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Prescriptions and General antidotes for Christianity against the Socinians.

Respondent: JOHN DEAK, of Benye, Hungarian. On the 14th day of February, 1635.

Since the doctrine of the Trinity, and the two natures of Christ in one person proposed in our Belgic Confession from the sacred Scriptures, has been defended by us in the course of disputations, we will not do something irrelevant if besides the special solutions then brought forward we suggest to students of Theology certain general antidotes, the use of which may be in the reading and examination of the Pseudo-Theology of the Socinians.

1. The truth concerning the Holy Trinity and Christ the God-man, supported by demonstrations of the Scriptures, having therefore been presupposed, which we here again undertake to defend according to the Belgic Confession and the ancient symbols: before all things we want it to be noted, that a distinction must be made between the "that" of those mysteries and the "how". Certainly the "that" is clearly established and proved from the sacred Scriptures; but since our mind cannot penetrate the "how" and the "why" (that is, in what way), nor has God willed to reveal it in this life, we must doubtless rest in learned ignorance and the loftiness of hidden truth. "O Trinity," says Nazianzus, Oration 4 on Holy Baptism near the end, "by thinking the One I am illumined by the Three; hardly do I distinguish the Three than I am carried back to the One." The adversaries therefore do wrong, who from the incomprehensibility of the "why" or of that which God has not revealed turn to the accusation of the "that" which God has revealed, as impossible and absurd.

2. A distinction must also be made between the naked truth, which we hold by faith, and between the clear proof and defense of that truth against the tricks of those who do not acquiesce to the Scriptures. Whence they sin, who when they cannot solve the subtleties or knots of the adversaries, recoil from the simplicity of their faith supported by the truth of the Scriptures. It is better to confess ignorance and stupor, or to accuse one's own sloth and negligence, or somewhere to captivate the intellect, than to desert the faith, and thus gradually slip into Libertinism and Atheism. For somewhere one must stop and hold by simple faith, when we cannot thus prove or solve all things by reason, so that we may satisfy ourselves or others. For in divine things there is much obscurity; He dwells in inaccessible light, and we walk here by faith, not by sight; we know in part, we prophesy in part.

3. It must be diligently noted that the adversaries scarcely ever or only meagerly attempt a direct demonstration of their opinion, and refutation of ours, from the sacred Scriptures (to which they otherwise seem to appeal); but perpetually apply the Lesbian and fallacious rule of corrupt reason, and draw forth from it nothing but their own ignorances, doubts, and murmurings; which they ought to repress with the denial of self along with us, rather than foster them and arm them against the Christian faith. Let the arguments of the adversaries against the Trinity, the personal union, and the satisfaction of Christ be inspected.

4. The adversaries perpetually harp on that same string of their sophistry, that not having noted the infinity of God, and the infinite distance from creatures, they fashion common pseudo-Logical and pseudo-Metaphysical concepts, notions, and terms, under which they comprehend God and creatures, finite and infinite being, and apply them to God and creatures altogether in one and the same way and with equal descent. Since God is not under one concept and univocal genus with creatures, but only under an analogical one, as is known from Philosophy. Thus, e.g., they take the notion of essence, nature, plurality, unity, individuality or singularity, personality, action, generation, procession, origin or principle, communion and communication, communicable, communicating or communicative, whole and part, composite, one in number, and principle of individuation or suppositum, likewise principle of personality, etc., only from creatures or from the second analogue of Being as a general measure and apply it to the Deity and exactly adjust it to that. Let them therefore distinguish the general notion which is attributed to God and creatures in some imperfectly one and common concept, from the special mode, by which it is attributed to God, and creatures in an unequal and infinitely distant way; nor let them confuse these, or argue from one to the other by a fallacious discourse. But it must first be freed from that imperfection which adheres to it from one analogue. And this pertains to the way of eminence commonly commended in the knowledge of God from the saying of Dionysius the Areopagite. The Scholastics following Thomas in the question on free choice not badly distinguish by saying that it can be considered either abstractly, universally, and according to its proper concept, or concretely according to state and condition in a certain subject, e.g., God, or angel, or man. This distinction must be applied to our present business.

5. Also that narrowness and difficulty of our contemplation about this mystery must be noted; that nothing similar occurs in the whole nature of things, in which we can perfectly demonstrate to ourselves or others the notion of the Triune, infinite God-man. The adversaries stumble against this rock, when they clamor that those things are repugnant to nature and reason, because nothing of the sort is found in nature. As if there were still other infinite Gods, or Gods manifested in the flesh. God is one; Christ the God-man is one. And nothing can be made like to God, Isaiah 40. By similar arguments the omnipotence, omniscience at least of things past and present, likewise the eternity of God, etc., could be opposed. Because those things cannot be found in anything; nor can a likeness be granted. I say the same about a material and separable form, namely the human soul, which is unique among all forms; about angelic substance which is unique among all substances; about the resurrection of our bodies, which is the unique return from total privation, among all other total privations. Let us therefore say rather concerning the Trinity, concerning the hypostatic union, that those or similar things are not or cannot be in

nature, nor can they be found or excogitated there by any reason, because they exceed the whole of nature in a most supereminent way. For God necessarily exceeds every creature. Let those mysteries therefore be beyond and above nature and all natural reason, not against.

6. It must also be considered, that with those mysteries of the Trinity and Christ the God-man having been detracted from and removed from the Christian religion, scarcely anything remains in it which exceeds the terms of natural Theology; and consequently there would be nothing in the knowledge of which Gentiles, Jews, Muhammadans could not be led by the light of nature. And so our religion could not be called a mystery, which none of the wise of this world knew, and which differs immensely from all other religions. For which mysteries they substitute their own new monsters unheard of to Christianity, concerning two Gods to be worshipped, concerning Christ the Demigod, concerning the metaphorical Son of God, concerning an exemplary Savior; concerning which see Smiglecius in his tract on the New Monsters of the New Arians.

7. Add, that with those foundations concerning the Trinity and Christ the God-man having been removed, men relapse from the new covenant established in the satisfaction and justice of Christ the sponsor to the old covenant founded in our own obedience, as can be seen in the miserable disciples of Socinus, and all others, who learn from him to have a different opinion. But that old or former covenant was made void through the intervention of the fall and sin, and no one can now any longer be saved through it, Romans 3:21, 22, 23, 24, and chapter 8, verse 3. Thus at length through consequences and successively that whole gospel vanishes, and retains nothing else in its religion than blind titles of God and Christ. I think such a religion is parallel to that of the Muhammadans: "There is no God but God and Muhammad is His apostle." For they do not differ in object, whether ultimate or proximate or intermediate, but only in the witness and Teacher of religion. Thus a Christian in his religion would have no greater or more certain consolation in life and death than any other Gentile or Muhammadan, who indeed having heard nothing of the Christian religion, nevertheless lived well according to the measure of his knowledge.

8. Nor must it be altogether passed over, that the whole world having obtained the knowledge of the Gospel, has sounded forth these mysteries with one mouth now from the times of the apostles; so that here that apostolic and Catholic "always" of Vincent of Lerins may truly be had: "What all, what everywhere, what always." The testimonies of the fathers evince this, and especially that common doxology: "Glory to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit." And that familiar way of catechizing from the formula of baptism, which was not unknown even to the Gentiles. For Lucian in his Philopatris introduces a Christian thus catechizing the Gentiles: "God reigning on high, great, ethereal, and eternal, the Son of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father, one from three and three from one." Lucian lived under Trajan around the year 120. Which faith also, when adversaries arose, was explained, established by Catholic consent of Christianity and the first General Councils, and afterwards sanctioned by pious Emperors in the Roman world by public laws; and from that time remained safe and intact under both powers, Ecclesiastical and Political, even when such great contention and ignorance arose in the East, and that great apostasy in the West; and even now persists in Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Persia, Syria, Armenia, Russia, the whole West, and wherever the Christian

name is heard. Whatever unhappy souls once upon a time or in the past century have attempted against this most well-founded faith, they have experienced to their own harm, how hard it is to kick against the goad. See some examples in the Epistle of Beza to Peter Statorius the Pole, then about to go over to the Socinians. Add that this way is directly to the precipices of Atheism, Libertinism, Epicureanism, Turkism, Judaism. Examples will be given by Neuserus and M. Erasmus Johannis, men not unlearned; of whom the former, a minister in the Palatinate after a secret attempt, having slipped away to the Anti-Trinitarians, at length publicly and solemnly embraced and professed Muhammadanism at Constantinople; the latter, a class teacher of the School of Marburg, defected to Judaism, testifying the cause of his defection in express words, because he could not digest that fictitious (as he blasphemously speaks in letters written from Thessalonica to Marburg to a friend) mystery of the Trinity.

9. Also the new method of disputing, which the adversaries use, must be observed. They do not attack the incautious by open war, but through mines. For first they are wont to pluck at the words and terms rather than the things; then also the passages of Scripture and hypotheses of the articles, when they still seem to spare the theses and articles themselves; in addition they seem, or want to seem, to inquire about the necessity of the articles rather and so about the salvation of the ignorant and erring out of scruple, for the tenderness of their conscience of course, than about the truth. Moreover, they sustain the parts of learners and inquirers more either in their own name or in that of others, or at most of doubters, than of asserters. Hence you may perpetually hear from them those formulas of doubting and Sceptical Theology: "This could be understood or expounded otherwise." "Someone could think otherwise." "It must be seen whether that word or phrase does not admit another signification." "I do not know, I doubt whether this is solid enough." "I could not, I would not dare to determine anything certain."

10. Add that they assign the parts of asserting and proving to their adversaries, and take to themselves only those of denying and excepting; thus they boldly and impudently deny whatever they please, caring not at all whether by their negation or exception they open a wide gate to Atheists, Muhammadans, Jews, Gentiles, and all adversaries of the Scriptures and Christianity, and even contradict their own tenets, provided that they place a hindrance before their adversary in the present disputation. Here they must be compelled to sustain the turns of proving and responding equally, and to hold a certain thesis, and to respond from their own opinion.

11. It must also be noted that nearly all their exceptions and oppositions labor under the fallacy from the particular to the universal, from the indefinite to the universal and indeed exclusive, from some state of Christ to every state, from Economy to Theology, for example: Some word is so taken somewhere, therefore it must be so taken everywhere and in this place. These and those things are attributed to Christ, that He is man, that He is the servant of God, that He is Teacher and martyr; therefore nothing further is attributed to Him, namely that He is eternal God, that He is the propitiation for our sins.

12. Finally, they partly deduce false consequences and applications from true principles and rules, partly they seem to be something among the more unskilled by the Pythagorean mastery

of axioms and general sayings, supported only by "he himself said" and the authority of the speakers. Which if anyone should call back to their disciplines, or demand proof of them from them (for the burden of proof lies on the affirmers), they soon vanish. Moreover, they are partly pseudo-Philosophical, partly pseudo-Juridical, or Political, partly pseudo-philological. These are infinite: which can be seen in the Antagonists of the Socinians, Chovetus, Simlerus, Francis Junius, Puccius, Grotius, Jacob Martinius, Franzius, Smiglecius, Steghmannus, James ad Portum, Winterus, Zarnovecus, Tarnov, Andrew Kesler, Pareus, John Justus, and others. Among those the common one is: No penalty of death can be inflicted on the innocent or just. And the other: Anyone can remit from his own right, which see examined by Grotius in the book on the Satisfaction of Christ. Those are: Numerical essence is not communicable to many. As many as are the persons, so many are the essences. Every generator has an essence numerically distinct from the generated. No human essence can be without its own subsistence. A person cannot be in a person. One action cannot corrupt the whole nature. Whatever is predicated of something is universal, not singular, for no singular is predicated. Person cannot be given to persons without its own corruption. And very many similar things which see noted in Kesler, in the Examination of the Logic, Metaphysics, and Physics of the Photinians.

13. The antidote of antidotes is that we resist those heresies by 1. the sacred Scriptures, 2. sound philosophy and philology, 3. the study of piety and conscience, and the intimate and assiduous contemplation, taste, and exercise about divine things. Concerning the first, these rules must be observed: First, many and closely packed testimonies of the sacred Scriptures must be urged against them, against which the fallacious exception from the particular will be of little avail. For they will not show, for example, that all those things which are said concerning the Son in John 1, Colossians 1, Hebrews 1, and elsewhere, or concerning the Holy Spirit in 1 Corinthians 12, as divine persons, can be said at the same time about some other. Second, where a passage of Scripture must be vindicated from exceptions, they must be compelled to the absurdity of teratology, Libertinism, Atheism, and to contradictions, by which it may be shown that from that depravation of the sacred Scriptures, their authority and credibility is shaken. In the use of philosophy against them, Keckermann, Jacob Martinius, Alstedius, Kesler, Smiglecius, and others have already led the way. Especially the Scholastics, and their prince Thomas in the Summa, and against the Gentiles will greatly aid our disputer. Meanwhile, it must be seen that by Logico-Theological judgment we make an accurate selection of the Scriptures and arguments, lest rashly and with blind zeal seizing anything we tenaciously defend it. For Thomas rightly says, part 1, question 32, article 1, and question 46, article 2: "When someone adduces reasons to prove the Christian faith, which are not cogent, he falls into the derision of the infidels. For they believe that we rely on such reasons, and on account of them believe." Concerning the third, the Belgic Confession rightly admonishes, article 9, that the persons of the Trinity are known both from the Scriptures and from their effects, and those especially, which we perceive in ourselves. For not easily will anyone obscure, much less extinguish in us the faith of the Trinity, if we daily feel in ourselves the grace of the Son, and the love of the Father, and the communication of the Holy Spirit, confirm them, excite them by confessions, prayers, doxologies, and renewed embraces of faith, hope, and love. In which indeed the sermons, liturgies, and doxologies both of all the ancients, and of ours today abundantly lead us, inasmuch as they begin from the Trinity, they end in the Trinity.

Nazianzen, Spiritual Sentences, book 3:

It is right to perform all the best divine deeds,
But let the Trinity be your chief care above all.

That is, translated by John Langus:

It is right to put forth all the best deeds divinely,
But remember especially the sacred things of the Trinity.

See the same Nazianzen's Episcopal Oath, and the preface to his poems. But we have spoken more fully on another occasion, in the year 1639, in the disputation on the Necessity and Utility of the Doctrine of the Trinity, which I soon subjoin.

COROLLARIES.

1. The doctrine of the Trinity, of Christ the God-man, and of His satisfaction, is not Scholastic or problematic, but belongs to the necessity of the Christian faith.

2. The Photinians or Socinians cannot be called Christians, except equivocally or very analogically. See Smiglecius in the prolegomena and appendix to New Monsters, etc. The Fathers ascribed the Arians to the number of the Gentiles, see Athanasius, oration 3 and 4 against the Arians. Constantine decreed by edict, that they should be called Porphyrians, not Christians, and that their books should be burned. Objection: But they confess Christ, therefore they are Christians; indeed they confess His true deity. Response: Those who deny the divine essence, they deny deity, and do not confess the true Christ, but only some idol, and another God than God the Father.

3. That judgment brought by the Theologians of the University of Leiden, D. Junius, D. Trelcatius Sr., D. Gomarus, at the request of the Most Illustrious States General in the year 1598 concerning Faustus Socinus, that he was not a Christian, but a Semi-Turk, best agrees with the truth of the matter and the consent of the whole of Christianity.

4. The Socinians Voidovius and Ostorodius in their apology published in the year 1600 against the Decree of the Most Illustrious and Mighty States General unjustly complain, that their blasphemous books were burned at The Hague, and they themselves were ordered to depart from Belgium, as if their Lordships had committed something unworthy of religion, their conscience, and Belgian liberty, and so by right those atrocious calumnies of the Apologists befitted them: "You seem," they say, "to be surpassed in equity and humanity by the very Inquisitors of heretical depravity in Spain, as far as this deed of yours is concerned," etc. And later: "as if now you plainly wanted to imitate Antichrist himself, and at last even to deliver men to the fire on account of religion," etc. And later: "The most cunning spirit of Satan has persuaded you, that you then preserve the honor of God, the peace of the Church, and the

advantage of your Republic, when you most disturb and ruin all those things." Let the reader note that among those books was the manuscript treatise of Ostorodius against Tradel, Syndic of Augsburg, where he calls the satisfaction of Christ a figment of the Trinitarians. Just as the same Ostorodius in his Institutes, chapter 36, calls it a false error, childish, ridiculous, blasphemous, etc., which smacks of an old wives', superstitious and Papist fable.

5. Ecclesiastical union, or Syncretism, ought not and cannot be entered into in any way between our Churches and the Socinians, however much the Socinians might want it. Yet it does not follow from this that we establish the perfection of our Church in hatred of peace.

6. The dubious Theology of Conrad Vorstius was rightly and deservedly condemned by the Synod of Dort in the year 1619, session 152.

7. The Papists in the Marian Psalter of Bonaventure, which has been reprinted more often in this our age, at Lille in 1605, at Liège in 1607, at Constance in 1611, and elsewhere, imprudently snatch from themselves many weapons, with which we must fight along with them for the deity of the Son and Holy Spirit against the Socinians.

Luther in the preface to the Reader prefixed to the treatise of an Anonymous on the Religion of the Turks:

Our chief defenses and most robust arms are the articles concerning Christ, namely that Christ is the Son of God, died for our sins, raised to our life, that by faith in Him we are justified and saved with sins remitted, etc. These are the thunderbolts, which destroy not only Muhammad, but also the gates of Hell. For Muhammad denies that Christ is the Son of God. He denies that He died for our sins. He denies that He rose again to our life, he denies that by faith in Him sins are remitted and we are justified. He denies that He will come as judge over the living and the dead: although he believes in the resurrection of the dead and the day of judgment. He denies the Holy Spirit: He denies His gifts. With these and similar articles the conscience must be fortified, against the ceremonies of Muhammad. With these engines his Qur'an must be refuted. Socinianism is a more modest or subtle Muhammadanism.

Francis Gomarus’s Treatise on Christ, Autotheos [Of Himself God], with Notes

OF FRANCIS GOMARUS A DIATRIBE, ON Christ the Autotheos, once dictated in the University of Leiden: which, permission having been obtained from the illustrious author, GISBERT VOETIUS edited in type and proposed for public disputation to be aired in the University of Utrecht, notes also having been added. March 9, 1639.

Respondent: CORNELIUS GENTMAN of Goes in Zeeland.

Just as it is fitting for us to flee logomachy and profane empty babblings, and foolish and ignorant questions: So on the other hand the right and pious use of those words, which are common in Theology, must be known, lest we fall into errors or be entangled in the contentions of adversaries. Wherefore I think I will not do something irrelevant, if to those things, which we have discussed against Socinus for the deity of the Son of God, in place of an addition we inquire and examine: Whether the Son of God is "Autotheos". For as by heretics of old, so also in our times this controversy has been variously agitated to the reproach of Christ and Christians. And although the industry of our ancestors has shone forth in treating this matter, they nevertheless left not a few things to the diligence of others. Wherefore for the fuller understanding of the truth and the glory of the Son of God I will endeavor to explain this question according to my ability, beginning from the origin and use of the word. "Autotheos" is an ancient word and oxytone as it rightly stands in Epiphanius and the analogy of similar compound words proves this. Someone (it was James Arminius) dared to affirm that that word does not exist in the fathers. For as in Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names, chapter 11, "Autotheotēs" stands, so "Autotheos" in Origen, on John, volume 2, page 372, and Epiphanius, heresy 76 against the Anomoeans. These said that Christ was anomoios, dissimilar to the Father. For what Gregory of Valentia in his Theological Works, and especially in the Summa of Thomas, page 717, and Bellarmine, in the Controversies, On Christ, book 2, chapter 20, cite heresy 69 (which is against the Arians), lest anyone seek in vain, it is a human lapse either of memory or of faith towards the diligence of another. But as to what pertains to the composition and form of the word "Auto", it appears to have flowed from nowhere else than from the custom of the Platonic school, which most formerly followed. For the Platonists in expressing their Ideas and the abstract forms of things compounded names with the pronoun "auto", by a certain poetic license. Suidas says, "The philosophers meant by 'auto' that which is properly so called and has its own nature, calling 'autoanthropos' man himself and 'autodoxaston' what is properly and more approved." Nor otherwise does Aristotle arguing against the ideas in Metaphysics, book 6, chapter 16. For he teaches that the ideas are declared by the word "auto" added to sensible things.

2. "For we know these, 'autoanthropos' (Scotus in the Metaphysics calls it 'ideal man'), and 'autoippos', by adding 'auto' to sensible things." And ibid., book 2, chapter, by a certain tmesis he says: "For they say 'auto man' is one, and 'autoippos' and 'health'." And ibid., "autoagathon". And book 6, chapter 11, "autogramme". And book 12, chapter 7, "autoakas". And by tmesis, "auto indeed akas". And chapter 10, "autoalpha" and "autobeta". And in the Physics, On Generation and Corruption, chapter 2, "autotriangular". And Topics, book 5, chapter 7, "Autoanthropos" and "autozoon". And book 6, chapter 6, "Autobole". Book 6, chapter 8, "Autoepithumia", "Autohedeos", and "Autobolesis" "Autoagathon", that is, "Desire itself is of the pleasant itself, and will itself of the good itself." Ibid., "Autophainomenon", "the appearing itself". And book 8, chapter 11, "Autodoxa Autoalethes", and "Autodianoia", "opinion itself", which is immediately expounded "doxa itself opinion".

In a similar way, by a certain imitation of the Platonists, God is called "Autotheos", as appears most clearly from Origen and especially from Dionysius the imitator of Plato, On the Divine Names, chapters 5, 6, 11, and the scholia of Maximus, and the paraphrase of Pachymeres. And this is the origin of the word, whence the sense and use is more clearly known. For "Autotheos" and "Autotheotēs" are said of God Himself and the deity itself par excellence, so that they denote not only God, but also from the use of the Pronoun the excellence of the Deity, just as in a hymn Callimachus profanely calls his Jove "theon auton" "aiei megan" "anakta", "God Himself", "always great", "king". Nevertheless that excellence is considered in two ways according to the twofold use of the name of God and diverse relation. For God either properly denotes the first and infinite essence, in which way comparatively with others "Autotheos" is said of God Himself the maker of the world and of the gods: or improperly and by metaphor, as the angel, who by grace of creation and likeness of office with God is named God, and because he was created before, and by power far surpasses in relation to men, who are also called gods, is called "Autotheos", God Himself metaphorically: although one can and ought more easily to abstain from that word in this sense. Moreover, we have also drawn this distinction from Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 11, pages 404, 405, 406, Paris Edition, Greek, and his Greek interpreters Maximus and Pachymeres. For he shows how sometimes he says God is "autozoe", sometimes truly "hupozoe", establisher "of autoeinai" and "autozoe" and "autotheotēs", that God is indeed called "archikos" and "theikos" and "aitiatikos", but the angels, whom he calls "intelligible powers", "provident virtues", "methechos" by participation; whence also distinctly from God (whom he calls "autotekton" and in chapter 12 "amethekton aition") he names them "autousiosis" and "autotheosis", and from men in chapter 12 "autometochas". And these things indeed concerning the origin and use of the word "Autotheos", it remains that we briefly subject the authors and examination of the proposed controversy.

The author of it, as far as I could observe, was Origen who in his Commentary on the Gospel of John, volume 2, page 272, Basel Edition, the last one, says: "For it must be said to them that Autotheos indeed (that is, God per se) is that God with the article, on account of which the savior also in his prayer to the Father says: 'That they may know you the only true God'; but whatever is besides this one who is called Autotheos (that is, God per se), deified by participation and communication of His deity, not that God with the article, but God without the article should more properly be said, altogether in this way, the firstborn of all creation, inasmuch as being the first with Him attracting divinity to Himself is more honorable than the rest of the gods, who are besides Him (of whom He is God), is God, according to what is said: 'That God of gods, the Lord spoke, and called the earth,' giving being to the gods, drawing abundantly from God, whence He might make them gods, and whence He might supply to them according to His own goodness. The true God therefore is that God with the article. But those who are formed as gods after His form, are as certain images of the first exemplar."

And a little after concerning the Son he says: "He would by no means have remained God unless He had perpetually continued in contemplation of the paternal profundity. But since perhaps it is likely that many will be offended, because we have said that only the Father is the true God, and besides the true God many are made gods by participation of God, fearing for the glory of Him who excels every creature lest it be equated to the rest who obtain the appellation

of God without the article besides the given difference by which we have said the Word of God is the minister of deity to all the rest," etc. These things Origen says, from which it appears, that he held that the Father is called "Autotheos", that is, God Himself (for the translator does not express it well enough "God per se") par excellence, compared not only with creatures but also with the Word, and Him alone the true and God by nature, but the Son and creatures made gods by participation of deity. For which reason he somewhere calls the Son "Theopoietos", "made God", as Epiphanius argues, Heresy 64, against Origen, and on that account Epiphanius and Jerome hold that Origen laid the foundations of the heresy of the Arians, although sometimes he speaks more piously and, compelled by the force of truth, is not consistent enough with himself, and so was to be convicted not so much of heresy, because obstinacy was lacking, as of error.

Origen therefore the Arians followed, as before the Nicene Council Eusebius of Caesarea shows in his Demonstration of the Gospel, book 5, chapters 1, 4, 12, 16. He opposes "Theon Auton" and "Theon Logon", and that the Father is the one and only God properly, the Son is "deuteros Theos", the second God, who exists from the Father deifying Him. Similar things were brought forward by other Arians, and other things Epiphanius shows, Heresy 69 and 76. But in our times arose Valentinus Gentilis, who in Proposition 8 says, "The Father alone is Autotheos, that is, essenced by no superior deity, but God from Himself." And 12, "He who contends that the Son is Autotheos either asserts two principles, or must necessarily build the tower of Babel." And Proposition 40 and last, "The one Jehovah the Father, the Word, and that one God of Israel are synonyms of the first person of the trinity." To this one, more from a desire of calumniating than from association in error with the Arians, there acceded first the papist Genebrardus, who names the heresy of the Autotheanites, so as to malign Calvin, Simler, Beza, Daneau; then from among the Lutherans Aegidius Hunnius in Calvin Judaizing, whom some others have followed.

But on the other hand the orthodox fathers have held in two ways that the Son is "Auto ton Theon" or "Autotheotēta", partly "kata rhēton" in the same word, partly "kat' ennoia" in the same sense with diverse words. And indeed in the same word Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names, chapter 11, in which place considering God "aplos", simply, without any distinction of person, and on that account naming the Father, Son, Holy Spirit "Autotheos". Then Epiphanius, Heresy 76, against the Anomoeans, concerning the Father and Son says: "The nature of God having the dignity eternally limitlessly not on account of something else but on account of being Autotheos and Auto-eternal. Accordingly will the offspring also be equal?" But they used a different word yet with the same meaning in many ways. For the Son of God is called:

1. "Autousia", the very essence or divine nature. For Arius called the Son alien from the essence of the Father and exclaimed: "How then can the very essence happen to be?" according to the testimony of Epiphanius, Heresy 69, pages 317 and 335. And Aetius asserts "Autousia" of the Father alone, ibid., Heresy 76, page 406. But against Aetius Epiphanius says, page 413, "Wherefore Autousia is God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and not inusia [non-essence]." And Basil the Great, Against Eunomius, book 4, page 392, Stephens edition: "If

unbegotten is not the name of the essence, but Autousia is the very essence, and the Son is also essence, the Son will also be unbegotten."

2. "Autozoe", the very life. As Basil, ibid., page 409, Greek edition in folio: "If the Son lives through the Father, He lives through another and not through Himself, but he who lives through another cannot be Autozoe, nor he who is holy by grace is Autoagios, the Holy One Himself; the Son therefore will have deceived when He said, 'I am the life.'" Thus concerning the Holy Spirit Gregory of Nazianzus says, in his Oration on the Philosopher Hero, page 162, Greek edition of Basel, "the proceeding one or the procession is Autagotēs". And Basil, book 2 against Eunomius, page 311, in the octavo edition with the Dialogues of Athanasius, calls the Son "the one truly being", "the fountain of life". And in his Apology for his Retreat, page 361, "For whatever lives through another cannot be Autozoe (just as neither can what is heated by another be Autothermes), but Christ and our God said: 'I am the life.'"

3. "Autodunamis". Which Epiphanius relates and in reality proves concerning the Son against the Marcellians, Heresy 72, page 358. Nor did Basil mean anything else, Against Eunomius, book 2, page 339, when he says concerning the Son: "of Autodunamis the true dunamis".

4. "Autoagathon", the good itself, Basil, ibid., book 2, page 335, "This is the implanted anticipation to all Christians (who indeed are worthy of this name), that the Son is the begotten light flashing forth from the unbegotten light, and Autophōs and Autoagathos from the life-giving fount, namely the paternal goodness." And Epiphanius, Against the Anomoeans, Heresy 76, page 407, says concerning the Son: "having the name Autoagathos from the one being Autoagathos". With all which agrees Damascene, Orthodox Faith, book 1, chapter 8, in which place most clearly he calls God considered absolutely and commonly to the three persons "autophusis", "autoagathotes", "autozoe", "autousia", not having being from another or any of those things which He is (for the translator renders it badly "are").

5. "Autoaletheia", the truth itself, as Nazianzen in his 2nd Oration on the Son, page 216, Basel Greek Edition, "For if you apply this, 'only true God', to the Father, where will you put Autoaletheia?" Similarly Origen, compelled by the truth, on John, volume 6, near the end, page 290, on those words ("I am the truth") calls the Son "Autoaletheia". And volume 3, on Christ the man, page 824.

6. "Autosophia", wisdom itself. In which way Dionysius calls God "aplos" and commonly to the three persons "Autoeinai", "Autozoe", "Autodunamis", "Autosophia", On the Divine Names, chapter 11. And Origen, on the Gospel of John, volume 2, page 272, says concerning the Son: "Since He is Autosophia or Autoagathos Himself the Son."

7. "Autodikaiosune", justice itself. As Basil, Apology for his Retreat, page 461, "But the Son is Autodikaiosune and immortality."

8 and 9. "Autoteleiov", the perfect itself, and "Autodoxa", glory itself, which flow from the preceding. For as Athanasius, Dialogue 2 on the Trinity, page 80, says concerning the Father,

"being God Autodoxa", so Epiphanius, Against the Ariomaniacs, Heresy 69, page 341, says concerning the deity of the Son that it has "the same glorified and the same perfect". Similar things against the Marcellians, Heresy 72, page 358, he recounts agreeably to his opinion, in which place the Son is "Autodoxa", "Autoboule", "Autodunamis", as by Nonnus on John, chapter 1, verse 40, "Logou Autoteleos".

This consensus of the orthodox fathers was followed by Calvin, Simler, Zanchius, Beza, Pareus in Calvin Orthodox, book 1, chapter 9, and not a few others.

But as to the matter and examination of the controversy:

1. Whoever is God Himself, and truly, properly and essentially God, He is Autotheos.
But the Son of God is God Himself, truly, properly and essentially God.
Therefore He is Autotheos.

The proposition is confirmed both by the signification and use of the word "Autotheos" among those fathers from whom it draws its origin, as we have demonstrated before. To which also pertains that saying of Justin Martyr, a most ancient Theologian, who in his Hortatory Address to the Greeks, page 13, Commelinian Edition, expounding "Theos Autos", says that the pronoun signifies "ton ontos Theon", "the one who is truly God".

The assumption is true and certain, whence also a true conclusion is gathered.

2. Whoever is "Autousia", "Autozoe", "Autoagios", "Autodunamis", "Autoagathotes", "Autophos", "Autoaletheia", "Autodikaiosune", "Autosophia", "Autoteleiov", "Autodoxa", He is also "Autotheos", because deity, His essence and attributes are reciprocal, But the Son is of this sort, as is clear from the right interpretation and use of those words from the preceding, and from the nature of the Son which is described in the sacred Scriptures, 1 John 5:20, Therefore He is Autotheos.

Just as also the fathers rightly affirm. And this is so clear and certain that among the papists Bellarmine openly acknowledged it, and although he is often unfair to Calvin, he defended him in this matter against his own Genebrardus at length in book 2 on Christ, chapter 19. But someone may say that the Son is rightly called "Autotheos" in this sense which agrees with antiquity and the use of the word, yet Bellarmine censures the manner of speaking: That Calvin says the Son is "Autotheos", that is, God from Himself. Finally, that it was said improperly and harshly in the Creed: "God from God, light from light." But on the contrary, Bellarmine quibbles ineptly. For something is said to be from itself in two ways: Either positively to be effected by itself, or negatively to be "anarcbos", or not effected by another. In the former way, it cannot befit deity, indeed not any thing, because it implies a contradiction for something to be its own cause and effect. But in the latter way it fits deity very well, indeed necessarily, because deity is the first being devoid of cause and the cause of all beings, as the name "Jehovah" proves and the nature of God in Exodus 3, Revelation 1, and roundly Anastasius and Cyril in the Compendiary Exposition of the Faith. "What is God? Essence 'anarchos' [without beginning], cause of all

things that are." And Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 2 on the Son: "What of beings is 'anaitios' [without cause]? Deity." For no one could state a cause of God. Thus in the same place when he calls the Father the cause of the Son, yet he calls the Deity "anaitios".

Then as to what Bellarmine also objects, that Calvin wrongly says the Son has essence from Himself, he quibbles again. For first, in those passages which he adduces he does not prove this; for it is one thing to borrow essence from elsewhere, which Calvin denies, another to have essence. For the former denotes having essence not by nature but by grace. Then it is one thing to speak absolutely, another relatively to a certain matter and phrase and opinion of adversaries, and in this way if the importunity of adversaries demands it, why may it not be allowed to say, the meaning having been rightly explained, that the Son has essence from Himself, not insofar as the word "from" denotes only a term, for thus He has it from the Father by communication through eternal generation; nor insofar as "from Himself" denotes being positively effected by Himself, but insofar as taken negatively it removes efficiency, and denotes "anarchos" or not effected by any, against the opinion of Valentinus Gentilis, who confessed that the Son has essence from the Father but as effected, because He was essenced by the Father; which opinion Calvin contradicted, and in this way Damascene speaks, Orthodox Faith, book 1, chapter 8, when considering God in common he calls Him "autousia", as "not having being from another or any of those things which He is" (for the translator renders it badly "are"). See, effectively, not however communicatively. For this does not break "eusebeia" [piety], but especially confirms it. And these things are certainly so solid and perspicuous, that Gregory of Valentia, the Coryphaeus of Pontifical Theologians, establishes the same to the Summa of Thomas, part 1, disputation 2, question 1, point 1, page 718, "Genebrardus," he says, "also attributes this error to Calvin, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 3, but truly if it is read attentively, he will only seem to have meant that the Son as He is indeed essentially God, is from Himself, and only as He is a person is from the Father, and this is true. For although most truly the fathers and councils affirm that God is from God, taking the word 'God' personally, so that it also signifies the very person of the Father and Son, yet the Son insofar as He is essentially God, that is, as He is that one most simple thing which is God not from another, because as such He is something absolute. But if this only is what other heretics, whom they name Autotheanites, wanted, there would be no need to contend with them about this matter. For also in this sense Epiphanius seems to have called the Son 'Autotheos' in heresy 69," and page 716, "the Son does not have essence from the Father as produced or begotten, but only as communicated, by this very thing that the Son is produced subsisting in it." These things Gregory of Valentia says. By which words the objection of Bellarmine, book 2 on Christ, chapter 19, is excellently refuted, by which he thus presses: "If Calvin asserts that the Father communicated essence to the Son, how can he truly say that the Son has essence from Himself? Likewise, if he says the Son was produced by the Father, how can he deny that essence and life in the Son are from the Father?" For it can most easily be replied to Bellarmine that the essence was indeed communicated to the Son by the Father, but not effected and produced by the Father, as the Jesuit says in the preceding. Valentinus Gentilis perpetually boasted that only the Father is "Autotheos", and by this name he understood that only the Father has truly divine uncreated essence, but the Son and Holy Spirit have another essence produced by the Father, and therefore as to essence they are not "Autotheos". Calvin therefore, wanting to counter Valentinus, asserted the contrary,

namely that the Son is "Autotheos" as to essence, in that sense in which it was denied by Valentinus. Therefore since Calvin spoke thus according to his adversary's admission Bellarmine with respect to the opinion of his adversary, and not absolutely, the Jesuit acts the sophist; while he takes it absolutely, just as also while he thus argues: "If 'Autotheos' signified him, who is God from Himself, certainly neither the Father nor the Son could be called 'Autotheos'; for the Son is not God from Himself but from the Father. The Father also is not God from Himself but from no one. For to be from Himself is to be produced by Himself. For the Father is simply unbegotten and unproduced." But this is mere vanity, for to be from Himself (as is clear from the preceding) can be taken either positively and thus the opinion of the Jesuit is true, or negatively so as to denote being produced by none metaphorically through a certain similitude that things which are from none are just as if they were from themselves. In which ways the same Epiphanius affirms and denies in a different respect. For in that he censures Aëtius, page 417, because when before he had called God "agenetos" [unbegotten], now he calls Him "autogennetos" [self-begotten] since He did not make Himself, not that we absolutely condemn the manner of speaking, but I object to the sophist and too rigid censor of words the neglect of propriety; as also appears from the preceding, page 407, where concerning the Father he says: "and He is unbegotten because from Himself", that is, begotten by none. And Hesychius in his lexicon: "autogenes", "autogennetos" "ouk ek tinon gennomenos", likewise "autolocheuta", "theia agenneta", "autogenneta", whom Suidas follows, "autogennetos", "autopoietos", "theos agennetos". Thus God the Father is called by Synesius, Hymn 6, "autoloches" and by Nonnus on John, chapter 1 and 5, "autogenes". And John, chapter 1, "autophues", and John 3, "autogenes". As also before from Orpheus Justin Martyr in his Hortatory Address to the Greeks, page 12. And the Sibylline Oracles, book 1, "autogenes ó'genes". Which also Lactantius saw, Divine Institutes, book 1, "But," he says, "because it cannot happen, that that which is made, did not at some time begin to be, it follows that when nothing was before it, it was procreated from itself before all things, and therefore by Apollo it is called 'autophues', by the Sibyl 'autogenes' and 'agenetos' and 'apoietos', which Seneca, a man of acute mind, saw in his Exhortations. 'We,' he says, 'depend on another, and so we look to someone, to whom we owe what is best in us, our soul; another begot us, another instructed us, God made Himself.'" These things Lactantius says, in which metaphorical manner of speaking Synesius also says, Hymn 3,

That is, translated by F. Portus
"Of all fathers - Father, father of Himself
Fore-father without-father - Son of Thyself."

Although I would demand greater caution in the use of similar words and phrases for the sake of reverence: but from all these things I think it is clear enough, that some Papists and Ubiquitarians and their followers rashly and unjustly inveigh against our Theologians, because they professed Christ to be "Autotheos", since it has been demonstrated that it belongs to the Father and Son in the same sense.

OF GISBERT VOETIUS Notes on the preceding DIATRIBE.

Page 443, line 15, "opinion itself".

The word "autos" when it includes in itself not a simple relation, but emphasis, and also enters into composition with this notion, denotes 1. "ton monon", the only one; As in that of Homer (Etymologicum Magnum citing), "Tydides, autos in the fore-fighters mingled." 2. "ton kat' exochen", the one par excellence. As in that (these are the words of the Etymologicum), "If he does not give, I myself will take"; And as, "Not angel, not man, but the Lord Himself." Thus the disciples of Pythagoras were accustomed to designate him, "autos epha", he himself said. 3. From itself, so as to exclude every other cause and principle, whence a thing may be or depend, and at the same time connote its own or proper principle or cause; as in the compounds "automatos", "autochthonos", "autoages", "autolechuthos", and similar, which are explained partly by the Etymologicum there, partly by Budaeus in his commentaries, and by the common lexicographers. Thus Plato called the human soul "autokinetos". But when it enters words designating God (such as "Autotheos", "Autozoe", etc.) the connotation of it must be taken only exclusively, not however positively: because in deity as such and absolutely considered, the notion of being caused, or having a principle does not have place. 4. Per se, intrinsic to the thing, essentially, "what it is", (philosophers would say quiddity, perseity, intraneity, formality) also "properly"; so as to exclude "the other", "the like", "the so-called", "the accidental", or whatever coming "from without", or all per accidens, through another, by participation, finally all admixture of accidents and attributes (which are not of the essence and formal notion of the thing). Thus in Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy they expound "autodikaion", being and what it is. See Scheckius, On Demonstration, and on Topics, book 8, chapter 11. For Plato in the Hippias, "the Auto" is the substance of the thing and proper and "belonging to oneself" is God; par excellence of course. That Aristotelian saying, Ethics, book 4, chapter 13, "But the great-souled man must needs be a good man and true in his life", Zwingerus in his scholia thinks can be referred to the essence of truth itself: "For truth," he says, "is posited in the conformity of things, and the concepts and utterances of our intellect. The truthful man therefore will be everything in a certain way, since he will rationally comprehend all things, as they are, not only in theoretical matters, but also in practical." Although he adds in the same place that "aletheuein" can be expounded from chapter 14 following, "oion nomothetein auta". To this notion refer, that "autos" sometimes among Philosophers has the force of limitative reduplication; as, "Animal itself senses," that is, qua animal. 5. Operating and producing something per se and by sufficient and proper principal force. Thus Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book 8, page 561 and 565, in the distinction of efficient causes calls the "synektikon aition" (which if present the effect remains, and if removed is removed), synonymously "autoperes", that is, "perfect by itself", because "autarkes di' auto poietikon esti tou apotelesmatos", it is through itself sufficiently productive of the effect. But in whichever of those five ways the emphasis of the pronoun "autos" in composition is expounded, we think that Autotheos can and should be applied: so that those seem to me to have erred not slightly, who thought this word was wrongly attributed by our Theologians to the Son of God, because He was begotten by the Father, and according to the Nicene Creed, "God from God". For who

compelled them to restrict precisely all the emphasis and signification of this syncategorema to that one notion "from itself"? When God from the usage of language can rightly be called "Autotheos", because God is 1. "kat' exochēn ho Theos", God par excellence. 2. Because He is alone and one. 3. Because through essence, not through participation; per se, and not per accidens; in Himself and essentially, not by some external respect or denomination; in which way many are "legomenoi theoi", 1 Corinthians 8. 4. Because from Himself, not from another, namely "anarchos". 5. Because the first agent, the first mover, who depends on no one, but on whom all second causes depend in being and operation, just as less principal causes on the principal. It having been granted therefore, not conceded, that the "Autotheos" is used of the Son rather harshly and improperly by reason of that notion "from Himself", yet it must not be denied, that by reason of the other notions it can be said of Him properly and suitably: which suffices against the censures of Bellarmine and Arminius, of whom the former contends that in no way, the latter truly that in no other sense this word should be applied to Christ, than insofar as it signifies true God. But we have now shown from the usage of those speaking rightly that the "autos" extends more widely, and in this question concerning Christ the diatribe has taught more things. "True God" in no way suffices to exclude the Anti-Trinitarians; for they confess this with full cheeks, as can be seen in the apology of Voidovius and Ostorodius to the Decree of the Illustrious Lords of the Belgian Orders in the year 1598, where they contend: "There was no cause why the Leiden Theologians should affirm that they (that is, the Socinians) deny the divinity of the Son of God and the Holy Spirit," and afterwards: "We do not deny, by the grace of God, the true (note well) divinity of the Son of God, but the false and imaginary, and which the sacred Scriptures nowhere acknowledge." And Valentinus Smalcius in his book on the divinity of Christ, chapter 25, preaches his diligence and zeal in defending the true divinity of Jesus Christ.

Ibid., line

God by excellence is called "Autos Theos", "God Himself" in sacred and profane authors alike (which is equivalent to "megas theos", "ho Theos", etc.), 2 Samuel 7:28, 1 Chronicles 17:26, "You are God Himself", 2 Kings 19:15, "alone" is added, Isaiah 43:11, "I am the first and the last," that is, "I am He", Nehemiah 9:6, "You are Jehovah Himself": where the Septuagint Greek translates "su autos Kurie", "You the Lord Himself", Galatians 1:3. Marius Victorinus, On the Secret of Catholic Truth, chapter 23, thinks that the Hebrew pronoun "ani hu" ["I am He"], placed separately without the substantive noun God, is one of the names of God, which he thinks can be proved from Isaiah 42:8. But in this he labors in vain, since the text itself most clearly proves that it must be taken relatively there (as Isaiah 41:4 and Psalm 37:5), and joined with its antecedent: which is as much as if it were expressly joined with the noun God. Hence judgment can be made, what must be said concerning the first signification of "autos" in the compound words "Autotheos", "Autozoe", etc.

Page 444, line 33

As Epiphanius and Jerome already cited draw Origen into suspicion of this heresy, so also Augustine, On Heresies, chapter 43. Origen himself moreover says, that the Son of God compared to the saints, is the truth: compared to the Father, a lie: and as far as the apostles are

distant from Christ, so far is the Son from the Father. Whence the Son must not be adored with the Father, because He is not the author of granting petitions, but a suppliant. Photius, Bibliotheca, codex 8, says that in book 1, On First Principles, he wrote blasphemously about the Trinity. However, Augustine in the cited chapter did not keep silent: the defenders of Origen said that one and the same substance of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit was handed down by Origen, and indeed besides the ancients Eusebius of Caesarea in his apology under the name of Pamphilus, and in six other books, about which Photius in his Bibliotheca, page 158, in addition Thaumaturgus, Didymus of Alexandria, Methodius, Olympius, Rufinus, there are also more recent authors who have endeavored to purge Origen from these and other heresies: among whom Pico della Mirandola in one book; James Merlin, Parisian Theologian, in the apology prefixed to the books of Origen edited by him in the year 1512; Gilbert Genebrard in the dedicatory epistle and in the collectanea added to the Paris edition of Origen in the year 1574; and not obscurely Sixtus of Siena in his Sacred Library. Of the Protestants, Elmenhorst in his notes on Gennadius, page 123, 125, suspects that many things were falsely affixed to Origen; and Hoeschel in the preface to the books of Origen against Celsus, edited in Greek and Latin, thus judges of him, "If he seems to have hallucinated somewhere, let us remember that he was a man, not unaware that some of his writings are held to have been maliciously corrupted by others, some falsely ascribed to him," etc. Which it seemed good to note here, lest the more benign judgment of the illustrious D. Gomarus concerning Origen, as also of the illustrious Du Moulin in the Novelty of Papism, and of the great Heinsius, Sacred Exercises on John, chapter 14, Scultetus in the Marrow of the Fathers, volume 1, page 168, and perhaps of others from among us, be drawn to calumny. Those great men are not ignorant, what has been bandied about concerning Origen on both sides, and what most of the Reformed Doctors have determined about him; let Daneau stand in place of many in his commentary on Augustine, On Heresies, chapter 43, Beza in his notes on the New Testament, especially in the epistle to the Romans where on chapter 3, verse 20, he calls him "a choice instrument of the devil destined for overthrowing apostolic doctrine": and on Romans 1:1, "Origen," he says, "I cannot with a good conscience place among those fathers, whom I would want to imitate, etc., I would desire that impure writer to be shaken out of the hands of readers, etc." Whose judgment Rivetus seems not obscurely to approve, Sacred Criticism, book 2, chapter 12. But since this controversy about the doctrine of Origen is merely historical, and turns on the state of denial, and concerns a judgment not of faith but of charity, what forbids us to think with our illustrious preceptor in the more benign part, or at least to suspend judgment, rather than to attribute such horrid and absurd things to that most learned man? "Concerning the Trinity," says Scultetus, "he everywhere generally teaches rightly, and likewise concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and among other things, homily 8 on Exodus (we add below another passage from book 3 against Celsus), yet nevertheless he said that the Son compared to the Father is very small, etc. For all these things those ancients attribute to him, Epiphanius, Jerome, Suidas. Which assertions indeed being so many ways contradictory, since they do not seem to fall upon a man of mediocre judgment, much less upon a learned and celebrated one for piety, I see that there is great cause, why Pamphilus, Rufinus the presbyter, Chrysostom, and other fathers undertook the defense of Origen against Epiphanius, etc., and determined that so many errors proceeded not from Origen, but from the calumniators of Origen, and the depravers of his writings. In which brief apology I acquiesce: especially since Beza on Romans 3:20 testifies tacitly enough his

retention concerning the historical hypothesis, whether these are the genuine writings of Origen; and much more openly in his epistles, epistle 28, page 163. Indeed, the Papists themselves (at least those most skilled in all things) although on account of the authority of the judgment of Gelasius they want all things once judged concerning Origen to be authentic and irrefutable, yet show themselves to fluctuate, as often as they allege him with the common title of holy father, and ecclesiastical Doctor in controversies, where of course they think he supports their cause: Cocus has annotated those passages in his Censure of the Fathers. To say nothing now of the authors just alleged. See the whole course of this intestine controversy in Baronius on the year 397, collated with the year 256, section 40. And Possevinus in his Sacred Apparatus, on Origen. At least in the controversy about the Trinity, if indeed it must be judged from the writings which exist, his constant doctrine must not be gathered from the dangerous and unsuitable phrases or certain opinions which he babbled, and be marked with the black coal of heresy. When the orthodox are not exercised by the zeal of contradictors and contenders, they often speak more securely.

Page 445, line 4

Here the threefold adversaries dissent. 1. The Papists; who depart into two classes; For some censure the very matter in Calvin, and by calumny impute heresy, blasphemy, atheism to him, as if of course he taught that the Son was not begotten by the Father in the unity of the same essence, and they are, after Genebrard, book 1 on the Trinity, Possevinus, On the Marks of the Word of God, book 3, chapter 74, Richeome, book 3, Huguenot Idolatry, chapter 3, Hay, in his Questions, question 132, Salmeron, volume 2, treatise 10, Claudius de Sainctes, in the Declaration of the Atheisms of Calvin and Beza, Lindanus, dialogue 2, which is more doubtful; Peter Canisius, preface to the book on John the Baptist: The monks of Bordeaux in the articles of abjuration, The Rhaetian priests in the disputation of Tirana, Reginald and Gifford in Calvino-Turkism, book 3, chapters 6, 7, The English-French Jesuits in their notes on John 1:1, Stapleton in the Catholic Promptuary, Tuesday after Passion Sunday, Campion, reason 8, Johannes Faber, J.C., Fabrianus Codex, book 1, title 1, Feuardent in the French book entitled "Entremangeries and Ministerial Wars", chapter 16. The same in the Calvinist Theomachy, book 3, chapter 3, imposes this heresy on Calvin, Beza, Viret, Farel, Simler, Gualther, Bullinger, Lavater, Volanus, indeed also on entire Swiss synods. Where however he adds that they contradict themselves and in the places and disputations which he cites from them in the same place, that heresy is solidly refuted. Prateolus, book 3, under the word "Calvinist". Others of the Papists only carp at the phrase in Calvin, as Bellarmine, book 2 on Christ, chapter 19, with whom can be joined Gregory of Valentia, book 2 on the Trinity, chapter 1 and 17, and book 1, chapter 22, and they doubt whether a new heresy of the Autotheanites should be constituted: which before them Genebrard had done with others of that ilk. 2. Lutherans, who censure not only the phrase, but also the very opinion of Calvin and as it were impute heresy to him under this name; as Heshusius in his book on the Eucharist, Hunnius in Calvin Judaizing, and if any preceded him, whom I think were noted and refuted by Pareus in Orthodox Calvin, book 1, chapter 9. Of the more recent Lutherans, Stechmann cooks up the same crambe against the Photinians, disputation 5, question 6. However, on the contrary, Meisner defends Calvin ex professo against the Socinians, whom Slichtingius the Socinian on that account exagitates in his

disputation on the Trinity, etc., against Meisner, page 375. 3. James Arminius in his declaration to the illustrious Orders of Holland, pages 61, 62, 63, opposes not the phrase but the very thesis itself, asserting that it conflicts with the word of God and the whole ancient Greek and Latin church. Page 64, he adds: "It can in no way be excused as well said, that the Son of God is 'Autotheos'." He treats the same controversy in his Response to the 31st Article, page 13, but a little more moderately. 4. Peter Carol, formerly minister of Lausanne, who in a certain Swiss synod is said to have opposed Farel by Feuardent in the Theomachy, cited place, where he also reports his arguments. 5. The modern Anti-Trinitarians oppose the very matter in Calvin and the orthodox, among whom Crell in his treatise on the One God the Father, book 1, section 2, chapter 2. And Slichtingius against Meisner.

Page 445, line 9

Let these be the arguments for our opinion. 1. He who truly is and is rightly called, "Autos Theos", "God Himself", that is, the true, only, great God, he is rightly called "Autotheos". But Christ truly is and is rightly called "Autos Theos", Therefore. The consequence of the major is clear, because "Autos Theos" and "Autotheos" in reality signify one and the same thing: nor has it been shown thus far from the usage of those philosophizing in Greek, or of the Greek fathers that those two differ so much, that to whom the one must necessarily be attributed, the other must not be attributed. The minor is proved from this, that He is the true, only, and one God with the Father (which is here presupposed), and our God is only one: but He is called "Autos Theos" in the places cited above, 2 Samuel 7:28, 1 Chronicles 17, 2 Kings 19:15, Nehemiah 9:6. 2. He who is "ho Theos" (with the article), "ho alethinos Theos", "ho megas Theos", "to phos to alethinon", He is "Autotheos": But Christ is: "Theos", etc., John 20:28, collated with Hebrews 1:8, 1 John 5:20, Titus 2:13, John 1:9. Where rightly Beza, that is, as Plato speaks according to his measure, "autophos". Therefore He is "Autotheos". The reason of the consequence is, because the particle "autos" and equally denote that excellence, or way of eminence (as it is commonly said with the so-called Areopagite) according to which all essence and perfection must be attributed to God, by which He is distinguished from creatures; so that "ho Theos", and "Autos Theos" is as much as "Theotes", as Damascene calls God: likewise "he zoe" and "Autozoe", "he agathotes" and "Autoagathotes" is as much as "Autozoe", "Autoagathotes", and so in the rest. 3. He who is "ousia anarchos anaitios", that is, essence devoid of principle and cause, without beginning the beginning and without end the end, God by nature and through essence, who is simply independent, and on whom all things depend: He is "Autotheos": But the former is true, therefore. The minor is proved, first, because Christ is one, only, eternal, the great God with the Father: but the supreme and eternal God in Scripture, Isaiah 40:18, 25, Romans 11:34, Galatians 4:8, 1 Timothy 1:17, and 6:16, collated with John 17:3, Exodus 3:14, is described as such and no other, and so the Gentiles themselves and from them the fathers everywhere describe God as "anarchos", "autogenes", etc. Theodoret, On the Cure of Greek Affections, sermon 2, page 25, from Orpheus: "One is 'autogenes', for Him all things were made." The description of God from Justin Martyr is commonly known, that He is "ousia anarchos anaitios": which Arminius also has, disputation on the Nature of God, thesis 9. Moreover, this description befits Christ, because and insofar as He is the one, first and supreme God: for by reason of the common deity (which each person has whole) and the common and

essential attributes no distinction ought to be thought, but only by reason of person, and personal properties. Second, because especially to the Son of God this description of divinity is applied, for He is called Jehovah, Jeremiah 23, "ho on kai ho en", "ho erchomenos", "ho protos kai", Revelation 1:8, 11, collated with chapter 4:8, and 10:5, and Isaiah 43:10, and 44:6, and 48:12. 4. He who has life in Himself, just as the Father, He in that respect is and can be called "Autotheos". But the former is true, John 5:26, Therefore. I cannot but transcribe the words of Cornelius à Lapide the Jesuit, from his commentary on this passage: "To have life in oneself signifies three things. First, to have life from oneself and one's essence, not from another. For the essence of God is life, and life is essence. God therefore is essentially and through essence the very essential, uncreated, and immense life. Thus St. Augustine here, tractate 19, 'What is it,' he says, 'the Father has life,' etc. And a little after: 'So He gave also to the Son to have life in Himself: as the Son is God, and that according to the three modes just reviewed, that His life might not be a life needing life,' says Augustine, 'lest by participating He be understood to have life: for if by participating He had life, He could also by losing be without life,' etc. 'Therefore the Father remains life, the Son also remains life: the Father life in Himself, not from the Son, the Son life in Himself, but from the Father.' Above of the Father He had said 'has life in Himself', that is, He does not have life elsewhere, but in Himself: for His living is in Him, and not from elsewhere. It is not alien, not as if He borrowed life, nor as if He were partaker of that life, which is not what He Himself is: but He has life in Himself, so that He Himself may be life to Himself." With these join from sermon 38 on the Seasons: "Whatever the Father is by which He is God, by which He is substance, by which He is eternity, this the Father, this the Spirit is," etc. But the Father is "Autotheotēs", "Autousia", and "Theotēs", etc., therefore also the Son. 5. He who is God with respect to Himself, although Son with respect to the Father, He in that respect is and can be called "Autotheos", that is, God Himself, God through essence, in Himself, by Himself, and from Himself God. But the former is true. Therefore. Augustine has the minor, sermon 38 on the Seasons. "But it must be known that certain things are said of God substantially: as God is great, omnipotent, and whatever is said with respect to Himself, that is, signifying the substance of divinity. But certain things are said relatively as Father with respect to the Son, the Son with respect to the Father, and the Holy Spirit relatively with respect to the Father and to the Son: but with respect to Himself, whether Father or Son or Holy Spirit is called God. And so the Father in that He is God, by this very thing is substance, because without doubt the Son is also God of the same substance, and the Holy Spirit is God. But God is said relatively in that He is the Father, because it is not a name of substance, but is referred to the Son as God. Nor do we so say that the Son is the Father, as we say that He is God, because God is said substantially, but Father and Son and Holy Spirit are said relatively." And a little after: "And this Trinity is the one God alone, good, great, eternal, omnipotent, Himself to Himself unity, deity, greatness, goodness, omnipotence, and whatever is said substantially with respect to Himself. It must not be so understood or said in relative terms: because it cannot be said that the Father is Father to Himself," etc. 6. From the absurd consequence. If the essence of the Son considered absolutely insofar as it is one and common to the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, is not "Autotheotēs", and the Son in that respect is not "Autotheos", then this essence will be other than the essence of the Father, or at least from another, namely from the Father. It is not another essence; because then the unity of the divine essence would be taken away: but now, if indeed the divine essence, which the Father has, were "Autotheotēs" and the Son's were not, then certainly one and the

same essence is not held. Again, if the essence of the Son qua essence considered in common, were from another, namely from the Father, then it will be either begotten, or essenced or caused. Not the latter, for then the Father would produce His own essence. Not the former, because essence in divine things neither begets, nor is begotten, as after the fathers ours unanimously teach with the Scholastics on Lombard, book 1, distinction 5. Nor is there need that we repeat this here. 7. Add also this absurdity, that many errors about this mystery cannot be solidly and felicitously refuted, and exceptions removed, unless the "Autotheos" with that distinction or limitation (which ours apply) be admitted. Let the adversaries make trial. The Sabellians or Patripassians deny the distinction of persons in God: because they do not distinguish between person and essence, substance and subsistent, as Eusebius speaks, Ecclesiastical History, book 10, chapter 29. The Arians on the contrary with Valentinus Gentilis take away the unity of essence. Gilbert Porreta, Bishop of Poitiers in the year 1147, was accused, that he had taught: That the divine essence is not God: That the properties of the persons are not the persons themselves; that the theological persons are predicated in no proposition: That the divine nature was not incarnate. The same in the Parisian assembly asserted: that the Father is Father by one thing and God by another, yet is not this and this. Let Bernard be seen, sermon 80 on the Song of Songs, and Otto of Freising, book on Frederick, chapters 47, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, Baronius on the year 1147, n. 17, 18, 19, 20, and the year 1148, n. 9, Thomas I, question 39, article 6. We ask that the Papists defend the opinion of the Council of Rheims by which it is decided against Gilbert in some things, and prove or disprove the rest, which are left undecided: and they will see, how necessary for them will be the explication and distinction of Calvin against Valentinus Gentilis. Joachim the Abbot in the year 1195 contended against Lombard, that essence begets essence, just as God begets God. Concerning which see the chapter "We condemn" in the Extravagantes on the Supreme Trinity. Let them also undertake the refutation of this opinion. We would also like to see how they will render their Genebrard and similar Calvin-scourgers immune from syncretism with the Arians. Let them hear Socinus in his response to the paraenesis of Andrew Volanus, page 193, "It is agreed among all that Christ does not lack origin, but has His principle the Father. For if here Volanus takes refuge in the distinction of essence and person, and says that the Son of God indeed by reason of person does not lack origin, but by reason of essence does lack it - First, I say, this does not seem to make for the matter: for there must necessarily be talk about the very person of the Son of God, when He is so distinguished from the Father, and the person itself is God, and is itself worshipped, adored, invoked, but not the essence. Then I advise (note well) that he diligently read the first book of G. Genebrard, Parisian Theologian, on the Trinity, where he will find explained against his Masters from the authority of the ancients, that the Son of God has origin from the Father by reason of the very essence, and only the Father is 'Autotheos', and those must be deemed heretics, who contend that Christ is 'Autotheos'." Finally, we do not see, how with the distinction of Calvin and ours of "from Himself", and "Autotheos" having been rejected, indeed marked with heresy, the Papists, Lutherans, and disciples of Arminius will felicitously respond to the argument of John Crell the Socinian, section 2, book 1, On the One God the Father. Let them make trial, I pray. The same I say, about the disputation of Jonas Schlichtingius the Socinian on the Trinity, etc., against Meisner the Lutheran, pages 375-386, where he laboriously defends Socinus boasting of his syncretism with the Pontifical Theologians, against Calvin, Beza and other Evangelical Theologians. Ibid., page 372. 8. It is added, that this opinion

best agrees with orthodox antiquity: as has been shown at length and excellently by Dr. Gomarus. To which add Augustine, sermon 38 on the Seasons just cited. Chamier cites Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 10, chapter 4 (but I could not find the place in this haste), where Christ is expressly called "Theou pais gnesios kai Autotheos". And indeed thus "kata to rheton". But through equivalence they express it in many ways. Dr. Gomarus reviews nine. To 2. "Autozoe" add to the cited authors Athanasius, Oration on the Incarnation of the Word, and Gregory of Nyssa in the Greater Catechesis, chapter 1, "It is altogether necessary, that admitting simplicity, we deem the Word Himself to be life by Himself (Autozoe), not the privation of life." To 3. "Autodunamis" add Athanasius, Oration against the Gentiles. To 4. "Autoagathon", add "Autoarete" and "Autodikaiosune", Athanasius, cited place. To 5. add Athanasius ibid. and Origen, Against Celsus, book 3, page 140. To 6. add Athanasius and Origen, cited place, with which agrees "Autosoter" in Basil on Psalm 44, and authors in Epiphanius, place cited several times. 10. Let "Autoboule" be in Origen, and Athanasius, places just cited. 11. "Autochos" in Theophylact on John 1:14. The arguments to these can be added those testimonies of the fathers, where by necessary consequence they assert the "Autotheotēs" of the Son. 12. Nazianzen, sermon on the Holy Spirit, calls God "Pantokrator"; therefore the same ought to be said of the Son. 13. Because all the essential attributes of God, are everywhere expressed by the addition of ("autos") as "Autoathanasia", "Autophos", "Autotheos", etc. But the divine attributes belong to the Son and Holy Spirit equally as to the Father. Indeed, they also apply to the true God opposed to creatures and the idols of the Gentiles in imitation of the Gentiles "autogenetos", "autoteles", "autogenes", "autophutos", "autolocheutos", "autokarpos", etc. But the Son is equally the true God to them as the Father. Therefore. Certainly Nonnus does not hesitate to call the Son in chapter 2, verse 12, "autopton huia", and chapter 1, verse 14, "logon autoteleston": self-existing (although the illustrious Heinsius suspects something else must be understood here), and the Spirit in chapter 3, verse 6, "pneuma autogonon". 9. Indeed the Papists themselves bear witness to this truth. Besides Gregory of Valentia and Bellarmine cited by the illustrious Gomarus, there is James of Valencia on the Canticle "We praise You, O God": "Furthermore," he says, "it must be noted with humility and trembling, that besides the aforesaid respective order, another order as it were absolute must be considered in divine things, which posits no distinction in God, namely insofar as God depends causally on no one, but is from Himself (note well), in Himself and on account of Himself." And soon: "And that order, which seems to be essentially absolute, does not take away the respective order: indeed it is simultaneously with it." Gretser, Apology of Bellarmine, volume 2, book 5, in defense of chapter 5, "The person of Christ and His divine nature, is as much the natural dominion of all things, as it is natural to Him to be the first being independent from Himself." Vasquez on the 1st of Thomas, Disputation 140, chapter 2, Where he thus speaks of the person of the Father: "The Fathers, both Greek and Latin, admit the Greek word 'agennetos' and the Latin 'ingenitus', without any suspicion, and that not to signify the essence, but the mode of the essence or subsistence, and the characteristic property which the scholastics call a notion." Here that distinction is insinuated, by which ours say the Son is from Himself, or from no one, by reason of course of essence: for by reason of mode of subsisting He is from the Father, and only the Father is called "agennetos". It is cited by Morton in his Apology on the Marks of the Church, Pineda in his commentary on Job, chapter 2. But nothing of the sort appears there. Perhaps the words of that author must be sought elsewhere. Lindanus in his Christomachy, while he makes it

his sole business to curse, that benediction slips from him imprudently in the catalogue of the Sacraments, page 33, where concerning Valentinus Gentilis: "He preaches that the Father alone is the true God: then he concedes to the Son the name of God, but as it were precarious, because He is essenced by the Father, whom he feigns to be the essencer (note well) and 'Autotheos', etc. He says therefore that only the Father is 'Autotheos', that is, essenced by no superior deity, but God from Himself: but he who contends that the Son is 'Autotheos', asserts two principles. In sum, the impious man teaches that the Son differs from the Father in substantial number, that is, is substantially other than the Father. Whence he makes two substances to be, but the Son not to have 'Autousia', as the Father does." We conclude with the words of Bellarmine, book 2, chapter 19, indicated by Dr. Gomarus, which we exhibit here described: "But although these things are so, yet while I thoroughly examine the matter and diligently consider the opinions of Calvin, I do not easily dare to pronounce that he was in this error: since indeed he teaches that the Son is from Himself with respect to essence, not with respect to person: and he seems to want, that the person is begotten by the Father, the essence is not begotten nor produced, but is from itself, so that if you remove the relation to the Father from the person of the Son, the essence alone remains, which is from itself." Then with some reasons solidly and perspicuously enough he proves that Calvin, or Beza, or Simler did not here depart from catholic truth: although afterwards he chastises the phrase of Calvin, but rather unskilfully. Possevinus transcribes part of the words of Bellarmine, and praises his judgment in his Sacred Apparatus, page 639, under the entry "Gilbert Genebrard". And because some of the Lutherans formerly thought that ours sinned here, we demonstrate to them the words of Meisner, Sober Philosophy, part 2, section 1, chapter 2, question 2, "Bellarmine, book 2 on Christ, chapter 19, taxes those who call the Son of God 'Autotheos'. But the suspicion of error arises from the equivocation of the word. For 'Autotheos' has a twofold sense. For it is opposed first to personal production, and denotes God altogether 'agennetos' and unproduced who is from no one nor receives the divine essence by communication. In this sense only the Father is 'Autotheos'. 2. To temporal production, and signifies God, who has the divine uncreated essence without any origin of time. In this sense both the Son and the Holy Spirit is 'Autotheos'. For the divine essence itself is nothing other than 'Autotheotēs', etc., which is to itself and through itself and in itself what it is, etc. And this is what others say, that divinity is considered in two ways. 1. By reason of its being. 2. By reason of mode of having. As to its being it is rightly called 'Autotheotēs', etc., and in that sense the Son, since He truly is the uncreated God, on this very account is deservedly called 'Autotheos'. As to mode of having a certain distinction arises between the persons. For the Father received deity from no one, the Son from the Father," etc. And afterwards, "Most briefly, the Son is 'Autotheos' with respect to the uncreated essence; He is not in relation to the Father, etc., He indeed has 'Autotheotēs' but not from Himself," etc. "Which one thing if Bellarmine had considered, in censuring he would not have been so rash, and in judging so unfair." The same Meisner at greater length and ex professo defends our opinion, and the sayings of Calvin opposed by Socinus in Slichtingius, cited place, where see, I pray. P. Tarnovius on the Trinity against Socinus, chapter 8, although he does not name Calvin, yet has the very matter, distinguishing that Christ is "Autotheos" not "huphestekotos" but "ousios": that He has the same omniscience and the rest of the divine attributes from Himself, not indeed by reason of person (because His person is from the Father) but by reason of essence. Finally, to the judgment of Arminius we oppose Vorstius, who in Anti-Bellarmine on

Controversy 2, book 2, chapter 19, defends the phrase of Calvin: adding that it implies a contradiction if it be denied that He is "Autotheos", who possesses the whole divine nature existing from itself necessarily, naturally, from all eternity. 10. Let the consensus of ours close the line, lest anyone think, that one perhaps or another has given more regard to his own genius and mental impulses, than to the defense of common necessary truth. Calvin in Institutes, book 1, chapter 13, in the refutation of Gentilis, and epistle 351, and Beza in his epistle to the Poles, Simler in his book on the Son of God, although some censured them teaching thus, yet the Doctors of our churches commonly followed, Daneau, Introduction, part 1, chapter 9, Perkins in his explication of the Creed, Keckermann in his System of Theology, Trelcatius Jr. in his Common Places, The same also in his disputation on the Person of Christ in the University of Leiden, proposition 12, July 1603, Respondent Jeremiah Pours, where in thesis 5 he thus speaks: "The first person did not give to the second the absolute essence (for in respect of that this person is from Himself and 'Autotheos') but the mode of essence in an incomprehensible way, which they call generation by Scripture," etc. Tilenus and Polanus in their Syntagma, Wollebius in his Compendium of Theology, Henry Salcobrigensis in his Becanus-Club, page 22, Alting in his Collected Theological Disputations. In the same sense I think it was said by Grynaeus, Theological Disputations, Disputation against the Ebionites, that the Son is "anarchos" and "anaitios" by reason of essence. To these Theologians add most especially Schriverius in his notes on the illustrious Heinsius' Hymn to Christ sung in our native tongue, where page 23 he thus says: "Our author in these two little verses has properly expressed what the Greek Theologians preach concerning the Son, namely that He is 'Autotheos' not 'Autohuios', God from Himself, but not Son from Himself." But especially here for the sake of the juniors those Doctors must be indicated, who have defended both the opinion and phrase of Calvin against adversaries ex professo, as many as I have happened to read. And they are, Daneau in his peculiar treatise against Genebrard which is published with his works in folio, where in chapter 1, pages 13, 14, he teaches that all the orthodox Theologians of Germany, Switzerland, England, France, Italy who then lived, and afterwards lived with Calvin think the same. Zanchius in his epistles, book 1, page 43, Chamier, Panstratia, volume 2, book 1, chapters 3 and 4, The colloquists in the disputation of Tirana in Rhaetia in the year 1595, part 4, pages 295, 302, 378, and these indeed a little more fully: but the following more briefly, Zadeel against the Bordeaux articles 1, James Lectius J.C., Theological Prescriptions against Faber, book 4, negation 4, Pareus, Orthodox Calvin, book 1, chapter 9, Morton, Catholic Apology on the Marks of the Church, book 1, chapter 52, The author of Turco-Papism, book 3, page 459, Whitaker against Campion, reason 8, Francis Junius on Bellarmine, book 2, chapter 19, and on the preface, note 20, Vorstius in Anti-Bellarmine ibid., Ames, Bellarmine Disarmed, part 1, disputation 16, Rivet on Genesis, Exercise 14, Alting, Theological Problems M.S., locus 3, paragraph 32. Add from the Lutherans Meisner and Tarnovius cited above.

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It will be easy to refute the objections of the adversaries from those things, by which Chamier satisfies the petty reasons and exceptions of Bellarmine and Claudius de Sainctes Salmeron: Likewise the Rhaetian ministers to one or another of their adversaries. Zanchius while he removes doubts for a friend, to whom he writes, concisely, accurately and scholastically,

nevertheless perspicuously removes every difficulty. Genebrard while he does this, that he may most shamefully impose the heresy on others by 8 arguments, he has given himself; uttering things not sufficiently agreeable to the Scholastics, nor to the fathers, nor to the Scriptures, nor to reason: which besides Daneau, his antagonist James Scheckius the Philosopher detects a great part in a peculiar response in Antisimonius, final chapter. James Arminius produces nothing new, which has not been abundantly refuted by the authors already cited, especially by Zanchius. And he himself in the 31 articles, article 21, seems to concede more, than in the Declaration; and rather to dispute against the peculiar phrase and hypothesis of Trelcatius (about which below) than against the common opinion. It will therefore suffice for us to indicate to the juniors the fountains of solutions, easily to be applied to doubts either moved by others or rising up to themselves. Moreover, they are partly hypotheses, partly distinctions. Those are 1. The essence of God is one individually, or most singularly; And so in it there is not essencing and essenced, nor does the Son have essence from the Father by multiplication: but He has one and the same essence, which is common to Him with the Father. 2. God is the first and independent being, He is "pragma autohuparxion", that is, a thing which is by itself, as Cyril defines the essence of God in his Catecheses. 3. He does not have therefore from Himself, nor from elsewhere His origin, as Chrysostom teaches, book on the Incorporeal Nature of God; and Basil, book 1 against Eunomius, where he says, this was always granted by all, that God neither existed from Himself nor from another. Hence perhaps in the same place, and Athanasius in his Dialogue of the Orthodox and Anomoean and other fathers reject the "agennetos" attributed to the Father alone. 4. And by this reason the divine essence is rightly said to be "Autotheotēs", and God "Autotheos". 5. Person is distinguished from essence, and the persons are distinguished among themselves; as also the essential properties and predications, from the personal, or notional as the Scholastics call them. 6. Essence in divine things does not beget or is begotten, but person: The Father begets in, from, and out of His essence, which is the same with the essence of the Son. 7. The essence therefore can be said to be communicated, given by the Father, and received and had from that communication or donation by the Son. Briefly, the person of the Father begets the person of the Son through communication of the same essence. 8. The Father is "Autotheos", in both respects both essentially and notionally. 9. The same things which are said of the Father with respect to essence or essentially, befit the Son. Athanasius against the Arians, oration 4, "Since therefore they are one, and deity is one to them, the same things are said of the Son, which are said of the Father; except that He is not called Father."

The distinctions are. 1. Person in divine things can be considered in three ways, commonly in essence, by which He is God; singularly absolutely in person, by which He subsists in unity of essence; relatively, in the distinction and order of one person to another. This is the distinction of Fr. Junius. 2. In divine things a twofold order must be considered: one respective to the persons, which regards the peculiar "taxis" and subsistence of each person; the other a causal, essential order, and of dependence: Thus the Rhaetian ministers in the Disputation of Tirana. 3. When it is said to have essence from another, it must be noted that "to have" includes many things in itself, both he who has, and he from whom he has, and the mode by which he has, and that which he has. Which things must be accurately distinguished. Thus Zanchius. 4. The reduplicative particle "quatenus" [insofar as] was invented, that by this those things may be

separated mentally, which cannot be separated in reality. The same. This badly and improperly used in this disputation, is the cause of confusion and error: which in his friend Zanchius notes in the same place. And this alone made Arminius hallucinate, because of course he did not want to admit the distinction of concepts or formal notions of essence and personality, because he saw that essence is not really and in existence separated from person, nor vice versa. Here the things which the Scholastics and more recent authors both Papists and ours inculcate concerning the identical and formal sense, and the distinction of essence as such from the person of the Father or Son, or Holy Spirit as such, must be conferred and repeated. We have also explained more fully elsewhere in the disputation on the adoration of Christ as mediator the "quatenus", and "qua", and "formal", "formality", etc., where we also adduce the Remonstrants, disciples of Arminius, to the sides: so that it may be agreed that the formal notions of person and essence must necessarily be distinguished. 5. The Son is not God, insofar as He has essence in this way, namely from the Father begetting (for then the Father and Holy Spirit would not be God); but insofar as He has essence or deity absolutely and simply. Again the Son is Son not insofar as He has the essence of God or deity (for then the Father and Holy Spirit would equally be Son, because they have the same deity), but insofar as He has essence communicated of course by the begetting Father. The same Zanchius. 6. The Son is said to be "Autotheos", because He has the divine essence which is from itself, but not because He has it from Himself; for He has it from the Father, John 5. Thus they commonly distinguish. However, they express it diversely. Others: The Son qua Son is not "Autotheos"; but qua God essentially or qua deity and divine essence He is "Autotheos". Others: The Son is "Autousia", "Autozoe", absolutely, regard being had of essence (for deity is "Autotheotēs", "Autousia"), but not relatively, regard being had of person. Others distinguish the consideration, by which the Son is compared with the person of the Father, from that by which the Son is considered absolutely as God. Others, The Son is "Autotheos" insofar as He is considered God with respect to Himself; He is not, insofar as He is considered God with respect to the Father. Others, As to essence or "kat' ousian", the Son is devoid of principle (for the divine essence is "anarchos"; and the Son has the same with the Father): but as to His own subsistence He is not. Others, The essence of God is considered commonly or singularly: in the former way it is equally in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit; in the latter way it is in the Father "autotheos", in the Son "hutheos", in the Holy Spirit "ekporeutikos". Thus Alsted in Theological Distinctions, chapter 3. The same, The being of the Father and being Father, likewise the being of the Son and being Son differ: by the former formula is signified the essence of deity which is common to the three persons; by the latter the character of the essence, which is proper to each person. Others, The Son is God from Himself and through Himself as to essence; He is not God from Himself and through Himself as to filiation.

Moreover, the fathers everywhere inculcate the truth and necessity of this fifth distinction, and with them the adversaries cited above, Bellarmine, both Valentia, Vasquez, Cornelius à Lapide, and before them the Scholastics: nor can Arminius himself in his response to article 31 much object; although in the Declaration pages 63, 64, he says contradictories cannot be reconciled by any distinction, they are new ways of speaking, new opinions, and which can in no way stand together. "For the Son, both qua Son and qua God, has deity from the Father," etc. and soon: "If He has it from Himself, insofar as it is considered absolutely, it cannot be communicated to Him;

if it was communicated to Him, insofar as it is considered relatively, He cannot have it from Himself considered absolutely. Perhaps I will be asked whether I do not confess, that these two are distinct between themselves. Indeed certainly: but when it is further proceeded, and said that just as for the Son of God to be, signifies to have His essence from the Father; so to be God signifies nothing other than to have His essence from Himself or from no one; but I deny this: and at the same time I say this is a great "hamartema" [error], not only in sacred Theology, but also in natural philosophy. For to be the Son, and to be God best agree between themselves: but to have His essence from the Father and at the same time to have it from no one, are contradictories and destroy each other." And after, page 64, "If it seemed good to act thus, nothing can be said so wrongly, which will not be able to be excused." And below: "Therefore in no way can it be excused as well said, that the Son is 'Autotheos'." But I think the whole mystery of the Trinity is overthrown imprudently, or the defense of it against Valentinus Gentilis and other Arians is deserted, when the distinction between the predications or attributes of the essence in itself, simply, absolutely, and as such considered, is rejected: and between the predications or attributes of the essence considered restrictedly in a certain proper subsistence and relatively to another subsistence or person. However, far be it that I impute heresy or voluntary betrayal of the cause to Arminius here (whose other errors are not unknown); as indeed his writings already cited collated with the Disputations both public and private persuade that nothing worse must be thought of him, than of the Papists, and Lutherans who likewise with him hallucinated about the "Autotheos" "from Himself God". But if to Theologians not Anti-Trinitarians those rancid sophisms are proposed perspicuously to be solved: (God or the essence of God is the Father, The Son is God, Therefore: and, The one and only true God is the first: the Son is the one only true God, therefore: and consequently is not second in order of subsisting or operating) At once they will take refuge in our distinction, and at the same time they will acknowledge the necessity of the particles "qua", "quatenus", "under this formal", "in this or that respect", in distinguishing the personal notions and predicates from the essential (which nevertheless are not separated in reality, nor can be separated). Indeed, Arminius himself page 64 warns: "although God and the divine essence do not differ really, yet by no means can whatever can be predicated of the divine essence, be predicated of God: because in our mode of conception they are distinguished: to which mode nevertheless all ways of speaking ought to be adapted." Apply the same to the notions of essence, personality, person, Son, Holy Spirit. Conceive distinctly in the Son, 1. the divine essence. 2. personality and person. 3. that person, namely the Son, and filiation: apply to each both the common attributes of deity, and the proper attributes of personality, and filiation: and our distinction will spontaneously offer itself. Let Athanasius be heard, Dialogue 1 on the Trinity, "By no means indeed with respect to God does it differ, whether to be in God. But in being the Father, and being the Son; Since the former indeed begot: but the latter was begotten." But let us proceed to the remaining distinctions. 6. It is one thing for deity in the abstract to be distinguished by concepts from God in the concrete by reason of personal and proper attributes: and another for the same to be distinguished by reason of common attributes according to one and the same deity. If in the latter respect they are so distinguished, that something can be attributed to deity in the abstract (for example, "Autousia", "Autozoe", "Autotheos") which must not be attributed to God in the concrete (as Arminius seems to want), certainly the cause is manifestly handed over to Valentinus Gentilis. 7. It is one thing to deny that the Son's essence is begotten, and another

that the Son is begotten through communication of essence. That common saying of Athanasius: "The Son has whatever He has natally, yet not naturally." 8. It is one thing to deny that the Son's essence arose and was produced from the essence of the Father (that is, was essenced according to Valentinus Gentilis): and another to deny, that it is from the person of the Father through communication of the same essence. 9. It is one thing to deny that the Son of God in a certain respect (namely with respect to essence considered absolutely) is from another (indeed "Autotheos"): and another that the Son is in any way, or even qua or insofar as Son from another. Thus it is one thing to deny that the essence of God or deity which is in the Son equally as in the Father, qua essence and as such, in itself, considered absolutely is from another; and another that that essence qua, or insofar as, or as it is in the Son, is from another. In one question it is asked what, who, of what sort is from Himself? and it is answered deity, God, the Son who is the eternal deity, one God with the Father and Son of the Father: (some abusively and loosely taking the particle "qua" would say that it is a question of "qua specificative"). In the other question it is asked, qua, insofar as, in what respect, under what formal it must be said to be from Himself, or not to be from Himself? And it is answered that the essence qua essence is from itself, but not the Son qua Son; likewise the Son God qua Son is from another, but not the deity or essence of the Son qua essence, or qua such. And this is the proper acceptance of the syncategorema "qua", which they call reduplicative. For example, "God from God, light from light", either is expounded essentially (and thus Valentinus Gentilis): or personally, so that the sense may be: God, namely the second person, or from the Father, who is God. We reject the former exposition, we approve the latter. See Augustine, sermon 38 on the Seasons, page 639, 640, Basel edition.

Page 449, line

Very many such "akurologies", and rather harsh phrases could be collected from the fathers: if indeed this were the purpose. The illustrious Heinsius in his Exercise on Nonnus, pages 67, 68, 87, 88, notes some in that author: And Elmenhorst on Gennadius, page 107, has gathered more. Julius Gabriel in his scholia to the Apology of Nazianzen, pages 445, 452. From the most ancient fathers Dionysius of Alexandria, Athanasius, Ambrose, etc., did not want the "agennetos" to be attributed personally to the Father: But in what sense, and in what respect to the adversaries, this was then done; from the more recent authors Vasquez learnedly shows on the 1st of Thomas, disputation 140, chapters 1, 2. Compare the things noted by Elmenhorst, pages 208, 209. I think only one thing must be warned on this occasion lest the juniors stumble, in the common places of Luke Trelcatius Jr. published in quarto at Leiden in 1604, and reprinted in the year 1621 to that edition at Hanau by Peter Anthony in 12, it is wrongly written: "since the essence is 'Autousia' and in respect of it the three persons in divinity are 'Autotheoi'." It must be said "Autotheos" according to the rule of Augustine, sermon 38 already cited: "What therefore is said with respect to Himself God, and is said of the single persons, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, and at the same time of the Trinity itself must not be said in the plural but in the singular," etc. And the distinguished man had promised to emend it, which besides Arminius in the cited place the most trustworthy Theologian Dr. Gomarus testified to me. I add in the edition of the Common Places at Leiden in 8 (which I think Dr. Festus Hommius presided over) in fact from the mind and wish of Dr. Trelcatius it was thus emended: "and in

respect of it each one of the three persons in divinity is 'Autotheos'." The same Trelcatius in the same place with Keckermann in his System of Theology seems to deny the communication of essence: whom Maccovius follows in Metaphysics, chapter 8, where against Arminius he determines, that essence is not communicated by the Father, but personality. But here it must be spoken accurately: namely that the person is begotten through communication of essence; and those authors must be excused: because we think they took the word communication too physically; and had respect to Valentinus Gentilis. That moreover the otherwise most learned philosopher Keckermann endeavored in vain to interpolate the definition of person in divine things (although with an intention by no means bad) the venerable my preceptor Dr. Gomarus most learnedly shows in his disputation on the Trinity: which that he would deign to give to be reprinted sometime for the public good with others I contend as earnestly as possible in the name of many from his humanity: Having prayed God that He would preserve him and other faithful servants of God, with our churches in the worship and profession of the one and triune God through the grace of His Spirit.

Page same, line 24

Where the phrases of Lactantius and Synesius are noted. Add, that Possevinus in his Sacred Apparatus under the entry "Gilbert Genebrard" judges that the no less harsh phrases of Augustine, Jerome, and all the other phrases of the fathers, by which they call God the cause of Himself, must be so expounded with Suarez, that He is "from Himself" and "Autotheos", negatively, that is, having being without emanation from another: so that through that negation the positive and simple perfection of that being is declared, which so in itself and in its essence includes existence itself that it receives it from no one: which perfection that being does not have, which does not have being, unless it receives it from another. These things he says. We have expounded above the "Himself" and "from Himself" in note 1 to page 443.

To the benevolent Reader.

I first gave the diatribe of the distinguished theologian and our preceptor Dr. Gomarus to be described in type at Utrecht in the year 1639, illustrated it with notes, and proposed it to be aired by public disputation with his good permission. Which I warn, lest anyone anxiously ask, why and on what occasion I now publish it with my theses. I exhibit here his words from his epistle to me on January 16, 1639: "Wherefore it would be to me no small grief if anything from those dictates of mine should come forth into the light without my qualitative rubbing of the matter. Meanwhile, lest I seem to attribute nothing to a most upright friend, I allow indeed that you correct, illustrate the things which you have concerning "Autotheos", the adduced authors having been consulted, those things having been prefixed or adjoined to the end, which will please you according to your erudition." And from the epistle of May 25, 1639, after I had sent him a copy of the diatribe proposed for disputing, he thus responded, "Your accuracy in illustrating the matter "peri autotheos" is pleasing." I also wanted to adduce these things, lest anyone interpret perversely, that I exhibit the diatribe of Dr. Gomarus only now after the edition of his works as I had received it before along with other students from the mouth of him dictating it in the Academy of Leiden: from which that varies somewhat which was published with his

works after his death in the year 1644. However, that I may confess the truth, I would have preferred, the former edition procured by me in the year 1639 having been suppressed, that the latter of the year 1644 had been expressed: unless the typographer not warned early enough preempted this plan of mine with a great part of the former printed.

On the Necessity and Utility of the dogma of the HOLY TRINITY.

Respondent: PETER JOHNSON SAANVLIET of Amsterdam.

On the 16th and 23rd day of February, 1639.

Those who secretly undermine the truth of Christian dogmas, generally first call into question their moment and weight so that men having been led into the sleep of security, may so much the more easily allow that truth to be shaken off by them, and may not fight for the faith, which was once delivered to the saints. You may see today's Anti-Trinitarians using such narcotics more than familiarly: and that not altogether in vain, the Epicureanism and Libertinism of this profane age of course assisting and aiding them. We therefore about to fight for the truth, the Church, and the author of both the one and triune God, as long as life remains, and about to exercise the juniors in this palaestra according to the measure of our talent and the conscience of our duty, will briefly discuss. 1. Concerning the Necessity of the Dogma of the Trinity. 2. Concerning the utility, or praxis of the same. 3. We will subjoin a corollary, on the toleration of the Anti-Trinitarian heresy.

1. For the more accurate unraveling of the first question two things must be foreknown. 1. What the dogma of the Trinity is. 2. What a necessary dogma is, or (as they call it) a fundamental article. 1. First, The dogma of the Trinity denotes not so much negative and elenctic Theology, as positive or assertive; not so much this or that reason, as the Theses, propositions, or assertions themselves; not so much the less principal hypotheses and other theses, as the principal Theses; not so much the mode and method of explaining this dogma grammatically, rhetorically, and logically, as the very matter explained: not so much the form and mode of defending this dogma through philosophical and logical notions, distinctions, and axioms against any pseudo-reasoners, by pursuing their subtleties and reducing them to the absurd, briefly not so much certain outworks, as the very citadel of truth itself, on which all Christians, even infants and sucklings, sit and are taught to sit by simplicity and solidity of faith; not so much the particular explication of this or that Doctor whether scholastic or ecclesiastical, whether ancient or recent, (although most orthodox in this part) as the common and catholic faith and profession of both ancient and modern Christianity (however miserably distracted in many other things) everywhere sounding publicly and privately: of which that of Vincent of Lerins may most truly be used: "What all, what everywhere, what always." Moreover, we want these antitheses to be so accepted not as if we make light of the other member: but only that we may show that much is

wont and can be connived at by the stronger towards hallucinations, ignorances, doubts, confusions about the other member of the antithesis; with the sincere profession of some pious person especially an unlearned one being rightly held about the principal and absolutely fundamental, and not laboring under just suspicion to the contrary; both because deploring his defects he shows himself docile, and because by true faith he has and holds that grain of mustard seed, that is, that least of saving truth precisely necessary for ecclesiastical communion and the salvation of the soul. Which consists in these capital theses. 1. That there are three really distinct, namely the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, not distinct as names, or attributes, or as operations, offices, or functions of one and the same person; but so distinct that they are and can be called another and another: that is, they are distinct hypostases. 2. And that those three and each one of them is that one true God the creator, conserver, redeemer; whom we worship with one religion. 3. That there is an order both of subsistence, and of operation of those hypostases. Namely that the Father is from no one, the Son is from the Father alone through generation; the Holy Spirit through procession from the Father and the Son. See the Symbols of the Councils, and the Harmony of Confessions. But the case is otherwise of adults and the perfect (as they are called, Hebrews 5, Philippians 3), especially of Doctors, particularly if the church begins to be surrounded by heresies, or to be disturbed within, or they obstinately and ex professo oppose those "deuteros", "hupodeixis", and "atomos" necessary things, and eagerly scatter their opposing concepts and opinions "sunairos dianos". For although they have the same foundation of faith with the more simple, yet in them those ignorances and doubts are not so to be transmitted, that by just presumptions they cannot be adduced to a fuller declaration of the fundamental truth, and to honor the learners, lest at length the fundamental having been shaken off, and the mask of hypocrisy having been cast away, those malignant and sinning humors sometime break forth into a grave and dangerous disease of the whole ecclesiastical body. Indeed, we think a Doctor of others, through this relapse of ignorance and doubt, as long as he labors under it, simply inept for the dispensation of the mysteries of faith. For how will he explain it dexterously and fully? how will he defend it solidly against adversaries? But by no means do we here understand by the dogma of the Trinity, or allow to be referred to it the false hypotheses of certain persons; bold and uncertain conjectures rather than assertions; arguments, if there are any nugatory and made of straw by which the cause seems rather to be betrayed than defended; inexplicable and vain subtleties by which they implicate themselves more than they explicate; All which things we distinguish as moles and scrofulas from the system and body of this doctrine. Moreover, how great is the error of those who urge such things, or obtrude them on others as first or secondly necessary, this is not the place to say. It suffices here to foreknow, that those things are not a part or appendix of this foundation, much less the very fundamental of this dogma. 2. Secondly, Necessary here states the necessity of the end. Moreover, it can be understood in two ways: 1. either the necessity of the profession of dogmas to external union and ecclesiastical communion, in the external, visible, and particular church. 2. or the necessity of faith of those dogmas to internal and invisible communion with Christ, and eternal salvation through Him; or with the grace and glory of God. We have explained and proved this distinction more fully in the Disputation on Fundamental Articles and Errors. Moreover, according to the sense of the adversaries any Theological doctrine less principal is opposed to a necessary or fundamental dogma; whether it is problematic in the schools and churches: about which through the liberty of prophesying it may be allowed to think

and speak modestly in either part as the case may be; or at least it is such, about which although it may not be so suitable to dispute in either part with the edification of the church, yet error about it does not prevent someone from being received into the communion of the ecclesiastical assembly, or if indeed being now an existing member of the church he has deflected to that error, from being retained in it. Moreover, it is asked which necessity is here understood. We, it having been presupposed, that they are always distinguished, and somewhere separated; here however we conjoin both, and state that it is necessary both for eternal salvation or internal communion with the grace and glory of God, and for external communion with the visible and particular church and its privileges, that someone believe with the heart and confess with the mouth the mystery of the Trinity. Moreover, what latitude the evidence, constancy, abundance of confession and cognition admits, and how it varies by degrees we have distinctly indicated in the Disputation just cited on Fundamental Articles and Errors. The Remonstrants make this doctrine problematic, that is, such, that the truth of it can be simply ignored, moreover opposed by reasons, exceptions, in addition by consequences in Christian Churches of course modestly, and the contrary opinion proposed and urged, saving ecclesiastical union and fraternity. Moreover, the principal reason is this, because thus far they cannot believe, nor see proved by anyone, that God excludes Anti-Trinitarians from salvation, and consequently they are not to be kept away from the fraternal communion of the Church. You will gather this opinion of theirs first from the Apology, chapter 3, folio 53, collated with the preface of N.N. to the Remonstrants, prefixed to the apology, signature 2, verso folio. And ibid., examination of the preface, folio 6 verso and folio 19. Then from the Response to the Excerpts of the Professors, page 85. Third from Vedelius Rhapsodus, book 1, chapters 6, 7, 8. From which writings the illustrious Dr. Vedelius has demonstrated it so perspicuously in the Secrets of Arminianism, that it is superfluous to do this at greater length. After that time a little book was published in our native language, titled "The Right Remonstrant Theologian", by which they busily do this, that they may persuade that the Socinians (the most famous Anti-Trinitarians today) are not to be excluded from fraternal communion, nor err fundamentally, because of course it cannot be proved that they are excluded from the hope of salvation. Recently a certain one from that cohort of darkness, while he pretends to deny all fraternity and salvation to the Muhammadans and Papists, would withdraw from this judgment the Socinians not obscurely, with whom (which is new and unheard of thus far) he conjoins the David-Jorists.

2. Concerning our Arguments, which we are about to adduce for the affirmative opinion against the opinion of the Remonstrants, we forewarn 1. that they will evince so great a necessity, that men with the errors of the Anti-Trinitarians are not to be received into the communion of our Church or of any Christian Church; or if indeed having been received before into its communion they have declined to those heresies, and have pertinaciously shaken off this necessary cognition and faith, they are by no means to be retained in it: which we will repeat below more explicitly and by way of corollary. 2. Moreover, that they cannot have communion with the saving grace of God, or be partakers of eternal salvation, if indeed someone pertinaciously repudiates and oppugns this truth. Moreover, although the demonstration of the former necessity would suffice, yet I acknowledge both in this business, and conjoin them. In any other questions whether of law, or of fact, likewise not. For there are not a few cases in which reception into the communion of the external and visible church can be rightly and properly denied to someone

(especially to a minister into the communion and society of the ministry), whom nevertheless we would not pronounce destitute of all more remote communion, or general, or implicit with all Christianity, nor also of all even the least connection with the grace of God and eternal salvation. I have inculcated this distinction in the Disputation on Fundamental Articles and Errors: by which all the sophisms of the Remonstrants, and their straw consequences for the union of sects indistinctly and subtly boasted by them to such an extent; in addition for the retention of Remonstrant ministers in the communion and ministry of the Belgian churches (against the judgment of the Synod of Dort) are validly eluded, and they themselves, the "equoson" petticoat having been removed, are dragged into the light. They themselves are compelled to admit such a distinction whether they want or not unless they want to be jammed into very many absurdities and monsters. For example, Whether the Remonstrants would receive into the communion of their assembly and ministry some Christian recently emerged from the papacy, if he still mordaciously retains, not indeed that the images themselves must be adored with religious worship, but that Christ must be adored through the image of the crucifix or cross, and therefore that images of this kind must be erected in temples, as also the image of the Holy Spirit, and therefore that one must bow down before them, that we may adore Christ through them with so much greater attention and devotion. But if they do not receive him, do they therefore exclude him from all Christianity, from all salvation simply? Again I ask whether they would receive some Anti-Trinitarian, for example, Valentinus Gentilis, Servetus, Socinus, Ostorodius, Voidovius, Smalcius, Crellius (if indeed they profess moderation and peace, that proper symbol of the Remonstrants together with them) into the society of their assemblies, or even of the ministry, their heretical and blasphemous (as we judge) sayings and writings about the Trinity notwithstanding. If they say they would not receive them, whether on account of the conscience of others, or for political or for ecclesiastical reasons, let them declare therefore, whether they are certainly persuaded from the word of God that the aforesaid Anti-Trinitarians cannot be saved, their faith so standing. But there is no need for us to press them further; they themselves contradicting themselves openly propose this distinction and apply it to their purpose (how rightly here we do not inquire) in Vedelius Rhapsodus, book 2, chapter 5, page 121, "It is not however ours to decide anything more sadly against those who overturn those necessary things, etc. It is better therefore that we always incline to the milder part, etc. Leaving to God the inspector of hearts the supreme judgment concerning it, and deeming it sufficient, that we abstain from their communion from the law and precept of the Lord Jesus, without any other harm." 3. We forewarn that our arguments (whatever perchance the Socinians may have excepted against them) evidently and incontrovertibly conclude against the Remonstrants. For they cannot impugn either all or some by any color of exceptions, unless they deny either the unity of God, or the "homoousios" of the Son and Holy Spirit, and thus openly flee into the camps of the Socinians.

3. 1st Argument. From Matthew 28:19, compared with Mark 16:16, 1 John 5:7, where this dogma is proposed as necessary to be known and believed unto salvation.

2nd Argument. From the clear testimony of John 17:3, compared with chapter 14:1, chapter 20:31, 1 John 5:20 where it speaks of the Son, and 2 Corinthians 13:13 where it speaks of the Holy Spirit.

3rd Argument. It is not only necessary to know whether or that God is, but also who that true God is, otherwise men with Pharaoh would ask, who is the God of the Israelites. But now the proper article of supernatural Theology, by which it is especially distinguished from natural, is the knowledge that the true God is the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Therefore.

4th Argument. It is necessary to believe that the one true God is the Father, which even the Socinians themselves are compelled to confess in general, while they prescribe to their books, Concerning the One God the Father; it is also necessary to believe in His Son, and the Holy Spirit. The reason is, because the Son is one and the same true God with the Father, as also the Holy Spirit. And he who knows, denies, loves, hates the Father, believes in Him, has union and communion with Him, he also knows, denies, loves, hates, etc. the Son, and on the contrary he who does not know, denies, hates, etc. the Son, at the same time does not know the Father as the one true God, denies Him, hates Him, etc. Which is invincibly proven from John 14:1 and 5:23 and 7:28 and 8:19, 54, 55, 58 and 15:21 and 16:3. Hilary appositely to this matter, book 9 on the Trinity: "For when Christ says, 'Believe in God and believe in me,' I ask, in what has He distinguished Himself in nature, who has not distinguished Himself in honor? For by saying, 'And believe in me,' when He had said, 'And believe in God,' is it not understood that He has signified His own nature through this, that He says 'And in me'? He plainly separates nature, if He separates faith." And a little after: "Uniting Himself to the faith of God and of His nature He has united Himself, when having mentioned God in whom it was necessary to believe, He also taught that it was necessary to believe in Himself; teaching that He is God through this, that He must be believed in by those who believe in God." Against these arguments it cannot be excepted by the Remonstrants, that all necessary and saving faith of the Trinity is only about those three bare words, of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, or about some chimerical idol or perverse imagination by which something is taken for something else, namely a temporal creature for the one and perfect nature of God itself (which they call the Holy Spirit). For this purely nominal knowledge without reality, or rather perverse conceptual knowledge repugnant to the reality itself is in no way true, much less that it is fundamental truth. For truth is the conformity of the concept with the thing. Just as the Leaguers in France conceiving Henry IV as the Lord of Béarn (which otherwise separately and by itself was not false) and acknowledging him only as such, and denying him to be the king of France, indeed cursing and resisting him under such a form (if he showed himself, and others acknowledged him); they could not be said to have the necessary and fundamental Political knowledge of the true and legitimate King of France, nor sufficient knowledge for rendering due obedience to that King. For they had only a perverse and Leaguer's imagination, apprehending for the Ruler of France some idol under the title of Béarnais, which was nothing less than the King of France.

5th Argument. Without which dogma the necessary and supreme cause of saving grace and salvation cannot be known or believed, that itself is necessary to be known and believed; But without the dogma of the Trinity, etc. Therefore. The minor is proven; Because it cannot be known who is the supreme author and worker of our salvation, which is the object of eternal life. For whoever does not acknowledge the Son to be a divine person and the one true God with the Father, he makes a creature the efficient cause, and object of his salvation, and consequently

attributes to a created being the glory which belongs to the eternal God alone. Consider the passage 1 John 5:20, "He is the true God and eternal life." Thus he who does not know the Holy Spirit to be a person, he does not know the author and principal agent of common saving grace (2 Corinthians 13:13, 1 Corinthians 12:1, 2, 3, 6, 11). For actions belong to supposita, but not to accidents. And a divine person is the object of our gratitude and therefore of all divine worship; but not some accident, whether created or uncreated, which is imagined.

6th Argument. What founds other fundamentals (which not even the Remonstrants themselves dare deny to be such), and on which they necessarily depend, so that with the Trinity removed all those must necessarily collapse, that itself is a fundamental dogma; indeed the foundation of the foundation, and properly and prototypically fundamental. But such is the dogma of the Trinity. For on it depend the dogmas, of the Mission of the Son, of His coming in the flesh, of His satisfaction, of His raising Himself and others, of the mission of the Holy Spirit and His divine works, namely illumination, sanctification, consolation. The sad example of the Socinians has sufficiently taught this, who by opposing the mystery of the Trinity, have lapsed to this point, that they have also in a marvelous manner bespattered and subverted with their heresies those just now mentioned and almost all other dogmas of Christians.

7th Argument. The negation of which dogma is infidelity, impiety, apostasy, and Antichristianism, the affirmation of it is necessary and fundamental; But of the dogma of the Trinity, etc. Therefore. The minor is proven, from 1 John 2:18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24 and chapter 4:1, 2, 3, Colossians 1:15, 16, 17, 18 with verse 23 and chapter 2:2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Here it treats of the person of the Son, which is no other than a divine person, and consequently one God with the Father.

8th Argument. The affirmation of which dogma on our part, or the negation on the part of the Anti-Trinitarians necessarily founds and infers either "adotheia" impiety, and refusal of worship to be rendered to the true God, or manifest idolatry; that is, necessary to be known, and believed: But such is the dogma of the Trinity. Therefore. The minor is proven first as to us; if we worship the Son, and Holy Spirit as the one true God with divine worship, which is fitting to the one God only (and yet they are not the one true God with the Father in essence) certainly we commit crass idolatry and imagine and worship three Gods essentially such: but if the Anti-Trinitarians do not worship the Son, and Holy Spirit as true God one in essence with the Father, certainly they cannot be excused from "adotheia", irreligiosity, indeed from Epicureanism and atheism. But if with Socinus against Francis David and similar Anti-Trinitarians they prefer to contend, that Christ although distinct in essence from God the Father must be worshipped with divine worship, now they are held for idolatry and worship two Gods, according to the truth of the matter and the judgment of the whole of Christianity.

9th Argument. Which dogma has very many and notable practical uses, that is (as the Remonstrants themselves are wont to speak) which promotes the faith and obedience due to God and Christ, that is necessary; but not problematic, about which namely without harm or loss of piety and good conscience it may be allowed to prophesy freely in either part. But the dogma of the Trinity is such. Therefore. We will prove the minor below.

4. And these indeed are the direct ostensive arguments: we now subjoin certain ones from absurd consequences. 1. Then scarcely any dogmas of supernatural Theology or of the Christian faith as such could be proven to be fundamental. Let the Remonstrants make trial, let them enumerate those dogmas, which they think are such, that in no way can those feeling the contrary be saved; let them show from Scripture their necessity, above the dogma of the Trinity "kata to rheton", or at least through a consequence obvious and evident to all of sound mind, as indeed they themselves fix this law, Vedelius Rhapsodus book 2, chapter 5, page 121. I add also some dogmas of natural Theology, can be held as not necessary, for example, God's foreknowledge of all future things, immutability, and that He alone is creator. 2. It would follow that the Christian faith, as to the object of its faith and worship, is not distinguished, from the Gentile, Jewish, Muhammadan. For if it does not necessarily believe in unity trinity, in trinity unity, now it is reduced to natural Theology, and symbolizes with the pseudo-religions just now mentioned. Moreover, how the whole essence and form of the Christian faith ought to be distinguished from Jewish apostasy and perfidy, and indeed specially by this dogma of the one true God, the illustrious Vedelius has demonstrated accurately and most evidently against the Socinians in the treatise on the God of the Synagogue. Concerning the religion of the Gentiles we recently noted something in the Disputation on Gentilism. We now only add concerning the Muhammadan, that it can hardly be convicted from the vague and uncertain hypotheses of the Neo-Skeptics, of absolutely fatal apostasy; for it, besides piety and probity, states faith in one God, and in Christ as a great prophet and legate of God born of a virgin, indeed as the Messiah; so that in these fundamentals they do not seem to dissent very much from the Anti-Trinitarians followers of Francis David; all of whom the Remonstrants will not devote to eternal destruction (as I think); the followers of Socinus alone of course, because they invoke two Gods, having been ascribed to eternal salvation. How rightly the Muhammadans think concerning Christ above other infidels, Grotius once the advocate of the Remonstrants wanted to suggest in the treatise on the Truth of the Christian Religion, book 6, page 18, "But when we say Jesus is the Son of God, we signify this, which he himself says when he calls him the Word of God: for the word is in a certain way begotten from the mind: add now, that he was born of a virgin, by the sole work of God supplying paternal power, that he was carried up into heaven by the power of God, which things confessed also by Muhammad show that Jesus can, and ought to be called the Son of God by a certain singular right." I leave these words to the Christian reader to consider. 3. It would follow, that it cannot be proven that the errors of Cerinthus, Ebion, Artemon, Hermophilus, Apollonius and similar monsters were fundamental, no more than of Arius, Samosatenus, Photinus, Socinus, Francis David, Servetus. For it will be equally easy for them as for those to except that if indeed they err somewhere, they nevertheless retain those few Remonstrant fundamentals, which are: That there is a God, and that He is a rewarder; that there is one Lord Jesus Christ, Or, to use the words "anonymos" in the apologetic epistle prefixed to the Remonstrants', "I call necessary dogmas, which are necessarily to be held and done by us from the duty prescribed to us in the Gospel of Jesus Christ; that we may become partakers of eternal salvation; which I comprehend in these three; Faith in the divine promises, obedience to the divine precepts, and due reverence for the Scriptures, in which besides the promises and precepts, all other divine oracles and enunciations are contained." If the aforesaid heretics notwithstanding their opinion about the Trinity, the person of Christ, etc., protest that their

religion remains within those terms, and will remain, as far as can be done through conscience and infirmity; by which testimonies of Scripture will they exclude them from the kingdom of heaven, and consequently from their ecclesiastical communion? Briefly by what color, and by what conscience do the Remonstrants hitherto celebrate separate assemblies from the Socinians: why do they not unite divided Christianity? why do they make, and foster a new schism? why have they not openly acceded to them inviting them sufficiently to fraternity, when conscience compelled them (as they pretend) to secede from us?

5. To our arguments we add the consensus of the whole of Christianity, among whom both by testimonies of Doctors, and by decrees of synods, and by Political statutes the necessity of this dogma has hitherto been prescribed: the Remonstrants alone dissenting for the sake of the Socinians. For they endeavor in vain to draw Justin Martyr to their side: as has been shown by the Professors of Leiden in excerpts from the apology, and Dr. Vedelius in the secrets of Arminianism. What we will say about Salvian below in the second part, thesis 3. Moreover, there is no need for us to weave here a catalogue of authors and testimonies. The Nicene Creed, and the Acts of the same Council, and of the 2nd Council of Constantinople, chapter 7, and the Athanasian Creed, approved by the whole of Christianity up to this day, bitterly and unjustly censured by the Remonstrants alone, Apology chapter 3, would suffice for demonstrating this matter: "Whoever wants to be saved" etc. We add Hilary in his book against Auxentius near the end: "Depart from Auxentius the angel of Satan, the enemy of Christ the devastator, the lost denier of the faith, which he so professed to the king that he might deceive; so he deceived; that he might blaspheme. Now let him gather, etc. to me certainly he will never be, than a devil, because he is an Arian. Nor will the peace of any ever be desired, except of those who according to the treatment of our fathers at Nicaea, with the Arians anathematized will preach Christ the true God." Fulgentius in his book on the Orthodox Faith to Donatus: "Hence principally hold the holy Trinity, that is, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is naturally the true God, the supreme true and good, of one nature, essence," etc. Afterwards he adds: "He teaches us and admonishes that it is a grave sin, if anyone believes in another besides the one God. Without doubt he believes in another, whoever thinks there is diversity of divinity in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit." Compare also Basil, book 2 against Eunomius, in the beginning and at the end. And Eulogius in Photius' Myrobiblon number 220. Neither the nature of the theses allows, nor is it even necessary to adduce more, because the adversaries do not deny the consensus, at least now from the time of the Nicene Council. But that the Socinians want the sense of the Catholic Church before that Council to have been far different, and with them Venator in True and Mere Theology, and the Remonstrants in the Apology and Response to the Excerpts of the Professors of Leiden, that will be able to be abundantly refuted from Polanus' Catholic Symphony, Syntagma; likewise Paxillus' peculiar treatise; to which is the title Monomachia and Cocceius' Catholic Thesaurus: especially Calvin maintains the same cause, book 1 of the Institutes, chapter 13, sections 27, 28, And Bellarmine book 1 on Christ chapter 10. Whom see. Very many passages of the fathers Elmenhorst has annotated in his commentary on Gennadius chapter 1. We only add here one Gregory of Neo-Caesarea called Thaumaturgus. Thus he in the 12 anathematisms chapter 2, page 30, edition of Gerard Vossius: "If anyone says that the flesh of Christ is consubstantial, that is, substantial to the divinity, and does not confess that He in the form of God, was God before the

ages, and emptied Himself, and took the form of a servant, as it is written, let him be anathema." The same in another exposition of the faith page 23, "But those who communicate with those, who reject the 'homoousion' and 'homoiousion', (Behold the use of 'homoousion', in the holy fathers, Before the Nicene Council) as alien from the Scriptures, and who say that something of the Trinity was created, and separate from the one natural divinity: we consider aliens, and have communion with none of them." Moreover, this Gregory lived in the year 233. The Political constitutions by which the truth and necessity of this dogma was confirmed, are of Gratian, Valentinian, Theodosius, Marcian, Justinian, which see in the Code on the Supreme Trinity, where it is prohibited, that anyone dare to contend publicly about this faith, and the heterodox are said Jewishly and apostatically to contradict this, and to sustain the infamy of the name of heretic, the name of Christians and Catholics must be denied to them, their congregations must be prohibited. Thus in the Law "The Manichaeans having been condemned" under the title On Heretics, among others the use of the name of Christians is plainly interdicted to the Arians and Photinians, as also in the Law "The Arians" and the Law "Whoever", under the same title, all private and clandestine conventicles are prohibited; and in the Law "Since" testimonial judgments against the orthodox are inhibited to the same and in the Law "The Arians" and "Whoever" their churches are named conventicles and as it were a church, "parasynaxeis". According to this decision, the Jurists, ancient and more recent, of whatever profession they were, have referred this dogma among the necessary things. For it is the principal part of the Christian religion, as from among the papists Cujas; it is the foundation of the orthodox faith, as from among ours (then when he wrote this) Pacius comments. Nor will be able, as I think, to be given any interpreter of the Law, who thinks otherwise. Add from the Greek Roman Law, tome 1, the prolix edict of Justinian on the Orthodox Faith where especially those chapters or anathematisms must be noted, page 533, (Greek Latin edition of Leunclavius and Freherus in folio), "If anyone does not confess the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit the consubstantial Trinity, one consubstantial Deity, and one power and might to be adored in three subsistences or Persons, let such a one be anathema." And page 535, "If anyone does not anathematize Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, Apollinarius, Nestorius, and Eutyches, and those, who have thought or think similar things to them, let such a one be anathema." Let the Remonstrants of today see now, if there are any J.C., how they defend the honor of their name and profession, when they deem with their vote and patronage the tolerance if not interpolation of most baleful heresies and sects (as the Emperor calls them) proscribed by the whole of Christianity both ecclesiastically and politically. We will not now resolve the objections and exceptions, whatever could be brought forward against our thesis and the arguments thus far adduced, lest we snatch away from the students the matter of disputing. See below in the second part, thesis 3 and 4, Above thesis 1, and the Disputation on Fundamental Articles and Errors: where we think the fountains of solutions have been supplied abundantly by us; which it will be easy to adapt to all tricks and quibbles.

PART II. On the Utility and praxis of this dogma.

1. The Theology of the Socinians as in most Christian dogmas is Libertine-Skeptical, and almost none: so in praxis it is miserably meager, scarcely ascending beyond the morals of Seneca, Plutarch and the recent Enthusiasts and Libertines, as also of the Muhammadans. How dexterously the Remonstrants understand and teach the praxis of religion (we are not here to dispute about their deeds) I have indicated in my Treatise against the blasphemous little book of Tilenus published by the Remonstrants in our native language to which they have replied nothing after some years of silence, than: That they do not understand, or do not know what I want. For I treat in that treatise of the utility of our doctrine of predestination and the grace of God to the praxis of consolation and new obedience; and of the ineptitude of the Remonstrant Doctrine to the same. But here is not the field of Socinian Rhetoric. In their Confession they annotate practical uses of the doctrine of the divine attributes (which they treat there) or of the one true God rather fully: But they plainly pass over the praxis of the Trinity. Whether because it is only useful, or truly purely speculative (according to the distinction of Episcopius in his private Disputations, Disputation 2, thesis 4) let them declare. When the illustrious Professors of Leiden had objected this to them in the Censure of the Confession, chapter 3, they bore no other response among many taunts, and witticisms, Apology chapter 3, folio 52, 53, than: "Those uses, which the concept of divinity furnishes had already before been annotated in the chapter on the Nature of God, nor can other proper and new ones be gathered from the trinity of persons." We on the contrary state with the orthodox, that as of all the articles of faith, so also of this one on the Trinity there are its own practical uses, namely proper and peculiar. Indeed all the articles of faith are one copulative, (as is wont to be said about the precepts of the law) and in their concourse and causality they stand for one cause or principle: but nevertheless each one separately as partial causes or parts of the system and body of faith for its part acts, moves, and promotes to praxis by a certain peculiar force and property; just as an organic body as a collective whole concurs to produce vital actions, and nevertheless the single parts in that whole concur and each for its part operates by its proper faculty and form.

2. Moreover, we prove this our opinion by these arguments. 1st Argument. Whatever is distinct in reality in some way (although not really) besides in our mind is conceived by distinct concepts (although partial and inadequate) suggests to us peculiar and in some way distinct uses both objectively and effectively. But the one divine essence or nature, and each divine person, have distinct formal notions, or distinct concepts both objective and formal: indeed also the persons are really distinguished among themselves and so ought to be conceived by us. Therefore the distinct vision and spiritual intellection of the persons as to origin, and order or mode both of subsisting and of operating within perfuses and affects the mind and will of man with a certain distinct perfection, and pleasure arisen from that light of contemplation. For why should that divine truth, In the one God is an ineffable trinity, not excite us by its light to the praxis of spiritual sense, acquiescence of faith, admiration, reverence, honor, joy? For if every word of God ought to stir up fear, joy, desire, love, humility in us, (Isaiah 61:1, 2, 10, Psalm 19 and 119:8, 9, and 119:72) why not also this wonderful word (so to speak) about the Trinity. 2nd Argument. The cognition and faith, who that one true God is, has the use and praxis of true religion (namely Christian), indeed makes a great part of it; nor can all its praxis be had or completed by the cognition, that and what the true God is. But now only the dogma of the Trinity teaches, who the true God is. Therefore. 3rd Argument. If the peculiar and appropriated order and mode of

operating of the persons in works to the outside suggests and furnishes a peculiar reason for peculiar praxis, namely devotion, faith, adoration, love, trust, etc. Therefore the dogma of the Trinity has in our mind and will peculiar practical uses. But the former is true. The major is proven, because those uses as such and under that notion would not be perceived, unless the distinct order of the persons is first conceived. The minor is proven; because it has a peculiar use; if according to the Scriptures we acknowledge and believe God the Father to be the creator, the Son the redeemer, the Holy Spirit the comforter. It is indeed one work, and one worker, but the mode and order of operating is distinct. 4th Argument. Because by a peculiar and distinct concept of the mind and act of religion we tend to one person, so that by that same act then we do not directly and explicitly tend to another: whence it follows that a distinct praxis of religion proximately arises from the distinction of persons, and is proximately and immediately terminated by a distinct person. Which certainly proves that proper practical uses are founded in the Trinity of persons. The antecedent is proven: Because prayers and acts of thanksgiving are directed distinctly and separately to the Holy Spirit or to the Son, or to the Father; which the universal consensus and devotion of all the faithful teaches, Acts 7:59, Revelation 22:20, 2 Corinthians 13:13. 5th Argument. Because it would follow that the doctrine of the triad in God and its distinct concept is plainly sterile (if indeed it founds no peculiar uses from itself) but only the concept of the monad is useful and sufficient for all piety; if indeed all uses are said to be generated in us from that alone, precisely and in itself without respect to the triad. And so the doctrine of the Trinity would be no more fertile and practical, than many genealogical, geographical, physical, chronological things in the Scriptures. 6th Argument. It would follow that the Jews, Muhammadans, likewise the Arians, Socinians could have the marrow of true piety and praxis sufficiently for salvation from the doctrine of the one true God and His attributes: provided of course they admit those fundamentals about the attributes of God, which the Remonstrants in the Confession and Apology state to be necessary to be believed: which I think most of them will do not reluctantly. Whence this also would follow, that there must not be labored very much, that at least the Muhammadans and Socinians (who do not deny God and Christ) be converted; for if indeed they exercise the praxis of piety according to the measure of their cognition, why do they so greatly need such a laborious and often dangerous mutation of their religion. 7th Argument. It pertains to the praxis of religion, indeed in it is the whole foundation and quintessence of all praxis, that He and such a God be worshipped by due cognition, faith, confession, love, fear, obedience, etc., who and such as He ought to be worshipped, or whom and such as He Himself wants to be worshipped: For this is the genuine praxis that divine honor, love, faith be attributed to the one true God alone, and not to another. God therefore wants to be worshipped not only as one, but also as triune, not only as the Father, but also as the Son with the Holy Spirit; But such praxis will be none, where the cognition of the dogma of the Trinity is not presupposed. For whatever is not from faith is sin, Romans 14. And nothing is willed, unless known; and we love as much as we know. 8th Argument. What is proposed to us to be looked to as an example and norm, both for consolation and for imitation, that moves and promotes praxis in us. But the admirable unity of the three among themselves with respect to the same divine essence is proposed as the most perfect conjunction and exemplar, John 17:10, 11, 21, 22, 23. Compared with John 10:38 and 19:11. But Christianity holds against the glosses of the Anti-Trinitarians, that here is understood not only conjunction of will and consent, but that ineffable unity in the unity of that individual

essence, which is the foundation (so to speak) of unity in volition and consent. (See Augustine, and Cyril of Alexandria on the cited passage, and Hilary book 8 on the Trinity, Ambrose book 3 on the Faith chapter 2, Athanasius sermon 4 against the Arians.) For the divine persons are united without confusion, and discerned separately, as Athanasius says on Matthew 11, "All things have been handed over to me" and Nazianzen, oration 3 on peace. Damascene, Orthodox Faith, book 3, chapter 5, indeed it is their "noerosis" 'mutual immanence and stability', Damascene, Orthodox Faith, book 1, chapter 19, and "asynchytos en allelais periochoresis" 'unconfused, mutual comprehension'; which others translate circumincession, and circuminsession. (The same book 1, chapter 11, and 3, chapter 5, Cyril on the Trinity and the person of Christ.) Will not meditation on that mystery according to the Scriptures cited perfuse the hearts of the faithful with most sweet consolation while they discourse from the union of the Father and the Son, to the communion, indwelling, inhabitation, most close presence of the Father through the Son in us (John 14:23, compared with John 20:31, and 17:10, 22): and again ascend from the inhabitation, and divine embrace, which they feel in themselves, Romans 5:5, to the union of the Father with the Son considered not only "kat' oikonomian", but also "kata theologian": in which contemplation the ultimate analysis of faith and saving trust is made: for here is the highest apex of the whole of religion, this "protoproton" "autopistou" foundation: God one and triune. Will not this mutual possession, remaining and inhabitation of God in us and of us in God, truly the tabernacle of God with men, be able to be conceived better, apprehended more firmly, felt more sweetly, if the Union of the persons of the deity, the love of the Father towards the Son be applied as an example, motives, "energemata", "hupomnemata" to our infirm and fluctuating consciences? Why may it not be allowed to exclaim with the Savior preceding in the cited place: I, O Lord Jesus, am of your Father; because I am yours, and you are the Father's; The Father loves me, because you love me, and the Father loves the Son. The Father remains in me, and who will separate me from His love in Christ, Romans 8? Because the Son remains in me, and the Father remains in the Son. These things indeed are the praxis of consolation. Nor is there less from here the praxis of excitation to imitating this union, that we most closely and "achoristos" unite ourselves to God through faith, and love, that God and man mutually inhere to each other on all sides (See Bernard, sermon 71 on the Song of Songs and treatise on divine love, chapter 4) in addition that with the faithful we may strive to preserve the unity of the Spirit through the bond of peace, Ephesians 4. The Son of God our Lord and head is one with the Father, and will we not be united to Him? The Trinity of persons in unity of essence and will is believed and adored by us; will we not strive for unity and peace among ourselves? will we be one heart and one soul? But the Reason of the Theses does not allow these things to be amplified more. Let the students diligently meditate on the cited passages and on a given occasion consult any commentators whatsoever; especially from among ours, Calvin and the rest conjoined by Marlorat; from among the Papists J. Ferus. I now only exhibit that most sweet saying of Bernard in the treatise on Divine Love chapter 4, "And this is in us the will of your Son, this is His prayer for us to you God His Father: I want that as I and you are one, so also they may be one in us. This is the end, this is the consummation, this is the perfection, this is the peace, this is the joy in the Holy Spirit, this is the silence in heaven." And of Augustine, tractate 48 on John: "We can say we are in God and God is in us. I and God are one, can we ever say? You are in God, because God contains you, God is in you, because you have been made the temple of God; but can you because you are in God, and God is in you, say: 'He who sees me,

sees God.' How the only begotten has said, 'He who sees me sees also the Father, I and the Father are one'? Acknowledge the property of the Lord, and the gift of the servant. The property of the Lord is equality with the Father, the gift of the servant is participation of the Savior." Add that celebrated Epigram of Melanchthon; "Nor you, O Son of God, could ask the eternal Father anything greater or better, O best Christ," etc. But if the Remonstrants except that the Socinians most pious and most fervent in the love of God and Christ, nevertheless strive for His worship and praxis although they do not acknowledge the essential union of the Son with the Father: (See Smalcius in the book on Divinity, chapter 24), We respond, that a false and absurd dogma, or idol of a perverse human imagination, is evil, and therefore cannot found any true and solid praxis of piety. The truth of which axiom the Remonstrants evidently acknowledge (although they badly apply it) when they contend that the doctrine of absolute predestination and perseverance plainly subverts all praxis, much less that it makes for praxis. But they insist; they do not have that exceptional love of Christ and the brethren from their dogma of the Trinity; but from elsewhere. Response: they cannot have it from elsewhere, since it is utterly subverted by their dogma. Love towards Christ ought to be divine, namely of the true and eternal God: but theirs, love, if there is any, is human or of Christ "kata andra". But now as the proper praxis and elicited act of divine faith, is not human faith; so the praxis of divine love is not the love of man or of a creature.

9th Argument. No praxis of trust, consolation and gratitude can be elicited from this, that our salvation has been placed on the highest rock, namely in Jehovah our righteousness, the great and mighty God, and consequently is invincible as to impetration and application: unless faith presupposes that the Son is the one God, and yet is a distinct person with God, is another than the Father. These uses are wont to be amplified to the common places concerning the eternal filiation and deity of Christ; likewise concerning His incarnation, or concerning the person of the mediator, likewise concerning His office and satisfaction. Where they must be sought.

10th Argument. The consideration of the person and deity of the Holy Spirit makes for the praxis of piety. It is of consolation, that He has been given to us to lead us into truth, to seal us, to testify with our spirit and to remain with us forever (John 16:7, 13 and 14:16, 17, 26, Romans 8:15, 16, 26, 2 Corinthians 1:22, Ephesians 4:30). It is of excitation to piety, that we ought not to grieve Him, Ephesians 4:30, to resist Him, Hebrews 3:12, 13, 18. To extinguish Him, 1 Thessalonians 5. And that we ought to consecrate ourselves wholly to Him as His holy temples, 1 Corinthians 6:19, 20. To desire and pray for His communion, 2 Corinthians 13:13. Which things see amplified in the sermons of the fathers and more recent authors on the Mission of the Holy Spirit and in the common places on the Person of the Holy Spirit as also in the commentaries and sermons to the cited passages.

11th Argument. It is the praxis of piety to acknowledge and receive the supreme testimony concerning the truth of religion, and to remove none of the divine persons as intestable from saying testimony. But the cognition of the one God without the cognition of the trinity cannot found this praxis. See 1 John 5:7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. For the Son, and Holy Spirit will be removed from saying testimony, indeed according to the opinion of the Anti-Trinitarians they are not the first revealing truth.

12th Argument. Because all doctrine of Scripture is useful for praxis; 2 Timothy 3:16. But the dogma of the Trinity (as Christianity holds it against the Anti-Trinitarians) is the doctrine of Scripture, and indeed primary, proposed in many places, general, from which the rest of the dogmas of the Gospel are derived and necessarily depend. Therefore.

13th Argument. What makes for the obedience of faith, pious humility, and profound self-abnegation, that makes for praxis. But the cognition and faith of the mystery of the Trinity makes especially for such obedience, humility, and self-abnegation. Because by no natural light through the way of causality or negation can it be investigated; nor when now the "that" stands from Scripture, can it be perceived by human reason, on account of the loftiness of hidden truth, as to the "how" and "in what way" namely. And so our thoughts must be confined into many straits, and a bridle must be put on our genius although reluctant. But it is a heroic praxis to bruise and conquer oneself and one's insane wisdom. I cannot but adapt to this purpose the words of Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exercitation 165, section 9, "For it is in the interest both of our piety, and of the immensity of God to think such things concerning God, which we cannot think: indeed to think in Him through Him, what we cannot think through ourselves." But lest anyone except that cognition is not praxis nor is contained under it, or reduced to it; we reply with the sayings of Scripture, Colossians 3:16, Philippians 1:9, 10, 2 Thessalonians 1:9. And so all Theologians refer the true cognition of God to the first precept of the decalogue; with whom the Remonstrants make in their Confession chapter 12. Briefly no one can worship God and Christ with religion, unless he becomes a disciple of Christ and knows what God must be worshipped.

14th Argument. The cognition and faith of which makes for the hatred and avoidance of errors and evil phantasms about the one true God; moreover for the reprehension, laborious conviction, and conversion of Muhammadans, Jews, Arians, Socinians, and other erring ones; besides for the zeal of prayers for those erring; finally for the instruction of the ignorant, or for the confirmation of the doubting about this dogma; the cognition of it is profitable for peculiar practical uses according to Romans 10:13, 14, 16, Ephesians 1:18, and 4:14, 15, 1 Timothy 6:3, 20, James 5:19, 20. But the cognition of the dogma of the Trinity, etc. Therefore. For of the unknown there is no desire. For if anyone does not know this dogma he will not love its truth, nor procure its propagation with any zeal. He who only knows and believes God as one, but not as triune in persons, he will not fight for the faith, which was once delivered to the saints, of which the dogma of the Trinity is a part. Briefly he will not glorify the triune God with heart, mouth, prayers, hymns, confession, apology, martyrdom. But it is a part or act of religion to glorify the Trinity in those ways.

3. 15th Argument. The consensus of both the ancients, and the more recent, who have acknowledged the peculiar uses of this dogma, is added. Hence the profession of this dogma was required from those to be baptized (see the Disputation on the Apostles' Creed, thesis 2, and the authors cited there) the more unskilled were catechized about it, which Lucian also sarcastically objects to them in Philopatris. Although James Micyllus in his notes on Lucian raises a doubt, whether that treatise is by Lucian. But he adduces no reason for doubting. Prayers, and doxologies were made publicly to the persons of the Trinity conjointly and

separately; as can be gathered from the Athanasian Creed, the liturgies and liturgical writers; hymns both ecclesiastical and private to the Son or Holy Spirit, among which is the celebrated: "Come, Creator Spirit, The minds of your," etc. And the Hymn of Ambrose: "Now with the rising of light" etc., and another of the same: "Creator of the stars, nourishing" etc. And another of the same: "Come, Redeemer of the Nations" etc. And of an uncertain author: "O Trinity, unity" etc. And another of an uncertain author, "God, creator of all" etc. And another: "O holy Father, gentle and pious" etc. And Bede: "First, God, the globe of heaven" etc. And of Prudentius: "Give the plectrum, boy" etc. And of Paulinus: "The whole world shines with golden light" etc. And of an Anonymous: "Be present, holy Trinity." See these and other hymns collected by Josse Clichtove with commentaries, in the book titled "Elucidatorium Ecclesiasticum" etc. After whom the same and others have done, among whom George Cassander in his Liturgical works, where he has also illustrated them with notes. See also Prudentius in the preface of his Apotheosis; and in the Apotheosis itself. Among the writers of the Middle Ages, Hildebert wrote a pious hymn on the Trinity: which see in Hondorf's "Theater" on the 3rd commandment, where he cites Vincent of Beauvais, book 25, chapter 114. Possevinus in his Sacred Apparatus under "Hildebert", says those hymns are found in Antoninus (he meant to say Vincent) "Mirror of Histories", title 16, chapter 3. But because Vincent is not at hand: I leave the place to be inquired by the industry of readers. Those for whom this is not vacant, let them read it in Hondorf's "Theater". Not a few things also, which may be done here, can be gathered from the writers on the Divine Offices, published in one volume at Cologne in 1568 by Hittorp; which same ones collected make a volume in the Library of the Fathers of Marguerin de la Bigne. There are also the Liturgical works of Claudius de Sainctes. And the Liturgy of the Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, Copts or Egyptians, etc., which all celebrate the Trinity in unity. Gregory of Nazianzus, Spiritual Sentences, book 3, "It is right to perform all the best divine deeds, But let the Trinity be your chief care above all." The same in the preface to his poems: "As to me it seems best" etc., that is translated by John Langus: "In hard matters, the solace of bitter grief, One refuge, one hope was to me, The common splendor of the Triad" etc. And at the end: "O may the prepared Triad be to me, now on all sides Which they strike: suppress the war, holy Triad." In his episcopal vow and oath he particularly declares his love for the truth about the Trinity: "I swear by the Word" etc., that is, translated by John Langus page 50, 51, "I swear by the Word, clearly by the great deity, The beginning of the eternal Prince and of the Father, The image of the Archetype, and equal in nature to the parent, Who came to us from the ethereal kingdom: I swear again and again, not to follow wandering The wicked dogmas fighting against the true faith: Nor to change with other mind the supreme mind Nor with inferior word the word of God. If I tear the divine honor of the holy Triad Following in adverse matters the swelling sails:" "If I cut the deity of the Triad" etc. The formula of prayers under the name of Basil, Chrysostom, Damascene, etc. described from the little book of Greek prayers by Camerarius, and published with other more recent Greek and Latin ones. Where note page 76, 77, in the morning prayer of Gregory Nazianzen: "Now we bless you, Christ, Word from the Father, light from light without beginning, and a dwelling place of the Spirit, shining light in one deity." And page 81, in the evening prayer of Basil, "By your good pleasure and goodness, O only begotten Son, with whom you are blessed, with the all-holy, and good, and life-giving Spirit, now, and always and for ages of ages. Amen." And page 91, in the prayer of Basil after receiving the Eucharist, "O Master Christ God, king of the ages, and creator of all" etc. Which he thus concludes, "For you are the bread of life,

the fount of sanctification, the giver of good things, and to you we send up glory, with the Father, and the Holy Spirit, now, and always, and for ages of ages, Amen." Page 145, 150, he exhibits recent formulas of pious prayers, distinctly and separately to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Page 227, he exhibits recent formulas of acts of thanksgiving: Where thanks are distinctly given to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Nor must it be passed over that now from antiquity up to this day that celebrated "Trisagion" in the East and West, by which they wanted the perpetual "homologia" and "doxa" of the most holy Trinity to sound in their churches. Concerning which see Baronius in his Annals on the year 446, paragraph 12, 13. Especially in the works of Damascene a prolix epistle on the Trisagion; and the same book 3 on the Orthodox Faith, chapter 10. And John Meursius' Graeco-Barbarous Lexicon: where under the entry "Trisagion" he has noted many things about it. If the homilies of the fathers on the Trinity, on the Son, on the Holy Spirit are read; and those who treat this dogma dogmatically and elentically (such as Nazianzen, Athanasius, Basil, Augustine, Hilary, Alcuin) we will see that it is not so dry and sterile, as some think: which especially the practical meditations, prayers, exhortations teach, with which Augustine, Hilary, conclude their treatises, and Nazianzen, oration 1 on the Son, and oration against the Arians, and about himself, and Oration on the Holy Spirit. The same in his Oration on Pentecost, everywhere through the whole. More ancient than all those Clement of Alexandria in his elegant little prayer and act of thanksgiving, with which he concludes his "Paedagogus". Which see. I do not have leisure now to compare the practical uses of the more recent authors, which they have in the common places on the Mediator, especially in the commentaries. I indicate to the students, a very few, whom I have consulted, who have separately and ex professo noted something about them, namely, Nicholas Bisfeld, in "Hypotyposis of Sounder Sermons", and the illustrious Professors of Leiden in the Censure of the Confession of the Remonstrants, Pezel in the Disputation on the Trinity inserted in the Examination of Melanchthon, page 170, Dr. Gomarus in the Disputation on the person of the Father and of the Son, and another on the Holy Spirit, Melanchthon in his Common Places near the end of the place on the Holy Spirit; where he very piously advises about the praxis of this doctrine, and through it the confirmation of orthodoxy. See him: and in his Counsels, part 2, page 397, where you have pious prayers to the Trinity, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, written by him a few days before his death. I would have wanted to run through the book of Gisbert Schevichau S.J. on the Trinity to be known, loved, praised, once examined; if perchance he had made some contribution here: but now I do not have a copy of it. Lorinus in his commentary on Wisdom chapter 7, verses 22, 23, collects many attributes of the Holy Spirit which can furnish their use for the praxis of pious meditations, and sermons. Add the meditations of Louis de Ponte, in the Introduction, paragraph 1, and 5.

4. The exceptions of the Remonstrants in their Apology, page 53, are now to be removed. 1. "The uses," they say, "of the doctrine of God were set forth before and now it is only asserted in this chapter, that God has revealed Himself under three persons or hypostases. Who, unless insane, would imagine new uses here. For whatever uses will be imagined here, they will not be imagined under another concept, than under the concept of Deity. Person as person is, cannot simply furnish use, unless insofar as it is a divine person." Response 1. I do not quite grasp what they mean by person. When we say or think of the person of the Son, we do not prescind deity, but we understand both the personality proper to Him and the essence of God at the same

time, that is, God the Son. But now the uses which we have noted here, are different than those which we have noted about the Holy Spirit; for the Holy Spirit is understood by one concept and the Son by another; indeed they are in reality another and another. 2. If you think of the Trinity or the three persons together, or one of them separately; now their precise concepts are not the concepts of deity as such and precisely considered: for the notion and concept of triad or multitude and distinction is not the concept of unity or union. If therefore you do not understand the Son, or the Holy Spirit by the same formal concept, how will they not suggest their own practical uses, those statements: Colossians 1:15, 16, 17, 18, with Hebrews 1:2, 3, about the Son; and the statements John 14:16, 17, and 15:26, about the Holy Spirit, and about the Father John 5 and 16:15, 23, 27, and 17:26, and about the three 2 Corinthians 13:13. Why then has Scripture distinguished? Unless they say that all those infer purely nominal distinctions, or at most of reason reasoning. But there is no need for them to pretend here metaphysical terms and distinctions: for they themselves precede us; by their "insofar as", and "under the concept", and "really distinct". 3. If indeed on account of the conjunction of concepts, or the mutual and necessary relation to each other (according to that of Nazianzen: "Hardly do I think the One than I am carried back to the Three" etc.) they allow no distinction of them, at least through proper and peculiar modes and respects; I do not see what they will respond to Sabellius? What likewise to those who are ignorant of or dissemble the three persons; if indeed they pretend, that by confessing the one God they have already confessed the triad, because the triad is not conceived except under the concept of the one divine essence. 4. It is indeed true that the triad is one essence, and one essence is the triad (in an identical sense, of course, but not in a formal sense): but for that reason the concept of the former is not of the latter, nor vice versa: for it will follow that the Gentiles knowing the one essence of God through the light of nature, knew the three persons. Thus it is also true, that the three persons one and united are in the communion of the one deity: yet it must not be denied, that they are really distinguished among themselves, qua persons. Here therefore the uses are to be constituted distinct and proper to that extent, to what extent and how far our concepts are distinct: For those mental and spiritual praxes follow the concepts of our intellect. See the distinction of Arminius and of the concepts made here in the disputation next preceding on "Autotheos". 5. What they add: "person as person is, cannot simply furnish use unless insofar as it is a divine person: moreover, what uses the concepts of divinity furnish had already been indicated in the preceding chapter (namely, On the Nature and essence of God)": is absurd in more than one way. For first, they presuppose what is false. Person as person simply, is not considered here: but, as the divine person of the Son, as the divine person of the Father, as the divine person of the Holy Spirit. In addition, as a triad, of which the second subsists and operates from the first, the third from the first and second. That the second is begotten by the first and therefore is the only-begotten, brightness: but the third proceeds from the first and second. That the divine person of the Father is in the divine person of the Son, and vice versa. These things are thus to be distinctly conceived the sacred Scripture proposes; and it does not only explain the one essence of God or the unity of deity and want the divine unity as such to be read in Scripture and conceived by us. Who will deny that these have their use? Second, they do not sufficiently distinguish who and qua. As if the question is with the Socinians whether the Son created the world. Who created whether the Father, alone and not the Son? I say that the Son also created, (this is my concept) but not qua Son; for then the Father would be excluded. I conceive and say the same about the first and

supreme divine adoration. Who is to be adored by it? I respond the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; but not qua Son, (filiation as such, formally and abstractly considered) but qua God, for the concept of the one deity founds that adoration. Nevertheless this concept "He is to be adored, He created, was a person before Mary, namely the Son." And the other: "He created, He is to be adored; namely the Holy Spirit"; furnishes its use to the orthodox, which the Socinians (although they conceive the one deity, and the one God, as one, a thousand times) lack. Third, that they may see their absurdity I retort to them a similar sophism: Unity as unity, knowledge as knowledge, beneficence as beneficence, mercy as mercy, justice as justice, etc. cannot simply furnish use, unless insofar as unity, knowledge, etc. is divine. Moreover, what uses the concepts of divinity furnish has already been said before, therefore new and proper uses should not have been noted by the Remonstrants to the single attributes. This opposed to them will bind more strongly, than what they oppose to the Professors of Leiden; For the divine persons are really or really distinguished among themselves; but the attributes of God are distinguished neither among themselves nor really from the essence.

PART III, On the toleration of Anti-Trinitarians.

1. From the things which have now been said by way of corollary it must be decided about the toleration of Anti-Trinitarians. Moreover, we premise these things to be foreknown. 1. Toleration is either ecclesiastical, or political. The former is the toleration of someone as a member or as a minister in the communion and fraternity of the church, or even reception to that communion. Which is wont to be expressed by the terms, moderation, peace, syncretism, union of sects, liberty of prophesying: about which we must treat elsewhere ex professo. The latter; is toleration in political society, either of Anti-Trinitarians thinking thus separately and privately, or moreover of assemblies, in which either publicly or privato-publicly the profession of that heresy is taught and propagated. We in the present inquire about the latter (which we can call permission and liberty of exercise). 2. The Anti-Trinitarians are not of one sect, namely, the Arians, and Photinians; and these again of Francis David (who deny that Christ must be adored) and the Socinians. Some months ago in Transylvania it was contended about the sum of the matter between the two dissenting parties, which were the genuine Anti-Trinitarians, to whom liberty had hitherto been conceded there, and ought to be conceded in the future. To decide which controversy eighteen Proceres were delegated from the remaining three professions (for four publicly obtain there, Reformed, Lutheran, Papist, Socinian). We here now will properly treat, of those Anti-Trinitarians, whose heresies are exhibited in the Racovian Catechism, the writings of Socinus, Moscorovius, Ostorodius, Goslavius, Smalcius, Crellius, Volkelius, etc.: because the Remonstrants especially bear them in their eyes before the rest, and extol their piety to heaven, indeed also not obscurely contend that fraternity with them must be cultivated, and that they have sucked their breasts, has been demonstrated by the Professors in the censure, and Dr. Vedelius in the secrets of Arminianism, and the treatise on the God of the Synagogue; and by the peculiar treatises of Dr. Bodecher and Dr. Peltius published for this end. Indeed, even before the Synod of Dort, not a few of the Remonstrant ministers were secretly attempting the introduction of Socinianism, which 1. The case of Conrad Vorstius and his promotion to the chair

of Leiden taught (about which let the Juniors at their own time consult the Apology of James King of Great Britain, Lubbertus and Sopingius against Grotius, the second disceptation of Matthew Sladus against Vorstius in the preface, the historical narration prefixed to the acts of the Synod of Dort, and the judgment of the Synod of Dort, session 151). 2. Not a few Remonstrant ministers caught in Socinian errors, among whom, the famous Henry Slaetsius, afterwards a parricide, Adolphus Venator, the two Geisterans (whose confession is inserted in the acts of the Synod of Dort, session): and some ministers in South Holland in the year 1618 and 1619 brought to light by the deputies of the Synod and the Most Ample Delegates of the Illustrious Lords of the States. With whose sayings, writings are to be conferred some excerpts of the same kind in the Specimen of the Belgic Controversy of Dr. Festus Hommius. 3. The promotion of M. Episcopius to the chair of Leiden, and his Theology scattered there into the youth; which how formally or how really it differs from Socinian Theology, let those judge who heard his lectures, or read the excerpts, or who (to use a compendium) will now deign to compare his private Disputations, (which are publicly extant) with the Racovian Catechism.

Concerning the Necessity and Utility of the dogma of the HOLY TRINITY, SECOND PART.

Respondent: PETER JOHNSON SAANVLIET of Amsterdam.

On the 23rd day of February, 1639.

1. That most of them (especially in Holland) refused to avert the suspicion of Socinianism from themselves by an ingenuous confession: which tergiversation is especially to be noted in those three deputies of the Remonstrant cause on February 27, 1613 in the Delft colloquy: about which see the historical narration prefixed to the acts of the Synod of Dort. 5. That among their own they tolerated, favored, promoted, those whom they knew were imbued with Socinian or Anabaptist, or worse opinions, for example, Adolphus Venator, Henry Slaetsius, the Geisterans, Welsingius, Tombergius, etc. 6. That the Illustrious States of Holland, although for the most part favoring partly the opinion partly the pretended moderation of the Five Articles, in the year 1611 made a decree, that concerning the perfect satisfaction of Christ, concerning faith, concerning original sin, etc. it should not be taught otherwise, than had hitherto been delivered everywhere in the reformed churches. See the said history. 7. That H. Grotius, whom they always considered the ornament of their faction, in his books on the Law of Peace and War, on the Truth of the Christian Religion, in his notes on the Evangelists, and in the appendices ibid. brought forth some things, which do not seem to be so far from Socinian concepts, as we indeed would wish. But we are not to fatigue ourselves further with heaping up presumptions and proofs: since from that time day has so taught day, and things covert have been made so overt, that it can easily be clear to all not blinded by prejudice that the first spears of the society were the contention about absolute predestination, etc. but the formal and material was Socinian Theology. For after the hope of publicly obtaining and gaining control of things had

plainly collapsed, they so poured out the latent poison of Socinus by confession and apology, with Vedelius Rhapsodus, and the response to the Professors of Leiden, that this can be resorbed by no sophistry, no little deceptions and equivocations, no evasions and declamations. Therefore, concerning these Anti-Trinitarians whose genealogy and history we recently exhibited synoptically in our prelections (which is also described for the most part in Schlüsselburg on Heresies, Possevinus in his Select Library), it is asked, Whether they are to be tolerated ecclesiastically or politically.

2. To the former member of the question we respond, They are not to be tolerated in the communion of our Church, or the liberty of prophesying about the controverted dogmas to be conceded to them there, or fraternity to be cultivated with them. All the reasons make for this, which we brought forward above for the necessity of the doctrine of the Trinity. There can also be conferred what we have said in general about Fundamental Articles and Errors, and about Syncretism, and about the Liberty of Prophesying. It will now suffice to have applied those specially to this business. 1st Argument. Because they do not know nor worship with us the one and same true God; who is the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, but they pretend to worship the one and first God, the Father, and another God (but inferior, and accidental or made), the Son. 2nd Argument. Because they lay another foundation, than what is laid against 1 Corinthians 3. For in place of Christ, who is a divine person having two natures, they substitute another person, namely human, consisting only of human nature or essence. They therefore deny that Christ came in the flesh, 1 John 4, they lay another foundation, and by no means invoke the same Christ with us. Wherefore fraternal communion with them is not to be cultivated, 1 Corinthians 1:2. 3rd Argument. Because they do not have with us the same laver of the blood of Christ, nor believe themselves purged and sanctified through it: For they deny His satisfaction and "antilutron" for sins. With such therefore fraternal communion is not to be cultivated, 1 Peter 1:2. 4th Argument. Because they partly overturn, partly gravely dislocate, the causes and means of the application of salvation; namely in the heads concerning Justification, regeneration and the converting grace of God: with which cohere those concerning original sin, and free will, concerning the image of God, concerning perfection in this life, concerning the resurrection of the flesh, concerning the dispensation of the new covenant, the sacraments. Not even the very principle of faith, namely the word of God, remains untouched, while they gnaw at its authority, and join to it, if they do not prefer, another principle (namely human reason). But these things imply partly grave, partly fundamental errors. Which can be gathered analogically from Galatians 5:2, 3, 4, collated with chapter 3:1, 2, 1 John 1:8, 1 Corinthians 4:7, and 15:13, 55, Hebrews 6:1, 2. 5th Argument. Because it would follow this absurdity, that syncretism must be entered into with all sects even the Libertine-Enthusiastic, namely the David-Jorists, Franckists, Schwenckfeldians, Henry-Nicolaitans; and the ancient Valentinians, Marcionites, Manichaeans, etc. The adversaries have nothing which they may except according to their hypotheses. Unless they prove that those 1. do not invoke Christ, or at least do not profess Him, so far as the followers of the Neo-Photinians, or of Francis David profess the same. 2. Do not want to live piously, according to their profession and cognition. 3. The degrees or parts of cognition by which the Socinians or Francis-Davidians ascend above those heretics are precisely necessary to salvation; and therefore those heretics because through their infirmity and conscience they cannot attain that Socinian height and that minimum which is thus, are damned for eternity: And

this appears in the Scriptures either "kata to rheton" or through a consequence so evident, that anyone of sound mind perceives this. 6th argument to the man. Because with the Papists they deny that syncretism must be entered into, Arminius in a peculiar Disputation on the causes of secession, and Vorstius in twelve Disputations on the same question; and the Remonstrants of today seem not yet to have cast off the same opinion. But the Papists are more tolerable than the Socinians; because they do not deny the very first fundamentals concerning the Trinity, concerning the person of Christ the mediator, concerning the satisfaction of Christ: nor also do they so corrupt, the dogmas concerning the Grace of God and free will, concerning the image of God, concerning the resurrection of the flesh, etc. then because most of their errors, even the gravest, do not so immediately and first take away the very fundamentals themselves through simple negation or subtraction, as the Socinians do: for they place beside the fundamentals, and other fundamentals, and thus corrupt through addition. Here they have nothing which they may except, that the Papists exercise idolatry, and for this reason are worse than the Socinians. Response 1. But the aforesaid authors do not make idolatry alone the cause of secession, but also other heresies of the Papacy: indeed Vorstius states that one of the twelve causes alleged by him suffices. But among those causes are, errors concerning Justification, Likewise concerning the sacraments (outside the missatic idolatry) the state of sin and the grace of God, etc. 2. But because the former day was perhaps the disciple of the latter, and so that response to the man now no longer binds, the Remonstrants of today or Neo-Remonstrants; we give this other and direct response: That the Socinians also are idolaters, and indeed most shameful, inasmuch as besides that one only God by nature the creator of all, they adore with divine worship Christ by nature a mere man, against Galatians 4:8, collated with Jeremiah 10:11. If they say, they in conscience feel that Christ must be adored with divine worship, we reply that the Papists protest that they feel the same about their missatic idol, about the image of Christ, about Mary, about other saints, about angels. 3. Non-worship of the true God or "atheotēs" is no less abominable, than idolatrous worship. But the Socinians commit that, by reason of the Holy Spirit, whom they do not acknowledge or worship, as the one true God; From all which it is clear that their impiety in this part surpasses Popish idolatry. 4. Finally, this exception is null, unless it be solidly proven from the Scriptures that the Popish idolatry (which they exercise from the precept of their religion) simply and absolutely excludes all and each one from all hope of salvation, but the Socinian idolatry conjoined with "atheotēs" just now said does not exclude, the errors of the latter are harmless, of the former by no means. 7th argument to the man: Because the Remonstrants state that fraternity and ecclesiastical communion with us could not have been preserved by their hearers, but secession and separation must have been instituted everywhere, even where they had never before had their separate conventions either in public temples, or in private houses, for example, at Amsterdam, Gorcum, Oudewater, Delft, Haarlem, Leiden. Therefore much less will it be able to be preserved with the Socinians. For if they say that the Belgic Churches then which were constituted outside the Remonstrant contentions (as in the province of Zealand, Frisia, Groningen and Ommelanden, and some cities in Holland), in short most outside Holland and the diocese of Utrecht; then, which were infested by those contentions, as this our Utrecht; likewise Rotterdam, Leiden, Hoorn, etc. are less tolerable, than the Socinians: we ask from them that they demonstrate from the evident testimonies and consequences of Scripture, that the degree of our error and apostasy so surpasses Socinianism, that this can consist with some hope of eternal salvation, but that cannot. When

they will have proven this, they will be to me (that is,) demonstrators from the Remonstrants saying. 8th Argument. Let the consensus of the ancient Church now accede; which sent a repudiation of peace to all Anti-Trinitarians: as can be seen in the Acts of the Nicene Council, which let the juniors at their own time seek in the Tomes of the Councils, and in the ecclesiastical histories, Baronius, the Centuriators of Magdeburg, or similar ones. It will have sufficed us here to have noted, that the Anti-Trinitarians called Paulianists or Paulianistae, (in Suidas and the Nicene Council, canon 18, and Augustine On Heresies, chapter 14) that is Samosatenes (as Epiphanius calls them, heresy 65) were called "a Jewish party", as Epiphanius notes in the same place, and if indeed they were converted the Nicene Council states they must be rebaptized, canon cited, collated with Augustine and Epiphanius, place and Nicetas, Treasury of Orthodox Faith, book 4, heresy 32. Concerning the Creed of Athanasius and of the rest of the first Councils, there is no need for me to repeat here. I add that the name of Christians was denied to the Arians by the fathers: as Athanasius teaches, disputation 1 against the Arians and disputation 2, and oration 2 against the Arians, and to Serapion. Hence also the orthodox were absolutely called Christians, namely exclusively or oppositely to the Arians. In which way Photius in his Epitome of Philostorgius (recently published in Greek and Latin by James Godefroy), writes that Christians are accused, by that Theomachist, that is, Philostorgius the Arian. But here especially must be considered with how great zeal, with how great difficulties and persecutions the orthodox Doctors of that age rejected every offered syncretism, fled from it obtruded; which the acts before the Sirmian Council in the year 357, and each Ariminian in the year 358, and after them teach, about which see Socrates, Ecclesiastical History, book 2, chapter 52, 29, Sozomen, book 4, chapter 5, etc., Athanasius, On the Synods, Hilary, On the Synods, Epiphanius, heresy 73, Augustine, Sermon 129. Especially also Theodoret, book 1, chapter 4, 7, 12, and book 4, chapter 3, and book 2, chapter 8, and Socrates book 1, chapter 9, and 6. It would be too prolix to describe the words of all. I only exhibit from Theodoret the words of the synodical epistle of Sardica written by 250 bishops: "Therefore let them also be anathema to you all, because they have adulterated the word of truth: for it is the apostolic precept, if anyone has evangelized to you," etc. In the same place they cite the passage 2 Corinthians 6:14. And the words of Socrates, book 1, chapter 6, "From this epistle of the Council (namely Nicene) it becomes plain, that they anathematized not only Arius and his followers, but also the words (tas lexeis) of his opinion." Among the pious endeavors of those resisting the celebrated saying of Hilary is elsewhere noted by us: "Anathema to you Liberius: on account of the admitted syncretism of course with the Arians." If anyone now desires a compendium, let him run through the "Mellificium" of the history of Pezel, or the Chronicle of Melanchthon: otherwise, where there is more leisure, let him confer the annals of Baronius to the year 357, 358, etc. But it makes for consensus from superabundance, that the Sirmian Council itself, however Arian, or at least of suspected faith, anathematized Photinus (whose genuine disciples the Socinians profess themselves in Ostorodius, Institutes, chapter 6), who for that reason was also punished with exile according to the testimony of Socrates, book 2, chapter 24, and Sozomen, book 4, chapter 5. 9th Argument. The consensus of Christianity of the Middle Ages, and of today recede not even a finger's breadth from those fathers in this part: for all and everywhere approved the Nicene formula and of the following Councils, by which the Anti-Trinitarians are excluded. For thus teach the writings of Bede, Theophylact, Euthymius, Oecumenius, Alcuin, Rabanus, Haymo, Hugh of St. Victor, Anselm of Canterbury, Richard of St.

Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux, Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas and his commentators, who partly in peculiar treatises, partly in commentaries, sermons, common places and Disputations defend this dogma: where they reject adversaries as erring in faith and as heretics; and consequently deny fraternal communion to them. Among others Alcuin or Albinus in the year 770 learnedly wrote three books on the Trinity, which separately edited in the year 1554 Lucas Lossius illustrated with a commentary. Where in book 1, chapters 2 and 3, the necessity of this doctrine is asserted. To these add all Canonists on the Clementine "On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith". If votes are collected by nations we will hear the same voice of all successively through each age: so that among so many corruptions and distractions the unity of Christianity and ancient Catholicism has been wonderfully preserved in the truth and necessity of this dogma. The suffrage of the Gallican Churches Bochellus has in his Decrees of the Gallican Church, book 1, title 1, where among other things this serious protestation of Gregory of Tours, who is first, from History, book 1, "But those who say, there was when He was not, I execrably reject, and protest that they are separated from the church." The consensus of the Orientals is exhibited by Photius' Nomocanon, title 1, chapter 1, where note the scholium of Balsamon (who wrote under Manuel Comnenus around the year 1200), "The first constitution of title 1 of book 1 of the code is" etc. "A Christian is he who believes the Father, Son and Holy Spirit under equal majesty to be one deity. But he who teaches contrary to these things, is a heretic." Nor have they receded from this opinion up to this day as can be gathered from those things which were done with the Greeks in the Council of Florence: likewise from the response of Jeremias Patriarch of Constantinople to the Academy of Wittenberg, the Epistle of Patriarch Meletius to the Most Noble J. van der Does, Lord of Noordwijk, and the recent confession of Patriarch Cyril: to say nothing of the private writings of various ones, and the public euchologies and liturgies of the Greeks, Armenians, Egyptians, Syrians, Ethiopians, Muscovites. There is also extant a Response of Basil Grand Duke of Muscovy in the year 1570 to the confession of Johannes Rokyta, where in chapters 3 and 6 he deprives those dissenting in this dogma of the name of Christian: but he calumniously applies it to that reformed minister. If we come to western Christianity after the times of the reformation, we will find that among all the changes, dissensions, disastrous disputations, the integrity and necessity of this dogma has been asserted by all with one zeal. We will say of the Papists below. And the Remonstrants in their Apology say that they are the chief defenders of this article.

The Protestants and Reformed, following in the footsteps of the Waldensians, Albigensians, Wycliffites, Bohemians, and others who had previously seceded from the Papacy, or groaned under its yoke, demanded no reformation or change here, indeed rather constantly adhered to this universal foundation of the whole faith. To which thing the following bear witness: 1. the contests with hidden and manifest Anti-Trinitarians: whose history is otherwise to be woven. 2. The Harmony of Confessions. 3. All syncretism and toleration constantly denied to them (however much they demand it by their chrestologies). 4. The name of Christians denied to them. 5. Their peremptory exclusion, outside all counsels of peace or syncretism or Interimism between Protestants and Papists, again between the Reformed and Lutherans, finally between any others dissenting elsewhere. If the histories are run through, and six hundred little books (as they are called) pacific (of which catalogues have been published with the consultation of Cassander, and recently with the little book of John Durie on Ecclesiastical peace to be

procured among the Evangelicals) you will not find that the Anti-Trinitarians are comprehended in the common peace, which is sought or pretended. The Remonstrants also bear witness to those things which in the year 1635, the Socinians in Poland offering themselves to a colloquy on religion and offering counsels of peace. One and only is the Treatise of Acontius which imposed on some of the more imprudent; nor is there need for the Remonstrants to object to it in their Apology, page 11, and Response to the Professors of Leiden, page 65. Since it would have become known to the Reformed Churches, what he obscurely suggests in book 3, pages 114, 123, and book 7, page 341, Basel edition in 8, by Waldkirch 1616, edited by Johannes Jacobus Grasser; Certainly they would not have retained him in their communion, unless he had declared more openly, that he had not brought from Italy under pretext of reformation, what his countrymen Alciati, Blandrata, Gribaldi, both Socini, etc. Add the consensus of Polities in Christianity: indeed also of the Remonstrants themselves (as they previously professed) both of which we will more conveniently note to the second member of this question.

3. And this is indeed the orthodox and catholic opinion of Christianity; which is opposed, besides the Socinians, by some paradoxical men, whom they call Remonstrants in Belgium. Moreover, they oppose it in their way, now of those asserting, now of those doubting and inquiring, now of those opposing, now as if restored to silence, now sustaining the person of the ignorant and desirous to learn. But the illustrious Vedelius has treated that question of the state of denial so solidly in the Secrets of Arminianism, that they themselves now seem to acquiesce, and in the little book recently published in the vernacular language titled, "The Right Remonstrant Theologian", pages 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, etc., to confirm that opinion of theirs with reasons and testimonies gathered from all sides. The arguments, which we could gather from the said little book and the Apology and Vedelius Rhapsodus, especially from the Response to the excerpts of the Professors of Leiden (see pages 31, 42, 57, 58, 82, 83), are nearly these. 1st Objection. Because they honor the Father in Christ, and seek to obtain the Holy Spirit from both by their prayers: but they only err in faith about the person and office of Christ. Remonstrants' Apology, pages 85, 86, in the controversies about the person and natures of Christ, which are moved among the learned, Ibid., page 72. Note, Christian reader, whoever you are, how here the divine person and adoration of the Holy Spirit is excluded; and the Socinian heresies are called controversies, which are agitated among learned men: as if, for example, they were nothing other than some problematic and scholastic disputations. To the objection thus I respond. 1. He who honors the legitimate king as some other honorable man, but not as his king, everywhere expressly contending, that he is not king, he surely errs fundamentally in the polity; nor can he be tolerated in civil communion and society as a good citizen. In the same way, they err fundamentally in religion and the church, who oppose the deity of the Son and Holy Spirit, that is, their supreme majesty; although they protest, that they religiously worship and adore the Son. 2. It is said pointedly that they seek the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son; but this is not to worship, and adore the Holy Spirit. He who asks the Holy Spirit from God no otherwise than daily bread, or peace of conscience, or faith, or hope, or cognition, or any other gift: he no more religiously worships and adores the Holy Spirit than bread; or his faith, or cognition, or any other gift. But it is a fundamental error, when it is stated that He must not be worshipped and adored any more than bread, or any of our internal or external good things, who with the Father and the Son is the one God; as the Remonstrants still profess this to be believed by their own.

3. In the same way it could be said that the Muhammadans honor Christ, so far as they understand and know Him to be honorable: and yet we would not want to receive them into our communion as good Christians on that account; as I think the Remonstrants also would not do. 4. Add that the Papists protest, that they adore the eternal Son of God the same God with the Father, when they adore the Eucharistic bread: whence however it does not follow that the error is not harmful or fundamental. 5. Indeed also the Jews could protest, that they intend nothing other than to adore and worship the one only true God; who and as He revealed Himself in the writings of the Old Testament. Would they therefore be said not to err fundamentally, and be received into ecclesiastical communion by the Remonstrants? 2nd Objection. They are Christians, and profess themselves such, and receive the word of God as the only canon of faith. Response. You may find very many among the ancient and more recent heretics who could use the same protestation, who nevertheless by that very thing are not better, for example, Nestorians, Eutychians, Monothelites, Sabellians, the last of whom nevertheless are placed by Acontius so greatly praised by the Remonstrants outside his new catholic symbol and communion or syncretism, because they state that the Son is the same person with the Father. The same could be said about any fanatic sects of the Anabaptists. From among the Papists Michael Bajus in his disputation on the Eucharist against the most noble lord of St. Aldegonde descended to this point, that he conceded the controversy must be terminated by Scripture as the only principle and judge. Would the Remonstrants therefore deny that all the rest of his errors about the sacrifice of the mass, about human satisfactions, about the worship of images, etc., are fundamental, notwithstanding which he would have to be admitted to our communion? 3rd Objection. They love the Lord Jesus and from His intimate love, as also of His word and truth they thus believe and feel, nor can they otherwise protest: so that the anathema of the apostle, 1 Corinthians 16:22, cannot be applied to them. Response 1. The Papists protest the same, and among them most of all the Popes, Cardinals, Bishops, Abbots, Inquisitors, etc., when they adore images, saints, angels, the Eucharistic bread, despise and traduce Scripture; persecute and butcher the truly faithful and pious, devise and execute a thousand perfidies, treasons, parricides. Would the Remonstrants therefore admit them to their communion? 2. What if someone loved or rather protested that he loved the Lord Jesus; meanwhile hated and blasphemed His same word and doctrine, for example, about His true divinity, about satisfaction for sins, about true and supreme divine honor, which belongs to Him equally with the Father; would that pretended love suffice for him to be numbered among the good disciples and imitators of Christ? 3. What if someone protested that he loved some person, who was his legitimate prince or Magistrate or tutor, or wife; meanwhile also protested, that he did not acknowledge her as legitimate prince, or tutor, or wife, nor loved them as such, would that common pretended love, in reality perverse and supposititious, suffice? The Socinians love Christ, as they boast, but by no means with divine love, which belongs to God alone, and tends to Him alone; consequently they love Him with no due and legitimate love. For the love of God and of a creature differ immensely: as is gathered from many reasons and from the text of Matthew 22:37, 38, 39. To each his own must be rendered here: nor can the infinite, supremely good and perfect God be loved with the love of a creature without the crime of horrible "adotheia" and "atheia"; nor vice versa can a mere man or angel or any creature whatsoever be loved with divine love without the crime of horrible idolatry. But if a husband cannot but pursue his wife with conjugal love, nor can he pursue any other woman with the same without error and

fundamental sin against marriage: how much less without fundamental error against religion can so much love of a creature be bestowed on the true God and divine love not be bestowed, or on the contrary can divine love be bestowed on a creature. Certainly the distance between the love of a creature, and divine love is greater than between the common love of men, and between special conjugal love. 4. If the Muhammadans protested that they love Christ; and showed this not only in words but also in deed itself, punishing out of love and reverence for Christ the Jews blaspheming Him: would they therefore be admitted to fraternal communion by the Remonstrants? 5. We give an instance to the man: The Jews protest that they love the one God, yet they do not acknowledge and love Him as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ (which the Remonstrants will not deny to be necessary), Will they say anathema to them, and indeed for this alone, because they do not love Him as the Father of Christ. Or will they receive them into their communion? What therefore will they respond to those passages, Romans 10:2, 1 Thessalonians 2:15, 16, John 15:22? The Socinians themselves in Smalcius, Refutation of Smiglecius on the errors of the Arians, book 1, chapter 2, confess that he is a heretic who defends such things which do not permit believing that Jesus is the Christ, and that God raised Him from the dead. Compare also Vedelius' "The God of the Synagogue". 4th Objection. They are pious, indeed most pious, and live piously conformably to their profession. Response 1. We deny that they live piously. For those who detract from the true God His honor, that is, deity and divine majesty, and openly and directly deny, oppose, blaspheme it, they live impiously. But the Socinians detract from the true and eternal God, namely the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the divine majesty, etc. Therefore. 2. This assertion about the piety of the Socinians rests on two false hypotheses; of which the Prior is that civil honesty is Christian piety. Which see refuted by the practical authors, who describe true Christianity, its distinction from feigned and hypocritical "morphosis" of piety. Compare our disputation on Simplicity and hypocrisy. The Other is, that the genuine spiritual cognition of God and its sincere and constant profession, is not a necessary part of piety, or praxis or obedience due to God, or of true religion. But it is commanded by the first precept of the decalogue, no less than trust, honor, fear, love. And the Remonstrants themselves state this in their Confession, where they explain the first precept: although afterwards in their catechism, question 58, they omitted it. 3. The same could be no less affirmed about Paul persecuting Christ and compelling men to His blasphemy, Philippians 3:6, 9. Will they deny that he erred fundamentally? will they say that that wolf must be received into the communion of Christ's sheep? See 1 Timothy 1:13, 15, Acts 26:9, 10, 11. 4. It could be said with no less right about some of the Muhammadans and Jews than about the Socinians, that they live piously and honestly. But the Remonstrants do not cultivate fraternity with them. 5. The same could be said about David Joris, and his followers. See his history published by the Baslers. 6. Finally, it could be said with much greater right that some of the Papal Bishops, Theologians, monks, Jesuits, Inquisitors furiously persecuting our religion and church live piously according to their profession, sense, and conscience. Nor does the zeal of persecution hinder, since according to their erring conscience they consider it no small part of true piety and divine love; just as the Socinians profess that they out of mere reverence for Scripture, and conscience of duty to be rendered to God, pursue and exterminate the dogmas concerning the Trinity, the satisfaction of Christ, etc. by words and deeds with all their might, and hinder faith in them even in their unwilling adversaries. Of their words, the manifold blasphemies of the Socinians against the mysteries of the Trinity, incarnation, satisfaction, resurrection of the same

flesh, etc. bear witness. Of their deeds, the prison of Francis David, in which having become frenzied he miserably died: which they ascribe to Socinus as the author or instigator. The Remonstrants could be added, who will say without doubt that the persecution stirred up against the orthodox at Rotterdam, Utrecht, Schoonhoven, etc. (let the decrees of Utrecht, and Rotterdam and Schieland be seen) proceeded from a good conscience, and divine zeal. Since the Papal persecutors, and certain Inquisitors, otherwise living piously and honestly according to their profession, pretend as much; how will the Remonstrants not offer fraternity to them, equally as to the Socinians? 5th Objection. Because they do not fight for their errors about the doctrine of the Trinity, the person and office of Christ, etc. against their conscience; and so their errors are harmless, nor are they to be excluded from fraternity on that account. Response. I would very much like to be taught by the Remonstrants, by what judgments and marks it can be certainly established, that errors are defended by someone against conscience. I do not think anything can be shown by them, besides the proper confession of the one erring. But now no heretic, fanatic, Enthusiast, atheist is to be excluded from fraternity, nor to be said to err against knowledge: as long as he himself does not declare this against himself and about himself. Therefore the Jews, Muhammadans, Marcionites, Manichaeans, Arians, Sabellians, Circumcellions, Henry-Nicolaitans, David-Jorists, the Pope with his Cardinals and Roman courtiers, Vanini and Godfrey de Valle (about whom see in the disputation on Atheism), James Clement, Balthasar Gerard, Henry Slaetsius, and other assassins and parricides, who constantly professed their parricidal faith, religion and conscience, and sealed it with their blood, are brothers. 6th Objection. Because God will condemn no one on account of Socinianism (which we believe to be heresy and blasphemy) at least this has not been able to be demonstrated directly from Scripture thus far. Response. We have proven the contrary throughout this whole disputation, from the foundations of Scripture, Galatians 5:1, 2, 3, and 3:1, 2, and 1 John 1:8, and 4:3, and 1 Corinthians 5:15, 13. Compare above, part 1, thesis 3, and the response to the objection to be subjected a little after. 7th Objection. Because speculative heresy, that is, pertinacious (but not against conscience) even about necessary things, will damn no one; if only he lives piously, and always denies, that he can feel otherwise through the dictate of conscience. Response 1. With this hypothesis admitted it would have to be said, that Paul the persecutor, Galatians 1:13, 14, as also the other Jews enemies of Christ, John 16:3, could not have been damned by God, or excluded from the spiritual and fraternal communion of the faithful, because namely they judged in conscience that God so commanded this: whose commands they could not but obey. That there is here a zeal for God, Romans 10:2, that there is an intended "agnosia", John 16:3. And yet the apostle condemns those Jews and himself, 1 Thessalonians 2:15, 16, 1 Timothy 1:17. 2. Whence will they prove that Hymenaeus, Philetus, Alexander, the Nicolaitans, scattered their errors against knowledge and conscience? who nevertheless are condemned in Scripture, and segregated from all communion, 1 Timothy 1:20, 2 Timothy 2:17, and 4:14, Revelation 2:6, 15. 3. Who will say that all the Judaizing Christians did it against conscience? Yet the apostle condemns them, and wishes them to be cut off from the communion of the faithful, Galatians 5:2, 4, 10, 12. 4. Also how would the Remonstrants prove, that all the Jews, Muhammadans, David-Jorists, Weigelians, Franckists, followers of Francis David, Martin Seidelius, etc., living honestly, hold and defend their errors against conscience? Meanwhile they would not admit them, as I think, to their communion, or affect their fraternity. 8th Objection. Because Justin Martyr does not place errors of this kind outside the

communion of the Christian Church. And Salvian, book 5 on the government of God (whom they allege in the book "The Right Remonstrant Theologian") thinks that the Arians err with a pious mind, and no one knows, how they are to be punished on the day of judgment on account of this opinion of theirs. Response 1. What Justin, and the whole of antiquity thought about the necessity of this doctrine, can be clear from their testimonies, which the students will see collected by Josse Coccius in "The Catholic Thesaurus", book 1, article 4, Elmenhorst in his commentary on Gennadius, chapter 1, paragraph 1, Polanus in "The Catholic Symphony", chapter 2. Compare above thesis 2 and of the first part thesis 4. To which add from the historians Paul Orosius, book 6, chapter 33, where about the destruction of Valens. And Jordanes "On the Gothic matters", chapter 25, where about the same. 2. Moreover, the Professors of Leiden respond to this objection of the Remonstrants in the Specimen of Excerpts, page 17, and Vedelius in the Secrets of Arminianism, part 1, book 1, chapter 7, and part 3, book 2, chapter 3, especially part 4, book 1, chapter 7. And Fr. Junius in his Anti-Apology, chapter 3, page 101. Which I do not want to transcribe here. 3. As to Salvian, book 5 on the government of God, page 162, 163 (Rittershausen edition in 8), he speaks not absolutely but comparatively, about a lesser judgment and punishment: as can be gathered from what follows, pages 164, 165. 4. Although they would not have dared to precisely and rigidly adjudicate condemnation to them, it does not follow from this however that salvation was adjudicated to those heretics: much less that they would have determined that they must be received into fraternal communion; as long as they doubted, and were not convicted with certainty from the word of God, that those heretics notwithstanding such a profession were true and pious Christians, and therefore pleased God unto salvation. They ought therefore to have abstained from a peremptory judgment, and from actual reception, as long as they were not certain: as they openly indicate that they were not convinced with the certainty of faith about that Remonstrant assertion. But now, "Whatever is not from faith, is sin." Romans 14:23. Compare the disputation on Fundamental Articles and Errors. 9th Objection. Because counsels of peace and syncretism and union of divided Christianity have always been proposed with praise by the more moderate theologians of our reformation; as Melanchthon, Bucer, etc. and others cited in the apology of the Remonstrants and elsewhere; among whom Acontius shines forth in his "Stratagems of Satan", which John James Grasser, Basil theologian, gave to be reprinted again in the year 1610 at Basel by Conrad Waldkirch. Response 1. All syncretistic writers about the controversies between us and the Papists, and between us and the Lutherans, expressly exclude the Neo-Arians and similar heretics, and presuppose for this syncretism the four first ecumenical councils (as they are called), and the universal creed. Let Melanchthon's Common Places, Theological Examination, etc. especially be consulted. 2. As to Acontius, we say that he is deservedly suspect in this business; however much the Remonstrants extol him. Let only book 3, page 114, 123, and book 7, page 341, Basel edition of 1610 be seen; and let it be judged, what snake lay hidden in the grass: because this man in the fundamental assertions never stated "homoousios" of the three persons, nor rejected the adversaries Samosatenus, Photinus, Arius, Eunomius, the Pneumatomachi, or their errors, content only that those are rejected, who denied that the Son is other than the Father. 4. The other member of the question is: Whether in Christian Polities, the heresy of the Anti-Trinitarians nominally the Socinian liberty of exercise or the celebration of ecclesiastical assemblies public, or privato-public is to be conceded. We defend the negative, with this limitation of course, if indeed the Magistrate has

both the power and the potency of impeding them, without the danger of subversion, or most grave concussion of the Republic. Concerning which limitation we have spoken in general in the disputation on the Liberty of Conscience, etc. Here we only presuppose it: And we adduce these reasons. 1. Because it is a baleful heresy, about the very first foundation concerning the Trinity and about the person of Christ: But that to such heresies liberty or license is not to be conceded, that they may spread to the destruction of the Christian name, the ignominy of the divine name, the seduction of souls, the perturbation of the church, and consequently of the Republic, the whole of Christianity states both theologically and politically: whose opinion is defended in general and ex professo from the testimonies of Scripture and reasons in the common places cited above. In hypothesis here it only remains to be subsumed, that the Socinian heresies are such: which I think has been sufficiently proven by the reasons brought forward for the necessity and utility of the dogma of the Trinity. 2. Because it is learned impiety, conjoined with horrible blasphemies, wherever of course the liberty of prophesying, and of proposing their own things according to the custom and method of the Remonstrants as it will have seemed good and from the dictate of their conscience, of urging "anakephalaioses" and "proslepseis" will have obtained. Examples of the blasphemies of Servetus, and of the Anti-Trinitarian Ministers in Transylvania, and of similar ones are well enough known, which let those read, who can; for the mind does not bear to relate those horrible things unless the highest necessity urges. See Calvin's defense against Servetus. 3. Because it is idolatry much more evident and more theoretical and crass than for example is the invocation of Mary and the saints in the papacy: for that does not so crassly lead away to another God, as this Socinian one does: but it is not clear from the sacred writings that license must be conceded to idolatrous seducers, at least not from Deuteronomy 13, nor would the Remonstrants themselves want it. 4. Because it would follow that in all Christian Polities that license must be conceded to the Manichaeans, Ophites, Simonians, Sethians, Coelicolists, Valentinians, indeed also to the Muhammadans, Samaritans, Jews: at least to those heretics who would similarly honor Scripture with the Socinians, would profess the name of Christ, and would promise that they would live probely and modestly. But if they except that such liberty is not to be conceded to the erring ones mentioned, I ask and adjure that they bring forth clear reasons from Scripture, by which they prove the specific difference between the heretics just now mentioned, and others prohibited by the Civil Law, and between the Muhammadans and the Socinians. 5. Because it has been observed that the permission of such blasphemous heresies for the most part procures grave judgments of God for Polities; on the contrary their coercion, the blessings of God. Which Ambrose excellently observes happened in his age, in the preface to his book on the Holy Spirit. 6. The praxis of Christianity accedes both ancient, and modern: where with the Churches and their Doctors so demanding that liberty was always denied to the Anti-Trinitarians, when it could be denied, and so much the more strictly the more the Princes and Magistrates excelled all others in wisdom, piety, virtue. We have noted in the Titles of the Code, with which the deeds of Constantine, Theodosius, Marcian, etc. are testified to have agreed by ecclesiastical history, and the Acts of the Councils. You will find there various decrees by which the Emperors, with heresies proscribed, sometimes with many penalties also imposed, fortify the catholic faith: which collected see in Goldast's "Constitutions of the Emperors". Memorable is that which is related about the deed of Amphilochius Bishop of Iconium, by which Theodosius having been moved ordered the temples of the Arians to be closed. Theodoret,

History, book 5, chapter 16, "After the return of Theodosius from there, that admirable Amphilochius, of whom already frequent mention has been made by me, approached to entreat the Emperor, that he cast out the assemblies of the Arians from the cities. But the Emperor judging that postulation to be too severe and inhuman rejects it. Therefore the most wise Amphilochius, the matter having been silent for the time being, devised another reason for obtaining what he wanted, and that plainly memorable. For when at another time by chance he was within the palace, and saw standing by the Emperor his son Arcadius, who had recently been created Emperor, he saluted the Emperor Theodosius indeed (as is the custom), but dismissed the son without honor. The Emperor however thinking Amphilochius had forgotten his duty, orders him to approach the son, and kiss him. But Amphilochius responded, that it was enough, that he had paid him honor. And so Theodosius bearing the matter bitterly and gravely, counted as a place of injury to himself the reproach cast upon his son. Then the most wise Amphilochius declaring to the Emperor, what he was contriving in his mind, with a loud voice: 'You see,' he says, 'O Emperor, how heavily you bear the ignominy of your son; indeed you are vehemently angry with those, who insult him. Believe me if you will, that the ruler of this universe God, likewise detests those who speak blasphemies against His only begotten Son, and pursues them as ungrateful towards their Savior and patron.' When the Emperor had understood his purpose in this way, at the same time admiring his deeds and sayings, he immediately wrote a law, by which he forbade assemblies to be held by heretics." After the composition of the body of Civil Law emanated in the year 639 the Ecthesis of Heraclius on the Holy Trinity and the Catholic Faith, where the Anti-Trinitarians are anathematized and cast out. It is extant in Goldast, tome 3, page 637, 7, "And following these in all things, and receiving their divine dogmas, all whom they have excepted, we except, and all whom they have cast out, we cast out and anathematize, especially Novatus, Sabellius, Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, Apollinaris, Origen, Evagrius, Didymus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Nestorius, Eutyches, Dioscorus, Severus, and the impious writings of Theodoret, which are against the right faith and the Ephesian Synod and the twelve Chapters of St. Cyril, and as many as wrote for Theodore and Nestorius, and the so-called Epistle of Ibas: and we exhort all Christians thus to think, and thus to glorify, adding nothing to these things, subtracting nothing, changing nothing, according to what is written." In the same place, page 642, is the Edict of Constantine V Pogonatus on the Catholic Faith, and the damnation of heresies, in the year 681. Where chapter 8, "Moreover, we anathematize every heresy, which has been introduced into the Church of God from Simon up to now for the purpose of dividing the peace and unanimity of the believers." And chapter, "With all these things thus constituted by this holy universal sixth Council, and confirmed by the subscription of our fortitude, we decree, that no one whosoever otherwise make any attempt concerning the faith, or machinate the invention of a new dogma, or entirely move any judgment or speech concerning one will and one operation. For we following our holy and approved Fathers announce the wills of the natures: and as we believe two natures in Christ, so we also preach two natural wills and two operations. These are the dogmas of true confession in God; these are the predications of the evangelical and apostolic voices; these are the teachings of the holy Councils and the approved paternal tongues; these Peter, who is also the rock of faith and the Prince of the Apostles, preserved inviolate. In this faith we both live and reign, and hope to reign again with God reigning with us. We desire to have this as a companion hence departing, and with this to stand before the tribunal of Christ. To this confession we exhort all,

we invite to serve God with us, and standing upon the high mountain of the Empire, we preach, and announce the ecclesiastical peace the solemnity of the whole people. For that dissension formerly of those beloved by Christ has now been turned into concord; the scandals of the heretics are on the contrary: and this faith has obtained its proper dignity, with Christ Himself healing His Churches. He is therefore our peace, who has broken down the middle wall of partition: and has reconciled into unanimity those things which disagreed through times. One Lord, one faith, one baptism, now is the unity of the Church in God. If anyone therefore is a lover of Christ, and fears the Lord, and desires the salvation wished for, let him hold this orthodox faith. For neither will there be through another faith to be saved. But if any of men exhibits grace to the persons of men, and does not show himself an imitator of charity in God, and does not receive our present pious constitution, if indeed he is a Bishop, or Cleric, or is surrounded with the monastic habit, he will pay the penalty of deportation: but if he is inserted in the Order of dignities, he is punished with the punishment of proscription, and his belt is taken away from him: but if he is of the idiot lot, he is cast out exiled from this Royal, and from every City altogether: and above all these things he will also not escape the terrible and inexpiable torment of judgment." Alcuin in the preface of his books on the Trinity to Charlemagne, desires and commends that by his imperial power the concordant confession of this doctrine be protected: "That your empire may be extended into all glory: that namely the catholic faith, which alone (note well) sanctifies the human race, may be truly fixed in the hearts of all in one confession: so that the unity of the same holy peace and perfect charity, the piety of the highest king granting, may rule and guard all everywhere." The same in a hexastich to the same Charlemagne, "May the Father and the offspring of the Father, may the fostering Spirit Protect you, exalt, save, honor, love. Whom your pious mind through peoples, lands, through kingdoms, through cities, May ever commend, always to love God." If we descend to our times (in which the new Arianism arose), we will find that liberty nowhere conceded to them, everywhere all approaches precluded. 1. In the German Empire, where up to this day it is abominable to import or expose their books for sale, much less that they could be comprehended under the peace of religion. Indeed also Frederick Elector Palatine rightly called Pious subjected to capital punishment a certain preacher by the name of Sylvanus secretly taking counsel with the Socinians about introducing Socinianism into the Palatinate. 2. That there is no place for them in Great Britain the contestations of the Most Serene King James against Vorstius suspected of Socinianism teach; besides the punishment there taken of a blasphemous Arian. 3. That they are not tolerated by the Reformed Swiss Cantons, as neither by the Genevan Republic, the punishment of Valentinus Gentilis, Servetus, and most recently of a certain Antonius in the year 1633 burned at Geneva bears witness. 4. In Poland, when it first crept in there, the Protestant and Reformed Proceres faithfully opposed themselves in the public assemblies of the kingdom: but the cause was then deserted by the Papists. But in the year 1640 something was decreed there against the same Socinians in the assemblies of the kingdom. 5. In Transylvania although they obtained before now in not a few places, today however the most high Prince Rakoczy the eminent protector of the reformed religion does so much, that it must be hoped with God that as their things have already begun to fall, so they will shortly collapse completely. 6. In federated Belgium prejudice has been done to the toleration of this sect in many ways. Namely by the Approbation of the synodal judgment concerning Vorstius and his dismission from Belgium in 1619. By the process of the Illustrious Frisians against the Socinian booklet clandestinely

published by the disciples of Vorstius, and by the admonition written upon it, to the Illustrious States of Holland in the year 1616. By the Deposition of ministers who would be kindred to the Socinian errors, through the Most Ample delegates of the Illustrious States of Holland and the Deputies of the Synod in the year 1618 and 1619. By the Burning of the books of Socinus and the ejection of Ostorodius and Voidovius from these Provinces through the Illustrious and Mighty Lords of the States General in the year 1598, who adduce the reason of this their decree that with them were found certain books, which having been visited in the University of Leiden, are found to agree with the Turkish doctrine, denying the divinity of Christ the Son of God and of the Holy Spirit: and because the said persons professing the same doctrine not obscurely, came into these Provinces, that they might introduce it into them, and so disturb the state of the church here the more: wanting therefore to occur to these things in time, for the conservation of the honor of God, and the advantage and emolument of the States of the United Provinces, we have decreed, etc. 7. Concerning the consensus of the Papists and Lutherans there is no need for me to add much: since it is clear that the former adhere to the Councils, which after the Papacy was established in the West prefixed a repetition of this dogma to meetings, with the exclusion of those thinking otherwise; as the Lateran in the year 1215, where the opinion of Joachim the Abbot was condemned: the Viennese in the year 1311, where the Clementines were approved, of which the 1st title premises as the necessary foundation of the catholic faith, that the Son eternally subsisting in the same essence with the Father eternally, etc. The Florentine in the year 1439, where the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son was defined. The Lutherans, how much they detest the Socinians and want them excluded from all Christianity, the writings of theirs sent out against them from some years ago bear witness. Indeed moreover from the principal motives (why they contend that ours are excluded from the peace of religion in the Empire) this one is likewise common to them equally as to the Papists, that our doctrine is suspect of syncretism with some dogmas of the Socinians: for which demonstration of theirs they thought they had found a suitable and evident argument in Conrad Vorstius. See about this matter the rescripts of Albertus Grawer the Lutheran, and of Becanus the Jesuit. Before them Bellarmine had objected to some affinity or syncretism with the Anti-Trinitarians in his preface to the 2nd general controversy; and from among the Lutherans Philip Nicolai in "The Detection of the Foundations of the Calvinian Sect common with the ancient Arians and Nestorians". Which book was approved by the theological faculty of Tübingen. But to that rude and absurd calumny we oppose the milder judgments and counsels of the Kings of France, who permit to ours the exercises of their religion: and of the present Emperor, who conceded the same liberty to the county of Hanau, and offered it to the Landgrave of Hesse in the treaties of peace; and of the king, queen, and nobles of the kingdom of Sweden, whose most close alliances with ours, and postulations and intercessions for them in the German Empire in the Treaty of Münster in the year 1645, 1646, are in the open. And the invitations of the King of Poland and of the Bishops there to peace; from which they exclude the Socinians alone, but not the Reformed. 8. But because the Remonstrants not rarely appeal for toleration and moderation to Melanchthon, Francis Junius, Hemming, the Swiss Theologians Musculus, Bullinger, Gwalther; moreover the Decree of the Lords of the States of Holland, the pacific Counsels of the Princes of Germany, as of Frederick Elector Palatine, and the irenical ones of the Palatine Theologians and of the most serene King of Great Britain, let them hear their consensus therefore, and apply it to Socinianism: otherwise by saying they say nothing, or

a snake lies hidden in the grass, according to that: "The deceitful one turns in generalities." Let them know therefore, that the Illustrious States of Holland, who for a great part seduced by the pseudo-political counsels of their advocate John Oldenbarnevelt favored moderation and toleration in the controversy about Predestination then and sanctioned it by decree in the year 1617, in the year 1611 prohibited all dissensions from the received doctrine about the full satisfaction of Christ, justification, original sin, perfection in this life. The same through their ordinary Deputies (among whom then was Grotius, and over whom presided the advocate of Holland John Oldenbarnevelt) relegated Adolph Venator the principal one from among the Remonstrant associates on account of Socinianism subtly stuffed into his book titled "True and Mere Theology", etc. Francis Junius a man by the praises both of ours and of the Remonstrants most studious of Christian peace and moderation together with Lucas Trelcatius Sr. and Francis Gomarus then Professors of Leiden compared Socinianism with Turkism, and so led the way for the Illustrious States to the decree just now mentioned; which as bloody and by far surpassing the cruelty of the Spanish Inquisition that pacific Junius with his colleagues imputes to the Apology of Ostorodius and Voidovius. The Swiss Theologians, approved, never at least disapproved the exaction of all sects by the Reformed Cantons; to say nothing about certain Catabaptists, and Valentinus Gentilis beheaded. The same with the Rhaetian Theologians, as also Melanchthon, Hemming and others approved the punishment of Servetus: no one as far as I know disapproving it, as the Socinians, Conrad Vorstius, and those shades, who during the burning contention of the Remonstrants published in the vernacular idiom "The Crystal Spectacles", "Certain High Things in the Schieland Classis", and other booklets, moreover gave the apology of Castellio for Servetus against the booklet of Calvin to be reprinted in the year 1612 with a prickly preface prefixed. Frederick the Pious Elector Palatine committed Neuser to prison, whom when he had broken out and fled to the Socinian brothers in Transylvania, thence to the Turks, his associate Sylvanus was afflicted with capital punishment: yet never on account of this deed was that Prince numbered among the Spanish Inquisitors by his irenical Theologians and their successors Tossanus, Olevianus, Francis Junius, etc. We just now indicated the apology of the Most Serene King James for his deeds and counsels against Vorstius, as also the burning alive of a certain Arian in England. But let the Remonstrants themselves close the line, who formerly by the mouth of the most celebrated and eloquent advocate of their cause thus spoke: "Grotius endeavors to persuade nothing beyond, than that the king wants, that the five articles be tolerated, which the king read. Far be it that we tolerate Socinian things: and may God avert that." Thus the Hyperaspist of Grotius (if not he himself) in "The Good Faith of Sibrandus", number 28. Here where the rumor crept through (namely about the Socinianism of Vorstius) "how they shuddered struck by the unexpected matter, those very ones who had commended Vorstius, (namely the Remonstrant preachers) Sibrandus cannot be ignorant." Grotius in "The Piety of the States", pages 11, 12. Where he subjoins the sum of the epistle of John Wtenbogaert to Vorstius (which was then divulged in the vernacular idiom) by which he warns Vorstius, that he dilute the calumny of Socinianism to be borne by no Christian: if anything of truth lay under, he is the author, that he refuse the offered function, and not impose on the States and Curators, and bring himself into danger. "For from all these a Christian professor is expected, not an Ostorodian one." Note that the Ostorodians then were not Christians to the Remonstrants; and so Grotius interprets him there, "Is he to be believed to favor Socinianism, or what is the same Ostorodianism, when he relegates those professing that

sect outside the name of Christians." And a little after page 13, "Here I profess with the best faith, that I know no one in all the assembly of Holland, who will not say anathema to all and each of those opinions." Moreover, the opinions designated in species, and called most grave crimes were, "Denied 'homoousios kai asynchytos, kai adiairetos Trias', the true eternity of Christ, indeed also of God, His immensity also and omnipresence 'somatikos', then His truth and immutability, and omnipotence, and 'prognosis' of future things especially 'ton endechomenon', besides fear 'peri to asomaton kai to apoion', but fear and despair having been attributed to God, and indeed 'kata kyriopoiian', not even the true and full satisfaction of Christ for our sins having been acknowledged." Concerning the Remonstrant Pastors, page 16, he reports that they testified in the assembly of the States, that "those things which the Samosatenians or Socinians are said to teach concerning the sacrosanct Trinity, concerning the person and office of our Lord Jesus Christ, concerning perfect satisfaction for sins, also concerning justification, are rejected by them, but on the contrary they adhere to those things, which the whole of Christianity approves about those matters: and which are taught everywhere in the reformed churches, and which they themselves had taught hitherto." At the end of the same book, page 126, "The most illustrious States do this (namely they show themselves as arbiters to the Theologians fighting about predestination), they do not overturn the ancient faith, they do not rescind the dogmas of the Ecumenical synods; they do not resuscitate Pelagius; they do not connive at the Sarmatian portents (note well). They are Christians. They remain Catholic. They do not cease to be Reformed." And these dictations then so pleased the Remonstrants "sympadon", or at least they simulated to approve them. Indeed also John Corvinus published an apology of this Grotian writing against Bogermann. Most recently the most ornate with many gifts of talent, and most celebrated poet Caspar Barlaeus Professor of Philosophy in the Illustrious Gymnasium of Amsterdam, thus thinks against the toleration of Socinianism in his "Vindications against Vedelius", which either he himself wrote or took care to have written for him: "I will speak," he says, "more severely for Barlaeus. He could not bespatter it with a fouler stain, than of Socinianism; which Barlaeus long ago believed to be the pest and pitfall of the Christian faith, and to pave the way to the 'panolethria' of that religion, which the eternal Son of the eternal God sprinkled with His precious blood, and so many martyrdoms and butcheries have rendered illustrious." And at the end: "For he himself (Barlaeus) thus judges, that he will be unworthy, who discharges a public office (note well) among the Batavians, unworthy whom the Most Ample Optimates of the Amsterdam Republic most tenderly favor; unworthy, whose studies the Most Illustrious Prince of Orange encourages with remarkable liberality, etc., if he assents to the unsound and universally damned by the church dogmas of Socinus, of the Anti-Trinitarians or of similar heretics." We add lastly, that from the prohibition of the exercise of the Reformed (who namely denied that they could through conscience either hear sermons, or receive the supper from those who calumniously traduced the doctrine of the Grace of God, predestination, and perseverance, moreover seemed to favor other novelties), which was formerly so greatly approved by the Remonstrants, and carried out by the Magistrates who heard them; it can be firmly concluded, that the Remonstrants then would have advised no toleration of Socinianism. The reason of the consequence is, because the Remonstrants judged such hearers formerly their own not worse at least than Socinians. If therefore they thought liberty here not to be conceded to their infirm brothers, certainly, they would not have conceded it to the Socinians. The antecedent of our argument is proved by the decree of Utrecht, and of

Schieland afterwards defended by Grotius, and both defended everywhere by the Remonstrant preachers, with arguments furnished to them by Episcopius' public and private Disputation, "On the Right of the Magistrate about sacred things". Here there is no exception unless they say that those sheep (erring and infirm in their judgment) were then worse than the Socinians. 6. It seemed good to gather these things so laboriously, not because I want all those counsels, sayings, deeds, with the most minute circumstances to be examined "akribos exetazontos", and to be proposed for imitation by all, much less that I want them to be applied to any erring and dissenting in religion, or the killing of heretics, as they call it, to be introduced, or the liberty of conscience to be taken away (as the Remonstrants are wont to sophistically calumniate), but only that I may show, that in this general axiom all have agreed both ecclesiastics and Politicians, That Anti-Trinitarians are not to be tolerated: "hoper edei deixai". Whatever has been agitated hitherto in Christianity about reformation or formation, whatever about sects and schisms, whatever about union and syncretism, whatever about profane and ecclesiastical peace, whatever about the liberty of Exercises, the liberty of prophesying, moderation, this catholic axiom about the Anti-Trinitarians has always remained. If anyone wants to defend the antithesis of our thesis, it is necessary that he aim at this, and in refuting the alleged statutes and judgments both ecclesiastical and political he first break the genuine, before he begins to odiously traduce the cause of the whole of Christianity devolved upon this or that Doctor. The arguments which could be gathered from the declamations of the Remonstrants as principal are 1. What we have excerpted above for ecclesiastical toleration; among which that first one must be diligently noted: because it contains a serious apology of Socinianism, twin to that of Ostorodius and Voidovius in their Apology against the Illustrious and Mighty Lords of the States, letter E iij, "We are accused as if we deny the divinity of Christ the Lord and of the Holy Spirit, because we do not concede that Christ was generated from eternity from the substance of the Father, nor that the Holy Spirit is a person. It is indeed true that we do not concede those things, and we ourselves freely confess it: but we say that nevertheless the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is not denied by us on that account: therefore a disputation immediately arises here between us and your Theologians, etc." 2. Because the liberty of exercise must be conceded to all in the name of Christians, who deny that they can through conscience lack those exercises: and the Magistrate has no power over such separate assemblies: nor can he prohibit them, unless he wants to exercise persecution and tyranny, and therefore bind himself with a most grave crime before God, and desire similar generalities which could be adduced for any sects and heresies whatsoever (the Idolaters alone excepted): of which sort are most of those axioms which the Remonstrants everywhere defend from their affirmation, in the books often cited. 3. Because the permission of sects (namely the Socinian which obtains in Poland, does not obtain in Belgium) would make for peace, greater perfection, and the singular felicity of the Republic; for this reason the Remonstrants in the booklet: "The Right Remonstrant Theologian", page 176, endeavor to persuade the Illustrious States of Belgium, "What kingdom," they say, "rejoices in greater peace and felicity, what stronger bulwark of the whole of Christianity against the Turks and Tartars, than the Polish, which nevertheless has this liberty for a fundamental law, where innumerable sects (or professions) are not only tolerated but defended by public authority. Let these be the pharos or Helice of your Republic, but especially the religion of Jesus Christ your savior, etc." But how well to the pattern of special politics, and Polish history these things have been said, will be seen elsewhere. 4. Because the religion of

Christ teaches "meekness" to all, namely to the erring, to use all lenity and gentleness towards them, and to instruct them, if perhaps sometime God may grant them that they repent. Apply now these arguments to Servetus, Blandrata, Socinus, Ochinus, Enjedinus, Francis David, Valentinus Gentilis, David Joris, the Valentinians, Manichaeans (for they insert the passage of Augustine about his lenity towards them to this persuasion about the liberty of sects ibid., page 178) and conclude liberty for them of holding their conventions and therefore of publicly scattering their heresies and blasphemies in figure and mode.

Corollary.

When we say, write, profess these things for the truth, necessity, utility of this adorable mystery, moreover oppose all adversaries open, clandestine, and have their profane sermons far from us and all the Reformed with us; surely those horrible calumnies ought to cease, by which our religion is held in the same census with the heresies of the Anti-Trinitarians both by Papal Theologians, and by Jurists. Among the Theologians shone forth the apostate Staphylus, Lindanus, Prateolus, Bellarmine, Coccius in the "Thesaurus", book 1, article 4, from whom the rest of the ignorant brothers transcribe without examination. But they have been responded to by many, especially by the Antagonists of Bellarmine. Junius, Chamier, etc. To whom are to be added Pareus, in "Calvin Orthodox". This was also accurately and ex professo done by ours in the colloquy of Tirana, in Rhaetia in the year 1595, 1596. Let them only ask the Anti-Trinitarians, which Doctors they experience as stronger adversaries and more harmful to their faction. Among the Jurists the leaders are Jordanus Brunus who covertly in 6 books on heretics, and Antonius Faber, who in the Fabrian Code openly want all things which have been stated by Civil Law against heretics to be applied to the Protestants. The latter with too much credulity muttered from some unreformable Cleric threw together in paper, impelling him, as I think, Savoyard hatred against the Genevan Republic. But the "aporoi" and wanderings of him were responded to excellently by James Lectius J.C., professor, and afterwards Syndic of Geneva in a treatise to which is the title: "Against the 'prota kaka' of the Fabrian Code, etc." We only to the titles, "On the Supreme Trinity", and "On Heretics", and "On the Manichaeans", objected to us respond, that neither directly nor indirectly is our religion kindred to any heresies of the Anti-Trinitarians, or even of the other heretics, who are named there, damned by Councils or the common consensus of the fathers: which nevertheless could be proved in many things about Papism. And this even the Emperors, Kings, Princes themselves although addicted to Papism acknowledge not obscurely, while in the Empire, the kingdom of France, indeed in the very Valleys subject to the Duke of Savoy liberty is conceded to our religion; which it is by no means to be believed that they would have done, if indeed by Civil Law the liberty of our religion had been prejudged. Compare what we note above to number 7. But if the Fabrians take what for what here, and analogically reduce other heresies made up by them to these titles which Faber strenuously does with the calumny about Arianism, Manichaeism, etc., when they are ashamed of them, certainly so much of theological magistery is not to be conceded to them, who are accustomed to believe with implicit and coal-like faith their unreformable Clergy; to whom to treat Theology, to read the sacred Scriptures, and the books of ours is a religion, and to

compare them with the Scriptures, lest namely they seem to play the theologians with the Lutheran and Calvinist cobblers (as Faber speaks). Then let them see whether they well apply their laws to our deeds by juridical and good consequence. They indeed run out to today's controversies, but we deny that those titles directly or indirectly designate them. If we deny the triple crown of the Pope, yet not the Trinity; if both his swords, yet not both natures, or the triple office of Christ; if his indulgences and the whole trafficking of souls in the Roman penitentiary and chancery, yet not the mystery of redemption, nor faith, or salutary penitence; if we state the Imperial power, and do not derive it from the Pope, yet we do not state with the Manichaeans two principles; if we dissent from the Roman-Papal faction, yet not from the Catholic church; if we are not Papists, we do not however cease to be Christians and Catholics; we do not adore the images of the Father, or the cross, or the species of a dove, yet we invoke the Trinity: and so in the rest. Finally, if it may be pleasing to ours to act by reconvention, it would be easy to show that Jurists of this kind cannot defend Papism through all things, but do violence to their law and juridical conscience, and therefore are heretics both Theologically and Juridically. Let the specimen of an Orthodox Jurist recently published at 's-Hertogenbosch by the Most Learned Dr. Maresius be seen, where he disputes, that a Catholic-Roman Jurist does not have arguments from the Code of Justinian of remaining in the papacy. We add, that not even to Canon Law can the Papist Fabrian conform himself, without much, and great reformation: as we will sometime elsewhere give an indication. Compare our disputation on Canon Law.

Appendix of questions concerning Remonstrantism.

1. The questions which are usually debated today among our countrymen concerning Remonstrantism are chiefly these: 1. Whether the Reformed should cultivate unity and fraternity with it. 2. Whether they seriously offer, or are able to offer, that unity to the Reformed. 3. Whether [they offer] the same to all of Christianity, or to the professions of today. 4. Whether a Christian jurist can remain in the communion of the Remonstrant society. 5. Whether the rest of their hearers [can].

However, in order to respond clearly to these questions, we premise these distinctions: 1. By fraternal communion is understood the participation of the same sacraments, the same sermons, the same government in the same ecclesiastical assemblies, and the recognition of the same pastors, e.g., as the ministers and members of the church of Utrecht, although on account of the multitude they frequent several temples, are nevertheless one church, so the Remonstrant ministers and assembly constitute one Christian Reformed Church of Utrecht with ours; whether their assembly is incorporated into ours (which seems to be the plan of some), or rather our assembly into theirs, and returns to it from its errors and schism; in what way a recent obscurantist explains the mode and mystery of this union: And thus, as one may come from integral parts to the whole, the entire Remonstrant society [may have] ecclesiastical communion with the Belgic Churches, and in turn the Belgic Churches, as σύσσωμοι [united in one body] with that society, may constitute ἓν σῶμα καὶ ἐν πνεῦμα [one body and one spirit] with it. For the

Remonstrants claimed that such communion ought to have been preserved by our people both before and after the National Synod.

2. By Remonstrantism we understand here, not as was claimed in the year 1611, namely the reformed religion, except for the opinion on predestination with appendices, which they then explained in a petition and the Hague Conference, and how it was first and properly defined by them according to Grotius in the piety of the Orders p.11.12.16.29.43. (reader, please see and compare) with all Socinians and other heresies concerning faith, justification, satisfaction, original sin, perfection in this life, etc. removed. In the year 1617, in their second Remonstrance, they asked the Illustrious Holland Orders not to give credence to such unjust accusations and slanders about the Remonstrants' novelties, but that the Remonstrants, and all who were devoted to their opinion, be considered as those who follow in all ways, and further desire to follow, Holy Scripture, the primitive orthodox Christian church, and at the same time also the true and first foundation of the Christian Reformation received in these regions. In the same place they describe certain of their adherents, that they desire to adhere to the first and ancient Reformation. Such Remonstrantism is not found today in the midst of Remonstrantism, no more than the ancient Roman church in today's church, or a pastor of the Reformed churches in Ochino, Neuserus, etc., a candidate for ministry in Statorius, a member of our church in Dudith, Gribaldus, etc., after they had already defected from the doctrine of the Reformed church. Nor do we understand certain political contentions or controversies, between Provinces, or cities, or Magistrates and subjects, etc. For those do not belong to this forum, and those who mix them with divine matters, or slyly substitute them, or bring them to the decision of this controversy, as if they were truly flung from on high, they certainly seek something other than religion through the pretension of religion. We do not understand also something composite and bipartisan from both Ecclesiastical and political controversies and secessions, by which our Belgium has been troubled somewhere, so that sometimes one was the occasion and cause of the other: But we conceive something purely and entirely Theological and ecclesiastical, and we dispute precisely about this. Whether it is, or ought to be. Finally, we do not understand the hearers and members, either separately or collectively, who now listen to the Remonstrants' sermons, or exercise and profess their religion in their assemblies: For here it is not inquired what and of what sort their faith is; how each one is to be invited, attracted or drawn back to the unity of our Church, on what conditions they are to be received, etc. For these things pertain to ecclesiastical polity, and special agenda: about which general canons have been established in Provincial synods, especially the South Holland Synod of Leiden in 1619 with the Synod of Dort in 1627, and of Delft in 1628, and of Leiden in 1629, and the rest is left to the prudence of pastors and presbyteries. But by Remonstrantism we understand the Society of the Remonstrants, both of ministers and of assemblies, who after the promulgated judgment of the Synod of Dort in 1619, profess to exercise a separate profession and religion in their assemblies, conformably to their Confession explained and defended through an apology. This controversy must be contained within these terms; if anyone wanders outside it, or confuses and mixes it with other questions, he is not seeking the truth, but fleeing it.

2. We establish the negative opinion, for these reasons: 1. Because they differ from us in confession and religion, and indeed in necessary things: which they themselves not obscurely

emphasize quite often, when fighting for schismatic or separate conventions of theirs, they deny that communion with us is to be cultivated (that is, if we remain in this our faith and profession repeated and confirmed by the National Synod in 1619), and they have wanted to have almost nothing in common with the Reformed. See the vernacular booklets, Achab's Fast, The Remonstrants' Free Exercise, The Nullities of the Synod of Dort, the apologetic booklet for the statue of Erasmus of Rotterdam, whose title is The Sponge of Erasmus against a certain Minister of Rotterdam, collected with the Apology in the preface. Add to these the suspicion of Socinianism, and the demonstration of an intended syncretism with them; which stains they have not yet wiped away: about which below. Let us now add more specific arguments. 2. The Pelagian doctrine in the five articles; which no Profession of Christians will admit (as indeed it is explained in the pre-synodal writings), not even in the one article on the Death of Christ. Besides which the Lutherans reject all synergy of free will in the first moment of conversion. Neither will they approve their opinions on predestination. For the Jesuits who come closer to them err much more modestly: but the Dominicans, and other genuine followers of Thomas, strenuously oppose Pelagianism here. Among the Lutherans, Tarnovius, Sacred Miscellanies, book 2, p. 710: "The Vorstians, Arminians and the like in Belgium, when they say that we are predestined to eternal life by faith, say the same thing, but do not think the same thing as us." Concerning the fifth article, on the certainty of salvation, the Lutherans think better, and some of the Roman Catholics—Catharinus, Isengrinius, Vlenburgius, etc. 3. Errors concerning original sin, concerning faith, concerning the distinction between law and gospel and both covenants, concerning justification, concerning perfection in this life, concerning the resurrection of the dead. 4. Doubts, skepticism, corruptions about nearly all the heads of Reformed theology; which are usually set forth publicly and privately in catechesis: How therefore will they cultivate communion with us in one external church and profession, who do not have the same catechism and confession with us but their own; but virulently attack ours? Unless they want the catechism to be proscribed from the Belgic churches' schools and churches, the confession along with the harmony of other confessions to be abjured: or rather one chaos to be made from the Racovian catechism and ours, likewise from our confession and others and the Remonstrants' confession with the Apology. 5. Of Photinianism renewed by Socinus and whitewashed by them, there is partly a very serious suspicion, partly a clear indication already often made, specifically by the renowned Dr. Wedelius in the book often praised. By which it would happen that that union with the Remonstrants would be a separation from all the Reformed churches, indeed an exclusion from general Christianity, and the name of Christians. Furthermore, that the Remonstrants do not clear themselves from the Socinian heresies; they do not even attempt this for the sake of all Christianity, it can be established even from this, that they would not dare to sign with their own hands a simple rejection of the following Socinian articles and at the same time to solemnly promise that they will not teach or promote them or any of them either directly or indirectly. But the articles are those which universal Christianity, and all its professors and Doctors simply reject. 1. That the Father is essentially and properly the only, eternal, and supreme God, to be honored and worshipped with a peculiar and more excellent adoration, honor, and worship. 2. That the Son is not of one and the same essence with the Father, and consequently is not of the same and supreme majesty, who ought to be worshipped with the same and equally excellent religious worship: but that he is true God in another way and for another reason than the Father, and consequently is to be worshipped with

another peculiar and distinct worship and adoration. 3. That Christ is therefore not called, or at least is not therefore only, or therefore principally not called the only-begotten Son of God, because he was begotten by the Father from eternity in the one and same divine essence, through the natural and necessary communication of the same essence. 4. That the Holy Spirit is not the coequal and coessential eternal God, with the Father and the Son; and consequently is not the third divine person and the same supreme majesty with the Father and the Son, to be worshipped with both in one and the supreme worship, that is, divine worship, but is only the virtue or power of God, to which neither the divine essence, nor the divine person, consequently nor divine worship can be attributed. 5. That God is not in every way or simply immutable; nor does he certainly foreknow future contingencies, which will come forth from the free will of men. 6. That God in his essence is not simple, immense, without finitude and quantitative extension, nor omnipresent. 7. That there is no original sin, so that all men are liable to the guilt of the first sin of Adam, nor are conceived and born in and with the inherent corruption of sin, which makes them damnable before God. 8. That Christ does not have two natures, nor is he God and man in the unity of person; that is, remaining, who and such as he was from eternity, immutable and ὁμοούσιος with the Father God; and in time made, what and such as he was not before, true man, the true human nature having been assumed indeed and personally united to himself from the flesh and blood of the virgin Mary. 9. That Christ by his passion, and perfect obedience and satisfaction as our sponsor and mediator in our stead or place for our sins, which he had taken upon himself, did not make satisfaction, nor bear and pay the penalties justly owed by us, and thus take them away from us, and redeem us, at least he did not fully pay and make satisfaction for us from what was demanded and the right of God the just judge and the divine law: but his passion was only an example, or had the reason of an example for us to imitate, or at least to some extent and only according to a gracious pact, stipulation, release, and connivance, and indulgence of God it accomplished something for payment, which is as it were in place of full satisfaction. 10. That the bodies of the faithful will not be resurrected on the last day, that is, these same bodies, which they now have; but that certain other spiritual bodies will be created anew, so that these our bodies, which have fallen through death, will plainly cease to be, nor will they ever come forth anew, or from being mortal become immortal and glorious. 11. That the souls of the ungodly perish with their bodies; nor will they be tormented in hell with the punishment of loss and sense: but that the souls of the pious separated from the body sleep until the day of judgment, or at least remain without some spiritual action to the outside. 12. That Baptism from the necessity of the divine precept is not to be conferred on all Christians, nor paedobaptism on the infants of the faithful.

3. The second question is, Whether the Remonstrants seriously offer, or at least can offer, fraternal communion and syncretism to the Reformed churches in Belgium? Resp. 1. Sometimes they affirm, sometimes they deny, sometimes they obscure, and like Proteus they turn themselves into various forms, as changes of times and things have occurred. Therefore it is not to be believed that they speak seriously here. For the first few years after the Synod of Dort, their philippics sounded nothing except separation, and its necessity, nor does the apology differ from them. After they seemed to have obtained connivance for their conventicles somewhere, they tempered their style; indeed they began to mutter something again about peace and fraternity in their letter to the South Holland Synod of Schiedam in 1631, as also in

the previous year in a certain vernacular booklet in quarto and most recently a certain Thersitic gloomy one in his most inept rhapsody, as blasphemous against God as it is desperately slanderous against men: but because the latter booklets were not published in the common name of the Society, their authority among them is perhaps small. 2. Whatever may be the case concerning their action, at least from their hypotheses they can neither seriously and in good conscience seek syncretism with our churches, nor offer it, nor admit it, for the reasons which they allege everywhere. 1. Because our five-article doctrine, through an evident and necessary consequence, brings with it horrendous βδελύγματα—Manichaean, Stoic, Socinian; which completely subvert all practice of piety and consolation. Apology in the preface and chapter 6. And Vedelius' Rhapsody p. 202. 2. Because it makes a great many dogmas necessary, which are not necessary. Vedelius' Rhapsody p. 121. 3. Because it teaches persecution: by establishing, namely, that conventicles of sects can be prohibited by the Magistrate; that heretics, whether Socinians or others (if indeed they are unwilling to desist from their endeavors and pretended liberty of exercise by other means), can be coerced by external pecuniary fines, also by exiles, deportation, incarceration: in short, because such things were decreed against the Remonstrants by the decree of the Illustrious States General in 1619, and then and thereafter were commanded to be executed, nor did the Churches or preachers dissuade this; a certain Anonymous one in the booklet whose title is The Sponge of Erasmus against a certain minister of Rotterdam explicitly and with many reasons tries to prove that the Reformed Church in Belgium is in no way the Church of God, because it taught the prohibition of the Remonstrants' assemblies, or at least was a receptacle for such Magistrates, who would pass the aforementioned decrees, and command them to be executed. Cf. the Apology ch. 24, fol. 273, and the preface and Response to the Leiden Professors p. 53. In the Dutch booklet whose title is The Real Remonstrant Theologian, p. 147, they say that those two opinions of ours concerning the decisions of things necessarily to be believed, and concerning the prohibition of heresies and the assemblies of any heresy whatsoever, are the two principal supports of the Papacy. 4. Because the speculative doctrine of the Calvinists is such, our Doctors are such, with their adherents, the sect of the Contra-Remonstrants is such, that it does not seem that it should be tolerated either ecclesiastically or Politically. Which kind judgment of the Remonstrants' charity concerning us Dr. Vedelius has brought to light in Secrets part 2, book 1, ch. 7, 8, 9, and in the Dedicatory Epistle to part 4 of the Secrets of Arminianism. And part 3, book 2, ch. 8. So that their peremptory conclusion against us is: Let not our soul come into their council. And this peace and union, ecclesiastical of course, which those moderate men pretend to seek so much.

4. The third question. Whether the Remonstrants seriously offer or from their hypotheses can offer and admit syncretism with all Christian professions, or the union of dissected Christianity. Resp. Neg. to both. With the Socinians alone they can; and perhaps with some Anabaptists (who are now called Semi-Enthusiasts and Socinians). At least they cannot with the Roman Catholics both on account of idolatry, and because they make dogmas necessary, and teach persecution. As also not with the Lutherans. Concerning the Reformed it has already been said. Therefore such pretended counsels of theirs about peace, moderation, and toleration are nothing other than mere logodaedaliae, and chrestologia by which they deceive the more imprudent. They have nothing to except: unless perhaps, that they so understand moderation, toleration and that syncretism, that the Reformed deny their doctrine, or suppress it (specifically

the five articles) and only the Remonstrants' doctrine resounds in the united Churches; moreover that they revoke their opinion on defining the necessities of faith, and heresies, as also on the Doctrine concerning the power of the Magistrate extending itself even to the private public conventicles of sects, and concerning the external, moderate and necessary coercion of seducing and disturbing heretics; which opinion they nevertheless have in common with universal Christianity both ancient and modern, as also with the Remonstrants themselves (up to the year 1618, of course). If indeed they except in this way, now there is no one who does not see how illusory that moderation, peace, liberty of prophesying, and toleration of those who think otherwise is, inasmuch as it could be offered to Gentiles, Turks, Jews in the same sense, if, namely, they change their opinion.

5. The fourth question. Whether a Christian jurisconsult, although agreeing with the Remonstrants in the five articles, can exercise and profess his religion in some Remonstrant assembly, unless the Society first purges itself from the errors of Photinus. Resp. Neg. if indeed he follows the Justinianic code. For there the heresies of Photinus, of Paul of Samosata, which of course the consensus of the church had condemned, are completely proscribed. Fifth question, Whether Remonstrant hearers ought to abstain from Remonstrant conventicles, even from the faith, conscience and definition of genuine and original Remonstrantism, which we brought forward above from Grotius, and whose toleration they want stabilized here and elsewhere by political decrees. Resp. Aff. And we think that none, to whom a taste and conscience of the Christian and Reformed religion still remains, (which we hope is the case for most) will object to this our assertion. Would that they might see that they are miserably deceived by vain pretexts, with irrelevant and extravagant things mixed in, by fraudulent dissimulations, and are gradually led so far from the original and genuine Remonstrantism, which consisted only in the opinion or at least moderation of the five articles, indeed also from the very Theology of Arminius itself, as heaven is distant from earth. Let them only ask of them these two things: 1. Whether and why they have now passed by those cautions and protestations against Socinianism of the Illustrious States of Holland, and of the first assertors of Remonstrantism in the years 1611 and 1613. 2. If indeed a day has meanwhile taught a day, and besides the cause or moderation of the five articles (expressed and circumscribed in the Hague Conference, the decree of the States of Holland for the peace of the churches in 1614 with the rigid decree (as they are accustomed to call it) in the year 1617, the piety of Grotius, the Ecclesiastical Constitutions of the Province of Utrecht in the year 1612), some other cause has been undertaken by them, why do they not set it forth equally with that former one to their hearers and followers? Why, when they are accustomed to eagerly publish so many vernacular booklets, have they not dared to publish the Apology of their confession for the sake of their Belgians? When the Censure of the Leiden Professors exists in Dutch, and the Apology is a common writing and as it were necessary, also so learnedly and with such care composed, that if Troy could have been defended by a right hand, it would have been defended also by this one. The same I can ask concerning the Response to the Excerpts of the Leiden Professors, and concerning the Vindications, or Vedel the Rhapsodist. But they are ashamed of those books before their hearers: for they know that the detection of heretics is their refutation.

Let it be added as an epimetrum concerning the Socinians. Sixth Question. Whether the Socinians seriously offer, or from their hypotheses can offer fraternity to the Trinitarians (as they call them), and among them to the Reformed. Resp. Neg. For they so describe them in the book concerning the doctrine of Christ and Antichrist published by the Neo-Arian ministers in Transylvania, that communion of light with such great darkness can in no way be thought (if indeed the truth stood on their side). Their Patriarch Servetus said the Trinitarians were Atheists: as Calvin testifies in the book against Servetus p. 82, ed. in 8. by Rob. Stephanus. In short, the Trinitarians are, in their opinion, horrendous idolaters; because they worship two as one, only, eternal God by nature; namely, the Son and Holy Spirit, who however are not truly the true and eternal God. Smalcius concludes his book on the divinity of Christ, ch. 25 or the last one, thus: We boldly affirm that none of those who hold that Christ is God from himself, and has divine power from himself by the property and force of his opinion can ever have a certain and firm hope of immortal life. So that it may deservedly be suspected that they sing this sweet little song of fraternity for so long, until they obtain a possession in Christianity: that afterwards they will do what the ancient Arians did under Constantius, and Valens, that is, not only exclude the Christian church from communion, but also cruelly persecute it; and what the Eunomians did, of whom Basil testifies, book 1 against Eunomius, a little beyond the beginning, that at Constantinople, with the favor of the court at hand, they were the accusers, and judges, and lictors, and all that they wanted. It is said that Socinus gave an example in Francis David, who was committed to prison, fell into a frenzy, and died miserably. See Caspar Schlüsselburg on heresies. And Possevinus' Select Library, book 8, ch. 12, etc.

Because in this disputation against the Remonstrants I have argued that no syncretism should be entered into with the Neo-Arians, I think that I will not do something irrelevant if I exhibit here the opinion and practice of the Reformed in Poland, where they have come to know those heretics more closely, from the compendium of universal history of Johannes Laetus Moravus, ch. 34, which contains the deeds from the year 1612 up to 1619. Thus therefore he writes on pp. 713-714:

But here Valentinus Smalcius, the standard-bearer of the Socinians, with his allies was disturbing the Churches with his dogmas and unjust demand for Union and Consensus. In the Synod of Lublin in the year [16]12, with Franciscus Jeserzicus presiding, when they were urging their demands given in writings, the Synod rejected the things sought, and again responded most learnedly in writings, Raphael Count Leszczinius, Andreas Fr. Castellan of Kalisz. And because they had made some reply, on that account from the number of the Nobles Petrus Goraifcius again sent back a most vigorous response to the sectarians. Afterwards in the Synod of Belzyce, again mocking, they had begun to trouble the Church with a sermon previously [preached], but Christophorus Krainícius, as he was most tenacious of Orthodoxy, [said]: "Depart from here, Lords, lest you trouble us; heaven will be able to agree with Orcus sooner than we Evangelicals with you! Let him who fears God depart from the temple." And immediately he himself was departing from the temple; in the afternoon session when they were again insisting, in the name of the whole Synod Raphael Leszczinius gravely responded: "This petition is neither of this place, nor of this time; it concerns all the Reformed Churches, with which we have a bond. A general Council would have to be instituted. We do not want to learn

the faith from you, since we are founded in the true faith." Then the adversaries having complained about the saying of Krainícius, "Let him who fears God depart from the temple," as if he judged them unworthy of conversation, Count Leszczinius added: "I fear God, therefore I will depart." And at the same time with this saying he went out, and having mounted his carriage he departed; thus Union was denied.

Concerning this question:

WHETHER CHRIST AS MEDIATOR IS TO BE ADORED?

Resp. Florentius Michaelides, from Arnemuiden in Zeeland.
On the 21st and 28th of April, 1638.

Although the problem brought from other Academies concerning the Adoration of Christ as mediator has often been aired by our students, and the truth seems to have been placed sufficiently and more than sufficiently in the light, nevertheless I will not be reluctant, after other most learned men, to repeat methodically in these theses those things which have been inculcated by the living voice and to submit them to public examination; for no other reason than because those whose studies I have devoted myself and my own [studies] to, demand it.

1. The controversies of the Socinians and Remonstrants gave the occasion or starting-point to the problem, to pass over others now, of which we will make mention in passing below. Christian Doctors, following in the footsteps of the fathers, are accustomed to prove the eternal deity of Christ and his consubstantiality from the divine honor, worship and adoration. As can be seen among more recent authors: Wiekus, Bellarmine, Zanchius, Fr. Junius, Tarnovius, Jacob Martini, Smiglecius, etc. against the Antitrinitarians; and everywhere among the Scholastics and the writers of common places.

The Socinians, in order to get rid of this class of arguments, make an exception against the consequence of the major proposition, by distinguishing between the faith, worship and adoration which is bestowed on the eternal God the Father as the first cause, and that which is bestowed on Christ the mediator as such, that is, as a second, mediate, and subordinate cause of all those things which pertain to our salvation; both of which adorations are divine, yet not in the highest sense; for the former is highest, the latter by no means, because Christ is not to be acknowledged as the ultimate end of faith, adoration and invocation, so that he who believes in Christ does not believe in him but in God. Thus the Racovian Catechism, ch. 1. Socinus in Response 1 to Volanus, and everywhere in the Letters. Smalcius in the book on The Divinity of Christ, chs. 12, 24. The same in the Refutation of Smiglecius, On the Errors of the Arians, bk. 1, ch. 10. Ostorodt in the Institutions, chs. 14 and 15, where in the former chapter he retorts such a syllogism: No one is that one God, whom on that account we ought to worship with divine

worship, because God gave him all judgment and the name above every name. But Christ is worshipped with divine worship on that account. Therefore. The Remonstrants in the Confession and Apology, ch. 16, inculcate these axioms: 1. That there is an honor of adoration, which has been conferred, attributed and communicated to Christ as mediator distinctly, as he is the only-begotten Son of the Father, graciously and from the promise of the Father, from John 5:26, Phil. 2:9. 2. Consequently, that the religious worship of adoration belongs to Christ as mediator. 3. That that glory is the true glory of adoration but not absolutely divine. 4. That it is not necessary that it be believed, how the honor of adoration has been communicated to Christ the mediator, whether according to the divine nature, or according to the human nature, or according to both. While the Orthodox strive to detect those quibbles and to respond accurately to the exception, this question has arisen, how one should respond to this argument of the adversaries: The adoration which is bestowed on Christ as mediator, that does not belong to God alone as such; and consequently it does not prove his deity and consubstantiality. But the former is true. Therefore. Most of those who treat these controversies (as far as we know) deny the minor; yet someone has wanted to deny the major. Hence at length the problem: How or under what formal [aspect] is Christ to be adored?

2. Therefore this question, or what is controverted between the orthodox, is properly problematic: pertaining not so much to the thetic or [doctrine] of our churches, as to the scholastic or philosophical-theological ἐπίσκεψις. Namely, whether and what kind of limitation should be added to the subject of the enunciation 'Christ', when adoration is predicated of him. (Indeed I had thus written in the former edition of this disputation; but below in the disquisition of the problem it will be discussed, whether it should not be said more accurately that the limitation is added to the predicate.) They agree indeed in the thing itself, but disagree in the explication, use, and application of the terms 'as', and 'under this formal [aspect] as'. Nevertheless the untying of the problem has its use, since it has been objected to us by the adversaries; nor is it now permitted by them to sacrifice to mere ignorance, much less to concede anything out of contention or ignorance of an evil disposition, lest we prejudice the cause of truth against the Socinians even in the least. For they do not stop here, but draw this further, as the Remonstrants obscurely intimate in the cited place, the Socinians openly in the cited place.

Just as happens in the theological-philosophical [debates] of Conr. Vorstius, concerning God in the category, concerning the place and duration of God, concerning accidents and affections in God, etc.

3. An examination of the title, or precognition of the terms, must be premised. Here there occurs first the subject of the problem, namely Christ; then the predicate, namely 'To be adored as mediator'. 1. The subject is Christ, a subject plainly extraordinary in relation to his attributes. For the person of Christ, when something is predicated of it, can be considered insofar as it is precisely a person of the divine nature; or insofar as it is precisely a person of human Nature, or insofar as it is a person of both natures. Concerning those predications the Scholastics should be consulted, and the more recent Theologian-philosophers. 2. As for the terms describing the predicate, because it is an enunciation not pure but modal, consider: 1. the predicate itself 'to be adored'. 2. The limitation or determination added to the predicate. As for the predicate itself 'to

be adored' or 'to be invoked', note: By adoration nothing else than religious worship, or divine and proper to God, is understood. But we distinguish between adorability and adoration. The former is an absolute attribute of God, and consequently his essential property, without which God is not God. The latter is a respective attribute, which is attributed to God in relation to creatures, and with a certain action of theirs intervening; which is not an essential property of God, because God was from eternity without it, as Zanchius rightly observes in bk. 1 On the Incarnation. With respect to the former God is considered (analogically and improperly) as the subject of inherence (if it is permitted to speak thus; which must be taken improperly) and of attribution, and thus the problem must be formulated: Whether God as God is adorable. By reason of the latter God is considered as the object terminating the active adoration of men; and thus the problem must be formulated: Whether God, whether Christ as God is adored. In the determination of the predicate there occur: 1. the real term or dictum: 'Mediator', through which the limitation takes place. 2. the mode or πρόσθεσις, the logico-grammatical formality of the limitation: 'as', or 'insofar as'. 1. There is no need for us to define mediator and its abstract mediation here.

This only should be noted in the present business. First, that the word 'mediator' signifies an office, which is in the category of relation. Next, that it is an accidental, contingent, temporal relation for the Son of God, not a necessary, natural and eternal one. Furthermore, that it is of reason, not real, in the person of the Logos (insofar as it is precisely considered as a person of the divine nature) positing nothing real, but only an extrinsic denomination. Cf. the disputation On the One and Simple Essence of God, theses 6 and 9. Then, that this relation is not one and the same in essence, formality, and concept with the divine nature, nor does the formal notion of the one include the other; which should also be understood concerning the absolute attributes and properties of God. And the reason is, because otherwise the Father or Holy Spirit would be mediator, insofar as he is God. Finally, that the formal notion of mediator as such is not the same as [that] of the second person of the divinity as such; nor is mediation of the notion of the personality of the Logos; for the Logos was, before he was mediator. For although now the one and same is both the second divine person of the deity, and the mediator, nevertheless the one is not mediator and that divine person (namely in the formal sense); just as the one and same is both Peter and Apostle, yet Petreity and Apostolate are not one and the same thing, but are distinguished by their formal notions. 2. The mode or πρόσθεσις formally limiting the subject is expressed either through a simple syncategorema, or through other circumscribing terms. 1. In the former way it is said 'as', in the explication of which particle the hinge of this whole disputation turns. Note therefore: 1. Its synonyms are 'insofar as', 'inasmuch as', 'as such', 'according to [it] as such', 'with respect to', 'according to', 'in that', 'by that notion by which', 'in that part', 'in that respect'. Although these synonyms are sometimes distinguished, and one is taken more broadly or more narrowly than another. 2. This sign determines the enunciating part, and makes a limitation in two ways: either by reduplicating and repeating the same term, so that what is to be limited is limited by itself, as being insofar as being is the subject of metaphysics; Man as man is risible; God as God is to be adored, Fathers as fathers are to be honored; motion is the act of being in potency as in potency, and of the movable insofar as movable. Or by adding a different term, which is either the cause of the attribution of the predicate, as man as rational is docile; or the Genus, as man as animal senses; or a part; or finally an internal,

external, absolute, respective accident, etc. 3. This sign 'as' is not always of one and the same signification among philosophers. When an adjunct is predicated limitedly of a subject (as in this business) and not absolutely, either it is applied to consignify the proper subject, to which the affection belongs first, immediately and per se, as man as man is risible; or to consignify the proper, adequate and proximate cause, through which and on account of which the predicate belongs to the subject first and adequately, as man as rational is risible. Sometimes it is applied to signify the mode of considering, as natural body as movable is the subject of Physics; and being as being is the subject of Metaphysics. But the former two modes properly square with this business of ours. In whatever way it is used, it always infers reciprocation or conversion, or adequation of the predicate and the subject, or of the limitation or determination of the subject, as is clear in the proposed examples, where man and risible, rational and risible, etc. are mutually converted. Examples of those restrictions could be brought forward most plurally from Theology, e.g.: Christ died for us, sends the Holy Spirit, but not as dead (although it may rightly be said, because he died), for dying or human nature is not the adequate formal cause of the sending of the Holy Spirit. The Son of God is αὐτόθεος, not insofar as Son (for thus he is from the Father) but insofar as God, for God is αἰτία ἀναίτιος καὶ ἀναρχος. Sin or the sinful act depends on the positive and operating providence of God, not as sin, but as act and as orderable or insofar as it is ordered to good. He who was born of Mary is eternal, not as born of Mary, but as God. Thus in our problem it must be asked, whether in the usage of the Philosophers, from whom we have those syncategoremata, 'as' and 'insofar as' and 'according to' 'as such', 'as', 'insofar as', 'according to which', 'under the formal [aspect] as', can denote anything other than that the predicates belong to the subject or limiting term of the subject καθ' αὐτό, and are reciprocal with it, e.g.: God as God is to be adored; Christ, mediator, the man Christ, the crucified one as God is to be adored. But if anyone extends those syncategoremata to any causes and reasons which are not reciprocal with the things, we think that he commits an impropriety of speech.

2. The other terms by which this restrictive enunciation is usually circumscribed, are: formal object, formal notion, formal, foundation. What and of how many kinds an object is, must be learned from the Logicians. Here it will suffice to have observed what the formal object is, which Cajetan calls ad 1, q. 1, a. 1, the formal notion of the object (for for the Peripatetics λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, the notion of the thing, is the form), and of which such frequent mention is made not only among the Philosophers, but also among the Theologians, when they dispute about the object and analysis of faith, and about the authority of Scripture. The formal object or formal notion of the object is that which is the reason why it and the material object are directly attained by the power or habit, or why the action of the agent tends to it. This formal notion in the object of the sciences is considered by the Philosophers in three ways: 1. Which; and is that which holds on the part of the thing as the thing is, e.g.: Being as being is the subject of Metaphysics. 2. By which; namely the formal notion holding on the part of the knower, and is the necessary means by reason of which the intellect assents to the conclusion, e.g.: rational is the cause why risible belongs to man, and is for me the necessary means through which I necessarily assent to that scientific conclusion: Man is risible, because rational is the true reason on the part of the thing, on account of which that belongs to the subject. 3. Under which; or is the object, or the notion holding on the part of the object, which is nothing other than the respect or habitude

which the object expresses to the power not insofar as it is some thing but insofar as it is knowable, e.g.: Natural body is the object of Physics, insofar as it is abstracted from sensible matter, as under the formal notion under which. We, in order to apply the distinctions to this business of ours, say that here it is asked: 1. concerning the formal notion of the adorable object as it is a thing, Whether God is adorable as God, Whether Christ the mediator or man is adorable, as such, that is, as mediator or as man? And this is the formal notion Which. 2. concerning the formal notion, which is on the part of the adorer, through which we come to the adoration of the Mediator, Whether the deity alone or God is the fundamental, necessary, and reciprocal reason why adoration can and ought to be bestowed on Christ; or whether there are other reasons or motives of our adoration, which can be called formal and fundamental. Which is as much as if it were asked, Whether risible as proper can be understood to be first, immediately, and adequately in man, through and on account of another means than the rational? As for the term 'formal' or 'form', in disputations of this kind it denotes nothing other than the reason for acting and the active principle: it is called the form from which, because the effect as from the principle of acting goes forth from it. Thus for example, adorability flows and follows from Deity (if it is permitted to speak thus) as from a form, and from the person of the Son considered precisely as a person of the divine nature as from its subject. 'Foundation' and 'to found' sometimes broadly denote any motive or reason, or any impulsive cause, with respect to us: strictly and properly, the fundamental reason or proximate and adequate cause. We take it here in the latter notion. Likewise we understand here the formal principle, which is nothing other than that power of a cause, which makes such an effect exist. And let these things suffice for the explication of the precognita in this problem. Furthermore, because so much is situated in the genuine explication of those terms, and by their abuse alone or diverse acceptation the heterodox play and mock in the Controversy concerning the Deity of Christ, the juniors will do something worth the effort if they know them more deeply and expressly from the philosophers or Scholastic Masters of human wisdom. See Gabriel ad 1, dist. 9, q. 1, and ad 3, dist. 27, q. 1, the Philosophical Terms of Fontanus, the Formalities of Franciscus le Roy lib. 1, c. 5, 2, the distinctions of Castaneo, Armandus de bello visu, etc.

4. With these things thus premised let us see what is not, and what is the κρινόμενον or what is controverted. It is not asked concerning the adoration of Christ, the mediator, the man, the crucified one, etc., as will soon be made clear: nor what the material object (if it is permitted to speak thus) of adoration is, to which adoration tends, for no Christian doubts that that is Christ the mediator, man, the son of Mary, our brother: Nor is it asked whether there are various reasons and motives, which ought to impel and incite us to worship Christ. But it is asked:

Whether Christ is to be adored as God, and indeed only under that formal [aspect] as God, that is, whether the Deity is the adequate subject of adorability or majesty to be adored, and the formal object of adoration, or the formal notion through which and on account of which adoration belongs to this supposit, and can be bestowed, but does not belong to another, nor can be bestowed. Whether the mediatorial office is the formal notion, and the essential, natural, and necessary foundation which founds adorability, and thus there are several formal notions in him who is adored, e.g.: to be the eternal God, to create in time, to redeem man, to free man from danger or disease, etc., so that there are as many formal notions and formal objects of

adoration, as there are motives or moving reasons; as many 'as' as 'because'; as many first principles, as many proximate causes of being, whence adoration flows first and immediately, and through which adorability belongs to the supposit or subject, and into which it is ultimately resolved, as there are means propounding, motives, and reasons inducing and moving us to render honor and worship to Christ. But if one posits only one formal notion, then the Question must be formed thus: Whether there is one formality or formal notion of Deity and of mediation: or whether the Deity as such is of the notion of mediation, and vice versa whether mediation is of the notion of deity; Likewise whether 'Deity' and 'to mediate' are one esse, one objective and formal concept, any more than humanity and deity are one, although personally one is God and man in Christ. Again, whether that attribute of adoration is more of the formal notion of the action of mediating or of the relation of mediator, than it is of the formal notion of substance, namely humanity in Christ. Or, Whether adorability, which is founded in the divine excellence, majesty, and glory alone (which it cannot give to another thing, unless it deifies it; which is simply impossible), is not of the notion of deity as such? But whether it is of the notion of mediation, as such? Or rather both equally and equally, of the notion of Deity as such, and of the notion of mediation as such? Or finally of the notion of both but unequally: of deity indeed primarily, through essence, naturally, necessarily; but of mediation secondarily, by participation, through grace or gracious communication and donation? Whether therefore it should be said more that Christ the mediator is to be adored as mediator, than, Christ the man is God, as man; Christ God is man, as God. Christ God died as God; Christ the man is eternal, and created the world, as man. Christ the weak one conquered death and raised himself, as weak. It is asked, whether and why all those restrictive enunciations are absurd, which limit the subject through adjuncts, which have accrued to the Son of God in time; adjuncts, I say, partly substantial, as humanity, partly accidental, namely actions, passions, relations: and why that enunciation alone (Christ as mediator is adorable and to be adored) which limits through an action (to mediate) or relation (mediator) is not absurd?

5. We now have the state of the controversy; Let us premise certain axioms. But they will be: 1. Things given and conceded by us. 2. Things presupposed and hypotheses, about the truth of which it is clear on both sides. 3. Postulates which it will be permitted to take here only, since they are proved elsewhere expressly. Therefore we concede these things: 1. Christ the man and mediator, in the flesh and with the flesh, in and with the mediatorial office is to be adored; so that the object of our consideration is the person of Christ with all things which are in it, or the whole Christ. For properly honor is exhibited to the whole subsisting thing, as Thomas rightly [says] p. 3, q. 25, a. 1. Nor are the natures to be divided, or any adjuncts from the person of the Logos. 2. In him who is adored two things can be considered, namely he to whom the honor of adoration is exhibited, and the causes of adoration. There can be on our part various causes or reasons in general (so to speak) of one adoration; provided that several proximate, adequate, fundamental causes of being, and a priori are not posited, which are formal notions, and whence is the formal esse of adorability in itself, or on the part of the thing; For that is only one, namely the singular, highest, first, and independent excellence and majesty of the eternal deity. 3. The flesh of Christ is adored at the same time not per se nor on account of itself, but on account of the deity conjoined and at the same time united to it, so that the ultimate terminus of the adoration is not the flesh but the Deity. Thomas in the cited article [writes]: We do not say that the hand of a man

is honored, but that the man [is]. And if sometimes it happens, that it is said that the hand of someone is honored, this is not said for the reason that such parts are honored in themselves, but because in those parts the whole is honored. This is the opinion of the Synod of Ephesus in the Apologetic, anathema 8, and in the Synodical epistle, of Athanasius against the Arians, Oration 5, and dialogue 3 against the same, of Cyril book 2, ch. 92 on John, and On the Incarnation of the Only-Begotten, ch. 26. Which opinion our men follow in the Disputations against the Ubiquitists soon to be cited.

The hypotheses, which are presupposed on both sides and commonly against the heterodox are: 1. That Christ is consubstantial with the Father. 2. That there are not two Gods, but one. 3. That all the properties of God are convertible with him and are God himself. 4. That they cannot be communicated to another really diverse subject, indeed not even one of them. 5. That adorability is a divine property, just as his singular majesty or excellence is incommunicable to any creature. 6. And therefore the true estimation concerning God, and thus also the veneration, worship, adoration proceeding thence is not communicable. 7. Hence also we owe to God a singular faith and love, because he is truly and in a certain excellent way veracious. Which three last hypotheses the Pontifical Doctors rightly inculcate with us even in the midst of their shadows, among them Smiglecius in New Monsters of the New Arians, and Suarez disputation 51, section 4, ad Thomas p. 3, q. 25, aa. 1 and 2. 8. That there is only one object of religion, and of religious adoration, namely the one true God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, against the Roman Catholics: who see refuted by Rivetus in the Decalogue on the 1st commandment, and Molinaeus in The Novelty of Papism, and other Antagonists of the Papacy. 9. That religious adoration is of only one species, nor is it distinguished by degrees or species of inferiority or superiority, against the papal worships of latria, dulia, hyperdulia, which they hold agree in genus either analogically or univocally. Bellarmine bk. 1, On the Worship of the Saints ch. 12, Suarez disp. cit., sect. 3. 10. That the properties of the Deity are not communicated to the human nature of Christ through the hypostatic union; and consequently divine worship of adoration is not owed to the flesh of Christ on account of all divine power, majesty, and glory communicated [to it], against the Book of Concord, title On the Person of Christ, and in the catalog of Testimonies, of Jacob Andreae in the disputation at Tübingen in 1582, theses 144-145, and Osiander the Younger in the Enchiridion of Calvinist Controversies, ch. 6, q. 5, Eckhard in the Fasciculus, ch. 6, q. 12. But what they attack in our men, and what our men have defended from the Scriptures and orthodox antiquity, see in Daneau, Beza, Zanchius, Sadeel cited there by the adversaries. 11. That the glory of God (in the cognition of which all glorification of creatures is founded) is essential to God, always proper to him alone, and not communicable to any creature. 12. That it differs from the human and mediatorial glory of Christ, since that is inferior not equal to the divine, but next to it. (For the former is essential, communicated to the Son by the generating Father from natural necessity and property. But the latter has been conferred on Christ as mediator, and as man from the free will of God, and the free dispensation of grace.) But the purely divine glory is attributed to Christ only as he is God. Each of these hypotheses is deduced by Polanus, Syntagma bk. 2, ch. 31, p. 190. See also and compare this distinction explained at length and expressly, and its necessity against the Socinians, by Polyander in the first Concertation against the Socinians, ch. 21, through the whole. 13. That Christ insofar as he is mediator, is less than the Father, and subordinate and unequal to him:

which inequality nevertheless is not natural and substantial but Economical and relative; which our men concede against the Arians from 1 Cor. 11:3, John 14:28 in the disputations. See Fr. Junius, Defense 2, On the Trinity, chs. 7, 11, 12, 20, and Zanchius, On the Three Elohim, part 2, book 3, chs. 10 and 11.

3. Let these be the Postulates, from philosophy: 1. The form of a thing is one, and the proximate efficient cause is one, which being posited the thing is posited, and being removed is removed. 2. In relation to a faculty or action, which is occupied with an object, there is only one formal notion in the object, because that is nothing other than the form according to which the object is motive of that power, according to Scotus in 1, dist. 3, q. 1. Therefore to admit several formal notions in the same object is as absurd as to posit several specific forms of the same thing. 3. As the formal notion is the principle, whence the thing first and immediately depends, so it is the ultimate object into which the ultimate analysis of that thing is made. 4. The formal notion is reciprocal with that thing of which it is the notion, and is adequate to it, that is, it belongs to it alone, to the whole, and always. 5. The formal notion is prior in the instant of nature, even in the sign of reason to that thing to which it is referred; because namely and insofar as that thing depends on the formal notion, and is founded in it.

7. With these things posited we establish this thesis: Christ as mediator, or under this formal [aspect], as he is mediator, is not adorable or to be adored. Which we will prove: 1. by direct arguments. 2. from the absurd consequence. 3. Finally we will add the testimonies of others, to show the consensus. The direct arguments are first from the nature of the subject. 1. Christ is adored with one and the same adoration with the Father and Holy Spirit, as αὐτόθεος God: Therefore he is not adored otherwise or under another formal [aspect] of his as mediator. 2. Because separately, as mediator or according to the οἰκονομία, he is not absolutely highest and first; but subordinate to God, dependent on him, less than and inferior to him, unequal to him, his servant, etc. 1 Cor. 11:3, Isa. 42:1, Chamier, Panstratia vol. 3, bk. 1, ch. 4, and everywhere the Antagonists of the Socinians. Therefore as such he is not adored. The consequence of the major is clear: because what is less than God, and unequal is not adored religiously as such or insofar as it is less than God and unequal to him: But to mediate, mediation, mediator, include of their formal notion, that the subject is, is less, is unequal, serves, etc. But the evidence of this argument will be made more clear from what follows. 3. That in which there is not the foundation of adoration, namely the due estimation of the supreme and infinite excellence, majesty and glory, that is not to be adored: But in Christ as mediator there is not such a foundation, etc. Therefore. The minor is proved. For we do not believe that the peculiar mediatorial glory of Christ, is that absolutely supreme and purely divine glory, but distinct from it, as these things are most excellently distinguished by our men against the confusion and transfusion of divine properties of certain ones (they call it communication), among others by Polanus, Syntagma bk. 2, ch. 31, and Polyander in the first concertation, ch. 21. For if he had the supreme and divine glory as mediator, he would have that either by nature or by the grace of union. But through neither. Therefore we do not judge that Christ as such is adorable with divine adoration. For there ought to be and always to be preserved a proportion between the honor and the honorability, between the estimation and the excellence or virtue which is esteemed, as rightly observed by the Scholastics on ST IIa-IIae, q. 25, a. 1, and Smiglecius in New Monsters of the

New Arians. 4. Because he is not the formal object of faith as mediator, therefore as such he is not the formal object of adoration. The consequence of the major is clear from Rom. 10:14. The minor is proved, because as mediator he is not the first efficient and ultimate end, the first and highest true and good infinite, eternal, etc., nor the first and supreme author or efficient cause of every good and of salvation: but he is an inferior cause both procatarctic or meritorious, and instrumental, and in this respect the conferrer of good things in whose name, through whom and on account of whom we tend to the highest good, namely God, and believe in him, hope in him, worship and adore him, John 14:6. Furthermore, what we here intimate concerning the one formal and ultimate object of faith and trust, you will find everywhere explained thus by our men in the Disputations on Religion, on prayer, on the invocation of creatures, on faith, and on the analysis of faith, on hope, etc. 5. Because there is only one formal notion of each thing; therefore also of the adorability of Christ, namely the deity, and nothing besides it. For that one formal notion is either the divine nature, or the human nature, or both, or some adjunct or relation resulting from the works and offices of both natures. Not the human nature, for the adversaries do not want this; nor both, for then the human nature would also be a formal notion; nor the adjunct or relation of mediator, because then again the humanity would be for its part a formal notion, Because Christ is mediator according to both natures. If therefore as mediator he is adorable, therefore also as man. Just as if as substance man is a being subsisting per se, therefore he is also such a being according to the soul not only but also according to the body. But this will be more illustrated by the next argument. 6. Mediation is not the formal object of adoration, therefore neither is the mediator as such adorable or to be adored. The Reason of the Consequence holds from the form to the formed, from the formal notion to the formal esse both affirmatively and negatively, e.g.: The universal is not the formal object of sensitive cognition, therefore the universal is not cognized by the one sensing as such; and consequently it must not be said, man as sensing cognizes universals: but it must be said: man as rational cognizes them. The antecedent is proved in many ways. 1. because mediation is an action, and the mediatorial office is a relation; But an action and an external relation in relation to creatures, is not the formal object of adoration, because it is not God or deity, but a certain definite work of God in creatures, from which God is externally denominated: And thus mediation or redemption is a work of the Son of God in men, which posits nothing real in the divine person, but only an external denomination. 2. Because it is a contingent, temporary adjunct, which could be and not be, therefore as such it is not adorable or a numen θεοπρεπές, ὀράσθαι: for it is not the supreme, divine excellence, divine by nature and through essence, not the form of God, not God by nature, but it is a certain inferior excellence and form, mediatorial through the grace of the hypostatic union, from the most free decree of God. 3. Because in the instant of nature and sign of reason, indeed also in time it is posterior to the majesty, excellence, adorability, indeed also to the adoration itself of the Son of God; Therefore it is not its formal notion. The reason for the consequence is, because every formal notion in the object is by nature prior to the thing and action tending to that object, or occupied with that object; just as every principle [is prior] to the principiated, cause to the caused, form to the formed and formal: 4. Because with the formal notion of the object removed, the attainment and motion of the faculty to that object is removed; but with mediation removed or denied the adoration of the Logos is not removed: First, because it would follow otherwise that before the fall and before the institution of the mediatorial office the Son of God ought not to have been adored; which is absurd. Second, because it would follow

that the Father and Holy Spirit (who are adored with the same adoration as one God with the Son) are not to be adored, because they are not mediator. But what certain learned men add to confirm this argument: That the mediatorial office is to be laid aside by Christ, and consequently cannot be the formal notion or adequate foundation of adoration, we prefer to leave in the middle. For it is to be laid aside from 1 Cor. 15:24, and yet it is not to be laid aside from Luke 1:33. Therefore here we must speak with a distinction. But that is rightly urged against the Socinians, which is said in the same place, 1 Cor. 15:24, that Christ even having already obtained the mediatorial excellence and glory will be subject to the Father; therefore such exaltation and glory cannot found divine or religious adoration. 5. Because the formal object is that in which the action or faculty is ultimately terminated and first founded, and into which it is ultimately resolved, as e.g.: Man sees, not as man or as rational but as sensitive; where the ultimate analysis is made into the sensitive, not into humanity or rationality; therefore this and not that is the formal notion: and it must be said man sees as sensitive, but not as rational, or under that formal [aspect], as man. But the adoration of the mediator is not ultimately resolved into the mediatorial office, but into the deity. For if I ask why Jesus is adored, and it is answered: because he is mediator: And I further ask why the mediator is adored, it will be answered by Christians against the Arians: Because he is consubstantial God with the Father, or: because he has the eternal Deity. This last response, this last term, and consequently this one formal notion, not the office of mediator.

Thus far the direct demonstrations from the nature of the subject. There follow [demonstrations] from the nature of the predicate. 7. God alone as such, that is, by the very fact that he has the divine nature and supreme excellence, is adorable and to be adored: But the mediator as mediator does not have that excellence, as shown above, Therefore. The antecedent has been demonstrated in many ways in the Ubiquitarian controversies. There is no need, therefore, for me to set in motion any proofs here. The Minor is proved, Because God alone as such has that excellence according to all the Antagonists of Ubiquity; therefore this must be attributed to the deity alone, not even to the adjuncts of the divine person of the Logos, as to the human nature of Christ, or to the mediatorial office or work. Indirect proofs from absurd consequences or things repugnant both to the subject and to the predicate could be adduced many. Now these will suffice. 8. It would follow and be conceded: 1. To the Socinians that there are two Gods, two numina θεοπρεπῆ, of which one is supreme, the other subordinate: at least those new monsters could not be solidly brought to light and crushed: nor could the fourth class of arguments for the deity of Christ be accurately and perspicuously defended against their exceptions; nor could they be convicted of idolatry. Nor should it be passed over that Smalcius the Photinian in the book on The Divinity of Christ, ch. 24, uses almost the same arguments to prove the donated deity, majesty and adorability of Christ the mediator, which someone from our men uses to prove that Christ is to be adored as mediator. 2. The double religious adoration of Christ but unequal could not be solidly and evidently refuted; which the Remonstrants the Socinians have, Confession and Apology, ch. 16, and the two formal notions of those adorations; nor could the Council of Ephesus be defended in the Apologetic, anathema 8, and in the Synodical epistle, where it rejects two adorations of Christ. 3. It would be conceded to the Roman Catholics that there is another religious worship according to the first table of the law, than the divine, which they, but wrongly, call by the proper name latria. Certainly the arguments of our men against the

religion and religious worship bestowed on creatures are not a little enervated; and a door is opened to the distinctions of latria, dulia, hyperdulia and to those new and portentous commentaries of Cardinal Perron, who in the response to the King of Great Britain, bk. 5, ch. 20, speaks thus: Prayer is indirect, or direct; relative, or absolute; subaltern, or supreme; transitory, or final; outside of oblation or sacrifice, or oblatory or sacrificatory. 4. The responses of our men to the Ubiquitists' communicated divine majesty, glory, and adoration are enervated: and thus also omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, and the supreme power of judging. For it necessarily follows, if Christ the mediator is adored as mediator, Therefore Christ the man is also to be adored. But the latter was always denied and solidly refuted as absurd by Beza, Zanchius, Daneau, Sadeel, etc., their Antagonists. No difference or exception can be adduced here why it should be said more that Christ as mediator, than as man is to be adored, except this: The mediator comprehends not only the human but also the divine nature, which latter in itself is to be adored per se. But this is the very thing we want, that adoration is attributed to Christ by God and under that formal [aspect], as God; but not as mediator because mediation equally respects the human nature and the divine nature; and by its intervention (if indeed it were the formal notion of adoration) it would equally apply it to the human nature and to the divine nature.

Especially it should be noted, that the same arguments are adduced by the distinguished Theologian Ames in the Disputation on the adoration of Christ as mediator, which Eckhard, and Osiander in the places already cited [adduced] against our men. 9. We add two arguments ad hominem. We oppose the first argument to the Remonstrants. For they, while pleading the cause of the Socinians, in order to diminish the necessary truth of the article on the Trinity against the common cause of Christianity, thus distinguish sufficiently philosophically and scholastically in the Response to the Excerpts of the Leiden Professors p. 93, to specimen 5: The person, as such, cannot provide use for worship, piety, except insofar as that person is divine, for divinity is the reason for worshipping God, not personality. And in Vedel the Rhapsodist p. 37: The Father as Father with the notion of Deity abstracted is not to be adored. I infer therefore neither is the mediator as mediator with the notion of deity abstracted to be adored. The consequence holds from an equal indeed from a greater reason: unless they prove that the relations of reason and external denominations attributed to God (of which sort is [the relation] of mediator) are more the formal notions of the adoration of religion, than the divine personalities, namely paternity, etc. And at the same time I ask these two things. First, Why they are accustomed here so willingly to ἀκυρολογεῖν with metaphysical, Logical, and scholastic terms, when the lights of all Christianity must be obstructed for the sake of the Antitrinitarians; but when the Christian faith is to be asserted and the heretics brought to light and confounded they order all the aids of logical and scholastic distinctions and terms to depart, indeed also attack [them] in a hostile manner, and thus immediately taking refuge in the asylum of ignorance (as indeed they carry themselves), they desert their bail: Second, whether they do not either strenuously contradict themselves or at least betray hypocrisy, when in their Apology loc. cit. they say, that Christ is to be religiously adored as mediator, and indeed with a true but nevertheless distinct honor of adoration from that, by which God is worshipped, which they call there absolutely divine. We oppose the second argument ad hominem to the renowned Dr. Ames, from his Disputation On the Adoration of Christ thesis 4. The particle, he says, 'insofar

as', 'as', 'inasmuch as', 'according to which', can denote nothing more in that proposition, than that Christ the mediator is the determinate object of adoration or also that some just reason of adoration is found in the mediation of Christ himself. We undertake to defend both senses. But this is to hand over the whole cause (as indeed it seems to me) or to profess not obscurely, that this whole disceptation languishes about a mere καινοφωνίαν, ἀκυρολογίαν, λογομαχίαν, not [about] οἰκοδομήν. We concede his assertion itself and that distinguished Theologian conceded it, to whom he was opposing these theses: but we think that those particles are badly applied by him to the explication already posited. 10. We add the consensus of those who have expressly examined the Antitrinitarian controversies and quibbles: who it is undoubted have spoken here a little more cautiously, Zanchius part 2, On the three Elohim book 3, ch. 3: It is not a sufficient cause that Christ be adored because he is mediator. For the sole cause of adoration is deity. For on that account Jehovah orders that he alone be adored and worshipped, because he alone is God the author of all things. Wherefore if Christ is not God, he is in no way to be invoked and adored. And in the same place: It is objected, the Father is adored as Jehovah and author of all good things, the Son as mediator and distributor of good things, which he received from the Father. Where in his excellent response he among other things replies this, p. 16, col. 9: The one cause, why the knees must be bent to anyone, [is] because he is Jehovah: therefore the knees will not be bent to Christ because he is judge, but because he is Jehovah. Cartwright, Evangelical History part 1, p. 327: Here see if with Cyril this whole place, by which Christ asserts his divinity, ought to be understood of the person of the mediator, or with Augustine partly to be referred to the eternal generation, partly to the person of the Mediator. For since equal honor is here rendered to Christ, which [is rendered] to the Father: and since he seems to have life included and innate in himself, these things do not seem to belong except to the person of the Son, as he was begotten from the substance of the Father. Smiglecius the Jesuit, who most happily engaged with the Socinians in New Monsters of the New Arians p. 21: Just as on account of the former power Christ must be called God, so on account of that other power he can in no way be called God; and indeed that former [power] was not donated, but innate to Christ: But this latter was indeed donated by God, but in consideration of it Christ is not called God, nor to be affected with divine worship on account of it. Suarez, with Thomas p. 3, q. 25, aa. 1 and 2, asserts that divine worship is to be bestowed on Christ only as God. For thus he makes the title sect. 1: On the adoration owed to Christ as God, and sect. 4: How Christ as God is to be adored. And he explains that that adoration is divine or proper to God. Grauwer the Lutheran theologian on Heb. 1, p. 93: Christ is not to be adored on that account, because prayers are directed through him to the Father, but because he is the eternal God, for this is the one and only cause of adoration. Thus a false cause is alleged when they say, that Christ is to be adored, because he has power over us. For this is not the true cause of adoration, nor is he adored on account of the supreme power granted by God. Pareus in the Irenicum ch. 28, p. 270: The object of adoration is Christ God and man: but the cause of the adoration of God and man is the deity. For in Christ the divine nature is adorable, and the adoring human nature, as Cyril says in book 1 to Theodosius, On the right faith. Zanchius part 1, On the three Elohim book 3, ch. 12, p. 117, fol. edition: We deny this consequence, if Christ is mediator he cannot therefore be invoked: for he is not invoked as mediator, but as God. And thus Stephen invoked [him], Acts 7:59. And he adds other examples, Luke 17:5, 1 Thess. 3:11, 2 Thess. 2:17. Cameron vol. 3, Lectures p. 173: If however it could not happen, which altogether cannot

happen, that he who is mediator is truly and properly, the same would not be God, certainly the mediator would not be to be adored; and the reason is suitable, because this worship is merely divine and religious. Johannes Junius, who solidly and learnedly refuted Socinus in the Examination of the Response of Socinus against Wiekus, class 5, ch. 6: God singular and one by reason of an individual essence, is to be loved from the whole heart, that is, as undivided in himself, and divided from every other. Therefore also as such to be adored, etc. In that sense also trust must be placed in the one God, *as if one, is to be adored and invoked etc. It is therefore necessary either that a twofold cult of the one divine essence be given, etc. See the remaining [arguments], by which he disputatingly argues against the two adorations of Socinus in favor of the unique reason for the adoration of God and Christ. The renowned Professors of Leiden in the Censure of the Remonstrant Confession, chap. 16. But now, since the divine nature is conjoined with the human nature in one person of the mediator, hence it happens, that by a merely divine adoration, by one invocation, by one trust and hope not by two distinct ones, nor by one mixed from two, he is worshipped by us; in which invocation, adoration, and confiding address, the formal object and proper cause, or terminus, (as the schools speak) is the divine nature alone, which alone is capable of this cult etc. We think that Polanus' distinction of the glory of Christ in the cited place also pertains to this. In short, the whole disputation of our [writers] against the Ubiquitarian communication of idioms and the other against the Anti-Trinitarians necessarily aims at this.*

9. We will not individually examine the objections of the renowned Dr. Ames, to be brief: especially since this has been done more than sufficiently by the illustrious Dr. Maccovius, and Dr. Cluto in Disputations set forth on this question in the Academy of Franeker in the year 1635. It will suffice to have indicated these sources of solutions. 1. It is one thing to dispute who and of what sort is to be adored, and another what is the formal reason under which he is to be adored. 2. Everything that is, is as, and by reason or respect, but not the reverse. Many reasons and motives can be adduced which may move us to be borne to the object, but there is only one formal reason. Thus there are many reasons or motives why Christ the mediator should be glorified by us and honored with divine worship, e.g. because he redeems us, because he was wounded and died, because he was poor for us, because he was a worm, because he was cursed, he wept, was deserted and in agony, because he intercedes for us, because he frees us from diseases, dangers, etc. But all those things cannot be called the formal object of divine adoration. 3. It is one thing to specify the material object which is adored, and another to limit it through the reason by which the predicate belongs to the subject. The former we can call with the Leiden Professors the object of consideration: which distinction the Remonstrants idly reject in their Apology, but do not refute. Most truly, what Epiphanius in the Ancoratus and Augustine sermon 58 on the words of the Lord and after them Thomas in the place more often cited and more recent authors in the Disputations against the Ubiquitarians have taught, that the Son of God is adored with the flesh, and by that reason his flesh united to his deity in the unity of hypostasis. Thus we also adore the whole Christ the mediator and thus considered by us as mediator, now clothed with all qualities, offices, and virtues, separating nothing: yet not as mediator, so that mediation or anything else besides deity is the formal object of adoration. What the Remonstrants adduce besides in the cited place to prove the peculiar and distinct

religion due to Christ the mediator as such, has already been refuted by the Antagonists of the Socinians.

Problem 1. Whether it can be said accurately and properly that Christ is mediator as he is God and as he is man. Resp. Neg. for it seems to be implied, that the Deity absolutely and the humanity as such, are the formal reason of mediation. 2. How is that formula of prayer to be understood: Lord Jesus, pray for me? Resp. Distinguish the petition itself formally as it is our act, from the thing petitioned. The former is directed to the person of the mediator and is terminated in it, in which the deity holds itself as the formal reason of that tendency or motion of our heart to Christ. The thing petitioned is, the action of the same Christ the mediator to be done namely according to the human nature, which is the immediate subject of prayer.

Consectary. 1. Those who rest in the assertion of Dr. Ames, and cut off the profane novelties about double adoration, etc., seem to dissent in impropriety of speech and words only. 2. We think nevertheless that such a lax and improper phrase, although they explain it orthodoxly, is accommodated neither to the usage of those speaking rightly nor sufficiently circumspectly to the detection and refutation of the Socinians. 3. If any strive to sculpt something further from this with the Remonstrants, let them see, lest a depraved error in the beginning become great in the end.

FIRST PART OF THE APPENDIX ON THE ADORATION OF CHRIST AS MEDIATOR.

Matthias Nethenus of Rees in Cleves.
On the 13th of July, 1642.

1. The problem concerning the adoration of Christ as mediator, born elsewhere (namely in the Academy of Franeker), thence brought from the neighboring Leiden Academy into ours by the students, who on account of the plague raging there were frequently turning aside to us at that time, and often protruded and agitated publicly and privately in the colleges and private colloquies by them with academic liberty, formerly imposed on us the necessity of responding something about it, and commenting. Hence it happened, that at length with them earnestly demanding, that we comprehend our conceptions in writing, with a diatribe publicly proposed for disputation, we communicated our thoughts such as they were; with which we then abundantly satisfied our hearers. But because the minds of novices are now and then exercised with new doubts and evasions from elsewhere (that is, proposed in a new mode, or new form) besides that these things are secretly carped at and calumniously traduced by certain unlearned or malevolent persons; I thought that I would do something worth the effort, if I illustrated our diatribe formerly published with the present appendix for the sake of the more unskilled (for the sources of solutions indicated there suffice for the more advanced). But there will be seven sections of it; of which 1. will contain the consensus of Theologians, especially of those, who had to fight with the adversaries hand to hand. 2. The occasions and origins of the controversy.

3. The moment, or weight of the controversy. 4. The occasions and sources of errors and hallucinations about this controversy. 5. Arguments for the truth: with a solution of the exceptions. 6. The arguments of the opposite opinion refuted together with the exceptions and replies. 7. Certain consectaries and corollaries proposed by way of problems.

2. The consensus, which I had begun to indicate in our diatribe, I now complete with a threefold supplement. 1. The first has the authors, who wrote before the Remonstrant Apology, and thence the formed problematic controversy. But they are Piscator on Matt. 2:15, where he says that Christ is to be adored not only civilly as man, as the Magi seem to have adored; but also religiously, as God. And a little after: For adoration is properly due to the divine nature. Joh. Cramerus in Enchiridion of Ubiquitarian Controversies, part 1, pp. 141-143. Where he urges that Christ is to be invoked only according to the divine nature (that is, in that part in which he is God): nor on that account is Christ divided in adoration into man separately and into God. Zanchius bk. 3, On the Three Elohim, ch. 12: We deny this consequence: if Christ is mediator, he cannot therefore be invoked. For he is not invoked as mediator, but as God. Franciscus Junius in the defense of the Trinity against the Samosatenians, everywhere so carefully distinguishes Christ as God, and as mediator, and as man, that our opinion cannot but be collected thence, and the opposite rejected. Among other things part 3, p. 190 (fol. edition), he distinguishes the prerogatives, namely excellencies, which are attributed to Christ in the Scriptures, into those which [are attributed to him] as God simply in the equality of nature, and into those which [are attributed] as mediator in equality according to dispensation, and by reason of office. But now he establishes that adoration is an excellency which belongs to Christ not as mediator, but as consubstantial God, in the Examination of Gratianus Prosperus, part 2, §5, p. 265: Christ is adored by us as consubstantial and equal with the Father according to his deity, with one adoration with the Father. To these we add Ames, who although he contended for the adoration of Christ as mediator; nevertheless by hypotheses scattered through his whole Theology he contradicted this thesis of his not obscurely, and supplied sources of solutions. See in his Marrow, bk. 1, ch. 19, §§28, 23, §17, §25, §29, §26, §§30-31, §8, §41, §§16, 19, §28, bk. 2, ch. 4, §§19-20, ch. 6, §§2-5, ch. 9, §§4-5. Also nothing else can be sculpted out of the words of the Leiden Professors in the Censure of the Remonstrant Confession. Let the reader himself see and weigh their words on p. 225. And the words of Pareus in the method of the Ubiquitarian controversy, ch. 31: We therefore invoke Christ because he is true God with the Father and Holy Spirit, αὐτόθεος, so to speak, by the absolute deity, we also invoke God in the name of Christ, because he is mediator, asking that we be heard on account of the λύτρον and intercession of this person of the God-man, etc. Nor should Grauerus the Lutheran Theologian be passed over in the commentary on Heb. 1, p. 63: Christ is not to be adored on that account, because prayers are directed through him to the Father, but because he is the eternal God, for this is the one and only (N.B.) cause of adoration. Thus a false cause is alleged, when they say that Christ is to be adored, because he has power over us: for this is not the true cause of adoration, nor is he adored on account of the supreme power granted by God. Smiglecius the Jesuit Theologian, bk. 1, On the errors of the new Arians, ch. 9, accurately distinguishes against the Socinians the independent and uncreated power of Christ, which he has communicated together with the divine nature, from the created, dependent and ministerial power of the same Christ, which Christ has communicated as mediator, whereby he is our priest and savior and can save us, by

praying, interceding, shedding blood. He says that Christ deserves divine worship, or absolute worship, by reason of the former power; but not by reason of the latter, which can in no way be equal to the former. Let the reader, who has leisure, see the thread of the whole disputation. 2. It has those, who wrote after the publication of the Remonstrant apology, with the response to the excerpts of the Leiden Professors, and thence the present problem having been formed and aired somewhere in terms, while labor is expended in refuting the exception of the Socinians and Remonstrants: who it is undoubted have spoken here more pressingly, exactly, and circumspectly. But they are Isaac Junius in the Antapology, ch. 4, p. 102, with ch. 2, pp. 78, 72, 23, and ch. 16 through the whole and ch. 3, p. 92. Wedelius in Theological Opuscula, Theological Disputations, disp. 30, thesis 5. The same in a certain manuscript judgment on this question, Deventer, August 21, 1638 (which we exhibit whole below), Maccovius in the disputation on this problem published with certain others in quarto in 1640, where he dissolves the objections. Afterwards those theses were reprinted and others besides added in 1641 in quarto. See Theological Disputations, part 1, miscellaneous disputations, qq. 5, dispp. 35-37, and disputation 6, disp. 3, in the corollaries. Abrah. Heidanus in the refutation of the Remonstrant Catechism q. 89. Jacobus Laurentius in the Exegesis or confession of faith written in the vernacular speech. Joh. Cluto in Idea, disp. 3, thesis 1, disp. 40, disp. 4, th. 15. Our Reverend and most joined colleague Carolus de Maets in the disputation on the person and offices of Christ. Henricus Diestius, Professor of Theology at Deventer, in the erudite disputation On the Adoration of Christ, held on August 26, 1640, from which (because perhaps it is not publicly extant everywhere) I exhibit these things to our students; thesis 63: From all which it is clear that the true reason or formal [reason] of adorability is the deity, etc. it is also clear, what must be replied to that question, Whether Christ is adored as God or as mediator? Namely, not as mediator, but as God. And a little after: It is also said more rightly the mediator is adored, as Son of God, than the Son of God is adored as mediator, or (which is the same) as θεάνθρωπος, as Christ, etc. Because that 'as mediator', 'as θεάνθρωπος', insinuates both natures, divine and human, it will be said that the Son of God is adored, as mediator, as θεάνθρωπος, not without the appearance of contradiction, etc. Unless that, 'as', can also be taken otherwise not only according to which nature he is mediator and θεάνθρωπος; but also for a new respect which he received in the assumed mediation and flesh: as we said above, thesis 19, etc. but this would be λογομαχεῖν, etc. What has been said about adoration, the same must also be understood about the honor or worship of faith and trust. And a little after: To believe in Christ, that is to place trust in Christ, we do not seem [to do], except as God, or on account of the Deity. Polyander van Kerckhoven in the 2nd Socinian Concertation, disp. 27, theses 23-27, as to the sum of the matter does not seem to me to depart from this opinion. Let the reader see and weigh the thread of the disputation. Indeed even Beza with the other Reformed collocutors in the Colloquy of Montbéliard, part 1, pp. 196-197, pronounces clearly enough that the sole foundation and ultimate object (which is nothing other than the formal object) of divine worship is the deity alone; He says: From the worship of the deity and of the Logos the collocutors of the other part by no means separate the adoration of the humanity; yet not in itself nor absolutely considered, but respectively, that is, because it is united to God, or because the deity of Christ which is the proper and absolute (N.B.) object of true adoration, is not simply the deity but the incarnate deity, and that, humanity is not simply humanity, but the humanity of the Logos. 3. It has those, who having published and read our diatribe, determined for it, and approved it: of

which sort are very many learned men and theologians; among whom the veteran and very erudite Theologian and our preceptor Franciscus Gomarus in his letters to me given at Groningen on the Kalends of August 1638, thus writes: I have unfolded the Disputation on the question, Whether Christ as mediator, is to be adored? and I have observed nothing in its discussion, which I do not deem accurate and agreeable to the truth. And indeed how great a mass of errors the contrary opinion of Dr. Ames draws with it, you have also most excellently observed: just as I showed to two erudite young men some years ago (having set out here from Franeker to test me). Wherefore thanks are deservedly due for your very eruditely accomplished work: and for it having been communicated to me, as also to Dr. Altingius, I both have and render the greatest thanks. Proceed strenuously: and prefer zeal for the truth and utility of the Church to ignorance and envy: God will without doubt favor, and prosper your undertakings. The highest man, the veteran and also polyhistor Theologian Andr. Rivetus in his letters to me from the Hague on the 12th day before the Quintiles 1638, thus judges concerning the same diatribe of ours: But since it is a question of divine adoration, and consequently supreme, which is due to God alone, and has the divine excellence for its formal object, as they say; I prefer that opinion which you defend, that Christ the Mediator, cannot be adored with that adoration, except insofar as he is one God with the Father and therefore the formal reason, why he is adored, is not mediation but deity, even if there are many and various causes, which may move us to adore him. And afterwards: What you cite from our censure (ch. 16, p. 225, lines 9, 15), are such, that nothing seems to me to be able to be said either more distinctly, or more expressly, and I do not doubt that they suffice, that you may prove to all who are not contentious, that there is no difference between your doctrine, and ours in this dogma. I would try to demonstrate it more fully, if there were need: but in a manifest matter I do not think that unnecessary witnesses should be used, etc. And thus far the demonstration of consensus; which will suffice to remove all suspicion of rashness, and καινοφωνίας, from the accurate defense of the truth, which we with others attempt and intend according to our measure. For we prefer to embrace and imitate the erudition and ακρίβειαν conjoined with the zeal for οἰκοδομήν of these men in philosophical and theological matters (especially the Socinian controversies), than to be compacted by the Socinians into ἀκυρολογίας, or ἀκυρολογίας, and the asylum of contradiction, or ignorance.

3. Occasion to this problem, and its more accurate and cautious untying, was given: 1. By the Roman Catholics, who inquire concerning the adoration of the human nature of Christ on Thomas, p. 3, q. 25, a. 2. Where see Cajetan, Suarez, Vasquez, etc. 2. After them the Ubiquitarians, who dispute concerning the adoration of the flesh of Christ, or concerning the adoration of Christ according to the human nature, and as he is mediator, as θεάνθρωπος. See Eckhard in the Fasciculus of Controversies, ch. 6, q. 12. And Lucas Osiander the son in the Enchiridion of Controversies with the Calvinists, ch. 6, q. 5. And Balduin in Cases bk. 2, ch. 4 case 7. The Giessen Theological Disputations of Winckelmann and Mentzer vol. 1, disp. 3, which is On the θεανθρωπότητος of Jesus Christ, theses 33, 44, 46. The Acts of the Colloquy of Montbéliard, as they were published by Beza with a response at Geneva in 1587, part 1, p. 196, coll. with pp. 174-175. Wolfgang Franzius in the disputation against the Pontifical Calvinists and Antitrinitarians, disp. 3, On the person of Christ, last section, th. 195. This opinion is opposed by our men Martyr, Daneau, Zanchius, Joh. Cramerus, etc. 3. Hence the Socinians, who deny that the deity of Christ is proved from the adoration of Christ, by this exception (to pass over others

now, in Socinus in the disputation On the adoration of Christ with Christian Francken, and Francis David p. 193. And the antitheses of Fr. David p. 181), that he is adored as, or insofar as mediator, that is as the mediate or second cause of all those things which regard our salvation, and as the intermediate end of religion: to whom the Father is contradistinctly opposed, as alone to be adored as the supreme cause, first efficient and ultimate end. Thus Volkelius, Institutes bk. 4, ch. 11, Crellius On the one God the Father, sect. 1, §§36-37. So that the foundation or formal reason of adoration is for them the mediatorial office of Christ, and the donated power, glory, dominion over us; of which the immediate cause is the exaltation of Christ, the mediate his obedience. Socinus against the preface of Wiekus. And they call this communicated glory divine and deity. Thus Ostorodt, Institutes ch. 10. How dexterously and fully the Lutherans dissolve these quibbles of the Socinians, who deny that Christ as God and only according to the deity, is to be adored: see in Paul Tarnovius bk. On the Trinity against Socinus. And Stechmann, disp. 9, qq. 13, 16. 4. Finally the Remonstrants, who lending their aid to the Socinians deny that an irrefragable argument can be sought from the divine worship to prove the deity of Christ: because from Scripture they have learned that God the Father has gratuitously bestowed on Christ the Son, insofar as he is θεάνθρωπος mediator, etc., God manifest in the flesh, divine worship and honor. But it is impossible that it be conceived that God has deigned his Son Jesus with that honor in time, if the reason of adoration is only his divine nature, Apology, ch. 2. And ch. 16, fol. 153 a: In this Chapter nothing is censured except this one thing, That the Remonstrants establish that those rightly do, who holily and religiously worship, that is, adore, invoke, place their hope and trust in, and suppliantly give thanks and bless Jesus Christ, insofar as he is our Mediator with God. The Censor confesses that Christ must be acknowledged and worshipped by us, not only as the only-begotten Son of God the Father and true God, but also as θεάνθρωπος and Mediator between God and men. But the Remonstrants say nothing else in their Confession. But, he says, they constitute this worship proper to Christ the Mediator, out of reason of the office alone imposed on him by the Father, or of the glory granted to him by the Father. Certainly: How can they otherwise, if it is worship, which has been graciously conferred, attributed and communicated to Christ, as Mediator, contradistinctly as he is the only-begotten Son of God the Father, which the Censor himself acknowledges? But this manifestly favors the Socinians, he says: therefore, I say, the Censor himself favors the Socinians, while he concedes that, which we have said: And where the truth favors a heretic, the heretic is not a heretic in that part. But, says the Censor, this opens the way for the Socinians to elude all the arguments of the orthodox, which for the true and eternal Deity of Christ, have always been invincibly sought from the communication of this divine worship, by the ancient and recent Church. And ibid. b: Alas! how great danger, Therefore one of two things must be said; Either it is false, that this worship and honor has been attributed and graciously communicated by God to Christ, as Mediator, or if this is not false, as the Censor concedes that this is not false, it is entirely most just, that we no longer fight with that leaden argument. And a little after: The words of the Council of Ephesus, which the Censor cites, are such, that the Fathers may seem to have defined the same thing, because they say, that they do not acknowledge two natures in Christ, one to be adored, the other not to be adored, but one incarnate nature of the divine Word, which is adored with one adoration together with its flesh. The same in the Vindications, or Vedel the Rhapsodist bk. 1, ch. 9, p. 54, they ask that it be proved, that it is necessary that it be believed, how the honor of adoration has been communicated to Christ the mediator, whether according

to the divine nature, or according to the human nature, or according to both, and that that mode be determined from Scripture. Let Simon Episcopius be added in the posthumous Dutch writing by which he responds to Dr. Abraham Heidanus for the Remonstrant catechesis, where to q. 85, p. 285, he says: Jesus Christ as Son not only of God but also of man is a glorified creature and consequently as such is the object of religious worship and adoration and that is evidently proved from John 17:3. Besides, religious worship belongs to God, and to the Son as God by nature; but to the Son as mediator only through and according to the will and ordination of God. Besides, This honor and worship is bestowed not on the mediator alone as mediator, but also on God himself because it is not bestowed on the mediator except on account of the will of God, and because God so demands, so that God is glorified through that honor and worship. Finally, it is not idolatry if something is religiously worshipped (as happens here) outside of and besides God or outside of and besides the divine essence and person because God expressly commands that his Son be honored as he himself is honored. But now this commandment cannot have place, except insofar as the Son is the Son of man. To the preceding question 84, p. 283: They confess that this worship is not the same or equal to that which is bestowed on God; because such does not belong to Christ the mediator as such. For although it is the same in substance, nevertheless it differs in this from the honor or worship of the Father, that the Father has his honor from himself and by nature; Christ has this his honor from the Father and indeed graciously granted in time as the reward of obedience. And this indeed is the proximate occasion of the disceptation concerning this problem. The nearest is, the ἀκρισία admitted in the refutation of these adversaries, by good and orthodox men, that is, to speak most gently, some things said by them impeditely or obscurely, or exceedingly loosely, improperly and ambiguously, consequently dangerously. Of which the cause seems to be, the improvident imitation of those theologians who before the Socinian and Remonstrant controversies arose spoke here more securely (as is usually accustomed to happen and the examples of writers teach, who flourished before Arius, Nestorius, Pelagius, etc. arose): or who have not so used the acroamatic and concise and scholastic style or manner of speaking, and consequently have not attended so strictly to the philosophical acceptations of particles and formulas, as indeed the Socinian sophists now teach and compel us to attend. There is added also and springs from the former another cause, that without a serious and accurate examination of all things, which pertain to this cause, from the first given occasion an opinion is often conceived, and said, which afterwards subjected to the examination of the erudite, they try to contract or incrust not a little, if they do not want to defend it unhappily by heaping up far more absurd absurdities. Other particular causes also can intervene. 1. Ignorance of the mind and intention of the adversaries: when namely all their hypotheses, conclusions, and arts are not yet sufficiently perceived. 2. Ignorance of the terms, both from the usage of the adversaries, and from the usage of the schools, which it is necessary to employ in the airing of this problem: hence it cannot happen, but that they implicate themselves and others, and confound all their conceptions; especially if they make light of the strict and cautious usage of terms. 3. Ignorance of certain theses, or reasons, or Theological distinctions; which in some way touch this controversy. 4. Perhaps also some contention, besides too great facility and rashness, in carping at those things in others, which they then do not grasp, or about which they have not thought before. 5. But if pertinacity and too great a love and admiration τῶν ἰδίων is added, they fall into more absurdities, and error draws error, Furthermore it is not a wonder that some things have sometimes fallen from

learned men inconsiderately and dangerously said in dissolving difficulties of this kind, in this human infirmity and darkness. We do not collect such hallucinations from the whole of theology: it will suffice to have indicated one or another in the problem concerning the adoration of Christ: where Martyr and Daneau standing in the line against the Ubiquitarians, made two adorations of Christ; the former in Gen. 18:2, the latter in the assertion against Jacob Andreae pp. 37-38. Perhaps Alsted had the same in mind, when in Theological Logic, ch. 20, §16, he wrote: From the proper worship of the mediator, the consequence does not hold to the proper worship of God. For the former is ἀξίωμα and θεανθρώπῳ, the latter is the sacrosanct λατρεία due to the Trinity. Ames makes one adoration indeed, but which after the incarnation of Christ varies from his adoration before the incarnation, namely which is now made under that formal [aspect] as mediator. Others [make] one adoration likewise, but which has several formal reasons (concerning which opinion below): all of whom seem in some way to supply or leave a buskin to the adversaries, under which they may be able to hide; nor do they seem to meet them directly, or to respond to their mind, but rather to decline the fight by playing with ambiguity, content with the petition and assumption of that, which is in question; not to say that they depart in some way from the analogy of the elenctic theology of our men and the laudable ἀκρίβεια of the schools in these, or related problems, and that without any necessity. Which when the more recent Theologians observed, whose genius has been trained and exercised in the Socinian controversies, they thought that it should be interceded seasonably; lest the good cause should receive any detriment: whose opinion and plan we together with more of the most excellent theologians willingly approve. And thus far concerning the occasion and formation of this problem.

4. Concerning the moment and weight of this problem, namely if it is explained dexterously, or less dexterously, there are three opinions, two extreme, the third middle. 1. is of those, who seem to think it necessary that one, in order to exhibit due honor to Christ, defend the affirmative opinion with them. How far they want these their words to be extended I do not know: nevertheless thus far I prefer to think that they from their opinion (how true, how safe it will be, will be seen below) do not want to make an ecclesiastical dogma, not even a scholastic one; and thus to brand all those thinking otherwise with the stigma of unworthy persons. But nevertheless it is to be feared, lest some abuse those and similar phrases of theirs (as it is easy to add something to things invented), who place their protection in their ignorance, and when they have not even most lightly tasted the terms or state of the controversy: indeed they do not even want to learn, yet they determine in a magisterial way. Concerning the stupid and wicked calumnies, namely that the invocation of Christ the mediator is denied, that an error or novelty is agitated, perhaps worse than the Remonstrant-Socinians, etc. there is no need for me to refer here, since such things are worthy not of a response, but of commiseration, nor are they going to find credence in the minds of the pious or erudite. Let us now show that this controversy is problematic, as long as it contains itself within the proper terms, in which it has been proposed. 1. Because it is in the proper or improper acceptation, use or abuse of the syncategorema 'as', as also of the term of formal reason. 2. because it is in the mode and reason of refuting the exception, or argument of the adversaries, namely this, Whoever is adored as mediator, he is not the supreme God; But Christ is adored as mediator; Therefore. Here some deny the major, with the minor conceded; others on the contrary deny the minor. In what way also in other most

grave controversies the Orthodox attack the common adversaries not in one way: as for example, concerning the genuine canon of Scripture and its authentic edition; when it is objected, that certain books have perished from the canon, that the points have been added by the Massoretes in place of [points] corrupted by the copyists. Thus in the question, concerning the interpretation of Scripture and its twin or single sense, concerning the judge of controversies, etc., concerning the invisibility and succession of the church, concerning the vocation of the first reformers, concerning the faith to which all are said to be bound, that Christ died for them. In dissolving those, some concede the major, or at least allow it to pass, with the minor absolutely denied; others except against the major: which dispute more safely and accurately, is not to be said here. 3. because, those who would make an ecclesiastical, or common, or capital controversy here, would apply almost similar knowledge, prudence, equity, charity, as the Roman Catholics who accuse our men of far better and more accurately attacking Arianism, of the heresy of the Autotheanites, and of syncretism with the Arians, and Turks. Concerning which see our notes to the Diatribe of Dr. Gomarus On the Avrede, and the Turco-Papism opposed to the Calvino-Turcism of Reginald. As likewise the Lutherans, because we do not admit τὸ 'as' along with them in the attributes of the person of Christ, or because we refute the Jews, Arians, Eutychians, Nestorians a little more solidly than they; so that we may avoid all the more any appearance of syncretism with heretics, and strip them of their buskins: they do not fear to write an accusation of Judaism, Arianism, Photinianism, Nestorianism against us. Concerning which see the diatribe of Gomarus just cited published with our notes, and the Judaizing Calvin of Hunnius with the Orthodox Calvin of Pareus, and the detection of the foundations of the Calvinist sect with the ancient Arians and Nestorians (also Mohammedans) of Philip Nicolai. 2. The second opinion is, that this subtlety is idle and useless, or an empty λογομαχία: and consequently to be made of no account. But this opinion must be taken with a grain of salt. I confess, that the contradiction of certain of the orthodox; proceeding from mere and simple ignorance, apart from a view of the Socinian and Remonstrant κυβεία, can be called an empty and unskilled λογομαχία, which may pass. But the σοφίσματα τῆς ἀπιστίας of the Remonstrants and Socinians, make that limitation 'as mediator', the cover and vehicle of a most real controversy. Therefore those to whom those secrets have been detected and perceived, are bound to the ἀκρίβειαν of truth, and here to strive for soundness and evidence: which if they neglect, or if they obstinately hinder others, whose opinion is better, doing this; certainly it will not be on their part, a pure λογομαχία: as will soon be seen. Compare the distinction of our men between those, who were in the communion of the Roman Church before the detection of Antichrist (after the manner of those, concerning whom 1 Samuel 15:11), and those, who today after the detection, remain there. 3. The third and middle opinion is, which we follow: that this controversy is indeed less principal and problematic; yet of some moment, as now is its state, after the detected snares of the Remonstrants and Socinians, and hiding places sought, in that distinction, concerning the worship of Christ, as mediator. The reasons are these: 1. Reason: Because, when in dogmatic theology it is dangerous to say true things about God, about the trinity, about the person of Christ; most accurately attention must be paid to phrases, syncategoremata, limitations. 2. Reason: Because, in elenctic theology, where strong and crafty adversaries exercise us with buskins, evasions, equivocations, badly fabricated distinctions, caution and accurate distinction is especially needed: specifically the use of the syncategorema 'as', must be attended to both in this and in very many other most serious controversies. For

example, whether living or efficacious faith through works, or as efficacious, justifies; is not a logical or grammatical controversy (as the Remonstrants want, Apology ch. 11, fol. 113, with which compare the notes of Grotius to Cassander and his reply to Rivetus), but in Theology the greatest as Isaac Junius learnedly shows in the Antapology pp. 237-239, whom see. Thus in the question concerning the object of predestination what it is and of what sort, namely a sinner: but whether as sinner? Likewise in the question concerning the formal object of faith, and its ultimate analysis, and concerning the authority and credibility of Scripture: where the whole determination of the contradicting parties is made through the particle 'as', and through the term of formal reason. See the Scholastics on ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, and from our men Baronius On the object of faith against the Jesuit Turnbull; and Rivetus in the disputation On the Object of faith, and in the Isagoge on Scripture. Also in the controversy concerning αὐτόθεος, as we have shown in the notes to the diatribe of Gomarus. Compare, I ask, Zanchius on this same question, Epistles bk. 1, ep. 9, p. 58, where after an accurate explication of the distinction both through 'as' and 'insofar as', he thus concludes: You see, brother, how much it matters to know how to distinguish all things. Similarly in that Socinian question; Whether Christ raised from the dead, and because raised from the dead, must be said and believed to be the Son of God. Aff. Whether also, as raised from the dead, that is, whether the resurrection is the foundation of sonship. Neg. In the question concerning the miracles of Christ the mediator, and concerning their principle: concerning which we have advised in the Disputation On Miracles, part 2. In the question concerning the Object of religion or religious worship; concerning which see Rivetus in the decalogue, Amesius in cases. And we advise concerning the same, and apply the use of τὸ 'as' to the present question, Disputation On superstition, appendix 2, arg. 4. In the question concerning the adoration of the man Christ, indeed also incarnate God, τὸ 'that' it is, is conceded concerning the material object, and the object of consideration, and concerning 'as' taken specificatively, but τὸ 'as' (namely reduplicative and properly taken) and concerning the formal object is denied. In the question concerning the right of God a distinction is adduced through τὸ 'as Lord', and 'as judge'. See Grotius On satisfaction p. 42-43, 8vo edition, and Joh. Junius in the refutation of the lectures of Socinus ch. 16, pp. 563-564. Thus Suarez On laws bk. 2, ch. 6, through the distinction of God as legislator, and as Lord, explains the right of dispensing in the natural law. Finally, to make an end, in that vexed controversy concerning the Right of the Magistrate circa sacra, τὸ 'as' neglected, or not well applied, begets all difficulty. Cf. our disputation On Ecclesiastical Power. 3. Reason: Because, either part does not defend the cause of God against the Socinians happily enough, nor refute them strongly enough; and consequently in a certain way confirms their hands although unwitting.

But it is of some moment, to render so great a cause suspected to the adversaries, and to disturb the legitimate defense of it in some way. But this must be applied to the affirmative part, I prove by these reasons: of which, the First [is] because they pervert the terms of the arts used in all schools, and accustomed to be applied to theological explications and disputations. Which we will not prove laboriously here; but we appeal to the philosophers and philosophical or scholastic Theologians, of whatever parties in religion. But such abuse, or distortion of terms could be objected to the Socinian and Remonstrant adversaries, as a sign of a desperate cause. Second, because when the terms must be taken not only in that notion, in which we take them, but also the Socinian and Remonstrant adversaries themselves take [them] in the same

usual and commonly received notion: our men seem to play and prevaricate with the fallacy of homonymy and ignorance of elenchus, and not to meet the adversaries directly (as truth always desires: Tertullian being witness) but to decline the fight and by responding to respond nothing, for they would be speaking about garlic, and these would understand about onions. But now it is clear that the adversaries, in these and their other distinctions, do not take the particle 'as', loosely, improperly, catachrestically or specificatively (as some of our men); but strictly, properly, and reduplicatively, e.g. from the Socinian Crellius, On the One God part [of book 1,] section 2, ch. 1, where for the sake of distinction he thus speaks: the Son as Son, as God, the person as person. In the same place section 1, §101. And Schlichtingius against Meisner p. 375, etc. And thus the Remonstrants in the Vindications p. 37, and the places cited above from the Apology, and the Response to the excerpts, etc. And Episcopius in the defense of the Remonstrant catechism against Heidanus to question 58, where he explains and proves ex professo the adoration of Christ as mediator. We appeal to the very champions of Socinianism themselves, who are tinged with some knowledge of philosophy, and are accustomed to use the method of the schools. Third, because they do not speak strictly, safely, and cautiously enough, with respect to the adversaries; but leave or suggest to them a buskin by which they may cover their heterodoxy. Fourth, because they open the way and lay a bridge, if not for themselves, at least for other more unskilled and weaker persons to slip further τῆς ἀμετρίας τῆς ἀπωλείας here into various absurdities, or at least dangerously, or impeditely and confusedly said things (of which we exhibit a specimen below): besides in other most grave controversies (which we have just now recensed) to strike similarly by a perverse use, or confusion and ignorance of the terms 'as', and formal reason, and to mix all things upside down. Fifth, because consequently they disturb the just and accurate defense of the good cause and prejudge its defenders against the new and Remonstrant-Socinians, and place a hindrance to their alacrity, by their contradiction often enough sharp and censorious, But who those defenders are, we have said thesis 1. And thus far we think it has been sufficiently proved from the judgment of our erudite preceptor Dr. Gomarus (which see thesis 1) that there is some moment of this controversy: and therefore it is not to be had for nothing, especially among the erudite and scholastics. Which nevertheless I want to be so taken that I subjectively or in the subjects distinguish the grades of this hallucination, for some imbibe and admit this opinion more deeply than others, indeed also extensively it could diffuse itself more broadly in some through assumed several hypotheses, and consectaries. To conclude; 1. If any only loosely use the particle 'as' or 'that', and without doubt understand nothing else, than the object of consideration, not the formal and ultimately terminating [object], I judge that they commit an impropriety of speech, and if they contend a logomachy. 2. If any besides make the formal reason by their peculiar conception and abuse denote something else against the will of all philosophers and Theological schools so that they once badly posited may defend [their opinion], I leave them to the judgment of the philosophers (whence the Theologians have borrowed these terms); to whom, if it pleases, let them give a reason, by what right and to what good they forge new acceptations of philosophical terms, indeed confound the well posited and everywhere received terms of the disciplines? [Is it] namely to excite or nourish a new problematic controversy in theology? Either this, or ignorance of the terms must be confessed. 3. If after the detected buskins and snares of the adversaries anyone proceeds to reciprocate this saw sharply, and to add Theological to philosophical

absurdities, he is to be admonished, let him see, lest a small error in the beginning become greater in the end.

5. The occasions and sources of hallucinations both in the explication of this problem, and in the defense of the affirmative part, are: 1. Ignorance, confusion, and abuse of terms, formalities, by which theological matters are accustomed to be expressed dogmatically and elentically in the schools. 2. Mutation of the state of the controversy. 3. Assumption, or fiction of pseudo-philosophemes, that is of false hypotheses in philosophy, by which they support their opinion. 4. Assumption, or formation of theological hypotheses. 5. Formation of new partly dangerous, partly absurd philosophical and theological distinctions. 1. As to the first source, we advise this in general that no one ought to absolve theological disputations acroamatically, and according to the didascalic method through the terms and technologemata of the disciplines, unless he understands them both in exercised act or as to common use, and in signified act, at least be prepared to learn and understand them more deeply, and that by revoking them to their respective disciplines, e.g. logic, physics, Rhetoric, politics, etc. in their proper seats there knowing, or if there is need, by consulting the living Doctors of those arts, according to that of the philosopher: The artificer must be believed in his own art. See, how Daneau, Martyr, Zanchius, Fr. Junius, Fr. Gomarus, Zach. Ursinus, Pareus, Sadeel, Cameron, etc. have disputed felicitously with the Roman Catholics, Socinians, Ubiquitarians. Indeed even Amesius alone, although in this controversy concerning the adoration of Christ as mediator he has hallucinated in our judgment, could teach the accurate use of scholastic terms and formalities, as they know, who have just now inspected his writings. I do not allege the way of disputing and writings of Twisse, Du Moulin, Vedel, Rivet, Maccovius, Wendelin, Spanheim, both because they live; and because above I have adduced some of them for my opinion. From the Lutherans Meisner in Sober Philosophy, Kesler in the refutation of Photinian Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics must not be passed over; add Jacob Martini, Fink, Daniel Cramer, Schram, Schroeder, Horneius, etc. Cf. our disputation On human reason in matters of faith: especially Vedel's Theological Rationale: and in the manuscript Problematic Theology of Dr. Altingius the place On Theology, where the calumny is diluted, concerning Theology subordinated or subjected to Logic. But let us now indicate in species the use and abuse of terms. 1. Philosophers distinguish the material object from the formal. Which must be learned from them; Let the Logical and Metaphysical booklets be consulted, and the explicators of terms, as Armandus de bello visu, Castaneo, Gothutius in the Speculative Gymnasium, Vallonus, Fr. le Roy, Goclenius, etc. Let us apply and show the use in Theology. The material object of adoration is the mediator or Christ the mediator, Christ the man, the priest, the brother or cousin of James, the son of Mary, the son of David, a Jew, etc.: but the formal object is, his divine nature, and consequently as God; not as son of Mary, servant of God, intercessor and advocate, mediator, made flesh, man cousin of James, son of David, etc. 2. They distinguish the object into immediate, first, principal, ultimate, terminating; and into mediate and moving. Seek the explication, as above. Have the Theological application, in this controversy thus: the first and ultimate object of adoration, and terminating it is the deity, or God as God; the mediate object, and moving, is mediation, and the mediator as such, likewise the assumption of human nature, the passions in the same, and all the ἀποτελέσματα of Christ the mediator towards us, indeed all the ἐνέργειαι of Christ the man as such in producing effects of this kind. For hence moving reasons can be sought, and each one

constitutes either objects of consideration, or motives. Thus there are also required conditions; but neither motives, nor conditions, nor objects considered or of consideration, are therefore formal objects, or formal reasons. The use and right application of this distinction, if indeed someone is unwilling to learn from the Philosophers; therefore let him learn from the Theologians, in the disputations On the Object and analysis of faith, and On the authority of Scripture, On the object of religion. From the Roman Catholics there are the Scholastics on ST IIa-IIae, q. 1, Cajetan, Bañez, Vasquez, Malderus, etc. and Becanus in Scholastic Theology vol. 2, treatise 1, ch. 1, Franciscus Albertinus in Theological corollaries which are deduced from complex Philosophical principles vol. 1, in 4to, Corollary from the 4th principle, q. 4. From our men there are Rivetus on the 1st precept of the decalogue, and in the Isagoge to Scripture ch. 3, §15, etc. Especially Baronius Professor of Theology (when he was living) of Aberdeen in Scotland, in the treatise On the Object of faith against the Jesuit Turnbull. Compare also the controversies On the worship of saints, of images; also On the object of predestination, of justification. 3. The term, other acceptations being omitted, is here taken for the term of the occupying subject, that is for the object or thing to which something is borne; thus the colored is the term of vision, because the power or act of seeing is borne to the colored. But it is distinguished into the term which or total, and into the term by which, or formal. Again it is reciprocable or convertible, and not convertible. Which distinctions we thus apply. The term which, of adoration is the mediator, or the person of the mediator, the term by which, or formal, is the deity of the mediator. Again, the term not convertible with adoration is the mediator, the term convertible with the same is the deity, but God in himself as God. 4. The ultimate or ultimated, is said, beyond which nothing is required, or sought, and ultimately terminating is said what per se and immediately terminates. Thus those phrases occur among Philosophers and Theologians; the ultimate concept, the ultimate resolution of the Theological discourse, which is made into the authority of the divine word, or into the first truth revealing. In this our controversy, to the question: why is the mediator adored, the ultimate response is not, nor the ultimate term, because he is mediator; but because he is consubstantial God with the Father: for this ultimately terminates both our adoration, and the question concerning the adequate foundation and reason of adoration. See our diatribe On the adoration of the Mediator thesis 7. If anyone cannot approve this truth yet cannot deny it, he ought not by petition of the principle and ἐκτὸς λόγου form another question, and by it decline the blow of our objection: for this is not to respond directly, and in terms to the adversary. If I ask, they say, why I adore Jesus: I will respond, because he is the eternal Son of God with the Father God. But if I ask, why I venerate and worship him as mediator: I will respond, because he is that only-begotten Son of God the Father, who has reconciled the Father to me, who has redeemed me from sin and death, who has gifted me with righteousness and holiness, etc. This is the true and only response to that question, and therefore also the ultimate term. Resp. But that this declination (not solution, which we see none) of our argument, can consist of many modes of striking, will be able to be clear from these: 1. either it is one question, or two diverse [questions]. If the former: why is it responded diversely, and distinctly. But if the latter why are two diverse [questions] made, when I in my argument had proposed one, and how then is my question, which my argument contained, responded to? or how does it become a contradiction and elenchus? But if it is conceded that my question has been legitimately instituted, and legitimately responded to by me; now my argument stands: if it is not conceded, it ought to have been legitimately

contradicted, and the contradiction proved, and indeed without petition of the principle. 2. When in the other question it is said, Why I worship Christ as mediator, and through 'that' 'as' is understood, so that the formal reason or formal object or ultimately terminating adoration is designated: now that which is in question is assumed and begged. For it is not legitimately asked why it is; unless the question has preceded whether it is and ὅτι ἔστι that the mediator is to be adored, as mediator. But we dispute concerning this, and we defend the negative part. 3. The distinction of the questions is plainly idle: because the response to the second could equally indeed also ought to be applied to the first. 4. It is absurd to say that the works of Christ the mediator are the ultimate object of adoration further namely and consequently prior to the eternal deity of Christ. For what is ultimate, in which something is ultimately terminated, this is also first and immediate whence it begins, and why the action of the agent tends to that object. But now, to say: that the mediatorial works of Christ are the first and immediate foundation in which adoration is founded, would be too hard in sound Philosophy, and solid Theology, see there the disputations On the formal object and ultimate analysis of faith. 5. Finally also to the second question, which presupposes and begs what is in question, it ought also to be responded, because he is man: for the mediator is God and man, and Jesus is mediator as man and as God; consequently when it is responded, the only-begotten Son of God as mediator is to be adored, because he was humiliated for me, because he freed me from sins, because he died for me, etc. And from that 'because', 'as' is inferred, or is substituted to it as equivalent; I will add, because he is man, and consequently, as he is man: because he is the Son of God who is man and because he is man; and consequently as he is man. Which nevertheless they do not want but reject as absurd, who dispute these things against us.

We defer the Supplement of the diatribe On the Adoration of Christ, to the end of this work: where see.

CONCERNING CREATION.

Resp. Lubertus Sprutius of Utrecht. To the 8th day of September, 1638.

