Proofs & Arguments for God

Under Construction

Order of Contents

God can be Proved
Catalogue of Proofs
Proofs

That than which Nothing Greater can Be
Change or Motion
Causation
Possible Some Things are Not
Degrees of Things
Designs in Nature
Something is Finite
It is Possible Something Exists
Something is able to be Effected
Things with Parts Exist
Abstract Objects
Essence vs. Existence
Principle of Sufficient Reason
Truth
Imperfection

On Probable Arguments
Arguments

Design
Conscience
Providence
Law of Nations

That God can be Proved

Order of Contents

Articles
Books
Quotes
Historical
Latin
Biblio

Articles

1100’s

Lombard, Peter – dist. 3, ch. 1 in The Sentences tr. Giulio Silano Pre (c. 1150; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2007), vol. 1, pp. 18-20

1200’s

Aquinas, Thomas – ch. 12, ‘Of the opinion of those who say that the existence of God cannot be proved and that it is held by faith alone’ in Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1

1500’s

Melanchthon, Philip – pp. 39-41 of ch. 3, ‘Of Creation’ in Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine, Loci Communes, 1555 tr. Clyde L. Manschreck (NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965)

Ursinus, Zachary – 1. ‘Whether there be a God’ in The Sum of Christian Religion: Delivered… in his Lectures upon the Catechism… tr. Henrie Parrie (Oxford, 1587), Creed, pt. 1, ‘Of God’, pp. 294-301

1600’s

Arminius, James – sect. 5-14 in 14. ‘On the Object of the Christian Religion: on God, its primary object, and what God is’ (c. 1603-1609) in The Works… ed. James Nichols (d. 1609; Auburn: Derby, Miller & Orton, 1853), vol. 2, Private Disputations, pp. 31-32

Bucanus, William – Institutions of Christian Religion... (London: Snowdon, 1606), 1. ‘Of God’, pp. 1-2

How do you prove that there is a God?
Show me the principal reasons to prove there is a God

Bucan (d. 1603) was a professor of divinity at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland.

Le Blanc de Beaulieu, Louis – ‘That there is a God is demonstrated’ in Theological Theses Published at Various Times in the Academy of Sedan 3rd ed. tr. by AI by Colloquia Scholastica at Discord (1675; London, 1683), pp. 177-88 Latin

Le Blanc (1614-1675) was a French reformed professor of theology at Sedan.

Pictet, Benedict – ch. 1, ‘Of the Existence of God’ in Christian Theology tr. Frederick Reyroux (Geneva, 1696; London: R.B. Seeley, 1834), bk. 1, pp. 1-6

Pictet (1655-1724) was the Swiss professor of divinity in Geneva after Turretin. He was the last theology professor to hold the orthodox faith there as the Enlightenment was arising.

1700’s

Fiddes, Richard – Theologia Speculativa, or the First Part of a Body of Divinity… wherein are Explained the Principles of Natural & Revealed Religion (London, 1718), vol. 1, bk. 1, ‘Of the Existence & Attributes of God’, pt. 1, ‘Of the Existence of God’

1. Whether the existence of God ought to be proved, or can be proved from the principles of natural reason? 1
2. The first proof of a God deduced from the following propositions 11
3. That the being, which we have proved to be God, is not a material being 20
4. That the being, which we have proved to be God, cannot be the one substance of Spinoza 32
5. The proof of a God from the necessity of supposing a first cause of motion 37
6. The proof of a God from the consideration of an intending cause of things, and of the uses to which they are adapted 42
7. The argument of the Epicureans answered, against the necessity of supposing an intending cause from the formation of things 46
8. The arguments of the Epicureans answered, against the necessity of supposing an intending cause, from the several uses of things; with an animadversion or two upon Descartes 49
9. The proof of a God from the idea of a being that has all possible perfection 53
10. Whether the existence of God may be proved from general consent? 57
11. Whether we have any innate idea of God? 61

Fiddes (1671–1725) was an Anglican minister and historian.

Venema, Herman –

Books

1700’s

Abernethy, John – Discourses concerning the Being & Natural Perfections of God, in which that First Principle of Religion, the Existence of the Deity, is proved from the frame of the material world, from the animal and rational life, and from human intelligence and morality. And the divine attributes of spirituality, unity, eternity, immensity, omnipotence, omniscience, and infinite wisdom, are explained, vol. 1, 2 3rd ed. (London: 1757) ToC 1, 2

Abernethy (1680-1740) was reformed and was an Irish, presbyterian minister.

Quotes

1200’s

Thomas Aquinas

Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1, ch. 3

“But there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance, that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers, being guided by the light of natural reason, proved demonstratively about God.”

Summa Theologiae, pt. 1, q. 2, article 3, ‘Whether God Exists’, ‘I answer that’

“I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.”

1600’s

On Polanus & Heidegger

Charles Johnson, ‘No, Roman Catholic authors are not better on the doctrine of God’ (2023)

“…there was a medieval debate on whether the existence of God is self-evident. Augustine, Anselm, and Bonaventure reply that it is. Thomas says it can only be known by second causes, and that Anselm’s ontological proof is invalid. Many of the Reformed side with Anselm, including Polanus and Heidegger.”

Gisbert Voet

Syllabus of Theological Problems (Utrecht, 1643), pt. 1, sect. 1, tract 2, I. ‘Of God’, 1. ‘Whether there may be a God?’

“Whether God is able to be proved and demonstrated from the light of nature? It is affirmed against the Socinians.

Whether one is able to prove the deity most fullly, expeditiously, sufficiently and by a sole rule against atheists and amidst all men whoever they may ultimately be, provided they are not devoid of a reasoning and sane mind, by the revealed facts in the Old and New Testament? It is denied against the Remonstrants.
…

Whether it is lawful and expedient unto edification to dispute to prove God exists? It is distinguished.”

Select Theological Disputations (1648), pt. 1, p. 167 as translated by H. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (Wipf & Stock, 2007), ch. 4, ‘The Existence & Notion of God’, pp. 47-48

“Whether the existence of God may be proved by disputation…

(1) Where there is danger form the frenzies of atheists, this must be done sparingly, cautiously, compendiously and clearly. Where there is none it may be avoided, especially before the ruder and weaker and in catechetical institutions. There is will as a rule be sufficient to assume and adopt the principle [that God exists].

(2) The treatment must be taught kataskeuastikos rather than anaskeustikos, i.e., proofs must rather be brought forward for the truth than adversaries’ objections refuted… lest such things be taught by the very mention of them, and the devil take occassion of corrupt flesh to confuse men’s minds with horrible thoughts of the kind.

(3) But the way with books that are published differs from that of instructions given by word of mouth. In the former, especially if dogmatic or argumentative, this proof can scarcely be passed over. In the latter it may, according to the matter under discussion.

(4) One method is that of academic instructions and disputations, another that of the ecclesiastical. In the former theologians should be armed against antagonists of every kind. But this should be done with such care and circumspection, that it does not appear to be an airing of a dialectical problem.

These distinctions being applied, we agree that (since the importunity of the ungodly does not create the necessity for us) there should be no dispute among Christians as to ‘whether there be a God’.”

Select Theological Disputations, vol. 1 tr. by AI by Onku (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberg, 1648), pt. 1 Latin

pp. 70-78

“11th Problem: Whether the most excellent, most expeditious, most sufficient and only rule of proving the deity against atheists and among men, whoever they may at last be, provided that they are not devoid of judgment and a sane mind, is from the revelations made in the Old and New Testaments.

I respond: The Remonstrants indeed think so in their Confession, ch. 1, sect. 2 and Apology, ch. 1, sect. 2, fol. 25, where they seem to hand over to the adversary, atheists, the whole cause of natural notions and the internal testimony from the conscience of each man, as well as of arguments from the book and principles of nature, and thus nearly the whole method of proving God, with this ἐφύμνιον besides having been added:

The Remonstrants love to follow the plain, easy, and brief things which the rude and unlearned immediately perceive without any labor, and all the most learned are compelled to admit (unless they want to play the part of cavillers and manifestly prevaricate), such as this is:

‘Those signs, prodigies, powers, etc. [in Scripture] were done; therefore, God exists, and He who did them is the true God and the religion which He prescribed is the true and divine religion.’

This argument can be felt at first sight. The remaining [arguments], which are deduced from philosophical principles, are so laboriously elaborated [say the Remonstrants], involved in so many exceptions, entangled in so many definitions, hypotheses and postulates that the unlearned often cannot follow them and all the most learned not infrequently find something which they desire in them.

I respond:

1. Thus is blown away and proudly despised whatever the intellects of all theologians, philosophers, and philologists have hitherto gathered against the wanton and impious skepticisms of the atheists. The Remonstrants alone, of course, are men here; the rest are ἀφημένην ἄγραν.

2. Specifically, natural notions, synteresis and conscience are relegated from this armory, which those persons who treat these things think should be tenaciously retained, and through which we contend that atheists are most felicitously oppugned–indeed, without which principles we contend that no demonstrations against them can be constructed. Let all the authors be seen who prove that there is a God:

Especially Mornay, On the Truth of the Christian Religion, ch. 1; Mersenne on Gen. 1, cited by us before; Lessius, Against the Atheists.

From the philosophers, all the metaphysicians whose disputations or systems are today worn by the hands of students.

From the philologists, Lipsius, Epistle to Berchemius, century 2, to the Belgians.

Indeed, even from the Gentiles, Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, bk. 8, ch. 1, and Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, bk. 1, and Dio Chrysostom, oration 12.

To whom let them add their own [Remonstrant, Hugo] Grotius, in his Demonstration of Religion, at the beginning; especially also Vorstius, in his book, On God, and their preceptor Arminius, Private Disputation 14, from thesis 4 to the end.

Even the Socinian Völkel himself, with Crellius, in the Institutes, bk. 1, ch. 5, where he does not reject the instinct of nature. We will soon cite more authors, among whom are fathers and scholastics, for the universal consensus.

3. How they may oppose this argument of theirs taken from the history of the Old and New Testaments to those who deny all the authority of Scripture, or call it into doubt, which atheists do, especially if there are any educated among the gentiles or Turks–here hands will have to be given and arms cast down by these new and compendious disputants, as long as the adversary atheists do not agree with them in that supernatural principle (namely, of Scripture). No escape lies open because they [the Remonstrants] explode, or do not make so much of, the natural light and principle common to all men.

