

PHILOSOPHY, THE HANDMAIDEN OF THEOLOGY

This is,

A Pious and Sober Explanation of Philosophical Questions that Frequently
Occur in Theological Disputations.

By the Author R. BARONIO, Professor of Philosophy during his lifetime.

A more correct edition than the previous one.

At the expense of T. Robinson & R. Davis

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TO THE CANDID READER

When, four years ago, some learned young men of noble birth, who had come here from lower Germany to pursue a richer cultivation of their intellect, strongly urged me to show them the use of Philosophy in Holy Theology, and to extract and select from each part of Philosophy, but especially from Metaphysics, those things that seemed to have a principal use in discussing Theological controversies, it pleased me to grant their honorable and laudable petition, and to undertake a labor of such a kind that would be of assistance and benefit to them and to me in Holy Theology. For because I had dedicated myself entirely to those sacred studies, than which, as is right, I hold nothing more dear, nor ever will, I therefore referred all my small philosophical lucubrations to Holy Theology as to their ultimate end, and I wished that Philosophy itself would acknowledge the authority of its mistress, Theology, and humbly serve as her handmaiden.

Wherefore, that I might in some part satisfy the pious desire of those young men, I began to turn over the volumes of the Metaphysicians and the Sententiaries, and to explain, according to my own measure, those philosophical problems which frequently occur in the controversies of this age, and by which heretics are accustomed to deceive the more simple. When I had accomplished this and those excellent Belgians had returned to their fatherland, I wished the rough and unpolished collection of my disputations to lie in the darkness of eternal night, nor did the slightest thought of publishing them or committing them to the press ever enter my mind. But because some learned and serious men with whom I have the greatest familiarity approved of those exercises, whatever they are, and thought that they could bring some increase to the candidates of Theology in the study of Controversies, I began to think about the publication of this little work, and to lick into shape, with a little more labor, the unformed offspring of my little intellect, not indeed that I might gather fame from those vigils and labors, but that I might promote the studies of those who, having laid the groundwork of the philosophical disciplines in the celebrity of the Academy and obtained public testimony of their progress, are now for the first time beginning to consider those argumentative controversies, thorny and bristling with difficulties, which the Emissaries of Satan, that is, the Sophists of this age, have from time to time raised against the faithful and pious servants of Jesus Christ.

For since in this last age of the world, that sinuous and insidious Serpent, with all the reins of his furies let loose, has sent forth his ministers, seized and incited by a Tartarean blast, to block up the senses of men with the filth of false opinions, and to instill that dark and pestilential venom of anti-Christian dogmas into incautious youth under the appearance of philosophical milk; therefore, in the study of theological controversies, it is especially useful to linger seriously in those parts of Philosophy from which the Sophists draw their petty reasonings:

for in this way the more simple will be forewarned, and the mouths of those veterans will be stopped, who, under the pretext of true Philosophy and Theology, raging in the bosom of the Church, try to overthrow it obliquely and as if through tunnels: led by this care and thought, I undertook this troublesome labor, which if it be salutary for the Republic and the Church, if it be pleasing and acceptable to candid estimators of things, I shall not seem to have wasted my effort, but to have reaped a great fruit from it, and to have harvested an excellent crop.

I have performed in this little work what I could perform, according to the measure of grace granted to me by the Lord, in such a great mass of occupations accumulating from all sides: I have performed it, I say, not to satisfy in every way the most polished judgments of serious and learned men, but to come to the aid of weak intellects, for whom the philosophical trifles of the heretics create great trouble. This is my attempt, this my purpose, this my labor, for which I vehemently again and again ask His most glorious Majesty that the Lord may bless it.

To Mr. R. BARONIO,

His former student.

"The threads twisted with a light spindle, and polished with a recent file,
Which are imbued with the dogmas of the Greek and Latin Minerva alike,
And with holy simplicity.

Which will not convince the enemies, though they burst their guts,
Posterity will receive with a grateful heart;

You stand before the doors, do you hesitate to admit fame?

And do you doubt to receive rewards for your work?

Let the papers that will live after you, live while you are alive;

Glory comes too late for ashes.

There is no reason for you to fear decay, nor the slow wounds
Of the bookworm; nor the vain trumpets of the Cynic's class,
When the wild fig tree splits the Mausoleum, and the high
Marbles of great Kings will be rotten.

You will be spoken of on the living lips of learned men,
And you will survive in the better part of yourself.

Scorn the bites of Thersites, and it is better to neglect
Humble whispers, when you cannot control them.

Zoilus finds fault with the sandals of the Idalian goddess,
When he has nothing in the goddess to censure.

You traverse the remote places of the Muses, trodden by no one's
Sole before, but first pressed by your foot.

As the armor-bearing bird of Jupiter snatched the boy from here:
So your genius will carry you above the stars."

For the sake of love and congratulation, F.

H. DANSKINUS, Professor of Belles-Lettres,

St. Andrews

To his dearest friend, Mr. R. Baronio.

"No art is in need of another's help; and all things remain

Associated with others in a friendly pact.

Yet so that every servant may be of service: and to them

Let her confess herself bound by a handmaid's aid.

Here the labor of Philosophy especially stands out: if with no

False color, she shines with her own simplicity.

For this one makes the oracles of truth to be revealed in the heavenly chamber,

So that each may shine with its own light.

If the chains of the Sophists are to be dissolved, this one

Uncovers their hidden snares and opens their deceits.

If solid faith is to be strengthened by reason, if heresy is to be slain,

By this work she accomplishes both.

But what good things are not perverted to evil uses,

If fury, or error, or self-love persuades?

Thus Philosophy is to be employed for right uses, while the Lesbian rule,

Made false, harms the Sophist with its inborn genius.

Hence the sacred writings teem with so many and such great errors: the mighty

Lernaeon swamp of heresies of the God of the Underworld thrives.

True oracles are wrapped in darkness: their beautiful flames

Do not shine for Phoebus as they should.

Do you wish to see the use of Philosophy in sacred matters, a thing to be held fast?

Do you wish to know how she may serve her mistress?

Read this. You will see the problems of Philosophy treated,

With great and very easy judgment,

Adapted to divine things, without deceit or tricks,

With ingenuous candor, with new dexterity.

Use it: thus you will scorn the feeble weapons of the Ubiquitarian:

The ingenious mass of Arminius will fall:

Those swollen decrees which the cunning Bellarmine patched together in his vast Roman order

For the Romulean cause will fall.

Can anyone be more useful by his labor?

Can anyone adorn his Sparta more nobly?

Go on then, Baronio: proceed where the prayers of the good,

Where virtue, where your generous mind calls you.

To deserved praises, to true honors, the rewards

Of your virtues, the way is now laid open for you."

JACOBUS GLEGIUS,

Professor in Taydunum

FIRST EXERCISE, On Being, Essence, Existence, Subsistence, Suppositum, Person. In which those METAPHYSICAL terms are explained, and their use in Holy Theology is declared.

SECOND EXERCISE, On the Origin of the Soul, & the propagation of Sin. In which the common opinion is explained and defended. And all the ways by which others explain the transmission of souls and the propagation of sin are confuted.

THIRD EXERCISE, On Faith, Science, & Opinion: In which the nature of Faith is clearly explained, and the errors of the Pontificians and Arminians concerning the habit of faith are detected.

In arranging these questions I have not followed the order of nature, but the order of easier cognition: in proposing and explaining them, however, I have aimed for clarity and brevity of speech, not for the splendors and charms of words, and therefore in assigning distinctions and accurate explanations of things, I have judged that those barbarous, rough, horrid, but clear names, almost cognate to the things themselves, which the Scholastic Doctors and interpreters of Metaphysics use, are to be preferred to Ciceronian words: I have also added to the philosophical disputations certain purely Theological questions; but I have treated them in a philosophical manner: and this so that the enemies of the Church may know that the dogmas of our faith so surpass the grasp of human reason that they are, nevertheless, true and in no way adverse to right reason.

If you wish to know (candid Reader) what problems are treated in these exercises, I will briefly propose their summary to you.

In the first exercise, first I propose some divisions of real Being, so that from them I may gather the explanation of these words, *Ens*, *Essentia*, *Existentia*, *Suppositum*, & *Persona* (Being, Essence, Existence, Suppositum, & Person). Second, I explain these words. Third, I apply this doctrine to the persons of the Trinity.

In the second Disputation, first I propose and explain the common opinion on the *Origin of the soul, & the Propagation of sin*. Second, I confute the opinions of others on the *Origin of the soul, and the propagation of sin*.

In the third, first I compare *Faith* with *Science* and *Opinion*. Second, I discuss various questions about the nature of *Faith*. Third, I show that *Charity* is not the form of faith, and that religion and Theology do not really differ from Faith.

INDEX OF THE ARTICLES OF THE FIRST EXERCISE

1. The first division of real Being is presented, and it is shown that only God is a necessary Being.
2. The second division of real Being is proposed, and it is proven that only God is Being by essence.
3. The third division is brought forward, and it is explained how God is pure act.
4. The fourth division of real Being is brought forward, which is derived from the modes of existing.
5. Explanation of these words: Being, Essence, Existence, Subsistence, Suppositum, and Person.
6. Whether in creatures, the suppositum and its singular nature differ in reality.
7. What is the reason why philosophers attribute the composition from Essence & Existence, and likewise from Essence & Subsistence, to created Substances, but not to God.
8. Whether, this being posited, that all perfection is of the essence of God, it follows that personal subsistence is of his essence: & whether God, insofar as he is communicable to the three persons of the Trinity, is a person, as Cajetan states.
9. Whether God, as he is common to the three persons, is a singular substance: & whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances.
10. Whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a person: likewise whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is everywhere.
11. Whether the arguments of the Ubiquitarians, drawn from the personal union, are valid.
12. Whether the personal subsistence of the Word (τοῦ λόγου) is communicated to his human nature: & whether they speak correctly, who say that the Humanity of Christ subsists everywhere through the subsistence of the Word (τοῦ λόγου); likewise that it exists everywhere according to its personal Being.

INDEX OF THE ARTICLES OF THE SECOND EXERCISE

1. On the diversity of material and immaterial forms.
2. On the twofold causality of matter, and its potentiality; on the eduction of forms from the potency of matter.
3. Whether the rational soul is from transmission (*ex traduce*).
4. Whether and how man is said to truly generate man.
5. Whether generation is posited in the production of form, or rather in the conjunction of form with matter.
6. Whether the preceding doctrine removes the propagation of original sin.
7. The arguments which are usually brought against the preceding doctrine concerning the propagation of native corruption through the seed of the parents are solved.
8. Some questions concerning the propagation of original sin are proposed and solved.
9. The weaker arguments which are usually brought against the creation and infusion of the soul are dispelled.
10. Whether a more convenient or more expeditious reason can be given for the transmission of concupiscence, or the propensity to evil, which we have said is the third part of original sin.
11. Two other opinions on the transmission of sin are considered.
12. It is shown that those who oppose the creation of souls dissent much among themselves; and the first three of their opinions on the origin of the soul are confuted.
13. The fourth opinion, which is that of Balthasar Meisner, is refuted.
14. The fifth opinion, which is that of Timothy Bright of Cambridge, is confuted.
15. That all the opinions of the Adversaries on Transmission (*de Traduce*) have now been confuted: likewise that no one from that number can explain the propagation of sin more safely or more easily than we, who defend the creation of souls.

INDEX OF THE ARTICLES OF THE THIRD EXERCISE

1. On the deformity, certitude, and evidence of the assents of our mind.
2. How to know, to believe, and to opine differ among themselves.
3. Whether faith is always of things not seen.
4. Whether faith can exist at the same time with knowledge concerning the same proposition, and in the same intellect.
5. On the division of faith into Explicit and Implicit; and whether the inevidence which we attribute to faith makes for the blind and implicit faith of the Pontificians.
6. On the triple light; namely of nature, of faith or grace, and of glory.
7. Whether there is given to wayfarers any light clearer than the light of faith.
8. In which we solve three questions: The first is, whether faith is well distinguished into infused and acquired? The second is, Whether faith is more certain than knowledge itself? The third is, What is it properly to believe in God?
9. The opinion of Nicolaus Grevinchovius is refuted, who asserts that the habit of faith is not infused, but acquired.
10. Whether faith, actual or habitual, is infused into infants, or can be in them.
11. Whether there is faith in Demons.
12. Whether faith was in the soul of Christ: And, whether it is in the Saints, who, now translated into heaven, have the facial knowledge of God, as the Scholastics say.
13. Whether the Remonstrants rightly deny that Adam before the Fall had the power of believing in Christ.
14. Whether the object of faith can be false.
15. How that argument of the Remonstrants should be solved: Whatever each one is bound to believe, that is true, etc.
16. Whether faith is a discursive assent: And, whether the Pontificians are caught in a circular discourse in establishing faith.
17. Whether knowledge is an act elicited from the habit of faith.
18. Whether trust is an act of faith.
19. Whether trust is an act of the intellect, and how it differs from assent.
20. Whether the object of saving faith is the remission of sins already obtained; or whether it is the remission of sins to be sought and obtained: Wherein is incidentally solved the principal argument of Bellarmine against the object and nature of justifying faith.
21. Whether and to what extent faith pertains to the will.
22. Whether Charity is the form of faith.
23. Whether Religion is a Theological virtue distinct from Faith.
24. It is shown that the Theology of Wayfarers is taken in three ways, and it is proven that Theology taken in the first way is not a habit really distinct from Faith.

25. It is proven, against Antonius Ruuius, that Theology taken in the second way is not science, but divine faith.
 26. It is proven that Theology taken in the third way, that is, Scholastic Theology, is a habit aggregated from Faith and the philosophical disciplines.
 27. That Theology is similar to all the Aristotelian habits, but especially to prudence.
 28. Whether Theology is a speculative or a practical discipline.
 29. Whether the Theology of Wayfarers can be called speculative from the speculation, or vision, which will be in the Fatherland.
 30. Whether true and properly so-called Theology can be in an impious, or unregenerate, man.
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FIRST EXERCISE: On Being and Essence

ART. I. The first division of real Being is presented, and it is shown that only GOD is a necessary Being.

1. Real Being is first divided into finite and infinite; that is, into creator and creature: which division, indeed, is accustomed to be delivered and proposed in many other ways: for some propose this division thus: one Being is from itself, another from another: others thus: of Beings, some are or exist by essence, others by participation: others thus: one Being is necessary, another contingent. The glorious GOD is infinite being, not having existence from another: likewise he is Being by essence, and supremely necessary: Creatures, however, are finite beings, having existence from another, and therefore not necessary, but contingent.
2. The first two ways of proposing this division do not need explanation: but the last two are not so clear: therefore they demand a longer explanation: I will begin from the last division, which is into necessary Being, and contingent Being. The glorious GOD is called a necessary Being, because it is necessary for him always to exist in act; for GOD cannot deprive himself of his being, that is, of his act of existence, nor can anything else do so, since he does not depend on another. Creatures, however, are contingent beings; that is, they exist contingently: for they depend on the conservative power of a freely acting cause; that is, of GOD, who before he gave them being, could have not given it; and after he has given it, can take it away.
3. Many things are usually objected here concerning the necessity of separated substances, celestial bodies, prime matter, universal natures, and necessary propositions, to which eternal truth is attributed by the philosophers: but because these thorny questions deter many by their difficulty, and call them away from philosophical studies: I, omitting them, will proceed to other things which are more necessary and pleasant.

ART. II. The second division of real Being is proposed, and it is proven that only GOD is Being by essence.

1. The other division is into Being by essence, and Being by participation. Being by essence is the glorious GOD, who exists by the power of his own essence. Beings by participation, however, are created beings, which do not have an actual and real existence in the world, unless it is communicated and participated from another, by which they were produced; that is, GOD. But that it may be understood in what way GOD is said to exist by the power of his essence, let these fundamentals be held: First, the Existence of GOD is of his essence; that is, it is not something superadded to the divine essence, nor ought it to be conceived by us as something superadded to it, but it is something included in the very essence of GOD, no less than animality or rationality is contained in the

human essence: this, however, is shown thus: every substantial perfection is of the essence of GOD (for the essence of GOD would not be of infinite perfection if any perfection were given which his essence does not contain in itself) but existence is a substantial perfection, as is manifest to anyone: therefore it is of the essence of GOD. Just as, therefore, it is of the essence of man to be an animal, or a body, or a substance, so it is of the essence of GOD to be something actually existing.

2. On the contrary, it is neither necessary nor possible for the existence of a creature to be of its essence. It is not necessary, because the essence of a creature is not of infinite perfection. It is not possible, because whatever is of the essence of a thing, that necessarily belongs to the thing, and its affirmation concerning that thing is necessary and of eternal truth. But existence does not behave so in creatures: for I do not truly say, it is necessary for a rose to exist, or it is necessary for thunder to exist: for they can not exist. But I do truly say, it is necessary for a rose to be a flower: or for thunder to be a sound, even when the rose and the thunder do not exist. From which it is clear that these are essential predications, but not those. This reason not only proves that existence is not of the essence of a creature: but also that existence does not necessarily follow the essence of a creature, or emanate from it. For whatever is from essential emanation, that is necessarily affirmed of the thing to which it is essential: but actual existence (as has been said) belongs to creatures contingently. In the meantime we admit that the capacity or potency for existence belongs not contingently, but necessarily and essentially to every real being, whether created or uncreated: but the same is not to be said of actual existence.
3. Let this be the second foundation: If anyone should ask whence it is that GOD exists, and cannot not exist: no reason can be brought forward, except this one, namely because his essence is of infinite perfection; that is, it contains all perfection in itself, and therefore also existence. Whence it is clear that GOD is rightly said to exist by the power of his essence. But if the question is moved concerning creatures, namely whence it is that they now actually exist: it is not to be answered that this happens because such is their essence, or because that is the condition of their essence: for their essence is indifferent to existing and not existing; that is, it can exist or not exist according to the will of GOD. But it should be answered that the true reason for that thing is because their essence, which before was only possible and apt for existing, has now been endowed with the very act of existence by GOD and secondary causes. Therefore, creatures cannot be said to exist by the power of their essence, but by the power of the causes from which they were produced, and especially of the first cause. Whence it follows that they are not beings by their own essence, but by participation and reception of existence from the first cause. Furthermore, the reason for this thing can be rendered from this foundation, which is very clear: this is the condition of the divine essence,

that it cannot not exist, nor participate its existence from another: but this is the condition of the created essence, that it can, according to the will of the first cause, have or not have existence, and that it cannot exist, except by participating the act of existence from the first cause. Whence it is clear that the first cause exists by the power of its essence: but secondary causes, or created beings, do not exist by the power of their essence, but by the action of the first cause, from which they receive actual existence.

4. The third foundation. The essence of a creature is really and truly called potency; but the existence of a creature can well be called an act superadded to the essence: this, however, is declared thus: just as physical matter is called potency, and physical form act, because matter in itself, and from itself, has no form, but is capable of form, or can receive a form: so the essence of a creature can be called potency, because it neither contains existence in itself, nor has it from itself, but is capable of it or can receive it, and participate it from the first cause: but on the contrary, the essence of GOD behaves far differently, for it contains in itself the act of existing: and therefore it does not relate to existence as potency to act, for no potency contains its act in itself, but refers to its act as to something external. And this much concerning the division of Being into finite and infinite.

ART. III. The Third division of real Being is brought forward, and it is explained how GOD is pure act.

1. Thirdly, real being is divided into that which is merely actual, that which is merely potential, and that which is partly actual, partly potential, or mixed from potency and act. A merely potential being is that which does not exist in act, but can exist: such a being is a rose in winter. It should be noted here that philosophers commonly say that those beings which do not actually exist, but can really exist, are in objective potency: for the object of the productive power which is in causes is that which is producible by causes, or that which has not yet received existence from causes, but can receive it. Therefore, some possible being, as long as it does not actually exist, is the object of the productive power of causes, and therefore it is said to be in objective potency, because, that is, it has that potency which belongs to things as long as they are objects of some causative power. But when that being is actually produced, and has received existence from causes, it is no longer the object of the productive power of causes, and for that reason it is said not to be in objective potency.
2. A merely actual being, or pure act, is the glorious GOD, to whom this supreme and perfect actuality is attributed: first, to indicate his simplicity: for all composition of potency and act is repugnant to him; that is, from some potential or imperfect principle, and an actual principle; that is, one actuating and perfecting that other principle, as we will later declare in the

doctrine concerning GOD. Secondly, to remove and exclude all potency which argues any imperfection. There are, however, three kinds of potencies, which because of their imperfection cannot be attributed to GOD: namely, objective potency, which is nothing other than the producibility of a thing by its causes: second, passive potency, which belongs to things inasmuch as they can suffer and be transmuted by some agent: third, potency to not-be. The first potency belongs to non-existing things, and therefore cannot be attributed to GOD who necessarily exists, and never could not exist: the latter two belong to things that do exist, but are mutable and passible: GOD, however, is immutable and impassible. But the case of active potency is far different, for active potency, as the Metaphysicians have well observed, deserves the name of virtue or faculty rather than of potency: for each thing acts in so far as it is in act, whence the very power of acting is a certain actuality. But someone will object: every potency is more imperfect than its act: but whatever is imperfect, either absolutely, or comparatively, must be removed from GOD. It is answered that even active potency in creatures is very often more imperfect than its act, and that is because the perfection of a creature is posited in the operation and exercise of the potency, and it is more perfect when it acts than when it does not act: but GOD is not so, for his supreme and infinite perfection, or blessedness, is posited in this, that he is GOD, and therefore he is no better or more perfect when he acts than when he does not act.

3. A being consisting of potency and act, is a finite Being actually existing in the world: and such a being is said to consist of act and potency, or to be partly actual, partly potential, for two reasons: First, because in finite beings various compositions are found, namely of genus and difference, of matter and form, of integral parts, of essence and existence, of existing essence and subsistence superadded to it, of subject and accident. In all these compositions, however (with the sole exception of that which is of integral parts), there is one potential and receptive principle, which for that reason is called potency, and another actual and perfective, which for that reason is called act: the principle of the former kind, in every composition, is laid under, and the principle of the latter kind is superadded to it. Hence it is clear that finite beings are rightly said to be composed of potency and act. The second reason is this: Finite beings, although they actually exist, and thus have some act and perfection, are nevertheless not merely actual and perfect, but have those three kinds of potencies that argue imperfection. For first, before they exist, they have that objective potency for existing. Second, when they exist, they have passive potency, and are receptive of new accidents. Third, they have potency to not-be, for they can be abolished by the first cause, and reduced to nothing.

ART. IV. The fourth division of real Being is brought forward, which is derived from the modes of existing.

1. The fourth division of real Being can be derived from the modes of existing; that is, the modes of actual existence superadded. For in every Being that actually exists, these three things can be considered: first, that it has such an essence and nature, by which it is constituted in a certain genus of Being, and is distinguished from all other beings. Second, that it actually exists in the world, and thus has the act of existing superadded to its essence. Third, that it has such a mode of existing appropriate to its nature: for singular and complete substances so are and exist that they are not in another, but exist through themselves: on the contrary, singular accidents, like this whiteness, this blackness, so are and exist that they do not exist through themselves, but in another: whence it is clear that there are two general modes of existing, superadded to existence itself; the former is perfection of existing, or the mode of existing *per se* (through itself), and not in another: the latter is the mode of existing in another, and not *per se* (through itself).
2. These things being posited, the fourth division of real Being can be conceived thus: every real Being either exists in such a way that it can in no way be in another or be communicated to another; or it exists in such a way that it is actually in another, or at least can be in another: for example, this man, this horse, this stone, are in no way in another, by way of a part, or an essential form, or an accidental one, or a quasi-form: on the contrary, their members are in them by way of parts; and their accidents are in them by way of accidental forms: I said, *or at least can be in another*, because of human souls separated from the body, which although they are not actually in another, can nevertheless be in another, in the manner of parts. But that these things may be better understood, the genera of those things which can in some way be said to be in another, by way of a part or a form, must be enumerated.
3. First, accidents exist in their subject: second, parts, both essential and integral, in their whole: third, the very nature of a total and singular thing is in that of which it is the nature, by way of a form: for the nature of a thing, or its essence, behaves in the manner of a form: but that of which it is the essence behaves in the manner of matter, and therefore not only does the universal nature inhere in singulars, but also the singular nature inheres in that suppositum of which it is the nature: thus the singular nature of Peter is in Peter himself: that is, it is included in Peter: for Peter is not the humanity of Peter, but is something consisting of his singular humanity, and the subsistence superadded to it.
4. Whatever can be referred to these three classes, these are to be said not to subsist, or exist *per se*, but to *inexist* in another (if it is permissible to speak thus); but those things which are referred to none of these classes, are said to subsist, or exist *per se*: for subsistence is nothing other than a certain

mode of existing, by which some Being so exists, that it in no way inheres in another thing, but is laid under and supposed for other things inexistent in it: whence such a Being is called *suppositum* in Latin, *hypostasis* in Greek.

5. It should be noted here that these words *hypostasis* and *subsistence* are very ambiguous, and have six meanings, of which the first three are less proper, and not used among philosophers: but the last three are more philosophical. First, *hypostasis* or *subsistence* is taken for the subsisting thing itself; that is, for the suppositum, or person. Second, for true being, not for its empty appearance, likewise for fixed and permanent being. Third, for that which in any way lies under, in which way in a building the foundation, in a column the base, in wine the dregs, in urine the sediment, is called *hypostasis* and *subsistence*.
6. Among philosophers, however, to subsist is taken, first, for being *per se*; that is, not inhering in a subject of inhesion: in which way every and only substance, whether it be universal or particular, whether it also be complete and total, or incomplete and partial, is truly called a subsisting Being, or a Being *per se*, not existing in another; on the contrary, accidents, in this way, do not subsist, but exist in another. Second, that is said to subsist which does not exist in another in such a way that it depends on it for the act of existing; that is, in such a way that because of its imperfect mode of existing it cannot exist outside it and *per se*. In this sense we deny not only accidents, but also universal substances to subsist, and this is because they depend on the primary ones for their actual existence, for they exist in them and by their benefit. Second, we deny that matter, and all substantial forms educible from the potency of matter, subsist in this way: for they so depend on the suppositum in which they are, that they cannot exist *per se* and outside every suppositum. I said, *forms educible from the potency of matter*, to exclude the human soul, whose case is different, as will soon be clear. I said, *outside every suppositum*, because matter can indeed exist outside this or that suppositum, as outside Socrates, or outside Plato; for it can, when these are dead, enter into the constitution of another suppositum, and be sustained by it, but it cannot exist outside every suppositum. Third, we deny that the singular substances themselves, signified by abstract names, subsist in this way; that is, the singular essences of created substances: for the singular humanity of Peter so exists in Peter himself, that it cannot exist *per se* and outside every suppositum; likewise the singular humanity of CHRIST so exists in CHRIST, that it depends in an ineffable way on his most glorious person for its being. Therefore, although singular men exist *per se* and in no way in another, nevertheless singular human natures exist not *per se*, but in their singular supposita, that is, in men. Someone will say: a singular man and a singular human nature are the same. It is answered that this is most false, for a singular man is not a singular humanity, but is something

consisting of a singular human nature, and the subsistence superadded to it, as will become clear in the progress. Whence the second person of the Trinity is said by theologians to have assumed a singular human nature, but not a singular man.

7. But on the contrary, in this sense we attribute subsistence, first, to all singular, complete, and predicamental substances, that is, signified by a concrete name; such as this man, this horse: likewise to the persons of the adorable Trinity, and this is because all these exist in no thing as parts, or essential or accidental forms. Second, in this sense we also assert that the Divine essence or Deity, although it exists in the three persons of the adorable Trinity, truly subsists: we also say the same of the human soul, although it is in the body as form in matter; and in the composite, as a part in the whole: and this is because neither does the essence of GOD depend on the divine persons for its being, for this argues imperfection; nor does the rational soul depend on matter and the composite, for it can exist without them, and really does exist when it is separated from the body.
8. Third, that is said to subsist which exists in another neither in act nor in potency; that is, which cannot be included in any suppositum: in this sense subsistence is denied to all those which exist in some suppositum; whether they depend on it for the act of existing or not; in which way we deny that the human soul and the most glorious essence of GOD subsist: for the former is in man as a part in a whole; but the latter, in an ineffable way, exists in the three persons of the Trinity: and therefore in this sense only and all supposita, we say subsist and have subsistence: for every suppositum so exists that it can in no way exist in another suppositum, as an accident in a subject, a part in a whole, or a nature in that which has the nature. Hence it is that philosophers say that a suppositum is something incommunicable to many, and altogether inept to exist in another. From these it is clear that in this fourth division of Being, subsistence is to be taken in this last way: for in it by a subsisting Being, I understand that which in no way inheres in another, as an accident in a subject, a part in a whole, or a nature, whether universal or singular, in its suppositum. But by a Being in-existent in another, I understand that which is in some way communicable to another, that is, apt to inhere in another.

ART. V. Explanation of these words: Being, Essence, Existence, Subsistence, Suppositum, and Person.

1. ESSENCE is accustomed to be described by philosophers in various ways.
 1. thus: The essence of a thing is that which is explained by a definition.
 2. thus: Essence is that by which a thing is constituted in a certain genus of Being, and is distinguished from all others.
 3. thus: Essence is the first and radical and innermost principle of all the actions and properties of a thing. e.g. the principles of many human operations are habits existing in the minds of men: the principles of habits are natural potencies flowing from the essence: the principle of the potencies is the human nature or essence: but the human essence itself, consisting of soul and body, has no productive and effective principle of itself existing in man: that is, nothing can be found in man himself from which his essence flows or emanates. I said, *it has no effective principle existing in man*, because it is certain that it has constitutive principles, both physical and metaphysical. Since, therefore, the natural potencies of things, and the operations of the potencies, draw their origin from the essence; but the essence has no efficient cause prior to itself in that thing of which it is the essence, deservedly, it is called the first, and radical, and innermost principle of all the properties and actions of the thing.
2. Finally, essence can be described not inconveniently thus: Essence is that which belongs to a thing most necessarily and first of all. I say *most necessarily*, to exclude common accidents, which are contingently present in that thing of which they are accidents. I say *first of all*, to exclude proper accidents, which although they necessarily belong to their subject, are nevertheless not first in it, but the essence is first in it, from which they emanate. This, therefore, is the general rule: Whatever inheres in a thing most necessarily, first of all, and most intimately, that is the essence of the thing: but whatever either inheres contingently, or on account of another from which it flows, whatever also is adventitious, and not intimate, that is something superadded to the essence, but not the essence itself.
3. Existence differs from essence principally in its role and function: for the role of essence is to constitute a thing in a certain genus of being, and to distinguish it from all others. Thus man by his essence, namely insofar as he is a rational animal, is distinguished from all other beings. But the function of existence is to make it so that a thing, having such an essence, is outside its causes (as the Metaphysicians say) or rather, that it is outside the power and productive potency of its causes: for when a thing does not exist, it is said to be in the potency of its causes; because it is producible by its causes, and can exist by their effective power: but when it has been actually produced, and has received the act of existing, it is no longer in the effective potency of its causes, but has been brought out from the state of potentiality into the state of actuality; during that state, it is not producible by the power of its causes; for it must perish, and lose the act

of existing which it now has, before it can be produced anew by its causes and receive existence.

4. This function of existence differs from the function of essence, in that the role of essence in all things is stable and perpetual: on the contrary, the role of existence in certain things is subject to various changes, because it itself is now present, now absent: e.g. the existence of a rose or of thunder exercises its function at certain times, but at other times does not exercise it; as in winter, when the rose, or thunder, are in the potency of their causes, as they say. On the contrary, the essence of these and similar things exercises its role perpetually: for whether the rose exists or not, a rose is a flower, naturally and essentially distinct from all other flowers: and physicists have knowledge of the rose, even when it does not exist: because they know the rose to be a flower distinct from other flowers, not only in nature or essence, but also in properties, virtue, and efficacy: for it is not to be thought that the rose, when it does not exist, loses its essential difference from other flowers, or is confounded with them as to its essence. From these things this definition of existence can be gathered: *Existence is a mode superadded to essence, making it so that the thing having that essence is outside its causes in the world.*
5. These words, *Essence* and *existence*, having been explained, it is easy to know what Being is: for Being differs from essence and existence as a concrete from two abstracts: likewise as that which has, from those things which are had by it: for Being is nothing other than that which has essence, or existence. It should be noted here that Being is taken in two ways, participially and nominally, as they say. Being, as it is a participle of the verb *to be*, signifies that which is actually existing: but Being, insofar as it is a verbal noun, signifies that which has an essence capable of existence, whether it actually exists or not: and as Suarez says, it signifies being itself, not as exercised in act, but in potency, or aptitude. Thus living, as it is a participle, signifies the actual use of life: but as it is a noun, it signifies only that which has that essence which can be the principle of vital operation.
6. Subsistence properly, and taken in the third sense, agrees with existence in this, that neither this nor that is Being itself, or the essence of Being, but a mode of Being: yet it differs from it, first, because existence is broader than subsistence: for the former belongs to all things, both substances and accidents: but the latter belongs only to singular complete substances, insofar as they are signified by concrete names; as to this man, this horse, this lion: for as I mentioned in the preceding article, this singular humanity or this singular equine nature is said not to subsist, but to in-exist in another: namely because the former is in this man, the latter in this horse. Second, existence and subsistence differ by reason of their role, or their function; for the function of existence is to make it so that some thing actually is in the world, outside the power or potency of its causes: but the function of subsistence is to make it so that a thing can in no way

be in another, either as a part in a whole, or as an accident in a subject, or as a nature or essence in that which has the essence. Third, they differ as the determinant and the determined: for just as essence is of itself indifferent to existing and not existing, so existence is of itself indifferent to being in another and being *per se*, or subsisting: that is, existence is indifferent to the mode of existing by inhering in another as a support, and to the mode of existing *per se*, without dependence on another receiving and sustaining it. Subsistence therefore can be described thus: *Subsistence is a mode superadded to existence, from which a thing has it that it can exist not in another, but per se.* Whence by some it is called the *omnimodal perfection of existing*.

7. From these things which have now been said, we can gather that in any singular substance signified by a concrete name, these three acts can be perceived: first, the act of singular essence, by which that substance is such an individual, distinct from all others: second, the act of existence, by which a substance having such a singular essence is outside its causes in the world: third, the act of subsistence, by which it is so outside its causes, that it does not in-exist or lean on another, but underlies and is supposed for others in-existent in it: whence, as was said above, it is called a suppositum.
8. A suppositum is easily explained, now that the nature of subsistence is known; for a suppositum is nothing other than that which has subsistence superadded to its essence and existence: or that which in the act of existing leans on no other, but is laid under and is supposed for other things leaning on it. It can also be explained thus: a suppositum is that which is in no way communicable to many, and in no way can inhere in another, in the manner of a part, or a form. Therefore, the singular humanity of Peter is not a suppositum, because it is truly said to be in Peter: likewise the human nature of CHRIST is not a suppositum, for the same reason: but Peter himself is a suppositum, because he does not inhere in another, as a part in a whole, an accident in a subject, or a nature in that which has the nature. Similarly CHRIST, and any other person of the Trinity, is a suppositum for the same reason. Accidents are not supposita, whether they are universal or singular, because they are in and lean on their subjects. Also, universal substances are not supposita, because they are communicated to, and are in, singulars. Finally, the glorious GOD, insofar as he is common, in an ineffable way, to the three persons of the Trinity, is not a suppositum: and this is because it is of the nature of a suppositum that it cannot be communicated to, or inhere in, another suppositum: but GOD, God, or the Deity, is communicated to, and is in, the three persons of the Trinity.
9. A Person differs from a suppositum in this, that every person is a suppositum, but not every suppositum is a person: for a person is nothing other than a suppositum endowed with reason: whence it is described by

Boethius thus: *It is the individual subsistence of a rational nature*. Wherefore a suppositum is rightly divided into rational and irrational. A rational suppositum is called a person: an irrational suppositum, as this horse, this stone, does not have a peculiar name imposed on it. A Person is divided into created and uncreated. The uncreated persons are three, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. A created person is either Angelic, as Gabriel, Michael: or human, as Peter, John.

ART. VI. Whether in creatures, the Suppositum and its singular nature differ in reality.