The creation and nature of things is discussed by the Scholastics on Lombard and Thomas; as also by the writers of common places. Among whom from the Roman Catholics I now indicate Viguerius; from our men Hyperius, Polanus, Tilenus, and the Natural Theology of Alsted. Also by the ancient and more recent commentators on Genesis: among whom from the more recent Roman Catholics Pererius will be of especial use, with whom to have accurate textual expositions Mercerus, Ainsworth, Willet, Rivet must be compared; or if someone must use a compendium, the notes of the Dutch Bibles. I see cited by others Vielmius and Martinengus on Genesis: but because I have not seen them, I cannot say, how much they have excelled before others. From the Rabbinic writers on Genesis R. Aben Ezra, a distinguished philosopher, ought to be especially commended here. To which must be joined the physics of R. Aben Tibbon. The particular treatises are, the Hexaemerons of Ambrose, Basil, Giles of Rome; of Rabanus Maurus On the Universe from bk. 6 to 20, of William of Paris On the Universe, the Naturale

Speculum of Vincent of Beauvais, of Bartholomew the Englishman On the Properties of Things, the Cosmopoeia of Eugubinus, of Zanchius On the Works of Creation, the Christian Physics of Dange, of Molina On the Work of the Six Days, the Christian Physics of Conrad Aslacus. Nor to be passed over are the treatises of Greg. of Nyssa On the Workmanship or Account of Man (which is a supplement to the Hexaemeron of Basil), and On the Philosophy Consisting of 8 Books; as also of [John] Damascene bk. 2, On the Orthodox Faith, with the commentaries of Josse Clichtove. The historians and sacred annalists, Tornielli, Salian, James Cappel and others also bring some contribution here, to whom must be joined Daneau in the Antiquities of the First World, and Eugubinus On the Periods of Philosophy bks. 7 and 9. The poem of Saluste du Bartas, whose title is The First Week, will increase the knowledge of various languages, in which it exists, and of divine poetry, also of sacred physics. But if anyone is less exercised in physics, let him read the commentary of Simon Goulart. But indeed these are Theologian authors. See the physical or philosophical apparatus, which ought to serve this part of theology, in our Library. We, at the present time, are about to touch upon only some of the most necessary and more difficult points concerning this matter, so that we may pave the way for the studious to unravel doubts, read the sayings of theologians, and reconcile contradictions. We will discuss: 1. Creation. 2. Creatures in general. 3. The specific works of the six days.

1. To begin from the name, to create in Hebrew and Chaldee "bara", in Greek "ktizein", in Arabic "khalaqa", which the Impostor Muhammad uses everywhere in the Koran, the same the Paraphrasts of the Pentateuch, Psalter, and New Testament express the Hebrew "bara" and Greek "ktizein". Synonyms are "yatzar" (Gr. "plassein"), "asah". But three things are to be observed here by philologists: 1. That the word is used in the sacred [writings] of God alone and denotes either to produce something from nothing, or to produce something new and excellent from something: "ktizein" is also [used] of men in Heb. 9:11 compared with 8:2, add the Greek translation of Lev. 16:16. 2. That the same [word] sometimes synecdochically denotes the origin of a thing, and its synonym "asah" the perfection of a made thing, as in Isa. 43:7, where R. D. Kimchi explains the former: "barati", i.e. I produced them from nothing to being: but the latter "yatzarti", i.e. the ordination or adaptation of its particular or special [parts]. In pihel by antiphrasis, to cut off, to purge, Josh. 17:15, Ezek. 23:47. 3. That the Greek word "ktizein" and the Hebrew "bara" as also the Latin "creo" and "procreo" synecdochically sometimes denote the same as "gigno", "genero": on which depends the determination of the problem concerning the Greek of the Seventy, Prov. 8:22 and Sirach 24:10, where "ektise" is used of the wisdom of God. Lest we fill the page, and snatch from the hands of students the most useful writings of others, we refer them to Sixtus Amama, Antibarbarus biblicus, bk. 3, p. 901. The notes of Drusius on Sirach ch. 1, v. 8 can be compared. And Cornelius à Lapide, commentary on Prov. 8:22, p. 178. 4. That the word "bara" (as also not the Greek "ktizein" or the Latin "creo") does not always of its own force and per se denote the production of a thing from nothing, but only per accidens from the subjected matter and circumstances it must be so taken in most places of Scripture. The contrary was formerly believed by some (among whom also the Hebrew interpreters, Aben Ezra being witness on Gen. 1:1). There are those who ascribe this opinion also to Kimchi; among whom Pagninus in [his] Thesaurus; But because the book of Roots of Kimchi (to which Pagninus refers) is not now at hand, I can establish nothing certain here. The place cited by us from the commentary on Isa. 43 will perhaps seem to intimate something of the sort. Lombard

with his Sententiaries so thought. See him bk. 2, dist. 1, and there Scotus, William, etc., and Pelbartus of Themeswar in the Rosary bk. 2, under the word "creation". But this opinion is refuted, first from an induction of places of Scripture, where that word is used of the first origin and effecting of substance from preexistent matter, Gen. 1:21, 26, 27, and of accidents Exod. 34:10, Num. 16:30, Isa. 45:7 and 57:19, Jer. 31:22, indeed also of the repairing and restoration of things, Isa. 65:17, Ps. 51:12. Second from this, that "bara", and "asah" or "facere", "poiein", "poieo" are said synonymously and promiscuously of the same production, Gen. 2:3, 4, Isa. 45:12, Ps. 115:16 and 121:2 compared with Isa. 42:5 and 45:18. Likewise Isa. 17:7 compared with Eccles. 12:1. Third, the consensus of the Greek Septuagint is added, who express "bara" and "asah" promiscuously through "ktizein", Gen. 5:1 compared with Deut. 4:32, and Gen. 1 compared with Ps. 148:4, 5, as also Aben Ezra who in Gen. 1 expressly refutes this opinion. These are his words: "Harabbim min hamefareshim ameru shehaberi'ah hi hotza'ah miyesh el 'ayin, veken ameru Num. 16:30. Vehineh shakehu, vayivra Elohim et hataninim, veshelosh peamim befasuq ehad, vayivra Elohim et ha'adam" - i.e. Many of the interpreters have said that "beríah" (creation) is the bringing forth from being to non-being, and thus they said on Num. 16:30. But behold they have forgotten that [in] Gen. 1:21 "And God created the great sea monsters" and three times in one verse, namely Gen. 1:27 "And God created man", and Isa. 45:7 "I form the light, and create darkness", which is opposed to light, which is something or being.

2. Creation can be distinguished: 1. into first and second: The former is the production of a thing from nothing: and thus were produced the heavens, elements, light; and even now human souls are daily produced insofar as they are a spiritual essence. The latter is the production of an essential or accidental form in a totally unfit, presubjected matter, and that through the immediate operation of divine power: And thus were produced the works of the five days, as also most miraculous works with the order of nature now established. 2. Again creation is either complete, or incomplete. The former is the production of a complete thing from nothing, as of heaven and the elements, angels, on the first day. The latter is the production of an incomplete thing from nothing, as of prime matter, on the first day and of the soul of Adam on the sixth day, and thence of all human souls successively up to the end of the world. 3. It is also usually distinguished by the Scholastics on bk. 2, dist. 1, specifically by Gabriel, creation into active and passive; or into creation action, and creation passion. The former, according to Gabriel, expresses the divine essence and the creature not able to exist unless with the divine essence posited. So that it is nothing other than God himself, with a relation or connotation of the creature producible, to be produced, produced by God. The latter expresses the creature not able to exist without God, and the divine essence; and is really the creature produced by God as it connotes the creating essence. 4. Creation is also distinguished from concreation. Concreation is taken in two ways: 1. universally for any action whatsoever, which is together with creation and immediately follows it, whether such an action is from nothing, or not. And thus the intellect and will of man is said to be concreated with the rational soul, because their natural emanation from the soul is together with its creation, and the material forms of plants, stars, animals on the third, fourth, fifth, sixth day were concreated; although not from nothing, but from a presupposed subject. 2. More properly and strictly for a partial production made from nothing, although it is conjoined with another production, or proximately follows it. Thus time and

place or space, namely of the heavens and elements, as also the quality of light were concreated on the first day, namely from nothing. But that we may most properly understand the nature and definition of creation, these things must be distinctly considered: 1. Its twofold antecedent and presupposition; namely the being creatable or possible to be created; and the decree of creating. 2. The causes of creation. 3. The terminus a quo. 4. The terminus ad quem. 5. The mode and peculiar reason of this action; which will be explained through certain adjuncts. 6. The consequent of creation. 7. Its comparison with the natural production of things through generation; and with the supernatural production both of any things whatsoever through a miracle, and of spiritual things and that ordinary and extraordinary. 8. Opposites or things repugnant.

3. Creation presupposes: 1. Potency, or being possible to be created; for unless there had been a potency by which nothing could have been brought to something, certainly God could not have created: since the simply impossible and involving a contradiction is not objected to the divine power. Cf. Luke 1:37 with 2 Tim 2:13. And this is the first grade either of entity or to entity: for it is not the place of this to determine the philosophical questions concerning being and essence. 2. Being to be created, or being future to be created: which happens through the decree of creating in God; for thus penury passes into τὸ ἐσόμενον, and being in potency is promoted to future existence. Concerning which in the doctrine of the foreknowledge and decree of God. And this is the second grade of entity.

4. The efficient [cause] is God the Father, Son, Holy Spirit; and indeed [God] alone. That God is the creator is clear from the history of creation, and other testimonies of Scripture. Isa. 45:18, 1 Pet. 4:19. Concerning the Son see John 1:4, Col. 1:16, Heb. 1:10 with Ps. 102. Concerning the Holy Spirit Gen. 1:3, Ps. 95 with Heb. 3:7, 9, Job 26:13. That God alone is the creator, and that no other cause whether principal or instrumental is to be admitted here is proved from Isa. 44:24, Job 9:8, Jer. 10:11 and by this work he distinguishes himself from all others, Ps. 96:5, Isa. 37:16 and 40:12, 13, 26, 28 and 45:12, 18 and 48:13. 1. From Rom. 1:20, where is taught the demonstration of natural Theology, by which God is concluded from creation: which conclusion would not proceed, if indeed another was or could be creator. See the vindications of this exposition, and argument drawn from the cited place in the Antagonists of the Socinians. 3. From reason: because to create from nothing exceeds finite and created power. Therefore there is not the power of creating in any creature, nor can it be communicated to it by God. 4. From the absurd consequence. Then there would be nothing of omnipotence in God; by which he would be distinguished from creatures; and a posteriori would conclude: Therefore I alone, and besides me there is no God. 5. The reason of Scotus and the Scotists is added, which they think alone sufficient with others repudiated. We will propose it briefly and perspicuously after Vasquez and Rada interpolated and adapted to exceptions thus: Neither substance nor accident can be the principal cause, or natural instrument of creation; Therefore. Concerning accident it is easily proved, Because as accident cannot be, so it cannot act or have a natural power of acting from no subject or independently from a subject. Concerning substance it is thus proved: It would be either material, or immaterial. Not the former, as Rada deduces; and presupposes as known and conceded. And Vasquez, whose these words are; If, he says, some creature could create it ought to be the most noble of all, because creation is the most perfect transient

action, which can be attributed to some nature. But that a spiritual substance cannot create, the same [Vasquez] thus proves: Because it would create proximately either through its nature, inasmuch as it is; or inasmuch as it understands and wills, or freely by means of intellection and will. Not the former: for then it would create necessarily and always. Not the latter: because intellection and will is an accident, therefore it cannot be the principle of creating substance; Nor even a natural instrument, because this requires some previous disposition, as is clear from induction: but there is no such in creation. 6. The consensus of the fathers favors [this], of Athanasius oration 3 against the Arians, Cyril bk. 2 against Julian, Augustine On the Trinity ch. 8, 9, and 12, City of God ch. 24 and bk. 9, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis ch. 15, Prosper in the book of sentences of Augustine, sentence 146, Damascene bk. 2, On the Faith ch. 3, Basil bk. 4 against Eunomius, and thus of all the ancients and more recent [fathers], who from creation prove the Son and Holy Spirit to be God. And of Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments bk. 1, p. 6, last ch., especially Thomas in ST Ia, q. 45, a. 5, with Cajetan, Bañez, Vasquez, Valencia, there; Ferrariensis on Thomas' Summa contra Gentiles bk. 2, ch. 21, of Giles [of Rome] and Henry [of Ghent] in [their] Quodlibets, likewise of Scotus, Ockham, Gabriel, Bonaventure with almost all the Sententiaries on bk. 2, dist. 1, of Valesius Sacred Philosophy p. 21, of Baranzano in New Opinions in disputation 16. The Theologians and Philosophers of our men commonly accede. Nor to be despised, are what foreign writers philosophize concerning the one God as first principle. Which let the students see in Du Plessis, On the Truth of the Christian Religion chs. 9 and 10. Nevertheless here Durandus dissents, establishing on bk. 2, dist. 1, q. 4, that some creature can be produced by God, to which it belongs to create by native power. Nor is there sufficient agreement among the Scholastics concerning the solid demonstration of this truth. There are those who deny that it can be proved by natural reason, as Varro on bk. 2, dist. 1, q. 6, whom Scotus reports and from him Vasquez, disputation 176, ch. 2. Others repudiate the reason of Thomas' followers taken from the infinite distance between being and non-being, and no proportion of no power to some act, for which an infinite active power is required, with all the other common [reasons] of the Doctors, as Scotus with his own. Which opinion Vasquez embraces, and defends it against the attacks of the more recent [authors] Rada in Theological Controversies, part 2, controversy 2, aa. 1 and 2, Suarez in Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 20, sect. 2. Others deny that it is proved from Scripture, as Vasquez loc. cit. Indeed the Master himself in bk. 4, dist. 5, last [ch.], establishes that a creature can be the instrument of creation voluntarily of course assumed by God, which would operate not by its own power but by borrowed [power]. Which opinion Thomas at one time held on the Master's place cited, and also Suarez sect. 3 and quite a few others in the Pontifical schools defend, Vasquez being witness, disputation 276, ch. 1, and that so that they may defend the obediential potency and elevation (as they call it) of the sacraments to the physical effecting of grace so much the better: as is intimated ibid., ch. 4. Nevertheless Thomas, Richard, Scotus with [their] followers attack it. But there is no agreement at all concerning the reasons, as can be seen in Rada, Vasquez loc. cit. Who in ch. 3 substitutes this reason, Because then the created thing would be referred to that instrument, as effect to its cause, for the most known of all is the real relation of the producer in act to the thing produced. But there can be no such [relation]: because either the effect from itself, from the intrinsic and its nature would be referred to the instrument as depending on it, or by some accidental mutation through the will of God alone. Not the former: for then there would be a native power in the instrument for creating: which is

most absurd. Not the latter: for that mutation would be either in the instrument previous to acting, or would be in the effect and not in the instrument. But the former is absurd: because then there would be a proper power for producing in the instrument, and thus it would constitute a principal cause. The latter is likewise absurd; because then there would be no instrumental power and reason of creating in the instrument. But that this question concerning the absolute power of God, and not only concerning the ordinary law is ventilated and determined by us usefully to the example of the Scholastics is taught both by the common consensus of the fathers and of today's Christianity who from creation demonstrate the deity of the Son and Holy Spirit; and the necessity of the defense of Scripture, which teaches to conclude the one true God from creation, Rom. 1:19-20, and other places just now cited, the patronage of which against Atheists, and infidels is not to be deserted, that what we hold by faith we may also prove by reason, and solve the opposite reasons (compare the disputation on Atheism): and the importunity of the heterodox, of whom some establish that the first created separate substance creates another after itself, and the substance of the orb and its soul; and the substance of the orb creates the matter of inferior bodies, as Avicenna: others, that the World was created by aeons or by angels, as the Simonians, Gnostics or Valentinians, Ophites, Carpocrates, etc. in Tertullian, On Prescription Against Heretics, chs. 47, 48, 49, and Irenaeus, bk. 1, chs. 20, 21, 22, 23, and Epiphanius, Heresies 27 and 31, and Augustine, On Heresies, chs. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 20, 46, 70, 81. Others, that it was founded by Christ as the Father's instrument, as the Arians and Aetians in Epiphanius, Heresy 99, and Augustine, just cited, whose rancid exception Socinus reheats against Wiekus, p. 455. Although however the certainty of the truth proposed by us were not so abundantly and so evidently demonstrated, nor the opposite arguments so clearly dissolved, nevertheless it is not to be deserted or left in the middle, since at least it is better and safer to incline to this part with antiquity and the common school, and thus to concede not even the least to the adversaries of the faith; especially if no stronger and more evident reason compels to embrace the contrary opinion.

5. The impelling causes (if indeed it is permitted to use this term of God), external there are none: of the Ideas we will soon speak. The internal is the divine goodness: but the good is diffusive and communicative of itself, Ps. 145:9, 136:5-9. Compare Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 4, [Gregory] Nazianzen, On the Nativity of Christ, Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, and his teacher Plato in the Timaeus, whose words Cicero expressed in the book On the Universe. The ordering cause is the divine wisdom, and decree, according to the prescript of which he acted: which cause we think is implied in Gen. 1, "And the Lord said"; perhaps also Ps. 33:6, which nevertheless most take of the substantial Word, that is, of the Son of God. The executing cause is power. The exemplary cause are the ideas, what they are we have explained ex professo in the Disputation on the Knowledge of God. We reject here the Platonic ideas or exemplars and forms constituted outside of God, which they want God to have regarded, and by them to have been helped in creating. See Justin, Hortatory Oration to the Greeks, [Gregory] Nazianzen, Theological Orations, Ambrose bk. 1, Hexaemeron ch. 11, Augustine 83 Questions, q. 46, Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy bk. 3, meter 9, elegantly explains the whole matter thus:

O Maker of the earth and sky, who from eternity

Bid'st time to march, and, still at rest, givest motion to the whole;
No causes from without impelled thee thus to mould
This fluid matter, but the form of perfect good
Inherent, free from envy. All things thou dost bring
From thy high archetype. In perfect beauty shining,
Thou in thy mind the perfect world didst bear, and like
To that ideal didst the sensible world create.

Which Thomas in the commentary on this place briefly and perspicuously thus exposes: you bring all things from the supernal exemplar, that is from the perpetual exemplar. You, most beautiful, elongated from all deformity, bearing in mind, i.e. in memory, the full world or beautiful world, namely the archetypal. Forming, i.e. producing the sensible world itself in a similar image, as it was before in your mind. To the efficient and impulsive cause of creation we subjoin the end: which is either supreme, or subordinate. The supreme is the glory of God, Rom. 11:36, 1 Cor. 8:6, Col. 1:16, Prov. 16:4, on which place there is an elegant meditation, among the meditations of Du Plessis, with which can be compared the practical and pious meditation of Alvarez de Paz, bk. 3, part 3, decade 9, contemplation 80, the sum of which you will also find in Cornelius à Lapide, commentary on Prov. 16:4. For the glory of goodness, wisdom, power is made manifest through creation both by God himself, who impressed the marks of that threefold glory on creatures, so that it exists as a mirror for knowing him, Ps. 8:2, 4 and 19:1, 136:5, Isa. 40:26, Acts 14:17, Rom. 1:19-20, and by the rational creature, when it renders due worship to him, Ps. 148:1-14 and 136:1-10 and 146:5-6 and 33:1-9, 95:1-9, Isa. 51:13, Rev. 4:11, 14:7. But how God is and ought to be accurately understood and said to be the supreme end of all things and to have created all things on account of his goodness, see explained by Thomas, ST Ia, q. 44, a. 4 and q. 65, a. 2, where he expressly refutes the opinion of Origen which established that the corporeal creature was created in punishment of the spiritual creature and not from the first intention of God, by which he regards his goodness. Let the students read Thomas himself. I only exhibit here the annotation of the most subtle Cajetan, who perhaps is not at hand to all. Thus he [writes] on q. 44, a. 4: Concerning the aforesaid insofar as they posit that the divine goodness is the end of all things, comprehending also the first agent, note that God can be taken in two ways. In the first way absolutely, and thus he has no end. In the other way as first agent: and then in two ways. In one way as to the thing, which is the action by which he is said to be agent. And thus again he has no end, because the action of God is his substance: and thus it is accustomed to be said, that God acts for an end not of himself, but of others, as was touched on in q. 19, a. 1, ad 1. In the other way formally according to the notion of action, and thus he has his goodness as the end of his action, because every agent, as is said in the text, acts for an end. And it is confirmed, because the end is the cause of causes, that is the causality of the other causes: therefore it is the cause of the causality of the agent: which is to be the cause of his action. If therefore the end, for the sake of which God acts, is his goodness, it will be the cause why God acts. And the text expressly endeavors to teach this in the body, and in the response to the first, by distinguishing concerning the agent for the sake of an end to be attained or communicated, and in the response to the fourth, by teaching that it is not unfitting in God to distinguish according to reason his goodness, as a prior cause from himself as agent. And thus the response is in a certain way ampler than the question. But I said in a

certain way: because the causality of the divine goodness, as end is not extended to more things, than are all creatures: but to some notion in the creator himself, as such, as is clear from what has been said. And on q. 65, a. 2: The divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things: and it is proved thus. The whole universe with its individual parts is ordered to God as to an end: therefore the divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things. The antecedent is declared, by showing and graduating the ends of some whole and its parts, according to a fourfold relation and grade: first of the parts to their works, second of the parts among themselves, third of the parts to the whole, and fourth of the whole to an extrinsic end. And it is proved, because the universe is for imitating and representing the divine goodness, which is to be ordered to his glory: but the consequence is proved from this that the universe is constituted from all creatures, as the whole from parts. And through this the end is the same of the whole and of those, speaking commonly. The subordinate [end], and indeed the first is the utility of the creature, especially the rational [creature], Ps. 115:16, Isa. 45:18, Gen. 1:26, 28, Jude v. 6. That the world was founded for the sake of man even the Gentiles saw. Add Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods bk. 2, and the Stoics in Laertius under Zeno, and Lactantius, On the Anger of God ch. 13, and Lipsius, Stoic Physics bk. 2, diss. 8. The ultimate [subordinate end], the salvation of the elect in heaven, Matt. 25:43, 22:30, Rom. 9:23.

6. The terminus a quo is nothing, which we distinguish: 1. into nothing absolutely and simply in the first creation, where the entire essences of things were produced from no matter: of which sort was the creation of heaven, earth, elements, angels, primeval light, Gen. 1:1, 2, Ps. 24:2, 2 Cor. 4:6. Refer here in its way the creation of the rational soul, which is not educed from the potency of matter. And we think such a creation from nothing is implied in Heb. 11:3, with which Rom. 4:17 can be compared. 2. Nothing according to quid, namely according to form only it is, when a thing is produced not by an innate and efficacious potency of matter, and by a certain succession, but by the force of omnipotence alone of God and indeed in an instant from or in a subject plainly unfit. And by this mediate (as some distinctly call it) or second creation all the species of things were produced, except those which we have just now noted. Furthermore Scotus on bk. 2, dist. 1, Anselm in the Monologion ch. 8, notes that the particle "ex" or "de" conjoined with "nothing" can be taken in various ways. But we need not dwell on enucleating distinctions laboriously, since it is undoubted and most known that in this matter "ex nihilo" intimates nothing other than that a thing is not made from something, as from matter or subject, or in any other way, but after altogether nothing receives being, as Anselm speaks loc. cit. We reject: 1. those who want things either all or intellectual to be produced from the essence of God among whom Plato in the Timaeus, from which error that phrase of Tertullian is not far enough removed in Against Marcion bk. 4, ch. 38, where he says man was expressed in the matter of God. Gennadius notes each of this error, in Ecclesiastical Dogmas ch. 10, Concerning the opinion of those who made the soul a particle of God. We will speak in the Works of the Sixth Day. 2. All materialists, who thought creation was made from preexistent matter. We do not here exclude matter, which gives particular being to a corporeal thing which is either prime or second, concerning which we must treat below: but that which is feigned to have preexisted at the first beginning of creation. But such materialists (as Tertullian calls them, Against Hermogenes) are of two kinds. 1. For some simply establish preexistent matter, as from the Gentiles Pythagoras in Tertullian, Against the Valentinians ch. 15, Plato in Laertius in his life, and Apuleius, On the

Dogmas of Plato, Tertullian loc. cit., Ambrose bk. 1, Hexaemeron ch. 1, the Stoics in Tertullian loc. cit. and bk. 5, Against Marcion ch. 19, and On Prescription ch. 7, Lactantius bk. 6, ch. 3, Homer Odyssey 7 who is thought to have understood such matter through his Eidothea in Sextus Empiricus bk. 8, Against the Mathematicians p. 309. Perhaps also Thales who made water and mind principles, and other philosophers investigating the principles of things: whom see in Aristotle, Physics bk. 1, chs. 3, 5, Plutarch, On the Opinions of Philosophers bk. 1, and the more recent authors Pererius, Physical Disputations bk. 4, Merula, Commentary on Ennius. From the ancient heretics, Hermogenes, Marcion, Manichaeans, Hermians, Seleucians, in Tertullian, Against the Valentinians ch. 16, and Against Hermogenes ch. 1, and On Prescription ch. 33, as also Theodoret, Epiphanius, Philastrius, Augustine On Heresies: to whom they add Sabellius, Baronius to the year 170, and Pamelius annotation on Tertullian, Against Hermogenes (how truly there is now no time to inquire). Of the same opinion were also certain Judaic heretics, of whom R. Manasseh makes mention, Problem 3 On Creation. Leo the Hebrew, dialogue 2 and 3 On Love from the opinion of the ancients (namely the Platonists) establishes matter coeternal with God begotten by God in eternity, from which all things were produced by temporal generation. This eternal matter he calls there chaos. 2. Others feigned chaos, as Hesiod in the Theogony, Orpheus in the Argonautica, Ovid bk. 1, Metamorphoses (where the commentators are to be seen), and others from the ancient philosophers. Augustinus Steuchus endeavors to reconcile this chaos with the darkness and void of Gen. 1:2 in the commentary there and in the books On Perennial Philosophy bk. 7, ch. 10, 11, but more kindly and ingeniously than truly. But if those things are adduced from the Gentiles only to show the vestiges of the ancient truth (from which they defected and which they studiously corrupted), or to convince them to the man (as they say), so that they may cease to insult our articles of faith as absurd, since certain similar (not the same) things occur among foreign writers: certainly such an endeavor is to be approved: and thus are to be taken what the fathers Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, Theodoret, etc. And the more recent writers on the truth of the faith Mutius Pansa, also Daneau in The Most Ancient Antiquities of the First World, Du Plessis, etc. are accustomed to adduce against foreigners, from any foreigners whatsoever, even the most fabulous mythologists, in this article. The same is especially also to be judged concerning the proof of the article on the Trinity, and on the redemption of the human race through a mediator. We could also conjecture otherwise the proximate origin and source of the error concerning chaos; that they conceived the air or space extended from earth to the stars, as a certain great and vast void, to which a similar space continuous with it was there, where now is heaven and earth with the things contained: all which things were produced from that space as from a certain preexistent matter, in the potency of which they were contained. Whatever may be the case with this our conjecture, it is at least clear that air was called chaos by the ancients (as also the renowned Vossius observes this, bk. 2, On Idolatry ch. 25, p. 426), and by the Arabs also now by verbals derived from the same root, air is called both "hava'", and chaos "havvat". From those pools of the fablers Valentinus and Basilides drew the Bythus and Sige, the first συζυγίαν of the Aeons (whence the whole progeny of 30 Aeons, not of deities but of crimes, as Tertullian speaks). Which mythology see compendiously set forth by Daneau on Augustine, On Heresies ch. 11. In some way akin to this figment is the opinion of those who explain the waters, or tohu, or heaven and earth of Gen. 1 as prime matter, concerning which afterwards we must treat ex professo. Nor does the Paracelsian [doctrine] concerning the great mystery, and the

ideal invisible prime matter prepared for the creation of the world in the center of the finite, which the eternal Word of God had placed in the eternal center of his infinite, disagree, as Dorn speaks in the Physics of Genesis expounded according to the Paracelsian Kabbalah. This great mystery, says Paracelsus in the Philosophy to the Athenians, was the mother of all elements, and equally of all stars, trees and fleshly creatures before [their creation]. The same Dorn p. 38: When therefore Moses says that in the beginning God created heaven and earth, and does not add from what matter, he tacitly intimates that it was that first matter of all things excited from the center through the Word. With which teratologies nothing new, but that ancient [doctrine] concerning the Soul of the world, concerning chaos, or concerning the idea is rightly evinced to be concealed by Sennert, On the Consensus of Chemistry with Aristotle and Galen, etc., ch. 7. Those Paracelsian [doctrines] far surpass the dream of David de Dinant, who said that prime matter is God, whom Thomas refutes in ST Ia, q. 3, a. 8, and Summa Contra Gentiles bk. 1, ch. 17. With which almost agrees the neology of Pliny, Natural History bk. 1, ch. 1, where he confounds God with the world: The world, he says, and this which by another name they have willed to be called heaven, etc. it is proper to believe [that it] is a deity eternal, immense, neither generated, etc. It is sacred, eternal, immense, all in all, nay indeed itself the all, etc. and the work of the nature of things, and the nature of things itself. Phrenetic deliriums are what Muhammad has: God created, he says, Adam from clay, but the clay was from foam, the foam from storms, the storm from the sea, the sea from darkness, darkness from light, light from the word, the word from thought, thought from jacinth, jacinth from the precept. Again the first heaven was created from green water, the second from clear water, the third from emerald, etc. Likewise concerning the devils created from fire, of which we made mention in the Disputation On Demons. See these and similar things of that ilk exploded by Ludovicus Vives bk. 4, On the Truth of the Faith, ch. On the Nature of Things, and Dionysius the Carthusian Against the Koran bk. 3, aa. 7, 8, 9, etc. Similar are the portents of R. Eliezer, which Maimonides reports and refutes in The Guide of the Perplexed part 2, ch. 26: In the well-known and most celebrated Apophthegms of the great Rabbi Eliezer I saw certain things so alien and wondrous, that I do not remember to have seen the like in any of those, who follow our Law. For he writes there in this sense: From what place (whence) were the Heavens created? He took from the light of his garment, and extended as a garment, and they were expanded and proceeding, as it is said: Who covers himself with light as with a garment, who stretches out the Heaven like a curtain. From what place was the Earth created? He took from the Snow, which is under the throne of Glory, and scattered over the Waters, and they were congealed, and made the dust of the Earth, as it is said: Who says to the Snow, be Earth. These are his words. Driven by the same spirit of fury that recent enthusiast and dreamer Jacob Boehme in the German treatise whose title is Explanation of Six Points etc., sections 10, 11, says: That God from eternity is alone all things: that his essence divides itself into three differences: of which one becomes the fiery world: the second the dark world: the third the bright or luminous world; and it is only one essence mutually in itself, yet so that one is not the other. That these three differences are equally eternal and immense; included in no place or time, etc. These same in the first apology against Balthasar Tylcken sect. 51, he makes three principles. But the furies of this fanatic idiot the most learned man David Gilbert of Utrecht, in the same speech in which his books were published at Amsterdam, has abundantly detected. Furthermore Tertullian refutes the heretical materialists ex professo in Against Hermogenes, Athanasius On the Incarnation of the Word, Eusebius

Preparation bk. 7, ch. 8, [Gregory of] Nyssa Against Eunomius ch. 24, Lactantius bk. 2, ch. 9, Epiphanius, Alphonsus de Castro, Prateolus, Sebastian Medices On Heresies, finally the Scholastics with Thomas Summa Contra Gentiles bk. 2, ch. 16.

7. The terminus ad quem or effect of creation is the creature, concerning which we must treat below more fully. Now it will suffice here to have indicated for the explication of the action of creating: 1. That from nothing it is terminated to something or being. 2. And indeed properly to substance, for accidents, modes, and similar things are not so much said to be created, as concreated with the substances, in which they have their being. Substance is therefore the fundamental term of creation, created per se, just as also it subsists per se. Hence Thomas ST Ia, q. 45, a. 1, ad 2, says: the terminus ad quem of creation is the whole substance of the thing. 3. To entity, which is good: Gen. 1:31, 1 Tim. 4:4. But that goodness is both by reason of quality, and by reason of relation to the convenience of things among themselves. Hence results the perfection and beauty of each creature. Aptly Basil, Hexaemeron homily 1: ἐποίησεν ὡς ἀγαθὸς τὸ χρήσιμον, ὡς σοφὸς τὸ κάλλιστον, ὡς δυνατὸς τὸ μέγιστον - He made as good the useful, as wise the most beautiful, as powerful the greatest. Question: Could he not have made more, and each in its kind better than he made? To the former we respond, that he could, and even now can through absolute power from Matt. 3 and 26. To the latter we distinguish: 1. God simply can make another thing better than anything made by him. 2. But he cannot make some thing better than it is, namely with a substantial goodness which is the essence of the thing, just as he cannot make the quaternary greater, for then it would not be the quaternary: but he can make each thing better with an accidental goodness. 3. He could not have made anything better (adverbially namely as it expresses the mode on the part of the maker not on the part of the thing made) because he cannot make from greater wisdom and goodness. See Thomas with his own ST Ia, q. 25, aa. 5 and 6. 4. Creation is not therefore terminated directly to the freaks of nature, to monsters, etc., for a direct or positive action of God is not required for them, which immediately and formally effects them and constitutes them in the species of things, but it suffices that in the beginning such things were made by him, to which defects could follow, or happen to them. We reject: 1. The Manichaeans, who thought that certain natures were evil, as a certain fire, smoke, wind, water: whence they said they were created not by the good but by the evil God. See Augustine, Heresy 46, and the book On the Nature of Good. And compare the common Metaphysicians, On Evil; and Thomas in the Disputed Questions, On Evil, q. 1, a. 1, and Du Plessis On the Truth of Religion, and from him Eilhardus Lubinus' Phosphorus. It must be held that no evil was created from the beginning, neither of fault, nor of punishment, nor even purely natural, of which sort are natural defects and monsters; namely in act, although the roots and materials, and dispositions and order were created, whence such things could arise with things having been posited that must be posited, and certain things also would necessarily arise, as for example the eclipse of the sun and moon. But whatever evils afterwards arose, on account of them another principle, or evil God is not to be posited: because evil has no nature; and because consequently it does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient [cause]. 2. Those who said that the female is a monster and ἁμάρτημα of nature: against the history and law of creation Gen. 1:26, 27 and 5:2, to pass over other arguments now, concerning which elsewhere. 3. The vertigoes of the Roman Catholics, who previously said that transubstantiation is creation, and the words of consecration creating words; when nevertheless it is not a production of the

terminus ad quem: which reason from the more recent [authors] Vasquez now urges disputation 176, ch. 6, and thence infers, that it is not creation nor production, but a certain order of one thing passing into another. But if anyone asks where [or] when the Roman Catholics have thus deliriated, let him go to the Star of the Clergy, where the priest of the Mass is said to be the creator of his creator; and Gabriel Biel's lectures on the canon of the Mass, lecture 38, where he makes five words, creating words.

8. The mode of creation is explained by us with these adjuncts. 1. That it is taken either actively or passively: In the former way taken it is a true action, through which God confers being to created things, and of which the immediate principle is the volition of God. 2. That actively taken it is not a true mutation, because through it God is not changed, but only acquires a new relation of creator to the created thing; which relation since it is not real in God, does not effect a real mutation. That it is not properly a mutation or motion, see disputed by Thomas in the Disputed Questions On Creation a. 2, compared with ST Ia, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2. 3. It is not formally the divine volition, nor the relation of creator to creature; But it is God himself creating, denominated by way of principle from himself and active outside himself. See Thomas with his own ST Ia, q. 45, aa. 2 and 3. But creation passively taken is something in the created thing, not really as having its own entity, but distinguished from it ex natura rei as its mode. See Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations disp. 20, sect. 5, and Thomas in the Disputed Questions On Creation a. 3. On this distinction of creation into active and passive depends the determination of the problem: 1. Whether creation is a created thing, or indeed uncreated? Which the Scholastics move on bk. 2, dist. 1. Resp. the same: if it is taken actively, it is not a created thing: for it is the same, as to create, and consequently, the same as creator or creating God. For it denotes the divine operation, which is not other, insofar as it is in God, than the divine essence or substance with a certain relation to the created. But if it is taken passively, it is a created thing: because it is a certain accident in the creature; namely a habitude of having being from another following the divine operation: and thus it is in the created thing itself, which is educed through creation, as in a subject; and it follows the divine action, or active creation, just as the filiation of Alexander insofar as he receives human nature from his father Philip in Alexander, is not prior to Alexander, but posterior, and follows the action of generation. Problem 2 and an appendix of the preceding is, in what the relation is founded, by which the creature is referred to the creator. Resp. That relation is really founded in the creature: But in God it is not founded really, but according to reason; because God is immutable, and unsusceptible of any accident, therefore there cannot be in him any relation really advening from temporal creation. Concerning this and other related problems, the Scholastics are to be seen on the cited place of Lombard and on Thomas ST Ia, q. 45, a. 3. 4. It is a single, most simple and undivided action by reason of its principle: so that in this respect it admits no species, grades, no order of prior and posterior, or succession: whatever of these is predicated of it, happens through an external and improper denomination taken from the term and effects. But this unity is not repugnant to the mode and order of acting, that the Father is said to act from himself, the Son from the Father, the Holy Spirit from both: nevertheless the action of creation remains one in number, one creature, one God creator, John 5:17, 18, 19 with 10:36, 33, 37, according to that common saying: The external works of the Trinity are undivided. Problem 1: How properly, and by what use of terms that distinction in the works of Basil bk. On the Holy Spirit ch. 16 is applied: πρακτικὴ αἰτία τῶν

γενομένων ὁ πατήρ, δημιουργικὴ ὁ υἱός, τελειωτικὴ τὸ πνεῦμα - the active cause of things made is the Father, the demiurgic the Son, the perfective the Spirit. Let a Disputation be permitted. 2. Whether creation of the trinity of persons can be gathered and ought, by the Kabbalah, which they call gematria, from the word and the three first letters of the word "בָּרָא" (he created)? Neg. Concerning the absurdity of the superstition or rather ἀσοφία of the Kabbalistic art in general, perhaps we must treat elsewhere. 3. Whether the creator trinity can be gathered from the plural word "אֱלֹהִים" (God) constructed with the singular verb in the third person and the plural in the first person, the pronouns of each number being added, Gen. 1:26, 27 with 3:22? Resp. We with certain distinguished Theologians and Antagonists of the Jews and Photinians think that this argument is not about nothing: although from the plural "Elohim" alone with Lombard and others we do not want the argument to be drawn out, and they rightly here are thought to be deserted by Calvin, Gomarus, etc. For they know, who have tasted the Hebrew language, that the names of the Lord are accustomed to be used in the plural number, even when speech is about one.

9. It is an action ad extra, and consequently free and thus agrees with the decree; besides external or emanative and thus is distinguished from the decree. God could therefore have founded the world earlier or later, he could also have founded others, he could also have not founded at all, because he was not obligated, nor did he need the world, nor can his power be limited. We reject: 1. The error of Aristotle bk. 1, On the Heavens ch. 9, where about to prove that there cannot be several worlds, among other things he brings forward this reason, that this e.g. heaven occupied all matter, and thus the defect of matter is the cause: εἰ μέντοι τοῦτ᾽ εἴη ἄλλῳ, οὔτ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο γενέσθαι πλείους διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ὕλην περιειληφέναι τοῦτον - But if this [world] should be for another, it would neither be nor could there be several generated on account of this having comprehended all matter. Which error see castigated by his more recent interpreters, the Conimbricenses and others. 2. Another of the same, and indeed most foul, by which he establishes, that God acts from the necessity of nature, so that thence he may conclude that the world is eternal, and that there cannot be several; which error Plutarch also attributes to Homer in the book On Homer: Thomas Waldensis in the Doctrinale ch. 10, and from him Lorinus in the commentary on Wisdom ch. 11, to Abelard and Wycliffe; but there is no place to speak about this here. Furthermore this error is refuted by Plutarch loc. cit., Justin Martyr Against Aristotle, Ambrose bk. 2, Hexaemeron ch. 2, Basil homily 2 on the Hexaemeron, Thomas ST Ia, q. 19, a. 4 and Summa Contra Gentiles bk. 2, ch. 23. 3. Finally we reject vain and curious questions, why God did not create earlier, why in such number, such figure, such form and qualities, etc., since beyond his free will no cause and reason must be sought, Eph. 1:11, Ps. 115:3, Rom. 11:33-35. 6. That it is an immediate action; that is, that God used no second causes, Isa. 40:13, which otherwise he ordinarily does after the order of nature was established: so that in another reason he is said now to produce creatures. 7. That it is a universal action, which attains to the whole world, no part excepted, Exod. 20:11, Neh. 9:6, Ps. 146:6, Acts 4:24, 14:15, Col. 1:16, and thus it is distinguished from particular actions of God. 8. That it is an action then absolute and complete, by reason namely of species. For another action of God undertook nature now constituted through creation, namely the ordinate production of things, concerning which below.

Problem: Whether the opinion concerning some species, or individual of a species created anew and extraordinarily, e.g. the Star of the Magi, or the φαινόμενον in the constellation Cassiopeia in the year 1572, prejudices the consummated creation of all things. Resp. Neg. Nor can those physical or astronomical authors, who [wrote about] that φαινόμενον of the year 1572 (whom see cited in Keckermann in the Physical Disputations, the disceptation on comets), be urged more by this argument leading to absurdity, than by any miraculous effects produced above and beyond the laws of nature. See below part 2, the penultimate thesis. 9. That it is an action not successive but instantaneous; for creation is not motion, as Thomas rightly proves, Summa Contra Gentiles bk. 2, chs. 17 and 19. Therefore God created each thing, if we consider them separately and in themselves, in an instant: although the creation of some succeeded to others in the span of six days, if we consider them collectively. But why God did not create all things at once, no reason besides his will can be adduced. For the twofold διασκοπία which is usually adduced from Ambrose, Hexaemeron bk. 1, ch. 7, and Augustine on Genesis seems to me indeed, to speak truly, insufficiently solid: namely so that hence it might more openly be established that the world was founded not from eternity but in time; and that men might so much the more distinctly and attentively meditate on the individual works of God. As if namely we would less meditatively and attentively [consider] the soul of man, or the animation of the fetus, or the sun, or the hypostatic union of Christ, because God effected those works in a moment. But that reason which Augustine adduces for the time of six days in bk. 4, On the Trinity, and bk. 4, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis ch. 1, namely that the number six is the first perfect [number]; is plainly atheological, and savors of Kabbalistic superstitions: Petrus Bongus On the Mysteries of Numbers in the number six p. 268, thus urges this, that he does not fear to write: For the number six is said to be sacred, and perfect not only because in this number of days all the species of things were founded, as William Hamerus had thought, following Pope Gregory the Great bk. 35, ch. 20, Moralia, but also for that reason God perfected his works in six days, because six is perfect, and sacrosanct. Therefore even if those things were not, it would be perfect; but unless it itself were perfect, those things would not become perfect according to it: In the same chapter he adduces for this μυσταγωγία Kabbalah Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius, who in the books of Evangelical Preparation cites Clement. But it can be said that they argued more to the man, than from the truth of the thing and their own sense. For thus Clement bk. 5, Stromata p. 432: The βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία indeed knows one world, which is perceived by the intellect, but another sensible, etc. καὶ τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, and that indeed archetypal it attributes to the monad as that which is perceived by the intellect: but this sensible [world], to the number six. For among the Pythagoreans marriage is called the number six, as that which is the generative number.

We reject: 1. the opinion of those, who establish that the entire world was founded in an instant, or at once, and afterwards the individual [parts] were successively separated from each other. Maimonides in The Guide of the Perplexed part 2, ch. 30. Of the same opinion are Philo bk. 1, Allegories, Cajetan on Gen. 1, Melchior Cano in Bañez on ST Ia, q. 74, a. 2, Augustine bk. 11, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis ch. 22. We reject: 2. those, who Kabbalistically deduce the duration of the world and other mysteries from the six days of the creation of the world. Of which sort were not only Jews, but also some from the Christians: Concerning which perhaps we must speak elsewhere in the chapter On the End of the World or On the Signs of the Times. 10. It is a

temporal action: for in time, or if you prefer with time, that is in the first moment of time and instant of the world the nature of things began, which we think is implied by that phrase "in the beginning": Which does not signify Christ; as Steuchus, and the ancients, in Jerome, Hebrew Questions on Genesis; nor wisdom, as the Targum of Jerusalem has, i.e. in wisdom; nor the principiated, as Procopius and Tertullian; nor in the head or summarily, as Aquila; nor the principal and more excellent things, as Ambrose, Procopius, Bede. Here three questions are agitated. Whether the world is eternal? Whether it can be demonstrated by natural reason to have been created in time? Whether the World or any creature can be eternal? To the first Resp. Neg. from the history of creation Gen. 1; from the chronological series; and the authority of faith Heb. 11:3, Prov. 8:22-24, John 17:5, Matt. 25 with Eph. 1:4. Affirming the contrary are Ocellus, Aristotle, Proclus, Averroes, Simplicius; whose reasons, to pass over the ancients, have been solved by the more recent authors Eugubinus On Perennial Philosophy bk. 7, Du Plessis On the Truth of Religion ch. 8, and Pererius in the Physical Disputations bk. 15, Zanchius On the Works of Creation bk. 1, ch. 3, and from the Jews Maimonides in The Guide of the Perplexed part 2, chs. 14, 15. To the second Resp. Dist. That the world could have begun can be demonstrated against Aristotle from his own principles, That God is one and eternal, from whom all beings participate their being, That he is an intellectual agent through intellect and will, these two are had in bk. 8, Physics and bk. 12, Metaphysics, texts 29, 42. The third principle is, that he communicates his being to creatures through love, and thus through an act and not a natural or necessary [act], but free. But that the world actually began, or was created in the beginning of time is not so evidently demonstrable, unless it is first held by faith. We would not nevertheless say with the Scholastics on Thomas ST Ia, q. 46, a. 2, that it is in no way demonstrable. See Du Plessis, Eugubinus loc. cit. To the third, the Scholastics affirm, and almost all the more recent Pontifical Theologians and Philosophers, in whom you everywhere hear sounding; Newness of being is not of the notion of creature, Scotus excepted who disputes problematically, and Albert [the Great], Henry of Ghent, Marsilius [of Inghen], [Francisco de] Toledo, who deny [it]. We with them and with Augustine bk. 12, City of God ch. 15, [John] Damascene bk. 1, On the Orthodox Faith ch. 8, Athanasius Oration 2 against the Arians, Basil bk. 2 against Eunomius, Ambrose bk. 1, Hexaemeron ch. 3, will defend the negative. And certainly we wonder that the more recent disputants Pererius, Suárez, Vásquez, Ruvius, etc. did not think of the argument of the fathers also their own and ours for the deity of Christ, drawn from eternity, against today's Photinians. Although however the certainty of the truth proposed by us were not so abundantly and so evidently demonstrated, nor the opposite arguments so clearly dissolved, nevertheless we think there is so much certitude here, that it ought to suffice for moderate minds and indeed for those contending for the faith. Aptly Athanasius expressed the sum of it, Oration 2 against the Arians: Even if it was possible for God, to make works from eternity; nevertheless they, which were made, could not be from eternity. Since they emerged from non-beings, and were not before they were made. But those which were not, before they were made, how could they coexist with the always existing God? Briefly, creation is the production of a thing from non-being to being: it must therefore be conceded [that there is] some instant not only of nature, but also of time, in which it was not produced; whence it follows [that it] was not from eternity. But if these things do not satisfy them, they nevertheless ought to have inclined to our opinion or at least to have been silent, lest they concede something to the Arians; which they do in the question, Whether a creature can create, Gregory of Valentia vol. 1, disp. 3,

q. 3, punto 2, not imprudently admonishes: It must be thought that there underlies some reason of this impossibility, although it does not yet seem sufficiently ascertained.

9. The consequences, concomitants, connected things of creation are: 1. God's acquiescence and delight, Prov. 8:30 with Ps. 104:31. 2. The praise of the angels, when the rest were founded after them, Job 38:7. 3. The right and actual dominion of God over creatures, Ps. 50:12 and 24:1-2 with Isa. 40:12, 15, 22. Here some move the question: Whether by the right of creation he can not only dismiss the rational creature without promises, and annihilate it, but also damn it without sin. But this is inquired into in the chapter on Predestination, as also concerning the Dominion and Right of God. 4. Rest or cessation from creating, Gen. 2:1-2: without labor and fatigue, Isa. 40:28. 5. The ordinate production of things through the continued conservation of individuals, or succession, Gen. 1:22, 28, which is also ascribed to God, on account of conservation and governance. The comparates of creation are: 1. Generation, how much it differs from it, is easily gathered from what has already been said, and the doctrine of physics. See Ruvius on Physics bk. 1, treatise 1, q. 2, and the Scholastics on ST Ia, q. 45, a. 1. 2. Miraculous production; concerning which see the Disputation on Miracles. 3. The supernatural production of spiritual things; and that either extraordinary as of those charismata, of which mention is made in 1 Cor. 12, or ordinary as of faith, hope, charity through the grace of regeneration. Hence in the sacred [writings] the terms, creation, new creature, etc., and these works of recreation can be conveniently explained through analogy from the works of creation; as Zanchius notes specially concerning physical Motion, bk. 1, ch. 6, theses 1-2, concerning wind the Savior himself, John 3, concerning rain Isa. 55, and six hundred things of this kind. That grace and the gifts of grace are not properly created, but men according to it are created and constituted in new being from nothing, Vasquez contends, Metaphysical Disputations, disp. 26, concerning which elsewhere. To creation, or to speak more accurately, to the continuation or conservation of creation is opposed Annihilation; which does not require a positive act, but only the cessation of the divine influx or conserving action: which is gathered from Ps. 104:29. Furthermore, the power of annihilating a creature can be communicated to none. Thus commonly the Scholastics. But during this universe (for concerning the end of the world we must dispute elsewhere) we think that no creature is actually annihilated, because immaterial [creatures] remain as wholes, but material [creatures] as to matter. Forms and accidents are not complete beings but are something of being, because they do not subsist, and consequently annihilation cannot properly be attributed to them. Besides, in the way in which they are, they are not reduced to nothing, but remain in the potency of matter and subject. Concerning these things the Scholastics on Thomas ST Ia, q. 104, aa. 3 and 4, and Scotus on bk. 2, dist. 1, q. 1, 26.

10. The uses of the doctrine concerning the Creation of things. 1. For θεοδιδασκαλίαν, in general through the whole natural Theology: concerning which use see the Commentators on Rom. 1:19, Acts 17, Ps. 19, Raymond of Sabunde, Alsted in Natural Theology, Du Plessis On the Truth of Religion, Bellarmine On the Ascent of the Mind to God through the Ladders of Created Things, etc. 2. For θεοδιδασκαλίαν in species of the places concerning God, concerning the creation of man in the image of God, concerning conservation and providence, concerning Regeneration and the new creature: which borrow light from here. 3. For ἔλεγχον: 1.

of the Arians concerning the Deity of Christ, as we have already said, 2. of Idolaters, Acts 14 and 17, 3. of Magic and divination, Jer. 10:1-2; add transubstantiation, the Ubiquity of the body of Christ, etc. 4. For παιδείαν and excitation, to admiration, love, reverence, and worship of God, Ps. 8, 19, and 104. For according to Hugh of St. Victor the voices of all creatures are three: Receive, render, flee. Receive the benefit, render the duty, flee the punishment. Which uses the authors just now cited amplify: and the common writers of common places indicate; indeed even Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles bk. 2, chs. 2 and 3. Add Daneau bk. 1, Christian Physics, chs. 1, 2, 3, 6, and the commentators on Ps. 8, 19, and 104, Alsted in Natural Theology. 5. Finally for consolation, patience, and hope: For if God created all things for your use, if he had care of you (says Augustine) when you were not, how much more will he have, when you now are.

Consectary 1. Hence we see how usefully, indeed how necessarily the study of physics and metaphysics is conjoined with Theology.

2. Badly by the Jews of old the reading of the history of creation ch. 1 of Genesis was prohibited up to 30 years of age; as if the mystery of creation should be concealed: in Origen on the Song of Songs, Jerome in the helmeted prologue, and preface to Ezekiel, Mercerus in the prologue to Genesis.

CONCERNING CREATION, SECOND PART.

Resp. Lubertus Spruyt of Utrecht. To the 15th day of September, 1638.

The term of creation, the creature namely can be considered in three ways: 1. abstractly, that is in general, and in itself. 2. collectively and coordinately, that is in the unity, universality, and coordination of the World to itself. 3. Distributively, through and according to its species.

1. As to the first mode of considering: The creature is called in Greek κτίσις, κτίσμα, Heb. 4:13, Rom. 1:19, Heb. "beriah", Chald. "beria", Syriac "beria". By which the Rabbis sometimes synecdochically denote men as also in Greek κτίσις, Mark 16:15: which in Matt. 28:19 is πάντα τὰ ἔθνη. How also the Arabs call a people "khalaiq", a creature; both from the root ברא "he created". The Rabbis from Ps. 103:14 use the word "yetzer" creature and creation. Whence they call Genesis the book of creation. And rightly this verbal is formed, because the words themselves are used plainly synonymously of man and animals, Gen. 1:27 and 2:7, of the same Gen. 2:19, which the Targum expounds through "yatzar". In the theological-philosophical schools the finite, created being, by participation, according to the analogy of being, second cause. And synecdochically Being, thing; how in Scripture "davar" thing, is expressed in Greek through κτίσμα, Luke 1:37. Furthermore: From 1 Tim. 2:13, Rom. 9:20 with Isa. 29:16 where the Septuagint translates ὄστρακον by πλάσμα. And Job 40:14 where "heyekh" that is way they explain through πλάσμα, I think [is] the so frequent use of plasma, plasmation, plasmare, plasta, protoplastos, among ecclesiastical writers.

Problem 1. Whether those enunciations are true: Christ is a creature, and, Christ according to that he is man, is a creature. R. Scotus, Bonaventure, Gabriel on bk. 3, dist. 10 and 11 distinguish between those, and this: Christ according to humanity is a creature. This they think should be admitted: those not likewise, unless improperly the 'according to that' is taken, so that it is a diminishing or distracting diction of the predicate: but [they think it] to be false if, properly that is reduplicatively and specifically the 'according to that' is taken: The reason is, because every reduplicative and specificative enunciation is false whose prajacent, which it presupposes, is false. But now the prajacent of it The Son of God is a creature, is false, Therefore. We do not see what of danger there is in enunciations of this kind: For if it is rightly said: God and the Son of God is man, is a creature; likewise, this composite, which is Christ, is created: why should it not be said: Christ is a creature: But the former is true according to the common school, in Becanus, Scholastic Theology, part 3, treatise 1, ch. 6, q. 4, etc., ch. 7, q. 1, Therefore. 2. Whether that inscription of Cornelius à Lapide prefixed to the commentary on the Minor Prophets savors of Scripture or orthodox antiquity: To the uncreated and created Trinity in Christ Jesus. Resp. Neg: And we taxed it, Disputation, Causes of the Papacy bk. 2, treatise 2, ch. 15. But now we find that the same neology is explained and excused far otherwise by the same in the apologetic appendix to the commentary on Sirach afterwards published than I not only, but also very many of the domestic Theologians (as he indicates there) had taken it. Therefore we absolve him from a Sabellian phrase; but not from impropriety of speech, vain speaking and dangerous novelty: because he calls the soul, flesh, blood of Christ a trinity, and dedicates that commentary to it.

2. But created being is, whatever is besides God; and such κυρίως and primarily is substance; secondarily and in its way, accidents, modes and relations. Problem: Whether also privations. Resp. Aff. concerning perfective privations, and natural destructive [privations], but with a distinction: so that not directly, but indirectly; not in themselves, or in act or formally, but occasionaliter and virtually in and with their subjects in the beginning they are said to be produced, because and insofar as the subjects were produced or created fit for such privations, and in those subjects as in principles those privations were contained virtually and by a sort of seminal reason. Its principles must be considered: 1. internal, 2. external. Of it the internal principle is, either essence, or existence. Essence is, by which a created being is that which it is, as for example man through humanity. Existence or individuation (so that we may call that principle), is, by which it is determined to act or singularity, and consequently to place or space, and time. For example, Peter to and through Petreity. No other further internal principle of that determination ought to or can be sought. For nothing actuates itself and determines itself to singularity; whether as to its whole, or as to the component principles or parts: For the union of them, e.g., in a material substance, of this matter, with this form (of Peter, whence this composite in number, Peter), depends on nothing other than an external cause both second, namely generating, and first, namely by the premotion and predetermination of God. Exod. 9:16 with Rom. 9:17, where Beza notes that the word ἐξήγειρά by which Paul expounds the Hebrew העמדתיך Exod. 9:16, must be referred to the first creation of Pharaoh, and that this appears from the word ἔστηκας v. 17, so that v. 17 must be explained, I made that you existed. This therefore is the principle of existence or individuation. And in the works of the six days, heaven, angels, earth, animals, trees, men, stars, are said to be so constituted not only in species, consequently,

and according to intention; but also in the individual first and immediately by God alone. And indeed in those confused disputations concerning the principle of individuation, it ought to have occurred to the Scholastics, what they elsewhere so expeditiously perceived concerning individual actions: The first cause predetermines both to the singularity and to the specification of the act. And all things necessarily depend on the first cause, in being, existing, and operating. See their disputations On the Providence of God, On the concourse of the first [cause] with second [causes], On the agreement of free will and grace. We have cited the names of authors elsewhere. A compendium and index of the Scholastics, and more recent Theologians and philosophers, the booklet of Sylvius the Theologian of Douai On the Motion of the First Mover will supply. With which, if anyone has leisure, let him compare our dissertation On the Term of Life. If therefore accidents and actions which are properly to be called concreated and coproduced and consequently coindividuated, have the first principle of their individuation or singularity external, namely the first efficient cause, and the second or subordinate principle, namely the second sufficient cause: why should the individuation of the subjects themselves and or of substances (or if you prefer of the essence of the subject considered abstractly and precisely, e.g. of Petreity, Bucephaleity, etc.) not be referred to external principles, namely the action of the first and second agent. Most of the poultices of the Scholastics and more recent philosophers which are usually brought together for the determination of this vexed question, either manifestly beg the question; or make an infinite regress. For it is always left to be asked, by what principle that matter, or form, or both, or the union and natural respect of both to each other, is individuated. We rightly evince that the external principle (namely of every created being, which is not in the individual, as Angels, heaven, stars, etc., but is perpetuated through the succession of individuals) is both nature, and art. Nature, is any natural composite acting to the production of something by powers implanted in it in the first creation of things (Gen. 1:22, 28). Concerning which principle the definition of nature in Aristotle must be understood: and that axiom of the same: God and nature do nothing in vain. Art, is a principle, by which an intelligent creature produces something from a habit of intellectual virtue. But understand that each of these principles is dependent and subordinate, namely to the first principle, God: hence it is that sometimes nature is not badly distinguished into nature naturing, namely God, and nature natured. The sacred Scriptures teach this concerning nature, Hos. 2:21-22. Concerning art, Exod. 31:3, 4. But that dependency can be considered in four ways. 1. by reason of order; For God is the first, Isa. 40, and the Son of God is the firstborn of every creature, Col. 1, nor can a second being be before the first, or subordinate it to itself. 2. by reason of essence, because from the first it has that it is a being, and is not nothing; and indeed is this species of being. 3. by reason of conservation and duration or persistence, Ps. 104:29-30, Heb. 1:3. 4. Finally by reason of causing or operation, Acts 17:28. Concerning which more fully the Philosophers and Theologians, On the Providence of God and On concourse [i.e., concurrence].

3. The affections or adjuncts of the creature pertain either more to its essence, or to existence, or to operation. Those we will note below to the chapter On the Universe: But these we relegate partly to the common places On Providence, partly to the Philosophical disputations On the Efficient Cause, On Motion, On generation, etc. We now indicate those chiefly here. But they are: 1. Positive. 2. Negative. 3. Compared. The positive are: 1. Every created being is a being by participation, and in this respect, comparatively to the first and oppositely to it, or without it, it

can be called nothing or as if nothing, vanity, shadow, etc., Ps. 62:10, Eccles. 1:2, Ps. 39:6-7, with which agrees the saying of Nebuchadnezzar, Dan. 4:32. 2. See the commentaries on the cited places. It has a potency of reception, that is a passive potency and consequently is mutable and defectible. This is what some understand through vanity, Eccles. 1:2. For corruption or even corruptibility from within cannot be attributed to all, e.g., to angels, to human souls: but well from without; because God can destroy them by the sole cessation of his influx. 3. It necessarily admits succession, prior and posterior, procession from potency to act, from non-being, to being if not in substance, at least in qualities or operations. 4. Newness of being is essential to it, or of its notion. Concerning which see the preceding disputation. 5. As also assiduous dependence on the first being and containment or inexistence in it. But its being in God is threefold, eminent, ideal, intelligible. In that way it is in his power as in an efficient cause, conserving and governing: in that [ideal way] in the idea as in an exemplary cause: in this [intelligible way] in knowledge as in the knower. The most beautiful himself bearing the beautiful world in mind, etc., Boethius sings. And divinely the apostle, Acts 17, In Him we live, and move, and are: And, τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, as the Apostle [cites] there from Aratus. Against Durandus, and those of whom Augustine makes mention, bk. 5, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis; who denied concourse. 6. It is composite, and has some parts improperly so called, namely nature and suppositum, essence and esse, subject and accident, genus and difference. The reason is, because it has in itself act and potency. 7. It is ordinate and finite; and thus as of finite essence so also of finite potency. But it is finite in two ways, circumscribed by the internal limits of its essence; and by an external efficient and end. 8. Hence it follows: that every created being has an end, which is not itself: as also an efficient; for nothing can be the cause of itself, and from nothing nothing comes to be. And because an infinite regress is not given in causes; hence it is that its being and operating are at length reduced to the first efficient and ultimate end, Prov. 16:4, Rom. 11:36. 9. It can take on the notion not only of caused, but also of cause: so that nothing has participated complete essence, which does not at the same time [have] true activity and power of causing: Gen. 1:11, 22, 28, Hos. 2:21-22, Ps. 19:5-6, Augustine, City of God bk. 7, ch. 30, Thus therefore he so administers all things, which he created, that he also allows them to exercise and act their own proper motions, Against Gabriel on bk. 4, q. 1, a. 1, not. 3 and others who want the first cause alone to operate in the presence of second [causes]. See this foolish and impossible opinion, as Thomas calls it, impugned by him bk. 3, Against the Gentiles ch. 96, and in ST Ia, q. 105, a. 5.

Problem: Whether incomplete beings, have the power of causing: Resp. Some by the causality only of matter as matter. Some also of form, and of emanative efficient, and of end, as commonly all forms. Some by the causality of emanative and transmutative efficient; as immaterial forms, that is, separated souls. See and compare the philosophers and theologians, where they dispute On the Separated Soul. 10. Yet so that on account of the close dependence on the first [cause] and its influx and premotion not only into the effect but also into the cause, all second [causes] in this respect are called its instruments, and God as principal cause is said to operate all things, Isa. 26:12 and 10:15, 1 Cor. 12:6, Ps. 139:13 and 135:6-7 and 147:8, 1 Cor. 3:6, Luke 12:28. 11. It is contingent, in a threefold way, because it needs conformation to another, and the cause by which it comes to be, and the end, because it cannot be terminated by itself. See Fonseca, Metaphysics bk. 4, ch. 2, q. 1 and other Metaphysicians On the

necessary and contingent. 12. It is good with a natural goodness, Gen. 1 with 1 Tim. 4, and the intellectual can be good with a moral goodness, but all goodness is by participation and to a certain measure. Hence it is that God alone is called good, Matt. 19, wise, 1 Tim. 6, absolutely, namely most perfectly, and through essence. The same is the reason of perfection. 13. It has a necessary and natural inclination and tendency to its perfection, and good connatural to it; and thus to the conservation and promotion of its nature and perfection. Hence the rule: Nature always desires and intends the most perfect. But that inclination is threefold, instinct in all things destitute of cognition, which is metaphorically described, Rom. 8:19, 22, appetite in sensitive things, Jer. 8:7, Isa. 1:3, Ps. 147:9, Job 39:3, rational appetite in intelligent things, Eph. 5:29. The two former modes tend to their end materially, and are directed by the first cause as an arrow by an archer to the target, Job 39:17-20, but the last mode formally. 14. As it is a vestige of God and subordinated to him, so also it is apt by nature by way of causality to lead to God everything that can be moved intellectually to God and united to him: hence the twofold use of creatures with respect to man (concerning which the Natural Theologians, and Beza homily 15 on the passion), One to the necessity of animal life, 1 Tim. 4:3, the other to heavenly life, and that in two ways: 1. by a certain common reason, in the general consideration of created things, and this is the book of nature, and its reading, concerning which Raymond of Sabunde, Du Plessis, especially Alsted in Natural Theology, 2. by a special reason: by which God uses some things for the instruction of man and the sealing of his word, as the Rainbow, Gen. 9:12, the miracles of nature, portents, prodigies, concerning which we must speak elsewhere, as also all those things, which God is read to have used in the Scriptures: of which sort are the ass of Balaam, the fleece of Gideon, the fire and rain of Sodom, the water of the flood, the earthquake in the passion and resurrection of Christ, the tree of life, etc., nor are the water of baptism, and the bread and wine of the Eucharist to be passed over.

4. And these indeed are the positive affections: from which the negative spontaneously flow and are easily collected. We note only for the sake of specimen those, of which especially there is use in Theological doctrine. 1. It is not to itself or to another the first efficient and ultimate end. Therefore it is not αὐταρκὲς to itself, nor the highest good to another. The use and application of this theorem is in the disputation On happiness or the highest good. 2. It is not pure act; and consequently not absolutely simple, nor perfectly one. 3. It is not absolutely necessary. 4. Yet neither absolutely and simply contingent, nor can any such be. Hence rightly Naclantus after Cajetan in bk. 4, treatise which is On the origin of contingency: Necessity and contingency are related, as one and many, or as uniform, and multiform, as also Cajetan says, ST Ia, q. 14, a. 13, From which it is inferred, that contingency cannot be without necessity: but on the contrary necessity can be without contingency. Since indeed many cannot be without one, but one can be without multitude. Which also Cajetan did not pass over, ST Ia, q. 41, a. 2, From which it happens that in those things, in which there is contingency, it is necessary to concede some reason of necessity; but not the reverse: which also can easily be manifested by induction. 5. Nor is it absolutely or simply good and perfect. 6. It is not actually infinite, nor can such be given, 1. whether you consider its essence, or 2. its discrete, or continuous quantity, namely mass and extension, space, duration, 3. or quality, namely potencies or habits. 7. Therefore it is not the immediate principle of its operation, or does not act through its substance immediately by the immediacy of power. 8. Nor can it act above the limited proportion of its power: Hence it

follows, that it cannot create, annihilate, do something above universal nature, that is, miracles. 9. No property of God can be communicated to it, namely Immensity, omnipotence, omniscience, etc. Hence it follows, that it cannot be at the same time in several places whether definitively or circumscriptively; nor rest at the same time in the terminus a quo and ad quem. 10. None is in itself, per se, and naturally evil: much less that some highest evil is given: Against the ancient and new Manichaean deliriums. The compared affections are: 1. One created being is more perfect and noble than another: which is understood only of essential perfection, when diverse species are compared among themselves: but not, when individuals of the same species; for then they differ only by accidental perfection. 2. Those which more closely according to analogy approach to God, and thus to more of his attributes not only of the first but also of the second genus, those are more perfect than those which only have essence; and again among them more perfect, which have intellectual life. Which are more simple, which more approach to unity, likewise to the immutable, as the more durable; among which again the incorruptible excel. Besides, which are of less limited potency, etc. 3. The more perfect created being is always the end of the more imperfect, and this is ordered to that. 4. The more universal (namely in causing or conserving) is nobler than the less universal, e.g., the sun than a mouse, or tree, etc. Hence also its good and perfection is promoted prior and rather. To which pertains that saying of the philosopher: The universal good prevails over the particular. Although in another respect a fly or ant is more excellent than the sun, indeed than the whole heaven with all the stars.

5. The repugnant things of created being are: 1. Those neutral [things] which are feigned, or mediate between created and uncreated being, namely God and creatures. Of which sort are, 1. Platonic Ideas (concerning which elsewhere), 2. Those effects which are posited besides angels, and indeed nearer to the first cause: namely of the Kabbalists ספירות that is numbers, or lights: which they pretend to be in the world emanations; and they are ten in number, Crown, knowledge, prudence, magnificence, fortitude, beauty, victory, glory, foundation, kingdom. They are also called dimensions, days of the fabric, light (Archangelus de Burgo Novo being witness, commentary on Kabbalistic dogmas, p. 759). Where on this Kabbalistic dogma, Souls from the third light to the fourth day, thence to the fifth descend: thence going out they enter the night of the body: thus he comments: Souls, he says, first from Chokhmah as to ideal being, second from Binah come forth through creation, then to the fourth day, that is, to Geburah, namely after the being of creation from the Holy Spirit, thence going out from Geburah namely descending, they enter into other Sephiroth, until they find a Sephirah proportioned, and symbolizing with the planet dominating that body of that soul they enter the night of the body. Thus he expounds them concerning the days of Bereshit or the fabric of the world. He adds p. 807 that those which the Kabbalists call the seven lower Sephiroth, and the seven days of the fabric, are the seven separate intellects; which according to the Apocalypse and Tobit are always in the sight of God, and execute inferior things, which the supreme Keter commands. From today's Doctors of the Jews R. Manasseh ben Israel in Problems concerning creation, prob. 27, conjectures that they are the Ideas of Plato, to which all things are reduced, and which are the very perfections of things, as justice, goodness, etc. But not trusting this opinion, he substitutes another from the Damascene Muslims: That they are perfections, or attributes of God superadded to the essence, which are something other than God and yet are not a distinct creature; but only

certain emanations of the essence, conjoined, just as solar rays with the sun, flame with burning coals: or, as Plato says, the last point of a line conjoined with the line. Rittangelius in the commentary on the book Yetzirah p. 2 explains these things far otherwise. Whom see. 3. The nine attributes of God (among which potency) which the Damascene Muslims constitute outside the divine essence; and for that reason they condemned Avicenna of heresy for identifying the attributes with the divine essence; if indeed R. Manasseh reports true, loc. cit. Nor are the Socinians to be passed over, who make the Holy Spirit, whom they make a power of God, to be not God, and admit some accidents, or as it were accidents in God. And Conrad Vorstius in the books On God, concerning which see Eglisemmius, Becanus, Lubbertus, and other Antagonists of Vorstius. 4. That uncreated light, which is the habitation of God: which Eugubinus has devised, to be neither God, nor a creature. Whose commentary the Socinians renew today; nor does Vorstius refuse it. The opinion of Steuchus concerning the eternity of the empyrean heaven expressly repugns against Heb. 11:10, Col. 1:16, and Zanchius refutes it, On the Works of Creation bk. 1, ch. 4, q. 2, Pererius on Gen. 1, as also the space or habitation coeternal with God of Vorstius, Math. Sladus, Scholastic Disceptations part 1, ch. 2, sect. 42, 46, part 2, p. 47. And before him Smiglecius in New Monsters of the Arians, p. 179. 2. Those seven things which the Rabbis dream to be created before the founded world, גן עדן ותורה וצדיקים וישראל וכסא הכבוד וירושלים ומשיח that is, paradise, the law, the righteous, Israel, the throne of glory, Jerusalem, the Messiah. Nothing existed before the founded world. Which R. David Kimchi being compelled by the authority of Scripture when he cannot deny, endeavors to excuse his own [people] that they wanted these seven to be the principal end why God founded the world. 3. Feigned impossibles, as an infinite human body, a creature creatrix, etc. Any actual infinite, creatable by God: which see refuted in Pererius bk. 10, chs. 10, 11. Fictitious beings, not existing or never future, which are said to be, as Intelligences or genii distinct from good angels and devils; which chimeras we noted in the Disputation On Demons: likewise familiar demons, as fauns, incubi, satyrs, penates, and similar, which R. Abraham author of the book Zeror Hamor i.e. bundle of myrrh on the place Gen. 2:3 pretends to be creatures, but imperfect, because God prevented by the evening of the sabbath did not perfect them. Hence they flee the sanctity of the sabbath, seeking mountains and hiding places of darkness, in which they hide up to the end of the sabbath, and then returning they trouble men and endeavor to inflict harm on them. To fictitious beings, and never created are also to be referred purgatory, both limbos, the aqueous or crystalline heaven: besides mountains, woods, regions, briefly another world in the sphere of the moon, which recently someone thinks he observed there by the beneficence of the Dutch tube: Which anonymously the Author satirizes falsely and facetiously in the little book whose title is The Conclave of Ignatius. Finally many chimerical things in the mineral, vegetable, especially animal kingdom, among the fabulous ancients, Pliny and similar writers, which never are, never were: some of which we will indicate on the fifth and sixth day. 5. The horrendous confusion of idolaters, by which God is transformed into a creature, and vice versa, Rom. 1:23, Acts 14:11, 15, and 17:29. See Pliny bk. 1, ch. 1. With whom almost agree those Manichaean [doctrines] concerning light created from the substance of God (in Augustine, On Heresies ch. 46), the Koranic [doctrines] cited above part 1, and others to be cited below Thesis 8.

(Not sure how accurate the following translation is)

6. The detestable things of the recent Enthusiasts who boast that man is deified, so that he himself is God: concerning which we must speak in its place.

7. Finally the profane novelties of the Anabaptists and Schwenckfeld: of whom the former establish that the substance of the Logos, that is, of the immutable God, was changed into a human creature: but the latter that the man Christ was changed into God. And these indeed things concerning Created Being in general it will have sufficed to have delineated for the supplement of metaphysics: where hitherto its synoptic contemplation has almost been passed over; when nevertheless it ought to have found a place there no less than the explication of substance, or accident, or all the species of accident, or first or infinite being.

6. Created being broadly taken can be distinguished into substance and accident; into universal and singular; into corruptible and incorruptible; into permanent and successive; into absolute and respective; into positive and privative; into thing and mode; briefly into the ten genera according to the 10 predicaments. That division in Col. 1:16 into visible and invisible most agreeably fits our purpose. The latter are Angels or intelligences, as also the heaven of the blessed which as they are not seen, so they have no natural and mutual connection and coordination with this sensible world, which indeed can be known by us. For how does the celestial or elemental world depend on the empyrean heaven in being or operating, how in turn is it ordered to that heaven? The former are all things, which we are accustomed to call properly the nature of things, τὸ πᾶν the entire world; above which nature separately we place the Intelligences, Outside of and above which spherical world, we place the seat of the blessed. Concerning this visible world we must now treat here, concerning the intelligible, namely Angels, elsewhere. Concerning the invisible heaven, which they call empyrean, we will inquire some things on the first day: reserving the rest for a peculiar disputation.

CONCERNING THE WORLD.

7. We therefore divide Created Being collectively considered into the visible and corporeal World, and the intelligible world, partly incorporeal, partly corporeal indeed, but invisible. This latter world comprehends the invisible and corporeal containing heaven; the contained invisible and incorporeal angels. The former world is chiefly defined and treated by authors both ancient - Timaeus, Locrus, Ocellus, Lucanus, an Anonymous [author] under the name of Aristotle, whom Apuleius made Latin, and another under the name of Philo the Jew, Cleomedes, Plato in the Timaeus, Cicero On the Universe, and in the fragment of Scipio's Dream, Macrobius on the Dream of Scipio; and also by more recent [authors] - Piccolomineus, and his censor Taurellus, and the common physicists under the title On the World. We indicated some Theologians above in part 1 at the beginning. We, about to taste chiefly theological things or things related to Theology concerning this World according to the reason of the undertaking, will consider: 1. What [it is] in name. 2. What in reality. These names almost occur among sacred and profane writers: κόσμος, τὸ πᾶν that is the universe, τὸ ὅλον (each occurs in Ocellus), nature, the nature of things, the entire machine of things, orb, αἰών, or αἰῶνες, Heb. עולם and חלד, ἡ οἰκουμένη

Heb. 2:5, which in the O.T. and the Targum and the Rabbis גגולם gnolam [means] world, (to which corresponds the Gr. ὅλον in the N.T.), in Arabic it is said عالم from حَكَمَ "he judged, ruled": whence are also derived city, (for the Hebrews, עיר, region, province, Esth. 1:1). The world is also otherwise said זמן "time", "age"; which agrees with the Heb. דור from the root דור "to dwell", so that it agrees with the Greek οἰκουμένη, Heb. תבל. But the Hebrews distinguish the world and age (namely according to the state of change) into present and future, into הזה hazzeh and הנא habba or העתיר hagnattid. Thus the Targum on Ps. 92:8 and 41:14 and the Rabbis everywhere: who again distinguish the present World into גדול "great" or macrocosm, and into קטן "small" or microcosm. It is divided into תחתון "lower", and אמצעי "middle", and עליון "upper". The upper world contains the angels, and souls, and is also called עולם הרוחני "spiritual world". The middle world contains the spheres or orbs, with the stars, and the aerial region. The lower world contains the sea, rivers, desert, wildernesses and uninhabitable places. Concerning some other acceptation of the middle world Kimchi thus writes in the commentary on Ps. 19:9, all the things of the tabernacle are of wondrous wisdom etc. so that the wise have called it עולם האמצעי "the middle world" דמות העולם העליון ודמות העולם הקטן "the likeness of the upper world and of the small world". The future world is again variously taken among them: either for the world which will be after the resurrection, when souls will have been conjoined to bodies; or for the world of souls, which souls possess after loosing from the body; or for the days of the Messiah. The Apostle employs the distinction and phrase of the present and future age or world from the accustomed style of Jewish Theology, Eph. 1:21, Heb. 2:5, and the Savior Matt. 12:32. Which last place (so that I may advise this in passing) if it is explained simply through "never", there will be no prolix disputation about it. But that that phrase "in this and in the future age or world" denotes the universal of time, that is affirmatively "always", "in perpetuity", negatively, "never", can be established 1. both from Eph. 1:21, 2. and from the Targumic and Rabbinic usage, 3. and from the usage of other languages, where about to comprehend all duration, they distribute it into the present of this world, and into the future after this world, 4. and from the cognate phrase "in heaven and on earth" by which through the distribution of parts (for the entire world containing synecdochically consists of heaven and earth, namely celestial and elemental places) we are accustomed to denote the universal of place, that is, affirmatively "everywhere", negatively "nowhere", Exod. 20:4, Phil. 2:10, 2 Chron. 6:14 with 1 Kings 8:23. Finally that this Phrase in Matthew must be so understood the collation of Mark 3:29, Luke 12:10 evinces. Which also Jerome saw on Matt. 12, where he thus expounds: to him at no time will blasphemy be remitted. Furthermore concerning the usage, distinction, and synonymy, of the word "world", so that we may spare paper and time, the lexicographers both sacred and profane are to be consulted, For us here it will have sufficed to have noted: 1. That the World is distinguished into ideal or archetypal, which Ocellus in the book On the World calls intelligible, Plato νοητὸν, that is, intelligible; and into ἔκτυπον or really existing outside of God, which is τὰ παραδείγματα ἀεὶ δεδημιουργημένον, as Clement speaks concerning heaven, Stromata 5, p. 427. Which distinction is elegantly expounded by Boethius in the place cited above: The most beautiful himself bearing the beautiful world in mind, and forming in a similar image. The same Clement just now cited, in the cited book, p. 432, according to the barbarian philosophy thus explains this distinction of the world, that as it were τὸ πᾶν is distributed into two parts or into two worlds, of which one is νοητὸς, ἀρχέτυπος, and παράδειγμα; the other αἰσθητὸς and εἰκὼν τοῦ παραδείγματος etc. What he subjoins there are drawn from Plato's Timaeus; the sum of which

Ficino exhibits in the compendium of the Timaeus ch. 10, p. 707, Basel edition. As therefore these six grades are disposed in order: First indeed the very substance of the sun: then the substantial and intimate light: Third the light flowing thence: Fourth the splendor resulting from the light: Fifth the heat kindled by the splendor: Sixth the generation growing together by the burning of heat: so six others are arranged: First indeed the unity, then the goodness; nor nevertheless are these two in reality, but are distinguished in a certain way by reason: for the same is the divinity: because it supereminates all things, it is called unity: and because it again exuberates through all things, goodness. Plato in the sixth book of the Republic calls this indeed power of exuberating the idea of the good. But in the epistles of goods: of the good indeed, that is of himself, and also of the goods which proceed from it. In the third grade may be posited a certain divine mind as light flowing from light, and conceiving in itself multiform ideas by a twofold fomenting of the supernal light, and of the one idea: not otherwise than in the light many rays are now derived from one ray of light. But in this mind the ideas of things are comprehended not only as in a fountain: but also to this many armies of minds are reduced as to a leader: namely equally proceeding from the same divine light from which also it [proceeds]. But that entire genus is named the superior world: but as far as it regards the following minds, the intellectual world: but as far as the leader, the intelligible. But also the mind itself the leader of minds, is partly indeed named intellect, partly intelligible. Intellect indeed by which it is incumbent to discern the reasons of things. But intelligible, by which reasons of this sort are contained in its ideas. Finally the idea of the good reigns not only over the intellect, but also over the intelligible. After this archetypal world in the fourth grade may follow the soul of the corporeal world: Now the rational World begotten from the intellectual world, as splendor from light. And as splendor is now mixed with motion, so the soul attains and runs through the reasons of the immobile ideas by a certain mobile pact. The fifth grade may succeed to this, namely the nature of things itself, now the seminal world, resulting from the rational world of the soul, as heat from splendor. In the sixth grade at last this corporeal world may be placed led most proximately from the seminary [world], just as the generation of things from heat. 2. The world is said either small μικρόκοσμος, man namely, or great μακρόκοσμος. 3. The great world, by reason of parts is distinguished into superior and inferior, or celestial and elemental, hence heaven is absolutely called κάτω world in Plato in the Timaeus: concerning which Clement of Alexandria observes, bk. just now cited, p. 427, that ἀδιαφόρως περὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, συνωνύμως κοσμόν τε καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀποκαλῶν he uses names indifferently, calling the world and heaven synonymously without any difference of name. The reason for this appellation was, that heaven is most highly the entire world containing, as embracing all things. Meursius proves this acceptation of the world from the Greeks and Latins in the notes to Arnobius ch. 1. Equally also the earth is synecdochically called world. The Rabbis make three worlds, lower, middle, and upper as we just now noted. The Poets also make a threefold world, but when they explain it otherwise than the Rabbis. The highest for them is heaven with the celestials; the middle is this visible world; the lowest is Tartarus, with its inhabitants. See the Mythological writers concerning the sons of Saturn, Jupiter, Neptune, Pluto, and concerning the tripartite kingdom between them. The poetic appellation of the threefold world exists in Statius Papinius, where Tiresias thus speaks:

For we know both whatever you fear to be said and known,
And to disturb Hecate, O Thymbraean, I would fear you,

And of the threefold world, the highest, whom it is unlawful to know,
Him, but I am silent.

The Kabbalists make it fourfold. 1. The World of emanation in which they posit the Sephiroth. 2. of creation, in which are intelligences separated from matter. 3. of formation, in which are angels who are related to the matter of the celestial orbs. 4. Of the Fabric, in which are celestial and elemental bodies. 3. That the world sometimes denotes only containing bodies; which signification also occurs in the sacred [writings], Acts 17:24. 4. That the universe τὸ πᾶν was distinguished by the ancient philosophers in Plutarch, On the Opinions of Philosophers bk. 1, so that this is the world; but that is the infinite void outside the world, or the world with the void. Lipsius bk. 2, diss. 9. Whether and how this visible world can be called a university, Daneau teaches, Christian Physics bk. 1, ch. 9.

D. But that this World is called by some Latins a University: but by the Greeks τὸ πᾶν and τὰ ὅλα is that approved by you?

P. And I know that it displeases certain most learned and pious men as too proud a name: yet because grave authors, and also Ecclesiastical fathers and writers have used that word, I indeed do not think it to be rejected. For also Augustine in the Enchiridion ch. 10, bk. 8, ch. 25, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, and Tertullian somewhere, Irenaeus bk. 2, ch. 32, do not dread to use this word for World, not to praise Ambrose and Basil to you, and perhaps from Heb. 3:4 their opinion can be confirmed. For although besides this visible World there are other creatures of God, and those indeed very many [and] excellent, and most beautiful, of which sort are Angels, and the seat of blessed men, and the appellation, University, seems altogether arrogant and audacious, yet in what sense this is said by them, and ought to be heard by us all understand so that this world is a university not of all creatures of God, but only of conspicuous and corporeal [creatures]. 5. Finally when we treat of the corporeal and visible world it can be considered in three ways. 1. As it was created and [is] whole. Gen. 1. 2. As it now is corrupted, Rom. 8. 3. As restored, or after restoration, Acts 3:21, Rom. 8. The essential attributes of this threefold world do not vary, in whatever way it is considered: but certain accidental [attributes]; concerning which we will speak below. Concerning the division of the world compare the Conimbricenses on On the Heavens bk. 1, ch. 1, q. 1, art. 2.

8. A suitable definition of the world is, which the author of the little book On the World has, under the name of Aristotle: It is a structure compacted from heaven and earth, and from those natures, which are contained in them. Cleomedes has the same, bk. 1, On the World, or On the Circular Inspection of Meteors, in the beginning. And thus also almost an Anonymous [author] from the Palatine library published by Hoeschel together with the definitions of [Gregory] Nazianzen: τί ἐστι κόσμος τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τὸ ἐν μέσῳ σύστημα - What is the world? The system in the middle of heaven and earth. The description of Ocellus Lucanus is a little otherwise, which he adduces about to give a reason why τὸ πᾶν is named κόσμος: Perfect, he says, and absolute is σύστημα ὅλων φύσεων the collection of all natures: outside of which nothing at all consists, but whatever it will have been it must be comprehended in the universe and with the universe. Which description comprehends visible and invisible things or the

sensible and intelligible world. Nazianzen in the metrical definitions published by Hoeschel and printed at Heidelberg in 1591 in 8vo: Κόσμος ἢ ῥευστῶν καὶ νοουμένων θέσις: That is, The World then is the connection of flowing and intelligible things. But here Hoeschel notes, that in the Augsburg codex ὁρατῶν was written, that is, of visible things: which perhaps respects the place Col. 1:16 and more agrees with the sense of Nazianzen, epistle 1 to Cledonius: κτίσμα, τὸ ἔξ ὁρατῶν καὶ ἀοράτων. And Homily on the new Lord's day: (κόσμον namely) ἔξ ὁρατῶν καὶ ἀοράτων συνεστηκότα. Cicero's definition in bk. 2, On the Nature of the Gods, is too metaphorical, and improper: as if the common home of Gods and men, or the city of both. If by Gods he understands only angels, we confess that they are contained in the world as their home: but this cannot properly be said of the true God. Rightly Nicephorus Blemmidas (although not so ancient an author) in his Physics ch. 24: νῦν ὁ κυρίως οὐρανὸς, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ἄνω, περιοχή ἐστιν ἁπάσης κτίσεως αἰσθητῆς τε καὶ νοητῆς. πᾶν γὰρ ὁπωσδήποτε σῶμα ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ περικλείεται. καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ οἱ ἅγιοι ἐνσώματοί πως καὶ ἔνυλοι, κἂν ἀσώματοι καὶ ἄϋλοι λέγονται τὰ αἰσθητὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν στοιχειακὴν ὕλην παραβαλλόμενοι. διὸ καὶ οὗτοι τῷ οὐρανῷ περιέχονται μόνον δὲ τὸ θεῖον, ἀπεριόριστον, ὅτι καὶ ἀμερὲς, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοτέλειον, ὅτι καὶ ἄπειρον. διὸ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἐστι καὶ πανταχοῦ ἐστι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ πᾶν ἐστιν. ὡς μὲν γὰρ ἀμερὲς, καὶ πάντῃ παντὸς σώματος καὶ πάσης ὕλης ὑπερεξῃρημένον, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστιν· ὡς δ' αὖ καθ' αὐτὸ τέλειον καὶ πληρέστατον, πανταχοῦ ἐστι τὰ πάντα πληροῦν· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον, ὑπὲρ τὸ πᾶν ἐστι καὶ πάντα περιέχει, καὶ πάντα περιορίζει, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἁπάντων ἐκτός ἐστι τῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως. - Now heaven properly so called, the first and above, is the comprehension of every creature both sensible and intelligible. For every body in any way is enclosed within it. And the saints themselves are in a certain way embodied and material, although they are said to be incorporeal and immaterial compared to sensible bodies and elemental matter. Wherefore also these are contained by heaven; but only the divine is unbounded, because it is also partless, because also self-perfect, because also infinite. Wherefore also it is nowhere and is everywhere, and is above the universe. For as partless, and in every way superexalted above every body and all matter, it is nowhere; but as again perfect in itself and most complete, it is everywhere filling all things; and as also infinite, it is above the universe and contains all things, and bounds all things, and none of all things is outside of its power.

Here some things are to be disquired concerning the world: 1. Principles. 2. Adjuncts or affections. The principles are either external or internal. The former are the efficient and end. The efficient is considered either, as to the first production of the world, [or] as to the permanence or continuation of the same. In the former way considered, it is the creation of God, concerning which we have treated in the preceding disputation. In the latter way considered, the respect of the whole world and of its individual parts is conservation and providence: but with respect to the parts of the world, which are corruptible, physical generation subordinated to divine providence accedes as a second cause; concerning some species of which in vegetables Ps. 104:13-14, Matt. 6:28, 30; in animals Job 39, Ps. 139. Here many things could be usefully disquired concerning the modes and species of generation, mixture, concerning the plastic power, etc.; but which we relinquish to the philosophers, although they do very much to explain the places of Scripture and theological doubts more felicitously. The internal principles are matter and form: which are found only analogically in the world; for it is not a body or composite per se, but a being per accidens, an aggregate, a collection of bodies. Therefore let the matter

of the world be, its parts both containing, and contained: the division and enumeration of which is known from physics. The world has no substantial form; but only a relative form, which we call formal, namely the apt disposition, connection, and ordination of the parts of the world. We therefore reject the opinions: 1. Of Plato and the Stoics, who say that the world is an animal endowed with sense, indeed also with reason, in Lipsius, Physiologia bk. 2, diss. 10. From whose opinion Campanella does not seem alien in the book On the Sense of Things. Abelard defends the same, as Bernard reports concerning him, epistle 190. 2. Of the Platonists who attributed a soul to the world, concerning which see Plato's Timaeus, and the commentary of Proclus on the same. But they explain this soul diversely. Some make it God; others a certain created Spirit, others something else. Dorn a follower of Paracelsus in the Physics of Genesis p. 67 thus reconciles this philosophy concerning the soul of the world with Scripture: namely that the firmament created on the second day under the name of heaven is the soul of the world; the general element under the appellation of earth on the third day, is the matter: the light placed on the fourth day in the greater luminary of the firmament is the spirit, and these three are the principal members, and principles of the world. Basso in Natural Philosophy p. 333 etc. denies that this Platonic soul of the world, and indeed from the mind of Plato, (as he endeavors to prove) is intelligent, but says that it is a certain more subtle, corporeal nature wandering through all things and moving all things according to the aptitude of each, p. 341.

8. But see this opinion refuted by Augustine in the book Against the Arian Felicianus, and the book Against the Priscillianists chs. 8, 9, by Daneau, Christian Physics bk. 1, ch. 14 and by the more recent philosophers, concerning which and other things pertaining to this question we must treat more fully below in appendix 3. 3. [We reject the opinion of] Those who make the world God, as Pliny bk. 1, ch. 1: It is proper to believe [that it] is a deity eternal, immense neither generated nor ever to perish etc. it is sacred, eternal, whole in the whole, nay indeed itself the whole: finite and similar to the infinite, certain of all things, and similar to the uncertain, outside, inside, embracing all things in itself: and the work of the nature of things is the same, and the nature of things itself. But above part 1 of this disputation we have cited Pliny, and other fanatics. Add Xenocrates and others in Clement of Alexandria in the Hortatory Address to the Gentiles p. 33: οὐκ ἀνασκοπήσω μὲν τὴν τούτων ἀναισχυντίαν etc. that is: But neither will I pass over the impudence of these. Xenocrates (this was the Carthaginian) tacitly signifies indeed seven gods the Planets, but the eighth, which consists of all these the world. But neither will I pass over the Stoics, who say that God pervades every matter however vile and abject, who openly affect their philosophy with disgrace. But neither will it be troublesome, as I think, since I have come to this place, to make mention also of the Peripatetics. Of which sect indeed he who is the father, understanding nothing concerning that Father who is supreme thinks that the soul of the universe is: that is, thinking that the soul of the world is God, he is confounded by himself. For he who defines his providence up to the Moon, then thinks that the world is God, is overturned, as he who thinks that it, which is devoid of God, is God. But that Theophrastus of Eresus, a familiar of Aristotle, somewhere indeed thinks that heaven, but somewhere spirit, is God. Nor is Plato to be passed over, who is commonly heard to be the greater theologian by as much as he is the lesser philosopher than Aristotle. He in the beginning of the dialogue to which is the name Critias, expressly professes the world to be God, and as such there religiously invokes it.

9. The affections of the world are: 1. Unity. 2. Finitude. 3. Time. 4. Place. 5. Figure. 6. Contiguity and connection. 7. Perfection. 8. Beauty. 9. Subordination and dependence. 10. Mutability, or corruptibility. Of which the nine former are agreeable, the tenth is disagreeable. Of the agreeable five are absolute, arising partly from quantity as the four former, partly from quality, as the fifth: the rest are respective, arising from some relation and habitude of the parts of the world among themselves. As to 1. The world is one, as the sacred Scriptures teach in innumerable places. It will suffice to have indicated John 1:3, Col. 1:16 compared with Gen. 1, 2, where one world created by the works of six days is described: but besides those things made in the beginning, nothing besides was made; nor is the conservator of any other world indicated, Heb. 1:3, nor the savior. We reject: 1. the ancient philosophers in Stobaeus, Physical Eclogues bk. 1, ch. 21, who [posited] innumerable worlds, 2. the Ophite heretics in Augustine, Heresy 77. Add Origen bk. 2 and 3 περὶ ἀρχῶν, who thought that at one time indeed one [world exists], but before it others were, and after this another will be, and in it also Christ, will suffer more often, as Jerome shows, epistle to Avitus. Let concerning more worlds be seen Plutarch, On Opinions bk. 1, ch. 5, Ambrose, Hexaemeron bk. 1, ch. 1, Augustine, City of God bk. 18, ch. 41, Theodoret, On the Cure of Greek Affections, discourse 4. Plato refutes this error in Alcinous ch. 12, Philo On the Creation of the World, Alexander of Hales part 2, q. 11, Thomas ST Ia, q. 47, a. 3. Isidore adds, Etymologies bk. 8, ch. 5, and the Decree cause 24, q. 3 (ch. Quidam autem), that it is a heresy condemned by the Church. Problem: Whether the unity of the world can be demonstrated a priori without Scripture by natural reason? Neg. 2. The finitude of the world is gathered from the infinity of God 1 Kings 8, where it is taught that not even by the heaven of the blessed can God, as infinite, be contained: But if that heaven is finite, much more the visible world, concerning which is our discourse. So that I may pass over the reasons of Aristotle and of those who follow him which see bk. 3, Physics, and bk. 1, On the Heavens, and the commentators, who in place of all, Ruvius and the Conimbricenses with Pererius, Physical Disputations bk. 10, besides the Scholastics on Thomas ST Ia, q. 7, aa. 3 and 4, and the Sententiaries in dist. 34. We therefore reject the ancient philosophers, who dreamed something actually infinite, whom Aristotle refutes in the cited place. But what thus is the definite quantity of the world, I judge no one to know exactly; besides God alone who founded all things in certain weight, measure, and number: concerning which we will say something afterwards. 3. The time of the world can be considered, either as to the beginning or by reason of the world in becoming; or as to the progress or by reason of the world in being made. In the latter way we here presuppose that time agrees with it according to that Eccl. 3:1, the reasons taken from motion, and successive flux according to prior and posterior the philosophers have enucleated: who are to be consulted. In the former way when it is attributed to it, these questions occur: 1. Whether it was created in time. 2. In how much time it was created. 3. When it was created: or what was the beginning of time. 4. Whether, what kind, and how time was created. 5. How much time has now flowed from the creation of the world. Concerning the fourth question we must treat in the following disputation: concerning the first and second action has been taken in the preceding disputation. Concerning the third and fifth we here disquire. Theologians, chronologers, philosophers, vary everywhere in opinions, both Christians and Ethnics and Jews. 1. There are those who refer the creation to the summer solstice among whom Ger. Mercator in the Chronology. 2. others to the spring time, 3. others to autumn. The two latter are most

celebrated: although the authors do not agree on the month or day. To autumn, whether September (as the ancient Rabbis, in Scaliger On Emendation of Times bk. 5, and R. Eliezer, in R. Manasseh prob. 9, Lansbergius in the Chronology bk. 2, ch. 2, Zanchius bk. 6, ch. 1, Daneau Christian Physics bk. 1, ch. 39, Piscator Questions on Genesis ch. 1), or October (as Scaliger on Manilius bk. 1, p. 32, and On Emendation of Times bk. 5, On the Founding of the World p. 366, and from him Calvisius Introduction ch. 34, Helvicus in the prolegomena to the Chronological System). From the Roman Catholics Lyra, Tostatus, Oleaster, Arias Montanus. Those who want the world founded in the month of September use various reasons. The chief are two. First, because the month of September was from the first age of men, the first month, and the beginning of the year: which is established from Lev. 23:9-10 etc. For in contracts and public business, in computing the very age of the world itself, which was done through jubilees, the years began from this month, and ended in this, Exod. 23:16, the going out of the year is referred to the seventh month namely Tishri, and Exod. 34:22, the turning or revolution of the year is assigned to the same month. See Pererius on Exod. 12:1. There accede vestiges of this antiquity, which we read, in the Chaldean Paraphrast 1 Kings 8:2, where he testifies that Ethanim was formerly the first month, which now is the seventh ירחא דקדמאי קרן ליה ירחא קדמאה וכען ירחא שביעאה הוא that is, in the month, which the ancients called the first month, and it is now the seventh month. Likewise in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, bk. 9, vol. 4, who from Alexander Polyhistor affirms Τοὺς Φοίνικας καὶ Αἰγυπτίων ἱερέας ἀστρολογίαν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ that the Phoenicians and priests of the Egyptians were taught astronomy and the rest by Abraham. But let us suppose that the Egyptians began the year from the seventh month: whence there is a probable conjecture, that this reckoning of the year was formerly delivered to them by Abraham. If anyone wants, let him also adduce the sabbatical years begun from the autumnal equinox by the mandate of God; the beginning of the biblical reading in the synagogues from ancient tradition falling in this month; the testimony of Julius Firmicus the Astronomer cited by Scaliger, who from the barbarian that is, Egyptian reckoning (most ancient certainly) relates, that in the posterior parts of Libra the earth was composed. The other reason is, that the fruits of the trees were mature; but this is more agreeable to autumn, than to spring. Danaeus takes a third, from the feast of trumpets, which at this time seems to have been appointed by God, so that the memory of creation might be preserved in the Church: and because more feasts were celebrated in the month of September. But these, and other things which are adduced by others, are conjectures rather than reasons. We therefore in a matter more chronological, than of faith or dogmatic Theology, content with two reasons incline to this opinion.

Concerning the Spring Time the opinion is no less celebrated, and most frequented by Ethnics and Jews, as well as Christians. See Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exercitation 257, Pererius on Gen. 1, and Cornelius à Lapide ibid. Who especially seem to have been carried into this opinion by the authority of the fathers, whom Pererius cites ibid. and of the Palestinian Council, which Bede reports in the book On the Vernal Equinox: for their reasons otherwise do not compel. Add to these Baranzano in New Questions, Digladiation 18, thesis 2, Gaspar Sanctius commentary on Acts 2, p. 47, Molina On the Work of the Six Days, disp. 14. From the Jews R. Joshua in R. Manasseh loc. cit. favors this opinion, from our men Alsted in Precognita of Theology, Scaliger first edition of Emendation of Times (which opinion he revoked in the second edition of the year 1600, which was printed from his manuscript at Aurelia of the Allobroges [Orleans] in 1629),

Polanus Syntagma bk. 5, ch. 7, who because he examines this question more accurately, is to be seen for this part. Keckermann Physical Disputations 20, q. 3. Whose censure is about the difficulty of this question (namely that before the fourth day there was no reason of the year or its parts) ibid. and in the System of Theology. But although the three first days did not have an actual number and measuring measure from the sun and the signs of the zodiac, yet they had a measurable duration and the number of its motion numbered to which from the first motion of the sun created on the fourth day, by numbering backward that imaginary measure can be fitted, not otherwise than if from the beginning of the first day the motion of the primum mobile, and the time thence deduced had run. Compare Thomas ST Ia, q. 70, a. 2. The words of Sanctius in the cited place can especially supply the sources of solution against these and other scruples about the Hexaemeron, which we here write: To me these things have not seemed so grave, that they wrest from me the former opinion: for as in the beginning of the universe many things were made, otherwise than in other ages, which followed afterwards: which namely God disposed otherwise for the use of men, than he had instituted in the beginning of things; as that the earth everywhere lay hidden under the waters, that the times were not divided by the vicissitude of days, and nights; that the first man had more ribs, than the rest of men; that in the beginning of spring the fruits of trees had that maturity, which they are accustomed to have for the most part in Autumn, so also it ought not to seem too hard, if we say that the times were either numbered, or described afterwards otherwise, than in the beginning of the world: or that entire time, which preceded the first coition of the Moon with the Sun, which begins the months, is not forced into the common other order of all ages. So that the first month from the Moon having been created, that is, from the full moon to the beginning of the second Moon, from which the second month begins consisted of fifteen, or sixteen days, the rest afterwards of 29 or 30, as also something no less difficult must be said about the year. For if the Sun was created at the beginning of Aries whence the year begins with the vernal equinox, surely either the three days, which preceded, are out of order, or that first year surpassed the others by three days. To which add the words of Thomas in the cited place: To the third it must be said, that on the first day the common distinction of time was made through day and night according to the diurnal motion: which is common to the whole heaven: which can be understood to have begun on the first day. But the special distinctions of days and times, according to which day is hotter than day, and time than time, and year than year: are made according to the special motions of the Stars, which can be understood to have begun on the fourth day. And a little after: To the fifth it must be said: that the moon when it is perfect, rises in the evening and sets in the morning. And thus it presides over the night. And it is probable enough, that the moon was made full: just as also the plants were made in their perfection making seed: and similarly the animals, and man. For although by a natural process one comes from the imperfect to the perfect: simply nevertheless the perfect is prior to the imperfect. Augustine however does not assert this: because he says that it is not unfitting, that God made imperfect things, which afterwards he himself perfected.

For the spring time see also Lipsius bk. 2, ch. 9. Furthermore chronologers determine the day of the said month: concerning which, because they are not so certain, and the reason of the theses does not allow to excerpt those things, they themselves are to be consulted. We do not approve the imprudence of that particular Palestinian Council, which induced by the most trivial conjectures, defines the time of the created world namely March 25: as if this concerned the

public doctrine of the Christian Churches. Concerning the fifth question, How much time has flowed from the beginning of creation up to this day, is properly to be disquired by chronologers: to whom we send away our readers: with whom Pererius on Gen. 1, disp. 14 and 15 may be compared. But who are, and of how many kinds the chronological writers, we have indicated in our library. 5. No other place of the world can be constituted than imaginary space or something intelligible: for real space and physical place containing was concreated with the world itself; concerning which see the following Disputation. But that space denotes nothing other than non-repugnance, or something in obediential potency, to the where or space and place producible and to be produced by God. Of which sort of spaces we understand outside the world with Augustine, City of God bk. 11, ch. 5. It is therefore neither substance, nor accident, specially it is not the Aristotelian place, nor the space of Scaliger and of those who follow him, nor vacuum such, as the ancients and certain more recent philosophers establish in the elemental world. We reject: 1. That vacuum of the Stoics, in the middle of which they think that the world is balanced, and which they think with Philo is called the abyss in the Scriptures, Lipsius loc. cit. 2. That place coeternal with God, which Vorstius attributes to him, Apologetic Exegesis ch. 19. Which absurdity see detected by Eglisemmius, Hypocrisy 5, p. 37. 6. That its figure is round the philosophers prove from the parts of the world, both the elements and heaven, and the stars. Pliny bk. 1, ch. 2, the Author of the little book On the World ch. 2, Aristotle bk. 8, Physics, and bk. 2, On the Heavens ch. 4, where they add also other reasons the Conimbricenses. Compare also Clavius' commentary on Sacrobosco. And Ptolemy's bk. 1, Almagest ch. 2. From Scripture Jerome rightly adduces on ch. 3 to the Ephesians, the place Eccl. 1:5-6. Nor are the things to be passed over which Daneau notes, Prov. 8:27, Isa. 40:22. Briefly, it is to be noted from its great parts, which absolve the whole, namely heaven and earth (according to the physical synecdoche of Moses' Gen. 1:1), that roundness is ascribed. To the latter indeed Isa. 40:22, where חוג "circle", is of the earth. But to the former Ps. 77:19, where heaven is called גלגל "sphere", "orb", "wheel". Therefore we do not see the reason why both the ancient philosophers in Theodoret, On the Cure of Greek Affections discourse 4, and Plutarch, On Opinions bk. 2, ch. 2, Cleomedes, On the World, and especially the fathers Lactantius bk. 3, ch. 23, Basil and Ambrose, Hexaemeron bk. 1, Chrysostom homily 14 and 17 on the epistle to the Hebrews, Procopius on Gen. 1, the author under the name of Justin, Questions to the Orthodox 130, attribute another figure to it. For what they think repugns Isa. 40:22, Heb. 8:2, Ps. 104:2, Rev. 21:16, we will dilute in the disputation itself. Meanwhile the commentators on the cited place can be consulted, and Daneau, Physics bk. 1, ch. 13, Lorinus on Eccl. 1:6.

10. 7. The relative affections are, Contiguity, unition, and connection of the parts of the world, namely of the celestial with the elemental, and of these in turn among themselves. Concerning the continuous and contiguous the philosophers [treat] on Physics bk. 6, ch. 1, On Vacuum bk. 4, ch. 7. Daneau constitutes a continuous interval from the earth all the way to heaven without air or a proper body. See him bk. 1, ch. 38, and bk. 2, treatise 2, chs. 5-7, whom Timpler follows. They oppose difficulties, and perhaps certain refuges to the received opinion of Theologians and Philosophers: but by that the contrary does not yet seem to be demonstrated, or a better [opinion] substituted. When this will have been done certainly and evidently, then at last the counsel of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. 1, ch. 6 is to be followed: ταῖς μὲν ἀρχαῖς ἥρμοσται πιστεύειν - It is fitting to trust in principles. 8. The perfection of the world is of the whole by

reason of the parts and end, as also of all things both essential, and accidental. Which see explained by the Scholastics on Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles bk. 1, ch. 85, and bk. 3, ch. 71, and on ST Ia, q. 50, and q. 45, a. 7, or by the Conimbricenses on On the Heavens bk. 1, ch. 1, where [they treat of it] at length. Here the following problems emerge. Problem 1. Whether the world is so perfect, or the universe so perfectly founded from the beginning, that afterwards new species of plants, or animals, or metals, or liquors, condiments, or medicines, whether by the natural commixture of diverse animals or other things, or by the skill and artifice of men have not been produced, and cannot still be produced daily? R. Experience teaches the negative: And Pererius On Genesis 1:24 rightly establishes this. Problem 2. Whether they are injurious to the wisdom of the creator and the perfection of the universe, who procure new species in minerals, or vegetables, or animals, through the commixture and commission of diverse genus of animals or plants, or through metallic transmutation? Resp. Neg. if indeed it is done for the necessity of the human race, or for some honest and licit use. For neither does he make void the law of the universe posited in creation, who procures the actual production of those things, which are understood to be produced causally and virtually in the beginning by him. Here pertains inoculation, and other species of grafting, likewise the restitution of some species or genus lost somewhere, as Virgil narrates concerning bees, Georgics 4, and many chymical and alchemical operations, the productions of mules, leopard dogs; and other artifices of natural magic, through which not species; but certain individuals of species (e.g. more mature flowers or fruits, chicks from eggs placed in an oven, and other things in V. Wecker, Secrets, and Giambattista della Porta, Natural Magic) are produced through the application of natural agents to their passives. Here nevertheless we admonish that curiosity, and too much is to be avoided: lest rashly and too ambitiously being carried forward the incautious fall into the precipices of evil arts. Compare below part 7, thesis 6. Problem 3. Whether all species of things; even poisonous beasts and herbs, insects accustomed to arise from putrid matter e.g. scarabs, etc., thorns, burs, thistles, etc. were created in the beginning? Aff. with a distinction; if not actually at least causally and virtually. See Daneau bk. 1, ch. 42, And Pererius on Gen. 1:11 and 24. Yet so that those, which afterwards are accustomed to arise ordinarily from putrid matter, are not said to be produced from the same in the beginning, Concerning which see below part 8, thesis 1. Pererius loc. cit. also not badly adds that animals, which do not arise except by the corruption or distemper of the human body, and are troublesome to it, (as e.g. intestinal worms) were not in the beginning. For this would repugn against the felicity of the state of integrity. Problem 4. Whether certain species of things have been lost, or have ceased to be? Neg. with dist. that absolutely, plainly, everywhere, and always in the whole world they have been lost, or have ceased to be. Concerning the Unicorn, which nowhere today seems to be found in the nature of things, we will speak below, part 8. Concerning purple, sal ammoniac, cassia, murrhine, stacte, bdellium, balsam, costus, aurichalcum, asbestos cloth, and others which Pancirolli in the tract On Things Lost and Found in Antiquity (with the commentary of Henricus Salmuth) enumerates; we say, 1. Either they have not been so lost absolutely, everywhere, and always, that they have plainly ceased to be in the nature of things; but only their frequency or abundance, ceases and is lost to us, in parts of Europe, or Italy, where those authors lived. 2. Or their common use (which was formerly accustomed to obtain) among us ceases, either on account of the difficulty of having them, and consequently too great a price, or on account of the inexperience of preparing and applying them, or on account of contempt, because the more recent [authors]

think far otherwise than the ancients concerning them, and do not believe them to be of such value, but have others at hand, which they can use with less expense and easier preparation, and more felicitous success. 3. Or at least they are less known and frequented in the whole world, than formerly. 4. Or they have ceased to be in this or that part of the world, which was accustomed to bear them peculiarly; but not in the whole world. For if here the fertile earth is effete; elsewhere the sterile earth is newly fecundated. Nothing else Pancirolli's histories of lost things want to say, he himself indicates enough, ch. 1, where treating of purple he expressly confesses that the species of things do not perish. 5. Finally if anything else lost is adduced, perhaps it could be said that it is artificial not natural; and consequently to be referred to the history Concerning the Inventors of Things. 6. Or never was in the nature of things; but to be referred to the mythology of wonders and natural [wonders]: to which not a few Plinian things pertain, concerning the Arimaspians, Cynocephali, etc. 9. Beauty, is deduced from goodness and perfection, see the commentators on Ps. 8, 104:2. 10. Its dependence harmony and coordination both in existence and operation can be considered either related to something outside itself; or by reason of its parts among themselves. The former is none: for the world is balanced (so to speak with the Stoics) and hangs, or rather subsists, and the earth in the middle of the world, through the power implanted in it by God the creator, in itself; with God immediately bearing it Heb. 1:3, so that it needs no other foundations or roots, Which from Ps. 104:5 and Job 26:7 the most learned Fuller Miscellanies bk. 1, ch. 15 excellently collects. And to the same in my judgment that word in Job has always seemed to pertain. Which the Jews especially the more recent, have thought to be composed from the negative particle, and signifying What or Something: With whom all the rest both Greeks, and Latins, assent, interpreting οὐδὲν, and nihilum, Nothing. But since a composition of this kind is rather rare among the Hebrews, and a deduction from the Theme itself is very easy, it is certainly agreeable, that we rather embrace this. For it is clear to the Hebrews and Syrians to signify שנק, that is, to constrict by art, namely in the manner of one suffocating. Hence according to the form a noun is made, which denotes as it were a δύναμις or buckle, or that most strong bond, by which the Earth is held constricted on every side, lest it be able to be moved from its place to any part. But what else is this, than that power κατοχῆς and ἀκινησίας divinely implanted, and disseminated through the whole globe of the Earth. But that eximiously, in my judgment indeed, the Arabic version אמתנא confirms (i.e. in or with its solidity), by which the Paraphrast cited above expressed [it]. For it signifies not only solidity or firmness: but also first and properly a certain astrictive power, by which it happens, that it obtains that firmness or stability. As if he should say, Upon its manifold firmness procreated from an innate most strong faculty of stabilizing and constricting itself to one place. And since this firming (so to speak) power emanates from the essential form of the terrestrial Orb, not rashly Euthymius says that the same is founded upon itself, or, if we follow the Eton edition, Chrysostom, or rather Theodoret. ἀντὶ γοῦν τοῦ ἐφ' ἑαυτὴν ἐδράσαι δέδωκεν αὐτῇ τὸ ἀκίνητον For instead of being established upon itself, God gave to it immobility. And a little after: And so in the Prophet concerning a thing fixed with nails, lest it change place anywhere, it is said בל תמוט, that is, this is done, lest it be moved. Furthermore in the manner of nails in the sphere of the Earth are those bases בדים, namely that manifold power or φυσικὴ ἀκινησίας which everywhere flourishes in it: whence it comes to pass, that with all the superior bodies being circumrotated with various, admirable, perpetual swiftness, it itself perpetually remains in the same place, and as the center devoid of motion, rests in the middle of the World. Isa. 41:7.

And this indeed is to be observed against the various opinions of the ancients. The latter is of the parts among themselves: thus especially sublunary things depend on celestial things, and those again on each other. For that celestial things are either nourished, or sustained, or moved by inferior things, has not yet been made probable to us. But what the Hermetics, and others even to superstition, overly extend the harmony of the macrocosm and microcosm, and the harmony of the invisible and visible world and again of the visible celestial or superior, and elemental or inferior [world], besides the magnetic, signature, astral, which they call, powers, we have noted in the Disputation On Magic, and Sennert disquires concerning them in the cited book ch. 6. Whom see, and our disputations On Magic and Superstition.

11. 11. That mutation agrees with the world is indubitable. But it is asked whether and how it is corruptible? There are those who plainly deny [it]; We thus distinguish. 1. Through sin the nature of things was indeed not changed essentially, but nevertheless accidentally, and made worse. Rom. 8:20-21, with Gen. 3:17-18, Deut. 28:23. And this is called a certain corruption Rom. 8:21. But that is, first, not so much absolutely and in itself, as with respect to us (how for example we say that the sun is eclipsed). Then, not in the removal of some nature, or form, or first potency, or even second [potency]: but in an impediment and obstacle posited to it, about the second potency, and the executions of that potency. And thus is to be understood that Deut. 28, and Amos 4:7. Hence also the mutation of the world and the nature of things, which is said to be future in heaven and earth in the times of the Messiah, Hag. 2:7-8, and Ezek. 47:12, Isa. 11:6, is to be taken allegorically: as the commentators there teach; indeed also the sounder of the Rabbis acknowledge. For thus Maimonides in Yad Chazaka last ch.: Let it not come into the mind, that in the days of the Messiah something will be effected in the governance of the world, or that there will be something new בראשית במעשה in the works of creation, but העולם הולך כמנהגו the world going according to its way, order and reason (that is, will be governed in the same way). And this which is said in Isaiah, And the wolf will dwell with the lamb etc. משל וחידה is an allegory and enigma. In the Talmudic Codex On the Sabbath in the Gemara, R. Samuel is said to have said: אין בין עולם הזה לימות המשיח אלא שיעבוד There is no or is no difference between this age and the days of the Messiah, except that the kingdoms must be subjugated. The apostle describes the corruption of the world introduced through sin Rom. 8 through vanity and the servitude of corruption. I think that vanity can be conceived in the explication of Rom. 8 both passive (so to speak) and active. Passive is twofold, One that it suffers abuse of itself by sinful men, who use indeed abuse creatures to the ignominy of the creator, The other, that reflexively and analogically in its own way it also bears the miseries and punishments of sin. Concerning the punishments of irrational [creatures] how those are to be understood, we have said something in the disputation On the Right and Justice of God. Active vanity and servitude is, both negative and positive. Negative again twofold, One that it does not so perfectly serve human uses, as indeed it would have served in the state of integrity See Gen. 3:17-18. The other, that by reason of corrupt opinion and human cupidity it does not afford that good, and that αὐτάρκειαν, which man vainly seeks in its usufruct. For there is a certain defect adhering and inhering in all things especially sublunary, so that the human mind cannot be satiated, filled, and quieted by them, but rather by how many more it enjoys, by so much the more it is constrained, tormented, and emptied, until it is fixed in God alone and united to him. Which Ecclesiastes proves by induction. Positive vanity is, that creatures vex, oppose, and harm man in many ways.

The sun burns, poisons extinguish, water suffocates, Air infects, animals tear apart and devour, etc.

Consectary. We reject: 1. the opinion of those, who hence conclude that some creatures are evil: [against 1 Tim. 4:4 compared with Gen. 1:31. Nothing however noxious or poisonous physically, is universally and absolutely evil; although particularly to man, or to this or that creature (e.g. the wolf to the sheep) it is evil. 2. The opinion of Frischlin in the little book On the Sphere, which Casmann touches on bk. 1, Astrology ch. 11, which ascribes the heat of the sun not to its primigenial nature but to the sin of man.

2. From the first creation or from the entrance of sin up to this day also to the end the world cannot be said to grow old, to collapse, to be weakened, to lose something either as to matter, or as to species, or the natural powers of things, if namely universally and in species they are considered: Which we especially want to be understood concerning heaven and the stars; Ps. 72:5-6, Gen. 8:22, against the opinions of the ancients and more recent [authors] in Lipsius, On Constancy bk. 1, ch. 16: That sun which you see? it fails. The moon? it labors and wastes away. The stars? they slip and fall. And as human ingenuity may wish or excuse these things, nevertheless they have happened in that celestial body and will happen, which may break every law and mind for the Mathematicians. I pass over comets, of various form, various site, and motion: all of which to be from the air and in it, Lyceum would not easily impose on me: but behold recently certain new motions having been apprehended have made trouble for the Astrologers, and a new star. A star having arisen in this very year; whose increments having been clearly observed, we have seen (with difficulty believed) that something can be born in heaven itself, and die. Indeed Varro behold cries out in Augustine and asserts, that the star of Venus which Plautus calls Vesperugo, Homer Ἕσπερος has changed color, magnitude There are also others from the ancients, who seemed to themselves to have apprehended the old age of the world. Among whom Cyprian, sermon On Mortality: Behold the world totters and slips, and testifies to its ruin not so much by the old age of things, as by the end. And Sidonius Apollinaris, Epistles bk. 8, ep. 6: For indeed the powers of those arts the rector of ages has more implanted in the ancient ages of the world which, as the seeds as it were extracted from the marrow through the now aging age of the world, show a little something admirable and memorable at this time in any whatsoever, and that in a few. Melanchthon in the Physics establishes that the sun is nearer to the earth, than it was in the time of Ptolemy by 9900 German miles, whence he concludes the old age and ruin of the world into worse, for God has retracted the sun towards the earth because effete nature needs greater heat and cherishing. And with Melanchthon Daniel Tossanus bk. 1, On Old Age ch. 4. And so almost Aretius vol. 2, Problems 1, title On Vanity. Copernicus and from him Stefler compute 2666 miles, Origanus in Prognostications to the year 1604, disputing concerning the eccentricity of the sun, concedes that it has been changed, but not as much as Copernicus establishes. But other philosophers reject this observation of the astronomers, and the opinion concerning the changed eccentricity of the sun: among whom Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exercitations 9: But what some have dared to relate: That the body of the Sun is far nearer to us, than how much has been written by the ancients: so that it seems to have changed place in the very corpulence of the deferent: either the writings themselves with sponges, or the authors themselves with whips are to be

castigated. But what things are circulated concerning hourly shadows, are false by the same reason. For the former opinion nevertheless Otto Casmann lib. 1, Astrology ch. 9 seems to stand. Where for proof he adduces 1. fabulous (as we judge) narrations of the Egyptians, concerning the course of the stars having been changed four times from Pomponius Mela; and of the Mexicans concerning the sun having been extinguished four times and born four times, from the Mexican histories. 2. histories concerning portents about the star of Venus, which changed color, magnitude, course, figure; and about the sun which in the year 790 was darkened, and did not give its rays for 17 days (Paul the Deacon being witness); and in the time of Justinian, the air being serene it shone so exilely, that it scarcely surpassed the splendor of the moon. Whence he concludes, that the sun suffered rarefaction in those times, and thus the light was more exiguous; but afterwards it again condensed its flame and coal; and consequently the sun, stars, and other celestial things have both suffered, and can suffer alteration, rising, perishing from a natural cause and the divine will of the founder. He adds also the mutations about the sun in the time of Joshua, Hezekiah, the passion of Christ. But those observations can be said, Either to have been fallacious. 2. or badly expounded and accepted; how idiots unskilfully interpret the stars, which they see, falling and mock-moons, mock-suns, circles around the moon to be affections of heaven. 3. Or at least it can be responded that those portentous or miraculous things if they happened in the celestial bodies themselves, ought not to be adduced to infringe the stable and ordinary laws of nature. 4. As to the effete and weakened powers of the lands, waters, planets, animals, men: we say that this does not happen according to the whole and through the whole world and all its parts equally and successively: but according to the variations and vicissitudes of places and times; for here or now the powers decrease, elsewhere or at another time they increase. We therefore by the distinction just now employed think that anyone can most safely philosophize concerning the mutation of the world both elemental and celestial. If anyone wants to treat of these things through the parts and one by one, let him compare the diatribe of Johannes Jonston the Pole On the Constancy of Nature, in which he distinctly proves these four things: 1. That the world by reason of its whole does not perpetually slip into worse. 2. Not by reason of heaven. 3. Not by reason of the elements. 4. Not by reason of mixed [bodies] both inanimate, and animate irrational. 5. Not by reason of man: which last proposition, he has cut into many parts and prosecuted from p. 40 all the way to 182, that is, all the way to the end. He cites there a tract of the same argument in English by George Hakewill the theologian.

3. The restoration and restitution of the world into a more perfect state Acts 3:21, with Rom. 8:21, and 2 Pet. 3:13, will not happen without corruption at least accidental through fire 2 Pet. 3. Concerning which we must properly treat in the chapter on the end of the world. Let them see meanwhile concerning this restoration of the world Aretius, Problems title On Vanity and On the End of the World, and Willet's commentary on Rom. 8, and Wendelin's Physical Contemplations sect. 2. But from each mutation both of vanity and of purgation through fire we except the heaven of the blessed, to which we refer 2 Cor. 5:1-3 compared with Heb. 12:27-28 and 11:10, and 2 Cor. 4:18.

CONCERNING CREATION, THIRD PART.

Resp. LUBERTUS SPRUITIUS of Utrecht.

For the 21st of September 1638.

Creatures considered through individual species are usually divided among Physicists, either according to The Species of natural body, which is simple and mixed etc. or according to the parts of the world, which are containers and contents, celestial and elemental etc. We presently omitting those things will follow the division by the works of the six days creation frequented by all Theologians and chronologers; and we will explain some things about the system of the world from Mosaic physics in the manner and method of theologians. For to want For to want to call that into doubt, and to reduce it to absurdity belongs to those who, being unwise, refuse to submit their wisdom to the most holy spirit, and pave the way for themselves and others to Libertinism or atheism: while the system of the world described by Moses to them does not seem dissimilar to the fables and absurdities of Muhammad about the earth founded on the horn of an ox (in the book Sunna) about the sun when it sets, immersing itself in a bubbling spring of water

(Quran, chapter on the Cave) Objections and exceptions against the sacred Mosaic physics; which are usually brought forward, are not so subtle that they cannot be resolved. As among others Francis Junius shows against the 22 arguments of Simplicius, and of today's antinomians, at the end of the explanation of the first three chapters of Genesis: with whom Scipio Claromontius on the Universe should be compared, and other philosophers to be cited below, who do not allow Anti-Mosaic systems of the moderns to be foisted upon them.

In order to dexterously perceive the works of the first day, in which the nature of things was first constituted, we divide them into visible and invisible. For at that time the whole invisible world was created; and the containing parts and matter of the whole visible world. The containing part of the invisible or intelligible world is the heaven of the blessed, the contained parts are the angels, of whom some fell away from the grace of the first creation and left their dwelling, Jude verse 6, compare 2 Peter 2 and John 8. We have dealt with demons ex professo, and partly with good angels. The description of the Empyrean heaven, because there are quite a few things to be discussed more fully there, we reserve for a separate Disputation on eternal life. Here it will suffice to note that that Heaven and the angels were created on the first day. The reasons are 1. because express mention is made of heaven in Genesis 1:1, from which the empyrean heaven cannot be proved to be excepted. 2. Because nowhere in the Hexaemeron is mention made of the creation of that heaven and the angels: but God completed in six days all things that were created, Genesis 2:1, and that heaven is among things created, Hebrews 11:10. Therefore. The same reasoning militates for the creation of angels; for which the passage of Job 38:6-7 can also be adduced. As from this argue that the angels existed then Epiphanius, vol. 2, book 2, heresy 65, against Paul of Samosata p. 295. And indeed since there are many stars, and the Sun and Moon were made on the fourth day, but the sea and trees and fruits were made before,

and the firmament of earth and heaven and the Angels were made together with these. For if the Angels had not been created together with heaven and earth, he would certainly not have said to Job, "When the stars were born, all my Angels praised me with a voice." Therefore before Lucifer, as if to say, before there was anything, and it was created. For the word was always with the Father, for through him all things were made, and without him nothing was made. Furthermore, someone may say, "You have shown that the angels existed before the stars, and you said that they were made together with heaven and earth, from where do you make the demonstration? Tell us." Were they then created altogether before heaven and earth? For nowhere does Scripture clearly indicate the time of the creation of the Angels. And indeed you have well shown that they existed before the stars, for if they had not existed, how would they have praised God with hymns for the creation of the stars? We indeed cannot state the discovery of each question from our own reasonings, but from the consequence of the Scriptures. For divine Scripture clearly indicates that the Angels were made neither after the stars, nor before heaven and earth, since this saying is plainly immutable, that before heaven and earth there was nothing of created things. For in the beginning God made heaven and earth: so that it may be the beginning, and nothing of created things may be before it. See on this question Zanchius, book 2, chapter 5.

We pass therefore to the other work of the first day, namely the visible world containing. Which work can be considered both as it immediately, first, and directly terminates creation, and as it does so mediately, consequently and indirectly. The former is properly said to be created: and is a complete being, and indeed a singular substance only; as heaven and the Elements. The latter is said to be concreated. And it is either an internal principle of a creature or an incomplete being, and could be called increate (the particle "in" taken not negatively, but as denoting containment) or presuppositively created: or its affection or adjunct, and could be called "ad-created" or ἐπίκτιστον, that is, consequently created. The metaphysical principles of a corporeal creature are considered by reason either of production or of constitution, or of operation. The former considered in this way are Matter and form; in that way matter, form, privation; in this way, nature. The affection or adjunct of corporeal nature is either of quantity, or of quality, or of action, or of relation. We must see briefly concerning all these, how and of what sort they were created or concreated on the first day.

2. Directly, first, and immediately created were heaven and earth, by which synecdochically we think the (containing) celestial and elementary world to be denoted. In general, therefore, we observe concerning them: 1. They were corporeal substances. 2. They were not only containing bodies, and mere receptacles: but also the matter of all other bodies, which on the following days were formed by God out of them, and placed in them, which are called by the name of "host" in Genesis 2:1. Consectary. Therefore we do not see the reason why we should agree with Pareus in his commentary on Genesis 1, and in volume of theological disputations, disputation 7 and 8, and with Keckermann, theological system, book 1, chapter 6, sections 11, 12, 13, that all the works of the following days (except man) were created out of nothing. See Genesis 1:11-12, 20. Which asserts the contrary at least concerning the elements: whatever may be the case with heaven. 3. There were therefore δυνάμεις and virtual containment in those bodies created on the first day, of all the rest to be created afterwards: and so it can be said that

in those few all visible things were produced, inasmuch as they were to be brought forth from their bosom and actually exist. 4. Yet by no means was the first (so-called) matter of Aristotle, stripped of all form, actually, formally, and directly created then: concerning which, see below. 5. Nor also a chaos or confused matter of all natures: which was no nature distinct in form and species, neither heaven, nor water, nor earth etc. But out of which those things were at last created and constituted in species. Which opinion some of the fathers and our own have embraced, of the Papists most have. Augustine understands by heaven the angels, by earth prime matter: Cornelius à Lapide with the fathers cited by him understands by heaven, the seat of the blessed: by earth that abyss of waters, which with the earth filled that depth up to the empyrean heaven, out of which afterwards all the heavens (except the empyrean) as well as the elements and the bodies compounded of them were formed. And this opinion agrees very well with the Platonic and poetic Chaos of the Gentiles, as can be seen in summary in Daneau on the Antiquity of the world, part 1, chapter 3, Eugubinus in Cosmopoeia, and on the perennial philosophy, book 7, chapters 9, 10, 11, which should be consulted: from which Pererius excerpted some things, book 1 on Genesis, question 28. We, on the contrary, agree with those who say that the terminus of creation here was heaven and the elements, but not some confused chaos. Let the reasons be these. First, Because the words "heaven" and "earth" nowhere signify this; nor can it be proved that they should be so expounded in this place. Second, then nowhere in the Hexaemeron, chapter 1, would mention be made of the creation of heaven and earth: although it is certain from chapter 1, verses 1, 2, 3, that they were created within that time. Third, because in Genesis 1:2 it is not said that the earth (that is, the globe consisting of earth and water according to the phrase of Scripture, Genesis 2:1, 4, and 14:22, Exodus 31:17, 2 Kings 19:15, Isaiah 51:13) was at last created, but that the earth existed and indeed was desolate and void, for this is the meaning of tohu vabohu as in Jeremiah 4:23, and in verse 9 it is said that the dried earth appeared (not otherwise than happened in Noah's flood, Genesis 8:3, 13, 14). Which is perspicuously explained in Psalm 104:5-8, "He founded the earth" etc. Whence we gather that there really was earth, mountains, valleys, a space destined for the waters to be gathered into, distinct from the waters: although they were surrounded by them. Which argument Tertullian rightly observes, Against Hermogenes, chapter 29. Let it be seen, he says, "Let there be": for it had already been made. Fourth, from the absurd consequence: because then creation out of nothing is taken away: for no part of the visible world, neither containing nor contained, would have been created out of nothing, but out of that pre-existing unformed matter. Fifth, there is added the consensus of the ancients: Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, chapters 19, 25, and 26; Athanasius, On the Incarnation; Lactantius, Divine Institutes, book 2; Ambrose, Hexaemeron, book 1, chapter 7; Chrysostom, Homily 2 on Genesis; Theodoret, Questions on Genesis, question 11; Basil, Hexaemeron, homily 2; John Damascene, Orthodox Faith, book 2, chapter 5. Of the more recent authors, Piscator, who retracts the contrary opinion which he had formerly taught, Questions on Genesis 1, question 7; Keckermann, book 8, Theological System, chapter 7; Tilenus, Syntagma, volume 7, disputation 27; Daneau, Most Ancient Antiquity of the World, book 1, chapter 1: although he seems to speak otherwise in Christian Physics. Especially of Pererius and of our renowned teacher Dr. Gomarus, in the Disputation on Creation, who excellently defend this opinion; from whom we have drawn the reasons just put forward. We reject therefore 1. the opinion of Lombard in book 2, distinction 12, and of the other Sententiaries, Bonaventure, Albertus etc. Also of Alexander of

Hales and the Glossa. Whom Tostatus and Catharinus follow in their commentaries on Genesis, and of our own Zanchius, book 1, chapters 2 and 3, Polanus, Syntagma, book 5, chapter 4, Vermigli and Junius on Genesis, Alsted in Harmonic Physics, chapter 1, page 18 (where he argues that not even by "heaven" can a certain nature be understood, or the empyrean heaven), who by the name of "earth" understand the unformed matter, out of which all things were produced. 2. Plainly absurd is the opinion of Marsilius of Inghen in book 2, question 8, article 2, who states that God created the celestial bodies, and the matter of the elements without any substantial and accidental form: except extension. To which Gabriel Biel nearly accedes in book 2, distinction 12, questions 1, 2, 3. 3. Some of the Rabbis in Fagius, Collation of Various Interpreters of the Old Testament on Genesis, and R. Menasseh ben Israel, Problems concerning Creation, Problem 4, of whom some understand by the waters, over which the Spirit moved, prime matter, out of which all things were created: but others by tohu understand matter, by bohu form. 4. R. Moses Maimonides, who in Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, chapter 30, says with certain Doctors that on the first day all things were created together, heaven and earth, and the things contained in them: according to Isaiah 48:13, on the remaining days those things were only separated, so that the particle "in" in verse 1 should be expounded by "that is, with": as if to say, "with heaven and with earth he created," namely all things contained in them. 5. Of Vatablus, and others, whom Junius and Zanchius note, who think that in the first verse, as in a universal proposition, is contained the sum of the whole history of creation, which is distinctly explained in the following verses. 6. Of Augustine, who although elsewhere he wavers, in Confessions, book 12, chapter 8, and book 1, On Genesis, Against the Manichees (whom Eucherius follows in his commentary on Genesis), by heaven and earth understand nothing other than unformed matter, and prove this from Wisdom 11:18, although the book is apocryphal, and the words admit of a far different interpretation: see Lorinus in his commentary. 7. Of Becanus, who in Scholastic Theology, volume 1, treatise 3, chapter 2, and Cornelius à Lapide, who in his commentary, state that three bodies were created on this day, the empyrean heaven, the earth, and water: out of which were afterwards created air, fire, and all the mobile heavens. 8. Of Mercerus, who denies that the empyrean heaven was created on this day. See the contrary proved in Willet's Commentary on Genesis, and Becanus, place cited. 9. Of Vatablus, who in his notes observes that the earth is here so called by prolepsis, inasmuch as it was to exist only on the third day, whom Willet follows.

3. We must now deal in particular with heaven, the Elements, and light: Concerning heaven, let these be the theorems. 1. Heaven was created on the first day. Genesis 1:1, with 2:1. Add Psalm 102:26-27, with Hebrews 1:10, where that phrase κατ᾽ ἀρχάς indicates that in the beginning when the earth was created, heaven also was created; namely heaven not only the empyrean, but that which is to be changed, as verse 11, compare with 2 Peter 3:10. But now the earth was created on the first day. We reject the opinion of Becanus, Cornelius à Lapide, and those whom they follow, who want it to have been created only on the second day. 2. Whether it was created before the earth, Scripture does not determine. It is indeed named first, but in verse 2, again, the earth. Therefore what prevents us from saying with Mercerus that they were created together? Most safely, however, we ἐπέχομεν and learnedly confess our ignorance. 3. It was created out of nothing, not out of chaos, or water: against the authors cited in the preceding thesis. 4. It consists of matter and form, as all natural bodies do: against Averroes, and the

Averroists, whose opinion among the more recent authors is defended ex professo by the Philosopher of Padua, Jacopo Zabarella, in his treatise On the Nature of the Heavens. Whom see refuted in Scipio Chiaramonti, book 1, On the Universe, chapters 7, 8, 9, 10. Perhaps that saying of the apostle in 1 Corinthians 15:40 would pertain to this, where he makes the celestial things bodies: but no body is without matter. 5. It is not animated or rational: against the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, Jews, Priscillianists. And some more recent authors who have attributed a soul to it, some only an intelligent one, others also a nutritive one. Those who attribute an intelligent soul to it, go off into diverse opinions: for some make the intelligence itself an informing form; others, some soul below intelligence, and that either rational, but equipped only with higher senses (as the Academics and of them Simplicius, On Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 2, text 3), or only sensitive, and that either equipped only with an internal sense, namely imagination (as Avicenna, Metaphysics, book 9, chapter 2), or equipped also with external senses (as Johannes Jacobus Pavellus, Metaphysical Disputations, disputation 5, chapter 26). Others, finally, attribute to it a vegetative soul, as the Epicureans and Stoics. See Seneca, Natural Questions, book 2. See Lactantius, Divine Institutes, book 2, chapter 6; John Damascene, On Heresies; Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, book 2; Seneca, Natural Questions, book 2, chapter 5; Plato, Cratylus and Epinomis; Laertius, Life of Anaxagoras; Pliny, Natural History, book 2, chapter 8. Of the Jews, Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, chapter 4, attributes to heaven a soul, intellect, appetite, but distinguishes its soul from the souls of animals. Compare Buxtorf, Jewish Synagogue, chapter 17, page 374.

Some of the Muhammadan Arabs foster the same opinion, such as Avicenna cited just now, and with him Algazel, Alpharabius, Albumasar: nor is it to be wondered at, since their prophet Muhammad attributes faith to the sun and moon. But it is a wonder that of the Christians, Origen, in book 7 of De Principiis and volume 1 of his Commentary on John and book 5 Against Celsus, states that the stars are capable of vice and virtue, and religiously worship God, for thus his words sound in book 5 against Celsus, where he argues that the stars are not to be worshipped by men but rather men are to be worshipped by the stars: "For indeed," he says, "the Heavenly Stars are rational animals and endowed with virtue (σώματα)" etc. "For their sensible light is the work of the creator: but the intelligible light is perhaps also their τὸ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν εἶναι αὐτῶν, that is, proceeding from their free choice." And a little later: "Not being ignorant that the Sun itself, the Moon, and the stars offer prayers to God the Lord of all things, we judge that there is no need to solicit with prayers those who themselves pray, since this is more pleasing to them if, when about to pray, we approach God rather than them, and do not divide our prayers." It is also a wonder that Augustine himself doubts, in the book On Christian Doctrine, chapter 58, "Whether to the same society (namely of the angels) pertain the sun and moon and all the stars, although to some they seem to be luminous bodies, not with sense and intelligence." Although in book 2 of the Retractions, chapter 7, he seems to waver, and in book 1, chapters 5 and 11, to retract it not obscurely. Of the Scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Aureolus, Cajetan seem to incline to this, as Pererius admits in his commentary on Genesis, book 2, question 7. And of the more recent authors, Baranzano, Uranoscopia, part 1, doubt 4, Paul Ricius, a convert from Judaism to Papist Christianity, revived the ancient error about the soul of heaven, with the publication of a compendium On the Soul of Heaven: Claude Espencé, a Parisian theologian, attacked him in a special treatise On the

Animation of the Heavens. The same opinion had been proscribed before him by the Scholastics on book 2, distinction 14, and by Thomas Aquinas, correcting his earlier opinion in part 1, question 70, article 3, and there by the commentators: who should be consulted. And Pererius on Genesis, book 1, question 7. If anyone desires a compendium, let him go to Chiaramonti, book 1, On the Universe, chapters 11, 12, 13. And the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 2, chapter 1, question 1. Whence it will be clear to the reader how wrongly Jacobus Schegkius has involved rather than explained the mind of Aristotle, in his Anti-Simonius, section 9, page 409: "But so that you may understand," he says, "that all things are true, I now want to explain to you clearly what my opinion is. Aristotle said that these three things are, as causes and principles, both of the Substance and of the celestial motion, namely Nature, or the Form of Heaven, then the Soul, and then the Mind and Intellect; by all of which the Orb and Celestial Substance is constituted as an eternal and divine Animal, not as separate in place or subject, but all concretely joined and united together, constituting the substance and celestial Animal to the number one." Ibid., page 411, he has this marginal lemma: "The form of Heaven is a separate act, because it is not constituted by a body, but itself constitutes a body, nor does it move by organic instruments, but it moves by the most secret appearance of mind, and by appetite." 6. That the heaven by its motion produces no harmony, against Pythagoras and some others who delight themselves with this pleasant fancy, a pleasing rather than necessary subtlety, as Pliny says in book 2, chapter 22. See Aristotle, On the Heavens, book 2, chapter 9. Nor were certain Hebrew Doctors aliens to this opinion, as Maimonides indicates, Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, chapter 8. But this opinion, once detected, falls of its own accord. 7. That the heaven or stars in Heaven are moved by their proper form is clear from the Aristotelian definition of nature: From Psalm 104:19, 136:8-9, 19:5-7, compare with Genesis 1:10, we learn that this is the law of nature originally implanted in them by God: why not therefore motion from form? Therefore that opinion of Aristotle about the Intelligences moving the orbs is more than Platonic-poetic and conjectural, most remote from the genius of his masculine philosophy: which nevertheless for so many centuries most Christian philosophers have followed out of ἀβασανίστως, on Physics, book 8, chapter 6, and Metaphysics, book 12, chapter 8, and the Scholastic Theologians on book 2, distinction 14, and on Thomas Aquinas, part 1, question 110. To whom add the Arabs and Jews. Indeed, Thomas Aquinas too, On the Power of God, question 6, article 3, says that this opinion is of faith. Of the more recent authors, the Coimbrans on On the Heavens, book 2, chapter 5, question 5, laboriously defend it. Francisco Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations, disputation 35, section 1, only admits Aristotle's discourse as probable. Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, in Summa Philosophiae, part 3, page 89, and Baranzano, Uranoscopia, part 1, question 7, doubt 1, and in New Opinions Engaged in Combat, daytime 12, thesis 2, attack it. Therefore, with this assertion overturned or uncertain, the following questions are about nothing. 1. Whether God immediately moves the primum mobile. 2. Whether there is one angel moving heaven or many. 3. Of what order and hierarchy those movers are. 4. Whether they rotate the heavens by intellect and will alone. 5. Whether they move by imparting impulse and freely. 6. Whether the inferior orbs are moved from east to west by a double intelligence; by their own, of course, and by the mover of the primum mobile: of which opinion Baranzano makes mention in the cited question, doubt 2, member 1. 7. Whether the first mover moves heaven only as a beloved end. 8. Whether the moving intelligence can be the true form giving being to heaven. Concerning all of which the Scholastics

inquire idly in the cited places, and of the more recent authors Lavellus on Metaphysics, book 12, questions 15, 16, 17, Baranzano and the Coimbrans in the cited place. 8. That the heaven is not so subject to substantial change, as also to alteration, as sublunary things, is taught by experience and Scripture, Psalm 72:5, 17, Job 14:7. By which, however, we do not determine that question, whether something new can arise in it. For because Scripture does not determine this, we leave it to the philosophers to ventilate, along with the following: Whether the matter of the heavens differs in species from the matter of sublunary things. Whether the figure of heaven is round. Whether there are many distinct orbs and how many. Whether the matters of the orbs differ among themselves, and the stars from their orbs, in form and species. Whether the quantity of heaven is of the same nature as sublunary quantity. Whether there is really rarity and density in them, likewise gravity and levity. Whether they are of a fluid or rather of a solid substance. What is the order of the celestial spheres. Whether each sphere of the planets is composed of eccentric orbs. Whether there are epicycles, etc. We admit that by the Scholastics, and by the more recent Ptolemaics and Peripatetics, Clavius in his commentary on Sacrobosco, Baranzano in Uranoscopia, Keckermann in Physics, Casmann in Astrology, Pererius book 2 on Genesis, questions 3 and 4, for the determination of certain theses passages of Scripture are cited: but that something certain can be concluded from them is sure concerning some, doubtful concerning others, not so clear concerning others; if indeed they are accurately examined from the original texts. Concerning the compact and solid substance of the heavens and concerning the etymology of the Hebrew word רקיע and its translation by στερέωμα, Valerius, book 1, Miscellaneous Theology, chapter 6, collects many things learnedly, with whom compare Drusius, on Difficult Passages of the Pentateuch, chapter 5. How the Gentiles worshipped heaven as God and why, Vossius explains at length, book 2, On Idolatry, chapters 37 and 38.

