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Subsection
Concurrence, Secondary Causes & Occasionalism
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Order of Contents
Whole of History 1
Time Periods 8
Reformed 10+
Scottish 22+
Christian Platonism 24+
Thomism & Scholastic Philosophy 10+
Scottish Common Sense Philosophy 3
From Form to Corpuscles 8+
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On the Whole of History
Copleston, F. – A History of Philosophy, 9 vols. in 3 vols. (1946-1974; New York etc.: Doubleday, 1985)
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On Time Periods
On the Middle Ages
Gilson, Etienne – The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy tr. A. H. C. Downes (1991; repr., Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 2009)
Oberman, H.A. – The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel & Late Medieval Nominalism (1963; repr. Durham, N.C.: Labyrinth Press, 1983)
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On the Renaissance
eds. C.B. Schmitt et al., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988)
Woolford, Thomas – Natural Theology & Natural Philosophy in the Late Renaissance PhD diss. (Univ. of Cambridge, 2011)
After surveying the theology of Romanism and Protestantism, this dissertation analyzes works by Raymond Sebond, Philip de Mornay and Lambert Daneau.
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Early Modern Philosophy
eds. J. Kraye & M.W.F. Stone, Humanism & Early Modern Philosophy (Routledge, 2000)
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1500’s to 1600’s
eds. C. Blackwell & S. Kusakawa, Philosophy in the Sixteenth & Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999)
eds. Garber & Ayers, The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998)
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On Lutheran Philosophy
Kusakawa, S. – ‘Lutheran uses of Aristotle: a Comparison Between Jacob Schegk & Philip Melanchthon’ in eds. C. Blackwell & S. Kusakawa, Philosophy in the Sixteenth & Seventeenth Centuries. Conversations with Aristotle (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 169–188
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On Reformed Philosophy
Articles
Sytsma, David
‘Sixteenth-Century Reformed Reception of Aquinas’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas (2021), pp. 121-143 This is an abstract with a bibliography.
”As a Dwarfe set upon a Gyants shoulders’: John Weemes (ca. 1579-1636) on the Place of Philosophy and Scholasticism in Reformed Theology’ in Philosophie der Reformierten (frommann-holzboog, 2012), pp. 299-321
ch. 1, ‘Richard Baxter as Philosophical Theologian’ in Richard Baxter & the Mechanical Philosophers (Oxford, 2017), pp. 1-22
See a review of the book by Stephen J. Hayhow.
‘Puritan Critics of New Philosophy, ca. 1660-1680’ in Reform & Revival 21 (2018): pp. 116-150
‘Reformed Theology & the Enlightenment’ in The Oxford Handbook of Reformed Theology (2020), pp. 74-98
Popkin, R.H. – ‘The Religious Background of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy,’ in R.H. Popkin, The Third Force in Seventeenth-Century Thought (Brill, 1992
Woo, B. Hoon – ‘The Understanding of Gisbertus Voetius & René Descartes on the Relationship of Faith & Reason, & Theology & Philosophy’ in Westminster Theological Journal 75, no. 1 (2013): pp. 45–63
Johnson, Charles – ‘Are the Reformed Philosophically Thomist?’ (2023) 20 paragraphs
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Books
eds. Hart, van derHoeven & Wolterstorff – Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition (London: University Press of America, 1983)
Goudriaan, Aza – Reformed Orthodoxy & Philosophy, 1625–1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus Van Mastricht, And Anthonius Driessen Buy (Brill, 2006)
“…focuses on the relationship of theology and philosophy as formulated in the thought of three key Dutch Reformed theologians… All three were at the forefront of the philosophical debates that swirled in the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially instigated by the arrival of Renee Descartes (1596–1650) in the Netherlands in 1628… By studying these three theologians, Goudriaan “seeks to understand better how Dutch Reformed theology integrated and responded to philosophical views in the period from 1625 through 1750.
Voetius, professor of theology at the University of Utrecht, was initially the premier defender against the Cartesian encroachment upon the Dutch Reformed Church that sought to undermine both her theology and piety. This mantle would be taken up by his successor at the university, Petrus van Mastricht. As might be expected, Goudriaan demonstrates that Voetius and Mastricht were in essential agreement with one another in their theology and polemic against Cartesianism as they engaged it from distinctly Reformed premises and commitments.
Goudriaan deals successively with specific loci where the relationship between theology and philosophy was acutely tried and tested, including: reason and revelation; creation and the physical world; the providential rule of God over the world; anthropological issues of the relationship between the soul and the body; and divine and natural law. He notes that both Voetius and Mastricht had aligned themselves with the older Aristotelian philosophy against the newer Enlightenment philosophy, yet the debate was not waged over whose philosophical system was correct. This in itself would have been a losing concession, for it was precisely their aim that Reformed theology not be corrupted by alien philosophical concepts or categories that ultimately undermined Scriptural authority and teaching.
