to him? For how shall they call upon one in whom they have not believed? Or how shall they believe one whom they have not heard? Or how shall they hear without a preacher? But another, slow in understanding, given to lusts, covered with scandals and crimes, is so governed as to hear, believe, be baptized, be snatched away; or if detained here, to live laudably. Where did these two men contract such different merits — I do not say, that this one should believe and that one should not, which is properly a matter of the will, but that this one should hear and that one should not? For this is not within the power of man.* The passage needs no commentary, being entirely plain. By it not only is Augustine's opinion established, but the chief argument of the opposing view is also refuted — the argument drawn from good works done by the powers of nature before grace, supposedly in view of which, or in respect of which, or on the occasion of which, grace is given. That argument is here aptly confuted by Augustine. Also to be read is c. XV, where the doctrine presented about infants is confirmed by adducing and explaining the passage from *John I: he illuminates every man coming into this world.*

The third passage, from *lib. II de Peccat. mer. & rem. c. V*, is no less illustrious. Treating there of the assistance of grace necessary for acting well — which he compares to light and rates above it, because light only assists healthy eyes to see but does not heal the sick nor open those that are closed, whereas grace does both, by which excitatory grace is expressed — he says: *For God is called our helper. And he cannot help unless one strives of one's own accord; because God does not work our salvation within us as in senseless stones, or as in those in whose nature he did not establish reason and will. But why he helps this person, why not that; why only this person, why this person only this way and that person that way — the cause of that equity is a secret too deep for him, and the excellency of his power is great.* No exposition is needed here. It is self-evident; it only needs an attentive reader.

An appendix to this is the whole of c. II of *de nat. & Grat.*, where Augustine teaches that there were in antiquity many nations — and that some still existed in his own time — to whom the preaching of faith had not arrived at all; and although he grants that they could believe in God as Creator and could fulfill his will by living rightly, he nonetheless denies that they could be saved even so, because Christ had not been announced, known, or worshipped among them. Thus he supposes that to those who do what lies within them by natural powers

grace is not given, and that therefore they do not obtain salvation — contrary to what the adversaries hold. The chapter is illustrious and plain. From its doctrine he concludes in c. IV: *Therefore this grace, without which neither infants nor those of mature age can be saved, is not repaid as a due but is freely given — for which reason it is called grace: "justified freely through his blood." Hence those who are not freed by it — whether because they were not yet able to hear, or because they were unwilling to obey, or even because, being unable to hear on account of their age, they did not receive the washing of regeneration when they could have received it — are therefore justly condemned: for they are not without sin, either that which they have contracted by original generation or that which they have added by evil conduct. For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God.* In this chapter both Augustine's own doctrine and the refutation of what is contrary to Augustine are contained. The same is the substance of the two following chapters V and VI.

The fourth testimony is composed of two passages. The first from *lib. II ad Bonifacium*, c. VII; the second from *lib. IV c. VI*. They are brief, but I set forth the sentences with their precise reasoning, since the full argument would be lengthy. The first sentence from the first passage: *If a man has two debtors, he may wish to remit the debt to one and exact it from the other; to the one to whom he wishes he makes a gift, but he defrauds no one; nor is this to be called a receiving of persons, when there is no iniquity.* And having adduced the parable of the householder with the laborers working for a day's wage, and having cited those two sentences — *Friend, I do no wrong to you and Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?* — he says: *So also when, according to the purpose of God, one person is called and another is not called, to the one called a gratuitous good is given, to the one not called an evil is repaid — because all are guilty, from the fact that sin entered the world through one man.* He does not base the denial of common grace on personal actual sins but on original sin — by which he cuts off every pact introduced by the adversaries, regarding the giving of grace to all through Christ even after original sin, of which Augustine knew nothing.

The companion passage, c. VI, is in harmony: *Why does he make these men his sheep and not those? With him there is no respect of persons.* This is the question which the blessed Apostle puts to those who press it more than is fitting: *O man, who are you to answer back to God?* And later: *Why this person receives and that person does not receive, when neither deserves to receive, and whoever among them has received receives what is not owed — let them measure their own strength and not search into things stronger than themselves. Let it suffice them to know that there is no iniquity with God.* He had spoken earlier of predestination; now he speaks of its effect, that is, grace, and proceeds to confirm this with the teaching of Paul.

The fifth passage is that famous one, c. I of *de Correctione et Gratia*, which Father Suarez accordingly cites in support of this position (*tom. II de Grat. l. IV c. XVIII**). Having set forth there the *adiutorium sine quo non* — the aid without which one cannot do anything — which was proper to the state of innocence

and the angels, and which was wholly and properly sufficient, as we have shown at length and repeatedly, he says: *But now, for those lacking such an aid, this is already the punishment of sin; but for those to whom it is given, it is given according to grace, not according to debt; and so much more abundantly is it given through Jesus Christ our Lord to those on whom God has chosen to bestow it, that not only is there present what without which we cannot persevere even if we are willing, but also so great and such is it that we are willing.* Augustine's meaning is evident, for he openly says that this kind of aid is lacking to some in the state of fallen nature, and that this is by reason of original sin, which deprived us of that grace — and therefore he says to those to whom it is given, it is not given *ex debito* — that is, according to the pact with innocent Adam, and according to the demands of that innocent nature for acting well, which he calls a debt, indicating sufficiently that any basis of equity and fittingness is enough to constitute a debt, and thereby showing how free and gratuitous he wished grace to be, and how removed from every consideration. He therefore adds: *To those to whom it is given, it is given according to grace, not according to debt* — that is, from the mere gratuitous will of God, which was given in opposition to the demerit of the sin that deprived us of that grace; for if it were given in view of works and through some pact, it would be given strictly as a debt.

Then Augustine shows that he acknowledges both kinds of grace in this present state of fallen nature. For he says: *To those to whom that grace proper to the angels and Adam — that is, sufficient grace — is given,* teaching that this is lacking to some and present to others. And he affirms that something even more is given still — namely, another efficacious grace, which is proper to the predestined. So in this passage we have in fullest clarity the sum of the doctrine. For there is the explicit *adiutorium sine quo non* — that is, sufficient grace — which is lacking to some. This is signified by the particle *tale adiutorium*. Then it is clearly stated that it is given to others — *quibus autem datur*. And that it is given to them entirely freely, that is, to the undeserving. Finally, not only is this grace available, but another and greater grace — namely, efficacious grace — is given beyond it.

Three other passages from the same book, cc. VII, VIII, and XIII, support this testimony. In c. VII, Augustine says that many do not receive grace, nor faith — indeed have never heard of it. And in c. VIII, he says many do not receive the gift of perseverance from God, and that many infants lack Baptism and the means for obtaining it, of whom he says: *For the evil desert is not lacking in those who are not baptized, nor is the good desert present in those who are baptized from their own proper will.* More plainly still in c. XIII: having set forth the predestined and explained their grace and salvation, he comes to the non-predestined and says: *Those, then, who do not belong to this most blessed number are judged by the most just judgments of God: for either they lie under the sin which they contracted originally by generation and pass out of this life with that hereditary debt which was not remitted by regeneration, or they have added other sins besides by free choice.* He denies that these have any grace at all. Then he says: *Or they receive the grace of God but are temporal,*

desert [God], *and are deserted*. To these he concedes that grace is given — but just and sufficient — since he had given none to the others, as is plain from what he says of the second category of the reprobate: *Or they receive the grace of God*. From which it is clear that those former reprobates did not receive grace.

The sixth passage is that remarkable one from *de Praedest. Sanct. c. VIII*: *Why, then, does he not teach all so that they may come to Christ? Unless it be because all whom he teaches, he teaches in mercy, and those whom he does not teach, he does not teach in judgment — since he has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills; but he has mercy by bestowing good, and hardens by returning what is deserved*. And in this vein he resolves several sentences of Scripture that speak universally, and among them: *God wills all men to be saved* — understanding it only of those who are saved. And further in the same chapter: *To some it is given to believe; to others it is not given*. And in c. IX at the beginning: *Faith, both begun and perfected, is the gift of God. And let no one doubt that this gift is given to some and not given to others, if he does not wish to resist the most manifest sacred scriptures. But why it is not given to all ought not to disturb one who believes that all have fallen into justly deserved condemnation from one man, so that even if no one were freed from it there would be no just reproach against God. Whence it is evident that it is a great grace that so many are freed, and that in those who are not freed they recognize what was owed to themselves — so that those who glory may not glory in their own merits, which they see to be equal to those of the damned, but may glory in the Lord*. This, as if by a sword, cuts off all those works from the use of natural reason: for the merits of all — that is, of the damned — are the same, on account of original sin. From which, as to why he liberates this one rather than that one, his judgments are inscrutable and his ways unsearchable.

Let no one object that this testimony of Augustine speaks of faith and not of sufficient grace — for in Augustine whoever is denied faith is denied grace as well, since for him faith is the door of grace. This we have observed elsewhere. In this vein, read the whole of c. XIV of the same book on the subject of infants.

The seventh consists of certain remarkable sentences from *de Dono Perseverantiae*. Some are in c. VIII. This one seizes me: *Between two infants bound by original sin, why this one is taken and that one left; and between two already grown and ungodly, why this one is called in such a way that he follows the one who calls, while that one either is not called at all, or is not called in such a way as to follow the one who calls — these are the inscrutable judgments of God. And between two who are devout, why this one is given perseverance to the end and that one is not given it — these are the still more inscrutable judgments of God*. These passages need not an accurate commentator but only an attentive reader.

Some are found in c. XI. But these move me: *To infants whom he wills, even when they are unwilling and do not run, he grants aid. And for those greater ones also whom he foreknew — that among them, if his miracles had been done, they would have believed — he does not grant aid when he does not will to*. He had just spoken of the Tyrians and

Sidonians. Chapter XII beginning agrees: *He gives to men what he wills, because he is merciful, and what he does not give even if not given is just; and he does not give to those to whom he does not will, to make known the riches of his glory to the vessels of mercy. For by giving to some what they do not merit, he willed his grace to be both truly free and for that reason truly grace. By not giving to all, he showed what all deserved.* He treats the same matter at the end of the same chapter.

Yet nowhere are his sentences more illustrious and profound than in c. XIV. Hear: *The predestination of the saints is nothing other than the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God by which all who are freed are most certainly freed. The rest — where are they but in the mass of perdition by God's just judgment? Where are the Tyrians and Sidonians, who could even have believed if they had seen those miracles of Christ? But because it was not given to them to believe, the very means of believing was also denied them.* Let the reader see. Can anything more manifest and forcible than this be said? When I read it, I not only understand but tremble. Let whoever doubts absorb the whole chapter with his eyes, and he will draw in the pure truth.

There are also certain sparks of this truth in *Sermo I de verbis Apostoli*, at the end, where he speaks of infants.

The eighth testimony is composed of certain sentences from *Enchiridion*, c. XCV: *Nor indeed did God unjustly refuse to save those who could have been saved if he had willed it.* And c. XCVII: *When the cause is asked — why are not all saved? — the usual answer is: because they themselves do not will it. But this cannot be said of infants, who have not yet a will or an unwillingness.* And c. CIII: *We ought to understand what is written — "who wills all men to be saved" — as if it were said: "no man is saved except one whom he has willed to be saved" — not that no man exists whom he does not will to be saved, but that no man is saved unless he wills it, and therefore he is to be prayed to that he may will it, because it is necessary that it happen if he wills it. For the Apostle was speaking about praying to God when he said this.* So also we understand what is written in the Gospel: *he illuminates every man* — not that no man exists who is not illuminated by him, but that no man is illuminated except by him. He pursues this point at great length in the same chapter.