4. Finally, the anonymous Remonstrant himself, taught by us in Thersites Heautontimoroumenos, and compelled by the force of truth, whatever he had skeptically disputed against us for speculative atheists and the abolished natural knowledge, at last was compelled to conclude thus in his latest writing titled, Gymnasium Ultrajectinum, p. 187:

‘Hence we will also most firmly demonstrate (note well) that there is a God, who, with no one denying, has so intimately insinuated Himself into the consciences of countless men that even very many of the impious, some reluctantly, others unthinkingly, have given Him testimonies beyond all exception.’

And later, p. 188:

“But if besides the testimonies of conscience which appear in very many, although they cannot appear in individuals, whence there is no need to dispute about the conscience of individuals–if, I say, besides these we also want to seek other testimonies, by which God is never destitute, and through which He can be found by groping, soon they will occur so infinitely that he who does not apprehend Him from any of them will have degenerated from man into a beast, etc.”

And thus, after the writers of natural theology, the antagonists of the atheists, philosophical booklets and the writers of common places, he [the Remonstrant] discourses through the heaven, moon, air, etc., and at last concludes:

“Who will not understand that they themselves (namely, men) were created rational not so much to live ungrateful as to seek by groping such a great benefactor, etc., especially since to this very end they have within conscience sitting as if before a tribunal in His name and threatening just things, etc.”

If he can reconcile these things with the dictates of his allies in the Apology and his own effusions before, he will be a mighty conciliator to us.

5. As to what the allies pretend, that they propose those things which the rude and unlearned easily perceive without any labor–this does not free them from prevarication and syncretism with the Socinians, if not also with the skeptical Libertines, that is, atheists of the second kind.

The question remains, however, whether the aforementioned dictates of theirs recently reviewed are true and useful for refuting atheists. If they are, let them not blame and scorn them, and along with them the universal consensus of all the wise. If not, then they vainly put forward the intellects of the more unlearned. For whether they grasp them or not, whether with labor or without labor, the truth is nevertheless in itself one and the same.

Besides, I add that here, according to their custom, they play games. When it is a question of whether there is a God, not only the unlearned but also the talented and learned, especially those, must be satisfied; for there are fewer atheists among the former, more among the latter, about whose conviction the theologians should labor. That the Theses of Episcopius (where there is nothing about natural theology) were written for the learned, no one, I think, will deny. That the whole Apology of the Remonstrants deals with almost nothing other than metaphysical rhetoric or declamatory Socinianism is known to those who have only lightly inspected it, and indeed [the Apology is] for the sake of the literate, not the unlearned–which they themselves show well enough when even to this day they could not prevail upon themselves to translate it into the vernacular language for the sake of their hearers, and to oppose it to the Censure of their Confession published by the [reformed] Professors of Leiden in Latin and the vernacular.

But let Grotius, that surpassingly erudite philologist and jurist, beyond all exception greater among them, take away this ludicrous and inept pretext–he who dedicates his Proof of the Christian Religion, written in Dutch verse (in which, following the customary method, he proves deity from philosophical principles drawn from the book of nature and conscience), to his Dutch countrymen, especially the more unlearned–sailors, clearly, and naval associates, who on account of commerce with the Indians and other barbarians often have to deal with atheists and infidels.

12th Problem: Whether so far a genuine and certain method of defending the divinity or deity and its providence, and at the same time the common principles of knowing, against atheists, skeptics, Epicureans and other fanatics, has been found and applied by the wise, so that they have been solidly and evidently convinced, if not passively, at least actively?

I respond in the affirmative, with all of Christendom, with all schools and wise theologians and philosophers, ancient and more recent, of whatever profession in the Christian religion, to say nothing about pagans, Muslims, Jews. We will indicate the classes and titles of proofs below in thesis 4. We do not want this universal wisdom of all ages to be idly ridiculed and rejected, and this worn and safe path to be removed so that a new one not yet found, not yet examined, but so far remaining in mere potency and chaos, or if you prefer, in imagination and the vanity of promises and great chasms, may be substituted for it.

For those who do this, or encourage those rash attempts, prostitute the cause of God and truth too much among atheists and skeptics, and (whether prudently or imprudently, God knows) confirm the hands of the impious not a little; moreover, they injure right reason, natural light, and God’s gifts–indeed, even the Holy Spirit Himself, who Himself taught and applied this method, Isa. 40, Ps. 19, Acts 17, Rom. 1, etc. as will soon be said. I hope that those who have a drop of piety will withdraw from this rash and dangerous opinion, lest they be implicated in blasphemies, as if, for example, the Holy Spirit in Scripture had handed down to us and employed an uncertain and less evident and safe method of convincing Epicureans or atheists, so that his own concepts must now be aided, perfected, or corrected by some petty philosopher.

13th Problem: Whether in this method the proof or consequence from effect to cause, or from works to the maker, which they commonly call the way of causality with the saying of Dionysius the Areopagite, and the proof from the book of nature, makes a part and indeed the principal one. I respond in the affirmative, and it is proven:

1. By the authority and example of the Holy Spirit: Rom. 1:19-20; Acts 14:15-17, 17:27-28; Ps. 8:2-4 & 19:1-3, etc., Job 38-39, Isa. 40:21-22, 26; Jer. 10:10-11. These passages should be carefully considered, in which you will hear God himself, the prophets and the apostles disputing by this method.

Secondly, this method is defended against all objections, as can be seen among the scholastics on [Thomas’s Summa,] pt. 1, quest. 2, articles 2-3.

Thirdly, it has been felicitously employed and applied thus far by all the wise men of all ages. Those who object to this method today are one or another inept petty philosopher, or certain idle Athenians eager for novelty (Acts 17), or men who are scarcely semi-literate, especially in metaphysics and natural theology, to the point that they have never even learned the terms or heard of them in conversation. But there are those who have already exposed, and will further expose, the ineptitudes and vertigos of those men.

Meanwhile, on this occasion, let the following be considered and compared:

1. From the Fathers: Lactantius, bk. 1, ch. 2; Eusebius, bk. 1 of Preparation for the Gospel; Theodoret’s Discourses on Providence, and On the Cure of Greek Affections, oration 3; the aforementioned Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names, ch. 17; John of Damascus, bk. 1, On the Orthodox Faith, ch. 3.

2. From the Scholastics: Thomas Aquinas, Opusculum 6 and bk 1, Against the Gentiles, chs. 12-13, and Summa, pt 1, quest. 2, articles 2-3, with Cajetan and other commentators. [Peter Lombard] The Master of the Sentences, bk. 1, distinct. 3, and all his commentators there.

3. From the natural theologians and antagonists of the atheists, Epicureans, gentiles, etc.: Savonarola in The Triumph of the Cross, bk. 1, ch. 6; Raymond of Sabunde in his Natural Theology (which was translated into French by Michel de Montaigne), ch. 1; Steuchus in The Perennial Philosophy, bk. 7, ch. 22; Luis Vives, On the Truth of the Christian Religion, bk. 1, ch. 9; Mutius Pansa in The Kiss of Christian & Pagan Philosophy; Mornay, On the Truth of the Christian Religion, chs. 1, 11-12; Thomas à Jesu, On Procuring the Salvation of the Gentiles, bk. 11, chs. 6 & 8; Possevinus, bk. 10 of the Select Library, ch. 2, sect. 414; Charron, bk. 1 of Truth, chs. 6-7; Pierre Du Moulin in his little book On the Knowledge of God; Alsted in his Natural Theology; Grotius in his book On the Truth of the Faith; Guillaume de Rebreviettes in his Atheomastix.

Add also the French tracts against the atheists: Alexandre Cappe’s in duodecimo; Baruch Canephe’s Atheomachus in octavo; the three tracts of Infanticus, Hotman, where in the first On Providence, ch. 2;

And the English ones: Smith’s The Quiver Against the Atheists, which was published together with his sermons; John Weemes of Lathokar in his tract, On the Four Degenerate Sons; Meredith Hanmer in his Atheomastix, Tract 1.

4. From the writers of common places, at least those who are intimately known to me or currently at hand: Philip Melanchthon, Wolfgang Musculus, John Calvin, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Andreas Hyperius, Stephen Szegedinus, Lambert Daneau, Daniel Tilenus, Amandus Polanus, in the common place on God. Compare also the same authors in the common place on Providence, and other writers who have defended providence ex professo, such as Leonard Lessius, Against the Atheists; Andreas Gorrutius, On Providence; Ulrich Zwingli, On Providence.

5. From the commentators on the aforementioned passages of Scripture: Juan de Pineda, Cornelius a Lapide, Juan de Lorinus, Andrew Willet, André Rivet, David Pareus, etc.

6. From preachers, practical and ascetic writers: Bonaventure in The Mind’s Journey to God; Robert Bellarmine, On the Ascent of the Mind to God, etc.; Jean Taffin, On the Amendment of Life; John Preston in his sermon on 1 Thess. 1.

7. From the metaphysicians: Francisco Suárez and others commonly.

8. From learned jurists, politicians, physicians, philologists: Innocent Gentillet in his Anti-Machiavel, pt. 2, axiom 1; Justus Lipsius in his letter to Berchemius; Hugo Grotius, On the Truth of the Christian Religion; Christoph Besold in his Specimen of Common Places, pt. 2, pp. 19 & 363 in the 16mo edition; François Vallès, ch. 58, Philosophical Sacred 9.

9. From the heterodox or suspect, the above-mentioned Arminius and Vorstius, especially Volckelius the Socinian in Institutions, bk. 1, chs. 2-5; John Trithemius in the book, Eight Questions, question 8 which is about providence.

10. From the Gentiles, such as Aristotle bk. 8 of Physics, Sextus Empiricus, Maximus of Tyre, dissertation 1. See many others cited by Plessis, ch. 2; 12 Against the Mathematicians, pp. 317, 319. Cicero, bk. 2, On the Nature of the Gods. Seneca, On Providence. Galen, bk. 3, On the Usefulness of Parts, which illustrious passage Beza described in the notes to Rom. 1:19.

11. From the Jews, Maimonides in The
Constitution on the Fundamentals of Law, ch. 1.”

14th Problem: Whether the knowledge of the senses serves and is presupposed for this proof of
divinity; and whether this means of knowing divinity is rightly used both for our own conviction
and confirmation, and for the confounding of adversaries, and defended against ancient and
new skeptics?

Answer: Affirmative, from Isa. 40:21, 26; Acts 17:27; Ps. 19:1-5 & 8:4; Rom. 1:19-20, and the authors cited in the preceding problem.

