

Calvin & Beza on Providence:
Translations by Knox

1545, 1558, 1560

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Publisher's Foreword

These two valuable pieces by John Calvin (†1564) and Theodore Beza (†1605), though previously available in English, have lain in obscurity, so much so that most people likely do not know that they exist. They originally appeared, translated by John Knox (†1572), in the midst of Knox's massive treatise on predestination.¹ That treatise, while having been collected into Knox's *Works*² (which have been recently reprinted), yet remains in old English; the English is old enough and difficult enough that to many it is unreadable. These pieces, Calvin's originally in French³ and Beza's in Latin,⁴ have, to our knowledge, not been translated or published anywhere else.

Calvin is well known for his works defending God's predestination from persons holding tenets about the free-will of man that would later be espoused by the Arminians. However, little known are Calvin's writings against the hyper-Calvinists, so to speak, of his own day. Those were the Libertines (resident in Geneva itself), whom Calvin argues against in this piece that is taken out of his larger work, *Contra the Fantastic & Furious Sect of the Libertines, which Call Themselves the Spiritual Ones*.⁵ The Libertines, having such a high view of God's eternal decree, held to what is known in philosophy as a form of Occasionalism, that all events that occur are directly and immediately worked by God.

¹ John Knox, *An answer to a great number of blasphemous cavillations written by an Anabaptist, and adversarie to Gods eternal predestination. And confuted by John Knox, minister of Gods Worde in Scotland. Wherein the Author so discovereth the craft and falshode of the sect, that the godly knowing that error, may be confirmed in the trueth by the evident Worde of God* ([Geneva]: Jean Crespin, 1560)

² John Knox, *The Works of John Knox* ed. David Laing (Edinburgh: James Thin, 1895), 5.172-28, 184-89. This edition has been the basis for this current version. Minor updates in spelling, style and formatting have been made for ease of reading. All words in [brackets] are those of the publisher. A few unclear spots have been made to more clearly reflect the original languages.

³ John Calvin, *Contre la Secte Phantastique et Furieuse de Libertins. Que se nomment spirituelz* ([Geneva]: [Jean Girard], 1545), ch. 14, pp. 90-103. Note that Knox translated the whole chapter except for the last page and a half. For more details on the publication history of this work of Calvin, see Knox, *Works*, 5.178 fn.

⁴ From Theodore Beza, *Ad Seb. Castellionis calumnias, quibus unicum salutis nostrae fundamentum, i.e. aeternam Dei praedestinationem evertere nititur, responsio* (Geneva, 1558), later published in Theodore Beza, *Theodori Bezae Vezelii, Volumen Tractationum Theologicarum...* 2nd ed. (Geneva, Johannes Crispinus, 1582), vol. 1, pp. 371-73. Knox split Proposition 9 into two propositions; hence from there on out, his numbering, which we have followed, is one number greater than that in the Latin. Note that Knox only translated 28 of the whole 38 propositions.

⁵ For background on the Libertines and the larger work from which this piece is taken, see Ben W. Farley, 'The Theology of Calvin's Tract Against the Libertines', *Calvin Studies I: Papers Presented at a Colloquium on Calvin Studies at Davidson College Presbyterian Church and Davidson College, Davidson, North Carolina, March 19-20, 1982*, pp. 16-28.

True secondary causation is eliminated; at best all things are simply as stocks and stones being efficiently moved by God's Spirit.

One main problem with God immediately performing all things, including all the actions of evil workers, is that it makes God the Author of Sin, something that the Libertines expressly affirmed.⁶ Calvin here not only repudiates this blasphemy, as God can only ever be and work good by his very nature (Ezra 3:11; Ps. 25:8; 143:10), but he also lays out three ways (and only three ways) in which God brings all things to pass through his providence, herein establishing true secondary causation.

The first way is God's universal operations through nature, directing all things according to their condition and properties as He has so formed them. The second way is the directing of his creatures, in accordance with his goodness, justice and judgment, to punish the wicked and to help and bless, or correct and chasten his servants with fatherly affection. This second way not only includes inanimate things, but also persons who freely act of their own accord, desires and reasons. In such actions, both the will of man and the will of God concur together, yet often for different reasons. Sinful persons directly perform sinful acts with sinful motivations (and will be judged for them); God willingly *permits* the act for good reasons and directs it and all things to his own eventual glory and the eternal good of his beloved people (Rom. 8:28). The whole sinfulness of the act comes from the creature, and none of it comes from God, who remains holy, just, righteous and only good. The third way of God's providence is his special glory, his governing of the faithful through whom He lives and reigns by his Spirit.

