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An Answer Rejoined to that much Applauded Pamphlet of a Nameless Author [William Ames], bearing this title: viz. A Reply to Dr. Morton’s General Defence of Three Nocent Ceremonies, etc. the Innocency & Lawfulness whereof is again in this Rejoinder Vindicated
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By Dr. John Burges
Pastor of Sutton Coldfield in Warwickeshire
Published by his Majesty’s special command
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Zech. 8:19, “Love the truth and peace.”
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London, Printed by Augustine Matthewes for Robert Milbourne,
and are to be sold at his shop in Paul’s Churchyard at
the Sign of the Grayhound, 1631
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[This unfinished public domain transcription is and will be spot-checked and lightly edited by Travis Fentiman when it is done. It has in large measure been done with AI, Claude, Sonnet 5 (2026) and may contain transcriptional errors, especially where the text is hard to read. Check the original for certainty. The outlines and some subheadings are not original.]
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Table of Contents
Dedicatory Epistle
Preface
Qualifications to Subscription
Intro
Answer to Ames’s Preface
I. Intro
II. Definition of ‘Ceremony’
III. Sorts of Ceremonies
IV. What the Ceremonies in Question are
V. What meant by using them “in the Worship of God”
Answer Rejoined to Ames’s Reply to Morton’s General Defence
Full Outline
ch. 1 Scripture condemns not only what is against the Word, but also that which is beside it, especially in worship, and these ceremonies are without warrant in the Word, Answered
I. Intro & Scriptures
II. Fathers
. Digression: Word’s General Rules & on Rules of Ceremonies
III. Protestants
IV. From Reason
ch. 2 Preview & Our ceremonies are made parts of worship, Answered
I. Theses: Definition & Distinctions of Worship
II. Intro & Scriptures
III. Fathers & Protestants
IV. Arguments Answered
ch. 3 Argument from the significance of ceremonies, Answered
I. Intro & Scriptures
II. Fathers & Protestants
III. Arguments Answered
IV. Scriptural Examples of Ceremonies
V. Church History & Protestants
VI. Nonconformists’ Inconsistencies
VII. Reasons
ch. 4 They have been abused by Papists, Answered
I. Intro & Scriptures
II. Councils & Fathers
. Digression: Whether in ceremonies we only differ from Papists in opinion?
III. Protestants
. Digression: Whether protestant testimonies do make for the nonconformists?
IV. Argument from Abuse of Ceremonies
1. General
2. Scriptures & Fathers
3. From Reason
4. Nonconformists Against Themselves
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Dedicatory Epistle of Burges
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To the most high and mighty Prince Charles [I], by the grace of God King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc.
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Most gracious and dread Sovereign,
It pleased your excellent Majesty by your letters to me vouchsafed, both to signify your Highness dislike of my suppressing what I had written some years past in maintenance of the reverend father the lord bishop of Coventry and Litchfield, his Defence of the Ceremonies of this Church of England, against an intemperate and scurrilous Reply made thereunto by a nameless author: and also straightly to charge me forthwith to deliver my papers on that subject into the hands of the said reverend bishop, my diocesan, that it might be seen how well I had vindicated the honor both of this Church and of that worthy prelate from the calumnies and indignities cast upon both by that Replier.
In dutiful obedience to that your Majesty’s injunction, I have so done; not keeping back any part of what I had then finished, nor presuming to stay it loner in my hands till the rest might have been added, for fear of incurring your Majesty’s displeasure. And now, that my Rejoinder (even unperfect as it was) has taken life and motion from the breath of your Majesty’s command, it comes abroad into the world.
Concerning which, I humbly crave leave of your excellent Majesty to protest (taking God Himself to witness) that I have therein sincerely followed the dictates of my conscience, labored to give (if God please) satisfaction to such as are wavering and doubtful of those matters, and to express my due respects unto the honor of this Church, by avouching of this branch of truth against the opinions of some; as also, of that most learned father, by declaring his integrity and solidity in that his Defense, against an impetuous adversary. All which I have to mine ability performed, without any aim either at advantages to myself, or at the detriment or just grievance of any contrary-minded.
Touching them (especially the moderate peaceable ones amongst them) I hold myself bound to pray, that as they are true and zealous professors with us of the same apostolical Faith, whereof God has established your Majesty under Christ, the supreme Defender within your kingdoms; so it may please God, by these my poor labors, or any other good means, to reduce them to uniformity with us, in observing the constitutions of this Church in matters of external order and discipline. Which, if God shall grant, they and we both shall rejoice: for he that is overcome of the truth, parts victory with him that overcomes, and has the better share for his part.
And now, most dread Sovereign, am I challengeable to myself, most humbly to crave of your Majesty, first your Majesty’s gracious acceptance of mine obedience to your Highness pleasure; and then a double pardon, one of my former slackness about this work; the other, of my present boldness in adventuring to dedicate so mean a piece to so great a Majesty.
So shall your Majesty’s humble petitioner be yet further bound and encouraged to enlarge his daily prayers to God Almighty for your Majesty, that your government may be long and happy on earth; and your glory endless in Heaven by Jesus Christ: as also, by all due observances to show himself always your Majesty’s most faithful and devoted subject,
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The Preface of the Answerer
(Burges)
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The Churches of Christ consisting of men which see not all by one measure of light, could yet never be, nor ever will be freed from difference of opinions, especially in these things which are not so punctually revealed, as are all the necessary matters of Faith in the word of God. And so long as we live in the flesh, we all labor more or less of self-love and pride, the one whereof makes us love the children of our own brains; and the other impatient of opposition. Hence (the malice of Satan blowing the coals) great contentions have arisen even from light occasions, as great fires from small sparks of fire.
Of which, if we find in the primitive Churches even while the holy apostles lived and shined in the glory of doctrine, sanctimony and miracles, such impressions that the stronger despised the weaker, as ignorant of Christian liberty; the weaker condemned the stronger, as men over-licentious in the matters of indifferent nature, as of meats and days (Rom. 14:12, see Beza and Piscator on the place): It is no marvel, if after those times, we find the world on fire about the observance of the memorial day of Christ’s Resurrection, called the Feast of Easter; and less marvel, if in this last age of the world, wherein charity is more cooled, and iniquity more abounding (Mt. 24:12), we find brethren of the same household of faith, divided, yea biting and devouring one another.
At the Reformation of religion, some learned and godly men were of opinion, that in detestation of the Popish superstition which had overspread and soiled al the worship of God, the best way was to go as far from the Church of Rome as possibly might be: others, no less learned and godly than they, thought it better to depart no further from the Romish Church than she had departed from the right way; partly, that they that would might step over from them to us the more easily; partly, that our departure from them, might appear to be made rather of necessity than of choice, and not for things which might be tolerated, but for things intolerable. Both aimed at one mark, but did not shoot after one compass; and the wiser sort and more pious, pleased themselves, and were not displeased with others in this difference.
But as in Germany, [Flavius] Illyricus, a man learned, but of a stirring and impetuous spirit (so Thuanus notes him, anno 1567; Beza, in the Life of Calvin, in anno 1549; Acts of the Interim, after alleged; Moller, Preface in Ps. 132), and some others of his party and temper, took fire and threw out fireballs against Melanchthon, Capito and Pomeran, and others the chiefest lights of Germany, for permitting the use of a surplice, etc. So in this land, for that and some other like ceremonies, great clamors and tragical conflicts have agitated and much afflicted the Churches thereof, yea and still do in sundry places (though not in all) to the great detriment of religion, and advantage of our common adversaries. Neither are we yet so happy, after above threescore years wrestling, as either the one to cast out the apples of contention, or the other, to find the reasons or necessity of being quiet. Yea, while both parts stand persuaded of their claim and title, and neither think enough of allaying that heat which does foment our strife more than the original matter itself, it comes to pass that fuel is brought to the fire still, and that opposition begets more opposition, and what has been done to purge out, has only stirred and sharpened the humor.
The outcries of some few in the first years of our late famous Queen Elizabeth did sharpen her, and she the bishops against them who opposed; whence even then (as appears by a letter sent by the superintendents of Scotland to the bishops of England) some were silenced and deprived, even when the preachers were but few in number, and might full ill be spared.
This pressure helped to beget the Admonitions of the parliament; those Admonitions, Answers; those Answers, Relies; those Replies begot requiring of subscription (which first was only to Articles of our Religion) unto the Books of Common Prayer and Ordination, and that subscription engendered more biting oppositions, those oppositions more vehement means of repression. Thus was the strife bandied from one to another, and holds up still.
Our late Sovereign, the learned King James, after the Conference at Hampton Court, resolved to make an end of this whirlwind by strengthening the one part more, and requiring a hotter assault of laws upon the other: at which time some peaceable and very worthy ministers were cast out of their service; whereby it was intended either to bring them in by a kind of necessity or to loosen from them such as depended more upon their examples than upon any other grounds of reason.
But so far was this course from attaining the desired effect in all that I am sure more violent books and invectives against those ceremonies have been since published than in twice twenty years before: and of some of those which yet hold off from conformity, the spirits are more embittered than when they were less restrained by execution of laws.
When Master Cartwright (a man very learned, godly and sharp) had whetted his wits and pen against some of them, yet he professed to oppose them as inconvenient, not as unlawful; and therefore persuaded ministers rather to wear the garments than cease their ministry (Second Reply, pp. 262-63), and teaches men to receive the sacrament kneeling, if they cannot have it otherwise, because though that gesture be (as he takes it) incommodious, yet it is not (says he) simply unlawful. ([Latin] See Harmony of the Evangelists, in Luke, vv. 14 & 19, all after alleged)
But they which have written of later times against them, undertake to prove them simply unlawful, either to be imposed or used; yea, will-worship, idolothytes, idolatries, idols, nay devils, as Master Parker calls them in his passionate and gaudy Treatise of the Cross, the Abridgment; Master Bradshaw’s Twelve Arguments, the book called, The Old Protestant and the New Formalist, the Altar of Damascus, and others, and namely, that Reply with which I join issue, do all stand upon this tenet, That they are simply unlawful to be used, and that the ministers of Christ ought to bear silencing and deprivation, whatever waste happen to the churches, or loss to themselves, rather than conform; Yea, and the people rather not to receive the sacrament of our Lord’s body and blood than to receive it kneeling: all which must follow, if they be simply unlawful. For we may not do evil, that good may come thereof (Rom. 3:8). And though not a few of those ministers which refused conformity in their own persons do quietly suffer it in their own sons (which is argument sufficient to prove that they do not believe so ill of these ceremonies as those books speak, seeing they loe the salvation of their own children as they ought), yet many of the poor people hold these conceits strongly and passionately, and esteem any minister, however gifted and painful in his calling, however blameless and exemplary in his conversation, to be a corrupt man, a time-server, a Formalist, or at the least a man blinded and deceived through ignorance. Some are now resolved that a godly Christian woman may not lawfully give her herself in marriage to one of them, as if they were the children of a strange God. They doubt whether they may rely upon the ministry of such an one, of which, if he do not conform, they doubt not at all. Yea, some think it a piece of great godliness to go out of the church if a surplice be then worn, and some charge their children on their blessing, so to do. Some scarcely will hear their own preaching ministers that are for conformity, if within some miles they may go to hear a far weaker, who is against it.
If (for shame) they dare not deny them to have excellent gifts, yet they limit the use of them only to the breeding of knowledge, or reprehension of some gross faults, but that their ministry, as well as other men’s that conform not, may work faith and repentance to salvation, they will not easily acknowledge, yea some flatly deny (see Dighton’s book).
Nay, so far does this conceit carry some men, that they scarce will give a friendly countenance or salutation to any of different mind: and these do commonly call any small company of their own party, the Church, and the Christians of such a town, as if Christ were (I say not) divided between us, but wholly taken away from us to them; and what wants this of schism in the heart?
I would by no means have this understood of all, which either use not or like not of these ceremonies in question; for I know there be some such learned, moderate, godly and loving [persons], whom with all my heart I also love and honor. But sure I am that this Serpigo spreads upon too many; and I fear that they who know that it cannot be justified, nor ought to be suffered, yet use not any such quick remedies as this disease requires, but are too indulgent to them, even only because they accord with them in the root of this division: viz. the dislike of these things, as of things simply evil, which is their partiality.
That many upon this groundwork build the doctrine and practice of Separation from this Church, is nothing so strange to me, as that all of that mind do not so: for if these be idolatrous will-worships, how can, how dare they join with us in those acts and exercises of religion which now we groan under, that all good behavior is scorned of many as a matter of Puritanism, and so termed.
Moreover, diverse [persons] in detestation of the strictness of some men in these matters of ceremonies, have declined also all strictness of conversation, which some such men do follow, and imagine their damnable looseness to be defensible, by the only accusation or scorn of some men’s preciseness where it needs not. And they again, who observe the unexcusable debosheries of many which oppose their inconformity, do strengthen themselves the more in that their preciseness. So as each party is the worse for this opposition, and the more confirmed in their mistakings, which should be reformed in each of them.
And hence also has it come, that while men have receded further and further one from another, without due circumspection, some of both sides have fallen into fearful extremities, such as lay nearest to their way: some on the one side to Separation and to Anabaptism; others to Popery or Neutrality, and in effect, Atheism, in words confessing a Godhead, in deeds denying it.
As for other evils, as the alienation or abatement of affections, even in the nearest bonds of society, and the souring of men’s minds towards their governors, in whom they cannot so heartily rejoice as they ought, while they take them to be the imposers of idolatrous ceremonies, I will not insist thereupon; not because it is a light matter, but because I neither do desire, nor would be thought willing to sharpen the sword of authority against them. Only this must I say, I heartily desire my Brethren to think, whether these their extremities do not, or may not tempt our prince and governors, and solicit them to courses inconvenient; yea, if it may not induce them to dislike anything which such sharp spirits do like, as if all which such men affect or follow, came out of rigid preciseness, and nothing out of true judgment.
I have hitherto discoursed of the mischiefs which have, do, or may follow upon this our civil war about ceremonies; I were a happy man if I could as certainly prescribe the cure, as I have truly discerned the symptoms: especially, if the same remedies might be applied. But as I am not so conceited as to think I have found out the way, nor so rash as to prescribe, yet I humbly crave leave to utter my thoughts, and subject them to the judgment of others.
To make a perfect cure is one thing; a palliate, or partial cure another.
A perfect cure cannot (I suppose) be expected, but by one of two ways, whereof the one is supposed much more easy than the other: that is to say, the former, which is the taking of this question out of the way, by those in authority, if they shall find that to be the better way: And to such it belongs to consider, as in God’s presence, not only what is lawful, but what is most expedient; And whether the keeping of a just possession be then best, when it costs more than ever it will be worth. Howbeit, to judge what is most convenient, and to determine thereof, belongs only to those, which together with the power of doing what they shall well like, have the scales of wisdom and judgment to weigh all circumstances, and so to make choice of the best way.
But so long as the State shall deem it unfit and inconvenient to alter that which it has settled, seeing it has not imposed anything unlawful, there is no hope of cure that way. The second way of remedy, is the clearing (if it may be) of the question in traverse, that they which believe themselves to oppose nothing but that which is indeed unlawful, and therefore not tolerable to them, may discern their error and so come without trouble of mind or scruple of conscience to use those things which they cannot safely adventure upon so long as they stand either resolved against, or not resolved of their lawfulness.
And indeed, while some men have, by persuasion of others, or for fear of penalties, conformed themselves in practice, before they were thoroughly settled in their judgment, God has sometimes smitten them with fearful horrors of conscience, because they dared to do that, of which they were not fully persuaded in their minds: and this by others has often been misinterpreted, as if the very thing done had been punished as unlawful in itself, and not the presumption or caring to do it before persuasion: and one or two such examples has beaten more off from conformity than a hundred other men’s conformity draws towards it.
Nor do I conceive that pressing the utmost rigor of laws against all that refuse conformity is the way to unite us; because this is so far from altering the judgment, that it rather confirms it, in such as will add the glory of suffering for (as they call it) the Good Cause. And this breeds in others more averseness, while naturally they pity those that suffer; and specially, when they can observe such men as have many other good things in them, to suffer more hardness for lighter matters, than others, who have not any appearing worth or goodness in them at all to move compassion, do for offenses more grievous.
Neither is it like, that preaching often and invectively against such men, will ever help to the cure: For they of the common sort live mostly by an implicit faith, relying upon such or such a man’s judgment, without whose fiat you shall hardly remove them from their hold by any argument. And if the men that reprove them, be also such as are obnoxious for their own carelessness, or unfruitfulness in preaching, or misgovernment in conversation; I dare say, one sermon of such a man against inconformitants, cherishes the liking of inconformity more, than many sermons of some other men for them, could do.
I confess it is sometimes necessary to speak of these matters in the pulpit, both to inform such as need it, and to manifest unto all men that we do not (as some uncharitably say) yield to them for our living sake against our consciences: But when this is done, I wish that we be careful to show reasons, not stomach, and be always ready to acknowledge any goodness that is on our brethren who are contrary minded, lest the under-sort take occasion of insulting against things which are good in them; or others, to challenge us that we are bitter against good men: To which censure we find them so forward, as if there could not be in good men some thing worthy [of] reproof; or this which we blame were an undoubted part of their goodness.
It were to be wished that of all the ministers which are not yet brought to conformity, that were exacted, which some of them willingly perform; that is, that they should sometimes openly give attestation of their good opinion and esteem of such ministers, as being persuaded in their own minds, do use the ceremonies. I speak this for such only, as in their calling, and course of life, do labor to approve themselves to God and men. And even this would make us among ourselves the more amiable, and stay the weaker sort of people from their sinful neglects, and more sinful censures of such as be conformable, and further the efficacy of the ministry, which is now shut out by that strong iron bar, Prejudice.
But we are not yet come to the most proper way of cure, which must be some public means of informing the mind, or convincing it of error.
Our illustrious late prince, King James, to this purpose appointed the Conference at Hampton Court: But against this sundry exceptions are taken, and namely, that Dr. [John] Rainolds, and the rest which appeared for them which are against the ceremonies, were not themselves of opinion that their use is unlawful, nor would be brought so far as to say that others were of that mind. Secondly, that these were not men chosen by them that are interested in the cause. Thirdly, that freedom and liberty of dispute was restrained by the royal presence. Wherefore Master Jacob propounds a way of conference by writing, where six or eight or more, chosen for each part, should logically, punctually and soberly dispute the matter, observing certain good rules by him set down, to which I would wish one added, that the parties should be sworn to speak according to their consciences.
Mr. Jacob might securely brave us with this his offer of conference: For however we might willingly accept it, in hope of gaining our cause: yet he knew well that this could not be entertained without leave of the State; and as well, that the State would never suffer these things to be questioned of unlawfulness, which Dr. Rainolds, Dr. Chadderton, Dr. Sparke and the rest, the most eminent men of this nation which seemed to favor that party, would neither affirm to be unlawful, nor be known that any of that side were so weak as to think so. And when Mr. Jacob quarrels the choice of those learned persons, who shall assure us that they will either agree in the choice of their disputants, or rest in their judgments. The only way therefore remaining is that answer be given in writing to their books, or at least such as be had in great esteem with them, as has this Reply to the reverend Bishop of Covent and Lichfield.
It may be said that this way has been assayed long enough, and that a sleeping pill were more medicinable in this case than a purging. I answer that the state of the question seems to be now altered, as I have showed. And there is a mere necessity that somebody speak for our cause. unless we shall yield the same lost and unmaintainable, and so suffer a schism to grow up in the Church, and ourselves to be rooted, not out of our livings, but which is worse, out of the hearts and consciences of those whom we serve in the Lord.
For this cause myself, though the weakest of many, being called on, have yielded to cast myself into the very gulf of this contention; not much regarding what become of my repute with men, so as I may discharge myself faithfully and with a good conscience towards God’s truth and the Church’s peace, and hold unfeigned love in my heart even to those whom I oppose; to whom I shall never be an enemy, unless it be in speaking for the truth, against that, which I believe to be an error in them.
Now that I may do this the more commodiously, I desire to answer such objections as have or might encounter me; and first, those which concern the business itself: Secondly, such as concern my person: for some would not have any such thing done at all; others, not by my.
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Objection 2: I shall be sure to lose many good friends, and their good opinions and respects of me: for no man ever has credit with them who was once against Conformity in any degree, and comes after to speak for it.
Answer: I partly believe, nay see, and feel this already. And though I dearly love the love of good people, yet not so as to purchase or hold it, with concealment of that which, in my conscience, is God’s truth, and now necessary to be avouched, when it is most contradicted. As for credit with men, if my ways please God, I shall have enough with men. If God will that ways try my patience, or humble me more; lo, here I am. And I stand or fall to my Master, not to my fellow-servants. For what will a blast of words do me good amongst men, when I shall shortly be gone from them to God, whose I am. And if I can still love them that will not love me, I shall certainly have more comfort out of my love to them, than discomfort from their alienation of affections towards me.
Objection 3: It will be said I hunt after preferment in my old days. I answer:
Surely they who think that sincerity is only their inheritance, will surmise any thing of me. Hitherto I have lived and never sought preferment; and shall I seek it now, when I cannot hold it? O my God, be then my witness for me in other men’s hearts, as Thou art to me in mine own, that all the preferment I look after, is to do Thee and they Church service in this matter before I die.
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Objection 8: Yet of all men I should not do this, because I have been of another mind, and the blot of inconstancy will stick in my face. It is known that about 39 years since, I was deprived of my place which I then had in Norwich, for inconformity.
I answer: that touching the use of the cross in baptism, I did then doubt and therefore refused it: But I have, I thank God, learned something more than I knew 39 years ago, and am now able to master those objections which then mastered me. Nor do I so affect the praise of constancy, as to purchase it with the holding of error or concealment of the truth when God has showed it to me, and the times call for it. And if I have mended my judgment, let them follow me; if not, let them show it.
Objection 9: Yea I then also refused the surplice, as the act of my deprival shows.
Answer: I did so; but with protestation, that I did not hold that unlawful. I told some of my parishioners that I must wear the surplice or loose my place, and they me: Requiring to know of them how they would accept my ministry if I wore it (for my judgment they knew), they answered that they should never profit by it. Hereupon I resolved not to stumble them, admonished them of their error, told them they would repent it ere the year went about; And indeed so did they with many tears, wishing that I had rather worn ten surplices than to have left them. The God of Heaven knows that I speak the truth and nothing but the truth herein.
Objection 10: I, but at the first coming in of King James, preaching before him, I related a speech of Augustus [Caesar], who commanded the glasses should be broken, that no man might incur such a fright as one [Vedius] Pollio was put into, for breaking a glass of his master’s, etc.
Answer: It is true, and my meaning was to intimate unto that wise and learned king, this consideration, whether it were not better to take away the ceremonies than throw out the ministers for them: And yet I was at that time fully resolved of their lawfulness. Zanchi wrote most earnestly to Queen Elizabeth to move her Majesty to abate the same ceremonies, or not to urge them; and at the same time to Bishop Jewel to persuade the ministers not to struggle with the Queen (in case she would not be taken off), seeing the things were not simply unlawful. Did he cross himself? or was he unsettled?
Objection 11: Yea, but since that time I published a book against them called my Apology, to which Dr. Covell gave answer, in which book I show my judgment then to have been against these ceremonies, and give reasons also.
Answer: Indeed being called to subscription by the bishop then of Lincoln, soon after the Book of Canons came forth, I was of mind either to refuse subscription, though I had subscribed four several times before without scruple; or else to be assured by the bishop mine ordinary, that there was no such variation in the doctrine or intention of the Church as myself and others suspected (by the Book of Canons), but that I might still understand things as I had before conceived of them. Hereupon I prepared that Apology, intending to give it to the bishop, wherein I set down in what sense and construction of things I had formerly yielded to subscription, and why I did not think that I could now do so. Always resolving that if it should appear to me that there was no such variation as I then suspected, I would then again subscribe as I had done four several times before that.
This tractate was by occasion first presented by mine honorable friend Sir Thomas Jermin, Knight, unto the King’s Majesty, who knowing his own purposes of changing nothing in the doctrine and intention of the Church, took it ill of me, as if I had undutifully imputed to his Highness some close innovation, which I meant not to do. This book the then Lord Archbishop, Dr. Bancroft imparted to Dr. Covell, who answered thereto, and printed it with his answer; and thus that writing which was private, became public without my knowledge of it. But no man can truly say that in that book I say anything at all to prove these ceremonies unlawful to be used, whatever be there said against the urging of them: Nay I do there plainly set down in what sense and meaning I did before subscribe to the use of them as lawful.
And after that time, even the very day in which I was deprived for refusal of subscription, I did openly before (I take it) a hundred witnesses (whereof some yet remain) profess that if it should be made plain to me that there was no such alteration in the Church’s intendment as I apprehended, I would then subscribe as I had done before, without scruple. And accordingly afterwards I did freely subscribe after that his Majesty had seen the interpretation of things which I had conceived, and satisfied myself in, and has allowed them, and after that my Lord’s Grace of Canterbury that now is, had told me that they were not my senses, but the very true meaning and sense of the Church of England, whatsoever some men out of the riot of their wits had discoursed. These interpretations I will subjoin to this Discourse, because it may do some men good.
I now appeal to the consciences of men, and pray any sober man to tell me whether I have in all this showed any inconstancy or mutability more than Master Calvin did in subscribing, in some construction, to the Augustane [Augsburg] Confession, and yet refusing it in another. When a judge upon new evidence, or better opening of evidence, alters his sentence, no man says that the judge is various; but the case altered, or better discovered.
Objection 12: But, say some, it appears in that book that I subscribed four times, and as often revolted from it, which cannot but be a fruit of singular inconstancy, and will be upbraided to me.
Answer: Indeed so some have reported, and will needs collect it out of mine own words, because I do acknowledge in that book, in mine epistle to the bishop, that I had subscribed four times before: But I pray you, where is it said that I had also four times revolted? Let them that have laid that imputation upon me, make ready their accounts to God for that slander: it shall not touch me.
Howbeit, I do ingeniously confess two errors in that mine Apology; one that I trusted to the quotations of the Abridgment, which then I had in writing, thinking the authors thereof so just that they would not have cited them unless they had been right, and (in that confidence) made use of them in that Apology, not having then examined, nor time to examine them as since I have done, and find them, some falsified, some forced, some impertinent; which mine error of trust, shall be a warning to me hereafter.
The other fault was properly mine own, that upon some lighter surmises collected out of the Book of Canons, I did construe things to a worse meaning than I after perceived to be in the Church; which because I did not maliciously, I doubt not but God and his Church have forgiven it unto me.
Objection 13: But some yet instance that after that Apology [was] written, and after my deprivation by the then Lord Bishop of Lincoln, the King’s Majesty being then at Phinchinbrooke, required four of those ministers which stood out, to come before him; of which I was by the ministers named for one, and had gone with them, but that Master Dr. Montague, then Dean of the King’s Chapel, excepted against me. And though I went not, yet I prayed God to speed them well, and encouraged them. Therefore, say they, I was then of their mind ho condemn these ceremonies, or at least so taken to be.
Answer: I confess that choice of me, and my readiness to have gone with them, and that I wished them good speed: but I deny the inference grounded thereupon; for, as I had at other meetings with the same men at Huntingdon, in all our conferences stood professedly against their opinion who condemned them as unlawful, whereof one wrote plaintiff letters to London: So did I at that time, when I was chosen with the rest, profess that I could not speak against these things as unlawful, but only as inconvenient. And that I heartily prayed for their good speed, I do confess: For I then did, and still do, and ever shall desire that such men as they might not be cast out of the Church’s service, for their different opinion touching these ceremonies; however I then was, and still am persuaded that in judging them unlawful, they were, and are deceived. As for any other encouragement, I gave none. And they which object this against me, know this mine answer to them to be true, and so do others.
Objection [14]: Yet some say I was of their mind against these ceremonies, till a good benefice brought me about.
Answer: To which I answer that so some have said, and in the pulpit too; but the untruth thereof is famously known. For I had subscribed and obtained the liberty of my ministry again (for which I thank God, and all those that helped me) and been preacher at Bishops-gate in London, above six months before I heard any word of the benefice I have. Nor knew I my worthy patron, Master Robert Shilton, nor he me, nor had we ever seen one another, when first he pleased to bring the offer thereof unto me at Istleworth, after that Dr. Chetwind, now Dean of Bristoll had first refused it. And they which know how gainful the practice of physic was then to me (which I affirm upon my conscience to have been every year as profitable as my benefice is in three years at the least) will never believe that it was matter of profit which took me off from physic, and brought me to conformity. I may boldly say this, that I have parted with more profit by taking up conformity and a benefice than any man in England has done by his inconformity and loss of his benefice. Therefore it was not a benefice that drew me on.
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Wherefore I conclude that as I see yet no reason sufficient to persuade me that it is not a work fit to be done in itself, so do I not yet find any such objection as should detain me from tendering my best service herein to God and his Church, to whose gracious acceptance I commend the cause and myself, beseeching God to give some good issue thereunto for his own glory.
And I do heartily pray such as be contrary minded, that if they will please to read the treatise following, they would endeavor to do it without prejudice and partiality, if possibly they can; and take heed that they struggle not in favor of their former apprehensions, or professions against any light of truth which shall appear unto them; nor yet depend upon the persons of men, how good soever, seeing all men may err, and the stricter sort sooner than others, may fall into that error which lies on the right hand of the middle way, namely of being just overmuch. Consider what I say, and the Lord give thee understanding in all things.
And to the reverend fathers the bishops who urge, and others of my brethren who practice conformity, I do make it mine humble suit in the name of Jesus Christ, that they would consider every man of his own way, and all take heed, that our negligence in matters of greater moment than a ceremony, do not give occasion to such as herein differ from us, to like their own opinions the better, because we dislike them, whensoever we do not in other necessary duties approve ourselves to the consciences of men, godly and moderate, as we ought.
And what I speak of our persons, I intend respectively to all such as any of us have charge and command over, others, children or servants. For till we shall make it appear that we labor seriously to approve ourselves to God and men in the promotion and obedience of the Gospel, we shall neither have true peace in ourselves, nor authority of persuading others to judge of these matters as we judge, when they shall not dare to do as we do in things which bear no controversy. I know they ought not to put off any light of truth by such pretenses: But I am sure withal, that we ought not to give them such occasions of stumbling. And if they shall fain and make other causeless exceptions against us, yet we shall be innocent, and their partiality appear, and our cause win upon them do what they can.
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Qualifying Interpretations of Burges’s Subscription
A particular [delineation] of those interpretations of some things questioned in the matter of subscription, with which I had satisfied myself in former times, and with which I offered to subscribe the same day wherein I was deprived for not subscribing (which were after presented to his Majesty, by the then Bishop of Winchester, and after to my Lord’s Grace of Canterbury) upon which I was restored to my ministry.
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To the first article, concerning his Majesty’s supremacy, and the third concerning the Articles of Religion, agreed on in the Convocation House, etc. I do willingly and absolutely subscribe.
To the second article, viz. “That there is nothing contained in the Book of Common Prayer, the Book of Ordination of Bishops, Priests and Deacons, in the two Books of Homilies, contrary to the Word of God,” I do also willingly subscribe, if I may have leave to satisfy myself in such interpretation of some things questioned, as may stand with the words of subscription, and things subscribed to, in manner following:
1. Concerning the translations of some Scriptures, printed in the Book of Common Prayer.
I understand that our subscription to the Book of Common-Prayer is to approve the form of Common-prayer contained in that Book, and consequently, the reading of such Scriptures as are therein appointed to be read: And not to justify either the printer or translators’ error, which may be noted in any part of the Scriptures, contained in the closure of that book. For I see that men are allowed to read the same Scriptures after his Majesty’s translation [the KJV].
2. Concerning the Apocrypha Scriptures appointed to be read.
I undertake by subscription to acknowledge that the reading of these (which is all the Book requires) not as canonical, but as Apocrypha books for instruction’s sake, so far as they accord with the canon, is lawful.
3. Concerning the rites and ceremonies required by the Book, as the use of the surplice, cross in baptism, kneeling in receiving the Communion, in general.
I undertake not by subscription to determine how well these be imposed, but only to acknowledge that the use thereof upon his Majesty’s command, and that in the best construction of them, is lawful.
4. Of the use of the surplice in particular.
I understand it not to be imposed as an holy vestment, as were the priestly garments under Moses, by reason of God’s institution; nor as a thing necessary to the worship of God, or any part thereof; neither take I it to be enjoined as any sacramentally-significant sign, but only for order and uniformity’s sake.
5. Of the use of the cross in baptism.
I know it is not made any part of the sacrament of baptism, which is acknowledged (by the Canon) to be “complete without it,” and not perfected, or bettered by it.
I understand it not as any sacramental or operative, or efficacious sign, bringing any virtue to baptism, or the baptized.
Where the Book says, “and do sign him with the sign of the cross, in token, etc. I understand the Book not to mean that the sign of the cross has any virtue in it to effect or further this duty, but only to intimate and express by that ceremony (by which the ancients did avow their profession of Christ crucified), what the congregation hopes and expects hereafter from that infant, viz. That he “shall not be ashamed to profess the faith of Christ crucified,” into which he was even now baptized.
And therefore also when the 30th Canon says that “the infant is by that sign dedicated unto the service of Christ,” I understand that dedication to import, not a real consecration of the child, which was done in baptism itself, but only a ceremonial declaration of that dedication, like as the priest is said to make clean the leper, whose being clean he only declared.
6. Of the interrogatories in baptism.
I conceive that these interrogatories made to the infant, and answered as in his name by the sureties, intend only an adumbration of that stipulation and covenant, which is really entered into by receiving the sacrament of baptism, and not to import that the child actually has such a distinct faith, repentance, or desires as are there professed: or that he is indeed supplied thereof from his sureties, who cannot make over their own faith and repentance to others, as goods and chattels use to be conveyed.
7. Of kneeling in the act of receiving the Lord’s Supper.
I confess I never saw cause to think this unlawful to be done, and therefore I do it.
First, because the Church of England abhors all adoration of the sacrament, and the Papists know it.
Secondly, because it holds sitting or standing to be as lawful and holy as kneeling, putting no necessity or worship of God in any of these arbitrary gestures. Yea, because in this Church a prayer is then used for each communicant, this gesture may seem more agreeable to the external arbitrary form here used than to the fashion of other Churches, whose liberty is not abridged by ours; as not ours, by theirs.
8. As for other phrases of doubtful construction, I take them in the best sense, and so subscribe to the Book of Common Prayer.
9. Of the Book of Ordination of bishops, priests and deacons.
I conceive that subscription to this Book does not intend an approbation of every phrase or application of every place of Scripture therein alleged as fitly applied: but only that the calling of bishops to govern in the Church, and the ordination of inferior ministers by them to the uses there assigned, are not contrary to the Word of God, and so I subscribe to that Book.
10. Of the two Books of Homilies.
I undertake not to approve of every phrase or allegation of Scripture as fitly applied to the mind of the Holy Ghost: But that dogmatically there is nothing delivered in those Homilies that I know to be contrary to the Word of God, but that they may lawfully and profitably be read to the people for their edification when better means are wanting: And in this sense I subscribe to those Books also.
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These interpretations King James accepted, and my Lord’s Grace of Canterbury affirmed them to be the true sense and intention of the Church of England.
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A Manuduction [Introduction] into the following Dispute
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Outline
I. Intro
II. Definition of ‘Ceremony’
III. Sorts of Ceremonies
IV. What the Ceremonies in Question are
V. What is meant by Using them “in the Worship of God”
I. Intro
The matters and questions occasionally handled in this treatise are neither few nor unuseful: But the prime question here debated is, whether the wearing of a surplice in divine service, signing the forehead of the newly baptized with the figure of the cross, and kneeling in the act of receiving the bread and cup of the Lord’s Table, being enjoined by lawful authority to be used as indifferent rites, may lawfully and with a good conscience be so used and observed, or no? We hold the affirmative, others the negative.
Some of those which deny the use of them to be lawful, published anno 1605 a book called the Abridgement, etc. containing certain objections or arguments against the same. Other ministers also of the diocese of Chester, since that time, gave to their then bishop, the reverend and most learned bishop now of Coventry and Lychfield, their arguments against the said ceremonies, in writings, mostly the same with the Abridgement, and some few others. The said lord bishop, to give (if it might be) satisfaction to them and others, published a book, anno 1618, which he called a Defence of the Three Innocent Ceremonies, etc., wherein he conjoined (where it might be) the arguments (but not always the full words) of the Abridgers and those other ministers, or else took them apart, or so many of them as needed particular answer; sorting the objections which were made against all the three ceremonies by themselves, under the title of general arguments; and such as were laid particularly against each of these three, he called their Particular Exceptions. The generals he answers in the first part of his Defence, the particulars in the second: and after his answers given to their objections, he fails not to set down some of our arguments for the affirmative.
To the former part of this Defence, a Reply was made in print; but by whom, when or where printed, is not to be known by the book. After followed a Reply to the second part, printed (I suppose at Amsterdam) anno 1623, written (no doubt) by him that made the first, and both these carry this title, A Reply to Doctor Morton’s Defence of the Three Nocent Ceremonies, etc. In which book, the Replier tramples so scornfully and often upon the Defendant that many of the ignorant people have gloried in this triumphant book, and reported the same to be unanswerable: Yea, and some have been at the cost to get it written out, whereby the fire which was well allayed before, is now as by a new gale of wind more dispersed and flaming then it has been of some years past amongst the vulgar, in sundry places, to no small prejudice of such as conform to the law in the use of these ceremonies, and hinderance of the success of their labors in the Gospel.
To this Reply, or at least the first part of it, an Answer is made, to stay (if God will) the fury of that unseasonable and unprofitable fire which by this Reply has been and is blown, lest when we have greatest need of accord and agreement amongst ourselves, the people of Christ and members of the Church should grow unto bitter and hateful distractions and into open schism. The parties in this dispute are four:
First, the Opposers of conformity, the Abridgers and others, whose words are marked when they speak with ‘Opposers’.
Secondly, the Defender of conformity [Thomas Morton], whose words are fully set down where it seemed needful, or else the sum of them. And his badge is ‘Defendant’, whether he answer objections against us or object against them.
The third is the Replier [Anonymous / Ames], whose words are set down punctually, yea even his out-leaps and digressions, that neither he nor any for him may justly complain of such injurious dealing with him, as he has commonly used toward the Defendant; and his mark, whether he reply or answer, is ‘Replier’.
The last actor is the Answerer [Burges] to this Replier, whose words whether he answer or sometimes object, are marked with ‘Answer’.
So that it may always be known by the marks, whether the Opponent, or the Defendant, the Replier or the Answerer speak. And of this advertisement there is a further use, viz. to show how this book swells to so great a bulk, namely because it has so many other books in the belly of it.
The reader also will find at the ends of sundry sections certain digressions, to which though the main cause did not necessarily lead, yet where the Replier has pleased to make his out-roads, the Answerer thought good to follow him: that he might not be thought to have said anything against this Church of England to which no answer could be given.
But over and besides these directions, the reader (before he can judge of this question) behooves to understand: 1. What a ceremony is, 2. What sorts of ceremonies there are, 3. Of what sort these in question are, and lastly, [4.] What is meant by using them in the solemn worship or service of God.
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II. Of the Definition or Nature of a Ceremony
Whether the word ceremonia [in Latin] took the first rise from the old word cerus, id est, sanctus, “holy”; or from Ceres, a town by Rome, or Ceres the mother of fruits, the earth, or a cerendo, or a claritate, the very difference of conjectures makes it uncertain, nor is it to our purpose material, seeing we enquire what thing is usually, and in this dispute, meant by that term, and not so much whence it was first derived. For customary use rather than notation or birthright of words settles their signification.
Wherefore I thus describe it: A ceremony is an outward action designed or purposely observed and done in reference to some other thing, to the substance whereof it does not belong, either as a proper cause or part thereof. Which description I thus explain:
[1.] I call it an action, because nothing is or can be a ceremony in respect of existence or being, but only in respect of acting or usage thereof as a ceremony; however the very materials by a metonymy of the subject are often called ceremonies, i.e., improperly.
A surplice, or cross, or the gesture of kneeling, are no ceremonies, but the wearing of the surplice, signing with the cross, kneeling purposely in the act of partaking the communion are ceremonies.
The Tabernacle and some appurtenances of it, while they were in action and use were ceremonies, but when after the building of the Temple, they were laid up in it, they were no longer ceremonies, but relics and monuments.
[2.] I call it an external action, because internal actions of the mind being matter of substance whether good or evil, cannot duly be called ceremonies.
[3.] I say designed or purposely observed and done, because such actions as are casually or necessarily done for the attainment of some other matter, are not ceremonies, though actions done in reference to some other thing. For that to a ceremony (qua talis [as such]), institution or (which is all one) intended observation is essential.
Fourthly, I difference it from other sorts of actions natural or voluntary, by this, that it is always understood to be done in reference to some other matter, to the substance whereof it belongs not as a necessary cause or part thereof. For such is in our notion the incompatibility of substance and ceremony, that whatever belongs to anything as cause or part of the substance thereof, cannot be to the same thing, and in the same respect, a ceremony.
For example, the wearing of a judge’s, minister’s, lawyer’s or citizen’s gown merely to keep a man warm, is in that use no ceremony. But the wearing of any of these as a distinctive cognizance of such or such a calling and profession, is in that use a ceremony.
So washing of the saints’ feet, mentioned [in] 1 Tim. 5:10, was in that use of the substance of hospitality, and therefore no ceremony. But when our Lord washed his disciples feet for a document of humility, that washing was a ceremony, Jn. 13:12-15.
When we make profession of our faith to the honoring of God, that act is a part of the external worship to God, and no ceremony; but when the same [Apostles’] Creed is repeated at baptism, to remind the Church into what Faith all are baptized, this is a ceremony, because [it is] no substantial part either of divine worship, or of baptism to which it refers as a profitable ceremony.
Lifting up the eyes to behold the heavens is a necessity means to that end to which it serves, and then [is] no ceremony; but lifting up the eyes purposely in token of our expectation of help from Him that dwells in the heavens, is in that use a ceremony.
Convening in one set place and at an hour appointed unto the worshipping of God then and there, in the use of the Word, sacraments and prayers; is in that relation to the worship of God a ceremony, as not being any proper part of the worship itself, which might be entirely and as acceptably performed to God in another place, and at another hour caeteris paribus [all things being equal]: And yet the same convention, so far as it is the observance of order, is in that respect no ceremony, but a part of the order constituted.
Where may be marked, that they which oppose matters of order to matters of ceremony, as if the same thing could not be done in double relations, do confound the several notions of things, and oppose things coincident.
For example, the observance of the order appointed for the readings, singing of psalms, prayers, administration of the sacraments, or preaching in their turns and times, is, in respect of that order, of the substance thereof, and so no ceremony: But as the same refers to the several exercises of divine service, it is but a ceremony, because all the same acts of devotion might be performed in another order or manner, without any alteration or diminution of the substance thereof.
So in giving of possession of lands by an attorney, the delivery of a turf and twig (being by law or custom an essential form of giving such possession) is, in that respect, of the substance of real possession, and not a ceremony. But as that turf and twig do represent, and in a sort contain all the soil and appurtenances conveyed (from which they are now divided and therefore [are] no parts thereof), it is a ceremony.
Out of which premises will follow these consectaries:
First, that the very same actions done at the same time, may be, in several respects, ceremonies and no ceremonies.
Secondly, that it is not a natural aptness and habitude of any action to express this or that, that makes it a ceremony, but institutions or observation of it to such an use as is ceremonious. For as Dr. [William] Ames well says of sacraments, that “it is their institution” which imprints their signification, and not simply their own similitude, which is but the “substratum”. (Marrow, pt. 1, ch. 30, thesis 30) So say I of all actions which do naturally carry in them some aptness for expression (as kneeling, to show reverence; sitting, familiarity) that they are not therefore ceremonies, but only when they are so designed and observed. Whence also may appear that these things are no whit the less ceremonies in such designation, because their significancy is naturally engraven in them; but [they are] only so much the more lively, easy and familiar ceremonies.
Thirdly, that it is not mystical signification, or the want [lack] of it, which makes a ceremony or no ceremony (as some would have it), but relation only to some further matter, to the essence whereof it belongs not. For not only sacrifices, and sacraments or types, of the [Old Testament] Law were ceremonies in their use, but the observances even of place or time, of the laver, besoms [brooms], fire-shovels, and other circumstances of order, as touching of the right care of the leper first, and his thumb after (Lev. 14:14), and the wearing of linen breeches by the priests, and such like, were ceremonies so far as they had relation to the service of God, no less than such as were significant: Only those which had relation to some further worship, and withal some character of significancy, were in a double or perhaps treble relation, double or triple ceremonies; the other single: Those, in more respects; these, in one; but all ceremonies.
Fourthly, that the difference which some would make between circumstances and ceremonies, while they admit unto the Church’s power the determination of some circumstances, but not of any ceremonies in the service of God, may hereby appear to be a mere nicety or fiction. For that all circumstances (I mean extrinsic) which incur not the substance of the action, when they are once designed or observed purposely in reference to such a matter of whose substance they are not, they are then ceremonies as well as circumstances of that matter or action to which they so refer.
Fifthly, that to acknowledge any thing to be a ceremony ordained by man to be used in the worship of God, and yet to affirm the same to be a part of that worship to which it refers, implies a contradiction, because nothing can be both substance and ceremony to or of itself. Wherefore it must be fictitious worship (which is no worship indeed) when an outward human ceremony is made a part of substantial worship.
Sixthly, that divine or human institution does not make an action to be a ceremony or no ceremony, but rather makes a difference of necessary and arbitrary ceremonies: For that it is the relation (as has been said) which constitutes a ceremony, whether divine or human.
Seventhly, that it is not essential to a ceremony simply that it be no proper part of divine worship, but to an human ceremony only. For the sacraments of the Old or New Testament were or are essential parts of God’s external worship in their use, because required of Him; and yet as they refer to religion itself, which is an internal virtue, they are ceremonies, as [Daniel] Chamier rightly says; and so also are they (I mean the outward elements and acts) in respect of the internal things which they represent and sacramentally exhibit. Where may be marked also, that as the same person is in one relation a father, and in another a son and not a father, so the same action may be in some consideration a real act of divine worship; and, as so, no ceremony: and in reference to some other act of worship, a ceremony, and not of the substance thereof.
Eighthly, that it is not the same use and end which makes a ceremony to be a part of divine worship or not, but institution. For divine institution makes any circumstance to be a part of that service of God to which it is limited, however in some other relation it be but a ceremony. But human institution, though to the same end and use, cannot make that action to be a part, but only an adjunct to the act of divine worship, because the observance thereof, cannot incur the act of any proper worship to god, but serves only as a ceremony thereto. For example:
The Lord’s appointment of one place for sacrifices, and of some set days for the solemn worship of God, as the Sabbath and three solemn feasts to Israel, made the observance of that very place, and of those very times to be part of the worship itself. But the Church’s appointment of a set place or time unto the celebration of the acts of religious worship, because it incurs not the worship itself, leaves the observance thereof as a mere ceremony in relation to the worship, of the substance whereof it is no cause or part.
Lastly, that ceremonies may be, in respect of the genus and end to which [they?] serve, acts of religious worship.
I say in their general kind, viz. so far as they are in their kind parts of order and decency, to which they serve, because God has commanded in general that “all things be done in order” and “decency”: and yet considered in their particulars they are not of the substance of order, comeliness or worship, because the same may possibly be as well provided for (at least in other times and places) by observance of other particulars different from these.
Thus not only Calvin acknowledges kneeling in prayer to be a part of that comeliness which God requires in his worship, and so David’s dancing before the ark; but Dr. Ames also says of constitutions tending to order and decency, that when they are duly made and are most convenient, all circumstances being well considered, they are to be “counted rather divine.” (Marrow, pt. 2, ch. 15, thesis 27) And yet in their particulars no wise man will say that they are divine, or simply necessary, or proper parts of any worship of God, not being prescribed of Him, but left unto discretion. So that when human ceremonies are called accidental parts of worship, nothing is meant but that properly they are not any parts thereof, but adjuncts thereto; and those ambulatory, that is, mere ceremonies.
III. Of the Sorts & Difference of Ceremonies
Ceremonies bear many partitions, of which it will suffice to know some:
First, the more close or open use makes them to be private or public. For it is not essential to a ceremony, but to a solemn ceremony, that it be public.
Secondly, ceremonies, from their object and use, are either civil or sacred, or mixed. Civil when their immediate object and end is civil; sacred when their immediate object and end is matter pertaining to religion; or if it be double and look both ways alike they are mixed.
Let the reader consider, not only that use and end of actions does discriminate them; but that it is the immediate object and end of actions from which they are called civil or sacred. For when the remote end is some civil respect, as was it in the setting up of Jeroboam’s calves at Dan and Bethel, to fasten the kingdom in his hands; yet if the next and immediate use belong to religion, as his setting up of the calves there was, that his people might worship God there, the action shall be construed religious or sacred, whether truly or falsely so called. So on the other side, when the remote end respects the glory of God, as even in eating and drinking and whatever we do, [which] we all stand bound to do, yet when the immediate end and use is civil, the action shall then be so esteemed.
And it is not so much the terminus a quo [from which], as the term ad quem [to which], that shall denominate. For an action imperated of religion, shall yet be civil in respect of the proper object, as was the midwives’ sparing of the Israelites’ children a civil action, belonging (says Junius) to the Second Table; because though it sprang out of the fear of God which is religion, yet it determined in the lines of men, and therefore was civil. So, though Jeroboam’s device sprang out of civil respects, yet because it pitched on a matter of religion, that action of erecting the calves was not civil.
Touching the difference of civil and sacred ceremonies, the reader also must know that we consider the present use of either, and so name them. For the same ceremony which is in present use sacred, may be forthwith by the change of the object, civil: and so on to the contrary.
The people in bowing down worshipped God and the king [1 Chron. 29:20], the ceremony was materially the same; but objectively different; one civil, the other sacred: So was the wearing of blacks, rending of garments, putting on of ashes, civil, when used to express natural sorrows and mournings for friends: yet the very same things used in humiliation to God, were in that use sacred.
So when at King James’s funeral the bishops went before the corpse or hearse in their formalities, [and] the clerks of his Majesty’s chapel [did so] in their surplices. This use of those habits [garments] was civil, as serving to show that they, as other sorts of his subjects, mourned for the loss of their prince. But the use of the same habits in the execution of their functions in the service of god, is in that use rather a religious or sacred ceremony.
Wherefore they which tell us that all which the Church may do touching rites and ceremonies is but the application of circumstances which are in nature civil, and serve to the comeliness as well in civil as sacred actions; adding that the Church may not ordain any one or other ceremony which shall be merely ecclesiastical, do manifest a spirit which lusts after contradiction. For if the Church ordain or observe at all any ceremonies in religious affairs, the same must be, in that use, sacred or merely ecclesiastical, though in other use civil. And yet, it is this they say were true, the ceremonies in question might stand, seeing there has been, may be, and is a civil use also of a linen garment, a cross for a shop sign and kneeling to honor a king or a father.
Thirdly, ceremonies called “sacred” are of two sorts, properly so called, or reductively.
Properly sacred are all and only such as be of divine institution, which we call also simply necessary, necessitato praecepti [by the necessity of precept].
Reductively sacred are such as in their particular have no divine institution, but are applied in their use to those things which are divine, and these we call arbitrary or ambulatory ceremonies.
Fourthly, of those which are reductively sacred, some are so called rightly, some absolutely.
Rightly, when both the object they serve unto is some matter of true religion, and when the end for which they are imposed and to be observed, is also such as God has allowed, and the things not unapt thereunto: For, variation from these rules, will abate the just title of sacred ceremonies.
Absolutely called “sacred,” are all such as are either idolatrous, superstitious or impious.
Idolatrous, when intended to a wrong object, as namely all ceremonies devised and used in and to the honoring of an idol, whether properly or by interpretation such; Of which sort were all the ceremonies of the pagans, and not a few of the Papists.
Superstitious, if men worshipping only the true God, yet place and put upon their own ceremonies, the title of divine, whether plainly in terms, or in effect.
In terms, as Bellarmine does father on their use of the cross, that it effects great and supernatural matters ex opere operato, by virtue of a divine institution;
Or in effect, as when the proper service of God is placed in them, or merit, necessity, holiness and efficacy (though by virtue of the Church’s institution or the doers’ merits) and when the very omission of them is reputed a sin, even though it be without contempt or scandal. For what can be said more of God’s own ordinances than this, nay nor all this truly I mean for efficacy ex opere operato or by merit operantis.
Impious ceremonies, when God’s own ceremonies are cast off, as the not giving of the cup in the Supper to the people; or when they obscure the Gospel, representing the history and mystery thereof by dumb shows, as in the pagent of the Mass.
Again, sacred ceremonies are, in respect of their continuance or changeableness, perpetual or temporary, moveable or immoveable.
Perpetual are only so many as God has ordained to be so. For the Church being bounded with certain rules and confined to them, cannot ordain any ceremony which shall not be alterable, when the same shall, by change of times and occasions, become not unprofitable alone, but dangerous and hurtful in the judgment and conscience of those to whom it belongs to discern thereof.
Of ambulatory ceremonies, some also are free, as left free by the Church as touching their use; and these are rather allowed than commanded: as when sundry synods (after mentioned) left it free to stand or kneel in receiving the Lord’s Supper, but forbade sitting, because of the Arians, who used that gesture in contempt of Christ’s deity.
Others are fixed (as being commanded). In which the observation must ever be free, in respect of the judgment to be had of them (otherwise they become superstitions and snares), but the practice only is required and restrained for order and discipline sake, and for edification of men unto the worship of god.
Again, ceremonies in regard of their use are simple or double. Double are such as beside their use for order and decency, serve also to edification by some profitable signification, which either of themselves they have some aptness unto, or receive by appointment, as it were by common agreement.
Significant ceremonies also are sacramental or moral.
Sacramental are either properly so called or improperly.
Properly so called, are only such as signify and seal the Covenant of Grace; The spiritual thing signified in the sacrament is (says Dr. Ames) the Covenant of Grace: which, because none can institute or ratify but God, therefore no creature may or can institute such a significant ceremony.
Improperly sacramental ceremonies are so called either reductively or analogically.
Reductively sacramental are all ceremonies which are ordained of men to attend upon the administration of the sacraments, whether they bear signification or not;
but significative sacramental ceremonies reductively so called, are such as being affixed to the use of the sacraments, bear some significancy, either of their virtues or our duties to which we are obliged by the sacraments.
Such was the tasting of milk and honey, the wearing of a white coat for a week after baptism, used of old and now deserted, and the holy kiss, used at the Communion, as shall appear. And such is the rehearsal of the [Apostles’] Creed, and imposition of the name at baptism (as of old at circumcision) as it were to notify that we have no name till we be incorporate into the Church of God.
These sorts, if they offend not in their unaptness, number, obscurity, or superstitious opinion or abuse of them, were never yet condemned as unlawful for their only significancy: And of this sort with us, signing with the cross after baptism, and kneeling in the act of receiving are sacramental, as ceremonies waiting on the sacraments in that use.
Analogically sacramental are such significant ceremonies which by men are instituted or observed not only to signify, but also to work supernatural effects, whether ex opere operato [from the work working], as (says Bellarmine) the signing with the cross does; or ex opere operantis [from the work of the worker], and that either by virtue of the Church’s consecration, prayers or blessing, or by the merit of him that uses them.
All such significant ceremonies which are analogically sacramental, albeit they signify not the Covenant of Grace, yet, inasmuch as operation and virtue is inscoffed upon them, they are fancy and impious emulators of God’s holy sacraments, and of all sound divines condemned in the Church of Rome, and justly.
Morally significant, we call those ceremonies which of men are ordained and observed not to signify or seal the Covenant of Grace, nor yet to exhibit any grace at all sacramentally, but only to express some benefit which God gives us, or to notify, profess or express some duty which we owe to Him or one to another.
And of this sort we affirm our ceremonies in question to be, if they be all (as two of them are) significant. For though reductively they may be called sacramental, as has been said; yet properly or analogically, that is, in respect of their own import and signification, or use, they are not sacramental: that is, either in respect of the matter signified by sacraments, which is the Covenant of Grace, or in respect of any operative or exhibitive virtue of that which they signify, ascribed to them.
They which make all mystical or significative ceremonies to be sacramental, because they carry some signification, do affect strife, and take up the term “sacramental” in such a sense as did never any before them, that men finding sacramental ceremonies to be condemned (that is, the falsely called sacraments, or analogically answering to them in signification and fained efficacy too in a measure), they might think ours to be condemned as sacramental in that sense and meaning.
Such significant symbolical rites, as ours be, in the intention of the Church, I dare affirm never to have been condemned as unlawful in the Church of God, save only by such as oppose us now.
And in the discourse it will appear that the Jews without divine prescription did devise and use such ceremonies as helps unto men in the acts of God’s worship. Such was the stone which Joshua pitched in the court of the sanctuary to be a monitory witness of their profession made in that place. Such the gesture of lying on couches in eating the Passover, in token of the rest which God had now given them in their own land, and the bread of affliction then also given with these words, “This is the bread of affliction which our fathers did eat in Egypt.” Yea such was the passing between the parts of the sacrifice, Jer. 34:18. The sealing to the covenant, Neh. 9, and hundreds more which no law of God did institute, and yet no prophet of God condemned, and some Scriptures allow (as shall appear) so long as they were used as moral signs for the help of men, and not as necessary acts of religious worship to God in themselves, nor as counterfeit sacraments.
IV. What the Ceremonies in Question are
Now to the third point we say that these our ceremonies are not private, but public; sacred, not civil: but yet sacred only by application, not by divine institution; mutable, not permanent; indifferent, not necessary; sacramental reductively, but properly moral; in the signification partaking nothing at all of the proper nature of sacraments, neither in the matter signified by sacraments, nor in the virtue of obsignation or moral efficacy, ordained to be used necessarily in respect of order and peace; but in respect of the judgment concerning them, and immediate conscience to God, freely.
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V. What is Meant by using them in the Worship of God
Of which when we say that they may lawfully be used in the solemn service of God, we mean not, that they are, or may lawfully be used as acts which in themselves are any part of God’s external service, but only as free ceremonies, when, and while we are in the exercise of prayers, the Word or sacraments, which are by God’s institution in their own use proper acts of outward religious or divine service, to which these serve only as ceremonies for order, decency and edification, and are not of the substance of all or any of them, because but mere ceremonies.
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The Answer to the Replier’s Preface
Replier [Ames]: Sir, however there may be many unknown motives which lead men in these days to conformity, yet those which are openly professed may be referred either to Master [John] Sprint’s way, who confesses the ceremonies to be imposed contrary unto the rules of God’s Word and yet contends that they are to be used in case of deprivation: or else to Dr. [Thomas] Morton’s way, who avouches the said ceremonies to be agreeable unto the rules of God’s Word and therefore are to be observed simply.
Answer [of Burges]: Some men (without all doubt) are led to conformity by private or unknown motives and so are some others to inconformity: viz. admiration of men’s persons for advantage, desire of revenge for private injuries and especially hope of being reputed the more godly and sincere men. Wherefore on all hands it behoves us to examine our motives for we must give an account to God. The two ways (as you call them) of conformity we acknowledge: and what can you say against them?
Replier: Now he that considers well of the matter shall find that there is no ground for the conscience to rest on in either of these ways.
Answer: That is to say, no man considers well of the matter except he find for the plaintiff [Ames]. No man has any ground of rest for his conscience unless it rest on your grounds. How masterly? When after all the diligence we can use for our information as in the sight of Christ we find those ceremonies in our opinions either wholly blameless, as some; or though inconvenient, yet not simply unlawful (and therefore [they are] to be observed for peace and the Gospel’s sake), as others of us think and believe, shall not the full persuasion of our minds be no ground to our conscience [p. 44] to rest on? O strange! that full persuasion of the mind (yea even where the judgement fails) touching matters not intrinsically evil, gives rest to the conscience. The thing so done is done out of faith and unto the Lord as saint Paul teaches us. Now whether you or we have best considered of the matter, let the Church judge. (Rom. 14:3-5, 16, 23) Give your reasons of this sentence and I will give my answers.
Replier: As for Mr. Sprint (to speak nothing of his mis-alleging of very many authors), he has but three main arguments, and to all three he has given sufficient answer himself.
Answer: Your rhetorical saying ‘nothing’ implies more than can truly be said of Mr. Sprint’s mis-alleging authors; yea ‘many’; nay, ‘very many’. Subtle men accuse only in generals lest they should be disproved in particulars. But if Mr. Sprint have mis-alleged authors, as I shall after prove the Abridgers and yourself to have done, he was much to blame, which yet I believe not. I am content that men believe you in this challenge of Mr. Sprint if yourself shall not be found to mis-allege Mr. Sprint’s arguments and confessions, which after [what] you say give[s] sufficient answer to them all.
And first you ascribe to him three main arguments when you say he has but ‘three’, and give instance of three, wherein is your first mis-alleging of him: for he has but two main arguments in his book: The one that the doctrine and practice of inconformity in case of deprivation is directly contrary to the Word of God, which he enters upon page 3. The other, that it condemns the doctrine and practice of all the Churches of Christ, primitive and others, etc. on which he enters page 70. And only these he propounds as his main arguments, page 2. And why do you say ‘three’? It is yourself that, p. 5 of your General Reply, tell us that against the ceremonies ‘it is enough if they were condemned but by one sound argument drawn from the Scriptures, though [p. 45] no more could be brought.’ If one such argument against them be enough, how comes it that you make a ‘but’ at ‘three’ for them? Are you not partial? But of all loves make it appear that Mr. Sprint has, by his own confession, sufficiently answered those three arguments.
Replier: His first argument is taken from the doctrine and practice of the apostles about the Jewish ceremonies.
Answer: Now here the second time you mis-allege him, for this is not his first main argument, nor either of his two main arguments, but only one of his sub-arguments brought to prove the first, as appears, p. 2 & 8, in which latter place it stands thus:
If the apostles by direction of the Holy Ghost and upon reasons of common and perpetual equity, did practice themselves and teach others to practice, yea and advised and enjoined (as matters good and necessary to be done) ceremonies, as inconvenient and evil in many main and material respects, as the ceremonies enjoined and prescribed in our Church are supposed to be (mark ‘supposed’), then it follows that to suffer deprivation for refusing to conform to the ceremonies of our Church is directly contrary to the doctrine and practice of the apostles. But the former is true, therefore the latter.
Thus he; But your framing of his argument [is] so short [it] has left out much of the pith of it and gained you more color of exception, which is (in my apprehension) some mis-alleging of him. Show us now his answer to this argument, if you can perform your words.
Replier: Now all the force of this reason does depend upon that parity and equality which is supposed to be between our ceremonies and the Jewish; our ministers’ warrant and the apostles: so that if this parity fails, the whole argument falls.
Answer: Nay sir, not all the force, nor the chief force: for though touching matter of practice the argument is from parity of the things done, yet touching the matter of warrant (which is the more weighty), it is grounded upon [p. 46] what the apostles taught by the Holy Ghost, and that upon common and perpetual grounds of equity, which point is proved and provable only by testimony of Scriptures. This, if you had marked it, would have spared you the comparison of the apostles and the ministers’ warrant, because it is even the same, though they had it immediately from God, [but] we from them. But go to: make the best of your own.
Replier: Yet Mr. Sprint himself confesses, pp. 250-56, that these Jewish ceremonies were not every way so evil as ours are.
Answer: He does so. But you told us of a confession of his which should sufficiently answer his argument, whereas this answers it not at all, much less sufficiently. For what if in some particular respects our ceremonies be acknowledged by Mr. Sprint to be worse (i.e.) more inconvenient than those of the Jews, seeing he also maintains, p. 6, that those of the Jews were in some other most weighty respects worse than ours are: does not this bring them even again in the total? Two ells are more than one, but two ells of half-yard broad-cloth is in the whole measure no more than one ell of yard-broad cloth, which in the breadth supplies what it wants in length. Again Mr. Sprint, p. 7, says that the apostles admitted and enjoined the use of the Jews’ ceremonies upon reasons equivalent, partly, partly inferior to the avoidance of deprivation, which again would make the matter equal, for look what proportion lesser necessity has to lesser inconveniency: the same has greater to greater, as two times twenty and twenty times two make one product.
Yea so far is Mr. Sprint from confessing any such inequality between those and our ceremonies on the part of ours, that on the contrary he (p. 209-10) maintains this argument to hold good a majori [from the greater], however he first propounded it a pari. And will any man now believe that his own confession has answered his Argument? [p. 47] Will the Replier believe himself in this? But proceed to the parity of the apostles’ and ministers’ warrant, and see if in that Mr. Sprint has confessed disparity.
Replier: Neither does, nor dare he say that ministers now have such particular warrant for conformity as the apostles had for applying themselves a little while unto some of the Jewish ceremonies.
Answer: You told us of his confession and now you tell us he does not, he dare not say? Where is his confession you spoke of? Where [is] his own answer?
But say, he dares not say that the minister has such particular warrant as had the apostles in respect of the manner of revelation, which was to them wholly or more immediate, yet when he dares and does say that ‘the apostles being directed by the Holy Ghost, have taught us what to do in like case,’ he does therein attribute the ministers’ warrant to be the very same (upon the matter) which the apostles received of God. And if this be not found, then have we not the same ground of faith which they had, because [we have] not the same particular manner of revelation. A modo ad rem [from the mode of a thing, to the thing], is a fallacy you know. The court roll and the true copy of it are the same evidence in substance. If the apostles’ practice only had been alleged, this objection had been reasonable: but when their doctrine, and that upon grounds of common and perpetual equity, was brought in, the very argument foreclosed this demurrer. Besides that, Mr. Sprint also has answered that objection of the apostles’ particular warrant fully (pp. 13-14). Where is his confession you spoke of?
As for those words of the apostles applying themselves for a while to the Jews’ ceremonies: they are true of their persons; for they lived not long: but not so of their rule, which is not measurable by the length of time, but by the continuance or discontinuance of the cause and reason. Hence the Church retained the observation of not eating blood and strangled [things] four hundred years, till the alteration of the reason dissolved the injunction. I conclude therefore [p. 48] that Mr. Sprint’s confession, as fully answering his own argument, is not alone mis-alleged, but untruly objected touching this first reason. Go to the second main argument.
Replier: His second reason is that a lesser duty must yield unto a greater.
Answer: Here is a third mistaking, for this is not his second main reason, as is pretended, but a proof of the second member of his first reason, as he says of it, p. 24. And yet this is not fully alleged: for you leave out his explicatory words, viz. ‘when both duties cannot be done,’ and his reason, that ‘in such case the lesser duty is no duty’. But show us how this shall be fully answered out of his own confession.
Replier: Now this case, by his own confession, p. 30, does not hold so, as that a man should do a thing formally, simply and in nature evil for any good.
Answer: You should rather have called it his own explication; and indeed his very argument imports so much when he compares duty with duty. For nothing which is in the own nature formally and simply evil, can ever become a duty, unless by [a] particular command of God, as Mr. Sprint also shows. But what of this?
Replier: Now he knows, as appears p. 45, that the ceremonies in controversy are esteemed such by most of those that now oppose them, so that this reason can be of no force with them.
Answer: You promised to show us out of his confession a sufficient answer: but this you suppose extending but to the most (if to the most) of those which oppose the ceremonies, is not sufficient for all that oppose them. Neither does Mr. Sprint take notice of the most, but of some writers, and the deprived ministers (p. 45), which are not the most of the opposers.
But secondly his confession relieves not one of you against his argument: for he excepts things which are formally and simply evil in their own nature and use: he does [p. 49] not say ‘which seem so’ or ‘so to some men by error of opinion,’ which he there avouches to be your case, affirming your reasons for that opinion to be weak and frivolous. Nor will you (if you think) say that when a man only thinks a thing to be unlawful which is not so, and yet cannot forbear that without breach of a greater and certain commandment of more importance, that he is then bound to favor his own opinion and to forbear, however, when he is a free man, he ought to forbear till he be better informed. You have done yourself wrong in making it all one to be simply unlawful and [for it] to be so esteemed. Indeed if men’s opinions could transform the very nature of things in themselves, to make those things simply unlawful which they so esteem, you should have some relief from his confession, but you have none at all, much less enough. Proceed to that which you set down as his third main reason.
Replier: His third reason is because refusal of conformity in case of deprivation tends to condemn in a manner all true Churches which have taught and practiced otherwise. He means by ‘condemning,’ accusing of error.
Answer: You mistake also in this. For this he professes to be his second main reason, both in p. 2 & 70. And this you mis-allege in the substance of it. For whereas he says absolutely, ‘all true Churches’, you make him say, ‘all in a manner’, which is as much as not all. Your gloss also is corrupt: for he says, It tends to condemn all true Churches, etc., you say he means by condemning, accusing of error, by what warrant? Is it all one to condemn and to condemn of some error and simply to condemn? He explicates himself and shows that the doctrine and practice of inconformity in case of deprivation, tends to condemn all true Churches, primitive and others and all learned men of all ages, of a gross and substantial error in judgment, and continual sin in practice never repented of by them, never found fault withal, save of late by your party, which cannot choose but [p. 50] be a great and presumptuous error and sin in you. Now tell us how his confession has discharged you of this argument.
Replier: Now Mr. Sprint himself does thus condemn all, or the most of the Churches which he alleges to have practiced such ceremonies.
Answer: Yet will not this amount to a sufficient answer to the argument, nor at all to an answer. For what if Mr. Sprint has himself committed the same fault with you, are you discharged of the objection because [he] himself is reproved by it? Is recrimination any purgation?
Secondly, if Mr. Sprint condemn some Churches or most, he condemns not all absolutely as your doctrine and practice does: wherefore if that were an answer, yet [it were] not sufficient for you; and the less, because he condemns them (as you interpret) but by accusing them of some crude, particular error; but you condemn all as drenched in a most dangerous and perpetual error, not of practice alone, but in their very doctrine, which is far worse.
Lastly, you show no place where he so condemns, as you speak, any Churches for this matter, and therefore you may well be suspected of falsehood. And the reason you give for proof will not help you out of this suspicion. Yet bring it in.
Replier: For acknowledging our ceremonies to be inconvenient, scandalous, evil, such as the urging of them cannot be justified, and yet affirming that almost all Churches have appointed and used such ceremonies of the case of deprivation or such like necessity, does he not plainly accuse all those Churches of error?
Answer: You direct us not to any place where this so affirm[ed] may be found. I find often that he says, ‘supposed to be’, as admitting them to be such: but not where he firmly says that they are such. Put be it so: does he say the same are also scandalous, offensive, inconvenient in other Churches where they are disposed or used? Or that they are used even out of the case of any necessity? And [p. 51] the case of necessity, for the greater good or avoidance of greater evil, he defends that the apostles did, and all the Churches have and might lawfully use, impose and urge the use of ceremonies accidentally evil, scandalous and inconvenient, which he strongly proves (marg: pag. 97). Wherefore it cannot be gathered from his confession that he plainly condemns any Churches of error, as you do all, in that your doctrine and practice of inconformity, in the case of greatest necessity, deprivation from the work of the Gospel.
Replier: These things considered, I thought it needless to spend much time in examining Mr. Sprint’s book any further. But according to your desire, I shall show you my opinion in brief, concerning the chief passages which are in Thomas Chester (i.e. Thomas [Morton], then Bishop of Chester), or as he was wont to be called, Dr. Morton’s Defence of Three Ceremonies commonly Used in our Churches, which I do the more willingly undertake, because diverse things are therein handled of singular use in divinity, whereof I profess myself a student, though in the ministry I cannot find a settled station.
Answer: If you can think that you have confuted all Mr. Sprint’s book with these few dictates, you do well to rest in them: but by your jeofailes[?] in this, other men will conjecture of your reply to the Bishop of Chester, Dr. Morton’s book, to which you now make your approaches. To which I also shall the more willingly attend you, because of the many useful points handled therein, being yet sorry for this word that you can find no settled station in the ministry. For sure I am that God has made you very capable of a settled station in the Church of England unless your settled resolution against her discipline shall give impediment.
Replier: But before I come to the Defence itself, first, I would faine understand the reason why three ceremonies are only defended, seeing there be many threes of those things which stay many godly men from subscription and conformity, as is to be seen even in that Abridgment which [p. 52] this Defender [Morton] does chiefly oppose.
Answer: The reasons may be:
First, because the Abridgement, though it do mention sundry other grievances, yet touching matter of ceremonies it dissents only against these three particularly.
Secondly, because in the title of these, sundry others receive trial.
Thirdly, because these are most in the way (or eye) of all sorts of opposers.
Fourthly, because if the Defendant had taken all before him (which some of you excepting justly) he should scarce have found out the limits of the controversy, nor would you all have stood to it.
And fifthly, because if God shall bring us to accord in these, the strife about conformity is likely to cease; unless men be of that mind that some were of in Queen Elizabeth’s time, to whom, when she offered to remove these ceremonies if that would give them content, they returned answer that ‘they were resolved not to leave one hoof behind them’; which answer made them all the faster. (This Sir Francis Walsingham told Mr. James Knewstubs, of whom I had it.)
Replier: Is it because our prelates have only a care to persuade conformity, that even in the ministry, that conformity be most allowed, not regarding in the mean time what becomes of so many godly learned young men, who not only for these, but diverse other corruptions also, are forced to turn away from the ministry, whereunto their education, gifts and hearts do carry them, while many lewd fellows, the chief blots of our congregations, do possess their places?
Answer: As for your suggestion of the bishops not considering what become of other godly young men, look you to your part in that; and they, to theirs. And if you have by your outcries and condemning of sundry things as impiety, causelessly frighted many men from the ministry, you shall have cause enough of humbling yourselves for so great a sin, whatever the prelates shall have of their accounts. And the worser men they are that now possess the places that such worthy men might have had, the more heavy shall be your reckoning, who have [p. 53] caused their consciences so far, that they have chosen to want the most necessary duties, for fear of failing in lesser.
Replier: I would know also what the reason should be, that the innocency only of these ceremonies is defended? Is this all that is required in ceremonies forcibly obtruded upon ministers and people, even to the silencing, excommunicating and utter undoing of many hundreds? Is this all I say that is required, that such ceremonies be in some sense innocent, or not hurtful? Surely not Scripture only, and sound reason, but common-sense will look for some good necessary use of such ceremonies and not innocency alone.
Answer: The Defendant endeavored to satisfy such as opposed the ceremonies, as things unlawful to be used: Now, to this purpose it was enough to prove them innocent. And perhaps you are the worse pleased, because you have less field-room for opposition, than if he had undertaken more. Yet does he in the book perform more than the title imports: And is this a fault, to be better than his word?
You say ceremonies should not be so urged on men, unless they be more than innocent, even necessary. But you forget that they should not be so resisted by private men, even unto their own undoing and the Church’s loss of them, being matters though not necessary, yet innocent: so still you must have a shift.
Moreover, such things as are not at all necessary in themselves, and inconvenient too, may yet be urged as necessary, when their use concerns the peace and edification of the Church, though but accidentally. Thus were some of the Jews’ antiquated ceremonies called necessary, by the apostles, Acts 15:28, and as so, imposed. You would faine have it thought that it lies in the bishops’ hands to abate these ceremonies, willingly forgetting, that they stand by regal and parliamentary authority, and not alone by canons, much less at the bishops’ pleasure. And if they did, name me that Church which does not [continues onto next page — matches the “not impose her Orders…” opening of page 54 already transcribed above] [p. 54] not impose her orders and ordinances upon her own members severely, especially when they come to contradiction. Schism is no small matter, though ceremonies be but light matters in themselves.
Replier: And then what is the sense (trow you) in which these ceremonies may be called ‘innocent’? When Calvin (whom the Defendant calls an honorable witness) would devise a charitable title for them, he styles them tolerabiles ineptiæ, viz. tolerable fooleries or fopperies; epistles 200 & 206. When he speaks more out of judgement, he not only calls them frivolous and unprofitable, but says plainly that their proper name is hurtful, noxious, or nocent, clean contrary to this Defendant’s language. Surely one of these writers, not differing only, but flatly opposing and contradicting the other, must needs be far wide.
Answer: Your meaning is that they may be called ‘innocent’, as natural fools are called ‘innocents’: and to this end is Mr. Calvin alleged as calling them, epistle 200 (in the mildest style) tolerable fooleries or fopperies, whereas in their proper name he calls them noxious or nocent, etc. epistle 206. As for this gybe, seeing the Replyer has couched it somewhat close, as half ashamed of it, for the lightness and incongruence thereof to a Theolog. call. Dispute, I will not press him further about it than with this one question: Whether he that is innocent for want of wit, or he that is nocent by the misgovernment of his wit, shall pass his accounts easier at the Last Day?
Touching the former testimony of Calvin (epistle 200): I answer that it does not appear that he spoke it of these ceremonies in question, there being some other things, as then, in King Edward’s Book of Common Prayer, to which it might refer. For thus he writes to the English exiles at Frankfort: In the English Liturgy, as you describe it, I find that there were many tolerable unfitnesses. By these two words I mean that there was not that pureness that was to be wished, which faults yet could not by and by all in a day be reformed, and were for a time to be tolerated, as having no manifest impiety in them. Where if we shall render tolerabiles [p. 55] ineptiæ, tolerable fooleries and fopperies, and not unfitnesses, we shall find Calvin to allow some fooleries and fopperies in a reformed Church, at least for a time, which in our language sounds harshly.
In the second place (epistle 206) where (say you) he speaks his judgement more freely to the same men, he says that lights and crosses (which as then were used at the administration of the Supper, not now) and other like trifles, came out of superstition. But he names not these ceremonies in question, nor did he mean them; or not all. For as he allows kneeling in the act of the Supper, so as the worship be directed not to the sacrament, but unto Christ as sitting in Heaven, Institutes, 4.17.37, so he blames Bishop Hooper for standing so stiffly against the cap and surplice. Nor does he anywhere (for ought I know) condemn the use of the cross in baptism, as it is with us. His words concerning such things as he there spoke of, are these:
‘Hence I resolve that they that hold these things indifferent do too willingly draw out of the dregs. Nor do I see to what end the Church should be burdened with vain and unprofitable ceremonies, not to call them by their proper name, ‘noxious,’ where liberty of a pure and simple manner is left unto our choice.’
Thus he. Now when he would not have these things (suppose these ceremonies in question) reckoned indifferent, which he denied in the other epistle to be impious, and calls them not only unprofitable, but noxious or nocent, who sees not that he so speaks of them respectively to the English Church at Frankfort, which was at liberty to choose for itself; and where these things, doing no good, were in the event noxious and hurtful? But the Defendant considers them partly in their own nature, partly in respect of the intendment of the Church of England in their use, and so calls them ‘innocent’. And in this there is no contradiction between Calvin and him, for the respects are different to the eye.
Replier: Innocent indeed these ceremonies may be called in regard [p. 56] of their materials and the fashions also which they use in their natural being: For the cloth of a surplice, and the fashion of it, is innocent, and so are all the idols of the Papists and heathens very innocent, so that this is no praise.
Answer: These are not ceremonies in respect of their materials, or fashions which they have in their natural being; and therefore it cannot be properly said that they are innocent ceremonies in such respects in which they are not at all ceremonies. Nor do I conceive how it can be said that in such respects all idols of Papists and pagans may be called innocent. For seeing the name of an idol, formally taken, imports some representation; and sundry such were made to represent the Godhead by that very fashion and shape, without which intention it had not been an idol; I can say, the metal or matter was innocent, and that shape in itself, but yet not that the idol was very innocent in these respects.
But we consider our ceremonies as they are actions, and in their use, and think it strange that any man should say that the administration of holy things should be better or worse if a man put on a black or a white, a linen or a woolen garment; and so, that it is either itself necessary or unlawful to receive the sacrament sitting, standing, kneeling, walking or kneeling, or to give a token of such profession as baptism itself does implicitly require of all baptized, more than to express so much in words (which are but significant signs of things), especially when words go along with the outward sign and declare the use of it.
Replier: But when we look at the use whereunto they have been applied, and wherein they have been a long time evil employed, I may truly say by the Devil, not only among Papists, but even in our Churches, to the breeding of dissension and distraction among brethren, to quenching many, and many a burning shining light, to the grief and unsettling of so many good saints, and to the advantage [p. 57] of the kingdom of darkness: If these things I say be considered, then it is more than manifest that this licking them over with a fair word will make them indeed no more innocent than Pilate’s hands were when they were washed. The fashion of a surplice, natural or artificial, is another use, as if a porter or baker wear such a garment, is indifferent.
Answer: They are no ceremonies but in use and action, as has been said, and the consideration of them in that use ought to be weighed by the Church’s intended application of them when the question is of lawful or unlawful, and not by such employment as the Devil or wicked men have made or make of them: for that belongs to the question of convenient or inconvenient: which two distinct considerations you cunningly shuffle by confounding the Church’s application and the Devil’s intendment to abuse them to distractions.
But yet know that if they had never been opposed, these bitter effects, or rather sequels of them, had never followed. Wherefore though no fair words could wash either side from guiltiness who have too eagerly either urged or opposed these ceremonies, yet they themselves may be washed, or rather need it not, unless you can prove the things themselves in their own nature or intended use to have been guilty, as Pilate was an actor, a principal actor, in the killing of our Lord Jesus.
As for your allowance of a surplice to porters and bakers coming in here at the end, as forgotten before, I suppose [it] only to be spoken [by you] to make sport, and therefore give leave to such as like so to do, to be merry with it.
Replier: If it be said that notwithstanding these accidental abuses, yet the ceremonies are innocent in their own nature and use: I answer first, they having no necessity otherwise, and these being their ordinary effects which have followed on them, there is no rule of logic, much less of zeal, that will allow the Defendant to call them ‘innocent’.
Answer: This bewrays somewhat, as that you knew well [p. 58] enough how unreasonably you have compared Pilate’s guiltiness with the guilt of ceremonies. For if these abuses were accidental to the ceremonies, and not intrinsic to their nature, or our intended use of them, you should rather have compared them to the judgment hall and seat in which Pilate sat than unto the wicked judge himself; and called whatsoever mischiefs have followed, not effects, but events, being accidental. The Defendant therefore had more reason to call them innocent simply in themselves than you to call them simply nocent, unless you will let nothing be called innocent, which, without any motion or assent to evil on the Church’s part, is abused thereto by men.
Replier: It is a shame for our prelates to talk of the ceremonies’ innocency when they cannot defend their own innocency in obtruding and urging of them. They are wont to say the practice and manner of urging we will not defend, but the lawfulness or innocency of the things themselves, we do. Indeed for a private man to stand upon such terms is tolerable: but for the prelates, whose hands are chief in this trespass, to cover their own guiltiness under so slender an innocency of three ceremonies, is too too gross. If Thomas, Dr. Morton, in times past had pleaded for the ceremonies’ innocency, it might have been well interpreted: But for Thomas Chester, Thomas Lichfield, or any that bears a cathedral name, to write of the innocency of three ceremonies, passing by three hundred foul nocencies which are plainly to be seen in the prelates’ urging and managing of these ceremonies, this is somewhat like, as if Samson, when he had sent foxes with firebrands tied to their tails among the corn, should have written unto the owners of that corn a long letter concerning the innocency of foxes and firebrand.
Answer: Why may not the bishops defend their urging of them by your opposing of them so extremely? And though you say for present advantage that pleading for them might have been well interpreted in a private minister, but [p. 59] not in prelates, etc., yet I doubt you will interpret no man’s defense of them well, as appears by your dealing with Mr. Sprint and others.
The bishops, I suppose, see not your three hundred foul innocencies, nor yourself neither. But certainly they which urge what law urges upon their places, shall not have so deep in the mischiefs that follow as you which urge them with contempts intolerable and condemn the ceremonies themselves as idolatrous. He that does the wrong makes the strife. Yet I humbly beseech them, the bishops, to use their patience toward men more moderate (no whit the less for such impetuous revilings of some others) for the Church’s good, and their own greater honor and peace.
As for the similitude of Samson’s foxes, you yourself would easily discern your own scurrility therein if any should reply that if the officers that urged you to use these ceremonies were foxes, then you nonconformists were the Philistines.
Replier: Thirdly and lastly, it is sufficiently proved and shall (by God’s grace) be further maintained against this Defendant, that these three ceremonies are not innocent or lawful in their use. Thus I had to say concerning the title [of Morton’s Defence].
Answer: This third had been full enough for the title. And if you can make this good, I will subscribe to your term of ‘nocent’ and disclaim his of ‘innocent’ ceremonies.
Replier: Now before I come to the book itself, some few things are to be questioned in the epistles, which are three, according to the number of the ceremonies defended. To the first epistle, to the — [a word uncertain in this scan, possibly “ministers”] — I would willingly learn what that Church is which is the mother of the nonconformists? It must of necessity be either the faithful congregations which are in England, collectively considered, or else the hierarchy consisting of archbishops, bishops, and their officers: If the former be here understood, then this Defence is begun with a slander: For [p. 60] neither is the Nonconformist an adversary impugning the congregations, nor do they defame their religious worship, nor infringe their wholesome liberty, nor contemn their just authority. But of all these things are the prelates manifestly guilty. For they in their lordly manors, do scorn and defame the most religious people as puritans: they hinder the people from hearing of sermons in another parish, though they have none or worse than none at home; they are enemies to that preaching whereby the godly people find themselves most edified; they suspend minister and people, not only to themselves, but even to their chancellors, commissaries, officials, and such like officers of their own making, to whom not Christ only, but all the primitive Church says plainly, ‘Depart from me, I know you not’: they deny any authority at all to be either in the congregations, or in their ministers, except it be a little of courtesy from the ordinary. These things are so well known that they need no proof.
If by the ‘Church’ here be meant the hierarchy, then we profess plainly we acknowledge no such mother; she is a step-dame, usurping this title and authority without all warrant of God our Father. She is a creature of man’s making and may more justly be removed when it pleases man, then ever she was by him erected.
Answer: The nonconformists, as nonconformists, have no mother Church in England: but as members of the churches there, by virtue of their baptism, they have each man his own mother Church where he was baptized and educated. But all of them together have one and the same grandmother with us, which is the Church of England considered as one Church. The Church of England considered as one must be understood to comprehend all the particular congregations in some way of unity.
There be but two ways; the one by way of representation, wherein some, for and in the name of all, are convened in one assembly: So the assemblies of the elders of Israel were [p. 61] all Israel. So the general assembly of the ten superintendents of Scotland and other ministers deputed for all the churches, are called by the authors of the Abridgement, the Church of Scotland; their judgment is called the judgment of the Church of Scotland. Thus are our parliaments, consisting of the three Estates, the State of England. And in this sense the convocations, consisting of archbishops, bishops, deans, archdeacons, and other ministers chosen and deputed for every diocese, is the Church of England. How else was the hierarchy the Church of Scotland?
A second way by which all the several congregations are but one Church, is the association and combination of them all into one profession, worship of God and discipline, which needs must include the orders and officers pertaining thereto. As for any other kind or consideration of the several congregations, to make them all one visible or constituted Church, it cannot be shown, because it is a non-ens [a non-being], a fiction. Wherefore, you, who impugn the liberty of the Church in her convocation, touching the appointment of external rites, and condemn her order of external worship of superstition, be one of them; and condemn her officers (which is the hierarchy) not for the personal faults of men, but for the very offices themselves: You should not have called that a slander, which yourself presently, and in your whole discourse, manifests to be true. The one-worshipping of, or association of, all congregations collectively considered, is but a mere mystic and inexplicable speech made for a covert.
That sundry offices and orders in our Church discipline are human and not divine, we acknowledge, and think it to be in the Church’s liberty to devise such for her good. The essentials of discipline are determined in the Word of God, but the accidental forms [are] not so to be esteemed by any but the Anabaptists and such as edge too near upon them. If your verdict were of divine inspiration, we should think that these human creatures might be plucked down with better reason [p. 62] than wherewith they were set up, but otherwise we may lawfully put in one Demurrer.
Replier: Secondly, I marvel with what conscience this man can spend a great part of his epistle in stirring up a courtier unto the opposing of nonconformists? As if this were a great point of admirable wisdom and zeal, as he calls it: and the courtiers such as stood in most need of instigations to the zeal of formality, being otherwise for substance such as they should be.
Answer: The whole epistle is not great, and the greater part of it spent in stirring up a great personage of the court against Papists in lesser [degree], in requiring his aid against the calumniations of such as defame the Church for her ceremonies, of which matter something was to be said in the Epistle Dedicatory, because it touches the subject matter of the book dedicated, and that the Church’s peace is precious. And he that is in his conscience persuaded of the lawfulness of these rites, and by his office bound to watch over the Church’s quiet, may with better conscience crave the aid of a courtier against evil tongues, than you (a private man) can have in writing your Reply, and commending it to the vulgar, to incite them unto detestation of these things, which you shall never prove to be unlawful; as if (to return your own money to you) it were a great point of admirable wisdom and zeal, and the people were such as stood in most need of instigations to the zeal of inconformity, being otherwise for substance such as they should be.
Replier: Thirdly, what agreement is there in this argument to conjure a man by the obligation of his baptism to stand for the defense of certain ceremonies? Was he baptized into the faith of the ceremonies? Or is he bound to maintain every ceremony which men have brought into that Church where he was baptized? If he were conjured by his bishopping to such things as these, there would be more reason in the consequence.
Answer: He was not baptized into the faith of ceremonies, [p. 63] but yet into that faith which is professed in a Church which uses these ceremonies. And if they be justifiable in her intended use of them (of which we doubt not), he that by baptism was made a visible member of this Church is bound to relieve her against defamations of her quiet men; and more by his baptism than by bishopping, because baptism, not bishopping did incorporate him into this Church.
Replier: Fourthly, what need is there that great men should be called to aid and assist the prelates against nonconformists? Have they not power enough in their own hands? Can they not at their own pleasure suspend, deprive, excommunicate and what almost they please? Do they not tread these poor men under their feet? Is it because the prelates cannot yet sufficiently prevail against them in the consciences of men, and therefore call for further help in vain? Or is the meaning that such men should be helped unto great bishoprics, being as yet more zealous against nonconformists? If this be the matter, I dare say the petition shall be granted; and yet the Petitioner, except he make great progress in this eagerness, shall hardly get beyond Lichfield, at least not to Canterbury.
Answer: That the bishops have any power to suspend, deprive, excommunicate at pleasure, etc., or further than the laws of the State or Church require, is a manifest untruth and calumny: That great courtiers can give them any further power than the law has invested them in, is a ridiculous supposition: That the Defendant aimed at a better bishopric, is a malicious surmise: And all this scandalous bundle is of no use, unless it be to ingratiate himself into the affections (which he calls the consciences) and applause of his own party; which may be as sinfully, and as ambitiously sought after, as any bishopric perhaps is.
Replier: In the second epistle to the nonconformists many things are jumbled together which afterward must be examined, but here cannot. For this epistle makes the whole [p. 64] book to be unanswerable, and therefore should rather have been set at the end than at the beginning.
Answer: It is the common manner of men to set their epistles before their books, though they be written after. You play at very small game in quarrelling at this. But perhaps you cannot help it, it is your habitual vein.
Replier: Only one ridiculous piece of rhetoric is to be touched, wherein (forsooth) the nonconformists above all their other faults wherewith they are usually charged and railed, are now, as it were, lovingly entreated to acknowledge themselves guilty of superstition. The reason rendered, because there is a negative superstition, the formal cause whereof is the forbearing and forbidding of things lawful, as unholy and profane: and the nonconformists have such negative opinions, as kneel not, crosse not, wear not, etc. All this is nothing else but a trick of prevention usual with crafty men, who choose to lay that upon their adversaries which they know more properly to belong to themselves.
Answer: A trick of crafty men, and yet a ridiculous piece of rhetoric suit not well. But if by this pretty device you can put off the weighty charge of superstition laid upon you, you may clap your hands, and say ‘My wit has saved me.’
Replier: But I would that this Defendant, or rather his saint, had given us some plain reason of his new opinion, for there is no definition of superstition, properly so-called, that will father this conclusion. The Schoolmen do with one consent place superstition in a kind of excess of religious worship, Thomas, [Summa] pt. 2 of 2, q. 92, art. 1, from whom in this point our divines do not dissent. Now though this excess do sometimes seem to consist in a negation, yet an excess or error in negation is never called by any author that ever writ (I dare say) ‘superstition,’ when he means to speak properly, except that very negation, abstinence or forbearing [p. 65] [seems] to hold a ritual worship. Now in the nonconformists there is no such thing to be found: they do not abstain from these ceremonies, but as they do from other unlawful corruptions. Suppose then that every erroneous denial of things lawful is not superstition.
The Defendant therefore, here being over-hasty to charge his adversaries, considered not well what weapon he chose. But if he had well remembered what is said of superstition, not only by our divines, but even by some of the Papists themselves, he would have forborne to make mention of this word. For our divines, let honourable Calvin speak, Institutes, bk. 1, ch. 12, §1: Inde mihi videtur dici superstitio, quod modo et praescripta ratione non contenta supervacuam rerum congeriem accumulet. Papists thus, Superstitio est (says Azorius, Moral Institutes, bk. 9, ch.14) cum quis cultum tribuit inanem et vanum, scilicet commentitia et inutili aliqua ceremonia cum veneratione, vel cum quis Deum honorat falsis vanis et frivolis ceremoniis, that is, as Suarez does in a manner interpret it, quando honor Dei in iis rebus ponitur, quibus non curatur, ut in Ceremoniis superfluis, et ad salutem animae nihil conferentibus. If this touch not the Defendant, I desire him to peruse what Master [John] Parker has written concerning the superstition of the cross, and give some answer to the same before he threaten any more such kindness as this is upon the nonconformists.
Answer: You require (me thinks) a plain reason, as the Jews still required a manifest sign, even when they had so many as vexed them. Can there be a plainer reason than that out of Col. 2:23, where the will-worship condemned by Paul is instanced in negative observances, ‘Touch not, taste not, handle not, etc.’
Whether any definition of superstition will bear this conclusion against negative superstition or no, we shall now try, not by the Schoolmen, but by the definition which Dr. [William] Ames (a man which you and I love better than any [p. 66] of the Schoolmen you name) has set down in his Marrow of Divinity. ‘Superstition’ (says he) ‘is that whereby undue worship is exhibited to God.’ Superstition then properly is in the opinion or mind of the worshipper, which agrees well with your schoolmen, especially Suarez, when the honor of God is placed in those things wherein he is not truly served, as in superstitious ceremonies, conferring nothing to the soul’s health. So that unless men put or place (by error of opinion) the honor of God in such trifles, there is no superstition in their use, though no profit in it.
Now sir, if a man may as well imagine himself to honor God in the use of such things as God has not forbidden or condemned, and thereupon forbear even for conscience to God things lawful: as he may on the other side imagine himself to honor God in the use of such things as God has not required or allowed, and therefore observe them out of conscience to God: then may there be negative superstition, as well as affirmative, or positive.
Moreover, there be negative precepts which concern the worship of God, where the very not doing of things prohibited (if it be observed for conscience to God) is worship. Therefore if superstition be, as you say out of the Schoolmen, an excess of religion, he that exceeds God’s own prohibition in not doing for conscience sake that which God has not forbidden in matters of religion, must needs be superstitious, because the negative precepts are as perfect in forbidding things unlawful as the affirmative are in requiring things necessary, or permitting things lawful. For if superstition (as you allege out of Calvin) be so called because not contented with the prescribed manner, it gathers together a needless heap; then, when men beyond God’s own restraint, increase restraints upon themselves or others to please God thereby, they must needs be superstitious in the negative, as well as in the congestion of positive observances beyond the rules they should be on the affirmative. [p. 67]
Again, superstition, say you, is an excess of religion. ‘Religion’ (says Dr. Ames) ‘is an observance whereby we perform those things which directly belong to the giving of honor to God.’ This say I, discharges our Church, which does not impose or observe these ceremonies as things which directly, but only consequently and mediately belong to the giving of honor to God. But withal, the same does imply that if any observance be made of not doing anything which God has not forbidden, of purpose and directly to give honor to God in the not doing thereof, this shall be an excess of religion, a negative superstition. And of this kind of superstition in the measure, Dr. Ames gives us an example in the Pharisees, viz. in their restraint of labor on the Sabbath Day beyond that which God had imposed. And seeing this observance was in not doing something which was lawful, what was it but negative superstition? Was not the Philistines’ observation of not treading on Dagon’s threshold negative superstition? When the garrison in Sfetigrade chose rather to render the city to the Turks than to drink of their well in which a dog had been drowned, lest their consciences should be defiled, was it not negative superstition? Nay, then well fare Dr. Ames who having told us that superstition is an excess of religion, not in relation unto the virtue of religion, but to the external acts and means of religion, adds immediately that this kind of excess is not only in those positive things which are acted or done, but also in abstinence from the use of certain things, as from meats and such like which are counted unclean and unlawful. And I pray you, does he not here teach us that there is a negative superstition, as well as positive or affirmative: to wit, when things lawful are forborne as if they were unlawful. You will perhaps object that Dr. Ames, thesis 30, subjoins that yet every abstinence even from lawful things, although they be held unlawful, is not (so to speak properly) superstition, unless by such abstinence some singular service and honor be intended to God. [p. 68]
To this I answer that not the abstinence, but the opinion and reason of it is superstition quoad causam; the abstinence itself, superstition quoad effectum. But when he requires the intendment of singular service and honor to God, he seems to have made his bias bigger than his own definition of superstition will bear. For if any undue worship or service to God be placed in a man’s abstinence from a thing lawful, it is superstition in some degree.
And yet if this singular be admitted, it will not exempt you from singular superstition, in as much as you fancy your abstinence from these ceremonies to be such a singular piece of service to God that men should rather never preach the Gospel than wear a surplice, never receive the Lord’s Supper than receive it kneeling. And your superstition esteems this your abstinence to be a singular point of piety and of true sincerity.
Perhaps you think that the sayings of Azorius, Suarez or others alleged by you will cut us that use these ceremonies, but cannot touch you who of conscience refuse them. But you are in both deceived, for we place no direct, proper or immediate worship of God in the use of them, but hold them indifferent and arbitrary rites. But these speeches of the Schoolmen touch you to the quick, because you put religion in the not using of them and teach men to do so for conscience sake and honor to God in that very observance of not yielding to the use of them.
If the name of ‘ceremony’ seem to relieve you, as importing some positive action: Be not abused, for even not doing upon purpose is some kind of doing: and there be negative ceremonies or observances which consist in not doing as well as affirmative in doing.
The not washing for a week after baptism was a ceremony [in the early Church], as well as the wearing of a white coat for a week after. So with the Jews, the not sitting upright at the Passover feast, as well as the breaking the unleavened cake into so many pieces as were guests at the table. And so [p. 69] was the not eating the sinew which shrank, Gen. 32:32, a ceremony, as well as their observance of seven days’ feast at the marriage of a man with a virgin.
Wherefore unless you can certainly prove that these our ceremonies as we intend and use them, be simply unlawful, as the water of — [name uncertain in this scan] — will not wash you (who so silly refuse and peremptorily condemn them, and fright men from God’s service because of them) from crude superstition, though negative. And even Mr. Parker (to whom you so often refer us) by too vehement opposition of the Church, has plunged himself, and such as follow him into the gulf of superstition, who makes us know what a singular service is done to God (in his opinion) by refusing conformity, when he compares such as have been therefore deprived to David’s worthies and to those three hundred men which followed Gideon, and such like stuff.
The Lord give you to lay down passions and high-mindedness and to seek after the truth with meekness and love, that the Church of God may not still be vexed with your new traditions, your negative superstitions, with which you have entangled the consciences and leavened the affections of many good souls, who aiming only to flee superstition on the left hand, have fallen into the negative on the right and think they are where they should be. This I speak not of such godly ones as only dislike the ceremonies and wish them gone, but of such as so abhor them as mere impieties, will-worship and idolatries, which language they learned from some of you.
Replier: One other thing also is by a figure of pretermission insinuated in this epistle, not unworthy [of] consideration, viz. that our parliaments and [ecclesiastical] convocations have established these rites. To this I answer:
1. The prelates in such matters as these have no respect unto the authority of parliaments. For they frame canons, use and execute them without the consent of any parliament, nay flatly against [p. 70] them. For so we read in the records of that worthy parliament, which was anno 1610. Amongst the canons late made by the clergy of England in their convocation, it was thought that some of their canons did extend to charge the bodies, lands and goods of the subjects of the realm farther than was lawful and meet. We therefore made a good [civil] law to make void such canons as do charge the bodies, lands and goods of the subjects unless the same canons were confirmed by parliament.
2. The Defendant cannot bring forth any act of parliament now in force that allows of subscriptions and conformity as it is urged now by the prelates. This appears by the judgment of the aforesaid parliament, in those words of their petition where they complain that diverse painful and learned pastors that have long travelled in the work of the ministry, with good fruit and blessing of their labors, who were ever ready to perform the legal subscription appointed by the statute of 13 Elizabeth, which only concerns the Confession of the true Christian faith and Doctrine of the Sacraments; yet for not conforming in some points of ceremonies, and refusing the subscription directed by the late canons, have been removed from their ecclesiastical livings, being their freehold, and debarred from all means of maintenance, to the great grief of many well-affected subjects.
3. It is well known that the prelates themselves in their proceedings about these matters do so far violate the statutes of parliament that they are liable by law subject to a premunire.
Answer: You are as good at catch-ball as ever I knew, but you strike not so well. For what answer is this to prelates’ regard not the authority of parliaments, to this objection, ‘These ceremonies are established by sundry acts of parliaments?’ Does your answer remove that objection, if it were true? [p. 71]
But you cannot prove that in making of canons they have no regard to the authority of parliaments. For they make none, except the king give his commission; nor do they, nor can they establish any, unless his Majesty allow them under his broad seal, which is the very way whereto the act of parliament does confine them. Whence follows that whatsoever you speak against the canons reaches the king and not the prelates or convocation alone.
Nor does that first evidence you allege out of the records of that worthy parliament, anno 1610, prove that the prelates had no regard to the authority of the parliament, but only that they mistook (if they did mistake) in one point their own authority given them by parliament; for that record does not blame them for making ecclesiastical causes which properly belongs to them, but for making the breach of some of them punishable by deprivation from their livings, which being matter of freehold, belong thus[?] openly to the cognizance and determination of parliamentary laws. And if upon the breach of such canons any man be deprived of his living, his freehold, contrary to law, then it lies in the law to relieve him. But not so with regard to the sentence of deprivation in the case of refusing these ceremonies, because the statute law itself [four or five unreadable words] or leaves it to the bishops.
The second instance out of the same record receives the same answer, for it blamesthis in the convocation, that it has made the refusal of subscription such as is now required penal, with deprivation of men’s freehold. As for that, that many good subjects have beene greatly grieved for such deprival of godly and fruitful ministers, it is true: And so also have been even they which have deprived them: Who yet proceeded against them (being so commanded to do) not because they were painful or fruitful ministers, but for other reasons: and namely, lest such an error of opinion, as has been and still is a root of division, should be still maintained or suffered in [p. 72] the Church, to the greater damage thereof; and the ministry of other painful and fruitful men, made contemptible, only for their conformity’s sake.
Lastly, if all the bishops be in a premunire (which is more than I know), yet will not this prove that they have no regard to the authority of parliaments, seeing they might incur that peril not knowing the laws, or not understanding them as some do. However, sure I am that the use of these ceremonies is established by statute, and the penalty of refusing them, as all men know, and some have felt, who have been deprived at the assizes or courts of pleas in Westminster Hall.
Replier: Now as for convocations (not to dispute what kind of synods they be), it is well known that they consist now of a faction, and that in memory of men they never conclude anything for the common good of the Church, more than by others was better done to their hands: but much evil has come from amongst them, and more would, but that many times their commission serves not but only to give subsidies, and then to tell the clerk.
2. They are servile to those on whom they depend, and tyrannical over the poor that are subject unto them.
3. There are very few that have place in them which are not gross offenders against the most ancient canons: as for example, it was observed that in that convocation which established and revived these corruptions of three hundred or four hundred, there were not above mere[?] three which were not, or had not been, gross non-residents or pluralists. Dr. Morton himself, in a Latin sermon held before the convocation some eight years since, decided with the most part of them [six lines are unreadable, speaking of giving three notes of corrupt ministers] [p. 73] that if any neighbor minister be more diligent and conscionable then they, they brand him straight with the name of ‘puritan’. These notes are well known to agree unto most of our convocated prelates. 4. The authority of this convocation either against or without consent of parliament, is not to be regarded, much less against the Scriptures.
Answer: The convocation consists of men which submit themselves to the laws of the land and constitutions of the Church, and not of those who are known to oppose them; and so does the convocation, of all Christian Churches respectively. If, because they are against your opinions herein, you that make a faction in opposition may call them a faction; so may the Recusants also, who are debarred the parliaments, call the House of Commons a faction. That the convocation has sometimes done no good in matters of moment, which case was better done to their hands, is no cause [for blame], since the agreement of the Articles of Faith and Religion were so good.
Convocations do sometimes [good], in confirming what was decreed before, though they make new canons. Or, if they have done nothing, because they have had no commission, to which they are limited by the act of parliament, whose fault then is that?
The greater blame they have done, reflects, as I suppose, upon the late Book of Canons, wherein there were many good provisions for more plentiful preaching, and for redressing the abuses of ecclesiastical courts, which would have done much good, had they been diligently executed, as they were made. And as for some other canons, they perhaps were meant to curb those who were opposite to the Church government; some whereof, it may be, the same censurers would since have allowed, had authority been given unto them.
As for your second, that servility to those on whom they depend [continues where legible below] [p. 74] their constitution. Or you may reckon that servility, which is not so.
If almost all of that convocation you mention were gross non-residents and pluralists, and many of them guilty of that which Dr. Morton reproved in ministers at large, and not, namely or only, in the members of the convocation; and that the authority of the convocation is of no value without or against the consent of parliament (which perhaps is true in the matter of freeholds), yet [this] leaves the Defendant’s speech unshaken, viz. that these ceremonies are established by sundry parliaments and canons, against which you should have levelled all your ordinance, if you would have disproved him that said so. The rest is labor in vain.
As for the authority of the Scriptures, we all agree that neither convocation nor parliament may justly make any laws or canons against them. But he that furnishes such an exception, must prove that such canons or laws are against the Scripture, or he shall lose his suit.
Replier: In the Epistle to the Reader, this only I would enquire of, what is the reason, that seeing he chose to bind himself [to answer] chiefly those Opposers, the Lincolnshire ministers, he does not deal with all their arguments, nor the twentieth part of their allegations, but only with such as he thinks fittest for his purpose? Of this I would not [make much]. But this I may not omit, that considering he knew how much has been said against the ceremonies by them and others, especially by Mr. Parker, which he never attempted to answer, neither he nor others for him, he had any cause to triumph in this book, as if it were a complete defense.
Answer: If you can show any one argument in the Abridgement, or any allegation which is not answered, either particularly or equivalently, you shall have good cause to triumph against the Defendant; else, you may be [p. 75] quiet. As for Mr. Parker’s Treatise of the Cross, he undertook it not; nay, he had not so much as seen it. For it is one of those that go about in the dark and by stealth; concerning which book (because you so often mention it as if it were your Gibraltar), I wish you would reduce it unto logical arguments, and then I doubt not but the body and limbs of it would appear crooked and feeble; yea, if it were but stripped of the bombast and bravery of seeming authorities and words with which it is clothed. That course, if you or any man will take, I doubt not but it will soon be answered: But as it is now, it is like a large waste, which is fitter (as I may say) for a horse race in and out than for a duel. The book is laborsome, and excellently painted with vermilion, and shows the author to have been a man of great wit, much read and industrious; but verily not so judicious, much less so moderate and well-advised as had been meet. Nor is he in his quotations so exact as frequent, as shall in some particulars hereafter be showed. And yet I persuade myself he was a very godly and worthy man, and is now at rest with our Lord, and knows ere this, that he ought not so far to have pressed against the Church in matter of ceremonies.
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An Answer Rejoined to the Reply to Dr. Morton’s General Defence of the Innocency of the Three Ceremonies of the Church of England, viz. Surplice, Cross after Baptism & Kneeling at the Receiving of the blessed Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper
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Full Outline
ch. 1 Nonconformists’ 1st Argument: Scripture condemns not only what is against the Word, but also that which is beside it, especially in worship; these ceremonies are without warrant in the Word.
