“…Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts…”
Isa. 6:3
“…God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.”
Eccl. 7:29
“…being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will…”
Eph. 1:11
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Order of Contents
Confessions 6
Historical 1
Problem of Evil 3
Latin 9+
Theologians that Answered Wrongly 2
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Articles
Early Church
Augustine – Against Julian
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Medieval Church
Aquinas, Thomas – ch. 141, ‘Providence & Evil’ in A Compendium of Theology
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1500’s
Melanchthon, Philip – Article 19, Of the Cause of Sin in The Apology of the Augsburg Confession tr: F. Bente & W. H. T. Dau (1531)
Calvin, John
Canon 6 in Antidote to the Canons of the Council of Trent in Acts of the Council of Trent with the Antidote (1547)
Commentary on James, ch. 1, verse 13
pp. 241-244 of The 47th Sermon, which is the Third upon the Twelfth Chapter in Sermons of Master John Calvin, upon the Book of Job… (d. 1564; London, 1575)
Institutes of the Christian Religion tr. Henry Beveridge (1559; Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1845), vol. 1,
bk. 1, ch. 18, ‘The Instrumentality of the Wicked Employed by God while He Continues Free from Every Taint’
bk. 2, ch. 4, ‘How God works in the hearts of men’ 358-67
Calvin, John & Theodore Beza – ‘Calvin & Beza on Providence: Translations by Knox’ trans. John Knox (1545, 1558, 1560; 2021)
These two valuable pieces on Providence by Calvin and Beza, though previously available in English, have lain in obscurity, so much so that most people likely do not know that they exist. They originally appeared, translated by John Knox from the French and Latin respectively, in the midst of Knox’s massive treatise on predestination. That treatise remains in old English, which is old enough and difficult enough that to many it is unreadable.
The Libertines, having such a high view of God’s eternal decree, held to what is known in philosophy as a form of Occasionalism, that all events that occur are directly and immediately worked by God. True secondary causation is eliminated. One main problem with this is that it makes God the Author of Sin, something that the Libertines expressly affirmed. Calvin here not only repudiates this blasphemy, but he also lays out three ways (and only three ways) in which God brings all things to pass through his providence, herein establishing true secondary causation.
Beza provides 29 propositions on providence from his work against Sebastian Castellio, touching upon similar themes as Calvin. Both Calvin and Beza’s pieces, while making some basic distinctions, expound the Lord’s providence in a way that is easy to grasp with illustrations from Scripture and human life.
Vermigli, Peter Martyr – The Common Places… (d. 1562; London: Henrie Denham et al., 1583), pt. 1
17. ‘Whether God be the Author of Sin’ 176
‘Of three sorts of Gods working about his creatures’ 181
‘Of the Will-Signified, and the Will Effectual’ & ‘Another Discourse’ 201
18. ‘How it may be said that God does repent, and does tempt’ 206
Viret, Pierre – ch. 8, ‘Of the Author of Sin & of the Incomprehensible Wisdom of God which is in his Eternal Ordinance’ in A Christian Instruction, Containing the Law & the Gospel… (London, 1573), pp. 9-10
Beza, Theodore – pp. 59-73 of A Book of Christian Questions & Answers... (London, 1574)
Olevian, Caspar – An Exposition of the Apostle’s Creed (London, 1581), pt. 1
Is God therefore the Author of sin?
Arguments taken out of the New Testament, whereby it is plainly showed that God does so work, that He remains void of sin
Olevian (1536–1587) was a significant German reformed theologian, and has been said to be a co-author of the Heidelberg Catechism along with Zacharias Ursinus (though this has been questioned).