The ninth consists of two testimonies from Augustine's books against Julian. The first is from *lib. VI c. XIV* — shorter, and serves as a prelude to the second: *What is much more admirable: sometimes he adopts as a son one whom he forms in the womb of a most impure woman, and sometimes he does not will to be his son one whom he forms in the womb of his own daughter. And so he brings into the fellowship of Christ one whom he has formed in the abode of the Devil, and does not will to be in his kingdom one whom he has formed in his own temple. Or if he does will it, why does he not do what he wills? For you cannot say here what you are accustomed to say about older persons: God wills, but the infant is unwilling. Certainly here, where there is no constraint of fate, no recklessness of fortune, no dignity of person — what remains but the depth of mercy and truth?*

But as standing in place of all other passages, let there be that one from *lib. IV contra eundem Iulianum*, c. VIII, which I would call the proper seat of this doctrine. It is somewhat lengthy, but nothing in Augustine is long that is not excellent. Therefore:

But you cite the Apostolic testimony and say that to those who knock it is opened by the one who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth — meaning, as you explain, that we should understand from your teaching that the reason not all are saved and come to the knowledge of the truth is that they themselves are unwilling to ask when God is willing to give; they are unwilling to seek when God is willing to show; they are unwilling to knock when God is willing to open. But this your interpretation is refuted by those very infants through their very silence, who neither ask nor seek nor knock — and indeed, when they are baptized, cry out, repel, resist, and yet receive and find, and it is opened to them, and they enter the Kingdom of God, where they have the salvation of eternity and the knowledge of truth — far more infants not being adopted into that grace by the one who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. To them you cannot say: "I willed it, but you were unwilling" — for if he had willed it, which of them, since they do not yet have the exercise of their own will, could have resisted his omnipotent will? Why, then, do we not understand the words — "who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth" — just as we understand what the same Apostle said: "through the justification of one to all men unto justification of life"? For God wills those all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth in whom all, through the justification of one, grace has arrived unto justification of life — lest it be said to us: if God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, but they do not come because they themselves are unwilling, why do so many thousands of infants who die without receiving Baptism not come into the Kingdom of God, where the knowledge of the truth is certain? Are they not men, that they should not pertain to what was said, "all men"? Or can anyone say: "God indeed wills it, but they themselves are unwilling" — when these who have not yet learned to will or to be unwilling are in question, since even those infants who are baptized and die — and who through that grace come most certainly to the knowledge of the truth which is in the Kingdom of God — come not because they themselves willed to be renewed by the Baptism of Christ? Since, then, those are not baptized because they are unwilling, nor those baptized because they are willing — why does God, who wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, allow so many to fail to come into his Kingdom, where there is certain knowledge of the truth, who resist with no exercise of will? Unless you are actually going to say that those infants ought not to be numbered among those whom God wills all to be saved — because they are already saved by that salvation which is to be understood here, having contracted no sin at all. And thus the more intolerable absurdity will follow: for in this way you make God more benevolent to all the most impious and most wicked men than to the most innocent and most pure from every stain of sin. For those — since he wills them all to be saved — he also wills to enter his Kingdom; for that follows if they are saved, and those who are unwilling themselves stand in their own way. But the immense multitude of infants who die without Baptism he does not will

to receive into his Kingdom — infants whom no sins impede, as you suppose, and who, as no one doubts, cannot resist his will with a contrary will. So it comes about that he wills all Christians to be saved, many of whom are unwilling; he does not will all [of those infants] to be saved, of whom there is no one who is unwilling.

This is contrary to the truth. The Lord knows who are his; and regarding their salvation and introduction into his kingdom, his will is certain. Thus, then, ought to be understood what was said: "he wills all men to come," just as it is understood what was said: "through the justification of one to all men unto justification of life." Which Apostolic testimony if you think is to be understood in such a way that you say "all" is placed for "many who are justified in Christ" — for indeed many others are not made alive in Christ — the answer will be given to you: so also where it was said that he wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, "all" is placed for "many whom he wills to come to that grace" — which is understood far more fittingly because no one comes unless he himself has willed him to come: "No one can come to me," says the Son, "unless the Father who sent me draws him." And: "No one can come to me unless it has been given him by my Father." Therefore all who are saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, are saved by his willing and come by his willing. For even those who, like infants, do not yet have the exercise of will — it is by his willing that they are regenerated, by whom they were created by being generated; and those who do already have the exercise of will cannot will, unless by his willing and his aid, by whom the will is prepared. And if you say to me here: why, then, does he not convert the unwilling wills of all? I will answer: why does he not adopt all infants who are about to die into the washing of regeneration, whose will he finds as yet non-existent and therefore not contrary? If you perceive this to be too deep for you to discover, let it be too deep for both of us, why God is willing to help this one and not that one, both in greater and in smaller matters — while we hold firm and immovable that there is no iniquity with God who condemns no one without evil deserts; and that there is goodness with God who liberates many without good deserts, showing in those whom he condemns what is owed to all, so that from this those whom he liberates may learn what punishment owed to them is remitted, and what grace not owed to them is bestowed.

This passage is so illustrious that no other torch is needed to illuminate its doctrine. Indeed, just as it would be inept to try to show the sun by bringing in lamps, so it would be absurd to wish to illuminate by small commentaries this passage, which is clearer than the sun itself. Whatever the adversaries can currently object regarding the conditional will and the universality of Paul's sentence, concerning equity, and the demand of merits or dispositions, and whatever could then have been brought against Augustine — all of it is anticipated and refuted by Augustine.

§. II. What Scotus Thought

Our Scotists commonly hold the universality of sufficient aid as truly exhibited to all and each — so that he taught that it is lacking to absolutely no one. So Faber (*in 1. d. XLI d. LXII c. II n. XI**), *Vulpes* (*disp. XLI a. V and VI*), *Mastrius* (*d. V q.*

I a. I, II, III) with them agrees Ruiz (d. XL l. III n. I*). They cite Scotus (in 1. d. XLVI and in 2. d. XXXVII and in 4. d. XX q. I); these passages are explicitly set out by Ruiz, who adds "and in other passages." Mastrius says in (4. d. XX q. I)* where he speaks of deathbed repentance. Vulpes adduces others which are more remote and serve rather for presuppositions than for proofs, because they contain general doctrine which, once presupposed, suggests that universality of aid runs through it. These passages are: q. I Prol. litt. D, and in 4. d. XLIX, quodlib. XVII litt. B, in 2. d. XXXVII q. vn. in fine, in 4. d. I q. VI, in 1. d. XVII q. II, in 4. d. XXIX — which he indicates in (disp. XLI a. VI n. I, II, III, IV*)*. Faber cites only dist. XLVI ad I. Ruiz, moreover, adds that Scotus, out of an excessive desire to defend the universality of sufficient aid, went beyond proper limits and asserted that any adult obtains assisting grace through the powers of nature by doing what lies within him, and cites (in 4. d. XIV q. II verf. II Ad huius intellectum).*

Let us begin here. Ruiz is mistaken in both respects. For neither does Scotus there deal at all with the universality of aid — he is disputing about the remission of sin through penance and the acts that concur with it — nor did he assert that anyone by natural powers, by doing what lies within him, obtains assisting grace. Rather, Scotus there speaks of the first movement of the sinner with regard to the detesting of sin in relation to the infusion of grace, as he explicitly holds in the same passage; and that movement can be continued and intensified before the infusion of grace, and he immediately affirms that this movement, when fully qualified with the morally required circumstances, is called attrition, and is a disposition or congruent merit for justification — not therefore for assisting grace. From which it is plain that that act is supernatural, and Ruiz's second claim collapses — namely, that this is done through natural powers — since Scotus adds "with the common influence," by which he understands common grace. For this is the locution of Scotus in (2. d. VII and quodlib. XIV and XVII*), as the interpreters Lychetus and others note there; among them Vulpes (d. XLV a. III)* where he defends Scotus from this calumny — as we shall say in its proper place and confirm by the example of Saint Thomas and other Doctors.

Indeed, when I have carefully examined and attentively reviewed the passages, I find nothing explicit in support of this universality of aid. Concerning the first passage, dist. XLVI, I showed this sufficiently above when speaking of the will to save all. For there Scotus applies that will to means, not immediately to persons. Insofar, he says, as he has given them natural gifts and right laws and common aids sufficient for salvation. And having posited the example of a king he says: *This king wills indeed that everyone live peacefully and quietly as a matter of antecedent will; but he does not will that each individual person immediately so live.* Note: immediately, that is, in the particular. And although Scotus adds: *Even if God does not have a will of good pleasure toward saving this man, yet he wills those common aids to salvation for him — aids which are for the salvation of all, by which this man too can sufficiently live well and be saved — on account of which it can be said that insofar as it depends on him*

he wills all to be saved — all these things are to be regulated by the example as set out by Scotus, of a king who wills all his subjects antecedently to live peacefully and quietly, but does not will each individual immediately so to live. And this is evident from the exposition of those instances in the matter of predestination: where God bore himself negatively toward Judas (*in 1. d. XLI q. vn. n. XII**)*. Therefore this passage does not prove the point.

Let us look at the other passage from *4. sent. d. XX* which Mastrius cites, where at the end of the single question, after Scotus has exactly disputed the difficulty of deathbed penance for salvation, he says near the end that God on account of the malice of some should not have omitted the remedies of penance necessary for salvation, and adds: *Of itself, there is the occasion to observe the law out of love for the Lawgiver, who is of such great mercy toward the wretched that he never closes the bosom of his mercy to them.* These are the only words there that can favor the opinion on universal aid — but they pertain only to the proposed case of penitents having recourse to God through the sacraments, who, being Christians, cannot by their example be extended to Gentiles. Certainly Scotus there presupposes Faith, and given that, there is no doubt that the aid of grace accompanies it, since faith itself is from God's grace and the door to further grace. Indeed, in this doctrine Scotus also presupposes the malice of many who condemn the law of God — who sin against it knowing it, and are not in the negative unbelief under discussion when it is denied that sufficient aid is given to many. So this passage, insofar as it makes deathbed penance difficult, seems to restrict aids rather than expand them — so how is it applied to the universality of aid?

As for the other passage (*in 2. d. XXXVII q. II §. Ad solutionem n. XIV**), *there is nothing in it that pertains to the matter: because in that passage, cited by Ruiz (d. XL sect. III n. I)**, Scotus treats of the concurrence of the First Cause with the second, and inquires from which side the defect arises; and proving it is not from the First Cause he says: *Universally, whatever God gives antecedently, he would give consequently insofar as it depends on him, if there were no impediment.* Ruiz should have proved that God gives antecedently to all, which he does not prove; nor does Scotus there speak of antecedent aids to the act, asking whether they are given to all wills, but speaking of wills he presupposes that, given those aids, they can issue in act — which is a different question entirely. For there are two questions: one, whether every created will has all that is required for acting rightly unto salvation; the other, given that it has it, from what cause does the defect arise so that right action does not follow. Scotus treats the second here, not the first. Therefore he draws no conclusion about the universality of aid.

We must therefore say that Scotus did not affirm so absolute a universality of aid with regard to all and each individual, as we said in the previous collation when speaking of the will to save all. This is evident from (*d. XLI q. vn. §. Dici potest n. XII**)*, where he sets out the examples of Peter and Judas, dividing the instants of their predestination and reprobation, and plainly says that in the first and

second instants God wills nothing to Judas, even though he wills blessedness to Peter. From which it follows that in those two instants God did not destine to Judas any sufficient aids, but left him in the state of perdition together with the other abandoned ones who were of the same condition as Judas — and so in regard to them he had no positive act of will, and consequently no effect of that will, that is, no aid, which presupposes God's will positively destining it.

Now if afterwards, in the third instant, when he willed to permit the sin of Judas, he willed antecedently to give him sufficient grace to avoid sin — without which he could not sin freely and with demerit — by then Judas was outside those two negative instants. But from that it does not follow that in the third instant he destined to all the others left behind in the first and second instants that sufficient grace which he destined to Judas; because Judas had been destined to Faith — and even to the Apostolate — as were not those other abandoned barbarians and unbelievers who were born and grew to adulthood in the midst of barbarism without any knowledge of Faith and the Christian name, with purely negative unbelief; and many of them are infants dying without Baptism, who are destitute of every aid of grace. Therefore it does not appear that Scotus set forth the common doctrine of universal aid.

§. III. What Saint Thomas Thought

The opinion of Saint Thomas is carefully inquired into by the authors. Suarez (*in Sum. lib. IV de Provid. erga Reprobos, c. I n. V and c. IV n. IV**), Bellarmine (*lib. II de Grat. & lib. arb. c. I and VI*), and Ruiz (*d. IV sect. I*)* with others consider that he posited the universality of sufficient aid. Among them Ruiz tries with great force of testimonies to show this and to answer the passages adduced in the contrary sense. Others, however, deny that Saint Thomas held that position: Vasquez (*in 1. p. d. XCVI c. II n. IV**), John of Saint Thomas (*d. X ar. III nu. XXXIII and XXXV*)*, and the earlier writers Bañez, Gonzalez, Alvarez, and all who deny the universality of that aid — speaking, of course, about the application and actual exhibition of it, as we observed above.