Beza's work shares some of the same themes as Calvin's: to seek to make good genuine human instrumentality under God's all-encompassing providence, while clearing God from being made the Author of Sin, as was so charged upon the Genevan doctrine by Sebastian Castellio (1515-1563). Castellio, a French protestant, had cordial relations with Calvin for some years and lived for a time in Geneva as a scholar and minister till he was banned from the city by the magistrates in 1544 for calumny against the Genevan ministers. Castellio had gained a Greek professorship in the University of Basel by 1554 when he went into print against Calvin over the Servetus affair which had occurred the year before. Also in 1554 Castellio published a second edition of his Latin

⁶ See Samuel Rutherford, *A Survey of the Spirituall Antichrist Opening the Secrets of Familisme and Antinomianisme...* (London, 1648), pt. 1, 126 & pt. 2, 54, 169-172, 200, 219-21.

Bible translation,⁷ in which he included a long annotation upon Romans 9, further attacking Calvin on predestination.⁸ Beza responded to Castellio in 1558 with, *A Response to the Calumnies of Sebastian Castellio which Endeavor to Subvert the Sole Foundation of our Salvation, that is, the Eternal Predestination of God*. The 29 propositions of Beza below are excerpted from the larger discussion in this work.

Both Calvin and Beza's pieces, while making some basic distinctions, expound the Lord's providence in a way that is easy to grasp with illustrations from Scripture and human life. Calvin observes that "all works take their quality from the purpose and the will of the author;" therefore for the ungodly, "their works are wicked and to be damned." Yet the purposes of God in willingly permitting those works of the ungodly are only good; therefore God remains righteous, especially as it is their wills, and not his that have performed the act. Beza gives the illustration of a magistrate appointing an executioner to execute a criminal worthy of death (Proposition 18). The magistrate's purposes in the execution are good, and the work itself is good. Yet if the executioner is filled with envy, avarice and other wicked affections for reasons other than the righteous appointment and command of the judge, his action is sinful and even murder; yet the magistrate remains upright and blameless. Calvin gives another analogy, of the sun shining its good and healthful beams upon dead flesh. The flesh by them, of its own nature, further rots and corrupts while the sun "draws to itself neither corruption, neither yet any filthiness."

May these writings be a blessing to you, and may we humbly submit ourselves to receive as much on this subject as our God has revealed in his Word. There we shall stop and adore,⁹ trusting Him who is altogether good and works "all things... for good to

⁷ Sebastian Castellio, *Biblia sacra latina* (Basil, 1554)

⁸ On the controversy, background to it, and on Castellio generally, see Philip Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, vol. 7 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), [section 126, 'Calvin & Castellio'](#), pp. 621-8; Mirjam van Veen, '[... Stoica Paradoxa...](#)' [Sebastian Castellio's Polemic Against Calvin's Doctrine of Predestination](#)' *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, T. 77, no. 2 (2015), pp. 325-50.

⁹ This is the position of the Westminster Confession (1646), ch. 5, section 4, "The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God, so far manifest themselves in his providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men, and that not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, and otherwise ordering and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends; yet so as the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature, and not from God; who, being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin." For more on the topic from the Westminster Assembly, see '[A Short Declaration of the](#)

them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.” (Rom. 8:28)
“How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?... For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever.” (Rom. 11:33-36)

[Westminster Assembly, by Way of Detestation of the Doctrine that God is the Author of Sin'](#) (ReformedBooksOnline, 2021).

John Calvin

God Works Providence in Three Ways

We do not deny but that all things are done by the will of God, insomuch that when we declare wherefore he is called Omnipotent, we give to Him an effectual power in all his creatures; and we teach that as once He created the universal world, so also that He governs the same; and that his hand is always at the work, that he might keep all things in their estate and dispose them after his will. And to the end that I may express the same more easily, I say that God is to be considered three manner of ways to work in the administration of his creatures.

