1623 – 1687
Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 1696, translated by George Giger, ed. James Dennison, Jr., Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1992
Volume 1, Question 17
XXI… We answer that it is one thing to speak of the approving and perceptive will [revealed will] (in which sense it is certain that many things are done which He does not will, and many things are not done which He wills, i.e. approves and commands: as He wills that men fulfill the law and obey Him, which nevertheless is not done), but another of the decretive will (which implies the purpose and intention of God, in which sense He cannot will and intend anything which is not actually done). The very things which He does not will by the perceptive will and yet are done, are not done unless He wills them by his decretive will. Thus what is done “against his will is not done beyond his will,” as Augustine formerly expressed it. But here [in response to Amyrauldians] (as we said before), we do not treat only of the approving will (by which He holds the salvation of men dear), but of the decretive (by which He intended to send Christ into the world to acquire salvation for all if they would believe). According to this [Amyrauldian] hypothesis, the decretive will is necessarily made void and frustrated.
XXXVIII. Although God can be said to will men to be saved who yet are not saved (when it treats of the will of complacency [eurestias] [the revealed will] which commands man’s duty and declares what is pleasing to God), yet this cannot be said equally of the will of decree. As many as God wills to be saved [by decree], He also wills to save and actually saves at the appointed time, that his will may not be rendered vain and frustrated…