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TO THE VENERABLE AND MOST CELEBRATED THEOLOGIAN DR. ANDREW RIVET

Honorary Professor of Theology at the Renowned Academy of Leiden,
AND ALSO
Resident Curator of the Illustrious Gymnasium of Orange, which is in Breda of Brabant, and formerly Supervisor of the Early Education of the Most Serene Prince of Orange.

Venerable and Most Celebrated Sir,

These Disputations, which I have subjected to public examination on certain select topics and questions at this Academy, I have finally decided, at the urging of students and friends, to revise with additional efforts and publish in parts. Since I know that plan, as well as the initial writings of many of them, did not displease you, I have ventured to inscribe your name on this first part, which now goes forth. I consider the reasons for my undertaking to be quite weighty. The earlier and principal one is that by this public attestation of my gratitude, I might bear witness to how highly I esteem your most useful labors expended for the good of the church and the common instruction of theologians, as well as the favor and benefits with which you have privately honored me since I became known to you. The other reason is that this writing of ours, protected by the shield of your most celebrated name, may come forth into the public so much the more safely and may be able to evade or scorn the darts of any adversaries all the more easily.

For you are one whom, after so many labors expended in churches and schools, after publishing so many most learned writings, after winning so many trophies from adversaries, and after being placed above all envy in this blessed old age, learned men everywhere revere as the leader of the theological warfare and the honorary arbiter of our order. If these meditations of ours are approved, or at least not disapproved, by your seasoned and most practiced judgment, beyond the judgments of my Reverend colleagues about which I am certain, I will certainly dare to claim for myself the favorable votes of others who judge rightly. But if it happens that someone, whether through error or a sickness of mind, prefers to carp at some things previously condemned rather than interpret them charitably, it will be easy to defend the same things prejudged by your vote and that of my colleagues, and at the same time satisfy any fair-minded reader.

Receive then, Venerable and Most Celebrated Sir, this little literary gift with the spirit in which it is offered, and continue to honor the author with your accustomed patronage and favor, concerning which since I am by no means in doubt, nothing remains but to entreat our God that He deign to preserve you safe and sound for a long time for us and the entire church. Utrecht, the Calends of October 1647.

Admirer of your Venerable and Most Celebrated Name,

GISBERTUS VOETIUS

To the Benevolent Reader, Greetings.

Benevolent Reader, there are three things about which I have thought it proper to give you a brief notice. The first is that I have preferred to make a selection of certain topics and questions, rather than to publish and subject to public disputations all the common topics of theology in order. The reason for this was none other than that I did not wish to do a work already done, and to knock from the hands of our students those most useful books which they are accustomed to study familiarly, substituting for them things of mine that are not mine, but only descriptions borrowed from those authors and marked with my name. The books which our students most commonly use at our recommendation in their academic course to impress and refine their understanding of the common topics have been hitherto the Theses of Gomarus, the Synopsis of the Leiden Professors, Maccovius' Collected Disputations, Ames' Marrow and Cases of Conscience, Cluton's Outline, the Ursinus-Pareus Catechetical Commentary, and Diestelius' Catechetical Treasury. For I am accustomed to recommend these authors to our students, and to conduct the college exercises of examinations and disputations based on them. To these, once they are more advanced and already giving their attention to sermon preparation, they adjoin at our advice the reading of Tilenus' Body of Divinity and Calvin's Institutes, continuing the latter also for some years into their ministry.

"What need then," you will say, "for the writing and publication of your disputations?" I do not contend that there was such an extreme need for them. I only reply that in this matter I have yielded to the desire of students and other learned men and friends, lest I should seem to attribute too much to my own sole judgment, and to be consulting my own ease more than the benefit of many. Also, there occurred to me that saying of Augustine in Book 1 of On the Trinity, chapter 3: "It is useful for many books to be produced on the same subjects by many authors with different styles but not different faiths, so that the subject itself may reach some in one way, others in another."

Some topics for explanation I took up myself, but most others proposed them to me, and indeed sometimes inopportunely but otherwise opportunely enough extracted them from me when I was otherwise occupied - that is, when they thought that certain things ought to be treated more fully on that topic, or at least clothed in a different method and vesture of clear explanation, and applied more specifically to particular hypotheses, or to the present state of the controversy, or to the latest and newest objections of the adversaries; and also that some peculiarities deserving separate titles and full disputations ought to be supplied, which most of the authors I have just mentioned either passed over completely (for reasons no doubt known to them but unknown to me) or at least treated too briefly. Hence it came about that I have not explained in public theses up to this point a great many fundamental common topics concerning Scripture, the Nature and Attributes of God, the Trinity, Angels, Sin and the Fall, the Image of God, Providence, Predestination, the Person of Christ, Justification, Faith, the Sacraments, the Church, Good Works, Idolatry, Oaths, Ecclesiastical Discipline, the Ministry, etc., nor have I

allowed students to propose these topics transcribed from the Leiden Synopsis, or from Gomarus, or any other author in everyone's hands at present. For I thought I should spare them those expenses, since they can read and commit to memory those topics much better in the authors I have just listed, and if they wish, each can transcribe them into their own manuscript common topics.

Nor do we lack examples of most excellent theologians who at their discretion made such a selection, not treating all the topics in order - among whom Aretius shines forth in his Problems, not to mention the select disputations of the professors at Marburg, Giessen, and various places in the Low Countries, which are published every day. "But," you will say, "by this skipping about and selecting, the students are not properly instructed, especially in those most necessary topics just mentioned." If the whole academic instruction consisted in the prescribed disputation on such selected topics or questions, or if I alone taught theology at this academy, this objection might indeed have some color of truth. But the case is far otherwise, as our students well know. The smallest part, scarcely the smallest particle of academic instruction among us is in the common topics. In the public lectures, those topics I just mentioned, along with all the others, are constantly explained both in continuous course and on every occasion in the interpretation of Scripture by way of doctrinal annotation and digression; and they are aired in the corollaries appended to each public disputation. There are added most frequent private college exercises of examinations and disputations on one or another of the authors I have mentioned, or any other orthodox one, if indeed the students request it, or their circumstances require it. Not to mention the private colleges and conferences on controversies, either running through all of them from beginning to end, or separately on the Papist, Socinian, Remonstrant, Anabaptist, and even Jewish controversies. I can affirm that each of the professors is occupied with three or four, sometimes five such college exercises on the common topics and controversies - besides the colleges reviewing sermons and proposing cases.

Nor do we lack the assistance of some of our Reverend colleagues in the ministry of the Word, who are accustomed to hold some similar college exercises continuously for the benefit of the students. By this method, it cannot fail to happen that those of middling ability, applying due diligence, will by God's grace imbibe the conceptions of the common topics quite successfully.

Those also are mistaken, if any there be, who upon seeing or perhaps only hearing rumor of the titles of some of our select disputations, with I know not what prejudice or feeling, want to imagine that I alone at this academy must cultivate all of theology by public disputations, and satisfy the needs and requirements of any and all students whatsoever. Besides myself there are two Reverend colleagues who labor in this same vineyard, and besides select topics, they also expound ex professo some of those principal common topics I have just reviewed and all the attending controversies. Moreover, by the corollaries which are customarily appended to each disputation according to the choice or procedure of the respondents, whether by selecting from the capital topics and controversies or following the order of the common topics, they cultivate that field of the common topics assiduously enough and more. If any want to judge this matter fairly, let them just inspect their most learned and useful disputations, with the appended

corollaries, and they will confess that effort is made at this academy that our students may not lack necessary aids of this kind of instruction.

I could add that in the problematic disputations which I have decided to conduct on the common topics I have not yet expounded ex professo in public disputations, if God grants me life and health, I intend to explain some more difficult conceptions clearly to the best of my ability. I do not think our students will demand anything more from me.

The second thing which I wanted to give you notice about concerns the citation of various authors. Now it appears twofold in these disputations of ours - one at the beginning or end of each disputation, the other in the context itself. Concerning the former, I do not think I need give an account to anyone. For I can defend by the example of distinguished authors the fact that I have undertaken to provide for the public good here, and have decided to continue to do so with additional efforts in all my problematic disputations (until students have a suitable index of authors and topics), that which was produced not without some labor and expenditure of time.

Victoreflus in his Notes on Toledo's Instruction for Priests, and other Papist Theologians soon to be cited, lead the way here. And among our own, Chamier in his Catholic Pan-stratia, where for each controversy the writers of both sides are listed. Here especially to be consulted are those writers who have expressly constructed mere indexes of topics and anthologies, such as Molanus in his Index of Topics, Augustine Barbosa in his Anthologies on the Decrees of the Council of Trent, and Martin de Ripalda in his Anthologies on the Epitome of Lombard - not to mention Possevin's Select Library, Gesner's Pandects, and other most useful works of that kind.

Concerning the latter citations then, those which run through the context of the theses, something must be said, lest they seem to have been instituted idly for vain display, or to perplex and vex the minds and studies of younger men, or to diminish the authority of Scripture. And first let me borrow some prejudice in favor of this practice from the examples of those who are above envy and are held by Reformed Theologians to be beyond all exception - such as John Rainolds in his various writings, especially in his Most Learned work of Lectures on the Apocryphal Books, which is tessellated with citations of authors of every kind. Furthermore, Peter Martyr in his Common Topics, Andrew Rivet in his Orthodox Catholic, and also Vossius in all the theological disputations formerly held at Leiden, further in his tracts on Creeds and on the Time of Christ's Nativity and on Idolatry. To whom may be added Selden in his tract on Natural and National Law, which pertains to theology and the explanation of Scripture.

I could add from the more recent Papist Scholastics Suarez, and from the older ones Pelbertus of Temesvar; from the Casuists Azorius, Eligius, Basseus, Fragoso, etc; from Writers on Rites Bartholomew Gavantus; from Commentators Cornelius a Lapide, especially John Lorinus, who seems to surpass all the others in this respect. And what prevents taking an example from writers on Law, Politics, Philosophy, Medicine, who are accustomed to occupy themselves copiously in citing authors, both in their academic theses and in the books published by them ex professo? Let anyone who has the leisure compare Tholosanus in his Commentaries on the Outlines of the Wondrous Art, in his Legal Collection, and in his Politics; Althusius in his Politics,

Legal Theory, and Ethics; Besoldus in his writings on Law, Politics, and Theology - these three men are accustomed to multiply citations not only from Scripture and from the legal corpus and their own doctors, but also from theologians and philosophers. Furthermore, Gryphiander, Liebenthal, Carpzov, Ruvius, the Conimbricenses, Goclenius (especially in his Conciliator and Philosophical Lexicon), Zacchia, Canonhieri, etc. But omitting these, let us show the various uses of these citations.

The first use is in treating historical theology (if I may so call it with that distinguished theologian Dr. Altingius), the ultimate analysis of which is into testimonies and authors, but not into Scripture. For the theology received in any age and the errors and heresies opposed to the truth cannot be properly explained from ecclesiastical antiquities or novelties without citing authors. All recent writers on heresies teach this, such as du Plessis' Mystery of Iniquity with Rivet's Defense of it, Willet's Tetrastylon of Papacy, Gomarus' disputations on Antichrist and on the Creed, etc., Molinaeus' Catalogue of the Traditions of the Roman Church. Above all, citations are necessary when the question is disputed concerning the actual state of affairs - that is, whether the Papists or other heretics have indeed said, written, or dogmatized such and such a thing. See Vossius' dissertation on the necessity of citations in historical and antiquarian matters, book 3 of his Idolatry, ch. 84, pp. 1184-85.

The second use is in polemic theology, where the adversaries must sometimes be convicted by their own domestic witnesses, especially if they are stubborn and have turned a deaf ear not only to the testimonies of Scripture but even of the Fathers. For just as in former times Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Theodoret, etc. used to confound the Gentiles by frequent citation of Gentile writers, so today the antagonists of Atheism, Gentilism, Judaism, and Papacy confound those who do not admit or do not acquiesce in the testimonies of Scripture by means of human testimonies. Examples are the aforementioned Rainolds and Rivet, to whom may be added Morton in his Catholic Apologies, Ferrius in Orthodox Scholastic, James Laurent in many writings.

The third use is in those questions where a doubt is or could be raised concerning novelty, a peculiar opinion, an idiom, a prejudiced and commonly received view, the consensus of ancient or recent theologians. For it must be shown solely from citations of authors (not from Scripture) which side is to be determined on in that doubt. An example of this was provided by that supreme theologian Rivet in his tracts on the Origin of the Sabbath and on the Imputation of Adam's Sin. In citing the Fathers, they are frequent: du Plessis, Molinaeus, Robert Abbot, Jewell, Davenant, Ussher, Rivet, Blondell, and other most learned antagonists of the Papists.

The fourth use is in establishing the state of a controversy, and on this occasion in detecting the incrustations, dissensions, and intestine contentions of the adversaries concerning that state. Examples are the tracts of Andrew Crastov and Flacius Illyricus on the Sects and Dissensions of the Papists, and Morton's Catholic Apologies. This cause can only be conducted by sheer citations of authors.

The fifth use is in untangling those controversies to which a knowledge of philology and sacred antiquities is adjoined. For it is unknown to no novices in theology that such matters cannot be handled without citing authors. See the Theses of Gomarus, the writings of Rainolds, the notes of various writers on the New Testament - Erasmus, Camerarius, Beza, Casaubon, Heinsius, Grotius; the Commentaries of Mercer on Genesis, Job, Proverbs, etc.; especially the textual and sacred philological Disputations or Exercises of Helvicus, Crinesius, Tarnovius, Amama. Compare also the writings of Selden, Schickard, Drusius, Scaliger, Serrarius, L'Empereur, in which they explain various matters pertaining to sacred antiquities. See the above-mentioned dissertation of Vossius, book 3 of Idolatry, ch. 84.

The sixth use, a special one, is in certain moral and casuistical controversies, where it is not so clear to everyone which side should be favored, and opinions are sometimes admitted which are judged among all to be more probable and safer. Whoever deigns to inspect the Casuists will learn that the citations of authors make up some portion there, if not a whole page, at least a part of a page. Certainly our moral theology and writings on cases and counsels concerning ecclesiastical polity are no less fittingly amplified by the opinions and counsels of the more learned and prudent, than the ordinary legal opinions, academic theses, and treatises of the jurists.

The seventh use, also a special one, is in the explanation of the whole of natural theology, and in the untying of those questions of supernatural theology which especially require the handmaid of philosophy. No sound person will deny that the citations and comparisons of philosophical doctrines, opinions, and testimonies can then be made with profit. See Danaeus on Physics, Ethics, and the Antiquities of the Primeval World; Zanchi on the Works of Creation; writers on God, Angels, and the Truth of the Christian Religion.

Add also the philosophers, both Catholic and Reformed, some of whom we have cited above. The eighth use is to introduce students to the knowledge of various most excellent authors, so that if it ever becomes necessary to read or at least inspect and consult some one or more of them, they may know that they exist in the world of books, and how to inquire about them and what selection of them should be made. To this end we sometimes expressly indicate which among them seem more useful for our purposes by the abundance and fullness of their material, or the excellence of their method, or the subtlety of their distinctions and disputations, or their citation of various authors. For surely not all orthodox writers, much less all others, ought or can be read by everyone at every time, much less in the course of an academic curriculum, or even inspected or compared. I do not think that even Detraction itself could gather such an insinuation from my theses or the Theological Library previously published.

The ninth use is that by this means I may candidly profess through whom I have made progress, and from what sources I have drawn either some things or most things, or sometimes nearly all, and whence students equally with myself may be able to draw the same or even much more, if they apply diligence. For I am far from the opinion of those who think that students ought not to be told what aids and resources their predecessors have chiefly employed in order to excel in lectures, disputations, and writings above the level of disciples and the common sort. I profess

myself to be of quite a different mind. For whatever I have comprehended in my mind, whatever I have attained by constant reading, study and experience up to this point, I have been and still am most ready to communicate to my students on every occasion for the advancement of their individual studies, according to their progress - even extending to some manuscript observations of learned men and my own preceptors, and others, if any have ever come into my hands, and even my own marginal notes written either in some of my books or scattered on various papers. For "the good is self-diffusive"; and I consider that I enjoy the most abundant fruit of studies when, being about to benefit as many as possible, I deliver and commend all my resources to faithful men who will be able to teach others also (to speak with 2 Timothy 2).

If some prefer to transcribe from the theses and orthodox, methodical, perspicuous expositions of the common topics of others, accommodated to the present state of controversies, passing over some things of mine which are by no means useless, and thus to stand forth and be read by students under their own name, while not recommending the most useful books and even suppressing the names of the authors whose calf they have plowed - let them indeed enjoy their own judgment, I will enjoy mine. At least I know this, that to men of integrity and truly learned, no less than to myself, such a manner of acting, by which they dislodge the more excellent authors from the hands of students, so that all the extensivee domains of theology and all arts and sciences are henceforth to be read in the books of the Jesuits alone, and all are to hang in admiring dependence on the tripod of that one society, seems patterned after the Jesuits.

To Ludovicus Coelius Rhodiginus, a man of extensive reading and varied erudition, it is imputed as a fault that he concealed the authors from whom he transcribed: concerning which, see the dissertation of Vossius in book 3 of his Idolatry, ch. 84, whose conclusion alone I will append, p. 1185: "Therefore, since even in rational matters it is better to cite the ancients, because to them the first honor is due as those who first taught; much more ought this to be done in those matters which rest on testimony, where the authority of the ancients is required for another reason, since without it in ambiguous matters the entire authority of the writer limps. And hence they do not deserve praise who, in order that for the ancients they themselves may be cited by juniors as witnesses of antiquities, relate many things with vain boasting and to the great detriment of studies, but with an ungrateful and likewise arrogant spirit refuse to point out the source whence they themselves have derived benefit and whence others may be permitted to draw more fully and certainly." I add the prudent admonition of Gryphiander in his tract on the Islands, preface p. 14: "But I have always striven, by faithfully citing the authors, to avoid the stain of literary theft, of which not only many modern, but also many more ancient writers are accused - who appropriate to themselves the ideas and glosses produced by the ancient doctors long dead, so that they may gain the praise and glory of scholars, as Rosfredus of Benevento complains in the proem to his Questions on the Sabbath, concerning which Frederick Tileanus discourses at length in his Philological Discourses, fol. (for me) 40. And although an advocate is not bound to cite individually the places from the laws and doctors, according to the Speculum in the title on Disputations and Allegations..."

The tenth use is that by this means our students and any reader may be assured all the better that I am walking the safe path of the Reformed religion, and am not corrupting the plain and

genuine theology of our churches with unheard-of curiosities or profane novelties or far-fetched niceties and subtleties, especially concerning cases of conscience, the practice of piety, and ecclesiastical polity. Hence it is that I not only cite our approved authors, but also, where the matter so requires, the decrees and constitutions of our synods, public conferences, confessions, apologies, liturgies - as will be evident especially from the third and fourth parts of our disputations.

The eleventh use is that by this means I may in a way supply what is lacking in my own resources, when either the limitation of time or of theses or of my plan does not permit me to treat those matters at present, or at least not to treat them as fully or extensively as the fruitfulness of the topic or the gravity of the controversy would indeed require; or when they have been handled so readily and suitably to the capacities and use of our students by authors which they have in hand at our recommendation, that I judge it more useful and concise for them to read and impress them from those sources than for me to propose them anew. But lest students and younger theologians lack any guidance in this matter, I usually indicate several authors, so that if they have access to some or even one of them, they may not lack the necessary aid.

And these are the purposes of those citations. But if anyone in reading our theses would prefer to do without them, he is free as far as I am concerned to pass them over, and leave their use to others who demand this from me, or who think our disputations deserve to be acquired by them for this very reason, if no other. For our theses are not written for theological tyros ignorant of the catechetical and elementary principles, or at least they are not written for them alone.

But lest anyone cavil that I am merely giving indexes of topics (although I could do this by my own right, following the example of great men, and not without profit), I have frequently exhibited the very formal words of the authors, but almost never or very rarely those of Sacred Scripture. This was done with no other intention than to prevent the book from swelling to an unnecessary size, since everyone should have the Bible at hand or ought to have it, which is not so with other authors. Yet I did not wish to burden the book and the reader with the transcribed opinions of all authors on all points, but only with those which set forth the point acutely or very significantly or concisely, or whose authors cannot be consulted every day by many readers, or when the proposed topic requires authority and testimonies. But if this exhibition of excerpts, which has cost me no small expenditure of time and labor, should nevertheless seem useless to anyone, I will refer him to Photius' Myriobiblon, Busa's Garden and Basket of Faith, Crespesius' Summa Fidei Catholicae, and similar anthological and collected authors, at the same time earnestly exhorting him to endeavor in turn to furnish something far better and more useful than this by his own efforts. For no one, I think - certainly not I who recall that common saying, "One will rather carp than imitate" - no one will begrudge it.

The third matter about which I have thought to give you notice on this occasion concerns certain pamphlets published against my theology, academic profession, and ecclesiastical ministry in these last years by two writers, one a professed Papist, the other a Reformed theologian - in case you happen to come across any of them. The former is Rene Descartes, formerly a pupil of

the Jesuits, who came to our Low Countries from France some years ago to hatch the egg of his new philosophy under the pretended shade of freedom, or rather license, and settled in various places here. Because he thought that no ordinary impediment to his philosophy had been thrown up at this our Academy, which might be considered its cradle, in that a certain Professor who was to have installed his philosophy on the throne here was restrained by an Academic decree and the authority of the Most Noble Senate of the Republic of Utrecht, he did not hesitate in a notorious pamphlet in the form of a letter to Dinet, the Jesuit Provincial in France, stuffed with most fetid lies and calumnies, to make an attack on the Most Noble Senate of this city and the Distinguished Professors, and above all and beyond all others on me, who was then Rector of the Academy.

On the occasion of this notorious pamphlet, when Dr. Martin Schoock, formerly a Professor at Utrecht and then at Groningen Academy, had undertaken to examine Descartes' Method of Philosophy and his Metaphysics and had also introduced some retortion against his notorious pamphlet, Descartes wickedly feigned that I was the author of that work (of which he had obtained the first few sheets), in order that under some pretext he might unload the ballast of his insatiable and ambitious revenge. With the obstetrician aid, or rather material assistance, of some most wicked architects of lies - who seem to have studiously taken care never to tell the truth, safe under the protection of their own darkness and hiding-places, according to the axiom of the father of lies, "Lie impudently, something will always stick" - he thrust forth another notorious pamphlet against me.

Concerning this man's vertiginous contentions and metaphysical meditations, I do not consider it necessary to speak at length or ex professo either here or elsewhere - not about the former, because among truly pious and learned men who have deigned to inspect his insipid papers, I am certain he stinks; indeed, I do not think his name is held in such esteem even among the Papists, not even among the Jesuit fathers whom he professes to revere so greatly, that much labor need be expended on him. Moreover, his insane and notorious pamphlet published against me has been condemned and proscribed by public authority, and an action was begun to be instituted by the Most Noble Lord Magistrate of Utrecht (which, however, I do not consider to be extinguished), and his most crass and wicked lies about me have been so confuted by the testimonies of the Most Noble Senate, the Distinguished Professors, and the Venerable Ecclesiastical Consistory, that there is no need to light another torch at noon on this matter. Concerning which, two pamphlets publicly issued and indicated below on p. 868 may be consulted. Besides, some restraint has recently been put on his ignorance and temerity in the neighboring Academy of Leiden, which while he vainly champs at the bit, let him beware lest perhaps other Anticyras for curing this disease be prepared there and elsewhere.

It is not my plan here or elsewhere to discuss ex professo certain vertiginous and perilous philosophizings of his, or of any of his followers who tread nearly in the same footsteps, in such a way as to defile my wretched pages with his name and words. We leave to Physicians, Natural Philosophers, and Astronomers the examination of what pertains to Medicine, Special Physics, and Astronomy. But those questions which properly pertain to Metaphysics, Pneumatics, and Natural Theology, and by proximate and even closest consequences shake

Supernatural Theology not a little, I have decided according to the requirement of my office to treat each in its proper place in the public and recurring course of lectures on the common topics, in public disputations, and in private theological colleges, absolutely and abstractly and not restrictively to the eristic pamphlets and dictates either of Descartes or of any other individual - for the necessary forewarning and instruction of our students, lest by making a public attack on that man or any of his followers under their proper name in published papers, he might perhaps derive some light and favor for his ungrateful philosophy in the Papacy and among his Jesuit preceptors from the antagonists of Descartes or that mystic, namely the Reformed Academics and Theologians.

I suppose this has been the reason for other Reformed theologians as well, that content with private admonitions and furthermore with the corollaries of their academic disputations, they have not examined his philosophizings ex professo in public books up to this point. For as the author is beneath their wrath and combat, so are his meditations on those metaphysical matters in which he implicates himself in various and dangerous absurdities while understanding neither his own views nor those of others sufficiently, and even frequently laboring under ignorance of the very terms. Nor should it be passed over that this has been done quite sufficiently by the philosophers or theologians of the Papist religion, among whom is Gassendi, to whom we have not yet seen opposed a just defense and refutation of all objections and exceptions.

But if he himself or any other of his followers, putting aside idle rhetorical displays and worthless verbiage and personal calumnies, should dare not merely to determine the following questions by bare affirmation or negation or explanation by some similitude, but as a philosopher to defend them briefly, acroamatically, and syllogistically on one side or the other, and to respond briefly and in form to opposing arguments, or at least to proceed according to the method of Thomas and other Scholastics, I certainly do not doubt that his opinions will be examined by the same method not only by students but also by Academic Professors - Philosophers and Theologians of whatever religion. Now these are those questions:

Since the human intellect is affected equally by imaginary things as by real ones, that is, can be deceived, can any certain knowledge of truth be had, apart from the Scriptures or a special revelation of the Holy Spirit?

Can any certain knowledge of spiritual things, that is, concerning God, the Demon, the Human Soul, be had?

Or of corporeal things?

Can anything be known through the external senses, and can there be any certainty of this knowledge?

Can whatever we can conceive actually exist?

Does whatever idea exists in some human, actually exist?

Is the rational soul separable from the body, and by its nature or intrinsically and in itself immortal or incorruptible?

Does immortality conflict with natural light?

Or can it be proved against the Atheists and Epicureans from natural light apart from Scripture?

Can it be clearly and distinctly conceived as necessarily really distinct from the body?

Is it a substance, or an accident (that is, a quality or action), or a mode of substance or body?

Is it thought itself? Or the faculty of thinking?

Is it an attribute of thought which, together with extension, inheres in certain substances or matters?

Does it inform the whole body and all its parts? Or only some parts? Or rather none at all, so that it is present with the body just as a sailor with a ship, or as angels or demons are present with the body which they assume or possess and actuate?

Is a wooden or dead ox the same in species and substance as a living one? And by the same reasoning, is an accidental being the same?

Do animals, plants, humans differ in their actions from a clock or any other artifact by no other reason than as beings per se or per accidens?

Do the human mind and the body endowed with an animal soul constitute one being per accidens?

As long as the human soul is in the body, is it organic in all its actions?

And is the union of soul and body to constitute the human being substantial or accidental?

Can numerically the same body be resurrected and reunited to its surviving rational soul, and constitute one human being with it?

Does this not conflict with natural light and right reason?

Can it be demonstrated apart from Scripture by natural light that sins against the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth commandments are sins and not indifferent actions; specifically, can this be demonstrated against the Atheists, Epicureans, Gnostics, Libertines, Gentiles, Saracens, etc. concerning those horrendous crimes mentioned by the Apostle in Romans 1:26-27?

Can the existence of God be known and proved by nature?

Do the articles concerning the Trinity, the Incarnation of Christ, Original Sin, Heavenly Blessedness, and Eternal Punishments of Hell conflict with natural light and right reason?

Has the existence of God been rightly proved from natural light up to this point by the Gentile philosophers, and among Christians by the Fathers, the present-day Scholastics, theologians and philosophers?

Is there an idea of God in us, and can His existence be solidly proved from it?

Are there any principles or common notions innate to man, among them practical ones which are called synteresis?

Among other reasons, can Deity and Divine Providence be rightly investigated and proved against Atheists and Epicureans by the way of causality, from effect to cause, from works to artificer, apart from Scripture?

Did the Holy Spirit in Scripture teach such a method of proof? And if so, can it be rejected or postponed without blasphemy?

Is it ever permissible, even for a moment, to doubt whether there is a God?

I ask the same about the articles of natural and supernatural theology.

Can a man doubt all that he has hitherto known or learned, or even affect ignorance or forgetfulness of all things, in order by this way to arrive at solid knowledge?

Can a Christian doubt the divinity and authority of Holy Scripture?

Or the certainty of his own salvation, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit in his conscience?

Is the principle or means of attaining knowledge, and consequently the knowledge of God, certainly that newly proposed "I think, therefore I am"?

By determining all those questions, or most of them, concerning the certainty of knowledge, concerning God and His justice and providence, concerning the rational soul, according to certain new hypotheses, can the Atheists, Epicureans, Skeptics, Gentiles, Mohammedans, and others outside the faith, as well as the Enthusiasts, Libertines, and even Socinians, be opposed, and the truth of the Christian religion defended against them?

Can unbelievers truly be said to be without excuse before God and men, or can they be so called, as long as they have not become Christians or been brought by the illuminating grace of the Spirit to a fuller certification of the truth proposed?

Is the world infinite, or indefinite, or both?

Could it have existed from eternity?

Is there an imaginary space outside this world?

Is God alone absolutely infinite and eternal?

We add from Sacred Physics or the History of Creation:

Does the earth move with a diurnal and annual motion, while the heavens or sun are at rest?

Are brute animals endowed with a living or sentient soul?

The other who has issued books bearing not only my name on the title page but assailing me, is Samuel Maresius, Professor of Theology at the University of Groningen. The titles of the books are: "The Last Patience", etc., "Good Faith", etc., "The Abortive Tongue", etc. I am ignorant of the title of the fourth book printed at Groningen (but whose copies have not been distributed), nor have I been able to obtain a copy of it up to now. Therefore a more accurate description of it must be deferred to another time, although I have heard some things about the subject matter of that book from friends, of which I am said to make up a large part. For the present I intentionally pass over other books or pamphlets in which he does indeed censure me by name or periphrastically, but does not prefix my name to the title page. What occasions and reasons for these writings against me he alleges there, what causes he chiefly treats well, by what right, in what manner, in what style, to what end, I will not inquire now, nor will I oppose a full historical account or apologetic declaration on this occasion, but I will only try to stem this torrent with a simple and preliminary negation and protestation. This is in case it should happen that my ministry, and consequently through my side the cause and the Reformed Church, should be defamed among the adversaries of religion and others who do not know me, by the force of their customary inference, "From the crime of one, recognize all."

Among the Reformed in the Low Countries, and our own people to whom I am known, no protestation is needed against the pamphlets either of Maresius or a hundred others of that sort. For there, as Zeno's reasonings by Diogenes' walking, all the little clouds have been dispelled more than enough by the very light of facts, and with God's help will continue to be dispelled. "A sharper shadow breaks out, and none at all is cast." I had long ago conceived the plan of prefixing this public protestation to the first volume of my disputations, and had communicated it to my Reverend colleagues and other learned, pious, and prudent friends, none of whom, as far as I know, disapproved this plan. My principal reason, in which they acquiesced, was this: That I did not see how so many and so great crimes, repeated again and again in published and enduring pages bearing the name and authority of a Professor of Theology, as though true or at least most probable, could fail to find credence among adversaries and others to whom I am entirely unknown - and not increase the personal criminations of our theologians by Cochlaeus,

Surius, Linga, Lindanus, Bolleck, Coster, and similar writers - if I did not dare to undermine their credibility by at least some public disavowal and protestation.

For it would seem highly probable that they would vindicate their own good faith by saying that they are ignorant of our affairs, but that this public accuser, compelled by conscience and profoundly disclosing these depths of Satan (as he himself speaks in Ultimate Patience p. 425), is of the same order and religion as the accused, and consequently there is no reason to doubt the credibility of so great and intimate a witness who published those books while I was living and not contradicting. That rule of law, "He who is silent seems to consent," the Doctors commonly explain and limit thus: He does not indeed confess it; but it is certain that he does not deny it. Therefore, lest this rule with its gloss be forged against me, I deny and flatly deny that Maresius' criminations are true or have any appearance of truth, but on the contrary I protest before God and men that they are most false, whether Dr. Maresius himself has fabricated them under the delirium of brain fever, or whether he has rashly adopted and published as his own suggestions made by most wicked and mendacious whisperers.

And at the same time I entreat Dr. Maresius that he may at length have some regard for his own conscience and reputation and for the edification of the Church, and consider some most equitable retraction, erasing his malicious criminations with a deserved deletion. I also forewarn any readers, especially those alien from our religion and Church, not to scatter with implicit faith the categorematic excerpts from his books against me on the mere affirmation of Maresius, but to wait until they see them duly proved by him, or some honest retraction or recantation made. Now the criminations which I deny and against which I protest are of three kinds.

The first are those which, if true, would bring political infamy upon me, such as: That against my knowledge and conscience I solicited and impelled Dr. Schoock to bear false witness and take a false oath (Ultimate Patience pp. 108, 410, 412-415, 417, 420; also in the paragraph Octern. 1. p. 13; and Abortive Tongue p. 57); that I am a fabricator of false testimonies, a forger (Abortive Tongue p. 93); that I am conscious in my conscience before God of the truth of all those things which Dr. Schoock declared in the Groningen court (which Maresius reports in Ultimate Patience at the places just cited, p. 415); that I did some violence to my conscience when I brought Dr. Schoock, constrained by arrest, before the Utrecht tribunal (Ultimate Patience p. 414); that I taught or suggested Jesuitical equivocations (Ultimate Patience pp. 409, 412-413); that I falsely imposed on the Most Ample Senate of Utrecht against my knowledge and conscience, both by the written testimony of Schoock produced then, and by my own false declaration made before that Senate (Ultimate Patience pp. 410, 412, 420; and Abortive Tongue p. 57); that I wanted to drag Dr. Diestius, the theologian of Deventer, before the tribunal of my holy Inquisition for I know not what corollary, etc. (Ultimate Patience p. 263); that I falsely cited the testimony of Gomarus on the question of good works (Ultimate Patience p. 331); that I committed deeds tending to the ignominy of the whole theological order, so that he had to disclose those profound depths of Satan in that public book (Ultimate Patience pp. 422-423); that I incited Schoock to write against Vedelius, Salmasius, Maresius, and indeed with this sole argument that they were foreigners and strangers (Good Faith p. 61 and Ultimate Patience paragraph p. 34); that I circulate a thorny little letter under the supposititious name of Dr. Leschepper (Abortive Tongue p. 50), and

that by this writing I wanted to impute three little lies to Maresius (ibid.); that I imitate the man who, charged and convicted of many crimes by fit witnesses, had nothing else to reply to the Prosecutor than that he denies those things against him and his witnesses (ibid. p. 60); that I disturb the Republic and public peace (Ultimate Patience pp. 121-122, 294 and in the paragraph p. 4); that the Bailiff of Heusden did not escape a beating without my fault (Good Faith p. 63); that in the Abortive Tongue he relates the same deed differently, that I received blows from the Bailiff (p. 50); that in my quarrelsome, eristic, and pavonian writings I make impudent attacks on all, and show myself in all respects an enemy of peace, and rush violently on the truth and innocence with my son and through him armed with force, and by that very deed I answer as one born of the seed of robbers and vagrants, etc. (preface to Abortive Tongue); that the shattered hull of my reputation is not only weighed down but utterly sunk and shattered by fierce storms through my own fault and the just judgment of God (ibid.); that I want to claim for myself the ecclesiastical goods (namely of the vicars and canons or the five chapters of Utrecht), so that, if it please God, out of mere idolatrous offerings spiritual things may be made (Ultimate Patience paragraph p. 43 and p. 227).

The second kind are those which would impose on me ecclesiastical disorder, such as concerning my transfer and transition from the charge of the church of Vlijmen to the charge of the church of Heusden without any previous authority of either the classis or synod (Abortive Tongue p. 50); concerning the impediment I procured from the Most Illustrious and Most Powerful Lords the States of the Netherlands, that the Synod of Guelders should not be held at 's-Hertogenbosch (Abortive Tongue p. 162); that I have stirred up disputes with many orthodox theologians while playing the Aristarchus against all, and that this matter is known publicly (Ultimate Patience paragraph p. 26); that I incited a certain elder of the Walloon church of 's-Hertogenbosch against him, and confirmed schismatics against Maresius and the church (Ultimate Patience paragraph p. 30); that I am the man from whom that preciseness which I first introduced into Theology is observed in nothing more sacredly and precisely than in hatred and irreconcilability (Abortive Tongue p. 1); that I compelled my colleagues the Professors of Theology to subscribe the judgment against the Marian Fraternity by usurped authority (Ultimate Patience p. 155).

The third kind are those which would make me a heretic or heterodox person, such as the words and consequences, or at least the amplifications, which he scatters here and there concerning Pharisaism, Anabaptism, Brownism, Preciseness, New Theology, New Casuistry, Atheism, Skepticism, etc. (Ultimate Patience pp. 159-161, 304, 340-341, 243; Good Faith pp. 48, 55, 126, etc.)

Concerning which matters, because they can be treated more suitably elsewhere and on another occasion without naming the accuser Maresius (that is, to avoid scandal and out of respect for the order), and because I have previously dealt with some of the same things, I have not thought it so laborious to treat them on this occasion, especially since he has not yet enumerated the particular heterodoxies (of which Maresius promises hundreds in the Abortive Tongue, next to last page) in the pamphlets of his that I have read. For I have not yet seen the fourth pamphlet, whose copies are detained at Groningen and in which he is said to have spun

out this web, as it were. Meanwhile, because in a charge of heresy no one ought to be patient, I protest in advance that to my knowledge I have not hitherto taught or undertaken to defend any opinion in dogmatic or practical theology which conflicts with the common and received doctrine of the Reformed or Dutch churches.

Besides these three kinds of criminations there are also very many other reproaches, some false, some true - from most of which, however, I do not think the Papists and other adversaries will furnish collectanea for their defamations. Some of which also, if they were true, could scarcely harm my good reputation at all. Most are false, against which with the same knowledge and conscience as above, I likewise protest before God and men. These are, about my education in the orphanage (Good Faith p. 57, compared with Ultimate Patience p. -); about the Latin and Dutch determinations of the Dutch Professors edited by me against the cause of the Marian Fraternity which he defended (Ultimate Patience p. -, paragraph p. 42, 43); that I am the principal or primary author of Schoock's book against the new philosophy of Rene Descartes, and that I supplied the material to Schoock while he contributed the order and style (Ultimate Patience p. 415 and paragraph p. 25); that to the book of Rene Descartes published against me, in which he defends the cause of the Marian Fraternity and at the same time Maresius himself, who had previously written for that fraternity, I preferred to oppose proscription rather than counter-writing, like Alexander who cut the Gordian knot which he could not untie (he says "By what arts this was accomplished is not the place to tell," Ultimate Patience p. 240); that I petitioned the French Synod of Utrecht by a petit for an absolute decision (namely on the question concerning the Marian Fraternity) which I might oppose to the Noble Descartes and Maresius (Ultimate Patience p. 283); that from the time of my writing against the Marian Fraternity there has scarcely been any lecture or disputation of mine in which I did not insert something about this matter, in order to render Maresius' orthodoxy suspect to my students (Ultimate Patience paragraph p. 29); that I openly impinge on the decree of the States of Holland of April 17, etc. (Abortive Tongue p. 4); that out of my innate curiosity I compiled the escritoires of his friends to search for his letters (Abortive Tongue pp. 67-68).

He commits to paper and wants publicly read, partly his conjectures or suspicions concerning pious frauds, partly fabulous accounts concerning a supposititious letter by which the library of the so-called Archbishop Rovenius of Utrecht was made known to the Magistrate (concerning which he confesses I was well conscious in my conscience), and similar chimerical trifles which he confesses to have previously communicated to a friend by letter (see ibid. pp. 68-70). He seems to want to defend or excuse the Pasquil published at 's-Hertogenbosch and proscribed there, at least as regards those things which it contains against his own personal cause against me in the said Pasquil, though not as regards those things which touch upon some of the Magistrates there. Yet he denies that the whole Pasquil (N.B.) was ever seen by him before a printed copy was communicated to him at Groningen. There he calls it a "festive dialogue". He also confesses that he wrote some things to friends about me and my son (namely the principal lies which are objected against me and my son in that Pasquil), which things he says he leaves in the middle whether they are true or false (ibid. pp. 68-70). That he believes the letter of Fr. de Wael and John van der Hagen (which my son inserted in the Unrighteous Tribunal p. 163) to be supposititious, made by a man (namely me) in order to suborn false witnesses against him; and

that that letter was written to imitate my style; and that I abused the name of those good and simple men (ibid. p. 73). He calls the same letters "Voetian" on p. 75. That out of my Casuistry, Francis de Wael, Minister of 's-Hertogenbosch, would not drink to another's health, but was prepared to respond to the one pledging "in his memory". Whence he concludes that Francis de Wael swore expressly at my dictation and always favored my cause (ibid. p. 74). That besides all his merit, he received so many injuries from the Most Ample Lord Quaestor Zuerius at my instigation alone (ibid. p. 76). That I collect handfuls and seek enemies for him all over the world (ibid. p. 77). That the notary of 's-Hertogenbosch, William van Camphen, drew up false instruments in my favor (ibid. p. 76). That I abused the name of the Classis of Gorinchem to extort, collect, and publish the judgments of the Belgian Professors against the Marian Fraternity contrary to right and law, and that all these things were done by me under the name of the Classis (ibid. pp. 81-82 and Ultimate Patience p. 136). That I (presupposing or feigning that I am the author of the pamphlets published against him), by enumerating the crimes and lies which were objected against him by Dr. Leschepper and others, am the architect of false testimonies (ibid. p. 92). That I, the fabricator of false testimonies, have risen up against him with Philippics and satires (by which he means the pamphlets of Dr. Leschepper, Dr. Leeman and my son, and finally some anonymous writer who composed a vernacular history of the Marian Fraternity), furious defamers of the reputation of more honorable men, together with my frantic adherents (ibid. p. 93). That for fame and glory I pant only through the infamy and disgrace of my fellow-mystics; from the broken and melted statues of others I strive to cast my own; like Caligula I am prepared to remove the head from the statue of Jove itself to place my own in its place; I seek a bath not only from the blood of the innocent but even of innocence itself, to heal that leprosy and scab with which I am infected; I strive to confound heaven and earth in order most wrongly to defend my worst deeds; in short, while one says "Do not seek to learn evil," I am prepared to respond with Nero, "Nay, indeed I have learned it" (ibid. p. 94). That all those things on account of which I am now called in the pamphlet entitled Piety, etc. (which is Maresius' Ultimate Patience), and in the other titled The Unrighteous Tribunal (which was opposed to that same Ultimate Patience of Maresius and his Good Faith by my son, although Maresius ascribes those books to me everywhere), a forger, criminal, furious man, disgrace of our order, etc., were publicly objected against him by Voetius and the Voetians (ibid. p. 95). That from the writings previously issued by him, it is quite clear that I am not exempt from the crime of forgery, etc. (ibid. p. 96). And this he constantly affirms, notwithstanding that in my son's Unrighteous Tribunal he had seen or could have seen the testimonies, reasons, and oaths of Schoock to the contrary.

But I proceed, and add his threat on p. 97: "I will bring you to realities, and publicly note and impugn some hundreds of dangerous, slippery, false assertions scattered through your public writings, which you imprudently propound to the youth while pursuing paradoxes and worthless opinions; you adopt nothing from the authors you tumultuously revolve except what is most remote from the more received and sounder view; you overturn the whole idea and hypotyposis of Reformed Theology hitherto received; you build hay and stubble on the foundation once laid instead of gold and gems; you derive dangerous axioms from the pools of the Papists to adorn rather than to corrupt sound doctrine." Whether he pours out these and any others of that ilk in the third pamphlet issued against me by name and bearing both his name and mine on the title

page, without truth, without reason, it will not be wicked to inquire whether he has dipped his pen in a sound mind and a good conscience, when there (in his usual manner) he crowns the aforesaid pamphlet with the olive branch of peace (p. 97), and wipes his mouth as if he had done no evil (pp. 91-92), and says that with an apology merely cast forth he wrote such things with an intention not of reviling or re-reviling, but merely of defending and excusing himself (p. 95).

There are some things which are indeed justly but less justly and untruthfully imputed to me as faults (if indeed the bare facts are historically related without sycophantic additions or detractions), against which I do not protest insofar as they were done by me, but I freely acknowledge them and consider their relation not to defame but to praise me. But these are chiefly the following: that I opposed the new philosophy (Ultimate Patience pp. 406-407, 240, 245) - if he understands for my part and with my suffrage, I confess it and am not ashamed. For I would not want our Academic youth, and consequently that Academy, to be disturbed and rent by dissensions and contentions. That I oppose the new philosophy of Rene Descartes - it is so: at least I judge it to be inept for studies, especially theology, and not to be admitted into the Academies as dangerous. That I determine and judge differently in a case of conscience concerning the use and abuse of ecclesiastical goods and the abusively so-called vicars and canons, differently, I say, than he himself wishes or others whose interest is involved (see Ultimate Patience pp. 294, 431). That I oppose (in determining a case of conscience) the profits of the common money-lenders among us (see Ultimate Patience pp. 203, 299) - it is so, nor do I yet see that anything else is to be determined here. That I oppose the cause of the Marian Fraternity - I confess it, and profess that I will continue to do so insofar as I am bound by conscience.

In the first two I am confident that the universal consensus of all the Academies of the whole Christian world will not be wanting. Let the philosophizings of Descartes and his followers be sent to them, and let their judgment upon them be sought. In the third and fourth I have the supporting consensus of all ancient and modern Christianity. The theologians of Utrecht have given some specimen and portion of that consensus in some excerpts on money-lending published in the vernacular under the title "The Matter Judged". The rest will be supplied by a repeated edition of my disputation on Usury, if God wills. Concerning the use and abuse of ecclesiastical goods, some theologians and ministers of Utrecht have collected a great cloud of witnesses in a certain manuscript response to a question proposed to them. In the fifth, the consensus of the Reformed Churches, and among them of the Dutch Churches, is too manifest against Maresius and Rene Descartes - the latter of whom, although a guest in theology, especially Reformed, and a Papist in religion, has undertaken to treat this cause for Maresius against me (see Ultimate Patience p. 240), in order to make his notorious pamphlet against me more dense, as it were, and to conciliate some favor for that same notorious pamphlet of his among the associates of his own religion and the few Reformed involved in the business of the Marian Fraternity. That the consensus of our people is against these two antagonists in this cause renders me certain, both the judgments of the Belgian Theologians and very many other things noted in my writings under the title "Specimen" and in the disputation on Indirect Idolatry on this question.

Concerning my view and doctrine about money-lending interest, and concerning the use of ecclesiastical goods under the abusively so-called titles of Vicars, Canons, etc., I dare to profess the same thing, no matter how Maresius censures me on that account. If anyone still doubts, let him inquire the opinions of the Academies and Synods in France, Scotland, England, Germany, Switzerland, Hungary, Transylvania, if he has so much confidence in the cause.

Finally, in addition to the accusations above, let there be added very many other direct criminations as well as scattered aspersions by means of suspicions, false conjectures or false consequences, odious amplifications, with which I complain of being burdened and exposed to contempt and hatred.

Now these are those: That the intercessions of our common friends, even the exhortations, counsels, and efforts of the more powerful men of our Republic of Utrecht, have been in vain, and do not touch me, and nothing moves the honor of our order, the scandal to the weak, the edification of the church - that this idol of my honor is dearer to me than life itself, and is reverenced only with the blood and reputation of others (Abortive Tongue p. 2). That I directly and expressly endeavor and strive to prove him a criminal, wicked man, forger, disgrace of his order, etc. (ibid. preface). That by saying that reputation is dearer and more to be defended for me than life, I am reckless of divine honor, etc., or I persuade myself that the honor of God and my own are the same, just as the Canonists foolishly prattle that the consistory of God and the Pope's are one (ibid. p. 2). That I seem made everywhere for the stage (ibid. p. 7). That I have bound myself as an authority to the father of lies to smear on Maresius those things (namely concerning the beating and subsequent miscarriage of the wife of Dr. Chabaneau, Headmaster of the Gymnasium of 's-Hertogenbosch) which I know most excellently before God in my conscience to be most false and calumnious (ibid. p. 7). That Anna Hortense, the wife of Dr. Chabaneau, instructed me for reviling (ibid. p. 8). That I pant for the scepter of the Cretans, etc., and that I have now effected this by so false and impious a crimination, that not even any true thing spoken by me or mine should be believed (ibid. p. 9). That I employed someone from my adherents in 's-Hertogenbosch to fabricate this false testimony (namely of Anna Hortense, wife of Dr. Chabaneau). That the declaration of Anna Hortense is convicted of false testimony, and I equally who knowingly and willingly produced her (ibid. pp. 9, 12). That in this art (namely of false testimonies) I will show myself such a Roscius that I have extorted a false testimony from that little woman, and have implicated her in the crime of perjury before God and the world (ibid. p. 15). I am weary of transcribing the remaining very many things of the same stamp in that pamphlet. Let anyone who has the leisure see pp. 16-17, 33, 43, 46-48, and compare the counter-writing of Chabaneau and my son's explanation of the cause deserted by Maresius. For nothing is sown or reaped there for me, except that I protest against the calumnies and lies just exhibited.

I now proceed to others: That in the business of 's-Hertogenbosch concerning the Marian Fraternity, I constitute the prow and stern of salvation (Abortive Tongue p. 4 and Ultimate Patience p. 125). That Dr. Leschepper de la Riviere removes me from the number of honorable men (namely by consequence or Maresian inference), because I dared to number him among

the wicked and bankrupt in the Pseudo-Riverian judgment. And that he dares wager anything that this thorny little writing is falsely ascribed to Dr. Leschepper, etc. And that I had previously threatened that letter, like one who predicts the evils he wishes to commit (Abortive Tongue pp. 46, 84-85). That in my disputation on Atheism I dared to defend as legitimately pronounced, and on account of which no action for injury can be brought - to the disgrace of sounder theology and the church - all those filthy revilings which I had vomited forth against Descartes under another's name in Schoock's writing against the Philosophy of Rene Descartes (as is related in my son's Unrighteous Tribunal pp. 55-58) (Abortive Tongue p. 48). That I tried to stir up the little crisis which had intervened between Maresius and the Celebrated Molinus and his family (Abortive Tongue p. 53). That axioms are proposed by me by which the Pope is excused from fault in permitting brothels (ibid. p. 55). That the consistory of 's-Hertogenbosch stubbornly clung to my dictates before it was associated with the Synod of Guelders (ibid. p. 55). That the harsh judgment once fabricated by me against my former colleague Dr. Regius, described in print, and disseminated everywhere, was extorted by me from the Celebrated Professors of Utrecht (Abortive Tongue pp. 58, 64).

That concerning some stupid and drunken lies solemnly retracted before the pacifying Senators by James Leuwius in the court of Rotterdam, which were affirmed about me, I complained, not approving them as excused and recanted - which God and time will further manifest (ibid. p. 62). That I glory so greatly in the celebrity of my name, which seems to be now verging towards its setting, etc. (ibid. p. 62). That I have acquired formidable power in the Republic of Utrecht by various arts (ibid. p. 64). That it is customary for me everywhere to play the Diotrephes (ibid.). That at Heusden I was accustomed to meet frequently with the other preachers of the Classis in the College of St. Hubert for the sake of music; among the ceremonies this was the first, that the novice had to drain an immense drinking horn, etc. (ibid. p. 83). That I am excessively hostile to the French name by profession (ibid. p. 88). That I chose the Most Noble Salmasius, Maresius, Descartes, three Frenchmen that is, not just to attack but to assail with every kind of insult (ibid. p. 88).

That the opinion of my infallibility was so highly esteemed by me that Maresius seems to have sinned against the Holy Spirit in not admitting it in matters of fact, etc. (The carts of revilings, calumnies, and sycophancies which follow, see Ultimate Patience paragraph pp. 27-28, 29, 32, 31, 32-36). That no other than myself is the author of Dr. Schoock's book against Descartes, and that this is now known to all the Netherlands (Ultimate Patience paragraph p. 25). That I wanted Schoock to swear that I was no more conscious of the publication of Schoock's book against Descartes than any man in the street (Ultimate Patience p. 413). That I destined 200 copies of my writing entitled "Specimen of Excerpts", etc. for Groningen (ibid. paragraph p. 30). That Dr. Schoock was first tempted by my letters to write that book against Descartes entitled "The Admirable Method", etc. (ibid. p. 406). That I could never obtain a copy of the sentence of the Senate of Utrecht against Descartes' pamphlets (ibid. p. 407). That the same Senate of Utrecht took care to suppress the Dutch pamphlet which my son had published concerning the Utrecht process against Descartes (ibid. p. 407).

That I made a deal with the executioner, and stipulated in advance that in burning Descartes' book he should take care to kindle such a flame as might be seen from afar - as if to say with that monster, "I did it so that he might feel himself dying" (ibid. p. 407). That I impelled Dr. Leschepper to publish his French palinode (ibid. paragraph p. 31). That I disseminated here and there the judgments of the Belgian Professors concerning the Marian Fraternity, in order to stir up greater hatred against Maresius as a pre-condemned heretic by the consensus of all (ibid. paragraph p. 22). That I made those Reformed people who had joined the Marian Fraternity in 's-Hertogenbosch manifest idolaters, scarcely worthy to enjoy this light (ibid. p. 133). That no greater crime than disagreement with me can be held among the Inquisitors of Preciseness (among whom he wishes me to be especially noted) (ibid. p. 197). That I accuse the Noble Descartes of atheism because he opposes the Skeptics with some new arguments; thus the Lords of 's-Hertogenbosch are idolaters for me because they root out idolatry (ibid. p. 229). That I previously praised the supposition of a decree of the Bishops of Cologne and Liege and its defense written by Maresius (ibid. p. 338). He has the same in his Rectoral Oration at Groningen, where he cites my disputation on the Vocation of Ministers, etc., which let anyone see who has the leisure, and judge concerning Maresius' candor and consistency. But I proceed.