1. I have not decided to ventilate here the celebrated controversy about the distinction and diversity of essence from existence: whether, that is, it is real, or only of reason: for that question has no utility in Theology, and is more thorny and more difficult than can be grasped by those who are unlearned and novices in Metaphysics. Concerning the distinction, however, of subsistence and nature or essence, I will say a few things: for the determination of this question has a signal use in Theology.
2. This question is accustomed to be proposed in two ways: first, thus: Whether in created supposita, subsistence is something positive, and really distinct from the singular essence to which it is superadded, or not. Second, thus: Whether a suppositum and its singular nature differ in reality: e.g. whether Peter and his singular human nature are really the same; or whether Peter, as Peter, includes something real and really diverse from his singular nature. Whether the question is proposed in this way or that, it is the same controversy; and therefore I answer briefly that Peter and his singular nature really differ, as the including and the included, or as the composite and its constitutive principle: for every created suppositum, like Peter, includes a singular nature and something superadded to it, namely subsistence: or (to speak more plainly) every created suppositum is really composed of singular essence and subsistence superadded to it, which some call *suppositality*, others *personality*. If therefore we compare a suppositum to a singular nature, they are distinguished as a whole and a part; but if we institute a comparison between the singular nature itself and the subsistence, as between the singular human nature of Peter and Peter's subsistence or personality, then they are contradistinguished among themselves as two extremes composing that created suppositum, namely Peter. But that this opinion may be established, it must first be proved that subsistence, or suppositality, is not a mere negation, as Scotus opines, but is something positive, together with the singular nature constituting Peter, insofar as he is a suppositum. Second, that that positive thing differs not by reason alone, but really, from the singular nature with which it constitutes Peter: from which, however, I will manifestly infer that Peter really differs from his singular human nature, and that his human nature is truly and

properly said to be in him. For if Peter, insofar as he is Peter, or insofar as he is a certain particular human person, includes these two, i.e. singular humanity and his personality, as two constitutive principles, really distinct, it is necessary that his singular humanity really differs from him, and is as truly in him as either his matter or his form is said to be in him.

3. Scotus, in 3 Sent. dist. 1, q. 1, says that every suppositum, besides its singular nature, also includes subsistence, but he asserts that subsistence is a mere negation of the aptitude, or potency, of being in another suppositum: for singular natures have the potency of existing in a suppositum: but the suppositum itself, like Peter, can be in no other suppositum, and therefore, according to his opinion, a suppositum, as such, is constituted by the negation of this potency of existing in a suppositum. This opinion is deservedly rejected by Francisco Suarez, Disp. Met. 34. First, because the subsistence which a suppositum adds to a singular nature is a certain substantial perfection: but a mere negation cannot be a substantial perfection; therefore a mere negation is not subsistence. Second, if subsistence, or personality, is a mere negation, the three persons of the Trinity will be constituted in their personal being, and will be distinguished from each other by a mere negation: for they are distinguished by their subsistences, or personalities: but this is absurd, and plainly destroys the mystery of the Trinity: therefore subsistence is not a mere negation, but something positive is superadded to the singular essence to constitute a suppositum.
4. It must now be proved against Durandus, in 1 sent. d. 34, that subsistence is something really diverse from the essence, or singular nature of created substances (for concerning GOD it must be thought far otherwise); and that is clearly shown by this reason: the Word (λόγος) assumed a singular human nature, but did not assume a human suppositum, or a human person; for thus he would not be one simple person, but a twofold one: Therefore a human suppositum and its singular nature are diverse in reality, and therefore something is really included in a human suppositum besides its singular nature: this, however, cannot be other than subsistence, or personality.
5. This reason is also accustomed to be proposed thus: what can be separated really, are not really the same; but subsistence can be separated from a singular nature: Therefore they are not really the same thing, which is proved by the assumption: the Word (λόγος) assumed a singular human nature, but did not assume personality, or human subsistence, as all Theologians confess. Therefore they can be separated. This reason not only proves that subsistence differs in reality from the specific nature, which is common to all individuals, but also from the individual, or singular nature; and therefore the opinion of those is openly false, who say that the subsistence or personality of Peter is his individual difference: for CHRIST did not assume human nature in common, but a singular

humanity; and he did not assume a singular person: therefore, in reality, a singular person differs from a singular nature; and includes something which is not included in a singular nature; namely, subsistence and personality.

6. By these two reasons it is clearly proved that every suppositum, besides its singular nature, includes something positive, really distinct from that nature, namely subsistence: and for that reason every created suppositum is really composed of its singular nature and subsistence, which others call suppositality. Someone will say: if subsistence is something real, distinct in reality from essence, it is either matter, or form, or the composite itself, or some accident of it. Resp: that which in the constitution of a suppositum is superadded to the singular nature is not a Being properly, but a mode of Being, and therefore is neither matter, nor form, nor a composite, nor its accident.

ART. VII. What is the reason why philosophers attribute the composition from essence & existence, and likewise from essence & subsistence, to created substances, but not to GOD.

1. Created singular substances are considered in three ways: First, insofar as they have such an essence. Second, insofar as they are beings actually existing in the world. Third, insofar as they have such a mode of existing, or insofar as they are supposita. If they are considered in the first way, they have a composition of essence from physical parts and its metaphysical degrees: e.g. if Socrates is considered insofar as he is a man, he is physically constituted of his matter and form: likewise metaphysically, or logically, of genus and difference; i.e., of animal and rational. If singular substances are considered in the second way, they include two things, namely essence and existence; but these, according to our mode of conceiving, relate as potency and act, as I explained above: and therefore since from potency and act there is always made some one composite *per se*, we rightly say that singular substances so considered are composed of essence and existence; i.e., of nature and the act of existing. Thus Peter, insofar as he is a man actually existing in the world, includes these two: human nature, and the act of existing; he includes them (I say) as two principles from which he is constituted.
2. If created singular substances are considered in the third way, i.e., if they are considered insofar as they are supposita, having not only an essence actually existing in the world, but also such a mode of existing, namely *per se* and not in another, if (I say) they are so considered, they include two things, namely an actually existing essence, and subsistence, or the mode of existing *per se*, superadded to that existing essence: but the essence or singular nature of a created substance is a potency with respect to subsistence, and subsistence is its act superadded to it and perfecting it; and therefore from the essence or nature actually existing, and the

subsistence superadded to it, we rightly say that something one *per se* is made; namely the suppositum itself. Thus Peter, insofar as he is such a person, includes a singular essence, by which he is a singular Being; and a singular subsistence, by which he is a singular person.

3. Someone will ask what is the cause why these three compositions are not attributed to GOD; since essence, existence, and subsistence or personality are found in all the persons of the Trinity, no less than in human and Angelic persons: for any person of the Trinity has his own essence and existence, common to him with the other persons of the Trinity; he also has his own proper subsistence, or personality, by which he differs from the other persons. It is answered that no composition of them can be attributed to GOD, saving his simplicity, and also saving the infinite perfection and dignity of that most glorious nature. This, however, will become manifest if we consider and weigh these compositions singly and separately.
4. First, therefore, essential composition, both physical and metaphysical, must be removed from GOD: the former, indeed, because it would overthrow his spiritual nature; the latter, however, because GOD is not contained under any univocal genus, as will be proved later (GOD willing) in the questions concerning GOD. Second, composition from essence and existence is removed from GOD for two reasons: first, because for every composition, whether it be real or of reason, it is required that one be superadded to another for the constitution of some third thing: but existence, neither in reality nor according to our mode of conceiving, is something superadded to the essence of GOD, but rather is something included in the very essence of GOD, as I declared in Art. II. Therefore the existence of GOD cannot concur with his essence to constitute some third thing. Second, the composition of essence and existence is attributed to created substances because their being so relates as potency, and existence as an act superadded to it: but the essence of GOD cannot be called potency with respect to divine existence, because it includes existence in itself, as was said in the place just cited: but no potency includes its act in itself, but is directed to its act as to something further and external.
5. Concerning the third composition, which is of a suppositum from a singular nature and subsistence, there is greater doubt, for that seems to be attributable to GOD, because any person of the Trinity includes these two, the divine essence, which is common to all three persons; and his particular personality, by which he is distinguished from the other two persons; Therefore he is composed of these two. If you answer that a person is not therefore composed of nature and subsistence, because subsistence is something included in the very essence of God, just as has now been said of existence; you will easily be confuted: for if the subsistence or personality of the Father were of his essence, it would be common to the whole Trinity, just as his essence itself is. But this is

absurd: Therefore so is that. Concerning this controversy I will propose my mind in some assertions.

6. Assert. 1. The subsistence or personality of the Father (the same may be said of the hypostasis of the Son and of the Holy Spirit) does not differ from his essence by any kind of real diversity, neither as thing from thing, nor as mode of a thing from a thing, but differs from it only by a distinction of reason. This assertion is proved thus: first, whatever is in God, is God. Therefore nothing is in God which in reality and on the part of the thing (as they say) differs from his Deity. Second, if the person of the Father is really composed of his essence and subsistence or personality, two absurdities will follow: First, God the Father would not be, absolutely speaking, supremely simple; for supreme simplicity removes all composition, but especially real composition. Second, the Deity would be a part of something; but every part is something incomplete and less perfect than the whole of which it is a part.
7. Assert. 2. God is not composed of nature and subsistence by such a composition as is seen in created Substances. This assertion manifestly follows and is inferred from the preceding one: for if God is not really composed of nature and subsistence, he does not have such a composition of nature and subsistence as created substances have; for these are composed of nature and subsistence as of two principles really distinct in themselves, and therefore their composition is real.
8. Assert. 3. Although the subsistence of the Father is not of his essence, but according to our mode of conceiving is something superadded to his essence, nevertheless it is not licit to say that the person of the Father is composed of these two by a composition of reason; nay, we ought not to conceive of these two in the Father as two parts composing him: for when we conceive of the Deity as a part of something, we form an enormous concept of God, and we attribute no small imperfection to God. Wherefore the modesty of those is to be praised and imitated, who piously feel and profess that essence and personality are included in the person of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, not by way of composition, but by way of an ineffable conjunction or union.

ART. VIII. Whether, this being posited, that all perfection is of the essence of God, it follows that personal subsistence is of his essence? and whether God, insofar as he is communicable to the three persons of the Trinity, is a person, as Cajetan states.

1. From what has been said, a slight difficulty arises concerning subsistence or personality: for since it has been established that all perfection is of the essence of God, it necessarily seems to follow that subsistence or personality is included in his essence; and therefore that God, insofar as he is common to the three persons of the Trinity, is a suppositum or person. The reason for the connection is: because subsistence is a certain substantial perfection, and not a small one; for every suppositum has a more perfect mode of existing than the nature which exists in the suppositum. Here, therefore, two things are to be discussed: First, whether personal subsistence is of the essence of God: second, whether God as God is a certain person common to the whole Trinity.
2. That the former difficulty may be removed, two observations having been premised, I will propose my opinion in some assertions; first it must be held that subsistence is taken by philosophers in three ways, as was said above: 1. for those things are said to subsist which do not exist in a subject of inhesion: 2. those which are not so in another that they depend on those in which they are for the act of existing: 3. those which in no way are in another suppositum, or can be in it. Second, it must be held that to these three significations of this word, a fourth can be added, which although it is less frequent, is nonetheless not less proper. For that Being can be said to subsist which so exists that it depends on no procreating or conserving cause for its being: this mode of existing is proper to God, and cannot be communicated to any created being; and therefore without doubt it is the most perfect mode of existing.
3. These things being posited, let this be Assert. 1. Subsistence, taken in the first and second way, is essential to GOD and common to the whole Trinity: for just as it belongs essentially to God to exist in act, so also it is of the essence of God to exist in such a way that he neither exists in any subject, nor depends on any suppositum in which he is for the act of existing.
4. Second Assert. Subsistence taken in the third way, although insofar as it is in GOD it does not differ in reality from his essence, nevertheless cannot truly be said to be of the essence of GOD: for whatever is of the essence of God, that belongs to God as he is God. If therefore personality is of the essence of God, God insofar as he is God is a person, and consequently, all three persons, insofar as they are one true GOD, can truly be said to be one person: which is certainly absurd, and contrary to the principles of our faith.

5. Assert. 3. Subsistence taken in the fourth way is of the essence of GOD, or is his essential attribute: for to be the first Being, having its being from itself and not from elsewhere, is the very nature or essence of GOD.
6. Assert. 4. This word (perfection) must be distinguished; for some are perfections whose negation imports an imperfection, as to be or exist, to live, to be a Spirit, to be good, to be just: for the opposites of these, namely not to exist, not to live, etc. are manifest imperfections. Others are perfections whose negation imports no imperfection: thus the most wise decrees of GOD concerning the creation and governance of things are perfections, but their negation imports no imperfection: for although GOD had had no such decrees, nay although he had had decrees contrary to these, he would not have been more imperfect: thus to walk, to run, to sit, to speak, are perfections of man, for they are acts, and every act is a perfection: but the negation of these acts involves no imperfection; although the negation of the potencies from which they arise brands the thing to which it is attributed with a note of imperfection: I say the negation of these acts involves no imperfection, because a man is not more imperfect when he does not walk than when he walks, or when he does not speak than when he speaks.
7. Perfections of the former kind are all of the essence of GOD, and necessarily belong to him as he is GOD: but concerning perfections of the second order, it must be thought otherwise; for they are not of the essence of GOD, nor do they necessarily belong to him as he is GOD, e.g. the decrees of GOD concerning the eternal salvation and death of men, although they do not differ in reality from his essence, are nevertheless not truly said to be of the essence of GOD: for if this were true, they would be in GOD from the necessity of nature, and thus the freedom of the divine decrees would be taken away. To the latter kind of perfections we refer personal subsistence; for although its negation, when it is attributed to the finite essence of creatures, involves an imperfection; yet when it is attributed to the Deity, or the divine nature, it does not stain it with any blemish of imperfection: the reason for the disparity is this, the divine essence includes in itself a certain mode of existing far more perfect than personal subsistence, namely the mode of existing without dependence in being on any procreating or conserving cause: I say this mode of existing is more perfect than personal subsistence, because in it is posited the perfection of the first being; and for that reason it cannot be communicated to creatures: but personal subsistence is communicated both to men and to Angels. On the contrary, the finite essence of creatures includes in itself neither the act of existing, nor any mode of existing more perfect than personality: and therefore it is imperfect because of the defect of personality, while God is in no way imperfect because of the lack of such subsistence.

8. Francisco Suarez, lib. 3, de Trinit. Cap. 10, brings forward another distinction of perfection, but more obscure and difficult, and therefore I will not propose it here: but this must be diligently noted, which he adds to that distinction, namely that the divinity, abstracting from the relations or personal subsistences, does not formally include their perfections: it does, however, include them eminently, both because this is necessary for the infinity of that being, and because the Deity itself is the root and foundation of all those perfections.
9. The latter question is easily solved, the former difficulty having been removed: for since that subsistence which is proper to supposita does not belong to GOD, as he is common to the three persons: it must be intrepidly said that GOD so considered is not a person. But (says Cajetan) GOD insofar as he is common to the three persons, although he is not a person strictly speaking, can nevertheless be called a complete person. I answer with Fonseca that in divine matters new and unusual locutions, and those abhorrent from all the custom of the Fathers, should not be used: especially since one could be deceived by such a manner of speaking, and think that the three persons are one person, or suppositum.

ART. IX. Whether GOD, as he is common to the three persons, is a singular substance: & whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances.

1. *Substantia* among the Latins is said from *subsistendo* (subsisting) (as some will have it) and from *substando* (standing under) accidents (as others will have it): according to the latter etymology, GOD the Best and Greatest is not a substance, but the principle and cause of all substances: but according to the former, he is most truly and most properly a substance; not indeed universal, but singular and individual: for second substances need first ones to exist in them; but GOD even as he is common to the three persons needs no thing in which to exist. But someone will object: GOD, as he is common to the three persons of the Trinity, is predicable of many, Therefore he is a universal and second substance. I respond that the definition of a universal must be conceived thus, *a universal is that which can be predicated of those which are many according to the name of the universal itself*: thus man is predicated of those which are many according to the name of man, i.e. of many men: but GOD is indeed predicated of many persons, but he cannot be said to be predicated of many according to the name of GOD, i.e. of many GODS. Others say that that is a universal which can be predicated of many, in which it is divided and multiplied: but it comes to the same thing. Second obj. no first or singular substance contains under itself other first or singular substances: but GOD contains under himself three persons; but each person is a singular substance. Resp: no singular substance contains under itself other singular substances numerically, i.e., distinct by individual differences, but one

singular substance can contain under itself multiple persons having one essence numerically, and distinct only by modes of existing.

2. The other question, proposed in the title, is: whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances? The difficulty of this question is posited in this, that the Orthodox Fathers state that the son is to the Father *homoousion* (ὁμοούσιον), i.e., as the Latin Church translates it, consubstantial, or of one and the same substance; as Jerome rightly said in his Epistle to Damasus, who would dare with sacrilegious mouth to grant three substances in GOD? On the contrary, since a person is a singular substance, there seem to be as many singular substances in the Deity as there are persons in it.
3. The determination of this question can be comprehended in two assertions. First, new and unusual locutions in the mysteries of faith are not to be used: for all modes of speaking which seem to favor heretics, even in appearance, are to be avoided. Therefore, those who speak of the three persons of the adorable Trinity should not use the aforesaid mode of speaking, saying that they are three substances; lest they seem to favor the Arians, Macedonians, Valentino Gentile, and his followers. Second, that locution can in no way be admitted, but must be rejected as openly false and Tritheistic: for if the three persons are three substances; either they are three finite substances, or they are three infinite substances: they are not three finite, or created, substances, as is clear: but neither are they three infinite substances, because they are not three GODS.
4. The consequence of the argument brought forward to the contrary is not valid: for I will give a similar consequence which is plainly vicious and inept, in the judgment of all: as if someone should argue in this way: Peter standing, Peter sitting, and every other aggregate of this kind, is a singular substance clothed with a certain accident; Therefore as many as there are such aggregates, so many are there singular substances clothed with accidents. If (I say) someone should argue thus, the inference will be vicious: because Peter standing and Peter sitting are two such aggregates; but they are not two singular substances, but one numerically and indivisible substance. Someone will ask, what from that antecedent, *A person is a singular substance*, can be rightly and legitimately collected. It is answered that this is a just and licit consequence; a person is a singular substance, Therefore as many as there are persons, so many are there of those to each of which it belongs to be a singular substance.

ART. X. Whether CHRIST, insofar as he is a man, is a person: likewise whether CHRIST, insofar as he is a man, is everywhere.

1. The affirmative part of the question seems to be proven by these arguments. 1. Just as all singular Oxen, Horses, Lions, etc. are irrational supposita; so also all singular men are rational supposita, or persons: Therefore CHRIST, as he is a singular man, is a person. 2. Every singular,

complete substance, signified by a concrete name, is a suppositum, as all Metaphysicians teach; but CHRIST, insofar as he is a singular man, is such: therefore he is a suppositum: but every rational suppositum is a person. 3. A singular man differs from his singular essence as a suppositum from the nature existing in the suppositum; therefore CHRIST, insofar as he is a singular man, is a suppositum, and consequently a person.

2. Then if CHRIST, insofar as he is a man, is a person, as has now been proven, either he is an immense person, existing everywhere, or he is a finite person, comprehended in a certain place: the latter cannot be admitted, because thus in CHRIST there would be two persons, one finite, the other infinite; therefore the former must be said, namely that CHRIST insofar as he is a man, is an immense person, existing in every place and outside every place: and therefore not only must it be confessed that that proposition, *CHRIST the man is everywhere*, is true; but also that one, *CHRIST insofar as he is a man, is everywhere*.
3. To satisfy this question, I say first, that that proposition, *CHRIST, insofar as he is this man, is a person*, is ambiguous and therefore must be distinguished: for as Suarez says, in the third part of St. Thomas, Tom. 1. quest. 16. art. 11, that particle *insofar as* either reduplicates the suppositum, or it reduplicates the nature; i.e., either this is its sense: CHRIST by reason of the human nature assumed by him is a person; and thus the proposition is openly false, for CHRIST neither has from his humanity that he is a person simply, nor does he have from it any new subsistence or personality; for thus there would be a twofold hypostasis in him; nor is it true to say that the humanity assumed by him has its own proper subsistence or personality, because it is nonexistent in another and does not subsist: Therefore it must be denied that CHRIST by reason of his human nature is a person: or this is its sense: CHRIST insofar as he is a suppositum including a human nature, is a person; and thus the proposition is most true, as the three arguments posited at the beginning of the article prove; for that suppositum in which there is humanity, is a person.
4. Others answer more briefly that CHRIST, insofar as he is this man, includes two things, namely divine subsistence and human nature; and they say that CHRIST, insofar as he is a man, is a person with respect to the divine subsistence, which he includes materially, but not with respect to the assumed human nature, which that voice, *this man*, more formally and directly imports.
5. I say second, that that mode of speaking, *CHRIST insofar as he is a man, is a person*, should be avoided: 1. Because it seems to favor the Nestorian dogma, by which two persons are attributed to CHRIST. 2. Because reduplication properly taken imports the proper reason or cause why the attribute is in the subject: but it is certain that the reason according to

which personality belongs to CHRIST is not in the human nature, and therefore CHRIST is not conveniently enough said to be a person insofar as he is this man. 3. Because Theologians, when they dispute about CHRIST and use these reduplications, *insofar as GOD*, *insofar as man*, or *insofar as this man*, do not respect the personal subsistence of CHRIST, but designate the nature: for they designate the nature according to which these or those attributes belong to CHRIST; but personality does not belong to CHRIST according to his human nature, and therefore that locution, *CHRIST, insofar as he is this man, is a person*, is unusual.

6. As to the other part of the argument, it must be answered as above, that CHRIST, insofar as he is this man, includes two things, namely divine subsistence, and human nature superadded to it: with respect to the divine subsistence, which it includes in a certain material reason, it can be said that CHRIST, insofar as he is this man, is an immense person, and defined by no place: with respect to the human nature which that voice, *this man*, more formally and directly imports, it is rightly denied that CHRIST, insofar as he is this man, is an immense person, and existing everywhere; and this is because his human nature has its particular *where*; and is comprehended in a certain place.
7. However, although that proposition is true in some sense, as has now been said; because nevertheless it savors of the error of the ubiquitarians, because also the sense which the words of that proposition more evidently bear is absurd, namely that CHRIST by reason of his human nature is immense; or that his humanity is immense; therefore it is to be rejected, and diligently avoided.

ART. XI. Whether the arguments of the Ubiquitarians drawn from the personal union are valid.

1. The first objection of those who fashion a certain ubiquity for the human nature of Christ is usually proposed thus: Whatever is personally joined with the whole Word (λόγῳ), that exists wherever the Word (ὁ λόγος) exists: but the human nature of CHRIST is such: Therefore. It is answered that the proposition is openly false: for from the personal union of the two natures in CHRIST, it no more follows that the humanity is wherever the Deity is, than from the substantial union of our soul with the matter of the head, it follows that the matter of the head is wherever the soul is, i.e., it is in the foot, because the soul is in the foot: I say it is substantially joined to the whole soul, because the whole soul is in the whole body, and whole in any part of it. If therefore the Ubiquitarians argue well and acutely when they construct such a syllogism, this argumentation will be good and effective: What is substantially joined to the whole soul, that exists wherever the soul exists: but the matter of the head is substantially joined to the whole soul: Therefore it is wherever the soul is: but the soul is in the

matter of the foot. Therefore also the matter of the head is the soul and is in the matter of the foot.

2. A second objection: The union of the two natures in CHRIST was made unchangeable and inseparable; therefore, one of them does not exist, except where the other exists, i.e., they coexist in all places. I respond: the adverbs "inseparably" and "indivisibly," when they are used to explain the manner in which the two natures are united in the person of the Word, have a twofold use. For first, they are used to refute the error of Nestorius, who not only distinguished these natures but also divided and separated them, assigning to each nature its own proper hypostasis, and therefore did not join them in one hypostasis. Secondly, so that we may know that this union is indissoluble, and that these natures, after they have once been joined, can never be disjoined or separated. We therefore deny that consequence: the human and divine natures are indissolubly and inseparably joined in one person; therefore, wherever one of them exists, there also exists the other. The reason is that the union of the two natures is not dissolved by the distinction of their local presence; rather, the truth of the natures is asserted, and confusion is removed.
3. Someone will press first: If one of these natures exists where the other does not exist, then one of them is separated from the other; but the first is true, therefore also the latter. I respond by denying the connection. For the human soul, which is wholly in the matter of the head, is also wholly in the other members in which the matter of the head does not exist; yet the union of the soul with the matter of the head is not dissolved by this fact. For, as all know, the soul is not torn away and separated from the head and the other members except by the death of the man. He presses secondly: The soul, which exists wholly in the matter of the head and wholly outside it, is not united to the head by an adequate and complete union, but is united to it as to a partial and incomplete matter; on the contrary, however, it is united to the whole body by an adequate and complete union, because the soul is so wholly in the whole body that it is in no way outside it. Therefore, since according to the opinion of the Calvinists, the whole Deity exists in the human nature and also outside of it, the union of the Word with humanity will not be adequate and complete. I respond: The reason is dissimilar. For the union of the soul with the matter of the head is said to be incomplete because it is not a union of a whole with a whole, i.e., of the whole form with the whole matter, but with a part of it. But the union of the Word with human nature is of a whole with a whole, i.e., of the whole Deity of CHRIST with his whole humanity, in one hypostasis. The true reason, therefore, why the union of the soul with the matter of the head is inadequate is not that the soul exists outside the matter of the head, but that it is not a union of a whole with a whole, i.e., of the entire form with the entire matter. Wherefore, there is no reason for the Ubiquitarians to object that we

dissolve the person of CHRIST, tear apart his natures, and ascribe to him an inadequate conjunction of natures. But on the contrary, it is we who are grieved and amazed that such feeble arguments, such childish follies, could have pleased and imposed upon men distinguished for their erudition.

4. Third objection: The second person of the Trinity, after he assumed human nature, is always and everywhere GOD INCARNATE. Therefore, he is nowhere DISINCARNATE, as Philippus Nicolai insolently says. I respond: That argument concludes nothing against us, and therefore can be wholly admitted. For since the incarnation of GOD is posited in the assumption of human nature and its hypostatic conjunction with the divine, it is necessary that excarnation (to speak with Philippus Nicolai) should signify the laying down of the human nature, its abandonment, and the dissolution of the union already made. But far be it from us to say that the most blessed Word anywhere lays down, puts aside, divests himself of, or banishes from his hypostasis the flesh which he assumed in the womb of the Virgin. Someone will press first: if the Word exists outside the flesh, the Word is somewhere disincarnate; but the first is true, according to your opinion. Therefore, you are bound to admit the latter as well. I respond by denying that connection. For just as the whole human soul exists outside the matter of the head, its union with the matter of the head remaining intact, so also the whole Word exists both in the flesh and outside the flesh, his personal union with the human nature remaining intact; and therefore, to be outside the flesh does not necessarily infer excarnation, or the dissolution of that personal union. The most acute theologian, Matthius Martinus, responding to an argument of this kind proposed by Balthasar Mentzer, says that the little word "outside" is ambiguous; and at times it means the same as "beyond," that is, it denies the inclusion of one thing in another thing; at other times, however, it implies separation and denies union. In the former way, he says that the Word exists outside the flesh assumed by him, but not in the latter way.
5. Someone will press secondly: If the Word, in the first sense, is outside of humanity, the Word somewhere will not be man; the Word is nowhere not man: Therefore, he is nowhere outside of humanity. The assumption is proven: the Word is always and everywhere man, for he is always and everywhere the God-man (theanthropos). I respond: Although Saint Thomas, and with him almost all the Scholastic Theologians, think that the proposition, "the Word is everywhere man," is simply false, I nevertheless think that a distinction should be employed. For either this is its sense: "the Word is everywhere the person having a human nature united to himself"; or this is its sense: "the Word is the person having a human nature everywhere united to himself, and therefore everywhere locally present to himself." In the former sense, the proposition is true and

is admitted by us, because it does not contradict our opinion; but in the latter, it is plainly false, and therefore is never admitted by us. That there is a great difference between these two senses of this proposition is clear from these examples: "A husband everywhere, or wherever he exists, is a man who has a wife," is a true proposition. But this, "a husband is a man who has his wife everywhere, or in all places," is a false proposition. Similarly this: "A master is everywhere a man who has a servant," is a true proposition; but this, "A master is a man who has a servant everywhere," is false.

6. Someone will press thirdly: If the Word does not have the human nature everywhere united to him and locally co-existing, the whole Christ is not everywhere, but only one of his natures, namely the Deity; but the latter is absurd. Therefore, the former is also. I respond by denying the connection of the proposition. For from the antecedent of this connected proposition, it correctly follows that the whole *of* CHRIST, i.e., all parts of CHRIST, are not everywhere; but it does not correctly follow that the whole CHRIST is not everywhere. Why D. Jacobus Andreae, and with him the other Ubiquitarians, repudiate this distinction, I greatly wonder. For the whole CHRIST is a man, but not the whole *of* CHRIST; the whole CHRIST suffered, died, and rose again; but not the whole *of* CHRIST, i.e., both his natures.
7. Someone will press fourthly: CHRIST is not whole without his humanity: Therefore if the whole CHRIST is everywhere, the humanity of CHRIST is everywhere. I respond by denying the consequence. For the consequence of that argument is plainly ridiculous and unworthy of refutation, as is clear from these examples, which contain a similar consequence: The whole CHRIST is not without the Deity: Therefore if the whole CHRIST suffered and died, the Deity also suffered and died. Likewise, CHRIST is not whole without his foot: Therefore if the whole CHRIST is a man, the foot of CHRIST is a man.

ART. XII. Whether the personal subsistence of the Word is communicated to his human nature: And whether they speak correctly, who say, that the humanity of CHRIST subsists everywhere, through the subsistence of the Word? Likewise, to exist everywhere according to his personal being.

1. From what is usually said about the hypostasis or subsistence of CHRIST, two corollaries are mentioned. For first, the Ubiquitarians thence infer that omnipresence, and indeed all the properties of the Word, are communicated to the human nature. The reason for the consequence is that the hypostasis of the Word does not really differ from his essence, and therefore not from his essential properties either. If, therefore, it is true that the hypostasis of the Word is communicated to the flesh, it must

be confessed that his properties are also communicated to it in the same way. Secondly, some even of our Theologians, who think that the flesh of CHRIST can be said to subsist everywhere, through the subsistence of the Word, although it exists in one place only, reason thus from the same foundation: The subsistence of the Word is communicated to the human nature of CHRIST; since therefore the subsistence of the Word is infinite and is not contained within the bounds of any place, the flesh of CHRIST, through that subsistence communicated to it, can be said to subsist everywhere. This latter argument is more dangerous than the preceding one, because it so pleases certain Orthodox theologians that they profess that in this controversy about the local presence of the flesh of CHRIST, we are engaging in a battle of words (logomachy), and differ from the Ubiquitarians only by a verbal disagreement. Whether this is true, let those judge who have more diligently considered the history of the Colloquy of Montbéliard and the polemical writings of Beza and Jacob Andreae on this matter.

2. In order, therefore, that those two arguments may be clearly resolved, the word "to communicate" must be distinguished, and it must be taught in what sense the subsistence of CHRIST is communicated. It must therefore be held that a thing is said to be communicated to another in three ways. First, both **intensively and denominatively**, in which way the odor of an apple is communicated to the hand; for both that odor, at least the same in species, is in the hand, and it denominates the hand, i.e., it is truly predicated of the hand. Secondly, something is communicated **denominatively, but not intensively**; in which way the wives of Emperors communicate the dignity of the empire to their favorites; for they are called Empresses and queens, not because they have in themselves imperial power or authority, but because their husbands have that authority. Thirdly, something is communicated to another **neither intensively nor denominatively, but either effectively**, in which way GOD is said to communicate himself to created beings (for they are called beings and good by participation in the first being and the first good, as Zanchius says); **or sustentatively**, in which way the subject is communicated to its accidents, namely by sustaining them and receiving them into itself; or in some other similar way. I say these are communicated neither denominatively nor intensively, because GOD neither exists in creatures as an essential or accidental form in its subject, nor is he predicated of them by a true and affirmative predication; the subject also neither is in its accidents nor does it denominate them, but on the contrary is denominated by them.
3. The hypostasis or subsistence of the Word is communicated to his human nature in this third way; that is, it is communicated to it **neither intensively nor denominatively, but only sustentatively**. The first part of this assertion is declared thus: The human nature of CHRIST (as Martinus

well notes against Mentzer) is devoid of all its own personal subsistence, and in no way subsists; that is, neither *per se* nor *per accidens*; or, to speak more plainly, neither by its nature nor from the union. Therefore, the subsistence of the Word is communicated to it neither intensively nor denominatively. The antecedent is proven: If the humanity of CHRIST subsists in any way, it is in some way a suppositum or person, and therefore in some sense it will be true that CHRIST assumed a suppositum or a person—but the latter is absurd; therefore also the former. The connection is proven, because suppositum and subsistence are reciprocal, so that every suppositum has subsistence, and everything that has subsistence is a suppositum. Someone will say: Therefore, the flesh of CHRIST is plainly destitute of personality. The answer is that it is not destitute of personality in this sense, as if it were not united to any person, for it is united to the person of the Word; but that subsistence, properly and formally, neither is in it nor can be attributed to it.

4. The same can also be demonstrated thus: If the human nature of CHRIST subsists, it either subsists *per se*, that is, it has subsistence from itself, or it subsists insofar as it exists in the person of the Word. The former will be admitted by no one; but the latter also does not lack manifest absurdity, which is proven thus: The flesh of CHRIST, insofar as it exists in the person of the Word, has a certain mode of existing contrary to subsistence. Therefore, it does not subsist. The antecedent is proven: To be in another suppositum, and to subsist, or to be *per se* and outside every other suppositum, are two opposite modes of existing. But the flesh of CHRIST, insofar as it exists in the person of the Word, has the former mode of existing, i.e., it exists in a suppositum. Therefore, it cannot have the latter, which is diametrically opposed to it.
5. The latter part of our assertion is declared thus: The Word graciously received and assumed our nature to his hypostasis, so that his hypostasis has the flesh intimately present to it, and carries it personally united to himself; on the contrary, the flesh adheres in that hypostasis and is sustained. From which it follows that the hypostasis of CHRIST, or his personal subsistence, is rightly said to be communicated to the human nature sustentatively.
6. From this distinction of communication, it is clear what should be answered to both arguments proposed at the beginning of this article. For since the hypostasis of CHRIST is communicated to his humanity neither intensively nor denominatively, it is evident that the Ubiquitarians cannot infer from the communication of the hypostasis of the Word that his essential properties are communicated to the assumed flesh, either intensively or denominatively. And therefore, all those inferences must be denied by which, from that foundation, they conclude that the flesh of CHRIST is omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, etc. Similarly, since all those statements are false by which subsistence or any personal being is

attributed to the flesh of CHRIST—because, that is, it has no subsistence proper to it and no personal being, but a certain mode of existing contrary to them—it follows that the humanity of CHRIST can neither be said to subsist everywhere through the subsistence of the Word, nor to exist everywhere according to his personal being. Someone will say: the human nature of CHRIST is joined with the person of the Word, who is omnipresent and omnipotent. Therefore, the human nature can be called omnipresent and omnipotent personally. I respond: If that consequence is admitted, by the same reasoning these consequences must also be admitted: The human nature of CHRIST is united with an infinite and eternal person; therefore, it is itself infinite and eternal personally, or according to its personal being. Likewise, it is joined with that person who is GOD and the Creator and redeemer of the world; therefore, these things belong to it personally.

7. Someone here will ask whether, just as the act of subsisting, so also the act of existing, should be removed from the flesh of CHRIST. I respond: By no means. For the flesh of CHRIST, although it does not subsist, nevertheless truly has its own existence, distinct from the existence of the Word, but dependent on it. I say it has an existence distinct from the existence of the Word, because every created Being has both an essence and an existence distinct from the essence and existence of the creator. I say it has an existence dependent on the existence of the Word, because it cannot exist by itself and outside the person of the Word.
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SECOND EXERCISE. On the Origin of the soul, and the propagation of sin.

ART. I. On the diversity of material and immaterial forms.