Their Proofs for it Examined
I. Intro & Scriptures
1 Morton’s endeavor and method
2 Scripture condemns not only what is against the Word, but also that which is beside it, especially in worship, and these ceremonies are without warrant in the Word, answered; Distinction of Scripture warrant
3 Heb. 3:2, Moses and Christ, state of controversy, distinction of doctrinal and ceremonial, Dt. 4:2
4 Comparison of Moses and Christ in real faithfulness
5 Comparison between them in rituals, Calvin, Heb. 3:2
6 2 Sam. 7:7 on David, Cartwright
7 2 Sam. 7:7 used against nonconformists
8-11 Jer. 7:22-23; Isa. 1:12, “Who has required this at your hand?”; Phil. 2:10 on bowing the knee
12 Jer. 7:31, “which I commanded them not”; Cartwright, Chrysostom on Gal. 1:8, Junius
II. Fathers & Protestants
13 Testimonies of fathers
14 Tertullian
15 Testimonies of Protestants, crossing not as bad as sopping
Digression: On Rules of Ceremonies: Cartwright, Jacob
Refutation of Nonconformists 1st Argument
Scripture, Word’s General Rules
16 General confutation of nonconformists’ negative argument, 1 Cor. 14:26, 40 on decency and order unto edification, Martyr, Whitaker, Junius, Whether order requires more than placing of things formerly instituted? Basil, Whether ‘comeliness’ (decency) be nothing but the seemliness of order?
Fathers
17 Ancient Churches and fathers always had some ceremonies of universal observation not of divine institution, anniversary feasts of Christ’s nativity, resurrection, ascension, etc. Polycarp said the Feast of Esther was taught by John
III. Protestants
18 Proves Church’s right to initiate some rites by Bellarmine’s confession of the consent of Protestant divines, Brentius, what things are imitable of apostles, what not
19 Chemnitz, Calvin, Junius, Zanchi, Whitaker, Daneus, Zanchi to Queen Elizabeth and ministers not to struggle about ceremonies
IV. From Reason
20 Morton’s critique of nonconformists’ negative argument from reason, three of them
21 Fourth reason: confession of nonconformists themselves, nonconformists set up parish-omnipotency
22 That these ceremonies have no warrant in the Word, being human inventions, is answered
ch. 2 Nonconformists’ 2nd Argument: Our ceremonies are made parts of worship
I. Preview: Theses on definition and distinctions of worship, Scriptures often express duties of worship by ceremonies used in them
II. Intro & Scriptures
1 2nd general argument of nonconformists that our ceremonies are made parts of worship answered; ceremonies serving comeliness and edification: no essential parts of worship; circumstantial-worship, Cartwright
2 Col. 2:23 on will-worship
3 Isa. 29:1, “their fear toward Me is taught by the precept of men”; Dt. 12:32, “thou shalt not add thereto”; addition of preservation not forbidden, Calvin, nonconformists’ new traditions must be unlawful too
4 Isa. 29; Mt. 15, “in vain they do worship Me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men”; Col. 2:23, “will-worship”; Daneus, Zanchi on Col. 2:23
III. Fathers & Protestants
5 Objection from fathers on will-worship answered
6, pt. 1 Calvin, Martyr, Chemnitz
6, pt. 2 Melanchthon, Bullinger, Polanus, Fenner, Tilenus, Chamier, Perkins, Bucanus, how many ceremonies may be lawful
7 Some will-worship is not to be condemned, in what sense, Ursinus, Zanchi
IV. Arguments Answered
8 Assumption of nonconformists, no reply to Defendant’s answer made
9 Reasons of nonconformists to prove our ceremonies are imposed as real parts of worship, answered; Why Bradshaw was unanswered, his conceit examined; whether any worship be indifferent; whether no worship be accidental
10 Four nonconformist arguments, R. Hooker, Mt. 15:2 explained, Calvin
11 Objection that ceremonies are preferred to necessary duties answered; Ames in some cases allows heavier punishments for some lighter offenses than for some others of higher nature; violence of some nonconformists have made others to fare worse
12 Many think sacraments are not rightly administered without these ceremonies, answered; Chemnitz, Hooker on the opinion of the people
13 Objection of severe punishments inflicted for bare omission of ceremonies answered
14 Objection that some peaceable men have been censured for declaring their judgments only, answered; nonconformist objections tend to separation; no man punished for disusing Popish ceremonies, but for defaming of ours under that name, Beza’s judgment that such is opposite to the constitutions of a Church
15 Recounting of the confutation of their general assumption; our ceremonies are alterable at the Church’s discretion
ch. 3 Nonconformists’ 3rd Argument: From the Significance of Ceremonies
I. Intro & Scriptures
1 3rd general argument against our ceremonies from their significance
2 Mk. 7:8; Mt. 15:15; testimonies of divines examined, Chrysostom, Whitaker, Church of Wittenberg, Calvin, Virel, Zepper, Fulke, Rainolds
II. Fathers & Protestants
3 Testimonies of fathers, Augustine
4 Testimonies of Protestant divines, Calvin on Lev. 4:2, Zepper, Jewel, Beza, whether divines which impugn some significant ceremonies do so on the ground that significancy gives them a chief part of the nature of sacraments, Junius, Daneus
III. Arguments Answered
5 Nonconformists argument from reason, that significancy gives unto ceremonies a chief part of the nature of a sacrament, answered, how the surplice has been imposed
6 Objection: Moral ceremonies of God’s institution in the Law for moral signification may not be used, much less those that are devised by men, answered; a multitude of authors brought by Replier shown to be nothing to the purpose; Replier abuses and perverts all authors he quotes, Whitaker, God’s will of preceptive and of permission
7 Objection: This will open a gap to images, oil, spittle and all Popish ceremonies, answered, what images Calvin allowed, opinions of sundry divines touching images, Junius’s defense of Jewel, Replier charges Martyr of an evil conscience, objection against images for historical uses from the 2nd Commandment answered, Heb. 8:5; 10:1, a distinction of the First Table’s Commandments
8 Assumption of nonconformists third general argument answered
IV. Scriptural Examples of Ceremonies
9 Gen. 24:2 on servant swearing putting hand under Abraham’s thigh, Calvin
10 What necessity Papists put upon ceremonies, Suarez
11 Diverse festivals set up by the Church for remembrance, Purim, Esth. 9, Jacob confuted
12 Feast of Dedication by Maccabeus
13 Cartwright on Church’s power in ordaining some holy days
14 Cartwright on Purim
15-16 Ordaining of ceremonious, significant instruments, Josh. 22, Altar of Witness, was of mystical signification
17 1 Kn. 8:64 on Solomon hallowing middle of court for altar
18 Replies about Solomon’s action answered
19 Second reply about Solomon answered
20 Third reply answered
21 Fourth reply answered
22 Synagogues
23-24 Love-feasts, Junius
25 Second reply to Love-feasts answered
26 Third reply answered
27 Holy kiss
28 1 Cor. 11 on women’s head-coverings, an institution of application and new invention
V. Church History & Protestants
29 Universal practice of moral use of ceremonies by early Church, standing in prayer on Lord’s Days, etc., festivals of Easter and Whitsuntide
30 Testimonies for moral use of ceremonies by Calvin, Luther, Zepper et al.
VI. Nonconformists’ Inconsistencies
31 Confessions of nonconformists: 1. in taking an oath, upon a book
32 2. Observation of the Lord’s Day, 3. Lawful use of church buildings
VII. Reasons
33 Defendant’s last proof from reason slid over by the Replier
34 Defendant’s reason from the nature of a ceremony
ch. 4 Nonconformists’ 4th Argument: From the Abuse of our Ceremonies by Papists
I. Intro & Scriptures
1 Defendant’s answer, what is meant by abuse, abolition and necessary use
2 Examples of abolition of heathen ceremonies, Lev. 18:3; 23:24; Dt. 14:1; 12:4; 30:32; 2 Cor. 6:14, 18; Rev. 18:4; Lev. 19:27, Calvin
3 Lev. 26:1; Cartwright advised to wear the surplice, Calvin, what kind Jacob’s pillar was, Gen. 28, Hos. 2:16-17, what is meant by Baal and Baalim, how these are used
4 Dt. 7; Ex. 23:24; 2nd Commandment; Dt. 7:25-26; Isa. 1:29; 30:22; Calvin clears our Book of Common Prayer from having any manifest impiety in it
5 Dan. 1:8 on Daniel not eating king’s meat or wine
6 2 Kn. 18 on Hezekiah, Zanchi on monuments of idolatry, difference between Jewish and Popish idolatry, comparison between our present Church and the early Church, of Church music, Cartwright’s confession that more discipline was executed in England than in foreign Churches, cutting[?] of ministers to particular charges, by whom it ought to be done
II. Councils & Fathers
7 2nd main objection from councils and fathers for abolishing ceremonies abused by heathens, 5th Council of Carthage, canon 54
8 canon 15
9 Council of Bracara, canon 73; Digression: Whether in our ceremonies’ use we differ not in time, place or person from the Papists, but only in some opinion? Differences with the surplice, cross and kneeling at Supper
10 Council of Africa
11 Tertullian, in what respects he condemned garlands
12 Tertullian, Jewel
13 Melchiades, why fasting on Lord’s Day was prohibited, difference of time and place may alter ceremonies for matter of convenience and inconvenience, but not for lawfulness or unlawfulness
14 Ambrose, instructing Monica about wine and cakes, Epiphanius
15 Augustine, on how to behave ourselves in point of conformity
16 Objection from abolition of Jewish rites, Council of Nicea and Easter, Calvin condemns rigid preciseness in matters of ceremonies
17 Objection from abolition of ceremonies abused by heretics, Council of Gangris
18 Council of Bracara, Cartwright complains of wrong because charged with holding our ceremonies to be unlawful
19 Gregory, Jewel, sitting at Supper used by Arians
III. Protestants
20 Leo, Suarez, Digression: Whether protestant testimonies alleged by the Abridgement do truly make for the nonconformists? Church of Scotland, Oecolampadius, Calvin, Bucer, Musculus, Martyr, Beza, French divines on kneeling, Beza on the surplice, many other divines, Rogers, Queen’s injunctions, Jewel, Pilkington, Bilson, Humfrey, Fulke, Andrewes, Sutcliff, Greenham, Merbury urged to cross and cut himself
IV. Argument from Abuse of Ceremonies
1. General
21 Nonconformists’ assumption that our ceremonies have been as ill and heathenishly abused by Papists, wisdom of our first reformers, Papists not justified by our use of the ceremonies, no ceremonies pleaded for by nonconformists but have been as much abused as ours, their pleas for theirs taken off by their own grounds, injury done to our Church by nonconformists, differences about our use of the sign of the cross and Papists’, how far shows of idolatry are to be abolished, different intentions between us and Papists do difference the ceremonies, Altar of Uriah in 2 Kn. 6, Unequal condemning of Papists’ answers when against the nonconformists, but not when those answers make for them
22 General confutation of their general argument for abolishing all ceremonies once abused, profession of our Church about this, Church of England has utterly taken away the ceremony of the cross abused by Papists
2. Scriptures & Fathers
23 Proof that ceremonies abused are not therefore necessarily to be always abolished, Judg. 6:26; Josh. 6:19; Gideon and Joshua’s examples considered, Calderwood deceived, diverse ceremonies abused to idolatry, yet used with another intention by God’s people
24 Objection from fathers, when Easter was observed by the Church, Justin Martyr preached in heathen philosophers’ clothing
3. From Reason
25 First argument against nonconformists from reason
26 Second, from the absurdity of only reforming abuses by abrogation, the Abridgers abuse the world by abusing Scriptures, what is mean by ‘state’ in God’s worship
27 Third, there are other ways of reforming abuses beside that of abrogation
28 Fourth, against the assumption of their fourth general argument, Parker abuses Rev. 18:2, Augustine, our ceremonies were received by our martyrs Ridley, Cranmer, Hooper et al. and statutes of Parliament, opposers have put many hurtful crotchets into many persons, Rainolds never opposed our ceremonies as unlawful, Parker miserably abuses Scripture
4. Nonconformists Against Themselves
29 Nonconformists’ own witnesses against themselves, Calvin, Zepper, P. Martyr and his two letters to Hooper
30 Argument against nonconformists from their own confessions and practices, eight queries of the Replier answered
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Chapter 1
Scripture condemns not only what is against the Word, but also that which is beside it, especially in worship; these ceremonies are without warrant in the Word, answered
Defendant [Bishop Thomas Morton]: The arguments, or rather accusations, which are brought by the nonconformists against our ceremonies are either general, which are made jointly against them all, or particular, by more special exceptions unto each of them severally.
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I. Intro & Scriptures
1. Morton’s Endeavor & Method
My endeavor is throughout this whole treatise to furnish my reader not only with defensive [p. 2] weapons by distinct and particular answers to all objections, but with offensive [weapons] also, by general confutations of their arguments: both which I assume to perform (if God permit) with as just a combination of brevity and perspicuity as the nature of the cause shall require. And now we put the matter unto trial.
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2. Scripture condemns not only what is against the Word, but also that which is beside it, especially in worship, and these ceremonies are without warrant in the Word, answered; Distinction of Scripture Warrant
Opposers: Major [Premise]: The Scripture in many places condemns not only that which is done against the warrant and direction of the Word, but also that which is done besides it, especially in the matters of God’s service.
Minor [Premise]: But these ceremonies of surplice, etc. are without all warrant of Scripture, either by express sentence or pregnant consequence out of law or Gospel.
Therefore, by this our negative argument from Scripture, they are to be accounted unlawful. (Lincolnshire’s Abridgment, pt. 1, p. 44; Mr. Hy)
Defendant: That we may not seem to affect any verbal skirmish or contention, we do readily accept of your distinction of warrant from Scripture, the one by express sentence, the other by pregnant consequence, yet so that we still observe the just latitude of the second member. This [pregnant consequence] does extend itself not only to general precepts and rules, but [p. 3] also unto permissions and the law of common equity contained in Scripture, for the justifying of our ceremonies, as will plainly, yea and confessedly appear in our Defence. Only we wish some sufficient warrant from yourselves that you would stand unto this your own distinction of a double-warrant. But you, in exacting of us, by this your negative argument, a proof of our ceremonies from [a] particular prescript (which is the same with express sentence or evidence), do so utterly overthrow the second member, which is the warrant by due consequence, as if you had studied to confute yourselves in your first entrance into this dispute: which will more fully appear in the proof of your major proposition.
Replier: Whatever is objected in this section for the all-sufficiency or perfectfulness of the Scripture we will take for granted, because nothing is denied by the Defendant; we take it as granted therefore at the first entrance that the Scripture condemns whatever is done, not only against the warrant and direction of the Word, but also that which is done beside it.
Answer: The all-sufficiency and perfectfulness of the holy Scriptures is not in controversy between us, but whether all lawful rites and ceremonies be punctually determined in those Scriptures as are all the points of faith [p. 4] and rules of obedience which are necessary to salvation?
You abuse your reader at the very first entrance into this Reply by misreporting the question and making show as if we denied, and you only maintained the perfectfulness of the Scriptures, which are no less perfect in giving the general rules than they should be in setting down of all particular instances. The rule about clean beasts, that they be such as chew the cud and divide the hoof, is as perfect as if all such beasts were named; yet is it not as particular.
When you say nothing of that which was here objected concerning your imaginary fulness of Scripture in case of rites is denied, this has no truth in it, unless you mean that the objection itself (which is the major proposition) is nothing: that being not only denied here, but said to be confuted by your own distinction of Scripture warrant into: warrant by express sentence or warrant by consequence. For, if some things be warrantable by consequence which are not warranted by express sentence, then something is warranted which is not prescribed in the Word: for prescription is all one with express sentence. You set not down the Defendant’s answer and therefore thought you might be believed in whatever you said of it.
That which here you conceive with joy as granted unto you, that is, that something is condemned as being only beside the Word which is not against it, you afterward travail of with pain seeking to be delivered of it, deny it to be your distinction, complain of wrong done to you (to make you the authors of any such distinction) and affirm that beside and against the Word are in this case all one. So as it seems you joy in your distinction as the men of Shechem did in their Abimelech, and yet you glory that it is here granted unto you, where it is not. [p. 5]
3. Hebrews 3:2 on Moses & Christ; State of the controversy; Distinction of doctrinal and ceremonial; Dt. 4:2, “You shall not add unto the Word”
Defendant: The nonconformists’ confirmation of their negative argument from Scripture is pretended to be justified: 1. By texts of Scripture. 2. By judgment of ancient fathers. 3. By confessions of protestant divines. Their first place of Scripture for proof of their negative argument from Scripture is Heb. 3:2.
Opposers: Christ is said to be as faithful in the house of God as Moses. But Moses prescribed the form of worship in every particular ceremony. Therefore, we may not allow of any religious ceremony without commandment from Christ. (Mr. Paget)
Defendant: We distinguish. Some points concerning religion are doctrinal and some are merely ceremonial; and we say that all things which doctrinally belong to salvation, whether appertaining to faith or moral conversation [conduct] of life, or yet essential parts of God’s worship, are sufficiently revealed in Scripture: but as for points merely ceremonial (being not the body, but the garment of religion), they are left to the liberty of the Church. Know therefore that this Scripture speaks of reals [formally real things of worship], and not of rituals.
Notwithstanding, if we examine the cause by due comparison of both, Christ will be found in both of these to be as absolute as Moses for faithfulness in God’s house, yea and to exceed him in perfectness, as much as his own glorious body (now ascended into heaven) does excel that of Moses putrefied long since in the earth. [p. 6]
Replier: But that which before the Defendant dare not deny, now he comes to oppose in the proofs of it, which be a strange course in him, especially [in one] that professes a distinct, logical proceeding.
Answer: Belike [it is very likely] the face of your proposition is more terrible than your proofs are, for otherwise how can you say that he dare not deny that in the proposition which he now comes to oppose in the proofs of it? That he did not only deny it before, but showed it to be confuted by your own distinction of warrant, has been said: Only he did not say in plain terms, “I deny your major” (as is used in schools), which is no stranger course in logical discourses than for a painter not to write over the picture of a swan, “This is a swan, for the instruction of the simple.”
Replier: In the propounding of our confirmation, I note two things once here in the beginning for all following occasions to be marked: 1. This Defendant does us wrong in distributing our confirmations into those which are taken from Scriptures and those which are from the fathers, and those that are from protestant divines, as if these were in our estimation of the same kind. Whereas we profess that we ascribe no force unto any testimony of man as if it were a proof, but only bring such allegations in as illustrations in regard of our adversaries’ perverse prejudice.
2. He wrongs us likewise in that difference which he insinuates between the fathers and our divines, calling their testimonies judgments and the other only confessions: We acknowledge no such disparity. If this were nothing but idle rhetoric in the Defendant, it may be passed.
Answer: These two notes set in the beginning for all following occasions do show yourself to be an egregious wrangler: For what are these but two notorious cavils:
1. The Defendant ranges their proofs into three sorts: 1. from Scripture. 2. from fathers. 3. from protestant divines. Is this sorting of them any equaling of their authority? When we say the king, the Lords and the Commons made such a statute, do we equal the king and [p. 7] his subjects [in the Lords and Commons], or only show their consents in that act?
2. The Defendant calls the testimonies of the fathers their judgments, and those of the later divines their confessions: Does this insinuate any disparity in their testimonies? Does not the Abridgement and yourself also use those terms of their judgments, confessions or testimonies indifferently? What a wrangle is this?
As for that you say the Abridgement does not allege these human testimonies for a proof, but only for illustration, it is not true, as shall appear, ch. 4, sect. 7, where you repeat it. Your terms of “adversaries,” “perverse prejudice” and “scorn of idle rhetoric” cast upon the Defendant, serve to show us of what spirit you are and [that you] have no other use. Now go to the matter in hand.
Replier: In the answer brought to Heb. 3:3, we have this distinction given us: Some points concerning religion are doctrinal and some merely ceremonial. The former are sufficiently revealed in Scripture, but the latter are left to the liberty of the Church. But: 1. Why is that denied here as a distinction which passed without denial or as distinction in the former section?
Answer: The proposition was denied in the former section. As for the distinction, it comes here in due place, for what need he hold out his buckler [shield] before you offer to strike?
Replier: 2. What kind of distinction is this which does not give us any of the term which is in the objection?
Answer: It does distinguish of the term “ceremonies,” which is ambiguous, sometimes signifying [1] divine ceremonies, which are substantial parts of religious worship (such as were those of Moses’ Law, and are now the two sacraments of the Gospel), [2] sometimes it signifies only such external solemn actions as are used in or about religious duties, which are not of the substance thereof.
The latter sort the Defendant calls for distinction’s sake “rituals” and “mere ceremonies,” and these have not particular determination in the Scriptures as the other sort and all points necessary to salvation have, which are therefore called “doctrinals”.
Replier: 3. The Defendant should have done well to have [p. 8] explained and confirmed his distinction.
Answer: So has he done, showing you what he means by “doctrinals,” what by “rituals,” or merely ceremonial; and this distinction he after (sect. 5) confirms by Mr. [John] Calvin’s testimony, and all our divines do use it. Why then say you he has not explained his distinction?
Replier: For “doctrinal” as opposed to “ceremonial” on the formal signification of these words, I never heard of before that I remember; and sure I am that no sound reason will allow it.
Answer: Formal signification of words cannot always be held, nor is it material, so as [at least] the meaning be clear; and a distinction may be good though you never heard of it before, or have forgotten what you have heard. You cannot be ignorant that all our divines have it in the same or other equivalent words, and all our men who did undertake against the Papists to defend the all-sufficiency of the Scripture do exempt out of that question particular rites and ceremonies, and confine it to matters of faith and good life necessary to salvation.
Thus Dr. [William] Ames, disputing against [the Papist Robert] Bellarmine for the sufficiency of the Scriptures, answers touching unwritten traditions mentioned by the fathers, that for the most part they mean by “traditions,” rites and ceremonies received without the Scripture, concerning which we dispute not. And the same author, elsewhere concerning those matters of faith and salvation preached by the apostles, calls that genus dogmaticum [in the kind of dogmas], [saying that] the apostles elsewhere have written nothing tending to the dogmatical kind which Paul had not preached to the Galatians: that is, all the points of faith and life necessary to salvation are of the dogmatical kind, and some rites and ceremonies called “traditions” by the fathers, were out of the question concerning the sufficiency of the Scriptures—which [Scriptures contain] all things pertaining to religion, either dogmatical, which are particularly contained in the Scripture, or ritual, which are not so contained in the Word. So is the distinction of doctrinal and ceremonial allowed by him; and why not? [p. 9]
Replier: Ceremonial is opposed to moral, and sometimes to substantial. But to doctrinal, it cannot be properly, because there is ceremonial doctrine, as well as moral or substantial [doctrine].
Answer: This reason is against yourself, for if the distinction of ceremonial and moral be good, although there be some moral ceremonies (as namely all those be which God has instituted for his worship), and the distinction of ceremonial and substantial be current, although there be some substantial ceremonies: then may the distinction of doctrinal and ceremonial be allowed, albeit there be some ceremonial doctrines, or doctrinal ceremonies. For if there be some others that are not so, the one sort of these is distinguishable from the other.
Replier: To which of these points will the Defendant refer the hierarchy of bishops? or are they no points of religion?
Answer: This is not a reply, but a jest, unworthy an answer: yet I answer that it is in several respects reconcileable to both, as having something in it that is divine, something human.
Replier: For the negative part of this answer, that ceremonial points of religion are not revealed in the Scripture, but left to the liberty of the Church: it is too, too nakedly set down to bear any color of truth with it.
Answer: Yourself only have made the Defendant’s words bare and naked by subtracting that emphatical word or term of “mere,” or “merely,” which the Defendant affixed to “ceremonial”. Restore that distinctive word to its place, and make the sentence as good as you found it, viz. that points merely ceremonial are not revealed in Scripture, that is, are not determined therein, as all doctrinal points are severally, but are left under certain general rules to the liberty of the Church, and then you shall find his speech able to bear the shock of all your objections, which I now expect in order.
Replier: 1. For first, was this true before the coming of Christ? then was the ceremonial Jew apocryphal.
Answer: It was true even then of points merely ceremonial, and the Jews knew it and accordingly ordained and used [p. 10] sundry such arbitrary rites, as Mr. [Thomas] Cartwright shows (Reply, p. 35; 2nd Reply, pp. 93-94), and that many more than we. Mr. Cartwright says twenty for one; and yet it follows not that then the Ceremonial Law was apocryphal; because that law concerned not mere ceremonies, such as we speak of, but such as were for that time necessary parts of the external worship of God then required.
Replier: 2. Is this true universally (as it is here set down) in the New Testament? Then water in baptism and bread and wine in the Lord’s Supper are no ceremonial points of religion.
Answer: It is true universally, as the Defendant sets it down of mere ceremonies; and yet it does not follow that the elements of water, bread and wine in the sacraments be no ceremonial points of religion, but that they are not points merely ceremonial, but essential parts of divine worship in their use, and therefore fall rather under the head of doctrinals.
Replier: The caution that is given, Dt. 4.2, and such like, did they not contain in them ceremonial points of religion? Then it was lawful for the Jews to add, detract and alter the ceremonies according to their pleasure; and does not that law bind us as well as the Jews? Then we do the Papists wrong in putting them to so much trouble as we do in finding out their shifts to avoid the sin which such places give them.
Answer: That caution given in Dt. 4:2 and elsewhere, concerning not adding to or taking from the Law of God, did concern the ceremonial points of religion then ordained of God as well as the Moral Law: and therefore the Jews might neither abate any one thing required of the Lord, nor add any one thing as of being divine in his worship: And yet had they a liberty in such rites as might serve to order, decency and edification amongst them, and did use it accordingly. And the same cautions which bound the Jews then, do bind us as well as they bound them.
And therefore we do no wrong to the Papists in pressing those places as we do against them, because they confine not themselves in the compass of arbitrary rites which [p. 11] serve to order. But they make bold both to detract from God’s own ordinances, as in their half-communion, and to add doctrines and sacraments of their own to his, and to place essential worship and religion itself in the very use of their own ceremonies. You may by this time see how much wrong you have done to the Defendant by taking and stealing away that one word “mere,” or “merely,” and how easily your objections are put off if that word be restored to the place thereof.
Replier: But to leave this mis-shapen distinction: My answer is given at length to the place alleged out of Heb. 3:2, concerning the comparison between Christ and Moses, sect. 4-5.
Answer: If you found this distinction well-shapen, and having cut off some limb of it, would leave it mis-shapen, leave it as you found it and so will I. When you add that an answer is given at length, sect. 4-5, you would bear the reader in hand that no answer was given in this third section to the place of Heb. 3:2 which is not so; for the answer thereto given, sect. 3, is this: That that place of Heb. 3:2 speaks of reals, not of rituals, which is a short and yet a full answer: but you had no mind to take notice of it or that your reader should know it.
4. Comparison between Christ and Moses in Real Faithfulness
Defendant: First, Moses by his bodily rites did but only prefigure man’s redemption, but Christ in his own body performed it in that consummatum est by his sacrifice on the cross.
Secondly, Moses had a veil over his face and delivered the Gospel only in types, shadows and mysteries, but Christ revealed the blessed countenance of our gracious God unto us by the light of the New Testament, expressly publishing our reconciliation with God by his own death.
Thirdly, Moses [p. 12] delivered [the Law] in thundering and earthquakes, and a terrible voice, which made Moses himself to quake for fear. But the Gospel of Christ was delivered with hymns and songs of angels and promises of saving joy to all people. So that the difference between Moses and Christ is no less than timor and amor, “fear” and “love”.
Fourthly, Moses, notwithstanding that he brought to the people the promises of the inheritance of but the earthly Canaan, yet he died in the mount and was not suffered to pass over Jordan: whereby was signified that the Law of commandments could never bring man to possess the heavenly Canaan. But Christ, being dead, to bring life to mankind, raised Himself from death, ascended, entered within the veil and has taken possession of the celestial mansions, that where He is, there his faithful may be also.
And thus in all these respects Christ was in the house of God as much, yea and more perfect in faithfulness than Moses.
Replier: In this section a comparison is made between Christ and Moses in real faithfulness, as he calls it, but this does not meet [fit] to loose the knot. For Moses was faithful in all the house of God; and Christ was not inferior, but in all parts of his office-prophetical, concerning all points of religion, was no doubt as faithful as Moses.
Answer: This may serve to unloose the knot for ought that you reply: for if Moses was therefore faithful in all the house of God because he taught and did all that was commanded him of God, although he did not teach or ordain all mere rites and ceremonies which lawfully might be used, but only all such as necessarily must be used in God’s service, then Christ also may be as faithful in all his prophetical office in teaching and prescribing all things necessary to be [p. 13] believed or done, that we might come to salvation, although He prescribed not all ambulatory [mobile or non-essential] ceremonies which might lawfully be used of his Church: for this to do was no part of his prophetical office further than in giving the general rules of direction concerning such matters.
5. Comparison between Christ & Moses in Rituals
The Defendant in this section compares the fidelity of Christ and Moses in rituals and shows that in such kind of rituals (which yet are not mere rituals) as God under the Law appointed by Moses, Christ was as faithful in ordaining as necessary a very few (even those two essential and necessary ceremonies, the sacraments) as Moses was in appointing those many ceremonies which under the Law were ordained.
And secondly, that because that multitude of ceremonies was a burden (Acts 15:10) importable, Christ showed his faithfulness in removing those ceremonies, as well as Moses did his in setting of them up in his time by the will of God.
Thirdly, he shows out of Mr. Calvin that our Lord Jesus, who was faithful as a Lord over the house of God and not only as a servant, as Moses, did prescribe particularly all things necessary to salvation, but not all rites and mere ceremonies, but left them under general rules to his Church for the good thereof. The conveniency whereof in respect of the spread of the Christian Church into all countries and unto all times, the Defendant shows in the fourth place. This is the sum [of what the Defendant says].
Replier: Here the Defendant can find nothing to bring out of Scripture for Christ’s faithfulness in ritual ordinances but that Moses appointed ceremonies and Christ removed them. [p. 14]
Answer: Nothing else? Yes verily it is something that our Lord was as faithful in ordaining so few essential ceremonies (as necessary) in the New Testament, as Moses was in prescribing so many in the Old. But what say you of that other point, of his fidelity in removing the legal ceremonies?
Replier: Is not this a proper explication of Scripture, to give a similitude by a dissimilitude? The Scripture makes Christ like unto Moses. This Defendant expounds the likeness to be in this, that Christ pulled down that which Moses had set up.
Answer: It is not given as an interpretation of the text, but as an answer to your objection from the text. And to that purpose it is proper enough. For, if the fidelity of Christ stood at all in removing that burden of ceremonies after their date was out (Dan. 9:27), as no longer necessary, then the fidelity of Christ in prescribing other ceremonies to be observed under the New Testament needs to extend no further than unto such as were simply necessary, and not to all mere ceremonies.
The thing compared is, fidelity which is the due performance of that which is committed to one. Now seeing it belonged to Christ to remove these ceremonies which Moses was enjoined to set up for a time, the fidelity of Christ in his office appeared as well in removing them as did the fidelity of Moses in appointing them. The faithfulness was alike, though the actions were unlike, even as the obedience of a servant in going when he is bid go (Mt. 8:9) is like to the obedience of a servant in coming when his master bids him come: though going from and coming to be actions as unlike as setting up and pulling down. Wherefore, in this you have showed too much lightness, dancing (as the proverb speaks) without a fiddle. Proceed to the next thing concerning Mr. Calvin’s testimony and judgement in this point.
Replier: Out of Mr. Calvin’s Institutes, bk. 4, ch. 20, sect. 30, he takes it upon himself to decide this question.
Answer: You tell not what question. The question [p. 15] referred here to Mr. Calvin’s judgment is whether the fidelity of Christ required of Him the prescription of all such ceremonies as may be lawfully used of us in the performance of religious service to God, or only of all such things as are in themselves simply necessary? And in this Calvin resolves with us and against you.
Replier: But he should have dealt more plainly and according to the scope of his author if he had cited Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, bk. 4, ch. 17, where the same words are according to his meaning. For in that place of Calvin there is nothing at all which, without gross equivocation, will serve the Defendant’s purpose.
Answer: I should be sorry to find so much waywardness and falsehood in any man of our religion, but cannot but wonder at it in a man pretending more than ordinary sincerity. For here are three gross untruths in one short sentence:
1. When it is said that the Defendant should have dealt more plainly if he had cited Bellarmine, for could any dealing be more plain than to set down the very words of Calvin and direct to the place where they are?
2. When it is said the same words which the Defendant cites as out of Calvin are found in Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, bk. 4, ch. 17, where upon my credit there be no such words, nor anywhere else in Bellarmine.
3. When he says that in that place of Calvin there is nothing at all which without gross equivocation will serve the Defendant’s purpose: the falsehood whereof would have appeared to the reader if the Replier had set down the words themselves alleged out of Calvin’s Institutions, bk. 4, ch. 10, sect. 30, by the Defendant. For Calvin in that place having first said that:
“because the Lord has both faithfully comprised and perspicuously declared in the holy Scriptures the whole sum of true righteousness and all the parts of his divine worship and whatsoever was necessary to salvation, he only is in these things to be listened unto as a master,”
then adds, quia autem etc. But because Christ would not prescribe sigillatim, id est, singularly and especially concerning external discipline and ceremonies, for that He foresaw these things to depend on the occasions and opportunities of times: nor did he think one form to accord with all [p. 16] ages. Hereupon we must have recourse unto the general rules that all things (whatsoever the necessity of the Church shall require unto order and decency) may be tried by them.
Finally, he delivered nothing expressly in these points because these things are not of necessity to salvation, but ought to be accommodated to the edification of the Church according to the different disposition and custom of times and countries. Thus far Calvin, wherein he differences matters merely ritual from matters real, as the Defendant does, and shows Christ (who was as faithful as Moses) to have prescribed the one fully and punctually, but to have left the other at liberty of the Church’s choice for her good under general rules only. And this being the very scope of that place, it is alleged to the very scope of the Defendant and decides the question, propounded directly and clearly, against them. Yet the Replier to prove his suggestion gives his reason.
Replier: For Calvin’s aim was nothing less than to teach that Christ had [not] given liberty unto men to prescribe at their discretion mystical signs in the Church, but only to dispose of such circumstances as in their kind are ever necessary, but in particular determination do vary.
He instances in the next section in the circumstances of time what hour the congregation should meet, in the place, how long, or in what fashion the church should be built; in mere order, what psalms should be sung at one time and what at another. These and such like circumstances of order and comeliness, equally necessary in civil and religious actions, are understood by Calvin, not significant ceremonies proper unto religious worship, such as ours are now in controversy. This allegation therefore borrows all the force it has from the ambiguous meaning of the word “ceremonies”.
Answer: 1. As Calvin meant not to turn the Church’s liberty upon the waste, that men might prescribe at their discretion any mystical signs in the Church, nor was it to any such end alleged, so Calvin never meant to put it as you do into a new pinfold, only to dispose of such circumstances as are in their kind necessary, etc., as you affirm. His words are that in matter of ceremonies, because Christ has not prescribed [p. 17] them in the words as He has done all things necessary to salvation, we must therefore have recourse to those general rules which He has left in his words, that whatsoever the necessity of the Church shall require to be appointed for order and decency, be tried by these rules.
Here you fasten on the word “necessity” and thence collect that only circumstances necessary in their kind, but in their particulars various, are left unto the Church’s disposal, but not any mystical signs, because, forsooth, they are not necessary in their kind.
But first you must know that Calvin by “necessity” understands utility. Witness Calvin who presently afterward says, “whatsoever the utility of the Church shall require,” reckoning, as you may see that to be “necessary” which is commodious.
And secondly, you ought to have marked that in the fourteenth section of the same chapter, Calvin, speaking against the Jewish-like burden of mystical signs or ceremonies in Popery, does yet profess that he knows that some such are profitable for a help to the weaker sort. Whereby appears that some such may in his judgment be ordained by the Church, among other things which the necessity, that is the utility, of the Church shall require.
Moreover, granting to you that whatsoever the necessity of the Church shall require must needs be some way necessary, I yet deny that the same must needs be necessary in the kind thereof. For it shall suffice if accidentally and propter aliud, it be found necessary. Thus was the abstaining from blood and strangled things found necessary (Acts 15:28), not because the things were so in their kind, but for the Church’s peace and edification, as then [needed]. Hence the same Calvin, ibid., sect. 12, professes not to oppose those holy and profitable constitutions of the Church which are made either for discipline (i.e. order) or for comeliness, or to maintain peace. Now though the necessary circumstances you speak of might possibly suffice to order and combine us, yet more is sometimes necessary for peace’s sake.
This appears also, sect. 22, where Calvin also allows that in Churches not well settled, the godly pastors required of their people that they should not openly eat flesh on Fridays, nor work on holy days [as the Papists], not because he judged these observances to be circumstances necessary in their kind, [p. 18] but because he judged the necessity of the Church then to require them. Yea, the same Calvin, epistle 379, judges that some things neither right, nor profitable, but scandalous and drawing an ill-use after them, yet not in themselves repugnant to the Word, must be born of the godly brethren when they cannot help it, and not [rather that] their Churches be forsaken. So that you see that in Calvin’s judgment, the necessity or utility of the Church will require sometimes more than circumstances necessary in their kind; and farther you may see, if you will, how some ceremonies may be necessary to this Church which are not so to others, and so were at the first reformation of religion in this kingdom, though not necessary in themselves, nor for the like reasons necessary to other Churches. And this may serve for answer to your two positions following in this section.
Finally, if Calvin’s words aforesaid imply at all any necessity in the things themselves determinable by the Church, they do cast it upon the particulars, which you say do vary, and not upon the kind, which (say you) is necessary. For he says, “Whatsoever the necessity of the Church shall require, be appointed for order, etc.” But that which is appointed is the particular [things], not the kind of circumstances. You bind what he loosens and loosen what he binds and yet presume to understand Calvin better than the Defendant.
The Defendant’s meaning jumps with Calvin in the point for which the words of Calvin were alleged; and if Calvin there had had no meaning to speak of ceremonies in that they are significant, no more had the Defendant in avouching his testimony any intention to call him in for a witness about that point of significant ceremonies, which was of purpose to be handled, p. 3; but brings him in only to speak to the issue of this present argument: Whether Christ, out of his fidelity, has prescribed all particular rites and ceremonies so that nothing of that kind is lawful more than what he has particularly named and commanded in his Word. Wherefore the Defendant has not made any gain of the ambiguous term of “ceremonies,” (as the Replier says he does), [p. 19] but the Replier has turned his back and fled from the issue of their own objection; and to conceal his running away from the question, calls in another, as if that had been the thing now in traverse; which is not to reply, but to decline.
3. And if Calvin in the next section had instanced in fewer things than the Replier mentions (as he has instanced in more, namely of the appointing of days for religious worship and the gesture of kneeling in prayer, of which one or both must needs be significant [signifying], and neither precisely commanded in the Word of God, as Calvin says, sect. 30), yet had he but in any one instance showed it, it had been enough against their general rule that all must be commanded or prescribed in Scripture that is lawful to be done in the service of God, or else Christ should not be as faithful as Moses; yet the Replier, running away from the cause, looks back at the Defendant and shows him his teeth, saying [all the previous] somewhat angrily.
Replier: The same deceit is in the known case which the Defendant applies to Calvin’s words, for if by “rites” he means such circumstances of order and decency as were before mentioned, then I grant all he says; but if by “rites” he means ceremonies properly of a religious nature, use and signification, such as the cross in baptism and surplice are known to be, then there is no reason in his speech.
For first, there is no necessity that in any nation the Churches should have any religious ceremony of spiritual signification beside those which Christ has appointed to all. And if the Defendant can show any such necessity, then I would desire him also to show by what rules and for what cause these religious ceremonies imposed upon us in England are fitter for us, or tend more to our edification, than other constitutions would, or than they would in any other nation under heaven. Except both these positions be proved, the words of this section are all but wind; and proved I am sure they never were, nor will be.
Answer: The same reason in part which Mr. Calvin afterward gives is amplified in the words subjoined to those cited words of Calvin, wherein this man complains of the same [p. 20] deceit. For in those words is said that it was necessary for the Christian Church (dispersed through all nations) to have the real common rites of ceremonies with liberty of applying them to the different conditions of each country and the occasions thereof as they should best tend to their edification. These words (though from Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, bk. 4. ch. 17) the Replier now grants to be true and a known case, if by “rites” or “ceremonies” such circumstances be meant as pertain to order and decency, and such as were before mentioned by him.
Wherein, though he grant not all he might, yet he grants as much as the Defendant needed to mean in those words for the avoidance of their argument from Christ’s faithfulness. For if at all any ceremonies pertaining to the order and decency of God’s service be left by Christ to the liberty of the Church, then either Christ has been less faithful than Moses was, which is contrary to the text of Heb. 3:2, or else it did not lie upon the faithfulness of Christ to prescribe all rites and ceremonies which may be lawfully used in the service of God, which is our tenet, and directly contrary to their argument from that text of Heb. 3:2. Here therefore the Replier has plainly given up and abandoned that place of Heb. 3:2 and demolished the castle built thereupon.
But to hide this manifest slight of his, he speaks here unseasonably of ceremonies, [as to] whether they be significant [signifying], whereas the argument here pleaded against them was only upon that point that they are not commanded or prescribed. So herein he does as it were make fires in the trenches out of which he is fled that he might be thought not to be run away, leaving therefore his two positions and the scantness of his grant to be further scanned in the third chapter where the argument of significant ceremonies comes in, in all the strength it has.
I close with him here and grant all the Defendant’s words of this section to be but wind if he will grant their objection to be carried away before it as chaff or stubble, as in truth it is. Having therefore taken from them this place of Heb. 3:2, let us from thence discharge one piece of ordinance after them: Whosoever does teach that Christ has [p. 21] not forbidden in his Word all unlawful things, as well as commanded all things necessary, makes the Scriptures imperfect and Christ less faithful than Moses, contrary to Heb. 3:2. But they that teach some ceremonies to be unlawful, though Christ has not forbidden them, only because He has not commanded them, teach that Christ has not forbidden in his Word all things unlawful; and therefore do make the Word imperfect in the negative precepts and Christ less faithful than Moses, contrary to Heb. 3:2.
6. 2 Samuel 7:7 on David
Opposers: The second place of Scripture produced out of the Abridgement and led on in disputation by for proof of their negative argument from Scripture is 2 Sam. 7:7, where David’s intention and purpose of building a temple to God is said to be unlawful and reproved; and thence it is inferred that no ceremony may be invented by man for God’s worship. (Mr. Hy)
The Defendant joins the issue upon this point whether David’s purpose was condemned or no, and declares against their opinion that say it was condemned, sect. 6, and inverts the example of David against their negative proposition, sect. 7.
Replier: The second place of Scripture handled by the Defendant is 2 Sam. 7:7, where I cannot but marvel why so resolute a disputer would pass by in silence Dt. 4:2; 12:32; Prov. 30:6 & Lev. 10:12, all which places are alleged by the Lincolnshire ministers (against whom he professes principally to write) and choose this place, which we bring in after the former. Was there not a cause?
Answer: If the Replier knew the cause, as he does insinuate, how came he to marvel? For we marvel at things because we know not the causes of them. A cause there was no doubt of referring those other places, as is done, to sect. 12 of this [p. 22] chapter and to sections 3-5 of the second chapter, and of handling this place here as more proper to this argument.
And though the Defendant professes specially to answer that book he speaks of, yet he neither did, nor needed to tie himself to their words or method, but to the substance of their arguments; wherein if he has failed, let the Replier show that and then glory, or else sit down and be quiet.
Replier: But to take him as we find him, he professes plainly, that it was lawful for David without special warrant to build a house unto God; and in this he is so peremptory that he condemns the contrary opinion of notable precipitancy and presumes to make this example a ground of confutation against his adversary, disputing as he pedantically speaks, first by extortion, then by retortion out of this place. But if his extortion be mere torting and torturing of the text, we need not fear his retortion.
Answer: If the Replier had indeed taken the Defendant as he found him, we should not have found the Replier here, as we must now take him, a false reporter. For whereas the Defendant undertakes only for David’s intention and purpose to build the house, the Replier affirms him to profess, and that plainly, that it was lawful for David to build a house to God without special warrant; as if all that might be lawfully purposed with submission to Gods pleasure might also be lawfully done without his pleasure known and leave given.
David, out of the Word of God prophesying of such a thing to be done, and not forbidding him to do it (both which Mr. Cartwright confesses)¹ and from the consideration of God’s favors done to him above all his predecessors and the subduing of his enemies round about him, and of his own dwelling now in an house of cedars, had warrant enough to move his religious heart to a holy desire and purpose of performing this service if God would accept it of him. But to perform it without God’s leave and direction for the place and manner, David knew by the same Word that it was neither lawful nor possible to him, seeing God had reserved the choice of the very place to Himself, calling it still “the place that He should choose to put his name there.” (Dt. 12:11)
¹ Cartwright, 2nd Reply, folio 49, num. 30, “Albeit the Lord had revealed before in his Word that there should be such a standing place where the ark of the covenant and the service of God should have a certain abiding, and albeit there was no word of God which forbade David to build the temple, etc.”
So the purpose without [p. 23] special warrant might be lawful, though not the execution, as a nobleman of England, before leave asked, may legally purpose to travel beyond seas, yet may not travel legally without leave first obtained of the king. A child may lawfully, with submission, purpose marriage which he may not lawfully perform without consent of parents. The Replier therefore confounding the purpose with the performance mis-reports the Defendant, making him to say that which he did not, that he might seem to reply when he does not. The rest of his words built upon this mistake are so far false; and his adjoined scoffings are unworthy of answer.
The Replier not marking, or not willing that others should mark, the fault he has made in confounding purpose and performance, propounds in the next passage some new arguments of his own for disproof of David’s very purpose, which, though it be objecting and not replying, yet let him say on.
Replier: Now that the purpose of David was partly condemned appears plainly, first because it was prohibited, as here the Defendant in his answer expressly grants.
Answer: That David’s purpose (which went before Nathan’s message to him) was prohibited, I believe not; nor has the Defendant (as the Replier says) confessed that it was, but his performance only, which is another matter; and if he think the inhibition of the prosecution will conclude a condemnation of his purpose, he is wide of the mark. Peter Martyr, [Nicholas of] Lyra, [Ludwig] Lavater, L. Mollerus on the Psalms and others acknowledge the purpose to have been commended of God, though the performance was forbidden him.
As Christ did not disprove Paul’s purpose of going up to Jerusalem when He restrained his journey, Joab condemned not the purpose of Ahimaaz to carry tidings to David, but for another reason put him by, why should we trifle? God himself commended David’s purpose and yet forbids the work to him: God rewarded his purpose (says Peter Martyr) and yet forbade the execution of it.
Replier: Secondly, because as honorable Mr. Calvin well observes on Acts 7:46, it was not lawful for man to choose a place [p. 24] for God’s name and ark, but it was to be placed in that place which God Himself should show, as Moses does often admonish. Neither dared David himself to bring the ark into the threshing-floor of Araunah until the Lord by an angel from heaven had witnessed unto him that that was the place chosen by Himself, 2 Sam. 24:10.
Answer: This second reason would prove well what we grant, viz. that David could not build the House, nor so much as set out the place for it, without leave and direction from God; but how does this condemn his purpose, seeing his purpose of doing might (and no doubt did) include a purpose of taking counsel from God, to which end it is likely he did ask counsel of Nathan the prophet? And if David dared not to bring the ark into the floor of Araunah, (as you say) till God’s pleasure appeared, who can think that he purposed to build the House of God without asking him leave, seeing he was not ignorant of what Moses had said?
Replier: 3. Because it cannot be absolutely excused from some mixture of rashness with zeal that he should resolve absolutely to build a house unto God before he knew either what manner of house God would have built, or when, or by whom, seeing without the special direction and assistance of God’s Spirit nothing of this kind could be well done. How could David have built a house except the Lord had filled with his Spirit of wisdom Bezaleel and Aholiab or some such?
Answer: To argue David’s purpose of building a house to the name of God was shear rashness, the Replier rashly charges him with an absolute resolution of doing that without leave of God, which David might know (and no doubt did), as well as this Replier, could not possibly be done without God’s direction for the place, nor without the special assistance of God’s spirit for the work. That which was in David was but a purpose, including God’s allowance; that which the Replier here condemns is an absolute resolution excluding all reference to God’s pleasure. And why this? but that David’s [p. 25] purpose must needs be naught rather than their argument be against them, commented upon the supposed reproof of David’s intention.
We have now answered the Replier’s objections; now hear we his reply to the Defendant’s answer and the reasons he gave thereof, against the opposer that said it.
Opposers: God did reprove David’s intention, and for that case sent to forbid it by Nathan the prophet, saying, “Go say to my servant David, ‘Shalt thou build me an house?'” (Mr. Hy)
Defendant: David had consulted Nathan and had his allowance.
Replier: The arguments brought by the Defendant for the contrary opinion are worth nothing: 1. Nathan (says he) had allowed the purpose of David, v. 3. But judicious [Francis] Junius answers in his Notes upon that place that so Samuel erred out of human infirmity and thought Eliab was the man whom God would have King, 1 Sam. 16:7.
Answer: Be it granted that Nathan was too sudden in his resolution given to David out of human discourse, before he was informed of the Lord (as Samuel was in his conceit of Eliab): what is this to the question of David’s purpose? Nathan was to judge of such a purpose by the Law of God, and in approving it did no more than every godly man would have done. Optimum probavit, says Peter Martyr, and that God Himself did, as shall appear.
But in that Nathan, allowing the purpose to be good, as it was, was so unadvised as thereupon to say to David, “Go do all that is in thine heart, the Lord is with thee,” before he had consulted the mouth of the Lord to whom the designation of the place, manner and man did belong, and who knew better than David or Nathan whether David and his time would be fittest for this work or no: herein he failed and was made the same night to retract his own words. But his judgment of the purpose of David was never reversed, but confirmed from the mouth of God Himself, 1 Kn. 8:18, “And the Lord said unto David [p. 26] my father, ‘Whereas it was in thine heart to build an house unto my Name, thou didst well that it was in thine heart.” The reader is only in this point to consider whether Nathan as a divine knew not what was then lawful for David to intend as well as our opposites do now. And so pass we to the second reason of the Defendant.
Defendant: Secondly, the tenor of the prohibition was, “Go say unto David my servant, ‘Shalt thou build Me an house, etc.'” God never gave any such honorable and gracious title to any man as to call him “my servant” in reproof of any transgression.
Replier: God calls David his servant, which he never does in reproof, is not true, though the reproof be for a thing simply evil, as is plainly to be seen, Isa. 1:3; Jer. 2:13 and in many such places where “my people” is as much as “my servant”; but the very word “servant” is also thus used in one verse, Isa. 42:19; much less when the affection is good in the general and blemished only by some circumstance.
For then why may not a good title be given as an allowance of that which is good and yet the evil be at the same time reproved. So many learned divines do interpret that of the midwives, Ex. 1:19-21; Moses was reproved and brought to his grave for his sin and yet when his death is recorded, it is said that Moses the servant of the Lord died, Dt. 34:5. The Churches are sharply reproved, Rev. 2:3, and yet are styled by the name of “Churches” and “golden candlesticks,” and their ministers, who are chiefly reproved, are called “stars”.
Answer: The Replier equivocates (as we say) and disputes sophistically from that which is spoken after a sort to that which is spoken simply. For, the Defendant speaks of a title not upbraided as it were in scorn (which is not properly a title), but of an honorable title given in good earnest, as a title for honor, as was this, “David my servant”; but the Replier tells us where such terms were used not as titles then acknowledged, but as titles forfeited and shamefully defaced, and where the very mention of them imports the reproof itself. So Isa. 1.3, “Israel has not known, my people has not understood”; and Jer. 2:13, “My people has forsaken Me the fountain of living waters,” that is, they which once had the honor to be by calling the Israel and people of God. So Isa. 42:19, “Who is blind but my servant, and deaf as my messenger? Who is blind as he that is perfect, and blind as the Lords servant?” Shall any man say that God does here intend to style them as with an honorable title, as servants his messengers and perfect ones, and yet affirms them to be deaf and blind? Or not rather by mention of these titles, to reprove them thereby for having dishonored and devested themselves of such excellent titles sometimes bestowed upon them?
The Replier therefore should bring us some place of Scripture where God (as Himself speaks) does give to any man a good title as an allowance of the man (like this, “my servant”) and yet does in the same place reprove that man for transgression. This is the very hinge of this our argument, and the Replier saw this and therefore offers to prove it, but cannot do it, nor any other for him.
As for the midwives spoken of, Ex. 1:19-21, however they had in them somewhat reproveable (as have all men, even the best), yet in that place where they are honored with this testimony that they feared God, their praise is not sprinkled with any reproof. Besides, this case is not of a name or title given in any singular manner, as was “Moses my servant,” “David my servant.” So, though Moses sinned and was reproved, Num. 20, and for that sin fell short of Canaan, yet is he not honored with the title of “my servant” in Num. 20 where his sin is reproved, nor blemished with any intimation of that or other sin where his title of “the Lord’s servant” is put upon him, Dt. 34:5, or when God says of him, “Moses my servant is dead,” Josh. 1:2.
The Churches of Asia are for their personal faults sharply reproved, Rev. 2-3. But where the titles of “golden candlesticks” are given to them, and of “stars” to their pastors, Rev. 1, their functions and callings only are there [p. 28] honored, without any intimation of their personal faults. But the case we speak of is of a person honored of God with faith. As for the name of “Church” it is not simply, nor of itself a title of honor without some other addition. And when other words of dignity are added there (as when it is said “the Church of the saints”), either the calling of all believers is honored, which is not capable of reproof in itself, or respect is had to the true members or purer parts of the particular Churches, which, being honored in those titles, are not taken down again by such reproofs as are justly cast upon particular Churches in respect of the gross parts of them.
Finally the question is not whether in the same laudable persons or actions whereto much praise is given, there may not be found matter also worthy of dispraise (for of that we are agreed). But whether God in the Scripture be found at any time to have given an honoring title to any man in way of allowance of the man, such as this, “David my servant,” and have at the same time reproved the same person for transgression. I find this very title “my servant,” given in Scripture to Abraham, to Moses, to Job, to Eliakim, to Nebuchadnezzar, to Jacob, to Israel’s posterity, to Zerubbabel, but oftenest to David, and sometimes to the Christ under David’s name, but I could never find this title given to any of them in reproof. I find also that when God sent Samuel, Nathan and Gad to David to reprove him, he said, “Go say to David” (2 Sam. 24.11) suppressing then this title of “my servant” as unsuitable to the reproof he then intended. Wherefore I believe still that the Defendant’s words are true, that God never gave such an honorable and gracious title to any man as to call him “my servant” in reproof of any transgression.
Defendant: Thirdly, the reason rendered by Solomon why God prohibited David and commanded Solomon to build him a house (1 Kn. 5:3-4) was because David was yet in wars and Solomon had now rest on every side. The restraint then was not in respect of any unlawfulness [p. 29] of the act.
Replier: But the Defendant should mark that one reason does not exclude another.
Answer: True: where many reasons do concur, one excludes not another; but when one is avouched as the only reason, the proof of any other disproves that allegation, which the Replier should mark. The opponent said that David’s purpose is here, 2 Sam. 7:5, reproved of God as unlawful, which was the cause that God did prohibit him by Nathan. He says not, “which was one cause, or some cause, or partly the cause,” but “the cause”. Now the Defendant, in showing out of Scripture another cause of this prohibition, disproves that allegation which affirmed that one cause as the only cause.
Replier: In this place of second Samuel, two reasons are rendered, as [Immanuel] Tremelius and Junius note, the second of which is taken (as he says) from the example of David’s ancestors, who never undertook any such thing, because they knew that the calling of God was to be expected.
Answer: Tremelius, or Junius’s Notes out of the text, give three reasons by which God averts David from his purpose:
First that of David’s wars, confirmed out of 1 Chron. 22:8 and 1 Kn. 5:3. Secondly, that which the Replier has set down. Thirdly, the consideration of God’s promise and charge laid upon David for the government of that people, out of v. 11.
P. Martyr also notes three reasons of this restraint. (Commentary on 2 Samuel, ch. 7, fol. 217, p. 6, ed. Zurich, 1575):
One on David’s part, for that he had shed much blood, 1 Chron. 22:8, in respect whereof he was made less fit to typify the Prince of Peace, the Builder of the spiritual House of God, than Solomon the peaceable king.
Another on God’s behalf out of this place of Samuel: I (says God) have hitherto dwelt in a tabernacle, and have been contented with that mansion, and was not therefore the less present or helpful to them (the fathers); therefore there is no cause that on my behalf thou shouldest be troubled about a temple.
Martyr also gives a third reason on David’s behalf, namely, that [p. 30] God had not commanded any of the former judges, no not David himself to do it; and why then should he only undertake that which God had not commanded either to any other of the judges or to David himself? He adds that God had indeed said that there should be one place for his worship, but which place that should be, He had not said, and therefore in that thing the oracle and certain Word of God was to be expected.
Here bee many reasons of David’s restraint from the work, but not one of these that condemns his purpose of building that house to God, if God should be pleased to give way thereto. For that last reason of Peter Martyr (which is in effect one with that second reason of Junius) does not reach (in Peter Martyr’s own judgment) unto the reproof of David’s godly purpose, which the same Peter Martyr confesses to have been allowed of God, yea, and rewarded too with many promises related to David in this very message of Nathan, namely that God, in answer to David’s desire to build a house to Him, says that He will build David’s house, which is far from any reproof.
The argument therefore implied in those words, “To which of the tribes” (that is, judges raised out of the tribes) “said I, ‘Build Me a house of cedars?'” has no intention to blame David’s purpose, but, as [Victor] Strigelius notes, to allay all doubtfulness of David’s mind that he should not think the Lord would ever take ill of his hand that he did not build Him a temple, inasmuch as he had not commanded it to be done, and, as Strigelius well says, Ubi nulla lex, ibi nulla transgressio [Where there is no law, there is no transgression].
But all this will not serve their turn, but it must be taken (forsooth) that God in saying He did not command any of David’s ancestors to build Him a house, did not only give a reason why David might without trouble of mind forbear that work, but gave him a reproof for once taking it into his thoughts and purpose before God required it, which is a violent strain of the text: For God does not say, “Spoke I unto thee, saying, ‘Why buildest thou not a house for me of cedars. [p. 31] But, spoke I to any of the judges saying, ‘Why build you not Me a house of cedars?'” plainly showing David why he needed not fear any displeasure for not building a temple to Him, seeing the Lord had so long time contented Himself with a tabernacle and never so much as required a temple.
So that among many reasons that take David off from his purpose, that which was alleged for the only cause, viz. the reproof of David’s purpose, has no place: and as little has that of Mr. Cartwright (Reply, p. 45) that David’s resolution was concluded against by this reason, that the Lord had not commanded who should do it; for herein the scope of the text is perverted and a reason thrust upon it neither agreeable to the words, nor to their intention, nor much helping their negative argument (for which it is by him avouched) if it were granted.
For if it were granted that David had been reproveable for intending more than was commanded him in a case, which for the performance of it required God’s particular determination by oracle, what is this to the prescription of arbitrary ceremonies, which neither by oracle, nor by Scripture are determined, but left to the order of the Church (as even Mr. Cartwright against himself confesses, Admonition, p. 1), so as they do nothing therein against the general rules of the Word of God? Proceed we to the fourth and chief reason of the Defendant’s answer.
Defendant: Lastly, what can be more forcible to convince these men of notable precipitancy, in affirming that God condemned this holy purpose in David, than that God did commend it Himself, 1 Kn. 8:17-18, where Solomon says:
“It was in the heart of David my father to build a house for the name of the Lord God of Israel, and the Lord said unto David my father, ‘Whereas it was in thy heart to build a house to my name, thou didst well that it was in thine heart.'”
And can they require either a better determination than the Lord’s or a plainer tenure thereof [p. 32] than this: “Thou didst well”? To this the Replier gives this short return:
Replier: God Himself commended this purpose of David, 1 Kn. 8:17. As if the same affection may not in diverse respects be both commended and condemned.
Answer: It would be hard for the Replier to give an instance of this in the same affection, though in the same action or person it may be found. But suppose it might be, does it follow that it was? We show out of Scripture that it was commended. Let them show also out of Scripture that it was condemned and then we shall have reason to inquire after diverse respects. Till then we are on the surer side, for we are sure God commended it, and I think never any man which was not engaged in their quarrel dared to say (as they do) contrary to the express words of the Holy Ghost that it was condemned of God.
Mark by the way, this Replier, he before stretched the purpose of David to an absolute resolution, that he might under that name condemn it, and now he shrinks it in as much in his term of “affection” that he might hold off God’s commendation from it: whereas affection is as far short of intention and purpose as absolute resolution is beyond it. But present necessities must be served.
Replier: But this evasion of Mr. Hy I pass over as childish and absurd, says the Defendant; and why so I pray?
Answer: “This evasion of Master Hy?” What now? Was this Mr. Hy’s evasion, that the same affection may in diverse respects be commended and condemned? It is your own, such as it is. This is the evasion of M. Hy: that God did approve David’s affection in general only; which evasion I suppose he borrowed of Mr. Cartwright, who, to wipe off our answer of God’s commendation likely to confront his objections against David’s purpose, says:
“The Lord with commendation of his (David’s) good affection and zeal he had to the advancement of God’s glory, concluded, etc.”
This, this is Mr. Hy’s evasion, that David was commended for his good affection to God’s honor in general, but not in respect of this particular affection to the building of the temple. For indeed if God had commended David for that very particular affection [p. 33] and purpose, they may all be ashamed before God and among men who have dared to say it was unlawful and condemned of God, who has commended it. This is the evasion which the Defendant censures (though Mr. Hy were a worthy man) as childish and absurd:
“seeing that God Himself did interpret his (David’s) affection for a deed, and did note this deed as special, saying in both respects, ‘Thou didst well that it was in thy heart.'”
Replier: In which words, if there be any consequence or good sense, then not only Mr. Hy’s evasion, but logic itself is childish and absurd.
Answer: I hope logic may scape to serve other good men’s turns, though it has here failed the Replier. How the evasion will evade, let the Replier look to that. The sense is plain, that God does not only commend David’s affection in general, but his affection actuated to a deed, and specificated to this deed, saying in respect both of the affection and of the particular determination of it, “Thou didst well that it was in thine heart,” the consequence whereof is that the evasion which said, “God commended David’s affection in general only,” is as the Replier will have it. Thus bids he his friend and the cause goodnight.
Thus is the place of 2 Sam. 7:7 extorted out of their hands, which the Defendant retorts upon them to this effect, sect. 7.
7. 2 Samuel 7:7 is against Nonconformists
Defendant: If this act of David without special warrant were commended by God, then institutions of ceremonies by man belonging to God’s service are not therefore to be condemned because they want [lack] that express warrant which they pretend. The Replier to this, besides his gibe at the terms of “extortion” and “retortion,” which he calls pedantic, replies:
Replier: But if his extortion be nothing but torting and torturing of the Scripture, we need not fear his retortion.
Answer: But if his extortion be no torting, nor torturing of the [p. 34] Scripture, then belike they may fear his retortion; and it seems so the Replier did: for he turns his back upon it and shifts for himself, giving no answer, nor reply. Let us therefore from this place of Scripture won from him, by main force of truth make our shot once more after him:
Whatsoever has general warrant by the Word of God (Cartwright, as above) and no word of God to forbid it, to that man, that is lawful for a man to purpose and to do.
But David (as Mr. Cartwright confesses) had general warrant from the Word of God for building the temple, and had no word to forbid him to do it (till God did inhibit him by Nathan).
Therefore for David to purpose to build the temple, till such time as God by Nathan did forbid it to him, was lawful.
Both propositions are true; and their own, the conclusion, therefore stands good against them. And indeed, if general warrant not crossed by any prohibition respectively to us shall not legitimate our actions, we have not any sufficient warrant in the Word of God for any particular actions undetermined in the Word, which is a snare and gross absurdity themselves and all reasonable men will deny.
.
8-11 in Sum: Jeremiah 7:22-23; Isaiah 1:12, “Who has required this at your hand?” Philippians 2:10 on Bowing
Defendant: The third place of Scripture alleged by Mr. Hy out of Jer. 7:22–23 for confirmation of their negative argument from Scripture is produced and answered, sect. 8-10, by the Defendant. In the 11th section a fourth place taken out of Isa. 1:12 is produced, examined and confuted. All which sections the Replier thrusts together that he might be gone the sooner from them, for he liked not the match, as his words (which are these) will show:
Replier: In these passages two places of Scripture are objected under the name of Mr. Hy, but I verily think Mr. Hy has some wrong done him in the matter. However, I will not undertake to maintain that these places are fitly alleged and urged, though by proportion the force of the argument used in those places “Who required these things at your hands?” is strong against our ceremonies. [p. 35]
Answer: The man is troubled:
1. He is loath to do so much prejudice to their cause as plainly to acknowledge either of their mistaking in one of theirs.
2. He does not so much as name the places of Scripture objected or what the need of them was, no doubt for very shame.
3. He professes that he will not maintain those places to be fitly alleged and urged.
And yet, lest his party should blame him, he says that the argument from those places, “Who required these things at your hands,” is by proportion strong against our ceremonies, but does not tell how or wherein. From the first place he stole away cunningly; the second he lost by force; the third and fourth he abandons without resistance and yet he would be thought to have maintained the cause. But I must not let him thus go, but must know ere we part what the objections, what the answers were. The former of these two places (which is their third) is Jer. 7:22–23, in these words:
“For I spoke not to your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings and sacrifices, but this thing commanded I them: Obey my voice and I will be your God:”
The inference from hence was: Therefore, ceremonies, which are beside the special warrant of the Scripture, are unlawful.
Now the sum of the answer is this, that this objection presumes that burnt sacrifices were without warrant and beside the command of God because it is said, “I commanded them not in that day, etc.” The truth is that though God did not make any mention of sacrifices in that very day [in coming out of Egypt], yet He had long before that commanded sacrifice.
To this the Opponent having objected (sect. 9) that that does not appear, the Defendant answers: It cannot but appear to them that will open their eyes and read, Ex. 5:19, where the Israelites require liberty to go offer sacrifice to the Lord, and Ex. 3:3, where Pharaoh gives them leave to sacrifice to the Lord their God. And because it was replied that this law concerning sacrifice was not published, it is answered by the Defendant, sect. 10, that [p. 36] it was published and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb commanded, Ex. 12:3, to all the congregation of Israel before the moral Law was given [at Sinai]. Wherefore, for satisfaction to the place objected, and to show that between that and the other there is no contradiction, it is declared that God in that place of Jeremiah meant not simply and absolutely to condemn sacrifice, which God Himself had commanded, but to prefer obedience before it, forasmuch as God in giving the Law mentioned not burnt sacrifices, which are only as the body, but required obedience to the moral Law, which is as the soul of God’s worship.
The other place (which is their fourth) is alleged (sect. 11) out of Isaiah, the eleventh and twelfth verses: “To what purpose is your sacrifice to Me, says the Lord, I am full of your burnt offerings,” and 12, “Who required these things at your hands?” The objection intended from hence is specially from those words, “Who required these things at your hands?” to which is answered in sum by the Defendant, that neither the sacrifices themselves, nor the act of sacrificing is there disclaimed when it is said, “Who required these things,” but the actors, who continuing in hypocrisy and transgression, thought to gratify God with sacrifices alone, even separated from the obedience of the law of godliness.
The Defendant’s answer now related by me is a clear answer and open to every eye, for the emphasis of that speech is not to be placed on the words, “These things,” which things were such as God had then commanded, but in these other words, “at your hands,” which were hands full of blood, (verse 15). And the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination to God, not because sacrifice is not required, but because it is not required [as conjoined] of a wicked and impenitent man [but rather of a good man]. Why? “[Wash] You [make you clean] etc.” (verse 16) Now let the reader see if the Replier had not cause to abandon these two places of Scripture as no way defensible, and yet he makes head again, and says:
Replier: The argument from this place, “Who required these things at your hands?” is by proportion very strong against our ceremonies.
Answer: “By proportion,” says he, but tells not how. [p. 37] Wherefore I will tell you the riddle: If God’s own institutions used by outlawed persons were disclaimed because they were not required of God (viz. not of such men, nor in such a fashion), then our ceremonies, because they are not any way required of God in his worship, are much more disclaimed of Him.
To which I answer: If we should appoint these or any other ceremonies not commanded of God for a service and worship to God in themselves in any of our use of them, this place would by proportion indeed reprove us, as it does the Papists, against whose will-worship it is by the best of ours applied. But in such things as God Himself requires not in any one or other particular, nor prohibits, and which are not tendered to God as immediate service to Him, but intended to order, decency or our own edification, this, quo warranto [by which warrant], will never lie from this place of Isa. 1 against our ceremonies. The Replier goes on:
Replier: We will not imitate Dr. Cary, now Bishop of Exeter, that proved the surplice by the armor of light, Rom. 13:12, or those that proved kneeling at the Communion and at the word “Jesus” out of the bowing of the knees of all creatures, Phil. 2:10, nor as those that fetch the cross out of the letter “Tau,” Eze. 9:4.
Answer: I see no cause of this outleap but either to ease his stomach or to please those of his side whom he has lately smitten, as children sometimes are pleased by smiting of others in their sight; nor know I how truly he speaks all this. What might be said for one of these places to prove the lawfulness of kneeling or bowing of the knee in testimony of that subjection spoken of in Phil. 2:10, I wish the reader to see, if he will, in Peter Martyr, [David] Pareus and others.
But if the Replier and his party (for he says, “We will not”) will in good earnest spare to wring the Scriptures to their turns, then I hope they will no more allege out of Jude the garment spotted with the flesh against the surplice, nor the bowing of the knee to Baal against kneeling to our God in receiving the sacrament, nor the mark of the Beast [p. 38] or Second Commandment against the use of the cross in baptism; nor force their margins (as their Mock Dighton does) with a multitude of Scriptures most miserably perverted, which with the Anabaptists and the Brownists is found most common, to say nothing of the Admonitions to the Parliament, which, in this sense, led the way to them.
Of all hands we ought to take religious heed of dallying with the holy oracles of God or making them speak not what they meant, but what they would fain have them mean, as did even that good man that found the deacons, etc. in those words of Solomon’s Song, “Thy teeth are as a flock of sheep, etc.” (D.F. on Canticles 4:2) The dignity of the Scriptures should fright all Christians from abuse of them; and the Lord grant it.
Replier: Neither need the Defendant please himself in this, that by some places of Scripture the ceremonies are not condemned; it is enough if they were condemned but by one only testimony of Scripture or by one sound argument drawn out of Scripture, though no more could be brought.
Answer: We subscribe. But yet we may by this occasion pray them not to be too confident in their allegations or arguments, seeing that it appears that they have no privileged spirit, but can sometimes mistake the Scripture and their arguments drawn (as they think) from them. The Replier lastly cries out:
Replier: But what kind of dealing is this, for him that professes a confutation principally of the Lincolnshire ministers to pass by diverse texts of Scripture alleged by them and to bring forth other of an uncertain author never publicly propounded in any of our writings?
Answer: 1. The kind of dealing with the Lincolnshire ministers is here (the second time) clamorously and causelessly complained of merely for noise, which has been answered.
Secondly, that he makes the author of these objections more uncertain than the authors of any of their books is more strange: for he is a known man and set his hand to his objections, which I have seen and (as I hear) there be many copies of them; whereas most of their writers are nameless libellers (as this Replier) or forge a false name on [p. 39] on the title page of their books, as he did that published anno 1618, a brainsick libel of his own, under the name of Thomas Dighton, when Dighton was dead.
But thirdly, where he says none of their writers have urged either of these places, let him know that the libeller, bearing Dighton’s name, will take it ill if he may not pass for one of their writers; and worse, if he shall understand that one of their champions does say that these two places, whereof Isa. 1:12 is one, are not fitly alleged against our ceremonies as not required, whereas he spends a whole page (p. 63) in pressing this place:
“Who required these things at your hands?” as an ordinance of God, forever, that all true Churches and true servants of God must only conform to such things in his worship as He has in his Word required; but the Lord never required kneeling as it is urged, etc. And here, viz. Isa. 1:12, is a manifest prohibition, or else the Lord should reason most absurdly (which is fearful blasphemy to think or infer), for else they might reply with the persuaders to conformity of these days: Thou hast not forbidden, therefore we may do it.
And again the manner of God’s reasoning remains immutable: Is there no commandment in the Word? or, which is all one: Does not the Word require it? Then does he absolutely forbid conformity to it, for the Lord hates whatsoever is not in the Word required, these words being spoken with detestation do most manifestly declare.
Thus he. Now you have one of your writers; and now think how you shall conjure down the spirit you have raised and raised up by this your negative argument so loosely delivered: “What God has not commanded in his Word must not be in the Church. Nothing may be placed in the Church which God has not commanded in his Word,” (so the Admonition to the Parliament, ch. 6, sect. 1, and others) and such like stuff, speaking not of doctrinal matters, but of matter of order and ceremony; and so condemning all the Churches of God under heaven that ever were, are or shall be, inasmuch as none of them ever did or can administer the holy things of God conveniently without addition of some things pertaining to the administration of them, which God Himself in his [p. 40] Word never commanded, never required and never determined particularly.
12. Jeremiah 7:31, “Which I commanded them not”
Opposers (Abridgment, p. 44): The fifth place for their negative argument from Scripture quoted by the Lincolnshire ministers, is taken out of Jer. 7:31 where God complains saying, “They have built the high places of Topheth, which is in the valley of the son of Hinnom, to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire, which I commanded them not, neither came it into my heart,” which place is brought to prove that the Scripture condemns whatsoever is done, not only against the Word, but beside it.
Defendant in sum: That from these words, “Which I commanded not,” they collect that the thing here condemned was only not commanded, or was beside the word, not against it; whereas, “which I did not command,” is as much as, “which I commanded them that they should not do,” or, which I forbade, showing that the burning of their sons to Molech was a thing not only not commanded, but a sacrilegious abomination expressly forbidden, Lev. 18:21. To this answer it is thus replied:
Replier: The last place of Scripture handled in this argument is Jer. 7:31, the force of which, as it pertains to the purpose in hand, is in the last words; “Which I commanded not, neither came it into my heart.”
Answer: And so the Defendant has conceived it to be, and tells you that this phrase, “which I commanded not,” is, in his sense, “which I forbade,” as indeed it is elsewhere, as Lev. 10:1 [p. 41] (which place is by one of your writers (Mr. Dighton’s book) vehemently pressed), “they offered strange fire which the Lord commanded not,” where less is said and more is understood, says Lyra: which “was forbidden,” says Jerome Zanchi, and proves it by Scripture to have been forbidden, whom Henry Ainsworth in his Annotations follows: and all must that will yield to Scripture or reason. So Dt. 17:3, “and has worshipped other gods, etc. which I have not commanded,” where “not commanded” must import disallowed or forbidden and not only that they did this beside the Word of God and not against the prescription of it. But the Replier tells us.
Replier: The reason lies thus (to take honorable Calvin’s interpretation upon the place): Seeing God under this title (“I commanded not”) condemns that which the Jews did because He had not commanded it them, therefore no other reason needs to be sought for the confutation of superstition than that they are not by commandment from God.
Answer: 1. Indeed the reason lies thus in the Replier, but it did not lie thus in the opponent who did not cite this place, as Calvin uses it against superstition and feigned worship of God devised by men (as his words following do show), but against any ceremony, yea, whatsoever thing is done beside the Word of God, even in cases indifferent, as Mr. Cartwright delivered it and would have maintained it, and the Abridgment itself in saying “specially in the worship of God” does more than insinuate. And their meaning was by this place to prove our ceremonies to be therefore condemned because they are not commanded in the Word, though not forbidden; and to this purpose is the place in hand called to witness. The Replier therefore has waived his office of a Replier and changed the issue, which is in effect closely to acknowledge that the plea must be changed or their suit is lost.
But take it as the Replier has laid it, according to Mr. Calvin’s conceit of the reason of that phrase, it is not one jot better argument than before against us, albeit it hold true in all proper points of religious worship which are all prescribed [p. 42] of God Himself, that not to be commanded is to be forbidden. Yet that this will not hold in matters of rites not prescribed of God, the Replier cannot (I hope), dare not hide.
For example, in receiving the Lord’s Supper before meat or after, unleavened or leavened bread, sitting or standing, once a week or month, or quarter, or such like. If all that is not commanded be in these cases (as well as in the substantials of the sacrament) forbidden, then are we forbidden to receive the sacrament before or after meat, leavened or unleavened bread, sitting or standing, once a week, once a month or once a quarter, because none of these are commanded. Nor dare any learned man say that sitting (which is one of these) is commanded in the Word, however that friend of theirs, Master Dighton’s ghost, was (through his ignorance) bold to affirm and publish it in his libel. Wherefore the Replier must not think to shake off the Defendant’s answer that not commanded is as much as forbidden in this place of Jeremiah, by saying as follows:
Replier: What is this to the purpose? Herein lies the strength of our argument, that not to command in things that pertain to worship is all one with forbidding.
Answer: 1. The Replier here takes covert in the ambiguous terms of “pertaining to worship,” hoping that because this holds in all things that are in themselves acts of divine worship, or fixed, as it were, to the freehold thereof, inasmuch as God Himself has determined them, his partial readers will be so good as to believe that it holds also in case of rites and ceremonies which pertain to worship, though not as fixed, but as movable, and removable appurtenances, such as himself has, ere while, confessed to belong to the determination of men.
And if in all things any way appertaining to religion, not to command and to forbid be all one, then is their distinction of “against and beside the Word,” specially in matters of religion, propounded sect. 1 and challenged as a thing granted to them, sect. 2, a mere idle thing, forasmuch as in matters of religion “beside and against” are all one, if as the Replier has lost more in the shire than he won in the hundred: for [p. 43] he has forsaken the main cause he undertook while he sallies out to rescue one poor argument (which yet he cannot) by equivocating as he does. Yet has he the face to tell the Defendant (charging the opponent to “collect out of this place of Jeremiah that the thing there spoken of is a matter only beside the Word and not against it”) that this is not their collection, but his own vain conceit, saying:
Replier: But you collect (says he) that this was not against, but only beside the Word. “It is not our collection, but his own vain conceit.”
Answer: It is manifest that this place was alleged by them to prove that not only all things forbidden, but all things beside the Word, or not commanded, are also condemned in the Scriptures; which how well it is proved by a text which says, “that was not commanded,” which was indeed forbidden, I leave to judgment. But hear we the Replier’s evasion:
Replier: Our argument is drawn from the form of speech here used. See Mr. Cartwright in his Reply, p. 48, fully clearing this point.
Answer: Your argument is drawn indeed (as wire is drawn) violently to this purpose from the force of words, as is to be seen by Mr. Cartwright’s explanation of it in the place pointed at in his Second Reply. For he collects there that the place of Jer. 7:31 is the more against the archbishop [John Whitgift] in that a thing which was forbidden is rather thus expressed, “which I commanded not,” than by saying, “Which I forbade,” because God would thereby teach men to hang upon his mouth.
To which I answer, first, that it is but conjectural that God did therefore choose so to speak, seeing it might be (as Lyra notes on Jer. 7:31) that the priests did encourage the people to offer up their children by fire as a singular devotion and such as God commanded to Abraham. In opposition whereof, God tells them it never came into his heart to command any such thing unto them. And if this were the reason of that speech, or that it be only a fashion of speech in the Old Testament to name forbidding by the abstract of not commanding, as it is Dt. 7, to call that “not commanded,” which is forbidden; that is to say, which is commanded not to be done: Then [p. 44] all this collection and argument built thereon falls, like children’s houses built of cards. But if God did make choice of this kind of speaking of purpose to teach men to hang upon his mouth, as Mr. Cartwright says, what is this in matters of order and ceremony, of which the mouth of God has not determined particularly, as in matters of doctrine and his essential worship, as Mr. Cartwright (First Reply, p. 87) himself confesses.
And that Mr. Cartwright did not think that this place, which speaks of a matter of salvation and damnation and of a thing forbidden (as was to him replied) would make proof of his negative argument, viz. that whatsoever God has not commanded must not be in the Church, it may appear by this, that he turns himself after to another argument of a thing not of salvation or damnation, not forbidden (as he says) and yet condemned because it was not commanded. Wherein though he mistake in his examples of the Israelites, Josh. 9 and David, 2 Sam. 7:5, 7, yet this shows that he thought the places which speak of things forbidden and matters of salvation or damnation would not hold well in things not forbidden, and of no such moment. See therefore, say I, Mr. Cartwright, p. 48 of his Second Reply, num. 5, fully clearing this point against them and for us, though he meant not so, confessing that place of Jer. 7:31 to speak of things forbidden in other places of Scripture.
Defendant: In the rest of this twelfth section the Defendant professes to have wondered at this their distinction of some things unlawful as against the Word, and other things unlawful as beside it only, as symbolizing with Bellarmine and other Papists in their distinction of mortal and venial sins, calling those mortal which are against the Law, and those venial which are only beside it: as if there could be a sin which is not against the Law, which is as much as a [p. 45] sin is no sin. He therefore wishes them to leave this art of subtlety to the false coiners, the Papists. And finally, he refers those places (forbidding adding or taking from the Scriptures, viz. Dt. 4:2, etc.) here alleged to their proper places, viz. ch. 2, sect. 3-5. So as here comes to be considered their distinction of against and beside the Word. Hear now the Replier:
Replier: He was, as it seemed, in a wondering humor.
Answer: When we see things to be, of which we can see no reason, there is just cause of marveling. Now when we see men condemn that folly of the Papists, who imagine a sin which is only beside the Law and not against it (whereas all sin is a transgression of the Law, 1 Jn. 3:4, and therefore against it). When I say we see men so wise as to condemn that distinction of the Papists, and yet to take it up themselves, though in other terms, is there not cause of marveling at them? For what odds is there between a sin not against, but only beside the Law, and a thing unlawful which is not against the warrant of the Word, but beside it only? Is anything here changed but the coat? Is not the body the very same?
Replier: But first, why does he not wonder not only at our late divines, but at Chrysostom also, as symbolizing with Bellarmine, when he in Gal. 1:8 does so distinguish between teaching contrary to the gospel and beside the gospel?
Answer: We do not wonder at you for using this distinction in any case or sense, but in such case as you do. And therefore we wonder not at Chrysostom condemning from Gal. 1:8 whatever is preached for a doctrine of the Gospel above and beside that which the apostles of our Lord had delivered, although it contained nothing contrary to the doctrine of the Scriptures. We know that those doctrines which are not contrary to the Gospel, yet beside the apostolical records of what our Lord taught and did (as namely many things in the Gospel of Nicodemus) are all as additions condemned as being beside the particular testimony of the Word and [p. 46] therein contrary to the Word in general, which has forbidden additions of anything so divine unto itself. But what is this in the case of ceremonies supposed not to be contrary to the Word and yet blamed for being beside it, as if we had the same determination of ceremonies that we have of doctrinals in the Scriptures.
Replier: Why does he not wonderingly also accuse Junius for symbolizing with Bellarmine, while he refutes Bellarmine by this distinction? (Contr. 3, bk. 4, ch. 17, num. 10)
Answer: Nor wonder we at Junius confuting this distinction of Bellarmine, who in defense of traditions devised for divine worship, pleads that they are not against the Word but beside it. For Junius is in the right, that all such made-worships are therein against the Word because they are beside it, inasmuch as God has as particularly determined what essential worship He will have, as what doctrine men shall believe.
But we wonder still at them who make the case of rites used in the worship of God, and the worship itself, alike; and yet confess the one not to be particularly prescribed as is the other. And we wonder more at this Replier who tells us that Junius does refute Bellarmine by that distinction, Contr. 3, bk. 4, ch. 17, num. 10, whereas Junius in that place does refute that distinction itself there used by Bellarmine as false in the case of proper divine worship.
Replier: It were easy, if needful, to produce other honorable partners in this fault.
Answer: If there be any need of upholding this distinction, which is the foundation of your negative argument, it were needful to produce some honorable partners in this fault, at least to excuse yourselves of novelty; and it would have been done, if the Replier could have done it, who now thinks to rid himself of this distinction and to make it over to us, saying:
Replier: But we need no other than persuaders to subscription, who have drawn diverse into this net by telling them that though the things they urge upon be beside the Word, yet they are not contrary thereunto, and that only is affirmed of such others. [p. 47]
Answer: We say right that by subscription we are required to no more than to acknowledge these things to be lawful as not repugnant to the Word, though not necessary as commanded in the Word. That is, beside it as not prescribed, and yet not disagreeable to it as forbidden. Which distinction in case of mere rites and ceremonies is good: for in such things as God has left only to general rules, that which is done agreeably to the general rules, though it be beside or without any particular determination, is lawful. But you say that such things, though not against the Word, are yet unlawful because they are beside it; wherefore we deny not this our child, but I say the living child is ours; your child is the dead one. Leave our distinction to us and keep your own if you can, for it is your own.
Replier: We are not the authors of this distinction, but they who thereby excuse human inventions in God’s worship. We are constrained to follow and ferret them in their own holes.
Answer: Was this bragged of, sect. 3? Was it Chrysostom’s? Was it Junius’s distinction? And had it ere while so many honorable partners, and now are we the authors of it? This poor distressed man knows not what to do. But for answer:
Human inventions in God’s worship (intended and used only for order, comeliness and our own edification, and not for any worship to God in themselves) we need not to excuse, but may justify by this distinction which you pursue. For either we must have such things of human invention in them or none at all, seeing God has not invented them for us and seeing that without some of them his service cannot be decently performed.
When we say our ceremonies are not contrary to the Word, but only beside it, we mean that though they are beside the particular determination of the Word, yet they are not against the sound sense of it. You take up indeed our words of “against” and “beside” in another meaning; yea, to a contrary construction, for your meaning was, that whatsoever is not expressly or by consequence commanded is forbidden. Now how you turn your [p. 48] back to us and do yet follow us I know not, nor see I how you will ferret us out of our holes by running northward when we go to the south.
Replier: See Mr. Cartwright, p. 56.
Answer: Though the Replier tell us not in which of Mr. Cartwright’s Replies we should see him, yet I have seen him in his second Reply, p. 56, in a miserable straight about their negative argument, for having confessed, p. 55, the true state of the question, namely whether nothing be lawfully established in the Church but that which God has commanded in his Word, as the authors of the Admonition (whom he defends) had rashly said: Mr. Cartwright there tells us in what meaning that speech is maintainable, namely:
“that inasmuch as there be general commandments in the Word for direction of all things falling into ecclesiastical consultation; therefore it may be said all things are commanded which are lawful in the Church,”
than which nothing could be spoken more weakly.
For, the general rules are not commandments of this or that particular, but are prohibitions of any thing contrary to them and approbations only of any particular not contrary, or agreeable to those rules. Did Joab command Cushi to run by the mountains or Ahimaaz to go by the plains in commanding them to carry tidings to David? (2 Sam. 18:21-26) Did he command the way by commanding the journey? Did God in commanding the daughters of Zelophehad and other heirs female to marry within their tribes (Num. 36:6), command them to marry this or that man and not leave them to choose their own husband in that tribe? Does the Apostle in commanding all things to be done in order (1 Cor. 14:40), command this or that particular order? If so, then the churches may not differ a jot in the things of order. If not, then has Mr. Cartwright strained his wit to find out a sense wherein their proposition, which required a command of God for the legitimation of everything in the Church, is maintainable, neither serving the turn, nor agreeable to their intention.
Yet see Mr. Cartwright also, after this misreporting the question, between the archbishop and the admonitors, which [p. 49] he makes to be thus only: “They” (the Admonitors)
“would have all things to be, not only not against the Word, but to be grounded on it. But he” (the archbishop) “would require that they be not against the Word of God.”
Wherein he has utterly misreported the question between them, which was whether it was not warrant enough in matters of ceremonies to observe those general rules of the Word, as to do nothing contrary to them: but we must have even in case of discipline and ceremonies a command of God’s Word to warrant them? And Mr. Cartwright in his First Reply so undertakes it and offers to prove that all is forbidden that is not commanded, yea, even in civil life and all our actions, as he does also in his Second Reply, for a time. But finding this not to be firm, he willingly slips from the issue, changes the question and finds a knot in a rush, as if all the dispute had been whether the value of two sixpences or one shilling [both which have the same value] were more or less still about words only and not about any matter.
And this he does with manifest wrong to the archbishop, who had freely confessed that he saw no great difference between “agreeable to” and “not contrary to the Word” and that they are all one; yea and had said that we must square all our actions by those general rules of the Word and yet may make our choice of particulars, which being different in themselves may yet be equally suitable to those general rules of the Word. Yet see Mr. Cartwright, p. 56, telling us that “there is a difference between not disagreeable to the Word and agreeable to it, that is to say between two negatives” and one affirmative; and why?
“For albeit it cannot be but that which is not agreeable to the Word of God is against it, and of the other side, that which is not against the Word of God is agreeable to it; yet he that so says that certain rites must be done not against the Word, that he will not also accord that they should be done according to the Word, gives thereby to understand, etc.”
That is to say: There is some difference because, indeed, there is no difference between them. See Mr. Cartwright; for as touching the flourish of words added, “For he that will so say, etc.” it supposes that some man had said that things [p. 50] must be so not against the Word that they must not also be agreeable to it. This is a mere fiction of a thing never said, never meant, never possibly incident into the conceit of any understanding man, that anything can be not contrary to the rules of the Word and the same not be also agreeable to the rules thereof.
So that I see here Mr. Cartwright holding the head of their negative argument till it die in his hands; and I see Mr. Cartwright cutting the throat of this their distinction of “against” and “beside” the Word in case of ceremonies, while he confesses in effect that nothing can be so beside the general rules of the Word as not to be against it; nor nothing can be so against those rules as to be only beside them. And thus the Replier himself understands him in this place, as appears, sect. 20, p. 14, where he says Mr. “Cartwright has resolved this question long ago in his Reply, p. 56,” that is to say Mr. Cartwright has long ago resolved that this distinction, in his sense, is idle, which this Replier boasts in the second section to be granted, and now is ashamed to own it. Yet to show how loathly he parts with it, he adds:
Replier: 3. Yet if need were, there might be shown, though not a real, yet a rational distinction between these two.
Answer: This is said to please them again whom he has smitten and yet is, to us, enough, that “really,” and in the matters themselves, he grants there is no difference, because there is no “real” distinction. If this will not help, then recrimination must: for to cry quittance with the Defendant he says lastly:
(margin: If they be all one as he says, sect. 13, it would be hard to find a rational difference)
Replier: 4. The Defendant’s answer does expressly herein symbolize with Bellarmine, On the Roman Pontiff, bk. 4, ch. 19.
Answer: If he had told wherein (as the Defendant told wherein their distinction does symbolize with Bellarmine), this “expressly” would have fallen in two pieces. For Bellarmine there speaks of ceremonies devised for a worship to God; the Defendant, of free ceremonies, not devised for any worship to God in themselves, but for the ordering of his worship in a comely manner and for our best commodity, which is a clean other case.
So as the Defendant does no more [p. 51] symbolize with Bellarmine in his answer than he that says, “It is necessary for the churches to have some set place to meet in unto prayer,” may be said to symbolize with him [a papist] that says:
“Without such a set or consecrated place, the Church’s prayers to God were not so pleasing, and that the very place makes the worship more pleasing to God, than out of such a place it could be, ceteris paribus [all things being equal].”
Replier: For the other allegations of Scripture quoted in the Abridgment for confirmation of the same truth with the former, the Defendant refers us to ch. 2, sect. 2-5, where only one of them is touched.
Answer: That one place there scanned, viz. Dt. 12:3, is all one upon the matter with Dt. 4:2; Prov. 30:6; Lev. 10:1, 3, which are all the places there alleged, and here omitted, because they are answered all in one.
II. Fathers
13. Testimonies of Fathers
Opposers: The second sort of proof for their negative argument from Scriptures is from the testimonies of the fathers, using the like argument in their writings, namely of Basil calling it a defection from faith to bring in anything besides the Scriptures; and such like out of Cyprian, pp. 34, 44; Pomp. Amb., Of the Calling of the Gentiles, bk. 2; Augustine, vol. 9, cols. 478 & 1089, and the same Augustine, vol. 7, bk. 6, 2, Contra Donatistists, ch. 6, col. 36-37 and vol. 2, epistle 73.
Defendant: To which answer is given to this effect, that these testimonies are for points doctrinal and not ritual, and of things not only beside, but plainly contrary to the Word, which is shown particularly in each of them. So as these testimonies are impertinent to the case for which they are produced: for that the fathers argue a Scriptura negante; these, a Scriptura negata. What says the Replier to this?
Replier: To many testimonies alleged out of the fathers, one answer [p. 52] is given: 1. That they speak not of things only beside the Scripture, but of things contrary; which answer is again repeated under the form of a distinction between Scriptura negans and negata. 2. They speak not of ceremonies, but of doctrines. To which the reply is easy.
Answer: Easy indeed, as a great shoe to a little foot, which is slipped off as easily as on. But what is it?
Replier: Our own meaning is mistaken, I fear, willfully, when we are made authors of an opposite distinction between “beside” and “against” in this case. It suffices us that beside in points of religion be all one with against.
Answer: To hedge in the testimonies of the fathers, he lays waste their own distinction, that seeing their sayings will not come to it, it might go over to them. Thus do poor men shift that borrow of one to pay another and grow still more indebted. For although it be not true that we have mistaken their meaning, yet if it be true in all points of religion absolutely spoken of (as here, without distinction of substantial, essential or doctrinal points from circumstantial points pertaining to religion) that against and beside be all one, then must the particular rites pertaining to order and decency be as punctually determined in the Scripture as doctrinal, contrary to all truth and the Replier’s own confession. And if this renouncing of their distinction will not serve, he has a second evasion thus:
Replier: 2. Though these general sayings (viz. of the fathers) be applied to doctrines in most of the places alleged, yet that hinders not but the truth of them may be taken generally as to include also religious ceremonies.
Answer: Why says he “in most of the places,” as if not in all, but only to abuse the simple? But when he adds, “that hinders not, but that the same sayings may include also religious ceremonies,” he again takes a bath and hides himself under the ambiguous term of “religious ceremonies,” which sometimes signify even the essentials of divine sacraments. And there it holds that whatsoever is beside is against the Word, yet sometimes it imports only arbitrary ceremonies which are [p. 53] used in religious actions, and there it holds not: for the same which is beside the determinations of the Word only shall not therefore be against either any particular word, or general rule thereof, as it is in the case of doctrinals. Yet see the man’s stomach, for he adds:
Replier: A particular or proper conclusion may be drawn from a general proposition, and yet the proposition remains general, full in the largest extent that it is capable of.
Answer: Any general rule applied to any particular remains applicable to any other of the like kind, but no further. That rule which was applied to Paul’s proof of his apostleship, that he was called not by the will of man but of Christ, that is, immediately, holds as well in any other apostle of Christ (properly so called) as in Paul, but not in any other ministers, which may be called “apostles of Christ” in another meaning: wherefore the same Replier having first lost (one after another) all the places of Scripture alleged for them, has now lost all succor pretended from the fathers also: unless one will say that all mere ceremonies which are lawful be revealed in Scriptures as particularly as the doctrines of faith and godliness.
14. Tertullian
Opposers: To them that thought it lawful for men to wear garlands on their heads because they are not forbidden by Scripture, Tertullian answers (De Corona Militis, ch. 2), saying: “That is prohibited which is not permitted.” (Mr. Hy)
Defendant: To this is answered, first, that this touches not our ceremonies, which are permitted by the word and therefore not prohibited. Secondly, he tells them they might blush to allege Tertullian to infringe the lawfulness of ceremonies only because they are ordained by man, seeing Tertullian in the same chapter, having mentioned sundry Church ceremonies with [p. 54] approbation, yet confesses that they have no Scripture for them (Si legem expostules, Scripturam nullam habemus).
Replier: To the testimony of Tertullian, De Coronis, ch. 2, “that is prohibited which is not permitted,” two things are likewise answered: 1. That it makes not against our ceremonies, for they are permitted: which is nothing else but a shift. For Tertullian’s meaning must needs be of other permission than the Defendant can challenge to our ceremonies, else he begs the question, otherwise there should be no sense in his words.
Answer: We need not beg the question seeing all learned men and all reformed Churches do acknowledge a liberty in the Church of ordaining Church rites and Church ceremonies not commanded, nor forbidden in the Word. Wherefore when we say ours are permitted, we mean that there is no Word of God which prohibits them and none that commands them. And what could Tertullian mean by his speech spoken of a garland of flowers worn sometimes in honor of the emperor on the heads of soldiers, “If not permitted, therefore prohibited,” but that there was some reason supportable by the Word of God which did condemn it, as his arguments following do witness? “Flowers” (says he) “are made of God, to be seen and smelt, and not to be put on the head,” wherein, to leave him to his own private conceit, it suffices us that his meaning is to account that to be permitted by the Word against which no reasons out of the Word may be given, though there be no particular word against it. Wherein our meaning and his are alike; and we hold our ceremonies to be so permitted and therefore not prohibited.
Replier: 2. He says, “we may blush to speak of Tertullian in this case” because he professes traditions in the same book. To which I answer that, then all our writers may blush who allege many things out of the fathers which they in other places gainsay.
Answer: Our writers shall not need to blush for alleging the fathers, even sometimes against themselves, when they (as Mornay says) become so dear as not to hear [p. 55] themselves speak or when in some particulars they left those principles which they had delivered soundly in the general. But yet (if it be not impossible) they should blush who allege any man’s words to prove the author to hold that which he never held: for the fathers (and namely Tertullian) are brought forth to show [by the opposers] that even in Church ceremonies they thought that whatsoever was beside the Word of God was forbidden: the contrary whereof appears in themselves inasmuch as they all allowed of sundry ceremonies not prescribed in the Word of God, and far more than we have.
Replier: Secondly, we blush not to make use of truth where we find it, though error follows at the heels.
Answer: Nor are you bidden to blush for this, but for saying that you have found a truth which is not truth, and found it where you find it not.
Replier: Rather let our idolizers of the fathers blush when they see their shame, yet of this answer we shall have occasion to make use hereafter.
Answer: All this ado upon the word, “blush”? If it be so much trouble to them, they may let it alone. But in that he calls us idolizers of the fathers, as if we held professedly any parcel of our faith or religion merely from them, and not all from the warrant of God’s Word, and speaks of the fathers’ shame as a man sporting at it, he appears herein such a man as is not very apt to be let alone for anything. Let him make what use he can of this answer hereafter, we fear him not.
15. Testimonies of Protestants; Crossing not as bad as Sopping; Digression on Rules of Ceremonies
Opposers (Abridgment, p. 44; Mr. Hy to this effect): The third sort of arguments for confirmation of their negative argument from Scripture is from the pretended testimonies of Protestants, who are brought in to witness that our best divines have used it against the Papists; and amongst others even Dr. Thomas Morton [p. 56] Apology, p. 2, ch. 49, p. 166, proving out of the fathers that the Scriptures make against all new inventions. And in this Appeal, bk. 2, ch. 4, sq., by the same argument he condemns the use of milk instead of wine, the wringing in of the grapes and sopping in of the bread into wine, even because these ceremonies were not found in the institution of Christ.
Defendant in sum: To this objection the Defendant, who (thanked be God) was alive to answer for himself, gives answer. And first, touching himself, showing that in the said Apology by them cited, pt. 2, ch. 42, p. 139, he did exactly set down the state of the question, and the difference between the Papists and us, which he placed in matters of doctrine pertaining necessarily to faith and good life, and did exclude the case of rites from the question; and that in the place by them quoted he speaks only of such things as necessarily concern faith or a good life, avouching by testimony of the fathers that all such things are so contained in the Scriptures, that we may receive nothing besides them. He blames therefore the nonconformists justly for shooting at him in his own bow and for avouching him as a disputer negatively from Scriptures in case of mere ceremonies, when he himself had excepted that case and professed to use that argument only in case of doctrinals. And afterwards he answers to that place alleged out of the Appeal, ch. 4, of which more after we have had the reply to this.
Replier: In this section answer is made to some allegations brought out of Protestant writers (not unto all which the Abridgment cites for the perfection of the Scriptures).
Answer: Unless the Replier can show some of those divines [p. 57] cited by them do use that argument in case of simple rites and mere ceremonies, and not only in doctrinal points, one answer to any one of them is answer to all of them; and this, “but not to all,” is but for pomp, for he shows not any one of those others cited, to whom this answer will not satisfy, nor (I think) can do; I am sure, I cannot.
Replier: First, the Defendant answers for himself that his meaning was not of matters merely ceremonial. And so was the meaning of our argument, was not of such mere ceremonies as the Defendant here describes in the end of this section, if he mean by “mere ceremonies” mere order and decency: but our [Anglican] ceremonies are of another nature, because they have doctrine or teaching in them, and therefore are doctrinal as he pleases to speak, or mixed.
Answer: First, call you this a reply? The Defendant against their avouching of his name in favor of their negative argument tells them not only what he meant, but where his meaning might appear: that in defending the sufficiency of the Scriptures he did exempt the question of rites as impertinent to that dispute: that is to say the question is of mere rites or mere ceremonies. If the Replier can show that the Defendant has not done, or meant not as he has said, then let him gainsay it: which if he does not, he only speaks after the Defendant but replies not against him.
Secondly, in taking up the word “mere” in this place for advantage, which (sect. 3) he did omit for advantage then, he shows himself to be a man that too partially strives for mastery.
Thirdly, whereas he says the question in this first argument is not of mere ceremonies or rites considered only as being beside the Word, without any other respect of them, is untrue: for their proposition was that whatsoever is done not only against the Word, but beside it, specially in the service of God, is indecent, of which see before, sect. 2.
Lastly, he is a deceived man if he think that a signification put upon a ceremony does necessarily make it more than a mere ceremony; or that because such rites have some teaching in them, therefore they are not mere ceremonies. [p. 58] For a mere ceremony is that which is so applied to the thing done as that nothing is thereby added to the substance of the thing, but a formality only is used, which if it were not used the same thing should still be. Whether the ceremonies be significant [signifying of something] or not is neither to, nor fro to this point.
Now come we to the Defendant’s answer to the place cited out of his book called the Appeal, which is before set down.
Defendant in sum: The Appeal does indeed mention ceremonies, yet not all, but such only as were invented (by man) and appointed to be essential parts of a sacrament: as milk instead of wine, sopping in of bread into the cup and wringing in of the grape, which all had in them a nature of doctrinals.
Secondly, that to ordain new material elements in the eucharist as parts thereof is, in a manner, to invent a new sacrament and is a sacrilegious depravation of the institution of Christ; in which case and sense, a ceremony beside the Word of God is against it.
Thirdly, that to take milk instead of wine and to sop the bread in the wine is directly contrary to Christ’s institution, who gave wine, not milk, and bread and wine apart, not bread sopped in wine, and commanded them to do as He had done, “This do, etc.” He concludes that this case has no affinity with circumstantial ceremonies and that they who would be so audacious as to wrest his testimony and to upbraid and thwart him thereby, would not deal less injuriously with other most worthy divines now deceased; nor indeed: had done.
Then he proceeds to show how they abuse likewise Bishop Jewel using the negative argument from Scripture against the Papists for their ceremonies, which with [p. 59] them are made a part of religious worship and such as were contrary to the Word (namely the Popish reservation of the sacraments), as if this would hold likewise in all ceremonies; whereas Bishop Jewel himself sets out the bounds of the negative manner of arguing saying, “This kind of proof is thought to hold in God’s commandments because his Law is perfect,” and concludes that therefore Bishop Jewel could not understand any abuse which he thought not to be contrary to the commandment of God, but only beside it.
The like measure he shows to be offered to Dr. Whitaker for his thus arguing against the use of the chrism: that it had no warrant by holy Scripture; while they consider not how the same Dr. Whitaker in his controversy about the sufficiency of the Scriptures does, as all other learned men do, exempt out of that question the question of ceremonies which are imposed or observed without mixture of superstitious opinion annexed by the imposers, and takes in only such as the Papists both profess and ordain (as in their chrism), to which they ascribe a spiritual efficacy and power, which no power of the Church can infuse by any consecration into any creature or sign. Now we see the Replier’s oppositions to this: and first, to that which concerns the Defendant’s place in his Appeal.
Replier: 2. (The Defendant) confessing that in one place he speaks of ceremonies, he limits his speech to such ceremonies as were made essential parts of a sacrament, as milk instead of wine, sopping in of bread into the cup and wringing in of the grape; these ceremonies he calls doctrinal. But here I would fain hear a good reason why sopping of the bread into the cup is more hurtful or more unfit for the Word than the chrism in baptism. [p. 60]
Answer: I doubt whether he would indeed fain hear a good reason, but yet I will yield him those which to me seem good reasons:
First, why more doctrinal? If he will learn first that the Defendant uses, and we all in this question do use the term “doctrinal” passively, for a thing taught in the Word, not as the Replier does take it: actively, for a thing teaching. And then we say that the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, both for the material elements of bread and wine, and manner of blessing, breaking and giving the bread apart, and so of blessing and distributing the wine apart, to represent Christ’s body broken and blood (not in it but) shed out of it, is all doctrinal and by institution of Christ so commanded to be done. But ecclesiastical ceremonies are not, nor in particular may be in such a sense doctrinal: for then they should be divine, not ecclesiastical.
Secondly, why the sopping of bread in wine, contrary to the institution of Christ who did otherwise and said, “Do this, etc.”, is worse than the use of the cross: for first, the cross makes no alteration at all of what Christ did ordain (more than sprinkling instead of dipping or having of witnesses or sureties, or giving of the name to the baptized); nor secondly is it substituted in place of the Lord’s baptism, as sops and wine were by those heretics substituted in place of the Lord’s Supper. Neither thirdly is it esteemed to be an instrumental sign of any grace given by the use thereof, as they took their sops in wine to be.
There must needs be reason enough, and more than enough to show why our crossing, if it were at all evil, could not possibly be so abominable as their sopping whereby they destroyed the very sacrament itself, was, as the Replier will (I hope) confess: who yet dares not say that our use of the cross after baptism does destroy and annihilate the sacrament of baptism. And I believe the Replier will hang down his head; I am sure he might for asking this question, yet he goes further offering to prove our crossing to be worse:
Replier: Bread and wine were ordained by Christ to a [p. 61] holy use in the Church, so is not the cross.
Answer: Because bread and wine were ordained by Christ to be used in the holy sacrament apart and not together, this alteration is even therefore the more abominable. For those things, says Zanchi (bk. 1, Of Worship) which are ordained of God do all pertain to the substance of worship; wherefore nothing can be taken away or changed but that the worship is changed, another made. Also, if anything be added as essential, another worship must needs be made by this addition. You see then what sops in wine are to the sacrament of the Supper.
The cross is not added to the sacrament of baptism, but to the solemnity, and is not esteemed any essential thing, and alters nothing of the institution. And even because it was not ordained by Christ or his apostles, nor yet forbidden by them, therefore it is in this use a thing indifferent. Ordination had made it necessary; prohibition, unlawful.
Replier: Sopping has some agreement with reason, crossing has none.
Answer: If sopping in wine for a sacrament has some agreement with reason, then our Lord in ordaining it to be always otherwise done, has done something not agreeable to reason. If crossing have at all no agreement with reason, then the Church of Christ has been void of all reason in the use of it about fifteen hundred years. Insanire cum ratione, is the most helpless kind of madness. Did ever a sober man argue thus?
Replier: Sopping was used by Christ Himself the same night and at the same table where the sacrament was appointed; crossing was never used by Christ or his apostles.
Answer: This argument would prove as well the eating of a paschal lamb before the sacrament to be better than sprinkling of water on the forehead of the baptized: for Christ did the one, and the same night and at the same table where the sacrament was appointed; but neither He, nor his apostles did the other in baptizing.
Replier: In sopping there is no new material sign appointed but a new fashion only of using the old; in crossing a new sign is added. [p. 62]
Answer: To have eaten the paschal lamb sodden and not roasted had been an abomination in the Law, though materially it had been the same lamb. But the addition of sitting or leaning on couches at the eating of it, in sign of the rest God had now given them in their own land (though it was a new sign added by themselves) was lawful and used by our Savior. To alter Christ’s instituted fashion was to take the sacrament from the element. To add the sign of the cross for a monitory sign to the baptized or lookers on, is no addition to the sacrament of baptism, nor alteration of Christ’s institution in anything. Yet the Replier concludes:
Replier: So that sopping seems to be better than crossing.