I. First, there is a universal operation by the which He directs all creatures according to the condition and propriety which He gave to every one when He formed them; and this government is nothing else but that which we call the order of Nature: for albeit the unfaithful know nothing in the disposition of the world but that which they see with their eyes, and therefore they make Nature as she were a goddess, to have empire and dominion over all, yet is this praise to be given to the will of God that it only does moderate and govern all things. Wherefore when we see the sun, the moon, and the stars fulfill their course, let us understand that they obey God, that they execute his commandment; yea, and that they are guided by the hand of God. And also when we see the course of earthly things, all things are to be ascribed to God. The creatures are to be esteemed but as instruments in his hand, which he applies to the work even as pleases Him.

The Scripture does often make mention of this universal providence, that we may learn in all his works to give glory unto God. But chiefly in us does God commend this his power, that we shall know it in ourselves, to the end that we may be purged of arrogance, which suddenly uses [is accustomed] to arise in us; how soon we forget ourselves to be in his hands. Hereunto appertains that which Paul said to those of Athens, 'It is He in whom we live, are moved, and have our being.' [Acts 17:28] By the which he would admonish us that except God uphold us by his hand, that unable it is for us to stand the least moment of time; for even as the soul dispersing her strength through the

whole body moves the members, so are we quickened of God, from whom only we obtain whatsoever strength or power we have. But this universal operation of God impedes not but that every creature in heaven and in earth retain their own nature and quality, and also do follow their own inclination.

II. The second manner by the which God works in his creatures is that He appoints them, in obedience of his goodness, justice and judgement, sometimes to help his servants, sometimes to punish the wicked and sometimes to examine the patience of his servants or to correct and chasten them with a fatherly affection: as when He will give us abundance of fruits, He gives rain in his time, He sends heat by the sun and bright and clear days, as also He uses all other natural means as instruments of his liberality. But when he pulls back his hand, the heaven is made like brass, the earth is iron; and so it is He that sends thunder, frost, hail; and also it is He that is the cause of sterility and barrenness. Therefore, whatsoever the ethnics [heathens] and ignorant did attribute to Fortune, we assign to the providence of God: not only to that universal operation of the which we have before spoken, but to his especial ordinance by the which He governs all as he knows it to be most expedient and profitable.

This He teaches when by his prophets he says that He created darkness and light, that He sends death and life, that neither good nor evil can chance but from his hand. [Isa. 45:7] Insomuch that He says that He does govern and direct the lots. [Prov. 16:33] Yea, if that any man by chance, and not of set purpose be slain, He avows Himself to be the cause of his death and that so He had appointed; that we shall judge nothing to come of Fortune, but that all comes by the determination of his counsel. And further, it displeases Him when we esteem anything to proceed from any other, so that we do not behold Him and know Him [as] not only the principal cause of all things, but also as the author appointing all things to the one part or the other by his counsel. Thus let us then conclude that prosperity and adversity, rain, winds, hail, frost, fair weather, abundance, hunger, war or peace to be the works of God; and that the creatures, which be the inferior causes, are only instruments which He has in readiness to execute his will, which He so uses at his pleasure, that He leads and moves them to bring to pass whatsoever He has appointed.

Moreover, it is to be noted that not only He thus uses his insensible creatures that by them He works his will, but also men themselves, yea, and also devils, insomuch that

Satan and wicked men are executors of God's will: as He used the Egyptians to punish his people, and a little after, He raised up the Assyrians and other such to revenge the sins of his people. [Isa. 10:5-15] We see that he used the Devil in tormenting Saul, and in deceiving Ahab [1 Sam. 16:23; 1 Kings 22:22-23]: which things when the Libertines do hear, rashly and without judgment, beholding no further, they conclude that now the creatures do no more work; and so horribly do they confound all things, neither do they only mingle and mix the heavens with the earth, but also they join God with the Devil.

That chances unto them because they do not observe two most necessary exceptions. The former is that Satan and the wicked are not so the instruments of God but that they also do their own parts. Neither must we imagine that God so works by wicked men as by a stock or a stone, but as by a creature participant of reason, etc. When we say, then, that God works by creatures, this impedes not but that the wicked work also upon their part, which thing the Scripture most evidently declares; for as it pronounces that God will whistle and blow as it were the trumpet to call and bring forth to battle the unfaithful, so ceases it not to make mention of their own counsel and ascribes to them both a will and a work which they did execute under the decree of God.