1. So that the decision of this question on the origin of the soul may be more easily understood, I will premise certain things about the diversity of forms, and about the varied causality and potency of matter with respect to the forms which are introduced into it or drawn out from it.
2. First, therefore, it must be held that there are three kinds of effects which are produced for a certain end, and not indeed randomly or by chance. For some of them are produced by the concurrence of all four causes, others by the concurrence of three, and others by the concurrence of only two. Corporeal substances are produced by the concurrence of all four causes, which cannot have any real being in the world unless two internal causes, namely matter and form, and likewise two external ones, i.e., an efficient cause and a final cause, concur to bestow on them the act of existing. By the concurrence of three causes, namely the efficient, the material, and the final, are produced all accidental forms or accidents, and likewise all substantial forms, with the sole exception of the rational soul. By the concurrence of two causes, namely the efficient and the final, are produced angels and human souls. For angels neither consist of matter and form, nor do they exist in matter; and therefore they can have only two causes, namely an efficient and a final cause.
3. I have said that accidental forms, such as whiteness, blackness, etc., are produced by the concurrence of three causes, because for whiteness to have real being in the world, 1. It is necessary for some end, or purpose, to excite and entice the efficient cause to act. 2. It is necessary for the efficient cause to apply its force, or active concurrence. 3. It is necessary for the matter in which, or the subject of the whiteness, to concur and cooperate with a passive concurrence to bestow that being on the whiteness. This, however, it does by receiving the action of the efficient and producing cause of the whiteness, and likewise by receiving the whiteness itself and sustaining it. From the concurrence of these three causes depends the existence of whiteness and of other accidents, but especially from the matter in which they are received, which by a passive concurrence produces and sustains their being. And this is because from the efficient and final causes, they depend only with respect to their *coming to be*; from matter, however, or the subject, they depend both with respect to their *coming to be* and with respect to their *being*. For they cannot come to be without the concurrence of the matter in which they are to exist, nor can they persevere in the act of existing if that matter is removed. But with the efficient and final cause removed, an accident already produced can persevere in the act of existing, as is clear from infinite examples.

4. I have said that all substantial forms, with the exception of the human soul, are also produced by the concurrence of three causes. Because for the form of a stone, for example, to exist in act, 1. It is necessary for some end, by a metaphorical motion, to move the efficient cause. 2. It is necessary for the efficient cause, by its active power, to dispose the matter of the stone to receive that substantial form. 3. It is necessary for the matter, in the genus of a subjective cause, to concur in producing and sustaining that form. And this is because that form depends on matter with respect to its coming to be, its being, and its operation; that is, it can neither come to be, nor be, nor operate, without the matter in which it exists. This dependence of substantial forms on matter manifestly argues that matter is a cause of the forms existing in it, not indeed an efficient cause, but a passive and subjective one, as they call it. For any dependence of one thing upon another as upon a prior, in coming to be and in being, is an evident indication of causality. But the human soul is far otherwise; for after the death of the man, it both exists and operates outside of matter. Therefore, it does not depend on matter with respect to its being and operation. Nor does it depend on it with respect to its coming to be; and this is because matter cannot by any force or causal concurrence bestow being on a spiritual substance, such as the rational soul is, as will soon be proven, and therefore it is in no way its cause. Hence it follows that the soul is among the number of those things which are produced by the concurrence of only two causes, namely the efficient and the final. It is also clear that the soul is rightly called an immaterial form, or one independent of matter, since, on the contrary, all other forms, both substantial and accidental, are called material forms, and are dependent on matter. For example, the form of fire, just as it cannot exist outside its matter, so also without it, it cannot heat and burn. The form of a beast, just as it cannot exist without its matter, i.e., its body, so without the same it cannot feel or desire. But the human soul not only exists outside matter after the death of the man, but also operates outside it, by exercising acts of understanding, willing, rejoicing, or grieving.

ART. II. On the twofold causality and potency of matter, also on the eduction of forms from the potency of matter.

1. In this article, it should be noted first that Matter, or the material cause, has a twofold causality: one with respect to the composite, or the materiate thing, the other with respect to the forms dependent on it. Its causality with respect to the composite is posited in this, that as an essential part, it constitutes the composite. With respect to the forms dependent on it, its causality is posited in this, that with a passive concurrence, it concurs with the agent to bestow being on them, and to conserve that very being.

2. Secondly, it should be noted that the potency of matter is twofold: one only receptive and not also causative, the other both receptive and causative. Matter has the former potency with respect to the rational soul alone; for it has the natural potency of receiving the soul into itself, but it does not have the potency of concurring in the genus of a material cause to bestow being on the soul. It has the latter with respect to all other forms, both essential and accidental; for not only can it receive them into itself, but also with a passive concurrence, it can cooperate with the agent to produce them.
3. Thirdly, it should be noted that those philosophers wrongly explain the eduction of forms from the potency of matter who say that the form exists in act in the matter before the generation of the thing, but does not appear, but rather lies hidden as if under the confusion of its potency, and through generation becomes manifest, so that that actual being, which previously was as if hidden, does not simply begin through generation, but through it begins to become manifest, and is thus drawn out from the darkness and confusion of matter as if into the light. I say this explanation of eduction is bad, because if the form exists in act in the matter before the generation of the composite, the composite itself exists before its own generation, which is openly absurd. The reason for the consequence is that from matter and form existing in act and united, the composite results, and these being posited, the composite is necessarily posited. Therefore, if the matter and form exist united before the generation of the composite, the composite itself exists before its own generation. Someone will say: if the form does not exist in the matter before the generation of things, it cannot be said to be drawn out or extracted from the matter; for nothing can be drawn out or extracted from that in which it is not. I respond: The form is said to be drawn out from the matter, not because it is drawn out from the substance of the matter, but because it is drawn out or extracted from the causative potency of the matter. For although the form does not exist in the substance of the matter itself before generation, it is nevertheless said to truly and properly exist in its potency, inasmuch as it is producible by the matter. For to be in the causative potency of matter is nothing other than to be able to be produced by matter as from a passive principle.
4. Fourthly, it should be noted that those also err completely who say that forms, before generation, exist according to an inchoate and imperfect being, that is, according to certain degrees of their entity, they exist in matter; but through generation, they truly begin to be in matter according to a complete and consummated being. I say the patrons of this opinion err shamefully, because it follows from this that a substantial form is varied with respect to degrees of intension and remission, no less than accidents; because it is also absurd that in one and the same matter, all the forms which can be drawn out from the potency of the matter, whether

they be total or partial, exist in act; for thus in one and the same thing, there would simultaneously be almost infinite substantial entities of diverse kinds. But someone will object: if the form is plainly nothing before the generation of the thing, it will follow that all forms are made from nothing, and therefore are created. I respond: All forms can be said to be made from nothing, if "to be made from nothing" is taken to mean to be made from no pre-existing part of itself, but not if "to be made from nothing" is taken properly, for that which is to be made from no pre-existing matter, in which sense it has the same force as "to be created"; for forms are made from matter, that is, they are made with matter concurring in the genus of a subjective cause, to bestow being on them.

5. Fifthly, it should be noted that those also wrongly explain the eduction of forms from the potency of matter who say that a form is drawn from the potency of matter because the matter, before the arrival of the form, has the potency to receive it. For if this explanation were in agreement with the truth, all forms, with no exception, would be educible from the potency of matter; and this is because matter has a potency to receive any form, a potency (I say) either natural or obediential. Now, a natural potency is that which is educible into act by the force of some natural agent, as the passive potency of wood to receive heat is called natural, because it can be drawn into act by the force of a natural agent, namely fire. The obediential potency of matter is that which cannot be drawn into act by the force of a natural agent, but by the force of some superior agent, and of another order, to which that matter is so subject and subdued that it necessarily obeys it. Such is the potency of wood or stone for the form of a statue; for it is not drawn into act by the force of any natural agent, but by the force of an agent through art. Such also is the potency of the soul to receive the supernatural gifts of grace, such as faith, hope, charity; for it cannot be drawn into act by any natural force, but by the infinite force and power of the creator.
6. These things being posited, it is easy to explain the eduction of forms from the potency of matter. For since nothing can be drawn out from something unless it was previously in it, it is manifest that only those forms are drawn out from the causative potency of matter which, before they exist, are in the causative potency of matter, i.e., are producible by the passive concurrence of matter. For those forms, as long as they do not exist in act, have the potency to receive being from matter, as from a passive and receptive principle; therefore, when they begin to exist in act, by the active power of the agent and the passive power of the matter, they are rightly said to be drawn out from the causative potency of matter, because they are no longer in the causative potency of matter, i.e., they are no longer producible by matter. For what has once been produced and caused is no longer in the potency of the cause, but has been drawn out from the state of potentiality into the state of actuality. The form of a

beast, therefore, is truly said to be drawn from the causative potency of the matter of the seed, because before the generation of the beast, that form was in the causative potency of the matter of the seed, i.e., it was producible by the passive power of that matter; but now, through the action of the generator, that form has been produced and placed outside the causative potency of the matter, so that it is no longer producible by the passive power of the matter, unless it loses that existence which it now has. On the contrary, the human soul, although it is produced in matter, is nevertheless not drawn out from its causative potency, but is induced into matter, and this is because it was never in the causative potency of matter, nor did matter ever have the potency to bestow being on the soul through its passive concurrence.

ART. III. Whether the rational soul is by traducianism.

1. The true state of this controversy is whether the rational soul is drawn out from the potency of the matter of the seed, by the seminal and prolific power, just as the souls of plants and beasts are; or whether it is produced by GOD without the concurrence of pre-existing matter, that is, is created and infused into the body. The latter opinion is pleasing to almost all modern Philosophers and Theologians, and rightly so; for I do not remember having read any argument to the contrary of such weight that it could induce anyone, even moderately versed in this controversy, to the opinion of those who contend that our souls are propagated from our parents by carnal generation, and not indeed created and infused by GOD. On the contrary, however, in favor of that opinion which asserts that human souls are immediately created by GOD, there are not only various testimonies of Holy Scripture, but also philosophical arguments resting on principles known by nature. I, however, omitting the arguments sought from Holy Scripture, because they are lucidly proposed by Theologians, and especially by the most distinguished D. Junius, in his explanation of the 1st chapter of Genesis, will adduce certain reasons, partly drawn from Physics, partly from Metaphysics.
2. The first reason is this: If the soul is generable, it is corruptible; but the consequent is absurd, therefore also the antecedent. The reason for the major premise is this: that form which so depends on matter that it is produced by the concurrence of a material cause in generation, also so depends on matter that if it is separated from it, which conferred and conserved its being, it must necessarily perish. To this argument, the Theologians and Philosophers who are of the contrary opinion are accustomed to respond that human souls are corruptible in themselves, as that argument proves, because they depend on matter in their coming to be and in their being, but that they will nevertheless endure for eternity, because GOD has decreed to conserve them. But if anyone asks them why the soul, considered in itself, is corruptible, they respond that this is the

reason: because if GOD were to cease from the act by which he conserves souls, they would immediately return to nothing. But this response is not pleasing, first because Theologians and Philosophers, when they divide substances into eternal and perishable, do not mean that some substances are eternal because they do not depend on the conservative influx of GOD, but because they cannot be destroyed by any creature through physical action. But in this way, not only Angels and Heaven, but also rational souls can be called incorruptible. Then, those who respond thus cannot deny that the human soul is such that it cannot be destroyed by any physical or material action. Whence I infer that it cannot be produced by any physical or material action. For what is the reason that it cannot be destroyed by any physical action? Is it not because it is a spiritual substance? But for the same reason, it cannot be produced by any material power, and this is because, just as it is repugnant for a spirit to be destroyed by a physical and material action, so also it is repugnant for a spirit to be produced by a physical and material action. But generation is a physical and material action, both because it takes place in matter and because it takes place through a material power, namely through the seminal power.

3. Second reason: God willed human souls to exist outside their bodies after the death of men; but he willed the souls of beasts to perish with their bodies. Therefore, he gave to the rational soul a nature independent of matter, so that by reason of that nature it could exist outside corporeal matter; whence I infer that the soul, with respect to its nature, is independent of corporeal matter.
4. Thirdly: Only that form is drawn out from the causative potency of matter which is made with matter passively concurring to bestow being upon it. But the matter of the seed cannot, with a passive concurrence, bestow being on the soul. Therefore, it is not drawn out from the potency of matter, but is infused into matter by God through creation. The proposition is manifest from the preceding points. The assumption is proven: no active power acts beyond its own genus, as they say; i.e., it cannot by acting produce that thing which is of a more excellent nature and of a higher order. But the soul exceeds the whole genus of corporeal nature, since it is a spiritual substance. Therefore, no corporeal power can produce the soul. To this argument they are accustomed to respond that the material force existing in the seed cannot by itself produce the spiritual substance of the soul, but it can by the power of that spiritual substance whose instrument it is, i.e., by the power of the soul of the generating man, be elevated beyond its own species to produce a spirit; just as a phantasm, which is a sensible and material species, by the power of the soul, whose instrument it is, impresses intelligible species, that is, spiritual images of things, upon the patient intellect. This evasion is plainly futile and of no moment. For it cannot happen that a created

agent, by the operation of a purely material instrument, should produce something immaterial. But the prolific faculty existing in the seed is purely material. It is otherwise, however, in the production of intelligible species; for the soul uses the power of the active intellect as a principal instrument, exciting and elevating the phantasm to produce those species. Wherefore it is universally true that a material power cannot be either the principal or the sole instrument in the production of a spiritual substance, although it can be a secondary instrument in the production of a spiritual quality.

5. Fourthly: Those who are of the opposite opinion are forced to admit very harsh and absurd conclusions. For to avoid the force of such arguments, they are forced to admit that the soul is not a spiritual substance; likewise, that the soul can be destroyed by a physical action, unless GOD conserves it by his special aid. These conclusions greatly derogate from the dignity and excellence of our soul, and take from us the opportunity of confuting Atheists with arguments drawn from the immortality of the soul. For if the soul is a form by its nature dependent on the body, so that it cannot exist by itself outside the body, how shall we persuade them that the soul is immortal? These conclusions also derogate from the divine wisdom, for to assert that GOD willed souls to exist outside their bodies, and denied them a nature suitable for this, is to say that GOD did not produce the soul with sufficient prudence.
6. Fifthly: Although we say that the soul is created by GOD and infused into the body, and therefore that the parent does not bestow the soul on his son, we can nevertheless conveniently enough maintain that man as truly begets man as a lion begets a lion, and an ox an ox. We can also maintain the natural and hereditary corruption, which they call Original Sin, is propagated from parents to children, and explain the manner of its propagation. There is therefore no necessity that compels us to embrace that opinion, which is repugnant to the nature of the soul and detracts so much from its dignity.

ART. IV. Whether and how man is said to truly beget man.

1. Philosophers and Theologians who say that the soul is not transmitted through the seed, or elicited from the seed, dissent in various ways concerning the generation of man, and the action in which the generation of man consists. For first, some, when this argument is objected to them—"a generating man does not bestow on his son the soul, by which he is a man; therefore, a man does not beget a man"—respond that a man is said to beget a man because he supplies the matter from which a man is made, that is, because he bestows on his son the body of a man. But this response is exceedingly frigid and unworthy to be brought forth by any Philosopher. For first, it follows from it that a man only begets the body of a man, not indeed the whole man; and this is the very thing that the

argument proves. Secondly, because no Philosopher has said that substantial generation is the production or supplying of matter. For if to produce a substance is to supply matter for producing a substance, by the same reasoning, he who supplies an artist with matter for making a statue will be said to make the statue, which is exceedingly absurd. Thirdly, to beget a man is to bestow being on a man, as is clear from the terms themselves. But the being of a man, or human nature, consists neither in the soul alone, nor in the body alone, as all admit. For if human nature consisted in one of these, human nature would not be destroyed by the separation of the soul from the body. Therefore, human nature consists in the union of the body and the soul, that is, it consists in this, that a man truly consists of soul and body. Thus, if the generator does not effect that the son be something consisting of soul and body, but only effects the body itself, the generating man is not truly said to bestow on the begotten man the being of a man, and so will not be truly said to beget a man.

2. Others, when they see that they cannot avoid the force of this argument by the former response, have devised another response, but it is almost as invalid as the former. They say that a man truly begets a man because he not only bestows on him the matter, i.e., the body, but also prepares the matter to receive the form, and so, through the prolific power, he brings about the conjunction of the soul and the body, by which conjunction man is constituted in the being of a man and becomes such a physical composite. These, therefore, do not say that the father joins the soul of the son with the body of the son by the seminal power (for this they attribute to GOD who infuses the soul), but that he prepares the matter of the seed to receive the human form, which preparation, after it has been completed, is immediately followed by the conjunction of the soul and the body. Hence it is clear from their opinion that the action of begetting is nothing other than a prior alteration of the matter and a preparation for receiving the form. In this opinion were almost all the older Philosophers, also almost all the Moderns, and most of the Pontifical Theologians as well; for the Coimbrians, in their explanation of Book 1 of *On Generation*, testify that they themselves formerly embraced this opinion, because it was received by all. But this opinion, as has been said, no more satisfies the argument than the former. First, because the preparation of matter is a change in quality, and so is an alteration. But generation is not an alteration; for they are motions of different species, differing in this, that one is terminated at a quality, the other at a substance. Therefore, generation is not a change or preparation of matter; nor is to beget to prepare matter. Secondly, generation is one simple change, or a simple motion, as all admit. But that preparation is not posited in one change, but in various alterations which precede the introduction of the form. For sometimes that matter is expanded, sometimes consolidated, sometimes the humor is increased, sometimes diminished, just as the nature of the

form to be introduced demands. Therefore, that preparation is not generation, but an aggregated or multiple change, or alteration. Thirdly, to beget is to bestow *being*; but the being of man consists in this, that he is composed of soul and body. If therefore GOD couples the soul with the body, by infusing it (as the Theologians say), GOD bestows being on man, not indeed the generator. For only he who couples the soul with the body effects that man be composed of soul and body. Finally, man is begotten in an instant, that is, he becomes a man in an instant. Therefore, not gradually; and so his production is not some successive change, but an instantaneous one.

3. The third way of responding is that of those who say that a man begets a man, neither because he bestows on him matter, nor because he prepares the matter, but because he also bestows on him a form, not indeed the specific one, that is, the rational soul (for this they wish to be bestowed by GOD alone, who creates it and unites it with the body), but because from the potency of the seed he draws out the vegetative and sensitive soul. But this opinion is least pleasing of all, because it manifestly follows from it that a man does not beget a man, but this living thing, and this animal. Besides (as I was saying), the being of man consists in this, that a man is composed of a soul and a body. If therefore the son does not owe it to the father that he is composed of a rational soul and a body, he does not have the nature of a man communicated to him by his father.
4. Having rejected these opinions, we, with the most learned Philosophers, Doctor Scotus, and the Professors of the Academy of Coimbra, embrace a fourth way of speaking, asserting that a man truly begets a man, although the soul is created by GOD; not because he bestows on him the body only, nor because he prepares the body to receive the soul, nor because in the matter or from the matter of the body he effects the vegetative or sensitive soul of his son, but because from the generating man comes the very action by which the rational soul is substantially united to the body and begins to inform, inhabit, and fill the whole matter of the body. So that according to our opinion, the generation of man is posited in that action by which, through the prolific power, the soul is coupled with the body by an essential bond.

ART. V. Whether generation is posited in the production of the form, or in the conjunction of the form with matter.

1. So that our opinion may appear, I will first show that the action of the generator (speaking in general, of all generation) is posited in the conjunction of matter and form; secondly, I will say something more specific about that action by which the soul is united to the body. As to the first point, the generation of a composite is not the production of matter, and this is because matter is properly ingenerable and incorruptible, that is, it can be made by none except the creator. For if any creature were to

produce prime matter, it would produce it from no pre-existing matter, and so would create it; but no creature creates, since creation requires infinite power. Then, since from fire comes air, the air generates another air by changing the fire into air; it does not, however, by that generation produce the matter of the new air, but into the pre-existing matter it introduces the form of the new air.

2. Substantial generation is not the production of matter, as has now been shown; nor is it the production of the form, which indeed is certain and evident among those who say that souls are created by God. But it can be proven no less evidently also against those who say that the soul is by traducianism. For first, the nature of man is posited in this, that he is composed of a soul and a body. But by the action by which the soul is united to the body, whether the soul be from GOD or from the father, the man becomes a composite consisting of a soul and a body. Therefore, by that action, the man receives the nature or being of a man, and therefore by that action he is produced. For what else is it to produce a man than to effect that a man exists, or a Being consisting of a soul and a body? Secondly, a physical composite can never be newly produced, whether by generation or by another change, unless its matter and form are newly joined and come together into a unity *per se*, as is evident. Yet a physical composite can be newly produced, and truly be made, although its form is not produced anew. Therefore, to effect a physical composite is rather to join matter and form than to produce the form. The assumption is proven, first, from the resurrection of the dead on the day of judgment. For then men will be newly produced, and will newly receive the being of a man, through a true substantial production, though not an ordinary one, but a plainly extraordinary one. But then their soul cannot be said to be newly produced, because it existed always after it was created; but only to be newly united with matter. Therefore, the production of a physical composite is not the production of the form, but rather the union of the form with the matter. If anyone is so impudent as to deny that in the resurrection of the dead there will be a true substantial production, against him I will use this argument: To produce a corporeal substance is to bestow being on a corporeal substance. But then GOD will truly and properly give to dead men, who as long as they were dead did not have the true being of a natural substance because they did not consist of matter and form united, the entire and full being of a natural body, by effecting that they truly consist of body and soul. Therefore, GOD, by that action, truly produces natural bodies. It cannot indeed be denied that that action is an action far different from substantial generation and the ordinary mode of generating; yet it is certain that that action is a true substantial production, which we prove from the definition of substantial production. For what else is it to produce a substance than to confer being on that substance which, before that action, did not have substantial

being? Secondly, the assumption is proven thus: GOD can create the soul of an infant for some time before its generation, and afterwards, in the generation itself, join that soul with its body. Therefore, there can be a true substantial generation without the production of the form.

3. As to the latter point: Theologians and Philosophers who are of our opinion concerning the origin of the soul assert that the seminal power in beasts has a twofold operation, namely, the eduction of the form from the potency of the matter, and the union of the same form with the composite. They say that these actions are not really different, but only by reason, and this is because by one and the same real action, the form is drawn out from the potency of the matter and is substantially united with the matter. On the contrary, they assert that the seminal power which exists in the seed of man has only one action, namely, the union of the form, i.e., of the soul with the corporeal matter; one principal action, I say, for it is certain that from that power proceed various less principal actions, to wit, the preparations of the corporeal matter to receive the soul. Wherefore, they say that in the production of man there are two actions proceeding from different agents: namely, the creation of the soul and the union of the same with matter. They say that the creation of the soul is the operation of GOD alone, which is evident. But the union of the soul with the body, they wish to be an action, not indeed of man alone (for GOD cooperates with man in that action), but of man and of GOD together. And they add that in this union, and not in another action, is posited the generation of man. This is clear from the fact that it was shown above that to produce a composite is neither to produce the matter nor to produce the form, but to unite and couple the form with the matter. According to our opinion, therefore, in the same instant that GOD creates the soul in the body, the generating man, through the seminal power, substantially unites and connects the soul created by GOD with the body. So that the action of GOD is terminated at the being of the soul simply; but the action of the father is terminated, not indeed at the being of the soul simply, but at its being in the body, or at the union of the soul with the body.
4. To that argument, "man is man through the soul; if therefore the father does not bestow the soul on the son, he does not bestow on him the being of a man," they respond that man is man neither through the soul considered separately, nor through the body, but through the entire nature, or through the human essence. And they say that the father, by uniting the soul with the body through the seminal power, bestows on the son "to consist of soul and body," and therefore bestows on him the nature and essence by which he is a man. It is clear, however, that each thing is such a thing not through one part of its essence, but through the whole essence, because the essence is that by which a Being is a Being; and so such an essence is that by which a thing is such a thing. But that which is

usually said, that each thing is such a thing through its form, must be conceived in such a way that we understand that each thing is such a thing through the form, not indeed as an adequate reason (for the adequate reason why a thing is such a thing is because it has such an essence), but as the principal part of the essence. For if we compare the parts of a physical essence with each other, any thing is such a thing through the form rather than through the matter. In the meantime, if we compare either the form or the matter with the entire essence, any thing is such a thing rather through the essence than either through the matter or the form.

5. But here a great difficulty arises. For if GOD infuses the soul (as all Theologians who are of this opinion say), the conjunction of the soul with the body should rather be attributed to GOD than to the generating man. For what else is the infusion of the soul into corporeal matter than the conjunction of the soul with the matter? Some respond that GOD is said to infuse the soul, not because he alone couples the soul with the body, but because he performs that through the seminal power, whose ministry he uses as an instrument, not indeed a necessary one (for he himself can connect the soul and the body by himself), but an ordinary one, because, of course, its use is ordinary in every generation of animals. Others more probably respond that God is said to infuse the soul into the body, not that he substantially joins the soul and the body, but that he locally joins them; that is, that he creates the soul in the body, and by its creation in such a "where," he makes it locally present to the body. For they say that in the same instant in which GOD creates the soul locally present to the body, in the same instant (I say) the seminal power connects those parts with a substantial bond. But they teach that the local presence of the soul is something far different from its substantial union with matter; because an Angel, clothed in an assumed body, is locally present to that body, but not substantially joined to it as a form to its matter.

ART. VI. Whether the preceding doctrine removes the propagation of original sin.

1. Those who think that the human soul is not immediately created by GOD, but is drawn out from the potency of the seed, are accustomed to object that our opinion plainly removes the propagation of original sin, and leaves no way by which the derivation of that sin from parents to children can be explained. In order, therefore, that I may refute this cavil by the fact itself, I will enumerate the, as it were, integral parts of that sin, and I will teach how each is propagated.
2. The parts of original sin are three: First, the participation in the sin of the first parents, for that was the common sin of the whole human race. Secondly, the lack of original justice, that is, the defect of the gifts, both of the intellect and of the will, with which Adam and Eve were adorned before the fall. Thirdly, the propensity or inclination to evil; for not only

do we lack original justice, which made us prone to good, but also, with it removed, a contrary quality adverse to the law has succeeded, which makes us prone to all baseness.

3. The first part of original sin is propagated from parents to children in the same way as the splendor of a family, and also hereditary right, is usually propagated: namely, neither through the soul, nor through the body, but through natural generation. For just as Charles, for example, is therefore the heir of the kingdom because he is the son of the King, and therefore the son of the King because he was begotten by the King; just as also Charles is therefore noble because he is the offspring of noble parents, and therefore the offspring because he descends from noble parents by natural generation: so also the sin of Adam is therefore ours because we are his sons and heirs, i.e., because we descend from Adam by natural generation. This opinion on the propagation of this first part of original sin coincides with the opinion of those who say that the soul, created by GOD, becomes corrupt and guilty through its hypostatic union with the body, because from that union of the soul and the body results the whole man, who is the successor of Adam, and so guilty of the disobedience of Adam.
4. Here three things are to be diligently noted: First, that what has just been said is not to be understood of any successor of Adam, but of a successor begotten by natural generation, i.e., of him who, by the ordinary mode of begetting, namely by the congress of a male and a female, descends from Adam. Otherwise, it would follow that our Lord JESUS CHRIST is guilty of the sin of Adam, which is absurd and impious to say. Secondly, it should be noted that the blessed Virgin is necessarily guilty of the sin of Adam. For if that very thing on account of which we are guilty of the sin of Adam is found in the blessed Virgin, she is no less guilty than we are. But the former is true, for she descended from Adam in the same way as we do. Therefore, the latter is also true.
5. Thirdly, it should be noted that the sins of the first man alone, not indeed of subsequent parents, pass to their children. The principal reason for this is this: the first man received justice not only for himself, but also for his entire posterity, so that if he remained in justice, he would transmit it together with nature to his posterity; but if he deserted it by sinning, he would transfuse sin also with the same nature into all posterity. Since, therefore, none of the subsequent parents was instituted by a similar law, it is clear that their sins are no more propagated to their posterity than their justice, but are only particular and (as they say) personal.
6. The second part of original sin, viz., the lack of original justice, parents transmit to their posterity in the way that poor, inglorious, and ignoble parents transfuse their poverty and the obscurity of their family into their children, viz., in some negative way, not a positive one. For just as the children of the ignoble and poor are therefore ignoble and poor because

their parents lack those goods and therefore cannot confer them on their children, so also a newborn infant lacks original justice because its parents are destitute of justice and therefore cannot communicate it to their offspring. Someone will say: faithful parents, through the grace of regeneration, have the gifts of justice and sanctity to some extent restored to them, why then do they not transfuse those gifts into their posterity? I respond: because to none of the immediate parents, no, not even to Adam himself after he once sinned, was it granted that he should transmit any gift to his posterity, for this was granted only to the first parents before their fall.

7. As for the third part of original sin, the common opinion is that it is propagated and transmitted to children in the same way that leprosy is transmitted from leprous parents to their children, namely, through the seed emitted by the parents. This, however, is declared thus: the infection which is in the seed of a leper is not leprosy or a disease formally and in act, but only virtually; for it is a certain hidden disposition to leprosy. So also the spiritual infection which is in the seed is not sin formally and in act, but is a certain hidden disposition to sin. From which it happens that the soul, created by GOD in the body, like a flower in a foul place, contracts from its very origin a habitual and culpable vice from the body. The foundation of this opinion is the mutual and natural sympathy, i.e., the communication of passions and affections, between the body and the soul, as between two substantial parts constituting the same natural composite. Whence we see it happen that when the body is ill-affected, the soul grieves, and conversely, from the cheerfulness of the soul, the body is refreshed. Wherefore, just as the soul, if it were infused into a wounded body, or one placed in a fire, would soon grieve in that body, so, while it is infused into a body disposed to sinning, it habitually sins in it in a certain way.

ART. VII. Arguments which are usually brought against the preceding doctrine on the propagation of native corruption through the seed of the parents are solved.

1. First, the body, being corporeal, cannot act on the spirit by impressing some vicious quality upon it. Therefore, concupiscence, or the propensity to evil, is not derived from the body to the soul. Pareus responds from Augustine, in book 4, chapter 12 of *On the Loss of Grace*, that it does not happen entirely naturally, but by the hidden judgment of GOD, that the soul, from the vitiated flesh, on account of the guilt of the first parents, contracts vice; that is, although the body cannot naturally act on the spirit, yet by the hidden justice of the divine law, it can happen.
2. Others respond that this does not happen through the action of the flesh on the soul, but through a certain natural concomitance and communication which exists between the matter and the form. For just as

the soul communicates its affections to the body, such as life, sense, and other things of this kind, so also the dispositions of the body are communicated to the soul. For the soul infused into a badly disposed body becomes foolish, as is seen in the naturally simple-minded; so thinks Esthius, a Pontifical Theologian, on book 2 of the Sentences, 31, art. 1.

3. Thirdly, Jerome Zanchius, in *On the Works of GOD*, part 3, book 2, chapter 5, responds that the soul is infected with sin from its conjunction with the body, not through a physical action of the body on the soul, but from the most just ordinance of GOD, who had so established at the beginning that, just as if Adam had not sinned, his entire justice would be propagated to his children, so, with him sinning, the entire corruption of nature which followed his disobedience would flow and be derived from him as from a head into all men, and this through the seed, as through a vehicle by which that stain is transferred from the part to the offspring.
4. Fourthly, Alensis and Bonaventure, on the second of the Sentences, say that the soul is vitiated in an unclean body, not because the flesh infects the spirit with a true and real action, but because the flesh, destitute of original rectitude and rebellious to reason, draws the mind downward, and thereby makes it oblique and distorted. Pareus, explaining this opinion, says that we can, without any absurdity, assert that the temperament of the body, although it is brutish, is prone to evil, and is not a fit organ for the soul for good actions; but the soul, deprived of original rectitude and purity, follows the inclination and vicious temperament of the body. The same is also intimated by the most distinguished Festus Hommius, in his *Anti-Bellarminus*, disputation 58, thesis 5.
5. Secondly, it is objected: If GOD casts a pure soul into so impure a prison, He acts cruelly and unjustly; but the latter is impious and blasphemous; therefore the former is also absurd. I respond by conceding the whole. For we do not say that God sends a just and pure soul into an impure body; for from that it would follow that our souls are just before their infusion and conjunction with bodies, which will be refuted later in art. 8. Someone will press: GOD infuses a soul, which in itself does not have sin, into an impure and contagious body. Therefore, He acts unjustly. I respond by denying the consequence. For he acts unjustly who does that whose contrary he is bound to do out of equity and goodness. But GOD is not bound to infuse the souls of the children of Adam, who sinned in Adam and thus deserved eternal death, into pure bodies, that is, He is not bound to cleanse our bodies, defiled by the stain of sin, before the infusion of souls. But on the contrary, he is bound not to cleanse them, and this by the force of that threat, "on the day you eat of it, you shall surely die."
6. Third objection: the cause of a cause is also the cause of the effect. But GOD is the cause of the union of the soul with the body. Therefore, He is

also the cause of that sin which the soul contracts from its conjunction with the body, for the union is the cause of that sin in the soul. Zanchius responds that the union of the soul with the body is a cause of sin not per se, but per accidens, and this is because if Adam had not sinned, GOD would have coupled souls with bodies without any consequence of sin. Wherefore it is by accident that the stain now follows that conjunction in the soul.

I respond: GOD only creates souls in bodies, but parents, through their prolific power, substantially join the souls with the bodies. Therefore, that we have souls in our bodies is from GOD; but that we have souls created in impure and contagious bodies is from the fall of the first parents. In sum, that rule, "the cause of a cause is also the cause of the effect," is to be understood of causes per se, not per accidens. For GOD is the cause of his law, and the divine law is the cause of sin by accident, as is clear from chapter 7 of Romans from verse 8 to 14. Yet no one can conclude from this that GOD is the cause of sin.

7. Fourth objection: what the body does not have, it cannot use to infect the soul. But sin, which is proper to the soul, namely ignorance of the mind and aversion of the will from good, is not in the body. Therefore, the body cannot infect the soul with sin. I respond: just as the seed of a leprous parent produces leprosy in the bodies of his children, although it does not have leprosy in itself actually and formally, but a hidden certain disposition to leprosy, so also the flesh can infect the soul with sin, although it does not have sin in itself actually and formally, but only a certain disposition to sin. I respond therefore to the proposition: what the body has in itself in no way, that is, neither formally nor virtually, with that it cannot infect the soul, but it can infect the soul with that which it has in itself virtually and dispositively.
8. Fifth objection: in Adam the vice was first in the soul, before it was in the flesh, and it passed from the soul to the flesh, not from the flesh to the soul. Therefore, the vice exists in the same order in the children of Adam; for the soul, not the body, is the first recipient of sin. Pareus responds that the order was different in the operation of vice which began from free will, and different in the generation of vice which begins from the flesh. It can also be responded that the same order is still preserved, and the soul is even now the first recipient of sin, and this is because ignorance, contumacy, and aversion from good are actually and formally first in the soul, then in the body; although dispositively and virtually they are in the body before they are in the soul. Here an occasion presents itself to us to reprehend the gross and absurd opinion of those who say that original sin is actually and formally in the seed before the arrival of the soul. For first, a habit and a privation are concerned with the same subject. Therefore, a privation cannot be in any subject in which the habit cannot be. But original justice, which is a habit, cannot be in the seed; therefore, neither

can original sin, which is its privation, exist in it. Secondly, if the seed actually and formally has sin in itself, various absurdities will follow. First, that a law has been given to the seed, for "the law," says Paul, "was given to sinners." Secondly, that the seed is liable to eternal damnation, for that which properly has sin in itself can be damned for eternity. Thirdly, that the seed can be redeemed by CHRIST, be saved, do penance, and believe, all of which, says Keckermann, are so absurd that hardly anything more absurd can be imagined.

ART. VIII. Some questions on the propagation of original sin are proposed and solved.

1. The first question is, how can original sin be transmitted and propagated, when the soul, which is its subject, is not transmitted; for an accident cannot be transmitted without its subject? Doctor Esthius responds that accidents are frequently transmitted, that is, they pass into another by a certain affection or infection, without the subject being transmitted. For heresies, errors, and vices are propagated from one to many without their subject, that is, the soul, being transmitted. This response is true and solid, if it is understood of that propagation by which an accident not the same in number, but the same in species, passes and is transmitted from one to another. For when the same accident in number is transmitted, it is necessary that its subject also be transmitted and pass over. Thus, as some Philosophers think, when an odor passes into the hand of a man handling it, the more subtle parts of the apple, in which the odor proximately exists, also pass over. Since, therefore, the propagation of sin is not a transmission of one accident in number from subject to subject, but the production of an accident of the same species, it is not necessary that its subject, namely the soul, be transmitted. For other responses to this argument, see Pareus, book 4, chapter 18 of *On the Loss of Grace*.
2. The second question is, how can the soul, which is produced by God and therefore not derived from Adam, nor in any way was in the loins of Adam, how (I say) can it be said to have sinned in Adam or to be guilty of the sin committed by Adam? Zanchius responds, and with him the other Orthodox Theologians, that the soul can be considered in two ways, namely either in itself and with respect to itself, or insofar as it is a constitutive part of that man who is a son of Adam. The soul considered in the former way cannot be said to have been in the loins of Adam, and consequently cannot be said to have sinned in the loins of Adam. But considered in the latter way, it can well be said to be derived from Adam, to have been in his loins, and to have sinned. For the whole man was in the loins of Adam, and this is because he descended from Adam by natural generation, and therefore the whole man is guilty of the sin committed by Adam. But the whole man cannot be obliged to punishment unless both his soul and his body are obliged to punishment.