There are two testimonies on the negative side that seem evident. One, on the case of infants (*in 4. d. VI q. I a. I ad I**), is this: *Ad I it must be said that it is not from a defect of divine mercy that a remedy is not exhibited to those existing in the womb — but because they are not capable of that remedy by which, according to the common law, they become partakers of the Passion of Christ, from which comes the remission of sins, because they cannot be subjected to the operation of the ministers of the Church through whom such remedies are administered. Moved by this authority, John of Saint Thomas (d. X a. III n. XXXIII)* said: Saint Thomas therefore thinks that for that state infants are incapable of the remedy, and consequently sufficient aid cannot be given them; and thus those who die in the state incapable of salvation lack the power for salvation, and therefore the sufficient aid also.*

So much for infants according to Saint Thomas. For adults, in (2. 2. q. II a. V ad I*), *having set forth the doctrine that man is bound to love God and neighbor and to believe the articles of Faith, but with grace, without which he cannot: But this, he says, is possible with the aid of grace, which aid, to whomsoever God gives it is given in mercy, and to whomsoever it is not given, it is not given in judgment — by reason of sin, and at least of original sin (Augustine, de Corrept. et Grat., cited at the margin from c. V and VI). This passage is beyond doubt. For what could be said more plainly? Especially since he cites Augustine there, who maintains the same position, in c. I of de Corrept. & Grat. — not in cc. V and VI as in the margin of Saint Thomas, since those chapters contain nothing of the kind. In c. XI, however, Augustine says: But now, for those lacking such an aid, this is already the punishment of sin — by "aid" is meant the common and sufficient aid, and Vasquez (d. XCVII c. II n. XV)* so explains it. Better cited would have been Augustine in Ep. CVII ad med., where: We know that to those to whom it is given, it is given freely by God's mercy; we know that to those to whom it is not given, it is not given by God's just judgment. Whence Saint Thomas derived it.*

I marvel that neither Vasquez himself nor John of Saint Thomas recalled this passage in proof of the opinion denying the universality of aid, since it is precisely on point and unanswerable. And I marvel all the more that John of Saint Thomas in the same (n. XXXV a. III disp. X*)* cites that authority of Augustine (c. XI de Correct. & Grat.) to prove that Augustine taught that negative position on universal aid. Father Suarez, however, recalls it (*tomo de Poenitentia d. VIII sect. VII Assertio II*)**, as we shall say shortly.

I add a third testimony about barbarians and unbelievers in the same (*tom. II 2. 2. q. X a. I in corp.*), where treating of negative unbelief: *If it is taken*, he says, *according to pure negation — as in those who have heard nothing of the faith — it has not the nature of sin, but rather of punishment, since such ignorance of divine things is a consequence of the sin of the first parent. Those, then, who are unbelievers are condemned for other sins, which cannot be remitted without faith, but not for the sin of unbelief.* This passage is well suited to proving the matter, with the added cause of the punishment arising from original sin — which is the Augustinian doctrine. Whence John of Saint Thomas (*d. X a. III n. XXXV*)** says: *There are unbelievers with a negative unbelief, which is not the guilt of unbelief but the punishment of ignorance, as Saint Thomas says (2. 2. q. X a. I*)**; *therefore they lack the sufficient aid for their conversion and justification.* He could also have cited the same Saint Thomas there in *a. VI at the end*, where he repeats that negative unbelief pertains more to the nature of punishment; and a little before the body he says: *The Gentiles did not know the way of righteousness as the heretics and Jews know it.*

In addition to this position — which affirms that Saint Thomas denied the universality of aid — Father Suarez himself, one of those who had cited him for the contrary, is on our side. For in (*d. VIII de Paenit. sect. II assert. II*)** he says: *I add that it is not worthy of censure for someone to say that God deals with certain men in such a way as not to give them an actual supernatural excitation, on account of their sins,*

either at some time or for the whole duration of their life. For Saint Thomas is not alien to this opinion (2. 2. q. II a. V ad I and q. I a. I, joining the body with the solution to ad I)*.*

Having examined and considered these passages, it is plain that Father Ruiz undeservedly cites Saint Thomas for the contrary opinion. And indeed he barely touched these authorities, as if on purpose to bury them lest, once cited, they should work against the lights of his own view. Those he cites for his own position are forced and do not at all contain the thing he wished to establish. The greater part of them turn on the argument that grace is not lacking to those who do what lies within them — which is a question belonging to another place. Indeed, these passages rather persuade that it is not given to others who do not do what lies within them. Others proceed on the presupposition of Christian Faith — which itself argues that the Angelic Doctor is not speaking of every kind of human being among the faithful and unbelievers, among infants and adults, but only of adult believers. Some involve an impediment to receiving grace, which favor the opposing side of Ruiz — for the impediment is original sin. And so they are passages assembled rather for show and display than for substance and proof. I read all those passages and reviewed them most carefully; I found nothing that could weaken the testimonies just adduced.

Therefore let it stand that Saint Thomas, together with Saint Augustine and Scotus, holds the position against the universality of aid.

I am deeply troubled, however, that Ruiz (*d. XLVI sect. VIII n. XXXIII*)** writes: *Saint Thomas (Disp. XL §. I*)** asserts that the universality of aid is the common doctrine of the saints, and seems to condemn the opposite in censure in his opinion on the opinion that denies the universality of aid. For neither does the citation hold up, nor does Saint Thomas assert this in that passage. The passage is entirely corrupt. He should have written (*in 4. d. XVII q. I a. II in respons. ad I quaest.*) and (*d. XX q. I art. I respondendo ad I quaest.*). Not (*d. XL**), where he treats of consanguinity in relation to matrimony. So much for the citation. As for the assertion: I say nothing of the kind is contained there, since in (*d. XVII q. I a. II*)** he is treating only of the preparation and disposition for justification. Indeed there, responding to the second question, he seems to favor the position that denies that the hardened have grace; for of Pharaoh: *Pharaoh is said to have been unable — not because he was wholly unable, but because of the fixedness of an obstinate will toward evil into which he had fallen, deserted by divine grace — note: deserted.* And in the other passage (*d. XX q. I a. I*)**, treating of deathbed penance, although in the body he says: *God, who gives abundantly to all, denies grace to none*, he immediately adds: *who does what lies within him, so as to prepare himself for grace* — linking this with the penance of a man who knows God and sins against him from malice and is able to perform penance for his sins at any time of life while he lives and is still on the way. These circumstances fit civilized and enlightened persons, not barbarians and uncultivated persons submerged in the darkness of ignorance and negative

unbelief — precisely those whom we described above and excepted, together with the same Saint Thomas. Finally, where in this passage is what Ruiz says — that Saint Thomas asserts the universality of aid to be the common doctrine of the saints, and seems to condemn the opposite in censure? It nowhere appears. What is established is that Ruiz put his foot wrong here.

JUDGMENT

There will be one judgment on the two questions, since they are connected and joined together. We have not so much sought difference and distinction between them as agreement and harmony — which, contrary to what our design would seem to require, came about because religious scruple intervened, which was a just cause for changing our plan. For since the doctrine of Augustine — sacred and inviolable in these controversies — was being presented, these two princes of the Schools could not oppose it; neither could depart from it without religious qualms. And so it must be attributed to the authority of Augustine that we changed our plan, and that the weight of his judgment drew toward itself authors who otherwise differ and disagree in temperament and genius.

Scotus, then, differs from Saint Thomas only in matters where Augustine's mind is less clearly perceived — such as the question about the constitutive element of predestination (whether it is an act of intellect or of will), the conception of antecedent and consequent will, and other minor questions. But in the other capital matters there is the greatest agreement of Saint Thomas and Scotus with Augustine's positions. Regarding the restriction and narrowing of the will, they agree; regarding the circumscription and containment of sufficient aid, they agree — and these are the capital points of the controversies. We have carefully accomplished this task, bringing the mind of both into conformity with Augustine's doctrine — and I think we have achieved it. And so we have shown that the heads of the Schools are in agreement, and have shown that the tributaries have flowed in different directions as we have written that their disciples taught various and conflicting things — whom we have therefore sometimes refuted exactly, studiously, and even sharply. Their carelessness in citing passages of Augustine we have detected and censured, and we have observed that from this carelessness less probable opinions have arisen.

And indeed we slowly and laboriously expounded that will of God for the salvation of all, and compressed that crowd of interpretations, by introducing Augustine's doctrine of the single will restricted and narrowed in that manner. I also observe that the Pauline passage — *God wills all men to be saved* — and the appendix to the logic of salvation — namely that God wills all men to be saved and blessed by seeing the divine truth, that is, God, as he is and face to face — leaves no room for Vasquez's exposition. Writers generally follow this, and we initially followed it as well. But later we returned to Augustine and understood it of blessedness, so that there should be no occasion for separating infants from adults in the granting or withholding of sufficient aid.

On that controversy we have argued in such a way that the opinion of others is established rather than our own; and at the same time we noted that it turns more on words than on substance. But if the reader requires our judgment, we say that the opinion which was Augustine's seems to be preferred over the other — especially since the two princes of the Schools, the Angelic Doctor and the Subtle Doctor, have joined it.

In this matter I take no account of the judgment of Father de Rhodes of Avignon, a Jesuit writer, who in his (*tom. I de Deo q. II l. II*)* extends that divine will to absolutely all human beings without exception, calling it not merely a simple complacency but a true and sincere will; nor of Father Thomas Compton, who in (*tom. I d. XXXVIII sect. VIII*)* denies sufficient aids to no one and reproaches Vasquez for holding otherwise. For these two theologians err in many things. Rhodes in (*sect. III*)* calls that will true and sincere, terms the opinion based upon it scholastic and Catholic, and attributes the contrary to Luther and Calvin — which we showed above to be false, having cited the heretical sects, including the Lutheran and Calvinist, in favor of the general will and universality of aid; and so many Catholic Scholastics in favor of the restrictive will and circumscribed aid. From this the carelessness of Rhodes is detected. The inattentiveness of Compton is no less apparent when, in (*tom. I dist. XXXVIII sect. VIII*)*, he cites Augustine for the position granting sufficient aid to infants in (*lib. IV contra Iulianum cap. VIII*), where Augustine denies this above all, as we showed at length above. Then in (*l. VII*), against Vasquez, he affirms that Augustine conceded common grace to all; and it is the more shameful that in (*d. XLII l. IV n. II*)* he attributes to Augustine an alien opinion in writing: *Augustine, in lib. I ad Simplicianum, q. II, says that natural talent, good conduct in education, and minor sins contribute to the operation of grace.* For in that passage Augustine teaches the contrary, taking those words in the opposite sense, denying that they contribute to the choice of grace — as we said (*Collat. X Differ. I in fin. and Collat. XII Differ. I sect. ult. fol. DXX and following*)*, and as is evident from the text itself. Hence no credit is to be given to these authors who so easily allow themselves to be deceived.

And indeed I am regularly astonished at certain recent writers, how carelessly they read and how wrongly they interpret Augustine. They drink from this Nile in passing — running and leaping — contrary to what is proper and contrary to the custom of men formed in Augustine, who have drunk up this whole Nile and, having imbibed it, have irrigated their own writings from it. And yet those are more to be reproached who, though they know Augustine's doctrine and set it forth, dare to depart from it — as if it were of less account and deserving of less respect. As happened with Rhodes, who, having cited Augustine for the opinion restricting the will and sufficient aid, set him aside and moved to the contrary opposite view — when Augustine alone should have been enough to contain him, who ought to count for a thousand witnesses in the estimation of Henry Henriquez, a qualified author of the Society; although Augustine alone is

not the one who holds that opinion, but many others — both Fathers and Scholastics — whom we have adduced, and whom he either did not see or having seen passed by: which happens to writers accustomed to read only their own and to neglect others.