Answer: If it seem not so to the Replier, he is of a roused conscience to say so. If it seem so to him indeed, God has smitten his contentious spirit with giddiness. For who but a man forsaken of wisdom will say that that is better which he himself will grant to destroy the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper than that of which he dares not say that it destroys the sacrament of Christ’s baptism. Yet on he goes.
Replier: If opinion of necessary use does put a difference, our men can easily conclude in the Convocation House that it is not the opinion of the Church of England, and then all will be well.
Answer: Opinion of necessary use for conscience sake to God, added to things indifferent, alters their nature and makes them in such use unlawful, as all sound divines grant. But that the violating of Christ’s own institution by sops in wine (with whatsoever opinion done) should ever be qualified and made lawful, the Convocation House (at which this man too often gibes) is not so likely to conclude as this libeller is to come to some shame for his factious and intolerable comparison of things so unequal, unless God shall humble him unto repentance for it, which I rather wish. Yet he further proceeds:
Replier: If sopping seem to be a part of the sacrament, crossing, when it is done in the very act of sprinkling (as sometimes it is) makes as much show of being a part in baptism. [p. 63]
Answer: Sopping in wine used instead of the Lord’s Supper seems to me to be no part of that sacrament, but a plain subversion of the whole institution, because it overthrows the main end of it, which is the setting forth of Christ’s death. And if any use crossing in the act of sprinkling the water, contrary to the order of the Church (which I do not believe to be done by many, if by any at all) yet could not that make any show that the use of the cross, as it is with us for a monitory sign, is made any part of the sacrament of baptism, no more than the use of sureties or the imposition of the name just at that time, which (with some others) are parts of the solemnity, but no parts of the sacrament itself: for it has but two parts, an outside and an inside: the outward sign and the invisible grace signified, sealed and instrumentally exhibited by that sign. In which of these two does the cross, as we use it, make show of being a part? Yet again he asks of us:
Replier: But what if out of the Lord’s Supper, a little before or a little after, while the prayers are being made which belong to the Supper, there should be appointed such a sopping to be used of all that communicate for mystical signification, I would know of the Defendant whether this were allowable or not by his doctrinal distinction? If not, why should he show more favor to the cross?
Answer: We would still find a difference between that and the use of the cross: First, because it is not so safe to use visible elementary signs in the time of those holy actions as it is to use a transient character, like as it is not so safe or lawful to represent the attributes of God by images as it is by words or writing: though the one and other signify the same thing. Our [Anglican] divines (who thought it not so safe to retain oil, cream or chrism, being elementary substances, as to retain the mystical actions of dipping into the water in token of our burial with Christ in baptism, or thrice dipping in signification of the Trinity of Persons; or once, to signify the unity of essence in that God into whose name we are baptized) thought they had some reason for significant actions more than could be given for significant elements annexed [p. 64] to baptism.
Secondly, because the use of sops in wine immediately before or after the Supper as a mystical sign were worse than the use of any other bodily element, because it comes so near to the very institution, like as the making of the same holy oil (Ex. 30) or perfume for any other use than God had set was mortal, though ointments and perfumes for common use different from that prescription might lawfully be made.
The Church, as saint Augustine says (epistle 118), thought fit to abate of the ceremony of washing their feet, used in token of charity and humility before the partaking of the eucharist (though they retained many other significant signs), because this was done with water; and why? Lest it should be thought to appertain to baptism which was instituted in water.
The Replier now has some reason from us why the transient sign of the cross after baptism finds more favor with us than his sops and wine for the Lord’s Supper or for a mystical sign at the celebration of the Lord’s Supper. Now why he favors sops in wine more than the cross, let them show. We have done with his reply so far as concerns the Defendant himself; let us hear how he puts off the challenge of like abuse offered by the opponents to Bishop Jewel and Dr. William Whitaker.
Replier: In excusing of Bishop Jewel and Dr. Whitaker, nothing is said by the Defendant, which has not formerly been confuted.
Answer: In excusing of them nothing was said at all, but only in the accusing of the opponents, who knowing these men to except the question of rites and ceremonies as impertinent when they stand upon the all-sufficiency of the Scriptures, do yet allege them as patrons of their negative argument from Scriptures in case of ceremonies. Nor ever was there, nor will be a confutation or downright answer to this challenge. The Replier’s close meaning is, no doubt, that these men were to blame that they did not hold the same argument to be good in case of ceremonies as well as of the most necessary doctrines. For whosoever thinks not as they do must be either condemned of gross corruption or excused as of good meaning, yet with much weakness withal; and this pride of spirit makes them so scornful. Return we now to the Defendant’s progress.
Defendant: Here the Defendant, to make an end with their first argument, recalls the state of the question; and the better to decipher such human ceremonies as are not commanded in the Scriptures from other human ceremonies which are condemned, he distinguishes mere ceremonies from mixed, calling them “mere,” which are indifferent, both in nature and our opinion; and those “mixed,” which though of indifferent nature, yet by error of opinion are held in themselves, or in such use of them, to be necessary even for conscience to God, while some opinion of holiness, justice, merit, efficacy or real necessity is placed in them: by which error they become in that respect doctrinal: that is, such as against which the holy Scripture has doctrinally put in a caveat, which forbids us to hold any ceremony of men’s invention in that false tenure of divine necessity or worship to God thereby. All which the gentle Replier passes by, and now instead of a reply, breaks out into a quarrel saying:
Replier: Now it might be here expected that the Defendant should have said something concerning those general rules which God has set down in his Word for the direction of the Church in rites and orders ecclesiastical, mentioned by the Lincolnshire ministers in this argument, p. 44. But neither here, nor in any other place of this book does the Defendant so much as endeavor to show that our ceremonies are needful and profitable for the edification of the people by the more comely and orderly performance of that service which He has expressly prescribed in his Word. This is a main matter urged in the Abridgment, without which the ceremonies cannot be [p. 66] innocent in their use; and all that the Defendant has hitherto endeavored to answer is in the Abridgment brought in to no other end than to prove that no ceremonies are to be brought into the Church without those conditions. And yet for all this, our ceremonies in this chief point are left destitute of all defense. If therefore all were granted which the Defendant’s arguments or answers in this book maintain, yet the ceremonies will be found nocent and to be rejected, if it be but for their unprofitableness, according to that of Basil.
Answer: 1. The Defendant took not before him the words of the Abridgment to answer, but the arguments therein, as they fall in with other men’s; and therefore he is not tied to their order.
2. No wise man would expect anything to be yet spoken about the conditions of lawful Church ceremonies till that argument which concludes all are unlawful that are not prescribed in the Word, be clean removed. For what an idle thing is it to enquire after sundry rules for the trial of ceremonies, if this one rule stand good: It is not commanded, therefore it is forbidden.
3. Truly the Abridgment does set down certain rules, as it were true marks of lawful ceremonies, in the 44th page, before which it first sets down one rule, viz. That whatsoever is done not only against, but beside the direction of the Word, is unlawful. Which if it be true, then can it be true that any ceremonies which are beside the determination of the Word or not commanded, can upon any other conditions be legitimated?
4. Though the said authors of the Abridgment do bring in the negative argument to prove all ceremonies unlawful which swerve from the directive rules that God has appointed in his Word, yet is that an argument of itself and gives a short rule which makes all the rest superfluous, viz. If it be not commanded, it is forbidden. So this rule and those rules added after are (as the byword is) like a rope and butter, that if the one slip, the other may hold. For [p. 67] let us prove our ceremonies never so square according to these general rules, yet if this peremptory rule stand still (whatsoever God has not commanded must not be: whatsoever is not commanded in God’s service, is forbidden), which I assure you is the common rule now in all their mouths whom I meet with, we have gotten nothing. This was the reason (I conceive) why the Defendant singled out this argument and gave it the first place; and nothing else is fit to be taken up till this fantasy be plucked up, which is the very taproot of inconformity and separation, yea and of anabaptistry too.
5. But if it be true that until our ceremonies be proved agreeable to these rules which they have set down (as God’s rules) in that book, they will be nocent, then it will be just (I think) that if they shall be proved answerable to those rules which God has indeed given for direction of his Church in matters of ceremonies, they shall be innocent. If so, then it follows that God has left certain rules for direction of his Church in rites and orders ecclesiastical and therefore has not determined of them Himself in his Word. So down goes their Goliath again.
6. If all be granted which the Defendant in his arguments and answers has maintained in his book and yet the ceremonies will prove nocent and to be rejected for their unprofitableness, what shall we do? For then ceremonies agreeable to the rules of the Word as made for order, decency and edification and are defensible against all their exceptions who oppose them (all which the Defendant has maintained), will still be nocent and unprofitable: so as we shall as soon fit the moon with a new coat as these men with pleasing ceremonies.
7. That he says the Defendant has not so much as endeavored in all this book to prove our ceremonies agreeable to the rules of the Word is so palpably false that I should hardly have believed any friar dared to have set it down in print. But the best is: he has concealed his name and therefore may be the bolder. And now here by way of digression I must crave leave to speak more fully of the rules [p. 68] to be observed in ordaining of ceremonies, lest the Replier or his party should boast of those their notes and abuse the ignorant.
Digression on the Word’s General Rules, Rules of Ceremonies & What they Warrant (which continues into sect. 16-17)
As touching the rules whereby the Church of God ought to be guided indeed in her choice of rites and ceremonies, we shall come forthwith to consider them; but as for those which our opposites give us, in the name of God’s rules, as the Abridgment calls theirs, or of saint Paul’s rules, as Mr. Cartwright styles his, they are not agreed among themselves which of them shall stand; and some of them are no more rules for ceremonies than are all other moral rules and which are, as well in civil as ecclesiastical, private as public actions (Mr. Cartwright himself being judge), to be observed. Mr. Cartwright, besides those for edification, comeliness and order, which we acknowledge to be indeed rules purposely given for the perpetual direction of the Church in all her sacred actions, and consequently in her ceremonies, and do so plead them: Mr. Cartwright (I say) in his First Reply gives us two more, which, together with these of ours, he calls the rules which saint Paul gave in such cases as are not particularly mentioned in Scriptures.
The first of them is that they offend not any, especially the Church of God, for proof whereof is quoted 1 Cor. 10:32, where that apostle charges the Corinthians to give no offense (that is, cause of stumbling)¹ either to the Jews or gentiles or to the Church of God; which charge is there given upon occasion of the Christians eating of the idolothytes, even in the idol temple or where it so grudged the consciences of some present that they had made their grief known. At which abuse of their liberty, because the gentiles were hardened in their idolatry, the Jews (provoked against Christianity) and the Christians themselves either grieved by dislike or drawn on by example to do the same doubtingly, the apostle gives that rule aforesaid that they should give offense to none of them all. (See Pareus on 1 Cor. 10:32)
And in good sadness was this a matter of Church ceremonies, or of conversation [conduct]? If it be said that it will follow much more in public actions, I will suppose it so; yet that [p. 69] will not make it a rule for such things as the Scripture does not mention (as Mr. Cartwright tells us) more than for all other our actions mentioned in Scriptures in which we must take heed that we give no offense. Besides, what needs this be made a rule by itself when it is comprised in ours of comeliness, order and edification: which if they be observed, will free all constitutions from being in themselves scandalous?
¹ Cartwright, 2nd Reply, p. 62, “Saint Paul by offense does not mean displeasing or [????? ???], but that whereby occasion is given to any of transgression against the Law of God.”
Mr. Cartwright and the Abridgment pitch both upon this rule supposing that they will prove our ceremonies by that rule to be unlawful because they are scandalous, which comes after to be handled. But if they may in that respect be challenged and required, yet will it not follow that that was given for a particular rule about ceremonies or things not mentioned in Scripture, as was pretended.
Finally we say as Dr. Ames in his Animadversions upon the Synodal Writings of the Remonstrants, disp. 8, De Remonstrantium Pharisismo, tells us concerning a negative rule given for direction, etc. He says that this rule, even therefore because it is negative, is unfit to the use of a sea-mark or watch-light for the guidance of sailors in their course, for it does not teach what is to be done, but what is not to be done. That ceremonies must not be scandalous may well be a caution, but a rule for direction, being a negative, it cannot be. If one undertaking to direct a man the right way from London to York should tell him he must not go by Staines or Gravesend, he should therein not direct him the right way at all, but only forbid him wrong ways; so is it with this negative rule.
The second of Mr. Cartwright’s rules added to ours (which is his fourth) is that they be done to the glory of God, which is a rule concerning the final end of all our actions and not particularly concerning ceremonies: for the holy apostle says, “Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, let all be done to the glory of God.” (1 Cor. 10:31) It holds (you will say) in all things, and therefore also in ceremonies. But (say I) it was [p. 70] no more a rule for ceremonies yet prescribed than for God’s worship prescribed or for all our actions, as Mr. Cartwright elsewhere confesses. (Second Reply, pp. 46, num. 20[?])
The Scripture, which Mr. Cartwright alleges to prove this to be an apostolical rule concerning things not mentioned in Scripture, is taken out of Rom. 14:6–7, where the apostle, umpiring between those Christians who, differing in their judgments about the observing or not observing of some holy days, eating or not eating of some kind of meats, and so in their practice censured and condemned one another: the apostle (I say) umpiring this strife, persuades them not to judge one another in those things, of which he gives the reason, verses 6-7, that both of them may aim at God, and his honor in their several ways in such things: and therefore should not condemn one another. So that this place proves not at all the rule for which it is cited, but another rule, viz. that in their differences about indifferent things, the servants of God should judge their own consciences and not other men’s. Which one rule well observed in this Church would have done more good than all their rules without it.
But why did not Mr. Cartwright here cite the place out of 1 Cor. 10:31, where it is required that all things be done to the glory of God, rather than betake himself to this of Rom. 14:6–7, where that or the like saying is not? Surely I think because he foresaw this rule given to the Corinthians by saying, “Let all things, etc.” would have hindered the appropriating of it to ceremonies alone: which I do the rather believe because Mr. Cartwright in his Second Reply defends not this quotation of Rom. 14, though the archbishop in his reply presses him thereto; but slipping by that challenge, does resume his fourth rule into his own protection, 2nd Reply, p. 64, where, to the Archbishop desiring to know how out of that place of Rom. 14 he could gather any rule to frame ceremonies by, rather than all other actions of grace whatsoever, etc. Mr. Cartwright gives a quick answer, but not to the purpose of the question. For plainly the question imports that this can be no special rule [p. 71] for ceremonies (viz. that they must be done to the glory of God), being a general rule to all other actions, Mr. Cartwright makes him to say it could be no rule for ceremonies because it is a rule for all actions, which (says he) “is a very strange argument, etc.” But if he had rightly taken the question (“Why rather for ceremonies, etc.”) and from thence the argument, that it cannot be a special rule for ceremonies which is a common rule to all actions, he could not so easily have rid his hands of it.
And if it be objected (as Mr. Cartwright does to the like answer made of another) that, if in all things the glory of God must be sought after, then much more in ordaining of ceremonies to be used in the solemn worship of God: I answer that that will not prove it therefore to be a rule given by saint Paul to direct in matters of ceremonies, no more than one may press the First Commandment to be a rule given for the honoring of God because a man may argue from thence that if we ought to honor the fathers of our flesh, then much more the Father of our spirits, our God, our heavenly Father.
Rules are called rules in respect of what they do punctually and purposely aim at and not in respect of arguments which may be drawn out of them: so that I cannot see any reason why two of Mr. Cartwright’s rules, viz. the not giving of scandal, or doing all things to God’s glory, should be divine rules given of God for direction in ceremonies; though I deny not but that all ceremonies ought to be such as may bear the test of these their rules also, rightly understood, or otherwise they cannot be framed for comeliness and edification. Thus we see what rules Mr. Cartwright has allowed for us upon ceremonies, which all are by himself confessed to be common to all actions; and therefore can no more be proper rules concerning ceremonies than two legs, two eyes or two ears can be proper marks of Titius or Sempronius, or this or that man, being common to all men of perfect body. Now let us see whether all the opposers of our ceremonies hold to these rules of Mr. Cartwright. [p. 72]
Master Jacob in his book of the Necessity of Reformation, printed 1604, appoints (p. 120) these four rules: comeliness, edification, avoiding of offense and God’s glory to be observed in the determining of mere circumstances, which he will have to be either civil or occasional. But as for any ceremonies merely ecclesiastical (pp. 2, 3, 12), he denies that any power of the Church can lawfully determine of them, and (p. 16) condemns all mere ecclesiastical rites, professing that all lawful ecclesiastical rites whatsoever are contained now in the Scriptures of the New Testament. And (p. 3, from Dt. 12:32; Isa. 30:11, etc.) he collects that all human traditions-ecclesiastical are directly contrary to the Word; yea, being but beside the Scripture, they are flatly contrary to it in these places (viz. which speak of the perfection of God’s Word and against additions and detractions) and concludes that God’s own Word, which is the holy Scriptures, ought to be religiously believed and held to be for us of most perfect and absolute demonstration of all things whatsoever, being properly and simply ecclesiastical or religious. Where you see that touching any rites and ceremonies merely ecclesiastical, as a font to baptize in or the observation of the days of Christ’s birth or ascension, or any peculiar apparel to the minister in his ministration, of what color or fashion soever, or the standing up at the profession of our faith, and in a word, all mere ecclesiastical things, are foreclosed.
So, though Mr. Cartwright’s four rules for the framing of ceremonies may seem to be allowed by Mr. Jacob, yet the ceremonies which should be framed by these rules are by him quite removed; and this is in effect to take those rules away. For if no merely ecclesiastical rites may be squared by them, how are they rules whereby to square ecclesiastical rites?
The truth is Mr. Jacob could never get over the block which Mr. Cartwright and the admonitors had laid in his way (however Mr. Cartwright himself, a man of more activity, made shift to leap over it), namely this: Whatsoever is not commanded in the Word, must not be in the Church. And yet Mr. Jacob, that he might seem to hold fair quarter [p. 73] with Mr. Cartwright and other learned divines, who acknowledge that certain ecclesiastical rites and ceremonies appropriated to holy actions were left to the determination of the Church under some general rules of the Word, will seem to allow somewhat; he cannot tell what: some circumstances only civil or voluntary, as the time and place, which he rather calls “circumstances” than “ceremonies”; that so if any shall say he allows nothing to the Church’s determination to be squared by those four rules, he may answer for himself and say: Yes, certain circumstances are, namely, such as are necessary in civil as well as sacred actions. If on the other side one challenge him to give some liberty to men for the ordaining of rites which are but extrinsic circumstances about the worship of God, he may answer for himself that he has protested against all mere ecclesiastical rites which are ordained by men and not left so much as one unto their determination.
Thus as he that by turning of his picture of a horse made it either a running or a tumbling horse, whichever you would, so has Mr. Jacob provided himself either to square some circumstances by four rules or to cut off all by another rule, as the market shall ask. Yea and the abridgers also (whether out of doubtfulness or wariness) do give one hand to Mr. Jacob’s cutting rule in their negative argument from the authority of Scriptures, which disables the Church to ordain any other rite or ceremony than God has prescribed. And yet lest that should not stand good, do also reach out their other hand to Mr. Cartwright in proposing certain rules (not altogether the same with Mr. Cartwright’s) for the squaring out of ceremonies, hoping that our ceremonies shall be proved unlawful, either by their first rule, which condemns all that God has not in his Word commanded, or at least for not answering the rules which should be observed in ceremonies, of which see.
Now therefore, having shown that two of their pretended rules (whereof one is negative) are no proper ones for the framing of Church ceremonies and that they seem not [p. 74] to be yet agreed about these rules, I will refer the consideration of the agreement of our ceremonies to the true rules given by the apostle, 1 Cor. 14, to a fitter place. And now give way to the Defendant’s disproof of their negative argument.
16. 1 Corinthians 14:26, 40 on Decency & Order unto Edification; Whether order requires more than placing of things formerly instituted? Whether decency be nothing but the seemliness of order?
Defendant: Our general confutation of the nonconformists showing that they have failed in the main ground of their general proposition when in the question of ceremonies they dispute negatively from Scripture. Our proofs arise from: 1. Scripture. 2. Judgment of fathers. 3. Consent of Protestants. 4. Reasons.
The first proof is from Scripture, 1 Cor. 14:40, “Let all things be done decently and in order.” And again, “Let all things be done unto edifying,” verse 26. By virtue of which permission the apostle does grant a general license and authority to all Churches to ordain any ceremonies that may be fit for the better serving of God. This one Scripture (not to trouble them with any other at this present) is universally used by fathers and all divines (although never so diverse in their professions) for one and the same conclusion.
Replier: The Defendant here undertakes to prove that God in the Scriptures has granted a general license or authority to all Churches to ordain any ceremonies that may be fit for the better serving of God.
Answer: The Defendant undertakes to prove that all rites and ceremonies which are beside the prescription of the Word are not unlawful, because God has given license to his Church to ordain some for the better serving of Him in the use of his ordinances. The Replier says he undertook to prove that by which he undertakes to prove [p. 75] another thing, and yet having shot beside the butt, he insults, saying:
Replier: But what if this were granted? What is it to the purpose? What makes it for our ceremonies in controversy except he can show that they are fit for the better serving of God? Now this he never undertakes to prove, nor dare, I think, profess so much in writing without many unwarrantable limitations.
Answer: If all this be granted which the Defendant undertakes to prove, then is all granted which in this first argument is stood upon: viz. that more is lawful than is by any rule of the Word particularly commanded to the Church. Whether our ceremonies will bear the trial of those rules which the apostle gives for direction is not (as has been often said) yet in question; but whether all is unlawful which is not against but only beside the warrant of the Word, that is, that which is not prescribed in the Word. We shall hereafter try our ceremonies by these rules and, if they will not bear the trial, we will relinquish their defense.
Replier: The only Scripture he brings is 1 Cor. 14:16, 40, concerning order and decency, a place much profaned by the patrons of our ceremonies, as shall be shown.
Answer: One plain place of Scripture is as good as a hundred: and by the Replier’s confession (sect. 5) is enough. And indeed this is the only place in the New Testament by which all divines of whatsoever religion do conclude that a power is given to the Church to constitute such rites as shall be needful to edification, decency and order, because she is commanded to see that all things be so done, which in respect of the variety of persons, places, times, occasions and opinions of men cannot be so done; that is, she may lawfully make and repeal certain laws, or rather constitutions, thereabout. When the Replier shall show how we profane this place, we will either justly defend ourselves or humbly confess our fault.
Replier: This place is used (says he) by fathers and all divines for one and the same conclusion. It is much used, I grant, and as much abused. [p. 76]
Answer: If it be as much abused as used to that conclusion for which it is here alleged, then it is abused altogether by all divines and by the Replier himself, who, arguing against us, says all that is left unto the Church’s liberty in things pertaining to God’s worship is to order them in a comely manner. This is manifestly collected out of the place in question, viz. 1 Cor. 14:26, 40. And if this be manifestly collected out of this place, how can it but be hence concluded that something is left unto the Church more than is prescribed: for else how were it left to her liberty? But he runs on still, saying:
Replier: But first it is not used by all divines to prove the institution of such ceremonies as ours lawful, for they are much mistaken which think our ceremonies to be mere matters of order; and as for decency, they have been often proved to be far from it, which of itself to every indifferent eye is more than apparent.
Answer: Nor is this place here used by the Defendant to prove the institution of our ceremonies to be lawful, but only to prove that the institution of some ceremonies which are beside the Word is lawful; and to this all divines agree. Whether our ceremonies do answer to those intentions and uses for which the Church may constitute ceremonies or no is not handled in this first argument brought against them; but the Replier can no more go right on than a sea crab. They are mistaken indeed who take our ceremonies to be merely for order. For some of them are also for decency and edification, or else they could not fill the apostle’s triangle. Touching his reference of their decency to the indifferent eyes of men: we will abide it, so as he will add (as is requisite) “indifferent and impartial minds.” But all this is besides the issue, as also is his brag of what has been proved.
Replier: 2. It is not used to this purpose by any that has authority sufficient to persuade us that it will bear such a conclusion except they will show us by what logic they form their consequence, which the Defendant is not able to do for them.
Answer: It is used generally by divines, old or [p. 77] new, papists or protestants, to prove that God has left authority in the Churches to make constitutions belonging to order and decency and tending to edification, because the apostle commands that all should be done so; of which argument the consequence is manifested by sundry divines, viz. that seeing the same particular circumstances would not be comely and to edification in all places and times, the Church must have power for to institute and alter them. Howbeit I partly believe that not all the divines in the world have authority to persuade some of you to any more than you like of.
Replier: 3. This Scripture being rightly understood does not only not justify such ceremonies as ours, but plainly condemns them.
Answer: If this Scripture did plainly condemn our ceremonies as not serving to order, decency and edification, yet if it allow at all any ceremonies to be ordained more than be in the Word prescribed to be used in God’s service, it plainly confutes your negative argument, for which end only it was now alleged. But if you cannot hold to the point in hand, go on at large awhile.
Replier: For the manifesting of which assertion, because it may seem strange to those ears that are accustomed to other sounds, I shall here distinctly set down an argument drawn out of these words against such ceremonies as ours are.
Answer: This is to oppose, not to reply, and might therefore be rejected, especially seeing it beats up a new hare [rabbit]. But let the reader only remember where the Replier lost his way and have the patience to hear his argument and our answer, and we shall come to this place again.
Replier: All that is left unto the Church’s liberty in things pertaining to God’s worship is to order them in a comely manner. But to appoint and use the ceremonies as we do is not to order in a comely manner anything used to God’s worship. Therefore to appoint and use the ceremonies as we do is not left to the liberty of the Church, i.e. it is unlawful. This is the Replier’s argument put all together. [p. 78]
Answer: 1. The [major] proposition (in his meaning) is not sound: the assumption [i.e. the minor premise] is false; the conclusion therefore must needs be naught.
2. I have said that the first proposition is not sound in his meaning because in a good construction of the words it would stand firm, but not in that which himself gives us. For to order in a comely manner may well comprehend all that is left unto the liberty of the Church: for she can make no new articles of faith, no new sacraments or new kind of worship to God properly so called, all which the Lord Himself has determined in his Word and commanded his Church to observe inviolably without addition, diminution or alteration: so as all that is left at liberty to her in matter of God’s worship is but the convenient and profitable disposing of the same, as may be agreeable to order and decency, and for edification of herself. Now touching this we agree with all the godly learned and with all the reformed Churches; and what is all this but to order them in a comely manner?
3. But the Replier works upon the advantage of the word “ordering,” which sometimes is taken largely for disposing and governing,¹ sometimes strictly for setting in their places, one thing by another: which is but a small parcel of ordering taken at large. Thus, to order a battle is sometimes no more than to marshal the troops and place them, sometimes to do besides that all that belongs to the battle itself, of which that other is but one little piece. And thus is the name of “order” in Scripture and in learned writers taken sometimes for all that which we call discipline or polity, or Church government, as Col. 2:5, “beholding your order”. Sometimes more strictly for that branch of the whole, which consists in ranking of persons and actions handsomely, one before, and another after; and so it is opposed only to confusion, as in this place, 1 Cor. 14:40.
¹ Augustine, Of Order, shows that all things, even the disorders of men, are in order in respect of divine providence.
4. The Replier delivers his proposition in doubtful terms and gives us his interpretation at leisure, telling us at last that “order requires not the institution or usage of any new thing, but only a right placing and disposing of things instituted.” And again that the circumstances of order are time and place; to which though he often put these for a blind, [p. 79] yet you shall never hear more of him but only as allowing of time and place left unto the Church’s determination as matter of order.
5. Again, whereas these terms “in comely manner” are in themselves large enough to enclose all formalities and fashions, or ceremonies which may become the worshippers and worship of God and the several kinds thereof, the Replier means no such matter, but understands by it a comely manner of placing and timing of everything: so as he admits not anything to the Church’s liberty and her institution that, peculiarly over and beside ordering and placing, is intended for comeliness or edification: “for as for comeliness, that is nothing but the seemliness of order,” says he.
6. Now though, no man may deny that even order itself, if order brings some comeliness to all things, as does the placing of the several parts of our bodies in their natural order. Yet no man should deny that there is besides that comeliness a comeliness in the proportion and in the features, especially of the countenance, which does not depend solely upon order of place: as appears by that wreck of natural comeliness of our bodies which by age, sickness or death is made, though the same limbs remain and in the same order which they possessed in our best estate of health or youth without any alteration.
7. And who knows not that beside that comeliness of the persons of men something also (even in the appareling) is added to comeliness, without which the same bodies would not be so comely, considered either as natural bodies of men or as those men be members of a politic body.
8. Wherefore we deny that our Lord has left the disposing of divine worship so unprovided for as neither Himself to have given out the robes which might best become the several acts and parts of his solemn service in all ages and places, nor left unto his Church authority and commission to do any more than only to place all things which He has instituted as handsomely as they can, and so set them in good order, as a pair of organ-pipes or soldiers in rank [p. 80] and file. Nor did ever any (that I can find) so conceive of the matter (till some of the opposers of our ceremonies, to put off the evidence of this Scripture, devised this new gloss) that, forsooth, nothing is meant by all this of order and comeliness but only to order in a comely manner, that is, that the ordering of sacred actions be comely so as each may have a fit time and place. And of this rare device I take Mr. Jacob to be the author and this Replier to be but one of his disciples therein.
Now we understand the Replier’s mind and have shown our own. Let us hear his proofs of this proposition, viz. that all that is left to the liberty of the Church in matters of God’s worship is the ordering, that is, the placing of things instituted in a comely manner; and then all is done.
Replier: This is manifestly collected out of the place in question.
Answer: The place whereof the meaning is now questioned is 1 Cor. 14:26, “Let all be to edifying,” and verse 40, “Let all be done decently and in order.” In which place three distinct things are propounded: one concerning specially the end, two concerning the manner. Now how these three should be but one, I understand not. For first, the frame of words, “decently and” (he says not “or”) “in order,” will not bear this their construction unless we may take (and give no reason for it) “and,” the copulative, expositively, as if it signified: “that is to say, in order,” and so deny any decency to be required, save that only which arises out of the order of things, against all common sense and truth.
The apostle’s discourse there will not bear it, which beginning at the eleventh chapter concludes itself in these last words of the fourteenth.
For some things in that tract are handled which only concerned matter of decency, as the women’s praying veiled in token of their subjection, the men’s praying uncovered in sign of their superiority, which does not at all depend upon the placing of prophecy or prayer, or any other parts of divine service, in their courses.
Some other things treated of were more properly pertaining to edification than either to order (in placing) or simply to comeliness, as the silencing of such as spoke (by [p. 81] miraculous gift), strange tongues, unless themselves or others could interpret this same to the assembly.
Some things again did he order more peculiarly, as that the prophets should speak by two or three and the rest should judge, and not all or many speak at once.
Wherefore, it must needs be that the apostle in the winding up intends to give them in a short rule the sum of his aforesaid resolutions: “Let all be done to edification,” “decently and in order”; and so have some of the best interpreters collected from hence, and not contrarily that no more is commanded but the comely placing of one thing after another, which this Replier (without giving any reason) does affirm, as if it must needs be so because he says so. He proceeds, saying:
Replier: So the Defendant seems to grant.
Answer: Indeed just so as it was manifestly gathered out of that place; what would a man not stick to say that would say this of the Defendant; and that even where he undertakes by argument to rescue this very place out of the Defendant’s hands? For what cause be there of opposition where both parties accord?
Replier: So Peter Martyr understands it, as is to be seen in his commentary upon 1 Sam. 14, which judgment of his is cited and approved by Dr. Whitaker, On the Roman Pontiff, pp. 841 & 844.
Answer: Nay, so Peter Martyr understood it not, as appears in that very place alleged and in his commentary upon the First to the Corinthians, verse 7, and yet most clearly in his commentaries upon the text in question, where he speaks of comeliness as a thing, though not divided from order, yet distinguished, and as a different thing as be light and heat in the same fire. And even in that place of Samuel, Peter Martyr (bounding all the ecclesiastical authority within the compass of things indifferent, mutable and arbitrary) does instance, among other things, in:
1. The ceremony of thrice dipping in baptism,
2. In the observation or institution of the feasts of Easter and Whitsuntide, at which times only they were wont to give public baptism.
3. About the Lord’s Supper, in what place, at what time, after what manner, fasting or [p. 82] sitting, morning or evening, they should communicate;
Of which he says, “Unless subordinate kinds of things shall be constituted, there will be no peace in the Church, etc.” where you see Peter Martyr casts into the Church’s liberty not only the ordering of time and place, but of gesture for comeliness, yea and the institution of some holy days, even of those commemorative feasts of the Passover and Pentecost, and the significant ceremonies of thrice dipping, too. I conceive therefore that the Replier never looked at the place itself, but because Dr. Whitaker, summing up Peter Martyr, says he had well said on this place of Samuel that all the liberty the Church had belonged only to good order, the Replier catches and runs away with a bare word (as some hungry creatures do with bare bones) and works upon that.
For all that he has from Dr. Whitaker is that he says all the ecclesiastical laws belong only ad eutaxian, that is, “to order,” or rather “ordering”: for eutaxia and taxis, though sometimes equal in use of speech, yet have some difference. Taxis is order, eutaxia (as Stephen says) is conservatio ordinis [conservation of order]. But however it may signify, and often does signify, all that the name of order, taken at large, does or may import, and not as it is a thing distinct from comeliness (which the Replier might have seen, perhaps did) yea, if he read the whole passage, must see in the second place of Dr. Whitaker, which is p. 844, where he joins decorum and eutaxian together; whereas in the former place, p. 841, he understood both by eutaxia tantum, “order only,” taking the word there in the larger sense; and likewise in that latter p. 844, where he gives instance not only in time and place, but quomodo, etc., “after what manner” we should carry ourselves in the holy assembly, instancing in kneeling and in being bare-headed in prayer. And such kind of things he acknowledges to be left to the Church’s liberty.
And again yet more fully, p. 851, he grants to Bellarmine that “beside the divine laws, there must needs be some ecclesiastical ordinances and constitutions”; adding that these do belong ad eutaxian et decorum, “to order and comeliness,” for so the apostle commands that all things in the Church should be done decently and in order, “For” (says he) [p. 83]
“if modesty and gravity be required in all civil society, how much more is eutaxia, order, to be observed amongst Christians in their Church assemblies and in the house of God?”
where, under the name of “order” he again comprehends things of decorum too, as his words following do show when he says that “rites” that are “comely and full of a kind of veneration do both help and stir up unto piety”; yea and afterward he shows what is decorum and does not say it is nothing but the seemliness of order (as this Replier), but denying it to lie in a vain pomp, as with the Papists it does, etc., he says:
Nobis illa decora sunt quae ad sanctam quandam dignitatem referuntur, quaeque fines illos respiciunt quos diximus
i.e. “those things are decent in our account which are referred to a holy kind of dignity and which aim at those ends, which we have spoken of.”
He gives instance in some particulars, as receiving the eucharist before meat, etc., which cannot possibly be referred to order strictly taken but must belong to the root of decency; of which ceremony, Dr. Whitaker says, it was egregius ritus, “an excellent ceremony”. His reason is the prevention of the distempers which befell that sacred action when it was anciently held after supper or late.
Thus largely have I set down Dr. Whitaker’s words in that treatise, that the unlatined may read it in English and see how these men that talk and write in so haughty and magisterial a fashion do but gull and deceive them with the names of worthy men, which is so great and shameful a sin, and in this Replier so frequent, that I wonder he dares dispute about ceremonies before he have learned the substance of common honesty in his quotations; of which we shall see more in Junius, his next witness.
Replier: This is confirmed also by Junius against Bellarmine, Controversy 3, bk. 4, ch. 16, num. 86-87 and ch. 17, num. 9, 10, 12-13, where he shows that Christ is the only Lawgiver that appoints things in his Church and that He has appointed all that are requisite, and that the Church makes no laws (properly so called) to appoint any new things to be used, but only canons, orders, directions, ordering in seemly manner those things which Christ has appointed; and that [p. 84] if she add anything of her own, she does decline.
Answer: Confirmed also by Junius? Just as it was affirmed by Peter Martyr and Dr. Whitaker. Bellarmine undertakes in that chapter to prove by Scripture that the Pope has power to make laws, properly called “laws,” and binding the conscience, per se, by themselves, even as God’s laws do extra contemptum [beyond only contempt of them], etc. And to this end Bellarmine says that beside divine and civil laws, some laws, properly called laws, are necessary. Junius answers to this, num. 86, that this is true with a double distinction:
First, that only “those human laws are necessary in the Church which tend to this, that all things may be done decently and in order,” alleging this text, 1 Cor. 14:40, that is not for doctrines or worship to God in themselves.
Secondly, that these are improperly called laws in the Church, because they have not in them all the full conditions of a law, but are by the fathers better termed constitutions or canons.
And because Bellarmine playing upon the word “law,” says that every law has a compelling power, Junius, num. 89, answers, But ecclesiastical orderings or disposings be not truly a law, but dispositions or canons:
“directing a man willing, not constraining an unwilling man. And if perhaps a coactive [coercive] force do befall these canons, this comes from elsewhere, and not from the nature of a canon.”
He means when God’s ordinance of the magistrate’s authority, of charity or peace of the Church, or edification, or such like moral respects, do tie the conscience to obedience.
And what is here to confirm the Replier’s position? Surely not this, that Junius acknowledges such ecclesiastical laws (though not in strict terms, or properly to be called laws so fitly as canons or constitutions) to be necessary in the Church. And much less that when he shows the proper object and end of them to be not only order in a comely manner, but decency and order, as the apostle says.
Hear his next, ch. 17, num. 9-10, 12-13 in the ninth annotation: Bellarmine answers to an objection from Dt. 4:2 that the Scriptures forbidding addition to God’s laws meant not to forbid the making of other laws, but the corrupting of a [p. 85] law made, because it is said, Dt. 5, “Thou shalt not decline to the right hand, or left.” Junius replies thus, “And what, I pray you, is more easy then that they that make new laws should decline; yea what else is this in divine things but to decline.” “In divine things,” mark you sir, that is, in points of faith or necessary rules of sanctity. But Junius has confessed before the necessary use of canons and constitutions tending to order and decency, and num. 10, where Bellarmine answers that the addition forbidden is of laws contrary to the Law of God, Junius replies, “That any laws at all added to God’s laws are contrary, in that they are added to the law of God,” speaking of laws properly called “laws” in themselves supposed (without any other law of God backing them) to bind the conscience, as he has interpreted himself, ch. 16, num. 86-87.
And num. 12, Bellarmine answers further to the objection against adding to the Law, that all:
“particulars were not determined in the New Testament, but the most common laws only given concerning the sacraments and articles of Faith, the specials left to the Church, etc.”
Junius replies that the laws of God’s making are perfect in substance, reason and manner; those made by the Church are but canons and disposings. Those of God are necessary, of mere necessity; these of the Church are of convenience and voluntary for the better observing of divine laws. Num. 13, Bellarmine answers to Calvin’s objection from those Scriptures which say, We have one Law-giver which is God, Isa. 33, and James the fourth, that God is the chief Law-giver. Junius replies, that he is not properly, univocally, the chief, but the only Law-giver: that is, as he has said, to give laws that in themselves, and by the very authority of the Law-maker, do bind the conscience. Now where be these words, All that was requisite, as spoken of rites and ceremonies, which Junius there, and elsewhere, confesses to be left to the Church’s disposing? And where finds he in Junius that the Church may constitute no new thing? Surely, not where he says no new law in divine things. And where are those words, ordering in seemly manner: that is, so as the manner of the placing of things be seemly? Nowhere in Junius, [p. 86] but they are fathered upon his name falsely; for Junius says nothing but only that the use of canons should be known to be voluntary accommodations for the better keeping of God’s divine laws, and such as tend to decency and order. In the making of which constitutions, if the Church may appoint at all no new thing, then has she a blank, not a patent, yea then must she make no particular ordinances, no not so much as for time and place, unless there be at all no things, or no new things, but all commanded of God. Now what conscience think you has this Replier, who dared point out distinctly these places in which nothing appears so clearly, as that they are nothing to his purpose, but against it.
Replier: The reason is, because unto her is committed no authority of appointing new things, but a ministry to observe and do such things which Christ has appointed; see Junius, De Translatione Imperii, bk. 1, ch. 2, num. 26-27, 31.
Answer: These words “new things” are the Replier’s “new nothing,” of which he finds no footsteps in Junius, but in Mr. Jacob. New things belonging to the doctrine of faith, or manners for conscience sake, and upon the danger of damnation to be believed, done or refused: neither men, nor angels may devise any, for God has sealed them up. But if the Church have a ministry to appoint, and do such things as Christ has commanded, then must she needs have a derivative commission, as Junius even in those places shows, to appoint and to use such rites and formalities in the outward worship of God as serve to that order and decency of which Christ has given her a charge.
The places of Junius contra Bellarmine are, either through negligence or mistaking, miserably perverted. Junius, De translatione Imperii, bk. 1, ch. 2, num. 26, has it thus:
Illyricus objected against the Pope’s overtopping of the emperor from Rom. 13, “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers.” Bellarmine answers that the ecclesiastical powers are higher powers than the temporal. Junius replies that no Churchman has properly any power, but only a ministry committed to him of God in divine matters. [p. 87] He has the authority of embassy, not of empire.
The same he insists on, num. 28, challenging the Pope to show that empire, and not embassy, was committed to him, seeing the apostles were but ambassadors for Christ, whose successor He claims to be.
In num. 31, Bellarmine objects that Nazianzen said to an emperor that he in his calling also had power. Junius answers that Nazianzen used not the word “power” properly; and adds that proper and absolute power in the Church, is only belonging to God, and that whosoever they be that carry the sacred Word, they have but delegated power. He then concludes that the pledge is God’s, the instrument is man’s whose ministry, when called “power,” is a misuse of the word. All this is good to prove that no ecclesiastical person has any power by his calling over temporal princes, whom the apostle calls properly “powers,” whereas he calls the others properly “ministers” or “ambassadors”.
But is this all, or any part of it, for the Replier’s turn? Have stewards or ambassadors no manner of delegated power because it is not absolute and independent on other men, as supreme lords have? By commission then, though not by absolute authority, the Church makes her constitutions; and that, Junius does acknowledge.
If the Replier or any man will see how Junius understands that apostolical canon, “Let all be done decently and in order,” let him take Junius’s own words. Junius, Theological Disputation on Traditions, says thus, of those traditions which are concerned with circumstances, the Law is given by Paul, 1 Cor. 14:40, to order and to honest decency. And that Junius, by decency, means another thing than the seemliness of order alone, appears, not only by his continual mentioning of them as things of divers sorts: as, contra, bk. 4, ch. 12, num. 20, where (of rituals pertaining to order and propriety) he says, Scripture shows the source of these to be necessary; let the church establish a fitting manner, etc. But more clearly where he makes the anniversary solemnities (as, of Easter, and Whitsuntide) to be ritual: and says, these solemnities are observed not of any mere religious necessity, [p. 88] but for a just and comely remembrance of the singular benefits of God. But these kind of rites which Junius subjects to the Church’s liberty, cannot possibly be referred to mere circumstances of order, but to the point of decorum, and to edification; wherefore the Replier’s witnesses witness against him.
Now lastly, he flies to reason; and if this also fail him, he will be ill to pass. Before we hear his reason, let it be remembered, that this Replier quarreled the Defendant for not placing his argument from reason, before the testimonies of men; and yet does so here himself; and indeed not much amiss, for his testimonies (though mistaken, yet) for the very names of the men from whom they were borrowed, have more show to them, than his reasons which are produced, as shall appear.
Replier: This is also confirmed by sound reason.
Answer: viz: That all which is left to the Church’s liberty in things pertaining to God’s worship, is to order them in comely manner. Your reason, sir?
Replier: Both in respect of the wisdom required in all law-makers, and perfectly found in Christ, and also in regard of the nature of such institutions. For the former reason teaches (as Aristotle shows, Rhet. 3) That all which possibly may, should be appointed in the Law by the Giver of it, and nothing left unto the ministerial judges, but that which needs must be left, as matters of fact, etc.
Answer: 1. I find this reason much stood on by the opposers of our Church discipline, as if they would thereby prove, that either our Lord has failed in his law-making, or else every particular matter of discipline must be determined by him just as they would have it; but this follows not. For, beside that the lawyers say, Lex non curat de minimis, they do well say too, that the chief law is the good of the people, wherefore in such cases as (by necessity) are variable for the good of God’s people, it was the wisdom of the Law-maker to leave the Law more general, so as the same Law might ever remain firm, and unbroken, when occasions should vary and change particularities. [p. 89]
Now the occasions of different rites and ceremonies, are so various, as if our Lord had fixed any one certain fashion, he should have made rather snares, than laws for his Church. For example, had he determined that the Sacrament of his body and blood should be taken sitting at a table, then, the want of a table, or something to sit on, or infirmity of the body disabling a man to sit, had debarred him the Sacrament; for who dared to have altered the gesture, if Christ had enjoined it? The like of kneeling in prayer: whereas the ordaining of that which was necessary, and leaving the rest to occasions and choice, has made the Law, even by the largeness of it, the more perfect; and in respect of the use of it, more commodious. If this agree not best to the wisdom of law-makers, let wise law-makers judge.
And yet it holds good with Aristotle (not in the third, but) in the first chapter of his Rhetoric, who says, That it is most convenient that laws well made should explain themselves, and leave as little as may be to the judges, which is not spoken so much for the particularity of laws, (for which it is alleged) as for the clearness of them; and so the words pointed to, are to be interpreted by those that go before. Thus, even in this quotation, the Replier has missed his mark.
But let it be as you will; I answer, that our Lord Jesus has left nothing absolutely to the will of his officers, but has determined all things necessary to salvation, and left ambulatory rites, (as Junius calls them) to the Church’s liberty; and not those neither, simply, but under general rules, which will try the test of any occurrence as perfectly, as if every one had been named, and with less encumbrance; even as the laws given for the discerning of the clean beasts by these two marks of parting the hoof, or chewing the cud; or of fishes that have fins and scales, will as sufficiently, by application, determine all particulars, as if all the clean beasts and fishes had been named, and with less ado; wherefore the wisdom of our Law-giver stands upright, though sundry particular circumstances, beside those of mere order be left undetermined. And why not other circumstances as [p. 90] well as those that pertain merely to order, as time and place?
Replier: Now in the worship of God, all but particular circumstances of order may easily be appointed (as indeed they were) by our Law-giver Christ.
Answer: In the worship of God, is a doubtful phrase; for if it import those actions, in the use whereof the substance of worship consists, all no doubt is determined in the Scriptures expressly, or inclusively: but if it mean (as I think it does) that all other circumstances, beside those of order, (which belong only to timing, and placing of the particular parts of essential worship) then it is untrue, that those of order were harder to be prescribed than others for decency. For of all other things incident to the managing of religious outward worship, this is the easiest to set down; viz. which action shall go before or after other; and, to which, the greater or lesser measure of time shall be allowed. Whereas matters of comeliness change so often, even in the same places, and be, in several ages and countries, and by the different opinions of men and occasional respects, so mutable, and divers, that if anything were uneasy, it should rather be circumstances of decorum, than simply of order.
But be the one or other harder or easier, what school of divinity has taught the Replier to say, that our Lord forbore the determining of the circumstances of order, because all else was easy? Was his wisdom so short that he could not have calculated the order of time and place, with rules for such climates, and seasons?
When Bellarmine, to prove that Christ has left but general rules of faith and sacraments to the Catholic Church now, because he could not so easily provide for all other necessary things, unto all nations as he had done for that one (margin: De rep. bk. 1) of the Jews, Junius rightly repels him for limiting the Holy One of Israel. And what would he say to our Replier, who supposes the circumstances only of order therefore to have been left to liberty, because all other things were easy for Christ, but not this?
(margin: The Scotch Dialogue, p. 135) How much better the Scotch Dialogue, p. 135: That nothing was left to the determination of the Church, whereupon [p. 91] particular determination conveniently could pass before or after; he makes it worse again, by saying, That the individual points of doctrine, petitions, and some other particular circumstances concerning the order and manner of worship were impossible to be determined, because they must vary according to the occasions and cases of persons, places, and purposes. For who shall dare to say that Christ, who knew all these varieties, could not, if it had been necessary have determined them respectively? Wherefore, much better (margin: Calvin, Instit. 4.10.30) Calvin: in matters of order and discipline Christ determined not, quia Christus noluit, because he would not; not because he could not. And why would he not? Because he saw it was not necessary for salvation. And for that he foresaw the need of variation, as also (as says the Scotch Dialogue, p. 136) for that many things need not be determined, because they were most easily discernible by the light of nature. And finally, because (as Zanchy says) it were profitable, that the Churches should have such things left to varieties, than be tied always to one, lest they should have placed the main of religion in a point of ceremony: which not a few do at this day; as some in their not kneeling when they receive the Sacrament, having yet no institution, but (as they call it) Christ’s imitable example. These speeches are comelier, than to say, It was not so easy: although if that stand for the reason, it will rather disprove, then prove the Replier’s purpose, inasmuch as it is certain, that of all other undetermined things, that of order had been the easiest to be determined, without any manifest show of danger therein. Come we to the Replier’s second reason.
Replier: As for the nature of such institutions, that does also require so much; for whatsoever is above civility therein, if it be not a circumstance of order, it is worship, and therefore invented by man, unlawful will-worship.
Answer: Let him prove this, that whatsoever is more than civility, or a circumstance of order, is worship, more than are the circumstances of comeliness (which he calls civility) and of order.
Replier: For whatsoever is used or acted by him that worships God, in that act, it must needs be either grounded on civil [p. 92] human considerations, and therefore civility, or a means of worship and therefore worship: or the ordering and manner of disposing of those acts and means, and therefore lawful, if lawfully and fitly applied; or else at the least idle and vain, and therefore to be avoided: according to that saying of Basil — a fifth cannot be given.
Answer: 1. A fifth may be given; viz. a significant ceremony for edification. For example, the stone which (margin: Josh. 24:26–27) Joshua pitched near the Tabernacle in Shechem to be a monitory sign unto the Israelites, of the covenant with God in that very place renewed by them, was neither matter of civility, nor worship in itself, nor circumstance of order, nor fourthly idle and vain; but a profitable significant ceremony appointed by Joshua, and not ordained of God. The like may be said (margin: Neh. 9:10) of the subscription to the covenant devised by Nehemiah to be an outward help unto the people, and an obligatory sign unto them of keeping covenant with God; and so of others, which we shall after hear of in due places. Wherefore his argument from division, is by the insufficiency of his division, overthrown.
The several branches of it are in themselves unsound. The first, in two respects; one, in that it confounds the decency to be used in religious actions, with civility to be used in our common life; and makes them altogether one; a second is, that it determines that comeliness which is grounded on civil human considerations, to be, even in sacred actions, and use, but civility; which is a gross absurdity and after confuted by himself, p. 48, where he confesses the same cleanliness which is used civilly at feasts, to be a holy cleanliness by application, to that sacred feast of our Lord’s Supper. And good reason; for as the natural spirits, bred in the liver and veins coming into the heart, are there made, of natural, vital spirits: so the same things, which are originally and naturally grounded on human considerations, when they come to be applied to sacred actions, for the comeliness thereof, are in that use made sacred.
The bowing of the body or knees, in token of reverence [p. 93] is grounded on natural reason; and, used to men, is but civility, but applied towards God is (I think) more than civility, in the Replier’s own judgment.
His second, (that if it be a means of worship, it is therefore worship,) being so loosely delivered, and at large, is false. For not all means of worship are worship, but only such as be immediate and determine themselves in God, who is worshipped; or else are by divine institution imposed, and in that respect made acts of divine worship. Sacrifice to God, is a means of worship immediate, and in itself. A place for the sacrifice is a remote means, and was in itself no worship, till God by command established that royalty on one place. Otherwise, if all means of worship shall be properly and in themselves worship, then not only preaching, but the pulpit, the church, the bell which calls men together, and the bellman shall be worship. Nor prayer alone, but each particular form of prayer, the very set hour, and place for public prayer, shall also be worship, because they are means of it, and of this absurdity there will be no end.
His third branch, viz. the ordering and manner of disposing those acts and means, is ill divided from comeliness (which he calls civility), which belongs to the manner of disposing of religious actions; and as ill, from the means of worship; for though they be not means of worship immediately, yet mediately they serve thereto. His fourth [or idle and vain] is false, seeing there may be a fifth given, as has been shown.
His inference, that, if idle and vain, then to be avoided, as Basil says, is not absolutely true; for some things empty and unprofitable in themselves, may, yea sometimes must, be tolerated, for some accidental good which may come by them, or for avoidance of greater evil. So was circumcision, and sundry other Jewish rites, even after all their sap was out, tolerated; and this is the common judgment of Divines, and even of Mr. Cartwright. (margin: Mt. 13:29–30) He that taught to suffer the tares rather than to pluck up the wheat with it, has shown a reason for this judgment.
We have now examined his two reasons brought to prove [p. 94] that no more is left to the liberty of the Church in matter of rites, than the handsome placing of the religious actions, and find them faulty.
A third reason there is; but the Replier was loath to tell that, namely, that if more circumstances than these of mere order be left to the Church, our ceremonies intended not only for order (strictly taken) but for comeliness, and edification, might be thought warrantable by this text of 1 Cor. 14:26, 40. Hear we now his own good opinion of his proofs.
Replier: By all this it may appear, that the authority of the Church is not to appoint whatsoever it will, no not of things in their own nature indifferent, and say they be in order, or for order, but only to order those things which God has appointed.
Answer: By the answer to all this, may appear, that although the Church may do in nothing imply what she will, without respect to the will of Christ her Lord; no not in things indifferent: nor may call that order, or for order which is not so; yet she may, she ought, she must, as she will answer it to God, appoint not only an order, in the things ordained of God, to avoid confusion; but also, such other rites as belong to decency and edification of herself according to a charge of the Holy Ghost laid upon her, 1 Cor. 14, v. 26, 40.
Replier: Thus far the proposition, or first part of my syllogism: the assumption follows. But to appoint and use the ceremonies as we do, is not to order in comely manner anything pertaining to God’s worship. The reason is, because order requires not the institution or usage of any new thing, but only the right placing and disposing of things which are formerly instituted.
Answer: Order requires no new thing, as a matter of worship to God in itself; but the disposing of things ordained; yet it requires some new thing as a circumstance, serving the disposing of the same, as time, place, and measure, which God has not determined, and are therefore in this respect, new. [p. 95]
Secondly, if order strictly considered, requires no new thing, yet ordering in comely manner requires the institution of such formalities as shall be suitable to the dignity and variety of the divine actions; seeing God requires comeliness with order, and has not prescribed the particulars thereof. But the Replier undertaking to prove that our institution, and use of ceremonies, is not to order in comely manner the things pertaining to God’s worship, herein his proof makes no mention of comeliness, but of order alone: as if he would prove that we do not order the things of God in comely manner, because we do not only order them, but, in a comely manner also: which is more than simply to see them in order. Is not this a good argument, from things badly divided to a conclusion well combined? Yet he goes on, as if he carried the whole cause along, whereof he has let fall one moiety, saying.
Replier: This appears first by the notation which is given of the word itself, which both in Greek and Latin is taken from the ranking of soldiers in certain bounds and limits of time and place. (Latin: Dicebant enim militibus tribuni, hactenus tibi licet, hic consistes, eo progrediere, huc revertere; sequi, sui, inde ordo.) — Scaliger.
Answer: Be it that the word order originally signifies no more than placing, shall it therefore signify no more in the use of speech? Words do often purchase another meaning by usage, than they had by birthright. Yea, his very instance from soldiers going to this, returning to that place, shows that order requires more than only circumstance of time and place: for there is a limitation also of action. And if he think the ordering of a battle requires no more than setting the same in battle array, he is not fit to be a general. Let order in this place signify no more than he says — is comeliness nothing?
Replier: And secondly, by the definitions which are given thereof, by philosophers and Divines. (Latin: Tull. Offic. 1.1: Eadem vis videtur ordinis and collocationis; ordinem definiunt compositionem rerum aptis and accommodatis locis, locum autem actionis, opportunitatem dicunt esse temporis.) Augustine, de civitate Dei, bk. 15, ch. 13: Order is the disposition [p. 96] which fits places to things, equal and unequal, that is, when things are seemly ranked, some to go before, some to follow, as Peter Martyr expounds it, loc. com. class. 4, ch. 5.
Answer: He makes here much ado to prove that which no man denies; viz. what order, taken in strict sense, is. Augustine is mis-cited, whether by the Replier’s own, or the printer’s fault. For the words are not in that book; but, in bk. 19, ch. 13. The same Augustine, in his books de ordine, takes the word order, in a sense as large as is divine providence, by which even disorders themselves are said to be ordered. But take it as strictly as he will, still will the point of decency remain to go along with order; and so much Peter Martyr (whom this Replier boldly appeals to) expressly teaches, sorting the things of order and decency one from another as distinct things.
Replier: 3. The same also confirmed by our Divines, who usually giving instance of order, do it in time, place, and such like circumstances, making a difference between mystical ceremonies, and order, at many times condemning the one and allowing the other, as the Divines of France, and Low Countries in their observations on the Harmony of Confessions, Sect. 17. Beza, ep. 8. Junius in Bell. append., de cultu imaginum ch. 7, num. 12, 13, 14.
Answer: 1. Our Divines, when they speak of order largely taken, understand by it, the whole ecclesiastical discipline; when strictly, they do indeed instance in time and place usually, as is fit they should: but our Divines do not wrap up comeliness in the name of order, as this man would do: and in this strict acception of the word order, they have reason to put difference between mystical ceremonies and mere order; who will not do so?
That the same Divines do often condemn some mystical rites, is true; but as true, that they do not condemn all, always. What learned Divine has condemned the observation of the solemnities of Christ’s birthday, resurrection, or ascension; the ceremony of standing on the Lord’s day used of old in prayer, or that of dipping or sprinkling [p. 97] or thrice, which be all significant rites? Beza indeed dislikes the sign of the Cross; not because it is significant, but for the abuse of it in Popery; but the surplice, he holds indifferent; and so, kneeling in the act of receiving. He allows, and holds it fit, that men should be bare-headed, and kiss their hand when they receive the sacramental bread, which are significant signs; and, if done to an idol, were idolatry, as well as kneeling. Junius in the same chapter, num. 9 and 10, clears himself. For even the holy oil while it was used for a mere significant rite, he does allow, as also the ancient use of standing in prayer, on the Lord’s day, in memory of Christ’s Resurrection, however he does justly condemn the blessing, and consecrating of oil, and water, and the use of things so consecrated, (Latin: ad effectus supernaturales efficiendos ac significandos), num. 11 and 12, etc. Wherein we do fully accord with Junius. For if not only signification, but effecting of supernatural events, shall once be imposed upon human ceremonies, they must needs become superstitions.
The notes of some few Divines on the Harmony of Confessions, ch. 17, condemn indeed all mystical rites; but they mean thereby such outward elementary things which have some mystical signification of grace annexed to them, as their reason shows — as which are a part of the heavenly doctrine, and a certain kind of Sacraments: which challenge made by the Replier against our ceremonies, comes in the third chapter to be examined.
Replier: Fourthly, by the context of the chapter, viz. 1 Cor. 14, it plainly appears, that order is opposed to that confusion spoken of v.33, and therefore imports nothing but that peaceable proceeding whereby they that should speak, speak one by one, and the rest attend, etc., vv. 30-31. So Basil expounds it, showing order to consist in sorting of persons, some to this, some to that according to their office and in determining of time and place. [p. 98] (A Greek quotation on order and decency appears here, too faded in this scan to transcribe reliably.)
Answer: And what then, does decency signify nothing? Basil does not expound the text in either of these places, but only applies it; and so, that every reader would have seen him point at decency as a distinct thing from order, if the Replier had turned his Greek into English (as had been fit in a book written for English men); but the Greek makes some show of his learning: the translation would have showed his false dealing: he therefore left his Greek as it is. For Basil, in the first place, question 24, to the question made about the mutual conversation of monks, answers:
‘Seeing the apostle says, ‘Let all things be done decently and in order,’ we take that to be a decent and ordinate conversation [conduct] in the near society of believers which in the course of bodily members is observed.’
He presently shows wherein, namely, that as there must be some as eyes to direct all, so there must be others as hands and feet to execute. And (I pray you) does Basil herein expound the text of Paul as the Replier does? And does he not make it a point of decency, as well as of order, that some should rule, others be ruled?
His second place, question 238, in answer to this question, Whether it be possible (he means lawfully) to sing psalms, to read or speak of the serious matters of God’s Word unceasingly, and that no space of time at all may be given to the homely necessities which befall the body, Basil says that the apostle has given us a rule for that where he says, ‘Let all things be done decently and in order’: wherefore we ought to have special respect of decency and order both for the time and place. And, in conscience, does not this answer lean most upon the very respect of decency, or does Basil thrust decency into order, or out of the text, as does the Replier?
The like application appears, Question 72, where asking if a man of the fraternity carry himself irreverently in eating or drinking too much at meals, he should therefore be reproved, [p. 99] Basil resolves that he should, unless necessity of nature or great labor may excuse him; of which he gives in the second place this reason, because all things done must be decent and in order: where, who sees not that he requires decency in the things done and not order alone in the time and place?
Replier: Lastly, neither Lk. 1:8, neither in any place of Scripture does the word ‘order’ import anymore than has been said.
Answer: If it did not, it skills not for this matter (seeing decency requires more than order alone. But it is not true, for in Col. 3:5, ‘Beholding your order,’ the word ‘order’ is put for the whole discipline, as their own Mr. Parker, after Beza and others, does confess. But all this is idle, unless decency and order be all one. This the Replier saw and therefore adds:
Replier: As for comeliness, that is nothing but the seemliness of order. For as Peter Martyr says on 1 Cor. 11, it is such a tempering of actions as whereby they may more fitly attain their end.
Answer: That order alone yields some comeliness we may see even in a stack of billets [tickets] handsomely piled; but that comeliness is nothing else but the seemliness of order is a fantastical speech. The body of a man has a comeliness which rises from other springs than that of order, otherwise a dead and living body, holding the same order of parts should have the same comeliness. And the different actions of worship should not need variety of gestures, which Mr. Cartwright requires, but only keep order of time and place, and that seemliness of order were enough.
Peter Martyr’s testimony is egregiously perverted and abused, for he in that place defines decency to be a certain tempering and accommodation of our actions whereby they may more honestly and the better attain their end. He presently puts in a caveat against two extremes: first that we deal not too austerely, as if we placed the main in such rites; the other, that we come not clownishly and vilely, as if we had no regard of what is done. The Replier leaves out the word ‘honestly’ and the word ‘accommodation’, that his [p. 100] reader might think Peter Martyr to speak of a tempering the actions of divine worship, whereas Peter Martyr speaks not of actions, and namely of rites. He also leaves out the word ‘honestly,’ lest it should appear that Peter Martyr requires not only order of things whereby we the better attain our end, but requires points also of decency, whereby we might the more becomingly attain the same end. When will this man deal sincerely, who tells us that Peter Martyr even where he purposely defines decorum, makes it nothing but the seemliness of order, and yet Peter Martyr in that place does not so much as name order, which also elsewhere he speaks of as a distinct thing from decency. But the Replier goes on.
Replier: Otherwise it may contain that natural or civil handsomeness which is spoken of in ch. 11:13, as it does in ch. 12 and 13, and so includes all that which is grounded on civility, as a fair cloth and cup for the Communion, a fair vessel for baptism, but not the appointing of new mystical ceremonies.
Answer: Otherwhere? and why not here? Forsooth because the Replier’s argument from hence were then spoiled. And that he may see that not a sincere mind, but a spirit of contradiction has carried him to this poor shift, let him repeat. Know, that even he himself does confess that the apostle in this very place gives a rule of comeliness, saying in the answer, so far as the apostle’s rule stretches, 1 Cor. 14:40, ‘Let all things be done comely.’ Is it therefore a rule here none can be directed by?
Secondly, in confessing the apostle to mean more the seemliness of order by this term of ‘comeliness’ in 1 Cor. 11:13, he does seem to prove that so it is in this place also, where the apostle shuts up his dispute begun in the eleventh chapter, for he takes the word in the conclusion, as he did in the premises.
Thirdly, as for his confounding of comeliness in divine worship and civility, as if there were no distance between them, it has been already corrected. Now therefore let it pass to the place from whence it came, as a vagrant.
But ‘comeliness’ will nowhere, in the Replier’s judgment, bear [p. 101] out mystical ceremonies. Where, if by ‘mystical ceremonies’ he means (as he must if he will touch our ceremonies) significant ceremonies, I answer that comeliness does require some significant ceremonies if it requires (as Mr. Cartwright tells us) gestures of the body suitable to the kind of worship in hand, as the lifting up of the eyes in sign of confidence, and casting them down in sign of humbleness. Junius refers the anniversary feasts to matter of comeliness; and whereto will this Replier refer their ceremony of sitting at the Lord’s Supper, which the admonitors make a sign of our rest and a later opposer of kneeling makes it a more comely gesture than kneeling because it carries more show of our co-fellowship and fellowship with Christ, to sit with Him, as it were, fellow well-met, than to adore Him. But why not any mystical ceremonies?
Replier: For then such ceremonies were commanded here to all Churches, which the Defendant, I think, will not say; and then the apostolic assemblies should have worshiped God uncomely.
Answer: This follows not in either branch: not in the first, for though all Churches are bound to comeliness, yet not to this or that particular way of comeliness. Nor in the second, for all comeliness lies not in significant ceremonies; neither did the apostolic assemblies forbear all significant ceremonies in the time of divine worship, as the women’s veil, the love feasts and kiss of peace afterward disputed of do prove.
Replier: Thus we have both proposition and assumption of our argument against the ceremonies confirmed out of this place which the Defendant chose as the only place that could be brought for them.
Answer: Whether both proposition and assumption have been confirmed out of this place, let the indifferent reader judge. As for the Defendant, he brought in this place only to prove that something is left to the Church’s appointment for order, decency and edification more than is in the Word prescribed: against which the Replier has said nothing but only turned his face from the argument: and yet, as if he conquered where he fled, he adds: [p. 102]
Replier: Now hence we may deduce the conclusion. Wherefore to appoint and use the ceremonies as we do is not to leave it to the liberty of the Church, and it is unlawful.
Answer: And I hope we may alter it, taking away the word ‘not’ and casting away [??] and from unlawful, and let the rest stand good. And let the reader mark that in this Replier’s own argument our ceremonies are condemned for being serviceable unto comeliness and edification, and not only order, as if that were a usurpation and a crime in them.
Thus having followed this outlier round, we are come to our road way out of which he has drawn us to this point: That something is left to the Church’s liberty in matter of ceremonies more than God has in his Word commanded in particular, because the apostle commands that all things be done decently and in order and to edification, 1 Cor. 14.
17. Ancient Churches & Fathers Always had some Ceremonies of Universal Observation Not of Divine Institution: Anniversary Days
Defendant in sum: In this section the Defendant shows that ancient fathers and Churches had always some universal ceremonies which were not of divine institution, as the celebration of the feasts of Christ’s nativity, resurrection, ascension and pentecost and the like. Zanchi, Treatise on Sacred Scripture, p. 299, does witness. Hence he infers that the practice which the ancient Church did always maintain may not be deemed to derogate from the authority of holy Scripture, and consequently that some ceremonies may be lawfully used which have not particular warrant in the Scriptures. To which the Replier opposes thus:
Replier: Concerning the fathers, we are told out of Zanchi that they had always some universal ceremonies, certain feast days, not appointed by God. To this we answer: First, if this “always” be taken too largely, [p. 103] we cannot believe the truth of the assertion. Neither does the Defendant prove it: who can think it likely upon the apostles’ departure, the disciples went straightway to be wiser than their masters?
Answer: How can you believe any truth cross to your opinion when as you seek honor one of another and prefer your new traditions as if the spirit of truth had come unto you or from you alone? [1 Cor. 14:36] The Defendant has affirmed out of Zanchi what the Churches anciently and universally did. This, as a matter of fact, is proved by the records of the Churches which can no other way be proved. Show something contrary to this or be silent: for who will believe that your conjectural reason shall sway us what the Churches then did practice, better than their own testimonies upon record?
Yet the reason given is rather against himself. For if the scholars of the apostles would not make themselves wiser than their masters (as is likely), then it should seem their masters had instructed them of the lawfulness of such things or had (as they prove in the case of Easter-day) given them example: which makes for us.
Replier: 2. The first beginning of these feasts was not a canonical imposition to bind men unto new ceremonies, but a voluntary accommodation in respect of the weakness of some in the Church, or [those] coming towards it. This appears by the variety which was between one Church and another in observing of them, and by the testimony of Socrates, alleged and allowed by this Defendant himself: Apol. bk. 2, bk. 3, ch. 9.
Answer: To what purpose does he tell us that the first beginning of these universal feasts was not by canonical imposition, but by voluntary accommodation unless he mean to prove, on our behalf, that all the Christian Churches had this knowledge planted in them, that they held it not only lawful, but convenient to impose upon themselves a thankful remembrance of the great mercies of God by the observation of certain anniversary days designed by themselves thereto? [p. 104]
His fiction, that this was done in respect of some men’s infirmity and not out of a general devotion to glorify God in the solemn remembrance of Christ’s birth, death, resurrection, etc., is boldly delivered without proof or color, merely for opposition’s sake. Were there in all Churches through the world so many weaklings, always and at once, as moved them all to provide this remedy and ever since to continue it? For, as Mr. Parker confesses, though the same solemnities were at first observed diversely in several Churches (which is the sum of that which Socrates says), yet the observation was universal: All Churches agreeing that the things were comely to be done, though at first they agreed not of the time and some other circumstances touching the manner. And is the universal consent of the ancient Churches of no moment with these men when the holy apostle thought it something to say (1 Cor. 11:16), “We have no such custom, nor yet the Churches of God,” and again, “Came the Gospel from you, or came it to you alone?” Who is this man that dares thus to censure the universal militant Church?
Replier: 3. The mischief that came in by these observations, in that they so soon overshadowed, obscured and jostled out of doors the simplicity of the Gospel and many ordinances of Christ, do sufficiently show that the fathers in these things had neither direction nor blessing from God.
Answer: The anniversary solemnities, here spoken of, never obscured or thrust out the simplicity of the Gospel, but rather preserved the memory of the chiefest reaches thereof, even in the darkest times that ever were, as that blessed and most learned Bishop (now Primate of Armagh) has well observed in a sermon of his preached before our late Sovereign, King James. And if by the malice of Satan, and men’s frailty they had so done, it could not be inferred that, at the first they had no direction or blessing from God. For the Holy Scriptures, and our Lord’s Supper, have been as much profaned and turned against the Gospel, as anything else could be. But let the Replier speak on.
Replier: But that which the ancient Churches of Christ did [p. 105] always maintain, may not be deemed to derogate from the authority of the holy writ. If “always” since the Apostolical times, I grant it; otherwise, then let the Defendant take to himself that which he unreasonably casts upon us before, of symbolizing with Bellarmine, Cont. 1, bk. 4, ch. 9. The same answer which our Divines give there, will serve here, whereunto is to be added that which Mr. Parker has in his book of the Cross, p. 2, ch. 9, sect. 6, and de polit. eccl. bk. 3.
Answer: If, as Polycarp and others (who were likelier to know it than the Replier) pretended Saint John the Apostle had taught the celebration of Easter unto his disciples, then these solemnities, or some of them, were on foot while some of the Apostles yet lived. But if ever, after the Apostles’ times, the whole Church has received the same as an arbitrary rite and ceremony, we may say with Saint Augustine, Ep. 118, in such a case, it is the most insolent madness to think it not right to be done that the whole Church does.
Nor do we herein symbolize with Bellarmine, Cont. 1, bk. 4, ch. 9, as the Defendant elsewhere has proved the opponents to have done; seeing Bellarmine there speaks of doctrines necessary to be believed to salvation, which without testimony of Scripture he would father upon tradition: and we speak of rites of which our men do all acknowledge the Apostles to have ordained some, which are not mentioned in the Scripture. Wherefore their answer to Bellarmine in that case will never agree to ours, themselves being judges. So that herein we need not see what Mr. Parker speaks, which the Replier points to, at large only, but tells not what it is.
.
III. Protestants
18. Church’s Right to Initiate some Rites: Consent of Protestants; What things are Imitable of Apostles, what not
Defendant: The Defendant, to prove that the Church (margin: In sum.) has liberty to institute some rites and ceremonies, produces the consent of the Protestant Divines, acknowledged by a common and indifferent adversary; (margin: Bk. 4 de verb. Dei) Bellarmine himself, who says, The Protestants [p. 106] grant that the Apostles did ordain certain rites and orders belonging to the Church, which are not set down in Scripture; which he speaks of our Divines in general, who still maintained the sufficiency of the Scriptures against human traditions. To this the Replier.
Replier: For Protestant Divines, Bellarmine’s confession is alleged, who says, That Protestants grant that the Apostles did ordain certain rites and orders, belonging to the Church, which are not set down in Scripture, Cont. 1, bk. 4, ch. 3. To which I answer, first rites and orders may be ordained, though such ceremonies as ours be unlawful.
Answer: But if nothing which is beside the word were lawful, then no rites and ceremonies might be ordained by men. Secondly, if ours were unlawful, it must not be upon this only reason, that they are beside the word, on which they have hitherto been challenged. So this is still from the issue.
Replier: And Bellarmine’s meaning could not be of such rites as our ceremonies are, except he spoke against his conscience; for he confesses, de cultu Sanct., bk. 3, ch. 7, that some of our Divines, as Brentius by name, condemn such, as unlawful.
Answer: Bellarmine reports truly the judgment of our Divines touching rites and ceremonies not prescribed in the Word (which is all we cite him for in this question); and if Brentius and some few other made difference between significant ceremonies, and others, yet might Bellarmine well though affirm that of our Divines which is generally held by them, though some few dissent. But the truth is, the said rites, which Brentius condemns, are such as do largely overshadow and darken the mysteries of the Gospel, as do the trinkets and turns done in the Mass, which are another kind of mystical rites, than ours will prove. But this is still beside the issue according to his manner. [p. 107]
Replier: Secondly, Bellarmine craftily brings in this confession of our Divines, that he may make them contradict themselves, as appears in the same place. His confession therefore in this place is not so indifferent, as the Defendant would have it.
Answer: 1. The more craftily Bellarmine brings in this confession, the more likely it is that he would (as he does) truly report it. For they that will craftily infer some falsehood, must tell some truth. He truly relates their confession, that he might thence infer a falsehood, and what of this? Is it not so as he reports? 2. Secondly, the Defendant said not (as the Replier supposes) that Bellarmine’s confession was indifferent, but that it was the confession of a common and indifferent adversary. But this Replier will take nothing right.
Replier: Thirdly, our argument is not from the Scriptures negatively against the authority of the Apostles, which was all one with that of the Scriptures, and therefore understood in our proposition, but against the ordinary authority of the Church. Except therefore the Defendant can prove either that our ceremonies were the rites brought in by the Apostles, or that our Convocation house has the same authority which the Apostles had, this confession of Bellarmine is nothing to the purpose.
Answer: 1. Your argument from the authority of the Scriptures negatively, was generally propounded against anything, which is beside the Scriptures; and therefore must touch any rites, not mentioned in the Scriptures, though Apostolical.
The things which our Divines there confess to be of Apostolical ordination, and yet not recorded in Scripture, they also affirm to be such, as are not necessary or perpetual, positive, not divine: and therefore cannot be of the same supreme authority with the doctrines of the holy Scripture, though from the same Apostles.
Such arbitrary rites the Apostles did ordain (as they did baptize, and preach, and pray) by virtue of the ordinary authority of pastors, not by their supreme apostolical [p. 108] and divine power. And in such things as they did by ordinary power, the pastors of the Churches succeed them. So as we need not prove these our rites to be Apostolical in particular, nor the Convocation house to have equal power with the Apostles in their highest commission. For unto such things, the ordinary power of the Church is enough, or else no rites at all may by her be ordained. And if the Churches may lawfully depart from some Apostolical ordinances, as namely that decree of blood and strangled, why may they not as lawfully ordain some others not prescribed by the Apostles? They that have power to repeal some laws, have power to make others for use.
.
19. Chemnitz, Calvin, Junius, Zanchi, Whitaker, Daneus, Zanchi to Queen Elizabeth & Ministers not to Struggle about Ceremonies
In sum. Defendant: In this section are brought in the Protestant Divines themselves affirming as much as Bellarmine confessed of them, and namely such as were opposed (margin: Exam part.) by Bellarmine: viz. (margin: (a) Calvin, Inst. 4.10.30) Chemnitius and Mr. Calvin, of such as have opposed Bellarmine, as (margin: (c) Cont. bk. 4) Junius; to whom are added (margin: (d) De sacra Scriptura) Zanchy, Dr. Whitaker, and Daneus, holding the very point of the perfection, and fullness of the holy Scriptures. What says the Replier.
Replier: Here the Protestants themselves are brought in confessing as much as Bellarmine said of them. But the first witness Chemnitius says nothing, but that some ecclesiastical rites though they have no commandment or testimony in Scripture, are not to be rejected; which in the sense now often expounded I willingly grant. Yet the Defendant should not instead of testimony of Scripture, have put warrant of Scripture: for testimony, neither in strict acception, nor yet in Chemnitius his own meaning, is so large as warrant.
Answer: Chemnitius says, There be some ecclesiastical rites which have neither command, nor testimony in Scriptures, which yet are not to be rejected. The Replier tells us, this will be willingly granted in the sense often given: that is, [p. 109] that by rites we understand circumstances of mere order; as, of time and place: which is a mere and idle shift, for neither did Chemnitius intend such a restrictive sense, nor will that sense stand with his words. For first, have the circumstances of order no command nor testimony in the Scripture, because no particular determination? Mr. Jacob tells us, they belong to the second commandment. Secondly, will Chemnitius his speech stand with theirs who say, all is forbidden that is not commanded? Or with his, that (margin: Necess. of Reform. p. 16) says, All lawful ecclesiastical rites whatsoever are contained now in the Scriptures of the New Testament? Or with the negative argument, here in hand, All is condemned that is done not only against, but beside the word. This man looks us on the face, but goes from us backward: he would fain seem to defend the cause, when he flies from it.
His cavil at the translation of testimony, into warrant, I might pass by, as impertinent: but the Replier may be pleased to know, that his own friends use the terms indifferently; and, that he cannot prove anything warrantable by the word, which has no testimony in the word, general or special, and therefore does but cavil.
Replier: The place of Calvin has been answered before.
Answer: And the answer given, has been avoided before, Sect. 5.
Replier: Junius is plainly of the same mind, and so to be interpreted.
Answer: Why then left he out the words of Junius alleged at large by the Defendant, whereby his reader might judge of that interpretation? Was there not a cause?
Junius says, (margin: Cont. 1, bk. 4, p. 284) The Scriptures contain in them all matters of doctrine belonging necessarily to faith and good life; but do set down only a general law concerning all rites and ceremonies, 1 Cor. 14 — therefore the particular rites appertaining to the Church because they be ambulatory, and mutable, might well be omitted by the Spirit of God, and permitted to the conveniences of the Church. For all men know, that there is very great difference between doctrines of faith and manners, and the matters of rites and ceremonies. To this is added by the Defendant another [p. 110] exact sentence to the like purpose, wherein Junius affirms rituals to be neither necessary in themselves, nor by authority of Scriptures. And does all this general law, 1 Cor. 14, left to the Church, concern nothing but circumstances of mere order for time and place? Or can our opposites (who require, in case of ceremonies, the same warrant from Scriptures, which is required in case of doctrines of faith and manners) be accorded with this saying of learned Junius and other Divines, whose testimonies the Replier suppresses? No verily. And hence it comes, that to deliver themselves from the appearance of contrariety to our learned Divines, they do call matters of external discipline and rites part of the Gospel, points of faith, and matters of doctrine; that by thus changing the terms and titles of things, they might seem to differ from other men, and justly to require under these forced names of doctrine and faith, all that which the Divines yield to matters of doctrine and faith, as they are distinct and different from points of mere ceremonies.
Replier: So say Zanchy, Daneus, and Whitaker.
Answer: Indeed so, as I say; but not so, as he says Junius is to be interpreted: as their testimonies produced would have testified. For Zanchius, taking notice of some ceremonies either contending with the Scriptures, or not distinguishing which are indifferent, says of these, They have no sure foundation in the Word, and yet may help for the furtherance of piety: and gives instance in the solemnities of Easter, the Nativity, and such like, which he calls (there) ecclesiastical and universal rites, that (says he) make to edification, if they be used without superstition. And is not all this defied off with circumstances of mere order, as time and place? Does he not instance even in significant rites, or those festival commemorations? But rather than face the sentence of Junius, than to answer it, the Replier makes this vagary of doubling.
Replier: But because Junius is styled here by the Defendant with his deserved title of judicious, I will not be amiss to show his judgment plainly about such additions as our ceremonies are. To name therefore one place for all at this time, because there he speaks professedly his judgment, and binds it [p. 111] with a solemn oath, for the sincerity and impartialness of his conscience in that behalf: the place I mean, is in his Ecclesiasticus, bk. 3, ch. 5, toward the end: where first he distinguishes between things necessary, and others not necessary, to the administration of the Church; and concerning the better sort, he modestly, but thoroughly shows how much liberty is left unto men. If any man (says he) either by cavil, or ecclesiastical authority will add things not necessary or agreeable to order, we would not pertinaciously contend with him, but desire only that he would seriously consider of three things. First, by what authority of example he is led to think, that the holy Church of God, and the simplicity of the mysteries of Christ, (whose voice only is heard by his sheep, according to the commandment of the Father, (margin: Jn. 10:27)) must be clad with human traditions which Christ does reject? Secondly, to what end he judges (margin: Here Junius appears to condemn our ceremonies, the garments of the Church, says he — how justly, will appear.) that his things should be added unto those that are divine? For if the end be conformity with others, it were more equity, that other Churches should conform to those which come nearest to the word of God, as Cyprian’s counsel is, than that these should conform to the other. If the end be comeliness, what is more comely than the simplicity of Christ? What is more simple than that comeliness? If there be no other reason beside will, then that of Tertullian is to be thought of; The will of God is the chief necessity, and that the Church of God is not tied unto man’s will in things divine. The third thing to be thought on, is, what event always has followed upon human traditions, as daily experience does show.
This was the judgment of judicious Junius, whereby it is manifest that he favoured not our ceremonies nor would have pleaded for them, as the Defendant does, under color of his name.
Answer: 1. It could appear in this passage that Junius liked not our ceremonies, yet, unless it did appear that he condemned them upon this very point, even because they are [p. 112] not commanded in the Word, all this is impertinent to the argument in hand, and neither interprets Junius his mind, in the testimony alleged by us, nor supports their negative argument. 2. But further I say, it does not appear, that Junius wrote this of our ceremonies, or such like, as the Replier boldly affirms; nor in truth could he. For how should he say our ceremonies are neither necessary, nor according to order, rejected of Christ, added by us to divine things; which must needs import necessity, and worship affixed to them: let the Replier pick out some one word or other, by which it may appear that Junius wrote this purposely, of such as be our ceremonies, or else he abuses Junius, and his readers. One thing even in blameable ceremonies the Replier forgot to learn of Junius, that is, not resisting pertinaciously: but that he will not learn, no not in case of ceremonies, not yet found evil, though often indicted by such as oppose them.
His marginal note wherein he says, that Junius speaks to the Defendant, who compared ceremonies to garments of religion, p. 3, might have been spared: for Junius in his phrase Clothing, means adorning, and hiding the nakedness; the Defendant uses the similitude of garments, in opposition to members of the body, to show that our ceremonies are not any essential limbs of religion. Now the body is better than (margin: Mt. 6:25) raiment, as our Lord teaches, and as Mr. Cartwright answered for himself, even when he was challenged for comparing the matters of doctrine to a naked body, and external discipline to jewels and bracelets: which yet was another intention, than the Defendant had in his similitude of raiment. It is an easy task thus to snatch at words.
Replier: Because Zanchius also is brought in with his deserved title of a profound Divine, speaking nothing to the purpose in hand, I will set down his judgment concerning this point, out of that Epistle to the famous Queen Elizabeth, where he treats expressly of ceremonies, and of our ceremonies, (Latin: Est autem ecclesia sicut in doctrina, sic etiam in ceremoniis ad ecclesiae apostolicae regulam informanda) — the Church must be ordered by the rule of the Apostolical Church, [p. 113] as well in ceremonies as in doctrine. What can be said more contrary to the Defendant’s distinction?
Answer: 1. This cannot be more contrary to the Defendant’s distinction, then to Zanchy himself, who acknowledges some ceremonies lawful which have neither command nor testimony of Scripture. Would Zanchy say the like of doctrinals, do you think? But this testimony neither crosses himself, nor the Defendant: for, sicut (as in doctrine, so in ceremonies) implies, not as particularly, but as truly; for it is (as Saint Augustine says) a note of similitude, not of equality. He that requires particular prescription for doctrines, and but only general rules of Scripture for ceremonies, does refer ceremonies to the direction of the Scriptures, as well as doctrinals to their prescription; and this we do, and this Zanchy means; and not, that we must have rites as expressly determined as doctrines of faith.
Moreover, Zanchy, when he wrote thus to famous Queen Elizabeth to the end to persuade her not to urge the ceremonies so severely (as he had been told she did) upon the ministers: did write at the same time, and upon the same occasion, to that famous Bishop Jewel, and that (as he shows) by the advice of many ministers, and of his own Prince, to move him, in case the Queen would not be taken off from urging those ceremonies, to persuade the ministers rather to yield unto her, than to surcease their ministry, for things not (margin: Zanchy speaks of in his letter to the ministers.) simply unlawful to be done, but of different nature. And now what has Zanchy said for them, or against us? Does not Zanchy, who confesses them to be lawful, though not commanded, cross those who count them unlawful, even because not prescribed? (margin: Zanch. Epist. ad Ang. Eccl., as it is 1013) Now well fare a good stomach. He cannot resist, but he will not yield.
IV. From Reason
20. Morton’s Critique of Nonconformists’ Negative Argument from Reason
In sum. Defendant: The Defendant in this section assails their negative argument from Scriptures, by argument of reason, in the fourth place, whom the Replier thus encounters,
Replier: [p. 114] …at length we are come to reason. But if this reason be sound and cogent, I see no cause, why it should not have had the upper hand of human testimonies.
Answer: The Replier did the like himself, Sect. 16, and yet he now quarrels the Defendant for doing so. It is a hard world, when a man may not marshal his own arguments as he likes best. Let the Defendant yet show his reasons, though they come late.
In sum. Defendant: The Defendant takes for granted, that the Opponents in their negative argument condemn our ceremonies as unlawful, because they are beside the word, yea though they were not against it; and thereupon thus disputes: Nothing can, in respect of God, be called unlawful, which is not against the word, because whatsoever is unlawful is a transgression of some law revealed in his word: but that which is only beside the word, is not a transgression of the word. Therefore (says he) your assertion is frustrate, viz. That whatsoever is done not only against the word but beside it, is condemned in Scripture. To this the Replier turns.
Replier: The first reason is grounded on the Defendant’s fantasy merely, for he supposes that we hold some points of religion to be only beside the Word, and no way against it; which not only I have confuted before as a cavil, but Mr. Cartwright long since, in his Reply, p. 56. The very words also of this argument, which the Defendant here alleges, are these, that we hold such things condemned in Scripture, and therefore against the general rule, though only beside their particular prescription.
Answer: Grounded on the Defendant’s fantasy! O strange, was this your babe at the birth, owned by yourself, Sect. 2, followed by so many texts of Scripture, brought to prove unlawful that which is not commanded, yea though not forbidden; and now you see the ill-favored face of this brat, will you father it on the Defendant’s fantasy? That which he supposes [p. 115] must be supposed of your proposition, or else it has no sense at all: for if the Scripture condemns whatsoever is done not only against, but beside the direction thereof, then does it condemn something as unlawful, for being only beside it, and not any ways against it, which because it is so absurd and contradictory to itself, you now thrust off, as an idle fantasy, and tell us, you have confuted that which has indeed confuted you, and itself. See before. Amend therefore your proposition, and say, the Scripture condemns not ceremonies for being beside the particular prescription of the word only, but because they are someway against it, and then see whether this be anything like that which you sent forth, or not contrary to it. And where will your negative argument become? You cannot say, that all rites are particularly described, or condemned in Scripture, for you have confessed otherwise. It is now too late when you are taken in your own snare, to tell us you are mistaken.
Defendant: The Defendant’s second argument is this: Nothing that is indifferent can be pronounced simply unlawful. But some ceremonies of man’s invention, without special warrant from the Scriptures, are indifferent by the judgment of Divines, of whatsoever sort or faction: Ergo, some such ceremonies may be held lawful.
Replier: The second reason concludes nothing, which we did not grant in the sense formerly expressed, viz. that by these ceremonies be meant circumstances of mere order, and not mere invention understood without Scripture determination: otherwise the assumption is false. Beside, the proposition also concerning things indifferent, is untrue, if indifferent be taken in such a general sense, as sometimes it is used by Divines. Vide Sepin., Apolog. respons. ad Libram Anonym., p. 366.
Answer: 1. Though this grant does destroy their negative argument, yet it is far short of that which should in truth be granted, as has been shown: for more than circumstances of mere order, are left unto the Church’s disposal, as [p. 116] as has been proved. It is an easy thing to say the assumption is false, and not to show wherein. 2. Nor will the largest sense of indifferent, (which can be no more than a thing neither commanded nor forbidden in the word) make any variation in our proposition, but is only said for a show, and so let it go.
In sum. Defendant: The Defendant’s third reason is from the variety of rites and ceremonies which has been, may, yea must needs be in the several Churches, as is shown out of Oecolampadius, bk. 4, Epist., p. 828, Peter Martyr, loc. com. Eccles., pp. 138, 140, 143: which variety could not be, if the ceremonies had divine prescription as the doctrine has which is, or ought to be, one in all Churches, in all ages. To this the Replier.
Replier: 3. The third and last reason is taken from the difference of ceremonies, which may, and must be in the Churches of Christ. The answer is, that this difference ought to be only in determination of particular circumstances of order, for time and place, etc.
Answer: Yet again these circumstances? What Divine ever so spoke before Mr. Jacob? Danaeus tells us, the Jews prayed with their heads covered, in token of their submission or humiliation, but we for the same end bare-headed: was this variety a circumstance of time and place? Calvin tells us, that in those times and countries, to be uncovered was a token of dignity, 1 Cor. 11; but with us, to be covered. Is this variety a matter of time and place? Some Churches receive the Lord’s Supper sitting, some standing, some kneeling, some in leavened, some in unleavened bread. Is this nothing but time and place? And the varieties of solemn feasts or fasts, which out of Socrates were even now objected, were all these but circumstances of mere order? Or is this man that says so a mere wrestler herein? He cares not what he says, so it be ad oppositum.
21. Confession of Nonconformists Themselves; Nonconformists set up Parish-Omnipotency
In sum. Defendant: In this section a fourth reason is brought, grounded [p. 117] upon the confession of Nonconformists themselves, who could like, as they say, that every minister in his own charge, with consent of the choicest men of his parish, should determine of such orders and rites, as should best like them; whence would follow variety, for some would observe festival days, some none, etc. Now (says the Defendant) if all be unlawful which is beside the Word, then this variety, which themselves would like of, must needs be unlawful; for the law of God’s Word is one to all nations. If then all human inventions are unlawful, they ought not to use any rites of man’s ordination; if not unlawful, why do they oppose them?
Replier: This section is of all others the most ridiculous.
Answer: Indeed he speaks of a most ridiculous thing, that a minister and some of his parishioners may ordain some rites and ceremonies for their use, and the King and Church under his authority may not. And this parish-omnipotency, and supreme authority of every minister in his congregation, without reference to bishops, as Mr. Jacob; or to synods, as the Brownists teach, is that golden apple they speak of. But though this section speaks of a most ridiculous dream, why is the section ridiculous?
Replier: For, first it supposes every circumstance to be of like nature, with the ceremonies in controversy.
Answer: This is a ridiculous surmise of that supposal, which supposes only, that some would like one thing, some another.
Replier: Secondly, it supposes all circumstances to be of institution.
Answer: No: but that such as be not of institution divine should yet be lawful when the minister and some of the choicest parishioners should allow them.
Replier: Thirdly, it supposes contrary circumstances continuously to be practiced, by the same men, as of institution; [p. 118] for otherwise the cavillation has no force.
Answer: Not so; but it supposes contrary fashions to be practiced by several men, not as of institution, but of their election: and thereupon is the objection grounded.
Replier: Now all these are conceived dreams.
Answer: So they are; but all his own: and this is all his answer, which is nothing but boggling, and scurrility. For if he would have answered to purpose, he must have shown either that this variety would not follow, if every minister were left to himself; or that the several parishes may lawfully determine such various formalities without prescription of the word. But the King’s Majesty and the Church under his protection and government, may not lawfully do the same. But the Replier not able to answer takes on him to object, saying.
Replier: But what if we should argue thus? You say these ceremonies are divine and yet dare not deny but the resisting of them in other Churches is divine. You retain these ceremonies as divine, and yet have rejected other ceremonies of like nature as divine as these: what divinity is in such courses?
Answer: If you shall argue thus, you shall argue an ill consequence; for in affirming that the Defendant says, that these our ceremonies are divine, you speak in your own conscience untruly. He says, Sect. 22, that in respect of permissive appointment, and in thesis, they are divine; but in particular, and in hypothesi, human. And thus may the different ceremonies of several Churches be as divine as ours in thesis, as agreeing to the general divine rules; and as human in hypothesi, and in respect of particular determination. And this is such divinity as our learned Divines do teach, but this man will not yet learn.
22. That these Ceremonies have no Warrant in the Word, being Human Inventions, is Answered
In sum. Defendant: In this section the minor proposition of the first general argument, which is this, that these ceremonies have no warrant in the word of God being human inventions, is answered unto, as follows. [p. 119]
Defendant: In the ordaining of ceremonies, two things come to be considered; the first is in thesis, and general position, that it be warranted by the word, whether it be by precept, or else by permission: and so we might say that the ordinance of ceremonies may be called divine. The second consideration is in respect of the hypothesis, and specification of the ceremonies, as prescribing of this or that gesture, habit, place, or time, and the like points of circumstance, agreeable to the service of God: these we say, in respect of the permissive appointment of our ceremonies, are from God, but in respect of the specification, and determination of some one sort of ceremonies, rather than another, they may be called human. This he explains by instance out of Calvin’s Institutions, who affirms kneeling in prayer, to be so human, as that it is also divine, considered as a part of that decency which God requires.
To the same purpose Ursinus is brought in, saying that ecclesiastical constitutions are good, so far, as they do specially assign that which is generally rather intimated, than expressed in the Word of God. And then the Defendant infers that our ceremonies cannot be said to be altogether beside the Scriptures, having dependence upon that rule of Scripture, Let all be done decently and in order, and are therefore in a generality divine, though they be in their particular application to that rule, human.
Replier: After all this ado about the proposition of the first argument, now we are told of an assumption out of the Abridgment, and Mr. Hy: For Mr. Hy I cannot say much: but I am sure, the authors of the Abridgment have great wrong done them. Whosoever will turn [p. 120] to the place quoted by the Defendant in the Abridgment, shall presently see that the words which our Defendant has turned into a proposition, are there but part of an illustration, belonging to this proposition, All ceremonies, that swerve from the rules given in the word, for the Church’s direction, in matters of ceremonies, are unlawful. The assumption of which is, But the ceremonies in question swerve from those rules. Now all the chief pith both of proposition and assumption is by the Defendant omitted: a new thing is put in place of the proposition, a new assumption is formed; and yet all fathered upon the Abridgment. But to prove that, the assumption here set down, is defensible enough.
Answer: This demurrer should have come in at the first, and not so long after traversed. But at the first the Replier owns the whole argument, Sect. 2. Now he is weary of it, and complains of wrong: but wrongfully. For though the Abridgment brings in this proposition (not as the Replier says for illustration, but) for confirmation of another, yet is it of itself an argument against our ceremonies, and indeed fit to be the first of all, seeing (as has been said) it is labor in vain to examine ceremonies by any other rule, if there be one rule which condemns all ceremonies that are beside the Scriptures.
The proposition which the Defendant produced, is taken every word of it out of the Abridgment, p. 44. The assumption can be no other to fit this proposition, and to produce their conclusion, then is delivered. Wherefore, if the chief pith of the proposition be left out, it must be because the authors forgot to put any in. For the Defendant has it, as they set it down, in every word. The Replier therefore is wrung on the withers, else would he not now complain. Yet on he rubs, and tells us, this assumption, as it is, is defensible enough. But let us hear how.
Replier: He tells us that in general and permissive appointment, these ceremonies are from God, and divine. A permissive appointment I never heard of before, nor understand how it will be excused from an implicit contradiction. [p. 121]
Answer: If the Replier live longer, he will still hear some things that he never heard before; and he had need hear some lectures of logic, if he yet cannot understand, how the same things may (in several respects) be said to be commanded, and yet but permitted, without any contradiction. And one would think the Defendant had made this as plain for him, as any well-marked way. The same things which in the general of order and comeliness are commanded, yet in the specification and particular are not commanded but only permitted. And what more harshness in permissive appointment, then in that which themselves embrace, divine and human constitutions? Divine in the general, human in the particular determination? But by this snarling about the form of words, the Replier has avoided all answer to the matter itself, which is some ease to him, and so he proceeds.
Replier: But for the explaining of himself, he brings Calvin affirming that some constitutions of the Church founded in Scripture, may be called divine, because they are part of that decency which God has commanded. All which being granted, and the like saying of Ursin, makes nothing at all for such ceremonies as ours are, except the Defendant can prove, that they are constitutions of mere order and decency, agreeable also to the other rules prescribed; the contrary hereto has been formerly declared.
Answer: Calvin and Ursin are brought in to explain and justify the Defendant’s terms of permissive appointment, by the like of Divine, and yet Human, which Calvin uses of the same thing, and the Replier allows in Mr. Calvin that, which he thought absurd in the Defendant. His answer; that this makes nothing at all for our ceremonies, unless they be proved to be for order and decency, and agreeable to those other rules; is a bare denial, not as has formerly been declared, nor ever will. We say they are ordained for those ends for which rites may be ordained, and agreeable to those rules which God’s word prescribes. If you deny, you ought to show your exceptions and prove them. Possession is deemed right till it be proved to be wrong. Let the Defendant [p. 122] goes on, for this point comes after to be discussed purposely.
Defendant: There is a second rule of direction, in case of ceremonies, which is, the equity of them, that are contained in Scriptures; according to the example of Solomon in building his new altar for sacrifice, beside that one altar which God himself had ordained; whereof one, of your own fellowship, confesses, saying, That he did it out of the equity of Moses’ Law. Notwithstanding, this equity was so void of prescription, that if this (viz. prescription) be necessary, that act of Solomon might be judged to have wanted due warrant. Let the Replier speak to this.
Replier: One rule of direction which he calls equity, as here only touched, and comes after to be handled, to which one place I reserve it.
Answer: One rule more is here added to those other which require order, decency, and edification in the ordaining of rites: and this is put off by the Replier, as if it were but referred to another place. But in that place it is not handled as a rule, but spoken of to another by-purpose. This is called clean conveyance. Let the Defendant speak on.
Defendant: Thus much of the first general argument, whereby they have concluded (against Scriptures, Fathers, judicious Divines, and all probable reason) That all ceremonies belonging to God’s service, which are invented of man, beside the evidence of Scripture, are unlawful.
Replier: Thus much for the maintenance of that argument which the Defendant makes the first.
Answer: And this is too much to talk still of the maintenance of that argument, which he himself has overthrown in the head, by confessing some circumstances of order and decency to be warrantable, though particularly determined by men, and not by any word of God. [p. 123] Wherefore I pray those that have been carried along with this negative argument, That whatsoever is not commanded in the Word, is forbidden: That nothing may be established in the Church, but what God has commanded in his Word: That as what God commands in his word must be done, so what he has not commanded in his Word, must not be done in the Church; no nor in civil life,) I pray them, to consider seriously, how the defenders of these propositions, have all been forced strangely to qualify the same, and at length to forsake them as undefensible in case of ceremonies, and other like things not determined in the word particularly. And I beseech them to know, that this is the root of inconformity in some, of separation in others, of horror to the consciences of many, who think nothing lawful more than is particularly enjoined; and of error to all that will follow a path so blind and uncouth as this is, wherein no footsteps of ancient, or of our modern Divines, is to be found, save only of those who lately made this new canon in opposition to this Church of God, and to the great disturbance thereof.
So we end this first chapter, and shall come to the second, before which, I crave leave to set a premonition as a light at the entry-door.
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Ch. 2, Nonconformists’ 2nd Argument:
Our Ceremonies are Made Parts of Worship
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I. A Premonition [Preview] of the Answerer:
Theses on the Definition & Distinctions of Worship;
Scriptures often express duties of worship by ceremonies used in them
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Because in this chapter the argument which challenges our ceremonies to be imposed and used as parts of divine worship is handled, I think it needful to prefix certain theses concerning the definition and situations of worship for a help to the simpler sort, for whose benefit I chiefly write:
Worship generally taken, is the performance of respect [p. 124] unto any thing or person according to the estimation and dignity thereof.
The Hebrews have sundry words which we sometimes translate Worship, beside Iare which is to fear, and Auad, which signifies to serve; which two, Peter Martyr observes. By which variety appears, that as well the internal reverence, as any the external demonstrations thereof, be called worship, and belong thereto.
Worship is first distinguished according to the object of it. For the object of it, is either our fellow citizens, and then it is called Civil: or our God, and then it is Divine worship.
(margin: Note, that veneration and worship are not distinguished by the nature of the words, but by the received use of many writers.) 4. Secondly according to the degree, and so it is either inferior, which we usually call veneration, which is a due respect of God’s ordinances and appurtenances to his service; or superior, which we call more commonly Worship, or Adoration, which is due to God himself alone.
The divine worship which is proper to God, is either principal, or subordinate.
The principal, is that holy reverence, and respect of the Divine Majesty, which is inwardly performed, for his honor, either by the understanding, wherein he is acknowledged, or by our wills and affections, wherein we do accordingly either depend on him alone, or yield honor to him simply, and absolutely. And this internal worship of God, is in itself worship, and always acceptable to God, where it is, and may be falsely pretended, but cannot be falsely performed.
The subordinate worship of God, is that which is done in token and testimony of that sovereignty which we acknowledge; and of our dependence thereon or homage thereto accordingly. And this is external worship of God.
The external worship of God is true, or false; the internal is true, or not at all, though different in degree. Imaginary internal worship, is no worship.
The external is true, when the person, the action, the manner, end, and present intention of the work, are such, and so done, as they may yield honor to God. [p. 125]
But if the person be in God’s disgrace, the action or manner not warrantable, the end corrupt, or present intention of worship wanting, the worship is in one, or more respects corrupted, according to the defects therein.
The external worship of God is the performance of any outward action, to this end that our reverent respect of him, our dependence on him, and subjection to him, may thereby be expressed to his honor.
This external worship of God is either mediate, or immediate. Mediate, when any duty of the second table is performed immediately to man, but out of conscience and in obedience unto God, to his honor.
Immediate worship is, when any act of obedience to the first table is performed for the honoring of God: and this we call special service of God, of which kind of worship the question is here.
The special external worship of God, is either properly so, or after a sort, and reductively so called.
The proper immediate external worship of God, is any action done to the honoring of God immediately and in that action itself: and of this sort are all and only such things as God has to that end ordained; as the right use of the Word, prayers, and hymns, and the use of the holy sacraments. When anything is done as a work of this kind, which God requires not so to be done, the worship is false.
Improper worship, is any act done to the honoring of God by the orderly and comely usage of his own ordinances, which because they so point at God’s honor in their remote end, as they determine their first end and use upon men as tending to order, decency, and edification, are therefore but improperly acts of worship, and not essential parts thereof in their particular, but adjuncts thereto. These are called worship, not in themselves, nor properly, but in respect, first of their remote end, and not simply of themselves; and secondly, as they are in conjunction with some proper action of worship, not as they are severed and apart by themselves. Thus fasting joined with prayer as a help to us, (margin: Anna is said to have served God with fasting and prayer day and night, Lk. 2:37) is worship, [p. 126] which of itself is none. Thus the bodily gestures and accommodations of a fit time, place, and other convenient rites, are, in respect of their application, and in a sort, and improperly, called worship, as serving to the expressions of our devotion towards God, in the respective and reverent use of his appointed service.
To explain this, I say, that as the human nature of Christ is capable of divine worship, not as it is a created thing, and of itself; but as it is inseparably united to the person of the Son: so these outward ceremonies, which in themselves are no acts or parts of divine worship, yet in their application to acts of worship for a help to us, and as exercises of our zeal, are worship in a sort, or (as Mr. Cartwright calls them) (margin: Circumstantial worship, this is Mr. Cartwright’s own comment.) circumstantial worship, which, out of that conjunction they could not be; nor yet is it, properly, or simply in themselves, but propter aliud.
To the proper and substantial worship of God his own institution is necessary to the being of it; otherwise it is false worship materially. To the improper, circumstantial, or accessory, the permission of God, and a right intention and use, suffice to legitimate them.
This distinction of worship into that which is so of itself and properly, and into that which is not so simply and of itself, but improperly, causes the different speeches of the learned, while sometimes they deny anything to be worship to God, which is not commanded by him, and sometimes call even arbitrary rites and ceremonies used in God’s worship, by the name of worship, because they serve in a sort thereto. And upon the consideration of this difference, rests the solution of their proposition in their second general argument which we shall hear anon.
To clear this point the better, it is worth the marking that the Scriptures themselves do often express and signify the duties of religious worship by the name of outward ceremonies used in them: as, Micah 6:6, wherewithal shall I come, and bow myself before my God? For, with what sacrifice shall I come before him and worship? Because, they used to bow down in the time of sacrifice. For this cause do I [p. 127] bow my knees unto God the Father, etc. For, do I pray, I have lift up (margin: Gen. 24:22) my hand, for, I have sworn, which was usually done with (margin: and also Deut. 32:40) lifting up of hands. And thus are bowing, kneeling and prostration, called worship, as an outward sign, expression, and testimony of worship. So that it is a mere strife about words, to deny altogether the name of external worship to ceremonies used in divine worship; as it is a gross ignorance to call or conceive any one of them (not being commanded of God) to be in that their use properly any part of his worship: that is, such an action as God is so pleased with, even in itself, that he would be offended if it were not so done, as Ursinus speaks. (margin: Ursinus is here alleged.)
Now come we to their second argument.
.
II. Intro & Scriptures
1. That our ceremonies are made parts of worship is answered; Ceremonies serve comeliness and edification and are no essential parts of worship; on circumstantial-worship
The second general argument made by the nonconformists against the three ceremonies of our Church is that they are held as properly parts of God’s worship.
Opposers: All human ceremonies which are esteemed, imposed or observed as parts of divine worship are unlawful. But such are these: surplice, cross in baptism, kneeling in receiving the communion. Therefore these are unlawful. (Abridgment, p. 37; Mr. Hy and others)
The Defendant answers to the proposition by a distinction, which the logicians (says he) call a wedge. His distinction is of the proper, and essential parts of God’s worship, from the improper, and accidental. And that the proposition understood of such, is false; of the former, is true. The essential parts of God’s worship, he interprets to be (as touching ceremonies) ceremonies which are so necessarily required to God’s service, as the contrariety thereof must needs displease [p. 128] God. The improper, and accidental parts, or rather appurtenances, are such (says he) as serve only as accessory complements ordained for the more convenient discharge of the necessary worship of God. He illustrates this by the similitude of creating our bodies, which is proper to God, and clothing the same, which, without derogation, yea in honor of God’s creation, is done by men; who to the body itself cannot add so much as a hair. So, etc. Against this, the Replier.