The other exception of the which these unhappy Libertines take no heed is that there is a great difference betwixt the work of God and the work of the wicked when that God uses him instead of an instrument. The wicked man is provoked to iniquity either by avarice, ambition, envy, or cruelty, neither yet looks he to any other end or purpose; and therefore the work takes the quality from the root from the which it springs, that is, from the wicked affection of the mind, and the mischievous end which he looks unto, and therefore justly is it judged evil. But God altogether has a contrary respect, to wit, that He may exercise his justice to the conservation of the good, to use his favor and gentleness towards the faithful and that He may punish such as have deserved.

Consider how we must make difference betwixt God and man; that upon the one part we shall behold his justice, his goodness and his judgements; and upon the other part we shall consider in the self-same work the malice and envy of the Devil and of the wicked. Let us take a bright and clear glass in the which we may behold these things. When the message of the loss of all his goods came to Job, the sudden death of his sons and so many calamities which all at once fell upon him, he does acknowledge that he was visited by God, saying, "The Lord gave all these things, and it is He that has taken them

away;" [Job 1:21] and no doubt so it was. But in the meantime, do we not know that the Devil procured all these things? And did not he understand, by narration of his servants that escaped, that the Chaldeans had driven away his beasts and flocks? Did he commend those brigands and spoilers? or ought we to excuse the Devil? because that all these calamities proceeded from God. Not so, for both we and He do and did understand that there was a great difference betwixt their purposes. And therefore he (yet damning the evil) said, "The name of the Lord be blessed." The same may we say of David [2 Sam. 12:19-24]; but at this time it suffices that God so works by his creatures, and so does use them to his providence that the instrument by the which he works ceases not to be evil. Albeit that He convert the malice of the Devil and of wicked men to good, yet they therefore are neither excusable, neither yet clean from sin: and their works are wicked and to be damned; for all works take their quality from the purpose and the will of the author.

Whosoever makes no distinction betwixt these things, makes a horrible confusion. And such be the Libertines, who, as before is said, do not only join the Devil in society with God, but also do transform him into God, judging his works worthy of praise under this color, that he does nothing but that which is appointed by God. But contrariwise we ought to observe that the creatures do work their own works in this earth, which works, according as they were directed to this or that end, so are they to be judged either good or evil: and yet God governs and does moderate all things and guides them also to a right end.

He turns the evil into good, or at least, God working by the goodness of his nature, draws as it were by violence some good forth of that which in the self is evil. So does He use the Devil, that He does not mix Himself with him, neither to be in fellowship with him, neither yet with his wicked fact, neither that his justice shall put away the nature of the Devil. For as the sun sending forth his beams and heat to the carrion, and so engenders in it some corruption, draws to itself neither corruption, neither yet any filthiness; neither yet does the sun by his purity and brightness so purge the carrion but that it remains stinking and corrupt: so does God so work by the wicked that the justice which is in Him does not justify them, neither yet is He defiled by their wickedness and corruption.

III. The third kind of God's operation consists in the governance of the faithful, in whom He lives and reigns by his Spirit. Insofar as we are corrupt by original sin, we be like to the dry and barren ground which produces no good fruit. For our judgement is corrupt, our will rebellious, ever ready to evil, and finally, our whole nature is nothing else but a lump of sin. And therefore not only can we not apply ourselves to any good action, but we are not able nor sufficient to conceive one good thought (as Paul does witness, 2 Cor. 3; Phil. 2), but if we be able to [do] anything, of necessity that must proceed from God. It is He therefore that works in us both to will and to perform [Phil. 2:13]; He does illuminate us and lead us to the knowledge of Himself; He draws us to Himself, and by softening our hearts, He forms new hearts in us. Further, it is He who moves in us a desire of praying; He gives power and strength to resist all the temptations of Satan and makes [it so] that we do walk in his commandments.