Nor can the pseudo-philosophy of those who rashly reject this principle of knowing and investigating divinity be entirely purged of scepticism or at least semi-scepticism; and consequently they silently accuse the Holy Spirit, because in recalling men to the testimony of the senses in these and other questions in Scripture, it has led them away from the truth and deceived them. Compare also Jn. 20:27 and Lk. 24:39-40. Let these things suffice for advising those who profess the Christian name and the divinity of Scripture.

See the objections of the sceptics against the testimony of the senses refuted among the
philosophers.

15th Problem: Therefore, can some dangerous philosophical notions [such as from Cartesianism], partly manifestly false and absurd, partly uncertain, involved and contorted, especially concerning metaphysics and natural theology, by which this well-worn and safe way of investigating divinity shown by the Holy Spirit Himself is removed, not only be rejected but also pressed by the affinity and consequences of scepticism, libertinism, atheism, in order to show the danger and forewarn incautious men, despite the fact that their authors profess knowledge of God and even some religion?

Answer: Affirmative. For although someone does not openly deny God but on the
contrary constantly professes knowledge of Him, and even defends against atheists (which was also frequently done by the ancient Epicureans and Sadducees, and today’s Deists, to say nothing of the Socinians, Vorstius, Taurellus), nevertheless dangerous and rash philosophical notions can be urged by those consequences.

But if he gives place to the conviction of truth and sounder counsels, he must certainly desist; if not, such pseudo-philosophical notions must not be absolved by the pretext and protestation of a peculiar opinion and pure mental error (if indeed it is judged an error). This seems to turn to that semi-Libertinism, Socinian-Remonstrant, about speculative heresy, which Vedelius
learnedly and solidly detected in the Mysteries of Arminianism.

This opinion of ours is proved:

1. From Scripture, Ps. 14:1; Eph. 2:12, 1 Thess. 4:5, 1 Cor. 15:32-34; Ps. 94:7; 59:8 & 10:11; Job 21:14-15, where they are burdened with the consequences of atheism or Epicureanism, who nevertheless did not openly attack all knowledge of divinity or divine providence.

2. By analogy, of idolatry either coarser or subtler, direct or indirect, which is burdened with similar consequences, whatever men are accustomed to protest against the consequent. Refer here the greedy, the voluptuous, etc. Eph. 5:5, Col. 3:5, Ps. 106:19-20; Isa. 44:15-17, 1 Cor. 10:7, 20-21.

3. By analogy of indirect or interpretive magic, by which are burdened the infinite actions and empty observations of those who protest that they are most alien to any diabolical pact and nefarious magic. See what we have noted in the disputation on Magic.

4. By analogy of other errors about the merit of Christ, free justification, and the observance of the Ceremonial Law,
which the apostle pursues with rigid consequences in the very faithful and brothers, Gal. 2 & 5:2, 4. Compare questions 30 and 80 of the Belgic Catechism.

5. From daily practice and common consent of any theologians and wise men, who impute the consequence of atheism to grave or capital errors about divinity and the attributes of God, also about the Word of God, promises and worship. See above pt. 1, theses 1, 3, 4, where the examples of Taurellus and other philosophers are especially to be noted, also of writers about God, such as Vorstius, and also of politicians and courtiers; though it is clear that they professed knowledge of God and some religion, some of them true religion.

6. From the sense and practice of orthodox theologians, who are accustomed to impute Libertinism or Epicureanism, atheism to the Papacy, Popes, and especially the Roman curia, Jesuits and their scales, both on account of dogmas and on account of morals and arts little Christian, as we will indicate below in its place.

Here refer the consequences by which both Libertines and Socinians, both neutrals and changelings, Ecebolii, apostates are burdened. I forgot in part 1, thesis 2 to write that for the Jews ‘Epicurus’ or ‘an Epicurean’ and minim, that is, heretic, apostate, are synonyms, as can be seen in Maimonides, Treatise on Idolatry, p. 83 of the Hebrew-Latin edition of Vossius in quarto.

16th Problem: If those who are sparing worshipers of the gods and infrequent, or occasionally neutral or nearly neutral in the matter of religion as the case may be, so indulge the vanity of their intellect as to contend that natural theology or the natural investigation and proof of divinity has not hitherto been shown by any of the wiser ones (not even by the fathers and Christian theologians); and on that account rashly substitute reasons thought up by themselves [such as by Cartesians], though false or inept or obscure and involved, for that safe and well-worn way: can their unhappy and vertiginous philosophy be reduced to absurdity by the consequences of atheism or scepticism, and those precipices be pointed out to the more incautious?

Answer: Affirmative, with a distinction, especially if they are not unlearned, or play with themselves in amiable madness. Those affecting the title and practice of a physician, if they bring harm on someone’s health or life, are not placed outside of fault, although they protest that they applied with good intention a new and best method of healing in their judgment thought up by themselves and substituted it for the received and well-worn method.

Thus the expugners of atheism and skepticism, if they betray the cause (albeit through error and imprudence) to the atheists or Epicureans or skeptics, and strengthen their hands by reason of their dangerous philosophy and rash innovation, can be reduced to straits by the consequences of atheism (at least participative and interpretive or indirect), lest their scandalous opinions spread too much and lead the incautious astray.

Those unhappy disputants [such as Cartesians] are justly beat upon with these absurdities and consequences, who imbued with the prejudices of the new Jesuit skepticism against the authority of Scripture, go about persuading the vanity of human intellect of universal doubt about all principles and truths (among which are also these, that God exists, that God is to be worshiped, that there is a distinction between the upright and the base, etc.), so that like a blank slate it may seek for itself an entirely new knowledge anew.

But there are not a few disadvantages of this dangerous method, one or another of which we here indicate in passing:

The first is that man is wrongly persuaded to willingly and knowingly strip himself of all natural knowledge, assent and persuasion of the truth, whether habitual or actual, even of the first principles both theoretical and practical. But an adult man cannot be in a state of ignorance of God and divine worship, that is, in a state of atheism, without sin even for a moment; he cannot hold back the truth in unrighteousness; he cannot induce or obscure common notions about God and divine things by his doubts or by affected ignorance of pure negation. True knowledge of God is prescribed to us by the First Commandment of the Decalogue, as all interpreters commonly teach.

The second is that man thrust down to that state of solitude, that is, to ignorance of pure negation or universal doubt, is too uncertain whether he will ever arrive at true and solid knowledge of principles and truths. Hope therefore is not to be bought at a price, nor are uncertainties to be preferred to certainties.

This difficulty is increased by the fact that the way and reason which is obtruded for emerging from this abyss of ignorance and struggling to certain knowledge is too slippery and impassable; at least by the admission of the authors themselves, it is obscure and perplexed, so that it can be grasped by few.

What then if someone remains in that doubt and ignorance? What if he always learns and never arrives at knowledge of the truth? What if he is thrust down through the whirlpools of scepticism into the abyss of desperation and atheism? To whom will we impute this? Will we not impute it to those murmuring flies, who neither understand themselves nor others, nor can be understood by others, especially blank slates and overly patient admirers of ὑπόνοια?

The third is that by this means those are driven more deeply into the mire of ignorance and atheism, who think less rightly about God and about knowledge of Him from both books or principles, both of nature and of Scripture; and that that excellent gift of God, Rom. 1:19, namely sound and sober philosophy, founding natural theology and serving the supernatural, is despised by this means; and the weapons are snatched from us by which the truth of faith has hitherto been successfully defended against outsiders and heretics. I would like these things to be considered by those who are touched by concern for orthodox theology and piety.

17th Problem: Must the lover of wisdom first [by Cartesianism] come to this state of doubt and universal ignorance in order to illustrate and perfect philosophy?

Answer: No. Because evils are not to be done so that good may come. But such an affectation of ignorance, and sequestration of all knowledge, and forgetfulness of the truth, which we have spoken of, is an evil, namely a sin against the First Commandment of the Decalogue, and against Jn. 17:3, Phil. 1:9-10, Prov. 4:5 and 23:23.

These men seem similar to the foolish philosopher who plucked out his eyes for love of wisdom, so that he could philosophize all the more freely. For they deny the external senses, and proclaim that those who use the aid of the senses for the knowledge of God are turning in the abyss of impiety. Moreover, they endeavor to extinguish for a time the internal light of natural principles, namely in order to kindle the light of their affected and admired knowledge. In both respects they seem to me to be silently accusing the Holy Spirit, Rom. 1:19-20; Isa. 40, Acts 17:27, Rom. 2:14-15, 2 Thess. 1:8; James 2:19.

18th Problem: Are the philosophical endeavors of those to be looked up to [such as of the Cartesians], or rather ought they to be suspect, who hold the authority of Scripture suspect on account of some things that occur there least congruent to their carnal sense, who explode the proven and common principles and axioms in the Christian world shining forth in logic and metaphysics, and do not substitute better ones for them; who consequently go about snatching the weapons from us by which hitherto the fathers, scholastics, more recent theologians and philosophers have proved natural theology and defended the supernatural against infidels, atheists, heretics; who teach to doubt all things, and consequently bring back the ancient scepticism; who make so little of Mosaic and Scriptural physics dictated by the Holy Spirit that they seem to prefer their concepts about the universe and the nature of things to it by far; who dismiss as inept all the demonstrations of divinity hitherto used in the Christian world by all, among which is also that from works to the maker, frequently used by the Holy Spirit in the Scriptures; and who consequently weaken the divinity of Scripture and silently charge the Holy Spirit with ineptitude and pseudography in the proof of divinity, and thus strengthen the hands of atheists and infidels; who have pleaded the
cause of God against atheists and sceptics in the most impeded, most obscure, most absurd, and most inept way of all; who profess that they have not made a vow to preserve a good conscience in all things before God and men; who admire and approve the new Jesuit skepticism and the blasphemous sophistry of those precepts against the authority of Scripture, which we have partly detected in the preceding disputation; who are sparing worshippers of God and infrequent, even according to that formula of religion by which they wish to be named?

Answer: I do not see a reason why Neutralism, or Epicureanism, or Libertinism, or skepticism and consequently atheism (but with a diminishing term, namely indirect and participative, at minimum) should not be imputed to such a philosophy, and those whose interest it is be accurately and maturely forewarned about this.

Judgment is not to be made in one way about the adherents and promoters of that philosophy. It must be seen whence they came forth, how long and with what constancy and by what machines they rolled this stone; how they accepted the admonitions made to them by others; whether the fish being struck have begun to be wise in some way, and to beware more of certain precipices for themselves; what means of instruction they enjoyed; whether idiot ignorance of the elements of philosophy, especially of the art of logic and the science of metaphysics, as well as of theology, drove men into this vertigo; whether intervals of melancholic delirium or amiable madness do not suffer their speculations.