Replier: This second argument is taken from the kind, unto which such ceremonies as ours are do in their nature belong, viz. that they are parts of divine worship: and therefore (being man’s inventions) unlawful. Here the Defendant comes out with a wedge, he calls it, distinguishing between proper or essential parts of God’s worship, and improper and accidental: but first he should have done well, to have considered the nature and measure of the thing which he would cleave, by the light of a definition. For otherwise he may spend his wedge, his beetle, and all his labor in vain.
Answer: The distinction itself, splitting their proposition into halves, does as much as a wedge need do: for, be worship what it will, if there be thereof two sorts, the distinction has parted one from another which were confounded in their proposition. Yet the Replier thinks he has said well. For he adds:
Replier: And so indeed he has, as may appear by his explication of this distinction. By proper and essential parts, (says he) we understand such ceremonies which are so necessarily required to God’s service, as that the contrary thereof must needs displease him. By accidental parts, (or appurtenances) such as serve only as accessory complements, ordained for the more convenient discharge of the necessary worship of God, i.e. for decorum and edification. For if all those ceremonies [p. 129] are essential parts of God’s worship, which are such as the contrariety of them must needs displease God, then certainly all ceremonies which serve for decorum, and edification, must needs be essential parts of God’s worship: because the contrary of decorum, and edification, must needs displease God in his worship.
Answer: If such ceremonies the contrariety whereof must needs displease God, be essential worship, then (says the Replier) all ceremonies serving to comeliness and edification, must needs be essential parts of God’s worship, why so, man? Does the contrariety of such ceremonies displease God? Then (say I) woe to the Churches for contrariety in ceremonies. But the Replier dare not say it, though his argument so required, that the contrariety of ceremonies serving to comeliness, and edification must needs displease God: but, that the contrary of decorum and edification must needs displease him. But will it thence follow that the contrariety of particular rites must also displease him? Surely not. Contrariety of particulars falls into one and the same general kind, without contrariety thereto, or therein. Fire and water are contrary elements, but not contrary to element, which comprehends both equally; black and white are contrary colors, but neither of them contrary to color; reasonable and unreasonable are contrary one to another, but neither of them to creature in general, which contains them both: contrariety of orders are not contrary to order; contrariety of formalities of comeliness are not contrary to comeliness; contrariety of the means of edification, are not contrary to edification.
It was comeliness among the Jews to pray with their heads covered, for with them it was a sign of humiliation: it is comeliness with us, to pray uncovered for the same reason. Covered and uncovered, are contrary one to another, but neither of them in all times, and places contrary to comeliness. It was to edification not to eat blood and strangled: it is now more to edification to eat them. Eating and not eating blood, are contrariety but neither of them always contrary to edification.
Wherefore the Defendant’s distinction is found; for [p. 130] there can be no variation from God’s prescription in his essential worship without sin; but in Church ceremonies (margin: Pareus on Rom. 14) there may be not only variety, says Pareus, but contrariety: and therefore they are not properly worship: for then contrary worship should please God. Therefore the Defendant has not lost his wedge, or labor. For, circumstantial and substantial, essential and accidental, proper and improper worship of God are thereby justly distinguished, to avoid confusion.
As for the Replier’s beetle, which of his own head he brought in, to make sport withal, he may keep it for his own use.
Replier: Secondly, what kind of wedging is this, so to distinguish the parts of God’s worship, that the accidental only, and not the essential shall serve for edification?
Answer: Nay rather what forced collection is this, to say a man denies the essential parts of worship to serve to edification, because he says the accidental serves thereto? For if these serve thereto, then those much more, which serve both to edification and worship of themselves.
Replier: Thirdly, what cleaving or dissolving is this of the parts of worship, where the accidental parts are rather said to be appurtenances then parts, and yet granted to be parts?
Answer: As good as may be. For this does difference proper from improper: that is, worship simply from worship in a sort so called: when the same which in some sense is called a part of the external worship, is acknowledged in strict terms to be rather an appurtenance then a part.
Replier: Fourthly, what worship of God is there that is not essential? If it have no essence of worship in it, surely it is no worship.
(margin: On this command, in the recital, Mr. Cartwright) Answer: Circumstantial worship is not substantial worship, if Mr. Cartwright has rightly distinguished them. And if there be circumstantial, which is not substantial, then must needs be accidental, which is not essential: which circumstantial or accidental has yet the essence of accidental, but not the essence of substantial worship. For without essence [p. 131] in some kind, it could not be worship in any kind.
Replier: 5. The accidental parts of worship have not so much communion with the essential, as the hair of the body (which is but an excrement) has with the body: shall that which is not so much as an excrement unto the chief worship, be accounted or called a part of worship?
Answer: By no means may that which has no communion with the chief worship be counted a part thereof; and therefore the Defendant denies human ceremonies, in their particularity, to be any part of essential worship. But as the garments of men are some part of their external honor, which are no part of their essential honor; so the ceremonies used in God’s worship, are some part of the complement of worship to God, though not of the substance of worship. As for (margin: P. 10, See Scotch Dialogue.) his terms of excrements, which he would be loath one should apply to the hair of his beard, it savors too much of rancor: as does the like foul speech in the Scotch Dialogue. God will judge them for these reproaches by which they labor to breed scorn and abhorring of these good things in the minds of ignorant men.
2. Colossians 2:23 on Will-Worship
Opposers: These ceremonies imposed, are not only not commanded as lawful, but prohibited as sinful, for the Scriptures, Fathers, and orthodox writers, do condemn as sinful all will-worship, or will-worship whatsoever, proceeding out of the force of men’s fantasies, whatsoever precepts of men in God’s worship, either for matter, or manner, delivered and imposed by men, although they seem never so good in their own sight. [p. 132]
Defendant in sum: The Defendant doubts the Opponent herein will show more will than wit, more fancy then sound reason; and so calls for his proofs.
To this nothing is replied, therefore we pass to the next section.
3. Isa. 29:1, “their fear toward Me is taught by the precept of men”; Dt. 12:32, “thou shalt not add thereto”; Addition of preservation not forbidden; nonconformists’ new traditions must be unlawful too
The Opponents’ proofs from Scripture: Isa. 29:13, “In vain” (says God) “do they worship Me, teaching for precepts the commandments of men.” Deut. 12:32, where God forbids to add ought to his Word, or take thence from. Col. 2:23, where the apostle condemns will-worship. (Abridgment, p. 44)
Defendant in sum: All these places of Scripture (says he) are merely heteroclites, in respect of the point in controversy, because, first, that of Isa. 29:13 speaks of such ordinances as were expressly contrary to God’s commandments, which he proves both by the title given thereto, viz. of flattering drunkenness (not therein their idolatries; and by the threatening of their destruction, by the hands of a multitude of nations, which kind of menaces (says he) were never pronounced, but for heinous transgressions.
Replier: For the proof of this, that no human inventions are lawful parts of God’s worship, the Abridgment alleges Ex. 20:4, Deut. 12:32, Isa. 1:26, Mt. 19:9, 24:23. Three of which are only mentioned by the Defendant, and two of the three only answered, or rather put off by miserable shifts.
Answer: The Replier often complains of proofs [p. 133] …omitted by the Defendant, but neither shows to what advantage of his cause, or damage of theirs; nor will take notice, that one answer may serve to sundry like places indifferently. As that answer to Isa. 29, to the same alleged out of Mt. 15:9. And that of Deut. 12:32, to the like in Deut. 4:2. And that of Col. 2:23, to that of Ex. 20:4, where will-worship is condemned. Nor yet will he mark that the same which are in some places omitted are in others handled. As that of Isa. 1:12, before, Ch. 1, Sect. 12. That of Mt. 15, afterwards; wherefore all this is but baffling of the simple or negligent reader. See how he will prove the answers given, to be miserable shifts?
Replier: By the precepts of men, Isa. 29:9, are signified (says he) such human ordinances as were expressly contrary to the commands of God. But I: if here he takes the word expressly as opposite to pregnant consequence, as he does, p. 2, then I hope, he will grant that there is the same reason of those human inventions, which are not expressly contrary. If he take it largely, as containing such consequence, then he says nothing to the purpose, because in that sense all religious worship invented by man, is expressly contrary to the commandments of God.
Answer: It is expressly shown in that place of Isa. 29, that the sin there condemned is idolatry; yet from the place (by pregnant consequence) it may be gathered, that all religious worship of God invented by man, is also condemned, if we will speak of that that is simply and properly worship so made, (or at least intended to be made) by the will of man. But it will never follow from thence, that the appointment of ceremonies to be used, as ceremonies, and not at all as worship to God in themselves, are in that place condemned. For how can men be charged to worship God in vain in such things, in which they do not at all place any worship of God properly so called? Has he any more to say?
Replier: Secondly, Christ himself, Mt. 15, does interpret this very place of will-worship in general, where for brevity’s sake I refer the Defendant only Mr. Calvin, which he calls an honorable witness in this controversy, who, after [p. 134] after long discourse concludes thus, Fixum ergo, etc. This must be held for certain, That worship invented by man is before God, vain, accursed, and detestable.
Answer: Our Lord does not interpret that place of Isa. 29 in Mt. 15, but applies the same to the Jews of his time, who also had falsified a worship of God by their own traditions, and made void his commandments. And Mr. Calvin has rightly gathered from thence, that all worship of God devised by man is vain, accursed, and detestable. But did not our Lord, and Calvin also understand by worship, that which is properly so called: that is, an act wherein God is supposed to be so honored and pleased, as the contrary thereof would displease and dishonor him; as the Divines define proper worship? And what is this to ceremonies which are professed to be arbitrary, not necessary, accommodations, not parts of divine worship?
The Replier’s objection is a mere fallacy, a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter. Wherefore the Defendant’s answer to this place is not a miserable shift, but has put the Replier to his shifts for aught I see. Therefore let us go to the second place out of Deut. 12:32, to which the Defendant thus answers.
Defendant: Secondly the adding and diminishing spoken of, Deut. 12:32, does not mean addition of preservation, but addition of corruption: like as the fraudulent coiner of money does corrupt the King’s coin, either by adding baser metal unto it, or by clipping any silver from it; and in both kinds he is a traitor. How much more high treason must we then judge it to be against the Highest himself, when men shall adventure either to make any divine precept or promise, and see God’s stamp upon it; to make the speech to be God’s speech, which is but the device of his own forge, or to diminish the estimation of God’s precept by accounting it but an invention of man? [p. 135] And the like may be affirmed of the sacraments which are proper to that divine person who is testator: it being no less sacrilege to corrupt the sacraments, which are the seals of God’s promises, than to deprave his will of commandments. To this is replied.
Replier: By adding and diminishing (says the Defendant) is not meant addition of preservation, but of corruption. Where first the phrase is strange — by adding and diminishing meant addition.
Answer: This phrase is thought somewhat strange, yet by the figure hysteron proteron, might be admitted, as the Replier’s learning can tell him. But seeing the Defendant has compared diminution of God’s word, to clipping of coin, which cannot be preservative: and that the question and argument in hand is only of addition; let the phrase be set by, and let him answer to the matter.
Replier: Secondly, this gloss is clean contrary to the text, for the Lord charges that we do not add to the word, that we may keep or preserve it, Deut. 4:2, even as we keep or preserve carefully, that which is committed to our trust, 1 Tim. 6:20. Now the Defendant tells us that some addition is the means of keeping or preservation. Cardinal Cajetan himself, on this text, speaks of the place far more judiciously and religiously: Inhibetur additio etiam praetextu custodiendi mandata Dei — addition is forbidden even under the pretext of preserving God’s commands, even of additions that are pretended, for preservation of God’s Law. Com. in Deut. 10.
Answer: This gloss contrary to the text, man? What, even this gloss, which says that all addition of anything to God’s word, or sacraments, as divine (which is as to set his stamp upon base metals) and all detraction from it, or admixture of human with divine precepts or promises, is sacrilegious; does this gloss contradict the text, which thus requires the safekeeping of the word as a depositum? How can this be? Forsooth, because the Scripture, Deut. 4:2, forbids any addition, even to that end that the word may be safer kept; and therefore the Defendant rightly collects, that any [p. 136] such addition as hinders the keeping of the text, or meaning, or observation thereof, pure and entire as God delivered it, is here forbidden. But if there be any other kind of addition, which may be a means indeed to keep them the better and safer, the Lord never meant to forbid that: no more, then he that leaves a jewel in depositum to be safely kept, forbids the provision of a cabinet with lock and key to keep it in, which was not delivered with the jewel. Caietan (whose interpretation the Replier prefers to that of the Defendant, as more judicious and religious) does allow this same distinction of corruptive and preservative additions, in Aquinas. Wherefore he means in that place only such additions to the word, as tended to the corrupting of text, or sense, or observation thereof, though made under a pretext of keeping the Law; and particularly the addition of anything as divine, and a part of the word under that pretense. And does not the Defendant say so?
Replier: Thirdly, he should have done well to have manifested to us the addition of preservation by some examples. But that which he takes of the coin pertains only to corruption, of which no man doubts.
Answer: The Defendant in that similitude of a coin, intended no more, then to show how the word of God might be corrupted as coin, by addition, or diminution. But seeing the Replier stumbles at this distinction, which our soundest Divines have not stuck at, because they discerned it to be true, and good, I will gratify him with some examples: first of additions preserving the text; as, various readings, marginal notes, and the Jews’ Masorah, which are not commanded in the word, and yet not forbidden. Secondly, of additions preserving the sense; as, interlinear glosses, notes, marginal references, and commentaries, which rightly done, are preservative helps, and yet additions, and may not be taken as divine. Thirdly, of additions preserving the observation of the same; as, the reading of the Scriptures by sections every Sabbath, the building and ordering of synagogues for sanctifying the Sabbaths, the fashion of gathering for repair of the Temple in Joash’s time, the swearing to the covenant [p. 137] Covenant under Asa, the subscribing and sealing to it under Nehemiah, the solemn fashion of reaping the sheaves for the first-fruit offering, the ordination of holy feasts, and fasts, also upon occasion, the marriage and burial rites, and some at circumcision, the solemn manner of sitting at the Passover. I might add a thousand such things, lawfully added, as rites, as helps, as memorials of such duties as God himself required. All which as additions made (in truth) for the better keeping of the Law, were lawful, while lawfully used, without opinion of worship, merit, or mere necessity. And such things your own party confesses to have been left free unto the Jews, notwithstanding this Law which forbids addition to the word of God, which cannot be so, if all additions simply were by that word forbidden; as well such as may help to preserve, as those which corrupt it.
Replier: Fourthly, I would know if there be not also a diminution of preservation, as well, as of an addition in the text, for they are joined together.
Answer: How some additions may be for preservation, has been shown: but how any diminution, which imports taking away of something prescribed in the word, can be preservative, I know not. And though they be both in the text mentioned together, Deut. 12:32, yet it follows not that they must therefore needs be altogether of like notion, no more than because hardening whom he will, and showing mercy to whom he will are both together in one text, Rom. 9:18, it will therefore follow, that as God does find some deserving cause of hardening in those he hardens, so we should find meritorious cause of mercy, where he shows it.
Replier: This pretense was the old cozening-horn, to draw on superstition into the Church, as Calvin notes on Mt. 15: The lawgivers themselves did not think they were delivering anything new, but only adding formulas of caution, which might be helps and aids to keeping God’s law. The old masters of ceremonies pretended that they meant only to bring in additions of preservation.
Answer: Likely enough, that under this pretense more than should [p. 138] should, has been brought in. But, even as the affectation of confirming error by Scripture, does show of what dignity the holy Scriptures are in themselves; so the very abuse of superstitious things, under this pretense of bringing in only preservative means, does witness that such additions, as were, preservatives were always allowed by God’s people; or else the pretense thereof would not have drawn them into fault, or easily. Howbeit the Replier does abuse Calvin’s testimony: for Calvin there, speaking of the Jewish washings (which he does not simply condemn) shows, at first, the devisers of them boasted not, as of any new thing; but added them as forms of wariness and helps toward the keeping of God’s Law; and then adds, Mox subsequuta est corruptela — soon after corruption came in, when the ceremonies invented, began to be reputed part of the divine worship. So that Calvin does not count additions, pretended to be made for preservation, to have been corruptions, till a superstitious opinion came in which did corrupt them.
Replier: 6. This is Bellarmine’s answer to Calvin, concerning this very point and place, de effect. Sacr. bk. 2, ch. 32: Prohibet Dominus additionem corrumpentem: i.e. (as the Defendant translates,) an addition of corruption is forbidden. This is, I hope, another manner of symbolizing with Bellarmine, than that which the Defendant formerly objected to the Nonconformists.
Answer: 1. It is indeed Bellarmine’s answer to Calvin touching this very place, but not touching this very point, as this Replier affirms. Yet the point controverted there between Calvin, and Bellarmine is not about addition of arbitrary rites and ceremonies beyond the prescription of the word; but of devising and appointing new worships to God properly so called. For as for ceremonies used freely, and without opinion of worship, holiness, merit, or mere necessity, Calvin in that very place does except them out of that his dispute, which Bellarmine there opposes. Now for matters of faith or necessary worship, or duties in themselves necessary to be done, there can be no addition to the [p. 139] word of God, but it is corrupting; but of external arbitrary ceremonies the case is otherwise, as Calvin (margin: The Pope can make laws to bind the conscience, in Bellarmine’s own words, p. 859.) and all our learned men do teach. Wherefore the Defendant does not symbolize with Bellarmine in this answer as the Nonconformists did in their distinction, Cap. 1, Sect. 12.
The distinction rightly understood, is sound; sin was in the misapplication, and therefore some of our Divines who answer Bellarmine do not deny the distinction, but wring it out of his hands, and tell him that the popish additions are corrupting additions, and therefore condemned not because additions, but because such as corrupt, as new articles of faith, new Scriptures, new sacraments, new worship, imposed upon the consciences of men. Wherefore this distinction has fully discharged the objection raised from Deut. 12:32, which forbids additions to the word; and so their second place is avoided notwithstanding the Replier’s opposition.
Nor only so, but these places will recoil upon themselves. For, 1. If all worship of God, taught by the will and commandment of men, and not of God, is vain, according to Isa. 29:13, and Mt. 15:9, then to place a worship of God in sitting or standing rather then in kneeling at receiving the Communion; in black rather then in white, in a woolen rather then in a linen garment in divine service, of which we have no prescript from God, or to hold ourselves, or God’s Sacrament to be polluted by the addition of a significant ceremony not forbidden in the word, is vain worship of God, and their fear of him, is after the commandments of men only: for word of God rightly alleged none is, none can be brought. So secondly, if all adding to, or taking from the Word which corrupts the Word, be unlawful, (as they are, Deut. 4:2, 13, 12), then all impositions upon the consciences of men, which make anything unlawful for conscience sake to God, which his Word forbids not, or anything necessary for conscience sake to Him, which He has not required, are unlawful: but such are your new traditions, Kneel not, but stand or sit at the Sacrament; Wear no linen garment in divine service, no cap, no surplice, nay with [p. 140] with some, no cassock or coat, but a jerkin like other tradesmen: use not the sign of the cross in baptism, nor the ring in marriage; for God will be offended if you do so: all these and the like, are unlawful impositions of men, and sinful traditions. And so, (in my conscience) they ought to be esteemed, however some men struggle to make some colorable defense of them from the Word of God. And sundry of the weaker fall into this superstition in flying superstition, which has been on the other hand in Popery. The like may be said for Col. 2:23, and Ex. 20:4, or all that we tie the conscience to, thinking to honor and please God, either in forbearing what he forbids not; or observing as necessary, what he commands not, is superstition and will-worship, after the precepts and commandments of men. Like, touch not, taste not, handle not, whatsoever show be made of more zeal, sincerity, or pureness; and do all add burdens which God has not laid on his people, or diminish the liberties, which he in his Word has left unto them.
4. Isaiah 29:13, “their fear toward Me is taught by the precept of men”; Matthew 15, “in vain they do worship Me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men”; Colossians 2:23, “will-worship”
Defendant in sum: In this section the Defendant confutes their interpretation of those Scriptures alleged against our ceremonies from Isa. 29, Mt. 15, Deut. 12:40, Col. 2:23, by the testimony of Danaeus, and Zanchius, whom he calls (in their phrase) their own witnesses. And first, he produces Danaeus interpreting those places, with limitation to such kind of ceremonies as are added, as appurtenances and parts of doctrine belonging to Christian faith, or are delivered as norma, the rule of God’s worship, which do in effect accuse the Word to be lame, and imperfect, which (says he) is plain blasphemy, as Tertullian teaches in his book of Prescription against Heretics. Now hear we the Replier to this. [p. 141]
Replier: Here are two testimonies brought to confute the Nonconformist’s interpretation of Scripture, whereby he would infer that all kind of will-worship is unlawful: for be that is here the question, and nothing else.
Answer: The question here was not, whether all kind of will-worship (as the phrase goes now) be unlawful; but whether those Scriptures which condemn will-worship, do condemn all human ceremonies used in divine worship, under the name of vain or will-worship. And to show that they do not, two of their own witnesses are brought in by the Defendant, to which the Replier, thus.
Replier: The first witness is Danaeus, where the consequence lies thus, If Danaeus in one place does apply these Scriptures to grosser will-worship than ours is, then he does not allow that they condemn all kind of will-worship: but the first is true, Ergo. Is not this a fair kind of reasoning? Just as the Papist Gregorius de Valentia reasons: Abominable idolatry is condemned, 1 Pet. 4:3, therefore not all idolatry.
Answer: 1. When Christ, Mt. 15 and 9, did apply the place of Isa. 29:13, the Replier said, he did barely cite it. Now, when Danaeus interprets the places, and expounds them out, the Replier says he does apply them. And then, making an absurd collection, jests at it: what truth? what conscience is in this dealing? The Defendant’s collection is, that Danaeus, purposely showing the scope of those places, limits them to such things as are added, as necessary, beside the word of God, and therein shows that such ceremonies as be not so added, are not reproved in those places. And that which Danaeus does in this one place determine, he does in no other reverse. Wherefore, unless the Replier can show that Danaeus does, in some other place, condemn arbitrary ceremonies intended, not for a worship to God in themselves, but as mere ceremonies for order, decency and edification, from those places of Scripture; as we can show to Greg. de Valentia, that all idolatry is abominable; Danaeus is for us, and our collection cannot be said to be just as that of Greg. de Valentia; unless he mean, just as Terminus stands, which were nine miles asunder. The second witness is Zanchius. [p. 142]
Defendant in sum: The second witness is Zanchius in his commentary on the Colossians, to this effect; that will-worship mentioned Col. 2:23, and the will-worship condemned in the other places of Isaiah and Matthew, is by Zanchius interpreted of such traditions of men, being merely their own, were yet fathered upon God, or else made necessary to be observed even in the court of conscience, and for salvation: as, for example, the popish traditions, seconded with the Pope’s thunderblasts. To this is replied.
Replier: The other witness is Zanchius in Col. 2:23. Where I hold that the like consequence is made as before, I would desire any indifferent man to consider the words of Zanchius found in that very place: One kind of will-worship is, if any new worship whereby God is worshipped be invented and brought into the Church: for God will only be worshipped, and only with that worship which he himself has appointed, Deut. 6, Mt. 15. Also those in 1 Thess. 1:9, by an idol in general is meant whatsoever in religion is brought in without the Word of God. He that looks upon these words of Zanchius, will scarce tell, what to think of this Defendant’s audacious alleging of this author and the vain triumph which he grounds upon him. He thought (it seems) that few or none would ever take the pains to examine what he said.
Answer: The like consequence is indeed made of Zanchius his judgment, that was made of Danaeus; namely that those places which these men allege against arbitrary ceremonies, do only smite at such ceremonies as are (falsely pretended) to be divine or imposed as parts of worship to God, upon the consciences of men. And what Zanchius in this place delivers, he does nowhere gainsay. Not in the words alleged by the Replier, in the first place, which apparently speaks of God’s worship properly understood, as the words immediately following do witness [p. 143] he says, Quicquid igitur, etc. Whatever therefore is added to the worship of God delivered in his Word: added (says he) by men as a part of divine worship, it is will-worship. So that if it be not added as a part of divine worship, it is not will-worship by Zanchius his own rule. For Zanchius on the twenty-third verse of the same chapter, undertaking to confute those, who in favor of human traditions, pleaded those words of Paul, Let all be done to order, decency and edification, shows, that the Apostle there speaks of things indifferent which are not for worship, neither are propounded to be necessary to salvation, but only make to order, decency, and edification. And a little after; But those that are enjoined, with an opinion of worship, or necessity, or merit, the Apostle does everywhere condemn: whereby, who sees not what distance Zanchius does put between ceremonies used in the worship of God as formalities, and ceremonies used as worship to God in themselves? Yet more fully on v. 20, Zanchius having shown, that the Apostle’s intent is to condemn the worship of God which is after the doctrine, precepts, and inventions of men, like as the same is condemned, Isa. 29:13, Mt. 15:9, (the very places opposed to us) Zanchius, I say, concludes thus, Loquitur ergo Apostolus, etc. The Apostle therefore speaks of the traditions of men. And by the name of men, he understands all those men, who, without the Word of God, have appointed anything in the Church of God concerning religion, doctrines, worship and rites, namely, as necessary to salvation: that is, with an opinion of divine worship, merit, and necessity, whether the same men were monks, bishops, or popes. Wherefore (says he) tenendum est, etc. It must be held for good, that what things are in this context delivered against all those traditions of men, do concern, and are against all those traditions of men wherewith the conscience is bound, and which are joined with an opinion of divine worship, and merit. Thus he.
And now let the judicious reader judge, whether the Defendant had not more cause to tell the Opponents that they had ever laden their bow with these shafts which fall short of our [p. 144] ceremonies: then the Replier to charge the Defendant with audacious alleging of Zanchius who speaks so fully, so clearly to the cause, in his comment on the Colossians.
But the Replier points us to another place also in his comment on 1 Thess. 1:9, set down before; By an idol is meant, etc. To which I answer that Zanchius, upon these words, from idols to the living God, says, that by synecdoche three things are there meant by an idol. First, their feigned gods. Secondly, their feigned worship of those feigned gods. Thirdly, the feigned worship of God devised by man. These follow the words of the Replier’s allegation, saving that the Replier turns confingitur (is feigned) into inducitur (is brought in), perhaps that he might hem in our kneeling in receiving the Sacrament, the better. But how idly is this alleged in this controversy? Seeing Zanchius himself does interpret that only to be worship feigned by men, which is both devised by themselves, and made to be in itself a worship to God, and of necessity to be so done for conscience toward God; which is indeed to equal them with his divine precepts.
III. Fathers & Protestants
5. Objection from Fathers on Will-Worship Answered
Opposers: The Fathers do reject will-worship, as idolatry: Augustine, Jerome, Cyprian, Chrysostom do speak against new doctrines, and human traditions. (Mr. Hy)
Defendant in sum: First, that the Fathers condemned all will-worship as we do. Secondly, that yet they allowed and used arbitrary ceremonies in divine worship, as we do. Thirdly, that their testimonies are not ingenuously produced, but in opposition to us, and, to cross the Fathers themselves, by themselves.
Replier: In the fifth section there is nothing on either side but a dumb show; I shall pass for me therefore in silence.
Answer: If he have no reply I shall not need to defend. Yet was not the Defendant’s answer born dumb [p. 145]
Sect. 6, pt. 1, John Calvin, Peter Martyr & Martin Chemnitz
Opposers: In this section is handled the last proof, brought by the Nonconformists for confirmation of this proposition, That all ceremonies imposed and used as parts of God’s worship are unlawful, did this from the judgment of the most judicious Divines, who had by this reason (say they) condemned the ceremonies of the Papists. Calvin, Instit. bk. 4, ch. 10:18, Martyr, Chemnitius, Dr. Morton, Apol. 1 part, p. 8, ch. 89, and others. (Abridgment, p. 37)
Defendant in sum: The Defendant again distinguishes (as before) between parts of worship properly so called, wherein is placed an opinion of justice, sanctity, efficacy, and divine necessity, (of which kind (says he) it is sacrilegious for the Church to impose, or admit any ceremonies of human institution) and parts of worship in an improper and large sense, when circumstantial rites tending to the more comely and convenient discharge of that essential worship of God, are so termed. This is a palpable abuse of these learned Divines, in transferring what they spoke of the one sort, which we condemn as well as they; unto another sort, which they allow as well as we.
Replier: Here comes the judgment of Protestants to be examined concerning this question, whether all parts of divine worship invented by man be not to be condemned; where first the Defendant brings forth his wedge again, distinguishing between essential, and accidental worship as before; but an easy answer serves it. The question here is rather whether all ceremonies which in any sense are used, be parts of worship, be proper parts of the same, and so condemned. And so clear is this, the wedge [p. 146] is brought out again to the very same purpose as before, though in other phrases: for, what difference?
Replier: For now he tells us, that essential worship is that wherein is placed an opinion of justice, sanctity, efficacy, or divine necessity: and accidental is any rite which serves for the more consonant and convenient discharge of that essential worship.
Answer: Well. And what is here more than was before; or, what fault finds he herewith?
Replier: But these are but words. For first, worship does not vary according to men’s opinions, it consists in the nature of the action itself.
Answer: The Defendant spoke words (says he) but he, (say I) speaks monsters; for who ever dared to say this, that opinion does not vary the nature of worship? That is, does not make that, by error of opinion, to be essentially false worship, which without such opinion were no such worship. Let us hear his reason.
Replier: Otherwise a man may go to Mass, conceiving a private opinion to himself, that he does it not, for justice, sanctity, efficacy, or divine necessity, but for some other cause. Or at the least, a Convocation house may appoint us the grossest of all the ceremonies in Popery, and set another opinion upon them.
Answer: Going to Mass may be a sign of scandal, and presumption, though a man go not thither to worship, nor can worship therein, whether he will or no. Secondly, going to Mass, to take the Mass Priest; the Replier will not affirm to be an idolatrous will-worship, I trow.
And if the very nature of the action make the worship even without intention or opinion of worshiping, then they which without these are present at false worship, though but by violence, must needs be false worshipers, whether they will or no. Fie, man, fie, can a man worship whether he mean it or not? No opinion of men can make ought to be truly essential worship to God, which God has not commanded: and nothing but opinion of worshiping God thereby does make human inventions [p. 147] to be essentially false worship of God. Nor can any man have opinion of worshiping of God in anything, in the use of which he does not conceive some holiness, justice, sanctity, or necessity. And therefore all our Divines do thereby decipher arbitrary lawful rites from will-worship.
As for his fling at the Convocation house, it is an unworthy answer; yet may he know, that the grossest rites in Popery cannot possibly be washed from such opinion, and remain as themselves; and that some others might be lawful, if they could be cleansed, though we need them not.
Replier: 2. Sanctity cannot be separated wholly from such ceremonies, which are proper unto religion, i.e. appropriated unto religious persons, actions, and purposes: only, in the solemn worship of God. For they must either be holy, or civil, or profane. But civil they are not; for then the bare use of them would argue rudeness and incivility; nor profane, I hope, in the Defendant’s opinion, therefore they must needs be holy.
Answer: Sanctity may, in respect of application, be acknowledged to all such things as are separated to holy uses; as, our churches, fonts, communion-table, and the clean cloth thereon, which this Replier says, after, may, in respect of that application, be called holy comeliness. But this holiness must not be supposed to be inherent, or adherent to the things themselves, or use of any of them, other than such as God himself has ordained, without gross superstition. And in that sense only, was holiness at any time spoken of when men imagined anything of human device to have holiness in itself, or use thereof (as have God’s ordinances,) and to sanctify the actors, and actions. So all this is but trifling or strife of words, for the authors of the Abridgment themselves, p. 38, do tell us that things are then made parts of God’s worship when opinion of holiness, or necessity is known to be annexed to them.
Replier: 3. There is no judicious Divine that uses to call circumstances of mere order and decency, worship, where the Defendant ever read that a pulpit, or a table, or a fair cloth, etc., was pronounced or listed worship? [p. 148]
Answer: The ceremonies themselves, a church, pulpit, communion-table, no Divine was ever so mad as to call worship: for worship imports an action of the worshiper. But the Divines have called the use and application of such circumstances, and rites, in the service of God, worship, circumstantial, or improper worship, as the Defendant does. For so Mr. Cartwright calls the gestures varied, according to the kind of worship, circumstantial worship. And so Polanus, saying: an ecclesiastical rite or ceremony is worship of God, whereby God is externally worshiped. And the like we shall see after in other judicious Divines, who yet speaking of worship properly so called, deny the same to be worship.
We now come to examine their witnesses: and first, Mr. Calvin.
Opposers: Calvin, his Institutions, bk. 4, ch. 10, sect. 8, says, All those constitutions are wicked in the observation whereof we place any worship to God. To this the Defendant answers.
Defendant: By worship, Calvin means not any circumstance either of time, place, person, or gesture which are required to the celebration of God’s worship, but, the inward virtue of worship, which consists in an opinion of holiness, and justice, etc. As may appear by his condemning of the Papists, for this cause, because they think ipsissimum Dei cultum, the very worship of God itself (meaning the essentiality of it) to consist in these rites, which he confutes by that of Isa. 29:14. In vain do they worship me, etc. Adding, that the Papists seek that righteousness in their ceremonies wherewith they may uphold themselves when they shall be called to answer before God’s tribunal: which judgment, says the Defendant, as an idol, and [p. 149] profanation of God’s worship, every Protestant does abhor. How will the Replier take off this answer?
Replier: The Defendant says, that Calvin means not by worship circumstances of order; which is most true, neither was any reader so foolish, as ever took that to be his meaning: for what sense could there be in these words, All human constitutions in which the circumstances of order are placed?
Answer: Leaving the Replier to play with his own baby, I answer, that if it be most true, that Calvin condemning all constitutions of men, in the observation whereof the worship of God is placed, does not thereby mean to condemn the institution, or observation (for that the Defendant means) of circumstances of time, place, person, gesture, and such like: then it is also true, that such constitutions, concerning these things to be used in divine worship, are not condemned by Calvin; unless the opinion of holiness, justice or necessity shall be affixed to them.
This testimony of Calvin therefore is misapplied to our ceremonies, in which, not the proper worship of God, but the manner of using the same, is intended: which appears plainly in Calvin’s own words, alleged by the Defendant, and may further appear in this very passage cited out of the eighth section, where Calvin, defining what constitutions are contrary to the word of God, says, Sunt autem eius generis, and of this kind are all constitutions which are fancied to appertain to the true worship of God, and to the observing whereof the consciences are bound, as if they were necessary to be observed. Here Calvin discharges those ceremonies which are not ordained or imposed as necessary for conscience, in respect of God himself, and his true worship.
The reader may please to take notice, that the same Calvin, sect. 14, allows ceremonies to the weaker sort, as a profitable kind of help against their ignorance, (which therefore must be significant:) and that, sect. 27, he teaches the necessity of constitutions for the observation of rites, as without which the Church would be deformed and dissipated, and without [p. 150] which, order, and decency required by Paul, cannot be kept.
And sect. 28, Ubi animus fixus est, etc. — where once (says he) a law is understood to be made for common decency, then a superstitious opinion is removed, into which they fall who measure the worship of God by the devices of men. Wherein we see, that Calvin does not count those ceremonies to be made a worship to God, whose use and end is declared to be common honesty or comeliness. Thus Calvin in that book of his Institutions.
Elsewhere; those laws which are made for external government, we deny not (says he) that they ought to be observed with obedience; but, to bind the conscience, there is but one Lawgiver: mark you, to govern the consciences. And, p. 61, in the same treatise, reproving the fruitless ceremonies of the Papists, he says, that ceremonies ought to be lively exercises of piety: lively exercises of piety, though not parts of piety itself which is exercised. Such exercise (as he speaks in another treatise, De vera Reformandae Ecclesiae) is not worship properly, because ceremonies are to be esteemed not so much of themselves as from the good end — which he gives instance there, on David’s dancing before the ark, as of a ceremony not made a new worship to God in itself, but to be esteemed by the end, which was to escort and observe the coming of the ark of God magnificently to his place: where, we see, he denies that solemn ceremony of dancing before the ark, in a linen ephod, to have been an act of worship to God properly, and in itself, because it was not so meant, but as a ceremony of decency.
And Calvin also, in the same book, says thus, Howbeit lest we should be thought too rigid, in externals, and precisely take away all liberty, I would have my readers know, that I do not strive about ceremonies which serve only to decency, or order, or yet which are significant signs, and incitements of that reverence which is due unto God, or prayer to God. For (says he) our dispute is about those things which the errors of men imagine to please God, or by force of which they say God is rightly worshiped; which he [p. 151] further explicates, applying against them, Isa. 29:13. In all this, any indifferent man may see, that Calvin allows ceremonies, yea even significant, as expressions and incitements of piety, of which elsewhere he says, That they serve also to adoration, tanquam vel adminicula, vel instrumenta, ut corpus una cum anima in cultus divini professione exerceatur — either as helps, or as instruments, that the body together with the soul may be exercised in the profession of divine worship.
And is not this full as much as to grant, that accidentally, and in some respects, such arbitrary ceremonies are parts of external worship? which yet in propriety he does justly and utterly deny to any human ceremonies? Yea, when he shows the error of the adversaries to lie in this, that they did fancy God to be pleased with such works of men’s devising ex se, and as with which God is truly worshiped; he plainly declares in what respect he condemns human ceremonies; viz. when they are made parts of divine worship. I have been thus large in the examining of this witness, because his authority is great in the churches of God. And now I refer it to judgment, whether his witness speaks for us, or against us, in this question.
Return we now to the Replier, who hopes by this witness to overthrow the Defendant’s answer, whatever become of his witnesses.
Replier: 2. He tells us that he means the inward virtue of worship, which consists in an opinion of holiness and justice. Where first I will not urge or grant, the wound which these words bear, the inward virtue of worship consists in an opinion. 2. How can an inward virtue be placed in an outward ceremony?
Answer: By error of opinion only, (if we speak of mere ceremonies:) as the Jews placed it in their often washings.
Replier: 3. The proper nature of worship is not in holiness and justice, but in the honoring of God: and all external ceremonies, whose proper use is the honoring of God, are external worship, as all divinity shows.
Answer: The honoring of God in what we do, is the proper, [p. 152] without opinion of justice and holiness in that action. And thence it is that they which fancy an honoring of God, in any human ordinances immediately, and ex se, must needs imagine some holiness and righteousness in those things in which God has not placed any.
And if all divinity teaches (as he says) that all external ceremonies whose proper use is the honoring of God, are worship; then all external ceremonies, which (by their own rules) must be devised, and used to the honoring of God, must needs be worship. But essential worship they cannot truly be, without his commandment; nor falsely so, without opinion that they are essential worship. Therefore they are but improperly, and accidentally, or after a sort, as has been said. Howbeit his divinity has not comprehended all divinity. For the Divines require unto essential religious worship, that it be such an action as wherein God is honored or imagined to be honored immediately, and ex se, and not secondarily, and per accidens. Otherwise all our actions, which ought to be done to the glory of God, even our eating and drinking shall be proper worship to God.
But if by proper use he mean immediate and peculiar use, then he must know, that even therefore our ceremonies cannot be worship (strictly taken) because, though their remote and final use be the honoring of God in the reverent use of his ordinances; yet their more peculiar and immediate use, is the edifying of men, to the honoring of God, consequenter. Essential worship immediately respects God’s honor, and man’s edification secondarily; circumstantial, the edifying of men immediately, but the worship of God not at all.
If by proper use he mean such use as is appropriated to religious action; (as perhaps he does) then our churches, pulpits, fonts, communion-table, table-cloth, and cups shall, in that use, be egregious worship, because used only thereto, which you will never say to be essential worship: or if he deny, common reason will confute him.
Nor can he say that these three ceremonies in question, are [p. 153] more appropriated to religious uses, than those other which he shows as lawful. For if he shall say (as they use to do) that churches are not appropriated to religious uses, because houses are used also, for civil meetings; then they must say that surplices are not appropriated neither to religious worship, because linen garments, as like surplices as our common houses be to churches, are used by porters in London. If fonts be not appropriated, because we use vessels to wash in, in common use; then, not the sign of the cross, because the sign of the cross is used on coins, banners, and shop signs, and partitions of parishes, civilly. If a pulpit be not appropriated to religious use, because in the schools such like places, or desks are for the philosophy lectures; then, not kneeling, seeing that gesture is used in civil respects to Princes, and sometimes to draw an ale. Wherefore the rest must be appropriated, or not these; and all condemned, or all acquitted, in that respect. Yet the Replier triumphs, and says.
Replier: This therefore but an idle, unlearned evasion, to talk of holiness, and justice, in opinion, when the question is of worship.
Answer: If this be idle and unlearned, to show that men do then feign a worship to God, when in the observation of their own inventions they place opinion of holiness, justice, or mere necessity; then all our Divines have been idle and unlearned in handling this question, except only this Replier. For let him show any one man of note, who does not so speak. But this man hopes he shall be counted extremely learned, by taxing the learning of the Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, as some young scholars sought, Nobilitare se, to make themselves famous, by writing against him, as himself says. The Replier further objects.
Replier: Calvin never thought of such toys.
Answer: Then Calvin never thought of what he wrote. For, (as has been shown) Calvin does mark out false worship, even thereby. So also he does, Inst. bk. 4, ch. 10, sect. 15 and 16, and ch. 38, and again, in his treatise De vera reformande [p. 154] vera reformanda Ecclesia ratione, inter opuscula: where, among many other passages he has this, Quartum vitium, etc. The fourth fault is, in a false opinion of God’s worship, for (whatsoever these reconcilers pretend) whatsoever observation is commended as necessary, it is forthwith judged to pertain to worship, of which there is no need to seek far for example, for who does not think abstinence from flesh to be a part of religion? Wherein, a false opinion of worshiping God, and opinion of necessary observation, is plainly shown to be that, which makes this observation of not eating flesh to be judged a part of divine worship; which, without such opinion and necessity, should not be so esteemed. Yet (says the Replier) Calvin never thought of any such toys. But why does he not show us what Calvin thought, in the words alleged out of him by the Defendant, wherein he charges the Papists with placing ipsissimum Dei cultum, the very proper worship of God, in their own ceremonies?
Replier: He amplifies indeed his accusation against the Papists, by such circumstances, as those are, according as the Defendant shows. But what logic can thence conclude, that nothing else is contained in the general rule?
Answer: Good logic will conclude that Calvin meant no more than he himself has expressed, because no man knew his mind so well as himself. Nor is it true, that Calvin does there amplify, but exemplify his own rule, by giving particular instance in the Pope’s ceremonies, which makes his meaning of that rule to be most evident: as does also his resolution, sect. 28, that when the laws (about rites and ceremonies) are once declared to be for comeliness, all superstition is then taken away; and that when they are known to belong to common use; that is, for the maintenance of mutual charity (by which he means peace among ourselves) then is overthrown that false opinion of obligation and necessity which casts a huge terror on the conscience when traditions were deemed necessary to salvation. The same Calvin in the meantime there teaches that decency, required of the Apostle Saint Paul, is to be partly to this end; that by such rites as procure a certain veneration to holy things, we may [p. 155] be stirred up to piety. And here, what does the Replier add? Why? and what not?
Replier: Calvin himself professes the contrary, if he had understood this Defendant so rightly as I well believe he will not. For these are his words: [The Latin quotation the Replier gives here is badly degraded in this scan and I cannot transcribe it reliably; the surrounding argument concerns Calvin’s private correspondence on ceremonies.]
Answer: [This portion of the Answer responding to the Latin quotation above is likewise too faded in this scan for a confident transcription. The general drift, so far as I can make out, is that the Defendant denies the Replier has fairly represented Calvin’s letter, and that the Replier has curtailed Calvin’s words and relied on a later, altered translation of that letter rather than Calvin’s original sense. Continuing where the text becomes reliably legible again:] — allows chrism beforehand, and the insufflation added to baptism. [p. 156]
…a sparing and moderate use of them: and Calvin allows in some case, the mixture of a little water with the wine in the Lord’s Supper, but says, Si religio in eo ponatur, ac si necessaria foret mixtio, superstitione haec non caret — if religion be put in it, as if the mixture were necessary, it is not free from superstition: and what (I pray you) made it superstitious but the opinion of necessity?
Yea rather from hence he might have learned, that only those ceremonies are there by Calvin condemned as will-worship which are therefore devised by men because they imagine to present thereby some new worship to God: which is true, and the very same which we affirm.
Calvin in his 120th Epistle, tells Bullinger, how he wished that Hooper had not struggled so much against the cap and rochet or surplice; to which purpose he had also written to him to persuade him, whereby appears that Calvin thought not these ceremonies to be with us, and in our use made any will-worship; or else, that he would not have had Hooper to stand against will-worship, which was far from Calvin. We have now done with Calvin.
Sect. 6, pt. 2, Melanchthon, Bullinger, Polanus, Fenner, Tilenus, Chamier, Perkins, Bucanus; How many ceremonies may be lawful
Opposers: Their second witness is Chemnitius, who affirms all worship of men’s device or choosing, to be condemned as will-worship.
Defendant in sum: To this is answered by the Defendant, that Chemnitius condemns that which is made an essential part of God’s worship, by error of men’s opinion; which he shows in the instance of the reservation of the Sacrament used by the Fathers voluntarily and occasionally; but, decreed by the Council of Trent to be necessary, and so made a part of worship.
Replier: For Chemnitius, the Defendant tells us, that he condemns only a ceremony, which is among the Papists modern-day. But he should show two things if he would answer soundly: First, that Chemnitius does distinguish (as he does) of will-worship, as some were lawful, some only unlawful, etc. [p. 157]
Answer: The Replier may be ashamed to say, that the Defendant does thus distinguish of will-worship, as if some were lawful, some unlawful: let him show that distinction in the words of the Defendant; or blush, if he cannot show it.
The Defendant’s distinction is of essential worship, and accidental; which accidental he denies to be properly worship, and therefore denies to be will-worship, unless when men falsely imagine it to be in itself a worship to God. And secondly, he speaks untruly, when he affirms the Defendant to say, that Chemnitius condemns only a ceremony, etc. Is it all one, to instance in one, and to say, that he condemns that only? 3. Though Chemnitius use not the same distinction which the Defendant does, of accessory and essential worship, in terms; yet he says the same in substance: which is sufficient. For Chemnitius in that very place gives two rules whereby to discern of false worship, whereof the first is, when the outward semblance of worship is without the inward motions of the mind: the second, That God allows not worship invented or elected by men, Mt. 15:9. When he applies these rules to the case there handled, which is the adoration of the Eucharist, or of Christ in it, he says, That God regards not any outward gestures whatsoever, without the true adoration of the heart. And thereupon showing at length wherein that inward adoration of Christ in the Sacrament consists, he concludes, That when this inward spiritual devotion, veneration, and adoration is present, and stirred up in the heart, then the outward expressions in the reverence and veneration of this Sacrament will follow, sponte et libere — rightly and freely. For, (says he) it pertains to the confession, that we should also openly witness both by speech and other signs, our faith, devotion, and high estimation of what we have spoken; whereby we may show what we think of the substance and fruit of the Supper, with what reverence, and devotion of mind we come to it, and what kind of food we believe ourselves there to receive: and after gives this reason, For the outward irreverence is a sign of a profane mind: as Paul affirms the Corinthians not to have discerned the Lord’s body, because they handled it not at the Supper with any greater reverence, than their ordinary suppers. And afterward [p. 158] upon all this, he infers: Haec igitur, etc. This therefore is the true adoration and veneration of Christ in these of the Supper, and not those fooleries of pomp, of bells, banners, etc., devised in Popery for the honor of Christ in the Sacrament. In which words he plainly calls the external gestures and signs of inward reverence used at the Lord’s table aright, veneration, and flowing from internal adoration, and such as is fit to manifest our inward devotion. And yet he denies that these gestures or expressions are in themselves any acceptable or essential worship to God. And is not this, upon the matter, the same which the Defendant has said: viz. that ceremonies are so parts of external worship in conjunction and application thereto, as that they are not, nor may be judged essential parts thereof in themselves.
The judgment of Chemnitius is elsewhere yet more manifestly declared. For, undertaking to show when we should stand against ceremonies, he says, first, when some are appointed which fight with the Word and precepts of God, Mt. 15. Or, when the opinions of worship, merit, and necessity, even without the case of scandal, are annexed or sewn to rites which in their own kind are indifferent.
Yet the same Chemnitius, showing what is comeliness, tells us, it lies not in a stage-like pomp, but is such a decorum as that by the external rites it may be manifested what we ascribe to the Word, to the Sacraments, and other ecclesiastical exercises, and that others may also be invited to the reverence of the Word, Sacraments, and Church assemblies.
Again the same Chemnitius interprets the places of Isa. 29 and Mt. 15:9 (objected frequently as spoken against us) de fictitiis hominum cultibus — of the feigned worships of men, taken up to this end, that men may obtain thereby praise and salvation. By all which may appear, that the testimony of Chemnitius, pointed to in the Abridgment, was racked from its legs, and turned to a meaning which the author never had, as his own words do witness; while allowing rites and ceremonies as useful and needful incitements and expressions of internal devotion, he then only condemns them as will-worship, when the opinion of necessity, [p. 159] merit, and worship even in themselves is annexed to them. And what else has the Defendant said, or does the Church of England teach, intend, or require in our ceremonies and use of them.
Wherefore the distinction of the Defendant (as he gave it, not as the Replier relates it,) is, though not in express terms, yet for the substance, found in Chemnitius.
Replier: Secondly, he should have shown, at the least, that there is no worship which is not necessary: for otherwise, Chemnitius in condemning will-worship that is imposed as necessary, does condemn will-worship.
Answer: The Replier supposes the Defendant to have said, that some will-worship is lawful so as it be not imposed as necessary, which is his own forgery, and yet he builds his objection upon it. To which I answer. 1. That Chemnitius by will-worship understands whatsoever of man’s device is imagined to be necessary worship to God, and therefore there can be no will-worship in observation of ceremonies without that vain imagination. 2. But if he would have us show, that there is some external, accidental, and improper worship which is not in the particularities thereof necessary, but may without offense to God be altered or omitted, unless in case of scandal, he may please to remember that himself after affirms (margin: Reply to the particular defense, p. 523) kneeling in any religious action to be worship, which he dares not affirm to be necessary, no not always in prayer. Whence will follow, that there is some kind of worship which is not necessary. The Replier goes on saying.
Replier: Now we in our simple divinity (for so we will be counted) conceive thus: All worship of God is that honor, duty, and reverence, which the reasonable creature does owe to the Creator: and therefore cannot understand, how such duty is not necessary to be performed; or how there can be a worship, which being part of this tribute, may rest in man’s choice, whether it shall be paid or no.
Answer: The duty of honor, and reverence to God, both inwardly and outwardly to be exhibited, is essential worship, and a tribute to God, that must of necessity be paid: [p. 160] but the Replier’s divinity is simple indeed, if he shall infer, that the particular actions thereof must needs be the same, further, then in such as God himself has determined. For the outward expressions, though in their general kind they be necessary, yet in their particulars may be various, and yet of equal value. As for example: he that binds me to pay him a hundred pounds in English gold, will require of me not only current English money to that value, but in that specie to which I am bound. But if the bond be only for so much current money of England, if I pay it in English gold of that value, my bond shall be discharged; or, if in silver, or if in both; because I was tied for the sum, and not to the species, save in the general that it be current money of England: So where God in his external worship has determined what I shall perform in particular, I am tied particularly; but when he has required certain generals; as, order, decency, and edification, he does not bind me necessarily to this or that particular ceremony serving to order, decency, or edification, but leaves that under general rules to discretion and choice. Otherwise, all the Churches standing bound to pay the tribute of reverence, and honor to God, even in their ceremonies, should be bound everywhere, to the very same ceremonies in particular. This the Replier saw, and therefore says.
Replier: Perhaps this necessity extends only to the worship commanded by God; but in that which man devises of himself, there is more liberty, there being no reason, that voluntary service should be constrained.
Answer: True it is, that necessity of observation for conscience to God immediately, pertains only to essential worship, which God only has power to ordain; and that there is more liberty in such accommodations as men devise, as formalities, to be used in God’s worship. And what then?
Replier: If this be the cause, then the worship appointed by men is no part of his love towards God, nor any testification of it.
Answer: A part of his love it cannot be strictly; but, a [p. 161] testification thereof in reverent esteem and usage of God’s ordinances, it may be; why not?
Replier: For if it were, surely it should be necessary, seeing it is necessary to love God with all our hearts, with all our souls, and with all our strength.
Answer: If it were a part of his love, it must needs go where all his love goes, for payment: but though it be not a part of the affection of love, yet it may (I hope) be an outward signification of it. And the Replier dares not say that we are all bound to all manner of signs and expressions of our love to God, but may freely make choice thereof. But this branch of his own objection, viz. testification of love, he passes by, without a fair proof, because he foresaw the absurdity which would follow, if he had said it is no sign of our love, if there may be some other sign as good as that.
We have done with Chemnitius the second witness: now follows Peter Martyr, the third.
Opposers: Peter Martyr says, That in ecclesiastical constitutions the first thing to be taken heed of is, lest any such thing be thought to make unto the worship of God, because divine worship depends not on the will of men, but of God. To this the Defendant answers.
Defendant in sum: That Peter Martyr justifies their phrase, of speech, but not their meaning of it. For Peter Martyr understands not by worship, as they do: rites and ceremonies, appointed for the complemental performance of divine worship, in which no necessity is put. For the same Martyr, in the same page, professes it to be lawful for the Church to make canons and constitutions, concerning time, place, and the manner of receiving the Sacrament of the Supper, at morning, or at night, sitting, or standing, by which it may appear Peter Martyr condemned not the institutions of accessory and accidental worship, but plainly [p. 162] approved of them. To which, the Replier, after rehearsal of Martyr’s words.
Replier: A man would think that these words (of Peter Martyr) are plain enough, for the condemning of all will-worship: but thus says the Defendant, he verifies your phrase of speech but not your sense; and why so? Because forsooth he says in the same place that the Church may appoint circumstances of order: as if there were any among us, that ever denied this: therefore he condemns not the institution of accidental parts of God’s worship. Let any man of sense give judgment here. Peter Martyr says, it is lawful to appoint circumstances of order but unlawful to appoint any worship. The Defendant says, Peter Martyr allows men to appoint circumstances of order, therefore he allows them to appoint some worship.
Answer: Peter Martyr’s words are plain enough to those that have eyes to see that light; namely, that by adding worship he must needs mean the proper and essential worship of God; or else his words were unreasonable: viz. that the constitutions of the Church must not make toward worship itself, for all ecclesiastical circumstances do some way tend toward worship, though they be not worship itself. Wherefore the Defendant has truly answered, that you follow his words, but not his meaning. And if Peter Martyr allows unto the churches, the appointment of time, place, gestures, and such like formalities, as was alleged, then does he not condemn such constitutions as you do, as if they were parts of God’s worship. Nor does he deny the institution of accidental worship, which lies in circumstances; but, the substituting of any of them into the place of essential worship properly so called.
The Replier further intimates, that no one of them ever denied that the Church might lawfully ordain circumstances of order: but he may not deny that any other ceremonies then of mere order, are by some of them, and even by himself, denied to the Church’s liberty. But Peter Martyr [p. 163] Martyr allows the appointment of gestures and of such like, and not only of time, and place — and is not their quarrel at our kneeling, about a matter of gesture? And do they not therein condemn us where Peter Martyr allows us? Again may not the very circumstances of time, and place, be made false worship, if men shall institute them as in themselves necessary parts of God’s proper worship?
But the Replier here calls for a judge, and judge we willingly admit: but the judge must take heed that he be not abused by false evidence. Let him compare what the Defendant said, with what the Replier charges upon him, and let him judge, first, of the Replier’s sincerity. For the Defendant does not collect, as he lays it down, but, that Peter Martyr, allowing so much as he does unto the Church, allows therefore the institution of accidental worship, but not of worship simply, which collection is plain enough, and free from the contradiction of which the Replier charges it, saying,
Replier: If this be not as plain a contradiction, as any man has framed, they (according to the proverb) — let him that tangles me in logic, give me my money again.
Answer: That which the Defendant called accessory and accidental worship, for distinction’s sake, from worship properly, the Replier calls “some worship” ambiguously; and then tells us of a contradiction, which if there be any, is of his own making. For what contradiction is there in this? Peter Martyr, condemning the institution of anything for divine worship, yet allows the institution of external rites in worship: therefore he condemns the framing of mental worship by the will of man, but not the ordaining of that accessory or accidental worship, which serves the essential. And if any man taught the Replier that there is a plain contradiction where a thing is affirmed and denied, but not in the same sense or respect, there is reason he should give him his money again: for this logic is not worth a rush. All this wrangle is about the phrase. Now, if the outward reckless use of holy things be blameworthy [p. 164] (as Zanchy truly affirms) then the outward, respective use of them must be, in some sense at least, rightly ordered: and this in particular, is left to the Church’s liberty in Peter Martyr’s judgment.
And that we may see that Peter Martyr does not simply deny the title or name of worship to such ceremonies as serve to express the inward reverence of the heart, be it known, that the bowing of the knee, is by him called external worship; which yet, to be essential worship of God in itself, neither does Peter Martyr say, nor will the Replier dare to affirm: for then a man should sin in worshiping God not kneeling. We have done with Peter Martyr; now comes the Defendant to answer for himself.
Opposers: The last witness is Dr. Morton, Apology, pt. 1, ch. 89.
Defendant: Your last witness answers for himself, that he, in that place, censuring the superstition of the Church of Rome, does not simply condemn all her ceremonies; but rather the crowded multitude and burden of her ceremonies — to wit, the immoderate multitude, and intolerable burden of her ceremonies, in feasts, and fasts, in gestures, etc. And Mr. Hy, I trow, in reproving a man for a surfeit or drunkenness does not thereby mean to deprive him absolutely of meat and drink.
Replier: In the last place (as those which make a feast use to do) Dr. Morton sets down himself. But he may be accused, though, for sitting down too soon: for in the Abridgment, I find Melanchthon, Bullinger, Bucanus, Perkins, and others invited to this meeting, who now by this hastiness of the Defendant can find no place.
Answer: If the Defendant sat down last, how was he too hasty? If others were invited by your friends, why did not you, sir, now call them in? But only because you had rather make a quarrel about their absence, then have them present? Verily, the Defendant did not leave them out because they [p. 165] witness more then the former did for you, or against him, as shall now appear.
Melanchthon, in that edition, which I have of him, folio, printed 1571, p. 718, reckons it an error in constitution of things indifferent, to account them worship of God: this I take to be your place. The same Melanchthon expounds what he meant by worship, when, teaching that ecclesiastical rites must be observed, he adds, but so that opinion of righteousness, worship, or of necessity be not added to them. And this appears elsewhere where blaming men for esteeming indifferent rites to be worship to God, he presently tells what he means by worship, videlicet, opera religiosa, that is, (says he) works which God so allows, that he judges himself to be honored by them, ex se, even of themselves. As likewise, in his Loci Communes, to be worships of God is (says he) works whose immediate end is that God would be honored by them.
In which places we see that Melanchthon means in the place objected by the term of worship: namely worship properly taken, which no man, or angels, may constitute, no, not any parcel of his worship to God. Yet the same Melanchthon acknowledges unto the Church, a liberty of ordaining rites and ceremonies of indifferent nature, and agreeable to the rules of the word, not only for order, but for the adorning of order. For which he cites 1 Cor. 14:40. And what he comprehends in this patent, elsewhere appears; namely, p. 738, where he reckons the wearing of a common garment; or that of the monks, indifferent: so, the appointing of fasts and holy days, vestments, and the like: to which he adds, the feast of Christ’s Nativity, Easter and the rest: of which kinds (says he) we willingly retain the old rites. And such rites (says he) as are fit to teach the common sort; as, certain days, and certain lessons, and such like, which without superstition or opinion of necessity may not be tumultuously violated without sin. And p. 48, he professes, that some rites are retained by them which served for ordering of things; as, the order of lessons in the missal, and the chief holy days; to all which he adds, that the people must be admonished, that such rites do not justify before God. In which words, Melanchthon [p. 166] [This page is very severely degraded in the source scan — the OCR came back badly scrambled, more so than any other page transcribed so far, and I am not confident enough in a reconstruction to present one as if it were reliable. As best I can tell, the passage continues discussing Melanchthon’s distinction between essential/necessary worship and accessory/circumstantial worship, brings in Mr. Cartwright’s similar distinction, and transitions toward discussing Bullinger’s “Decades.” I’d rather leave this page honestly incomplete than offer confident-sounding prose that may not reflect what’s actually on the page. If this passage matters for your purposes, it may be worth checking against another copy or a higher-quality scan of the original.] [p. 167] patrons of human laws do command will-worship, even that arbitrary worship, which we fancy, out of our own seeming and pleasure of ourselves. And this is all I find in that Decade. But in the 5th Sermon, 4th, fol. 305, he says, that these laws cannot be good, which presume, of their own pleasure, to teach faith, or prescribe the worship of God: whereas God only must teach us what is the true faith and what worship will please him, Isa. 29, Mt. 15:9. So again he says, Therefore all worship and rites which are not reduced to the Word of God are vain, and abominable. So that undoubtedly Bullinger (as those that spoke before him) condemns all worship of God which is merely of the traditions of man.
But first, the same Bullinger puts difference between ecclesiastical laws deduced out of the Scriptures, and traditions of men: i.e. neither instituted as necessary nor allowed by the Word as lawful.
Again, Bullinger, justly condemning all worships of God which are neither instituted by God himself, nor agreeable to his Word, but feigned out of our own good intention, does there distinguish lawful worship of God into two sorts; one instituted of God himself, another, agreeable to his word. Which can mean nothing else (I think) but that there is some kind of essential worship, which is of institution; and some other accessory, which is of permission, agreeable to the rules of the Word, but not instituted in the Word particularly. Lawful, by the Word; but not necessary, by institution.
Bullinger shows, what things the Church has under certain laws deduced out of God’s Word; namely, her public meetings to the Word and prayer, morning and evening, set hours thereto; supplications, litanies, holy days, fasting days; a set time, place, and prescribed manner of administering the Sacraments according to laws, and the received rite of the Church. But these laws and the like (says he) she deduces out of the Scriptures and applies for edification to places, times, and persons. Among all which, as Bullinger would not affirm any one particular rite to be any part of essential worship, being arbitrary, and variable (as may appear by his judgment in one instance of kneeling in prayer, of which he [p. 168] teaches, and cites for it Augustine, bk. 2, ad Simplicianum, that it is not materially necessary, because if the heart be humble, men may pray as well standing, sitting, or lying in their beds, as kneeling: so, Bullinger will not deny, that in a certain sort God is worshiped or honored (though not simply nor immediately) in the use and observation of such ecclesiastical constitutions. For he says, Colunt Deum externo cultu, etc. Those men worship God with external worship, who out of faith and obedience come to the holy assemblies, in some ecclesiastical order, drawn from the Word of God: who hear the word of God expounded; pray publicly with the congregation; who religiously partake the Sacraments, and observe other lawful, wholesome rites. Thus far Bullinger. Whereby it is manifest, that he does acknowledge the observation of times, places, and other rites instituted by the Church, agreeable to the rules of the Word, to be (if such as observe them out of faith and obedience) external worship of God, though the same cannot be deemed to be essential worship; as be the prayers, word, and sacraments themselves in their use, without gross error and superstition. Wherefore Bullinger has justified the Defendant thoroughly, and his distinction of external, improper worship (left in the particular formalities thereof to the Church’s liberty under general rules) from the proper, essential and necessary worship of God which requires his own institution.
Bucanus was named next: but because I have not his book at hand, I will call in others first, named in the Abridgment; and if these be not enough, I will call in others: Amandus Polanus, Mr. Cartwright, M. Fenner, Tilenus, Chamier, and the Replier himself; and after that Mr. Perkins: and (by that time) Bucanus. And then I hope the Defendant shall have leave to sit down at the table.
Amandus Polanus says, An ecclesiastical rite or ceremony is the worship of God whereby God is externally worshiped: and after, of a religious fast, That it is an outward worship of God when we abstain for a certain time from all meat and drink, for the more fervent exercising of piety. And among the same ecclesiastical rites, he reckons the observation of festival [p. 169] festival days, both those of God’s institution, and those which the Jews themselves ordained, and such as the Christian Church appointed. Where Polanus gives the name of worship to the observation of Church ceremonies, but not in the same meaning which himself has, when elsewhere he delivers the worship of God saying, Cultus Dei, etc. The worship of God is any work inward or outward, commanded of God, performed by a man regenerate, through the grace of Christ, out of true faith, for this principal end: that God may be glorified. This man speaks plainly: for his definition is of worship properly understood, whereto the command of God is required. But the external and accessory worship of God in the use of arbitrary Church ceremonies, he calls external worship in another sense: that is, respectively and improperly, as the Defendant does. The next is Mr. Cartwright.
Mr. Cartwright, in his larger Catechism (as he has been shown before) has divided the worship of God into substantial, and circumstantial: to which circumstantial worship he refers the bodily gestures varied according to the kind of worship, which not being commanded of God in particular are left to the Church in their particularities; and therefore are, in his judgment, but accidental worship in their species (though in their genus commanded in the second commandment, as he thinks).
The next is Master Dudley Fenner, who in his Theology, fol. 15, sorts the things which pertain to piety, into those that do directly respect God (as, his fear and love): and, such as belong to outward worship. The disposition of the body, modulation of the voice, the bowing of the knee, the lifting up of the hands, or eyes, he makes parts of adoration, which, if any man shall affirm to be essential worship, not being commanded of God, he errs; wherefore they must be accessory and accidental, in Fenner’s judgment: and, in all wise men’s judgment, arbitrary, not necessary in particular.
Tilenus is the fourth, who in his Syntagma says thus: A vow made concerning a thing prescribed of God is a worship of God, per se, of itself. But, made concerning things indifferent and arbitrary, may not be called worship, but per accidens, accidentally; namely, [p. 170] namely, in some as it is in some manner referred thereto. Wherein Zanchy gives the distinction of per se, and per accidens: that is, of essential and accidental worship, and places the latter in things indifferent and arbitrary. Which also, p. 384, he follows, showing, That of actions which in themselves are worship, or which are necessary thereto, God only is the Author; but, of means arbitrary and indifferent, the Church is to determine.
Now the arbitrary means of worship are some way worship, but not essential, because arbitrary; nor in themselves, but in reference to that worship to which they serve.
The fifth of the new-bidden guests is Chamier, Panstratia Catholica, tome 3, bk. 20, ch. 5, who in that chapter (at least four times) uses this distinction of worship properly and per se, and worship per accidens and improperly applied. Placing that which is per se, only in those things which are commanded of God; and the worship which is improper, and accidental, in those arbitrary, which are referred to God per aliud, and subordinate.
As for the Replier himself, he also may come in to this company, to make him see his own failing; for even he, in saying, That all external ceremonies whose proper use is the honoring of God is worship, as all divinity teaches, Sect. 6, (margin: Reply to the particular Defense, p. 923.) And again, that kneeling in a religious action, is of itself worship, has confessed some worship which is not essential; and therefore, accidental worship: the particular determination whereof if he shall deny to be left (under general rules) unto the Church’s liberty, all the rest of the Divines will resist him; yea, his own former confession in part, and his own conscience.
Master Perkins is yet wanting whom they object, because he, giving cautions concerning Church traditions, (margin: Reformed Catholic, fol. 501) says, The second caution is, that they be not imposed as parts of God’s worship, to which I answer, that Mr. Perkins speaks not thereby as simply, and in itself; as the rest did, or the like speeches. For, in his Treatise of (margin: Reformed Catholic, p. 692.) worship he tells of a bodily worship which is necessary (that is, in the general) and this he calls adoration, instancing in the [p. 171] bowing of the knee, prostration or bending of the body, lifting up of the hands, or eyes, which he calls the less principal worship: but, worships such worship as is determinable by the Church, and not prescribed in the word particularly (and what is this but accidental, or accidental worship) and that the determination of that external comeliness (which he makes the third property of God’s worship) belongs to the Church touching time, place and gestures, order and comeliness, in which yet he does not place the essential outward worship of God: for, p. 697, he reduces that unto the use of the Word, Prayers, and Sacraments; proving it from Acts 3:42. So that Perkins has (for the matter) yielded the distinction of arbitrary and necessary, essential and accidental worship of God.
Now we have all these witnesses save Bucanus, for whom we have taken in six others: all (I say) that were invited by name. For when they tell us (and others) without any name, we know not thereby whom to call for; unless it be Master what shall I call him? Wherefore now let Bucanus come in. Bucanus in p. 532, quoted by the Abridgment has no word for them; but, p. 566, this, against them; that ecclesiastical rites may not be deemed or taken for the worship of God per se, and ex opere operato, by themselves, and of the work wrought: wherein he implies the Defendant’s distinction — worship properly and of itself, and that which is deemed worship, propter aliud, that is, accidental.
Replier: Yet let us hear what he [the Defendant] says for himself. I do not (says he) condemn all the ceremonies of Rome, but the multitude and burden of them. To which I answer. 1. The question is not, how many or how few you condemned of the Romish ceremonies, but by what reason you condemned them. He that condemns one ceremony because of a worship of man’s devising, condemns all worship that man devises. And he that condemns a multitude in that same, condemns one that is such, though it be alone.
Answer: If the question be here, by what reason the Defendant in that place does condemn the Romish ceremonies: [p. 172] his answer was as direct as could be, when he tells you, he condemned them there, even because they were so many and burdensome, which reason cannot touch ours that are few: wherefore this first reply is merely impertinent, and so let it go.
Replier: Secondly, because I have heard men often speak in this manner of the fault that is in a multitude, I would willingly know, what certain limits and bounds are set by God’s Law, for the number of human ceremonies, such as now are in controversy. If there may be three, why not four, five, six, and so forth, as many as shall please the Convocation house, or him that can, when he will, turn the Convocation upside down? Surely, if once we depart from God’s institution, there will be no place to rest our foot on, but we must ever follow wind and tide, which in Religion is one of the greatest blindnesses.
Answer: The Replier speaks of the censure of a multiplicity and burdensomeness in ceremonies, as of a matter which he had only heard talked of; whereas all Divines that write of this argument, have made as much of it, as this Replier does. But he would know just how many ceremonies shall be, by his rate, allowed. To which I answer, just so many as shall not clog and overcharge the Churches with ceremonies. If he ask how many those may be, tell him, so many as the several conditions of the several churches may probably bear, in the judgment of those to whose discretion it belongs to judge thereof. If this content him not, let him tell me by Scripture how much gold or silver a King of Israel might lay up in treasure abundance, or how many horses he might keep, being forbidden to multiply either of them, Deut. 17; or, how many bits of meat any man may lawfully eat at a meal, and not eat too much? And if he shall answer, that this must be determined according to circumstances, and by discretion, let him take it for our answer and be content.
As for his close, importing the peril of leaving God’s institution, as it has a good use in all matters of faith and necessary duties to salvation: so in point of ceremonies, and [p. 173] rites, wherein we have no particular institution of God, but only general rules, it is improper, if not ridiculous. (margin: Ad Castalio, p. 86.) And though in Religion itself, which is merely divine, it is baseness itself to follow wind and tide; yet in ceremonies, not repugnant to religion, we must (as Ambrose and after him Augustine shows) conform ourselves to the churches where we live; unless we mean to be offended, or to offend others. A man shall not be like a salmon, which still swims and climbs against the tide.
7. Some Will-Worship is not to be Condemned: in what Sense
Defendant: In this section the Defendant offers to confine the proposition of the Nonconformists, which is, That all ceremonies which are imposed and used as parts of God’s worship, are unlawful. Leaving out two of their own choice witnesses, Ursinus and Zanchy, (margin: Catech. p. 739. and p. 42.) that when they deny that any Church ceremonies may be imposed as parts of God’s worship, they take the word worship strictly, for that which is in itself and properly an act of worship. But as the word worship imports generally and at large, the action of worship with all the circumstances thereof, they deny not, but that the Church may impose (as accidental parts of worship) her rites and ceremonies, as has been said, by virtue of that commission, 1 Cor. 14:26 and 40, for edification, order and comeliness.
Replier: Here is promised a confutation of the proposition, viz. of this assertion, All will-worship whatsoever is to be condemned: and to this purpose he brings forth again his Magna Charta, Let all things be done decently and in order. But I think that plea is sufficiently confuted.
Answer: Though the Replier has falsified the proposition and changed it into another of harsher sound, yet in such sense as has been said, it is maintainable, that all will- [p. 174] -worship is not condemned, seeing the free-will offerings and vows were, in some sort, will-worship, and not condemned: and the use of kneeling in public prayer is by himself confessed to be worship, and because not commanded of God is so far forth will-worship, as the determination thereof is of the will of man. Wherefore if he list not to wrangle all day about words, he must grant, that the Magna Charta of the Church gives her power to appoint at her godly discretion, or will, such external formalities and fashions as do attend upon the proper worship of God, and may in their use (though improperly) be called accessory parts of external worship; which, how well the Replier has confuted, let the Reader judge.
Replier: In the next place he produces, or rather (as the fellow said once) seduces two witnesses, Ursinus and Zanchy. But believe me, when I looked upon the places which he alleges, one of them, I could not but lift up my heart unto God, and say, O Lord, how can such conceited confidence fasten on a man that regards either conscience or credit? How dare mortal men upon such grounds as these, obtrude the conceptions of their brains upon thy Churches?
Answer: If the Replier would have shown that the witnesses speak not to that purpose, to which they are produced, he ought as well to have told, wherefore they were avouched; as, what they say. But had he so done, truly his jest of “seduces” and his whole Reply had been marred. The plea of the Defendant is (as has been shown) to manifest a different acceptation of the word Worship, that it is taken sometimes strictly and properly, sometimes improperly and at large. And if this shall appear to be so received by Ursinus and Zanchy, then it shall suffice to answer to this Replier’s exclamation. Here is much crying and little wool, as he said that did shear his hogs.
Replier: Ursinus (says the Defendant) has catechized them well. True, but our proud Prelates, for the most part, scorn not only that, but all other catechisms, except for fashion’s sake that which begins with What is your name? and though I do not account this Defendant in that [p. 175] number, yet I may safely say, that he never well considered whom or what he cited out of Ursinus.
Answer: The excursions of the Replier draw me on after him, to tell him, that he now rails downright, in saying, that our Prelates (to whom his meekness gives the addition of Proud) do scorn Ursinus’s catechism and all other, but that which begins with What is your name? For believe that, they willingly suffer sundry others to be used, especially in private, which they would not do if they scorned them; they have established the use of Nowell’s middle catechism, even for the public use of those of better years; as the little one, he speaks of, is by Parliament established for younger children.
His exemption of the Defendant from the rest of his brethren in this challenge, may seem to be made rather to cover his own head, then for any good respect to the Defendant, whom he presently challenges to have cited Ursinus inconsiderately; and soon after, mocks at him.
Replier: All that he brings, is out of the Commentary on Q. 96, ob. 3, 4, and 5, as it is set down by Pareus. Now before objections be brought, it is fit and usual, that the thesis, or sentence be set down, against which those objections fight: and no wise man will take up an answer made to an objection, before he considers the assertion against which that objection is made. See then what the assertion of Ursinus is.
Answer: All this preamble is, that the Reader might think this Replier to be some extreme wise man, who thus bitingly scorns a man famous for his wisdom. But he is here but a Sophister, whatever he goes for. For though sometimes it be necessary to observe the whole process, yet when the use of a phrase only is in question, it suffices to allege that sentence, wherein such use may appear, without further ado. But let Ursinus speak.
Replier: Ipsae ceremoniae, etc. Human ecclesiastical ceremonies themselves, not only are not the worship of God, but also they bind not the conscience. The very same which we here maintain, viz. That no lawful ceremonies [p. 176] are the worship of God. Except therefore ecclesiastical ceremonies be therefore the worship of God, because they be not the worship of God, the Defendant has no reason to allege this place of Ursinus in this question.
Answer: The Defendant is blamed by this Replier for not alleging this assertion, in the words next before; and here, for mis-alleging it. Did he mis-allege it, and yet not allege it? The allegation of the Defendant was, of an answer made to an objection against this assertion; in which Ursinus manifests what he means by the term of Worship, used in this assertion; namely, that which is so ex se — in which sense, the Defendant agrees with Ursinus’s assertion. So the collection is this, If there be some worship which is properly so called, and ex se, then there is some other than is called so improperly, and per accidens. And this is the Defendant’s collection, in stead whereof the Replier has set up a man of clouts of his own making, and then shoots at him, as boys do. He saw this, and therefore puts on another string to his bow, saying.
Replier: And so is it in the words here alleged out of the answer to the third objection, those things which turn accidentally to the glory of God are not the worship of God. And to the fourth objection: By these examples will-worship is not established. And to the fifth objection, indifferent things (being done of faith) do please God otherwise than that worship of God properly so called. Is it possible that anything should be concluded from hence for will-worship? Surely no. And therefore the Defendant himself makes his conclusion out of these premises, that divine worship, properly so called, is ordained of God.
Answer: The Replier has willingly omitted some branches of the testimony alleged, viz. such as do most exactly describe what is that worship of God which is properly so called: namely, that which ex se, does please God, and that the contrary of it would displease him — which I understand otherwise in things indifferent. Now whereto serve these terms of ex se, and accidentally, worship properly so called, but to show that the name of worship may improperly be given [p. 177] to such ceremonies as serve mediately (that is, by the comely performance of God’s proper service and worship) unto the honoring of God. But properly that term belongs only to such things as do immediately, and in themselves, give honor to God who has required them.
It was therefore but the contradictious spirit of the Replier that moves him so often to thrust upon the Defendant the patronage of will-worship, without any distinction, and specially in this place where he confesses the Defendant to make the same conclusion (which they also do) ad oppositum, to will-worship viz. That divine worship properly so called, is that which is ordained of God.
Replier: Was there any of us that ever doubted of this? Is it not the proposition which the Defendant undertook to confute?
Answer: It is not alleged because you denied it, or to confute that your proposition in the same sense that Ursinus there expresses: for the Defendant also embraces it; but only to make you see, to what sense you must hold your proposition, if you will keep it sound: and, in what sense the same may be denied; which is all that the Defendant undertook, and is, I hope, clear enough in the words of Ursinus.
Replier: But in a large sense (says he) human ceremonies may be held to be a part of divine worship. This is that which we have heard averred before in a section, I had thought we should have seen it proved. But alas, it could be no more than affirmed, and that under the shadow of a sentence whereby it is flatly condemned.
Answer: The Defendant sets down the large sense he means, so as the word worship notes all circumstances which may confer and appertain to the setting out of the aforesaid divine worship. In this sense only (says he) we say that ceremonies may be held to be parts of divine worship. And this has by many witnesses, and from the Replier’s own words, been made good. Nor is it condemned at all by any sentence of Ursinus, but rather implied, while he does distinguish worship properly so called, from something [p. 178] so called improperly. Which same he also manifests to be his meaning, or at least Ursinus does, where immediately before the words of this assertion lately cited, he says of ecclesiastical and ceremonial precepts of men; Harum legum genus, etc. The genus of these, as well as of civil laws in general, if they be rightly and profitably made, are therefore worship of God: but the particular ceremonies themselves not only are not the worship of God, but also they do not bind the conscience; neither (except in case of scandal) is their observation necessary. Where if the genus of them be counted worship, because they serve to the better keeping of the first table, as Ursinus there says; then, the particulars may after a sort, that is, reductively and improperly be called worship, and often are: which is all that the Defendant stands for, and needed not halt in this wording, if men had not a spirit which delights after strife, rather then the composing of differences. Now, that even such things done by the rule, to the right end are some way worship to God, though not ex se, may appear by this, that the same things done to the honoring of an idol, were idolatry; that is, the worship of an idol: as, namely, to build a place, a temple to the service of an idol is idolatry; or, to frequent it, for the honoring of a false god. The second is Zanchy.
Replier: Zanchius (says he) distinguishes the substance of worship, from those things which are annexed to worship. Why, so do all the Nonconformists. What then? Are ceremonies a worship in a large sense, because they are annexed to worship? Then the sign of the Cross is a Sacrament because it is annexed to a Sacrament.
Answer: The Replier puts down the Defendant’s words as he could best reply upon them, much heeds not whether he tells truth or no. For the Defendant says, Zanchy distinguishes those parts of God’s worship, wherein the substance of worship does consist (as, the Word, Sacraments, etc.) from such things as be annexed to worship (as, veil, vestments, etc.). In which passage of Zanchy, both the substance, and the circumstances are made parts of the external worship, one essential, the other accidental. The [p. 179] Replier’s leaving out “parts of worship,” makes him say, that Zanchy distinguished the substance of worship from things which are annexed to it. Zanchius’s own words will justify the Defendant, and show the Replier’s ill dealing. Of a sacred rite, this therefore is the eighth division: Ceremonial worship consisting in things and actions, is distinguished into those things of which the worship itself consists, and into such things as are annexed unto worship. Where, the whole is called worship, and the same worship is divided into that which is the proper substance of it, and into the appurtenances. And what can be clearer, then that Zanchy does comprehend human rites and ceremonies under the term of worship in general, though he deny them to be the very substance of worship itself? Had the Replier produced the words of Zanchy, or of the Defendant, he should have laid the matter thus: If human ceremonies be some part of external worship, and yet not of that worship which is essential, as Zanchy shows, then (in a large sense) ceremonies applied to religious actions may be called parts of God’s worship, though not essential. Now, let the Replier try if his inference of the Cross annexed (not to the Sacrament, but) to the solemnity of administration, will be hence concluded a part of the very Sacrament itself, by the like reason; or of the solemnity only.
Replier: I wonder (says the Defendant) how such points should be so raw to some of the Nonconformists.
Answer: What points? Those assertions which Ursinus and Zanchy express, they seem to all of us well-digested axioms of divinity: but the consequence which the Defendant would draw from hence is so evidently so raw, that none but a very ostrich could digest it.
Answer: This gibe here used is unworthy of an answer. How the Defendant’s consequence follows from these sound axioms, any judicious man will discern. The issue is this, that human ceremonies being no parts of divine worship, strictly and properly so called, yet in respect of their annexation to acts of worship and general end, which is to honor God by the orderly and comely handling [p. 180] handling of his worship, they are, and may, in some sense, be called parts of God’s worship, id est, improperly or respectively.
.
IV. Arguments Answered
8. Assumption of Nonconformists; No reply to Defendant’s Answer made
The assumption of the Nonconformists.
Opposers: This our argument is strong against all these ceremonies, that they are all taken to be, esteemed, imposed, and observed as parts of God’s worship. (Abridgment, p. 39; Mr. Hy)
(margin: The Replier wholly omits the assertion of the Defendant as he set it down, but had reason: it gave no advantage to tell plainly what he meant.) Defendant: If you can prove these our ceremonies to be imposed, or observed by our Church as proper, essential, and necessary parts of God’s worship and religion, we must necessarily yield unto you the whole cause, and subscribe unto your nonsubscription.
.
9. Nonconformists’ reasons to prove our ceremonies are imposed as real parts of worship, answered; Why Bradshaw was unanswered; his conceit examined; whether any worship be indifferent; whether no worship be accidental
Reasons of the Nonconformists to prove that our ceremonies are imposed by our Church as real parts of God’s Worship. Their first reason:
Opposers: The use of these ceremonies is divine worship, because the same with the Jewish, wherewith God was honored, because of the same kind. For whatsoever is of the same use and of the same kind in respect of worship, although it may be diverse in the adjunct of true and false, according as it is appointed, or not appointed of God. As for example, Levitical vestments will not be denied but to have been part of the external worship of God, as well as other rites among them: for what definition of worship can be given, which does not may be predicated of these rites? For to [p. 181] to be instituted of God (if any shall so aver) does not vary the common nature of worship, but distinguishes it into true, or false.
Defendant: This is a piece of learning, which I think never saw print: to wit, that the institution of God does not alter the common nature of worship; because God’s institution does distinguish necessary worship from the indifferent, and the essential, from accidental. For, before the Levitical Law, the offering of any colored sheep, spotted, or unspotted, was indifferent, but after that the commandment of God had prescribed that the lamb, which was to be sacrificed unto him, should be without spot, then this ceremony of an unspotted lamb, became necessary and essential in God’s worship. And so we might say of the rest of the ceremonies under the Levitical priesthood. Therefore the commandment of God does not distinguish only between true and false; but sometimes between necessary and indifferent, essential and accidental, divine and human, that being only necessary, essential and divine, without which the worship of God cannot be lawfully performed.
Replier: To prove that our ceremonies are imposed, and used as worship, this argument is brought: Those ceremonies which have the kind, nature, and definition of worship belonging to them, so that they want nothing but a right author to make them true worship, those are in their imposition and use worship, and for want of a right author are false worship: but our ceremonies are such: Ergo.
Answer: The Replier’s leaving out the term “real” (which was by the Defendant put into the assumption, as really pertaining to the question) brings an argument to prove our ceremonies to be worship, which in some fashion of imperfect [p. 182] has been acknowledged: so as this argument, being all granted, touches not the question, which is of real, essential, and proper worship, of which we confess our ceremonies to be no part, even therefore because not commanded of God, nor so esteemed of us. And this argument proves nothing contrary to that.
Replier: The Defendant is angry that this learning never saw print, that the institution of God does not alter the common nature of worship. First, it may be, he never saw it in print, but I can witness that Mr. Bradshaw, a man that knew how to frame an argument in logical manner as well as any bishop in England, set this reason down in print some 14 years since, in one edition (as I remember) of his Treatise concerning indifferent things. But an answer to that treatise, or to this argument, was never yet seen in print, though that be of the question the chief ground of those, which are ordinarily used in sermon and writing about these questions: viz. that they are things indifferent. This argument is also found in another treatise of the same man, touching divine worship, print, p. 103. Secondly, though it had never seen print before now, yet that does not hinder, but it may be sound. For all sound reasons are not found in print.
Answer: 1. If this argument have of late seen the print, since some discontented persons have sharpened their wits to find out new arguments against the ceremonies; yet might the Defendant say that he thought it never saw print. For that little parallel of things indifferent, or the other treatise of Mr. Bradshaw here named, or his twelve arguments against our ceremonies, printed anno 1605, do creep in the dark, and are hard to be seen of men that walk by daylight.
That Mr. Bradshaw was able to make a syllogism in form as well as any bishop, is no great praise to him. The carpenter’s son can carve a pin as well as his master. But that of sound things unanswered: it needs not. For Mr. Bradshaw revoked his own opinion of things indifferent. And [p. 183] good reason; for as unfit all learning, and interest, he, in that treatise, resolves, that there is nothing indifferent whereto most to do, that all things are either commanded or forbidden, and either necessary or unlawful to be done.
We will not impeach the argument simply for the newness, but stay it to be examined, because it is not likely to be a very sound argument, which all this while came into no man’s head till Mr. Bradshaw rose up.
Replier: 3. There is none of our Divines that treats of worship in general and particular, but has for substance this learning, viz. that religious worship is that which is done to the honor of God; if it be so done according to God’s commandment, then it is true; if not, then it is false. The Defendant cannot name one of all that ever handled the common place of worship, that has not so taught: whereby, if it be true, then the institution of God does not alter the common nature of worship: (i.e.) does not make that worship which otherwise, being used to the same end, and in the same manner, without God’s institution were no worship at all to the same end, which otherwise it should be.
Answer: This learning, that is, that such things as if they were commanded, were essential worship, being not commanded, and yet used in God’s service, are essentially false worship only because not commanded: the substance (I say) of this learning, cannot be deducted out of that, which the Divines hold, who (as has been shown) do hold: that indifferent rites both may, and must be observed to the honoring of God in his worship, and yet are not therefore properly acts of worship, because they do not, per se, and immediately, tend to the honor of God, which unto proper worship of God is essential, be it true or false.
The Replier leaves out those terms of per se and immediately, by which the Divines do distinguish proper worship from that which after a sort is so called; and yet he talks as if he had them all in his pocket. The Divines of Saxony, saying, that God allows not that boldness of (margin: Sax. 174. Confess. Saxon., art. 15 or 17) men of devising worship to him, tell us presently what they mean by worship: such works whose immediate end is that God may be honored, and do wisely distinguish [p. 184] that which is properly worship, from the appurtenances, by this, that the immediate end of religious worship is the honoring of God by doing that very work.
The Divines of Wittenberg, confessing that the Church may make ordinances for stated or festival days, readings and preaching for edification, etc., forthwith add, that yet it is not lawful for her to obtrude on the Churches, the rites of the old law, for any sacred divine thing, whereby of itself God is worshiped. Where we see, that they account the Church there to presume, and err, when she supposes rites, though not commanded of God, as divine worship, whereby God is worshiped per se. But such things as are done to the honor of God not immediately and in themselves, but by reduction, and, as at the second hand, or in respect of some other thing then themselves, the Divines deny to be properly divine worship, though done to the honor of God, as has been said.
The like we have heard out of Ursinus, Zanchy and others before, which being so, the institution of God alone is that which makes the same thing, to be worship truly and really, which without that institution were no such real worship, though used to the same end and manner. The reason is, because where God has determined the means which do immediately belong, though but to order and decency (as the linen breeches of the priests), there the very means per se (as Perkins has told us) are of the essence of God’s worship properly so called, because of the command of God. And their own Mr. Fenner tells us, that, if of the people is required external reverence, that, after the sacred action, bending down the crown of their head, and bowing themselves before the Minister, they should worship God, Ex. 4:24 and Neh. 8, etc., of the practice whereof, the places alleged prove this. See the Replier now tell us whether this adoration is essential and necessary worship, or arbitrary and rational only; and whether this respect of the Minister, be by him called worship of God in a strict, or in a large sense only, or untruly.
The Replier should have done well to have cited some [p. 185] one learned Divine who does deliver, or insinuate his new learning, That the institution of God does not alter the common nature of worship: that is, does not make that to be an act of real worship to him which without the same institution of his, was no act of real worship, though done to the same end, and in the same manner. Sure I am, that our Divines in defining the real worship of God do tell us, it is any act internal, and/or external, which is done according to the commandment of God, and specially to this end that God might be honored. Where we see, that the observation of a commandment of God is in their definition of worship, which excludes from the title of proper worship whatsoever act is not commanded of God, and makes any act commanded to be matter of worship properly. Yet Mr. Bradshaw the father of this new conceit tells us, we cannot deny that his proposition wants a grace of modesty. And why? For else (says he) how could the sole ratification of God, make such things to be true worship, if they were not at all in such use, any worship of God before? To which I answer, that as the sole stamp of the King makes current money, of bullion, which was not money at all before (though used for payment by way of barter as well before as after) or as the sole word of God made living creatures of those that were nothing at all living before: so the sole institution of God makes that action to be true worship, which was before no real worship at all, though used to the same end, and the same manner. For example, the place of sacrifice at Ramah, or elsewhere, before God had determined the particular place, though used to the same end and in the same manner, for sacrifice, yet was not in itself any part of real worship to God; and yet when God had once designated the place, the very observation of that very place, was divine worship, as all learned Divines acknowledge, because all obedience to God in religious actions is religious worship of God, in the kind.
But what need we more to confute this proposition than itself? For to say, the institution of God does distinguish (that is) really do true worship from false, and yet does not vary nor alter the common measure of worship, implies a contradiction… [p. 186] …tradition: as if one should say, the reasonable soul given to a man does not alter the common nature of the creature, but does distinguish him from creatures that have not understanding. Whatsoever really and effectively distinguishes worship, must needs alter the nature of worship.
That these specifical differences do not take away the common natures, the one of a creature, the other of worship, is true; but that they do not at all alter the general nature, and yet put on it a specifical difference, is to me a paradox.
To help the simpler sort, I take the Replier’s words, No lawful ceremonies instituted by men are worship to God, as the time when, the place where we meet. But if God should from Heaven say, You shall meet in such a place, and at such an hour, then by Mr. Bradshaw’s confession, the observation of that very place, and time, should be divine worship, as (says he) the surplice should be, if Christ should so command it. If so, then the institution of God alone might make the observation of the same circumstances, to the same end, and in the same manner, to be a duty of worship, which by themselves was confessed to be none before. How then can it stand good, that divine institution does not alter the common nature of worship?
Lastly, if by common nature of worship, they will understand, all that may be many sort called worship; that is, respective use of body or mind to help forward any religious worship, as (margin: Ames, Marrow 1.4) Ames defines it, and Mr. Perkins seems to allow that description; then we grant that, our ceremonies have something in them of that common nature, as ordinary rites, and yet cannot be parts of essential worship because they have not divine precept to make them; nor of essential false worship, because they are not so imposed or understood as acts of real worship.
Replier: But God’s institution (says the Defendant) does distinguish necessary worship from indifferent, and essential from accidental. Grant all this; what can be made of it, but therefore alter the common nature of worship, making that worship which without it, being used in the same manner and to the same end, is no worship: here is no consequence at all.
Answer: 1. No consequence at all? Can accidental be made essential, without any alteration? 2. The consequence is the Replier’s, not the Defendant’s, who only infers that therefore our ceremonies are no parts of real worship, which, to be parts of arbitrary and accidental worship, he never denied. It may seem that the Replier therefore left out the eighth section, where the Defendant set down in plain terms that our ceremonies are not held any parts of real worship, that he might have the more liberty of playing upon words. If this help not; the Replier has another shift.
Replier: Besides, neither Scripture nor Interpreters of Scripture, nor any good reason will allow that there is any indifferent worship to God.
Answer: Of proper and real worship, no parcel can be simply indifferent, because all is commanded: but of worship taken at large for the external disposing of divine worship, or the manner of it, Scriptures, Interpreters, and all reason does acknowledge indifferent worship. For example, to express our devotion to God by bodily gestures, is (as has been confessed) in the kind, real external worship: but whether this reverence shall be expressed by kneeling, standing, bowing down of the head, or prostration, is indifferent. So, to sing Psalms is a real worship in kind; but this or that tune is arbitrary. To assemble unto the celebration of God’s name and worship, is worship properly, and necessary; to meet in this or that place and hour, to the same end, is worship, but per accidens, and this is arbitrary. So then, so far as we may call the particularities, worship; that is, respectively to their general end, so far may we call them indifferent worship, because they may, without offense to God, be changed or occasionally omitted. Again, amongst the very essential parts of divine external worship, there is an arbitrary choice at sometimes; as, whether we will meditate, pray, read, or sing, or converse for such a time, so as, in respect of this liberty of choice, the kind of worship is indifferent, not simply, but in some respect. But let the Replier go on. [p. 187]
Replier: But the offering of any colored sheep was indifferent before the Levitical Law: afterward, the offering of an unspotted lamb, was necessary and essential in the worship of God. To this objection I answer, first, this opposition of offering any colored sheep before the Levitical Law, to the offering of an unspotted lamb afterward is vain and without ground, from the Law of God: seeing this does nowhere appear in the Scriptures, but that it was as lawful to offer any colored sheep after the Law given as well as before. God requires by Moses that the offerings of his people should be perfect, Lev. 3:10, etc. And this might well be, notwithstanding diversity of color. The party-colored sheep of Jacob were not the worst of the possessed sort, and that by the special direction and blessing of God, Gen. 30:32, 42, with 31:11, 14. God complains of those that offered corrupt sacrifices, torn, lame and sick, Mal. 1:13, 14. But for difference of color, there is little color or show of reason that God gave any such charge in his Law, and it is the doctor’s ignorance of the story, or want of due consideration that made him thus write.
Answer: 1. The Defendant was not without great color, or show of reason, to lead him into this instance of an unspotted lamb, seeing the Holy Ghost describes the Lamb of God typified thereby, by these two terms, of blameless, and unblemished, and without spot. The truth is, that the color or show of this reason, was so great in those words of Saint Peter, as moved him without further examination to conceive, that there was like to be something in the shadow answerable to that term of unspotted, as Mr. Calvin says (in general) there was; however I do not find, but that by “spotted” the Holy Ghost meant blemished in the outward parts; as by the other term, found within. Now he that shall mark, how upon this slight advantage the Replier flies upon the Defendant’s face, shall find a great deal less show of Christian moderation in his reply, then of reason in this instance, which he opposes.
Moreover, when the Defendant mentioned as well the whole body of Levitical ceremonies, which became [p. 188] necessary and essential worship of God merely by (margin: As is cleared in this section.) institution, the Replier needs not triumph upon the failing of one instance, seeing he has said nothing to a hundred other instances concluded in the Levitical Law. For example, that only the family of Levi, and therein the sons of Aaron, should offer sacrifice to God was by institution made necessary, which before was indifferent to that, and other tribes, and families. That they, in worshiping, should turn their faces westward toward the Tabernacle, was then necessary, before arbitrary; as now, in itself. That by two only silver trumpets in the hands of the Priests, the several conventions should be called, was made necessary after the Law, but not before. That the people of Israel should eat the Paschal Lamb, with their staves in their hands, was necessary for the first time; after, arbitrary, and altered. That the Priest should stand on the north side of the altar in offering up his sacrifice, was necessary by constitution; but indifferent, before. To plant a grove, as Abraham did, for convenience of worship, was indifferent, till God forbade it. To sacrifice in any place, was indifferent, till God restrained sacrifice to one place. Yea even when the Law stood in vigor, the Jews used many rites in the performance of worship to God, as arbitrary, because God had not determined of them: (margin: The Opposers argue therefore, that all such rites are false, and this worship is only true or false, and there is no arbitrary worship of God at all, which is contrary, as we have shown.) as, in sprinkling the blood upon the horns of the altar first, and soon to the west; or pouring of the blood out, at the west end of the altar, which God only commanded to be poured out at the foot thereof; and a hundred such like arbitrary rituals, serving to order, decency and edification, noted by Master Ainsworth on Lev. So as the Defendant’s conclusion stands as a rock, That divine institution does not only distinguish true worship from false, but accidental from essential, accessory from necessary; yea and sometimes worship, from no worship, into substantial, which is commanded, and true from that which is falsely so accounted.
Replier: Secondly, suppose a lamb without spot to be forbidden, then I answer, that if any man before the commandment had offered an unspotted lamb with the same mind that after it was to be offered with, as thinking that his sacrifice should in that respect have been the more acceptable unto [p. 189] unto God, because it was of a lamb unspotted, then the offering of such a lamb had been as essential worship before, as it was after, though it could not be so true and lawful.
Answer: As thinking, etc. This Replier who said, Sect. 6, of this chapter, that worship does not vary according to men’s opinion, but consists in the nature of the action itself, now on the contrary confesses, that a man thinking his sacrifice to be the more acceptable to God, because it was a lamb unspotted, when God had not yet commanded that it should so be, should therein perform (even because of such opinion) essential worship to God; but false, because it was not commanded: where the truth he before opposed, is now confessed by himself to our advantage. For hereby it will appear, that no external act can be made a part of essential worship to God, either truly by God’s institution, or falsely by men’s opinion; that it is such a thing as in se pleases and honors God, though it be not required of him.
And indeed this is properly will-worship, superstition, and in a large sense idolatry, when men fancy God to be immediately served and pleased with any such things as he has not required: which is, as (margin: Catech., p. 66.) Ursinus says, to make an idol of God, by ascribing to him another will then he has.
Whence also will follow, that the Replier has discharged our Church ceremonies from his own arrest of them, unless he can prove that we think or teach men to think, that the Lord is better pleased with these ceremonies, even in themselves, then he is without them, or that they are as needful to him as if he had commanded them in his Word.
Replier: Did the Defendant never read nor hear, that matter and form do usually make up the essence of things? And that in institutions which are meant to an end, the respect of that end is also required to the being, but a right efficient is not so? Let him consider a little of the grounds of logic, or read our most logical Divines, such as Zanchy, and he shall soon perceive this truth.
Answer: [p. 190] The Replier undoubtedly has some good conceit of his logic, of which he so often insinuates his skill: but, as ill use of it as other men. And that even here where he so insultingly calls on the Defendant to consider the grounds of logic. For what though all compounded beings are made up of matter and form, and all actions also have something proportionable to matter and form, which gives them their essence; may it not yet stand good, that such actions as have as it were matter and form, and consequently essence of accidental, shall yet have neither matter nor form, and therefore no essence of essential worship, which properly and in itself is so? Does not every distinct thing require, to the being thereof, matter disposed, and a specifical form to give it that being? Has not incest (which is called in a large sense adultery) or unadvised anger (which is called murder) no matter, or form? Or have they the same matter and form, and so the same essence with adultery and murder properly so called? The image of a man is not made without matter and form, no more is a man himself; but, not both of the same matter and essential form. We deny not our ceremonies to have such matter and form, as gives them the essence of religious ceremonies, or appurtenances to outward worship; but, to have any such matter and form as gives them the essence of worship itself, properly so called. And what learned Divine does not with us, in effect, teach that?
As touching this, that the respect of the end is required to the being of such constitutions as are means to that end, whereto will it serve, unless to clear our assertion? That seeing our instituted ceremonies do not respect the honoring of God immediately, and in themselves, but mediately and per accidens, as the late reverend Bishop of (margin: Perth Assembly, p. 60.) Salisbury says, therefore they are not properly parts of divine worship, but by reduction, and in a large extent of that word, as it contains all the adjuncts, and not only the parts of divine worship.
And if every respect of the honor or glory of God, as the final end, makes things done to that end mediately or immediately, to be properly an act of religious worship to [p. 191] God, then all our actions, even our eating and drinking, seeing they ought to be done to the honor of God, shall be acts of proper worship to God. Wherefore this Replier’s logic, who confounds things distinguished, is nothing so ripe as by his brags of logic, one would have expected. But to spare us the search of our logical Divines, he says further.
Replier: Or else without that labor, let him, or any other of common sense tell me, if the Temple of Jerusalem should have been built with all the appurtenances and sacrifices with other observances there used, without any commandment of God, according as they were by his appointment, had there not been essential false worship erected to God? Have the Papists and heathens no essential false worship, but only accidental? It is a shame to confute such unlearned conceits.
Answer: No doubt, if we may call (as the manner is) the essential disworship of God, essential false worship; as we may call a rank rebel, a false subject; then any such action as properly belongs to the acknowledgement and worship of a Deity, (as the consecration of a place for his worship as necessary, the erecting of altars, priests as necessary, which are of their own nature acts of religious worship) done without command or allowance of God, is essential false worship, either in respect of the things themselves, which have no use but for the worship of a Deity; or, of the opinion conceived of them in such use. Nor will any man deny that the Papists, in forging new sacraments, and a new sacrifice, even therein commit essential will-worship, even ratione rerum ipsarum, because sacraments, and sacrifice always intend, in their use, divine worship properly: and in their ceremonies (though many of them be such as do not necessarily import divine worship in their use, yet) when they fix and place the worship of God upon those rites, they do make essential will-worship of them.
But what of this? Is there therefore no true or lawful accidental worship, because there is some essential false worship? And if the command of God made the use of the Temple with [p. 192] with the appurtenances, to be true essential worship, which without such command had been essential false worship; then must it be, that the institution of God does alter the common nature of worship (which the Opponents and this Replier denied), though it does not simply take away the common nature of worship, which the Defendant never affirmed. Is there no difference between changing and taking away the nature of worship? Grace alters nature, but takes it not away.
After all this ruffle, the man cries out, It is a shame to confute such unlearned conceits. But if the Replier has not confuted them, then may he be ashamed to boast as if he had. And if he has confuted them, he has, by his own confession, done that which is a shame for him to do. So that shame will take him which way soever he go, if he say true.
10. Four Nonconformist Arguments; Mt. 15:2 on the Pharisees’ Condemned Traditions, Explained
In this section four arguments are brought to prove our ceremonies to be imposed and used as parts of God’s worship, and discussed.
Opposers: That which is imposed to breed an opinion of holy practice, is appointed and ordained part of God’s worship. But these ceremonies are therefore imposed; for Master Hooker tells us out of Ecclesiasticus 45, that they could not mention the holy garments, but with effectual signification of most singular reverence and love; giving us thereby an ample acknowledgement that reverence is to be yielded, and holiness afforded to our ministerial garments. (Thesis 7 and others; Ecclesiastical Polity, p. 61)
Defendant in sum: That by this and the rest objected, it may appear, that these objections proceed not so much out of precipitancy [p. 193] [p. 194] precipitancy or mis-guided zeal, as from a perverse and sinister purpose of calumniation: else would he not have dealt so unjustly with Mr. Hooker, by imputing to his testimony alleged, such a superstitious opinion of holiness, as though he had meant any operative holiness either by infusion or inhesion, and not only that which is significative, even as his own words do directly import.
Replier: Here are many proofs conjoined under the name of Master Hy. and others; the answers to which are just such as the ceremonies be, merely formal without merit or substance of truth.
Answer: That our ceremonies are merely formal, and therefore have nothing of the essence or substance of divine worship (properly so called) in them, is that which we say, and you oppose. Whether the answers brought to the objections now brought to prove them matters of divine worship, be merely formal, without substance of truth, comes now to be tried.
Replier: The first is, Ceremonies are imposed to breed an opinion of holiness, says Master Hooker, affirms, p. 61, and therefore are parts of God’s worship. The consequence is not denied by the Defendant, nor yet the antecedent directly: so that the whole argument seems to be granted, only the Defendant says, that Master Hooker did not affirm operative holiness either by infusion, or inhesion, (which two terms are unreasonably by him disjoined) but only significative, as his words import.
Answer: The Defendant indeed took not all the advantages he might against that objection; contenting himself with one only exception as most material, namely at the proof of their antecedent from Master Hooker’s testimony. Whether it be not a clear denial thereof, let any man judge. For as he that cuts off the leg of a man throws down his body, so he that takes away the proof of a proposition, overturns it necessarily. But the Defendant does not do this [p. 195] this alone, but taxes the Opposers of a sinister purpose of calumniation, in fathering on Master Hooker even a conceit so far from truth, that our ceremonies are appointed to breed an opinion of holiness in them. Now, if this be to grant all, I know not what it is to deny. Master Hooker’s own words are these: The wise man which feared God from his heart, and honored his service that was done unto him, could not mention so much as the garments of the High Priest, but with effectual signification of most singular reverence: were it reasonable, that the very least things which are employed in his service, should be amiable; then that our over-scrupulous dislike of so mean a thing as a vestment, should from the very service of God withdraw their hearts and affections? Thus he.
And what ground is here for their antecedent, viz. Ceremonies are appointed to breed an opinion of holiness (as Master Hooker affirms)? And let any man’s conscience tell me, if this dotage be not fathered on Master Hooker perversely, whose argument there, is only from the example of that writer, who for love of the service of God spoke of the holy vestments of Aaron with so much affection, that we should by proportion the rather count a surplice lovely for the service of God, about which it is employed, then abhor the very service of God itself for so mean a thing as a surplice is, even in their own account who oppose it.
The Defendant’s answer therefore, that this is a perverse calumniation of Master Hooker, as if he had meant to attribute any operative holiness to garments, is not only a denial, but a just rebuke of that antecedent.
The terms of infusion, or inhesion, are not used distinctively, but equivalently, as two words of which they may choose which they will, as when we say love or charity, magistrates or governors. And yet the Replier will needs set up his own mark, and shoot at it, saying, These terms are unreasonably disjoined. But he further answers.
Replier: To which I answer, first, that as the nice distinctions which are now used in the schools of Jesuits, do not help, but that popish superstition is as gross as ever it was in [p. 196] practice; so this distinction of operative, infusion, inhesion, significative, does not help, but the common people, in many places inclined to superstition, do attribute as much holiness to some of these ceremonies, as they do to some holy ordinances of God.
Answer: 1. This is not a reply, but a vagary. He should have shown, if anything, that Master Hooker, in that place alleged, affirms or insinuates, that our ceremonies are imposed to breed opinion of holiness. But this he could not do, and yet he will say something, though nothing to the matter in hand.
2. And what though there be some nice distinctions made by Jesuits to palliate those popish superstitions which are in common practice as gross as ever; is there therefore no distinction between holiness operative and holiness significative? And if some of the people do attribute as much holiness to some of these ceremonies, as to God’s own ordinances, alike as (of their disciples) not a few, make more conscience of not kneeling, then of not receiving the Sacrament (which is a gross superstition:) shall our ceremonies therefore be said to be imposed to that end, because they are, by some men’s ignorance or superstition abused thereto? We look for a better reply than this.
Replier: 2. The patrons of our ceremonies, such as Master Hooker was, do attribute that holiness to the ceremonies, which the Fathers did. Now that they ascribed operative holiness to some of them, Master Parker has made plain in his book of the Cross, part 1, p. 77, 79, 92.