Babington, Gervase – pp. 38-59 of Commandment 1 in A Very Fruitful Exposition of the Commandments, by Way of Questions & Answers… (London, 1583)
Vermigli, Peter Martyr – Pt. 1, Ch. 17, ‘Whether God be the Author of Sin?…’ in The Common Places… (London, 1583), pp. 176-206
Ursinus, Zacharias
The Sum of Christian Religion: Delivered… in his Lectures upon the Catechism… tr. Henrie Parrie (Oxford, 1587)
pt. 1, Of Sin, ‘What Sin is’, 4. ‘What are the Causes of Sin’ 99-115
pt. 2, On the Creed, Of God’s Providence, 2. What the Providence of God is, 2nd Sophism: Of the Cause of Sin 409-15
pp. 221-226 of ch. 9, ‘Of God’s Providence’ in Rules & Axioms of Certain Chief Points of Christianity in A Collection of Certain Learned Discourses… (d. 1583; Oxford, 1600)
Of the Cause of Sin, Part of a letter of Ursinus to his friend… in A Collection of Certain Learned Discourses… (Oxford, 1600), pp. 127-28
Zanchi Girolamo
‘God is not the Author of Sin’ from ‘Observations on the Divine Attributes; Necessary to be Premised in order to our Better Understanding the Doctrine of Predestination’ prefixed to The Doctrine of Absolute Predestination, pp. 1-37 trans. Augustus Toplady 1769
Zanchi (1516-1590)
The Discourse touching the blinding of the Wicked, consists of these Propositions in Sundry Positions out of the Praelections of Zanchi which were carped at by his Adversaries in Speculum Christianum, or A Christian Survey for the Conscience, containing Three Tractates… (d. 1590; London, 1614)
Taffin, Jean – ch. 2, ‘2nd Cause of Amendement, Drawn from the Name ‘Holy’, Attributed to Jesus Christ: wherein is handled Election, Reprobation, & God’s Providence’ in The Amendment of Life... (London, 1595), 4th book
Whittaker, William – pp. 193-200 of ‘Answer to the Eighth Reason, which is the Paradoxes of our adversaries’ in An Answer to the Ten Reasons of Edmund Campian the Jesuit, in confidence wherof he offered disputation to the ministers of the Church of England in the controuersy of faith… (d. 1595; London, 1606)
Dove, John – pp. 55-62 in A Sermon Preached at Paul’s Cross, the Sixth of February, 1596… (London, 1597) on Eze. 33:11
Kimedoncius, Jacobus – Ch. 17, ‘How God is Said to Harden & Blind’ in Of the Redemption of Mankind... (London, 1598), A Book of God’s Predestination, pp. 346-341
Rollock, Robert – ch. 24, ‘Of Sin in General’ in A Treatise of God’s Effectual Calling… (d. 1599; London, 1603), pp. 127-132
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1600’s
Junius, Francis – pp. 58-63 of ‘Answer of Junius to the Sixth Proposition of Arminius’ †1602 6 pp. in A Discussion on the Subject of Predestination between James Arminius & Francis Junius in The Works of James Arminius, vol. 3
Junius (1545-1602)
Perkins, William – Lectures upon the Three First Chapters of the Revelation… (London, 1604)
p. 197 of ch. 2
pp. 293-4 of ch. 3
Rutherford, Samuel
Rutherford’s Examination of Arminianism: The Tables of Contents with Excerpts from Every Chapter tr. Charles Johnson & Travis Fentiman (RBO, 2019) See also ch. 2, sections 25-37 & 40-45, namely pp. 60-70 of the document.