COLLATION XII. DISTINCTION IV

Whether the Predestined Can Be Damned; Whether Predestination Is Within the Power of the Predestined

SECTION I

Various Opinions Are Set Forth

These two questions may seem to be the same, but they differ and are distinct. For the first is more abstract and regards both God and creature together, embracing simultaneously the first and second cause; but the second is restricted to the second and created cause — though not without the first. The question is, then, whether it lies within our power to be predestined and reprobated, or not. This is raised by Suarez (*lib. V de Praedest. & reprobat. c. VIII n. IV**)* treating only of the reprobate, by Vasquez in a special question (*disp. XCII and XCV c. VIII**), and by Alarcon (*tract. IV disp. IV c. VII*), Ruiz (*disp. LV sect. II*), Vulpes (*d. XXXII a. III n. IX responsione ad argu.*), Faber (*disp. LVT*), Mastrius (*disp. IV de Div. voluntate a. I and II*), Pennot (*in propugnaculo lib. IV C. XXIII and XXIV**).

In this matter Ruiz holds that those who make predestination depend on foreseen merits will consequently affirm the affirmative part. Yet this is not the case; for Vasquez and Alarcon, who do so make predestination depend, deny that predestination is within the power of the predestined.

In this matter there was the opinion of certain persons described by Bonaventure (*in 1. d. XLI a. II q. I**)* — that God's decrees are temporal and are newly changed in accordance with the variation of temporal events, and that God decrees what each person freely does; so that when someone is in grace, God wills to save him, and when in sin, wills to damn him — which is certainly absurd.

There are those who affirm the possibility: and one of them is Faber, who in the matter of predestination has fabricated much that is foreign to right reason, and Pennot, who often departs from Augustine out of fear of the heretics of his time, as we have already observed elsewhere. These say that predestination is so within the power of the predestined that one who is predestined can simply be damned, and one who is reprobated can simply be saved. And indeed Pennot uses testimonies of Scripture: *I Cor. IX — I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached to others I myself should become a castaway*; second, *II Pet. I — brethren, be diligent to make your calling certain by good works*; third, *Apoc. III — hold fast what you have, that no one take your crown*. Faber adds

(disp. VI c. II*)* the passage from *II Tim. II*: *In a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay, and some for honor, some for dishonor. If therefore anyone shall cleanse himself from these, he shall be a vessel sanctified and useful to the Lord, prepared for every good work* — where the words *if anyone shall cleanse himself* signify the power in the predestined and the damned to become vessels of gold or clay by their own free will. And after other matters — which he hints he will adduce against predetermining grace — he adds in confirmation of his view the prayer of the Church: *O God, whose sole knowledge is* — in whose end we read: *that he may retain inscribed in the book of blessed predestination the names of all the faithful*. And he concludes (n. XXXVI*)* that predestination varies according to our merits and demerits. He adduces the celebrated saying attributed to Augustine: *If you are not predestined, make sure you are predestined* — though he says he himself cannot find it in Augustine. And in (n. XXXVII*)* he cites from the Fathers: Augustine (*lib. VI Hypognosticon c. ult.*) and Ambrose (*in c. I Lucae, relatum de Paenitentia d. I c. nouit, and causa XXII q. IV c. Incommutabile*), and repeats the words of the Church's prayer. Pennot (*lib. IV c. XXIII**)* insists on the passage from Augustine (*lib. Hypognost. c. ult.*) and Ambrose (*in c. I Lucae*). That saying attributed to Augustine he does not affirm, but says it can be deduced from this position; and he cites it differently: *if he is not predestined, make sure he is predestined*. He also adduces for himself Bonaventure (*1. p. d. XL a. II q. I ad finem*) and Scotus there (*q. vn. ad I**), while Faber adds Saint Thomas (*1. p. q. XXII a. IV ad I and 1. 2. q. X a. IV*)* where in that passage he says: *Therefore it comes about infallibly and necessarily that what divine providence disposes to come about infallibly and necessarily comes about; and what divine providence's plan holds as contingent comes about contingently*. And where he says in the second: *the will is a principle not determined to one thing but indifferent*. To these Ruiz adds (disp. LV sect. V*)* the testimony of Chrysostom (*Hom. LXXV in Ioannem*) and Cyril (*in Ioannem lib. X c. VI**)* and a passage from the Council of Trent.

Vasquez (disp. XCV c. IX*)* adduces a certain opinion holding that it is not within man's power to be predestined but that it is within his power to be reprobated — which he himself there sharply attacks as absurd. Yet he names no certain author for it. Its foundation is specious: because predestination is God's free and gratuitous purpose, whereas reprobation is not of that kind, since it is supposed to occur on account of the sins and demerits of man. Therefore man is the cause of his own reprobation, not God. Whence there is greater reason why man can be damned than predestined. So Vasquez should not have attacked that opinion so sharply. But this is the nature of a sharp and vigorous mind — resembling that Brutus of whom it was said: he wills too much whatever he wills; and I am accustomed to commend this, as it is proper to a free and spirited man, such as Brutus was in political affairs and Vasquez in the Scholastic.

But let this be said in passing. I return to the question. In which two Scotists of ours — Vulpes and the more ardent Mastrius — attack the opposing position that absolutely teaches that it is within the power of the predestined; whom I am

surprised that in the ardor of dispute they did not notice that their adversaries abused the testimonies of Augustine, and that they themselves showed less familiarity with the matter. For that testimony of the *Hypognosticon* is not Augustine's but of another author — whom nonetheless Vulpes and Mastrius think to be Augustine. Next, that saying which the common people attribute to that great Father, they deny to be his with insufficient consistency, when they ought to deny it absolutely — since it is nowhere found in Augustine and conflicts with his doctrine. I state this with certainty and consistency, having been asked by many about it and always denied that it is found in Augustine, adding that it is entirely unworthy of him.

Furthermore — and this I marvel at more — Vulpes cites a fabricated text of Augustine, contrary to what Augustine writes, (*tract. XXVI in Ioannem*). For Vulpes says these words alone are found there: *If you are not drawn, make sure you are drawn. If you are not justified, make sure you are justified*. Whereas in Augustine the words are *pray*, not *make sure* — a word in which there was great force for proving the contrary position, if Augustine had used it; but he said *pray*, not *make sure*. In this Mastrius too dozed (*disp. IV de Divina voluntate q. IV a. III n. LXXXIV*)*, who having adduced that passage in the name of Vulpes accepts it as if Augustine had said *make sure*, when he should have corrected Vulpes's slip and preferred to err with him rather than see the passage at its source, where it is found: *if you are not drawn, pray that you may be drawn*. Nor is the second part of the sentence found — *if you are not justified, make sure you are justified*. Augustine has only: *if you are not drawn, pray that you may be drawn*. As may be seen in the text at the passage from John.

SECTION II

The Opinion of Scotus Is Set Forth

Scotus (*here d. XLVI q. vn. §. ad istam quaestionem n. II*)* distinguishes two senses — the divided and the composite — and resolves the question accordingly. In the first he affirms that the predestined can be damned; in the second he denies it. That is: Peter, of whom predestination is predicated, has it contingently and has always had it, because predestination was made freely and contingently by God, and is of itself capable of being and not being. But Peter, who is predestined, supposing that he is predestined, cannot be damned. Therefore in the divided sense, Peter, who is predestined, can contingently be damned; in the composite sense, Peter, who is supposed to be predestined, cannot. And lest you should object that this first divided sense has no place in the act of divine predestination because it is eternal and posited from eternity, Scotus notes that this objection arises from a false imagination — because we conceive God's free act as past, and therefore almost do not conceive of freedom in that will toward the act, as if it were already posited by the will. *But this imagination is false. For that "now" of eternity in which that act is always present is thus free and contingent*. And indeed logically the doctrine runs correctly when reduced to the present "now"

of time. And by this reasoning Scotus decides the matter; and the ancient Scotists Meyronnes, Bassolis, Tataretus, along with the great theologian Gregory of Rimini, whom Tataretus cites before the arguments, follow him, as does the Pozzanensis.

The modern Scotists treat this question with great effort: Vulpes (*disp. XXXVI ar. V and VI**), Faber *in the same distinction*, and Mastrius (*disp. IV de Divina voluntate art. II and III*), while Pontius explains his mind less clearly and refers the reader to his *Summa. Father Sparsa* (1. p. lib. de Deo q. XXXIV de Concord. art. II ad IV)* sets forth Scotus's position in express words — though without citing him at all — through the distinction between the divided and composite sense, entirely in the mind of Scotus. It is true that he adds that God's will never passes into the past, because it is measured by eternity — from which I dissent, as will shortly appear.

Therefore, along with the ancient Scotists, I say plainly that Scotus teaches that in the divided sense the proposition is true — namely, insofar as predestination is made freely and contingently with respect to the present time, so that for this present moment one can not be predestined and thus can be damned. But it is otherwise when the proposition is referred to past time, because then it passes from the divided to the composite sense — and in this I dissent from Sparsa.

I further observe that in two senses this proposition — *the predestined can be damned* — is false: first, taking it reduplicatively given the presupposition of predestination — that is, the predestined precisely as predestined can be damned; second, referring the proposition to the past eternity — for then it is also false, because one who has been once predestined from eternity cannot subsequently be damned. But in only one sense can the proposition be true: when taken with reference to the present "now" of time, to which that predestinating act of God corresponds. Whence since it is false in two senses and true in only one, it is better to deny than to affirm it. From this arises another question, however, as to why Scotus said (§. *ex hoc dico, n. II**): *for it is not on account of his predestination that his will is confirmed, and thus he can sin* — which I see little noted by the interpreters. I answer that Scotus acutely saw that predestination can be taken in two ways: first as it is an act of the divine will in its intention; second as it is the execution of that intention through the human will. He referred those words about confirmation to this second sense; for if the human will is considered without that confirmation, it remains entirely indifferent and completely free, and can therefore sin even finally, and thus be justly damned, and thus not be predestined. Whence, both from the side of God predestining contingently and freely, and from the side of man operating contingently and freely, predestination will be completely contingent with respect to both.

But once that confirmation in grace is posited, there will be no contingency either on the part of the human will or on the part of God positing that

confirmation to the end that man should not sin — and therefore willing to save him. And so that predestined person whom God willed to confirm in grace neither from the past nor from the present seems to be contingently predestined, since God wills to confer eternal salvation on him by confirming him.

Yet I see three objections that can be made to Scotus, which I wish to set forth distinctly for our Scotists — the ones that occurred to me examining his text most intently, as I am wont. The first is lighter: how does Scotus say that confirmation removes contingency, when it is compatible with freedom? For one confirmed in grace can sin, since he merits by freely acting well. The second: even granting he cannot sin, contingency still stands, because that confirmation is posited by God through a free and contingent volition — therefore just as God's will can change, so also the human will depending on it: and thus even the confirmed person can be damned. The third: if the reason the divine act relative to the present time is contingent is that if it were made now it would be contingent, it follows from this that predestination is still going to be future and thus has not been made, and that the predestined are not secure in their blessedness throughout eternity — since that act of the divine will corresponds also to the future eternity which will never end; and so the Blessed will be suspended and hanging in fear from the contingency of a decree eternally contingent.

To the first I answer that Scotus did not say confirmation removes the contingency of predestination through some necessity of not sinning, which necessity would destroy merit in the predestined — Scotus does not introduce it — but said that once confirmation is posited the effect of predestination infallibly follows: which that confirmation infallibly produces, not necessarily. Indeed, from this it appears that Scotus never admitted any physical predetermination necessitating free will, as we showed above in the Collation on middle knowledge. Therefore confirmation in Scotus is a certain infallible mode of providence, whereby God wills to concur with the will of the predestined person through victorious and efficaciously moving graces that are compatible with freedom; and with these there stands the infallible certainty of human consent. So under that mode the effect will follow freely but infallibly; and it is evident that once that mode of confirmation is removed, the will remains in the ordinary state and under ordinary providence, which is only joined with ordinary and less efficacious aids, and does not have the infallible connection with the effect which that confirmation introduced by Scotus posits.

To the second I answer that the assumption is true insofar as it says that in this state contingency still retains its place — but such a contingency as brings with it complete certainty of infallibility, since it is composed of a decree and confirmation, from which arises the said connection composed of God's confirming decree and the confirmation arising from it.