Philosophy was instead viewed by them as an instrument or servant of the most basic Reformed principle, namely, the authority of Scripture as their principium cognoscendi. For them Scripture was not subordinated to philosophy, but philosophy to Scripture. This starting point alone accounted for the full-orbed nature of creation with its rich diversity, including spirits and bodies, heaven and earth, which Cartesian dualism could not account for or bring into any real, dynamic relation. Because of this common commitment to the Reformed principle of Scripture’s authority, Goudriaan observes, “the theological development from Voetius to Driessen supports the broader claim that biblical Christianity outlives the philosophical and conceptual apparatus with whose help it is explained.” To put it another way, philosophy was not the indispensable lord of theology, but its disposable handmaiden—it would, therefore, continue even when philosophies changed or failed.” – Daniel Ragusa
Sytsma, David – Richard Baxter & the Mechanical Philosophers (Oxford, 2017)
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On Scottish Philosophy
Articles
Gellera, Giovanni
‘Descartes in Scotland & Pre-Enlightenment Scottish philosophy’
‘The Epistemology of Sense from Calvin to [Francis] Hutcheson [d. 1746]’ Journal of Scottish Thought, no. 7 (2016), pp. 148-170
Hutcheson (1694-1746)
‘The Scottish Faculties of Arts & Cartesianism (1650-1700)’ History of Universities XXIX (2), pp. 166-187
‘The Doctrine of the Fall in Early Modern Reformed Scholasticism: Philosophy Between Faith & Scepticism’ eds. Zohar Hadromi-Allouche & Áine Larkin, Fall Narratives (Routledge, 2017), pp. 78-89
‘English Philosophers & Scottish Academic Philosophy (1660-1700)’ Journal of Scottish Philosophy, issue 2, vol. 15, (2017), pp. 213-231
‘A Scotistic Answer to a Thomistic Problem. Scotism & the Eucharist in the Seventeenth Century’ Proceedings of the Conference: Implications Philosophiques et Théologiques de la Doctrine Eucharistique, Geneva, 17-18 June 2015
‘Sixteenth-Century Philosophy & Theology after John Mair’ in eds. D. Fergusson & M. Elliott History of Scottish Theology (2019)
‘Logic & Epistemology in the 17th Century Scottish Universities’ in Alexander Broadie, Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (2020)
‘Reformed Scholasticism in 17th Century Scottish philosophy’ in Alexander Broadie, Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century (2020)
‘Calvinist Metaphysics & the Eucharist in the Early Seventeenth Century’ (2013)
“This paper wishes to make a contribution to the study of how seventeenth-century scholasticism adapted to the new intellectual challenges presented by the Reformation. I focus in particular on the theory of accidents, which Reformed scholastic philosophers explored in search of a philosophical understanding of the rejection of the Catholic and Lutheran…”
‘The Scottish Faculties of Arts & Cartesianism (1650–1700)’ Vol. XXIX / 2
‘English Philosophers & Scottish Academic Philosophy (1660–1700)’ (2017)
‘“Calvinist” theory of matter? Burgersdijk & Descartes on res extensa‘
Abstract: “In the Dutch debates on Cartesianism of the 1640’s, a minority believed that some Cartesian views were in fact Calvinist ones. The paper argues that, among others, a likely precursor of this position is the Aristotelian Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635), who held a reductionist view of accidents and of the essential extension of matter on Calvinist…”
‘Robertson’s Philosophical Theses (1596): between Late Renaissance & Early Modern Scholasticism’ eds. Alexander Broadie & J.S. Reid, Philosophical Discourse in Seventeenth-Century Scotland: Key Texts (The Scottish History Society)
‘The Philosophy of Robert Forbes: A Scottish Scholastic Response to Cartesianism’ Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11(2) (Sept., 2013): 191-211
Abstract: “In the second half of the seventeenth century, philosophy teaching in the Scottish universities gradually moved from scholasticism to Cartesianism. Robert Forbes, regent at Marischal College and King’s College, Aberdeen, was a strenuous opponent of Descartes. The analysis of the philosophy of Forbes and of his teacher Patrick Gordon sheds light on the relationship between Scottish Reformed scholasticism and the reception of Descartes in Scotland.”
‘The Reception of Descartes in the Seventeenth-Century Scottish Universities: Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy (1650-1680)’ Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 2015
“In 1685, during the heyday of Scottish Cartesianism (1670-90), regent Robert Lidderdale from Edinburgh University declared Cartesianism the best philosophy in support of the Reformed faith. It is commonplace that Descartes was ostracised by the Reformed, and his role in pre-Enlightenment Scottish philosophy is not yet fully acknowledged. This paper offers an introduction to Scottish Cartesianism, and argues that the philosophers of the Scottish universities warmed up to Cartesianism because they saw it as a newer, better version of their own traditional Reformed scholasticism, chiefly in metaphysics and natural philosophy.”
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Books
McCosh, J. – The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical. From Hutcheson to Hamilton (London: Macmillan, 1875) 480 pp. ToC
Seth, Andrew – Scottish Philosophy; a Comparison of the Scottish & German Answers to Hume (1885) 255 pp. ToC
Laurie, Henry – Scottish Philosophy in its National Development (Glasgow, 1902) 345 pp. ToC
Robinson, Daniel Sommer – Story of Scottish Philosophy: a Compendium of Selections from the Writings of Nine Pre-Eminent Scottish Philosophers, with Biobibliographical Essays (NY: 1961) 285 pp. ToC
Stewart, Michael A. – Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment (Oxford Univ. Press, 1990)
Broadie, Alexander – Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century Pre (Oxford, 2020)
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Scottish Philosophy Bibliography
Jessop, Thomas Edmund – A Bibliography of David Hume & of Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour (NY: 1966)
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On Christian Platonism
On the Whole of Church History
eds. Hampton, Alexander J. B. & John Peter Kenney – Christian Platonism: a History Ref (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2020) 512 pp.
“…this landmark volume examines the history of Christian Platonism from antiquity to the present day, covers key concepts, and engages issues such as the environment, natural science and materialism.”
Baldwin, Anna & Sarah Hutton – Platonism & the English Imagination Pre (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994) 343 pp. ToC
Markos, Louis – From Plato to Christ: How Platonic Thought Shaped the Christian Faith Ref (InterVarsity Press, 2021) 256 pp.
“…Markos offers careful readings of some of Plato’s best-known texts and then traces the ways that his work shaped the faith of… Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Dante, and C. S. Lewis.”