We hold the opinion with Basil, Hexaemeron, Mercerus, Pererius, Münster, although the latter does not speak so expressly, that the elements were created on the first day, and that they are contained synecdochically under the name of earth. That this acceptation of the word is usual is shown by the passages Genesis 1:17 and 2:1, 14:22, Exodus 31:17, etc. And indeed concerning water, which constitutes one globe with the earth, it is clear from verse 2, compare with Psalm 104:6, where mention is made of the abyss (that is, of the depth of waters), and the spirit is said to have moved over the face of the waters. That fire and air are comprehended under the name of earth is observed by Basil and Bede not to be unusual, because they are really contained in the earth in many ways even now; which the fires, flames, boiling waters continually erupting from the earth teach, and the air filling the caverns of the earth. The various interpretations disagree, however, for 1. there are some who by earth understand chaos or common matter, as we noted above; indeed Philastrius even accuses of heresy those who think otherwise. But this is an error of Philastrius, which along with others of that kind in him and in other writers on heresies should be noted; lest we define heresies and heretics promiscuously by their faith alone. 2. Others understand all sublunary bodies, as Vatablus, and whoever hold that in this first verse the entire history of creation is summarily set forth. Which is repugnant to the series of creation and Exodus 20:11. For then God would have created nothing in its form and species on the first day. 3. Others understand only earth and water; as Becanus, Cornelius à Lapide, and others cited above. Which interpretation, although for another end, is embraced by those who acknowledge only two elements. 4. Eugubinus, whom Lorinus would nearly follow

in his commentary on Wisdom 11:18, by the earth empty and void understands the nothing, out of which afterwards the earth and the whole world was made. Perhaps Aquila and Theodotion wanted the same, when the former translates tohu vabohu by κένωμα καὶ οὐδέν, the latter by κενὸν καὶ οὐθέν. But how is God said to have created that nothing on the first day? Furthermore, concerning the elements (presupposing the Aristotelian definition) these things are usually inquired. 1. How many and what the elements are. Plato in the Timaeus and in Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, book 1; the Stoics in Stobaeus, Eclogues, book 1, chapter 25; Varro in Augustine, City of God, book 7, chapter 6; Aristotle with the Greek, Arab, Latin physicists, also the physicians, astronomers, poets; in addition the theologians, both the fathers and the Scholastics and more recent authors hitherto have held that there are four: the Hebrews have followed the same path, as can be seen in the physics of R. Aben Tibbon, chapter 7, and Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, chapter 30. So that it is allowable to exclaim here that saying of Pliny, book 2, chapter 5: "Nor do I see it doubted concerning the elements, that they are four." Reasons are also adduced by the common physicists, drawn from the elementary qualities, from the generation of a mixed body, etc.: which see there. Something could also be adduced from Scripture; indeed for fire everywhere (for no one doubts about earth and water) Exodus 35:3, Numbers 28:24, 9:15, Psalm 104:4, Romans 12:20, etc., where surely some substance, and a subject (for actions belong to supposita), both from the qualities, namely heat, light, and heating faculty, and also from another substance (as earth, or a mixed body), to which it is joined, seems to be implied as distinct. And indeed the faculties and actions of fire which we apprehend in a mixed body require that some substance be conceived: If you say that it seems that it cannot be except in terrestrial dryness, or in some mixed body, and so is either an accident, or nothing other than earth, or air accidentally changed: it can be replied that the animal, vital, natural spirits in man are substances, and yet are not seen, nor can they subsist outside their vehicle of blood and other parts of the body, both similar and dissimilar. What then prevents us from calling that attenuated and ignited thing, which they call air or earth converted into fire, a simple body, specifically distinct from them, not otherwise than as the vital spirits differ specifically from air or blood, from which however they are said to be generated and in which to inhere. Concerning air, to leave experience and reasons to the philosophers, what prevents us from expounding רקיע (raqia), the expanse (concerning which on the third day), as it is taken in Genesis 1:20? Indeed the word אתר (ether) too in Isaiah 45 signifies air; as the Targum also there expounds it by ענני (clouds). To this received doctrine are opposed 1. those who posit only three elements: and substitute for fire either heaven (as the Epicureans, who thought that only the stars were fiery, and that the matter of heaven and of fire was the same, in Lucretius, book 5, with whom Plato agreed in the Timaeus and Epinomis and in Plutarch, book 2, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, chapter 11, section 1, Pliny, book 2, chapter 5, and the ancient philosophers in Aristotle, Meteorology, book 1, chapter 3, and Stobaeus, Eclogues, book 1, chapter 25) or the light of the sun as the pure element of fire, which they want to have been created on the first day. Thus R. Menasseh ben Israel, On Creation, problem 14, where he adduces three reasons. 2. Those who acknowledge only two, as Daneau, Christian Physics, part 2, treatise 1, chapters 6, 7, 8, where he argues that air is not a body, but that expanded space from earth to heaven, likewise that fire is a mere accident, namely that luminous heat created on the first day; as concerning the same John Damascene, book 2, chapter 7. Timpler follows Daneau in his Physics. Polanus likewise by that light understands fire: although he

wants it to be an element, and so a simple body properly so called. 3. Those who, although receiving them in name, in reality plainly deny all the elements (as the more recent Hermeticists), while they make other elements invisible, which are as it were the soul of the visible elements, in which the seeds of things lie hidden, which in certain periods of time proceed into generation: while also they make three other principles prior to our four elements, namely salt, sulphur, and Mercury; which opinion I do not see how they will reconcile with the history of creation (Genesis 1:1-3, Hebrews 11:3). Indeed we do not deny that in elementary earth, that is, the salt of Paracelsus, the four elements have their seat and dwelling as in their proper domicile (as Dorneus explains in Physics Taken from Genesis, page 53): but we do not see how from this it follows that those three either were created before the elements, or were concreated together in and with the elements themselves as principles. These elements you will find expounded in Petrus Severinus, Philosophical Medicine, and after him Oswald Croll, Basilica Chymica, preface, pages 40-41: "For the holy Trinity, through its Triune pronounced word 'Let there be', created all things Triune, as the Spagyric Analysis testifies: God through the word 'Let there be' produced prime matter, which by reason of the three Principles contained is first triple, and afterwards these three species were separated into four diverse bodies or Elements, not otherwise than as if a skilled artificer should make from Lead, Red Lead, White Lead, Glass and Spirit of Saturn." And a little later, page 41: "They usually add a fourth element, which they call Spirit (the Spirit of the Lord over the waters, as the marginal lemma has it there), which although it can be gotten from minerals and vegetables, yet in animals on account of the subtlety it is not subjected to the artificer's actions, nor can it be captured: thus sulphur would correspond to fire, salt to earth, Mercury to water, Spirit to air." And page 44: "Our visible Elements are only the bodies and dwellings of others, and impede and delay their power. For all things that are joined with a visible body suffocate and break the force, potency, and operation of the internal Spirit. Earth is twofold, External visible, Internal invisible. The External is not an Element, but is the body of the Element, and is Sulphur, Mercury, Salt. But the Element of Earth is life and spirit, in which lie the Stars of the Earth, which through the body of the Earth produce all growing things." And page 45: "Water too is twofold, namely Body, which is Mercury, Sulphur, and Salt: but the Element is life and spirit in which are contained the Stars of Water, which from their abyss like a mother bring forth all minerals, salts, metals, stones, gems, sands, and all the fruits of Water, which nevertheless are dug out of the Earth." He adds there in the marginal lemma: "Such is the power of the element of water, that not even spiritual regeneration takes place without water, as Christ says to Nicodemus." These anti-elements of Paracelsus, examined, see in Sennert, chapter 1 of the oft-cited book. And in the Physical Hypomnemata, book 1, chapters 2 and 3, where he treats of Mixture. Libavius also defends the Aristotelian elements and doctrine of Generation in his Physical Questions Controversial between the Ramists and Peripatetics against James Martin the Scot. 4. Those who, against the Aristotelians, deny the element of fire below the concave of the moon, as Valla, Cardano, most of the followers of Ramus, etc. The examination of this problem we entrust to the philosophers: see the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 3, chapter 5, question 1, Scaliger, Exercitations 9, and other common physicists, and Cervello and Clavius, who plead the same cause for the astronomers on Sacrobosco, chapter 1. Chiaramonti, book 11, On the Universe, chapter 8, etc., and book 2, chapter 1, defends the same but as probable. Vossius, book 2, On Idolatry, chapter 83, thinks that Aristotle himself did not acknowledge such a fire but only a dry

and hot exhalation, Meteorology, book 1, chapter 7, so that that so-called fire is nothing other than air burning from the mixture of hot exhalations. Perhaps the passages of Aristotle that seem to locate fire near heaven could be so expounded as to say that from the opinion of the ancients he understood by superior fire the celestial body, but not the elementary body; which they held to be fire. Pliny, book 2, chapter 5. See other authors cited in Lipsius, book 2, Physiologia Stoicorum, dissertation 12. 2. It is inquired concerning the order and location of the elements in this universe. Concerning earth and water, that they make up one globe is clear from the work of the third day: and that they are in the lowest place below air and whatever celestial bodies there are, which are above air (among which the Sun too is numbered, Psalm 19). But how the system of the world delineated by Kepler, Epitome of Astronomy, book 4, page 438, agrees with these, no one has yet taught us. He says that there are three principal parts and regions of the world, symbols of the three persons of the Holy Trinity, namely the center of the Father, the surface of the Son, and the intermediate of the Holy Spirit. He removes the Sun from the number of the stars (by what Scripture, whether Genesis 1 and Psalm 8), and places it in the center of the world: the sphere of the fixed stars on the surface, and finally the system of the planets in the region intermediate between the sun and the fixed stars. But he reckons the Earth in the planetary region or mobile world: For it is not a primary part of the world. In what style? whether of Scripture, Genesis 2:1 and 14:22, etc. But let the artificers see about these things. We have elsewhere attacked as best we could the primary thesis on which he builds this hypothesis, concerning the rotation of the earth and the stillness of the sun. 3. Whether the elements change into each other, and whether generation and mixture really take place, as also the resolution of mixed bodies into the same through corruption: the philosophers excellently teach: who also so defend it against the attacks of adversaries, as could suffice in this darkness of our mind, if not for evident knowledge, at least for learned ignorance. See Sennert, place cited, and the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption, book 2, chapters 4, 8, 9. But more on this below. 4. What besides is usually defined by the philosophers concerning the dignity of the elements: concerning the round figure of each: concerning the greater quantity of the superior ones: concerning gravity and levity, concerning their primary and symbolic qualities, etc., we do not want to reject: since they are at least not repugnant to the Scriptures, if they are not expressly contained in them: indeed, the most learned theologians too have touched on them: and they suffuse our minds with the honest pleasure of contemplation. 5. Since we must deal specifically with air on day 2, with water and earth on day 3: only concerning fire, on this occasion we propose these things from the sacred writings to be considered by students of theology. Mention is made of wonderful fires, in the bush, Exodus 3; in the column, Exodus 13:21 and 14:24; on mount Sinai, Exodus 19:16; in the destruction of Sodom, Genesis 19; devouring the holocaust, Leviticus 9:24, and Nadab and Abihu, Leviticus 10:2, and Korah, Numbers 16; the sacrifice of Solomon, 2 Chronicles 7:1, and of Elijah, 1 Kings 18:38; descending and devouring the soldiers of Ahab, 2 Kings 1:10, 12. In the chariot of Elijah, 2 Kings 2:11; in that appearance, 2 Kings 6:17. In the Babylonian furnace, Daniel 3. In the miracles of Antichrist, Revelation 13:13. At the end of the world, 2 Peter 3:7, with 2 Thessalonians 1:8. In hell, Mark 9: concerning which fire we must speak elsewhere ex professo. Concerning prodigies and portents through fire, Acts 2:19, and concerning the various miracles of nature, as also concerning fires, conflagrations, death by burning, concerning subterranean fires and concerning fire-spewing mountains, the historians and natural thaumatographers

should be consulted. Concerning the last-mentioned we note some things below, part 6. The vehemence of this natural element from Proverbs 30:17, and its various use and abuse in common life, in religion, in the arts, will easily be clear to the diligent reader from other sayings of Scripture. Which observations will contribute not a little to explaining many spiritual things analogically. As an example, Polanus noted some things, book 5, Syntagma, chapter 16. How great the necessity, efficacy and use of fire is, is clear even from this, that it was elevated to a god among the Gentiles. Lipsius, book 2, Physiologia Stoicorum, dissertation 12. See very many things collected concerning the worship of Fire in Julius Caesar Bulenger, book 1, Eclogues on Arnobius, chapters 5 and 6; after whom likewise very many things were collected by Gerardus Joannes Vossius, book 2, On Idolatry, chapters 64, 65, 66. Among the problems usually agitated by the philosophers, that one is not ignoble: Whether any animals live in fire, or are generated from fire. For the negative part there seems to make the fact that in the history of creation, the fecund production of animals is attributed to water and earth, none to fire. Besides, both common experience is alleged, and the consensus of the wise with Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, book 2, chapter 3, and On Generation and Corruption, text 21, and Meteorology, book 4, chapter 1; and reason, because no animal can subsist without touch; but since that consists in the tempering of the primary qualities, it is immediately corrupted and dissolved by any excelling quality (especially heat). Thus Pererius, book 1 on Genesis, on chapter 1, verse 24. What are usually adduced from Pliny, book 10, chapter 67, and book 11, chapter 36, where he treats of pyraustae, and from Aristotle, History of Animals, book 5, chapter 19, especially concerning the salamander, some number among fables: and Matthiolus, in his commentary on Dioscorides, book 2, chapter 65, refutes the contrary concerning the salamander from his own experience, Galen too is adduced, book 3, On Temperaments. On the other hand, however, Albertus Magnus, Cardano, Scaliger, Georgius Agricola, Mercurialis, Licetus strive with and for Aristotle and Pliny, and with them Nieremberg, book 4, Natural History, chapters 17, 18, where he defends the opinion of Aristotle ex professo, and reconciles his φιλοσοφεῖν with this distinction, that animals are born or generated in the middle of fire, but not from fire. Which Cardano, Mercurialis, Licetus, and after all of them Sennert, Physical Hypomnemata 5, chapter 8, page 420, think is the same. Seneca, Agricola, Scaliger, Exercitation 23, however, think that they are generated from fire. Pliny seems to want the same, book 11, chapter 36: "Nature's contrary element too generates some things: for indeed in the copper-smelting furnaces of Cyprus" etc. Concerning the salamander living in fire ibid. Nierenberg, chapter 19, distinguishes that for a time it only blunts small fires either by its skin or by a rival stiffness, or even extinguishes them by pouring back moisture, but is overcome by large fires. I think we must acquiesce in each distinction of this man.

And these indeed are the self-subsisting things created on this day. Concerning which it must be said that they were created directly, properly, and immediately out of nothing, but not out of any pre-existing matter, whether eternal or produced before the beginning of the world and time. And to this we think pertain the passages Hebrews 11:3, Romans 4:17. And the history of creation, Genesis 1:1, where no matter is mentioned. With which can be compared 2 Corinthians 4:6, where the light produced on the first day together with heaven and earth is said to have shone out of darkness; that is, as from a terminus, or non-light, but not as from matter. Which likewise should be understood equally of heaven and earth. Therefore by faith it is held,

and by reason defended, creation out of nothing. Concerning which see Tertullian, Against Hermogenes; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, book 7, chapter 8, etc.; among the more recent authors Pererius, Philosophical Disputations, book 5.

5. In another [sense] things were created either separately produced in substances, or together with them. Of this kind only is light; to which darkness is opposed. Concerning light it is asked: 1. Whether it was properly light? We affirm, against those who say it was the element of fire, as Polanus cited above, or the sun, as R. Menasseh in the cited place, or luminous heat, as Daneau just cited. They are refuted from the text, verses 2-3, compare with 2 Corinthians 4, the privation of which opposed to it is darkness, that is nothing other than light. Moreover, the luminaries created on the fourth day, verses 14-15, cannot be understood under the name of light created on the first day. We reject especially the opinion of Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 1, chapter 3, and City of God, book 11, chapter 9, of Eucherius on Genesis, and of Rupert of Deutz, book 1, On the Works of the Trinity, chapter 10, who think that this light was spiritual, namely the confirmation of the angels in grace and consequently the division of light from darkness was the separation of the good and evil angels. See this refuted by the Master of the Sentences, book 2, distinction 14, and the Sententiaries, Pererius, book 1 on Genesis, on chapter 1, verse 3, Zanchius, part 2, book 1, chapter 2, especially Becanus, Scholastic Theology, cited treatise, chapter 3. 2. Whether it was a substance or an accident produced in a substance? The affirmative is preferred, nor is there need here for many reasons: they can be sought from the doctrine of metaphysics about substance and accident; as also from physics about light. See the Scholastics on Aquinas, part 1, question 67, articles 2 and 3. We reject 1. those who want it to have been the sun, or the element of fire, as John Damascene, book 2, On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 7, and others already cited. 2. Those who think it was produced and existed as a quality without a subject: which opinion Cornelius à Lapide attributes to Basil, homily 6, Theodoret, Gregory Nazianzen, Oration on Sunday (how truly, I do not now inquire) and from there concludes: "Which note against the heretics, who deny that accidents can exist without a subject in the Eucharist." 3. Whether it was created out of nothing or out of matter? Zanchius, cited place, wants it to be out of matter (namely chaos), because God said, "Let there be light," namely out of matter, which he confirms from 2 Corinthians 4:6, "out of darkness he commanded the light to shine," that is, out of chaos. But these reasons are less firm. About the question itself we do not labor so much, although we prefer to believe that that quality was added to some body as a subject out of nothing, in the way that God introduces grace or the gifts of the Spirit (which are mere qualities) in the mind and will by creating out of nothing. 4. Whether it was celestial or elementary; that is, whence that light shone and to which proper subject it inhered; or what and of what sort the luminous body was. Those who make it elementary go off into two opinions. 1. There are those who state that it arose from the element of fire placed in its seat, and so was diffused through the air: thus Junius on Genesis 1:3. Hugo of St. Victor held nearly the same opinion, annotation 6 on Genesis, as did Gregory of Nyssa, homily on the Hexaemeron. But that fire (which is posited below the concave of the moon) on account of its excessive subtlety does not illuminate, but that more impure fire which was in the earth could not illuminate that whole space, especially since it was enclosed by earth and the rest of the adjoining elements: See this opinion refuted by Zanchius, cited place, Pererius, page 90, Valerius, Miscellaneous Theology, book 1, chapter

12, Becanus, Scholastic Theology, cited place. 2. Others, that it was a bright cloud created on the first day, which by its circular motion from east to west made day and night; so that it was a sort of imperfect sun, or the matter and embryo of the sun, because afterwards the sun was formed out of it: Thus Zanchius; and with him Valerius, cited place, Cornelius à Lapide; and before them Bede, Hugh of St. Victor, the Master of the Sentences, book 2, distinction 14, and there Bonaventure and other Sententiaries, Nicholas of Lyra, Alfonso Tostado. Becanus, cited place, does not disapprove of this opinion: but in general calls it a luminous body; which on the fourth day was either resolved into water, or changed into the sun. Which opinion Thomas Aquinas opposes, part 1, question 67, article 4, reply to objection 2. 3. Others, that it was immediately produced by God in the water, as in a subject. Thus Becanus ibid. The authors who make it celestial, and placed in a celestial body, go off into two opinions. 1. Some think it was the perfect light of the sun, just as it is now: thus Catherinus, who excepts that on the fourth day the fixed stars were created, but the planets created on the first day are there commemorated by way of recapitulation. Pererius, Zanchius, Becanus refute him, cited place. 2. Others, that it was imperfect and as it were unformed: because the sun only had the motion of the primum mobile, and by it was carried from east to west to distinguish day and night: but on the fourth day its proper motion from west to east was given to it, and so a new perfection accrued to it for effecting the different seasons of the year, unequal days and nights, giving signs and presages of storms, etc. So that only on the fourth day should it be said to have been created, not as to substance (for thus it was created on the first day) but as to those perfections. Thus Thomas Aquinas, part 1, question 67, article 4, and Gregory of Valentia there, Denys the Carthusian on Genesis 1, Pererius especially sharply defends this, pages 96, 97, 98. But this opinion does not agree with the history of Moses: which Becanus also notes. To us in a matter so controverted it has always seemed safest to state that this light was produced and dispersed in the whole starry heaven: but on the fourth day contracted into the created stars (which to Aristotle are the denser parts of heaven): in the way that the waters at first dispersed were collected into the sea and abysses. I now observe in Zanchius, chapter 2, page 314, that some had something akin to this opinion, saying that the subject of light (or rather of illumination) was the whole last sphere of chaos itself: so that without circular motion it would make day by its expansion, and night by its contraction. Concerning that contraction John Damascene, Orthodox Faith, book 2, chapter 7: "In the three days, therefore, the light being diffused and contracted by divine command, day and night were made." And Basil, Hexaemeral Homilies, homily 2, near the end: "Now indeed henceforth after the generation of the sun, day is the air itself, illuminated by the sun shining in the hemisphere above the earth: and night is the earth's shadow, succeeding when the sun is hidden. But then not according to the solar motion, but that primogenital light being diffused, and again contracted, according to the predefined measure from God, day was made, and night on the other hand approached." Where similarly the light is said to be "diffused and contracted, κατὰ τὸ ὁρισθὲν μέτρον παρὰ Θεοῦ". The same Basil, Theodoret, and some of the more recent authors in Becanus affirm that God produced light immediately without any subject, and diffused it from a certain part of space through the whole hemisphere, in the way that now it is diffused from the sun: so that it began successively to run from East to West and completed its course in 24 hours. But in this I dissent from them, that I hold it was not only illumination, but also light properly so called, and its subject was not only a body receptive of light (suppose, water or chaos), but one which had the power of producing light outside itself (namely, heaven), as the

sun and stars do, although in a lesser degree: because united forces are stronger. 5. Whether the celestial light which now is differs in species from that primeval one? We deny, and it is sufficiently clear from what has been said. 6. Whether that light began to be diffused from the point of the East, or from the point of the South, or from some other point, I judge it vain to inquire: and rashly determined by Bede, Cajetan, Molina, etc. For what they designate, the land of Canaan (with respect to which they want Moses to have described the boundaries of days and nights), and so say that that light was produced at the point of the east, with respect to that land, after 12 hours from the creation of the world, that can be rejected with the same ease with which it is asserted. Let him see, who has leisure, Molina on part 1, question 67, and Becanus, cited place.

Consectary. We disapprove of that light having been without any subject, as indeed some want by pretext of the authority of Basil, Theodoret, Gregory Nazianzen, as Cornelius à Lapide just now cited and Becanus: not only with Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, part 1, question 68, article 2, Pererius, page 95, because a miracle is not to be conceded in the work of the six days; but because it implies a contradiction for an accident to be without a subject, and so not even by a miracle is it possible.

6. And these things concerning the primeval light. Concerning light in general perhaps something will be said on the fourth day. To this light are opposed the darknesses, out of which the apostle teaches that light shone, 2 Corinthians 4:6. It is not much to be inquired by those who have tasted philosophy, what darknesses are. Maimonides by Genesis 1:2 understands elementary fire (which he ridiculously proves from Deuteronomy 5:23, with Job 20:26), which namely does not provide light, although it is transparent. Basil, Hexaemeral Homilies, homily 2, says these darknesses were the shadow of the heavens. For he thinks, as does Theodoret, that those darknesses arose from heaven, an opaque body interposed between the earth and the inaccessible light in which the angels were engaged, and which God had made before this visible world. Pererius admits that Bede brings forth nearly the same things in his Hexaemeron, and confirms them by the testimony of Peter (according to Clement of Rome) on Genesis 1:2, but not without blushing. But concerning the first darknesses of the world, he says, it is memorable and truly paradoxical, what Basil and Theodoret etc. And a little later: But truly, if they thought this which their words bear on the surface, and wanted to signify it, it is difficult to approve their opinion. So that from this you may see how safe a refuge it is from Scripture to tradition, and to the fathers and demi-fathers, or quasi-fathers, namely the disciples of the fathers, and all the writers of the intermediate age. But if Basil thinks that philosophical demonstrations should be renounced, much more should such conjectures and figments which are brought forward both without Scripture and without reason, indeed without the least shadow of reason: "Let the simplicity of faith be stronger than rational demonstrations."

7. Things concreated at the same moment of time with their complete substances, that is, with heaven and the elements, and indeed as parts in and with the whole, and as principles and with things principiated, are considered either metaphysically and logically or physically. The former are genera, differences, species. Differences taken from the essential form are understood to be co-produced no otherwise than the forms, insofar namely as they are absolutely and in

themselves constitutive: but insofar as they are divisive, they should be said to be created consequently or by resultance. But differences taken from proper accidents we understand to have been created in the same way in themselves and by reason of their subject, as the accidents themselves: but συναύξως with respect to another subject (from which they distinguish) by consequence. As to universals, namely genera and species, we say they were concreated insofar as they are without the operation of our mind. For they can terminate creation neither more nor less. And thus is to be understood what is commonly said: that God by creation brought forth all the species of things. In individuals, namely, because it was terminated first and directly to individuals: for the terminus of every action is something singular. The things which modern philosophers dispute against Plato, the realists, the nominalists, about universals should be compared: among others Ruvio, Suárez, the Coimbrans. Parts of a composite or principles considered physically with respect to constitution are called principles, with respect to operation nature, and are matter and form, to which is not badly added privation, as a principle per accidens, required for transmutation. That nature, as it is commonly described by the philosophers from Aristotle, does not conflict with sacred philosophy, indeed rather agrees with it well enough we gather from Genesis 1:11, 12, 25. Whence טבע in Rabbinic, and طبيعة in Arabic, nature, from the Biblical root טבע, was immersed, infixed, impressed, because it is impressed and innate in each thing. The apostle James attributes nature to all animals, chapter 3, verse 7. Why then should we not say that the first natures, that is, matter and form, through which individual composites, and the affections and faculties of composites are called natures, were in the beginning increated and concreated by God in their composites? Furthermore, many things most worthy of being known could be exhibited here by the philosophers concerning principles in general and in particular, which theologians should not disdain. We, because those things have been excellently explained, and the books are daily in hand, will now abstain from them by design: although our theologians Zanchius, Daneau, Polanus etc. by the example of the Scholastics do not fear to discuss them ex professo. Therefore let it suffice now to exhibit this gleaning. 1. Whether prime matter in the Aristotelian sense is given; and it was created by God? We affirm. And the declamations of Ramus in his Physical Schools, and of the Hermeticists in Sennert, chapter 7, by which they deny this concreated matter, sin against right reason and the doctrine of creation. Not to repeat now the reasons of the Aristotelians, these things should be opposed to their objections. 1. The forms of things, the center of the earth, the essence of the soul etc. are not perceived by the senses, and yet are something created, nor do the adversaries deny this. 2. The quantity of bodies, and consequently lines, surfaces, points, time, number, do not exist separately without their substances, nor were they created separately without them: yet no one denies that they have been produced. The same should be said of the coexistence of the sun and light which were created at the same time, and yet their entities are distinct, and one is prior to the other in the instant of nature. Similarly it should be thought concerning prime matter. 3. When God created natural composites, did he not create their parts and principles, which are distinct in their entities, although they never existed separate and apart, not even for a moment? But now matter as it is conceived without this form (suppose, of water) under which it now exists, and its entity is distinguished from the form: so no less without any form whatsoever it should be conceived and distinguished from it. 4. This creation of matter is properly called incomplete creation. See of the more recent Aristotelians Antonius Ruvius on Aristotle's Physics, book 1,

treatise 1, on Form, question 1, page 105. Just as also the essence and existence of matter, or of form, and of body or soul in living Socrates is incomplete. With this distinction posited, those exceptions fall which from the Ramist declamations against Aristotle are adopted by those who say that prime matter is rather from the operation of the mind than from the truth of existence, and is considered abstractively rather than to be or exist so: and concerning the principles of things it should be considered as they are, not as they can be considered. Philosophers know that by precisive abstraction many things are conceived as really distinct, which nevertheless are not separate in existence, or do not exist separately. Thus soul and body in Socrates are two really distinct (but incomplete) beings, and are conceived as distinct: although his body does not exist except with the soul. Thus prime matter does not exist except under some form, and yet its incomplete essence is distinct from the incomplete essence of form, and should and can be considered distinctly from it.

2. Whether this matter is one in species and number. We reply affirmatively, at least concerning sublunary matter; yet so that just as its essence, so also its unity incomplete and partial, may be understood. Moreover it has that unity not only negatively, but also positively from its intrinsic nature: which unity distinguish from the extrinsic or accidental unity which it has from form and composite. See the Scholastics on Aquinas, part 1, question 16, article 7, and question 69, article 2. 3. Whether this numerical unity is so perfect that from the beginning to the end of the world nothing of matter has departed. We affirm, because otherwise annihilation would be given in the nature of things, which we denied in Disputation 1. 4. Whether heaven and earth created in the beginning (if indeed they are conceded to have been an unformed mass or chaos) were the prime matter of Aristotle? We reply negatively, for it was not directly created but increated or concreated in composites; nor did it exist (the Thomists add, nor could it exist by the absolute power of God) for even a moment without some form. Against Marsilius and Gabriel cited above. And Gregory of Rimini who in book 2, distinction 12, the one question, argues that it existed before without form, for an imaginable duration of time. 5. Whether there existed in matter created in the beginning a certain universal form without qualities and properties, as Gregory of Nyssa wants in his Hexaemeron; or a form of corporeity, as Tostado. We reply negatively. 6. Whether prime matter was that mass, for which Baranzano argues at length, in New Opinions, daytime 2, question 4. We reply negatively. 7. Whether form is something accidental, and whether the whole essence of a thing, and consequently the only essential part of a composite. We deny both, with all the sounder philosophers. See Suárez, the Coimbrans, Ruvio; and compare below appendix 4. Hence depend the questions: What is soul? And whether the body of man is an essential part of him; concerning which on the sixth day. 8. What is the origin of material forms? We reply: 1. There are those who say they actually pre-exist, whether in indivisible forms, namely atoms, as Anaxagoras, Leucippus, the Epicureans, and some moderns: whom the philosophers refute on Aristotle's Physics, books 2 and 6, especially Ruvius in the treatise which he inserts in his commentary on book 6 of the Physics, On the Composition of the Continuum, and Pererius, Philosophical Disputations, book 6. And Libertus Fromondus in a special treatise, On the Composition of the Continuum. Or that they are actually in matter, before they are generated, but do not appear, and that either perfectly, as those in Thomas Aquinas, part 1, question 45, article 8, or according to imperfect actual being, and a certain inchoation, as those in Durandus, book 2, distinction 18, question 2, or according to

some part of them. To this last opinion can be referred the opinion of Sennert on the conciliation of the Chemists with Aristotle and the Galenists, chapter 9, and in the treatise titled Physical Hypomnemata, where he defends this opinion ex professo. Whom Freitag, Professor of Medicine in the University of Groningen, examines in his book On the Paradoxes and Errors of the New Sennertian-Paracelsian Sect. And Juan Gallego de la Serna in Youth on the Natural Origin of Souls against Sennert. Compare below, part 10, last problem. 2. The other extreme opinion is of those who say that form neither actually nor potentially pre-exists in matter, but only in the power and potency of the first agent by whom they are produced, although by a particular agent they are united to matter, so that they are produced by creation, not otherwise than immaterial forms. And this is the opinion of Avicenna, nor does it displease some of today's philosophers and theologians. 3. The third and middle opinion is of the Scholastics on Aquinas, part 1, question 45, article 8, and question 90, article 2, and so of all the Peripatetics, who state that they are educed from the potency of matter. Moreover, they want that eduction to include two things. Namely, that the form comes to be in act; and that it depends on matter both in being and in becoming. To which opinion, since we see that so far nothing better or more explicit has been either added or substituted, and since it is repugnant neither to natural reason, nor to the order and nature constituted by God for physical generation, as indeed can be known from Scripture; it is fair that we acquiesce in it rather than with the Skeptics, on account of the secrets and ἄρρητα which in nature, especially in the production of forms, still lie hidden from us, we also reject almost all things which can be known: by which it happens that sometimes sacred physics itself is indirectly and by consequence opposed in some things, while only the Peripatetic and received philosophy of the schools seems to be attacked. Compare below, part 6, and appendix 4.

CONCERNING CREATION, FOURTH PART.

Respondent LUBERTUS SPRUITIUS of Utrecht.
For the 29th of September, 1638.

We will now explain
1. certain paralipomena of the first day.
2. The works of the second and third days.

1. WHETHER the forms of the heavens and elements in the first creation can be said to have been produced from the potency of matter? We reply affirmatively, the more recent Scholastics on Aquinas, part 1, question 45, article 8, and with them some of the more recent authors on Aristotle's Physics, book 1. Others deny, at least concerning heaven, with whom Suárez sides, Metaphysical Disputations, disputation 15, section 3, who nevertheless there devises a conciliation. If by eduction is signified the positive nature of that action, by which the form comes to be dependently on matter both in becoming and in being, it is conceded: But if by the name of eduction besides the said positive and real nature a negation is connoted, or an extrinsic

denomination, namely that the subject is not produced at the same time by that action (although it is created by another action), it is denied. For now it is not called eduction but concreation. Baranzano, daytime 5, theorem 5, against the more recent authors defends that a material form can be created alone independently of matter, he adduces this reason, because it has its own (partial and incomplete) entity really distinct from matter, it can terminate an action distinct from the action tending to matter. Those who follow the affirmative have devised various ways of explaining this matter. We with Ruvius on Aristotle's Physics, book 1, treatise 2, question 2, distinguish that action in the beginning specially tending to form, both from generation and from creation then conjoined with it, indeed preceding it in the order or instant of nature but not of time. From that creation (properly concreation or complete creation) it is distinguished in species, both because the termini to which are formally distinct; and because the modes of those actions are formally diverse and opposite, since matter is from nothing, and form from a presupposed subject. Although each was conjoined, and in the same instant of time. From physical generation it is distinguished; because this eduction of form from matter is immediately conjoined with the production of matter from nothing, and in the same instant of time as matter form was produced, and united to matter, and the composite constituted: so that the substantial production e.g., of earth, is really the same action as the eduction of its form, and as the unition. But on the contrary in generation, first is required not only matter but the whole, and a change of the whole into the whole, according to the Philosopher, On Generation, book 1, chapter 4. So that the generation of one is the corruption of the other. Then the actual privation of form should precede, and so matter be moved from privation to form. So that everything which comes to be, should come to be from the privation of itself, and not from pure negation. Finally, antecedent dispositions are necessary for the expulsion of contraries from the subject. But it is asked whether there is creation out of nothing which in Disputation 1 we said to be first and properly so called. We reply, why not? For the general nature of creation as such remains; that is, of production out of nothing, and it is equally predicated of angels, the human soul, earth, water etc., although the particular natures differ. An angel is out of nothing by a single total and complete action of creation as its complete and adequate terminus. The human soul is out of nothing, by an incomplete and partial creation, as an incomplete and partial nature. Earth or water (from the opinion of others, that unformed body first created out of nothing) are not by a single total action of creation as a complete and primary terminus of it. And the reason is, because their principal part, namely the material form, had to be produced dependently on matter, as it had to be. Which distinction notwithstanding, in the general nature of creation out of nothing, corporeal things agree with angels and the soul. For 1. their matter, which as a partial and incomplete terminus terminates that incomplete action, is created or concreated out of nothing. (For production out of nothing chiefly and as such excludes all dependence on matter and subject.) 2. The form thus educed is, as we have already said. 9. Whether a form once made in this matter can be conserved without it, or inform another subject or several subjects. Or whether several non-subordinate forms, or two of the same species can actuate the same matter, etc. We reply affirmatively, Suárez, cited disputation, Baranzano, daytime 5, theorems 7 and 8. So that they may succor the labyrinth of nugatory contradictions. We say, whatever they explain and incrust, a contradiction is implied: for the ultimate analysis is in "it is" and "it is not": because the essential predicates and the whole definition of form (at least material form) are denied of form. Compare the disputation on the power of God. The rest of the questions about

forms, although not useless, we leave to the philosophers to discuss: such as: Whether form and matter have their own subsistence; In what the nature of principiating the physical composite consists; Whether form is divisible; How the production of form, its union with matter, and the whole composite differ; Whether the essential parts differ from the whole; Whether accidents are subjected in the form, or in the whole composite, etc. 10. Concerning privation both in general or metaphysically, and in particular or physically, as it is a principle, many things most worthy of being known could be exhibited here, if the reason of our undertaking permitted it. This speculation is useful at least for a distinct and fuller cognition of sin, of death both corporal and spiritual, of spiritual desertion, of spiritual hardening and blinding, of infernal punishment, and of other heads of theology, and also for the explication of Scriptures which use metaphors of shadow, darkness, night, sleep, etc. Let it suffice now to have noted: That there are privations not only of substances and of absolute accidents, but also of relations, as divorce, celibacy, tyranny, and its opposite Anarchy: indeed also of privations, as ἀϋπνία, which is of sleep, and defloration which is of virginity: The latter of which perhaps will be said below to have a use in the Pontifical controversies. But these things now dismissed, we propose a single problem. Whether tohu vabohu is a principle of natural things explained by Aristotle; as some interpreters want. We reply negatively, for it does not denote a substantial privation or of form to be introduced into matter (which is the Aristotelian principle) but only of accident and external adjunct: for the earth was empty then of all external adjuncts, that is, of those mixed things which were created on the third day, and also of internal accidents whether in itself, or by reason of its operations; because it was impeded by the waters: not otherwise than at the time of the flood totally, and never not somewhere partially it is impeded through that vanity imposed on it, Genesis 3, with Romans 8, concerning which something was noted above, part 2.

And thus far concerning the indirect works of the first day incompletely created. There now follow those which they commonly refer to the second moment of essence, and adjuncts: which are properly called concreated. Moreover, they are partly accidents and internal modes as quantity and quality; partly external, both absolute, as actions and passions, and relative. We here presuppose from philosophy that all accidents, and also modes both pure and entitative, both absolute and respective, are something and consequently co-produced by God; moreover, that accident is not, nor can be, without its substance, against the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On Generation and Corruption, book 1, chapter 4, and Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations, 2. Compare the disputation on the power of God. First, therefore, we will deal with quantity and for the sake of better doctrine we distribute it into interminate (which is attributed to prime matter) and terminate. The latter is again said either absolutely, or comparatively. In that way it is said to be either continuous or discrete. Continuous quantity is either improper and transcendental, which they call intensive, which is both of perfection and of force or vigor: or proper, namely extensive. Which we again divide into permanent 1. into magnitude, namely length, breadth, depth; to which we refer place or space: likewise weight: 2. into successive, which is time. Discrete quantity is number: the metaphysician considers its affections, the mathematician its species and numerations. Quantity said comparatively is great, small, long, short, broad, narrow, high, low or inferior and superior; interval, near, distant; situation, commensuration, and similar denominations resulting from quantity. The excellent speculations of the philosophers having been neglected, we now note these things as θεολογικώτερα. 1. That mention is so

made in Scripture of quantity and its species, affections and terms, that from there at least it is easy to gather that they are not mere τερετίσματα, and chimeras of the human imagination. See Ephesians 3:18, Isaiah 40:12, Psalm 19:5-7, Proverbs 8:27, and there the commentary of Cornelius à Lapide. Compare Pererius, Philosophical Disputations on the Principles and Affections of Natural Things, book 10, chapters 3, 4, 5, 6. 2. That the divine providence is admirable, which hitherto seems to have fixed a cross for human wit about those minutiae of figures and quantities; so that the quadrature of the circle could not be found, and the demonstration of the exact proportion of the diameter to the periphery. Salmuth briefly touches on the history of this labyrinth and of the erring mathematicians in his commentary on Pancirolli, part 2, title 10, where other authors are also cited. That the quadrature of the circle is possible (although some of the more recent authors deny it, among whom Alsted, Geometry, part 1, chapter 8) Pererius proves, book 10, chapters 19 and 20. At last the Coimbrans somewhere seem to intimate that it was found by their Clavius in their commentaries on Aristotle's books of Physics, if I am not mistaken: the place does not now so occur to me. I remember, however, having read it several years ago. But I do not think it has yet passed into a matter adjudged in the Areopagus of the geometers. 3. That the quantity of magnitude or extension is, if not an intrinsic mode of body, and so not really distinct from it (as Aureolus, Ockham, Gabriel Biel, John Major, Albertus de Saxonia wanted), at least its first πάθος: And so no body can be without its quantity and vice versa; and consequently none is in several places nor several in one place, so that penetration of dimensions is given: against the Papists, concerning which we must speak presently. 4. That quantity per se has no efficacy, namely of number, magnitude, place, time: which posited, many superstitions must necessarily fall, concerning which in the Disputation on Magic, and On Superstition. 5. That all quantity of body is finite, namely in act: to which infinite in potency does not conflict in discrete quantity through genesis, and in continuous quantity through analysis or division. We reject the opinion of those who state that God can make something actually infinite; such as besides some Arabs, of the Scholastics Ockham and Almain, book 2, distinction 13. Likewise Gregory of Rimini, Pierre d'Ailly, with some of the more recent authors. See the commentators on Aquinas, part 1, question 7, article 4. The Sententiaries on book 1, distinction 43, the philosophers on Aristotle's Physics, book 3.

Concerning the place of the world in general we spoke before. Imaginary space should be distinguished from physical space really existing. And again extension and termination, the intrinsic finitude of body, likewise the locability and commensurability resulting from it to any space or external place, from actual location, coextension, commensuration, containment, presence: and both again from the surrounding or sustaining place. By vain litigations and logomachies about these terms some strive to pour darkness on the doctrine of quantity, place, the finitude of the body of Christ. We briefly note these things 1. All created things are in their own finitude, space, and where; corporeal things also in the finitude or terms of their own quantity in themselves: which of the more recent authors Keckermann in his Physical System and Physical Disputations, and little book On Place called internal location and place, so that he might the better detect the cavils of his adversaries, he has devised nothing new: since at least the thing itself is beyond controversy, and the distinction of place into internal and external displeased not even the Jesuits Suárez and Toletus; and from Toletus Baranzano defended it, disputation 8, which is on place, question 5, doubt 5, besides that Nicephorus Blemmydes the

Greek in his Physics written more than 300 years ago expressly employed it. Concerning which more in the disputation on the Power of God. Keckermann's antagonists, Hockerus, James Martinus in a special treatise, Slekerus in his refutation of Keckermann's Physics, from Aristotelian philosophemes badly understood oppose mere logomachies to him: but in vain; since the usage of those who speak rightly, and of Scripture itself grants that place is there where there is no surrounding body and consequently no surface of what surrounds, John 14:2, 2 Corinthians 5:1. Whatever may be the case about the use of words, that common saying of Augustine remains: "Take away spaces from bodies, and they will not be." No body can be in diverse spaces, or in diverse wheres; nor vice versa several bodies in one where or space; because penetration of dimensions cannot be given. We refute the exceptions of the Papists in the disputation on the Power of God and show that they either beg the question, or presuppose something plainly false, namely this: A contradiction is implied only when essential predicates in the first mode of perseity are denied of their subject, or attributed to another really diverse subject. Therefore attribute the faculties of understanding, willing, laughing etc. to a stone, an ass etc., again deny them of man, because namely they are essentials not constitutive, but only consecutive, in the second mode of perseity. Also say that mind from man, liberty from will, three angles equal to two right angles from a triangle can be absent in act but not in potency; and free these monsters together with the distinction between the aptitude of extension in place, and the act of extension, from contradiction. 2. As place was created with the world and bodies, so also all bodies, relatively to others adjoined to them, are said to have a certain place and situation, or at least ubication: And in this sense it is rightly said by our authors that above the starry heaven is a place, namely a physical place suitable to the nature of the empyrean heaven and the bodies which are or will be there, concerning which John 14:1-4. Whatever may be the case, this at least follows, that the human body in heaven can no more be infinite, or everywhere, or in several places, whether spaces, or wheres, than in air or earth.

Consectary. We relegate to deliriums those things which today resound in the philosophical schools and writings of the Papists: Whether, the same body having been posited in several places, a change made in one place would be made in all, for example, whether Hermachus existing at the same time at Rome and Utrecht, could there be moved upwards, here downwards, there walk about, here rest in bed, there be sick, here be healthy, there be warmed, here be cooled etc. See Gabriel Biel on book 4, distinction 10, Baranzano, disputation 8, which is on place, question 5, doubt 8, Ruvio on Aristotle's Physics, book 4, question 7, and our disputation on the Power of God.

4. Concerning the creation of time before the fourth day, so that we may judge rightly, the acceptation of the word must be distinguished; lest we be led away into the labyrinth of the Scholastics: some of whom have recourse to motion and discrete time of angelic thoughts, as Thomas Aquinas, part 1, question 66, article 4. Others say the waters were then agitated and that local agitation of the waters was time. Others, that there was time according to the agitation of matter, as Hugh of St. Victor, Bonaventure, Gabriel Biel; Others, that there was imaginary time before the production of light; but the production, true and real time, so that the first day was composed of imaginary time, which preceded light, and true time, which followed light. Thus Becanus, chapter 3 of the cited treatise. Therefore note that time denotes 1. the

successive flux of duration or permanence of a thing in actual being or in its existence: which we can call internal time; the scholastics call it imaginary time, and it is here an intrinsic mode of existence nor does it differ really from it. 2. A certain concrete being or συνόνασμα, including the relation of the measured (of motion or duration of motion) and measure of a certain motion of something (e.g., of primeval light, or of the sun): which is usually called external time. That time existed, as long as any creature existed: but the latter did not exist before such a measure was created, to which all inferior durations and motions were referred; which was done on the first day as it were provisionally with the creation of light, Genesis 1:2, and at last completed on the fourth day with the creation of the stars, Genesis 1:14. Baranzano, disputation 8, question 4, doubt 10, not badly distinguishes measure or number into that which is in the intellect, and that which is in things: which again is twofold, either aptitudinal, which is called numerability, or actual, which is called actual passive numeration. With these distinctions posited, we think the doctrine of place is not a little illustrated: and the objections of Simplicius and of recent antinomians against the history of creation are dexterously solved. See Francis Junius towards the end of his commentary on the first three chapters of Genesis, in Response to objection 4. Moreover, that the denominations and differences of external time are metaphorically attributed in Scripture to God, the possessor of eternity, 2 Timothy 1:9, Hebrews 13:8, Psalm 102:28, that should be understood θεοπρεπῶς: indeed God coexists with time, but is not subjected to it, nor measured by it: as is shown in the chapter on the eternity of God. The antagonists of the book of Conrad Vorstius on God should be compared, especially Becanus, in the treatise On God published against the atheisms of the Calvinists (he means Vorstius) in the year 1611, chapters 6 and 8, and George Eglisham in his Examination of the Vorstian Response, chapters 3 and 4, and in Hypocrisy Unmasked, chapters 5 and 6, where they examine place and time attributed to God.

5. It is manifest that qualities were created by God; and that common saying of the Philosophers can be applied here: "He who gives the form gives what follows upon the form." Concerning physical qualities which are natural powers, passive qualities, figures and forms, very many things are excellently disputed by the philosophers (indicated in our library): We, because we aim at a compendium, refer students to the said philosophers, and among the Theologians to Zanchius and Daneau. We only warn that occult qualities, namely sympathies and antipathies (concerning which Fracastoro, tract On Sympathy and Antipathy, Fernel, On the Hidden Causes of Things; Sennert, chapter 5, On the Consensus and Dissension of the Chemists with Aristotle and Galen, and in various places the writers on Natural Wonders cited elsewhere, in the disputation On Signs), should not be entirely denied, or derided with some as an asylum of ignorance; nor on the other hand should they be too much multiplied, or their acts extended, with the more recent Hermeticists and other credulous lovers of novelties, lest we add superstition to error. Concerning which we warned in the Disputation on Magic, as also Sennert, chapters 6 and 8, Delrio in Magic Investigations, book 1, chapter 3. Besides those things which tend to superstition, there are also not a few other uncertain things, such as about the fish remora etc., and very many similar things in Pliny, Albertus Magnus On the Virtues of Herbs and Stones, Alexius Pedemontanus, and Wecker On Secrets, Mizaldus in Remarkable Centuries, Giambattista della Porta in Natural Magic, Cardano On the Variety of Things, Nieremberg On the Miraculous Natures in Europe, Kornmann in Temple of Nature, and On the Miracles of the

Dead etc., others plainly ridiculous; such as the sympathy between the Monks of the abbey of St. Stephen, and between the fish of the lake in the same town of Savoy called St. Maurice: and the antipathy between bedbugs and Carthusians, concerning which Baranzano, disputation 9, thesis 32, Scaliger, Exercitations 246, number 3, section 5, Gerardus Joannes Vossius, book 4, On Idolatry, chapter 94. We indicate more things of this kind in the disputation On Superstition. Concerning elementary qualities in particular, both the primary ones, such as light, heat, cold etc., and the secondary ones such as rarity, levity, gravity, softness etc., and the "second secondary" ones, such as color, odor, taste, sound, the physicists indicated in our library should likewise be consulted, and among the Theologians Zanchius and Daneau: If anyone must scrutinize some matter or question ex professo, let him compare the Optical, Musical, Medical, Astronomical, Geographical etc. apparatus indicated in the same place in the library. Concerning physical action and passion, which is motion (at least alteration, and local motion), likewise contact, reaction, and resistance, co-produced on the first day, there is no reason for us to doubt. But that substantial change, namely generation and mixture, existed on the first day, or even proximate potencies either in heaven as an equivocal generator or in the elements for mutual generation by simple transmutation, much less for mixture and the generation of a mixed body, there is no reason for us to believe. The same should be judged concerning augmentation; to which we refer rarefaction. Therefore, the most noble physical contemplations should be referred here: On Motion and Rest, and on contact, reaction, and resistance, rarefaction, condensation: On Generation, corruption, putrefaction; Mixture; Temperaments, Poisons, Monsters. Concerning which the physicists, and theologians just now praised. We think real relations were created in the beginning, namely the order and location of parts in the world, up and down, high, deep, middle, Genesis 1:2, 6, 7, Psalm 103:11-12.

Concerning the production of any other modes, if any are besides posited, the same should be stated. We reject Baranzano, who in daytime 16, thesis 8, argues that a mode can be created and conserved without the thing modified. But the determination of this and similar things pertains to the disputation On the Power of God. To which also refer the Examination of that Scotistic assertion, which Tartaretus has from Scotus on Aristotle's Physics, book 4, treatise On the Vacuum: That God can move any mobile in an instant, because a mobile is in full obedience of a greater power than infinite. And these things concerning the work of the first day.

Concerning the Work of the Second Day.

6. The work of the second day is 1. the firmament. 2. and the division of the waters; to which 3. refer the meteors. It is asked 1. what the firmament is. I reply, the Hebrew word רקיע is "expanse," it is expounded by the Greek Septuagint as στερέωμα: concerning its etymology, Valerius, Miscellaneous Theology, book 1, chapter 6, and the authors of the annotations to the English Bible published this year 1646. Its synonym is "heaven," Genesis 1:8. Both sometimes denote the starry heaven, Genesis 1:14-15, Psalm 19, sometimes the air, as in this place and verse 20. See David Kimhi on Psalm 27:20, the Targum on Psalm 19:5, sometimes the universality of the whole, that is, of air, fire, starry heaven; which are distinguished from those

more feculent and denser things, earth and water: whence purity, and splendor or brightness is attributed to heaven, Exodus 24:10, Daniel 12:3. We say it here signifies the air, and indeed synecdochically that part which is from the earth up to the clouds. Thus besides our authors Zanchius, Daneau, Polanus, Gomarus in their commentaries on the place; likewise Vermigli, Junius, Mercerus, Piscator, Willet in their commentaries, and, who are nearly in place of all, the Authors of the annotations to the Dutch, English Bibles, of the Papists themselves Rupert of Deutz, Pererius, Gregory of Valentia, Cajetan on verse 20. There dissent 1. Ambrosius Catharinus who explains it as the eighth sphere. 2. Luis de Molina and Becanus, who understand the air, fire, and all the starry orbs. 3. Nearly all the rest of the Pontifical Doctors, the starry heaven. 2. What the waters above the expanse are? I reply, the Clouds: thus our authors just now cited. And with them Basil, Hexaemeral Homilies, homily 3, and a certain orthodox author in Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 2, chapter 4, and of the Papists Pererius: Against this Becanus objects that there were not yet clouds, because there was not yet a sun which draws up clouds. I reply, But I retort, whence and when before the sun was Becanus's bright cloud, concerning which in the work of the first day. He objects besides that in the Song of the Three Young Men the waters above the heaven are distinguished from the clouds, verse 60, 73. Baranzano adduces Psalm 148:4, Revelation 7:17. But these do not deserve a response, among those who have merely inspected the texts cited. There dissent 1. Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, Nicholas of Lyra, Alfonso Tostado, Cajetan, Catharinus, and most of the modern Pontifical philosophers and theologians, who make it a watery heaven which they call crystalline and icy. Baranzano, daytime 18, Francis Titelmans, Compendium of Natural Philosophy, book 7, chapter 13, Christopher Clavius on Sacrobosco, chapter 1, page 45, the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 1, chapter 5, although they speak rather thinly and doubtfully. 2. Justin Martyr, Basil, Theodoret, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Hilary, Bede and with them Molina understand true waters. 3. Origen, Homilies on Genesis 1, spiritual waters; to which the lower waters opposed are the waters of the abyss, in which darknesses are said to be, in which the prince of this world etc. 4. Augustine, On Genesis, Against the Manicheans, chapter 11, doubts whether the waters are not invisible, namely angels. Both of these allegorical opinions Basil excellently refutes, Hexaemeral Homilies, homily 3. Finally, Maimonides, cited place, wants a formal division or distinction to be understood here, but not a local one, verse 4. For he imagines that water was one common nature or matter; out of which God formed and distinguished into three natures specifically distinct the water in the sea and rivers, the expanse, and the upper water, which is not water specifically, but is so called only in name, according to the placita of the Rabbis. But Baranzano, daytime 18, amplifies the properties of that water above all, while he states that it is neither clouds, nor heaven or parts of it, nor true water of the same species as the lower water, but the more subtle part of water, which congealed in the manner of crystal (for crystal is made from water, Ecclesiasticus 43:22), was turned into a certain most transparent substance similar to water; placed there for that end, that it might adorn the universe, and marvelously delight the eyes of the Saints: for the crystalline humor surrounded by the light of the empyrean produces most beautiful images, by which the eyes of the blessed are fed; to which John seems to have alluded, Revelation 7:17, he also conjectures about the various orbs of the empyrean heaven, so that the saints can thus respire. But we, omitting these false opinions, give the reasons for our interpretation. First, because clouds are said to be the upper waters of heaven or the

expanse, and to contain waters in themselves, Psalm 104:3, Job 26:8, as Cornelius à Lapide himself admits, commentary on Proverbs 30:4. Second, because water is corruptible, and is actually corrupted when some natural agent is present; but an agent is present there which can corrupt them, namely the solar rays which reach that far, according to their own opinion: But to state such corruption there is absurd. Becanus indeed excepts that they are not actually corrupted either on account of the quality of the place preserving them, or on account of the highest resistance, or on account of some quality impressed on them (such namely as is of a glorified body), or because God denies his concurrence. But these are mere conjectures. Third, because we locate other meteors, for example, fiery ones, although they are said to be above in heaven or the expanse, Psalm 18:13, nowhere else than in the air: why not therefore also water, namely the clouds which are called waters, Psalm 104:3, Job 26:8, especially Jeremiah 10:13 with Psalm 135:7. Fourth, because above the highest heaven cannot be the natural place of water, which is a heavy element tending to the middle or center of the world. For God created the nature of things, not the violent, which is against nature, and the ταξιν and κοσμιοτητα of the world. And this reason caused the Scholastics and philosophers cited above to incline to substitute a crystalline heaven for the waters. But Chrysostom, Homily 4 on Genesis 1, Ambrose, Hexaemeron, book 2, chapter 3, Augustine, although dissenting from himself, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, book 2, chapter 4, and with them the Pontifical Doctors just now cited, among whom Molina and Becanus expressly prove that they were true waters of the same species as the lower ones, locate them there. But what some except, that those waters do not remain there violently, because they do not have their center, except below the moon; is repugnant to all reason, and is rightly refuted by Baranzano, cited place. Because the inclination and tendency of the waters to the center is from their gravity and intrinsic nature; therefore against their innate impetus they are there just as elsewhere violently detained outside their place: Moreover, the natural coordination of things is one and the same, the world is one, and the center one and the same; therefore to it the appetite of bodies is one and the same. Fifth, because those waters would be of no use there, not so that they may impede, lest the celestial substance made from waters as it were congealed be dissolved by the rays of the sun and stars, as Procopius of Gaza and Theodoret want, nor so that they may temper the heat produced from the motion of heaven as Bede; nor so that they may reverberate the rays of the sun, and depress them to the earth, as Procopius, nor so that they may depress the firmament, lest it tend to the empyrean, as Justin Martyr; nor so that they may cause the flood of Noah, as Jerome Oleaster, who in the cataracts of heaven, Genesis 7:11, thinks these waters were reposited. But this opinion is refuted; because then it would have been necessary for the starry heavens themselves to be dissolved and for these waters to be carried through them; which is absurd: Besides, there would have been a vacuum there in the meantime; indeed, there would be even now, because they never returned. Compare the commentators on the cited text. Finally, that opinion, to which the Scholastics inclined concerning the crystalline heaven which is the primum mobile, and Baranzano, concerning water turned into a most transparent substance which is true water, but of a species diverse from the lower, is easily refuted, from verse 6 and 7 itself, and Molina and Becanus rightly urge this, where it is said that the expanse was constituted, so that it might divide or separate the waters from the waters, which before were conjoined, and are of the same species, that is, each is true water: nor can that conjunction be said of the primum mobile and elementary waters which never was. What they except, that that

heaven is called water, because it is pellucid, and eminently (not formally) cold; that is proved neither by experience, nor reason, nor Scripture. 3. Whence was this expanse created. I reply, Becanus contends that the air, fire and heaven were created out of water; (for these to him are the expanse) Maimonides, cited place, out of the same; others object that then heaven would be corruptible: and not produced out of nothing. But it should be said that heaven is not understood here, nor created on this day, nor even air: The air was only separated from the other elements, with which it had been created on the first day, and that interval and lower part of the air between earth and clouds was constituted. 4. Whether the upper waters are other than the meteorological, or exhalations attracted upwards. I reply, Daneau, part 2, treatise 2, chapter 13, endeavors to prove by some reasons that there are waters there of the same species indeed as the lower, but distinct from these and from exhalations by thinness, splendor, transparency, and solidity. But I do not yet see that the reasons are sufficiently urgent. 5. Whether the element of fire was placed under the sphere of the moon on the second day. I reply, why not? If indeed fire is there, as indeed the reasons of those who state that it was not placed by God in the earth as in its proper sphere do not yet seem routed. See Baranzano, daytime 8, thesis 16, the authors cited in the preceding disputation.

7. Concerning Meteors there are very many and most pleasant speculations, and frequent mention of most of them in Scripture. Zanchius, Daneau, Garcaeus in Meteorology, Keckermann in his System and Physical Disputations, Polanus in his Theological Syntagma have noted those passages. It should be investigated more laboriously by the student of Theology. 1. Concerning Clouds. 2. Concerning winds: about which Federico Bonaventura, treatise On the Cause of the Motion of the Winds. 3. Concerning the rainbow: about which besides the writers on meteorology, the writers on optics. 4. Concerning comets: about which Keckermann discusses at length in his Physical Disputations. 5. Concerning earthquakes: about which Keckermann in a special treatise fully and learnedly, and after him Polanus in his Theological Syntagma, and Henry van Diest in a special disputation proposed on the occasion of the earthquake in the year 1641 in the school of Deventer. With whom can be compared the writers on burning Vesuvius noted below, part 6, thesis 3. See further concerning the whole of meteorology, Keckermann, Physical Disputations, and Timpler, Goclenius, Seidelius, Sennert, Havenreuter, Meurer, Garcaeus, the Coimbrans, especially also Libertus Fromondus in his treatise On Meteors, Gerardus Joannes Vossius, book 2, chapters 1 to 16. You will find the authors and treatises on any meteor in particular cited in Keckermann, Physical System and Disputations, book 1, and Jonston in his Thaumatographia, and Lorinus in various places in his commentary on certain books of Scripture. We now only touch on these things for the explication of the Hexaemeron. Problem 1. Whether meteors were produced on the second day? I reply affirmatively, as to place, and common matter, namely exhalations and clouds; that is, in proximate potency: but in act, as to accidental forms and figures, I deny, with the clouds alone excepted. It is proved from chapter 2, verse 5. Then, because the stars did not yet exist, by whose power vapors drawn out of the elements were carried aloft. Cornelius à Lapide objects against Calvin for the waters above the heavens against the clouds, that it is gathered from chapter 2, verse 5, that clouds did not yet exist, indeed not for six days, but only the clearest air. I reply, the text has nothing about clouds; but there can be a cloud concerning rain, and yet rain be absent, otherwise it would perpetually rain, since there are nearly always clouds.

It is not said concerning the six days, but concerning the time when God produced the plants, before the stars, celestial influences, and the rains produced by them existed. His other objections coincide with those just now mentioned. Problem 2. What was the אד, that is, the vapor which watered the whole earth, Genesis 2:6. I reply, the Greek Septuagint and the Vulgate translate it as "spring." Hence Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 5, chapters 9 and 10, thinks it was one spring, which at a set time like the Nile watered the shoots of the whole earth. The interlinear gloss adds that that irrigation lasted up to the times of Noah, and there was no rain in the meantime: Hugh understands the subterranean abyss: Alcuin, that only Paradise was irrigated by this spring. Others want the springs, rivulets, and rivers to be denoted, which as it were flowing from one fontal matrix (which is indicated in Genesis 1:9) irrigated the whole earth here and there. Thus Philo, Augustine, Pope Nicholas I in Cornelius à Lapide, commentary on Genesis 2:6. Who in the same place thinks that by spring is better understood the whirlpool and inundation of waters, namely the primeval abyss, Genesis 1:2. But these interpretations, to favor namely the Greek Septuagint or the Vulgate version, are too forced and far-fetched. Therefore it is better to translate it as vapor; which without the influences of the sun and stars was able by the power of God no less to sit upon and moisten the earth, than the light of the first day to illuminate, and distinguish day and night without sun or stars. Thus falls that exception: How did vapors exist without celestial influences. See what we cited above, part 3, from Sanctius, commentaries on Acts 2. There also falls the other exception of Cornelius à Lapide: in the preceding verse, he says, Moses denied that then there was any rain, or similar celestial moisture, which watered the earth. I reply, he denied rains, but not any other moisture or vapor. Furthermore, the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan, which expound it as ענני, that is, cloud, and Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra, who says "like smoke," favor this opinion of ours: and thus other Hebrews. The Arabic published by Erpenius as بخار, that is, exhalation, vapor, smoke; And thus Pagninus, Arias Montanus, the Zurich version, Vatablus, Johannes Benedictus, Pererius, Molina, Delrio, Andreas Osiander, Mercerus, of the ancients Theodoret. There are, however, various interpretations of that vapor. 1. There are those who make it a negative enunciation, "And vapor did not ascend" etc. Rabbi Saadia Gaon in ibn Ezra and Rabbi David Kimhi, Junius and Tremellius, the French version, and Willet defends it ex professo. Which opinion Drusius censures in chapter 4 of his annotations on Genesis. But Rivet restrains him, Exercitations on Genesis. 2. Others, that vapor and so rain irrigated the earth, before it was said by God: "Let the earth sprout vegetation." Thus the more ancient Rabbis, and with them Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed, part 2, chapter 30. Vatablus reports nearly the same exposition in his notes. Eugubinus wants it to have rained on the second day, and so the plants to have germinated on the third day. 3. That this vapor was the matter prepared for the germination of the plants, and the creation of man; the history of which is immediately subjoined: and for this end its ascension is here related. Thus Vatablus in his notes, from Rabbi Solomon Jarchi: But Willet refutes it. 4. Wolfgang Musculus refers the ascension of the vapors in verse 6 to the time of the first creation of the plants. 5. Mercerus distinguishes and understands verse 5 of the first creation without rain; verse 6, of ordinary germination. And so with the subtle and sought expositions having been neglected, we think we can acquiesce in that simple and plain one, which we have brought forward. Problem 3. Whether the origin and path of the winds is unknown, as seems to be implied in Proverbs 30:4, Job 38:24, Jeremiah 10:13, Psalm 135:7, and John 3:8. I reply, At least that the wind is not moved air (as the Stoics wanted, and Jean

Bodin, Theater of Nature, book 2) seems to be sufficiently gathered from the cited places and 1 Kings 18:45, where it is expressly distinguished from the air (which is designated there by the name of heaven). It cannot be known for certain from what determinate and proper place of the earth this or that exhalation arose, whence, by what way, and where it is carried, and where it is terminated: moreover why it now blows from the south, a little later from the east or from the west? why a storm wind is suddenly propelled with great force; why whirlwinds whirl things around in a circle, why fiery winds are heated, why south winds are rainy, why elsewhere healthy, to us in this clime unhealthy etc., why certain winds blow at a certain time of the year, like the etesian winds? why in the Indian Ocean they are more regular and lasting, but in our sea on the contrary are very unstable? and the other wonders, concerning which the meteorological authors. Whence it is said well: that man does not know whence the wind comes and where it goes: for whatever man investigates, yet very many things lie hidden from him. Hence we by no means approve the exception of Daneau, part 2, treatise 2, chapter 30, who wants these words of Christ to be understood of the common rabble, or those who have not learned physics. For the opinion is general; which specifically includes Nicodemus, by no means unlearned. Besides that such an exception seems dangerous enough and unsuitable: which will appear, if it is applied to all those things in Job 38 and 39 and 40, and Proverbs 30, Mark 13, and Genesis 15:5, and Psalm 139, which man is said to be ignorant of. Nor does the exception of Keckermann satisfy, in the appendix to his Geographical System, Nautical Problem 5, that the wind cannot be discerned by sense per se whence it blows, unless it is apprehended by certain signs, for example, flags on the tops of buildings etc., because it is invisible. I reply, Indeed not even by hearing can this be known more than by sight, although it is audible enough: Moreover, by sight conjoined with touch it can be discerned in general, from what region of the world and from what general place the wind blows: but not from what special place; or where it ceases and stops blowing; and where or into what part of earth or water this and that exhalation is at last resolved. In what way in spiritual regeneration we know in general that it is from the Spirit of God etc., but the singular mode and process in this or that man, indeed also the general mode in the adaptation and concurrence of grace with the will of man we are ignorant of. And I think this to be the genuine explication of that passage. For what Keckermann in the same place subjoins: "Otherwise in Ecclesiastes 1:6 it appears, that the motions and blasts of all the winds are known by a certain reason": either it does not pertain to the matter, that is, to that knowledge which we delineated above; or rather (if indeed spirit there should be understood as wind) it confirms this ignorance. Grant that there is a circuit and going and returning of the wind through certain circles; but who has been able to observe, measure, number these journeys instituted by a certain law, with intervals, stations, boundaries etc.? Problem 4. What sort were those extraordinary winds and storms, Exodus 14, 1 Kings 19:11, likewise 2 Kings 2:11, and Job 1, Jonah 1, Acts 2. I entrust the discussion to the experts. With these and similar things which could be adduced for the explication of various texts of Scripture, and of sacred physiology, especially also Acts 27 and 28, we for the present forbear from delineating, both because by some of the more recent commentators, Pererius, Francisco de Toledo, Juan de Lorinus, Cornelius à Lapide (who ex professo pursue such things) they have been in great part illustrated, and also because we reserve them for another occasion, as also for a college, which someday, God willing, we will privately institute about the interpretations of passages the matter of which pertains to other disciplines, but the interpretation to Theology, by the example of

Nicolaus Vedelius in his Sacred Philosophy and Johann Heinrich Alsted in his Biblical Triumph. Problem 5. Whether predictions from meteors, or meteorological prognostications are licit. I reply affirmatively, with a distinction, namely if it is done concerning natural effects; but not concerning human, contingent ones, and those depending on free choice: And if certainty of necessary or ἁπλῆς truth is attributed to them. It is proved from Matthew 16:2, Luke 12:54-56. It is added, that natural reasons of most of those effects and signs can be rightly assigned, as can be seen in the writers of problems and on meteorology. And because universal experience, especially of farmers and sailors teaches that they always or nearly always so happen, attention could be paid to such signs without superstition, even if the manifest causes were unknown to us. The same should be stated concerning prognostications of natural effects from animals, plants, and other perfectly mixed things (which see collected by Mizaldus in Ephemerides of the Air, and some in Rhodiginus, book 8, chapter 6, and book 24, chapter 28), lest anyone think they coincide with auguries and similar predictions, which we repudiate in the disputations On Prophecy, On Magic, On Superstition. Furthermore, these prognostications from meteors occur in Hesiod, Works and Days, Virgil, Georgics, Aratus, Phaenomena, Pliny, book 18, chapter 35, Theophrastus, book On the Signs of Winds, Rain etc., especially Antonius Mizaldus in the treatise titled Phenomena or Ephemerides of the Air. Some also occur in Aristotle in his Problems, and other writers of physical problems. Concerning astrological prognostications, see below, part 7.

Concerning the Work of the Third Day.

8. On this day 1. earth and water are separated. 2. Plants, on the surface, and other things in the bowels of the earth are produced. As to the former, there occur to be considered 1. what concern earth and water together. 2. what distinctly, and separately earth. 3. what water. Therefore it is asked, problem 1, how the gathering of the waters into one place was made, concerning which verse 9. And where the place was able to be for the waters covering the whole earth, whither they flowed together. The antinomians raise this doubt in Francis Junius, the book several times cited. I reply, There are those who say that the water, which before surrounded the whole earth, fled into one place, and raised itself in a great mass into height. Thus Basil, Ambrose, Catharinus, Thomas Aquinas, part 1, question 69, articles 1 and 2. That the water previously rarer, on the third day condensed occupied a smaller place of the earth. Thus Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 1, chapter 12, and Bede, Hexaemeron. 3. That it neither ascended, nor was condensed, but was received in the great cavities of the earth, for the earth is greater and deeper than the periphery of the waters, which surrounded the earth. For let the periphery of the earth be 19,080 miles, the diameter 7,000, the semidiameter 3,500; but now what was the depth of the waters above the earth, is apprehended from the height of the expanse from the earth namely up to the clouds; which does not surpass 60 miles (as indeed from the twilights, and the distance of the impressions appearing there the Mathematicians enter this calculation.) Thus Pererius, Molina, Becanus, Willet. Compare Clavius in his commentary on Sacrobosco, chapters 31 and 32. But the doubt still remains, with what body the cavities of the earth were previously filled, and how they were evacuated, so that

they might yield place to the waters. 4. That the earth on this day at last was created out of the waters; thus Hugh of St. Victor, and Peter Lombard. But this is not probable. 5. That the earth was equable and flat without mountains; by which it happened that the waters flowed together into one so much the more commodiously. But neither does this solve the knot. 6. That by the heat of the sun and by natural power they were dried, so that the northern parts of the globe, which lie between the arctic and equinoctial circle, first of all began to appear and then others: but the whole earth was not suddenly and simultaneously uncovered and denuded of waters by the singular omnipotence of God. Thus Eugubinus in Cosmopoeia; whom Pererius rejects, and rightly, book 1 on Genesis, chapter 1, verse 11. 7. That by a vehemently burning wind the waters were dried; not otherwise than after the flood. Moreover, mention of this wind was made in verse 3. Thus Alfonso Tostado, Bishop of Ávila. But absurdly. 8. That they flowed together to the part of the globe uninhabitable, opposite to ours, and cover it. Thus Procopius of Gaza, commentary on Genesis, for whom Augustine seems to have preformed this hypothesis, book 16, City of God, chapter 9, where he denies that there are Antipodes. Which is a wonder in so great a philosopher, who had Themistius as his teacher. Experience refutes him, today's navigations, and the common consensus of Geographers. But concerning the Antipodes, we must deal below, part 5. 9. That the waters, inasmuch as constituting a peculiar globe, gathered themselves to their own proper center, with the earth left behind. Thus Paul of Burgos in additions to the postil of Nicholas of Lyra. 10. That the clouds established on the second day, and the expanse, took away a great part of the waters. We, saving better judgment, conjoin this and the third opinion; Willet adds also the second. And it is clear from Genesis 1:9, Psalm 104:6-8, and 33:7, that this reason is most agreeable to Scripture. The rest of the opinions have their difficulties, also false hypotheses, which are to be noted presently below. See Pererius or Willet. Problem 2. How the waters are said to have been collected into one place, when there are so many rivers, springs, lakes, marshes, estuaries; not to mention the Euxine Sea, which is not conjoined with the ocean, the great receptacle of waters: which for that reason as also on account of other wonders you may rightly call ἀξιοθαύμαστον and ἀξιοθεάτιστον, with Herodotus, book 4. I reply, Basil responds, one place is not to be understood of any gathering of waters whatsoever, but of the sea, which is indeed one, although it obtains diverse names: as the earth (with the exception of some islands) makes one continent, so all seas one sea; according to Genesis 1:10. Others think all waters are said to have been collected into one, because rivers (although distinct from the great receptacle) discharge themselves into the sea, Ecclesiastes 1:7. As to the Euxine, Pliny, book 6, chapter 13, Strabo, book 2, Solinus, Pomponius Mela, Dionysius Periegetes and other more ancient authors (whose common error this was, Dalechamps notes on Pliny, book 2, chapter 67) and with them Basil, Hexaemeral Homilies, think that it is conjoined with the other sea. Aristotle, Meteorology, book 2, chapter 1, states the contrary. And Ptolemy, book 7, chapter 5, where he says it is beset on every side by shores, and on the opposite side it draws the similitude of an island, παρακειμένης ἠπείρου μικρὰν ἔχον διαφορὰν ἐν βραχείᾳ, as the scholiast of Dionysius Periegetes says concerning Ptolemy on verse 49. Herodotus thinks the same in the same place cited by the Scholiast. And Hethum the historian in his On Armenia, chapter 9. And Maciej Miechowita, On Sarmatia, book 1, chapter 7. And thus the more recent Geographers. The equal of all, Abraham Ortelius in his Thesaurus Geographicus under the entry "Hyrcanian sea," says that he prefers, with Arrian in his Periplus of the Euxine Sea, and later authors to call it a lake in the interior, and on all sides

remote from the Ocean, and the greatest of the whole world: in the way that the Moors today call it in Arabic Bahr Khazar, that is, closed sea. The opinion of Dalechamps on Pliny, book 6, chapter 13 coincides with this. And of the Coimbrans, treatise 8, on Meteorology, chapter 2. And of Benignus Saumaise in his French commentary on Dionysius Periegetes. The Arab Geographer of Nubia (who wrote about 470 years ago), climate 6, part 5, calls it بحر مظلم, bahr muzlim, that is, the dark sea. Wilhelm Stucki in his scholia to Arrian's Periplus of the Euxine Sea, page 10, argues that it should not be called a marsh. Arrian himself everywhere calls it θάλασσαν, and πόντον; and among other things suggests this distinction between it and the sea, τοῦ δὲ πόντου παντὸς, πολὺ τῆς ἄλλης θαλάσσης γλυκύτερα τὰ ὕδατά ἐστιν, ἢ περ ἡ ἔξω θάλασσα. καὶ τοῦδε τὸ αἴτιον, οἵ ποταμοί εἰσιν, ἔτι μείζους ὄντες καὶ πλείους, that is, "Of the whole Pontus, the waters are much sweeter than of the external sea. And the cause of this is, the rivers are, being still greater and more numerous." Strabo, book 7, page 206, wants there to be about forty rivers. But I think this sweetness should be understood of the upper part of the sea, but not the lower. In the same way, in the words immediately before these, he had said concerning the river Phasis, that its water is sweet, if someone should draw it from the top; salty, if with an urn let down to the bottom he should draw it from below. Besides this cause assigned by Arrian, Stucki in his commentary on Arrian, page 13, not badly adds two others: of which one is said to be probable to him, that in those northern regions the oblique, not direct, rays of the sun have less force for resolving and burning the more tenuous parts of the water. The other, that the Maeotic Marsh itself not much smaller than the Pontus by its open influx into it brings much sweetness. Moreover, the waters of that marsh are much sweeter than those of the Euxine. But this sweetness of water does not seem to make the chief and peculiar difference between it and other seas: since, by the testimony of Peter Martyr in his History of the West Indies, in a certain province of the region of Mariatambal there is a certain sea of sweet water, on account of the rivers running down into it from the highest mountains with great impetus; Also the water of the Thracian Bosphorus is very sweet: which for that reason Petrus Gyllius in his Description of the Thracian Bosphorus thinks to happen from the approach of the Euxine Sea, not of the Aegean. The congelation of this Sea makes a greater difference, concerning which Stucki, cited place. Others think the place of waters is said to be one, because it is separate and distinct from the habitable earth. Thus Willet. But this seems to satisfy less. And so I acquiesce in this response: That all waters flow together into one receptacle (as into a wineskin, Psalm 33:7), because all rivers, all marshes etc. flow into the Ocean either mediately or immediately, either openly or secretly: the Euxine Sea too, or the Caspian and Hyrcanian Sea, if not by open at least by hidden and subterranean passages. From which opinion I found after the first edition of this disputation that the Coimbrans, cited place, are not averse, where they thus say: "It is not so much a sea as a marsh stagnant by the incursion of many rivers, unless perhaps it also secretly receives the ocean by a subterranean meatus." Pererius more openly affirms the same on Genesis 1:9, page 148, where others too are cited. Thus the dissenting opinions of the ancients and the more recent authors seem to be able to be easily reconciled. And indeed, recently consulting the scholiast of Dionysius on the place just now cited, I found that this distinction and conciliation was not unknown to the ancients, as he expressly testifies, page 18 of the edition of Robert Estienne: "They themselves indeed disagree. But the ancients devising an agreement for such a disagreement of the periegetes say that perhaps through unknown places the Kronian Ocean sending itself pours out the Hyrcanian

Gulf. And thus will be saved the saying that the Caspian is traversed in a circle on foot, and he who said that it supplies it from the Kronian sea." Add Junilius Africanus in his commentary on Genesis 1: "It is well, when it is agreed that there are many seas, yet he says the waters have been gathered into one place: doubtless because all these by a constant wave and continuous are joined to the Ocean and great sea. But also if any lakes seem to be circumscribed in themselves, they too are said to evolve their courses into the sea by certain hidden perforated caverns. For well-diggers prove this: both because the earth is filled with flowing waters through invisible veins, and because they draw their beginning from the sea."

ON CREATION, FIFTH PART.

Respondent LUBERTUS SPRUITIUS of Utrecht.
For the 6th of October, 1638.

1. Problem. Whether the earth and water constitute one globe, and have one center? We affirm, against Philo in his book On the Creation of the World, Paul of Burgos in his additions to the postil of Nicholas of Lyra: who from this sculpts out his opinion on the mode of the earth poised by the waters, which we just now mentioned. Ambrose also seems to doubt, Hexaemeron, book 3, chapter 3. But they are refuted, first, from the roundness of the earth, which Scripture implies in Proverbs 8:27, Isaiah 40:22, where גוּר is γύρος in the Greek Septuagint, gyrus as the Vulgate, globe, as the Zurich version and Vatablus; compas in French, so Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki: and philosophy proves the same in Peucer's elegant treatise On the Celestial Circles, as also Cervello, Pierre d'Ailly, Clavius on Sacrobosco, and all the common spherical and geographical books: but the earth or water separately do not have that roundness (as experience teaches), but conjointly; therefore it is necessary that they make one globe. Second, Because, as Scripture testifies, the waters in the beginning covered the earth and were concentric with it, and so with it tended to one center: which Paul of Burgos is forced to confess. Therefore also on the third day and afterwards forever, they have the same center. Unless we want to say that the nature of water was changed on the third day, or that now it is miraculously borne towards its own proper center. Which unnatural nature there is no reason for us to admit in the first constitution of nature: as Pererius well argues, book 1 on Genesis, page 144. Problem 4. Whether the terrene globe is in the middle of the world, and the mundane center? I reply, we do not see why the terms of the ancient and common philosophy should be moved from their place with Kepler and other more recent authors. See the authors just now cited, the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 2, chapter 14, question 3. And indeed the passages of Scripture which say that heaven is elevated above the earth, and extended around it on every side, Psalm 103 and 104:3, Isaiah 40, Proverbs 25:3, seem to be opposed. We leave the reasons usually adduced on both sides to be discussed by the philosophers. See the Coimbrans, cited place, and Chiaramonti, book 12, chapters 21 and 22, and David Christiani, book 1, Geographical System, chapter 53. Problem 5. Whether the quantity of earth, if it be compared with heaven, is so small, that it can be said to be a point or like a point? I reply, It is indeed not properly a point: for a point is not a quantity (of which ἴδιον, as Euclid defines), and

the sea is said to be great and broad in the hands, Psalm 104:25. But we concede that it is so called hyperbolically and comparatively: at least it is gathered from Psalm 102:11 that the distance is great; which however should not be amplified by the Uranometers without necessity, so that it may seem to vie nearly with the immensity of God; which against the new Copernicans and Keplerians the most excellent Astronomer Möller not inopportunely warned in the preface to his Epitome of Astronomy. Problem 6. On what supports, or to what foundation the globe rests, or whence it is suspended. I reply, concerning the external foundation or support, namely God, it is clear from Job 38, Psalm 104. No other internal or adjoined and foundation or root or fulcrum should be sought except or outside it, and its nature implanted by the creator, namely gravity, by which it happened that all its parts gather themselves towards their own center; and so from the center of gravity (as all heavy things) the whole is suspended and rests: as Ovid learnedly says, Metamorphoses 1: "Nor did the earth hang in the surrounding air, poised by its own weights." And Manilius, book 1, Astronomica:

"And it holds the middle seat of all from every side the lowest,
And therefore remains stable, because the whole world
Flees equally from it, and by falling
Made it so that it would not fall on any side, it is the middle and bottom of the whole.
And so with contracted regions bodies consist,
And by concurring prevent going further."

And before him Parmenides, whose verses expressed by Manilius are exhibited there in his commentary by Scaliger. You have the same in the Philosophical Poetry published by Henri Estienne in octavo, page 44. And this is what is implied by those phrases of Scripture, Psalm 104:5, Job 38:4, 6, with Isaiah 40, Jeremiah 5, where mention is made of the base and foundations of the earth. Although David Kimhi on Isaiah 40 understands the four elements, which are the foundations of those things which are in the earth. Elsewhere "the foundations of the earth" and of the mountains are said to be the interior parts of the earth, which like a base sustain the superior parts; thus Psalm 18:8, for those are shaken in an earthquake. Therefore the earth rests and is founded מתלה על בלימה, "hanging upon nothing," Job 26:7 (concerning the explication of which there is an elegant dissertation of Valerius, Miscellaneous Theology, book 1, chapter 15, part of which we exhibited above, part 3), if you regard other supports besides the body and center of the earth itself: but upon its own base or foundation, if outside its own nature you seek no other sustainer (namely innate or internal). We reject 1. the opinions of the ancients concerning the cause of the stability of the earth in Aristotle, On the Heavens, book 2, text 78, and the Coimbrans on chapter 14, question 5, among which that of Thales shone forth, who wanted the earth to have been founded upon the waters, and it being sustained by floating on the waters by the benefit of its broad figure: which Chrysostom seems to have embraced. From the Scriptures are usually adduced Exodus 20:4, Psalm 24:2, 2 Peter 3:5. But this opinion fights, First with experience and reason; for the earth is round constituting one globe with water; it is also heavier than water, of which the parts since they do not float in water, certainly neither will the whole be able to float. Then, with the passages of Scripture already cited from Psalm 104:5 and Job 26:7. As to the passages adduced to the contrary, we will respond to them in the disputation itself. Aristotle refutes this opinion, cited place, and Seneca, Natural Questions, book

6, chapter 6, of the more recent authors the Coimbrans, cited place, likewise Clavius; of the Theologians Pererius, Willet, Zanchius. 2. We reject the sayings of certain, who refer this whole thing to a miracle, and imagine this work of God to be similar to, as if the axe of Elisha should float upon the waters, or a millstone should stick in the middle of the air: although however it is neither beyond, nor against, nor above nature, but most according to it, that the heaviest body should rest in its natural place, that is, in the middle of the world. See Pliny, book 2, chapter 65, cited below, thesis 2. 3. Finally, the delirium of Muhammad, concerning the earth built upon the point of a bull's horn, and concerning the earthquake or tremor existing from there: which the Muhammadan book Zuna has, as John Andrew the Moor testifies in his Confusion of the Sect of Muhammad, chapter 5, for that book is not yet published among us. Problem 7. Whether the earth rests immobile in the middle of the world? We affirm, with all Theologians, Physicists and Astronomers, Jews, Arabs, Greeks, Latins (with the exception of one or another of the ancients, and all of today's followers of Copernicus) relying on reasons, as we think, most solid, which should be seen among the philosophers, and the Astronomers here and in our Thersites Heautontimorumenos cited, lest we do what has been done: lest I say anything of Pererius and other commentators on Genesis. For us here it will suffice by the example not only of Theologians, but also of astronomers to indicate unmoved arguments from the Scriptures. Peucer places them in the first line in the praised treatise On the Celestial Circles, folio 6: "That the earth is not moved by a right motion, nor a circular one, but rests in the middle of the world, both the sacred writings confirm, and physical reasons prove." The same has been most recently done by David Christiani, Professor of Mathematics at Marburg, book 1, Geographical System, chapter 8, page 126, where he thus determines: "But this opinion (namely of Copernicus, Galileo etc.) is opposed to the sacred writings, sound reason and experience, indeed it overturns the foundations of astronomy and geography." We adduce three classes of arguments from the sacred writings. The first has those passages which say that the earth rests, Psalm 104:5, Ecclesiastes 1:4, Job 26:7 and 38:4, 6. The second contains the passages which attribute motion to the Sun, Psalm 19:6-7, Ecclesiastes 1:5-6. The third, those passages, Joshua 10, Isaiah 38:8, which refer the station and retrogression of the Sun among miracles; therefore those motions are natural. That these classes of arguments are rightly defended, and should be defended by the sons of the Scriptures, especially the Theologians, against the exceptions of certain more recent Copernicans, I have discussed at length in Thersites Heautontimorumenos, nor will I repeat those things here idly. That the physical and astronomical reasons brought forward by Aristotle, Ptolemy, Sacrobosco, Tycho Brahe, and their followers, have suffered no damage from those either conjectures or trifling exceptions of Kepler and others, I indicated there according to the reason of our undertaking. If anyone desires a compendium, let him seek the reasons, and their vindications in the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 2, chapter 14, question 5, or in Cervello, Pierre d'Ailly, Clavius on Sacrobosco's Sphere, especially in Froidmont in the treatise published on this question, to which is the title Anti-Aristarchus and a defense of the same treatise against Jacob Lansbergen the Physician, to which is the title Vesta, or in David Christiani, book 1, chapter 8. Compare below appendix 4 to this disputation On Creation. We reject 1. that opinion concerning the twofold motion of the earth, namely diurnal and annual. 2. And the other of Baranzano, which states a motion of libration; which happens when the middle of the earth and consequently the center is changed, while from one part of the earth a portion is taken away, from another

brought, mountains are taken away through earthquakes, islands are destroyed through tempest, seas are dried, mountains fall upon towns etc. "Wherefore I would believe that now it is no longer in that place precisely in which it was created by God, but like the beam of a balance has now inclined to one part, now to another" etc. "for so many changes of cities, islands, mountains, seas etc. were able to cause a recession of the earth from the first center." Thus he in New Physical Opinions, daytime 18, theorem 10. But as the reason for the changed Copernican opinion, which he had defended in the first edition of his Uranoscopia, he adduces in the same place the decree of the Sacred Congregation of Cardinals etc. condemning the opinion of Copernicus, which whether it militates against every motion of the earth, you see. "I persuade myself this one thing, that some very small libration, which does not pervert the motions of the stars, is not prohibited there" etc. But whether this libration is not repugnant to that decree of the Cardinals, let the Cardinals themselves see, and Froidmont, who ex professo wrote for that decree. We, holding that decree as indifferent, think First that this pretended motion of libration for the change of the center does not less but rather more conflict with the ἀκινησίᾳ of the earth (concerning which Scripture speaks) than the diurnal or annual motion in its own center, which the Copernicans attribute to the earth. For what greater instability is there, than that for such frequent changes the earth should be forced to change its base, pillars, foundations, place, its cornerstone, that is, its center (as not unhappily Thomas Aquinas interprets Job 38:6), and so be moved like the weights in a balance, while they are increased or diminished. Certainly to be suspended and moved in a balance is not to rest or to be stable and founded. Then, that consequence seems marvelous to us: Some mountain is cast down by an earthquake, therefore something of the matter and consequently the weight of that mountain has been taken away from that part of the earth; and so concerning islands, seas etc. The consequence would have some appearance, if the mountains, or seas absorbed in the bosom of the earth (for example, in Savoy or Italy), should descend to the antipodes through the center of the earth, or at least beyond the center, or should fly away to a neighboring region; moreover, while that portion of matter and weight is taken away there, nothing again either of water, or of air, or of exhalations, or of earth should accede from elsewhere, which would impede the libration and contain the earth in the same center of gravity. But let others further discuss these new opinions: where in the treatise On the Elements he will have taught fully (which he promises in the same place) that some libration is possible. It is not yet agreed to me whether that treatise has been published, at least I have not yet been able to see it. 3. We reject with Baranzano himself, cited place, the ridiculous opinion of certain (who and of what sort they are I know not) who think that at each moment from the compression of our feet, or of other animals, the earth is poised. Problem 8. Whether a universal flood can happen naturally, after the earth was once separated from the waters? We deny, and consequently, that the Noachian flood was natural. For although the same quantity of water is always in the fountains of the abyss, and the same quantity of exhalations in the cataracts of heaven (which was at the time of Noah), yet there is no natural agent which can lead it into act, namely by evoking all the waters from the abysses, and resolving all the exhalations into rain. Problem 9. Whether therefore the universal sea is contained within the shores miraculously, or naturally? I reply, The former certain (among whom Ambrose, Basil, Theodoret on Psalm 104) assert from Job 38:9, Psalm 104, and with this reason added, that the sea is higher than the earth, and consequently would naturally inundate the earth. We affirm the latter, and indeed from the same passage, Job 38:8-10, compare with

Psalm 104:9, Genesis 1:9, Jeremiah 5:22. For there is mentioned the admirable law of nature imposed by God from the beginning; but not something transcending the laws of nature, that is, a miracle. Then, it was a miracle when the waters of the Red Sea stood, Exodus 14:22. Therefore that from the third day of creation they stand forever is not a miracle, because it is ordinary. To the reason added the next question will respond. Problem 10. Whether the sea is higher than the earth? I reply, It was affirmed against experience and reason by the authors just now cited, and Melchior Cano, Paul of Burgos, Ambrosius Catharinus, Thomas Aquinas, part 1, question 69, article 1, Zanchius, book 4, chapter 1, question 2, thesis 2, and that from Psalm 104:6 badly understood, Basil, homily 4, and from him Zanchius, cited place, moreover adduce the experience of Sesostris king of Egypt, and afterwards of Darius the Persian who, about to join the Egyptian sea with the Red Sea, apprehended the sea to be higher than the earth by some cubits. Others add daily experience, which teaches that ships in the sea viewed from the shore seem to be higher and the earth viewed from a ship more depressed. George Abbot the Englishman in his erudite commentary (but written in his native language) on Jonah 1, lecture 5, number 21, not only approves Basil's demonstration through all things, but also adds from his own: That the sea in diverse places is higher than the earth; and that observed by sense in the Atlantic Sea towards Mauritania: as the history of the navigation of Jean de Léry has in chapter 2. But on the contrary, more recent Theologians and philosophers state (Pererius and Willet on Genesis, Lorinus on Psalm 24, the Coimbrans, book and chapter cited, question 4, and Clavius on Sacrobosco, Keckermann in the appendix to his Geography, nautical problem 3, Kepler in his Epitome of Astronomy, Gasparo Contarini On the Elements, Giles of Rome, Hexaemeron, book 2, chapter 2 and 27, Cajetan, Aloysius Lippomano, Andrés de Honcala on Genesis, Juan de Pineda on Job 38:10 and on Ecclesiastes 1:7, Luis de Molina in the disputation on the work of the third day, disputation 11, Gregory of Valentia on Aquinas, part 1, question 68, article 3) that as to its whole the sea is not higher than the earth, nor the earth higher than the sea (inasmuch as they constitute one globe), but that as to the parts by which the sea touches the shores, it is more depressed than the earth not indeed universally, but in respect to the parts of the earth which we call shores, that is, the shores are higher than the sea washing against them. See the reasons in the cited authors, especially Pererius and the Coimbrans. To the objection from Psalm 104, the response is easy: there it treats of the state of the waters on the first and second day, but not after the separation made on the third day. To that attempt of Sesostris and Darius, which nevertheless succeeded more happily to Ptolemy as Strabo testifies, book 17, we say with Pererius that Basil lapsed in memory in that; for they were trying to join not the Egyptian sea, but the Nile with the Red Sea, as Pliny testifies, book 6, chapter 29. Then their opinion or hallucination does not make a philosophical demonstration. Moreover, if we believe Strabo, those digging the isthmus of Ptolemy showed by that experiment, and indeed without inundation, that the sea was not higher. Finally, grant that some sea was then higher than that plain of Egypt, as rivers are sometimes higher, yet from this it does not follow that the sea is higher than the whole earth. To the third, concerning the view of the earth from ships, it is responded that it is a fallacy of vision; for because the earth verges to blackness; and all black things seem depressed, hence the earth seems more depressed than the sea. Which fallacy of vision see demonstrated in Kepler, book 1, Epitome of Astronomy, page 27. He adds in the same place: "If standing on the shore, you measure with an instrument the level of the waves, even those which sight follows to the uttermost; by no means will you apprehend elevation in

them, but always some slight declivity: and it will appear that the waves do not overhang the lands, but subside below them." See other objections solved by the Coimbrans, cited place. But that they so frame their reasons as if the earth were absolutely higher, we want that to be taken with the distinction just now posited. See Keckermann, cited place. What are usually objected from Psalm 107:23, Daniel 7:3, Revelation 13:1, betray a crass ignorance of the sacred language. For "to ascend" in Hebrew sometimes synecdochically denotes any animal motion, even from a higher to a lower place: just as on the contrary "to descend" sometimes denotes a setting out to a higher place, Judges 18:11. Problem 11. Whether the quantity of earth is greater, or of water. I reply, The latter certain Peripatetics affirmed, saying that the elements preserve a tenfold proportion; and that there is ten times more water than earth: whom Peucer refutes, cited book, folio 57, Clavius, page 130, Scaliger, Exercitations 38. And Alexander Piccolomini in a special treatise On the Quantity of Earth and Water (which I have not yet been able to have, but to it Pererius appeals, book 1 on Genesis, and Clavius, cited place). We acquiesce in their experiments and reasons. Therefore what Cajetan asserts, that water in the beginning of creation was ten times more ample than the earth, because this is the natural proportion of water to earth, should be consigned to uncertain conjectures. As also that saying of Bede, that the whole space from the earth up to the empyrean heaven was full of water. Problem 12. Whether and how the globe of the earth can be accurately measured? I reply, The artificers show the method on Sacrobosco, chapter 1, conclusion 6. But in assigning the perimeter they vary exceedingly as can be seen in the same place and in the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 2, chapter 14, question 1, and Pererius, page 71. Hence some from the text of Job 38, Ecclesiastes 1, have come into that opinion, that it is not measurable. Pererius, although for the affirmative opinion he responds to the cited places that by that phrase is denoted not ἀδυναμία, but the rarity and difficulty etc., yet he subjoins page 71: "Scripture speaks of the exact and infallible cognition of the amplitude of the earth, which the Mathematicians do not hand down; nor is it agreed among all, how much space of the earth responds to one degree of a celestial circle" etc. Others think the differing opinions or calculations about the perimeter of the earth can be reconciled. David Christiani, book 1, Geographical System, chapter 11, says it is the more probable opinion, that not only can the magnitude of the terrestrial globe be investigated, but also that by the aid of arithmetic and geometry a certain dimension of it, whether you regard the perimeter, or the diameter, or the surface, or the solidity, has been left to us. We think it should be said, that the Geographical measuring (which the recent Geographer David Christiani, book 1, chapter 10, calls historical) is possible and suffices: which (as also architectural measuring) is done roughly, and so should be distinguished from geometrical ἀκρίβεια. For since the highest mountains, the deep valleys, and other things render the globe of the earth unequal, and a body (so to speak) in some way irregular, hence concerning the precise measuring of its quantity we think should be said what Clavius says concerning its roundness, cited place. Strabo rightly explained and distinguished this, book 2, page 54, where about to defend the Geographer Eratosthenes against Hipparchus he says: "It does not advance the accurate discourse to distances not agreed to be certain to each other" etc., that is, "the distances posited not as certain are not to be refuted more accurately." And soon he subjoins concerning the mainland and other known places: that Eratosthenes was not to be examined "geometrically, as I said, but rather geographically." Consectary. Since the artificers have proved by manifest reason that one globe is constituted

from earth and water, and that it is concentric with heaven, and equally distant from it on every side, it follows that sense should be dismissed, which by its fallacy would teach that heaven overhangs the earth, that the extremity of the horizon touches both heaven and earth, and that the sun when it rises emerges from the Ocean.

2. Now we must deal with the earth or dry land (Hebrew יבשה) separately. Concerning which the physicists partly, the geographers partly inquire many things; Whether it is the coldest element; Whether and why the heaviest and densest; how great it is in itself, and how great compared with the celestial orbs; Whether it is round, and why it appears flat to the senses; and whether it should be understood to be mathematically round; Whether it is hollow; how great a part of it is habitable; Its perimeter by what ways it is investigated; Why it alone occupies the center of the earth, and not also water; What is an island, mountain, rock, cave etc.; Whether and how sand differs from dust and one earth from another; whether and how sand can be numbered; what is the cause of the sterility and fertility of the earth? etc. Concerning which see Zabarella, On the Qualities of the Elements, the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 3, chapter 14, and On Generation and Corruption, book 2, chapters 2 and 3, Clavius in various places on Sacrobosco, Chiaramonti, book 12, and the common physical and geographical books; among which has been most recently published the Geographical System of David Christiani. As to certain parts of the earth, to be considered by students of Theology are especially both physically and geographically the Land of Canaan, Paradise, Babylonia, Egypt etc., likewise the mountains Ararat, Lebanon, Sinai, Zion, Moriah, Seir etc., the deserts of Paran, En Gedi etc., the Rock of Rimmon etc., the Cave of Adullam etc., of which mention is made in the Scriptures. We will be content to glean these few physico-theological things: Problem 1. Whether the earth is an animal, or at least animated? I reply, The latter Daneau asserts, part 2, treatise 3, chapter 28, led by this reason because it germinates living things, according to Genesis 8:21, and the spirit of God injected this vegetative power into earth and water, Genesis 1:2. The former the Priscillianists stated, who attributed not only sense but reason to the earth: which seems to have been drawn from the pools of Pythagoras and the like (compare Lipsius, Physiologia Stoicorum, book 2, dissertation 19). Of the more recent authors Tommaso Campanella attributes sense to all things, consequently also to the earth. For thus he says, book 1, chapter 1: "But when animals (by the testimony of all) have sense; but sense does not arise from nothing: it must necessarily be affirmed that the Elements, their Causes, sense, and indeed all things. For what is in one of the Elements, we will demonstrate to be fitting to all. Therefore heaven senses and earth and the world, and the animals remain within it, just as worms within the belly of the human body, which do not perceive the intellect and will of man by sense, because they are not proportioned to their sense." But they are mere plays on equivocation and improper use of terms. For if we regard the definition of sensitive or vegetative life, certainly it can by no means be adapted to the earth. The philosophical arguments against the life of metals should be applied here analogically. As to the reason of Daneau, it should be said that the earth is vegetative efficiently, but not formally: for the sun too produces vegetables, and yet does not live. The earth generates plants, but by equivocal generation (not otherwise than as animals from putrid matter), because it differs in species from plants; indeed it also makes plants germinate each from its own seed, according to Genesis 1:11. Which seed is either manifest, or occult, or proper and of its own species, or analogous; as concerning the origin of spontaneous

living things the philosophers not badly distinguish. See the common physical books, among them Seidelius, book 2, chapter 2, page 399. And Scaliger on Theophrastus, On Plants, book 1, whom Sennert cites and approves, On the Consensus and Dissension of the Chemists with Aristotle and Galen etc., chapter 12, and in the Physical Hypomnemata, 5, and Sagittarius, Physical Disputations 13, thesis 5. We respond therefore to Genesis 8:22, that the earth produces plants because it concurs to their production as a transient matter, and indeed a remote one: for the proximate is the seed in which immediately and properly is the faculty, or as others (Anselmus de Boodt, book 1, On Stones, chapter 11) prefer to speak, the seminal principles and the architectonic spirit is enclosed in the seed of the plant. Concerning whose life for that reason Scaliger, Exercitations 208, sections 5 and 7, Sennert, Physics, book 6, chapter 2, and On the Consensus and Dissension of the Chemists with Aristotle and Galen, chapters 9 and 12, dispute. The hypothesis and consequence of Campanella, which he diffuses through that whole treatise, and extends to all and each of the parts of the world (even to light, darkness, cold, book 3, chapter 5, cadavers, book 4, chapter 9); that instance will easily elide, God as the universal and equivocal cause produced all bodies, and their parts, corporeal life, corporeal senses etc., and yet he does not have parts or qualities of a body, or see with corporeal eyes, or is nourished by a nutritive faculty, increased by an augmentative one etc. Problem 2. Whether the whole earth is habitable? I reply, Common is the division of the zones of the earth, of which the middle on account of heat, the two extremes on account of cold are said to be uninhabited, as can be seen in Virgil, Georgics 1, Cicero, On the Republic 6, Pliny, book 2, chapter 108, Martianus Capella, book 6, page 196, Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, chapter 6. Specifically Aristotle proves that the middle zone subjected to the equinoctial circle is uninhabitable, Meteorology, book 2, chapter 5, whom in their custom Thomas Aquinas, part 1, question 102, article 2, Duns Scotus and Durand of Saint-Pourçain on book 2, distinction 17 follow. But experience through the navigations of the more recent has detected this error; as now the philosophers commonly show: among them Clavius on Sacrobosco, and the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 2, chapter 14, question 1, Francisco Vallés in Sacred Philosophy, chapter 26. And before the experience of our times something of the sort had been suspected by Eratosthenes, Polybius, Ptolemy, Avicenna, and those Theologians, of whom Thomas Aquinas makes mention, cited place, who thought that under the equinoctial circle the place was most temperate on account of the perpetual equality of days and nights: contrary to what Aristotle stated, cited place. Of which opinion although he had pronounced it more probable, not daring to trust he concludes: "But whatever may be concerning this, it should be believed that paradise was constituted in a most temperate place, either under the equinoctial, or elsewhere." Pierre d'Ailly Cardinal and Bishop of Cambrai, a Theologian, Philosopher, and Mathematician outstanding for the reason of those times (he flourished around the year 1410), in his Cosmographical Work, to which is the title On the Image of the World, chapter 49, openly professes doubt and ignorance about the habitation of the parts of the earth: "Wherefore," he says, "half of the equinoctial circle will not be a habitation between east and west, nor half of the roundness of the earth, nor twelve hours as certain estimate. But by far more than half of the earth and more than the revolution of half of heaven. But how much this may be, it has not been measured in our times, nor do we find it certified in the books of the ancients. Nor is it a wonder since more than half of the quarter in which we are is unknown to us, nor are the cities comprehended by the philosophers. Similarly if we speak of the other two quarters and consider

the natural ways, those will not be covered with waters as the common run of mathematicians estimates. And to this they adduce some reasons which to pursue is not the part of this work from which it is clear that the quantity of the extension of the ocean over the earth and its condition is very uncertain." Problem 3. Whether there are Antipodes whom Scaliger calls Antichthones, commentary on Manilius, Cleomedes, book 1, περὶ τῶν ἀντιχθόνων ἡμῶν, and ἀντίχθονες, that is, turned or opposed with respect to the shoulders? I reply affirmatively, with Pliny, book 2, chapter 65, Cleomedes, book 1, Circular Inspection of Meteors, chapter on the orbs of heaven, Manilius, book 1, page 8, quarto edition, Pomponius Mela, book 1, chapter 1, and more recent Theologians and philosophers: whose reasons see in the Geographical authors, especially also in Zanchius, book 5, chapter 1, question 3. The contrary Augustine thought, book 16, City of God, chapter 9, Lactantius, book 2, chapter 24, Bede, On the Reckoning of Times, chapter 26, and Alfonso Tostado on Genesis 1. And certain Rabbis in Rabbi Menasseh ben Israel, problems 27 and 28, On Creation. Also well known from Johannes Aventinus is the history of Virgilius Bishop of Salzburg, whose opinion about the Antipodes Pope Zacharias, with Boniface Bishop of Mainz accusing, had condemned in the year 745. Which history Libertus Froidmont in his Anti-Aristarchus, so that he may consult for the infallibility of the Pope, strives with all his might to explain far otherwise than indeed it was related hitherto. The French Historian Fauchet, however, has the same history, volume 1, near the end. Their reasons were 1. because those men would be hanging down. 2. because if it were granted that the earth is round; it was not yet proved, however, that that part opposite to our globe has been denuded of waters. 3. Because if indeed it was uncovered by the waters, men would not have been able to arrive there. 4. Because this absurdity would follow, that those men, if indeed any dwelt there, would not be of the race of Adam. 5. Because when the apostles brought the Gospel to all the inhabitants of the globe, Romans 10, it is not read however that any of them crossed the equinoctial circle. Which we easily dilute: and a tyro would scarcely hesitate in the solution of them. See also Zanchius, book 5, chapter 1, the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Heavens, book 2, chapter 14, question 1, Clavius' commentary on Sacrobosco; David Christiani in his Geographical System, published last year 1645, book 1, chapter 39, Samuel Clarke on Guido Panciroli's New Discoveries, title 1. To the first reason too idiotically Pliny elegantly responds, book 2, chapter 65: "Here there is a great fight of letters, and against the common people, that men are poured around the earth on every side and stand with feet turned towards each other, and that the vertex of heaven is similar to all, and in a similar way it is trodden from whatever part the middle: with it inquiring, why those opposite do not fall off; as if reason also were not at hand, that we should wonder that we do not fall off. Between comes the opinion which you will approve although to an unteachable crowd, on an unequal globe, as if the figure were of a pine nut, that the earth is nevertheless inhabited on every side. But what does this matter with another miracle arising? that it itself hangs, and does not fall with us, whether the force of the spirit shut in the world especially be doubtful: or it can fall with nature refusing, and denying to where it may fall. For as the seats of fires are nowhere except in fires, of waters except in waters, of spirit except in spirit, so of earth, with all things repelling, there is no place except in itself." The second reason daily experience solves, and navigations, and thence the common Geographical history. The third we will soon touch on, problem 5. The fourth falls when the third will have been responded to. It is certain that all men, whenever they will have been found (whether it is agreed to us how they were brought there, or it is not agreed) descended

from Adam and Eve. It is proved from Acts 17:26, and Genesis 3:20, because she is the mother of all living, namely men. Concerning the fifth, which moved the very erudite Tostado to defend this opinion, we must deal ex professo in the Disputation on the Calling of the Gentiles. Problem 4. Whether the new world was known to the ancients? I reply, We incline to the Negative part. At least nothing certain can be adduced to the contrary: but the burden of proof lies on the one affirming. We from abundance say 1. Nowhere in Scripture, Old or New Testament, is mention made of those nations: although indefinitely under the name of islands, Genesis 10:5, together with other islanders they can be understood. 2. not even when the predictions and histories about the calling of the Gentiles are recounted. 3. No ancient Geography, no political or ecclesiastical history makes mention of them. 4. No vestiges of any tradition, of any memory, of any wandering rumor, of any monuments hitherto found in either world, by which we would be taught about mutual knowledge and commerce, at least formerly held. Which indeed among the divine, natural, human wonders has always seemed to me exceedingly wonderful: at which it is right to exclaim: "O the depth" etc., Romans 11:33. Who may sufficiently wonder that thence after the Noachian flood the first inhabitants after the flood, namely (for it is not to be denied that there were men there before the flood), of that world with their posterity were so divided from this our world, that no memory of the way then found and opened, much less a going and returning by it frequented and retained remained? So slight a care of their own salvation was in the inhabitants of the new world, so null in the inhabitants of the old world, from whom they had departed? No prophets and men of God, with the splitting and departure now recently made, betook themselves there: not even the apostles or their successors, when now that harvest of the calling of the Gentiles had arrived? Those nations walked in their own ways for more than three thousand years, with indeed not even the faintest light appearing to them at least by reflection, which could happen to others in this globe? There are however those who want that globe to have been known and frequented before the navigations of the Portuguese. To which they refer that about the Island Atlantis from Plato, and some similar things from others, which see in Lipsius, book 2, dissertation 19. And Keckermann in his Nautical Problems, which he subjoined to his Geographical System; Jonston, page 82. Who should be consulted. But especially the Ophirian navigation of Solomon, 1 Kings 9 and 2 Chronicles 9, drew some Theologians into this opinion, for from some probabilities they think they gather that Ophir is Peru. Thus Benito Arias Montano, in his Phaleg, Vatablus on 1 Kings 9, Hugh Broughton on Job 38, Gilbert Génébrard in his Chronology, Daneau, Christian Physics, part 2, treatise 3, chapter 46. With whom from the philosophers and philologists agree Guillaume Postel, Johannes Goropius Becanus, and Keckermann, Nautical Problems, part 2, page 9 first edition, Jacques Daléchamps on Pliny, book 2, chapter 67, where other authors too are cited, Theodore Zwinger in his Theater, book 1. But José de Acosta, book 1, On the New World, chapter 14, and Andreas Balester in his Sacred Onomasticon, page 288, refute this opinion. Especially Abraham Ortelius in his Thesaurus Geographicus; And Jacobus Pontanus in the appendix of his Historical Discussions; Finally Gaspar Barreiros in a special treatise, which together with the Historical Discussions the just now praised Pontanus took care to reprint, Juan de Pineda on Job 28, where he cites others too. Johannes Gryphiander, On Islands, chapter 4, number 25, etc., chapter 29, number 56, Samuel Clarke on Pancirolli, part 2, title 1, who can be consulted. To these should be added all the authors who with Flavius Josephus make Ophir a region of Judea, as Pererius on Genesis 10, Mercerus on Job 22:24, Simeon de Muis on Psalm 45:10,

Francisco de Ribera on Jonah 1. The reasons alleged on both sides the students will find there: nor is it necessary that I repeat them here. Erasmus Schmid treats the same question, in his oration at the end of his commentary on Pindar. I only add two things. The first is, Broughton in his annotations on Job translated by him into English (if I remember well) makes something of the fact that gold is called ketem by the inhabitants of the new globe; which Hebrew word occurs in Song of Songs 5:11, Job 28:16, 19, where in the first passage is had כתם אופיר, that is, "gold of Ophir," as also 22:24, and Psalm 45:10. I reply, but this is a very slight conjecture; for that could have been retained now from the confusion of languages, and brought there by the first inhabitants. (Something nearly of which sort seems to have happened to the name שק, that is, sack, which so many languages have retained.) Or, if there was some commerce of the Ophirians with the inhabitants of it after the first occupation of the new globe, thence it adhered. The other is, that conjecture from the metathesis of Peru and Ophir, and the other from parvaim (which they want to be a dual from Peru) after all the others utterly jugulated by Garcilaso de la Vega the Inca in Pineda, cited place, who reports that this region was not called Peru except by the Spaniards, and that on this occasion, when the Spaniards coasting those shores had happened on a fisherman and by signs had inquired of him about the name of the region, he, thinking his own name to be asked, responded Beru, Beru, which name is there most frequent to the maritime men. Problem 6. How men arrived in the new globe? I reply, 1. It is certain that they arrived there from Asia (where man was first created, and where after the Noachian flood he settled): although the mode were unknown. Augustine, book 15, City of God, chapter 7, inquires, whether and how every kind of beasts even the noxious ones was preserved in the ark, was brought to even the most remote islands. He there proposes some modes, tacitly conceding that some of the most remote islands from the lands received some from that number. Moreover, he proposes those modes, either that they crossed by swimming, to the nearest islands; or were brought there captured by men, or could have been transferred there by the command or permission of God by angels. The middle mode Louis Vivès confirms, by the example of the Fortunate Islands, where many animals were not found, but imported by the Spaniards. The middle mode therefore presupposes navigation. Wherefore it is more a wonder that none of those modes was rather devised elsewhere by Augustine, than that he should deny the Antipodes, book 16, chapter 9, with this argument: "And it is excessively absurd, if it is said that some men were able, the immensity of the ocean having been traversed, to sail and arrive from this part to that: so that also there from that one first man human kind was established." But if the certainty of that hypothesis concerning the continuity of Asia and America, or at least concerning the separation of both by a gulf or some narrow strait could be had (into which even now men most skilled in these matters think it should be inquired; among whom the most distinguished and erudite Johannes de Laet in his treatise On the Origin of the American Peoples, chapter 16) certainly this doubt could easily be resolved. But whence, when and how men were first brought into that new globe, is contended today among the learned not so much by reasons, as by ingenious conjectures. There are those who think that immediately after the division of languages (concerning which Genesis 11) men penetrated there by a certain terrestrial journey, and fixed their seats, whence those nations were propagated. Johannes de Acosta, book 1, Indian History, chapter 16, inclines to this opinion; and Johannes de Laet just now praised, cited book, page 11, and page 104, and page 89 and 99, prefers it to all others. Who nevertheless, pages 132 etc., adds some observations, from which diverse ways are

opened, by which men sailing seem to have been able to come into parts of America, "if indeed it is still so obscure and difficult to lead men into it by a terrestrial journey." Likewise Acosta, cited book, chapter 20, concludes that it is probable that the first inhabitants driven by shipwreck and tempest arrived there. The former opinion indeed would most expeditiously remove all doubts; but since it is only probable, and the whole hangs on a conjecture and suspicion concerning the continuity of the old and new globe: I do not see why it is not allowed to acquiesce more safely (at least for so long as we have nothing ascertained concerning that continuity) in that opinion, which states that men arrived there through navigations, and animals were led there; and indeed through the Noachides, Genesis 10. That the doubts which are moved against it are not such [as cannot be answered], the distinguished man just now praised shows in the same place. Concerning the skill of navigation, and frequency among the ancients, see what he has page 75, concerning the nearness of the islands, and the easier crossing from them page 132, and page 197, and 14. Hugo Grotius thinks that nearly all the peoples on this side of the Isthmus of Panama arose from Norway and Iceland, the rest of the peoples from the Isthmus of Panama up to the Strait of Magellan from the Chinese. Whom Johannes de Laet refutes in the said book. Others prefer that they were brought there from Tartary: whose opinion is refuted in the same place by Grotius. Others derive their origin from the Jews. Others from the Canaanites. Which opinion is examined in the same place. Robert Comtaeus of Normandy in a dissertation On the Origin of the American Peoples, tries to prove from the monuments of the ancients, authorities, and conjectures that the Americans were procreated by the Phoenicians or Sidonians, or Tyrians, or Carthaginians. Which let him see, who has leisure. Problem 7. Whether mountains, valleys, and other inequalities of the earth existed before the flood? I reply, with Scaliger, Exercitations 43: "But concerning the generation of the mountains, let him who inquires, inquire also concerning the sea, heaven and others." And Proverbs 8:25, Psalm 90:2 evince this, especially Genesis 7:20. We do not deny that a great change was made around the mountains, valleys, channels of rivers, marshes, lakes etc. by the flood; and hence the ancient reason of Geography was not a little disturbed if not nearly lost. Indeed also after the flood mountains are turned into valleys, plains or deserts into lakes, islands into continents and vice versa either by nature or sometimes by human industry. What we say concerning the mountains, Whether it should be asserted concerning Atlas, and the other greater ones mentioned by Scaliger, Exercitations 42 (on account of the passages Psalm 36:6), and not rather concerning their parts or concerning hills and hillocks, is doubted. Yet it seems that that can be gathered from Isaiah 54:10, with Job 9:5, and what Strabo, book 17, and the writers on earthquakes, especially Keckermann and Polanus before cited, Pineda on Job 18:4 report, favor it. Memorable is the history of Mount Conto in the Valtellina valley of Rhaetia, which when a rain of some days with lightning and thunder had preceded, in the very twilight and with a serene sky on the 4th of September, 1618, with the highest impetus and noise and in one moment fell down, and crushed the town of Piuro and the village of Schilano with 920 inhabitants. See this history described by Fortunat Sprecher in History of the Motions and Wars of Rhaetia, pages 63, 64, 65, 66. But yet these things too can be expounded concerning the lesser mountains or parts of the greater. What are the greatest and most celebrated mountains, and what wonders are around them, you will learn in compendium from Heinrich Kornmann's Historical Temple of Nature, part 4, consideration 13. To which can be adjoined Jonston, Thaumatographia, page 89, Bartholomaeus Anglicus, book 14, and d'Ailly, On the Image of the World, chapters 38 and 39,

the ancient Geographical and Natural Historical writers, Pliny with the notes of Jacques Daléchamps, Gaius Julius Solinus with the Exercitations of Claudius Salmasius, Strabo with the notes of Isaac Casaubon, the Geography of Nubia, etc. (see the rest in our Library): or if anyone desires a compendium let him consult the more recent authors; Gerardus Mercator's Atlas; with David Christiani's Geographical System, book 1, chapter 9. Concerning the mountains mentioned in sacred Scripture, Christian van Adrichem should be consulted in his Description of the Holy Land, and Juan Eusebio Nieremberg in his book On the Miraculous Natures of the Promised Land: although many fabulous things occur there. Whence also the contemplation of Promontories, heads, rocks, valleys etc. in general and in particular should be sought. Problem 7. Concerning fire-spewing mountains, it is asked, whether a natural reason for that burning can be assigned? I reply, Affirmatively. That there are fire-spewing mountains before others, the common experience of so many ages teaches, concerning Etna in Sicily; Vesuvius in Campania, Hekla in Iceland, in Joachim Camerarius, Leisure Hours, century 3, chapter 17. Adervam in the Nubian Geographer, page 29 and 123 of the Latin edition. The fires of Etna were described by Pietro Bembo in a special little book On Etna. And Philipp Clüver, book 1, Antiquities of Sicily. Of Vesuvius, Vincentius Alsario a physician of Pope Urban VIII in a historical-physical book especially erudite, to which is the title The Burning Vesuvius. There are extant also other treatises on the same Vesuvius by Friedrich Schönbeck and Giovanni Battista Mascolo: but which it has not yet happened to me to see. In my judgment Alsario explained clearly the cause of that burning and it will suffice for our students. Some passions of the earth could also be noted here 1. concerning chasms and openings of the earth. There is an example in Numbers 16. 2. Concerning earthquakes: about which above, part 3, where we dealt with meteors. 3. Concerning subterranean fires; which often stir up terrible earthquakes: about which Vossius, book 2, On Idolatry, chapter 42, especially chapter 63. Refer here the fire-spewing wells about which the Nubian Geographer, pages 35 and 67. Compare below, part 6, thesis 2.

3. Physicists and natural historians and geographers just now cited inquire very many things concerning waters and the sea, as also springs, rivers, lakes, ponds, straits, Euripi, estuaries, marshes etc., not a few things also Theologians on Genesis 1:6-7, Job 38, Psalms 104 and 107, Acts 27, and six hundred other passages. See here Zanchius and Daneau. How noble the contemplation of the sea is, how excellent its utility, Stucki shows in compendium in his dedicatory epistle to the Periplus of the Red Sea; and Gregory of Cyprus in his encomium of the Sea in Greek, which B. Vulcanius published with Aristotle's little book On the World. And, if those authors are not at hand for someone, Alsted in his Natural Theology. For the student of Theology to become more familiarly acquainted with in Scripture, among the Seas, the Western or Mediterranean of Judea, the Dead Sea or of Sodom (concerning which Benjamin of Tudela, Itinerary, page 53, and the Nubian Geographer, page 111, and Adrichomius, number 186, Salmasius on Solinus, chapter 36, David Christiani, book 2, chapter 7), the lake of Gennesaret, the Red Sea (concerning which the Periplus of Arrian with the most learned scholia of Stucki, and the Coimbrans, meteorological treatise 8, Benjamin of Tudela, page 12, and Fernando de Córdova in his Didascalia multiplex, chapter 49. Among the rivers: the Jordan, the Nile (concerning which latter most celebrated river there are special treatises by Johannes Goropius Becanus titled Niloscope and by Giovanni Battista Scortia and Marcus Fridericus Wendelinus), the Tigris, Euphrates, Pison, Gihon, which four are called the rivers of Paradise: concerning

which below, part 6, thesis 5. Outside of Scripture, most celebrated is the Maeotic Marsh, and the Euxine Sea, concerning which latter exists the Periplus of Arrian with the most learned commentary of Stucki. Moreover, for sacred hydrography and geography the treatise of Arias Montanus will conduce for students, to which is the title Phaleg, and Adrichomius's Holy Land: especially that incomparable Geographical Thesaurus of Ortelius will provide a key and index; with which should be joined the Atlas of Mercator and Nieremberg's book On the Miraculous Natures of the Promised Land. Concerning waters, and the sea, springs, rivers, the physicists, and natural historians should be consulted, Pliny, book 2, chapter 79, with the notes of Daléchamps; Solinus in various places, with the exercitations of Salmasius, Vossius, book 2, chapter 57, and the Coimbrans, Clavius, Jean Bodin, Seidel, Cardano On Subtleties and On the Variety of Things, Scaliger against Cardano; Nieremberg's Natural History, and his books On the Miraculous Natures of Europe; Jonston in his Thaumatographia, class 2, Thomas Lydiat On the Origin of Springs, the sum of which little book Jonston exhibits, class 2, chapter 4, page 64, where see. Some things also occur in certain little works of Aristotle and Theophrastus in Greek published by Henri Estienne in the year 1557 in octavo, in Athenaeus, book 2, and in the Wondrous Histories of Antigonus in Greek and Latin published in the year 1620 by Johannes Meursius with notes at Leiden, Plutarch and Giovanni Bocaccio On Rivers. Concerning natural Baths, or hot springs, Franciscus Fabricius in a special little book, Gaspard Bauhin, Gabriele Falloppio, Gregor Horst, Melchior Sebisch, Battista Aleardi of Verona. There are also others who have written on baths in common languages, namely German and French. But it is not necessary to cite them here: especially since some Latin writers have been indicated by Jonston, class 2, chapter 5. Concerning the healthfulness, efficacy, and use of waters drunk, or externally applied to the body whether snow, or sea, or river, or rain waters, the passages of Scripture Proverbs 25:13 etc. provide an occasion for thinking: See Vallés, On Sacred Philosophy, chapter 16. Some things pertaining to this Wendelinus has, On the Nile, chapters 10, 11, 12, 13, 23, and Tommaso Minadoi a physician of Udine in his Medical Disputations, disputation 6, which is, What more avails for the correction of waters, cooking or sublimation; and Johannes Menelius in his disputation to the first section of the Problems of Aristotle. Whoever hastens to other things, in the contemplation of the sea and waters, let him go to among the theologians Zanchius and Pererius, book 1 on Genesis. Among the philosophers Keckermann in his Physical System and Disputations, and David Christiani in his Geographical System, and Casmann's Marine Problems: who also indicate other most excellent authors. Concerning the machines and artifices of men about the motion of waters, especially about their elevation, among the ancients Hero in his Pneumatics should be consulted; Vitruvius, book 10; and among the more recent authors Giuseppe Ceredi in his Italian book published in the year 1579 at Parma titled Three discourses on the mode of raising water from low places; Cardano, book 1, On Variety, chapter 6, Joseph Scaliger in his French discourse in his Opuscula. We have indicated authors concerning the arts of diving, swimming, sailing on waters elsewhere. After that time I learned that Georges Fournier of the Society of Jesus published a Hydrology, or On the Art of Sailing in 4 books. Which can be consulted by our students, who undertake evangelical embassies to East or West India. It is asked by the physicists, Whether water is coldest; whether densest; whether heavy in its own place; whether it nourishes; whether and how especially the lunar influences dominate it; what is the depth of the sea; whether it is moved from east towards west; whether it is moved by diverse other motions; whether all seas

have tides; what is the cause of the marine tide; why one sea has more tide than another; whether the Euxine Sea is a sea; whether the sea is a meteor. We, one problem having been proposed concerning water, three concerning the sea, one and another concerning rivers and springs, subjoin little appendices concerning floods and inundations, and concerning Islands. Problem 1. Whether water is hot or cold, or neither? I reply, The first is affirmed by Franciscus Patricius in his Peripatetic Discussions and Bernardino Telesio; of whom the former adds that no body is cold by its own nature, and consequently neither is water; but its cold is adventitious from the air, namely either through antiperistasis, or through flight from the contrary, or through concentration into a narrow space. They pile up not a few reasons for this their opinion, which Casmann too reviews, part 1, On the Sea, problem 7. There are those who think (in the same place in Casmann) that it is neither cold nor hot, but because it suffers more than it acts by receiving, is apt to cold and heat, on account of its tenuity. We do not see why the opinion of Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, book 2, chapter 3, and of his followers both philosophers and physicians should be deserted. Scaliger, Exercitations 47, section 6, contends that water does not have heat in potency. But it will suffice for us at least to deny heat in act to water, and that by the testimony of sense, reason, and Scripture, Proverbs 25:13, 25.

ON CREATION, SIXTH PART.

Respondent LUBERTUS SPRUITIUS of Utrecht.
For the 13th of October, 1638.

1. Problem. What is the origin of the sea; and whether it existed from the beginning? I reply, The sea was created from the beginning on the first day namely as to matter or content, namely the element of water, Genesis 1:2; but on the third day as to its form or rather formality, that is location and external form or figure, insofar as it is the receptacle of the lower waters, verses 9-10. Eucherius on difficult questions of the Old Testament in Genesis: Where do we read that the waters were made by God? Although the text of divine reading did not evidently express that they were made in the beginning of creatures, yet they were made by God. For some other things too which are not written, how they may be understood from the rest is shown. And yet that testimony can in some measure instruct us that the waters were made by God which is said: "Let the waters be separated into one gathering, and let the dry land appear," doubtless because he would not command, that the waters which he had made be separated from the earth, unless he himself had made the waters. For consequently he would not order to be distinguished in the order of creatures afterwards, what he himself had not created before. And this indeed we gather from this: because Genesis did not bring in manifest mention of its creation. But more manifestly that Psalm designates God as author of this creature which says: "For the sea is his, and he made it."

Therefore the producing cause is God the creator alone, as is clear from the cited passage, and Psalm 95:5, Job 38, Jonah 1:9. The same is the conserving cause, Nehemiah 9:6, with Hebrews 1:3, but not alone and immediate; because he uses second causes, namely rains

falling immediately both into the sea itself, and into marshes and rivers, which discharge their waters into the sea. Hence therefore the errors of those should be corrected, who said that it is the sweat of the earth; or that it is the remains of the primogenial humor, which the heat of the sun had dried up; or that it breaks forth from a certain subterranean spring (with which perhaps the Tartarus of Plato agrees); or that it arises from rivers; or from vapors resolved: concerning which see Aristotle, Meteorology 2, Plutarch, book 3, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, chapter 16, the Coimbrans, Meteorology, treatise 8, chapter 1, Zanchius, book 4, chapter 1. Problem 3. Whether the sea is one? We affirm, namely with a collective unity. In Scripture the Sea, and Seas, are promiscuously called by the singular and plural number. Thus in Genesis 1:10 occurs מקוה (mikveh), that is, a gathering, and ימים (yammim), that is, seas. Because the sea is really one; one מקוה (mikveh), one receptacle; although according to the various places, through which it passes or which it washes, it obtains various names. Hence the first distinction is into the Ocean, and the Mediterranean. The former is the external, which surrounds the whole globe, and distinguishes through the middle, which is distributed according to the four regions of the world into the Atlantic from the west, the Eastern and Indian Sea from the east; the Red Sea and the Ethiopian, from the south, the Frozen or Dead Sea from the north. The latter is what breaks into and penetrates the land itself, and makes many gulfs, which they number 30, of which the principal are the Persian from the east, and the Arabian from the west: whence the rest of the gulfs are derived. Concerning which the Geographical books should be consulted: and among the Theologians Zanchius, book 4, chapter 1. Problem 4. Whence the saltness of the sea? I reply, Plutarch, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, book 3, chapter 16, Pliny, book 2, chapter 100, Aristotle, Meteorology, book 2, chapter 3, refer various opinions: and they attribute it to the sun, which extracts the most tenuous parts, and converts them into vapors, which opinion Scaliger explains at length, Exercitations 51, section 1: for it also Rhodiginus, book 27, chapter 15, who in the same book and in various places observes very many things concerning the Sea. Whom let him compare, who has leisure, and Jonston in his Thaumatographia, page 74, David Christiani, book 2, chapter 9. There are those who assign this cause only, because the sea is mixed; inasmuch as terrestrial burnt things are mixed with it. But how and why from burning salt is generated, if you further ask: they do not respond. Scaliger says, "Blessed will be that life: which will teach us how from burning salt comes to be. For now it is the limit of our intellect." Others state that in the beginning it was created salty: as Daneau, part 2, treatise 3, chapter 11, Patricius in his treatise On Water and the Sea; and from him Casmann, part 1, problem 8, who ex professo attacks the contrary opinions. We agree with these: both on account of the history of creation, which affirms that not only water, but also the sea was so created in form (of which saltness is proper): and because we do not see, how those extractions of vapors would contain so vast a mass of waters in perpetual saltness: and finally, because it would follow that the nature of things was changed, and fell away from the first creation. They adduce two reasons for the saltness: One, lest it putrefy. The other, lest the fish in it putrefy: which is that of Daneau, cited place. To the former we attribute something: to the latter nearly nothing. I add, that we thought beforehand, that both opinions concerning the cause of marine saltness can be so reconciled: that it may be said to have been created salty by God in the beginning: and afterwards to be so conserved by the mediation, and concurrence of the force of the sun. I now find nearly such a distinction in Titelmans, Physics, book 6, chapter 7. Problem 5. What is the cause of the tide, and of the other motions of the sea. I reply, See all the

species of marine motion explained in Casmann in his Marine Problems, questions 13 and 14. The same author thus determines concerning the tide, question 27, page 231, that he makes saltiness the proximate, internal, and most proper cause: but he states the sun and moon to be universal and external causes through their motions, aspects, diffusion of light, and effusion of seeds, as he there speaks with Patricius. Canonhiero in his interpretation of book 2 of the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, page 652, refers it to the light of the moon alone (for he denies all influences commonly so called) with Ludovicus Buccaferrea, Gasparo Contarini, Petrus Burrius, Paulus Venetus, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Averroes, Scaliger cited in the same place. To whom in the margin he adds Claude Duret, On the truth of the causes and effects of the diverse courses etc. of the sea etc. But he endeavors to remove that objection, that the moon not appearing in our hemisphere, nor darting its light, yet the flux and reflux of the sea happens; thus: When the Sun tempers all lights both lower and higher at various times, and moderates them: the Moon then not tempered by the Sun, but nearly left to its own nature moves these lower things and especially the moist things which it dominates more vehemently; for it is easy to move and agitate per se slippery things and mobile by no difficulty, which it does not do with so much impetus, when it is tempered by the Sun; therefore the Moon excites greater assaults of the Ocean, and perturbs the rest of the lower things, then possessing a lesser light, because for stirring moist things a lesser light is required provided that it be proper and not too much tempered by admixture, because then having it as its own in cold and moist things which it dominates, according to the nature of its substance, and the particular condition of operating it transfuses its forces. Others prefer to seek the cause in the nature of the soil, on which the sea rests, as Alexander, Buccaferrea, Jean Buridan, Andreas Cesalpino cited in the same place in Canonhiero. Chiaramonti, book 13, chapters 22 and 25, makes the cause the increase of the water of the sea through rivers, and thence its tide. But I do not see the proximate and adequate cause assigned by the authors just now mentioned, why for six hours it flows in, for six it flows back, and why it suffers those monthly vicissitudes. The opinion of Canonhiero and the authors cited by him, more fully explained and further advanced, Zanchius gave, part 2, book 4, chapter 1, page 514: "For as the light of the Moon over the waters is increased: so they swell and flow: But as it is diminished, so the waters remit, and flow back; or as its motion is intensified, or remits. And so the matter is explained thus. Because the Moon dominates the waters; therefore the tide of the sea follows the diurnal motion of the Moon. But the diurnal motion of the Moon, is divided into four quarters: so that to each quarter, six hours are attributed, of which the whole natural day consists, which is of 24 hours. And so those quarters are given to the diurnal motion of the Moon, according to the 4 quarters of heaven, of which there are four points, rising, setting, the height of the day, and the height of the night. And so each natural day, the sea following the course of the Moon, is moved four times, twice by flowing; and twice by flowing back." See the rest in the same place and thesis 2, chapter 3, concerning the monthly tide, and why there is no tide in any sea nor the same in all. The same is the opinion of the Coimbrans, Meteorological treatise 8, chapter 6. Other conjectures and opinions of those inquiring are usually adduced very many, The Sun, Winds, Depths, Situations and Configurations of Shores, Course of the Ocean, Obstacles, refraction, concourse into a heap, reflection of water, palpitation, regurgitation, heating, cooling, Imitation of Heaven in a circuit, parts of Heaven opposite to the Moon, course of the Moon, rays of the Moon, reflection of light, vapors, the Moon's leading of the waters, the Moon's drawing, the Moon's carrying away, the Moon's rising,

the Moon's course through the winds, the Moon's ascent to the meridian, the Moon's descent to setting. Some of which Casmann examines, cited book. Who can be consulted; and Chiaramonti should be compared, book 13, chapters 23 and 24, Jonston, Thaumatographia, pages 79-80, Majoli, book 1, colloquy 10, Vossius, book 2, chapter 69. But if anyone wishes, if not to penetrate at least to look more closely at this secret of nature, it would behoove him to inquire more inwardly the history of the facts (so to speak) from any sailors, and the observations of all to be compared. Those things about which the philosophers should be more fully instructed were embraced by these questions. Marco Antonio de Dominis Archbishop of Spalato, when about to depart in the year 1617 from Italy to England, crossed Holland, and in it the city of Amsterdam. I here exhibit a copy of those questions, as he communicated it to me described by his own hand some years ago, when the Reverend and most friendly Antonius Plantius was a minister at Amsterdam, the Most Reverend and most celebrated Petrus Plantius likewise a minister at Amsterdam, and a highest geographer, Son. The Most Reverend Lord Archbishop of Spalato desires to know from skilled sailors, about the flux and reflux of the sea.

1. Whether the maximum elevation of the sea in a place always happens when the Moon is in the Meridian of the place; and whether the precise end of the Reflux and beginning of the Flux always happens when the Moon is at a point distant precisely by a quadrant from the meridian. And if those points of the beginning and end of Flux and Reflux are not Noon and the line of the sixth hour, but others; which they may be, by how many degrees they differ from the meridian and from the line of the sixth hour: And Whether they are always and everywhere the same respectively or truly vary in the same place or in different ones, and in what way?

2. Whether in the wide Ocean besides the motion of the sea upwards and downwards, that is Intumescence and Detumescence, there is also motion in Longitude, or latitude, suppose diurnal from East to West, or another?

3. Whether the maximum flux and reflux is under the equinoctial and the minimum under the poles or perhaps none, as to intumescence and detumescence?

4. Whether in some sea, the Moon existing in square aspect with the sun, the flux and reflux is either very small or none?

5. Whether the flux and reflux of the New Moon is always equal in the same place to the flux and reflux of the Full Moon. Likewise also in each square aspect. Or whether in the New Moons and Full Moons the Moon existing around Cancer, has a greater flux and reflux than the Moon existing around Capricorn?

6. Whether everywhere in the wide Ocean the flux and reflux are equal in time, namely of six hours?

Problem 6. Whence springs and rivers arise. I reply, Aristotle, Meteorology, book 1, chapter 13, wants, if not all at least most to be generated from air and vapor enclosed within the pores of the earth, and there condensed by cold into drops of water: which opinion not ignoble

Peripatetics defend, and Cardano incrusts it, On Subtlety, book 2, page 162. Others, from rains received within the cavities of the earth: which opinion the Coimbrans solidly refute by three reasons, Meteorology, treatise 9, chapter 1. Others, That some arise from the sea, some from elsewhere: thus Titelmans, commentary on Ecclesiastes 1, who nevertheless in all things follows the opinion of Aristotle, Physics, book 6, chapter 7. Others, that all arise from the sea: thus Vallés, Sacred Philosophy, chapter 63. Which opinion Scaliger strenuously defends, Exercitations 46. Before them it was delivered by Pliny, Philo: and among the Theologians Basil, Jerome, Isidore, John Damascene, Hugh of St. Victor, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas etc. relying on the passage Ecclesiastes 1:7. But they endeavor to explain the mode how the water is derived from the sea into springs variously: concerning which the Coimbrans should be consulted, cited treatise. Others finally reconcile the opinions by some distinction, which they apply to the saying of Scripture; as Lorinus, commentary on Ecclesiastes 1, Zanchius, book 4, chapter 1, the Coimbrans, cited place, where also Lorinus explains, how it should be understood: "The sea is not filled." We think it can be most safely said, that all Springs and rivers immediately arise from the sea whether through open, or through subterranean passages: so that this is their perpetual and primary matter: There also accrues water from rains, and from resolved vapors collected, which makes some part, and in this way they arise from the sea only mediately, because namely the rains and vapors are extracted (at least for the most part) from the sea. Compare Chiaramonti, book 13, chapter 5. Problem 7. What concerning miraculous springs and wine-like waters, bloody, discerning of human things and qualities; concerning which partly Jonston, Thaumatographia, class 2, article 2 and 6, partly Nieremberg in his books On the Miraculous Natures in Europe. I reply, Concerning the water of Bethesda it is certain from John 9, and concerning the water of jealousy, Numbers 5, and in both places it was a divine miracle. Concerning others which are reported, Nieremberg imputes them to the superstition of the Gentiles, or to little fables and popular errors, as often as it happens to him. Concerning the Lake of Pilate, book 2, chapter 28, from his Gretser: "So that that common one seems to rely not so much on truth; as on the unlearned tradition of the multitude" etc. 29, where concerning prodigious springs: "Nor do I accumulate more springs; let him who is held by the desire of knowing more marvelous springs go to the aforesaid writers. Although some handed down not only from the Poets, but also from the Historians and Philosophers, seem to pertain to fables rather than to the nature of things, or rather to the superstitions and impostures of evil geniuses, as are those concerning which Solinus, chapter 10: 'Indeed hot and healthy springs bubble up in some places, which bring remedies, or consolidate broken bones, or abolish the uncertain venom from venomous spiders, or even dissipate eye diseases': So far rightly, for with these and similar faculties of healing it is allowed to find not a few springs equipped and endowed. But, he subjoins, those which heal the eyes, 'are also strong for convicting thieves. For whoever denies a theft by oath, touches the lights with the waters, where there is no perjury, he discerns more clearly: if perfidy refuses, the crime is detected by blindness, and captured in eyes he confesses the crime in darkness.' These things Solinus, which either were done by natural force of the water, or by divine power, or by operation of a demon. Not the first: for no water has that force naturally implanted in it, so that it may make manifest hidden things, and punish the guilty by touch, and permit the innocent to depart unharmed. Not the second: for where did God obligate himself to do these things through the waters of these springs? Where did Scripture or tradition make this attested? Therefore the third

remains, that namely, whatever here happens, it happens by work of a demon, whose powers it by no means transcends, that it may either endow someone touching that water with a sharper power of seeing, or deprive them utterly of light, so that it employs that water not for an instrument, but for a sign of producing the effect; by which kind of tricks the demon was once accustomed frequently to mock the Heathen not yet illuminated by the Christian faith." And chapter 30, he calls superstitious springs which among the Heathen were to be wondered at by unusual effects. Let him apply these things to his bloody springs, or healthful ones, concerning which in the same place, chapters 32 and 33, and the water the food of fire, chapter 75, concerning the spring of St. Columba, chapter 65. Concerning wine-like springs, whether any mention of them was ever made by the ancients, Casaubon disputes against Baronius in his Exercitations; whom Rosweyde in turn oppugns in the law of Retaliation, tablet 4, page 49. Who should be consulted.

Little Appendix concerning Inundations.

SINCE in the explication of the texts of Scripture, and in the cause of inundations Theologians sometimes have to deal with them, we will here briefly indicate the things most necessary to be known. 1. Every flood is from God, whence he is said to preside over it, Psalm 29:10, and to command the waters, Psalm 77:14. 2. From God as the agent alone, when it is miraculous: such as was the universal Noachian one: concerning which the commentators on Genesis 7, and Daneau, On Antiquity, book 4. Which naturally will not be able to happen hereafter, Job 38:8-9, nor will happen, from the covenant entered into, and confirmed by the peculiar sacrament of the Rainbow, Genesis 9, with 2 Peter 3:6-7. Concerning that peculiar one, by which the land of Sodom was turned into the dead sea: whether it was a flood, how it happened; and whether miraculous: Let it be discussed. 2. From God, through natural agents. 1. an earthquake, such as was in the year 1509, when a great part of Constantinople was overwhelmed by the waters. Compare the authors on Earthquakes hitherto cited. 2. Without an earthquake it happens either from a river only, or from the sea. The former is when some field or part of a region is inundated, either the mounds having been broken or overcome: because by rains, or melted snows the waters of it have so increased, that the narrow channels do not suffice for deriving them into the Ocean: especially if the mouths, through which it discharges itself, are blocked by ice: such as nearly every year are accustomed to happen somewhere. The latter is when the sea itself intumescing and going out of its boundaries inundates a part of the land. Which can happen in two ways, either by overcoming the very shores, and covering the nearest land, or by tiding into some strait, or through mouths into a river, and so by breaking or overleaping the bars made either by nature or by art. If we inquire into its cause; the superior is the just judgment of God against the sins of men, by which it happens that the earth, which yielded to the sons of men, Psalm 115:16, having been taken from them is joined to the sea, Psalm 107:33-34. The inferior, and natural causes of that extraordinary intumescence are, both celestial bodies and influences especially lunar, and vapors, winds, fires, air partly in the bottom of the sea, partly in the sea itself, and if anything besides can probably be adduced by the

physicists for explaining the cause of the ordinary tide. For here there is no doubting that the limit is of our intellect, and a cross fixed to the curious.

Problem 1. Whether such a flood is natural? We affirm, because it is against or above the laws posited to the sea; which does not change its whole location or boundaries then. Job 26, Jeremiah 5:22. Although it should be referred to the rarer and extraordinary miracles. Problem 2. Whether the intumescence and motion of the sea, Jonah 1:4, 13, was natural? Let it be discussed. Problem 4. Marine floods of this sort can be noted from histories, and Meteorological writers (Coimbrans, treatise 8, chapter 10). If any desire a compendium, let them go to the Chronicle of Sethus Calvisius; or of Alsted, or of anyone else: Of our countrymen Petrus Twisk in the vernacular language published a catalog of all inundations together with one of comets. Which authors since they are at hand to anyone, there is no reason that I should be more prolix here. 5. The effects and consequences of inundations are various changes, 1. A continent becomes an island, as Sicily, Cyprus, Euboea, Bithynia. 2. Cities and regions are engulfed, as Helice, Bura, Pyrtha, Antissa; and, lest we depart far, certain parts of Flanders, Frisia, Holland, Zeeland etc. Of which some for a few years, some for centuries, some for more than a thousand years and more, some perhaps up to the end of the world remain covered by the waters. At least concerning the land of Sodom that can be piously believed. 3. Akin to these is that change, by which an island is joined to the land, as Antissa to Lesbos, Zephyrium to Halicarnassus, Dromiscus and Perne to Miletus, Narthecusa to Parthenius. 4. And the other, by which new islands emerge (which perhaps existed before, but having been submerged by the waters, are again denuded), as Delos, Rhodes, Anaphe, Nea, Alone, Thera, Therasia, Hiera, concerning which see the Geographers, and the Lexicon of Ortelius. And Jonston, Thaumatographia, page 86. And what parts of the continent emerge anew, either by nature or by human industry, as in Holland, Beemster, Purmer, Schermer etc. 6. Fertile, champaign and depressed land, by heaped up sands becomes higher, and vice versa. Compare Jonston, cited place, and Johannes Gryphiander, On Islands, chapter 29.

Problem 1. Whether some memory πατροπαραδότως also among the Gentiles remained of the Noachian flood. I reply, We affirm, with Daneau in Antiquities of the World, book 3, chapter 3, Du Plessis-Mornay, On the Truth of the Christian Religion, chapter 26, Pererius on Genesis 7, Lipsius, book 2, dissertation 21. Concerning the American nations the same the histories and navigations of the more recent authors assert; and from them Johannes de Laet in his book On the Origin of the American Peoples. And Jonston, Thaumatographia, class 2, chapter 3, article 7. Problem 2. What faith is there in the history concerning the rivers Thames and Trent and others stopping their course for a whole day (Alsted, Chronology, chapter 32, section 309), whether it does not obscure that miracle, Joshua 3:16, with Psalm 114. I reply, I prefer not to believe, at least I suspend judgment. The reason is other, and manifest, when either by an earthquake, or by any violent obstruction the course of a river is stopped: as happened in the year 1618, when in the Valtellina valley a mountain was broken off: concerning which Sprecher in his Rhaetian history, pages 63-66. Problem 3. What concerning the sabbatical river. I reply, concerning this and other rivers and springs resting at intervals, see the disputation On the Sabbath and Feasts. Problem 4. What should be stated concerning the Pyrenean lake, and the other on mount fractus near Lucerne of the Swiss (which they call mount Pilatus), into which if

someone throws a stone, continual storms, thunders, hails are said to arise, in Bodin, Theater of Nature, book 2, page 171, and Pedro Mexía, Various Lessons, part 2, chapter 8. I reply, Either it is a fallacy of hearing, or the illusions of lying men, or diabolical specters, or it should be referred to popular mythologies. Compare Nieremberg, book 2, On the Miraculous Natures of Europe, chapter 28. Whom see concerning this, and in various places concerning very many other wonders of the waters: and Jonston, class 2, chapter 3, articles 3, 4, 5, especially article 6. In particular, thirteen wonders or miracles of the Sea Cornelius a Lapide briefly noted, commentary on Ecclesiasticus 43:25, and Lorinus on Psalm 107. Of Lakes David Christiani, book 2, chapter 18. Of Springs the same, chapter 21. Of Rivers the same, chapter 20. Concerning the marine tide, besides the authors just now noted, I indicate Pliny, book 2, chapter 97, Aristotle in his Problems, and Meteorology, book 2, chapter 1, Plutarch, book 1, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, chapter 17, Augustine, City of God, book 7, chapter 22, Ptolemy, book 2, chapter 12, Solinus, chapter 22. And among the more recent authors David Christiani, book 2, Geographical System, chapters 10-16. And Vossius, book 2, chapter 69. Problem 5. What concerning flames in the sea or wells, or springs? Concerning which Jonston, class 2, chapter 1, articles 1 and 2, and we below, thesis 3. I reply, either they are a flaming πυρώδη brightness, such as of certain fish, of rotten wood, of pyropus, of asbestos. Or if truly fire burns, it is generated and nourished by bituminous or salty matter. See Alsario, The Burning Vesuvius. and Jonston, Thaumatographia, cited chapter, article 4.

Little Appendix 2. On Islands.

Problem 1. Whether there were no islands from the beginning, that is, from the third day of creation; but all at last arose through and after floods both universal and particular? I reply, We premise a distinction of island into perfect, and imperfect, which is a rock (projecting of course, for a hidden rock cannot be called an island) such as the island of Tyre. And again into peninsula and island properly so called. Besides into marine, fluvial, marshy. Moreover into greater, middling, least. Finally into natural, casual, made by hand or art. Where natural is again distinguished into perpetual, which was from the beginning; and into arisen. And arisen into fixed and floating or swimming; such they report to be in Scotland in loch Lomond, of which Camden makes mention in his description of Scotland, page 383. See very many others indicated together with the writers in Johannes Gryphiander, chapter 6, page 71. Concerning some natural islands, especially the larger ones (such as America, Taprobane or Sumatra, Madagascar and St. Lawrence, Albion and Hibernia, Cyprus, Crete) it is not improbable to assert, that they existed before the flood. Concerning the middling ones, as also concerning the lesser ones which are infinite, both marine, and fluvial, and marshy, it seems it should be responded with a distinction that some were from the beginning, some were not. This opinion is usually proved from Genesis 10:5, compare with Ecclesiasticus 43:25, where after the flood and the earth restored certain islands are said to have existed. Thus Majoli, Dog-Days 9 and 14. And from him Johannes Gryphiander, On Islands, chapter 6. But what if someone excepts that Genesis 10:5 can be expounded by prolepsis, not that then actually there were islands, but that afterwards they were made. It could also be excepted that by the Hebrews any lands (even

continents) situated far off, and to which one goes by ships, are called islands. See Jeremiah 25:22. The passages Psalm 24:2, Psalm 136:6, which Gryphiander adduces in the same place, do not seem to me to prove this. The argument he subjoins in the same place, chapter 6, All those should be held for perpetual created from the beginning, which afterwards are not found to have arisen in histories, because a change is not presumed, unless it is proved l. 3. l. 21. de probat. etc. But this is nothing other than probable. Of the same degree is the argument deduced from the ends and uses of islands: namely that they may promote navigations; distinguish seas; provide ports and stations for those sailing; protect the continental lands, or larger islands against the violence of the sea: as concerning the islands covering the shores of Norway Chytraeus, book 4, On Saxony, and concerning the islands of Frisia Ubbo Emmius, books 1 and 2, On the Affairs of Frisia, and concerning the Cyclades Strabo, book 10, Pliny, book 4, chapter 12. Problem 2. How natural islands arise, or are born. I reply, in three chief ways: when through alluvion and colluvion of sand they are born little by little: when rivers leave dry the place, which had been of their channel, and begin to flow around: when islands do not cohere to the channel of the river, but are sustained by twigs or other light matter, so that they do not touch its soil. See these modes explained and proven from the Jurists, historians, Geographers in Gryphiander, chapters 6 and 18. Problem 3. How casual, or fortuitous islands are born? I reply, Through an earthquake; or through a flood or force of the sea or of a river, through which parts of the earth torn away from the continent recede into islands. Gryphiander, chapter 7, proves these two modes by many examples. Problem 4. Whether the whole sea at some time will be changed into land; or on the contrary the land into sea. I reply, The former Democritus thought in Rhodiginus, book 1, chapter 14, the latter Blancanus in Chiaramonti, book 12, chapter 17. But each without reason. We instructed from the sacred writings know, that the earth is not to be overwhelmed by the waters, and that the world has been established up to the last day. Genesis 8, 9, and 2 Peter 3. On which day we have not yet seen it proven from Scripture that some of the containing bodies of the lower and upper world (among which are the sea and earth) will be taken away. Go to the common places and the writers On the End of the World. Problem 5. Whether and what are the wonders of islands? I reply, Jonston, page 87, collected some things from authors, but Gryphiander, chapter 32, did this far more laboriously and abundantly. Whom let those consult, whom these things touch.

On the third day plants were created. Whether also plant-animals (ζωόφυτα)? We do not think so. The history and contemplation of plants is most noble: inasmuch as in them is an illustrious mirror of the creator and of divine providence, and in their origin, form, figure, qualities especially antipathies and sympathies infinite wonders: which the Botanists observe; although who may observe all things? Jonston exhibits a selection of certain ones in his Thaumatographia. The wisest of kings (1 Kings 4:29) Solomon most ennobled this part of physics by his study (1 Kings 4:33). Concerning the plants mentioned in sacred Scripture, besides the commentators, Levinus Lemnius in a special treatise, and in various places (which was published with Lemnius) Vallés, On Sacred Philosophy. Concerning the same in general Daneau and Zanchius; and some things cursorily the Scholastics and the writers of common places. Especially the wits of the Theologians are exercised around the dudaim of Reuben, the mandrake (concerning which is the little dissertation of Johannes Drusius and Juan Luis de la Cerda, Sacred Miscellanies, chapter 110), the ricinus of Jonah; as also hyssop, sandalwood,

palm, balsam, myrrh, aloe etc. of which mention is made there. It is also curiously inquired by those evilly at leisure of what kind the tree of life was, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, that wood, Exodus 15:25, the tree from which Judas hanged himself. Among the philosophers these questions are agitated; Whether plants are animate; whether they sense; Whether in them there is a difference of sex; why leaves were given to plants; whence is mistletoe in trees; why their parts live even separated from the rest of the body; Whether there are more monstrosities and monsters in plants, or on the contrary in animals; To what and to which stars and planets it is subjected; Whether they should be collected with a certain position of the stars, What should be stated concerning their signatures (as they call them), How nature and art produce plants: what concerning walking leaves, the Scythian lamb, that herb called by the Portuguese Sentida, the root Bacharas, and many more wonders in Pliny, and the writers of Natural Magic hitherto cited, concerning which see Keckermann, Physical Disputations 13, Scaliger, Exercitations 138 and 178, Sennert, chapter 18, Sagittarius, Disputation 13, Timpler, Magirus, Sennert, Velcurio, Seidel, and other physical authors, and the Theologians just now cited. The same will suggest the divisions of plants: and as if in a little table Alsted's Natural Theology exhibits all. Concerning balsam, and other things hardly found today, Guido Pancirolli and Samuel Clarke: where also other authors are cited. We propose these things to our students to be ventilated. Problem 1. Whether God actually produced plants: Or on the contrary only gave the earth the power, by which it might afterwards produce plants. I reply, The former Augustine states, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, chapter 4, for reasons, which will be dissolved in the following questions. But we with the Scholastics on Aquinas, part 1, question 69, article 2, and more recent Theologians think the contrary: both because it agrees with the text, Genesis 1:11, and 2:9, and because they were necessary for the food of animals: and because in paradise there were trees: which if not on the third day, at least before the fall of man was created. Problem 2. Whether the earth also actively concurred to the production of plants: or on the contrary only passively, so that it supplied the matter. I reply affirmatively to the latter, against Cajetan. The reasons are. 1. because the earth now does not concur actively, (for the active and plastic force is in the seed not in the earth: as was said in the preceding Disputation against the opinion of Daneau:) much less that in the first creation it concurred. 2. Because expressly Genesis 2:9 thus explains the words of chapter 1, verse 11, "Let the earth sprout" etc., which Cajetan and Daneau object. 3. Because, in the production of animals the earth behaved passively by supplying the matter: why should not the same be said concerning plants? Problem 3. Whether noxious and poisonous herbs, moreover medicinal ones; likewise thorns and thistles were created on the third day; before man sinned? I reply with Augustine, and the Scholastics on Thomas Aquinas, cited place. 1. Because this is affirmed Genesis 2:5, where expressly, "every shrub"; compare with chapter 2, verses 1-2, where God is said to have ceased from producing the species of things. 2. Because thorns and thistles are apt to the use of animals; indeed also certain poisonous things noxious to men, are sweet foods to them: which Lucretius sings concerning hemlock. 3. Because there were serpents before the fall; why not poisonous herbs. 4. Because, then they were not poisonous or noxious to man ἁπλῶς (as poisons are said to be, Mark 16:18), since all things were subject to his dominion and use: in the way that lions, wolves, bears etc. then did not harm man. And so thorns, thistles were not for a punishment to man, nor troublesome. 5. Because, all those things were good and perfect in their own kind, accommodated namely to the end, to which they were produced: and especially on account of

man, to whom partly in themselves they are useful, either for food, or for medicine; partly in another, that is in the animals created for the use of man, as Lucretius shows by the example of hemlock; and could be shown by very many others. 6. Because, the nature of things was not changed through sin: but this is the nature of thorns, thistles, aconite, wolfsbane etc. Which is against Basil, who, Hexaemeral Homilies, homily 5, wants the rose to have been created on the third day without thorns.