The third is resolved by distinguishing between that present "now" of eternity which presupposes execution accomplished in time, and that which precedes the execution. When, therefore, it is said of a predestined person still on the way that he can be damned, it is truly said — because that "now" of eternity corresponds to a time in which execution has not been accomplished and will come about contingently and freely. But when now Peter, for example, having been predestined, is dead and saved, then that "now" of eternity presupposes the execution of the thing, and is conformed to an object already placed in act — not to a future contingent one — and therefore passes into a certain, determined present. Since, then, throughout all eternity from its conclusion Peter, already predestined, enjoys blessedness, the "now" of eternity corresponds to that state and cannot be contingent with respect to non-being, since it is already determined and obtained. I give an example: when the Divine Word in time assumed a body contingently, it was true to say *he can or cannot become incarnate*; but now that the incarnation has been accomplished, it is not true to say *he can or cannot become incarnate*, but it will be true to say *he cannot not be incarnate*, because this "now" of eternity presupposes the incarnation already accomplished. Hence the divine act will not be suspended throughout eternity — indeed it will be certain and determined and necessary with the necessity of consequence, presupposing the execution of predestination. And in this I disagree with the above-cited Sparsa, who determines the decree to the present time only, as he says (*q. XXXIV a. II ad IV**)* — though Sparsa can defend himself by saying he only said the word *passes into*, by which reasoning it is true that the decree does not pass into or change. I therefore say more softly: the decree is applied and corresponds to past time, and in a certain sense passes into the past together with its object.

Furthermore I do not approve what Faber says (*disp. LVI num. LX at the end*): *That predestination according to its eternal purpose is immutable — that is, predestination in God as measured by eternity is immutable; but insofar as it is measured by time and coexists with the various parts of our time, it is mutable*. This doctrine is false on two counts. First, because God's act is not changed, but its object. Nor does any change occur in the divine act, but in the object. Second, because predestination is not changed in its object, because it comprehends the whole series of acts up to final perseverance. This, moreover, neither changes nor can change. What deceived Faber is the state of mortal sin in which the predestined is often placed, and the state of grace in which the reprobate is sometimes placed: for that state does not change the predestination or reprobation, which comprehend the persevering state of the whole way unto death, and are not contracted to that time in which the predestined sins or the reprobate is justified. Therefore it is not true to say that predestination or reprobation changes, but that the state of the predestined or reprobate changes, and has within it those temporal variations, which do not conflict with final predestination and reprobation. Nor did Faber say this on the authority of

Scotus — indeed it is contrary to Scotus's doctrine (*in 4. d. XVI q. II**)*, where Scotus calls those conditional volitions regulating them according to the states of final sin and grace.

By this reasoning I also refute Pennot, who shares Faber's view in his *Propugnaculum* (*lib. IV c. XXIII at the end*)*, citing Scotus for himself without right, deceived by the same Fabrean arguments, and not attending to the final state which predestination comprehends — which is not removed by those intermediate interruptions, which change nothing about the final state on which predestination and reprobation depend. But in this matter neither Faber agrees with Scotus nor Pennot with Augustine, as will appear afterwards.

As for the passage of Augustine that Pennot adduces for himself (*lib. VI Hypognosticon ad finem*) — it is neither Augustine's, nor was it well understood by him and Faber. For the author there does not speak of a change of the predestined into a reprobate or the reprobate into a predestined, such that one passes from the temporary state of grace to the temporary state of sin and back; but he speaks of the change from the state in the mass of the damned to the state of predestination. For he was speaking there of that undeserved predestination, expounding Paul's words: *God wills all men to be saved*. The author does not extend this to all universally, but to those who are saved, and removes despair by saying: *it is not established for us from which number we are. For God alone knows who are his*. Hence, the *Hypognosticon* says: *let no one glory, let no one despair; and as far as we can let us exhort, let us pray for all, let us give no one despair, let us humble ourselves before God saying: Thy will be done*. These things pertain to that distinguishing of the predestined from the reprobate before the foundation of the world. In which sense the author concludes: *it will be within his power — not our merit — to change the judgment of damnation* (in the state of the damned mass) *and to bestow the undeserved grace of predestination*. Undeserved, because we were children of wrath in that mass, to which damnation was owed, not the grace of predestination. There is no temporal change here from the state of sin to the state of grace, but a change from the state of damnation in the children of fallen Adam to the state of predestination.

The word *will bestow* — which seems to render the sense somewhat harsh — is no obstacle, because the author's intention was not served by speaking of the past, to which those he wished to animate with hope of future salvation could have no recourse, but the future tense was fitting, since it signified predestination together with its connected execution, which since it included merits brought with it hope of salvation going forward. Because Pennot and Faber did not attend to this exposition, they abused the passage; and since Vulpes and Mastrius received it from others without examination, they did not adequately satisfy the objection, as appears in Vulpes (*disp. XXXVI a. V n. IX**)* — though he labored less. Mastrius labors and sweats far more (*disp. IV a. III nn. LXXXIV and LXXXV**)*, and because he understood that testimony about those

alternating temporal changes, he changes the word *prarogate* to *prorogate*, cites Vulpes as reading thus, and denies the proper meaning of the word *praerogo*, appealing to Calepino and Ulpian in order to sustain the word he forced upon it — taking it as meaning *to defer* and understanding it as grace being deferred, when it should have been understood as grace being dispensed. For no sinner would say: *Lord, defer your grace to me*. Certainly no one — rather he would say: *Lord, defer the punishment, until you bestow your grace upon me*. Moreover, *prorogare* in Latin does not mean to defer but to continue — as to *prorogue* a magistracy, that is, to continue it — and in this sense it does not fit the sinner who lacks grace, as Mastrius wishes in that passage. By whom the sense is corrupted when he denies that the word *praerogo* means to give, when it means precisely the same as *praerogare* — that is, to bestow in advance, or liberally, without antecedent merit. And in this signification the author of the *Hypognosticon* used it in that passage when he said: *it will be within his power to change the judgment of damnation owed to us, and to bestow undeservedly the grace of predestination* — that is, to dispense it, or concede it freely and liberally, not from our merits. Let the reader consult that author of the *Hypognosticon*, and he will find that he spoke as we interpret it.

SECTION III

Whether It Should Be Said Absolutely That Being Predestined or Reprobated Is Within Our Power

Certain recent authors described by Vasquez (*d. XCII c. I**)* hold absolutely that being predestined and being reprobated is within our power; some say that being predestined is not within our power, but that not being predestined — that is, being reprobated — is. Vasquez himself, following the position of predestination from foreseen merits, and after foreseen merits, denies both; and with him Alarcon (*tract. IV d. IV c. VII**), who cites Ruiz as teaching the same, as he indeed does (*d. LV c. II*). Against them, along with those first recent authors, Pennot (*lib. IV cc. XXIII and XXIV*)* wished to favor liberty, as did Faber (*d. LVI c. II, III, and IV**)*.

I observe here that it is one thing to say the predestined can be damned, and another to have that within his power — which I do not see distinguished in the schools. And I think there is much weight in this distinction: for the predestined being able to be damned refers to the divine decree, which is contingent, and refers that contingency to God; but predestination being within the power of the predestined regards the human will, and attributes to it that change from predestination to reprobation — as if it were within man's power to vacate God's predestining decree. This is surely something different and very different.

Hence Scotus admirably distinguishes both senses (*in 1. d. XL q. vn. in solut. ad II**)*, that a created will cannot impede the ordination of the divine will: *for to impede would be if the purpose of the divine will were to stop, and the opposite were to*

come about through the created will: but this is impossible. Because just as the created will can merit damnation, so also it can follow concomitantly that the divine will did not preordain him to glory. Here the distinction I observed is plainly apparent. For having earlier conceded that the predestined can be damned — since the divine decree is so present and contingent to being and not being — he now denies that it can be impeded by the created will, and consequently that predestination is within the power of the created will.

I add that Scotus at the beginning of the body (*n. II**)* holds: *Predestination in its proper sense says an act of the divine will; how, then, can this act be within man's power?* Although in the second objection he says: *if the predestined cannot be damned* — and again: *there would be no reason to be solicitous about the observance of precepts and counsels, and the divine law would be established in vain* — he refers these to the execution of divine predestination, not to the intention, which is predestination itself; speaking in another sense, namely whether one can pass from one state to another — always depending, however, on the divine decree, which entirely overturns that power of the human will under discussion. Scotus therefore leaves the transition from predestination to damnation within the power of the divine will, but not within the power of the human will — which only with respect to execution provides the occasion for the change of divine states.

Indeed I add further that, attending carefully to the words and sense of Scotus, he says that predestination and reprobation refer to acts of the divine will: so that one asking whether the predestined can be damned has recourse to the contingency of the divine act from which proceed predestination and negative reprobation — and says this can be or not be, and therefore the object of the one can pass into the object of the other. But when he speaks of observing or violating precepts, he refers them to the states of salvation and damnation, in which the human will is engaged — not to the acts of predestination and reprobation, in which the divine will is engaged, and which the created will cannot reach. And so it appears that whatever the created will can do regarding predestination and reprobation is all contained in and pertains to the order of execution, which is posited in time.

Whence the above-mentioned opinion is entirely foreign to the mind of Scotus, from whom Faber plainly dissents. But Scotus agrees with Augustine, whom he follows in this impotence of the created will with regard to predestination through the divine will, which is immutable — and thus Scotus, together with Augustine, is placed in God's efficacious purpose. Hence Augustine says (*lib. de Corrept. & grat. c. VII**): *Of these none perishes, for all are elect; and they are elect because they are called according to the purpose. And shortly after: If any of these perishes, God is deceived. And c. IX: They are children of God, and were going to be so through the preaching of the Gospel; and yet before this came about they were already children of God, inscribed in the memorial of their Father with unshakeable stability. Again (lib. de Dono Persev. c. XVII sub init.): Those whom he predestined, these he also called with that*

calling of which I am never tired of speaking — of which it was said: the gifts and calling of God are without repentance; for in his foreknowledge — which cannot be mistaken or changed — to arrange his future works, is altogether nothing other than to predestine. Finally Augustine calls this necessity one of consequence, arising from the presupposition of the decree and foreknowledge. Thus in Enchirid. c. CIII: It is necessary that he be saved, if God has willed — which necessity is not of the antecedent but the consequent. If he wills — and he will so will as befits the preserved freedom of the secondary cause, accommodating his decree to the creature's nature, and whatever is posited through the decree to act freely and contingently, as we said above with Scotus (in 1. d. XXXIX q. vn. §. viso de contingentia). With this Vasquez agrees (d. LXV c. IV n. II), who affirms that contingency is compatible with God's determining will from the force of his free decree — yet with certainty of effect on the part of the free secondary cause, not because he impresses on it some predetermining quality before it acts — which Scotus also rejects (in 4. d. I q. I and d. VI q. V and d. XIII qu. I and d. XLIII qu. III), as Livius Montursio observes (lib. II Physic. d. V q. III) — but because, having all things within his power and being intimately present in all through essence, power, and presence, as he is their cause in being, so also he is present in their acting through that intrinsic subordination of creatures to their omnipotent Creator.*

I shall explain this in its proper place; nor do I wholly agree with Montursio — for God can impress something antecedently on the will which affects and inclines it after the manner of a habit, with which freedom is perfectly compatible. Nor does it stand in the way of Augustine's position — that argument of Scotus about the eternal act corresponding to this present "now" of time contingently. For that presence is so connected with eternity both from the part before and the part after that, if by reason of presence it can be or not be, by reason of having passed it cannot be otherwise than as it was decreed; and consequently it is not, as such, within man's power. For that presence in eternity does not remove the having-passed of the decree from the part before — which, having been from eternity, is always firm and immutable, just as eternity itself, and thus exceeds the bounds of human power.

From which it is concluded that it is not permissible to say absolutely that being predestined and not being predestined is within man's power. As Augustine says (*lib. de Don. Persev. c. VIII at the end*): *Therefore it is not in the power of men, but in the power of God, that men have the power to become children of God* — in whose power is our heart, and we do not know what will come, and do not know our thoughts.