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On the Early & Medieval Church
eds. Pavlos, Janby, Emilsson & Tollefsen – Platonism & Christian Thought in Late Antiquity Pre (Routledge) ToC
Rist, John, M. – Platonism & its Christian Heritage Ref (Variorum Reprints, 1985) 318 pp.
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On the Early Church
O’Daly, Gerard – Platonism Pagan & Christian: Studies in Plotinus & Augustine (Ashgate, 2001) 135 pp. ToC
On the Alexandrian School & Clement
Bigg, Charles – The Christian Platonists of Alexandria: 8 Lectures: being the Bampton Lectures of the Year 1886 (Oxford, 1913) 380 pp. ToC
Bigg was an Anglican canon and professor of ecclesiastical history.
Lilla, Salvatore R.C. – Clement of Alexandria: a Study in Christian Platonism & Gnosticism Pre (Wipf & Stock, 1971) 235 pp. ToC
Casey, Robert Pierce – Clement of Alexandria & the Beginnings of Christian Platonism Ref (Gorgias Press, 2007) 63 pp.
“Casey’s survey reveals not only his adept insights into Clement’s thought but also the great breadth of his knowledge of the Greek philosophers and the early Jewish and Christian theologians in the Roman Empire.” – Bookflap
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On Augustine
Dobell, Brian – Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion: The Journey from Platonism to Christianity Pre (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009) 239 pp. ToC
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On the Medieval Church
Henle, R.J. – Saint Thomas & Platonism: A Study of the Plato & Platonici Texts in the Writings of St. Thomas Pre (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956) 479 pp. ToC
Walker, Daniel Pickering – The Ancient Theology: Studies in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century Ref (Duckworth, 1972) 276 pp.
Siniossoglou, Niketas – Radical Platonism in Byzantium: Illumination & Utopia in Gemistos Plethon Pre (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011) 427 pp. ToC
Pletho (c. 1355/1360–1452/1454) was a Greek scholar and one of the most renowned philosophers of the late Byzantine era. He was a chief pioneer of the revival of Greek scholarship in Western Europe. As revealed in his last literary work, the Nomoi or Book of Laws, which he only circulated among close friends, he rejected Christianity in favour of a return to the worship of the classical Hellenic Gods, mixed with ancient wisdom based on Zoroaster and the Magi.
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1400’s – 1900’s
ed. Kim, Alan – Brill’s Companion to German Platonism Pre (Brill, 2019) 379 pp. ToC
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On the Post-Reformation Era
Harrison, John Smith – Platonism in English Poetry of the Sixteenth & Seventeenth Centuries (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1903) 250 pp. ToC
Walker, Daniel Pickering – The Ancient Theology: Studies in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century Ref (Duckworth, 1972) 276 pp.
eds. Hedley, Douglas & Sarah Hutton – Platonism at the Origins of Modernity: Studies on Platonism & Early Modern Pre (Springer, 2008) 283 pp. ToC
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On the 1500’s
Article
Parker, Eric M. – ”Saint Dionysius:’ Martin Bucer’s Transformation of the Pseudo-Areopagite’ Ref in From Rome to Zurich, between Ignatius & Vermigli: Essays in Honor of John Patrick Donnelly, SJ in Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, vol. 184 (Brill, 2017), pp. 122-45
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Book
Kirby, W.J. Torrance – Richard Hooker, Reformer & Platonist Pre (Ashgate, 2005) 113 pp. ToC
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On the 1600’s
Article
Parker, Eric M. – Ch. 9, ”The Sacred Circle of All-Being’: Cusanus, Lord Brooke & Peter Sterry’ Ref in Nicholas of Cusa & the Making of the Early Modern World in Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, vol. 190 (Brill, 2019), pp. 257-84
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Books
Roberts, James Deotis – From Puritanism to Platonism in Seventeenth Century England Pre (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968) 275 pp. ToC
eds. Hedley, Douglas & David Leech – Revisioning Cambridge Platonism: Sources & Legacy Pre (Springer, 2019) 259 pp. ToC
Ch. 3 discusses Jerome Zanchi.
Bryson, James – The Christian Platonism of Thomas Jackson Ref (Peeters, 2016) 228 pp.
William Twisse wrote against Jackson.
“Although Thomas Jackson (1579-1640) is recognized by scholars as the most important theologian of the [Anglican, Arminian] Laudian church, hitherto there has been no comprehensive study of his philosophical theology. The reason for Jackson’s neglect is that scholars have been puzzled by the sources, character and influence of his Christian Platonism.
From a close and comprehensive reading of his magnum opus – a massive twelve book commentary on the Apostle’s Creed – this book shows how Jackson regards the Platonic tradition as an essential and perennial resource for the Christian theologian, anticipating and informing central aspects of Christian theological speculation and belief, given by divine providence to help him interpret and defend his creed. Special attention is paid to the influence of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) on Jackson, an important moment in the history of thought since the German cardinal is generally thought to have been without intellectual successors in the early modern period.”
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On the 1700’s
Hickman, Louise – Eighteenth-Century Dissent & Cambridge Platonism: Reconceiving the Philosophy of Religion Pre (Routledge) ToC
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On the 1800’s & Mormonism
Fleming, Stephen J. – The Fulness of the Gospel: Christian Platonism & the Origins of Mormonism Ref (Univ. of California, 2014) 524 pp.
“Scholars have long wondered about the source of Mormon doctrines, many of which differed significantly from the Protestantism that dominated Joseph Smith’s environment. In 1994 John Brooke’s Refiner’s Fire proposed that Joseph Smith drew on Renaissance ‘hermeticism’, esoteric beliefs… Mormon scholars criticized Brooke, often arguing for ancient connections inaccessible to Smith, while scholars of Western esotericism argued that the concept of hermeticism was problematic and that the esoteric ideas labeled hermetic were actually Platonic.