Problem. Whether aquatic plants growing in the depths of seas or rivers are comprehended by this creation (Genesis 1:11, with 2:9). We affirm, Because they arise from the earth, just as all others. The water, which provides for them the surrounding place, does not claim them for itself more than the air, which surrounds the terrestrial ones. The same should be judged concerning the plants, which come from stones. That malediction of the land of Israel, Hosea 4:3, which Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra puts דרך משל (derech mashal) that is should be taken allegorically (for the fish of the sea did not even die at the time of the flood), is properly expounded by Rabbi David Kimhi, Deuteronomy 29:23 having also been compared: לא יצמח עשב וצמח בקרקע הים וגם בסלעים אשר בים שהמה ירעו הדגים בקללת האל יתברך שהיתה בארץ ישראל ארץ וים: id est (in the Hebrew), that is, "Herb and plant will not sprout in the bottom of the sea: nor in the rocks which are in the sea by which the fish are fed; and that in the sea of the land of Israel. For there was a malediction of God, blessed be he, on land and on sea." And these indeed natural bodies on the surface of the earth: which if they are considered according to certain species of collection or situation or their opposed privations, they are distinctly called wood, grove, forest, spinney, shrubbery, thicket, thornbush, field, land, plowed field, vineyard, meadow, pasture. Of woods, groves, valleys, deserts or forests; and of certain semi-artificial ones, as fishponds, fish-preserves, (נברכות (berechot), Greek παράδεισοι) frequent mention is made in the Scriptures. Concerning all which Geographical, architectonic, Economic, and Geoponic writers should be consulted. There exists a special treatise of Jan Dubravius Bishop of Olomouc On Fishponds in octavo hitherto published. And a prolix treatise of Janus Cornarius the Theologian published by Abraham Scultetus at Heidelberg in 1614, titled The Vine-bearing Theology of the Vine, where from the Scriptures and good authors he illustrates very many things Ethically and theologically, and determines problems looking to this. Guilielmus Gratarolus also wrote (but physically and medically) On Wine and Every Drinkable; Vallés, chapter 27, Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae, books 1 and 2, and some things concerning its various mixture among the ancients and concerning sweet wine in Girolamo Mercuriale, book 1, chapters 17 and 18, and concerning the use of wine and oil in curing all wounds, Petrus Bayrus in a special treatise. Furthermore, concerning vegetables and plants in general the natural historians and Botanists have written, of the ancients Pliny, Theophrastus with the commentary of Julius Caesar Scaliger; Dioscorides with the commentary of Pietro Andrea Mattioli; Of the more recent authors Leonhart Fuchs, Matthias de l'Obel, Rembert Dodoens, Gaspard Bauhin; and Charles de l'Écluse On exotic plants and Nieremberg, books 1 and 15. Some things pertaining to this also occur in Prospero Alpini, On the Medicine of the Egyptians, in Samuel Clarke on things anciently lost (where also other authors are cited); in Majoli in his Dog-Days; Mercuriale in his Various Readings; Cardano On Subtlety and On the Variety of Things, with the Exercitations of Julius Caesar Scaliger, Vossius On Idolatry, book 3. For those who do not want to treat these things ex professo and laboriously, the Herbal of Dodoens with scholia published at Leiden in

the vernacular language will be able to suffice; which let them consult where there is need. Concerning the wonders of plants and concerning foreign plants Jonston in his Thaumatographia, and Nieremberg, books 14 and 15, and Juan Terencio On the Plants of Mexico; Garcia de Orta and Juan Fragoso On the spices among the Indians. Concerning the herbs of Scripture Vallés and Lemnius. Their explication is pursued diligently enough in various places by Lorinus and Cornelius a Lapide in their commentaries, and of our authors Beza in his notes to the New Testament. We have just now indicated Zanchius and Daneau. Johannes Bauhin, the brother of the most celebrated Caspar Bauhin, described in a special little book the plants named from saints (the speculation of which denominations touches theologians for some reason more than others). There are also certain other things on the surface of the earth, but which are not of this place 1. inasmuch as merely artificial, as roads, pyramids, obelisks, citadels, watchtowers, cities, gardens, labyrinths, bowers, circuses, theaters, xysti, porticos, pergolas, ports, canals and aqueducts, houses, courts, temples, tombs etc. concerning which Political, Economic, Architectonic, Antiquarian writers treat.

3. The contained bodies, which are contained within the earth or in the bowels of the earth are 1. Animals; as moles, earthworms and other kinds of worms concerning which Georgius Agricola in his book On Subterranean Animals. To which refer the fossil fish in Gallia Narbonensis of which Polybius makes mention, book 34 of his Histories, and from him Athenaeus, book 8, chapter 1, Strabo, book 4, page 126. And that such fish are found in many other places Pliny testifies, book 9, chapter 57. That such are found even today the more recent authors write, Georgius Agricola, cited book, Guillaume Rondelet, On Fishes, book 1, chapter 14, Majoli, Jacques Daléchamps on Pliny's cited place, Isaac Casaubon on Strabo's cited place and on Athenaeus, book 8, chapter 1, Nieremberg, On the Miraculous Natures of Europe, book 1, chapter 43, Vossius, book 4, On Idolatry, chapter 4. But on the contrary Seneca not obscurely calls this physics into doubt, book 3, Natural Questions, chapter 17, and ex professo explodes it in Pomponius Mela, book 2, chapter 5, Francisco Fernández de Córdoba oppugns the same in his Didascalia multiplex, chapter 11, where he calls as witness Gaspar Barreiros. Pliny however excepts and succors, book 9, chapter 57, where he shows how they can live and respire there: "The same author relates that in Paphlagonia fish are dug out most pleasing to food, terrestrial in other ditches, in these places where no waters stagnate, and he himself also wonders that they are born without coition. He thinks that some power inheres in the soil, which he judges from wells, since in some fish are found. Whatever this is, certainly the life of moles, a subterranean animal, makes it less admirable, unless perhaps the nature of terrestrial worms is also in fish." And Strabo, book 4, page 126, where he teaches, how they can be salted in the same place: "And a little later above the sea is a watery place, full of salt-works; it also has fossil mullets. For where you dig two or three feet, it is allowed to pierce the fish of just size with a trident let into the muddy water: it is nourished by mud like an eel." And to this would not a little pertain what Nieremberg has, book 6, Natural History, chapter 13: "Toads and serpents found in the middle of the most solid stones. It is said that on the Anconitan shore and sea stones were found whole and solid on every part, in the middle of which fish lay hidden, of whose egress or ingress there was or could be no vestige. With those stones split, however, they burst forth very suitable to the food of men. Therefore the fish are thought to have lived there, and to have grown up by the innate humor and cold of the stone." Against the defended life and respiration it

could be replied, that fish respire by water attracted through the gills, but not, as moles, by subterranean air alone. Perhaps it will seem safest and most agreeable to the order of creation, Genesis 1, (by which origin and life in the waters is assigned to fish), if we say with Córdoba: "Therefore we will not concede fossil fish, unless perhaps in some vein of waters, which the covered earth may have hidden; for from it laid bare, just as also from wells, fish will sometimes be able to be extracted; but for the rest unpleasant, and of noxious taste, and not pleasant, and healthful, as the ancients had said concerning the Paphlagonian, and Ruscinian fish: for that cannot be found in fish lacking light, as for a colophon, I will prove by the testimony of our Seneca, who thus says; 'But that I may return to the proposition, accept an argument for a great force of waters in subterranean places fertile with the foul plight of fish: if ever it bursts forth, it brings with it an immense crowd of animals, horrid to behold, and foul, and noxious to taste. Certainly when in Caria around the city of Myndus such a wave had leapt forth, whoever ate those fish, which the new year showed to the heaven unknown before that day, perished. Nor is that a wonder; for they were fat, and stuffed bodies, as from long leisure, but for the rest unexercised, and fattened in darkness, and devoid of light, from which health is derived.'" When I had written these things and had compared the authors of each opinion, it finally pleased to institute a conciliation of all with Vossius, cited place. "Nor for that reason should it be thought, that fish of this sort can live their whole age without waters. For such either live in muddy places, or in soil of such sort, which is irrigated by water through its little veins. Indeed those fish either were born in those places, in which they are captured, as eels, and frogs: or were driven there by reciprocal waves, and afterwards covered with soil." And these things concerning fossil fish. To this pertains the problem: Whether under and in the earth flesh is generated, and consequently whether fossil flesh is given. I reply, Libavius and from him Jonston, class 4, chapter 3, page 170, affirm. But to confess the truth, I see no experience or observation, no reason, no necessity. 2. Subterranean plants, such as bulbo-chestnuts, which our countrymen call subterranean acorns, and similar ones. We do not refer plants in the bottoms of the sea and of rivers, concerning which see just above, to subterranean ones, nor radishes, parsnips etc. which show their leaves on the surface of the earth. 3. Subterranean fires: not only insensibly mixed with the individual parts of the earth (aggregated from the four elements); but especially those which notably united in certain places exsert themselves, as in mines, and hot springs 2. In mountains, and wells visibly spewing fire. We noted something above concerning the mountains. Among all Vesuvius celebrated for so many motions etc. and fires, and the devastations thence arisen: concerning which Alsario above praised acts physically and historically in special treatises; and Giovanni Battista Mascolo, Friedrich Szembeck, Giulio Cesare Recupito. Concerning fire-spewing wells the Nubian Geographer, part 9, climate 1, page 35: "At the extremity of the same island is seen a well of burning fire, of a height of a hundred cubits: but by day it is smoke, but by night kindled fire." And part 9, climate 2, page 67: "Moreover it is said to be in the aforesaid island (namely Sejafa) a burning well sometimes vomiting fire, but sometimes tranquil; and appeased by the fire." 4. Subterranean waters not only insensibly mixed everywhere with the earth, but also collected and separately subsisting in springs and other crypts and subterranean cavities. Refer here rivers, or subterranean parts of rivers. Such as Pyramus in Strabo, book 12, Vachschiab in the Nubian Geographer, part 8, climate 3, page 138: "The river Vachschiab flows out from the regions of Tore, up to where it may appear in the land of Vachs, where it hides itself under a certain great mountain, over which

it must be crossed as if over a bridge: nor is it known how great a course it makes under that mountain; but afterwards with the mountain left it flows through the borders of Balch, until it arrives at Termed." 5. Subterranean air, partly mixed with the earth, partly filling caverns, and other greater and lesser cavities, lest a vacuum be given. Which not rarely enclosed in certain subterranean crypts and destitute of all ventilation puts on a poisonous quality: by which men and other animals are suddenly extinguished. Examples (if I remember well) occur in Cardano, On the Variety of Things. Which is usually referred to basilisks or poisonous animals hiding there. Compare below, part 8, problem concerning the basilisk. 6. Fossils so called: of which the species can be conveniently reduced to metals of course, metallic juices, stones, all kinds of earths. Concerning Fossils, and their species, Metals of course, stones, earths, juices, the physicists more often praised treat: from whom Jonston cited very many, and noted most wonders in his Thaumatographia, class 4, throughout. Georgius Agricola, and Libavius, and Martinus Casius in Mineralogy, concerning Metals: Albertus Magnus, Marbode the Gaul with his scholiast, Especially Anselmus de Boodt Imperial Physician wrote special treatises On Stones both common and precious. That I may now say nothing of the Chymical authors, whose field this is (whom see in the Chymical Theater, and in Samuel Clarke on newly discovered things, titles 7 and 8, and in various places in Heinrich Nollius, Hermetic Physics.) And Cardano On the variety of things and On subtlety with the Exercitations of Scaliger, and the special treatise of Bernardo Gomes, to which is the title Discepsis on salt; concerning which also Clarke, On lost things, title 15, William Gilbert and others cited below, On the Magnet; Angelo Sala of Vicenza On Mercury etc. See more cited in Nollius and Jonston. It is known that Arnaldus de Villa Nova, John of Rupescissa, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, published on the nature of minerals and their various use, although by profession they were Theologians. An explication of the Fossils, which occur in Scripture, Rabanus Maurus attempted in his book On the Nature of Things, and Bartholomaeus Anglicus, book 16, On the Properties of Things: of the more recent authors Daneau, part 2, treatise 3, chapters 30 and 50, and François La Rue the Physician in his little book On the Gems of Scripture, which was printed separately, and with the Sacred Philosophy of Vallés. Our students should be forewarned not to have promiscuous faith in all things ὑμνουμένοις by Pliny, books 34, 35, 36, 37, Solinus, chapters 38, 52 etc., Albertus, Vincent of Beauvais etc. and from them by Alexius Pedemontanus the Secrets, Mizaldus, Wecker, Porta. For as in other parts of special Physics, so also in this not a few fabulous things deformed a most noble ἱστορίαν. Especially for the speculation of Scripture of a Theologian there occur gold, (which obtains seven names in the Old Testament), orichalcum or chalcolibanum, copper, silver, iron, gem, that stone From which the knives of Joshua 5, the twelve precious stones of Revelation 19:20, Exodus 28:17, 39:10, etc. We think these questions agree with our commentary. 1. On what day the fossils were created, and why Moses does not mention them. I reply to the former, on the third day: for we do not see to which they were more agreeable, than to that, on which the earth was clothed with the immediately adhering adjuncts. And thus the Theologians commonly. To the latter, that it is not clear: except that it seemed enough to embrace them with their bosom and matrix (so to speak), that is, the earth: in the way that we judged before the creation of the angels to be contained under the creation of heaven (their domicile). The reason of Daneau: because namely Moses set forth only those things which run into the eyes: but these are not discerned by us everywhere; I know not whether it is solid enough. For also in the depths of the sea many things remain, which do not run into the

eyes everywhere, of which nevertheless he makes mention, verses 20-21. Problem 2. Whether it does not conflict with the order of creation, if it is said that one species of things can be transmuted into others through human industry, for example, baser metals into gold? I reply, Not at all: for chryopoeia conflicts with neither nature, reason, nor Scripture: indeed also manifold experience favors this opinion, which among others Walter von Hogelande proves in a special little book. To which, as also to the reasons and experiences adduced by the more recent philosophers, and Martín Antonio Delrío the Theologian, Magical Disquisitions, book 1, chapter 5, and Guido Pancirolli and Samuel Clarke, part 2, Memorable Things, title 7, (where they also cite others) I would not want to object; nor do I see what more solid could be replied. But lest anyone think that through that attempt, injury is done either to nature, or to God the author of nature; let him think that no one is accounted at fault; because he procures the production of plants, and animals (for example, of hens from eggs through the heat of hearth fire tempered conformably to natural heat): Concerning which Scaliger, Exercitations 23, and Jean Brodeau, book 3, Miscellaneous, chapter 25. But when I say these things, I would not want to be the author to anyone that with his own things neglected he should play the golden dustman: far be it, far be it. I approve the prudent warning of Pancirolli and Clarke, cited place, and Keckermann, Physical Disputations 11, Problem 8. Problem 3. Whether orichalcum is a distinct species of metal, and long ago ceased to be in the nature of things? I reply, If indeed the latter is true, as Pliny wants, book 34, chapter 2, Pancirolli, Memorable Things, part 1, title 8, Magirus in Physics, chapter on Metals, Alessandro Piccolomini, On Meteors, chapter 30, I deny that it is a distinct species, for the species of things do not perish, but are eternal, namely with a physical eternity. The same should be stated concerning the other lost things of Pancirolli just now mentioned; either they are artificial, or they never were in the world, or they did not cease to be, although they are found with difficulty. Compare above, parts 2 and 3. Problem 4. What should be stated concerning the stone asbestos, amiantus, cyprius, charistius, and concerning the linen and wicks made from there, and concerning the other lamps and lanterns (which they call) perpetual. I reply, concerning the stones, and the linen made from there of which the filth is purged not by water but by fire, Pliny affirms, book 19, chapter 1, Stephanus of Byzantium under Κάρυστος, Solinus, chapter 7, Strabo, book 10, where he calls Cretan linen, Augustine, On the City of God, cited below, Isidore, book 16, Origins, chapter on gems, Rhodiginus, book 13, chapter 18, Majoli, Dog-Days, part 1, colloquy 20, Adrien Turnèbe, Adversaria, book 1, chapter 1, book 2, Various Lessons, chapter 27, Anselmus de Boodt, book 2, chapter 204, Levinus Lemnius, book 2, On the Hidden Miracles of Nature, chapter 12. Moreover that linen is made from stones, Plutarch teaches, On the Failure of Oracles, Strabo, book 10, Dioscorides, book 5, chapter 156.

And Podocatarus in his history On the Affairs of Cyprus, testifies that at Venice he had such linen (which he calls Cyprian) unharmed and cleansed by fire: which is made from the stone amiantus, which is found in Cyprus, and crushed with a hammer with the earthy superfluity shaken off, retains with its fibers the appearance of linen and is woven into cloth. Giambattista della Porta testifies something similar in his Natural Magic. Anselmus de Boodt, book 2, History of Stones and Gems, chapter 204. Against it, however, the Same Anselmus de Boodt seems to doubt concerning the stone, book 2, History of Gems and Stones, chapter 303, page 280: "Asbestos is born in the mountains of Arcadia of the color of iron. Pliny, book 37, chapter 10.

Albertus Magnus corrupted the word and from there made abeston. An unknown stone unless it is amiantus." But in chapter 102, page 190, he explains himself otherwise, "The mode," he says, "of weaving in this age has perished." Plutarch in his book On the Failure of Oracles takes a middle way:

"Τῆς δ' ἐν Καρύστῳ πέτρας χρόνος οὐ πολύς, ἀφ' οὗ πέπαυται μηρύματα καὶ σπάσματα μαλακὰ χαλκευτικὰ συνεκφέρουσα. καὶ γὰρ ὑμῶν ἑωρακέναι τινὰς οἴομαι χειρόμακτρα καὶ δίκτυα καὶ κεκρυφάλους ἐκεῖθεν, οὔτε πυρικαυστούμενα, ἀλλ', ὅσ' ἂν ῥυπανθῇ χρωμένων, ἐμβαλόντες εἰς φλόγα, λαμπρὰ καὶ διαυγῆ κομίζονται. νῦν δ' ἠφάνισται, καὶ μόλις οἷον ἶνες ἢ τρίχες ἀραιαὶ διατρέχουσιν ἐν τοῖς μετάλλοις."

That is, "The stone of Carystus has not long ceased to yield soft woolly tufts for the copper-works, fit for the weaving of cloth. For I think that some of you have seen napkins, nets, and women's cauls that have been brought from thence, which are not burnt by fire; but when they have been soiled by use, they are thrown into a flame, and they are taken out white and shining; now, however, the mine is exhausted, and there run through the quarries only, as it were, some few fibres or hairs."

Pancirolli, title 4, says that living linen is not found today. Concerning long-lasting or perpetual lamps and lanterns, various authors affirm, some of whom we will soon cite, who now occur. There are fires and brightnesses which by the apposition of new combustible matter are preserved perennial by nature or by human art and industry: such as the fire Photius reports from Ctesias, book 71, page 145, to be in Lycia, which burns nights and days. Pliny, book 2, chapter 106, calls the mountain burning from here Chimaera and in the same place compares it with Etna, and Vesuvius. But this is not of this place: as neither the perpetual fire among the Jews, and Romans; because it has nothing of wonder. Cardano, book 6, On the Variety of Things, page 661, teaches how a lamp is to be made, which may shine for a whole year. But neither is it asked here concerning such a one: Therefore it remains to be inquired, concerning a lamp to be made from the stone lychnis, or carbuncle, which may perpetually shine, and burn, or at least on account of its brightness may seem to burn: as the poet speaks, "and with the flame-imitating pyrope." But that such lamps can be preserved for many years is not a wonder: since they consist of a hard, and shining or flaming stone. Therefore is this wonder to be sought in the stony and durable linen kindled, or in the inextinguishable oil of the lamp. Indeed the authors who write about these things seem to want it so, although all speak neither in one mode nor accurately enough. Certainly the wick although it were not consumed (in which alone some seem to place the cause of duration, but wrongly in my judgment), yet the flame and lamp by defect of oil would necessarily be extinguished: unless there be present an inextinguishable oil, by which that wick might be perpetually moistened and burn. This wonder therefore should be investigated, Whether there is an inextinguishable oil, which for a long time could moisten the wick of a lamp or lantern in perpetuity or at least to 1000 or 2000 years; so that it would not be consumed by flame and fire. And, from what matter, and how that oil can be made? Pancirolli numbers such among the anciently lost things, title 35. They easily make faith concerning a perpetual wick; but not likewise concerning an oil about to feed the flame of a lamp never however to be consumed. Apollonius, Miraculous Histories, chapter 36, page 34, (Greek and

Latin edition of Meursius in quarto) seems to me to speak more cautiously and correctly: "τὰ δὲ ἐλλύχνια μόνα τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἀκατασκεύαστα καιόμενα μετ' ἐλαίου", that is, "But the lampwicks alone burned with oil, are unconsumed for all time." Compare concerning oil Jonston, part 2, chapter 1, article 5. I would conjecture that there were seen perhaps in those sepulchers not lamps truly kindled and flaming, but made as if flaming, that is, the figure of a flame to have been formed from the stone lychnis or similar. But it opposes, that the histories report, some lamps with the sepulcher opened and the air admitted to have been extinguished, but others kindled. To the extinction, which is reported, it could easily be opposed, that it was not a true extinction, but only a cessation of sensible flashing through the day and light admitted into the darkness of the sepulcher or crypt. Therefore the histories and faith of the writers seem to be further inquired into. We exhibit to the reader those things, which are now at hand and permit to him the further investigation and judgment. Gutherius, On the Law of the Manes, book 2, chapter 32: "As far as pertains to the lamps, they are found in nearly all monuments, which are called lychnuchi and Bilichnes, or of more wicks. For I have seen one ἑνδεκάμυχνον" etc. "after many years with the tumulus opened, with air let in: those lamps are immediately kindled. By what art this can happen it is not ours to inquire further. Others have philosophized much in this matter, who with kindled lights have burned the flying wings of their wit." Damasus in his Life of Pope Sylvester reports that Constantine the Great at Rome in his baptistery set up a linen made from amiantus and incombustible so that it might perpetually burn in lamps. Guido Pancirolli, On Things Anciently Lost, title 35, page 124: "The ancients also prepared an Inextinguishable Oil, which was never consumed. This was seen also in our age, when Paul III was Pope, namely with the sepulcher of Tullia the daughter of Cicero having been found: in which there was a lamp even then burning; but with air admitted, it was extinguished. Moreover it had burned for more or less 1550 years." On which Samuel Clarke thus comments:

"This Incombustible Oil seems to be able to be called more rightly Living Oil, Statius:

'A house built by Vulcan, under which as you go
There are ponds sitting in the veins, and wet with living oil.'

But also Ermolao Barbaro, book 5 of his Corollary, and Francesco Maturanzio in his epistle to his friend Alfeno, long ago testified, That there are found somewhere in the subterranean monuments of Italy lamps shining with a perpetual brightness, such as was that of Maximus Olybius in the field of Padua, dug up near the town of Este: which Bernardino Scardeone, book 1, Antiquities of Padua, at the end, relates to have burned for more than fifteen hundred years: whom Melchior Wieland praises in his commentary On Papyrus, chapter 6. Moreover of that perpetual Oil or Fire there is extant a clear description in Girolamo Ruscelli, in his excellent work, to which the title is The Illustrious Impressions: which passage we once rendered from Italian into Latin. Nor perhaps was the nature of Naphtha much dissimilar: which Pliny, book 2, chapter 105, says flows around Babylon, in the manner of liquid bitumen. With whom Xiphilinus in Dio, book 35, agrees. Moreover Naphtha, he says, is from the genus of bitumen, burning to such a degree, that it completely burns all things, to which it adheres, nor is it easily extinguished by any moist thing. Pliny says, it has a great cognation with fires, and they leap over straightway into it from wherever it is seen."

Augustine, City of God, book 21, chapter 6: "If such things are to be believed, believe also us what has been related in the same writings, that there was or is a certain shrine of Venus, and there a candelabrum, and in it a lamp so burning under the open sky, that no storm, no rain extinguished it. Whence just as that stone, so that λύχνος ἄσβεστος, that is inextinguishable lamp was named." And a little later: "Therefore either in that lamp human art contrived something mechanical from the stone asbestos, or it was made by magic art, which men might wonder at in the temple, or some demon under the name of Venus presented himself with so much efficacy, that this prodigy both appeared to men, and remained for a long time." And on that passage Louis Vivès in his commentary: "Concerning the stone asbestos. Or even linen, which is not consumed by fires, for Pliny relates that there is such a kind of linen, book 19, they call it living, the Greeks ἄσβεστον by argument of its nature: of which kind I and Petrus Garsias Lalos my fellow student and most joined to me in highest familiarity saw very many wicks at Paris, of which kind also in this region a napkin given to the fire in the middle of a banquet, and returned to the owner cleaner and more shining than it could be by any waters and soaps, just as Pliny testifies that he saw the same experiment of napkins." "Or it was made by magic art. It is reported that a sepulcher was dug up in the memory of the fathers, in which a lamp was burning placed there, as appeared from the inscription, for more than a thousand five hundred years, and that whole lamp as soon as it began to be handled, crumbled into a very fine dust between the applied hands."

Pausanias in his Attica, pages 24-25, (Greek and Latin edition of Sylburg published by Wechel in folio 1583), reports that the lamp of Minerva made with oil poured in burned nights and days for a whole year: because the wick in the lamp was of Carpasian flax, which alone is not destroyed by fire (καίεσθαι). Problem 5. What concerning the powers and operations of the magnet; and whether manifest causes of all of them can be explained. I reply, Very many magnetic wonders are described in special and huge volumes by Niccolò Cabeo, Athanasius Kircher, Leonardus Garzonius. William Gilbert also wrote On the Magnet; also Anselmus de Boodt in his History of Stones, from chapter 247 to 258. Libavius in his Singularia, Giambattista della Porta, book 7, Natural Magic, chapter 7, Jonston, class 4, chapter 15. Among the ancients some observations were also noted by Augustine, book 21, City of God, chapter 4, Isidore of Seville, book 16, Origins, chapter on gems. Pliny, book 36, chapter 16. But among and after all others Samuel Ward the Theologian exhibits very many of his observations concerning the various and wonderful affections of the magnet in a little book published at London in 1639, titled The Reduction of the Magnet. If anyone attentively reads the observations of Ward alone, he will easily see that those do not seek an asylum of ignorance who willingly profess a certain learned ignorance in this occult miracle of sympathetic nature; but rather that those fall into a labyrinth of absurdities and most foul errors, who persuaded that they are ignorant of nothing, promise the knowledge and easy explication of all those things, which the wise hitherto ignore. Let them give a specimen of their pansophia in the demonstration, how the pores and perpetual effluences of insensible particles from the magnetic body (to which they wanted to ascribe all the wonderful magnetic tractions, but with unhappy success) can surround like camps or bonds an anchor of 20 pounds (concerning which Ward, chapter 11), and lead it to the magnet by a violent motion of protrusion or propulsion and appulsion, indeed most easily elevate it from the

earth, with all the rest of the metals, stones, and any things occupying the intermediate places or most nearly neighboring, unmoved? How iron far removed through the pulse and thrusting of those particles approaching the magnet by a slow motion may strive to the same by a swift motion. Concerning which Ward, chapters 13 and 14. How through these effluent particles iron can be moved to be thrust and drawn towards the magnet, with the medium interposed not impeding, namely the thick boards, of an earthen, marble, metallic vessel, even a golden one, or a thick plate of gold, silver, tin etc., or of a brick wall or chimney. Concerning which Ward, chapter 16. How thrusting and pulsing may impel and lead the magnet to iron, when iron is detained lest it approach to the magnet. How those fictitious particles descending from a higher place can embrace an iron mass, and elevate it from the earth on high, namely they themselves ascending with the iron and balancing themselves in the air? Concerning the elevating power of the magnet see Ward's chapter 5. How those fictitious particles can not only drive iron towards the magnet, but also retain it there. Concerning which Ward, chapter 41. How with so great a supply of magnetic particles a hundred or a thousand times calling iron continually flowing out the magnetic body is not diminished? Why the magnet effects greater things through an instrument, than immediately by its own power? Why it draws ten times more through two caps than single ones? Why not rarely very small magnets scarcely exceeding the quantity of a hazelnut, raise their own weight multiplied sixty or even a hundred times: when on the contrary certain great magnets scarcely or hardly raise a weight equal to themselves? Concerning which, and other wonderful effects see Ward, chapters 18, 19, 25. Here therefore is stopped the course of those; who recently boasted that they would demonstrate most easily and to the eye all effects as by the universal principles of nature, quantity, rest, position, figure, local motion; and who driven back from here flee to other and other new asylums; lest namely they be forced to confess a learned ignorance somewhere. To us the most wise opinion seems to be that of Anselmus de Boodt Physician of Rudolph II, book 2, On the History of Gems and Stones, chapter 249, page 219: "It seems truly a quality, and one which can be compared with light or sound. For as light passes through glass in a moment of time and sound is carried through opaque and most solid bodies to the ears and is recognized; so also the faculty of the Magnet passes through any bodies to iron, which having a Sympathy with it follows its motion and agrees with it as with a friend, and this happens not otherwise than to strings, which while they are so extended, that if they are struck they may be distant from each other a diapason, that is an octave, one being touched the other untouched will be moved and sound together, with the rest of the strings lying between or intermediate unmoved; which surely can happen only with the quality of sound transmitted to the other string.

The cause why they rejoice in a mutual embrace, or the magnet attracts iron, is not only in my judgment most difficult to find, but altogether impossible." And a little later: "Therefore something else lies hidden here than what the human mind can attain, we leave it to nature which has many things hidden in its bosom, and wants to be admired more often than understood."

Problem 6. From what stone were made those knives by which the son of Moses, Exodus 4:25, and the Israelites are said to be circumcised, Joshua 5:2, and whether they were stone knives. I reply, As to the former, the response seems more expeditious, if we say that they were made from common rocks or stones (a material easily obtainable in those lands, and fit for cutting):

and that the word צר (tzur) also implies this, which is not accustomed to denote rare or precious stones. As to the latter, we altogether state, and some years ago we responded to a friend inquiring about the interpretation of this passage, that there is no reason why the proper interpretation of this word, and the defense of the Greek version and usual Vulgate Latin, and our usual Dutch version (which the new and more accurately elaborated one retains) should be deserted. I admit indeed that the Chaldean paraphrast expounds it by סכינין חריפין, that is, sharp razors, sharp knives; and the commentaries of the Rabbis Shlomo Yitzchaki, David Kimhi, whom the more recent Lexicographers Santes Pagnino and Johannes Buxtorf follow, go into this opinion, with the interpreters Sebastian Münster, the Zurich scholars and Vatablus, Immanuel Tremellius and Franciscus Junius, Johannes Piscator, the French version of the Reformed, the English, the Italian of Giovanni Diodati; Johannes Drusius in his commentary on the more difficult passages. Benito Arias Montano and Andreas Masius in their commentaries on Joshua 5. And the annotations to the Bibles very recently published by public authority, Exodus 4:25. The latter of whom with Arias Montano do not bring a new signification of this word from here; but think that sharp knives are said metonymically, because they had sharpened them on a rock or flint; or metaphorically, because they were sharp like a sharp rock or flint. But the Rabbis seem to have first devised this new improper signification, and indeed without any necessity. For no example of it is adduced from Scripture. The authority of the Rabbis (which otherwise per se in grammar and lexica should not be worth more than in theology) is at last resolved into the Targum and into that one place, Psalm 89:44, as can be seen both in the commentaries of Shlomo Yitzchaki, Levi ben Gershon and David Kimhi on Joshua 5, where they adduce their Targum, and for confirming it that one place, on which David Kimhi in his commentary on Psalm 89:44 thus notes: וְצוּר חַרְבּוֹ חַרְבּוֹ וְצוּר חַרְבּוֹ (ve-tzur charbo) is expounded, the edge of his sword. And thus in the same place Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki and Abraham ibn Ezra in their commentaries, the latter two of whom for proving this exposition adduce the place Joshua 5:2. By a circle of course, or the obscure by the equally and more obscure. Although to that place the most known metaphorical acceptation of that word can be aptly and neatly adapted so that צור (tzur) may be transferred [to mean] the strength or fortitude of his sword. In which way the Arab there translates it by نصرة سيفه (nasrat sayfihi) the help of his sword: And the Syriac by ܥܘܕܪܢܐ ('udrono) help. But perhaps these expressed not so much the Hebrew text as the Greek Septuagint (τὴν βοήθειαν); which is not unusual for both, especially for the Arab. Among the reasons, which compelled the Rabbis and those of the Christians who follow them to seek these evasions, this seems to be the chief one. That rocks and stones are inept for knives; and stone knives for circumcision. But they err. For first, even the Jews of today, although they circumcise the living with steel knives, yet the dead before the eighth day, or abortives with stone knives: as Valentin Schindler reports in his Lexicon under the entry צר. And it is most well known, that among the Gentiles the priests of the great mother Cybele (called Galli) cut off their genitals with a stone knife, or Samian potsherd. Concerning which rite, Lucian in his treatise On the Syrian Goddess, the Interpreter of Nicander; Sextus Aurelius Victor in his Life of Elagabalus. Juvenal, Satire 2, "He who cut the soft" etc. And Satire 6, "It was cut off by a Samian" etc. And Martial, book 3, epigram 80, "From this argued the nature" etc. Hence the celebrated Attis, in Catullus, poem 63: "He rolled down the weights to himself with a sharp flint." And Ovid, book 4 of the Fasti: "He too tore his body with a sharp stone." Concerning which also Arnobius, books 1 and 5 Against the Gentiles, Eusebius, and others. And this was without

doubt a mimicry of the devil, who taught the Gentiles to imitate the external rites of the Jews in these sacred things (as also in most others). It is added, that the men of the new globe before the arrival of the Europeans used stone knives, not iron ones, and with them cut all things no less aptly than we with iron ones. See the description of Hispaniola, and other parts of the new globe, and Majoli, part 1, Dog-Days, colloquy 18. Indeed even anciently in Herodotus, books 2 and 3, section 7, the Ethiopians used arrows, of which the points were not of iron, but of stone. Pliny, book 12, chapter 25, says that the balsam shrub is cut, with glass, stone, or bone knives. Not to say anything about emery (vernacularly amarill) with which our glaziers cut their glass, and about adamant, and other stones fit for cutting and engraving. And let these things indeed suffice for diluting this objection. There are also others in Andrew Willet's commentary on Exodus 4, but which are of less moment. That there so many stone knives did not turn up there, by which so great a multitude could be circumcised. That in the institution of circumcision God did not prescribe stone knives. The former objection also falls if someone thinks that there was no lack of plenty of cliffs, rocks, and mountains in that region. The latter objection would perhaps militate against Peter Lombard, book 4, distinction 1, and Bernard, sermon 1 on circumcision, who say that stone knives were necessarily always employed: not against us. Moreover in this our opinion and defense of the Dutch version we have been more and more confirmed from that time, after we found it not disapproved by many interpreters. Moreover they are from the ancients Justin Martyr, Augustine. From the more recent authors besides the Papists (who nearly all go here, on account of the authority of the Vulgate version, and the Greek Septuagint, and Peter Lombard, book 4, distinction 1, and Thomas Aquinas, part 3, question 70, article 3), Andreas Osiander in his interpolated edition of the Vulgate version; Sebastian Castellio in his Latin translation; Valentin Schindler in his lexicon; Martin Luther in his German version: Antonio Brucioli in his Italian version, Ludwig Lavater in his homilies on the book of Joshua, homily 19, who moreover acknowledges something mystical foreshadowing Christ, who is the rock. Johannes Brenz in his commentary on Exodus 4 says that Zipporah seized a sharp rock. Indeed the Chaldean paraphrast himself, Exodus 4:25, expounds צר (tzur) by טינרא (tinra), that is, a flint, a rock. The greatest of the Rabbis, Maimonides, part 1, Guide for the Perplexed, chapter 16, expounds the words of Joshua, by "knives of stones or stony." And Genesis Rabbah (which is a most ancient commentary) calls them סכיני דטינרי (sakkinei de-tinrei), that is, "razors of rock or flint," that is, rocky. And the French version, Exodus 4:25, writes this exposition in the margin, "cailjou aigue." And the English, Joshua 5, writes in the margin: "or knives of flint." Exodus 4:35, in the text itself: "a sharpe stone." There are from the fathers (whom Thomas Aquinas, cited place, Alonso Tostado, Benedictus Pererius on Genesis 17, and Andreas Masius on Joshua, page 83, follow) who think that something mystical and typical was designated through the stone knives, namely Christ who is the rock, 1 Corinthians 10. Which opinion has nothing absurd or impious: it cannot however be certainly proven. Justin Martyr seeks here besides another mystical signification, but which may avail, as much as it can: Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, page 232, (Latin edition of Johann Lange): "He is said by the second circumcision to have circumcised the people with stone knives: which was a proclamation and announcement of this circumcision, by which Jesus Christ himself cut us off from stones and other idols and heaped up heaps of those who from the foreskin, that is from the error and seduction of the world, in every place have been circumcised by stony knives, that is by the name and words of our Lord. For that Christ was predicted by the Prophets through similitude (κατ' ὁμοίωσιν) as a stone and

rock, has been demonstrated enough by me." And page 235: "O us blessed, who by stone knives have been circumcised by a second circumcision. For your first was made by iron, and is still made, for you persevere in being hard-hearted. But our circumcision, which in the middle was produced second after yours, through sharp stones, that is through the words of the Apostles themselves of the highest corner stone, and cut off without hands, circumcises us from the worship of idols, and (to say it in a word) from all viciousness. Of whom the hearts have been so circumcised from depravity, that we also gladly meet death for the name of the beautiful rock: whence with living water, springing in the hearts of those who through him love the parent of this universe, let it provide drink, to those willing to drink the water of life." Johann Lange in his commentaries there besides other things adduced from Epiphanius, notes page 32: "The Jews today say that it is related in the writings of their Rabbis, that Abraham used two sharp stones in circumcising, by which the foreskin interposed was cut off, having been opposed to each other from opposite sides, but now they confess that they are circumcised by him with iron." And page 233: "Circumcision was done with stone knives for this reason, because Christ was the rock. And since everyone is born with the foreskin, with the fault of propagation: nor are we cleansed either from the fault with which we are born, or from the faults which by living badly we add, except by the stony knife, that is our Lord Jesus Christ, in the opinion of Augustine, tractate 30 on John." Nicolaus Serarius in his commentary on Joshua 5, question 8, says that very many of the Rabbis expound it of knives sharpened on a stone; and that Benito Arias Montano does the same, and of the heretics David Chytraeus: but that John Calvin studiously dissembled it. But with what candor he may have written these things, is clear from those things which we just now noted. Especially from Calvin's Institutes, book 4, chapter 15, section 22, which he should have read. Problem 7. What should be stated concerning the much-celebrated philosopher's stone? I reply, Who, of what sort and whence that stone may be, those who boast of it do not explain in one way. Anyone will easily suspect that it is not a little distant from a chimera, if indeed such a one is supposed, as Heinrich Nollius describes in the appendix to his Hermetic Physics, pages 737-738:

"What is the Spirit of the Universe? The Spirit of the Universe is a most subtle essence diffused through all creatures comprehended in this world, endowed with the highest power of acting penetrating all things by its subtlety, and so disposed, that it preserves, invigorates, animates the bodies, in which it is, and frees them from all imperfection, if only they are capable of perfection. But whence is this Spirit of the Universe? It was created by God under the beginning of the world, and incorporated into the corporeal substance of the world, yet so that it is found in a more constant body with greater power and plenty. What is that body, into which the Spirit of the Universe is copiously transfused? It is the most subtle of all bodies, and most remote from corruption and crassness, doubtless heaven, which through its stars and luminaries possessing the highest plenty of the universal Spirit sends power and essence of the universe into these lower bodies, so that hence they persist in vigor, are disposed to life, are impregnated with soul, and by certain grades of changes are advanced from all imperfection." And pages 739-740: "How can the Spirit of the Universe be had? By that means, through which it is communicated from the celestial luminaries to the sublunary creature and incorporated, without doubt it is acquired. But now water is the medium, by the intervention of which not only minerals and metals, but also vegetables and animals participate of the spirit flowing down from the Sun and

Moon, and the rest of the stars. Who therefore will be able to deny that the Spirit of the Universe should be sought in water? And Moses himself, Genesis 1, ingenuously confesses that the Spirit of the Lord was borne upon the waters. Therefore is the Spirit of the Universe the Philosopher's Stone? Not per se, insofar as it now actually sustains and conserves all things, but insofar as now from the Universal medium by Philosophical digestion it has been boiled down into a most eminent medicine, it is said and is the Philosopher's Stone. What therefore is the Philosopher's Stone? The Philosopher's Stone is the Spirit of the Universe; actuating the waters by its incubation and led by Philosophical digestion into a medicine of both superior and inferior things, and endowed with that power, that it may engender perfection by its own communication to imperfect substances. What is the perfection, which the Philosopher's Stone imparts to its things by communication? The Stone legitimately administered leads imperfect metals into the state of gold, induces maturation, verdure and vigor in vegetables, and whatever animals, whether they are beasts, or rational creatures, if they have been infected by any disease, it frees from it in a stupendous manner by a most minute dose. Indeed it adorns man with Angelic wisdom, so that nothing is done and found in the universe, which is not known by its legitimate use."

But the matter of making this miraculous stone from the tears of the pious, from the fantastic secrets of those men Johannes Jebsenius detected and brought into the light in his discourse On the Philosopher's Stone published at Rostock in 1645: from which it will suffice to exhibit these things: "For what (that I may add a few other things making suspect the labor without the command of God) do the Alchemists chiefly intend? That noticing, that Nature has conceded all the highest things to man, they may more ardently love God the author of nature, and from the noblest part of man (let it be allowed here to speak unphilosophically) extract that, which can profit man in many ways; that is, that they may reduce pious tears to a little dust by the benefit of fire, of which nature first a not so great quantity of gold may assume, and then any particle of this philosophical gold may convert a not small mass of lead or of another more imperfect metal into gold, and (which is a greater power) drunk in wine to any sick within the space of 24 hours after a profound sleep may restore pristine health?" To detect these deliriums even begun to be proven from the Scriptures (Psalm 126:5) without impiety is to refute them. By the historians and Physicists those questions are agitated, Whether metals differ in species; whether they live; whether they are generated from vapors, or truly from water with earth, or from sulphur and quicksilver; whether copper is adverse to iron; whether gold is the most solid and heavy of all: What was the electrum of the ancients, what pyropus, marble, bdellium, sal ammoniac, Corinthian bronze, ductile glass, murrhine; what should be stated concerning potable gold; what concerning the use of quicksilver and of other fossils in medicine; what concerning the bezoar stone, and its powers etc. Concerning which our students should consult Keckermann, Sagittarius, and Sennert etc. in the books more often cited. Add also Libavius, and Pancirolli with Samuel Clarke, Memorable Things, part 1, titles 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 33, 34, 36, and part 2, title 3, where very many rarer things and most worthy of being known.

Corollary. As we honor true chymistry, and leave chymi-iatria in its place (concerning which Libavius, Sennert and other artificers:) so we reject that exuberance of pride and vanity of certain chymical dustmen, of the recent Hermeticists, Paracelsians, and of the so-called

Rosicrucian brothers, which exserts itself in these things: 1. that they profess the knowledge of all things, and claim it for their Hermetic shades alone (who appear nowhere), as if the rest of the wise both ancient and recent flitted about like shadows. 2. that they attribute such a force of operating either to their art, or to their tinctures or metallic extracts, or to the philosopher's stone, which necessarily should be reduced either to a miracle or to Magic, Oswald Croll in his Basilica Chymica in various places, and Heinrich Khunrath in Amphitheatre in Samuel Clarke; and Dialogue On the Philosopher's Stone published by Joachim Tanckius, pages 55-56. And the Epistle of Julian the Physician, which was published with the Fama and Confession of the Fraternity of the Rosy Cross: and in the German book published at Lüneburg in 1617, to which is the title Here or Nowhere, Greater Elucidation of the Elucidarius concerning the reformation of the whole globe etc. by Radtichs Brotoffers Laxene. There are also other trifles of little books, marked with magnificent titles, Fortress of Knowledge, Shield of Truth, Mirror of Constancy, Philosophical Rapture, Treasure of Faith, Fount of Grace. With which should be compared the excerpts from the Chymical Theater published at Strasbourg. 3. That some imprudently, if not impiously, mix magical axioms of their knowledge, and magical operations of practice; some of which we noted in the Disputation On Magic. 4. That in the acquisition of their pansophia they not obscurely boast of a peculiar light, and an extraordinary divine grace and an age of the Holy Spirit, as Oswald Croll in the preface to his Basilica Chymica, pages 25, 51, 56, 57, 68, 69, and the Rosicrucian brothers in the Fama and Confession where they mutter about angelic revelation and assistance. Compare the treatise of Heinrich Khunrath, On the Fire of the Magi etc., page 87, and the judgment adjoined to it concerning the Amphitheatre of Heinrich Khunrath, pages 111-113. 5. That they postpone the light and wisdom of Scripture to their chymico-universal mastery or art; as Martinus Rulandus, Progymnasms of Alchemy, dedicatory epistle. Such Physicists and Physicians the most celebrated Physician Sennert learnedly and piously warns in his Physical Hypomnemata, 1, page 5: "But the Philosophers were not able to sufficiently know the power of God the Best and Greatest acting above the powers of nature, relying on the bare reasons of nature and intellect. But we can most rightly know it from the sacred writings, the use of which has been granted to us by the benefit of God; and for that reason those things in which the Philosophers are deficient, should be supplied from them. For although the Sacred Writings were not written for the interpretation of nature; yet because, what things have been written by Moses concerning the creation of the world were published by the afflatus of the Holy Spirit; all those things, which are had in the history of creation, should be thought most true; and it is alien to piety, to think that what things are said there, depart even a finger's breadth from the truth. And let it be, concerning which I do not now dispute, that here and there certain things occur in Sacred Scripture concerning natural things, which according to the common opinion of men and to the comprehension of the common people have been said either tropically, or figuratively: yet that can in no way be said concerning the history of the creation of the world, inasmuch as God wanted it comprehended clearly in this one writing of Moses to be known to men up to the last times of the world. And although the primary scope of Sacred Scripture is to set forth the means of eternal salvation: yet the history of the creation of the world is not to be excluded from them, as the Apostle teaches, to the Romans 1:20, when by the same work those things are revealed to us in them by the Holy Spirit concerning natural things, to which the acuteness of no wit was able to arrive." And page 7: "Moreover Moses described the history of Creation, Genesis, chapter 1, the interpretation of which I do not think it

worthwhile to adduce here, since there exist many commentaries on this, and they sufficiently prolix, and among them, although brief, not the last, that of Francisco Vallés. I only warn this, that there are found not a few, who introduce an alien mind into the text of Moses, and endeavor to interpret Moses not from Moses, but from the writings of the Gentiles, with unhappy and intolerable daring. For it is certain among all Christians, that all things, which are had in the sacred writings, are true, and what things are handed down by Moses, are plainly historical, and for that reason to be understood according to the proper and genuine, the words themselves, according to the genuine signification and usual in sacred writings, indeed to the common people, but not to be explained according to preconceived opinions, and drawn from the reading of the Gentiles, nor should Sacred Scripture be twisted to such opinions." Before Sennert, Francisco Vallés once Physician of the King of Spain had touched upon such ἄθεους or ἄτοπους and profane physicists in the preface to his Sacred Philosophy, pages 6-7: "On account of these things I persuade myself and want it persuaded to all, that every other doctrine, which may be true, so natural, is contained in these divine books, to such a degree, that I hope that all disciplines will be able to be helped very much, if most learned men, with the others having been traversed, may labor especially in them, handling each their own things. For the most ancient Philosophers were very much helped by the reading of these, therefore I, with commentaries now made on all the books of Aristotle On Nature, and very many of Hippocrates, and Galen On Medicine, what God may have granted of the rest of life, have decided to philosophize in these, both because I judge that nothing certain concerning natural things can be had by any other reason; and because I know not in what way their reading, even historical, or physical, imbues the mind with piety latently. Wherefore it is just to think to consecrate old age to this reading, to have written philosophical things hitherto, to opinion, but to write these to truth. For God himself is the author of these." Indeed also recently Johann Freitag Professor of Medicine in the University of Groningen accused certain physical philosophemes of Sennert himself of the impiety of blasphemy, of heresy, because they seemed to him to be opposed to the theology of the Scriptures and the consensus of the theologians and the received philosophy of the Academies, and to draw after them certain absurd and dangerous things. See his apology to the Academies of the Christian globe prefixed to the Refutation of the new Sennerto-Paracelsian sect. Here should be held the rule of Augustine, book 1, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, chapter 21: "To whom I respond, that I have arrived sweetly at that very food, that I learned not to stick to man in responding according to faith, what should be responded to men who affect to calumniate the books of our salvation: so that whatever they will have been able to demonstrate by true documents concerning the nature of things, we may show not to be contrary to our writings. But whatever they may bring forward from any of their volumes contrary to these our writings, that is, to the Catholic faith, either we may show by some faculty, or we may believe without any doubt to be most false: and so let us hold our mediator, in whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden, so that we may neither be seduced by the loquacity of false philosophy, nor be terrified by the superstition of false religion." 6. That they admit nearly no Epoptae of their mysteries, except the credulous and those swearing in their words and dreams: especially that they keep away all theologians as profane from these sacred things. As if theologians were peculiarly unskilled in natural things and plainly inept for their contemplation. Rabanus Maurus, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Vincent of Beauvais, Bartholomaeus Anglicus, Roger Bacon, John of Rupescissa, Arnold of

Villanova, and very many others showed the contrary: that I may now pass over infinite more recent authors, whose physical writings the Nomenclator of Israel Spach and the Bibliotheca of Philippus Alegambe exhibit. But the theologians overturned the wagon, because they want all philosophemes concerning new inventions and systems of the world, concerning the principles and natures of things, and concerning the new and dangerous hiatuses of a presumed as it were omniscience, to be conformed to sacred physics and Scripture, at least to be handled so cautiously or moderately, lest they be repugnant to Scripture in something, and Christian youth be led by this way to skepticism, or a profane disdain of Scripture, or its unworthy abuse. Let the pious reader consider, whether theologians indeed all pious and wise to sobriety should digest these philosophemes; which Heinrich Nollius draws out from the secret Hermetic workshop, book 1, Hermetic Physics, page 551:

"If it is possible by art to be made and from impure bodies a certain burning and yet incombustible oil, which although it may burn for all ages, and give a flame from itself, yet is not consumed: much more God happily helping that same balsamistic oil a remedy agreeable to human nature can be prepared, so that hence man may transgress the accustomed terms of life, and prolong his life even into a thousand years. With so great a benefit certain Philosophers especially the Patriarchs of the Old Testament before the flood were divinely endowed. But do not think, that so great a treasure of wisdom has been divinely denied and plainly taken away from men in this our age. For I know for certain that it is permitted by God even in this abject time to the pious sons of the doctrine and to the true Theosophists by means of continual prayers, that they may inquire into the accommodation of that incombustible and perpetually burning oil, and apprehend with their eyes the reason and way by which their incombustible oil is so disposed, that it can give even in water a perpetual flame, and so perpetual life. Therefore if you whoever aspire to this divine wisdom, will have taken care to mix that Philosophical oil with our blood, and to cause it to burn constantly in it, without doubt you have access to a certain most noble treasure, than which after the word of God scarcely a greater is possessed in this world. That I may approach more nearly to the matter, the incombustible oil and balsam, which conduces to the prolongation of life, is produced from metals, through, in, and with metals. Therefore it is general." And page 137: "Wherefore no one will wonder, that the more secret Philosophers having attained the miracle of nature are endowed with Angelic wisdom, since God has also enclosed the supercelestial waters in an abject mineral found everywhere, and has conceded to the Philosophers that they be elicited and with the external clothing taken away be led out, and wise men have existed in all times, who by the inspiration of God have known the subject of so great a treasure, and have dug it out from there." See also other inanities (or insanities) of this sort in Samuel Clarke, On Newly Discovered Things, title 7, among which those words of Martinus Rulandus savor of enthusiastico-atheism, in his Progymnasms of Alchemy, in the dedication: "If it will be allowed to reason agreeably to Paul (the apostle), a more eminent knowledge of God can be drawn from the praxis of this art of Alchemy than from the very monuments of the sacred writings." 7. That they involve themselves in many particular teratologies, labyrinths, absurdities concerning which (because they are not of our forum) see Libavius in his Examination of the Fama and Confession of the Fraternity of the Rosy Cross, Johannes Jebsenius the Holsatian's discourse On the Philosopher's Stone, published in the year 1645 at Rostock by Richelius, Samuel Clarke on newly discovered things

of Pancirolli, title 7, Sennert On the Consensus and Dissension of the Chemists, Thomas Erastus against Paracelsus. With whom the Antagonists of Ramon Llull should be compared, to whom the judgment of Keckermann will provide a leading, which is extant in his Logical Precognita. To such a degree that it has been apprehended that so great a hiatus and those παραμύθια βόμβοι have for the most part ended in superstitious Magic, or fanatic deliriums and portents of opinions, or Pyrrhonico-Skepticism, or Libertino-Enthusiasm, and consequently impiety and hypocrisy, or sacred and universal ignorance: concerning which last perhaps the saying of Cardano may not badly be used concerning subtlety, book 15, page 737: "The third kind of useless subtlety it is allowed to behold in the books of Ramon Llull. A matter plainly worthy of laughter, to want to hand down every doctrine, to know none." Here should be compared our disputation On Atheism, and also the Antagonists of the Enthusiasts and Libertines, whom we indicated in the Theological Library, to whom we now add the treatise of our Reverend colleague Johannes Hoornbeeck On the Weigelians published this year 1646. For there is a parallelism, or if you prefer syncretism between the Neo-skeptics, theological and philosophical Libertine Enthusiasts: so that fanatic and thaumatophoric philosophers of this sort for the most part produce or contain in themselves fanatic and monstrous Theologians. I will confirm that by the words of the most celebrated Physician and philosopher Sennert in the preface to his book On the Consensus of the Chemists with Aristotle etc.:

"Namely from Paracelsus, as from a fountain, Weigel, Croll drew their dogmas; indeed those very Enthusiasts, who a few years ago endeavored to disturb the Christian religion in Thuringia; and many others of those, who today want to seem either associates or clients of the Fraternity of the Rosy Cross."

And a little later: "From the same fountain Heinrich Conrad, Oswald Croll, in his admonitory preface, and very many others drew their opinions in Philosophy and Theology, who studious of Magic, which they think, natural, and of the Cabala, neglect the Academies and good letters and the instruction of teachers, and in their Laboratories, as they call them, either desire to be taught by the stars, or, in the manner of the Enthusiasts, await occult inspirations and revelations, and consortia, colloquies and aids of spirits; and incautiously freely object themselves to the snares of the Devil, who is able to transform himself into an Angel of light."

Samuel Clarke also learnedly and prudently warns not a few things concerning the use and abuse of the chymical art and Hermetic philosophy in newly discovered things, titles 7 and 8. Who will be read with fruit. Compare what we will say below, part 7, concerning certain rash philosophemes about heaven and the system of the world.

4. The earth is distinguished into upper and lower; The former is also called the land of the living and its inhabitants the superi. The latter the land of the dead and tartarus, hades, and its inhabitants the inferi. Concerning which distinction see many things collected in the most erudite treatise of Parker On the Descent into Hell, books 1 and 2. Let us now add something concerning hell: and the terrestrial paradise. About to deal with hell elsewhere ex professo, we now ask, when was it created? I reply, 1. Alfonso Tostado on Matthew 2, and Cornelius a Lapide

on Genesis 1, want it to have been created on the first day. And thus Isidore, Boethius, and with them Rusca, book 1, On Hell and the State of Demons, chapter 85. 2. The Rabbis commonly from the opinion of Bereshit Rabbah on the second day: and they adduce the most inept reasons. 1. Because in Jeremiah 30, last verse, it is said to have been prepared from yesterday (whence also Boethius just now cited absurdly proves it was created on the first day.) 2. Because to the works of the second day it is not added, that they were good. See those ineptitudes in Rabbi Menasseh ben Israel, On Creation, problem 20. 3. Martín Del Río and Benedict Fernandez on Genesis 1, Luis de Molina, On the Work of the Six Days, disputation 11, on the third day. 4. Richard of Middleton on book 4, distinction 44, question 3, on the sixth day, when man was created. 5. Rupert of Deutz, book 9, On the Works of the Holy Spirit, chapter 21, before the creation of the demons: which would be before the works of the first day, that is, before the creation of the world. We in a matter so doubtful think it should be held, that it was among the works of the six days and so created in the beginning of the world; as rightly Gregory the Great, book 15, Morals, chapter 17. 2. that it was created before the creation and fall of man: for then God had bound the angels who had fallen with the everlasting chains of darkness, 2 Peter 2:4. 3. Finally, that it is most probable, if it is said to have been prepared on the first or third day. Moreover, what certain ones curiously dispute in Rusca, cited place, whether it was prepared in the very moment of the fall of the devils, or truly before: we leave that to them to define. Otherwise, that hell was prepared before the entrance of sin into the world, is no more absurd, than that heaven was prepared before the creation and redemption of man, or before the perseverance of the angels in grace, and so their existence in the term of obedience: than that medicines were created, before diseases existed.

5. Concerning Paradise the Scholastics inquire, on book 2, distinction 17, and on part 3, question 92, and more recent commentators on Genesis, especially Pererius, whole book 3, as also Bellarmine, On the Grace of the First Man, chapters 10-19, Malvenda in a special book On Paradise; of the ancients Moses Bar Cephas in his book On Paradise. But because not a few uncertain and doubtful, very many curious things occur there, the Antagonists of Bellarmine should be compared; and Matthieu Béroalde in his Chronology, book 1, chapter 9. And Gabriel Kaltmarck in his Historical Description of Paradise; finally Francis Junius, Andrew Willet, David Pareus on Genesis; and Zanchius, On the Works of Creation, part 2, book 1, chapter 1. We, because we are writing theses, are compelled to indicate only our opinion concerning each thing without an apparatus of reasons. 1. Whether the creation of paradise should be taken allegorically. We reply, No, against Abraham ibn Ezra and Maimonides, and those ancients, whom Pererius refutes, book 3, commentary on Genesis, pages 269 and 373, and Epiphanius, epistle to John of Jerusalem, Bellarmine, chapters 10 and 11. 2. On what day it was created? I reply, The third or sixth, but the former seems more probable. And thus the Theologians commonly: also the Rabbis in Rabbi Menasseh, problem 18. 3. Whether it is a place in some part of the earth, or truly the whole earth? We reply, The former we affirm, against some in Pererius, page 373. 4. Whether it is the receptacle of the souls of the faithful after death. We reply, No, against the Jews: whose opinion, and indeed the common one, Rabbi Menasseh explains, problem 17. 5. Whether the word is of Hebrew origin (Ecclesiastes 2, Nehemiah 2, Song of Songs 4), which the Greek Septuagint expounded by the word παράδεισος, garden. It seems so. Nor does Julius Pollux oppose us, who says it is Persian, book 9. 6. Whether from

Genesis 2:8 it can be gathered that Paradise was situated to the East? We reply, Affirmatively. For it is clear that Eden was an eastern region towards Assyria, from Genesis 2:14, 2 Kings 19:12, Isaiah 37:12, Ezekiel 27:23. And from the notation of the adjacent places and rivers. 7. Whether by the eastern part of the world is understood India, according to the style of the Geographers, and of all Latin and Greek writers? We reply, No, but the lands which stretch on this side of the Persian Gulf up to Judea, namely Armenia, Persia, Arabia, Mesopotamia etc., and that according to the style of Scripture, Genesis 29 and 25, Numbers 23, with Deuteronomy 23. 8. Whether it is outside our habitable globe, beyond the Ocean: as Ephrem the Syrian wants in Moses Bar Cephas in his book On Paradise and Bellarmine, On the Grace of the First Man, chapter 14. We reply, No. For it was in the eastern region: as we have already said, problem 6. Indeed Bellarmine himself contradicting himself states and proves the contrary, chapter 12. 9. Whether it is a place nearest to heaven; as Rupert of Deutz, book 1, On the Trinity, chapter 37, reaching up to the lunar circle, to which the waters of the flood did not arrive, as Rabanus Maurus, Walafrid Strabo; which opinion Ambrosius Catharinus assigns to Augustine, and the Scholastics to Bede (which Pererius calls into doubt, page 376). We reply, No, Pererius, cited place, excellently overturns each opinion which excludes paradise from our earth. 10. Whether it was above this turbulent air, or in the third region of the air, as Alfonso Tostado, Alexander of Hales? We reply, No, and Pererius, page 380, excellently undermines their two reasons, lest namely man should dwell in air or a less healthy place; and lest it be devastated by the waters of the flood. 11. Whether it was situated under the equinoctial line, as Bonaventure and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, book 2, distinction 17. We reply, No, nor are the rivers Euphrates, Tigris etc. there. 12. What were the rivers of Paradise? I reply, among so many opinions (which Bellarmine examines, chapter 12, Pererius, Willet, and Cornelius a Lapide on Genesis, Zanchius, On the Works, part 2, book 1, chapter 1), it is most expeditious to say: It is one river the Euphrates, which indeed not in Paradise (for the text does not have this) but after irrigating Paradise then is divided into four heads. Thus Josephus in Ambrose, epistle 32, John Calvin, Francis Junius, Andrew Willet. For it is agreed from Ptolemy, Geography, book 5, chapter 23, Strabo, book 15, Pliny, book 5, chapter 24, Arrian, book 7, that the Euphrates diffuses itself into diverse channels, and obtains diverse names. If anyone hastens, or the authors are not at hand to him, let him go to Abraham Ortelius's Geographical Dictionary under the entry Euphrates and Tigris. 13. What are today, or formerly were according to the geography of the ancients, those rivers Pison, Gihon, Hiddekel, Perat? I reply, That Perat is the Euphrates can be gathered from the passages of Scripture, Genesis 15:18, Deuteronomy 1:7, 11:24, Joshua 1:4, 2 Kings 23:29 and 24:7 (see the commentators there), where they are described. That Hiddekel is the Tigris from Genesis 2:14, Daniel 10:4 (see the commentators there, and Pliny, book 6, chapter 26), Benito Arias Montano and Andreas Masius on Joshua 1 think to be sufficiently agreed, who in the same place teach why the Euphrates and Tigris are called great rivers. Very many fathers thought Gihon to be the Nile, and to this also some more recent authors adduce an argument from the etymology of the name from Moses Bar Cephas: as can be seen in Giovanni Battista Scortia, book 1, On the Nature and Increase of the Nile, chapter 1. There are those who fight for this opinion (among whom the Coimbrans, Meteorological treatise 9, chapter 8) with two arguments: The former is: they bring to this the passage Jeremiah 2:18. I reply, But there in the Hebrew it is שחור (shichor), not גיחון (gichon); although through error the Greek version so wrote, or perhaps the copyists corrupted the place. The latter is: Because Gihon in Moses is said to go

around the land of Cush or Ethiopia: but it is the Nile, which crosses Ethiopia, as the Geographers teach. I reply, It is one thing to cross Ethiopia, and another to go around it. Then Ethiopia should be distinguished (see Strabo, book 1, page 21, and Pliny, book 5, chapter 8) into eastern near Palestine and Syria; and into western which extends to the south. The former Gihon surrounds (concerning which the Nubian Geographer, part 8, climate 3, page 138); the latter the Nile. Moreover, the Coimbrans presuppose to this their opinion the false hypothesis concerning the rise of the Nile from paradise. But they are refuted by the genuine history concerning the rise of the Nile, which the Nubian Geographer describes, part 4, climate 1, to spring first in Ethiopia from ten fountains in the mountains of the moon. And from today's peregrinations the more recent Geographers now teach the same by unanimous consent; and Giovanni Battista Scortia, who wrote ex professo concerning this question, book 1, On the Nature and Increase of the Nile, chapter 2. Moreover, that there is given an Ethiopia near to Palestine and Syria is agreed from the Geographers. This one reason would suffice for refuting this opinion; That the four rivers of Paradise are said to have been conjoined, and to have arisen from one source or head, Genesis 2:10. But the Tigris and Euphrates (which without doubt are to be numbered among the rivers of Paradise) are not conjoined with the Nile by this reason. For they flow from the north from Mount Taurus of Greater Armenia, and discharge themselves into the Persian Gulf towards the east: but the Nile flows from the Mountains of the Moon (which are more than 600 German miles distant from Taurus) and discharges itself into the Mediterranean sea towards the west and north. But perhaps occasion for this error was given, because the Ethiopians call the Nile Goion or Gichon: so that deceived by that ambiguity they may seem. I now observe in the Nubian Geographer, cited place, mention to be made of the river Gihon, distinct from the Nile; and part 5, climate 4, page 196, of the river Gihon or Gihan, distinct from the Nile in the same place. For he distinctly describes the Nile, part 4, climate 1; and part 3, climate 3, and there expressly distinguishes it, page 197, when he numbers six very great rivers, the Nile, Dagele (that is, the Tigris), Euphrates, Mehran of Sind, Ganges of India, Baghanum in Sin, and Gihon in Khorasan. Concerning Pison and Gihon, Junius learnedly and diffusely inquires, and Pererius from page 427 to 444, and others cited there and by Cornelius a Lapide. But because we see that the opinions of certain ones openly conflict with geographical truth, all others uncertain and doubtful, it is better with Mercerus, Cornelius a Lapide, Willet to profess a learned ignorance here. 14. Where therefore was Paradise situated? I reply with Pererius, Cornelius a Lapide, Willet, André Rivet, Exercitations 49, Zanchius and others cited there. Around Mesopotamia and Armenia, because 1. there are the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, which have their origin in the mountains of Armenia, their course through Mesopotamia, Assyria, Chaldea, but their exit into the Persian Gulf. 2. Because Eden is a part of Babylonia, and this a part of Mesopotamia, as is agreed from Ezekiel 27:23, Isaiah 37:12. For there it is said to have been near Haran, which is in Mesopotamia. 3. These regions are to the East, and most pleasant, and so it agrees with the description of Paradise, Genesis 2. Pererius and Cornelius a Lapide add also other reasons: but those are less solid. 15. What was the quantity of Paradise? I reply, Alfonso Tostado treats of it on Genesis 13, question 98, Pererius, book 3, question 3, On Paradise. But it should be said: It is not clear. At least with Cornelius a Lapide I think the opinion of those should not be admitted, who attribute to it all Armenia, Syria, Media, Persia etc. That would have been some globe, not a garden. 16. Whether Paradise still remains even today? I reply, Indeed Bellarmine, Leonard Marius, Leonard

Lessius, and other Papists cited by them would want it so, that they may establish their comment concerning the translation of Enoch into that paradise. Of the ancients Irenaeus, book 5, chapter 5, thought the same, that he may make it the receptacle of the souls of the faithful up to the day of judgment. But this is (says Cornelius a Lapide on Genesis 2:8) the error of the Armenians condemned in the Council of Florence. The Papists here go off into various sects. There are those who assert that only the place remains, but that the form and beauty was taken away by the waters of the flood, as Jerónimo de Azambuja, Agostino Steuco, Cornelius Jansen, Francisco Suárez etc. Others, that the form itself and pleasantness remains; and that this by the providence of God was untouched by the waters of the flood, as Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Alfonso Tostado etc. with the fathers cited in the same place. Others, that it seems not to exist, but to have perished in the flood. Thus Juan de la Vega on Revelation 11, commentary 5, section 5, Pererius, question 4, page 387, question 5, throughout. But our Disputators concerning Antichrist have solidly refuted that comment concerning Paradise still remaining; and its shred, concerning the habitation of Enoch in Paradise; especially André Rivet on Genesis, Exercitation 49. And Pererius with Juan de la Vega just now cited. 17. Concerning the qualities and adjuncts of Paradise, and what animals were or were not in it, the Scholastics and more recent authors in Pererius and Cornelius a Lapide curiously inquire. It will have sufficed for us to have said, what can be said certainly from Scripture, that there were trees, waters in it, nor were animals absent, since the serpent was there the instrument of the devil, Genesis 3:1. 18. Whether the beauty of paradise remained up to the flood; and was frequented by men; at least known. I reply, Concerning the first and third, let it be discussed, permission having been given, see Pererius, page 336. The second we deny, from Genesis 3:23-24. 19. Why Paradise was never found? I reply, certain ones devise and fabulate many things in Pererius, question

XIX. Why was Paradise never found? Some people invent and fabricate many things according to Pererius in question 4. But we must say along with him: Because it does not exist.

XX. Regarding the cultivation of Paradise, whether it would have been laborious; what good things it would have brought to man; and whether man in the state of innocence would have lived even outside of it; how long he would have remained in it; whether guarding it would have been necessary for him; whether and when he would have been transferred from there to heavenly life; what the tree of life was, and the other tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and what the power and use of each was; whether and how Paradise was a figure or type of heavenly life, etc. These things must be investigated in the discussion about the Image of God, or the Grace of the first man.

Finally, the questions about the Ejection of man from Paradise, and about the change of the Pleasantness of Paradise (when the whole earth was subjected to curse and vanity), and about the Cherubim placed at the entrance of Paradise, pertain to the topic of the Fall of Adam. See Bellarmine's cited book, compared with his Antagonist Amesius. And the Scholastics on Part 1, question 102.

And these things indeed concern the work of the third day, and the constitution of the elemental world, and the things contained in it, except the animals, which pertain to the work of the fifth

and sixth days. We will briefly discuss the Harmony of the same with the celestial world at the end of the work on the fourth day.

Moreover, you will find the most admirable things noted in this lower or elemental world, if indeed you study in the most compendious compendium, Johnston's Thaumatographia; to which you may add, if you please, Kornmann's Temple of Nature.

If you are able and willing to spread yourself through more writers, consult the more recent writers and examiners of natural history: Majolus in the Dog Days; Mizaldus in the Centuries of Memorable Things; Gaudentius Merula in Memorable Things; Lemnius on the Hidden Miracles of Nature; Georgius Bruno in the Theatre of the World; Nieremberg in Natural History, and on the miraculous natures in Europe; Camerarius in the Centuries of Wonders; Cardano on the Variety of Things and the same on Subtlety with the Exercises of Scaliger; Vossius on Idolatry.

If anyone prefers to wander through every kind of author, or at least to consult all of them when given the occasion on some question or matter, let him add: 1. The ancient physicists and natural historians, Aristotle, Pliny, Theophrastus, Solinus, Stobaeus, Apollonius, Phlegon, and Antigonus in Greek and Latin edited by Meursius; Raban Maur, Albertus Magnus, Vincent of Beauvais, Bartholomew the Englishman. 2. Ancient and more recent geographers, whom we have indicated in our library. 3. Writers who treat mixed matters, namely medico-physical ones, such as Fracastoro, Valesius, Caesalpinus, Lycetus, Condroche, Aquapendente, Libavius, Sennert, Erastus, etc. 4. Writers of Problems, both ancient and more recent: Aristotle, Theophrastus, Aphrodisias, Zimara, Giorgio Valla, Trissino, the Coimbrans. 5. Writers on Natural Magic and Secrets, such as Giambattista della Porta, Wecker, etc.

6. Authors who have written miscellaneous and various questions, or histories, or observations, among whom either many or at least some things pertaining to this topic occur, such as Athenaeus, Plutarch, Aulus Gellius, Macrobius, Lucian, Photius in the Myrobiblon, Rhodiginus, Philippus Camerarius in spare hours, Lonicenus in various history, Alexander ab Alexandro (but who has very little, namely in book 4, chapter 9, book 5, chapter 9, and book 6, chapter 2), Petrus Messia in various readings, Mercurialis in various readings, Talantonius in the Treasury of various and recondite things, Fernandius Cordua in the manifold didascalia, Salmuth on Panciroli, finally Brodaeus, Magius, Hadrianus Junius and others published together by Gruter in the Critical Thesaurus.

7. Writers of portents and prodigies, such as Cornelius Gemma in Cosmocritica, or the divine characters of nature, etc., whom we indicate in the first disputation on Signs.

8. Finally, writers on particular wonders and natural histories, such as on Monsters, on meteors, on plants, on animals, on metals, on stones, on Fires, on the Sea and waters, on Poisons, on medicines, on foods - whom we indicate in their own places in this disputation and elsewhere.

9. The writers on celestial things in the work of the fourth day should be compared, and the zoological writers noted in the work of the fifth and sixth days, and the anthropological writers in

the work of the sixth day. To the anthropological writers, refer the remarkable medical histories of Donatus and Schenck.

10. The pneumatological writers should also be compared, such as Martín Del Río and similar authors in the disputation on Demons, on the Energoumenoi, on Magic, etc., and those indicated in our Library.

On the Work of the Fourth Day

6. Here we must treat of the stars, II. of their effects, motion, light, heat, influences, phenomena and signs, and on this occasion, of the Harmony of the upper and lower world, or the celestial and sublunary. Concerning the stars in general, the philosophers inquire whether they are denser parts of their orb, and consequently of the same matter; whether their number is diminished or increased; whether and how they can be numbered; whether and why they should be distinguished into fixed and wandering stars; whether six of their differences, in terms of magnitude, are rightly assigned; whether they are all spherical; whether the fixed stars have a threefold motion; whether the stars move by themselves, or by the motion of the heavens; whether and what was the star in the year 1572; whether and what stars always appear and are always hidden in each region, etc. On these matters, see the Coimbrans, d'Ailly, Clavius, Baranzan, Gigas in the Sphere, Werenberg in the Astronomical Disputations, Casmann in Astronomy. Among the Theologians, Zanchi, Pererius on Genesis, and especially also Wendelin in the Physical Contemplations and Claramonti on the Universe, who in their determinations have regard for Scripture. You will find the various opinions of the ancients about the stars in Scaliger's commentary on Manilius, and in Stobaeus' Eclogues 22, 24, 25, 26. We must now note these remaining problems.

Problem I. Whether in the science of the stars specifically, in the difficult question of explaining the system of the world, account should be taken of sacred Scripture? We affirm this, against Rothmann in his Astronomical Letters (which is also extant in Casmann, part 1 of Astronomy, chapter 6, page 329) and some other recent investigators of the system of the world. For although observations, collections of observations, comparisons, confirmations of consequences from these hypotheses, and deductions of arguments are not set forth in Scripture, nor should they first be learned and sought from there, nevertheless no hypotheses should be assumed, no theses defended, no arguments produced which contradict the truth of Scripture and prejudice its authority. If the struggle and disquisition is doubtful concerning the interpretation of Scripture, it is better to suspend judgment than to defend dangerous theses scandalously. This opinion of ours is proved by the arguments by which the authority of Scripture is usually defended in general against atheists and all those outside the faith. There is added the consensus of the most outstanding astronomers of every sect. Concerning the defenders of the Ptolemaic system, there is no doubt about this. Above we indicated Peucer in his book on the Celestial Circles, p. 60. Concerning Münster, who was both an astronomer and a theologian and biblical interpreter, and others cited elsewhere, this is very well known.

Maestlin, in the dedicatory epistle prefixed to his Astronomy, after citing all the texts of Scripture containing astronomical matters, does not hesitate to assert: "For if we properly examine the sacred Codex, it is not difficult to prove and obtain from it the truth of all the foundations of Astronomy (which in this book are called Hypotheses), so that if we had to abstain from all the arguments of the Physicists and Mathematicians, nothing more could be desired in these alone. I doubt whether this could be said and proved similarly concerning other theoretical sciences. Thus it seems that nothing is left to human reason except a fuller and more exquisite treatment, which nevertheless, being itself also created in the image of God, has been divinely informed with admirable sagacity so that it can achieve this."

The leaders of the Tychonic system willingly follow the wisest dictates of their greatest teacher in his response to Rothmann (which Casmann excerpted in the cited chapter, p. 336): "Much less will the things you allege to excuse those against whom sacred Scripture asserts the contrary be able to merit a place. For the authority and reverence of the divine writings is and should be greater than that it would be fitting for them to be twisted like a buskin. For although they for the most part adapt themselves to the understanding of the common people in physical and certain other matters, let it be far from us to think that on account of this they speak in such a common way that we do not believe they also propose truth. Thus, although Moses, in treating the creation of the world in the first chapter of Genesis, does not disclose the innermost parts of Astronomy, inasmuch as he is writing for the uneducated people, nevertheless he sets forth nothing which cannot also be conceded by Astronomers themselves."

Ibid., p. 337: "Thus you also derogate too much from the Prophets when you wish them to have understood no more about the nature of things than other common men. For although they did not treat Physics ex professo (for that was not their office), nevertheless they mix into their oracles many things taken from Physics which no one, however imbued with natural Philosophy, will be able to deny."

And p. 340: "I did not think it should be approved that you again derogate too much from the Prophets by asserting that they understood no more in astronomical and physical matters than the uneducated common people, even though they were immediately instructed by God, and moreover had at hand not a few traditions of the most ancient Fathers cultivating the visible things created by God, which were doubtless more certain and better than ours accepted from the pagans - in which opinion I still persist. For I never thought that these matters should be decided lightly. Francis Vallès recently explained many things, and not to be disregarded, which are contained physically in the sacred writings, also according to the reasonings of the common Philosophers, and not without skillful labor in regard to those principles, although many more things by far lie hidden in them to be elaborated in a far different way according to a truer Physics, perhaps also to be sought for the most part from these very things. Indeed, Lambert Daneau, a man truly very erudite and most deserving for instructing others, constructed his Theological Physics with useful labor from both the Old and New Testament."

The zealots of the Copernican system have nothing they consider more important, when the occasion arises for them, than to recall their adversaries to the Scriptures. I need not speak of Foscarini and similar authors who have also professed the science of theology. More remarkable is that Kepler himself, entirely a Mathematician, in the epitome of Copernican astronomy, book 1, part 5, page 109, when about to draw an argument for the rotation of the earth and the rest of the stars from the cause of the first motion, thus begins: "Since not only the earth, but also the heavens are of matter, as Moses affirms against Aristotle, neither body is of itself suitable for motion, etc."

From what has been said, that dangerous exception of Kepler should be corrected, ibid. p. 138 and pp. 9-10, and proposed by other moderns: that Scripture is accustomed to speak about physical and astronomical matters according to the deceptions of sight and the errors of the common people. We examine this exception at length in Thersites Heautontimorumenos.

Problem II. Whether the stars can be numbered by men? Scripture denies this, Gen. 15:5 and 22:17 and 26:4, Jer. 33:22. Clavius objects, p. 149, that this should be understood according to the opinion of the common people, and the fallacy of sight, because in winter on a clear night, especially towards the north pole, the stars shine very brightly; hence it happens that men think they see many stars, when they see only appearances generated by that vehement twinkling. But this response is dangerous, especially since the numbering of the stars is attributed to God as something peculiar, Ps. 147:4.

Furthermore, because it is evident from the recent voyages of the Dutch, who beyond the 48 Ptolemaic constellations noted certain new stars (which see in Alsted and Müller in the Astronomy, p. 55), and from the starry world of Galileo, where he describes the Medicean stars previously observed by no one, that this multitude was not exactly noted and numbered by astronomers (which nevertheless does not seem absurd to Clavius); finally, from the stars of the Milky Way having been detected, and that by the aid of the Optic tube, without which they have hitherto eluded the keenness of Ptolemy and his followers, as Müller expressly notes in the cited place.

We therefore reject this pronouncement of Clavius: that the words of Scripture are not to be understood as they sound, namely, that there are as many stars as the children of Israel would be in the future, etc. The other exception of the same Clavius (in which, however, he does not have such confidence) can be admitted: that Scripture speaks of all the stars, even the nebulous ones, which are outside the constellations, but not of the notable stars, which can indeed be numbered. And thus astronomy will not be badly reconciled with Scripture.

Problem III. Whether the distances of the stars from the earth, and from each other, and consequently the size of the heavens, can be accurately measured? It seems that Jeremiah denies this to man, ch. 31, v. 37, and places it among impossible things, just like the cessation of day and night, vv. 35-36, and the numbering of the stars, ch. 33:22.

What then will become of the most noble Uranometry? We think that such a metria is possible which suffices, approximately of course, such as that of Geographers and mechanicians, which, both because of the manifold difficulties arising from the instrument and its placement, from the viewer, and from the obscuration, disturbance, multiplication or mixing of the medium through which it is seen, is always done with some postulate or hypothesis. But Scripture denies an absolute and mathematical ἀκρίβειαν [precision]. As we responded in the preceding Disputation on the Measurement of the Earth. In short, the stars can be most exactly measured and numbered, from a hypothesis of course, as the sands can be numbered; and Clavius numbered them in his commentary on Sacrobosco, p. 217. All of which is not repugnant to the sayings of Scripture. We think this is the most convenient reconciliation of Scripture with Astronomy. It is not our purpose to bring up the complaints of the philosophers about the defect of this science in many things, or the exceptions against their metrias and observations, in Pererius' commentary on Genesis, book 1, pp. 312-313, Keckermann's Physical Disputations in the Decade on Comets, or about the uncertainty or falsity of all hypotheses in Claramonti book 3, chapter 3, especially Casmann part 1, chapter 6. It will suffice for us if they do not teach the Holy Spirit ἀπρόνοιαν [lack of foresight] or μέμψιν [blame], or prefer the certainty of their science and observation to the certainty of the Scriptures. See what we warned in our Thersites Heautontimorumenos.

Problem IV. Whether stars fall from heaven, or are extinguished in heaven, or restrain their light, according to Isaiah 13:10, Acts 2, Matthew 24. If it is said that this will happen before the end of the world in the stars themselves, it must be understood hyperbolically and allegorically, or of some extraordinary sign, but not of the natural course. Compare the first disputation on Signs. Besides, the stars which are called falling, and comets, and other meteoric phases, bring no prejudice to the starry world and astronomical laws, because having no law or order of their motion and appearance, they are to be relegated to physics, as Kepler rightly warns in the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, book 1, page 12.

Problem V. Whether they were created on the fourth day? We affirm, with the Fathers and more recent authors, against Eugubinus and Catharinus. And the matter is most evident from Genesis 1:19, nor is there anything we should add. See, if you wish, abundantly in Pererius, p. 170.

Problem VI. Whether they are animate or rational? Aristotle seems to have affirmed the former, according to Thomas, Aureolus, Scotus, Pererius. The latter was affirmed by Maimonides in his book on the Foundations of the Law, pp. 29, 33, 34, and Origen. And more absurdly than him, the Manichaeans held that the body of Christ was affixed to the stars, especially infused into the bright globe of the sun, according to Daneau on Augustine, On Heresies, ch. 46. Virgil in Georgics 4 and Horace in Odes 1, Catullus in the poem on the Hair of Berenice, will supply similar delusions of heretics, Platonists, and poets about the souls of animals, men, or their parts changed into stars. Add to this the Muhammadan teachings about the intellect and faith of the stars, that the sun, when it sets, plunges itself into a fountain of boiling water (Koran, chapter 17, on the Cave); that the stars hang from the lowest heaven by golden chains, and that demons repel them from access to the heavens; and about the nebulous sea above the seventh heaven, and the airy one above the nebulous, and the stony one above the airy, and another

dark one above the stony, and a delightful one above the dark, etc. And similar things which will present themselves in reading the Koran. See the Refutation of animation in Pererius p. 285, and what we said above, part 2, section 3, about the animation of the world, and we will say below, appendix 3. Of similar stuff are the phantasms about the angels who are in charge of individual stars and move them. From these foolish opinions about the intelligence of the stars, either innate or assigned by attendant angels and movers, arose the idolatry and magic of the ancients. Compare Vossius' erudite work on Idolatry, book 2, chapter 30. And what we will soon note specifically about the sun in the next thesis. Consectary. The exceptions of Simplicius and the Antinomians against the work of the fourth day spontaneously collapse by the hypotheses and axioms indicated thus far, to all of which, as well as the rest, Franciscus Junius solidly responded, to arguments 1, 3, 4, 7.

Problem VII. Whether Scripture teaches that the stars are fiery and formally hot? Psalm 19:7. Augustine, Basil, and Ambrose indeed thought so, who were confirmed in this opinion by the consensus of all the ancient philosophers (Aristotle alone being almost excepted). But no reason compels us to embrace this opinion. Nor do I see why the reasons adduced to the contrary, taken from the straight motion and fire, and its consuming and corrupting force, and other absurd consequences, are trivial. Therefore, let them be hot, not formally, but virtually. Compare Pererius, book 2, question 10.

Problem VIII. Whether on the fourth day they were produced with respect to accidents, or also with respect to substance, so that to these denser parts of the heaven God gave new substantial forms, a round figure, light, and motion. The resolution of this doubt requires the resolution of this, whether they differ in species from their heaven or orb. There are those who affirm it about the fixed stars (Thomas on On the Heavens 2, lecture 10). Others about all (except the moon), such as Becanus, Scholastic Theology, vol. 1, treatise 4, ch. 3. On the contrary, about all, Albert, Richard, Major, Averroes, and Niphus deny it, according to the Coimbrans on On the Heavens 2, ch. 7, qu. 1, where they themselves distinguish. We think Becanus' opinion is more probable, and on this hypothesis, we respond to the proposed problem affirmatively. But should it also be said that on this day the parts that were going to turn into stars were condensed by God, when before all were equally rare? We do not see that the reasons of Pererius, p. 171, against Hieronymus Vielmius, are so pressing that this must be denied. For it still remains that the heaven, after the nature of things was constituted, is incorruptible, nor are things ordinarily generated and corrupted in it by a perpetual succession of individuals, although God then formed the stars from its matter. On the other hand, we reject the opinion of Pererius ibid. as less agreeable to philosophy and theology: "It is necessary," he says, "that the stars were made from the beginning with respect to their matter, which is nothing other than the substance of the heaven, and with respect to their figure, magnitude, density." Where he adds that on the fourth day the form was given to them which gives a thing being and a name, and that form is light; in addition, various motions; finally, the power and virtue of producing various effects. But given this opinion of his, I do not see how he so precisely rejected Eugubinus and Catharinus, who said the stars were created on the first day.

Problem IX. What will be the state of the stars after the end of the world? Perhaps it could be said that they will preserve their light and splendor for illuminating, but not for heating or producing anything. For the active qualities of the stars themselves (for example, vegetative qualities), as well as of the elements, and even of glorified bodies, will cease from work, with God suspending their use and restraining his concurrence with those qualities for acting. But this is properly to be treated in the common place On the End of the World.

Problem X. Whether the stars have light from themselves, or borrow all from the sun? The philosophers and theologians dispute about this in the Coimbrans on On the Heavens 2, ch. 7, and Pererius 4.1, p. 176. We think the affirmative agrees more with Genesis 1:14-15, Isaiah 30:26, Jeremiah 31:35, Ezekiel 32:7, and 1 Corinthians 15:41. And so Daneau, treatise 4, ch. 27. Nor does Pererius dissent, loc. cit.

Problem XI. Whether the distance of the stars from the earth has changed. Peucer testifies that Copernicus indeed found this, in his book On the Celestial Circles, near the end, where treating the exact proportion and magnitude of these bodies among themselves, which artificers deduced by the geometric method, he speaks thus: "Copernicus, when he had found that the distance of the luminaries from the earth had changed, more diligently investigated and examined the distances, apparent semidiameters, and parallaxes, etc." We indicated above, part 3, that Melanchthon and others affirm the same thing. Cardano cites Melanchthon in his book On Subtlety, p. 189, adding: "an argument, as it were, of the aging world." However, it is well known that that outstanding astronomer said this not from his own opinion but from that of Melanchthon, which he there relates historically, from the words immediately following: "But a reason can be deduced, either from the variety of instruments, or the disposition of the solar heaven, or the observation of equinoxes, which admits variety both from places and from the magnitude of the sun, on account of which the equinox occurs somewhat more quickly than &mdash." But when this had been observed by many, it was referred to the magnitude of the Sun. So much so that the careless or incurious placement of the marginal lemma in Cardano's book seems to have deceived that most erudite man when he writes that Cardano led the way for others in this opinion. But as for those who make Copernicus the author of this observation, they seem to have misunderstood him. Whatever the case, this opinion is rejected by Scaliger in the Exercises cited above, and Rothmann in the Astronomical Letters of Tycho Brahe, p. 131. Nor does it seem to agree with Scripture, as we showed above. It seemed good to note these things briefly, so that our students may be warned not to make themselves ridiculous to the more clever by less solid amplifications about the old age of the world and the change of all things.

Problem XII. Whether the names of idols and fables once imposed by Gentilism on the stars or celestial signs should be changed by us, if possible? According to Zechariah 13:2, Psalm 16. We have explained at length what should be thought about this whole business in the disputation On Indirect Idolatry, and its twin apology published under the title and on the occasion of the Marian confraternities. Because some names of stars occur in Job 9:9, 38:31-32, there is no reason for some to excuse the pagan theology which they daily breathe and profess in speech and writing. For the translation of the Latin Vulgate interpreter, whoever

he was, is no more to be attributed to the Holy Spirit than the unsuitable phrases, both French and Latin, of Sebastian Castellio, which he unhappily used in his translation, as noted by Beza in a special treatise against Castellio, Henri Estienne in his notable preface to the Greek New Testament in 16mo, in the year 1580, and de Thou, Histories, book 36. Besides, it is one thing to speak of the stars in the customary discourse of astrologers, another to speak of God and the worship of God in the phrases and even the opinions of the Gentiles, and to exercise the very practice of their insane theology. We warned about this in the disputation On Gentilism. Meanwhile, I cannot fail to point out on this occasion a blunder in the conjecture of the otherwise most erudite and excellent Peucer in the book just cited, where he seems to refer the pagan denominations of the signs to the holy Patriarchs. For thus he writes (E.7): "They collected the stars into 48 images or figures, and imposed on them congruent names from the likeness and agreement of known things." And a little later (E.8): "Nor is there any doubt that it first came from Phoenicia into Greece, but was handed down to the Phoenicians from the holy Patriarchs after the flood as if by hand, both the whole doctrine about the stars, and this very distinction itself. For stars are also mentioned in the history of Job and the prophecies of Amos, such as Kesil and Kima. The learned judge that Kesil signifies Orion, Kima the Pleiades, and they conjecture that the month Kislev is named from Kesil. The sacred text calls the Sun Shemesh, and its idol Moloch; the Moon Yereach; the Morning Star Mazzaroth; the Evening Star Ayish - which declare both that the partition and distribution of the stars into certain figures is very ancient, and that it first came from the Holy Patriarchs."

Problem XIII. What was the star of the Magi in Matthew 2? We will perhaps elsewhere treat this ex professo; for now we will defend that there is nothing absurd in saying it was newly and miraculously produced. Daneau, treatise 4, ch. 10, thinks it was either a comet or one of the ordinary stars which then held a singular course. Meanwhile, the commentaries on Matthew 2 can be consulted, among them Maldonatus and Cornelius a Lapide.

Problem XIV. They also raise these questions (Thomas I.70, Pererius p. 172, 174, Becanus loc. cit.): Why the stars were created on the fourth day, before animals, and why after plants, which surpass them in dignity. In addition, why Moses did not mention the five remaining planets. But because these questions are defined by the said authors with insufficiently solid reasons, there is no reason for us to dwell on recounting them, acquiescing in the free will of God, which is the cause of causes and the reason of reasons.

7. Many admirable things concerning the sun and moon and their natural powers and operations are presented to our contemplation from reading Genesis 1:14-16, Psalm 8, 19, and 104:19, Psalm 136:1, 1 Corinthians 15:40-41. Concerning the extraordinary signs about them, see Luke 21:25, Acts 2. The four miracles regarding the sun in Exodus 10, Joshua 10, Isaiah 37, and Matthew 27 should be considered especially. We may have to speak about these expressly elsewhere. God, and Christ the mediator, are also compared to the sun in Psalm 84:11 and Malachi 4:2. On the passages cited thus far, commentators everywhere will supply no small part of this contemplation. But physicists and astronomers ex professo inquire in the Theory of the Planets: What is the magnitude of the sun and moon, and how is it to be investigated? Whether the moon is smaller than all the stars except Mercury alone? What is the cause of eclipses?

Why the sun suffers eclipse from the moon and not from Venus or Mercury? Whether the sun should be placed in the middle of the planets? What is the altitude of the sun, its maximum declination, etc., and how is it apprehended? etc. On these matters, besides the philosophers, Pererius discusses some things, especially Zanchi, Daneau, Vossius book 3 On Idolatry, with whom the physicists and astronomers indicated above should be compared. Because time and paper warn us, we now propose to consider these things:

I. Whether the sun is animated. We deny this, with the common consent of philosophers and theologians. Pererius p. 281, 283. From the soul of the sun, its intellect, and finally from its intellect, its deity or divinity was deduced. And for this reason today's Christians should be moved not to rashly and unnecessarily mock the more cautious opinions about the soul, life, sense, and intellect of the world, heaven, and stars. Whoever wants to know the ancients' horrendous idolatry, its occasion, progress, and various forms, should consult Vossius On Idolatry, book 2, chapters 2 to 15, with which Selden's Syntagma on the Syrian Gods can be compared. Benjamin of Tudela, in his Itinerary p. 105, 107, relates that in Havila the sun was worshipped in a peculiar way, and for this purpose on individual altars or high places there was a מְזֻבֵּח, as it were a solar orb made by magic arts, which at sunrise turns with a great noise. Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed, part 3, ch. 29, describes the idolatry of the Sabians. See the excellence of the sun from the Scriptures, and its anagogy to spiritual things, described there by Vossius ch. 2, and by Alsted in Natural Theology. Compare, if you have leisure, the encomia of the sun in Macrobius Saturnalia book 1, ch. 10, Chalcidius on Plato's Timaeus, Pliny book 2, ch. 6, Cicero book 2 On the Nature of the Gods, Ambrose Hexameron book 4, chs. 1-8, Lorinus on Ecclesiastes 11:7.

II. Why is the moon called a great light in Genesis 1:16, when it is smaller than all the stars except Mercury? We explained this more fully in Thersites Heautontimorumenos, where we cite Ibn Ezra and some Christian interpreters, physicists and astronomers, for the genuine exposition of this passage. Add Chrysostom homily 6, Cornelius a Lapide and [Peter] Martyr on Genesis, and Franciscus Junius in response to argument 8 of Simplicius and the Antinomians, the notes of the new Dutch translation, and the English notes most recently published. The sum comes to this: Because the moon is closest to the earth, it appears not only larger, but is also greater than all the other stars in efficacy and power of acting, and consequently with respect to the nature of a luminary, though not with respect to the nature of mass, it is rightly called a great light.

III. What are the spots of the moon? Daneau treatise 4, ch. 28, thinks this happens because the body of the moon, just as it is near to the earth, so it has a kind of contagion of earthly dregs. But this seems to be said with little philosophy, although Pliny says the same thing, book 2, ch. 9. The Coimbrans on On the Heavens book 2, ch. 7, qu. 4, with Richard and Giles cited there, say better that this is from the rarer parts of the moon. See the opinions of others there and in Plutarch book 3, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, ch. 30.

IV. What should be thought of the opinion of those who think they see there a certain new orb through the optic tube? That it is lunatic. This was the opinion of certain ancients: Democritus,

Heraclitus, Anaxarchus, etc. See Plutarch's book On the Face of the Moon, and book 3 On the Opinions of the Philosophers, chapters 13, 25, 30, and Diogenes Laertius books 2 and 9. And perhaps the Muslim delusions in Koran chapters 4, 7, and 65 about mountains, rivers, and fields in heaven tend in this direction. In our age this opinion was renewed by Galileo Galilei, for whom Campanella wrote an apology in a special little book. An anonymous English writer wanted to persuade of the same thing in a vernacular booklet titled The Discovery of a World in the Moon, published at London in 1638, where besides the principal thesis he defends these hypotheses and corollaries: That more worlds are not repugnant to any principle of nature or faith; that the heavens do not consist of incorruptible matter, any more than sublunary things; that the moon is a solid, compact, opaque body; that the brighter parts represented in the moon are the sea, but the darker or spots are land; that there are high mountains there, deep valleys, most extensive spaces of plains; that there is an atmosphere there, or orb of thick and vaporous air, which immediately surrounds the body of the moon; that our orb is a moon to them, just as their orb is a moon to us; that probably such meteors of that lunar orb are posited there as are of our orb; that human inhabitants of that orb are posited there, but it is uncertain of what kind the humans are.

Aristotle opposes this opinion about more worlds in On the Heavens book 1, ch. 8, and Metaphysics 12, ch. 8; Plato in Plutarch On the Opinions of the Philosophers book 1, ch. 5; and the Scholastics on Thomas part 1, qu. 47, art. 3. Especially in a special treatise and ex professo, Julius Caesar Lagalla did this against Galileo in On the Phenomena in the Lunar Orb. However, I would not want to say that all their arguments and testimonies alleged from Scripture firmly conclude. See the contrary shown by Plutarch On the Failure of the Oracles and Jacques Charpentier in his commentary on Alcinous. Indeed, the Peripatetics themselves acknowledge the weakness of Aristotle's arguments, especially of those which seem to infer that a plurality of worlds is impossible. See Claramontius book 16 On the Universe, ch. 12, especially the Coimbrans on On the Heavens book 1, ch. 8, where many other authors on both sides are cited, and it is shown that this can be demonstrated from the Scriptures but not from physical reasons, to which end they adduce Acts 17 and Romans 5:12.

Zanchi book 2, chapter 5, thesis 7, likewise rejects Aristotle's arguments, and thinks we should fight with no argument or testimony other than this: "But this is finally an effective reason why there is only one world: because God created only one, as Moses relates. But there cannot be another world, unless it is created by the same creator by whom this one was. But He created and wanted to create only one; He would have created more if He had wanted to. And this is the conclusion about the unity of the world, and the true faith." If any argument should be added from the Scriptures, the two arguments of the Coimbrans do not seem improbable to me, to the latter of which, from Romans 5:12-19 about the two Adams of men and about the preaching of the Gospel, I would add. Certainly the argument brought forward here by Tostatus, Bishop of Avila, against the Antipodes would be valid. For there would be no reason to convert the people there, unless the apostles and evangelists became winged, or were carried there by angels pulling them by the hair - something like which is said to have happened to someone in the apocryphal addition to Daniel verse 35.

V. On what day the sun was created, and on what day the moon - whether in the full moon - is determined by Bede, and partly by Daneau ch. 28 with Basil and John of Damascus - to pass over now the chronologers Scaliger, Tornielli, Cappel, and others. We are not displeased with Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis book 2, ch. 15: "Many most loquaciously inquire what kind of moon was also made, and would that the inquirers spoke, and did not rather try to teach. For they say it was made full for this reason, because it was not fitting that on that day, when it is written that the stars were made, God should make anything imperfect among the stars. But those who resist say: Therefore the first moon itself ought to have been called the first, not the fourteenth, for who begins to enumerate in this way? But I am in the middle between them, so that I affirm neither, but plainly say that whether God made the moon first or full, He made it perfect. For God is the author and founder of the natures themselves. But whatever a thing somehow brings forth and unfolds through natural progress at suitable times, it also contained hidden before, even if not in the appearance or mass of its body, nevertheless by the principle of nature."

VI. What should be thought about the sun rising four times in Herodotus, Euterpe, and other miracles or prodigies concerning it which are commonly related? They should be referred either to fables, or to meteorological phases, and to fallacies of sight.

ON CREATION, PART SEVEN.

RESPONDENT LUBERT SPRUIT of Utrecht
For October 20, 1638

1. The effects and consequences of the stars are 1. Motion. 2. Light and illumination. 3. Heat. 4. Hidden influences. 5. Time. 6. Signification. Concerning motion, the philosophers ask whether it exists; whether that of each star is even and orderly or wandering and varied; whether the motion of the higher planets from west to east is slower; whether that motion is ordered to the generation and corruption of sublunary things, as Aristotle wants in On Generation and Corruption book 2, ch. 10; whether the motion from east to west is the cause of the perpetual duration of things; whether, when the motion of the celestial bodies ceases, all motion of sublunary things must cease; whether the lower spheres are carried by the diurnal motion of the first movable; what is the aspect of the planets and how many kinds there are; what are their station, progression, direction, retrogradation, etc. On these matters, see the Commentator on Aristotle's On the Heavens, Baranzano in the Uranoscopia, and the common astronomical booklets and Clavius from p. 40 to 61, and others indicated above, namely in part 6. Pererius also touches on some things, especially Zanchi and Daneau. For us, in accordance with our plan, it will suffice to inquire into these problems.

I. Whether the proper motions of all the heavens or stars must be completed before the end of the world? There are some who think the end of the world will not occur before all the stars return to the same position they had at the beginning of creation. But this conjecture is rightly

rejected by Pererius p. 270, because it rests on a twofold hypothesis, if not false then at least uncertain. The first is that the motions of the celestial orbs are commensurable with each other, so that they can all be completed at the same time and the stars can return to the same position they once held. The other is that the world will last until the proper revolutions of all the heavens are completed, that is, it will last 36,000 years from the beginning of creation - for so much time is assigned by Ptolemy to the motion of the eighth heaven from west to east, if indeed any faith should be placed in such observations. You see, therefore, that all things are uncertain, and the unknown is being proved through what is more unknown. Finally, it would follow from this opinion that the end of the world could be certainly inferred by astronomers from the certain and consummated revolution of the heavens. But this is absurd from Mark 13. Some astronomers attempting such a thing were found ἀργοὶ [idle] in their vanity, among whom the celebrated Regiomontanus, who made the year 1600 the end of the world.

II. Whether after the end of the world all motion of the celestial bodies will cease? The Scholastics commonly determine this affirmatively on Sentences book 4, dist. 48, and part 3, qu. 91, art. 2, but not all the things said by them there are so certain. Their arguments taken from Revelation 10:6 and Isaiah 60:19-20, to which Pererius book 2, question 6 adds Ecclesiastes 1:2, 4-5 with Romans 8:20 and Deuteronomy 4:19, are mere pseudographemata [false writings], from misunderstood scriptures. Nor does that reason conclude: "The motion of the heaven is for the generation of sublunary things; but that will then cease when the number of the elect is completed." For they themselves deny with Thomas on On the Heavens 2, ch. 10, that the diurnal motion is for generation. Nor do those arguments have anything solid: "The motion of the heaven is for the sake of rest; if it never attains this, it will be in vain. Moreover, rest is more noble than motion," etc. On the contrary, Baranzano thinks the negative part more probable, Uranoscopia part 1, qu. 7, doubt 2, section 4, and proves it from Jeremiah 31:35-36, and indicates reasons deduced from the beauty and perfection of the universe, the end of the heavens, the illumination of the earth, divine goodness, etc. The Supplement of Thomas has these things more explicitly in the place just cited, where Genesis 8:22 is also added. But there is nothing solid here that compels assent, as can be seen in the solutions added there. Except that they labor a great deal in unraveling this argument: "Circular motion is natural to the heaven; but if the heaven remains, its natural things must remain." Thomas responds that in the present state of generation of sublunary things, motion belongs to the nature and perfection of the heaven. Pererius loc. cit. rejects this, and substitutes: "There will not then be a propensity for circular motion in the heaven, but only an aptitude," etc. But they seem to me to suffer their familiar shades, making by far the most difficult and obscure (which otherwise would be plain in themselves) from some badly understood philosophical axiom. For first, action is not an intrinsic perfection of the agent but only significatively, as they dispute elsewhere. Then, a remote inclination, like an active potency or powers of nature, could remain in some nature, even if they do not go out into actual inclination or into the act itself. This would happen through the mere subtraction or cessation of the divine concurrence with such an inclination and with such an act. For what prohibits saying here about the heaven what they themselves teach about glorified bodies? Therefore, let circular motion be said to be natural to the heaven (in first act, of course), in the way that nutrition with receptive, attractive, expulsive faculty, etc. is natural to the glorified body, or touch with respect to every tangible, which nevertheless is not to be led into act with

respect to each and every tangible. It is not, therefore, that we should imagine with Albert, Scotus, Durand that motion is neither natural nor violent to the heaven. Finally, it is not that we should compare the nature of things constituted by God until the end of the world in all respects with the renewed and then surviving world. For they discuss in many places that there will then be another state with respect to motions and changes, and Pererius book 2, question 2, which pertain to the common place On the End of the World. Besides, the rest of the sun at the time of Joshua did not remove the nature of things, nor do violence to the faculty and inclination of the sun. We think this question should be left in the middle, or soberly inquired about on both sides, or rather this reconciliation should be brought forward: that the motion from west to east (which they determine is destined for the generation of things and for signs and seasons) will cease, but not the motion from east to west - which it is not repugnant should remain, and perhaps would even be fitting, since it is more truly said to be ordered to conservation.

III. Whether according to sacred Scripture the stars are immobile, or are moved through the heaven as fish through water and birds through air. Justin Martyr affirms this in his response to question 93, Origen book 1 On First Principles ch. 7 and book 5 Against Celsus, Chrysostom homily 6 and 13 on Genesis, Augustine in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis book 2, ch. 10, Eusebius of Emesa, Diodore of Tarsus, Procopius on Genesis 1. Philastrius adds in his Catalogue of Heresies that the contrary opinion is alien to the Catholic faith and its assertors have fellowship more with pagan truth than with Christian doctrine. Before them this opinion was frequently held by the Stoics according to Cicero book 2 On the Nature of the Gods, and by those philosophers according to Aristotle On the Heavens book 2, text 43. And today it was partly revived by Tycho Brahe and his followers. Nor do certain more recent physicists deny it. And Fracastoro defends it with many arguments in his book On Homocentric Spheres. Nevertheless, very many physicists and astronomers, along with the Scholastics and today's Theologians, hold the contrary in their commentaries on Genesis and in disputations on the Hexameron, and Clavius expressly proves it from page 433 to 458, from various phenomena, that there are given not only distinct orbs but also eccentric ones and epicycles. Pererius thinks this opinion should definitely be held. But the reason he brings forward from Job 37:18 is less solid, refuting neither those wandering motions of the stars nor the channels (which some imagine) - just look at the words of the text and the commentaries of Mercer and Pineda, and it will immediately be clear that it is dealing with the air there. Daneau treatise 4, ch. 16, concedes that space is continuous and one, but that the stars are distinguished from the planets by diverse intervals, as it were by spaces and seats of places, and that the fixed stars are higher in place than the planets, which he thinks is implied in Amos 9:6.

We, to say something, do not attack the opinion of Tycho and Daneau, but nevertheless we do not think the common opinion of Astronomers is repugnant to the Scriptures. For although they never mention the motions of the heavens, but always of the stars, this could happen for the reason that the latter falls under our senses, the former not at all. It remains, therefore, that this truth is to be investigated from the observation of the senses and reason - namely, whether there are orbs, and whether epicycles should be posited on account of the observed motions of the stars from east to west and vice versa, also from south to north, and of ascent and descent, etc.

IV. Whether any example similar to the swiftest motions of the celestial bodies (by which, of course, any star placed on the equator is conceived to traverse 24 million miles and a third of a million in individual hours) can be given in the motions of lower things, whether natural or artificial; and what can be replied to today's Copernicans, who explode that motion as monstrous, in which they may exercise their talent, so that they may either likewise learn to marvel, or call their own hypotheses, observations, and measurements into doubt. To the first we deny, to the second we affirm, and that with a threefold question. The first of which we set forth in Thersites Heautontimorumenos, section 3, page 261. By what equal or example will the Copernicans teach that the earth can run around 225 German miles in the space of one hour? For this is their opinion. The second is, how can it be conceived that Christ, Elijah, Enoch, and on the last day all the faithful (with the matter, quantity, and locality of bodies remaining) arrive in the highest heaven in a short time, when the Ptolemaics in Clavius pp. 215-216 hold that the earth is distant from the concave surface of the eighth sphere by 80.5 million miles, and therefore a millstone descending from there would need 90 years before it reached the earth (although it descended 200 miles every hour), and a man ascending directly from here to the same eighth sphere would not reach its concavity within 2,000 years (although he traveled 100 miles each day), nor again from the concave to the convex of the same sphere in the space of 2,000 years, nor finally from the convex of the same sphere to the empyrean heaven in the space of 2,000 years. But if we follow the measurement and calculation of the Copernicans, the distance will be almost infinitely greater, and the unraveling of this question so much more difficult. The third is that they should explain the motion and projection of light in an instant or imperceptible time through so great a space, and illustrate it by some similar swift motion in nature, if they can. For although it is not a body, it is nevertheless a corporeal quality. Nor are there lacking among them those who contend that it is a body. But when they have measured the swiftest motion of lightning and wind (namely, of exhalation and consequently of body), let them show something similar in other motions. Therefore, let them either profess here the straits of their talent (with Scripture leading the way, as I think, in Job 38:19-20, Luke 10:18, Matthew 24:27), or let them not trust their measurements and observations, which fight against each other in most cases, to such an extent that they make the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures culpable. It is necessary that they do one or the other.

2. Now we must treat of light and illumination, and the phases or appearances arising from them. Many things occur in Scripture, to be indicated elsewhere, and God Himself and Christ the Savior, as well as the word of God, the gifts and grace of the Holy Spirit, and consolation and serenity of conscience are compared to light. Its primary opposite is darkness, its secondary shadows, and in their way twilights. We would wish all these things to be known at least moderately by the student of Theology, so that he may be able to explain the more accurately certain passages of Scripture, controversies, and practical matters by way of analogy. Physicists and Opticians do this ex professo, among whom the celebrated by profession are the theologians Maurolico in his treatise On Light and Shadow, John Archbishop of Canterbury, author of the so-called Common Perspective, and Marin Mersenne, celebrated among today's Opticians, who sprinkled many pious things in his commentaries on Genesis. Finally, Athanasius Kircher of the Society of Jesus, a theologian who published works of

Gnomonics and Catoptrics. For those who do not have leisure to learn these things laboriously from Euclid, Vitello, Alhazen, Kepler's Supplement and Dioptrics, Nonius' treatise On Twilights, etc., let them at least make Risner's or Rhodius' Optics, or Timpler's compendium, or (which is better, and fuller) Alsted's in the Encyclopedia familiar to themselves. Let them add the physical authors, and Ficino's treatise On Light, or at least impress what Keckermann collected in his Special Logic under the theme On Light (which the latest edition of Lange's Polyanthea also described from there), and Dionysius the so-called Areopagite in On the Divine Names part 1, ch. 4, and On the Celestial Hierarchy ch. 15, where he recounts 34 properties of light.

Admirable things and encomia of light occur everywhere in the Fathers in their Hexaemera, and Damascene book 2 On the Orthodox Faith ch. 7, and Pineda in his commentary on Job 38, and Lorinus on Ecclesiastes 11, where other authors are also indicated on Job 38, with whom Zanchi, Daneau, Valesius, Bartholomew the Englishman etc. should be compared, and any who apply it especially to spiritual matters, namely Ambrose Hexameron book 4, ch. 1; add what was noted about the sun in the preceding Disputation. The extraordinary light or splendor in Luke 2:9, Matthew 17:2, 5, Acts 12:7 and 22:6, Exodus 13:21, 22, 34:29 should be considered especially by the theologian. Concerning ordinary light, and the lucid, whether it radiates of itself (as the sun, flame) or reflects light received from elsewhere (as the moon, mirror) - what questions are raised by the philosophers, Timpler has set forth most of them, and some are touched on by Baranzano in Uranoscopia parts 1 and 2, and Maurolico in the appendix of problems to the cited book, and among the Theologians Temesvári part 2 of the Rosary under the word light, day. For us, in accordance with our plan, it will suffice to inquire:

I. Whether light is a body or substance? Augustine book 4 On the Soul to Vincent ch. 12 reckons it among bodies, but the most tenuous kind, which he also attributes to angels. Theodoret in his Questions on Genesis qu. 7 seems to make it a substance, but Pererius p. 10 tries to excuse him. But Thomas with his followers proves the contrary in I.67, art. 2 and 3, that it is not a body, because illumination occurs in an instant, and indeed in every part, which is impossible in the local motion of a body. Then, because the penetration of bodies would be given. But that it is an active quality consequently per se of a luminous body he proves there. See also Daneau's Christian Physics treatise 1, ch. 10, the Coimbrans on On the Heavens 2, ch. 7, qu. 2. In short, if light is a substance, it will be corporeal or incorporeal. Not the former, because the penetration of dimensions would be given, and many bodies would be in the same place. Not the latter, because it falls under the senses. Nor is there any reason to except with a certain more recent philosopher (Fridericus Bonaventura of Urbino, in the short work How Heat is Produced in the Sun ch. 21) that it is a substance intermediate between corporeal and incorporeal. For whence will he prove such a thing is given? And why will he multiply beings without necessity?

II. Whether it is the substantial form of the stars? Bonaventure affirms this in Sentences book 2, dist. 13, art. 2, about the light which inheres in a luminous body, from which illumination (which emanates from there to other bodies) is a distinct accident. But Scotus rightly refutes this opinion in book 3, dist. 33. And Temesvári, a follower of Scotus, perspicuously refutes both this

and the previous opinion in the Rosary book 2 under the word light, nn. 3 and 4. See also the Coimbrans on On the Heavens 2.

III. Whether it is an intentional being? We deny this, because it is a most active quality of the first altering body, and as the first and universal instrument of the heaven it produces heat (Psalm 19) and substantial forms in these lower things, to which that description from the effect can be referred, Ephesians 5:13: "Light is what reveals all things." But all these things cannot be attributed to intentional beings. The Thomists specially prove about light, on I.67, art. 2, both because it has a real effect, and because it denominates a medium, and because it expels its opposite, namely darkness. But Scotus attacks this, contending that it is an intention or species of light, for this reason: because a pure sensible placed above the sensorium does not produce sensation. Temesvári nn. 6 and 7 has this reconciliation: by intention is understood a diminished being, and light is called such because it does not have as perfect a being in the medium as in its source.

IV. Whether it is action and passion, or a quality, or both, so that it can be referred to those three categories? Giannini the Ferrarese philosopher affirms the third in his disputation On Light chs. 8 and 9. But we do not see that this can be said philosophically, since the nature of quality is distinct from action, and the formal ratio of one is not the formal ratio of the other. Action is something transient, but light is permanent.

V. Whether light is fitting to every part of the heaven intrinsically, of course from its own nature. Baranzano Uranoscopia part 2, qu. 3, doubt 20 affirms this, but his reasons are less solid. The opinion itself, however, is not improbable in itself. What if it should be said that the heaven, which was made luminous on the first day (as was said in the work of the first day), nevertheless retained something of light after the luminaries were created on the fourth day?

VI. Whether the celestial light of the stars differs in species among themselves and from sublunary light? Following Plato's Timaeus, they commonly make three species of fire: 1. celestial, which is the light of the stars, illuminating more than heating; 2. aerial, as is flame, equally illuminating and heating; 3. terrestrial and dense, such as is coal or glowing iron, of course illuminating little and vehemently burning. Albert, Richard, Aegidius defend the specific distinction among the Scholastics on Sentences book 2, dist. 13, led by a reason taken from diverse effects. Thomas in the second writing on the cited distinction distinguishes, and Temesvári with him, that the natural or innate light of the stars differs in species from the light of the sun, but not the light received from the sun. Baranzano loc. cit. proves that they are of the same species; the Coimbrans on On the Heavens 2, ch. 7 do not disagree, nor do I see that that opinion contains anything absurd. He removes well all the arguments of the opposite side, by denying that a distinction in secondary and arisen effects infers a distinction of the cause, but only of the primary effect, which here is one and the same in all light. Averroes explains this in On the Soul 2: "There is one nature in every transparent thing." And Temesvári extends this against Albert in n. 12: "In the light of fire," he says, "and of higher bodies there is the same ratio of proportion to act, because each light is the action of the transparent, and each makes colors in act, and each suddenly changes by illuminating," etc. Perhaps it could also be said that the

various and contrary effects are from hidden influences and not from light, or from the disposition of the subject or matter on which light acts. Daneau ch. 10 makes celestial light wholly distinct in genus from elemental (which he confuses with the element of fire), because the former needs no fuel, nor is ever extinguished in heaven, and is pure, free from all soot and smoke. To which we reply nothing else than that the color white, or any other which is in glorified bodies, neither needs fuel, nor is corrupted or altered, and yet is not wholly distinct in genus from this whiteness of ours; for it is reduced to its genus, that is, color, and to its species, that is, whiteness, and has the same natural and primary effect, namely whitening.

VII. Whether the light of glorified bodies is of the same species as the light of the sun. The Scholastics heap up conjectures and fig-leaf arguments about this and the other endowments of the glorified body on Sentences book 4, dist. 49. And from them Temesvári book 4 under the word Endowment, nn. 7 and 8. Among the more recent authors, Baranzano in the cited question of the Uranoscopia, in doubt 3, disputes that they differ in species, where nevertheless he concedes that the brightness of glorified bodies will be of the same species as our whiteness. We prefer to be learnedly ignorant of most of those things, meanwhile referring the reader to the common place On the Glorified Body.

VIII. Whether the light of the sun and stars differs in species from the light of the Empyrean Heaven. Baranzano loc. cit. does not very much deny it. The same author in Digladiation 18, theses 14-15, philosophizes more fully about that light from Pseudo-Clement of Rome. But it would first have to be decided whether and what light is there. Which pertains to the common place On the Heaven of the Blessed.

X. Whether the light of the sun is of the same species as the light created on the first day? Thomas affirms this in Sentences book 2, dist. 14, and I.67, art. 4, and qu. 70, art.1, whom the Carthusian follows. Pererius p. 96, see his reasons there. On the contrary, Temesvári denies it with William in n. 20, for this reason: because according to the Master, the sun was created from that light on the fourth day. But the state of the controversy seems to be confused. For the question is, or ought to be, not about the subject of light (which is a substance) or about the luminous body, but about the quality of light itself. But what prohibits saying that it is the same in species? As long as the distinction of degrees is left.

X. Whether therefore the light of the sun is greater. Pererius ibid. affirms this, and before him the Sententiaries commonly on Sentences book 2, dist. 13, the Glossa, Lyra, Tostatus and others on Genesis, who allege for themselves Tertullian, Ambrose, Augustine, Junilius, Hugh. On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa, Athanasius, Theodoret, Procopius, Eugubinus hold that the light of the first day was greater and collected around itself and went around the whole of things, afterwards, namely on the fourth day, it was reduced and separated into its own parts, as it were, to things cognate to itself. Others prefer that it was equal in both cases, such as the Carthusian, Catharinus, Vielmius, Gregory of Valentia, to whom Lorinus adds commentary on Wisdom 7:29, Thomas I.67, art. 4, ad 2, qu. 70, art. 1. But Thomas says something else: namely, that the substance of the luminaries was created on the first day, but unformed; however, on the fourth day it was formed, not by a substantial form, but by the conferral of a

determinate power - so that that illuminative power in general was raised to a special and determinate power for particular effects. We follow the opinion of Pererius.

XI. Whether the rainbow, parhelia, paraselene, Milky Way, and similar phases existing from the various illumination of light (which see in Zanchi book 3, ch. 3) are real beings or intentional beings. We affirm this about all of them, except the Milky Way, which we believe with Ptolemy and the more recent astronomers and physicists to be in the firmament and a celestial circle, against Aristotle, who thinks it is an appearing meteor. Clavius on Sacrobosco p. 106, especially Zanchi book 3, ch. 3, the Coimbrans on the Meteorology treatise 3, ch. 2.

XII. Whether the rainbow existed before the flood, and could have existed before the fourth day of creation. To the first we affirm, to the second we deny, and this is evident from the definition of the rainbow, both lunar and solar. For given a thin, dense, uniform, dewy cloud set opposite the sun or moon (which was the case before the flood), the rainbow is posited; when that is not posited (which was the case at least before the fourth day), the rainbow is not given. On the rainbow, see Maurolico, who boasts that he gave a demonstration of it, when before him the Opticians had said many things but demonstrated almost nothing. And those after him, Risner or Rhodius. Among the Theologians, Zanchi explains it extensively in the cited chapter, add the Coimbrans treatise 5.

XIII. Whether the beauty of the dove in Psalm 68:14, which arises from colors, is real or intentional. Lorinus in his commentary, following experience (as he thinks) and the judgment of Seneca in Natural Questions book 5, ch. 5, Cicero in Academic Questions book 4, Lucretius book 2, etc., inclines not obscurely to that opinion which holds that the color on the dove's neck is one, but seems to be many - and so all that beauty is apparent, and he compares it with the rainbow. On the contrary, Ulisse Aldrovandi in Ornithology book 15, ch. 11, thinks that the colors are diverse, and diverse surfaces radiating from portions of diverse feathers. Franzius in his Sacred History of Animals p. 464 has almost the same thing from and with him. What if we join both opinions, with Maurolico leading the way in the already praised treatise book 2, p. 74? "It should be noted that the colors of the rainbow in a dewy cloud are not an inseparable accident, like colors in cloth, or on the necks of doves, or on the feathers of peacocks. For if it were so, the colors of the rainbow would appear in only one place. Which is not the case, for different spectators see the rainbow in different places." (Which he had demonstrated a little before, theorem 28, p. 62.) "Therefore those colors in the rainbow are generated from the reflection of received light at a determinate angle. But the colors on the feathers of peacocks are really in the feathers themselves, for they are seen there by every spectator, with this exception, that they are changed and appear differently if such a feather is looked at straight on than if obliquely, etc. Since perpendicular vision inspects the innermost threads, but oblique vision the outermost flocks, which are of another color." These things, adapted analogically to the dove's neck and the words of Psalm 68:14, will explain to us beauty at once single and varied, changeable to the varied view of each spectator, according to that saying of Lucretius: "For at other times it happens that it is red with bright ruby, sometimes it is seen as it were to mix green emeralds with blue."

XIII. What should be thought about that extraordinary phase in 2 Kings 3:22? Lyra thinks it was a natural fallacy of sight from the reverberation of the sun. But it is not credible that none of the Moabites understood this natural phenomenon, and that all were equally deceived. It is therefore better to say that some miracle is involved - not indeed in the real conversion of the waters (as in Exodus 7:17), but in appearance. But whether that happened immediately to the waters, with the rays of the sun producing such a species of red color, as in the rainbow; or to the sight of the Moabites themselves, whether in the organ, or in the medium, or in the visual species (as to Balaam in Numbers 22:31, and Luke 24:16, and John 20:14-15) - is not so clear.

XIV. Whether the light of the sun will be increased sevenfold, and the light of the moon will be as the light of the sun. From Isaiah 30:26 Jerome, Haymo, the Carthusian, Lyra, Cornelius a Lapide affirm this, who take that properly. Richard on Sentences book 4, dist. 48 adds that they will receive this light from the splendor of glorified bodies. The Gloss says that they will be increased in light because it was diminished through sin. We with the rest of the interpreters prefer to interpret it through a hyperbolic metaphor of the joyful and happy state of the people of God in Christ. To the treatise on the light of the stars pertain: 1. Questions about eclipses, shadows, and sundials in Job 40:17, Psalm 102:12, Isaiah 38:8, Hebrews 10:1, Matthew 27:45. But these things are to be sought in the commentaries of Pineda, Lorinus, Cornelius a Lapide, and the authors cited there. 2. The distinction of light, illumination, ray, brightness, coruscation, splendor; likewise, of the luminous, the transparent; finally, of darkness, shadow, twilight. On which see Temesvári and the Scholastics cited there, and from him the Theological Dictionary of Johannes Altenstaig, also Bartholomew the Englishman book 8 from ch. 41 to the end. If anyone seeks more, let him go to the sources themselves, the writers on physics, optics, astronomy, indicated above and in our library. Goclenius' Philosophical Lexicon will supply a guide to the definitions and distinctions of terms. 3. The consideration of parallax, refraction, twinkling, reflection - which happen to the light and illumination of the stars. Parallax depresses the stars more to the horizon for us viewers. Refraction raises the same stars above the horizon more. That there are refractions, that is, that the stars are seen by us refractedly, is proved by Wittichius astronomical disputation 1, Kepler in the Dioptrics, in the preface. The same author in the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy book 1, part 3, p. 199. And in the Optics of Astronomy ch. 3, sect. 10. But what the cause of parallax is - whether the concave of the sphere of fire lying below the moon, or the air poured around the earth, or terrestrial and aqueous exhalations mixed with the air, or two of those, or all three together - is investigated by Rothmann in Tycho Brahe's Astronomical Letters, Kepler in the Supplement to Vitello ch. 2. Where also on p. 104 he teaches that the refractions are not the same in all places and times. Let him go to it who has leisure. Claramontius treats of twinkling in book 9, ch. 11. On the reflection of the rays of the sun and moon, the same author in book 8, chs. 5, 6, 7, 8.

3. Heat follows, which they commonly distinguish into celestial, elemental, and innate or inborn. Physicists and physicians should be consulted about each one. The craftsman of the world is indeed admirable and common, and most worthy of our knowledge, but because we see few things that can be adduced to or compared with sacred physics, we will be more sparing here. Concerning that special heat which the plastic power uses in the procreation of man, there is an illustrious passage in Psalm 51:7 compared with Job 39:14-15. Concerning celestial heat, see

Psalm 19. Concerning the opposite of heat, namely cold, and the intermediate tepidity of participation, see Revelation 3. Concerning heat tempered by art for the melting and smelting of metals, and all pyrotechnics, see Exodus 32:4, 20, Jeremiah 6:29, 1 Kings 7:45-46. Compare what we noted in the work of the first day concerning fire. Concerning heat in general, the philosophers ask: Whether elemental heat differs in species from celestial heat; in how many ways heat is produced; whether through motion, and how; how through attrition; how through rarity; how through light; whether through a direct ray; whether the motion of heaven is per se the cause of heat, etc. On these matters, see among others Baranzano in the Uranoscopia, Scaliger against Cardano, and Pererius on the last question, the Coimbrans on On Generation book 2, ch. 3, qu. 8 on the first question. We ask here:

Problem I. Whether heat is a proper internal thing which emanates from fire? We affirm, and philosophers prove this analogically when they teach how water returns to its former coldness.

Problem II. Whether therefore it can be separated from fire, or was separated in the Babylonian furnace? We deny. See there Pererius, Cornelius a Lapide, Willet.

Problem III. Whether it can be communicated to iron? We deny. See the disputations on the communication of a proprium in the authors cited in the disputation on God's power.

4. Besides light and heat, hidden influences are ascribed to the heaven, which seem to be sufficiently demonstrated from the operation of the moon alone on all watery things, and from the generation of minerals in the depths of the earth, and of plants and animals in the depths of the sea (where the rays of the sun do not reach). However, Canonhierus denies them in his commentary on Hippocrates' Aphorisms, cited place, and attributes all those effects to light. We propose only two things to be inquired about them:

I. Whether the hidden influences which Ptolemy in his book On the Significations of the Fixed Stars, and after him the Arabic astrologers, attribute to the stars on each and every lower thing - the opinions of whom certain more recent astrologers, especially almanac writers, follow too leisurely and credulously - in addition, the signatures and sympathies of certain empiricists between the signs of the Zodiac and parts of the human body, can be proved by reason or experience, if not universal then at least moderate or some? We deny, and the experience of the uncertain conjectures of common almanacs confounds them, when they annually note from Ptolemy, for example, at the end of January: "The Dolphin begins to set, the Lyre begins to set with its first torch, the North Wind blows violently with rain. Rains mixed with snow fall." And thus at the end of February: "Arcturus rises, and it rains, etc. Favonius widely blows." And at the beginning of April: "Scorpius sets, etc. The Pleiades rise, etc. cloudy air through all lands." Compare well the censure of common almanacs by William Perkins (who was most practiced in thematics, according to the testimony of Samuel Ward in the preface to the Catholic Problem).

II. Whether they directly influence the free wills and actions of men? We deny, for that fights with theology and philosophy, which do not admit the free will of man to be transformed into a natural cause, and consequently its dependence on natural causes, and which directly subject all free

causes to divine providence and concurrence alone. Since these hypotheses are solidly proven by theologians and philosophers, partly in physics, partly in ethics and metaphysics, here we assume them and only indicate them, so that we may be brief. For from them all classes of arguments can easily be deduced.

III. Whether therefore those influxes, and mixtures, friendships and enmities of the stars, etc. at least incline (if they do not necessitate) human wills? They commonly distinguish in this way. And this seems to be the opinion of Ptolemy. For thus he says in the Centiloquium, n. 5, according to the interpretation of Jovianus Pontanus: "Whoever is knowing can avert many effects of the stars, when he has learned their nature, and prepares himself before their occurrence." And n. 8: "A wise soul assists the celestial operation as the best farmer assists nature by plowing and cleansing." And n. 10: "In the elections of days and hours, use the malefics just as the best doctor uses poisons moderately for healing," etc. But 1. Why are human wills subjected to those influences more dispositively than to pills, decoctions, and the whole workshop of pharmacists; than to air, waters, and places; than to winds, rains, odors, flavors, filth and cleansings of houses and utensils; and consequently to brooms, brushes, lyes, drudges, indeed also to dunghills, beasts, and their diseases, deaths, cadavers, etc.? Why are not dung-watchers and privy-speculators equally appointed to write down their observations, to erect themes and predict human actions from them? Whence is it established that the change of complexion of, for example, Hermachus or Socrates depends more immediately or necessarily on this or that influx of that star than on this sweet odor or stench, on the trust and skill of this privy or dung-cleaner, on the heat of this hearth or kitchen, on the quality or quantity of this food, on the art or inertia of this cook or kitchen-maid? 2. But if they say the stars act on these lower natural agents, these in turn on the nature and complexion of the human body, and this on the will inclinatively, of course, they have not yet proven any disposition except a very remote one, and uncertain in more than one way and merely conjectural. For they do not have certain rules and experiences by which they definitely connect and adapt each higher nature with individual lower elements, of course, and their distinct parts and regions, as with the elemented things in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms. Then, we think Galen's booklet That the Manners of the Soul Follow the Temperament of the Body, which Piccolomini and others allege in the Ethical Disputations (with respect to inclination, of course), should be explained from theology and philosophy in such a way that man or the composite is properly said to be the principle of human actions, and the radical principle (if any is sought) is the soul, and indeed in it the ἡγεμονικόν [ruling part], not the body. According as the mind has been well or badly disposed, it will use the senses, lower appetite, and consequently the humors and members of the body for good or for evil, according to Romans 6. And practical theologians show how the Holy Spirit does not remove but converts to good each individual affection, as well as cold, melancholic, choleric complexions, etc. But these alleged influences are refuted more fully in the controversy on genethlialogy. We reject:

I. The deliriums of the Manichaeans and Muhammad, of whom the former dream that light was produced from the substance of God, the latter from the sea.

II. The influences of the stars on angels or demons.

III. Those ancient superstitions of the Gentiles about the labors and eclipses of the sun and moon, about which see Dalechamps on Pliny book 2, ch. 12, and Salmuth on Panciroli's New Discoveries, title 9, and Vossius On Idolatry book 2, ch. 20.

IV. The readings of the stars, and talismanic statues erected and consecrated at certain positions and constellations of the heaven, so that they may receive influences from there - about which see Selden in his Syntagma on the Syrian Gods, and Delrio in the Magical Disquisitions, which Gaffarel, a priest by profession, was not ashamed to defend recently in a book titled Unheard-of Curiosities, parts 2 and 4. But after the first edition of this disputation, I found that book was marked with censure (and rightly) by the Sorbonne of Paris. We have also touched on these and similar things partly in the Disputation on Demons, On Magic, On Prophecy, On Superstition.

V. The genethlialogical vanities of the Chaldeans and other Gentiles, and the mazzalot of the Rabbis. I. The planetary and fortunate fortunes, or astrological fates. About fate in general and in particular, as well as about fortune (about which in the ordinary course of common places I am accustomed to treat in the chapter on God's Providence), I had often before promised that I would publish a diatribe. But after the treatise On Idolatry by the polyhistor Gerardus Vossius, a work of much erudition, appeared, I changed my plan, content to have added a few gleanings and indicated authors in our dissertation On the Term of Life: the aforementioned Vossius, who in book 2, chapters 42-51 treats fate and fortune more fully. Before him, some things about fortune were collected by Aretius in his Problems, vol. 1, p. 705 in the octavo edition, Pererius in his Physical Disputations book 9, Ludovicus Vives on Augustine's City of God cited there by Pererius, Alexander ab Alexandro book 1, ch. 13, and Jovianus Pontanus in a special and lengthy treatise. Gryphenander in his treatise On Islands p. 81. Tholosanus in his commentary on book 3 of the Syntax of Wonders, ch. 12. Wendelin in his Physical Contemplations, sect. 1, ch. 4. Gevartius in his Selections book 3, p. 144 notes that bad fortune, Nemesis, the envy of the gods are sometimes taken for the same thing. Natale Conti treats the fortune of the pagans extensively in book 4, ch. 9.

Now we must treat of time, the fifth consequence or effect of the stars. But time is either absolute and intrinsic, or comparative and extrinsic. Not the former, but the latter follows the motions and positions of the stars, and was co-created only on the fourth day. Its measure is considered in three ways: 1. in measuring all lower motions by applying the motions of higher things to them and comparing them with them; 2. in discerning days and nights, summers and winters, months and years; 3. in signifying and designating occasions or opportunities for doing things, as natural diacritical signs. All of which are indicated in Genesis 1:14. For this is implied by the word מועדים. He then explains the differences of times. The Computus of Sacrobosco, and more perspicuously and clearly the more recent astronomers Münster, Keckermann, Alsted, Mästlin, as well as Scaliger in his Isagogic Canons, and other chronologers cited in our library, and Franciscus Paduanus of Verona, prepare this. The last consequence or effect of the stars is signification or signature, the opposite of which are pseudo-signatures, about which soon in the appendix to this thesis. But the stars are for signs or significations which, divided from the

object, are 1. natural, such as eclipses of the sun and moon; 2. mixed, that is, natural-civil, about which Pliny book 18, ch. 42, and Hesiod in Works and Days, Virgil in the Georgics, Palladius, Varro and other writers on agriculture - to whom add the writers on nautical matters; 3. supernatural and extraordinary, such as Joel 2:31 compared with Acts 2:19. Which signs are again divided from the form or efficient cause into miraculous and non-miraculous. Compare disputation 1 on signs. We raise only two questions here:

I. Whether prognostics of weather and similar natural things can be predicted from the stars? In general, it is indeed known both that the constitution of lower things depends on the celestial bodies, and this is proved by the passage Judges 5:20 compared with ch. 4, v. 15, as George Abbot excellently explains that passage objected by genethlialogists in his Theological Prelections. But it is nevertheless uncertain and indeterminate which stars in this or that position, aspect, opposition or conjunction produce this or that effect in lower things; consequently, there is hardly any certainty to those prognostics. Greater certainty indeed belongs to those taken from the elements and elemented things, that is, to rustic and nautical prognostics, which Mizauld collected in his booklet titled Ephemerides of the Air, the truth of which, for the most part (that is, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), our Savior not obscurely approves in Matthew 16:2-3 and Luke 12:54-55. But we touched on these things above.

II. Whether events and actions which depend on the free will of men, and are by their nature merely contingent, can be certainly predicted from the stars? We deny, and consequently we rightly accuse of foolishness, ignorance, and superstition the Quadripartitum and Centiloquium of Ptolemy, Julius Firmicus Maternus, Bethem, Almasor, Zahel, Messahala, Omar, Manilius, Bonincrontius, Johannes de Indagine, Luca Gaurico, Cardano, Garcaeus on erecting celestial figures, and similar planetary and genethlialogical treatises published in Latin or the vernacular. Nor can we wonder enough that Christoph Stathmion, a physician of Coburg, around the year 1569 defended it in a public writing against Savonarola, and another anonymous person in academic theses - against whom Thomas Erastus wrote a special apology.

BRIEF APPENDIX On the Harmony of the Upper and Lower World

We acknowledge the harmony of the world in general, for it is an ordered structure. But this harmony or proportion consists chiefly in the quantity and quality of the parts of the world - in quantity, with respect to number, weight, and measure; in quality, inasmuch as higher things pour light and heat into lower things, etc. See Valesius ch. 70 and Kepler's treatise On the Harmony of the World. But we reject the various speculations of some, supported by no authority of Scripture, no demonstration of natural light, especially on account of the danger of superstition and magic. There are those who imagine such a degree of harmony that all natures agree in their proper sense and mutually symbolize. The fancy of Campanella, celebrated by him in a special treatise On the Sense of Things and Magic, seems to tend in this direction. Others elevate harmony to a common intellect, which they seek in the common form and soul of

all natures, which they call the soul of the world. About which more below in appendix 3 to the disputation on Creation. There is no reason for us to dwell on the harmony or concent by which Pythagoras wanted the world to be administered, in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, p. 27.

To present a brief sketch of many commentaries to our students, we distinguish these three: harmony, signatures, seals.

I. Franciscus Georgius Venetus wrote a special book on the harmony of the whole world, published at Paris in 1546 by Andreas Berthelin. I have not been able to see that book thus far. But from the Kabbalistic concepts which the author, well enough known to me, sprinkles in his Sacred Problems, it can easily be left to conjecture about what kind of harmony he philosophized. We describe it from the reading of other writers thus: Harmony is a putative agreement, symbolization, and mutual connection of the natures and parts of the world in magnetic or sympathetic and antipathetic powers for the production of admirable effects. I call it putative, because it is supported neither by the authority of Scripture, nor by the certainty of reason and experience, but by the mere assertion of those saying it. It is divided:

1. Into the harmony of the sensible or corporeal world, and of the intelligible or angelic world - which is the next path to magic and other superstitions. Refer here the fancies about the seven intelligences, about angels intermediate between good and bad ones, and about the prefecture and affixing of certain angels to certain natures, forms, qualities, hours, times, actions and passions, positions, conjunctions, oppositions of celestial or sublunary things - about which Trithemius, Peter of Abano, Agrippa and others, both ancient and more recent Jewish or so-called Christian Kabbalistic and magical writers, indicated elsewhere (in the disputation on Magic).

2. Into the macrocosmic harmony of the corporeal or visible world, and the microcosmic harmony. The former is the sympathetic agreement and operative dependence between the whole world, both celestial and elemental, and between man or the human body. The more recent Kabbalists, Hermeticists, Paracelsians especially hunt for and boast of this. We noted some authors above with the principal antagonists. The latter is again twofold. One is the agreement between the natures and powers of the celestial world and the elemental world, both among themselves and with the perpetually mobile operations (as they call them), not only to produce astral operations in these lower things, but also to communicate those astral powers to them, just as a magnet communicates its power to iron. Thus Agrippa book 1 of Occult Philosophy, chs. 11 and 16. The philosophers just cited follow this, and certain vain astrologers, hence called judiciary, genethlialogical, prognostic - some of whom we indicate in the following thesis. If anyone desires to know the inanities of the astrologers compendiously, let him go to Alsted's Astrology. The other macrocosmic harmony of the sensible world is of the elemental natures among themselves. Very many vain or uncertain things pertain to this, about the admirable powers of herbs, stones, animals, etc. in Pliny, Albertus Magnus, Alexius of Piedmont, Mizaldus, Wecker, etc. They want the harmony of this sensible world to be founded on the soul or spirit of the world, which is the bond of occult qualities. Thus Agrippa in the book

on Occult Philosophy, ch. 14. Nollius explains the parts and species of that harmony distinctly in Hermetic Physics book 11 throughout - let those who study compendiously see him. He also dictates something there about the crystalline heaven and the waters above the heavens, and all the spiritual elements which are in the empyrean heaven no less than the corporeal elements are in the visible world. Compare what the same author has in book 1, p. 133, where the waters above the heavens with the more divine air and fire constitute the empyrean heaven for him, and he tries to prove it from Scripture. But the authors cited above refute the opinion about the watery or crystalline heaven, among whom is Franciscus Fernandius de Corduba in his Manifold Didascalia. That this boasted harmony is not the foundation of all medicine (as Agrippa wants, cited book, Croll on Signatures, and Nollius, cited book, and other neo-Hermeticists), Sennert teaches in his work On the Consensus and Dissensus of Chemists, ch. 18, whom see, and Bartholin warns in his Anatomical Controversies, qu. 5, p. 35: "Nearly all the Paracelsians so think, who in their philosophical and medical foundations scarcely regard anything else, and indeed are by no means to be blamed in this, that they diligently strive to uncover the kinship and consensus of the small world with the great, as long as the analogy keeps itself within its boundaries. But if it wanders too freely beyond the limits in Theophrastus Paracelsus and his accomplices who abuse it, it will certainly deserve the censorial rod of philosophers and physicians, and will incur it not undeservedly. For who would undertake to establish with Paracelsus, book 4 On the Invisible Origin of Diseases at the beginning, in the First Paragraph, tract 2, and elsewhere, that absolutely nothing is found in the great world or conceived in the mind of which there is not some true form in the small world? And his followers want the nature and property of all beings of the whole world to be in man, nor should the choler or melancholy of the microcosm be cared for, because the macrocosm does not recognize such things, but arsenic and alum, etc. - little mindful of the saying: 'Every similitude limps,' and 'Every analogy totters.' Therefore we will stand by this argument from the negative of the question: Every true and legitimate foundation ought to be immovable, constant, and placed beyond the hazard of doubt. The analogy of the great and small world is not such. Therefore. The proposition shines by its own light. The assumption will be clear from the following examination of the analogy." In the beginning, the Paracelsians locate the east in the mouth, the west in the anus, the south in the navel, the north in the back. But why the rising in the mouth rather than the forehead or nostrils? Why the setting not in the groin rather than the anus, so that it may correspond to the rising? Here the disputations can be compared, whether God placed images of the animals and mind of this lower world in the heavens, and whether He subjected these lower things to those images, etc., in Bartholomaeus Sibylla, Peregrinate Questions, decade 1, ch. 9, p. 377, and Delrio, Magical Disquisitions. But these things pertain to the disputation on Magic.

II. Signature is nothing other than the investigation and apprehension of the said macrocosmic or microcosmic harmony, or occult powers, through certain signs impressed on individual natures. But they seek the art and demonstration of signs in likeness, whether of figures, or motions, or other passions or affections. And in unlikeness or opposition. About which Agrippa, cited book, chs. 15, 16, 19, 22. From ch. 22 we present these few things: "It is manifest that all lower things are subject to higher things, and in a certain way (as Proclus says) are in each other, namely the highest things in the lowest, and the lowest things in the highest. Thus in heaven there are terrestrial things, but as it were in a celestial cause and manner, and on earth

there are celestial things, but in a terrestrial manner, namely according to effect. Thus we say that there are certain solar things here, certain lunar things, in which the sun and moon cause something of their power. Whence things of this kind receive many operations and properties similar to the operations of stars and figures to which they are subject. Thus we know that solar things have respect to the heart and head, on account of Leo the house of the sun, and Aries the exaltation of the sun." And from ch. 23: "But it is very difficult to know what thing is subject to which star or sign; nevertheless they are known through imitation of the rays, or motion, or figure of higher things; certain things also through colors and odors; certain things also through the effects of their operations consonant with certain stars. Thus among the elements, fire and bright flame are solar; among humors, purer blood and the spirit of life; among flavors, that which is sharp mixed with sweetness. Among metals, gold, on account of the splendor it has from the sun, is comforting to the heart. Among stones, those which imitate the solar rays with golden drops, such as the eagle-stone, imitating the sun with golden drops, has power against the falling sickness and against poisons; thus the stone which is called the eye of the sun, having a figure similar to the pupil of the eye, from the middle of which a ray flashes forth, strengthens the brain, is conducive to sight." Special examples of signatures are recounted there in the chapters just cited by Agrippa, and by Oswald Croll in his treatise on Signatures, which he published with the Chemical Basilica. Cardano also has some things in book 16 On the Variety of Things, ch. 89, p. 1051. Agrippa book 1, ch. 33 calls them seals and characters of natural things which the stars produce through their rays in stones, plants, animals and their members. "Each thing," he says, "obtains from harmonic disposition, and from its star irradiating it, a special seal or character impressed on it, signifying that star or harmony, and containing in itself a special power, differing from others either in genus or species or number of the underlying matter. Therefore each thing has its own character for some peculiar effect impressed on it by its star, especially by that which obtains the principality in it above the others. And these characters contain and retain in themselves the proper natures, powers and roots of their stars, and produce operations similar to them in other things on which they are reflected, and provoke and assist the influxes of their stars, whether of the planets or even of the fixed stars and celestial images and signs, whenever of course they have been fabricated in the proper matter, at the proper time, and with the proper solemnities."

III. Seals are signs and images made by men artificially according to the harmony of the world and the signatures just mentioned, through which those putative powers of the macrocosmic or microcosmic harmony are transferred to or applied to some thing or person. Cardano philosophizes thus about the construction of seals in book 16 On the Variety of Things, ch. 89: "But it is necessary that four things concur in these: the faculties of nature, and matter, and star, and then of the man who wants to use it. As if I want a ring or seal for procuring sleep, I will choose a sleep-inducing stone, such as jacinth, or a species of crystal marked and spotted with blue, in a conjunction of the moon with Venus in Pisces or Taurus, and so that it then has a right relation to the nativity of the one who will want to wear the seal. For if this conjunction falls in the opposite of Mars of the one who ought to wear it, it will help little, or perhaps even induce wakefulness. The figure also contributes much in those things which pertain to the affections of the mind, as for sleep we will engrave a man sleeping by a stream in a forest, for both the gaze and memory of the image will be useful. But if the stone is green, it will help by its very color, or

mixed from watery and green, like a species of leek with white bands. But it is necessary to know that there are two kinds of seals: for some obtain a general power, and help almost all in that cause, but are proper to none, and are not easily made, except in general constitutions, such as eclipses and great conjunctions, when the luminaries also come together or are opposite each other. But proper seals help one person, not another, but are far more effective than general ones and are more easily prepared. Nevertheless, the nativity of the one for whom the seal is made must be accurately known. Again, some seals have power for a good work, some for an evil one. And some also for honest and licit things, some for shameful things, though not evil. We therefore will discourse only about general seals, licit and honest ones, and tending to a good work, of which sort are for procuring sleep, for health, length of life, for increasing memory and talent, for natural foresight of future things, for riches, honors, the favor of princes, continence, procreation of children, friends, for security, from lightning, from serpents, from wild beasts, for tranquility of mind, and other things of this kind. There are also other seals, some indeed of the planets, others of the celestial figures - and not only of the zodiac, but also of others. But we will speak only of the planets and figures of the zodiac. Therefore we will teach the construction of nineteen seals, besides the one already handed down for sleep." And Agrippa book 1, ch. 33, p. 68: "Considering this, the ancient sages, who labored greatly to investigate the hidden conditions of things, noted the images, figures, seals, characters of the stars, which nature itself depicted through the rays of the stars in these lower things - some in stones, others in plants and the junctures and nodes of twigs, others in the various members of animals. For the laurel, lotus, heliotrope, and marigold show the characters of the sun in their roots and cut nodes; so also in the bones and shoulder blades of animals - whence a species of divination through shoulder blades proceeded." The same author prescribes seals and images of all kinds more fully from ch. 35 to 52, through which some power may be attracted from the celestial bodies. Among those seals are mirrors, rings, eye-salves, fumigations, images or statues, chs. 43, 44, 45, 47, and book 2, ch. 36 to ch. 51. And book 2, chs. 29, 30, 31 he teaches the characters and seals of spirits, and ch. 38, what divine gifts man receives from above from the individual orders of the heavens and intelligences. Here pertain the things we indicated above from Selden and Gaffarel about the statues of the sun and others called talismanic, that is, astral or celestial. About which more in the disputation on Magic.

On the Work of the Fifth Day

6. On the fifth day the fish and birds were produced. Here something must be said in general about the brute animals, then specifically about the fish and birds. Concerning the brute animals it is asked:

I. Whether they are endowed with reason, especially bees, ants, monkeys or dog-headed apes, elephants, etc. We deny, against Plutarch affirming this, and Virgil, who in the Georgics book 4 wants bees to have part of the divine mind and ethereal draughts, etc., and against Francis of Assisi, who is said to have preached to brother donkeys and wolves and sister crows the gospel and turned them to repentance. Besides the philosophical reasons in Keckermann and other

physicists, we indicate Psalm 32:9 and Job 39:20. With the doctrine of that other Francis, namely Muhammad, that is, of a frenzied man, the ψευδαλαζονεία of Muhammad in the Koran and Sunna agrees very well (according to John Andrew, formerly a Moor and jurist of Muhammad, afterwards a Christian priest in his Confusion of the Muhammadan Sect), by which he establishes that all brute animals, even the birds, will return to life on the day of judgment and undergo the censure of God, and the sheep and castrated animals slaughtered at Passover by the Saracens will rise again on the day of judgment, enter paradise, and make vows for their slaughterers; and when the angel Gabriel will weigh souls, that is, discern good and evil works, the castrated animals will ascend into the scales of good works to increase their weight. And on p. 563, it is related from the Sunna that a certain animal named al-Buraq, on which Muhammad had been carried into heaven, will enter paradise with him, and indeed first of all the animals.

II. How the perfect brute animals, especially the reptiles, terrestrial animals, etc., reached the new world both before and after the flood. Augustine inquires about this in the book of the City of God cited above, and Lipsius book 2, diss. 19. We think that if indeed that land is not joined to our world by a continent to the north, or at least was not formerly joined by a narrow strait (which is not yet plainly ascertained), this happened partly by swimming, partly by naval transport. Compare above, part 5.

III. Whether brute animals use speech, and whether they understand each other, and whether there are men who understand the speech of brute animals. We deny, and whatever is related about these things in Delrio, Magical Disquisitions 2, qu. 19, and Salmuth on Panciroli, book 2, title 10, we refer partly to fables, partly to demonic illusions. Compare below, part 8.

IV. Whether they were produced from the 4 elements? We affirm. But what Simplicius and Antinomius object to Junius, arguments 12 and 13, that Moses says the fish and birds were produced from water, man from earth or dust - this we partly deny, partly refer to the fallacy of arguing from what is said secundum quid to what is said simpliciter. About which more below.

V. Whether any brute animals are produced by univocal generation, or whether some imperfect ones are produced by equivocal generation from putrid matter, and others also by both generations, such as mice, etc.? To the first we deny, and affirm the second and third. But how generation occurs and from what matter, Fortunio Liceti inquires in his book On the Spontaneous Origin of Living Things, and after him Sennert ex professo and perspicuously treats this matter in his Physical Commentaries. Vossius can be compared, book 4, chs. 64, 65, 66.

VI. Whether therefore those which are produced by diverse generation are of the same species? We affirm. See Pererius Physical Disputations book 8, chs. 16, 17, 18, and the Coimbrans on On the Heavens book 2, ch. 3, qu. 7. And this opinion contributes to proving that Eve, Adam, and Christ (Hebrews 2:11, 14) are of the same species with us, although the manner of origin is far different.

VII. Whether within the six days brute animals of every kind, even the poisonous, harmful, and insect kinds were created? Baranzano, Digladiation 18, thesis 28, with Augustine, establishes that gnats, fleas, lice, and other insects generated from the sweat of humans or putrefaction did not exist, because this was repugnant to the blessedness of man. He could have said the same about gnats, flies, worms, and other things now troublesome to man. Then he adds that if such little beasts must be admitted with Basil, homily 7, fleas should be left to dogs, lice to sheep, bedbugs to apes. See below.

VIII. Whether brute animals were given for food from the first creation of things? We affirm, against some Rabbis who want this to have happened only after the flood of Noah; before that time, only vegetables were granted, Gen. 1:29-30. But this savors of that Pythagorean saying in Ovid: "What have oxen, an animal without fraud and deceit, deserved?"