That I interpret it as an injury not to want to lie and bear false witness (Ultimate Patience p. 415). That there still remain great men who remember what sort of person I showed myself in the Synod of Dort in 1618-1619 (Good Faith p. 62). That whatever Dr. Schoock did imprudently or wrongly proceeded from my counsels (ibid. p. 209). That I am a Diotrephes, imperious towards my colleagues, and want to be considered infallible, a man of Boniface VIII who judges all things and is judged by none. Add those iterative taunts about the Pope of Utrecht, the dictatorship, the triumvirate, and that I am canonized in my own judgment (ibid. pp. 44, 49, 85, 124, compared with Ultimate Patience p. 236). He imputes blasphemy to me, and Jesuitical frauds and equivocations, wicked arts, and heterodoxy concerning the inquisitorial or ex officio oath (Ultimate Patience pp. 407, 414, 405-406, 409-410, 412, 418; Good Faith pp. 26-27, 76-77). Those things objected by Dr. Schoock in the Utrecht process were so refuted in our Response that he afterwards thought it better to pass them over. My son treated them a little more fully afterwards in Piety and the Unrighteous Tribunal. But since these will have to be treated sometime in the Moral Problems for maintaining our orthodoxy against the criminations of Maresius, we refer them there.

As for the fables, false conjectures or suspicions, caviling allusions, calumnies concerning my indirect atheism and skepticism which he accumulates (Ultimate Patience p. 243; Good Faith p. 48) - concerning snappish objections and sophistical exceptions, concerning the pamphlet of the Papists written against him entitled "An Adventitious Gift", concerning will-hunters (Good Faith pp. 52, 58; Ultimate Patience p. 342); concerning the writing or translation of Dr. Leeman's Retorsion from the vernacular into Latin, the publication of the judgments of the Belgian Professors on the Marian Fraternity, and their Dutch translation, and concerning the History of the Fraternity written or published by me, so that under the pretext of this fiction he might make an attack on me (Ultimate Patience paragraph pp. 21, 23, 28-30, 33-35, 41-43, and pp. 123, 130-133, 307, 318); concerning Rivet, concerning injuries done to himself (Ultimate Patience

paragraph pp. 35-37 and p. 158), and other similar stuff of the same stamp - we refer all this to the same category as non-entities and homonyms before distinction is made. I am ashamed and weary to note more. If not most, at least very many pages, indeed nearly every line of the three pamphlets, would have to be transcribed.

I therefore break off the catalogue of insults and cavillings, against which, as being most iniquitous, partly openly false, partly sophistical and calumnious, I profess to protest again and again, leaving it to pious readers to judge in what sense Maresius protests that he wrote none of those things with an intention of inveighing, reviling, or re-reviling, but only of defending and excusing himself (Good Faith p. 41; Abortive Tongue p. 95), and consequently did not exceed the moderation of blameless self-defense (Ultimate Patience paragraph p. 49) - against the pamphlet of the anonymous writer, which he now ascribes to me, now does not dare to ascribe to me.

Concerning his fourth book, which is said to have been written largely, perhaps mostly, against me while the period of refraining from writing was in force, which the singular prudence of the Most Noble and Ample Lords the Curators of Groningen and Ommelanden had taken care to observe, and whose copies I understand are in the hands of some - since I myself have not seen the book, nor can be sufficiently certain about all the things which are reported, this consideration must be deferred to another time.

But perhaps some will say that a simple denial and protestation is not sufficient, especially since they hear Maresius saying in the Abortive Tongue pp. 62-63: "I am prepared to prove as true in court those things which he accuses of mendacity and calumny, although it is well known that an ass will deny more than a philosopher will prove; let him take care to restore his credibility fully before accusing others of mendacity. Between my assertion and his denial concerning the things published, let those judge who are outside the controversy, and let him know that he lies most splendidly as often as he charges me with lying. Concerning the facts and matters of deed, I appeal to the consciences of those whose interest is involved and to God the searcher of hearts." (Compare p. 60, and where he appeals to my conscience in Abortive Tongue p. 7, Ultimate Patience paragraph pp. 28-29, 32, etc.)

I confess that from his words I can gather nothing else than that Maresius has publicly charged me before the whole world as most true with most of the crimes excerpted above in his published writings - the knowledge and proof of which, however, he does not obscurely seem to confess he does not have or did not have, but could or would then only have, when and if I had ever unloaded my conscience concerning them; besides, those whose interest is involved unloaded their consciences to him concerning the same things. But let us apply this to the present case. Maresius' criminations are not of one kind, nor to be dispelled in one way. For first, concerning certain criminations, it is from God the searcher of hearts alone, and from me in my conscience, that it can be judged and determined - such as these: That I acted against my knowledge and conscience when I sought such a testimony from Dr. Schoock; and that consequently I did violence to my conscience when I accused that same Schoock, on account of that extorted false testimony, of injury. That before God in my conscience I know most

excellently that those things are most false which are charged concerning the wife of Chabaneau, etc. In these and similar criminations, appeal can be made to me alone among men, and I alone responding by affirming or denying, whether under oath or not, can declare anything certain.

For granted (which is nevertheless false) that I had sought from Schoock some declaration that does not have itself so, who could say for certain except me whether I sought this through error, forgetfulness, or lapse of memory, or against my knowledge and conscience? And the same is to be said concerning my certain knowledge about that business of the beating of the wife of Dr. Chabaneau, etc. The same must also be said concerning those deeds of mine whose conscious witnesses have ceased to live. I do not see that anything else ought to be done by me here than to testify by affirming in favor of my accuser Maresius if he has spoken the truth, or by denying to testify and protest against him if he has spoken falsely. The latter I now do, so that all may hear it if possible to whom Maresius' accusation has come.

The Doctors commonly lay down (says Schneidwin on §. sed ista of the Institutes on Actions) that those things which consist in our intellect or conscience are proved by our simple assertion with an oath. But whether and how he can appeal to God when the matter concerns the sayings and deeds of others, which the accuser himself neither saw nor heard, I confess I do not sufficiently comprehend, nor do I inquire further at present.

Secondly, there are criminations concerning the facts of which, besides me, the conscience of one or more others can know and testify (if indeed they remember it), because they saw or heard this saying or deed of mine jointly with me. Therefore, while after the promulgated and repeated public accusations Maresius appeals to their conscience and mine or consciences, it certainly seems to me that nothing should be done first in response to Maresius' appeal and demand except that according to my knowledge and conscience, I testify by affirming in favor of Maresius concerning that deed of mine, or by denying I testify and protest Here is a continuation of the translation:

Nothing should be done first in response to Maresius' appeal and demand except that according to my knowledge and conscience, I testify by affirming in favor of Maresius concerning that deed of mine, or by denying I testify and protest against him, as I have now done later, and was further compelled to do for the reasons indicated above, as well as by Maresius' insult: "That since Dr. Voetius unleashes his son against me, and does not himself respond openly (N.B.) and clearly for himself, he is therefore held to be convicted by that very deed" (Abortive Tongue p. 63).

Therefore, for proving the criminations of the second kind, no anchor remains except the knowledge, conscience, and declaration of that one, or two, or more, if any are jointly conscious with me of my deed, or "whose interest is involved," as he himself speaks. And yet Maresius preempts the knowledge, conscience, and declaration of very many concerning certain presumed deeds, and he himself has published those deeds, quite to the dishonor of my reputation - which deeds, however, he neither saw nor heard in person, and concerning which

also he has neither heard in person nor consulted by letter those presumed and appealed witnesses and conscious parties "whose interest is involved" and who alone can testify here. Indeed, not a few of them have already testified against his assertion, and some of those testimonies have already been published in the New History of Philosophy, etc., and in the Account or Mode of Proceeding against Rene Descartes, further in the writings of Chabaneau, Leeman, and my son against Maresius.

Nor do I think he is entirely ignorant of what the Classis of Gorcum declares, and what the writings of that same Classis to the Consistory and to the Classis of Groningen intend. Whence then he will derive the legitimate proof of all those things, to which he offers himself, I would truly like to see. Meanwhile, while I do not yet see it, and await the promised and offered conference to be held at Groningen between him and me, as one accused I am bound to oppose nothing else to those criminations published without any proof, without any testimony, except a candid and open denial and protestation according to my knowledge and conscience. And if to this is added the declaration of the witnesses produced by me, whom we have just mentioned, I refute my accuser out of his own abundance.

Examples of these reproaches are, among others, those things which are fabled or consulted or done between me and Dr. Leeman, between me and Dr. Chabaneau, between me and the Most Ample Quaestor Zuerius, between me and the Utrecht Printer, between me and Dr. Leschepper, between me and Reverends de Wael and van der Hagen of the Classis of 's-Hertogenbosch, deputed to the Synod of Guelderland at Harderwijk, between me and the Classis of Gorcum. To which refer those things which he alleges were done and acted by me to the prejudice of my colleagues the Professors of Theology, further of the other Celebrated Professors of this Academy, in addition of former or present colleagues in the ecclesiastical ministry, and furthermore of Dr. Diestius, Professor at Deventer. They all deny these things jointly with me. What more does he demand? If in criminations of this kind he thinks he must appeal to God, to whom he expressly appeals in the place cited, I would certainly want it first determined from the Theologians and Jurists whether and how it is lawful and right, in presumed deeds which one has neither seen nor heard, and which those deny they saw or heard who either alone could see and hear them or alone are accustomed and ought to judge concerning them in case of public testimony - whether, I say, it is lawful and right in such a case to appeal to the judgment of God and thus to offer himself for just proof before any judge.

In this second kind of criminations I have done and will do what I am bound to do. But that Maresius demands anything more, and thinks his affirmation should be preferred to my denial and the denial of the witnesses and testimonies just mentioned, I willingly endure, if indeed it shall seem so to a legitimate ecclesiastical or political tribunal, or to honorable and requested arbiters, that canonical purgation, and consequently an oath, the "assurance of full discussion," should be imposed on me, and those witnesses mentioned should again be heard, and indeed under oath - yet on this condition, that the same be imposed on Maresius in those matters which concern his own deeds, and which have been objected against him in the published writings of Dr. Leschepper, Dr. Leeman, Dr. Chabaneau, and my son in Piety, Unrighteous Tribunal, Explanation of the Deserted Cause.

The third kind of criminations are those which he has tried to furnish with some testimony, either explicit and revealed, or implicit and hidden (for example, the friend who wrote to him, Abortive Tongue pp. 76, 82-83) - these are very few in such a multitude. Here first, from my conscience to which he so often appeals, he has a most ready response: that I deny all those things which I have enumerated above, as destitute not only of all truth but even of all verisimilitude, no matter what witnesses he may appeal to or exhibit some few.

If canonical purgation by oath is required by a legitimate judge or honorary arbiter, I do not shrink from it - on this condition, that the same be imposed on him in similar matters which have been objected against Maresius in the published writings just mentioned. But as for the witnesses conscious of the deeds and transactions to whom he appeals, let him produce them under oath through me if he can. But if I or those witnesses should refuse to testify for him, or some of them cannot legitimately do so however much they may wish, then again let him see according to what theology and jurisprudence he appeals to the tribunal of God, when he presumes to prove without proof, without certain or due knowledge, such grievous things asserted about me.

And certainly concerning that most serious crimination of the crime of forgery, which he so frequently thunders relying almost solely on the pretended testimony and credit of Schoock (as he confesses in Abortive Tongue p. 58), and for which he has labored so greatly - I am prepared not only to purge myself by oath if it shall seem so to a legitimate judge, but also Dr. Schoock himself, Maresius' sole presumed witness, has already sufficiently withdrawn himself from that testimony. For with the religious obligation of an oath interposed before the Noble and Most Ample Delegates of the Utrecht Tribunal, he declared that he did not say this about me and my Reverend colleague Carolus de Maets (which the Groningen acts seem to put forth, and which Maresius, interpreting the same acts, has openly and publicly charged against us), nor had he ever said this about us elsewhere or even before the Academic Senate of Groningen.

The same Dr. Schoock, before the Cartesian process at Groningen and in letters written to me one and even two months after the pamphlet entitled "Epistle to Rene Descartes" had begun to be printed, had protested not without an oath that the work "The Admirable Method" was written by him, and indeed by his own motion, and at the same time he charged Descartes, who ascribed that book to me, with mendacity. He had previously done the same in a testimony written and signed by himself, in which he likewise offered himself for an oath. And although Dr. Schoock had not liberated me from that crimination by his testimonies and sworn declaration before the Utrecht Tribunal, he could have wounded his own conscience, but by no means could he have overthrown my cause and innocence. My oath sworn before that same Most Noble and Most Prudent Tribunal, joined with sworn witnesses testifying for me against him, would have sufficed to avert that blow.

And now, by the favor of God the vindicator of truth and justice, that machine is prepared. For I have appeared three times before the Tribunal or its Delegates, and have responded under oath to all those things pertaining to this process which Schoock with his advocates wished to be

proposed to me in the customary manner and mode used here. My Reverend colleague Carolus de Maets also appeared there and responded to the interrogatories proposed - he who was made out equally guilty with me of the same crime of false testimony extorted from Dr. Schoock (see Ultimate Patience pp. 409, 412, 417, compared with Good Faith pp. 6, 22, 30). Yet Schoock sufficiently and more than sufficiently purged him from that crime by the interposition of an oath in court, although the denial of my colleague and his oath ought to suffice for purgation with any fair cognitor.

Those witnesses also appeared there who were most fully conscious of the deeds about which there could be any doubt. Not to mention the reasons by which I think that Maresian witness concerning my deed, and concerning the deed of my Reverend colleague, was reduced to contradictions and the absurd. Concerning which the Process and Unrighteous Tribunal may be consulted. But these and other acts, whether the process is terminated or not terminated, if it is necessary, will be disclosed at some time more fully and point by point with all the circumstances.

As for the deed and intended crime of our colleague, he himself long ago dispelled it with a brief apology, which my son published inserted in his Unrighteous Tribunal, etc. p. 117, with the consent of the author, where it can be seen. Nothing else now remains except that Maresius, who has so often offered and recommended peace, although in the meantime he has never spared me (as his three books indicated above evince), should in reality and seriously promote the business of peace, and to that end should inopportunely as well as opportunely insist with the Most Noble and Ample Curators of his Academy that the conference at Groningen, to which I have been invited by the letters of the Most Noble and Ample Lords the Curators to the Most Noble Senate of this city, may be held as soon as possible.

There, if he shall have furnished proof of all those things written against me, whose principal heads I have now excerpted and against which I have protested, in accordance with his promises and his triumphal conclusion (Abortive Tongue pp. 59, 62, 94, 96; Good Faith p. 89), I promise confession of fault and due satisfaction. But if he fails in proving them, let him not reject due satisfaction and restitution according to equity and good conscience. But if he pursues neither this nor that seriously, I leave it to more prudent men to judge in what way, up to this point, he has offered himself for peace and for the proof of so many and so great crimes promulgated about me.

I have now eagerly awaited nearly a whole year, and will await further, the offered conference, trusting after God in the peaceable counsels, studies, and promises of the Most Noble and Ample Lords the Curators. My colleague Dr. Carolus de Maets awaits it with me.

whose brief apology, if it has not yet satisfied Dr. Maresius after being certainly read by him, still offers itself freely, just as it previously offered itself, for a brotherly conference with Dr. Maresius at Groningen concerning this mark of infamy undeservedly branded upon him. My son also awaits it with us, who now declares the very thing he once declared before the Most Noble and Most Ample Councilors and Senators of this city, when the first letters of the Most Noble and

Ample Lords the Curators of Groningen were sent here concerning the composition of the dispute and the abstention from writings - namely, that he is most ready for all those things which he shall be found to have retorted in his pamphlets against Dr. Maresius (while he strives to vindicate his parent, and likewise his venerable supporter Dr. Carolus de Maets, and himself from infamy against Maresius' criminations), either to prove them severally, or to revoke them publicly by recantation, in order that due satisfaction may be rendered to Dr. Maresius - provided that on his part Dr. Maresius likewise promises the same in turn in all those matters where he sustains the part of plaintiff and the son that of defendant.

Moreover, as he declared then, so also now he declares that to this end he is prepared, together with me and with our Reverend colleague Carolus de Maets, to confer with Dr. Maresius. When at the same time (December 4, 1646) those two things were proposed to me by the Noble and Most Ample Councilors and Senators of this city from the letters of the Noble and Ample Lords the Curators of Groningen and Ommelanden - namely, whether I was willing to confer in person with Dr. Maresius concerning the controversies, and in the meantime to abstain from all apologetic or counter-writings, if perhaps I was meditating or had in hand any - I consented to both, on this condition: that the proposed conference should not be protracted to a long or indefinite time, and that by this means I should not be compelled to neglect forever my reputation unjustly prostituted before all the enemies of the Church by Maresius' pamphlets. For it was my fixed purpose, by the advice of friends, to emit a simple protestation on the first occasion, not indeed a just or separately written apology, lest our adversaries and posterity should ever say with my accuser that those most grievous and infamous crimes which Dr. Maresius publicly charged against me while I was still living and in possession of my mind by God's grace were not even once openly and simply denied by me, and to whose proof he offered himself.

I added that the most suitable occasion for publishing this protestation was now at hand and therefore not to be neglected, because the publication of the first part of my theological disputations was soon to be completed, to whose prefixed preface to the reader I had decided to insert or subjoin the said protestation. Therefore, lest too great prejudice should be inflicted on my reputation, on the printer, and on the publication of the work, I declared myself indeed prepared, for the sake of peace, to defer the publication of the said protestation for two or three months, but that I could not be bound any longer if after that time elapsed or a little later the conference should not be begun.

Since this was so pleasing to that Most Ample Assembly before which I had been summoned with my son, and now nearly nine months have elapsed since the Most Noble and Ample Lords the Curators of Groningen and Ommelanden abundantly declared by their last writing that the wish and effort for peace was to be promoted on that side, and furthermore Dr. Maresius has in the meantime taken care to have a book printed at Groningen - which, although suppressed there, we scarcely doubt will easily come into the hands of others, and consequently be reprinted elsewhere anew (as has happened to the youthful poems of Beza, and the Pasquil of 's-Hertogenbosch, and other books and pamphlets) - I ought not to allow this first volume of my Disputations to go forth without the promised and awaited Protestation.

Indeed from my heart I grieve that this necessity has been imposed on me, partly by Maresius' appeal and repeated offer of proof, partly by no vain fear of the adversaries' insult, that I could not purge my innocence even by a simple protestation from those personal criminations hitherto unheard by me and by those who know me and my affairs, unless at the same time some not very glorious brand seemed to be imprinted on my accuser himself, such as he wished without cause to be imprinted on me, and he himself has fallen into the pit which he dug for another. This is the fruit, alas! of the rashly defended Marian Fraternity.

Since in that cause he saw himself to have fallen unhappily after the judgments of the Theologians and Professors in the Netherlands had been written, and no other judgment was to be expected for him from all the other Reformed churches and academies, he has preferred to impute to me, who had defended my Theses publicly attacked by his book with a necessary counter-writing, all this calamity either of his own or of his bad cause. And under the pretext of a vain presumption or fiction concerning an anonymous vernacular pamphlet written against him on that Marian controversy (as though written by me, although I neither wrote nor published it), he has overwhelmed me with invented fictions of personal criminations hitherto unheard, and has spewed forth on me a most un-Christian revenge, rather than yield to the truth or, if he still seriously doubted, further pursue the cause itself omitting personalities, by the theological method.

But I break off, and enough of complaints. May God grant that this may be the last impatience of this man, the last fury arising from injured patience (as it is pretexted). If some little word should slip from me which is not so pleasing to him, let him consider that I, having been first assailed without any cause by so many and such atrocious and cruel calumnies, have responded to my accuser. I will not cease to pray to the God of truth and peace that Dr. Maresius and all others, as many as in our Netherlands have complained either publicly or privately, or privately-publicly, concerning his actions or writings, may follow truth and peace, and may all in reality perform those things to perform which they offer themselves. Utrecht, November 13, 1647.

1 Corinthians 9:15
"But I have used none of these things: neither have I written these things, that it should be so done unto me: for it were better for me to die, than that any man should make my glorying void."

Augustine, Sermon 52 to the Brethren in the Wilderness:
"On our account, our conscience suffices for us; on your account, our reputation ought not to be polluted, but to flourish among you. Hold fast what I say, and distinguish. There are two things, conscience and reputation: conscience is necessary for you, reputation for your neighbor. He who, trusting in his conscience, neglects his reputation, is cruel - especially being placed in that position of which the Apostle speaks, writing to his disciple: 'In all things show yourself a pattern of good works.'"

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Here, in the peaceful image of Voetiades' countenance,
It marks the divine talents and the line.
If you desire greater things: the living image of virtue exists,
By which he himself expresses in life and in his writings.

ON HUMAN REASON IN MATTERS OF FAITH.

Resp. LUCAS COUTERELIUS Hag. Comit. Batav. 17. Febr. 1636.

On the use of human reason in matters of faith there is a twofold controversy: One with the Socinians and their followers; the other with certain modern Papists. We will briefly explain both in these Theses.

The SOCINIANS, although they sometimes seem to I. fluctuate (as this sect is akin to the Skeptics and Pyrrhonists), while they profess that all things are attributed by them to the scriptures, yet they wrongly babble these and similar things. Ostorod. institut. cap. 6. Racovian Catechism pp.37, 55, 56. Smalc. in praef. c. Franzium. By reason alone can the possibility and impossibility of articles of faith be judged; things which seem impossible to the mind are not to be believed, the highest religion is reason: and their method of disputing against the Trinity, the person and offices of Christ, etc. shows that not only scripture but also reason, and even primarily, is the rule of religion and of things to be believed: especially since they want all the truths of faith to be deduced from things simply prior and better known: indeed, they imagine univocally universal notions and concepts about God and creatures, about divine and human things and actions, as equally fitting and applicable to them, and this before, outside, and above scripture. Nor does the anonymous author of a booklet scattered in Holland in the year 1633 differ, which contains an examination of the Papist booklet of Valerius Magnus on the rule of believing of the Acatholics, where, the opinion of both the Papists and our own on the judge of controversies having been rejected, natural human reason is established as the judge and norm of faith.

2. Percognita & hypotheses to us may be these. I. By human reason, first and properly, we understand the faculty of the rational soul in man, by which it apprehends and judges intelligible things; concerning which the Naturalists write in their books on the soul. Secondly, by a metaphorical metonymy it can also denote the light of natural cognition. Of which there are two kinds, one affixed, extrinsically an object, or external, which is outwardly proposed and offered to man through the moral providence of God: And it is nothing other than the book of nature, and the means, aids, and occasions supplied in this universe for natural cognition and reasoning, which is accomplished apart from supernatural revelation. The other is innate or internal, which is inwardly instilled and introduced. This again is twofold, either impressed on all men from their very birth, and has itself in the manner of a principle, or if you prefer a habit of principles, and is called common sense, common notions: concerning which we have treated in the disputation on Atheism: or acquired and anew superinduced after the birth of man through the general helps of God; and it has itself in the manner of science or a habit of conclusions, by which the mind is disposed, facilitated, and determined to elicit actual cognitions, to form concepts, and to deduce conclusions rightly from principles concerning God and divine things. Concerning this internal or innate light, see Rom. 2:14-15, Ps. 19:1, 8, Rom. 1:19-20.

II. Human reason properly so called can be considered 1. either in idea, or objectively, and abstractly: or concretely; or subjectively, and by reason of a certain state, namely before the fall as endowed with the image of God; in the fall, as corrupted; in grace, as liberated, although imperfectly; in glory, as perfectly illumined by the light of glory. We here for the most part take it subjectively, as through the fall it is totally corrupted, or as through grace it is liberated, but not perfectly: sometimes also objectively, abstractly, as thus and in its essence contradistinguished and divided from every habit, or disposition, or any accidental form informing it, determining and modifying it, which does not emanate and flow from the essential principles of the subject (namely, of man); and so is not a property, which belongs to every, only, and always. Namely, as it is from God producing man; and so the work of God or the good creature of God: sometimes also compositely with a habit, or disposition introduced into it through natural means alone or through certain common aids of God apart from the grace of regeneration.

III. The principle of faith is twofold, from which or external; and by which or through which or internal. The former could be called the objective principle; the latter the formal principle. The former is the word of God: the latter the illumination of the Holy Spirit or the supernatural light infused into our mind. The external principle of faith, concerning which the question here is, ought to be first and indemonstrable, from which first are educed and into which are ultimately resolved all the truths, articles or conclusions of faith: concerning first principles see the Philosophers on bk. 1 of the Posterior Analytics, chs. 2, 6, 10, the Scholastics on part 1, q. 1, arts. 2, 6, 8.

IV. By the object of divine faith here we understand the formal object, not the presupposed: that is, the articles of saving faith properly and strictly so called, not the presupposed articles, which are common to it with natural theology, and with sound philosophy: Such as, for example, that there is a God, that God is just, the governor of the world, that the soul is immortal, etc.

V. We presuppose that human reason really is and is rightly called the receiving subject of faith, also the instrument and (as they call it) elicitive principle of faith and actual cognition: because it alone is capable of faith, not some other inferior faculty, which man has in common with the brutes. This as the principle which educes the conclusions of faith from the one infallible principle of the scriptures, and so accomplishes the acts of simple apprehension, composition, division, and discourse of spiritual or supernatural intelligence.

VI. We also presuppose that the supernatural truths of divine faith surpass the reason of man as such or as thus: because it does not perceive them unless it be elevated and informed by a higher light: Yet they do not per se, as such, conflict with it, but per accidens of corruption, and of the depraved disposition, which adheres to our mind. Thus far, therefore, our faith and theology can all be called rational, not because it necessarily demonstrates its truth a priori by reasons to those denying the principles of the Christian religion; but because it demonstrates conclusions from the authority of scripture, and by reasons deduced from scripture, to those who concede something of those things, which are divinely revealed: and because it resolves at least the reasons of those who concede nothing, by which they charge our faith with contradiction, and absurdity, as Thomas rightly distinguishes, part 1, q. 1, art. 8. Add that by

directly attacking false theology, consequently and indirectly it at the same time defends the true: namely, by removing impediments and prejudices, and thus clearing the way to the truth. Such a defense of the faith can be seen in Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, Arnobius, Lactantius, Augustine, Theodoret, Cyril of Alexandria, etc.; and the writers of the intermediate age, Thomas against the gentiles, and the rest of the Scholastics if the more solid things be excerpted with choice and judgment; also Savonarola, in his book on the triumph of the cross, Raymond of Sabunde in his natural theology; Cardinal Cusanus, Dionysius the Carthusian, and others against the Mohammedans; and finally more recent authors, Ludovicus Vives, Augustinus Steuchus, Charron, the Scholastic questioners and commentators on Lombard and Thomas; especially in Plessis in his excellent treatise on the truth of the Christian religion: to whom can be joined the antagonists of the Socinians elsewhere cited by us.

3. With these things premised we say that no human reason is the principle by which or through which, or from which or why we believe, or the foundation or law, or norm of things to be believed from the prescription of which we judge: and so that is not to be held false in matters of faith, e.g., the trinity, original sin, the God-man Christ and his satisfaction, whatever the natural light or human reason does not grasp from things prior and more known, either as to an accurate definition, or as to a demonstration, or as to both: but on the contrary our faith is resolved, as it marks things to be believed, into Holy Scripture; as it marks the act of believing, into the illumination of the Holy Spirit. It is proved

I. because the reason of unregenerate man is blind concerning the divine law. Eph. 4:17-18, Rom. 1:21-23. Concerning the Gospel it is plainly blind, mere darkness. 1 Cor. 1:23 and 2:25, John 1:5 with 9, Eph. 5:8.

II. Because there are many mysteries in our theology, indeed the whole Gospel is called a mystery. 1 Tim. 3:16, Matt. 13:11. But the animal man perceives nothing of them apart from divine revelation, neither that they are, nor because they are. But the regenerate man also when he conducts himself best within and above others in the first and highest heads of faith, does not perceive from accurate definitions the "what," the "how," and the "because," but only that they are from the supernatural revelation of the Holy Spirit. Matt. 19:17 and 13:11, 25, 27.

III. Because the essence and attributes of the Deity are not immediately, adequately comprehended by the human mind, as they are in themselves, and so perfectly: but only through the way of negation, causality, eminence: for here the human mind conducts itself as the eyes of owls to the sun. Indeed, scripture also testifies concerning the works of God, that they cannot be comprehended, Rom. 11:33-34, Job 41:2, Isa. 40:13, 1 Cor. 2:19. Much less can the persons of the Trinity, Christ the redeemer, and the whole mystery of redemption be comprehended by human reason. Compare here the disputations of the theologians on the vision and cognition of God, and on his incomprehensibility.

IV. Because the mind of regenerate man, especially if he still be an infant, 1 Cor. 3:1-2, Heb. 5:12-13, with Phil. 3:15, here knows imperfectly and in part, 1 Cor. 13:12. And much native

darkness always adheres to it; hence the difficulty, imperfection, obscurity, confusion in knowing divine things: It is not, therefore, the principle of divine faith, to which what is false cannot be subordinated.

V. A principle is infallible, whence faith is first educed and demonstrated, and into which it is ultimately resolved, but human reason is not such, Therefore. For the ultimate resolution of the faithful is not that or because I so understand, grasp, judge, therefore it is of faith, but because God so speaks in Scripture, therefore it is of faith, and hence I so judge, and ought to judge and believe. 2 Tim. 3:14-16, 1 Thess. 2:13, so that the reason of the infallibility of faith, is in and from the word of God, not in or from human reason as a principle.

VI. Human reason is not prior, better known, more certain than faith; therefore it is not its principle. The consequence of the major premise is admitted, from the Philosophers on ch. 2 of bk. 1 of the Posterior Analytics, the minor premise is proved: because all cognition of faith, which reason holds is from the word of God, John 1:18, Matt. 16:17, therefore it is not prior. Because through faith reason is illumined, Eph. 1:17-18. Therefore it is not better known. Because faith is the testimony of God, namely through supernatural revelation, but human reason is not, therefore it is not more certain, 1 John 5:9.

VII. Christ, the Prophets, the Apostles referred their hearers to the word of God alone, and from it alone explained and demonstrated faith. Isa. 1:20, Luke 24:25, 27, Acts 25:22, 27 and 13:27 and 17:2, 11, 2 Tim. 3:15-16.

VIII. From absurd consequences. First, then it would follow that all religion is natural, and demonstrable by natural reason, and light; but this is absurd: for there is the widest distinction between grace and nature, between the special revelation of grace or supernatural light, and the general revelation of God or the light of nature, between philosophy and theology or faith, from 1 John 1:9, Rom. 1:19 and 2:14-15, with Ps. 147:20, Acts 14:16-17, Eph. 2:12-13. Secondly, it would follow that reason is nowhere to be taken captive, denied, checked, and so to be reduced to the silence and quiet of learned ignorance in the height of hidden truth, and so needs no regeneration, renewal, and transformation, contrary to Rom. 11:33-35 and 12:2, Eph. 4:23, 1 Cor. 1:18-25, Matt. 16:17, 24. Thirdly, it will follow that they to whom reason is more perspicacious, and their intelligence more exact and well-trained, can better perceive and judge the mysteries of faith, contrary to universal experience and 1 Cor. 1:19-22, Matt. 11:25.

IX. Let the argument to the man be added, Socinus with his own denies all natural theology, or cognition of God both innate and acquired, and contends that it all, if it is or was anywhere among those outside of scripture, was had from inartificial proof and so most fallible, namely by mere tradition and the testimony of men. How therefore will human reason be the infallible principle of the mysteries of faith? and let these reasons suffice. We can therefore rightly say to the Socinians, and to their adherents and promoters, what Augustine says to the Manichaeans in book 17 against Faustus, ch. 3, "Your evasion is confounded on all sides. Say openly that you do not believe the Gospel: for you who believe in the Gospel what you want: what you want you do not believe; you believe yourselves rather than the Gospel." After I wrote these things there

came out in the year 1641 the Theological Lectures of Johannes Maccovius, where in vol. 1, p. 544, this question is treated against the Socinians. Which can be compared with ours. The uncertainty and insufficiency of human reason considered subjectively in morals (not to mention in the mysteries of faith) Selden describes in his learned work on natural and international law etc. published in 1640, bk. 1, ch. 7. Some things have slipped from the Remonstrants in their Vindications or Vedelius Rhapsodus, which do not seem to differ so much from the Socinians: which have been detected and shaken out by Nicolaus Vedelius in his Secrets of Arminianism, part 3, bk. 1, ch. 4 and part 4, bk. 1, ch. 4.

4. Let us now proceed to the new device of the papists, who contend that Papism ought to be refuted by our side only from the express words of scripture, without any reasoning, discourse, connection and proof of consequences, and so reject and remove from the collations and disputations to be held with us all natural and artificial, docent and utent Logic. Which invention the Jesuit Gunter seems first to have produced in the Duriacensian colloquy, held, or rather attempted, in the year 1612: the Jesuits in France at last perfected that Pandora, among whom shone Verronus, who sang I know not what songs of triumph in published books, what miracles he attributed to it. What became of that mushroom and Jonah's gourd, and with what success it died in birth we have indicated in the Desperate Cause of the Papacy, book 2, sect. 2, ch. 25. How finely our men in France, especially at Rouen, received Verronus, the illustrious Dr. Rivet indicates in the dedicatory epistle to vol. 1 of his Catholic Orthodoxy, and the author of that most elegant little book whose title is Verron Exposed. But because they exhibited in Latin at Cologne in 1628, and later to the Belgians in their own language from the prolix volume of Verronus a few years ago, a compendium of that playful method of confounding our men without serious disputation, we think we will do something worth the effort, if we briefly explode this, whatever inanities it is.

5. The precognita and preambles of our proofs are these, I. They prestructure and substructure to that colossus of theirs this most false hypothesis: that our men, by asserting that scripture is the unique principle of faith, by that very fact have hitherto admitted, or even now want to admit, all demonstrations of dogmas and refutations of errors only from the express words of scripture: since our doctrine and practice strenuously denies this, their whole mass collapses. II. They take for themselves this postulate, that in all collocations it falls to our collator alone, although only provoked, to take on the role of proving, but not to the papist: Since no sane person will concede this to them, also natural reason and equity, and so all the laws of collocations, and the perpetual practice of both the ancient and the more recent, also of all papists with our men either by live voice or in writings up to Gunter and Verronus, etc., exclusively plainly teach the contrary; again this method collapses on itself. Indeed we contend that, since the papists affirm Indulgences, the power of the Pope, human satisfactions, the sacrifice of the Mass, the worship of images, etc., proof falls to them alone there: for the faith and theology necessary for salvation is not of itself negative, otherwise it would be indefinite, and infinite; since the truth is one, falsity is multiple, as the Philosopher testifies: moreover by every law proof falls to them alone, not to us, at least when they bring against us the action of novelty, heresy, apostasy, schism to be expiated by temporal and eternal flames. III. If therefore it pleased us to evade that Verronic histrionics without laborious proof; we would seek what once Diogenes sought from a certain

quibbling Sophist: What I am, that you are not, I am a man, therefore. Begin with me, he said: so that the Verronians also would begin with us, and so would test the firmness of this their method. Let them dare to affirm that we are schismatics, Apostates, Heretics, etc., which the Council of Trent does, session 13, in October 1551, and session 21, 16 July 1562. If they do not dare, we would now triumph before the spectators of the drama; if they dare, now they would have to prove it, or forfeit their recognizance. We would concede that they draw proofs not only from the scriptures, but also from the Councils and Fathers, whom they constantly prattle about. Let them show us, not by human consequences, not by Aristotelian Syllogisms (as they reproach us), but by clear sentences, express words: The Protestants, Lutherans, Calvinists, English, Scots, Wittenbergers, Genevans, Emdans, etc., or Calvin, Beza, Zwingli, Martyr, Bucer, Musculus, etc., are innovators, heretics; or cannot be saved, are not the Church, because they do not acknowledge Urban VIII to be the head of the Church, because they do not receive the Council of Trent, etc. Just as they demand be shown by us, The Pope is not the head of the Church, the Mass is not a sacrifice, there is no Purgatory, etc. Thus they will see the Verronic Method turned against them, and like repaid with like, not otherwise than the dilemma of Euathlus with the dilemma of Protagoras, concerning which Aulus Gellius writes, bk. 5, ch. 10.

6. Our opinion is that in Elenctic Theology, or in the refutation of falsity, e.g., of purgatory, indulgences, etc., discourse and consequences must be used, and if indeed the obstinate adversary denies them, also proofs of the consequences, not only from the sacred writings, but also from the axioms and principles of the light of nature known either naturally or technically from Philosophy and Logic, so that the apt connection of the middle term with the major extreme may appear: But the truth of the sentences or the middle term and the connection of the middle with the minor extreme must be demonstrated from scripture alone (unless the sentences pertain to natural Theology, which kind are also proved primarily from scripture, and secondarily from the light of nature), either by express words, or equivalent words, or through a good consequence to be demonstrated. Our reasons are these,

I. Because all positive theology is argumentative, first, because it is wisdom and science: it does not therefore deduce conclusions of faith from its principles without discourse. Then, because all interpretation of scripture, and assertion, or theological thesis deduced thence ought to be according to the analogy of faith, Romans 12:6 (Confer Irenaeus bk. 6, chs. 46, 47, and bk. 4, ch. 63, and Cornelius a Lapide, and other commentators on Romans 12), therefore it is not without discourse, collation, consequence. Therefore elenctic theology is much more argumentative. The force of this argument is admitted; and ought to be among all papists, from Thomas, part 1, q. 1, a. 8.

II. Because the elenctic Theology of the Prophets and Apostles is argumentative and the divinely inspired writers use the formalities and terms of those arguing, such as λογίζεσθαι, κρίνειν, συγκρίνειν, διάνοιαι, δοκιμάζειν. Rom. 6:11 and 8:28, Heb. 11:19, 1 Cor. 2:13 and 10:16 and 11:13 and 14:29, Heb. 4:12 and 5:14, Acts 17:11, Eph. 1:18, 1 Pet. 1:13 and 2 Pet. 3:1, 1 Thess. 5:21, and Phil. 1:10. Also διαλογίζεσθαι, διαλέγεσθαι. 2 Tim. 2:15 and 4:15, Acts 17:2, 3, κατ' ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως. Rom. 12:6. And τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἐλέγχειν. Tit. 1:9. ἐπίστασθε, etc. Acts 18:28 and 1 Cor. 11:13-14, κρίνατε, etc. χωρὶς πάσης ἀντιλογίας, etc. Heb. 7:7.

III. Because Christ, the Prophets and Apostles demonstrate their dogmas through consequences and convict falsities. Thus Paul, Apollos and others validly proved against the Jews that Jesus was the Messiah, Acts 18:28, yet saying nothing beyond Moses and the Prophets, Acts 26:22. Christ himself, how does he prove his person and office, and refute his adversaries from Moses and the Prophets, John 5 and 8 and 10, Luke 24:12? When he says that Moses and the Prophets testify and wrote concerning him, John 5:39, 46, so Matt. 22:44. He proves that he is the Lord of David; and v. 29 he proves the resurrection of the dead: and he says this is contained in scripture, although the conclusion did not appear there in express words: in the same way they disputed in the Apostolic council, Acts 15:8-9, 16-17. And so the Apostle in the epistle to the Romans and Galatians disputes about justification; and 1 Cor. 15 about the resurrection, and Acts 17:16-18 he did not refute the Athenian philosophers without consequences. Peter in Acts 2 and 3 disputes about the sending of the Holy Spirit, the passion, resurrection, advent of Christ.

IV. Because very many dogmas of Christianity do not exist explicitly, but only implicitly or in equivalent words in scripture, such as the three persons of the Deity really distinct, the Son consubstantial with the Father, two natures in the one person of Christ essentially, unconfusedly, etc., therefore they are to be educed thence through consequence.

V. From the nature of articles or dogmas of faith. For they are and are rightly called conclusions; but these are elicited also through consequences from their principles, in which they are contained potentially and virtually: what therefore is the reason of all principles, axioms, and laws in theoretical and political matters, the same is also of the divine word; but there something is established and judged not only from the words but also from the sense through evident reason and consequence.

VI. Because no disputation is without elenchus and contradiction, but there is no judgment concerning contradiction without rules of consequences, without principles of reason, which are from God, not from man, whether Aristotle, or another, no more than the use of ears (without which neither faith can be had nor defended against heresies) is from Aristotle.

VII. From the common consent and practice of the fathers, councils, scholastics, also of more recent papists, who have hitherto refuted atheists, gentiles, Jews, heretics, any adversaries by applying reasoning and consequences: the contrary opinion and practice, which the Verronians now renew, was that of the ancient heretics, the Arians, Nestorians, Monophysites, etc., who constantly demanded the express words of scripture from the Catholics.

VIII. The testimonies of the fathers are added, by which they commend the use of the principles of reason. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 6 on the Holy Spirit, says that his adversary is a slave to the letter, and leaving the things pursues the syllables, calls him an alphabetical sophist, a caviler about words, namely because he did not admit the consequences, by which the Deity of the Holy Spirit is proved from the scriptures. See the same in his Funeral Oration in praise of Basil the Great. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 2, ch. 30, "It is one thing to know the rules

of connections, another the truth of sentences: in the former is learned what is consequent, what repugnant. It is consequent, if he is an orator, he is a man. It is repugnant, if he is a man, he is not a quadruped. Here therefore judgment is made concerning the very connection." See the same, chs. 31, 35, 37 of the same book, and Against Cresconius, bk. 1, ch. 15. Athanasius in his Epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, "It belongs to perspicacious men, as Paul commands, to attend to the reading, so that they may discern the matter by judgment, and receive the words according to the nature of the things which are written there, without confusion of understanding." Augustine, bk. 2, Against Cresconius, ch. 2, "I do not care whether it itself is called dialectic, yet I do care, as much as I am able, to know and be able to dispute, that is, to discern the truth from falsity in speaking, which if I do not care to do, I will err perniciously." Jerome on Galatians 1 says, "The Gospel is not in the words of the scriptures, but in the sense, not in the surface, but in the marrow, not in the leaves of the discourses, but in the root of reason." With these agrees the saying of Anselm in his book On the Harmony of Grace and Free Choice, "Thus therefore all holy scripture contains the authority of every truth, which reason collects, when it either openly affirms it, or in no way denies it. For what is collected by open reason, and is contradicted to it from no part of scripture, since it itself, just as it is opposed to no truth, so favors no falsity, by this very fact that it does not deny what is said by reason, it is received by its authority." With them side the papist Scholastics on the place of Thomas praised above. Salmeron, vol. 1, proleg. 9, can. 7, and vol. 8, tract. 61. Vega on the Council of Trent, ch. 39. Bellarmine, bk. 4, On the Word of God, ch. 9, and On the Notes of the Church, ch. 3, and On Justification, bk. 3, ch. 8. Cano, Theological Places, bk. 12, ch. 6, and bk. 6, ch. 8. And whoever defend the use of Philosophy, Logic, and Scholastic Theology, which is still explained today in all their Academies. Also Costerus in the prolegomena to his Enchiridion and others, who forewarn that we are to dispute with them only by arguments in form. So bore the laws of the Ratisbon Colloquy in the year 1600, where also from time to time the papist collocutors clamored: In form, in form. The same papists place contempt for Logic and Philosophy (which they calumniously fabricate against the reformed) among the slogans of heretics. See Pererius in the preface to his Physical Disputations, Cornelius a Lapide on 1 Tim. 6:20, Cano, Theological Places, bk. 9, ch. 3.

IX. From absurd consequences, first, because it would follow that men ἀλόγως conduct themselves concerning divine things without reasoning: in short to be as horses and mules, contrary to Ps. 32:9. Secondly, that we cannot instruct, reprove, convince others, and so obtain that end of the scriptures (concerning which 2 Tim. 3:16): any heretic or sinner will be able, as often as he is convicted from the scriptures, to demand that it be shown without consequences from the general to the particulars contained under it, also from like to like, from similar to similar, etc., where it is written that he is accursed, damned, that this or that deed of his displeases God. Therefore let no particular cases hereafter be decided from scripture, or the fathers, or Canon Law. and this is the straight road to atheism and libertinism. Confer our disputation on Atheism. Thirdly, then the Jews will conquer, to whom without consequences Christians will never expressly show in the Old Testament, "Jesus of Nazareth the son of Mary is the Messiah," any more than we show in the New Testament, "The Roman Pope is Antichrist"; the Skeptics and Pyrrhonists, Enthusiasts, Libertines, also the Socinians and similar will also conquer, and let the papists answer them when they say that all their Scholastic, casuistic, and

textual Theology, just as a great part of our reformed theology, are glosses, consequences, and human subtleties, by no means necessary for salvation, indeed which do not exist in express words in scripture. Fourthly, then all the capitula, canons and symbols of the ancient councils lie prostrate, particularly of the first four Ecumenical, which forged them against heretics and schismatics by our method, not the Verronic, that is, through consequences, as Bellarmine expressly testifies, On Councils, bk. 2, ch. 12, and is evident from the acts and canons of the Councils throughout. Fifthly, because by this Verronic art every manner of disputing used by the fathers against the ancient Manichaean, Arian, Pelagian and other heretics is condemned and derided; also the whole method of Scholastic Theology: in addition, the papist elenctic writers such as Bellarmine, Stapleton, Becanus, Serrarius, Gretser, Costerus, Perron, etc., finally their writers, who commend and demonstrate the use of Logic and Philosophy in Theology. And let these reasons now suffice. If anyone desires a fuller unfolding of certain reasons with the solution of exceptions, let him consult the Rational Theology of Nicolaus Vedelius; where others are also cited. Compare Rivet in his Catholic Orthodoxy; especially Abraham Ramburtius, Sedan theologian, who published a learned disputation with this title: On the Renewed Art of the Ancient Heretics, by which the Modern Mountebanks and Quacks Hawk Themselves, Provoking the Ministers of the Orthodox Churches to Combat. Finally, Conrad Bergius in his dissertations On the Catholic Faith published in 1639 in octavo, dissertation 5. We conclude that the papists in all things here are similar to those heretics concerning whom Gregory Nazianzen says that love of the letter was nothing other than a garment of impiety for them. See, I ask, his Oration 6 on the Holy Spirit; In short, by these and similar declinatory and dilatory exceptions, some devised after others, they only do this, that the case is not conducted at all, which Augustine objects against the Donatists, Epistle 152, and in the acts of the Carthage conference with the Catholics: indeed since their cause is so desperate, that they think it is rather to be despised, how reason cannot be given, than how it is to be given, as once Alcibiades pressed something of this sort on Pericles. If perchance someone should experience the feeble assaults of this method, we suggest this counsel and have already touched on it above, thesis 5, that our men protest that they want to dispute by that method, which the ancient fathers, scholastics, and papist Doctors used up to and including the Jesuits Arnoldus and Verronus against all their adversaries, whether in writing or by live voice. Let them either approve or disapprove that method: if they approve, therefore let it also be permitted to us to follow it: but if they disapprove; let them prove it by reasons, as they say; to which our men will be prepared to respond. But if they obstinately insist on the Verronic method nevertheless: let our men first or later, in alternating turns of the instituted collation urge by the same method, that the papists bring us back to the unity of the Roman church, by convicting us of heresy and schism (of which they arraign us guilty, and on that account sentence us to be burned alive) and that from the fathers and councils alone. If they dare to attempt this, exception is to be taken to the individual arguments in that way, in which the Verronians take exception to ours: so that all the hearers and judges may see the absurdity of that method. Here no escape lies open, other than that the papists alone can as it were use that method against the man, the reformed cannot: First, because from the hypothesis of the reformed, no truth is to be believed, no falsity rejected and refuted, unless all things are had expressed in so many words in scripture. Then, because the reformed alone as actors ought to perform the parts of the opponents; but not the papists, who are arraigned as guilty of idolatry and apostasy. Then, because this is the most compendious

and expeditious manner of disputing: if we will have convicted the papists of idolatry and defection: which having been accomplished no further disputation will be needed. But to the first reason I reply, that calumny is only presupposed, not proved, nor to be proved to eternity. To the second I reply: this is assumed or postulated, but not conceded by us, nor proved by the papists. In the question of heresy and schism we are arraigned and suffer as guilty; the papists are the accusers and persecutors. To the third I reply, it can thus be inverted: namely, with the proof of heresy and schism duly carried out and we most justly reduced to a recantation or to be burned alive, the proof of the idolatry and apostasy of the Papacy is to be labored over in no way or hardly. Let the reader, who has leisure, see some things which make for this fiction in Bartholdus Nihusius in his New Method of Disputing with the Protestants; which he repeats in his Apologetic for this Method published in the year 1640 in octavo, where see especially ch. 5. But Georg Calixtus, Helmstedt theologian, censured the vanity of this method in his repeated address to the University of Cologne, which he published with his treatise On Communion under Both Kinds in the year 1642.

COROLLARY.
IT is a defect of charity, that Eckhard, bundle of controversies, ch. 1, Stechmann in his Photinianism, disp. 1, Meisner in his Sober Philosophy, in the general questions, join our men with the Socinians, as if they made reason the principle and norm of faith. When we require the use of reason and logic, we no more make them the foundations, principles, and rules of faith, than the eyes, ears, tongues, without which we neither learn, nor teach religion, nor defend it against adversaries. They are therefore means for us and requisites, without which there is no faith or theological cognition: but not principles, norm, rule, foundations.

Supplement to the common topic of Theology pertains to the discussion of Scholastic Theology as an opposite to true and genuine Theology. Elsewhere, we have depicted Leudorius or corrupted species of theology in other works concerning paganism, Judaism, and perhaps in many others we will pursue this further, if God grants life and strength to address issues concerning heresy, Muhammadanism, Enthusiasm, etc.

ON SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

Resp. EVERHARDUS ROTARIUS of Nijmegen in Gelderland, on the
22nd of February, 1640.

For a supplement to the common place on Theology, an investigation of Scholastic Theology as the opposite of true and genuine Theology pertains. We have elsewhere censured other species of pseudo- or corrupt Theology in disputations on Gentilism, on Judaism: and perhaps we will pursue this plan more fully, if indeed God will have granted life and strength to publish disputations sometime on heresy, on Mohammedanism, on Enthusiasm, etc. I. Now let us historically describe Scholastic Theology according to the mind of its own followers.

II. Let us critically inquire, what are its vices, what abuses and uses.

III. Let us append some problems.

1. Scholastic theology is so called from the school, as obviously the subject place, or containing and adjunct circumstance. That we should here treat of the School, what it is, what are its causes, properties, effects, etc., the reason of our plan, and the brevity of the Theses do not permit. Authors are to be consulted, who in political disciplines, or in ecclesiastical polities, or in the universal precognita of erudition, or also in the peculiar discipline, which they call Scholastic, do this. See our theological library, bk. 2, sect. 1, ch. 1. For beginners the Scholastics of Alsted, which he inserted into his Encyclopedia, will serve in place of an index and guide. Perhaps also our sermon on Luke 2, which we prefixed to the initiation of this our Academy, will suggest something. But the word Scholastic Theology can be taken 1. most broadly for all that which in the Old and New Testaments either well or badly, either through divinely inspired doctors, or through orthodox but fallible doctors, or through erroneous ones, heretics, apostates in schools and private or public assemblies was ever handed down. 2. Broadly for that formula and method of Theology, which obtained for the most part in the schools of Europe, in some later centuries of the church after the entrance of the Antichristian corruption of religion. They called it so, both because it was handed down in the schools and its reason and method was other than that which resounded in the churches: and because on the contrary it was distinct from Ecclesiastical Theology, which in the first and better centuries of the church, as well as in the intermediate age, they followed not only in the churches but also in the schools and Theological colleges. For the sake of better doctrine we make it quadrimembral, textual or scriptural, dogmatic-questionary, Canonistic, and summistic or casuistic compounded from all those. Although the first was miserable and corrupt, yet it did not appear so frequently and familiarly in the schools: to which the so rare chairs and scriptural lectures established in the schools and monasteries, and the so few commentaries on scripture (namely comparatively to the other theological and ecclesiastical writings) published in those dark centuries will bear witness. But what and how imperfect that textual theology was, the commentaries of Thomas, Albert, Holcot, Bonaventure, Giles of Rome, Richard Middleton, Gregory of Rimini, and similar scholastics will teach. To the textual theology of the scholastics are especially to be referred the questions of Cardinal Torquemada on the Sunday Gospels, scholastically treated. The second and third, especially after the Sentences of Lombard, and the rhapsodies of Canon Law were established, indeed dominated alone in most schools and monasteries. The fourth, excerpted especially from both of those, and handed down separately, the necessity of confessors, and as it were that omnipotent and universal calamity of the estate both ecclesiastical and political, namely auricular confession, introduced. We have elsewhere spoken of the vices and virtues, mysteries and writers of this Theology in the prelections under the title of practical Theology, namely, under the title of Moral Theology, and of Ecclesiastical Polity. How the Papists commend and prescribe this Theology of theirs see in Possevinus, Selected Library, bk. 3. We recently treated of the third disp. on Canon Law. 3. Strictly for the formula and method of Theology, such as Lombard synoptically exhibited in the four books of sentences, and after him Thomas in the three parts of his Theological Summa and so thereafter in the disputations and commentaries on Lombard all the Sententiarii, and on Thomas the more recent scholastics; finally all the eclogarii and quodlibetarii, who separately fabricated questions and quodlibets. Concerning

which we must now properly treat. For we think that Scholastic Theology and a scholastic, that is a didactic and elenctic Professor of Theology (such as Possevinus describes, bk. 3, biblioth.) differ by an entire heaven from the scholastic Sententiarii.

2. The subject of treatment or matter of this Theology, is sacred doctrine (as indeed it is claimed) drawn from the word of God, the declaration of councils and fathers, natural reason and the authorities of philosophers; yet not with equal authority and certainty: concerning which see Thomas with Cajetan distinguishing I, q. 1, art. 8, to 2. Where they do not mention tradition and ecclesiastical definition, from which nevertheless this Theology was built up especially; unless they want it comprehended under the word of God. The form and method of handing down this Theology is almost entirely elenctic or questionary: for it is usually completed by a certain number of controversial questions and doubts recurring in a circle to the dictates of Lombard or Thomas; except that some explain the letter of the text by illustrating the more obscure things, or by reducing it to a compendium or summary, or by setting it forth analytically. It is therefore distinct from positive or thetic Theology, which synthetically and simply defines and explains Theological truths. The external form is the style or discourse by which it is handed down; plainly simple, Philosophical, and acroamatic; agreeing with the very things, concerning which it treats; for an apology of which see the epistle of Pico della Mirandola to Ermolao Barbaro which is extant among the epistles of Poliziano. The occupying object, or end for which of this theology were the students of sacred doctrine in the Academies, and the Monks and other Clerics in the monasteries and colleges, wherever any exercises of theology flourished.