3. Here Balthasar Meisner objects, an acute philosopher indeed, but proud and a notable scorner of great men, that the whole man cannot be said to be derived from Adam unless both his body and his soul are derived from Adam, and this is because the whole man is a subsisting thing composed of soul and body—an excellent argument, truly, and worthy of so great a man! Is not the whole CHRIST said to be the son of Mary, and to be wholly begotten and born of her, although he did not receive his Deity from her substance? By all means. Whence also it was defined against Nestorius in the Synod of Ephesus that Mary should be called the God-bearer (Theotokos).
4. The third question is whether souls are created pure or impure by GOD. Although others deem this question to be involved in many difficulties, I nevertheless think that it can be easily dissolved and explained. I respond, therefore, that this question has a twofold sense. The former is whether souls, in the instant in which they are created, are pure or impure. The latter is whether souls receive purity or justice from GOD the creator, or indeed impurity and corruption. If the question is conceived in the former way, I respond that souls, in the very instant in which they are created, are impure, for they are at the same time created and substantially united with contagious bodies, from which they contract a stain. If the question is conceived in the latter way, I respond that our souls receive from GOD the creator neither purity or justice and sanctity, nor impurity and a propensity to evil, but only a spiritual essence and the properties emanating from that essence. I say that GOD does not inspire into the soul the lethal poison of concupiscence, because He does not wish to be the author of evil. I also say that He does not infuse sanctity and justice into the soul, because the soul is created to be a constitutive part of a son and successor of Adam, to whom GOD is not bound to confer spiritual gifts. See the most distinguished Junius's Commentary on Chapter 2 of Genesis.

ART. IX. The final arguments which are usually brought against the creation and infusion of the soul are dissolved.

1. It is objected first: GOD completed the whole work of creation in the first six days, and afterwards he truly rested from his work, Gen. 2, Exod. 20. Therefore, no new souls are now created. I respond: GOD, after the sixth day, ceased from the creation of new species, but not indeed of new individuals. But the souls which He now creates differ not in species but in number from the soul of Adam, which He first created.
2. Secondly, it is objected: In Genesis 5, it is said that Adam begot a son in his own image, but a son is the image and likeness of his father according to the soul. Therefore, Adam begot his son according to the soul. I respond: a son is the image and likeness of his father not so much by reason of the soul, as by reason of the whole suppositum, i.e., insofar as he is something

composed of a soul and a body. Adam, therefore, not only begot a son like his father, as Esthius wishes, but he also begot that in which that likeness chiefly consists, namely the very person of his son, composed of soul and body.

3. Thirdly, it is objected: In Genesis 46, it is said that 70 souls came out of the loins of Jacob, which is nothing other than to be transmitted by the propagation of the seed. I respond: souls are put for men by synecdoche. We can also add that the souls themselves came out from the loins of Jacob, not because they were transmitted from the loins of Jacob with respect to their simple being, but because they descended from him with respect to their existence in the body and their union with the body. For the power of the seed that came out from the loins of Jacob effected the union of the body and the soul.
4. Fourthly, it is objected: if a man in begetting does not produce the rational soul, he is of a worse condition than beasts and plants, which produce souls proper to themselves, namely the vegetative and the sensitive. Esthius responds that man is of a better condition, even in the office of generating, than are beasts or plants, because his generative power extends to the union of a most noble form with matter, as was declared above. Add that this very thing pertains to a great dignity, to have such a soul, that to produce it, on account of its very excellence, that power of nature could not reach; for which reason, no power of generating belongs to the angels, whose nature is more excellent than that of men.
5. Fifthly, it is objected: if a man does not beget the soul of his son, but the body, he does not beget the whole man, but the other part of him, indeed the more ignoble part of him. I respond by denying the consequence. For Mary did not beget the Deity of CHRIST, and yet she is truly said to have begotten the whole CHRIST. Also fire, when it generates another fire from wood, does not generate the matter of that fire, but only the form, and yet it is said to generate or produce that whole fire. According to the definition of Aristotle, generation is the change of the whole, etc. Wherefore, here a distinction must be made between the whole man and the whole *of* man. For the father begets the whole son, but not the whole *of* the son, that is, all the parts of the son.
6. Sixthly, it is objected: if GOD creates individually the souls of all who are begotten in any way, he cooperates with fornicators and adulterers. For he creates and bestows souls for the conceptions of fornicators and adulterers, which seems absurd. I respond: GOD cooperates with natural generation, which is *per se* good, and a work of nature, but not with the vice by which fornicators and adulterers perform generation against the law of GOD.

ART. X. Whether a more convenient or more expeditious reason could be given for the transmission of concupiscence, or the propensity to evil, than the one we have said is the third part of original sin.

1. Those who spurn and reject the common opinion concerning the infection of the soul by a body disposed to sinning can be called to and reduced to four classes or orders. For first, the Traducianists, who attack the creation of souls, most firmly assert that from the foundations of their opinion, they can give a far better and safer reason for the transmission of sin than we, who defend the creation of souls. That this assertion of theirs is false, I will show (with GOD's help) in the last Article of this disputation.
2. Secondly, the pontifical Theologians, who with Bellarmine, book 5, chapter 15 of *On the Loss of Grace*, condemn the opinion of Lombard, Henry, Gregory of Rimini, and Johannes Driedo, who say that concupiscence is an adventitious and positive certain quality superadded to the faculties of the soul; those (I say) who reject this dogma, intrepidly assert that they can with no trouble give a reason why in the soul of an infant created by God, there is concupiscence or a propensity to evil. For first they say that man naturally consists of flesh and spirit, and therefore partly with the beasts, partly with the Angels, he shares a nature. And indeed, by reason of the flesh and his communion with the beasts, he has a certain propensity to corporeal and sensible good, towards which he is carried by sense and appetite; by reason of the spirit and his communion with the Angels, he has a propensity to spiritual and intelligible good, towards which he is carried by intellect and will. But from these diverse or contrary propensities, in one and the same man, they will that there exists naturally or by a necessary consequence from his essential principles, a certain struggle between sense and reason, and from that struggle, a great difficulty in acting well, while one propensity impedes the other.
3. They say secondly that divine providence, at the beginning of creation, to apply a remedy to this disease or languor of human nature, which arises from the condition of its essential principles, added to man a certain signal gift, namely original justice, by which, as by a certain golden bridle, the sensitive appetite would be contained and subjected to reason.
4. They say thirdly that the first parents, and all of us in them, lost that golden bridle of original justice by which sense was subjected to reason; and they say that from the removal of that supernatural gift, a struggle immediately arose in us between the superior and inferior part of the soul, that is, between sense and reason. For with the bridle removed (they say), by which the appetite, in itself prone to desire against the order of reason, was contained, there follows by a necessary consequence in the sensitive appetite a propensity to resist reason and to desire objects pleasant to the senses, which are prohibited by law. These, therefore, will

that concupiscence or the propensity to evil in infants is not contracted from the conjunction of the soul with contagious bodies, but partly emanates from the very essential constitution of the soul, by which it is constituted of a sensitive part and a rational part; partly from the lack of original justice, which subjected the sensitive part to the intellective part.

5. This teaching is rightly rejected by our Theologians. First, because it is the foundation of that absurd dogma concerning concupiscence in the reborn, namely that after baptism it is not a sin, but a disease and a certain languor of nature. Secondly, because it falsely asserts that the rebellion of the sensitive appetite against reason and its direction is natural. For those who assert this are contumelious towards GOD, saying that GOD, that most holy one who hates and execrates sin, himself impressed upon human nature in the first creation an impulse so rebellious and iniquitous, namely a propensity to sinning and to desiring base and dishonest objects. Thirdly, because (as Bellarmine himself admits, book 5 of *On the Loss of Grace*) that vicious concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite, which resists reason, but also in the will, which is prone to desire honors, vainglory, and other vanities. I will therefore ask Bellarmine, whence comes this proneness of the will to obey the desires of the flesh? He responds in chapter 15 that it comes from the removal of that supernatural gift with which GOD adorned man in the first creation. But this response is absurd and contrary to his own doctrine. For in the book *On the Grace of the First Man*, chapter 5, he says that the superior part of the soul is, of itself and by its own nature, prone and inclined to spiritual and intelligible good, and consequently that it naturally resists the desires of the flesh. Therefore, with the supernatural gift removed, the will will still remain prone to resisting the desires of the flesh, if only it lacks no natural gift (which Bellarmine himself concedes). And therefore my question has not yet been satisfied, by which I asked whence it is that the will is now prone to obeying the desires of the flesh and to desiring those objects which are pleasant to the senses and displeasing to reason, since previously it was disposed in the contrary way, and that naturally. Here Bellarmine is stuck, and will be stuck forever, until he has embraced our opinion concerning concupiscence in the reborn.
6. Bellarmine, responding to the second reason just brought by us in the book *On the Grace of the First Man*, chapter 7, says: the concupiscence of the flesh was in man in the first state natural, not indeed as some good of nature, but as a defect and, as it were, a certain disease of nature consequent upon the condition of matter. Wherefore, concupiscence is most rightly said not to be from GOD; worthy of hatred, not love; evil, and contrary to nature, for two reasons: first, because it would have existed in man not from the intention of the author of nature, but contrary to his intention, if man had been created in a purely natural

state. Then, because GOD had removed it, and it has a place in us from the fault of man himself.

7. This doctrine of Bellarmine is too gross and absurd. First, because he says this rebellion of the flesh against the spirit emanates from the principles of nature, and yet is contrary to nature, which implies a manifest contradiction. For it cannot happen that something flows from nature itself and yet is contrary to nature, unless one wishes to say that nature is contrary and inimical to itself. Secondly, because he says this rebellion emanates from nature itself, and yet happens contrary to the intention of GOD. For if the very natures of things exist by the intention of GOD, without a doubt the properties of things, and all those things which necessarily emanate from the nature of things, happen not contrary to, but according to the intention of GOD. For he who intends the nature, intends also those things which follow the nature. Thirdly, because whoever produces a nature, consequently produces those things which follow the nature. But GOD produces the nature of man. Therefore, He also produces this rebellious impulse which follows its nature. But this is absurd, because it follows from this that GOD produces something contrary to his own nature; for the nature of GOD, just as it is goodness itself, so it is the propensity to good itself, and therefore is contrary to the propensity to evil. Fourthly, because to say that the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is from nature, and yet is not from GOD, who is the fount and cause of nature, implies a manifest contradiction. Fifthly, that supernatural gift of justice, according to the opinion of Bellarmine, did not remove the natural propensity of the sensitive appetite to desire against the order of reason, for thus it would have overthrown the very nature of the sensitive appetite; but it only restrained it from actually resisting reason and desiring something against the direction of reason. Therefore, Adam in the state of integrity had in his appetite a propensity to evil, although he had not yet experienced the acts and exercises of that propensity, and consequently was stained with original sin. For what else is original sin than a propensity to evil?

ART. XI. Two other opinions on the transmission of sin are considered.

1. There follow to be considered in this article the third and fourth classes of those who condemn and reject the transmission of sin through the seed of the parents. To the third class I refer those who, with Anselm, in the book *On the Virginal Conception*, and St. Thomas in the First Part of the Second Part, question 81, article 1, and question 4 of *On Evil*, article 1, say that for the transmission of sin, nothing else is required than that a man descend from Adam by true generation. For by this very fact that someone was in the loins of Adam when he transgressed the commandment in Paradise, he communicated in that sin of his. This opinion is to be rejected, because

our descent from Adam by natural generation is indeed the cause why we are guilty of the sin committed by Adam, but it cannot be the cause of our blindness, ignorance, and propensity to evil. And therefore this opinion sins in this, that according to it, the transmission of the first part of original sin can be explained, but not of the second and third parts.

2. To the fourth class I refer those who agree with us in explaining the transmission of the first and second parts of original sin, but dissent in explaining the transmission of the third part, saying that it is propagated and transmitted from parents to children, not *per se*, but through the second part, that is, through the lack of original justice, with which it is necessarily connected and joined. If, therefore, anyone asks them whence it is that a newborn infant is guilty of the sin committed by Adam, they will respond, because he is a son of Adam, that is, because he descends from him by natural generation. Likewise, if he asks, whence is it that that infant lacks original justice? They will respond, because his parents could not communicate justice to him, for they themselves lacked it. Finally, if he asks, whence is it that that infant is prone and inclined to evil? They will respond, because he lacks original justice. For whoever lacks original justice is necessarily prone to evil. And therefore, the propensity to evil seems to be propagated by a certain concomitance, by which it accompanies and follows the lack of original justice.
3. The most learned and never sufficiently praised Peter du Moulin explains and defends this opinion excellently in his *Anatomy of Arminianism*, chapter 10, and in the same place gives a reason why the propensity of the will and of the sensitive appetite to illicit objects, which are pleasant to the senses, necessarily follows the lack of original justice. But because that signal work of du Moulin is not in everyone's hands, I will, through several foundations or assertions, propose the sum of those things which were proposed by him towards the end of chapter 10, and this for the benefit of those who have not yet read du Moulin.
4. First assertion: The intellect of a man destitute of original justice, and not yet called by the preaching of the word, neither knows nor can know, during that state, spiritual and supernatural goods. This assertion needs no proof, for as Bellarmine teaches, book 6 of *On Grace and Free Will*, chapter 1, it is agreed among all Theologians, whether they be Pontifical or Evangelical, that these mysteries of faith cannot be known without divine revelation.
5. Second assertion: The will of a man destitute of original justice, and not yet called by the preaching of the word, is prone only to those goods which that man has known, that is, to temporal and earthly goods. The reason for this is that the appetite of the will presupposes the cognition of the intellect; and therefore the will can desire nothing unless reason knows it.

6. Third assertion: The will of such men is prone to natural and earthly goods, as to the chief and most desirable goods. And this is because such men do not know that good which is truly most perfect, and for that reason they pursue other goods with the highest love, as if they were most perfect.
7. Fourth assertion: Although the appetite for temporal goods is not evil in itself, it nevertheless becomes evil by accident, inasmuch as those goods are desired as the chief and most desirable. And therefore, the propensity to desire them thus can truly be called a propensity to evil. Hence it is clear that the propensity to evil necessarily follows and accompanies that lack of supernatural light which is in all who descend from Adam by true generation.
8. I once embraced this opinion, but now I am forced to reject it, and this on account of grave and effective reasons which can be brought to the contrary. For first, concupiscence or the propensity to evil is something real and positive, as du Moulin himself teaches in chapter 8 of that work. Therefore, it has a real and positive cause. The sequence follows, because a privation, or a non-Being, such as the lack of justice, cannot produce any real Being. For a real Being requires for its production a real influx and operation of some cause. But a non-Being, just as it does not have real being, so it cannot have a real operation. Someone will say: blindness, which is a privation, can be the cause of a fall, and the privation of light can be the cause of wandering from the way; but a fall and wandering from the way are real beings. I respond: a fall and a wandering from the way include two things, namely the positive entity of such motions, and a superadded inconvenience, or defect. That inconvenience, which is something privative, can have a privative cause; but the positive entity of those motions is from a positive cause. For the positive entity of a fall is partly from the internal gravity of the body, partly from an external obstacle. Likewise, the positive entity of wandering is from the locomotive faculty, as from a cause.
9. Secondly, from this opinion it follows that the true cause of that vicious propensity and inclination which is in the will is the blindness and ignorance of the mind. This is false, and contrary to daily experience. And this first, because many impious or unregenerate men, by natural demonstrations, evidently know that GOD is the highest good, and therefore to be pursued with the highest love; and nevertheless, in their will, they have a propensity to pursue temporal and earthly goods with the highest love, the supreme and most perfect good being postponed. Therefore, the cause of that propensity is not ignorance of the mind. Secondly, many impious men know what is honest, what is dishonest; and yet in their will they have a propensity to do those things which are dishonest and contrary to natural reason. Therefore, ignorance is not the cause of that propensity.

10. Thirdly, concupiscence or the propensity to evil is not only a proneness to an excessive love of earthly things, arising from ignorance of heavenly and supernatural things (as this opinion states), but it is also a certain proneness to contemn and neglect those heavenly goods which have been disclosed and revealed to us, that is, of which we have acquired knowledge from hearing the word. Likewise, it is a propensity to do those things whose baseness we know and have perceived from the word of GOD. Whence Paul complains of himself, in chapter 7 of Romans, verses 22 and 23: "I delight," he says, "in the law of GOD, as to the inner man; but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and making me captive to the law of sin which is in my members."
11. Fourthly, if the concupiscence of the flesh were nothing other than a propensity to the inordinate love of earthly things, arising from ignorance of heavenly things, a great absurdity would follow, namely that concupiscence is not in the reborn, who are imbued with the knowledge of heavenly things. For those who certainly know that those heavenly and supernatural gifts excel by infinite degrees and are to be preferred to earthly and temporal goods, cannot from ignorance of heavenly things pursue earthly and perishable goods with an inordinate love.

ART. XII. It is shown that those who attack the creation of souls disagree much among themselves; and the first three of their opinions on the origin of the soul are confuted.

1. I had determined with myself, in this Exercise, to dispute only against those who think that human souls are drawn from the potency of matter. But because I saw many, and those most learned men, defending the transmission of souls, and nevertheless seriously condemning and rejecting that dogma of the eduction of the rational soul from the potency of matter, I therefore felt that I would be doing a worthwhile task if I proposed and individually confuted all the opinions which I remember having read or heard concerning the transmission of souls.
2. The first opinion is that of Jacobus Martinus, who in book 3 of his *Miscellaneous Questions*, disputation 7, says that the soul of the son is from the soul of the father by transmission, yet in a way that is inscrutable and unknown to us. This way of departing from the common opinion is easy, but dishonest, and if I am any judge, unworthy of the acumen of so great a man. But lest those who hide themselves in these lurking-places should lie hidden securely, I will use against them a single argument, but unless my mind deceives me, a valid and clear one. It can be proposed thus: The father neither produces the soul of the son from some pre-existing thing, nor does he produce it from no pre-existing thing, for this is to create. Therefore, he in no way produces it. The consequence of this argument can be denied by no one, because it rests on that common principle, that of anything, it is true to affirm or to deny. The antecedent is proven by

this reasoning: The father produces the soul of the son neither from the corporeal matter of the seed, nor from the spiritual substance of his own soul, as will soon be proven. Therefore, he does not produce it from any pre-existing thing. Likewise, he does not create it, because to create is proper to GOD alone, and therefore he does not produce it from no pre-existing thing.

3. The second opinion is of those who say that the soul is drawn from the potency of the seed; that is, they will that the soul, when the seed is first emitted, is not actually in the seed, but only potentially. But when the seed has been somewhat elaborated, and the members of the body have been in some way delineated, then at last, through the plastic power inherent in the seed, the soul is drawn from the potency of the seed, excited, and kindled, so that it now actually begins to live and to inform its own body.
4. This opinion has been confuted by me above, and by Balthasar Meisner, who most keenly advocates for the transmission of souls, it is not undeservedly rejected in section 3 of his *Philosophy*, chapter 6, question 1. His arguments are these: 1. An accident, namely the plastic power, cannot produce so noble and excellent a substance. 2. The plastic power is a faculty of the soul. Therefore, it is not in the seed before the arrival of the soul. 3. It is proper to material forms to be drawn out of the potency of matter; but the soul is a spiritual form. See the rest in Meisner himself, in the place cited.
5. The third opinion is of those who assert that the parent, together with the seed, emits a particle of his own soul, and therefore the seed, when it is first emitted, is actually animate. These, therefore, will that the soul of the son is from the soul of the father, by its division and, as it were, diminution. This way of defending the transmission of souls Meisner judges not safe enough, and rightly so; because it follows from it that the soul is divisible, and therefore material and corruptible; because it also follows from it that a form can migrate from one matter into another, indeed from one suppositum into another. For according to this opinion, it is true to say that the whole soul of the son was once in the body of the father and informed his body.
6. Whence our most Serene Prince JAMES, KING OF BRITAIN, very learnedly and acutely inferred, while he was here at ST ANDREWS, that the soul of the son is guilty of all the sins which were committed by the father before its emission and transfusion; for the soul of the son, before the transfusion, was in the father and sinned in him, but "the soul that sinneth, it shall die," Ezekiel 18, verse 4, and Jeremiah 31, verse 30.

ART. XIII. The fourth opinion, which is that of Balthasar Meisner, is refuted.

1. The fourth opinion, which Balthasar Meisner embraces, agrees with the preceding in this, that it states that the soul is not drawn from the potency

of the seed, but is transmitted from the parent into the offspring, and is infused into the womb together with the seed; and therefore the seed, as soon as it is emitted, is actually animate. It differs from it, however, inasmuch as it asserts that the animate thing existing in the seed is not made from the soul of the father by a cutting off and partition of the paternal soul, but is generated and produced anew by it. Explaining this opinion, Meisner on page 924 says thus: "as soon as the parent transfuses the seed into the womb of the mother, then together with the seed he transmits a soul, not indeed his own or a part of his own, but one like his own." And on the following page: "Just as light multiplies itself, that is, it immediately produces another light in suitable matter, and this (as he advised above) not by a partition of itself, nor by a local transmission of itself into another torch, but by the kindling of a new light, so also our souls in the seed disposed for the generation of a man multiply themselves, that is, they produce another soul like themselves in species, immediately, without the intervention of any corporeal instrument."

2. This opinion is most easily confuted, for from it, it manifestly follows that the soul of the son is created by the soul of the father, which is a great absurdity and inconvenience. But that this may be evidently demonstrated, it must be held as a foundation, first, that creation is production from no pre-existing subject. Secondly, it must be held that a thing is said to be made from something in four ways: 1. **Terminatively**, in which way we say that a man is made from a non-man, white from non-white. 2. A thing is made from something **decisively**, or by a cutting off and subtraction, in which way we say that a small nail is made from a huge mass of iron, and a small ring from a huge mass of gold. 3. A thing is made from something **subjectively**, namely that which is drawn out from the potency of some subject, in which way we say that all material forms are made and drawn out from the potency of matter. 4. A thing is made from something **constitutively**, in which way we say that all natural bodies are made from matter and form.
3. These things being posited, it is thus proven that the soul of the father creates the soul of the son according to Meisner's opinion: That which produces something from nothing, creates it. But the soul of the father produces the soul of the son from nothing, according to Meisner's opinion. Therefore, it creates, and therefore has infinite power; for to produce from nothing, or to create, argues infinite power. The major proposition is clear, for it rests on the definition of creation. The minor is proven thus: If the soul of the father produces the soul of the son from some pre-existing thing, it either produces it from its own substance, or from the matter of the seed. But it in no way produces it from the matter of the seed, as Meisner himself admits. Which is also proven by this reason: the soul is not made from the matter of the seed terminatively, that is, the matter of the seed is not the terminus *from which* of that

mutation by which the soul is produced, for the terminus from which of any mutation perishes upon the arrival of the terminus *to which*; but the matter of the seed, upon the arrival of the soul, does not perish, but receives the soul into itself. Secondly, the soul is not made from the matter of the seed decisively, because thus it would be a part of the matter, which is too absurd. Thirdly, it is not made from the matter of the seed subjectively or eductively, for thus it would be a material form, as Meisner himself admits. Finally, it is not made from it constitutively, for thus it would be a corporeal substance.

4. In no way also is the soul of the son produced from the soul of the father. For first, it is not produced from the soul of the father terminatively, because the terminus *from which* perishes when the terminus *to which* is produced; but the soul of the father does not perish when the soul of the son is produced. Secondly, it is not made from it decisively either divinely, or by division and partition, as Meisnerus himself admits. Thirdly, it is not made from it subjectively, that is, it is not brought forth from its potentiality, because what is brought forth from the potentiality of some subject is received in that subject and exists in it; but no one would say that the soul of the son exists in the soul of the father as in a subject. Fourthly, the father's soul is not a constitutive part of the son's soul; therefore, the son's soul is not made from it constitutively.
5. As for the analogy drawn from light, it must be held that it is inept and in no way supports his opinion; for light is brought forth from the potentiality of matter, as all admit. Hence Fonseca, in *Metaphysics*, book 5, chapter 2, question 4, section 1, says: "No one doubts that light is brought forth from the potentiality of the air"; and certainly when another torch is brought near a burning torch, it is manifest that a flame and its light are brought forth from the potentiality of the matter of that torch which is brought near. Wherefore, the second argument against Meisnerus is this: if the son's soul is produced from the father's soul in the same way that light is from light, then the father's soul brings forth the son's soul from the potentiality of matter. But the latter is absurd, as Meisnerus admits. Therefore, so is the former. Now, it is proven that light is brought forth from the potentiality of matter, because those forms are brought forth from the potentiality of matter which depend on matter for their being and becoming, as is clear from article 1 of this dissertation. But light is such a thing, because it can neither be made nor exist without the passive concurrence of the matter receiving the light. Therefore, let that multiplication of forms derived from their eduction be invalid, for it is a figment of some crude mind and rests on no reason.
6. Thirdly, if the spiritual substance of the soul as such, that is, as it is spiritual and rational, has the procreative power of begetting similar things, it will follow that the procreative faculty is not a proper faculty of the vegetative soul, which is against the doctrine of all Philosophers. The

reason is that the faculties of the vegetative soul do not belong to the rational soul as such, but only insofar as it is vegetative. But this procreative faculty of similar souls, without eduction from the potentiality of matter, belongs to the rational soul *per se*, and not insofar as it is vegetative.

7. Fourthly, in generation, each parent emits semen, as taught not only by many Scholastic Theologians, in book 3 of the *Sentences*, Distinction 4, such as Scotus, Bonaventure, Major, Ockham, Lichetus, and Gabriel, but also by physicians who are convinced by many manifest signs drawn from anatomical experience, which I cannot present here. Nevertheless, these have been committed to writing by Galenus in book 2, chapter 4 of *On Semen*; Fernelius in book 7, chapter 6 of *Physiology*; Levinus Lemnius in book 1, chapter 6 of *On the Occult Miracles of Nature*; Vesalius in book 5, chapter 15 of *On the Fabric of the Human Body*; Laurentius in *Anatomy*, book 8, question 9, and many others. This being established, I argue thus: The semen of each parent is either animated, or one of them, namely the mother's semen, is inanimate. If both are animated, one must either say that the son has two rational souls, or that a particle of a soul is contributed by the father and a particle of a soul by the mother. The first is absurd because it destroys the unity of man, as Meisnerus himself admits. The latter is also absurd because, if this were so, the indivisibility of the soul, and therefore its immateriality, would collapse. If the mother's semen is inanimate, that is, if the mother does not contribute a soul to the son, then by Meisnerus's own consequence (page 908), the mother is not the mother of the whole son, but only of the body; likewise, she does not beget a man, but part of a man. This argument is not in itself valid, as is clear from what was said above, but it is *ad hominem*, as they say, because it rests on Meisnerus's own consequence.
8. Fifthly, if one were to ask Meisnerus what happens to that semen which is transmitted into the uterus but from which a man is not generated, and whether that too is animated, he answers in the negative. If you ask the reason, he says it is either because the semen was not in all respects aptly disposed for generation, or because it is a singular punishment inflicted by God miraculously inhibiting the course of nature. I say miraculously, because just as it would be a miracle if another torch, having suitable and well-disposed matter, were brought near a burning torch and did not catch flame, so also it is a miracle, if Meisnerus's opinion is true, when a father emits sufficiently disposed semen without a soul; and this is because the soul, by nature, is multiplicative of itself in sufficiently disposed matter. This response argues for the weakness of the opinion that Meisnerus defends; for it is preposterous and absurd to say that a true and proper miracle occurs as many times as a father emits sufficiently disposed semen and that emission is not followed by animation, and therefore generation.

9. Sixthly, everything rational is a man. But the semen, if it is actually animated by a rational soul, is actually rational. Therefore, it is actually a man. For it actually has the form of a man. From this, however, various absurdities follow: 1. That the father transfuses not merely semen but a man into the mother's womb. 2. That a man and the semen of a man do not differ in species. 3. That these propositions are true: "some semen is a man," and by conversion, "some man is semen." 4. That the generation of a man occurs without the destruction of the semen; for the form of the semen, that is, the soul, remains.

ART. XIV. The fifth opinion, which is that of Timothy Bright of Cambridge, is confuted.

I was putting the final touches on this dissertation when, while perusing the most acute and polished animadversions of Timothy Bright of Cambridge on Scribonius's *Physics*, I came upon the place where he asserts that the father's soul procreates the son's soul from a certain spiritual and incorporeal seed. His words are these: "To which I respond; that neither the whole nor a part of the parents' soul is transmitted, nor is it some accidental rudiment of the soul. What then? Surely, a certain substance born from the soul, neither the whole of it nor a part, as an immortal seed of the soul, is the principle of the future soul of the offspring. And just as the corporeal seed, separated from the parents' bodies, is neither the body itself nor any member of the body, so the soul is transmitted into the offspring through the fertile seed of the soul, not through the soul itself or any part of the soul." And a little later: "Therefore we hold that the soul is not received whole and complete from the parents, but a seminal something, excluded from the soul as well as from the body, is eventually to come forth, by the power of that word (namely, the blessing of fecundity), into a rational and immortal soul."

2. I could not approve this opinion of the most distinguished and learned Timothy, because that seed of the soul is either something corporeal, or it is a spiritual substance. If it is something corporeal, a spiritual substance cannot be made from it, as Bright himself seems to admit when he contrasts the seed of the soul with corporeal seed. If it is a spiritual substance, it is either a partial and incomplete soul, or it is a substance specifically and essentially distinct from the soul. It is not an imperfect soul, as Bright himself admits when he says that the soul is transmitted from the parent to the offspring, neither through the soul, nor through a part of the soul, but through a certain seed excluded from the soul. Nor is it a spiritual substance specifically and essentially distinct from the soul, as will be clear from the following reasons.
3. First, if such a spiritual substance, distinct from the soul, is granted, there will be granted some created spirit which is neither an Angel nor a human soul. But the latter is repugnant to the doctrine of all Philosophers.

Therefore, so is the former. Secondly, if that spiritual seed is truly and really excluded from the soul, it must have truly and really pre-existed in the soul, for a real emission presupposes a real inherence. But that spirit cannot really inhere in the father's soul. Therefore, it cannot be really excluded and emitted from it. The assumption is proven: that spirit cannot inhere in the father's soul as a part in a whole, as Timothy himself admits; nor as an accident in a subject, because it is a substance, and it is repugnant for a substance to inhere in a subject; nor as a thing in an encompassing place or in a containing vessel, for such a mode of containment and circumscription is repugnant to the spiritual nature of the soul.

4. Thirdly, that spiritual seed is either made from the whole soul of the father, or from a part of the father's soul, or from nothing. For it cannot be made from corporeal matter, both because it is a spiritual substance, and because Bright himself testifies that it is born not from the body, but from the soul. It is not made from the whole soul of the father, because then the entire soul of the father would vanish and be converted into that spiritual seed. Nor is it from a part of the paternal soul, because then the father's soul would be divisible into parts, and a part of it could be lost and transmuted into another substance. But these things are repugnant to the nature of a spiritual substance. Finally, the father's soul does not produce that seed from nothing, because then it would be said to create that seed, which is absurd.
5. Fourthly, that seed of the soul is either incorruptible and remains after the generation of the man, or it is corruptible and perishes at the instant the soul is produced. If you say the latter, it will follow that the seed is not a spiritual substance, because a spiritual substance is incorruptible and cannot be abolished by any created power. If you admit the former, it will follow that in the generated man there are two spirits or spiritual substances, namely the soul of the son and the seed from which that soul arose. Moreover, it is repugnant to the nature of a seed to remain after the generation of the thing; for it ought to be transmuted by a substantial change into the thing arisen from the seed. But for such a transmutation, it is required that the thing generated and the thing corrupted agree in matter, which cannot be said of the seed and the soul.
6. Fifthly, that conversion of the spiritual seed into a soul is either an accidental conversion, such as the conversion or change by which a bad man is converted and changed into a good one, and a white stone into a black stone; or it is a substantial conversion, such as the conversion of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt, or the conversion of wood into the substance of the fire to which it is brought near. It is not an accidental conversion, because from that it would follow that the spiritual seed does not differ specifically and essentially, but in a degree of accidental perfection, from the soul; that is, that it is a rational soul made incomplete and imperfect

by some accidental privation. But this contradicts the words of Timothy himself, who says that the seed is not actually a soul, but the principle of a future soul, and is at some point to come forth into a soul. The same is also confuted by all those reasons by which we proved against Meisnerus that the father's soul does not *per se* and immediately produce the son's soul; likewise, the semen when it is emitted is not actually animated by a rational soul.

7. If it is a substantial conversion, it is either by a total annihilation of the thing converted, in the way the Pontificians will have it that the Eucharistic bread is converted into the body and blood of CHRIST, as the Council of Trent teaches in session 13, chapter 8, canon 1; or it is by the abolition of one essential part constituting that thing, in the way wood brought near fire is converted into fire; for it is not totally abolished, but only its form is destroyed, while the matter remains under the form of fire. But neither can be said. For first, the conversion of the seed into a soul is not a total annihilation of the seed, because the annihilation of a substance, especially a spiritual one, can be done by GOD alone, as St. Thomas teaches in part 1, question 104, article 4. Also, because with the seed annihilated, the soul must be produced from nothing. Wherefore, since not the father, but GOD, is able to annihilate that seed, and with it annihilated, to produce a soul from nothing in the same instant, the production of the soul must be ascribed not to the father but to GOD alone; which is a great absurdity, if their doctrine is true.
8. Secondly, the conversion of the seed into the soul cannot happen by the abolition of one essential part while the other remains. First, because it would follow from this that the spiritual substance of that seed is corruptible and capable of substantial transmutation, no less than physical bodies; for they can be naturally abolished and destroyed with respect to one single part of their essence, namely the form. Secondly, it will follow that that spiritual substance is truly divisible into physical matter and form, or into integral parts; for it is true of these parts alone that, with one of them destroyed, the other can remain surviving, with respect to its actual existence. Indeed, the case is different for metaphysical parts, that is, genus and difference, for no one would say that with the animality of Socrates destroyed, his humanity could remain with respect to its actual existence, or conversely, with his humanity destroyed, his animality could remain. Thirdly, where there is a transmutation from one contrary to another, there it is necessary that there be one common matter which is the subject of the transmutation. But here there is a transmutation from non-soul to soul, and a substantial one at that. Therefore, there is here a matter constitutive of both the seed and the soul. And it is confirmed, because that surviving part, entering into the constitution of the soul, is necessarily matter; for it cannot have the character of a physical form, nor of a genus or difference, as is manifest to anyone.

ART. XV. That all opinions on traducianism have now been confuted; that no one from that number can explain the propagation of sin more safely or easily than we, who defend the creation of souls.

Those who think that the soul is by traduction, and is not created and infused by GOD, must necessarily assert either that the soul is brought forth from the potentiality of the semen through the passive concurrence of matter, or that it is produced by the father's soul without the concurrence of the matter of the semen; for between these two there is no middle ground. The former opinion was confuted by me in articles 3 and 12. The latter way of speaking we can divide and subdivide into four others: for if the father's soul produces the son's soul without the concurrence of the matter of the semen, it produces it either from its whole substance, or from a part of its substance, or from a certain spiritual seed, or from nothing. No one (as far as I understand) embraces the first way of defending traducianism; for as Bellarmine well warns in book 4, chapter 11 of *On the Loss of Grace*, if the son's soul is from the whole soul of the father, either the parent is thenceforth without a soul, since he transfuses the whole of it into the son, or the whole remains in both the parent and the son. Both are evidently false. The second opinion I confuted in article 12, the third in article 13, and the fourth in article 14. From which I conclude that no way of defending or explaining the propagation of souls can be devised which has not been confuted in this inquiry.

2. Someone says that the opinion of traducianism, although it is exposed to many philosophical difficulties, is nevertheless safer in Theology, because it explains more expeditiously and easily the manner in which original corruption is derived from parents to children. I respond that those who assert this, assert it gratuitously, for no one from that number can explain the propagation of original sin more conveniently or expeditiously than we who defend the creation of souls. This, however, will be manifest if we consider the opinions of the Traducianists one by one.
3. First, therefore, those who say that the soul is brought forth from the potentiality of the matter of the semen must necessarily assert with us that the soul is infected by the semen, and thus by something corporeal; as Meisnerus rightly observed, section 3, chapter 4, question 1. For they must say that the soul contracts a stain from the unclean semen, from whose potentiality it is brought forth.
4. Secondly, those who say that the parent, together with the semen, emits a particle of the soul, explain the propagation of sin rather inconveniently; because from that opinion it follows that the son is guilty not only of the first fall, but also of all the sins committed by his immediate parents, as was proven in article 12.
5. Thirdly, those who assert that the father's soul produces the son's soul from a spiritual seed, and those who think that the father's soul produces

the son's soul without any passive concurrence, either of material seed or of spiritual seed, and therefore from nothing, cannot be said to explain the propagation of sin conveniently or expeditiously; because they have devised a certain impossible mode of propagation, contrary to the principles of both Philosophy and Theology, as was proven in articles 10 and 11.