Meanwhile, while they sweetly applaud themselves in their vertiginous and dangerous philosophical notions, they are to be plucked with absurdities and consequences, albeit ungrateful and harsher ones, if perchance they can be aroused from their lethargy. We have the example of the apostle, Gal. 5:2, 4 and Phil. 3, ‘Whose God is their belly’, and 1 Cor. 15:33-34,

‘Be not deceived: Evil communications corrupt good manners. Awake to righteousness, and sin not; for some have not the knowledge of God: I speak this to your shame.’

In a similar way the Papists are urged by our Catechism, q. 30, where they are said to deny in reality the only savior Jesus; and q. 80, where the mass is said to be a denial of the one sacrifice of Jesus Christ accomplished on the cross. By the theologians it is commonly imputed to the Pope from 2 Thess. 2 that he exalts himself above all that is called God or worshipped. And thus very many actions and observations of men by no means evil are urged by absurd consequences of idolatry, magic, superstition, who nevertheless seem to themselves to be as alien as possible from those things. Concerning which in the disputation on Indirect Idolatry, Magic, Superstition.

19th Problem: Have the ancient Skeptics and Pyrrhonians, with their fanatical trifles, been solidly refuted as promoters or attendants of the atheists and Libertines long ago, or is this praise reserved for certain new men [such as Cartesians]?

Answer: Affirmative to the first, negative to the second. From the things that occur in Tertullian, Augustine, Sextus Empiricus and the more recent philosophers.”

William Bates

The Whole Works ed. W. Farmer (d. 1699; London: 1815), vol. 1, ‘On the Existence of God’, p. 3

“But, ‘The fool saith in his heart there is no God.’ He secretly whispers in contradiction to nature, reason, conscience, authorities, there is no supreme invisible power to whom he is accountable.”

Francis Turretin

Institutes, vol. 1, 3rd topic, question 1, p. 169

“Can the existence of God be irrefutably demonstrated against atheists? We affirm.”

Historical

On the Post-Reformation

Platt, John – Reformed Thought & Scholasticism: the Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575-1650 in Studies in the History of Christian Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1982) 255 pp. ToC

Latin Articles

1100’s

Lombard, Peter – dist. 3, ch. 1 in Libri IV Sententiarum 2^nd ed. (c. 1150; Florence: College of St. Bonaventura, 1916), vol. 1, pp. 30-31

1500’s

Hyperius, Andreas – ‘Whether God is’ in A Method of Theology, or the Principal Common Places of the Christian Religion (Basel, 1567), vol. 1, bk. 1, pp. 73-89

Hyperius (1511-1564)

Danaeus, Lambert

3. ‘Whether God is’ in A Christian Introduction to Christian Theological Common Places (Geneva, 1588), pt. 1, bk. 1, pp. 3-5

Daneau (c. 1530 – c. 1590) was a French jurist and reformed theologian, who taught for a time in Leiden and other places. Manetsch describes Daneau as a “champion of Calvinist orthodoxy, with the expansive vision of expanding and extending the domains of secular knowledge… on the basis of Scripture through the use of the scholastic method of dialectic.”

A Threefold Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, which is on the True God… (Geneva: Eustathius Vignon, 1580)

dist. 3, ‘Knowledge of the Creator through the Created’

Lombard 42
ch. 1. 55-57
…
Censure, point 1 62-66

Junius, Francis – 11. ‘God, or that God is’ in Select Smaller Theological Works ed. Abraham Kuyper (d. 1602; Amsterdam, 1882), III. B. Theological Theses at Heidelberg, pp. 318-20

1600’s

Piscator, Johannes – 2. ‘Whether one is able to prove out of the Book of Nature that God is? We Affirm’ in Theological Theses (Herborn, 1606-1607), vol. 2, 9 Miscellaneous Questions, Another 9 Questions Illustrated, p. 375

Polanus, Amandus – System, 2.4

Jacchaeus

“There were also quite a few Protestant philosophers who, in the spirit of renewed Aristotelianism characteristic of the second half of the sixteenth century, developed the proofs as purely philosophical arguments.” – R. Muller, God, Creation & Providence (1991), p. 88 citing Platt, Reformed Thought, pp. 155, 159

Timpler, Clemens

See above on Jacchaeus.

Polander, Johannes – Theological Theses on God (Leiden, 1613) in Theological Disputations on the Principal Heads of the Christian Religion appended to A System of Theological Exercises (Leiden, 1627)

See Platt, Reformed Thought, pp. 157-63.

Crocius, Ludwig – A System of Sacred Theology (Bremen, 1636), bk. 3

2. Of the Origin of Man in Specific, where it is Specially Treated of the Existence of God 409
…
8. Of God’s Absolute Necessity of Existing 468-72

Crocius (1586-1655)

Maresius, Samuel

1. ‘Whether or solely by natural reason the existence of God may be solidly proved? Affirm, contra atheists and Socinians; and Calvin is liberated from the calumnies of Tirinus, and the natural knowledge of God, acquired as well as innate, is propounded’ in A New Synopsis of Elenctic Theology, or an Index of the Controversies of Faith out of the Sacred Scriptures (1646-1647), vol. 1, 1. ‘On God’, pp. 1-7

Maresius (1599-1673)

The Hydra of Socinianism Expunged (Christian Religion, Precepts of Christ), 3 (Groningen, 1651), vol. 1, bk. 1

2. God is Demonstrated to be out of the Universal Nature of Things 3
3. God is Demonstrated to be out of the Working of this World 8
4. That God is, is understood, being continued to be demonstrated by the working of this world 21
5. That God is, is displayed from things proper to man 49
6. That God is, is displayed from things which are, or are worked, before nature [i.e. metaphysics] 59-73

Chamier, Daniel – 5. ‘Of the Existence of God’ in A Body of Theology, or Theological Common Places (Geneva, 1653), bk. 1, pp. 4-6

Chamier (1564–1621)

Cocceius, Johannes – 8. ‘Of the Recognized Arguments from Nature by which it is demonstrated that God Exists’ in A Sum of Theology Rehearsed out of the Scriptures (Geneva, 1665), Locus 2, pp. 97-125

Cocceius (1603-69)

Prideaux, John – Introductory Inquiry: ‘Of the Existence of God’ in All the Theological Works Extent in Latin (Tigur, 1672), IV. A Bundle of Theological Controversies, pp. 531-33

Prideaux (1578–1650) was a reformed Anglican bishop and professor of theology.

van Mastricht, Peter – 4. ‘On the Existence & Knowledge of God through [Cartesian] Ideas’ in The Gangrene of the Cartesian Innovations, Gnawing & Consuming: Most of the More Noble Parts of a Body of Theology, or the Cartesian Theology Detected… (Amsterdam, 1677), Section 2, the Particular Points of Cartesianism are Exhibited, pp. 198-217

Le Blanc de Beaulieu, Louis – ‘God is Demonstrated to Exist’ in Theological Theses given & proposed to be Disputed at Various Times in the Academy of Sedan (London: 1683), pp. 90-97

Le Blanc (1614-1675) was a professor of theology at Sedan.

Turretin, Francis – 1. ‘Can the existence of God be irrefutably demonstrated against atheists? We affirm.’ in Institutes of Elenctic Theology (Geneva, 1679-1686; NY, Robert Carter, 1847), vol. 1, Locus 3, God, One & Three

Turretin (1623–1687)

Leydekker, Melchior – sect. 5-10 in 5. ‘Of the Existence & Names of God’ in A Synopsis of the Christian Religion (Utrecht, 1689), bk. 1, pp. 45-47

Heidegger, Johann Heinrich

sect. 1 of Locus 3, ‘Of the Existence & Divinity of God’ in A Marrow of the Marrow of Christian Theology, in favor and in use in Tyron (Zurich, 1697), pp. 16-17

sect. 1-6 of 3. ‘Of the Existence & Divinity of God’ in The Marrow of Christian Theology: an Introductory Epitome of the Body of Theology (Zurich, 1713), pp. 40-43

sect. 1-13 in A Body of Christian Theology, Exhibiting True Doctrine, which is according to godliness (Tigur, 1700), vol. 1, pp. 60-66

Heidegger (1633-1698)

1700’s

Van Til, Salomon – A Compendium of Both Natural & Revealed Theology (Leiden, 1704; 1719), bk. 1

Preliminaries of Natural Theology

3. Of Written Truths out of the First Knowledge [Scientia] 4-8

Section 3, of the Attributes of Existence

A. Of the Necessary Existence & Primacy of God 25-26

Voget, Albert – 1. ‘Of the Existing God’ in Institutions of Christian Theology (Gronigen, 1736), The Principal Part, pp. 70-74

Voget (1695-1771) was a professor of theology at Gronigen and Utrecht. According to Wikipedia he tried to combine the theologies of Cocejus and Voetius.

Stapfer, Johann

I. ‘Of the Divine Existence’ in Institutes of Universal Polemical Theology, Ordered in a Scientific Arrangement (Zurich, 1756), vol. 1, pp. 67-73

Stapfer (1708-1775) was a professor of theology at Bern. He was influenced by the philosophical rationalism of Christian Wolff, though, by him “the orthodox reformed tradition was continued with little overt alteration of the doctrinal loci and their basic definitions.” – Richard Muller

pp. 10-11 of 2. ‘Of the Knowledge of the Existence of God from his Works, even the prime fundamental of all Religion’ on Rom. 1:19-20 in Theology Analyzed (Bern, 1761), vol. 1, pp. 9-15

Beck, Jacob Christoph – Fundamentals of Natural & Revealed Theology (Basel, 1757)

4. Of the Existence of God 44
5. The Refutation of Atheism 78-86

Szent-Gyorgy, Stephan – ch. 1, ‘Of the Existence of God’ in The Natural Theology in Use with his Auditors (1784), pt. 2, pp. 129-86

Latin Book

Wolf, Christian –

Biblio

Quote

1600’s

Gisbert Voet

Select Theological Disputations, vol. 1 tr. by AI by Onku (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberg, 1648), pt. 1, pp. 172-74 Latin

“13th Problem: Whether in this method the proof or consequence from effect to cause, or from works to the maker, which they commonly call the way of causality with the saying of Dionysius the Areopagite, and the proof from the book of nature, makes a part and indeed the principal one. I respond in the affirmative, and it is proven:

Secondly, this method is defended against all objections, as can be seen among the scholastics on [Thomas’s Summa,] pt. 1, quest. 2, articles 2-3.