ch. 2, On God
19. ‘Whether a distinction of will between effecting and permitting is commendable? We affirm with a distinction against the Arminians.’, p. 59
26. ‘Whether God wills sin to exist, He permitting it? We affirm against the Remonstrants.’, pp. 60-63
31. ‘Whether God impels persons to sins which He prohibits?’, p. 63
34. ‘Whether the act and the lawlessness are distinguishable in all sins? We affirm against the
Arminians.’, pp. 64-65
35. ‘Whether sin is opposed to God in its essence? We deny against the Remonstrants.’, pp. 65-66
36. ‘…Whether because God would predetermine the will to material acts of sin, therefore He is the author of sin?’, pp. 66-67
40. ‘Whether each wicked action, which is from sinning instruments, is done by God as by the principal agent? We affirm with a distinction against the Remonstrants.’, pp. 67-69
42. ‘Whether that distinction is frivolous by which it is taught that God hates sin, and yet wills its existence? We deny against the Remonstrants.’, pp. 69-70
45. ‘Whether sin necessarily follows upon God’s giving permission by a logical necessity? We affirm against the Remonstrants.’, pp. 71-72
ch. 4, On Reprobation
17. ‘Whether it conflicts with the blessedness of God for Him to absolutely put forth an end which cannot be reached without sin, which thing is ungracious of Him? We deny against the Remonstrants.’, pp. 78-79
19. ‘Whether it would have been better for the reprobate to never have heard the gospel? We deny with a distinction against the Remonstrants.’, pp. 79-80
ch. 5, On the Estate of the First Man
2. ‘Whether God is made the author of the first sin if man sinned for this reason, because God, without regard to his fault, denied him grace necessary to escape the first sin? We deny against the Remonstrants.’, pp. 81-82
A Survey of the Spiritual Antichrist… (London, 1648),
pt. 1, pp. 4-5 of ch. 2, ‘Of Libertines’
pt. 2
ch. 77, ‘Antinomians & Libertines’ Foul Opinions Touching God & the Author of Sin’, pp. 169-172
ch. 85, ‘Libertines & Antinomians come nigh to [each] other in making God the Author of Sin’, pp. 219-221
The Westminster Assembly – ‘A Short Declaration of the Westminster Assembly, by Way of Detestation of the Doctrine that God is the Author of Sin’ (London, 1645; RBO, 2020) 6 pp.
This may be the least known, most important, short document of the Westminster Assembly. A book was circulated in London arguing that God is the Author even of Sin, purportedly for the benefit of saints taking comfort in this in their trials.
The Westminster Assembly requested the English civil Parliament to suppress this blasphemous book. The Parliament ordered the burning of the book, and that the Westminster Assembly draw up a declaration in order “to declare to the people the abominableness of it.” The declaration, unanimously approved by the Assembly, with none dissenting, very helpfully and carefully condemns the sentiments of the book that go to far, as many today do, and precisely defines how God orders sin for good, while not being the efficient cause of it, it coming solely from the creature at God’s effective permission.
In this short piece, see how the civil government and the Church ought to cooperate between their distinct jurisdictions unto godly purposes, and how censorship of that which is immoral, it violating God’s Law, is good and necessary.
Voetius, Gisbert – ‘A Method of Responding to Slanders concerning God as the Author of Sin’, pp. 159-74 in Select Theological Disputations, vol. 1, pt. 3 tr. by AI by Onku (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberg, 1648) Latin
Hoornbeek, Johannes – ‘Theological Disputation on the Efficacy of God’s Providence in Relation to Evil’ tr. by AI by Nosferatu (Utrecht: Johann a Waesberge) 6 pp. Latin
Leigh, Edward – ch. 8. ‘Of the Cause of Sin’ in A System or Body of Divinity… (London, A.M., 1654), bk. 4, pp. 326-28
Turretin, Francis – Institutes of Elenctic Theology, tr. George M. Giger, ed. James Dennison Jr. (1679–1685; P&R, 1992), vol. 1, 6th Topic
7. ‘Do sins fall under providence, and how is it applied to them?’ 515
8. ‘Whether it follows and can be elicited by legitimate consequence from our doctrine that we make God the author of sin. We deny against the Romanists, Socinians, Remonstrants and Lutherans.’ 528-35
van Mastricht, Peter – Theoretical-Practical Theology (RHB), Bk. 3, ch. 10
Sections 18-19
Section 32, ‘5. Does that predetermining influence make God the author of sin?’
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2000’s
Feser, Edward – ‘The Thomistic Dissolution of The Logical Problem Of Evil’ in Religions 12:268 (2021) 17 pp.
Feser is a Romanist, analytical Thomist, and professor of philosophy.
Abstract: “In his book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’, James Sterba argues that the existence of much of the evil to be found in the world is logically incompatible with the existence of God. I defend
the Thomistic view that when one properly understands the nature of God and of his relationship to the world, this so-called logical problem of evil does not arise. While Sterba has responded to the version of the Thomistic position presented by Brian Davies, I argue that his response fails.”