IX. Whether some should abstain from them by conscience (the ceremonial law having now been set aside and abrogated). We deny. Which question pertains to the disputation on superstition. Furthermore, very many things are asked and related about animals by the physical authors already often cited, by the authors on the wonders of nature (whom we indicated above, part 6), especially by the natural historians Aristotle, Pliny, Aelian, Albertus, Vincent of Beauvais, Bartholomew the Englishman, the Pliny of the previous century Gesner, and Belon and Rondelet on fish, and finally as an ocean of them all, Ulisse Aldrovandi. Wolfgang Franzius laudably prepared a compendium here for students of theology in his book On the Animals of Sacred Scripture, to which Bustamantinus On the Insects of Scripture can be added. There is a special volume by Aldrovandi on insects in general and in particular, and Vossius collected not a few things about them in book 4, ch. 94 ff. Concerning animals in general, and the contemplation of them to be applied to theology and piety, Nieremberg supplies many things in his History of Nature - he should be seen especially. Alsted's Natural Theology can also be consulted. On the origin and variety of superstition and idolatry concerning animals, see Vossius in the often-praised treatise book 4. If anyone desires a history of animals described in verse, let him go to Oppian On Fishing and On Hunting, and the iambics of Philes rendered in Latin verses by Gregorius Bersmann, the poem of Ausonius titled Mosella, Ovid's fragment of the Halieutica, and the poem of the more recent author Natale Conti On Hunting, which was published with his Mythology. To the contemplation of animal nature considered in general pertain these titles:

I. On the generation of animals, about which see Liceti, Sennert, and Vossius just cited.

II. On the sensitive soul of brute animals, that it is a substance, incomplete of course, but not a vigor or heat, as Daneau wants, part 2, treatise 5, ch. 8, nor some other accident. About which see the more recent physicists, the Coimbrans, etc.

III. On the body and parts of animals, and on the humors, spirits, innate heat, complexions.

IV. On the senses.

V. On progressive motion.

VI. On sleep and waking.

VII. On hunger and thirst.

VIII. On health and disease.

IX. On monsters. About which see the authors indicated in disputation 1 on signs.

7. On fish and birds, see the writers on animals just cited, to whom add Athenaeus, and among the Theologians Temesvári has collected not a few things, and Daneau. In general it is asked:

I. Whether the amphibians were created on the fifth day? We think nothing prohibits affirming this and that they are included under the name of fish, such as the beaver, otter, frog, crocodile, hippopotamus.

II. From what matter were the fish and birds produced?

1. Becanus contends (in my opinion, to defend the hymn of the Church) that the birds were produced from water just like the fish. First, because Augustine, Ambrose, Basil, Rupert, Eucherius, John Damascene, Jerome, and the Scholastics on Sentences book 2, dist. 15. Second, because the Church thinks the same in the Vespers hymn of the fifth weekday: "Great is the power of God, who sends back part of the race arisen from the waters to the abyss, part raises into the air." Third, because it is more in conformity with Scripture, Gen. 1:20. Fourth, because there are many birds which live in the waters. Fifth, because fish and birds agree in many things. Thomas with his followers is of the same opinion, I.71, art. [1], Baranzano Digladiation 18, thesis 19, and Cornelius a Lapide on v. 20, Zanchi, Daneau who in ch. 26 alleges for himself Gen. 1:20 and Augustine On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis book 3, chs. 5, 6, Fulgentius On Faith to Peter ch. 3. There are those who derive the fish from the lower waters, the birds from the upper. Others attribute the birds which delight in water to water, but those which delight in land to land. We prefer to say with Cajetan, Catharinus and Vielmius that the fish are from water and the birds from earth, but in such a way that by synecdoche the rest of the elements are understood to have been mixed with earth and water, as Franciscus Junius rightly explains to the 12th and 13th objection of Simplicius and the Antinomians, and Pererius on Genesis p. 185. But this opinion is proven from Gen. 2:19. Then because God ordered the birds to multiply not in the waters (as the fish, Gen. 1:22) but on the earth, Gen. 1:30, nor are they called birds of the sea or water, Gen. 1:26 [with Psalm 8], nor do they live in that element or have proximate kinship with it - which nevertheless God observed in the works of the three days, that He produced each thing in its proper place. Pererius refutes the contrary opinion with its exceptions vigorously enough, and refers the origin of it among the Fathers and Scholastics to the unsuitable version of the Latin interpreter, since it is far otherwise in the Hebrew text and Targum. It could be added that the accent Atnach in the text, in addition the Arabic paraphrase and the Rabbi commentators favor this opinion. But they are not of such importance, nor do we

urge this matter in this way. It will have sufficed to show that not rarely doctors entangle themselves in snares without necessity, sometimes forge decrees of opinions from them, from which afterwards they can neither extricate themselves, nor perhaps want to extricate others, lest the Church, that is, lest they seem to have somewhere so drowsily read the Scriptures, or so childishly stumbled.

III. Whether fish are more imperfect than other animals. The Scholastics and more recent authors affirm, among whom I seem to myself to observe these reasons:

1. Because they are called "creeping things" (רֶמֶשׂ). Response: But in Hebrew it is שֶׁרֶץ, which has a broader signification, Exod. 1, Psalm 105:30, Lev. 11:29. Nor did this escape Pererius p. 182.

2. Because the whole genus of fish is oviparous - thus Cajetan. Response: Many fish are viviparous, such as the saw-fish, whale, seal, dolphin, etc.

3. Because they lack memory - thus Basil. Response: But experience teaches the contrary, and Augustine solidly proves it, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis book 3, ch. 8, and Pererius p. 179.

4. Because they have more obscure organs and members, namely than other perfect animals; for it is indubitable that they are more perfect than most insects.

5. Because they have more obtuse senses, and consequently are less teachable - most of them, of course.

6. Because they have a more imperfect temperament of body, which is evident from the fact that they provide little nourishment, and therefore those who want to fast and afflict the body are accustomed to abstain from other animals and eat fish. Thus Becanus, cited chapter. To whom I exhibit a no less profound question of Baranzano, who in the cited Digladiation, disputing that birds were produced from water just as much as fish, and proving it from the great agreement between the two, thus objects to himself: "You will say, why then are fish permitted in the time of Lent, birds prohibited? But why do you ask me? I will ask you: Why on Fridays and Saturdays are eggs, milk, cheese permitted, but not chicken, veal, and meat, when nevertheless the same food which is converted into milk, cheese, egg, can also be, and often is, converted into chicken, meat, and veal? The original source should not be considered, but the quality of the things originated following conversion." But we say it should be asked of the Ichthyophagi and inhabitants of the sea-coasts in Norway, Lapland, etc., who feed themselves on fish without bread, and in Holland, who for the most part feed on fish but with bread, whether they can show men there most patient of labor, in addition fat and sleek with well-cared-for skin. Not to mention the Carthusian monks and all the Lenten abstainers in the papacy. Levinus Lemnius book 2 On the Hidden Miracles of Nature, ch. 36 teaches that men are incited to lust by eating fish - besides that the palate and gluttony of Apiciuses are often more irritated by them than by other meats, as is evident from Plutarch's Table Talk and Athenaeus' Deipnosophists. Meanwhile we

do not deny that fish are more imperfect and provide food colder and moister to men (about which see the physicians and Sennert, Institutes book 4, part 1, ch. 3), but this has nothing to do with the principal scope of the alleged institution of abstinence from meat.

IV. Whether water concurred only passively or also actively to the creation of fish? We affirm the former, with Pererius. Here apply analogically what we said about the germination of plants. We reject the opinion of Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis book 3, ch. 4, that the fish were not actually created on this day, but only causally or potentially. Response: From verses 20, 21. Then, if they were not created now, they do not pertain to the hexaemeron; nor could they be created afterwards, because it is repugnant to Gen. 2:1-2.

V. Whether the number of aquatic animals is greater than terrestrial, both with respect to species and individuals? We affirm, as experience testifies, and the wise men in this genre, Aristotle On the Generation of Animals book 3, ch. 11, and Pliny book 9, ch. 2. And it agrees not badly with Gen. 1:20 and Psalm 104:25.

VI. Whether among the former there are larger ones than among the latter, and whether terrestrial animals of the same name are surpassed by aquatic ones both in strength and size. To the first we affirm, and it is proven both by experience, which teaches that the largest among terrestrial animals is the elephant (but it cannot be compared with the whales), unless perhaps certain dragons are larger than it, if the things are true which Pliny has in book 9, chs. 12, 13, 14, Aelian book 15, ch. 21, Olaus Magnus book 21, ch. 44; and by the consensus of the wise in Pliny book 9, ch. 30, and book 32, ch. 1, and the authors cited there by Dalechamps; and also by the Scriptures, Gen. 1:21 with Jonah 1:17, Psalm 104:26, Job 41, Ezekiel 32:2, Psalm 149:7. To the second we affirm, and experience proves it, if one compares with Oppian (Halieutics book 5) tortoises, dogs, panthers, hyenas, rams.

VIII. What should be thought about the geese in Scotland, about the remora, and similar things? I very much doubt the credibility of those who relate those things. If indeed those geese are generated in this way, there must be some seminary in the tree. I vehemently doubt that the story of the remora is not a golden Plinian legend. Meanwhile, Bodin, Jonstonus, Nieremberg book 3, ch. 5 can be seen - especially about the remora, Vossius book 4, ch. 11. Let him who wants admit the manifest cause of this effect which he brings forward there from Rondelet - I thus far prefer to doubt. The things he brings forward there about the torpedo are of another kind. For an animal acts on an animal, but not an animal on a wooden ship. But these are not of such importance for theology. Of greater moment is what follows.

IX. Whether among birds there is a pelican which revives its dead chicks by sprinkling them with its own blood, and a phoenix which is unique in the world, and when it has lived for six hundred years, burns itself, from whose ashes another is born again. We respond: fables, which when applied to defending faith in the resurrection, seem to me to obscure it remarkably. For it would follow that naturally there is given a return from total privation to possession, and consequently from death to life. I confess that the natural historians Pliny book 10, ch. 2, and Aelian book 6, ch. 58, Oppian, Philostratus, Herodotus, Epiphanius Physiologus ch. 8, 11 testify to this; also the

Fathers and sacred orators enriched their amplifications from there. Indeed, even some of the more recent theologians, among whom Zanchi also seems to admit the fable about the phoenix, book 7, ch. 1, p. 588, led by the authority of the Fathers (whom he cites there). And Ribera on Job 19:24 and 29:18, where he cites very many Fathers. See the same Fathers and other authors noted, as well as the passages of Scripture according to certain versions, in Fernandius de Corduba ch. 7 and Hoeschel in his notes to Origen Against Celsus, p. 484, and to Photius p. 940, and Consalus Ponce de Leon in his scholia to Epiphanius' Physiologus, where nevertheless on p. 33 he holds the story of the pelican for a fable: "Wherefore I think it truer that this figure of the pelican wounding its breast with its beak and dripping blood on its chicks has hitherto been exhibited to us by the choice of painters, and that no bird of this nature exists anywhere; and that all this was fashioned partly from Aelian's passage about the piety of the same bird towards its offspring, partly from Horus, who wrote that the vulture wounds its thighs and feeds its chicks with the flowing blood. Which is also proved by the opinion of the Hebrews, who frankly confess that they do not know what bird the pelican is. But let it be free (for why should we hinder?) both to use inventions at will and to add new ones (if it will please anyone). However, I would not want to approve what follows there: 'No anagogy is more frequent in pulpits, and in printed homiliaries every third word; indeed, after Christ crucified, the next place is given to the pelican on the very walls of churches, suburbs and rustic estates, as of course the most well-known adumbration of our redemption. Well indeed, for the aforesaid nature of this bird wonderfully agrees with Christ the Savior.'" Nor does it matter much if its truth is doubted. But where now is the phoenix? Who has seen it? Why do those who inhabit Arabia, and who describe it, relate no such thing? And what man has observed its 600 years of life? The same must be asked about the pelican. Fernandius de Corduba discusses the phoenix most fully, Didascalia Multiplex, ch. 7. See him, and Nieremberg prudently in book 1, ch. 15 wonders "whether the phoenix with that disposition which is related truly is in the census of nature. The crowd has always favored it, the artificer of fables; the learned have doubted. Probable reason resists with no slight foundations from the storehouse of nature itself. In this dispute our gaze must be driven as an arbitrator, which if it had seen a unique bird in the universe recreated from its own ashes, against all reason and the repugnancy of its species, we would immediately assent. We believe greater miracles of nature, and they exist; but because it is impossible for all things which are evident in the universe to have been evident to one person, since we have not yet seen all its parts (for it would have been necessary first to scrutinize all the corners of the world, so that that unique bird might be asserted), also because no one thus far has seen that vital funeral and ceremony of dying, no one worthy of credence has related to have seen what could be seen, it must not be believed. Even if there were no reason against it, sense has already condemned it sufficiently, because it appears to no one."

X. Whether anything should be believed about the youth of the eagle? We absolutely affirm, since Psalm 103:5 has it. But what and of what sort that youth is, the commentators there teach, among them Lorinus, and Franzius in his History of Animals - who should be seen.

XI. Whether flesh properly so called should be attributed to fish? We affirm. For since anatomists commonly distinguish flesh (see Bartholin p. 8, book 5, ch. 1, and Laurentius) into glandular, of the viscera, which is called παρέγχυμα; the peculiar flesh of any part, which lacks a

proper name; muscular, which is most properly called flesh - it cannot be denied that even any kind, and indeed most properly so called, belongs to fish. Which is proved:

1. From the open testimonies of Scripture, 1 Corinthians 15:39, Numbers 11:4-5, 13, 22, Job 41:23, where flesh is ascribed to the sea monster.

2. From reasons. First, because fish have a heart, liver, and other parenchymas, also glands and muscles; therefore. Then, because blood, the proximate matter of flesh, and the causes procreating flesh belong to fish; therefore.

3. From the consensus of physicists and physicians. See Aristotle History of Animals book 8, ch. 2 and 3 and 18, and book 9, ch. 37, and book 3, ch. 2, and On the Parts of Animals book 2, ch. 8; Hippocrates On Regimen book 2, section 4; and Galen On the Power of Foods book 3, where he says the best flesh is of fish that live in the pure sea, especially when it is agitated by the storms of the winds, etc.; Cardano On the Variety of Things book 7, ch. 38, where on p. 495: "It is proper to sea urchins to lack flesh, for fish also have their own flesh." Compare also Athenaeus books 7 and 8, where there are many things about fish. Hence therefore it is evident that not only the popular error in the papacy about the use of fish in the time of abstinence from meat is repugnant to all reason, but also the canon law itself, Concerning Consecration, distinction 4, ch. 32, [distinguishes] "flesh" - as if of course fish were not flesh. Their own sacrificers, compelled by the force of truth, attribute flesh to fish: Durandus Rationale of Divine Offices book 6, rubric 7; Bellarmine On Good Works book 2, ch. 4; Nieremberg Natural History book 7, ch. 19, where the chapter title is "On the Flesh of Fish." Compare what the medical dieticians warn, and Vossius book 4, chs. 22, 31, etc. about the flesh of fish being less or more healthful, tasty, etc.

XII. Whether the reasons alleged in Plutarch, Table Talk book 4, problem 4, prove the thesis proposed there that "the most just relish is that which is sought from the sea." I do not see why they cannot be referred to Pythagorean superstitions.

XIII. Whence it is that it was sometimes doubted about cetacean fish whether it was permitted to eat them in the time of abstinence from meat, according to the testimony of Rondelet On Fish book 16, ch. 1. Because on account of their great agreement with terrestrial animals, they are sometimes opposed to fish strictly so called, as Rondelet has in the same place. Concerning the same, thus Belon On Aquatic Animals book 1, ch. 3, p. 4: "It has been so arranged by nature for the genus of fish, that those which she formed larger than the rest and endowed with blood, she wanted not only to fortify with flesh and bones in the likeness of terrestrial animals, but also to come together in the manner of the rest and bring forth live offspring." The same doubt could be raised by the superstitious about aquatic amphibians, and is said to have sometimes been raised, and baptism was applied to the otter by this formula: "Let it be made a fish."

XIV. What genus of fish does that one seem to have been by which Jonah was swallowed? Vossius conjectures, book 4, ch. 7, that it was λάμια, the shark, which has such a vast gape of mouth that it swallows a whole man, and indeed in armor. Rondelet thinks the same, book 13,

ch. 12, Aldrovandi book 3 On Fish, ch. 32, and from them Pineda On the Things of Solomon book 4, ch. 12, Cornelius a Lapide on Jonah 2:1, whom see if there is leisure.

XV. Whether it is wrong to prepare storks for the food or other uses of men along with others? Popular superstition indeed seems to bear this, which perhaps took occasion from the fact that anciently in Thessaly, which had many snakes, it was a capital offense to harm a stork. But I think the foolish law of Pope Zacharias especially engendered this superstition, who decreed that jackdaws, jays, storks, even hares and beavers were by all means to be avoided for food by Christians. See Councils, vol. 2, the epistle of Zacharias to Boniface. This was a Pythagorean superstition, and almost similar to that of the Orientals and Greeks, to whom anciently it was a religious matter to eat dolphins, in Athenaeus book 7, where he discusses the pilot-fish and dolphin, and Oppian Halieutics book 5, where he calls the capture of it ἀλιτήμονα, "accursed." That a similar abstinence flourished in the time of Jerome, and was not corrected by the learned, is evident from the words of Jerome, Against Jovinian book 2: "If everything that moves and lives was made and prepared for eating by the gullet, let them answer me why elephants, lions, bears, why vipers, scorpions, bedbugs, gnats, and fleas, why the vulture, eagle, raven, hawk, whales, dolphins, seals, and tiny snails exist."

XVI. What about the death-song of swans? This was chanted not only by common credulity, but also by the suffrages of very many of the learned, and passed into a proverb and rhetorical flourishes eagerly usurped by the Fathers and ecclesiastical orators. See what things Talantonius gathers in his Treasury of Various and Recondite Things, book 3, ch. 11.

But those credulous people do not at all agree among themselves in the narration of this fable. Therefore let the amplification of this song henceforth cease by the credibility of Pliny's experiments, book 10, ch. 23, in which Franzius also acquiesces in his History of Animals, p. 378. Talantonius loc. cit. adds Lucian in his book On Amber and Swans, Aelian book 1, Alexander of Myndus in Athenaeus book 9, Scaliger Exercise 232. We add Pierius Valerianus. Rader on Martial book 13, epigram 72, having cited the authors on both sides, seems to leave it in the middle. Since modern experience is silent, there is no doubt that it is fabulous.

ON CREATION, PART EIGHT

RESPONDENT LUBERT SPRUIT of Utrecht
For October 27, 1638

On the Work of the Sixth Day

1. On this day the terrestrial animals and man were produced. The former are divided into three classes in Genesis 1:24-25: into beasts, which are wild and sylvan; into cattle, which are tame; into creeping things. Concerning all of which it is asked:

I. Whether God then produced all the species? We affirm from the cited text with Genesis 2:1-2. Concerning the adulterated species (such as the mule from a horse and donkey, the leopard from a lioness and male panther, the lynx from a wolf and stag, the tityrus from a sheep and goat), some think it is uncertain whether they were produced. Thomas I.37, art. 1 denies it. And Pererius on the contrary, p. 194, thinks that in the generation of those things all things are natural, and consequently it is not beyond nature, and consequently they were created on the sixth day. But what Rupert, Thomas and the rest of the patrons of the opposite opinion object from Genesis 36 and Leviticus 19:19 is answered. To the former, that passage can admit a far different interpretation (see Pererius, Cornelius a Lapide, and Rivetus, Exercise 144). To the latter, that the mixing of diverse species is not simply forbidden, according to Cajetan and the Hebrews. But about this question, see the Scholastics on Thomas I-II, qu. 102, art. 6, and the commentaries of Serranus, Willet, Cornelius a Lapide on Leviticus 19. Franzius in his Sacred History of Animals seems to incline to the negative, where nevertheless he adds on p. 319: "Furthermore, five things are required for the apt commingling of brute animals if indeed the wantonness of men, not content with the simple course of nature, has devised mixtures, of all which the first author is Ana of Genesis 36, who found mules when he was pasturing his father's donkeys, that is, who compelled a donkey and a mare to mate, so that a mule might be born from there. First, the animals to be mixed ought not to differ much in size. A dog and a horse cannot be mixed, but a wolf and a dog, a donkey and a horse, a panther and a lion can. Thus man in an abominable intercourse mates with horses, goats, cows, pigs, etc. 2. Brute animals cannot be born from the commingling of diverse animals unless the time of gestation in those which are mixed has been equal. Therefore a dog cannot be born from a man, nor a horse from an elephant, because man is completed in the space of 9 months, but a dog in a few months. 3. It is necessary that those animals which ought to be mixed are also most lecherous, as especially are dogs, cows, goats, pigs, donkeys, etc. 4. It is necessary for the mixing to occur at a suitable time, which in most is the spring. Thus it has been arranged by nature that they indulge in venery only at a fixed time, and there are few which are tormented by perpetual goads of lust. 5. It is also necessary that this occurs at a flourishing age, when they can both generate seed and emit it, conceive it, retain it. If these five rules have been at hand, animals will be able not only to mix spontaneously, but they are also accustomed to be compelled by their possessors to mix, and so that a new species may be produced from there. But the end for which the ancients compelled brute animals to mix is this: so that the animals which are produced from such a mixture may become stronger." It suffices for the determination of the present question to say that all the perfect species were produced. But now the said animals are not at least such, if we do not want to call them monsters, which is evident from the fact that they do not propagate their own species. For either they are entirely sterile, like mules, or if they generate, their offspring incline to one or the other species, nor do they constitute a certain third nature specifically distinct from both, although the external figure seems mixed. Thus those dogs which we call leopards, lions, etc., are in reality dogs, even though the external figure and perhaps certain other things bear some likeness of a leopard or lion.

II. Whether the animals were produced which are generated from putrid matter? Basil affirms this, homily 7. Augustine distinguishes, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis book 3, ch. 14, that nothing prohibits it being said that those were produced which are generated from the putrid matter of earth or water or plants or fruits. But those were by no means produced which are generated from some cadaver or corruption of animals, because then no animal was corrupted. And thus Thomas I.72. But Pererius and Becanus rightly refute this opinion by these reasons: 1. because the reason for the corruption of animals and other things is the same; 2. because in the beginning they were produced neither from the putrid matter of plants or fruits, nor from the corruption of animals (which is otherwise the ordinary seminary or analogical seed of them after the nature of things was constituted), just as the perfect ones were not produced from seed (because no such thing existed, no more than the cadavers of animals), but all were likewise raised from the earth mixed with the other elements, to be propagated in the future through seminaries both univocal and analogical. I add here the determination of Valesius p. 29: "All the forms of things existed from the beginning, some indeed in act, others in potency, since already from then all either existed in act or could naturally arise. Nor indeed ought this to seem hard to anyone, because it seems to be able to be demonstrated in certain examples. For since there are certain animalcules which have no other generation than from the diseases and excrements of man, such as lice, nits, and the itch-mite, I say that smallest of all animals which is the beginning of scabies (the common people call it the plowman, and common surgeons the Acarus scabiei), and worms, both the broad ones called taeniae and the round ones called ascarides, and certain other unnamed animalcules which have been found in certain abscesses and in the decay of bones, it is agreed that they did not exist from the beginning, since Adam was created by God without any disease, and so persisted until he sinned, which happened when the creation of the world was already completed. And so I do not doubt that certain most vile things, and which come to be only from putrefaction, of which sort are the animalcules already mentioned, and the algae which are generated in pools by putrefying water, and which are rather called filth than things, as Aristotle says, sprang forth after the completed creation of the world. But whether other things which are not so vile, yet could naturally arise, such as metals, stones, living things which have both origins, I say from seed and spontaneous, existed within the first six days for the sake of adorning the world, or not, but arose afterwards - I do not have anything to affirm. That, however, seems to me most probable - if they existed at the very beginning of the world, they were made by noted creation, which was a hastened generation. For that axiom of the philosophers is most accepted: nature (much more God) does nothing in vain." Compare about the generation of animals from putrid matter Sennert in his Physical Commentaries, last section, and Nieremberg book 5, chs. 20, 21.

III. Whether any animal lives and is generated in the element of fire? It seems to be affirmed by Aristotle book 3 On the Generation of Animals, ch. 11, but, as is shown by Pererius from the collated passages book 2 On the Generation of Animals, ch. 3, and On Generation and Corruption 2, text 21, from the opinion of the ancients. It is reported, however, that from burnt aromatic chalcitis in the middle of fire, pyralids or pyraustae, little beasts larger than flies, are born (according to the report of Aristotle History of Animals book 5, ch. 19, and Pliny book 11, ch. 36), and that the salamander lives in fire. But this was treated above, part 4.

IV. Whether there are griffins? We deny, with Cardano On Subtlety book 17, ch. 97, Pliny book 10, ch. 49, Arrian Histories book 5, especially Cornelius a Lapide on Leviticus 11, and Nieremberg book 5, ch. 22. Keckermann distinguishes, disputation 18, problem 11, that it is some animal, but not such and so great as it has been described by Herodotus, Mela, Philostratus, Albertus Magnus.

V. Whether there are pegasi or winged horses and sphinxes? Pliny affirms, book 8, ch. 21. But we deny both fables with Brodaeus Miscellanies book 5, ch. 24, and Dalechamps on Pliny's cited passage. Unless about the latter we want to say with Pausanias in his Boeotia, p. 297, that that beast called marticoras by the Indians, σφίγγας by the Greeks, is a tiger.

VI. Whether there is a monoceros or unicorn? Indeed, in the sacred books there is not infrequent mention of ראם, which the Septuagint everywhere translate μονόκερως, and the common Latin translation in Psalm 22:21 and 92:10, Isaiah 34, and thus the commentaries of the Rabbis everywhere explain, as well as of our authors, especially the Fathers. But nevertheless the difficulty remains whether there is this animal about which the natural historians Pliny, Solinus, Aelian, Albertus, Isidore, Franzius relate so many things. The reasons are:

First, because there are seven kinds of animals equipped with one horn, as Dalechamps notes on Pliny book 8, ch. 21, and book 11, ch. 37; and Thomas Bartholin describes more fully all the one-horned walking, aquatic, flying, and creeping animals in the treatise to be cited soon. If therefore the texts of Scripture can be adapted to any one of the six equally or better than to the said unicorn, now this argument falls.

Second, because in Deuteronomy 33:17, Job 39:9 (which passages among others Baccius alleges in his book On the Unicorn to prove that it exists in the nature of things), Numbers 23:21 and 24:8, the Vulgate interpreter translates "rhinoceros," and thus Aquila in Job 39. From which Pineda suspects that the unicorn and rhinoceros are the same to the Septuagint and Jerome.

Third, because the description which is gathered from the cited passages of Scripture can be adapted to the rhinoceros, which certainly exists, not only from the historians already cited and Strabo book 16, Diodorus Bibliotheca book 4, Oppian On Hunting book 2, Pausanias Eliaca 1, p. 159, and in his Boeotia p. 297 (where he calls it θηρίον ἰνδικόν), Rader and others on Martial, and Pineda on Job 39, Politian Miscellanies ch. 65, Philip Camerarius Leisure Hours book 1, ch. 25, but especially from more recent experience. For it was seen a few years ago at Madrid and Toledo, according to the testimony of Pineda loc. cit., and in the year 1515 it was pitted by King Manuel at Lisbon against an elephant, where the elephant succumbed, according to the testimony of Cornelius a Lapide in his commentary on Numbers 23, and Pineda loc. cit. It was also sent by Manuel to the Pope, according to the testimony of Jovius and Camerarius, but perished in a shipwreck. But three things are attributed to ראם in Scripture: the height of the horn, strength, ferocity. Which is said to be fitting for the rhinoceros (and Pineda loc. cit. disputes at greater length that it is fitting in Job 39), but by no means for the said unicorn, since

the authors do not agree in their description of it. After the first edition of this disputation, I recently read the treatise of Thomas Bartholin On the Unicorn published in the year 1645, where in ch. 24 he describes the rhinoceros, but denies its ferocity.

Fourth, because Tertullian Against the Jews ch. 10 and Against Marcion book 3, ch. 18, Gregory the Great Moralia 31, ch. 13, Bede on Job 39, Isidore Etymologies 12, ch. 21 (whom Marcilius reproves on that account in his commentary on Martial, De Spectaculis book 9, p. 90), and Albertus Magnus book 22 On Animals take the unicorn and rhinoceros for the same thing. We think these reasons suffice so that physicians and physicists may be permitted today to inquire from reason and experience whether the unicorn exists in the nature of things, lest anyone think with Andrea Bacci the physician in the cited book and Franzius the theologian that the matter has been determined there, nor for that reason dare to embrace the contrary opinion, although he inclines to it. As for the authority of the Fathers, it is very slippery and weak in other histories, so especially in natural ones; hence they too credulously, and because they thought it was very agreeable to their amplifications, seized upon the fables about the phoenix, pelican, unicorn, etc. But so that students of theology may beware of that unhealthy desire, and by nourishing the people with fables or at least uncertain accounts, and illustrating Scripture and theological matters, may not offer themselves to be mocked by the more clever, we briefly suggest these reasons for doubting about the unicorn:

1. Because the whole history seems to have been described by Pliny and Aelian, and those who follow them without examination, from Ctesias, about whose doubtful credibility see Aristotle, History of Animals book 8, ch. 18.

2. Because none of the ancients writes that he saw it - not even at Rome in the spectacles, to which nevertheless so many rarer animals were led, especially in the time of Domitian, Diocletian, and Gordian.

3. Because in the intervening centuries, as well as in the previous and this our own (in which so many unheard-of journeys have been undertaken, and so many rarest animals donated to emperors, kings, etc., especially to the Roman Pontiff), no one testifies to have seen it. For what Marco Polo the Venetian and Ludovico di Varthema report about unicorns seen by them does not at all agree with the description of Pliny and the ancients (compare Scaliger, Exercise 205). They were therefore animals of another kind.

4. Because the writers who describe Africa, Egypt, Asia do not mention it - whom nevertheless no one will find it probable would pass over this marvel.

5. Because the descriptions of the authors just cited agree in almost nothing, except in the unity of the horn. But there is great disagreement about its position, color, size, as well as place, mass of body, figure, color, and that so miraculous power against all poisons, all diseases, even incurable ones of the whole substance - which is not at all surprising, since they speak about an unknown thing, and of a non-being (as I think) there is no affection.

6. Because from horns or pieces of horns which are shown among the great, they infer unicorns (which nevertheless nowhere appear) - that is, the unknown from the unknown. For it is rightly asked: Are the miracles of those horns so great? By whom, where, when were they found? Whence brought? What certainty, what experience is there that they are genuine, when such manifold fraud and imposture has intervened here, according to the testimony of Bacci, and from him Keckermann disputation 18, problem 15, and Anselm Boethius Boodt in the book and chapter to be cited soon, and Thomas Bartholin ch. 27, where he also thinks the horns which are preserved here at Utrecht in the Marian church are to be numbered among the spurious ones: "Nor do these accurately represent the character of the monoceros. For they are larger than is fitting, and whiter than they come depicted by the ancients." Fernandez de Cordova, in the cited book and chapter, thinks that the horns which are circulated today are of the fish called monoceros, but not of the unicorn, or Indian ass, or rhinoceros. And let there somewhere be genuine ones, that is, let them avail against poisons or some disease, which we have left to the physicians to judge - whence, I ask, will it be demonstrated that they are the horns of the said unicorn and not of another animal? Certainly common medicine seems to find antidotes in deer horn and others. For thus Anselm Boethius de Boodt, imperial physician, in book 2 On Stones and Gems, ch. 244: "Whoever therefore desires true unicorn with effect, let him procure for himself either the horn of the Indian ass, or of the rhinoceros, or that which represents the appearance of pork fat, or also the fossil which was formerly ivory, deer horn, walnut or ash wood, or even of another matter recommended against poisons, and contains the white fragrant marrow adhering to the tongue, boiling in wine. For thus he will obtain his wish, nor will he have a medicine of little moment against any poisons." On the preceding page there he relates that true unicorn lacks the powers of expelling poison. Thomas Bartholin, cited book, ch. 29, sufficiently implies that this commonly boasted power of unicorn above other horns is uncertain, as is also the uncertain knowledge of it through the signs of mountebanks; on p. 225 he writes thus: "Whence in its absence they prescribe the horn of the rhinoceros, as Jean de Renou, book 3 On Medicinal Matter, ch. 21, testifies about himself: 'Since not all the sick are equally strong in wealth, unicorn should be exhibited only to the rich, to others of more slender fortune I prescribe the horn of the rhinoceros, like that of the stag, with no less happy success.'" The pharmacist of Toledo testified the same thing in Fernandez de Cordova, Didascalia Multiplex, ch. 9. Finally, to conclude, it is not at all probable that the species of this animal has perished; and when horns are sometimes said to be found under the sand or under the waters which flooded the forests (as I remember was claimed in Holland some years ago), it is not credible that this horn-bearer can never be found by anyone. Is it not therefore permitted to suspect that philosopher-theologians out of reverence for Scripture (but badly understood), as well as for the Fathers; philosopher-physicians for the honor of the great, who especially exalt their own horn in the contentious treasury and magnificent appearance, have continued this fable for the sake of concord, or at least have scarcely dared to call it to a rigorous examination? But what some of the Fathers handed down, that the unicorn cannot be captured by anyone, but is tamed by a virgin, Albertus Magnus with them - the physicians Gessner and Bacci explode this, Cornelius a Lapide himself on Numbers 23, although out of reverence, as I think, for what has just been said, he retains the general history. I will weigh elsewhere that other matter about the two horns of the Monoceros, and the figure of the cross represented by them, in the disputation on the Cross; and I leave Cornelius a Lapide and Ribera loc. cit. to be reconciled. When I had written

these things thus far in the year 1639 in the first edition of this disputation, I came upon Fernandez de Cordova's Didascalia, ch. 9, who noted not a few things about the unicorn from the authors; but he himself seems more similar to one doubting than believing. I also saw the treatise On the Unicorn recently (in the year 1645) published by Thomas Bartholin, where he ex professo exhibits a lucid description of both the name and the thing, and tries to prove that the unicorn exists, from authority and reasons in chs. 25 and 26. But since there are three opinions of the disputants, two extreme ones (of which Bacci defends the affirmative in a special treatise, Marini the negative); he himself embraces the third, middle or limited one, previously defended by his parent Caspar Bartholin - as does Anselm Boethius de Boodt, cited chapter, who in the same place, chs. 241, 242, 243, treats of the fossil horns which are commonly sold as those of the monoceros. Bartholin relates many things about the same and related matters in the cited book, which is most worthy of being read on account of its varied and manifold erudition. But whether he has persuaded that there is the celebrated monoceros, I leave to the reader's judgment. I do not yet see why it is not permitted to doubt about it as much as about the phoenix, which he makes walk with equal step with the monoceros in ch. 94, p. 164.

VIII. Whether there is a basilisk? It occurs פתן and צפעוני in Isaiah 11:8 and 14:29, Jeremiah 8:17, which they translate as "basilisk"; for it is gathered from the circumstances of the texts that it is a most venomous kind of serpent. But these things do not help the Plinian fables in book 8, ch. 21 about the catoblepas, basilisk, which kills by its glance or hiss alone, which walks upright, which destroys bushes by its breath, burns up herbs, breaks rocks, etc. That not all the things which are narrated about the basilisk are fabulous, however, Scaliger shows by examples brought forward, Exercise 246. What should be thought about their sight, and how they kill, the physicists teach under the title On Sight, On Venoms, On Serpents. The Arab geographer of Nubia mentions large serpents which kill by their glance alone, part 4, clime 1, whence he also says that land is called the land of serpents. The basilisk or regulus occurs in Psalm 91, Isaiah 11 and 14, etc., according to the interpretation of the Septuagint and the common Latin version. That there is such a serpent seems to be proved by the testimonies of interpreters, Fathers, physicists and natural historians ancient and recent (among whom are the divine Mercurialis and Matthiolus, noted by Lorinus with all the rest in his commentary on Psalm 91:13). But whether the things which are commonly related about its origin from the egg of a rooster hatched by a toad, and about its powers, are true, Lorinus doubts in the same place. Concerning the origin from the egg of a rooster hatched by a toad, Encelius affirms in his work On Metals that experience testifies to this. Cardano believed the same. Lemnius book 4 On the Hidden Miracles of Nature, ch. 12, denies that the basilisk, a serpent peculiar to Africa and other scorched and parched regions, is born from the egg of a rooster. Meanwhile he does not deny the egg of a rooster. "I imagine," he says on p. 402, "that something of this sort comes forth from a putrid concretion globbed together inside and the heat of the fowl poured around the shell, especially when it grows unaccustomed to the use and habit of mating; for then the excrement restrained inside is coagulated and hardens into an egg, which when it happens to be warmed either by the rooster itself or by another animal, a venomous worm or some other virulent beast is produced from it, which they designate by the name of Basilisk, which kind of serpent is peculiar to Africa and other scorched and parched regions. But as worms are born in human bodies, and are animated from the putrefaction of humors by the benefit of heat and conceive a

lively agility; as wasps, beetles, caterpillars, flies spring forth from ox dung and other putrid humors; as weevils swarm in wheat, borers in wood, acorns, hazelnuts, cheese, by the ministry of heat and the ambient air - so from this egg a venomous worm or a noxious and monstrous beast not unlike the Basilisk bursts forth, which by contact, breath, exhalation, hiss is harmful and destructive to those meeting it. Thus it has been handed down to memory that a snake is generated from the putrefied spinal marrow of a human." Nieremberg approves these things, book 6, ch. 20, so that that common and popular opinion of Europeans, especially also of our Belgians, must be said to rest on fables. But that it is said to kill by hiss and glance alone, that is either fabulous or must be understood in this way, as the more recent physicists teach when they dispute whether sight occurs by emission - that venomous breaths flowing out from the open parts of the body, especially from the eyes, are harmful, but not vision itself, active or passive. But Lemnius loc. cit. explains the causes of this matter more clearly, p. 403: "But that the common people think, and seriously persuade themselves, that sometimes such a pernicious and harmful serpent is produced in our regions by the incubation of a toad, and that sometimes basilisks in subterranean caves and dens bring death to humans, if ever they betake themselves to those places, I consider old-womanish, since the stench of poisonous exhalation, foulness, stink, filthiness which emanate from foul and dreadful places intercept the breath and sometimes strangle a person, which even the venomous beasts which lurk in lairs of this kind are able to accomplish sometimes, which no one should doubt." Besides the authors cited by Lorinus, see Lemnius loc. cit. and Vossius book 4, chs. 52 and 56, and Nieremberg loc. cit., the latter two of whom observe that many fabrications are mixed into the history of the basilisk, which they enumerate there.

XI. Whether there are dragons, and indeed winged ones? To the first we affirm, from Revelation 20:2, which however do not constitute a special species, but are aged and enlarged serpents. On their size, strength, and other attributes, see Pliny, Franzius in the History of Animals, and Pineda on Job 13. To the second is alleged Solinus ch. 35, Scaliger Exercise 189. From Scripture they adduce for winged serpents Isaiah 14:29 and 30:6. And thus the commentators in Cornelius a Lapide take it. The Rabbis, however, take it otherwise: "It is a kind of serpent" (says Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki on Isaiah 30:6) "not because they have wings for flying, but because it jumps," or "attacks, מלרחוק, from afar." And thus Rabbi David Kimchi on Isaiah 14:29. It should be noted that in Hebrew there is the word שרף, which does not signify a dragon, but a fiery or burning serpent, such as Numbers 21:6, 8 with Deuteronomy 8:15. And they abound in the deserts of Arabia. I think they are called πρηστήρ as well as διψάς from their effect, although Rabbi Shlomo loc. cit. says they breathe or vomit fire from their mouth, and Cornelius a Lapide on Numbers 21 brings forward the example of a fire-vomiting dragon in Scotland in the year 1558 from Leslie in his Description of Scotland. But in that natural display-case, I would require the testimony of greater experience. On the etymology of διψάς and the Hebrew צמאון see Vossius book 4, ch. 53. That divinity or something divine was once ascribed to dragons, and that the devil and magicians were accustomed to delude men or carry out their evil deeds through serpents and dragons, you will learn from the things collected by Fernandez de Cordova, Didascalia ch. 1, and Reynolds in his lectures on the apocryphal books, a work by far most erudite which students will read sometime. Compare also Vossius book 4, ch. 45, Nieremberg book 12, ch. 37.

X. Whether there are elephants such as Pliny, Aelian, etc. describe, and from all of them Lipsius Centuriae 1, epistle [50], and after him Nieremberg pursued the wonders of the elephant more fully, book 9, chs. 84 to 93. Many fabulous things are mixed in, repugnant to the sacred writings, reason, experience - especially those about the speech and writing of elephants. For this is to attribute reason to them, since they mutually accompany each other by λόγος and ὁμιλία. As is known to beginners of physics and logic on Aristotle On Interpretation book 1. Hence elegantly the Syriac and Arabic languages call an irrational or brute animal בלא מלה, خرس, that is, mute. For thus each interpreter translates 2 Peter 2:12, and its opposite they translate ζῷα λογικά, as Ecclesiastes 12:1 [actually Wisdom 9:15], and the Arab Genesis 2:7 "into a speaking," that is, rational, "soul." With which agrees the Dutch phrase: "Een stom" or "een dom beest" [a mute or a dumb beast]. And expressly as Scripture denies reason to brute animals, Psalm 32, Job 39, so also speech, 2 Peter 2:16. But if something similar happens somewhere, it is not to be attributed to the nature or nobler imagination of the elephant, but to diabolical operation, as the speech of Simon Magus' dog, and of that parrot which responded to the Pope, which we mentioned elsewhere, and many similar things, such as Philostratus relates about Apollonius of Tyana book 4 in the chapter on the Serpent of Epidaurus brought to Rome, Valerius Maximus book 1, ch. 8. And what Porphyry says about the speech of brute animals, which Angelo Rocca also mentions in the Vatican Library, pp. 304-305. See Origen, Against Celsus to be cited soon. Compare Vossius book 3, ch. 44. Finally, Scripture in Job 40, when it describes wonderful things about the elephant under the name Behemoth (for to explain it with most of the Fathers and Catholics about the devil is inept, as even Franciscus Georgius admits, vol. 5 of Problems, sect. 2, p. 108, and others noted by Pineda, who also laboriously applies each thing to the elephant, as well as about the serpent, with Bustamantinus refuted there in Pineda - not to mention that immense Rabbinic beast in Mercerus on Job, and Buxtorf Jewish Synagogue ch. 36, p. 536, column 1, p. 29), would have mentioned at least some of those things, concerning speech. The commentators Cajetan, Cornelius a Lapide, etc. rightly note on Numbers 22 about the speech of Balaam's donkey that it was miraculous, formed by God or an angel in the mouth of the donkey, which nevertheless it did not understand.

XI. Whether the serpent in Genesis 3 was a true animal, and what kind of serpent it was. To the first we affirm, with Pererius, in whom see it proven, as well as in Willet and Cornelius a Lapide in their commentaries. To the second, about which there are various ancient and more recent conjectures in Pererius and Cornelius a Lapide loc. cit., we say it should be learnedly ignored, which Cornelius a Lapide also thinks.

XII. Whether the serpent before the fall was endowed with feet, or at least an upright gait? We deny, with the more recent authors, against Basil and Didymus. For the gait which it now has is natural to it, but after the fall it became infamous, abominable and hateful to man, and as if for a sign or monument of punishment and detestation of sin - in the way the rainbow, which existed before the flood, was made for a sign of the covenant. To which example Cornelius a Lapide inappropriately adds on Genesis 3:14 death, which was as it were natural to man, but after his sin began to be the punishment of sin for him. What we say about gait must also be understood about eating dust. Nor should it be passed over that some of our authors add this difference:

that crawling on the belly in the state of integrity was not as troublesome to the serpent as after the fall. It is distinguished almost in this way concerning the labor of man and the cultivation of the earth in Genesis 3:17 compared with 2:5, 15.

XIII. Whether speech was then natural to the serpent and other animals in Paradise, as Flavius Josephus and Basil want (which agrees with the Platonic fables in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel book 12, ch. 9), or whether the faculty of speaking and understanding was bestowed on it for a time, as Ephrem wants in Bar Cepha's book On Paradise? We respond that each is a paradox, thus Cornelius a Lapide, Willet, etc.

XIV. Whether before the fall there was a natural antipathy between man and serpents? We affirm, with respect to potency, but not with respect to act - for then it was restrained through grace and the privilege of man's dominion over animals, afterwards permitted to go out into act. Thus approximately Pererius, Willet and other commentators on Genesis 3.

XV. Why did the devil tempt man in the form of a serpent rather than of a sheep or donkey? It is not clear, and we consider the reasons brought forward by Cornelius a Lapide on Genesis 3:1 to be of no moment.

XVI. Whether it is true, what they assert from Aristotle, that the saliva of man tortures a serpent, even if it touches its jaws, kills it; that the same immediately perishes if its head is pressed by the bare sole of a woman's foot, which Rupert has; in addition, that it puts off its venom when it seeks a drink, as Epiphanius wants; and that the serpent hates man above all animals; finally, that it is moved and affected above all animals by incantations, etc. We respond that most of these things are fabulous; the rest are uncertain or not to be accepted without limitation. See about these things the natural historians, and Pererius in his Commentary on Genesis book 6.

XVII. Whether from Psalm 58:5-6 it should be established that the asp stops its ears against incantation? Lorinus affirms in his commentary on Psalm 58, and Franzius Sacred History of Animals p. 726, and most interpreters, and the note of the Dutch Bibles. Valesius denies it in his Sacred Philosophy ch. 3. See also Turnebus Adversaria book 15, ch. 5, and book 30, ch. 34. But on the contrary Reynolds proves, and explains how it happens by the aid of the devil, in his most erudite work of lectures on the apocryphal books.

XVIII. Whether the female vipers kill the males in mating, and whether in birth the young, impatient of delay, burst forth by force, having pierced the sides of the mother, and whether they mate with the moray eel? The natural historians Pliny and Aelian affirm this, whom among others some of the Fathers have followed, and from there, by succession, they have subserved that fable to ecclesiastical orators. But because they are fables, I think it is more prudent to abstain from them. But whence the fable arose, Vossius indicates, book 4, ch. 52, whom let those see with profit, if they have leisure. Especially Fernandez de Cordova learnedly and laboriously discusses these fables, ch. 12, where he opposes to the historians and Fathers who followed this opinion reasons, authorities, and experiences greater than any exception. Let those who desire to know these things thoroughly see him.

XIX. What should be thought about the serpent called characrius in Epiphanius Physiologus p. 98? I think it is a fable. About the bird of that name, see Vossius book 5, ch. 88.

XX. Whether the chameleon is nourished by air alone, and takes on any colors? It is indeed commonly claimed thus, and frequently used in the rhetorical flourishes of orators. But that it is a fable, John Hesronita and Gabriel Sionita warn from frequent experience in the treatise which they append to the Arab geographer of Nubia ch. [21].

XXI. What should be thought about the revival of silkworms? That something of this kind happens is proved by daily experience. See Libavius in Jonstonus' Thaumatography book 1, p. 377, and Vossius book 4, ch. 66. But it must not be said that there is a return there from total privation to possession, or a resurrection of the same in number, but a new equivocal generation from putrid matter, that is, from the cadavers of silkworms - just as it is known that animals are born from the cadavers of animals, and indeed of the same species, although sometimes they are not truly dead. See Sennert Physical Commentaries, last section, ch. 8, p. 465, where nevertheless these words on p. 466 are to be marked with an obelus: "So that no disposition to life is any longer present, where nevertheless the latent soul, having obtained matter, forms the pristine body."

And these things concerning the terrestrial animals - about which the Scholastics in Thomas curiously inquire, and the more recent authors in Becanus and Pererius: Why God did not bless the terrestrial animals and plants as much as the fish, and why the terrestrial animals and man were created on the same day. But nothing solid besides the good pleasure of God can be alleged here. Besides, the former question assumes what is not granted: that God did not bless them, because Moses did not write this. It is inquired more usefully about the clean and unclean animals, about the eating of the blood of animals in Genesis 9, and how they stood before Adam so that he might impose names on them, Genesis 2, and before Noah so that he might lead them into the ark, Genesis 7 - about which see the commentators on the cited passages. Furthermore, what can be known about their species, parts, senses, and other faculties, and what miracles of nature are in the individual species, students will find in the authors cited by us several times on the fifth and sixth days. Among them, Nieremberg has diligently ordered various contemplations about the nature of animals in general, from book 1 to 9, which can be read with this caution, however: that they should not think all the wonders are of equal certainty, but should apply them to theological matters with judgment and choice. Origen wisely discusses them, Against Celsus book 4, near the end, from whom we present only these words, let them read the rest sometime, if they have leisure, p. 233 of the Greek-Latin edition of Hoeschel in quarto: "But grant that there are some who, learning from the inarticulate voice of birds, predict that they will go somewhere, or do this or that - we will say that demons have also indicated these things to men, for no other reason than to deceive them, and alienate their mind from God, drawn away from heaven to earth or even lower. Moreover, as to the elephants - where indeed has Celsus heard their celestial oath, and that these are more religious than us towards the deity, and know God? I indeed remember that many wonders are narrated about the nature and tameness of this animal; no one, however, as far as I know, has related anything about the

oath of elephants, unless perhaps he wants the treaty once entered into with man and perpetually preserved to be understood by this name - which is not true either, for we read that they, although rarely, yet sometimes, forgetful of their accustomed nature, have raged against men, and on that account have been killed by the decision of their masters as useless. But since he soon adduces storks repaying the service of nursing to their parents as an argument of piety, by which he wants us to seem inferior to them - we respond that storks do not do these things from a consideration of duty or by any reason, but by an instinct of nature, providing an example in brute beasts to men, so that they may be ashamed not to return thanks to the authors of their life. But if Celsus knew how much it matters whether these things are done by reason or by nature, he would never prefer storks to men in the praise of piety; but he contentiously asserts this palm for the brute animals, also bringing forward the Arabian bird, the Phoenix, into the middle, flying into Egypt after an interval of many years, and bringing there its dead father in a globe of myrrh to be buried in the temple of the sun. This is indeed narrated, but it can be natural, if it is true at all."

The things which occur in Scripture more abundantly about animals are inquired by Franciscus Georgius Venetus in his Sacred Problems, vol. 6, sect. 6, but he is to be read with judgment.

On Man

2. Concerning man, what can be inquired theologico-philosophically we refer I. to his essence and existence, II. affections, III. difference of sex. Concerning his essence, there are to be considered 1. the principles of essence, 2. the principles of existence. The principles of essence are considered either metaphysically and logically, as genus and differentia, or physically, as human matter and form. Here, the questions about the image of God and the state of innocence having been set aside, it is asked:

Problem I. Whether man differs in species from angel, and that through his form, namely the rational. We affirm, for although his soul symbolizes with the angels with respect to immortality, spirituality, and the faculties of understanding, nevertheless through it, or through the rational as such, he is distinguished from them. For angels, with the Platonists (in Alcinous On the Doctrine of Plato, and Porphyry Introduction to Aristotle's Logic), are not to be called rational animals, because they are complete spirits and not ordered to an animal body. See Thomas I.50, art. 2, and I.51, art. 1.

II. Whether therefore man is transformed into an angel, either good or bad, and vice versa angelic nature into man? We deny, neither with respect to body, nor to soul, nor to the composite; for that body ἰσάγγελον, 1 Corinthians 15, and διαφθαρτόν, Matthew 22, are to be understood of a likeness of acts and qualities, not of substance. Compare the disputation On Specters, and On Demons.

III. Whether man is transmuted into a brute animal or vice versa? We deny, and what should be thought about the boasted lycanthropy, and the phrenetic and melancholic delirium of Nebuchadnezzar, we have shown in the Disputation on Demons.

IV. Whether there are more species or semi-species of men besides one? We deny, which is proved not only by reason, but also by Scripture, Acts 17:26. Therefore we reject the four kinds of men of Paracelsus, who in his Epistle to the Athenians, or On Occult Philosophy, asserts that God, besides the men who are the posterity of Adam, created four other kinds of men, endowed with flesh and bones and reason, and placed them in the individual elements - the pygmies and gnomes in the bowels of the earth, the nymphs and undines in the waters, the sylphs and melusines in the air, the Vulcans and salamanders in fire - and that it is still uncertain to which of these kinds true faith in God has been given, and the way to salvation opened. Thus Godelmann relates from him in On Witches, and Delrio Magical Disquisitions book 2, qu. 27. See what has been said in the Disputation on Specters, and On Demons. The same Paracelsus constitutes a double man in each individual man, about which we will speak below.

V. Whether man before and after the fall is the same in form, species, and essential properties? We affirm. For nothing substantial, or essential, or absolute natural was added or taken away. What difference there was in the symmetry of qualities and temperament, in stature and beauty, in nutrition and foods, in intercourse and the propagation of the species, in labor, in the order and relation of superiors and inferiors, is to be explained in the common place On the Image of God. Meanwhile, see Daneau part 1 On the Antiquity of the World.

V. Whether there are giants, and whether they constitute a distinct species, or are at least monsters? To the latter we deny both. About the former, Scripture does not allow us to doubt, Deuteronomy 2 and Joshua 14:15, 2 Samuel 21, 1 Chronicles 20, and experience consigned by the authors who have written about giants - Daneau On the Antiquity pp. 310 and 359, Pererius and Cornelius a Lapide on Genesis 6 and 14:5, and the latter on Numbers 13 and Deuteronomy 1:28 and 2:10 and 3:13 and Isaiah 26:14, Pineda on Job 26:5, Masius on Joshua 14, Lipsius book 3, diss. 5, and before all Magius in his treatise On Giants which he inserted into his Miscellanies published separately and with the Critical Thesaurus of Gruter. The same booklet of Magius, torn away from the body of the Miscellanies, was published separately in quarto. Add Delrio on Seneca's Tragedies and Magical Disquisitions book 2, qu. 15, p. 164; Fazelli in his History of Sicily mentions the Sicilian giants; Benjamin p. 56 the Damascene one; Camden the British ones, and two of their wooden statues are still shown today in the London court; an epigram of a certain Pomponius Laetus about the Etruscan ones; Goropius Becanus does not allow his giant of Antwerp to be exploded by Delrio loc. cit.; the Dutch mention a certain one called Nicolas Kiten in the village of Sparwoude near Haarlem; and another rustic born some years ago from North Holland, whom, when he was in his nineteenth year and still growing in stature, I myself saw at Leiden around the year 1610 (if I remember well); others of others. But it must not be omitted that a few years ago a booklet was published in Latin, and afterwards in Dutch, about the bones of a very large giant found in France, on whose sepulcher was inscribed: "Theutobocus Rex." On the giants who are still found today in India and the New World, see Nieremberg book 8, ch. 1. But I fear that the giants with almost a dog's face, beak

and pointed teeth are fables. Add also Cardano On Subtlety book 11, p. 634, On the Variety of Things book 8, ch. 40, p. 527, and ch. 43, p. 555; Scaliger Exercise 263; Valesius Sacred Philosophy ch. 8; and Lavater on 1 Chronicles 20; Rhodiginus Ancient Readings book 2, ch. 6; Lorinus on Wisdom 14:6. In the said authors you have cited Virgil, Diodorus, Plutarch, Pliny, Solinus, Isidore, Mela, Herodotus, Philostratus, Philo, Augustine City of God book 15, ch. 9 (see there Ludovicus Vives), and other Fathers; Marianus Scotus; Hector Boethius; Olaus Magnus; Boccaccio; Nauclerus; Surius; Fulgosus; Majolus; Galeottus Martius. Indeed, that giants are still found today is shown by the navigations of the Spanish, and from the cited authors Lipsius, Cardano, Scaliger, Pineda, the Japanese letters of the Jesuits for the year 1555. Not useless questions could be raised here:

1. Whether the things which the ancients related about giants should be taken metaphorically or mythologically, as Strabo book 17, p. [29], Macrobius Saturnalia book 1, ch. 20, Goropius Becanus in his Gigantomachy seem to want. The opinion of Jacobus Bolduc, a theologian of the order of Friars Minor Capuchins, is peculiar here, in his treatise On the Church before the Law published in the year 1630, where in book 1, chs. 8, 9, 10, he contends that by "giants" in Scripture, γίβωρες, nothing else is understood than sons of man, that is, earthly ones, attached to the pleasures of the world and the flesh, savage, proud, impious - by no means men of unusual mass and height of body. And he cites for this opinion, besides Strabo and Macrobius in the places just cited, Philo in his book On Giants, Flavius Josephus Jewish Antiquities book 1, ch. 5, Chrysostom and John Damascene in the catena on Genesis 6, Cyril of Alexandria Against Julian book 9, ch. 9. He adds that these are the ones who in the mythology of the ancients are said to have waged war against the gods, and wanted to dislodge them from heaven. He distinguishes from them the Titans of the ancients, who were the sons and grandsons of Noah, and who (according to Diodorus Siculus book 5) invented certain things useful to men, and on account of their merits obtained immortal honor and memory among all mortals. See and compare Daneau in the Antiquity of the World just cited, and Natale Conti's Mythology book 2, ch. 1, and book 6, chs. 20, 21, and the booklet of observations on Natale Conti added by an anonymous learned man, which the Geneva edition of Samuel Crispin in 1612 has, chapter on the Giants. The just cited Bolduc proceeds in chs. 9 and 10, that the nine Hebrew names אימים Deuteronomy 2:10-12, זמזמים Deuteronomy 2:20, רפאים Genesis 14:5, זוזים ibid., נפילים Genesis 6, גברים ibid., רמים, אלפים, ענקים, everywhere translated by the word "giants," do not signify mass of body, but strength and excellence of piety and truth, with which the most holy patriarchs, the first propagators of the human race and divine worship, were endowed. Which he laboriously proves about the individual words, but for the most part with the analogy of the texts being opposed, especially Deuteronomy 3 and 1 Chronicles 20 and 1 Samuel 17, where the mass of body is expressly demonstrated against Bolduc and Tostado, whom he cites for himself.

But it is evident from Jewish Antiquities book 5, ch. 2 that Josephus was brought forward to no avail by him. Add Phlegon in his Mirabilia ch. 9, p. 79: "At Messina not many years ago, as Apollonius is the author, a jar made of stone was broken by the force of storms and the alluvion of copious water, and from that jar a head was poured out, triple the quantity of a human head, having two rows of teeth." And ch. 12, p. 80: "Also in Dalmatia, in the cave which is called Diana's, it is possible to see many bodies whose ribs exceed 16 cubits." And ch. 14, p. 83: "For

indeed in places where the earth was torn apart from itself, immense cadavers were found, by whose magnitude the inhabitants were stupefied, not daring to move them from the place, but for the sake of evidence they sent to Rome a tooth taken from one, which not only reached but also surpassed the measure of a foot." And ch. 15, p. 84: "Nor is credibility to be denied to this narration, since in Egypt also there is a place called Litrae, in which Litrae bodies no smaller than those are shown, not buried in the earth, but placed in sight." And ch. 16: "But we have also heard that at Rhodes there are such large bones that our men compared with them are much smaller." See more there, chs. 17, 18, 19, and in Pliny loc. cit., and in Hieronymus Magius in the cited book. The arguments which Bolduc brings forward to the contrary from reason labor in vain, nor is there any reason why we should dwell on examining them.

2nd question: Whether they are produced by the power of demons or magic, as Valesius wants, and Franciscus Georgius Venetus vol. 1 of Sacred Problems, sect. 2, where he concedes that there were giants in Scripture, but denies that it is said there that they were born from men. But his memory deceived him. See Joshua 15 and Numbers 13.

3rd question: What therefore is the proximate cause, where the parents are not giants - whether heat and plastic power on the part of the parents, also whether abundance of matter, whether the particular temperament of the air and bodies, whether celestial influences, or on the other hand augmentation and the goodness of the radical heat and moisture in the giant himself?

4th question: Whether all of them excel in strength and robustness in proportion to their body?

5th question: Whether they are entire nations or peoples, or only families and as it were clans, or only singular and rarer miracles of nature?

6th question: Whether they are monsters?

7th question: Whether they can compete with others of the same nation or clime in nobility of imagination and talent?

8th question: Whence is it that all or most of them were violent and truculent men?

9th question: Whether all are deformed?

10th question: Whether today nature should be said to be so exhausted that it produces such vast masses of bodies less than it is accustomed to in the same regions?

11th question: What are the names of the giants in Scripture, both proper, national, or patronymic, and common - and what is their notation, signification, and difference?

12th question: Whether today they would be as formidable in war as they are accustomed to be, and whether soldiers of middling stature are not of greater use? But it is fitting for us to be

mindful of our plan, especially since it is easy for students through leisure and for the sake of exercise to prepare some proper honeycomb from the authors indicated by us.

Problem V. Whether the Pygmies are men? We do not deny dwarfs and midgets, about whom see Cardano and Delrio loc. cit. But we refer Strabo's (book 18), Pliny's (book 7, ch. 2) Pygmies, three spans in length, etc., warring with cranes, to the mythological or to the genus of brute animals. Compare Rhodiginus book 4, ch. 3, Cardano On the Variety of Things loc. cit., Aulus Gellius book 9, ch. 4, Aristotle History of Animals book 2, ch. 12, where he calls them Troglodytes, Ludovicus Vives on Augustine City of God book 16, ch. 8. Especially Cornelius a Lapide on Ezekiel 27, where he refutes the fable of the Pygmies more fully. About the province of dwarfs found in Peru in the year 1600 (which Delrio mentions), I take it in this way, that there were men of smaller stature there. As for the passage in Ezekiel 27:11, where Aquila and the Vulgate translate γομαδείμ as "Pygmies," as do the Zurich version with Vatablus, Pagninus, Forster, Schindler; and Rabbi David Kimchi explains it as גוצי , that is, "men of small stature," which exposition Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki also relates - from this the Pygmies of very short stature certainly cannot be inferred, as Delrio wants. For 1. Jerome, whom they make the author of this translation, derives the etymology from σωμάτων πυγμή, wrestling and fighting. 2. Theodotion retains the Hebrew גמדים, the Syriac and Arabic do not mention Pygmies; the Targum explains it as קפודקין, that is, Cappadocians. 3. Cornelius a Lapide explains it as cubitales, that is, of the length of cubits, namely giants or cubitantes, that is, strong in their elbows and fighting, or stationaries, standing, as if alluding to מד . But these conjectures are sought from too far and are uncertain. 5. It is better to say with Marinus and Buxtorf in their lexicons that it is the name of a nation (perhaps whose city in Phoenicia Pliny corruptly calls Gamale, book 2, ch. 91). And this agrees with the circumstances of the text; but the Pygmies do not at all. Whatever is accustomed to be adduced for them from Augustine loc. cit., from Nonnos and Ctesias in Photius cod. 72, p. 145, from Procopius Gothic War book 4 and other authors just cited, Olaus Magnus also and the legend of Macarius (whose credibility Cornelius a Lapide himself destroys loc. cit.), persuades nothing else than that apes were seen. That they are brute animals, not men, is established by Belon, Cardano, Scaliger loc. cit. About the sea-man not shorter than the space of five acres, in Pausanias Phocica p. 319, no one doubts that it is a fable. Indeed, Pliny himself, Triton and the Nereids book 9, chs. 4, 5, and book 32, ch. 11, Aelian book 13, ch. 21, Pausanias in his Boeotia describe them as nothing other than sea-monsters, and thus Dalechamps on Pliny, and Alexander ab Alexandro, although he seems to attribute some things to them that are by no means brutish. Pliny book 32, ch. 11 says that the Triton is a fish of the genus of pelamydes or orcymi, or tunnies. More recent authors also number them among the fish - Gessner On Aquatic Animals in the chapter on Sea-Men, on the Nereids, on the Tritons; Rondelet book 16, ch. 20. The Sirens are translated by the Septuagint and the Latin Vulgate in Isaiah 13, where in the Hebrew text there is the word תנים. But that word signifies terrestrial animals, namely dragons and serpents, as is gathered from other places where it occurs, and from the circumstances of the text. And thus the more recent interpreters explain it. In Job 20:29 the Septuagint have thus: ἄσωτος ἄγγελος Σειρήνων. But there the more recent interpreters, and the Latin Vulgate itself, rightly explain it from the Hebrew as "dragon." Nieremberg book 5, ch. 13 explains the sirens and onocentaurs in Isaiah as demons appearing in that figure. That the Sirens were virgins in the upper part of the body, birds

in the lower part, not fish, to the ancient mythologists, Natale Conti notes, Mythology book 7, ch. 13, and after him Nieremberg loc. cit., and after him Vossius book 3, ch. 94. But the occasion of the physical fables about sea-men seems to have arisen partly from specters, partly from the idolatry of the Gentiles, who worshipped as deities, as other terrestrial and flying animals, so also aquatic ones. See Selden On the Syrian Gods, syntagma 2, ch. 3, and Vossius On Idolatry book 4, ch. 51, compared with book 3, ch. 100. The matter of the crocodile as the deity of the Egyptians is very well known. To return to the point, we do not want to deny that forms as it were human have sometimes been seen, whether they were kinds of fish or monsters or diabolical specters - and to this are to be referred the histories (nevertheless partly fables, as I think) which Nieremberg gathers in book 5, ch. 14. As for that female fish which the Dutch annals narrate, and from them the most erudite Hadrianus Junius in his Batavia, and Petrus of Amsterdam in a letter to Gilbert the Physician of Rome (as Cardano and Belon loc. cit. relate) was cast into the lake (called Purmer) after fierce storms of the sea in the year 1403 and captured there, I indeed easily admit this, provided it may be permitted to me to doubt about the form which they imagine and depict as wholly human, so that it seems to bear nothing of a fish; provided also it may be permitted to me to explode as a little fable of its time whatever they attach about the womanly duties performed by that female fish, and human cohabitation with women, and other works of human reason (although it was destitute of the use of speech), and the Christian burial that followed (as they are accustomed to speak commonly), in the cemetery, because it had given signs of religion, among other things it had honored the cross. About the divers lurking in the sea for a whole hour, indeed even three or four, in Alexander ab Alexandro book 2, ch. 21, and Cardano On Subtlety book 11, p. 635, we say that they use tubes or other instruments through which air is derived to them, or the water being removed stands around them (which we think was done by those artisans who a few years ago in Belgium preserved a lit candle, wrote, sang under the waters), or the work of the devil intervenes when they lurk so long. For what Keckermann disputation 17, qu. 20 thinks can also be referred to the peculiar temperament of the lungs, to me indeed is ἄπιστον; for the lung does not make respiration per se without air, no more than the eye sees without light, as he himself teaches this in his Physical System, with all the physicists and anatomists. Furthermore, Jonah's duration in the belly of the whale was purely miraculous - that he breathed there, that he was not consumed by the heat of the whale, nor killed by the most serious odor, and so was in possession of the powers of body and mind, so that he could offer prayers to God. Jerome rightly says on the cited passage that Jonah was preserved in the same way as the three companions of Daniel in the Babylonian furnace. With these things thus determined, let the reader judge whether Ludovicus Vives indulged too much in credulity, On the Truth of the Faith book 2, p. 125: "But there are also men in the sea, just as on land; which is to be held as indubitable that whole men live in the sea, as Pliny relates, one of whom was captured twelve years ago in Batavia, whom very many saw; for he was detained for more than two years mute, and was beginning to speak, until struck twice by the pestilence he was sent back into the sea, rejoicing and leaping. But these also are begotten from terrestrial men. For there are in certain maritime places men very greatly devoted to swimming, to which exercise they accustom their boys, so that they can endure for a very long time under the waters. The sons of these, almost born, begotten, educated in the waters, delight in a habitation of this kind no differently than fish, so that just as other men live on dry land, so they live in the sea; of which sort it is permitted to conjecture from the things we have

accepted in the relations of our men to be in those farthest islands of the Ocean, in the warmest places." Raffaello Maffei relates that there was in Apulia two hundred years ago a certain youth accustomed from infancy to live in the sea. And so he spent many days among the sea-monsters and continued unharmed, not otherwise than if he were one of them; he penetrated the inmost and most remote parts of the sea, often returned to the shore, and warned the sailors about future storms; previously he was called Nicholas, afterwards Colapiscis [Nicholas the Fish].

VIII. Whether moles and so-called lunar births are men, especially such as seem to live by palpitating? What moles are, how they are generated even without a man, Lemnius teaches, On the Hidden Miracles of Nature book 1, ch. 8; Weinrich in a certain epistle which he published with the treatise of Pico della Mirandola On Witches; and extensively Laurentius, Anatomy book 8, qu. 13. With these teachers leading the way, problems and cases can be determined by theologians: Whether those fetuses will rise again on the last day; whether they should be baptized when they live in the opinion of some, when in reality they do not live, nor are they animals; whether one who bruised them or procured their abortion perpetrated homicide or abortion, etc.

IX. Whether, given that some fetuses live an animal life (as perhaps could be believed about certain ones which the Belgians call "Janekinderen" and "suggers"), if indeed we see that they are endowed with touch, it should immediately be established that they are men, any more than any monsters born from men in a complete canine or equine form (about which we will soon speak), or any more than worms, serpents, and other animals produced through equivocal generation in the human body? For why could animals not be produced in the womb by equal reason as in any other part of the body? Examples are supplied by the Observations of Schenck. To which I add one most memorable thing in England in the year 1637, where in the heart of a noble youth of 21 years of age, after his death when dissected, a serpent was found. Edward Bray, extraordinary physician of the most serene Queen of Great Britain, published the history and physical disquisitions pertaining to this point in the native language at London in 1639. The same thing is asked among the theologians about abortive fetuses: whether, namely, they are men, and will rise again on the last day? We distinguish between those which lived in the womb of the mother with a human life, and those which did not live. About the former we affirm, about the latter we deny. Augustine City of God book 22, ch. 13 does not dare to affirm or deny, but in such a way that he inclines to our opinion. But in the Enchiridion ch. 85 he openly professes it, and with him Bede and Philip the Presbyter on Job 3:16. Furthermore, Scripture also mentions the abortive fetus in Ecclesiastes 6:3 and 1 Corinthians 15:8. The case is to be decided with respect to the sixth commandment: Whether the procuring of abortion is homicide? Various authors treat of this case. First, the commentators on Exodus 21:22-23. Second, Thomas and others on Sentences book 4, dist. 31. Third, the casuists on the sixth commandment of the Decalogue, and under the word "abortion." The authors are to be compared who write about reserved cases, among whom after all others Francesco Coriolano, a theologian of the Capuchin order, seems to have done this most fully - see him part 4, case 6, p. 736. Fourth, the jurists on the law "Something," paragraph "Of abortion," and on the law "Cicero," Digest, "On punishments," and on the law "If a woman," and on the law 3, paragraph

"From the decree of the Senate," Digest, "To the Cornelian law on assassins." The civil and canon criminal lawyers are to be compared. Fifth, the canonists who accurately and laboriously inquire into this, on ch. "Moses," 32, qu. 2. Their practical criminal lawyers are to be compared, among whom is Diaz with the commentaries of Lopez de Salzedo. And the bulls and constitutions of the Popes, and their collectors, whence new laws can be learned - they are Flavio Cherubini, Agostino Barbosa, and Stefano Quaranta, to be cited by us more often. Of whom the last one noted here many and various things, and indicated other authors. So that we may now give some taste to students and others who do not have leisure to inquire laboriously into these things, or who do not have the books at hand, we set down these conclusions:

1st conclusion: An accurate determination of the case presupposes and requires the knowledge of physicists and physicians about the time when the fetus is animated by a human soul, so that it may be rightly judged whether homicide properly so called has been committed or not. From Exodus 21:22-23 we are taught that a distinction is to be applied here. Although among Catholics even if some doubt should intervene in thesis or hypothesis, nevertheless they think that should be established which is safer, as Quaranta warns, cited place. "The fetus," he says, "is said to be animated in a male after forty days, in a female after eighty; and if it is doubted whether it is male or female, it is to be presumed to be animated after forty days. Navarrus in the Manual for Confessors, ch. 15, n. 14, because in doubt the safer part is to be chosen, and it is the common opinion, which the sacred penitentiary follows," etc. The recent casuist Eligio Basseo follows the same opinion. And Coriolano, cited chapter, who nevertheless in ch. 5 distinguishes between the rational soul and the vegetative and sensitive soul, and wants the case to be understood only of animation by the rational soul.

2nd conclusion: That the procuring of abortion, when the fetus is not yet animated, and the procuring and inducing of sterility is a most grave sin against the natural production of men and the propagation of the human race, and cannot be made honest by any good end, Navarrus establishes in his Manual, ch. 16, n. 33. Whatever to the contrary other casuists, cited by Basseo, Azor, Bonacina, Diana, the annotators on Toletus, etc., except and distinguish under various distinctions dangerous enough here. See Genesis 38:7 and there Cornelius a Lapide in his commentary. For it prevents a human fetus from being conceived, or a conceived one from being animated, which is against Genesis 1:28.

3rd conclusion: Whether in the external forum, both political and ecclesiastical, such an abortion or procuring of sterility is homicide complete and strictly so called, and consequently to be punished by an equal penalty with the procured abortion of an animated fetus, was doubted. The bull of Sixtus V in the year 1588 seems to affirm this, which you have in the Bullarium of Cherubini, and in the constitutions of Quaranta. But the bull of Gregory XIV in the year 1589 revokes that, and reduces the penalties to the terms of the common law of the sacred canons and the Council of Trent. But the penalties in the political forum (as Cherubini indicates in his notes on the aforesaid bull) are exile, or another arbitrary penalty according to the quality of the deed and persons, as the civil and canon criminal lawyers teach, cited in the same place. Coriolano loc. cit. says: "If the author of the crime is noble, having lost part of his goods he is relegated; but if ignoble, he is condemned to the mines, Digest, On Punishments, law 'If anyone

something,' paragraph 'Of abortion.'" The more recent casuists and canonists now follow this milder opinion of Gregory XIV, as can be seen in the authors just cited. The Mosaic law seems to suggest and supply some distinction, Exodus 21:22-23. See the commentary of Cornelius a Lapide. Although he is not freed from homicide in the interior forum of conscience before God, where the occasions, beginnings, progymnasms of homicide, even remote and internal ones, are analogically reduced to homicide.

4th conclusion: One who kills an animated fetus by procuring abortion commits true and properly called homicide, because every composite of body and human soul is a man. Thus Coriolano rightly from the canonists, cited case, paragraphs 2, 3. And he taxes those who lightly say the contrary. For there are among the more recent authors those who in certain cases concede the procuring of abortion through a potion which directly tends to the health of the mother, although it was doubtful that the killing of the fetus would follow. Thus Thomas Sanchez. There are also the dangerous disputations of others, which see in Azor vol. 3, book 1, ch. 4, qu. 1.

5th conclusion: It is homicide to procure the abortion of an animated fetus, when it is doubted whether the fetus is animated. In the papacy most teach that irregularity is incurred by such a one, because he is doubtful whether he is a murderer. Diana nevertheless holds the contrary, who for himself cites from the canonists Praepositus and Gomesius. Coriolano distinguishes, cited chapter, n. 4: "But if it is doubted about the animation of the fetus - whether a religious giving or procuring a potion for abortion, or advising or lending assistance, incurs irregularity? I respond that in the contentious forum, where the question is about punishment, interpretation ought to be made in the milder part, law 'By interpretation,' Digest, 'On punishments.' But in the forum of the soul, where the question is about placating God and amendment, one ought to consider himself a murderer, because in such matters the safer way is to be chosen, as in ch. 'A young man,' on betrothal, and it belongs to good minds to fear fault there where there is no fault, ch. 'To his hearing' at the end, dist. 5, argument from ch. 'To his hearing,' on homicide. See Navarrus in the Manual, ch. 27, n. 223."

6th conclusion: That all those procuring and advising abortion in any way whatsoever are held by this crime, the bull of Sixtus V establishes, and rightly so.

7th conclusion: That those are held by the same crime who, although they do not indeed directly or immediately inflict death by a potion or in some other way, but procure that the infant be brought forth into the light before the time, so that it cannot be vital.

8th conclusion: Likewise those who have procured abortion by a potion or in some other way as much as is in them, although the effect has not followed on account of some impediment. Thus Coriolano, and rightly.

9th conclusion: That abortion can be procured in various ways - by potion, cudgel, burden, through magic and sorceries - and consequently this crime is greater or lesser, but is always homicide. Coriolano proposes doubtful cases there: Whether a cleric introducing a pregnant

harlot through the roof, who by falling dies or aborts, becomes irregular. And whether a cleric who jokes or dances with a pregnant woman who aborts becomes irregular. And to both he responds affirmatively. But these and similar things are to be aired elsewhere.

Problem X. Whether monsters born from man are men? We affirm, if indeed they are endowed with a human soul. Thus Augustine City of God book 16, ch. 8 wants all men to be of one species from one Adam, even the monsters in each nation, the monstrous nations in the human race. But the whole difficulty remains as to which ones and by what signs are to be judged to be endowed with a human soul. For first, it is not to be affirmed that all are such, for example serpents, elephants, hippocentaurs in Pliny book 7, ch. 3, and Julius Obsequens On Prodigies ch. 218, and a complete form of a dog or pig, etc. Delrio book 2, qu. 10, or the form of a horse, such as I learned was born from a Jewish woman at Padua in the year 1627, from the manuscript Itinerary of the most noble Lord Berck, ambassador of the Belgians to the Venetians; and Fortunio Liceti exhibits a complete cat, book 2 On Monsters, ch. 53. To which refer those hairy worms which Delrio narrates, Magical Disquisitions book 2, were brought forth in one birth by a nun of Ghent from diabolical intercourse. Second, it is very much doubted about those which are of a mixed form or figure, of which occur not one kind in Julius Obsequens On Prodigies and Pliny, especially the historians of monsters, namely Arnoldus Sorbinus a theologian, Weinrich a physician, and Fortunio Liceti in their treatises On Monsters, as well as in Lycosthenes in his treatise On Prodigies, in the Theater of Zwinger, and in the Selections of the History of Boaistuau, Launay, and Simon Goulart. Third, nor is it free from difficulty if what is brought forth is indeed for the most part of human form, but so portentously small that under that quantity an organic human body scarcely seems to be able to consist. Fourth, if it is biform or bicorporeal, and that in a double way: 1. consisting of another human body, another brutish, or at least the more important parts of one or the other; 2. consisting of a twin human body, or the more important parts. About the monsters of the first kind it does not seem to be doubted that they are brute animals, because no organic body of a human soul appears there. Of the second kind we distinguish into those which in the upper ventricles, namely the head and chest, resemble a man, if not exactly, at least for the most part, but in the lower ventricle and limbs a brute, and into those which in those ventricles resemble some brute, but in the lower ventricle or limbs or both a man. The former I would affirm to be men, because from the containing parts it is permitted to conclude that there are the primary viscera of men, namely a human brain and heart. Such was that boy in Zonaras vol. 3, Annals, without arms, and with a fishy tail extended upwards all the way to the hips, brought forth under Maurice around the year 578. The latter, if indeed they lack both ventricles, I would deny, or at least not dare to affirm. But if only the head is human, or the chest, such as that one in the Fasciculus Temporum in the year 914, with a human body and a dog's head, I would doubt, although I would easily incline to the affirmative, provided that the head (where the workshop of the senses is) is human. About the third kind, I would doubt if, for example, they are of the size of an auricular finger, such as embryos a woman in Germany is said to have ejected into a basin in the number of 150, and another 70, as Albertus Magnus reports, from him Dalechamps on Pliny book 7, ch. 3. I would doubt less about the infant whom Nikephoros saw of the size of a partridge, book 12, ch. 37. Again I would doubt more about the 365 live infants which they say, or rather fable, that Margaret Countess of Holland brought forth of the size of a squilla (I believe the smallest, or the smallest worm), about

which more below. But here two questions arise. The first: Whether monsters of this sort, if they live, are to be baptized. The other: Whether they are to be killed? To the former I respond: Where a doubt exists, it should be waited until it grows up, and it can be more fully known whether it is a man, for there is no danger in delay here, since baptism is not necessary by necessity of means. At least, whatever one might think about the necessity of baptism, no evil is to be done so that good may come about. But it is an evil to confer baptism on a monster which you do not know whether it is a man or a brute animal. To the other I respond: No, if even the least doubt exists. This was indeed once established by Lycurgus, and by Romulus according to the testimony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus book 2, that a monstrous offspring should immediately be killed, and Daneau approves it in his Christian Ethics. Nikephoros refers an example of such a monster being killed, book 18, ch. 35. That horse born from a Jew at Padua was killed by the Jews, Rabbi Leon, the chief rabbi of the Venetian synagogue, had reported then to the domestics of Ambassador Berck. What the necessity is of killing them, even if they are certainly brute animals, if indeed they are nourished secretly, and do not harm men by their ferocity, or incite terror in pregnant women by their public appearance, is not so clear. Perhaps regard is had for the Mosaic law, which establishes that a brute animal is to be burned with the human, Leviticus 20:15-16, whether for detestation of the deed and admonition of men (in the way the serpent was cursed, Genesis 3, and an ox is stoned, Exodus 21:28-32, and a brute animal is killed, Leviticus 20:15-16), or to prevent monstrous births, if indeed it had happened for them to be impregnated, or for both ends? About the monsters of the fourth kind, we say that the other brute body can be injured, even killed, if indeed the human body can be succored in some way by it. In addition, the human body is to be sprinkled with the water of baptism. But if each body is human, or at least if by the upper part it is a twin human body, it can be judged that there are two souls there, and consequently each is to be baptized separately. But what if there is one chest and two heads? I do not think there are two men if one heart exists. The youth seen here in the cities of Belgium at the price of thousands of men made the question very difficult two years ago, from whose belly the head of another man, but mute, protruded; that he was distinct from the one carrying him in soul and its intellective and sensitive faculties, and consequently was another person (although they used certain common parts of the body), is evident even from the fact that they were stirred up against each other by contrary affections and perturbations of soul. If anyone requires more about human monsters, let him go to Weinrich just praised, or rather to Fortunio Liceti, who after all others increased the history with very many new examples, and inquires more fully into all the differences and causes of monsters.

Problem XI. What about the Centaurs, Sylvans, Satyrs, Fauns, etc.? Either they were individual human monsters, beheld somewhere, whether they were born from the abominable intercourse of men with beasts, or from any other aberration of nature. Or they were diabolical specters, which sometimes appeared to men in that form. Or they were species of brute animals, namely apes or similar beasts, which in some part approach the figure of the human body. Or they are to be referred to the fables and figments of idle men, which are written about them. By this determination we think is exhausted what was once related by ancient authors or eyewitness testimony today that could move doubt, as if, namely, they were diverse species of men, or entire monstrous nations and peoples. Compare what we just said about the Arimaspians,

Cynocephali, Nereids, Sirens, etc., namely problems 6 and 7. What was once or is today written, believed, doubted about men of this sort so called, see in Nieremberg book 8, chs. 1-7, who compared with the commentators brings light to the interpretation of the passages Isaiah 13:21-22, 34:14, Leviticus 17:7, 2 Chronicles 11:15. What the superstition of the Gentiles fabled about the Fauns, Satyrs, Pan, Sylvanus, Sileni, etc., see in Natale Conti book 6, chs. 6-12. Lucretius book 5 denies that there are Centaurs and Scyllas. Virgil Aeneid 6 sings that they stable in the entrance of the underworld with dreams. Compare also vol. 1 of the Critical Thesaurus published by Gruter, where on p. 1115 there is a discussion of Centaurs and Satyrs.

XII. What about the Striges, or fables? Either they are specters, or nocturnal birds, which they made out to be women. See the disputation On Demons and Specters, and the commentators on Isaiah 13:22, Lamentations 4:3, Micah 1:8. Natale Conti explains the fables of the Gentiles; Buxtorf those of the Jews in his Jewish Synagogue. The same amount of credence should be given about the Harpies.

XIII. What about the Kobolds, or mountain manikins, which men call earthly? They are not men, but diabolical specters. Agricola and other metallic historians, and from them Kornmann in his Temple of Nature p. 172, describe them. Compare what the same author has on p. 165 about earthly genii or spirits, and our disputation On Specters.

XIV. What about other earthly homunculi, which are believed to inhabit hidden places of buildings, which are called Kobolds by the Germans, Koltri by the Ruthenians? The same response as above.

XV. What about the white nymphs, who are also called Sibyls, ladies of the night, Fata by the Italians, Fées by the French, Witte Vrouwen by the Belgians - about whom see Delrio in his Magical Disquisitions, and Kornmann p. 113, and the writers on specters? The same response. See our disputation just cited.

XVI. What about the prodigious races which are said to have two hands on the right side, asinine ears, one leg equine, the other human - which are said to have been found by Spanish sailors on a certain island in the middle of the journey to Calicut? With Nieremberg book 8, ch. 2, we respond: "I do not entirely pledge all faith to similar monsters, but let the authors claim it, especially in these things which follow. Nor did I think they should be omitted, not because I certainly think that those nations are of such great deformity, but because I consider it probable that at least some singular monsters gave occasion to the fable."

XVII. What about the men called Sterlocks, who are said to have three eyes somewhere in Arabia, very large ears, etc.? Either these are fables, or such a monster was beheld. The same must be said about the men in Egypt whom they report to be partly similar to camels, and others noted by Nieremberg in the same place and ch. 3 from Lycosthenes' book On Prodigies, about which he thus concludes in the cited chapter, p. 134: "Lycosthenes relates all these things; most are vain. I now inculcate what I observe in the Natural Questions, that demons appearing in a deformed form gave occasion to most monsters, just as they were seen by St. Anthony in the desert under the face of a satyr and centaur. But also to the apostolic man Balthasar Barreira of

our Society of Jesus, various monsters appeared on his return from Bena. He thought in the beginning, when he was far off, that they were black native inhabitants, but the place was entirely deserted and he recognized that they were spirits emulating human form. It sometimes happens that monstrous men are brought forth from incestuous or demoniacal intercourse. In Brazil a horrendous monster is said to have been begotten from the congress of a barbarous woman with an incubus, and to have grown to the height of sixteen palms, with its back covered with the skin of a lizard, swollen breasts, leonine arms, rigid eyes glittering like fire, and with certain most foul members to behold."

The men lacking a nose in Benjamin of Tudela's Itinerary p. 96, and those with beastly heads in the Arab Geographer of Nubia p. 71, walk with equal step.

XVIII. What about the tailed men on the island of Inzignanin, about whom Peter Martyr writes in his History of the New World? We respond that it is a fable. Nieremberg ch. 4 doubts whether it is history. And he adds: "It is more certain that in the kingdom of Lambri there are tailed men. Marco Polo the Venetian writes that the tail is one palm in length. The same infamy is borne by other men of Europe." This was evidently why he adopted this fable among the histories rather than another of the same mint. He was thinking about the miraculous curse of Augustine, the Apostle of the English, through which he reports it was brought about that tailed men were born in England. Thus he in book 1 On the Wonders of Nature in Europe, ch. 83, from John Major book 2, ch. 9 on the Deeds of the Scots. The Arab Geographer part 10, clime 2, by the trustworthiness of the author of the book of Wonders, reports that on the island of Namaneg there is a tailed race, over which a king from their own people rules. But I think that is as true as the fable about a similar race in Spain in Nierenberg, cited chapter, and about the women who have the legs and tails of donkeys, book 8 of the Natural History, ch. 2.

XIX. What about the horned men? If such were beheld anywhere, they are to be referred to the monsters. But that there were monstrous men of this sort, unicorns and bicorns, to whom horns grew out not only from the head but also from the nose, from the back, from the spleen, from the feet, from the hands, the medical histories teach which you see collected by Thomas Bartholin in his treatise On the Unicorn, chs. 1, 2.

ON CREATION, PART NINE.

RESPONDENT LUBERT SPRUIT of Utrecht
For November 3, 1638

Some things about man in general remain.

Problem I. Whether wanderers, commonly called changelings, Wechselkinder, are men? Whether there are such who, taken from elsewhere by demons, are substituted so that they may feign a human birth can be doubted, although Sprenger, William of Paris, and others in Delrio book 2, qu. 15 affirm it. But if they are, I do not see why it should be denied that they are

men of the same species as others. For neither the feigned childbirth nor the substituted infant take away the truth of the human essence. Otherwise it could be said that those changelings are sometimes demons who show themselves in the form of infants - if indeed the things are true which Mersenne notes in his Commentary on Genesis, p. 651: "I think that Paracelsus' homunculi are the same as the devils who take care to be nourished in the likeness of infants, whom some call 'mont de gloire.'"

Problem XXI. Whether Melusine, Merlin the prophet, and others who are said to be born from man and devil in Delrio loc. cit. are true men? Whether anything can be born from the devil is to be said below. But if anything of the sort had happened, it should not be denied to be a man of the same species, and consequently univocal generation, since it is from the plastic power and its vehicle, human seed. For the devil would only conduct himself as an instrument, applying natural agents to patients.

Problem XXII. What about those specters or monsters which they call cursed men, who namely by a peculiar curse and judgment of God are said to be converted into brute animals or brute-human monsters, or into specters and demons or wandering spirits? Either they are figments of men, or diabolical impostures. Stumpf has an example in his Swiss Chronicle for the year 1520. And from him Kornmann refers to it in his Temple of Nature, p. 173. The same thing is fabled about the Melusine just mentioned.

Problem XXIII. Whether satyrs, fauns, Cyclopes, Pans, Centaurs, metallic manikins, etc. are men? Either there is nothing of the sort; or if anything of the kind appeared to someone, they were either sylvan animals, for example apes etc., or animal monsters, or diabolical specters, as we indicated in the Disputation on Specters. Whether chimeras of this sort can be generated, Magius inquires, Miscellanies book 1, last chapter. But we treated them above, part 8. The authors cited there can be compared.

Problem XXIV. Whether Adam, Eve, Christ, and the rest of men are of one species? We affirm, for a diverse mode of origin or production cannot infer a diverse species. The philosophers suggest reasons when they dispute that animals generated from putrid matter and from seed are of the same species. We add the testimonies of Scripture, Hebrews 2:11-16 with Acts 17:26. Whether the generation of Christ was univocal will be determined below.

Problem XXV. What should be established about the opinion of a certain person which asserts that Melchizedek was a true man created from nothing? It is repugnant to Acts 17:26 and stands in the way of the defense of the truth against the Anabaptists. The things which will be said below, part 10, thesis 3, are to be compared.

Problem XXVI. Whether man can be called a miracle of nature, the most perfect in the universe, indeed its perfection, end, etc., indeed also the universe itself or all things, μικρόκοσμος, εἰς ὂν μένον, a certain God, etc.? We affirm, limitedly of course, in a certain respect, in a certain way, and in its own manner. For 1. he is the whole universe, and encompasses it in himself in a threefold way. According to real being, for he participates in the nature of the invisible and

visible world, the incorporeal and corporeal, the upper, lower, celestial, elemental. All of which, amplified, see in Alsted's Natural Theology, Bartholin's Anatomical Questions 2 and 3. According to representative or ideal being. For as he is an epitome or compendium, so he is a mirror, an example representing all creatures, their powers and excellences. According to intelligible being, because his intellect, according to Aristotle, is all things, namely by assimilation. 2. He is the most perfect in the universe, something nobler and more excellent not only than every corporeal nature (about which the writers on the Hexaemeron on the sixth day), but also than the angels themselves, because the Son of God assumed human nature, not that of the angels, Hebrews 2:16 and 1:4, Philippians 2:7, and calls them brothers, ibid. v. 12, and they are said to be flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones, Ephesians 5. 4. He is a being next to God, namely in Christ, ἄφθαρτος. 4. He is the perfection and end of the universe - indeed of the lower world in himself, of which he was constituted lord, Genesis 9:25-26, Psalm 8:6-7, 2 Corinthians 3:18, where it is implied that this dominion was restored through Christ; also of the invisible world in Christ his head, for whom are all things, Hebrews 2:10, Colossians 1:16, who indeed is the firstborn of every creature, Colossians 1:15, and received power in heaven and on earth, over all things, even thrones, powers, etc., Matthew 28:18, Ephesians 1:21-22. With these limitations having been observed, those praises of the excellence of man in Manilius book 1, Lipsius book 3, diss. 2 and 3, Boaistuau and L'Anneau in the Theater of the World, Bartholin loc. cit., Maimonides part 1, ch. 72, and the Kabbalistic authors published by Pistorius pp. 130-131 are to be accepted, and can be rightly explained. And thus the reasons of Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed book 3, chs. 12 and 13 are satisfied, where he disputes that man has no proportion to this whole universality of the world; also that all beings exist for their own sake, and not for the sake of another, and consequently not for the sake of man.

Problem XXVII. How therefore is man called nothing, vanity, dust, a shadow, a worm, Genesis 18:27, Psalm 62:10 and 144:3-4, Isaiah 40:15? With which the sayings of Nebuchadnezzar, Daniel 4:32, and of the friends of Job, 4:19, 25:6 agree, although they are not authentic in themselves; and that of Pindar, γαῖας γὰρ etc. And Christ, by assuming human nature, is said to have emptied himself, Philippians 2:7. Not absolutely and in himself, but partly comparatively to the infinite perfection of God, because he has all things from himself, in himself, by essence, immutably, independently, and most perfectly (in which way he alone is called good, immortal, wise, Matthew 19, 1 Timothy 1 and 6); partly on account of the accident of sin and misery, and consequently without that man, namely Christ, and outside the grace of God, through which, in which they are whatever they are, otherwise they would be nothing, 1 Corinthians 15:10 with 2 Corinthians 12:11 - by which it happens that he should be considered fetid, abominable, the vilest of all, indeed nothing, and worse than nothing, more detestable than every nothing, so that if he is not freed from it, it would have been better for him never to have been, that is, to have been nothing, Matthew 26:24. On the meanness of man, see Pliny book 7, preface, Plutarch On Fortune, the commentators on Ecclesiastes 1, the little work of Lothair, afterwards Pope Innocent, On Contempt of the World, Boaistuau's Theater of the World, the Meditations of Du Moulin, Dennison, Bayly, Bessaeus, Stella, and others on the Vanity and Misery of man. Furthermore, on the nature and properties of Man, the common physicists and anatomists should be consulted, the writers on the Universe and the Hexaemeron (Nemesius or [Gregory of] Nyssa On the Nature of Man, Theodoret On the Cure of Greek Affections, discourse 5),

Cardano On Variety and Subtlety, Jonstonus in the oft-cited book, besides the special treatises On Man, On the Mind or On the Human Soul, On Laughing and Weeping, On the Affections, On the Beard, and innumerable others, which we have partly seen, partly have cited by others. Finally, on the opposites of man, especially on Death, in the same place the cited authors are to treat paraenetically and exoterically for their purpose, but acroamatically partly by the physicists and physicians, partly by the theologians, and by these alone practically, as we have shown in the common place On the Four Last Things, and in the Ascetic - perhaps sometime about to reduce the dogmatic, historical, and practical things into the compendium of one diatribe.

5. Thus indeed about man in general; now let us treat of the principles or parts of essence considered physically, which are body and soul. And first, about the body it is asked:

I. Whether it is an essential part of man? In the philosophical schools there is no doubt about this. But recently our innovators, called Remonstrants, in their Apology wanted to leave this in the middle, namely whether the body is only an instrument of the soul, or truly also an essential part of the composite - so that they may help the Socinians, who by denying the resurrection of this flesh nevertheless deny that they deny the Resurrection, because, they say, the body does not pertain to the essence of man.

But we respond: First, by all the reasons by which the philosophers prove that all matter in general, even of an animal, constitutes the essence of a thing and not only the form; also that from matter and form one thing per se comes to be. See Suárez, Ruvius, the Coimbrans, the Disputation on Matter and Form. Second, because man is said synecdochically in the Scriptures, and man was created, formed from the earth, taken and to return into it, Genesis 2:7 and 3:19, Psalm 90:3 and 139:14-15 - although this is immediately and primarily according to the body. Third, because the truth and essence of human nature is also constituted in it, when Scripture speaks about the incarnation of Christ, Hebrews 2:7, 14 with 10:5. Fourth, because a mixed, living, animal body is of the essence of man, therefore also a human body specifically so called. The consequence holds, because whatever is said of the genus is also said of the species. But now that an animal body, or animal, as also a living thing etc., is not something accidental but essential, is evident from that logical rule: A genus is not an accident, nor a part of its species.

Fifth, because the soul is the act of an organic body, insofar as it is organic: therefore, the body is an essential part of the soul, coordinated and composed.

The human essence consists not only of the soul, but also of the body. See the commentators of Aristotle in the explanation of the definition of the soul. Sixth, because the human soul, already separated, cannot be specifically and formally distinguished from an angel, except by an essential or substantial order and coordination of itself to its own body, and vice versa: which coordination necessarily argues and presupposes two essential parts, or internal principles of essence. Seventh, because otherwise there would be no consequence in that demonstration of Christ in Matthew 22:32. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob live (now, according to the soul); therefore,

they will also live according to the body: for the promise was not made to the soul of Abraham, but to Abraham consisting of soul and body.

Let one try whether that demonstration of Christ can be explained and defended, from the Socinian hypotheses. 11. Problem. Whether the body is in itself or per se evil, harmful, and therefore to be called with the Platonists the prison of the soul, the tomb, the egg? I answer in the negative, no more than the soul: for it is, firstly, partially the essence of man, a good creature of God, Genesis 2:7 with 1:31. Then, no one ought to hate that, but to nourish and cherish it, Ephesians 5:29.

Thirdly, the Son of God assumed that into the unity of his person, no less than the soul, Hebrews 2:11, 14, 15, 16. And that flesh and blood were of God, John 6 with Acts 20:28. III. Problem: Whether it excels other bodies in variety of parts, mutual coordination, nobility of spirits, exquisite disposition of senses and organs, exquisite proportion of humors and temperament for animal operations, etc. I affirm, if you consider all things together. It is not our purpose to demonstrate this: let students consult the physics and anatomy, and Ambrose book 6 of the Hexaemeron chapter 9, Rhodiginus book 3 chapters 10, 11, 12, the authors cited above on the excellence of man. It will suffice to have indicated Psalm 139:14-15 and God's process in creating man, Genesis 1:25-26 and 2:7-8, whereas of the other animals it is only said: let the waters bring forth, etc., the flying thing shall fly in the expanse, etc., let the earth bring forth, etc. IV. Problem: Whether there is a tempering equal to weight, and its excellence is to be extolled, so that prodigious effects, indeed even miraculous ones, are derived from it? I deny, and rightly reject the delusions of those who ascribe magical operations, divination, and miracles to a peculiar complexion of the body. Delrio indicated those paradoxes in book 1 chapter 3 question 2, and Medina refuted them explicitly in his book on right faith in God, book 2 chapter 7. V. Problem: Whether by the medical art, specifically the Paracelsian-Hermetic art, the human body can be reduced to such a temperament that life is quasi-perpetuated, youth restored, etc. I deny. These are the words and voices of Paracelsus, Croll, and similar mountebanks, which we touched on in the disputation on the term of life. We suggested in the disputation on demons that not even the devil could do this, let alone the Hermetic Enthusiasts. VI. Problem: Whether there is a double body in man, and therefore a double man; one sidereal, incorporeal, etc., the other elemental, visible, etc. I answer: the new Hermetics indeed say this, but without reason, without sense. On this see Sennert on the consensus and difference of Chymists and Aristotelians, chapters 5 and 15. We concede that man can be called a microcosm, and therefore analogically a celestial and elemental world can be found in him; and the authors cited by us have shown this, among them Bartholinus in his Anatomy cited above and Laurentius book 1 chapter 2. But it is not to be tolerated that this be understood properly, and therefore the body of man and man himself be divided into two, celestial and elemental. To pass over the reasons adduced by philosophers and physicians, scripture rejects this fiction, since it teaches that man was created from the dust of the earth, Genesis 2 and 3, with 1 Corinthians 15:2, 45-49, and that no other body is carried around by it, none is laid down in death and resolved into elements, except this one earthly, corruptible and mortal body, 2 Corinthians 5:1-4 and 1 Corinthians 15:53-54. Where then is that household god, astral, gabalis, demon, God of Paracelsus? In Utopia, I believe. VII. Problem: Why the human body is more subject to diseases

and defects than other animals? I answer: It is the punishment and most just judgment of God in detestation of sin. For as death, so the preludes to death and that whole ocean of calamities inundated miserable man, as soon as sin entered, Genesis 3. Hence man among other living things is peculiarly called in Hebrew "enosh", in Greek "brotos", in Latin "mortalis". Therefore there is no reason for us to complain with Pliny and other infidels about the unfortunate lot or stepmother nature of created man. And this indeed is the first cause. Secondary causes can be assigned: 1) The more perfect and noble system of the human body - hence more and more frequent defects happen to it, once that bulwark and privilege of the divine image is removed. For good comes only from an entire cause, and evil from any defect. And the greater the perfection of a thing, the more prone and frequent its defect. 2) The remnants or shadows of dominion regarding the choice of any creatures; which when man uses or rather abuses for the pursuit of novelty and instability of mind, hence it happens that changed air, place, food, drink, diet (not to mention intemperance) become poisons to man and attendants of divine judgment. Whereas the other animals, as natural causes, are for the most part fixed to the same and accustomed places, foods, labors, etc. VIII. Problem: Whether melancholy, lycanthropy, mania, frenzy, etc. are diseases of the mind or of the body? I answer: Properly and formally they are of the body. For the mind does not properly and in itself labor under them, except insofar as it is hindered in its actions, for the execution of which it requires the organs of the body. Hence it is that physicians rightly and deservedly ascribe to themselves the cognition and cure of those ills, as can be seen in the common Institutes of Medicine.

Poisonous diseases or symptoms inflicted by demons vexing or corporally possessing, or by magicians with the aid of demons, also pertain to the cure of physicians, since they do not differ in species from the diseases just mentioned or any others whatsoever. Compare our disputations on the energumens, on demons, on magic, and Baptista Codronchus the physician of Imola, book 4 on poisonous diseases and poisons, from chapter 4 to 10, where at the beginning of chapter 4 he claims for his fellow physicians the cognition and treatment of those diseases against the exorcist theologians. And since some exorcists have put their sickle into the harvest of the physicians, proposing various emetics, ointments, fumigations, baths, and other things of this sort, which those professing this art use without any distinction and rashly, with great harm and danger to the sick, for that reason, lest error be committed in the future regarding their use, I have decided to examine them one by one, as well as all the other simple medicaments which the ancients and moderns have used to expel poisons.

Regarding other affections, diseases and symptoms of the parts of the human body, knowledge of which can be especially useful to theologians in the explication of scripture, or resolution of controversies, or determination of cases, or visitation of the sick, we have advised what is in the Theological Library. Where one may see if there is leisure.

Especially the repetition of the questions which are to be predetermined by the physicists and physicians for the jurists, canonists, and casuists must be referred here. Baptista Codronchus gave a syllabus of the principal ones in his treatise titled "Method of testifying in any medical cases that arise." They are as follows:

By what method are those feigning illness to be detected by a physician, and what are the diseases which they are especially wont to feign. That the sick, especially those with an acute disease, placed in custody, can be cured only with the greatest difficulty and danger to them.

First, the universal method of testifying both in the sick and in the wounded is handed down; second, the particular method in the sick, where it is shown how many things are to be attended to in their prognosis, and diseases are treated according to their genera, quantity and quality, as well as salutary and fatal signs.

In what way testimony is to be given concerning a wounded person, where the signs and judgments of wounds are treated.

By what marks wounds inflicted by poisoned weapons, or infected with poison, are recognized. Whether the sudden event of death or symptoms is to be ascribed to administered poison or corruption of humors, where the signs of poisons in general and in particular are treated, as well as the signs of one dead from poison.

It is prohibited to give or sell poisons, which are enumerated. Whether any quantity of poison can kill a man.

Concerning puberty and the signs of puberty. Concerning those who cannot have intercourse, and the causes.

That a virgin is uncorrupted can be detected by certain means. By what signs a pregnant woman is recognized.

Whether a physician can know if a woman has aborted a fetus, and concerning abortifacient medications.

Whether a woman can give birth after the tenth month, and whether that birth is legitimate.

To whom the child of a nine-month birth of a woman who married another a few days after the death of her husband is to be judged to belong.

It is proven that certain fifty-year-old women can conceive.

Whether dissimilarity of the child to the parents is a sufficient argument for adultery, from which the causes of similarity and dissimilarity of children to their parents are treated.

But what is to be judged concerning spiritual desertions and temptations, with which melancholy is conjoined, and how those spiritual diseases (the cure of which properly pertains to the theologian) are not to be confused with it, we began to indicate in the Disputation on Desertions. There are also other more illustrious medico-philosophical questions, on temperaments; on innate heat and moisture, and the natural balsam; on humors; on spirits; on pulses; on

respiration; and other things to be named below at the end of part 10, on the unity and continuity of the body, on the dependence of the soul on the body; on the distinct forms of the individual parts of the body; on the principality, situation, figure, matter, use of the parts, etc.; whether there is a neutral body, that is, neither healthy nor sick; whether the hair, nails, four humors, animal and vital spirits, milk, semen are animate; whether the same body in number perseveres through the whole course of nutrition, etc. On which the physicists and anatomists already often praised are to be consulted, among them the Coimbrans on the books on Generation and Corruption, Sennert in his Physics and in the treatise against the Paracelsians already often praised, compared with Freitag, his antagonist; and from the anatomists Laurentius and Bartholinus, who add questions. If they are not at hand, or if one does not have leisure to consult them, let him at least read some common physics, and Melanchthon on the soul with the commentaries of Magirus and Caselius.

We now come to the speculation on the soul, concerning which first, the philosophical systematists and questioners from the more recent Pontifical authors - Toletus, the Complutensians, Thomas of Jesus's Thomistic course, Ruvius, Arriaga, Oviedo, Mendoza, Masius, the Scotistic physics of Antonius Faber, the Coimbrans, in whom authors of every kind are cited. From our writers the physical authors indicated in the library, to which we add Combachius's Anthropology. Second, the scholastics on the first part of Thomas, compared with the first of the second part, who here are truly the fathers of human wisdom. Third, from our authors of common places, such as Grynaeus, Tilenus, Polanus, and especially Zanchi. Fourth, if one wishes to compare the ancient philosophemes of the Greeks, let him consult Theodoret, sermon 5 on the cure of Greek affections, Stobaeus in his physical eclogues, Alcinous on the doctrine of Plato chapter 17, and from the more recent Steuco in book 9 of his perennial philosophy. Very many things also most worthy of being known were collected by Julius Caesar Bulenger in his Eclogues on Arnobius book 1 chapters 4, 5, etc. After the first edition of this disputation, the most noble man, and also the most celebrated polymath most versed in the ancient writers and antiquities, Salmasius, published notes on Epictetus and Simplicius in the year 1640, where he explicitly digs out the philosophy of the Stoics and other ancients on the nature and faculties of the human soul. The polymath Vossius will also supply very many things pertaining to this in book 3 of his work on Idolatry, chapters 33, 40, 41, 42, 90.

We briefly touch on these problems. I. Problem: Whether it is rightly called spirit? I affirm, and we desire theology in Scaliger, when he scourges Melanchthon with this name, Exercise 307 section 39. For thus it is called in Ecclesiastes 12:7, Psalm 31:6, Luke 25:26, Acts 7:59. Although we do not deny that the souls of brutes are also called thus, with the addition of "of life," or "of flesh," Genesis 7:15, Numbers 16:22. Further, what the Rabbis say about the difference between "neshamah," "ruach," and "nefesh" is not very solid, as we have taught several times in our lectures. II. Problem: Whether it is an accident, a crasis or temperament, corporeal or a body, an animal or vital spirit? I deny. See Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 63, and in his Disputed Questions on the Soul article 1, from the more recent Coimbrans on the second book of On the Soul question 1, Zanchi book 2 chapter 5. III. Problem: Whether it is a part of God? I deny, against Cerdo, the Gnostics, Manicheans, etc., as well as some Gentiles and more recent Enthusiasts, who confuse God with the substance of

man. Augustine refutes these madnesses in his book on the origin of the soul chapter 2, and the scholastics on the first part question 90 article 1. IV. Problem: Whether it is the true and substantial form of man, and is thus united to the body, and substantially actuates and informs it? I affirm, so that the union is not per accidens but per se, not accidental but substantial. For scripture names those two essential parts of man, from which man is constituted, Ecclesiastes 12:7, Matthew 10:28 and 6:25, 1 Kings 17:21-22. But now the body cannot be said to inform the soul, but the soul informs the body, as its matter or subject; whence it is said to be in it, remain, go out from it, be emitted, breathed out, etc. Zanchi, book 2 chapter 6, declares this union by the similitude of light united with air.

We therefore reject the opinions of Simplicius, Philoponus, Themistius, Averroes, and those mentioned by the Council of Vienne and the Canon Law in the Clementines, chapter "Ad nostrum" on the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith, and likewise of others, whom the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8, has in view. We also reject Plato, who in the Alcibiades holds that it is united to the body as a mover to the movable, a governor to a ship. Finally also Cajetan, who on the first part question 76 article 1 seems to think that the soul according to the intellective grade is not the form of the body, but only by reason of the vegetative and sensitive faculty. Further, the scholastics solidly dispute for the truth of our opinion, against these and similar errors, on the second book of Sentences distinction 17, and on the first part question 76 article 1, and the Coimbrans on the second book of On the Soul chapter 1 question 6. Compare the corollary which we will subjoin below after the appendices of this disputation. V. Problem: Whether for each man there is his own soul? I affirm. For if there were one for all or many, it would follow that knowledge and ignorance, truth of faith and heresies, virtues and vices, guilt and stain of fault, together with justice, innocence, and the consequent rewards and punishments, as well as the antecedent grace and freedom, would be in one and the same soul - all of which are most absurd. Further, if any soul which lives the life of grace lives by its own faith, Romans 1, to which the rest contradistinguished are said to be dead; and if the soul that sins shall itself die, Ezekiel 18, it follows that each has a distinct soul. Further, the fathers defend this truth with reasons, Gregory of Nyssa book 2 of philosophy chapters 7-8, Epiphanius Panarion volume 2 book 2; from the scholastics, Durandus and Gregory on the second book of Sentences distinction 17, Scotus on the fourth book distinction 43, Ockham, Henry of Ghent, Hervaeus in their Quodlibetal Questions, Giles in his treatise on the Intellect, Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 73, and he and Albert in a special treatise; from the more recent authors often cited.

We therefore reject: 1) The Manicheans, Pythagoras, the Platonists, and similar fabulists, who believed in metempsychosis, that is, the migration of souls either into brutes or into men. On whom see the authors cited in Lipsius book 3 chapter 12, the Coimbrans on the second book of On Generation chapter 11 question 1, and on the second book of On the Soul chapter 1 question 7. The same opinion had also pervaded the ancient Gauls, Germans, indeed even the Jews themselves, as we gather from Matthew 14, where see the commentators. Nor do the Talmudists and modern Jews recede from it, as we showed in the Disputation on Judaism. The same is to be said of the modern Indians living under the empire of the Great Mogul, who are followers of the ancient Pythagorean philosophy and theology. Benjamin of Tudela mentions the

same some centuries ago in his Itinerary page 34. That Lorinus on Wisdom 2:22 and Alphonsus de Castro, Against Heresies book 2 folio 63, join the Albigensians to them on the faith of Antoninus - we number that among the remaining calumnies with which those pious and orthodox men were burdened by the Papacy. We showed in the Desperate Cause of the Papacy book 3 section 2 that they were as far as possible from this and other heresies. 2) Averroes and other followers of the Peripatetics, Themistius, Simplicius, etc., who imagine one universal intellect, separate indeed from individual men, but assisting and conjoined to them through the images which reside in each one's phantasy. 3) Lycanthropy, or the union of the human soul with a lupine body, on which we discoursed in the Disputation on Demons. 4) Those unnamed people in Philaster and Augustine's book on heresies chapter 78, who held that the souls of the impious after death are turned into demons and brutes. Augustine chapter 86 attributes the former part of this opinion to Tertullian. We noted this error in the Disputation on Demons and the Disputation on Specters. VI. Problem: Whether there are more than one soul in each man, or whether the vegetative, sensitive, and rational in one man are three souls really distinct? I deny. Gennadius, in his book on Ecclesiastical Dogmas chapter 15, imputes as a heresy to James and other disputers that they posited two souls in man, one animal by which the body is animated and is mixed with the blood, and the other spiritual which provides reason - with which opinion those agree who posited two, and indeed opposite souls, namely the sensitive and the rational, of which the former is mortal, the latter immortal, in Clement book 2 of the Stromata and Theodoret book 5 on the cure of Greek affections. And Ockham on the fourth book of Sentences distinction 7, Francis de Meyronnes on the second book distinction 17, Pico della Mirandola on the eversion of the singular certitude book 33. There were some (among whom Didymus book 3 on the Holy Spirit) who from 1 Thessalonians 5:23 wrongly understood constituted three essential parts in man - body, soul, spirit - in Gennadius chapter 20, Jerome to Hedybia question 12 epistle 150, the author of the work on Spirit and Soul chapter 49. But in response to the objected passage, among the orthodox some understand by "spirit" the grace of the Holy Spirit (Gennadius and Jerome); others the soul itself, which for its diverse functions and respects is called soul, insofar as it animates the body for living or vivifying, and spirit, either because it breathes in the body and makes it vital and spiritual, or because its substance is spiritual (the author of the work on Spirit and Soul, Gennadius cited above, Jerome book 4 on Matthew chapter 27, Tertullian on the Soul chapter 6, Gregory the Great book 11 of the Moralia chapter 3, Isidore book 11 of the Origins chapter 1).

We with the more recent interpreters expound "spirit" as the rational part of the soul, and "soul" as the remaining part which we have in common with the brutes. Thus they generally distinguish Matthew 22:37. The Manicheans imagined two souls, one a particle of the divine breath and free from all fault, the other vicious produced by the evil principle, in Augustine book 6 against Faustus chapter 8 and book 10 on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis chapter 13. Plato in the Timaeus, compared with book 9 of the Republic, as Aristotle also reports in book 1 of On the Soul the last chapter, posited three souls. This opinion of his, condemned by the common school, was revived in the previous century by the celebrated philosopher Zabarella in his treatise on the Faculties of the Soul (with Averroes preceding him), whom one or another then followed, among them William Ursinus, who contends that this is the opinion of Aristotle, Disputations part 2 disputation 2. Although we with Hervaeus, treatise on the unity of forms

question 18, are unwilling to call this opinion a heresy, nor with the Coimbrans on the first book of On Generation and Corruption chapter 4 question 21 to say it is a heresy when it denies that the rational is the form of man, nevertheless we think it must be held that there is only one soul in each man - both on account of the philosophical reasons adduced by the common consent of theologians and philosophers, specifically by the scholastics on Thomas's first part question 76 article 3, and Summa contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 58, by the more recent Coimbrans cited above, Ruvius on the second book of On the Soul questions 5-7, to whom can be added Suárez, Metaphysical Disputations 13 section 3 and 16 section 10, where he disputes that of one thing there is given only one form, and Eustachius a Sancto Paulo in his Summa Philosophiae page 173. From our theologians Zanchi book 2 chapter 3 does the same extensively and solidly. And Polanus compendiously in his Syntagma book 5 chapter 32.

I will not repeat here the reasons and authorities of the fathers, scholastics and philosophers adduced by the said authors. I only indicate: First, this opinion is repugnant to the sacred scriptures, which according to composites or individuals numbers souls, attributing to each their own and denominating from them, Genesis 46:26 with Acts 7:14 and Romans 13:1, Ezekiel 18:4. Then, because it teaches that one vital soul or spirit is given to man, both in the first creation, Genesis 2, and in ordinary generation, Ecclesiastes 12:7 with Zechariah 12:1; and that one is returned in the death of man, and separated from the body, Acts 7:59, Matthew 27:50 with Psalm 31:6. For if three souls are given, in death those three would have to be returned; for if either the vegetative or the sensitive remained, the corpse would now live the life of a plant or animal, which is absurd. Third, from Matthew 10:28, every soul in man, distinct from the other part of the composite, that is, from the body, is immortal; but the pretended sensitive and vegetative in man is not incorruptible or immortal; therefore there is no such soul in man, but only those two, namely the human soul and the body - which is confirmed by another argument. Fourth, there are no essential parts, no principles of essence, no incomplete substances constituting man, besides those which can be punished in hell or crowned in heaven; but those are the soul and body, Matthew 10:28, Acts 1:18, 25 and 7:59 with 8:2. Fifth, because the authors of this opinion seem to implicate the dogma of the incarnation and conception, as well as of the death and resurrection of Christ, in some difficulties, and indeed without necessity. One thing, for example, I ask: whether the sensitive soul remained in the body after the death of Christ or not; if the former, then his body would have been alive in the sepulchre; if the latter, either it was separated and subsisted outside the body, or it perished. Not the former, because it depends on matter or the body, nor is any form separable from it, except the rational. Not the latter, because otherwise he would have had to create it anew in the resurrection or produce it in any way whatsoever, and therefore substantially unite it to the body existing in the sepulchre - all of which are absurd. After I had written these things thus in the first edition, the treatise of the illustrious Vossius on Idolatry came out, where in book 3, chapter 40, he judges this opinion safer. VII. Problem: Whether therefore it is to be said that the embryo is successively informed by three souls, so that when the sensitive arrives the vegetative is abolished, and when the rational arrives the sensitive is abolished? I answer: Indeed the scholastics commonly say this with Thomas, first part question 118 article 2, and Summa contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 89, and Scaliger Exercises 297 section 1 and 290 section 2, the Coimbrans cited above, and all the other Pontifical philosophers and theologians. To me, however, this opinion has never been

pleasing. Now looking around to see if others also judge with me, I find Goclenius in his Exercises on Scaliger question 5 page 55 doubting it, but Zanchi in the chapter cited openly rejecting it. See their reasons there. To me it has always seemed absurd: 1) to imagine a triple generation and introduction of form, and therefore to constitute a triple species of living nature in act (for the soul is the act of an organic body), so that the pregnant female conceives and carries first not a man, but a plant, and then a brute; 2) then an abortion which occurs after the animation of the fetus would not always be a man, but sometimes only a plant or brute; 3) then it could not be judged whether an aborted fetus was to be baptized and honored with (as they say) ecclesiastical burial, because although it lived and moved itself for some moment, there is still no certainty whether the rational soul had been introduced and the sensitive abolished. The Pontificals especially should have thought about this case, who so precisely and anxiously inquire about the necessity of baptism and ecclesiastical burial. These things I thus commented in the year 1638 in the first edition of this disputation for the determination of the present and immediately preceding problem. Afterwards it happened that some obsolete concepts about the mind or spirit, distinct from the human soul and body, and about the human animal, were rehashed by some more recent authors - which if they are defended with their own thorns and hypotheses to the end, seem to render theology inconvenient and difficult for us somewhere, especially in the refutations of the Socinians and others, ancient and modern. I, given the occasion here, gave in advance to Christian philosophers and theologians to consider in the year 1641, in the corollaries to the disputation on the Jubilee, what inconveniences seemed to me to be able to follow from that new philosopheme about man as a being per accidens.

See below, after the appendices, the corollaries just mentioned. Recently it has also been disputed elsewhere about the distinction of spirit, soul, and body. The books published on this controversy can be consulted. Compare Calvin, Institutes book 1 chapter 15 section 6, Polanus book 5 of the Syntagma chapter 32, Zanchi part 2 on the works of creation book 2 chapter 4, the scholastics with Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 58 and first part question 76 article 3, although they hold that the fetus is first informed by the vegetative soul, then the sensitive, finally the rational, yet they strongly deny that three souls subsist simultaneously in man. Let their reasons be seen, and compare articles 4 and 5 of the same question. I do not see these more subtle and solid speculations refuted by the Platonic-Hermetic opinions of the more recent authors, or by the followers of Zabarella. Even if the reasons of each side were placed in equilibrium, nevertheless one who preferred to incline to that side by which the errors of the Socinians and others, ancient and modern, could be refuted more safely and expeditiously, would commit nothing absurd. For sound and sober philosophy always desires to serve the truth of religion and Christian theology. But what those errors are, it would be worthwhile for philosophers to learn from Gennadius, Augustine, Alphonsus, Prateolus, and other writers on heresies, whom we indicate elsewhere. For ignorance of such histories often makes disputation here more carefree. When that die has been cast, it sometimes brings with it stubborn defense and disturbances. VIII. Problem: Whether the soul is whole in the whole and whole in any part? I affirm, as theologians and philosophers commonly do, and we with them. 1) There are those who deny that the soul is in the whole body, locating it with the Stoics in the heart, like Philo (Lipsius book 3 disputation 18), Albert, and some more recent authors. And here they adduce scripture, from which it is clear that the soul is essentially or according to

essence in the heart, virtually in the whole body, in which it exercises its powers through its own instruments, Deuteronomy 29:4, Romans 1:21, Matthew 15:19. 2) Others tie it to the brain or head, like Xenocrates, Herophilus, and others in Tertullian's On the Soul, and the Platonists in Alcinous's On the Doctrine of Plato chapter 23. 3) Others again in some hidden place, from which as a spider it would run through the whole body as necessity required. But it is answered that it is in the heart only, not essentially or informatively, but according to a peculiar and organic mode of operation, as in the fount of heat, the workshop of spirits, and the seat of the sensitive appetite. 4) Others deny that it is whole in each part, among whom Timpler, Metaphysics book 2 chapter 5 question 6, but whom I think took this from Conrad Vorstius, at that time a theologian of Steinfurt, who laid this opinion as a hypothesis under his infamous disputation against God's immensity. Before them Simon Portius had rolled the same stone in his work On the Human Mind chapter 7, but whose reasons, says Zanchi, can be easily refuted.

We, with Augustine in his work On the Immortality of the Soul, Gregory of Nyssa in his work On the Making of Man chapter 12, the scholastics on question 76 article 8, and all the more recent authors, hold that it is whole in the whole and whole in any part; and because the matter is of some moment, as Zanchi says in the cited place, let the reasons be these. First, because the whole human body and any part of it is informed by the soul and substantially united to it, and through it lives and operates, and therefore is a human body - not only the heart or brain, etc. Second, then the soul would be one with the body per accidens, and thus the composite or whole would be no essential and per se whole, but nothing else would remain but an equivocal human body. Third, if it were in the parts by parts and not whole in each part, it would follow that it is divisible, quantitative, corporeal, and corruptible by parts, and thus consequently according to the whole of itself - all of which are most absurd. The opposing reasons are solved if it is noted: 1) The soul is not called a quantitative whole, but an essential or metaphysical whole. 2) Moreover, it is whole in the whole body adequately as in its first and proportioned perfectible, in any part inadequately. 3) It is in the body not inherently as an accident in a subject, nor adhesively as something located in a place, but essentially and formally, as form in matter, and with matter in a composite. After the first edition of this disputation, I see some doubts moved against this opinion by Vossius book 3 chapter 40, who nevertheless professes that he does not want to contend about it odiously. As the prudence and modesty of that greatest man is pleasing, so I do not see why, those doubts notwithstanding, the received opinion should not be retained. On extension, which is conceived with the greatest difficulty, see Galenus de la Serna against Sennert. IX. Problem: Whether the faculties or powers of the soul are also in each part of the body? I affirm concerning the immaterial ones, namely the intellect and will - in which sense Scaliger, Exercise 307 section 37, says that memory and intellect are in the foot. The common opinion denies it concerning the material and organic ones, in Thomas first part question 76 article 8, the Coimbrans on the second book of On the Soul chapter 2 question 9. They support this opinion with the hypothesis that those powers are not in the soul as in a subject, but in the whole composite, Thomas first part question 77 article 5. But I do not see why the opinion of John of Jandun on the second book of On the Soul question 7, Giles of Rome in his Quodlibetal Questions quodlibet 3 question 10, Soncinas book 7 of the Metaphysics question 7, Cajetan in his work On Being and Essence chapter 7 question 16, and others who hold the contrary, should be rejected.

Therefore let us reconcile all things by the distinction of power into first and second. The former emanates from the soul and is wherever the soul is; for example, the first power of seeing is in the blind, even one deprived of all disposition of organs, and thus the power of understanding in a fatuous man; by equal right the power of seeing is in the foot. But the latter includes and requires a due organ and its apt disposition, and thus sight, phantasy, memory, etc. are not in the foot - no more than ingenuity or subtlety of imagining is in the brain of a fatuous man. With these things posited, we elicit this consequence: vital powers cannot be really separated from the soul without implication of contradiction, because they have an immediate and necessary connection with the soul, and emanate from it not through a mediate action but through an immediate efficiency and dependence. Thus Cajetan on the first part question 54 article 4. And before him Capreolus on the first book of Sentences distinction 3 question 3. And this against the more recent authors in Ruvius on the second book of On the Soul, treatise on the powers of the soul, question 2, where nevertheless he concedes that separated thus they cannot be united to an extraneous subject. This corollary makes a hypothesis for us in the controversy on the implication of contradiction, on which see the Disputation on the Power of God. X. Problem: Whether the soul is also in the spirits, blood, and other humors, likewise in semen, milk, etc., that is, whether they are animate? I deny, as is commonly held in Thomas first part, last question, article 1, and the Coimbrans on the first book of On Generation and Corruption chapter 4 questions 24-25, and Ruvius on the second book of On the Soul question 8, where besides solid reasons authors of every kind - philosophers, physicians, scholastics, fathers - are adduced; to whom, so that we may be brief, we refer the students. We only indicate that the use of this disputation is manifold: 1) in the explication of Genesis 9:4 and Leviticus 17:11, 14; then, in the resolution of the question whether Christ personally and mediately united the blood to the divine suppositum, and how the fifth canon of the Council of Ephesus and the first, fifth and third articles of Chalcedon are to be understood; 3) whether that blood which is shown somewhere as the blood of Christ is the formal object of adoration; 4) whether that blood is to be restored to each one's body in the resurrection; 5) whether, if indeed the whole body of Christ is under the species of the host, the blood is also there in its vessels; 6) whether blood poured out of the vessels can rightly be called concomitant to the body, and that as either a part or at least as something necessary for the life and sustenance of the body; 7) whether the traducianism of the soul can be explained in such a way that the soul of the parents is said to be decided and transferred and propagated in and with the semen; 8) whether the spirits are the medium of the essential union and the bond of soul and body; 9) whether the same can under some color be called the life itself and soul of man. XI. Problem: Whether the hair and nails are animate? I answer: Here philosophers and physicians equally with theologians fence most fiercely, although this controversy does not touch the theologians so much as the previous one. The Coimbrans in the cited place, question 23, think the three opinions equally probable. The first is that of Thomas, Scotus, Javelli, Vega, Viguerius, who want them to be informed by the rational soul. The second is that of Bonaventure, Durandus, etc., who say they live and are informed not indeed by the soul of the whole animal, but by another proper to them, which is endowed only with the vegetative faculty. The third is that of the physicists and physicians - Conciliator, Fracastoro, Fernel, Garbius, Peramatus, etc. The Coimbrans in the cited place incline to the first opinion, and Ruvius on the second book of On the Soul, treatise on the way in which the soul

informs, question 9, defends it on account of the authority of Thomas, as he there says. Ruvius rejects the second opinion, the Coimbrans defend it. With whom I prefer to side, at least as to the hair. Further, to the arguments of the adversaries, both in this and in the immediately preceding controversy, it is easy to respond. 1) They object from reason and the authority of Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas, that the blood is an integral part of the living thing. Therefore. Thus Conrad, the Archbishop of Seville, Medina, Toletus on the second book of On the Soul question 4, Scaliger Exercise 280. I answer from the philosophers, and Thomas and the other sententiaries on the fourth book of Sentences distinction 48 question 1, that parts are said in three ways: primary, pertaining to the primary constitution of the body, which are solid, like bones, flesh, nerves, etc.; secondary, not indeed pertaining to the first constitution, but without which the primary cannot have either natural being, or consistency, or operation, which are fluid, like blood, etc.; pertaining to the adornment and some conservation of the body, but not to its natural consistency, like hair, etc. 2) They object that when the Son of God personally united human nature to himself, he also assumed the blood and humors, because they pertain to the truth of human nature, as the scholastics commonly teach on the third part question 54 article 1. I answer: the blood and humors were assumed by him, not by distinct assumptions but by the same total and complete one by which human nature was assumed from the beginning, which is one through one substantial form. Although these secondary parts are not informed by the same form or soul, nevertheless under their own proper and incomplete forms they pertain to the truth and integrity of the same human nature, to which and to the primary parts of the body they were ordained from the beginning, as necessary for their consistency and natural state, and as instruments for exercising operations, and as transient matter (like blood) which passes into the primary parts. Thus Ruvius excellently in the cited place. Compare the scholastics on the third part question 54 article 2. 3) They object: the spirits as well as the nails and hair are nourished and grow. Thus the authors of the contrary opinion cited above. Concerning the spirits, Scaliger in the cited Exercise, where he contends that not only the innate but also the adventitious ones are animate. Concerning the nails, Valesius in his Controversies book 2 chapter 21, where he also grants them touch. Concerning the nails and hair, Thomas on the fourth book of Sentences distinction 44 question 1, Javellus on the second book of On the Soul question 10, Viguerius in his Institutes of Theology chapter 21. I answer: I deny that it is a proper growth; but only an earthy excrement is apposed to one part, nor is there motion simultaneously to all differences of position - not otherwise than as fire, water, etc. sometimes increase. 4) They object: in Leviticus 17 it is said that life is in the blood; therefore the blood seems to live. I answer: This must be taken causally and concomitantly, because all life is caused, sustained, and declared through the blood. For from the blood come the spirits; the spirits serve the senses, and in man the senses serve reason. Therefore it must be said that the blood is vital and living life, not formally, but causally or dispositively and conservatively. For blood is required in the body as a certain necessary disposition for this, that the soul be conserved in the body itself for an extended time. In the way that food is called healthy not formally but conservatively, and medicine healthy effectively and dispositively. Augustine book 2 chapter 6 against the adversary of the law and the prophets explains this passage: That the soul is called blood in the way that the Rock is called Christ - not because it was this, but because it was signified by this. From the Rabbis, Aben Ezra, an excellent philosopher otherwise, expounds the word "nefesh" as the vital spirit, and the words in verse 14 "its blood in its soul," that is, let it cohere with its soul (that is, its vital

spirit), because the vessels proceeding from the left corner of the heart are divided into vehicles of spirit and blood. But better Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki: Its blood, he says, is for it in place of the soul, because life depends on it. Most plainly of all we here interpret life, which is called blood and is said to be in the blood, in the way we have said. 5) Cajetan objects, third part question 4 article 3, that there is a twofold blood: imperfect, which has not reached the ultimate concoction, which namely becomes nutrimental, because it has the nature of nourishment; and perfect, which is more purified and has attained the ultimate concoction, and therefore does not pertain to nourishment, but to the truth and integrity of nature; the latter was assumed by the Son of God and is to be restored to bodies in the resurrection, but the former by no means. I answer: reason and physical and medical experience do not recognize a twofold blood distinct in species. Therefore this fiction is evanescent. How the Son of God assumed blood, and concerning the blood to be restored to glorious bodies, will be opportunely said in the common places on the Resurrection and Incarnation. 6) Some object that the blood receives only a grade of life from the soul. But Toletus and other more recent authors with him want it not to live, but only for the grade of a mixed body to be attributed to it by the soul, as also to the bones the grade of life, not of sensation, to other more perfect parts the grade of sense and motion, to others in addition the substantial grade of rationality. I answer: It is said indeed but not proven that the soul does not attribute all grades of being to each part of the body, but more or fewer according to the mode of disposition and organization. Then I do not see how they do not fall back into those absurd opinions: That the soul informs the body through the mediation of a body or corporeal disposition; likewise that the soul qua rational, or according to the intellective grade, is not essentially united to the body and informs it. 7) They object from Aristotle that the blood moves in the body according to every difference of place. I answer: But it does not follow from this that it is animate, because it is moved not by itself, but by the same soul, through the vital spirits as instruments. Problem 1: Whether fat is informed by the soul? I incline to the negative, if indeed it is held not to differ essentially from blood. 2) Whether and how the semen of the Blessed Virgin is said to have been infected and unclean with original sin. I answer: We will speak of this in the disputation on the propagation of original sin. And these things we thus determined in the year 1638 in the first edition of this disputation according to our capacity. But the recent skirmishes of some for the vanity and luxury of the aging world in the adornment of hair have given learned men occasion to inquire more accurately into those questions, whether hair is a part of the body or an excrement, and whether it lives, and how. Among others, our Reverend colleague Charles de Maets seems to have skillfully solved the knot (in my judgment at least), who, insisting on the second opinion, does not deny that hair lives, but denies that it follows from this that it lives by the common life and form of the whole composite, and consequently is a part of the body properly so called, as one or another of the patrons of capillary vanities wished to contend, so that they might build their paradox upon this problematic opinion, about shaving or shearing the heads of women, and indefinitely or infinitely growing the hair of men, namely in a way agreeable or at least not repugnant (so to speak) to nature or natural honesty, or right reason - which teaches, of course, that the parts of the body are to be retained, cherished, etc. I believe they want to reduce our Belgians to the ancient custom of the Indians on the island of Formosa, or rather to the wisdom of the Pygmies, about whom Ctesias in Photius's Myriobiblon page 145: "they wear very long hair" (note the use and signification of the word "coma"), "let down to the knees themselves and even below, with a beard longer than

any other men's - which indeed when it begins to be rather long for them, they subsequently use no other clothing, but their hair let down far below the knees in the back, and their beard flowing down past the chest to the feet, they mass together and gird around the whole body, and thus their own hairs are for them in place of a garment." Let the reader himself consult our colleague's textual diatribe on 1 Corinthians 11. Most recently there has also been published by the distinguished theologian and Doctor of Medicine Johannes van der Heyden, minister of the church at Brouwershaven in Zeeland, a Diascepsis on hair, whether it is a part of the body, where by the weight of reasons and the consensus of physicists and physicians he validly disputes for the negative opinion - to which we refer the reader. Suárez and other more recent scholastics subtly inquire on the third part question 119 whether the blood is animate and whether it is a part of the body, where a hypothesis is made for them in determining the question whether the blood of Christ shed on the cross remained united to the divinity for the three days, and in the resurrection was again assumed by Christ and united with his whole organic body to his soul. And a most heated contention arose over this between the Dominicans and Minorites, mutually condemning each other of heresy, to such an extent that Pope Paul II had to check it by a special bull in the year 1464. Today some think it was defined by that Pope that the shed blood remained united to the divinity for the three days. However, Franciscus Collius, theologian of the Ambrosian College, denies this in his treatise on the blood of Christ book 5 disputation 4 chapter 2. And with him Flavius Cherubini in his notes to the compendium of the Bullarium volume 1 page 67. XII. Problem: Whether hair, nails, blood, milk, semen are animal parts? I answer: It depends on the determination of the preceding problem. Arriaga affirms in his Physics Course. Eustachius a Sancto Paulo denies in his Summa Philosophiae page 169, and the Coimbrans in the cited place, and the scholastics on the cited place of Thomas. And Angelus Morellus Aretinus, a Servite theologian and philosopher, expressly ventilated this problem and the preceding one in his treatise On the Passage of Human Souls into Beasts etc., published in Padua in 1589, where after weighing the reasons and authorities of each side, he determines for the negative. I will have done a worthwhile thing if I transcribe his distinctions here. Quire E.

Secondly, it must be noted from Alexander of Hales in the second part of his Summa that living things are of three kinds: for of living things, some are said to live properly, some less properly, but some very improperly.

I declare each one: those properly live which are united to a soul perfecting them, as are organic bodies, already perfected in act by the soul itself, whence the Philosopher said, "The soul is the act of a physical organic body having life in potency."

Those are said to live less properly which live by conjunction, as are those which are not conjoined to souls perfecting them, but are nevertheless conjoined to a body having a soul as a perfection. Although these do not have a soul, nevertheless by reason of that conjunction with the body they have some vital power through which they have operations similar to a thing properly living, of what is contiguous or containing - and in this way the embryo before its organization is said to live; similarly nails, hair, apples conjoined to trees, and in like manner concerning other fruits of the earth.

Thirdly and lastly, those are said to live very improperly which are not united to a soul nor from a colligation or conjunction with a living body do they receive some vital power within themselves, as living things in the second way do, but from that colligation with the body they receive only some vegetation, whence they are in a disposition to union with a vivified body, and are as nourishment with respect to the vital power, and in that way the spirits and humors which serve the vital power are said to live, according to which they are in a certain way vegetated, augmented, or restored in the body. Someone will say: How are the humors vegetated or nourished in the body? I say that they are vegetated or nourished in the way in which we commonly say that something is vegetated in the body, insofar as it is not putrefied or corrupted in the body - and in that way the humors, among which blood is numbered, are said to live.

Therefore, living is in three grades: properly, as are things having a soul; less properly, as are things having only a vital power; very improperly, as are things not having a soul, nor a vital power, but only a certain vegetation. And thus from this excellent distinction it is clear how it can be conceded that the blood is animate, and in what way all things proving that the blood lives and is animate can be satisfied.

Thirdly, it must be principally noted that the nails, hair and fur of the body are not formally animate or univocally living. The reason is because such things are not properly called healthy or sick; therefore they are not formally living, as was deduced above, and consequently it could be said that they are not augmented by a true augmentation, but only from a continuation or a certain addition of some part supervening, added or continued to the preceding part, in the way that water and other liquids are said to be augmented. And to the second question of quire G: The first distinction is such: That something is of the truth, integrity and part of man happens in four ways.

First, that it is an essential part of man necessarily required, without which man cannot be, as matter and form with respect to man and any composite.

Second, that it is an integral part of human nature. Integrating parts are required for the being of man, without which nevertheless man could be, as the head, hands, feet, arms, and similar members, which man sometimes lacks - for we see many men without hands and without feet. The reason for this is because such integral parts include not only that which pertains to the essence of man, but also include something added, that is, such or such a quantity or figure.

These essential and integral parts are intrinsic, because they intrinsically pertain to the integrity of the animal, and among these the essential parts pertain more intrinsically.

Third, something can be called a part of man not indeed intrinsically but purely extrinsically, without which, or without which plural, nature according to its common course could not be saved, unless such parts were adjoined, as are the humors, choler, phlegm, melancholy, blood.

Fourth, something is called a part of man as to its beauty, loveliness, ornament, or comeliness - and thus everything which pertains to the beauty of man can be called a part of man, as are these: beard, nails, and hair.

XIII. Problem: Whether the bones, hair, nerves, blood, spirits, brain sense? I answer: Campanella affirms, book 2 On the Sense of Things and Magic - which is not surprising, since he attributes sense to all things. Nevertheless, the common school of physicians and physicists determines the contrary, which we can safely and without wandering into absurdity follow, especially since theology and scripture (as far as we know) do not touch on these things. XIV. Problem: Whether man can be without a spleen, whether lost lungs can be restored, etc.? I answer: These are to be rejected to popular errors (although Talantonius book 3 chapter 19 of his Treasury of Hidden Things disputes that the spleen can be removed), and the disputation is to be left to physicians. For they do not (as far as I know) touch our theology. Concerning the heart and its affections and wounds, the matter is otherwise, as we indicated in the Disputation on the Pierced Side of Christ. As also concerning the ribs and wounds around them, because scripture makes mention of them.

ON CREATION, PART TEN.

RESPONDENT LUBERT SPRUIT of Utrecht
For November 10, 1638.

I. Whether all souls are of equal substantial perfection, or whether one is more perfect than another? I affirm the former and deny the latter, concerning both specific and individual perfection. And thus Thomas, second part of the second part question 5 article 4, and third part question 69 article 4. Hannibal Guaschus in a special Disputation on the equality of souls laboriously proves that the contrary opinion is attributed to some Thomists. However, more recent authors generally either make this question problematic or quodlibetical, like the Coimbrans on the second book of On the Soul chapter 1 question 5, or keenly defend inequality, like Báñez, Ruvius, and before them Capreolus, Javellus, Ferrariensis, Cajetan, Giles of Rome, Bonaventure, Richard, and almost all the scholastics, with the Master preceding them in the second book of Sentences distinction 17, as indeed they adduce his words for this, although I judge that such a thing is not contained in them.

Indeed, among the articles condemned by the Parisians they refer the opposite opinion. See the syllabus of various erroneous articles of almost all faculties condemned studiously and authoritatively in England and Paris, with their revocations, which is usually published with Lombard. Where in chapter 8 there are errors on the soul and intellect, among which also this one: "Likewise, that it is unfitting to posit some intellects nobler than others, because since that diversity cannot be on the part of the bodies, it is necessary that it be on the part of the intelligences - and thus noble souls would necessarily be of diverse species, like the intelligences." An error, because thus the soul of Christ would not be nobler than the soul of

Judas. Nevertheless, Durandus, Argentinus, Soncinas, Soto, Toletus in the third book of On the Soul question 18, where he adds that the opposite opinion is rash and dangerous, expressly embraced the opinion here condemned. Fonseca, Metaphysics book 5 chapter 26 question 16, where he also adduces the authorities of the fathers. To be brief, the Thomists cited with Ruvius whitewash it, and make the exception that individual perfection is a substantial mode, hence one soul is substantially more perfect than another, namely modally, not essentially.

Moreover, that one man understands more perfectly than another and better penetrates the nature of the object, on account of two things: 1) because he has a better intellect and a better soul; 2) on account of the inferior powers being better disposed, namely the internal and external senses. I answer: The principle is begged; for this would have to be demonstrated, that both the essence of the soul and the faculty of understanding are substantially more perfect. For the arguments of the opponents themselves accomplish nothing other than that the second powers are more perfect, that is, the ingenia of men are more perfect and noble than others - which we concede. But from this the consequence to the first powers and the very substance of the soul is false. Moreover, the first union of the individual soul clothed with its faculties with its individual body into one substantial composite must be distinguished from the second union in operations and for the operations of the composite. In the latter, more and less have a place on account of more and less in the qualities and disposition of the organs; but in the former, by no means. We therefore prove that common saying of Aristotle bandied about in the schools: If an old man had the eye of a youth, he would see as a youth. But in what follows, it will be seen that this our opinion is more suitable for explicating certain doubts. XII. Problem: Whether by the fall of man human nature was essentially changed, and therefore made worse? I deny. For every change is accidental, in the second powers executing human actions - the modification and disposition of which through habitual or permanent sanctity or adventitious corruption determines and specifies to good or to evil. Therefore neither the essential constitutives, like body and soul, or animal and rational, nor the consecutives, like mind, will, and their connatural properties, have been lost or changed in themselves and intrinsically - much less is sin the very substance of man, or an essential property of man. Which must be observed against the Manicheans and Flacians, likewise against the Anabaptists attacking the conception of Christ from Mary infected with sin.

XIII. Problem: Whether it is immortal or incorruptible, and that from its own nature, but not through grace; and whether its immortality can be demonstrated from the light and reason of nature? I affirm, first, from within, namely because its being has no principle of dissolution or ceasing, and therefore its nature demands that it perpetually retain the being which it once received, to such an extent that although it depends on God, nevertheless it cannot be destroyed through his ordinary power. But from without it is corruptible, because God can destroy it through his absolute power. And thus, in opposition to the angels and human souls, he alone is said to have immortality, 1 Timothy 6. But the immortality of the soul is proven from innumerable testimonies and arguments of scripture, which see in Zanchi, Polanus, Alphonsus de Castro, etc. 2) I affirm, because there is no composition in it from contraries, nor any other principles of dissolution, so that it cannot be corrupted through the application of a natural agent, or through the removal of an impediment or object posited by grace - to which some refer

that in Matthew 10, "But they cannot kill the soul." 3) That it can be persuaded a posteriori by certain reasons by which a man not entirely petulant or pervicacious could and should be moved, is not to be denied; but nevertheless, that an evident demonstration by which the human mind is convinced and compelled a priori has hitherto been found is not so clear. Scotus, Cajetan, and others think that it is known by faith alone; almost all the scholastics and more recent authors cited in the Coimbrans and Ruvius, as well as Lorinus on Ecclesiastes 3 and 12, hold the contrary.

Whatever may be the case concerning the certainty of the demonstration, nevertheless its facility and evidence has not yet appeared up to now, besides the fact that every demonstration is a posteriori. And this is not obscurely admitted by the cited authors. Nevertheless it is most certain that the truth of faith can be solidly defended, and all objections from the light of nature dissolved. And this is what the scholastics wanted, and from our side Zanchi, who also dissolves the objections of the atheists, specifically Simon Portius. Theodoret in sermon 5 of his Cure of Greek Affections explains the opinion of the Gentiles on the immortality of souls. And from the more recent authors Steuco in book 9 of his Perennial Philosophy, and Mornay in chapter 15 of his work On the Truth of the Christian Religion. After them Julius Caesar Bulenger did the same in his Eclogues on Arnobius book 1 eclogue 1 chapters 5-6. Before him Turnèbe had collected some things in his work on Plato's Phaedo. But these do not argue for an evident demonstration from the light of nature alone any more than the sayings of the Gentiles on the resurrection of the body, heavenly beatitude, indeed even the Trinity, the satisfaction of God's justice, and appeasement through blood.

Aristotle's opinion is very much disputed. There are those who say he denies it, others that he doubts, others that he affirms - thus Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 79, and there Ferrariensis, and Naclantus Bishop of Chioggia in a special treatise, Steuco book 9 chapter 18, and almost all the more recent authors. The texts of Aristotle himself must especially be looked at, book 2 of On the Generation of Animals chapter 3, Metaphysics book 11 (in Latin it is book 12) chapter 3, and book 1 of On the Soul chapter 4, and book 2 chapter 1. However, it cannot be denied that he holds the passive intellect to be mortal, only the active immortal, as is clear to one inspecting just now chapter 6 of book 3 of On the Soul, and Julius Pacius in his commentary and Montecatini in his lecture on the cited chapter solidly and perspicuously show this against other interpreters or rather torturers of Aristotle's text. The latter devised a subtle evasion and reconciliation, so that "always" may be joined with the participle "separated," and thus be opposed to the mind, soul, etc., if it could be proven from the words of Aristotle. The more common and solid natural demonstrations are these.

1) It is taken from the independence of the operation of the soul, namely intellection, which is not organic, nor absolutely and necessarily depends on a bodily organ. For although according to the order of nature, as long as it is in the body, it receives species from the senses, nevertheless God can immediately impress them on it; he can also suspend the actions of the senses, as is clear in ecstasy and rapture, on which see the Disputation on Prophecy. Hence therefore it is inferred that it is independent in being, and separable from the body.

2) The intellect is a purely spiritual, inorganic power, perceiving spiritual and universal things, etc.; therefore it is independent of the body, etc.

3) From natural conscience and synderesis, and the justice and providence of God, whence it is gathered that something of man remains after death, because in this life it is not well with the good, nor ill with the evil, in proportion to their works. Therefore, etc. Which reason I prefer to all others.

Scaliger in Exercise 309 section 20 urges these two reasons: because it is simple, and because it is a fifth essence, not elementary; therefore neither is it dissoluble. Antonio Sirmond, a Jesuit theologian, in a special treatise published in 1635 pleads this cause, and for it adduces these classes of arguments.

1. From divine authority, Matthew 10, etc. 2. From human authority. 3. Reason, from the providence and justice of God. 4. From the excellence of man. 5. From the law of heroic virtues. 6. From the law of common virtue. 7. Because the soul has some proper operation, namely the vision of itself: 1) Through common principles. 2) Through its own intelligibility without a species. 3) Through an equal power of understanding. 4) Through the independence of intellection from the body.

Further, the mortality of the soul was asserted in olden times by the Sadducees; the Nazareans, Arabians (although these said it would be resurrected together with the body, Augustine on Heresies chapter 83). Philastrius attributes the same error to the Samaritans; and Prateolus book 1 page 23 to the Albigensians. Which is a satanic calumny; and Alphonsus de Castro book 2 folio 62 testifies that it was revived by Hermann Rijswijck, a Dutchman. Prateolus has the same, both of which copied from Lutzenburger, who relates that this Hermann, first condemned to perpetual prison in 1499, was later burned in 1512 when he had relapsed. This at least is certain, that this error is nowhere more common than at Rome and in Italy, and specifically among the literate and academic professors, and the Roman Curialists, and those who eat under the jaws of the Pope. They cannot be ignorant for what reason and against whom the decree of the Council of Vienne under Clement V and of the Lateran under Leo X session 8 was established, compared with the counsel of the Cardinal Delegates under Paul III. Moreover, treatises have been published by Niphus, Naclantus, Cano, Johannes Cognatus, Antonio Possevino, Leonard Lessius, and others on the immortality of the soul; Javelli against Pomponazzi, Fortunio Liceti against Cremonini; and Talantonio's dissertation in the treasury of hidden things, book 2 chapter 7. Compare our disputation on atheism.

XIV. Problem: Whether it is a purely spiritual substance, so that it has nothing of body mixed in its entity; and whether this can be proven from the light of nature. I answer: The first part is affirmed from Ecclesiastes 12:7, Luke 23:46, where spirit can signify neither air, nor wind, nor the vital spirits, nor anything which is corrupted in and with the body (from which the soul is separated). However, the Luciferians in Augustine on Heresies chapter 81 thought the contrary, as well as some of the fathers who attributed thin and more subtle bodies to angels and souls, like Origen, Tertullian, Justin Martyr, Macarius, Caesarius, Claudianus Mamertus on the State of

the Soul, Gennadius chapter 12, and John of Thessalonica in the pseudo-Nicene synod (which they call the second) action 5. Augustine speaks in that direction, but he seems to explain himself better in epistle 28 to Jerome. And Ruvius in vain strives to excuse them in his treatise on the Separated Soul question 2, and the Coimbrans on the second book of On the Soul chapter 1 question 1. Which it would be easy to demonstrate to the eye, if it were worth it and the narrowness of the paper allowed it.

The contrary opinion is to be held, with the common theology and philosophy, and the scholastics in Thomas first part question 51 article 1 and question 75 article 1, and in the Master on the second book of Sentences distinction 8, as well as Gregory Nazianzen, John Chrysostom, Cyril, Gregory of Nyssa, and other fathers, whom I see cited by Elmenhorst on Gennadius chapter 12. The latter part is affirmed a posteriori, namely from its proper operations; for since they are not corporeal nor organic, fixed to a certain and proper organ (as the sensitive ones are), it follows that neither are the rational faculties corporeal, and therefore neither is the rational soul according to its proper entity.

XV. Problem: Whether it is simple or composite from matter and form, or from a real receptive potency and a real act or form received in it? I affirm the first and deny the latter, with the common school in Aristotle book 2 of On the Soul chapters 1 and 3, and Thomas first part question 75 article 5, where see the reasons. XVI. Problem: Whether it is divisible, whether it grows weary, ages, sleeps, directly suffers from the body or corporeal things? I deny. The psychopannychia and burning of souls by fire is expressly treated in the common places on the state of the separated soul and on hell. Meanwhile, let students consult the cited authors and Goclenius's Exercises on Scaliger page 51.

XVII. Problem: Whether the excellence and powers of the human soul are to be so amplified that all things are said to be subject to its command, and divination, miracles, tricks, fascination are attributed to it as to a direct and physical cause? I deny, against the magi, Hermetic Platonists, and Cardano, Pomponazzi, and similar authors, on which below and in the disputations on miracles, on prophecy, on magic.