3. The efficient causes, origin and progress of Scholastic Theology are now to be explained. The first author, who exhibited this new method of Theology in the schools in some form and substituted it for the older method and indeed with some approbation, was Lanfranc the adversary of Berengar. Whom afterwards his disciples and followers in Italy followed, by the number of votes they gradually extruded that better and older method of treating Theology already derived from Augustine, which hitherto had still obtained to some extent in the schools and churches of Europe. But this happened around the year 1020; when in the odious name of Berengar the older and purer Theology (I speak comparatively) more supported by and conformable to the scriptures and the sounder doctrine of the fathers was condemned and routed. Thus gradually that more impure formula of Theology, which they call scholastic, prevailed and grew through the ages. Afterwards Lombard in the year 1150, Albert the Great in the year 1200, and Thomas Aquinas perfected this work. The collections of Lombard and Thomas were as it were canonized for the schools, and obtained such authority that it was almost a crime to depart from them anywhere. There were indeed other summae, or collections of common places published from the time of Lanfranc both before Lombard and after: but none obtained this felicity, that it occupied the schools. But they are these, the Summa of his Sentences of Hugh of St. Victor in 1120, the Theology of Peter Abelard in 1120, the Epitome of the Bible of Richard monk of St. Victor in 1140, one book of the Sentences of the Faith of William Abbot of St. Thierry, the Sentences of Bandinus; which Lombard purloined and sold as his own, as Génébrard wants; but Daneau suspects it to be a calumny in his Prolegomena to Lombard ch. 3, the Summa of Theology of Robert of Lincoln in 1140, the Summa of Theology of Albert the Great in 1200, but which he did not complete, the Compendium of Theological Truth

of Bonaventure around the year 1270, the Golden Summa of William of Auxerre, in the year 1306, the Quodlibets of Walter Bishop of Poitiers in 1250. He is the first, who published scholastic quodlibets. The Compendium of Theology of John Gerson, which is contained in vol. 2, although it is thought not to be his. The Summa of Antoninus; which includes dogmatic, casuistic and canonical material. But that we may observe the origin and progress of Scholastic Theology so much the better, we will note the antecedent, the occasion, and its threefold age.

I. The antecedent is both remote and more proximate. The remote is the method and reason of Theology from the fourth century up to the seventh; of what sort it was is evident at length from the writings of the fathers; but concisely from the summae or eclogues, such as the Exposition of the Symbol of Rufinus, the Treasury of the Orthodox Faith of Cyril, the Enchiridion to Laurentius of Augustine, On Ecclesiastical Dogmas of Gennadius. There were also others of that kind, but which have perished. The proximate is the reason of Theology in the schools and colleges of the West from the seventh century up to the tenth. Of what sort it was, is evident from the writings of Gregory the Great, Bede, Alcuin, Rabanus Maurus, Claudius of Turin, and their followers; who tried as much as was in them to preserve and propagate to posterity the Theology of Augustine drawn from the most excellent writers of the previous centuries Fulgentius, Primasius, Prosper, Maximus of Turin, and commended to posterity. In the East although there was another method; as can be seen from John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, at least it was not Scholastic; and Nicetas Choniates, bk. 4, On the Orthodox Faith.

II. The occasion of it among others was, the fervent study of the Roman laws recently excited in the schools by Irnerius around the year 1030 and after him by Johannes Bulgarus, Azo, Placentinus, etc. Hence the Monks and Theologians strove to set forth their Scholastic Theology and Canon Law adorned with human authority and secular wisdom and subtlety. As indeed Peucer in his Chronicle bk. 4, and with him Daneau proleg. cit. 1, rightly observe.

III. The age of the scholastic doctors Daneau most learnedly (from whom others afterwards have described very many things, Keckermann in Logical Gymnasium, Alsted in History, and in chronology title 4, Himmelius in his treatise On the Canonists and Scholastic Theologians), in his Prolegomena to Lombard, distributes into old, middle, new: The old is that which began from Lanfranc of Pavia in the year 1020 and lasted for almost 200 years up to Albert the Great in the year 1220; this used to summon dogmas also from human authority of the fathers, and not only from the scriptures. It is easy to collect from the Catalogues of writers or the Libraries of Trithemius, Gesner, Bellarmine, Sixtus Senensis, Possevinus, what writers of that kind then flourished: and we will perhaps sometime note them in the alphabet or idea of ecclesiastical history. Lombard excelled among them as the most Scholastic indeed the father of them; and after him Alexander of Hales, who first commented on Lombard. The middle is that which begins from Albert the Great in the year 1220, and lasts up to Durand of Saint-Pourçain in the year 1330. Then besides indeed and above the sayings of scripture and the fathers, the statements of Aristotle often badly read, badly understood, were introduced into Theology as the principles of irrefragable demonstration. Hence they placed more study and labor in expounding certain shreds and parts of Aristotle, or in raising and solving questions on them, than in the meditation and explication of the scriptures. Among the celebrated writers of this age are, Albert, Thomas,

Bonaventure, Scotus, Giles of Rome, Durand, Richard Middleton, Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Francis of Meyronnes, etc. The new begins after the year 1330, and lasts up to the year 1517. In this age many things, which among their predecessors were either untouched, or left in the middle, or as doubtful and disputable, were superciliously defined, and at the same time the dissenting votes were obscured, or oppressed, Celebrated then were Capreolus, Soncinas, Peter d'Ailly, Gerson, John Major, Gabriel Biel, Nicholas Denisse, Pelbartus of Themeswar, etc. Possevinus in biblioth. 3, ch. 5, where he makes Christian and Scholastic Theology synonyms, constitutes the origin, progress, and ages of Scholastic Theology far otherwise. Therefore according to him the first period of Scholastic Theology was, when Hierotheus, Dionysius the Areopagite, Pantaenus, Clement of Alexandria flourished. The second runs for him from Athanasius up to the end of the seventh century. The third, from the disciples of Bede, up to Lanfranc, Alger, Guitmund, etc., and Lombard inclusively; and then in his judgment, Scholastic Theology was recalled under the standards, when its exercise before had been less treated. The fourth, from Alexander of Hales, Albert, Bonaventure, etc., up to the Council of Florence. Then according to his own testimony ibid. it began to resume more lively strength etc. And a great crop of excellent Theologians ripened to fruit in the church of God etc. when most learned books and commentaries were sent forth into the light against schisms, and heresies and six hundred other pests etc. The adjuncts of this Theology are both absolute, necessity, authority, interpretation, and comparative, excellence, and license, before all other Theology.

I. Cano in his Theological Places, bk. 8, ch. 2, extols its necessity, perfection, and utility, because it is the science of God, the cognition of heavenly things, the prudence and practice of human things: because it as it were digs out from darkness into the light those things which are contained hidden in the sacred writings and the traditions of the apostles; by its study and doctrine fortifies the faith, and defends it against the impious; as far as can be done, either illustrates or confirms the doctrine of Christ and the church from the human disciplines; because it invites, allures and prepares for the study of the sacred writings; in short because without it we can attain altogether no doctrine in the church: See these same utilities, but a little otherwise distributed and explained in Possevinus bk. 3, ch. 3.

II. Cano d. bk. ch. 4, makes its authority so great that to oppose the common opinion of all the scholastics is to him rash and impudent; indeed to contradict the agreeing opinions of the school concerning faith and morals, if not heresy, is next to heresy. The reason of which he afterwards assigns; because no decree of the school is so proper to it, which does not have a sure origin either from the sacred writings, or from apostolic tradition, or from the definitions of councils or popes. Thus those who have refuted the decrees of the school, have always been found to have repudiated also the fountain, whence they flow. etc. he adds ibid. p. 470. The church has defined very many things by its authority; and if it has condemned any heresies in the past three hundred years, it has been vehemently helped by its subsidy and diligence. Finally he draws to this the words of Christ: He who hears you, hears me, etc.

III. The Pontifical Doctors teach what the interpretation and tradition of this Theology ought to be (for to us here properly nothing is sown or reaped); among others Possevinus bk. 13, ch. 12. Refer here the requisites of a Professor of Scholastic Theology in the same ch. 10, which fit

ordinary Scholastics equally, as a packsaddle does an ox. Of what sort our interpretation (in reality examination and censure) most fittingly agrees, you will learn from the prolegomena and censure of Daneau on bk. 1 of Lombard. By what reason students in the Academy are to be led by the hand to some cognition of scholastic Theology, our little book On the Library and Exercises of a Student of Theology indicates.

IV. Possevinus bk. 3, ch. 5, cited by us above, celebrates its excellence above all other Theology after the times of the Apostles not obscurely.

V. The school gives great license to its own (according to the testimony of Cano ch. 4), that it may be permitted to them by their own right to defend whatever occurs as most probable; but it is not permitted however to condemn rashly and lightly those who are opposed.

VI. What arose from all these utilities and excellences was the adjunct; that hitherto in the schools they preferred it to positive, scriptural, and Practical Theology and cultivated it before those.

5. With this Theology agree, 1. Canon Law. 2. The sophistry of the ancient and modern sects in philosophy. 3. The curious, litigious, and fastidious Grammar, Criticism, Rhetoric of certain ones. 4. The wicked subtlety of certain Pseudo-Jurists and Pragmatists, and the audacity and temerity of defending or impugning anything. 5. The vain talking of ancient and modern heretics (especially of Papists and Socinians). It is opposed by 1. The divinely inspired writers. 2. The Theology of the fathers. 3. Also the writers of the intermediate age, up to Lanfranc and Lombard. 4. Reformed theology. 5. Especially the judgment of Luther, Melanchthon, Daneau, Chandieu, etc., and of all of ours. Concerning whom Cano pronounces not without atrocious calumny and inconsistency bk. 8, ch. 1, "But the heresy of the Lutherans, if it wants to be consistent with itself, can say nothing about the institution of the school, in which it itself confesses that it was never trained." And bk. 9, ch. 3, "Because it wants its disciples to be alien from the faculties which consist in reason: and because they call away from every faculty of knowing." Who does not know that the first reformers were nourished in Scholastic Theology and Philosophy (as they were then usually handed down in the schools), were promoted in it, indeed some taught the same in the Academies or Colleges? But how actively and dexterously their successors cultivated the disciplines and arts, especially the Philosophical, together with languages and histories beyond the Papal Scholastics, their writings published in that kind proclaim, and the appearance of the schools among us up to this very day.

6. Scholastic Theology can be variously divided from the matter of dogmas, and from certain adjuncts and circumstances: and according to it the Scholastic Doctors.

I. There is old, middle, new, which division we explained above.

II. There is the sect of the realists and the nominalists: to whom some add the conceptualists. The sect of the nominalists was cultivated especially by Ockham the disciple of Scotus. The sect of the realists followed the views of Thomas.

III. Again there is the sect of the Thomists and the Scotists; which division flourishes up to this day. The third of the Albertists is now obliterated. The readers of Theology in the colleges of the Minorites mordantly adhere to Scotus, who do not hand down their Theology to the summa of Thomas, which happens in the Academies, but to the Master of the Sentences and to the commentaries of Scotus on the Master. They report that somewhere in some Academy of Spain there is still a Scotistic chair, to which Professors of Scotistic Theology are successively appointed. The Dominicans follow Thomas, and most Professors in the Academies. The modern Jesuits, although they comment on Thomas, yet not rarely incline to Scotus, and so show themselves mediators between those dissenting parties; as can be seen in the writings of Suárez, Vásquez, Becanus, Arriaga, etc., not to mention the Philosophical dictates of the Conimbricenses, Toletus, Ruvius, Pererius, etc. But what dissensions there are between the Scotists and the Thomists, you will know from the Thomist Cajetan in his commentaries on the Summa of Thomas; where he responds everywhere to the impugnations of Scotus; and from the Scotist Cavellus in his scholia on the commentaries of Scotus on the Master; especially from Rada the Bishop of Patti in his tract On the Theological Controversies between Thomas and Scotus. Cardinal Sarnano published a conciliator between both. In the celebrated controversy concerning the immaculate conception of Mary the Thomists now seem not a little inferior, and as if diminished in head: concerning which contest see from Chemnitz's Examination of the Council of Trent and from the Bullarium of Cherubini and its epitome published by his son, finally from the Legations of Philip III and IV to the Pope described by Luke Wadding. Elsewhere in a prelection on common places I set forth a synopsis of this history for the sake of the hearers. But let them now see the Apology for Mary bk. 1, ch. 5, 9, of the illustrious Rivet. In the other celebrated controversy concerning the grace of God and free choice, they still fight in doubtful battle; with the Jesuits pouring cold water as there so also here, and eagerly attacking the Thomists. See the opposing endeavors of the sects in Bellarmine in the Controversies, or Suárez in his Theological Opuscula; or Francis Sylvius in his tract On the Motion of the First Mover: and in our Disputation On the Knowledge of God.

IV. The Scholastic Doctors are also distinguished by the grades of authority which their doctrine obtained in the schools.

1. For some are more obscure, and almost commonly attacked and rejected, such as Joachim of Fiore, Abelard.

2. Others are commonly reproved only in some peculiar opinion or opinions as Gilbert de la Porrée, Aureolus, Durand, Ockham; as also Lombard in various opinions, to which that black Theta is wont to be appended: "Here the Master is not held." See the syllabus of opinions, which the school of Paris condemned in him in part, in part that of Oxford, published with Lombard himself, and with the commentaries of Bonaventure on Lombard.
3. Others are approved, and immune from the stigma of the schools.

4. Finally, others are raised above all others into the columns of the schools: as Alexander of Hales called the Irrefragable Doctor: Thomas, called the Angelic Doctor (concerning whose

almost canonical authority, see Sixtus Senensis, Possevinus, the editors of the works of Thomas, Sylvius in the preface to the tract On the Motion of the First Mover). Bonaventure the Seraphic Doctor: Henry of Ghent the Solemn Doctor: John Duns Scotus the Subtle Doctor, Giles of Rome the Most Fundamental Doctor: Francis of Meyronnes the Illuminated Doctor. John Baconthorpe the Resolute Doctor.

V. From the manner and method of writing, they are divided into Sententiaries, and Quodlibetaries. The former are those who adapted their dictates to Lombard; the immense number of whom see in Possevinus biblioth. bk. 2, and everywhere in his Sacred Apparatus. The latter, who disputed concerning certain and select Quodlibetical questions. The first editor of Quodlibets was Walter Bishop of Poitiers; whose example Thomas, Henry of Ghent, Ockham, Raymond of Sabunde, etc. imitated.

VI. Finally they are divided by the circumstance of time, into Scholastics before the times of the reformation or rebirth both of letters and of religion, and after them. How much the latter differ from the former, obviously taught, or aroused, or compelled by the reformed Doctors, theologizing not a little more modestly and circumspectly in many things, will be evident to one comparing both. But among the latter today the most celebrated are Cajetan, Domingo de Soto, Sylvester Ferrariensis, Domingo Báñez, Bartolomé Medina, Gregorio de Valencia, Antonio de Córdoba, Luis de Molina, Gabriel Vázquez, Francisco Suárez, Rafael de la Torre, Willem Hessels van Est, José Anglés, Pedro de Ledesma, Francis Sylvius, Giles de Coninck, Jan Malderus, etc., whose commentaries and disputations on the Master, or on the summa of Thomas either whole, or a part of it are publicly available. Besides them there are those, who published particular treatises or certain scholastic opuscula by the scholastic method, such as Francisco de Vitoria, Leonardus Lessius, Diego Álvarez, Francisco Zumel, Juan Martínez de Ripalda, etc., not to mention the infinite Casuists and Moralists; concerning whom elsewhere: meanwhile see their prolix Catalogue (to which however not a few are to be added) in Possevinus, Biblioth., bk. 3. Nor are those to be passed over, who took care that the opuscula of the ancient Scholastics interpolated be republished as introductory to Scholastic doctrine, or who wrote dictionaries or explications of terms, or summaries of Scholastic Theology, such as Chrysostomus Javellus in his Speculative Gymnasium, the Author of the new edition of the Theological Dictionary of Johannes Altenstaig at Cologne 1619, Walter Roy in Formalities, Vallo in Lectures, Charles Chasteignier de La Roche-Posay in Distinctions, Martinus Becanus in Scholastic Theology, Arnoldus Vesalius in his compendium of Lombard, Martín de Ripalda in his compendium of the same with scholastic allegations recently published, the Anonymous in the tract whose title is Conclusions of Thomas reprinted a few times; and other epitomes of the Thomistic summa indicated in our Theological Library.

VII. The peculiar Scholastic Philosophy and Theology of Ramon Llull would make a member of the division here, if it had not been deserted by almost all schools in common, and so as if obsolete. There were indeed some, who from time to time endeavored to extol the Lullist school, but they could not succeed: so that it had to contain itself within the narrow limits of his own fatherland Majorca alone: where the Lullist doctrine is still read publicly. We have elsewhere indicated from Nonius's Spain, and others the various and contradictory judgments of Popes

and Councils concerning it. See the book published in the year 1604 with this title: Definitive Sentence in Favor of the Lullist Doctrine, etc. Bellarmine denies however that it has been defined whether Llull is a heretic, or a holy martyr, and illuminated doctor. Compare Possevinus in his Sacred Apparatus. Bernardo de Lavinheta the Minorite Theologian in the year 1523 at Lyons strove to adapt the disciplines of Llull, and his Theology compendiously comprised in one volume and to mix it with the Scholastic. Concerning the Philosophical method of Llull very many of the more recent have passed their judgment: among others Keckermann against it in his Philosophical Precognita, but especially and at length in his Logical Precognita; and for it Alsted in his Lullian Logic.

7. Thus far the Exegetical treatment, now follows the critical: which is of two members; the former of which will indicate the censure, the latter the use of Scholastic Theology. In the censure very many things occur to be noted, and that both in the matter, and in the form. In the matter indeed:

I. The falsity and novelty of capital theses or opinions, e.g., concerning free choice and grace, concerning justification, concerning human merits and satisfactions, and concerning indulgences; concerning the worship of saints, images, consecrated things; concerning the efficacy of the sacraments, concerning transubstantiation and the mass, concerning the infallibility and power of the Church and the Pope, concerning venial sin, and concerning the work worked, concerning Councils and monastic vows, etc. And which things of that kind are controverted today between us and the Papacy.

II. The falsity of many opinions in secondary controversies, e.g., concerning Angels, Demons, Hell, Heaven, Creation and the works of Creation, etc.

III. Falsity in hypothetical controversies, when namely they contend for a bad cause with pseudographical writings, and support some truth of faith with a fig-tree prop or false hypothesis: or from a true thesis deduce false works and corollaries: or oppose false and insufficient responses to contrary arguments.

IV. Innumerable vertigines, contradictions and doubts: by which they involve both themselves and their readers and followers, and render them more uncertain, than instruct them. But there are those contradictions and fluctuations 1. partly between the sects, such as the Thomists and Scotists, Nominalists and realists; partly between the Doctors of the same family or sect. 2. again, partly in controversies of the first kind: such as concerning the grace of God, concerning the matter and form of each sacrament, concerning the worship and adoration of images, concerning the power of the Pope, etc., partly in controversies of the second and third kind: as is evident from Bellarmine in the Controversies; and Tanner and Becanus in Scholastic Theology; and Suárez, Vázquez, Sylvius on the summa of Thomas, and the Casuists Azor, Diana, Bonacina, etc. Andreas Craston, Johannes Pappus, Matthias Flacius Illyricus from our side collected centuries of those contradictions. But the Papists meet this in vain with the distinction of dissensions in faith and in Theology, and the praise of them, as of a peculiar and salutary effect of divine providence. Hear the Jesuit Theologian Tanner in the preface to vol. 1 of

his Scholastic Theological Lectures, "Vázquez and Suárez, great Theologians of our society, and at this time certain ones as it were coryphaei of theologians, who wrote many and quite large volumes of commentaries on the individual parts of St. Thomas, so that nevertheless in most scholastic controversies, not without a singular nod of divine providence as I think for the sake of more illustrating the truth, they constantly dissented between themselves." Concerning their problems properly so called, and other things either to be left in the middle, or to be freely, soberly considered on both sides, or to be suitably reconciled after investigation, I judge that nothing is here to be noted; since dissenting opinions and quodlibetical (so to speak) disquisitions, and free prophecies concerning such things occur everywhere among the fathers and orthodox Theologians. But such problematic controversies (to explain this also in passing) are of six kinds, concerning which it is usual to inquire and opine on both sides among the pious and orthodox. Of the first kind are those about purely Theological theses, e.g., Whether the faithful will recognize each other in eternal life; whether the impious living on the last day are to die, etc. Compare our theological library, bk. 1, ch. 9. Of the second kind about special and intricate certain cases of conscience, in the matter of scandal, or in the appearance of evil, or in participation with another's sin, etc., where it is hardly clear what is certainly to be established. Of the third kind about Theologico-Philosophical or technical theses; e.g., Where the trope is in the words of the Supper, How that non-real distinction, by which the attributes are distinguished from the essence, also the essence from the person is properly to be called. We will perhaps sometime give a syllabus of those questions. Of the fourth kind, about the explication of sayings of scripture; especially which contain obscure antiquities, or rites, or certain chronological, or topographical things, or also are thought hard to reconcile in any way. Of the fifth kind, about very many historical controversies or ecclesiastical antiquities, and novelties; where it is inquired; whether such a thing was believed, said, written, done, determined by this or that Doctor, martyr, Church, Council, patron of the Church, or by a heretic and outsider, or not. Of the sixth kind, about formalities, and the method and manner of explaining, or disputing: namely, whether something was explained or disputed properly, evidently, methodically. For the illustration of this material concerning problematic controversies, the collation of the disp[utations] on fundamental articles and errors will be useful, and the title in ecclesiastical polity concerning the freedom of prophesying, and concerning toleration.

8. We consider the form of scholastic theology either as more extrinsic, or as more intrinsic. The extrinsic has style or phraseology, and external order and disposition of parts: in which although very many things pertain to the censure of Logicians rather than Theologians, yet we briefly note these things.

I. That sometimes without any necessity, they use barbarous and obscure words.

II. That also somewhere they employ terms expressing the thing not at all; obviously as less proper, adequate, and perspicuous.

III. That the method of each Theological chapter in particular is purely elenctic and questionary not positive and so they seem to labor only in accumulating certain questions and fly upon them, without explication of terms through definitions, divisions, etc., although Aristotle himself taught

them, that the precognita of demonstration are, whether it is, what it is. Hence it happens, that they often dispute about Non-being. Which Lucifugal method the modern Papists still imitate today in disputations on Merit, free choice, etc.

IV. That the universal method of the whole of Theology does not seem to be observed accurately enough: if indeed the sons of the Logicians want it from the beginning; concerning which however we do not want to contend here. Possevinus bk. 3, ch. 8 & 9, passing over the method of Lombard, Scotus, Bonaventure (whom he indicates were expounded in the schools by the Professors ibid.), contends that Thomas's is most integral and most absolute. Yet he cannot dissimulate that it seemed otherwise to others; whence it happened, that, when that tighter manner of speaking of the scholastics was neither approved nor able to be perceived by all in the previous century, Sixtus Senensis in Sacred Library bk. 3, Alfonso Tostado in On the Theological Study bk. 3, Melchior Cano in Theological Places, Maldonatus at Paris (whose idea of method he exhibits there) showed and entered upon another more useful method and reason of teaching Theology. Of the same opinion were [Jean] Viguier who composed anew the Institutions of Theology, Cardinal Sarnano, who [published] a Theological Summa: Jerónimo Torres, who reduced Augustine to places and method, Serafino Capponi, who published a compendium of the Theology of Albert the Great, with scholia added: not to mention the common places of [Johann] Eck, [Konrad] Kling, [Jan van der] Bundere, etc. So that it is not to be borne with difficulty, if our Logicians and Methodicians (among whom Keckermann, bk. 1 of Logical Gymnasium) examine the method of Thomas. The more intrinsic form has the principle, object, and manner of scholastic treatment.

I. Concerning the principle we note. 1. That they demonstrate and determine Theological dogmas promiscuously partly from their false reason, partly from the authorities of scripture, fathers, writers of the intermediate age and Aristotle: the more recent add Canon law, Thomas, Scotus, etc. 2. That they often allege sayings of scripture, the Fathers, Aristotle badly translated, badly read, badly understood, by them often neither seen nor read but only by another's faith. We will from time to time show examples to our students: and this can be done expressly, when we will have sometime examined Lombard or Thomas, or at least their compendia in a private college. Meanwhile let the specimen exhibited by Daneau be seen, on the first book of Lombard.

II. Concerning the object. 1. That they are intent only on finding and heaping up too many questions and controversies. 2. That sometimes, and expressly they languish too much about useless, vain, curious, dangerous, absurd, indeed also blasphemous questions: such as, e.g., Whether in the state of innocence all would have been born in the male sex; of what quantity and figure is the empyrean heaven: Whether the Son of God was able to assume any nature, such as of a gourd, ass, serpent, etc., or sinful human nature. Whether baptism holds to whose formula these words are mixed, in the name of the devil, or, I sing of arms and the man; Whether it would have been a good form of baptism, if Christ had instituted it in the name, buf, baf; What a mouse gnaws, when it gnaws the consecrated host, and what is to be done with that mouse; Whether the proposition is possible, God the Father hates the Son, etc. 3. That they stuff in too many Philosophical questions from alien disciplines. 4. That while they tarry on those

absurd, or alien or superfluous things, they plainly are ignorant of and omit many most useful things pertaining to the inmost marrow and practice of faith: such as are, concerning the practice of faith and repentance; concerning the art and method of praying, concerning temptations and spiritual desertions, and very many similar things, which we are accustomed to treat in Moral and Ascetic Theology; also in Ecclesiastical Polity: which nowhere appear in the summa of Lombard or Thomas.

III. Concerning the manner of explaining, proving, refuting. 1. That they often scribble the page with ridiculous and inept explications, and proofs. 2. That they not rarely pass over the more solid and better proofs. 3. That they for the most part commit the fallacy of passing to another genus: and strive to prove the mysteries of faith from reason and the light of nature, or from Philosophy and human philosophical authority. 4. That sometimes they place more effort in recounting doubts, and opinions of every kind: than in removing and deciding them: as if they were going to write in imitation of Plutarch On the Opinions of the Philosophers. 5. That going away to one extreme, they themselves also stick in quodlibetical probability, and leave their reader in it. 6. That again going away into the other extreme, they determine too contentiously in problematic minutiae, or uncertain things. 7. That in the explication, and reconciliation of alleged authorities, or in the solution of reasons, they employ too silly and fig-tree distinctions: which entangle the thing more, than explicate it: and betray the cause more, than defend it. All which things we will illustrate abundantly with examples sometime: when the reason of the Theses does not bear this at present. It will have sufficed now to have indicated the authors who marked the scholastics with censure. But they are both ours, and Papists, and witnesses of the truth living before the reformation in the communion of the Roman-Western Church. Ours are, Chandieu, Daneau, and Keckermann in the places cited, Marnix of Saint-Aldegonde in his Beehive of the Roman Church. Johannes Himmelius in his treatise On the Canonicate, where at the end he treats of Scholastic Theology, Binder On Scholastic Theology and before all those Erasmus Sarcerius in his peculiar tract On the Uselessness of Scholastic Theology. The Papists are, Abbot Trithemius, Josse Clichtove and Johannes Aventinus bk. 6 of the Annals; Erasmus in the Praise of Folly, and the Antibarbarians, Pierre de la Ramée in his Theological Compendium, and the epistle prefixed, On the Reason of Arriving at True Theology; and in his notes on 1 Tim. 1, Juan Luis Vives On the Corruption of the Disciplines and on Augustine, On the City of God bk. 13, chs. 1 & 21, ch. 7, & bk. 20, ch. 16, & bk. 18, ch. 18, the Author of the epistle of obscure men, who is thought to be [Heinrich] Glarean; Melchior Cano in his Theological Places: Ambrogio Catharino against Domingo de Soto, and on the 208 errors of Cajetan: Claude d'Espence in his commentaries on the epistles to Timothy and Titus: Christophe de Cheffontaines, in his tract On the Necessary Correction of Scholastic Doctrine. [Christoph] Longolius in his oration To the Lutherans, [Heinrich Cornelius] Agrippa On the Vanity of the Sciences, Andrea Alciato in an Oration On the Laws delivered at Avignon. The witnesses of the truth, Anselm of Havelberg in 1140, Nicolas de Clamanges, Wessel Gansfort, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, the book, whose title is The Burden of the Church: and others whose sayings (if indeed all the books are not at hand) see in the Catalogue of Witnesses of the Truth of Flacius Illyricus, and the Mystery of Plessis. The rest of the authors are everywhere readily available: therefore we do not copy out their words. Only now we exhibit the words of the celebrated jurist Alciato from the oration on the laws delivered at Avignon (which perhaps many libraries,

especially of Theologians do not have): "What," he says, "the Theologians have besides the materials common with jurists, hardly pertain to Theology: such are the infinite volumes, and innumerable inept questions, which can do that in divine worship, which a dog in the bath can do." So that we may see, how much in the Academies the erudite made of the common Scholastic Theology.

9. It remains now that we indicate the origin and occasions of this so corrupt Theology.

I. It is ignorance of languages, especially Greek, and Hebrew: in which God willed the scripture to be written: and hence ignorance of sacred phraseology, and consequently of the literal sense.

II. Ignorance of histories and antiquities, especially ecclesiastical.

III. Ignorance of disciplines, in which nevertheless they were especially proud. For they used to draw their Philology from the Grammar of Alexander, and Hugutio, the Catholicon, the Mammotrectus, the Gemma Gemmarum and similar dictators of that age. Philosophy with its cognate arts was circumscribed by the little summula of the dialectic of Peter of Spain, certain dictated questions by the teachers on the Little Logicals, on certain parts of the Logic and Physics of Aristotle often not translated happily enough; with a very few Ethical and Metaphysical questions added. And this Philosophical course, which even still today has not yet become obsolete somewhere. Equipped with those languages and disciplines they used to proceed to Lombard, on whom most died.

IV. Defect of practice and exercise both of piety, and of ecclesiastical care. For they were for the most part purely speculative and shadowy Doctors.

V. Ignorance of the scriptures (that is, of the unique Theological principle) and rare, or perfunctory, or no reading, meditation, collation, etc., of them. Which we gather from various indications. 1. That the Doctors themselves, even at 50 years old usually profess in the schools, that they have not read Scripture, but they have those places, which they cited, from Jerome or from Canon Law: as can be seen in the Apology of Robert Estienne against the Parisians. Carlstadt confessed, that seven years after the conferral of the doctorate of Theology he at last began to read the scriptures. 2. That in place of biblical reading they used to stuff themselves with the ecclesiastical history of [Peter] Comestor: who defiled sacred history with his insipid additions: whom afterwards Bonaventure and Ludolph of Saxony imitated, in the Life of Christ. 3. That they everywhere twist and pervert the scriptures with such insipid and inept interpretations. In which kind the Popes used to shine before them, and the Canonists used to go in equal pace with them.

10. The other part of the Critique follows, which sets forth the use of Scholastic Theology: concerning which we have also advised something elsewhere, namely in Thersites Heautontimorumenos and afterwards in the theological library. But it is:

I. That they are most conducive in unfolding Philosophical subtleties, especially Logical, Physical, Metaphysical, Ethical, Political: and most of the more recent plow with their heifer. See the praises of Scaliger, Exercitations 249. 3, & 324, & 340, and the epistle of Pico della Mirandola to Ermolao, in the epistles of Poliziano.

II. In their Theological method, especially of Thomas, these things are to be approved. That it joins together four things irreconcilably fighting between themselves, indissolubly, abundance, brevity, perspicuity, obscurity: as the common proverb has concerning Thomas, according to the testimony of Sixtus Senensis: which if not in all at least in many things we find to be true. 2. That they devised many terms and distinctions for elucidating things otherwise most obscure and most difficult: by which the intellect and memory of man to be wonderfully helped, and the many mysteries of Theology to be most expeditiously and most safely explicated and defended no one will deny, unless ignorant of solid Theology. 3. That they treat controversies without stomachic inflammation, that is without stale and grammatical pigments, without oratorical and poetical amplifications and digressions, which obscure the truth more than they illustrate it. 4. That they employ a phraseology or style not always so inept and barbarous (as certain delicate people cry out), but truly acroamatic, most suitable for defending abstruse and divine things against adversaries (where it is dangerous even to speak true things). 5. That although they do not always seem to show so much use of Logic especially in analysis: nevertheless in the analysis of an Aristotelian text, or of scripture they often show the highest judgment and subtlety. Let those see, who have leisure, e.g., the Commentaries of Thomas on Aristotle's books On the Soul, the Commentaries of Bonaventure on Luke, etc.

III. The matter of Theology is twofold, either in dogmas which do not exceed the terms of natural Theology (which we designated elsewhere), or in dogmas which exceed them. In that they are quite felicitous: and their fecund intellects will help us not a little in expediting reasons and solutions against Atheists, Epicureans, etc. Let the writings of the more recent be consulted concerning God, concerning angels, concerning the human soul, etc. The matter of supernatural Theology is either controverted today between us and the Papists, or not controverted. In things not controverted, for example, concerning the simplicity, infinity of God: concerning the Trinity, the person of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, etc. They serve us not a little against the ancient and modern heretics, especially the Neo-Arians: for they are ingenious in explicating and detecting the entanglements of heretics, in finding reasons, which they may oppose to the reasonings of heretics, in addition, in solving perplexing sophisms, and insoluble knots: finally, which is more wonderful, not rarely in explicating scriptures twisted and objected by the adversary. In the matter controverted today they offer us a twofold use. One is, that while they set forth the mysteries of their corrupt Theology more candidly than the modern tergiversators, they give us the occasion of so much the more easily convicting the prevaricating Lucifuges and dragging them into the light. Of all others, the Controversy concerning the adoration and worship of Images will be a proof to us. The other is, that they still better retained the truth in some things, or approached nearer to it, than the modern irreformable and incorrigible Papists: e.g., concerning the Principles and object of faith, concerning the grace of God and free choice: by which it happens that we everywhere confound them by domestic witnesses. Our more excellent Theologians acknowledge these and other utilities of Scholastic Theology everywhere

if not in words, at least by the very deed: that is by imitation and use of the Scholastics in their writings: where they borrow not a few things from them partly, partly allege them. I wove a Catalogue of them in my Thersites.

11. It remains that we touch on certain problems.

I. The first probl., and what makes the capital controversy here is: Whether scholastic is genuine Theology, and to be retained in the schools? Resp. The Papists indeed so contend: Gregorio de Valencia Disp. 1, q. 1, point 2; Girolamo Vielmi in his apologetic oration, which was published with the book On the Six Days of the Founded World: Possevinus biblioth., bk. 3, chs. 3, 5, and at length Melchior Cano in the book cited, where he professes the solution of all objections. But if anyone attends, he will see that he, plays with the ambiguous and the proofs pertain to Scholastic Theology in idea and abstractly, such as namely it ought to be; but not to that, which yesterday or today obtained in the schools of the Papacy. Which he himself discloses enough, when tacitly and as if doing something else he intermixes most of the censures, by which we burden the Scholastics. Therefore he takes to himself to defend Scholastic Theology, not that one, which was and obtained everywhere in the schools, and which the first of our reformers along with some Papists Erasmus, Vives, etc., had censured: but such as it ought to be, in his judgment. Thus he, by pretending an accusation but calumnious of our men, and an apology of the scholastics, in reality accuses them (see p. 461, 463, 465, 467, & bk. 9, ch. 1) and prescribes a far other and new reason of Theology, and substitutes it for the ancient scholastic. Let him see, who has leisure, his very diatribe, and let him attend especially to those words ch. 1, "But in every discourse remember reader, that I defend that doctrine of the school, which has been constituted on the foundations of the sacred writings," and the same p. 460 he forewarns that he calls no one a scholastic Theologian, "unless he reasons aptly, prudently, learnedly from the sacred writings and institutions concerning God and divine things." Ch. 2, p. 463, he describes the proper office of a Scholastic Doctor, that he ought to know "in what way the Catholic faith both helps the pious, and is defended against the impious": and p. 426, "That those things which are contained hidden in the sacred writings, in the traditions of the Apostles, may be dug out into the light as if from darkness": And p. 464, "That they illustrate and confirm the doctrine of Christ and the church, as far as can be done, from human disciplines." Again p. 465, he manifestly betrays his prevarication: "Therefore three ends of true Theology are to be established. For I dispute not only concerning scholastic, but concerning all Theology altogether." And a little after: "For this is true Theology, etc., the science of God, the cognition of Celestial things, the prudence and practice of human things." Therefore that whole disputation of Cano (as also of Possevinus) is not so much a disputation as a calumnious prevarication and concealment of the sundering. Which we detect by these fountains of solutions: 1. We do not relegate reason, the light of nature, Logic, Philosophy serving Theology from the Theological school: as can be seen in our Disputation: On Human Reason in Matters of Faith. 2. We do not reject the acroamatic method of treating Theology didactically and elenctically in the schools: but we studiously follow and cultivate it. 3. True and solid Theology is one thing, Papal Scholastic Theology, or Socinian, or any other heretical Theology is another: just as the Catholic Church is one thing, and the Papal another: Christianity is one thing, Antichristianity another: he who disapproves those, is not to be said to disapprove these by that very fact. 4. The error of

our censure on Scholastic Theology is not in this, that we do not distinguish the opinions of the school from the sure and constant decrees: and that we confound those things which pertain to religion, with these which do not even touch it: as Cano wants ch. 5, pp. 472, 473. See and compare our censures indicated above.

II. Probl. Whether someone can be an erudite didactic and elenctic Theologian, who is a stranger in scholastic Theology? Resp. By no means. For to pass over the utilities alleged above: how I ask will he be able to refute it solidly, or to resist the Papists still today fighting with its arms, if indeed he neither reads nor understands it?

III. Whether the study and some cognition of Scholastic Theology can consist with the study of practical Theology: and whether the cognition and tasting of that does not corrupt and subvert the cognition and study of this? Resp. I affirm the former, I deny the latter. No more than an accurate explication of practical Theology subverts that saying 1 Thess. 5, Test all things, hold fast what is good. Let Perkins and Ames be examples, two excellent practical Theologians.

IV. Whether its study is so difficult and stern? Resp. I deny it, if only someone is imbued with a mediocre cognition of Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics.

V. Whether we ought to be authors to the students that they taste Scholastic theology in the Academic course? Resp. I affirm, for there they are fresh from philosophical studies, and so are especially suitable for understanding its distinctions and terms. But when, and with what preparation, and in what way and order they are to proceed to tasting scholastic things, we indicate in the Theological Library.

VI. How much and what kind of study of it is then to be imposed on or persuaded to them. Resp. A twofold one, one namely expressly, the other incidentally or given the occasion. Let the former be completed by the reading of Scholastic Theology: also, if it can be done, by the associated exercise or college of those examining and disputing. The latter is especially threefold. 1. when they study Metaphysics, and dispute concerning them. 2. when they are exercised in Theologico-Philosophical things. 3. When it must be opposed publicly or privately, Theologically or Philosophically. On those occasions they will most usefully turn aside to the reading of some scholastic disputation.

Concerning this question

TO WHAT EXTENT THE AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE EXTENDS.

Resp. HENRICUS RIDDERUS of Rommerswaal in Zeeland.
On the 9th of July, 1636.

The capital controversies concerning the Authority of Scripture have been so solidly and fully expounded by the Theses, systems, and elenctic writings of the Most Learned Theologians against Atheists, Epicureans, Libertines, Papists, that if any should anew smear their commentaries on paper, they might seem to be writing an Iliad after Homer. We therefore, having directed the Students to their labors, exhibit in these theses only a gleaning, and some select problems to be investigated, and that in this order.
I. We will premise a distinction of the Authority of Scripture.
II. We will briefly delineate the Extensive Authority or extension of the authority of scripture (for we presuppose the intensive asserted by our men) for variance or inequality.

The divinity of Scripture or its divine and infallible truth and power with respect to us is called authority or authenticity. But the authority of any writing or instrument is nothing other than a certain dignity, according to which and on account of which that writing is held as true, indeed also as powerful to oblige us to believe or perform all that, which it commands to be believed and performed. In the authority of scripture a distinction can be made and considered between Historical or historica authenticity, and the authenticity of a norm, or normative, which I am also accustomed to call of a precept. The former is that, by which Scripture is understood to be infallibly true with a historical truth, insofar as the sacred writers historically setting forth the divine words have received all the dogmas, counsels, sayings, deeds, whether good or evil, which are contained in the Bible, from the mouth and through the immediate revelation of God and are believed to have exhibited them to us without any error. The authenticity of a Norm is that, by which the very matter of things contained in the scriptures (e.g., counsels, sayings, deeds), besides the knowledge of it, also oblige and constrain our consciences to faith, observance and imitation of those things which are there said to be believed, observed, and imitated. Although we confess that historical authenticity also has and includes the authenticity of a precept, because God commands that we give faith to his word dictated to the sacred writers, as to the word of God dictated by the Holy Spirit. But to this general precept and obligation, by which all readers and hearers are obliged to faith or assent of any historical truth whatsoever, we contradistinctly oppose the precept and obligation, by which they are moreover obliged to assent of evangelical truth, namely in evangelical promises; or of legal truth, namely in legal commands; or of any theological truth in theological dogmas, concerning God, and his attributes, works, etc. We therefore take in the other member of this distinction the authenticity of a precept, strictly, not loosely. The necessity and evidence of this distinction will best appear from the analogy of law and history. In law let us distinguish these two moments, the power and act of notifying, and the act or power of commanding, obliging and constraining. Some municipal law, e.g., in this or that kingdom whether good or bad is authentic to me, because it certainly indicates and notifies to me with the certainty of human history, that this or that was established by the King in that kingdom; but it is not authentic to me with the authenticity of a norm or precept, because it does not have the power of constraining and obliging me to do those things which are demanded, or contained in that law. Similarly in history, e.g., of Sallust, I distinguish the truth of the historian faithfully relating whatever counsels, deeds, sayings, writings, from the truth or goodness of the sayings, counsels, etc., as also from the veracity of those speaking, counseling, writing, e.g., of Catiline, Lentulus, Cethegus, etc. We approve history as such, formally so called, but we do not approve history materially or all the matter contained in it, such

as the conspiracy of Catiline, the sayings and counsels of the conspirators; nor do we think that those are proposed as examples for imitation or constrain us. Thus the whole scripture as a divine and infallible history is received by us on account of the authority of the historian, namely of the Holy Spirit, by whom actuated the sacred amanuenses handed it down to us. But that simple and bare historical narration considered separately and in itself (if something else is not added) does not immediately oblige our conscience, that we should promiscuously rely on the promises of all, or be terrified by the threats of all, or acquiesce in the counsels of all, or give faith to the sayings of all, or use the deeds of all as examples as if approved by God (although recorded in the codex of God and from his mouth), as if we thought ourselves fixed to all those as to beam nails of divine law and precept, and so subjected our consciences to them without further examination and discretion. It is true indeed that the bare truth of any sacred history mediately, by the intervention of another, through some consequence makes for the instruction of faith and morals, when namely individual sayings, whether true, or false, and deeds whether good, or evil, are weighed and compared with the law or the rules of divine law elsewhere proposed in scripture, e.g., Job 2:4 and Job 4 and thereafter where the friends of Job speak. For neither are those sayings per se, first, and immediately authentic that we should give faith to them, or institute life according to them, but they need another prior and superior norm of divine law, into which the ultimate analysis of our faith and conscience is made.

2. With these things premised we say that the whole scripture is authentic with the authenticity of history, that is, infallible and divinely inspired truth is diffused through all and each of its parts: so that the writers uttered all and each sentence not by their own private impulse and pleasure, but by the Holy Spirit dictating, both as to the thing and as to the phrase, whether they describe the good or the evil, whether things truly said or falsely, whether things well done, or badly. This is evident from 2 Timothy 3:16, compared with 2 Peter 1:21, and other testimonies and arguments, by which the authority of scripture is wont to be proved. Whatever the case, we have the whole scripture authentic, canonical, as it now is, it has hitherto shone by the proper light of its own divinity among so many sects in such Cimmerian shadows of this world, and because it is the first principle, this ought not to be demonstrated a priori; no more than the light of the sun to be illuminated by another light, that it may be actually seen. For principles are assumed, not proved. But if any strangers to the faith deny these principles, this only is to be done, that by refuting their reasons, we may reduce them to the absurd.

3. But we reject as repugnant to this our opinion partly those recounted in the Disputation on the Insoluble Things of Scripture, Thesis 3, partly those to be recounted here which sin either in defect or in excess. Those sin in defect who too much restrict the authority of scripture: such are 1. those who attribute the method or disposition, and moreover the ornamentation, phraseology, and style of scripture to human genius and industry, and not to the immediate and infallible revelation of the Holy Spirit, among whom Castellio shines in dialogue 2 on Election, pp. 132, 103, 107, 113, where he complains that the place of Paul, Romans 9, is obscure, hard, too impeded in expression, and that Paul entangles and confounds two similitudes, and wishes that he had expounded his mind more copiously and openly. Making a comparison between Jeremiah and Paul he says, "Certainly if Paul had written so copiously and openly in this place, as Jeremiah, no discrepancy would be discerned between them: for the truth cannot dissent

from the truth. Although if the truth must be confessed, if one dissented from the other, I would prefer in this place to believe Jeremiah rather than Paul, and that for two reasons. First because Jeremiah writes both more openly, and more agreeably to the nature of the thing: if indeed you want to urge more pertinaciously certain words of Paul, and not rather the perpetual tenor of his doctrine. Then because in Jeremiah God himself speaks, whereas Paul speaks from his own person. But how much it matters, whether he speaks from his own person, or by the command of God, appears from himself, who somewhere writes thus, 1 Cor. 7, 'To the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord,' etc." On the contrary, it is to be held that the Holy Spirit immediately and extraordinarily dictated all things to be written and written, both things, and words, both those which the writers before ignored or were not able to remember, and those which they well knew, both historical or particular, and dogmatic universal theoretical and practical; whether they had learned them by sight, or hearing, or reading or meditation. But it is to be thought that he dictated these things (as Cornelius a Lapide well says on 2 Tim. 3:16), "first, because he assisted those writing, lest they erred even in a point from the truth. Secondly, because he aroused and suggested them, that they should write these things rather than those, etc., he inspired that they should write this concept rather than that. Thirdly, because the Holy Spirit ordered, digested, and led all their concepts and sentences, e.g., that they should place and consign to writing this sentence first, that second, another third, and so consequently: for this is then properly to compose and write a book. And in this way the Holy Spirit is properly said to be the author of the sacred books." And he cites there the saying of Gregory the Great, preface to Job, ch. 2.

II. Those who want the writers of the New Testament to have conceived what they wrote in the phrase of another language (namely, Syriac), but to have written what they conceived in another (Greek or Hellenistic), and so the genuine interpreter must go to the allusions, not which exist, but which they conceived in mind. These things, although they are speciously so said by most learned men, cannot consist with the authority of the whole scripture. For it is firmly to be held, that the Holy Spirit inspired to his amanuenses not only the things, but also the method and phrase, by which they should set forth those things; that they perceived the things inspired, and rightly formed their concepts; finally that they rightly expressed the things well conceived by living voice and writing, so that no falsity, no error, no danger of error was able to be subordinated to their discourses or writings. Which things as they are admitted among Christian scripturaries, so Edward Kellett confirmed them by the suffrages of the ancients in his Theological Miscellanies published in the vernacular language (that is, English) in the year 1635, bk. 2, ch. 9.

III. Those who accuse the style of Scripture, especially of the New Testament, of barbarism and solecism; as if the Holy Spirit had not been able to expound his mind in the usual and received discourse (which prevails by use, and consequently thence has analogy). To them we reply first; that many Hebraisms, also some Targumisms, Rabbinisms, Latinisms, etc. occur, which in that age were not barbarisms at least to those, who were accustomed to idioms of this kind: besides that it would be a more than trivial error in Rhetoric and Grammar, if anyone should mark a Grecism occurring in a Latin writer as a barbarism or solecism. Secondly, those Phrases which are taxed, are for the most part swallowed by those delicate critics as the delights of Attica and

Hellenism, when they occur in profane authors. But that they do occur has already been more than sufficiently demonstrated by Beza in his notes on the New Testament and by Henri Estienne in the excellent preface of the Greek New Testament, edition in 16, in the year 1580. Thirdly, neither are all things so averse to Hellenism, as some want. Which things certain imperiti of the oriental languages have gazed at with left eyes as exotic Hebrew, or Syriac, can be shown to have been born in the middle of Greece, or perhaps to have been transferred from the Hebrews to the Greeks. See Sebastian Pfochen's Diatribe, on the purity of the Greek language of the N.T. and the Hebraisms of Homer annotated by Jacques Cappel, Vindiciae of [Isaac] Casaubon, bk. 4, chs. 11, 12, of which I remember the illustrious [Daniel] Heinsius somewhere to promise a full harvest in his Sacred Exercitations on John. Compare also the same, ch. 10 of the exercitation on Nonnus.

IV. Those who stir up the punctuations in the original text of the New Testament, as often as it seems to profit their reasons. Among whom Faustus Socinus shines. What reason persuades not to ascribe the punctuation (if indeed it was always held as a part of writing or speech, both of old, and always) to the sacred writers? But if it is ascribed to them, it is to be changed by no one.

V. Those who deny that the vowel points in the Old Testament are authentic, obviously written to the Hebrew text first by the Doctors of Tiberias commonly called Masoretes, in the year 446. Galatinus, bk. 1, On the Secrets of the Catholic Truth, ch. 8, attributes the invention of the points to ben Naphtali and ben Asher. Elias Levita the German brought this opinion into Europe, who after him drew some of the Rabbis of the Christians, Petrus Martinius in his Technology, the Author of the secret of punctuation edited by Erpenius; Sixtinus Amama in his Biblical Anti-barbarian, besides the Pontifical Theologians (see Bellarmine, On the Word of God, bk. 2, ch. 2), and some of ours, who if they do not mordantly assert the punctuation to the Tiberians, at least detract it from the sacred writers: among whom Johannes Piscator in the appendix of questions on the Pentateuch; and of the Lutherans N. Oelschlegelius in a peculiar little tract on the points: where he cites for himself Chemnitz, and Salom. Gesner. The contrary think Fr. Junius in his animadversions on Bellarmine, and with him most Theologians; and moreover all the Jewish Rabbis, and of the Christians the chief men Broughton in the place cited below, Buxtorf, who expressly pleads this cause in his Tiberias, part 1, chs. 7, 9, compared with the Rabbinic library, under the word zohar. Compare the book of Theodor Bibliander, On the Best Kind of Interpreting Hebrew: And of the Lutherans Crinese in his discourse On the Confusion of Languages, ch. 3, Laurence Fabritius in his Partition of the Bible, ch. 2, Helvicus, appendix 3, Jewish Elenchi, who distinguishes. To whom we remit the Reader. We add also these reasons to those of Buxtorf. First, if punctuation had first been invented by the Masoretes of Tiberias, why do they exercise criticism on an unpunctuated word, Jer. 51:3, and other anomalies of punctuated words? For they were able to punctuate according to the sense of their mind. Therefore they found it already constituted, and did not give the punctuation. Secondly, it would follow this absurdity, that some part of scripture or of its authority and of our faith depends on the Rabbis and Jewish Critics liable to error, and not on the Holy Spirit. The reason of the consequence, because the literal sense of scripture is to be educed from the words; but the words are constituted not only by the consonants but also by the vowels. Thirdly, many

sentences in the sacred writings would be uncertain and ambiguous to us, because the points very often distinguish words noted with the same letters by a whole class, and consequently as the soul and form (according to the Rabbis in Buxtorf and Broughton in the place cited) they specify and give its own signification to each: but if the points are absent, the signification will be indefinite and indeterminate first indeed of that word, then also of the whole sentence. Fourthly, the argument from Matt. 5:18, Luke 16:17 is not improbable, where the learned think that by iotas the points and accents can be commodiously understood: among whom Broughton in his commentary on Daniel, p. 45, and Polanus, Syntagma, bk. 1, ch. 37, although we do not want to insist on that argument. Fifthly, add the argument to the man; because the Papists and others who deny that the points are authentic anxiously torture themselves about the exposition of sentences and words according to the points, as e.g., Ps. 22:17, concerning which in the disputation on the Insoluble Things of Scripture: But this would in no way be necessary, if indeed the points were not authentic.

Problem I. Whether the partition of the books of the Old Testament into Moses, the Prophets, the Psalms, and into 22 books, also into chapters, and verses, was from the times of Ezra; or from the Prophets themselves the writers of the individual books before Ezra; or from the men of the great synagogue after Ezra? Resp. It is not so clear. Concerning the chapters the younger Buxtorf denies it in the preface to the Hebrew concordances. Concerning the distribution of the books, I do not see a reason why it cannot be referred to Ezra.

II. Whether every Soph Pasuk makes a period or colon? No, see Jer. 41:17-18.

III. Whether the Papists in any way prove that the Gospel of Matthew with the epistle to the Hebrews was written in Hebrew, and the Gospel of Mark in Latin. No, see the dissertation of Fr. Gomarus subjoined to the tract on the genealogy of Christ.

IV. Whether the Chaldaic, Syriac, Arabic or other Oriental translation of the Old or New Testament can somewhere be compared with the original text, indeed preferred to it, as to the evidence or efficacy of expression. Resp. no more than some Latin, Spanish, German, Japanese, Malay translation.