Marino, Matt – ‘The Origin of Evil’ (n.d.) 11 paragraphs at ReformedClassicalist
Dr. Marino is a professor of theology and a minister in the ARP. Here he includes a summary of Augustine on the topic from his On Free Choice of the Will.
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Books
1600’s
Gale (1628–1678) was a reformed, dissenting, English Independent minister.
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2000’s
Davies, Brian – The Reality of God & the Problem of Evil Ref (Continuum, 2006) 272 pp.
Feser: “See Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil… for an excellent recent full length treatment.”
Davies is professor of philosophy at Fordham University (NY).
Blurb: “The real issue is: `Why is there not more good than there is`. From the discussion Aquinas emerges as a hero (as filtered through analytical philosophy) but many moderns thinkers do not emerge so well. Davies effectively picks holes in the arguments of Peter Geach, Paul Helm, Richard Swinburne and even Mary Baker Eddy. This is a lively book on a tricky subject, written at all times with humour and much practical example.”
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Quotes
Order of Quotes
Perkins
Wolleb
Rutherford
Maccovius
Hoornbeek
Feser
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1600’s
William Perkins
A Golden Chain... (Cambridge, 1600), A Declaration of Certain Spiritual Desertions…, p. 682
“Desertion in sin is when, God withdrawing the assistance of his spirit, a man is left to fall into some actual and grievius sin. And for all this no man is to think that God is the author of sin, but only man that falls, and Satan. A resemblance of this truth we may see in a staff: which, if a man shall take and set upright upon the ground, so long as he holds it with his hand, it stands upright; but so soon as he withdraws his hand, though he never push it down, it falls of itself.
In this desertion was the good king Hezekiah… God left him (namely, to the pride of his heart to exalt himself) in tempting him, that he might try out all that was in his heart. To this place appertain[s] Noah’s drunkenness, David’s adultery, Peter[‘s] denial of Christ.”
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Johannes Wollebius †1629
Compendium of Christian Theology in Reformed Dogmatics: Seventeenth-Century Reformed Theology through the Writings of Wollebius, Voetius and Turretin, pp. 48-9, 67
Ch.3, The Works of God and the Divine Decrees in General
“IV. Both good and evil, therefore, result from the decree and will of God; the former He causes, and the latter He permits.
V. Nevertheless, the decree and will of God are in no sense the cause of evil or sin, although whatever God decrees takes place of necessity.
Since evils are decreed not effectively, but permissively, the decree of God is not the cause of evil. Nor are the decrees of God the cause of evil on account of the inevitability of their result, since they bring about results not by a coercive necessity but merely by an immutable one.
VI. The inevitability [necessitas] of the decree of God does not destroy the freedom in rational creatures.
The reason is that the necessity is not a necessity of coercion, but one of immutability. The fall of Adam took place by necessity, with respect to a divine decree; however, Adam sinned freely, neither commanded nor coerced nor influenced by God; indeed, he was most strictly warned not to sin.
VII. The inevitability of the decrees of God does not destroy contingency in secondary causes.
Many events which take place of necessity with respect to the plans of God are contingent with respect to secondary causes.”
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Samuel Rutherford
Lex Rex... (1644; Edinburgh: Ogle, 1843), p. 34
“…for as no power given to man to murder his brother is of God, so no power to suffer his brother to be murdered is of God; and no power to suffer himself, a fortiori, far less can be from God. Here I speak not of physical power, for if free will be the creature of God, a physical power to acts which, in relation to God’s law, are sinful, must be from God.”
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On Johannes Maccovius
Willem van Asselt, ch. 14, ‘Christ, Predestination, and Covenant in Post-Reformation Reformed Theology’, pp. 220-21 in eds. Lehner, Muller & Roeber, The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Theology, 1600-1800 (Oxford, 2016)
“In implicative necessity neither the antecedent nor the consequent needs to be necessary–indeed, both can be contingent. The necessity of the consequent [on the other hand,] corresponds with absolute necessity and the necessity of the consequence [corresponds] with hypothetical necessity.