Meanwhile, on this occasion, let the following be considered and compared:

5. From the commentators on the aforementioned passages of Scripture: Juan de Pineda, Cornelius a Lapide, Juan de Lorinus, Andrew Willet, André Rivet, David Pareus, etc.

7. From the metaphysicians: Francisco Suárez and others commonly.

11. From the Jews, Maimonides in The
Constitution on the Fundamentals of Law, ch. 1.”

Catalogues of Proofs & Arguments

Articles

On the Post-Reformation

Heppe, Heinrich – sect. 5-6 of ch. 4, ‘The Existence & Notion of God’ in Reformed Dogmatics (Wipf & Stock, 2007), pp. 48-50

Heppe (1820–1879) was a German reformed theologian.

Heppe summarizes and translated a series of eleven “arguments of nature” Ursinus gives in his Common Places (p. 459) and then translates another list of sixteen from Polanus. Heppe comments on the change of how the proofs were presented (i.e. “scientifically”) with the later Wolf, as they were in Lutheran dogmatics, and ends with a quote from Voet on the nature of God’s necessity in contrast to that of creatures.

1600’s

Richard Muller:

“Much of Arminius’ theological writing came from the years prior to the debate over his doctrines and dealt with topics that were never drawn into the debate… the set of Disputationes privatae begun by Arminius in 1603… the noncontroversial and nonapologetic character of Arminius’ work on these fundamental topics…

the Orations and two sets of disputations include Arminius’ discussions of the presuppositions and foundational topics of theological system, the prolegomena and principia of theology as typically stated in the early Protestant scholastic systems… these resemblances indicate an interest in the theological patterns established in Reformed theology by his predecessors and teachers…” – God, Creation & Providence in the thought of Arminius (1991), pp. 25-26

Quotes

Gisbert Voet

Select Theological Disputations, vol. 1 tr. by AI by Onku (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberg, 1648), pt. 1, pp. 206-9 Latin

“Conviction [of atheists] involves assertion and confutation. Here only the method or titles and classes of arguments of the former are to be indicated. Leaving all others aside, I will exhibit here only those of [Marin] Mersenne [d. 1648, a Romanist] (who embraces all):

One is that all creatures in some way affirm the existence of deity;

2. That all men have that thought;

3. Because it is necessary that something be from itself;

4. From the eternity of truth;

5. From the best entity and goodness;

6. From the axiom ‘Whatever has the power of moving has it from another’;

7. From the grades of beings;

8. Because God is the light manifesting the rest, and it is known through itself that God exists;

9. Because a creature is a being produced by another from nothing;

10. From the beauty of each creature;

11. From the immutable natural law;

12. From our appetite [desire for something greater, best and satisfying];

13. From the concord of dissonant things;

14. From the government of things;

15. From metaphysical science, its object, etc.;

16. From arithmetic and algebra, namely from the monad, the principle of number, and other admirable things of numbers;

17. From geometry, namely from the abstruse and admirable things of figures and dimensions;

18. From music, where he discusses the harmony of the macrocosm and microcosm and the comparison of mundane music with human;

19. From astrology, namely from the ordered revolution of the stars, especially the swiftness of the diurnal motion from east to west;

20. From mechanics, especially the crane which lifts the greatest weight by the least force;

21. From any sciences and arts;

22. From other inferior sciences;

23. From all species of divinations;

24. From the six determinations of things which are indeterminate by their own nature–they are of (1) quantity, (2) disposition and parts, (3) duration, (4) figure, (5) multitude of individuals and species, (6) intension of grades, and existence;

25. From moral matters;

26. From all artifacts and from the stars;

27. From the collection of all beings;

28. From geography and hydrography;

29. From poverty, from the diversity of faces, voice, writing, states, gaits;

30. From the end to which all things tend;

31. From this, that an object ought to be assigned which can terminate and satiate our love;

32. From various absurdities and disadvantages and from the advantages which follow from the opposite or varying opinion;

33. From optics;

34. From gnomonics [using dials];

35. From architecture;

36. From nautical science.

And this is a most diffuse assertion. Its confutation occupied in the solution and attack of atheistic exceptions, twenty-six in number, I do not exhibit here because the reason of the theses does not bear refuting them. Let Mersenne himself be consulted, p. 234, and Valesius, Mornay, and others cited above in part 1. You have the marrow of them in Mornay and those who defend the Providence of God. In the course and repetition of the common topics which we complete in this Academy about every year and a half, we have hitherto set forth those classes of arguments to our students and to the best of our ability deduced and defended them.

The arguments [against atheists] are either intrinsic or extrinsic. The former are more as if a priori [from first things] or more a posteriori [from things following]. The former are drawn from certain principles and axioms of the light of nature:

1. There is not given an infinite regress in causes;
2. Nothing is from itself, or nothing is the cause of itself;
3. Whatever is moved is moved by another, and so finally one must come to an unmoved mover;
4. In order there is something first.

The latter arguments are drawn:

1. From the adornment, perfection, order, actions, powers of the creatures or universe, Ps. 8 & 19; Isa. 40; Rom. 1;

2. From the intellectual nature of angels, devils and their appearances, operations, ἐνεργήματα;

3. From man, the microcosm, considered both in his nature and essential, integral parts, etc., and in the symbiotic, economic, political, ecclesiastical, scholastic order, with the changes and rewards and punishments in this life: Ps. 8 collated with Isa. 40 and the Ecclesiastes of Solomon;

4. From miracles and prophecies, Isa. 64.

The extrinsic arguments or testimonies are:

1. Internal, of synteresis and conscience, Rom. 2, and here about the common notions;

2. External, the consensus of all nations, and the doctrine of all sages.

But with all reasons having been subtracted and repeated thoughts more often recurring, we have found that the order both of nature and of our better knowledge is rather to be observed and more safely served in this way, that the demonstration from effects to cause, from works to maker and governor, be put first as preeminent and universal, which embraces all others in itself since indeed all others depend on it and are derived from it, and all presuppose it. For no one doubts that the law of nature and of implanted common notion, and hence the acknowledgment and profession of deity, in addition miracles, prophecies and political order, are to be referred to the works of God.

As for those axioms about causes, about motion, about order, those complex principles would not exist unless those things from which induction and finally complex theses and principles arise had been observed in the works of God or creatures; there would not be observation nor induction about and from creatures unless there were creatures. But that this method is safest, most expeditious, and most evident, the doctrine and example of the Holy Spirit persuade Christians, Rom. 1, Ps. 19, Acts 17, Isa. 40, etc. To accuse Him of ignorance or pseudography is atheism lurking under the cloak of a Christian.

But if anyone having been advised persists in playing the fool and involving himself and the truth in mere begging of the question or obscure or uncertain consequences, such as [Descartes’s] ‘I think, therefore I am’, and ‘That of which the idea is in me, that very thing, etc.’–skepticism having first been inducted and all natural, innate and acquired knowledge having been erased or sequestered by doubt, and also all principles and demonstrations hitherto customary to all of Christendom, and indeed agreeably to the Scriptures, having been denied and snatched away, certainly to those proud betrayers or corrupters of the cause it must be suggested what Tertullian said, “Evidently the truth was waiting to be liberated by the Valentinians and Marcionites.” To the same men and their favorers all students and masters of all sciences, especially of theology, could say, “Render the legions. For easy is the descent to Avernus, but to retrace one’s steps, etc.”

Where all knowledge, even about God and the worship of God, about the upright and the base, about harming no one, rendering to each his own, has once been cast away, and the principles of the light of nature and the rule of consequences together with all logic and metaphysics put to flight, whence will anyone restore natural and supernatural theology to himself or others according to his pleasure, whence will weapons be at hand by which he may defend both against infidels, fanatics, skeptics, heretics, Libertines?

Since these are not matters of the geometric or optic or mechanic court, they must be seriously pondered by theologians and consorts of true religion and piety. God is not mocked. Woe to that man by whom one of the least is scandalized. What if ruder or flighty or distorted talents, having been entangled by the perplexed, ambiguous, uncertain, obscure inanities and phantasms of those men under the appearance of newly invented or illustrated philosophy (for the inventor himself [Descartes] admits that his inventions are grasped by few) or driven to desperation of obtaining knowledge, are cast into the dangers of skepticism and libertinism–to whom will this be imputed?

And what will we say about those ingrates who want to be blind with petulance in the very midday of truth, always seeking, never arriving at the knowledge of the truth? The truly pious soul [Philip] Melanchthon was presaging sad things for our Belgium from a river of blood and the petulance of talents, as Henry Antonides reports in the preface to his System of Theology. But about the fecundity and dangers of atheism in our Belgium we will advise below in three words.

Moreover, the method of disputing with atheists is either general or special. We have now delineated the former. The special method is chiefly fourfold according to the nature of the adversaries:

1. Against practical atheists and pigs of Epicurus, to whom almost none of the noted arguments are to be opposed, but conscience is only to be plucked by the daily judgments of God and the four last things;

2. Deists and naturalists or rather gentiles, against whom those arguments are not to be constructed (they do not deny God), but only those which first evince the justice and providence of God, then the authority of Scripture and the truth of the Christian religion, which occur in the writers of common places and the authors cited above;

3. Against Machiavellians, who hold religion to be a human invention, of whom there is the greatest number. These, because in name and profession they are men of letters or politicians, but in reality have not penetrated the hidden things of the sciences, ought not to be attacked, nor is it necessary, with the weapons just now proposed. Campanella well observes that Machiavelli was most ignorant of all sciences except human history alone (and that nearly only Roman). And so nearly history alone is to be opposed, and thence the judgments of God on Machiavellians suggested to them, and the natural notions dug out within and appeal made to their own sense and fear.

Moreover, the particular axioms of Machiavelli have been sufficiently examined by Stephanus Junius Brutus, Possevino, the anonymous Frenchman (Innocent Gentillet the Jurist) in a prolix treatise which he dedicates to the Duke of Alençon, Molanus in his treatise On Keeping Faith, Campanella, especially chs. 18-19, Contzen, Tolosanus, Bodin, Althusius, Keckermann, Thomson Against Lipsius and other political writers. The rest which are everywhere thrown out to the deception of the Christian religion by the Ethnico-Machiavellians (in which they agree with the Deists), the apologists for the truth of religion already cited sufficiently dissolve;

4. Against Naturalists or φιληκόους, Philosophers, physicians, mathematicians, Scripturists, historians, etc. For them, although fewer in number, Mersenne’s armory is properly constructed.”

Allan B. Wolter

Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), pt. 3, ch. 1, article 2, ‘Other Arguments for the Existence of God’, p. 81 Wolter (d. 2006) was a Scotus scholar.