This dissertation argues that Smith’s quest to restore what he called ‘the fulness of the gospel’, or the complete truth that was missing from contemporary churches and even the Bible itself drew from the thought of Christians influenced by Plato and is best understood as a form of Christian Platonism. Thus, for Smith, ‘the fulness of the gospel’ included the restoration of divination, the central Christian-Platonic doctrine, as well as the rites and priesthood offices needed to achieve it.”
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In the Modern Era
Tyson, Paul – Returning to Reality: Christian Platonism for our Times Pre (ISD) 213 pp. ToC
Tyson examines Christian, platonic concepts in C.S. Lewis and Tolkien. He covers some of Church history and puts forth a case in the last part for an ‘Applied Christian Metaphysics’.
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On Neo-Platonism Historical Theology
On the Whole of Church History
ed. O’Meara, Dominic J. – Neoplatonism & Christian Thought Pre (Norfolk, VA: International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, 1982) 293 pp. ToC
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On the Topic Generally
Camus, Albert – Christian Metaphysics & Neoplatonism tr. Ronald D. Srigley Pre (Univ. of Missouri Press, 2007) 135 pp. ToC
The chapters include the topics: Evangelical Christianity, Gnosis, Mystic Reason and Augustine.
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On Thomism & Scholastic Philosophy
Articles
Intro
Geisler, Norman – ‘Does Thomism Lead to Catholicism?’ 24 paragraphs
Reeves, Ryan – ‘The Significance of Thomas Aquinas’ Ligonier Ministries
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Scholarly
Sacred Congregation of Studies – ‘The Twenty-Four Fundamental Theses Of Official Catholic Philosophy’ (1914) with commentary by P. Lumbreras They are divided into 3 subsections: ontology, cosmology, psychology.
Donnelly, J.P. – ‘Calvinist Thomism’ Viator, vol. 7, pp. 441-55
Haines, David – ‘The Use of Thomas Aquinas & Aristotle in Reformed Theology’
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Books
1800’s
Brothers of the Christian Schools – Elementary Course of Christian Philosophy, based on the Principles of the Best Scholastic Authors, adapted from the French of Brother Louis of Poissy 2nd ed. rev. (NY: Oshea & Co., 1893) 570 pp. ToC
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1900’s
Shallo, Michael W. – Lessons in Scholastic Philosophy (Philadelphia, 1916)
Table of Contents
Introduction: Definition & Division of Philosophy 3
Part 1: Logic: Definition & Division of Logic 5
Bk. 1, Dialectics 6
Bk. 2, Critics 57
Metaphysics: its Definition & Division 119
Part 2: General Metaphysics 121
Part 3: Cosmology 179
Part 4: Rational Psychology 261
Part 5: Natural Theology 319
Index 389
Gilson, Etienne – The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas authorized 3rd rev. & enlarged ed. trans. Bullough & Elrington (Cambridge, 1929) 390 pp. ToC 6th ed. trans. Shook & Maurer
Wuellner, Bernard J. – Summary of Scholastic Principles Buy Ref (Loyola University Press, 1956) 164 pp.
“Principles may well be regarded as the main part of philosophy. They are among the major discoveries of philosophy, condensing in themselves much philosophical inquiry and insight…
…They serve the student and the reader of philosophy much as legal maxims serve jurists and as proverbs serve the people. They are for scholastic philosophers the household truth of their tradition. This book includes not only all principles of scholastic philosophy, but also exercises to apply the principles to several occasions. The book is useful for all students and professionals in philosophy.” – Bookflap
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2000’s
Cleveland, Christopher – Thomism in John Owen Pre (Routledge, 2013)
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Multi-Volume Set
Grenier, Henri – Thomistic Philosophy 2nd impression (Charlottetown, Canada: St. Dunstan’s University, 1948-50), vol. 1 (Logic), 2 (Metaphysics), 3 (Moral Philosophy), 4 ToC 1, 2, 3, 4 Both a 3 vol. & a 4 vol. edition exists.
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Latin Books
Blanc, Elia – Manual of Scholastic Philosophy, containing, vol. 1: a Scholastic Lexicon, Logic, Ontology, Cosmology; vol. 2: Psychology, Natural Theology, Ethics, Natural Law & an Accurate History of Philosophy (Leiden, 1901) ToC 1, 2 The Preface and the history of philosophy is in French.
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On the Scottish Common Sense Philosophy
Article
Gellera, Giovanni
‘Common Sense & Ideal Theory in 17th Century Scottish philosophy’ in ed. C.B. Bow, Common Sense in the Scottish Enlightenment (Oxford, 2018)
Abstract: “In the 19c James McCosh and many others identified the Common Sense school with ‘Scottish philosophy’ tout court: the supposedly collective ‘Scottish’ reply to Hume was the rejection of scepticism and Ideal Theory. This paper addresses the anticipations of the Common Sense school and its broader place in the history of Scottish philosophy. The 17c Scottish philosophers reacted to Cartesian scepticism with epistemological views which anticipate Thomas Reid: direct realism and perception as a faculty of judgment. Common sense-like views seem to have been a popular strategy against scepticism already before the Common Sense school, thus providing additional evidence for McCosh’s claim of the special role of common sense in the history of Scottish philosophy.”
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Books
ed. Johnston, G.A. – Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Chicago, 1915) 265 pp. ToC
Davie, George Elder – The Social Significance of the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Univ. of Dundee, 1973)
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From Form to Corpuscles, 1500’s-1700’s, & Contra a Mechanical Universe
Book
1700’s
Gib, Adam – pt. 3, ‘A View of the Absolute & Immediate Dependence of All Things on God in a Discourse of Liberty & Necessity’ 75 pp. in Sacred Contemplations (1786)
Gib was a leader in the Secession Church of Scotland and here critiques the mechanical philosophy, which the Secession Church had condemned.