By distinguishing between these different forms of necessity, the Reformed and particularly Maccovius argued that the divine decree (including predestination) did not make God the author of sin nor did it destroy the contingent nature of the created order (Maccovius 1658, 75-76). It could have been possible for sin not to happen: God does not permit sin per se but per accidens (Maccovius 1641b, 104, 127).
Although this implicative connection between God’s permission and sin is necessary, this does not mean that God is the author of sin. As sun does not cause darkness, God does not cause sin itself. Even so, if God did not move the sinning creature, it would not be moved, and therefore, it would not sin; just as a limping horse would not run and limp unless somebody would set it in motion. But the person that moves the horse is not the cause of the limping itself: the cause of limping is the foot of the horse and not the one who set the horse in motion (Maccovius 1641a, 19, 120; Maccovius 1656, 83).”
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Johannes Hoornbeek
‘A Practical Theological Disputation on Sin, pt. 2’ tr. by AI by Onku (Leiden: Johann Elsevir, 1660) Latin
“3. God is in no way the author of sin, but He certainly is of punishment.”
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2000’s
Edward Feser
Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ignatius Press, 2017), ‘The Divine Attributes’, ‘Perfect Goodness’
“Goodness and badness, then, are not on a metaphysical par. Goodness is primary, since it is to be understood in terms of the presence of some feature. Badness is derivative, since it amounts to nothing more than the absence of some feature, and in particular the absence of goodness of some kind or other. Goodness is a kind of actuality, and badness a kind of unrealized potentiality. To be bad in some respect is, ultimately, to lack something rather than to have something, just as to be blind is simply to lack sight rather than to have some positive feature…
But if, as the principle of proportionate causality holds, whatever is in an effect must in some way be in its cause, wouldn’t it follow that all badness or evil too must be in God? That does not follow. The reason is that, as we have seen, badness of any sort is the absence of something, rather than a positive reality in its own right. Hence, while it is perfectly true to say that there is evil in the world, what this amounts to on analysis is simply that certain good things are absent from the world.
Thus, making a world with evil in it is not a matter of making two kinds of thing, good things and bad things. Rather, it is only a matter of making good things, but also refraining from making some of the good things that could have been there. Suppose I begin to draw a triangle on a piece of paper, but after drawing two sides and starting to draw the third, I stop before the side is finished. The triangle, being defective, manifests a certain kind of badness. But the badness is not some extra thing I have put into it after drawing the triangle. Rather, the badness amounts to the absence of something I refrained from putting there.
It is in that sense that God creates a world with evil in it. Evil is not some thing that God has put into the world alongside all the good things He has put there. Rather, evil is the absence of certain good things He refrained from putting there. Now, what the principle of proportionate causality entails is that whatever things, whatever positive features, are in an effect must in some way be in its total cause. But since that is not the sort of thing evil is, the principle does not entail that evil must in any way be in God.
Yet wouldn’t God’s failure to create all the good He could have created constitute a defect in Him? No. Would my failure to finish drawing the triangle in my example indicate the presence of a defect in me? Not at all, since I might have a very good reason for not finishing it. For example, it may have occurred to me that there was no more effective way to make a certain philosophical point during the course of a lecture than by drawing an incomplete triangle and then going on to use it as an example. The good effect of generating philosophical understanding in my listeners would outweigh the trivial instance of badness represented by the imperfect triangle. Considered in isolation, the incomplete triangle is bad, but the overall situation consisting of the triangle together with the lecture, the audience members’ coming to understand a certain philosophical point, and so forth is good, and it is a good that would not have been possible without allowing into it this element of badness.
Similarly, God’s refraining from causing all the particular good things he could have caused is consistent with his being perfectly good insofar as the overall creation is good in ways it could not have been had certain localized instances of badness not been permitted to exist. To take just one example, courage could not exist unless people faced real danger of suffering harm and yet did the right thing anyway. But courage is good and suffering harm bad. Hence, a world with that particular good in it could not exist unless that particular sort of badness also existed in it. Hence, just as even God cannot cause a round square to exist, neither can He cause a world to exist in which there is courage but where no one faces any real danger of suffering harm. Hence, God’s being perfectly good is consistent with the world He causes having badness in it as well as goodness.”