“Many other arguments for the existence of God have been worked out in the course of time, among which the following come to mind:

Aristotle’s argument from motion (Physics 8.5), St. Augustine’s proof from truth (On Free Choice 2.12-15), the famous argument of St. Anselm, the triple way of St. Bonaventure (Disputed Question on the Mystery of the Trinity q.1 a.1), the five ways of St. Thomas, the very fine demonstration of Scotus, Ockham’s proof from conservation (see Boehner, ‘Zu Ockhams Beweis der Existenz Gottes’, Franz. Stud. 32, 1950, 50ff), and the argument of Peter Auriol (see Schmücker, ‘Propositio per se nota, Gottesbeweis und ihr Verhältnis nach Petrus Aureoli, Franz. Forsch., Heft 8, Werl i., Westf., 1941).”

Proofs for God

That than which Nothing Greater can be

1000’s

Anselm

Monologium [‘a Soliloquy’] on the Being of God ToC in St. Anselm: Proslogium; Monologium; an Appendix in behalf of the Fool by Gaunilon… tr. Sidney N. Deane (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1903), pp. 35-144

Anselm “at first based his perfect-being theology on Augustine’s axiom, that God is the greatest actual being (Monologion, chaps 1–3). To fill out the concept of God, Anselm directed, ascribe to God all attributes F such that whatever is F is better than whatever is not F (Monologion, ch. 15).” – Leftow, ‘3. Perfect-being theology’

Proslogium, or ‘Discourse’ on the Existence of God ToC in St. Anselm: Proslogium; Monologium; an Appendix in behalf of the Fool by Gaunilon… tr. Sidney N. Deane (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1903), pp. 1-34

“In his Proslogion, Anselm switches to Boethius’ axiom [from Augustine’s], and suggests filling out the concept of God by many arguments of this form:

(10) Nothing greater than God is conceivable.
(11) If God is not F, something greater than God is conceivable.
(12) So God is F.” – Leftow, ‘3. Perfect-being theology’

Anselm: “…this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak–a being than which nothing greater can be conceived–understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist. For it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists…

And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.” – ch. 2, pp. 7-8

“And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist… There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God…

For, if a mind could conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise about the Creator; and this is most absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others. For, whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist.” – ch. 3, pp. 8-9

“But what art thou, except that which, as the highest of all beings, alone exists through itself, and creates all other things from nothing? For, whatever is not this is less than a thing which can be conceived of. But this cannot be conceived of thee. What good, therefore, does the supreme Good lack, though which every good is? Therefore, thou are just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better to be than not to be. For it is better to be just than not just; better to be blessed than not blessed.” – ch. 5, pp. 10-11

“Therefore, O Lord, thou art not only that than which a greater cannot be conceived, but thou art a being greater than can be conceived. For, since it can be conceived that there is such a being, if thou art not this very being, a greater than thou can be conceived. But this is impossible.” – ch. 15, p. 22

“Therefore, thou alone, O Lord, art what thou art; and thou art he who thou art. For, what is one thing in the whole and another in the parts, and in which there is any mutable element, is not altogether what it is… But thou art what thou art, because, whatever thou are at any time, or in any way, thou art as a whole and forever. And thou art he who thou art, properly and simply… thou are all-sufficient to thyself, and needest none; and thou art he whom all things need for their existence and well-being.” – ch. 22, pp. 27-28

Responding to Objections

Robert Flint

Alvin Plantinga

For a summary of Plantinga, see William Lane Craig.

Norman Malcom

From Change or Motion

Articles

Antiquity

Aristotle, Physics 8.5

1200’s

Aquinas – ch. 13, ‘Arguments in Proof of God’s Existence’ in Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1

1700’s

Fiddes, Richard – 5. ‘The Proof of a God from the Necessity of Supposing a First Cause of Motion’ in Theologia Speculativa, or the First Part of a Body of Divinity… wherein are Explained the Principles of Natural & Revealed Religion (London, 1718), vol. 1, bk. 1, ‘Of the Existence & Attributes of God’, pt. 1, ‘Of the Existence of God’, pp. 37-42

Fiddes (1671–1725) was an Anglican minister and historian.

2000’s

Feser, Edward – ch. 1, ‘The Aristotelian Proof’ in Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ignatius Press, 2017), pp. 17-68

Feser (b. 1968) is a professor of philosophy and an analytical Thomist.

Fentiman, Travis – A Proof for God’s Existence (2024)

Aristotle’s argument for God from change was developed through Thomas Aquinas and more recently by Edward Feser. Fentiman has restylized it in a popular way.

Quotes

1200’s

Aquinas

Summa Theologiae, pt. 1, q. 2, article 3, ‘Whether God Exists’, ‘I answer that’

“I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways. The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion.

It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion.

Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except as it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.

Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.

If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand.

Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.”

1600’s

William Bucanus

Institutions of Christian Religion... (London: Snowdon, 1606), 1. ‘Of God’, Show me the principal reasons to prove there is a God, p. 1

“First, because there is motion in the world. Now nothing can be moved but by some being, which actually is.”

From Causation

Article

1700’s

De Moor, Bernard – sect. 10, ‘Arguments for the Existence of God: Nature’, pt. 1 in Continuous Commentary, ch. 4

Quotes

1200’s

Aquinas

Summa Theologiae, pt. 1, q. 2, article 3, ‘Whether God Exists’, ‘I answer that’

“I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways… The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause.

In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes.

There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect.

Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause.

But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.

Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.”

1600’s

William Bucanus

Institutions of Christian Religion... (London: Snowdon, 1606), 1. ‘Of God’, Show me the principal reasons to prove there is a God, p. 1

“2. Because there must be a primary cause, on which all the rest depend… 4. Because it necessarily follows that there must be some Summum Bonum [Highest Good] and first Being, which may be the cause of goodness, existence and perfection in the rest. 5. Because no cause is worse then his effect: now there are creatures which use reason, and a wise order, therefore the cause of these creatures must needs be most wise.”

Johann H. Heidegger

The Concise Marrow of Theology tr. Casey Carmichael in Classic Reformed Theology, vol. 4 (RHB, 2019), Locus 3, ‘On the Existence & Divinity of God’, sect. 1, ‘The Existence of God’, p. 21

“It also teaches things existing in the world, all of which are from another, to another, or on account of another. For bodies are not sufficient to exist in themselves and lack the power of motion, and those that consist without support and that are born from things unaware of themselves must be astonishing.

Nor can spirits, differing entirely from bodies, be produced by either bodies or other finite spirits, and they cannot be satisfied in any created thing.”

1700’s

Bernard De Moor

sect. 10, ‘Arguments for the Existence of God: Nature’, pt. 2 in Continuous Commentary, ch. 4

“The force of the argument for the existence of God sought from this universe because of the relationship between cause and effect, Hume rather stupidly denies; see Leland’s Beschouwing van de Schriften der Deisten, part 2, section I, epistles I, II, pages 1-36.”

From it being Possible that some Things be Not

1200’s

Aquinas

Summa Theologiae, pt. 1, q. 2, article 3, ‘Whether God Exists’, ‘I answer that’

“I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways… The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be, at some time is not.

Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd.

Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary.

But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes [see on Causation above].

Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.”

From there being Degrees of Things

1200’s

Aquinas

Summa Theologiae, pt. 1, q. 2, article 3, ‘Whether God Exists’, ‘I answer that’

“I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways… The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things.

Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like.

But more and less are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written [by Aristotle] in Metaphysics, 2[.1].

Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things.

Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.”

From Designs or Purpose being found in Nature

1200’s

Aquinas

Summa Theologiae, pt. 1, q. 2, article 3, ‘Whether God Exists’, ‘I answer that’

“I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways… The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world.

We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end.

Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer.

Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.”

From “Something is Finite”

Allan B. Wolter

Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958) Wolter (d. 2006) was a Scotus scholar.

pt. 2, ch. 8, article 3, ‘On Infinite & Finite’, p. 76

“68. When being is divided through contradictory attributes opposite to each other with respect to being [such as permanent vs. transient; eternal vs. temporal; uncaused vs. caused; necessary vs. contingent; act vs. potency; substantial vs. accidental being; absolute vs. relative being; simple vs. composite being; infinite vs. finite], one of the dividing attributes belongs to a perfection in being and the other to imperfection.

The reason is that one extreme of the disjunction formally involves the negation of the other. But both perfections cannot formally be perfections simply or pure perfections because, from conclusion 62,¹ pure perfections cannot formally exclude each other. Likewise, both extremes cannot formally be imperfections or mixed perfections, otherwise no being could be infinite (against conclusion 65).² But a true disjunctive should include under one or other extreme every actual or potential being. Therefore one extreme is a perfection (a pure perfection) and the other an imperfection (a mixed perfection).

¹ [62. No pure perfection is incompatible with another pure perfection. This is plain from the definition of pure perfection; for a pure perfection or a perfection simply is that whose formal idea does not involve limitation or imperfection. Therefore of itself such a perfection cannot limit the being-ness of the subject in which it is, and so neither can it exclude from its subject other perfections simply.]

² [64. Conversely, no being that is altogether independent and uncausable can be finite, either intensively or extensively.

65. If there is something finite, there is something infinite. I prove it as follows: a finite being, because it is also a caused being, involves the existence of another being, namely an uncaused being (from conclusion 23 and following [on pp. 45-46]). But from conclusion 64, an uncaused being is both intensively and extensively infinite.]

69. From this follows a general law of disjunction, namely that in disjunct properties of being, when the extreme that is less noble is posited of any being, the other more noble extreme can be deduced about some other being (see Scotus ibid. [Oxon. 1 d.39 q.un n.13]). The reason is that the one extreme involves imperfection and is therefore finite, while the other involves perfection simply or pure perfection. But from conclusion 65, if something is finite, something else is infinite and has all pure perfections in the highest degree.”

[Wolter’s proof goes on below in the section ‘From ‘It is Possible that Something Exists”.]

Intro, p. 8

“for when we prove the disjunctive properties of being
we by that fact demonstrate the existence and nature of the first being, namely God… God, in whom indeed is verified the perfect member of each disjunction, namely
permanent, pure act, uncaused, substance, absolute etc.”