6. The syllogism which Meisnerus and the other Traducianists use to explain the propagation of original sin is as follows: As is the one propagating or traducing, so is the one propagated or traduced. But the souls of the parents who propagate are infected with sin. Therefore, so are the souls of the sons. Because, however, someone could object from Bellarmine that from this argument it follows that a justified soul procreates a just soul in the son, Meisnerus forms his argument more cautiously and reasons thus: "Such as the soul of the parents is in itself, such a soul it also propagates. But in itself it is sinful, although this sin is not imputed to the just. Therefore, it also propagates a sinful soul."
 7. Meisnerus's reason, even conceived and limited thus, is of little efficacy and suffers from the falsity of its proposition. For if the parent's soul propagates and produces such a soul as it is in itself, it necessarily follows that a soul adorned with erudition and knowledge of the liberal arts produces such a soul in the son; for considered in itself, it is adorned with these habits. Someone will say: What if the reason is formed thus: "such as the soul of the parent is from itself and its own nature, such a soul it propagates; for generation is an action of nature. But from itself and its own nature it is destitute of the habits of the arts and sciences, for these habits are acquired by labor and industry, they are not naturally inherent in the soul. Therefore, it propagates such a soul." I respond that the parents' soul is not destitute of the habits of the sciences by reason of its nature simply considered; for absolutely speaking, those habits are natural (as our authors say against the Pontificians, when they speak of original justice), but by reason of its corrupt and depraved nature. Generation, however, is an action neither of corrupt nature, nor of nature renewed by grace, but of nature simply and absolutely considered. Therefore, speaking physically, and not considering the hidden judgment of GOD in this matter, only those things could be propagated by the force of generation which pertain to the nature of man simply and absolutely considered. But the stain of sin is not of this sort; for it is not natural to man, absolutely speaking.
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THIRD EXERCISE: On Faith, Knowledge, and Opinion.

ART. I. On the firmness, certainty, and evidence of the assents of our mind.

1. Since every intellectual habit has for its proximate end knowledge, or assent, by which the mind assents to those propositions whose truth it perceives and knows, it will be worthwhile to say something beforehand about the assent of the mind, and about its affections and species, so that the diversity of the acts of our mind may be understood.
2. The assent of the mind is the judgment by which the intellect judges some proposition to be true. For the mind assents to this proposition, "man is an animal," by embracing and approving it, that is, by judging it to be true.
3. Philosophers have observed three degrees of perfection in the assent of the mind, namely firmness, certainty, and evidence, to which are opposed as many degrees of imperfection, namely weakness or vacillation, uncertainty, and non-evidence.
4. A firm assent is that which is without hesitation, doubt, or fear of the opposite position. A weak or vacillating assent, however, is when the mind so assents to this or that proposition that it doubts its truth, or at least in some way fears that in assenting to that proposition it may err.
5. A certain assent is that which rests on some certain or solid foundation, not on a light or fallacious reason. An uncertain assent is that which is of the opposite character. Here it must be diligently noted that for the certainty of an assent, it is required that the foundation on which the mind rests when it gives assent not only be certain in itself, but also appear to be such to the one assenting. For unless he knows that the reason on which he relies is certain, his assent will in no way be certain and stable.
6. Finally, an evident assent is when one perceives through himself, that is, by the force of his own sense or reason, without the information and testimony of another, that the proposition to which he assents is true. For example, when I see Socrates standing before me, I assent to this proposition, "Socrates is standing," and my assent is evident, because I perceive the matter to be so not through the information or testimony of another, but by the force of my own sense. Likewise, when I assent to this proposition, "man is an animal," the assent is evident, because by the force of my own intellect, or reason, I perceive that a sensitive nature is in man; and so even if no one were to assert it, indeed even if everyone were to assert the contrary, I would judge that proposition to be true.
7. Conversely, an assent is non-evident when one assents to a proposition not because sense or solid reason demonstrates it to be true, but either because a light and inefficacious reason persuades him of it (for a light reason does not dispel the darkness of the mind, and thus makes the assent obscure and non-evident), or because another testifies that it is true.

Thus, he who saw Peter killed and gives assent to this proposition, "Peter is killed," his assent is evident. But he who, on account of this one's narration and testimony, gives assent to that proposition, his assent is non-evident, because he perceives it to be true neither by sense nor by reason.

8. These three degrees of perfection, which are discerned in assent, are so related that the second includes the first and adds something to it, while the third includes the first and second and adds something to them. For an assent to be firm, it is enough that the foundation on which that assent rests appears certain and solid to the one assenting; for even if it is not in fact so, if it nevertheless appears to be so to the one assenting, he will undoubtedly assent firmly and without hesitation. Thus heretics firmly assent to their errors; for although the foundations on which they rely are not certain and solid, to them nevertheless (such is their blindness) they seem most efficacious and most valid.
 9. But for an assent to be certain, and completely free from error, it is required not only that the foundation on which it rests appear certain and solid to the one assenting, but also that it truly and in itself be so; otherwise our assent will be erroneous and false. Wherefore, although we may allow that heretics possess firmness in judging, we do not think that certainty in judging belongs to them; for certainty and error cannot exist together.
 10. Finally, for an assent to be evident, it is required not only that its foundation appear certain and solid to the one assenting, and also be so in itself, but it is also required that that foundation not be the testimony or narration of another, but either sense, or some solid reason clearly demonstrating the matter to be so.
 11. Just as, therefore, an assent can be firm although it is not certain, as can be seen in heretics, who without any fear or dread give assent to those dogmas which are repugnant to the Catholic Faith or to good morals, so also an assent can be certain although it is not evident. For he who assents to some proposition on account of the testimony of GOD proposed in Holy Scripture, his assent is undoubtedly very certain, because it rests on a most certain foundation, namely the testimony of GOD. Yet it is not evident, for the Theologian does not assent because he perceives by either sense or reason that it is so, but because GOD asserts or says the matter is so.
 12. From these things it is clear that these three degrees of perfection, which are discerned in the assent of the mind, are so related that the first is broader than the second, and the second than the third; just as also in the degrees of necessity, "of all" (κατὰ παντὸς) is broader than "in itself" (καθ' αὐτὸ), and "in itself" is broader than "universal primary" (καθόλου πρῶτον).
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ART. II. How knowing, believing, and opining differ from each other.

1. Every assent of the mind is either an act of knowing, or of believing, or of opining. For whenever we judge something to be true, we either certainly know it to be true, or we believe it to be true on account of the testimony of another, or on account of a light and inefficacious reason we opine it to be true.
2. The act of knowing, when it is opposed to the acts of believing and opining, is taken broadly for any certain and evident actual knowledge. In this sense, knowledge is found not only in the speculative disciplines, but also in the practical ones. For in moral Philosophy, which is a practical discipline, we do not opine or believe, but we evidently know that actions of liberality are honorable, while the actions of the vices opposed to it are dishonorable. In the art of building, skilled Architects do not opine or believe, but evidently know that the bases in buildings are to be placed level, that columns are to be erected perpendicularly, and other similar things. Nor is this knowledge concerned only with universals, but also with singulars. For when I see Peter standing, or hear Peter speaking, I do not opine or believe, but I know that Peter is speaking and standing.
3. The sufficiency of this division is demonstrated thus: every assent of the mind rests either on testimony or on reason. If it rests on testimony, it is actual faith, or the act of believing. If it rests on reason, it either rests on a certain and solid reason, and it is knowledge, or it rests on a reason that is only probable, and it is opinion.
4. An assent resting on the testimony of another either rests on divine testimony, and by the Scholastics it is called divine faith, or it rests on human testimony, and it is called human faith.
5. Here we can note in passing the carelessness (*ἀβλεψίαν*) of the Pontificians, who admit with us that faith is not divine but human which rests principally on the testimony of men, and yet they most audaciously assert that the assent which we give to the articles of faith and to Holy Scripture itself, from which those articles are gathered, rests on the testimony of the Church (as they call it) representative, that is, of the Bishops and Pastors gathered in a general council; likewise of the Church (as they themselves speak) virtual, that is, of the Roman Pontiff himself. And so they are forced either to confess that all faith of pilgrims is human, thus utterly removing divine faith, or that their Bishops are to be designated not as men but as GODS.
6. A fine comparison can be instituted between knowledge, opinion, and divine faith. For knowledge is a firm, certain, and evident assent; divine faith is a firm and certain assent, but not evident; opinion, finally, although it is sometimes a firm assent, that is, without hesitation or doubt, is often neither firm, nor certain, nor evident.

7. Knowledge is a firm assent, because he who knows a certain proposition to be true does not assent doubtfully or hesitantly, but firmly. It is a certain assent, because he who knows rests on a solid foundation; otherwise he would not know, but would opine. Finally, it is evident, because the one who knows does not assent because another testifies that the proposition is true, but because he himself, by the force of some evident argument, perceives the matter to be so.
8. Divine faith is a firm assent, because those who believe in GOD do not hesitate or doubt concerning the truth of sacred history and the divine promises. It is a certain assent, because it rests on a most certain foundation, namely the testimony of GOD, who is truth itself. Yet it is not evident; for he who believes does not assent because he perceives by sense or reason that the matter is so, but because GOD testifies and asserts this.
9. From this it is clear how excellently the Apostle, in the eleventh chapter to the Hebrews, the first verse, expressed the nature of divine faith. For when he says it is the "assurance" (ὑπόστασις), he indicates its firmness and certainty; but when he says it is of "things not seen" (τῶν οὐ βλεπομένων), he declares its non-evidence and enigmatic obscurity.
10. Opinion can sometimes be a firm assent (for sometimes men are so moved by light reasons that they take them for the most valid arguments, and therefore they assent without any hesitation or fear of the opposite position); but it is never certain or evident. For he who opines rests either on light reasons or on the testimonies of men, which never produce in us either certainty or evidence in judging.
11. Someone will say that this comparison of faith, knowledge, and opinion, which we have just brought forth, derogates from the dignity of faith; for from it, it follows that any knowledge is a more perfect assent than faith, because, namely, faith lacks evidence, which nevertheless belongs to knowledge. I respond that knowledge is more perfect than faith in a certain respect (secundum quid), namely because it is an evident assent; but faith is more perfect than any knowledge simply and absolutely (simpliciter & absolute), and for two reasons. 1. For faith is concerned with the most noble object, that is, with that great mystery of piety, GOD revealed in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen by Angels, and preached to the Gentiles. 2. Faith rests on the most certain foundation, that is, the testimony of GOD himself, who is truth itself, and who can neither deceive nor be deceived.

ART. III. Whether faith is always of things not seen (τῶν οὐ βλεπομένων).

1. It was said in the previous article that all faith, whether it be divine or human, is a non-evident assent; and for that reason the Apostle in Hebrews 11, verse 1, asserts that faith is of things not seen (τῶν οὐ βλεπομένων). The same can also be confirmed from 1 Corinthians chapter

13, verse 12, where the Apostle asserts that we now see through a mirror, and in an enigma. Also from the doctrine of the same Apostle, concerning the cessation and evacuation of faith, which will occur in the fatherland; for faith is said to be evacuated, and not perfected, like charity, because it involves a certain imperfection, namely obscurity and non-evidence, in its own nature and essence. Wherefore Augustine, on that passage of John 14, "I go to prepare a place for you," says excellently, "Let the LORD go, to prepare a place; let him go, so that he may be seen; let him be hidden, so that he may be believed." Similarly, Gregory teaches, in Homily 16 on the Gospels, and in book 4 of the Dialogues, chapter 5: "Apparent things," he says, "do not have faith, but recognition"; and again: "that is eagerly said to be believed which cannot be seen."

2. That this may become clearer, I will present and solve those arguments which prove that even those things which are seen or known are comprehended under the object of faith. Of this kind is first of all that of the LORD to his disciples in John 14: "I have told you before it comes to pass, that when it does come to pass, you may believe." For from this it is gathered that faith is sometimes of things known through experience, and therefore seen.
3. Secondly, in John 20, when the Apostle Thomas had said, "Unless I see, I will not believe" that CHRIST was risen, the LORD, when he was now believing, said to him: "Because you have seen me, Thomas, you have believed."
4. Thirdly, the other Apostles and the Virgin Mary, and many other faithful, believed what they saw; namely, that CHRIST was a man, suffered, died, was buried, rose from the dead, and ascended into heaven, and many other things which are expressed in the very articles of faith. Whence John in his first Epistle says: "that which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon and our hands have handled, concerning the word of life, we announce to you."
5. Fourthly, some philosopher, knowing by demonstration that there is one GOD, the principle and cause of all things, can accept faith in the same proposition, while the prior knowledge remains; if, for instance, he becomes a Christian from being a Pagan. He, therefore, will at the same time have faith and knowledge, and his faith will have for its object things evidently known or seen.
6. To remove these arguments, I will first set down some foundations, from which the solutions to these arguments can be gathered; then I will confute the flawed doctrine of Fonseca, Estius, and others concerning the repugnance of faith and knowledge. Let this be the first foundation: Faith, or "to believe," is very often in Scripture and among approved authors taken generally for assenting in any way and judging something to be true. For in this way one is said to believe his own eyes, and among the Dialecticians any argument is said to produce belief.

7. The second foundation is this: St. Thomas and the other Apostles and faithful saw one thing and believed another. For they saw a man, and they believed in GOD. That is, as Augustine says: "They saw a living man whom they had seen dying, and they believed in GOD hidden in the flesh"; and elsewhere: "A man appeared among men, offering a MAN to those who saw, reserving GOD for those who believed."
8. The third foundation: faith is said to be a non-evident assent; likewise, it is said to be of things not seen (τῶν οὐ βλεπομένων), not because the things that are believed are entirely non-evident, and can in no way be seen, but because *insofar as they are believed*, they are non-evident, or because they do not have evidence from that on account of which they are believed. For in this faith differs from knowledge, that the foundation on which knowledge rests (that is, the middle term of a demonstration) convinces the intellect through the evidence of the thing, by revealing its causes; whereas the foundation on which faith rests (namely, the authority of GOD) convinces the intellect not through the evidence of the thing to which we assent, but through its own certainty and infallibility. Since, therefore, the function of faith is not to make obscure things become clear, but to make the intellect yield to the authority of the one speaking, and thus to assent, it is manifest that the things which are believed, *insofar as they are believed*, are non-evident, or do not have evidence from their foundation on account of which they are believed. See D. Pareus, *On Justification*, book 2, chapter 5, and D. Richard Field, *On the Church*, book 4, chapter 8. However, this does not prevent the things which are believed from being evident in another respect, if they are manifest either to the external senses or to reason in themselves. For just as one and the same proposition, insofar as it is the conclusion of a demonstration, is judged to be necessary and unable to be otherwise, but insofar as it is the conclusion of a probable syllogism, is judged by the same man to be contingent and able to be otherwise, so also certain articles of faith, insofar as they were perceived by the Apostles through sense, or are demonstrated by us with manifest reason, have evidence and clarity; but insofar as they are believed on account of the authority of GOD who testifies, they do not have that evidence, and for that reason are rightly called "not seen" (οὐ βλεπόμενα).

ART. IV. Whether faith can exist at the same time as knowledge concerning the same proposition and in the same intellect.

It is often asked concerning knowledge and faith whether one and the same man can at the same time believe and know that the proposition to which he assents is true, or whether the repugnance of faith and knowledge is so great that they cannot exist together in the same intellect. In this controversy, the variety of opinions is so great that you will scarcely find two celebrated men who think the same thing about it. For first, Scotus, in *Sentences* 3, Distinction 24, single question, says: "Neither the act nor the habit of faith and knowledge can exist at the same time in the same intellect concerning the same subject."

2. Secondly, Durandus, in the prologue to the *Sentences*, question 1, and book 3 of the *Sentences*, distinction 17, question 4, establishes the complete contrary, saying that faith and knowledge concerning the same proposition and in the same intellect can exist at the same time, both according to act and according to habit. Thirdly, Peter Fonseca, in book 6 of *Metaphysics*, chapter 1, question 1, section 5, asserts that the habits of faith and knowledge can exist in the same intellect and concerning the same subject, but in such a way that the act produced by them is not an act of faith, but a certain kind of knowledge, and a supernatural one at that, on account of the concurrence of faith in producing it. Fourthly, William Estius, a Theologian of Douai, in *Sentences* 3, distinction 24, Article 3, asserts three things: 1. The habits of faith and knowledge can exist at the same time in the same intellect concerning the same object. 2. Each habit can exercise its own act at different times. 3. The act which the habit of faith then elicits is not faith considered according to the whole breadth of its meaning, that is, according to all the conditions required in it, because, namely, it is not a non-evident knowledge of the thing.
3. The fifth opinion, and the truest one, is that of the most acute Doctor Antonius Ruvius Rhodensis, in his little work *On Habits*, treatise 3, question 3, where he also implies three things: first, that these habits can be at the same time in the same intellect, and concerning the same object. 2. That each habit can exercise its own act at different times, but not at the same time. 3. That the acts elicited by these habits at different times are the true and properly so-called acts of those habits, and that by the presence of the habit of knowing, nothing is derogated from the property of the act of believing. I say that Ruvius only implies these things, because he explicitly and directly speaks there only of knowledge and opinion; but the same reason applies to knowledge and faith, with respect to the possibility and impossibility of coexisting, as is manifest to anyone.
4. First, therefore, it is proven against Scotus that the habits of faith and knowledge can be at the same time in the same subject and concerning the same object, and by this reason: If anything prevents these habits from coexisting in the same intellect, it is most of all the repugnance of the acts

to which they are referred. But this does not prevent it. Therefore, etc. The assumption is proven: Habits are nothing other than easy and ready powers for acts. But it is not impossible for someone to have at the same time powers for repugnant acts, which he can exercise at different times, although he cannot exercise both at the same time. For we have at the same time the power to stand and the power to laugh, likewise the power to walk and the power to sit, although the acts of these powers are so repugnant that they cannot be in one subject at the same time. Secondly, someone who through faith knows that the world was created by GOD can afterwards, through demonstration, acquire knowledge of the creation of the world, and by this production and acquisition, the faith concerning that article is not destroyed. For otherwise it would not be licit for a Christian man to devote himself to Metaphysics and Physics, from which demonstrations concerning the creation of the world are gathered; for it is not licit to do those things which either destroy or diminish faith.

5. Secondly, it is proven against Durandus that it is not possible for the intellect at the same time, that is, in one and the same instant, to elicit both the non-evident assent of faith and the evident assent of knowledge, because just as it is impossible for a man through the sense of sight to see and perceive the same thing at the same time distinctly and confusedly, so also it is impossible for a man through the intellect, which is the eye of the soul, to perceive the same thing at the same instant evidently and non-evidently; and therefore it is impossible for him to have at the same time two acts: one evident, of knowledge, the other non-evident, of faith.
6. Thirdly, it is proven against Fonseca and Estius that the habit of faith, although it has the habit of knowledge coexisting in the same intellect, can elicit a true and properly so-called act of faith, and that according to all the conditions required in the act of believing. And therefore, faith and knowledge can be in the same intellect and concerning the same proposition, even with respect to their acts, but elicited at different times. The reason is this: a faithful person, even after acquiring knowledge about the creation of the world, can so resolve within himself: "I assent so firmly to this proposition, 'GOD created the world,' on account of the authority of GOD who testifies, that even if I did not perceive by some reason that the world was created by GOD, indeed, even if a corrupt reason dictated the contrary, I would nevertheless assent to that proposition without any dread or fear."
7. This judgment of the mind, without controversy, proceeds from faith alone, not from knowledge and faith together, and is a true and properly so-called act of faith; that is, it lacks no condition required in the act of believing. The former is proven against Fonseca, because neither knowledge nor any other natural habit can dictate such a thing. The latter is also proven, both against Fonseca and against Estius, because that assent rests solely on the authority of the one testifying. Therefore, it is

non-evident. The reason for the consequence is that an assent is non-evident whose foundation on which it rests cannot produce evidence, but only certainty. But this assent is of such a kind, for the authority of the one testifying does not convince our intellect through the evidence and clarity of the thing, but through its own certainty and irrefutability. The reason for the major proposition is this: such is the assent as is the medium and foundation on which it rests. For if the medium is certain, and can make our intellect certain, and is known as such by the one assenting, our assent is certain. If, however, it is not so, it is uncertain. Therefore, by the same reason, if the medium can produce the evidence of understanding, the assent is evident; but if it cannot, it is non-evident.

ART. V. On the division of faith into explicit and implicit; and whether the non-evidence we attribute to faith supports the blind and implicit faith of the Pontificians.

1. Scholastic Theologians divide faith into explicit and implicit, or as Lombard speaks, in *Sentences* book 3, Distinction 25, into distinct and veiled or confused. The explanation of this distinction can be read in the most distinguished Tilenus, part one of the *Syntagma*, Disputation 38, Theses 23 and 24; also in Durandus, book 3 of the *Sentences*, distinction 25, question 1; St. Thomas, 2.2ae, question 2, Article 7; William Estius, book 3 of the *Sentences*, Distinction 25. From these authors, the descriptions of that division can be gathered thus: explicit faith is that by which something is believed according to itself, distinctly, and in particular. Implicit faith, however, is that by which something is believed not in itself, but in another, as in a universal. For example, unlearned and simple Christians (as they are called), who understand only those things which are absolutely necessary for salvation, such as the articles of faith, the decalogue, and the rest, when they profess from the heart that they believe Holy Scripture to be the word of GOD, and therefore worthy of faith, have a twofold object of their faith: one general, which they believe formally, explicitly, and in itself; the other particular, which they believe implicitly and consequently. The general object, which they explicitly believe, is that Scripture is the word of GOD, and therefore that faith should be given to it. The particular objects, which they believe implicitly in that general one and consequently, are the histories and dogmas of Scripture, the knowledge of which they have not yet attained, such as that Noah had three sons, Abraham two, that the scepter was not taken from Judah before the coming of the Messiah. For he who believes the whole of Scripture to be true, implicitly and consequently believes all things to be true which are contained in Scripture; that is, he has implicit faith in all the histories, dogmas, and prophetic predictions which are in the volume of Holy Scripture; of all, I say, of which they have not acquired a particular and distinct knowledge.

2. It can be asked here whether this division of faith into explicit and implicit is to be tolerated in the Schools of the reformed Churches. I respond with two assertions. The first is this: the aforesaid distinction of faith can be admitted, if it is conceived in a sound manner. For it is certain that not only the Laity and the simple, but also the most distinguished and learned Theologologians, believe certain things implicitly in that general proposition that Scripture is the word of GOD and therefore most worthy of faith; certain things, I say, of which they have not yet attained a distinct understanding. This is clear from our daily progress in the knowledge of Scripture, which, however, does not argue for the obscurity of Scripture itself (as the Pontificians prattle), but for the imbecility of our own intellect, and the immense richness of the celestial mysteries which are handed down everywhere in Scripture, which must be instilled gradually into that narrow vessel of the human mind, and cannot be poured in all at once.
 3. The second assertion is this: the aforesaid distinction of the Christian faith, if it is accepted as the Pontificians are wont to accept it, is to be rejected as crude, absurd, and plainly contrary to the nature of faith. For they, by implicit faith, understand that faith by which the Laity believe unknown and not yet understood dogmas of the faith implicitly in that general proposition, that all things are true which the Roman Church believes and embraces as true. Which faith is indeed not divine, but human; that is, it rests not on the testimony of GOD, but of men. It is not an "assurance" or "conviction" (ὑπόστασις or ἔλεγχος), but a light and fallacious conjecture, which rests not on the word of GOD, but on the judgment of men, which is in itself of little firmness, and thus on a very fragile and ruinous foundation.
 4. It can also be asked whether the non-evidence which not only the Sententiary Theologians but also the Orthodox Doctors attribute to faith supports that blind and implicit faith of the Pontificians. For that general and confused assent, which rests solely on the testimony of the Roman Church (to say what is the case), is especially non-evident. I respond that the non-evidence does nothing for their opinion, because that non-evidence does not exclude all knowledge, but only that which rests on a scientific medium, that is, on sense or on an evident reason derived from the nature of the thing. Secondly, because certainty, which is the second condition of faith, necessarily presupposes a firm knowledge and persuasion concerning the doctrine to which we assent, that it is the word not of man but of GOD. But such a knowledge or persuasion is directly opposed to the implicit faith of the Pontificians, and therefore certainty cannot be found in it.
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ART. VI. On the threefold light, namely of nature, of faith or grace, and of glory.

1. In Scholastic Theology, various distinctions are found, derived from these three terms: nature, grace, and glory. The first is that by which the kingdom of GOD, the Best and Greatest, is distinguished into the kingdom of nature, the kingdom of grace, and the kingdom of glory. The kingdom of nature is that natural dominion which GOD has over all created things, which he rules and governs according to his will. The kingdom of grace is that by which GOD reigns in his Church militant on earth. The kingdom of glory is that by which he reigns in the Church triumphant in the heavens.
2. The second distinction is that by which the local presence of GOD is distinguished into a natural or essential, a gracious, and a glorious presence. According to his natural presence, GOD is everywhere. By his gracious presence, GOD is said to be in just and holy men, and they in turn are called the dwelling and Temple of GOD. And by his glorious presence, God is said to be in the heavens, where he manifests his glory and the splendor of his majesty to the blessed men and Angels.
3. The third division is that by which the external works of GOD are divided into the works of nature, the works of grace, and the works of glory. The works of nature are the creation, conservation, and cooperation with all visible and invisible things in all their actions; for in him we live, and move, and have our being. The works of grace are the incarnation of the Word, his humiliation, his exaltation, his threefold office, namely Royal, Prophetic, and Sacerdotal; likewise the efficacious calling of the elect through the preaching of the word and the administration of the Sacraments, and their regeneration and justification. Finally, the works of glory, which Polanus calls the works of GOD after this life, are the final advent of the LORD, the resurrection of the dead, the universal abolition of this elemental world, or at least its marvelous transmutation through the fire of conflagration, as they say; likewise the process of the last judgment, its execution, and the manifestation of the glory of GOD for all eternity.
4. The fourth distinction is that by which human life is divided into the life of nature, or natural life; the life of grace, and the life of glory. Natural life is posited in the conjunction of a living soul with the body. The life of grace is posited in the conjunction of pilgrims on earth with GOD through faith, hope, and charity. The life of glory is posited in that eternal and immutable conjunction of glorified men with GOD, through the clear vision of him and ardent love or charity.
5. The fifth division is that by which the counsel and decree of GOD concerning the eternal salvation of certain men is divided into predestination to glory and predestination to grace. The former is of the end, the latter of the means to the end. The former is the decree of GOD

to give glory; the latter is his decree to give that grace which the Scholastics call "grace that makes pleasing."

6. The sixth distinction is that by which the light of the human intellect is divided into the light of nature, the light of grace or faith, and the light of glory. The light of nature is that by which we know those things which can be understood and judged by us by the powers of nature alone, without the special aid of GOD. Concerning the power of this light, and how far it extends, I will, with GOD's favor, discourse at length in the following disputations. The light of faith is that by which we know and understand those things which GOD has revealed to us in his word. The light of glory is that by which the blessed spirits in heaven clearly and perspicuously see the most glorious essence of GOD. To this threefold Light corresponds a threefold Theology, namely Natural Theology or Metaphysics, the Theology of revelation which is also called the Theology of pilgrims, and the Theology of vision or the Theology of comprehenders.
7. I here propose only this last distinction by design, so that it may be manifest that the Scholastics, when they attribute non-evidence to faith, do not attribute blindness and ignorance to it, but a certain knowledge, which, although it is obscure if compared with the vision which is in the fatherland, is nevertheless called a light by the Scholastics themselves. The other distinctions, however, I propose as if by accident, because they have a beautiful analogy and proportion to this distinction of intellectual light.
8. The analogy or proportion of these distinctions can be conceived thus: man, insofar as he lives the life of nature, is a citizen of the kingdom of nature; he uses the light of nature, and through it he perceives that presence of GOD which is called the presence of nature, and also the works of nature which follow that presence. The same man, insofar as he lives the life of grace, is a citizen of the kingdom of grace; he uses the light of grace or faith, and through it he perceives the gracious presence of GOD in his heart, and the works of grace which follow that presence. The same man, finally, insofar as he lives the life of glory in the heavens, is a citizen of the kingdom of glory; he uses the light of glory, and through it he perceives the glorious presence of GOD, and also the works of glory, that is, the ineffable effects of that glorious presence.
9. It can be noted here in passing that just as GOD once began the work of creation with corporeal and sensible light, so also he begins the works of our regeneration and glorification with spiritual light. For when GOD efficaciously calls the elect to salvation through the Holy Spirit, he first illuminates and enlightens their intellect with the light of faith; secondly, he softens and sanctifies the will. Similarly, in the work of glorification, the illumination of our intellect by the light of glory, to see the essence of GOD clearly and perspicuously, precedes in the order of nature the inflaming of the will. The reason for this order is that cognition precedes

love, and thus clear cognition or vision ought to precede ardent and perfect love.

10. Conversely, however, that great Dragon, who is rightly called the Ruler of darkness, begins that dire work of eternal perdition with darkness. For since (as St. Thomas teaches, 1.2ae, question 77, Article 8, and with him Cajetan, Durandus, Capreolus, and Estius) there can be no sin in the will without a prior error of the intellect, that cunning spirit first casts a shadow and, as it were, a certain night over the intellect; then he turns the will from the true good to the apparent good, and gradually hardens it.

ART. VII. Whether there is in pilgrims a light clearer than the light of faith.

1. Theology is usually divided into the Theology of the Laity and the Theology of the Doctors, which they call argumentative and Scholastic. The former is a bare knowledge of the credibilia (as they call them) necessary for salvation. The latter is not a bare knowledge of the credibilia, but is the faculty by which we are able to explain, defend, and confirm the articles of faith, and to instruct others concerning their truth.
2. Argumentative or Scholastic Theology is said to exceed the Theology of the Laity in a twofold respect: first, because it extends itself to more credibilia; for learned men in spiritual matters understand more than the Laity and the simple. Secondly, because it is able to explain to others those things which are to be believed, and to defend and confirm them against Atheists, Jews, Mohammedans, and Pagans. This distinction of Theology offered to some, of whom Durandus speaks in the prologue to the *Sentences*, question 2, the occasion to devise a certain spiritual light in pilgrims, different from the light of faith, and clearer and more excellent than it. For since in all the faithful there is the light of faith, it must be admitted that in the Doctors and Pastors there is a certain light clearer than faith, by the benefit of which they have (as Durandus says) a higher knowledge of the credibilia than through faith.
3. The first reason for this opinion is usually taken from the testimony of Augustine on those words of John 1, verse 9, "He was the true light," etc., where he says that the light for believing is one thing, and the light for understanding is another. Likewise, that the uncreated light illuminates men with a twofold light: infants indeed with the light of faith, by which they are nourished as with milk, but adults with the light of wisdom, on which they feed as on solid food. The second reason is this: it is necessary for the public good of the Church that there be some in it who can defend the faith, instruct the simple, and confute the enemies of the Church. This, however, cannot be done by the light of faith alone, or by that knowledge of GOD alone which is common to all the faithful, for then anyone from the assembly of the faithful could perform these duties.

Therefore, there must be in the elders some light clearer than faith, by which they have a certain higher knowledge of the credibilia.

4. Thirdly, they prove that such a light does not evacuate faith, or is not so repugnant to faith that it cannot consist with it. Because if such a light could not stand with faith, it would be most of all on account of the opposition which seems to be between the enigma of faith and the clarity of that light. But that does not prevent it, because contraries, although they are not compatible in their excellences, are nevertheless (as they say) compatible in a remiss and diminished being, or (as others say) in remiss degrees. But the obscurity of faith, although in its intense degrees it is opposed to the clarity of the beatific vision, and for that reason cannot consist with it, is not so, but in a remiss being, contrary to this light.
5. They explain their doctrine with the example of the air, which at night is simply dark, and at midday is simply illuminated, but in the morning is partly illuminated and partly dark, nor are the shadows totally dispelled before the midday hour. Thus glory, as a midday light, totally expels the darkness of faith. But this light of the Doctors is like the light of dawn, which does not dispel the darkness of faith, nor is it expelled by the midday light of glory, but is rather perfected. I call the light of glory the midday light, because natural blindness is like the densest darkness, the light of faith is like the light of the Moon, the Scholastic light like the morning light, and the light of glory like the splendor of the midday light.
6. This is the opinion of certain Sententiary Theologians, against which Durandus disputes at length. I, however, without a longer disquisition, will propose my opinion concerning this middle light in two or three assertions. Let the first be this: That light which they call a medium between the light of faith and the light of glory, insofar as it extends itself to more credibilia than the faith of the Laity, is not something distinct from the light of faith, but is a certain more perfect degree of faith, or (as others say) a certain extension of faith.
7. Second assertion: The aforesaid light, insofar as it is defensive and explicative of the articles of faith, is not true and properly so-called knowledge, as Durandus well proves. Because all knowledge properly so-called is resolved into evident and self-known principles. But the knowledge of the Pastors and Doctors, which they have of spiritual things, cannot be resolved into self-known principles, but only into principles naturally non-evident, which the Holy Spirit has revealed to us in the word.
8. Third assertion: That middle light is not a specific kind of intellectual light distinct from the three aforesaid, but is a certain complication of the light of nature and the light of faith, that is, of Philosophy and Theology. For by Philosophy applied to Theology, we explain, defend, and confirm the articles of faith against adversaries, and confute them.

ART. VIII. In which three questions are solved.

The first is, Whether faith is well distinguished into infused and acquired.

The second is, Whether faith is more certain than the sciences themselves.

The third is, What it is properly to believe in GOD.

1. Bonaventure, an excellent interpreter of the Master of the Sentences, in book 3, Distinction 23, Article 2, question 1, asserts that two things are required for the habit of faith: first, that the intellect be instructed about the credibilia. Second, that it be inclined and bent to assent to those articles which are to be believed. For it is one thing to know what is said in some text of Scripture, and another to know that what is said there is true. For a Pagan or an infidel can know what is said in the Mosaic or Evangelical history, but he cannot know that what is said there is true, unless his intellect is moved by GOD to assent. Although, therefore, faith is something acquired with respect to that information of the mind about the credibilia (for it is from hearing, Romans 10), it is nevertheless something merely supernatural and infused, if it is considered according to that which is principal in it, that is, the inclination of the mind to assent.
2. Since faith properly so-called is a gift of GOD, and not something acquired by ourselves, that distinction of faith into infused and acquired seems hardly suitable; unless we either say that it is not a division of faith into two different species, but rather a distinction of one and the same faith into two of its considerations—for according to different considerations, faith is both something acquired and something infused, as has just been said—or we say that faith is taken broadly for any assent by which we assent to Holy Scripture. For such an assent is twofold: because some assent to it, moved by human persuasion, that is, on account of the love and reverence which they have for the one speaking, or on account of reasons and arguments. The assent of these is called by Bonaventure acquired faith, the name of faith being taken broadly. Others, however, assent because they rely on the first truth as on a most certain foundation, and the assent of these is infused faith, and is properly called faith.
3. Bonaventure, comparing faith and the philosophical sciences with respect to certainty, distinguishes certainty into certainty of cognition or speculation, and certainty of adherence, and says that faith is more certain than the sciences with the certainty of adherence, which principally regards the will, but not with the certainty of speculation, which pertains to the intellect. He says it is more certain with the certainty of adherence because Christian faithful cannot be led and inclined (these are his own words) by arguments, nor by torments, nor by blandishments, to deny, even with their mouth, the truth which they believe. Which no one skilled

in any science would do, if he were forced by the most severe torments to retract his opinion about some geometrical or arithmetical conclusion. For a Geometer would be foolish and ridiculous who would dare to undergo death for his opinion in geometrical controversies, except insofar as faith dictates that one must not lie.