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Confessions & Standards
1500’s
Augsburg – Article 19
French Confession – Article 8
2nd Helvetic Confession – ch. 8
Belgic Confession – Article 13
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1600’s
Synod of Dort (1618-1619) – Canons, 1st Head, Articles 1, 5, 15
Westminster Confession of Faith, 3.1
“God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass:[a] yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin,[b] nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.[c]
[a] Eph. 1:11. Rom. 11:33. Heb. 6:17. Rom. 9:15,18
[b] Jam. 1:13,17. 1 John 1:5
[c] Acts 2:23. Matt. 17:12. Acts 4:27,28. John 19:11. Prov. 16:33″
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Historical
On the 1600’s – 1700’s
Book
eds. Kremer, Elmar J. – The Problem of Evil in Early Modern Philosophy Pre (Univ. of Toronto Press, 2001) 190 pp. ToC
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On the Problem of Evil
Quotes
Order of
Aquinas
Turretin
Feser
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1200’s
Aquinas
Summa Theologiae, pt. 1, q. 2, art. 3, ‘Whether God Exists’, obj. 1 & reply to obj. 1
“Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word ‘God’ means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.
…
Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion, xi): Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil. This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.”
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1600’s
Francis Turretin
Institutes (P&R, 1992), vol. 1, topic 3, question 1, ‘Can the existence of God be irrefutably demonstrated against atheists? We affirm.”, section 26, p. 177
“Infinite goodness does not immediately take away all evils if it is a perfectly free and not a necessary agent. It judges that the permission of evil for the purpose of extracting good from it pertains more to its wisdom and omnipotence than the not permitting the existence of evil.”
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2000’s
Edward Feser
The Last Superstition: a Refutation of the New Atheism (St. Augustine’s Press, 2008), ch. 4, ‘Scholastic Aptitude’, ‘Faith, Reason & Evil’, pp. 161-64
“The atheist says that if God exists, He would, being all-powerful and all-good, prevent the suffering we see around us; yet suffering persists; therefore God does not exist…
there is much that could be said.² But Aquinas, as he so often does, gets to the nub of the matter. The first premise of the atheist’s argument is simply false, or at least unjustifiable — that is to say, there is no reason whatever to think that an all-powerful and all-good God would prevent the suffering we see around us — for it is ‘part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it to produce good.’²
¹ See Brian Davies, The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil (Continuum, 2006) for an excellent recent full length treatment.
² Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1…
If God can bring out of the evils that we actually experience a good that is far greater than what would have existed without them, then of course He would allow those evils. But God is infinite in power, knowledge, and all the rest — Pure Actuality, Being Itself, Goodness Itself, and so forth, as we have seen — and, since human beings have immortal souls, so that our lives in the here-and-now are but a trivial blink of the eye compared to the eternity we are to enter, there is no limit to the good result that might be made in the next life out of even the worst evils we suffer in this one. For even the worst evils we suffer are finite. Therefore there is every reason to think that God can and will bring out of the sufferings of this life a good that so overshadows them that this life will be seen in retrospect to have been worth it.
…Suppose your child is trying to learn how to play the violin. This will require much practice, and thus a sacrifice of time that could be spent playing. It will also require hours of frustration and boredom, some pain and discomfort… and possibly humiliation when at recitals and the like he makes serious mistakes… He may often want to give it up, and keeping him from doing so may require not only encouragement but also occasional punishments for failures to practice every day. On bad days he might almost hate you for what you’re putting him through. But eventually he becomes very good indeed, and the frustration he once felt disappears entirely. He might even forget about it almost completely, and if he is a normal, sane human being he certainly will never hold it against you or think the suffering he once thought was unbearable is even worth thinking about now. Indeed, if anything, his accomplishment will have the value for him that it does precisely because he had to suffer for it. In hindsight, he might well say that he wouldn’t have had it any other way.