Whether predestination is to be called necessary or contingent is a question between Ruiz and others. For Ruiz (*d. LV l. V n. XVII and XVIII**) affirms that in any sense — whether divided or composite — it is absolutely and simply already necessary by reason of having passed in eternity. Against whom Lychetus denies it (*commentar. in q. vn. d. XL at the end*)* where he concludes: *and thus predestination is not simply necessary*. With this I fully agree, since predestination is a free act of God and can be and not be primarily and in the divided sense, as

Scotus says — whence what is posited through it is simply free, not necessary, and therefore predestination is free, not necessary.

I clarify the matter by an example. If in God there were a necessary love of creatures, it would certainly be of a different kind from a free love — even though this love were also eternal. Hence the former would be absolutely and simply necessary, the latter would not, but would be of another kind, namely free and contingent; just as what is posited through those acts would be necessary and free according to the acts through which they were posited. Hence Scotus always has recourse to the freedom of the divine act, as appears in that passage (1. d. XL §. *Adistam n. II*)* where he says: *Insofar as the volition is considered as prior by nature to its own passing over to its object — which is the glory of this person — in that priority by nature, the opposite object is not incompatible with it; indeed, it could equally be of the opposite object, though not of both simultaneously.* Which Lychetus also observes there. Therefore since predestination is a free act, and as such passes over its object, neither is simply necessary — contrary to Ruiz and his followers. There is given, therefore, only the necessity of consequence and in a qualified sense, of which Augustine speaks, with whom Scotus in no way contradicts.

I observe, however, that there can be another state of this question — namely, taking predestination as it regards itself and as it regards us. In which state a distinction seems necessary. If predestination is considered in itself, as it is in God: it is certain and infallible that the predestined cannot be damned — by Augustine's reasons; for what God has decreed and known will come to pass cannot be changed. For the Lord has chosen and knows who are his. But as regards us, who do not know who the predestined are, as the Council of Trent (sess. VI c. XII)* states: *No one should presume to determine with certainty that he is among the number of the predestined* — which is also stated in (Can. XV and XVI)* — neither part is to be affirmed. For one whom we think predestined can be reprobated, and vice versa. Hence in the matter of execution one must act as if both were within our power — in which sense the authorities adduced for the first opinion of Faber and Pennot are to be taken.

I received this doctrine from Augustine (*lib. de Corrept. & Grat. c. VII at the end*), where he sets forth these two modes. The first thus: *These (the predestined) are indicated to Timothy (II Tim. II)*, so that when it was said that Hymenaeus and Philetus were overthrowing the faith of certain persons, it was immediately added: "But the firm foundation of God stands having this seal: the Lord knows who are his." Of these, faith either does not fail at all, or if there are some whose faith fails, it is repaired.* Here is predestination in itself before God, and it contains the first mode. Let us see in the second the predestination as it regards us. Further on: *"Many are called, few are chosen." And yet who would deny that these are elect when they believe and are baptized and live according to God? Plainly they are called elect by those who do not know what they will be in the future — not by him who knows that they do*

not have perseverance. See the state as regards us: and in it the change from predestined to reprobate. Similar things occur in the same (*lib. de Corrept. & grat. c. XIII**), where he proves that the number of the predestined is certain before God and uncertain before us, and sets forth words which the Council of Trent recently cited seems to have transferred and adapted to its own text: Hold what you have, that no other take your crown. If no other will take it, the number is fixed. But because these things are said even to the saints who are going to persevere, as if their perseverance were uncertain, they ought not to be heard otherwise than by those for whom it is useful not to think too highly but to fear. For who among the multitude of the faithful, as long as they live in this mortality, should presume to be among the number of the predestined? For this must be concealed in this place where pride must be guarded against, so that even the great Apostle would be struck with the buffet of an angel of Satan lest he be exalted. From these words the Council seems to have drawn (*c. XII sess. VI*): No one likewise, as long as he lives in this mortality, should so presume about the mystery of God's hidden predestination as to determine with certainty that he is altogether among the number of the predestined. Consonant with these are the corresponding things in the same (*lib. de Corrept. & grat. cc. XIV and in lib. de Dono Persev. cc. VIII and XV at end*), where is refuted the error of those who — then in the case of the Massilians, now in the case of sectarians — abuse this truth of predestination to gratify their own lusts, under the pretense that God has already decreed and foreseen what is to happen to them, whether they are predestined or reprobated — and therefore however one lives, whether well or ill, it will turn out no differently from what God has decreed and foreseen.

Now because when some, upon hearing this, turn to sloth and laziness, and being prone to passions follow after their own concupiscences — is what was said about God's foreknowledge therefore to be thought false? And a few lines later he adduces an example: *There was a certain person in our monastery who, when the brethren reproached him for doing certain things that should not be done and not doing certain things that should be done, answered: whatever sort I am now, such I will be, as God has foreknown I would be. This man was certainly speaking the truth, and by this truth he made no progress toward good; but he made progress toward evil to such a degree that, having abandoned the fellowship of the monastery, he returned like a dog to his vomit — and yet what sort he will be in the future is still uncertain.* So Augustine in (*c. V lib. de Dono Persev.*) On this matter we have said much and excellent things from the same author in our commentary on the exercises of Saint Ignatius in our *Concentus Euchologicus* toward the end.

From this it follows that — since it is uncertain for us whether we are or are not predestined — that proposition *the predestined can be damned, and the reprobate can be saved*, taken as regards us, can in some sense be sustained: namely, one who in our view seems predestined on account of good works he does in time can fail to persevere and be damned; and one who seems reprobated on account of bad works can change and finally be saved — as often happens, and as could have happened to that monk about whom Augustine just told.

JUDGMENT

In predestination two things concur: act and object. The act is God's; the object is man, about whom God is engaged when he predestines or reprobates — with this difference: that predestination is one only and positive, while reprobation is twofold: one negative and the other positive, as we said above.

Therefore predestination, since it is a free act of God and not simply necessary, can be and not be — and consequently in the divided sense it can not be; and by reason of it, the effect or object can be posited or not posited. This is the manifest doctrine of Scotus, taking act and object in the divided sense; which is the same as saying: God did not necessarily predestine. Man is not necessarily predestined. The same is to be said about reprobation, both negative and positive: for although negative reprobation is not a positive act of God, it nonetheless arises from a positive free act, which it follows not necessarily but freely — for when God did not elect or left behind Judas, he could have elected or not left him behind, as is plain. But once the supposition is made that God has willed to predestine or leave behind, it is necessary that each be the case in the composite sense — with a necessity that is not antecedent or simply such, but consequent and in a qualified sense. This in no way destroys freedom; indeed it is most perfectly compatible with it.

By reason of this act, the denomination passes into the object — so that it can be or not be. But this must be carefully observed: with this freedom of the act in the divided sense it is possible for there to be simple necessity in the object if through that free act something necessitating is antecedently posited in the object. For example: when God freely wills to create fire, the creation of fire with respect to existence can not be — because it is free for God to create and not create. But the operation of already created fire will not be free, since its nature operates necessarily. The case is different with a free cause such as the predestined man, who both according to his existence comes into being freely from God alone, and according to his operation with God freely concurring cooperates freely. Hence if through the divine predestining will something necessitating were imposed on the cooperating man, he would cooperate not freely but necessarily — and consequently, though from the side of existence predestination could be called free insofar as it is from God, it could not from the side of operation be called free but necessary predestination, so that man could or could not be predestined, but would necessarily be predestined, since he would necessarily be saved.

From this it follows that predestination is also free on the side of the object in the divided sense, since the predestined man is in his freedom and acts in such a way that he could act and not act. This reasoning of non-necessitating predestination is introduced and asserted through seventeen sections of the last disputation on the Providence of God by the admirable theologian Antonio Perez following the mind of Augustine, and rightly so — I add, and of Scotus as

well, who denied every physical force predetermining the will antecedently and impressed upon it, even though both admitted the excitation and premotion of grace affecting, leading, and inclining the will, which the Council of Trent (*sess. VI c. V*)* handed down.

With this in mind: according to Scotus it can and must be said that the predestined in the divided sense can be damned, since all things both in God predestining and in the predestined man are free, and that divine decree corresponds to the present time of the way of the predestined, in which it is free for him to be saved and to be damned. About this alone Scotus speaks (*d. XL q. vn. §. Quantum n. II* and *§. Ad primum n. III*)*, with the sense of states outside the way excluded — for of the Blessed it cannot be said that he can be damned, which sense is altogether composite.

Observe, then, Scotus's acuity: he expressly said the sense of composition and the sense of division, and affirmed that in the latter the proposition is true: *the predestined can be damned*, and in the former false — because whenever it is false it is always extracted from the divided sense. For if you refer predestination to the past time in which one was predestined from eternity, it has already passed from the divided sense of the present to the composite of the past, and presupposing that one was predestined: but if you refer it to the future in the state of blessedness — for example, *Saint Peter when blessed will be able to be damned* — you transfer the divided sense of the way to the composite sense outside the way, and pass to the state of the Fatherland, which conflicts with the divided sense of which Scotus spoke.

Finally: while the theologian is permitted to say *the predestined can be damned*, it is not permissible to say absolutely: *being predestined and being damned is within the power of the predestined* — as Ruiz (*d. LV ff. II, III, IV**), Vasquez (*d. XCII c. II*), and Suarez (*tract. de Praedest. lib. V de Reprob. c. ult.*) prove at length. This is the doctrine of Augustine (*lib. I ad Simplic. c. II post med. & ad fin. and in Enchir. c. CIII and lib. I contr. II epist. Pelag. cc. II and III and lib. de Correct. & grat. c. XIV and lib. de Don. Persev. cc. VIII and XI and lib. I Retract. c. XXII ad fin. and lib. II c. I*)* which Fulgentius follows (*lib. de Fide ad Eulyeme. Petrum c. XXV*)* and Gregory sets forth (*in lib. I Reg. lib. V c. IV*)*.

COROLLARY

Having concluded this treatment of predestination and grace, there remain certain difficulties arising from opposing arguments and emerging from their solutions, which must be resolved so that nothing remains doubtful or obscure. And since some of them contain more recondite doctrine and must be sought from elsewhere, it was necessary to attach here a part of the disputation on Dogmatic and Practical Faith that I conducted in my volume on the Keys of Peter, where they are carefully examined and maturely resolved. Their authority is all the greater for having been reviewed and approved in the City of Rome,

both by the Most Reverend Father Raimondo Capizucchi, Master of the Sacred Palace, and by the Most Reverend Father Lorenzo Brancati Laurea, a most learned man and Consultant of the Holy Office. I present them in the same words in which they were written in that book, so as to provide the reader with faithful testimony. I shall follow in this the example of Augustine, who often repeats what he said and wrote elsewhere, in order to answer questions — as may be seen in the question about the soul of Samuel, and about the coming of Christ, and about free will and grace, which are decided from what was treated elsewhere, as appears in (*lib. II ad Simplic. q. III*)* where he adduces a passage from the books *de Cura pro mortuis gerenda*; in *de nat. & grat.* where he cites (*lib. III de lib. arbitr.*); and in the book *de Praedest. Sanct.* where he produces a passage from the opusculum against Porphyry. The reader will find in this place everything that could be desired for the completion of these disputations on God's general will and the universality of sufficient aid.

I presuppose, first, that not all have faith, as Paul teaches (*II Thess. III*)* — *for not all have faith* — which is a special gift of God, as Augustine proves (*lib. de praedest. SS. & de bono persever.*)

Second, I presuppose that there can be ignorance of all the mysteries of faith, and even of God himself, as we proved in our singular question on the possibility of the commandments through the testimonies of many authors; one of whom is Vasquez (*in 1. p. tom. I d. XX c. I n. I*)* where he numbers many atheists, and Suarez (*in sum. lib. I de essent. Dei c. I n. XIX* and *tract. de praedest. lib. IV r. III n. XVIII* and *tom. I de Relig. lib. VI c. VI*), to whom we now add Father Recupitus, demonstrating this most fully (*lib. de existentia Dei q. III*)* — for we agree with him that God is known only through himself, as to himself, not as to us. As the same one carefully shows from Saint Thomas, Scotus, and many examples of atheists, he confirms it; and he speaks of negative ignorance, which is inadvertence and inattentiveness toward God, which he affirms can occur — denying it of positive ignorance, which nonetheless is easily admitted by others, as the same proves (*q. VII c. II*)*.