From “Something Exists” or “It is Possible Something Exists”

Article

1700’s

Fiddes, Richard – 2. ‘The first proof of a God deduced from the following propositions’ in Theologia Speculativa, or the First Part of a Body of Divinity… wherein are Explained the Principles of Natural & Revealed Religion (London, 1718), vol. 1, bk. 1, ‘Of the Existence & Attributes of God’, pt. 1, ‘Of the Existence of God’, pp. 11-20

“1. There is something which exists
2. Something has existed eternally.
3. Something has been eternally self-existent.
4. What is self-existent must have all the perfections that anywhere exist, or in any subject.
5. What is self-existent must have all possible perfections, and every perfection in an infinite measure.
6. What has all possible perfection, and every perfection in an infinite measure, is God.

If I can show that these propositions are founded on certain and evident truth, and that there is a necessary connection between them, the inference I would draw from them is clear and undeniable.

…
2. Something has existed eternally… For if something had not always existed, nothing could ever have existed. To suppose any being to begin to exist antecedentaly to all other beings is to suppose it the cause of its own existence, and by necessary consequence to act before it is; but since there can be no operation either in order of time, or of human conception, previous to the subject of it, to say, a thing may act before it is, is in other words to say that a thing may be and may not be at the same time… there cannot be a more express and flaming contradiction.”

Quote

1900’s

Allan B. Wolter

Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), pt. 3, ch. 1, article 1, ‘On the Existence of a Single God’, pp. 77-81 Wolter (d. 2006) was a Scotus scholar. The below continues from Wolter’s section in ‘From ‘Something is Finite”.

“We can briefly recapitulate the essentials of the preceding proofs and complete them in the following demonstration of the existence of one God.

Beginning from the necessary and evident proposition that ‘it is possible that something exists’, we lay down three conclusions: first, that some being from-itself actually exists; second, that such a being is infinitely perfect; third, that only a single being infinitely perfect can exist.

Conclusion 1: Some being from-itself actually exists.

I prove this conclusion summarily as follows: if something can exist, this something is either a being from-itself altogether independent or a being from another and so dependent with respect to its continued existence.

If it is from another there is required at the same time a cause conserving it in existence. If this cause is not a being from-itself there is either a) an infinite regress in conserving causes, or b) a circle in such causes, or c) there is an ultimate stand in some being simply first, namely in a first conserver that is not conserved by anything because it is a being from-itself.¹

¹ [Wolter speaks on p. 81 of ‘Ockham’s proof from conservation (see Boehner, ‘Zu Ockhams Beweis der Existenz Gottes’, Franz. Stud. 32, 1950, 50ff)’.]

But an infinite regress in conserving causes is impossible, for such causes must be simultaneous.¹ The like must be said of a circle in conserving causes. Therefore in either case, in order that something be able to exist, there is required as a condition sine qua non some other being that exists from-itself. But if a being from-itself did not actually exist, it could not exist.

¹ [“But what of the reason that a being persists? Either it is something that depends on another with respect to its existence and permanence or it is not… An infinite series of things existing simultaneously is impossible, because such a series would be simultaneously dependent and independent: dependent because it would be indifferent to existing and would not have in itself a reason for existing; independent because nothing would exist outside the series for it to depend on, otherwise it would not be an infinite series since limited and brought to an end in the being on which it depends.

By such a series then cannot be explained why something exists. This argument is confirmed by an example. Who would say that a sufficient reason for the suspension of the whole of a chain could be found in the length itself of the chain even though it could not be found in any ring of the chain?” – pp. 34-35]

Hence in brief, if it is possible that something exist, a being from-itself must exist. But it is possible that something exist, as is plain from experience. Therefore some being from-itself actually exists.

Conclusion 2: Every being from-itself must have every pure perfection in the highest degree and hence is both intensively and extensively perfect.

Every finite being is from-another, because no such thing has in its positive being-ness any sufficient reason as to why it lacks any pure perfection and indeed in the highest degree. Therefore the reason for its limitation must be found in
something else, namely in its cause. Conversely, no being from-itself can be finite either intensively or extensively.

Conclusion 3: Only one infinite being can exist.

This conclusion involves two things: a) that existing-from-itself belongs to only one nature, because such a being is infinite; b) that a plurality of such from-itself natures is excluded.

For Scholastics admit a double unity, namely essential or quidditative [what-ness] unity and the unity of singularity. The first excludes a multiplicity of species within the same genus, or the sort of multiplicity found, for example, in the genus of animal, which includes several species, as man, dog, horse, insect, amoeba, etc. The second excludes a multiplicity of individuals within the same species, or the sort of multiplicity found, for example, in Peter and Paul, who differ as individuals within the same species of man.

Proof of the two parts:

By the first is excluded the possibility of there being several infinite beings diverse in species in this way. To only one nature does it belong to be infinite, for if several essentially diverse natures can exist they would have to differ by reason of some essential perfection that was pure. The independence of a being from-itself or infinite being would exclude all reason for limitation. But on this supposition one or other nature would lack some pure perfection, namely the perfection by which it would differ from another. But the consequent is false; therefore the antecedent is too.

Secondly, one must note that this infinite nature is also of itself individual and singular. The sense is that this nature qua [as] nature is such as to be unable to be multiplied in several individuals, and so no difference contracting this nature to this individual is required… if there were two beings completely identical in positive being-ness, they would not be two but one being. But if anything does differ from a completely perfect or infinite being, it would be because it lacks some perfection that is found in the infinite being. Hence there can be a plurality of beings precisely because all beings beside the infinite
being are finite…

Some Corollaries

1. Whatever besides God actually exists or can exist is a) dependent on God as on the first cause, and b) a finite or limited being. For these conclusions follow from the unicity of a being altogether independent and infinitely perfect; for if
anything besides God were a being from-itself, it too would have to be infinitely perfect. But there cannot be two infinite beings.
…

5. If all mixed perfections are reducible to a plurality of pure perfections existing in limited degree, and if an infinite being possesses all pure perfections, the consequent is that God in some way possesses every positive perfection that is found or can be found in creatures, and indeed possesses it in unlimited degree.

Accordingly God seems to differ from creatures by something positive not possessed by creatures. Creatures, by contrast, do not seem, in the ultimate analysis, to differ from God by any positive perfection precisely but rather because they lack some
perfection that God has.

This notion is also expressed in the theory of participation, according to which creatures are finite or imperfect likenesses of God insofar as any perfection possessed by them is found in God either formally or virtually or eminently.”

Something is able to be Effected

1200’s

On John Duns Scotus

Oxon. 1, d. 2, pt. 1, On the First Principle; Allan B. Wolter, Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), pt. 3, ch. 1, article 2, ‘Other Arguments for the Existence of God’, pp. 85-86 Wolter (d. 2006) was a Scotus scholar.

“From the proposition ‘something is able to be effected or effectible’, which is immediately inferred from experience, Scotus proves a triple primacy of the first being, namely:

I. In the order of efficiency he demonstrates that 1) something able to effect or [something] effective is simply first; 2) an effective simply first is uncausable; 3) some first effective thing is actually existent.

II. In the order of finality he likewise proves from the same proposition ‘something is effectible’ three conclusions, that 1) some finalizing being, that is, which cannot be ordered to anything else and is not of a nature to finalize other things in virtue of something else, is simply first; 2) a first finalizer is uncausable; 3) a first finalizer actually exists.

III. In the order of eminence he shows that 1) some eminent nature is simply first in perfection; 2) a supreme nature is uncausable; 3) a supreme nature actually exists.

Next Scotus shows that this triple primacy, namely of efficiency, finality, and eminence, belongs to the same quiddity [what-ness] or nature. Having proved these relative properties of the first being, he proceeds further to prove the infinity of the first being.

Having proved infinity, he demonstrates that God is unique in nature, using six (or seven) arguments: namely first from infinite intellect, second from infinite will, third from infinite goodness, fourth from the idea of infinite power, fifth from the idea of the infinite absolutely, sixth from the idea of necessary existence, seventh from the idea of omnipotence.”

From Things with Parts Existing

2000’s

Feser, Edward – ch. 2, ‘The Neo-Platonic Proof’ in Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ignatius Press, 2017), pp. 69-87

Feser (b. 1968) is a professor of philosophy and an analytical Thomist.

From Abstract Objects

2000’s

Feser, Edward – ch. 3, ‘The Augustinian Proof’ Pre in Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ignatius Press, 2017), pp. 87-117

Feser (b. 1968) is a professor of philosophy and an analytical Thomist.

From the Essence vs. Existence Distinction

2000’s

Feser, Edward – ch. 4, ‘The Thomistic Proof’ in Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ignatius Press, 2017), pp. 117-47

Feser (b. 1968) is a professor of philosophy and an analytical Thomist.

From the Principle of Sufficient Reason

2000’s

Feser, Edward – ch. 5, ‘The Rationalist Proof’ in Five Proofs of the Existence of God (Ignatius Press, 2017), pp. 147-69

Feser (b. 1968) is a professor of philosophy and an analytical Thomist.

From Truth

Quotes

400’s

Augustine

Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace & Free Choice, & Other Writings, tr. Peter King in Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), On the Free Choice of the Will, pp. 56-61

“Even if we cannot be clear whether number is in wisdom or derives from wisdom, or whether wisdom itself derives from number or is in number, or whether each can be shown to be the name of a single thing, it is certainly evident that each is true, and unchangeably true.

Consequently, you will not deny that there is unchangeable truth, containing everything that is unchangeably true. You cannot call it yours or mine or anyone else’s. Instead, it is present and offers itself in common to all who discern unchangeable truths, like a light that is miraculously both public and hidden. Who would claim that everything present in common to all who reason and understand pertains to the nature of any one [person] of them in particular?

…We said that those things that we touch in common with the senses belonging to the eyes or to the ears, such as colors and sounds (which you and I see simultaneously or hear simultaneously), do not pertain to the nature of our eyes or ears but rather are common objects for us to sense. The same applies to those objects you and I recognize in common, each with his own mind. You would never say that they pertain to the nature of my mind, or to the nature of your mind…

…Then, in regard to this truth we have long been talking about and in which we recognize so many things: Do you think it is (a) more excellent than our mind is, (b) equal to our minds, or even (c) inferior?

If (c) were the case, we would make judgments about it rather than in accordance with it, the way we make judgments about physical objects because they are lower than us – we often say not only that they are so or not so, but that they ought to be so or not so. So too with our minds: We know not only that the mind is so, but that it ought to be so. We make judgments about physical objects in this fashion when we say that something is less bright than it ought to be, or less square, and so on, and about minds when we say that one is less well disposed than it ought to be, or less gentle, or less forceful, as we are wont to do by reason. We make these judgments in accordance with the inner rules of truth that we discern in common.