Answer: Even now the distinction of operatively holy and significatively holy, was despised as a novelty. Now the Replier seems to acknowledge it a distinction good enough. But yet he speaks not to the issue. For what if some other patrons of our ceremonies did ascribe operative holiness to some of them, does this prove that Master Hooker does so? And, in that place also? Or, that the Church of England does so? Surely no more than that this Replier and all other opposers of our ceremonies, may be charged with saying, that we bow the knee to Baal when we receive the Sacrament kneeling, because some of their party speak and so [p. 197] write. The instance of Master Hooker was, of the vestments; the Defendant (after Master Parker) now puts in for the Cross; which, though one of our ceremonies, yet not that for which Master Hooker was now alleged.
3. It is but captious equivocation, when we speak of some of the Fathers whose better examples we imitate, to oppose other of the Fathers whom we neither named for patterns, nor imitated.
4. Master Perkins might have taught Master Parker to understand sundry passages of the Fathers touching the Cross, in a better sense, then Master Parker’s eagerness will admit. Finally whatsoever is to be said against our ceremonies in their particular, belongs to the second book, not to this wherein general arguments against them all are produced.
Replier: 3. Master Hooker does not here speak of reverence signified by the ceremonies, but of reverence to be signified towards them, as being things holy and worthy of reverence.
Answer: What Master Hooker speaks of, his own words recited erewhile do manifest, where the signification of reverence to the holy garments of Aaron for the use and service to which they were ordained of God is noted; not to infer thence any such like holiness in our vestments appointed by men; but only to show, that we should rather think well of them, for the sake of God’s service in which they are used, then ill of God’s service, for their sakes, which is most reasonable.
Replier: 4. What Master Hooker ascribed to the Cross, is to be seen in Master Parker, p. 91.
Answer: 1. But whatever he ascribes to the Cross elsewhere, will not prove that here he ascribes holiness to the surplice as was affirmed. 2. Neither can any man see so well in a few excerpted parcels which Master Parker has, as in Master Hooker himself, that all he ascribes to the (margin: R. Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, 5, p. 68, 69, 484) Cross, is, but the benefit of a monitory sign, which is far enough from the conceit of inherent, or operative holiness. And if Master Hooker had overstrained himself in the defense of this ceremony, as the opposers of it have done on the contrary, how would his private opinion prove, that [p. 198] the same is imposed by the Church to breed an opinion of holiness in it, when the contrary is by public authority professed? Pass we then along to their second reason.
Opposers: Secondly, they may challenge this respect of reverence and holiness, being the constitutions of the sacred Synod, which (as is alleged) is the Church of Christ representative.
Defendant in sum: This objection proceeds (as the former) out of a sinister purpose of calumniation, because else they would not have twitted with such foul scurrility, our Church in her Convocation, for assuming the title of sacred Synod unto her, as being the representative body thereof, seeing the Apostle in all his superscriptions to the several Churches, calls them Saints by calling: to which is added, that themselves are sufficiently bent to call their brethren the Nonconformists, holy Professors. To this hear the Replier.
Replier: The second reason is, because the ceremonies are the constitutions of a sacred Synod. The force of which argument lies in this, that a holy assembly of spiritual Lords and their assistants, if they be truly holy, and spiritual, in their authority, and in the exercise of it, will appoint no ceremonies but holy: and by the observance of the said ceremonies, have some spiritual honor redounding unto themselves, because the virtue which is found in any effect, does redound always unto the praise of the cause. To this the Defendant gives no real answer.
Answer: Instead of opposing the Defendant’s answer, the Replier has confirmed it, pouring out to the very lees, that foul scurrility, with which this objection was first vexed. For I appeal to the conscience of any man, what could tend more to break a scornful jest upon the Convocation house than can be imagined of this argument. And is this [p. 199] the way of holy and religious men, to pretend arguments, and perform jestings? The Replier says, no real answer has been given to this. As if a spiteful jest were not answer enough, to note it and so let it go as a vagrant thing? But he shall now have more.
First, it is a manifest untruth that these three ceremonies, now in question, were of the institution of the Convocation house. For they were so ordained by King Edward, ratified by Queen Elizabeth, and by consent of the whole Parliament. But these men find it safer to cast a scorn at the Bishops and Ministers assembled in Convocation, then to spit their gall directly in the face of majesty, and Parliamentary power.
If the Convocation house had ordained them, it follows not that they were therefore ordained as parts of divine worship; or, to breed an opinion of holiness in them; but, as all Church ceremonies ought to be, for order, decency, peace and edification.
If we shall call them holy, as the churches, and other vessels are called, because they are not mere civil ceremonies, but used in holy actions; this term (I hope) may be borne very well, and yet no holiness ascribed to the things in themselves in the exercise of them, save only in respect of their application, and end, which being for order, and decency in God’s worship, is holy, and ought not to be so scornfully despised.
He that will deny to a Synod of men, sanctified to the special service of God by their callings, and exercised about Church matters, the term of a sacred Synod, to distinguish the nature of it from mere political assemblies, has, or shows more stomach than wit, or learning. For the title of holiness not always personal, but often functional: be it thus; all Israel in general, the Levites and Priests in particular were styled holy, and that even when in their persons, the vigor of holiness did not appear as (blessed be God) it does in many of that our assembly however these men who (God knows) say to all other men, stand back, I am holier than thou, do censoriously and uncharitably speak of them. But against the Defendant’s [p. 200] comparison of that assembly with the visible churches, which are called Saints by calling the Replier objects.
Replier: That this comparison is affirmed contrary to the truth, whereas, besides other differences, churches are of God; or Convocations of men; churches are gathered for the holy worship of God: Convocations (as experience shows) for nothing less.
Answer: Churches are of God by men, by whom they are gathered and governed: and are not Convocations so? Has not the Sovereign of God established the use of ecclesiastical Synods for church affairs, as well as the gathering of churches? Indeed so the separatists (Master Jacob dealt with) who the parish pastor, in his parish, has supreme authority, and is not subject to the control of Synods or Bishops, further then by way of brotherly admonition. So excellently skillful are men become in forming of bodies without ligaments or sinews, which no age before did ever apprehend.
As to his second, I answer, that however little is sometimes done at their meetings, because they find no special reason of change or addition, nor have commission from his Majesty: yet are they always gathered unto a special duty of God’s service, as the writs of their calling show: so that it may, in this respect, be called a sacred Synod, even as well as other church assemblies, or societies of professors are, whereof sometimes a great part do not only pretermit but neglect that worship of God for which they are gathered together. Pass we to the Opponent’s third objection.
Opposers: Thirdly, seeing that the Cross and Surplice are set apart from civil uses, and appropriated to the acts of Religion in God’s service.
Defendant: As for the third point concerning appropriation of anything to God’s service, you could not have indeed it to be a necessary argument of essential holiness, especially having confessed that the pulpit-cloth may, without any superstition, be continually fastened to the pulpit, and the Communion cup be reserved only for sacramental use, and not employed [p. 201] employed at all in any civil or ordinary service: even as the Church and place of God’s service itself, is no less lawfully a ceremony because it is assigned only unto holy worship. To this, the Replier.
Replier: The third reason is, because the ceremonies are appropriated to acts of religion in God’s service. To this the Defendant answers, by denying the consequence, because the pulpit-cloth, the Communion-cup, and the place of meeting are so appropriated, and yet not essentially holy. But herein he shows, that he does not understand well what it is that he opposes.
Answer: It is a pretty shift to say, you were not rightly understood, when you can no longer defend what you said. What could you mean by appropriation of ceremonies to God’s service, but that they are separated unto religious actions only? Now you are puzzled, and toiled with instances of some things, appropriated in like manner to acts of religion, which yourselves confess not to be thereby, or therefore made parts of divine worship, and to be lawful; you tell us that these are civil. This flim-flam Mr. Jacob lent you, and both he and you take it up merely for a shift; not out of conscience, or judgment, but of a haughty desire of defending what you have once spoken. Show the difference in the point of appropriation, and why the Defendant understands not what he opposes?
Replier: For these things, whereof he speaks, are only civil, being drawn from the ordinary civil customs of men.
Answer: Only civil? Our churches separated for holy meetings, our pulpits for preaching, our fonts for baptism, our cups for the Communion, are they (in that application) only civil? What civil man will say so? And are all things in application merely civil which are drawn from civil to sacred uses? Then the water to wash with in baptism, and bread and wine to be eaten and drunk in the Lord’s Supper, are merely civil. But he adds.
Replier: And are of the same use out of the service of God, that they are in it.
Answer: [p. 202] > > Answer: The same use, man? The use of any thing is the application of it to an end. Is the use of our common houses, pews, cups, and lavers, the same with that of churches, etc.? Some use there may be, the same cannot be; if holy and civil use do differ.
Replier: And therefore however some special individuals of this kind may be impropriated unto religious acts, yet the kind is not.
Answer: What then? Are these individuals the less appropriated because the kind is not? The Tabernacle, Trumpets, Chariots, sheep market, particular offerings were in their particulars appropriated to holy uses, though all the kind were not. Nor are all the kind of linen garments, crosses, or kneelings appropriated to religious uses, but the individuals only.
Replier: Neither have those specials any other signification in the service of God, then they have in the service of men.
Answer: What makes that to the point of appropriation, which is here their argument, and must prove either our churches, pulpits, communion cups, and fonts to be in their use essential parts of God’s worship, because appropriated to his worship; or not these our ceremonies to be essential worship, for being appropriated to religious uses. Yet might it be shown, that churches (as Zanchy says) and pulpits, and fonts, (as others) signify something else then civil houses, drinking cups, and lavers, though we need not lay hold thereon. For, if appropriation of a thing to actions of religion make them to be a means of real worship, our churches shall in, or our ceremonies out of this net. The fourth reason follows.
Opposers: 4. Because they may claim a religious reverence and honor, which was the cause why Christ rebuked the Pharisees for washing of their hands, Mt. 15, because they feigned a holiness in their own invention.
Defendant in sum: This objection is altogether impertinent, considering [p. 203] that Christ did not reprove their act of washing, but their intention and opinion, in attributing a legal and operative sanctity to that their own invention; which was indeed a superstition and the very leaven of the Pharisees, from which there issued a religious reverence, far exceeding that respect which we shall hereafter prove to be lawfully attributed to our ceremonies. Now the Replier.
Replier: The fourth confirmation is from Mt. 15, where such ceremonies are blamed of Christ by this reason. To this the Defendant answers, that the act of washing is not there reproved, but the invention and opinion of an operative sanctity and holiness ascribed to it. But first, to what purpose does he deny, that the act of washing simply considered in itself, was unlawful? Was there ever any so dirty, that he would affirm such a foul fancy?
Answer: Indeed it had been to no purpose to deny the act of washing simply considered, to be lawful; but the Defendant did not so. The Replier forges that idle answer, and then jests at it. The Defendant says, that Christ did not reprove (he says not the act, but) their act of washing, but their intention and opinion; now, their act of washing was not washing simply for cleanliness, but was a monitory significant ceremony, as yourselves confess; and that act of washing, Christ does not reprove, but only in respect of the superstitious opinion which they annexed to it. Otherwise (as Mr. Calvin says) Christ would not have suffered (as he did without reproof) the six water-pots after the manner of their purification, Jn. 2. And this (I hope) is to the purpose, and is Calvin’s judgment on that place of Mt. 15.
Replier: Secondly, the intention and opinion of holiness; that, which now our ceremonies are charged with, therefore in that there is no difference.
Answer: Christ accused the Pharisees truly of that fault, wherewith you accuse us falsely: now between a true and false accusation there is some difference.
Replier: [p. 204] Thirdly, that the Pharisees attributed any more operative holiness unto their washing, then many among us do to the cross, cannot be shown out of the text: there is not one circumstance there, which may not fitly be applied to our ceremonies.
Answer: The question is not, what some blind and superstitious persons attribute to the cross, contrary to our doctrine of it: but, whether the Church does impose or allow like opinion of holiness or necessity thereof, in that use which she enjoins of it. The Replier flies off from this, and tells us, what some amongst us do; and whether this be true or no, I know not, but I am sure it is impertinent to the question.
Secondly, we find in the text, that the Pharisees so strongly conceited the necessity of this their washing, that they thought the very creatures of God should defile them, if they were eaten with unwashen hands: yea, say the (margin: Rabbi Levi in Gen. rab. Sect. 6.) Rabbis, as much as if they had lain with a harlot, abusing thereto the place of Prov. 6:28. Can any man so much forget all modesty, as to say we conceive so of any of our ceremonies?
Replier: Fourthly, not only Calvin upon the place, says, that the inventing of such ceremonies was an idle vanity, even before the high opinion of religion was added unto it, but Bellarmine himself confesses, that Christ reproved this ceremony in the Pharisees, because it was vain and unprofitable.
Answer: Not only Bellarmine is here abusively obtruded by the Replier; but Calvin also himself, abused. Bellarmine says, that Christ condemned three things in the Jews’ ceremonies, whereof the second is, that many of their traditions were altogether vain and unprofitable, quamvis toties mandatum. Now this which Bellarmine speaks falsely to defend the popish ceremonies from the lash of that place; this man cites, as if it were judiciously and rightly said by him; whereas the truth is (as (margin: Chemnitius, Exam. part. 1.) Chemnitius well observes) that Christ condemned not these washings simply as profane follies, as the Papists suppose, nor as simply unlawful; but in respect of religion placed in them. Calvin is wrested unreasonably. [p. 205] For he makes there three sorts of human traditions; the first, empty; the second, when men involve the worship of God in profane follies; the third, which have more color, or are blemished with any remarkable faults, which yet are therefore condemned because they are imagined to be necessary for the worship of God: and so men depart from the true obedience of that one God, and a snare is cast upon the conscience. And of this last sort (says he) it is certain that this place speaks. For the washing of hands which the Pharisees urged, could not of itself be a wicked superstition, otherwise Christ would not have suffered the water-pots to have been set out in their marriages, unless it had been a free ceremony: Sed in hoc, hic peccarunt — but herein lay the fault, that they thought God could not otherwise be rightly worshiped. Thus far Calvin, who showing after, what a fair pretense these washings might have at the first, tells us, that corruption quickly followed when men’s inventions began to be reputed parts of God’s worship, and further, when in free and voluntary things necessity was placed: for that God will be served according to the prescript of his Word, he concludes thus; Iam vitium, etc. Now as God permits the faithful to have their external rites, in which they may exercise themselves unto godliness: so he suffers not the same to be mingled with his word, as if religion lay in them. I appeal unto the consciences of men therefore, whether Mr. Calvin has not cleared this place from their false interpretation, and our ceremonies from that blame, which was cast upon the Jewish superstitious washings, in which religion and necessity were fondly placed? Yea, if he does not teach, that their very washings while used only as a free ceremony, and as an exercise unto piety, were so long blameless? As for that little thread which the Replier has cut off, it is falsely alleged as touching the intention, though the words be Calvin’s. For what Calvin speaks ex hypothesi, the Replier delivers as if it had been simply spoken. Comminisci, etc.: To devise new washings (says Calvin, besides those which God has in the Law ordained) was of idle vanity, that is, to devise new washings to the like end, and with the like opinion of them, as of those which God had set; as all the context [p. 206] shows. But this never could be without some superstitious opinion: although (as Calvin after says) this corruption was made much worse, in that religion was cast upon the consciences; that he was made guilty of pollution, who did not every hand-while wash his body with water. Calvin therefore is so far from condemning this ceremony of washing, before superstition did arrest it, that he does clearly discharge the same of fault (and so, the like) considered as a free ceremony, and exercise unto piety without superstition.
11. That ceremonies are preferred to necessary duties, answered; Ames allows in some cases heavier punishments for lighter offenses; Nonconformists’ violence have made others to fare worse
Opposers: These ceremonies imposed, are, for their use and practice, preferred before necessary duties, and principal parts of God’s worship; as, wear a surplice, or preach not; use the sign of the cross or baptize not; practice these ceremonies, or else you shall not exercise any other ordinances of God.
Defendant: This is but dull sophistry; for who sees not that this is not the preferring of wearing a surplice before preaching (as you fondly imagine,) but to prefer an orderly and discreet preacher, before one that is factious and exorbitant? If the Lord Chancellor, having appointed a commission for his Majesty’s service, and designing a place most convenient for that purpose: afterward, understanding some one or other of the commissioners to be so peremptorily self-willed, as to refuse to sit with the rest of the commissioners, in the place appointed; shall exempt that party, and put him out of the commission, placing another in his stead; should it not argue want of common reason, to infer hereupon, that the said Lord Chancellor had hereby preferred the circumstance of a place before his Majesty’s service.
Replier: [p. 207] Here is set down a reason of Master Hy, to prove that our ceremonies in their use and practice are preferred and honored above principal parts of God’s worship: because the ablest ministers that are, may not be suffered to exercise any ministry in England, except they shall apply themselves to these ceremonies. To this the Defendant answers, that it is dull sophistry; because by this means only an orderly and discreet preacher is preferred before one that is factious and exorbitant. Now, if ever, he speaks like a bishop, when he sits in his pontificals, to judge the poor according to the laws of iniquity. It seems some galled place of his conscience was touched, when mention was made of silencing able and godly ministers for trifling ceremonies of man’s invention. How much better were it for such men to enter into their hearts betimes and think what answer they can give unto God for such palpable treachery?
Answer: All these more then pontifical words, lying in the mouth of the Replier’s stomach, and cast up before any reply can come? If any Bishop’s heart can challenge him of willing silencing any able, godly, and peaceable minister, merely for omission of these ceremonies, he may do well to consider of it in time. And so should every minister do who has chosen to acquit his ministry, rather then to conform himself in ceremonies, though human, yet not impious, nor offensive to God; for there may be damnable treachery therein. Now, that some galled part of the Defendant’s conscience is touched with this objection (who never silenced any minister for only omission of ceremonies) has no ground, but from the malice of the Replier. And by these intemperate railings, the wiser sort may judge, whether men spirited like to this Replier, and opposite to the laws of the Church, established by kingly power, (which this man calls the laws of iniquity) be not likelier to disturb the Church with their furies, then to build it up with their labors, what abilities soever they have.
Replier: But to examine a little the reason that is in this answer, under the term of dull sophistry; he more then [p. 208] touches the consequence of the reason; yet if it be rightly understood, all his wit will not avoid the point of it. For first thus I take the meaning, which the practice: he that is an able, godly minister, if he will not use these ceremonies, may not be suffered to have place in the ministry. But he that will use these ceremonies, though he may neither comparatively to the other, nor anything competently by himself, be either able or godly, shall hold his place in the ministry. Therefore these ceremonies are preferred before the main things of the Law and Gospel.
Answer: 1. Though the conclusion were granted, yet the inference supposed to follow thereupon, that therefore our ceremonies are made parts of God’s worship, will not hold: but only, that men have erroneously preferred the lesser things before the greater. A man, who for his business, or pleasures, profanes or neglects the Lord’s day, and the duties thereof, does not thereby profess his pleasures, or profits, to be parts of God’s worship, to which yet (in practice) he prefers them.
But secondly, his argument is ill grounded. For first, if some men have practiced, as he speaks; there is no more reason to charge all with this, then all judges or magistrates with that which some have done amiss. Secondly, if it be so that the laws of the state have not given power to the bishops to deprive evil, unlearned, and scandalous ministers, as the same have done to remove men opposite to these things (as indeed it has not) the bishops may with grief suffer others far more worthy of sentence, and deprive some for these things, not as counting these things greater, but as wanting power to the other.
Thirdly, it is a double calumniation, that no inconformable ministers may be, or are suffered, and that no unable and ungodly minister being conformable is deprived. For though the episcopal power simply cannot do all that were fit, yet the High Commission does often deprive such; and I trust will do, when cause shall be.
Fourthly, it is to be considered, that a far lesser offense defended, is more punishable, then a greater confessed: and [p. 209] further, that certain evils, although simply considered in themselves they may be lesser, yet they may do more hurt to public tranquility and peace, then others which in themselves are greater: as Dr. Ames says, giving that for our reason, why stealing of an ox, or sheep was more deeply punished by God’s Law, then taking away of money or household stuff of greater value. (margin: Ames, Of Conscience, bk. 5, ch. 52, thesis 5)
Lastly, if all this were truly to be said of the bishops generally, yet seeing all the bishops do teach and profess, that these ceremonies are not to themselves, or in their account of them, any parts of divine worship, or things so important as are the abilities and godliness of the ministers; it may be conceived, that it is something else hanging at this string of inconformity, which makes them so ready to break it off. The prosecution of Jephthah was not after Shibboleth, but after an Ephraimite whose Shibboleth betrayed him. Judg. 12:6. Schism in the Church, dividing Christ and Christians, is no light matter, though ceremonies be not weighty: the not wearing of a surplice hurts not, but the condemning of it as a piece of will-worship, an idolatrous thing, hurts more, then a right good man’s preaching repairs again. And the abler and better he seems, that lays on this corrosive, the more hurt he does. For my part, I think that the violence of some meaner men against these things, has caused the sharper execution of laws against some other men of worth, Crudelem medicum intemperans aeger facit — the Lord give grace and wisdom to both sides to consider what they have done, and to do what they ought; and peace be to Zion. But sure I am that such books as this Reply, are much more likely to remove more inconformable ministers, then to abate any of the ceremonies.
Replier: Secondly, I take it thus; though there cannot be found able and discreet conformable ministers enough to supply all the parishes of England, yet many able and godly men are thrust out of the ministry, because they will not conform to these ceremonies; therefore conformity to these ceremonies is preferred before the main duties of God’s worship.
Answer: This follows not simply, but that they conceive, that [p. 210] that it is better that some places should for a time want some part of that shape, which it were fit they had; then have the same with such conditions, as by consequence may produce a hurt greater to the general, then the good which would come to some particulars, would recompense. And herein some of the nonconformitans are no less blameable, who had rather that all the parishes had wanted preachers, then that the preachers should conform; will they then grant that they prefer inconformity to the main duties of God’s worship? Let them get out of this trap where they can, and they shall let us out with them.
Replier: If all the Defendant’s sharpness of wit can answer the bluntness of this argument, which every plowman that is a good Christian does usually make against the Prelates’ proceedings, then for my part I shall be contented to be called dull, for from my childhood hitherto I ever took it to be unanswerable.
Answer: A far less wit then God has given the Defendant, may answer, that this dull argument is but a fallacy non causa pro causa, like as one should say, God would admit no man to the priesthood who had any blemish in his body whatever abilities or graces soever were in his soul, therefore he preferred bodily perfection before spiritual, whereas he meant to prefer both together, before one alone, for the type’s sake.
That he tells us, it is every plowman’s argument, and such as from a child hitherto, he thought unanswerable, is no great good argument, for this argument; for plowmen and children are not the best logicians. His addition, that is a good Christian, etc., savors strongly of that spirit of separation which has been hunted after in the chase of inconformity; for this shows, that with these men (the adversaries of ceremonies and bishops) are the only good Christians. Who are you that judge another man’s servant.
Replier: The comparison of the Lord Chancellor will not help him in this case. For that Chancellor were unworthy of his own place, who would for his own pleasure, or for the circumstance of a place, which may easily be changed, put out of com- [p. 211] -mission a grave wise man, when another like unto him could not be found.
Answer: 1. “When another like unto him could not be found,” was not in the Defendant’s comparison; but is brought in by the Replier as it were to inform us of what a high strain beyond all other men, inconformitans are; and indeed whether this party persuaded, whether upon cause or out of partiality and prejudice, I leave to judgment. For my part, I honor the graces of God which are eminent in some of them, and the persons in whom they are; but that there be none others equal unto them, I was never yet able to discern.
But, he tells us, the Lord Chancellor should be unworthy of his place that would put such an one out of commission for a circumstance of a place, etc. Wherein he speaks boldly enough, but not so considerately. For though the circumstance of a place be light, yet the contumacy of such a man as would not obey in that so light circumstance, would in all men’s judgments be thought cause enough to put him out of commission. The Replier it seems was not well assured of this answer, wherefore he puts in another, saying.
Replier: Beside the case is nothing like; for in the circumstance of a place for commissioners to meet in, there can be no conscience pretended. But herein offer has been made by the ministers thus wronged, solemnly to confirm by oath, that nothing but conscience does keep them from conforming.
Answer: 1. This unlikeness, makes no unlikeness in that point in which the comparison was laid, which was only in this; that as the Lord Chancellor putting out of commission such an one, as refuses the place designed cannot be said simply to prefer the circumstance of a place (which as the Replier says might easily be changed) before the King’s service; so neither can they, which put out a minister for refusal of conformity, be said simply to prefer ceremonies to the duties of God’s worship. That the Replier has found some dissimilitude, is nothing to the matter, so long as the resemblance does hold as far as it was set.
That sundry ministers would have taken such oath I believe: and I doubt not but so may and will (if need be) many [p. 212] many more of us the conformitans, that nothing but conscience makes us conform. And likely enough that many of the separation, Papists, and Familists will do so for their ways. But whether this make it not the more needful to oppose that opinion so much the more strongly, is disputable. For the more conscience is fixed to any error of opinion, the more haste must be made to cut it off. And our Divines (margin: de Theol. exercit. christ., p. 245.) tell us that in case of indifferent rites, when men come once to challenge our title, and to infringe our liberty, we must not then give place no not for an hour; though otherwise if they were only weak and doubtful, we ought for a time be indulgent to them who are contrary minded.
I wish with all my heart that they would all revise the grounds of that their conscience, and be as willing to have their judgments informed, as their reputation with men maintained: and this would not hurt their consciences, and might end the strife.
Replier: Now for the sweet terms which it pleases the Defendant here to use, I will desire no more, then that he would bring them back again to his own conscience: and ask that before God; whether Master Midgley of Rochdale, who after he had labored near fifty years in the ministry, to the conversion of thousands, was inhumanely silenced by the Bishop of Chester, were a factious and exorbitant man? And that which I say of him because he belonged to Chester I understand of many hundreds, which have in like manner been oppressed.
Answer: It is out of doubt, that as two hundred men followed Absalom in the simplicity of their hearts, ignorant of his treason. So, sundry men followed inconformity, without a factious purpose led by the persuasion of their minds. Nor did the Defendant mean to brand such with those terms which nothing but faction will deny to be but so agreeable to sundry others; and it is to be lamented that Master Midgley, and some others of excellent mark, have suffered as well as they that were indeed factious and exorbitant. And though I conceive that such noted men were taken off in hope that many which held dependence upon them [p. 213] them would the sooner have yielded; yet neither has the event answered that expectation, nor did all men approve of that way; of which they, who by their clamorous and factious carriage, have brought others that were peaceable to be besieged as they in Abel, should not speak, without remorse: for they chiefly caused this. The remedies of evil are not always pleasant, nor always answerable to expectation. And this I know that some of the Bishops did silence and deprive some ministers with much compassion and grief, and if any did otherwise, it lies on their accounts.
Replier: No doubt the evil servant which is spoken of, Mt. 24:49, when he began to beat his fellow servants, called them factious and exorbitant fellows: but he with all that are like him know better, and one day shall be constrained to give other witness.
Answer: Here is a great deal of rashness to say, no doubt of that; of which there is no proof to be made. That servant fell to drinking and then to fighting, in which case the terms of factious or exorbitant are not so frequent, as that one should say, no doubt he called them so. But the truth is, when men are drunken with wine, or error, or pride, especially spiritual pride, they are ready enough to vilify and oppress. And if the Bishops for executing the Law with rigor, shall find something to answer for; does this Replier, and such as he, who without Law, without calling, without reason, without conscience do smite with their tongues and condemn to the pit of darkness the Bishops, the conformed ministers, and in a manner all that are not of their party; think that they shall find nothing on their score? The Lord give us more brotherly hearts on both sides: for surely that will bring more peace, then violence and despitefulness can yield.
Replier: 2. I would know of the Defendant also, whether all or the most of them that are in the ministry be orderly and discreet men, in that religious meaning which belongs to ministers? This I am sure of, the voice of all the country goes clean otherwise.
Answer: [p. 214] No answer need be given to such extravagant bitings, impertinent to the cause: yet thus much to him, lest he boast, first, that the voice of the country is mostly the echo of their own voice; and they might help that. Secondly, that some rigorous preciseness in which they have entangled many poor men’s judgments; as, about some recreations, and some other like things have caused many to be collied with their black stone, who (I trust) will be found clothed in white at the great day. Thirdly, I confess there be too many disorderly and unexcusable; for whose deposition the Law of the Land has not fully provided. And if he know any so large a province that has not too many such, I desire to know where it lies. Fourthly, if he imagine that all nonconformable men be orderly and discreet, he is a man of strange imaginations, or a great stranger in his own country. Lastly, orderliness of conversation otherwise, does in no Church free any member thereof from censure, who is disorderly in respect of their Church orders and discipline established.
Replier: When Master Midgley, and his son after him, were silenced at Rochdale, all the country knows what an orderly discreet preacher came into the place. When worthy Master Baynes was silenced at Cambridge, as a factious exorbitant man, there was, beside many other unworthy ministers, one commonly called the Vicar of Foolishness, who was kept in, as an orderly discreet preacher.
Answer: 1. It cannot be denied that into some of the places voided by the deposal of inconformable ministers, some wondrously unequal and inferior to them, and unworthy men, have succeeded. Which if it cannot but grieve any godly Bishop, (howsoever it lies not absolutely in their power, either to present worthy, or to refuse such as be presented to places being qualified by Law) I see not, but it should lie more heavily upon those, who crying out unto those men, Stand, stand; yield to nothing, if ever you will keep your credit with good men, stand to your tackling: have by this means helped to lift out their excellent ministers, and withal to let in others, whom they now complain of. And the consideration [p. 215] of this mischief likely enough to follow, was that which our godly and learned Divines used of purpose to persuade men to conformity.
I fear me, some men complain of the weakness and faults in the ministry, (as some preached Christ) of envy: being in their heart more sorry there be so many able, godly, and painful conformable ministers, then that there be so many insufficient or scandalous ones. Sure I am, that some of them do point more at the best then at the worst; and this verily must needs be the child of faction. For the respect of these more worthy men, is no doubt a great hindrance to their market. This like humor made Browne so violent against Master Cartwright, and Henry Barrow against Mr. Calvin, and all our separatists against the best lights which in this, or other Churches do shine forth.
Replier: 3. If faction and exorbitancy may be charged on them that neglect a ceremonious canon upon conscience, what name shall be found fit for the Prelates, who willfully, without and against conscience, do continually live in and by the breach of many substantial ancient and wholesome canons? For this see Mr. Parker, Of the Cross, pt. 2, ch. 9, sect. 4.
Answer: 1. What ado is here upon these terms of factious and exorbitant, neither given to all inconformable men, nor to be put off from all of them? How would this man have startled, if such terms of proud Prelates, limbs of Antichrist, hypocrites, time-servers, belly-gods, idolaters (familiarly bestowed by these men upon others) had been put upon themselves? So sensible are men of the smaller blows which they take, more then of those greater which they give.
The recrimination, which out of Mr. Parker, the Replier inverts upon our Bishops, has more show than substance: for all ancient wholesome canons bind not every particular Church, but her own. Nor is it rightly taken up, that these men are counted factious for neglect of a ceremonious canon upon conscience, but for stiff opposition to ecclesiastical canons, which they despitefully speak and write against, and for contempt of those state laws, by which the [p. 216] Book of Common Prayer, and these ceremonies in controversy are established; and for that they draw (as fast as they can) into a body of themselves, engrossing aforehand the name of the Brethren, the Godly, the Church, the Good Christians; as if we had lost our Christ and they had found him and carried him quite away.
12. Many think the Sacraments are not Rightly Administered without these Ceremonies, Answered
Opposers: They are known to be imposed (and observed) as parts of God’s worship, for many people in all parts of the land are known to be of this mind, that the sacraments are not rightly and sufficiently administered or received without them. (Abridgment, p. 39; Mr. Hy)
Defendant in sum: This your argument, if it be rightly examined, will not prove so strong as strange: for to conclude thus; many people within the state of this kingdom, do hold these ceremonies to be necessary parts of God’s worship; Ergo, they are imposed and observed as necessary parts of God’s worship, may by as good, or rather better reason, be retorted upon yourselves, thus: most people in the land hold them not to be necessary parts of God’s worship; Ergo, they are not imposed as essential and necessary parts thereof. 2. You ought to have made a difference between the judgment of the governors in imposing, and the opinion (if yet there be any such) of some people in observing of them, as necessary: for which, to blame the governors, is, as if the halting of a leg should be charged upon the brain. And because they object so often the multitude of the people, 3. the Defendant asks of what sort they are? Popish, or of their own discipline, or conformable men? Showing first, that the Papists have no good conceit of the use of our ceremonies.
Secondly, if they be men of their own discipline, the seducement of the scholar is the sin of the master. Thirdly, if some, otherwise conformable; these will not be found to be so many as they suppose, and the same may be thought to fall into that misconceit, not so much by imposition of the Church, as by their opposition, whereby the simpler sort are perhaps moved to think so of them.
Replier: [p. 217] Here is alleged the opinion which many people in all parts of the land have concerning our ceremonies, viz. that the Sacraments are not rightly and sufficiently administered without them. To this the Defendant answers three things: 1. That most people hold the contrary. 2. That opinion of people in observing does not prove the judgment of governors in imposing. 3. That it is most likely that those people which think so, are brought into that conceit by the opposition which is made against the ceremonies. But first, I would fain know of the Defendant, why he passes by in silence, not only the testimony of Chemnitius, cited by the Abridgment for confirmation of the assumption, but also the passages of God’s Word, and many of the best Divines, which are all alleged there in the proposition, and applied unto this part of the assumption by the authors of the Abridgment? Surely this is not plain dealing.
Answer: He shall know, first, why the testimony of Chemnitius, saying, That the conceit of the multitude is much to be respected in this case, is omitted; namely, because it makes not anything to the proof of this their assumption. For how will this speech of Chemnitius help to prove, that a multitude of the people in any land hold the ceremonies to be proper parts of God’s worship? Indeed against them the Defendant might have taken it up. For, Chemnitius saying, That the conceit of the multitude is to be respected meant the common conceit of the most, and not the conceit of the smaller company in opposition to the most. To his second demand, (viz. Why the [p. 218] Defendant passes by Scriptures and other Divines alleged,) answer, that to bring in the proofs he speaks of, laid to the proposition, p. 37, which are not, (as he untruly says) applied by the authors of the Abridgment to the assumption, p. 39, had been as absurdly done, as it is now questioned. Are propositions and assumptions all one, that the proofs for the one, will serve the other? This is plain wrangling, to speak no worse of it.
Replier: Secondly, I answer, that the opinion of a few may make that action unlawful, which the opinion of many other cannot make lawful, as is to be seen, 1 Cor. 10:28: If any man say unto thee, etc.
Answer: If the opinion of a few would serve to make the impositions of ceremonies unlawful, why did they not say some, but many people in all places hold them thus; and so, to what end cited they Chemnitius’s speech of the multitude? Wherefore this Reply yields up the objection made from a number and multitude of the people. Secondly that the opinion of some few can make that simply unlawful unto others, which God has left indifferent, is absurd; and, takes away all liberty both of constitution, and of observation from the Church. For nothing, then, shall be lawful which any ignorant or proud Pharisee shall count unlawful. The place of 1 Cor. 10:28 shows, what should for a time, and in cases not so easily cleared, (such as was that of eating meats offered to idols) be yielded, out of our liberty, to the infirmity of the weak: but not, that their error restrains our consciences; or that we must always yield so to them. See (margin: Peter Martyr, Of Conscience, p. 560.) Peter Martyr, and others.
Replier: Thirdly, it does not appear the most are otherwise minded. For the most being used unto the ceremonies, and not unto good teaching, may well be thought to have the same opinion of human ceremonies, which they have of divine.
Answer: The most of the people (thanked be God) are better taught, though too many want such teaching. And where the ceremonies are used by godly ministers, the people (for the most part) are taught how to esteem them, [p. 219] and do so. Of near eight hundred communicants in my parish, I do not think there is one of that opinion.
Replier: Fourthly, the Defendant forgets what was to be proved in this place: for the question is not only whether our ceremonies be so imposed, but also whether they be so esteemed and observed, as appears in the Abridgment. Now the opinion of the people proves, I hope, in what manner they are esteemed and observed; and while they are so observed, they that still impose them, in those places where they are so observed, may truly be interpreted so to impose them. In actions of this kind, (says Hooker, l.5, p. 165,) we are more to respect what the greatest part of men is commonly prone to conceive, then what some men’s wits may devise in construction of their particular meaning.
Answer: The Defendant forgot it not: for he repeats it in express terms. But the Replier forgets that the Opponent undertook to prove our ceremonies to be imposed and observed as parts, (that is, proper parts) of divine worship: both which, how they are proved from the observation of some, let the Reader judge. For if possibly they may be observed with another mind then they are imposed, then may they be imposed otherwise then they are observed. Secondly, the observation of the people is not proved by the erroneous conceit of some of them, neither ought that to be counted the observation of the people, which is not so commonly, and for the most part. Thirdly, the imposition of these things (with admonition of the end and use) even upon such places where some observe them contrary to direction, will no more argue, that they are imposed to that end, then the spurring of a lame horse to make him go, is said to be done of purpose to make him halt.
The testimony of Master Hooker is prevented. For he, in that place, speaks of worshiping the material cross with relation to Christ crucified, which in that very place (margin: which is his fifth book, printed with the rest, p. 348.) he distinguishes from the ceremony of the sign of the [p. 220] cross, as from a thing of another kind. Yet, says the Replier, in things of this kind, says Hooker, as if these were all of one kind, an idol worshiped, and a ceremony used in the worship of God.
Replier: Fifthly, the last conceit is ridiculous, that the opposing and condemning of ceremonies should make men think, that the Sacraments are not sufficiently administered without them.
Answer: The opposition of them, as if they were made parts of religion, must needs make some think that they are so imposed indeed, and may occasion the simple to think that we esteem them so: which whether it be ridiculously said or not, let the Reader judge.
Replier: The Popish people (says he) have no great conceit of our ceremonies. Why is it then that Gretser, and some other Jesuits, call our Prelates, Calvino-Papists, popish Calvinists?
Answer: If he had told us where Gretser, or others call them so, we should have told him, why. But it is no more, though they call them so for the use of these ceremonies then that others call the Jesuits Puritan-Papists for opposing (margin: D. Humphrey.) ceremonies.
Replier: How is it that by these ceremonies we are borne in hand that the Papists are likely to be drawn unto communion with our Church?
Answer: Not because they have any great conceit of them, but because they have a better conceit of them then of the (margin: T.C. 1, Rep., p. 173.) contrary. And Master Cartwright thinks they were retained partly for that end.
Replier: Whence is it that all our Church-Papists are great maintainers of the ceremonies?
Answer: I do not know that it is so in all. If it be so in many, it is not because they have any great opinion of them as we use them: but because they have great disaffection to those that will not tolerate so much of their religion, as some resemblance in ceremony. Extreme opposition causes extreme tenacity especially in things wherein the conscience cannot be convinced.
Replier: The rest (says he) which are not of your [p. 221] disciplining are not so many. O miserable outfacing of God and man! Who has disciplined for this threescore years almost all the people of Wales? Who but the Prelates and their creatures have had the disciplining of all the cathedral churches in England, and all the poor parishes that depend on them? Who are the discipliners of all the non-residents and pluralists for so many charges? And who of the many ten-pound cures? Do these seem a few in the Defendant’s eyes?
Answer: The rest which are neither of the Popish sort, nor of your disciplining will not be found many, as you suppose (says the Defendant) that is, many in all places of the land, which esteem the Sacraments not to be sufficiently administered without these ceremonies. He says not, that there be not many people in the land which are not of your disciplining, for he knows the contrary; but, not many which are so conceited of the ceremonies, and be otherwise conformable. And this may be true, though the people of Wales, cathedral, and other churches here put into the black-bill, were many more then they be. This exclamation therefore O miserable outfacing of God and men! is ridiculous and so let it go.
13. Severe Punishments have been Inflicted for the Bare Omission of Ceremonies, Answered
Opposers: The omission of them (even without the case of scandal and contempt) is more sharply punished then any other sins committed against the law of God, as perjury, and adultery. (Mr. Hy, thesis 15)
Defendant in sum: What therefore? Ergo (for this is your mark,) they are preferred before the precepts of God, and made parts of God’s worship. This consequence is not necessary. For that (says he) herein the Church seeks to preserve her own peace and integrity, against those that defame her: as bodies natural and political do specially avoid those things which [p. 222] which more immediately threaten the peace thereof. Even as false coining is punished more severely then manslaughter, not as a more heinous crime, but as more immediately tending to the ruin of the commonwealth, etc.
Replier: The omission of ceremonies is here alleged to be more sharply punished, then many great sins against the Law of God, though it be without scandal and contempt. To this the Defendant answers, first by denying the consequence, viz. that if this be so, then these ceremonies are preferred before the precepts of God, and unlawful. But why, says he, nothing to the Churches of Germany, to Melanchthon, Martyr, Chemnitius, Beza, Junius, Zubertus, Polanus, Bucanus, Pilkington, Perkins, and the whole clergy of England, brought in as allowing this consequence, in the Abridgment? Are not all these worth one answer of the Defendant?
Answer: Let me tell you first, that you have not truly reported the Defendant’s consequence, but have left out these material words, made parts of God’s worship. And then, I tell you why he gives no answer to those Divines. First, because those testimonies are not alleged in the same place of the Abridgment from whence this argument was taken, viz. p. 39. And secondly, because where they are alleged, they are not brought to prove the very same consequence, but another. You say, that when the omission of ceremonies is punished more then heinous faults, there the ceremonies are made parts of God’s worship: but they say, that when the omission of Church ceremonies (even extra casum scandali et contemptus) is punished as a sin; such ceremonies are made parts of God’s worship, and are therefore unlawful, which is most true. For how can the mere omission of ceremonies be esteemed and punished as a sin in itself, (even out of the case of scandal and contempt) unless such a ceremony be esteemed so necessary that any omission of it would offend God. The punishment of the omission or rather refusal of our ceremonies, however sharper then for some [p. 223] some more heinous faults, is inflicted for the contempt of lawful Authority, of the Church’s discipline, and peace; and not because we hold the mere omission of them to be sin. For we teach, that were it not for neglect of the Magistrate’s, and Church’s authority, and disturbance of the Church’s peace, these ceremonies might without offense to God be as well omitted as used. But of any the proper parts of God’s worship, we do not, we dare not say so.
Replier: 2. The reason that he gives for punishing more severely the omission of a ceremony then heinous sins, is frivolous. For the true peace of the Church does more depend on the keeping of God’s laws, then of observing men’s inventions; especially of such things which never brought peace with them to any Church, but at first from hell have always bred a combustion.
Answer: The internal peace of the Church with God, immediately consists more in observing God’s commandments, then in the keeping of her own arbitrary canons: but the peace of her external policy and government, of which the Defendant spoke, is more impeached by the neglect of her constitutions, without which, as Peter Martyr and others show, there can be no peace: that is, no external peace in the Church. The Replier therefore equivocates in the word Peace. As for the fire of combustion, there is, too much, no doubt: but it comes from hell, from whence the tongues of men are set on fire, James 3:6, of which, the ceremonies may be objects, or occasions: causes they cannot be.
Replier: Neither yet can the Defendant justify that which he says of civil governments, that they lawfully, at any time, more severely punish that offense which is every way less, then another which is greater.
Answer: The Defendant needs not justify that he never said: nor can the Replier justify his falsifications. Did the Defendant say, then another which is every way less? Show those words. He says, then others which are not in their own nature less heinous. And is this all one with every way less heinous? May not that which is in nature the less heinous, be in some respect more hurtful and intolerable; or, on the contrary; [p. 224] contrary? May not robbery in some case be as ill, or worse then some manslaughter? In David’s judgment in two supposed cases, one in 1 Sam. 22, of a supposed robbery punishable with death: another, ch. 14, of manslaughter produced, because of the circumstances, and consequences.
Replier: Howsoever, he that has but half an eye may see, that it is but a sophistical evasion, common to our Prelates with the Papists. I will not there fare insist in this: if you please, you may see more of this matter in Master Parker of the Cross, part 2, ch. 9, 16, 17.
Answer: Wherein the sophistical evasion, wherein the likeness to the Papists lies, he says not: nor can; but thought, that railing words would serve for a reply. We shall not need to see Master Parker for this matter. For he which has but half an eye may see, that many things of less moment in themselves, are more severely punished, (margin: See for this consequence, Ames, de Conscientia, l.5, c.7, thesi 5, etc.) then things which in themselves are far more heinous faults, and so esteemed. So in the Palatinate, the stealing of grapes out of a vineyard, is more severely punished then robbing a house. The sleeping of a sentinel upon his watch, is death: not as a greater sin than perjury; but as a fault, which by consequence may more endanger an army or city, to the enemies. And what Church is there, that does not punish the contempt of her public peace more severely, then some other sins which in their own natures simply considered, are unto God more offensive? This answer the Replier rails at, and so leaves it, and comes to the Defendant’s second answer.
Defendant in sum: The Defendant secondly answers, that their complaint of so grievous punishment for only omission of those ceremonies, even out of the case of scandal and contempt, is no better then an open slander against the Church of God: that they cannot instance in any one minister, that has been so grievously punished for the bare omission of a rite, without his persisting opinionatively, refractorily, and that publicly, [p. 225] -ly, in flat contradiction against the Church. And demands, if the judges of the land would esteem the obstinate refusal of a lawyer’s or sergeant’s habit, by lawyers or sergeants, to be only an omission and not a contempt? To this answer of the Defendant, thrust together, the Replier objects.
Replier: He answers in the second place, that it is not omission but contempt that is punished, as if a counselor should refuse to wear a lawyer’s gown. But I: mere omission has been punished with suspension.
Answer: This should have been proved by some instance: and withal that it was so continued: for else suspension for a time, will not be held a more grievous punishment, then is inflicted upon other malefactors.
Replier: 2. The Convocation house in their canons have provided and appointed punishments for mere omissions.
Answer: This is an uncouth thing in print; yet, as if it were true, he builds upon it, saying.
Replier: If those canons be not in all such points rigorously executed; it is either some personal good which is found in some officers, or else mere fear; for though canons do not blush, yet the executioners have some forehead left.
Answer: All penal laws should be more rigorous than the execution. And if the executioners have some forehead left, the accusers which cry out of such severity used to them, want some forehead: and this Replier, who interprets their indulgency so ill, as if they forbore censures out of shame, either wants brains, or a heart, thus to provoke them against his fellows, if it were (as he feigns) that the canons were made so rigorous.
Replier: There may be continued omission, upon other causes beside contempt, as ignorance, conscience, etc. So that while the Defendant so peremptorily charges others for slandering the Church of God, he manifestly slanders them, which for anything I know are as much the Church of God as the Prelates. Concerning this contempt, see more in Master Parker, part 2, ch. 3, 14.
Answer: [p. 226] Answer: Invincible ignorance, and an erroneous conscience, may continue long in some. And where this appears not to be mixed with consent, indulgence is to sundry men continued also. So that still there remains a slander cast upon the Church generally, that she punishes so severely the mere omission of ceremonies. Master Parker’s description of contumacy and contempt will not help us.
The opposites are members of the Church as well as the Bishops, or else the Bishops should not have power over them: but this proves not, that they are as much slandered as the Bishops.
Replier: As for the lawyer’s gown, it is not long enough to cover the nakedness of this answer, though it be stretched to the length of one of our great Prelates’ long trains, that be carried up after them.
Answer: If this man has ever seen any long train of our Bishops carried up, it was in a dream. I have seen their gowns held up sometimes by a servant to keep them from soiling: but a long train I never saw, nor I think any man living. But, true or false, is not so material with this Replier, as whether it sound harshly, and be to disgrace. Tell us why the resemblance of the lawyer’s gown will not serve turn.
Replier: For unless the counselor would swear that he refused of conscience and that he could produce the judgment of the best lawyers for his opinion, condemning such a robe as unlawful, the case is not like. And if the case be so put, account that lawyer worthy to be turned over the bar, that could not defend himself from contempt.
Answer: This is to remove the argument, not to reform it. For the Defendant supposed and named obstinate refusal in the lawyer, which (says he) would not be interpreted an omission, but a contempt, by the judges.
Secondly, though a lawyer, in that case, should swear, he refuses the lawyer’s gown for conscience, and say he could produce the best lawyers for that his opinion; yet if it were even manifested, that his conscience was ill-grounded, his books mistaken by him, and he foolishly still speak [p. 227] speak of his conscience, and books, his folly might be judged the more, but his contempt no whit the less, for his protestation. And this case is like enough to fit the Replier’s case. And therefore he may be turned over the bar with his lawyer, for he cannot defend himself, and such as he is, from the charge of contempt.
14. Come peaceable men have been censured for only declaring their judgments, answered; Nonconformist objections tend to separation; No man punished for disusing Popish ceremonies, but for defaming of ours under that name
Opposers: The contrary minded, albeit never so peaceable, learned, or godly minded; if they shall declare their contrary judgment, are accounted Puritans and Schismatics; and, by Canon, if they shall offend, censured as excommunicate. (Mr. Hy)
Defendant: The Defendant answers, that though they may have some reason to wish the release of some penalties; yet ought they to consider their own deserts; and know, that Schism takes beginning from the difference of opinion, even in smaller points.
Secondly, that they should consider the multitude of Separatists who take their first principles of separation from these men’s school of contradiction, and from their aspersions of no less then idolatry to this Church; and then judge, whether there be not some cause to call them schismatical.
Replier: In the next place the same thing is confirmed by the particular indignities which peaceable, learned, godly minded men do suffer, for but declaring of their contrary judgment: as that they are accounted Puritans, Schismatics and by Canon excommunicated, ipso facto. So as no council ever censured any heresy without liberty of appeal, which is not denied to great malefactors, Conf. Hampton, p. 26, Can. 6 and 9. In the repeating of this argument, I add that which the Defendant, for I know not what reason, omitted.
Answer: It may seem the Defendant left out those words, as [p. 228] as partly untrue, partly impertinent. For first it is untrue, that they say, a man is excommunicated ipso facto, for declaring his contrary opinion; and secondly as untrue, that no council ever so censured any heresy: for, with them it is usual to say, anathema sit; which is more then simply to be excommunicate: at least, as much. That of malefactors’ appeals, is impertinent; because from the highest courts they have no appeal, but from the inferior. Now, of ecclesiastical courts, the Convocation is under his Majesty the highest court.
Replier: Now in this answer he neither denies antecedent or consequence: so that the judicious reader may safely take all to be granted.
Answer: His charging you with the breeding of schism, implies a denial of your antecedent, pregnantly. For therein you suggest, peaceable men. Now how they are acknowledged men of peace, who are charged to make the fire of division, I see not.
Replier: Yet, that he might seem to say somewhat he grants, that we have reason perhaps to wish, that some penalties were released. And has he not reason then, to think the Convocation which set these penalties, was nothing less then led by the Spirit of God? And if the Defendant can thus show his differing judgment from that Convocation in the penalties, what disorder or exorbitancy is it, for another to show his differing judgment from him, and him in ceremonies?
Answer: The Defendant did not say, that he thought it reasonable; but, that you perhaps may have some reason (as all men that feel the smart of punishment any have) to wish some release of penalties. Nor do his words import any different judgment of his, from that of the Convocation house. Yet if he had so said, or meant, your inference is naught. For even of things that are judged worthy of punishment, the penalty may sometimes be judged too rigorous. The Prophet Oded reproved the cruelty of the Israelites against the (margin: 2 Chron. 28.) men of Judah, who yet acknowledged them to be justly punished by the hand of God. [p. 229]
Replier: Secondly closely sliding by the chief accusation of Puritanism, which is ordinary and most impure, he says for Schism, that those which will not conform unto our ceremonies, do teach the principles of separation. To which I answer.
Answer: Nay tarry awhile, and see if you reported him truly. He says, that out of your school of contradiction, and by your aspersion of no less crime then idolatry itself, upon the Church of England, the Separatists have taken their first principles of separation, which is manifestly true. And is this all one with those which will not conform? There be many men, which will not yet conform, who do not, dare not vilify our ceremonies, as some of you do; nor dare they to charge the Church so rashly and blasphemously with idolatry, as some other fiery men of your side do, and have done. Now answer, sir, and be content, that the Defendant slide by the name of Puritan, as a term not imposed upon you by him. And yet says he enough to proclaim you authors of Schism.
Replier: To which I answer, that there was never yet any Prelate that confuted the opinion of separatists any otherwise, then by railing words; whereas on this side divers, most averse from conformity, have soundly confuted them.
Answer: I know not that ever any Prelate (if thereby he means a Bishop) has at all written in confutation of the Brownists. I have seen some of the inconformists’ confutations, which I confess, never satisfied my conscience: for I am, and have ever been of that opinion, that there can be no just confutation of the separatists, made by such of the Nonconformists as have given them their main principles, which principles if I did believe to be true, I profess in God’s presence I would proclaim separation from idolatrous worship, and worshipers this day ere I sleep; and not halt, as these men (by their own positions do) between idolatry and religion.
Replier: 2. Our principles do no more tend to separation then Saint John’s rule does; who when Diotrephes played the diocesan in the Church, did write unto the faithful people that they [p. 230] they should not follow the evil which was among them, but the good, 3 Jn. 11.
Answer: Your principles which are, That nothing may be established in the Church but what God has commanded in his Word: That all forms of worship not prescribed, and all men ecclesiastical rites are will-worship: That the calling of our Bishops, and consequently of our ministers, is Antichristian: That our ceremonies are idolatrous in our use of them, and such like stuff; lo, your Master Bradshaw’s very arguments against conformity, are pretended by the Separatists, as grounds of their separation. And they themselves prove their pedigree from you: and no man can deny it, who has any forehead left. You should therefore deal more ingenuously, to call them your dear brethren of the separation, as Dighton’s book calls them. And avouch them to be as good Christians as any of the Prelates, as Master Bradshaw does: and own them cheerfully, as yours; for yours they are, though some of you would fain deny it. Of which this speech of Saint John, advising men to follow the good and not the ill examples, is the weakest pretense that could be devised.
Replier: 3. Thirdly, he talks of divers distractions in the Church, while some will hear only a conformable minister, and some only an inconformable. But what is this to the purpose? For, by this reason, conformers may as well be accused of Schism, as Nonconformers.
Answer: He indeed wished you to observe the convulsion, by this distraction of affections, fallen upon the Church to God’s dishonor, while the Word and Sacraments are by this means held in respect of men’s persons: of which the purpose is to make you see the mischief of this your opposition, as the cause of those sharper laws made against you. Now, to say that we that conform, may be as well accused of this Schism, as you that oppose, is as if one should say the upper part of the tenter-hook does as well make the rent, as the stretcher, which is below: whereas, the one only holds, the other pulls and tears.
Replier: Again, if all did conform, there would be still like difficult [p. 231] difficulties: for some would only hear preaching ministers; and some would never be present but at reading. Some would only hear godly preachers; and some would only take liquor fit for their lips. Who should then be the authors of Schism?
Answer: Conformity would free from such distractions as are now made by inconformity. If like would arise from other occasions, if this were not, this no more clears inconformity from being now a cause of distraction, then usury might be cleared from biting, because there may be other biting exactions, where usury is not.
Replier: Fourthly, he tells us, that all Churches challenge a subscription to their orders. But first all churches cannot possibly do this lawfully; because some Churches do directly contradict others in their decrees.
Answer: If the contradiction be in matters merely of ceremony, as whether the Lord’s Supper shall be celebrated with leavened, or unleavened bread; before or after meat; sitting, kneeling, or standing: this hinders not the unity of faith, or mutual love in general Churches, and they may all lawfully and equally require subscription of their own.
Replier: 2. Few Churches require such a form of subscription as ours is, though they have not the tenth part of points and difficulties in their forms, which we have in ours.
Answer: Let him show the odds of subscription, and things subscribed, by instance; or else he trifles. Crafty men hide themselves in generalities.
Replier: 3. I ask again, that which Master Parker has left without an answer; that a minister of the Gospel should be deprived for disusing Popish ceremonies, when was it ever the judgment of any man which was of note for learning, unless he were interested in the quarrel?
Answer: And when was it the practice of this Church to deprive any man for the disusing of Popish ceremonies, and not rather for the defaming of our ceremonies, by the name of Popish ceremonies; though, as shall after appear, they are [p. 232] not with any true color of reason be so called; but are so termed out of faction, and to make the imposers and observers hateful with the people of God, which I believe no Church would suffer, I am sure it ought not.
Replier: Calvin, Bucer, Beza, Martyr, Zanchy, and many others have given their judgment concerning those controversies: but few either any of them, or among Jewel, Fulke, Reynolds, Whitaker, Perkins, or any such, that ever allowed of such tyranny.
Answer: Such tyranny as deprivation of godly ministers, for disusing only Popish ceremonies, (as is here falsely suggested) neither they nor we will allow: and, as little, that a son of the Church should thus rudely cast dirt in the face of his Mother. What these men think of observing Church constitutions in general; what, of our ceremonies in particular, which Jewel, Fulke, and Whitaker both practiced in wearing the surplice, and required others to observe, is for another place, and will in due time appear.
Replier: If there were any one among them of that opinion, we should have heard of him. For our Defendant dares bring in the name here of Beza himself, as making for him: notwithstanding Beza does not only condemn our ceremonies in plain terms, Epist. 8, but also in this very place which is quoted out of Epist. 4, does cashier our ceremonies in the first words quoted by the Defendant himself, Constitutions being thus made, etc. What understands the Defendant by thus, or hac ratione? Surely, those conditions going before which do as absolutely condemn our ceremonies, as any argument in all the Abridgment.
Answer: 1. We find no learned Protestant of that opinion which you slanderously charge upon us; viz. That a minister should be deprived for disusing Popish ceremonies: but we find some men of opinion, that the constitutions of the Church in matters of order, cannot without sin be neglected, and that such neglect ought to be punished.
Beza’s judgment, That such as oppose constitutions well made, should be proceeded against, as the public enemies of the Church, was it alleged to show, that all Churches re- [p. 233] -quire observation of, and subscription to, their constitutions. And if Beza did require such conditions in the making of those constitutions, as do condemn our ceremonies, why are none of them named, that this might appear?
His opinion of our ceremonies now in question, is not one and the same, of all the three. For the surplice and kneeling he condemns not as unlawful, though he would not have them rigorously urged, or stiffly refused. Whether he rightly understood our use of the cross, and what reason he has against it, belongs to the third chapter of this book more properly, but most properly to the second book, where the particulars are opposed.
15. Recounting of the confutation of their position that ceremonies are made parts of God’s worship (wherein worship essentially and absolutely consists); Our ceremonies are alterable at the Church’s discretion
Defendant in sum: In this section the Defendant recounts the confutation of their general assumption, by the judgment of their own witnesses, Calvin, Chemnitius, Peter Martyr, Ursinus, and Zanchy, who teach those ceremonies only to be made parts of God’s worship, wherein the worship of God essentially and absolutely is said to consist. Secondly, in confutation of their assumption he shows out of the book of Canons, Can. 25 and 30, as also out of the Book of Common Prayer, that our Church publicly professes to retain these ceremonies for decency, not for holiness, for order, without making them of the substance of God’s service; with a Christian liberty, in thinking them alterable and changeable, and in unity of Christian brotherhood with other reformed Churches abroad, and therefore may justly challenge uniformity within herself. Thirdly, he wonders at the Lincolnshire Ministers, who take knowledge of this profession of our Church, p. 53 and 55, and yet do parallel our Church with the Romish, which they confess to be justly [p. 234] taxed by Bishop Jewel and other divines, for the opinion of holiness and necessity, which they put in their ceremonies: Adding, that however Bellarmine and some other Papists seem to disclaim this necessity of ceremonies, and placing of opinion of holiness in them; yet, in their more public practice and records, they declare the contrary. And so does even Bellarmine himself, in telling us that their ceremonies have power, and some of them ex opere operato, to cure diseases, drive away devils, purge venial sins, etc. All which effects do import an efficacious, and necessary holiness: wherein they are far remote from our Church’s judgment. Lastly, he complains of their consciences, who knowing that we attribute no other holiness to our rites, then that which is common to all such ceremonies; namely, to be significative and alterable, and not operative and necessary, as the Papists do; yet, fashion their quills, to impute that guilt of superstition to our Church, which she has, and does both by doctrine and practice condemn in the Popish sect.
Replier: After full satisfaction given to our arguments about the point of the will-worship (as the Defendant would have the Reader believe), he comes to confute our assumption, viz. The ceremonies are not esteemed, imposed, and observed as parts of God’s worship. But first, I would know of him, why he that talks so much everywhere of their own witnesses, does here first of all give no answer to our witnesses as has been formerly cited? And then passes by that which is alleged in the Abridgment, p. 40, out of his own witnesses, Doctor Covell and Doctor Wilkes? If they be not his witnesses, they are at least the ceremonies’ witnesses: he should therefore have given some respect. But we shall have another champion soon after this Defendant, as likely, who will as little regard [p. 235] as this. For, justum est quod Sparta prodest — that’s good that makes for the times.
Answer: Was any of the learned writers which you call your witnesses, alleged to prove, that the Church of England imposes, or observes these ceremonies as parts of God’s worship? Or could any? This Replier often complains of their witnesses not answered, and yet does not at any time, nor can (I believe) produce any one testimony, which is not answered unto, either particularly or in answer to the like, in one or other place of this book. So that, this is mere facing.
As for the speeches of Dr. Covell, and Dr. Wilkes; seeing the Defendant undertook to show the general judgment of our Church concerning the ceremonies, there was no reason that he should answer, no more than you should object, (if yet you have done it truly) the private passages of two men.
Replier: Secondly, whereas he has nothing to bring for confutation of our argument, but only the judgment of the greater part of the imposers, I say this is not sufficient: for the question here is not only of imposing, but also of esteeming and observing.
Answer: To confute your assumption, wherein the ceremonies are said to be esteemed, imposed, and observed as parts of God’s worship, what could be brought more fit? Or what needed any other thing be brought, then the common, clear, and joint profession of all those who did impose the observation of them? Nor is the observation generally other then according to the intent of the imposers. What some particulars do contrarily, can with no justice be charged upon the whole.
Replier: Thirdly, I answer to the places alleged, that it cannot be logically concluded, either from any one, or from all of them, that they are not imposed as parts of God’s worship. We do not attribute any holiness or special worthiness (says the Canon) unto the garments. No more (say I) is any special holiness, or worthiness to be attributed unto water; yet in baptism it has a holy relation to holiness.
Answer: [p. 236] We attribute then, a special holiness to water in the sacramental use; though not, simply to water: but to the garments in their ministerial use, we attribute no holiness, says the Canon. And does not this prove that we make them not any parts of worship? Let him tell me what part or act of divine worship there is, to which we are not bound to attribute some holiness in the use of it? Is there any body divine worship unholy, in the kind?
Replier: The cross is not of the substance of the Sacrament. What then? It may notwithstanding be worship; except the Defendant will acknowledge no worship, but in the Sacrament.
Answer: The cross is charged by yourself, to be made a part of the Sacrament of Baptism; and therein, of worship. If therefore it be made no part of the Sacrament, it is, in your own opinion, not made any part of divine worship. Yet tell us of what other worship it is, or may it be a part.
Replier: These ceremonies may be altered and changed: by whom? By those that appointed them. Show me any Papist that dares affirm, that the Church of Rome has not authority to alter and change the ceremonies which she herself has appointed.
Answer: Even this, that we acknowledge our ceremonies to be alterable at the Church’s discretion, who withal believe and teach all proper worship of God to be unalterable by the Church, shows plainly, that we put some difference between free ceremonies and essential worship. And the consequence is good and strong, in our principles: however among the Papists (who teach that the Church has power of instituting and repealing the true and proper worship to God) beyond prescription, the argument holds not: this therefore is but one of his sophistical tricks. Let him then tell us in good sadness, if according to his and our religion, any proper part of divine worship be alterable by the will of men. The Papists say they can do it, what is this to us?
Moreover, the Replier guilefully conceals part of the words of the Common Prayer (alleged by the Defendant) where…
[p. 237] wherein, those reverend men, having professed the ceremonies to be alterable, add, and therefore may not be esteemed equal with God’s Law. If not equal with God’s Law, then no part of worship which is prescribed in that Law. He conceals also, that they profess to think it meet, that every country should use such ceremonies as they think meet, etc. Would they have said, that every country may worship God as they think meet, and not as he has required? Who sees not how, to make show of this calumniation, this man forces his wit, and I fear his conscience also, and does not believe himself, when he says, that these ceremonies are imposed as parts of God’s worship; but only for faction and opposition sake, would fain have it thought so, that their opposition might be justified before men.
Replier: But the opposites do acknowledge this, (Abridg. p. 53, 54) as much, as this Defendant does in this place acknowledge the same of the Church of Rome, when he says in this very page, that Bellarmine with some other Papists seem to disclaim the necessity of ceremonies, and the placing of holiness in them.
Answer: Just so? Nay neither so, nor so. For that which Bellarmine seems in some places to grant, he himself in other places does deny, (as the Defendant proved) while he attributes to some of their ceremonies, the power of driving away devils, curing diseases, and purging from venial sins. Wherefore, unless the authors of the Abridgment, or this Replier can likewise show, that what our Church professes of these ceremonies in her public records, she has (by as public records) retracted, or crossed; he is an unjust man, to say, just so, instead of just not so.
Replier: So that, in all this section there is nothing to be found but vain conceited confidence.
Answer: All this is true of this Reply in this section, but I cannot say, vain conceited confidence is all: for, a wrangling spirit, yea an ill conscience is also plainly to be observed, while he studies to persuade, what himself believes not, viz., that these our ceremonies are imposed; or, by the direction of the Church, observed, as parts of divine worship; which [p. 238] which she professes to be arbitrary, not necessary; alterable, not perpetual; peculiar, not general: not made any part of that worship, of which they are said by opposites to be parts; neither to have any special holiness, or worthiness in them: Finally, to be only for order, decency and edification unto men, and even therefore not to be parts of immediate or proper worship unto God.
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Ch. 3, Nonconformists’ 3rd Argument: from the Significance of Ceremonies
I. Intro & Scriptures
1. 3rd General Argument against our Ceremonies from their Significance
The third general Argument against our ceremonies: Because they are significant [signifying of something].
Opposers: All human ceremonies being appropriated to God’s service, if they be ordained to teach any spiritual duty by their mystical signification, are unlawful. But such are these three, the surplice, cross in baptism, and kneeling in receiving the communion. Therefore, they are unlawful.
To the major proposition the Defendant answers to this effect: That this point of mystical signification, or significant ceremonies, which they think so deeply to pierce, and deadly to wound our ceremonies, will make no impression to hurt our cause, but rather offend the opposites, if either reason, examples of Scripture, continual custom of the Church, or similar practice of the Inconformitans themselves, may be called a just defense. And therefore he calls for their proofs in this section.
Replier: The third argument is, because all human ceremonies [p. 239] appropriated to God’s service if they be ordained to teach any spiritual duty by their mystical signification, are unlawful. Concerning this, we have in the first section a flourish of words.
Answer: You shall have blows time enough, when you come nearer.
2. Mark 7:8, “ye hold the tradition of men, as the washing of pots and cups: and many other such like things ye do”; Mathew 15:15 ff.; Testimonies of Divines Examined
Opposers: After distribution of their arguments into these sorts, 1. from Scriptures, 2. Fathers, 3. Judicious Divines, 4. from reason. The first proof from Scripture is produced out of Mark 7:8, where the Jewish washings are reproved, and the 10th and 11th, where their Corban is also condemned, which though not significant, yet was a Jewish tradition there condemned, but here improperly objected, and also Mt. 15.
Defendant: To that of washing hands, pots, cups, etc., condemned Mark 7:8, the Defendant answers, that it was indeed a human significant ceremony, and reproved by our Savior; but that reproof was not (as they take it) because that ceremony was significant, but because it was, in their use of it, superstitious, while they placed holiness, necessity, and efficacy in that their own invention, counting themselves polluted even by the use of God’s creatures, unless they so washed before they took them, as appears, v. 28. To that of the Corban the Defendant also answers; but because that instance is not of a significant ceremony I forbear to repeat it, or the answer. Lastly he taxes them for being too like the Sadducees in not brooking any ceremony, etc.
Replier: In the second section, something is said of Mark 7:8. But first, what was the reason that this confuter of [p. 240] of the Abridgment, should pass by, or put off the first or second reason for confirmation there alleged, and snatch at one place of Scripture, which is but a parcel of those confirmations wherewith the second reason is backed?
Answer: 1. The Replier would persuade his reader, that the Defendant undertook a professed confutation of the Abridgment, which should have tied him to their order and words; whereas he only says, that the objections answered in this treatise, are taken principally out of that book, and also from the writing of some other ministers, which he himself ranged methodically into the best order he could. And does the Replier still ask a reason why he has not done that, which he never undertook? 2. In this section he sorts their proofs into their proper ranks; first Scriptures, secondly Fathers etc. And had he not reason then to take up this parcel of Scripture, being all that they allege directly to this point? And to refer (as he does) their reasons to that fourth sort of arguments, which are from reason?
Replier: The first confirmation in the Abridgment is, That the second commandment forbids us to make to ourselves the likeness of any thing whatsoever for religious use: as it is understood, by Bucer, Vireh, Fulke, Andrewes, and others.
Answer: This their first objection, from the second commandment, is put off to a place of more advantage for them, where the sign of the cross is by this argument assaulted; against which it carries more force, then against the surplice or kneeling. And is he angry for this favor done them?
Replier: The second confirmation is, that Christ is the only teacher of his Church, and appointer of all means whereby we should be taught, and admonished of any holy duties. For illustration of this second reason, among twenty other allegations, something is brought out of Mt. 7. Now the Defendant passes by the main reasons, and other allegations that belong to these, and makes a stand at this place of Mark the seventh, which yet for substance has [p. 241] been once handled before, in the former chapter. Is not this proper confuting?
Answer: Yes verily, this is proper confuting of the objections which he undertook to answer, to confute them methodically. As for the second reason of the Abridgment, it is not omitted, but transmitted to the proper place thereof, where it comes in substance to be handled and confuted. Only the Defendant forgot here to tell how absurdly they collect, that because Christ is the only authentic teacher of his Church, and that the holy Scriptures contain all things necessary to be taught and received to salvation: therefore there may be no means of teaching or admonishing unto duties, but such as be ordained as necessary. By which all use of characters, or whatever other help of art memorative, or the like, shall be also condemned, because not instituted. Nor may so much as a gibbet be set up, or a traitor’s head upon a pole, to give men warning against murder or treason: for this is to set up a new teacher amongst God’s people in these men’s imaginations.
His brag of twenty allegations passed by, is like the tale of that boy who first said he had seen twenty hares together in such a place, but came at last to say, that indeed he had seen one, or else it was a brake-bush. For, beside a number of good authors, falsely avouched, as defending the opposites’ interpretation of this place of Mark 7, and some others, speaking against the setting up of images in churches to be laymen’s books, they produce nothing. And we shall find, that all this is nothing to the purpose. The place of Mark, has been handled before, upon another consideration; viz. of worship: here, it is by themselves produced to another purpose. And shall we not here answer to it? What wrangling is this? And yet he has another quarrel.
Replier: Secondly, in this very text, he touches not that whereon only the Abridgment grounded their reason: for in the Abridg. p. 32, there is nothing cited out of Mark 9 but the 4th and 7th verses; he answers to the 8th, 10th, and 11th verse. What should a man say to such dealing?
Answer: [p. 242] > > Answer: What should a man say? Why let him say that the Defendant has answered to the 10th and 11th verses, objected by some other body, though not by the Abridgment, as his marginal note intimates. And touching the 8th verse objected by M. Hy. and containing the same matter that do the 4th and 7th verses (that is, the reproof of the Jewish washings as a vain worship of God) let a man say, That the Defendant has answered to the Abridgment’s citation of the 4th verse, where their washings, and the 7th where our Lord’s reproof of them is set down, in answering to the 8th verse where they are both reported together. And this (I hope) is no ill dealing.
Replier: Thirdly, they say, that our Savior by this argument (among others) condemns the Jewish purifyings, and justifies himself, and his disciples in refusing that ceremony, because (being the precept of men) it was taught and used as a divinity-way of signification, to teach what inward purity should be in them, and how they ought to be cleansed from the pollutions of the heathen.
Answer: They do indeed say, this argument among others. They confess then, that there were other reasons of our Lord’s reproof, which is true: but, that this of their fiction was one among others, they say untruly.
Replier: For which interpretation of the place they allege Chrysostom, Whitaker, the Church of Wittenberg, Calvin, Vireh, Zepperus, Fulke, Reynolds, and others.
Answer: Indeed when they have named these, they say, and others; but, name none; and of these they name, there is not one which speaks for their interpretation, as shall anon appear.
Replier: To all this the Defendant answers nothing, but with a simple denial, he shows, that there were other causes why our Savior condemned those washings, which is the very same thing which the Abridgment affirms, when they say, By this argument among others, our Savior condemned them.
Answer: They say, by this reason among others, Christ condemned the Jewish purifyings. The Defendant proves [p. 243] by other reasons, and denies that Christ did at all reprove them by this reason: and these two, says the Replier, are all one. Indeed if “by this, among others,” and “by other,” and “not, by this,” be all one, we are gone. But, the Defendant gives a simple denial, whereas they allege divers authors for their interpretation: I answer there is more strength in a simple denial which cannot from the text be refuted, then in false allegations, which cannot be justified, as shall now appear.
Chrysostom is first. But he is abused. For in that place he has not one word importing that Christ condemned the Jewish washings because they were significant, but because they added this new imposition, with which they did straiten, bind their own consciences contrary to the Law which forbade all such additions: and secondly, because they preferred their own traditions to the Law of God. Yea Chrysostom confessing their washings not to be in themselves contrary to the law (which they must needs have been, if the law had condemned all human significant ceremonies) and saying that, the Apostles did not of purpose forbear them, but minded greater matters, and sometimes used them, and sometimes not; does show that he thought them to be therefore only condemned upon those two reasons which he gives; and not, for being significant.
Dr. Whitaker is the second, approving (say they) this interpretation of Chrysostom. To which I answer, that his approving of Chrysostom’s interpretation, is no approving of theirs, which differs from Chrysostom’s, as has been said. Secondly, they tell us not where we may find this in Doctor Whitaker; perhaps, lest we should find out their false dealing, what he has, is Contr. 1, ch. 14, p. 464, where Doctor Whitaker alleges Chrysostom blaming the priests for this addition of their washings to the law of God: that is, to bind the conscience (as the question there disputed requires) though it was not in itself contrary to the law. And this Doctor Whitaker approves, and so do we. Doctor Whitaker declares that these acts of the Jews were not contrary to the law, save in that the Pharisees put holiness therein, and yet Chrysostom reproves them. And is not this for the Defendant’s [p. 244] answer, and against their interpretation, who say they were condemned even because significant?
Their third, is the Church of Wittenberg, which makes no mention of this place of Mark the 7th, nor gives any glance at it: and how then confirms it this interpretation? What? By condemning the use of symbolical rites to shadow out the mysteries of the Gospel? Are all significant rites, or ours, to that use? Or did they, and even Brentius with them a Lutheran, condemn all significant ceremonies, and yet allow anniversary feasts and images, also for historical use in churches? Let him that can, believe that; I cannot.
Their fourth is Calvin, but they do also abuse him egregiously, mis-alleging him as favoring their interpretation, who plainly acknowledges the lawfulness of this and other like ceremonies for expression, or incitation of piety used with other convenient cautions; and shows even this ceremony to have become evil, when superstitious opinion of holiness and necessity corrupted it, as has been shown out of him, Cap. 2, at large.
Viret is the fifth, but he neither in that, nor in that book, so much as points to this place of Mark, however he condemns superstition justly from Mt. 15:9. He is therefore abused, as the rest be.
Zepperus is the sixth, who in that edition which I have, p. 119, to prove that human traditions which are made superstitious, must be abolished, gives this reason, For the commandments of God are not to be made void by the traditions of men, Mt. 15:6, Mark 7:9. But what is this for their interpretation of Mt. 7:7? Is it not rather for the Defendant.
Doctor Fulke is the seventh, who says (as we do also) that precepts of men condemned by Christ Mark 7:7, be not only such as are against the word, but even such as are beside the word, wherein any part of religion or the service of God is placed: and gives instance in these washings, whereby is manifest, as also by his practice and use of our ceremonies, that he did not think human ceremonies to be condemned for being [p. 245] significant, when no religion or service of God was placed in them. So he is also abused.
The last is that worthy, Doctor Reynolds, who in that place, gives no hint touching the interpretation of this place in hand, but only inveighs against the multitude and burden of symbolical rites, and the school of ceremonies used in Popery; showing their use thereof in Popery (though most of their ceremonies have signification) to be Jewish, and abuse, then which, Augustine in his time (when there were nothing so many) complained of. And does he that condemns the overlading of a ship condemn the ballasting of it? Doctor Reynolds knew these, or at least some of these our ceremonies in question to be significant, and yet (of my own knowledge) judged them lawful to be used, and persuaded such as would hear him, to use them rather then to be silenced or deprived for not using them. So he also is wronged by the authors of the Abridgment, whose shame of thus abusing the world, with false allegations we should not now have discovered, if the Replier had not appealed to their quotations of these men.
Replier: So that in all this section nothing at all is said to the purpose; save that in the winding up the Defendant accuses those of Sadduceeism who depart so far from the Pharisees; which accusation, if it does not touch our blessed Savior himself, I leave to be considered by the Defendant himself.
Answer: What has been said, and whether to purpose or not, let others judge. Only one thing it seems is to purpose, that the Defendant tells them they draw near to the Sadducees who would bear no addition of any ceremonies, while they go so far from Pharisees who had so many superstitious additions. Which opposite extremity of the Pharisees and Sadducees, the Defendant had noted before out of Danaeus, in which speech what could be meant, but that the opposers of ceremonies, in flying one extreme, fall into another? And for this speech he is arrested of blasphemy against our blessed Savior, as if our Lord also had been of their judgment: whereas it is clear that our Savior Christ [p. 246] Christ was not of their mind touching significant ceremonies, who observed the feast of Dedication, allowed the custom of embalming at burials, which was a significant human ceremony; and used sitting at the Passover, which the Jews had ordained as a significant ceremony: and used the synagogues, yea the formalities thereof, as, opening, and again closing the book, giving it as the manner was to the ruler or master of the synagogue, and sitting down to preach, Lk. 4:17, 20. So as he walked a middle path between the excess of the Pharisees and preciseness of the Sadducees in ceremonies.
Replier: Howsoever the mentioning of Phariseeism in this matter is idle, for the Scripture says expressly that this ceremony was common to all the Jews, Mark 7:3.
Answer: If Phariseeism had been named here in this matter of purifying, as it was not, yet had it not been amiss: for though the text says that the Pharisees and all the Jews used their washings, yet is not that term all simply universal, unless Christ and his Apostles were no Jews, or did use them. All the Jews generally (except the Sadducees) that is, both Pharisees, Essenes, Herodians, and the rest generally used them. For if the Sadducees (as Danaeus and others say) would brook no traditions but those of Moses’s prescription, then not this; and therefore must be exempted.
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II. Fathers & Protestants
3. Testimonies of Fathers; Augustine
Here is brought in their second kind of proofs from Augustine (one of the fathers).
Opposers: Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 3, ch. 15, does argue against significant ceremonies.
Defendant in sum: To which objection the Defendant answers, that Augustine in that place speaks only of figurative speeches in Scriptures, that when they, being literally taken make against piety or charity, they must be understood [p. 247] to be figuratively spoken: as namely those words of Christ, Except you eat the flesh, and drink the blood of the son of man, etc. But how this speech of Augustine will more condemn significant ceremonies, then figurative speeches he sees not.
Replier: The same kind of dealing which was noted in the former section we meet with also in this. For whereas in the third confirmation of this argument, the Abridgment brings in Augustine, the Churches of France, and Flanders, Calvin, Martyr, Beza, Sadeel, Danaeus, Zepperus, Polanus, Jewel, Humphrey, etc. The Defendant calls out Augustine alone by himself, and that with a double trick.
Answer: That having sorted their arguments in four rows, he took the Scripture by itself. And now, Augustine by himself, because beside him they produce none of the Fathers: and produces the later Divines by themselves, is orderly done, and without detriment to them, unless their proofs go by tale and not by weight. But he singled out Augustine with a double trick (says the Replier,) and why?
Replier: For first, he cites but one place of Augustine, which was mis-cited or mis-printed by the Abridgment.
Answer: Indeed if he had done them right, he should have charged them with mis-citing two places, one, for the words; the other, for the scope. Is this your meaning?
Replier: And leaves out the other place out of Epist. 5, rightly quoted in the Abridgment.
Answer: He does not leave out the place, for he brings in the words thereof: only he forgot to quote it in their names, or in his own; without any profit to him, or loss to them, was not this a sore trick? What is the second?
Replier: Secondly, he makes this place to conclude the main argument, whereas in the Abridgment it illustrates only the third confirmation of that argument.
Answer: The Abridgment says, that Augustine affirms, and gives it as a reason against significant ceremonies, that when [p. 248] when they are appointed to teach or admonish us by their signification, this gives unto them a chief part of the nature of Sacraments. If this be true that Augustine by this reason disputes against them, then it must needs be, that he does dispute against them. The Defendant gathers them not up so straight, as to bid them prove that Augustine disputes against them by this reason; but, denies him at all to dispute against them for being significant. And if not at all, then not by that reason. So that by this second trick, he has let them out of the stocks, and given them the liberty of the prison. And yet this man complains of tricks put upon them.
Replier: Concerning Augustine he answers, first, that in the first place cited there is no such thing, which I grant to be true.
Answer: Well, then you grant the authors of the Abridgment, or the printer, to have played but a slippery trick.
Replier: But if instead of bk. 3, ch. 35, he read bk. 2, ch. 1, something will be found.
Answer: If something be to be found only at Athens, the more wrong do they that send us to seek it at Corinth: does this excuse them that they sent us to a wrong place? Howbeit the Replier is more to blame then they, in telling us that in another place, l.2, ch.1, something will be found, viz., to the purpose. For beside a general description of a sign, and a distribution of signs into such as signify naturally (as smoke signifies fire) some others by imposition, there is not a word in that place, that can, by any engine of wit, be forced to their purpose.
Opposers: A second place out of Augustine, Epist. 5, ad Marcellinum, quoted by the Abridgment, to prove that Augustine disputed against significant ceremonies.
Defendant: There is, I confess, elsewhere in Saint Augustine, these sayings; Signs which pertain to divine things are called Sacraments.
Replier: [p. 249] Elsewhere, says he (not mentioning) the first Epistle which the Abridgment quoted.) Augustine says, that all holy signs are called Sacraments.
Answer: The not mentioning of the place, was of forgetfulness, not of purpose: for, cui bono? Augustine’s words on which they ground are produced in his name, but are not as you translate them, All holy signs, etc. But (says he) It were too long to run through the variety of signs which when they belong to things divine are called Sacraments, tom. 2, p. 25. In which words he seems to me, by those terms of divine things, rather to show to what things the name of Sacraments belongs properly, then to make the name common to all signs of holy things, (seeing all holy things are not simply, in his phrase, Divine.) But take it as you will, all signs of holy duties or things are called Sacraments, Ergo Augustine by that reason disputes against all human significant ceremonies. Thus the Abridgment reasons: and to this the Defendant answers.
Defendant in sum: If hereby you shall collect that Saint Augustine, in his opinion, will admit of no sign of holy duties, which are not Sacraments, you shall betray your small acquaintance with St. Augustine’s language, with whom all signs of holy things are familiarly called Sacraments, etc. This is the Defendant’s answer, but how does the Replier report it?
Replier: He answers, But yet it does not follow from hence that in his opinion all such signs are Sacraments, but only in word and phrase of speech.
Answer: The Defendant makes not this answer, but a far other. Viz., that it will not follow (as the Abridgment seems to gather) that Augustine would allow of no holy signs, but such as are indeed Sacraments. Instead whereof, the Replier sets up a mark of his own, and then shoots at it.
Replier: Neither was it brought in (as he might have marked it) to prove any such thing.
Answer: To what end then be it brought. [p. 250]
Replier: But only, to show, that such signs partake part of the nature of Sacraments.
Answer: A curb this (surely) will not hold. For first the Abridgment has not, participate the nature; but, that a chief part of the nature of Sacraments is given to significant ceremonies, now, between participate, and a chief part there is room enough for a wedge. Secondly, he says untruly, that Augustine’s testimony was brought in either only, or at all, to show that such signs do participate the nature of Sacraments. For it was quoted to prove, that Augustine does affirm and give this as a reason against such ceremonies, that a chief part of the nature of Sacraments is given to them. When shall we have truth from this Replier’s pen? But if it had been true that Augustine had to that end been cited, how would that be showed from his words, signs pertaining to divine things are called Sacraments?
Replier: And this, as that use of the word Sacrament, does confirm, so that which was derived from thence, and has been in perpetual use, viz. that such ceremonies are called Sacramentalia, Sacramentals.
Answer: If the name of Sacrament improperly given to other things, prove that these things so called do participate the property, and nature of Sacraments; then indeed we have lost the day. But then you shall make parable themselves, and all that Saint Augustine and other men call Sacraments, to participate the nature of a Sacrament. And then, why not the Swan in Holborn, to participate the nature of a Swan? And the idols of the Gentiles, to participate the nature of God? For that sign is called the Swan, and those idols, Gods. Denominations real and proper, argue participation of nature; but denominations analogical or relative, do not so.
Secondly, If by the name of Sacraments given to signs of holy things the nature was also ascribed, then in taking away that name from our ceremonies, we have discharged them from partaking the nature of Sacraments, and then, what ail you?
Sacramental, the derivation will not do it, if the pro- [p. 251] -per name Sacrament will not: no more then the tenant can pass over a better estate to another, then the landlord did make to him. The name Sacramental taken properly is given out of relation to Sacraments, not out of participation or resemblance of their nature. Thus the font, the communion cups, the table cloth, and all rites used in administration of Sacraments, are called Sacramentals (say the Schoolmen.) And in that sense, the Book of Common Prayer uses that term of all our ceremonies, or vessels, whether significant or not, which belong to the administration of Sacraments. Again, analogically, such ceremonies as are consecrated to signify and work supernatural effects, are called by the Schoolmen, Sacramentals; and such are the holy-water, oil, wax, etc. in Popery; which indeed being consecrated to such use, participate or rather usurp the nature of Sacraments. And in this sense the Defendant takes Sacramental ceremonies in his distinction following. Sometimes also the Schools call the very Sacraments, Sacramentals, in concreto; as men call miracles, mirabilia. So that neither the term Sacrament at large, nor Sacramental given in relation, or in some resemblance to ceremonies significant, will prove them to participate the nature, much less to participate a chief part of the nature of Sacraments. And thus you have lost Saint Augustine.
The Defendant therefore told you right that your slight acquaintance with Augustine’s language appeared by that collection, who in every volume of his works does show his own allowance of some, or other significant ceremony which was not of divine ordination. And that your alleging of one only Father (who yet makes against you) does openly tell us that you conceive small confidence that antiquity did ever patronize your cause. What say you to this?
Replier: But neither Augustine, nor other Fathers do disallow such ceremonies (says the Defendant) and this we do not deny? If by disallowing be meant constant refusing of such things, we do not deny this. Yet something is to be found in their general doctrine, from which we may soundly conclude against those inventions of men.
Answer: [p. 252] If you will not deny this, then you must grant that the Abridgment has wronged Augustine and that yourselves in constant rejecting all such ceremonies, are mere Novatians, which is no praise to you. That you could wring the general doctrines of the learned to a purpose, never intended by them, we doubt not. But we take their constant practice to assure us better then you can do, how they meant to have their general doctrines understood and limited.
4. Testimonies of Protestant Divines; Whether divines which impugn some significant ceremonies do so on the ground that significancy gives them a chief part of the nature of sacraments?
The third kind of proof from the testimony of Protestant Divines produced out of their special witnesses, some answered in particular, and in general all the rest.
Opposers: Master Calvin in Levit. 8:12, Zepperus, On Ecclesiastical Polity, p. 50, Jewel, Treatise of Sacraments, p. 248, 249, Beza, Epist. 8. All condemn ceremonies invented by man which are of mystical signification.
Defendant in sum: That they err for want of a distinction of terms. For that there be two acceptions of that term Mystical; one, Sacramental by sign of grace conferred by God, the other only moral, signifying some duty of men to God. The mystical ceremonies condemned by the learned writers are Sacramental. All the ceremonies which we defend, are mystical, moral, not sacramental, which difference of terms he observes in their own witnesses, as shall appear.
Replier: But in this fourth section more legerdemain is used then in many other. For when the Defendant professes he answers the testimonies of Protestant Divines found in the Abridgment, he produces only four, as if there were no more to be found; whereas in the same place of the Abridgment, viz. p. 33, there be many more joined to those [p. 253] before I have shown by name, and to them divers others are added, p. 35.
Answer: The Defendant having singled out four special men out of a greater number of their witnesses, and answered to them, gives to all the rest this general answer, That no Protestant Divine which he has read (unless perhaps Beza) has spoken absolutely against signs symbolical and merely significant. And what legerdemain is in this? Are not all answered with one answer, when all speak to one purpose? If the Replier could have instanced in any other of those named by the Abridgment, against the Defendant’s answer, he would suppose have done it; and that had been somewhat. But when he thus stands aloof, it is a sign he dares not come up close to the answer.
This might serve to take off this Reply, but lest the Replier brag, or the Reader imagine that their other witnesses cannot be thus avoided; let us take them in, remembering only, that they are brought in as reasoning against ceremonies significant upon this ground, That a chief part of the nature of Sacraments is given unto them.
The Divines of Wittenberg and those of France, and the Low Countries, produced before, have there been answered to, that they speak not simply of all significant rites, but only of those that serve to shadow out the mysteries of the Gospel, or to supply the office of true Sacraments.
Martyr on that place, speaks purposely of Exorcism to drive away the devil, and altar names, oil, spittle, and exsufflation; to all which the Papists ascribe not signification only but operation also: and some of these they consecrate by prayer to that end, wherefore Martyr says they make them Sacraments: and that their distinction of Sacraments and Sacramentals, is therefore vain: which justifies the Defendant’s answer. Beside, Martyr is known to approve sundry significant ceremonies as lawful, and namely those of ours; and bowing the knee at the name of Jesus Christ, and yet they allege him.
Sadeel, of that Treatise which they follow, that not, but in that Treatise against the Monks of Burgundy, produces five, [p. 254] five, that, in answer to the twelfth article, he condemns the addition of Salt, Oil, Spittle, and other things to Baptism in Popery, as we also do; not simply for signification, but for consecration, necessity, and efficacy, ascribed to them, and for some other reasons. And in the thirteenth article, he condemns the popish Chrism, which as the rest is made sacramental, not merely significant.
Danaeus against Bellarmine, Cont. 7, ch. 17, is falsely quoted by the Abridgment, or mis-printed. For the place is ch. 7, not 17, where he says, It is blasphemous to think and teach that any outward things can be to Christians a sign and Sacrament of spiritual things; in opposition to Bellarmine who there maintains the lawfulness of consecrating creatures, to signify and work supernatural effects. And this justifies the Defendant’s answer. And this Danaeus (elsewhere) allows the feast of dedication (which these men condemn) the Jews’ manner praying with their heads covered in token of reverence, the anniversary feast of the Nativity, and some other significant ceremonies.
Polanus is quoted part, Theol., p. 196. In my edition there are but 163 pages in all. But he nowhere condemns all significant ceremonies: Yea, he allows some; as, the anniversary feasts of the Jews and Christians, p. 133, 134, feasts, gestures significant. Yea his definition of superstition, p. 113, That it is when effects of divine grace or any natural force, is ascribed to anything or gesture, without divine precept or natural cause; shows, what kind of ceremonies he condemns: namely, not such as only signify morally, but such as are made Sacramental.
Thus with the four singled out by the Defendant, we have all their witnesses, cited p. 93, to witness, 1, that they speak not against all significant ceremonies; 2, much less upon this reason, that if they be used to teach or admonish any spiritual duties, a chief part of the nature of Sacraments is given to them, as was said by the Abridgment. Let us hear then who are those divers others said to be added, p. 35, where we find added only Perkins, Merbury, and the late Reverend Archbishop Doctor Whitgift. Perkins… [p. 255] on Gal. 3, p. 230-1, is cited, as condemning significant human ceremonies. That edition which they follow, I have not: but I am sure, that on that chapter, he says nothing to that purpose; only on verse the second, he blames the setting up of images in the Churches to be laymen’s books, which we also do: and what is this for them? Do we also condemn all significant ceremonies? Yea, in the same commentary, p. 298, Perkins prefers (in persons of age and hot countries where it may be safe) the dipping of the baptized into the water before sprinkling, because it does more fully represent our spiritual washing, then sprinkling does. And is not this a human significant ceremony, and stated in religious use?
Master Merbury on the second Commandment, I never saw; perhaps it is but a manuscript. His judgment and practice in his latter times, they and we know: and therefore they object his name, not so much for proof, as of spite to cross him that crossed them.
The last is the late Archbishop, out of whose defense of his answer to the Admonition, p. 291, they tell us, that he professed not to like that any prescript apparel should be used in God’s service for signification. To which I answer, that where they saw these words, they saw also Peter Martyr’s words alleged; that forasmuch as angels appeared in white apparel, and the ministers of the Church are angels, so therefore the Church may appoint her ministers such apparel in signification of their offices. Why did they then allege Peter Martyr, as condemning all significant ceremonies, and not put him out of their bede-roll, wherein they put in the Archbishop? 2. Why will they not believe the Archbishop that the surplice with us is not appointed for any moral signification, but, for distinction, order, and decency, save that they seek matter of quarrel? 3. With what conscience do they avouch the Archbishop, as disallowing all significant ceremonies, whom they knew to use, defend, and urge these our ceremonies which themselves oppose, because significant? Finally what consequence is this, the Archbishop says he approves not of their significant gesture of sitting at the [p. 256] Sacrament in token of rest, no more then of the surplice for signification. Therefore he disallows all significant ceremonies?
Now we have all; and now I ask the Replier, what pleasure he takes to see his friends openly whipped, by causing us still to discover their falsehood in their quotations? Return we therefore to examine the Defendant’s answer to those four, which he singled out from the rest, Calvin, Zepperus, Jewel, and Beza.
Replier: But let us hear what he can say to these four which himself has chosen to answer. To Calvin he says, that he speaks only of those mystical ceremonies, which are properly sacramental.
Answer: You curtail his answer, leaving out the proof, and application contained in them; whereas the Defendant brings in Calvin’s words speaking of Sacraments, saying, etc. — unto which is annexed the promise of grace. And again, testantur de gratia Dei, they bear witness of the grace of God. So that, by Sacramental, the Defendant means such ceremonies as are substituted to the very office of Sacraments, as Calvin does, when he condemns symbolical signs which else he does expressly allow, as exercises, and incitements of piety, as has been shown. But what reply, you: this, Calvin speaks of signs Sacramental?
Replier: And this, says he, is the very point for which he was alleged, viz. that such significant signs are properly sacramental. Is not this then good answering?
Answer: Yes verily, the answer is good; but the reply is naught, which bobs the simple reader by equivocation in the word Sacramental, which being understood (as has been shown) of signs consecrated by men to signify and work grace, (which is an abomination to do:) this Replier interprets (to serve his own turn) of all signs which signify (not any grace given by them, but) duties which we owe to God: and would have us to believe, that these are all one. Have you not the distinction, of mystical-moral, and mystical-sacramental?
Replier: [p. 257] Concerning mystical-moral, I will speak something in the next section.
Answer: You should in all reason have spoken of it here, seeing the Defendant’s answer is grounded on that distinction, but proceed to Zepperus.
Replier: Zepperus, says he, has not a word there of mystical signification. The place is l.1, ch.10, where, among divers rules, he gives this for one, that Sacramental signs must signify only things to be sealed up in the heart.
Answer: Good. For this proves that such signs as are not appointed to seal up any grace in the heart, are not made Sacramental. Is this all? Or does he from thence conclude against all significant ceremonies?
Replier: From whence he concludes as against human traditions, because God will not by them stir up any grace in the heart of man: so in special by this with some other rules, he concludes against the sign of the Cross, and other such ceremonies in Baptism. Is this nothing?
Answer: Yes this is something, but it is against you. For this shows why he condemns the crossing on the breast and crown, as exorcism, holy water, and some other rites, namely, because they were made signs both significant and efficient of grace in Popery: that is, Sacramental. For that Zepperus allows of ceremonies merely significant, and used as free ceremonies, appears ch.16, where he allows dipping into the water as more significant with Pomeranus: and thrice dipping with Augustine, as signifying both the Trinity, into which we are baptized: and also our Lord’s resurrection on the third day. And are not both these human significant ceremonies, and stated in the worship of God as much as any of ours? But see now what the Defendant says to the third and fourth, Jewel, and Beza: and then, what the Replier excepts.
Defendant: Bishop Jewel insists only in the sacramental, and has not one word touching the moral; nor any Protestant author that I have read (Beza only excepted) has spoken absolutely against signs symbolical, [p. 258] and merely significant. Yet Beza himself will be found, I presume, hereafter to allow them in some cases. This distinction therefore (of moral and sacramental) as pertinent, and important ought to be diligently observed.
Replier: Jewel (says he) insists only in sacramental signs; and (such saith the Abridgment) are all they that signify spiritual graces.
Answer: Nay the Abridgment says, Which teach or admonish of any spiritual duties, which is harder the Replier not helped by changing duties to graces as if that were all one. By what authority has the Abridgment to call all significant signs sacramental in such sense as few or others have, when they condemn sacramental signs? Or what is their authority that we must believe them?
Replier: As for Beza, he grants him in a manner to condemn all symbolical signs.
Answer: In a manner, not simply; for he says, it will after appear where he found that Beza does allow them in some cases. Indeed, Beza differs from others in phrase only, and not in meaning. He condemns all symbolical rites, which he calls Sacramental, that is (says he) signifying spiritual grace. He says not, spiritual duties, but graces. Now that Beza meant not simply to condemn all significant ceremonies, save such as are made sacramental is manifest in that he allows the feast of Christ’s birth, and Resurrection which we call Easter, after the High-Dutch (Ostern) which signifies Resurrection. Yea Beza confesses these our ceremonies to be indifferent in nature, as the surplice, and kneeling. Of which of the last he says, that (so) sometimes (before adoration came in) it might be profitably used as a sign of godly reverence. So he likes, the being a sign of reverence was not unlawful, though since the adoration of the host, he judges inconvenient.
And concerning the signing with the sign of the cross, he says, that however sometimes of old there might be some use of it, yet for the superstition which has since been [p. 259] added, he thinks it should be abolished. Which is to judge it inconvenient in respect of that abuse, not unlawful merely for signification. For then it could never have had lawful use, because it was always significant. Therefore however Beza, in his terms, differs from other Divines in seeming to confound symbolical and sacramental; yet in his judgment he consents with the rest, and so with us. And this the Defendant meant.
Replier: But to extenuate his (Beza’s) credit herein, he would have the reader believe, that no other Divine does consent with him therein.
Answer: Nay, not so: but rather that by his manner of speech, in that 8th Epistle, he seems to differ from others with whom elsewhere he appears to consent. For indeed he says, he would have all symbolical rites banished out of the Church, whereas Calvin allows some to be in the Church, and yet their minds were the same. Can you show any other Divine speaking so as Beza, and in such force as you take him to speak in?
Replier: But if any man look upon the places quoted in the Abridgment, p. 35, viz. Hum., Confess. part. 2, opp. 229, 306, Ainsworth sect. 17, ad Sax. Conf. obs. 1, Calvin l.4, 20 and in Matt. 20:25, Perkins in Gal. 3, p. 230, he shall find that Beza is not alone, in this point.
Answer: In this point for which you fetch up his words out of one place, he is not at all: and in that, wherein he and the rest here recited, do agree with him, we also do agree with them: that is, that there be some symbolical rites made sacramental, which are unlawful; others heaped up to shadow out the mysteries of the Gospel (which is to turn us back to our selling-book) which are also unlawful. But that all mystical-moral ceremonies are by any of them condemned as usurping the nature of Sacraments, neither Beza nor any of these say, as has appeared in them. For all these have been examined; only here be two new places pointed at unto? Which we shall now look on.
In the former place Calvin shows how God both commanded the Prophet to go naked, and tells him to what end: whereby [p. 260] the false prophets put upon themselves sundry strange shows, only to blind men withal, and to purchase respect to themselves. Then he adds, that this is to be marked against the Papists who obtrude their empty ceremonies. And that the Papists do perversely give the name of Sacraments to their empty ceremonies, and is there of mere significant ceremonies any word? Speaks he not of the new-made Sacraments of the Roman Church? What shameful abusing of men is this?
The other place of Calvin is out of his Harmony: There Calvin speaks of that question, The baptism of John was it of God or men? And showing that it must be understood of his doctrine as well as of his washing, collects well from that question, Was it of God or of men? that among the godly no doctrine, nor a sacred sign ought to be admitted, unless the same appear to come from God, and that it is not in the pleasure of men to coin ought. In which passage, they only have the term of (Sacred sign) to stand upon, by which Calvin can here mean nothing but a Sacrament; showing, that the Church may neither broach new doctrine nor coin new Sacraments, which is most true: but nothing to their turn, who confound Sacraments, Sacramentals, and merely significant rites, without reason, or authority of any the godly learned.
We have looked on all which the Abridgment quotes save Doctor Humphrey, whom in that place has no word for them, or against us, but only shows that no man or Angel has power to institute a Sacrament.
Replier: Beside, Bellarmine confesses that Brentius is of his mind, De cult. Sanct. l.3, c.7.
Answer: Bellarmine says there, that Brentius in his last confession, c. ult., reproves the same ceremonies, of hallowed water, oil, etc., consecrated to signify and work supernatural effects, because the mysteries of Faith should not be new shadowed out, when the Gospel shines in the whole world. Are these ceremonies only significant, or signifying moral duties?
But if this prove Brentius to be of that mind which you suppose Beza to be of, then Beza was also of Brentius’s mind, and consequently allowed some mystical ceremonies [p. 261] though not consecrated, nor to the like end with the Papists. For who knows not that Brentius allowed not only the sign of the cross, as a significant sign, but images in Churches for historical use, he being a Lutheran. Is this all? You have not won Brentius, but lost Beza by this reckoning.
Replier: Bellarmine, in his second book de effect. sacrament., joins with Brentius, Calvin and Chemnitius.
Answer: He sends us to a book of 34 leaves in folio, to seek these men out; perhaps, wishing we should not find the place, lest we found him halting. The question there disputed is, whether the Church may appoint ceremonies which shall be a worship to God, meritorious, and binding the conscience, even out of the case of scandal, col. 261, so as the very omission of them is sin. This Bellarmine affirms, col. 265. Bellarmine brings in Calvin’s objections against them, and (in the 7th argument) Brentius and Chemnitius disputing as Calvin does, against the school of ceremonies, instituted to adumbrate the doctrines of the Gospel, now that God has taken away his own shadows of the law, and left his Church to a clearer kind of teaching. But what is here to show that mere significant ceremonies were condemned by Calvin, Brentius, or Chemnitius, who all professedly allow some such? What meant the Replier to cite these to us, but to let us see that he has learned to abuse his Reader with the names of learned men, as well as the authors of the Abridgment? Are these all?
Replier: I will add one whom this Defendant calls worthily a judicious refuter of Bellarmine: (1) Junius. His words in his Animadversions upon Bellarmine de cultu Sanct., lib. 3, cap. 7, ann. 12, are these,
Answer: This is the man that told us, No wise man will set up an answer made to an objection before he considers the assertion against which that objection is made. Which objection is made, who now brings in an answer of Junius, but tells us not to what objection, much less against what assertion: wherein, if his own rule hold, he can be no wise man. Yet I will yield him to show some wit. For if he had told us, that the assertion there disputed against, is this; that the Church may of her own power consecrate creatures [p. 262] creatures to signify and work supernatural effects, as namely, heal venial sins, and drive away devils, and cure diseases, he would only have forestalled his own market. Now we know whereto Junius speaks, let us hear what he says.
Replier: His words are these: Quod si ad usum non potest quisquam instituere, profecto neque ad significationem homo legitime potest adhibere, etc. (i.e.) Human ceremonies cannot be lawfully used for signification without encroaching, no not in private, much less in the Church of God, and public administration. Thus he.
Answer: Stay awhile. Is this your English a true translation of the Latin you produce? Or is it not a manifest falsification? Where be these words in Junius, Human ceremonies may not be used for signification? Are you not ashamed? Or can you not blush? Now go on, sir, with his words.
Replier: There can be no blessing, or consecration ecclesiastical without the Word and Prayer. Here is now no way of institution; and prayer of faith there can be none, where there is no commandment, nor promise of the instituting.
Answer: And do not these words declare plainly that Junius speaks of Sacramental ceremonies, consecrated to signify and effect supernatural things? And is this all one with mere significant ceremonies? But that the Reader may see Junius in his own posture, and this mis-reporter in his own colors, let us take his whole answer, word for word, in opposition to Bellarmine’s assertion, above written, which in bulk is this: We do rightly use water, oil, and other things consecrated by Prayer to signify and work supernatural effects. To this Junius. I deny that the Church can do this rightly, without express institution and promise of God: for, (that we may conclude shortly) it is the work of God alone to produce supernatural effects; and to whom it belongs to effect them, to him alone does it belong to use the signs for the effecting of supernatural effects: therefore see he not, that as that working, so this (i.e.) [p. 263] means to such an end, belongs only to God, that he ordain, promise, and perform? And that no man can arrogate this to himself without most grievous blasphemy? Now if no man can appoint to the use, neither certainly can a man lawfully apply to the signification, unless by human and arrogant appointment, not in private, but much less in the Church of God, and public administration thereof, there cannot be ecclesiastical blessing, and consecration without a Word of institution, and prayer of faith. There appears no word of institution, and the prayer of faith cannot be there, where is neither precept of institution, nor promise.
Can anyone find here the words of the Replier, Human ceremonies cannot be lawfully used in the Church for signification? Does not Junius speak of consecrating creatures to signify and work supernatural effects? And is this all one with mere significant ceremonies not consecrated? For, does not Junius professedly sever the point of signification from that of efficacy, and, in the two next annotations speak of significant ceremonies, and allow them as voluntary, though not necessary? Does he not by another allow (while it was used without superstition) the standing in prayer on the Lord’s days, as a ceremony signifying their profession of Christ’s resurrection, which example Bellarmine objects out of August. Epist. 118? Nay, the very first original use of that they called Holy bread, though significant and human, he allows as then lawful, annot. 10. And yet this Replier would have us think, that Junius (condemning the consecration of things to signify and effect supernatural effects) condemns also simply the use of all significant ceremonies, of human institution. And just so he adds Danaeus.
Replier: To Junius add Danaeus, contr. Bellar. de cultu Sanct., lib. 3, cap. 7. It is blasphemy to think, that any outward thing may be made a sign in the Church, unless it be expressly ordained in the Word, and commanded by God himself to be used unto that end.
Answer: Danaeus is corrupted by the Replier. His words spoken against Bellarmine on the same section are, That the Church does rightly use consecrated creatures to signify and effect supernatural effects, these are blasphemous to teach or think, that any external [p. 264] thing in the Church of God can be unto Christians a sign and Sacrament of spiritual things, unless it shall be expressly ordained of God to that end. The Replier leaves out the words Christians, Sacrament, and spiritual things, and tells us that he says, It is blasphemous to think that any outward thing may be made a sign in the Church, etc. As if to be made a sign, and to be made a sign and Sacrament, were all one thing.
III. Arguments Answered
5. Nonconformists’ arguments from reason; That significancy gives unto ceremonies a chief part of the nature of a sacrament, answered; How the surplice has been imposed
In this section the fourth sort of arguments taken from Reason are brought in.
Their first objection is this.
Opposers: Symbolical signification gives unto ceremonies a chief part (of the nature) of Sacraments, when they are appointed to teach us by their signification.