4. And these indeed too much restrict the authority of scripture. Those sin in excess and too much extend it, who make the keri or marginal readings of the Old Testament authentic, either alone to the exclusion and extrusion of the ketiv (which Sixtinus Amama favors in Anti-barbarian, bk. 3, where see his reasons), or together with the ketiv, for which opinion is Broughton in his annotations on Job 6:21, 29, and after him Ainsworth, annotations on Exod. 21:8, whom on that account Pagett gravely censures in his tract against the Brownists published in English in the year 1618, in the appendix of the admonition, ch. 4, p. 372. This opinion Polanus favors, Syntagma, bk. 1, ch. 37. Broughton adduces these reasons in the place cited, because Christ or Luke, ch. 4:18, from Isa. 61:1, expresses in one tenor the words of the context and the marginal reading, and because the Chaldee paraphrast very often translates the marginal reading with the context passed over. We, reserving the solution of objections to living disputation, lest we abuse leisure and the narrowness of paper, oppose some arguments to

each of these opinions. First, If we renounce the text, and substitute the Masoretic readings for it, then it will follow that the text either by the fault of the writers, or of the copyists has undergone some change in more than 800 places, and indeed not rarely such a one which corrupts the very sense: which indeed not a little conflicts with the inviolable authority of scripture, and divine conservation, and the care and faith of the Church, which is the custodian of this treasure. Compare the disputation on the Insoluble Things of Scripture. Secondly, because the marginal readings are often not necessary, indeed nugatory and futile, when they are worth the same as the ketiv, or when the ketiv makes a sufficiently good sense, as Gen. 27:3, 1 Kings 21:8, Prov. 6:14 with 19, Ezek. 37:10, Jer. 15:4 and 24:9 and 29:18, and yet they leave the same word untouched, Isa. 28:19. See also Prov. 17:13 and 22:3, Ps. 18:4-5 and 24:5 and 56:7, 1 Kings 17:14, Judg. 16:21, and there are very many things of this kind, about which the criticism is frivolous enough, when e.g. the letter o is omitted, 1 Sam. 17:23, Ps. 10:5, Num. 15:24, Prov. 3:15, 2 Sam. 20:23, or is redundant, 2 Sam. 11:1, Zech. 4:2, Ps. 16:10, Mic. 1:10, or is changed, Judg. 19:3 and 7:13, 2 Kings 5:12, 2 Chron. 26:15, or is transposed, Isa. 6:12, Judg. 12:3, or one is substituted for another, 1 Kings 12:33 with Prov. 2:7, 1 Kings 23:31, Jer. 31:40 and 28:1, Dan. 9:24, Isa. 65:7, or the points vary, Num. 21:30, 2 Kings 20:18, Job 42:2, or one word is distracted into two, 1 Sam. 9:1, or two words are contracted into one, Isa. 3:15, Jer. 6:29 and 18:3. All which things in Greek and Latin literature make Grammatical and Rhetorical figures, tmesis, crasis, epenthesis, paragoge, enallage, pleonasm, ellipsis, metathesis, etc., but not corruption: which things therefore by no means impose on genuine Critics the necessity of changing or condemning the genuine text. Concerning the variety of Orthography and language, see Aldus Manutius, On Orthography, Justus Lipsius, On the Pronunciation of the Latin Language, Ausonius Popma, On the Use of Ancient Locution, the Specular of Junius on Gilbert Génébrard, Claude Duret's Treasury of the History of Languages. The Masoretic or yoke, and the false hypothesis of certain Critics is against General Grammar, and the nature of all Languages: that the Orthography and Etymology of the sacred Language was always the same and invariate through all things, up to the least points, and indeed from Moses the first writer up to Malachi and Ezra. To which is to be added the other: that the analogy of the sacred language in pronouncing words, letters, syllables, vowels, was one and the same in all villages, cities, regions of the Israelites; and that one analogy alone is adequately contained in the books of scripture alone, from which if anything in scripture recedes, that is to be held as barbarous, and corrupt. As if they themselves also do not make and admit exceptions from almost every rule, or common biblical analogy, which see annotated in Buxtorf's incomparable Grammatical Thesaurus; especially to the individual conjugations, and the Syntax of the construct state, of the affixes, of the particles. Indeed the Rabbis, when they are not able to expedite themselves through Grammar and the Analogy of the Language, take refuge in ornament and euphony. See if you will their commentary on Hos. 3:2. But if it happens that some anomalously formed word is found only once, what Critical rule will command, to transform it immediately? Whether because in that narrowness of classic writers of that language, no other example occurs, we will conclude that there were no others then in the speech or writing of the Hebrews?

Thirdly, Because the various readings and Masoretic criticisms very often labor from curiosity, ignorance and oblivion, audacity and superstition. From curiosity indeed, when they exercise criticism about proper names as 1 Chron. 1:45 and 4:7 and 6:20 and 9:5, which however it is

most known are written not in one way in Hebrew and in all other languages. Let only the onomastica and Poetic, Historical, Geographical, etc. dictionaries be seen. From ignorance, when they without reason thought that scripture implies contradiction as Isa. 9:3 (See there the notes and commentaries of our men), and when they draw criticism on a word in one place, elsewhere they pass over the same as we will indicate soon: which certainly is of no common oblivion or negligence. From superstition and audacity, when they expunge words, which seem to them obscene, as much as is in them, and substitute others for them, as Deut. 28:27, which however they retain, 1 Sam. 5:6, 9. And again Deut. 28:30, Isa. 13:16, Zech. 14:2, which they retain Jer. 3:2, and certainly the verbal thence deduced the Holy Spirit uses in a most honest thing, Ps. 45:10. See 18 places emended by the scribes, as they speak, because they contained something unworthy of the divine majesty, in Buxtorf's Tiberias.

Fourthly, Because the keri often makes ambiguous, or inverts the sense of scripture, 1 Sam. 2:3, Ps. 130:3, Eccl. 9:4, 2 Sam. 14:2, 2 Kings 23:33, Prov. 4:3 and 19:7, indeed contradicts the context, Exod. 21:8, Lev. 11:21, 2 Kings 8:10, Ezra 4:2, Isa. 63:9, at least infers a diverse and double literal sense; therefore it cannot be authentic together with the text itself.

Fifthly, Because those marginal readings at least for the most part (especially as to the 18 words) are from the Rabbis, as Amama confesses in Anti-barbarian, pp. 739-740, and it is evident altogether from Buxtorf's Tiberias that the origin is not to be sought from elsewhere: but they are not divinely inspired Prophets to us, such as the writers of the Old Testament, Rom. 1:2, Heb. 1:1, Acts 26:27, 2 Pet. 1:21, therefore their criticism is not authentic.

Sixthly, by the argument to the man against the Papists, Amama, etc., who, as often as it comes to use, seek arguments from the ketiv itself to assert theological dogmas: but this would be wrong, if indeed the keri alone were authentic. These reasons having been alleged, the arguments of Ainsworth collapse of their own accord. If anyone however wants to see them solidly refuted, let him go to the most erudite Pagett in the place cited.

PROBLEMS

I. Whether the parashoth, haftaroth, semichoth, larger letters, smaller letters, projecting letters in the New Testament are to be traced back to the Apostles, or Evangelists, or Amanuenses of the New Testament? See Amama, Anti-barbarian, bk. 3, pp. 736ff, and Buxtorf's Tiberias.

II. Whether the large and small Masora, as it now is, is to be ascribed to Ezra and the men of the great synagogue? No.

III. Whether the titles and inscriptions of the books are authentic? Resp. Concerning the Greek ones of the Old Testament, no, as also concerning most of the Hebrew ones. We think otherwise concerning those which make a continuous part of the sacred context, e.g., of Proverbs, Isaiah, Joel, etc.

IV. Whether the distinctions of chapters, sections, verses; also the subscriptions of the epistles of Paul, and the variant readings, in the New Testament? No. See Beza's notes; and Compare

the controversy concerning the Episcopate and the Presbytery: where the subscriptions of the epistles of Paul are expressly shaken out.

V. Whether all the ketiv, at least for the most part, is from the faulty description of copyists? Resp. I see no necessity, why learned men have conceded this, whom Amama praises, Anti-barbarian, p. 740. Compare the Disputation on the Insoluble Things of Scripture.

5. And these things indeed concerning the truth and historical authenticity of scripture, now it is to be seen to what extent the authenticity of a norm or precept extends itself. But we presuppose that in the judgment of no sane person does it extend equally broadly as the authenticity of history. Therefore things said or written are to be distinguished from counsels and deeds; likewise persons from persons.

I. The persons, whose sayings, deeds, counsels are in every way authentic without any discrimination, are those of the holy and undivided Trinity, also of the Angels; authentic, I say, that we receive the individual things by faith, and also express and imitate them in life, insofar as they pertain to our office, that is, they have the reason of a common precept or imitable example. Therefore to be excepted are the extraordinary and special motions and commands of God, as of Abraham, Gen. 22, Phinehas, Num. 25, Moses, Exod. 2, Elijah, 2 Kings 1 with Luke 9, Elisha, 2 Kings 2, Samson, Judg. 16, Peter, Acts 5. To these are to be added the special deeds and commands of God beyond and above the law (where God does not dispense from the law, but changes the state of the thing or object: concerning which in the disputation on the Law and Justice of God), likewise the miraculous things, etc.

II. The persons whose sayings, counsels, deeds are in no way authentic, nor have the reason of a norm of faith, or of a precept, or of an imitable example, are those of the Devils and the wicked: nor is there any exception here, unless God names their sayings his sayings, and approves them as those of Balaam, Caiaphas, etc. We are not therefore to approve the lies and calumnies of the devil, Gen. 3, Job 1-2, and of the wicked, of Pharaoh, Exod. 6, Rabshakeh, Isa. 36, Herod, etc., nor are their deeds and counsels authentic to us.

III. The doctrine and sayings, or the counsels and deeds of any of the faithful and pious, or at least of men not evil, are not promiscuously authentic to us: whether they have said or done something separately or in an Ecclesiastical assembly in the Old or New Testament: they are not, I say, more authentic, than the sayings and deeds of today's Christians; unless the prophetic or Apostolic assistance and direction, namely of an extraordinary minister a prophet or Apostle, was present and presided over them; for then their prayer, confession, profession, dogmatization in matters of faith is authentic: with the proper instrumental principle of authenticity, and the infallible light residing not in them, but in the apostles or prophets alone. Concerning private deeds, counsels, sayings, and discourses it is to be judged otherwise, as we will say soon. But we count as such faithful all whether plebeians, or priests or ministers, of whom mention is made in scripture, only those being excepted whom we recount soon. Consectary 1. Hence it follows, that the names in 2 Thess. 1:1 and Col. 1:1 joined to the apostolic name do nothing for the authenticity of that epistle, whether first or secondly, whether

immediately or mediately. Consectary 2. It is not cautious enough to allege promiscuously from scripture any examples you please for a sermon, as reasons of doctrines. For they make no reason, unless either generally or specifically they are approved by the Holy Spirit in scripture.

IV. That the deeds first of the divinely inspired Prophets as also of the Patriarchs, Apostles, are not authentic, is now admitted by almost all; and certain deeds of Abraham, Jacob, Lot, David, Peter, etc. (Gal. 2), worthy of reprehension and to be shunned, evince that: Secondly, concerning private economic counsels, also of someone concerning special circumstances and particular execution of public Ecclesiastical or political government we think the same is to be established: this teaches, e.g., the counsel of Paul and Barnabas concerning assuming or not assuming Mark, Acts 15, concerning the Gospel to be preached first in Asia, than at Jerusalem, or Rome, or elsewhere: the counsel of David concerning extirpating Nabal, concerning sparing Absalom, concerning fleeing to King Achish and undertaking an expedition with him; concerning building the temple.

Thirdly, any sayings and discourses privately and in common conversation held concerning any particular Economic, Political, and artificial matters and affairs, indeed also concerning questions of Ecclesiastical fact, as they were not absolutely authentic to the hearers, so they would not be authentic to us, if indeed they were written out. The same is to be judged concerning writings and epistles of the same kind. From the very few of those, which are written consider only those words of Moses, which he is said to have babbled, Ps. 106:33, and the lie of Abraham, Gen. 20:2 and 12:12, and the words, if they exchanged any in the schism, Acts 15:39, Paul and Barnabas, and the rash oath of David, 1 Sam. 25:22, and whatever he babbled with king Achish, chs. 21 and 27 and 28 and 29. The curses with which Job cursed the day of his nativity, ch. 3, and the Epistle of David by which he procures the destruction of Uriah, and if any things are similar to these.

Fourthly, it remains therefore that all sayings or writings which dogmatize and instruct the church of God, are authentic first, per se, and absolutely, whether they immediately treat of the mysteries of faith or by consequence and in order to spiritual things, by digression or incidentally also intermix certain Physical, Astronomical, Historical, Political, Geographical, etc. things. There is nothing which they do not truly expound, dexterously apply, and legitimately impose on our consciences.

Fifthly, it has been doubted concerning the examples, and deeds of the apostles, or of the apostolic church, which and how far they had apostolic assistance and direction, in ecclesiastical government. We, a distinction having been applied between special things peculiarly agreeing and accommodated to that place, time, persons, things; and between general and common things; say, the latter examples and deeds whether under the form of a command, or counsel to imitation, or nakedly and only historically set forth or related oblige our churches in specie to observance; But the former oblige only analogically, or as to genus. Concerning which elsewhere, namely in ecclesiastical polity, expressly and more fully to be treated. Meanwhile let Parker be seen, bk. 3, On Ecclesiastical Polity.

6. Therefore they sin I. in excess, who without judgment seize any counsels, sayings, deeds (provided they are recounted in the scriptures), that they may found divine faith and divine law in them, by which consciences are obliged. Thus, e.g., we often see alleged in the writings of the ancients and more recent from the book of Job the sayings of his friends, although nevertheless in the principal conclusion of their disputation they erred, God himself being judge, Job 42:7. Cornelius a Lapide agrees with me here in his commentary on 1 Cor. 3, Baranzanus in his Uranoscopia, p. 1, q. 3, doubt 10, member 3, Fr. Gomarus in his Disputation on the Angels. Such carelessness in alleging the sayings or deeds of others was too frequent.

II. They sin in defect. First, the Anabaptists, who do not seek the norm of faith and morals in the writings of the Old Testament but only in the New Testament. Secondly, Castellio with his own, who in dialogue 2, p. 113, cited above, detracts authority from the opinions and disputations of Paul. Thirdly, the Anonymous Remonstrant Hyperaspist, who denies that the sacred Writers even when dogmatizing are authentic in those things, which are not precisely necessary to salvation: which error we have shaken out more fully in our Thersites Heautontimorumenos, part 3, ch. 2. Barranzano in the place cited says that Joshua ignorant of Astrology spoke from his own sense. But see Thomas, p. 1, q. 1, art. 6, to 2, and Compare Reynolds soon to be cited. Fourthly, the Socinians, who detract authenticity from, or doubt concerning certain minutiae. See Socinus's little book on the authority of scripture; The Remonstrants do not seem so alien from this opinion: as is evident from the private disputation of Episcopius under the title On the Authority of Scripture. Fifthly, Valesius, Philos. sacr., ch. 2, who thinks that the sacred writers sometimes play with fabricated fables. But learnedly according to his custom Reynolds refutes this fiction, Censure of the Apocryphal Books, vol. 2, prelection 196, etc.

PROBLEMS

I. Whether it ought to be said with Canus, Theol. Places, bk. 2, ch. 18, that St. Stephen, Acts 7, lapsed in memory? No, for otherwise and rightly the Pontifical and our commentators eliminate that contradiction to the cited place. See the disputation on the Insoluble Things, etc.

II. Whether all the judges from Moses up to Samuel were divinely inspired? Resp. The Affirmative seems to be favored by the fact that all were immediately and peculiarly aroused and actuated by God. The greatest reason for doubting is concerning Jephthah, and concerning Eli. As for the rest, I would prefer to incline to the Affirmative. Concerning Joshua I would certainly establish it against Baranzanus in the place cited, because he was the writer of a canonical book, and the Spirit of the Lord was upon him, Num. 27.

III. Whether also the kings from Saul, or at least from David up to Zedekiah? Resp. No. Concerning the pious kings Asa, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, Josiah it could be doubted. But I would not dare to affirm: because I do not yet see a solid reason.

IV. Whether all the things said and disputed by Job were authentic? Resp. No. For the Holy Spirit himself expressly distinguishes, ch. 1:20, 2:10, and Job himself having been reproved by God, does penance for certain of his sayings, ch. 38:2, 39:34-35, 36-37, 40:3, 42:6. If therefore

some of his sayings were not simply true, right, good; much less were they infallibly true. Therefore the conclusion, thesis, and sum of the disputation, is to be distinguished from the hypothesis, or particular application to the person and state of Job: again the defense of his cause and the determination of the controversy, from certain reasons occurring in the meantime, or if you prefer affections and amplifications, which Job himself historically reports and recounts by way of objections suggested from his flesh and infirmity; subjected nevertheless to the final triumph of faith and hope concerning those objections, doubts, and suggestions. How the same is to be said soon concerning David and Jeremiah.

V. Whether the sayings of Elihu the Buzite are authentic? Resp. It is not so clear. It seems to favor the Affirmative, that God does not reprove him with the three friends of Job. But this does not suffice. For he pursues the disputation of the friends of Job, which was bad. And his very disputation seems to impose on Job as if he had attributed to himself an absolute innocence and consequently had accused God of injustice, who afflicted the innocent. But Job only vindicates to himself innocence or justice of cause with respect to the accusation of his friends: namely that he was not a hypocrite and a worker of iniquity alienated from all piety, or that he had not committed some enormous crime above other men; and consequently was not peculiarly afflicted by God on that account. And God himself approves this apology and vindication of Job, ch. 42:7.

VI. Whether from 1 Cor. 3:19, where the apostle is thought to cite Job 5:13, it is solidly proved that the sayings of the friends of Job are authentic. Resp. No. For it is evident from Job 42:7 and the analogy of the whole scripture, that they erred in the conclusion and principal cause, and so their whole disputation in this respect was evil, as if namely God externally so afflicted no one, except a hypocrite, or someone notable for some wickedness, contrary to Eccl. 9:1-3, 8, 11, 14, John 9:2-3, Heb. 12:6-7, 1 Pet. 4:17-18, Ps. 73 throughout. There is therefore a suitable solution to be given to the objected place of Paul, which can be threefold: 1. That the Apostle does not expressly cite the book of Job: and so it is not so certain, which is presupposed, that these words are cited from the book of Job. 2. As to the words cited by the Apostle, that they do not agree in all things with the words of Job 5. And although they agreed, yet it is not thence inferred, that the Apostle had respect to the place of Job: for he was able to have respect to other texts, where a sentence containing that occurs either definitely, or indefinitely, in which way the commentators observe to the place Eph. 5:14. 3. What if it be said that the Apostle has respect to Job 5, and calls to this place the words of Eliphaz (although in themselves and of themselves by no means authentic, namely with the authenticity of a norm), no otherwise than elsewhere the words of Epimenides and Aratus, and Jude in his Epistle, v. 14, the words of Enoch.

VII. What concerning the sayings of David, Ps. 73:13-14 and 116:11 and 77:7-9, and Jer. 12:1-2? Resp. No. They here authentically report their own thoughts, doubts, temptations, assaults, objections, voices, and murmurings of their flesh; briefly their infirmities, their sins: which they expressly distinguish from the responses and victories of faith and spirit in a paroxysm of temptation. The latter they set forth for us to be imitated by faith, thought, heart, work: the former by no means; because they are from evil, as they themselves confess there

when they reject and condemn them. Therefore they are no more authentic to us as a norm of faith or confidence, hope, charity, patience, constancy, etc., than the infidelity of Moses, the adultery of David, the abounding sin of Paul, Rom. 7.

VIII. Whether Hannah the mother of Samuel was divinely inspired, and her canticle (which is had 1 Sam. 2)? Resp. Concerning the canticle, which was inserted by the Holy Spirit in Scripture and the Canon, I do not at all doubt. But it is further inquired whether she was divinely inspired only to the dictation of that canticle, or perpetually, as often as she spoke among men concerning divine things. I would prefer to incline to the Affirmative, and to say that she was endowed with the prophetic and infallible Spirit, if not before, at least from that time.

IX. Whether and how the sayings of Agur the son of Jakeh (Prov. 30) are authentic? Resp. There are those who establish, that these names are appellatives, or epithets, by which Solomon is described: in which way the epithet Ecclesiastes denotes the author of the second Solomonic book. Others prefer to say, that there is a person introduced, whom Solomon makes speak: not otherwise than Plato in his dialogues Socrates, Cratylus, etc., Minucius Felix Octavius; and more recent writers, Lipsius in his Constancy, Saturnalia, On the Pronunciation of the Latin Language, etc., his friends and wise men. Others think, that these are not the words of Solomon, but of a wise man and Prophet, who flourished in that time. Whichever interpretations have their own authors: whose opinions see expounded and proved in the commentaries of Cornelius a Lapide. The last opinion does not displease me: because to the Davidic Psalms have been added the Psalms of Asaph, Heman the Ezrahite, etc., who were instructed with the prophetic spirit. Why therefore could not the proverbs of Agur a Prophet have been comprehended in one volume with the Proverbs of Solomon? But something else occurs, which it seems to me can be most safely said, That these sayings indeed are from Agur a wise man (although not divinely inspired), and thence Solomon received and learned these things whether as to the matter proposed only, or also as to that manner and order of proposing; and so repeated and approved by Solomon they have from him their proper mark and character of authenticity as from an infallible amanuensis of the Holy Spirit, who adopted them for his own, but not from Agur. Thus the sacred writers relating history, or a Philosophical dogma, or whatever Theological dogma which they had heard of old from a fallible teacher, or at least from elsewhere, than from the infallible dictation of the Holy Spirit, and had learned, authentically bear, hand down, and apply them with the ultimate analysis made not into the teachers, or sensitive perceptions and observations, or into reasonings, disquisitions, and discourses of their own mind, but into themselves inspired infallibly and immediately by the Holy Spirit, as into the first instrumental principle, on which authenticity depends.

X. What concerning the dictates of Bathsheba the mother of Solomon, Prov. 31? Resp. It could be said that these were there adopted by Solomon, and consequently are authentic. Nevertheless the opinion of Juan de Pineda, bk. 1, On the Things of Solomon, ch. 4, §8, does not displease, who establishes that she was a prophetess, and actuated by the Spirit of God dictated these things. With whom Cornelius a Lapide sides in his commentary on Prov. 31. And it seems to be confirmed in some way from the word in v. 1, which commonly signifies the burden, prophecy, oracle of the prophets.

XI. Whether Zechariah, Simeon, the Blessed Virgin Mary were divinely inspired? Resp. We prefer to accede to those affirming. At least it cannot be denied, that their Canticles are authentic. The Remonstrants, ch. 11, Apology, fol. 125, not obscurely make Zechariah even when dictating that authentic Canticle fallible, obviously because according to them he did not even then know the Messiah to be a spiritual king. But on the contrary it is to be noted, that he is expressly said to be filled with the Holy Spirit and to prophesy, Luke 1:67. And that in that same canticle he recognized the spiritual kingdom of the Messiah, is evident from vv. 70, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79. We are taught concerning the prophetic spirit of Simeon, and his divine oracles and alloquies, Luke 2:25-26, 27, 34-35.

XII. Whether the 70 disciples, and the Apostles before receiving the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Acts 2), were infallible in cognition and doctrine? Resp. No. The multiple hallucinations, and doubts of the Apostles teach this.

XIII. Whether from the deed of Peter, Gal. 2 and Acts 10 with 11, it can be gathered that he was fallible in doctrine? Resp. No.

XIV. Whether in the individual Apostles after Pentecost, actual infallible cognition extended itself equally? Resp. I affirm, as to the universal dogmas of faith and morals. I deny, as to certain particulars whether past or present or future deeds, to be proved, or disapproved, whether by way of example, or of comparison, or of human testimony and saying, alleged and applied for the illustration of universals, as amplifications or as arguments to the man. That hypothetical and particular counsels, deeds, sayings, writings, whether past or present were not equally known to all, is indubitable: for they were not omniscient. That future things also were actually known to one Apostle (e.g., to Paul concerning his own death, 2 Tim. 4, and to Peter concerning his own, 2 Pet. 1), and not to another, can be said without scruple. But concerning future things, which concern the whole church (e.g., the advent of Antichrist, 2 Thess. 2, the conversion of the Jews, Rom. 11, the change of the living on the last day, 1 Cor. 15, the advent of pseudo-Prophets, 1 Tim. 4 and 2 Tim. 3), the same ought not to be affirmed.

XV. Whether nevertheless those particulars, if indeed in order to the proposition, examination, apology of the universal dogmas of faith, and their application to any consciences they were of use, could not have been understood and judged by all the Apostles given any necessity and occasion with equal infallibility? Resp. I affirm. Nor does Acts 23:5 stand in the way, as is evident from the suitable expositions of the interpreters: which see in them.

XVI. Whether the Apostles whether by voice, or writing, privately or publicly, in sermons, instructions, disputations, apologies, cited, examined, applied exotic things of the Poets, Philosophers, Rabbis, etc., did this rightly from ordinary study and human judgment alone: or truly from the immediate and infallible revelation and direction of the Holy Spirit? Resp. I deny the former. I affirm the latter. For God sanctified these parts of human erudition, namely thus far, that he taught their understanding anew to the apostles (given the occasion); or if they had learned before, aroused them to their actual concept and recollection, inspired and dictated

them verbatim and syllabatim, and applied them to the present business, and absolved the writing of them in the mind and hand, and through the mind and hand of them.

XVII. Whether the writers of the N.T. conceived in one language (namely, Syriac), than they wrote; and wrote in another language (namely, Greek or Hellenistic), than they conceived; and consequently whether the genuine interpreter is to have regard to the allusions, not which exist in the Greek text, but which the writers conceived in mind, namely, Syriac or Targumic? Resp. No. For no one rightly and rationally brings forth anything whether by living voice or writing, unless he first rightly conceived it. If therefore they wrote in Greek or Hellenistic, they also conceived in Greek, and that from the inspiration and dictation of the Holy Spirit. Unless the author of the contrary opinion concedes with a distinction, that the sentences of the sacred text were first conceived in Syriac (concerning which nevertheless it would have to be inquired), afterwards in Greek by the sacred writer, and so the immediate Greek concepts were written by him, or dictated to an amanuensis for the pen through the special, immediate, and infallible inspiration and direction of the Holy Spirit, and indeed it would detract not a little from the authority of scripture. But see this new opinion of the Most Famous man expressly shaken out by Edward Kellet, bk. 2, Theological Miscellanies, ch. 9, where he inculcates these postulates and axioms: 1. That the inspirations and concepts of the divinely inspired writers were delivered and impressed in some language. 2. That those writers were not able to err, or be deceived in their concepts. 3. That inspiration is ordained to conception, as cause and means; but conception to exhibition and expression. 4. That the means together with the end are indubitable, certain, and infallible: nor can this be certain, with those uncertain and fluctuating; or vice versa. 5. Therefore the writers were infallibly illuminated and led by the Holy Spirit from beginning to end. 6. Nor were they able in the last rule and execution of this divine work (namely, writing) to wander and depart more from the internal conception of the mind, than in the same conception from the internal inspiration of the Holy Spirit. For the Spirit made that they should so do; and they so actuated by him (2 Pet. 1:21) acted conformably from first to last: so that they were not able to act otherwise, namely in the composite sense. Therefore these are the conclusions of the same Kellet against the opinion of the Most Famous Man: 1. That there is no difference between the writers of the Old and the writers of the New Testament, as to conception and writing in diverse languages. 2. That in the right interpretation of scripture recourse is to be had to the allusions which appear in the writing; but not to those which are said to have been in the mind or thought of the writers. 3. That the writers did not have the liberty, of conceiving anything, or writing beyond or besides the dictation and inspiration of the Holy Spirit; whether by adding, or detracting, or in any other way changing. 4. That they did not have the liberty of clothing and polishing their interior concepts, with their own words not dictated by the Holy Spirit.

XVIII. Whether the Apostles intermingled with their epistles certain things whether historical, or moral from their own sense, and ordinary study or from the mere testimony and tradition of men, without the infallible and immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit? e.g., 1 Cor. 7:12, 25, 2 Tim. 3:8. Resp. No. We have noted that error in Castellio. In whose footsteps once treading I heard Arminius in a certain disputation concerning scripture: where he compared the place 1 Cor. 7:12, cited to this end, with 2 Tim. 4:13. There is also someone from our Most Celebrated

Theologians, to whom something similar seems to have slipped in a private epistle, in the year 1619, afterwards nevertheless published with the little works of Lancelot Andrewes Bishop of Winchester published in the year 1629 by William Laud then Bishop of London and John Bishop of Ely. That saying of the Most Celebrated Theologian concerning human prudence somewhere employed by the Apostles is noted there p. 193 by the Bishop of Winchester, and is refuted more fully by Kellet, bk. 2, Miscellanies, ch. 9, pp. 98, 99, 101. But I judge that the Most Celebrated Theologian wanted something else, as the preceding words p. 182 seem to imply: although he did not express his mind accurately or fully enough.

XIX. Whether the sacred writers, namely the Prophets and Apostles, understood all things, which they wrote; or whether they were ignorant of certain things, or doubted concerning them. Resp. I affirm the former, I deny the latter. For whatever matters, sentences, phrases they wrote, they themselves understood, nor were they able to labor under ignorance or doubt about them: otherwise the authority of scripture is to be denied, and ignorance or doubt is to be attributed to the Holy Spirit himself exciting them, and continuously directing and illuminating them. To those things, which are objected in Thomas, 2a2ae, q. 173, art. 4, and in Alfonso de Castro, from Augustine, bk. 7, On the City of God, ch. 33, from Ambrose, On Abraham, bk. 1, ch. 8, and in Cano, bk. 2, Theological Places, ch. 4, and from the places 1 Pet. 5:12, 2 Cor. 11:5, 17, 1 Cor. 7:40, John 21:25 (where an opinion or doubt seems to be attributed to the writers), there is an easy response. It can be seen in Kellet in the place cited, lest I do what has been done.

XX. Whether the sacred writers wrote willingly, or unwillingly and compelled to write? Resp. I affirm the former, I deny the latter. See this explained through a distinction by Kellet in the place cited, p. 76, etc.

XXI. Whether the Holy Spirit put anew into the writers the concept and memory of those things, which they had learned before, or had known through revelation? Resp. I affirm, with this distinction: that namely he put in anew not only things known habitually through the infusion of the charisma of infallibility and supernatural light (which we conceive in the manner of a habit) by immediate impression, but also things known actually, as to the formal concept namely and actual recollection; but not as to the impression of intelligible species, for we think that those once impressed remain, and do not in the manner of a coruscation approach or recede. And in this way the authority of scripture as divinely inspired is sufficiently saved. On the contrary it is exposed to danger, if we say with Cornelius a Lapide on 2 Tim. 3:16, "It was not necessary that the histories and morals which they had learned before, etc., be inspired and dictated by the Holy Spirit, etc.," for (as he afterwards explains himself) "the Holy Spirit did not put into them the concept and memory of those things, which they knew." But badly: they indeed knew materially but not formally, or under the formal [aspect] of immediate divine revelation: they knew humanly, not divinely: they were able to forget them, to err, to hesitate, to doubt in the repeated conception, and writing of them, as also in the application to the present matter. More rightly therefore and more safely did Estius express himself in his commentary on the cited place, 2 Tim. 3, "So namely that not only the sentences, but also the individual words, and the order of the words, and the whole disposition is from God, as if speaking or writing through himself."

XXII. Whether all the Evangelists, such as Barnabas, Titus, Timothy, Silvanus, Epaphroditus, etc., were divinely inspired and infallible? Resp. I do not see a reason for affirming this. The Apostles were distinguished from them by this privilege and charisma.

XXIII. What is to be thought concerning Luke and Mark? Resp. I do not see, why it should not be affirmed concerning them, as writers of Canonical books. For what is said that the Gospels were dictated to them by the Apostles, so that they were only amanuenses; I do not yet see sufficiently proved.

XXIV. What concerning the amanuenses of the Prophets, or Apostles, e.g., Baruch, Tertius, Rom. 16:22. Resp. There are those from the Papists who want them to have been infallibly directed by the Holy Spirit (see the commentators on Rom. 16); nor does Kellet seem alien to this opinion in the place cited. But I do not see that they had to be more infallible, than the Copyists and Typographers, who now from the Apostles up to this day procure Bibles for the Churches.

XXV. Whether those words, Rom. 16:22, are authentic? Resp. Why not? obviously because Paul ordered them to be inserted and written.

XXVI. Whether the faithful gathered in Acts 12:15 were infallible; and consequently a Theological argument can be constructed from their sayings as authentic? Resp. No.

XXVII. Whether the sacred writers sometimes taught and wrote unwillingly. Resp. Benedict Aretius seems to have sensed such a thing in his commentary on 2 Pet. 1:21. If they are understood not to have written by their own motion and instinct, but impelled, drawn and actuated by the Spirit of God; moreover if they are said before that drawing or inspiration to have been unwilling: certainly we concede. But if they are said to have been and remained unwilling and reluctant, when they were now moved by the spirit to write, and actually wrote: we absolutely Deny. For the first grace, or extraordinary infallible habit of Theology divinely infused into them; and the second grace accruing to it, that is, the actual rapture, agitation, leading, and compulsion of the Holy Spirit made them willing and prompt: although before grace they were unwilling, or in the beginning sometimes fear or another infirmity had rendered them less prompt. Compare Isa. 6, Jer. 20, compared with Luke 1:1, 3, Gal. 6:11, Jude v. 3, 2 Pet. 3:15. Therefore those places, which perhaps can be objected, 1 Cor. 9:16, Acts 4:20, are to be explained with a distinction. Not otherwise than any faithful and regenerate are sweetly and powerfully compelled and drawn, Song 1:4, 2 Cor. 5:14, and are said as it were not to act, 2 Cor. 12, and yet they do not act unwillingly, as is explained elsewhere, in the controversy concerning free choice, and concerning the grace of conversion, and of effectual calling. And in this way, the divinely inspired writers are distinguished from the God-moved Prophets, namely Balaam and similar ones, in whom unwilling God sometimes flashes with extraordinary light. As they are also distinguished from Pythonesses and Pythonesses, demoniacs, and others actuated by the devil.

XXVIII. Whether the sacred writers understood those things, which they wrote? Resp. I affirm, against the ancient Montanists in Epiphanius, heresy 48. But concerning this question it is to be treated elsewhere, in the common place on Prophecy. Meanwhile, Christophorus a Castro can be seen in his Minor Prophets, bk. 3, On the True Cognition of Future Things, ch. 12, and Kellet who transcribed many things from him, bk. cited, p. 80.

XXIX. Whether ordinary Studies, inquiries, and premeditations were necessary for writing? Resp. No. For the Spirit immediately, extraordinarily, and infallibly moved to write, and inspired and dictated the things to be written. 2 Pet. 1:21. Compare the disputation on Prophecy.

ON THE (AS THEY CALL THEM) INSOLUBLE THINGS OF SCRIPTURE.

Resp. JACOBUS MIGRODIUS, of Arnemuiden in Zeeland.
On the 5th of March, 1636.

As in all sciences, so also in Theology certain doubts and as it were unsolvable things seem to have been left to the imbecility of the human mind, since it seemed good to God (as someone says) so to temper the Scriptures that by the more evident places he might wipe away hunger, by the more obscure, disgust. Which nevertheless not withstanding, individual believers hold them for the true, unique, and indemonstrable principle of divine faith, they willingly acknowledge the infallible truth diffused through all sentences and little words, at least implicitly; since somewhere explicitly they are not able to see and give a reason of it, so as to satisfy themselves and others most fully: they impute this to their inertia, ignorance, stupor, imperfection, not to the word of God, which is whole, and without spot, Ps. 19. We do not want to say however that from the resolution of this or that contradiction, and genuine conciliation all and each of the faithful err at the same time and once, who live in one age: much less all and each, who have lived and are to live from the constitution of the ancient or new canon of scripture up to the end of the world.

1. Absurd and contradictory things not a few from every age, even today, the adversaries of true religion and of the scriptures have seemed to themselves to find, they have also boasted studiously sought out, as if namely they conflicted not rarely with sound and sober reason, or with universal experience, or with the truth of history, and the thing done, or with piety and honesty, or with themselves. The impious machinations of Lucian, Porphyry, Simplicius, Julian the Apostate, and others from the Gentiles are known, whom the Doctors of the ancient Church, Origen, Cyril of Alexandria, Gregory Nazianzen, etc., opposed themselves to. The Jews also not sluggishly insulted the Scriptures of the N.T., as is especially to be seen in that most virulent writing whose title is Nizzachon, from which Münster exhibited and refuted certain excerpts, on the Hebrew Gospel of Matthew. R. Farrar and other Jews contended that they were corrupted, with whom Hugh Broughton disputed, as he himself reports in the little book On the Family of

Christ, published in English in quarto. The Heretics the Marcionites, Manichaeans, and others of that ilk clamored the same, Augustine, On Heresies, ch. 40, Epiphanius, heresies 42 and 66. The most impure impostor Muhammad increased and surpassed all their contradictions, Azoara 5 compared with 1, that by this occasion he might obtrude on men a new principle of faith, new revelations, namely his abominable and insane Alcoran, which alone is now rarely called the word of God by the Saracens. The Enthusiasts roll this same stone, that the imperfection and ineptitude of the written word having been proved, they might thrust men to the hidden word, to their internal spirit, and to enthusiastic furies, and so lead them away from all external means of faith and piety, Sebastian Franck in the preface to his Paradoxes, and in the book Of the Seven Seals throughout.

2. The Papists, who otherwise boast that they defend the divinity of Scripture, and the truth of the Christian religion against the aforesaid adversaries, have not feared with the arms and insignia of the Atheists, Gentiles, Jews, Mohammedans, Enthusiasts adapted for themselves to fight against their own cause and so that of the whole of Christianity as much as is in them, and to betray it to their enemies, partly that they might deter their own from the reading of scripture, partly that they might show to the reformed Catholics as if through the rule of the false, the necessity of their Chimerical traditions and of their masked supreme and infallible magistery and judgment in the Roman Church. The narrowness of the paper does not allow, that I should refer that long injury here, let Whitaker, Chamier, Rivet On Scripture be seen, [Pierre] Du Moulin in his Novelty of Papism against Cardinal [Jacques davy] deu Perron, [Benedict] Turretin against [Pierre] Coton, [Théodore] Mestrezat against the Jesuit [François] Regourd, who (the former three in Latin, the latter in French) have so defended the cause of God and of the divine word, that all sane and sober men most easily see that those Elymases and Balaams have been struck with blindness and the Spirit of contradiction. We, the infinite invectives of them against Scripture having been set aside, will only endeavor to vindicate from contradiction and absurdity certain places which also seem depraved and difficult to some Catholics or Orthodox. Let him compare, who wishes, our disputation on Atheism. Galatinus, On the Secrets of the Catholic Truth, bk. 1, ch. 8, asserts that the Hebrew scriptures depraved by the Jews in not one way through the Thalmudic traditions can and ought to be corrected. Which indeed is not to defend the cause against the Jews, but disgracefully to betray it. Maldonatus on Matt. 1:11 critically restores that corrupt place. Cajetan in his Commentary on the O.T. notes these places to be corrupted in the Hebrew, Chaldee, Greek, Latin, 2 Chron. 5:last verse and 16:1, 2 Chron. 22:2. Bellarmine, On the Word of God, bk. 2, ch. 2, says that the Hebrew Codices are Erroneous, Exod. 2:22, Isa. 9:5, Jer. 23:6, Ps. 19:8, Ps. 22:7. Cardinal Perron in his Response to the King of Great Britain, bk. 5, ch. 6, collected very many things from the scriptures, which seem absurd, scandalous, and contradictory. Regourd, demonstration 2, objects Luke 3:36, Matt. 27:9, Acts 8:26, Acts 7:43, etc. Coton in his Plagiarizing Geneva, in the preface, proves the Hebrew fountains to be corrupted from Matt. 2:23, Matt. 5:27, Ps. 19 and 22 and 96, Deut. 21:23, Gen. 49:10, Zech. 9:11, etc. Of all the places, Ps. 22, 2 Chron. 22:2, Matt. 27:9, Luke 3:36, Acts 7:14, Acts 13:20, and indeed most in the judgment also of our men seemed difficult enough, indeed as if insoluble, to Scaliger in his 1st Elenchus of Chronology, Jacques Cappel in his Sacred and Profane History, pp. 35, 36, 37, Beza and others to be cited below. The rest are easy enough, already sufficiently explained by the interpreters both ancient and new, and by those who have

published conciliators of Scripture (such as [Sébastien] Cumirano, [Bartholomaeus] Westhamer, Hermann Bodius). See also Amama in his Biblical Anti-barbarian, and Cappel in his Sacred and Profane History throughout; especially pp. 35, 36, and p. 129.

3. Against those contradictions and insoluble things they supply various antidotes, various modes of conciliating or interpreting. First, some think the matter easily expedited, if they conceded that the sacred writers were able to lapse in memory, or to err in lighter things. Castellio in his Dialogues, dialogue 2, On Predestination, Socinus, On the Authority of Scripture. Bede, Rabanus, Melchior Cano, bk. 2, Theological Places, at the end, have such a thing concerning the lapse of the memory of St. Stephen, Acts 7; and concerning the lapse of Matthew the Evangelist, ch. 27:9, Bede in his commentary on the place, Augustine, bk. 3, On the Harmony of the Evangelists, ch. 7, and so some authors thought, both learned and Catholic, as Maldonatus admits on Matt. 27:9. But rightly in the same place as also Cornelius a Lapide and Zanchius on Acts 7, they repudiate this opinion. For this having been conceded, I do not see, how the authority of Scripture can be sufficiently defended. Second: others pretend that the Hebrew and Greek Codices are corrupted; and the remedy is to be sought from the Vulgate version, or the infallible interpretation of the Church. Thus the Papists cited above, to whom add Cano, bk. 2, ch. 13, [Willem Damasz] van der Lindt, On the Best Kind of Interpreting, James [Christmann] Bishop of Christopolis, preface to the Psalms, and the rest of that ilk; which audacity nevertheless the Papists themselves repress. Bellarmine, bk. 2, On the Word of God, chs. 1 and 2, Simeon [Marotte] de Muis Professor of the Hebrew language at Paris in his commentary on the Psalms, especially in the dissertation prefixed to vol. 2 of the Psalms. See also others cited by Rivet, ch. 8, Introduction to Scripture. From whom none of them departs, as often as it must be fought with Atheists, Gentiles, Jews, Mohammedans. See Dionysius the Carthusian, Against the Alcoran and the Mohammedan Sect, bk. 1, ch. 9.

Third: there are those who assert that in matters not precisely necessary to salvation, the Holy Spirit and the sacred Writers do not speak so accurately. How dangerous and unusual this way of interpreting is, we began to show in our Thersites Heautontimorumenos, sect. 3, ch. 2.

Fourth: Others concede that by the fault of copyists a very few blemishes have crept in, and now also lie hidden in the original text, which can be healed by no faith and collation of Manuscript Codices, but by that Criticism by which without Manuscripts it is usually established from genius and judgment concerning the genuine reading of places in good authors. Thus Scaliger in the place cited, Casaubon to the apparatus of Baronius, num. 28, p. 94, 95, edition in quarto, Beza on Luke 3 and Acts 13, Cappel in the place cited, [Bonaventure Corneille] Bertram in his Frankenthal Lucubrations on Acts 7. To whom Turretin against Coton, Mestrezat against Regourd, Amama in his Biblical Anti-barbarian, Spanheim in his Evangelical Doubts recently published seem not obscurely to accede: while they deny the major of the argument of the Papists, but concede or permit to pass the minor. Cappel in his Sacred and Exotic History, p. 39, a distinction having been applied, conjectures, that the former books written by the Prophets, confirmed by the Prophets, and expurgated from the blemishes of copyists by the work of Ezra, have come down to us as corrected as possible. But the last ones, such as the books of

Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, the prophets now failing, are perhaps less corrected, not by any fault of the authors, but of the copyists.

Fifth: Others, as almost all interpreters both ancient and more recent, both ours, and the Papists vindicate the authority and integrity of those places by genuine interpretations having been applied or sought; with whom we agree. Our reasons are these. 1. Those places are not desperate nor doubtful insoluble things, as some persuade themselves, and we will see soon, and excellent interpreters have hitherto shown. 2. Because God preserved his word by his wonderful providence: which is one of the arguments for the truth of the Christian religion hitherto adduced. Universal experience testifies that no violence of Tyranny, no cunning of worldly wisdom here ever prevailed, although they did not move every stone. See the writers of common places on the authority of scripture; and the writers On the Truth of the Christian Religion against Atheists, Gentiles, etc. The testimony and promise of God is added, Matt. 5:18, 1 Pet. 1:25, compared with 1 Cor. 10:11, Rom. 15:4, Matt. 28:16. But we extend that promise also to the individual sentences and phrases of scripture. For what is objected concerning the inversion of letters, or a greater or lesser figure, or the variety of termination and writing, in which alone almost the whole Masoretic Criticism labors, prejudices nothing of the essence or matter of words, no more than if someone writes in French reine or roine and in Dutch mogen or morgen, etc. But it would be something else, if an affirmative sentence were changed into a negative or vice versa, also one disparate thing into another disparate or opposite. We strenuously deny that such a thing has happened. 3. If indeed it were permitted to us to confess the text to be corrupted somewhere and to emend it by addition, detraction or mutation, then certainly a too wide gate is opened to Atheists, Gentiles, Jews, Enthusiasts, etc., nor do I see how we can defend the authority of Scripture. Indeed if this is permitted to you or me, when I am unable to expedite myself, why not also to another, and likewise to a third, and thus to infinity. 4. If that Critical license of emending from genius without the authority of Manuscript Codices is once conceded, we will soon have either from the curious, or from heretics (especially Socinians) so many hot conjectures, conjecturals, verisimilars, suspicions, expunctions, variant readings, as Plautus and other good authors have suffered in some years now, indeed the original text will end at last in a chaos of various readings, and discordant concord, such as is of the Vulgate version, concerning which Thomas James in his book whose title is The Papal War, or Discordant Concord, etc. Therefore we more safely follow the faith of the best and most ancient Manuscript Codices, where the reading varies. Let this be the general rule of sacred Criticism, outside of which it is not to be wandered. Therefore let that more audacious criticism depart from here, which emends from genius, which not even in profane authors the more moderate critics bore with equanimity, among whom Lipsius in epistle 13 and 15, century 1, to the Belgians. Whatever the Senate of critics may establish concerning Manilius, Plautus, Petronius, Apuleius having suffered so much, etc., and concerning the books of conjectures, verisimilars, etc., we nevertheless according to the fear and reverence of Isa. 66:2 will not cease to repeat, "Far, far hence, you profane ones." That prudent admonition pleases us in the Commentary of [Peter] Martyr and [Johann] Wolf on 2 Kings 8:17, "Often obscure places occur in those Chronologies, to the reconciling of which I do not think it is to be fled to this, that we say the sacred Codex is erroneous. For God who of his mercy willed the divine writings to be preserved for us, granted them also whole, not corrupted. Wherefore if ever as to the number of

years, we are by no means able to explicate ourselves, ignorance is to be confessed, under which we labor. And it is to be attended that the sacred writings sometimes speak so concisely, that it does not easily appear whence the computation is to be begun. Therefore let scripture remain uncorrupted, which if it be weakened in one or another place, will also be suspect in others." 5. The testimonies of the fathers are added against the pretended corruption of Scripture, Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, bk. 5, ch. 13 near the end, Jerome, against Helvidius, and preface to the Gospels to Damasus, Augustine, Epistle to Jerome (it is extant in the epistles of Jerome, Lyons edition, by Gryphius, vol. 1), and Against Faustus the Manichean, bk. 32, ch. 16, and On the City of God, bk. 15, [ch.] 13, Origen, bk. 8 on Isaiah in Jerome on ch. 6 of Isaiah, of the more recent John Isaac against van der Lindt compared with Buxtorf's Tiberias, part 1, chs. 8 and 20, Rivet, Introduction, ch. 8, and others, the Antagonists of the Papists, Whitaker, Chamier, Francis Junius, etc., indeed also Bellarmine himself, bk. 2, On the Word of God, ch. 2, which we also by right apply to those insoluble things.

4. We supply such a solution of doubts, in which we prefer to acquiesce, Ps. 22:17, כארי, that is, as a lion. What Whitaker, [Sibrandus] Lubbertus, [Francis] Junius, Chamier responded to Bellarmine and [Martin] Gretser, Turretin to Coton, Amama in his Anti-barbarian, Rivet in his Commentary on Ps. 22, to the Papists I do not repeat. This however I add (with better judgment safe) that I do not see a reason, why it is to be conceded to the Papists that some blemish crept in here into the text, whether by the perfidy of the Jews or by the fault of copyists. Let it indeed be read and remain כארי as a lion my hands and my feet, the Discourse flows and the sense is sufficiently constant, here there is no contradiction, no absurdity, we are able to expedite ourselves not in one way: for either it can be supplied with the Chaldee Targum כארי נכרין as a lion piercing, in which way the Ellipsis of the verb [is] in 2 Sam. 8:12, 1 Kings 22:36, and thus Augustinus [Justinianus] Bishop of Nebo in his Psalter of Eight Languages, says that the construction is defective, to be supplied, they pierced; or to be supplied with R. Shelomo Yarchi, צרי מדקין בפי they piercing with the mouth of a lion; or with Abraham ibn Ezra, that כארי hikifuni is to be joined to כארי and expounded they surrounded or encircled (namely they coarcted and constricted on all sides) my hands and my feet, so that there is no escape. For no necessity compels this text to be expounded of transfixion properly so called: Or, that we may retain the argument of our men from this place against the Jews (which most pleases me), we will say that the verb נקף nakaf signifies to strike, pierce through, break, as Kimchi in his Lexicon expounds it by שבר shavar and כרת carat. See Isa. 10:34, Ps. 140:12, Lam. 3:16, to bore through, perforate, pierce, in which way Job 19:26, as the same as נקב nakav: for the letters ב and פ are easily changed between themselves, not only in Chaldaic dialect, but in the Hebrew language itself: thus the sense would be they dug, they transfixed or broke as a lion my hands and my feet, in the same sense as Isa. 38:13. The Metaphor R. David Kimchi in his Commentary on Ps. 22 explains thus to his own: "as a lion which digs with its tail in the forest." Why do we not rather say, which digs, breaks, pierces with claws, and teeth. Among the Chaldeans they occur in the signification of striking, breaking in the Chaldee Targum on Ps. 140:6, 12, and 56:14, Isa. 66:3. Philipp Aquinas from a Jew made a Christian in his Dictionary under the word כרה, observes פארי, that is חתוך וכריתה the signification of cutting off, and breaking. Thus it will not be necessary to disturb the received reading כארי as a lion. And this interpretation is conciliated aptly enough with the Greek of the 70 (although it is not authentic to us): for they expressed

both significations of the verb כרת by two words; ὤρυξαν which is from the signification of נקף, and ἤσχυναν which is from נקב. This is not unusual for them, when a verb occurs having altogether diverse significations, and both seem able to be adapted to the text, or the punctuation seemed doubtful to them, or another rational cause was present in their judgment. See Isa. 61:1-2 compared with Luke 4:18-19, and there the commentators. What John Isaac objects against van der Lindt against the reading which is now in the text, that the accent Athnach prohibits that הקיפוני can be joined with כארי, is refuted first from the places inspected, Gen. 1:1, Ps. 83:13 and 119:13 and 124:3-5, 8 and 130:2, 8, Jer. 7:20, Ezek. 6:13, Zeph. 2:1, Josh. 3:11. Secondly, it would indeed avail against most Jews who elsewhere insist on the accents as authentic, although they neglect them here; but it does nothing for the Papists nor for Amama, who attribute the vowel points and accents to the Masoretes or others, but not to the divinely inspired Writers. Similarly his other objection is invalid, which says that the letter Kaph is not servile, because it is pointed with Qamets. For the punctuation if from the Masoretes (as is their opinion) prejudices us in nothing. Then that the Qamets is from the prepositive article here extruded: for it is a Grammatical rule that that article joined to a word begun from כ is pointed with Qamets. If anyone says that all interpreters both vernacular and Latin retain foderunt, they pierced. Resp. let them retain it indeed, but so as to express the word הקיפוני not כארו: For this can in no way be expounded they pierced, unless against the common consent of all codices (excepting perhaps one or another, which R. Jacob ben Chayyim and John Isaac say that they saw: let the faith be with them) we inject violent hands into the text itself. Whatever the case I would prefer to retain the original text, and to pass over the others in silence or to profess my ignorance, if indeed a suitable interpretation did not occur, than to addict my faith nakedly to the authority of the interpreters, and to the testimony of John Isaac from a Jew converted a Christian, but then a Papist. The Most Learned Amama in his Biblical Anti-barbarian, pp. 723-724, from the opinion of the Jews affirms or assumes for himself two hypotheses, the first of which: that כארי here is not to be translated as a lion; the other that the Masoretic marginal reading was כרו they pierced: But thence he elicits two theses, the first of which is therefore to be interpreted they pierced, the other is that the marginal Keri is to be replaced into the text by Christians; and so this place is to be vindicated from the corruption of the Jews. We approve his zeal for the Christian faith; but we do not see knowledge and sufficient demonstration. Who and where are those Jews by whose consent those hypotheses are conceded? Certainly from the commentaries of Kimchi, Abraham ibn Ezra, Shelomo Yarchi the contrary is plainly evident. Concerning the Masoretic Keri to be replaced into the text we consider it wrong. Far be it, far be it. Of what and how great authority the marginal readings are (which he equals and prefers to the text itself in the same book), we inquire elsewhere, in the disputation To What Extent the Authority of Scripture Extends Itself. Of how great authority the Greek translation is, and that it is not of the 70 Interpreters, but mixed from many, and so in most things is deficient or corrupted, our men teach against the Papists, Chamier, vol. 1, Panstratia, bk. 13, Rivet, Introduction, chs. 10 and 11. Indeed why not moreover I may doubt, Whether that Greek mixed translation, was interpolated and formed in this and other places after the times of the Apostles by unskilled zealots to the Greek text of the N.T. where those places are cited from the O.T. not always to the letter, but paraphrastically and with exposition, and that through the infallible authority of the Apostolic spirit.