4. But whatever Bonaventure may say, faith is more certain than the sciences, both with the certainty of cognition and with the certainty of adherence. And this is because the certainty of cognition arises from the certainty of the foundation on which our intellect rests when it assents to some proposition. But the foundation on which the assent of faith rests is the truth and authority of GOD, which is a far more certain foundation than any human reason. Meanwhile, if the certainty of cognition is taken improperly for the firmness of assenting which is opposed to hesitation and doubt, it is not to be denied that the sciences are more certain than faith. For knowledge is often so firm that it excludes all doubt, which is not always true of faith. For although that fount of water springing up to eternal life does not fail, yet it is not to be thought that this virtue always runs its course with an untroubled tenor, beyond all reach of dread; but rather, it must be ingenuously confessed that it has a perpetual struggle with diffidence.
5. The most distinguished TILENUS, in *Syntagma*, part 2, Disputation 43, Thesis 5, distinguishes certainty into evident and non-evident. The former, he says, is of those things which are seen by the light of either reason or sense, of which kind are the first principles and the conclusions evidently deduced from them, and then those things which we have learned with experience as our teacher. The latter, he will have it, is of those things which rest on the affirmation of a veracious witness. Whence it happens that the greater the authority of the witness, the more certain and firm is the assent of the one believing. From this he gathers that those things which rest on divine testimony, whose authority is supreme, also beget supreme certainty, and with respect to this cause, which can neither deceive nor be deceived, the things which we believe are far more certain than those which we know by the guidance or light of human reason.
6. The third question proposed in the title is, what it is to believe in GOD, and how it differs from believing GOD and believing GOD to be. P. Lombard, in Book 3 of the *Sentences*, Distinction 23, explaining these things, says thus: "To believe GOD is to believe that the things he says are true. To believe GOD to be is to believe that he himself is GOD. And to believe in GOD is by believing to love, by believing to go into him, by believing to adhere to him and to be incorporated into his members." I cannot approve this distinction of the Master, because from it, it follows that to believe in GOD is an act of both charity and faith, which is absurd, since the acts of different habits are different.

7. Wherefore it seems it must be said that to believe *in* GOD differs from that which is to believe GOD in this, that to believe GOD is to give faith to him insofar as he simply narrates something; but to believe *in* GOD is to give faith to him insofar as he promises something, or to assent to his promises, and that with this threefold persuasion: First, that he is not feigning or acting hypocritically, as men are wont to do, but that he truly wishes to confer that benefit on you. Second, that he is also able to perform what he has promised, indeed, that he is so able that he cannot be impeded by any stronger power. Third, that he is unable to change his counsel, and therefore that he will truly give what he has promised. From which it is clear that although we give faith to a man who promises something, we cannot be said to believe in a man, for we can have none of these three persuasions concerning a man.

ART. IX. The opinion of Nicolaus Grevinchovius is refuted, who says that the habit of faith is not infused, but acquired.

1. WILLIAM AMESIUS, in his contracted rescription to the response of Nicolaus Grevinchovius, chapter 10, proves against him and other Remonstrants that the habit of faith is infused by GOD, and not acquired by ourselves through frequent and repeated acts of believing. For Grevinchovius, although he freely admits that actual faith or the acts of believing proceed not from nature, but from the special grace of GOD, nevertheless denies that the cause of such acts is habitual faith, or a habit of faith infused by GOD. But on the contrary, he asserts that through frequent acts of faith proceeding from the special grace of GOD, habitual faith is finally produced in us, just as through frequent acts of justice and liberality, the habits of justice and liberality are produced in us.
2. This opinion of Nicolaus is not only contrary to the doctrine of the Scholastics and of modern Theologians, both Pontifical and Evangelical, who with unanimous consent call the Theological virtues infused habits, but it is also exposed to various and inevitable difficulties.
3. For first, those who through the preaching of the word and the internal efficacy of the Holy Spirit are recently converted and reborn either have only the act of faith, or both the habit and the act. If the latter is true, the proposition is established. If the former, it will follow that the whole of that by which a reborn person differs from one not reborn is to be referred to acts, and therefore to something evanescent and unstable. For our actions are not permanent, but quickly pass and vanish. Grevinchovius responds that that by which a reborn person differs from one not reborn is not wholly, but for its greatest part, to be referred to acts. Which response, insofar as it asserts that the whole of that by which a reborn person differs from one not reborn is not to be referred to acts, manifestly destroys his own doctrine. For if the reborn person differs from the one not reborn in some other respect, it is necessary that there

be in him some good habit, either complete or inchoate. The same response, also, insofar as it places the greatest part of that difference in acts, is absurd, because since the old man consists of permanent habits, why not also the new? Also, because it would follow from this that the state of grace is very unstable and subject to infinite mutations.

4. Secondly, that saying, "without faith it is impossible to please GOD" (Hebrews 11, verse 6), is to be understood either of the habit or of the act of faith. If of the habit, the proposition is established; for from this it openly follows that no one can be in the state of grace who lacks the habit of faith, and consequently that all the reborn, once they have been converted and established in the state of grace, are endowed with that habit. If it is to be understood of the act of believing, it will follow that the reborn, when they are asleep and do not actually believe, displease GOD and are not in the state of grace.
5. Thirdly, Amesius argues thus: if men recently called and converted are not endowed with the habit of faith, but only have acts, how could they persist in grace for even one night, while they do nothing? Nicolaus responds that those who are sleeping are plainly destitute of faith, and yet they persist in grace, that is, in the love of GOD. Amesius not undeservedly judges this response to be absurd. First, because no one can persist in grace without faith, for without it, it is impossible to please GOD. Secondly, that a faithful person puts off his faith along with his clothes is a dream of Nicolaus. For many pious men have expired while sleeping; if they did not then have faith, it is all over for their salvation. See more in Amesius, chapter 10 of that treatise.
6. Nicolaus adduces various arguments for his opinion, which, however, are of no weight. The first objection: by the preaching of the word, the habit of faith is not infused, but only the act is produced. Therefore, the act precedes the habit. Response: by the word and the operation of the spirit, as by instrumental causes, the very habit of faith is produced, although the infusion of that habit is to be ascribed to GOD alone. For the word produces that habit by preparing, but GOD by infusing. The second objection: GOD in his word first requires from us the act of faith, not the habit. Amesius responds that a good tree is required first, then good fruits. The third objection: if the habit of faith is produced in us before the act, we are faithful before we actually believe, which is absurd. The same author responds that we are faithful in the first act (in the order of nature, not of time) before we believe in the second act; that is, the habit of faith, from which we are denominated faithful, precedes the act of faith not in time but in the order of nature; which should seem absurd to no one. See the rest in the treatise of Amesius.

ART. X. Whether actual or habitual faith is, or can be, in infants.

1. First Assertion: It is not impossible, absolutely speaking, for both actual and habitual faith to be in infants. Concerning habitual faith, the matter is manifest: for infants, in the state of integrity, would have been born adorned with the habits of original justice, as taught not only by the Sententiaries in *Sentences*, Book 2, Distinction 20, but also by the Evangelical Theologians, when they discuss the first state of man, which they call the state of integrity. From which it is manifestly clear that the habits of faith, hope, and charity can also be in them now, because whatever was once possible can also be possible now, provided we consider the absolute power of GOD.
2. That actual faith, or the act of believing, can also be in them, is easily proven by the example of John the Baptist, who in Luke 1, verse 44, is said to have leaped in his mother's womb "in exultation" (ἐν ἀγαλλιάσει), in joy. Therefore, he recognized the presence of his LORD, and thus an infant can actually understand. But if an infant can actually understand, or use reason, he can also actually believe. I admit, indeed, that this was a singular event, and therefore no one can gather from it this general conclusion, that, namely, actual faith is in all elect infants. Nevertheless, it evidently proves that GOD can exert his secret and wonderful power in infants, by bestowing on them actual faith, although ordinarily nothing of the sort happens.
3. Second Assertion: It is not probable that infants have actual faith, or the act of believing. This assertion does not contradict the preceding one, because there it was taught what can be done, but here what actually and ordinarily is done. This assertion is therefore proven: first, because Scripture, in Deuteronomy chapter 1, verse 39, and Jonah chapter 4, verse 11, testifies that infants do not know the difference between good and evil, and therefore lack actual intelligence and cognition. But actual faith cannot exist without actual cognition. Secondly, if actual faith is in infants, it either arises from hearing the word, or from an internal revelation made immediately by GOD alone. The former cannot be admitted, because if they understood the word of GOD, they would listen attentively and reverently, the contrary of which we see happening. Nor the latter, because that mode of revelation is extraordinary and very rare. For "faith is from hearing," Romans 10. But if all elect infants had actual faith arisen from the revelation of GOD alone, that mode would now be ordinary. Thirdly, that opinion which ascribes actual faith to infants is displeasing not only to Nazianzen, Augustine, and the Scholastics, but also to Calvin, Beza, Junius, Tilenus, Pareus, and all other Orthodox Theologians, with the sole exception of Luther, who professes that opinion in many places.
4. Third Assertion: The opinion which attributes to infants holy movements of the intellect and will without actual cognition entirely lacks probability and implies a manifest contradiction: movements, I say, similar to the

movements or acts of faith and charity, but truly different from them. I say it implies a contradiction because movements or operations of the intellect and will cannot exist without cognition. For what else is a movement of the intellect than intellection, or the act of understanding and knowing? For the intellect cannot be moved and operate otherwise than by understanding, just as the eye cannot, except by seeing, and the sense of hearing, except by hearing. Similarly, every movement or act of the will is volition. But every volition presupposes actual cognition of the object, because there is no desire for the unknown. This opinion is usually attributed to the theologians gathered at the Council of Wittenberg in the year 1536, and also to Martin Chemnitz, who in the second part of his examination of the Council of Trent, on canon 13 of Session 7, professes to embrace that opinion concerning the regeneration of baptized infants which was explained in the formula of concord between the theologians of Saxony and upper Germany in the year 1536.

5. Fourth Assertion: Those who say that faith is in infants in the first act, not the second, and likewise that the seed, germ, or root of faith is in them, must necessarily confess, first, that by the seed of faith they do not understand the word of GOD, because infants, of course, do not hear and understand it. Secondly, that they understand not something different from faith, but the habit of faith, at least incomplete and inchoate. This the most distinguished Junius openly professes in his little work of theses, Disputation 51, Thesis 8. The first reason is that just as the condition required in the covenant of works is the perfection of our actions, so also the condition required in the covenant of grace is faith in JESUS CHRIST our LORD. Therefore, it is necessary that this condition be in all the covenanted. But the infants of the faithful are covenanted, that is, they belong to the covenant and to the Church, as our Theologians teach against the Anabaptists. Therefore, it is necessary that some faith be in them, that is, either actual or habitual. For no one is covenanted unless the condition required in the covenant is found in him. But that seed of faith, if it is something different from faith, is not the condition required in the covenant of grace, unless perhaps one wishes to say that GOD made one covenant of grace with infants and another with adults. For if the condition required in the covenant is different, the covenants themselves are substantially different. For the substance or essence of a covenant is posited in the conditions which he who establishes the covenant stipulates.
6. Furthermore, original sin is taken away in baptism with respect to its guilt, as both the Pontifical and the Evangelical Theologians teach; and therefore elect infants, when they are baptized, are justified. For justification is posited in the remission of sin, by which its guilt is taken away. But if they are justified, they have some faith, that is, either habitual or actual; for by faith alone are we justified.

7. Fifth Assertion: The aforesaid opinion, which attributes to infants only the habit of faith, and that either complete or inchoate, seems to be preferred to all the rest, both because almost all Orthodox Theologians embrace it, and because the common opinion of all Theologians concerning the removal of original sin with respect to its guilt in baptism, that is, concerning the justification of baptized infants, imposes on us the necessity of embracing it.
8. That this may become manifest, let these foundations be held: first, the original sin of elect infants is taken away in baptism with respect to its guilt, that is, it is remitted to them, and therefore they themselves are justified. For justification is posited in the remission of sin and the imputation of the justice of Christ. Second, it is not to be thought that in baptism only original sin is remitted to infants, and that afterwards actual sins are remitted to them, because the remission of sin, or justification, is not repeated, but, as the Orthodox Theologians teach, it is one and an indivisible act, and happens only once. Third, if the elect are justified in their first infancy, they are also necessarily called at the same age, for calling in the order of nature precedes justification, as is clear from the Pauline gradation in Romans 8, verse 30, which we can rightly call the chain of salvation. Someone will say: that Pauline gradation is to be understood of adults, and not of infants; for adults are first called before they are justified. But infants are first justified, and afterwards, when they hear and understand the word, they are called. But let those who object this to us consider whether it is probable that, ordinarily and for the most part, in procuring the salvation of the elect, the order and progress proposed in the Pauline gradation is violated. For if all who are born in the Christian order, and are therefore baptized in their first age, are first justified, and after some years are called, it manifestly follows that ordinarily and for the most part that order is violated.
9. These things being posited, I argue thus: Elect infants are called. Therefore, they have the habit of faith, at least an incomplete one. The reason for the consequence is that no calling is efficacious without the renewal of the intellect and will; but no renewal of these powers of the soul can exist without the infusion of good habits. But if any habit is infused, faith is infused, both because the mind of an infant is no less capable of faith than of other habits, and because no other habit is so necessary for the justification of an infant, for without it, it is impossible to please GOD. Furthermore (as the most distinguished Trelcatius teaches), the very form and essence of internal calling (which alone can exist for infants) is posited in the illumination and information of the mind, through faith in CHRIST. Whence D. Pareus in his commentary on Romans 8, verse 30, speaking of calling, calls it "a calling to faith in CHRIST." And Ambrose says that to call is nothing other than to compunct to faith.

10. The most distinguished Beza, although in his *Confession*, Chapter 4, Article 48, he attributes the seed and germ of faith to infants, nevertheless in other books manifestly asserts that elect infants are justified in baptism, not by their own faith, but by the intervening faith of their pious parents. For in his *Questions*, part 2, Response to Question 128, he asserts that to elect infants are conferred engrafting into the covenant, and the remission of sin, and therefore justification, with the faith of their parents intervening. He also teaches the same in his Response to the Acts of the Colloquy of Montbéliard, Treatise 2, on Baptism, where he asserts that to infants destitute of their own faith, the faith of another is so imputed that, by God's pact, it is considered as their own in them. Likewise, that infants, just as they are sinners by another's sin as well as their own, are so justified by another's faith as well as their own; their own, I say, by imputation. The most learned Cassander explains and defends almost the same opinion in his book *On the Baptism of Infants*, explanation of proposition 3; also many Fathers, namely, Justin, Ambrose, Augustine, Bernard, and others.
11. I would gladly embrace this opinion, to avoid those difficult questions concerning the faith of little ones which are wont to be agitated in this our age, if I did not perceive it to be exposed to other far more serious difficulties. For first, if infants justified in baptism are destitute of all faith, they have not yet been efficaciously called; and thus justification, ordinarily, that is, with respect to all who are born in the visible Church, will precede calling. The reason for the connection is that no calling can be efficacious without the renewal of the mind through the habit of faith, as has been shown above. But infants, according to this opinion, have no faith. Now it is proven that calling cannot follow justification, but must necessarily precede it, because calling is the change and translation of a man from the state of misery and corruption to the state of grace. But those who have been justified cannot be changed and transferred from the state of misery to the state of grace, because they are already in the state of grace, not in the state of misery. Whence the Prophet, in Psalm 32, verse 1, proclaims blessed those whose sins are forgiven. Therefore, no one can be called to grace and salvation after justification.
12. Secondly, from this opinion it seems to follow that the ordinary mode of justifying is through another's faith, and therefore that ordinarily and for the most part, both the meritorious and the instrumental cause of our justification do not exist in us, but are external and imputed. For according to this opinion, all the elect who are born in the visible Church, or in the Christian world, are justified in their first age, namely, in baptism, not by their own faith, but with the faith of their pious parents intervening. But whatever is true of the justification of those who are born in the Church, that is true of ordinary justification, or of the ordinary mode of justifying.

13. Thirdly, this imputation of another's faith is displeasing to most learned men; indeed, Beza himself, in his Response to question 128, part 2, in a way condemns it. His words are these: "By no means, however, would I say that anyone is saved by another's faith, lest someone take this to mean that I say the faith of the parents is imputed to the infants, as if they believed with another's faith, which indeed would be no less false and absurd than if I were to say that someone can live with another's soul, or be wise with another's wisdom."

ART. XI. Is there faith in demons?

1. Bonaventure in the 3rd book of the *Sentences*, Distinction 23, question 3, proposes his opinion concerning the faith of demons in these words: "they have," he says, "some knowledge of the articles and credibilia, which can indeed be called faith, or credulity, because it is not in them an open vision. And that knowledge was partly instilled in them at creation, and partly from acquisition. For from their first creation, they had some knowledge of the articles pertaining to the Trinity, which, although it does not deserve to be called faith, but rather the knowledge of contemplation, on account of the obscurity of the enigma; yet with sin supervening, and the enigma following, that knowledge deserved to be called faith, since it is an enigmatic knowledge of those things which pertain to the divine. As for the articles pertaining to the humanity, there is in them an acquired knowledge through many miracles and experiments, and, as it were, extorted by a certain necessity. For while the demons see openly that those who believe in CHRIST cannot be damned, they are compelled by manifest reason to believe that the faith of believers in CHRIST is true; and by this, consequently, they believe all things to be true which the Christians believe, and from this also they are terrified; on account of which James says that they believe and tremble." Thus Bonaventure.
2. From these words it is clear that Bonaventure does not attribute historical faith properly so-called to the demons, that is, a historical assent resting on the authority of GOD, but rather an experimental historical assent, that is, resting on experiments and miracles. But experimental knowledge pertains not so much to faith as to knowledge. Estius professes the same opinion in Book 3 of the *Sentences*, Distinction 23. His words are these:
3. "There is," he says, "necessary for true or Christian faith a certain propensity of the will, by which the intellect is led to assent to his words, in whose authority the mind of the believer acquiesces. For the act of faith has this as its property, that out of a certain humble reverence towards God, the intellect yields to his authority, and receives firmly and obediently those things which are said, even if it perceives them less by reason. If, therefore, anyone, convicted either by the sagacity of his natural genius alone, or by the weight of arguments or reasons, or by the evidence of sense or even of signs only, assents to those things which are

divinely revealed, that assent will not pertain to Christian faith. Since, therefore, the demons, by the subtlety of their nature and the perspicacity of their intellect, see that the dogmas of our religion are not repugnant to the truth known to them by nature, and see the same confirmed by miracles exceeding the faculty of nature, which is well known to them, and finally experience that by the power of Christian doctrine very many are snatched from their kingdom and power, and, led and convicted by these and similar things, are forced to confess that the doctrine of the Christian religion is most true—since there is in them otherwise no spontaneous submission and obedience of the will towards the divine truth—their assent concerning divine things cannot properly be called faith, but a certain knowledge extorted through experience and the evidence of things or signs."

4. The most learned Pareus embraces the contrary opinion. For in part 2 of his explanations of the Catechism, question 21, he attributes historical faith properly so-called to the demons, and describes it thus: "Historical faith is to acknowledge and to establish that the whole word of GOD is true, etc. And that on account of the authority and asseveration of GOD himself, of which we are certain."
5. Rightly, therefore, it can be asked here concerning the assent of the demons: whether it rests on the authority of GOD, or whether it is only an experimental knowledge, extorted by the evidence of signs. I will propose the determination of this question in three assertions.
6. Let the first assertion be this: The knowledge of demons is true and properly so-called historical faith; that is, it rests also on the authority of GOD, and not only on experiments or miracles. The reason for this assertion is that they are most persuaded that GOD cannot lie or speak falsely, and therefore they necessarily assent to the whole divine word on account of the authority of GOD himself.
7. Second assertion: The historical faith of the elect, that is, the knowledge of Holy Scripture which the elect have, differs in four ways from the historical faith of the demons. First, that the historical faith of the elect has joined to it trust and the application of the gratuitous remission of sins, whereas the faith of the demons has joined to it the contrary persuasion, that is, the application of vindictive justice. Secondly, that the faith of the former, as will become clear later, arises from a pious inclination and reverence of the will, leading the intellect captive into the service or obedience of CHRIST; whereas the faith of the latter has joined to it a rebellion of the will, by which they would wish that to be false which they are forced to confess is true. Thirdly, that the elect love the truth to which they assent, whereas the demons pursue it with hatred. Fourthly, that the assent of the former has joy and delight joined to it, whereas the latter assent not without pain and horror.

8. Third assertion: GOD, the Best and Greatest, instilled this historical faith in the intellect of the demons at their first creation, and after the fall of the demons, he did not remove or abolish it, but preserved it, not indeed to adorn and bless them by this means, but on the contrary, to increase their misery. For the consideration of the divine wrath, power, and justice strikes into those damned spirits an ineffable horror and dread.
9. Fourth assertion: The faith of the demons, before their fall, was a splendid and signal virtue, but now it has the character of an evil and vicious habit; not in itself, but accidentally (as Pareus well notes), because, namely, it has joined to it the rebellion of the will and an immense hatred with which they pursue the known truth.

ART. XII. Was there faith in the soul of CHRIST? And is it in the Saints, who, having now been translated to heaven, have facial knowledge of GOD, as the Scholastics say?

1. To the first question proposed in the title, it is answered thus: Although in CHRIST, during the state of humiliation, there was an excellent charity, by which he both loved GOD for his own sake and the human race for the sake of GOD, nevertheless the habits of faith and hope were never in him. Because the object of faith is GOD insofar as he is known obscurely and in an enigma, while the object of hope is also GOD, insofar as he is not yet had, but is expected. But CHRIST from the first instant of his conception was not only a pilgrim, but also a comprehensor, and he clearly saw GOD and divine things, which are the object of faith and hope.
2. First Objection: All virtues were in the soul of CHRIST. But faith is a virtue. Likewise, in CHRIST there was the fullness of all grace. Response: That is to be understood of those virtues and gifts which are not repugnant to his state. But faith and hope import a certain imperfection, contrary to that perfection which CHRIST had from the beginning. Nor should it seem strange that we do not attribute these virtues to CHRIST, for the virtue of penitence, on account of the evil adjoined to it, cannot be attributed to CHRIST. Second Objection: If CHRIST lacked faith, his actions were sins; for "whatever is not from faith is sin" (Romans 14, last verse). Response: Faith is there taken for a firm persuasion and knowledge, by which we know for certain that the things we do are honorable and good, that is, conformable and agreeable to the divine will. But faith so taken both should and can be attributed to CHRIST, for he rendered perfect obedience to the divine law.
3. Objections are also usually made from the testimonies of Scripture which attribute hope and trust to CHRIST. Matthew 27, it is said of CHRIST: "he hoped or trusted in the LORD; let him deliver him," or as it is in Psalm 22, "he committed himself to the LORD; let him deliver him." Likewise, Hebrews 2: "I will put my trust in him." Response: 1. From Augustine, many things are said in the Psalms concerning the person of CHRIST, not

with respect to himself, but with respect to his members, with whom he constitutes one body. 2. It is not to be denied that there was hope in CHRIST with respect to those things which he had not yet obtained, such as the resurrection, the glorification of his Name, and the like. But that hope, because it did not regard GOD himself as its principal object, but certain other goods, was indeed a true hope, but it was not an act of the principal theological virtue of which we are here discoursing. But faith could in no way have been in him, because the full knowledge of things, by which he clearly saw all things in the WORD, completely removes faith.

4. To the latter question proposed in the title, the Sententiaries respond with unanimous consent that faith cannot be found in the blessed, because, namely, they do not know GOD in an enigma, but face to face. But far more probably, Amandus Polanus, in *Syntagma Theologiae*, Book 9, Chapter 6, question 4, *On the subject of faith*, says that faith is one way in those things which pertain to the essence of celestial beatitude, and another way in its adjuncts. "The essence," he says, "of beatitude, we believe by faith here; in heaven, faith is evacuated by vision. But certain of its adjuncts are believed both here and there, namely because they are in no way adverse to the blessed vision." And below he says that the things which are believed by the blessed are partly past, such as all the things which CHRIST did for our sake, and partly future, such as the second advent of CHRIST, the resurrection of the flesh, the last judgment, and the perfection of the Church.
5. Because, however, someone could object that faith is evacuated by vision, or that faith cannot be there where there is vision, Polanus responds that where there is faith, there is no vision of that thing of which there is faith; that is, the faith and the vision of the blessed are not concerned with the same object. For their faith is concerned with past and future works of GOD, but their vision is concerned with GOD himself and CHRIST incarnate. From which it is clear that faith in the Fatherland is not evacuated with respect to its secondary object, although it is evacuated with respect to its principal and primary object, that is, GOD.
6. Someone will say that Polanus asserts this gratuitously and offers no reason for his assertion. I respond that this opinion can be confirmed by a most valid reason: for either it must be said that the knowledge which the blessed have of past and future things rests on the authority of GOD testifying in Scripture that they once were or will be, or it must be said that they contemplate and behold these things in the WORD, that is, in the second person of the Trinity, as in a mirror. The latter cannot be admitted, for it is a figment of the Pontificians, introduced into the Church to establish the invocation of the dead. Therefore, the former must be said, namely that their knowledge of past and future things rests

on the authority of GOD, and is therefore true and properly so-called faith.

ART. XIII. Do the Remonstrants rightly deny that Adam, before the fall, had the power of believing in CHRIST?

1. The Orthodox Theologians, when the Arminians ask by what right the obedience of faith is demanded from sinners to whom GOD does not wish to give the strength to believe in CHRIST, are wont to respond that GOD in the first creation gave to Adam the habit of faith, by which he was able to assent to every word of GOD, and therefore to the Gospel, if it had been announced to him. This habit, however, they say was lost by us in Adam. Therefore, since justice does not require that GOD should continuously restore to us what we lose by our own fault, to demonstrate the divine equity in demanding the obedience of faith, it suffices that he does not demand except what he once gave to us.
2. The Arminians condemn and reject this opinion of the Orthodox in their *Apology* against the articles, response to article 19; Johannes Arnoldus, in his defense of the opinion of D. Jacobus Arminius against the consideration of the same edited by Daniel Tilenus, Chapter 14; also the Remonstrant Theologians cited and called to the Venerable Synod of Dort in defense of their opinion concerning the fourth article on the operation of grace. But these authors warn that the dispute here is not simply whether Adam could have believed in GOD, but whether he could have believed in CHRIST. The former they readily concede; the latter they stubbornly deny.
3. Peter Molinaeus, that distinguished light and ornament of the Gallican Church, in his *Anatomy of Arminianism*, chapter 11, rightly judges this question to be of very great importance, and therefore to be diligently considered. Therefore, that we may proceed in explaining it in right order, I will first propose and explain our own opinion on the faith of Adam. Secondly, I will confirm it with reasons. Thirdly, I will respond to the arguments of the Remonstrants.
4. I will propose and explain the opinion of the Orthodox concerning the faith of our first parents before the fall in a few assertions. The first assertion: Adam before the fall not only had ethical virtues, but also theological ones, that is, faith, hope, and charity; for he could not have been without them without a manifest loss of felicity, as the great Tilenus rightly notes. The second assertion: Adam, through that habit of faith, actually understood only those things which were then revealed to him, but through the same, he could have understood all those things which we understand, provided they had been revealed to him. The third assertion: the potential to believe in Christ, which we attribute to Adam before the fall, was not natural, but habitual, that is, it was not the natural faculty of understanding itself, as Arminius supposes, but it was a supernatural habit

infused by God. The fourth assertion: That potential to believe in Christ could not have been actualized during that state, because, namely, its act is repugnant to that state. The fifth assertion: Nevertheless, it should not be said with Arminius that the potential was improperly so-called, and taken in a most general sense; for no one would say that the potential to see the Sun, which a person in a dark prison has, is an improperly so-called potential, because it cannot be brought into act during that state; for it is a true and properly so-called natural faculty. Likewise, no one would deny that Adam before the fall had a properly so-called faculty and potential to read and understand the Mosaic history, although that potential could not be brought into act during that state.

5. This opinion, thus explained, can be easily proven and confirmed: for first, Tilenus argues thus: Adam before the fall suffered from neither blindness of mind nor hardness of heart, which are the internal causes of the inability to believe; but he had a lucid mind and composed affections: Therefore, if the Gospel had been preached to him then, he could have seen its truth with his mind and embraced its goodness with his heart.

Secondly, Adam had the potential to believe every word of God, whether then revealed or to be revealed later; likewise, every promise of God, whether given or to be given, in which category the certain doctrine of the Gospel is also contained. Joh. Arn. Corvinus replies that Adam did not have the potential to believe every word of God, whether then revealed or to be revealed later, but only had the potential to believe the word of the revealed law and the given legal promise; and he adds that Tilenus can in no way prove the contrary. But (if I may judge) Tilenus's argument is valid and forceful, nor is it difficult to prove what is asserted by him, namely that Adam had the potential to believe every word of God, whether revealed or to be revealed. And this is because Adam before the fall could perform all those things which the law, written in his heart, required; but it required a readiness to believe every word of God, whether revealed or to be revealed: Therefore, he could also believe that word which was not yet revealed.

6. The Remonstrants can respond to this instance in two ways: first, they will say that Adam had the potential to believe every word of God, even to be revealed, provided its excellence and mystery do not exceed that first light with which Adam was adorned. However, the evangelical promises seem to exceed that light of faith of the first parents. But this evasion was dealt with above: for it was said that Adam suffered from neither blindness of mind nor hardness of heart, which are the causes of the inability to believe. Furthermore, just as he who knows that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, upon the introduction of any particular triangle, by virtue of that general knowledge immediately judges that it has three angles equal to two right angles; so also Adam, who was most persuaded that every word of God is worthy of faith, and therefore to be

believed, by virtue of this general persuasion could easily assent to any word of God, whether legal or evangelical.

7. Secondly, they can respond by retorting our argument, in this manner: Adam was not bound to believe the Gospel: Therefore, he did not have the strength to do this. This argumentation is very weak. For first, the consequence is very easily denied, and the reason for our denial can be brought forth manifestly. For Adam was not then bound to read, understand, and believe the Mosaic history, and yet he had the strength to do these things. Secondly, the antecedent of that Enthymeme is, in a certain sense, false, and therefore must be distinguished: for the law inscribed in Adam's mind, although not actually and expressly, yet by virtue and implicitly, commanded the obedience of faith in Christ, because, namely, it ordered Adam to believe every word of God. The most distinguished Molinaeus uses this distinction, but to exhaust the difficulty, another seems to need to be added to it, for of those things which are implicitly commanded by the law of nature, or the moral law, some are commanded absolutely, others hypothetically. For example, the first commandment of the Decalogue expressly forbids the worship of idols, and commands the worship of the true God implicitly but absolutely: the fifth commandment expressly commands the duties of inferiors towards superiors, but implicitly it also commands the duties of the latter towards the former; that is, it latently orders us to feed, instruct, protect our children, and to provide for their future, but hypothetically, or on the hypothesis that we have children. Thus Adam, by virtue of the first commandment requiring the obedience of faith, was bound to believe the Gospel, but on the hypothesis that the Gospel had been announced to him. Hence it is clear how the antecedent of that argument is to be distinguished. See Molinaeus in the aforementioned place.
8. A third reason, or proof of our opinion, is this: Those who deny that Adam had the potential to believe in Christ deny this either because the evangelical promises were not then given, or because they absolutely could not have been given during that state. But neither reason suffices. For Adam before the fall had the potential (as has already been said) to read and understand the Mosaic history, although that history during that state neither was nor could have been in existence; he also had then both the potential and the habit of pitying and helping the needy, as Arnoldus himself admits, although then there neither was nor could have been, during that state, any misery or need.
9. Arnoldus argues for his opinion thus: What in the first state was not necessary, what was useless, what could not be performed with truth, what is repugnant to the first covenant, and pertains to the second covenant, for that Adam did not receive the potential in the first state. But the obedience of faith in Christ is such: Therefore, etc. I respond by denying the major premise, for to help the needy, likewise to read, understand,

and believe the Mosaic history, were neither useful nor necessary in the first state, nor could they then be performed, indeed they were repugnant to that state: yet, as Arnoldus himself admits, man had the strength to perform these things. Arnoldus will insist: therefore, this potential was in vain. I respond by denying the consequence: for that potential to believe in Christ was in reality a habit of believing and assenting to every word of God. This habit, however, although it could not issue into that particular act during that state, could nevertheless be brought out into other acts suitable to that state.

10. Objection 2. What is not commanded by the law, but by the Gospel, to perform that, man was not given the strength in the first state; but faith in Christ is not prescribed by the law, but by the Gospel. I respond that faith in Christ is commanded differently by the law and differently by the Gospel: for by the law it is commanded, but implicitly and hypothetically; by the Gospel, however, it is commanded expressly and absolutely. Likewise, by the law it is commanded as a good work, whereas by the Gospel it is commanded as an applicative instrument of the merit of Christ.

Objection 3. He who did not receive the strength by which, if he were to fall, he could rise again, did not receive the strength to believe the Gospel if it were announced; but Adam did not receive such strength; therefore. Molinaeus responds that Adam did receive the strength by which he could rise from sin, if he had not lost it by his very fall. But it is certain that Adam by his fall lost all the habits of virtues with which he was previously adorned. And therefore also lost the strength of rising again.

ART. XIV. Whether the object of faith can be false.

There are not lacking those who assert that the object of faith can be false, and that things are often laudably believed and held as true which are in fact false; for example, they tell us that we must conclude that God wills for us that to be done which He commands us, and likewise wills for us that to be omitted which He forbids us to do. And yet (they say) He Himself in the meantime often wills the contrary. This opinion is too absurd, and unworthy of the patronage of learned men. For first, the divine law nowhere commands us to err: Therefore, it nowhere commands us to give faith to false things, and therefore we are not bound to believe false things. The reason for the consequence is that to believe false things, or to hold false things as true, is to err. The antecedent is proven: The divine law commands or mandates nothing which is contrary to the divine nature: but error or false assent is repugnant and contrary to the nature of God, who is truth itself.

2. Secondly: only those things are to be believed which God testifies in His word to be true. But God does not testify in His word that false things are true: Therefore, false things are not to be believed. The reason for the

proposition is that faith is an assent resting on the testimony of God. The assumption is manifest enough and cannot be denied by anyone.

3. Thirdly, if by a true faith, and one conformed to the Divine will, we assent to false things, then divine faith is sometimes an error. But the latter is absurd; therefore also the former. The proposition is proven, because to assent to false things, and to embrace them as true, is to err. The assumption is manifest, because divine faith and error are habits not only essentially distinct, but repugnant and contrary, and therefore one of these cannot be attributed to the other. See Tilenus, part one of his *Syntagma*, disp. 38.
4. Objection: We must conclude and believe that God wills that to be done by us which He commands us; and yet He Himself in the meantime often wills the contrary: Therefore, some false things are to be believed. The antecedent is proven: The precept of God is a sign of the divine will, for this reason it is called the will of the sign, and the revealed will. Wherefore, since every sign is conformed to the thing signified, we must conclude that God truly wills those things which He commands us; yet He does not truly will them to be done: for if He willed them to be done, they would necessarily happen.

To remove this difficulty, it must be held that the precept of God is called a sign of the will, not because it signifies the absolute will of procuring or effecting that the thing commanded be done, but because it indicates (as Suarez says, Book 3 on God, Chap. 8) the will of commanding and of obligating men to do those things, together with an affection of simple approbation. Therefore, every precept of God indicates or signifies two things: first, the will of obligating men to do those things which He commands; second, an approving or approbative will, by which He approves and loves those good acts which He requires of us. The decretive, or absolute and efficacious, will, however, is by no means indicated or manifested through the mandates of the divine law; and therefore we are not bound to believe that God wills those things to be done by us by an efficacious will, which He commands in the word.

5. Secondly, it must be held that all those things which God wills with a decretive or efficacious will necessarily come to pass; but those which He wills with a will of simple approbation very often do not come to pass; for He wills all men to obey His law, with a will of simple approbation, yet this does not happen, as experience teaches.

These things being established, the proposed argument is answered by distinguishing each part of the antecedent. Its first part can be distinguished thus: we must conclude that God wills all those things to be done by us which He commands; He wills (I say) with an approbative will, but not a decretive and efficacious one. The second part also is to be distinguished in the same way: for God does not always will those things which He commands to be done with a

decretive will; yet He always wills them to be done with an approbative will. Wherefore, since we are only to conclude that God wills those things which He commands with a will of simple approbation, which is without a doubt always true, it is manifest that the necessity of believing false things, or of embracing false things for true, never falls upon us.

ART. XV. How that argument of the Remonstrants is to be solved: What each and every person is bound to believe, that is true, etc.

The Remonstrants, in their conference presented to the Delegates of the States-General at the Synod of Dordrecht, try to demonstrate with this argument the universality of the death and merit of Christ.

What all and single individuals are bound to believe, that is true.

But all, even the reprobate, are bound to believe that Christ died for them.

Therefore, it is true that Christ died for them.