Defendant in sum: First, that these our ceremonies are only moral signs signifying moral duties; as the Surplice, sanctity of life, the Cross, constancy; the Kneeling at the Communion, our humility in receiving such pledges of redemption: whereas Sacramental signs have a double signification; one, ad modum signi, another, ad modum sigilli, and therefore are both significant, and obligatory. So as this kind of sign sealing always a promise from God, cannot without sacrilege be instituted by man.
Secondly, that these moral signs do not represent any collation of grace, (as do sacraments) but only notify some duty: neither do seal up or ratify the covenant of grace (as do Sacraments); which thing he does illustrate by a speech of Zanchius, saying, What are Sacraments [p. 265] images, wherein is revealed and represented to us the grace of God in Christ Jesus, by the remission of sins and everlasting life, whereby there is offered to the minds of the receivers, Christ with all the benefits of the eternal Covenant made unto us in Christ. Thirdly, he taxes them, for making signification to be the chief part of the Sacrament, because thereby they give advantage to Bellarmine, who charges the Protestants (but most falsely) to hold Sacraments to be only bare signs.
Lastly, he answers, that by this their objection it will follow, that all the moral signs of the Law should be made so many Sacraments, seeing every thing takes the denomination from the principal part: whereas the very use of a sign, to make it a Sacrament, is a promise of grace annexed thereto by God himself, as Bellarmine himself does acknowledge.
Replier: Here that which in the Abridgment is the third proof of a Proposition, and backed with many allegations, is nakedly brought in, that it may be the better answered.
Answer: The argument (being naked, and without bombast) has no sinews, nor is it strengthened, but only covered, by the clothing of men’s names put upon it. And it has been shown, that all that facing, with which the Abridgment rather decked, then backed this argument, was counterfeit stuff, testimonies being all forced or forged.
Replier: Symbolical signification gives unto ceremonies a chief part of sacraments. For the clearing of this point, the Defendant distinguishes between Moral signs and Sacramental. Of Sacramental he makes two parts, one after the manner of a sign, and the other, of a seal: then he makes a difference between Moral and Sacramental signs not only that Sacraments do seal, which Moral signs do not, but also that [p. 266] sacramental signs do represent a collation of grace given by God unto man; whereas moral signs do only notify a duty of man which in some moral virtue he owes unto God. Then after he finds fault with this, that signification should be called the chief point of a Sacrament. Now for the first, I do not marvel that he makes his distinctions vain: for this is a most unhappy wedge indeed, which rives in sunder the holy Sacrament of God, and makes way for human inventions to creep into their place.
Answer: This wedge was set right by the Defendant, to separate moral signs of human invention from Sacramental signs, which (if right) are divine. And if this wedge has riven in sunder the holy Sacraments, and made way for human inventions to come in their place; it must needs be that the Replier’s beetle (unevenly carried) has forced and driven the wedge awry. Which will appear so to be.
Replier: The sacraments (says he) do signify grace conferred; and moral signs do signify a duty of man in some moral virtue. But the Scripture teaches us that the Sacraments do also signify the duty of man towards God.
Answer: It is not true, that Sacraments do signify any particular moral duty of man, but only imply it, as a consequent of the general Covenant of grace. And if they yield only that it be a chief part of the nature of Sacraments to signify some moral duty, it will not hold, that every significant sign of moral duties participates a chief part of the nature of Sacraments, as the Abridgment affirms. For that which is common to Sacraments with all signs, is that they suggest unto the understanding another thing than that which appears to the senses; but, that they do confirm and instrumentally exhibit what they signify? As also that they signify and seal the Covenant of grace, which (as Perkins says) is their special difference whereby they are distinguished from all other holy signs. But how will the Replier prove that Sacraments signify moral duties?
Replier: For by the Sacraments the whole Covenant is [p. 267] signed and sealed between God and man. So that not only God’s conferring of grace, but man’s duty through grace is there professed and represented.
Answer: 1. If the whole Covenant of grace be signed and sealed by the Sacraments, then such signs as neither sign nor seal that Covenant of grace between God and man, cannot partake the office or special nature of Sacraments.
2. Unless signifying be a more principal part of the nature of Sacraments, then sealing is, such signs as communicate with them only in signifying, do not participate any chief part of their nature.
3. The Sacraments do confirm our obligation unto sanctimony in general, but do not signify any moral duty in particular, and of that sanctimony they do seal the promise and not only admonish or put in mind of the duty thereof, as moral signs do: The stone which Joshua set up to admonish the Israelites of their Covenant with God, did only signify that duty of which Circumcision sealed up unto them the promise of God. But see how he proves Sacraments to represent moral duties?
Replier: This the name of Sacrament, as it signifies an oath or obligation, does import, by Bellarmine’s own confession, De Sacr. bk. 2, ch. 10.
Answer: No man doubts whether the Sacraments ratify the obligation between God and man; but, whether they therefore represent any moral duty in particular. Is it all one to imply and to represent? Have you no better?
Replier: This the name Eucharist, does also show, in the Lord’s Supper, notifying that thankfulness we owe unto God. This the words of the institution do plainly testify, in this Lord’s Supper, Do this in remembrance of me.
Answer: And is the word Eucharist (which signifies thanksgiving) the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper? Or rather, a term brought in by men, to put them in mind of their duty in receiving it? Let him tell us in what element or action of that Sacrament this duty of thanksgiving is particularly represented, as our reverence or humility is signified by kneeling. The remembrance of Christ is by the Apostle [p. 268] interpreted of his death, for which we ought to be thankful.
Replier: Again I think the Defendant when he considers the matter well, will not dare to deny, but that sanctity (which he says is signified by the surplice) is signified in Baptism: and constancy also, which he ascribes to the Cross. If he do, he may be easily confuted, by those places where the Scripture speaks of it, especially Rom. 6, throughout the Chapter.
Answer: Sanctity in general, and constancy as a parcel thereof, are signed and sealed unto us as graces, and fruits of Christ’s death by Baptism, and not barely signified, as duties; wherefore we are said thereby to be engrafted into the similitude of his death and resurrection, Rom. 6, and elsewhere, to have part in Christ. But the sanctity required in a minister of the Gospel in his administration, and the constancy of bearing up our profession of Christ, are not by any distinct sign in Baptism represented: and if they were, yet is not this signification the chief part, or a chief part of Baptism, or of the nature thereof. So that still the distinction of grace given and duty required; and, of signifying only, and sealing also, stands unshaken; which the Replier perhaps saw and therefore now breaks out of the way, and turns himself to new objections.
Replier: Against that moral signification attributed unto man’s inventions, I propound this argument in the words of a reverend man (whom for some reason I will not name): To be a teacher of my understanding, and an exciter of my devotion are such effects, as require virtue inherent, or assistant, to those things which should be causes of them. But no sign of man’s devising has any such virtue in it, or with it. For then it must come from that word put forth in the creation. And so nothing natural should have a force communicated to them of teaching supernatural or else by God’s after-institution: such we read not any but of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper only, or by the Church’s impetration. But this cannot be. For prayer obtains those effects of things [p. 269] to which they serve by God’s creation and institution. But not any creating or new conception of things to supernatural uses. For then the Church might ask that this or that creature might be made a Sacrament unto her, in which case she should pray without all warrant from God’s will.
Answer: He did wisely not to name the author of this, for either he must have shamed himself, if it had appeared that what his author spoke against operative signs of man’s invention, he wrests and applies to signs merely significative; or he must have abated the reputation of his reverend author himself, for making so sickly an argument against merely significant ceremonies. The weakness lies in this, that what we ascribe to monitory ceremonies is occasional occasions and objects only, whereby the mind of a man works upon itself: he takes it to be ascribed to the very things themselves, as unto causes working such effects in us, by some virtue in them: than which, scarce anything more childish could be imagined. And yet upon this fiction he builds all his long-drawn objection. What virtue is there in letters or characters themselves to instruct or incite? What virtue in a gibbet to warn a man against robbery; and yet that they do it occasionally, who will deny? Not because they work directly and virtually upon the understanding or affections, but only objectively give occasion to them to work upon themselves. And such use the creatures of God have (as Augustine shows,) whereas no sensible sign can be a cause of grace, or infallibly signify the same; unless by divine institution, as even Bellarmine confesses. Wherefore we shall dismiss this objection, and take in another of the Replier’s own making.
Replier: 3. If human inventions be such moral admonishers in spiritual duties? The consciences of men without doubt are bound to subject themselves unto their admonitions? And then unto them, from whom they do admonish, or by whom they be made admonishers: (i.e.) to mortal men, such as our Convocation consists of: Is not this good divinity?
Answer: I believe if human significant ceremonies were such [p. 270] admonishers as by their virtue could teach the understanding, and excite the devotions of men, as your reverend man’s reason imagines, then were men bound in conscience to use such helps, seeing nothing can have any such virtue but by divine institution. But if they be only external objects, tending by their signification, to those uses, then the consciences of men are not bound simply to them, but only collaterally and propter aliud. For though we be bound to the thing admonished, yet not to the particular means of admonition, considered in themselves, because God has not required them. As to the imposers of such rites whether ecclesiastical, or civil, or both, we are so far bound in conscience to subject ourselves unto their impositions (supposing they be done in order) as we cannot (with contempt, or scandalizing) neglect them without sin, as Beza says. For that (as Master Cartwright says of lawful ordinances) God commands thereby the Church. And this is good divinity, else all our judicious Divines such as Calvin, Bullinger, Beza, Zanchy, Ursinus and Melanchthon have ill taught us.
Replier: 4. Whatsoever is ordained in the Church as a teaching sign, that ought oftentimes to be interpreted unto the people in sermons: for that is the teaching which must clear and perfect all teaching signs. And should not they preach diligently in the name and words of Christ, that should expound unto the people the signification of a surplice and a cross?
Answer: Where things are known, interpretation needs not, and much less often interpretation, and least of all where interpretation goes along with the things, as in our use of the sign of the cross. The surplice is not imposed as significant by our Church, but supposed so to be, seeing you will have it so. And whether it signify (as Peter Martyr conceives) that the Minister is as an Angel, or Messenger of God; or that he ought to be holy in his person, or administration; or, do his work with a grace: all this is so soon taught, as the Minister need not spend the fortieth part of a Sermon about it. And if this be touched sometimes in a Sermon (as Saint Paul does the women’s veil, in an Epistle) what fault find [p. 271] you with that? Calvin exhorts to the like duty, and so does Bucer likewise, Calvin, Institutes, bk. 4, ch. 10, sect. 2, and Common Places of Bucer, Of the Government of the Church, ch. 6.
Replier: Would not this also be thought for the edification of the people, that sometimes they must hear of the moral good which the ceremonies teach: and sometimes be admonished of the right meaning of our Convocation-house in the appointing of these ceremonies, if they charge them to be moral evil in superstition; and at other times they must be instructed, how to defend these ceremonies against the opposers of them, lest otherwise they use them without faith? Surely all the Sermons which many Parishes have, would scarce be sufficient for this doctrine of ceremonies.
Answer: Less then the tenth part of one Sermon, might have served to show the signification and intended use of our ceremonies, had not some of your selves furiously alleged them as superstitious, and idolatrous; whereby you have stopped your own mouths from preaching the Gospel, and forced the godly ministers to instruct themselves and this Church against such calumniations, at more length then needed, or then they would have done. Hereby you have occasioned some hindrance of the handling of better matters, as did the body of Amasa stay the pursuit of Sheba the traitor, 2 Sam. 20. And do you now complain of us? The truth is, that some of you there be, that think no time too long, nor any labor spent better, then what is wasted in speaking and writing against these things, as if all Religion lay in opposing them. But when we redeem ourselves necessarily from their depravations, they are, of all men that ever I knew, the most impatient: which is a sign of much partiality, if not of Pharisaical pride. Shall we have so much patience as the Maccabees to be killed sitting in caves, when we may lawfully resist those that labor to root us out of the hearts of our people, by clamors and calumnies? And yet we find time enough for other more important doctrines, and by the grace of God do labor in them.
Replier: 5. I dare appeal to the consciences of the best conforming Christians, whether ever they found themselves truly stirred [p. 272] stirred up to holiness by the surplice, or to constancy by the cross?
Answer: Whoever expected that men should be stirred up by these things, as by causes; or otherwise then by sensible objects, as we are by sight of the creatures or other memorials? Of which use, if men by prejudice or negligence deprive themselves, whose blame shall that be?
Replier: One thing I am sure of, that in some one Congregation where these ceremonies have not appeared for 20 or 30 years together, there has been more holiness and constancy of faith, then in many cathedral Churches where they were never omitted.
Answer: And I am sure of another thing, that neither the omission of them in some places wrought such devotion, but some other thing: nor the usage of them in Cathedral Churches, caused less devotion: but, want or neglect of some other means. For where other helps stand equal, I see no such difference, save only in the opinion of such as still say, non sum sicut isti, some of us this mean; counting their very opposition of ceremonies a high point of devotion; and stiffness therein, constancy in the faith. This argument therefore is a fallacy, non causa pro causa.
Replier: This point being cleared, there needs no great answer be given to the cavil, of making signification the chief point of a sacrament. For if the Defendant meant to deal plainly, why does he change the words, that he may find some color for his accusation? The Abridgment says only that it is a chief part: He accuses them for saying the chief part, between which two phrases, he knows how great room there is for a wedge.
Answer: The Defendant propounds their objection, and after repeats it likewise in their own phrase, a chief part: whereby his fair dealing and meaning may appear. And when he charges them with saying the chief part, he presses them with such words as their argument requires, however they decline them. For though there be great odds sometimes between a chief part and the chief part; yet, when [p. 273] when there be in all but two parts, (a chief) and (the chief) are all one. The Sacraments considered as signs, have but two parts, signification and obsignation: if signification be a principal part, then obsignation is not; and that must be the principal part which is in the comparison of only two, a principal. So as here is no room for a wedge.
Replier: 2. To prove that signification is one chief part, the Abridgment alleges Gen. 17:11, Ex. 12:13, Lk. 22:19. Why is no answer given to these places, if the assertion be false?
Answer: Answer need not be given further than was in the Defendant’s distinction implied: viz. That though signification be a part of the nature of Sacraments (which is all that those places prove,) yet not simply signification of any holy thing, but signification of grace collated. And secondly that the more principal part is obsignation as appears in Rom. 4, where it is said that Abraham received the sign of circumcision as a seal of the righteousness of faith. Now, how from participating in the general nature, you will prove participation in the specifical property, I see not; unless we shall say, that because men and beasts are both called creatures, beasts do participate the proper nature of man.
Replier: 3. The Defendant himself in his distinction which he brings here, concerning a Sacrament, does allow one chief part of a Sacrament’s nature to be signification ad modum signi. Bellarmine therefore has as good a friend of his, as of the Abridgment.
Answer: First, where does the Defendant make signification a chief part of the nature of Sacraments without any limitation? Secondly, is a part and a chief part all one? Is your little finger no part of your body, or is it a chief part? Bellarmine therefore has more fuel out of the Abridgment’s objection for his slander, then can be shown out of the Defendant’s answer.
Replier: But (says he arguing herein against himself) if signification be a principal part of a Sacrament, then all the moral signs used in the Levitical worship should be properly deemed Sacraments. Why so? Because things take their denomination [p. 274] from the principal parts. True, but first, as has been observed, there is difference betwixt a principal and the principal.
Answer: Where many parts comparatively to some others, may be called principal, (as in the body of a man where the liver, stomach, lungs, heart and head, are respectively to other parts called principal and more noble) there is difference betwixt a principal and the principal: but where two only parts stand in comparison, (as the body and soul of a man) then, betwixt a principal and the principal, there is no difference; for both, in the same relation, cannot be principal parts.
Replier: Secondly, everything that has denomination from a principal part, has not properly the same name withal. A man may in some sense be called spiritual, because his principal part is a spirit; yet he may not be properly deemed a spirit.
Answer: Denomination is verbal or real: verbal is vocal, or by name, and is either analogical upon some resemblance, (as a chess-man or picture are so named) or relative, (as says Aquinas) as medicines are denominated wholesome, as conducing to health, or urine as declaring it. Real denomination is either at large, or simply: at large, from any participation; simply, from a principal part of that from whence it borrows the name. And of such denomination we speak. And if signification be a chief part of the nature of Sacraments, then must it be the chief part, as has been shown; and so, give the denomination to all signs of holy things. And then what shall let all the Levitical moral signs to be called Sacraments, seeing they participate as fully, as any Sacrament, the principal part of the nature of Sacraments, if that lie (as you say) in signification of holy duties, and not in a peculiar signification and obsignation of the Covenant of grace? That every natural man may be called spiritual in respect of his soul, if the Replier have a mind to call him so, cannot be denied: but that either Scripture or Divine has so called him, the Replier cannot show. Yea, from the predominance of nature or of grace, a man is termed [p. 275] termed in concreto, spiritual, or carnal; yea in abstracto, flesh or soul. Wherefore the Defendant’s distinction yet stands good.
Replier: 4. And those ceremonies which had signification in the Levitical Law, have this denomination from Sacraments, that they are properly called Sacramental, (i.e.) as partaking something of the nature of Sacraments, though they be not Sacraments properly so called.
Answer: As partaking something of the nature of Sacraments? Is this now come from a chief part to something? Well fare your heart, you will, as the saying is, play small game rather than sit out. 2. If signification of any holy thing be some part of the nature of Sacraments, then the very letters in the Bible partake something of the nature of Sacraments. And so all the parables therein, yea all the visible creatures, because they signify to us, and teach some things of the Creator: and so all our gestures in the worship of God. 3. That the Levitical ceremonies are called Sacramental by some Divines, proves not necessarily that they partake something of the proper nature of Sacraments; for they may be called so analogically, only upon some resemblance. 4. And if they be called properly Sacramental, then must that denomination be only reductive, and not real; given (say the Schoolmen) to such things as attend and belong to the administration of Sacraments. But this the Replier will not have, for it fits Aquinas. 5. If from your participating something of the nature of Sacraments the very morally-significant rites of the Law were called Sacramental, yet might that denomination be common, or after a sort, not proper or simple: and therefore could not conclude participation of any chief part, but only of some part; that is of the common nature of Sacraments, as they are sub genere signorum, and not of their specifical, and distinctive nature, as they are a peculiar kind of signs. Wherefore it still remains, that mere signification of moral duties, does not give to significant ceremonies a chief part of the nature of Sacraments, nor any part of their proper nature, but only something of their common nature; that is, that they are signs of holy things.
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6. Moral ceremonies of God’s institution in the Law for moral signification may not be used, much less those that are devised by men, Answered; Replier abuses and perverts all authors he quotes; God’s will of precept and permission
Now follows their second objection from Reason. [p. 276]
Opposers: If the ceremonies that God himself ordained, to teach his Church by their moral signification, may not be now used, much less may any of those which man has devised.
Defendant: The Defendant answers in sum. First, that the use of some Jewish rites, with a mind and intention not Jewish, is not damnable; of which he gives instance. 1. In circumcision used under Prester John, not as a Sacrament, nor as necessary but as a national and customary rite: and 2. in the keeping of Easter on the same day wherein the Jews kept their Passover, but without relation to the Jewish Passover, which custom was anciently used by the Greek Church. Secondly, the Defendant answers, that it is far more safe to devise some other new, then to recall the Jewish rites which God himself has now abolished, lest an opinion of their necessity should be engendered or fostered thereby, as fell out in the case of circumcision, Gal. 2.
Replier: A second objection from reason is here brought in, viz. that if ceremonies which God himself has ordained to teach his Church by their moral signification, may not now be used: much less may any of those which man has devised. But why does the Defendant pass by all the allegations which belong to this reason in the Abridgment, p. 33, 34? They cite to this purpose first the Council of Nice, Augustine, Martyr, Bullinger, Lavater, Hospinian, Piscator, Cooper, Westphalus, etc., and then after, Calvin, Bullinger, Hospinian, Arcularius, Vireh, Bilson, Reynolds, Willet, etc. And again, Calvin, Bullinger, Chem- [p. 277] Chemnitius, Danaeus, Hospinian, Arcularius, the Book of Homilies, Humphrey, Reynolds, Willet, etc. Are all these worth no answer? At least they show, that this is no new reason devised by the Nonconformists; but the common consent of Protestants and the ground whereby they confute the superstition of the Papists.
Answer: It is a great affliction to dispute with a wrangler. Has not the Defendant answered, in sum, to all Protestant Divines produced by the Abridgment, that not one of them which he has read (except perhaps Beza) condemns all symbolical rites? Does the Replier take off this answer? Does he, can he show out of this mustering of men (whereof some of them are here called thrice over) any one that does by this, or any other reason, condemn all significant Church ceremonies? And to what end then is the Defendant so challenged for passing by the bare names of these worthy men?
Is not this the man that told us they use the testimonies of men, not for a proof, but only for illustration? Why then is he so troubled that their argument should come forth without this garnish, and long train of human testimonies? Is not this he, that said he saw no reason why arguments from reason should not take the higher hand of human testimonies? And why now is he angry that a reason should come forth without a guard of men to countenance it? Writes this man out of conscience, or not out of a spirit of contradiction, even until he contradicts himself? Yet lest he should brag I will give him some further answer to these allegations.
First, the first of their testimonies, namely the Nicene council is falsified twice: once, when they say that the Nicene council did, upon that reason, condemn significant ceremonies namely, because that God had abolished his own ordained to the Jews; secondly, in that they affirm the same council to condemn significant ceremonies devised by man. For in that very place quoted by them, Eusebius shows how that council ordered and established the anniversary feast of Easter in memory of Christ’s Resurrection. And the council itself, in the twentieth canon, decrees the sig- [p. 278] -significant ceremonies of standing in prayer on the Lord’s days, and every day betwixt Easter and Whitsuntide, in memory and profession of Christ’s Resurrection. Did these men, do you think, condemn all significant ceremonies; and yet ordain these two?
Secondly, the testimonies of all the rest are perverted. For what they speak ex hypothesi against Roman ceremonies as imposed upon the conscience as necessary acts of divine worship; yea consecrated or consecrating: or secondly, against the intolerable multiplicity and burden of ceremonies (as Augustine, and others;) Or thirdly against the pedagogy and school of them, whereby the mysteries of Faith are wrapped up in new shadows, which God had freed us from the old; and meant to have published plainly by the preaching of the Gospel and not again to be adumbrated by new shadows. All this, say, spoken suppositively against the Popish bundle of human and superstitious presumptions, these men allege, as if this argument had been intended against all kind of significant Church rites were they never so few, or free from such abuse, or false opinion.
Sundry of these as our Book of Homilies, Doctor Bilson, Humphrey, Reynolds, Martyr, Willet are known to have allowed these our ceremonies in question as lawful; and all of the rest in general, to have allowed some significant ceremonies of men’s institution. What a shame is it for men to glory of sincerity in refuting the ceremonies, and to use no sincerity in alleging their authors? In which kind I do not believe that ever any Protestant Writers abused the world so much, as the Abridgment and this Replier have done. We have answered this Replier’s cavil, now let us hear his Reply, to the Defendant’s answer or rather his demurrer upon it.
Replier: Yet let us hear his answer to the reason, as it is nakedly in itself considered: remembering always, that he can say nothing, but that which the Papists may as well say for any of their ceremonies, against the argument pressed upon them by our Divines.
Answer: Like, no argument will be ashamed to come [p. 279] forth naked and without garnish; unless it be faulty, no more then Adam was ashamed of his nakedness, till guiltiness overtook him, who then hid himself, not because naked, but because fallen. Secondly, when he says we can say nothing for ours, which the Papist may not as well say for many of theirs; not for ours which are merely significative, then they for theirs which are held also operative; not for ours which are esteemed arbitrary, then they for theirs which are all deemed necessary: not, we for ours which signify moral duties only, then they for theirs which serve and shadow out divine graces, and the mysteries of the Gospel: he marks not, how the heat of contending has transported him, and made him speak what is most hateful, though in cold blood he would know it to be most untrue.
Replier: His first answer is, that the use of some Jewish rite, without any Jewish opinion, is not damnable: instancing in circumcision, and Easter, where first he should have told us, how a Jewish rite can be used, without some part of a Jewish opinion? For he himself after contends, that our ceremonies are not the same with the Papists’, because we have not the same opinion of them which the Papists have.
Answer: Need you be told that the same rite materially, is not formally and in use the same, when the reason and end of using it is different? And that therefore, in several respects, it may be affirmed or denied to be the same, Jewish, or Papal?
Replier: What does he mean by this new term damnable? I hope he does not symbolize with the Papists in their difference of mortal, and venial sins, of which sort he so vainly accused us before.
Answer: Yea, you know, that he does not symbolize with the Papists in that distinction; as you did in yours of unlawful as beside the word, though not against it.
Replier: If he mean by not damnable, nor unlawful, then he holds circumcision, as it is used under Prester John, to be lawful.
Answer: He does so, and you say nothing to disprove him. [p. 280]
Replier: If he means anything else, as that which does not utterly destroy the being of a Church, then he speaks some truth, but nothing at all to the purpose.
Answer: And because such a meaning had been to no purpose, you are the more injurious to suppose such a meaning, and give no reason for your surmise.
Replier: His second answer is, that it is far more safe to invent new ceremonies, than to use those which God once appointed, and now has abolished: because they might engender an opinion of necessity, and so might bring in the Levitical Law. Where first it is well that he confesses plainly that all the Jewish ceremonies are abolished, for therein he contradicts that which he said in his former answer.
Answer: All Jewish ceremonies which were properly figurative, and all others in respect of divine worship or obligation of the conscience to their use, are abolished; and yet some of them which were not figuratively but morally significant, as sackcloth and ashes in fasting, may be used materially, not formally (i.e.) significatively not figuratively, freely not necessarily; and this implies no contradiction at all.
Replier: 2. From hence our Divines use this to argue, Nam veteres figurae sublatae sunt ut locus esset novis? Num divinae sublatae sunt ut humana succederent? [Were not the old figures taken away that room might be made for new ones? Were divine things taken away that human things might succeed?] Are divine ceremonies abolished that human may be erected in their place? Can you show this? They are the words of Doctor Whitaker.
Answer: The Replier manifestly abuses and perverts the argument of all our Divines, and namely of Doctor Whitaker in that very place. For in that place, the question is, whether the Pope can make laws which shall bind the conscience or no? Doctor Whitaker to prove that he cannot do it, uses this for his first reason, That God has freed us from the Jewish ceremonies and other positive laws of the Old Testament, and therefore much more from the Papal ceremonies. To prove this consequence he shows that in number of rites the Pope exceeds the Jews; and thereupon infers, that if these laws of the Pope bind the conscience, the burden of the Christian Church is more heavy then was that of the Jewish ceremonies. And whereas Bellarmine objected, that the Jewish [p. 281] rites were abolished because they were figures of the New Testament, Doctor Whitaker grants that, and answers that therefore in the New Testament we should have no figures but those very few, which Christ has instituted (meaning his Sacraments:) And that the Papists have infinite many ceremonies, and figures, as appears in Durandus. Then follows, Num vero, etc. [But surely…] And, are old figures taken off that place should be made to the new? And are the divine abolished that human should succeed? Therefore if the ceremonies of Moses were removed because they were typical, why should not the Popish be removed which are not less typical? I answer, secondly (says he) that the Jewish ceremonies were taken away not only because they were figures, but because they were many and cumbersome, etc.
This sentence of Doctor Whitaker the Replier has corrupted in translating divine figures, divine ceremonies, as if all ceremonies were figures. Secondly he cuts it off by the waist, that the scope might not be seen. And thirdly he perverts the whole intention, which is to condemn the Popish ceremonies, for being charged (as if they were divine) upon the conscience, as necessary; or secondly for being figurative and sacramental; or thirdly for being numerous and insupportable. Now, that Doctor Whitaker had no intention to condemn by this argument, all significant ceremonies which are not burdensome in number nor signs of grace, nor yet urged as necessary in their use to salvation, appears in the same chapter p. 723. where to Bellarmine objecting the institution of the feasts of Purim, Esther, and of the dedication of the Temple, 1 Macc. 4, he answers that this objection touches not the question, Nam hae constitutiones, etc. [For these constitutions…] For these constitutions of festival days were not urged as necessary to salvation, but were only, as it were, certain memorials of divine benefits. And these feasts though human and significant rites, so long as they were not esteemed necessary in themselves as divine institutions he allows, as he does also our late observation of the seventeenth of November, the day of Queen Elizabeth’s entrance. And yet this Replier would have us think that he disputes simply against all significant ceremonies, imagining the same reason to be good and strong [p. 282] against A, which only is strong against some kind of significant ceremonies.
Replier: And the reason is strong. For if it had been the will of God that we should have been taught by other signs, then those that are appointed in the New Testament, he could easily, and would likely, either have chosen some of the old, or appointed new ones in their places.
Answer: There is a will of God preceptive of all that is necessary; there is a will of God permissive of what is lawful but not necessary: What God wills as necessary he has prescribed: But what he wills only permissively, he has only taught and limited, and so left to choice. Your reason therefore against all significant ceremonies, is no better then against Churches to meet in, or hours of meeting, or a certain order and form of public prayers and administration. For if it had been the will of God to have his people meet constantly in one set place, and at such an hour, and to use any set forms of prayer and of administration, he could easily, and surely he would, either have chosen some of the old, or have appointed some new in their places. Answer this objection and answer your own. Speak on then to the Defendant’s second answer, That it were more dangerous to use the old then to invent new ceremonies.
Replier: 3. Though there may be more danger in some respects on the one side, yet there may be more absolutely on the other.
Answer: That which is barely said, is sufficiently answered with a bare denial.
Replier: 4. The inventing of new human ceremonies has itself engendered an opinion of necessity in them, and has brought in all the Popish load of rites: So that even in these respects, it may be questioned, on which side is the greater danger.
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7. This will open a gap to images, oil, spittle and all Popish ceremonies, Answered; Opinions of divines on images; Objection against images for historical uses Answered; Hebrews 8:5; 10:1
Now, he has told us before out of Mr. Calvin that the opinion of necessity for the worship of God thereby brought in the invention of human ceremonies: Now he says, the invention of them brought in that opinion of necessity: Varying witness therefore you see, and as it seems uncertain, whether the water first engendered the ice, or [p. 283] the ice the water. The truth is, that sometimes opinion of necessity engendered ceremonies; and that sometimes the blindness of men, corrupted (even lawful ceremonies, by annexing to them) the opinion of necessity afterwards. So that there is a possibility of superstitious opinion incident to all ceremonies significant or not. But the use of those which God had once appointed and has now abated, having more color of necessity, because of the first divine institution, then others of meaner birth, does much more easily engender or foster that opinion of necessity; as may be seen in the Jews themselves who even therefore stood for the Legal rites, as Master Dering has well observed. Wherefore the Defendant’s second answer stands good, and the Replier’s argument from the abolishing of the Legal Rites, to the prohibition of all human significant ceremonies, is not able to prevail.
Opposers: This will open a gap unto images, oil, spittle, and all popish ceremonies, all which Bellarmine commends as fit to put men in remembrance, as when the Priest did sprinkle the people with holy water, saying, Remember thy baptism. And thus defend they their images even for remembrance;
Defendant: What is this you say? That therefore there will be a gap opened, 1, to all others, 2, to the Popish, 3, and (for example) to these ceremonies now specified. So many particulars, and so many errors; for first, to argue from the use of some few, to an admittance of all other ceremonies of like kind which are in the Church of Rome almost innumerable, is a consequence far more loose then this, viz. Some wise man may be of his Majesty’s Privy Council, therefore all wise men of the kingdom ought to have place in that honorable Senate. [p. 284]
Replier: Secondly, being all popish, etc. say you. This consequence I take to be both unreasonable and unconscionable. It is first as absurd as it would be for a patient, who having had of his Physician the recipe of some Apothecary’s drugs, should thereupon presume that it is safe and wholesome for him to taste of every box in the Apothecary’s shop. For it is well known, that as there are some good customs in the Church of Rome, so are there many bad.
Answer: Next, the word, popish, is here taken of you in the strictest sense, not simply for the ceremonies themselves, but for the mixture of abuses that are in them, by the superstition of that Church. And therefore to conclude from the lawful use of ceremonies in our Church, to an appropriation of the Romish abuse of them, gave me just cause to call your consequence unconscionable, forasmuch as your own hearts can tell you, that our Church is not so earnest to entertain the use of any one ceremony formerly observed in the Church of Rome, as it is zealous to abhor her superstition in all her abuses; some of them being slavish and senseless, some childish and ridiculous, some heathenish and idolatrous: whereby such their ceremonies respectively are become to be most properly Popish.
Thirdly, you argue, that if these, viz., Surplice, Cross, Kneeling at the receiving the Communion, be unjustly used, then is there just cause that these, to wit, Oil, spittle, Images, and the Priest’s sprinkling of water may likewise be in use, because all are equally for remembrance.
We confess that spittle was used by our Savior Christ in the healing of the dumb; and Oil, by the Apostles, in curing many other diseases; yet both [p. 285] miraculously: but to imitate the work of a miracle, without the miraculous power, is but an apish counterfeit: for to hold such a miraculous ceremony, after the virtue be gone, is but to preserve a carcass, because it had been once possessed of a soul.
We come to your other instances in the use of Images, and that which they call Holy water, to the end that you may the better discern your own injurious and odious comparison; For 1, the true use of Images with us is only for historical commemoration; but in the Popish Church, it is for a superstitious adoration by kneeling unto them, praying by them, and by determinating a kind of religious worship in them; and therefore only in regard of such their superstition is to be called popish.
The second, which is their sprinkling of water upon the people, for remembrance of their Baptism, if it were applied only to make them often mindful and careful to keep their vow of Christianity, made once unto God in Baptism, it might be called a moral ceremony, and Christian. But that sprinkling of water, as it is used in the Romish Church, not only as significative, but also as operative, with an opinion that it has power both of purging venial sins, and of driving away devils, is in that regard also popish and execrable; for what is this else, but to take upon her to constitute a new Sacrament, seeing that a Sacrament is a sign representing, and exhibiting, and conferring of a spiritual grace? She therefore, who has made the profession of the definite number of but seven Sacraments, an article of faith; has by this new invention of Holy water made up eight.
I may not omit a witness, who has given you [p. 286] you an answer long since unto this objection, which notwithstanding you urge again, as if this cabbage had never been cooked before. The Author is Peter Martyr. Neque mihi dixeris, etc. [Nor may you say to me] (says Peter Martyr, speaking of the use of the Surplice) There shall be now a gap opened for all abuses, to water sprinkled by the Priests, Incense, and infinite such other abuses, because your adversaries will answer you, that there must a mean be kept, that the Church of God be not burdened, with these kind of things, and that no worship or efficacy of religion be placed in them, as we see there is in that water-sprinkling, Incense, etc. So he. And do not you furthermore see, by happy experience, that opening a gap of many ceremonies, whereof you speak, to be now, through the wisdom and providence of our Church, quite shut up, seeing that she is contented, to admit of so few, and no more?
Lastly you can with as little reason divest a Christian Church of her liberty and power of ordaining of significant ceremonies, because it is possible that she may abuse her power by instituting vain superstitions, and burdensome rites, as it were to seek to deprive a civil Magistrate of all power of legislative authority, in making of laws because there is a possibility he may abuse them. Thus much in answer to your general proposition.
Replier: The third and last reason, which the Defendant could find brought against significant ceremonies, is, that it, viz., will open a gap to images, oil, spittle, and all Popish ceremonies, all which Bellarmine commends as fit to put men in remembrance of good things etc. To this he answers diverse things. 1. This consequence (says he) from some to all is too loose. But this consequence is of his own framing. For the consequent which the [p. 287] the Abridgment makes, is from the common nature of significant ceremonies, to every special, being equally considered in regard of either circumstances. Neither is there any occasion at all in the Abridgment for that other consequence which the Defendant makes, viz. as, must, of his example of the King’s Council.
Answer: This third is the last. For other reason the Abridgment gives none, save that from the second Commandment, which is referred to a fitter place, as has been shown. And their words, in this third reason, have begotten that lavish consequence, which the Replier would father upon the Defendant. Nor can their answer be freed by what the Replier here pleads in the defense of it, as shall upon his after-repetition of this answer be shown.
Replier: Secondly, it is as unreasonable (says he) as if a patient that has some drugs prescribed him, should thence conclude he may taste of all: But it is as unreasonable, say I, if a patient, having some drugs prescribed unto him, should thence conclude he may taste of any which are of the same nature, especially if the same Physician should prescribe them unto him.
Answer: Nay verily, it is rather as unreasonable, as if a patient should say, if my Physician may this day prescribe me a dram of Rhubarb, to purge choler, he may as well tomorrow prescribe me an ounce of Scammony, especially if he shall judge that Scammony will purge choler as much as Rhubarb; as if his art could find no other reason, of not doing the one, though he did the other.
Replier: Thirdly, it is unconscionable (says he) because there are many abuses mixed with Popish ceremonies. Which answer seems merely unconscionable, because it is plainly expressed in the Abridgment, that this inference does consider the popish ceremonies only in regard of that signification, which they have of good things.
Answer: The words of the Abridgment must determine this difference. They are these: This will open a gap to Images, Oil, Spittle, Cream, and all other popish ceremonies, especially if they shall be judged as fit, for to teach by their signification [p. 288] as those which we retain. Wherein their words (whatever their meaning was to say) do (in effect) affirm, that all popish ceremonies may be taken in at this gap, which lets in any significant ceremonies, though especially if we shall judge them as significant.
The Replier’s conscience was not waking, when he says, It is plainly expressed in the Abridgment, that this inference does consider the popish ceremonies only, in regard of that signification, which they have of good things: for when they say, all may, especially if they be significant, etc., is any man so simple as to say, they mean, only significant, when they say, especially; as if those two words were equivalent? The Replier says, that our Divines confute the Papists for having Images in any religious use, especially in Churches. Does he thereby mean, that they confute the religious use of Images only in Churches? What, only, when he says but, especially? Here the Replier would complain of force done to his words, and yet does he the same unto the words of the Abridgment, in opposition to the Defendant.
Replier: Fourthly, he disproves the use of Oil and Spittle, because they were once used miraculously. As if the miraculous using of any thing, did forbid, that it should at any time after be used for signification. Surely, then the many miracles which histories do record to have been done by the Cross, must needs banish that also out of the Church.
Answer: No man living can guess by the Replier’s relation of it, what the Defendant’s answer here was. This he gets by printing the Defendant’s words by little patches, as his manner is. And hence has come to pass, that such as read his book, and never examine it by the Defendant’s (as many do) be led to think the Defense to be very poor; the Reply, invincible: But credit stolen thus at a back door, must be redelivered openly, with damage to him that stole it.
The Defendant, after general answer given to the objection, ut supra, descends to some of their particular instances:
[p. 289] and to show how unreasonably and odiously they compare the scantling of our ceremonies with those of Popery, to which they say a gap will be opened, does show that there be other considerations sufficient to foreclose the entrance of these Popish ceremonies, howsoever they be significant. This he first shows in oil, and spittle, which having their birth and being from an apish imitation of a miraculous employment of them, by our Lord, and his Apostles are therefore to be kept out of doors, though some significant ceremonies be let in. This the Replier turns another way, as if the Defendant only reproved these things in the Papists, but had no intention of answer to the objection of the Abridgment: And so, instead of a reply, he gives only a flout.
Replier: Lastly, for Images he says, They are not to be called Popish but only in regard of superstitious adoration.
Answer: Here is not at all told, why he says this; namely, to show their injurious matching of Popish images with our significant ceremonies, as if those Camels could go in at a needle’s eye, as well as they. Nor is there a clear report of what is said, for the Defendant not only says, that the Popish use of Images is for a superstitious adoration: but shows how? Namely, 1. By kneeling unto them. 2. Praying by them. 3. Determinating a kind of religious worship in them: whereas with us, the true use of Images is only for historical commemoration, etc.
Replier: As if Cassander’s images were not Popish.
Answer: Cassander’s images, or rather images or pictures, not at all to be adored but only to represent things done for information and incitement. Are Calvin’s images and therefore, I hope, not Popish? For, Calvin distinguishing betwixt single formed statues, and such pictures as represent the history of things done says of these, that they may have some use in docendo et admonendo [in teaching and admonishing], in teaching and putting in remembrance, but not so of idle images, because they teach not. Yea as to that Cassander’s allowance of all such in Churches, is, in respect of the consequents, unsafe and reprovable, as the Defendant elsewhere shows; but yet [p. 290] that use of Images is rather the Lutheran, then the Popish use of them, unlawful for other respects, not simply in itself: for then it were nowhere lawful, no not in Bibles, or (something).
Yet the Replier has yet more against this assertion.
Replier: Which is an assertion. 1. Directly against all our Divines, Who not only confute the Papists for adoration of their Images but also for having them in any Religious use, especially in Churches.
Answer: Against all our Divines? O strange, are Luther, Chemnitius, Brentius or others, called Lutherans, none of our Divines? And do they not all practice and defend the use of historical Images in Churches? But let them stand by, as none of ours. Does Calvin condemn, as unlawful in itself, all use of Images for information or admonition? Does he not rather condemn that opinion as superstitious? Is not he one of our Divines? Surely and a good one, if any man. Does not Peter Martyr, when he sets down the lawful use of Images, say, Let profitable and sacred stories (especially) be painted that the beholders may receive some edification thereby? And is not he one of our Divines? Does not Zanchy say that it is not in itself impious to make the picture of Christ as man; and that, especially it cannot be blamed when some entire history, as of his Passion, Resurrection, Ascension, or coming to judgment, is depicted: for it has profitable and honest uses? And is he none of our Divines?
What shall we say of Junius, Danaeus, and Master Perkins, are they none of our Divines? Or do they not all acknowledge an Historical use of Images which is not Popish, but lawful in itself?
Beza, was one of our Divines, when he was alleged, as condemning all significant Ceremonies, yet let him still be one of our Divines, and with him his then fellow Minister in Geneva, when in 1583 they set forth that excellent translation of the Bible into French, wherein they have so many exquisite pictures, as of Noah his flood and the Ark at Gen. 7, of Aaron’s robe and Aaron in his robes, at Ex. 28, of the godly fabric of the Temple, and the vessels thereof, and of Solomon’s dedication of it, at 1 Kgs. 6, of the city of Jerusalem, [p. 291] as it was repaired by Nehemiah, at Neh. 2, and some such others: did they not do this for the better information and edification of the Readers, and could they think this to be unlawful? Or do any of our Divines so judge it to be? It is idle that the Replier tells us that our Divines condemn all religious use of Images: for so does the Defendant as well as they, and that even in this place: and they all allow an Historical use of some images, as well as he. But forsooth, with these men, an Historical use is confounded with a religious use: as if all use which serves to our edification by way of object, were a religious use properly so called, whose determination must be to Godward true or false. So our Divines express themselves to mean by religious use, in the second Precept. Ursinus, acknowledging that not all, but some images are forbidden in the second Commandment, shows, which are unlawful; namely, first, such as are made to represent, or worship God by, p. 793: Secondly images of the creatures, placed in the Churches or elsewhere, ad cultum Dei, vel ad ornatum periculosum [to the worship of God, or to perilous ornament]. Where he distinguishes the religious use, which is always ad cultum, from the personal use, even of lawful pictures; maintaining the one to be forbidden, in respect of the use intended; the other, in respect of the peril incident thereto, though not of mere unlawfulness in itself. Methinks the Replier might conceive this Argument, viz. All our Divines do condemn all religious use of Images anywhere; but none of our Divines do condemn Historical Images, in private, where they are not worshiped, or in hazard to be so; but hold them lawful and profitable remembrancers. Therefore none of our Divines do condemn as unlawful, a simple Historical use of Images, when they condemn all religious use of them. As for placing of even some lawful Images in Churches, it is justly blamed in other respects, though it be not held to be in itself simply unlawful. Yet the Replier hopes to prove his challenge, saying at this matter.
Replier: For this is the controversy, betwixt Calvin and Bellarmine, Of Images, bk. 2, ch. 9. Wherein this Defendant takes Bellarmine’s part.
Answer: If the Defendant take Bellarmine’s part against [p. 292] Calvin, in that question, whether images may well be placed in Churches, because he confesses such an Historical use of Images to be lawful; then does Calvin also take Bellarmine’s part against himself. For he confesses that there may be not only a lawful, but a profitable use of Images, cum notatione historiae [with historical notation], as Bellarmine in the next chapter rightly confesses of him. But Calvin knew that all things lawful in themselves, are not lawful in all times and places to be used: and so does the Defendant, so here is no crossing of Calvin.
Replier: Secondly it is directly against the Homily concerning Images unto which we are bound to subscribe.
Answer: If this be true, the Defendant deserves to be suspended; the Replier, if this be untrue. And untrue it is. For the Homily against the peril of Idolatry strongly confutes the setting up of Images, viz., single and adorable, in Churches, as a thing of inevitable danger. Of this mind is the Defendant, and yet holds that there is a lawful historical use of Images, and these may stand quietly together.
Replier: Thirdly it confirms the foul words of Bellarmine, who says that the Apology of the Church of England lies in saying that the Council of Frankfurt decreed that Images should be abolished, de conc. Auth. lib. 2, cap. 8.
Answer: The Apology says, that the Council of Frankfurt decreed the taking away of Images, etc. Bellarmine says, the Apology lies in saying so. The Defendant says, Images are not Popish, but in respect of the superstitious use of them, for adoration. Now can any man’s wit tell me, how this speech of the Defendant confirms Bellarmine’s foul language? Does the Defendant herein decide what was decreed at Frankfurt council? But the Replier can prove anything, it seems: for he adds.
Replier: For the only answer is that which Junius gives in his notes upon that chapter, Annotations. 56. He that forbids Images to be worshiped, does forbid having Images worshipable, especially in Churches. Which answer this Defendant does flatly deny.
Answer: He means, the Bishop otherwise, it is not the only answer, [p. 293] answer, Junius himself gives another elsewhere; viz. that he could not find those words in the Apology nor thinks them to be so, Bellarmine should have quoted the place. And any man may give another answer, that if the Apology were mistaken, yet it lies not: for to lie is to speak contrary to a man’s own persuasion or mind. But there is a truer and a better answer, which Junius (I suppose) would have given, if he had found the words as they stand in the Apology: for, the words are these; the Council of Frankfurt decreed the taking away of Images, contrary to the second Nicene Council: which is not to say, simply, the taking away of Images; but, after a sort, viz. contrary to the Council of Nice, which required the adoration of them. Bellarmine then for taking that to have been spoken simply, which was spoken with reference; and taking that to be false in sensu diviso [in the divided sense], which is true as it was spoken in composito [in the composite sense], gives the lie to the Apology, but may take the shame to himself, for wracking the words from their partners and from the meaning of the Author.
And indeed Bishop Jewel maintains what he said, only by proving that the second Council of Nice for adoration of images, and the Council of Frankfurt directly against (not having of Images, for that they also decreed contrary to the Council of Constantinople, but) all adoration or veneration of them.
Junius showed his love to Bishop Jewel’s honor, in so defending him, as if he had not meant to say directly what the Council decreed, but only what was from thence to be collected: which yet to be but a mere excuse may appear, in that Junius confesses that the Council did not decree the casting of Images out of Churches, but only that they should not be adored; which he also partly excuses in them, because they could not foresee, nor had seen the abuses of them, as we since have done: Wherefore the Defendant takes not away this answer of Junius, as Junius himself does, and yet must needs be crucified. Junius, I am sure, allows, as lawful, an historical use of Images as well as the Defendant, and yet forsooth, they do not agree.
Replier: Sixthly, for Holy-water, he says, that may be counted [p. 294] counted Christian, were it not for the operative power, which is prescribed unto it in Popery. But good Protestants I think will rather believe Calvin, Who calls it a kind of repetition of Baptism, Institutes, bk. 4, ch. 10, sect. 20. And Junius, Who peremptorily affirms that no human ordination, opinion, or superstition, can make it good and profitable, in Bellarmine, Of the Worship of the Saints, bk. 3, ch. 7. At the least let it be called Jewish, not Christian, for Christ will not have his name called upon such superstitious devices; neither can it, without taking it in vain.
Answer: The Replier shapes the Defendant’s answer to his Reply; not his Reply to the Defendant’s answer; for, 1. He perverts the main scope, so as one that shall read his book alone would think the Defendant to be surely inclining to let in the use of Holy water: whereas his purpose is to show that, being so superstitious and execrable in itself, it cannot get in at that gap, which is said to be opened to it, by admission of our significant Ceremonies. Secondly, he curtails and alters the Defendant’s words. For the Defendant named not Holy-water, which implies the consecration of it; nor does he say thus Holy water, but the sprinkling of Water upon the people; nor does he say, what it may be, but it might be; that is, if the Superstition had not stained it, nor does he say, Were it not for the operative power which is ascribed to it, but, if it were done only to make men often remember their vow made in Baptism, it might be called a moral Ceremony, and Christian, that is, not Sacramental or Antichristian as now it is. For when Water shall be hallowed and sprinkled to put men in mind of Baptism, and that as being of virtue to cleanse from venial sins, it is (as Calvin says) in a sort to repeat Baptism; And, as Junius says, no institution, opinion, or superstition of men can make such hallowed Water good or helpful, as God by his Institution has done the water of Baptism.
But that Calvin would not have condemned such a use of sprinkling of water, as the Defendant supposes, appears in the same Section. Where (objecting to himself so water-sprinkling to be Apostolical) he answers, that there is much odds betwixt ordaining a thing as an exercise of piety to be [p. 295] be used with a free conscience, and ensnaring the conscience with necessity; intimating the one to be lawful the other superstitious.
As for Junius, seeing in the two next Animadversions he excuses as tolerable, the first use of Oil, and of that they called Holy-bread; he could not condemn such a use of water as the Defendant speaks of: And therefore the good Protestant in believing Calvin and Junius, must believe the Defendant, that such a use might be called comparatively Christian; as being opposite to the Antichristian abuse of Holy-water, which is to drive Devils away and cure venial sins, as Bellarmine professes, De cultu sanctorum, lib. 3, cap. 7.
Replier: Lastly, he says, there is no reason to deprive the Church of power of ordaining significant Ceremonies, because she may abuse it: Wherein he says true.
Answer: If he say true in that, then is your Argument against the institution of significant Ceremonies (because it will open a gap, to the abused Ceremonies in Popery) supplanted.
Replier: But to argue from manifest abuses, against that which is called use, and yet is as like those abuses, as one egg is like another, this I hope is reason.
Answer: And so it may be: but, no reason to succor your objection, unless you can prove our Ceremonies to be, in our use, like those of Popery, in which they profess proper worship of God to lie, and that their use is meritorious and necessary, binding the conscience, even out of the case of scandal; and operative too, yea some, as Bellarmine says of the Cross, ex opere operato [by the mere performance of the work]: To which if you shall say, our use is like, as one egg to another, your conscience and credit shall suffer for so saying, and if you say not so, you say nothing to the purpose.
Replier: That which by the way is brought out of Peter Martyr, is not of any great force. For he there persuades master Hooper, out of a good affection, which out of conscience he durst not do himself, though his place at Oxford did tie him unto it, as he professes in an Epistle, p. 1137. Where also he shows, that the chief end that moved him to [p. 296] persuade Hooper, was because he hoped that by his and such men’s yielding, the Ceremonies might in time be abolished, which we find to be an erroneous conjecture.
Answer: Indeed a varying witness is of little force, say the Lawyers: And such a one would this Replier make Peter Martyr to be: but he wrongs that honorable Servant of Christ, and his Reader. For Peter Martyr never varied in his judgment about the Surplice, which he constantly held to be in itself indifferent and lawful to be used: else he had been a wretched man to persuade any man unto it, for what end soever: as he does, both Hooper, and his friend, in a second Epistle, on the same page, which the Replier quotes, viz. p. 1127. But when he considered the scandal which was suggested in that friend’s case, and some personal respects in himself, he did dissuade it to his friend, and himself forbore it in Oxford; which plainly shows, that when he dissuaded the use of it, he looked at it in respect of those persons and inconveniences, not as in itself unlawful. And this is no wavering in the judgment, but change of the information. His reason of persuading Hooper and other zealous men to bear the use of vestments, that so they might come into place and power of removing them in time, appears not yet to have been erroneous. Sure it is, that the clamorous opposition, and violent censuring of them, has now made them faster and will never unsettle them. Finally, Peter Martyr never shifted his foot from that Answer which he gave to Hooper’s objection, (the same with yours:) and therefore in that, his testimony may be of force, yea though he had upon other respects retracted his judgment of the same thing, which he did not.
Replier: But that has much less reason in it which he adds, viz., that the open gap of many Ceremonies is now quite shut up, because our Church is contented to admit of so few, and no more. For first we have not so much as the word of our Prelates, for this Nil ultra [nothing further].
Answer: He says, you see it by happy Experience: And do you not so? Has any significant Ceremony been superinduced these threescore years? And if the deeds of the [p. 297] Prelates, will not secure you, their words should be given in vain.
Replier: 2. The gaps every day made wider and wider by such evasions as this is, which allow of Images themselves, for some religious use. For by this means any crucifix may come in, that is not greater then the Church door.
Answer: If the Replier’s conscience be not steeled, he will one day bleed for this injuriousness. Does the Defendant allow of Images, and in Churches too, and for some religious use? Or not only some Images, and that for Historical use only, in the very phrase of all our best Divines? But that use, which the learned Divines call Historical, these men (as has been said) call Religious, that they might, by a false ear-mark, bring us into suspicion abroad, and into hatred with our religious people at home. And yet they would be counted sincere men. The Defendant says no more then Master Calvin said, and therefore has made the gap no wider then he did; which if it might let in a crucifix or two, Calvin and Bellarmine were both deceived. But such a way for a Crucifix, as our Church doors cannot afford, the Inconformitans have made, by breaking down a Church window, while they tell us, That it were far less sin, and an appearance of Idolatry that is nothing so gross, to tie us in our prayers to kneel before a Crucifix, then to bind us to receive the Sacrament kneeling which they call kneeling before the bread and wine; as if kneeling determined in them. And surely, if kneeling before a Crucifix forbidden be no worse then kneeling before, though not unto the Lord’s own Sacrament, when we receive it, and not else; there will be no keeping out of a Crucifix, as unlawful, if it be not bigger then the Church itself will receive.
Replier: 3. They that shut up a gap upon their pleasure only, can when they please open it again.
Answer: But unless your janglings, and our sins bring God’s displeasure upon us, you shall never see that opened. And in this your uncharitable surmise, you involve his Majesty, and the State, not the Bishops only, so does your spirit transport you. [p. 304]
Replier: Now I have maintained the testimonies and reasons, which this Defendant could find in the Abridgment, against significant ceremonies, I will add one, lest it should be forgotten or lost; which I know not how the Defendant leaped over, seeing in the Abridgment it hath deservedly the first place, among all the proofs which are brought in to this purpose.
Answer: The Defendant found this reason, but (as hath been showed) put it over to the particular exceptions against the sign of the cross: but this Replier will have it come in here, lest it should be lost; and, for aught I know, it may be here lost, in this encounter. Let us hear it.
Replier: The argument stands thus in the Abridgment, p. 31. The second commandment forbids us to make to ourselves the likeness of any thing whatsoever, for religious use: and so is this commandment understood by Bucer, Virel, Fulke, and Doct. Andrewes now Bishop of Winchester. And, p. 32, 33, D. Andrewes is brought in, alleging this for the root of all superstition and idolatry, that men thought they could never have admonitions and helps enough to stir them up to worship God, yet God (says he) had given four means, viz., the Word written, the Word preached, the sacraments, and the Book of the Creatures.
Answer: Well: and what will all this help your cause? Save by a trick of sophistry, wherein you work upon the captiousness of a phrase, religious use: whereby your authors understand, 1. Worship to the image, 2. Worship tendered by the image to God, or a representation of that which is worshipped: and not simply that, which may any ways conduce to the furtherance of religion. For then we might not make our church, pulpit, communion-cup, or font-stone, like any other, seeing their use is some way religious, and the latter should be made after the similitudes of the former.
Replier: Now lest the Defendant might seem to have passed over this proof, as unworthy any answer, I will briefly add the grounds of it.
Answer: If the ground will bear it, let it stand. [p. 305]
Replier: 1. The word Temunah [Hebrew: תמונה], likeness, used in the second commandment, is general, and comprehends under it all religious similitudes, because they are homogeneal to images there expressly forbidden.
Answer: Though all this touches not our ceremonies, which are not religious similitudes in such a sense as the commandment intends them, and divines understand; yet may his words be amended. For when he speaks of images, as expressly forbidden in the text, and similitudes, only as homogeneal, he speaks ignorantly. For though graven images be first named as most usual, yet, by similitudes, are forbidden also any other kind of images molten, painted, woven, or any way made for such use. For the commandment forbids such similitudes of any thing, in the word Temunah, as expressly; as any graven image, in the word Pesel.
Replier: 2. Significant ceremonies are external acts of religious worship, even as they are used to further devotion. Suarez in Thom. p. 3. qu. 65. art. 4. Bell. De Effectu Sacramentorum [On the Effect of the Sacraments] lib. 2. c. 29 & c. 31, and therefore being invented of man, of the same nature of images, by which, and at which God is worshipped.
Answer: Significant or not significant ceremonies, are by the Papists proclaimed to be profitable, meritorious, and the worship of God, such as cannot be omitted without sin, even out of the case of scandal, as Bellarmine in the place cited doth aver. And (no doubt) such ceremonies, so used, are homogeneal to images in this, that a means of necessary and immediate service to God is devised by man; which is in effect all one, as to tender him homage at, before, or in an image, whether that ceremony be significant, or not; as namely, to tie the worship of God to time or place. Now what the Papists grossly hold of ceremonies in their use, and all our divines condemn in them, this man now takes up, as if it were a sound and orthodox saying: and foreseeing that we would deny that any human ceremonies can be, or that ours are acts of worship to God in themselves; but only acts attending upon the worship of God, as helps to us,
marginal note: Bell. de Effect. Sacr. lib. 1. Cap. 31. p. 259, 261. marginal note: Viret, Catechism, pag. 93. To hold difference of time or place, to observe days, &c. [p. 306] not as means of proper and immediate service to God; he thought good to put in a bar, saying.
Replier: The Defendant’s distinction of Essential and Accidental Worship, will help no more here, then the Papists’ δουλεία (transliterated: douleia; “service”) and λατρεία (transliterated: latreia; “worship, adoration”). God’s Law is not mocked with vain distinctions.
Answer: God’s law is not mocked with vain distinctions: but men are mocked, when they learn not such distinctions as God’s law intends. As the Turks are, which think all images and pictures to be forbidden in the second commandment, not distinguishing religious from civil use. And every man shall be mocked, that will not distinguish essential from accidental worship: for thence will follow, that man may not determine of any circumstance belonging to religious actions, no not of time, place, or any gesture. His bare assertion therefore, that the Defendant’s distinction will help no more, then the Papists’ of douleia, and latreia, is both uncharitable and unlearned. For are these two words, accidental and essential, words of one and the same value, as douleia and latreia? But it is enough, if by matching us with the Papists, he can bring scorn or suspicion upon us. So uncharitable is his heart.
Replier: 3. The affirmative part enjoins obedience to all the worship appointed by God; all which was significative, Heb. 8:5. & 10:1. From whence it follows, that no significant ceremonies must by man be brought into religious actions. The nature of the affirmative shows the quality of the negative: by the circuit of the one, we may learn the compass of the other.
Answer: The affirmative part enjoins us (says Master Cartwright) to use such outward means only in the worship of God, as himself doth approve in his Word. These he makes either substantial, or circumstantial. The circumstantial he reckons to be the reverend gestures of the body, which being forbidden to be given to images, are commanded (says he) to be given to God. If so, then all bodily gestures in religious actions are either determined in the
marginal note: * D. Ames, Medulla, p. 1, diss. 5, thes. 8, hath this distinction of the essential and accidental manner of worship, & refers to the accidental use and ceremonies, religious or ecclesiastical. Thes. 11: in which (says he) religious worship doth properly consist; & yet (says he) thes. 24, though such circumstances are not particularly commanded in the Scriptures, they are to be accounted as commanded by the will of God, in the general they are commanded under the law of order, decency & edification. 2. Because, &c. Cartwright’s Catechism, pag. 100, pag. 101. [p. 307] the Word, or man may lawfully appoint some of them significantly in the worship, though not as the worship of God in itself.
That all the worship of God among the Jews, was significative, is not proved out of Heb. 8:5, or 10:1, but, that the types and shadows of the law were significant. Were prayer and preaching not worship of God then? Or were they significant in our sense of significant? Significative worship no man may appoint, if we speak of worship properly, but significant rites, in which the worship of God is not placed, some must, some may be ordained by man, and so were by the Jews and Christian churches always without reproof.
Replier: 4. Significant ceremonies which are by institution, must of necessity belong to the second commandment.
Answer: Why may they not belong rather to the (o) third, as serving to the more reverend use of God’s appointed worship, then to the second, which concerns the immediate means of worship? And why not accidentally to the fourth, to which some of our divines refer all the solemn worship of God?
Replier: An accurate distinction of the commandments will easily show this.
Answer: Why give you not this accurate distinction to us? The first table (say we) concerns the immediate worship of God in four precepts: whereof the first provides, that all religious worship, whether internal or external, be performed to God alone. The second, that from himself we take the prescription of all that, by use of which we may really worship him, and esteem him to be truly and properly honored of us. The third, that in all acts, even of his allowed service, public or private, in word or deed, we carry ourselves sincerely and reverently, in body, and mind, and all our behavior. The fourth, that we set one day of seven apart unto the public exercise and profession of his worship. And after this distinction, it will appear, that the right use of ceremonies belongs rather to the third commandment then the second, as touching their end; and to the
marginal note: * So doth D. Ames in his Medulla, part 2, diss. 15, thes. 8 &c. Danaeus. Zanchius. [p. 308] the fourth as touching their customary use: howbeit, not as things therein commanded particularly, but only in their general, and ratione finis [by reason of the end].
Replier: But nothing contained in the second commandment is permitted to man. For to him this commandment, in regard of making, is wholly negative. Thou shalt not make to thyself, &c. Which words, as Calvin says, “Nos à carnalibus observatiunculis, quas stolida mens nostra comminisci solet, in totum revocent & abstrahunt.” [These words wholly recall and withdraw us from the carnal petty observances which our foolish mind is wont to contrive.]
Answer: Nothing contained in the second commandment permitted to men? The ten commandments, all (save two) are negative; is nothing in any of them therefore permitted to men? Indeed, of that which is forbidden in any commandment, and so in this second, nothing is permitted to men: but in that second commandment nothing is forbidden as touching the making, but the instituting or fancying of some or other our own mere devices, as an immediate means of worshipping God thereby. Nor doth Calvin’s words import any more. And this superstition is equally forbidden in significant, or not significant ceremonies, or circumstances, I trow.
These be the Replier’s grounds, as he called them; but it seems he had no list to set up his frame on these grounds, lest it should fall at his heels. Now let us see, if out of our grounds we can raise something against them.
1. Nothing is forbidden in the second commandment but the false worshipping of the true God, by some human invention, in the use whereof he is supposed to be truly worshipped, as means necessarily inducing thereunto. But our significant ceremonies are not imposed or observed, as means of worshipping God in them, or with opinion of worship placed in them, or as necessary inducements thereunto. Ergo [Therefore], these our ceremonies are not forbidden by the second commandment.
2. Again, the second commandment, in forbidding us to place the worship of God in any thing not commanded, doth forbid us to place the worship of God, in the forbearance of what he hath not commanded us to forbear. But [p. 309] to have opinion of serving and honoring God, in the forbearance of our ceremonies, is to place the worshipping of God in the forbearance of that which he hath not commanded us to forbear: therefore to forbear the use of these ceremonies, out of conscience of serving and honoring God in this forbearance, is forbidden in the second commandment, as a superstition; and no doubt so it is. For to make a conscience of a thing not forbidden, as if God would else be offended, is as much superstition, as to hold him to be necessarily pleased with that which he hath not required, as hath been said, and cannot be avoided.
.
Sect. 8
In this Section the Assumption of the Non-Conformists, is produced and answered.
Opponents: But these ceremonies in question are ordained by the will of men to teach some spiritual duty, by their mystical signification: for thus the Book of Common Prayer speaks of them, that they are neither dumb nor dark, but apt to stir up the dull mind of man, to the remembrance of his duty to God, by some special signification.
Defendant: To this the Defendant answers, that this exception against our ceremonies, because they are significant is in effect, as it were to blame a man’s speech for being sensible. He therefore remits them to their own authors, whereof some condemn the popish ceremonies, for being dark and dumb; others admit of symbolical ceremonies, for incitements, and some approve of signs for remembrance of duties. He adds that themselves confess, that they were not destitute of some such like symbolical significations. Finally
marginal note: Abridgment, Line, pag. 35 (beside the Opponents’ paragraph); In Sum (beside the Defendant’s paragraph). [p. 310] he foretells them of instances to be produced from patriarchs before the law, holy men under the law, Apostles, and primitive antiquity, and the whole current of succeeding times.
Replier: In this passage, there is nothing to be found but a noise of words, crackling like thorns under a pot. Let it therefore vanish of itself.
Answer: But it will not vanish of itself. For if there be naturally an expression by signs, as there is by words; ceremonies are no more blamable simply for being significant, then words for being sensible: which seeing the Replier skipped by, let it stand for good.
.
Sect. 9
Defendant: In this section the Defendant begins his confutation of their third general argument, by proving the lawfulness of moral significant ceremonies. 1. By Scripture. 2. Fathers. 3. Reason. 4. Witnesses of the Non-Conformists themselves. 5. Their own practice. 6. Reasons.
The proof by Scriptures, is from examples. 1. Before the law. 2. In the time of the law. 3. In and about the time of the Apostles. And the first example is from Gen. 24:2. Where Abraham, putting his servant to an oath, commands him to lay his hand under his thigh: which he shows to have been in all points like ours. 1. Of human invention, without any special revelation from God, appearing in Scripture. 2. Appointed unto divine worship (that is used in it:) for, swearing by God, is a worship appropriated to him: Thou shalt λατρεύσεις (transliterated: latreuseis; “thou shalt worship”) worship the Lord thy God, how? and swear by his name. 3. This was significant: for, the morality was this, as all the elder divines, and some new conceive it, that,
marginal note: Dt. 6:13. [p. 311] as Abraham’s servant believed to have any life by Christ the author of life, which was to descend from Abraham’s loins by Isaac, and his seed; he should be faithful unto him. So that this oath was unto his servant a sign, as of his faith to God, so of faithfulness to Abraham his master.
Replier: Here the Defendant undertakes, and begins a confutation from Scriptures, of that assertion, which denies significant ceremonies of man’s institution to be lawful in God’s worship. Now a man would have expected by the title some rule of Scripture: but seeing none can be found, we must be content with examples: which notwithstanding are nothing so firm and certain as rules. Yet let us hear what examples he can bring.
Answer: Proofs from approved examples out of the Scriptures, are good to avouch the lawfulness of a thing; but not to infer necessity of imitation, where the same is not commanded. Now, that examples make for us, they are not so certain as rules, (which is true, unless they be cut out by the rules) but when they, for sitting at the communion have nothing but example, they press that, as if it had the nature of a precept. Is not this to have a weight, and a weight?
This is a sure rule (say they) in divinity, that we are bound to imitate Christ, and the commended examples of his Apostles, in all things; wherein it is not evident that they had special reasons moving them thereunto, that do not concern us. Which rule of theirs, though it be a false rule, in things not commanded but arbitrary, in as much as we may have reasons, which they had not; yet shows how partially they make their rules to fit only their own turns. For from their examples must be concluded, It must be so necessarily: but from ours, not so much as it may be so lawfully, for that it was so. Let them tell us directly, that these examples are not good, or else we will carry it, that the like in the like case shall be lawful. Now try we out the first.
Replier: The First Example is, Abraham’s directing of his servant to put his hand under his thigh, when he did swear.
marginal note: Abrid. p. 56. [p. 312] It is marvel he did not begin before Abraham. For Suarez the Jesuit to prove the same point for substance, brings Abel’s sacrifice, Noah’s altar &c, in Thom. 3. qu. 65. a. 4. Which serve also as much to the purpose, as this example.
Answer: It were marvelous, if the Replier should fall close to his business, without any bitings or digressions: for that, he never did yet. His assertion, that Suarez there handles the same point in substance, with this of mere significant ceremonies, is false & but a shift. For Suarez speaks of some essential worship: as, sacrifice, an immediate means thereof.
Replier: But to the point in hand. 1. It is in all probability false, that Abraham appointed this ceremony. So Calvin, Junius, and others upon the same place do judge, because it was a sign of subjection usual in those eastern parts.
Answer: Whether Abraham first devised this ceremony or no, is not said by the Defendant, nor material to the point. Abraham appointed it to his man, not by any divine ordination then, or before, and therefore it was of human invention, which is enough. Calvin acknowledges that the Jews still think Abraham to be the first inventor, but whether he first brought it in, or received it of his ancestors, it is (says he) not manifest. Junius on the same place shows how it was followed by Jacob Gen. 49:7, & that of old it was a solemn rite in taking of an oath, and said by Aben-Ezra to be continued among the Ethiopians and Indians; and not one word, that Abraham did, or did not invent it. So false a man is this Replier, in all his allegations. Pareus says, it seems then to have been the usual rite of swearing: which yet is not certain, nor very probable, seeing that Abraham Gen. 14:22 lifted up his hand to Jehovah in swearing. But if it were not divine, it is sufficient for the first point, and whether Abraham devised it, or received it from other men, makes no matter.
marginal note: Pareus in Gen. 24, Col. 1418.
Replier: 2. It is false also (which he says in the second place) that swearing is the most divine service of God of all other. For the proper end of swearing is not to worship God, but to confirm a truth: though in the appealing unto a supreme [p. 313] witness and judge, worship is implied, and so an oath appropriated unto God as a part of his worship, not in the principal end of it, but in manner of seeking that end. This is plain, by the nature of an oath.
Answer: 1. If at all the use of a lawful oath be a worship of God as the text of Dt. 6:13 proves, then the appointing of that human ceremony to be used in an oath, was the appointing of an human ceremony unto some divine service, or rather in it. 2. The Defendant said not, that the taking of an oath duly is the most divine service, but that there is not a more divine service. Is there no room for a wedge here? Will the Replier say that this is false? Will he confute those Scriptures, which under that one comprise the whole worship of God? And what act doth a man, importing more his homage to God, and dependence on him, than by appealing to him, as the searcher of all hearts, and avenger of all unrighteousness, in an oath?
As for the proper end of an oath, which (not simply, but in respect of men) is confirmation of truth, it will no more prove that swearing is not a prime act of divine worship; then that preaching, receiving of sacraments, or petitioning for benefits may be proved not to be special divine worship, because the proper end of these good means is edification of men, confirmation of faith, and obtaining of mercies. Besides that, this man hath told us, that worship consists in the nature of the action itself, and yet as if he knew not where to find it, he would now place it in the end of the action.
marginal note: Reply. Cap. 2, sect. 6.
Replier: 3. It cannot be proved, that this ceremony did teach any spiritual duty. It is most probable, that it was a common sign of subjection used in solemnities of that kind, as well out of an oath, as in it, without any respect unto Christ as with it. If the Defendant never read any such thing (as he says he did not,) I cannot help that.
Answer: 1. The ancient, and not a few of the later writers conceit, that it was a sign of the promised seed to come out of the loins or thigh of Abraham: with the like phrase in Gen. 46:26, of the souls that came out of Jacob’s thigh, makes
marginal note: Annot. in Gen. 24:2. [p. 314] it probable, even to Master Ainsworth, the Brownist.
2. If it was a sign of subjection, yet might that concur with the other: but that it was a common sign used in solemnities of that kind as well out of an oath, as in it, is barely and boldly affirmed, and implies contradiction. For how were the solemnities of that kind, common with this; and yet no use of an oath, as in this? Calvin, Junius and Pareus think it to have been sometime a common solemnity used in swearing in token of subjection; but that it was a solemnity ever used, except in the taking of an oath, they neither say, nor intimate, but rather the contrary: and yet the Replier says.
Replier: I assent unto Calvin herein the rather, because that as imposition of hands in these parts did always signify some superiority, so this underposition of hands was by proportion fit to signify subjection of inferiors.
Answer: Nay, you assent not unto Calvin, save in this one branch, that it was a sign of subjection to his master; and so of faithfulness promised to him. The reason of your assent herein is grounded on a fiction, that laying on of hands in those parts did always signify some superiority: for it oftentimes signified only designation to such an use, as when the disciples or prophets laid hands on Paul and Silas. Acts 13:2,3, and on the head of the sacrifice. Lev. 1:4 & 3:8, &c.
But say it was a sign of the servant’s duty too which (in fidelity) he bound himself by oath to perform, was it not therein a mystical sign of some spiritual duty? Is not all the law spiritual? Is not obedience to masters for conscience’ sake, a service of God, though not immediate? If so, then this instance holds in all the points. First that it was human, not divine. Secondly that it was appointed to be used in the performance of an act of religious worship. Thirdly that it was morally significant, and yet lawful.
Replier: Lastly if all this were granted, that this sign was appointed, that it was appointed in solemn worship, and that it did signify a holy thing: yet the Defendant should remember that Abraham was a prophet, and of more authority by [p. 315] far, in the church of God, than our convocation house. So that this instance is nothing to the purpose, as, I am persuaded, Abraham’s servant would swear, if he were here present, and it were needful, even in the same manner, that then he did to his master.
Answer: Neither shall this instance, nor any other, be to the purpose, if men may take this liberty of evasion, and show no reason for it. Let him show that Abraham, as a prophet of God, was directed thus to do; and then he answers something: but to say he was a prophet, therefore he did this by prophetical inspiration, is but a starting hole, fit for a distressed and willful disputer, whose cause cannot be defended, and yet his stomach will not yield. Howbeit, in this last he entertains and hews upon his former answer, that this was then a common sign of subjection, &c. Sed nil refert quo, dum potior modo. [But it matters not by what means, so long as the manner be the better.] Now leaving him to take an oath of Abraham’s servant when he comes, that this instance is nothing to the purpose, let us go to the text.
.
Sect. 10
In this Section, the Defendant, to clear his way to his own instances following after, takes out of the way an objection of the Opponents, and answers it.
Opponents: In the time of the law, when God saw it good to teach his church by significant ceremonies, none might be brought or received into the worship of God, but such only as the Lord himself did institute. This reason is used against the Popish ceremonies, by Master Calvin, Junius, Lubbertus, and others.
Defendant: And this reason is good against the Popish abuse of ceremonies, which is to be discerned from our use of such, in these two points. 1. In their significations, whereby that church doth commonly teach some new doctrine, not warranted by Scriptures:
marginal note: Abridgment Line. [p. 316] 2. In their application, by her superstitious opinion of necessity and holiness, whereby they are made essential parts of God’s worship; as by your witnesses will be manifestly shown.
Replier: Here comes in a straggling objection, as it is here alleged, without any dependence, omitted in the place whereto it belongs. I will not therefore press it in this place.
Answer: Indeed it comes in here occasionally, and as it seems was forgotten in the proper place: but it is never the worse for that, let his goodness yet speak to it.
Replier: Only it would be marked how little the Defendant cares what he says, so that he say something to every thing: 1. He answers that Papists doe commonly teach by their ceremonies some new doctrine, not warranted by Scriptures. For confutation of which, the Papists may well appeal to Durandus his Rationale, where he shows the signification of almost all the popish rites. Now if the Defendant can there find one signification of a hundred, which teaches any strange doctrine not warranted by the Scriptures, I have taken my number amiss.
Answer: The Defendant said not, most commonly; but, commonly; so as his speech will hold, if the Papists doe often teach false doctrine by their significant ceremonies; though more often, true. Let the Replier tell me whether their baptizing of bells, their exorcism, their pompous carrying of the host about, their holy-water, sprinkled in token of cleansing them thereby from venial sins, their feast of Corpus Christi, and the conception of our Lady, their representations of the deity, their adoration to the sacrament, in acknowledgement of Christ his real and bodily presence there, their censing of images, their chrism, &c. Be not significatives of doctrines repugnant to the word? And then let him upon cold blood tell me also why he hath charged the Defendant with speaking he cares not what? unless it be to stop the pursuer, by crying stop the thief.
Replier: 2. He says the Papists’ ceremonies differ from ours in application, by their opinion of necessity and [p. 317] holiness: but first the question here is only of signification, and therefore it is out of time to talk of application.
Answer: Though the question be of significant ceremonies, yet is it not simply of all, but of such as are brought into the worship of God (as the objection shows:) that is, which are made real parts of divine worship, such as were the legal ceremonies, in their time. Wherefore the answer is very direct, which shows that our ceremonies are not brought into the worship of God as the popish are, wherein they place holiness and necessity, which we do not in ours. If this difference stand, then that which Calvin and the rest speak of significant ceremonies brought into God’s worship, that is, as parts thereof, touches not ours.
Replier: Secondly, the Papists doe not hold their ceremonies absolutely necessary to salvation. For this Bellarmine, de Verbo non Scripto [On the Word Not Written], lib. 4, c. 11, denies of all unwritten traditions; as also Aquinas 1.2, qu. 147, a. 4, ad. 1.
Answer: Nor did the Defendant say, that the Papists made their ceremonies absolutely necessary to salvation; but, that they put necessity in the observation of them, upon the consciences of men, even out of the case of scandal. This Bellarmine plainly affirms, making the simple omission of them to be sin; as also doth Stapleton. And Aquinas likewise 2.2, qu. 147 (in the very place which the Replier points at) professes the ordinances of the church to be of necessity unto salvation, though not per se [of itself], as God’s precepts; yet, by the institution of the church. The place of Bellarmine, alleged by the Replier, doth not deny the use of their ceremonies to be necessary to salvation, as other acts of obedience, the omission whereof is sin; but says, that all doctrines simply necessary for every man to know, are taught in Scriptures; but many others not simply necessary for every man to know and believe explicite [explicitly], came by tradition. Which traditionary doctrines the church of Rome makes as necessary to be believed and observed, as any divine truths, when once the church hath opened them. Thus is the Replier false in every quotation, one way or other.
marginal note: Bell. de Effect. Sacram. tract. 31, col. 259 & Stapl. Cont. 5, qu. 7, art. 2. Statuta ecclesiae sunt de lege quae non per se sunt de necessitate salutis, sed solum ex institutione Ecclesiae, &c. [The statutes of the church are of a law which are not of themselves necessary to salvation, but only by the institution of the Church, &c.] — Bellarmine, in the place brought by the Replier. [p. 318]
Replier: Neither do they [the Papists] hold them essentially necessary to the being of a sacrament.
Answer: So they say indeed, as Bell. lib. 2, De Effectu Sacramentorum [On the Effect of the Sacraments], cap. 30. But they make chrism and crossing on the forehead therewith, of the essence of confirmation, which is one of their sacraments; and auricular confession, of the essence of penance, which is another of their sacraments; and the want of an altar, or of hallowed vestments, to make a mere nullity of their consecration of the Eucharist, their deeds disclaim their words. Yet where they do not hold their ceremonies essentially necessary to the being of a sacrament, they hold them a necessary worship of God, and efficacious signs, Bell. lib. eodem [the same], cap. 31, which is as much as the Defendant said, and makes difference enough betwixt their and our significant ceremonies: let us hear your proofs?
Replier: This Aquinas with all his followers deny, p. 4, qu. 66, a. 10.
marginal note: It should be p. 3, not p. 4; there is no such thing there.
Answer: Nay, this Aquinas doth not there deny of all their ceremonies, but only of those used in baptism. But what says Aquinas there?
Replier: Where he says expressly, that all signs invented by man, are only for stirring up of devotion, and procuring of reverence to the sacraments. Which is word for word, our English plea.
Answer: This is untrue. For neither doth Aquinas there speak of all signs invented by man, but only of the rites of baptism; neither doth he say of them, that they are invented only for stirring up of devotion, &c. But giving that for one cause, he adds two other professedly, whereof the third and last is, because by the prayers, blessings, and such other rites, the power of the devil is restrained from hindering the effect of the sacrament. So as he makes these ceremonies necessary and operative, though not absolutely, to the being of that sacrament, yet to the efficacy. And is this the English plea, word for word?
Replier: 3. It doth not appear that the learned Papists have any [p. 319] opinion of all their significant ceremonies, which this Defendant doth not maintain.
Answer: What, man? Not for their numerosity? Not for their consecration of creatures, to signify and work supernatural effects? Not for shadowing out the whole story of the Gospel? Nor for any holiness, necessity, merit, or worship of God fancied to be in the observation of them? I should scarce have thought that any Jesuit durst have put this in print, it is so grossly and so palpably false.
Replier: For Suarez, a principal Jesuit, in Thom. p. 3, q. 65, a. 4, propoundeth only three errors, as he calls them, wherein Protestants differ from Papists, concerning ceremonies in general: whereof the first is, that only those things which are written ought to be retained and used in the church: the second is, that no outward worship of God is lawful, but only that which is appointed by God. The third and last is, that the church hath not power of commanding and ordaining those things (he means mystical ceremonies) which are necessary for the convenient celebration of the sacraments. Now there is none of these three points, wherein Suarez and the Defendant doth not agree.
Answer: It is untrue that Suarez propoundeth these three points, as three errors of the Protestants. For Suarez there mentions not the Protestants, nor any sect by name; but tells us of three sorts of heretics, who oppose their sacramental ceremonies; that is, their ceremonies used in administration of sacraments, whether only for ornament, as silver chalices, or significant, as exorcism.
marginal note: In 3 part. Tho. qu. 65, art. 4, Disp. 15 §. 2.
The first sort, says he, are such as allow no external worship at all. He cannot here mean the Protestants, nor any other, but the Swinckfeldians, who reject the use of the Word and sacraments, and all outward worship of God.
marginal note: Osiander, Hist. Eccles., Cent. 16, cap. 4, & Simson’s History of the Church, Cent. 16, lib. 3, p. 543.
The second sort is, of such as allow some external worship of God, but refuse all ecclesiastical ceremonies in his worship, as the inventions of men; and hold nothing to be lawful in God’s service, but what is commanded in holy Scriptures. And this their tenet Suarez observes to be the ground of three [p. 320] other errors, the very same, which the Replier speaks of.
A third sort is of such as disallow not ceremonies in general, but impugn the ceremonies of the church of Rome, as vain and superstitious. These, no doubt, are the Protestants, to whom he imputes there no other error, but their opposition against Romish ceremonies, as vain and superstitious. And sure I am, that the Defendant and Suarez accord not herein, but Suarez defends them all, and the Defendant reproves them.
That second sort, upon whom Suarez justly charges those three errors, are only the Anabaptists, not the Protestants. For such a negative argument from Scripture, in matter of rites and ceremonies, the Anabaptists hold indeed, viz. whatsoever is not commanded in the word is unlawful. No gossips as we call them, no holidays, no set forms of prayer, no oath, and no baptism of infants, because they are not commanded in the word. But as for the Protestants, the Papists know well, and Bellarmine confesses that they do admit and require the use of some ceremonies in God’s worship, for order, decency, and edification, yea though they be not commanded in the word: and he cites Luther, Calvin, and Chemnitius, to prove that it is so, and so it is.
marginal note: See Guy de Bres, or an extract out of him, in Master Hooker’s Preface to his Ecclesiastical Polity.
And that those three errors, as Suarez truly calls them, are the offspring of that Anabaptistical rule, (if it be not commanded, it is forbidden in God’s worship;) and are such as no Protestant church or classical writer did ever yet uphold, or own, will appear in every particular.
marginal note: Bell. De Effectu Sacramentorum [On the Effect of the Sacraments], lib. 2, cap. 30.
The first is, sola scriptura [Scripture alone] &c., that those things only which are written, and no traditions, are to be held in the church. The Replier gelds this, and leaves out traditions: doctrinal, all Protestants reject, but he speaks here of rituals professedly, all which the Anabaptists reject; but not, the Protestants: as all men know. The second is, that only external worship of God is lawful, which is delivered and commanded of God himself: which being understood, as it is there, only of rites and formalities, which are used [p. 321] in and about the exercise of proper religious worship, is a fanatical opinion of the Anabaptists; which no Protestant church ever yet allowed. For all of them both teach and practice otherwise, as hath been shown, Cap. 2, though all of them accord in this, that no kind of proper and immediate worship of God, other than what he hath instituted in the word, can be lawfully performed. The third is that the church hath no power of commanding or ordaining those things, (he speaks (says the Replier) of mystical ceremonies) which are necessary for the convenient ministration of the sacraments. Take away the Replier’s addition, or corruption rather (he speaks of mystical ceremonies) which is false; and then let the Replier tell me, if this can be so much as probably affirmed of the Protestants, contrary to all their confessions and practices. Nor may it be said that the Jesuit belies the Protestants, being as clear as it is, that he here meddles with none but such as condemn all ceremonies ecclesiastical, and after comes to the Protestants as hath been shown. And now mark, that the Replier takes to himself the errors of the Anabaptists, and would have men think, that the same are the doctrine of the Protestants. And indeed their negative argument from Scripture in matter of rites and ceremonies being alike, it is no marvel that these three errors depending thereupon, be common to them with the Anabaptists. God give them hearts to think well of the matter. Now let the Replier make his collection.
marginal note: Suarez speaks of all kind of ceremonies which belonged to the sacraments, whether significant or not. Quo supra [as above], §. 1.
Replier: Now there is none of these three points, wherein Suarez and the Defendant doth not agree.
marginal note: That which Suarez speaks of the Anabaptists, the Replier owns as belonging to Protestants, most injuriously done.
Answer: God forbid, that we should not acknowledge any truth, whosoever speaks it. And if you had not been somewhat encamped in the trenches of the Anabaptists, in these particulars about ceremonies, you would agree in this with Suarez, and with the Defendant, and all sound Protestants in condemning these fanatical errors, which Suarez hath justly taxed in the Anabaptists, and you take to yourselves at unawares.
.
Sect. 11
Defendant: In this section the Defendant objects the institution of the festival days of Purim, by Esther and Mordecai, for a continual remembrance of the Jews’ deliverance from the intended massacre of Haman, Est. 9, which he parallels with our like celebration of the Fifth of November, in memory of our state’s deliverance from the hellish powder treason. To which the Replier answers.
Replier: The next example, is the day which Mordecai and Esther appointed, Est. 9, concerning which I answer; first it was no mystical ceremony, but a circumstance of order.
Answer: But this answer will not be taken: because, as Junius well answers to Bellarmine, Cont. 7, lib. 10, annot. 17, Opponit male quae sunt coordinata. [He wrongly opposes things which are coordinate.] He unreasonably (says he) opposes those things which are coordinate. It was, in respect of the institution, political and not divine; and yet was a mystical or significant ceremony calling to mind the thirteenth and fourteenth days of that very month Adar, on which the Jews were delivered.
Replier: When Bellarmine objects the same example to like purpose against the Protestants, De cult. Sanct. lib. 3, cap. 10, Junius answers, Praeceptum fuit politicum. [The precept was political.] It was a precept of order.
Answer: Bellarmine objects the same example, but not to the like purpose, (as this Replier affirms;) but, to prove that the church hath power to make laws, binding the conscience even in themselves, and out of the case of scandal, or contempt. To this Junius rightly answers that this precept was political; and this he maintains against Bellarmine, although it were also significant, as (Annot. 17) he hath said. The Replier told us, c. 2, sect. 16, that order is but the disposing of things ordained, and requires no new thing to be instituted or used, and yet now he tells us that these newly instituted festivals were but a circumstance of order. Thus he that speaks not the truth sincerely, must sometimes cross himself.
marginal note: Junius, ibidem, anno. 34.
Replier: And some of our own writers at home say, that it was appointed for a civil use, a day of rejoicing.
Answer: He was not forward to name his author, but I will do it for him. This their own writer is M. Jacob, who is content to impute to Esther, Mordecai, and all the Jews, the decreeing of a gut-tide, rather than of a holy festival, lest from this example the institution of some significant ceremonies, and of some holy-days, should appear to be under the church’s liberty, as we say. And this is a forced answer, and against the grain of the text, which shows by whom, why, and to what use, these days were appointed.
marginal note: M. Jacob, Treatise of Reformation, p. 15.
But Master Jacob gives a reason out of the 22nd v., Chap. 9, because it is there said, they should make them days of feasting, and of joy, and sending portions one to another, and to the poor. To which I answer that this shows them to be festival-days, but denies them not therefore to be holy-feasts. For the like injunction was given Nehemiah 8:10, and accordingly executed verse 12, and the reason was, because the day was holy, and not as Master Jacob would have it, because it was not a holy-day, but (as it were) a merry meeting of friends.
Master Jacob yet durst not rest in this civil feast, but further puts in, that if these were days of thanksgiving, we (says he) may answer, neither can any man disprove it, that Mordecai was a prophet of God, and author also of this Book of Esther, and so did ordain this constant holy day, not by human discretion, but by divine direction, &c. To which I return, that indeed they may answer thus, if no proof be required of them. But this will seem but a shift, without Scripture or reason, to define thus, as no man before them ever did. Moreover, the text ascribing it to Mordecai as an officer, and to the Qu. Esther, as queen, and to the common consent of the Jews, who, (as Junius says, according to the text) took it upon themselves, doth look awry, upon Master Jacob’s singularity. And seeing the Jews had a precedent of seven holy-days, instituted and kept together by Hezekiah and the princes, 2 Chron. 30:32, and lawfully, (and [p. 324] yet without any special direction from God;) and by the memorial which God himself had ordained of their deliverance out of Egypt, must needs know how it became them to hold this, (as great a deliverance as that was) in eternal memory; they needed not particular injunction or direction from God, to do as they did. For where the ordinary means serve, we need not extraordinary. Wherefore this instance of a significant ceremony of human institution, and lawfully stated in religious use, holds firm against our adversaries, and will never be moved.
.
Sect. 12
Defendant: In this section is given a second instance of a human significant ceremony, appropriated unto God’s service: that is, the feast of dedication, instituted by Judas Maccabeus, which by the opinion of Dan. (one of their own witnesses) was approved by our Lord, John 10:22-23. To which the Replier opposes.
marginal note: In Sum. marginal note: 2 Mac. 4:59. marginal note: Dan., tract. de institutione Christiana [Concerning Christian Instruction], cap. 29, p. 345.
Replier: The feast of dedication ordained by Judas Maccabeus, is also alleged by Bellarmine, De cult. Sanct. lib. 3, cap. 5, & De Rom. Pont. lib. 4, cap. 17.
Answer: The Replier doth what he can, to match us with the Papists in our opinion: but all in vain. For Bellarmine, in the former of these two places, alleges the text to prove thereby the dedication and consecration of churches, and what is this to our question of significant rites? In the second place he alleges the same place to prove that some ceremonies may be added to those of the law; which though it be true, and truly proved by this place, yet is it not for Bellarmine’s turn, who would thereby justify the imposition of ceremonies, upon the conscience, as of necessity to be observed as God’s own laws. To whom Junius well answers, that this feast was not enjoined by way of authority, but taken up by consent; which he proves out of the text. And therefore this being an arbitrary rite, and so taken up, may well
marginal note: Junius, Cont. 3, lib. 4, cap. 17, annot. 5, & art. 3. [p. 325] serve our turn, though not Bellarmine’s: nor must we put off our fell, because the wolf would have put it on.
Replier: But we need not be so careful of excusing Maccabeus, and those times from all fault.
Answer: Yet ought you not to condemn that as a fault, which you cannot prove so to be; unless, by this, that it crosseth your way.
Replier: Christ seemeth (says he) to approve that feast, John 10:22. But seemeth only, say I. It is said that Christ, who had been before that time resident in Jerusalem, was walking in Solomon’s porch, at the feast of dedication, when some Jews came to ask him, whether he was the Christ or no: doth it follow, that he observed the feast? As for Danaeus here cited, it hath been shown before, how well he liked of significant ceremonies ordained by man.
Answer: Christ’s presence, and in the temple, at the festival time, seemeth to Danaeus, and other learned divines, to justify (even by this presence) the lawfulness thereof. But seemeth only, says the Replier: but it did not seem so without reason. For, as well as we plead his approbation of marriage, by his presence and miracle thereat wrought, John 2, so well may we prove his allowing of this feast, which with his presence & doctrine he as it were honored and blessed. And he that reads how Christ whipped the buyers and sellers out of the temple, John 2, in testimony of his detestation thereof, can hardly tell why he should vouchsafe his presence at that feast, if he were of these men’s mind, that it was a presumptuous innovation of men, and unlawful. At least it must be said that he yielded to an appearance of evil in being there, and not reproving the feast, which he at least seemed to allow by his presence. As for Danaeus his opinion of significant ceremonies, brought in by man, it will appear by what hath been alleged out of him before, to be this; that some are lawful, some not: which is enough for us, nothing at all for them.
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Sect. 13
Defendant: The Defendant here brings in a reply of Master Cartwright’s: viz. That the church may appoint holy days in certain cases: but it is one thing to restrain part of the day, and another to restrain the whole day. To which the Defendant thus answers, that if proof should be required why the church’s liberty should not extend to a whole-day, as well as to a half-day, he would die in our debt for a good reason: secondly, that if it be lawful for the church to separate half a day, unto thankful remembrance of a benefit, then ceremonies cannot be simply unlawful upon this act, that they are significant.
marginal note: In Sum. [p. 326]
marginal note: Cartwright, in the rest of his 2nd Reply, p. 191, 194.
Replier: Here Master Cartwright is brought in, as answering the former objections out of the Maccabees, and Esther. But Master Cartwright p. 197 doth profess that there is as great difference betwixt these two, as is betwixt heaven and earth.
Answer: Indeed Master Cartwright would have us think, the days of Purim to be of divine and extraordinary institution, the feast of dedication, of human, and therefore unlawful; that so he might wipe us off both these instances: but what is this to the point of a half-holy-day, and a whole one, which the Defendant spake of?
Replier: And in his confutation of the Rhemists, who urge the feast of dedication, as this Defendant doth, in John 10:22, he answers plainly that this feast was unduly instituted, and ungroundedly, by the Maccabees.
Answer: Indeed he doth so answer, and more too; for he makes it to be presumptuously and rashly done of Maccabeus; which another learned answerer of the same book, Doctor Fulke, acknowledges to have been a thing indifferent, and so, lawful. Had not Master Cartwright been engaged, before that answer to the Rhemists, in these home controversies, he might (and I suppose, would) have answered as D. Fulke did. But let his answer be good, if it be grounded, it is so; else not: how proves he what he says.
Replier: Which also he proves by such reasons, as neither the Rhemists, nor the Defendant will ever answer.
Answer: Indeed, if they be concealed, they will not be answered: but let us fetch them in, and see if they may be answered. Master Cartwright’s reason is, [p. 327] Because neither Solomon being full of the spirit for the building, nor the captivity, which had the prophets at stern for the rebuilding of the temple, ordained any such yearly memorial thereof, no not for so much as one day: therefore the Maccabees were not led by the same spirit. To which I answer that this reason serveth well to prove the dedication not to be of necessity, but a thing indifferent; as Doctor Fulke hath said, and Junius intimates: but will never prove the institution of this feast, to be rash, presumptuous, or unlawful. For in things neither commanded nor forbidden by the Word of God, divers men may take different ways, and both well, and by the guidance of one spirit. Some of the godly emperors demolished the idols’ temples, others converted them to Christian churches, and both well. (1) Solomon built the temple, before he built the altar for sacrifice; Ezra first (2) built the altar, and the temple after; both well, and by guidance of one spirit. Solomon used no solemnity at the (3) laying of the foundation of the temple which he built; Ezra (4) did at the founding of the temple rebuilt. Solomon (5) separated seven days for the first dedication of the altar, Ezra instituted none, but took the first day of the feast of trumpets, being the first solemnity after his return, as (6) Junius noteth, and on that day dedicated the altar renewed. (7) Joash and (8) Nehemiah took different courses, for the repair and maintenance of the temple, and both well. Finally Solomon’s appointment of seven days for the dedication of the altar then, though he did it but for once, might induce and warrant the Maccabees to institute a like yearly memorial: seeing that Solomon’s festivity was for the altar, only as it were translated from the tabernacle to the temple; the Maccabees, for the recovering of God’s temple, altar, and worship from under the tyranny of Antiochus, which, being the greater mercy, might seem more suitably to require that anniversary. Their
marginal note: (1) 2 Chr. 3. (2) Ezra 3:3,6. (3) 2 Chr. 3. (4) Ezra 3. (5) 2 Chr. 7. (6) Junius on Ezra 1. (7) 2 Chr. 24. (8) Neh. 10:2, &c. [p. 328] different ways then doe not argue different spirits, but unequal circumstances. Wherefore for aught that hath been or can be said against it, that feast was of lawful and pious, though of human institution; seeing Maccabeus was a right godly zealous man, and all the Jews ever since, (whereof no doubt many were in their time godly) have allowed and observed this ordinance. May we not think M. Cartwright’s censure thereof, being but his private opinion, to have rather been rash and ungrounded, then that act of the whole church of God, then in being? Could neither Jew, before, or in Christ’s time, nor any Christian since, discover this error, till Master Cartwright arose? If any did it before, give his name?
Replier: Yet let us hear what he hath chosen out of Master Cartwright to answer. The church may appoint holy days in certain cases: but it is one thing to restrain part of the day, and another to restrain the whole day. Where 1. M. Cartwright is wronged by the Defendant: for he confesseth, (in the places quoted) expressly, that upon some extraordinary cases the church may restrain a whole day, as at a solemn fast.
Answer: Wronged by the Defendant? Why man? He delivers M. Cartwright his own words, and in his meaning too, and your reply helpeth them not. For though in extraordinary cases he allow a whole fasting day, yet for thankful memorial of benefits, he will allow but half an holy day of the church’s institution. Now whole, or half, if it be ordained for a memorial of a benefit, as on such a day of the month, or week received, it is as much significant in the half, as in the whole day it could have been; and then all human significant ceremonies, are not in his judgement unlawful. To which answer the Replier speaks not a word: wherein I commend his wit: for it cannot be avoided.
Replier: 2. He should let us see what mystical signification is in the times appointed, as he striveth to doe in other significant ceremonies; if he would have a more particular answer. Otherwise they are alleged here to no purpose, to prove significant ceremonies.
Answer: Hath he not told you, that the days of Purim, celebrated on the fourteenth and fifteenth days of the month Adar yearly, signified the rest which on those days God had given the Jews, from Haman’s lot cast upon their lives? And that the feast of dedication recalled to mind the benefit of the recovery of God’s temple and altar from under Antiochus? And are they not herein significant observations? But the Replier not knowing well what to oppose, makes himself deaf to that which was spoken. [p. 329]
.
Sect. 14
Here a second reply of M. Cartwright is produced by the Defendant, and answered, touching the Purim feasts.
Opponents: Howbeit, the example out of Esther 9, of the two days which the Jews instituted, in the remembrance of their deliverance, is no sufficient warrant for these feasts in question; for first, as in other cases, so in this case of days, the estate of Christians under the Gospel ought not to be so ceremonious, as theirs under the law; secondly, that which was done there, was done by a special direction of the church of God, either through the ministry of the prophets, which they had, or by some other extraordinary means, which is not to be followed of us.
marginal note: Cartwright, quo supra [as above].
Defendant: To the first part of this reply, the Defendant answereth by inversion, that, if under that estate of the Jews, wherein the people of God were pressed with an importable burden of rites, the institution of a new ceremony was lawful, then the addition of one or two rites in the New Testament should not be so rigidly condemned.
To the second assumption, or rather (says he) presumption, he answereth, that this plea of some special direction by God’s Spirit given to the Jews therein, is an imagination, without any certificate revealed unto them for the proof of it, and therefore subject to that of Hierome: Eadem facilitate rejicitur, qua obicitur [It is rejected with the same ease with which it is alleged], that is, it is as easily rejected, as it is objected.
Replier: The other words quoted out of Master Cartwright, are, that the example out of Esther is no sufficient warrant for our holy-days: 1. Because our estate ought not to be so ceremonious as theirs. 2. That it was done by a special direction of the spirit of God. To this the Defendant answereth, first, that if then when the ceremonies were so many, one might be added, much more now. Which consequence were good caeteris paribus [other things being equal], if all other things did agree: but this is that very thing, which Master Cartwright denied.
Answer: 1. Caeteris paribus, is but a blind of words to amuse the simple, unless he can show some disparity in this point. For if the Jews, being forbidden to add ought to the law of God, and deeply loaden with multitude and multiplicity of other significant ceremonies, yet were not restrained from instituting some more significant holy-days, for the preservation and expression of their thankfulness to God; how is it that the Christian church hath not liberty in moral significant rites, to do as much now to the like end, being now disburdened of that surcharge of other ceremonies, with which that church of the Jews was laden? That Master Cartwright denies this liberty, which all other divines old and new, (his followers excepted) have granted and practiced, in the anniversary feasts of the nativity, resurrection, and Pentecost, doth much more reprove his singularity, then confirm his cause. Neither, if the church should in this one kind of memorative feasts equal the Jews, shall be as ceremonious as they, seeing they had a world of other ceremonies, which the Christian church reformed nor have, nor may have; and were necessary [p. 331] tied unto them, which the Christian church is not.
Replier: He answereth in the second place, that it is presumption to imagine a special direction where none can be proved: But how shall we trust this man in relating the arguments and answers of the ministers in private conference, when now the second time, as it were in one breath, he so unjustly accuses Master Cartwright, as giving no reason for that he says, whose printed book doth confute him.
Answer: The Defendant did not tax Master Cartwright as giving no reason, but as having no certificate for proof revealed; meaning, no proof of his assertion from the Scriptures, as his term of revealed, and application of Hierome’s words doe show. And no doubt it is presumption, upon some slight reason to affirm more than is written. Let therefore the Defendant be trusted in his report of the ministers’ arguments and answers, by his dealing here with M. Cartwright, or by their own writings to which he refers them, and he will have credit enough. Let us therefore examine, not whether M. Cartwright gave some reasons, but whether he makes any proof from the Word of God.
Replier: For so it followeth in M. Cartwright, immediately upon the words by him quoted, p. 194. This may appear, (that they had some special direction for the days of Purim) by another place where the Jews changed their fasts into feasts, only by the mouth of the Lord, through the ministry of the prophet.
marginal note: Zac. 8:19.
Answer: That the feasts in Esther 9 were instituted by prophetical direction, doth not appear by that place of Zacharie, whereby M. Cartwright tells us it may appear: and therefore, as M. Cartwright somewhere says, a false argument is no argument; so I say, a false proof is no proof. For, suppose that those fasts there mentioned were by prophetical direction turned into feasts, it will not thence follow, that so were these feasts of Purim likewise divinely instituted: no more then it will follow, that Hezekiah kept the feast of the Passover other seven days by divine institution, (marginal note: 2 Chr. 30:2, &c.) [p. 332] because it appeareth in Exod. 12, that the observation of that feast at the first for seven days, was ordained by God. Secondly, it doth not appear that those fasting days were ever turned (in strict terms) to so many feasting days, seeing that (as M. Calvin on the place conceiveth) the prophet meant by that phrase of speech to tell them, that God would turn their mourning into joy, and so the phrase is used. Thirdly, if the feasts there mentioned, were properly to be taken for festival days, yet by that same prophet it doth appear, that their fasts were instituted by the captive Jews themselves. But these were holy-days, and significant, and instituted (as Junius well noteth) as memorials of those days in the fourth, fifth, seventh, and tenth months, wherein these great calamities had befallen them. And these fasts thus instituted by the Jews themselves, Master Cartwright alloweth as lawful. So that by this place, not only appeareth not what Master Cartwright promised to show us there, but on the contrary doth appear, that the church may lawfully institute some significant holy feasts in her joy, seeing it is confessed she did and might lawfully appoint certain significant holy fasts, in her sorrows: and we have yet no proof from M. Cartwright.
marginal note: Calvin in Zac. 3:19* [Zechariah 3 has only 10 verses; the discussion concerns the turning of fasts to feasts, which is the subject of Zech. 8:19 — likely the intended reference]. Junius in Zac. Cartwright, 1st Reply, pag. 126.
Replier: For further proof whereof (says M. Cartwright) I take the 28th verse, where it appeareth that this was an order to endure always, even as long as other feast-days, which were instituted by the Lord himself: so that what abuses soever were of that feast, yet as a perpetual decree of God, it ought to have remained: whereas our churches can make no such decree, which may not upon change of time and other circumstances be altered.
marginal note: Cartwright, quo supra [as above].
Answer: The 28th verse of Est. 9 sheweth the observation of those days of Purim to be enjoined in perpetuity. But withal, the 27th verse tells us, that the Jews ordained, and took upon them and their seed, the observation of those two days, which sheweth more strongly, that they were of human institution, then their perpetuity mentioned in the 28th verse, doth argue them to be divine. For was it ever [p. 333] in Scripture, that the Jews ordained any thing when God himself had ordained it, and no mention made of God’s ordination? Or would it be said, that they took it upon them, and their seed, if God had imposed it, and no word be spoken of God’s imposition.
As for this, that then they should tie themselves in conscience to observe the same, &c., it is but a weak surmise: for such general laws doe not preclude any exceptions or liquidations, which may be after occasioned; but only witness what was the present resolution.
We have a statute made for the observation of the Fifth of November, in memory of the great deliverance then given to our late sovereign, his children, and people; and the establishment is intended in perpetuity: have we here bound ourselves in conscience never to lay this down, what inconvenience soever should hereafter befall this observation? No; no more did the Jews.
And that the Jews themselves took these feasts to be not of divine, but of human ordinance, appeareth probably by this, that they are called Mordecai’s days, 2 Mac. 15:36; but more probably by this, that whereas they were wont to observe the thirteenth day of the month Adar, as a solemn fasting day, in memory of their sorrowful estate on that day, which was the very day next before their intended slaughter; they did after by another occasion alter that fasting day to a festival, for their commodity: which, if God had ordained it for a fasting day, they might not, they would not have dared to doe. Wherefore Master Cartwright seemeth not yet to have proved his answer.
marginal note: 2 Mac. 13:36.
Replier: For the other proof hereof (says he) I take the last verse. For the prophet contenteth not himself with that that he had rehearsed the decree, as he doth sometime the decree of profane kings, but adds precisely, that as soon as ever the decree was made, it was registered in this book of Esther, which is one of the books of canonical Scripture: declaring thereby in what esteem they had it. If it had been of no further authority then our decrees, or then a canon of one of (marginal note: Cartwright, ibid. [in the same place]) [p. 334] the councils, it had been presumption to have brought it into the library of the Holy Ghost. [The sum of mine answer is, it was divine, and not only ecclesiastical.]
Answer: This is a proffer, but no proof. For he taketh the last verse to tell us, that Esther’s decree, as soon as ever it was made, was written in this book of Esther. And, I pray you, where in that book find we her decree? Is it all one to mention such a decree as made, and to exemplify it? And was the book of Esther then written all to the ninth chapter, that presently upon her decree, the same was put into that book? And doth the text say it was written in the book of Esther, or, in a book? That is, for more assurance it was put upon public records, as the acts of princes use to be; and so Junius understandeth it. So Master Cartwright, by changing a book, into this book of Esther, hath not won so much credit to his argument, as will pay his own less.
See now, suppose it had been so, that this decree had been put into God’s library, as a memorable thing, must it thence follow that it was a thing therefore of special divine direction, and of another nature then any ecclesiastical constitutions? Then must it also follow that the church’s decree about blood and strangled, was also from special and divine information, seeing that is set down in the Holy Ghost’s library. And yet Master Cartwright will not have it so, and is in the right. Yea the decrees of Cyrus and Darius must also then be divine decrees, because they are verbatim found in God’s library. So then, this proof is somewhat like her conceit (which Master Hooker mentioneth) who said Pontius Pilate must needs be a holy man, or else he should never have been put into the creed.
marginal note: Cartwright’s Answer to the Rhemists, on Acts 15 (approximate; the note is faint in the original).
Now, let any man tell me in conscience, whether the Defendant might not well say, that without proof revealed, Master Cartwright had presumed to say, that the appointment of the Purim feasts was by special divine direction and not out of the common power and devotion of God’s people, being directed by rule of equity from Scriptures [p. 335] as were (says Master Cartwright) the decrees of the Apostles and brethren, Act. 15, which therefore upon change of the reason of things, were subject unto change.