The highest Rabbi among Christians John Buxtorf the elder, almost insisting on the opinion of John Isaac defends the Hebrew text from corruption otherwise: whose Manuscript diatribe I here exhibit, liberally communicated to me by the Reverend and Illustrious Henry van Diest Professor of Theology and of the Hebrew language then in the illustrious school of Harderwijk, now in that of Deventer, after he had seen this my disputation published. Let the Reader compare both, and judge, which is more certain and safe, mine (in which I still remain) or Buxtorf's: Thus therefore that greatest Hebrew:

(Section omitted currently because of poor manuscript quality below is the ending of the manuscript quality err)
Argumenta duo video infuper huic fententiæ opponi : Vnum eft ferè

I see moreover two arguments opposed to this opinion: One is almost common to all Theologians, because in the N.T. Matt. 27 is cited ὤρυξαν, which in Hebrew is כארו. The other is of those who have too great a conscience of the Masoretic, or marginal reading. To the first it is responded, that the citations of places from the O.T. in the N.T. prejudice nothing to the Hebrew text, nor make that the Greek translation discordant from the Hebrew fountain absolutely agree with the Hebrew. See the Sacred Parallels of Francis Junius, and the annotations of Johannes Drusius. To the latter it is responded, that the Masoretic marginal readings are not authentic to us. Compare the preceding disputation, To What Extent the Authority Extends Itself, etc.

Insoluble 2, 2 Chron. 22:2, Ahaziah is said to have been forty-two years old when he began to reign; although nevertheless his father Joram in the preceding chapter is said to have begun to reign in the thirty-second year of his age, and to have reigned eight years. There are those who break the knot, they do not solve it, saying that there is a blemish in the text, as Scaliger, Cajetan, [Agostino] Tornielli, [Jacques] Salian, [Denis] Petau. The conjectures of others having been omitted (which see in Henry Philippi the Jesuit Theologian in his accurate Chronological Examination of the O.T., p. 141, and that of Cappel, p. 159, concerning the forty-second year of the Samaritan era), we receive the interpretation of Nicholas of Lyra from Jerome. Namely that Joram reigned twenty years beyond those eight. But of these mention is made only in ch. 21, because in them he reigned well enough, before he was drawn by his wife to idolatry. In the remaining twenty he reigned and did not reign, whence as inglorious he was not brought into the sepulchers of the Kings, 2 Chron. 21:last verse, either because he did not reign so well then, or rather because with him and for him his son Ahaziah reigned and administered the affairs of the kingdom.

Insoluble 3. Hence also depends the conciliation of 2 Kings 8:26 with 2 Chron. 22:2. There he is said to have begun to reign in the twenty-second year, namely in the name of his father, so that the sum of things was in the power of Ahaziah, but the dignity and title was left to his inept or secure father. But here he is said to have begun to reign in the forty-second year, namely after the death of his father (concerning which in the preceding chapter), for then he reigned alone and in his own name and indeed one year. Vatablus also has each of these conciliations. The Papists therefore see that this knot was not insoluble even to their own.

Insoluble 4, Matt. 27:9. See various conciliations in Maldonatus on Matt. 27, and Glassius, bk. 1, Sacred Philology, tract 2, p. 189. But we, all others having been omitted, expedite ourselves from the difficulty of this place beautifully enough, saying that Zechariah is called Jeremiah, in which way the priest Jehoiada is called Berechiah, Matt. 23:35, who nevertheless is never so called in the O.T. For it comes to the same thing whether you say Exalter of God, exaltation of God (Jeremiah), or Rememberer of God, remembrance of God (Zechariah), just as the same are Nathanael, Theodore, Dorotheus, Deodatus, Gottschalk; and in the Sacred Writings the same is Jehoahaz, with Ahaziah and Azariah, 2 Chron. 21:17 and 22:1, 6, Johanan with Jehoahaz, 1 Chron. 3:15, 2 Kings 23:30, 34, Elishama with Elishua, 1 Chron. 3:6, 2 Sam. 5:15, Azariah with Uzziah, 1 Chron. 3:12, 2 Kings 15:30. See also Gen. 46:10-11 compared with 1 Chron. 4:24, 13, and very many others, 1 Chron. 3, compared with concordant places. Compare also the commentaries of [Andrew] Willet on Gen. 46:10, where concerning synonymous proper names, or the variation of names.

Insoluble 5, Luke 3:36, it must be said that Cainan is cited from the Hellenistic version; which in Gen. 10 and 11 and 1 Chron. 1:18 places Cainan between Arpachshad and Shelah. But why this was done by them is left to be inquired. See the analysis of Francis Junius on Gen. 11. Provided it is evident that the copies of the Greek translation of the O.T. and the copies of the N.T. with the Syriac and Arabic paraphrast, and the ancient commentators so have it: For one copy, which Beza saw, cannot constitute the reading, or move the old reading and text: If such dangerous Criticism is once admitted, now six hundred places could be changed with the same facility. But you will say why did Luke make the error of the 70 Interpreters his own? If indeed it is an error, at least he did not make it his own, when he cites that whole context: for by citing he neither disapproves nor approves the inaccuracies of the version, nor did he professedly call its accuracy to examination lest he disturb men accustomed to that version and according to it to the genealogy in the beginning. It sufficed him for the proof of the genealogy of Christ to have cited Biblical places from the common version, especially of all the most known and received, chiefly by that Alexandrian Jewish synagogue, which Scaliger in his notes on the N.T. testifies to have used it. Moreover it is too well known that that version was left in its own place by the writers of the N.T., and from it almost all places cited from it word for word (although often it did not express the Hebrew truth so learnedly or accurately). This sufficed for their purpose and scope, let only the epistle to the Hebrews be read compared with the parallel places of the O.T. Compare the Parallels of Francis Junius. But the Papists themselves did not believe this to be an error, while they devised various modes of conciliating; among others Tornielli in his Annals says that Arpachshad begot Shelah (namely Gen. 10 and 11 in the Hebrew text) because he begot Cainan, in whose loins Shelah was, just as Matt. 1:8, Joram is said to have begotten Uzziah. Many other conjectures of the Doctors of the Papists are reported by Henry Philippi in his accurate Chronological Examination of the O.T. on Gen. ch. 11, question 1. Compare also Glassius, bk. cited, p. 196.

Insoluble 6, Acts 7:14 with Gen. 46:27, the Papists themselves contend does not conflict and adduce various conciliations, which see in [Gaspar] Sanchez, commentary on Acts; in [Benito] Pereira and [Cornelius] a Lapide, commentary on Genesis and on Acts. Of all which they report this seems safer: that Stephen cited from the version of the 70, which has that number; and so

here as also above on Luke 3:36, the rule of Jerome holds in his Hebrew Traditions on Genesis: "Wherever the Apostles speak to the people they for the most part abuse those testimonies, which were divulged to the Gentiles." Cornelius a Lapide approves this conciliation of Jerome and Nicholas of Lyra in his commentary on Acts and Genesis: and Sanchez on Acts 7:14, p. 148. But why the 70 Interpreters increased that number, they explain there more fully. But also another conciliation is adduced by our men, that Stephen and Moses do not speak concerning the same thing; and consequently there is no repugnance. For Moses weaves a Catalogue of all those, who had come out of the thigh of Jacob, v. 26, although then they did not actually enter Egypt with him (as Joseph, Ephraim, Manasseh), indeed some were not yet born (as Hezron and Hamul the sons of Perez, v. 12). All Hebrew Codices have that number, Gen. 46, with the Chaldean, Arabic paraphrases, the Latin Vulgate, and the 70 Interpreters themselves, Deut. 10:22, where there is a repetition of this history, and Josephus, Antiquities, bk. 2, ch. 4. But Stephen recounts all the kindred of Jacob, as it is described by Moses, and not only as its sum is calculated, Gen. 46:27, namely five having been added to that sum in this way: and one having been detracted, namely Jacob himself, and that in this way:

The family of Jacob consisted, Gen. 30 and 46, of:

(Jacob 1 Issachar 5 Joseph 3
(Reuben 5 Zebulun 4 Benjamin 11
(Simeon 7 Dinah 1 Dan 2
(Levi 4 Gad 8 Naphtali 8
(Judah 6 Asher 8

Sum 70

Gen. 46:27, Deut. 10:22, where the Greek Interpreters have the same number. If it is said that the proto-martyr Stephen numbered the four wives of the sons of Jacob before recounted, and Er and Onan the sons of Judah dead in Canaan, but omitted Jacob the head of the whole family (who is expressly distinguished from his kindred, Acts 7:14): the conciliation is had, that namely the enumeration of the family is understood to be repeated here by Stephen, not such as it was, when it descended into Egypt, but as it had been described by Moses, Gen. 30 and 46. And this is that of Epiphanius, which Francis Junius embraces in his analysis on Genesis; nor is Rivet alien to it, exercitation 149 on Genesis. But it is difficult to explain, how the family so enumerated is said to have been called by Joseph, so that it came into Egypt. What if therefore it is said with Sanchez on Acts 7, that Luke cited from the Greek translation the text of Gen. 46:27, in which way concerning Cainan most respond to Luke 3. Whatever the case, v. 14 of Acts 7, Sanchez and a Lapide defend from a blemish after most ancient and more recent interpreters; the latter of whom in his commentary on Gen. 46 conciliates both enumerations: Salian does the same in his annals on the year of the world 2529. So that here from their opinion there is no insoluble thing, on account of which the spear is to be cast away by us and refuge to be taken to the oracle of the Pope.

Insoluble 7, Acts 13:20 with 1 Kings 6:1. The most expeditious way of conciliating has always seemed to me to be that of Bede, the Ordinary Gloss, Nicholas of Lyra, Hugh [of Saint-Cher], [Denis] the Carthusian, [Alfonso] Salmeron, [Gilbert] Génébrard in his Chronicle, which the Jesuits Sanchez and a Lapide embrace. Namely that the years are numbered here not of the Judges, but which preceded the Judges, from the birth of Isaac up to the division of the land, which thence are calculated (Acts 7:6) up to the exodus from Egypt 400, to which if you add the 40 years in the desert, and 10 or 8 or 12 in subduing the Canaanites, we have the round number ὡς τετρακόσια καὶ πεντήκοντα expressed from the custom of scripture; So that the number of years is not to be joined with μετὰ ταῦτα, but with πάντα, so that the sense may be: And after these things (concerning which vv. 17-19), four hundred and fifty years. We note here in passing, that the Syriac and Arabic interpreters omit μετὰ ταῦτα, consequently they remove this excellent interpretation. When therefore in the places now alleged from the N.T. both the Greek codices, the Arabic and Syriac interpreters, also the Ethiopic and Hebrew, Matt. 27:9 (where nevertheless the Syriac dissents) so read, and no necessity, no argument of the Papists compels us to the corruption of the text; especially when even the Papists alone suggest to us such excellent interpretations, in which both they and we equally acquiesce, and we stop the mouth of the adversaries, Jews, Mohammedans, Atheists, Enthusiasts, happily enough, what remains than that, the unhappy and too dangerous Criticism having been postponed,

We intrepidly deny both the major and minor of that argument,

That which is corrupted by some blemishes, which labors under some insoluble absurdities and contradictions, or at least which to us and our intelligence, seems to labor under them; that cannot make us wise to salvation, nor is it the canon of faith:
But scripture is such, Therefore etc.

and further sing to the Papists that of Irenaeus, Against Heresies, bk. 3, ch. 2, "The Heretics fight against and resist their own salvation, for when they are argued from the scriptures, they are turned to the accusation of the scriptures themselves, as if they are not right, nor are of authority, and because they are variously spoken, and because the truth cannot be found from these by those who do not know the tradition: for that was handed down not through letters, but through the living voice."

We add here the opinion of Juan Andrés, a Moor, once a Priest in the Roman church converted from a Mohammedan lawyer at Valencia in the year 1487, who in ch. 10, p. 229 of his Confusion of the Mohammedan Sect translated from Italian into Latin by Johann Lauterbach in Noscowitz in the year 1595, convinces all Mohammedans contending that the Old and New Testaments are corrupted, and were different in the time of Moses and Jesus Christ, in a twofold way: "First by saying, that nothing is changed or perverted in the O.T., and it is the same today, which was under Moses and the Prophets up to J. Christ, after whom the Christians plainly had the same book, not even one title having been omitted. But you know, he says, that the Christians dissent from the Jews. If therefore the Jews had corrupted or perverted the holy scripture, it would not have always remained one and the same among the Jews up to now. But the divine scripture is never lost, as the books of the Mohammedan Zuna, concerning which we have treated above in

chapter three. Secondly, in the time of Mahomet now six hundred years had elapsed, in which the Christian law had become known to the whole world, and a union had been made of the Old and New Testaments, that is, of the figure and the thing figured, which so well came together, that they seemed to be one and the same thing. Because it was also then revealed by God to Mahomet, that that scripture was good and true, it altogether remained in the native truth, and today is such. But if in the age of Mahomet some change had happened, God would without doubt have indicated the errors to him. Therefore you do nothing, Moor, with the whole gathering of your men, otherwise he who produces two whole witnesses, obtains a sure victory, but the evil are reproved. And since God ordered Mahomet to consult the Jews and Christians concerning the scriptures, the scriptures of them were true and whole, as they have been propagated inviolate up to this time. Therefore yield to the truth, acknowledge the contrarieties of the Alcoran enumerated by us."

Corollary

Cornelius a Lapide unhappily gathers faith in the Saints, and the invocation of the same from the epistle to Philemon, v. 5, a distinction having been applied in his commentary. For, to pass over the solution which [Denis] the Carthusian, Cajetan, Isidore Clarius and other Papists not obscurely supply in their commentaries, here is a figure which Hermogenes calls a chiasm and Photius in his Myriobiblon or Bibliotheca, cod. ccxlvi, κύκλωσιν. Whom see; and especially Cujas, who observes very many examples from Civil Law and good authors in book 14 of his Observations, chapter 24. An example of the same figure occurs in Matthew 12:22, as Casaubon noted there in his annotations on the New Testament. Hence it is that the Syriac translator here rendered it thus: haimonutoch vechoubo, that is, "your faith and love", putting faith before love, whereas in the Greek it is tēn pistin kai tēn agapēn. The Arabic translator preserves the same order as the Syriac.

ON THE APOSTLES' CREED

Resp. JOHANNES ALMELOVEEN, of Utrecht.
On the 26th of March, 1636.

Nothing is more familiar than the Apostles' Creed; therefore something certain is to be held concerning its origin and authority. But since we see that not all think the same here, or explain their mind accurately enough, we think we will do something worthwhile if for the sake of candidates of Theology we comprehend the matter itself in a few aphorisms.

1. Gerson in his Compendium of Theology, tract 1, defines a Creed as a compendious collection of all things to be believed pertaining to salvation. The Origin of the word is disputed. σύμβολα and σύμβολον differ, as in genus and termination so also in signification, as Casaubon advises on Athenaeus, bk. 3, ch. 31, and Matthias Martinius in his Etymologicum. This affinity of the word drove Rufinus into error in the place cited below, and Budé in his Commentaries on the Greek Language, who says that a Symbol signifies faith on account obviously of a collation, and

yet he adduces no Greek author for this signification. Gabriel Biel in distinction 25, question 1, article 1, book 3, deduces Symbolum from σὺν which is con and βῶλος a particle or little bit, as if a collection of little parts: for each of the Apostles placed his own little part as if his own bit. Others deduce it from σὺν and βολή, that is, an opinion as if a collection of opinions; Altenstaig in his Theological Dictionary attributes this etymology to Bonaventure. If there is any place for conjecture, it is called a Symbol, because it is a note, sign and token of Christianity: or metonymically it is so called from the very sign and pact of baptism. See Chrysologus, homily 62, and Chrysostom, homily to Neophytes, vol. 5, and Gerson in his Compendium of Theology, on the articles of faith, vol. 2.

2. From a collation of the most ancient fathers and writers, who lived in the 4th, 5th, 6th, and following centuries we gather that a twofold Creed is to be distinguished: which distinction having been neglected or not noticed begot all confusion and error. The former Creed is shorter in explication, more ancient in use, greater in authority and Catholicity, received with the very institution of baptism, and used perpetually and inseparably together with the administration of baptism now thence from the times of the Apostles, immediately divine in origin, and so indemonstrable and authentic, the rule, norm and principle of faith obviously as a part of Canonical Scripture. But it is that which is had in Matt. 28:19, "Go and teach (μαθητεύσατε) all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." This Creed instituted by Christ, propagated by the Apostles is the naked foundation. The other Creed is that, which we now have clothed with so many articles as if with ornaments successively, but by other and indeed uncertain authors; to whom an authority equal to Christ and the Apostles is by no means to be attributed. The fathers are necessarily to be understood concerning the former most simple and shortest Creed, but truly not concerning the latter when they say that the rule of faith was instituted by Christ, when he sent the Apostles into the world so that they might teach the nations to be baptized into the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Tertullian, On Prescription, chs. 14 and 28, that we received the rule of truth through baptism. Irenaeus, bk. 1, ch. 2, That we have the confession of faith through the very tradition of baptism. Basil or the author of the book on the Holy Spirit, bk. 1, ch. 2. And thus Gennadius of Marseilles begins the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas: "We believe," he says, "that there is one God the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit." Where Elmenhorst notes: "He begins from the common rule of faith which he opposes as a foundation to all heresies." And he cites there Gregory Nazianzen, On Faith, Oration 49, Socrates, Ecclesiastical History, bk. 2, ch. 25, Tertullian, On the Veiling of Virgins, ch. 1, Guitmundus, On the Trinity, vol. 4, Library of the Fathers, Augustine, Bishop of the Church of Hippo, vol. 3, On Faith and the Creed, ch. 1, On the Times, sermon 195 and 125, John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8, Pope Gregory in the decrees, part 1, title 1, Athanasius in his Exposition of the Faith, fol. 394ff, the Second Council of Constantinople, ch. 7, the First Council of Toledo, ch. 21, the Fourth Council of Toledo, ch. 1, the Lateran Council, ch. 1, Isidore of Seville, On Ecclesiastical Offices, bk. 2, ch. 23, the Author On the Faith to Peter the Deacon, ch. 1 in Augustine, vol. 3, Victor in his Exposition of the Faith, vol. 5, Library of the Fathers, fol. 457, fol. 457, Fulgentius to King Thrasamund, bk. 3, fol. 54, Ferrandus the Deacon, Paraenetic to Reginus, fol. 1893, in the Appendix of the Library of the Fathers, the Edict of the Emperor Justinian on the Faith, vol. 1, Graeco-Roman Law, fol. 521, the Third Council of Arles, ch. 1, the Council of Worms, ch. 1, Rabanus Maurus, On the

Institution of the Clergy, bk. 2, ch. 57, Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks, bk. 1, ch. 1. From the many which Parker adduces, bk. 4, On the Descent into Hell, we exhibit here the words of some of them, so that it may be evident that they understood that foundation of the foundation, that is, the Creed without a commentary, but truly not such as it now is, when they honored it with so many praises and titles, namely the rule of faith and truth, the manner of faith, the boundary, the constitution of faith, the sum of faith, the Body of Faith, the Apex and foundation, the sacrament of the Evangelical Faith, the form of Faith, and of the celestial precept, the confession first and only of the Evangelical Faith in baptism, the reason of Faith, the Mystery of religion, the Faith, the idiom of Faith, the Character of the church, the norm of the holy Faith.

Therefore let Athanasius be heard first, in his Epistle to the Orthodox Everywhere and his Oration against the Greek Sabellians and against the Arians, "The sum," he says, "and whole body of our faith is contained in the words of baptism, and is founded in that scripture: Go and baptize all nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit," and Augustine against the Donatists, bk. 6, ch. 25, "The Creed consists of Evangelical words," and a little before, "God is present to his Evangelical words, without which the baptism of Christ cannot be consecrated." And in his sermon on the Creed: "Our Lord Jesus Christ himself instituted this norm of faith, and no one except the impious doubts concerning that rule of the Catholic faith which he dictated to whom faith itself is owed. Therefore our Lord Jesus Christ himself, when now glorified he rose from the dead about to ascend into heaven to the Father, left these sacraments of faith to the disciples, that is, to the Apostles. For he says, going baptize all nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Gregory of Nyssa, On the Resurrection, Oration 2, calls that scripture that net, by which the Apostles became fishers of men, and says that the whole mystery of our religion consists in it. Epiphanius in his Recapitulation, after he recounted all the heresies which were against the Catholic faith, takes that one scripture for their impugnation: "But this is our faith: Go preach, etc." Eusebius Pamphilus in his epistle to the Palestinians calls the same text the faith, "This faith having been expounded by us (he says), no place of resisting is left." The Council of Antioch reciting the Creed to Socrates at length, bk. 1, ch. 8, calls it the evangelical tradition and places its foundation in the same text. Thus the Council of Ancyra concerning the Holy Spirit 2 says to the same text, "Our faith according to the doctrine of Christ is in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Spirit," and Didymus of Alexandria expounding that of the Apostle, "There is one Lord, one baptism, one faith": "And this one Faith (he says) is in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit."

3. The Question is whether the Creed, that which we now have was written by the Apostles or by apostolic men, and so is of divine and canonical authority. The Papists establish that it was composed by the 12 Apostles (and indeed before the conversion of Paul, Bonaventure, bk. 3, dist. 25, q. 1, num. 8) gathered into one before they departed from each other to preach the Gospel, so that the individual articles were from the individuals through expression, and the whole Creed from anyone through approbation. See there Bonaventure, Durand, and Biel, and the Catechism of the Council of Trent, p. 15, and Baronius's Annals on the year 44, §3, 8, Bellarmine, On the Word of God, bk. 4, ch. 4, Bayle in his Catechesis, q. 9, Gaspar Sanchez, On the Preaching of James in Spain, tract 1, ch. 7, but he cites for himself Rufinus in his

exposition of the creed, Augustine, sermon 181, On the Times; Clement in his 1st epistle to the brother of the Lord. Others add that the divine origin and authority of the creed is not evident to us except from unwritten tradition, Becanus in his Manual, bk. 1, ch. 2, Bellarmine in the place cited, "They did not write it," he says, "but only handed it down by living voice." Baronius in the place cited endeavors to prove by the testimony of Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, that this creed was handed down by the apostles without writing. All attribute to it an authority equal to the Canonical Scriptures. We on the contrary profess, that although by matter or materially it is divine, as also the Athanasian Creed, obviously as taken from the Holy writings, yet by form and structure, or formally it is a human writing, and ecclesiastical of human authority: it is not therefore a canon, rule or infallible principle of faith, into which the ultimate analysis of faith is to be made, but it is regulated and principiated, indeed it is not most ancient by perpetual succession, now thence propagated and received after the Apostolic times.

4. Our Reasons are these. First, because when the Scholastics and more recent refer that history concerning the origin, antiquity, and authority of the Creed they do it on their own faith, without any proof, therefore we reject it with the same facility, with which they assert it. Bellarmine and Baronius indeed cite Augustine, sermon 115, On the Times, for the twelve bits, but soon Baronius draws the authority of that sermon 115 into doubt ibid., and substitutes or supplies the testimonies of other fathers (as he speaks), Pope Leo, epistle 96 to Pulcheria, Venantius Fortunatus in the preface of his exposition of the creed, Alcuin, On Ecclesiastical Offices, ch. 22, Rabanus Maurus, bk. 2, On the Institution of the Clergy, ch. 56. But with what candor and judgment he cites these, and names Rabanus and Alcuin as fathers to be substituted for or equated to Augustine as ancient witnesses in this business, the more prudent will easily judge. We will speak below of Rufinus and others. Secondly, because it is not a part of the books of scripture, therefore it is not a part of the canon nor a divine and authentic writing. Experience teaches the antecedent, for nowhere does it appear there, or is it said ever to have appeared. The consequence needs no proof, at least among our men who strongly assert the integrity and sufficiency of the written word against pretended traditions. Since therefore every writing concerning matters of faith is formally either divine or human, authentic or not authentic, Canonical or not Canonical, nor can a third be given, or a middle either of participation or of negation of the extremes: it follows that the Creed is a merely human writing. Thirdly, it seems ridiculous and unusual that each contributed to the Creed, as if a cento was to be sewn together. And the articles are rather badly separated and connected, e.g., that Peter said: I believe in God the Father almighty, John added, Creator of heaven and earth, etc. Fourthly, because it was not composed at one time but successively: some adding these, others other articles, and indeed late, some centuries after the times of the Apostles. Therefore it was not constructed by the Apostles, or by Apostolic men: and consequently it is not divine or Canonical, indeed not even a most ancient succession, Catholicity and Ecclesiastical authority can be attributed to it. The antecedent is proved 1. because the most ancient writers Martial, Ignatius, Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, the Nicene Creed (as it exists in Nicephorus, bk. 8, ch. 13, Socrates, bk. 1, ch. 5, Tripartite History, bk. 2, ch. 9), when they recount the sum of the faith do not proceed beyond the Trinity. 2. Because the article concerning the Descent into hell which is attributed to the Apostle Thomas is not had in the ancient editions of the Creed: not in Augustine in his book On the Creed to the Catechumens, vol. 9, not in the Roman Creed nor in the

Churches of the East according to the testimony of Rufinus. Thus also Rufinus, Augustine, other fathers also do not have certain other words. See Erasmus to the Censure of Paris, title 11. Indeed Rufinus himself in his preface to the Exposition of the Creed confesses that other things were added in other Churches on account of heretics. But it would be absurd that such a sum of faith, and as if a Canon of Canons, constituted by the Apostolic College, was not conserved in the Church by divine providence from corruption or change so that one of the 12 Articles and of the 12 Apostles did not fall out: Since God conserved the scriptures from all corruption, detraction, addition. Nor is it to be passed over that there is nothing certain concerning the number of articles in the Roman Church itself, whether there are 12 or truly 14. Thomas, ST, IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 8. 3. Because the ancient fathers about to convict heretics and provoking to the first most ancient and most simple sum and rule of faith do not pretend this Creed which we now have, which nevertheless they ought to have done and were able to do by a divine compendium, if indeed it was of Apostolic origin and authority, and of a most ancient and perpetual Catholic succession. But it is not that we prove the negative; we expect instances from those who defend the affirmative. From superabundance nevertheless we indicate the places cited above, Thesis 2. 4. Because the ancient expositors of the Creed, namely the Nicene, Antiochene, Sirmian, Ariminensian Creed, also Rufinus, Epiphanius, Augustine do not have as today "I believe in the Holy Spirit"; but "And in the Holy Spirit" which is a judgment that primitively nothing more was said, concerning the Father and the Son, than concerning the Holy Spirit, and through the copulative conjunction those words "in the Holy Spirit" cohered most nearly and immediately with those "in the Son", so that the first structure of the Creed of Christ was this, "I believe in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." We conclude therefore in a word that the Creed, as it now is, existed nowhere before the fourth century. Fifthly, Thomas, ST, IIa-IIae, q. 1, arts. 8 and 9, ascribes the structure of the Creed to the universal Church: indeed also in the middle of the Papacy without heresy Erasmus opposed the Pontifical opinion or fable concerning this our Creed having been written by the Apostles in his Response to the Censure of the Parisians, title 11. Lorenzo Valla doubts concerning it and Polydore Vergil, bk. 5, On the Inventors of Things, ch. 13. Sixthly, from the absurd consequence; then the whole revealed word of God would not be in scripture, nor would the canon be perfect, if indeed something else Canonical or authentic could be added to it. See the disputations of our men on the Canonical books and the perfection of scripture especially when they cite the place Rev. 22:18. Seventhly, and lest anyone think that we adduce plainly new paradoxes, Chamier will be able to confirm not a few of our men hesitating here. "In the Churches," says Chamier, "there is the authority of teaching the faith in various words, only the same. Thus was made the Nicene Creed, thus the Ephesine, thus the Chalcedonian, also of Athanasius. Thus many Catechisms, infinite homilies, treatises, and books." You see it is to him a merely human writing as to the structure and composition of the words as he himself had distinguished ibid., §§6, 7. And in his Panstratia, bk. 9, on scripture, ch. 10, "That the Creed was so composed by the Apostles, if it is not false, certainly what is next to false no one denies, is uncertain." Brenz in his Catechesis expressly denies that it was written by the Apostles. Thus also Perkins in his exposition of the Creed in the beginning, p. 3, "Moreover it is called the Apostolic faith, not indeed in that sense, as if they themselves wrote it, and besides the things contained in it, also so formed the style and words, as we have now recounted them, since certain words and phrases are comprehended in it, which are by no means found in the writings of the holy Apostles, such as that 'he descended

into hell,' and 'the Catholic Church,' which last words no doubt came into usage, then when the Church of Christ after the times of the Apostles, was dispersed thence into all parts of the world. Then if both the matter and the very manner of speaking descended from the Apostles, the Apostolic faith ought certainly to be canonical scripture just as the rest of their writings and monuments." See also Parker in his most learned treatise On the Descent into Hell. Jacob Laurentius also seems to incline to this opinion in his Orthodox Heidelberg Catechesis against Coppenstein, q. 22, although he does not determine it. Parker is followed by Ludovicus Crocius in his Syntagma. Lavater in his tract On the Descent into Hell had preceded all of them. The Remonstrants in their Apology, ch. 1, fol. 37-38, rightly number it among human writings. Eighthly, the Reformed Churches never number it among the Canonical books of scripture. As is evident from the Harmony of Confessions. Indeed the Gallican Confession, Article 5, expressly distinguishes this, and other Creeds from scripture. The same does our Belgic Liturgy in the formula of the administration of Baptism, question 3, customarily proposed to the parents of infants to be Baptized.

5. The Papists nevertheless contend for the Apostolic origin and authority of the creed, among others Génébrard, bk. 3, On the Trinity, Feuardent on Irenaeus, bk. 1, ch. 2, Baronius on the year 44. They have scarcely anything to oppose, except the testimony of Rufinus, who in his exposition of the Creed thus relates: "Our elders hand down that after the ascension of the Lord when through the advent of the Holy Spirit fiery tongues had sat upon each of the Apostles, so that they spoke in diverse and various tongues through which no foreign nation, no barbarous language seemed inaccessible to them, and in the way the precept was given to them by the Lord for preaching the word of God to depart to each of the nations therefore about to depart from each other they establish in common a norm of preaching, lest by chance led away by another they expound something diverse to those who were being initiated to the faith of Christ, therefore all placed in one, and filled with the Holy Spirit, they compose this brief indication of their future preaching as we said, by conferring into one what each one thought, and they establish that this rule is to be given to believers. But they wanted to call this a Symbol for many and most just causes, for in Greek a Symbol can be said to be an indication and a collation, that is, what more confer into one, for the Apostles did this in these discourses, each one conferring into one what he thought." Resp. 1. Rufinus is not an unimpeachable witness for the Papists: For thus Bellarmine, On Ecclesiastical Writers, num. 390, "In his apology for Origen he lies much according to the testimony of Jerome himself, etc." And a little after, "finally Rufinus is deservedly marked with error by Pope Gelasius, ch. The Holy Roman, distinction 15." Possevin in his Sacred Apparatus, vol. 2, p. 358, calls the writings of Rufinus a Labyrinth: and that "it can not easily be judged, of what genius or faith Rufinus was." 2. Faith is not to be given to Rufinus relating these things without a suitable author, since he is more remote from the times of the Apostles. 3. The pretended tradition also basely deceived the most ancient fathers, who nevertheless had it from the next successors of the Apostles, but Irenaeus, bk. 2, chs. 39, 40, in the question on the age of Christ, the same as also Justin, Lactantius, etc. (and whom not?) deceived the Chiliastic tradition propagated by Papias himself the disciple of the Apostle John: see our disputation On the Millennial Kingdom: Thus Cyprian with the Africans obtended apostolic tradition for their anabaptism: and in the contention concerning the observation of Easter each part provoked to tradition. Concerning which see the annals of Baronius and the

Mystery of Iniquity of [Philippe de Mornay, seigneur] du Plessis-Marly. Now let the argument be made from the greater to the less, from the most ancient fathers to Rufinus, who flourished in the year 390. 4. The time of the composition of the Creed, which Rufinus assigns neither all the ancients nor the more recent even the Papists themselves accept: Eucherius, homily 1, On the Creed, Paschasius, preface of his book On the Holy Spirit, Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 5, Thomas, ST, IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 9, Durand, Biel and other Scholastics in Distinction 25, bk. 3, say that it was collected from the whole scripture or the Canonical scriptures. If the Creed was composed after the canon of Scripture was constituted, therefore not at that time, which Rufinus cites. Baronius refers this composition to the second year of Claudius or to the 44th from the birth of Christ. See his annals on the year 44. 5. We add if they had composed it at that time, certainly Luke would not have passed over the narration of so great a thing in Acts. 6. The cause which is imagined for the composition of the Creed, is not the cause. For the Apostles had one Holy Spirit, therefore it was not to be feared, lest they teach something diverse: nor was there need to them of a Creed as if a norm of consent in preaching the doctrine of faith. 7. Eucherius, homily 1, On the Creed says: "The Fathers solicitous for the salvation of the peoples composed the Creed." Erasmus conjectures that it was written in the First Nicene Council. Concerning which conjecture what is to be established is left for disquisition. 8. What prevents the words of Rufinus from being restricted to the primeval Creed, or to the Creed by reason of the foundation, which Christ laid, Matt. 28, whence and upon which the whole was built. Certainly Rufinus says nothing concerning the 12 bits or Morsels to be attributed one by one to as many Apostles.

6. It could also be objected that the fathers often call the Creed Evangelical, Apostolic, and Tradition. Resp. 1. among the more ancient the word Symbol is not used for the sum of the Christian faith, but for the very sign of water or baptism. 2. When they call it Evangelical and Apostolic and Tradition, they have respect to the Creed by reason of the first foundation or accepted in the former manner: I believe namely in the Father, in the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but truly not the explication afterwards added or the Creed accepted in the latter manner, and as it now is: as is evident from the places cited above, thesis 2; indeed even from the bare inspection of the places which the Papists cite for themselves, see Becanus in his Manual, bk. 1, ch. 2, citing from Basil. That Bellarmine, bk. 4, On the Word of God, ch. 4, Baronius on the year 44, advocate here Clement, Irenaeus, Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose, Leo, Chrysologus, Venantius, Alcuin, Rabanus Maurus, scarcely deserves a response. That you may spare paper see them briefly censured by Chamier in the place cited, and to the places of Clement, Augustine, Ambrose, Rivet in his Orthodox Catholic, vol. 1, q. 9. But if anyone desires the fullest and superabundant response, let him go to the Most Learned Parker, On the Descent into Hell, bk. 4, and let him join to him Gerardus Joannes Vossius, who after I had written these things, published a dissertation On the Creeds in the year 1642.

7. This principal Question concerning the Origin and Authority of the Creed having been shaken out it remains that we educate from this certain corollaries. The first is: That the Creed is not a divine Tradition or the unwritten word of God, nor is the necessity of traditions proved thence. See Chamier and Rivet in the places cited, and the latter in his Introduction to Scripture, ch. 26, nn. 9, 10, and from the Papists Thomas, ST, IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 9, to 1. The second, that it is not a

divine Canonical, and authentic or indemonstrable writing. The third, that it is said ambiguously and less accurately to be almost canonical or divine in which way some of the reformed Theologians speak less accurately. For no almost, or middle is given between Canonical and not-Canonical. The fourth, that it is not Apostolic, whether written by the Apostles or by Apostolic men: as Ursinus wants in his Catechesis, and in his Neustadt Admonition, p. 120. Calvin in the place to be cited soon, does not determine. Other reformed Theologians nevertheless embrace this opinion too easily without a more accurate examination, as Johann Jacob Grynaeus in his exposition of the creed, Alsted in his Synopsis of Theology, place 4, p. 15, where he wrongly shows for the place of proof the exposition of the creed of Cyprian (it should have been said of Rufinus). The fifth, and so that it is not Catholic, most ancient, now thence propagated by perpetual succession through the universal Church by unanimous consent from the Apostolic century, or even the next. As indeed most of our men seem to concede this to the Papists without necessity: also Calvin, Institutes, bk. 2, ch. 16, §18. Sixth, that it is badly usurped as a formula of prayer, since it is a profession of faith. Seventh, that nevertheless the formula of that profession was written by the best and salutary counsel, and is still repeated and proposed in Christian families and Churches.

The Problems may be, 1st Problem: Whether it is the fountain and origin of the other Creeds? Resp. Thus indeed it is sometimes said. But I see no reason; why scripture ought not to be said to be equally the fountain both of this and of the other creeds. Besides that it is not the universal creed: but the Roman. 2nd Problem: Whether faith is contained sufficiently in this Creed? Resp. also by the thetic and simple Profession of that faith: If faith is taken strictly for the Evangelical promises or the proper object of faith proximately or formally justifying, Thus indeed it is commonly said. Let the Scholastic Polanus be seen, bk. 2, Syntagma, ch. 2, and other writers of common places; and almost all the elenctics, who dispute concerning things necessary and fundamental. Compare our disputation on fundamental articles and errors. But there is need of much distinction here. I affirm with the limitation, which Bonaventure also has in the place cited. And Thomas on the writing 2, on Lombard, bk. 3, dist. 25, that namely all things necessarily antecedent or presupposed and necessarily consequent or consectaries of faith are contained and included, but truly not excluded, in the articles of the Creed. But if we require the explication of faith and its evident formula, and indeed apologetic and elenctic, aptly and accommodated to our times, and aptly to the adversaries and heresies ancient and new, I would dare to prefer the reformed Catechisms, especially the Belgic, the Harmony of Confessions, the Nicene Creed, and the Constantinopolitan, especially the creed called, of Athanasius; the Confession of Faith of Chalcedon, the Determinations of the Ephesine Synod, and the Edict of Justinian on the Faith, which exists in the Graeco-Roman Law from the edition of Leunclavius, vol. 1, p. 521. Certainly we see that the Socinians are less hostile to this Creed, than to the Athanasian, indeed also that Socinus in his Epistles praises it benignly enough: for no other cause, as I judge, than because it does not detect and condemn their heresy so expressly, as the Athanasian.

3rd Problem: Whether the fathers of the Nicene Council, or truly the Bishop or Clergy of the Roman church are the authors of this Creed? Resp. the latter is more probable: even by this reason alone, that it was not in use among the Orientals, and other churches; but it would have

been, if indeed it was held for the creed of the universal church, not less than the Nicene, and other Canons of the universal church. See these things prosecuted more fully by Gerardus Joannes Vossius, Dissertation 1, On the Creeds.

4th Problem: Whether the creed was sung in the Mass from the beginning of the church, as Gavantus wants in his Treasury of Sacred Rites, vol. 1, p. 36? Resp. No. The proof which he adduces from Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3, and the liturgy of Peter does not deserve a response. Let only the writings of those be seen by Cocke in his Censure of the Fathers, and Rivet in his Sacred Critic.

5th Problem: Whether it is rightly called by Dionysius in Lindanus to the Liturgy of Peter, the catholic hymnology, and the hierarchical eucharist? Resp. No. for it is not a formula of prayer or of thanksgiving. For it does not speak to God, but to men, who delivers the confession of faith.

6th Problem: Whether the creed which is recited in the Papist Mass is the Apostolic, or truly the Constantinopolitan? Resp. I affirm the latter. The Papists affirm, saying that that addition "and proceeds from the Son" was made in the Council of Toledo under Leo I, according to Baronius, year 447, or in the Roman Council, under Damasus, according to Jean Étienne Durant, bk. 2, On the Rites, ch. 24. With whom Gavantus sides in the place cited.

7th Problem: Whether the article concerning the descent into hell, as indeed it is had in the creed, is necessary and fundamental, and whether the disputation concerning the genuine explication of that article is concerning the faith, or at least concerning Theology; or rather concerning history or the sense of antiquity? Resp. I deny the former. I affirm the latter. That Christ suffered immediately in his soul is a truly Theological dogma (but of what weight and whether fundamental, I do not here determine): but whether the authors of the creed directly taught this by their article concerning the descent into hell, does not properly and directly pertain to the Theological dogmas, much less to the foundation of faith. Much less is it of faith, that opinion concerning the local descent of the soul of Christ to hell, as the Papists want; or concerning the descent properly accepted of the whole Christ after the resurrection, as the more recent Lutherans want in Eckhard in his tract On the Descent into Hell, ch. 2, in the beginning, and ch. 8, pp. 102, 106, 108.

8th Problem: Whether by the analogy of faith in Rom. 12:6 is understood the Creed, commonly called Apostolic, formally namely, as to its structure and composition? Resp. No.

9th Problem: Whether it was settled and perfected at one time simultaneously and at once: or truly at diverse times and successively? Resp. I affirm the latter. Let Gerardus Joannes Vossius be seen: for I do not want to describe a book most worthy to be read. There are also other problems partly historical, partly liturgical, concerning which the Papists inquire among themselves, where we take no part: such as for example, Whether and why the Creed is to be recited after the gospel: On what days it is to be recited: With what tenor of voice it was customarily pronounced both in the first, and in the Mass: Whether the Roman Creed is more ancient than the Nicene: Whether it was permitted to add anything to the Nicene Creed:

Whether the creed in the Roman church was at some time ceased to be recited, and why: Whether it is to be recited at each of the hours in the office, or truly five times: Why at the end of compline it is recited in a low voice: Why in the middle to the prayers it is recited partly in a low partly in a clear voice: How many are the creeds in the Roman office; three, or four, or more: Whether the Apostles alone composed the Creed commonly called Apostolic, or truly besides them the 120 men, of whom mention is made in Acts 1: How many are the articles, or heads of the creed: Whether the individual apostles contributed the individual articles, or truly commonly composed the creed: whether the apostles composed it with the Holy Spirit so dictating; or truly excerpted it from those things which they had written diffusely: At what time they composed it: Whether for their own cause, or truly for the cause of the church they composed it. Concerning these let Jean Étienne Durant be seen, bk. 2, On the Rites of the Catholic Church, ch. 24, Bartolomeo Gavanti, Treasury of the Sacred Rites, vol. 1, p. 36, and vol. 2, p. 64, Domenico Gravina, bk. 4, Catholic Prescriptions, To be conferred from our men are Parker in his treatise On the Descent into Hell, Lavater, On the Descent into Hell, Gerardus Joannes Vossius in his dissertation On the Creeds. Perhaps sometime about to treat in the 3rd part of Ecclesiastical Polity concerning confessions and creeds in general, and concerning the ancient creeds in particular.

ON THE FATHERS, OR THE ANCIENT DOCTORS OF THE CHURCH

PART ONE.
Resp. CORNELIUS P. F. vander LINGEN
On the 23rd of June, 1640.

About to treat of the fathers, I. we will delineate thetically, who and of what sort are the fathers of the church, and what is their use. II. We will determine the principal controversy, and the problems. III. We will subjoin an appendix concerning the Ecclesiastical historians.

I. God alone is called the Father of the Church or of the faithful as the author of all essence, life, spiritual goodness, Matt. 23:9 and 6:9, Rom. 8:15, Gal. 4:6, 1 Pet. 1:17, compared with Mal. 1:6, Deut. 32:6, Isa. 63:16. Where God is to be understood essentially not notionally; who is the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Eph. 3:15, the name of father is appropriately attributed to the first person; because he is the origin and fount of operations to the outside. The Catholics have respect to this acception of the father, when in the Carthaginian conference through the mouth of Augustine they deny, that Caecilian is their father, Collat. 3, chs. 222, 230, 232, 235. II. Man as the minister of divine grace, 1 Cor. 4:1 and 3:5, obviously who offers, proposes, applies it by word, sacraments, prayers. Hence he is called architect, planter, savior, father, etc.: because he begets the church or the faithful to God, 1 Cor. 4:15, Gal. 4:19, Philem. 10, and thus John in his epistles everywhere uses the word τέκνα. But this paternity is 1. either broadly said, in which way all whoever by living voice or writings lead men by the hand to salvation, are called fathers;

and among them κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν the genuine Pastors and Bishops. Hence also the title of Pope was formerly attributed to the Bishops: as can be seen in the epistles of Jerome to Augustine and in the book of the epistles of Augustine, epistles 25 and 30. And in the epistles of Sidonius Apollinaris, bks. 7 and 8 and 9 to diverse Bishops. Thus with the titles of father, in Augustine, epistles 35, 51, 191, etc., or most strictly and thus belongs to the θεόπνευστοι writers and Doctors alone, namely the prophets and Apostles: for the church is regenerated through their word as the unique infallible principle of faith: hence it is said to be built upon the foundation of the Apostles, etc., Eph. 2:20. 3. or strictly, and in a certain peculiar way: and thus the ancient Ecclesiastical Doctors who shone before the church by their writings, are called fathers: for antiquity, succession, Catholicity of doctrine and of the church is thought to be exhibited to them historically (I understand human history). To these are sometimes reckoned the writers of Ecclesiastical History, of whom some are usually called fathers univocally and primarily, some at least analogically and secondarily: concerning whom below. It is to be noted here especially, that that antiquity admits latitude in the common disputations of the Papists; as the necessity of the cause, or the defect of the more ancient will have demanded this. Sometimes they allege all Ecclesiastical writers as fathers (not even excepting the Greek schismatics) who intent on writing homilies, commentaries on scripture, ascetics, are distinguished from the scholastic disputators by the form, method, and style of writing. See Bellarmine's Controversies, and Coccius's Catholic Thesaurus: And Benoit Vernier in his tract whose title is The Great and Universal Council on the Truth of the Most Divine Eucharist, etc., which like the Nicene Council consists of 318 orthodox fathers. Among whom appear also besides most of the Scholastics, Ludolph the Carthusian, Angelo Carletti, Rodrigo Sanchez de Arevalo, Bessarion; briefly all the Pontifical writers up to the year 1500. Hence also the title Library of the Fathers, which Marguerin de la Bigne published. At other times appeal is made only to those, who lived after the times of the Apostles, up to the year 600 inclusively. From them Harding disputes against Jewel; Campion cites no others, Reason 5; and thus everywhere the rest of the Polemics of the Papists in controversies (where they think a cloud of witnesses is at hand from antiquity) adduce them alone: See [Joannes] Bunderius, [Johann] Eck, [John] Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, [Thomas] Stapleton, [Francis] Costerus, etc. Recently Cardinal [Jacques Davy] du Perron in his Epistle to James King of Great Britain, wanted especially those to be fathers and judges, or indicators of ancient Catholicity, who lived at the time of the four Councils, namely from Constantine up to Marcian. From whom he also disputes in his prolix volume published after his death; whose examination [Pierre] Du Moulin instituted in his book On the Novelty of Popery. We so that we may distinguish something in that confusion and preserve order, think that the title of father is used in a threefold way, properly, analogically, equivocally. Attributed properly, and indeed primarily to the Orthodox and approved writers, who lived up to about the death of Augustine; secondarily, who lived after Augustine, up to the death of Gregory the Great. Of the first class we distinguish again into the most ancient, who flourished before the Nicene Council; and into the ancient who flourished thereafter. Analogically to the writers of the middle, which they call, age, after Gregory up to the culmination of Antichristianism in the West, that is, up to the tenth century. Where those who preceded the year 800 are to be had of the first class; but those who followed of the second class. It is attributed plainly equivocally to the novice writers, who flourished either a little before them, or even after their rise. Thus you may sometimes hear cited with the honorific title of fathers, Anselm (namely of Canterbury), who flourished in the year

1081, Bernard, who in 1130, Euthymius (Zigabenus), who in 1118, Theophylact, who in 1071, Micrologus, who in 1077, Oecumenius, and Olympiodorus, whom some place between the year 800 and 900, others after the year 1000. For although they studied to imitate and express more closely the form and method of patristic Theology; also they did not recede so far from the fathers in purity of doctrine, as others: yet they are not to be called fathers (especially if it is expounded in our idiom Out-Dabers [Dutch for "old fathers"]): either because they lived under the Papacy; or because they are too remote from the Apostolic age; or because their age is uncertain: not to say that the more recent Greek writers are numbered by the Papists themselves among the schismatics. See Bellarmine, On Ecclesiastical Writers, and Possevin in his Apparatus, on Euthymius and Theophylact. What we are about to say concerning the fathers, we want to be understood especially of the writers up to Augustine; and in some way of those following up to Gregory the Great. But to the writers of the middle age, who lived after the birth of Antichrist in the year 607, and after the division of the Western Empire from the Eastern, only analogically and in passing is it to be applied somewhere.

2. The fathers are commonly divided into Greek and Latin, denominated namely either from the idiom in which they wrote, or from the place of their ministry, or from both. We need not here mention the Syrians, Egyptians, and others: because none of their writings exist, or if any exist they are had only in Greek; or if in another idiom, that they were translated into Greek. They are therefore to be numbered with the Greeks. For what Possevin in his Apparatus boasts that he learned from his Serrarius that there exist at Venice some Arabic and Syriac books, among which was Ephraem; we relegate that to the peculiar itch of certain more recent men, by which they affect to say and hear "some new thing" (Acts 17), so that thus they may stir up a new admiration concerning themselves. The most ancient Greek fathers are Ignatius (although there is dispute concerning his epistles: concerning which see the editors of Ignatius, Nicolaus Vedelius, and James Ussher, who appeared at Oxford in this year 1645), Polycarp, Justin, Melito (of whom certain fragments in Eusebius), Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tatian, Irenaeus (concerning whom it is doubted, whether he is to be numbered among the Greeks, or the Latins), Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Ammonius of Alexandria, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Methodius, Eusebius of Caesarea, Macarius of Egypt. From the time of Constantine and the Nicene Council flourished, Athanasius, Serapion, Didymus of Alexandria, Cyril of Jerusalem (concerning whose writings what is to be established learn from Rivet's Sacred Critic), Ephraem, Basil, Andrew of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Gregory of Nyssa, Theophilus of Alexandria, Diadochus, Chrysostom, Severian, Synesius, Lucian, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, Proclus Bishop of Constantinople, Isidore of Pelusium, Nilus, Simeon Stylites, Theodore the Presbyter, Aeneas of Gaza, Gelasius of Cyzicus, Leontius of Byzantium, Anastasius Sinaita, Procopius of Gaza, Hesychius, Sophronius. The Latins up to Constantine and the Nicene Council, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Julius Africanus, Cornelius Papa, Sixtus II, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius. Now thence from the time of Constantine, Juvencus, Julius Firmicus Maternus, Lucifer of Cagliari, Victorinus Afer, Hilary, Gregory of Elvira, Phoebadius, Pacian of Barcelona, Optatus of Milevis, Zeno of Verona, Faustinus the Deacon, Ambrose, Idacius Clarus, Jerome, Rufinus, Gaudentius of Brescia, Prudentius, Chromatius, Augustine, Paulinus, Sedulius, Claudianus Mamertus, Cassian, Vincent of Lérins, Peter Chrysologus, Pope Leo, Hilary of Arles, Prosper [of Aquitaine], Arnobius the Younger, Salvian of Marseille,

Salonius, Faustus of Riez (but a Pelagian, by no means to be numbered among the fathers; see Bellarmine, On Ecclesiastical Writers, and Possevin), Gennadius of Marseilles (but who favored Faustus), Julian Pomerius, Pope Gelasius, Gildas the Wise, Paschasius the Deacon, Fulgentius, Primasius, Ennodius, Ferrandus the Deacon, Eugippius the Abbot, John Maxentius, Avitus, Boethius, Dionysius Exiguus, Victor Bishop of Africa, Justus of Urgell, Arator, Junilius Africanus, Martin of Braga, Gregory the Great. Sometimes under the name of the ancient fathers and holy writers are cited, writers, or books plainly supposititious: such as, who flourished before Constantine, partly Greek partly Latin; the Canons of the Apostles, the Liturgical books containing the mass of Peter, Mark, etc., the Works of Clement, the Epistles of Anacletus, the Works of Dionysius the Areopagite, the Epistles of Martial of Limoges, the Testament of the 12 Patriarchs, Hippolytus On the Consummation of the World, the Works of Zeno of Verona, Victorinus's commentary on the Apocalypse. From the time of Constantine, Titus of Bostra; the homilies of Eusebius of Emesa; the epistles of Cyril of Jerusalem, and his catecheses, the commentary of Philo of Carpasia on the Song [of Songs]; the Works of Mark the Hermit; the Sermons of Maximus of Turin; the commentary of Philip the Presbyter on Job; the Works of Eucherius of Lyon; the three books ascribed to Sixtus III; the five books of Vigilius against Eutyches; the homilies of Caesarius of Arles; the book of Responses of Anastasius of Nicaea; the spiritual meadow of Sophronius. Besides other spurious and supposititious things, which are wont to be foisted on the approved authors above recounted, Cyprian, Augustine, Epiphanius, Basil, etc.; moreover the supposititious or doubtful historians (whom we will recount below); and the collectors of the Councils, and of those things which pertain to that, concerning which it is to be treated in the common place, On the Councils. But concerning the life, writings, editions of the works of the fathers cited, those studious of antiquities are to be consulted besides the ancients, Jerome, Gennadius, etc., Trithemius, Gesner in his Library, Sixtus Senensis, the annals of Baronius with the Antagonists (that I may now pass over other Pontifical historians), Bellarmine, On Ecclesiastical Writers, Possevin in his Sacred Apparatus, Coccius in his Catholic Thesaurus, [Juan María de Guevara] Johannes Maria Master of the Sacred Palace in the Roman Index of Books to be Expurgated, the later edition of the Spanish Expurgatory Index, the epitome of Angelo Rocca of the theological and scriptural library. From our men, the Magdeburg Centuriators, [Johann] Backhusius in his historical appendix to his Catechism fortified by the testimonies of the fathers, Perkins's catholic problem, [Abraham] Scultetus's marrow of the fathers, [Thomas] Cocke's censure of the fathers, Rivet's Sacred Critic, Thomas James's tract On the Corruption of the Writings of the Councils of the Fathers, etc., to whom add Hyperius, On the Theological Study; from the Elenctic writers especially [John] Rainolds, Chamier, etc., especially also the editors of the individual fathers both Pontifical and our men. Let those who study compendiously, or seek some first taste of this Criticism (especially students in the Academic course), only run through Perkins's problem, with Rivet or Cocke. But let them seek an historical epitome from Backhusius just cited.