Theologians against the Remonstrants are accustomed to respond to this argument in three ways: first, by denying the major premise; second, by distinguishing the minor; third, by simply denying the minor. The first way of responding does not seem safe enough, because if the major premise is denied, it will follow that that most holy and most truthful God commands the reprobate to believe things which are false, which was confuted in the preceding article.

2. The second way of responding is followed by the Belgian Ecclesiastics, in the Hague Conference; also Molinaeus, in his *Anatomy of Arminianism*, Chap. 29. For these say that faith in Christ is prescribed to all men, not absolutely, but under the condition of penitence and conversion; that is, if they convert, and so embrace the benefit of Christ with a faithful soul, as is to be seen in the summary of the Evangelical Precepts, Mark 1, verse 15: "Repent, and believe the Gospel." From this opinion, therefore, the reprobate, speaking absolutely, are not bound to believe that Christ died for them; but (as has been said) with the condition of conversion presupposed. For as long as they persist in their malice, God wills that they believe that the wrath of God remains upon them. John the third, verse thirty-six.
3. The truth of this response is effectively proven by two reasons: first, only those things are to be believed which God testifies in His word to be true; but God in Holy Scripture nowhere testifies that Christ died for sinners, whether they convert or do not convert: Therefore, that is not to be believed. Secondly, if sinners persisting in their malice are bound to believe that Christ died for them, they are also bound to believe that they are elect, and will be partakers of eternal beatitude; but the latter is false,

therefore also the former. The reason for the proposition is that Christ died for the elect alone, as is clear from those places of Holy Scripture which testify that Christ died for His sheep, for His Church, for those whom the Father gave to Him, for the children of God, for His people, etc. The assumption is also proven, because sinners persisting in their malice are bound to believe that the wrath of God remains upon them, and therefore they are not bound to believe that they are elect to eternal life.

4. The third way of responding is followed by that venerable old man Johannes Piscator, Professor of Holy Letters in the illustrious School of Herborn. For he, in his Apologetic Response to the *Paraskeve* of Conrad Vorstius, chap. 7, absolutely denies that the reprobate are bound to believe in Christ, that is, to believe that Christ died for them; yet (he says) they are bound to believe the Gospel and the doctrine of the Gospel, which is beyond controversy most true. This response, although it later displeased Piscator himself, in his Response to the friendly Duplication of Conrad Vorstius, in reality has great probability, as is clear from this reason: What is true neither absolutely nor under condition, that is to be believed neither absolutely nor under condition; that Christ was sent into the world to suffer death for the traitor Judas is true neither absolutely nor under condition; Therefore, Judas was in no way bound to believe this, nor could it be proposed to him to be believed.
5. However, because the preceding opinion is more pleasing to most Orthodox Theologians, I will solve from the foundations of that opinion two principal arguments which can be brought to the contrary. The first is this: Those precepts which God wills to be proposed to all and single individuals bind all and single individuals with the necessity of obeying. But "BELIEVE IN CHRIST" is such a precept: Therefore, etc. I respond that the precepts of God are twofold, namely absolute and conditional. Absolute precepts bind all, whether elect or reprobate, absolutely to obedience. Conditional precepts also bind all, whether they be elect or reprobate, but under a certain condition. Such is that precept of which we are speaking here; for that binds even the reprobate, but under the condition of conversion, or repentance. That is, if they acknowledge their sins, and perceive in themselves a sorrow conceived for them, which the Scriptures now call a rending of the heart, now compunction (κατάνυξις), for only to those who feel these things in themselves does the voice of the Gospel command that they believe that reconciliation and the remission of sins have been obtained for them through the death of Christ.
6. Someone will insist: First, that precept ("believe in Christ") is proposed in vain to the reprobate, in whom not even that required condition, viz. conversion, can be found. I respond: this precept is not proposed for the same end to the faithful and to the unfaithful. For to the penitent and faithful this consolation is proposed for their own salvation; but to the impenitent and unfaithful, such as the reprobate are, the way is shown in

which they must walk, that they may receive the fruits of the death of Christ, namely that they ought to convert and, with conversion presupposed, believe in Christ. They insist: Secondly, every good work is absolutely and without condition commanded to all by God; but to believe in Christ is a good act or a good work: Therefore. I respond: First to the proposition, by denying it; for (as was said in article 13) in the Decalogue itself many good works are commanded hypothetically, or under a condition. Secondly, I respond by distinguishing: for the persuasion of reconciliation and the remission of sins, obtained through the death of Christ, is in the faithful a good and salutary act, elicited from the habit of faith; but in the reprobate who persist in malice to the end of life, it is a pernicious error and a fanatical arrogance.

7. The latter argument is this: The reprobate will be condemned for their unbelief; that is, because they did not believe in Christ: Therefore, they are bound to believe in Christ. The Contra-Remonstrants in the Hague Conference respond that impenitent sinners do not sin because they do not believe that Christ died for impenitent and unfaithful sinners, who are and remain such (for if they believed that, they would believe a lie), and therefore they are not condemned for that species of unbelief; but rather because they were unwilling to convert and, according to the doctrine of the Holy Gospel, to believe in Christ.
8. So that this response may be understood, it must be held that that species of unbelief, of which the question here is, that is, the defect of that persuasion which they call the trust of special mercy, can be considered in two ways: either it is considered in and of itself, or insofar as it arises from a defect of conversion and repentance, which we have said is a preceding and prerequisite condition for faith in Christ. Considered in the former way, it is not a meritorious cause of condemnation, because, namely, they are not absolutely bound to believe that Christ died for them; but in the latter way, it can rightly be said to merit condemnation: for although they are not absolutely bound to believe in Christ, they are bound by the prescription of the Gospel to convert, and with conversion presupposed, to believe, and to apply to themselves those evangelical promises.
9. They insist: That unbelief of which the question here is, is a sin; for it is opposed to a virtue, that is, to faith, and therefore is a vice; if however it is a sin, it is badly denied that it is in itself a meritorious cause of condemnation. I respond by distinguishing unbelief into privative and negative. Privative unbelief is when we do not believe those things which we are bound to believe; for this unbelief has an obligation to believe joined to it. For example, Heretics and other enemies of the Church are unfaithful with privative unbelief, because they do not believe those things which they are bound to believe; that is, because they do not believe those things which God testifies in His word to be true. Negative unbelief is the mere lack of faith, without an obligation to believe. For

example, those to whom the Gospel was never announced are unfaithful with this negative unbelief, because they are not bound to believe those things which they have never heard.

10. To apply this proposition, I assert that privative unbelief is a sin, or a vice, because it is privatively opposed to a virtue, that is, to faith; negative unbelief, however, is not a sin, because it is only contradictorily opposed to a virtue. But no one would say that all those things which are contradictorily opposed to a virtue have the character of a vice. The same is also proven from the saying of Christ: "if I had not spoken to them, they would not have sinned," viz., of this privative unbelief, by which they do not believe the Gospel, which was announced to them by me, and therefore which they are bound to believe. Whence Augustine, expounding that place, tractate 89 on John, testifies that those to whom the preaching of the Gospel has not reached are excused from the sin of unbelief, but are to be damned for other sins, for which they have no excuse, as being committed against the law of nature.
11. Therefore, the unbelief of the reprobate, by which they do not believe those things which the sacred Scripture testifies to be true, concerning the power of God, concerning His justice, and wrath against sin, concerning the beatitude of the saints, concerning the eternal misery of the reprobate, concerning the vileness of earthly things—this unbelief (I say) is privative, and is a sin properly so-called, because, namely, they do not believe those things which they are bound to believe. But the unbelief of the same, by which they do not believe that Christ died for them, is a negative unbelief; that is, a mere lack of faith, without an obligation to believe; for (as was said above) as long as they persist in their malice, they are rather bound to believe that the wrath of God remains upon them. This unbelief, therefore, considered in itself and separately, is not a sin, although insofar as it arises from a defect of conversion and repentance, it is truly and properly called a sin.

ART. XVI. Whether faith is a discursive assent? And whether the Papists use a circular discourse in establishing faith.

Assent is usually divided into simple, which they call Noetic, and Dianoetic or discursive. Simple assent is that by which our intellect assents to propositions clear in their own light, and manifest; such as these: "Every whole is greater than its part"; "Concerning anything, it is true to affirm or deny." For the truth of these propositions becomes known to the intellect at the first glance, as it were, through the apprehension of the terms, and not through any external medium notifying them. Discursive assent is when the intellect assents to propositions, not on account of their inherent evidence, but on account of the certainty, evidence, or probability of the medium by which the intellect is moved to assent.

2. To the question, therefore, proposed in the title, it is responded that the assent of faith is not simple, but discursive; because, namely, those propositions to which we assent through faith are not clear or manifest in their own light, nor do we assent to them on account of their inherent evidence, but on account of the authority of God, testifying in the sacred Scripture that they are true.
3. The discourse of faith is not inconveniently expressed by this syllogism: "Whatever God says is true. But God has said and dictated all that is extant in the Prophetic and Apostolic writings. Therefore, all those things are true." The major proposition of this syllogism is evidently proven from principles known by nature, that is, from metaphysical foundations, by which the truth and veracity of God are demonstrated; so that there is no ethnic philosopher who would dare to deny it. But if anyone is so absurd and mad as to deny this manifest truth, he should be met with whips; he deserves not the words of a philosopher, but the lashes of an executioner.
4. The minor proposition of the aforesaid syllogism cannot be proven by natural reason, and therefore it is necessary that its truth rest on other foundations. Here Papist and Evangelical theologians differ widely; for the former think that our faith, by which we believe the writings of the Prophets and Apostles to be the word of God, should be supported and established by the testimony of the Church. The latter, however, although they do not rashly reject the testimony of the Church, but embrace it reverently, yet do not suspend the truth of that minor proposition on it alone, but deduce it partly from the internal criteria (κρητήρια) of Scripture itself (that is, from the kind of doctrine, which is most wise, most holy, and everywhere consistent with itself; from the quality of the style, which is indeed simple and humble, but pure, unaffected, and befitting the divine Majesty; from the very operation of the speech, for it wonderfully affects the minds of men, and is in a certain Divine way efficacious in engendering faith and piety in the souls of men), and partly from the testimony of the Holy Spirit, sanctioning and sealing within the hearts of the pious the divine truth and authority of Scripture.
5. That process which the Papists use in proving the authority of Scripture is circular, and therefore not only useless, but also (as Tilenus says) foolish, and the offspring of a sophistical absurdity (ἁδολεσχίας). For when asked why they believe Scripture to be the word of God, they respond that they believe so because the Church, which is placed beyond all risk of erring, testifies to it. Again, when asked by what arguments they are persuaded of that inerrancy (ἁσφάλεια) of the Church, they respond that they believe this because Scripture testifies that the Church is the house of God, the bride of Christ, the pillar and foundation of truth. And so, having revolved from Scripture to the Church and from the Church to Scripture, they foist a circle upon us.

6. Stapleton, in order to avoid this circular progression, says that he believes the Church is directed into all truth by the Holy Spirit because the Holy Spirit effectively moves his intellect to believe it. But this escape can easily be blocked for Stapleton: first, because the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit is not to be separated from the written word, nor (as Tilenus rightly admonishes) should one long for vertiginous Enthusiasms; for the word is the norm and rule, to which the persuasions of our mind are to be examined, so that we may know that we are agitated by the Spirit of truth and wisdom, not by a spirit of vertigo and lies. Therefore, it is necessary for Stapleton to return eventually to Holy Scripture. Secondly, because for the assent of faith three things are required, as the most learned Richard Field excellently teaches in book 4 on the Church, chap. 7. First, the light of Divine intelligence, by which we apprehend and understand the things that are of God. Secondly, the Holy Spirit, who is the author of that illumination. Thirdly, the weight of the arguments by which the Spirit moves our intellect to assent. Therefore, we do not here ask Stapleton who is the author of that faith by which the infallibility of the Church is believed, nor by what light that infallibility is known, but by what means or arguments the Spirit persuades the intellect that the Church cannot err; that is, whether it persuades this by arguments from Scripture, or indeed taken from elsewhere.
7. This is the rock which Stapleton cannot sail past, unless with Durandus he takes refuge in what they call human reasons; that is, in arguments not taken from Scripture, but from elsewhere. And certainly there are not lacking those who try to patch up this delirium of Durandus, and as it were recall it from the underworld; saying that the faith by which the authority of the Church is believed rests on human reason, which dictates from appearances (these are Durandus's words) that a doctrine confirmed by so many signs, preserved by martyrs amidst so many tortures, is true; and therefore that the assembly of men professing this doctrine is the true Church of Christ. But this opinion is easily refuted: first, because this reasoning, although it seems to prove that this or that assembly is the true Church, does not however prove what they assert; namely, that the Church is placed beyond all risk of erring and deceiving. Secondly, because that reasoning is not certain and necessary, but probable; for it is from appearances, as Durandus himself admits, and therefore it cannot be the foundation of divine faith, which is a certain and firm assent.
8. Certain Papists, to avoid these inconveniences and absurdities, take refuge in the command of the will, which they say moves the intellect to believe that dogma of the infallibility of the Church without any reason or argument. This opinion rightly displeased Pico Mirandola, Cardinal Cambrai, and Durandus. First, because faith is an assent resting on testimony; therefore, that faith by which the infallibility of the Church is believed either rests on some testimony, or it is not faith. Secondly, no

one can assent to any doubtful proposition, unless either reason, or sense, or the testimony of someone worthy of belief teaches that it is true. Thirdly, the intellect cannot assent to any proposition unless it appears true to the intellect; but the mere command of the will cannot effect that a doubtful proposition appear true to the intellect: Therefore, it cannot effect that it assent, unless some reason or testimony is present.

9. Other Papists confess that the authority of Scripture is established through the infallibility of the Church, and in turn, the infallibility of the Church is proven by the authority of Scripture, but they assert that this progression is not a circle, but a regress; because, namely, it is not from the same to the same known in the same way. For first, when the authority of Scripture is proven from the infallibility of the Church, there is a progression from the infallibility of the Church, as from something more known and more evident to us, to that which is less known to us. Then, when the infallibility of the Church is proven from the authority of Scripture, there is a progression from that which is more known and prior by nature, to that which is less known and posterior in the order of nature.
10. This opinion is no less absurd than the preceding ones; because the Church and its infallibility, which the Papists attribute to it, are not only in the order of being, but also of knowing, less known than the word of God, as is clear from this reason: That which can be known from Scripture alone is, in the order of knowing, not more known, but less known than Scripture itself. But the Church and its infallibility can be known from Scripture alone. Therefore, etc. The major premise is manifest; the assumption is proven. The Church is nothing other than an assembly of men professing the true and sound doctrine about God and His works. But which assembly is such cannot be known except from Scripture; for that doctrine alone is true which is consonant with Holy Scripture. As for the infallibility of the Church, it becomes known to us either from natural reason (which no one will admit) or from testimony. Again, if from testimony, either from the testimony of God, or from the testimony of those men who are outside the Church, or from the testimony of the Church itself. Not from the testimony of the Church itself, because that is of no weight for those who are not yet persuaded of the authority of the Church; nor from the testimony of those who are outside the Church, because they cannot bear witness concerning the Church. Therefore, it is necessary that it become known from the testimony of God in the word, and therefore the word of God is also more known in the order of knowing than that infallibility which they assign to the Church.
11. Becanus, intending to evade the force of our argument, says that a circle is not committed when one thing is proven by another to someone who admits one and denies the other. For example (he says), a Calvinist admits Scripture, but denies the infallibility of the Church. I will therefore rightly convince him in this way: "The Scripture which you admit says the

Church is infallible: Therefore, it is truly infallible." Similarly, if some unlearned person admits the judgment of the Church, and yet does not know in particular that the Books of the Maccabees are divine, I will easily persuade him without a circle if I say thus: "The Church, whose authority you admit, asserts that the Books of the Maccabees are divine: Therefore, you should no longer doubt this matter." Thus far Becanus.

12. This escape of Becanus is nothing. For I ask of him, and the rest of the Papists, whence the divine authority of Scripture can be proven to one who attacks the entire Scripture, and consequently holds the Church to be an assembly of absurd and delirious men. For these two cohere necessarily and cannot be separated. For since the doctrine of Scripture and of the true Church is the same, it cannot happen that someone who denies the entire Scripture should acknowledge and believe the true Church. If they say that the canonical authority of the sacred codex is proven by no other means than by the authority of the Church, I will object, first, that the unknown is being proven by the equally unknown; for that person denies the authority of the Church no less than that of Scripture. Secondly, I will ask how the authority of the Church can be demonstrated to him? For it must be demonstrated either from the Scriptures or from elsewhere. Not from elsewhere, because the authority of the Church is built upon the Scriptures alone, as has already been proven. If recourse must be had to Scripture, the progression will be circular, for Scripture will be demonstrated by the Church, and in turn, the Church by Scripture.

ART. XVII. Whether knowledge is an act elicited from the habit of faith.

Robert Bellarmine says that faith is not knowledge, but assent; likewise, that faith is to be defined more by ignorance than by knowledge. The Evangelicals, however, reject this opinion of Bellarmine as absurd and pernicious, saying with Calvin, "The kingdom of heaven is entered not by ignorance nor the submission of our senses, but by a certain and explored knowledge." Meanwhile, they advise that by the knowledge which they attribute to faith, they do not mean the science of conclusions, acquired through the means of demonstrations from principles known in themselves; for such knowledge conflicts with the lack of evidence which we attribute to faith. They also advise that they do not eliminate degrees in the knowledge of sacred things, when they also call the faith of the unlearned knowledge; for they confess that greater knowledge is required in the teacher than in the student, in the Pastor than in the sheep. But they oppose that knowledge to the gross ignorance which the Papists adorn with the praises of implicit faith and blind obedience; namely, so as to foster an asinine stupor in the laity rather than Christian faith.

2. The certainty which all theologians attribute to faith easily overthrows and destroys this error of Bellarmine; for it, a threefold knowledge is required. The first is the knowledge by which we know who is speaking; that is, by which we know that the speech to which we assent is of God Himself, and not the speech of men. For no one assents to any proposition on account of the testimony of another, unless he knows for certain whose testimony it is, and whether he who bears testimony is worthy of belief. The second knowledge is that by which we know what he is speaking; that is, by which we correctly understand the word of God, and recognize the true sense of the words. For no one assents to speech which he does not understand. The third is the knowledge by which we know that those things which he speaks are true. The first and second knowledge are prerequisite antecedently, as they say, to the assent of faith; for the assent of faith presupposes them. The third knowledge is not prerequisite, but is required concomitantly, as they call it, for the assent of faith; for it is intrinsically and essentially included in the very act of assenting.
3. Since, therefore, a threefold knowledge is required for the assent of faith, as has now been proven, who does not see that Bellarmine absurdly contends that justifying faith is not knowledge, but simple assent and ignorance? Who will not wonder how so inept a dogma could have entered the mind of a learned man? Certainly, this error has been most pernicious to the Church: for hence gross ignorance and blindness have occupied the whole Papacy; hence human traditions, errors, superstitions, and lies have been brought into the Church; hence it is that the Papist Doctors highly praise that laughable faith of the charcoal-burner, as if it were spiritual wisdom.
4. I have not decided here to respond to the arguments of Bellarmine drawn from the Scriptures (for the consideration of them pertains to Theologians), but to his reason drawn from the nature of faith, the sum of which is this: a judgment resting on the testimony and authority of another is not knowledge; but faith is such a judgment: Therefore. The major premise of this syllogism is most false, as is clear from what has already been said. For although such a judgment is not evident and scientific knowledge, it ought not for that reason to be called ignorance rather than knowledge.

ART. XVIII. Whether trust is an act of faith.

Orthodox theologians do not speak in the same way about the trust of the saints militant on earth. For some of them call trust the form and specific act of faith, while others call it the effect and consequent of faith. This diversity of speech, indeed, arises from the different way of taking this word, as will be clear to anyone who considers their words more diligently.

2. Therefore, so that this disputation may be clear and perspicuous, I will enumerate four significations of this word, and I will show that trust, taken in the first way, is a true and properly so-called act of justifying faith.

Trust, in the first way, is taken for a firm persuasion, or for a certain and stable judgment of the intellect, by which we conclude within ourselves, and because of God's testimony in His word believe, that our Lord Jesus Christ has redeemed us with His precious blood, and that God the Father for the sake of His merit has remitted all our sins; and that the same, for the sake of that merit of Christ and the sacrifice offered on the cross, will deliver us from all the miseries and calamities of this life, and will finally gift us with the eternity of that ineffable glory.

Secondly, it is taken for an internal acquiescence in the divine benevolence and grace, by which we depend entirely on it, not expecting help and salvation from elsewhere.

Thirdly, for a spiritual fortitude and courage, by which we oppose the sinews and strength of our soul to those evils and perils, whether temporal or spiritual, with which we struggle in this valley of tears.

Fourthly, for the peace, tranquility, and as it were serenity of conscience, or spiritual security, which (as the Scholastics say) implies rest from servile fear.

3. Trust, taken in the first way, regards the truth of the evangelical promises, and assents to them. Trust, taken in the second way, regards the goodness of the promising God, and rests upon it. Trust, taken in the third way, regards the perils and miseries of this life, and courageously opposes itself to them. Trust, taken in the fourth way, regards the Book of conscience, and reads it with joy.
4. Trust, taken in the first way, is the basis and foundation of the three following: because we apply the evangelical promises to ourselves with firm persuasion and a certain judgment of the mind, therefore we acquiesce in the benevolence and mercy of God; therefore we fight bravely against the world, Satan, and our own flesh; therefore, finally, we have a tranquil and serene conscience.
5. These things being established, the first question proposed in the title is answered with two assertions. The first is this: trust taken in the second,

third, or fourth way is not an act of faith, but is an effect and consequent of faith. The second asserts: trust taken in the first way is a true and properly so-called act of salvific faith; indeed, it is its principal and specific act, for it distinguishes salvific faith from the other kinds of faith. The first assertion is manifest and needs no proof. The latter is proven by this reasoning:

A firm, certain persuasion, resting on God's testimony, concerning the remission of my sins and the attainment of eternal life, is a true act of faith.

But trust taken in the first way is such a persuasion.

Therefore, it is a true act of faith.

The minor premise of this syllogism is manifest; the major is also easily confirmed, because every persuasion resting on the testimony of another is faith, as is clear from what has been said in article 2 of this exercise.

6. The Papists will respond that there is no firm persuasion of the remission of sins in the minds of the faithful, and therefore the subject of that major proposition is a mere fiction, and a non-being. Their reason is that in the word of God, salvation is never found announced to me or to him in particular. But this response is frivolous and manifestly false. For first, Bellarmine himself, in Book 1 on justification, Chap. 10, admits that salvation was announced in particular to a certain few, as to the paralytic, to whom it was said in Matt. 9, "Take heart, son, your sins are forgiven you"; and to the sinful woman, of whom it was said in Luke 7, "her many sins are forgiven, because she loved much"; likewise to the adulteress, John 8; to Zacchaeus, Luke 19; and to the thief, Luke 23. The persuasion of these, therefore, concerning the remission of sins was a true and properly so-called act of faith, because, namely, it rested on the testimony of God himself. But the persuasion of these was trust taken in the first way. Therefore, trust taken in the first way is an act of faith.
7. Secondly, although in the word of God salvation is not found expressly announced to me and to you in particular, yet from the word it is evidently deduced that God wills to remit sins to me, to you, and to each of the believers, and to give eternal life. The syllogism of this deduction can be formed thus:

Everyone who believes in the Son has remission of sins and eternal life: John 3, Acts 13, and Rom. 3.

But I believe in the Son.

Therefore, I have remission of sins and eternal life.

Bellarmino objects that the major premise of that syllogism is most certain, because it is found in Holy Scripture; but the minor is not in the Word of God, but in our opinion, which is fallacious and conjectural. I respond that our persuasion of the truth of the minor rests on those places of Holy Scripture in which true faith is distinguished from dead faith, and the infallible signs and indications of true faith are proposed, and therefore it is not a conjectural opinion, but a firm and certain knowledge, established by the testimony of God himself in His word.

8. Someone will insist: The faithful can know from the word of God what the signs and distinguishing marks (γνωρίσματα) of true faith are; but whether they themselves have these signs, they cannot know with certain knowledge, but only conjecturally. I respond that this is most false: first, because it would then follow that those signs of true faith are proposed in vain in sacred Scripture. For an indication of a thing is proposed in vain, if the thing itself cannot become known through that indication; that is, if the indication is as obscure and doubtful as the thing itself to be notified by that indication. Secondly, because this dogma attributes a remarkable stupor and lack of perception (αναισθησίαν) to the faithful. For if someone were to see with his physical eyes and not know for certain that he sees; if someone likewise had knowledge of physical things and did not know for certain, but only conjectured that he had knowledge of them, he would be considered foolish and stupid. By the same token, if those who believe in God do not perceive and certainly know that they believe, they suffer from a miserable stupor.
9. Thirdly: The Spirit of God testifies together with our spirit that we are children of God, and consequently that we have true faith, Rom. 8, verse 16. From which testimony a most valid argument against the aforesaid instance of the Papists can be formed thus:

Whatever the Spirit of God testifies, that is true, and we can be persuaded of its truth.

But the Spirit of God testifies together with our spirit that we are children of God, and therefore have the indications of true faith.

Therefore, etc.

Bellarmino, seeking to evade the force of this argument, says that the testimony of the Spirit of God sometimes begets a certainty that is only conjectural. This response is unworthy of refutation, for it is impious and contemptuous towards God, as it accuses the Spirit of God of fallaciousness and ambiguity.

10. Fourthly: Moral philosophers, speaking of civil happiness, condemn the opinion of Plotinus, who asserted that a man can be happy and not perceive that he is such. Therefore, Orthodox theologians, speaking of the

spiritual happiness of Christians (which is situated in the exercise of the theological virtues), rightly condemn the error of Bellarmine, who in the third book on justification so often asserts that those who are adorned with spiritual happiness cannot have a certain persuasion of their happiness.

11. Piccolomini, in *Civil Philosophy*, refutes the error of Plotinus with three reasons, which, if applied to this proposition, overthrow and destroy the opinion of Bellarmine. His words are these: "First, happiness is situated in action; but action is not hidden from the agent, and especially because the excellence of the action is situated in choice; but choice is conspicuous to the one choosing. Moreover, happiness is accompanied by joy; but he is not filled with joy, nor does his soul rest, who does not notice that he is happy. Furthermore, in happiness nothing diminished should be found; but the condition of that man would be greatly diminished who was happy and did not perceive himself to be happy, for in that way even a stone could be happy."

ART. XIX. Whether trust is an act of the intellect, and how it differs from assent.

Bellarmino tries to prove that trust is not an act of faith, with an argument taken from its subject; because, namely, faith pertains to the intellect, but trust to the will. This reason is weak on two counts: first, because faith, although it exists subjectively in the intellect alone, as Tilenus teaches, in truth also pertains to the will. Secondly, because trust, which in Greek is called confidence (πεποίθησις) and full assurance (πληροφορία), exists formally in the intellect alone. But so that this may be understood, I will propose some foundations, which in my judgment have no small utility for establishing our opinion and confuting the opinion of our adversary.

2. The first foundation: the faithful or reborn apply the merit of Christ and the mercy of God to themselves not by one, but by two acts. The prior act exists in the intellect, and is a certain persuasion, or judgment of the mind resting on God's testimony, by which we conclude within ourselves that our Savior Jesus Christ has most fully satisfied for our sins, and consequently that not only to others, but also to us, the remission of sins, eternal justice, and life have been given, and that freely, out of God's mercy, for the sake of the merit of Christ alone. The posterior applicative act of grace exists in the will, for it is an ardent love by which the will embraces the grace and favor of God, earnestly seeking a more perfect sense of that grace in this life, and a clear vision of God in the life to come.
3. The second foundation: Both acts are required for trust. For no one can be said to be confident, or to have trust in obtaining a good, unless he has both a firm persuasion in the intellect and a desire or love for that good in the will. Tilenus explains this excellently, saying that the object of salvific

faith is divine truth, not only as it narrates something, but especially as it promises something, where it is not enough to assent to the narration as true, but it is necessary to embrace the thing offered, which certainly pertains to the will.

4. The third foundation: the prior act is the very essence or formal reason of trust; the posterior, however, is only an act annexed to it and concomitant. And therefore, trust is formally in the intellect, although it has an annexed desire of the will. This assertion is proven, first, because the opposite of trust, namely diffidence, is in the intellect: Therefore, trust itself is in the intellect. The reason for the antecedent is that the diffidence by which someone is said to distrust himself, or his affairs, does not signify hatred or aversion of the will, but either doubt about his powers, or a persuasion of his weakness, which undoubtedly pertain to the intellect. Secondly, because if trust were formally an act of the will, it would be nothing other than desire or love of the object. But this is contrary to daily experience: for many ardently seek and desire some object who do not have trust in obtaining it.
5. First objection: If trust is an act of the intellect, the whole of salvific faith will exist in the intellect. I respond with Tilenus, that the whole of faith, by reason of its essence, is in the intellect, as in its proper subject, although energetically (*ἐνεργητικῶς*) it is in the will, insofar as it moves and affects it. But more on this question later in Art. 21.
6. Second objection: If trust is in the intellect, it does not differ from assent. But this is repugnant to the doctrine of all the Orthodox, who distinguish these two in faith: assent and trust. I respond that trust, taken in the first way, and assent differ as the universal and the particular; but trust, taken in the second, third, or fourth way, differs from assent by an essential distinction, for they are acts of the mind of different species. I say that trust taken in the first way differs from assent as the universal and the particular: because assent, which theologians call the second act of faith, is a certain general act by which the intellect assents to the whole word of God, that is, both to the law and to the Gospel. But trust is a certain particular and applicative assent, having for its object first the evangelical promises, and second, the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. For by trust we both assent to the doctrine of the Gospel, and to the testimony of the Spirit of God, testifying together with our spirit that we are children of God. And thus we apply to ourselves the evangelical promises, certainly concluding and judging that we are children of God, and therefore that those promises were made not only to other believers, but also to us in particular.
7. Third objection: We embrace and apply to ourselves the promises of grace through the will alone. Therefore, trust, which is the applicative act of faith, pertains to the will alone. I respond that the application of grace is made both by an act of the intellect and by an act of the will (as was said

above), but principally by the act of the intellect; for I apply the promise of grace more to myself by judging and certainly concluding that it pertains to me, than by seeking and desiring the promised grace.

8. Fourth objection: No Orthodox theologian has ever said that trust is an assent or a judgment of the mind. Therefore, that opinion is not to be tolerated. I respond: First, the doctrine about the faculty or power of the soul in which trust is situated is not a dogma of faith. For whether we state that it is in the intellect or in the a will, it matters little, provided that, having rejected the error of the Papists concerning the uncertainty of justice, we say that it is a true act of faith. I respond: Secondly, that Orthodox theologians, when they say that trust is in the will, are speaking of trust taken in the second, third, or fourth way. I respond: Thirdly, that certain most learned men assert that trust is a certain assent or judgment of the intellect. For Zanchius says that trust and salvific faith are the same, and he defines salvific faith thus: "Justifying faith is a firm and indubitable assent, etc." He also defines trust thus: "Trust is a most certain persuasion of the truth of the promises, etc." But assent and persuasion pertain to the intellect, as is manifest to anyone. Polanus also, in his *Syntagma Theologicum*, says that trust is a full and certain persuasion, free from doubt and dispute, and so on; and in the second book of his *Partitiones Theologicae*, he says that special or salvific faith is the internal worship of God when we assent to the evangelical promises.
9. But if someone stubbornly condemns this opinion as new and previously unheard of, I will ask him to which act of faith he thinks that applicative judgment of the intellect, of which we are speaking, should be referred: whether he refers it to knowledge, to assent, or indeed to trust. This particular and applicative judgment cannot be referred to the preceding knowledge or to the general assent, for the object of those acts is the whole word of God. Therefore, it ought to be referred to trust, and consequently, trust pertains to the intellect; for this judgment is an act of the intellect.

ART. XX. Whether the object of salvific faith is the remission of sins already obtained? Or whether it is the remission of sins to be obtained? Where, by the way, the principal argument of Bellarmine against the object and nature of justifying faith is solved.

1. The act of salvific faith, which is the instrumental cause of justification, does not seem to be the trust of pardon or remission of sins obtained, but the trust of pardon to be obtained. First, because the instrumental cause of justification precedes justification, or the remission of sins; but the trust of pardon or remission obtained follows it; otherwise, it would be convicted of being false, because to believe that sins are remitted to oneself, which

are not yet remitted but are to be remitted by the very act of believing, is to have a false and erroneous judgment.

2. Secondly, because the persuasion about a thing done is always by nature posterior to the thing itself being done, and therefore it cannot be the instrumental cause of the thing itself being done. The reason for the antecedent is that every object is by nature prior to its act, for the act depends on the object and presupposes it. The reason for the consequence is also that what is by nature posterior cannot be the cause of that which is by nature prior, since every cause is by nature prior to its effect. These two reasons are brought by Bellarmine, in the first book on justification, chapter ten, but in vain, for they do nothing for his opinion, as will soon be clear.
3. The third reason is this: If someone asks what a sinner must believe in order to obtain the remission of sins, I will not respond appropriately if I say that he must believe that his sins are already remitted. For it is ridiculous to say to someone, "so that this may be done, believe that it has been done," because when I say, "believe this has been done," I indicate that it has already been done, whereas when I say, "so that it may be done," I indicate that it has not yet been done, but is only possible. But these things cannot stand together.
4. The fourth reason is this: Whoever prays to God to remit his sins, confident that he is one of the number for whom Christ died, and that God will hear his prayers for Christ's sake, will undoubtedly obtain remission of sins. Therefore, no necessity compels us to assert that the act of salvific faith which is the instrumental cause of justification is the trust of pardon obtained.
5. Meanwhile, I am not so absurd as to think that the faithful do not have such a trust of pardon obtained through the merit of Christ, or to think that this trust is not an act of salvific faith. In truth, it is an act of salvific faith, but by nature posterior to justification, and something consequent to it; and therefore it is not that act of faith which is the instrumental cause of our justification.

Therefore, concerning the object of salvific faith, these things are to be held: First, it must be held that the object of trust is not only the remission of sins to be obtained, but also the remission of the same already obtained. Secondly, that trust tends towards these two through two distinct acts, one of which precedes justification, as its instrumental cause, and the other follows it, as its effect and consequent. Thirdly, that the fiducial act which precedes justification as its cause is the persuasion of Christ's satisfaction for us in particular and of the remission of sins to be obtained through and on account of His satisfaction. Fourthly, the fiducial act which follows justification is the persuasion of the remission of sins already obtained, and of our perseverance in that state until the end of life.

6. I embraced this opinion about the object of salvific faith when I first began to devote myself to theology, but I held it suspect because of its novelty, and therefore I had condemned it to perpetual darkness. But in this very year, while I was reading the most learned animadversions and castigations of David Pareus on Volume 4 of Bellarmine, I found plainly the same thing in him, in Book 1 on justification, Chap. 10. Wherefore it happened that, supported and fortified by the testimony of so great a man, I have not been afraid to publish this opinion.
7. From these things, it is clear that the second reason brought by Bellarmine against the object of salvific faith, in Book 1 on justification, Chap. 10, is of no strength or weight. For he argues thus: "Justifying faith ought to precede justification. But the faith of special mercy follows it. Therefore, the faith of special mercy is not justifying faith." I respond to the proposition: Justifying faith precedes justification, but not according to all its acts, for some acts of justifying faith follow justification, as has been said. Similarly, I respond to the assumption: The faith of special mercy is posterior to justification, but not according to all its acts. For the persuasion of pardon or remission of sins to be obtained is an act of that faith which they call the trust of special mercy, and that, however, precedes justification, at least in the order of nature.

ART. XXI. In what way faith pertains to the will.

Guilielmus Estius says that faith is partly of the intellect and partly of the will: of the intellect, indeed, as its subject and proper power, for believing itself, or assenting, is an act of the cognitive part; but of the will, because it depends on it as on a commanding and consenting principle. "For since," he says, "it is proper to the human mind to discuss by reason and to examine whether assent should be given to proposed matters or not, and those things which pertain to religion are for the most part such that they do not admit of the examination of reason, being for the most part improbable to the judgment of human wisdom, as the Apostle teaches in 1 Corinthians chap. 1, verse 18, surely our intellect would never, or rarely, acquiesce in matters of this kind unless it were led into assent by the command and inclination of the will, and, as the Apostle says, 2 Corinthians chap. 10, brought into captivity in obedience to Christ. Therefore, this benign inclination of the will is necessary for the intellect in believing, both so that it may turn itself to those reasons which engender and nourish faith, or at least show that what is believed is not absurd, and so that it may reject those which can impede or delay assent. Whence it is said of Abraham, Rom. 4, that he did not consider his own body, now dead. Thus the assent of faith is consequently also an act of the will, namely, commanded by the will, both as to its beginning and as to its continuation." Thus far Estius.