Of course, I am not claiming that the relatively minor suffering in question is comparable to the death of a child, or bone cancer, or Auschwitz. But then, neither could the relatively minor joy of being a great violinist compare to the beatific vision. Indeed, even the greatest horror we can imagine in this life pales in insignificance before the beatific vision. To quote St. Paul once again, “the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us.” (Rom. 8:18, RSV)…
Reason itself, as I have argued, shows us that there is a First Cause who is Being Itself, Goodness Itself, all-powerful, allknowing, and all the rest, and it also shows us that we have immortal souls. Hence reason tells us that there is a God who created us for a destiny beyond this life and who is fully capable of guaranteeing that the good we attain in the next life outweighs the evil we suffer in this one to such an extent that the latter, however awful from our present point of view, will come to seem “not worth comparing” to the former, and indeed if anything will even be seen to have been worth having gone through from the point of view of eternity. And therefore, reason itself tells us that there is simply no reason to believe that even the worst possible sufferings of this life constitute any evidence whatsoever against the existence of God.
Nevertheless, since we are finite beings, it can be very hard to keep this in mind when faced with severe suffering. The arguments of philosophers and theologians, however logically impeccable, seem cruelly abstract and cold when compared to the agony of the parents of a raped and murdered child. But then, reason is abstract and cold. Atheists are always telling us how we need soberly to follow it where it leads us, even if it were to break our hearts by telling us that there is no hope for cosmic justice, no hope for seeing lost loved ones ever again, no hope for a life beyond this one… Thomas Aquinas reassures us that in fact no matter how bad things get in this life, reason assures us that God can set it right…
In any event, it is precisely because of the abstraction and coldness of reason that a kind of faith is needed where evil is concerned… faith in God in the face of evil is nothing less than the will to follow reason’s lead when emotion might incline us to doubt… Yet reason says that that pain is part of an overall plan which we cannot yet fathom, but one in which God can bring out of that pain a good compared to which it will pale in insignificance. Hence reason tells us: have faith in God. We will not always be able to understand what that plan is, or how this or that particular instance of suffering fits into it.
We have some general clues here and there — for instance, the fact that certain goods, like patience, forgiveness, and self-sacrifice, cannot be had without certain evils. But we don’t know the details. And yet, why should we expect to know them? If there is a God of the sort the arguments I’ve described point to, and if the soul’s ultimate destiny surpasses the cares of this life in the way its immortality implies, then these matters are so far beyond our ordinary experience that it would be extremely surprising if we could fully understand them…”
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Latin Articles
1300’s
Bradwardine, Thomas – Book 1, ch. 34, ‘If & How God Wills & does Not Will Sin’ in Of the Cause of God, pp. 294-307
Bradwardine (c.1290-1340) was a proto-reformed theologian in the Middle Ages.
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1500’s
Melanchthon, Philip – On Rom. 1
Calvin, John – An Instruction Against the Fanatical & Furious Sect of the Libertines, which Call Themselves ‘The Spiritual Ones’ in The Smaller Works of John Calvin… (1563)
ch. 13, pp. 184-188
ch. 14, pp. 189-200
ch. 15, pp. 200-205
ch. 16, pp. 205-212
Beza, Theodore – A Response to the Calumnies of some Sycophants which Press to Overturn the Sole Foundation of our Salvation, even the Eternal Predestination of God (Geneva, 1558)
3rd Calumny
4th Calumny
6th Calumny on the author of sin
7th Calumny
8th Calumny
9th Calumny
10th Calumny
11th Calumny on being the efficient cause of sin
12th Calumny
13th Calumny
14th Calumny
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1600’s
Pareus, David – Bk. 2, ‘Of the Status of Sin, which is on the Cause of the Sin of the First Man, & on the Cause of Sin in General’ of 6 Books on the Loss of Grace & the State of Sin by Robert Bellarmine… to which Three Following are Joined, on Original Sin, are Explicated & Castigated (Heidelberg, 1613) ToC
Pareus (1548-1622) was a German Reformed Protestant theologian and reformer.