3. Thus we have described who and of what sort are the fathers; namely, the approved Doctors of the ancient Church, who illustrated the faith by their writings; of whom we have woven a catalogue. Concerning which it is to be noted. 1. some intercur whose writings both of old and today were of doubtful authority; either because they wrote some things without judgment and less consonant to the sacred writings (and that from a given ignorance); or because they

acceded to the parties of the erroneous and schismatics, such as for example, Tertullian, Origen, etc. Of the former kind very many are, if not most, See everywhere Sixtus Senensis, Bellarmine, Possevin; and the editions of most of the fathers in the Papacy. II. Some appear there, who never functioned in the office of Doctors; although they taught by their writings, as, Alcimus Avitus, Boethius. III. They can be otherwise divided by reason of the grades, of estimation and of authority, which they obtained in the ancient Church, or in the intermediate age, or in Papal novelty both before and after the times of the reformation. Which divisions are to be collected from the lives and praises which are prefixed to the works of each one: or, if anyone study compendiously, from Possevin. Among all Ephraem the Syrian seems to have excelled (how rightly, I do not now say), whose writings in some churches are testified by Jerome, On Ecclesiastical Writers, to have been read publicly. IV. They can also be distributed into certain classes according to the matter, and method of treating. So that their writings are 1. philosophical, e.g., some of Augustine, also of Justin, Gregory of Nyssa, etc., 2. Historical, concerning which below. 3 Commentaries on scripture, of which Angelo Rocca composed an index: and after him Bellarmine. The catalogue of commentators which exist in the library of Oxford can also be seen. 4. Elenctic; which again are distributed according to the heresies of Marcion, Mani, Arius, Pelagius, etc., and according to the apostasies, as against the Gentiles, or Jews. 5. Didactic; such as Augustine's Enchiridion, Rufinus's exposition of the creed, etc. 6. Moral, Oratorical, paraenetic. 7. Ecclesiastical political; such as for example of Dionysius Exiguus, Martin of Braga, with other codices or collections of canons. 8. Ascetic; such as the Confessions of Augustine, Ambrose On the Good of Death, Chrysostom On Prayer, etc. 9. Poetic; which nevertheless can be referred partly to historical, partly to ascetic, partly to elenctic, partly to paraphrastic writings of scripture; as are for example those of Tertullian, Juvencus, Paulinus, Sedulius, Nazianzen, Prosper, etc. Compare our Library.

4. Concerning the efficient, and final causes of the fathers, there is nothing that we here delineate anything: for they are almost given, and are at last resolved and reduced into the use, custom, possession, and private and free judgment (sometimes affection) of any of the later doctors imitating the former uncertainly. So that it cannot be designated more concerning most of them when, through whom, by what authority, by what simple or jurisdictional opinion, by what consent they were constituted, or canonized, or recognized or promulgated as the public and common Doctors of the Church, than concerning the classic authors, or concerning the fame of this or that man, which grows as a tree by a hidden age, sometimes undeservedly creeps in and deludes men suspecting no evil. Which things are not said by me, that I may detract anything from the orthodox and excellent Doctors, but that I may show that nothing divine has here intervened, and so that we may expect nothing of the sort from the fathers. It will therefore suffice to indicate here the requisites of the fathers, and thus to collect the foundations or efficient causes of this paternity a posteriori. I. is, that someone be of proved and exemplary piety. II. that he commended himself before others by zeal, in propagating the faith, converting men, defending the truth: especially if he ascended to the honor of confessor or martyr. III. That he fulfilled the parts of a sedulous and faithful Doctor: which is true of most. If any functioned in no office they are called fathers less properly, and as if analogically. IV. That he did not recede from the unity of the church, at least not finally. Therefore it is to be disquired, by what reason Tertullian now made a Montanist ought to be numbered among the fathers. V. That he

pertinaciously defended nothing against the catholic and fundamental dogmas of the church. VI. That he taught not only by living voice, but also solidly and aptly by writings; and that his writings exist today: Otherwise they cannot by right be called the public Doctors of the Churches, and our common preceptors. VII. That commonly all the Orthodox churches and Doctors held them for such by a positive, or at least passive opinion. Into whomever the individual of these conditions less or more came together, he is a father less or more. Especially those will be less worthy of this name, if any taught or rather erred so vulgarly, that they seem to be not so much common preceptors, as disciples: that some of those just named are such is not to be denied, For it was true also of old that common saying: "We the unlearned, and the learned everywhere write poems."

5. The adjuncts of the fathers (besides those just said) we note both absolute, positive, privative, negative, and comparative. The positive are I. Eloquence, and δεινότης in most, especially of expressing and amplifying their concepts exoterically and oratorically, let Tertullian, Cyprian, Chrysostom, Basil, Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysologus, etc., be an example. II. That those who wrote against Gentile superstition, were excellently instructed from all secular literature, some professed them, for example, Athenagoras, Justin (called philosophers), Tertullian (whom Jerome says to have embraced all the erudition of the age), Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, Theodoret, Augustine, Cyril of Alexandria, Jerome, etc. III. Dexterity and subtlety in dissolving the deceptions of heretics; where Augustine, Athanasius, etc., excel. IV. Perspicacity and acumen in the explication of difficulties and contradictions, which occur in the scriptures: See before the rest Chrysostom, Theodoret, Augustine, Jerome. Hermann Bodius in his union of differing things collected those conciliations from the fathers. V. Invention in the invention and elocution of moral and practical things. Here Cyprian, Chrysostom, and other eminent preachers just cited triumph. VI. Prudence (that is, prudent zeal and piety) of them in Theological counsels, and Ecclesiastical cases: which many of their sayings and writings breathe, and the Histories speak of their deeds. VII. The sixteen consequent effects of this prudence; which things enumerated by the Most Famous Vedelius, ch. 2, bk. 1, On the Prudence of the Ancient Church, apply analogically to the counsels, determinations, exceptions and responses of the fathers. And these adjuncts contain the virtues and praises of the fathers.

6. The privative are those which exhibit their blemishes and censures. I. Great, if not well-nigh universal ignorance of the original languages of scripture, and consequently of sacred phraseology. Scarcely any appears among them, who tasted Hebrew, except Origen and Jerome: which negligence and vertigo they would scarcely have tolerated in any profane reader or Doctor of the Laws; namely, that they had heard their fundamental authors only through an interpreter. II. Ignorance of solid and properly incocted philosophy in not a few: which as to physics the more recent everywhere note in their commentaries on the beginning of Genesis, and in their Physical Disputations. In Metaphysics, and natural Theology or Pneumatics very few performed anything excellent. That Augustine shone before all others in abstraction, subtlety, perspicacity and judgment concerning the most universal and most general concepts his writings especially teach against the Manichaeans and Pelagians, with the Enchiridion. III. Ignorance and hallucination in historical and chronological things. Which Casaubon touches,

Exercitation 1 to Baronius, section 26, and we in the Disputation On the Time of the Nativity of Christ. IV. Defect of acroamatic and Logical judgment and artifice in the analysis of scripture as also in thematic, syllogistic, methodical genesis: whether because studies and exercise in that kind were lacking to them, or because they disdained that, obviously most intent on Rhetorical and florid dissertations from the custom of their age: Although nevertheless by the acroamatic and concise kind of dissertating they would have often better consulted Theological matters (in which it is dangerous even to speak true things). V. Hence often frigid, if not ridiculous, curious, fallacious, erroneous, dangerous, doubtful, interpretations of the scriptures: thus they especially stumble on the most necessary and most perspicuous while they adhere as if to rocks to their allegories and vain conjecturings especially about unknown things and things to be learnedly unknown. The more recent who collect the various interpretations of others in their commentaries on scripture do not dissimulate their ramblings and digressions in absurd conjectures, and interpretations; such as Maldonatus, Salmeron, [Juan de] Lorinus (or Lorin), [Francisco de] Ribera, [Juan de] Pineda, [Nikolaus] Serarius, etc., and most recently of all Cornelius a Lapide; of our men instead of all [Andrew] Willet in his Hexapla. VI. Neglect of Thetic Theology; in the concepts of which they seem to have labored little in forming and delineating from scripture: at least scarcely any attempt in that kind survives today. Hence it happened, that in their homiletic writings they often seem to dissertate concerning those things, which we are ignorant what they were to them; so that they seem to dispute concerning Non-being: since nowhere did they explain its name and definition expressly. VII. Carelessness in the choice of arguments, by which they prove the truth of dogmas against adversaries. They seize upon anything; so that they seem to want to fight by number rather than by weight. So that the more recent have to labor not a little in applying choice, and in cleansing that Augean stable. Let the disputation of Franciscus Gomarus On Antichrist be compared, where some blemishes of patristic theology are noted.

7. The Negative attributes are I. that they do not make a law, norm, or rule, neither primary nor secondary in the interpretation of scripture and in matters of faith: concerning which it is to be disputed expressly below. II. That they make no norm or rule of prudence (nor even always an example) in constituting, and governing ecclesiastical things. The same is to be understood concerning all rites, and adiaphora. Here the disputations and problems pertaining to ecclesiastical polity, and to the second precept of the decalogue are to be conferred. III. That consequently they took away neither the genius, nor the study, nor the freedom of their successors. The related and comparative attributes are I. That the Scholastics and those who follow them are to be preferred to the fathers in disputations concerning God, concerning the Angels, concerning man, etc., which are illustrated from natural Theology; as also in accurate distinctions and limitations in response to the sophisms of adversaries. II. That the Reformed Theologians, and those who assisted and excited by their study and labors are from the Papists (as Vatablus, Arias Montanus, Masius, etc.) are to be preferred to the same by far in the philological or verbal, and consequently in the real and genuine interpretation of scripture. For since they did not see the phrase of scripture with their own eyes, how could they have judged felicitously concerning its interpretation from the analogy of those languages? Origen, who among all the blind reigned here one-eyed, nevertheless most badly interpreted scripture; so that his obscurations and distortions are often stupendous if not detestable. What is to be

established concerning his writings, we indicate in the disputation On Christ the Author of Faith. III. The more recent are not inferior to the same in positive, didactic, or systematic Theology. Indeed, how many surpass them by far? IV. Although certain ones were not common in practical and ascetic things; nevertheless I see none of them, who from the fountains of scripture with the apparatus of all-begetting erudition and spiritual experience proposed so liquid, profound, and medullar practice and for the sermon of the faithful applied it to consciences, such as very many Reformed Doctors, especially who after Perkins excited by his labors in that kind, wrote: whose names we indicate somewhere. But if this seems too odious; I would only want it to be shown what ascetic writing of theirs can make equal with the little book of Thomas à Kempis On the Imitation of Christ?

8. It remains to treat of the use and study of patristic Theology. The use is either secondary, or primary. The primary is I. in commentations on certain contradictions and difficulties of scripture, where in not a few they broke the ice; as can be seen compendiously in either interlinear gloss namely of Anselm of Laon, and the ordinary of Walafrid Strabo, as also in the postil of Nicholas of Lyra: not to mention the Catena of Thomas on the Evangelists and the more recent Cornelius a Lapide, Willet, etc., where the interpretations of the ancients are either exhibited or at least indicated. But another compendium of indication and judgment here is supplied by the Union of Differing Places of Scripture of Hermann Bodius, where the conciliations of contradictions are from the fathers. II. In morals and cases of conscience: in which, as was their piety and zeal, they for the most part follow τὸ ἀκριβές: from which would that the Papists and certain other more recent men did not so easily recede, in the cases concerning Usury, dances, comedies, vanity in the ornament of garments and hair, indirect idolatry, etc. III. In pathetic amplifications, and the style of sermons. For that anyone imitate them in the invention and choice of matter, and the disposition and method of the same, as to the explication of the text, the dogmatization deduced thence and the application; our age does not demand, nor would I be the author to anyone. Today the artificers of preaching consult the intellect, memory, and affects of the hearers far otherwise; and produce in them more abundant fruits of scriptural and spiritual knowledge and judgment through the grace of God. IV. In Elenctic things, or responses to the objections of adversaries; especially of the Arians, Nestorians, Monothelites, Novatians, Pelagians. And these are their spontaneous uses, and per se. There remains another today, but per accidens, and on account of the importunity of the Papists most frequent and necessary; which is V. In Disputations concerning the antiquity and Catholicity of Doctrine. But that we may here dexterously use the fathers among the Papists, if any are literate or want to be had (for in vain the saw of the fathers is reciprocated among the unlearned, who although they are accustomed to provoke to them stupidly and ineptly, nevertheless can inspect or confer none of them), note these two things to be performed by you. 1. If their dogmas, and interpretations of scripture are to be detruded from the bridge of Catholicity; or if ours are to be freed from the crime of heresy and novelty, nothing is more expeditious, than to proffer the opinion, or interpretation of some one or more of the fathers: thus the veil of prejudice will be immediately taken away from them; unless they want to prevaricate against conscience, or recoil from their own hypotheses. Thus did Bucer in the Colloquy of Ratisbon, Calvin in the preface to the Institutes, Erasmus everywhere in his Apologies against adversaries. The testimonies of the fathers for our dogmas (which are attacked today by the Papists) are indicated to the juniors by

Backhusius's Catechism, or Polanus's Catholic Symphony; Jewel, Plessis, Whitaker, Junius, Chamier, Abbot, etc., explicate and defend them. Cornelius a Lapide indicates the interpretations of the scriptures. 2. But if they attack us, or propagate their own, and so it must be responded to their objections from the fathers (although we neither stand by them, nor are held by them: and so they can by no right force us to a response): I advise the juniors, that they attend to these general things in order and apply them prudently and accurately to the individual objected testimonies. First, let him diligently weigh, Whether he who is produced is a father or approved author and indeed to the Papists themselves. For thus for example, Origen, and the masked Eusebius of Emesa, and similar to whom the name of saint was formerly attributed. Secondly, What is the text of the father, which is alleged, the original Greek, or from a translation: If the latter; let it not be received in controversies, unless with the Greek text having been consulted. How great the defect of the translators here is those know, and the Papists themselves have complained, cited by us in the Desperate Cause, bk. 3, sect. 1, ch. 7. Thirdly, what is the edition of the original Greek or Latin text. That there are some suspect, castrated, or falsified editions in controversies; we show in the Desperate Cause, ibid., and chs. 11, 12. Fourthly, Whether a treatise or book published under the name of some father (e.g., Cyprian, Augustine, Chrysostom, etc.) is not spurious or supposititious. Here the reading of Cocke, or Rivet, or Perkins will succor. But if anyone does not hold it in memory, or those books are not at hand, let him inspect the very edition of the father, which for the most part indicates in the frontispiece or in the prolegomena, which things in those works are spurious or doubtful. Fifthly, Whether the phrase is rightly expounded from the usage of that age, and of the cited author, and of others contemporary with him: here it will profit to inspect and consult either the scholia or marginal notes added by the editors, the little dictionaries or glossaries added at the end or published separately. Sixthly, Whether the real interpretation of the cited opinions is made consonant to its entire context, and the rest of the writings of the same author. Here refer the distinctions, absolutely and in a certain respect, also in this or that respect: which are to be sought from the Theological, Juridical and Philosophical Conciliators. Compare what Photius here advises in his Bibliotheca, cod. 225, p. 762. Seventhly, Whether he only refers the opinion of others, or truly establishes his own: Also whether a fact, or truly a right: whether a popular abuse and error, the remains of Paganism, a bad habit of that age; or truly an ecclesiastical practice and constitution; whether prejudiced and then frequently used opinions by most Doctors, or truly his own opinion, which he thinks is to be received. Briefly whether it is a dogma; or a condescension. Eighthly, whether doubtfully, probably, hesitantly, and once and again as if treating of something else or from affection and zeal for parties in eristics, or paraenetics, and so in the heat of disputation or Rhetorication they said this; or truly assertively determining, and seriously and perpetually inculcating this. Ninthly, Whether they so dogmatized their opinion; that at the same time they condemned the contrary and proscribed it from the church; or truly the contrary: whether as a necessary dogma, or article of faith, or Ecclesiastical and Catholic consent they dictated it; or truly only as an opinion truer in their opinion. Tenthly, Whether the cited words contain the form and therefore the system of the Papal error and novelty; or also the form or substance of our opinion, which that father is pretended in the alleged place either to prove or disprove; or truly something related or cognate. Which is especially to be observed. Eleventhly, Whether (if indeed nothing can be excepted and responded from the preceding) the cited author makes the consent of the fathers or of antiquity: and whether here he proffers his

own and particular opinion; or truly a Catholic dogma not so much from his own, as from the universal sense and consent of the Church and of the Doctors. But if the author himself asserts this, whether faith is always to be given to him in this, and in all other dictates, and whether the Papists always give so great faith to him dictating these, and other things. But if with us the Papists do not give faith to Cyprian asserting his Anabaptism, and to Augustine infant eucharist, as a Catholic, ancient, Apostolic dogma: why should we stand either by them or by any fathers, if indeed they pretended Catholicity against the truth of scripture and the consent of the Doctors. Briefly if against the pretended Catholicity of the alleged father, I can oppose not I say others but even one father and approved Doctor, who thinks the contrary; now the Catholicity immediately falls. That the Papists daily adduce these and similar exceptions to the interpretation of the fathers, is clear from the Elenctics and commentators, and we indicate strictly in the Desperate Cause, bk. 3, sect. 1, ch. 2, p. 419, and ch. 7, § 469. The secondary use of the fathers is I. in perpetual notes and commentaries on the text of scripture. II. In the idea and system of positive Theology. III. In the choice of arguments, and digesting the classes of them, by which the truth of theses is demonstrated, or antitheses are opposed. To those three how very little it is, which most of the fathers confer, I think is evident from the things just said.

9. The study of patristic Theology is now to be spoken of. That anyone in the Academic course, or in the novitiate of the ministry, indeed even in the first quadrennium, or quinquennium, give himself expressly and wholly or by half from the reading of any of the fathers, I would advise no one. Whom I want in the Academic course given the occasion to be turned over and as much as can then be performed in patristic Theology, we indicate elsewhere, namely bk. 1, On the Exercises and Library, etc. In the first years of the ministry it will suffice. I. to read and reread the principal places which in the Pontifical controversies are wont to be objected to us today before the learned and unlearned, with a collation made both of the antecedents and consequents of that treatise, book, homily, epistle, whence the words are alleged; and, of other sayings and opinions of the same and of other fathers, whence the controverted allegation may borrow some light. Here let Perkins's problem lead by the hand: and Du Moulin in his Novelty of Popery, Chamier in his Panstratia, etc., and similar Elenctics. What I have said concerning the fathers, I also want to be understood concerning the Councils. II. To the theses of thetic Theology both dogmatic and moral (namely which today either the Papists, and other sectaries, or the popular error of carnal men and the inundating abuse make controverted) to select for ornamenting by the consent of the fathers, one and another testimony from the indication of Perkins, or Polanus, or Backhusius, which especially urges, and to read that in the author himself, and to weigh with the same collation having been applied, which above. III. To the interpretations of the fathers which are pretended, of the places of scripture objected for the Papistical, Ubiquitarian, Neo-Pelagian, etc., dogmas (in which namely the adversaries place the protection of the cause), to examine the fathers themselves, and if indeed they have such an interpretation, to compare them with other sayings and interpretations of them and of other fathers either to the same, or to parallel or concordant places of scripture. And here a more recent Pontifical commentator, or Cornelius a Lapide alone will perform the function of indication and leading by the hand: although he applies less candor, than others. IV. The patristic interpretations, if any go into the same sense, of the places of scripture, which we oppose to the adversaries for our theses, it will not be so necessary to read and weigh in the fathers themselves; You have them in Thomas,

Cajetan, Jansenius, Pereira, Toledo, Lorinus, Sanctius, Ribera, Pineda, Salmeron, Cornelius a Lapide, or some similar one from the more recent, who are wont to indicate the various interpretations. V. The conciliations of difficult places and contradictions of scripture, or also the interpretations of any others, to read and examine at this time in the fathers themselves, is likewise less necessary. Let the index of conciliations composed by Bodius above cited now suffice: unless there is controversy concerning certain ones. I say the same concerning the opinions of the fathers in the exposition of any places: where it will suffice to have an indication from the Catena of Thomas, or from a Lapide, or from Willet. Therefore let the study, reading and impression of the fathers be threefold. First, in the Academic course; to these (if indeed this course is more contracted) in the first biennium of the ministry. Second, which as if eclogarian (which we have just described) from the beginning, or from the third year of the ministry, up to the sixth, or seventh. Third, thereafter. Which is partly occasional, when namely either the provocation and opposition of adversaries, or any other reason of private studies or of sermons to be had invites to read through these or those either fathers, or treatises of the fathers: partly, undertaken by a fixed and certain order, which will run through the select works and treatises of select fathers in spare hours from beginning to end, namely alternately the Elenctic, such as especially those of Athenagoras, Justin, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Eusebius, Lactantius, Arnobius, Theodoret against the Gentiles, Justin, Tertullian, Chrysostom against the Jews, Athanasius, and Hilary against the Arians, Augustine against the Manichaeans and Pelagians, etc., the Moral and oratorical, such as those of Cyprian, Chrysostom, Basil, etc., the Historical, such as some of Epiphanius, Jerome, Augustine. All and the individual of the individuals, as anyone may turn over night and day is not more to be exacted from the Theologian, than that he read all the Scholastics, or recent writers, in the reading of whom nevertheless and in Theology he is not therefore to be called a stranger. In which way in the Latin or Greek language he is not to be called a stranger, who has not rendered all and the individual authors familiar to himself.

ON THE FATHERS, OR THE ANCIENT DOCTORS OF THE CHURCH PART TWO

Resp. CORNELIUS P. F. vander LINGEN
On the 20th of June, 1640.

1. The precognita concerning the Fathers having been premised, we must come to the capital controversy, namely concerning the authority and use of the fathers in matters of faith. That the state of the controversy may be rightly constituted, and be determined through some conclusions, first the calumnies are to be removed, by which the state of the controversy on our part; and the incrustations and prevarications, by which the same on the part of the adversaries is involved and obscured. I. The calumnies are partly of the Papists: partly of some from the innovators in the Belgic Churches, whose rashness was checked in the year 1619, through ecclesiastical and Political power; partly from today's innovators, who somewhere not obscurely

seem to set in motion a new Remonstrantism and Popery under the specious pretext of the fathers. 1. The Papist hyperaspists everywhere clamor, that we plainly reject the fathers, and manifestly oppose the doctrine handed down by them: thus Cano, Theological Places, bk. 7, ch. 2, where he says, that the Lutherans strive to cast down the authority of the saints from its rank. Lessius in his Consultation, cons. 8, Campion, Reason 5, Possevin, Library, bk. 5, ch. 29 and 26, where he imputes to our men, that not without cause they never expressly expounded the fathers in the schools, nor ever willingly or incorruptly published them, etc. Becanus in the prelude to his Manual, num. 2, that they acknowledge that they recede from the common sense of the church and of the fathers. 2. From the Remonstrant innovators Grotius in his Piety of the Illustrious Orders of Holland, p. 15, "You would have said that he was so reverent of antiquity, that he not only is stupefied at the names of Calvin and Beza, etc., but also ferociously contemns the Greek and Latin fathers, etc." Thus in the manner of advocates, who plead a bad cause, he lashes the innocent Belgic church (of which he himself then was a member and son) with wordy and calumnious taunts; when he was not able to press it with laws, testimonies, and arguments. Which Reformed church, which approved Doctor or writer has ferociously contemned all the fathers? produce the author, book, chapter, page? But with what counsel and how felicitously he pretended the fathers for Vorstius and his Remonstrant-Socinians; Bogerman, Lubbertus, Sopingius taught with his Antagonists; and he himself afterwards began to betray by his own judgment in his books On the Law of Peace and War, and On the Truth of the Christian Religion, at last in his notes to Cassander and their apologies against Rivet, and in his notes on the Old and New Testaments which appeared after the first edition of this our disputation. But we oppose to him the round confession of his fellow Remonstrants, Apology, ch. 2, "It is vain, because a purer and more impure antiquity are nothing but empty voices. Each one estimates purity and impurity according to his judgment and as it comes to use." And in the dedication, fol. 3, "Wherefore not according to dignity, etc., that they convicted the declaration of the Remonstrants not so much of error, as of similitude with those whom antiquity once, and now common opinion believes to have erred. This belongs to those who since they distrust their cause, etc." How reverent they are of antiquity the Apology everywhere teaches, and the Response to the Professors of Leiden, and the Vindications, and the vernacular booklet The Right Remonstrant Theologian: as often as in them they dispute against the rejection and condemnation of Arianism, and Socinianism, which the orthodox demand from them. 3. Certain of today's innovators, who elsewhere under the pretext of pious antiquity, the ancient Church, the fathers, apostolic or ancient traditions, as much as is in them study to deform with Remonstrant and Papistical filth the reformation planted there with so much sweat of the pious predecessors and watered with the blood of martyrs: and not only this, but also everywhere to contemn all other reformed churches, to traduce most of novelty, some of heresy. Where indeed Richard Montagu publicly bore the standard in his vernacular little books entitled An Appeal, etc., especially also in his Exercitations on Baronius: the title Apparatus and Origins of the Church, concerning which elsewhere. Very many others either followed him, or walked with equal pace with him, certain ones also surpassed him, a catalogue of whose writings the most learned anonymous author (whom after the first edition of this disputation I apprehended to be a Scottish minister) composed, and excerpted the Papistical tidbits for the reader in his vernacular Book, whose title is Ladensium and Answers, But see only the preface of Montagu to his Apparatus, and what I noted from that book in the Disputation On the Time of the Nativity of

Christ. And especially note that they impute to the Reformed, nominally to the Genevans the distortion and corruption of the fathers, See Montagu's appar. 1, p. 19, where he rages against the Genevan typographers, as if nothing can be expected from them, besides frauds, pretenses, and tricks. And nominally against Nicolaus Vedelius the editor of Ignatius: who responded for himself in the preface to his tract On the God of the Synagogue.

II. We oppose to the calumnies and taunts of the Papists, and if any today follow them, both the doctrine and the practice of our men from the first reformation up to this day. How greatly Bucer, Melanchthon, Oecolampadius, Victorinus Strigel, Musculus, Bullinger, Lavater, Martyr, Calvin, Beza, Jewel, Matthias Flacius Illyricus, Chemnitz, Benedict Aretius, Whitaker, Zanchius, Tossanus, Francis Junius, Hospinian, Chandieu, Du Plessis-Mornay, Scultetus, Perkins, Backhusius, George and Robert Abbot, Pelargus, Polanus, Ussher, George Downame, Aubertin, Jacob Laurent, David Blondel, Lancelot Andrewes bishop of Winchester, Gerardus Joannes Vossius, Andreas Rivet, Pierre Du Moulin, Daniel Chamier, John Forbes, Thomas Morton, John Davenant: made of the fathers, their didactic and polemic writings teach, and their commentaries on scripture. Nor are those Anglican Theologians to be passed over, who in their own language fought the Papists from the fathers, such as Francis White, Daniel Featley, Robert Abbot, Thomas James, etc. Before all Hyperius, On the Theological Study, bk. 4, ch. 9, is to be seen; and whoever others, who concerning the method of that study, or concerning Ecclesiastical Rhetoric, or concerning the reason of interpreting scripture commented anything. Compare the tract of Jean Daillé On the Use of the Fathers, in French. Especially it is to be thought that learned men living in the reformed or Protestant Church published or illustrated with notes so many writings of the fathers, as the Baslers, who published the orthodox monuments of the fathers in the year 1555, the Zürichers, who in the year 1559 published the little works of certain Greek fathers; Gwalther, and Goulart, of whom the former translated Theodoret On Providence into Latin, the latter into French. Junius who published Tertullian; Goulart who published Cyprian; Hoeschel, who published the Philocalia of Origen, Chrysostom Against the Jews; Xystus Betuleius, who published Lactantius; Weitz, who published Prudentius; Savile, who published Chrysostom; Elmenhorst, who published Gennadius and Arnobius; Heraldus who published Tertullian's Apologeticum, Minucius Felix, and Arnobius; Justellus, who published the Codex of Canons of the Universal Church, and of the African Church, and the Nomocanon of Photius; Daneau, who published Augustine's Enchiridion, and On Heresies; Heinsius, who published Clement of Alexandria; Sylburg who published Theodoret On the Cure of Greek Affections; Laurentius Ludovicus, who published the Dialogues of the same; Rittershausen, who published Salvian; Beza, who published the dialogues of Athanasius, and other writings of the ancients against the Arians; Henri Estienne, who published Athenagoras; Casaubon, who published some epistles of Gregory of Nyssa; Du Moulin, who published the epistle of the same On Those Going to Jerusalem; Coppenius, who published Oecumenius (although he is equivocally called a father) on the Canonical epistles; Lucas Lossius, who published Alcuin On the Trinity with commentaries; (although he also is improperly to be called a father;) Vulcanius, who published Cyril of Alexandria Against the Anthropomorphites, and On the Incarnation; Montagu, who published the Orations of Nazianzen Against Julian; Jeremias Stephanus and the Oxonians, who published Cyprian On the Unity of the Church, and Gregory the Great's Pastoral; Vedelius, who published the epistles of Ignatius; James Ussher, who published the same

epistles of Ignatius; Meursius, who published Arnobius. That I may now say nothing, concerning the same one's Graeco-Barbarian lexicon: Concerning Bonnefoy's and Leunclavius's Oriental Law; concerning Scaliger's Eusebian writings, and On the Emendation of the Times; concerning Salmasius's Suburbicarian Churches and diatribes to Tertullian On the Pallium, and dissertation On the Episcopate against Petau, and tract On Usury; concerning Casaubon's Exercitations on Baronius, the Centuries of the Magdeburgers, the catalog of witnesses of the Truth of Flacius Illyricus; Concerning Selden's commentary on Eutychius of Alexandria; Concerning Gothofredus's commentary on Philostorgius; Concerning Conrad Rittershausen's seven books of sacred reading; Concerning Samuel Petit's and similar miscellanies, by which the ecclesiastical antiquities are illustrated not a little. I wanted now in this haste to indicate these from those, who are at hand to me, to our students; or for this reason especially, because their names never appear in Possevin, Sixtus Senensis, and others' indexes of the fathers, and libraries (which are wont to be published by the Papists), unless perhaps in the Expurgatory Indexes. Concerning Eusebius, Sulpicius, and other ecclesiastical historians published by our men, it is not to be said here. Let our theological library, bk. 2, sect. 2, ch. 7 be compared. It is therefore evident that we by no means contemn the labors of the fathers.

II. The prevarication, vertigo, and contradiction, on the part of the Papists is not one. Now they affirm, now they deny (see even Cano alone, bk. 7), now they seem to attribute well-nigh nothing, now something to the fathers in this or that particular controversy; now they prefer today's church, or new councils, or the Roman Pope to the consent of all the fathers and of the whole of antiquity; now again they seem to prefer the ancient to the moderns, the holy fathers to this profane age; now they distinguish the fathers from traditions, and both of these from the definitions of the church; now they mix and confuse all those things. A similar tergiversation and digladiation happens to them about determining the consent of the fathers, and what and of what sort it is; concerning which below. But let us establish certain opinions, which are asserted by them dogmatically and speculatively (for in practice and application they extol, or depress, the authority of the fathers, as it will have come to use to them): but there are three of them. Two extreme, and one middle. 1. One extreme is that of the glossator c. Noli meis dist. 9, "He speaks here according to those times, when the writings of Augustine and of the other holy fathers were not yet authentic: but today they are ordered to be held all up to the last jot." And the marginal lemma has there, "The writings of the saints are to be observed to a nail." Which opinion Melchior Cano, bk. 7, ch. 3, expressly censures, and Alfonso de Castro, Against Heresies, bk. 1, ch. 7. From the same also Possevin in his Apparatus, and those, whom he cites there, not obscurely depart; to whom add Gregory of Valentia, tract On Analysis, bk. 8, ch. 8, briefly all those, who follow the middle opinion. But let them see how much is here to be attributed to their private authority: since this gloss underwent no censure under Pius V in the year 1572, or under Gregory XIII in 1580. Therefore let this opinion be held for the present as Papistical, until it be condemned by public authority. 2. The other extreme is that of Cajetan, which thinks that neither of one nor of some, nor of many fathers should the concordant interpretation of scripture prejudge another and truer sense brought from scripture. See his preface to the Pentateuch. This opinion Cano censures in the place cited, and Pereira on Gen., ch. 1, 4th rule premised to his explication. 3. The middle is that of the more recent, which thinks, that the common interpretation of scripture of all the fathers affords to the Theologian the most

certain argument, and it is not to be departed from. Thus Cano, Valentia, in the places cited. The same Stapleton, Bellarmine, Suárez, and other Elenctics and Scholastics intimate, and everywhere the Council of Trent: indeed also Cassander (whom today some want dug up again) in his tract On the Duty of a Pious Man, etc., pp. 6-7. But this opinion is again divided into various branches. For there are, who think that more fathers, are so to be preferred to one and another or fewer, that these are believed to have the truth and the catholic faith, but those to be versed in error. Thus Valentia in the place cited, and before him Netter cited by Cano. Others, restrict it; if indeed the opinion of fewer or some will have been rejected by the Church; otherwise nothing can be concluded certainly from the authority of most. Thus Cano in the place cited. Others say that it is to be stood by the principal ones, by some from each region of the world, indeed also by six, finally also by one (if indeed he affirms that he proffers not his own proper, but the common opinion of the church). Thus our Antagonist Cornelius Jansen then Theologian of Louvain, and a little after Bishop of Ypres in his Sponge, ch. 5, p. 45. It is also to be observed that Theological things, are distinguished by them from philosophical, and in those fundamental things from non-fundamental things: in those especially or only the pretended authority of the fathers avails. Finally the more rude are to be advised, that this snake lies hidden in the grass among the more recent Elenctics (among whom Becanus in the prelude to the compendium of his Manual, §1), that when he seems to attribute so great authority to the fathers, and objects it to us and his subjects like a Gorgon, they are wont to add for the most part the church (that is, the Roman Pope), by whose judgment a dogma of the fathers stands or falls; indeed the ancient Doctors are fathers or stepfathers. Which mystery Cornelius Musso Bishop of Bitonto, elsewhere cited by us, discloses, and Gretser in his defense of Bellarmine On the Pontiff, bk. 3, ch. 10, especially also in his tract On the Custom and Manner of Correcting, etc., Suárez in his 3rd commentary on the 1st q., 2nd art., disputation 42, sect. 1, "The definition," he says, "of the Pontiff is altogether true: and if it were contrary to the sayings of all the saints, it would be to be preferred to them." Bellarmine, bk. 4, On the Pontiff, ch. 5, "If the Pope erred, commanding vices or prohibiting virtues, the Church would be held to believe vices to be good, and virtues evil: unless it wants to sin against conscience." The words of Gretser, and others we exhibit in the Desperate Cause, bk. 3, sect. 1, ch. 11, pp. 496, and ch. 12, pp. 520, 521, 522. There are also not lacking those who when they confess that the fathers, the scholastic Doctors, indeed also the Popes stand on both sides of a controverted dogma, want it to be weighed not by the number or consent of the greater part, but by scripture and the decrees of the Councils to the part to be embraced. Thus Christopher Christophorus a Capite Fontium in his Tract On the Necessary Correction of Scholastic Theology, p. 123, "Certainly I will see (he says), whose opinion more agrees with scripture, or the decrees of the councils, and I will follow that." And this discordant concord, and labyrinth of the erring Papists.

2. We, the covering of calumnies having been removed, and τῶν κρυπτῶν τῆς αἰσχύνης, determine our opinion by these conclusions; of which the first seven will be positive, the three latter negative. Therefore let the 1st be: We acknowledge the orthodoxy of the fathers in the chief and fundamental things, to these their sanctity, zeal, labor, also erudition (in some the highest, in others greater, in others mediocre, in some inferior on account of the difficulty of those times, and other disadvantages and defects). II. We hear them as mute masters and common preceptors; and we willingly use their labors according to the nature of the thing for our

study and progress in matters of faith: As we have said in the former part of this disputation. III. Moreover we greatly rejoice in their consent. IV. Indeed also in doubtful, obscure, and controverted questions (the truth of which we still seek from scripture, we have not yet apprehended), the prejudice of their consent so preponderates with us, that we want our mind to be occupied and detained by strong presumptions rather for that opinion than for the other a posteriori; that we also abstain for the present from the rejection of that opinion and the lightest reception of the opposite and preserve ourselves whole; until the opinion of scripture is clear to us. V. In fundamentals concerning the one and Triune God, concerning the person and offices of Christ, and other things depending thence, as also in the doctrine concerning virtues and vices through the whole decalogue, we never postpone their consent, but subjoin it from abundance, and in the second place (yet in the first place in the genus of human and Ecclesiastical testimony) to the simplicity of the scriptures. For we will never be apprehended to have rejected in those any catholic consent, concerning which it can be truly said, that of Vincentius of Lérins: "What all, what everywhere, what always." In ceremonies, rituals, ecclesiastical politics, and similar things either determined or at least usurped to the circumstances of their own men, the reason is far otherwise: nor would the Papists themselves want theirs to be formed or recalled to that module. VI. We tolerate their censures and blemishes in phrases, dictates, problems by covering or excusing, where and when it can be done. VII. But if the errors are more grave and dangerous, we nevertheless prefer on account of their virtues to think or to be silent concerning them in a more benign part, than to condemn them of heresy or syncretism with heretics, schismatics peremptorily, or to reduce them to the class of stepfathers; otherwise than the Papists, when they are wont to judge concerning Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian, Theodoret, Jerome, indeed concerning whole Universal Councils (e.g., Chalcedon). See Jacob Laurentius's Reverence of the Fathers; and our Desperate Cause of the Papacy. VIII. The fathers are not either the principle, or the norm of faith, nor the supreme infallible judge in controversies concerning the dogmas of faith, and the interpretation of scripture: as the common practice and pretension of the Papists wants, and their authors cited above expressly defend it. IX. Consequently, they are not suitable judges of the controversies, which are agitated today between the Papists and Catholics as Campion pretends, reason 5, Perron in his Response to the King of Great Britain, and other polemics. X. Much less, that it is the safest, easiest and most expeditious way through the fathers and ecclesiastical historians of investigating the antiquity, catholicity, succession of the true faith and Church: at least far safer and easier, than if anyone seeks the true faith and church in the scriptures. Which is the παράδοξον of my antagonist Jansen, shaken out by me in the Desperate Cause of the Papacy, bk. 3, sect. 1, chs. 7, 8.

3. But for the three latter conclusions (for the rest indeed there is no need) let us note the arguments, or rather let us digest the classes of them and communicate them to our students. Therefore for the eighth conclusion let these be: I. Because scripture alone is the principle, norm, and canon of faith; and the same is alone the opinion of the supreme judge, and thus metonymically the infallible judge: obviously which is the word of God, into which is the ultimate analysis of faith. Therefore the fathers are not, whether considered separately, or with scripture (namely above it or below it) as its interpreters. The antecedent is proved in the controversy concerning Scripture. II. arg. Because the testimony of the fathers is human, and their authority

merely human, and the arguments deduced thence beget only probability: but the principle and norm of faith is divine truth and revelation: The former is admitted among the Scholastics on Thomas, ST, Ia, q. 1, art. 8. The latter, not only our men, but also the Scholastics themselves whom the more recent Papists follow, solidly prove, elsewhere cited by us. Let him who studies compendiously see Becanus's Scholastic Theology, or if he has any commentator, Cajetan, Báñez, Vázquez, Valencia, Sylvius, Malderus, on the place of Thomas cited, and on IIa-IIae, q. 1, art. 1. III. Because in fact, in very many things the fathers 1. openly erred, 2. spoke obscurely, impededly, improperly, dangerously. 3. contradicted themselves and others. 4. and indeed not only individually, but often in some number, sometimes equal with the orthodox, indeed with greater and so common consent; if indeed we have respect to that age, or century. Therefore they are not the norm or judge, etc. We will not undertake the proof of the antecedent, since the Papists have taken away this labor from us; 1. in Polemic writings among others Bellarmine, who in very many controversies indicates the dissension of the fathers from the Papists in the interpretation of scripture, in controverted questions, etc. 2. In commentaries on scripture. 3. In editions of the fathers, where you will see notes, scholia, censures, etc., added. 4. In expurgatory indexes, e.g., the later Spanish one published by Turretin, where see certain excerpts exhibited to the reader in the beginning. 5. In histories, e.g., Baronius everywhere in his annals. 6. In monitions, antidotes, libraries, observations, etc., e.g., [Jacques] Billy in his Sacred Observations, Sixtus Senensis, Holy Library, bk. 5, annot. 170, 171, and bk. 6, 7, [Aloisio] Lippomano, prologue to the Catena on Genesis, [Francisco de] Ribera, prelude to his commentary on Hosea, Bellarmine, On Ecclesiastical Writers, Salmeron in his prolegomena to the Gospels, Possevin in his Library, bk. 5, chs. 5, 6, etc., where he also cites others whether censors or antidotaries; The same in his Sacred Apparatus under the word Father: and thus everywhere to the names of the individual fathers: of whom alone the collectanea from all the others will be able to suffice for our beginners for the first impression of patristic study, and the deduction of this our argument. But if anyone has either the mind or the leisure to investigate those things very carefully, let him consult in the meantime from our men Rivet in the prolegomena to his Sacred Critic, and in his Orthodox Catholic, and others to be cited below, who exhibit not a few excerpts from them. But what I have said concerning the greater number of fathers, or common consensus as it were for some error: you have that proved by examples concerning chiliasm, concerning infant eucharist, concerning the fire which at the end of the world the faithful were to pass through, etc., in the same authors both Papists and our men. IV. arg. Because we have few writings of the fathers, especially from the most ancient antiquity (namely of the three centuries) which was next to the apostolic age, and consequently had receded less from the primeval simplicity and integrity: whether because they wrote little then, or because most have perished. To these of the following centuries up to the sixth, not a few have perished, besides that, that many Doctors (perhaps equal, if not superior to the rest in doctrine and sanctity) did not write. Finally whatever exist, are not of the Doctors in the whole Christian world, (which had already received the gospel from the apostles and apostolic men and disciples), but only of the Doctors and churches in the Roman empire. Therefore the writings of the fathers which exist, cannot be a sufficient norm, and universal, supreme and infallible judge. V. arg. Because from the fathers, and the writings of the fathers, which are pretended today so many are spurious; nor was it able to be certainly evident hitherto (not even in the Papacy by the common and irrefragable Papistic credulity) which are the genuine and indubitable writings.

Which is thus proved through parts, 1. because, so many writers were before this publicly adorned and recognized with the title of saints and fathers, who are now rejected by the more recent as heterodox or unworthy: I have woven a catalogue of them elsewhere, 2. because so many writings are foisted on the genuine fathers, and are published with their works: which some receive, others reject them, others doubt concerning them: concerning which Cocke, Rivet, Sixtus Senensis, Bellarmine, Possevin are to be consulted. 3. because there is never an end, nor a certain number of writings constituted, but daily even now new ones appear, or are expected, or are even now thought to lie hidden in the potency of some library, if not of some heretical genius. Thus appeared not many years ago, some things of Gregory of Nyssa, the Works of Gregory Thaumaturgus, Tertullian To the Nations, the Honeysweet Sayings of Augustine, some things of Cyril of Alexandria, etc., and recently the epistle of Clement to the Corinthians: which certain ἀρχομανεῖς now admire so greatly, as if they had found a fifth Gospel. Most recently the writings of John of Jerusalem, which the editor burdened with vindications surpassing the very mass of the author. Compare Possevin everywhere in his Apparatus; and the catalogues of libraries added there at the end. Not to say anything now concerning the ancient writings, which are thought to exist in the Ethiopic, Armenian, Syriac, Persian, Coptic language (and what not?). Kircher mentions in his Coptic Prodromus, ch. 8, pp. 193-195, that now some ancient volumes of liturgies or Missals, rituals, Martyrologies existing there in Coptic have been collected into the Vatican fish-trap, and other Roman libraries; which will no doubt be said to be most ancient. I related in the preceding disputation that Possevin had heard something new concerning the works of Ephraem in Syriac: Perron concerning the canons of the Nicene Council in Ethiopic, in the Desperate Cause of the Papacy. Since therefore there is no end of this infinite potency, it follows that the fathers are not a certain norm, or infallible judge. VI. arg. Because however certain the fathers may be, and certain their writings: nevertheless so uncertain are their editions not only in the versions, but also in the originals. For

1. The versions, by which most are read today by the literate; and can be read by most theologians (at least Papists) in not a few are corrupt, mutilated, obscure, uncertain.

2. Many editions expressed in type partly by ignorance, partly by fraud have been corrupted in many ways from some years and are daily more and more corrupted: as we indicated in the Desperate Cause, bk. 3, sect. 1, ch. 7 and 11, especially when they openly defend that the fathers are to be expurgated, that is, falsified, Ibid., and they published excellent specimens in Cyprian, Augustine, and others noted by Thomas James (in his tract often praised). The Latin manuscript codices, especially the Greek both which still today survive in the libraries of Greece, and which have been brought thence into the Western libraries; how immune they are from corruption, the Papists themselves teach, indicated by me in the place cited. I now add the constitution of Sixtus V (in Quaranta in his Sum of the Bullarium, or Constitutions of the Pontiffs, p. 256), concerning the congregation of Cardinals for the Vatican Typography, where pretending the erroneous impressions and editions of the fathers defiled by heretics, he sanctions that emended editions are to be given by the erudite from the collation of copies, etc., with this condition: "if more grave doubitations, and difficulties fall in the authority of the ancient codices, in the correction, and emendation of books, with the things first having been examined in the congregation they refer to us, that in the variety of readings we may establish that, which will be

most consonant to orthodox truth (N.B.) from the special privilege granted by God to this holy see." VII. arg. Because so many writings of the fathers (add of the Councils and historians) still survive; that it cannot be seen when and how literate men and Theologians (not to say the unlearned) are to read, collate, understand all those, that they may draw thence the true consent and ecclesiastical and Catholic interpretation of scripture, and determination of dogmas. Certainly it must be established briefly, indeed also today, what is the true worship of God, what is the way to salvation, that we may enter it in time, while it is still called today. Therefore they are not a suitable judge, or norm. VIII. arg. Because they are difficult and obscure, on account of unusual phrases, idioms, allusions, histories and antiquities, ambiguities, excessive subtleties, ἀκριβολογίας, catachreses, allegories, involvements of tropes, figures and rhetorications, apparent contradictions, etc. Therefore they are not a suitable and supreme judge; or norm in matters of faith, especially controverted. But if the Papists (although impiously) object this to the scriptures; how much more justly we to that chaos of writers, who all were able to be deceived, and to deceive. IX. arg. Because in most there was so great, ignorance of languages, in some, also of sciences and arts; In others so great oscitancy, and infelicity in comparing the scriptures: that their interpretation is by no means to be constituted for us as a norm. X. arg. Because when now from the well perceived words someone elicits the mind or opinion of a father; it will nevertheless scarcely (at least in many) be certainly evident: whether there he hands down his own particular opinion, and that a constant one, which in old age or afterwards he did not retract (as some did); or whether this slipped from him in the heat of declamation or disputation; or whether he only referred this from the sense of others; or finally from the custom of his age, or that he might accommodate himself to his hearers, rather κατὰ συγχώρησιν and συγκατάβασιν, than from his own faith, and confirmed judgment: Again whether he dogmatized the opinion of his own church or of neighboring ones; or truly a Catholic one and common to all the churches, and that from the truth of the thing, or only from his own judgment and intention, in which that he can be deceived, and that some were exceedingly deceived, the examples of Cyprian, etc., teach. Compare what we have said concerning this argument in the former part of this Disputation. The words of Franciscus Quaresmius the Minorite prefect of the holy land and apostolic commissary are notable, bk. 2, On the Elucidation of the Holy Land, ch. 19, "Nor is it to be wondered that Jerome, etc." XI. arg. Because it is not yet evident, not even in the Papacy, at least by the common faith and ecclesiastical determination, not even by the doctrine of the schools, what is the consent of the fathers: Therefore they remit both their own and ours to a norm, which is not in the nature of things. The antecedent is proved; because the miserable Andabatae in the schools (with the Church or Pope idly watching) dispute; 1. Whether and who genuine fathers, and their genuine writings, and how they may be distinguished with certainty from the pure and apocryphal ones; the same doubt and uncertainty exists concerning complete and corrupt editions. 2. Who and how many of the genuine ones make a consensus: whether all and each one: or rather simply the greater part: or rather the better part and the one thinking more rightly: or some and indeed the more excellent ones from all the regions of the world; or at least six: or one: finally, whether of only one age, or truly of all ages are to be understood all those and each one, or the greater part, or the better part, or some, or six. See here the disagreeing ones: Gregory of Valentia, book 8, chapter 8, and Jansenius in Spongia, chapter 9, page 45, cited above by Cano, chapter 12. To this opinion of ours is added the consensus of the fathers: which we perceive partly from their

open doctrine, partly from their practice. The former, from their various testimonies: of which we now indicate these few: First, of Optatus Milevitanus, book 3 against Parmenianus: Judges are to be sought, etc., where he relegates us to Scripture alone as the norm and judge: Second, of Augustine, On the Good of Perseverance, chapter 21. Add, Against Cresconius the Grammarian, book 2, chapters 31 and 32, and against Maximinus, book 3, chapter 14, and On the Baptism of the Donatists, book 2, chapter 6, and against Petilianus, book 3, chapter 6. You have six testimonies of the same, which are inserted in the Canon Law, Distinction 9, chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, where see all and compare with the codices of Augustine. I exhibit only one here, from epistle 19 to Jerome, which is contained in the cited Distinction, chapter "I alone": "I", he says, "confess to your charity that I have learned to bestow this fear and honor only to those books of the Scriptures which are now called Canonical, that I most firmly believe that none of their authors has erred in writing anything. And if I find anything in their letters which seems contrary to the truth, I do not doubt that it is nothing other than either the codex is faulty, or the translator has not followed what was said, or I have not at all understood it.
But I read others in such a way that, however much they excel in sanctity and doctrine, I do not think something true because they themselves thought so: but because they were able to persuade me either through those Canonical authors, or by probable reason, which is not abhorrent to the truth. Nor do I think, my brother, that you think anything otherwise: absolutely, I say, I do not think that you want your Books to be read as if of the Prophets or Apostles: about whose writings, that they lack all error, it is wicked to doubt. May this be absent from pious humility and truthful thought about yourself, which unless you were endowed with, you certainly would not say", etc. Third, in the book of Morals (under the name of Basil the Great, chapter 72, section 1): "It is fitting for learned listeners in the Scriptures to prove all things which are said by Teachers; indeed, to accept those things which are consonant with the Scriptures, and to reject those which are foreign." Fourth, of Ambrose, On the Incarnation of the Lord, chapter 3. Fifth, of Jerome, on Psalm 86: "Although someone may be holy after the apostles, although he may be eloquent, he does not have authority; since the Lord narrates in the Scriptures of the peoples and princes (he explains in the same place the prophets and apostles) who were in it." The same, in his Apology to Jovinian: "Concerning me, wherever I do not interpret the Scriptures but speak freely according to my own sense, let anyone refute me." Sixth, of Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechetical Lectures 4 and 12. Seventh, of Lactantius, On the Origin of Error, chapter 8. This practice, namely of the fathers, teaches the same, since 1.in their predecessors or contemporaries they reprove errors, or at least freely dissent from them. Thus Cyprian from Cornelius, Theodoret from Epiphanios, Augustine from Jerome, Rufinus from the same. See Augustine, epistle 19. which is to Jerome. 2. when they do not bind the reader
to their dictates, but permit him free judgment: indeed, they subject themselves to the judgment and correction of others, and ask pardon for errors. See the conclusion of Augustine to the books on the Trinity: "O Lord, the one God, God the Trinity, whatever
I have said in these books that is of You, may both Yours and mine acknowledge; whatever is of my own, may You and Yours forgive." Amen. 3. When they subsequently retract the same things, see Augustine's books of Retractions. 4. When in their books and treatises they are by no means satisfied with themselves, as being not sufficiently elaborated and solid, or extemporaneous. See Jerome's preface to Proverbs, and epistle 16, the epitaph of Marcella,

and epistle 128 to Fabiola, and epistle 47, the preface to the commentary on Matthew, and the preface to the second commentary on the epistle to the Ephesians.
4. And these are direct arguments. The indirect ones are of two kinds: 1. leading to absurdity, 2. ad hominem. Of the former kind are these: 1. Then it would follow that the fathers are equal, indeed superior to the prophets and apostles; for we would not believe the latter except on account of the former. 2. Their writings would be more perfect,
more evident, easier to read and understand than sacred Scripture itself; in short, divine matters would be expounded by the fathers less ambiguously, obscurely, dangerously than
by Scripture: hence it happens that the reading of the latter is not permitted indiscriminately to all the unlearned, but is rather prohibited in the Papacy (as is solidly proved from the 4th rule of the prohibited books of the Council of Trent, together with daily experience and the warning of the Index of Prohibited Books of Clement VIII, which Azorius acknowledges and reports, Moral Institutes, vol. 1, book 8, chapter 26); but the reading of the former is not prohibited. 3. A promise was made by God equally about the genuine writings of the fathers as about the word of God; namely, that they will remain forever, and not one iota of them will perish. 4. The interpretation and opinion of the fathers ought to be equally the norm in philosophical, historical matters, problematic theology, rites, and ecclesiastical agenda,
as in the dogmas of faith and morals: since they interpret Scripture equally in the former as in the latter; and if in the latter their consensus is the measure for us, why not also in the former? For what Scripture, or what father, where, by what authority has ever made this distinction? But in fact, the papists do not accept the philosophical, historical, ritual, and agenda of the fathers as the measure of their philosophy, theology, liturgy, polity. 5. In the business of faith, we must act through more, which could be done more briefly and safely through fewer: namely, through the infinite digressions of the fathers; which, from the truth of the matter and in our opinion, could be done compendiously and certainly through Scripture alone, or, in their opinion, through the word written in the heart of the church, and to which, nevertheless, after boasts and shipwrecks in such a vast ocean of the fathers, we must finally come. All
these things, and others to be added to them, are most absurd. Therefore.
5. The arguments ad hominem are these: 1. because the papists themselves, both directly and expressly, and indirectly, deny it. Directly, from very many testimonies, we now note only the following: 1. From the ancients, Gerson, in the 1st part of the Examination of Doctrines, consideration 5, where he teaches that the assertion of one simple man educated in the Scriptures is to be believed more than the Pope or a council: therefore, also more than the fathers.
2. From the writers of common places, or scholastics: Thomas Aquinas, in the first part of the Summa Theologica, question 1, article 8. Add Cano, book 7, chapter 1; Villavincente, On the Study of Theology, book 4. 3. From the polemicists: Bellarmine, book 3, On the Word of God, chapter 10, to argument 16: "It is one thing to interpret the law," etc., and book 2, On Councils, chapter 12: "The sacred writings of the fathers are not a rule, nor do they have binding authority." Stapleton, On Scripture, against Whitaker, book 1, chapter 2, section 1. Alphonsus de Castro, book 6, On Heresies, title "Episcopi." 4. From the commentators: Stella, on Luke 10, on those words: "I thank you." I transcribe his words here, as they are worth noting, because the author is perhaps not so familiar to all: "We know well, however, that pygmies placed on the shoulders of giants see more than the giants themselves." Pereira, on Romans 8, disputation 22

and 23. Maldonatus, on John 5:53. 5. From the historians and antiquarians: Baronius, on the year 34, number 213: "The Catholic Church," he says, "does not always nor in all things follow the fathers in the interpretation of the Scriptures." We cited Sixtus of Siena and Possevinus above. Add now the Belgian Expurgatory Index, where it says of Bertram: "Since in other ancient Catholics we tolerate very many errors, and extenuate them, excuse them, very often deny them by a fabricated commentary, and assign them a convenient meaning when they are opposed in disputations or in conflicts with adversaries," etc. Indirectly,
they deny it in many ways: 1. when in dogmatic works, commentaries, and controversies, they freely depart from them, indeed, they note, disapprove, and attack their errors, whenever this happens to be useful; which could be proved by innumerable examples, but an inspection of Bellarmine, Possevinus, Cornelius a Lapide, and similar ones, whom we indicated above, will suffice. 2. When they fortify the edition and reading of the fathers with so many cautions. See Possevinus, Library, book 5, and the Apparatus, cited above. And Sixtus of Siena, books 5, 6, 7, where he professes to have noted the errors of the fathers which could not be concealed without offense to Catholic piety, nor without great disturbance to the readers. And the censures of Feuardent on Irenaeus, of Billius on Justin Martyr, of Raudensis on Lactantius, of Hervetus on Clement of Alexandria, and other editors of the fathers. 3. When so many distinctions occur in their polemical works and commentaries, by which they make exceptions to the testimonies of the fathers objected to them; which we indicate for the most part in the Desperate Cause, cited place. 4. When they believe that their writings are to be subjected to expurgation and correction, and they actually exercise it; as indicated above, and this was irrefragably proved by Thomas James in the writing praised above. 5. When finally they both show in reality, and openly profess, that the authority of the fathers is a mere mask, mockery, and nothing to them; all authority resides in their said church or Pope. To which
pertains the saying of Suarez cited above, to which add that famous and often-agitated saying of Cornelius Musso, Bishop of Bitonto, in his commentary on Romans 14, page 606:
"I (to confess frankly) would believe one supreme Pontiff more in those things which touch the mysteries of the faith than a thousand Augustines, Jeromes, Gregories, etc., because the supreme Pontiff cannot err in those things which are of the faith." Gretser, in his book On the Mode and Custom of Correcting, etc., argues that the fathers and the writings of the fathers are also subject to the judgment of the church (that is, of the Roman See or Pope), and so can be expurgated and corrected if they have written anything dissonant from its opinion. Sixtus of Siena, in the preface to Pius V, in the year 1566: "I have taken care that all the writings of Catholics, and especially of the ancient fathers, be expurgated and emended." Add the constitution of Sixtus V, cited above.
6. And we think that these classes of arguments for the seventh conclusion are now sufficiently furnished. This paper does not allow the deduction of all and each one; in the meantime, let them consult in their own time, among and besides the authors cited, the following or some of them, who do this on purpose: Hyperius, book 4, On the Method of Theological Study, chapter 9; Rivetus, in the Prolegomena to the Sacred Criticism; Morton, Catholic Apology, book 2, chapter 14; Tilenus, Syntagma, volume 2, disputation 16; Jacob Laurentius, Reverence for the Fathers, etc.; our Desperate Cause of the Papacy, book 3, section 1, chapters 7, 8, 11, 12; Thomas James' English treatise On the Corruption, etc.; Jean Daillé, Parisian minister, French treatise titled On the Use of the Holy Fathers. Especially with regard to rites and ecclesiastical

regimen, the weak and suspect authority of the fathers and antiquity is proved by Didoclavius, chapter 9 of the Altar of Damascus, pages 542, 543, 544, where both our authors and the papists are cited and are to be seen there; and by us in the disputation On the Time of the Nativity of Christ. How little the fathers avail in today's dogmatic controversies (in moral matters it must be judged otherwise) which are stirred up by the sects outside the Papacy, is piously and learnedly shown by Willem Teellinck in his Eubulus, written in Dutch, chapter 15. As for the remaining two conclusions consequent to this principal one, it is not necessary to confirm them with new or other classes of arguments, since they can be derived from those already adduced and easily applied to them. Only to the former or ninth conclusion, which was: From the consensus of the fathers, the controversies between us and the Papacy cannot be suitably explained and decided, I add these reasons: 1. Because most of them treat matters foreign to our controversies, and most of our controversies, at least in the form in which they now exist, do not appear in most of them. 2. Because, besides those things which we have excepted above from the truth of the matter against the consensus of the fathers, all those difficulties can be raised according to the hypotheses and consequences of the papists, which they are accustomed to object to the Scriptures; namely, that they are darkness, Scripture written on parchment, a wax nose, a Lesbian rule, books of heretics, and that all authors of all opinions appeal to them, and each one depreciates them by an adulterated interpretation, alleges them for himself, and strives to bend them to his own fathers. 3. Because, concerning the genuine authors, writings, and editions, the same doubts can be raised, at least, as the papists are accustomed to raise concerning Scripture for the sake of atheists, infidels, etc., such as Perron, Jansenius of Louvain in his Sponge, chapter 8, and the Jesuit Regourd, to whom the aforementioned Parisian minister responds in a special French treatise. The disputation interpolated by us and held under our presidency On the New Jesuitic Skepticism, which we will soon add, can be compared. To the last consequent conclusion, which is: Whether it is more expedient, easier, and safer to seek the succession of the true faith and Church in the fathers and ecclesiastical histories than from the Scriptures, etc., we add not a word, but we send the students to the Desperate Cause, book 3, section 1, chapters 7 and 8.