.
Sect. 15
Our second kind of examples, is from the like ordaining of ceremonious instruments, belonging unto the worship of God, by four instances. First instance is in the altar. Joshua 22.
Defendant: We read that the Gileadites, which were of the children of Israel, did build an altar, on the other side of Jordan, in testimony of their joint faith and profession with their brethren, in the one and only religion of God. This example is pregnant, and hath much exercised and troubled your wits, but to what effect, we shall best judge by your answer.
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Sect. 16
The Non-conformists’ Answer.
Opponents: The altar that stood on Jordan’s bank was not of ecclesiastical, but civil use; the tribes themselves confess, that they had grievously sinned, if that they had determined an altar unto the same use, that the Lord God set up one before. It was a memorial that they were one people with their brethren, entitled to, and estated in the privileges of the Lord with them: but it was no mystical sign of Christ and his grace.
marginal note: Master Nic., Master Pag., M. Lang, and others.
Defendant: The Defendant replieth that the point in question is whether this altar were not especially for religious use: that the whole current of the text (marginal note: In Sum.) [p. 336] resolves us, that it was ordained to be a mystical sign, though not of Christ, as was the like altar; yet, of some spiritual blessings, and moral duties: and that though it were not erected for the same use with the Lord’s altar, yet for a representation thereof. He appealeth to the text. But let the Replier say to this.
Replier: In the title of these two sections, the Defendant promiseth an instance of a ceremonious instrument belonging unto the worship of God: but he bringeth none save the altar of the two tribes mentioned Josh. 22, which he cannot show to have been any instrument of God’s worship: so that he seemeth merely to have forgotten his title.
Answer: His maintenance of it following, sheweth how he understood his title, and did well remember it. But the Replier forgetteth his own tenet, namely that all significant signs appointed by men, to stir up the remembrance of duties, and consequently devotion, are by himself accounted instruments of worship: and so are they indeed remotely, though not immediately. For whatsoever, any way, mediately or immediately, tendeth to an end, may in some sort be called an instrument serving to that end.
Replier: But for the thing itself, Master Parker long since, p. 1, c. 2, §. 33, hath given this answer.
Answer: Long since: that is, Anno 1607, when the book was first printed, with his own allowance. But, long since, lately, what is it?
Replier: 1. That we may better argue from the altar of Damascus, 2 Kgs. 16, against the cross; then they can from this altar, for it.
Answer: But this is only said, and therefore is as easily denied. If all be true that Master Parker hath said in his book of the cross, the cross is a sinner against all the ten commandments; and not only the sign, but the very name of it should be odious to us. Doth any man believe this because Master Parker saith so? What other reason hath Master Parker. (marginal note: Parker of the Cross, part 2, p. 42, and in the Table.) [p. 337]
Replier: 2. That this altar of the two tribes was not in the state or use religious, as the cross is; which he confirmeth by the confession of Bishop Babington on the 2 Commandment, and by the testimony of Lavater on Jos. Hom. 61.
Answer: That which Master Parker here answereth, Master Parker himself shall confute, by his own description of religious in state, and religious in use. For he tells us, that a thing is religious in use, when it is done to a holy end, because the end of actions determineth the use. And thus the sign of the cross (says he) even in coins and banners, is and hath been religious, and not merely civil in use; since first it served to profess the faith against pagans. He again tells us, that in state religious is that which is ecclesiastical; that, civil, which is political: that religious, which belongeth to God’s service: that civil, which hath the use solemn in the service of commonwealths. Thus Master Parker, disputing against the cross, describeth religious in state, and in use. From whence this argument ariseth: if whatsoever is done to a holy end be religious in use; and whatsoever is ecclesiastical and belonging to God’s service, and not in the solemn use thereof to the service of the commonwealth, be religious in state; then the altar set up by the Gileadites, for a monument of their interest in God and his altar, and not for any service of the commonwealth, was religious both in use, and in state. And now let any man tell me, what but partiality did put out the eyes of that learned man, who will needs have the cross even on coins to be religious in use, and yet affirmeth this altar to have been merely civil. (marginal note: Parker of the Cross, part 1, §. 34, p. 50.)
As for Bishop Babington, and Lavater, they confirm not his judgement, but he abuseth their phrase of speech. For a thing is called civil in the proper use of it, in opposition to religious; and so this altar was not civil, but religious; that is, for a religious end. Or else a thing is called civil analogically, because ordained by consent of fellow citizens: and so all ecclesiastical constitutions, serving to the external ordering of religious actions, are called civil, as made by men, in opposition to divine institutions, (marginal note: Idem, ibid., §. 36, p. 51/52.) [p. 338] which in themselves bind the conscience, and are in their use proper worship. And in this latter sense those learned men say rightly, that this altar was civil: as Master Parker himself elsewhere saith, that the cross and surplice considered as matters of order, are in that respect civil; which yet he maintaineth to be in use, and state, religious. So he playeth upon the ambiguity of the word civil, which his authors give in one sense, and he taketh in another. (marginal note: Lavater sheweth his meaning, in saying, it was not in the tabernacle, nor for sacrifice. Parker ib., part 1, §. 34, pag. 50.)
Replier: (Master Parker answereth) that in this our men say nothing which the Papists allege not for their superstitions, and the Lutherans for their images, as probably as they, Masius and Chytraeus upon this place of Joshua.
Answer: As probably, says this Replier; as, honestly, said Master Parker. But he that shall examine these witnesses, shall find the example indeed alleged by Masius and Chytraeus, to their turns; but not so honestly, or probably, as for ours. Masius saith that they may plead for their crosses, as the Gibeonites for their altar, that they set them up for memorials, and not to be worshipped: but either Masius speaks untruely or equivocates in the word worship, which he saith they give not to the cross, because not simply to it, for its own sake: for, that the Papists profess to worship the cross for Christ’s sake, this all the world knoweth. Wherefore his plea is not so honest or probable as ours.
Chytraeus a Lutheran pleadeth this example also for images used in their churches; but yet not so honestly, as we: for he supposeth us to challenge them of worshipping of images, which we doe not; but, blame them for making that dangerous adventure of setting them in places appointed for divine worship. So Master Parker hath matched us unequally. But if they may any way make us black, it giveth them content; and yet we are of the same faith with themselves, and labour to worship one God in Spirit and Truth, as they doe. Let Master Parker now goe, and the Replier return to his office.
Replier: To the same purpose tendeth the answer which the [p. 339] Defendant hath set down in the name of certain ministers. Let us hear therefore his reply.
Answer: Nay, it seemeth you will not hear it, nor have others hear it, by your will: for you wholly suppress the first part of it, which giveth light to all the rest: namely, that the use of that altar must show whether it was civil, as the ministers said; or ecclesiastical and religious, as the Defendant said, &c. All which you skip over, and begin where you could best fasten, saying.
Replier: 1. He proveth the setting up of this altar to have been human, which no man that I know ever doubted of.
Answer: Yet seeing you have, in that example of Abraham, and the other of Mordecai’s holy-days, denied that to be human, which was such; the Defendant had reason to prove, (as he doth, from the 24th and 26th verses) that which he affirmed, viz. that this altar was of human institution, as well as our ceremonies are: which (if you deny it not) is agreed on.
Defendant: The Defendant secondly proveth that this altar was appointed to God’s service, though not to sacrifice upon; yet, as the text saith, for a pattern of that altar, on which sacrifice was offered to God; as, the cross with us, is a kind of resemblance of that cross, on which Christ offered that great sacrifice of man’s redemption. To this is replied. (marginal note: In Sum.)
Replier: 2. He would prove that it was appointed to God’s service. But alas he can bring no colour for that. It was a pattern (says he) of the Lord’s altar, which was a chief instrument of God’s worship: as our cross is a resemblance of the cross of Christ. Where 1. Why doth he compare the cross whereon Christ did suffer, with the Lord’s altar? that cross was no more holy, then the soldiers that nailed Christ to it, or, then Judas that betrayed him into their hands: and therefore the sign of that cross, in respect of the resemblance which it hath to that, is no more holy then the picture of Judas.
Answer: The Defendant compareth them, not in point of [p. 340] holiness, as if the altar of the cross (as the (o) divines use to call it,) had sanctified the offering, as did the altar of God, Matt. 23:19 (for so the deity of Christ was the altar, Heb. 9:14). No, nor in point of holiness in use, as if that which men wickedly applied were holy, as the altar that God had ordained. The Replier should not have compared the cross (a senseless creature abused, which could not be guilty of sin,) with the soldiers and Judas, wicked voluntary instruments of the Lord’s death. Sure I am, that he will grant these men to have been unholy in this action, the cross itself not so, but in another respect; namely, that as the sign of the cross is a character and kind of resemblance of that cross on which Christ was crucified for us, so was that altar made for a pattern of God’s altar: and, to preserve their claim thereunto; and, was appointed in that manner and respect, for the service of God, (that is,) remotely, not immediately, as also the cross is with us. And though neither the sign of the cross, in relation to the cross itself, nor yet that very cross itself, have any holiness in them, yet the remembrance of Christ crucified for us, and the expression of our profession of him thereby, is an holy use, as Master Parker teacheth. And so was the use of that altar an holy use, though not an act of immediate worship.
marginal note: (o) Lavater in 2 Chron., pag. 115, & almost who not.
Replier: 2. Is every resemblance of a holy thing holy? Then every ale-house picture, which resembleth any thing belonging to the Scripture, and holy uses, is also holy.
Answer: If Master Parker say true, that the sign of the cross is never merely civil, no not in civil objects themselves, if at all it be made as a badge of Christian profession, then an ale-house-picture of Scripture stories, made or used to that end to represent them to our remembrance, (as namely that of Abraham offering his son Isaac,) shall be in that use holy and religious. But the Replier here separateth the resemblance of a thing from the use of it, and so disputeth a male divisis [by a wrongful division], sophister-like, as also in the next.
Replier: 3. If any of the Tyrians which wrought under Solomon about the work of the temple, should have procured a model of the temple to be drawn, and carried it with him [p. 341] Replier: into his country for to have showed it them for news, had that model been religious, or holy? The Defendant thought he had to doe with such as would believe whatsoever he said.
Answer: The resemblance of a holy thing for curiosity or mere civil uses is not holy; but the resemblance of an holy thing to holy uses, must needs be holy in that respect; seeing the use and end discriminate and determine actions. But that end which the Gileadites propounded in making a pattern of the altar, (which the Defendant supposeth ever to be so understood,) this man separateth, that he might have matter both of reply, and insolency.
marginal note: So M. Parker confesses, and cites Tho. Aquin., 1.2, q. 16, art. 3. Parker, l. 1, c. 54.
Defendant: In the third place the Defendant sheweth that this altar was of mystical signification (as the sign of the cross is with us) of a moral duty: which he proveth by the text, which calleth it Ed [that is, a witness] between them, that the Lord is God, v. ult. So as their end was not the claim of any temporal inheritance, but to protest for themselves their joint faith and service to God, with the rest of the Israelites; and, in respect of their posterity, to preserve their claim unto the Lord and his altar; if (because of their division from the rest, by the river Jordan,) their interest should be questioned. Which end being a religious end, and the altar a moral sign of a religious signification, it is therein like to the sign of the cross, in or after baptism. And this altar he sheweth out of the 30th verse, to be allowed by the priest and princes and all the congregation, as lawfully done, when they once understood their mind and intention that did erect it. Whence he wisheth unto the opposites such moderation in construing the intention of the church, as the Israelites had touching the altar of the Gileadites; and so, judge of our [p. 342] Defendant: use of the cross more judiciously and charitably, then they doe.
Replier: 3. He goeth about to prove, that it was of mystical signification, teaching a spiritual duty: because that one end of it was, in respect of the present Gileadites, to teach that the Lord was God: and another in respect of their posterity, to testify their consent in the true religion. But in all this fair show, there is scarce one word true: for first, it doth not appear out of the text, that there was intended any use of it for the present age that then lived. The contrary appeareth plainly, v. 27, 28, &c.
Answer: If I would imitate this Replier’s vehemency, here were cause to cry out, O miserable out-facing of God and of men! Doth not the text say, & that in the 27 & 28 verses, (where he saith, the contrary appeareth plainly) that it may be a witness between us and you, and between our generations after us, that we might doe the service of the Lord, &c? And in the 28th verse, when they shall say to us, or to our generations, &c? And yet this man saith it doth not appear in the text, that there was intended any use of it for the present age that then lived.
Replier: The last verse cited to this purpose by the Defendant must be interpreted, as Junius noteth, out of the 30th verse.
Answer: Junius giveth no interpretation at all, but referreth the last verse to that which, in his division, is the 30th verse, but the 27th of our Bibles, where the express words of the text mention the use of it, both to themselves, and to their generations. Is not this man much too blame, thus confidently to speak without book, and yet challenge the Defendant of so doing, when he did not?
Replier: So that even by this it is manifest that a direct help unto devotion was not sought for in the erecting of this altar.
Answer: A direct help to devotion, no man saith it was; if, by direct, he mean immediate: for the immediate end was significative; the collateral end only was for devotion. And why not for devotion?
Replier: For then not only the two tribes then living should [p. 343] Replier: have had use of it, but most of the other tribes should have had reason to have imitated their example, in setting up altars of devotion even at every three-way-leets, as crosses are wont to stand.
Answer: That the other tribes also had this use of it, there is no doubt. For it is said, to be a witness that the Lord is God: and withal, that all Israel was interested equally in, and bound to his altar and worship. Yet were not the rest of the Israelites bound to make more altars to that end, because first, all are not bound to use the same helps to devotion, and secondly, because they, not being divided by a Jordan as those two tribes, they had no such reason to set up such a monument, not needed they any such pattern, having the altar itself in possession.
Replier: 2. In regard of posterity, the immediate end was to testify, that though they were separated from the other tribes by the river Jordan, yet they belonged to the same people, and had right to come unto the same place of worship.
Answer: Well; and was not this end a holy and religious end, to profess themselves thereby fellow citizens with the rest of the church, and to be equally bound unto, and interested in God’s worship with the other tribes? What? Doth the Replier hope to disprove us by proving for us?
Replier: Now what is this to a ceremony, which hath state, and immediate use in the special solemn worship of God?
Answer: 1. All the state and use that altar had, was to an holy and religious end; and therefore, by Master Parker’s own rule, it was a religious, not a civil thing.
2. That this use was not in the special solemn worship of God, maketh no difference in the point of civil and religious. For there is a religious use of things, as well out of the solemn worship of God, as in it. Master Parker telleth us the use of the cross was religious, when ad omnem progressum [at every going forth] they signed themselves with it, yea on coins, and banners: and are not private prayers religious actions, as well as public? And who doubteth whether crosses by the highways were not of religious use, as well as in the churches?
3. His [p. 344] terms of immediate use in the worship of God, are captious: for if he mean that our ceremonies are used as immediate means of worship to God, he slandereth us and them; for their immediate use, as significant, is for the information and admonition of men. If he mean that their use is, when we are about the immediate solemn worship of God, it is idle; unless we shall say such outward expressions are unlawful where they have most use; but, else where lawful.
Replier: The use of this testifying, was to procure a consent and approbation in future times among the other tribes, that these two tribes might be suffered to come to the temple for to worship God there. So that neither the two tribes nor the other ten were stirred up by this altar as by an instituted mystical ceremony unto worship or devotion: for as for the two tribes, they were only to shew this monument unto those which called their right into question; and the other were to consent and grant them their right. What is this to a garment of religion or solemn religious worship?
Answer: And doth this professed use abrogate the other, or establish it rather? What devotion the tribes were stirred up unto, is not the question. For no man is so senseless as to think that any outward ceremonies can stir up devotion by themselves, but only that they serve thereunto as objects by their order, decency, or signification. And no doubt, the tribes of Israel seeing that altar, and remembering out of what holy zeal, and to what end it was set up, had reason to stir up themselves unto devotion to that service of God, to which the Gileadites were so careful to make claim. And this use might consist well with that other which the Replier sets down. Wherefore from one coordinate and coincident use, to deny the other, is unreasonable, as if one should say, the law was given for rule of righteousness, therefore it was not at all given to convince men of their unrighteousness.
marginal note: This answer hath sometimes been made to myself in conference, and to some others, though I find it not yet in print.
Wherefore, others of that party, not liking the form answers now pretended, doe answer roundly, that the Gileadites did ill in erecting this altar; yea, and that the high [p. 345] priest, princes, and all the congregation of Israel did err in allowing it. And to prove this, they tell us that the whole visible church may err in such a matter. Now what is this, but to say the whole then visible church of God must be judged to have erred, rather then their argument against significant ceremonies shall take a foil.
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Sect. 17
Defendant: The Defendant’s second instance is of a brazen altar built by Solomon, and set beside the altar of the Lord, as he collecteth out of 1 Kgs. 8:64. This (says he) was ordained by Solomon, not of the Lord; and was (because a new altar) a new ceremony: and having necessary relation to sacrifice, concerned a special worship of God: which sacrificing and offering, being the manifestation of that homage and thankfulness which is properly due to God, cannot but signify man’s spiritual duty.
Replier: The second instance is Solomon’s altar, 1 Kgs. 8:64. Wherein first I cannot but marvel at the addition which the Defendant maketh unto the text, when he telleth us out of the Scripture of an altar, and of a brazen altar built by Solomon, without special warrant: whereas in the text there is neither mention made of brass, nor of altar, but only of sanctifying the inner part of the court: he did not surely attend much unto that which he wisheth to another, §. 20, in these words, I would you had leisure to look more directly upon the text alleged.
Answer: The Replier may indeed marvel that the Defendant should add any thing to the text, because he useth not so to doe. The addition of the word brazen, slipped in by oversight, nor was it the Defendant’s purpose to set down the words of the text, as may appear by the omission of many words in it; but only the sum of it, with marginal reference to the place: Now, though the word altar be not in the text, but only the sanctifying of the inner court; yet seeing that court ordained for the priests to [p. 346] stand in, was now used in place of an altar, for burning of the sacrifices thereon, it may well be called an altar, in respect of that present use: and what was it else?
Replier: But for the matter itself, it is worth the marking, to observe by this example what authority is given unto men in the worship of God, by our masters of ceremonies, not only to appoint accidental worship, but even that which is principal, and most essential: that which maketh other essential worship to be holy: for what is this else, when they say, man may of his own head appoint an altar; if they say man may appoint an altar, but not the offering upon the altar, let them hear our Savior’s answer, Matt. 23:19. Ye fools and blind, whether is greater, the offering, or the altar that sanctifieth the offering.
Answer: Your readiness to vilify and scorn those whom you call masters of ceremonies, may rather be marked in this reply; and so may also your want of judgement in your collection. For that which is by our Lord affirmed of that one only altar in the temple, that it sanctified the gift, viz. legally and in the ceremony; you take, as if it were said, or to be said absolutely of any altar used for sacrifice. Wherein you deceive yourself, by not distinguishing betwixt the privileged use of that typical altar, which (representing Christ crucified, with respect to his (a) divine nature, or his eternal spirit (b) by which he offered himself to God, &c.) had this dignity appropriated to it, and to it alone; that whatsoever touched it, was (c) holy; and other altars which only served as instruments unto sacrifice; which were not in that use cultus [worship], but annexa cultui [annexed to worship], as * Zanchius saith, not the worship itself, but serving to it; nor did sanctify the gift, but were sanctified by the gift: that is, separated to that holy use, according to the phrase of the very place in hand, where it is said that Solomon (d) sanctified the inner court, and the like we read in Nehemiah, they sanctified the sheep gate, &c. (e)
marginal note: Fallacia à Dicto secundum quid, ad Dictum simpliciter [The fallacy of arguing from a qualified statement to an unqualified one]. (a) Heb. 13:10. (b) Heb. 9:14. (c) Exod. 29:37. * Zanchius, De Redemptione, lib. 1, cap. 16, thes. 2, 3. (d) 1 Kgs. 8:64. (e) Neh. 3:1.
But you ought to have considered that no other altar save that one, which God did institute, was essential worship in the use; much less principal worship to God; but was [p. 347] only an accessory appurtenance to that kind of worship, which was by sacrifice. Which worship also was, and might be performed (until that altar of the temple was established) upon any other altar, either of earth or unhewn stone; as appeareth Exod. 20:24,25,26. Or upon the ground, without any erected altar, as were (in all appearance) the sacrifices of David before the (f) ark, and those innumerable (g) sacrifices of Solomon and all the congregation, which were offered before the ark, betwixt the city of David, and the temple, even in the streets of Jerusalem.
marginal note: (f) 2 Sam. 6:13. (g) 1 Kgs. 8:4,5.
The (h) divine altars (I mean both that of Moses placed before the tabernacle, and that of Solomon, set before the temple) being of special divine institution, were part of the essential worship of God in their use; because of the special command of God, to use them: and these, by reason of their superadded mystical signification, did mystically sanctify the gifts offered upon them. But the (i) altars which Abraham, Jacob, and others before the law, or which the holy men of God did use after the law given, either occasionally, (as the stone at (k) Beth-shemesh) or purposely, (as Samuel’s altar which he built at (l) Ramah) were (as then) only permitted; and so, lawful helps unto the work of sacrifice; but not essential parts of the worship, nor such as did sanctify the offerings, but were sanctified by and in that use of them. See * Zanchius.
marginal note: (h) Dt. 12:5. (i) Gen. 12:7 & 13:18, or 33:20. (k) 1 Sam. 6:14. (l) 1 Sam. 7:17.
And that you may see that it is not incident to the common nature of an altar, quà tale [as such], to sanctify the gift, but that this came to God’s own altar by special ground, as a ceremonial privilege; you should mark that even these altars of Moses for the (m) tabernacle, and of Solomon for the (n) temple, as also that which after the captivity, (o) Ezra repaired in Jerusalem, and (p) Maccabeus after that; were first sanctified by the gift offered on them, and so as it were inducted into, and installed in that peculiar privilege of sanctifying (legally) the gifts which were afterwards offered upon them. Whereby it is manifest, that it is not incorporated simply into the nature of an altar, to sanctify the gift: for then these altars, even at the first use of them, as well
marginal note: * Zanch., De Redemptione, lib. 1, cap. 16, thes. 3, de Sacr. (m) Exod. 29:37 & Num. 7:10. (n) 2 Chr. 7:9. (o) Ezra 3:3, cum 5 [together with 5]. (p) 1 Mac. 4:56. [p. 348] as after, should have sanctified the offerings, and not have been sanctified by them, as at the first they were.
Now then, we, in granting to Solomon a liberty, without any special command or direction of God, to separate the floor of the inner court for an altar-like-use, till such time as the brazen altar should be consecrated, (which they were then about;) we yield therein no more to him, than the law of God did then permit, and the holy men of God did lawfully use; that is to say, an arbitrary use of that place, as an altar for sacrifice; not as a sanctifying altar, but only as an altar sanctified in that use; nor as any essential worship of God in itself, but as an accessory instrument of the worship of God by sacrifice. And more than we yield to Solomon herein, we doe not, we dare not, we will not yield (in God’s worship) to any man, ourselves, or others: and your conscience knoweth that I speak the truth herein. Wherefore I wish you to oppose us (if you can) by arguments, but not to pursue us with surmised calumniations as here you doe.
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Sect. 18
The First Answer of Non-Conformists to this Instance.
Opponents: This act of Solomon was by extraordinary inspiration, and therefore may not be called human.
marginal note: M. Nic.
Defendant: To this the Defendant answereth, that this can never be proved; because the very text yieldeth the reason which moved Solomon thereto, namely, because the brazen altar sufficed not for the burnt offerings. And though this action, as deduced out of the general grounds of God’s word, was (as other men’s holy actions) in that respect, divine; yet in respect of the particular determination of it out of natural discourse, it was human. So this answer (says he) wants weight. To which is replied.
Replier: As for our answer, it is the same which all our divines give unto Bellarmine; as the objection is the very same with that which Bellarmine opposeth to Calvin, De Pont. lib. 4, cap. 19.1. This act of Solomon’s was by special direction of God’s Spirit. So Doctor Whittaker answereth, De Pont. cap. 4, qu. 7, ad Arg. 7, Quicquid Solomon fecit, id Dei authoritate, & Spiritus Sancti nutu fecit. [Whatsoever Solomon did, he did by God’s authority, and at the bidding of the Holy Spirit.] So Doctor Sutcliffe, De Pont. lib. 4, cap. 6. But from Master Nic. this answer will not be received. [p. 349] Answer: Neither is the objection of Bellarmine the same with ours, nor doe all our divines give this answer. Bellarmine’s objection raised from this example, is, that men may ordain proper and essential worship of God: which cannot be maintained from Solomon’s example of building an altar, or sanctifying the very floor of the inner court for a lawful help of essential worship, at the dedication of the brazen altar set up in that court. But we allege it for proof of the lawfulness of some significant ceremonies, not as worships in themselves, but helps to us in worshipping of God. And is this all one? > > Secondly, our divines doe not all give this answer alone: for Junius and Danaeus give other answers, rather then this. And their own Master Parker confesseth several answers to be given. Doctor Whittaker first answereth that Solomon sanctified the middle court for burnt offerings, because the brazen altar was not sufficient for the number of sacrifices. But he denieth him to have built an altar there, but rather to have burnt sacrifice upon the ground, as Lyra saith. Which to our purpose is all one, seeing that was for religious use, without divine prescription. Secondly, that Solomon did every thing by divine authority, and guidance of the Holy Ghost: he saith not by special direction, as the Replier hath it; for direction of the Holy Ghost, doth not necessarily import divine inspiration, as * Master Cartwright observeth upon those words, It seemed good unto the Holy Ghost and to us: by which is meant (says he) not an immediate inspiration, but the direction of the Holy Ghost speaking in the Scriptures, and shewing what in such a case should be done > > marginal note: Parker of the Cross, cap. 2, §. 33. () Cartwright, Answer to the Rhemists, Act. 15. [p. 350] done. And to this (z) Junius leaneth, saying, that this was extraordinarily done, by occasion of present and special necessity, which Solomon provided for, out of the equity of the common law: peradventure (says he) also by special revelation. So that our divines, you see, doe not all give, at least not rest upon, that answer: which if we did receive from them as certain, we would also take it from Master Nic. his hand. But seeing there is no need to fly to that answer, for avoidance of Bellarmine’s objection, we rather choose to stay upon that which we find in the text; for that, we are sure of; whereas the other cannot be proved thence. > > marginal note: z In Cont. 3, lib. 4, cap. 19, Ann. 2, p. 860. Cui per Analogiam communis iuris prospectum est a Salomone* [for whom, by analogy, consideration was had of the common law by Solomon].
Replier: The Defendant saith, it can never be proved, but suppose an altar to have been built, as the Defendant will have it, and then I hope the nature of the thing doth sufficiently prove it, as before I showed.
Answer: Whether an altar were raised, or the pavement used for an altar, cometh all to one. For the court was used as an altar, and yet will not the nature of that action prove, that it must necessarily have extraordinary direction from God, as hath been before said, and proved.
Replier: Beside Solomon had not yet declined from the right ways of his father David, who did attempt nothing about the temple, but according to the writing which he received from God, as he told Solomon. 1 Chron. 28:19.
Answer: The more upright Solomon was, when he sanctified the court for the sacrifices, the more assurance we have that some things not commanded may be done for exercise, incitation, or expression of devotion in our service of God without blame. As for the place of 1 Chron. 28:19 where David telleth Solomon how God had made him understand all the works of that pattern of the temple; whereto is this alleged? Will it follow that nothing at all might be done about the service of the temple, but what was in the pattern? Was the brazen scaffold which Solomon set up, in that pattern? Or this sacrificing in the inner court upon the pavement, was that also in the pattern?
Replier: Neither is it to be omitted, that Solomon at the very time, when he did this thing in question, was acted and [p. 351] Replier: lifted up extraordinarily in communion with God: as appeareth by that divine prayer which he then made for the dedication of the temple, which cannot be imagined but to proceed from the extraordinary direction of God’s Holy Spirit.
Answer: Acted and lifted up extraordinarily, is an ambiguous speech. For it may import only a greater than common or usual extent of all his sanctified powers, such as all godly men feel sometimes in prayer; or, simply extraordinarily, as when the prophets spake, acted by the Holy Ghost. This latter only will serve his turn, but this cannot be proved to have been done then in Solomon, more then in Ezra and others, whose devout prayers are recorded. Yet if in his prayer he had been so elevated, what need was there of extraordinary instinct in this other, which fell under an ordinary rule?
Replier: Lastly, if that had not been so, yet the high priest was at hand with Urim and Thummim, by which when it was so easy to have special direction, who can think that Solomon would venture on such a matter as this, upon his own head?
Answer: In matters resolvable by common rules, and precedents of the word, and discourse of sanctified reason, there was no need of consulting God’s oracle. And that Solomon might then know, as well as we doe now, what was in such a case permitted unto him, who can doubt? Nor are such things done simply upon our own heads, when we have warrant from the equity of the law, to doe them, as he had.
Replier: But the contrary is proved (says the Defendant) because a reason is rendered in the text, which moved Solomon to doe that he did. As if these two could not stand together, to doe a thing upon some reason; and yet to doe it upon special direction from God. See Num. 36.
Answer: Where the text importeth divine direction, as in Num. 36, we must believe it: shall we therefore believe it, where the text saith it not? May we be thus bold with the holy oracles of God? That they might concur, is undoubted; that they here did, is not proved by Num. 36.
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Sect. 19
A Second Answer is given, and repulsed.
Opponents: Solomon did this out of the equity of Moses’ law itself, as Junius sheweth, Cont. 3, l. 4, c. 17.
marginal note: Master Nic.
Defendant in sum: This second answer; first, overthroweth the former. For if Solomon did collect the lawfulness of this from the equity of the law, then not by extraordinary inspiration. Secondly, this answer yieldeth us maintenance of our ceremonies against their objections; seeing they may be grounded upon the equity of the word, as well as Solomon’s altar was: if we may borrow our equity either from general permission, or particular examples of the New Testament.
Replier: A second answer is given by some of our divines, that Solomon did this out of the equity of Moses’ law. So Junius Cont. 3, li. 4, c. 19. To this the Defendant replieth that this our second answer overthroweth the former; which is nothing so. For Solomon might be, and no doubt was in special manner directed to see the equity of the law, and specially directed and authorized also to follow it. The Defendant therefore is deceived in that advantage which he maketh of this answer.
Answer: The Defendant cannot be deceived; unless ordinary and extraordinary, special and common; Scripture-light, and immediate revelation; shall be confounded. And the Replier’s answer, that Solomon had special direction to see that equity, and authority to follow it, hath no fence in it, nor testimony in this case; and yet he saith, there is no doubt of it. Yet if Solomon saw this equity by special direction, then the equity was contained in the law: whence would follow, that by the equity of the law he might without any other particular warrant, have done this, if he had seen the equity of the law; nor needed he any special authorizing unless [p. 353] we shall say that the allowance of the word is not sufficient authority.
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Sect. 20
A Third Answer.
Opponents: God by his visible descending approved of the work of the temple, and did authorize him. Which David’s words, 1 Chron. 28:19, may seem to confirm.
marginal note: M. Nich.
The Defendant wisheth him more leisure to look more directly to the text alleged: where, says he, we doe not find that God approved the temple of Solomon by any visible appearance, before the sacrifice was ended; whereas by this answer, he should approve it before he did approve it. To the place of 1 Chron. 28:19, where David saith, that God made him understand all this work by pattern; he answereth that the altar mentioned in that pattern was that first, which the text nameth, the altar of incense; not this second of Solomon’s, which David never thought of.
Replier: A third answer is brought in by the Defendant under the name of Master Nic: viz. that God by his visible descending approved of the work of the temple, and did authorize Solomon to do that he did. To whom the Defendant wisheth more leisure, that he may look better upon the text, where he should not find that God approved the temple of Solomon by any visible appearance, until the sacrifice was ended. But if the Defendant had had both leisure and pleasure to look better upon the text, before he had censured another, then 1. he would have seen that God appeared in the temple before the sacrifice was either ended or begun. 1 Kgs. 8:10,11. 2 Chr. 5:13,14.
Answer: It is true that before the sacrifice began to be burned, the Lord by a cloud took as it were possession of the [p. 354] house, and approved therein the building of it. But the appearance which approved the sacrifice, was after Solomon’s prayer, when fire came down from the Lord, and burned it up. Therefore the first visible sign approved not this action, but the latter: seeing it was the giving of fire thereto, which was the token of God’s acceptation, as Judg. 6:13. 2 Sam. 24. And of this the Defendant spake, and spake both truth and reason therein; if his answer be understood in reference to the objection, as it ought to be.
Replier: 2. He should have seen also that Solomon built the brazen altar not of his own head, nor upon a sudden, which was impossible, but by the same direction that he did all the other holy things, 2 Chron. 4:1.
Answer: The Defendant in the 18th section, taketh notice of that brazen altar as built before by Solomon, and therefore had found out this. But still the altar or court which Solomon upon the present separated for sacrifice, must be acknowledged to be suddenly done, even on that day, as the (n) text saith, and therefore had not approbation, as had the temple itself (which was finished according to the pattern) by the first appearance of the cloud in the (o) temple; but by the second appearance and descent (p) of the fire, &c. which followed after. The first approved the house with the appurtenances made by the pattern; the second approved the worship there done by sacrifices; though there was something in it of Solomon’s own appointment, as an appurtenance to it, as hath been said. Which is for us, not for you.
marginal note: * Because the first altar which had been made by God’s appointment sufficed not, &c. (n) 1 Kgs. 8:64. (o) Ibid., verse 10. (p) 2 Chr. 7:1.
Replier: 3. He would not have talked so loosely as he doth here, Sect. 20, where no man can gather by his words, that he knoweth of any altar appointed particularly of God, besides the altar of incense.
Answer: A sore quarrel! that in this sentence that doth not appear which appeared before in this very section, where he saith, this second altar was ordained by Solomon before any sacrifice was begun on the former. Must all be said in every period, over and again?
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Sect. 21
The Fourth Answer.
Opponents: And this was no addition of a diverse kind.
marginal note: M. Nic.
Defendant: To this is replied in substance by the Defendant, First, that God had commanded that there should be but one altar, as of divine necessity, for solemn sacrifice: and this of Solomon was, though not of another kind, yet an additament; as it should be in the Lord’s Supper, to appoint the communicants to drink twice. Secondly, that this unconstant and unconsonant answering, sheweth them to be perplexed with this instance. Thirdly, that this act of Solomon, however allowable as an addition (not perfecting God’s ordinance, but serving to the accomplishing thereof) would have been matter to spirits of contradiction, of challenging Solomon to his face, for this addition without particular and express commission.
marginal note: In Sum. [p. 355]
Replier: A fourth answer is that which Danaeus giveth unto Bellarmine, Con. 3, lib. 4, cap. 19, viz. that this was not a new additament for kind, but for some circumstance only; because this court was sanctified by God, Exod. 27 & 40, and Solomon is said to sanctify, because he put it to that use which was not ordinary. To this the Defendant replieth nothing worth the answering: but only that he accuseth Master Nic: and so indeed the divines formerly alleged, of unconstancy, and unconsonance: whereas the answers that have been given may very well concur all of them in one action and one answer. The rest of his talk doth hang upon the horns of his new-found brazen altar: and there I leave it.
Answer: What the Defendant replied, is before set down; and whether it were unworthy answer, or not answerable, let [p. 356] let others judge. The several divines gave, some, one of these answers; some, another; but not all of them jointly, and therefore cannot be taxed as Master Nich: may, who being uncertain which to take too, took all; whereof some thrust out others, though some of them may fall in together. For example, that it was done out of the common equity of the law, and yet by special inspiration: or that it was authorized by the pattern shewed to David, and yet needed special direction to legitimate it. Or again, that it was no additament in kind but in circumstance, and yet required special and immediate warrant from God. Can all these couch well together? Wherefore even this variety of answers sheweth that the opponents were willing to give answer, but not resolved wherein to rest.
.
Sect. 22
Defendant in sum: The third instance concerning ceremonious instruments belonging to God’s service, is in the Jewish synagogues, which were erected by the Jews, for God’s public worship.
Touching which the Defendant sheweth out of Sigonius, that the Jews had them in every place for religious worship, and confirmeth it by Luk. 17:50* [Luke 17 contains only 37 verses; the citation as printed does not correspond to an actual verse], and yet these were nowhere in the law prescribed. Whence he inferreth that something not prescribed is lawful in God’s service; and that God in forbidding additions to his law, meant not to forbid simply all manner of additions to any use whatsoever.
marginal note: Car. Sigon., De Republica Hebraeorum, p. 58 & 86.
Replier: Concerning synagogues, I answer, First they were no significant ceremonies, about which the question now is. Secondly it is most likely though, that the same prophets which erected schools, called schools of the prophets, were the first founders of those synagogues. Thirdly for the doing in the synagogues there was no significant ceremony, action or apparel, appointed by men, to be used in them, therefore in the Christian congregation, which in form [p. 357] Replier: worship, (saving the addition of sacraments appointed by God) is altogether the same with the synagogues, there ought much less to be any.
Answer: Ceremonies they were, as appurtenances to religious service, and significant also, as bearing some representation of the sanctuary whereunto the people of God resorted to solemn worship. Hence the Jews take them to be comprehended in the plural number of the word sanctuaries, Lev. 19. And the Psalmist calleth them the houses of God, or synagogues of God, Ps. 74:8, as dedicated to his worship. And in this respect the Jews built them in the highest places of their cities, and higher then other houses, and forbade to make them through-fares, or to use them to any common use, as of eating and drinking, bartering, or chatting about worldly affairs, for reverence of the place separated to holy uses.
marginal note: See Ainsworth’s notes on Lev. 19:30 & 26:35.
To his second, that it is most likely the prophets first founded them, I answer, that being without proof from Scripture, it is as boldly to be denied as affirmed. And others of his party think, that necessity and light of natural reason hatched them, without any divine ordination, which is much more probable.
marginal note: Scotch Diall of the Course of Conformity.
Touching his third, that there was no significant ceremony of action or apparel in them, it is false, for beside their reverend gestures there, and what hath been said, they had in every synagogue an ark or chest, wherein they laid the Bible, in some resemblance of the ark of the covenant, in the temple, and when they prayed, they turned their faces toward that ark, no doubt as to a monitory sign of the ark of God, and his dwelling there betwixt the cherubim; wherefore, if our congregations be like their synagogues, some significant ceremonies shall be lawful to us.
marginal note: See Purchas his Pilgrim, of this matter.
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Sect. 23
Defendant: From Jerusalem the Defendant passeth to Antioch; from the church of the Jews, to the Christian churches, and in this section objecteth the love-feasts called [p. 358] Defendant: Agapae, ordained and used by the Apostles, without any prescription from Christ, to which, answer was made.
.
Sect. 24
Opponents: If they were apostolical, then they were of divine institution.
marginal note: M. Nic.
To this the Defendant thus. If by divine, they mean godly, in opposition to wicked and profane, this institution was divine; but if by divine, they mean, commanded of God, in opposition to all other constitutions, they could not have uttered a more unlearned position, then to say, that all apostolical constitutions were divine. For the divines of all times have distinguished constitutions and traditions into divine, apostolical, and ecclesiastical: by divine, understanding those which were ordained by Christ for perpetual use of the church; by apostolical, such as the Apostles instituted with a liberty of alteration; by ecclesiastical, such as the church of God after the Apostles at any time ordained for present use, and left alterable as times and occasions should serve. To this the Replier repeating first the objection and answer answereth.
Replier: All popish divines indeed doe allow of this distinction, because it maketh for their purpose; and some of our English, when they write in defence of the hierarchy, or of the ceremonies: but so deeply to accuse those that refuse it, for want of learning, this is too magisterial.
Answer: This distinction, in this meaning, is not used by the Papists at all, nor by our English divines only, but by others; as namely by Zanchie, De Sacra Scriptura, p. 278, 279. Neither can it be denied (as shall appear) that the Apostles ordained some things, out of discretion, and particular occasions, according to the rules of equity and edification [p. 359] manifested in the word; and not by any immediate information: as, that decree of blood, and strangled, and some other rites, besides such as are recorded, as all our divines confess. And among them Calvin on 1 Cor. 11. And to say that, whatsoever the Apostles did upon discourse of reason and by common rule for the time, was done by immediate direction, is unlearned: because it confoundeth things of divers kinds, as shall appear by examination of the Replier’s reasons to the contrary.
marginal note: Vid. [See] Whittaker, De Scriptura, Cont. 1, cap. 6, p. 384, 385.
Replier: For first that which came from the Apostles, as they were Apostles, that came from the Spirit, or, God, Act. 15:28, 1 Cor. 7:40; and to call that divine which hath the divine spirit of God (that is) God himself for author, what want of learning is in this?
Answer: The want of learning in this, is, the confounding of that which is manifested by the Holy Ghost shining in the word, with that which is immediately revealed by the same spirit unto men. The decree spoken of Act. 15, was not of the Apostles as Apostles; that is, as therein immediately taught of God, but was the decree of the whole church then assembled, whose guide was the Holy Ghost, in the Scriptures, as Master Cartwright well observeth in his Answer to the Rhemists, on Act. 15. The like may be said of the other place, 1 Cor. 7:40, wherein the Apostle saith that he had the spirit of God, that is, guiding his judgement in that he said about marriage: but that he had this by immediate revelation of the Holy Ghost, as he had the mystery of Christ, Gal. 1, it doth not appear. No man can call Jesus the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost: yet were it great ignorance to say that the manner of working this knowledge in all men is by such inspiration as the prophets and Apostles had. The Defendant therefore showed you a double acception of the word divine.
marginal note: M. Cartwright: the meaning is not, as you fondly imagine, that they were immediately inspired of God: for that could not agree either to the elders or people, no not to the Apostles at that instant of the council; but the meaning is to shew that that decree had the approbation of the Scripture, whereof the Holy Ghost was the indicter, &c.
Replier: 2. Junius was a divine and learned, yet he saith that this distinction betwixt divine and apostolical traditions is almost imaginary and superfluous, in Bell. Cont. 1, lib. 4, c. 2, an. 6.
Answer: And in saying it is so almost, he insinuateth that it is [p. 360] not altogether so, and therefore he adds, sed valeat [but let it stand]. And seeing Junius doth confess in the next chapter, an. 1, that the Apostles delivered some things beside the Scriptures, namely which belong to rites and order; though not to the matter of faith or salvation, he must needs acknowledge something to be apostolical, which was not so absolutely divine as the Scriptures are, which was not revealed immediately, as a thing necessary to the church’s salvation.
Replier: Danaeus calls it a childish distribution, in eundem locum [in the same place].
Answer: He doth so; but what he speaketh of it, Ex Hypothesi [from the hypothesis], you urge as simply spoken. For to the Papists which distinguish of divine, apostolical, and ecclesiastical, divine understanding things decreed by our Lord himself but not written; and by apostolical, understanding things determined by the Apostles, by their ordinary faculty, as pastors, and yet having the same authority with their writings, and their decreeing the same authority to the church in ordinary; it is justly answered to be a childish distribution. The Replier only abuseth men with sophistry, as if that distinction were the same with ours in meaning, because alike in words.
marginal note: Whit., De Script., qu. 6, cap. 3.
Replier: More learned divines might easily be named that doe so allow of this distinction.
Answer: This distinction, as the Papists understand it, and Doctor Whittaker hath expressed it after their mind, is in all our judgements ridiculous, wherefore we need no more proof of that, yet may it in another sense stand. So the distinction of venial and mortal sins, in their sense is ridiculous, yet in some sense good, and according to Scriptures, which shew us that there is a sin unto death, and other sins pardonable.
Replier: And indeed to examine it by that learning, by which distinctions are chiefly to be tried, it hath no logic at all in it. For first the distinction pretendeth betwixt things appointed for perpetual use, and those that may be altered upon occasion; this distinction or difference (I say) is no way contained in the terms, Divine, Apostolical.
Answer: The distinction is taken chiefly from the different authors, as the Defendant told you. For those are called [p. 361] divine, which Christ himself delivered; those apostolical, which Christ’s Apostles determined occasionally; which is some difference, and therefore beareth some distinction.
Replier: 2. Some things were immediately by Christ appointed, which were not perpetual; as many things proper to the Apostles and their times. And some things appointed by the Apostles which were to be perpetual, as the essentials of ecclesiastical government.
Answer: Be it so; yet were not those things appointed by Christ immediately, which were appointed by the Apostles of Christ occasionally. And therefore still there is some difference, such as the Apostle himself intendeth, when he saith, Thus say I, not the Lord, 1 Cor. 7. Specially in such things which the Apostles rationally and occasionally ordained with a liberty of change, whether by themselves, or the churches after them. And of this sort were the love-feasts; and therein, apostolical, and not divine, either in respect of the immediate author, or obligation of the conscience, till God himself should reverse the ordination. Wherefore the first answer touching these love-feasts, if apostolical then divine, will not doe.
marginal note: See Musculus, his Common Places of Traditions, §. 2, fol. 362.
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Sect. 25
A Second Answer is brought.
Opponents: These Agapae were abrogated by the Apostles themselves.
Defendant in sum: If justly abrogated afterwards, then, not, of divine institution. So this second answer confuteth the first.
Replier: Not in that sense indeed (divine) which meaneth by divine, perpetual: but yet they might be divine, as gifts of tongues, healing, prophesying, &c., were.
Answer: Nay, they could not be divine, as those gifts: because God only gave them immediately, and God only abated the use of them. But this constitution was not immediately from God, nor altered by any immediate direction of his. For if they had been of his institution, they must have waited for his abolition also, unless men of themselves may abrogate God’s divine ordinances.
Defendant: The Defendant’s second reply upon this second answer is, that if the Apostles did first institute, and afterwards abrogate those love-feasts; then the church may institute and abrogate such kind of ceremonies, according to the conveniences or disconveniences of the church. To which our Replier answereth.
Replier: The consequence is but faint: yet the consequent thing inferred may be granted, so that the church keep within her bounds.
Answer: We take so much as is granted; and then, ask you why you quarrel with the church, for appointing significant ceremonies, seeing the Apostles not by their extraordinary power and divine direction in special, but out of their ordinary pastoral power and sanctified discretion did appoint these feasts, which you say (they;) we say, (the church) did after abrogate. Wherefore the second answer will not serve.
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Sect. 26
Their Third Answer.
Opponents: But these were not of mystical signification, yet merely of ecclesiastical.
The Defendant replieth that they were ordained to be practiced in the solemn feasts of religion, and appropriated to accompany the holy communion, and therefore were merely ecclesiastical.
Secondly that they were of mystical signification, being instituted both for the signification and preservation of Christian love. This he illustrateth out of ancient histories, witnessing that they were used in sacris conventibus [in sacred assemblies], sometimes before, sometimes after, the receiving of the Eucharist; which is confirmed out of 1 Cor. 11, where their abuse is reproved, but not all use abrogated; for it appeared to continue in some churches till the time of Chrysostom, and the Council of Gangra, which denounceth anathema to those qui nolunt communicare huiusmodi vacationibus [who refuse to take part in such observances].
Replier: Our final answer is, that these feasts of charity were not of mystical signification, nor yet merely ecclesiastical. And indeed it is plain, that these feasts did carry no ordained signification, but that which nature herself had imprinted in their foreheads. For who knoweth not that familiar feasting of poor and rich together is a demonstration and preservation of love, without institution? And yet this is all that the Defendant can say for their signification.
Answer: The signification which feasting together is apt to demonstrate, hindereth not, but that the appropriating of this feast to that signification of Christian love, when they meant to partake the same bread and cup of the Lord, might be in that use by ordination; no more then the natural aptness of bread and wine to natural nourishment, doth hinder the application of them to signify our spiritual nourishment by the body and blood of Christ by ordination: even as kneeling is by ordination a mystical sign of reverence in receiving the sacrament, although nature itself hath imprinted such a signification in the forehead of it, and it is also used in common and civil use. Wherefore this answer fails.
Replier: Neither were these feasts merely ecclesiastical or religious, because they were used in the assemblies: for they were also used in the same manner, and to the same end, out of [p. 364] Replier: of the assemblies. Their proper end was relief of the poor, and maintenance of brotherly love.
Answer: If the use of them in their holy assemblies at the time of receiving of the communion, as a profession and an incitement of that love to which their communion in one body did oblige them, did not make these to be (in that use) ecclesiastical; then, can there be no ecclesiastical ceremony made ecclesiastical, by appropriation. And if because they had to the same general end of maintaining love, their civil feasts also, therefore this could not be religious: their eating of the idolothytes in the idols’ temple, religious feasts, because they did also eat them at their common tables; nor, eating before the Lord, a religious ceremony, because they that could not come thither feasted at home and in part, to the same end. As for that he saith they did it in the same manner, and to the same end, out of the assemblies; it is barely and falsely affirmed, howsoever somewhat after that manner, and to part of the same end, they did so: but if he will make their use conformable, there must be no difference in the end or manner.
Replier: Last of all, for the ordination of these feasts, it cannot be shewed to have been apostolical.
Answer: He said before, their final answer was that these feasts were not of mystical signification. And now after that final answer, he comes in with a last of all. But remembering that the final answer should be last of all. But if this were true, that the ordination of them was not divine nor apostolical, and yet they were used and permitted in the Apostles’ times, as appeareth 1 Cor. 11 and in Jude. The argument is the stronger for us. For then, they were of merely human institution, and yet had apostolical approbation. But how proveth he that the Apostles did not ordain them?
Replier: Peter Martyr in 1 Cor. 11:22 judges otherwise.
Answer: Nay sir, Peter Martyr doth not judge otherwise, but rather confirmeth this, while he confesseth the same feasts to be mentioned every where in the fathers, as a thing descended to them: which is rather to carry them up to [p. 365] the Apostles as their spring-head, than to deny it. Yet see the Replier’s close.
marginal note: Fol. 155.6.
Replier: So that in this example the Defendant can neither show mystical signification, religious ceremony, nor ecclesiastical ordination: and yet except all these be proved, the instance maketh nothing at all unto his purpose. But that which he lacketh in weight of arguments, he strives to make up in number.
Answer: Whether all these have been proved or no, the reader may now judge by laying all before him and considering things impartially. And so let this instance pass. For as for his merriments, they shall not stop our way.
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Sect. 27
The Second Apostolical Instance.
Defendant: The second apostolical example is the kiss of peace, mentioned Rom. 16:16, 1 Cor. 16:20. So also 1 Pet. 5:13,14, &c., which is commended by Saint Paul to all professed Christians, 1 Thess. 5:26.
Opponents: This was not of mystical signification, but a natural sign of peace, and reconciliation, as is embracing and shaking of hands.
marginal note: M. Nic.
Defendant: Let us take with us the light of antiquity, for our better direction in this point. Justin Martyr and Origen say hereof, Precibus finitis mutuo nos invicem osculo salutamus. [When prayers are ended, we mutually greet one another with a kiss.] Tertullian calleth it, Signaculum orationis [the seal of prayer], the words of precation therein used being, Pax tecum [Peace be unto thee]. Cyril termeth it, Signaculum reconciliationis, quo in sacris utimur. [The seal of reconciliation, which we use in sacred rites.] The sign of reconciliation used in divine service. And Clemens Alex. saith of it, Quod oportebat esse mysticum, id sanctum vocabat Apostolus. [That which ought to be mystical, the Apostle called holy.] That which should be mystical, the Apostle calleth Holy [p. 366] Defendant: Holy. Which saying is used by the same Clemens, to the reproof of such as did abuse it; because that which is holy must be used after a holy manner, and not to wantonness and lasciviousness, as was the fashion of some. Is there now any point in your general proposition, which is not particularized in this holy kiss? First, the institution (so far as it was not commanded by Christ) was human: secondly, the property of it significant: thirdly, the use was in sacris [in sacred rites], to wit, in the time of holy and public worship: fourthly, the end was signification of Christian love. So that in this instance, you have a full contradiction to your first proposition.
As for your conceit of embracing and shaking of hands, whereby you would shake off all mystical signification, and make that holy kiss to be nothing else than a natural civil salutation; it is but your proper fancy, seeing the mystical object, in this outward rite, was immediately that mutual charity which Christians professed; not simply among themselves, but grounded primarily upon the relation to the atonement, which we have by Christ, wherein consisteth all Christian peace. These premises doe argue that the author of this answer was not so spiritual as civil, or rather uncivil, in making such an homely interpretation of this apostolical rite, which had so singular an epithet as holy; so blessed an object as peace; which were never applied in Scripture to any action or gesture of only civil use.
Replier: The next instance (like the former) is, the kiss of peace, to which our answer is, that it was a natural indicant sign of peace and reconciliation. But the Defen- [p. 367] Replier: dant borrowing light from some oratorial phrases of the fathers, will prove the contrary: though it be as manifest as any thing can be, both by Scripture, and also by other histories, that it was a civil natural fashion used in those parts upon civil occasions as well as holy.
Answer: The phrases of the fathers produced, are explicatory, and not oratorial; and, doe prove that they used and esteemed this ceremony as mystical; and, of religious and not of civil use in these holy meetings. And though kissing was in the East parts a civil salutation betwixt man and man, as bowing the knee was also a civil reverence, yet was it in this use sacred, as well as is kneeling to God in our prayers. When it is said, The people worshipped God and the king, the gesture was one; but, the intention and end made the one religious, the other civil.
marginal note: Da: Parin. Rom. 16:16.
Replier: Now what doth he prove? First, the institution, so far as it was not commanded by Christ, was human. This he affirmeth, but proveth not, and in his affirmation wavereth like a reed shaken with some wind. So far as it was from Christ, and so far as it was from man: and yet we hear not how far from either.
Answer: When the Defendant saith, (so far as) he meaneth (in as much as) or (because) this institution was not from Christ (that is, not of immediate divine institution) it was human: that is to say, it was in respect of the authors of it, human, not divine, as his words shew: the wavering here averred, is feigned, both in the words and sense, as the Defendant’s own words, omitted by the Replier, declare.
Replier: The plain truth is, it was of no institution at all: but of natural inclination and civil custom, used long before the coming of Christ, as is to be seen every where in the Old Testament. Gen. 29:13. 1 Sam. 20:41, &c. Yet by direction or custom is received constant application unto some special acts. > > marginal note: 1 Chr. 29:20.
Answer: Of no institution at all, because of a natural inclination and custom; and yet, by direction or custom applied constantly, unto some special acts? Why? Was not this ap- [p. 368] plication of it by direction, or custom constantly to some special acts, an institution? This is strange. It was used in the East of old: howbeit, it was not of such use with the Romans, and yet even of them Paul requireth it; though (as (o) Calvin saith) not precisely the ceremony, but rather the thing, viz. the cherishing of love. Singing is a natural expression of joy: and yet singing to God was by institution. Institution may be by application as well as by invention, I trow. Now, if God did not institute this kiss of peace, then men did institute it in this use whereof we speak, and the Apostles required it.
marginal note: (o) See Calvin in Rom. 16:16.
Replier: Secondly he saith it was significant, that is, it had a natural fitness to declare the inward affection of love. What is this to a signification imposed by man? It was so significant as shaking of hands: which gesture also used to be joined with it: Tunc ambo nexi admovicem dextras damus in osculo pacis sacrae, &c. [Then both, having clasped hands together, give them in the sacred kiss of peace, &c.] It did so signify love, as the turning away of the face, doth signify alienation of mind.
Answer: The aptness or use of this fashion (as is with us shaking of hands to signify natural love) made it the fitter to be translated to that signification of spiritual love and peace in one Christ; but hindereth not that this signification, and the solemn use of this fashion, at their holy meetings, and before the communion, might be of institution: no more then the aptness of a trumpet to give warning, did hinder, that the several warnings given thereby of solemn conventions, were by (o) institution. The Replier fondly opposeth things coincident; as if one should say, marriage is not of institution, because there is a natural aptness thereto. And is not kneeling as naturally and usual a sign of reverence; which yet, because we apply to the signification of our reverence, in receiving the sacrament, they condemn as an human ceremony or mystical signification? So partial are they.
marginal note: (o) Numb. 10:1, &c.
Replier: But (with this) it signified Christian love. As if Christian love were not in the common nature of love, and therefore be signified partly by natural signs common to that, as cleanliness in the celebration of the sacra- [p. 369] Replier: ments, is the same that it is at another feast; though in regard of that application, it may be called Christian or holy cleanliness or decency.
Answer: Christian love hath no doubt the common nature of love, else it were not love at all: but hath a special difference from common love, else how is it Christian? Wherefore that salutation which was fit to signify common love, by application of it to their holy assemblies, (and even before the communion, and that with mutual prayer each for other) was exalted in the use of it, and made in that application, sacred and not civil: even as the cleanliness or decency in administration of the communion is in that use sacred, by his own confession; though, in common use, civil.
marginal note: Calvin in Rom. 16:16.
Replier: Thirdly he saith it was used in time of holy worship. So no doubt was giving of the upper place unto the elders in token of reverence: and yet it was no religious instituted sign of mystical signification.
Answer: Yet your Master Fenner maketh bowing of the body and crown of the head to the minister, after the holy action, a significant ceremony, and an act of external worship, alleging no divine institution, but examples for it from Exod. 4:14 & 12:28 and Neh. 8:6, Apoc. 3:9. And if there had been such an ordinance of seating the minister in an higher place, in way of reverence due to his function, what should let it to be of mystical signification, as well as these you impugn?
marginal note: Fenner, Theo., Fol. 88.a.
Replier: Such reasons as these bewray more confidence then good consideration.
Answer: Put answers instead of reasons, and all will be well. For the reasons are good, and the case so judged of by the fathers above mentioned, and by Cyril, who saith that this holy kiss was not of that kind, which is used to be made in the market among common friends: for, this kiss doth unite souls, and promiseth to forget all injuries. And to judge our better divines.
marginal note: Cyril, Mystag., cap. 5, Catech. 5.
Calvin doubteth not to say, that the Apostle, exhorting the Corinthians to salute one another with an holy kiss, would exhort them to cherish mutual love not only in their minds, and
marginal note: Calvin in 1 Cor. 16:20. [p. 370] and by other offices, but also by that significant sign; provided that it were holy; that is, not lascivious: and this symbol (says he) was used before the communion amongst the Christians, from the Apostles’ times; though before, in common use only among the Jews or Eastern people, and not among the Christians, as he there saith; nor among the Romans; as elsewhere, Com. in Rom. 16:16, of whom yet the Apostle requireth it: which plainly sheweth this use among them to be of institution, not of custom.
marginal note: * So Par. in Rom. 10:16.
Peter Martyr in his commentary on the same place saith, Nec Dubitandum est, &c. [Nor is it to be doubted, &c.] Nor is it to be doubted, that the Christians in the primitive church used this mutual kiss of peace and concord, before the sacred communion: by which significant sign they might admonish themselves of the communion of saints, which is celebrated in those mysteries. And after, that it became the Corinthians (which were divided in factions) to be admonished of concord, not only by word, but also by this outward sign of a holy kiss.
marginal note: P. Martyr, Com. in 1 Cor. 16:20.
Beza, in his notes upon the place acknowledgeth this rite to have been used at the communion, ad summum illum, &c. [to signify that utmost…], to declare that singular consent of their minds; for which he citeth, Justin Martyr, Apologet. 2, and referreth us to 1 Cor. 13:11: Christianis hunc mos fuit ante coenae communionem se mutuo osculari ad testandam eo signo dilectionem mutuam. [It was the custom of Christians, before communion of the supper, to kiss one another mutually, to testify by that sign their mutual love.] Aretius saith, there was an excellent admonition in this kiss of peace, because it shewed intimate conjunction; and, not only agreement, but that communion of saints, which they professed in doctrine, and the sacred ceremonies; he meaneth, the sacraments. But what should I press these men with authorities of men, who have themselves above all other men in estimation for soundness of judgement? For else, they would be persuaded that this ceremony was symbolical, of human, not divine ordination, and stated in the solemn worship of God in this use, which the Apostle then required of it.
marginal note: Beza in 1 Cor. 16:20. * The like hath Par., Com. in Rom. 16:13, for which he cites a place of Origen. Elegans Admonitio [An elegant admonition].
.
Sect. 28
Our Third Example is the Apostles’ Ceremony, concerning, the Covering of the Head; at Divine Service. 1 Cor. 11.
Defendant: Likewise, the Apostle is urgent about another ceremony, of having the man uncovered and the woman covered in the church; and this also is significant, and that mystically, of spiritual things and duties: for the man, being uncovered, signifieth thereby his immediate subjection to the ordinance of Christ, who hath constituted him to be head over the woman: and the woman being covered, doth thereby express subjection to her husband, vers. 9 & 10.
marginal note: 1 Cor. 11.
To which purpose, Tertullian describeth the fashion thereof to have been this, viz: Quantum crines soluti capere possint [as much as loosed hair could hold]; by having their hair loose: which is further noted by Clemens Alexand., saying, Ut non tantum mulieres velamine caput tegerent, sed eodem in frontem promissa vultum obumbrarent. [that women should not only cover their heads with a veil, but also with the same, hanging down over the forehead, shade the face.]
marginal note: Cent. 3, Col. 14. Clem. Alex.
That the women (says he) might not only hide their heads with a cover, but also shadow their faces, by the laying down of their hair. And not only so, but the Apostle requireth yet another cover besides that of the hair, saying of the uncovered head (ver. 5.) It is all one as to be shaven. So then, this must needs be a mystical sign of a moral duty; which is there specified to be of the Christian subjection that women owe, in Christ, unto their husbands. Now here you may not say, that this ordinance of the Apostle, touching covering in the church, was no way of human, but altogether of divine institution; for then might you challenge, that [p. 372] that women, at this day, in the time of divine worship, should have their hair still hang down, to cover their faces.
This point is of some moment, and may not slightly be passed over. Wherefore that you may be satisfied, not so much from any collections, as from the confession of those witnesses on whom you must rely, I have thought it fit to produce such as have more particularly pointed out this text, as namely, Calvin, Chemnitius, P. Martyr, and Zanchius. From these I would first learn, whether this ceremony of covering the head of the woman, and uncovering of the man, were not mystical and symbolical; that is, significant of some good thing, or no? M. Calvin, and some others, call them expressly, symbols, or signs. Secondly, I would ask, what thing it is which is hereby signified; and whether it were not some Christian duty? And upon due search it appeareth, that the things signified by this ceremony, are two; the first, in respect of the man and woman mutually betwixt themselves; and the next, of man unto God. Concerning the reciprocal duties between man and woman, these witnesses affirm, that the cover, on the head of the woman, did betoken her subjection to the man; and the uncovering of the man’s head, did signify the sovereignty that man had over the woman. But this you interpret, to hold only in a civil respect. If so, then would it suffice to justify the ring in marriage; yet look into the second point, which is, the relation it had unto God, and there you may perceive something more. For, as Calvin, in 1 Cor. 11, Dei gloria elucet, propter dominium quod habet: that is, In the superiority that man hath [p. 373] hath over the woman, the glory of God is manifested, by the dominion which he hath. Also the Apostle, in respect of this sovereignty saith; The man is the glory of God. Likewise, P. Martyr; Imago Dei, ut omnibus praesit, sita est in dominatu. [The image of God, that he may preside over all, is placed in dominion.] Now what symbol can be more choice, than that a man by his outward gesture should in a sort, represent both the authority that God doth hold over his creatures; and also, that superiority which he hath given him over his wife? Again, the Apostle, in this comparison, maketh Christ the head of the man, even as God (in respect of the human nature) is the head of Christ. And Chemnitius, treating of such rites, calleth them Incitamenta, & retinacula pietatis: that is, the incitements unto piety and godliness (as his allusion to the Apostles’ rule seemeth to import) they make for edification.
marginal note: Calvin, in 1 Cor. 11. P. Martyr, on the same place, p. 151. P. Martyr, ib., pag. 149. Examen, part 1, pag. 72, &c.
Zanchius likewise noteth, two ends of the cover on the woman’s head; one is of honesty and decency, that so the external worship of God, in hearing of his word, and participating of his sacrament, may be performed in more seemly manner: the second, that by this ceremony; (unusquisque moneatur officii sui) every man may be admonished of his own duty; the man of his dominion over the woman, and the woman of her subjection unto the man: [Haec sunt utilia ad cultum internum,] These (says he) are profitable for inward worship. Then which, I doe not see, what any divine could have spoken more directly for our purpose.
marginal note: De Sacra Script., p. 273.
Our third demand is, whether these ceremonies, of covering and uncovering, were not instituted to be observed in God’s public worship? For, howsoever this custom might sometimes alter in civil assemblies, and much more in private consort betwixt man [p. 374] man and wife; yet nevertheless the Apostle doth most strictly challenge it, in the public service of God: for, every man (says the Apostle) praying or prophesying, &c. And for better demonstration, he doth in a manner call the angels to witness: exacting that ceremony (propter Angelos) in regard of the angels. For as the angels are appointed to be ministering spirits every where, for the good of the elect: even so are they in very special wise attendant at public assemblies, for God’s worship.
marginal note: P. Martyr, quo supra, pag. 50, 6.
As for the custom itself, Chrysostom useth this excellent simile, for the illustration thereof. When (says he) the king sitteth in his public chair of state, and there resort unto him, dukes, counts, tribunes, &c. and none of these present themselves before the king without their robes of honor, according unto their degrees: so God being present in his royal majesty, [in sacro coetu] in the holy assembly; men and women ought to be adorned with such ensigns, as may best declare their state and condition. Therefore may not that man, who hath received from God’s diadem of honor and prerogative over his wife, at that time cast away his ornament, and take upon him some servile habit. Whereby you see, that this symbol was then as well applied to all holy worship, as now our gesture of kneeling is, at the participation of the Lord’s Supper.
marginal note: Chrysost.
Fourthly, we desire to know whether this matter were not a thing indifferent, and thereupon (albeit apostolical yet) subject to alteration, according to the necessity of occasions? This we may best understand from the first original thereof. The Apostle (says Master Calvin) took it from the common custom of men in their times; which custom in many countries (marginal note: Calvin.) [p. 375] was otherwise; yea anciently every where (viri comati erant) that is, men had long hair. Chemnitius saith, to the same purpose, that Christian liberty did moderate the Apostles’ rites, to make them in their kind different, &c. Which according to the divers natures of times, places, and persons might be appointed, changed or abrogated. For in the days of the Apostle, this custom, of the woman’s cover, was a sign of subjection; and of the man uncovered, a token of dominion and government: but now in our times the fashion is quite contrary; for in these days the uncovering of the head is a note of subjection, and the covering is a testimony of authority.
marginal note: Chem. Exam., part 1, p. 75.
Lastly it is worthy our inquiry, to learn how far other churches may be directed by this example of the Apostles’ ceremonies, for the authorizing of their constitutions in like cases? Herein Peter Martyr is bold and saith: The church of God is an assembly of the faithful, governed by the word of God in all such things as belong to man’s salvation. (meaning things absolutely necessary to the worship of God, as hath been amply proved:) But touching such things as pertain unto discipline, it is lawful for the church to make laws, canons, and constitutions: so doth the Apostle teach, that women must pray with their heads covered, and men bare headed. So doth the church ordain in what place, at what time, and (quomodo) after what manner, whether standing or sitting, men must communicate.
marginal note: Loc. Theol., Tract. de Trad., p. 720.
And Master Calvin, observing the Apostle’s reproof of persons contentious in ceremonial points (which is, v. 16, If any man seemeth to be contentious, we have no such custom, nor yet the church of God) when he meets with some that did, out of the same spirit of contention, resist the constitutions of that church of Geneva, he makes (marginal note: Com. in 1 Cor. 5, v. 16; 1 Cor. 11, v. 11.) [p. 376] a general application thereof, against all such turbulent and factious spirits; Qui bonos & utiles Ritus nulla necessitate convellunt [who without necessity overthrow good and useful rites], that is, who unnecessarily doe oppugn the profitable rites of the church.
Here I need not make any recapitulation of these several points; the indifferent reader may easily find in the confession of the fore-named witnesses; first that these are things indifferent. Secondly that they were prescribed as fit for those times. Thirdly that consequently they were to be dutifully observed. Fourthly, that they were symbolical, and had in them significations of moral duties. Fifthly, that they were applied to divine worship. Sixthly, and lastly, that the same authority doth still remain in the church, to ordain the like significant ceremonies, whensoever there shall be just occasion thereunto. Thus much of the Apostles’ time. We descend lower.
Replier: The third and last example which is brought out of Scripture is the covering and uncovering of the head at divine service, 1 Cor. 11. To which I answer, as before, that it was a civil order of decency used, as well out of God’s worship as in it.
Answer: That it was a civil custom taken up by the Apostles, and urged in religious worship is true; but that it was therefore in this use, civil, and not religious, is as absurd, as it should be to say, the blowing of trumpets was not a religious action or ceremony at the (a) new moons or sacrifice of burnt offerings, because it was used in civil (b) occasions as well as in religious, &c.
marginal note: (a) Num. 10:10. (b) Ibid. 2:4,9.
Replier: But here the Defendant taketh pains to make many collections and confirm the same by divers witnesses, because (as he says) this point is of some moment, though the other were of none. Let us therefore briefly consider what they be.
Answer: You owe him thanks for his pains taken to give you [p. 377] you satisfaction, but you pay him with a flout, when you inferre that the other points were of no moment because this is said to be of some. But goe on.
Replier: I would first learn (says he) whether the ceremony of covering and uncovering were not significant of some good thing? I answer that this fashion which he abusively calleth a ceremony, was significant in a general sense, that is it did declare or argue a good thing.
Answer: The Defendant did not enquire this of you; but, of those learned men whose resolution he hath produced, not blanched (as yours is) but clearly given, that this was ritus, a ceremony, and symbolum a significant ceremony. Wherefore your answer given, without further proof, may stand by, while your elders speak. Define a ceremony right, and see if you can shut this out from being a ceremony.
Replier: Secondly I would ask (says he) what thing it is that is hereby signified? I answer, subjection and superior power.
Answer: And, (if there were no more,) these I hope are moral duties, the profession whereof was made by that ceremony. Therefore it was significant.
Replier: But there is a relation also to God (says the Defendant,) I answer there is in man’s superiority a kind of resemblance of God’s sovereignty: and so there is also as Calvin observeth in omni principatu [in every position of rule], in all superior power, so that this maketh covering and uncovering no more a religious significant ceremony, then the upper seat of an heathen magistrate sitting in judgement. For by that seat is signified a superiority in which there is some image of God’s sovereignty.
Answer: 1. If there be in man’s superiority a resemblance, and some image of God’s sovereignty: and, if the uncovering of the head in prayer, and prophecy, did signify this superiority of the man, and was (even because of the resemblance it bare of God’s sovereignty,) urged by the Apostle: how could it, in that use, but be a religious ceremony, seeing it is the intention and use which denominates the kind of action, as all wise men know? Secondly, [p. 378] Secondly, it cannot be denied, but even a throne set up to that end to represent the sovereignty of God in the lifting up of his officers, is in that use religious; as M. Parker saith, the sign of the cross even in coins and banners is religious in use, though not in state, as those things be which are annexed to religious actions. Wherefore even that which the Replier proves, is enough to disprove their proposition. For if in civil actions a significant sign of religious cognizance & document, may lawfully be devised by man, how much more in sacred actions as in the most proper place thereof?
Replier: There is nothing alleged out of our divines by the Defendant which may not as well be applied to the judge’s bench as to this covering and uncovering.
Answer: Yes, this; that the one used in civil actions, is religious in use only, not in state: the other used in religious actions, is religious both in state, and use: which being Master Parker’s distinction, must needs be current with you.
Replier: And the Apostle doth show plainly, that the veil he speaketh of, was of the same nature with long hair, so that by the Defendant’s reason men’s short and women’s long hair must be accounted religious mystical ceremonies.
Answer: The Apostle doth show that nature itself having given long hair unto women for a covering, confirms that use of the veil which was an instituted sign of their subjection. But doth not show that the long hair of women was of the very same nature with the veil; but, on the contrary, because that was of nature, this of institution, which to a ceremony is essential. And that veil required this, saith Calvin. Nature gave hair to Samson; but institution the ceremony of his profession. Nature hath given to man a face to look upward, and to behold the heavens, and yet a lifting up of the eyes to heaven in prayer, is in that use, a religious ceremony, saith Master Cartwright. And why may not as well this veil be a religious ceremony, though long hair be as it were a kind of natural veil?
marginal note: Cal. in 1 Cor. 11, v. 5.
Replier: Our third demand (says he) is whether their ceremonies of covering, and uncovering, were not instituted to be observed in God’s public worship? I an- [p. 379] Replier: swer, that it was required that they should be observed in holy assemblies.
Answer: And was not that requiring of it, an institution? Or was it merely natural, as the hair?
Replier: But first it was not only required in God’s public worship, but also as Calvin upon the place granteth, in quovis graviore coetu aut matronarum aut virorum [in any more solemn gathering of matrons or of men], in any grave meeting of men and women. And Instit. lib. 4, cap. 10, l. 29: Ne mulieres in publicum nisi velatae procedant [that women should not go out in public unless veiled], that is, whensoever they goe into public places.
Answer: 1. No more is kneeling required in God’s worship only, and yet therein is a religious ceremony. 2. Civil and religious are not contraria [opposites], but diversa [different]; so as something of the one may be well annexed to the other, as the veins have spirits with the blood: and the arteries, blood with the spirits, though the one be called the vessels of blood the other of the spirits, from that which is principal to either of them.
Replier: 2. It was not instituted primarily and principally for God’s worship. If it were I ask when, and by whom.
Answer: Though it had not the first institution unto that use in holy assemblies, yet the application thereto by injunction, was as it were an institution thereof to an holy use.
Replier: Paul surely did not institute a new ceremony in this place, for v. 14, he groundeth his admonition upon nature (that is) as Calvin well expoundeth it, upon a received use and ancient custom in those parts, which some through lightness began unseemly to transgress. There is nothing alleged out of Martyr, or Chrysostome against this answer.
Answer: This is a cavil about words only: for, as there is a building upon an old foundation, and a building altogether de novo [anew]: so there is institution of application, as well as of new invention. The lawyers tell us that sometimes to institute is but to invest, or instate, prosequi, or gravely to determine. David did not institute the Levites to their work of the Lord’s house primarily, (for that was done before;) but his ordering of them was yet an institution (in respect of that order,) according to the will of God. (marginal note: See Sharpius, his Lexicon, pag. 478, on the Word.) [p. 380]
That this fashion was out of the light of nature taken up before, hinders not the application of the same upon other further grounds, (as the support of Christ’s honor, and bearing of the image of God decently in the congregation) to be an institution in that respect: so as, in respect of that use which Saint Paul enjoins, it was requisite to be observed in God’s public worship, as well as is kneeling in the act of receiving the sacrament, though kneeling was in use before that sacrament was ordained: what was alleged out of Peter Martyr and Chrysostome, is set down before, and enough to stop the Replier; for Martyr saith, this ceremony was ordained as an inducement to piety of soul, decent, & profitable to further God’s inward worship. Is this nothing?
marginal note: Paulus in Corinthiorum Ecclesia constituit vir aperto capite orare, mulieres velato capite. De hoc referent, cap. l, c. 13, infine [approximate reading of a badly worn note].
Replier: Fourthly (says he) we desire to know whether this matter were not a thing indifferent? I answer, indifferent in the general nature of it: yet at that time, and in that place they sinned that did otherwise, even before Paul, or any of their overseers gave them charge about it.
Answer: If it were of indifferent nature in general, and could not have been there and there omitted without sin, because that uniformity made it comely: how any child could omit here, even then willingly, without [it being that] when it was required as commanded by the Apostle? And by this judge whether it be ingenuous choice to use, or refuse indifferent things, required for comeliness and decorum, by those who be in authority. [This paragraph is transcribed as fully as the worn right margin of the original permits; a few words are uncertain despite close examination at high resolution.]
Replier: Lastly (says he) it is worthy our enquiry to learn how far other churches may be directed by this example. I answer, so far forth as the Apostle’s rule stretcheth, Let all things be done comely. 1 Cor. 14:40.
Answer: And this is as much as we require. For, what is comely, must needs then belong to their judgements who are to appoint things comely. It is well that here the Replier confesseth the rule of comeliness to be there given, by the Apostle, which cap. 2, fol. 6, he denied, saying, that comeliness is nothing else but the seemliness of order.
Replier: Now the Defendant hath a direct answer to every one of his demands, let him cast up his sum, and he find [p. 381] Replier: that he hath proved just nothing.
Answer: Indeed if your answers may stand good, his reckoning will be small. But he asked these his questions of other men, who gave better answers which have been summed up before.
Replier: He could find but three examples in all the New Testament, which had any colour, so as they might be alleged for mystical ceremonies, appropriated to God’s worship by man’s institution, the love-feasts, the kiss of peace, and the veil of women, and yet there is not one of these three (as any indifferent man if he hath common sense may see, by that which hath been said) that can be shewed either to be of mystical signification other then nature giveth it, nor appropriated to God’s worship more then to civil occasions, nor yet ever instituted by any man in the church of God.
Answer: But three? Why in the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every thing be established. Three are sufficient, which, whether they be of some mystical signification more then nature gave them; and, by application in that use, religious, not civil; and that, not by divine but human or ecclesiastical direction; I am well content the understanding and impartial reader judge. For as for me, I want common sense, if it be not cleared against you.
marginal note: Deut. 17:6.
Replier: Is it not a marvelous thing that men should presume so as they doe, to domineer in words and deeds, over poor men in such things as they can neither shew precept nor pattern for in all the Scriptures?
Answer: Yea rather, is it not marvelous that when both general precept to doe all things in order, decently, and to edification, hath been shewed, and examples before and under the law, and some under the Gospel, have been produced out of Scripture to justify the lawfulness of some significant human ceremonies, &c., that a man should yet dare to say, nothing can be shewed for them out of all the Scriptures?
Replier: We will descend lower says the Defendant. And that, I assure him, is his best course: for so long as he wadeth in the pure waters of holy Scripture he doth but strive against the stream, descending lower to human writings he may find [p. 382] Replier: the waters troubled, and so bring some fish to his nets. Yet having the Scriptures on our side, we need not fear to follow him whithersoever he pleaseth to lead us.
Answer: This is but a flourish of words not worthy of answer.
.
Sect. 29
Defendant in sum: Our second proof (says he) for confirmation of the moral use of ceremonies, is from the universal custom of the church of Christ, as well primitive, as successive; which hath always taken liberty of ordaining some ceremonies of mystical signification, to be used in the public service of God without controlment or gainsaying, so far forth as can appear by light of story ever since the Apostles’ times. Of this two instances are given of universal ceremonies (for, the justifying of all particulars he disavoweth) the one of standing in prayer on all the Lord’s days, and on every day betwixt Easter and Whitsuntide, in memory and profession of Christ’s resurrection; and the festivals of Easter and Whitsuntide: which two latter have continued (as Zanchie witnesseth) ever since the Apostles’ times, and were human significant rites appropriated to actions of religious worship. The Non-Conformists themselves not denying this.
Replier: Here is alleged the universal custom of the ancient church, even from the Apostles’ times for confirmation of human mystical ceremonies in God’s worship. To which I answer. First, of the first and purest times, next after the Apostles, this cannot be proved: nor is it likely, because it is not to be thought that all churches would immediately admit of any thing, which they had not received from the Apostles.
Answer: The oldest records we have, doe mention these as apostolical traditions; nor can any man conceive how the universal church, before it had opportunity of meeting in any [p. 383] any general council, could be brought to the acknowledgement and observation of these rites (though with some variety) if the allowance thereof had not been taken to be apostolical. For (as Saint Augustine observeth) such universal observations, not being written in Scripture, must be understood to be commanded and ordained by general councils, or from the Apostles. Nor can any man give any other probable reason for those ancient times. And if it be not likely that the churches would admit of any thing which they had not (doctrinally or exemplarily) received from the Apostles, it is therefore likely they, to received these, being certain they did embrace them.
marginal note: August., Ep. 118.
Replier: 2. For the next ages, it may easily be shewed, that the best writers taught many general rules concerning the perfection of the Scripture, and the purity of God’s worship, which cannot stand with these human inventions, however in their practice they were carried away unto other customs.
Answer: Nay rather their practice interprets their meaning in those general rules touching the perfection of the Scriptures and purity of God’s worship, to be the same with ours, viz. that no necessary doctrine, or proper worship of God is to be received beyond that which is manifest in the Scriptures: and indeed so doe they interpret themselves, and with this rule such ceremonies may stand, and did without any contradiction.
marginal note: * This chapter mentions the same, Ib. 8 & 9, those which in Basil, Athanasius, & others, at large.
Replier: 3. The infinite troubles of those times against infidels & heretics, about the chiefest grounds and main foundations of faith, would not suffer them to examine these points of less moment as they should. And indeed they were so taken up with these conflicts, that they neglected many usual truths. So that if all should be received which the fathers practiced, neither any thing understood but by their interpretations, we should be destitute of much truth and overcharged with the burden of human presumptions, as Augustine complained in his time, Ep. 119.
Answer: All this is but a shuffle: for it supposeth that the universal church had never so much leisure, or wit, as to examine those customs of keeping the yearly feasts afore- [p. 384] said, or that ceremony of standing in prayer on the Lord’s days in 1200 years, during which time (as your own note says) it continued. See the Treatise against Kneeling, printed 1608, pag. 68, 91, &c. Secondly, it is an evasion, to tell us of private fathers, or churches, whose customs before Augustine’s time were grown excessive, when we object only those universal ceremonies which the whole church retained as well in persecution, as out of it, constantly: and which the same Augustine allows, Ep. 119, though he complain of the burthen of others. Thirdly, it may argue what spirit these men are, who think the whole church of Christ, even in the days of purest zeal and frequent martyrdom, to be wholly so slack, or so blind, as to have continued by joint consent in the use of these observations, without due examination of their lawfulness. This is singular singularity.
Replier: 4. The Lord in justice would have Antichrist to prevail; which mystery could never have grown to any ripeness, had the worship of God been preserved sincere. The corruption begat him, and the reformation thereof must be his utter ruin.
Answer: That standing in prayer on the Lord’s day, or observing the yearly memorials of Christ’s resurrection, &c., corrupted religion, or engendered Antichrist, the Replier durst not say; and yet, if he say not that, he saith nothing to the objection. And if even from these ceremonies Antichrist had drawn (by abuse) some sap to his roots, this could not prove them to be in their kind unlawful, seeing from the abuse of God’s own ordinances, as namely of prayers, and sacraments, of excommunication, yea and of the very doctrine of remission of sins, Antichrist hath drawn his special nourishment. The reformation which shall ruin Antichrist, needs not be the abolition of all things abused; but, the restitution of them to their right use. For corruption bred him, and the removal of that corruption will starve him.
Replier: It is sufficient that the lamentable experience of 1500 years hath declared unto us what sinful significant ceremonies [p. 385] Ceremonies Brought By Man Into God’s Worship, Are Wont To Afford Unto Those That Affect Them.
Answer: It is a wonderful rashness, and answers the spirit of Montanus, to challenge the whole church of error in this matter for 1500 years, and to give no proof for it. Who are you?
Replier: To fetch authority in this case from their practice, by which hath ensued such inestimable hurt to the church of God, is not the wisdom of the burnt child who dreadeth the fire.
Answer: It is an idle excuse of a sluggard, to say, a lion, a lion, is in the streets, when he is loath to stir abroad. And that child who would refuse (being commanded) to come near a wood-stack, because he had been burnt with fire made of wood, would be whipped for his folly, not prayed for his wisdom.
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Sect. 30
Defendant: The third proof for confirmation of the lawful use of significant ceremonies, &c., is, from the testimony of Protestant divines, and namely of Master Calvin (worthy of the first place) in Opusc., pag. 344, and Instit. lib. 4, cap. 10, sec. 14, where he professedly allows, significant human ceremonies to be permitted to the simpler sort for an help of their ignorance, as a profitable thing: and to be used as signs and incitements unto that reverence which we should perform to God: provided that a mean be kept; of which, our Savior in his institution of so few and easy ceremonies, hath given example. The same Calvin doth allow private use of pictures set forth with narration of story, which have some use in teaching and admonishing. Luther also (as Chemnitius saith) held images that did represent the histories of acts done, as things indifferent, which might be had for
marginal note: In Sum. * pag. 448 in my edition. See the place at large below, cap. 2. Instit. l. 1, c. 11, sect. 12. Chem. Exam., part 4, tract de Imag., p. 13. [p. 386] Defendant: for ornament and for remembrance without superstition, according to the rule of Scripture. Zepper also is brought in, acknowledging that such kind of pictures may (according to the Council of Frankford) be kept in the church without impiety, to refresh the memory of things passed, which yet doth no whit advantage the popish superstition, or adoration of images. Junius is alleged as allowing the memorative festivals of Christ’s death, resurrection, and ascension, for the due remembrance of the special benefit, which, as on those days had befallen the church of God. Chemnitius is also called in, who alloweth the ancient use of those significant ceremonies when by men were admonished of the doctrine of the sacraments, blaming the Papists, for misinterpreting their speeches, touching such ceremonies, and taking that to be held as operative, which in the fathers’ meaning, was to be understood as significative. And though this general doctrine of Protestant divines might suffice, yet the Defendant tells them that the allowance of these our three significant ceremonies in question, by P. Martyr, Chemnitius, Jewell, and Zanchie, after averred, must needs abate something of the opposer’s contradiction.
marginal note: Zepp., de Legum Abr., lib. 4, cap. p. 312. Junius, Cent. 4, p. 283. Chem. Exam., part 4.
Replier: Of our own writers the Defendant here opposeth unto us Calvin, Junius, Chemnitius and Zepperus. Now for these, it hath been plainly manifested before, that they all with one consent, condemn human symbolical ceremonies in God’s worship, and that upon good grounds out of God’s word.
Answer: If the clean contrary have not appeared, let the reader trust this man; else, not.
Replier: Now therefore if any thing elsewhere hath fallen from any of them by occasion sounding to the contrary, then we may [p. 387] Replier: well think, that either their meaning is mistaken therein, or else they showed themselves to be men. And indeed to say the truth, there is a little variety to be found in some of our divines, concerning the point of ceremonies.
Answer: The places alleged by us, doe positively set down their judgements and resolutions: and therefore if anywhere else they seem to speak otherwise, the exposition of their meaning must be framed to agree to these places, and not a conceit standing cast upon them, as if they were not at unity; but men without judgement, or good conscience, and doe therefore err themselves. For all passages by the way, must be reduced to such places, as doe handle these points professedly and not these cut to those other. But the Replier seeing no interpretation will help against the clear testimonies of the learned by us alleged, confesseth they were men (as if he and his partners were more than men) and that there is a little variety, to willing are men rather to cast dirt in the faces of others, then to confess any mistaking in themselves. Is this any thing but the spirit of pride, thus masterly to judge the Lord’s worthies, and the whole church of God for 1500 years?
Replier: But the cause thereof being marked, will make it less offensive.
Answer: Have you broken their heads, and will you now give them a plaster? What was that cause?
Replier: All our divines, when they looked into the clear crystal of the Scripture condemn plainly all devices of man in God’s worship whatsoever: but again, some of them when they fix their eyes in the false glass of ancient times, and consider withal, how hardly men are drawn from their accustomed vanities, and what good some men may doe by applying themselves somewhat to the times, then receiving an kind of impression, they seem sometimes to waver in their words.
Answer: Will this observation make the supposed wavering of our divines less offensive? Surely no. For, if after they have discerned (in the clear light of the Scripture) God’s truth, they shall by a false glass, antiquity, or upon [p. 388] presumptions of discourse, depart from that truth, they must be men of irresolute judgements; or, which is worse, of cheveril consciences. But this man fears not to make his own way through the bowels of the Lord’s excellent servants in this contention, whereas the truth is, that these men, in determining according to the Scriptures that no devices of men are to be brought into God’s worship, and yet allowing the institution and use of some kind and measure of ceremonies, yea even of significant ceremonies for helps to us in God’s worship, and not for a worship of God in themselves; have not at all wavered in their judgements, but only interpreted themselves, even as we doe our selves in saying the very same with them. And this is the cause why Bishop Powell, Andrews, Bilson, Fulk, and other worthies of this church, are in this dispute alleged against us as well as Calvin, Junius, or the learned divines of other churches (as we have heard before) although our opposites know, that they judged of these things as we doe, and that without contradiction of themselves, or wavering in their judgements as he feigneth.
Replier: This observation I thought fit to set down in general, because it may have good use in some particular places, which this Defendant threateneth hereafter to object. But as for the places here quoted, the answer is easy.
Answer: This answer you think good to give, because you are resolved to sink the reputation of all men, ancient or later, how learned, zealous, or holy soever they were: rather then to confess your own mistaking. And whether, without this miserable shift, you can put off the testimonies here cited, let us now try.
Replier: Calvin in the first place, disputing against the gross corruptions of the Papists, saith, he doth not contend therein about ceremonies, which he might truly say: not only comparatively, but even absolutely in regard of contention with others, who did not obtrude them upon him. And so I am assured, few or none would contend much about ceremonies, if they would not force them upon others.
Answer: Calvin in the first place, which is in his treatise of [p. 389] the true way of reforming the church, pag. 448, saith, he would have it known to the godly readers, that he doth not strive about ceremonies which only serve to order, or decency; or yet, which are symbols, signs, and incitements of that reverence which we owe to God: for we (says he) dispute of those works which these mediators imagine to please God of themselves, and with which they affirm God to be rightly worshipped. Calvin (quoth this man) says, he doth not contend therein about ceremonies. But, the words following (which only serve to decency, and order, or yet which are significant to express or incite to reverence due to God) the Replier leaves out. He gives the speech such, as if Calvin had there said indefinitely, he did not contend against ceremonies, and no more: whereas Calvin sheweth against what kind of ceremonies he did not strive, and professedly strives against such others, as were fancied to be a worship of God in themselves. The Replier’s starting holes therefore of comparatively, or in regard of contention for ceremonies, not urged upon him, are miserable shifts, his own conscience being judge. For wherefore, else, left he out the rest of Calvin’s words? Whereas he adds, that they would not much contend about ceremonies if they were not urged upon themselves, this argues them to struggle not merely out of conscience. For if these ceremonies be idolatrous pollutions of God’s worship, they ought to contend against them for his honor’s sake:
marginal note: Calvin, Epist. ad Verae Ecclesiae Reformationis, p. 448, as verse cited: reformation.
Replier: In the other place he (that is, Calvin) understandeth by ceremonies such as are given us of God; as the following words shew: Paucae igitur nobis divinitus datae sunt Ceremoniae. [Few, therefore, are the ceremonies given us by divine appointment.]
marginal note: Instit. l. 4, c. 10, sect. 14.
Answer: In the other place (says he) as if there were but one other alleged: whereas, besides this, there is a third, allowing historical pictures for remembrance and admonition, which the Replier knew not how to spell, and therefore skips over it. To this place he answereth not truly, in as much as Calvin professedly there speaks of significant ceremonies ordained by men. For, having showed how the church is now freed from the cumber of ceremonies used under the law, he objects, Ergone inquies, &c. [Will you then say…] Thou wilt say [p. 390] say, shall therefore no ceremonies be yielded to the ruder sort, to help their weakness? to which he answers, id ego non nego [this I do not deny], I doe not say so, for I hold this kind of help to be very profitable for them; only I here I show that such a mean be used as may set out Christ, and not obscure him: therefore were a few, (and those, easy) ceremonies given us of God, whereby he might demonstrate Christ present; more were given to the Jews, that they might be images of him absent; absent, I say, not in virtue, but in the manner of signification. Wherefore it is necessary to retain that fewness in number, easiness of observation, dignity of signification, which also may consist with clearness. This is not to have been done, it needs not to be said: for the thing is manifest to all men’s eyes. This sentence of Master Calvin will not easily be bailed out with the Replier’s answer; for the mention of our Lord’s own ceremonies, is there made only to shew, that we likewise should in our ceremonies keep us to a few, easy, useful, and manifest ceremonies; and not riot in their number, or have them dark, some, or fruitless, as in popery they are.
Replier: What indeed he (Calvin) thought was to be given to the rude people in this kind, he showed sufficiently, not only by his words formerly cited, but also by his practice in that he banished such ceremonies utterly, not only out of Geneva, but also out of all churches which hearkened unto his counsel.
Answer: What he allowed in his judgement, appeareth in the places cited. What he, in his practice, did in that place of Geneva, or (by advice) in others, crosseth not this judgement: nor was meant as a law to other churches, which should find reason to use more of their liberty in ceremonies, then he thought agreeable to those places. The next is Chemnitius: for the Replier thought not Luther worth looking at.
Replier: Chemnitius in regard that some ceremonies were in use where he lived, handleth them so gently as he can: and speaketh too favorably of images: yet in other places the truth wresteth from him, and Brentius also, a right confession, as hath been alleged before.
Answer: [p. 391] Answer: Chemnitius, you meant, had an ill conscience, and spake in his teeth, and out of a corrupt judgement touching the lawful use of some images. And when he, and Brentius, speak rightly (as you think) of ceremonies, it was nothing but the power of truth wrested that from them. Thus you care not whom you deface, so your own cause may be painted. But Chemnitius delivers his judgement clearly, without respect to his country, according to his heart, in opposition to popery. So did Brentius. Nor doe they vary from the same, when they speak against mystical ceremonies, devised to shadow out the Gospel; but only out of their general rules, make exceptions, which you unreasonably call contradictions: See before what hath been of both parts alleged, and judge.
Replier: Zepper meaneth only that the simple having of images in churches is not such an impiety as doth unchurch a people.
Answer: Zepper (poor man) could not express his own meaning; for, he saith that images may be in churches without impiety; by which (says the Replier) he meaneth, without such impiety as shall unchurch a people. Is this well? What will not a man doe to save his life?
Replier: Junius and Chemnitius in the last place, doe but give a difference betwixt the fathers and papists’ use of some things. Here is nothing directly against our assertion.
Answer: Junius doth expressly allow of the festival days of Christ’s nativity and resurrection, as symbolical signs, and ceremonies. Chemnitius doth not only shew a difference betwixt fathers and papists’ use of exsufflation, and some other ceremonies used in baptism; but, shews this to be the difference: that whereas the papists make them significative and operative, the fathers intended, and used them as significative only, which use he allowes. And yet (says this Replier) here is nothing against our assertion,
Replier: But of all these witnesses did speak as the Defendant would have them in these places mentioned, what were that to the cloud of testimonies, which are brought forth in the Abridgement, and unanswered yet by the Defendant?
Answer: A cloud of dumb witnesses on the negative, are not so good as four or five clear speaking witnesses on the affirmative. The Abridgement brought forth nothing but names; the Defendant, the words of men, of which enough hath been said before. [p. 392]
Replier: His own mouth will testify that our divines are generally on our side.
Answer: What, when he saith, that of all that he had read, he found none, except perhaps Beza, to condemn all significant human ceremonies? Nay then take all.
Replier: For in that regard (if he speak with good reason) he calleth them still our own witnesses.
Answer: Why? Hath he not reason to call them your witnesses, ironice [ironically], when you brag of them, and yet they speak against you?
Replier: Our own they are not, because we allege them only; for so both fathers, and Papists, and Conformists also are alleged by us; but because they speak plainly for us, which appeareth also the more by his silence at the most part of their speeches.
Answer: Indeed you allege them all (so) that is, you corrupt, pervert, or mistake one and other sort of authors so, as I think never any did before you: but these you call our divines, and our witnesses; as if you had ingrossed them; and when it comes to, they witness against you, and were therefore called yours in derision, by the Defendant, as his confutation of you even out of them, doth witness. He hath not been simply silent to any one; but, clearing his answer to some, hath given it generally to all the rest, nor have you reproved him by any one instance; and yet you boast.
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Sect. 31
The fourth kind of proof is (as from the confession of witnesses, so) from the practice of the Non-conformists themselves. The first instance whereof is their laying the hand upon a book and kissing it in taking an oath.
Defendant in sum: After long sailing in the main sea of dispute, the Defendant professeth to direct his course homeward to the narrow seas of the Non-conformists themselves, by instancing in such particular ceremonies wherein the Non-conformists themselves are ordinary actors, or else, their witnesses are approvers of some symbolical ceremonies, and namely in laying hand upon, and kissing of the book in taking an oath wherein the ceremony is appropriated to a special act of religious worship, an oath, Dt. 6:13, and is a sign of moral signification, namely of our faith to God and man, and is of human institution. The lawfulness whereof may be confirmed by that of Abraham’s servant handled, Sect. 9.
Replier: After much sailing in the main sea the Defendant directeth his course (as he saith) homeward to the narrow seas by instancing in the course of Non-conformists themselves. His comparison is good; for as the Scriptures were too deep for him to fasten any anchor of a conforming argument in: so the practices of weak men are so full of sands and shelves, that here he can have no sure ride: the sea of Rome termed by one of our prelates, mare Romanum [the Roman sea], is the best harbor of all the world for the compasses to arrive and rest in.
Answer: All that is but gamboling, and so let it goe, speak to the matter.
Replier: The first example brought, is the form of an oath, which is taken on a book. To which I answer, first, that if this form of swearing can be proved to be of the same nature with the cross in baptism, &c. We will rather abandon this form to avoid the cross, then admit of the cross for love of this.
Answer: Like enough, that you will doe anything, rather then give over the bucklers. But why have you not hitherto quarreled this form of an oath, as well as the cross in baptism, seeing they are both of human invention, significant, and annexed to acts of divine worship? Doth not your practice in that confute your opinion in this?
Replier: 2. I affirm that it were much better that this form (invented by Papists, and abused not only by them, but by many among ourselves) were abolished, as it is in other countries not popish, then retained.
Answer: Indeed you affirm it, but you prove it weakly. For, that the Papists did invent it, or that it is by many among us abused, must first be proved, before you can prove your assertion by it. And if an other form were better, and much less to be therefore ill, because it is significant: for which, if this form be ill, then all forms used by other churches must be ill, because they all are significant, if of nothing else, yet of consent (by your own allowance;) and the lifting up of the hand, was a sign, and is, of their appeal to God on high.
Replier: Master William Thorp, a martyr, or confessor in King Henry the fourth his days, refused to swear upon a book, alleging Chrysostome for the same opinion.
marginal note: Master Fox.
Answer: M. William Thorp, confessor, (not martyr) did maintain, that to swear so upon a book, as to swear by it, was unlawful, because a book is made of sundry creatures; and to prove it unlawful to swear by a creature, allegeth Chrysostome. But that he refused to swear by God, laying his hand upon a book, in token of his assent to that book of God, and truth of that oath, as he looks for any comfort of the contents of that book, he saith not, meant not, as his story sheweth. The Replier therefore mocks
marginal note: Fox, pag. 538b, compared with pag. 529b. [p. 395] mocks his reader with ambiguity of words.
Replier: 3. This form if it be worship, seemeth to be essential and necessary worship, not accidental. For no man is esteemed to have taken his corporal oath, (as Linwood saith) but he that sweareth upon a book.
Answer: Who said, that this form of swearing, is worship? Verily, not the Defendant, but this Replier makes work for himself. Yet, if it had been called worship, relatively, as a ceremony pertaining to worship, must it therefore be essential worship? Yes, for Linwood saith, A man is not esteemed to take a corporal oath without it. Is not esteemed to take his corporal oath, Ergo, this is essential to an oath: instead of, Ergo, this is essential to the formality of an oath, according to common estimation. What sophistication is this?
Replier: 4. It is not our practice to make any more of touching the book, then of lifting up of the hand, which is used in other countries, (that is) to make it a sign of assent unto that which is required of us. So that I, for my part, would not find fault with those which sometimes hold out a service-book, or any other to touch and kiss; for it is all one, whether we shew our assent one way, or another, so it be shown in a decent manner.
Answer: Lifting up of the hand in swearing, is not only a sign of assent, but of appeal to him that dwelleth in the heavens, as witness of the truth of our hearts; which is as much a significant ceremony, as touching, or kissing the book of God, and therefore are they indifferent one or other. But that any book should be as fit as God’s book; or as our service-book (which for the greatest part, is the very letter of the word, according to the translation then in use when it was first composed,) for this solemnity of an oath, is inconsiderately spoken. For it were too much against decency to lay the hand on a mass-book, Aesop’s fables, or the like.
Replier: 5. This form is not used in the special solemn worship of God, but in a civil assembly, where occasionally God is called upon for confirmation of the truth. And indeed as the [p. 396] Replier: the Defendant speaketh well, an oath is rather a cognizance or note of supreme worship, then proper and direct worship.
Answer: First, what though this form be used in civil assemblies; is it not therefore annexed to an act of religious worship? Is nothing worship, that is used in civil assemblies? How came the Jewish washings before meat to be false worship? Or is our saying of grace at meals, no worship, because it is at meals? Secondly, that an oath is an act of religious worship, whereby (as Augustine speaks) Jus veritatis Deo redditur [the right of truth is rendered to God], the Scriptures teach, and the fathers, schoolmen and all divines doe witness. Nor did the Defendant say, that it is rather a cognizance of worship, than worship, but that it is a part, or at least a cognizance of supreme worship. So that the Replier falsifies his words, and then commends them: which is to commend himself, and reprove the Defendant.
marginal note: Dt. 6:13. Vide [see] Tho. 2.2, q. 89, 4, and the schoolmen on him.
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Sect. 32
Defendant: The second instance is, the observation of the Lord’s day, with and in remembrance of Christ’s resurrection, and as an allegorical sign of our eternal rest in heaven; which is, in that respect, a symbolical ceremony, and not of divine institution; appropriated to religious worship, and lawful to be so observed: that is, with memory and meditation of Christ’s resurrection, and of our eternal rest to come, which use, he parallels with that which Zanchius alloweth to be made of our temples, saying, that they are types and shadows of the heavenly temple, where the angels, and spirits of the faithful, gathered together, praise God, as we doe in those earthly temples, and that these earthly things ought to lift up our minds to heavenly, and this use (says Zanchie) is not to be despised. Finally he adds, that many of themselves observe the ceremonial festivals of Easter and Pentecost willingly, &c. which
marginal note: In Sum. Zanch. de Redemp., lib. 1, tract. de tempt., Col. 203.
are significant human ceremonies annexed to divine worship.
Replier: The next instance is the observation of the Lord’s day; which the Defendant would never have brought in as an example of an human ceremony, if he had not either been seasick, or else sleepy with his long saying, which he spake of in the former section. For he taketh it for granted, that we hold the Lord’s day to be an institution of man, which we utterly deny. We hold, as Junius answereth Bellarmine about this matter, De Cultu Sanct., lib. 3, cap. 10, an. 33, cap. 11, an. 3: it is the divine institution of Christ himself.
Answer: The Defendant doth not give instance of the Lord’s day for the observation thereof, in place of the Jews’ Sabbath, as if it were of a human institution: but only in respect of those analogical, or (as Junius calls them) allegorical instructions, which in the observation of that day, were, are, or may be lawfully railed from that day. And these uses are of human institution, and not of divine, and so Junius in the same place, Cap. 11, an. 4, doth account them, saying, In medio reliquimus [We have left it undetermined]. So that the Defendant was neither seasick nor sleepy, as the Replier speaks. But the Replier rather fell into travail of a scurrilous jest, and could not well heed what the Defendant said: or if he did understand him, yet thought it an easier thing to return a scoff, ad faciendum populum [to please the crowd], then a solid answer to satisfy the judicious.
Replier: By the way here he bringeth in a testimony of Zanchius, calling our temples types and shadows of the celestial temple. But Zanchie’s meaning was not to make them destinated instituted types; but only such things as by accommodation may serve fitly to put us in mind of such a matter: even as any arbitrary similitude that is fit, may be called a type and shadow.
Answer: Zanchius there, gives five reasons to prove the lawful and profitable use of temples for God’s public worship, whereof the first and last is Because these our temples are types and shadows of the heavenly temple, &c. As Solomon’s temple, or the tabernacle were of Christ’s body, and this use (says he) is not to be despised: and so concludes, quare visitia sunt
marginal note: Zanch. de Red., lib. 1, cap. 19, sic. 9, pa. 641, Edit. 1597, in Fol. [p. 398] sunt [therefore they are useful], wherefore they (that is, temples) are profitable. All this the Replier thinks to wash off with his distinction of destinated institution, and accommodation; as if these two did oppose one another. But when Zanchie makes this to be one reason of the profitable use of temples, who sees not that he means to approve that use as one determinate end of temples, that they might by a kind of resemblance raise our minds to remember that heavenly temple? And yet if it be lawful, by accommodation, to put men in mind of heavenly, by earthly things, as the Replier intimates; how can it be unlawful to determine or institute things fit to that use? So that even his own grant confutes him.
Replier: I would the Defendant would read the very next thesis of Zanchie to that he quoteth, there he should see, that images, though they be not for the present worshipped, yet ought to be removed out of churches, because they hinder the worship of God. If images, then (by the Defendant’s own former grant) mystical ceremonies of man’s invention: and so mystical churches too.
Answer: No doubt the Defendant hath read it, and if the Replier had set down the words of Zanchie, his reader would easily have perceived both the mind of Zanchie, & the Replier’s trifling. For Zanchie saith, Furthermore all images should be absent from temples, especially which have usually been worshipped, or easily might be worshipped. For such things doe not become Christian temples, which God in his law condemneth, because they not only profit nothing, to that end for which temples are instituted (namely to the worship of God) but are extremely against it. The Replier’s collection, that if images (which have, or may easily be worshipped) then ought mystical ceremonies and mystical churches to be removed also, crosseth Zanchius, and all our divines: as much as the Defendant: and is an argument without consequence, because God hath forbidden the one in respect of the imminent peril, but not so the other. Nor is the reason of both alike. When he would fasten his collection upon the Defendant’s former grant, he is therein injurious. For though one may argue (as the Defendant hath done) That if historical [p. 399] call pictures in private use be lawful, then some significant monitory signs much more; yet it will not follow, that if images in public places of worship be not lawful, therefore not mystical ceremonies, nor mystical churches. For the hurt of images is not because they are significant, but because in such places, by the common weakness of men, they are dangerous corrupters of religion. His eyes therefore were not marches in making these alike.
Memorandum, this, that which in this section, was objected for the observation of the feasts of Easter and Whitsuntide, which are significant ceremonies, the wary Replier passeth over with silence, as not knowing what to answer. For if he shall condemn those, all the churches of God will condemn him: if he yield them lawful, it will be impossible to condemn all significant human ceremonies. I commend his wit.
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Sect. 33
Defendant: In the last place proof of the lawfulness of significant ceremonies from reason is promised, Section 33. In which is said, that our ceremonies are, by the Book of Common Prayer, affirmed to be significant, which is even therefore taxed by the opponents, saying,
marginal note: In Sum. This section is passed over by the Replier and the intention of it here by the Answerer, I only to shew the reader the sum of it, albeit the Replier left it without reply to it.
Opponents: The Communion Book saith of these ceremonies, they are neither dark nor dumb, but significant: which is unlawful.
Defendant: To this the Replier answers nothing. It seems no argument to him, that the authors of that book (though learned and holy men) thought our ceremonies the better for being significant, for which these men deem them the worse: yea, and even therefore unlawful. Is it nothing to be thus cross and contrary to such men?
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Sect. 34
Defendant in sum: In this last section a reason is given from the nature of a ceremony properly so called, which must even therefore be some way significant, if it be properly a ceremony: so as, to imagine a ceremony without all signification, is as to imagine a day without light, fire without heat; of which the intention is. If any human ceremonies at all be lawfully instituted, then significant ceremonies. For this reason M. Calvin inveigheth against the popish ceremonies, saying, Is not this fault worthy our inveighing against? They make a pompous show of ceremonies that are not understood, as if it were some stage-like dumb show, or else some magical incantation; for some ceremonies in popery are separated from doctrine, that they may hold the people with signs void of all signification.
marginal note: Calv. Instit., lib. 4, cap. 10, sect. 15.
The same exception (says he) doth Peter Martyr take against some Romish ceremonies, even because their significations are often unknown not only to the beholders, but to the actors themselves, &c. Among which sort of dumb rites, he instanceth in the priest’s muttering of the words of consecration in secret; which as a dumb show crept into the church, is even therefore condemned, and justly by Doctor Reynolds.
marginal note: L. 4, com. class. 2, cap. 4, p. 198.