2. Daniel Tilenus says that salvific faith is subjectively in the intellect alone, but energetically (ἐνεργητικῶς) or effectively it pertains to the will, insofar as

it moves and affects it, just as the knowledge by which we distinguish good from evil is subjectively in the mind, but pertains to the will effectively when it commands or elicits actions which reason dictates. This opinion differs from that of Estius because it does not refer faith to the will by reason of its origin, but by reason of the fruit which the will derives from the direction of faith; for the illumination of faith in the mind is followed by the renewal and softening of the will.

3. David Pareus says that faith, not only effectively but also subjectively, is in the will, at least with regard to its final act, namely, trust. For although knowledge and assent are in the intellect alone, trust, according to his opinion, is formally in the will, as in its subject.
4. Having proposed the variety of opinions, I will set forth my own mind in some assertions. The first is this: one should not dispute anxiously about the subject of faith. For whether we say it is in the intellect or in the will as in a subject, our opinion, which asserts that the trust of special mercy is an act of faith, will suffer no harm. Someone will say: Bellarmine concludes from this that trust is not an act of faith, because trust pertains to the will, and faith to the intellect. I respond that Bellarmine indeed asserts, but has not yet proven, that trust is an act of the will, see Art. 19.
5. Second assertion: faith is in the intellect alone properly, subjectively, and with respect to its essence, as Tilenus says. The reason for this assertion is that not only knowledge and assent, but also trust, exists in the intellect, as was proven in the preceding article. Therefore, the whole of faith is in the intellect.
6. Third assertion: although faith exists in the intellect alone as in a subject, it should not for that reason be thought that the habit of faith is speculative and, as it were, idle; both because its end is action (*πρᾶξις*), for it "works through charity," Gal. 5, verse 6, and because it pertains to the will in various ways, although it does not exist in it properly and subjectively. And hence it is that in Holy Scripture faith is often attributed to the heart, as in Rom. 10, verse 9 and 10, "If you believe in your heart," etc., and "With the heart one believes unto justice," etc.
7. Fourth assertion: Faith pertains to the will, first by reason of its origin, second by reason of its annexed act, third by reason of the fruits which are born from faith in the will. It pertains to it by reason of origin, because our intellect is moved to assent and brought into captivity by the pious inclination and command of the will. Whence the assent of faith is wont to be called an act commanded by the will, and also to be denominated a voluntary and free act, namely because it depends on a freely acting principle, that is, on the will. And hence it is that Augustine said, "no one believes unless he is willing." Faith also pertains to the will by reason of an annexed and concomitant act, for in that very instant in which faith in the intellect assents to the evangelical promises and applies them to itself by a certain and stable judgment, the will embraces the grace and favor of God

with ardent love. Finally, it pertains to it by reason of its fruits and operations, because (as has been said) the illumination of faith in the mind is followed by the sanctification and softening of the will.

ART. XXII. Whether Charity is the form of faith.

Durandus, in Book 2 of the Sentences, dist. 23, quest. 8, disputes on both sides of this controversy. And first, he proves that Charity is not the form of faith, for two reasons. The first reason is: Because the form and that of which it is the form exist in the same subject, but Faith and Charity are in different subjects, for Faith is in the intellect, whereas Charity is in the will. Therefore, Charity is not the form of Faith. The second reason is that Charity is neither the essential form of Faith, nor the accidental one. Therefore, it is in no way its form. He proves the antecedent thus: Faith can exist without Charity, therefore Charity is not its essential form. Also, Charity is nobler and more excellent than Faith. Therefore, it is not its accidental form.

2. Then he proves that Charity is the form of Faith, because that through which something lives and operates is its form. But Faith operates through Charity, Gal. 5, verse 6. It also lives through it, because without the works of charity, faith is dead, James 2, verse 26. Therefore, Charity is the form of Faith.
3. To resolve this question, Durandus uses a distinction, saying that the habit of Faith can be considered in two ways: namely, according to its natural being, that is, according to its essence; and according to its meritorious being, that is, insofar as it merits eternal life. According to the first consideration, he says that the form of Faith is not Charity, as the two arguments proposed in the first assertion prove. But according to the latter, he thinks Charity is rightly called the form of Faith, and this is because the act of Faith is not meritorious unless insofar as it is commanded by Charity, without which it does not have the character of merit.
4. From this distinction of Durandus, I gather two things. First, that ours do not proceed correctly against the Papists when they prove that Charity is not the form of Faith with arguments taken either from the essential diversity of Faith and Charity, or from the priority of origin by which Faith precedes Charity in the order of nature, or from the fact that Faith directs Charity and Charity obeys Faith, etc. For these arguments are not *ad hominem*, as they say, for they prove nothing other than what the Papists concede, viz., that Charity is not the form of Faith with respect to its natural being.
5. Second, I gather that the doctrine of Durandus and other Papists about the form of Faith should be rejected and exploded, because it rests on that most absurd and most dangerous dogma about the merits of Faith and of good works, the falsity of which our theologians most evidently

demonstrate in the controversy on justification, and that for four principal reasons: first, because those works, insofar as they are good, are not ours, that is, the goodness of those works is to be ascribed not to us, but to God. Second, because those works are owed. Third, because nothing accrues to God from them. Fourth, because they have no analogy to the reward, which is eternal life.

6. The argument of the Papists, taken from the operation of Faith through Charity, is most easily solved. For the principal agent operates not only through its form, but also through its faculties and through its instruments. And therefore, that consequence is to be denied: "Faith operates through Charity, therefore Charity is the form of Faith." No less inept is that consequence: "Faith without the works of Charity is dead, therefore Charity is the form of Faith." For if that inference were good, it would follow that the head or heart of a man is his form, and this because a man cannot live without a head or a heart.

ART. XXIII. Whether Religion is a Theological virtue distinct from Faith.

Thomas Aquinas, treating of Religion, asserts a threefold notation of it, or reason of the name (λόγον ὀνόματος). The first is that by which Religion is said to come from *Religendo* (re-reading), because those who are religious frequently reconsider and, as it were, re-read those things which pertain to divine worship. The second is that by which religion is said to come from *Reeligendo* (re-electing), because we ought to re-elect God, whom we had lost through negligence. The third is that by which religion is derived from *Religando* (binding back), because it binds us back, or joins us anew, to almighty God. "But whether," says Thomas, "religion is named from frequent re-reading, or from the repeated election of that which was lost through negligence, or from re-binding, religion properly implies an order to God. For He is the one to whom we ought principally to be bound, as to an unfailing beginning; to whom also our election ought to be constantly directed, as to an ultimate end, whom we also lose by sinning negligently, and whom we ought to recover by believing and professing the faith." Thus St. Thomas.

2. Religion is thus defined by St. Thomas: "Religion is that which offers due worship to God." By Zanchius it is thus explained: "It is a virtue situated in the true worship of the true God, both external and, indeed, especially internal." By Polanus it is thus described: "Religion is a virtue instilled or infused into our souls by God through the Holy Spirit, by which, being made religious and pious, we rightly acknowledge and worship God, that is, according to His will revealed in the Prophetic and Apostolic writings." Finally, by Tilenus it is explained with this description: "Religion is the observance of the ceremonies and rites prescribed by God." This description of Tilenus differs from the preceding ones in this, that it does

not assign a sufficiently ample object to religion; for it says that it is concerned with the rites and ceremonies prescribed by God, when, however, it is certain that religion is principally concerned with internal worship.

3. Bellarmine defines Religion thus: "Religion is a state of men, tending to Christian perfection through the vows of poverty, continence, and obedience." But this definition is very inept, for as St. Thomas says, religion is a certain virtue or habit of the mind, and therefore it is not rightly called a state of men, etc.
4. From the first three descriptions of Religion, it is clear that it is the right reason for worshipping God, or a habit directive of those actions by which we worship and venerate God. For since our corrupt nature is prone to conceiving erroneous opinions about God and to following false reasons for worshipping Him, our worship cannot be pleasing and acceptable to God unless we are endowed with some directive habit, by the benefit of which we may rightly acknowledge and worship God.
5. It is usually asked whether this directive habit is a moral virtue or a theological one. St. Thomas says that Religion is a moral virtue, and Daniel Tilenus embraces his opinion. In opposition, however, Zanchius and others say that Religion is a virtue instilled or infused into our souls by God through His Spirit, and therefore is to be numbered among the theological virtues; for the moral or ethical virtues are not infused by God, but are acquired by the frequent repetition of good actions.
6. I will propose the determination of this question in three assertions, and then I will solve the two principal arguments which can be brought to the contrary. The first assertion is this: that virtue by whose benefit we rightly acknowledge and worship God cannot be acquired by the powers of nature, but is immediately infused by God. This, however, is proven manifestly, because as Tilenus himself teaches, the light of nature is not sufficient for rightly knowing God, much less for duly worshipping Him; and therefore there is need for a certain supernatural habit, which may be regulative and directive of our veneration.
7. Second assertion: Religion is not a virtue really distinct from Faith; for the definition of religion befits Faith. This, however, is shown thus: Faith is a habit directive and regulative of our adoration, by which we adore and worship God. Therefore, faith is Religion. The reason for the antecedent is that through Faith we know what worship is pleasing to God, and how that worship is to be rendered to God.
8. Third assertion: The knowledge of the divine will, which we have from the word of God, can be considered in two ways: first, insofar as it is knowledge or assent resting on the testimony of God in His word. Second, insofar as it is directive or regulative knowledge of our actions by which we worship God. This knowledge, considered in the former way, is called faith; but insofar as it is considered in the latter way, it is called religion,

and therefore faith does not differ from religion in reality, but only in reason.

9. Against this opinion it is objected, first, that Religion is not a theological virtue, because the object of a theological virtue is God Himself, whereas the object of religion is the worship of God, or as others say, that which is offered to God, namely, sacrifices, fasts, prayers. I respond that the theological virtues are to be estimated not so much from their object as from their origin; for those virtues are to be called infused, or theological, which cannot be acquired by our labor and industry, but are immediately infused by God. Secondly, I respond that Religion, insofar as it is the same in reality with faith, has for its object God Himself; for the object of faith, as all admit, is God Himself.
10. Second objection: Religion is not a supernatural virtue, because it has its origin from the dictate of human reason; for that a divine power is to be worshipped in some way (says Tilenus) is received by the consent and custom of all, even the most savage, nations. I respond that Religion is not the general knowledge by which we know that a divine power is to be worshipped in some way, but the distinct knowledge by which we know that God is to be worshipped in this particular way; that is, that this worship and not another is pleasing and acceptable to God. This knowledge, however, cannot have its origin from the dictate of human reason, as is manifest to anyone.

ART. XXIV. It is shown that the Theology of Wayfarers is to be taken in three ways; it is proven that Theology, taken in the first way, is not a habit really distinct from Faith.

There is a great variety of speech and a wonderful divergence of opinions in this controversy about the nature of the Theology of Wayfarers. For first, St. Thomas, and with him many other Sententiary theologians, state that Theology is a science, with whom Dudley Fenner also agrees. Secondly, Durandus, Canus, and Andreas Vega assert that Theology does not differ in reality from the habit of faith. Thirdly, Keckermann says that it is prudence. Fourthly, the most distinguished Junius, Trelcatius, Polanus, Tilenus, and our Scharpius affirm that it is wisdom. Fifthly, Balthasar Meisner says that Theology cannot be defined by a more special and proper genus than by a God-given (θεόδοτον) habit.

2. Although this controversy is treated by the Scholastics in the prologue of the first book of the sentences, in reality it is more philosophical than theological. For it is the business of philosophers to consider the different kinds of habits and from that class of habits to derive the genus of any particular habit.
3. Therefore, so that this controversy may be more lucidly determined, it must be held, first, that Theology is taken in three ways, as Durandus rightly admonishes. For first, it is taken for the habit by which we assent to

the whole of sacred Scripture on account of the authority of God. Secondly, for the habit by which we assent to theological conclusions deduced from sacred Scripture. Thirdly, for the defensive and explanatory habit of the articles of faith, which is usually called the Theology of the Doctors, or Scholastic Theology.

4. Secondly, it must be held that every habit of the mind is either a habit of knowing, or a habit of believing, or a habit of opining. The reason for this division is that the variety of habits arises from the diversity of the acts to which those habits refer and are ordered. But the acts to which all intellectual habits are ordered are three: namely, the act of believing, the act of knowing, and the act of opining, and therefore there are three kinds of habits of our mind.
5. Thirdly, it must be held that the habit of knowing, insofar as it is opposed to the habits of believing and opining, comprises under itself those 5 kinds of habits which are enumerated by Aristotle in the 6th book of the Ethics. For here the habit of knowing is taken broadly, for any certain and evident habitual knowledge, whether it be of necessary and speculable things, or of contingent and operable things. Such knowledge, however, is discerned not only in the speculative disciplines, but also in the practical ones. For those who are endowed with the habit of Prudence, or moral Philosophy, do not opine or believe, but certainly and evidently know that the actions of liberality are honorable, and the actions of the vices opposed to it are base and dishonorable. Likewise, those who are skilled in some art do not opine or believe, but certainly know that their artifacts are to be made in this or that way; for their knowledge is experimental, and therefore is certain and evident. But certain and evident knowledge is not opinion or faith, but science, as is clear from what was said in the first article.
6. These things being established, the question proposed in the title is answered with four Assertions. The first is this: None of the Aristotelian habits can be the genus of Theology taken in the first way. First, because all those habits are habits of knowing, as has just been said. Likewise, all those habits were invented and cultivated by the cleverness of men, or deduced from principles known by nature. Theology, however, is not a habit of knowing, but of believing, as will soon be clear. Likewise, it is not a habit invented by the cleverness of men, or God-given, for its principle is not human reason, but divine revelation.
7. Secondly: If we specifically run through all those habits, we will see that Theology is contained under none of them. For first, Theology is not an art, because it is not an effective habit. It is not prudence, because that is a virtue directive of civil actions; for it is "a practical state concerned with what is good for man" (ἐξῆς πρακτικὴ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ), Book 6 of the Ethics, chap. 5. But Theology is a virtue directive of spiritual actions. It is not intellect, because it is not concerned with principles known by nature,

clear in their own light. It is not science, both because it is not a demonstrative habit, and because it does not rest in cognition, but orders and directs it to operation. It is not, finally, wisdom, because wisdom is a certain science, for it is "intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge" (νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη). But Theology, as has been said, is not a science.

8. The second assertion is this: Theology taken in the first way, that is, taken for the habit by which we assent to the whole of Scripture on account of the authority of God, is nothing other than divine faith. This assertion is proven: first, because faith is the habit of assenting on account of the authority of God, but Theology taken in the first way is such a habit: Therefore, it is faith. Secondly, the theologian, as theologian, does not opine, because his knowledge is certain, whereas opinion is uncertain; he does not properly know, because science is evident knowledge. But the theological knowledge of wayfarers is not evident, but enigmatic. Therefore, the theologian, as such, believes; and consequently, Theology is faith.
9. Third assertion: Although the historical faith of the wicked, by which they assent to Scripture, can in some way be called Theology, because it is knowledge of God and of divine things, yet only the salvific faith of the elect, by which they both assent to sacred Scripture and, by assenting, apply the evangelical promises to themselves, deserves the name of Theology. The reason for this assertion is that true Theology is not a speculative habit, but a practical one, as will be proven later. But the theology of the impious is inefficacious and idle, not active. Someone may ask: In what is that action (πρᾶξις) which is the end of Theology situated? I respond that it is situated in our gratitude towards God for that singular benefit of our redemption; that is, in the acknowledgment, preaching, and celebration of the clemency of God, who so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, etc. Likewise, in the celebration of the divine wisdom, justice, and omnipotence. But no one can perform these things unless he has in his heart that applicative persuasion and trust concerning the remission of sins, of which we have spoken above; whence it is manifestly clear that true and salutary Theology is rightly called salvific faith.
10. Fourth assertion: Balthasar Meisner errs when he says that the proximate genus of Theology is a God-given habit (θεόδοτον); for it is only its remote genus. This assertion is proven manifestly: because, as has now been declared, true Theology in its first signification is in reality the habit of salvific faith. But the proximate genus of salvific faith is divine faith in general, as it comprises under itself historical, temporary, miraculous, and salvific faith. Its remote genus, however, is a God-given habit (θεόδοτος), that is, infused by God, which contains under itself Faith, Hope, and Charity.

ART. XXV. It is proven, against Antonius Ruvius, that Theology taken in the second way is not a science, but divine faith.

Certain Papist theologians assert with us that Theology, taken for the habit by which we assent to sacred Scripture, is rightly called divine faith; but Theology taken for the habit of conclusions deduced from Scripture, they call not faith, but science, because it rests proximately not on authority, but on evident discourse. Antonius Ruvius explains and defends this opinion excellently.

2. If you object to these theologians that science is evident knowledge, but the habit of theological conclusions is inevident knowledge, they will respond that evidence is of the essence of naturally acquired science, which alone Aristotle defined; but that it does not befit supernatural science, namely Theology, which they admit to be an imperfect science on account of its defect of evidence.
3. But this response is not satisfactory. Since science, generally taken, agrees with faith in firmness and certainty, and is distinguished from it by evidence alone, it should doubtless be said that a habit which lacks evidence, provided certainty and firmness befit it, should be referred not to science, but to faith; for it was said above that faith is a certain and inevident assent. Besides, if the habit of theological conclusions deduced from Scripture is a certain and inevident habit, "the substance of things not seen" (ὁπόστασις τῶν ἐ βλεπομένων), and therefore is divine faith. But the former is true, as Ruvius himself admits; therefore also the latter.
4. Others respond that the knowledge of theological conclusions is in fact evident. For this being posited, that all those things which are contained in Holy Scripture are true, it follows evidently and perspicuously that the conclusions deduced from Scripture are true. But those who respond thus do not notice that for the evidence of knowledge more is required than that the conclusion to which we assent be evidently inferred from its premises or principles; for besides this it is also required that the premises from which it is inferred be evident, that is, that they be known, not indeed believed.
5. This assertion is proven: Because if the knowledge of conclusions drawn from Holy Scripture is evident because those conclusions are evidently and perspicuously collected from Scripture, by the same token the knowledge of conclusions evidently and perspicuously drawn from probable premises, about which we only have an opinion, ought to be called evident. But this is manifestly absurd, for the knowledge of conclusions drawn from probable and opinable premises is uncertain, and consequently also inevident.
6. Furthermore, the falsity of the aforesaid opinion is clear from this, that to believe is not only to assent to a testimony on account of the authority of the testifier, that is, to assent to some narration on account of the dignity of the narrator, but also to assent to a conclusion deduced from that

testimony on account of that testimony. For he who assents to some truth deduced from a testimony, on account of the testimony from which it is deduced, is not properly said to know, but to believe the matter to be so. And this is because the foundation on which science rests is not testimony, but reason. Wherefore the act of believing is not only the assent which we give to the testimony of God proposed in Scripture, but also that which we give to the conclusions deduced from that testimony.

ART. XXVI. It is proven that Theology taken in the third way, that is, Scholastic Theology, is a habit aggregated from Faith and the philosophical disciplines.

1. From what has been said in the two preceding articles, it seems to follow that Theology is a habit infused by God, and not acquired by ourselves. This, however, seems to be false and contrary to daily experience, for we see that the habit of Theology in young men is not produced immediately by God, but is rather acquired through their diligence and unwearied labor.

To remove this difficulty, it must be held that in Theology, taken in the first and second way, two things are to be considered. The first is the information or instruction of the mind concerning credibles, as the Scholastics say; that is, the knowledge by which we know what dogmas are proposed to be believed in Scripture, and what dogmas are gathered from Scripture by necessary consequence. The posterior is the inclination of the mind to assent to those credibles, that is, a firm persuasion of the truth of those dogmas. The former knowledge is not infused, but acquired by our labor and diligence, namely by reading and re-reading the Prophetic and Apostolic Books. But the latter knowledge or persuasion is not from ourselves, but from God, who effectively moves and inclines our minds to assent to those articles.

2. But the case is different for Theology taken in the third way, viz., for the defensive and explanatory habit of the articles of Faith. For in it, thus taken, three things are to be considered: first, the information of the mind concerning credibles; second, the assent which we give to those credibles, or articles of faith; third, the facility or readiness of explaining, defending, and confirming those articles, against Heretics and other enemies of the Church. The first act depends on our labor and industry; the second is from God alone, as has just been said; but the third part of it is also procured by our labor and diligence. For by diligently reading and considering theological controversies, we acquire that readiness of explaining and confirming our opinion, and of confuting the doctrine of our adversaries.
3. Hence it is clear that Theology, taken in the third way, is not one simple habit, but an aggregate of the habit of faith, or Theology, and the

philosophical disciplines. For that facility of explaining the articles of faith, and of disputing about them, which Scholastic Theology superadds to the habit of divine faith, is nothing other than Philosophy applied to Theology.

4. But so that this may become manifest, it must be held that almost all parts of Philosophy have their use in the explanation and defense of the articles of faith. For first, by the benefit of Logic, the Doctors explain the articles of faith distinctly and methodically, proposing in due order the causes, effects, subjects, and adjuncts of theological matters. Likewise, solving the sophisms of adversaries, and confirming the true doctrine with solid reasons.
5. By the benefit of Metaphysics, they explain many attributes of God, such as immensity, immutability, simplicity, eternity, etc. By its benefit also, they prove that these attributes are truly attributed to God, and if any arguments are brought to the contrary, they dissolve them.
6. By the benefit of Physics, they explain the faculties of the rational soul, and this so that it may be manifest in which faculty of the soul this or that theological virtue has its seat. Finally, by the benefit of Ethics, they explain the moral virtues which are commanded in the decalogue, and the vices opposed to them, which are forbidden therein.

ART. XXVII. That Theology is similar to all the Aristotelian habits, but especially to Prudence.

There are not lacking those who assert that Theology is every habit eminently, but not formally; that is, that some condition of every habit is found excellently expressed in Holy Theology, although it is contained under none of those habits as under a genus. For first, insofar as it considers God, who is the supreme and most general cause, it is similar to wisdom. Secondly, insofar as it is concerned with necessary things, and things not dependent on human will, it can be called science. Thirdly, insofar as it considers the first and indemonstrable principles of Faith, from which theological conclusions are deduced, it can be called intellect. Fourthly, insofar as it directs the acts of a Christian man, it can be called Prudence. Fifthly, it is similar to Art insofar as it is edifying of the Church. Whence the Apostle in 1 Cor. 3 says: "according to the grace which was given to me, as a wise master builder I have laid the foundation, and another builds upon it."

2. If someone asks whether Theology is more similar to one of these five habits than to the rest, I will respond that it is most similar to Civil Prudence. For first, the definition of prudence can be accommodated to it. For just as Civil Prudence is a habit active with right reason, that is, directive of Civil actions, so also Theology is a habit active with right reason, that is, directive of spiritual actions. Secondly, just as Prudence, which is the directive principle of civil actions, existing in the intellect,

operates through the moral virtues existing in the will, which are the executive principles of good actions, inclining and, as it were, impelling the will to choose that which the intellect judges to be better; so also Theology, which is the directive principle of good spiritual actions, existing in the intellect, operates through the theological virtues which are in the will, that is, through Charity and her daughters. For these are the executive principles of spiritual actions, that is, inclining the will to choose that which Theology, existing in the intellect, judges to be conformed to the will of God revealed in the word. And hence it is that the Apostle in Galatians 5, verse 6, says that Faith operates through Charity.

3. The third similarity or agreement of civil prudence and Theology is situated in this, that each proposes to itself a practical happiness to be obtained. For practical happiness is twofold, namely, Civil and spiritual. The former is situated in action according to the best moral virtue, that is, universal justice, and is the end of Civil Prudence. The latter, however, is situated in action according to the most excellent theological virtue, namely Charity, and is the end of Religious Prudence, that is, Theology. This action, however, is nothing other than the adoration of the divine Majesty, proceeding from a fervent love of the divine goodness, and conformed to the will of God revealed in the word.
4. Someone will say: The ultimate end of Theology, or theological happiness, which we attain in this life, is not situated in the actions of charity. For it seems rather to consist either in the act of justifying faith, or in the justification of man itself. I respond that the worship and adoration of God is rightly called the ultimate end of Theology which we attain in this life; and this is because both faith and justification are referred to it as to a further end. For it is for this reason that our mind is illumined by faith, for this reason also our guilt is remitted to us, so that we may worship God and celebrate His clemency and goodness.

ART. XXVIII. Whether Theology is a speculative or a practical discipline.

In this controversy, the opinions of philosophers are various. For first, some say that Theology is neither practical nor contemplative, but higher than the practical and contemplative disciplines, and therefore they call it affective, because its end is the adoration of God, proceeding from the affect of Charity. Others say that it is simply contemplative and practical, but more contemplative. Others think that it is both contemplative and practical, but more practical. Finally, others say that it is simply practical and not contemplative.

2. So that this last opinion, which is to be preferred to all the rest, may be understood and confirmed, it must be noted, first, that that knowledge is called theoretical which rests in itself and is not directed to operation as to a further end; but that is called practical which is referred to operation as

to an end. Secondly, it must be noted that a certain knowledge can be directed to operation as to an end in two ways, viz., either absolutely and in itself, or in a certain respect and by accident. That knowledge is directed to practice in itself which, according to the nature of that discipline to which it pertains, is referred to operation. Thus, knowledge of ethical matters is practical, because the nature of Ethics requires that all things which are treated in it be referred to operation and use. But that knowledge is referred to operation by accident which is not practical according to the nature of that discipline to which it pertains, but by reason of the end which he who is endowed with it proposes to himself. Thus, knowledge of physical or natural things is practical by accident, when he who is endowed with that knowledge directs and orders it to operation or use.

3. Thirdly, it must be noted that that knowledge which is in itself and absolutely practical is directed and ordered to practice in three ways. First, that knowledge is directed to practice in itself which is regulative and directive of some operation. For example, the knowledge by which architects know how the foundation of a house is to be laid, how the walls are to be erected, etc., is practical, because it is regulative and directive of building. Second, that knowledge is directed to practice in itself which is incitative and impulsive to operation. Such is the knowledge by which prudent men know what advantages follow the honorable actions of the virtues, and what disadvantages indeed follow the actions of the vices; for this knowledge incites and impels a man to honorable actions. Thirdly, that knowledge is also directed to practice in itself which is neither directive of an operation nor impulsive to an operation, but according to the nature of that discipline to which it pertains, is prerequisite for operating and acting better. For example, in the art of medicine, which is entirely a practical discipline, it treats of the parts of the human body, of the diseases of the parts, of the causes, signs, symptoms of diseases, etc. This knowledge is indeed not speculative, but practical, because, namely, the nature of that art requires that we not rest in that cognition, but direct it to operation and put it into practice.
4. From these things it is clear that those philosophers assert an imperfect and inadequate definition of practical cognition who say that only that knowledge is practical which is of an operable thing, and is regulative and directive of some operation. For it would then follow that that part of medicine which considers the parts of the human body, the diseases of the parts, and the causes and signs of diseases, is speculative and not practical: for this part of Medicine is not formally regulative of any operation, nor is it about operable things, but about natural things, and it is absurd to assert that this part of Medicine is speculative; because a discipline, or some part of a discipline, is called speculative (as Fonseca rightly notes, Lib. 6. Metaph. Cap. 1. Quæst. 5.) from its ultimate and

principal end: but the ultimate end of that part of Medicine is not the knowledge and speculation of diseases, but their cure, as is manifest to anyone. I said that a discipline, or part of a discipline, is called speculative from its ultimate and principal end: because otherwise all intellectual virtues, and therefore even the arts themselves, would be speculative: for the proximate end of all intellectual virtues is the knowledge or consideration of the intellect.

5. From these things, it is clear that all Theology is practical, and no part of it is speculative. For firstly, all the knowledge we have of GOD and his works is generated by the Holy Spirit in our hearts for this reason: that we may rightly worship the rightly known GOD; that is, in the manner prescribed by him in his word. Secondly, if we look at the nature of Theology itself, we will see that all Theological knowledge, by itself and by its nature, is either regulative of some operation, or indicative and impulsive to operation: for the knowledge by which we know how we ought to worship GOD and love our neighbor is regulative and directive of our actions towards GOD and neighbor: but the knowledge we have of the nature and attributes of GOD, the incarnation of the Word, and other similar things, is incitive or impulsive to the love, fear, reverence, and adoration of GOD, the Best and Greatest, and this according to the nature of this discipline: for GOD wished us to know his power so that we might fear and revere him; he wished us to know his goodness and mercy so that we might love and celebrate him.

ART. XXIX. Whether the Theology of Wayfarers can be called speculative from the speculation, or vision, that is to be in the Homeland.

PETRUS FONSECA, Metaph. Cap. 1. Quæst. 5. Sect. 7., says that the Theology of revelation, or the Theology of Wayfarers, is truly called speculative, because its end is the vision or knowledge of GOD in the Homeland. The same is also openly taught by Balthasar Meisner, in his Philosophy, Sect. 2. Chap. 2. Quæst. 1. his words are these: "The end of Theology is not practical Beatitude, but rather theoretical, consisting in the contemplation and fruition of GOD."

2. This opinion is false and to be rejected: for firstly, every end that denominates a habit is either an operation which that habit elicits (in which way science is called speculative, because it elicits the act of speculating, or contemplating:) or it is an operation which that habit directs and regulates, as they say: (in which way prudence is called active, and art effective, not because they elicit external actions and effects, but because they are their regulative, or directive, principles:) but that beatific vision of GOD is neither an act elicited by the habit of the Theology of revelation, nor is it regulated by it: and this is because the Theology of revelation is evacuated in the Homeland and is succeeded by the

Theology of vision: Therefore, the Theology of revelation cannot be called speculative from that speculation or vision which is in the Homeland.

Secondly, from that opinion it follows that the Theology of Wayfarers can be called an intuitive habit of GOD, or a habit of vision: for that speculation from which the denomination is taken is the vision of GOD: but this is absurd, because the Theology of the way would be confused with the Theology of the Homeland, which alone is intuitive of GOD.

ART. XXX. Whether true and proper Theology can exist in an impious, or unregenerate, man.

BALTHASAR MEISNERUS, in his Philosophy, Sect. 2. cap. 2. quest. 1., discussing this controversy: first asserts that Theology is called a God-given (θεόδοτον) habit, not because all who teach and know Theology are in a state of grace and specially illuminated by the Holy Spirit; but partly because of the celestial and divine reason of its principle, partly of its object. Secondly, he proves this from the fact that the habit of Theology can also exist in an unregenerate subject and a man of perverse life: for it would follow (he says) otherwise, that the habit of Theology would perish if any theologian were to sin mortally; likewise, that it would return if he were to do penance: which alternating removal and return of habits is absurd; since a habit (ἔξις) is distinguished from a disposition (διαθέσει) by this one thing, that it does not so easily yield and is not moved from the subject.

2. From this, thirdly, he collects that a careful distinction must be made between theology (θεολογίαν) and piety (θεοσέβειαν), for (he says) a true sense of GOD is one thing, a pious worship of GOD is another: the latter denotes practice (πράξιν), the former knowledge (γνῶσιν): each is divine, but in a different respect: knowledge (γνῶσις) because it is of GOD, and through GOD, or his word: practice (πρᾶξις) because it is from GOD, and with GOD, etc., it is joined with his gracious indwelling.
3. The contrary opinion is professed by Bartholomeus Keckermannus, Lib. I. Syst. Theolog. cap. 1. for he says that Theology is a faculty and skill infused by GOD into elect men: whence it is clear that, according to his opinion, Theology cannot be found in impious and wicked men.
4. I will propose the determination of this question in two assertions: the first is this: wicked and dissolute men can have an exact and accurate knowledge of theological matters; they can also have a wonderful facility and promptitude in discussing theological controversies: this assertion is evident and rests on daily experience.
5. Assert. second. the knowledge of theological matters with which the impious and unregenerate are endowed is not Theology properly so called, but is called Theology equivocally, just as a painted man is called a man equivocally: thus the knowledge of moral matters, with which wicked

and evil men are endowed, is equivocally called moral Philosophy: for they are not truly endowed with the habit of moral Philosophy: and this is because moral Philosophy and Prudence are one and the same habit in reality: but Prudence does not exist in a wicked man, as Aristotle testifies, who often says, "No one who is not a good man can properly be called prudent." See Jac. Martinus's first ethical disputation, 9. 5. where he proves that moral Philosophy and Prudence are the same habit.

6. This latter assertion is effectively proven by two reasons: first, Theology is a practical virtue, as was proven above: but that knowledge of theological controversies, with which the impious are endowed, is not a practical virtue: Therefore it is not true and properly called Theology. The assumption is proven: a practical, or operative, virtue is nothing other than the facility and promptitude of doing those things which are honest and good: but that habit with which the impious are endowed is not a facility, inclination, or propensity for doing those things which are good: for they do not have such a facility. Therefore it is not a practical, or operative, virtue.
7. Secondly, the knowledge of moral matters, with which wicked men are endowed, is not called civil Prudence: and this is because it is ineffective and idle: Therefore, by the same reason, the ineffective and useless knowledge of theological matters with which the impious are endowed is not true Theology, or religious Prudence. The reason for the consequence is this: Theology is no less a practical habit by its nature than civil Prudence: and therefore if the knowledge of civil matters, which the wicked have, is unworthy of the name of Prudence, because it lacks the inclination and propensity to act well civilly: by the same reason, the knowledge of theological matters, with which the impious are endowed, is unworthy of the name and title of Theology, or religious Prudence; because it lacks the inclination and propensity to act well spiritually.
8. Obj. first. David and Solomon, when they sinned gravely, remained good theologians, although they were bad Christians: Therefore, true Theology can exist in an impious man. I respond, that utterly impious men, destitute of piety, are neither good Christians nor good theologians, indeed, they are not truly and properly theologians: for just as bad and wicked men are not endowed with the true habit of moral Philosophy, or civil Prudence, so also the impious, or unregenerate, are not endowed with the true habit of Theology, or religious Prudence: I know indeed that, according to the common custom of speaking, those who are skilled in theological and ethical matters are good moral philosophers and good theologians, but as they say, one must speak with the common people, but think with the wise, who teach that practical virtues, such as Theology and moral Philosophy, cannot exist in dissolute and impious men.
9. As for what is objected concerning David and Solomon, I respond that when they sinned gravely, they were neither good theologians nor good

Christians, because they were committing those crimes which Theology or Christianity condemns: yet they were truly and properly theologians and Christians, because they had not totally lost true faith and piety.

10. Object. second. If the habit of Theology does not exist in an impious and unregenerate man, it would follow that the habit of Theology perishes if any theologian sins gravely, but returns if he does penance. That alternating removal and return of habits is absurd, because it removes their stability and permanence, by which they are distinguished from dispositions. I respond by denying the connection of the proposition: for although the habit of true Theology cannot exist in an unregenerate man, or one totally destitute of faith and piety, it can nevertheless exist, and indeed often does, in the faithful or elect when they sin gravely, although it does not then have as much efficacy or energy (*ἐνέργειαν*) as it otherwise has: wherefore that alternating removal and return of habits is not based on the foundations of our opinion, but on the absurd dogma of the Pontificians, Arminians, and of Meisner himself, concerning the Apostasy of the Saints: for if this is posited, that he who has once been born again can totally fall from the state of grace and regeneration, it manifestly follows that the habit of true Theology, and indeed also the habits of Hope and Charity, are subject to that alternating removal and return of which Meisner speaks.
11. Thirdly, someone will say, if the knowledge of moral matters, which is in a wicked man, is not Civil Prudence: likewise, if the knowledge of theological matters, which is in an unregenerate man, is not true Theology, to what habits are those knowledges to be referred? I respond: The expertise of impious theologians is a habit aggregated from merely historical faith and philosophical disciplines. But the knowledge of moral matters, which is seen in dissolute men, does not constitute a new species of habit distinct from Prudence, but is to be referred to Prudence, as something imperfect and incomplete to that which is complete and perfect.
12. I conclude therefore this EXERCISE, on FAITH, with this Assertion: faith (*πίστις*), theology (*θεολογία*), and piety (*θεοσέβεια*), that is, Saving Faith, Religion, and true Theology, are in reality one and the same habit; that is, they differ only in reason: for the knowledge of celestial matters in the regenerate and faithful, insofar as it relies on the testimony of GOD, is called Faith: the same, insofar as it is regulative and directive of divine worship, is called Religion: finally, insofar as it is comprehended and expressed in an artful system, is called Theology.

Glory to you, Lord.

THE END.