But yet we must consider that of nature we have both will and election; but because they are both depraved by sin, the Lord reforms them and of evil makes them good. That we therefore be apt to discern that we have a will, that we do this or that, this is a natural gift; but that we can choose, desire, or do nothing but that which is evil, that cometh of the corruption of sin. That we thirst to do good, that we have some power to execute the same, this proceeds from the supernatural grace, by the which we are regenerate, and newly born to a better and more godly life. Behold then what God works in his children: first, putting away their perverse nature, He conducts and guides them by his Holy Spirit in obedience of his will.

But these drunken or rather furious Libertines, crying that all things are wrought by God, do make Him author of evil. And further, even as the nature of the evil were changed when it is cloaked under the coverture of God's name, they affirm it to be good; in the which they do greater injury and contumely [insolently] unto God than that they should transfer his power and justice to another. For seeing there is nothing more proper unto God than is his goodness, it behoves, first, that He should utterly deny Himself before that He can work evil, which thing these blind Libertines attribute unto Him. And, assuredly, the God of these men is an idol, which ought to be more execrable than all the idols of the gentiles."

Theodore Beza

Propositions on Providence

1. The First Proposition: God effectually works and brings to pass all things, according to the counsel of his own will (Eph. 1:11).¹⁰
2. This counsel does God execute in certain moments of time; nevertheless the counsel itself is eternal and passes before all things, not only in time (as it is before all time), but also in order. For otherwise the will of God should not be the principal and first rule of God's counsel, but rather the qualities of things foreseen and foreknown, and moving God to take this counsel, or that should prescribe a rule to the will of God.
3. This counsel may not be separated from the will of God, except of necessity we spoil God of his Godhead.
4. This counsel is not put in moderation and in direction of chance or fortune, but it has an effectual and working strength in all things, as Paul speaks.
5. This strength and efficacy is attributed to God working, but it is not said to be from God; therefore by this word efficacy, or strength, is not declared any nature and power given by God the Creator to the things that be created, that they should do this or that, but thereby is understood the power of God which He has in Himself to do all things.
6. This universal particle, 'all', in the words of Paul, can by no manner of exception be restrained, but that God in that part shall be judged idle as Epicurus¹¹ did falsely affirm. And if we shall say that anything is done which God may not impede, then shall He be spoiled of his infinite power.

¹⁰ Eph. 1:11 "In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will."

¹¹ Epicurus (341–270 B.C.) was an ancient Greek philosopher who was the founder of the tradition of thought known as Epicureanism.

7. So that the conclusion is, since that God Himself, even as it has pleased Him to determine all things to come from eternity, even so He works by his own power that the same things come to pass in their time as He wills.
8. Of these things notwithstanding, none of those blasphemies do follow wherewith we be burdened, to wit, that God is the author of sin, either that He delights or wills iniquity, that Satan or men doing wickedly do obey God, or, insofar as they do evil, that they do the thing that God wills and therefore are blameless. Let such blasphemies be far not only from our mouths but also from our cogitations and thoughts.
9. That none of these blasphemies necessarily may be concluded of our doctrine may be proved thus:¹²
10. God puts in execution the counsels of his will by second causes and mid-instruments, not as bound unto them, as the Stoics did affirm,¹³ but freely and potently making, moving and directing them as it pleases his wisdom.
11. Of those instruments there are two principal kinds. The one has life and moving; the other be without life, which rather be moved by the force of others than move themselves. There be two sorts of those that have life: the one be endued with reason and judgment, the other be without reason and are only carried by the blind force of nature.
12. Those that be without life and those also that have life but lack reason can neither be said to do well nor evil; but those that use them as instruments may be said either to do well or evil.
13. Those that have life endued with reason are either angels or men. The angels be of two sorts, some good, some bad; but as for men, all by nature are evil: but by grace they are so separated that some are utterly evil, some partly good, to wit, insofar as the Spirit of God has sanctified them.

¹² Propositions 9 & 10 are both Proposition 9 in the Latin. We have followed Knox in the numbering of the propositions, which from here on out are one number greater than those in the Latin.

¹³ Stoicism was an ancient Greek school of philosophy founded by Zeno of Citium in Athens in the early 3rd century B.C.