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Quote
1600’s
Gisbert Voetius
‘On the Natures of Things & Substantial Forms’, pp. 369-76 in Select Theological Disputations, vol. 1, pt. 2 tr. by AI by Onku (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberg, 1648), ‘On Creation’, pt. 8 Latin
“1. We do not introduce these things to the students so that they will all now immediately necessarily believe in forms with their appendices, or contend tooth and nail for them, but so that they may at least for a time abstain from a peremptory judgment and its execution, by which the miserable and innocent beings are cast down from their ancient possession, until they have learned thoroughly, if not most accurately, at least moderately the philosophy of the schools, specifically logic, metaphysics, physics and these few notes which we subjoin, having been solidly determined, and they see that they are satisfied in them.
However they will finally judge, we will not have wasted our labor if in the meantime we will have recalled them from a fierce contempt and flight of the philosophical study, moreover from an idiotic rustic and proud ignorance, so that at least it could sometime be said concerning those dissenting elsewhere what is boasted among the Arabs: A wise man when he errs, errs with learned error.
Moreover our notes are threefold: 1. Certain prejudgments which I [approvingly] suggest to the disputants. 2. Reasons for forms, which are to be clearly solved. 3. Reasons against forms and for those vicarious accidents which certain more recent [mechanical] authors wish to be substituted for forms, which forms and their doubts, with their principles and consequences, are fittingly to be defended.
2. The notes of the first kind are:
I. Let them consider whether they satisfy themselves in the reconciliation of this opinion [of forms] with sacred scripture. For it indeed harmonizes with truth: and Christian philosophers will profess learned ignorance a thousand times rather than that they bring even the least appearance of prejudice to divine truth. See Gen. 1:11, 21-22, 24-25; Prov. 30:24-27, where we think permanent natures, faculties and distinct species of things are implied.
II. It is to be seen whether from the denying opinion there would be at least an easier lapse than from the affirming into doubt. [Put the question forth:] Whether there are any substantial forms which actuate the body of man and constitute one composite with it? But if someone denies this, and substitutes the krasin of Galen, or a particle of divine breath or soul of the world, or the universal intellect of Averroes, or the mind of Plato, thrust into the workshop of the body as a genial pipor and bound to it, as Prometheus the Caucasian, if someone I say substitutes such a thing, by what reasons would you more successfully and safely rebut him than [those by which] the assertors of forms [do].
III. It is to be seen how with this opinion standing the distinction between the being of substance and of accident can be conveniently explained and defended. For there would be, according to them, no substantial difference between a wolf, a sheep, a whale, an elephant, a serpent, a stone, a monk’s hood, aconite, wheat, the sun, the moon, the earth; add also a clock, the wooden Trojan horse, the bronze bull of Phalaris, the flying dove of Archytas, the bronze head of Pope Sylvester, the speaking statue of Albertus Magnus, a house, a chair, a garment etc.
But perhaps they would retort that those substances differ essentially through those five accidents motion, rest, position, figure and quantity.
I respond: Granting this to be so (about which we do not now dispute), the difficulty is nevertheless not removed by this escape. It nevertheless remains [on this view] that substances are distinguished from substances in no other way than accidents from substances and accidents among themselves, for both the former and the latter are distinguished by accidents.
IV. It is to be seen whether from here there is not an easier lapse, when someone is pressed by reasons and consequences into this absurd [occasionalist] opinion: ‘Secondary causes endowed with their own causality are not given, but only the first and universal cause acts in the presence and disposition of secondary causes.’ See the absurdity of this opinion shown by the Scholastics and more recent metaphysicians and theologians in the topic on Providence, on the concourse of God with creatures. Let the consequences [of their position], by which they could be pressed, be these:
1. That the concourse of God is not given, nor the motion of the first mover accommodated to the natures and properties of secondary causes, whether they are necessary or contingent.
2. That there is not in created substances an intrinsic mover and a substantial principle of internal and proper motion: for the disposition of the mobile thing to motion from quantity, figure, position is not the activity or causality of the efficient cause, but only a required condition, and a cause sine qua non (‘without which nothing’).
3. Consequently, since no mobile thing can move itself in potency to act or determine itself to motion, it remains that some external mover is to be sought which may lead the potency into act. But what will they give here? The Platonic-Virgilian soul of the world, or intelligences, or God, or atoms, or celestial globules. Here something will have to be said [by them].
V. It is to be seen lest the negation of proper qualities, which internally emanate from the form and substance of a thing (the negation of which follows the negation of forms, just as one error drags another), drive us into these absurdities:
1. That created substances are the immediate principle of their own operation, since there are no active qualities by which substances operate as a means: which see shaken out by the metaphysicians and theologians when they treat of the simplicity of God and of the distinction of the divine attributes.
2. That there are no qualities altogether, as neither of the second, or third, so also not of the first species; that is, there are no habits, against the common school of philosophers and theologians. I would like to see how those who deny natural faculties or powers will vindicate habits against the atheists, skeptics and infidels (the necessity of which Scripture and reason persuades), lest they be likewise shut up in that pentagon-workshop of motion, rest, quantity, position and figure.
VI. From this opinion it follows that no definitions of substances are given, since there are no forms or proper first and internal essentials from which the difference can be taken. How this may savor to the sons of the logicians of whatever sect, and to all acroamatic minds, and to the professors of whatever disciplines, they themselves will see.