2. So much for the principles of human essence; now for the principles of existence, or the origin of man. This can be considered in four ways: 1) in the very first creation from the earth; 2) in the creation of the woman from the rib of the man; 3) in ordinary generation from man and woman; 4) in the extraordinary generation of Christ from a virgin by the power of the Holy Spirit.

Concerning the first and second modes of production it is asked: I. Problem: From what matter was the first man produced - from earth alone, or from the four elements? I answer: Nothing prevents understanding earth in Genesis 2:7 and 3:19, 1 Corinthians 15:47 (which with water is the predominant element in the human body according to the scholastics on the first part question 99 article 1) synecdochically as the four elements. II. Problem: Whether God first formed the body in the mode of a statue from mud or clay, because dust is not suitable for formation; then gradually introduced the dispositions of flesh and the human body into this clay statue; finally simultaneously with the ultimate disposition introduced the heterogeneous forms

of the individual parts, and creating and infusing the soul together with them? I answer: The scholastics commonly affirm on the first part question 91 article 2, and some commentators - Chrysostom, Gennadius in the Catena, Cornelius a Lapide. But these things are uncertain and cannot be proven from scripture.

Indeed, the contrary is proven from it concerning dust, from Genesis 2:7, 3:19, 1 Corinthians 15:47. Nor are the passages Job 10:9, Jeremiah 18:2 relevant. III. Problem: Whether Adam was created from red earth, and indeed in the field of Damascus near Hebron, where he is also said to be buried, to which Joshua 14:15 is thought to pertain. I answer: The Hebrews indeed hand this down, and with them Jerome, Nicholas of Lyra, Hugh of St. Victor, Tostado; and those who have described the Holy Land - Burchard, Breidenbach, Salignac, Adrichem. But the former is fallaciously inferred from the etymology of the word "adamah," since that word in general signifies soil or earth (because untouched earth is red or seems to be red), and not only some part of the earth distinguished from another by redness; see Genesis 4:2, 1 Samuel 4:12, Nehemiah 9:1, Exodus 3:5, etc. The rest of what they append is fabled. That the passage of Joshua is to be explained otherwise, and the name Adam there is appellative, is taught both by the accent which distinguishes this word from the preceding ones and joins it with the following, and especially by the prefixed article, which is not construed with proper names. And thus the Targum expounds Adam by "ish," that is, man. Thus at the same time is exploded the fiction of Johannes Lucidus, who makes Adam the greatest giant.

IV. Problem: Whether the soul of the protoplast was immediately infused by God, and is signified by the breath of life? I affirm, for the soul from that effect in the body most necessary, namely respiration, is called "neshamah" from the root "nasham," he panted, drew breath, Jeremiah 2:24, 1 Kings 19:1; hence God is said to have breathed into his nostrils the spirit of life, and man to have spirit in his nostrils, Isaiah 2:22. Therefore we do not see that the Vulgate translator rendered it better "into his face," as Cornelius a Lapide wants, whose lapses see in his commentary on Genesis 2:7. But we admit what the scholastics and commentators note, that this soul includes the vegetative, sensitive, and rational; but we think their proof from the word "chayyim," of lives, is inept; for it is plural in number, like other age nouns. See Psalm 16 last verse, 103:4, Job 10:12, 24:22, Genesis 7:28.

We reject Philastrius, who numbers this opinion among the heresies or errors, contending that the breath suggests the Holy Spirit or grace imparted to the soul of Adam. But Alphonsus de Castro rightly refutes him in the cited book, and before him Augustine book 13 of the City of God chapter 24. Hence note in passing (which we also advised in the Desperate Cause of the Papacy book 2 section 1 penultimate chapter) that not all are heresies which someone from the heresy writers - Epiphanius, Philastrius, Augustine, Theodoret, Gennadius, John of Damascus, Leontius - labels as such, not to mention the more recent heresy nomenclators to be named elsewhere.

V. Problem: Whether from the passage Genesis 2:7 and Ecclesiastes 12:7 it is rightly proven that the soul is one and the informing and essential form of the body? I affirm. VI. Problem: Whether Eve was really created from the rib of Adam? I answer: 1) There are those who take

these things metaphorically, like Cajetan. 2) Others want the woman to have been created at the same time with the man, but conjoined to him at the back or side, and afterwards separated; and this to be indicated in Genesis chapter 2, verses 21-22. Thus the Rabbis in Rashi and Abraham ibn Ezra in their commentaries, and Maimonides in the Guide of the Perplexed part 2 chapter 30, which opinion Steuco takes up; but it is refuted from the text compared with 1 Timothy 2:13. See Zanchi. 3) Others say that Eve was really formed from Adam according to the letter of the text compared with 1 Corinthians 11:8. Thus Augustine book 9 on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis chapter 16, and the commentators commonly, the scholastics, and the writers of common places, with whom we agree.

A difficulty is moved concerning the rib taken from Adam - whether another was restored with the flesh which verse 21 mentions, as Catharinus wants? Or whether Adam had thirteen ribs, one of which being taken away there remained for him and all men 12 in equal number with women, as Thomas wants, first part question 92 article 30, whom the Pontifical theologians commonly follow, and from our side Zanchi. We prefer to think with Catharinus; for the reasons of the Thomists seem too diluted. It was therefore not a bare rib but also flesh with it taken from Adam, and from both the woman was formed, verse 23 (which Pereira rightly hands down from the more recent authors), and consequently restored with flesh and rib. What Abraham ibn Ezra and the other Rabbis establish, that "tsela'" here as elsewhere signifies synecdochically "tsad," that is, side (not otherwise than the Greek "pleura"), indeed has nothing absurd in itself; and I do not yet see the reasons why that interpretation is to be preferred to this one, since it agrees with the text.

VII. Problem: Of what sort was the sleep of Adam - natural and ordinary, or extraordinary? I answer: From the Rabbis, Abraham ibn Ezra observes that "tardemah" says more than "shenah," and again "shenah" more than "tenumah." For it is a deeper and more profound stupor. Hence Symmachus renders it "ekstasis" (by which word the physicians denote the loss of sense and motion in the whole body of the animal, the faculty of breathing remaining unharmed). And the Septuagint "ekstasis." We with the fathers, scholastics, and our men think there were two extraordinary things in this sleep: 1) that it was deeper than natural sleep, and supernaturally and immediately sent; and this it had in common with the sleep of 1 Samuel 26; 2) that it was ecstatic, or conjoined with ecstasy; and this it had in common with the ecstasy which happens to those sleeping, concerning which Numbers 12:6 and Elihu in Job 33:15. But as for what Augustine in treatise 9 on John and book 9 on Genesis chapter 19, Bernard in sermon 2 on Septuagesima, and the more recent Pereira, Cornelius a Lapide, etc. append, that Adam as one ecstatic and a prophet saw in his mind the spiritual marriage of Christ with the church - we reject that with the same ease with which it is asserted by them. Much more do we reject the fiction of Richard in the second book of Sentences distinction 23 article 2 (from which Thomas does not shrink, first part question 94 article 1), by which he establishes that Adam in this ecstasy saw the divine essence. Which opinion on the vision of God in this life Cornelius a Lapide refutes on 2 Corinthians 12.

VIII. Problem: Whether the soul of Adam was prior in time to the composite, and whether it was produced outside the body? I deny, with Gregory of Nyssa in his book on the creation of man

chapters 29-30, Jerome in epistle 61 to Pammachius, Theodoret on the cure of Greek affections book 5, to which Augustine also inclines in book 12 of the City of God chapter 23, although in book 7 on Genesis chapter 24 he had thought otherwise. See the reasons in the scholastics on Thomas first part question 90 article 4, with whom the more recent authors side, except that Becanus in his Scholastic Theology thinks the contrary opinion probable, Bonaventure prefers it, and the Master leaves it in doubt in the second book of Sentences distinction 17. But on account of the error of Origen to be noted below, it is fitting to embrace the common opinion.

IX. Problem: How could Adam's rib be taken out without a sensation of pain? I answer: Two modes can be devised. One is that God suspended the power of touch as to second act, which happens by the mere suspension of his concurrence with the second cause for such an act producible naturally by the sensitive faculty innate to it. The other is that by that stupor and ecstasy he so benumbed all the senses that they did not perform their office. Nor should this seem impossible, since experience teaches that men are rendered insensible by diabolical obsession, by a lethargic disease, by an epileptic symptom, indeed even by certain narcotics made by art - not to mention fascination and witchcraft, diabolical raptures or ecstasies, mania, frenzy, melancholy, drunkenness, etc., by which it is well known that the phantasy is disturbed and sense not a little dulled. Tostado refers examples of witches on Genesis chapter 13 question 354, and Augustine of a certain priest in book 14 of the City of God chapter 24. Of nearly the same stamp are the raptures of the Anabaptists of Münster, and of that little monk of Bern, whom the Bernese Dominicans abused to prove their opinion on the conception of Mary. The history is described in a special booklet. Lavater repeats the same in his work on specters part 1 chapter 7. Martin Delrio in his Disquisitions on Magic book 2 question 15 expressly teaches when and by what causes indolence can be induced. See him. Compare the Disputation on the Energumens.

X. Problem: Whether the body of the first men was formed earlier in time than the soul was created and infused into the body? I affirm, with many ancients and not a few or ignoble more recent authors. However, the negative is to be held with Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, John Damascene, Thomas on the first part question 91 article 4 reply to objection 3, and the more recent authors who follow him, on account of the reasons adduced by them, which see there, and in part in Pereira book 4 on Genesis question 4.

XI. Problem: Whether the angels created man, or contributed something to his creation; whether the soul of man is from the substance of God, but not from nothing; whether Eve was created on the seventh day; whether the woman was produced per se or per accidens; whether the marriage of Adam and Eve was naturally indecent and illicit, because she was formed from his rib? I deny, and because we must break off, we send the students away to the authors already often praised.

XII. Problem: Whether Adam was created outside Paradise, but Eve in Paradise; whether in perfect age and stature of body; whether the origin of man by creation, and indeed from earth, was also known to the Gentiles? I affirm. See the same authors as above, specifically Pereira.

And on the last point, see Lipsius book 2 disputation 4, Steuco book 9 chapter 21, and Daneau on the first age of the world chapter 3 article 2.

XIII. Problem: Whether in the formation of man something of the celestial nature was mixed in; why Adam was created outside Paradise, Eve within; why the woman from the rib of the man and not from earth; why God wanted Eve to be formed from the sleeping Adam; why he created only one woman; whether she was created from the rib by rarefaction, or by the addition of other matter; why Moses does not mention the creation of the soul of the woman; why God did not equally assign drink and food to the protoplasts, etc.?

I answer: Because these things are partly curious, partly uncertain and doubtful about which it can be said either way, we think they can be learnedly ignored, at least our paper spared. If anyone desires to know what the scholastics and commentators sculpture out from this, let him go to Pereira.

3. The questions about the third mode of human origin, namely generation, we refer to three classes: 1) on generation in general; 2) on the origin of the soul; 3) on the formation of the body. The illustrious questions of the first class are:

I. Whether man can be generated from putrid matter? It is denied, against the shameful disputations of Cesalpino, an otherwise celebrated philosopher, book 5 question 1, and Cardano on subtlety book 9, of whom the former is refuted by Taurellus in his Alpes Caesae, the latter by Scaliger, Exercise 193. Before them Avicenna book 6 of his work on Natural Things, Plato in the Menexenus and elsewhere, Empedocles and Parmenides in Plutarch book 5 of his work on Philosophical Opinions chapter 7 seem to have dreamed something similar. With whom colludes the vanity of the Athenians, who boasted that they were autochthonous. (Compare below problem 9.) It was also a widespread opinion of the ancient Gentiles and of the modern Chinese that men were born from the earth, and that there was such fecundity in Ethiopia and Egypt by the indulgence of the sky and the Nile that not only flying, aquatic and terrestrial things, but also men were born there by spontaneous generation like mushrooms. See Diodorus Siculus book 1 chapters 1 and 7, Justin book 2 chapters 1 and 6 with the notes of Bernegger, Eusebius book 7 of his Preparation for the Gospel chapter 17, Justin Martyr in his Exhortation, Lactantius book 2 chapter 12, Rhodiginus book 2 chapter 19, Pliny book 9 chapter 58, Gryphiander on Islands chapter 8 section 60, Salmuth on Panciroli's New Discoveries title 10 page 212, Otto van Heurn in his Indies chapter 13. The poets in their fashion fable about origin from stones or teeth: οὐ μόνον γηγενεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ σπαρτοὺς ἀνθρώπους γεγενῆσθαι - "not only earth-born, but also sown men were born," as Theodoret says in his Cure of Greek Affections sermon 5. Refer here the fables about mushroom men in Caspar Barthius book 8 of his Adversaria chapter 17. But to detect this opinion is to refute it. See however Lactantius in the cited place urging it with certain absurdities.

And Averroes on the third book of On the Soul in Rhodiginus cited above. Paracelsus teaches that men can be produced by the chymical art in his Paramirum, where he makes three parts of man: elemental, celestial, and divine; he denies that the first two come into heaven. There he

writes thus: "It was doubted by the philosophers whether it could happen that a man be born outside the womb of a woman; to which I respond that it is not repugnant to chymical art and nature, but is very easy. For sperm enclosed in a cucurbit or sealed in the belly of a horse, by the highest putrefaction putrefies for fifty days, until it moves, which is easy to discern. After that time, it will appear somehow similar to a fetus; yet without a body, transparent. If you then daily prudently nourish or feed this with human blood, and keep and cherish it in the equal heat of the horse's belly, after nine months it will appear adorned with all members like an infant born from a woman, yet smaller in quantity. This thing we call a homunculus, which must afterwards be educated with careful solicitude and diligence like a true boy or infant, until it grows up." He adds there that those who are thus born understand all arcana and hidden things which it is otherwise impossible for men to know, because they have acquired life, body, flesh and bones by art; therefore the arts and sciences are innate to them, nor do they need to learn from elsewhere.

Mersenne, citing these words of Paracelsus in his work on Genesis page 65, adds in the margin: "I think this homunculus of Paracelsus is the same as the devils who get themselves nourished like infants, whom some call 'homunculi of glory.'" Jean Bodin book 9 of his work on the Syntax of the Art of Wonders chapter 2 relates from Paracelsus's Great Philosophy tract 1 and 2, book on the homunculus, that some men are Adamic like us, others non-Adamic, of whom some are undines living in the waters, others pygmies and sylphs living in the earth, others gnomes living in the mountains, others salamanders living in fire. We do not find these things said by them.

Briefly, to our students we suggest considering whether such an origin of man agrees with Psalm 139 and Job 10, or with the noble and admirable structure of the body and organs. See those rejecting this opinion - Cristóbal de Vega book 2 of his work on the Medical Art section 6, and Lorinus in his commentary on Ecclesiastes 3:20.

II. Problem: Whether from the devil? I answer: We showed in the disputation On Demons that we incline to the negative opinion; now we absolutely deny it with the authors cited there, on account of the reasons adduced there and by the cited authors; we especially deny it concerning the devil as a succubus, about which Delrio himself, although he concedes it concerning the incubus - which sinful congress can happen, Rivet concedes from our side in Exercise 50 on Genesis, but he denies that conception and birth of a man can result from it. I wrote these things thus in the year 1638. Afterwards I read and compared Fortunio Liceti book 2 of his work On Monsters chapter 73 page 231, where he enumerates all the modes by which monstrous births can and are wont to be produced through demons. Which, because they are related to this problem of ours, I will transcribe here:

"For in the first place, a perfect fetus originating from parents can appear monstrous by the power of a demon deceiving the senses of the viewers; for just as by tricks a man seemed to himself and others to put on the figure of an ass, so with no difficulty an infant can appear compacted of the members of various animals, with an evil demon deceiving the senses of the viewers. Then, the same evil demon can secretly substitute a monster taken from elsewhere,

born from any of the causes proposed before, for the woman giving birth, with the true offspring taken away or by a feigned pregnancy. Then, the demon can promote the constitution of a monster by applying, as is usually said, active things to passive, namely by introducing into the uterus each of the causes of monsters proposed before; for by the power of a demon, God permitting, the generative and formative power residing in the semen can be so enervated in certain parts that it cannot constitute a fetus similar to the parents; then the nature of the semen can be cast down in some part into a viler essence which is apt to constitute only the members of a more imperfect animal; then some parts of the matter of the fetus can be rendered inept for the form of the same species as the parents; then the nourishing power of the fetus can be damaged, so that it cannot conciliate a figure to the parts to which nourishment has been applied; then the alimentary matter can be deprived in some part of those dispositions which are necessary for putting on the effigy of the members to which it is applied; then a disease can be induced in the body of the fetus by which its effigy is deformed into that of a beast; then such a specter can be deeply fixed in the imagination of the parents by which a monstrous fetus may be born; then the prolific semen of various animals can be latently infused into the uterus of the woman, by whose mixture we recently recognized the cause of monsters of this sort to exist; then also in the womb of a pregnant animal a half-formed fetus taken from elsewhere from the uterus of a wild beast can be adjoined to the fetus and conglutinated to the human conception in the constitution of a monster. Of which monster indeed the proper physical efficient cause is the demon, but the minister and artificer is applying active things to passive, introducing dispositions, removing or adducing impediments, agitating the causes of monsters only by local motion."

III. Problem: Whether from man and brute? I answer: I would scarcely dare to concede it. Some examples are adduced by the historians Castanheda the Portuguese, Saxo Grammaticus, Olaus Magnus, João de Barros, Juan Eusebio Nieremberg book 5 chapters 6 and 7, and that well-known one in Belgium in Delrio book 2 question 14. But to confess the truth, I would prefer not to be so liberal in believing. For often impure women would pretend a conception from a boy to cover up adultery or incest.

But as for what Delrio in the cited place says, that they are neither men nor brutes, but a certain mixture from both, not otherwise than a mule from a horse and a donkey - this indeed I cannot approve. For if reason and a human soul are not present in some animal, it is now necessarily a brute; for no mean or third thing is given. After the first edition of this disputation I thought these things should be distinguished more accurately. Therefore one question is: Whether from a man father and a brute mother a man can be generated? The other question is: Whether from a brute father and a human mother a man can be generated? To the former, Aristotle from the hypothesis of his opinion on the semen of women could respond affirmatively without great difficulty. But since his opinion deviates from the truth, the determination is more difficult.

"If," says Juan Eusebio Nieremberg in the cited place, page 76, "the fetus requires the efficacy of both parents, only the feminine womb knows and can know a man endowed with truth and a mind; but if the power of the male alone fabricates the fetus, and the female is only a workshop, perhaps according to the physicists it will be possible after a sinful coitus for a man to be

nurtured in a bestial uterus with human semen produced beforehand. But it is more fitting for theologians to assert that this has never happened. Wherefore, if any true births of beasts occurred from which human-formed fetuses emerged, they were rather empty of mind, and always with some pledge of irrational nature." It is said that a certain pious man among the Belgians was born from a cow; however my faith in this is doubtful. To the latter, after reciting the examples which are reported, in the same place chapter 7, he responds through doubt: "Nevertheless these things should not be liberally believed. Nor do I think it is beyond the powers of nature, if the female semen is efficacious."

But Fortunio Liceti in book 2 of his work On Monsters chapters 68-73 strongly contends for the affirmative of each question against Martin Delrio and others. First through very many examples collected from ancient and recent histories and observations, which are to be seen there. In which nevertheless he seems to me to be more credulous than is fair. However, I would not wish to call all of them into doubt. Then through the reasons adduced, which are at once the founts of the solutions whence the opposing objections and exceptions can be diluted. Among his reasons, the chief one is that not only from plants but also from brutes of diverse species mixed with each other, plants and brutes are generated, especially if the time of birth of each cohabiting species is equal, or at least not very unequal. He proves the minor from daily experience and the testimonies of Aristotle. He confirms the consequence of the major in chapter 71, that men do not differ more in species from dogs, bears, horses, asses, apes, than plane trees from apples, chestnuts from beeches, manna ash from pears, etc. But he would have tightened the argument more if he had said: than dogs from lions or wolves, than dormice from rabbits, than horses from asses. In chapter 70, to prove the major and solve the exception, he adds: "Because man has an animal nature common with the brutes, and a common soul and sensitive and vegetative faculties, among which is the generative with its subordinates." And lest the inequality of the formation and gestation of the fetus seem to stand too much in the way, he notes that it was proven by Pietro Corsi, a celebrated physician, that men are born in the eleventh and twelfth month, in his book On the Time of Birth chapters 10, 27, 28.

His second reason is: That the uterus, for example of a cow, can be a suitable place in which a human fetus can be conserved, cherished, and all the functions necessary for its formation and perfection can be performed no less than in a human uterus, as he says is clear from what he wrote in his book on the perfect constitution of man in the uterus chapters 23-24.

His third reason is: Because we are nourished from the same things from which we consist, as Aristotle testifies. But infants can be nourished by the milk of wild animals, of cows, etc.; therefore they can be generated from the semen and blood of a cow. And these are the chief reasons of his which we could observe in him. Which although not all with their prosyllogisms are equally solid or evident, nevertheless with the adduced examples they accomplish so much that I would not now dare to contradict this opinion.

The same Liceti in chapter 72 distinctly explains how from the sinful congress of a man with a wild beast and of a woman with a brute a threefold birth can be produced - human, bestial, or of a mixed (external) form or figure, or of two forms, human and bestial, according to the victory

and predominance of the human or bestial semen, or according to the genuine and separate congress of the woman with a man and a brute so that superfetation occurs.

These philosophemes have their use among theologians, when cases are to be determined according to the sixth commandment of the Decalogue, concerning fetuses conceived or brought into the light from that monstrous and sinful commingling, whether they are to be killed or not. Certainly if a man has been conceived or brought into the light, although from a cow, he does not seem to be one who should be killed. If a brute has been conceived or born, although from a woman, that it can be killed is scarcely doubted everywhere. And yet the Mosaic law in Leviticus 20 indistinctly pronounces that a brute mounted by a man is to be burned - with no consideration or distinction made of conception, if there was any, and of whatever sort it was, of a true man or a true brute. One of two things must be said here: either that a true man could not be conceived by a brute female, or if he was conceived, that God by his absolute dominion could command his killing in and with the maternal uterus of the brute.

IV. Problem: Whether a man is naturally generated from a hundred-year-old man? I answer: I ask this on account of the text of Romans 4:19. For if the powers of Abraham were miraculously intensified, it must now be said that it was naturally impossible. But the contrary is proven not only by the examples of the men before the flood in Genesis 5, but also by those of today, although rare. It must therefore be said that Abraham's body was then "nenekromenon," that is, inept for generation, seeing that it was broken and enervated by labors, peregrinations, and other troubles. That other solution of Augustine in book 16 of the City of God chapter 28 is foreign, that his body was not absolutely inept, but only with respect to Sarah. Far more absurd is that of Pereira on Genesis 18, where he says it was inept not in reality, but in his own opinion. But we treated of this more fully when in public lectures we explained the epistle to the Romans.

V. Problem: Whether a man is generated from a boy or girl before their mature age? I answer: It does not seem to be deniable, if indeed we accept the examples adduced by Scaliger in his Elenchus on Chronology, although it may be permitted to suspect that fraud often lies hidden there. But if it is not, then these must be said to happen rarely, and to be miracles of nature.

VI. Problem: Whether a man is naturally generated from a virgin without conjunction with a man, and this through imagination or any pretended attraction of male semen? I answer: It must be altogether denied, lest we prostitute the miraculous conception of the virgin Mary (which not only Christians but even the Saracens themselves believe according to their Koran) to be made light of by the infidels. An uncertain author from Septemcastrensis in his treatise On the Customs and Religion of the Turks chapter 14 writes thus about their religious:

"But that great prodigy, about which there is a great rumor among them (namely that many have been conceived and born without male semen, who are called Nefes ogli, who are also mentioned in the following chapter) must be believed to happen through women not corrupted by carnal corruption. However, it can be that the mothers themselves of such are the wives of the religious, and on account of the prodigy of their continence, sons are born to them in a non-natural way, but in another way of diabolical dispensation, hidden to men. Whence on

account of this it does not seem unusual to the Turks themselves, when the Christians say, indeed they themselves say and confess, that Christ was conceived and born from Mary without human semen. Therefore, in whatever way this happens, although it is unusual and marvelous to hear, nevertheless it will not seem impossible by diabolical power, if his other works which are worked in them and through them are inspected."

But these things are as true as the dreams about the nativity of the Antichrist or Melchizedek, or the pretended births of certain fanatics. If they had more attentively weighed Luke 1:34-35 compared with Matthew 1:20-21 and Isaiah 7, Thomas Aquinas in his Quodlibetal Questions quodlibet 6 article 18, Tomás Sánchez in his work On Matrimony volume 2 book 7 disputation 113, Tostado on Exodus 5 and 7 and Isaiah 7, Martín de Azpilcueta in his Counsels book 4 counsel 2, Henrique Henriques book 11 on matrimony chapter 15, Luis de Molina volume 3 of his work On Justice and Right treatise 3 disputation 104, would certainly not have said that a woman without congress with a man and with virginity intact can conceive; nor would they have owed mockery to the physicians. But they too easily believed that little story in Thomas in the cited place about the girl who conceived from her father without coitus, and the other in Averroes about conception in the bath, etc., and the third about the boy born from a virgin at Rome and deported to an island by order of the soothsayers. To the first, Jean Riolan the Younger rightly responds in his work on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates page 427 that that fable was a palliated flagitious incest. To the second and third, that they are mere fables. Let him see, who has leisure and who can grasp it, Riolan laboriously and minutely ventilating these things which modesty does not allow us to exhibit here.

It is amazing indeed that the most excellent philosopher and physician Francisco Vallés inclined to this paradoxical opinion, when he said that a very hot woman can generate or conceive without a man, whom André Du Laurens notes in book 2 of his Anatomy chapter 4 question 4. Delrio also touches on this question in book 2 question 15. But as for what he injects, that the Calvinists, by denying that Mary gave birth with a closed uterus, obscure the greatest part of the miracle - it is unfair and unlearned. For virginity does not consist in what he with Riolan in the chapter cited above and his scholastics imagines, about which modesty and the narrowness of the paper forbid us to say more here. See the commentators like Toledo, Maldonado, Cornelius a Lapide on Luke 2:23, and Andrew Willet and André Rivet on Exodus 13, and Cornelius a Lapide and the other commentators on Deuteronomy 21, and Séverin Pineau's treatise On the Signs of Virginity.

It will suffice for warding off the calumny to have noted here that virginity is formally neither a substance nor an accident, nor something positive, but a privation, namely of conjunction or carnal copulation with a man, as we gather from the words of the blessed virgin in Luke 1:34 compared with Judges 11:37-39, Genesis 24:19. Which definition or description of virginity no sane person can deny.

Further, the determination of this problem of ours against the natural conception of man from a virgin makes for a safer defense of the miraculous conception of Christ. Related to this problem of ours on the generation of man from a virgin are the questions:

1. Whether a wife through a strong imagination while awake or dreaming can conceive from an absent husband, so that the infant must be adjudged to the husband as the genuine father. I deny; see on the powers of the imagination, that they do not extend to the miraculous, Delrio in his Disquisitions on Magic, Daniel Sennert in his book On Chymists etc. chapter 9, Thomas Feyens in his treatise On the Powers of the Imagination. Eight or nine years ago a little book was published in France and translated from French to Dutch which contained the history (I do not know if it was a fable fictively composed parabolically or in mockery) of a son of this sort conceived from the imagination of some woman, with the husband absent for three years, who nevertheless was adjudged to that husband as a legitimate son by some court.

2. Whether demons can cause virgins uncorrupted in mind and body to conceive without any congress of a man, namely by infusing fertile semen procured from elsewhere into the uterus while they are sleeping and not sensing it. Delrio affirms in book 2 of his Magical Disquisitions question 15. But he is deservedly flogged by that greatest theologian André Rivet in Exercise 50 on Genesis; see him. Let the Pontificals think whether by such paradoxical disputations they do not prejudice the miraculous conception of Christ from a virgin without male semen.

3. Whether a mole can be generated in virgins without masculine congress? I affirm, with Weinrich in his learned epistle published on this question and subjoined to the treatise of Pico della Mirandola On Witches in the octavo edition, which Weinrich had republished with a notable preface. Where he shows the reason how this can happen.

4. Whether a boy of 10 or 11 years can generate? I affirm. Joseph Scaliger in his Elenchus of the Chronological Oration of David Pareus, where some examples are adduced. But to confess the truth, I would prefer not to be so liberal in believing. For often impure women would pretend a conception from a boy to cover up adultery or incest.

5. Whether there is a birth of eleven or twelve or even fifteen months, and to which husband the birth can or should certainly be adjudged when a woman quickly passes to second nuptials. I answer: See what Salmuth laboriously collected here in his work on Panciroli's New Discoveries title 10 pages 202-211, where quite a few authors, physicians as well as jurists, are indicated.

VII. Problem: Whether in one birth 365 men can be produced, and indeed live so long that they are all touched with baptism, as they relate of Margaret the wife of the Count of Henneberg and daughter of Floris IV, Count of Holland - not only our writers like Hadrianus Junius in his Batavia page 346, and before them Desiderius Erasmus and Juan Luis Vives (as is related in the same place), Petrus Bertius in his Geographic Tables, and one or two common historians of ours who wrote in the vernacular language, but also foreigners, among whom now occur to memory Lodovico Guicciardini in his description of Belgium, Rudolph Goclenius in his Physics, André Du Laurens in his Anatomy book 8 question 21, Salmuth on Panciroli's Discoveries title 10 page 216, Godefroy Wendelin in his work on the Wonders of the Nile chapter 24, Cornelius a Lapide on Deuteronomy 24. Indeed, even today in the church of Loosduinen an inscription is shown, and the basins in which they are said to have been baptized. I answer: If one inquires into that

miracle, he will find not a few things to explode this fable. We note only two. One is that it is said to have fallen in that time (namely the year 1276) which, fertile in stupendous ignorance and lying miracles, is wont to augment the spoils of the clergy (I mean ecclesiastical revenues) to an immense degree by such fables. But the abbey of Loosduinen was the unique mother and nurse of this history, which they know was on that occasion not infrequently visited by those eager for novelties, especially the richer and the magnates - all who know what the monastic fowlings were. The other is that the manuscript chronicle which most accurately recorded things done in Holland, at least those of any moment, and is still preserved (as I learned from a trustworthy friend) in the Chamber of Accounts, does not mention this miracle. Besides the fact that foreign historians would not have been silent about so great a miracle performed in such an illustrious person. Since therefore so many fetuses could not naturally be produced in one birth, and a divine miracle should not be rashly believed by us, our country and our history must be freed from such an insipid fable, lest we deliver ourselves to be mocked by the more sagacious foreigners.

Jacques Daléchamps on Pliny's Natural History book 7 chapter 3 not obscurely diminishes faith in this prodigious birth. But he relates others less paradoxical to him in the same place, and Du Laurens in the place cited, and Salmuth on Panciroli's Discoveries title 10 page 26, and Joachim Camerarius century 2 of his Medical Histories chapter 66. Among other things they relate from Albertus Magnus about 150 embryos of the size of the little finger ejected in a basin in one birth, which does not seem to me to differ much from the Dutch miracle. Hadrianus Junius in the cited place adduces an example of an equal birth (365) from Margaret the wife of the Count of Holstein, which happened in the thirty-seventh year after the Dutch birth, witnesses namely being the annals of Brunswick, Albert Krantz, and Ernestus the historiographer of the princes of Anhalt. The same, but doubting, is related by Cornelius a Lapide in his commentary on Deuteronomy 24:19:

"A celebrated example, common in the speech of all, exists in Holland: for the wife of the Count of Holland, repelling a poor beggar woman and accusing her of adultery because she now had such a numerous offspring, was cursed by her, that she might bear as many children as there are days in the year. God heard the curse, and made it that the wife of the Count bore 365 children in one birth, who were all baptized and soon died after baptism. A picture of this prodigy exists in the monastery of virgins between Leiden and The Hague. Krantz in his Vandal History and the annals of the Brunswickers relate that exactly the same thing happened to Margaret the wife of the Count of Holstein in the year of the Lord 1313."

Whether this prodigy is the same as the former, so that the nearby words "Holstein" and "Holland" deceived them, I do not labor over, provided we do not doubt that the matter is most true. Seek examples of four at most, namely five, seven, twelve, etc. in Marcello Donato in his Wondrous Histories chapter 24, and Johannes Schenck von Grafenberg volume 2 observation 162, and Salmuth in the cited place. Marcus Zuerius Boxhorn in his Theater of Holland page 173 has an example of a fertile Modenese woman who sometimes bore four at a time, and three, and ten times twins, so that before the age of 40 she was the mother of 42 sons.

And up to now in the first edition of this disputation in the year 1638, I had called this history into doubt; afterwards it seemed good to equip our arguments and arrange them into classes so that they can be subjected to the eyes of the readers.

Reasons against the history of the monstrous birth of Countess Margaret of Henneberg:

1. Because the popular rhymed chronicle of Holland (whose author lived at that time) does not even once mention this miracle, nor does Beka in his history of Utrecht, who lived in the year 1358, nor the manuscript chronicle which is preserved in the chamber of accounts of Holland, in which the most memorable things are annotated, as was related to me by a trustworthy friend and eyewitness. If anyone inquires into these things more curiously, let him consult the archives of the chamber of accounts of Holland, to which I appeal. Nor do the charters of the counts of Holland mention it in Boxhorn cited above.

2. Because the history itself renders itself suspect: that 365 infants are carried in one womb, and indeed alive, with all the members perfectly formed, and lived so long that they were baptized. Let the physicists, physicians and jurists see; we already cited Daléchamps. We add from Salmuth's cited place, page 213: "But about the manifold number of the fetus, Paul says, so many varied and incredible things are handed down that they are numbered among fables. For both that four girls were born together by a matron is related in the ancient law 3, if a part of the inheritance is sought; and Gellius writes that in the reign of the divine Augustus, a slave woman of Caesar gave birth to five boys in the Laurentine field in one birth, book 10, chapter 2; and Ulpian testifies that there was an Alexandrian woman at Rome who had likewise given birth to five at once, and then had them safe, in the law 'si pater' 36, paragraph 'for also Aristotle' in the Digest 'on payment,' and Gaius in the law 'whether' 7, on doubtful things." To which Simon Majolus, in part 1 of his Canicular Days, colloquy 3, pages 45-46 and following, and Johannes Schenck, in volume 2 of his Medical Observations, book 4, observation 162, give remarkable assent, who with genuine faith recount very many wondrous examples of fecundity and numerous offspring received in one birth.

3. Because the circumstances render the whole history suspect: 1) The mother, namely the daughter of the Count of Holland and wife of the Count of Henneberg, does not appear in the genealogy of the counts of Henneberg. For none of those counts ever married a daughter of the Count of Holland. See the genealogical writers, among them Michael Eyzinger and Pontus Heuterus. 2) Nor does Hermann, Count of Henneberg, appear. 3) Because nothing is more absurd and fabulous than that occasion which is related for this miracle: that the countess could not believe that a woman was able to conceive twins from one man. 4) Because Otto, Bishop of Utrecht, the uncle of this Margaret, who they say baptized these infants in person (others say through his suffragan Guido), was not in existence at that time, namely in the year 1276 (to which time most refer this birth). For at that time the bishop was John of Nassau, and before him Henry of Vianden. 5) The name of the woman in childbirth is Margaret, thus the Dutch chronicle of Holland in folio, division 117, chapter 11, Snoius, Bockenberg. To others Matilda, thus Heda, Meyer, and the chronicle of Holland just cited, division 14. 6) Some make the year of this birth 1314, whom Meyer says are in error. Marcus van Vaernewyck in his History of Belgium book 4,

number or chapter 68, from a certain chronicle, the year 1244; the small Dutch chronicle of Holland (according to the same Vaernewyck) the year 1266; the great chronicle of Holland and the chronicles of Brabant the year 1276; Meyer the year 1287. 7) The number of infants (of whom half were male, half female), some establish as 365, others 364. 8) The great chronicle of Belgium from the library of Pistorius published at Frankfurt in 1607 says the mother lived some years after the birth and finally died in 1277. All others say she died immediately with the infants.

4. Because the proofs by which this history is usually supported are partly fabulous and trifling, partly doubtful and suspect. 1) From the basins and tablet suspended in the church of Loosduinen, on which even today an inscription is read. I answer: This inscription is new, which John Meursius, pastor of Loosduinen, the parent of John Meursius well known for his various critical and philological writings, took care to have interpolated and placed there about 60 or 65 years ago, after the religion was changed in Belgium, as I remember he himself, being quite old, related this to me in the year 1617, when he discoursed with no common affection and credulity for the truth of this history. You therefore see of how great authority that recent inscription is. You will say there was previously some inscription in the abbey of Loosduinen, which the pastor of Loosduinen followed, and which Hadrianus Junius exhibits in his Batavia, and from him Marcus Zuerius Boxhorn. It is so, but it is also clear that this one, besides differing from today's, is recent and much at variance with the rhymed one which Boxhorn describes there from a manuscript chronicle of Frisia, and which the author says was read and existed there a hundred years ago. Therefore the newness renders the second inscription, and the same and the basins render the first one alone suspect, because they were displayed in the abbey of Loosduinen. All who do not wish to be deceived know what is to be expected of truth from the papal monasteries concerning miracles and revelations.

2) That on the bank of the Meuse in the Bommel area, the castle of Poederoijen was built, furnished with 365 windows in memory of this birth and called by the boys "Puroyen," according to the witness of Renerus Snoius. But you will recognize from this how putrid this fiction is, that neither from the histories (especially of Guelders and Holland) nor from constant fame handed down is there anything certain about such an etymology of the castle, and about 365 windows built in memory of that birth. On the contrary, the histories teach that that castle was built around the year 914 by Robert, lord of Heusden, who founded the domain of Poederoijen, and bestowed it on one of his younger sons. On which partly the manuscript chronicle of Heusden, which is preserved in my native place, partly the History of Guelders by Pontanus book 5 page 65. Who likewise relates from the acts of Tiel, book 7 page 270, that that castle was first built by John Moliart in the year 1356. It could happen that the castle, destroyed by the furies of war, was again restored by him. Whatever the case, the histories relate nothing about 365 windows built in memory of that birth. Besides the fact that the language of the Gypsies or Andabatae would admit such a marvelous formation and etymology of the word, not Dutch or Latin. For although the first syllable "pu" might refer to something from the name of the boys, what will you do with the two syllables "royen"? What do they signify or consignify? And in what language? And the fabulists have forgotten that that castle and domain are not called "Puroyen," but "Poederoijen" or "Poederoyen."

It may also be asked why they wanted a monument of this miraculous birth to exist there so far from Loosduinen, the place of the birth, and indeed on foreign soil, in that part of the county of Teisterbant which first belonged to the domain of Heusden, later to the duchy of Guelders - by which founders just mentioned, I ask.

3) That some historians relate this. I answer: What is to be attributed to the histories and historians of that truly mythical or fabulous thirteenth century and the following ones up to the times of the Reformation, when they deal with the matter of miracles, I will not now say; let Luis Vives, Melchior Cano, and others elsewhere cited by us be read in the Desperate Cause of the Papacy and in the disputation On Miracles.

5) I add that from the more recent writers of Dutch antiquities, the most illustrious men Petrus Scriverius and Marcus Zuerius Boxhorn incline to this opinion of ours (which without doubt, if not evidently true, is at least safer) in their descriptions of Holland, who can be read.

I wanted to add these things not ineptly, as I judge, by way of digression on this occasion, so that physicists, physicians, theologians, especially foreigners, may be advised not to adapt this example to their purpose so easily without examination. It occurred to me to wonder why Cornelius a Lapide wanted to illustrate the common moral passage about the poor not being afflicted with contumely in the place just cited by this example, rather than by that of Hatto, Archbishop of Mainz, gnawed by mice - unless it pleases him to number the latter among the fables with Nicolas Serarius in his work on Mainz. The historical truth of which see vindicated by Wendelin in his work on the Wonders of the Nile chapter 21.

9. Problem: Whether the men in the new world, or in any land cut off by the vast spaces of the ocean from the old world, and therefore hitherto neither known nor frequented, have another beginning of their origin than Noah and Adam? I deny, from Acts 17:26 and Genesis 10. Augustine expressly defends this opinion in book 16 of the City of God chapter 8. Hence therefore we see what is to be decided about the contentious boasting of the Egyptians and Athenians, who boasted that they were autochthonous and sprung from their own earth, with no migration of nations, no foreign progenitor intervening - which boasting Diogenes said they had in common with worms and mice. See Justin the historian, Diodorus and the other authors cited above in the first problem on the contention of the Scythians, Athenians and Egyptians over the antiquity of their origin. Polydore Vergil has something similar about the English, as we noted in the Desperate Cause of the Papacy book 3 section 1.

There remain other questions as well: Whether generation consists in the production of form, or matter, or the whole composite, or in the union of matter and form; whether in the generation of man there is given an action which intrinsically touches the soul (if indeed it is held to be created by God); what is the time of gestation and birth; what things necessarily concur for the conception of man; what are the causes of sterility, likewise of abortion, etc. But the narrowness of the paper and time does not allow us to touch on those things now, although it would pertain to the explication of certain sayings of scripture. Let the physicists and anatomists often cited by

us or others be seen, if there are any who do this more accurately. After the first edition of this disputation, the treatises of Pineau, Bonacioli and Platter on the conception and formation of the fetus were reprinted at Leiden. There also exists Fortunio Liceti's treatise On the Perfect Constitution of Man in the Uterus, and Pietro Costa's little book On the Time of Birth. Difficult are the questions, at what time the fetus is animated, and what is the proximate and internal principle of the formation of the fetus, which have their use in the explication of certain passages of scripture, for example Ecclesiastes 11, Psalm 139, and in the disputations on the person of Christ, and in certain cases about abortion and homicide pertaining to the sixth commandment of the Decalogue. Thomas Feyens inquired into the animation of the fetus in a special treatise, where you will find the varying opinions and authors indicated. He himself, however, diverges from the common and received opinion of the physicians (whom hitherto the fathers, scholastics, and our philosophers and theologians have followed). They also treat of this matter - Sennert and his antagonist Gallego de la Serna, and Freitag. But on this question see below appendix 1 thesis 4. Concerning the inconveniences and faults that usually intervene in the formation and gestation of the fetus, whether from external natural, artificial, or supernatural causes (namely demons), or from internal ones, namely the imagination of the conceiving or pregnant woman - among all the authors I know, Fortunio Liceti most fully treated in his work On Monsters, with whom can be joined those just cited and those to be cited below who wrote on the imagination. On the question whether the semen of each parent is the material principle of generation, we will briefly advise something below in thesis 5, problem 3, and in the first appendix to the disputation On Creation, given the occasion.

4. The conception of Christ is expressly treated in the common places on the incarnation. Here only one thing is to be determined: Whether the definition of physical generation univocally and properly applies to the generation of Christ from a virgin. I affirm, if you consider it as to its essence and those things which pertain to its quidditative concept, which are these two: 1) the transition from the privation of form to form in matter; 2) the unition of substantial form with matter. But if you consider this generation as to certain extrinsic things and connotations, there is no small difference. For what the mother exhibits for her part to generation, namely the matter and its activity and vehicle and instrument, the blessed virgin also contributed; but what the father is accustomed to actively furnish was here supplied by the work and power of the Holy Spirit, and by the same the vital faculty and concurrence of the virgin were excited for evoking and attracting the matter to the place of conception, and for delineating and forming the body of Christ for her part. The scholastics on Thomas third part question 33 article 1 add that the body of Christ was formed in a moment of time, not successively - about which we will not now dispute, although up to now we have seen no reason by which this is solidly proven. But on this doubt see below in appendix 1, the final thesis. Similarly, certain differences can be assigned between the production of the protoplasts and ordinary generation. Let the fount of solutions against the contrary opinion be this: that the essence, univocation and identity of a thing are not varied by the active principle, or by the mode of making, or by the person, since it does not depend on them per se, but on the form. And this is the opinion of many of the scholastics in Capreolus on the first book of Sentences distinction 5, the only question article 2. But the use of this doctrine is evident in the defense of the Council of Ephesus, Chalcedon, and the sixth council, where it was orthodoxly defined that Mary is properly the mother of God. Let students

compare the scholastics on the passage of Thomas just cited, and the Coimbrans on Aristotle's first book On Generation and Corruption chapter 4 question 14.

5. On the origin of the soul many things are inquired into; we propose to ventilate these especially for the illustration of our theology:

1. Whether they were created in the beginning, or at least existed before their bodies and union with them? I answer: Certain of the Gentiles held one or the other affirmative - Plato in the Timaeus, who dreams that they are thrust into bodies as a prison to suffer the penalties of their offenses; 2) of the Jews, most of the Talmudists and Kabbalists, as can be seen in Menasseh ben Israel On Creation problems 15-16, and Archangelus Burgonuovo in his Kabbalistic work which we cited in the Dissertation on the Term of Life, where see; 3) of the Christian doctors, John of Jerusalem in Jerome's epistle to Pammachius, and Origen book 1 of On First Principles. Indeed, Philastrius contends that it is a heresy if someone says that the body of Adam was formed first and then the soul. Three falsehoods occur in the Platonic-Kabbalistic opinion: that the souls existed before their body and before the composite; that they existed from the beginning of creation; and that they were in a state of sin or demerit. It must be prudently and candidly discerned how far others are related to this error. Epiphanius in his epistle to John of Jerusalem, Jerome in the epistle cited, Augustine epistle 28, Cyril of Alexandria on John book 1 chapter 9, the scholastics on Thomas first part question 90 article 4, and others indicated by Elmenhorst on Gennadius refute this error. We briefly indicate these arguments: First, the souls before union with the body admitted no sin, from Romans 5:12-13 compared with 9:12 and 2 Corinthians 5:10. Then, if the soul were united with the body in punishment, then the union would not be natural, nor would it be a good and perfection of nature, but rather something evil, just as every punishment is - which is most absurd. Third, that which is natural to a thing is prior in it to that which is beyond nature; but the separation of the soul and subsistence in separation is beyond nature, but union is according to nature; therefore the latter was prior to the former, not the reverse. Fourth, if God had created separated souls in the beginning, then he would not have created all things according to the perfection fitting and due to the nature of each one. The reason for the consequence is because the soul obtains its proper and connatural perfection in the body, not outside the body - seeing that it has an innate propensity to its own body, as the writers on the separated soul and the scholastics on the first part question 76 article 1 commonly teach. Fifth, if souls exist before the body, they are either in the way, or in the end or in the homeland, or in neither. Not the former, as was already said from Romans 9:12, 2 Corinthians 5:10, because there is no way or course of salvation except in this world and this life. Not the latter, because the end and reward are not obtained except after the labor and contest of this life, Hebrews 12:1-2, 1 Corinthians 9:25, 27, 2 Corinthians 5:1-3, 2 Timothy 2:5, 12 with chapter 4 verse 8. Nor this, because there is no rational creature which is not a moral subject and citizen, subjected to God in the genus of morals, and consequently whose actions do not take on the nature of virtue or vice. (Compare the disputation On the Right and Justice of God.) Unless perhaps they say that souls sleep, that is, are as if dead and destitute of intellectual life, or when they are thrust into the body they immediately forget all that they knew before, so that learning is reminiscence (as Tertullian translates that Platonic saying: ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις). Which fiction see refuted by Tertullian in his work On the Soul, Augustine book 12 of

the City of God the last chapter, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 83, and Aristotle with his followers in the first book of the Posterior Analytics chapter 1 and the third book of On the Soul chapter 4.

II. Problem: Whether the soul was produced, or is a part of the divine essence. I affirm the former and deny the latter, against some Gentiles and ancient heretics. See the writers on heresies and the philosophical disputations on the soul.

III. Problem: Whether they are through the immediate operation or creation of God from nothing, or through traducianism or induction. I answer: If any controversy has been vexed, this is one. So many treatises and disputations of both theology and philosophy exist that many think there is more cause for complaint about the abundance than the lack. I, however, prefer the abundance. Those who defend creation unanimously hold that it is infused by being created and created by being infused. But they believe that this is demonstrated both by scripture and by reasons taken from the light of nature. Indeed, most of the fathers and with them the scholastics and more recent authors think that the immortality of the soul is undermined if indeed its traducianism is conceded, to such an extent that they everywhere number this opinion either among the heresies or at least among the dangerous errors. See Gennadius chapter 14 compared with chapter 18, Thomas first part question 118 article 2, the scholastics on the first part question 90 article 3, Lorinus on Ecclesiastes 12 and Pineda on Job, finally Alphonsus, Prateolus and the other writers on heresies, and the more recent philosophers on the second book of On the Soul chapter 1. But we advise that a selection of reasons be had, lest we promiscuously seize upon all that are adduced. But for us these are:

1. From Genesis 2:7, where the soul was not raised from its passing matter, namely earth (which analogically was then the seed or seedbed of the human body), but was formed by God and united to the body. But this history of the creation of man must be compared with the creation of the other animals.

2. From Ecclesiastes 12:7 with Hebrews 12:9, to which Zechariah 12:5 could be added. In which passages something peculiar is attributed to God in the production of souls, in opposition to the production of other living things.

3. From the conception of Christ, who since he was made similarly a partaker of flesh and blood as we are, Hebrews 2:11, 12, 13, 14, 15, had a soul from creation, not from traducianism. For if he had it from traducianism, it certainly would have been from the father (for the father alone is established by most as the author of traducianism, at least the primary author by all). But he did not have a father. And although he did not take a soul from the seed of the mother, nevertheless he was the son of his mother, and of David, Abraham, Adam.

4. No corporeal power can attain the effecting of a spiritual substance, because no power acts beyond its genus. But now the intellective soul exceeds the whole genus of corporeal substance.

5. If the generation of the body is the cause producing the soul, then the dissolution or corruption of the body will be the cause corrupting; but the latter is absurd, therefore. But the traducianism of the seed is the proper cause of the generation of the body.

6. Every natural agent which acts dependently on matter produces nothing except what depends on matter; but the soul does not depend on matter, because it can subsist outside the body.

7. There is added the consensus of all the fathers (with one or another excepted) and of the ancient philosophers, the words of all of whom see in Zanchi; in addition, of the writers of the intermediate age and the scholastics; finally, of the more recent theologians, philosophers, physicians, both Pontifical and those who departed from the Papacy, with Sohn volume 2 page 563, Peucer in his treatise On the Origin of the Soul, Combachius in his Anthropology chapter 2, Timotheus Bright in his notes on Scribonius's Physics page 18 excepted, and all who call themselves Lutherans, whom the authority of Luther drove into the contrary opinion, or at least into suspension of judgment. From our side, Musculus in his Common Places and Piscator in his Disputation On Sin leave it in the middle. Peter Martyr thinks traducianism cannot be refuted from scripture.

Of the reasons of the contrary side which are of any moment, there is one nearly the only one which Augustine, Luther, the Lutherans, and our authors cited above, whether asserting or doubting, put forward, namely the propagation of original sin. See Augustine, Sohn, Combachius cited above, and from the Lutherans Meisner in his Sober Philosophy part 3. I answer: But whether they can explain that mode or not, nevertheless the fundamental thesis is certain from scripture, that there is original sin and that it is propagated to the posterity of Adam. Besides the fact that some mode of that propagation was shown by our more recent authors Tilenus, Du Moulin, Baron, professor of philosophy and afterwards of theology at Aberdeen, and before them Zanchi book 2 chapter 5 - which mode we endeavored to further explain and support with hypotheses in the Disputation On the Propagation of Original Sin.

2. They now append another reason from Genesis 1:22, 28 and 9:1 conjointly, with the physical axioms "man generates man," and "the most natural work of the living is to generate something similar to itself," etc.; therefore man produces the soul. Thus Sennert, Sperling, Havenreuter, Libavius, Taurellus and other Lutheran physicians and philosophers, especially Bartholin in his Anatomical Institutes question 9. I answer: the scholastics on the Master of the Sentences, Thomas, and the more recent philosophers both ours and the Pontifical ones - Scaliger, Pereira, Toletus, the Coimbrans, Ruvius, Timpler, Goclenius, etc. - have already responded sufficiently and more than sufficiently; from the theologians, Zanchi cited above. We suggest only this one thing: that Mary truly generated her son and is properly called his mother, and Christ her son, as well as of David, Abraham, etc., although his soul was not produced by the mother.

3. Bartholin reproaches that this opinion is defended by the Calvinists to diminish original sin. I answer: As if they were the first or principal authors of this opinion. What then will happen to the ancient philosophers, fathers, scholastics, and the whole school of philosophers and

theologians throughout all of Christendom (a great part of whom Bartholin himself cites there), with only the Lutherans excepted? Besides the fact that the orthodox (whom he calls Calvinists) have done and still do this with no less erudition or zeal, so that by this doctrine they most solidly defend both original sin and the immateriality and immaterial substance of the soul, and so that they may overthrow the Manichaean, Flacian and similar deliriums so much the more successfully. See Whitaker and the others On Original Sin.

4. To Bartholin's epiphonema: "Further, unless someone wishes to secede to the camp of Pelagius with hands and feet, who denied original sin, it is necessary that he establish the traducianism of the soul through the parents," we oppose two things: First the restraint of Melanchthon in his book On the Soul, who forbids touching this controversy, and Augustine book 5 against Julian chapter 3, who leaves it in the middle, and the modesty and fear of Luther, who said he would publicly affirm nothing but would privately think thus (as Bartholin himself relates on pages 73 and 81). Then the consequences and determinations broken by the fathers, councils, specifically John of Damascus book 2 On the Orthodox Faith chapter 12, and the common school - and this especially to defend the spiritual, incorruptible and independent from the body essence of the soul. To those things adduced by the Coimbrans, Ruvius, and the theologians on the first part question 118 and 75 article 4, Bellarmine On the Loss of Grace book 4 chapter 11, it is for him to respond solidly. Nothing is sown or reaped for us here. For we do not defend traducianism, nor nevertheless have we accused the assertors of traducianism of heresy or quasi-heresy.

4. Bartholin also notes that certain of the fathers were of this opinion, naming Lactantius, Augustine, etc., thus on page 97. I answer: But concerning Augustine, he says a little earlier on page 81 more rightly: "Some prefer, as Augustine." And the Pontifical authors just cited everywhere prove this about him, to whom add Lorinus on Ecclesiastes 12. Compare from the Lutherans Elmenhorst on Arnobius book 2 folio 49, and on Gennadius chapter 14, where he cites the author of the work On Spirit and Soul chapter 48, and Augustine On Heresies chapter 81. Concerning Lactantius, when Rufinus and the author of the Dialogue On the Soul affirm the same, Elmenhorst responds to Gennadius chapter 14: "Both most openly speak falsely, as appears from Lactantius On the Workmanship of God chapter 19." If anyone from the fathers should be alleged for this opinion, it is Cyril and some of the Latin presumers, as the author of the work On Spirit and Soul says with Gennadius - that is (as Elmenhorst indicates in the same place), Tertullian in his work On the Soul chapters 19, 22, 27, 36, not to mention the Anapyschians and Apollinarians, as well as the Luciferians otherwise orthodox in Augustine On Heresies chapter 81. With all things weighed, we do not see why we should recede from the common and received opinion of the fathers and of all Christendom and therefore of the common opinion of the philosophers, especially since those denying have not yet been able to agree with themselves in a certain opinion. For they seek and do not find anything in which they may acquiesce.

1) Whether the soul is produced from the substance of the seed, or is elicited from its potency - those affirming marvelously torment themselves to explain this. There are those who say that the seed is the matter from which, with respect to the spiritual part lurking in it, and thus with the

body delineated, the soul drawn out and excited from the potency of the seed finally accedes through the plastic power. There are others who not obscurely make the seed of plants, animals, and thus also of men the subject and vehicle of the soul - whence it would follow that the seed is animate, and consequently a man, unless perhaps they establish inferior and distinct souls.

2) Whether it is educed from the potency of matter, and at the same time is translated and propagated from the soul of the parent (as light is kindled from light) and is communicated to the offspring with the seed as a vehicle at the very moment of conception, when generation is certainly going to follow. The Lutheran philosophers of today have now been borne to this opinion, so that they may prop up their philosophy against the Calvinists, although in life indifferent, as can be seen in Meisner's Anti-Calvinist Sober Philosophy section 3 chapter 6, Bartholin cited above, Sennert with his champion Sperling in their treatise On the Origin of Forms against Freitag; from their theologians, something similar is handed down by Chemnitz part 1 of his Common Places, place 7 on Original Sin chapter 4, Gesner disputation 2 on Genesis question 18. But this opinion is so urged by Timpler, especially Freitag against Sennert and Sperling, with certain absurd consequences, that I do not see how after many exceptions and evasions it is not finally compelled to fall back either into actually animate seed, or into eduction from the potency of matter, or into the generation and propagation of spiritual substances either by division or by multiplication of themselves, or into creation, so that the soul of the parents remaining such is said to create from nothing the soul of its son without its own diminution and corruption. For that simile of a candle lighting a candle, besides not proving the matter, does not at all illustrate this thing. For if you precisely understand the light, it is an accident and indeed a corporeal one; but the question here is about the generation of a spiritual substance. But if you understand the flame itself, it is a body, indeed fire - nay, on account of the impurity of our usual fire, it is a mixed body, just like coal. But what consequence is there from the generation of fire or a mixed body and its conjunction and inherence with some body (for example in glowing iron) to spiritual generation (which they make this), by which spirit produces spirit?

3) And it is a labyrinthine question whether it is translated from the father alone, and the body from the mother alone, or from both parents. Bartholin in question 10 thinks the first is most probable, the second less so, the third which Horstius embraces not at all. Thus we see this opinion pressed on all sides by more absurdities and those from which they are less able to extricate themselves, and therefore it is not to be substituted for the received and ancient one - at least as long as its patrons do not better satisfy themselves and others. The particular reasons and exceptions of these men, as well as the other things that remain concerning the formation of the body, the faculties and properties of man, the diversity of sex and other accidentals, etc., we cannot now examine, because the printer advises that we must break off. We reserve those things for a special appendix, by which we will sometime place a crown upon this disputation On Creation. Meanwhile, compare below appendix 1 to the disputation On Creation, where we have commented anew on some things concerning this vexed question.

Problem: Whether the origin of the flesh of Christ from a virgin was rightly denied of old by the Anabaptists, by this argument, that women do not have semen? I deny. The physicians and philosophers dispute about their prolific semen. See for the affirmative Laurentius in his Anatomy book 8 chapter 2 question 4; for the negative and for Aristotle, the treatise of Cremonini the philosopher of Padua On Semen. We think it safer to acquiesce in the affirmative opinion, and thus the Coimbrans on the first book On Generation and Corruption chapter 4 question 28 - especially since in addition to the arguments of the physicians, it seems that semen and semination are attributed to them in Leviticus 12:2, and Christ is called the seed of the woman, of Abraham, of David, also the fruit of the womb of Mary and of the loins of David. The illustrious Gomarus, our preceptor, suggested to us in his explication of Genesis 3 the passage in Hebrews 11:11. Which nevertheless, since it also admits another interpretation, does not seem to constrain by itself. Related to this problem is the question whether women actively concur in generation. Canonhierus in book 2 of his work on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates page 647 defends the negative opinion of Aristotle with reasons expressly and by the common consent (as he says) of theologians, jurists and politicians, where nevertheless he distinguishes that the female proximately concurs in the delineation of the members, but not actively in the animation of the fetus or the very introduction of the form. Not a few Aristotelian philosophers think the same, and from the scholastics Thomas part 3 question 32 article 3 and others, whom you see cited by the Coimbrans on the first book On Generation and Corruption chapter 4 question 27, where they themselves leave it in the middle, yet seem to incline more to the affirmative side, and for it adduce not only physicians but also some scholastics. See them there, among them Cajetan on the second part of the second part question 154 article 12. And this opinion altogether seems safer and more agreeable to the phrasing of scripture and to the explication of the conception and generation of Christ.

Addenda to Disputation 10 On Creation

I had written these things thus far in the year 1638 in the first edition of this disputation. Meanwhile there was no occasion to weave the whole anthropological supplement then promised and propose it in public disputations. In the year 1643 we only gave three appendices, which we subjoin below. The first two of them explain some problems pertaining to anthropology. Nevertheless, lest our students lack guidance and judgment in this part, we briefly delineate this sciagraph of anthropology.

To this contemplation will contribute the physico-medical and physico-theological authors, such as Cardano, Cornelius Gemma, Libavius, Fabricius of Aquapendente, Liceti, Grynaeus, Combachius, and others indicated in our library. But the whole of anthropology can be circumscribed by these sections: 1) on the principles of man; 2) on his affections; 3) on his division; 4) on his marvels - which section, although contained in the first three, nevertheless for the sake of better doctrine each one will be able to delineate separately from the others according to his judgment. We will only note an index of the materials subjected to our speculation here, and of some of the principal authors who are known to us or now occur.

Section 1. The principles are either of essence or of existence or origin. The former are the human soul and the human body.

1) On the soul we briefly touched upon not a few things above, indicating the authors where necessary; and below in appendix 1 and 2 we add some things.

2) On the body in general and collectively taken, we also touched upon some things above.

3) On the parts of the body, we leave it to the anatomists and physicians indicated elsewhere to treat. It is for the theologians, following the example of Zanchi and Daneau, to annotate the passages of scripture in which these physiological things occur, which are not a few, and to prepare a genuine interpretation of them for themselves and others.

4) To the treatise on the human body and its parts must be referred the speculation on human monsters, in which among others Fortunio Liceti acts as a predecessor in his treatise already often praised, with whom must be joined Bauhin On Hermaphrodites, presently to be indicated again below.

5) On the origin or production of man we treated above. Which is either first, through creation, or second, through generation - and this either miraculous (namely of Christ from a virgin) or natural and ordinary from male and female. Here pertain the contemplations on conception, on the formation of the fetus, and gestation, on birth, and on the affections and symptoms of all these. Besides the anatomical writers, we indicated above some others who do this in special treatises.

Section 2. The affections of man can be divided into absolute, which are either vital, or animal, or human; and into relative, and these composite or relative and opposite. We here indicate the chief heads of them in order.

1) On life. Here pertains the subtitle on the brevity and length of life, and on the long-lived, about which you will find very many things noted with the authors in the epistolary dissertations On the Term of Life published by Johan van Beverwijck.

2) On the various ages of men - infancy, boyhood, manhood, old age; on this last there is a medical treatise of André du Laurens. Here can be referred in some way the treatises of Plutarch and others On the Education of Boys, and the treatise of Cardinal Paleotti On the Good of Old Age.

3) On foods and nutrition, or on food and drink, and on hunger and thirst. On these there are various treatises of physicians, among which also the treatise of Liceti On Abstainers. And the treatise of some Cardano (if I well remember), not Gerolamo, in octavo On Not Eating Fetid Foods, which I had many years ago, but now it is not at hand. Here also must be referred the Schola Salernitana, Luis de Fonseca, Rantzau, Lessius, the younger Goclenius and others who

wrote on diet and preserving health. Specifically on preserving the health of men of letters, Marsilio Ficino and Guglielmo Gratarolo. A treatise of the same Gratarolo exists On Wine and Every Drinkable Thing. Here must be referred the treatises of Jacques Grévin, Henri de Rochaz and Libavius on poisons.

4) On the external senses and their affections, both in general and in particular. On these, besides the physiology of physicians and the common physical systems, Vopiscus Fortunatus Plempius treats in his Ophthalmographia; Girolamo Fabrizi d'Acquapendente on the eye, vision, hearing; André du Laurens on the excellence and preservation of sight, in French, etc. The optical and acoustic writers indicated in our library must be compared. Here refer the treatise on sleep and dreams, on which the writers on divinations, such as Peucer, Delrio in his Magic Disquisitions, and others, in whom you will find other authors cited. And on night-walkers or sleepwalkers, on whom Horstius and Tandler, and Keckermann in his Physical Disputations.

5) On the internal senses. Here especially dominates the speculation on the powers of the imagination, on which Delrio in his Magic Disquisitions and in a special and learned treatise Thomas Feyens, and Hieronymus Nymann in a certain oration, published at Wittenberg in 1613 with some physico-medical dissertations of Tobias Tandler. To the treatise on phantasy refer the lesions of phantasy through frenzy and mania, especially through melancholic deliriums, on which Tandler in the book cited, and André du Laurens in a special treatise, but written in French. Not a few things also before them had been noted by Levinus Lemnius in his treatise On Complexions. There are also other symptoms of the internal senses which are commonly wont to be distinguished and enumerated by physicians. See Daniel Sennert book 2 of his Institutes part 3 section 1 chapter 7 and section 3 chapters 4, 5, 6. But there does not appear there corybantism, on which something was noted by the great Scaliger on Catullus and Salmasius in his Plinian Exercises on Solinus chapter 52 page 1086 - unless perhaps by "wakeful evil or delusion" (which he thus calls with Hippocrates) Sennert designates this evil in the cited place. On hydrophobia Ambroise Paré treats in his Surgical Works, and Jules Le Paulmier de Grentemesnil, a physician of Paris, in his treatise On Contagious Diseases. Here also pertains Bauhin's little German book On Rabid Wolves, which he cites in the same place. These anthropological symptoms (if I may so speak) and others to be named presently in number 7 are most worthy of the cognition of the studious contemplator, especially the theologian, so that he can judge so much the more successfully concerning fascination and poisonous diseases, and concerning the energumens, concerning raptures, ecstasies and diabolical divinations, finally concerning temptations and desertions (with all which they have some affinity and are sometimes conjoined). Compare our disputations On Demons, On the Energumens, On Magic, On Miracles, On Prophecy, On Desertions.

6) On the affects, commonly little books physical and ethical, and the rhetoricians, among whom Gerardus Vossius learnedly did this. The same was usefully and diligently done by Gutberlethus in a special treatise. But especially for solid erudition here the scholastics on Thomas's first part of the second part questions 22-49 must be consulted. There are also moral and practical little books both on the passions in general and on some one in particular, for example love, anger, fear, etc., which it would be prolix to recount. In our library and disputations we indicated some.

7) On the appetites. Here especially occurs the title on hunger and thirst, to which gluttony and abstinence must be referred, on which the Medical Histories of Donato and Schenck and the treatise of Fortunio Liceti just cited. On the venereal appetite many things (perhaps too many) by the writers on love.

8) On the locomotive faculty. Here refer the title on respiration, on which besides the medical writers the philosopher in his Minor Works, on which Albertus Magnus, Agostino Nifo, Conrad Gessner, etc. have commented. The same philosopher wrote On the Progression of Animals. Symptoms of the motive faculty are paralysis, spasm, aphasia and lesion of the voice (on which presently under another title), cough, sneezing, yawning, pandiculation, horror, rigor, on which Sennert chapter 8, the cognition of some of which if the philosophical and theological students of anthropology taste, they will be able to judge more rightly about some things of their forum. Here especially should be commended some cognition of the affects which injure not only the motive but also all or most of the other actions, such as are related by Sennert in chapter 9: lethargy or torpor, caros, catalepsy and catochus, apoplexy, epilepsy, vertigo, ephialtes or incubus - to which add uterine suffocations. There follow the human affections. Here occurs the speculation:

1) On the intellect, on which the more recent commentators on Aristotle's On the Soul treat extensively - the Coimbrans, the Complutensians, Ruvius, Mendoza, John of St. Thomas, etc., where others are cited; especially also the scholastics on Thomas first part, and from our theologians Zanchi, Polanus, etc. On ingenuity, there exists a celebrated treatise of Juan Huarte written in Spanish under the title Examination of Ingenuities for the Sciences, published at Leiden in 1603 in the Plantin workshop, which Gabriel Chappuys translated into French. You will also find some things that pertain to this in Johann Heinrich Alsted's Praecognita Philosophica, and Edward Herbert Baron of Cherbury in his French treatise entitled On Truth etc., and Robert Greville Baron Brooke likewise in his English treatise On the Nature of Truth and Its Union and Unity with the Soul in the year 1641. On memory, besides the common physicists, Guglielmo Gratarolo treats in his work on preserving and restoring it, etc. But Johann Heinrich Alsted explained all things more fully in the seven books of his Systema Mnemonicum. On the intellectual habits, the authors just cited, among others Alsted in his Praecognita Philosophica, to which must be added the common philosophers in the prolegomena to logic and physics, and in their commentaries on book 5 of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Let the fathers and founts of the more subtle speculations here be for you the scholastics on Thomas's first part of the second part.

2) On speech - besides the common physical and medical writers, those who wrote on languages must be consulted, perhaps to be indicated by us elsewhere and on another occasion in the textual disputation on Genesis 11 On Languages. On the symptoms and vices of speech (which Sennert explains in book 2 part 3 section 2 chapter 5), Battista Codronchi and Girolamo Fabrizi d'Acquapendente treat in special treatises.

3) On the will and its liberty, the more recent writers in physical and ethical systems, and the disputations on Aristotle's On the Soul, of all of whom the founts are the scholastics on Thomas's first part of the second part. We below in appendix 2 will taste something on the determination of the will. As to its liberty, occasion was given to us before now to explain and distinguish it in the dissertation On the Term of Life.

4) On laughter and weeping, besides the common physicists, Rudolph Goclenius in a special treatise. The moralists and theologians contribute some things here, whom you see indicated in the disputation On Tears. And these things concerning the affections considered absolutely; there follow the related and comparative, both composite and opposite.

1) The affections composite with each other are the sympathies of men, on which the writers on sympathies indicated above (if I well remember).

2) The affections comparative and composite of men are with creatures superior to man, namely angels, and with creatures inferior to man.

3) The opposite affections are of men among themselves, and those which intervene between man and other creatures, on which the writers on antipathies and occult qualities. Here pertains the speculation on poisons indicated above; moreover on diseases, and on the death both of the body and of the soul. On the former the physicians treat; on the latter the theologians alone; on the former, besides the physicians, the physicists and theologians. The authors will perhaps be indicated elsewhere and on another occasion. Here pertain the contemplations on corpses, and on those things which happen about corpses. Hermann Conring gave a farrago of various things in his treatise On the Miracles of the Dead, where many fabulous things noted from any authors appear, which he himself by no means approves. In the disputations On Lots and other abuses of the divine name, we inquire about the presumed bleeding of corpses.

Section 3. The division of men can be variously instituted, namely:

1) by grades of age, which pertains to the physicists;
2) by complexions, which to the physicians;
3) by diverse faces, voices, gaits, gestures, which because it is individual and as if infinite, cannot be passed over by us; meanwhile it ought to leave in us admiration of the divine wisdom and providence;
4) by times, which to the chronologers;
5) by places, which to the geographers or topographers;
6) by statuses, vocations, and various civil and artificial works, on which Tommaso Garzoni treats historically and technically some things in his Universal Plaza etc., where other authors are also indicated, and practically and morally by the Jesuit Johannes Busaeus in his posthumous book On the States of Men;
7) by statuses, vocations, works, and supernatural ministries both ordinary and extraordinary, namely miracles, prophecies, and other charisms, on which the theologians;

8) by difference of sex; thus they are either males or females. To which must be referred the titles on eunuchs and on hermaphrodites. On the former, besides the physicists and antiquarians, the theological commentators on Matthew 19; on the latter, Ambroise Paré in his Surgical Works, and most fully Gaspard Bauhin in his special treatise On Hermaphrodites.

Concerning women, contemplations can be variously instituted, either according to the sciences, namely physically, medically, ethically and theologically, economically, politically and juridically; or according to their diverse states. Here occurs first the animal and natural life, on which the physicists and physicians, among whom Hippocrates in four books, besides what he inserted in his Aphorisms and other works; and from the more recent authors Jean Liébault, a physician of Paris, in his Treasury of Remedies Against the Diseases of Women, which translated from Latin was published in French at Paris by Marc Orry in 1597.

Second, the ethical and theological life. Here on the vices and virtues, sciences of women, on which Filippo Foresti da Bergamo On Famous Women, Jean de Marconville On the Praises and Vituperations of Women, Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa in his Declamation On Women, Pietro Bongo On the Mysteries of Numbers, where he has many things in number 11 in vituperation of women. Johann van Beverwijck surpassed and exhausted all in his treatise On Women. On the studies of wisdom not to be denied to this sex, the most noble and erudite virgin Anna Maria van Schurman, the ornament of the city and University of Utrecht, treated.

Third, the economic life. Here it must be treated on the virgin, the married woman, the widow, on whose states and offices the most noble and ample man, the Phoenix of Belgian poets, Jacob Cats knight and syndic of the Illustrious Orders of Holland. I indicate other ascetic and paraenetic little books elsewhere: namely Georg Vivien On the Mother of the Family, Caspar Stiblin's Coropaedia, Desiderius Erasmus's Christian Widow, Ambrose On Widowhood, Fulgentius epistles 1, 2, 3.

Fourth, the political life, on which the political writers everywhere, to which refer the treatise On the Right of Women which some jurist in Belgium was promising a year or two ago (whether it has now appeared, I do not know), and the apologies for women of Johannes Irenaeus and others.

Section 4. It contains the excellence and marvels of man, which although they can and ought to be treated in the previous sections, nevertheless for the sake of better doctrine we reject them to this special section. The writers of those marvels are Jan Jonston in the last section of his Thaumatographia, Pierre Boaistuau in his Theater of the World, Levinus Lemnius On the Hidden Miracles of Nature, Cornelius Gemma's Cosmocritica, Jean Riolan the Younger on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, Tommaso Garzoni in his Seraglio of Marvels, Gerolamo Cardano On the Variety of Things, and the other authors of marvels indicated above in part 6 and the anthropological authors in part 10. But those marvels are of five kinds: of nature, of art, of virtue and prudence, of science, of piety.

1) Of nature they are, both considered in itself and as to its corruption. The former are the marvels of ingenuity, memory, strength, speed, beauty. Here refer the examples of prodigious ingenuities in Étienne Pasquier's Recherches page 579; of memories in Alsted's Mnemonica; of similarity of faces in Pasquier's Recherches page 570, 582. The latter are of diseases and symptoms, on which the Medical Histories of Marcello Donato, Johannes Schenck von Grafenberg, Wilhelm Fabry of Hilden, Amato Lusitano; to which add Lycosthenes On Prodigies, and the writers on monsters cited above, and Cardano On Variety book 8 chapter 44, Codronchi On Poisonous Diseases, and our disputations On the Energumens and On Specters. Juan Eusebio Nieremberg also notes some partly natural, partly mixed admirable actions in book 1 of his work On the Miracles of Nature in Europe chapter 34.

2) Of art they are, both of the liberal (as they call it), namely rhetoric, poetics, etc., and of the quasi-liberal, as of the plastic arts, namely statuary, foundry, painting, sculpture, etc., also typography, instrumental and vocal music, etc., and of the mechanical, among which excel architecture, navigation, livestock raising, agriculture, hunting, fishing, commerce, etc. On all which see Tommaso Garzoni's Universal Plaza just cited with the authors there annotated, and Polydore Vergil On the Inventors of Things, and Cardano On Variety books 10 and 11, and Salmuth on Panciroli, Nieremberg book 8 chapters 16, 22, and others cited in our library.

3) The marvels of heroic virtue and prudence are exhibited by the theaters of examples, and the sums of virtues and vices.

4) Of the sciences and of the wise, the marvels are commonly annotated by those who expressly treat the individual sciences or commend them to others.

5) Of religion and piety the marvels are partly the heroic impulses of the saints about the worship of God (on which the martyrologies, lives of the saints, and writers on mystical theology, likewise books of examples, apothegms, etc.); partly prophecies, miracles, and other charisms, on which the theologians and our disputations on those matters, where the authors are cited. Here must be referred the marvels of sins, heresies, atheism, blasphemy, magic, cruelty, monstrous lust, etc., on which our disputations and the theaters of Theodor Zwinger and Andreas Hondorff; add the Tragic Mirror. Finally, the marvels of death and of the dead, on which Hermann Conring in his treatise On the Miracles of the Dead. And by these heads and titles the contemplation on man is circumscribed. I would here refer the principal problems to their titles as to their standards, if I had not already done this before in the Syllabus of Problems published in 1642, treatise 4, title 1, subtitle 9.

APPENDIX TO THE DISPUTATIONS ON CREATION, FIRST.

Respondent Cornelius Bruinvis of Zierikzee in Zeeland.

For July 11, 1643.

1. For the better explication of the history of creation and the nature of things, the opinions of certain fanatics and pseudo-philosophers must be known, and the truth vindicated from them. But they must be suspect and precondemned of old, and today ought to be, from the Stoics, Epicureans, Platonists; and some things of Aristotle - which, if someone is less practiced in historical philosophy or not so equipped with books, he will see annotated in Cornelius a Lapide on Acts 17 and on James 3, pages 139-140. Compare, he who can, the schediasmata of Libavius against Rennemann, where Platonic things are reviewed, and Lipsius's Stoic Physiology, where Stoic things. Especially also Alcinous On the Doctrine of Plato, and Plutarch's five books On the Opinions of the Philosophers, and the lives of the philosophers by Diogenes Laërtius and Eunapius. With these the opinions of the ancient heretics and of today's Libertines and Enthusiasts frequently conspire. Today the Neo-Platonists, Paracelso-Hermetics, and so-called Rosicrucian brothers, and other vertiginous or Libertine and Skeptical minds related to them, under the appearance of finding or illustrating the truth, scatter nothing but smoke, and pro virili disturb the studies of the learners and the teachers. Against whom youth is to be faithfully forewarned, even if they are going to beset us with six hundred satires and defamatory pamphlets, which hatred and desire for vengeance on account of ignorance chastised and trampled are wont to dedicate. For since they cannot reconcile their chants and absurdities proudly boasted with Mosaic and sacred physics, nay more, and some not obscurely profess divorce from it, theologians must intercede no less than if heresies were being forged under the appearance of theology by pseudo-theologians. And with this intention we previously published three appendices to the disputation On Creation, which we here replace with a few changes. But because the matter concerning the human soul spreads far and wide through the wide fields of physics and theology, and has been vexed not a little by heretics and heterodox, in this first appendix we will make a beginning from it. Therefore let these be the problems.

Problem 1: Whether spirit and soul differ in man? I deny, if we are speaking of a real distinction which is on the part of the thing - whether, that is, spirit in man is another thing than soul, which is in the same man. For some distinction of reason can be established between these two, namely that spirit and soul denote indeed the same entity partially constituting man, but in a diverse respect: spirit indeed according to the absolute being which it has in the nature of things, but soul denotes the same thing but according to the relative being which it obtains in order to the body, actuating it. But that these two do not really differ in man is proved: 1) because scripture, speaking of man, posits only one thing in him besides the corporeal substance, see Genesis 2:7; 2) because scripture everywhere takes spirit and soul for the same thing. For in the assigned passage of Genesis, that which was added to the dust is called "nephesh" soul, and in Ecclesiastes 12:7 "ruach" spirit; 3) because otherwise two substances would remain after the death of man. For the spirit after the dissolution returns to God, Ecclesiastes 12:7, and in Matthew 10:28 the soul is said to remain after the mortification of the body. But where the soul may go (if it is posited to be distinct from the spirit) after death, is not undeservedly asked. Because the dying saints only took care of the spirit, commending it to God, as Christ Luke 23:46 and Stephen Acts 7:59. But it would be absurd to say that the souls

of those whose spirit is received by God fall to the devils as prey, nor can a third thing be said, since there are only two ways of the dying, Luke 16.

Objection: the celebrated passage of the apostle, 1 Thessalonians 5:23: "And may the God of peace himself sanctify you entirely, and may your whole spirit and soul and body be kept blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." Something similar occurs in Hebrews 4:12. The Thnetopsychite Arabians seized upon this passage to overthrow the immortality of the human soul, which we conjecture from a collation of the theology of the new Thnetopsychites who came forth from the school of Socinus. But this is it: that the dead are annihilated; the body vanishes; the spirit returns to him who gave it; the soul feels neither pleasure nor pain. Thus an anonymous author in a Dutch treatise published in 1631. But by spirit which returns to God they by no means understand a spiritual and immortal substance, endowed with its own intellect and will, but only a divine particle of breath which has no existence in itself and per se outside of God. The same anonymous author, and Volkel in his work On True Religion book 3 chapter 11. Briefly, they deny that anything of immortal life is to be acknowledged in man from creation itself. Socinus, epistle 5 to Volkel, page 484. On the immortality of the human soul or spirit, see above part 10 thesis 1. A response was also given to the passage 1 Thessalonians 5:23 in part 9 thesis 3 problem 6. We add that the exposition of the authors of the new Dutch translation pleases us very much, who understand by spirit the mind (as in 1 Corinthians 2:12), by soul the will and affections (as in Isaiah 26:8-9). As to the passage Hebrews 4:12, soul and spirit there seem to be taken for the same thing, so that the word spirit stands intensively to the word soul, as a similar example occurs in John 3:5, so that from this may appear the power of the word of God, inasmuch as it penetrates and reaches to the dividing of the soul, which is a spiritual nature. And in the same verse at the end, two things are coupled which signify the same thing. Further, the origin of spirit distinct from soul is explained thus by J. A. Comenius in his Synopsis of Physics chapter 11 section 2: "Man," he says, "is composed of three things: body, spirit, and soul." He proves it from 1 Thessalonians 5:23 and 1 Corinthians 14:14. "There," he says, "the apostle distinguishes between spirit and mind. And in reality," he says in the same place, "it is so: we have a body conflated from the elements just as the brutes do; we have a spirit from the spirit of the world; but the soul or mind is from God." See the same more fully. But what that spirit of the world (which he also calls the soul of the world) is, the same author explains in chapter 2 of his Synopsis, page 25: "It is," he says, "life itself infused into the world to work all in all." From this general spirit individual bodies participate, and are then said to have their own special and particular spirits, from which bodies are partially composed according to Comenius, as he says in the same chapter section 3 in the exposition of the paragraph, page 31. But when he says that this spirit is life, he either properly and abstractly understands it as the form through which the living thing is constituted in the being of the living, as white is white through whiteness, or in first act; and thus it cannot compose - since life thus taken is not something real but a certain mode of existence and duration, or the union itself of the soul with the body as it expresses the power for exercising common operations. If he understands it metonymically as that which vivifies, now he contradicts scripture, which says that the soul is the effective and formal principle of life, that is, of vital actions - for it calls it the breath of life, Genesis 2. Whatever the case, such a spirit is not yet proven. For what is adduced from the passage Genesis 1:2 without compelling reasons from the analogy of the text and of faith, and against

the common interpretation of Christendom and the vindications against the Pneumatomachi and today's Socinians, is rejected by us with the same ease with which it is asserted. As to the passage 1 Corinthians 14:14, the word "nous" should not be translated "mind" but "understanding," as Beza and others do. The apostle wants to signify that he indeed prays inwardly in his heart, although he uses a foreign language, but the hearers can receive no fruit from it, see verse 16. The philosopheme about the soul of the world we touched on in part 2 thesis 8 in Plato and his followers, and below in appendix 3 we will inquire about it more fully. But Comenius's opinion seems to incline to the speculations of the Paracelsists. We cited Dornau the Paracelsian-Scripturalist in the same place. Compare, he who has leisure, Paracelsus himself also aiming at this in his treatise On the Creation of Man page 757, see also page 761.

Problem 2: Whether mind does not differ from soul? I affirm, as an accident from its subject. For mind is a faculty of the soul by which it is apt to discern between true and false, good and evil. But more often mind and soul are taken by the philosophers for the same thing, namely synecdochically.

Problem 3: Whether mind is thought, as a certain one from the more recent philosophizers loves to speak? I deny, for they differ as the agent by which and the action itself. For mind is a faculty of the soul, by means of which it thinks; but thought is the effect of the soul through the mind. Especially from the state of the separated soul it is most clearly proven that there is a distinction of the subsisting and permanent thing, namely the human soul as a vital, spiritual, incorruptible substance, from the transient and evanescent action (namely thought), and likewise a distinction of the same action both from the active principle by which, namely the power or faculty of thinking and understanding, that is, from the mind or intellect, which is in the separated soul as in its subject, and emanates from it - in the way that all proper things emanate from their subjects. If someone confounds the soul of man with mind and thought through inconsiderateness or idiotical ignorance, or ignorance of pure negation, certainly it must be judged concerning this crude concept as concerning that other one by which the soul is sometimes confounded with the breath proceeding from the mouth. But if such things are professed and studiously urged by those who have learned philosophy, nay more, profess an excellent knowledge of it, certainly it could deservedly be suspected that some monster is being nourished by them here which would finally end in skepticism or Epicureanism or Socinianism - if being admonished they do not desist. So that on this occasion theologians must opportunely keep watch against these dangerous philosophemes, lest the academic youth, especially dedicated to the studies of theology, be corrupted by them, and lest profane men fall into those thoughts that the soul is an evanescent and corruptible thing.

Problem 4: What is to be decided about the divisibility and extension of rational souls? I answer: Fortunio Liceti endeavored to explain the knot in a special treatise. From him and after him Daniel Sennert attempted the same in his Physical Hypomnemata 4, chapter 6. After him and against him Johannes Gallego de la Serna in his treatise On the Origin of Souls chapter 3, where he determines that they are not divisible either per se or per accidens (consequently not extended either), not otherwise than the angels - because they are spiritual or incorporeal

substances, opposed to body and incapable of quantity. But he says that the other souls, being material forms, are extended and divisible per accidens, to the division of the bodies - but more or less. Thus the parts of more perfect animals cut off from the whole live minimally; more the parts of imperfect animals or insects; most the parts of plants. Finally he concludes this chapter against Sennert thus: "For it is certain that all material souls are divisible to the division of quantity, either occultly, as in brute animals, or conspicuously, as in annulose animals and in plants, and that the souls of plants are multiplied by division, and not by traducianism, as Sennert wants - just as all the other material souls come to be through generation." In whose opinion I prefer to acquiesce, in the remaining arcana of this nature professing a learned ignorance. The scholastics on the first part question 75 should be compared. But above we briefly touched on the question whether the soul is whole in the whole and whole in any part. Which nearly coincides with this question of ours, or certainly is very closely related to it. We affirm concerning the essential whole, and concerning the totality of essence and power. To which pertain the golden words of Augustine in his book Against the Epistle of the Foundation chapter 16: "It is whole, present to the individual particles of its body, since it senses whole in the individuals," etc. "Nor do you so hold both that you have one part here and another elsewhere, sufficient to exhibit itself whole in individual places simultaneously," etc. And in his book On the Spirit and the Soul chapter 28: "As God, being one, is always and everywhere whole, governing, moving, vivifying all things, so the soul in its body everywhere vigors whole, vivifying, moving and governing it."

2. Concerning the origin of the rational soul, three things can be asked: 1) by whom they are; 2) from what they are - whether from nothing, or from some preexisting thing; 3) when they were made or are made - whether from eternity, or in time. Concerning the first, these problems can be proposed:

1) Whether God does not use the ministry of angels for the production of the rational soul? Seleucus and Hermias wanted this, besides Avicenna - which heresy the Messalians are later said to have followed. But especially Carpocrates, who first of all thought that the whole world was created by angels, and therefore also souls. Irenaeus book 1 chapter 24. But since souls are produced through creation, which requires infinite power in the agent, and an angel is by its nature finite, the production of souls can in no way be ascribed to it, not even by way of instrument. For it would follow that the angels dispose to the production of the effect which the principal agent intends, for this is the nature of an instrumental cause. But this cannot be, because creation, since it happens in a moment and from nothing, requires and can admit no preceding disposition at all; for a preceding disposition cannot be in nothing, which is perpetually equally indeterminate. Compare what was said above in part 1 thesis 4.

2) Whether the soul is produced immediately by God? I affirm: 1) because their production is assigned to no one in the scriptures except to God alone, Genesis 2:7, Zechariah 12:1, Ecclesiastes 12:7, Hebrews 12:9; 2) reason also teaches this, because souls are produced through creation (as will be proved later), but this requires infinite power in the agent, and this is found in God alone. Therefore. And so the church deservedly condemned the contrary error, as Leo I testifies in epistle 93 to Turribius the bishop, chapter 10, where, after he had reviewed the

errors of the Priscillianists concerning the soul, he added these words: "But the catholic faith cuts off all these from the body of its unity, constantly preaching and truly that the souls of men were not before they were breathed into their bodies, nor are they incorporated by anyone except by God the creator, who is both the creator of them and of the bodies." The rest pertaining to this question, see below in thesis 3.

Concerning the second, from what souls are made, it is asked: 1) whether they are made from the substance of God? The Manicheans, and finally also the Priscillianists, thought this after the Stoics; for they thought that breath of which Genesis 2 speaks proceeded from the substance of God. But this opinion was condemned by the church as impious and heretical, as is clear from the epistle of Jerome to Marcellinus, and from epistle 28 of Augustine to Jerome, likewise from the book On the Origin of the Soul, book 1 chapter 4 and book 2 chapter 3. But most clearly from Leo I, epistle 93 to Turribius chapter 5. Thomas refuted this impious error with many reasons, Summa Contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 85; the other scholastics did the same on Lombard book 2 distinction 17. But the words of Moses concerning the insufflation of God into the nostrils of Adam, whence the heretics took occasion for their heresy, must be understood synecdochically, because God does not have a body by which he could corporally send breath out of himself. Therefore by this phrase it is signified that by God's command, and as if by his breath, the soul was created and imparted to the body of Adam; or he breathed into his nostrils, that is, he made the nostrils breathe and respire, which actions are indications of the soul acting within. See Zanchi book 1 On Creation chapter 1 article 6 section 2. This one reason suffices to overturn that heresy: because God is indivisible, and therefore nothing can be made from him - unless we want to say that what is produced is God himself, which is most absurd. Then, because all souls would be one; for God is indivisibly one.

Question 2: Whether souls are propagated by traducianism, or rather new ones are created daily? The meaning of this question is whether, just as the body of man is formed from the matter of the seed which is detached from the one generating, in the same way also the soul is made and produced either from some seed or in any other way, yet so that it is derived from the one generating and is somehow detached from his soul - or whether it is created by God and in this way united to the body? Augustine treated this question copiously, especially in volume 2, the whole epistle 28 to Jerome, also epistle 157 to Optatus; in volume 3 On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, where the whole seventh and tenth books contain this disputation; then in volume 7, the four books which are On the Soul and Its Origin. There is also among the works of Jerome a dialogue in volume 4 written by I know not whom, in which the opinion of Augustine and Jerome is briefly collected from the writings of each father. See also Zanchi book 2 On Creation chapter 5 article 2, and Goclenius who in a certain book titled The Reliable Way reviews the commentaries and disputations of certain theologians and philosophers of our age on this question, and the special treatise of Rudolf Lavater. But the opinions of learned men on this issue are found to be quite differing. As to the fathers, the most ancient of them Tertullian, who for this reason is called a presumptuous man by Gennadius in his book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas chapter 14, asserted that the soul is from traducianism, as is clear from his book On the Soul chapters 9, 19, 22, 26, 36; whose opinion the Luciferians, Cyril, and some other Latins followed. Others taught that souls can in no way be propagated through the parents, but are

fabricated daily by God - which is the opinion of Hilary book 10 On the Trinity, Ambrose book On Noah and the Ark chapter 4, Jerome book 3 of his Apology against Rufinus, Chrysostom homily 23 on various passages of Matthew, Theodoret book 5 On the Cure of Greek Affections. Finally, some preferred to determine nothing, but rather to confess that they are completely ignorant of the origin of the rational soul - and this pleased Augustine especially, as is clear from book 10 On Genesis, also from the four books On the Origin of the Soul, also from epistle 28 to Jerome, and from epistle 157 to Optatus, finally from book 2 of the Retractions chapter 56. As to the scholastics, they not only taught that our soul is created immediately by God, but moreover rejected the contrary opinion of traducianism as not only erroneous but heretical. See the Master of the Sentences book 2 distinctions 17 and 18, also Thomas first part question 118 article 2, and on that passage Cajetan and his other commentators, and the Pontifical doctors promiscuously follow them. See Lorinus on Ecclesiastes 12, Francisco Suárez On the Work of the Six Days book 3 chapter 8, where he tries to prove by certain reasons that this is of faith. The same, from and with Suárez, contends Juan Gallego de la Serna, a physician of the King of Spain, in his declamation On the Origin of Souls against Sennert chapter 8, where on page 108 he says that Sennert's contrary opinion is heretical and suspect enough in faith. Finally, among those who embraced the Reformation, they also went in various directions - with most of those who call themselves from Luther openly defending traducianism (see Meisner in his Sober Philosophy and Bartholin in his Anatomy, and Sennert in his Physical Hypomnemata, cited before, and Eckhard in his Bundle of Controversies chapter 10, and Sperling in his Physics), to whom one or another from the Reformed accede: Peucer in his treatise On the Origin of the Soul, Georg Sohn formerly a theologian in the University of Heidelberg, as is clear from volume 2 of his works, and the illustrious theologian and distinguished philosopher Combachius in his Anthropology. But with most subscribing to the creation of souls. There are also some who leave it in suspense and in the middle, like Musculus and Piscator. The Remonstrants, although they seem to think with us, nevertheless reject the arguments adduced from the scriptures, nor do they substitute better ones, in Corvinus against Du Moulin chapter 10. We briefly open up what is to be thought about this whole matter. But we establish, with the scholastics and the doctors of the Reformed church (with only a few excepted), that souls are created immediately by God, and we think that someone can more safely acquiesce in this opinion, because the immortality of the soul can thus be better defended and proven by natural reason, relying partly on the testimonies of sacred scripture, partly also on philosophical reasons evincing the same. From the testimonies of scripture and scriptural arguments which are wont to be adduced for this opinion, we select only Ecclesiastes 12:7, Zechariah 12:1, Hebrews 12:9, to which, being premised and rightly explained, could be added Genesis 2:7. The rest which are adduced from Psalm 33:15, Isaiah 57:16, etc. we purposely pass over, because we do not yet see that anything is solidly or evidently concluded from them against the adversaries. Ecclesiastes 12:7: "The dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it." Here we distinctly see three things: 1) an open opposition of dust or body, and spirit or soul; 2) the spirit is said to return to God, which could not be said if it had not first proceeded from God - which argues a clearly diverse origin of soul and body; 3) God is expressly said to have given the spirit; nor can this be understood of the communication by which God as the concurring first cause produces all things with second causes - for thus he also gives the body. But emphatically

God is said to give the spirit, but this is not said of the body, which clearly suggests to us a diverse mode of origin.

Cartwright objects in his commentaries on this passage and in this way: "Those," he says, "who from this passage strive to overturn traducianism rely on a foundation too little firm. For it is clear that Ecclesiastes has respect to the formation of the protoplast, when God breathed the soul into Adam, as appears from the fashioning of the body, which is said to have come from the earth." But to the contrary: it cannot be had respect to the creation of the first man, because from the force of that creation the soul of the first man was not to be separated, so that thus it alone would return to God. And sin, which was the cause of this return of the soul to God, does not touch Adam alone, but all his confederates. Wherefore also the sentence of death in Genesis 3:19, "You are dust, and to dust you shall return," was not pronounced upon Adam alone, but also upon all who were reckoned in the same ancient and primeval covenant with Adam. Wherefore also this passage must be understood not only of Adam, but of all the sons of Adam.

For this opinion also makes the passage of the prophet Zechariah chapter 12 verse 1: "The declaration of the Lord, who stretches out the heavens and founds the earth and forms the spirit of man within him." Here it is expressly said of God that he is the former of the spirit of man. Nor is that exception of any avail, that indeed God forms the human soul, but that it is not yet satisfied from this passage to the question whether from the substance of the parents, or from nothing. For since the scope of the Holy Spirit in this passage is to preach the power of God, it would not be so accommodated if he adduced such things which can also be done by men. For this reason also it is conjoined to those things which also without controversy were created by God from nothing. So that it may be denoted that the soul is of the same order as to the mode of effecting, with heaven and earth. Nor does the distinction between the mediate and immediate production of God make any difference here. For if this were a mediate production, now man would be admitted into participation of the deed, which the text does not bear, which assigns the production of the soul, as well as of heaven and earth, as peculiar to God. Here also the passage Hebrews 12:9 is adduced by not a few, where the apostle says: "Furthermore, we have had human fathers who corrected us, and we paid them respect. Shall we not much more readily be in subjection to the Father of spirits and live?" Here the fathers of the flesh and of the soul are expressly discriminated. But if the soul were from traducianism, the same would be the parents of body and soul. Two things are excepted to this passage: 1) that the word flesh is homonymous and does not denote here the corporeal substance, but the innate corruption, as it is taken in John 3:6; similarly also the word spirit, which here does not signify the soul, but spiritual gifts; 2) that God indeed is the Father of souls, but mediately. But the former exception is not congruous. For the name of spirits is plural; but that antithesis then obtains when "flesh" is opposed to "spirit," not to "spirits." The second exception is no more firm. For the antithesis would not be consistent with itself - of the father of the flesh, that is, who generated the bodies, and of the Father of spirits, that is, who procreated the spirits. Then also the force of the apostolic exhortation to greater obedience to be shown to God than to earthly fathers would collapse. As to the passage Genesis 2:7, which we were accustomed to adduce before now in our prelections and disputations, we learned after the first edition of this disputation that it is also

urged by Francisco Suárez in the book just cited chapter 7, and Juan Gallego de la Serna page 107. But they argue from it far otherwise than we do: "He breathed into his face the breath of life," etc. Where they assert that the breath of life was a created thing having similitude with God himself creating, in understanding, immateriality, and immortality. And he adduces the passage of Theodoret, question 23 on Genesis, arguing against the heretics who said that the breath of life was something of the substance of God. And Theodoret says: "This opinion is of extreme impiety and blasphemy; for by this the divine scripture demonstrated the facility of creating, and obscurely declared the nature of the soul itself - namely, that it is a creatable spirit, invisible, intellective, and devoid of the crassitude of body," etc. Where he asserts not only that the souls of Adam and Eve were created, because they were the souls of the first two human beings, but because they were in reality of a creatable nature, and in no way of a generable nature, namely from an incorporeal substance. Whence, since all rational souls agree in essence, which from its nature is creatable, they all must without doubt be multiplied through creation. Which indeed is a most common opinion in the said books of Francisco Suárez, that it is of faith and is a Catholic truth, namely specifically in the production of each individual man. We, leaving aside this explication and argumentation, otherwise and only infer from the passage that the human soul came extrinsically, and did not arise intrinsically from or with the principles of the body of Adam materially produced from a corporeal substance (namely of earth or the elements). Nor is the observation of Tostado on Genesis 1 folio 76 irrelevant: "In all the other animals and plants it was said: 'Let the earth bring forth' or 'Let the waters bring forth'; but of man it is not so said, because the matter of the rest of the animals and plants is earth, and the form is educed from the potency of the disposed matter, since it is not something which is. But it is not so concerning the human soul, which holds the highest grade among the forms." Yet this determination of Tostado, which follows there, seems to me too harsh: "He is said to generate the composite who conjoins the form to the matter - since God alone can create the soul, and he alone can formally unite the created soul to the body, he will properly be said to produce man. And if we say that one man begets another, this is taken broadly, insofar as he ministers the matter and the dispositive power, namely the formative and organizing power," etc. But see the vindications of the genuine interpretation of the passage Genesis 2:7 in Rivet, Exercise 17 on Genesis. Whether Job 33:4 can be applied to the present question together with Genesis 2:7 (as indeed is commonly done by the Pontifical theologians) is deservedly doubted. For by breath, God or the Holy Spirit is most fittingly understood, so that the same thing is said in the latter part of that verse as in the former, not a different thing (as the Rabbis speak); for this is most frequent in scripture, especially in the books of Job, Psalms, Isaiah. Juan de Pineda in his commentary on the cited passage professes plainly enough to incline to this interpretation: "But as for what is said in this place, that the spirit of God made man, I would say the same thing is signified as in the following part by breath - if it did not stand in the way that the first part nearly always pertains to the formation of the body, just as the second to the vivification of the soul."

Philosophical reasons confirming the same succeed:
1) If souls come to be by traducianism, by traducianism is understood either the soul itself of the parents, so that they are said to be propagated from the soul of the parents, or the seed. But neither can be said. Not the former, because the rational soul is indivisible. Therefore, either the parents must communicate their whole soul to their children, and thus they themselves will not

have it, or in no way - and this is what we want. It also pleases us to know whether the soul of the fetus is detached from the soul of the father, or of the mother, or of both. Not from the soul of both; for thus the soul of the fetus would necessarily be composite from integrating parts, at least two - that which was detached from the father, and that which was detached from the mother. Which is absurd. Nor can a reason be given why not from both, since the father and mother in the generation of the fetus are coordinated agents, and one total effective principle, nor can the male generate without the female, just as the female cannot without the male. Nor also can the soul be made from the seed. Because what is made from the body is corporeal. But the soul is not a body. Then it would follow that human seed is animate - which can be pressed by those absurdities from which the patrons of this opinion will not easily extricate themselves. Nor does the seed concur to the production of the soul in the mode of an intrinsically constitutive principle, which nevertheless is denoted by the particle "from." Whence it would further follow that the principles of body and soul would be the same, and consequently the essence the same. How absurd this is, no one does not see. Hence we also conclude that since neither the soul of the parents, nor the seed of the same can intrinsically constitute, and yet it has an essence by which it is constituted in its own being, it necessarily has it from nothing, and consequently is created by God, which we intended to prove. But perhaps souls are disseminated from the plastic power which is impressed on the seed; but neither can this be said, since the plastic power conducts itself in the mode of an instrumental and indeed corporeal agent, concurring intrinsically to the constitution of the thing. Then, since the soul is a substance, and the plastic power is an accident, how the soul can be made from it is inexplicable - unless by the power of the principal or substantial agent, but this is corporeal, or a body.

2) If the soul comes to be by traducianism, now it will depend in becoming on the body. With this posited, I do not see how the immortality of the rational soul can be conveniently proven and naturally enough defended, since this is the best way of proving it.Indeed, the ancient orthodox therefore denied that the soul perishes with the body, because it is not disseminated with the body.For thus it is had in the book On the Definitions of the Orthodox Faith or Ecclesiastical Dogmas chapter 18, volume 3 of the works of Augustine:"The human soul does not die with the flesh, because it is not disseminated with the flesh, but with the body formed in the womb of the mother it is created by the judgment of God and infused, so that man may live within in the womb,and thus proceed by birth into the world." What, that the ancients taught that it necessarily follows that the soul becomes liable to death if it is from traducianism? For thus Jerome, book 2 against Rufinus to Pammachius and Marcellinus, volume 2: "If," he says, "the soul is taken from traducianism, therefore the same is the condition of the souls of humans, which we confess to be eternal, and of the souls of brute animals, which are dissolved with the body." And Thomas, question 118, article 2, says: "Since the soul is immaterial, immortal, and a substance per se subsisting, being and coming-to-be are owed to it not through generation, but through creation."

3) Nor can any natural agent which in acting depends on matter produce something independent of the same, but whatever it produces must have dependence on matter. Since this

can in no way be fitting to the rational soul, which can subsist even outside the body, neither also can it come forth through the traducianism of seed, insofar as it is material.

4) Also various absurdities would follow from this opinion, which we have now indicated in part, and we add these: 1) If soul produced soul, it would follow that spirit produces spirit and propagates itself either through generation or through any other species of production. Indeed, that the soul generates separately, not the composite. But all these things are absurd. 2) If the soul were produced from seed, it would follow that with the seeds concurring, the fetus would immediately be animated. But this is absurd. 3) It would follow that the human soul lies hidden in the seed, either as in the potency of matter, or actually in its receptacle or domicile - both of which are absurd. 4) It would follow that the soul of the father is either transfused and infused with the seed, and dependently on the paternal seed into the uterus of the female, and there on the 40th or 30th day, or whatever other day (on which the soul is said to be in the fetus), produces the soul of the son through detachment or kindling of light, or any other mode of propagation and production; or with the paternal seed still existing in his body, the soul of the son is actually produced in it and dependently on it by the soul of the father, and is constituted outside its causes. If the former is said, it must be further explained whether and how the whole paternal soul (nor must a divisible soul be dreamed of) returns from the female uterus to the father, and whether and how the father subsisted for so long without his soul? If the latter is said, now it would follow that the soul of the son is infused by the father together with the excretion of the seed into the female uterus, and consequently the fetus is animated from the first moment of the reception of the paternal seed - nay, indeed was already animated in the paternal body before it was poured out. To whichever side they turn here, I do not see how they can extricate themselves from absurdities. 5) Add that in the question of the concurrence of the maternal soul to this production, they are not sufficiently consistent with themselves, nor can they satisfy themselves and others.

Objection 1: Genesis 1:28: "Be fruitful and multiply." From this they conclude that the nature of man is the same as that of the beasts, and that both his soul and body are produced in their manner, because the same thing is said of these in verse 22. But the consequence is weak, because from the fact that the same words are said of both, it cannot be gathered that the generation of beast and man is similar in all respects, and the text has respect to the composites to be disseminated from each species; for both men and brutes increase, while from the same other men, other brutes are produced according to the similitude of the species. Nor does fecundation consist in the production of the form, but in its union with matter, which similarly happens in man, so that, the immediate production of the soul by God notwithstanding, man can nevertheless be said to generate man. Thus the virgin Mary is said to have borne Christ, Luke 2:7, and she herself is his mother, ibid. verse 51, John 2:3, 5, 12.

Objection 2: From Genesis 2:2-3, that God is said to have rested from all his work. But if this is understood simply, it is false; for God even now operates both mediately and immediately: mediately, by concurring with every natural agent to the production of all effects proceeding from them; immediately, to the conservation of the universe, for which God does not use the work of any creature, since it is no less than creation, indeed differing from it only by reason. And Christ

in general testifies that his Father works even until now, and he with him, John 5:17. Therefore, the passage must be understood of the production of new species.

Objection 3: Genesis 46:26, where 70 souls are said to have come out of the thigh of Jacob. I answer: It is ignorance of the phrasing of holy scripture, in which soul is taken for the whole animate thing, as is also clear from the text. For properly souls did not come into Egypt, but men. Then, because they are said to have proceeded from his thigh; but men had proceeded. Finally, from the following verse, where the sons of Joseph are said to be two souls, by synecdoche. It is added that the word soul is taken for a corpse in Leviticus 19:28 and 21:1; why not also synecdochically for the whole man?

Objection 4: Hebrews 7:10, from the antithesis which the apostle institutes between Levi and Christ, as if Christ was only in the loins of Abraham according to the body, but Levi by reason of body and soul. But it is a fallacy of non-cause for cause. For the apostle wants there to extol the Melchizedekian priesthood above the Levitical or Aaronic, from the fact that Levi himself, who was the head of the Aaronic order, paid tithes to Melchizedek, and typically to Christ.

Objection 5: Containing the principal argument, is taken from the propagation of original sin. For they think that those who establish creation are necessarily compelled either to deny original sin, or to constitute God the author of sin. But since scripture admits neither, it consequently follows that the soul is from traducianism. But this difficulty has been removed clearly enough by the theologians and philosophers; see Zanchi book 2 chapter 5 article 6, and in Goclenius's Progymnasma everywhere in the opinions of those who defend creation, etc., and others cited in our disputation on the propagation of original sin. Here we briefly repeat that Adam, created with justice by God so that he could worship the creator above all things if he willed, by voluntary malice fell away to the love of creatures, and thus merited for himself the privation of original justice, and for all his posterity who were reckoned in the same covenant with him, because in Adam as the root and head of the covenant all had sinned. Further, that demerit of theirs is completed in the act of God's justice and vindictive justice, when in creating souls he does not create or concreate habitual grace, as was done from the beginning. Nor nevertheless does that non-concreation have the nature of sin, but only of something antecedent to sin. For that non-giving or privation, considered privatively on the part of God and negatively, conducts itself as a just and due punishment (the opposite of which, namely giving, is not due); but the privated privation (so to speak), considered on the part of man and in man, is formally sin and unjust guilt, because it is a certain habitual aversion from God and conversion to the creature - which defect is culpable. See this opinion of ours explained and defended more fully in the disputation On the Propagation of Original Sin.

Objection 6, or rather an instance and exception, by which they strive to extricate themselves from the principal arguments and absurdities by which they are urged: Because a flame by its multiplication produces a flame, and propagates itself, and light arises from light, therefore also the soul produces a soul in the same or a similar way?

I answer: Nothing is more absurd than this instance or consequence. Flame and fire are bodies, and fire is in the vapor which is kindled, as a substance contained in a containing substance, as water in a sponge; but light in the flame is an accident in that body, namely in the fire immediately, and in the vapor mediately. But what consequence is there from the production of a corporeal substance, from body into body, and the coproduction of a corporeal accident in and with its body, to the production of a spiritual substance from a spiritual substance?

Problem 24: Whether the souls of men arrive from elsewhere, so that they transmigrate from another human or animal body? I answer: On account of the affinity of the matter, we here again note what we touched on above and in the disputation On Judaism. This was once the opinion of Plato in the Timaeus and of Pythagoras, on which see Diogenes Laërtius in his life, and Lactantius book 7 chapter 12, Plotinus in his book On the Proper Demon, Justin Against Trypho, Plutarch book 5 On Philosophical Opinions chapter 2, Porphyry in his book On the Abstinence from Animals, Augustine book 16 of the City of God, Basil in his Hexaemeron, Apuleius in his Metamorphosis. The Indians under the reign of the Great Mogul, as many at least as have not exchanged their paganism for Muhammadanism, tenaciously hold the same opinion drawn from him up to the present day. See the Jesuit reports and letters published about the Moguls. Benjamin of Tudela on page 34 of his Itinerary mentions certain pagans whom he calls Dogziin, among whom the same tenet then obtained. We learn from Josephus, Jewish War book 2 chapter 7, that this absurd opinion had already migrated to the Jews before the time of Christ, together with Pharisaism - with which compare what the Rabbis say on Job 33:20, and the more recent ones, Elijah in the Tishbi on the word "gilgul," Buxtorf's Rabbinic Lexicon, and its abbreviation under "g," and Schindler's Pentaglot, Menasseh ben Israel in his Conciliator question 43 on Genesis, and book 2 On the Resurrection chapter 18, and Leon of Modena in his disputation On Judaism cited by us. Which will contribute to the understanding of the passage Matthew 16:14. Where see the more recent commentators. There are not lacking, however, those from the Rabbis who repudiate this opinion, some of whom Menasseh ben Israel indicates in the cited place. And there are those among them who say that this and similar fables must be taken metaphorically. And thus Boethius in book 4 of the Consolation of Philosophy and Thomas there in his commentaries interpret Pythagoras and Plato. And on purpose Agnolo Morosini, a Servite theologian of Arezzo, does this in a special dissertation titled An Explication for Pythagoras and Plato on the Passage of Human Souls into Beasts. But I cannot approve this custom of interpreting, or rather twisting, authors through devised fictions. For what enthusiastic, heretical, magical, Kabbalistic things cannot be defended in this way, and finally transformed into mystical wisdom? Certainly the authors cited above judged far otherwise about the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato, and the genuine disciples of Pythagoras among the Indians prove it, not only in that opinion but in others, on abstinence from animals, etc. Concerning the Jews, the text of Matthew 16:14 does not allow us to doubt. Josephus cited above.

4. Concerning the time of the production of the soul, it can be asked: 1. Problem: Whether souls were created from eternity? I answer: Nothing is more certain than that they were not from eternity; for nothing is eternal except God. For whatever things were created, were made either with time itself, or in time. Because in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,

Genesis 1:1. Indeed, we think it implies if a creature is held to be from eternity, since novelty of being is altogether of their nature; see the reasons which were adduced in general against the opinion which holds that a creature could be from eternity, disputation 1 On Creation thesis 8 number 10 - to which perhaps could be added an argument taken from the nature of eternity. For it is at least a duration interminable from before; but every creature from within itself says an order to the creator, as to the efficient cause. But now every cause is prior to the effect; and the priority of nature suffices (for priority must be simply removed from eternity). For from this it follows that the existence of the creature from within itself says a termination to the existence of the creator; for to one asking what was before the first moment of the existence of the creature, the moment of the existence of the creator must necessarily be answered. For as all goodness is resolved into the first goodness, all cause into the first cause, so also all duration into the first duration, that is, of God. Hence I think it is gathered that no creature could be from eternity, because it cannot exhaust all the moments of duration, because it cannot exhaust that moment of existence which must necessarily be presupposed to the first moment of its own existence. Otherwise I do not see how the creature depends more on the creator than he on it, and they are not to be subordinated to each other but coordinated - which nevertheless is against the nature of being from itself and being from another. See this opinion defended at length by Wendelin, Physical Contemplation section 2 chapter 15 sections 12-13.

Problem 2: Whether in the beginning of creation all souls were created at once? I answer: Origen seems to have held that all souls were made from the beginning of the world in a certain number, and lay hidden either in the stars and heavens, or in I know not what treasuries of God, then came into bodies either spontaneously or by the command of God. See Zanchi book 2 On Creation chapter 5 thesis 1 section 4. We touched on the fiction of the Jews and Kabbalists, as well as of Plato, in the dissertation On the Term of Life. But it is overthrown: 1) by scripture, Zechariah 12:1, who forms the spirit of man in the midst of him - where the prophet expressly says that the soul is formed in the body, therefore not in heaven, or in the beginning of the world when the body did not yet exist. Reason persuades the same; for the soul is the form of the human body, since man consists of both soul and body. But it is natural to the form to be united to its matter, and it is beyond nature for it to be separated from its matter. Therefore, if all souls had been made from the beginning of the world, each would have been long separated beyond nature from its matter. But that this is absurd is clear, because in all things it is so disposed by nature that what is per se is prior to what is per accidens. If therefore souls had been prior without bodies, what is per accidens and against nature would have been prior to what is per se and according to nature.

Problem 3: At what time the soul is infused into the body. Although this question as to substance and directly is physiological, nevertheless it has its use in theology, inasmuch as from it is sought the decision of that case which occurs in Exodus 21:22, where God establishes a law concerning those striking a pregnant woman. The words run thus: "If men fight and strike a pregnant woman, and the children come out, and there is no death, he shall surely be punished as the husband of the woman lays upon him." Where there is an open distinction between pregnant women in whom the fetus is animated, and in whom it is not. It is therefore expedient to know when it is animated.

Sennert in his Physical Hypomnemata 4, chapter 3, section 3 says: "Secondly, I think it is most certain that the soul is present immediately from the first conception, as soon as the seed of the father and mother is conjoined and retained in the uterus of the mother, and the body begins to be formed - and whoever asserts the contrary, whether he is a patron of traducianism or of the infusion of the soul, errs from the truth." Others who deny that the soul is infused immediately from conception do not agree among themselves at what point of time, or with how many days having passed, the intellective soul is united to the body. Valles in his Controversies book 2, chapter 9 at the end says that females are never formed before the fortieth day, but males are formed in thirty or thirty-five days. The Coimbrans in their commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul book 2, article 2, section 2 say that the more common opinion, which they also follow, is that in males the conformation of the body is completed, and consequently the soul infused, around the fortieth day, in females around the eightieth. Feyens in his treatise On the Formation of the Fetus, question 8, conclusion 2, says: "The rational soul is infused around the third day from the conception of the seed, understand if the conception proceeds to life and is not frustrated." Whatever may be the case about the precise time of infusion, it must be established that the soul is introduced into a body that is organized and accommodated for receiving the soul. Which is proved: 1) from Zechariah 12:1, where God is said to form the spirit in the midst of man. But this cannot be said if he infuses it into the seed, because the seed is nothing of man, except only in potency. 2) From reason. Because it happens against nature and per accidens that the soul is not united to the body; but we said before that what is per se is prior to what is per accidens; therefore it is more fitting to the soul to be united to the body than to be not united. But it cannot be united unless the matter is predisposed; therefore, in general it is required that the body be disposed before the soul can exist. These arguments press the opinions of Sennert and Feyens. To which also add this against both: If on the third day from conception, when it is probable that the conformation is not yet perfect, and consequently the soul is not yet united to the body, it happens that the seed is corrupted or ejected from the uterus, what will become of that soul? It is not probable that it is to be annihilated. Nor will it be united to that unformed seed in the last judgment; for only men will rise again, and that was never a part of man. Nor can it always exist separately, since this is against its nature, insofar as it says a natural order to the body. Apply here also what we brought against the opinion which holds that all souls were made in the beginning of creation, where we proved that they were not made before they were united to matter - but we are speaking of a priority of time. As to those opinions which assign the animation of the male to the thirtieth or thirty-fifth day from conception, but of the female to the fortieth, or which assign that of the male to the fortieth, of the female to the eightieth - it is scarcely credible that the animation of the fetus should be extended beyond the period of the former opinion, so that the latter seems to extend the animation too far. Those who extend it the furthest, to persuade what they think, bring forth the law of purification which Moses enacted in Leviticus 12:2. See Maldonado on Luke chapter 2, Toledo there annotation 34, who with others take the reason for the doubled days of purification from the days in which the fetus is animated - the male with forty having elapsed, but the female with eighty. Hurtado warns in his disputation On Generation 2, section 112, that the doctors of this opinion do not try to show the days of formation from that law, but suppose that opinion from Aristotle and other philosophers, which being posited, they give the difference between the purification of one giving birth to a son and a

daughter. The Coimbrans nevertheless in the cited place directly prove their opinion, and this one, from this passage. But the foundation is slippery. For it is not certain to us from that passage that the reason for that law is a certain period of formation. From the same passage one could conclude that the fetus is animated on the seventh or fourteenth day, namely because the members are then conformed, although the perfect formation is extended to the fortieth or eightieth day, since even that is not simply necessary for the soul to be received. But he will prove it from the fact that the graver impurity is terminated on the eighth day, if she had borne a male, but on the fifteenth, if a female. Hurtado in the cited disputation, section 112, says: "What the period of embryonism is, and what the beginning of animation, neither Hippocrates, nor Galen, nor Aristotle know; but he knows who knows all things. For the precise definition of that matter is endured neither by the diversity of the seed itself from time to time, nor by the different disposition of the uterus or of the whole mother." Cornelius a Lapide in his commentary on Leviticus 12, after attacking the opinion of Maldonado, concludes: "The proper and genuine cause of this sanction and disparity is the will and good pleasure of God, etc. which is apposite to nature, namely on account of the greater flux of humors and corruption of blood, and the greater languor of the one giving birth in the birth of a female; for as Theodoret teaches, women are wont to labor more gravely when they bear a female than when a male." To this join the congruity of Francisco Vallés (whom see chapter 18 of his Sacred Philosophy), that the flux of blood in the birth of a male can last to the 40th day, in a female to the 80th, or rather that it never exceeds these terms, so that if the terms define not so much the maximum or most that happens, as the most and maximum that does not. Let it suffice to have said that this dispute of the physicians and physicists is not ours, provided that the genuine explication of the sayings of scripture and the theological truths about the incarnation of Christ are guarded. Meanwhile, we have nothing against that opinion which holds that it is not credible that animation is extended beyond the thirtieth or thirty-fifth day in males, and the fortieth in females.

Problem 4: Whether immediately after the detachment of the seed from the Blessed Virgin the soul of Christ was formed? Those who establish this do not indeed want the soul to have been infused into the rude seed, but that the matter in a single moment of time was so disposed that it was accommodated for receiving the soul. The Coimbrans explain this opinion in the cited place. "Nevertheless," they say, "the body of Christ our Savior did not observe this law of successive formation in the womb of the virgin mother; for what was to be gradually fashioned by the force of nature in the space of forty days was perfected and completed in a moment by divine power and the work of the Holy Spirit." And this is the common opinion of the scholastics. See Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles book 4 chapter 44. The theologian of great name among the Reformed, Jerome Zanchi, thinks the same, book 2 On the Incarnation of the Son of God, question 8 thesis 1, and with him many others. But we, to candidly explain our view, have never been able to see why the contrary opinion should be rejected. And in Hebrews 2:14 the apostle says that Christ was made similarly a partaker of flesh and blood as the children, and in verse 17, whence he had to be made like his brothers in all things. Nor do the reasons usually brought to the contrary prove anything else. The chief one is: that he was never joined to any embryo, but only to true human flesh endowed with a rational soul. For the Word was made flesh, that is, true man; but not first blood, then seed in the body of the virgin Mary, then an embryo, and afterwards man. But this reason presupposes that the person of the Word assumed flesh

immediately from conception - which nevertheless we deny, and we establish that, just as other fetuses are animated with the matter already disposed, similarly also Christ was animated, and that the Word assumed the body thus endowed with a soul, not indeed that the human nature at any time subsisted outside the person of the Son of God, but that in the order of nature the infusion of the soul preceded the assumption of humanity and personal union.

APPENDIX TO THE DISPUTATIONS ON CREATION, SECOND.

Respondent Cornelius Bruynvisch of Zierikzee in Zeeland.
For September 16, 1643.

1. In the disputations On Creation part 10 thesis 1, it was shown that the soul is immortal and incorruptible, and this from its own nature, not indeed through grace; in addition, that its immortality can be proven from the light and reason of nature. But two questions related to this still remain to be discussed around this matter.

1. Whether it is so disposed with this immortality of the soul, that with it in no way can consist some interval or certain state of not existing by its own existence, at least for some time which is terminated by the death and resurrection of man? Something like this seems to be established by the Socinians. Namely, that the souls of the just, when they have departed from the body, live and exist in God - which according to the same interpreters is nothing other than that the souls of the just, when they have departed from the body, do not indeed live and exist by a life and existence proper and distinct from the existence of God, but that they are of such a nature that from God, in whom they are said to live and exist, they can receive their own life and existence, which also they will then actually receive when they are reunited to the body on the day of judgment. But in this they are absurd who follow Socinus. For it openly implies that the soul is immortal and yet at some time does not exist; for the not existing of a thing is a sign that that thing is dead, for the immediate effect of death is the non-existence of the thing which lived or existed; but to be dead and to be immortal contradict each other. Furthermore, it is an inept evasion by which they contend that although they do not exist in themselves, they nevertheless exist in God, that is, they say a relation to the active power of God, by which they can be and are to be restored - for thus it would follow that all things produced in time also were from eternity, because from eternity they were in the active power of God, that is, they could be produced by God and were to be produced each in its own time. What, that existence is nothing other than a mode by which something is understood to be constituted outside its causes, as the metaphysicians everywhere teach - which being posited, it again implies to be in the power of God as the cause of existing, and to exist, which is posited by them simultaneously in the soul. The same is proven from Scripture, which testifies that souls exist in themselves and per se, even after separation from the body and before the resurrection. Matthew 22:32: "I am the

God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead but of the living" - where Christ expressly proves that the patriarchs according to something, that is, their souls (for their bodies had returned to dust), live or exist, and this in themselves, by their own existence, which is clear from the text; for thus they are said to be alive or to live, so that their state is opposed to the state of the dead, who are known also to have an existence in God (may there be no improper speech), or a potential existence; therefore nothing remains which can be said, than that the patriarchs even then had an actual existence, distinct from the existence of other beings. Similarly also Luke 23:43: "Truly I say to you, today you will be with me in paradise." To this passage they are accustomed to except that to the thief indeed paradise was promised, but to be given only after the resurrection; but that Christ said "today you will be with me in paradise" on account of the certainty of the future thing, just as the prophets express future things through the present or past tense; therefore "today" will be a particle not of time, but of assertion. But truly this overturns the common and natural signification of the word too audaciously without example. And who does not see that through the adverb "today" Christ wanted to respond to that adverb "when" which is contained in the petition of the thief: "Remember me when you come into your kingdom" - so that the sense may be "today will be that 'when,' or the time in which you ask remembrance of you from me, and also today, that is, on this very day you will be with me in my kingdom." But the truth of our assertion will be even more evident from the treatment of the following problem.

It is asked secondly: Whether souls, after separation from the body until the resurrection, sleep and perceive neither afflictions nor joys? The Anabaptists affirm this, as is seen in their antagonists Abraham Doreslaar and Petrus Austro-Sylvius, where they treat of the four last things. Protocol of Emden, folios 360 and 361. The Socinians agree with them, who also themselves contend that the soul, even if it existed by its own existence, at least does not feel pains or joys. For thus Smalcius disputes about this matter against Frantzius on the last judgment, page 409: "Just as," he says, "the body without the spirit is a corpse, so in turn the spirit without the body cannot exercise any actions; hence the spirit after death is endowed with no sense." And the same there: "Whether that spirit which returns to God and is separated from the body is endowed with some sense, and whether it enjoys some pleasure before the advent of Christ and before the new conjunction of the spirit with the glorified body, we very much doubt - indeed, we believe the matter to be otherwise." And in disputation 8 against Frantzius on the Church he says: "It is an error when in thesis 25 Frantzius divides the Church into triumphant and militant; for in reality there is now no triumphant Church, but it will be in the future when Christ Jesus comes to render to each one according to his works." Whence also this problem is sometimes conceived in these words: Whether there is some triumphant Church before the resurrection - which the illustrious Maccovius did in his Theological Collegia part 3, disputation 12. Whether the Remonstrants are entirely alien from this opinion or not, cannot be so said; nor will they themselves say it openly. The words of Episcopius could move a scruple for someone in his Theological Disputations 22 thesis 7, where he establishes that the souls of the just after this life up to the day of judgment have no operation outside themselves, nor do they feel anything. See his words, and compare with disputation 23 theses 2 and 4, and with his Defense of the Remonstrant Catechism against Dr. Heidanus on questions 100 and 101, compared with the Remonstrant Apology chapter 19. We in our catechization of the Remonstrant Catechism on

question 100 offered for the reader's consideration excerpts from the horrible Socinian booklet which a certain Remonstrant Socinian, formerly a minister of the word among them, who marked his name with the first letters D.R.C. (Dirk Rafaelsz Camphuysen), is thought to have translated into our vernacular language and published. Where the anonymous Socinian says that whatever is commonly believed about the infernal torture, punishment and damnation of the separated soul, and of the soul and body after the day of judgment, has flowed from the trifles and fables of the Papists and pagan poets. The aforementioned Remonstrant Dutch interpreter (D.R.C.) adds on pages 214-215: "No one has accomplished so much in the restoration of collapsed Christianity as Socinus. Nevertheless," he says, "no one seems to me so excellent and so useful to piety as that through the thick and common shadows of the fabulous hell and infinite damnation he saw through, and restored this illustrious light to men, etc. As for me, I give thanks from my inmost heart to God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. For this illumination in this article (to which I could not arrive by my own ingenuity) made it so that when I was just about to reprove the whole Christian religion, I began to love it, to esteem it, to find it rational, and hitherto through God's grace to express it from all my powers in life and morals." And afterwards on page 219: "So that I dare confidently assert that this Papistic, or rather pagan fiction (about the infernal punishments after this life) is one of the greatest impediments which impede the Christian religion from being able to be purged of false dogmas and pillows of sins, such as are about the merits and satisfaction of Christ, about the imputed justice of the impenitent, the impossibility and non-necessity of Christian obedience, etc."

Whether the Remonstrants are going to except anything against these excerpts, and whether the aforementioned Socinian of theirs vomited such Socino-Libertinisms so openly without their knowledge or against their will - there is no leisure now to inquire. At least up to now they make no response, nor do they clear themselves. In their Apology folio 218 they strive to purge the Socinians of this opinion, while they say it is uncertain whether they deny that the soul has vital operations within itself and enjoys them, so that it does not sleep. Some of them seem to affirm this openly enough. But sending the reader back to the excerpts from Socinus and the Socinians which our catechization just cited on question 100 exhibits, we reject this opinion about the sleeping of souls, whoever's it may be, establishing: the souls of the pious, as soon as they have departed from this life, are affected with pleasure, and those of the impious with torments. Concerning the pious it is proven from John 5:24: "Truly, truly I say to you, whoever hears my word and believes him who sent me has eternal life and does not come into judgment, but has passed from death to life" - where the attainment of eternal life is immediately subjoined to death. But that life is not without pleasure; hence it is called joy, Matthew 25:21: "Enter into the joy of your Lord." And that is the state which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, etc., 1 Corinthians 2. It is proven secondly from the desires of the saints by which they sought that state which is after death, 2 Corinthians 5:2, 4, Philippians 1:21, Romans 7:24 - which could not happen unless they thought something better was to be conferred on them; for appetite is borne only to the good, and more to that which is better. But they would rather seek the state of this life than of the future, if in the future life there was no place for joy except after the judgment, because it is better to enjoy spiritual joy, even if inchoate (1 Peter 1), than none. That the impious are tormented immediately from death is proven from Acts 1:25: "He went to his own place," namely the place of perdition where there is a fullness of all torments, Mark 9:43-44. For

that was his place, who is the son of perdition, John 17:12. Finally, it is proven concerning the pious and impious together from Luke 16, from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. For immediately after death their states were disparate - the former miserable, the latter blessed, which could not have happened if the soul of both this one and that one had slept; for then they would have been equal, which the scope of the parable does not permit.

Objection 1: That the dead are commonly said to sleep in Scripture, Matthew 9, John 11. I respond: Not the body, nor the soul are said to sleep in the scriptures, but the dead, that is, the composites. For as the body is not dead, nor the soul, but the living, so neither the body nor the soul sleep, but what was conflated from these. But from this the rest of the soul cannot be concluded. Indeed, on the contrary, just as through natural sleep the operations common to body and soul are indeed impeded, but not those which are proper to the soul, as is clear from those illapses of God into the minds of the prophets through which he was accustomed to reveal wondrous things to them of old - so also in this sleep which is beyond and against nature, indeed the common operations cannot be exercised, but nothing forbids the proper ones from being able to be exercised. But by this phrase in the sacred letters the resurrection even of the dead is suggested. For just as those who sleep at some point cease to sleep, so those who are dead will at some point rise again from the dead.

Objection 2: Hebrews 11:39-40: "And all these, though commended through their faith, did not receive what was promised, since God had provided something better for us, that apart from us they should not be made perfect." I respond: 1) The Socinians cannot use this argument with a good conscience, since they deny that eternal life was promised to the fathers in the Old Testament. 2) By that promise is not understood eternal life, but the exhibition of Christ in the flesh; for this was promised to the fathers, but not to be fulfilled before the fullness of time; therefore that proposition "that apart from us they should not be made perfect" denotes nothing other than "that they may not have perfect knowledge concerning Christ promised to them before it had come to our times." But the controversy about the sleeping of souls should properly be referred to the treatise on the four last things. Meanwhile, the antagonists of the Anabaptists can be consulted, and Calvin, whose special treatise exists.

3. The faculties of the rational soul as such are two: intellect and will. The intellect is a faculty of the rational soul, ordained for knowing the true and the good. For things are set before the intellect under a twofold aspect: either as they are in themselves, or as they are disposed in order to us. In the former respect the speculative intellect knows them, in the latter the practical. With most questions hence being sent away, because they belong to the philosophical forum, we will here inquire first about the order which is observed in these faculties as to their operations: Whether in general the intellect acts prior, or the will? Or whether the command which is between these faculties with respect to each other, is to be deferred to the intellect or to the will?

The opinion of Bonaventure, tome 2 of his Opuscula, treatise On Mystical Theology, single question, is this: that not only some, but even the most perfect operation of the will in this life happens without intellection and the proposition of the object. The same was followed by

Vercellensis in his paraphrase of chapter 1 of the said Areopagite On Mystical Theology, at the beginning and end. The same was taught by Gerson, Alphabet 66 letter O, and in his treatise On Mystical Theology; for the same is also referred Gregory of Rimini on book 2 of Sentences distinction 7 question 1 conclusion 2 to the third reason. But to the contrary, Gabriel Vázquez in Prima Secundae disputation 35 question 3 part 1, Suárez, and other more recent scholastic philosophers and theologians depart; the same is taught by Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 1 question 15, affirming that the opposite is impossible. Compare our disputations On Meditation. But to us that opinion seems more probable which is also more common: that the intellect acts prior, nor does the will operate except consequently to the action and motion of the intellect; the intellect therefore moves the will, not indeed effectively, in the way that God, who as first cause flows into the agent and the action, but morally and through the mode of persuasion, through the antecedent knowledge of the object and end; whence arises not only the action of the will simply, but also such and such an action - for the will is moved by the intellect not only as to the exercise of the act, but also as to the species. For the intellect proposes the object to the will, from which as from a formal external principle the acts of the will take their species. This opinion is proven:

1) From the fact that there is no desire of the unknown, as is commonly said. The will is proportioned only to the good, nor is it borne to anything unless allured by its goodness. But if the will pursues a thing on account of goodness, it is necessary for the goodness to have been known before, and consequently for the act of the intellect to be constructed beforehand; for to know is of the intellect, but the will is blind.

2) It would follow that the will could be borne to evil as evil, which is contrary to its nature. The consequence is clear. For let it be posited that someone desires adultery, which, being conscious of the divine law, he is persuaded by absolute judgment to be evil - I ask under what aspect he desires it? Certainly not under the aspect of adultery; for then he would desire it under the aspect of evil. Therefore, he cannot be borne to that except what is evil from itself and in itself, it by accident puts on the nature of good, for example the pleasant. Which necessarily happens through the intellect, which so determines the struggle of spirit and flesh in the regenerate, or of the fearing and desiring flesh in the unregenerate, that pleasure is preferred to honesty, or is judged better. And this cannot be done by the will. For the will by willing does not make good things desirable, but is borne to desiring them; for the adequate object of the will is the good. It is therefore necessary for the good to be before it is desired by the will, because the object as such, or in the nature of object, is prior to the act tending into it. The object of the will is therefore good before it is desired by the will. But whence it has that goodness, which is evil in itself, I do not see, except from the intellect. It remains therefore that the act of the intellect is required beforehand, at least in such things, by which the will is promoted to the exercise of its act. What we have said about things evil in themselves must similarly also be understood about good things in themselves - because no one will desire a thing, although good in itself, unless it is also good for him. But whether it is good for anyone in this place, at this time, in this state, is a judgment belonging to the practical intellect. It is also confirmed by the authority of Augustine, On the Trinity book 8 chapter 4, book 10 chapter 1, where he teaches that the will can love nothing except what is in some way known - if not known, at least believed. And when in that

first chapter he had proposed a difficulty against this doctrine, because the will sometimes desires to know the unknown, he removes it in this way: "It must be understood that the same thing is not said when it is said 'he loves to know unknown things' and 'he loves unknown things' - but that he may love unknown things, he cannot; for 'to know' is not placed there in vain, since he who loves to know unknown things loves not the unknown things themselves, but the knowing itself," etc. - by which words he shows that it not only never happens that we are borne by our affection into unknown things, but also that this cannot happen, and therefore, when we desire to know something, then we are borne by our affection into the knowledge itself, which we apprehend as pleasant and useful, and so we are not borne into what we are ignorant of, but into the knowledge of it, which is not unknown to us.

Someone could say: We experience that we apply our mind to knowing something or withdraw it from it when we will; the will therefore seems to apply the intellect to acting. To the contrary: We do not will to understand, except the intellect has already judged before the willing.

4. It has been demonstrated that the knowledge of the intellect as preceding is required for any act whatsoever of the will. But there still remain other questions connected as corollaries to the preceding one, of which the first is: What and of what sort an act of the intellect is required? As to the former, since in order to the will there can be four acts in the intellect, namely apprehensive knowledge, the judgment by which it is judged that a thing is good or bad, another judgment or practical dictate by which the intellect judges that the thing which by the preceding judgment it had decreed to be good or bad is to be embraced or shunned, the practical syllogism or discourse by which reason concludes a dictate of this sort - it is doubted whether for every action of the will is required, besides apprehensive knowledge or any sort of notice of the object, a knowledge of the goodness or suitability of the object itself, that is, a judgment by which the intellect thinks and decrees the object to be good or bad, salutary or harmful, pleasant or troublesome. The negative part is followed by Scotus and Gabriel on book 2 of Sentences distinction 6, and Marsilius on the second book question 16 article 1, establishing that simple apprehensive knowledge suffices, and indeed simple, without any composition and division. The affirmative part is held by Peter of Ailly and Gregory on book 1 distinction 3, and Valencia on Prima Secundae question 9 article 1 disputation 2 question 4 point 1, who here alleges for himself Thomas Prima Secundae question 9 article 1. This reason is adduced, because unless the object is shown to the will under the aspect of good, its proper object, which is the good and suitable, is not yet shown to it - for the will is a blind power which needs a demonstration of its object made by the intellect. See the explication and deduction of this reason, as well as the solution, in Valencia, and especially in the Coimbrans on the third book of On the Soul chapter 13 question 4, who make both opinions probable. We nevertheless prefer to follow the affirmative with Valencia.

The second question is: Whether besides the simple judgment about the suitability and goodness of the object, a further act of practical reason which is called command is required in addition, so that the will may be moved and elicit its act? Thomas affirms, Prima Secundae question 17 article 1, and with him Valencia disputation 2 question 4 point 1, especially Prima Secundae point 1, and among other things he places the principal foundation of it in this, that it

is necessary to assign a peculiar and proper cause on the part of the intellect why the will elicits an act about some object and is moved toward it. But the apprehension and judgment about the goodness of the object are not the proper and sufficient cause. Therefore, this command must be admitted. The consequence is proven, because otherwise the will would seem to be moved only by chance and fortuitously and without reason. But what that command is, and what the order between command and the use of the will, Thomas teaches ibid. article 2-3, whose mind Valencia expounds question 12 points 2-4, and after him Sylvius on the cited questions and articles.

The third question is: Whether and when the will is moved by the intellect and vice versa - on which Thomas, cited question 9 article 1, where he establishes that the will is thus moved by the intellect as to the specification of its act, so that as to the exercise it is not moved by the same, but rather itself moves the intellect and the other powers to their acts as to the exercise of them. But Valencia finds a difficulty in this opinion, which nevertheless he thinks can be removed by certain distinctions, which see in him, disputation 2 question 4 point 2 pages 205-206, and Sylvius on question 9 article 1. Further, Thomas explains the mode by which the intellect moves the will ibid. in these words: "as presenting its object to it." And more fully in question 22 On Truth article 1 reply to objection 5: "The intellect rules the will, not as if inclining it to that to which it tends, but as showing it to what it ought to tend."

5. The fourth question: Whether the will not only depends on, but is also determined by the practical judgment of the intellect, or whether the will, the practical judgment of the intellect being posited, is determined to follow it, especially if it is the last one, which is usually expressed in these words: "this now, all things considered, is to be chosen or done." Here the opinions of the doctors vary. For some establish that the will is determined by the judgment of the practical intellect as to the specification, but not as to the exercise. Thus Thomas and his followers. To which opinion Thomas constructs this hypothesis in Prima Secundae question 9 article 1, that the intellect moves the will as to the specification, but the will moves the intellect as to the exercise. Which Gregory of Valencia ibid. disputation 2 question 4 point 1 thinks must be taken in such a way that the intellect in moving the will by its own nature primarily has respect to the specification of the act of the will, but the will in moving the intellect primarily has respect to the exercise of its acts. Yet he soon adds that he doubts whether this is really so, nor is it of such great importance to know it for certain. Others say neither as to specification nor as to exercise - thus Becanus in his Summa of Scholastic Theology of the second part, part 1 treatise 1 chapter 2 question 5, Suárez, Arriaga and others soon to be cited. Others say both as to specification and as to exercise. And this opinion John Cameron a few years ago brought back into the schools from the Reformed theologians, and expressly defended it in a special treatise against the epistle of a learned man; whom not a few Reformed theologians and philosophers have followed since then, among whom Johannes Maccovius publicly wrote for this opinion, tome 1 of his Miscellaneous Disputations page 455, and Rivet in his disputation On Free Will, February 7, 1631. But this opinion is proven:

1) From Scripture, Psalm 9:10: "Those who know your name trust in you." If therefore knowledge did not determine the will, it could happen that those knowing the name of God

would not trust in God. John 4:10: "If you knew the gift of God, and who it is that is saying to you, 'Give me a drink,' you would have asked him for living water." If therefore the intellect did not determine the will, the Samaritan woman could have known the gift of God and not asked God for living water; and thus Christ would have said something false.

2) If it happened that the will did not always follow the dictate of the intellect, charity could be separated from the true knowledge of Christ; although the apostle John denies that those who hate their neighbor have seen or known God, 1 John 2:9-11.

3) If the will could suspend its act after the judgment of the intellect, now it could not desire its own preservation, because it could not desire the good by which, being preserved, that is promoted; but in this way the rational creature would be worse than the brutes.

4) The will is naturally proportioned to the good; it will therefore be against its nature if it rejects the well known good.

5) If the will were not determined by the judgment of the practical intellect, it would follow that it is borne into the unknown. But this is absurd. Therefore.

6) With this the argument nearly agrees: The will is a blind power; therefore it needs the direction of the intellect.

7) When a man is asked why he does such a thing, he responds: because he judges that he must do this for himself in this way.

8) If the will desired the contrary to the good shown by the intellect, it could desire evil under the aspect of evil. It is clear; because if not killing the innocent here and now has the nature of good, on the contrary killing the innocent here and now will have the nature of evil. If therefore the intellect dictates that the innocent is not to be killed, but the will on the contrary wills to kill the innocent, it will desire evil under the aspect of evil, which is absurd.

9) But if it could happen that someone chose against the dictate of reason, it could also happen that there would be sin in the will without ignorance, or any error or defect in reason or intelligence - which is contrary to that saying of Solomon, Proverbs 14:22: "Do they not err who devise evil?" And sin is said to be "chata'" in Hebrew, that is aberration, error, Greek "hamartia," Hebrews 9:7 compared with Leviticus 16. Thus sinners are everywhere called foolish, and the just are called wise, prudent. See also Isaiah 53:6, Romans 3:11.

10) Because the will needs the representation of the intellect; therefore, unless the thing were represented here and now as to be loved, the will will not be able to be moved to it.

11) If the judgment were indifferent, the will could not be moved to any determinate thing through it; for from an indifferent principle no determinate action arises.

The other extreme opinion opposed to this is defended by Suárez, Fonseca, Vázquez, Arriaga, Hurtado de Mendoza, Oviedo, and other hypothetical doctors. But it is proven by these reasons:

Argument 1: If the will is determined by the last practical judgment of the intellect, it will not remain free, but will be borne into the act by necessity; but this is absurd; therefore also the former. The antecedent is proven: First, because it belongs to the nature of a free cause that, all the things required for acting being posited, it can act and not act; for this is the difference between free and natural powers, that the latter are determined to one thing, and all the things required for acting being posited, they cannot not act; the former otherwise. It is confirmed secondly, because a free power ought to be indifferent; but when the will is determined by the intellect, it itself is not indifferent, but determined to one thing; therefore it does not remain free. It is confirmed thirdly: if someone moved the hand of a boy to write, which the boy could not resist, it would not be free for the boy to write, but necessary. If therefore the intellect moves the will to its actions, the will is not free to exercise them, but necessary, supposing that it cannot resist or act otherwise.

Argument 2: If the will is necessarily determined by the judgment of the intellect, it follows: 1) that the will cannot choose the lesser good, the greater being left aside, because the intellect always judges (unless perhaps it errs) that the greater good is to be preferred to the lesser; but this is contrary to experience, because we often choose the lesser good. Here pertains that common saying: "But a new force drags me unwilling, and desire one thing, reason persuades another; I see and approve the better things, I follow the worse."

2) It follows that the will can choose neither of two equal goods, because right judgment of reason does not prefer one to the other.

Argument 3: What only acts morally, that does not determine the will to one thing; but the intellect only acts morally with respect to the will, moving it objectively or finally; therefore it does not determine it to one thing. Suárez proves and expands this minor in his Metaphysics. Because the judgment of the intellect does not move the will except by means of the object which it proposes. But the proposed object does not always infer necessity or determine to one thing, nor is this necessary so that the will may tend to its object; therefore that determination on the part of the judgment is not necessary, indeed not even possible. But that the will is not moved by the judgment of the intellect except by means of the object is proven thus: Either the judgment moves by reason of the object only, or by reason of itself, so that it has a peculiar efficacy for determining the will. But the latter is absurd. First, because such efficacy would be repugnant to the liberty of the will. Second, because such a mode of moving is plainly alien to the function of the intellect, which is to illuminate, direct and regulate the actions of the will as an extrinsic active principle, not indeed to elicit the formal action of the will either as an extrinsic or intrinsic principle. Third, because the objective mode of moving is proper to the will. For it is not necessitated and determined to one thing by another, except by God alone as to exercise, and except by the good in general and similar objects as to specification.

Argument 4: What cannot follow the judgment of the intellect in spiritual good unless specially helped by the grace and efficacious motion of God, that is not determined by practical judgment; but the will cannot follow the intellect unless specially helped by God; therefore it is not determined to one thing by the intellect. The minor is confirmed: For if it could follow without the special motion of grace, then men dead in sins, handed over to a reprobate sense, the damned, likewise demons could follow the intellect well prescribing according to the measure of cognition or assent in the mind; but the contrary is true.

Argument 5: It is drawn from those sinning against the Holy Spirit; for they voluntarily deny the truth known altogether, against the dictate of the practical intellect, reason vainly resisting.

Argument 6: Because it would follow that every sin proceeds from such a judgment, and consequently that every sinner is a heretic. But this is absurd. Therefore. This argument is of Arriaga in his Physics, disputation 8 on the soul, section 2.

Argument 7: Because it would follow that man is similar to the brutes, whose cognitions, whatever they may be, so determine the appetite that they do not leave it indifferent. This argument is of Hurtado de Mendoza in his Physics, disputation 14 on the soul, section 8.

Argument 8: It would follow that man cannot commit sin against conscience; but this is false. For often men who have an illuminated mind do evil against the dictate of their mind.

Argument 9: Because Adam transgressed not so much by understanding as by willing.

Argument 10: Because error in the intellect does not have the nature of fault, but rather of a sad evil.

Argument 11: Because the angels transgressed, whose intellect nevertheless was good.

Argument 12: Because in Ezekiel 12, the people are said not to have eyes to see, because they were rebellious.

But the authors of the opposite opinion could deal with these arguments thus:

To the first: First, it is denied that the liberty of the will consists in this, that it can act against the ultimate dictate of the practical judgment; but it suffices that it is moved by that power which is not determined to one thing, but indifferent to many. For intrinsically it retains its liberty and indifference to the opposite, even when, following the determination of the practical judgment, it determines itself. For just as the object could be proposed by the intellect under another aspect, so also the will itself could choose something else. It must be altogether denied that it belongs to the nature of a free cause to be indifferent to opposites, all things required for acting being posited - which can be shown by innumerable instances. 1) In order for God to create and redeem the world in time, one of the things required was the eternal decree of God by which he had resolved to create and redeem it; although these could not be composed together - both

that God decreed from eternity to found and redeem the world, and that he did not found it nor redeem it - nevertheless he most freely both founded it and redeemed it. 2) Supposing that God moves the human will to something, it is incompossible with this supposition that the will not be moved to that; and yet, this incompossibility notwithstanding, it is repugnant for the will to be moved by God by necessity, but its act remains contingent and free; for it implies that the will is necessitated as to its elicited acts. I now say nothing about the blessed, who are not indifferent to the love of God clearly seen, and yet freely love; nothing about Christ, who while he was still in life was not indifferent to obedience or disobedience to the divine law, and yet freely obeyed. At least this is added: 3) The will cannot desire a spiritual good, unless it is premoved by special converting grace. That grace is therefore a requisite for desiring a supernatural good; which being posited, the will cannot not desire, so that these propositions could be composed: efficacious grace is present to the will, and yet it is not moved to desiring. The reason for this is: because grace formally expresses the infallibility of the outcome. It is concluded therefore that the will can be free in its act, although the ultimate judgment of the intellect being posited, it cannot not desire what the intellect has dictated must be desired - because necessity from supposition, such as is found in this case, does not overturn liberty simply. Compare our dissertation On the Term of Life. It must therefore be known that, when it is said that the intellect determines the will, the authors do not mean this as if it assigned it to one part, but that it moves it efficaciously and sweetly: efficaciously indeed, by making it infallibly operate; but sweetly, by making it operate according to the mode proper to its nature, that is, freely. Nor does the difference between a necessary and a free cause consist in this, that one can act and not act, all things required for acting being posited, the other cannot not act; but that the determination which is in the former causes is natural and absolute in the one, in the other only from supposition. For example, fire does not have an intrinsic faculty by which it can not burn nearby wood, because it is naturally determined through its form to one thing, namely to burning combustible things legitimately approximated. But the will still retains intrinsically the power to not act in the divided sense, according to which it is indifferent to one thing, even then when it is actually applied to one thing.

To the third confirmation, I respond: It would not be free for the boy to write, if his hand were moved by another to write against his will; but if it were moved with him willing it, he would write freely.

To the second argument, I respond: That consequence is weak; for we do not deny that it can happen that the will desires the lesser good, the greater being left aside, namely then when the intellect errs in judging, judging that the lesser good is to be preferred here and now to the greater. It is also conceded that if the intellect judges two goods equally to be desired, the will is not going to choose one over the other - because choice formally imports a certain betterness in what is chosen over what is left behind. And to that common saying "I see and approve the better things" etc., it must be said that the absolute intellect is distinguished from the comparative; the will does not follow the former, it follows the latter.

To the third argument, it is conceded that what only acts morally cannot determine to one thing in the genus of efficient cause operating physically and directly; it is denied in the genus of final cause.

To the fourth argument, I deny the consequence. For although, the judgment of the intellect being posited, something more is still required for it to actually operate, namely the prevenient motion of God by which it is applied to acting, it is nevertheless so disposed with it that, the judgment of the intellect being posited, the will infallibly operates; for God infallibly executes such an order constituted by himself. Then in this argument disparates are conjoined, namely that the intellect can be renewed, but not yet the will - which is false. John 6: "Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me."

To the fifth argument, I respond: Those sinning against the Holy Spirit indeed judge absolutely that the truth is not to be denied, because that is evil in itself; they nevertheless judge comparatively, that is, in these or those circumstances, that it must be done, so that they may obey their hatred - and in this respect it has the nature of good. It is added that Christ in Matthew 12, where he treats of those sinning against the Holy Spirit, calls them (namely the Pharisees) blind leaders of the blind, that is, erring in judgment. And in Hebrews 6 it is said that they cannot be renewed to repentance; but repentance belongs to the mind.

To the sixth argument, I respond by a distinction. Any sin is a heresy, not formally or specifically, but implicitly and reductively. Thus when someone rightly thinks in general that the abuse of the divine name, drunkenness, etc. are sins, and yet commits them, he is not properly to be called a heretic; but his deed implies a sort of heresy, or something analogous to heresy. Briefly, heresy formally expresses by its nature an error about a question of law. But in the deed of one sinning by drunkenness or abuse of the divine name, there is only an error about a question of fact.

To the seventh argument, I deny the consequence. For this most broad dissimilitude remains, that man acts from pre-election according to the judgment of the practical intellect, and thus most freely and indifferently, namely in the divided sense; but brutes, not at all.

To the eighth argument, I deny the consequence. For every sin is against conscience which is against the absolute judgment and general dictate of synderesis, although it is according to the comparative judgment of the intellect.

To the ninth argument: Indeed, Adam transgressed both by understanding and by badly judging, according to that saying in 2 Corinthians 11:3, where Eve is said to have been deceived. Here is the vice and error in judgment.