7. With the principal controversy determined, it would now be necessary to respond to various problems, partly general, partly special or historico-theological. But because time and paper do not allow it now, we will only propose a few things nakedly. 1. Whether the method and study of Scriptural and more accurate theology should be demanded and recalled today to the module of the ancient form of the fathers? No. 2. Whether they should be employed against heretics otherwise than after the triumph of our cause from the Scriptures; namely, out of abundance, to show consensus, and to free us from the suspicion or calumny of novelty and singularity? No. 3. Whether it is permissible to follow the papists, who summon our faith, in which we differ from them, to the tribunal of the fathers, otherwise than with this protestation: That we do not dispute from the fathers as judges of the faith; nor can or ought we to be urged by their authority; yet we are willing, out of abundance, and by a certain concession and condescension, to dispute; that it is not condemned by the consensus of the fathers, nor are the papists' new antitheses contained therein? No. 4. Whether, therefore, the question of the truth of any article is in any way to be submitted by us to the judgment of the fathers, or rather only the question of antiquity? To the first, no; to the second, yes. 5. Whether, when the papists, like infidels, seem to reject or at least decline Scripture as the sole principle of faith, it is imprudent to do what we can

then, that is, to convict them from the fathers, or councils, or their own doctors, as the fathers convicted the pagans from pagan writers? No. 6. Whether a student of theology should begin with the fathers or with more recent theologians, and whether the fathers should be preferred to the latter? To the first, no; to the second, I distinguish. And it should be noted that those proceed most unhappily who, when they are scarcely sufficiently imbued with catechetical theology, and have not formed and collected for themselves common places and solid concepts of theology from their own reading of Scripture and the collation of excellent authors, fly to the reading of the fathers, or at least of two, three, or four, and thence, having scarcely imbibed some semi-concepts and crude observations, arrogate to themselves a dictatorship in theological controversies, in the determination of cases of conscience, ecclesiastical regimen, and the practice of piety, above and against the ecclesiastical and common interpretation of Scripture, and the received universal practice and experience of theologians. This dictatorship would be preposterously snatched from barbarian and agrammatical or aphilological scholastics, if indeed we concede it to others constituted outside the theological order and perpetual exercises. For we see that the learned, although distracted by other studies and ordinary occupations, when treating theological matters in spare hours or in old age, find some things quite felicitously; yet in logical, philosophical, and accurately solid consequences of theology, in devising definitions, distinctions, and reconciliations, and in subtly and profoundly judging against the tricks of heretics, and also in the practical instruction of consciences, they often fail, and indulging too much in their own peculiar (but not infrequently half-baked and poorly coherent, poorly ordered concepts), they proudly insult ecclesiastical men and theologians (whose field this is). Nor is it surprising, since, on account of the dangers and precipices in such matters, and what coheres with or is repugnant to what, they do not so thoroughly see. 7. Whether one suffers a greater loss in theological study if, in the academic course or at least in vigorous age and the first years of ministry, one has not tasted scholastic theology, than if one is a stranger to the reading of the fathers? I affirm. For one who is plainly ignorant of philosophical and scholastic theology can scarcely afterward rise to more accurate concepts for forming against the subtleties of heretics and carnal minds in dogmatic and casuistic matters, and to understanding scholastic authors. But for reading, consulting, and understanding the fathers, no age seems to me unsuitable. For who, without a teacher, or in old age as an autodidact, if only he applies the industry of reading, does not hope for some progress?

Yet let no one think that I say these things otherwise than comparatively, not absolutely; for that plan of studies pleases us which we delineated in our Library, book 1, chapters 6, 7, 8. 8. What about the epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, recently published, but not without great and many lacunae? I reply: We admire the singular divine providence, which has taken care that by the disciples of the apostles, and apostolic men, and those nearest to the age of the apostles, either nothing was written, or nothing was preserved and passed down to posterity, or at least nothing has survived from the beginning of the church until this day about which there is no doubt, or which has not been mutilated by moths and bookworms or any other army of God, so that its authority may be all the more evidently constant for Scripture alone, and incorruptibility and eternity may be proper to it alone. See and compare what is disputed by their editors, and Possevinus, Bellarmine, Cocus, Rivetus, etc., concerning the epistles of Ignatius, *the letters of Martial written to the Lemovices, and those of Clement, Abdias of Babylon, &c.*

Appendix on Ecclesiastical Historians.

6. Campion, in his Rationes, the 6th proof of his cause, among other things, defers to the historians,
namely Eusebius, Damasus, Jerome, Rufinus, Orosius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, Cassiodorus, Gregory of Tours, Usuard, Regino, Marianus, Sigebert, Zonaras, Cedrenus, Nicephorus. These he calls there the more ancient historians, who uncover the pristine face of the church. With these he wants to be joined
the particular historiographers of certain regions. But whether that man ever
saw those historians, whether even besides the bare names described from some little index he knew anything about their writings, deeds, age, I vehemently
doubt. We pronounce the last three negative conclusions, which we brought forth above about the fathers, about the ecclesiastical historians, relying on the same classes of arguments, from which we here taste some and apply them more closely.
1. Because no historians from the most ancient antiquity survive; which, however,
is here especially required. 2. Because of the rest, who wrote after the third century,
some in number (especially those who would exhibit the face of the ancient Church) are suspect to the adversaries themselves, indeed are also accused of heresies and schisms; which we have proved about Eusebius, Socrates, etc. in the Desperate Cause of the
Papacy, book 3, section 1, chapter 7. Others are supposititious, as the Pontifical of Damasus, according to the testimonies of Baronius, Possevinus, Bellarmine, Onofrio, Binius. Briefly, see almost all the historians of Campion cast down by us in the cited place with pontifical pitchforks from the bridge. 3. Because the historians are so few that Baronius, on the year 44, number 22, and Onofrio, cited there by us, despair that the history of the church can be patched together from them.
4. Because those who remain diminish their authority with uncertain narrations, fables, partisan zeal, not only among us but also the adversaries. Hence it is that they reject them, accuse them of lying, castigate them, call them into doubt, as often as this happens to come into use. See Baronius on the year 383, numbers 28 and 29. And Perron everywhere in his Response to the King of Britain, where he disparages the reliability of Eusebius as an Arian, and of Socrates as a Novatian. Compare those things which Cano has in book 11, chapters 3, 5 and 6. 4. Because whatever difficulties are customarily (but wickedly) objected to sacred Scripture by the papists, we rightly object the same things to their pretended history. 5. Because whatever the histories may or may not exhibit to us, nevertheless no other authority remains, however minimally suspect, than merely human, according to the opinion both of us and of the papists, which Cano explained well in book 11, chapter 4. With this one criticism of Baronius, on the year 39, section 22, we dismiss all: "No one will deny that the Acts of the Apostles written by Luke are of greater reliability than any authority of the ancients."
However, we do not want the study of ancient ecclesiastical history to be neglected or despised, but we would want judgment and selection to be applied. Moreover, ecclesiastical history is the knowledge of particular things done in and by the church, or around it.

1. The principal parts of this historical object or matter are two. Of which the former contains those things which pertain to the absolute state of the church, such as:
1. Formulas of faith in the principal heads are to be noted from the histories, especially from Perkins' Problems. Here refer to published creeds, catechisms.
2. Rites and ceremonies, etc.
3. Ecclesiastical regimen or polity, and written constitutions, if there are any.
4. Life and morals.
5. Councils.
6. Propagation of the faith, which has evangelical embassies, conversions of nations, plantings of churches. Here refer to newly instituted bishops.
7. Celebrated doctors and writers.
8. Celebrated defenders and patrons, if there are any.
9. Succession of the Roman bishops.
10. Colleges and academies instituted or flourishing. Here refer to the more celebrated monasteries and chapters.
The latter contains those things which pertain to the disturbed state of the church, such as:
1. Persecutions and devastations of churches.
2. Martyrdoms and more notable martyrs.
3. Celebrated confessors and witnesses of the truth.
4. Apostasies, heresies, heretics.
5. Schisms and contentions in the churches.
6. Collations, disputations, and colloquies.
7. Reformations and restorations of churches.
2. The end and use is manifold: 1. It teaches the propagation of the Gospel and the origins of the churches. 2. It is a testimony of consensus. 3. It exhibits examples of heroic patience, Christian fortitude, exceptional piety. 4. It has a mirror both of the malice of the Devil with his own, and of the goodness and power of God in the defense of the Church. 5. It teaches ecclesiastical prudence, especially ministers and pious princes and magistrates. 3.
Its efficients are the writers or historians. Who are: 1. partly fathers or approved doctors of the church, partly others; 2. Again, of two kinds: either those appointed to it by the public authority of the church, or those who undertook it by private zeal; 3. Who either write only a part of history, for example, about heresies, about persecution, about martyrs, about a council or councils, about doctors, bishops, patriarchs, popes, etc., about theological schools or colleges, about the conversions of nations; or the whole history, and that either perpetual, or by selections, collections, epitomes, etc.; 4. Either ancient, or middle, or new (as ecclesiastical history is divided). Now receive the ancients one by one, namely, those who lived before the year 700; for the rest do not pertain here. Moreover, they are: Eusebius in his Chronicle and Ecclesiastical History; Epiphanius on Heresies; Theodoret; Sozomen; Socrates; Gelasius of Cyzicus; Nicephorus; Evagrius; Pontius the Deacon; Jerome in his Chronicle, and On Ecclesiastical Writers; Rufinus; Palladius Galata; Philaster; Augustine On Heresies; Possidius; Sulpicius; Paulus Orosius; Prosper's Chronicle; Victor of Vita; Gennadius; Marcellinus Comes; Cassiodorus; Victor of Capua; Dacius of Milan; Liberatus; Venantius Fortunatus; Gregory of Tours. And these alone pertain to ecclesiastical antiquity. The spurious and supposititious ones are: Prochorus; Aristeas; Abdias of Babylon; Linus; Joseph Ben Gorion; Hegesippus; the

Passion of Andrew; that of Melito on the passing of Mary; the Synopsis of Dorotheus; that of Epiphanius on the life of the prophets; the Pontifical of Damasus; the Life of Basil by Amphilochius; the epistle of Eusebius on the death of Jerome; that of Evodius of Uzalis on the miracles of Stephen. Something should be added about the age and writings of each one, and how far they extended the history, about the editions, about reading and studying them, as also about the principal historians of the middle age. But I must break off. In the meantime, let the students consult, about the spurious ones indeed, the Censure of Cocus; but about the genuine ones, the Apparatus of Possevinus, and Vossius On the Greek and Latin Historians. Concerning the apparatus of ecclesiastical historical study, let the students see our theological library. Some years ago I came upon Franckenberg's disputation on ecclesiastical historians; but it is not at hand now.

THE NEW JESUITIC SKEPTICISM

CONCERNING
The Principles of the Christian Faith
Respondent: LAMBERT vanden WATERLAET
For the 15th of March, 1645
It pleased me to insert into my own this little disputation, contracted and written down by the Respondent from his own notes sent to the Jesuit; both because it felicitously expresses my own conceptions which I am accustomed to pre-form for our disciples, and the method of taking exception to such Jesuitical questions, which I am accustomed to show them publicly and privately; and because I myself interpolated and polished it (as to the principal matter), by removing or adding where there was need.

Last year a Jesuit theologian and preacher, not uncelebrated among his own in a celebrated city, wholly clothed in the mask of infidels and atheists, took care that these skeptical questions be obtruded through one of his admirers to an honest man consorting with our religion. To them I, having been asked, prepared some response according to the capacity of the common language; which was exhibited to that theologian. While he until now is more mute than a fish, he leaves us to think how incorrigible he is, and how great is the force of truth. In the meantime, I did not think I would do amiss if on this occasion I subjected my response, contracted into a compendium, to an exercise of academic examination.

1. The first question or problem is: Whether a Christian relying on the books of sacred Scripture alone (with all authority and confirmation of the church, fathers, traditions, etc., excluded) can be altogether certain that all things which are contained in those books are the genuine word of God? I respond, 1: The Holy Spirit in the sacred page meets this question and satisfies it in this way, in the Second Epistle to Timothy, chapter 3, verses 15, 16, 17; the Gospel of John, chapter 5, verse 39, taken together with Isaiah, chapter 34, verse 16, and Luke, chapter 16, verses 29 and 31; the Second Epistle of Peter, chapter 1, verses 19, 23, 21; Psalm 119 and 19, verse 8; Deuteronomy, chapter 4, verses 1, 2; Isaiah, chapter 8, verse 20; the First Epistle to the

Thessalonians, chapter 2, verse 13; the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 2, verse 13. Let our Jesuit add those places of Sacred Scripture by which Robert Bellarmine the Jesuit, in book 1 On the Word of God, chapter 2 etc., urges and endeavors with all his might to confute any infidels whatever. With these manifest testimonies of Sacred Scripture (to the discussion and citation of which he will be able to stand by both our Bibles and those of Pope Clement VIII and the Louvain doctors published in the city of Antwerp), we require that our Jesuit either categorically assent and subscribe to them as to the divine truth, together with all of Christendom; or dissent from them along with the infidels, atheists, and all the antichristians, and accuse them of lying and falsity. If he does the former, now he acknowledges that the Question and his Conscience have been satisfied; but if he prefers the latter, let him who is unworthy of the Christian name await from us another method of response and disputation, prepared and applied against the atheists, pagans, Turks, Libertines, Epicureans, and men of similar ilk and opinion; in this always complying with the doctrine, admonitions, and practice of the Christian Doctors, struggling always so solicitously and spiritedly for defending the truth of Christianity against any of its most bitter enemies whatever. Let our Jesuit consult his own Bellarmine in book 1 On the Word of God, and the prudent Counsel and Admonition of his Angelic Doctor Thomas Aquinas, in the Summa, Part 1, Question 1, Article 8, etc. From which whether the Jesuit prefers to degenerate, I would like to learn, being about to respond further and to defend the pious endeavors of others against the infidels. I respond, 2: To the Jesuit's question, the most lucid testimonies and sayings of the Fathers. In place of all, let Augustine be heard, in book 6 of the Confessions, chapter 5, and against the Donatists and Petilian, chapter 3, Volume 7; On the Trinity, book 3, chapter 14; against Maximinus, likewise in book 19 of The City of God, chapter 18; Against Cresconius the Grammarian, book 2, chapter 31; Against Faustus the Manichean, books 11 and 13, chapter 5; likewise On the Unity of the Church, chapter 10; To Jerome, Epistle 19; On Baptism, against the Donatists, book 2, chapter 6; and On Christian Doctrine, chapter 24. Jerome, on chapter 1 of the Prophet Haggai; likewise on chapter 23 of the Gospel of Matthew; likewise the Epistle to Paula and Urbica; and Epistle 48 to Vincent; add the Epistle to Demetrias and the Prologue on the Psalms and Isaiah, etc. Chrysostom, on Genesis, Homily 13; on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Homily 13, near the end; on chapter 1 of the Epistle to the Galatians; on Psalms 95, 86; the Gospel of Matthew, Homily 49; on the Second Epistle to Timothy, Homily 9; likewise Volume 1, Homily on Eutropius, and Volume 2, Homily on Matthew, etc. Tertullian, in the book On the Resurrection of the Flesh, chapter 3; likewise, Against Marcion, book 1; and Against Hermogenes, chapter 1; and the Apology Against the Gentiles, chapter 5. Origen, On First Principles, book 4, chapter 1, and chapter 63; likewise on Jeremiah; and Homily 25 on Matthew. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, book 3, chapter 1, and book 4, chapter 60, and likewise book 2, chapter 46. Basil, the Treatise on the True and Pious Faith, and in the Moral Rules, Rule 26, Rule 8, and Rule 27; Epistle 80; add the Epistle to Eustace, the physician; the preface to the exposition of Isaiah, etc. Cyprian, to Pompey, Epistle 74, etc. Athanasius, in his Rescript to Liberius, and Volume 1, sermon on the Incarnation of the Lord against Apollinaris; likewise the book on the Opinion of Dionysius and the book Against the Jews in the Synopsis, etc. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 6. Epiphanius, Heresies 41, 42, 1, 9, etc. Clement of Alexandria, book 7 of the Stromata, etc. Theodoret, the preface on Ezekiel and on chapter 34 of Ezekiel, and the Preface on Malachi, etc. Lactantius, book 6, chapter 21, of the Divine Institutes, and Chapter 71; likewise book 3 of the Divine

Institutes, chapter 26, etc.; and book 4, On True Wisdom, Chapter 20. Salvian, book 3, On the Governance of God, etc. The sentences and sayings of these Fathers (which we transmitted word for word, but here judge it to be too long and less necessary to repeat, and so consider it sufficient to have cited) we would want the Jesuit (if indeed he loves to be considered a papist) either to approve categorically as conforming to truth itself, or to disapprove as absurd and erroneous. If the former, there is nothing which he justly asks; but if he prefers the latter, we shall owe a further response. In the meantime, it will become manifest to the Christian reader that the Jesuit himself makes little account of those Fathers whom by these questions he pretends and simulates that he wants to obtrude upon us or others as a principle of faith or at least a co-principle along with the sacred pages themselves, traditions, etc. I respond, 3: It is clear that the writers of the intermediate age make the same point on the present question and problem as the sacred Scripture itself and the ancient fathers, from those things which Damascene has in book 4 of On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 18, and book 1 of On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 1, etc. Theophylact, in his Commentary on chapter 3 of the Second Epistle to Timothy; Commentary on chapter 6 of the Epistle to the Ephesians; Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, chapter 23, etc. Anselm of Canterbury, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit Against the Greeks, etc. Add Hugh of St. Victor, book 6 of his Didascalicon, chapter 4; likewise Volume 1 of the Preliminary Elucidations on Sacred Scripture, etc. If the Jesuit assents to the opinion of these writers, now he acts as a vain questioner; but if, on the contrary, he wants to dissent, it is a vain appeal to writers whom he himself refuses to approve by appealing to them. I respond, 4: Along with the response of Scripture and the ancients in the places cited above, the whole army of pontifical doctors fights against any enemies of the Divine Word whatever. Thomas Aquinas (whom they say never spoke falsely), in the Summa, Part 1, Question 1, Article 8, and Article 9, Reply 1; and Question 3, Article 10, Reply 1; likewise the Commentary on chapter 3 of the Second Epistle to Timothy; and Part 2-2, Question 1, Article 9. Scotus, in the prologue to Lombard, Question 2, at the beginning, and in book 4 of the Sentences. Baptista Mantuanus, the Carmelite, in book 3 of On Patience, chapters 32 and 33. Gabriel Biel, on the canon of the mass, Lecture 71, page 166, Basel edition of 1515, through the whole lecture, and Lecture 7; likewise on book 3 of the Sentences, Distinction 15, Question 2. Claude Espencé, doctor of the Sorbonne, on chapter 15, verse 4, of the Epistle to the Romans; the same on Titus, chapter 2, verse 8; likewise on the Second Epistle to Timothy, chapter 3, and on the First Epistle to Timothy, chapter 2. Peter of Ailly, Cardinal of Cambrai, Commentary on book 1 of the Sentences, Question 1, Article 3, column 46. Gerson, On the Examination of Doctrines, Part 2, Consideration 1, and Consideration 5, and Part 18, Consideration 1, folio 105; likewise the Tract against the Assertion of Master John Parvi, number 14; the same on the Objection from Augustine: "I would not believe," etc., taken together with Wimpheling in the Prologue to Volume 4 of Gerson's Works, etc. Laurence of Villavicencio, On the Method of Theological Study, book 1, chapter 3, and on the First Epistle to Timothy, chapter 3. William Pepin, the Dominican, on the 2nd Sunday of Advent, Sermon 1, etc. Robert Bellarmine, in book 3 of On Justification, chapter 8; book 1 of On the Word of God, chapters 1, 2, 3; likewise book 4 of On the Word of God, chapter 9, against any adversaries and enemies of the Christian religion and word of God whatever. Gregory of Valence, Analysis of the Faith, book 1, chapters 5 and 15, and book 8, chapter 5, etc. Nicholas of Nyssa, in Theological Resolutions, Question 2 of the prolegomena. John Major, on book 1 of the Sentences, Distinction 11, chapter 1. John de Turrecremata,

Cardinal, Summa on the Church, book 4, Part 2, Chapters 8, 9. Melchior Cano, Bishop of the Canary Islands, Theological Commonplaces, book 12, chapter 16. Brother Brito, in the Preface to the Ordinary Gloss. Eustachius of St. Paul, Part 1 of the Theological Summa, Treatise 2, Disputation 1, Question 2, etc. Becanus, Scholastic Theology, Part 1, Treatise 2, chapter 6, Question 2. Martinus Smiglecius, the Jesuit, against Moscorovius on Baptism, page 7, etc. A Costa, the Jesuit, book 3 of On Christ Revealed, chapter 21, etc. Christopher de Capite Fontium, Treatise on the Necessity of Correcting Scholastic Doctrine. Serarius, in his Prolegomena, Chapter 4, Question 5; likewise James de Castro, Bishop of Roermond, To the Senate of Nijmegen. Add the Canon Law, chapter "Ego solis," Distinction 9. If it pleases the Jesuit Questioner to subscribe to the testimonies and praises of all these pontifical doctors for sacred Scripture as the infallible external principle of faith, he has that on which to acquiesce to the Response; if not, another way must be tried by us. In the meantime, our Jesuit, having spurned the Pontifical Doctors, does not even deserve the name of Papist (which he boasts himself to be); indeed, he would scarcely make up the number in the catalog of the Manicheans, Arians, Pelagians, and similar Heretics.

2. The second question or problem is: Whether a Christian relying on the books of sacred Scripture alone (with all authority and confirmation of the church, fathers, traditions, etc., excluded) can be altogether certain: 2. That those books were written in their entirety by the dictation of the Holy Spirit, and not, on the contrary, by certain impostors and wicked or scurrilous men. I respond, 1: The testimonies of Sacred Scripture itself cited above in Thesis 1 are especially these: the Second Epistle of Peter, chapter 1, verse 21; the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 2, verse 13; Exodus, chapter 17, verse 14; Jeremiah 30, verse 2, and 36, verse 2; Apocalypse 1, verse 19; Isaiah 8, verse 1; the Second Epistle to Timothy, chapter 3, verse 16; John, chapter 14, verse 17; etc. Unless these merit credence with our Jesuit as a Christian, let him, unworthy of the Christian name, await from us another method of response, provided he has taught us that those divine testimonies, with the Reasons taken from and by their sanctity, infallibility, origin, and Author, confirmation, matter, style, and other circumstances, are not sufficient or suitable, which hitherto such noble and strenuous defenders of Christianity have felicitously used against its most bitter enemies whatever. Let the Jesuit see even his one Robert Bellarmine, in book 1 On the Word of God, etc. I respond, 2: The unanimous consensus and doctrine of the Fathers inculcates that the Books of Sacred Scripture were written by the dictation of the Holy Spirit. The Jesuit can see in addition to the things said above: Augustine, in two whole books Against the Adversary of the Law and the Prophets, which are apt for the matter and are in Volume 6 of his works; likewise book 1 of On the Consensus of the Evangelists, chapter 35; likewise Against Faustus the Manichean, book 32, chapter 21, and sermon 31 on the words of the Lord; The City of God, book 11, chapter 3, and Sermon 2 on Psalm 90, etc., which we saw above in book 6 of the Confessions, chapter 5. Tertullian, Against Heretics, chapters 22, 23, 24, etc.; likewise the Apology, chapter 18, etc. Origen, On First Principles, book 1, chapter 1. Justin Martyr, in his Exhortation to the Greeks. Irenaeus, book 3, chapter 1. Athanasius, in his Rescript to Liberius. Gregory the Great, in the Preface to Job, and book 4, Epistle 84, and all the other things we saw above, especially from those Fathers who wrote against Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian. From which it is abundantly evident that it is and is acknowledged as the genuine word of God which is written in these very books, and so the

same cannot be said not to have been written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. If the Jesuit derogates credibility from them, let him know now that he clamors to us, deaf to the Fathers as co-principles, in whom he himself does not want to place credence; but if he prefers to assent to them, now there is agreement between us about the Question. I respond, 3: Here all those Pontifical Doctors and Writers should have been recalled by me from the places cited, establishing this divine, not fraudulent or impious, writing of the sacred books; but I will not do what has been done; although I could review here very many sentences specifically making this point. They can be seen: Gabriel Biel, On the Canon of the Mass, Lecture 71; Salmeron, Prologues 25 and 26; Serarius, Prolegomena, chapter 4, Question 21; Lorinus the Jesuit, on Acts of the Apostles, chapter 22; Robert Bellarmine, book 4 On the Word of God, chapter 4, and book 1, chapter 2; Thomas Aquinas, Summa, Part 1, Question 1, Article 8; Cardinal Baronius, Volume 1, on the year of Christ the Lord 41, section 18; Baptista Mantuanus, chapter 33 of book 3 On Patience, near the end. And all the others, who above, with the whole consensus of the church and of Christendom, both in the East and in the West, affirm the same thing here altogether consonantly with the word of God itself. If our Jesuit Questioner wants to be a member of the Catholic Christian church, he cannot dissent in such a serious matter; and if he dissents, he can no longer be called a Christian, not even analogically, nor even equivocally.

The third question and problem is: Whether a Christian relying on the books of sacred Scripture alone (with all authority and confirmation of the church, fathers, traditions, etc., excluded) can be altogether certain: 3. That the books of Sacred Scripture have nowhere been corrupted by the interval of time? I respond, 1: To this Sacred Scripture thus responds: Matthew, chapter 5, verse 18; the First Epistle of Peter, chapter 1, verse 25; Isaiah, chapter 40, verse 8; Luke, chapter 16, verse 17; Isaiah, chapter 55, verse 11; etc. If our Questioner acquiesces to these, now the Problem is outside of controversy; but if he chooses to kick against the goad, there is that which he should hear from us further. I respond, 2: If it is permissible for me to call upon the Fathers again to respond to this Jesuitic question, let the Jesuit hear the weighty saying of Jerome in his Commentary on Isaiah, chapter 6, where he also names Origen, whom see also now in the Canticle of Canticles. But Augustine, in book 15 of The City of God, chapter 13, and book 18, chapter 18; Athanasius in his Synopsis; Hilary in the Preface on the Psalms; Theodoret, book 1 On the Faith; and very many others, to the citing of whom lest I create nausea, let me have recourse to the one Sixtus of Siena, where I may detain our Questioner, evidently in book 7 of his Bibliotheca Selecta, and book 2, chapter 22, where he demonstrates the uncontaminated, true, sincere, and faithful Codex to have endured by the reading of twelve and more Fathers, both before and after the times of Jerome. To which I add other Doctors of the pontifical religion: Driedo, book 2 On Scripture and Ecclesiastical Dogmas, likewise On the Translation of Scripture, book 2; Genebrard on Psalm 21, likewise Chronicles, book 2, on the year of the world 3560, likewise the year 3638, and the year 3666, etc.; Possevinus, Bibliotheca Selecta, book 2, chapter 39; James Bonfrerius the Jesuit, Prolegomena on the Pentateuch, chapter 12, section 5; Salmeron, Prologue 9, canon 4; Louis de Tena, book 2 On Scripture, difficulty 3, section 4; Joseph A Costa, On the Christian Revelation, book 2, chapter 16; Louis Vives, on the words of Augustine, The City of God, chapter 13; Marcus Marinus, in the Preface to the Treasury; Arias Montanus, Preface to the Interlinear Bible; Andradius, Defense of the Council of Trent, book 4; Simon Muis, Professor of Hebrew at Paris, in the Prolegomena to his Commentary on the

Psalms. Add Santes Pagninus, Cajetan, Jerome ab Oleastro, Sanders, etc. The crown of all these let Robert Bellarmine the Jesuit conclude, in book 2 On the Word of God, chapter 7, and chapter 2, and 1, etc. The sayings, testimonies, and praises of all these in defense of the truth we exhibited word for word to our Jesuit Questioner, and urgently required and finally require him either to support or to oppose their judgment, so that the controversy may be ended for us, or we may prepare ourselves for a further Response to a man who is neither a Roman papist nor a heretic, but an Atheist, an Epicurean, a Libertine, a Manichean.

4. The fourth question and problem is: Whether a Christian relying on the books of sacred Scripture alone (with all authority and confirmation of the church, fathers, traditions, etc., excluded) can be altogether certain: 4. That a Saracen cannot demonstrate just as firmly that the Koran of Muhammad is the word of God, as a Christian relying on the books of sacred Scripture alone (with all alien testimony excluded) demonstrates and proves? etc. I respond, 1: Sacred Scripture thus responds: Epistle to the Romans, chapter 1, verse 16; First to the Corinthians, chapter 1, verse 18; John, chapter 5, verse 39; Psalm 19 and 119 throughout; First to Timothy, chapter 1, verse 15; First of Peter 1, verse 25; First to the Thessalonians 2, verse 33; to the Colossians 1, verse 2; John 14, verse 24; Second to the Corinthians 6, verse 7; to the Ephesians 1, verse 13; to the Philippians 2, verse 16; the Gospel of John, chapter 6, verse 68; etc. If the Jesuit asserts that all these things are equally congruent in each case to the Koran of the Saracens and to the Sacred Scripture of the Christians when weighed in the equal scale of truth, now let him allow that we deal with him as with a Saracen; but if as a Christian he prefers to deny it, now there is no reason why a Christian should molest a Christian with similar questions for the sake of a Saracen and his weapons. I respond, 2: The Fathers have thus supported Sacred Scripture and never ceased to defend it assiduously: Augustine, book 26 of the Confessions, chapter 5; likewise the book On the Usefulness of Believing, to Honoratus, chapter 16, and Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called Fundamental, chapter 14; Against the Donatists, chapter 3. Jerome, Epistle to Paula and Urbica, etc. Chrysostom, on chapter 1 of the Epistle to the Galatians. Origen, On First Principles, book 4, chapter 1. Junilius, On the Parts of the Divine Law, book 2, chapter 27. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, book 3, chapter 19. Ambrose, to Gratian the Emperor. Theodoret, on chapter 34 of Ezekiel, etc. Cassiodorus, Divine Institutes, book 1, chapter 16, etc., which we saw above in Thesis 1. To which it is no objection to have joined and numbered in one operation certain Doctors of the Papal religion. They can be seen: Gregory of Valence, Analysis of the Faith, book 1, chapter 25, from Clement of Alexandria and Lactantius; Baptista Mantuanus, book 3 On Patience, chapter 32, etc.; Peter of Ailly, on book 1 of the Sentences, article 3, folio 46; Gerson, book On the Examination of Doctrines, part 2, Consideration 1, Volume 1, folio 105; Melchior Cano, book 2 On Theological Commonplaces, chapter 8; Malderus, Bishop of Antwerp, On the Object of Faith, question 1, section 8; Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, on book 3 of the Sentences, Distinction 24, *Question 1 fol. 196. Driedo, lib. 4.de Dogmat. variis &libr. Apoc.cap. 4. Bellarmine, in the places cited above. If our Inquirer wishes to insist on these matters with us, and to follow the manner of their teachings; now, if he has valiantly refuted questions unworthy of both atheists and Christians, and with pious embrace, let him kiss the divine word itself, the beginning and foundation of our faith, with us.*

5. We have already taught our Skeptical-Libertine Questioner, an enemy and adversary of Scripture, in what way he must cross over to the party of the Atheists and Infidels, having abjured the name of Christian, if the line of arguments from and with the Fathers, Scholastics, and all Christian theologians is to be drawn up against him. But if he does not want to give himself to such a shameful precipice, let him cease hereafter to test Christians, however much they may dissent from him, with the weapons and insignia of atheists and infidels. However, so that they may see all the more clearly that the man has been driven to the vertigoes of the Skeptics, we exhibit here the author's counter-questions, as it were parodically put back to him. To which when he will have responded, let him know that by the same method his questions have now been answered. Moreover, our counter-questions were: 1. Whether the Roman popes or papal councils (for example, Trent) can certainly and firmly rely on their dogmas, decrees, traditions, with all testimony and all inspiration of the Holy Spirit excluded, or all internal persuasion, conviction, and assurance made through the special grace of God, whether cooperating or preoperating. 2. But if the popes and papal councils are said to have persuasions of this kind from the Holy Spirit, it is asked whence the aforementioned popes and councils can first know in themselves with certainty that the persuasions and inspirations are from the Holy Spirit and not from the devil, or their own corrupt nature; secondly, convincing all others with certainty and evidence, who do not acquiesce to the papal decrees (such as are the Reformed, Armenians, Greeks, and the rest of the Easterners, besides the Jews, Saracens, Pagans), that their persuasions just mentioned are from the Holy Spirit and not from the devil? 3. Whether the Jesuit questioner, or any Roman Catholics receiving the papal decrees as infallible, have that faith and knowledge of theirs (which all the Reformed, etc., indeed even the Jews, Saracens, Pagans lack, although to many of them the same dogmas are speciously proposed as worthy of belief) from the instinct of the devil, or from the deception of their own corrupt nature, or from the illumination of the Holy Spirit and the cooperation of divine grace. 4. But if he or they say the latter (as we judge they will say), it is asked: Whether and whence they can be certain in themselves, and at the same time convincingly prove to all who contradict, that that Roman Catholic faith or persuasion of theirs, which they have in their heart, is from the Holy Spirit as from the first truth and author of all truth, and not from the devil, or their own corrupt nature? 5. Whether and whence a Roman Catholic, relying on the Tridentine decrees alone, and the decisions of the popes, and the dogmas and consensus of the fathers, and ecclesiastical traditions, and the books of sacred Scripture, can be certain that all those things were written by the genuine fathers, decreed by the genuine Tridentine and other papal councils, decided by the genuine popes, handed down by the Catholic Church; and none of them were fabricated and obtruded in the name of ecclesiastical tradition, the Fathers, Councils, Popes, by Impostors and Scoundrels? More questions of this kind could be proposed to our Jesuit and his allies; to which if they dare to respond (as I judge they will not dare), they would see themselves manifestly driven to a circle, a vertigo, a contradiction, and self-condemnation. But these will have sufficed. We add: The method which we use against Atheists, Gentiles, Saracens, Libertines consists in these three things, and the papists are also accustomed and ought to use the same method and no other against the said adversaries. (See Possevinus, Johannes Andreas Maurus, Guadagnolus, Thomas à Jesu, and other antagonists of the Gentiles and Mohammedans.) 1. That the arguments which they oppose to our principle, that is, to sacred Scripture, may be resolved. Thomas alone commends this in Part 1, Question 1, Article 8, etc. 2. That we may

assail their principles, which they have or put forward (for example, the Koran), and from the falsities, absurdities, and contradictions occurring therein, prove that they are not divine, given by God, certain, infallible. 3. That by certain persuasions and reasons taken a posteriori, likewise by deductions to the absurd, finally by arguments ad hominem, with whatever probabilities added, we may lead them to the recognition of the authority of sacred Scripture and at the same time of the Christian truth. See this last method in the common places on the Authority of Scripture and in the ancient and more recent writers, especially the papists, for the truth of the faith against Atheists, Skeptics, Gentiles, Epicureans, Saracens, Jews, Enthusiasts, and Libertines. The students may look for those writers in the theological library of the renowned President.

COROLLARIES

Related
1. Whether all the dogmas of religion or theological theses and conclusions must be shown to be described in express words in the Scriptures? It is denied.
2. Whether whole syllogisms with rules of consequences must be shown there for the refutation of false dogmas? It is denied.
3. Whether all determinations of cases of conscience in moral doubts, all hypothetical reprehensions of sins, and all applications of preachers must be exhibited there in so many words. It is denied. This way would finally lead us to the precipices of Libertinism, Skepticism, Atheism, as has been shown by the renowned President in the disputation on human reason in matters of faith, and fully and learnedly by Vedelius in his Rational Theology.

ON ATHEISM

Respondent: GUALTERUS de BRUYN of Amersfoort
For the 22nd of June, 1639

Although the subtitle on atheism and atheists can also be referred to the title on the Church, where they are reckoned among the enemies, and to the first precept of the Decalogue where it is opposed to religion by defect, nevertheless we judge it not out of place here, where it is customary to treat of God and the demonstration of deity in the course of common topics. Sacred Scripture makes mention of atheism and atheists in Psalms 10, 14, 53, 94, Malachi 3, Job 21, Ephesians 2, etc. And theologians everywhere: 1. All the didactics in the common topics on God and the knowledge of God. 2. The writers of natural theology, along with the metaphysicians. 3. The polemicists, especially those who defend the truth of the Christian religion. 4. The writers on heresies; to whom add the Directories of the Inquisitors. 5. The casuists and moralists, under the title on Religion, and in the explication of the first commandment. 6. The practical ascetics, under the title on Repentance. See among others Johannes Taffinus in his book On the Emendation of Life. 7. The commentators on the places of Scripture just cited, and others. 8. Indeed even the political writers, along with the jurists. Besides this, the universal experience of all times, especially the most recent, to such an extent

that you may see atheisms being promoted and spread everywhere not only by secret machinations, but also by published books, voices, and dissertations, as will be clear below from history. However, since atheism and superstition are two extremes of ignorance, as Clement of Alexandria says in his Protrepticus, page 12, Heinsius edition of 1616, we must especially combat the former. Therefore, let it seem strange to no one if we cast this diatribe onto paper, and instruct our students according to our capacity for detecting and routing those pests more successfully, especially since most learned and friendly men have long demanded such a thing from us, to whom it would be wrong to deny this. There is also another use of this diatribe, which Hyperius indicates in his Common Topics, book 1, title on God, page 74: "Moreover," he says, "as often as some are led by the cunning of Satan in temptations and dangers to doubt whether there is any God, it is therefore necessary," etc. We pray God that while our minds are occupied in examining and agitating those furies and madnesses, He may confirm them by His Spirit in the truth and so make them tremble at His word, lest they be polluted by impure thoughts or infested by Satanic injections. Moreover, this diatribe of ours will have: 1. Some didactic things, describing the nature and properties of atheism thetically, so to speak. 2. Polemical things, deciding controversies. 3. Practical things, indicating the uses of this doctrine and theological counsels. 4. Historical things, touching upon both some ancient and some recent things about atheists.

1. The word "atheists" and "atheism" has a wide meaning: for either it is said only catachrestically or equivocally, or it is truly such, and that more or less. In the former way, Julian the Apostate called Christianity "atheism," according to Sozomen, book 5, chapter 15, because they had not preserved the received religion, of course. And before Julian, already from the beginning of Christianity its followers were commonly traduced as atheists among the Gentiles, as is clear from Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 7, page 504, and especially from the apology of Athenagoras. So also today the papists impute atheism to our people, as Possevinus, Bibliotheca Selecta, book 8; Claudius de Sainctes, in a special treatise; Chicotius, against Cuvilli; Campanella, in Atheism Defeated; Mersenne, in his commentary on Genesis; and very many others, about whom more below in the problems. Indeed, they also commonly traduce some of their own as atheists under the name of Politiques, especially those French Gallicans who have not given themselves over to the nods of the Roman Curia, as can be seen, among other things, in the book of the Jesuit Garasse against Etienne Pasquier, councillor and royal advocate, published in French in the year 1622 under the title Recherches, and in the book of the Jesuits Richeome and Felix de la Grace, titled La Chasse du Renard Pasquin, compared with the Apology for the same Pasquier published by his sons, book 4, pages 673, 731, where a dictionary of sayings and calumnies is exhibited. Thus those of the Hispanic party are greeted as atheists by French theologians - the French, the Venetians, and all others who did not favor the counsels and endeavors of the House of Austria. To which the author of the Vindiciae Gallicae against Patrick of Armagh, chapter 29, retorts by accusing the Spanish of atheism. Jérémie Ferrier, at that time a papist but formerly a professor and preacher at Nîmes, replies that "whoever is not a political Catholic, that is, a political Catholic, is a traitor to his country, a hypocrite, an enemy of God and the divine word, indeed an impious man and an atheist." In a treatise titled Catholique d'Estat, published separately in octavo and later in the year 1640 with other treatises under the title Recueil de diverses pièces pour servir à l'histoire. But leaving

aside this calumnious signification for now, we here understand an atheist as one who is truly such, who directly or indirectly removes the knowledge, faith, and worship of God from himself or others. I gather this description from Psalm 10, verses 6, 11, 13, and 14:1, 36:2, Job 21:14-15, Ephesians 2:12, compared with 1 Thessalonians 4:5; 1 Corinthians 15:32, 34; 2 Peter 3. And certainly Beza saw in his notes on Ephesians 2:12 that the appellation of "atheist" should not be restricted in such a way as some indeed want: "There are," he says, "many kinds of atheists. One is of those who do not acknowledge any divinity at all. Another is of those who worship completely fictitious gods in place of the true deity. A third is of those who indeed acknowledge that true God, but not of such a kind as He is, but such as they imagine Him to be," etc. Clement of Alexandria, although in Stromata 7, page 504, he strictly defined an atheist as "one who does not think there is a God," nevertheless in his Protrepticus, page 11, shows that this word should be taken more broadly, and applies it to the sacred rites of the Gentiles: "I rightly call them atheists, who have been ignorant of Him who truly is God, but shamelessly worship a boy torn apart by the Titans," etc., "being held by a twofold atheism," etc. Add Suidas, cited below. Plato, in dialogue 10 of the Laws, near the end, makes six kinds of atheists that should be restrained by public authority. Of the more recent authors, Estienne Pasquier, in his Recherches de la France, book 3, chapter 8, lists three kinds. Compare also Vossius, book 1 of On Idolatry, chapter 3, and the addenda on page 1, number 20. But I refrain from this superfluous proof from the authors to be cited everywhere.

2. An atheist and ἄθεος or ἄγνωστος (which word is frequent among the pagan authors and once in Scripture, Ephesians 2:12) is variously called: 1. A fool, senseless, in Psalm 14:1; wicked, in Job 21:7. 3. Ἀπόθεός in Sophocles' Thyestes, and ἀνοσίως in the same author's Electra, as indeed the Scholiast expounds it. 4. Profane, in Hebrews 12:16; ἀνόητος in Lucian; ἄθεος in Plutarch; ἄνομος in Philo, book 3 of On the Life of Moses. They are commonly called Epicureans, a denomination taken from a certain grade of atheism. 6. And Libertines, likewise from a species and certain mode, about which elsewhere. The Jesuits, in The Image of the First Century, book 6, page 800, call Libertines "free," whom they make the same there as atheists. 7. Moreover, atheism is called synecdochically "Cyclopism," because like the Cyclopes, they have no care for piety and honesty. Thus they are called "giants," "God-fighters." 8. Today in France they are called "Deists." See Henri Estienne, preface to the Apology for Herodotus, chapter 14, and Mersenne, a theologian of the order of Minims of St. Paul, in his commentary on Genesis, where he defines them as those who, while pretending to have some knowledge of the deity, nevertheless deny His providence and justice. We add: either the immortality of the soul, or the infernal punishments after this life. The same Mersenne professedly exposes and refutes them in a French book published in the year 1630, in octavo, titled Questions rares et curieuses théologiques, naturelles, morales, politiques, etc., Paris, by Pierre Billaine, where on pages 112 and 146 the author Mersenne reveals himself sufficiently, although he conceals his name. The atheism of the Deists conspires with that of the Socinians and their allies, who have published those trifles in our language with an appendix in Belgium. See our catechization on question 105 of the Remonstrant Catechism. 9. Of Lucian, Aretino, Rabelais, who in their example hiss at all religion. 10. In France, in the vernacular, by a mystical cabala or term of that fury used by the initiates and devotees, "Degrués," by which they imply that they are not cranes ["grues"], that is, not easily deceived. That this is the meaning of the Deists, and of that French

proverbial phrase ("je ne suis point grue"), the great theologian André Rivet taught me by letter. The same Deists call themselves "Esprits forts," who are confirmed, of course, to believe nothing more, or who have now reached perfection in believing nothing. 11. They are also called by a synecdochic denomination "Politiques" (how truly or accurately I do not here discuss), and markedly "Machiavellians," so that "Libertine," "Atheist," and "Politique" are synonyms. Cornelius a Lapide, on Hebrews 11:6: "But if then someone is an atheist or a politique who thinks God does not care for human affairs," etc. And on 2 Timothy 3:9, he says that "Lutheranism and Calvinism turn into atheism, and their followers become Libertines and politiques." Compare Lensaeus, Stapleton, Contzen cited below.