VII. This absurdity also follows: That all created substances, even man himself (and why not angels and separate souls?), are beings per accidens [through accident], collective and aggregate: but not essences or natures, one per se [through itself]. So that no essence seems to be per se, except perhaps atoms, or ethereal globules, or insensible particles, or Platonic ideas (which he called αυτοάνθρωπον, αυτοίππον, etc.) or chimeras buzzing in the void, etc. But that man ought to be called a being and one per se, we will teach below.
VIII. It would follow that there are no proper and intrinsic faculties, nor are their principles in animals of another kind than in automata or Daedalean statues; and consequently the works of God and nature produced through creation or generation are essentially and univocally the same with works of art: which how it may agree well enough with Ps. 104:29; 7:14-15; Num. 16:22; 27:16; Heb. 11:9-10; Hab. 2:19, I confess I do not see the knot.
IX. It would follow that there is no generation or corruption of natural things. But more on this in Thesis 4 [below].
X. Since efficiency and motion, which is usually attributed to forms and their active qualities, is attributed to quantity and figure, it is to be seen lest young men at some time imprudently admit through consequence that magical axiom rejected by all Christian theology and philosophy: “There is some efficacy of quantity and figure, and it either per se or with others things concurs as an active principle of transmutation.”
XI. This doubt is to be solved: How is it not a process to infinity, or a circular demonstration nearly similar to the demonstration which that chanted-off black faith of the Papists pretends? So it may amount to the same as to that: Why is the earth moved ex. gr. R.? Because its site, position, figure so move it. And why do they so move, and whence is this? whether from atoms, or from ethereal globules etc. But if you say this, I ask again, the world of atoms, or globules, how is it moved, and why? You bear so far and it returns to the [same] way.
XII. The reproach of this [mechanical] opinion, as if it is omniscient, is to be removed: “That it [the theory of forms] explains or solidly demonstrates much less than the opposite [mechanical] opinion, indeed nothing in the secrets of nature.” In general indeed and indefinitely it says that natural effects are from that five-fold reason of accidents which any dancers could be taught in the space of one or another little hour: but it explains or proves neither in species nor in an individual determinately about celestial things and motions, about those which are in the bowels of the earth, in the depth of the sea, in the internal motions of bodies, about those, I say, which have thus far lain hidden from other investigators of nature. But more on this in Thesis 4 following.
3. The reasons which are usually brought forward by the assertors of forms must first be thoroughly known, then clearly and solidly solved. To this end some one of the more recent physical or metaphysical disputators should be read accurately by the juniors, such as [Francis] Suarez, [Benedict] Pererius, [Jacob] Revius, [Francisco de] Toledo, the [Jesuit] Conimbricenses, the [Spanish] Complutenses [at Alcala], [Rodrigo de] Arriaga, [Francisco de] Mendoza, etc. Out of all these Suarez most fully and most subtly pleads this cause. For the present we will defend these three reasons:
The first reason is taken from the proper actions of natural things, which emanate each from their distinct perfections and qualities: Moreover those perfections perfect some nature and substance. Hence it is inferred that in any composite there is given one principle and root of all powers and operations, which is not matter (which is common), nor accidents, which cannot be the ultimate principle; therefore it remains that it is nothing other than the form.
The second reason: There is given some first root and first concept of each entity, e.g. of humanity, equinity, etc. which constitutes the thing in its proper being and distinguishes it essentially from others. But that is not matter, since it is common, nor any accidents, because they cannot compose or constitute a substance and give entity to it: Therefore it is that which we call form, eido, tò** en eina* entelekeian, ‘I hold the perfected nature according to [Greek]’ (since it actuates and informs matter, and with it constitutes the composite).
The third reason: We gather this from substantial corruption. The essence of man, horse, dog, etc. is taken away [in death], so that according to Scripture and natural reason they are said not to be. But here matter has not ceased to be, since it is ungenerable and incorruptible: therefore form [exists], by which it happens that [without it] the composite is dissolved, and becomes a non-being, namely, this thing, e.g. horse, dog, etc. But if someone says that through destruction only a change of accidents happens, we retort: then a dead man, lion, dog, etc. differs accidentally and not substantially from a living one, no more than a sick Socrates differs from a healthy one, a sitting one from a standing one, a learned one from an unlearned one, an old man from a boy. We will dissolve other objections which [Sebastian] Basson [d. 1621, an anti-Aristotelian], bk. 3, opposes in the presence of the disputation.
4. The reasons which are usually brought forward against forms must be demonstrated philosophically in such a way that they compel the intellect desirous of truth and make it rest. That this has by no means been done thus far we will now defend according to our ability:
I. The reason, and indeed the chief and Achillean one [of opponents] is: Because the origin, or mode of origin of forms cannot be explained or so demonstrated that no difficulty remains.
I respond: I do not repeat our response to the major of this argument and its consequence, which we intimated in the corollary, but I again take it up to be defended, with this caution added: If the more imprudent young men do not cease to wander on that string and support the overthrow and mockery of the whole sound and sober philosophy with such a ruinous and rotten prop, they are to be driven at last through solid consequences to that point that they become either beasts or atheists. But see our corollary.
Moreover that this was the Achillean argument of the denying opinion is clear from Gorlaeus, Exercit. 14, p. 267 and Basson, bk. 1, intent. 3-4, where having premised this argument, he concludes (p. 159, line 3, p. 161 compared with the index under the word ‘form’) that there are no substantive forms and the ancients could have easily shown in what way, from which and out of which forms are made, for they said that the soul and form of each thing is an instrument and consists in a certain composition and proportion of the parts of the thing.
Furthermore on the difficulties and manifold disquisition of the philosophers, so that they may explain the mode of origin of forms, consult besides Basson, bk. 3, loc. cit., especially Sennert, Hypomnem. physicor. 1. ch. 3; Suarez, disp. metaph. 15.