But nobody makes judgments about the rules themselves. When anyone says that eternal things are more valuable than temporal things, or seven and three are ten, no one says that it ought to be so; he simply knows that it is so. He is not an inspector making corrections but merely a discoverer taking delight [in his discovery].

Now if (b) were the case, that this truth is equal to our minds, then it would itself also be changeable. For our minds sometimes see more of the truth and sometimes less. And for this reason, they acknowledge themselves to be changeable. The truth, remaining in itself, neither increases when we see more of it nor decreases when we see less, but instead it is intact and uncorrupted, bringing joy with its light to those who turn towards it and punishing with blindness those who turn away from it.

We even make judgments about our own minds in accordance with [the unchangeable truth], although we are not able to make any judgment about it at all. For we say that a mind understands less than it ought to, or that it understands just as much as it ought to. Furthermore, the closer a mind is able to approach the unchangeable truth and hold fast to it, the more it ought to understand. Consequently, if the truth is neither inferior nor equal, it follows that it is superior and more excellent.

Now I had promised you, if you recall, that I would show you that there is something more exalted than our mind and reason. Here you have it: the truth itself! Embrace it if you can and enjoy it; “Take delight in the Lord and He will give you your heart’s longings” [Ps. 36:4 (37:4 rsv)]. What do you long for more than to be happy? And who is happier than one who enjoys the unshakeable, unchangeable, and most excellent truth?

People cry out that they are happy when they embrace with passionate desire the beautiful bodies of their wives, or even of prostitutes. Shall we doubt that people are happy in the embrace of the truth? People cry out that they are happy when, with throats parched from the heat, they arrive at a plentiful and wholesome spring, or, when hungry, they come upon a well-supplied sumptuous lunch or dinner. Shall we deny that we are happy when we are refreshed and nourished by the truth? …Are we afraid to set up the happy life in the light of truth?

Instead, since the highest good is known and possessed in the truth, and this truth is wisdom, let us recognize and possess the highest good in it and enjoy it completely, since anyone who enjoys the highest good is happy. This truth reveals all true goods, which people elect for themselves to enjoy – either one or many of them – in accordance with their capacity for understanding.

Consider the following analogy. There are people who elect what they like to look at in the sunlight, and take pleasure in the sight. And if they were by chance to be supplied with sound, healthier, and quite powerful eyes, they would like nothing better than to gaze at the Sun itself, which also sheds its light on the rest of the things that weaker eyes take pleasure in. Likewise, when the sharp, healthy, and strong sight of the mind is trained upon many unchangeable truths with its sure reason, it directs [its gaze] on the very truth itself by which all things are disclosed; holding fast to it as though it were unmindful of the others, it enjoys them all together in the truth itself. For whatever is agreeable in the other truths is surely agreeable in virtue of the truth itself.

Our freedom is this: to submit to this truth, which is our God Who set us free from death – that is, from the state of sin. Truth itself, speaking as a human being among others, said to those believing in Him: “If you continue in my word, you are truly my disciples; and you shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free” [Jn. 8:31–32]. The soul does not enjoy anything with freedom unless it enjoys it with security.

Now nobody is secure in goods that can be lost against his will. Nobody loses truth and wisdom against his will, however. It is not possible for anyone to be physically separated from it. Instead, what we call “separation” from truth and wisdom is a perverse will that takes delight in inferior things, and nobody unwilling wills anything.

Hence we possess something that all can enjoy equally in common. It has no restrictions or defects. It welcomes all its lovers who are not envious of each other: It is common to all and faithful to each. No one says to the other: “Back off so that I too may approach! Take your hands away so that I too may embrace it!” All hold fast to it and all touch the selfsame thing. Its food is not divided into portions; you drink nothing from it that I cannot drink. For you do not change anything from its commonness into something private of yours, but rather you take something from it and yet it remains intact for me. When you draw in its breath I do not wait for you to exhale for me to then draw breath from it. No part of it ever becomes the property of anyone. On the contrary, it is common as a whole to all at once. Therefore, the objects we touch or taste or smell are less analogous to this truth than those we hear or discern. Every word is heard as a whole by all who hear it and as a whole at once by each of them; any sight before the eyes is seen at once as much by one person as another.

But these analogies [to the truth] are quite remote. No utterance is spoken as a whole at once, for it is brought forth and extended in time, so that one part of it is pronounced before another. Any visible sight is elongated (so to speak) in space, and is not a whole in any one place. All these things can surely be taken away against our will, and various obstacles prevent us from being able to enjoy them… To cap it off, even if the sweetness of light were always present for me to see, and of sound for me to hear, what great benefit would I gain? This would be common to me and the animals.

By contrast, insofar as the will to enjoy it is steadfastly present, the beauty of truth and wisdom does not shut out those coming to it… It is close to all the people in the whole world who take delight in it and have turned themselves to it; it lasts forever for all; it is never absent from any place; outwardly it counsels us and inwardly it teaches us. It changes for the better all those who behold it, and it is not changed for the worse by anyone. No one passes judgments on it, and no one passes judgments rightly without it.

And from this it is clear beyond a doubt that it is more valuable than our minds, each of which becomes wise by this one thing and passes judgment, not on it, but on other things through it.

Now you had conceded that if I were to show you something above our minds you would admit it to be God, as long as there were nothing still higher. I accepted your concession and said that it would be sufficient if I were to prove this point. For if there is something more excellent, that instead is God; but if not, then the truth itself is God. Therefore, in either case you won’t be able to deny that God exists…

There is a God who truly is, in the highest degree. This we now not only hold free of doubt by faith, I think. We also reach it by a form of understanding that, although as yet very slight, is certain.”

1200’s

Aquinas

Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1, ch. 13, ‘Arguments in Proof of God’s Existence’

“Another reason can be drawn from the words of Aristotle. For in 2 Metaphysics 1, 5, he shows that those things which excel as true excel as beings, and in 4 Metaphysics 3, 4, 27-28, he shows that there is something supremely true because we see that of two false things one is falser than the other, from which it follows that one is also truer than the other.

Now this is by its approximation to that which is simply and supremely true. Therefore, we may further conclude that there is something that is supremely being. And this we call God.”

From Imperfection & Degrees of Perfection

Article

1700’s

If I can show that these propositions are founded on certain and evident truth, and that there is a necessary connection between them, the inference I would draw from them is clear and undeniable.”

De Moor, Bernard – sect. 10, ‘Arguments for the Existence of God: Nature’, pt. 1 in Continuous Commentary, ch. 4

Quotes

1600’s

William Bucanus

Institutions of Christian Religion... (London: Snowdon, 1606), 1. ‘Of God’, Show me the principal reasons to prove there is a God, p. 2

“4. Because it necessarily follows that there must be some Summum Bonum [Highest Good] and first Being, which may be the cause of goodness, existence and perfection in the rest.”

Stephen Charnock

The Existence & Attributes of God, ‘On the Existence of God’ in Works (Edinburgh: Nichol, 1864), p. 151

“[God] Must be infinitely perfect. Since man knows he is an imperfect being, he must suppose the perfections he wants [lacks] are seated in some other being, which has limited him, and upon which he depends.

Whatsover we conceive of excellency or perfection must be in God; for we can conceive no perfection but what God has given us a power to conceive. And He that gave us power to conceive a transcendent perfection above whatsoever we saw or heard of, has much more in Himself, or else He could not give us such a conception.”

On Probable Arguments (or Arguments of Probability) for God

Quote

1200’s

Thomas Aquinas

Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1

ch. 8

“It would also seem well to observe that sensible things, from which human reason derives the source of its knowledge, retain a certain trace of likeness to God, but so imperfect that it proves altogether inadequate to manifest the substance itself of God.

For effects resemble their causes according to their own mode, since like action proceeds from like agent; and yet the effect does not always reach to a perfect likeness to the agent.

Accordingly, human reason is adapted to the knowledge of the truth of faith (which can be known in the highest degree only by those who see the divine substance) insofar as it is able to put together certain probable arguments in support of it, which nevertheless are insufficient to enable us to understand the aforesaid truth as though it were demonstrated or understood in itself.

And yet, however weak these arguments may be, it is useful for the human mind to be practiced in them, so long as it does not pride itself on having comprehended or demonstrated, since although our view of the sublimest things is limited and weak, it is most pleasant to be able to catch but a glimpse of them, as appears from what has been said (ch. 5).

The authority of Hilary concords with this, for he says in his book On the Trinity 2, 10-11, while speaking of this same truth:

‘begin by believing these things, advance and persevere, and though I know you will not arrive, I shall rejoice at your advance. For he who devoutly follows in pursuit of the infinite, though he never come up with it, will always advance by setting forth. Yet do not pry into that secret, and do not meddle in the mystery of the birth of the infinite, nor presume to grasp that which is the summit of understanding, but understand that there are things you cannot grasp.'”

ch. 9

“In support, however, of this kind of truth [i.e. of things of faith which cannot be known by reason alone], certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings.”

Arguments for God

From Design, Harmony, Purpose & Purposes in Nature & our Experience

Articles

1700’s

De Moor, Bernard – sect. 10, ‘Arguments for the Existence of God: Nature’, pt. 2, 3, 4 in Continuous Commentary, ch. 4

Quotes

1200’s

Aquinas

Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1, ch. 13, ‘Arguments in Proof of God’s Existence’

“Another argument in support of this conclusion is adduced by Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith 1, 3) from the government of things, and the same reasoning is indicated by the Commentator in 2 Physics. It runs as follows:

It is impossible for contrary and discordant things to accord in one order always or frequently except by someone’s governance, through which each and all are made to tend to a definite end.

Now we see that in the world things of different natures accord in one order, not seldom and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore, it follows that there is someone by whose providence the world is governed. And this we call God.”

1600’s

William Bucanus

Institutions of Christian Religion... (London: Snowdon, 1606), 1. ‘Of God’, Show me the principal reasons to prove there is a God, pp. 2-3

“3. Because all things are directed to an end. Whence it must needs be that there is some one supreme Spirit which does order all things, not only to their special ends, but also to some one sovereign end. Prov. 16:4, “The Lord hath made all things for Himself.”

From Conscience

Article

1700’s

De Moor, Bernard – 10. ‘Arguments for the Existence of God: Conscience’ in Continuous Commentary, ch. 4

Quote

1600’s

William Bucanus

Institutions of Christian Religion... (London: Snowdon, 1606), 1. ‘Of God’, Show me the principal reasons to prove there is a God, p. 2

“6. Because man’s conscience after sin committed, does naturally stand in fear of a supreme Judge.”

From Providence

Quote

1600’s