Although concerning this also it is not improbable that it can be found at least for some time and in some barbarians — such as those who from boyhood held the idolatry of their parents and never heard anything of the true God; indeed even when they did hear they were unwilling to believe and persisted in idolatry. Indeed Father Hieronymus Ferranti (*d. I q. XLII*)* says there can be an invincible ignorance even of idolatry itself. That there are and have been nations without any knowledge of God, Paul Jovius, Bishop of Novara, sets forth in his *Elogia* — in the *Elogium on Christopher Columbus*. Two great theologians, Suarez and Vasquez, agree with him. For Suarez (*tract. de praedest. l. IV c. V n. XVIII*)* says: *There are found many pagans who are entirely ignorant of all things, even those things about God that can be known naturally — so that they had neither the apprehension nor the conception of them.* And Vasquez (*in 1. p. tom. I d. X c. VII n. I*)*

says: *Among the worst of men there are those who either deny that God is one, or, what is worse, deny that he exists.* I add again Hieronymus Ferranti (*tom. de Theor. & pract. disputat. I q. XLII*)* admitting that an unbeliever can be invincibly an idolater, thinking that the sun and moon are the true gods.

Third, one who invincibly ignores God can also invincibly ignore sin — since the concept of sin cannot exist without the concept of divine offense, and therefore knowledge of God whom one offends is necessary for sin. We proved this exactly in that same question with Cardinal de Lugo (*tom. de Incarnatione disp. IX q. I art. VI*)* and Father Sforza Pallavicino (*in 1. 2. disp. IX q. I art. VI*)*, who set this forth plainly and reproach John de Salas for having said that mortal sin can exist without knowledge of God and for having marked the contrary position with a censure.

With these presuppositions established, I respond to the argument. And first, the argument from the authority of Paul is resolved in two ways: first, by conceding that he speaks of a natural knowledge of God obtained through visible creatures, and admitting that many pagans had this; but nonetheless they did not worship God thus known — indeed having come to know him they despised him — and were therefore damned. But from this it does not follow that those with only that knowledge are to be saved, for more is required for salvation than for damnation. An infant who dies without Baptism perishes, nor is he saved without Baptism actually received, even though parents may wish to save him and pray. That those pagans are blamed for not having worshipped God is because if they had willed to — as they could by the powers of nature — they would not have placed an impediment to grace, which would have illuminated them if they worshipped God: not that those natural good works were a disposition or condition for grace (which cannot be said), but that the impediment and obstacle placed against grace would thereby have been removed. This is the common response of theologians from that maxim: *to one who does what lies within him, God does not deny the aid of grace*, etc. — those whom Vasquez (*1. p. disp. XCI c. X*)* enumerates, who wish to draw Saint Thomas to their side, which Cajetan also pushes him toward in the same sense; but Vasquez rightly denies that Thomas thought with them (*in the same c. n. LXIII in 2. 2. disp. CXCIX cap. II n. VII*)*.

This solution is presented and proved by Valentia (*de Fide disp. I q. II punct. III*)* and is not improbable — provided it excludes every notion of merit, disposition, and condition. But this is certainly difficult. For which reason that explanation never appealed to me.

I observe here anew: it is wrong to deduce from this passage of Paul that natural knowledge of God is common to all — on the grounds that Paul seems to speak universally. For although creatures are spread before all, not to all does it occur or come to mind what they signify — that is, God. So Paul was speaking of men according to their state and condition — for example, of the wise and of the less

barbarous. Indeed, in that passage he indicates he was speaking of the philosophers, as the words of the text show in saying *claiming to be wise*. Hence Father Suarez (*tom. I de Relig. lib. VI c. VI**)* affirms that invincible ignorance of God can befall some pagan who has no right constitution and cannot philosophize on his own — as many are found now in Ethiopia, Brazil, and similar regions.

The argument from Paul is resolved in a second way: by understanding Paul's testimony as speaking of a certain nascent knowledge of God given through some supernatural faith with which God irradiated certain men; and since they did not respond to it as they could have done aided by the supernatural aid that was given to them along with that nascent faith, they were punished, hardened, and damned. I gather this first from Paul's manner of speaking: *God manifested to them*; then: *his eternal power and divinity*. This knowledge savors of faith. Third: *they hold the truth of God in unrighteousness*, and *when they knew God, they did not honor him as God*, and *they exchanged the truth of God for a lie*. Furthermore, from the punishment inflicted, it appears the guilt was great and against faith. *For this reason God gave them up to dishonorable passions and gave them up to a debased mind*, and not only those who practice but those who approve are damned — which is certainly too exaggerated for the guilt of pagans from natural light alone. Finally, this I prove effectively from what Paul presupposes: that if they had so worshipped God as they knew him, they would have been saved — as the adversaries concede — which worship had to be supernatural, and therefore arising from supernatural faith; for by the powers of nature alone they cannot be saved.

There is added the fact that Paul had just said: *righteousness is revealed from faith for faith*, and *the righteous shall live by faith*; and from this he immediately passes to the unrighteousness of those men who did not know God, of whom he says: *they hold the truth of God in unrighteousness*. Therefore if that righteousness was from faith, that unrighteousness is against faith — and thus those acting badly acted against faith, from which it appears that neither are they saved without faith nor damned except on account of evil deeds committed after having received faith.

The second Pauline testimony, *Rom. II — the Gentiles who do not have the law do by nature what the law requires* — has two interpretations. The first is that Paul is speaking of Gentiles in the law of nature observing the natural law innate in them through their proper natural powers. This interpretation is further twofold on the part of the object, that is, of the law: either the whole law can be observed by Gentiles without grace, or only some part. Cajetan understands it only of some part, claiming that Gentiles can fulfill certain natural precepts. But this interpretation is alien. For Paul speaks of observing the whole law, through which he says *doers of the law shall be justified* — which observance is opposed to observance of the written law, so that the whole natural law corresponds to the

whole written law. Therefore this first interpretation, about observing the whole natural law without grace, pleased theologians of great name who say that Paul teaches that the whole natural law can be observed by Gentiles without grace, and in the example of these he confounds the Jews. Yet these authors note that this observance of the natural law is not sufficient for eternal salvation; for they admit that grace is necessary, but say it will not be lacking to Gentiles observing the natural law. This is proved by Father Suarez with many others whom he cites (*tom. I de grat. cap. VIII**), and he attacks Father Vasquez for saying that none of the ancient Fathers except Cassian had held this — which Vasquez said (*tom. II in 1. sec. disp. CXC cap. XV**), where he teaches the contrary interpretation, which is the complete second exposition.

This second one holds that Paul is speaking of Gentiles who observe the natural law with the aid of grace outside the law of Moses, and who are faithful though Gentile by nation — which is certainly the common interpretation of the Fathers, especially the Latin ones, and the genuine one of Augustine (*lib. I de spiritu, & litera c. XXVII**) and his disciples Prosper (*cap. XXII contra Collatorem*), Fulgentius (*lib. de Incarn. & grat. cap. XXV**), Anselm, Bede on Paul, Saint Thomas both in his *Epistle of Paul commentary* and (*1. 2. q. CIX ar. IV ad I*), which Valentia (*de fide disp. I q. II punct. II**) and Vasquez (*tom. II in 1. 2. dis. CXC cap. XV**) also follow — and to which we have long assented often in other volumes on Augustinian grace, and we assent now. We therefore deny that that passage proves anything against the necessity of faith — indeed because Paul in that chapter said that *doers of the law shall be justified*, he could not have been speaking of Gentiles observing the whole natural law without grace and faith, since these are certainly not justified by that law alone — which is an invincible argument against Suarez's first position.

To the probable argument drawn from the Pauline passage — *God wills all men to be saved* — I have often and carefully responded in my books on the grace of Augustine. Now I say briefly: this passage is explained in many ways. First: not altogether universally of all individuals of mankind, but of all states of mankind — what is commonly said to be understood of the genus of men, not of the individuals of the genus — so that the sense is: God wills some of every genus and state of men to be saved, for example from the noble, from the obscure, from the wise, from the foolish, from secular, from ecclesiastical persons. Second: of those who are saved — as if to say: he wills all who are saved to be saved, just as when we say of the only teacher in a city, *this teacher teaches everyone in this city* — not that he teaches all citizens, but that he teaches all who learn. Third: God wills all men to be saved through us — so that we should preach to all, exhort all to salvation — in which ways Augustine expounds it and Saint Thomas and other Fathers prove it, as we cited in our books. And William Estius excellently observes and teaches this (*in 1. dist. XLVI and in loco Pauli I ad Timoth. II n. III**).

Meanwhile see Smisingh (*tract. III d. VI qu. XII**)* and Suarez (*de Incarnat. disp. XLI sect. IV**)* and Vasquez (*1. p. dis. XCVI cap. II**)* and Alvarez (*lib. V disp. XXXIII**)*.

There are also other more Scholastic ways of explaining the passage. First: God wills to save all men by a sign-will, that is, from a sign it can be gathered that God willed to save all — because we see the effects of this will in the Redemption of the World, and in the Sacraments he instituted, and in the means he furnished men for eternal salvation — not that he willed them to be actually applied to all and each, but that those remedies were in themselves ordained and instituted for salvation and could of themselves be applied to all. Second: God wills all men to be saved, insofar as he wills before sin — as appeared in that will by which he created innocent Adam, in which state he willed all to be saved. Hence the reason for damnation was not God's will but man's sin against God's will; so that if he afterwards willed to damn some, it was from a conditional will arising from the object — sin being presupposed on man's part — which will cannot properly be called God's absolute will but conditional, given the condition of sin on man's part. This exposition is appropriate and pleases Estius in his commentary on Paul, and is undoubtedly that of Damascus (*lib. II de Orthodox. fid. cap. XXIX**)* — whence the distinction comes easily: *God wills all men to be saved with an antecedent will prior to sin, I grant; with a consequent will following upon sin, I deny.* Or: *God wills all to be saved insofar as they are men, I grant; insofar as they are sinners, I deny.* By which reasoning Vasquez does not fear to say (*p. p. disp. XCVI**)* that God does not will some to be saved in this present state of sinful nature — namely, infants who die in the womb, for whom there is no remedy provided by God for eternal salvation in the particular. Therefore from that passage of Paul it is not concluded that God willed the means of salvation to be applied to all individuals of mankind after original sin — which Hesselius and Estius teach in their *Commentary on Paul* — and they share Vasquez's view.

But from this arises a strong and weighty argument. If faith is necessary for salvation and no one can be saved without it, and it is a gift of God that is not given to all — those who lack it cannot justly be damned. For how are those damned who lack guilt? For they do not sin by not believing, since they could not believe. Some respond to this argument by conceding everything: both the necessity of faith for all, and the impossibility of believing for many; and consequently that these cannot be saved and so must be damned — but not for this sin, for they do not sin in not believing, since they are altogether invincibly ignorant of it, which is plain in itself given the ignorance, and Cardinal de Lugo shows at length (*tom. de Incarnat. d. V sect. VI**)* and Pallavicino (*in 1. 2. d. II q. II a. II**)*.

Others say that if men do not know God in any way — which was presupposed at the outset — they will not sin mortally, and therefore will be damned for

original sin alone; and perhaps for some venial sin, either to the punishment of loss alone or also to the very light punishment of sense for the venial sin added — as Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino clearly teaches (*in 1. 2. disp. II q. II a. II**), *where he concedes that many adults die in paganism with original sin alone; which case Aegidius Coninck does not consider impossible (tom. de fide disp. XIV dub. XI)*.*

But from this arises an objection: that eternal salvation is impossible for many — which does not seem to be conceded. Hence a better response is given both to the argument and to the objection: by appealing to the judgments of God. For many infants dying in the womb and born in the midst of barbarism cannot have Baptism applied to them — they are altogether damned; whence some infer that just as these cannot be saved, so neither can those; for both are damned, according to the opinion of Sforza Pallavicino, for original sin — from which, as Paul testifies, all are condemned. Nor is there any iniquity or injustice in this damnation, for original sin is conjoined with the deprivation of grace, of which God can deprive man — not only sanctifying grace but also excitatory and sufficient grace, as serious Jesuit authors admit; as Vasquez (*p. p. disp. CXCI cap. XLI**), *who in turn (disp. XCVI c. II)** in fact denies that sufficient grace is given to infants dying within the womb, and Becanus agrees (*in opusc. IX cap. IV**)* and in his *Scholastic Summa* (*cap. X q. VI n. VI**)*, where: *Three things are certain. First: infants for lack of the use of reason cannot use actual grace; and consequently it is not conferred on them. Second: they have no other ordinary means in the new law by which they are saved, except Baptism. Third: many are deprived of this means by divine disposition and will — especially those who by the sheer force of nature die in the womb or who in some remote place die more quickly than water can be administered.* These two Jesuit authors speak of infants.