II. The second reason is that which Gorlaeus intimates: That beings are not to be multiplied without necessity, when the effects of natural things can be sufficiently explained through other principles and reduced to them. But they do not explain those principles in one way. For the ancients, whom Basson praises, and Aristotle refutes l. 2. Axpo, explain it otherwise, the more recent authors otherwise: although very many opinions agree in some one common thing, which being denied or refuted, they themselves also fall.
We will not now dig up the rancid and long exploded opinions of both the ancients and the more recent Paracelsists, Hermetics (which Dornavius has tried in vain to reconcile with the sacred Scriptures), but we only ask that it be demonstrated: that which emerged today or yesterday [the mechanical philosophy], stating that all things are derived from quantity, figure, site or position, motion and rest, and that all the secrets of nature can be best explained and demonstrated through them; which we deny. These reasons are brought forward:
First, as a clock is moved by the mere disposition of its parts, through quantity, figure, etc. so also natural things: But the former is true; Therefore also the latter.
We deny the major and the minor. To the proof of the minor and other instances besides we say that a clock well disposed and fitted nevertheless is not actually moved without an external mover, namely the hand of a man, or its vicar, the depression and traction of a weight: in the way a harpsichord, lyre or cither optimally disposed and fitted for song does not actually sing without an external moving accident, namely the hand of the artist, as also mills optimally disposed do not actually grind without the external impulse or traction of water, wind, horse or ass, etc.
We add now that hydraulic organs or harpsichords do not actually sound without the motion or pulse of water in subterranean tubes; and yet that water cannot be said to be a part of the organ, much less its internal mover.
The second reason: Because the heart of an animal is moved by the mere disposition of the parts R. it is moved by the soul or informing form, by means of qualities as quo principles, and other instruments required for animal motion.
Instance: but the motion of the heart can be diminished, nay even completely cease or be taken away, even with the animal living [or moving for a time]: therefore it is not from the soul. For if indeed the heart moving were from the soul, assuredly with that soul present [in the body], the motion would be present.
I respond: The consequence of the major is denied. It is a reasoning from the rational soul, and yet it is absent from the infant recently born, although the rational soul is not absent. Thus granted that the motion of the heart ceases in a living animal, nevertheless it does not follow from that that the soul or form is not the principle of that motion. For the fact that the motion is either diminished or ceases, that is from the organs and from the impeded faculty.
Instance 2: If that form were the principle of motion, and used qualities and instruments for it, then it would follow that that form uses reason or ratiocination.
I respond: The consequence is denied, because forms operate through natural faculties without ratiocination; thus animals by natural instinct, nay even vegetables, flee harmful things and pursue what is agreeable to them; thus e.g. the swallow without the use of reason, with applied celandine, heals the eyes of its chicks; and our stomach, liver, etc. concoct, nor are they subject to the direction of reason.
We add that a stone falls downward, stars rise, finally all natural things perform their motions without reasons, for thus they have been created by God and tend to their ends according to the faculties impressed on them, just as an arrow to the target. See the Metaphysicians disputing on the final cause.
To the minor of the syllogism it is responded: Concerning the diminution of the motion of the heart it is conceded that it happens, but then there is no species of consequence, since a diminished motion is also [by degree] a motion. A total cessation of motion is not conceded, but this is deferred to the experience of physicians. But who has experienced this, is not clear. And what if someone at some time perceives none of its motion extrinsically; for that reason it must not be said that there is no motion within or without. For it can easily be retorted that the motion is insensible, as some state concerning the systole in the pulse.
And indeed these reasons have been aired thus far. That the same may be urged so much the better anew, and others may hereafter be added, we have written this appendix.
5. In place of a consectary, we add something about all hidden [or obscure] qualities: That the opinion of philosophers and physicians is not to be rashly rejected:
I. Because it agrees better with learned ignorance (about which we will sometime, God willing, treat professionally): than the opposite opinion, which seems to breathe and promise pansophy [complete wisdom], and indeed without difficulty, which cannot fail to be suspect. See meanwhile the sayings of Scripture Job 38-39; 26; 42; Eccl. 1; Ps. 29.
II. Because the hidden qualities, which sagacious investigators of nature have objected to them to be explained, have not yet been explained by them. See I pray Sennert on the consensus of chemists with Aristotle, ch. 8, especially Hypomnem Phys. 2. And if they try to explain any (which however rarely happens), they bring forward inept and ridiculous reasons, or deny those things which have even been confirmed by experience, as the most erudite Sennert speaks of in the same place. But although they are not properly of our forum, yet because they spread the train of consequences too much to the exploding of the whole philosophy, we will now for our capacity and for the sake of exercise defend that poisons, hydrophobia, the contagion of plague, nay not even the magnet can be explained by them through motion, rest, position, quantity and figure.
Problem: Why are certain men so affected [with allergies] by the presence of cats (which they themselves are unaware of), that they almost suffer syncope, others, if they unknowingly eat a particle of cheese [with unseen mold], are so moved that from it they sometimes contract a serious and dangerous disease for themselves?
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7. In Corollary 1 I had said that the opinion of Taurellus and Gorlaeus about man as a being per accidens stumbles in many ways. The argument by which they are moved is such. Two beings or complete substances make one per accidens and not per se: but the body and soul of man are two complete substances. Therefore.
I respond: The major is not universally true; and the minor is denied. That in the presence of the disputation itself it may be aired to many and to the end, we now cursorily indicate these hypotheses:
1. That man is a species of substance and animal created into one essence or nature from soul and body, we think is implied in Gen. 3:7, 1 Cor. 15:45, compared with Gen. 1:26-27.