Voet, Gisbert – 54. ‘A Method to Respond to Extracts & Calumnies about God being the Author of Sin’ in Select Theological Disputations (Utrecht: Waesberg, 1648), vol. 1, pp. 1118-37
Rutherford, Samuel – Ch. 18, ‘Whether, Supposing that God had Stored up the Damned unto the Day of Destruction & had Permissively Ordained them unto Sin, it would then follow that God would be the Author of Sin? The passage Prov. 16:4 (“The Lord hath made all things for himself…”) is judged & vindicated. Likewise the passage Rom. 9:17 (“Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up…”). Also, the passage 1 Pet. 2:8 is judged & vindicated. Bellarmine, Ruiz, Louis le Mairat, Arubal, Fasolus & the Arminians are Invoked in Parts’ in A Scholastic Dispute about Divine Providence… (Edinburgh, 1649), pp. 211-247
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1700’s
Werenfels, Peter – A Theological Dissertation Against the Calumny Thrown on Calvin by Bellarmine & the Papists, as though God were Made the Author of Sin, or that it may follow by Necessary Consequence from his Doctrine of the Providence of God (Basil, 1702)
Vitringa, Campegius – ‘On Concursus’, sections 27-36, pp. 197-201 in The Doctrine of the Christian Religion… (d. 1722), ch. 7, ‘Of the Conservation & Government of Created Things in General, & Specially of Man’. The section on Concursus starts on p. 187.
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Latin Book
Calvin, John – A Brief Instruction Fortifying the Faithful Against the Errors of the Sect of Anabaptists; the same Against the Fanatic & Furious Sect of the Libertines, which Call Themselves the Spiritual Ones (Strasbourg, 1546) 140 pp.
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Theologians who Gave the Wrong Answer
1500’s & 1600’s
The Libertines & Antinomians
Article
Rutherford, Samuel – A Survey of the Spiritual Antichrist… (London, 1648)
pt. 1, pp. 4-5 of ch. 2, ‘Of Libertines’
pt. 2
ch. 77, ‘Antinomians & Libertines’ Foul Opinions Touching God & the Author of Sin’, pp. 169-72
ch. 85, ‘Libertines & Antinomians come nigh to [each] other in making God the Author of Sin’, pp. 219-21
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Quotes
Samuel Rutherford, A Survey of the Spiritual Antichrist… (London, 1648)
pt. 1, p. 125
“That ‘we are meere patients in all we do’, and ‘God the immediate agent’, and that ‘God’ (as say the Libertines) ‘is the author of sin and righteousness’, ‘no man is to be rebuked for sin, nor to be touched in conscience for sin, because God is the Author and worker thereof,’ and there is no letter of a command of either Old or New Testament that does oblige a believer’, ‘The Law is now’ (says Saltmarsh) ‘in the Spirit.'”
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pt. 2, p. 54
“The Libertines of old, some Familists, and Antinomians of late have said that God is the author of sin, that his working, or not working on the creature, is the cause of good and ill; righteousness and unrighteousnesse: 1. Because sin is nothing but God’s not working. 2. It cannot hurt God, and why should He hate it? 3. It has its first being in God. 4. It is his servant, and conduces to heighten free grace, and rich mercy.
I do not impute this to all Antinomians, yet some have said it and written it, the same principles common to Libertines and Antinomians, as you may read in worthy Calvin (Instructione adversus Libertinos), incline to the same conclusions.”
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1700’s
Jonathan Edwards
A Careful & Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will... 4th ed. (Wilmington, DE: James Adams, 1790), pt. 4, section 9, p. 254
“But if by ‘the Author of Sin’, is meant the Permitter, or not a Hinderer of Sin; and at the same time, a Disposer of the State of Events, in such a manner, for wise, holy and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: I say, if this be all that is meant, by being the Author of Sin, I don’t deny that God is the Author of Sin…
And I don’t deny, that God’s being thus the Author of Sin, follows from what I have laid down…”
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Related Pages
On the Ethics of Material Cooperation with, & Associations with Evil