He therefore concludes, that all these considerations, proofs and examples drawn from the religious persons of the Old Testament, both before, and under the law; from the Apostles in the New; from the universal practice of all churches that are within the horizon of the church’s records, from the testimonies of their own witnesses, and from the practice of the Non-conformists themselves; and lastly, from the necessary consequence of reason, may sufficiently free our ceremonies from any guilt (as they term it) of superstition, as though they were therefore superstitious, even because they are significant
marginal note: Raynolds, Conf., p. 499. [p. 401] Replier: In this last section some reason is promised for a final confutation of the Non-conformists in this point; but I for my part can see none.
Answer: It is then because he will not see: for if all ceremonies properly so called must some way be significant, then either all ceremonies are unlawful, or some significant ceremonies are lawful. The Replier saw the proposition, but could not see the reason: that is, the trees kept him from seeing the wood.
Replier: Nothing (says he) is properly called a ceremony if it be altogether destitute of signification. Then (say I) away, and out of the church with all ceremonies properly so called of man’s invention.
Answer: Say you so? What? Even away with sitting at the communion in token of rest, which your progenitors throw for in their admonition, and your late champions still doe, as fitter to signify our co-heirship with Christ? And away with our communion table too, as fitter then an altar to signify our spiritual feasting better? Methinks it were better to put off their fancies, then to turn out all significant ceremonies. But they will not agree.
marginal note: Admonition to the Parliament, & Treatise against Kneeling, & Altare Damascenum.
Replier: But why hath he gone about to deceive us so often before, by confounding circumstances of order, and decency with other ceremonies, and now in the winding up of all, confesseth that they cannot be properly called ceremonies? Surely there is no reason in this kind of dealing but only that which they call sophistry.
Answer: The Defendant hath not gone about to deceive you by confounding circumstances of order, and decency, with ceremonies. For what are all ceremonies but circumstances which belong to the time, place, person, instruments, or manner of actions sacred, or civil; and are not of the substance of the action itself? And the Defendant hath said truly that, every ceremony quatalis [as such], is some way significant. He saith not, symbolically; which is but one way; but, some way significant. Doctor Ames telleth us, that a sign in general is as large as a logical argument. Can you designe a time, or place, or any order or thing which
marginal note: Part 1, Medul. Theol., de fide, p. 36, thes. 2. [p. 402] which shall no way signify what is to be done, or where, or when, or why, or how? Now if all lawful ceremonies must signify some way or other, then it is not signification of ceremonies which alone can make them unlawful. And this I hope is no sophistry.
marginal note: 2 parte, diss. 17, thes. 19.
Replier: Calvin (says the Defendant) and some other, doe accuse the popish ceremonies because they are dumb, I answer, they accuse them also for speaking, as the Scripture doth condemn images both for being dumb, and for teaching lies.
Answer: Well said; when the ceremonies are altogether dumb, they condemn them for not speaking; when they speak idly, or falsely, they condemn them for speaking amiss. But you condemn them simply for not being dumb; do not they?
Replier: So that lay altogether which the divines say, and you shall find, that in their judgement, human ceremonies in God’s worship are like a fool in a place of honour, who whether he speaketh, or holdeth his peace, still sheweth himself unworthy of that place.
Answer: The reader, if he will lay the sayings of our divines together, shall find that they allow, as lawful and profitable helps unto men, some human significant ceremonies, though they condemn all such as either speak not, or not sensibly, or speak idly, or too much, or falsely; whose judgement, whether it be well put off, with this jest of a fool in a place of honour, &c. Let the reader judge.
.
.
THE FOURTH GENERAL ARGUMENT URGED
by the Non-Conformists against the foresaid Ceremonies, is taken from a pretence that they have been abused to Popish superstition. [p. 403]
.
Sect. 1
Their Argument.
Opponents: O ceremonies which have been notoriously known to have been of old, and still to be abused to idolatry and superstition, (especially if there be now (a) no use of them in God’s church) can be lawful, but must be abolished, whether they have been the ceremonies of pagans, Jews, or heretics.
marginal note: Abridg. Line. pag. 17. M. Hutch. M. Hy. and the rest. (a) Necessary.
Opponents: But these ceremonies have been idolatrously polluted by Papists, namely, the surplice, cross in baptism, and the gesture of kneeling at the sacrament.
Opponents: Ergo, they ought to be removed and abolished.
Defendant: If you require that ceremonies so abused be abolished (as if there were no other cure for such sores, but only abscission and cutting off the members by the joints) then we deny your major: (b) but if you understand such things, as in their own nature are not ill, but indifferent; (c) or, by excepting things necessary, you mean (d) an absolute, and not a convenient necessity, we deny your assumption. (marginal note: (b) Put out “but.” (c) Read “But if.” (d) Read, not “an absolute,” but “a convenient.”) [p. 404] And now that you see your marks, look to your aim; and first prove (if you can) your proposition; then afterwards, your assumption: for otherwise you can conclude against our ceremonies, just nothing at all.
Replier: This argument in the Abridgement, p. 17, standeth thus: It is contrary to God’s word to use, (much more to command the use of) such ceremonies in the worship of God, as man hath devised if they be notoriously known to have been of old, and still to be abused unto idolatry and superstition by the Papists, especially if the same be now of no necessary use in the church: but our ceremonies are such; Ergo.
Answer: Thus indeed it standeth in the Abridgement, but thus it stands not in the Defendant’s books, though for substance it be the same. Why then doth the Replier alter the terms in which the Defendant set down this objection? Is it not to persuade his reader that the Defendant hath misreported the Abridger’s argument, or not answered punctually thereto? And is this fair dealing? The Defendant, by his marginal note, hath shewed that he took this argument partly from the Abridgement pag. 17, and from others there named: wherefore the Defendant hath not wronged the Abridgement, but the Replier him, in altering the form of the objection which he set down, and in concealing it from his reader. But hear his reply to the Defendant’s answer.
Replier: The Defendant’s answer is very brief?
Answer: The better for that; if withal it be sufficient.
Replier: He dares not absolutely deny either part of the argument.
Answer: He denies both, with limitation; as was fit, where the terms are ambiguous. This prayeth him.
Replier: He could not find a fit distinction whereupon to grant a conditional denial with reason: he contents himself therefore to make a shew of distinguishing after an unreasonable manner.
Answer: [p. 405] Answer: An accusation not proved, reproves the accuser. Let us try this accusation.
Replier: For he doth not distinguish of any one term found in the argument: nor maketh the parts of his supposed distinction, such as will bear any logical sense. If (says he) you require such ceremonies to be abolished, then we deny your major: but if you understand indifferent things, or mean an absolute, not a convenient necessity, we deny your assumption. If this, and but if that. This form of speech, (as indeed, every distinction,) implieth some dissention and segregation in the parts distinguished. But here is no shew of any such thing betwixt abolishing and indifferent, or absolute necessity. I know not what to make of such a confused distinction. It is, as if one should say, if you require an establishing of the ceremonies, I deny one thing; but if you understand convenient ceremonies, I deny another thing. Such kind of speaking is nothing else but nonsense, or, as some use to call it, a very bull. Let this general answer therefore pass: though be it, that in it we may see our marks and take our aim.
Answer: In the objection, as the Defendant propounded it, are three terms; two in the argument, viz. abuse, and abolished: a third in their exception, viz. necessary use.
1. To abolish is either utterly to take away the thing from all use, or only to cleanse it from abuse, as the Latin term of abolish [aboleo] (from whence our English “to abolish” is derived) is used, though mostly for utter defacing, yet sometimes for ablution only, as in that of Virgil, nec viscera quisquam / Aut undis abolere potest aut vincere flamma: [nor can anyone cleanse the entrails either with water or overcome them with flame.] Where the poet saith of the inwards of sheep dead of the rot, that they could neither be abolished by water, nor subdued by fire; that is, neither made clean, nor boiled. Thus in the law, uncleanness of polluted vessels was diversely abolished; that of the pollute earthen vessel, by breaking it; that of the brazen, by scouring and rinsing it only.
marginal note: Lev. 6:28. Of the terms of abused.
2. Human ceremonies abused to superstition, are either such [p. 406] such as in themselves are evil, as is (says Calvin) any image of the Godhead made by man: or evil only by abuse, but in nature indifferent; as is the surplice, says Master Beza.
marginal note: Epist. 8.
3. Necessity is either absolute, or in a sort, that is, commodious or convenient, as all men know. Upon these distinctions the Defendant grounds his answer; and tells them, that if they require abolition by abscission, and not by cure, he denies their proposition, it withal, they mean it of things not ill in nature, but indifferent. But it, in their exception of things necessary, they mean not an absolute, but even a convenient necessity, he denies their assumption, which saith, that our ceremonies are of no necessary use in the church. And this, I hope, is a reasonable answer, though that which the Replier suggesteth instead of it, be indeed void of sense.
marginal note: 3. Of the terms of Necessary use.
The distinction of abolishing is so cleared by the similitudes of abscission, and curing a diseased member, that I marvel how the Replier could not discern it. The other (to doe the Replier right) are so obscured by misplacing two particles, (but) and (not,) or by omitting one of them where it should be, (which fault is now corrected on the margin) as therein the Replier may be excused for not conceiving the Defendant’s mind. Yet me thinks he should rather have thought that the transcriber, or printer, had made some fault, then that such a man as the Defendant, famous for his learned writings, for which the whole church of God oweth him thanks, should write non-sense: at least he ought to have spared his scoiling (which addes neither strength to his cause, nor reputation to himself) and have truly set down the Defendant’s answer, as it was, which he hath not done.
.
Sect. 2
Their proofs are from examples of the abolishing of ceremonies, that have been either Heathenishly, Jewishly, or Heretically abused. And first concerning Heathenish Ceremonies, by divers instances in Scripture.
Opponents: This may appear by God’s word forbidding all provocations unto spiritual fornication, and commanding us to separate ourselves from idolaters, and to be as unlike them as may be, especially in their religious observations, and ceremonies, and instruments of idolatry, that so we may shew our utmost detestation of them; and to cast out the very memory of them, and to cast away even such things as had a good original (if they be not still necessary and commanded of God) when once they are known to be defiled by idolatry, or abused by it: according as (for example sake) God commandeth, Lev. 18. Not to be like the heathen, &c. And Lev. 19:28, &c.
marginal note: Abridg. Line, pag. 17.
Defendant: In these places of Scripture are forbidden three kinds of things which were in use among the heathen: the first was, the sin of incest; the second, the fashion of rounding their heads, and cutting their flesh for the dead; the third, their sowing of their grounds with divers seeds, and letting their beasts of divers kinds to engender together. Now, we know that incest was forbidden, as being a sin against the moral law of God: and rounding of the head, and cutting of the flesh for the dead, was prohibited, as being against the law of grace, and for that it did demonstrate inordinate sorrow for the departed, as of men void of hope of the resurrection of bodies, or immortal- [p. 408] Defendant: of the souls of men. Lastly, the commixtion of divers kinds of seeds, and of divers kinds of beasts was forbidden, not for any natural viciousness in the things themselves, or in the use that the heathen had of them; but because, in the prohibiting of these kinds of mixtures, he propounded unto his people a type of abstinence from irreligious mixtures, as well corporal, as spiritual: that they should not dare to defile their bodies with bestiality; nor yet, by joining in marriage with people of divers religions, and that they should not pollute their souls by consenting unto the worship of any strange god.
See now your manifold fallacies, by labouring first, to conclude the unlawfulness of our ceremonies, which are things in their own nature indifferent, from the condemnation of an heathenish sin against nature. Secondly, to oppugne ceremonies ordained to a good end, to wit, the representation of Christian virtues, from the examples of a wicked custom, that plainly demonstrateth mere infidelity. Thirdly, by condemning ceremonies of godly signification, as namely, purity, constancy, humility, from the example of ceremonies that signify nothing, but either bodily, or else spiritual adultery, which is idolatry. Which kind of consequences are merely extravagant, wandering and gadding from the matters in question.
Replier: The Abridgement beginneth the proof of the proposition, thus: This may appear, first, by the second commandment, which forbids all provocations unto spiritual fornication, as the seventh doth unto that which is carnal. Secondly, by the commandment and direction God hath given us in his word. Thirdly, by equity and reason of these commandments. Now the Defendant though he professeth [p. 409] Replier: a full answer to all that is objected, yet he silently passeth over the first proof out of the second commandment wholly.
Answer: The Defendant professing a full answer to be given in his book, to all their objections made by the Abridgement, and others, doth not profess to follow the footing of the Abridgement; but contrarily, to have cast the objections which that book and other men made, into such a method, as best liked him. And therefore ought not to be blamed for not treading just in their steps. Yet can he not be said wholly to have passed over in silence their objection from the second commandment, seeing he gives it answer in another and fitter place, viz. Part 2, cap. 2, sect. 2, where, against the sign of the cross, it is produced.
marginal note: See the Preface.
But lest the reader require further answer to it here, let it now be answered; that as the seventh commandment doth not forbid the use of all such things as accidentally doe or may provoke some men to base uncleanness; but only such, as in, and of themselves are working incitements thereto: so neither doth the second commandment forbid the use of all such things, as the lust of some idolaters may turn to spiritual fornication; but only of such as have in themselves, an habitude or aptness to provoke thereto: and therefore it condemneth not our ceremonies in our use of them. The Replier runs on.
Replier: And in the second and third proof, whereabout forty places of Scripture are cited for confirmation of them, he doth not attempt to answer above eight or nine.
Answer: If the Replier had shewed of those forty places, so much as one, which may not be satisfied with the answer given to eight or nine of them, he had then indeed replied, and had deserved a further answer, which also by and by he shall have.
Replier: But let us examine his answer to these: Lev. 18:3, &c. Three kinds of things are forbidden; 1. Incest, 2. Rounding their heads, and cutting their flesh for the dead. 3. Sowing with divers seeds, and letting divers beasts ingender together. The first was a sin against [p. 410] Replier: against nature; the second was a wicked custom of infidelity; the third did signify adultery: in all which our ceremonies are innocent.
Answer: If the Replier had intended a just examination of the answer, he should have fully and justly reported it, which he hath not done, no not in the very substance of it. For, first he obscures the main scope of the whole; which is, not simply to shew that our ceremonies are in those respects innocent: but that those places of Lev. 18 and 19, doe not prove the abolishing of things indifferent in nature, merely for the abuse of them to idolatry and superstition, (which was the point to be proved:) because incest, and cutting the flesh for the dead, were forbidden as evil in themselves: and sowing with divers seeds in one field, was forbidden, neither for evil in it itself, or any ill use it had amongst the heathen, but for a typical document of that sincerity which God required in his people: and that therefore these places are unaptly cited to prove the abolishing of ceremonies, only for and in respect of their abuse, &c.
Secondly, the Replier suppressing the body of the Defendant’s answer, touching that third instance of sowing divers seeds, makes the Defendant’s answer to be this, that mixture of divers seeds did signify adultery; which if the Defendant had imagined he would never have said as he doth, that in the heathen’s use thereof there was no viciousness. The error is, first that what the Defendant speaks by way of supposition, saying of these mixtures, that they signified (that is, among the heathen) nothing, or else spiritual, or corporal adultery; the Replier delivers, as absolutely spoken: and secondly, what the Defendant only infers upon his answer first given, viz. that they had ill matched our ceremonies which signify good things with such mixtures as either signified nothing, or else adultery, this inference made upon the answer the Replier puts for the answer itself: which is not plain dealing. But reply to the answer.
Replier: He answereth here only to the places taken out of the eighteenth and nineteenth of Lev.
Answer: He doth so here in this section, but withal gives such [p. 411] such answer as may satisfy all the other places, which are cited together with these, to prove the same thing. What say you to his answer to those places cited out of Lev.?
Replier: Concerning which I reply, First, that in the first place the words are general, v. 3, 4, however therefore in the following verses they be applied to some sins, yet seeing in other places of Scripture the like application is made unto general ceremonies, they were therefore mentioned as the general ground, comprehending both kinds in it, and joined unto other places, condemning conformity with idolaters, even in matter of ceremonies. > > marginal note: Lev. 18:3,4.
Answer: General words must be restrained to the matter spoken of, otherwise one may prove the mass to be lawful by those general words of Saint Paul, All things are lawful. The words of this place are these, After the doings of the land of Egypt wherein you dwelt, shall you not doe; and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, you shall not doe, neither shall you walk in their ordinances. Ye shall doe my judgements, &c. If any man will take these words generally without any restriction, then must he say, that an Israelite might doe nothing at all, good or ill, civil or sacred, which the Egyptians or Canaanites did; for the words are general, After their doings you shall not doe. Wherefore, unless we will draw blood instead of milk out of this Scripture, we must acknowledge the words in their intention to be restrained, as Master Calvin well affirms them to be. And if they be restrained, who shall better tell us to what, then God himself, who by the instances of incest, and other abominations after named, shews us what mad doings of the Egyptians and Canaanites he there forbade his people to imitate? And what God himself spake against these abominations, have you not racked extremely to bring it to matter of ceremonies?
As for that you speak of like application, in other places made to ceremonies (such as we dispute of) you only say it, you cannot prove it. And if some other places did apply like general rules to ceremonies, yet seeing this doth not so, you are very bold with holy Scripture to make it seem to speak, what it never meant. Nor [p. 412] Nor can this place be well laid for a ground of your proofs, being too narrow in the foot to bear your collection. Where you add that it is joined (that is, in the Abridgement) to other places of Scripture condemning conformity with idolaters, even in matter of ceremonies, you doe seem to confess, that of itself it will doe you no service. Now whether all, or any of the other places to which these of Lev. were joined in the Abridgement doe condemn all outward conformity with idolaters in matter of mere ceremony, let us try. For thereby also will appear, whether the Defendant’s answer given to the places of Lev. be not sufficiently satisfactory to all the rest.
The first place cited next after those of Lev. is Exod. 23:24. Thou shalt not bow down to their gods, nor serve them, nor doe after their works: but thou shalt utterly destroy them, and break down their images. The first words forbid idolatry in plain terms. The middle condemn also their superstitions, Omnes vitiosos cultus [all corrupt worship], saith Calvin. The last clause, But, &c. shews us of what kind of works the Lord spake in this place, that is, such as concerned their false gods, or false manner of worship, as namely by images. Wherefore this text speaking of gross idolatry and superstition, is as untowardly cited against conformity in mere ceremonies, as were those of incest, and cutting the flesh for the dead, out of Lev. And therefore may be satisfied with the Defendant’s answer to those places of Lev.
marginal note: Abridg. Line, Edit. 2, p. 22. Calvin, Com. in Ex. 23:24.
Yea out of this very place laid to some others, it may well be proved, that outward conformity with idolaters in some human ceremonies is lawful. For, bowing the body in token of reverence is a ceremony, whether civilly or religiously used. This gesture either the wits or custom of men found out. And God himself did never institute it in the law, no not in the act of prayer; for then it had been unlawful to pray in other posture.
marginal note: See Calv., Instit., lib. 4, c. 10/30.
This ceremony, idolaters abused notoriously to idolatry, witness this text, Thou shalt not bow down to their gods. And yet this very gesture of bowing (whether the head, trunk of the body, or knees) the Holy Ghost approves as lawful, [p. 413] lawful, and adviseth as comely in God’s worship saying; Let us worship, &c., Ps. 95:6, wherefore this text will rather speak for us, then for them.
Their second place is, Dt. 14:1, forbidding cutting of the flesh for the dead, &c., as doth that of Lev. 19:19. And therefore is answered in the answer to the other viz. that this was in itself a wicked custom, not a ceremony misused.
The third place is Dt. 12:4. Thou shalt not doe so to the Lord thy God. Of which I say, that these words may not be so taken, as if God utterly condemned in his worship, all kind of things which the heathens did, in their superstitions; for then must follow that neither house, nor altar, nor bowing down, nor a set place for sacred use, nor ought else was lawful, if the same or the like had been used to idolatry by the nations here spoken of. We must therefore enquire what it is, of which the Lord saith, Ye shall not doe so to me.
A notable and learned Inconformitant, Master Ainsworth, understands it thus, Thou shalt not doe so, in any of the former particulars, viz. (such as are mentioned, ver. 2,3,) or such like: as * not to destroy or doe evil to God’s sanctuary, or synagogues, Ps. 74:3,6,7,8, nor to break down his altars, 1 Kgs. 19:10, &c. If this be the meaning, as it seemeth to him, then will not this text serve their turn by any means.
marginal note: * Ainsw., Annot. in Dt. 12:4.
Otherwise, Thou shalt not doe so, may refer to the doings of the Canaanites mentioned, v. 2, thus; Thou shalt not fondly, or superstitiously choose out mountains, hills, or groves, as places fitter for God’s worship, as did the heathen, who carnally imagined that such places as men specially admired or affected, would also specially please the Godhead. And indeed some understand the place thus. But if this be the meaning, then, seeing not simply the choice or use of an hill or mountain for God’s worship, but the superstitious reason of the choice, is here condemned: this place makes against them. For it is manifest, that the Jews did lawfully place the tabernacle on a hill in Gibeon, (which is called a great high place; high, for the situation; great, because of the
marginal note: 1 Kgs. 3:4. [p. 414] the tabernacle: and they placed the ark in the house of Aminadab on the hill: and that they built their synagogues always on the hill, or higher ground of their cities, and so their schools of the prophets; and the holy man Samuel calls one of these hills, God’s hill: and the Psalmist calls these synagogues, the houses of God. Yea and our blessed Lord went up to a mountain to pray, which may assure us that God here condemns not material conformity with idolaters, in that ceremony or circumstance of the place of worship, but formal conformity in the superstitious reason of such choice or use of a place.
marginal note: 1 Sam. 7:1. 1 Sam. 10:5. Ps. 74:8.
The reason why the Jews seated their synagogues on hills, was respect of comeliness, or to express their hill-like esteem of God, and his worship, and not as if God were better pleased with service on an hill. And for this cause they forbad any man to build his own house higher then the synagogue of that city. Wherefore this place so understood, condemning only a superstitious opinion, or usage, may be satisfied with the answer given about cutting the flesh: and further, is directly against them, by retortion.
marginal note: Answ. Annot.
Or thirdly, Thou shalt not doe so to the Lord thy God: means, thou shalt not worship him with variety, or multiplicity of temples, and altars for sacrifice to him as did the nations, who set up their idolies, and altars on every high mountain, and hill, and under every green tree: But thou shalt hold thee to that one only place (for matter of sacrifice) which I shall set out. And that this is the meaning, the whole text to v. 16, may assure us. To this purpose Master Calvin interprets it. Can a man infer that God here condemns all conformity with idolaters in a ceremony otherwise indifferent, only because, it hath been abused? Verily, no. For first, if we respect multiplicity of temples and altars as it was used with the heathen, as it were to bring God nearer to them: it is so repugnant to the divine nature, which is a God a far off, as well as near, as it must be judged an idolatrous superstition, and so forbidden.
marginal note: Jer. 23:23.
If we consider variety of places simply, as serving oportunely [p. 415] tunely to us, for worshipping, God forbids not that here: for he approved of their synagogues (a) in every city, which were for divine worship.
marginal note: (a) Acts 15:21.
But, in opposition to heathenish misconceits of the Godhead, and to distinguish his own people from all others; but chiefly to contain them in unity of faith and love; and lastly to figure out that one temple in which the Godhead dwelt bodily, and that one society of the elect, the church, which is the house of the living God; the Lord ordained one sanctuary, and one altar for burnt offerings, not because the superstitious abuse of several places among the heathen had made it unlawful to sacrifice to God in sundry places, which his own people lawfully did in the wilderness, and after in Canaan, until that one place was designed of God, in David’s time. Therefore the Defendant’s answer to the third instance of sowing divers seeds may serve (mutatis mutandis [with the necessary changes]) to this place, viz. that not unlawfulness or abuse of the thing, but another reason produced this law.
The fourth place cited, is Dt. 30:32. This place may well prove the negligence of the opponents or of the printer, but not their proposition. For, in that chapter, are but twenty verses, and this place is, v. 32. Nor is there any verse among those 20, which looks this way. Wherefore the Defendant’s not answering to this place is a fit answer, because this place is no place.
The fifth place is, 2 Cor. 6:14,18. The fourteenth verse condemns unequal yoking of believers with infidels, whether in familiar society, as some; or rather in marriage, as others take it. But were these forbidden for that they had been abused to idolatry, and were otherwise lawful; or rather, for other reasons? First for the inequality of such yoking: and secondly for the unavoidable peril of contagion. And was this a matter of mere ceremony, that this text should prove against mere ceremonies? Perhaps they mean, that in a proportion there may be perill of like infection; but they will not say like perill of infection; or if they doe, who will believe that? The Defendant’s answer to the first and second instances will serve this. The 18th verse [p. 416] verse, is not for them in any shew. Perhaps they intend, v. 17, where (out of Isaiah) are alleged these words, Separate yourselves from among them, touch no unclean thing. These words I have heard objected, and urged vehemently against our ceremonies; and therefore suppose they meant to pitch on them, & not on the eighteenth verse. The words in Isaiah 52:15, are (as (b) Junius notes) a command to God’s people to sequester themselves from the pollutions of the world. The phrase of touching, is borrowed from the ceremonial law, where touching of the dead body, made the living (ceremonially) unclean. But when the prophet applies this to a spiritual sense, he means, that we should not only in practice forbear, but even in respect of liking, or any consent, abstain from the corruptions which are in the world through lust, as Saint Peter (c) speaketh. For, consent in spirituals, is like contactus (touching) in bodily matters, and draws infection and guiltiness to men. Wherefore this text forbidding only all partnership with men in uncleanness, may be satisfied with the Defendant’s answer to the first and second instance. But if they draw it to matter of indifferent ceremonies, of which we dispute, I demand, what is in them the unclean thing? Is it the thing itself? What can the abuse of men defile unto our use the very nature of things which God hath not made to us (d) unclean? How then saith Paul, the clean are all things are clean? How durst he allow men, not only to touch, but to eat of meats* offered before to idols, without scruple of conscience in that respect? But if they shall grant that the uncleanness is in the superstitious abuse of such things, then let them know, that he who useth the same thing without the same or other superstition, may be said to touch the thing, but not to touch the unclean thing; as he that touched Naaman cleansed from his leprosy, touched the same man, but not the same leper.
marginal note: Junius, Annot. in Isaiah 52:15. 2 Pet. 1:4. Acts 10:15. Titus 1:15. * 1 Cor. 10:23,27.
Their sixth and last place, is Rev. 18:4. And I heard another voice from heaven, saying, Come out of her my people, lest ye be partakers of her sins, and lest ye receive of her plagues. We are agreed, that by (her) in this verse, is meant the city [p. 417] city of Rome, called verse 1, and elsewhere in this book, Babylon; and that God’s people are warned of him, to come out of her. But there is, as a double being in Rome, bodily or spiritual: so, a double coming out; local, in removing from the city; mystical, in separating from the society and communion of that church. Some, (as Beza, M. Brightman, and others) interpret it of local departing out of the city, as Lot went out of Sodom: and the text seems to favor that interpretation: 1. Because the very outward destruction of the place is in that chapter menaced, and therefore the removing out of the very place in avoidance of the mischief coming upon it, forewarned. 2. Because God acknowledges these he speaks to, to be his own people; which may better agree to such, as dwelling in Babylon, doe abhor the filth thereof, then to such as not resident in the place, yet adhere to the pollutions of it. 3. It is said, Lest ye be partakers: which supposeth that they were not as yet partakers of her sins. This may be true of dwellers in the city, even where Satan hath his throne; but, of such as dwell in the communion of that church, not so: for even therein they are partakers of her sins. Now if we take the words literally, of going out of the city of Rome, lest they be either polluted in it, or destroyed with it; this text concerns not us, or any who are not locally in Rome. But if we shall take it in another meaning: namely, that separation from, dependence upon, or communion with the church of Rome is meant, I hope our brethren (who are of the same faith with us) will not deny that we, as themselves, are (blessed be God) come out of her: and sure I am, that Rome herself so accounteth of us.
If it be objected, that we yet hold some communion with her, because we use some of her defiled ceremonies; let them know, that they also themselves are yet so in her, who use the very same churches, church-yards, bells, & fonts which were in Rome as much defiled, as our ceremonies, or some of them: for which also they are as smartly taxed by those of the separation, as they tax us for these rites. Therefore either we may be innocent with them, or they [p. 418] must be guilty with us, of abiding still in Babylon.
Howbeit we will not excuse ourselves by recrimination, but exempt ourselves and them from this challenge by just apologie. For this text doth require no further coming out of Rome, then is requisite for the avoidance of partaking her sins; because so is the text, lest you be partakers of her sins; not, lest ye be partakers of her ceremonies.
The rites and ceremonies of Rome are not all of one suit. Some she hath that were hers in her virginity, in some sort; but, after her fornication, prostituted to abuse. Others be her own begotten as it were of her polluted body originally. Again, some of them are in themselves, and in the simplest use that may be of them, unlawful: as, images of the Godhead, half communion, and such like. Others be such as in themselves (sometimes) were lawfully used, and therefore be of indifferent nature: and such Master Brentius confesseth ours now in question to have been.
marginal note: Epist. 8.
Where the sin and ceremony are inseparably woven together, we are enjoined to separate from the use of the ceremony, because we cannot else decline the sin: and this is like the polluted earthen vessel, which the law (not for the baseness of the metal, as some conceive, but for the remedilesse taint thereof) commanded to be broken.
But where an accessory abuse only hath befallen a ceremony, which in itself might without such abuse, be lawfully used, and had been; there it sufficeth to avoid her sin, which lies only in the abuse: it is not required that we break the vessel, but only that we wash and sweeten it; as it was in the law concerning the wooden vessel: not because it was more precious then was the earthen, but more capable of sweetening. He that washed and used a wooden vessel, after the washing, was not partaker of the uncleanness which that vessel had before contracted. And how shall we after the purging of our ceremonies from the pollutions they had accessorily contracted in Rome, be still partakers of her sins?
Dare any man say, that the sinful use of any thing by man takes away that indifference which God hath as it were crea- [p. 419] created in it? Are the very things made unclean to the clean, contrary to Saint Paul, Titus 1? Doth not the offering of flesh to an idol pollute it, so as to debar us the use of the flesh, in respect of such defilement? And shall the superstitious use of a ceremony, in the service of the true God, make it utterly unlawful to us?
That some blessed churches have thought it a better, a more compendious, & a surer way to prevent such like abuse as had been, by forceasing all use of these ceremonies, is so their praise, that it is not our disparagement; nor did they take it so to be. For they and we propounded (as necessary) one end; which is, avoidance of her sins: only in the ways to that end, grew the difference, and the same which, upon consideration of all circumstances seemed, and perhaps was, respectively to some the better way, seemed not so, nor haply was so, to others. But they had both the grace to thank God, that one way or other, we all took the care to come so far out of Babylon, as not to partake her sins, whether we retained some of her abused ceremonies yea or no.
Now, these men who will needs urge abolishing of all her defiled ceremonies, by virtue of a text which only forecloses the partaking of her sins, have misapplied this text; as they did those, of incest, and cutting the flesh for the dead: and might have been satisfied with the Defendant’s answer to them. Thus having shown at large, that these other places doe not condemn all conformity with idolaters in matter of ceremonies, I desire that the Replier may proceed in his further reply to the answer made to those places of Leviticus, 19:19 & 27.
Replier: 2. The second and third were no more wicked, nor yet so much in any respect among the heathen, as our ceremonies have been among the Papists.
Answer: Suppose it even so: yet is this no reply, forasmuch as the former of these, which is cutting of the flesh for the dead, was not forbidden, as a thing abused; but, as an horrible abuse itself. The latter, of sowing divers seeds, was not forbidden at all, for that it was an abuse, or abused; but, for typical instruction: as was the linsey-woolsey garment forbid- [p. 420] den. But what infer you of this, that our ceremonies were so wicked in the popish abuse of them?
Replier: And therefore in these Master Calvin’s collection in Lev. 19:27 is found.
Answer: Yet this inference (and therefore,) is not found. For it is not the wickedness of our ceremonies in the popish abuse, that makes Calvin’s collection found. Perhaps he means, that that collection of Calvin is found and strong against our ceremonies as more wicked. Let us hear that collection.
Replier: God would have his people to know, that they could not have his favour, except they would in all points be unlike to such, and goe as far as they could from their fashions, and examples; especially in those rites wherein there was any shew of religion.
Answer: This is not Calvin’s collection; but, a piece of it cut off from the rest, being added would plainly show his intention: and, in this part, somewhat is altered for Calvin’s collection is this, Quanquam autem, &c. And although that thing (he speaks of rounding or cutting the hair for the dead) was in itself indifferent, yet God would not have it indifferent to his people (mark now why,) that they, as little children might learn by small rudiments, that they could not be acceptable to God, unless they should be utterly unlike to the alienated and uncircumcised: and specially, that they should eschew all those rites wherein religion was shewed. Thus Calvin. Now, not to press the Replier for the lighter faults, as omitting the mention of the uncircumcised: addition of the word fashions, and not observing how that latter clause is (by a colon) distinguished from the rest of the sentence, in all which there is some little advantage laid for: I only challenge him for suppressing that part of the sentence, which should enlighten all the rest: namely, those words in which Calvin shews, for what end God restrained the Jews from conformity with the Gentiles in a thing indifferent. For, whereas the Replier would have it conceived, that this fashion, or rite of mourning, was therefore forbidden to the Jews, because it had been used by
marginal note: Quanquam autem videbat per se medium, Deus tamen populo suo noluit liberum esse, ut tanquam pueris ex parvis rudimentis discerent, se non aliter Deo fore gratos, nisi exteris & profanis essent prorsus dissimiles, ac longissime essent ab earum exemplis: praesertim vero istis rebus quibus testata fuerat religio. [Although he saw that the thing was in itself indifferent, God nevertheless did not wish it to be free to his people, that, as with children, they might learn by small rudiments that they would not be pleasing to God otherwise than by being utterly unlike foreigners and the profane, and as far removed as possible from their examples: especially in those matters by which religion had been evidenced.] [p. 421] idolaters, and thereupon made unlawful to them; Calvin’s own words (omitted by the Replier) doe shew, that not that, but another reason was the cause of this restraint, namely, that the Jews, under that pedagogic of ceremonies, might spell out thereby another matter: and not, because the abuse had made the thing unlawful, which Calvin, in saying that it was in itself indifferent, implicitly denies.
They say, it was unlawful to the Jews, and therefore forbidden; Calvin says (in effect) it was forbidden upon a peculiar reason to the Jews, and thereby made unlawful, but yet otherwise indifferent even after the abuse. But yet (they will say) Calvin says, that the Jews must learn by this restraint how far off they must be from the idolatrous heathen, &c., if they would have God’s favour. And the like they suppose must be still said of us. What Calvin saith of the Jews is true: because God’s pleasure was to set up a partition wall betwixt them and all others, not only in religious observations, or things evil, or abused to evil; but even in things otherwise lawful, even in meats and apparel, Victu & vestitu [in food and clothing], for which difference sake, he made many things, which were morally lawful, to be, by positive determination unlawful, in the time of bondage, to the Jews; and this is the thing Master Calvin here speaks of. But if Calvin had meant, that the like restraint lies still upon the Christian churches, he would never have mentioned the childhood of the church, as then; or, the schooling of them by such poor rudiments; no, nor have said, that God meant that they (the Jews) should spell out this lesson, of their required distance, from the Gentiles: but have given rather a downright note upon the place, that hereby we may see, that no conformity with idolaters in any rites, abused by them to idolatrous superstition, is lawful to be used of God’s people, especially in his service.
And indeed such a collection had fitted these men to an hair, but had bewrayed such weakness of judgement, as a man shall never find in that excellent man M. Calvin: as namely, that he had then confounded the infancy, and manhood of the church; conformed us to the ceremonial in-conformity, [p. 422] conformity of the synagogue, and consequently denied Christ to be come in the flesh, or to have taken down the partition wall, and given us a liberty which they had not, in such external things. This, not Calvin, nor any learned and advised man, dares affirm; no, nor even these men, howsoever in heat of dispute they forget themselves, and speak as if they meant to have it so said. Wherefore confessing Master Calvin’s collection to be found, concerning the state of the Jews; we deny, that the like can be safely applied, to the Christian state; viz. that unless we goe as far off from idolaters as is possible in all their examples, especially in church-rites, we cannot have God’s favour. So, the foundation which Calvin laid is of stone; but the building of the Replier thereupon, is of stubble. We require therefore further reply.
Replier: 3. I would demand whether, if the high priest, with the whole synedrion of the Jews lawfully assembled, had with one consent decreed, that whereas the Lord enjoineth Lev. 19: Ye shall not sow with divers seeds, nor cut round your heads, nor marre the tufts of your beards: this was only in regard of infidelity, and in respect of an evil signification: but seeing the things are in their nature indifferent, and that it might be convenient for them to use them, they would therefore all from thenceforth use the same, provided that none should use them upon infidelity as the heathen did, nor make any evil interpretation of them: I would demand (I say) whether such a decree should ever have been lawfully made, or warrantably obeyed? I think the Defendant will say no. But why? Perhaps because of the express commandement to the contrary: but doth not this commandement then respect some other reason beside those which by this decree should be now taken away? And may we not collect a further matter from them?
Answer: The Replier hath woven, and again cut his own web, forasmuch as he supposeth an answer to his demand, which might have kept him from once propounding it, saying that it is manifest, that a determination of God is like a statute with us, which takes the wall both of common laws, and [p. 423] and customs. His inference, that there must be yet some reason of this law, is no reply to the answer, which having declared what was the reason of them both, hath shewed that it was not for the reason of abuse of things otherwise lawful, as their argument pretended. To say, there must be some reason, and therefore yours; is as good, as to say; There is some order among angels, therefore nine orders of them.
.
Sect. 3
Their second instance from Scripture.
Opponents: Such things as had good originals and beginnings amongst the heathen, were notwithstanding prohibited to the Jews, as for example, the erecting of any titular pillars by the way, Lev. 26:1. Ergo &c.
marginal note: Abridg. p. 17. Lev. 26:1.
Defendant: Had these titulary pillars of the heathen (which were set up at limits of their grounds) a good original and beginning, trow you? It is an ill gloss that corrupteth the text. The words are these, Thou shalt not erect a pillar, nor shalt thou set up any polished stone in your land, (which was the fashion of the heathen) that you may bow unto them; whence Master Calvin collecteth, Sequitur non aliam statuam hic damnari, nisi quae ad Deum repraesentandum erigitur [It follows that no statue is here condemned, except one which is erected to represent God], that is, no statue was here condemned, but that which was erected to represent God. It was not therefore the erection of pillars that was forbidden: for then the patriarch Jacob would never have erected (* as we read,) a pillar for a religious monument. But the thing prohibited, was the heathenish end and purpose in erecting it. Therefore you might as well say, that the thievish taking of a man’s goods, as that this heathenish manner of building those pillars, had a good original and beginning.
marginal note: Calvin upon that place. * Gen. 28:18.
Replier: Because one usual evasion much esteemed by the pa- [p. 424] Replier: patrons of our ceremonies, is, that they had a good beginning; therefore the authors of the Abridgement, to stop that muzzle, add, that even such things are to be cast away which had a good original, and use, (if they be not still necessary and commanded of God) when once they are known to have been defiled by idolatry or abused unto it.
Answer: 1. The authors of the Abridgement, and yourself especially, have broken down one hedge or two to stop a muzzle, (as you call it,) and not stopped it neither. This, we call tinker’s luck. For if the exception stand as you deliver it, except the same be still necessary, and commanded of God; then down with all our churches which have been idolized, seeing they are not in their particulars commanded of God, as the temple at Jerusalem was, however necessary for our use. For you say, except they be still necessary and commanded of God.
2. The Abridgement in both the editions thereof, hath the exception thus: Except the same be still necessary or commanded: where they suppose some things to be necessary in God’s service which are not commanded, contrary to their own argument, Cap. 1. And some other things commanded of God which are not necessary, against all reason: for else how will their disjunctive (or) be maintained? If you say, necessary, and commanded, conjunctively, then away with all polluted bells, fonts, churchyards, and defiled churches also, as not in their individuals commanded of God. If you say, necessary or commanded, then have you not stopped our muzzle, but rather opened a gap, to us and our ceremonies, that is to say, to our use of them, being so imposed as they are. For, if temples dedicated to idolatrous use in popery, shall be preferred, as necessary in civil respect, as Master Paget saith, because so much money (as new buildings would cost) is spared to other good uses: then say I, our ceremonies also are unto us in their use necessary by consequent, seeing thereupon depends the maintenance of so many ministers and their families, the obedience of the king and his laws both civil and ecclesiastical, the peace of the church of Christ, and free preaching and passage of the Gospel
marginal note: Answ. against Freewill, pag. 113, and elsewhere cap. 7 and 19. [p. 425] Gospel in this land; which are things (especially the latter) of greater necessity then the only sparing of purses. The consideration of this necessity moved Master Cartwright to advise the wearing of the surplice; and Master Beza, to refuse for the use of these ceremonies in question, rather then the flocks of Christ should be forsaken of their pastors for these.
marginal note: Cartwright in the end of his second Reply, pag. 262, an. 1, 263. Beza, Ep. 8 to Grindal, p. 249.
The muse you would have stopped, that is, the distinction betwixt things originally instituted to idolatrous use, and things first lawfully intended and done, but after perverted to superstition; all the wits in the world cannot stop. For, if there be in the things a difference, there will be in their notion, a distinction. The Jews themselves observe this difference (as Master Ainsworth the Brownist notes) betwixt the idols which men’s hands make to themselves, and the creatures of God which men have perverted to idolatry by worshipping of them; and hold, that by the law of God, the former are to be destroyed, but not the other. Again if (say they) an house was built, or a tree planted, purposely, for an idol, it must be utterly destroyed; but if the house was first built, the tree first planted, for common civil use, and an idol hath after been placed in the house, or under that tree; these revert to their first intended use, their idol being removed.
marginal note: Ainsworth, Annot. on Deut. 7.
And surely Master Calvin, in a sentence which themselves allege, doth in matter of ceremonies put difference betwixt those which came from Satan or from Antichrist; (that is, originally) and such as only had been abused in popery, and so doe (I think) all our judicious divines. But we shall not need now to flee to this distinction, and therefore doe (without it) deny this their assertion, that all such human ceremonies are to be cast away, as have been notoriously abused, &c., and, require the proof of it.
marginal note: Calv., Epist. 87.
Replier: For proof whereof they allege Lev. 26:1 and other places more, but the Defendant singleth out this one, and denieth that the titular pillars of the heathen (which were set up at limits of their grounds) had a good beginning.
Answer: The Defendant in this section, singleth out this one [p. 426] one place; and others, in the sections following, would you have him let slip at the whole herd? What reply you to his answer given to this place of Lev. 26:1.
Replier: Suppose that this be true, and that the authors of the Abridgement were mistaken in this place: is not the same thing sufficiently proved out of Dan. 1:8, 2 Kgs. 18:4, Hos. 2:16,17?
Answer: If they were mistaken in this place, they may likewise mistake or misapply the other places of Dan. 1:8, 2 Kgs. 18:4, Hos. 2:16,17. And indeed so they doe, as shall appear. But speak your mind of this place.
Replier: But yet it is more then probable, that those titulary pillars were at the first only set up for civil use.
Answer: If they were so, yet doth not that prove a good beginning of them, univoce [in the same sense], in such a meaning as we now consider and speak of, which is the first beginning in religious use; and not, in natural being, or civil use. But how shall it appear to be more then probable, that their first use was only civil among the heathen?
Replier: Because many statues, which afterward served only for worship, were at the first for civil respects, and these had still a civil use for distinction of bounds.
Answer: Many statues were; Ergo, these, is not more then probable. These had still some civil use, therefore only civil at the first, is not more then probable. For our crosses set at lete ways, had a civil use in directing the traveler; and yet, a religious use as principal, even from the first erection of them. But why trifle we? The pillars which God forbiddeth Israel to erect, were only such as served to idolatrous use.
marginal note: Durandus, de ritibus, lib. 1, cap. 6, pag. 40.
Replier: But Calvin collecteth that no statue was here condemned but that which was erected to represent God. Calvin: indeed hath those words: but what kind of representation he means, he sheweth sufficiently before, Omnes picturas quibus corrumpitur spiritualis Dei cultus [All pictures by which the spiritual worship of God is corrupted]: all pictures that corrupted God’s spiritual worship. And after; Quaecunque nos a spirituali eius cultu abducunt [whatsoever things lead us away from his spiritual worship]: whatsoever leads us from the spiritual worship of God.
Answer: [p. 427] Answer: Calvin hath (as you confess) those words. What then, goe you about to elude them by telling us of his other words there? You lose your labour: for those other words are the reasons, why such statues, images, or pictures as were set up to represent God in his nature, properties, or special pretense, are (in the places which Calvin there handleth) forbidden; that is, because they withdraw from, or corrupted the spiritual worship of God, being set up to represent him. You would have this confirmation taken as if it were a liquidation: but it will not be put off so. For Calvin, elsewhere speaking of the same matsebat, or statue, saith, that in his opinion a statue was now condemned, Non qualem erexit Iacob ut esset monumentum duntaxat, sed qua putabant Deum figurari; not such as Jacob set up for a monument, only, but whereby men imagined God to be figured. You see what manner of representation he means, even such as was that of the golden calf, and Micah his teraphim. And Master Calvin, you see, confesseth that it was not forbidden by the law to erect a matsebat, or statue (such as Jacob did) for a religious monument only.
marginal note: Calvin on Deut. 22:3, pag. 286 of his Harmony on the Books of Moses. Exod. 32:7,4,5. Judg. 17:3,4,5.
And thus did Joshua think, who erected and set up a stone in Shechem by the door of the tabernacle, for a religious monument of the covenant in that place renewed with God. And of this judgement was Samuel, who for a monument of the glorious victory which God in that place had given them, erected a great stone, and called it, Eben-ezer, the stone of help, &c., and this, after the law, as well as Jacob had done the like, before it. This place therefore, and the like, forbidding only such statues as were for idolatrous use, and yet allowing others for religious monuments only, is directly against their assertion, and not for it.
marginal note: Joshua 24:26. 1 Sam. 7:12.
Replier: Jacob erected a pillar for a religious monument, saith the Defendant, Gen. 28: true: but not after the law was given against it. So also he offered sacrifices, and many other things in such sort as after the law it was not lawful.
Answer: If it had been unlawful (as you pretend) by the moral law, then had Jacob sinned: for the moral law was then in being, though not in writing. And if the by-laws, made [p. 428] made for the Jews in their nation, made this kind of act after to be unlawful, which was lawful before, why doe you now press Christians with those laws which the moral law enforces not? Yet have you said true, that Jacob erected a religious monument, Gen. 28:18, as he did also, Gen. 35:14, in the places where God appeared to him, before the law was given against it; for there was never yet any law of God given against the erecting of a religious monument, such as Jacob set up (as Calvin hath said) and Joshua and Samuel have, by their practice, assured us. The case therefore of sacrifices and such things, as God did for a time leave at large, till he pleased otherwise to determine of them, is not like this; but, is put in for a blind to the simple reader. In sum, this instance of pillars is not with you, but against you.
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An Addition to this Section
Because the Defendant hath not particularly, but only implicitly, answered to the place of Hos. 2:16,17, which was alleged with this of Lev. and others, by the Abridgement in the same proofs, and is much esteemed; I think fit to give it a trial here; and the rather, that the reader may see that the answer given by the Defendant to that instance out of Lev. is with a little change of words, satisfactory to this place of Hosea also.
Replier: Ver. 16. The text is, Thou shalt in that day, call me Ishi; and thou shalt no more call me Baali; verse 17. For I will take the names of Baalim out of her mouth, they shall be no more remembered by their names; whence the argument is thus raised.
Replier: Baal is a name of good original signifying a Lord; and, by application, an husband, as well as Ish, which primarily signifies a man, but in common use an husband. But because the name Baal had been communicated to an idol called Baal, God will not have it by any means applied to him; but, cast away. Hence from a particular, they gather a general rule, That such things as were of good beginning must be cast away, if once, &c.
To which our answer is this.
The [p. 429] The Defendant’s double answer to the former instance may satisfy this. First, the use of the word Baal, in religious application, was originally evil, and not good. Secondly God doth not here condemn all use of the same word in application to himself; but only such, as might either further the practise, or at least bear the appearance of gross idolatry. And therefore this argument is but a sophism, a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter [from a statement qualified to a statement made without qualification], like that of the titulary pillars. This answer I make good in both the parts of it. And first, for the original use of the word Baal. > > We consider not in this question, the use of words in their notation, as grammarians; nor of things as they are in their natural existence, as philosophers; but, of their application to religious use, as divines: and so we say, the original use of the word Baal, was evil. For by it (even before Moses was born) the great and common idol of the Gentiles was marked out, as by a proper name, which with the Chaldeans, and Assyrians was called Bell; with the Persians, Belus; with the Sidonians, Beel; with the Hebrews, Baal* [Hebrew: בעל], to which they prefix (as Avenarius notes) the demonstrative letter he paragogicum, Habaal (which is as much as, the Lord, or that Lord) in honour of their idol god, which was (as is conceived) the sun. Baalim, in the plural number, they designed the other planets or stars called the host* of heaven, (all save the moon, which the Sidonians (dwelling upon the sea) worshipped as their chief god, and called Ashtoreth, 1 Kgs. 11:5, 2 Kgs. 23:13. > > marginal note: See Pagninus & Forster upon the word. Hieron. on Hos. 2. D. Reynolds, de Idololatria Romana Ecclesiae, lib. 2, ca. 3, sect. 25,27,42, but chiefly 51. 2 Chr. 33:3. > > The name of Baal was so well known to import another then the god of Israel, called Jehovah, that all men knew what Elijah meant* when he said, If Jehovah be God follow him, but if Baal, follow him: and what Jehu* when he said, See that there be none of the servants of the Lord among you, but the worshippers of Baal only. > > marginal note: 1 Kgs. 18:21. 2 Kgs. 10:23. Hence Baal-berith, Judg. 9:4. Baal Peor, Num. 25:3 & 5. Baalzebub. 2 Kgs. 1:2. Baalzephon, Exod. 14:2,5 & 33. > > Secondly, the title of Baal (so of Baalim) was by a trope given to the several images, or representations of that their great god, which in sundry places, and different forms were set up, like as with the Papists, (as their Ribera makes the comparison) the name of our Lady is given to the several images > > marginal note: Ribera, Jesuit, Com. in Hos. 2, sect. 16. [p. 430] Images set up at Loretto, Halle, Walsingham, or elsewhere. So as in the first religious use we can find of this word, Baal, it was evil, and not good, and therefore this instance fails. > > But secondly, suppose the original use of the word (even in religious application) to have been good; yet their collection will not hold from this place of Hosea, because all religious use of that very word Baal, is not there condemned, unless we shall say, that God in his word hath crossed himself, and both condemned and allowed the same thing. For God himself doth direct his prophets, to give this very name and title of Baal to himself sometimes, and therefore required, that his people in hearing, or reading those prophecies, should understand and honour God in that very name of Baal there mentioned, which is (I am sure) some religious use of it. So Isa. 54:5. Thy Creator is thy Baal, Baalayik [Hebrew: בעליך], thy husband, say we. Nahum 1, v. 2. The Lord is styled, the Baal of wrath, Baal chemah [Hebrew: בעלחמה], where our translation hath only “furious”: but the French, of ’88, Et a la commandement de fureur, and have “the command of fury,” that is, in the original, ba’alat chemah [Hebrew: בעלת חמה], where we read, He was an husband to them: by all which appears that God did not so abhor the word, or name Baal, for the abuse of it to idolatry, that he would not have it in any case applied to himself; but contrarily, doth apply it sometimes to himself, notwithstanding all the pollution of it. So as this instance also confutes that assertion, which it should have confirmed, as did the former. > > All that can justly from this place be inferred, is, that because the name of Baal was appropriated to an idol, God would not have that title applied to him in their invocation of God, propter sermonis ambiguitatem & similitudinem, ne dum aliud loquitur, alterius recordetur, & dum virum nominat, Idolum cogitet [because of the ambiguity and likeness of the expression, lest, while saying one thing, one should be reminded of the other, and while naming a husband, think of an idol], saith Saint Hierome: Though it might well be spoken in respect of the signification of the word, which signifies in common application an husband, as well as Ish, yet I so hate the name of idols, that I will not have it said Baali, but Ishi, in respect of the ambiguity and likeness of speech, lest while a man speaks > > marginal note: Hieron., Com. in Hosea 2:16. [p. 431] speaks one thing he mind another, and mentioning an husband, (scil. by that name Baal) he mean an idol so called. Thus Hierom on this place. > > He doth not say, Non vocabis Baal, Thou shalt not name Baal, saith Zanchie; but, thou shalt no more call me, O my Baal. So that, in invocation, God will not have that term given to him, lest secret idolatry should be practised; or at least, an appearance of idolatry. But this forbids not all religious use of the word Baal, but only such use of it as savoured idolatry, or gave manifest shew of it. I resemble it by the like. To call upon God now, by the name of Jupiter, were very profane; But, in a sermon to say, the Lord is our true Jupiter, that is, our Iuvans Pater (as the word imports) our helping father, were neither offensive, nor unseemly. The like is to be said of the word Baal: if that interpretation be received which they build upon, and which many good authors have followed; as, Hierom, Junius, Tremelius, Lively, and Pareus upon the place. Thus we see the answer, if that interpretation be embraced which they follow, that the place is not for their turn. But other interpretations are also given by learned men, which take away all foundation of their argument from hence. > > marginal note: Zanch. in Hos. 2:16. > > First, of those that take the affix (i) to be a note of the plural number in the word Baali, all one as if it were written Baalim. Thus the Greek translators took it, as Tremelius on this place notes. If so, then the sense is, Thou shalt no more invocate, worship, or know many gods but me only as thine husband: and the next verse fits this well enough. > > marginal note: Tremel. in Hos., printed 1563, in 8. > > Secondly, Thou shalt rather know me by the more sweet name of Ishi, which imports unity of nature betwixt the man, called Ish, & the wife, called (of his name) Ischa, Gen. 2, then by that sour & more imperious name of Baal, which signifies an husband, with notation of his dominion over his wife. If thus, then it is like to that speech of our Lord, John 15:15. I call you no more servants, but friends: that is, rather friends, then servants. And this, our English translations (both the Geneva, and the last) conceive of it. So Lyra, Mercerus & others upon this > > marginal note: Lyra, Mercerus in Hosh.
this place, and others. This Tremelius also takes in: and this fence will not bear their argument.
marginal note: Tremel. in Hos.
Thirdly, Thou shalt no more call upon me as thou hast done in Baal, nor worship me after that manner that Baal is served; but I will take all honourable mention of false gods out of thy mouth. Thus M. Perkins understands it, and gives strong reason for it. Thus, thine own M. Parker; yea, and M. Cartwright; and thus Zanchie seems (in his larger explication of the words elsewhere) to take it. If any of these three fences be taken, their argument hath no footing on this text. And why it should not be taken, as the opposites take it, I urge this: If God simply condemn, in calling upon him, the use of the word Baal, because it is said, Thou shalt no more call me Baal; then, on the other side, the very word Ishi is required as necessarily to be used in calling upon God, because it is said, thou shalt call me Ishi: which no man will, I suppose, affirm: and why then, the other?
marginal note: Perk. in Fol., Vol. 3, pa. 655 and 660, Edit. 1608. M. Park., Treat. of the Cross, part 1, p. 68. M. Cartw. in his Catech. on the 2nd Commandment.
I conclude, If any other of these three aforesaid interpretations be received, the root of their objection is stocked up: but if that only which their objection is grounded upon, yet the body of their objection is hewn down even to the root of it, as hath been shewed: and moreover, that from hence we may argue more strongly against their tenet, because some religious use of this defiled name finds warrant in the Scriptures.
.
Sect. 4
Their Third Instance from Scripture.
Opponents: Dt. 7 and Ex. 25. God commandeth to destroy the statues and groves of idolatry, and to extinguish their names: and that we cannot be thought to have sincerely repented of the idolatry or superstition, except we cast away with detestation all the instruments of it. See Calvin his sermons upon Dt. > > marginal note: Abridg. Line, pag. 17,18.
Defendant: See Calvin, say you? Whom I have seen upon
marginal note: Abridg. ibid. in Margine. [p. 433]
these places of Scripture; and, upon the full sight thereof, am justly moved to call upon you, as you have done upon your reader, saying, See Calvin; and then (surely) you shall see a foul error in your collection from Calvin, who is so far from speaking any thing for your advantage, that in his exposition of these places, he doth flatly confute you. For in these Scriptures, Exod. 23 and Exod. 24, Dt. 7:12, Num. 23, where we read of nothing but of destroying of all the images, groves, altars; and rooting out the very names of the heathenish gods. Although indeed, he doth infer, that Omnia insignia idolatriae [all the tokens of idolatry], that is, all the monuments or tokens of idolatry were to be abolished by the Jews; yet, when the question is, whether Christians be precisely bound to doe the like, he so distinguisheth betwixt the commandments of the decalogue and these appendices, as he doth between the law moral, and the politic or judicial; notifying unto us, that the moral precepts doe oblige all men unto the end of the world, (as being enacted against all formal idolatry:) but these politic precepts of destroying altars, groves, &c., which are materials only, differ (says he) from the other (namely from the commandments of the two tables) so, as to bind only the Jews during the time of their pedagogic; but, not the church Christian to the end of the world. And therefore coming to the point concerning churches, the places of God’s worship, he resolveth, saying; Neque nobis religio est, templa retinere, quae polluta fuerunt Idolis, & accommodare in meliorem usum: quia nos non obstringit, quod propter consequentiam, ut loquuntur, legi additum est [Nor is it a matter of religion for us to retain temples that have been polluted by idols, and to adapt them to a better use: because we are not bound by what, as they say, was added to the law by way of consequence], that is, We may lawfully use the temples, or churches, which [p. 434] have been defiled and abused with idols, and apply them to a better use: because that doth not bind us which was added to the (moral) law, only by consequence: (thereby meaning, the occasions peculiar to those times and common weal) the same whereof (says he) doth tend thus far, namely, to shew in what detestation God held all manner of idolatry, and therefore would have them to abolish the very names of such things as had ever been dedicated to idols. But you will say, shall we then have no regard of other superstitious circumstances? Calvin seemeth to prevent this objection, saying; Fateor quidem, &c. [I confess indeed, &c.] Indeed I confess that all such things are to be removed which may seem to nourish idolatry; so that (observe I pray you this moderation) we ourselves in urging too vehemently things which are in their own nature indifferent, be not too superstitious: meaning, that the urging a prohibition and abolishment of them, is that negative superstition, whereof you have been already found guilty, in oppugning our rites as superstitious, only because they are significant. As though any thing could be judged therefore superstitious, because it carrieth with it a true orthodox and Christian signification.
Replier: The third proof in the Abridgement standeth thus: The equity of these commandments is thus set down in Scripture. First the detestation which the Lord our God being a jealous God beareth unto idolatry, and all the instruments and tokens thereof, as unto spiritual whoredom, Exod. 20:5,6, Dt. 7:25,25. Secondly, that we cannot be said sincerely to have repented of the idolatry or superstition, whereby we or our forefathers have provoked the Lord, unless we be ashamed of and cast away with detestation all the instruments and monuments of it, 2 Chr. 33:15, Isa. 1:29, and 2:20, and 30:22, 2 Cor. 7:1, Calvin in Deut., serm. 52, Ep. [p. 435] 86, pag. 166,167. Thirdly, that we shall be in danger to be corrupted, Exod. 34:12,15, Dt. 74:25,26, Judg. 2:13, Gal. 2:5. Fourthly, we shall harden idolaters, Ezek. 16:54, 1 Cor. 6:10. Fifthly, There is more danger in popish ceremonies, because the Pope is Antichrist, and we converse more with Papists, then with other idolaters. Now of all these reasons and allegations, the Defendant answereth directly to nothing, but only to those words, See Calvin.
Answer: As if in shooting, a man should remove the mark that was shot at and hit, and set up another which was not shot at; and then complain, that the archer had shot wide of the mark set up: so dealeth the Replier here; for he never tells what was the third instance from Scripture, which the Defendant (according to his professed method) here took out of the Abridgement and then complains, that the Defendant hath not answered here, to those many reasons and allegations. Is not this perverse and injurious dealing? The Defendant hath answered that which he objected to himself in this place; you complain that he hath not answered all those reasons and allegations which he, in this place, undertook not. What ail you? What mean you? Perhaps you thought this third proof, as it stands in the Abridgement welted and guarded with so many reasons and Scriptures, would make a gallant shew; and therefore, had a mind (though no just occasion) to bring it on the stage in all the garnish. Therefore I will suspend a while the process in hand, and give answer to this third proof as it is by you produced, or stands in the Abridgement, and then goe on.
And first I answer, that these five reasons of equity, being all yielded unto, will not enforce, that* we are bound unto all, and the very same ways of repressing idolatry, or expressing our detestation of it, or avoiding the peril of it, to which God then thought fit to hold his people the Jews; though we be bound as much, or rather more then they, to detest and decline idolatry itself: which truth, when yourselves confess, in allowing the use of idol temples for necessary use, and turning into our private purses, or
marginal note: See for this M. Paget’s Arrow against the Separatists, where, cap. 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14, this matter is largely, and learnedly handled. [p. 436]
common treasury the very silver and gold of their idols, or their garments; or, of eating the very flesh which had been offered to an idol, 1 Cor. 10:27 (which things are by name forbidden to the Jews, and upon the very same reasons of equity, yea and some of them in the same places here* alleged:) I wonder with what hearts you can still allege, against mere ceremonies, those laws which yourselves take not to be now of force against nearer instruments of idolatry.
marginal note: Exod. 34:15, in fine. Dt. 7:25,26. Isa. 30.
Secondly I answer, that many of these places; as, Exod. 20:5,6, Dt. 7:25,26, Isa. 1:29, and 30:22, speak of idols themselves, or their garnish; and, to argue from the destruction of idols themselves, to the abolition of all indifferent ceremonies abused in idolatry, or rather superstition, is as unreasonable, as to conclude the stoning of the adulterer’s house, on which he rode to the brothel house, from that law which appointed that the adulterer should be stoned to death.
marginal note: Dt. 22:24.
Thirdly, that some of the places are grossly mistaken and misalleged: as, Isa. 1:29 and 2:10, where the confusion which God threatened to bring upon idolaters in the day of vengeance, when they should forsake their idols (as, their idols, them;) is taken, as if the holy and godly shame for their sin, were there spoken of. So also is Ezek. 16:54, utterly misalleged, to prove their reason of hardening others. So is eating of idolothites in an idol temple, 1 Cor. 8:10, misalleged, in the case of indifferent things abused, being in itself evil, 1 Cor. 10:21,22. So are Exod. 34:12, and Dt. 7:4, where marriage, and league with heathens, are forbidden; and Gal. 2:5, for ceremonies abused.
Fourthly some of the places may serve rather to confute, then to confirm their assertion; as, Isa. 1:29. Thou shalt be ashamed of thy oaks and thy gardens which thou hast chosen (that is, of thy gods set up in them.) For this abuse of gardens did not make it unlawful for our Savior Christ to worship and pray in a garden; as, by John 18:1 and 26, (compared with Matt. 26:39) appears that he did. Likewise Jude (not that 13, but 23 v.) hate even the garment [p. 437] spotted with the flesh is against them; for, as a garment spotted with the flesh of the unclean, was no longer to be hated, then till it was washed: and being washed, might again be used: So is it with ceremonies of indifferent nature, which have been defiled.
Now sir, you have your will. Their third proof is examined, and found (in my opinion) light: and now it appears also (which I am very sorry to see) that the authors of the Abridgement have gloried too much in facing their book with texts of Scriptures, and with names of excellent men; but, not regarded enough how justly, or fitly they applied them: which fault, God give them to repent of; for this hath abused many good minded men, who have taken all these things upon trust.
Now goe on with your reply, and begin again with your complaint, if you please.
Replier: Now of all these reasons and allegations, the Defendant answereth directly to nothing, but only to these words, See Calvin, and yet not to them neither as they are cited in the Abridgement.
Answer: He hath answered those allegations concerning the demolishing of idols, and that one reason of expressing our repentance and zeal thereby, for which, on the margin, the Abridgement bids us See Calvin; beginning his answer, as he ended the objection, with See Calvin. And out of Calvin’s positive judgement set down upon the places of Scripture (which are, pag. 17 and 18, alleged for this point) he hath answered, that those positive laws given to the Jews, doe not strictly bind us unto the same way of expressing or opposing idolatry. Is not this a full and direct answer to that objection which here he undertook? But you say he answered not directly, neither to these words See Calvin; tell us why.
Replier: For there it is See Calvin in his 52 Serm. on Deut. and Ep. 87. Now on these places the Defendant’s eyes would not serve to look, or at least his heart would not suffer him to give answer, they are so pregnant.
Answer: Good words, I pray you sir. Methinks those [p. 438] places are answered. For, if Master Calvin (upon the places of Scriptures where the defacing of idolatries with their appurtenances, is enjoined) doe confess that we are not tied now, as the Jews were then, to the same manner of proceeding; and therefore, keep our old temples: and that, in removing the occasions of idolatry as far as we can, we must take heed of being too superstitious, as the Defendant hath alleged: doe not these words answer those other words of Calvin elsewhere spoken, and set up limits to them? Let us try it in the pregnant places which you glory in: what be they?
Replier: If we have any drop of good zeal in us, it must needs vex and grieve us to see the marks and signs of idolatry and that we must to the uttermost of our power deface them. marginal note: Cal., Serm. on Deut. 52.
Answer: Is this such a terrible place, that the Defendant’s eyes durst not see it, or his heart durst not answer it? Why man? The Abridgement itself, pag. 21, alleges our late queen’s injunctions requiring, that all monuments of idolatry and superstition be so utterly extinguished, and destroyed, that there may remain no memory of them either in our churches, or houses; we have therefore to the uttermost of our power done, (as Calvin wisheth;) viz. we have defaced the marks and monuments of idolatry; but we took not those ceremonies to be marks and signs of idolatry; nor did Calvin so take them, as shall appear in the place itself, which I here set down at large, because I find it alleged and quoted at the least five times, in the Abridgement, and this reply, as if it were their masterpiece.
marginal note: Calvin speaks namely of images and forbids the marks of idolatry: which they have not defaced, the marks, that is might seem to serve their turn: yet see the place after.
It is not enough for the faithful to refrain from all idolatry, but they must also shew, that they abhor and hate all things that are against God’s service, and to the uttermost of their power, they must endeavour to have them all wiped away, so as the remembrance of them may be rooted out, that they may never be spoken of, any more. For else, what zeal have we to the honour of God, when we see idols set up instead of him, and look upon things that serve to corrupt and deface the true and pure religion? If we doe but laugh at them, and take them as small trifles, or as children’s
marginal note: Cal. in Deut., Serm. 52. [p. 439]
games: is it not a token that we esteem the honour of our God no more then a thing of nothing? For if our desire to have God glorified were as earnest as it ought to be, surely it would wound our hearts, to see idols so set up in his place, and to see men bereave him of his majesty, to attribute the same to dead creatures; and that so precious and holy a thing as religion, should be so marred, corrupted and turned upside down. When these marks come before our eyes, surely if we have any one drop of good zeal, it must needs vex us, and grieve us; and we must, to the uttermost of our power, deface all those signs and marks of idolatry, and cause God’s honour to be maintained unimpaired.
In this passage of Calvin, the reader may, and cannot but observe, that Calvin speaketh of images idolized, and calleth them, these marks and monuments of idolatry, &c. Now the Abridgers, suppressing the rest of Calvin’s words, have turned “these marks,” into “the marks,” hoping that men would understand Calvin to speak that, of all ceremonies abused to superstition, which he only spoke of the proper instruments and monuments of idolatry, and namely, of images, yet remaining and worshipped. But, that Calvin had not the same opinion of all abused ceremonies, which he had of those idols, or other like monuments of idolatry, will further appear in the examination of the second place objected, and otherwise. Let us hear your second place out of Calvin’s epistle.
Replier: Nothing upon pretence must be tolerated in the church, which came either from Satan or from Antichrist. marginal note: Cal., ep. 87, p. 166,18.
Answer: It seems your eyes either served you not to see this place; or, your heart served you not to produce it fairly, and whole, as it stands in Calvin. The Abridgement quoted Epist. 87, p. 166 and 167, but you give us a little bit of his sentence out of pag. 167 only. We must have all. Calvin, in that grave epistle written, Anno 1548, in the time of king Edward the sixth, to the Lord Protector of England, after many other things, opposeth (pag. 166) their opinions, who persuaded to leave the abuses (brought in by the Papists,) untouched; so as, the gross corruptions might be redressed. [p. 440] Which error of opinion, Calvin confutes, and then adds pag. 166 in the end, and pag. 167.) Fateor quidem moderationi locum esse oportere, ut extremitates nimis abscisae neque hic utilis sint, neque simpliciter usurpanda, adeoque ceremoniis ipsis ad usum & captum populi esse accommodandas: sed non minus constanter affirmo, videndum esse ne sub illo pretextu tolleretur quicquam quod a Satana, vel Antichristo profectum sit [I confess indeed that there ought to be room for moderation, so that overly cut-off extremities are neither useful nor simply to be employed, and that ceremonies themselves are to be accommodated to the use and capacity of the people: but I affirm no less constantly, that care must be taken lest, under that pretext, anything be tolerated which has proceeded from Satan or Antichrist]: that is, I confess that there ought to be a moderation, so as too precise extremities would here be neither profitable nor simply to be used; and also, that the ceremonies themselves are to be accommodated to the use and capacity of the people. But withal, I doe no less confidently affirm, that heed must be taken that under that pretence nothing be tolerated which came either from Satan or from Antichrist: Thus he.
All that which Calvin speaks of a necessary moderation; and of using the ceremonies, and, against precise rigor, the Replier passeth by, because he saw it to be directly against the Abridgers. The general words of not tolerating any things which came from Satan or Antichrist, pleased him well: for he hoped that those words would seem to hook in these our ceremonies also, which Calvin professedly intended rather to exempt. This appears, partly in his words alleged, and more clearly in the process of the same epistle, where he shews what he pointed at; namely, Prayer for the dead, Chrism, and extreme unction, which as then were yet remaining in this church: but after, abandoned. The same appears in an epistle of his written, Anno 1551, to Bullinger.
And yet again, in his 200th epistle written in Qu. Mary’s time to the English exiles at Frankfort, who fell into a fierce contention about the use of the English book of common-prayer, and the ceremonies thereof, which some in that place unreasonably urged, and others as violently resisted. Master Knox and Whittingham sent the heads of the book of common-prayer (I dare say not one whit better’d) to Master Calvin, whereof they shew their own dislikes, and crave his judgement. Calvin blameth (justly) both parties: more sharply those, who would abate nothing
marginal note: See Preface, and, sig. K4. [p. 441]
of the book, which had then some things amiss that are not now in* it. Yet he blames the other also, and, (to supple them) tells them, of the book, that there was no manifest impiety in it; and, of the worst things, that they were tolerable, though not fitting, tolerabiles ineptiae [tolerable absurdities]. Of himself, he professeth that, in things indifferent, quales ritus sunt [such as rites are], such as ceremonies are, he is wont to shew himself facile, and flexible.
marginal note: As namely, about confirmation & the days of offering, and purification of women after childbirth.
By which appears, that even then, Calvin thought nothing to remain in that book which was intolerable; and therefore nothing, that came from Satan or Antichrist, which he would not have under pretence of moderation to be tolerated.
By all this * the reader may see Calvin’s judgement of these matters; and, that he was of another judgement and spirit, then these men are now of, who would have the church of God rather lie untilled and waste, then that the church should be yielded to; teaching the poor people, rather to receive no sacrament of Christ’s body and blood, then to receive it kneeling: though it be not done (as they know) to the sacrament, yea and professed to be, in itself, a thing indifferent.
marginal note: * As also in an Epistle written after this, An. 1551, to Bullinger, where he so commendeth Hooper’s constancy in refusing the fashion: yet witnesseth he had not thought to stand against the square cap and surplice, or rochet: and yet lately averred to see his professed allowance of kneeling: Instit., lib. 4, cap. 17, thes. 35, & diss. to observing of Easter day, Serm. 57, on Dt.
Replier: Yet the Defendant says he has seen Calvin upon Exodus 23 and 24, and Num. 23, and Dt. 7:12. And findeth that Calvin holdeth these precepts of destroying altars and groves to bind the Jews only, not Christians.
Answer: If the Defendant hath this, as he hath, and more at large; how were you not afraid to say, that he had answered directly to nothing, but only those words (See Calvin)? Safer is it always to speak truth, then to trust one’s memory. But what say you to Calvin’s answer?
Replier: Surely I have looked, and could find no such thing.
Answer: Surely then you must look better: for, upon my life, the words are as the Defendant alleged them; and, in the place quoted.
Replier: If there had been any thing worth the knowing for maintenance of the ceremonies we should have heard of the words of Calvin, whereas now Calvin is brought in expressly affirming, that we may use temples which have been defiled with [p. 442] idols: which is nothing at all to the question of unnecessary ceremonies.
Answer: 1. You have these words of Calvin in the Defendant’s answer, That in labouring to remove such things which may seem to nourish idolatry, we must take heed that we be not too superstitious, in urging too vehemently things which are in their own nature indifferent. But you were not willing to have it known, that any such words were alleged, and therefore make no reply to them. 2. That which you yield of temples, though your direction from these Scriptures which then (of the Jews) required the absolute demolishing of such temples or evil-houses, by name. For if we (without scruple of conscience) may now doe, what the Jews under no pretence might then have lawfully done, there must needs be some change in the law. Though our ceremonies are not in themselves so necessary or useful as our churches, yet being (as they are) imposed, the use of them, to us, for the consequent, is so much more necessary then churches, as the exercise of the ministry is more necessary, then one set place to exercise it in; as hath been shewed before.
Replier: But if the Defendant would discuss this point exactly, whether the laws alleged out of the Old Testament against the monuments of idolatry, doe not bind Christians, why doth he not answer to the testimonies of Calvin, Martyr, Gualter, Wolphius, Ursinus, Machabeus, Zanchius, Simlerus, Zepperus, Fulk, and other books of Homilies alleged to this purpose, in the Abridgement, pag. 24.
Answer: The Defendant had neither purpose nor occasion in this place, to discuss, by authors, the question you mention, but only, to shew the judgement of M. Calvin, to whom the Abridgement referred, in that place of p. 18 saying, see Calvin. Yet seeing the same Calvin is made the foreman of that inquest which (from p. 24) you here call in, if all the jury be of one mind, as you pretend; then, have you the verdict of them all, delivered by the mouth of their foreman M. Calvin. Which also are of them, namely Zanchie, doth maintain against all comers: so also Master Paget (learnedly) against
(Zanchie, de Redemp., l. 1) [p. 443]
Master Ainsworth the Brownist: and so the question is difficult by authors, as much as needs be. But in truth the question requireth rather to be rightly stated, then discussed. For (if I be not deceived) we differ not in our judgements about it, in that we confess with the learned, that Christian princes are bound by the moral equity of those laws, to demolish all the proper monuments of idolatry (which shall not be of some necessary use to us,) in token of their detestation of idolatry, and for the prevention of it. So you seem to yield, that in such things as be full of necessary use, and namely our churches, those precepts doe not bind Christians to demolish all the materials and instruments of idolatry, without any exception or reservation, as they did bind the Jews. Numb. 33:52, Dt. 7:25,26, and 12:2,3. This is as much as we require, and enough to dismount your election rated upon those texts of the Old Testament against us.
That which indeed ought in this case to have been better considered, is two-fold: first whether the same sentence which is decreed in those Scriptures alleged against the monuments of gross idolatry (of which only they speak) be equally extensive to the case of superstition properly so called; betwixt which two, Doctor Ames might have shewed you a great difference, if you had consulted him. Secondly, whether rites and ceremonies (of indifferent nature) shall be arrested under the name of idolatrous monuments properly so called: for example, whether bowing of the knee, lifting up the eyes, or hands unto God, were (in that use) monuments of the idolatry committed in the use of them to Baal, as well as the houses, altars and images of them were. We say no: for nothing is properly a monument, but that which doth monere [remind, warn], and that not occasionally, but of itself, and from the institution end or use thereof fixed thereunto: as no metal is (moneta) money, but in respect of the stamp set upon it, which doth make it money.* Wise men tell us, that a tomb without a title or inscription, is properly no monument, but only a grave: and, that the effacing or doing out of the inscription destroys the monument, and a new inscription makes a new monument of an old grave-stone.
(Dr. Ames in Medulla Theol., part 2, diss. 14, thes. 6, with 42 and 41. Valla, Elegantiae, lib. 4, cap. — Cicero, De Off., 70) [p. 444]
Like as the English stamp makes that which was Spanish, to be English money, and not Spanish.
So as it seemeth to me, that the present use of a ceremony, cannot be the monument of another use, which it had before. And therefore as the bowing to Baal, was in that use, no monument of religious bowing used unto God; so neither was the bowing (after that) unto God, any monument of the idolatrous bowing which had been used to Baal. Nor is the use of the cross with us, any monument of the popish abuse, more then the popish abuse was a monument of that lawful use which the primitive church had of it. Present intention, and professed use of an indifferent ceremony, is all the impression or inscription which it hath; even as the elements in the Lord’s sacraments, are only sacramental in the sacramental use, and not before or after. Wherefore your error is, in confounding ceremonies abused to superstition with proper monuments of gross idolatry, which, by our homilies (alleged justly against the monuments of idolatry; but unjustly, against our ceremonies) you might have discerned; and so by other of the learned men.
.
Sect. 5
Their Fourth Instance from Scripture.
Opponents: Daniel would not defile himself with eating of the king’s meats. Dan. 1:8. > > marginal note: Abridg., quo supra.
Defendant: Scire est per causas scire [To know is to know through causes]. The only solid knowledge of any thing, is the understanding of the true cause thereof. First therefore, Daniel did not abstain from those meats of the king, because they were the king’s: for then (says Master Calvin upon this place) should he have shown himself very inconstant, when afterwards he took a liberty to himself to eat thereof. Why then (will you say) did he abstain? Read but Master Calvin his commentary, and it will resolve you,
(Calv. in Dan. 1:8) [p. 445]
that Daniel was now in exile from God’s worship, and that the king sent unto him all his kingly services and delicates, to the end that thereby he might alienate him from the love of his own country, and the religion of his God. Therefore Daniel, lest he might be ensnared with the allurements of riot, did abstain from all that dainty fare.
If you further demand, why Daniel called the king’s diet a pollution, or abomination unto him; listen again (for your satisfaction) to the said author: Non fuit quidem, &c. [It was not indeed, &c.] It was not in itself abominable: for it was lawful for Daniel to eat or drink; but it is called an abomination for the consequence thereof. Thus Master Calvin: where, by consequences he means, lest Daniel by such dainties, as by the devil’s baits, might receive his spiritual bane, by forgetting the holy covenant, religion, and the worship of the only God. Nothing can be more plain to prove, that by these words, (being polluted with the king’s meats) is not meant any pollution ceremonial, as if the meats had been idolatrous: but only moral, or occasional, as being baits and allurements, to draw him to an irreligious forgetfulness of holy duties. Seeing therefore, this reason doth not argue ad idem [to the same point], it will become you to take some other testimonies, whereby you may make good your first assertion.
marginal note: Calvin upon the same place.
Replier: In one place of Scripture yet, viz. Dan. 1:18, the Defendant thinketh he hath some advantage; because Calvin interpreteth it otherwise then of ceremonial pollution. But therein the Abridgement followed that interpretation which is most generally received: for which see Junius in his commentary upon the place.
Answer: If Calvin’s interpretation stand good, then hath their assertion no colour of argument from this place: and, if that of Junius, it hath yet but a little: for, if Daniel [p. 446] forbore to eat the king’s meat, lest some of it should be of the kinds forbidden (as then) to the Jews, or such as had been offered to an idol, of which to eat was then unlawful: yet was that forbearance grounded upon some special and ceremonial injunctions of God, and not upon this your supposed moral rule [that abuse had made the use unlawful:] nor was this a ceremony in God’s worship. So as this place is not ad idem [to the same point], however interpreted.
Replier: And suppose that pollution was not ceremonial, or idolatrous, yet I hope the Defendant will not say, but if the meat had been so polluted, Daniel would have abstained from it.
Answer: He would, and ought, because of the laws then in force: but if a man should now upon the like reason abstain, when that law is abrogated, (1 Cor. 10:25) he should be as superstitious, as Daniel was religious.
Replier: Take therefore some other testimonies to prove your assertion, saith the Defendant, so confidently, as if he knew no testimonies which he had not answered. What can one say to him, that will not take that which is thrust into his hands, and yet calleth for more, as if he could find none.
Answer: The Defendant’s calling for some other testimonies, was but a transition to the next place alleged, and not any intimation that he could find no other: for he instantly brings in another. Howbeit, every text alleged is not a testimony, no more then an empty spoon is spoon-meat. One may call for testimonies, if you bring only texts, which testify nothing for you.
.
Sect. 6
Their Fifth Instance from Scripture, is the Example of Hezekiah.
Opponents: 2 Kgs. 18. Hezekiah’s zeal, in breaking down the brazen serpent which God himself had ordained for a figure of Christ, is commended in Scripture, for that it being polluted with abominable idolatry, he brake it in pieces. > > marginal note: Abridg. Line, and others.
Defendant: This noble fact of that religious king, is indeed commended in Scripture, and therefore ought to be honourable among all devout and religious worshippers of God unto the ends of the world. We grant that God had wrought by that serpent a miraculous safety to his people, by delivering them from the stings of fiery serpents; and that for this very cause, it was (as some think) long after reserved in some part of the temple, for the remembrance of so great a benefit: even as the pot of manna, and Aaron’s rod, were kept in the ark to the like end. But when the Israelites began to defile it by offering incense unto it, then did Hezekiah demolish it, and that for four special respects. The first was, because there was now flagrans delictum [the offence in the very act of being committed], that is, the idolatry was notorious, and in the very heat. Secondly, it was general and public. Thirdly, it was done within the compass of that place, and among that people which were otherwise accounted the professed worshippers of God. Fourthly, the act itself was offering incense to a creature, the most gross and palpable kind of idolatry that can be; for whereas bowing and kneeling may carry some shew of pretence in them, because the same gestures are used sometimes civilly, without any just exception against them; yet sacrificing is an external act, so properly and essentially belonging to God, that every eye which beholdeth such acts must needs judge them idolatrous. Lastly, the case was now desperate, and (without utter extirpation thereof) past all hope of reducing that figure to the former use and end, which was a commemoration of God’s mercy in their miraculous deliverance. [p. 448]
And it is (by the way) a point very observable, that Hezekiah did not destroy the idols which Solomon suffered to be set up, in favour of his strange wives that were of heathenish religion, placing in one temple, Ashtaroth, which was the god of the Zidonians; in another, Molech the idol of the Ammonites: in a third, Chemosh the god of the Moabites. The reason whereof was, because in the days of Hezekiah they were neglected, no man adoring them; yet afterward when they occasioned idolatry, the good king Josiah did break them down, which Hezekiah in his time had spared; notwithstanding, is the same Hezekiah commended by God, as walking in the steps of David, as well as Josiah.
(2 Kn. 11:13)
To the point, Zanchius thought not this act of Hezekiah to be to katholikon [the universal thing], or an universal remedy for all abuses of ceremonies, when he said of some indifferent rites that had been abused, Tolli ea prorsus possunt, & saepe etiam debent [They can be altogether removed, and often ought to be]: they may, and sometimes they ought to be utterly abolished; sicut Hezekias [as Hezekiah did], even as did Hezekiah: Intimating that the example of Hezekiah is to hold, but sometimes only, that is, in case of necessity. For of some ceremonies that have been abused, he said only, tolli possunt [they can be removed], they may be removed. Which is a word of indifferency, and signifieth that they may be also not removed.
(2 Kgs. 23:13, 18:3, 22:2. Zanch., de Redempt. in 4 Praecept., p. 678)
But if that proceeding of Hezekiah, concerning those Israelites, against heathenish idolatry shall be still urged upon our magistrates, in respect of the popish ceremonies, wherewith they may seem to symbolize, although but in an outward appearance only, then are you to be informed of the manifest disparities in this comparison. First, that idolatry of the Jews being [p. 449]
done both publicly, and generally, and also within the bowels of the same church, (for the serpent was then kept at Jerusalem) called for an Hezekiah to remove it. But that which is done of Papists, is, in a church separated from us; or, if you will suppose any to be idolatrous among us, yet is that neither general, nor public; but, so secret, that it is done by you know not whom, unless you mean certain men moulded in your own fancies, and only imagined to have committed such idolatry.
The second distance may be this, that the case of reformation of the idolatry committed under the government of Hezekiah, became desperate, and therefore required an answerable remedy, which, as then the case stood, could be no other, then to abolish the figure without delay. But within the kingdoms of our Hezekiah, this disease would be found curable without any such extremity; especially in this our most truly reformed church, wherein we draw the sweet breath of the pure truth of God: if you will allow that to be called a reformed church, which doth most lively express the face and full body of her primitive mother-church. I spare to insist upon the grossness of that outward fact, which was offering incense, lest the weakness of some reader may suspect, that when I would excuse the Papists a tanto [from so much], I would free them a toto crimine [from the whole crime], by these comparisons.
Replier: The last thing which the Defendant will take knowledge of, as alleged out of the Scriptures in this point, is the example of Hezekiah, 2 Kgs. 18, in breaking down the brazen serpent. This example is so famous, that he could not omit it, yet he knoweth not well what to say unto it.
Answer: This is the last place alleged by the Abridgement, in this point, save that of Hosea 2:16,17, to which the [p. 450] Defendant gave answer sufficient, in his answer to that place of Lev. 26, as hath been shewed. Whether the Defendant knew not what to say to this famous example of Hezekiah; or rather that you knew not well what to reply to him, let the reader judge.
Replier: First, he giveth five reasons for the abolishing of the brazen serpent; as if any of us doubted but that Hezekiah had reason enough for that he did, or as if there could not be reasons enough alleged, and the like almost the very same, for abolishing of our ceremonies.
Answer: If you could have shewed that those five reasons which the Defendant gave, as just inducements to Hezekiah for breaking the brazen idol, would have held good against our ceremonies, you would have done it; and then you had indeed made a reply: instead whereof, you give us a jest or two.
Replier: Let them be abolished by public authority, and I will undertake reasons to justify the action done, will easily be acknowledged, even of those that now can see none to persuade unto the doing of it.
Answer: Like enough; and well enough. For many actions may be justified as lawful, which may not be required as necessary. And those ceremonies which cannot be justly condemned, as unlawful; may justly be abolished by public authority, as inconvenient. But we shall never believe, that these our ceremonies are guilty of high treason, as was the brazen serpent, whatever become of them. The Lord Protector was acquitted of the treason laid to his charge, though found guilty of felony in king Edward’s time.
Replier: Secondly, he propoundeth, as very observable, that Hezekiah did not abolish the idols which Solomon suffered to be set up, because they were neglected. But 1, it may well be thought, that those idols were destroyed by Hezekiah, and set up again before the time of Josiah, as many other superstitions were.
Answer: Say you so? Then belike it may well be thought, that the Holy Ghost knew not so well as you, what was done; for the text saith, that Josiah destroyed those high places
(2 Kn. 23:13) [p. 451]
which Solomon king of Israel had set up; and then describes, by the very place, where, and by name those same idols which Solomon had set up for his outlandish wives, 1 Kgs. 11:5,7. I hope you will repent this rashness, I am sure you should.
Replier: Secondly, it cannot be doubted, but they should have been destroyed, even though they were for the time neglected.
Answer: This proves not that they were, nor is it likely that God himself would have vouchsafed such thorough praises to Hezekiah, as he doth, 1 Kgs. 18:5, if Hezekiah had been bound to destroy those neglected idols, as well as others then taken in the manner, and did not say, why he was bound to doe that which he did not.
Replier: Because either Hezekiah had as good cause to destroy them as Josiah; or else, he might have prevented that cause which Josiah had; and to prevent evil, we are as well bound, as to correct it.
Answer: If Hezekiah had as good cause to destroy those high places which stood neglected, (and had done perhaps about three hundred years, even since the death of Solomon’s wives, whose chapels they were) as Josiah had, when Manasses, or Ammon had, after Hezekiah his time, revived that idolatry; the Holy Ghost would have taxed Hezekiah for not doing that, for doing whereof he commendeth Josiah; or at least, not have left his integrity crowned with like praises, as he doth, 2 Kgs. 18:5. Nor was Hezekiah bound to prevent the cause which Josiah had, unless he had suspected it. For though we are bound to prevent evil which we foresee, so far as we well can; yet are we not bound to foresee all that may happen. Neither are the same means always requisite for prevention, which must be used for recovery. If you think otherwise, burn all your popish books, lest they fall into the hands of popelings and doe mischief; for you are bound to prevent evil, as well as to correct it.
Replier: Thirdly, he citeth Zanchius to prove that this is not an universal remedy for all abuses of ceremonies. The place [p. 452] in Zanchie I cannot find; neither skilleth it much.
Answer: You sought it, as I perceive, in the edition of Neustadt, printed anno 1597, where you could not find it on pag. 678, for in that edition the words are on pag. 618. But the Defendant followed the later edition of 1613, where they are, as he quoted, pag. 678. But why say you, it skilleth not much: is Zanchie no body?
Replier: I grant the conclusion. It is not a remedy for all abuses of ceremonies, viz. for such as God’s appointment hath made necessary, to be retained.
Answer: This is not to grant, but to elude the conclusion; for Zanchie, in that place, speaks professedly of ceremonies which God’s appointment hath not made necessary, as namely, of the feasts of Christ’s nativity, resurrection, &c. Yea, and of days dedicated to God’s worship in commemoration of the Apostles, and martyrs; and, of them he saith, that such churches as doe retain them, and have purged away the superstitious abuse, are not to be blamed for it. Doe you grant this conclusion thus understood?
Replier: Besides, the words of Zanchie here cited by the Defendant, doe only therefore seem to make for him, because they are not full enough against him.
Answer: If they be not full against you, and for the Defendant, I confess mine eyes to be out. But if you will have Zanchie tell us his mind yet more fully, whether the example of Hezekiah require the abolishing of all ceremonies abused in popery, except such as be of divine institution, hear his words in the same book de Redempt., pag. 728 of the former edition; of the later edition, pag. 800, where, having from the example of Hezekiah and Josiah, and by other reasons proved, that to Christian princes it belongs to overturn idolies, and exhorted them to see to it, that God is purely worshipped, where he permits not idolatry; he adds, Loquor autem non de rebus indifferentibus, sed de rebus doctrina aperte idololatricis [But I speak not of indifferent things, but of things openly idolatrous in doctrine]; but I speak not of indifferent ceremonies (and such elsewhere he confesseth these in question to be) but of things manifestly idolatrous: then he explains himself, saying; * Neque enim, &c. [For neither, &c.] For, if the papists would em-
marginal note: * Neque enim si Pontificii velint sane damnare idololatricam aperte doctrinam, verumque cultum et puram sacramentorum administrationem… [approximate reading; a badly worn marginal note] [For if the Papists would soundly condemn what is openly idolatrous doctrine, and the true worship and pure administration of the sacraments…] [p. 453]
brace sound doctrine, and the true worship, and sincere administration of the sacraments, a prince should not be too strait-laced in yielding to them certain ceremonies, which are not evil in themselves, and which shall have no superstition annexed to them. Doe you not see that Zanchie is of our mind, that there is not required in indifferent ceremonies abused, the same course, that in case of an idol, or things properly idolatrous, there is: and, that the example of Hezekiah extendeth not to all abused human ceremonies? Is not this full enough for the Defendant? Or, skills it not what Zanchi says?
marginal note: Difficile est probare, obiter praecepta in consuetudinem ceremonias aliquot per se minimas, & quae nullam habeant adiunctam superstitionem [approximate reading] [It is difficult to prove, incidentally, that some ceremonies, in themselves very slight and having no superstition attached to them, are precepts…]
Replier: But in other places of the same book Zanchius’ judgement is plain enough, as pag. 649, where from this example (of Hezekiah) he reproveth those that keep the relics of superstition in some holy places, though they have removed them out of the churches.
Answer: In this place which you cite, Zanchie proveth, by the example of Hezekiah, that all the monuments of superstition which are Ad nihil utilia, valde autem perniciosa [Of no use, but very harmful], good for nothing and extremely perilous, ought to be abolished: and therefore wonders at such men, as keep in secret those monuments (he saith not, as you, relics) of superstition, which were cast out of the church as looking for a day when superstitions may (as they wish) return. Lay this place and the other together, and you shall find that Zanchie doth distinguish betwixt monuments of idolatry or superstition, properly so called, and indifferent ceremonies abused only to superstition; which two, you confound without equity or reason.
Replier: And if about this matter the Defendant doth ascribe any thing to the judgement of our divines, why doth he not answer the testimonies of Aug., Calvin, Martyr, Wolphius, Lavater, Zanchius, Sadeel, Jewell, Bilson, Fulke, Rainolds, Andrewes, Perkins, alleged to this purpose in the Abridgement, pag. 24.
Answer: It had been, in this place, unseasonable to answer at full to that, which in another place is objected. Howbeit, the minds of all the rest may appear in Zanchie, who is [p. 454] one of them: and by this, that such as are known defenders of these our ceremonies in hand, (as Martyr, Jewell, Bilson, Fulke, and Andrewes) are cited there, whence it must needs be, that they urge the example of Hezekiah against the proper monuments of idolatry which are of no necessary use, but not against ceremonies, as you would have it conceived.
Replier: Fourthly, and lastly (which only indeed is to the purpose) the Defendant would shew us a disparity betwixt the idolatry of the Jews, and that of the Papists. The first is, that that idolatry of the Jews was done publicly and generally, and in the bowels of the same church, but the Papists’ is not so. To which I answer. 1. These circumstances are not rendered as reasons, of the abolishing in the text, but invented by the Defendant.
Answer: These circumstances accompany the thing done: and though the text doe not render them as reasons, yet any man may conceive that they might be reasons: for suppose, that in Bethel, the ten tribes had set up such another brazen serpent in relation to that at Jerusalem, and burned incense to it: but they of Jerusalem, had used this well as a religious monument only, would Hezekiah, for the idolatry openly committed with the like serpent in Bethel, have defaced that at Jerusalem: or, ought he to have done it? If not, why doe you urge the abolishing of these our ceremonies in England, for the abuses which Papists have of them in other countries, and not here in our sight, knowledge, or sufferance.
Replier: 2. Private particular idolatry is to be removed, as well as public and general.
Answer: Private particular idolatry is removed de iure [by right], by law, out of our land as well as public and general; de facto [in fact], it can never be so well removed. And if stolen abuses of ceremonies shall make them still unlawful in public use, the church shall lawfully use none at all.
Replier: 3. All these circumstances did more then agree to our ceremonies in the beginning of our reformation.
Answer: You reckon in this, as she did reckon the charge [p. 455] of her brewing, who forgot the malt, which was the chief. For though in the beginning of our reformation, the abuse of these ceremonies was public and general, as was that of the brazen serpent; yet were they never the object of gross idolatry, as that was; but, the subject of superstition only: this, which is the main, you forget. Reckon again.
1. If Hezekiah had forbidden bowing down to God in sacrificing, or lifting up the hands to him, because idolaters had done so to Baal, and had been therein commended, you had fitted us. But so shall you never doe, with the example of an idol. Therefore our reformers, casting away all the monuments of idolatry, thought it lawful to retain these ceremonies, and only to purge them (at the first reformation) from their old abuse.
2. What if then they ought, in respect of the public abuse, to have been removed, will it follow that they ought now also to be cast off, when that abuse would not be known unto any man’s offence, if such as you did not rake it out of the grave?
Replier: And sure they are not grown better since, by any good they have done.
Answer: But if the like abuse of them be not now at all: or, at least, not general, or public as it was before the reformation, they are (in that respect) grown better, and that is the point here considered: and not, what good they have done.
Replier: The second difference which the Defendant imagineth, is, that there was no other means to cure the idolatry of those times but now there is. I answer first, this is the very question whether there be any other sufficient means to cure the disease of human ceremonies idolatrously abused beside abolishing.
Answer: This indeed, you make a question of: but, who else? For when the superstitious opinion of them (which you captiously call idolatrous abuse) shall be taken out of the minds of men, their disease is cured: which, as darkness brought in, so, light may expel.
Replier: Secondly, it is a vain imagination whereby this difference is confirmed and no reason at all in the dominions of our [p. 456] Hezekiah (says the Defendant) this disease would be found curable without any such extremity: but the experience which, in the last fifty or sixty years shew, that hitherto it is not cured, neither in Ireland, nor Wales, to say nothing of England.
Answer: It is no vain imagination to say, that soundness of doctrine is sufficient to cure the superstitious abuse of indifferent ceremonies. And the experience which, in the last fifty or sixty years, we have had in this land, confirms this, there being now, so many thousands who place no superstition in them, as in former times generally men did; and, not a few who doe even superstitiously abhor them, as they have (of some) been taught. In Ireland, Wales, or England such as have not yet embraced the Gospel, and doe still adhere to popery, are unhealed of their superstitious conceits of these ceremonies; which proveth not, that the means are not means sufficient to cure this, but that they are not well applied; or, not omnipotent. And the taking away of the ceremonies utterly, would have rather enraged, then healed: for that like superstition may be found in the popish sort, which live, where these ceremonies are not retained. The waters of the sanctuary healed not the marshes, and yet were sufficient to heal the dead sea, Ezek. 47:9,10,11.
Replier: Surely our prelates are miserable physicians, that in a disease so easy to be cured, suffer the patient to languish under their hands unto death.
Answer: You are in your trims, when you can by any occasion fly upon the faces of our bishops. If they have not been careful to apply the medicine, they are miserable. If the patients have stubbornly refused to take it, they are miserable. But still the medicine may be sufficient, if it were duly given and received. And this medicine may cure, without abscission of the ceremonies; but, not abscission, without this. Probatum saepius [Proven many times].
Replier: Especially (says he) in this our most truly reformed church, which doth most lively express the face and full body of her primitive mother-church. This he hath [p. 457] now 3 or 4 times repeated: as if he did desire to make a question of it, and here propounds it, with a doubt, if you will allow. It is not fit here to make a long digression about this matter. In short therefore thus, we allow with all thankfulness that our church is to be called a reformed church in regard of the main points of faith, which are purely and freely taught among us with public approbation: and also in regard that the grossest superstitions are by public authority cast out of our assemblies. But, if our ecclesiastical government be considered, and some ceremonious superstitions, we deny utterly that we have such a reformation therein, as may represent the face of the primitive church.
Answer: 1. The Defendant spake only of the pureness of doctrine, as a means sufficient to cure the disease of ceremonies. And, in that respect, compared the face of this church of England, with that of the primitive church. This addition, If you will acknowledge such a church to be a reformed church, we see had some reason, seeing you stumble at this, and hereupon make a digression, of which there was no need, save for easing your stomach of something which lay upon it. The Defendant laid the comparison betwixt face and face, or body and body, which consist in the pureness of doctrine and religion: you require trial hereof to be made by some things of the external government, which are not the face or body, but as it were the hair, or clothing of the church. 2. You charge us with some ceremonious superstition, you mean, in respect of some human significant ceremonies we use; and speak, as if (in this behalf) we might not compare with the primitive church. But because you know that the primitive church we speak of (that is, which succeeded the age of the Apostles) had many more such significant ceremonies then we, you waive this point, in your particular queries; which was wisely done. 3. If the ambulatory points of government must needs be counted, of the face of the church, the doctrine and religious worship, much more. Take all with you (as is fit, in making comparison) and put it to trial; not, whether the face of the church hath now, or had then some freckles, and [p. 458] flesh-moles in it: but, whether the face of this church of England, be not as fair, and lovely, as was the face of the primitive church, in the second and third ages next after the Apostles. Remember the issue. And because we affirm, and you deny, let our proofs be first brought in, and we shall after hear your disproofs, or queries.
First then, we confess the external discipline of the primitive church to have been more exact and severe, and our reformers profess our want of something: our (a) apologie saith, We are come as near to them, as we well could; it saith not, as could be. In this, we are not comparable with those times. But look at many material points of doctrine, how they were taught then, by some of the best and clearest lights of the church; and you must say, that therein they may not compare with the grace of God vouchsafed to this church now: for example, in the second and third centuries (which are the two first ages after the Apostles) there was either some want of clearness, or else a manifest touch of error, in the doctrine about a predestination, b fall of angels, c free-will, d repentance, e fulfilling of the law, f the first resurrection, g apocryphal Scriptures, h the matter of justification, i the state of souls departed, k necessity of unction after baptism, l the merit of martyrdom, m against second marriages, n the merit of fasting, o praying for the blessed souls departed, p the giving the Lord’s supper to baptized infants: (wherein they differ, from the present tenets of the Romish church, as well as from ours, and from the truth.)
Preface to the Book of Common Prayer.
(a) Jewel, Def., pag. 17,28. See D. Field’s Fifth Book of the Church, cap. 27,28,&9. See the Centuries. a Cent. 2, cap. 4, pag. 44
b Pag. 37 and 121
c Pag. 58,50
d Pag. 62, and Cent. 3, p. 54
e Pag. 59
f Pag. 66,67
g Pag. 68,69
h Cent. 3, p. 52
i Pag. 60 & 67
k Pag. 81
l Pag. 85
m Pag. 86
n Ibidem
o See the Ep. of Meth.
p Cent. 3, pag. 133
Beside such other opinions as were generally condemned by the church, which we impute not to her, though bred in her bosom.
In the matter of external worship the church in those ages had sundry things in use which we have not; some, indeed (in your account) evil. Consecrating of the water for baptism as necessary; and so, mixing of water with the wine, in the supper; taking the bread in public, and eating it at home; sending of part of the bread to the sick, or to other churches, for a token of communion in the faith; thrice dipping, kissing the baptized, (in the solemnity of baptism) [p. 459] and crossing; exorcising, tasting of wine, milk, and honey; putting on a white coat; not washing of a week after; imposition of hands and unction; all these used as significant ceremonies, not as operative: peculiar garments for the minister in administering the Lord’s supper; ministering of it upon an altar; altars built in memory of the martyrs, and over their relics; observation of their nativity, or death-days, but to God’s honor; standing in prayer on all the Lord’s days betwixt Easter and Whitsunday; prayer for the patriarchs, Apostles, and martyrs, though in bliss; their faces in public prayer turned to the east only; reading of some apocryphal books, as divine, and refusing some of the canon; to say nothing of their ceremonies of marriages, and burials, their weekly set fasts, and Lent, their anniversary feasts, not alone of Christ’s nativity, resurrection, &c. but of martyrs, kept to the honor of God, in memory of his martyrs. All of which, and more, the second or third centuries, Cap. 6, you may find avouched out of the records of those times, and most of them noted in Mr. Sprint’s book.
As touching the frame of external discipline, and officers thereof, we find that in the primitive church and long before that first Nicene council, they had for the combination of all particular churches, in the highest degree, patriarchs; under them, primates or metropolitans; under them, bishops in every particular city church, (which they had even from the Apostles’ times,) and under them, presbyters, as coadjutors, and deacons, as the Apostles had ordained. And below the deacons, sub-deacons, lectors, exorcists, ostiaries, acoluthes, and soon after, deans, and archpresbyters, serving in some part to the bishops as officials, and chorepiscopi, and viviers also. See for this, Magdeburg., Cent. 3, cap. 7, Conc. Nic. 1, Can. 6.
(Magdeb., Cent. 3, cap. 7, Cent. Nic. 1, can. 6. See also D. Field, lib. 5, c. 27,28,29)
Now, if all officers, and all additions to the essential parts of discipline, prescribed in the word, be unlawful; and, all significant human ceremonies be, in God’s worship, superstitious, as your new tradition fancieth: then was the face of the primitive church much more spotted, then is the face of [p. 460] the church of England, in that respect also: and verily, in some things, was so indeed. We conclude therefore, that however in some things we are not so well, yet seeing in many other, and of greater moment, we are (by the mercy of God) in a better estate, it is no pride, no presumption in us, to compare face with face, body with body; but, either ignorance, or partiality in you, to judge otherwise. And we doubt not but such, as shall duly compare all things together, will say, that though the face of this church of England be, in the forehead of discipline, more freckled; yet, because it is in the eyes of doctrine, and in the cheeks as it were of religion, more fair and beauteous then that of the aforesaid primitive church, the face of it is (in comparison) the fairer, Glory be to thee O Lord. Now take your course, and bring in your disproofs and spare not.
Replier: Let the Defendant tell us if ever the primitive church had such chanting idol service, as is every day to be seen in our cathedral churches.
Answer: Chanting is an English-French word, and is no more but singing. The primitive church worshipped God in singing of psalms, and hymns, and songs to his honor: and this, she held to be essential worship to God (as we doe) according to Col. 3:5, Eph. 5:19. But the manner of singing, she believed to be (a) variable, for order, comeliness, and edification. And therefore sometimes all sung together, as we, in our assemblies, the council of Antioch forbade this to women; and, that ancient council of (b) Laodicea, to all men, save such as were canonically appointed, perhaps for some discord of voices (of which (c) Chrysostome in his time complained) when all sung together. The primitive church had certain (d) hymns composed and sung to the honor of Christ, and not only psalms of Scripture. The primitive church sung their public psalms and hymns by (e) turns quire-like, anthems, (antiphona,) as the women answered the men, Exod. 15. (f) Sometimes their singing was but like fair long reading, sometimes with modulation of the (g) voice, with which Saint Augustine was so much affected. And what doe they, but
(a) Tot pene psallentium chori quot gentium diversitates [approximate; “as many choirs of singers as there are diversities of nations”], Hier., Epist. 17, ad Marc., cap. 6.
(b) Concil. Laodic., can. 15.
(c) Chrysost., 8, Isai. hom.
(d) Euseb., Hist., lib. 5, cap. 27, and 7, cap. 24.
(e) Basil, Ep. 63, ad Cler. Neocaesar.
(f) See Junius in Exod. 15.
(g) Aug., Confess., lib. 9, cap. 6 and 7, & lib. 10, cap. 33.
[p. 461] this, in our cathedral churches; save that organs, or other musical instruments are added to the voices of men. And is this manner of singing to God, idol-service? What is our God an idol? Is such a manner of singing as he ordained, or allowed for his service in the temple and out of it (1 Chr. 15:27,28, and 17:4,5, etc.) (not as a significant, typical ceremony, but as a comely expression and help unto the devotions of his people, and not in the New Testament forbidden.) Is this service (I say) fit only for an idol? Or rather, have you not spoken rashly and sinfully in calling it so?
The broken music hinders (you will say) the understanding. I answer, that this hurts not much, where the matter is familiarly known; as with us: and how much music (being grave and well becoming the holiness of such a service) works upon the affections, all men feel whose hearts are not averse by distraction, stupidity, or prejudice. Indeed if it appear to be set out with curiosity and ostentation of art, wanton, or light, or unsuitable harmony, such as only pleaseth the ear, and doth not naturally serve to the very kind and degree of those impressions which the matter that goeth with it leaveth, or is apt to leave in men’s minds: you know who* hath already given you this free censure of such church-music, that it doth rather blemish and disgrace that we do, then add either beauty or furtherance unto it. What would you have more? It is not (you will say) such music with which God is taken. True, nor so used, or intended. But it is intended for an help unto* men, to stir up that grace or melody in the heart in praising of God, with which only, God is pleased. And this is no idol service I trow.
marginal note: * M. Hook., Eccl. Pol., l. 5, sect. 38. * Iusti. respons. ad Quaest. Orth., Quest. 107. See also his caution herein, Epist. ad Zenam & Serenum.
Replier: If there were in the primitive church chancellors, commissaries, officials under the bishops, which executed the censures of that church? (Cypri., lib. 3, Ep. 14. See also for the Cent., Cent. 2 and 3, cap. 6 and 7)
Answer: 1. No; nor did any presbyters, without leave, or consent of their bishops, then execute any church censures: nor did any unpreaching, or lay-elders at all execute any censures of the church. And yet we hold these lawful officials, or commissaries of the churches to which they serve in the discipline, if they be well bounded. 2. When the bishops (See Doctor Field, Of the Church, lib. 4, cap. 26. the places)…
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