II. Christ-Theanthropos [God-man] (in whom there are two natures or complete substances) is one per se and not per accidens: for the union of natures was made into one suppositum, [Greek]. See the theologians on the person of Christ: Much more therefore substantially and per se the union was made between the soul and body of man, which indeed are not so far distant, nor are they such complete substances as divinity and humanity.
III. The true human nature of Christ would not be more one substance through itself than in the death of the same
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[These articles are about Christ, man, the soul and angels]
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IX. This opinion even impinges on many metaphysical dogmas…
1. Concerning being, essence and existence, nature and suppositum.
2. Concerning one, composition by union, whole, and concerning per se and per accidens.
3. Concerning principles and causes, specifically concerning univocal and equivocal cause, concerning internal and external principle, concerning informing and assisting form.
4. Concerning the distinction between substantial and accidental, concerning the distinction of a natural thing from an artificial one, concerning the distinction of a monster (which as such is a being per accidens) from human nature duly constituted according to the laws of nature.
5. That man is not a substance nor does he directly pertain to the predication of substance: but only indirectly, and per accidens is referred to it, since he is a being per accidens and collective.
6. That one man is no more one per se, than an army, a city, etc. where there are many men collectively.
7. That consequently man cannot be defined by an essential and perfect definition.
8. That the matter and form of a composite are properly matter, and its form is the union, that is an accident, or pure mode, namely a relation. See Gorlaeus, Exercit. 14, p. 266.
9. That the union of the human soul with its body is to be sought in some mere accident from those five, and indeed in position or posture: as some seem to concede.
10. That the body is not the nature of man, but only his instrument, through which the soul existing in the body operates.
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9. In place of an epimeter, let these notes be about the invention, constitution and augmentation of the sciences:
I. Not to want to use and enjoy things well invented and well constituted, but to want to invent them anew per se or other things in their place is to multiply beings without necessity, and to do injury to talent and erudition: since art is long, life is short, experience is fallacious.
II. Students in the academic course are not so much occupied with observations and experiences as with the perception and impression of things invented: And thus with Aristotle, Metaph. 1. ch. 1. I would prefer a learned and non-expert student to an unlearned and expert one. If however experience [Greek] can be joined to doctrine [Greek] (which happens here), I would certainly judge that academy most happy.
III. Fallacious and useless is that method of inventing and constituting the sciences, so he:
1. unlearns, forgets, rejects and as it were abjures all universal experiences, all inventions, all dogmas examined and proven through so many ages by the whole chorus of the wise, through new and repeated experiences, through the most subtle reciprocations of arguments: with the hope in course of a new and better philosophy to be invented by himself or others.
2. Perpetually adheres to one or another experience about one thing or about one natural effect of one thing, and sells such a tiny particle for genuine philosophy: the whole philosophy and common experience, at least by far more frequent than his own and indeed about all or most natural things, beening held in contempt.
3. Often builds such unhappy consequences upon that narrow experience and is compelled to fabricate uncertain, slippery, insufficiently proven principles, axioms, definitions and demonstrations from it, or to desert security.”
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Historical
Articles
1900’s
W.R. Newman – ‘“Matter” & “Form”: By Way of a Preface’ in Early Science & Medicine 2 (1997), pp. 215–226
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2000’s
Goudriaan, Aza – 3.2 ‘Substantial Forms’ in ch. 2, ‘Creation, Mosaic Physics, Copernicanism & Divine Accommodation’ in Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625-1750 : Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus Van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen Pre (Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 113-125
Sytsma, David – ‘Puritan Critics of New Philosophy, ca. 1660-1680’ in Reform & Revival 21 (2018): pp. 116-150
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Books
1900’s
Ruler, J.A. Han van – The Crisis of Causality. Voetius & Descartes on God, Nature & Change (Brill, 1995) 340 pp. ToC
“…deals with the reaction of the Dutch Calvinist theologian Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676) to the New Philosophy of René Descartes (1596-1650).
Voetius not only criticised the Cartesian idea of a mechanical Universe; he also foresaw that shifting conceptions of natural causality would make it impossible for theologians to explain the relationship between God and Creation in philosophical terms. This threatened the status of theology as a scientific discipline.”
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2000’s
eds. Lüthy, Murdoch & Newman – Late Medieval & Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories (Brill, 2001)
Emerton, N.E. – The Scientific Reinterpretation of Form (Cornell Univ. Press, 1984)
Sytsma, David – Richard Baxter & the Mechanical Philosophers (Oxford, 2017)
Abstract: “Drawing on largely unexamined works, including Baxter’s Methodus Theologiae Christianae (1681) and manuscript treatises and correspondence, Sytsma discusses Baxter’s response to mechanical philosophers on the nature of substance, laws of motion, the soul, and ethics. Analysis of these topics is framed by a consideration of the growth of Christian Epicureanism in England, Baxter’s overall approach to reason and philosophy, and his attempt to understand creation as an analogical reflection of God’s power, wisdom, and goodness, or vestigia Trinitatis. Baxter’s views on reason, analogical knowledge of God, and vestigia Trinitatis draw on medieval precedents and directly inform a largely hostile, though partially accommodating, response to mechanical philosophy.”
See a review of the book by Stephen J. Hayhow.
Feser, Edward – Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical & Biological Science Buy (2019) 515 pp.
“Actuality and potentiality, substantial form and prime matter, efficient causality and teleology are among the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian philosophy of nature. Aristotle’s Revenge argues that these concepts are not only compatible with modern science, but are implicitly presupposed by modern science.” – Blurb
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Related Pages
On the Reception of Aquinas in Church History
Where Reformed Orthodox Writers Agreed & Disagreed with Aquinas