For adults let us hear William Estius. He, in his *Commentary on Rom. X*, expounding those words of Paul: *how shall they hear without a preacher?* says: *These two questions of the Apostle sufficiently show, as do the two propositions placed a little further below in response to them — "faith comes from hearing; and hearing through the word of Christ" — that sufficient aid for salvation is not given to all men by God, as some think. For it is established that very many exist, and that far more existed in former times, especially before the coming of Christ, to whom nothing of the faith necessary for salvation had been preached — who therefore cannot be said to have had the sufficient aid by which they could have been saved; since, as the Apostle testifies, men cannot believe unless they have heard those who preach what is to be believed.*

And in his *Commentary on I Cor. VII* — *but each one has his own gift from God: one in this way, another in that* — meaning one such, another such. *It does not signify that all men have some gifts from God. For there are many, says Hugo Victorinus in his question on this passage, to whom nothing has been given by which they could be saved — a point to be noted by those who introduce a grace sufficient for all.* But the Apostle is treating of the faithful, etc. And in his commentaries on *I Cor. X*, on the verse *God is faithful: But truly it is established that very many men, especially unbelievers and*

those plunged deep in sins, cannot overcome all temptations — except by a very remote power: namely, insofar as they are still constituted in the way of this life, while it is useful to pray for them, and, with God's mercy, can be converted to good and escape temptations. But neither is the divine promise — of not permitting temptation beyond one's strength — found in the Scriptures as pertaining to all men other than the one by which God promises to be a helper to the afflicted and tempted. But he does not promise this simply to all of them, but to those who ask. For he says: "Ask and it will be given to you; and everyone who asks receives." How many of those truly tempted do not ask? Indeed, how many cannot even ask? Especially those who do not know God? For how shall they call upon one in whom they have not believed (Rom. X)? Certainly, as far as this passage is concerned, the Apostle does not say: "God is faithful who suffers no one" but "who will not suffer you to be tempted beyond what you can bear." From which it is sufficiently apparent that he wished his statement to be restricted to a certain class of persons — either the faithful, or the just, or the elect. And the best commentary is that of those who interpret it of the elect.**

And again, two columns later at the end of that verse: Here also could be adduced many other things from other scriptures and from the Fathers, by which it is shown that not to all men, nor always, are there present the forces to resist temptation. In his Commentary on Titus II, verse XI — the grace of God has appeared — he says it appeared to all men, not that it had become known to all and each and every man in the whole world, but because it had now been preached openly to the world through the Apostles, as bringing salvation to every kind of man, not even slaves excepted. Hence this passage does not favor the opinion of those who say that each and every individual man has sufficient grace for salvation present to him. For if that were true, then this grace would have appeared to all men not only at the time of the Apostles and thereafter, but from the beginning of the world — which is plainly foreign to the sense of the passage.

Again, in his commentary on Heb. VIII on the verse because they themselves did not remain in my covenant: Aquinas, expounding these words, subjoins as it were this reason — because it was not written in their hearts: not that this was properly the cause of the covenant not being kept, but because God not writing the law in their hearts, they were unable to keep it. And so his reasoning proceeds from the negation of the necessary cause to the negation of the effect. Such is what the Lord says to the Jews: "You do not believe, because you are not of my sheep" — that is, of the predestined to faith (John X). These things are to be noted against the opinion of certain persons who think that there is present to all men sufficient aid of God's grace for keeping his law.* He has similar things in his Commentary on II Pet. III and in his Commentary on the Epistle of Jude at the end, from the opinion of Saint Thomas.*

This doctrine of Estius was delivered entirely before him by Bañez (in 1. p. q. XXIII a. III concl. VII n. VIII). I take from among many the words of the seventh conclusion at the beginning: If we use the word "give" as the correlative of "receive," God does not give to all men — even those coming to the use of reason — the supernatural aid of preparing grace, whether for believing or for doing penance. And he shows it to be the*

mind of Saint Augustine and Thomas. Whence Suarez rightly cited him for this position (tomo IV de Paenit. d. VIII de Paenit. sect. II assert. II).*

Alvarez puts the same conclusion in express terms (*lib. XI d. CXII nu. VII*)* and fully proves it from that citation, and says: *This aid is not given to many as punishment for at least original sin preceding it.* He calls this the common opinion of Thomists and the express opinion of Saint Augustine and Thomas. Father Suarez (*tom. II de Gratia lib. IV c. XIII*)* says that some Thomists hold that sufficient aid is lacking to many adults as well. Father Seville sets forth the same (*lib. II c. II*)*.

From all this it appears that this question on sufficient grace common to all is a question of terms — for all admit that gifts, sacraments, and instruments of grace are indeed prepared by God, which certainly many have neither heard nor known. Therefore to these they have not been applied in practice. Those who say it is enough for sufficient grace that they exist in the first order consider it to be given. Those who require further application deny it. Both parties agree on the substance and disagree on the name.

One thing here is most certain: that Christ died for all and each. For that is a wholly other and very different question. Christ indeed died for all and each and offered his blood to the Father for them, doing insofar as was in him — but the Father did not accept it on behalf of all. Besides other genuine senses on which Estius comments (*in c. II epist. Timoth. I* and Vasquez *d. XCVII cap. III* and we ourselves in our *Cortina*, in the last *Thesis*, and *Super Bullam Innocentii X*, and in our *Scrinium* most carefully disputed against Jansenius)*.

What could still be desired in this place — on the book of life, who it is for and who are inscribed in it and how; on the number of those to be saved and damned, whether the predestined are more numerous than the reprobate; whether any of the pagans have been saved, which is commonly asked about Plato, and how; to what glory and punishment the elect predestined and the reprobate are destined; whether it is better for the damned not to exist than to exist; what punishment and of what kind infants who die without Baptism are to suffer, and whether they are to be judged together with others; and that capital question about the predestination of angels and men — what it was like and what it would have been for the latter in the absence of sin, and on the whole ordering of merit and glory — all these are reserved for their proper place, where, God willing, they will be resolved.

Thus far it has been permitted to proceed as far as the boundaries of the subject matter in the first book of the Sentences allowed. Let the reader be content with these. Let him await the rest in the commentaries on the other books which we are preparing; and God willing, with life sparing, we will complete them. Though life is uncertain and fluid, and since I am now placed in extreme old age it cannot be long, there is nonetheless no reason to despair that God in his piety

will grant me such a loan of it that I can both complete the course of the undertaking begun and fulfill the wishes of my readers. I shall diligently devote myself to study and shall not spare labor; I shall add to daily readings nocturnal vigils, and the noble impulse of running that I have begun I shall not interrupt; I shall multiply my cares and, beyond the strength and lot of old age, strain every sinew so that the work undertaken may be brought to completion.

Meanwhile I await the judgment of readers on this my first volume, and I shall not fail to inquire diligently how it is received in the schools — and from the approval of the studious I shall take guidance in writing the remaining volumes: what pleases the learned I shall retain and press forward; what displeases I shall abandon and give up. For it is their reckoning that I respect — not that of those who are unlearned, and who cannot form a proper judgment about what they read. Whatever the outcome, I shall have regard for candor and modesty, prepared to correct where I have erred, to supply where I have fallen short, to cut where I have exceeded — accustomed to hear those more learned than myself and to give them ear; as appears in the course of the work, since in nearly all the matters I have treated and decided I have applied to each its own patrons whose authority I relied upon for their resolution, and have cited those authors who are gravest in judgment — so that no one would be ashamed to follow their lead, and no one would dare to contradict their judgment. So much so that I have taken care to form my interpretations of Scotus's texts almost entirely according to the sense of Lychetus, his best interpreter; and to confirm the positions of that great man — in every scholastic matter the highest account is to be taken of him — with the judgment of Augustine. For when I reviewed Scotus's works most diligently, I found them interwoven with testimonies of Augustine; and the more I marveled at this, the more it appeared that in so short a span of life Scotus had so thoroughly explored and examined the works of Augustine. But that subtle mind — to which nothing was more acute — flew and penetrated with its edge whatever it read, like the eagle which in a moment sees even what is distant and hidden.

And indeed it is established that Scotus is in no way inferior to Saint Thomas in the reading of Augustine. The passages I have cited and compared with those I found in Saint Thomas bear witness to this — you will not find more in the one than the other. An example is the first book of the Sentences, all of whose questions — except seven or eight which I noted — are filled with testimonies of Augustine. The second book of the Sentences will present somewhat fewer. The third likewise abounds in the same, though in smaller number. In the fourth there is a fitting abundance of them. In the Quodlibets, the greater part of the questions present Augustine. Among the Reportata few lack Augustine. Believe one who has examined these things most accurately, and marvel that two Schools so discrepant and discordant agree in this: that they both wish to have Augustine as their patron. I bring forward from many two passages of Scotus: one in (*1. dist. XII q. I**), *where attempting to explain the words of Richard on the*

principle of the Holy Spirit — which he places in the mutual love given and returned between Father and Son, contrary to Scotus's own opinion, which considers the Augustinian one to be proper — he says: If this is not sufficient to attain Richard's intention, let one who can explain him do so — because it does not seem that his determination can stand well with the sayings of Augustine. He values Augustine's opinion so highly that he considers the authority of Augustine a matter prejudicially established. The other is (in 4. dist. III qu. IV), where expounding that celebrated controversy between Peter and Paul about the legal observances, he says: The controversy between the two eminent Apostles Peter and Paul, and afterwards between the famous Doctors Augustine and Jerome — and adds: Saving the reverence due to others, I hold with Paul and Augustine.*

And now the commentators and interpreters of Scotus — of whom there is a great throng — have all woven Augustine into their commentaries. I have read Lychetus, Bassolis, Tataretus, Bargius, Trombeta from the earlier ones; from the more recent, Capellus, Mons Pilosus, Mastrius, Pontius; they are plainly Augustinian and wish to appear so. Of this distinction I find Lychetus the most diligent, for whom I have great esteem as an interpreter. The mind of all these is to establish that Scotus's doctrine agrees with Augustine's sense. If at times they cannot show this, they at least try to show that Scotus in no way contradicts Augustine — as (to adduce something definite) Tataretus does (*in 1. d. XXXII q. I and II and in 2. d. I qu. III and IV*)* and Mastrius (*disp. V de Divina Praedest. & Reprob. ar. II and q. II a. III and VII and disp. VII de Trinitat. q. III ar. III*)* and Vulpes (*tom. I par. I disp. XVIII a. III*)*.

This is not surprising, since Scotus himself does not dare to depart from Augustine; and to prevent this from happening or appearing, he often labors greatly and takes pains that he never dissents from Augustine, interpreting him according to his own mind — of which there is no need to take note, since examples occur everywhere, both in Scotus and in Vulpes (*tom. I par. V and II*)* — and these are endless. Hence Mastrius (*disp. V de Praedest. & Reprob. a. II n. IV*)* said that Scotus is most devoted to the doctrine of Augustine, the greatness of whose authority he often declares — as will appear from what will be said below.

And to make this devotion of Scotus and his school in following Augustine more manifest, I produce the testimony of Master Pedro del Campo, an Augustinian friar, who in his *General History of the Hermits of the Order of Saint Augustine* (*lib. III c. III*)* narrates: *A dispute having arisen at Salamanca among the Salamancan Doctors, who swore to follow the doctrine of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, when they wished to compel the Scotists to take a similar oath, the Scotists resisted — saying that they, under the leadership of their subtle Scotus, follow and honor the doctrine of Saint Augustine no less than the Thomistic school with their Angelic Master; and they proved this by the argument that Scotus in the books of the Sentences cites Saint*

Augustine DCCCXV times, and lays the foundations of his conclusions in the doctrine of Saint Augustine.

FINIS