To the 10th argument: The antecedent is false. See 2 Thessalonians 1:8. And if the theological and intellectual virtues, like faith, wisdom, prudence, are virtues, therefore their opposites are vices; consequently they are not merely sad evils.

To the 11th argument: The contrary is clear from John 8:44, where they are said not to have remained in the truth, that is, their judgment of intellect was corrupted. As it is said of men in 1 Timothy 6:5, 2 Corinthians 4:4.

To the 12th argument: That "because" can denote a reason taken a posteriori, so that, namely, the reason for the consequence may be assigned, whence it is clear that they do not rightly see and judge. So that, namely, rebellion is the effect or consequent and sign of an evil mind and perverse judgment, not indeed the cause or antecedent.

To the arguments of the opposite opinion, not a few things could be said and applied from the disputations of the Scotists against the Thomists' command of the intellect, and of the more recent Semi-Pelagians disputing for the concourse of free will, like Suárez, Fonseca, Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, and others whom Oviedo cites in controversy 8 On the Soul point 5, and also from Vázquez in Prima Secundae tome 1 disputation 128, where he denies that a defect of the intellect is necessarily required beforehand for a defect of the will in acting; or Bellerus the Thomist in book 9 of the Metaphysics question 4, and indeed according to the way of Thomas (as he there speaks) determines that liberty is radically and originally in the intellect, but formally and completely in the will alone. In addition, that intellect and will are indeed rational and free powers, but the will is freer than the intellect, because, namely, it does not have an intrinsic moving cause in the genus of efficient cause necessitating it to act, because it is motive-effectively both of itself, and of the intellect, and of the other powers; but the intellect is only motive of the will in the genus of final cause.

The Coimbrans in their Ethical Disputations disputation 4 question 2, whether the knowledge of the intellect also concurs actively with the will to elicit its acts, say that each opinion seems quite probable to them. The same in On the Soul book 3 chapter 14 question 4, whether for the will to elicit its act a judicative knowledge is required in the intellect, they think each opinion probable.

From our theologians, William Ames in his Marrow everywhere fights for the indetermination and principality of the will, especially on account of that problem (as it seems) whether faith is in the intellect or in the will. But that his reasons for theology and faith in the will do not solidly conclude, we have shown elsewhere. Nor in vain or rashly do we accurately distinguish faith in the intellect, and from fiducial faith as its own essential part, with the excellent theologians Beza, Zanchi, Perkins, Piscator, Gomarus, Maccovius.

It must not be passed over that the Remonstrants in their Apology folio 89 infer from this determination that it follows that there are not, or cannot be, any depraved habits in the will; for if, they say, the practical judgment being posited or removed, volition is necessarily good or evil, it does not become more depraved if it follows a false judgment of reason for some centuries of years, than if it follows it, so to speak, for almost a single moment. Briefly, an evil will is depraved according to the Censor (namely the Reformed theologian, to whom they ascribe the opinion about determination) just as the locomotive faculty of a blind man, otherwise healthy, is depraved or inordinate; not because a habitual privation inheres in it, but because, destitute of

directing light, it only actually errs in moving itself, or wanders uncertainly, immediately going to move itself in an orderly way, if only light were restored to the eyes.

In the same chapter 7, section 2, folio 81, they propose certain other reasons against this opinion, which Isaac Junius in his Counter-Apology thinks can easily be dissolved. See his solutions there. But these reasons are:

1. Because then it would follow that the liberty of the will, if indeed it consists only in the indifference of the practical judgment, is only an extrinsic denomination in the will, because the intellect is extrinsic to the will.

2. Consequently, liberty will not be a property impressed by God on the will.

3. Liberty would be only a passive indifference, such as is that of the intellect in order to this or that object.

4. Thus free volition in order to the judgment of reason will be plainly necessary, no less than the sensitive appetite is necessary in order to the dictate of the senses, which it cannot not follow.

5. A law sanctioned by the threatening of punishment could no more be borne to the will than to the sensitive appetite.

6. Sin will only be in the intellect or judgment, not in the will.

7. No sin will be able to be given against conscience.

8. There will be no need of a reformation of the will, no immediate operation of God into it, when he converts a man; but a reformation of the judgment will suffice, which the will will necessarily follow.

9. No corruption made immediately in the will will be able to be said.

10. It will follow that the will in every state is free in the same way and with an equal degree of liberty, and remains so. For whatever is antecedently necessary is necessary in only one way.

11. If the indifference of the judgment sufficed for the nature of free choice, it would follow then: 1) The will cannot choose one of two equal goods, because the judgment about the equal is indifferent. 2) Nor, when the judgment of reason has preferred one to the other, can it choose the lesser good, because the will is not indifferent except with the indifference of the judgment posited; but this then ceases, when one good has been preferred to the other, or judged better than the other.

And these indeed are the reasons for each opinion. We think that neither is of such weight that on account of it we should deny that the natural liberty of the will and the efficacy of divine grace

against the Pelagians are established through either one. For the assertors of each opinion can aim and strive for the common goal of necessary truth, although not with equal steps, on account of disagreement in this hypothesis.

Perhaps a reconciliation, or at least a closer union of the dissidents could be instituted through the distinction of directive command from motive command (which Salazar, Viguerius, and Oviedo suggest in their Physics, disputation On the Soul, cited place), of which the former is attributed to the intellect, the latter to the will. To which we add the distinction also between the motive command by which the will commands the intellect, and the motive command by which the intellect, already moved by the will, in turn by moving directs and as it were determines the will - so that the will is determined by itself, both mediately through the intellect directing it according to the antecedent command of the will, and immediately through its own motive command according to the antecedent direction or judgment of the intellect.

But here a difficulty is thrown up: Whether then the will and intellect move each other through a circle, and whether it is not necessary for that first motion of the will by which it moves the intellect to the ultimate determination to be preceded by some other motion or determination of the intellect, and whether thus there is not a process to infinity. But how this difficulty must especially be met, the commentators of Thomas inquire on Prima Secundae question 9 article 1. They commonly extricate themselves by those distinctions: Every distinct cognition of the intellect requires a prior volition or motion of the will, but not confused cognition, nor the acts of the intellect which are elicited naturally and which are in no way voluntary to us, for example when, excited by some sensible object, we also apprehend it through the intellect. Again, the acts or motions of the will necessarily and always precede the deliberate and free acts of the intellect, at least implicitly and virtually, but not explicitly. See Gregory of Valencia cited above. Of whose order of human acts we exhibit on this occasion, because it makes for the understanding of the proposed question. He therefore explains it thus, disputation cited, question 12, point 5, pages 276-278:

"Therefore, of all those voluntary acts, and consequently proper to man, which we have shown from question 3 of this disputation up to now, this is the order:

First, the end is apprehended, that is, some thing absolutely according to itself. Second, the thing is judged to be suitable, that is, good. Third, it is practically proposed to the will through a command, which we showed above necessarily precedes any act of the will. Fourth, there follows indeed an act of the will, which is a simple or absolute will, by which, namely, the thing itself pleases and is approved by the man. Fifth, the thing is further apprehended as possible to attain. Sixth, it is again proposed through a command to the will itself as to be attained. Seventh, the will therefore intends to attain it. Eighth, the will through use applies the intellect to consult about the means by which the thing is to be attained; which can also be done implicitly by this very fact, namely, that the will can at least will that the intellect so consult. For after the intellect apprehends the thing as possible to attain through means, it can well be moved only from this to proceed further to inquire into the means, even if it is not impelled to this inquiry by the express and actual motion of the will. Ninth, it is concluded through counsel and practical

judgment that this or that means is to be preferred to the others. Tenth, that means is again proposed through a command to the will as useful before others. Eleventh, the will elicits an act by which it is inclined to such a means, and such an act in a different aspect is both a consent to the means, and a choice of means: a consent indeed, insofar as through it the will adheres absolutely to such a means proposed by reason; but a choice, insofar as it adheres to that means before others. Twelfth, then follows another command of reason, by which it is intimated to the will to use other powers for executing the means. Thirteenth, the will uses, that is, effectively applies the powers to that execution. Fourteenth, the very execution of the powers finally follows. Which execution indeed, insofar as through it the end is obtained, is also a real attainment of it. Fifteenth, there finally follows the enjoyment of the will concerning the end now obtained, which enjoyment is nothing other than delight and the rest of the appetite in the thing now obtained.

In this order, I say, these acts are elicited, whether they are directly referred to the thing itself and the object about which each one is concerned, or also reflexively to each other. For, as will be clear to one considering it, these acts can also fall reflexively on themselves in the same order. For he who consults, for example, about the means to be chosen, also consults about the choice of means, and so concerning the others."

And these things indeed up to now it seemed good to taste beforehand concerning the human soul, and its faculties and acts. I had decided to touch on certain other questions in this second edition which are theological-philosophical, but because the typographical works are hastening, I now refrain for the present, content to have indicated those questions. Therefore, it is:

Question 1: Whether the soul is man. See Thomas with his interpreters on the first part, question 75, article 4.

2. Whether it is a part of God, or something plucked from the divine nature, as the Platonists wished, and Epictetus in Arrian book 1 of his Discourses chapter 14, and with them Cerdo, the Gnostics, the Priscillianists in Augustine On Heresies chapters 46 and 70, and today's Enthusiasts, confounding the substance of God and man - whose detected madnesses see in the treatise of the most noble and far most learned theologian Philip Marnix in his Dutch treatise against the Enthusiasts. Nor did Lactantius speak cautiously enough here, book 2 chapter 11. See these deliriums refuted in Augustine On the Origin of the Soul chapter 2, Thomas first part question 90 article 1, the Coimbrans on the second book On the Soul question 1 article 6.

3. Whether it is corporeal, or material, or arisen from something corporeal or material, so that there is some matter of it constituting or passing; or whether it is of a spiritual nature. Not a few nor ignoble ancients wanted the former, although perhaps some think they can be excused through improper speech - in which way Augustine also strives to excuse Tertullian in his book On Heresies chapter 86, and book 1 On the Origin of the Soul chapter 3. But he will scarcely make credible to those who have read Tertullian himself On the Soul chapters 2 and 9. Nevertheless, in a certain way and in a certain extrinsic respect it can be called corporeal and material, not indeed in its absolute being, but in its respective being, namely insofar as it, as an

incomplete being, has been deputed and created by the author of nature for union with the body, and its information, and the constitution of the whole composite with it, and common life and operation with it and in it. Besides the fact that compared to God's most absolute simplicity and spirituality, it can be called in some way material - in which way also all created beings, indeed even man himself who is undoubtedly a being, can be called nothing compared to God, the first analogue of being, who is through his essence what he is, Philippians 2:7 compared with Psalm 62:10, Daniel 4:35, Ecclesiastes 1:2, where see the commentators. But on the immateriality of the soul, Antonio Rubio and the Coimbrans on Aristotle's On the Soul must be consulted among the more recent authors. Here pertains the question whether the soul can suffer from fire, or any other corporeal thing - on which the theologians in the controversies on hell and purgatory. Compare also our disputation On Demons.

4. Whether it is of the same species with the angels, as Origen wished in book 1 On First Principles chapters 5 and 8, or whether it is inferior to the angels in essential nobility. On this question, see Thomas with his commentators on the first part question 75 article 7, the Coimbrans On the Separated Soul disputation 1 article 7.

5. Whether and how it is simple, and from what composition it is absolved - I respond: From essential parts, and from integrating or quantitative parts. Whether also from genus and difference? I deny, although it is of an incomplete nature. For who would deny that the separated soul is constituted under some genus, and is contracted through the difference "rational" to a certain species and is essentially and specifically distinguished from the angels?

6. Whether it is divisible - I respond: Concerning quantitative division, it is denied. See the scholastics on the first part question 76 article 8, and the Coimbrans on the second book On the Soul chapter 1 question 8, and the treatise of Gallego de la Serna against Sennert, now cited several times. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles book 2 chapter 72, attributes indivisibility to all forms of perfect and animate things. Which nevertheless must be taken with limitation. On this question depends another, on the extension of souls - on which see the same authors just cited, and we did above.

7. Whether the individuation of the human composite is first from the soul as an intrinsic principle, especially in the reunion of the separated soul with its body - on this latter doubt, see Naclantus in his treatise On Contingency, the Immortality of the Soul, etc., page 82.

8. Whether the superior and inferior portion in the soul are distinct powers - on this Scotus, Bonaventure, Durandus, Richard of Middleton dispute on the second book of Sentences distinction 24, and from the more recent authors Rhadawas expressly in his Controversies between Thomas and Scotus part 3 controversy 10 article 1.

9. Whether and how the affections are distinguished from the will, and among themselves - on this question see the scholastics on the first part question 80 article 2, question 81 article 2, Prima Secundae question 22 article 3 and question 23.

10. Whether sin is formally in sensuality, or only in the will alone; or whether it is the proximate subject of sin - on this the scholastics on Thomas Prima Secundae question 74 article 2, and Rhadapart 2 controversy 18 articles 1-2. Related to this is the question whether the moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite - on which the Coimbrans in their Ethical Disputations disputation 7 question 5, and the scholastics on Thomas Prima Secundae question 65 article 4, and Rhada part 3 controversy 15 article 1, whose opinion drawn from Aristotle Ames rightly opposes in his Marrow book 2 chapter 1.

11. Whether the manners of the soul follow the temperament of the body, or whether it should rather be said that the temperament and executive powers of the body, as well as all the members of the body, follow the soul? We affirm the latter. For the soul, sanctified and renewed by the Spirit of God, uses the sanguine complexion for promptness, alacrity and joy in good works and the duties of piety; the melancholic complexion in profound contemplation of heavenly things and serious practice of penitence, in perpetual disdain for the world and its allurements; the choleric complexion in zeal, fervor, and holy contention for the cause of God, and in the swiftest execution of all spiritual plans and expeditions. On the contrary, the perverse and unsanctified soul uses the temperament and members of the body as arms of injustice, for example the sanguine complexion for easy lapse into complacency and worldly delights, the melancholic for solitary evil machinations, treacheries, heresies, superstitions, the choleric for quarrels and contentions. The affirmative opinion has Galen as its author, who wrote a special treatise on it. They commonly distinguish that we are inclined in manners by temperament, not necessitated. But it is rightly inquired whether the temperament, insofar as it affects and modifies the executive parts and powers of the body, is not inclined by the soul a priori, but not the reverse. But whatever may be the case concerning this distinction, at least it is clear that it is pagan impiety by which the analysis of good disposition or docility, and consequently of our conversion to God, is made in temperament or complexion, and in education. What the Remonstrants think here, these words of theirs will teach, in chapter 10 of their Apology folio 118: "Nor indeed does it seem to be denied altogether that the condition of the temperament of each man has great force for the manners of the soul, for virtues and vices. In proportion to it each one is more fit or unfit to attain docility and probity of soul. Education and training, however, have the chief force. And from there the discrimination is generally to be sought. The Censor does not seem to deny this, and therefore cautiously adds, where the question is agitated about true docility and about true probity, which is required for divine things. But docility, which renders us apt for virtues, or for honesty and chastity of manners, how does it not render us apt for divine things? What things would a docile and upright soul more quickly and willingly admit than divine virtues, as being especially agreeable to equity and right reason, and constructed by such arguments by which and of what sort all other disciplines lack?"

For the rest of the questions on the human intellect and will, and the other faculties of the soul, see the more recent scholastic physicists (for they are especially to be heard here) - Toledo, the Coimbrans, Rubio, Arriaga, Oviedo, Mendoza - to whom may be added the treatise of the Coimbrans On the Separated Soul. If anyone prefers to proceed as a mean between the Thomists and Scotists, it is permitted by us according to those common hypotheses which

suffice for explaining and defending the theological truths about free choice and grace. But they are these:

1. That the intellect or cognitive faculty is distinguished from the will or appetitive faculty.

2. That the will in its actions necessarily requires a cognition of the intellect beforehand, and not only an apprehending one, but one theoretically and practically judging.

3. That nevertheless the act of the will is not produced efficiently by the judgment as by a formal and intrinsic principle.

4. Nor does the will conduct itself as a purely passive power determinable by reason of the intellect, or of any other agent whatsoever.

5. Nor is it to be understood that the will is so determined that a quality, or motion, or some influx is impressed on it by the intellect, or that it is necessitated by a necessity of coaction either natural or absolute, or that it is moved and determined physically, but only by an antecedent, and as by a condition, and a proposition of the object, and a certain moral quasi-application and determination.

6. So that from this only a necessity of consequence follows, in a certain respect, or from a hypothesis.

7. And the will itself nevertheless freely or voluntarily and spontaneously as an active and [Greek phrase], formal, proper, proximate and intrinsic principle determines itself, and moves itself into its object, namely after the preceding determination of the practical judgment. Not otherwise than after the pre-election of the intellect, the will chooses.

8. So that good or evil habits are not denied to be in or able to be in the will.

9. Nor is the immediate operation of God in the will and within the will denied, whether natural or supernatural, but there remains the precursus and immediate influx of God in both, and the immediate concourse with both - although the former is prior in the order of nature, the latter posterior.

APPENDIX TO THE DISPUTATIONS ON CREATION, THIRD.

Respondent Cornelius Bruynvisch of Zierikzee in Zeeland.
For December 9, 1643.

1. Due to the affinity of the matter, we also insert this question with the questions on the rational soul: Whether a rational or intellective soul, or any other soul whatsoever, is present in the world or at least in the heaven. We touched on this previously in part 2, thesis 8, and part 3, thesis 2, not indeed examining it expressly, but only rejecting it as a rancid and sufficiently exploded opinion. Now because we see it interpolated and not only reconciled with scripture but even constructed from the same, we think it will not be alien to our purpose and profession if on this occasion we inquire accurately about that opinion, and show that there are no reasons why we should recede from the modern and common opinion of the schools of all Christendom, or from the views of the fathers, scholastics, and our theologians, which are sufficiently agreeable to the sacred writings, or at least not repugnant to them. But I forewarn this, that I do not want to pursue the particular and proper hypotheses, or corollaries of this opinion, or the diverse modes of explaining it, but only to aim at the common paradox, into which all the opinions of all must necessarily fall back in the end. I note this, lest anyone think me ignorant that this opinion is split into various sects: while some make the motive intelligence the soul of heaven; others, besides the intelligence, attribute a proper soul to it, and that either rational and sensitive, but equipped only with the superior senses, and using it not as informing, as the Academics and from them Simplicius On the Heavens book 2 comment 3; or only sensitive, but endowed only with an interior sense, namely imagination, as Avicenna Metaphysics book 9 chapter 2. From the theological authors, whom I here follow and defend, I now indicate first the Fifth Ecumenical Synod, namely of Constantinople, which at the request and effort of the Emperor Justinian in the year 538 struck with anathema those who with Origen said that the heaven, sun, moon, stars and waters which are above the heavens are certain animate and material powers, as Nicephorus testifies in his Ecclesiastical History book 17 chapter 72, who there says that he described those anathemas from the acts of the synod. Baronius for the year 535 numbers 6-7 says that he described the same from the manuscript of Antonio Agustín. Add to this synodal decree Lactantius book 2 chapter 5, Basil Hexaemeron homily 3 and on Psalm 48, Cyril of Alexandria book 2 against Julian at the end, Ambrose book 3 of the Hexaemeron chapter 4, Augustine book 1 of the Retractions chapter 5 and book 2 chapter 7, Jerome on Deuteronomy 32:1 and on Isaiah 1:2 and especially in his epistles to Pammachius and Avitus, John Damascene book 2 On the Orthodox Faith chapter 6, Thomas first part question 70 article 3 with the commentators, and all the more recent scholastics, Bonaventure, Durandus, Ockham, Gregory of Rimini on book 2 of Sentences distinction 14, Nicholas of Lyra on Jeremiah 10, Tostado on Exodus 23 question 47, Steuco on Psalm 19. And from the more recent authors Lorinus on Psalm 19:2, Scaliger against Cardano Exercise 6 number 2, Pineda on Ecclesiastes 1:8, Pereira on Genesis book 2 questions 7 and 19, Nieremberg Natural History book 2 chapters 4, 9 and 15, Dandini On the Animate Body page 479, the Coimbrans on the second book On the Heavens chapter 1 question 1 article 1, Claremont book 1 On the Universe chapters 11-13, Wendelin book 2 of the Physical Contemplations section 2 chapter 6 and section 3 chapter 2, Vossius book 2 On Idolatry chapters 33, 40-41. And many other more recent scholastics, commentators on Genesis, physicists, whom it would be too laborious to recount here. However, Espencé, a Parisian theologian, must not be passed over, who in a special treatise opposed the animation of the heavens in Paolo Ricci. From our side, Daneau Physics book 1 chapter 14, where he expressly and gravely touches on this opinion. Those who

wanted the world, or at least the heaven, to be animate were of old not a few: Timaeus of Locri On the Soul of the World, Anaxagoras in Diogenes Laërtius, Plato in the Cratylus and Epinomis. See Alcinous chapter 14 and Stobaeus in his Physical Eclogues chapter 25, the Stoics in Lipsius book 2 of the Stoic Physiology dissertations 7-10. This was followed from the ancient heretics by the Priscillianists in Augustine's book Against the Priscillianists, the Jews in Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed part 2 chapters 4 and 8 compared with Buxtorf's Synagogue chapter 17, the Arabic philosophers, Avicenna, Averroes, etc. From the more recent authors Paolo Ricci and other Kabbalists, whom see published by Pistorius, Campanella book 2 On the Sense of Things and Magic last chapter, Bodin in his Theater of Nature, Baranzano part 1 of the Uranoscopia question 2 doubt 4, Giovanni Giacomo Pavesi Metaphysical Disputations disputation 5 chapter 26, Basso page 333 and 341, Stefano Tiepolo book 5 of the Academic Contemplations chapter 2, Francesco Patrizi book 4 of the Panpsychia. Nor was Origen immune from this absurdity, as we showed above in the disputation On Creation part 3. We will say more about Augustine below. The anonymous author of the Enchiridion of Physics Restored, published at Paris in 1623 in octavo by Nicolas Buon, sections 5-7, makes nature twofold: one uncreated, namely the spirit of God the creator of the world, who first brooded over the waters; the other created, or second, the minister of the first, namely the spirit of the universe, or the power of light created in the beginning and contracted into the solar body, vivific and endowed with secret fecundity. Which he also calls the fiery spirit, and invisible fire. But he says that both this spirit is called the soul of the world: the former indeed from his own opinion, the latter from the opinion of Zoroaster and Heraclitus. Of which afterwards in section 30: "Not without probability have some philosophers placed the soul of the world in the sun, and the sun in the center of the universe." But whether he wants this created spirit of the universe to be understood as a soul properly so called and vital is not clear. At least he very badly establishes the Holy Spirit as the creator of the world and soul of the world. Which almost agrees with the madness of that Arab in Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed part 3 chapter 29, who made God the spirit of heaven. The more recent Platonic-Hermetic and Paracelsian authors, what they want for themselves, neither others nor they themselves sufficiently understand. For either they say the same thing as the Peripatetics with the Philosopher in On the Generation of Animals book 3 chapter 11, and with the author of the little book On the World chapter 4; or they dream an inexplicable and indemonstrable figment. On which see Sennert On the Consensus and Difference of the Chymists with the Aristotelians etc. chapter 7. Dornau the Paracelsian produces new interpretations of scripture, and from them the soul of the world or spirit. See above. Henry Nollius book 1 of the Hermetic Physics chapter 3 makes the soul of the world and spirit of the universe the same with fire. He says that this fire was primeval and in the chaos, and not only vivified the primeval water in the chaos, but also all other things produced from the chaos. He defines the same fire as the spirit subtly diffused through the whole primeval water, so that it may dispose it to receive the various forms of various species. He adds in the same place that it does not subsist outside the waters, and is present in elemental things through the communication of the primeval water, and without external assistance it could not exercise its powers and operations, but with God moving the chaos through his word it began to operate; yet it is not a body, but assumes it from elsewhere and disposes it variously to its own nature and the variety of tinctures. Finally, it has in itself the ideas of all things, and by the power of its imagination impressed by the divine word (note well), according to those ideas it receives in

itself the various rationes of seeds. Who would not think that Hesiod was mythologizing about his Pandora and the whole genealogy of the gods? Yet when he said all those things, he finally concludes on page 103: "The primeval fire is nothing other than nature itself, which is defined by Aristotle as the principle of motion and rest, etc." Nevertheless, on page 104, making a circulation he returns to his mythology: "The superior fire (which namely is in the stars), when it perceived the inferior fire (namely the elemental) to be hidden in the sink of impurities, obtained from God that it might come to its aid, and lead it to itself as to the fount of purity." Yet elsewhere he seems to locate this spirit of the world or soul in heaven. Compare above the disputation On Creation part 6 thesis 3 problem 3. This Paracelsian fable about the soul of the world presupposes the other fable about the chaos. On which Nollius cited book chapters 2-4, and he defines it on page 89: "A body consisting of water, actuated by vivific fire, and standing without consistence, so that all things which are comprehended in the world might be produced from it by the word of God." Kepler in his manner in physics incautiously attributes a soul to the world and its parts and specifically to the earth, about which he thus inquires in book 1 of the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy page 126: "If there is a soul in the earth, under what species of soul do you refer it?" He answers: "It constitutes a peculiar species by itself; for it does not make the earth grow, nor sense, nor reason as if through discourse, but only moves, and promotes all the said works, expediting all things by mere instinct." And a little before on page 125 he asks: "What are those indications of a soul turning in the body of the earth?" And he responds there:

"1. Perpetual and sensible subterranean heat. For coldness is proper to matter as such; on the contrary, all heat is a vestige of a soul, either past or present. For even the fire obtains the matter by which it is fed and remains, having been produced by the faculties of a soul.

2. The proper works of a soul, such as are the generation of metals, minerals, and fossils; the exudation of humor, whence the perennial origin of rivers from the mountains; the exudation of mists, and perpetual exhalations moist or dry, whence various kinds of meteors. Thus from blood, bile, phlegm, from mucus, sweat, saliva, excrements, we reason about the various faculties of a soul.

3. The faculties of those things which are dug out from the bowels of the earth, such as that they are potentially hot, inflammable, and convertible into light, to which the soul is cognate - such are sulfur, marcasite, sparks given off when struck, and finally the subterranean fires themselves. And these are beheld only in the exterior crust of the earth; how much more marvelous do you think are hidden in its most spacious interior bosom, through one thousand seven hundred miles? We therefore rightly argue from the things generated by nature to the generating cause; for thus we also otherwise rightly reason that a thing which within itself concocts oil, which is potentially hot and inflammable, is conformed by a soul.

4. A formative faculty in the air, whence locusts, flies, and even the hexagonal figure of snow; thus lice born in the body of man make an indication of some faculty of a soul present in that body. A formative faculty in marine and fluvial waters, whence the Ocean is called the father of monsters; a formative faculty in the surface of the earth, whence so many kinds of spontaneous plants, so many insects; a formative faculty in the inmost bowels of the earth, plainly similar to

that which is in females - it expresses outwardly the species occurring within; ships, fish, kings, pontiffs, monks, soldiers, fossils.

5. The exercise of geometry, which cannot be performed around the work of the mind and thus of the soul. For it expresses the five regular bodies in little stones, hexagonal figures in crystals and salts. For thus also from the hexagonal figure of the cells, we rightly conclude that bees, the weavers, are endowed with a soul and capable of geometry in their own way.

6. Extraneous and celestial geometry, which consists in the concourse of rays, and perception, and according to it the agitation of subterranean matter. For the earth exudes meteors according to the prescription of the aspects, the formal rationes of which are merely geometrical. For thus also that animal which moves its feet according to the laws of some tune, we rightly conclude both perceives the tune, and understands the measure, and finally is ruled by a soul.

Although the soul of the earth has and perceives all these things by a primeval instinct, not by discourse and reasoning and progress, as men do."

Baranzano in part 1 of his Uranoscopia question 2 doubt 4 member 1 page 60 makes the soul of heaven of another order than are the sublunar souls, and says there is only an analogical agreement between them, such as is between the life of angels and brutes, and thus the celestial souls are not vegetating us, nor sensitive, nor intellective.

The opinion of the ancient Platonists and the recent Hermetics is expressly whitewashed by Conrad Aslaksson in his Mosaic Physics and Ethics published in 1613 chapter 12, where among other arguments he adduces the passage Nehemiah 9:6: "And you give life to all these things." But there he expounds soul and life through active virtues, powers, and energetic faculties. Although he previously seemed to say something against the opinion about the soul of the world in his treatise On the Threefold Heaven book 2 chapter 11, and commended the expugnation of this soul to his reader in Daneau and Casmann, here nevertheless for the same he appeals to the said treatise page 100, and to his Oration on the Soul of the World. There are some who strive to excuse the opinion of the Platonists, as if by the soul of the world it wanted to designate God the creator and preserver of the universe. Calcidius on the Timaeus says that Plato understood by the soul of the world what Christians do by the Holy Spirit. Cyril of Alexandria has the same against Julian in the cited book. Philo Judaeus in his little book On the Eternity of the World makes the soul of the world the providence of God. Sennert chapter 7 On the Consensus and Difference of the Chymists with the Aristotelians etc. seems with Ficino book 4 of his Platonic Theology chapter 1 to interpret the Platonic soul as the containing bond of contrary things. But although sometimes he manifestly and crassly confounds God with the world (as we showed above in part 2, and Cicero also testifies in book 1 On the Nature of the Gods), not at all consistent with himself, nor understanding himself or others and poetically with improper speeches, allegories, games and pictures rather, and turning himself into all forms like Proteus, and delighting the exoteric reader and follower of words rather than disputing seriously and acroamatically - nevertheless he cannot escape being condemned of this absurd opinion about the soul of the world distinct from God the maker of the world, both from his own words

and from the consensus of his ancient and more recent followers. Let his words in the Timaeus be seen. From his followers Proclus in his commentary on the Timaeus, let Alcinous On the Doctrine of Plato chapter 10 be heard instead of all, where he expressly distinguishes God, whom he denies to be a part of anything and a whole constituted from parts, from this soul: "For from his will he filled all things with himself, exciting the soul of the world and converting it to himself; since its intellect (namely of the mundane soul) is the cause which (intellect), being adorned by the Father, in turn adorns the whole nature in this world." And in chapter 14, which is about the soul of the world, he philosophizes thus about it on page 489: "Moreover, the soul of the world, which always was, is not made by God, but only adorned, and in this way it is sometimes asserted that he makes it, because he excites it, and converts its mind to himself as if from a body and a certain deep sleep, so that beholding his intelligibles, and desiring his notions, it may thence receive species and forms. Whence it is clear that the world is both an animal and endowed with mind by God. For since he wanted this to be best, he deservedly also had to make it animate and intelligent." Stobaeus in book 1 chapter 25 of his Eclogues says: "Plato said the world is an animal and endowed with reason, because it is nourished by itself; but he placed its principality in the heaven." In the same place he produces the words of Plato from the Timaeus. In the same way Cicero in book 2 On the Nature of the Gods interprets the opinion of Plato. Plutarch in his Platonic Questions question 1. But Pliny in Natural History book 2 chapter 7 seems to fluctuate in the manner of Plato, now confounding God with the world and soul of the world, now distinguishing them: "Wherefore I think it is of human weakness to seek the effigy and form of God. Whoever God is (if only he is other), and in whatever part, he is all sense, all sight, all hearing, all soul, all mind, all of himself." And afterwards at the end of the chapter: "By which is undoubtedly declared the power of nature, and that this is what we call God." There are also others who contended that the world is not only animate and endowed with intelligence, but also God. Among whom Sextus Empiricus in his work Against the Mathematicians page 326 numbers Xenophanes, whom he induces discoursing Socratically and thus concluding: "The world is therefore intelligent, and therefore God." Nor was Plato absent from this enthusiastic delirium, as we indicate above in part 2. Augustine fluctuates quite indecorously in his Enchiridion to Laurentius chapter 58: "But I do not even have this as certain, whether the sun and moon and all the stars pertain to the same society (namely of the angels), although they seem to some to be luminous bodies, but without sense and intelligence." But this is the fruit of the overly esteemed Platonic philosophy, as Daneau well observed in his commentary on the cited passage - in the way that once Nicephorus Callistus said of Origen, book 17 chapter 27. However, elsewhere Augustine denies that the stars are animate and dissolves the arguments of the adversaries in his book Against the Priscillianists chapters 8-9. But as for what Plotinus, Numenius, Amelius interpreted the Platonic soul of the world as the Holy Spirit (as Theodoret testifies in his Cure of Greek Affections sermon 2 page 33), that cannot help Plato against his will, and argues the corruption and heterogeneous confusion of the sacred doctrine by those authors very little understood. For they (as Theodoret observes in the cited place), when they came after the advent of the Savior, heard the Gospels and inserted many mysteries of Christian theology into their books.

2. So that we may judge so much the better about this opinion, we posit some conclusions, of which the first may be:

Conclusion 1: The world does not have one substantial form in number.

It is proven: 1) Because complete natures do not have one substantial form. But the species of things in the world are complete natures, for example the heaven, the elements, and all things composed from them - minerals, vegetables, animals.

2) Because the particular natures in this world could not then be distinguished from each other specifically, as complete natures. Which is absurd, and against scripture, which teaches natures specifically distinct and complete, and from this demonstrates the admirable wisdom and power of God. See Psalm 104 throughout, and Genesis 1:11, 12, 21, 24-25, where the name "min," species, is expressly used. Compare Genesis 6:20 and 7:14, Leviticus 11:14-16, 19. See Zanchi On the Works of Creation book 1 chapters 2, 4-5. The consequence is clear, because all specific distinction is from the form; and therefore those which have one form are not distinguished in species, but are essentially one or one essence, or in one essence and nature, namely as to complete being.

3) Because by this opinion the particular natures and causes, and their particular active principles and specific faculties of acting depending on the forms, are denied and overthrown. For whatever of specific operations is wont to be attributed to these per se and primarily as principles, that is sent away to the form of the world through this opinion.

4) Because through this universal form of the whole of nature, that is, the active principle, the special divine providence which immediately by the immediacy of power and supposit works all in all is withdrawn - not only by conserving through continuous influx, but by moving, premoving, and applying or determining it to the singularity and to the specification of the individual acts, while it flows both into the second cause, and with it into the effect. Briefly, whatever is ascribed to this universal form, that is necessarily withdrawn either from the particular causes and natures, or from the divine providence. If you say the former, now you oppose the whole of philosophy, and indirectly also theology, which thinks with Augustine that God so administers all things which he created, that he also allows them to act and exercise their own proper motions (Augustine, City of God book 7 chapter 10), and consequently rejects the opinion as foolish and impossible which establishes that second causes are idle, and God alone acts at their presence. See Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles book 3 chapter 69, first part question 105 article 5, and the modern commentators on him, and also from the metaphysicians Suárez. But if you admit the latter, now you imagine something similar to the paradox of Durandus, who denies the concourse of God and all special providence. Into such a manifest absurdity Campanella allows himself to be thrust, book 2 chapter 32 page 194, where he says that this soul takes care of the whole. And on page 195: "Others attribute these secret acts to God. But I say that God is infinite, and no created nature, especially an inferior one, can receive his infinite influx, but with a finite modification; for it is not apt to sustain, as also Bernard says: For this reason he first made a shadowing in the mother of Jesus; how much more therefore do things borne naturally need modification, and overshadowing in such great light?"

5) Because from this the argument for the providence of God against the atheists and Epicureans, taken from the immutable order, mutual dependence, coordination, subordination, co-adaptation, succession, vicissitude, discordant concord of the most distinct and repugnant and mutable things in all their operations, both for the proper good of each one, and for the common good of the whole universe, is weakened, if not overthrown. For if all these things can be reduced either in whole or in part to a proper, chiefest and intrinsic universal principle, namely the form of the world, certainly a sufficiently wide crack, if not a door, is opened to the exception against this demonstration of providence. But see this demonstration of providence in the writers on providence, and against the Gentiles, atheists, etc., cited elsewhere. And these are our arguments - to which if anything can be excepted, we will dilute it in person in the disputation itself. Let us now only touch on the objections.

Of which the first objection: Whatever is not contained by form, that is either confused and indigested, or ordered by some extrinsic force beyond nature (as all artificial things), and consequently cannot endure. But neither can be said of the world; for it is an ordered structure, and endures forever, namely with a physical eternity. I respond: That axiom, if it is taken absolutely and universally, is false. For the angels are not contained by one form, nor separated souls, indeed not even any soul in the body; nor also would multiple worlds be contained by one form if God produced them - nevertheless they would subsist. In addition, God by his powerful word conserves and contains all things in himself, as an efficient cause (Hebrews 1:3, Psalm 104:29-30), and hence it is that they do not fly apart, nor are they confounded.

Objection 2: If a universal form is not given, it will follow that God does all things through the proximate and particular natures of things. But the latter is absurd. Therefore. I respond: I deny the minor. Indeed, it would be absurd for God not to act through the particular natures according to the law and distinction imparted in the first creation of things. For those natures would be in vain, if they themselves did not have their specific activities, and act according to them. Indeed, this would also manifestly be repugnant to scripture, Hosea 2:20-21 compared with Genesis 3:17, Deuteronomy 28:23.

Instance: If this is admitted, now God and nature will be the same (which is the fiction of the Stoics), and God must be said to preside over all things in the manner of a form - which is absurd. I respond: I deny the consequence. For God is an external principle, any nature an internal principle; God presides over all, as efficient, not as a part or form.

Objection 3: If a universal form is not given, it would follow that heavy things cannot tend upwards, light things downwards. But the latter is absurd; for often heavy things tend upwards, etc. I respond: The consequence rests on that false hypothesis, that heavy things of their own accord, naturally, and per se tend upwards. Which is denied; for this happens per accidens, and beyond the nature of heavy things, namely through the extrinsic force of particular agents, for example the sun, which attracts vapors, and man who projects a stone. So that no universal or common form is required here.

Objection 4: If the vilest things in nature need a substantial form which ties their parts together, which being dissolved the parts are loosed - therefore much more must a form be assigned to the world itself adorned with such varied and distant parts. I respond: The consequence is gratuitously knotted, nor can any reason for it be assigned. To God the most wise architect nothing from our mechanical imagination is to be prescribed in the workmanship of the world. The things created by God are the measure of our wisdom, not the reverse. See and ponder Job 38, 39, 40, 41. God has made more things, and can make more things, than we comprehend. But lest anyone think that the structure of the world has been deserted, and will soon be dissolved or fly away, unless it is bound by that imaginary form, we chant to him from Boethius book 4 of the Consolation of Philosophy: "You bind the elements by numbers, so that cold things may agree with flames, dry things with liquids, lest the purer ether fly away, and weights may lead down the submerged lands." Who contains the earth, the water, etc. within their limits? See Job just cited, and Psalm 104 and 42.

3. II. Conclusion. The world does not have a soul, neither vegetative nor sensitive; and consequently it is not an animal. This is proven firstly because all things in the world are not animate, nor do they feel, nor do they breathe the breath of life: therefore there is no common soul. The antecedent is proven both by scripture, by reason, by experience and by the testimony of the senses themselves. Scripture explicitly distinguishes between living and non-living creatures in Gen. 1. 20. 21. 22. & 7. 15. 21. Psalm. 150.6. The reasons are as follows. Because every animate thing has an organic body united and compacted in a certain way through the closest joints Eph.4 16. But the world does not have such a body. Because every animal has its soul in the heart and blood according to Deut. 12.23. & Gen.9.4. compared with 1 Corinth. 15.39. But many parts of the world have neither flesh nor blood: Because they do not perform any vital actions, such as nutrition, growth, respiration or transpiration, progressive motion, or animal motion, sensitive appetite both irascible and concupiscible, 2. Because it would follow that the world could produce another world, or worlds of the same species as itself, by univocal generation. For it is the most natural work of a living thing (according to the philosopher) to generate something similar to itself. But the more perfect an animal is, the more perfect the manner of generation appears. But the world is imagined to be the most perfect animal. For the fact that among animals mules do not generate, or perhaps certain insects; this happens because the former are monsters or μ of nature, and the latter are most imperfect. III. Because it would follow that each animal (e.g. a dog, a horse, a man) would be informed by a double soul, both its own and the common soul of the world; and consequently would perform animal and specific operations of two kinds proceeding from that twofold intrinsic and formal principle. But let it be shown what are those distinct operations in man or dog which are not to be reduced to the human or canine soul as to their principle, but to the soul of the world alone. IV. Because it would follow that not even perfect and most perfect animals (such as a horse, a lion, an elephant, a man) are complete natures in themselves, or animals properly so called, but are parts integrating a perfect animal (namely, the world): just as we judge of the head, heart, tail, foot etc. of an animal. But this is absurd, repugnant to scripture and to the wise. See Genesis 1, Psalm 8 & 104, Job 39, 40.

[The animal] cannot properly die; at least not that which [has] the soul of the world: since it is never separated from any body or could be separated. Nor do we see how the bodies of animals could be dissolved and reduced to dust, since they are connected by the last act and last form, namely the soul of the world, through its essence and unity. But if you say there are two deaths, one of which is from the separation of the particular soul (e.g. human or canine), and the other from the separation of the universal soul. Now I ask that this distinction be reconciled with the infinite texts of scripture, which make mention of life, death, and mortality. Then I ask, whether, and how the soul of the world is to be separated from the world on the last day, and from each living being, both dead and living men then to be changed according to 1 Corinth. 15. From these and other things let the supporters of this opinion extricate themselves, so that truth may harmonize with truth everywhere throughout theology and philosophy. VI. Because it would follow that all particular souls, especially human souls, are either parts of that soul of the world and arise from it and fall from it; or are formally contained by it, and thus other and further forms are informed by form, souls are animated by soul. Whichever is said here I do not see how it cannot be pressed by many difficulties and inconveniences. Let us now see the objections. 1. Obj. The body of the universe is by the consensus of all the most excellent; therefore animated: for animated things are the most excellent. Resp. 1. A falsehood is presupposed, namely that there is one body; when it is an aggregation of many bodies. Let us grant an instance in an ordered army (for the world is compared to it Gen. 2. Is. 40.), where there is a most excellent body compacted from so many most noble creatures, namely men: who nevertheless would infer that it is animated by one common intellective soul. I say the same about the church, which is one body (Ephes. 1.23. & 4.4.), not however naturally, but supernaturally most noble. Conclude therefore that it is informed by one essential form, one intellective soul in number, and one regenerating grace and faith in number, and thus is one nature and essence per se, and one supernature, 11. Obj. In the world there appear very many vital works, and all its parts are said to be full of soul: Therefore it is endowed with a soul. Resp. 1. The vital works are to be reduced to the particular souls of the living: unless someone wishes to deny all souls and vital principles against scripture, reason, and the knowledge of the senses. It is not therefore necessary to posit a soul of the world on that account. 2. That all its parts are said to be full of soul, if someone understands this of local containment and union per accidens, in the way a sponge is said to be full of water, it can be conceded, concerning the sea, earth, air, as containing parts. But if someone understands that all and each part, both containing and contained, are endowed with a living soul: We deny it, and the principle is begged. 111. Object. At least the entire heaven moves continually in a circle: therefore in it there is a soul, the principle of circular motion. Resp. 1. It is conceded that the heaven moves: but from this there is no consequence to the universe, and its soul. 2. From motion, especially circular, some form and nature of heaven is rightly concluded: but not a soul or living and sentient nature. 3. If this corporeal motion were animal, nay even voluntary: it would have to be explained how and why the animal would not be fatigued by that continuous and most rapid circumgyration, and that motion, like all other animal motions, would not be more remiss at the end. IV. Obj. The world is enclosed by its own figure; therefore it is also terminated by its own soul? Resp. The antecedent can be denied: for the world is not per se and immediately enclosed by some proper figure, but by the outermost containing body. In the way a circumvallation of a camp is said to enclose the soldiers, and a ship, or house, or temple, or the wall of a city is said to enclose the men and

other things contained there: from which nevertheless it does not follow that the proper figure of the containing body is proper to all the contained things. 2. The consequent is also denied. Because wood, water in a vessel, stone etc. are terminated by a proper and particular figure, yet not by a proper and particular soul. V. Obj. Very many little bodies, obscure and vile parts of the world, like flies, worms etc. are endowed with a soul. Therefore it would be absurd for the most absolute body of the world to lack a soul. Resp. 1. Again a falsehood is presupposed, that the world is one body. 2. Inconsequent consequence. What if I make a similar connection, those little bodies are endowed with a sentient soul, and cicadas only make a sound, and nightingales sing so sweetly: therefore much more the sun and moon; so that there may be a Pythagorean harmony of the heavens. Again dwarfs or pygmies are endowed with a rational soul: therefore much more the bodies of whales and elephants, whose excellence scripture itself so magnificently proclaims in Job 40 and 41. Again the little body of a flea is endowed with a soul, therefore much more the body of an ordered army is informed by one human soul. VI. Obj. Since the world is one, through the consensus of parts, disposed by divine providence: it follows that a soul must be given, without which the union and consensus of parts cannot be preserved. Resp. The consequence is begged, not proven. We deny it and think the intrinsic principle of the particular nature of each thing suffices, and the extrinsic [principle] of divine maintenance and special governance. VII. Obj. It would follow that the world is a monster, since some of its parts would be animate, and not the whole itself. R. 1. The corpse of a brute or man is not a monster, although it is not animated, because it does not depart from the nature of a corpse. Thus a horse is not a monster, because it is not a man. It is therefore presupposed falsely and not proven, that the individual parts of the world are or ought to be animated by their nature. 2. It is no more absurd and monstrous than that all plants do not feel equally with animals, or that all brutes do not reason equally with man, or that not all animals fly, equally with birds. 3. I do not wish to bring forward here what the philosophers state, that neither the excrement nor the blood of animals is animated: and yet there is nothing in their bodies that is 7 parakes. VIII. Obj. If the world were not animated, then man could not be called a small world: for he is especially called such with respect to the soul. Resp. The similar is not the same. If someone extends that metaphorical phrase even to the essence and faculties of the soul, he would have to prove that the world has a will, and consequently is to be saved or damned for eternity. 4. III. Concl. Neither to the world, nor to heaven, nor to the eighth sphere, nor to the stars is an intellective soul or created mind to be attributed, which as a universal principle and form, whether informing or assisting, would contain, direct, produce, adapt, move all things. It is proven. I. Because Holy Scripture recognizes no intellectual natures besides God, except angels and men. II. Because every intellective nature or mind has right reason, and will, and consequently is ordained by its nature to the first and highest right reason and will, that is, to God: and thus is under law to him, is capable of eternal blessedness or misery. All of which things are exceedingly absurd to affirm of the world or heaven. III. Because it would follow that stones, metals, stars, waters, winds, lands, mountains, and all brutes in air, sea, land are endowed not only with sense but also with reason no less than men; since they as parts of the universe are informed by that soul equally with men. IV. Because a labyrinth of difficulties and the apparatus seems to be in this opinion. But lest I seem to burden it too idly by accumulating many arguments to absurdity, I will only indicate some from which they ought conveniently to extricate themselves. But they are these. 1. Whether this soul is divisible, and whole in the whole, and whole in any part; or indeed

indivisible. 2. Whether human souls and the souls of brutes are likewise derived from that common soul. 3. Whether it is incorruptible from within, as the human soul and angel. 4. Whether with human mortality having entered the world through sin and with that servitude of corruption of the whole world (Rom. 8.20,21); that soul was changed with respect to its essence, or with respect to its qualities and operations. 5. Whether in the final conflagration of the world, that soul is to be corrupted or annihilated; or indeed like other souls and intellective forms, only to be separated from its body for a time, and to subsist separately outside the body, and afterwards to be reunited to it. 6. Whether it animates and informs the whole world, lower and upper, visible and intelligible, that is, the empyrean heaven, hell, good and bad angels, the separate souls of men, even the separate soul of Christ, when he was in the state of death, nay even the whole Christ according to his human nature now existing in heaven, and in the days of his flesh. 7. Whether after the last judgment, it will animate and inform the blessed in heaven, or whether its intelligence will then cease. 8. Whether in brutes and other living things it is mortal according to the whole, but in men an incorruptible form. 9. Whether it is a material form, or immersed in matter, and dependent on it; or whether it is immaterial? 10. Whether God created this intellective soul in his image or not? 11. If the former is said, whether he placed a law on it, and made a spiritual covenant with it, and with what conditions and promises? 12. But if a covenant intervened: it is asked whether it has persisted in it, and come to the end, and is now in it, just as the good angels. 13. Or whether it is to be saved through the covenant of grace? 14. Whether it does not follow that this soul in one mundane animal most closely representing the image of the one God, and most intimately present to all things and operating all in all, is by this reason more excellent than the angels, contrary to Heb. 1.0.5.6.7.13.14, nay even than the human soul of Christ itself. Campanella admits this absurdity l. 2. on the sense of things etc. c. 32. where he says that this soul is more excellent than any angel, likewise most excellent and also most blessed, which in the first mind, may operate what is to be done, and according to its ideas in particular matters and formations; finally that it is the divine mind. Which deliriums whether they savor of heresy, let the Christian reader judge. 15. Whether, positing this created spirit, this soul created on the first day, through which the following works of the five days were created and are even now sustained in being and operation, the position of our Theology, opposed to Socinus against Wiekus, and other fanatics, is not infringed: That nothing besides God is the principal or instrumental cause of creation: and consequently that from creation the deity against the Atheists, and the deity of Christ against the Arians and Photinians is solidly demonstrated. See the disputation on Creation part 1. and the disputation on Atheism part 4. & Joh. Junius in the examination of the response of Socinus against Wiekus class. 6. cap. 1. 16. Whether just as in man some posit a body, and human soul (from which the human animal consists), and besides these a third, namely spirit or mind, which is personally united with the human animal; so also besides the mundane animal composed of body and soul, some spirit or intelligence is to be constituted which is personally united to the mundane animal? V. Because this opinion reheats those rancid and obsolete opinions of the Platonists expelled from Christian churches and schools by unanimous consensus: or paves the way to the precipices of the Stoics; and the paradoxes of more recent authors like Campanella on the sense of things and Magic, as well as Abaylard and the ancient Priscillianists, on the life of the heavens and stars in Bernard in his Epistles, epist. 190. and Augustine on heresies: and to the opinion of Philo the Jew, that the world has the image of God in itself in a more perfect way than man. See this

opinion refuted among the Scholastics in 1. q. 93. art. 3. And Pererius on Genesis lib. 4. q. 2. on the image of God. Not to mention now the Arians' essentialized God or vice-God, through whom all created things are preserved; the Socinians' virtue and power of God really distinct from God; and their inaccessible light, and space, or place, which is coeternal with God; the aeons of Valentinus; The infused occult virtues of Cornelius Agrippa through the reasons of the soul of the world, and the spirit of the world, which is the bond of occult qualities, finally the vital, intellectual and divine gifts to be drawn down from above etc. (See lib. 1. on occult philosophy chaps. 11.14. 37.38.), In addition the ten Sephirot of the Jews (on which see the disputation on Creation part 2.), the universal active intellect of Averroes; the Enthusiastic confusion of God with creatures, and the transformation of these into him; and the febricitating or rather fanatic dreams of the more recent Paracelsists, Weigelians, and similar people, on the idolatrous worship of the heavens by the Gentiles, nay even of the whole world under the name of Pan, and muleα mλuJeóm, on the origin of which see Vossius in the place cited above. And Maimonides in Moreh part 3. c. 29. on the impious superstitions of the Magi and Genethliacs, on which see the disputation on Magic. To these and similar portents (some of which we have touched on in the disputation on creation part 2. thesis 8.) there would be an easy lapse; at least their not so easy and safe refutation through the defense of this soul. Especially since this whole Pandora seems to have been conflated from the Platonists and Paracelsian Weigelians and enthusiasms. Here the Antagonists of the Koran, of the Jewish Kabbalists, of Trithemius, Agrippa, and other Magi, Platonists, Stoics, Paracelsists, Weigelius, Johannes Bohemus, the Brothers of the Rosy Cross, and all other Enthusiasts both in philosophy and theology, some of whom I have indicated elsewhere, others I will indicate, are to be seen and compared. Here I especially commend Nieremberg lib. 2. cap. 4. & 9. & 15. who shows the dangerous wóμsva and precipices of this figment. The supporters of this opinion do not sufficiently free their opinion from these consequences or precipices of absurdities if they say they do not admit them, much less pertinaciously defend them; and therefore they are not heretics or akin to heretics, and therefore are not to be pressed by those absurdities. For whatever may be the case concerning heresy, and their obstinacy, and particular intention, and also the limitation and contraction of their opinion, and the solicitous precision of certain hypotheses and consectaries, in which the fanatics luxuriate (on all of which we do not now take judgment on this occasion): at least they cannot deny that they imprudently confirm the hands of the fanatics just mentioned, and take away from themselves and us no small apparatus of solid refutation, give occasion of stumbling to ruder or flighty minds, and of adding something to their inventions (which is easy); and thus their idle speculations and disputations are at the very least erroneous, ill-sounding, dangerous, scandalous, offensive to pious ears. Compare below the consectary to thesis 6. 5. IV. Concl. The soul of the world is not a person whether considered per se, or united with the world. It is proven 1. Because there are no created persons besides men and angels. 2. Because the definition of person would not befit it: granted that it were some form of the world. Which can be deduced through the parts. 3. Because such personality and personal union inconveniences the Theological explication and defense concerning the persons of the trinity, and concerning the person of Christ, as also concerning composites and human persons. For in whatever way those commentaries on the personality of the soul of the world, and on its union with the mundane animal are colored, they obscure and disturb the Philosophical and Theological truths placed in the light with so much labor and with such anxious caution. V. Concl. This soul of the

world was not created in the image of God. Proven 1. Because scripture attributes this only to men and angels; as catechumens know from catechetical theology. 2 Because then it would be capable of a spiritual covenant, and of eternal blessedness; not only itself, but also the whole mundane animal informed by it. VI. Concl. That soul can neither be, nor be called the first intelligence, that is, the angel, through which God as through a minister and vicar, governs the world. Proven 1. Because nothing certain can be known about any angels in particular, except from the word of God. But the word of God does not mention this supreme intelligence. 2. Because this angel would be good or evil. It is not good: because then it would be elected to eternal blessedness, and would be a ministering spirit sent forth as the occasion requires, to minister to the pious in this world Heb. 1. Not evil, because God would not make it his perpetual minister and vicar, that is, the immediate ruler of the world. A third kind of neutral or purely natural angels is not given: except in the Magical commentaries of the Platonists, and of Psellus, and of Abbot Trithemius in his book on the seven Intelligences, and in Steganography: which I have touched on in the disputation on Demons. VII. Concl. Therefore there are not those three things in the world: nature or body, soul, mind. Much less should the image of the Trinity be shown or sought in that triad. 6. Let us now briefly note the objections which are or can be brought against Conclusions 3, 4, 5, 6. 1. Obj. from Gen. 1. v. 2. Resp. The safest exposition and that of most of the ancients and more recent authors is, that the Holy Spirit is understood. As Zanchius teaches professionally on the work of creation lib. 1. c. 2. Rivetus on Genesis Exercise 2. Pererius on the cited place. But although he brings forward two others there, nowhere does the soul of the world appear: not even in the exposition of Cajetan, which he rejects there not without indignation. Compare also the antagonists of the Socinians Joh. Junius, and others cited. Especially also the notes of the Belgian and English Bibles. This Platonic-Paracelsian exposition is involved in not a few absurdities and difficulties. For it can be asked, when was this informing spirit of the world created? Whether it animated the world from the first moment? If not, what then informed the world in the meantime, and made it subsist? Or was the world for so long matter without form, body without life, Platonic chaos? II. Object. From Psalm 104. v. 30. Resp. That fictitious soul or spirit of the world is not understood there, but the Holy Spirit. From which Ecclesiastical and common interpretation when there is a departure without reason, the argument is also taken away, which among others Athanasius, Ambrose, Didymus, Nyssenus etc. employ to prove the deity of the Holy Spirit. III. Obj. from Psalm 19. v. 1. Resp. From this not only the soul of the world or heaven, but also that Pythagorean concert was approved by some as can be seen in Maymonides in Moreh Nebuchim chap. 6. But to have reported these things is to have refuted them. See the authors for and against the celestial concert cited in Lorinus on Psalm 19. v. 1. & 4. IV. Obj. From Psalm 136. 5. from which Cajetan made probable the opinion of the animation of the heavens. See Lorinus in his commentary on the place. Resp. The intellect is praised, not of heaven, but of God: in the way Proverbs 3. 19. Jerem. 10. 12. 51. 15. V. Obj. From Job 38. v. 7. by stars can be understood metaphorically angels. But if you take it properly, they are to be said to have praised God, as in Psalm 19. 1. & 4. as Pineda shows in his commentary on the place. VI. Obj. Because whatever is most beautiful should be attributed to the world, but this is to be endowed with intellect. Resp. What if you say the same about brutes, about stones, about melons and mushrooms? For they are the works of God. All the Thalmudic and Alcoranic fables, about the rooster endowed with intelligence, about the faith of the stars, about the salvation and paradise of the animal alborach,

and of the sheep slaughtered at Passover, and six hundred similar things (with the Eons of the Valentinians, and the whole Theogony of Hesiod), could be defended from the same affirmation. I say the same about the sweetest concert of the heavens, which Pythagoras dreamed. VII. Obj. Because such an ordered disposition of all things cannot subsist without intelligence: but there is none, except of this soul of the world, since it is absurd and unworthy to attribute to God the immediate and special conservation and motion of all those things. Resp. Indeed it is most absurd in such light of the gospel for Christians not to have learned from the catechetical elements even of the least and most vile things that providence is to be attributed to God. I do not wish to diffuse myself in inculcating these catechetical things. See the writers of Common Places on Providence, and what we partly discuss concerning the same in the treatise on the Term of Life: where we have indicated some of the more excellent authors. There are also other objections, which the Conimbricenses have on 2. de caelo cap. 1. qu. 1. art. 1. and certain more recent Platonists, and other paradoxologists in Wendelin in his Physical Contemplations sect. 2. cap. 6. which because they are accurately and laboriously solved there, and have nothing peculiar, I refrain from criticizing them; especially with the narrowness of time warning us. Compare the antagonistic authors of the animation of the world and heavens cited above in thesis 1.

Consectary.

We judge the opinion about the animation of the world or heaven with Bonaventure on 2. dist. 14. and the Conimbricenses in the cited question art. 3. to be false and erroneous; not heretical. We add, however, that it could be defended by someone with such hypotheses and consequences, that with obstinacy added it would end in heresy. For it should not be thought that whatever is brought on stage under the title and scheme of philosophy, by the safe conduct of philosophical liberty and subtlety, is rendered immune in perpetuity from the suspicion or accusation of heresy. Pineda on Ecclesiastes 1. v. 1. holds a middle way, and asserts the common opinion not indeed as an article of faith, but as an ecclesiastical dogma close to faith: "If it is not established," he says, "by certain faith that heaven and the stars are not animated, it is nevertheless [established] as an ecclesiastical dogma very close to faith, most frequent among the fathers, most received among the scholastics, now to be accepted by no one, except with a grave mark of temerity." Espencaeus has nearly the same thing and proves it by the testimonies of Thomas and others in the cited treatise. Compare what we advise above in thesis five at the end. Nieremberg lib. 2. cap. 9. pag. 22. judges otherwise: "However, without irritating these, many have made a mild judgment about the animation of the heavens, and with the permission and peace of the Faith. I will judge severely concerning its law. I think that opinion is very much alien to our doctrine and Religion. Do those minds of the bodies, I ask, enjoy God? Are they capable of sin on the way [of life]? Will those vast defendants appear in the judgment of Christ? Then if they are to enjoy God, must they be transmitted into the empyrean? Why did Jesus, who made all things known to us as friends, keep silent about those fellow citizens of ours? Did he die for them? Why was Moses silent about them, who with such great apparatus and divine occupation described the human condition? For if the heavens are animals endowed

with reason, they are more noble than man, nor should a hasty and perfunctory narration of their origin have been neglected. Why on the second and fourth day were the more perfect creatures perfected, when the procession was from the more imperfect? Are those most noble bodies on account of man more ignoble than he is? Would it not be more reasonable for the ignoble little man to be on account of them? In addition, if they enjoy the sight of God, what have they done that they should finally be worn away, be dissolved, be burned up at the end of the age? The bodies of blessed souls, and which were always innocent, are not to be treated so badly." But the dangers condemn that opinion, the mother of very many heresies. Let the Menandrians, Carpocratians, Simonians, Cerinthians, Archontics, see about their Princes, the powers of the world. In addition, how liable to superstition is the license of Aureolus permitting the heavens to be adored with dulia? The fifth council under Justinian numbers among the impieties and heresies and says anathema to the author of this opinion, namely Origen, no less than to Arius, Eunomius, Macedonius, Nestorius, Eutyches. See Nicephorus, Callistus lib. 17. of ecclesiastical history c. 27.

Epimetra of the Respondent for philosophy serving as a handmaid to Theology.
1. It is very ambiguous to say: Mechanics is the foundation of physics. If someone explains it concerning the physics of the celestial world, we think it is absurd; but if it is understood that the whole nature of things and the workmanship of God is to be measured and examined according to the works of human art, or to the level of Archimedes and Vitruvius, we think it is Pythagorean and dictated without reasons and deduced from that one principle alone of, "he himself said it".
2. It is dangerously disputed by most Scholastics, that some creature can be eternal from before [creation].
3. The Platonic soul of the world is not given, or any other living and life-giving incorporeal substance; nor are the heavens animated.
4. We relegate multiple worlds, the world of Galileo on the moon, to the amusements of petulant minds.
5. We think the human mind of Plato, which is man, and which inhabits as it were, is to be nearly compared with the double man of Paracelsus.
6. The universal intellect of all men according to Averroes, agrees neither with philosophy; nor with the God of his Aristotle, nor with the prophet of his Mohammed, or the Mohammedan religion.
7. If it is granted that a demon or angel produces animals either perfect or imperfect, would they be distinguished from other animals by their whole genus or essence as supernatural? It is denied.

APPENDIX To the Preceding Corollaries.

Proposed for disputation on the 23rd and 24th of December at the Ninth hour. 1641.
A LITTLE PREFACE
To the most learned, most expert Professors of Medicine and Philosophy, and the rest in this famous Republic of Utrecht Physicians, and Philosophers.

Most illustrious men, it happened in our recent disputation, that the most learned and most distinguished opposing Doctor, who in your judgment and that of all the auditors has always won every point in the Medical and philosophical arena, gave me, who thought nothing of the sort from the beginning to avoid the suspicion of moving the question, a most pleasing occasion to digress into the capital question about substantial forms; which I had otherwise relegated to your forum: because I would freely confess that your philosophy (specifically, physics) was unknown to me; that Theologians could for the most part be content with a necessary and sober use. Since these things thus came about with your kind permission, I could not fail to weave the web I had begun and open a somewhat broader field of disputation to our Gymnasts, with certain reasons, doubts, and hypotheses indicated, which have thus far dissuaded my judgment, such as it is, from the fastidious negation of forms with their appendices. I have not decided to thrust a sickle into your harvest, or to censure the moderate and philosophical liberty of inquiring more accurately about questions of this kind, than is usually done; which you admit, provided only the main point, and the whole philosophical school are not taken away: I strive for this so much, that I may show that I have thus far, as far as I could, willingly learned for my own capacity and reason of time, and up to now from time to time still learn, repúonovra dei noma didanouver, the ingenious inventions of you and the predecessors of your order, skillfully observed, subtly judged, supported by reasons; and thus to wish to applaud you masters of natural wisdom by right and merit; but where it is not granted to proceed further, to rest with you in learned ignorance. Indeed I could add, that I would commit nothing dróky, if in this way I advise young men scarcely imbued with the elements of philosophy, not to hiss at the whole philosophy of the schools so easily without the evident and valid conviction of demonstrations, before they have understood its terms: and thus, when they have applied themselves to the studies of the higher faculties destitute of necessary assistance, they are compelled to read all authors without fruit, to hear lectures and disputations as xa póowwe, or Daedalean statues: of course uncultivated with the condiments of a philosophy unknown to them. But it is better now to take the hand from the tablet. It will have sufficed, to the common depository of truth, in which both your discipline and all others allied by a common bond with Theology conspire, to have contributed this little flower-bed of ours, such as it is. Farewell and proceed to deserve well concerning the Academy, which you do.

On the natures of things and substantial forms.

1. We do not introduce these things to the students, so that they all now immediately necessarily believe in forms with their appendices, or contend tooth and nail for them, but so that they may at least for a time abstain from a peremptory sentence and its execution, by which the miserable and innocent beings are cast down from their ancient possession; until they have learned thoroughly, if not most accurately, at least moderately the philosophy of the schools, specifically logic, metaphysics, physics, and these few notes which we subjoin have been solidly determined, and they see that they are satisfied in them. However they will finally judge, we will not have wasted our labor, if in the meantime we will have recalled them from a fierce contempt

and flight of the philosophical study, moreover from an idiotic rustic and proud ignorance, so that at least it could sometime be said concerning those dissenting elsewhere what is boasted among the Arabs: A wise man when he errs, errs with learned error. Moreover our notes are threefold, 1. Certain prejudices, which I suggest to the disputants. 2. Reasons for forms, which are to be clearly solved. 3. Reasons against forms and for those vicarious accidents, which certain more recent authors wish to be substituted for forms, which are fittingly to be defended and doubts which with their principles, and consequences.

2. The notes of the first kind are 1. Let them consider, whether they satisfy themselves in the reconciliation of this opinion with sacred scripture. For it indeed harmonizes with truth: And Christian philosophers will profess learned ignorance a thousand times, rather than that they bring even the least appearance of prejudice to divine truth. See Gen. 1.11.21.22.24.25. Proverbs 30.24.25.26.25. Where we think permanent natures, faculties, and distinct species of things are implied. II. It is to be seen, whether from the denying opinion, there would be at least an easier lapse than from the affirming into doubt; Whether there are any substantial forms, which actuate the body of man, and constitute one composite with it? But if someone denies this, and substitutes the xe of Galen, or a particle of divine breath or soul of the world, or the universal intellect of Averroes, or the mind of Plato, thrust into the workshop of the body as a genial pipor and bound to it, as Prometheus to Caucasus, if someone I say substitutes such a thing, by what reasons would you more successfully and safely rebut him, than the assertors of forms. III. It is to be seen, how with this opinion standing, the distinction between the entity of substance and accident could be conveniently explained and defended. For there would be, according to them, no substantial difference between a wolf, a sheep, a whale, an elephant, a serpent, a stone, a monk's-hood, aconite, wheat, the sun, the moon, the earth; add also a clock, the wooden Trojan horse, the bronze bull of Phalaris, the flying dove of Archytas, the bronze head of Pope Sylvester, the speaking statue of Albertus Magnus, a house, a chair, a garment etc. But perhaps they would retort that those substances differ essentially through those five accidents motion, rest, position, figure, quantity. Resp. Granting this to be so (about which we do not now dispute) the difficulty is nevertheless not removed by this escape. It nevertheless remains, that Substances are distinguished from substances in no other way than accidents from substances and accidents among themselves, for both the former and the latter are distinguished by accidents. IV. It is to be seen whether from here there is not an easier lapse, when someone is pressed by reasons and consequences, into this absurd opinion: Secondary causes endowed with their own causality are not given, but only the first and universal cause acts in the presence, and disposition of secondary causes. See the absurdity of this opinion shown by the Scholastics, and more recent metaphysicians and theologians, in the topic on Providence, on the concourse of God with creatures. Let the consequences, by which they could be pressed, be these. 1. That the concourse of God is not given, nor the motion of the first mover accommodated to the natures and properties of secondary causes, whether they are necessary, or contingent. 2. That there is not in created substances an intrinsic mover, and a substantial principle of internal and proper motion: for the disposition of the mobile to motion from quantity, figure, position is not the activity or causality of the efficient cause, but only a required condition, and a cause without which not. 3. Consequently, since no mobile can move itself in potency to act or determine itself to motion; it remains that some external mover is to be sought, which may lead the potency into act. But whom will they give here? The

Platonic-Virgilian soul of the world, or intelligences, or God, or atoms, or celestial globules. Here something will have to be said. V. It is to be seen lest the negation of proper qualities, which internally emanate from the form and substance of a thing (the negation of which follows the negation of forms, just as a bow [vara] drags a cross-bow [vibiam])", drive us into these absurdities. 1. That created substances are the immediate principle of their own operation; since there are no active qualities, by which substances operate as a means: which see shaken out by the metaphysicians, and Theologians, when they treat of the simplicity of God, and of the distinction of the divine attributes. 2. That there are altogether no qualities, as neither of the second, or third, so also not of the first species; that is, there are no habits: against the common school of Philosophers and Theologians. I would like to see how those, who deny natural faculties or powers, will vindicate habits against the Atheists, Sceptics, infidels (the necessity of which scripture and reason persuades) lest they be likewise shut up in that pentagon workshop of Motion, rest, quantity, position, figure. VI. From this opinion it follows, that no definitions of substances are given: since there are no forms, or proper first and internal essentials, from which the difference can be taken. How this may savor to the sons of the logicians of whatever sect, and to all acroamatic minds, and to the professors of whatever disciplines, they themselves will see. VII. This absurdity also follows: That all created substances, even man himself (and why not angels and separate souls?) are beings per accidens, collective, aggregate: but not essences or natures one per se. So that no essence seems to be per se; except perhaps atoms, or ethereal globules, or insensible particles, or Platonic ideas (which he called αυτοάνθρωπον, αυτοίππον etc.) or chimeras buzzing in the void etc. But that man ought to be called a being and one per se, we will teach below. VIII. It would follow that there are no proper and intrinsic faculties and their principles in animals, of another kind, than in automata, or Daedalean statues, and consequently the works of God and nature produced through creation or generation, are essentially and univocally the same with the works of art: which how it may agree well enough with Ps. 104.29.6 7.14. 15. Num. 16. 22. &. 27.16. Hebr. 11.9.10. Hab. 2.19., I confess I do not see the knot. IX. It would follow that there is no generation or corruption of natural things. But more on this in Thesis 4. X. When efficiency and motion, which is usually attributed to forms and their active qualities, is attributed to quantity and figure; it is to be seen lest young men at some time imprudently admit through consequence that Magical axiom rejected by all Christian theology and philosophy thus far, "There is some efficacy of quantity and figure, and it either per se or with others concurs as an active principle of transmutation." XI. This doubt is to be solved: How is it not a process to infinity, or a circular demonstration nearly similar to the demonstration which that decanted coal-like faith of the Papists precedes? So that it may amount to the same to that: Why is the earth moved for ex. R. because its site, position, figure so move it; and why do they so move, and whence is this, whether from atoms, or from ethereal globules etc. But if you say this, I ask again, the world of atoms, or globules, how is it moved, and why? You will take away as much; and the way returns and turns back. XII. The reproach about this opinion as if omniscient is to be removed, which is imposed on it: "That it explains or solidly demonstrates much less than the opposite opinion, indeed nothing in the secrets of nature." In general indeed and indefinitely it says that natural effects are from that five-fold reason of accidents which any Chorebus could be taught in the space of one or another little hour: but it explains or proves neither in species nor in an individual determinately, about celestial things and motions, about those which are in the bowels of the earth, in the depth of

the sea, in the internal motions of bodies, about those, I say, which have thus far lain hidden from other investigators of nature. But more on this in the following Thesis 4.
3. The reasons, which are usually brought forward by the assertors of forms must first be thoroughly known, then clearly and solidly solved. To this end some one of the more recent physical or metaphysical disputators should be read accurately by the juniors; such as Suarez, Pererius, Ruvius, Toletus, the Conimbricenses, the Complutenses, Arriaga, Mendoza, etc. Out of all these Suarez most fully and most subtly pleads this cause. For the present we will defend these three reasons. The first reason is taken from the proper actions of natural things, which emanate each from their distinct perfections and qualities: Moreover those perfections perfect some nature and substance. Hence it is inferred that in any composite there is given one principle and root of all powers and operations which is not matter (which is common); nor accidents, which cannot be the ultimate principle, therefore it remains, that it is nothing other than the form. The second reason: There is given some first root, and first concept of each entity, e.g. of humanity, equinity etc. which constitutes the thing in its proper being and distinguishes it essentially from others: But that is not matter, since it is common, nor any accidents, because they cannot compose or constitute a substance, and give entity to it: Therefore it is that which we call form, Eido, Tòl reire, cuixar, perfeti& habeam, naturamix (since it actuates and informs matter and with it constitutes the composite). The third reason: We gather this from substantial corruption. The essence of man, horse, dog, etc. is taken away, so that according to scripture and natural reason they are said not to be. But here matter has not ceased to be, since it is ungenerable and incorruptible: therefore form; by which it happens that the composite is dissolved, and becomes a non-being, namely, this, e.g. horse, dog etc. But if someone says that through destruction only a change of accidents happens: we retort, then a dead man, lion, dog etc. differs accidentally and not substantially from a living one; no more than a sick Socrates differs from a healthy one, a sitting one from a standing one, a learned one from an unlearned one, an old man from a boy. We will dissolve other objections which Basson lib. 3. opposes in the presence of the disputation.
4. The reasons, which are usually brought forward against forms, must be demonstrated philosophically in such a way, that they compel the intellect desirous of truth, and make it rest. Which has by no means been done thus far, we will now defend according to our ability. I. The reason, and indeed the chief and Achillean one is: because the origin, or mode of origin of forms cannot be explained, or so demonstrated, that no difficulty remains. Resp. I do not repeat our response to the major of this argument and its consequence, which we intimated in the corollary, but I again take it up to be defended: with this caution added, if the more imprudent young men do not cease to wander on that string, and to support the overthrow and mockery of the whole sound and sober philosophy with such a ruinous and rotten prop: they are to be driven at last through solid consequences to that point, that they become either beasts or atheists. But see our corollary. Moreover that this was the Achillean argument of the denying opinion, is clear from Gorlaeus Exercit. 14. p. 267. and Basson lib. 1. Intent. 3. & 4. where having premised this argument he concludes p. 159. line 3. p. 161. compared with the index, under the word form, that there are no substantive forms, and the ancients could have easily shown, how, by whom, and from what forms are made; for they said that the soul and form of each thing is an instrument, and consists in a certain composition and proportion of the parts of the thing. Furthermore on the difficulties and manifold disquisition of the Philosophers, so that they may

explain the mode of origin of forms, consult besides Basson lib. 3. loc. cit. especially Sennert Hypomnem. physicor. 1. cap. 3. Suarez disp. metaph. 15. The second reason is that which Gorlaeus intimates: That beings are not to be multiplied without necessity, when the effects of natural things can be sufficiently explained through other principles, and reduced to them. But they do not explain those principles in one way. For the ancients, whom Basson praises and Aristotle refutes l. 2. Axpo, explain it otherwise, the more recent authors otherwise: although very many opinions agree in some one common thing, which being denied or refuted they themselves also fall. We will not now dig up the rancid and long exploded opinions of both the ancients and the more recent Paracelsists, Hermetics (which Dornavius has tried in vain to reconcile with the sacred scriptures): but we only ask that it be demonstrated, that which emerged today or yesterday stating that all things are derived from quantity, figure, site or position, motion, rest, and that all the secrets of nature can be best explained and demonstrated through them: which we deny. These reasons are brought forward. First, as a clock is moved by the mere disposition of its parts, through quantity, figure etc. so also natural things: But the former is true: Therefore also the latter. We denied the major and the minor. To the proof of the minor and other instances besides we said, that a clock well disposed and fitted, nevertheless is not actually moved without an external mover, namely the hand of a man, or its vicar, the depression and traction of a weight: in the way a harpsichord, lyre, tortoise optimally disposed and fitted for song, does not actually sing without an external moving accident, namely the hand of the artist; as also mills optimally disposed do not actually grind without the external impulse or traction of water, wind, horse or ass etc. We add now that hydraulic organs or harpsichords do not actually sound without the motion or pulse of water in subterranean tubes; and yet that water cannot be said to be a part of the organ, much less its internal mover. The second reason: Because the heart of an animal is moved by the mere disposition of the parts R. it is moved by the soul or informing form, by means of qualities as quo principles, and other instruments required for animal motion. Instance: but the motion of the heart can be diminished nay even completely cease or be taken away, even with the animal living, therefore it is not from the soul: for if indeed it were from the soul, assuredly with that soul present, the motion would be present. Resp. The consequence of the major is denied. It is a reasoning from the rational soul, and yet it is absent from the infant recently born, although the rational soul is not absent. Thus granted that the motion of the heart ceases in a living animal, nevertheless it does not follow from that, that the soul or form is not the principle of that motion. For the fact that the motion is either diminished or ceases, that is from the organs and from the impeded faculty. Instance 2. If that form were the principle of motion, and used qualities and instruments for it, then it would follow that that form uses reason or ratiocination. Resp. The consequence is denied: because forms operate through natural faculties without ratiocination; thus animals by natural instinct, nay even vegetables flee harmful things, pursue what is agreeable to them; thus e.g. the swallow without the use of reason with applied celandine heals the eyes of its chicks, and our stomach, liver etc. concoct, nor are they subject to the direction of reason. We add that a stone falls downward, stars rise, finally all natural things perform their motions without reasons for thus they have been created by God, and tend to their ends according to the faculties impressed on them, just as an arrow to the target. See the Metaphysicians disputing on the final cause. To the minor of the syllogism it has been responded, Concerning the diminution of the motion of the heart it is conceded, that it happens, but then there is no species of consequence, since a diminished

motion is also a motion. A total cessation of motion is not conceded, but this is deferred to the experience of Physicians. But who has experienced this, is not clear: And what if someone at some time perceives none of its motion extrinsically, for that reason it must not be said, that there is no motion within or without. For it can easily be retorted, that the motion is insensible, as some state concerning the systole in the pulse. And indeed these reasons have been aired thus far. That the same may be urged so much the better anew, and others may hereafter be added, we have written this appendix.

5. In place of a consectary, we add something about all occult qualities: That the opinion of philosophers and physicians is not to be rashly rejected.
I. Because it agrees better with learned ignorance (about which we will sometime, God willing, treat professionally): than the opposite opinion, which seems to breathe and promise pansophy, and indeed without difficulty; Which cannot fail to be suspect. See meanwhile the sayings of scripture Job 38. & 39. & 26.6 42. Eccles. 1. Ps. 29. II. Because the occult qualities, which sagacious investigators of nature have objected to them to be explained, have not yet been explained by them. See I pray Sennert on the consensus of Chemists with Aristotle c. 8. especially Hypomnem Phys. 2. And if they try to explain any (which however rarely happens) they bring forward inept and ridiculous reasons, or deny those things which have even been confirmed by experience, as the most erudite Sennert speaks in the same place. But although they are not properly of our forum, yet because they spread the train of consequences too much to the exploding of the whole Philosophy: we will now for our capacity and for the sake of exercise defend, that poisons, hydrophobia, the contagion of plague, nay not even the magnet can be explained by them through motion, rest, position, quantity, figure.
Problem. Why are certain men so affected by the presence of cats (which they themselves are unaware of), that they almost suffer syncope, others, if they unknowingly eat a particle of cheese, are so moved, that from it they sometimes contract a serious and dangerous disease for themselves?
6. We add a little word about all circular local motion, about the agitation of insensible parts, about ethereal globules, about the coarser part of the world distributed into particles of various figures, which is carried around in a circle by the more subtle elements and compacted into the globes of comets and planets variously distant from the sun according to the diversity of their parts; and if any similar things; they can be heard as ingenious conjectures, or new inventions; but not received for solid and proven philosophy, so that thus like the Homeric Glaucus we may rashly exchange xguraxuxxew, unless they are far more evidently demonstrated by the author of the French Dioptra, who seems to promise a new philosophy, or any others ardenpasaîs, than forms, and faculties of things both manifest and occult and other philosophemes of the schools have been demonstrated thus far by their patrons. But let them remember that this demonstration ought to be made either to our sense through duxluλode, or to reason through solid arguments: which we would like to be a little more evident, than those, by which Renatus Descartes in his Method p. 34, 35, 36. demonstrates that there is a God: "I think," he says, "therefore I am," etc. Concerning which the erudite Mersenne and other Parisians ex professo in a treatise recently published; and we perhaps elsewhere.
7. In Corollary 1, I had said that the opinion of Taurellus and Gorlaeus about man as a being per accidens, stumbles in many ways. The argument by which they are moved is such. Two beings

or complete substances make one per accidens and not per se: but the body and soul of man are two complete substances. Therefore. Resp. The major is not universally true; and the minor is denied. That in the presence of the disputation itself it may be aired to many and to the end, we now cursorily indicate these hypotheses 1. That man is a species of substance and animal created into one essence or nature from soul and body, we think is implied in Gen. 3.7, 1 Cor. 15.45, compared with Gen. 1.26,27. II. Christ tvepw (in whom there are two natures or complete substances) is one per se and not per accidens: for the union of natures was made into one supposítum επωδώς. See the Theologians on the person of Christ: Much more therefore substantially and per se the union was made between the soul and body of man, which indeed are not so far distant, nor are they such complete substances, as divinity and humanity. III. The true human nature of Christ would not be ma mus. 1. Concerning being, essence and existence, nature and suppositum. 2. Concerning one, union, composite, whole, and concerning per se and per accidens. 3. Concerning principles and causes, specifically concerning univocal and equivocal cause, concerning internal and external principle, concerning informing and assisting form. 4. Concerning substantial and accidental distinction, concerning the distinction of a natural thing from an artificial one, concerning the distinction of a monster (which as such is a being per accidens) from human nature duly constituted according to the laws of nature. 5. That man is not a substance nor does he directly pertain to the predicament of substance: but only indirectly, and per accidens is referred to it, since he is a being per accidens and collective. 6. That one man is no more one per se, than an army, a city etc. where there are many men collectively. 7. That consequently man cannot be defined by an essential and perfect definition. 8. That the matter and form of a composite are properly matter, and its form is union, that is an accident, or pure mode, namely a relation. See Gorlaeus Exercit. 14. p. 266. 9. That the union of the human soul with its body, is to be sought in some mere accident from those five, and indeed in position or posture: as some seem to concede. 10. That the body is not the nature of man, but only his instrument, through which the soul existing in the body operates.

8. In Corollary 2. The diurnal rotation of the earth, which against Kepler, Galileo, and some other neoteric astronomers see shaken out in Alexander Rosseus in his little book against Lansbergius and Carpentarius; especially in Froymundus in Ant-Aristarchus, and his Apology for the same; we said was repugnant both to the divine truth revealed in the sacred scriptures, and to natural reasons. We will now constitute the former class of arguments Josh. 10. v. 12,3,14. Ecclesiast. 1. v. 4,5,6,7. Psalm 19. v. 5,6,7. We will therefore defend that the exceptions to these passages which occur in Lansbergius, Kepler, and Foscarinus (who most acutely and most fully did this, as can be seen in his epistle published at Leiden in the year 1635 together with Galileo on the system of the world), are weak, atheological, dangerous and play and luxuriate too lightly in sacred things, against Rom. 12: v. 2. Is. 66. v. 2. As we have previously shown in our Thersites Heautontimorumenos. See the latter class of arguments instructed in Froymundus. We pluck these from it: 1. A weight will not fall back to the perpendicular in the same part of the earth: which Aristotle objected 2. de caelo c. 13. we say the same about a weight from the highest tower, that it would fall not at its foot, but far from there to the western part; which Tycho, Thomas Fienus, Fromundus object. But it will press more strongly concerning a globe from a larger military cannon emitted towards a stake or tree from north to south, or vice versa. If therefore an arrow emitted straight up through the axis of the horizon, would not return to the same point of the earth, but would fall back almost four German miles (according to the

calculation of Tycho in his epistle to Rothmann) from there towards the west, if only it consumed one minute of an hour in going and returning; how much more will this happen in an iron globe. The exceptions, which are usually brought forward about the magnetic force of the earth, about the rotation of the air, cannot heal this absurdity, nay they add more absurd and most absurd things to it. And so that I may briefly reply in a little word. How therefore is a globe emitted from west to east not carried with greater velocity, than from east to west? Nay, how can a globe go out from a cannon from east to west and accomplish its course, so that it is not retained and carried back by the air. II. Buildings, and the earth, at least its upper parts, likewise seas, rivers, would fly apart by such rapid circumgyration (which in individual hours completes 225 German miles). III. The sea making one globe with the earth and flowing from west to east, would make navigation swifter: but the Conimbricenses affirm the contrary in their Meteorology from the experience of Portuguese sailors. The arguments for the motion of the earth from scripture indeed are ridiculous: from hypotheses and Astronomical observations they are uncertain conjectures or beings of reason, or imaginary: as shown enough by the authors just cited. See in Fromundus in his Apology p. 106 & 117 how the chief one which Lansbergius has concludes. To the other chief one, which Galileo has, about the motion of Mars and the planets around the sun as center, we will respond in the disputation itself.

9. In place of an epimeter, let these notes be about the invention, constitution and augmentation of the sciences, I. Not to want to use, to enjoy things well invented and well constituted: but to want to invent them anew per se or other things in their place is to multiply beings without necessity, and to do injury to talent and erudition: since art is long, life is short, experience is fallacious. II. Students in the Academic course are not so much occupied with observations and experiences, as with the perception and impression of things invented: And thus with Aristotle Metaph. 1. cap. 1. I would prefer a learned and non-expert student to an unlearned and expert one. If however experience mig, could be joined to doctrine (which happens here) I would certainly judge that Academy most happy. III. Fal- lax and useless is that method of inventing and constituting the sciences, [if] someone 1. unlearns, forgets, rejects, and as it were abjures all universal experiences, all inventions, all dogmas examined and proven through so many ages by the whole chorus of the wise, through new and repeated experiences, through the most subtle reciprocations of arguments: with the hope of course: of a new and better Philosophy to be invented by himself or others. 2. Perpetually adheres to one or another experience about one thing or about one natural effect of one thing, and sells such a tiny particle for genuine Philosophy: the whole Philosophy and common experience, at least by far more frequent than his own, and indeed about all or most natural things having been held in contempt. 3. Often builds such unhappy consequences upon that narrow experience, and is compelled to fabricate uncertain, slippery, insufficiently proven principles, axioms, definitions, and demonstrations from it, or to desert bail.

ON THE CELESTIAL HIERARCHY, AND GUARDIAN ANGELS.

Resp. TO JOHANNES PASCHASIUS of Amisfort. On the 30th of March 1639.

Many things are usually inquired about Angels in general, and about the good ones in particular, by the common Writers of Theses and common places. We now postponing them (because other things are more urgent) will only ventilate two questions for the present about Hierarchies, and guardian angels. He who desires the rest, let him go to the writers of common places, and Suarez lib. 8. on Angels, and the rest of the scholastics on Thomas 1, but to be read with judgment; And Joh. Wilhelm. Stuckius on angels and angelic protection, Casmann's angelography. Add Stephen Clotz's treatise on Angelolatry, where he fully treats the controversy about the worship of angels against the Papists; And Vossius lib. 1. on Idolatry from c. 6. up to 10.

1. For the understanding of the prior question we premise these conclusions 1. Concl. there is no certain reason why the angels should be said to differ in species: whatever the Scholastics here dispute on Thomas p. 1. qu. 50. art. 4. and the sententiaries on 2. dist. 3. 2. Concl. Consequently their disparity in natural dignity is not to be constituted. Pelbartus Themeswar in the golden rosary of theology lib. 2. under the word angel III. 37, after reviewing the opinions of the scholastics, more soberly thus determines: "But whether in fact there are in one angelic species several individuals? Resp. according to Scotus together with William and Bonaventure from dist. 3. part. 1. art. 2. q. 1. gathering, that although we do not have certain knowledge about this: nevertheless we have a probable opinion because it is not known to us or does not appear through scripture nor through the sayings of the saints, nor through the offices or through the operations of the angels such a distinction in them that any angel is specifically distinguished from another, it is therefore presumptuous to say this. Therefore the sober and catholic position is that in the angels there is also to be posited a personal or numerical distinction only under the same species: either in all: or at least in some." III. Concl. It cannot be determined as certainly as a dogma of faith whether the angels are distinguished by offices and grades: yet the affirmative is most probable from Col. 1.16. Eph. 1. 21. compared with 1 Thess. 4. 16. IV. Concl. It can in no way be known or ought to be investigated, how they are distinguished by offices, 1. whether namely only in relation to men, or also by superiority and subjection among themselves. 2. again, whether by offices assigned to each one peculiarly, or promiscuously according to the nature of the thing and the command of God now imposed on this one now on that one. Here learned ignorance has a place. On the contrary, the Papists rashly and very unlearnedly determine the following theorems, upon which they build many consectaries dos, about which below. 1. That there are nine orders or choirs of angels. Which they prove partly from Col. 1 & Eph. 1. partly from the explanation of those nine names and other arguments to be recounted below. II. That those distinct orders are in three classes, or ternions, (from a superstitious imitation of the trinity in God) which they call hierarchies. III. That those hierarchies are distinguished by offices, so that the first or supreme immediately knows God and divine things, and teaches the following and this again the third. Which they prove from Is. 6.3. & 63.12. Zech. 1.13. & 2. v. 5,6. Ezek. 9.4,5. Dan. 8.16. Ps. 24.6. IV. That the same are so distinguished by dignity and grades, that the first commands the second, and the second the third. V. Moreover that the first only assists, does not minister; The middle (except the order of dominations) and the lowest minister that is command the hierarchies of men, announce or

execute the precepts of God accepted from the superiors. VI. That only the lowest order (namely the angels) is deputed to the particular custody of individual men: about which later VII. Hence the more recent authors constitute such a definition of hierarchy from pseudo-Dionysius ch. 3: that it is, a sacred order, knowledge and action, which approaches to the likeness of divinity, as far as can be done, and is brought over to the intention of God by the proportion of the illustrations which have been divinely given to it. Thus Vasquez on Thomas disp. 224. Gabriel on 2. dist. 9. previously had thus defined it: Created hierarchy is a certain sacred power, containing several orders, communicating to inferiors in a determined order what it received from the first divine power. Hierarchy itself is distinguished by them in general according to a threefold intellectual substance, divine, angelic, and human, into supercelestial, which is of the Trinity celestial, which is of the angels; ecclesiastical, which is of men. The celestial is divided into the eparchy, or supreme; the mesarchy or middle; the hyparchy, or lowest. The properties by which they are distinguished, are order, knowledge, operation. The hierarchical acts are three, to purge, to illuminate, to perfect: which in the substrate also suppose for the same namely, the induction of knowledge; but in the connotated they thus differ, that illumination denotes the manifestation of the object; purgation the removal of preceding ignorance, perfection the elevation and amelioration of the subject. The supreme is purged, illuminated, perfected by the supercelestial or divine; the middle by the supreme, and at the same time purges, illuminates, perfects the lowest; the lowest is purged etc. by the middle, and purges etc. the human hierarchy. Order in general is defined from Lombard a multitude of celestial spirits, who are similar to each other in some office of grace, just as they agree in the natural participation of gifts. Which definition see declared in Gabriel on 2. dist. 9. qu. 1. The special properties, offices and consequently definitions of the individual orders pseudo-Dionysius elicits thus from the notation of the words, Seraphim, who are endowed with charity above the rest. Cherubim, who have a multitude of knowledge. Thrones, who are like dopópof, and receive God sitting upon them. Dominations, who freed from subjection burn with desire of true domination, and form themselves and the rest following them to its true likeness. However, Gregory the Great and Bernard think otherwise. Virtues durames who have an unconquered fortitude for accomplishing all divine things, and confer virtue to inferiors. Gregory the Great thinks otherwise. Powers, who have free disposition in divine things, and precede others in preserving it. Principalities who obtain principality, or who preside over archangels and angels; as indeed Pachymerius the interpreter of Dionysius wishes. Archangels, who preside over angels. Angels, who command the hierarchies of men. And thus commonly the Scholastics philosophize, or rather fable, about the angels on 2. dist. 9. & 1. and on 1. qu. 108. 112. 113. And with them the commentators on the places of scripture to be cited below, especially on Eph. 1. & Col. 1. From the philosophers Franc. Patricius in Panarchy. From the Polemicists Baillius defends these things with contention in Catechism part 2. qu. 45. Coccius in the Catholic Treasury vol. 1. book. 3. Whom pseudo-Dionysius preceded, with his interpreters, commentators, and vindicators, The interpreters are Joh. Erigena Scotus, Ambrose the monk Orator Camaldulensis, Joh. Sarracenus, Joachimus Perionus. The commentators are, from the Greeks Maximus and Pachymerius, from the latins Hugo of St. Victor, Albertus Magnus, Dionysius the Carthusian; to whom can be joined Vercellensis, who made extractions; and Ambr. Orator and Faber Stapulensis who added scholia. The vindicators are, Baronius to the Year 109, Possevin in the apparatus under the word Dionysius the Areopagite. Bellarmine in Ecclesiastical Writers, Martin

Delrio in Disquisitions on Magic lib. 6. and in a certain peculiar little book against Scaliger to which is the title Vindication of the Areopagite, finally Matthew Galen in a peculiar treatise to which is the title, Areopagitica. Compare below thesis 4. object. 4. at the end. Besides the pseudo-Dionysian speculations, some things about the hierarchies occur in Greg. the Great homil. 34. on the Gospels, and lib. 32. on Job c. 24. but which dissent somewhat from the Areopagitic. Hence it is that both the Scholastics and the more recent authors do not agree in all respects in explaining the hierarchies. About Ignatius, and the other fathers, whom Coccius cites, we will speak below.

The three Hierarchies. (Nine Choirs or Orders.)

1. First
   1. Seraphim - 1.
   2. Cherubim - 2.
   3. Thrones - 3.
2. Middle
   1. Dominations - 4.
   2. Virtues - 5.
   3. Powers - 6.
3. Lowest
   1. Principalities - 7.
   2. Archangels - 8.
   3. Angels - 9.

2. Let us now hear the reasons by which this fabrication is refuted. 1. Because 2. it cannot be known through the light and natural reason, nor through scripture. The adversaries themselves acknowledge the former: and Suarez disput. Metaphy. 35. sect. 3. enumerating the angelic attributes knowable by nature, does not mention the hierarchy and orders. The latter is clear from the inspection of all the texts of scripture, which are usually brought forward by Dionysius and his followers. Therefore here it is not to be known above what is written, especially when in Col. 2. 18. it is said about the angels igneviμőnteúwn. II. Because with the foundation of this speculation removed, the whole thing falls. The foundation is the difference of names, from which the distinction and definitions of the orders are taken. But besides those nine names, there still occur others, Sons of God Job 1. & 2. Morning Star Job 31.7. (which is explained about the angels by all the Greeks and Latins, as also the Chaldean & the Septuagint, as Pineda acknowledges in his commentary) Gods Ps. 8. 6. & 97.7. Watchers Dan. 4.15. Host of heaven Luke 2.13. Men Gen. 18. Spirits Heb. 1. 7. Mighty ones Ps. 78.25. eyes of God which two last if not solidly at least to the man ought to conclude: because namely most of the fathers take it about the angels: Add mountains, and Stones: of which the former is to be explained about the angels from the opinion of Nazianzen, the latter from Jerome on Ezekiel 28 and Gregory the Great lib. 32 moral. c. 25. referring and approving Joh. Lud. de la Cerda l. on the Excellence of the Celestial Spirits chap. 30. Therefore there still ought to be constituted eight or ten orders of angels. It is added, that arguments from etymology or notation of words do not conclude demonstratively (as the tyros of Logic know) unless God himself has taught. Not to say, that some of the etymologies of Dionysius brought forward above are inept or uncertain. III.

Because in scripture there is no mention of archangels, but only of the archangel: who in the properties of knowledge, action, and office is not postponed to the principalities (which is a fabrication of Dionysius) but is equated to them, as is gathered from Dan. 10.13. compared with Jude v. 9. IV. Because no properties are drawn out from the notation of those words, which are not common to all angels. For all know God, burn with his love, God sits upon them as upon thrones etc. V. Because it is repugnant to scripture Heb. 1.14. with Ps. 91.11. 34.7. that distinction into assisting and ministering; as if namely only the lowest hierarchy, or the lowest order are deputed to the ministries of men. Nor is the exception valid through the distinction & mediately & immediately: both, because it is not proven from scripture: and also because the angels of little ones (who are to them guardian angels, namely from the lowest order) immediately learn from God and assist him: Matt. 18.10. Which reason is valid at least to the man and from the hypothesis of the common interpretation of the Papists: which however we will show below is not so solid or certain. VI. Because these things are more Platonic and Ethnic, than theological? For they distinguished their genii into supercelestial, celestial, and subcelestial as can be seen in Iamblichus in the mysteries of the Egyptians p. 180. And Proclus on the Alcibiades of Plato p. 408. From the more recent authors can be compared Eugubinus on perennial philosophy book 8. c. 14. Patricius loc. cit. Compare also the Stoics in Lipsius Physiol. Stoic. book 1. diss. 18. 19. And Vossius book 1. on Idolatry chap. 6. The Rabbis and Kabbalists imitated these, who review these orders, 1. Chajot kadosch. 2. Ophannim. 3. Arelim. 4. Chashmalim. 5. Seraphim. 6. Malachim. 7. Elohim. 8. Bene elohim. 9. Cherubim. Under which they place shim. See these orders explained in Archangelus de Burgo Novo commentary on Kabbalistic dogmas p. 738. And Francis George vol. 6. of sacred problems sect. 5. 5. 173. where he tries to prove them from scripture, but in his way, that is, very absurdly and ineptly. Similar are nearly the speculations of the Gnostics and Valentinians about the eons in Irenaeus, and of the Magi about the Intelligences in Trithemius lib. on the seven Intelligences, and Agrippa in the place cited below. VII. The fathers condemn these curious and vain speculations both tacitly by their silence (for in the first four hundred years there is deep silence about those hierarchies) and expressly, Irenaeus lib. 2. c. 45. where promiscuously and indistinctly he reviews angels, thrones, dominations, powers, innumerables. Nazianzen Oration on Theology at the end. "You see how in this oration, as if seized by a certain vertigo we stick fast, nor can we proceed further, than that we may know that there are certain messengers, and chief messengers, and thrones, and lordships, and principalities, and powers, splendors and grades and troops endowed with the power of mind." Augustine Enchiridion c. 58. "But how that most blessed and supernal society may be, what may be the differences of persons there, so that when all are called angels as if by a general name, as we read in the epistle to the Hebrews: "For to which of the angels did God ever say, Sit at my right hand," for in this way he signified that all are universally called angels: nevertheless there are also archangels there: and whether the same are named virtues under the name of archangel, and thus it was said, "Praise him all his angels, praise him all his virtues," as if it were said, "Praise him all his angels, praise him all his archangels:" and what may be the difference between those four words, by which the Apostle seems to have embraced that whole celestial society itself, saying: "Whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities or powers:" let those who can say if however they can prove what they say, I confess that I am ignorant of these things." and against the Priscillianists to Orosius chap. 11. "But indeed lest by precipitate suspicion we rush into sacrilegious fables, divine

scripture cries out: "Seek not the things that are too high for you, search not into the things that are too strong for you, but always think on the things which the Lord has commanded you," so that in these things rash presumption may seem more to be blamed than cautious ignorance. Certainly the Apostle says: "Whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers." And therefore that there are thrones, dominations, principalities, powers in the celestial apparatuses, I most firmly believe, and that they differ among themselves in something I hold by undoubted faith. But you may despise me, whom you think to be a great teacher, what those things are, and how they differ among themselves I do not know. Nor indeed do I think that ignorance endangers me, just as disobedience if I neglect the precepts of the Lord." (Although in the City of God book 11 and the book on the literal meaning of Genesis chap. 12 he treats some things more copiously; which however do not so agree with the placits of Dionysius and the Scholastics) Cyril of Jerusalem Catechesis 11. "For when they are ignorant of the thrones and dominations, which are the works of Christ: when they are ignorant of the principalities and powers, they curiously attempt to scrutinize the maker himself. Tell me first, O audacious one, how a throne differs from a domination, and then be curious about Christ: tell me, what is a a && principality? what a power? what a virtue? what an angel? and then curiously seek the maker." Bernard sermon on the Feast of Martin (although he also follows the Dionysian fables changed by himself in some things serm. 19. on the Song of Songs.) "thus are the celestial spirits and terrestrial; nor is the distance between them less. Angels, archangels, virtues, principalities, powers, dominations, thrones, cherubim, and seraphim. I know the names well. Perhaps this is the whole. For what more can I, a man of earth, grasp concerning celestial things: a carnal man concerning spiritual and divine things? Nevertheless, even if I am ignorant of what may lie hidden in these so great appellations, I most certainly know this: that something great and wonderful is enclosed and signified under this so great majesty of words." To these add Theodoret on Col. 1. & Rufinus in his exposition of the creed, who state that these names of offices have a relation to men. VIII. Nor is it to be passed over that the Papists do not agree well enough either with themselves or with their associates, especially that they fluctuate very much and are uncertain, because Gregory the Great orders and explains the choirs differently than Dionysius. And from here I think the Council of Trent dared to decree nothing against us, or to indicate heresies about the angels. Bellarmine in the controversies of this time, passed over all the hierarchical ones. Becan. disp. on the offices of the Angels c. 1. sect. 8. 11. 12. 13. 16, ingenuously confesses, that it is uncertain what may be the distinction of the hierarchies: That nothing certain can be had from Dionysius about the series of the orders and their disposition, Much less can it be affirmed, how the orders are distinguished among themselves etc. the rest which are said in this opinion in the cited place, let the reader himself read for we must consult the paper & form of the Theses. Vasquez on Thomas 1. disp. 226. c. 1. [says] that Dionysius was not able to learn these things except through revelation, namely from Paul as he himself testifies c. 6. he adds that Gregory the Great wrote his things from the commemoration of others; that Augustine ingenuously confesses ignorance: The cause was, that the books of Dionysius long suppressed lay hidden.

2. Having finished our demonstration, we subjoin these consectaries. The following disputations and determinations are argued of vanity and curiosity, and fall of their own accord: 1. That this theology is not necessary, or of faith, nor so useful to practice; as indeed Coccius sells it under the name of catholicism in his Treasury, and Baillius proposes it as a catechetical head part. 2.

catechesis qu. 45. and Gabriel Biel on 2. dist. 9. inculcates its use to practice and devotion. "From the part of man it was congruous & necessary, that an angel defend him from the invisible adversary. For because man does not have only a struggle against flesh and blood, but against the rulers of the world and against spiritual wickedness in the celestial places as is said by the Apostle Eph. 6. as many as are invisible enemies. he ought through the opposite to have invisible helpers for his own defense. And because the adversary attacks us from every side. For he seduces reason through cunning. He allures the will through blandishments. The executive corporeal powers: that is the members as in the obsessed he oppresses through violences. Therefore it was necessary that the good angel be specially given for this that he defend man from oppression. That he teach and direct man against fallacy. That he exhort and incite man to good against blandishments. And because the devil was stronger than man and more pertinacious in the intention of malice it was fitting for man that angelic custody be given to him which might suppress the piety of the adversary in the premises." Thus also Pelbartus Themeswar in the Rosary. Which the same from the more recent authors does Joh. Ludwig de la Cerda tract on the Excellence of the Celestial Spirits, where c. 9. he thus speaks: "That the orders of the angels are nine is certain." II. That the disputations of the Scholastics about the angels of the supreme hierarchy, whether they are ever sent to men, are vain and futile: Dionysius denies it heavenly hierarchy c. 13. Gregory the Great lib. 17. Moral. c. 9. Damascene lib. 2. on faith chap. 3. Thomas 1. qu. 112. artic. 2. whom most of the Scholastics follow; and from the most recent Hieron. Medices absolutely denies it. On the contrary others affirm, from whom Corn. a Lapide on Daniel 10. & Heb. 1. & Joh. Lud. de la Cerda chap. 4. laboriously prove it from Heb. 1. Gen. 3. Is. 6. Ezek. 9. Dan. 10. 13. & 12. 1. Luke 1. 19 & 2. 13. compared with Ps. 97. Matt. 25. & 18.10. Apoc. 1.4. & 5.6. Tobit 12. where the angels standing before God, namely the Cherubim, Seraphim are said to have been sent to the Church. He adds there the fathers, Cyprian in the preface to Pope Cornelius, Origen in Philocalia c. 22. Primasius on Heb. 1. Gregory of Nyssa on the Life of Moses, The Author of the meditations under the name of Augustine lib. 3. c. 3. Chrysostom Oration on Good Friday, Jerome in the epistle to Damasus, Athanasius serm. 3. against the Arians. With the aforesaid Jesuit Theologians agree from the same Society Becanus in the Disputation on the Offices of the angels around men. And Vasquez on 1. Disp. 242. Whom Durandus and Scotus preceded, who nevertheless with some of the more recent limit, that they are sent extraordinarily, but not ordinarily. Vasquez although he refutes all the reasons of Thomas, confesses disp. cit. chap. 2. that there is no firm foundation in scripture or the fathers for either opinion, From here let the reader judge, how certain is the faith & devotion, practice & Papistic religion, which is built upon those uncertain conjectures & quodlibets. III. That the diatribes about the distinction of assisting & ministering angels are vain, from Pseudo-Dionysius chap. 7. The Jews make four assistants, Raphael, Gabriel, Uriel, Michael. That distinction also is vain, by which the more recent try to extricate themselves here, That the assistance which says the immediate vision of the divine essence, all the holy angels assist God, but that all do not assist by the assistance, which says the immediate revelation and notice of the secrets of God. Thus Jerome Medices in the formal explication of the Summa of Thomas p. 1. q. 112. art. 3. IV. That those speculations also about the seven angels standing before God are vain; who are the Princes of the celestial court, the presidents of all Churches, the ministers of God, the mediators & governors of men: whose offices Pineda describes on the things of Solomon lib. 5. chap. 15. Joh. Lud. de la Cerda lib. cit.

chap. 5. Cornelius à Lapide on Apoc. 1. where he cites several authors: And with a hamaxis of arguments (none of which is solid) he tries hard to prove this hyper-Dionysian speculation, so that namely some Papistic ayyeλépü- could be palliated by some reason. Their names are reviewed by Serrarius commentary on Tobit c. 12. v. 15. Michael, Gabriel, Raphael, Uriel, Sealthiel, Jehudiel, Barachiel. In the Papacy there is anxious contention about these names. Others refer them to Jewish & Magical fabrications, as it is clear they truly have their origin from Agrippa occult philosophy lib. 3. c. 24. Abbot Trithemius lib. on the Seven intelligences, whom the latter Corn. à Lapide also calls upon for the confirmation of his opinion loc. cit. Nay Pope Zacharias also in the Roman Council condemned the names of the angels (except Michael, Gabriel, Raphael) in the year 745 and called them names of demons: About which decree Joh. Lud. de la Cerda chap. 4. & Delrio disquisition lib. 1. c. 4. qu. 4. & Serrarius loc. cit. sweat very much so that they may reconcile it with their cult of the seven angels. Others think that the seven names & offices are had partly from scripture, partly from tradition, the authority of the Doctors, & revelations. See à Lapide loc. cit. Others elicit and form them by a certain artificial method & Talmudic-Kabbalistic rule, from the scriptures. Agrippa exhibits that art from the Jews l. cit. c. 25. which is nearly twin to the hunting lamp of Pseudo-Dionysius, by which he investigated his nine choirs in the scriptures. The same Agrippa c. 26. 27. indicates two more methods besides. Others make these same seven assisting Spirits the same with the planetary angels, or the intelligences moving the orbs; like Trithemius, Agrippa. And from the Theologians Francis George sacred problems vol. 6. prob. 186. others however doubt, among whom Cornelius à Lapide loc. cit. & Serrarius on Tobit 12. Joh. Lud. de la Cerda C. 4. says this opinion ought deservedly to be suspect. That Pope Zacharias just cited. among the three names, which he excepts, also places Raphael, that was done without judgment. Since no other origin of it is had except from Jewish fables, & the book of Tobit sprinkled with those fables. In Bereshit Rabba sect. 48, the names of the angels are said to have ascended from Babel, namely Raphael, Michael, Gabriel. IV. That the special cult of the seven angels is not only superstitious, but also from the uncertain hypothesis of the Papal faith vain and uncertain, as the presidents of the whole world, specifically of men, who namely through themselves or through others sent by them defend us from the seven capital vices, exhort to the contrary virtues, resist temptations, remove occasions of sin etc. as indeed here Serrarius, de la Cerda, & à Lapide philosophize loc. cit. In this last old age of the world the Papacy fabricates wonderful & new fables about the Septangelic government & cult. In Palermo in Sicily in 1516 an ancient effigy & ascribed names of the seven archangels were found. To Antonio Duca a priest in the year 1527 it was revealed that the Baths of Diocletian in Rome are the place of the seven spirits standing before God: (moreover those revelations were published at Venice, & then at Rome in the year 1555.) from here it happened that that place in the year 1551 was dedicated to the Blessed Virgin of the angels, that is, surrounded & girded by the seven angels. In the year 1555 by another vision it was signified to the same priest that those Baths were to be consecrated into a temple to the honor of the seven angels, Wherefore Pius IV. took care that a temple be built there and he dedicated it μónsparabias, in the year 1561 and decorated it with the Cardinalatial title. The same temple was afterwards illustrious with new privileges & ornaments by Pius V. & Gregory XIII. From that time through the invocation of these seven angels, who are worshipped at S. Maria of the angels, many energumeni are said to have been freed: if there is any faith in the Chronicle of the said temple, & the Jesuit Cornelius à Lapide, who read it. There can be

compared Victorellus on the Ministries of the angels c. 21. Anton. Spinellus tract. on the Feasts & Temples of the Mother of God, Pancirolus in the Hidden Treasures of Rome c. on S. Maria of the angels & the little book on the 7 angels published at Naples in the year 1594. But so that you may know how firm is the foundation of this temple & cult of the seven angels, the Chronicles of the same temple & the Chronicles of the order of S. Francis part. 4. l. 6. c. 30. report that to Blessed Amadeus in the year 1460 their names reviewed above by us were revealed, but Cornelius à Lapide notes that besides this revelation, there are also had there & many others partly paradoxical partly formed to Scotistic Theology, so that not without cause (says A Lapide) a grave man said: The Angel of Blessed Amadeus was a Scotist. And these indeed and similar revelations found the celebrated angelic devotions in Sicily, Naples, Rome, & through all Italy: as also the Imperatorial sodality instituted to the seven angels at Palermo: besides the decisions of the Doctors, who approve these seven names, such as Alcazar, Galatinus on the Apocalypse. Salmeron vol. 3. c. 3. Masselius l. 3. on the Blessed virgin c. 5. Spinellus, Victorellus, and others already cited. About the Exorcisms & benedictions through these seven names we will properly treat in the disputation on Magic, on Superstition, on Exorcism, on Benedictions, & on the Antidote of the Plague. As for the cult of the angels whether considered in general or according to the properties of the hierarchies & orders (which Drexelius, de la Cerda, & similar practitioners just cited. trumpet forth ex professo) it is examined in the chapter on Idolatry. & ex professo by Stephen Clotz the Strasbourg theologian tract. on Angelolatry. To the cult refer the Temples dedicated to the Angels (about which la Cerda c. 49.). & the Feasts, about which in the Disputation on Feasts. V. That the disquisition is futile & most vain whether those seven princes are from the order of the Seraphim or from the order of the Principalities etc. See Salmeron, Vasquez, Serrarius loc. cit. & Cornelius à Lapide on Ezek. 1. & Daniel 7. Apoc. 1. fencing like Andabatae, who however the last conquered by the difficulty of the thing, & the contradictions confesses it is not clear. After him however Joh. de la Cerda book cit. c. 5. states, that they are certainly from the Seraphim. Nor is it a wonder since in the same place he also dares to determine not only against the judgment of Rangolius on 1 Kings c. 20. & Baronius vol. 9. year 745. n. 3. but also of Pope Zacharias himself and the Roman Council it seems, he says, the Council wanted to condemn these latter angels (among whom Uriel) in hatred of Adelbrecht the heretic, although otherwise there is mention of Uriel among the Catholics in a good & catholic sense, and he adduces there 4 Esdras, Isidore lib. 7. etymol. c. 5. The Ethiopian Mass vol. 4. biblioth. of the fathers fol. 120. Ambrose lib. 3. on the Faith to Gratian c. 2. VI. No less futile is the disputation about the four Cherubim Ezek. 1. Whether because the care of sublunary things befits a quaternary, or there are four orders of angels, who preside over the globe & the church, or there are four princes, counselors, & as it were prefects of God Michael, Gabriel, Raphael, Uriel: which last Pineda on the things of Solomon lib. 5. c. 4. Alcazar on Apoc. 4. Corn. à Lapide on Ezek. 1. prove as most literal & genuine, for these four names are had in the Ethiopian Mass, & were found in the sepulcher of Maria the wife of the Emperor Honorius inscribed on a golden plate, the witness being Marlianus in the topography of the city of Rome l. 5. c. 21. VII. That the theologems about the angel Michael & Raphael are uncertain & vain & the Papal cult built upon them. About the former see A Lapide & Lorinus commentary on the epistle of Jude. About the latter hear Ludovicus Ballester, in the Onomatography under the word Raphael: "Hence therefore the Church sings in the hymn to the infant Michael,

O Christ,
Send from heaven Raphael the angel, the physician of salvation to us, so that he may heal all the sick, and likewise direct our actions.

In S. Augustine serm. 226. Raphael himself says: I am the minister of healing, God is the author of health." About Raphael the master of the sentences refers two opinions lib. 2. dist. 10. one, that he is from the higher orders: the other from the lowest, & D. Thomas follows this in that place saying that Michael is from the order of the Princes, Gabriel from the Archangels, Raphael from the Angels. There was not lacking who wrote that Raphael was the proper & tutelary Angel of Tobit, others taught from the order of the virtues. indeed it seems clear that he was not the proper, or even the guardian of Tobit, or Sara, because he was not present to Tobit himself, or Sara before, but was then sent to them, when both had poured out their prayers to the Lord, & chap. 12. he does not say he is their tutelary Angel, but one from the seven, who stand before the Lord: but of what order he may be, is less clearly signified. Nevertheless it is most probable that he was an Archangel, & was one of those seven who stand before God. Then the ancients seem to be in the same opinion: For lib. on the promises part 2. chap. 39. S. Prosper, says, "Raphael, the Archangel sent by God, ministered not only solaces to the captives, but also celestial benefits to those praying." Similarly D. Severius Bishop of Minorca in the Epistle on the conversion of the Jews, which can be read in the year of the Lord 418 in Cardinal Baronius vol. 5. of the annals, calls him Archangel. D. Isidore also calls Raphael the Archangel origins l. 7. c. 4. The Ethiopian Mass also just as Michael & Gabriel, so also constitutes Raphael one from the greater & more splendid Angels. The Septuagint interpreters also signify this, while they call him not simply the Angel Raphael, but the great Angel, and thus make him one of the principal from the Angels. VIII. That whatever the Scholastics on Thomas 1. qu. 63. 7. and the Pontifical commentators on the cited place usually foolishly say about Lucifer the Prince of the angels from Is. 14. Job 41. is inept & adoroga. IX. And at once falls, whatever they inquire about the angels apostatizing from each hierarchy; & about the hierarchies and orders of the demons: which we touched on in the Disputation on demons. X. That the philosophemes, about the genera of the angels, whether there are several intermediate, or only one proximate genus, which see in the Scholastics on 1. qu. 50. a. 4. & Suarez disput. Metaph. 35. sect. 1. n. 43. 44. are clearly curious & uncertain. XI. Likewise this question also is vain, Whether the orders will remain after the day of judgment: about which on 1. qu. 108. art. 7. XII. That whatever is determined, about the illumination & purgation from ignorance, which the superior angels are said to provide to the inferiors, is uncertain: about which on 2. dist. 9. & 11. & on 1. Thomas question 109. from the more recent authors laboriously Vasquez disp. 216. 217. XIII. That the disputation is vain, Whether the superior angels understand through more universal species, than the inferiors; about which on 1. qu. 55. art. 3. XIV. As also that one, whether the distinction of orders & hierarchies is from nature, on qu. 108. art. 4. XV. Most vain, & at the same time most absurd, Whether men can so merit, that they are assumed to the orders of the angels; on the same qu. art. XVI. That the demonstration or imitation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy & the Papal monarchy is sought in vain & ineptly from this hierarchical Theology, as also the seven deacons & the seven cardinals: About the first see solidly disputing Chamier vol. 2. l. 9. c. 11. About the

second it must be treated in the controversy on the equality of ministers, & on the Episcopate. About the third Lapide trifles on Apoc. 1. which to have indicated is to have refuted.

4. We will dissolve the objections of the adversaries in the disputation itself, here only for the sake of the opponents we indicate them. I. Object. is from Col. 1. & Eph. 1. compared with Ezek. 22. Is. 6. 1 Thess. 4. Gen. 3. Jude v. 9. where the remaining names occur: which is an argument common to the followers of Pseudo-Dionysius. Various interpretations indeed of the passage to the Colossians 1. & Ephesians 1. are brought forward, which we will not examine here. See the commentaries of Gomarus & Davenant on the epistle to the Colossians. We at least acknowledge there indefinitely some distinction of angels, both on account of the disjunctive particle re; and because we see mention made of princes Dan. 10. 21. & archangel 1 Thess. 4. 16. Jude v. 9. But we deny that it can be known definitely from those passages, what sort, & how great that difference may be. II. Obj. Baillius adds in catechesis part 2. qu. 45. the passage Matt. 11. v. 11. Coccius 1 Pet. 3. 22, & under the same title: The sacred writings assert, he comprehends citations of the Liturgies of Peter, Mark, James. How inept, nay how imposturous this method of theology. III. Obj. The Scholastics bring forward sufficiently fig-like reasons & congruities on 2. dist. 9. among others Gabriel: of which this is one: The distinction of hierarchies is taken according to the properties, which Dionysius posits, which are knowledge, order, action. Or otherwise this distinction is taken & more clearly according to the three states & offices, which are the state of contemplatives, & of actives. Thomas in his second writing on 2. dist. 9. art. 1. ingeniously indeed, but without scriptures excogitated the sufficiency of this distribution. "Those who participate in divine things in one general way, are of one hierarchy. But now, he says, the first hierarchy perceives the divine mysteries which pertain to the ministry of the angels, in its very fountain, that is, God: & on account of this its orders are named with respect to God. The second perceives the divine mysteries in certain universal reasons: wherefore also its orders express power not limited. The third perceives them in special reasons: whence its orders have power limited to man, or Province." He deduces the distinction of orders in the same place from diverse acts. First, "Because there are three respects of the rational creature to God, 1. to be inhabited by him through grace. 2. to be borne into him through knowledge. 3. to be borne into him through love: hence thrones, cherubim, seraphim." Then "because three things are required for someone, who has general power of ruling some multitude 1. to dispose in operating. 2. to fortify the command through the strength of power. 3. To execute the things which pertain to the office of government: Hence dominations, virtues, powers." Finally "because the acts are 1. either over one nation. 2. or over one man, concerning those things which pertain to the nation. 3. or over one man, concerning those things which regard him singularly: & hence principalities, archangels, angels." But however ingeniously these may be proposed, nevertheless it must be said about them that of the Scholastic philosophers: "Sufficiencies are often insufficient." IV. Obj. From the authority of Dionysius in the celestial hierarchy chap. 6. 7. 10. whom they pretend to have learned those mysteries from Paul. But that Pseudo-Dionysius whoever he is, has been sufficiently detected by our men (namely Illyricus in the catalog of witnesses of the truth book 1. Beza on Acts 17. Scaliger on the Emendation of the times book 6. page 539. but especially & fully by Rivetus in the Sacred Critic, & by Cocus in the censure of the fathers); & before them by Erasmus in the response to the Parisian Censures title 31. p. 181. Cajetan, likewise also Valla on Acts 17; it is not that I

should do what has been done here. Let the authors just cited be consulted. Or if someone studies compendiously, Rivetus alone. Surely if indeed Dionysius had heard from Paul (which Cornelius à Lapide boldly affirms on Eph. 1.) those things which he had heard & seen caught up to the third heaven 2 Cor. 12. it would surely be a wonder. 1. That Paul was not able to write or speak them. 2. nay also to have prohibited Col. 2. 3. to have interwoven into the Pauline doctrine so many vain, false things, repugnant to the scriptures & historical truth, which see noted by the cited censors. 4. finally to have used such a style, which agrees with the writings of Paul as well as the style of Pindar, or Aristotle, in the books of physics axpod & the logical Organon. Then, Dionysius is not a writer sós, nor has anyone of the Papists dared to equate him with Paul or the apostles. Thirdly, the said Dionysius himself did not believe he learned these things from Paul: otherwise he would not have fluctuated in the interpretation of scripture, (as chap. 6.) nor would he have left Timothy the freedom of dissenting; which he does chap. 13. "These things," he says, "I likewise hand down to you. It will now be your spiritual & discreet knowledge, either to absolve one of these causes from every scruple of ambiguity, & to prefer that honor to the other, as being supported by consonant reason & perhaps by truth, or to find something from yourself; or to learn from another, what may be nearer to the most pure truth etc." He adorns the book on the divine names with a similar epilogue: "Moreover if we have said these things either less rightly, or less fully, & have erred from the truth either in the whole or in part etc." Fourthly, Granting it not conceded that the genuine Areopagite is the author of this doctrine, nevertheless no more faith should be given to him than to Papias, who from the institution & tradition of the apostles was thought to have drawn the chiliastic opinion, about which see our Disputation on the Millennial Kingdom. Fifthly not even the Papists themselves acquiesce in the authority of Dionysius: who in the explication of the orders with him left behind adhere to Gregory the Great: especially they refute his opinion about the non-mission of the first hierarchy to men from scripture & the fathers: as can be seen in Vasquez, A Lapide, de la Cerda, & others cited above. Martin Delrio in a peculiar little book against Scaliger titled Vindication of the Areopagite, & in the Magical disquisitions book 6. chap. 2. at the end contends sharply for this Dionysius, & produces witnesses, who acknowledge the Areopagite as the author of the hierarchical work, Blessed Maximus, George Pachymerius, Joh. Syneopolitanus, Mich. Syngellus, Photius & Theodore the presbyter in Photius in the library, who in a peculiar book wanted to vindicate this hierarchical writing for the Areopagite, Andrew of Crete, John of Damascus, Suidas, Anastasius of Sinai, Anastasius of Nicaea, Anastasius the librarian, Liberatus in the breviary, Billius Prumeus book 1. of sacred observations, Hilduinus the Frank, Gregory the Great, Pope Martin & Martyr, Agatho. But how easy it would be with a selection made, to remove most of them from antiquity, others from ecclesiastical authority, even in the Roman Church, & consequently from giving testimony. Then with the words of each one inspected & examined, certain ones from their own fig-like & vain little reasons or conjectures would be apprehended as witnesses too credulous, & consequently too light. Finally it would have to be seen whether the more ancient Chrysostom, Nazianzen, Dionysius of Corinth, who are said by those more recent witnesses to have acknowledged these writings of Dionysius, or to have taken many things from them, understood these same writings, which today exist; & specifically all those things about the celestial hierarchy. Not to say anything, about the silence & hesitation of the ancient fathers, around the said hierarchy, as I showed above thesis 1. near the end. But there is no need to laboriously hunt down those trifles: they do not yet dare to refer

the writings of Dionysius among the canonical or authentic; or to determine & sanction his opinion as about the faith or a necessary & common ecclesiastical dogma. V. Obj. From the authority of Ignatius epistle to the Trallians. But what should be decided about the epistles of Ignatius, Cocus & Rivetus just now praised by us have taught & most recently James Usher a theologian of vast reading & erudition & most versed in ecclesiastical antiquity, in the new edition of the epistles of Ignatius in the year 1644, where in the prolegomena chap. 3. & 15. with invincible arguments & the testimonies of the adversaries themselves he shows that those epistles were corrupted in many things & indeed by a heretical man. The same notes that this passage cited for the hierarchy, Indes vaλufque μals, does not exist in the ancient English codex, which contains a peculiar Latin version of the epistles of Ignatius. Besides he observes in his annotations on the cited epistle p. 23. that the proposition of Ignatius according to the versions, of Morellius & Verlenius is negative, but not affirmative. For thus Morellius; "For I not just as I am bound, so can I understand heavenly things." And Verlenius: "For also I, not insofar as I am bound, can even understand heavenly things." And Petrus Halloixius apology for the writings of Ignatius chap. 2. "From his innate humility he had said, that he could not understand heavenly things just as he was able to be bound: namely as the apostles, to whom both happened; that they were both bound by tyrants, & understood. For that draugif signifies, I can also, thus I can." Which sense is easiest, & by far the most obvious, & by far the most agreeable to the modesty of the most holy martyr. Otherwise it is not found, to what that particle of negation & is referred. Add that in this interpolated text of Ignatius there occurs Rones, (diwvwn Te μsgadómls, i, the magnificences of the aeons), which savors neither of scripture, nor of ecclesiastical antiquity, but of the heretical deliriums of the Gnostics & Valentinus. About which see Irenaeus, Tertullian, & Augustine in the book on heresies. With this argument among others Nic. Vedelius was convicting this assumption of the interpolator of the epistle to the Trallians, before some years Exercise 8. on the cited epistle. We conclude therefore, that the bold hierarchical mythology of the Papists, can by no means be established by the authority of Ignatius: since Ignatius himself in the same cited place denies that he can understand those heavenly things about the orders of the angels, and since he explained them there. VI. Object. From the constitutions of Clement book 8. c. 12. Resp. But that those writings of Clement are spurious has already been proven enough by our men (Rivetus & Cocus), with the proper confession of the adversaries added. Most recently it was shown by Usher in the prolegomena to the epistles of Ignatius chapters 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, that both the Clementine & the Ignatian writings were corrupted by the same interpolator, VII. Object. From Gregory the Great book 32. on Job c. 25. who argue from Ezek. 28. 13. & Eph. 1. & the said Dionysius. Resp. because his pseudoepigraphical writings are manifestly refuted it is easily agreed how much his authority ought to avail here. Add that the Papists do not follow it, as said above. VIII. Object. in the Catholic Treasury Coccius Adds Irenaeus Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria & others in great number: but of whom a part do not even have anything about the Areopagitic angelography; others do not come under the name of the fathers even in the Papacy, such as e.g. Lombard, Otto of Freising, Caesarius of Heisterbach Bernard of Siena, Torquemada, Henry Gorichem etc. IX. Object. Specifically they prove that appendix, about the seven angels Princes, who are as it were more universal administrators of mundane things who nevertheless are sent sometimes to more universal affairs: A Lapide on Apocalypse 1. & de la Cerda book cit. c. 5. First, from the testimonies of scripture, Apoc. 1. 1. compared with 5. & 8. 15. & 16. & 17. from Zech. 3. & Tobit

12. Then, from the authority of the fathers. Thirdly, from revelations. Fourthly from certain reasons, Fifthly, from the consensus of the Rabbis, & philosophers: they ought to have added, & of the Magi. Sixthly, De la Cerda besides the seven names indicates also others, Jeremiel, from 4 Esdras c. 4. Eremiel, Saniel, Azael from book 2. of the Sibylline songs, Ramiel, & Phaniel from Bede in the collectanea. But to transcribe & refute those reasons, or rather inanities minutely into these theses the paper does not allow. I only note the most wise admonition of Cornelius à Lapide, which I would that both he himself & all the Papal Heptangelic worshippers, Exorcists etc. would well remember; commentary on Ezekiel 1. 4. "Thus those (he designates the Jews & Cornelius Agrippa l. 3. c. 47.) either Magi, or figuli of names & portents, whom I know not what Uriel, Magiel but either Vaniel & Stultiel agitates. For scripture equally as the church, acknowledges only three names of angels, Michael, Gabriel, Raphael: and it is ignorant of these familiarities of the fathers with the angels." How these can be reconciled with the book of de la Cerda, & his portents about the Heptangelic cult on Apocalypse 1. (of which we made mention above) & with the Scourge & club of Demons of Jerome Mengus, & other Exorcistic things, let those see whose interest it is.

On Guardian Angels

5. The offices and ministries of angels towards other creatures, especially towards men, are often described in many ways, but for the most part dve poss. First they make some Guardians universal, namely the seven angels about whom we have already spoken. Besides those there are particular Guardians, and they are threefold 1. either of any creatures, and for particular effects: thus diverse orders (says Thomas from Gregory 1. quest. 113. article 2.) are deputed to diverse kinds of things, e.g. powers to ward off demons, virtues to work miracles in bodily things etc. II. or of communities or nations, Provinces, cities Thomas 1. qu. 113. a. 2. De la Cerda chap. 31. tries to prove by the testimonies of Doctors, revelations, examples and histories, that they preside over kingdoms, cities, walls, the law of Bishops etc. The same chap. 20. proves that they are the presidents of wars. III. Or of individual men, who are specially called guardian angels: about whom they posit these things as undoubted 1. That a good guardian angel is set over individual men; to each one, I say, as much to the non-predestined as to the predestined, as much to the Gentiles as to the Christians: even to Antichrist himself. See the Scholastics on 2. dist. 11, on 1. qu. 113. art. 5. And de la Cerda chap. 39. where he extends it to the virgin Mary and Adam before the fall, and only excepts Christ. And this is the common opinion of the scholastics and more recent authors: except Altisiodorensis lib. 2. summa and Argentinus and others who on 2. dist. 11. & the said Dionysius c. 4. of the celestial hierarchy. So that from here you may see how much the authority of Dionysius is to the Papists, when it pleases them otherwise. 2. That also an evil angel is assigned to individual men, but deputed by the prince of the Demons: thus › Lombard, 2. dist. 11. & Bonaventure and William on the cited place. Moreover they call this demon exercising. 3. But whether the good angel is given from conception itself, only from nativity, or from baptism is disputed on Thomas loc. cit. He himself affirms the second, and Vasquez from the more recent authors follows him disp. 145. c. 1. Bonaventure however prefers the first, and with him de la Cerda chap. 39. 4. That that guardian

remains up to the end of life. 5. That the same never wholly leaves man. For although he leaves him in place (namely when he is in heaven) nevertheless he never leaves him as to the effect of custody. Thus Thomas qu. 113. art. 6. 6. That he sometimes permits that man lapse into the evil of fault or punishment. 7. That nevertheless he is not saddened, when something evil happens to men. 8. That all guardians are from the lowest order. 9. They variously enumerate the offices or effects of custody on Thomas qu. cit. & on 2. dist. 11. And de la Cerda tract. cit. at length. Gerson part 3. tract. on the Magnificat enumerates seven others four as Bonaventure; others five; as Cornelius à Lapide on Exodus chap. 23. or eight, as the same A Lapide on Matt. 18. 10. others twelve, as Gabriel on 2. dist. 11. who collects them from the scriptures. The first is to rebuke for offenses Judg. 2. The second, to absolve from the chains of sins, Acts 12. which must be understood dispositively. The third to take away things impeding from good, which is figured Exod. 12. where he struck the firstborn of Egypt. The fourth to ward off demons Tobit 12. The fifth, to teach and illuminate within Dan. 9. The sixth, to reveal secrets Gen. 18. The seventh, to console the afflicted, Tobit 5. 6. The eighth to strengthen in the way of God 1 Kings 19 where he says to Elijah, Arise and eat etc. The ninth, to lead and conduct in the way, Tob. 5. The tenth, to cast down enemies Is. 37. The eleventh, to mitigate temptations Gen. 32. from the wrestling of Jacob, & the blessing of the angel. The twelfth, to carry prayers, Tob. 12. De la Cerda c. 22. 24. adds other special effects around the cross of the Lord, & the eucharist. The same c. 21. enumerates some special effects around death: and tries to prove by examples from Cantipratensis, Mirror of examples & similar fabulists. Anthony Dauroultius in the Flowers of Examples or in the historical catechism c. 3. l. 43. adds this effect, that they provide the light of knowledge, solace, and aid in purgatory to the soul, whose custody is committed to them. Cornelius à Lapide on Acts 12. adds, that sometimes they put on the person & appearance of their clients, and take care of their affairs in this life, supply their place, when they are absent, and do nothing of the sort, nay often are unaware, or basely neglect. The same Thyraeus has on the appearances 2 c. 10. Who the same book 1. c. 12. hands down that they assume the person & appearance of the dead. About which in the disp. on Specters. Let him see the examples brought forward by both from fabulous writers to whom there is leisure. And let him compare the explication of those mysteries and collation with the Ethnic theology in Delrio lib. 2. disquisition qu. 26. sect. 2. Nor must that effect be omitted, that sometimes they punish the good & just with bodily punishments. Lorinus proves this on Ps. 77. (78 to us) v. 49. by the example of Frances of Rome related among the saints by Paul V. (see the Bullarium), whom he says to have had an assessing angel, sometimes a monitor & corrector, with even some punishment inflicted. Cornelius à Lapide on Jeremiah c. 51. v. 8. from Origen hands down, that the angels desert the impious soul which despised their corrections & inspirations in life, in agony. Feuardentius most diffusely expounds all the particular effects of the guardian angels in the appendix to the book of Alphonsus de Castro 1. on heresies. Besides these things already noted, the Scholastics Problematically ask 1. how the angel carries the predestined or faithful. 2. Whether also individual angels are set over individual things, or at least the genera of individuals. And Thomas indeed here judges the affirmative probable qu. 113. art. 2. There are also other disquisitions of this kind, which collected see in Themesvar lib. 2. rosary, under the word angel sect. 10. & Joseph Angles in the theological flowers quest. on 2. sentences part. 1. dist. 11, quest. only & Barthol. Sibylla in the mirror of pilgrim quest. decade 2. p. 426. & thence. But the Cabalists & Magi more fully unfold this philosophy, & from them Agrippa on occult

philosophy lib. 3. chap. 20. 21. 22. And these things thus far concerning the tutelary or guardian angels according to the Papists. Who make this theology about the guardian angel assigned to each man from nativity necessary. See Binsfeld the suffragan of Trier on the confession of witches prelude 17. p. 186. Where nevertheless he deceitfully changes the terms, & perverts the state of the controversy, so that he could calumniate Calvin with some color. For thus he has the theorem: "Just as to each man from the origin of his nativity, for protection & custody, a good Angel is deputed, according to the sacred letters, & the doctrine of the holy Fathers: Thus Nus also one evil spirit is destined to each one for exercise and temptation, as the Doctors think." But the commentary, which is added, thus has it: "Calvin calumniates the custody of the Angels in the institutions sect. 7. c. 14. & on chap. 18. Matt. & elsewhere, whom men of the same grain follow: but the Catholic Church firmly embraces the tutelage of the Angels." With this Lapide nearly agrees on Matt. 18. 10. & Acts 12. Where see. Especially Suarez lib. 6. on the angels chap. 17. where he cites several authors. Let also Renatus Laurentius on Tertullian on the Soul be seen, & Sirenius lib. 5. on Fate chap. 4. which two compare with the theology of the Gentiles. Which was also done ex professo by Steuchus Eugub. l. 7. on perennial philosophy c. 18. Lorinus in his commentary on Ps. 91. remarkably hides the state of the controversy, and thus thinks he has found an occasion of calumniating our side of Calvin: "But this whole place convinces that the angels take care of us, if any other, from many, against the error of Calvin, who laughs at it as pagan doctrine, and through it malignly extenuates the grace of God, the devil by this craft tries to diminish our confidence in some part, to fight with all scripture; that it is a false & profane comment." From one know all, & all the rest. Let the places of Calvin noted in the margin be inspected, & let the reader judge, whether he said these things even with the least appearance about the protection & custody of the angels, or truly about the two genii assigned to each man from nativity, about the religious worship of the guardian angels. More candidly & modestly Maldonatus on Matt. 18. 10. "That also is handed down not only by perpetual tradition, but by more than probable testimonies of scripture that individual Christians have individual good angels etc." And afterwards: "The Calvinists however, as they are most wise in their own judgment, believe nothing: they only say that all the angels are the guardians of all men etc." There are some of ours who with the rest of the consectaries set aside admit as a probable opinion, about the good guardian angel assigned to individual men, at least, to the faithful, among whom Zanchius on the Work of Creation lib. 3. c. 13. And recently Alsted ex professo defended that opinion in the supplement of Chamier, on the Church lib. 5. c. 7. Most recently also Vossius lib. 1. on Idolatry c. 7. indicates not obscurely to incline to the same. Grotius in his notes on Matt. 18. 10. seems to stand for this opinion: in the end however he abandons it or leaves it in the middle. Each one seems to be moved in some way by the authority of the fathers (of whom they cite some there, more the Papists indicated above). We nevertheless embrace the opinion of Calvin in the Institutes lib. 1. chap. 14. §. 7. & commentary on Ps. 91. & on Matt. 18. and of the other reformed, who reject that opinion as vain & curious; and we think that something from the Platonic philosophy, & the mythological theology of the Gentiles adhered here to the ancient fathers.

The reasons for this opinion are. I. Because scripture commonly ascribes our custody to the angels Ps. 34. 8. & 91. 11. compared with Matt. 4. 6. Heb. 1. 14. Luke 15. 10. & 16. 22. II. Because the particular effects of the guardian angels are not proven from the scriptures: nay some are d repugnant to the scriptures, as the carrying & offering of our prayers: which the

Antagonist of the Papists, namely Reynolds solidly proved in the censure of the Apocrypha vol. 1. prelection 62. Who is to be seen. From the most recent writers Stephen Clotz the Strassburg theologian treats diffusely about the interpretation of the passage Apoc. 8. v. 3. 4. 5. in disputation 12 on Angelolatry. III. From the absurd consequent: because it is agreeable neither to reason nor to scripture, that it should be said that to the unfaithful, blasphemers (from whom God has departed) the guardian angel is present, up to the hour of death. IV. Because this opinion makes more, than the opposite one, for ayyeλo@ pnoxéia, or at least for the affectation of familiarity with one's own angel; likewise with the angels or genii of place, nation etc. and thus the lapse from here is easier into idolatry or Magical superstitions. V. Because it agrees with the Ethnic, Mohammedan, Rabbinic-cabalistic Theology. About the Rabbinic-cabalistic commentaries on the tutelary, genethlialogical, of childbirth, of pestilence, of death etc. angels, let Buxtorf's Jewish synagogue be consulted. And the Cabalistic authors published by Pistorius. And Fr. George the Venetian in the sacred problems vol. 6. sect. 5. §. 174. p. 373 "What are the offices of the Angels? Does not Daniel report, that some of the Angels are assistants, namely to the divine tribunal, continually praising God: but others ministering to him, and to us of course. To which ministering ones the assisting respond. Moreover of these some preside over the four night watches: about which Christ makes mention saying: And if he comes in the second & third watch, namely of the night. But Matthew and Mark make mention of the fourth watch of the night, saying: But in the fourth watch of the night Jesus came to them, walking on the sea, But in the first two watches, when there will be a hard influx, and a hard judgment, which the Hebrews call Din, fiercer Angels from the North side preside: but in the latter two the milder, namely the Southern. Others also are set over the four year watches, through the four stations of the Sun, distinguished from hinge namely to hinge: as we have discussed elsewhere. But others preside over the Planets, whose names we have mentioned in the Harmony. Others also preside over the twelve signs: about which John makes mention saying, that in the gates, that is the signs, which (as Plato says) are the gates of heaven, are twelve Angels: And, since some of those signs are Oriental, some Occidental, some Meridional, some Northern: Hence John himself adding says: From the east three gates, from the North three gates, from the South three gates, and from the West three gates. But other Angels are addicted to our protection & custody. Others preside over living things. Others preside over plants: others over stones, which are called precious: as the more secret Theologians & true Sages affirm. Others also preside over war: others over peace. Others preside over Kings & Prelates. But others are set over provinces & regions: which differ in manners, according to the difference of their guardians. And Angels are so set over all things & operations: that God may work all things in this lower World through the ministry of the Angels. Therefore Paul not ignorant of these sacraments says: All are ministering spirits, sent to minister." Let these be compared with the Magical theology, which agrees with the Rabbinic-Cabalistic & ancient Chaldaic, see Agrippa on occult philosophy l. 2. c. 58. 59. & l. 3. c. 10. 16. 17. 20. 21. 22. 24. etc. And Abbot Trithemius in the epistle to Emperor Maximilian. And what Gilbert Gaulmin everywhere indicates in his notes on the Rabbinic book on the life & death of Moses. The Mohammedan theology, agrees here with the Rabbinic, as having been drawn from those dregs. Phil. Lonicerus vol. 1. of the Turkish chronicles chap. 24. "This," he says, "is the firm opinion of all Mahometans, that to individual infants, as soon as they have been born, two angels are added, of whom one guards the right, the other the left, and are their perpetual guardians through all life." See the same chap. 19. about the two angels, who

examine the dead already a fourth part of an hour buried & vivified by a new spirit divinely infused about the life led before. That this theology agrees with the Gentiles, Binsfeld confesses loc. cit. "To this," he says, "doctrine the Platonists accede. Apuleius wrote many things about the Demon of Socrates. It is handed down by the doctrine of the Egyptians, that a Demon is assigned by the presiding God of the Demons according to the plan of the proposed life, not by a star or Planet: which Porphyry is thought to have felt, as Iamblichus is the author." Coelius Rhodiginus, in his Ancient Lessons book 1 chapter 31, reports the various opinions of the Philosophers about the Demons assigned to each one. Hence that beautiful example in Plutarch in the book on the Fortune of the Romans. When Mark Antony and Augustus, joined by a singular friendship and goodwill, having obtained leisure were often accustomed to pass the time between themselves with diverse sports, and Mark Antony always went away conquered: A certain one famous in the skill of divining among them, began to admonish him thus boldly. O Antony, what do you have to do with that youth? Flee him, and avoid him. Indeed you are more illustrious, also older in age, but also the commander of more, you have endured many wars, you are more outstanding in the experience of things. But I know not, in what way the Demon of that one dreads your Demon. Indeed your fortune is ample from itself, but the fortune of the youth flatters itself. But unless you will have gone far away, it appears about to defect to him. It can be doubtful: Whether with the place changed, the Demon also is changed? For some think it absurd, as the same Coelius reports in the same book chapter 32, that one Demon so comes into bondage, that he does not depart from us even a finger's breadth, however far spaces of lands we may have gone: Who also are in that opinion, from the same root, that a man is more fortunate in one place, than in another. Because since in any decury of Demons, there are many discernicula of dignity and virtue, with the places varied there are various events of things. Thus he will be happier and more fortunate in a place, who will have obtained a more powerful Demon, more unhappy, who an inferior and weaker one, as is shown by the example related by Plutarch. And thus indeed Binsfeld compares the Papal theology with the Ethnic, Which Delrio also does book 2 of the disquisitions on Magic question 26 section 1. Whom see. And the celebrated verses of Menander in Ammianus Marcellinus book 21 make faith of this thing,

Απανκ δαίμων ανεεὶ τῷγενομένῳ
Απαλονια μυςαγωτό βίας.

And the saying of Arrian in Epictetus book 1 chapter 14. Επιτροπον έκασῳπροέση σε τὸν ἐκά - σε δαίμονα , και παρέδωκεν φυλάττειν αυτὸν αὐτῷ , καὶ τουτον ακοίμητον τα απαρᾳλογιςον.

And Maximus of Tyre dissertation 26 and 27 on the demon of Socrates, through the whole. So much from dissertation 26 at the end p. 270 I note these things, because they especially agree with the Papal Theology: "Thus those whom they called demons, are between the Gods and men. These are they who offer themselves to mortals, address mortals: who turn in the middle nature of men, and abundantly are accustomed to furnish whatever the human race desires. Their number is great.

For thrice ten thousand are they through the most fertile realms of the earth.
The immortal race, the servants of Jove.

Of these some heal diseases, others give counsel in doubtful matters, others announce hidden things, others are an aid in practicing the arts; others are companions of journeys. Again others are urbane, others are rustic: others are marine, others are terrestrial. Again another inhabits another body. This one Socrates, that one Plato, that one Pythagoras. That one Xenon, that one Diogenes. This one terrible, that one most loving of men, this one civil, that one military. Finally as many as are the characters of men: so many also are the kinds of demons:

For often in the likeness of foreign settlers, the Gods,
Assuming every form, visit the cities of men."

In this however he dissents from the Papal angelography, that he assigns no genius to the impious: For he concludes the preceding words with this limitation: "Ear &E Moxmagi'rdiens Lugar' , a'rés à¨v xì àª« salni. But truly if you will have shown me an impious soul, know that it has neither an inhabitant, nor a president of its life." Here refer what they have about the genius of each one, about the spirits apiegos, about the demon of Socrates, about the Genius of Antony, in Plutarch in his life. As for the tutelary angels of places, nations etc., you will find them in the Theology of the Gentiles; about the presiding Gods, the wayside, tutelary, genii of place, lares, penates etc. and what Plato with his own everywhere philosophizes about the Gods and Demons: for Theodoret observes that they are our angels in the Cure of Greek Affections, sermon on Matter and the World. Compare Eugubinus perenn. philos. lib. 5 c. 12. And the writers of Antiquities, Gyraldus, Rosinus and Dempster, Natalis Comes, and others where they treat of the Gods of the Gentiles, and of the genii. About the genii paredri see Lipsius' Stoic physiology lib. 1. chap. 19. Delrio loc. cit. and Erasmus Schmidius' commentary on Pindar's Olympians p. 322. and 19 Pythians p. 118. Vossius lib. 1. on Idolatry chap. 7. 11. And Rhodiginus in the place just cited. Natalis Comes' mythology lib. 4. chap. 5. Where he observes, that genii were attributed not only to men, but also to plants, buildings, places and other things. Compare about the same lib. 3. c. 6. p. 205. And Maximus of Tyre dissertation just cited. Alcinous on the doctrine of Plato chap. 15. VI. The Master himself doubts in 2. dist. 11. §. therefore.
7. The objections of Alsted are I. from Matt. 18. 11. From Acts 12. III. From the history of Tobit. Besides these the Papists also have the following. IV. Bonaventure Is. 29. Ecclesiasticus 17. Others Dan. 10. 12. Is. 37. 36. Coccius in the Catholic Treasury, Gen. 48. 16. Exod. 14. 19. Ps. 91. 11. Judith 13. 20. Heb. 1. 14. V. The Scholastics on 2. dist. 11. bring forward some reasons and congruities also de la Cerda chap. VI. The same Cerda, and especially Cornelius à Lapide on Acts 12. revelations, examples, fables. VII. Coccius and de la Cerda the authority of the fathers. To which objections we will respond in the disputation itself: lest we delay too long on these, especially since they have no difficulty. To the passage Matt. 18. there is an erudite response in the myrothecium, or in the works of Cameron. Let also the Evangelical Doubts of Spanheim part 3. doubt 61. 62. be compared where he responds fully to the passages Matt. 18. & Acts 12. It is not therefore that I should do what has been done.
8. Hence we draw these porisms. I. That the disquisitions are vain and futile: Whether Christ, or the Blessed Virgin had guardian angels; Whether the angels are ever removed from the custody, to which they were deputed, as Francis George the Venetian wants sect. cit. §. 177.

and other inept and absurd questions of that kind which let him see, who has leisure, in Suarez in the treatise on the angels, and the writers on the tutelary angels to be named just below. II. That the doctrine about the guardian angel is not catholic, or necessary, nor does it make for the peculiar practice of faith and piety: as indeed Vasquez wants disp. 245. c. 1. n. 2. Baillius in Catechism p. 2. qu. 47. Coccius in the Treasury, Binsfeld loc. cit. De la Cerda tract. cit. Through the whole. III. That the guardian angel is not to be saluted daily, nor familiarity with him to be affected. IV. That every religious worship, which the Papists bestow on the guardian angels, is vain and idolatrous; and on all the angels in general and collectively through any devotions, and through the feast of all the angels; about which Gavantus vol. 2. p. 164. About the worship of the guardian angels see the apparatus of prayers and devotions which de la Cerda collected from various Angelolaters from p. 512. up to the end. Compare the Jesuit Drexelius' clock of the auxiliary tutelary guardian angel, Fr. Albertinus' tract on the guardian angel: The same angelic apparatus with the golden diurnal of the tutelary angel. Nigronus' Office of the guardian angel; The College of Lille's Pilgrimage of Paradise instructed with things necessary for the journey to heaven with the Angel as leader; James Hautinus on the guardian angel; Martin Roa's benefits of the holy guardian angel; Paul de Barry on devotion towards the angels; Peter Hermandez de Ovalle's Obligation of worshipping the guardian angels; Peter Cotton's meditations & sermons, among which the sixth is on the guardian angels; Didacus de Celada in his literal moral commentary on Judith, where to chap. 13. v. 11. -21. §. 24. about the guardian angels. I find in the library of Philip Alegambe p. 490, that mention is made of discourses on the Guardian Angel vol. 2. in Portuguese by the author Antonio Vasconcelli the Jesuit. The same Alegambe p. 502. says that seven volumes on the tutelary angels are preserved in the Roman College of Francis Foliani, where he noted the celestial senses of perfection, which he preached were put into him by it. And indeed these things the Jesuit for the promotion of the new religion of the tutelary angels. To them add the poem of Joh. Hemelarius the canon, at Antwerp in the year 1621, to which is the title Paraneticon of the guardian angel to Hugo Grotius etc. And the public little prayers to the guardian angel in the common ascetic little books: among which that common one is in the Office of the Blessed Mary.

"Angel, who are my guardian by supernal piety
Save me (N.B.) entrusted to you, defend, govern;
Wipe my mind flowing with vices and stain.
And I pray be assiduous to me, and raise me falling."

Finally the office and feast of the guardian angel was conceded to be celebrated by Paul V. Which see in the offices of the Order of Minors published with the Roman Diurnal; and about the concession of the Pope Gavantus vol. 2. of the sacred Treasury of Rites p. 164. Molanus also has something about the feast and office of the guardian angels in the ecclesiastical diary of the Physicians. In the year 1601 16 May the Mass of the guardian angel was conceded by the holy congregation of Rites for the congregation of the announced society of Jesus. By the same congregation the Mass of the angel is approved 6 April 1615. The same decrees that the office of the guardian angel be a double minor 2 October 1627. And to be celebrated on the first day not impeded by the office of nine lessons after the feast of St. Michael; it also yields to Sunday 12 March 1618. Moreover about the controversies, whether the feast of the guardian angels is a double major, so that it ought to have both vespers entire, and to what feasts it ought to yield or not yield, see Gavantus trifling loc. cit.; where he also determines; that the feast of the guardian

angels was made conceded from devotion and not from precept. This worship takes its origin from Ethnicism, as is clear from the authors cited in the preceding thesis. The Pythagorean and Platonic philosophemes were spread under this theology: That there is and is required a middle power, which may join men with God, namely ròdespónon. Which power they especially designate by three names, or distinguish into three, Haſis goas, dulonas: of whom the former most nearly cohere with the gods; the latter with men, these placed in the middle. See the golden verses of Pythagoras. And Maximus of Tyre dissertation 26 near the end, and dissertation 27 through the whole.