14. Such as in any action are moved by their own inward motion justly may be said to work; and therefore in that kind of instruments falls the difference of good and of evil works; neither yet properly in that respect may they be called instruments, but [rather] the efficient causes.
15. An evil action I call that which has not the revealed will of God for the assurance and end; and by the contrary, the work is good when the worker looks to obey God's express commandment.
16. These same, although they be causes, insofar as they work by their own proper motion, yet are they in another respect called instruments, insofar as they are moved by another. As when the hangman, by the commandment of the magistrate, kills a man, or when, by instigation of the Devil, men hurt others, or when, at the commandment of any, we do either good or evil to any man.
17. In this kind of actions it is evident that one work is attributed to two: to the one, as to him that works by an instrument, and to the other as to the worker, by motion or commandment. Such workers are instruments, not simply as the hammer or axe is in the hand of the smith or hewer, but they are such instruments as also move by their own inward motion.
18. And for this double respect, a double work appears sometimes to be done: insomuch that the one may be laudable and the other wicked. As if the magistrate shall commit an offender worthy of death to the executor of justice, this work is praiseworthy of all good men. But if the lictor [executioner], inflamed rather with envy, avarice or any other wicked affection than looking to the commandment of the judge, shall kill the same offender, most certain it is that before God he cannot avoid the crime of murder.
19. Now let us apply these things to God, whose efficacy before we have proved to work in all things without exception; and so that by those things which He has made as by instruments, He executes in time whatsoever he has decreed from eternity.
20. Whatsoever God works is good, seeing from Him (who is infinitely good) no evil thing can proceed. But He works all things; therefore all things be good insofar as they are done by God. And that difference of good and evil has only place in the instruments, and in those of whom we have spoken in the 14th proposition.

21. For if those instruments be good, and if their actions look to the revealed will of God, they do well, and God also does well by them. Wherefore that work is always good, as when the good angels execute that which God commands and holy men do follow, God calling them.
22. Evil instruments, evil, I say, not by creation but by corruption, insofar as they work always, they do evil; and therefore justly do they incur the wrath of God. But insofar as God works by them, they either by ignorance, or else against their purposes, serve to the good work of God. But God Himself, by whatsoever instruments He works, works at all times well.
23. And so He works by those instruments that not only He permits and suffers to work, neither does He only moderate the event or chance, but also He raises them up. He moves, He directs, and that which is most of all, He also creates, to the end that by them He shall work that which He has appointed. Which things God does righteously, and without any injustice.
24. For when the wicked man sins, either against himself or any wicked person, God, without any sin, does and brings to pass that the wicked man shall take vengeance upon himself, or that evil men shall take vengeance upon other wicked men who have deserved punishment. And this one and other work of God is most just; and by such examples of his judgement God erects and comforts his afflicted.
25. How oft that evil men hurt good men, the wicked men sin, and in the end they suffer just punishment; and yet by them, nevertheless, does God chasten, instruct, and confirms his own; and by the manifest enemies of his Church does God make glorious his Church.
26. Yet can it not be said that those evil instruments do obey God. For albeit that God works his work by them, yet they, so far as in them lies, and as concerning their own counsel and will, do not the work of God, but their own work, for the which, meritably, they are punished. Albeit, whatsoever God works by the wicked is good, yet whatsoever the wicked men work is evil.
27. Neither is the consequent: God works all things; therefore He works sin. For the name of sin is not but in the vicious and faulty quality, which is altogether in the instrument that works.

28. By reason of this corrupted quality, the work which in the self is one, some manner of way is double and may be divided: insomuch that the one, that is, the just work of God, directly fights and repugns against the unjust work of man.
29. God, nevertheless, far otherwise works by his good instruments than He does by his evil instruments. For besides that by his good instruments He works his work, the good instruments also do their work by that strength and efficacy which the Lord ministers unto them. And God also works his work by them and in them He works to will and to perform. But by the evil, as by Satan and wicked men, insofar as they are not regenerate, as oft as God does execute the just counsels and decrees of his eternal will, He declares his own strength and efficacy in his work by them, which they do either ignorantly or else against their purpose. And yet, insofar as they work, God works not in them, but He looses the bridle to Satan, to whom, by his just judgment, He gives them over to be moved and possessed forward to all iniquity, that they may be carried to perdition, even by the instigation of the Devil and by their own proper will.

The End