3. So that we may know the grades and species of atheists, we divide atheism into proper and participated. The latter is when someone by counsel, permission, command, or in any other way by which one is a participant in another's sin, promotes atheism. But among the other modes, that one excels when someone by curious and unhealthy disputations against their own sense persuades another of atheism, and does so in order to obtain something from others which they believe they cannot obtain in any other way, or in order to appear subtle, learned, and eloquent above others. Mersenne, in his commentary on Genesis 1, verse 1, page 226, does not want these to be called true atheists. But they are certainly to be called such, just as participated idolatry or magic is truly such, although distinct from other species. We think Cardinal Du Perron was not averse to this participated atheism (what he was of proper atheism, we will not say here; perhaps below. In the meantime, see, if you have the leisure, our Desperate Cause of the Papacy, book 3, section 2, chapter 10), who, when he had proved in a speech before Henry III, King of France, that there is a God, offered on the following day to prove the contrary, if it pleased the King; for which reason he was ordered to leave the court. Proper atheism is either direct or indirect, that is, interpretative. Direct atheism is when someone endeavors, as far as is in himself, to extinguish all knowledge, sense, and faith of the deity in his heart, to the point that he strives for ἀθεΐαν, indeed sometimes wants to persuade both himself and others that he has reached it. And we will show in the polemical part below that this is the highest and most perfect grade of atheism. Indirect atheism is when someone by necessary consequence goes about to overturn all knowledge and sense of God. And it is either theoretical or practical. Practical atheism is: 1. when someone by the very profession of religion and piety denies or neglects the care and exercises of it, even external ones, as useless. Such can especially be called Deists, Epicureans, Lucianists, Libertines, Profane. To this class we refer the enthusiasts and zealots of the spirit, especially the Henric-Nicolaites, David-Jorists. About whom see Marnix, Lord of Saint-Aldegonde, Ubbo Emmius, Casparus Grevinchoven, etc. 2. When someone denies or neglects the profession and external exercises of the true religion, although they profess some religion. And thus all pagans are called atheists in Ephesians 2, and sinners κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν in Galatians 2. In nearly the same way Mohammedans, Jews, and those sectarians among Christians, both ancient and new, who come closest to those apostates. 3. When someone denies God and religion not so much by sense or profession as by life, morals, and practice, in 2 Timothy 3:2-5, Psalm 14:1-2. About such today there is the innumerable complaint of preachers and theologians. I will write down the words of the most perspicacious and pious Perkins, Works, volume 2, page 446, in the second part of the explication of Christ's Sermon on the Mount, on Matthew 6:24: "Use 2. Hence the atheism of this age, which abounds

everywhere, is made manifest to us; for to despise and hate God is pure and undefiled atheism. But now those who withdraw their hearts from God and devote themselves wholly to this world, with the commandments of God forgotten and their obedience excused, are judged despisers and haters of God, according to Christ the Judge; but everything is full of these." I know indeed that these men are very indignant to be called atheists (note well), but it does not matter how much they are esteemed by the world, for until they have corrected these wicked morals, Christ will not consider them better. Scultetus complains in his Isaiah 22, sermon 1, page 274, that there are many such ulcers today in our churches. To this class can be referred those who are neutral and indifferent to the acceptance and profession of any religion, and who use religion like a coin - now they affirm, now they deny, simulate, dissimulate - about whom it is truly said: "All religion, no religion." But they are called "Neutrals," "Eceboliuses," "Vertumnuses," "Buskins." 4. Of this kind are especially the disciples of Machiavelli, pseudo-politiques, pseudo-courtiers, and the χαρίεντες of that ilk, minions of the popular breeze and ambition. 5. Add the minions of gluttony, whose God is their belly, Philippians 3, who are φιλήδονοι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόθεοι, 2 Timothy 3, pigs from the herd of Epicurus, whose highest piety is this: "Let us eat and drink," etc., 1 Corinthians 15. 6. Finally, the minions of avarice, who are described in 1 Timothy 6, Ephesians 5, Colossians 3. Among whom the English theologians Topsell in his Joel, sermon 10, and Kellet, book 2 of his Theological Miscellanies, page 9, page 50, designate by this name those who usurp ecclesiastical goods and do not give to God what is God's. 7. Lastly, flatterers and liars, especially courtiers, whom the celebrated pontifical theologian Contzen calls atheists in his Aulicus, chapter 21, and Chavasse in his On Perfect Prudence, book 2, chapter 3. Compare Filesac's treatise On Political Idolatry. Indirect theoretical atheism is when someone by a true and solid consequence denies God and takes away deity. This again is twofold, either primary or secondary. Primary atheism is when: 1. the consequence is immediate, as for example, if someone denies all providence of God, he denies God by a proximate and immediate consequence. So if someone denies that God is just, immune from all sin, etc. Thus the Epicureans are commonly called atheists. 2. When there is a generality of the denied antecedent, because it is a general principle of religion, as if someone denies the divinity of Scripture along with the pagans and other outsiders, or calls it into doubt along with the papists; or if he denies the natural light and its certitude, which nevertheless after the Scriptures is the principle of all knowledge of things both divine and human; which the ancient and more recent Skeptics, Pyrrhonists, Academics do, to whose madnesses no little midwifery is given by the presumed new method of the Jesuits Arnauld, Verron, etc. We censured this in the Disputation on Human Reason in Matters of Faith. Compare Vedelius' Rational Faith, book 1, chapter 5. Perhaps the most learned Mersenne had respect to the same thing when, under the name of Matthias Flacius Illyricus, he proves with such zeal and labor that there are natural notions and a law of nature in man, in chapter 1, verse 1, folios 225 to 279. I hope he will see at some point that the weapons are eagerly supplied to the atheists not by the heretics, as he calls them, but by the papists. About which more below in the problems. Illyricus himself, in his disputation against Strigelius, page 313, concedes that there is some light in man, which is some divinity and power above man. 3. When there is a generality of the denied consequents or conclusions, by which God is denied. Thus, for example, if someone denies all or most of the attributes of God, he consequently denies God. 4. When by a consequence not only certain and proximate, but also evident by the light of nature, deity is denied, for example, when someone denies God's

foreknowledge. Secondary atheism is when the consequence is indeed certain by the light of nature, but not so proximate and evident, as when the mode of God's immensity, immutability, the immortality of the soul, the restoration of bodies is denied; by the denial of which mode the thing itself is understood to be denied. And in this sense we concede that Becanus, in his Manual and writings against Vorstius, not undeservedly calls certain of his errors "atheisms." See Becanus' first little treatise against Vorstius, where he says that these atheisms are now taught by the Calvinists, etc., and his other treatise On God and the Divine Attributes published in the year 1611 at Mainz, where on the title page these words appear: "And the new atheisms of the Calvinists (he means Vorstius) are refuted." The same is done by Grawer the Lutheran. Of the philosophers of our religion, Georg Eglisem imputes atheism to Vorstius in his Crisis and Hypocrisy of the Vorstian Response. And Matthaeus Sladus, in part 1 of his Scholastic Disceptations, prescribes such a title: "On the blasphemies, heresies, and atheisms of Vorstius noted by the most serene and most powerful James, King of Great Britain, etc." Indeed, King James himself, in his Declaration on the cause of Vorstius, by the words and mouth of his legate ascribes this epiphonema to the novelties of Vorstius: "The fool has said in his heart, 'There is no God.'" All his censors and antagonists everywhere attribute skepticism to the same Vorstius: Sladus in the preface to the book just cited, Pareus in the epistle there, Lubbertus, and others. Their antagonists contend that atheism is promoted by the Socinians and other anti-Trinitarians, among others Wigand, whom Prateolus cites and approves in his work On Heresies under the entry "Athei." Vedelius imputes the same to the Remonstrants, book 1 of the Secrets of Arminianism, chapter 1. Which book, approved by the renowned Leiden theologians, was afterward defended by Vedelius in the three following parts. See part 4, book 2, the penultimate chapter. And this division of atheisms. Each atheism, both direct and indirect, could be distributed otherwise and variously: 1. From the causes. Thus some are those who proceed from practice to theory, and attack the latter from the former; others, on the contrary, corrupt practice from seduction and bad theory. Some are called Epicureans from their authors, others Machiavellians, others Rabelaisians, others Lucianists, etc. Again, some who by curiosity and vanity of intellect; others who by depraved affections and desires of leisure, sloth, novelty, pleasures, avarice, ambition, vengeance, etc., are propelled into atheism or propel others. 2. From the subject: some are of a more theoretical or artificial genius, such as those among physicians, philosophers, mathematicians, architects, grammarians, rhetoricians, poets, who make little or no account of the worship of God, or assail the deity, or call it into doubt. Others are of a more practical genius, such as the profane among politicians, jurists, military men, ecclesiastics (or if you prefer, politico-theologians and politico-ecclesiastics), in which kind not a few popes, cardinals, bishops, and other pseudo-clerics excel, especially Roman curials; about whom see the domestic testimonies collected by Illyricus in his Catalogue, and Mornay in his Mystery of Iniquity. To which I add the recent words of Pierre Matthieu, the French historian, in his History of Henry IV, book 7, narrative 2, 5, 8: "The minds of some in Italy are quite libertine, who want to have and believe faith only in their own opinions, to worship God according to their established custom, to submit everything to their judgment and faith, and the closer they are to the Pope, the less they care about the Vatican thunderbolt. They place their opinion about the soul in delights and pleasures, and have it as a grain of salt, which keeps the body safe from corruption, and they focus solely on this, lest they should appear to be men." The marginal notes and mottos written there are: "Atheistic and libertine minds," and, "Atheists persuade

themselves that the soul does not exist, nor is there any Rhadamanthus as the judge and discerner of vices." Let the papists henceforth cease to accuse Calvin of lying because in book 4 of the Institutes, chapter 7, section 27, he objected to something similar in the papal court. 3. From adjuncts, states, and vocations of men. Thus some are princes and magnates; others courtiers and ministers of kings or kingdoms; others nobles; others merchants; others scholars and academics; others plebeians, laymen, etc. 4. From quantity, both intensively and extensively, that is, from integrating parts, grades, etc. Thus some are atheists in becoming, others in being; some are whole and perfect, or total, others partial, according as they pretend the faith either of few or of none; some are more modest or moderate, others open, audacious, and stoutly wicked; some are leaders and seducers, others seduced; some under the appearance and pretense of religion or some peculiar sect, others without any such palliation; some who nominally and perpetually in the impugnation of this or that article, for example, of the immortality of the soul, divine providence, resurrection, divine justice or wisdom, the authority of Scripture, etc., betray the sense or teaching of their atheism, others on the contrary universally pretend the τὸ ψεῦδος of things divine and natural.

The divisions of atheism or atheists could be instituted in another way: so that it may be 1. Crass, when they either assail God, or at least God's providence, or the fear and worship of the deity, or call it into doubt, or do not admit and constantly profess it. Here refer the brutal ignorance of divine things; besides this, Cyclopean and ferocious contempt. 2. Subtle and palliated, or hidden, when the divine attributes and what the true God is, or the true God, or who that true God is, is denied in the manner of the Gentiles, Mohammedans, Jews; or religion or the reason for worshipping God is indirectly denied, whether in whole, or as to the principal part, or as to a great part, in Psalm 94, Malachi 3, 1 Corinthians 15, 2 Peter 3; or at least it is not cared for. Caspar Barth, book 10 of his Adversaria, chapter 6, at the end, calls Mohammedanism "a farrago of diabolical atheisms." What is to be decided about present-day Judaism will be clear from Buxtorf's Jewish Synagogue, compared with Vedelius' erudite diatribe On the God of the Synagogue. The text of 2 John, verse 9, is relevant here: "Whoever transgresses and does not abide in the doctrine of Christ does not have God." All who deny or assail the true religion are reckoned among the atheists by William of Assonville in his Atheomastix, published at Antwerp in 1599. But I desire greater faithfulness in him in the application of the thesis to some hypotheses. 3. Most subtle or interpretative; and that either indirect or participated. In this signification, Mersenne, in his aforementioned French book against the Deists, calls Charron into suspicion of atheism, who nevertheless professedly disputed against the atheists in his French treatise On the Three Truths, book 1, chapters 3 to 12. Today's Jesuits (among whom Delrio, book 2, question 26, section 1 of his Disquisitions on Magic) openly decorate Erasmus with the title of "the Batavian Lucian." Atheisms are everywhere imputed to the Reformed by the papists, as will be said below. The Remonstrants, in their Apology, chapter 2, folios 42-43, and in their Response to the Excerpts of the Professors of Leiden, page 88, dared to burden the common opinion of Christians about God's immensity with the consequence of atheism. The same is almost shouted about the whole Reformed religion, which asserts the grace of God against the Pelagians. With what truth and with what charity these appellations, suspicions, and consequences are formed, I do not here determine; it suffices to have shown that the various and multiple use of this word extends far and wide

among common writers, although they err in the application of the thesis to the hypothesis. Moreover, indirect atheisms are either external or oral, or secret and internal in the thoughts of men - which are either formed and with victory (but these are rather to be referred to the crasser ones), or unformed and without victory (at least total or final), and these voluntary (for we do not here number the involuntary ones through mere injections and obtrusions of the demon), whether in themselves or in their cause, when thoughts and doubts creep in against God, providence, the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, eternal life, infernal torments, the authority of Scripture, etc. The palliated and indirect atheisms, and indeed the external or oral ones, are considered either collectively or individually. The former are by way of a sect and peculiar profession, and that either theological or religious, such as Sadduceeism, Manichaeism, Libertinism, and after it Socinianism; or philosophical, such as Skepticism and Pyrrhonism, Epicureanism, Stoicism. Concerning the latter two there is the judgment of Cornelius a Lapide in his commentary on Acts 17:18: "From what has been said it is clear that both the Stoics and the Epicureans had their atheisms, and in reality were atheists, indeed polytheists, and therefore more atheists." About Skepticism we will perhaps warn in three words below. The latter are those which are judged to lie in one or another heretical theological or philosophical opinion. Thus atheism is imputed to Aristotle by Tycho Brahe, in Claramontius, book 15 On the Universe, chapter 20. Concerning other monstrosities of opinions, and the jests of petulant minds in subverting the principles of disciplines and forging novelties, Melanchthon, and with him the University of Wittenberg, think as follows, volume 1 of their Consilia, page 200: "Let them not bring forward, or approve, or defend profane opinions contumelious against God, as many philosophers in the gymnasia of other nations want to be reckoned philosophers by this one thing, because they dare to defend the Epicurean or other madnesses," etc. And a little later: "Let not the professors of philosophy be a troop of giants or Cyclopes furiously sporting by feigning opinions, just as the giants contended by heaping up mountains." Thus the theologians of Heidelberg, in the year 1610, in an epistle to their Belgian brothers concerning the cause of Conrad Vorstius, called Nicolaus Taurellus an atheist on account of his absurd and dangerous philosophical opinions and novelties. We related above what the council of select cardinals complains about the professors of philosophy in Italy. Other philosophers, ascribing all things to nature, or scarcely rising above natural knowledge, are commonly called "Naturalists." Jude, verse 19: ψυχικοὶ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες. The palliated atheisms that are more practical in kind are all formalists and crass hypocrites, about whom we treat in the disputation On Simplicity and Hypocrisy. In species they are: 1. Machiavellians and pseudo-politiques, whom the celebrated pontifical theologian Stapleton, in his academic oration Whether the Politicians of These Times Should Be Considered in the Number of Christians, thus describes: "Politicians are those who put the care of private and public affairs before religion, and thus consider religion itself of no account, and impose a most honorable garment of polity and civil prudence upon this so perspicuous impiety, so that those who are atheists are called politicians." Compare Lensaeus' oration Against Those Who Falsely Call Themselves Patriots, pages 36-37, where he calls them Libertines. Adam Contzen, the Jesuit, in book 2 of his Politicorum, chapter 14: "Atheists who administer the Republic are glad to be called politicians, by an altogether false name," etc. "The opinion of atheists or pseudo-politicians about governing the Republic is twofold. For some openly take away not only all religion, but also all superstition. The other kind of atheists is of those who are held by no superstition themselves, but think the common folk should be pressed

by the empty terrors of divinities, add ceremonies to ceremonies for it, and gods to gods, the irreligious founders of various religions," etc. Among the political atheists the courtiers are eminent; among the courtiers, the Roman curials, especially the popes themselves. See Szegedi's Mirror of the Popes and Mornay's Mystery of Iniquity. See also, out of the courtiers' treatises, the one by Antonio de Guevara titled The Contempt of the Court. Contzen the Jesuit, in his Aulicus, says that the courtiers of Nebuchadnezzar were atheists. Gentillet, in his Antimachiavel, page 235 (French edition in 12mo), testifies that atheists were so esteemed in the courts that they were called "Gens de service." There are very many pontifical theologians who hold not only those of our profession, but also those of their own, suspect of atheism. See the anonymous Statera Against Erycius Puteanus, page 98; Corretus and Possevinus against the discourses of La Noue; Claude de Sainctes' Defense of Both Legislations, pages 38, 48; Lensaeus, On Christian Liberty. The Apology of William, Prince of Orange, attributes atheism and similar Roman arts to the Duke of Parma and his court, and to the heirs of Pier Luigi Farnese, page 66 of the Latin edition in octavo. To the so-called "politiques" are to be reckoned the neutrals, buskins, vertumni, Eceboliuses, the inept or wicked syncretists, and the like, about whom can truly be applied that common saying: "All religion, no religion." About these we note some things in the disputation On Syncretism. 2. The avaricious, who, as they are called idolaters according to the Scriptures, so also are to be called practical and indirect atheists, Ephesians 5:5, Colossians 3:5. Among those avaricious ones the usurers shine forth, about whom Luther thus complains, volume 1 of his Meditations, Counsels, etc., page 98: "Leipzig is immersed in such great avarice that it receives 345 florins annually under the guise of piety and the title of charity. To lend 100 florins to someone, they pay 1,000 florins. Is this not Epicureanism?" etc. "Ah, how bad the future times will still be! Our Epicureans are worse than the Italian cardinals, who said, 'Let us allow others to be pious, if we ourselves do not want to be.'" Ibid., page 97, he reports that a certain usurer, snatching ten from ten, said: "If you want to exercise piety, you will never become a rich man. I would more gladly take fifteen florins." We spoke above about the gluttons of ecclesiastical goods. But the moralists and casuists under the title On Sacrilege, where they exaggerate the impiety of these men, should be consulted. And perhaps we will do so elsewhere. 3. The voluptuaries and those devoted to their belly, Philippians 3. Among whom the Roman curials and the rest of the papal clergy excelled, and among these the canons, most of whom seemed to have simultaneously and at once espoused pride, avarice, and luxury, the three daughters of the devil. About whom we will perhaps exhibit many things to be collected from pontifical writers elsewhere. Luther, in the book just cited, under the title On Epicureanism in the World, page 97: "The canons of Würzburg, Mainz, and Cologne lead a most sumptuous life, in leisure and luxury without care, having all things at hand, and afterward seize heaven with the highest hilarity, evidently." Out of the papists themselves, Adriaan van Baerland, in his Dialogues published in the year 1524, in the colloquy of a canon and a philosopher, speaks quite contemptuously about them: "A canonry has fallen to me." Philosopher: "See that it not be offered as the matter for living more incontinently. You may see a great many boast of the word 'canon' who meanwhile are further from the thing itself than the east is distant from the west." Contzen also tacitly needles this idle and superfluous kind of clergy, book 6 of his Politicorum, chapter 41. More openly and freely Grotius, in his notes on Cassander under the title On Canons, page 48. And it is especially these Epicureans and idlers that some commentators have respect to in Apocalypse 9, the last verse, among whom

are the authors of the annotations to the new Dutch translation, who are to be seen. To all carnal men in general and to the pigs of Epicurus, Suidas appropriates the name and definition of "atheist" when he thus writes: "ἄθεον, from not preserving the immortality of the soul and leading it to the divine form and joining it to the divine with unbreakable and indissoluble bonds - or the opposites of these things, pulling down and dragging what is divine in us to what is earthborn and pernicious and gigantic, or to the Titanic prison." The description of Christoph Besold in his Philosophico-Theological Axioms, part 2, page 363, nearly agrees with this: "An atheist is one who believes and cares for visible things only." Compare the commentators on Philippians 3:19 and Jude, verse 19, and 2 Peter 2:12. So that from here you may see again how widely the name of "atheist" extends, and how it is attributed not only sometimes, but as for the most part, to those who do not expressly or directly deny God. Let students also compare Daniel Tilenus (by no means a stranger in this diatribe on atheism, on account of his manifold peregrination and habitation in France, as well as his various erudition and reading), volume 1 of his Syntagma, disputation 10, theses 24 and following. The various species of participated atheism can be gathered analogically from a comparison of the doctrine of the participation of sin in general, and of interpretative and participated idolatry and magic. Those who, by doing evil or not doing well, whether prudently or imprudently, promote atheism, become participants of atheism in their own way - no less than a physician who professes the medical art is guilty of injured health and life, although not willingly and knowingly, but through mere ignorance and ἀπορία, having ferociously despised the trite counsels and remedies of others and followed a new and dangerous method of medicating beyond and against art, has destroyed men. About which perhaps more below.

4. Let us now proceed to the causes of atheism. There is no need for us to speak about the principal cause, for it is undoubted that it is man, and the impelling devil. But the impelling and assisting causes are to be explained, which are either internal or external. The internal and leading ones are both the more common ones and the more special ones. The former are the corruption of fallen man and his aversion from God, and in that the blindness, vanity, pride of the human intellect, a disdain for the present and the ancient, an appetite for new things and things perceived to be least if at all possible, ἀθεΐα and the difficulty of believing, especially those things that are removed from the senses. The latter can be considered partly in the intellect, partly in the will and affections, partly in the actions proceeding from both principles. In the intellect, when someone either with the Skeptics and Pyrrhonists, whether ancient or today's, explodes, derides, calls into doubt all that is knowable, all certitude of knowledge; or by freely embracing or repudiating whatever according to one's nature, shakes off, as far as is in oneself, all natural conscience of truth, all love of it, all natural desire for knowing implanted in men (according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 1, chapter 1). The cause of this is partly envy of others' knowledge, partly despair of one's own, and that on account of their own laziness or poverty of intellect, or difficulty and defect of occasion. What they cannot expect from their intellect alone, they do not want to expect from another's; what they do not want to acquire by their own industry and labor, they deny was found by others; and when they cannot attain and learn the least part of the experience and knowledge of so many ages, or do not want to learn it through laziness and levity of mind, and yet that saying of theirs stands firmly on account of their innate pride and vanity: αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων - hence it is that, with

desperation and sadness turned into audacity and impudence, they pour out their skeptical madness upon all sciences, all inventions of the wise, dictates, writings, all academies and the most honest studies, all the gifts of God, all labors and endeavors. 2. When someone, on the contrary, by an excessive and impatient ardor for knowledge is borne into all hidden and abstruse things, and the higher he is carried, the more strongly, having been repulsed from the height of unsearchable truth, he is at last cast down into the abyss of desperate ignorance and wickedness, or is borne sideways like the wind, and disturbs and subverts the knowledge and conscience both of himself and of others. The cause of this shipwreck is that he did not want to check his intellect somewhere, to captivate it, and to feed it with learned ignorance. Although, nevertheless, mental quietation is to be sought in learned ignorance no less than in knowledge. For this too is to know, if we are certain that something cannot be known, or ought not to be investigated; for thus we safely pass by, or look down from on high upon, the errors of others in this part. But about learned ignorance we will perhaps discourse elsewhere and at another time. 3. As that impotent desire for knowing has conjoined to itself τὸ μηδὲν θαυμάζειν, so also τὸ μηδὲν πιστεύειν, when a man, of course, in the inquiry and progress of knowledge either does not transcend the terms of his own senses or of nature, or is not content with their cognition. Those of the first kind are commonly rejected by the more subtle intellects and solidly erudite as being too idiotic. Of the second kind, too many are found among the literati. For such were the philosophers, otherwise excellent mystics of nature, and physicians in Italy, who are testified not only by others, but also by their own writings, to have professed atheism not obscurely, about whom more below. To this class refer the new Sadducees, who either draw all operations and apparitions of spirits back to natural causes with averted steps and a twisted neck, or sweetly laugh at them as fables. Of the third kind are those who show their ἀμαθίαν or θεοβλάβειαν in this: that in supernatural things, which concern God and His works, and also the good or evil angels and separated souls, they do not admit anything except mathematical demonstrations, and indeed those τοῦ διότι or "most powerful," always proceeding with an equal step of certitude and evidence - although even the most accurate method of philosophizing does not reject experiences and inductions, cognitions τοῦ ὅτι, and demonstrations of an inferior grade, and such as the subject matter allows (Nicomachean Ethics, book 1, chapter 6). I add that even the common life, and thus the whole orbit of the state and the household, is sustained and carried around by the axis of bare human faith. For let the atheists and skeptics, always demanding the ἀκρίβειαν and evidence of certitude, bringing forward none themselves, say why they are truly and are called the sons and heirs of this or that magnate, noble, or honest and excellent man. Is it not because their mother said so? Here indeed is mere faith, and indeed human, whose ultimate analysis is in the affirmation of one woman, without any other proof. Here let them first exercise their cavils and sophistic quibbles before they proceed to disparaging all divine and human faith. 4. When someone does violence to τῷ νῷ or the habit of principles, and rashly denies or undermines the common principles of any science, indeed, and quibbles about the reception of these most common ones: "Nothing can be and not be at the same time," and, "Contradictories cannot be true at the same time," or ties knots of exceptions. Which happens to those who have tenaciously undertaken to defend any preconceived opinion whatever against their adversaries; who, if they do not fall into atheism themselves, at least pave the way to it for others. 2. On the part of the will and appetite, the internally impelling causes are: 1. Impatience with some defect in the affected and solidly boasted πανσοφία, whence men not infrequently

lapse into desperate counsels. 2. Elation of mind, and affectation of carnal singularity, by which it happens that men by any way, provided it is not trodden, like Herostratus, who burned down the temple of Diana, proceed to some windy bit of glory. Alexander Capellus, a theologian of Saumur, notes such an inflated bladder of vanity in his French book titled Atheism Refuted, page 32, where he calls him "a new and admirable philosopher, a greater mathematician than physicist, who wants to bring back the atoms of Democritus, etc., who demands that a certain matter be given to him, and promises that he will produce and form from it a world similar to ours." He adds in the same place: "When he will have published the demonstration just mentioned (namely, of the atoms), it will be seen whether this promise of his is as well founded as that of his teacher Archimedes, etc." 3. A ferocious and unworthy contempt of all the wise, of all illustrious inventions, of all intellects, and of the gifts of God before oneself. 4. Which contempt also extends to one's own things, which they once learned well, to such an extent that they act, or at least profess to act, so as to forget and unlearn whatever they ever learned from the writings or instruction of others, so that, of course, their miraculous intellect, like a blank tablet, may be rendered suitable for having only their own inventions and observations inscribed upon it. 3. On the part of actions emanating from those two principles, the intellect and the will, the impelling causes are chiefly these: 1. That preposterous method, when some begin from the highest or last things, that is, magisterial judgments and dictates, before they have been disciples or perceived the terms and elements - contrary to that saying of the Philosopher: "It is necessary for the learner to believe"; indeed, contrary to the admonitions of Scripture, James 3:1, 1 Corinthians 3:1-2. 2. Carnal security, a profane life, especially derision of religion and piety; who for that reason make shipwreck of the faith, 1 Timothy 1, the last verse. Calvin, in his treatise On Scandals, names that celebrated François Rabelais, and with him Dolet and Govea, out of many, whom he says were previously imbued with a taste of the truth but were struck with blindness because they had profaned that sacred pledge of eternal life with a sacrilegious audacity for ridiculing. 3. Frequent change of religion, and passing from sect to sect; thus you may see the Anabaptists, running through all or many as it were steps of their order, at last fall into the precipice of Libertinism or Atheism. The same thing has been taught by experience about the vertumni, Eceboliuses, Libertines, Enthusiasts, who, when they have plucked κορυφὰς ἀρετῶν ἁπασῶν, that is, the potherbs of all (as Luther not ineptly says of Sebastian Franck), when they have crept through them, are finally suffocated in their own. But this holds true especially in those who fall away from Christianity to Mohammedanism and Judaism, or who, having been educated among us in the true religion, or having gone over from the Papacy to us, return like dogs to their vomit. I cannot but write down the memorable saying of a celebrated Venetian theologian, who, at the mention brought in of the return of Marco Antonio de Dominis, Bishop of Spalato, candidly affirmed: "He who falls away from the Reformed religion to the Papacy is either a beast or an atheist." These words were heard from his own mouth at Venice in the meeting of N.N. on the 13th of March in the year 1625 by the most noble and excellent Lord Gerard Dönhoff, at that time the supreme steward or prefect of the court of the most illustrious Vladislaus, then prince of Poland, and the most erudite Lord Andreas Colvius, our friend, at that time court preacher to the most noble knight Berck, ambassador of the Belgians to the Venetians, who immediately recorded those words in his diary (which contains not a few things heard, seen, done, and memorable); and there he exhibited it to me to read and to note down from it. The same man most recently added by letter from the same diary

that the most noble Lord Dönhoff was seriously admonished at the same time by that theologian to strive to impart the taste and knowledge of the Gospel (that is, of the Reformed religion) to his prince as much as possible. 4. That perverse method of divine, natural, and human wisdom, that being content with goods arising in themselves alone and in themselves (to use the words of Seneca), they rely only on their own experiences, and from them want to fabricate anew all knowledge of God and creatures, distrusting all books and histories, even sacred ones, as being suspect of mendacity and ψευδολογίας. I see and am glad that such a cause or way of atheism is also noted by the most erudite Mersenne in his commentary on Genesis, page 232. Indeed, Aristotle does not fear to prefer the wise man inexperienced to the experienced man unwise, Metaphysics 1, chapter 1. And that trite saying of Hippocrates is relevant here: "Art is long, life is short, opportunity is fleeting, experience is deceptive (or dangerous)." Compare what the commentators have on each author, and put that back to our empirics of today who, without books, without studies, without arts and letters, perceive all things by some idle and desultory thought.

5. And these indeed are the antecedent causes, or those internally impelling, which Scripture refers to foolishness, as to the first and general root, Psalm 14:1. See there the commentators. The external causes follow, which are either impulsive, or instrumental or assisting. The impulsive or procatarctic causes are either properly so called, which are such per se and by their own nature, or improperly so called, which are such per accidens, that is, mere occasional causes. Of the latter kind are: 1. Unlearned and badly composed books, which make a show of explaining and defending sacred things. 2. New attacks of atheists, less solid, which while they seem to meet atheism and libertinism from one side, open a door to the same from the other. Such are those of Vanini in his Amphitheater, but his catastrophe shows that he did this deliberately, and Mersenne everywhere notes this. The more prudent easily see that the writings of Campanella, Postel, Cardano, Gaffarel, Taurellus, as well as of the Cabalists, Paracelsians, and the masked brethren of the Rosy Cross are not at all free from this inconvenience; although I do not want to pass judgment here on their intention. 3. Some natural things rashly or unskilfully believed and boasted to be supernatural; when they apprehend the natural causes of these, they take occasion from there to compress all those things within the terms of nature. 4. Especially, as a snail to its shell, so they perpetually cleave to one or another experiment about magnetic virtues or idiosyncrasies, and about the powers of imagination, and subject even the most supernatural things to those laws, and deduce all those effects from them or from some occult art of natural or astral magic. 5. Because they see the pious, just, industrious, erudite, most often neglected in republics and by the great, but impostors and the wicked held in delight and exalted. And these occasions indeed, which are eagerly seized, involve some harm of those who cast them before men, and have the nature of a given scandal. There also follow other occasions, but plainly per accidens, and harmless both as to the thing or deed in itself, and as to the intention of the agent, whether formal or virtual. 1. The same tenor of nature, and the recurring and stable vicissitudes of all natural things. See 2 Peter 3:4. 2. The permission of sins. 3. Because it goes so well with the wicked, and so badly with the good. See Psalm 73:4. Because God does not always or immediately hear, and because He does not immediately punish. See Ecclesiastes 8:11-12. The primary procatarctic causes, and which are such per se: 1. Rampant apostasy and heresies, which carry away the greatest part of men. Cornelius a

Lapide, in his commentary on Jude, verse 11, says that heretics at last become atheists, and that every heresy is the royal road to atheism. He inculcates the same thing on 2 Peter 2:10, and applies it to our people. The other pontifical writers everywhere do the same, some of whom we will cite below. But how truly they tie these consequences, and whether they do not better fit most of the libertinic disciples and pupils of the papacy and the Jesuits, is to be inquired elsewhere. 2. Most bitter contentions and contests for them. 3. Fabricated miracles, apparitions, and revelations; likewise the lives and legends of the saints, especially when the impostors feigning such things are caught in the act, or the histories themselves sufficiently convict themselves of impossibilities and lies, or the doctors themselves, whose conscience is not completely seared, declare war on those fictions. When men see these things foisted upon the Christian churches, and more valued by the common people in the business of religion than the Scriptures themselves, they lapse into ἀθεΐαν, thinking that all things have been ingeniously fabricated by men, and that so the common folk may be kept in devotion. I would briefly add twenty-six insipid and insane reasons by which vain and profane minds today exercise themselves and others, which Mersenne has collected as into one bundle, as it were, on page 234, and which he himself there, and before him the authors for the truth of religion, to be named below, especially Mornay, familiar to our students and available everywhere in French, Dutch, and Latin, have more than adequately refuted. You also have the chief objections of the atheists and Epicureans in Plutarch, On the Opinions of the Philosophers, chapter 7, and Sextus Empiricus, book 3, chapter 1, and Pliny, book 2, chapter 7, which Valesius repeats and resolves in his Sacred Philosophy, chapter 58. Compare Espencé on 2 Timothy 3, page 106, and the authors on Providence, Theodoret and others indicated in our dissertation On the Term of Life. But because my mind is not now to transcribe idly or to elucidate where needed the excellent responses of those men, I deliberately abstain from delineating the objections.

6. The instrumental and assisting causes are partly more remote, partly nearer, partly more common, partly more proper. 1. Wicked teachers, who either gratis for the ostentation of their intellect, or in hope of pay, or so that they may disturb republics and overturn every order established among men, everywhere make as many as they can devotees of this discipline. That infamous Vanini, burned at Toulouse, confessed that thirteen had been sent from Naples to spread this poison through all Europe, but that by lot or designation Lutetia [Paris] had fallen to him, where he had also strenuously adorned his part, as Mersenne relates on page 671. 2. Books, partly openly, partly by mines promoting atheism, partly manuscripts (which Mersenne mentions on page 1830, and in his French book against the Deists), partly published in print, some of which we will indicate below. But what Mersenne adds there about the booklets which Krakow, Geneva, and very many other cities (just as many asylums of impiety) print out, etc., I would like to have explained; and I desire judgment, prudence, and charity in him. Concerning Geneva, it is certain that nothing of the sort can be affirmed. Concerning Krakow, where the papacy dominates, they themselves may see. But perhaps someone badly reported it to him, or he badly understood it, so that by error he substituted Krakow, the metropolis of the kingdom of Poland, where there is a celebrated academy, for Rakow (a town in Poland where the Socinians previously published their blasphemous books). 3. Conversations, dissertations, doubts, etc. which may contribute to this. Among which those most entangle the incautious which are instituted for the sake of exercise and for the ostentation of intellect, or under an assumed

character. Here refer to the dissertation of Du Perron offered to the King of France, which we mentioned above, and the quodlibetal disputation before Leo X, when out of two men one proved by all reasons that there is a God, the other denied it, and he himself brought forth such a judgment: "Your opinion indeed is more true (namely, that which would prove God), but yours (namely, the contrary) makes a more cheerful face." 4. The sect of philosophers or religions which by a certain proper genius act as midwives to atheism. Of the former kind are: 1. Pyrrhonists and Skeptics. 2. Epicureans. The Hermetic Lullists and Hermetic Paracelsians do not depart so far; in short, the ancient and new Cabalists. For who could ever show one or another among the sane immune from atheism, or deism or libertinism, or neutralism in the business and profession of religion? Of the latter kind are the families of Enthusiasts, Spirituals, and fantastic contemplatives and sublimators, about whom we will soon speak.

7. To the assisting causes I think the specious and deceitful pretexts by which the mystery of atheism is carried out, and which are just as many enticements for capturing men, should especially be referred; for they seem at first glance to promise something not alien to the true and the good. For when this is said in general, and not explained in species, or parts, or ἐνεργητικῶς in all its corollaries, the incautious and less solidly learned or pious are easily enticed. For the deceitful man deals in generalities. But they have poison like a scorpion in the tail. 1. The pretended liberty of philosophizing, even of taking away or calling into doubt all the principles and axioms of natural light hitherto received by the common consent of Christians and outsiders philosophizing, which they call Socratic, Academic; but which in reality ends in temerity, audacious ignorance, and skeptical ἀθεΐα. 2. The boasted liberty of prophesying in divine and theological matters, about which we must treat elsewhere with its appendages. See the excellent remarks in Vedelius' Secrets of Arminianism. 3. The promised ἀκμή, perfection, and innovation of all the sciences, and through this the desired knowledge of all things, and indeed in compendium, without long and great labor, without an apparatus of books, teachers, writings, collections. 4. Boasting, and hope given, of unheard-of and admirable methods, dogmas, dictates, subtleties, inventions, which since they exceed all human intellects and things hitherto invented as much as the solar light a candle, indeed, darkness itself, they certainly require empty, pure, and thoroughly purged ears and minds, and thus the deletion, oblivion, and instantaneous erasure and rejection of all knowledge and faith, if one has previously conceived or admitted any, that is, the profession of skepticism or semi-skepticism, indeed, of libertinism. But if someone does not want to pay so much or to buy hope at a price, they now say that he is not suitable for grasping those sublime things (which they never explain of what sort they are), since he has not yet made a divorce from books, teachers, ancient disciplines, still infected with prejudices. It is therefore necessary that he give himself over and hand himself to those thaumaturges and miracle-workers with implicit faith and blind obedience, passively receiving all infused and impressed species, as it were; indeed, in case of sickness it is necessary that with the same faith (namely, of miracles) and astral knowledge he renounce all medicine and all his physicians, and thus entrust and expend his whole health and life to them, so that they may make in him the experience of the promised miracle, of course, under the faith of silence, which most also religiously keep, because the dead are not accustomed to divulge what unheard-of and marvelous things they have applied, and whether they have cured themselves well or badly. And this, of course, is that vaunted liberty of philosophizing, and compendium for arriving at

pansophia. 5. A specimen of judgment made with some dexterity in certain defects of the sciences, which, however, all the truly and solidly erudite have already furnished before them, who never fail to confess that the cross and goal have been fixed for our intellects somewhere not only in theological but also in philosophical disciplines, nor will the sciences and academies ever be perfect in all things. From the good authors, whom they confute, they generally draw those arguments, with the omission of the adjoined solutions, which they sell as their own admirable and unheard-of subtleties. Hence they conclude wrongly among the unlearned, and those literate in name only but in reality unlearned and unstable (2 Peter 3): "And from one crime know them all." 6. A specimen of some speculation or invention for the most part not so new or admirable as clothed in a new garment, and consequently in the Stoic manner not so much in reality as in words or terms (such as, for example, Lull's, Paracelsus', Campanella's ψιττακολογίαι, σκινδαλαμοφράσται, περατολογίαι, devised in imitation of the agyrtæ, vagabonds, and Gypsies). In which one or another specimen of this kind, since they perpetually boast without rhetoric (not otherwise than the quack empirics in one liquor or ointment), hence it happens that the incautious expect equal things from them in every knowable matter; meanwhile they allow themselves to be drawn out of their element, that is, the principles and axioms of both supernatural and natural theology, like a fish by that deceitful bait. What such vertiginous innovators may or may not intend, we will not say (God knows), but we only indicate the effects and occasions of the work. 7. The pretended refutation of heresies and zealotic contention with them. It is indeed odious to apply this, but it is nevertheless necessary to forewarn. In the papacy indeed (whatever they may protest about their intention), some so assail the truth of Scripture and the Christian religion that they use the weapons of all atheists, libertines, infidels against us, and thus not obscurely betray the common cause of Christianity to them. Let Cardinal Du Perron's booklet On the Insufficiency of Scripture only be seen, the Disputation of the Jesuit Regourd On Scripture, the Arnaldic and Verronic fictions which subvert not only the principle of Scripture but also of natural light, and other things of that ilk, and let them be compared with the writings of Sebastian Franck the Enthusiast, of the Libertines in France (whom Calvin refutes), and of those to whose arguments Bellarmine responds, finally of all whose madnesses the most noble Marnix exposes in his treatise Against the Enthusiasts, and he will see that those senseless Libertines have not pleaded that cause so speciously and ingeniously as the papists. Let Mestrezat against Regourd be seen, and the other champions from our side in the treatise On Scripture, and especially also Vedelius' Rational Theology, where he shows that the Perron-Verronian venom leads directly to atheism. But if they except that they do not think these things, but only assume them in order to reduce us to the absurd, I reply that this could be said by Vanini and other atheists under the same color, as if those things were hurled by them from an assumed character, or ἀγωνιστικῶς and κατὰ διάθεσιν; meanwhile, while they reply nothing, or at least nothing solid, they infect the incautious and the fatal arrow sticks in the side. The atheists and libertines at least have this, that when their books are prohibited, they may rejoice that their own things, however, are publicly displayed and served to all without any adjoined refutation under the seal of Roman approbation. Hence it is that you may see more atheists nowhere, and more safely, than in the papacy, especially at Rome, in Italy, in France, of which we will weave the history below. 8. The pretended refutation of atheism, which is the most subtle and most harmful pretext. Julius Cæsar Vanini used it, who, having obtained his apostolate of atheism among the Parisians, covered his poison by

disputations against the atheists, and paved the way for himself to spread it with authority. Indeed, he also published a treatise titled Amphitheater of Eternal Divine Providence, in which, with great effort as it seems, and in a new and more solid way, he defends the providence of God. But in reality in some things he so defends the cause that he rather deserts and prostitutes it. For this is the art of arts: if such a great Atlas, with such rare and new machines applied from philosophy and theology, cannot sustain it, therefore nothing certain, nothing solid is to be expected from elsewhere. The oft-praised Mersenne has everywhere exposed these arts of his. Concerning Campanella's, Postel's, and similar men's new machines and singular lotions by which they plead this cause, perhaps someone may suspect the same. However, I do not want to judge their intention. Pasquier's Apology imputes atheisms to the Jesuit Garasse, because in the example of Vanini (who drew out his impious axioms under an assumed name, as if relating things said by a certain Alexander or another libertine), he again pronounced the buried and obsolete sayings of the libertines in public as if in a theater, book 5, page 841; that he made God the author of sin, page 854; that under the character of a libertine he called the passion of Christ into doubt, page 839; that he prostituted the tears of Christ and the saying of Christ about the camel through the eye of a needle by ridicule, pages 837, 841; that he called Him intoxicated "Incherubinate" (encherubine), pages 827, 852; in short, that he far surpasses the profanities of Rabelais and Machiavelli, page 30, and indeed under the pretext of piety and zeal against atheists and libertines, page 825. 9. The pretext of piety, of a sublime and deified spirit, of singular and rigid honesty. Thus some perversely contemplative men of old thought that they had arrived at such perfection and deification that they affirmed: "They have no God, but have become so dead to themselves and united to God that they themselves have been made God," as the celebrated mystical theologian Johannes Ruysbroeck relates in his Apology, chapter 2. Today's Enthusiasts of ours especially, while they want to appear spiritual and deceive the more simple by this appearance, they strenuously 『atheize』, as indeed the most noble Lord Marnix of St. Aldegonde detected their mysteries and implored the piety and authority of the powers of Belgium against those monsters. But I produce one witness beyond all exception against the atheism of the Family of Love, or of Henric Niclaes (about which elsewhere), Dirk Coornhert, known in Belgium as a Libertine, or at least more than a Semi-Libertine, who in his Specimen of the Injustice of the Deified Henric Niclaes, preface, relates that he had intimately conversed with that Henric and his followers for many years, and had heard this open confession from them: "I am God." And so far we have expounded the μεθοδείας τοῦ πλάνης. Let him compare, if he has leisure, those things which Wigand noted about the causes and occasions of atheism, and from him Prateolus, On Heresies, and Tilenus, volume 1 of his Syntagma, disputation 10, sections 24, 25, 26, 27, and Charron, On the Three Truths, book 1, chapter 3, where he lists five causes.

ON ATHEISM, PART TWO

Respondent: GUALTERUS de BRUYN of Amersfoort
For the 29th of June, 1639

1. We now note these accompanying adjuncts of atheism, partly concomitant, partly consequent: 1. blasphemy, the definition and species of which we most recently explained on

the 3rd precept of the Decalogue. Agreeably to this present business, it will have sufficed to have distinguished it into the more palliated and the more open. The former is when someone not seriously, and not so much from his own sense as only for the sake of seeking (as they are accustomed to excuse) delight, vomits blasphemies against God and sacred things, and thus makes them the matter of jokes and laughter. In which kind excelled among the ancients Lucian, among the more recent François Rabelais, whom several others not to be named here follow - unworthy and obscure men, unless perhaps the Jesuit Garasse, who renders himself famous through his adversary Pasquier, as can be seen in Pasquier's Apology titled Antigarasse cited above. See 2 Peter 3:3 and Jude, verse 18. The latter is when someone openly and professedly blasphemes God, the modes and examples of which common experience supplies, and we then indicated some things. In the meantime, let him read, if he has leisure, Henri Estienne's Preparatory Treatise to the Apology for Herodotus, part 1, chapter 14 and chapter 25, where he lists certain blasphemies common in Italy, especially among the clerics. 2. The accumulation of all impieties, vices, and crimes against the first and second tables, which it is superfluous to recount here. For by what bonds of honesty, faith, obedience, and from what kind of sin is he restrained, who denies God? 3. In species, a seared conscience, a reprobate, foolish heart, and the callousness and hardening of the same. 4. Desperation, unless they repent. 5. In some who also do not know how to repent, the sin against the Holy Spirit. About which Scultetus in his Sermon Ideas on Hebrews 6, page 106: "The question still to be settled: Whether even the denial of Christ, which happens with a heart having lapsed into Epicureanism, is the sin against the Holy Spirit? Our apostle below in chapter 10, verse 26, and Peter in 2 Peter 2:20, indeed Christ Himself in Luke 11:24, respond affirmatively." 6. The judgments and terrors of the Almighty, by which He pursues them even in this life, and for the most part punishes them exemplarily, among which their unhappy and ignominious death stands out. Suidas relates that Lucian was torn apart by dogs. A certain anonymous man, who in the presence of Calvin in an inn, deriding all worship of God and hope of a better life, now and then impiously repeated a blasphemous distortion of Scripture customary to atheists (according to the testimony of Henri Estienne in the treatise just cited, part 1, chapter 14, page 102), "The heavens are the Lord's heavens, but the earth He has given to the sons of men," was suddenly struck by God with dire torments, as a result of which he now cried out with a great roar, "O God, O God!" To which one of the guests, an honest but facetious man, said: "Do you now invoke God? Or have you forgotten your philosophy? Why do you not let God rest in His own heaven?" And as often as he thundered, "O God," this other one, mocking, retorted: "Where now is that saying of yours, 'The heavens are the Lord's heavens'?" Thus Calvin in his commentary on Psalm 115. When in the year 1464, on the 16th of May, the case of a certain citizen accused of atheism by the Bishop of Angers was being conducted at Paris, and the words of that atheist were being reported by the bishop's procurator, the hall of the court of the parliament (where the case was being conducted) trembled twice and a stone fell from on high; the next day, when the same case was recalled, the hall trembled again, and a beam was lowered from its proper place to two feet away without collapsing, so that all who were present were stunned with horror and nearly passed out. Thus Monstrelet relates, volume 3, and after him Louis d'Orleans in chapter 26, On the Seat of the Presidents, and from them Honsdorf in his Theater, chapter 25, and Mersenne in the dedicatory epistle to his commentary on Genesis. François Rabelais died drunk, laughing at those who exhorted him to conversion to God. Bonaventure des Périers, author of the

Cymbalum Mundi (whom Honsdorf in his Theater of God's Judgments, chapter 24, and Mersenne everywhere in his Genesis accuse of atheism or Epicureanism), fell into despair and laid unhappy hands on himself, as Honsdorf relates in the cited place. Concerning the tragedies of the atheist Machiavellian politicians, especially those praised by Machiavelli himself (Cesare Borgia Duke of Valentinois, Oliverotto, Castruccio Castracani, Ludovico Sforza, etc.), consult the histories, or if you desire a compendium, the little historical book in octavo titled The Tragical Mirror. Other examples, and most of those alleged everywhere in the admonitions and examples by political writers, where they treat of impious, unjust princes and tyrants. Nor are those to be passed over who were subjected to infamous and extreme punishments, such as that most celebrated and most learned professor and apostle of atheism, Julius Cæsar Vanini, a pontifical theologian, who, having been detected and convicted, suffered being burned alive at Toulouse, with his blasphemous tongue first cut out. Geoffroy Vallée (whom the papists pretend was made an atheist from a Calvinist, in Henri Fitzsimon's Britonomachia of the Ministers, book 1, chapter 12), author of the book On the Art of Believing Nothing, was burned at Paris in the year 1572. And another anonymous man was recently burned there, as Mersenne reports on page 672 of his commentary on Genesis published in the year 1623, but who should rather be called a pseudo-Judaizer than an atheist, whose opinion seems nearly to agree with that of Martin Seidel the Silesian, whose epistles exist in Socinus' Disputation on the Adoration of Christ against Christian Francken and Francis David, and with that of Giorgio of Novara burned at Bologna, about whom Baptista Mantuanus in book 3, On Patience, chapter 13. Honsdorf, in his said book of Examples on the Decalogue published at Leipzig in folio in the year 1570 (whence others have published in compendium the Theater or Examples of God's Judgments Against Sins, etc. in Dutch), makes mention of a certain Lignerolles, a courtly parasite, who openly professed atheism and at last had a tragic end, and of Etienne Jodelle, a French poet, whom he says was an Epicurean and atheist, and was consumed by want, his goods having been squandered. Concerning the latter, I have diligently inquired what he was, but I could find nothing in my little library, until by chance I consulted the renowned Dr. Rivet, who suggested that he was a Parisian nobleman, lord of Lymodin, and died in the year 1573 at the age of 41; that nothing was published by his friends after his death which savored of atheism; indeed, on the contrary, some of his verses openly teach the contrary, such as those which Antoine du Verdier inserts into his Catalogue: "Love is not at all that great God who under Himself / Holds the universe governed by His law." And a little later: "Another God has built this great work, / And has subjected to His will alone / Every soul comprised in heaven and on earth." Which he opposes to Ronsard's poem on Cupid, where he had introduced him speaking: "I am Love, the great master of the Gods." The same man thus commends Beza's labor in translating the Psalms: "Beza was then rightly received, when he retouched that immortal Harp; / But why was Beza assailed by it? / Beza assailed the plague deadly to all." The same distinguished Dr. Rivet adds that perhaps the rumor of atheism having been imputed to him proceeded from this, that when he first introduced the tragic buskin among the French (for he was a tragic poet, as Honsdorf acknowledges in the cited place), and indeed felicitously, in a certain village near Paris, Ronsard, Muret, Baïf, Belleau, and other poets, after they had indulged their genius, sacrificed a goat found there in honor of Jodelle as the coryphaeus of the tragic poets. About which thing Binet treats in the Life of Ronsard, and protests that it was all playful and theatrical. Thus far the renowned Dr. Rivet, who leaves it undecided whether he should be called an

atheist on account of the same deed, unless other authentic testimonies are available from elsewhere. In whose opinion we also acquiesce, and we owe him thanks both in our own name and in the public name. In the meantime, that pagan sacrifice is by no means to be approved. But about the familiar and nearly common itch in almost all poets of mimetically expressing the religion of the Gentiles both in words and deeds, we have said something in the Disputation on Gentilism. In the meantime, I cannot conceal that after the first edition of this disputation, it came to my mind that this deed about the goat sacrificed is refuted by Joseph Scaliger as a lie, in his Refutation of the Fable of the Burdons, which is published with his little works in octavo, page 145. The unhappy end of the Roman pontiffs who not obscurely displayed atheism or Epicureanism can be sought from the histories of the popes; among others there were Benedict IX, Boniface VIII, Alexander VI, etc. I would add Protagoras of Abdera, who they say was condemned to death by the Athenians for atheism and perished at sea as a fugitive. But about the punishments inflicted by human judgment, it will have to be said below in the practical problems. But whether Protagoras was an atheist, likewise below in the historical problems it must be inquired. 7. An adjunct is that this poison of atheism has been diffused far and wide, and as if universal, both by reason of places, nations, states, times, etc. See the historical things which we note below. 8. That it is familiar to magnates, courtiers, Roman clerics and curials, and the like. Hence those common sayings: "Let him depart from the court, who wishes to be pious." And, "The faith of the laity is best." And that saying of Baptista Mantuanus: "You who desire to live holily, depart from Rome. / When all things are permitted, it is not permitted to be pious." And that saying of Pius II: "Stygian Pluto does not dare to attempt what / An unbridled monk and a fraud-filled old woman dare."

2. Among the adjuncts of atheism, the signs and marks by which they can be detected are especially to be noted. Moreover, they are: 1. They deny, or at least on every given occasion call into doubt, supernatural things, namely miracles, prophecies, apparitions and operations of spirits; and when they cannot contradict the light of the deeds, they refer all things to natural power, namely to antipathies and sympathies, to fictitious temperaments and peculiar temperaments of certain men, to the powers of the human intellect or imagination. 2. They studiously search out and exaggerate whatever they think they find in the Scriptures that is paradoxical and ἄτοπα, ἀδύνατα, contradictory, and thus render the authority of Scripture suspect and contemptible to men, both in histories and in dogmas. 3. And they set it against the light of human history, and against reason and natural knowledge, as if, of course, truth fought with truth. And here they speciously apply all their erudition, if they have any. 4. They everywhere traduce the schools and academies, and their doctors and studies, especially the theologians, as fantastic, senseless men, unsuitable for civil life and the sweetness of human intercourse, as being alien from all elegance and charm of intellect, judgment, letters and morals. 5. They admire, and extol to the sky, at least the mediocre gifts of all libertines, Lucianists and atheists, as well as their common good deeds, as if no one could do the equal with them. 6. They endeavor to shake off all fear and just solicitude from men, and provoke nothing but security and hilarity, and lead others to it, according to that saying in 1 Corinthians 15:32, "Eat, drink, play," etc. And with this epiphonema the Epicurean poet Lucretius dismisses a severe religion: "So great an evil religion could persuade." 7. Hence also they shrink from the pastors of souls who lead by doctrine and example to the fear of God, gravity, etc.; they

everywhere avoid and traduce them as Stygeses, or unlucky birds, Alastores, black clouds; indeed, at the sight and hearing of them they are filled with horror, not otherwise than Felix in Acts 24:35; or as once the diabolical oracles at the entrance of a Christian (Tertullian, Apology, chapter 23), their cheerful and Epicurean dissertations fall silent. 8. They eagerly report the atheisms and Lucianisms of others, and expatiate upon them historically and oratorily; and indeed, if the times and men so require, they subjoin their frigid rejection, or a feeble and novel refutation of them, or leave them as ἀπορήματα and certain admirable subtleties in the middle. 9. Because they pour out their Lucianisms privately, and among their own, or those capable or gluttons and favorers of such abominations; meanwhile, where the thing, place, time so requires, they strenuously simulate some religion, and most gravely protest against those who accuse them of atheism. The author of the Antimachiavel elegantly shows this in French, part 2, pages 236-237, in the Machiavellians, especially in Caligula. Concerning Vanini, the oft-cited Mersenne relates. 10. Because they never or rarely and very sparingly exercise the religion and piety which they seem to profess by title, at least they strenuously deny that they are enemies of it, where, of course, the public religion is not imposed, or where liberty of conscience flourishes, or any religion whatever is promiscuously permitted. "A sparing and infrequent worshipper of the gods," the pig from Epicurus' herd once sang about himself. 11. Because they bear it most grudgingly that people publicly write, dispute, preach against the atheists, and about the atheists whether in thesis or in hypothesis, so that they seem to be tacitly pricked, or to put on themselves the darts which are sent into the air with no one named. Doubtless this is the force of an evil and unquiet conscience. It is certain that this disputation of mine has been and will be exceedingly burdensome and troublesome to them. Castellio, writing his little treatise On Calumny, forewarned that the calumniators would be recognized from this, if they could not bear that little book of his. More marks of atheists can be taken from the assisting causes and pretexts delineated above. These and others, partly sure, partly probable and plausible, whence suspicions and presumptions can be taken, so that we may guard ourselves so much the better, and forewarn others more incautious, are to be taken conjointly, not separately. And those which do not profit singly, help when many.

3. These things agree with atheism: 1. Hatred of God, about the nature and differences of which we have spoken elsewhere. 2. Blasphemy, about which we spoke on the 3rd precept. 3. The sin against the Holy Spirit. 4. Hardening, and a seared conscience. 5. Ἀθεΐα, ἀσέβεια, θεοστυγία. 6. We think Sadduceeism, Neo-Enthusiasm or Libertinism, and similar madnesses are to be called not so much cognates of atheism as species. Moreover, how all those abominable things differ from atheism will be easy for anyone to gather from a comparison of the descriptions of each with the description of atheism. The things fighting against atheism are: 1. directly and primarily theology, religion, and the whole practice of faith and piety; 2. as antidotes, solid knowledge of divine and human things, and those things which pertain to that apparatus. About which more below.

4. The polemical part follows, where problems of three kinds occur to be examined: 1. more dogmatic, 2. practical, 3. historical. The dogmatic problems are: Problem 1: Whether there is given a connate natural knowledge of God. I respond: there are those who deny all natural theology, both connate and acquired, and thus the Socinians today. Whether the Remonstrants

are far from this opinion, I will not say, but I leave it to the reader to weigh their Apology, chapter 1, folio 25b. Our people commonly, from Romans 1:18 with 2:15 and John 1:9, establish that there is an innate theology, that is, κοινὰς ἐννοίας or innate notions, a latent seed of natural reason and religion, which conducts itself in the manner of a habit of principles, which in adults is educed into act, and whence an act of theology is elicited without demonstration, with only the apprehension of the terms having been perceived; or otherwise than as the truth of first principles radiates by its own light and infuses itself into our mind, as soon as the terms of the enunciation are perceived, to such an extent that the mind of no adult man can be free from the actual coruscation and sense of that truth at the explication and perception of all the terms. Damascene, book 1 of On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 1: πᾶσι γὰρ ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ εἶναι θεὸν αὐτοφυῶς ἐγκατέσπαρται, "For the knowledge that there is a God is naturally implanted in all." Augustine, on Psalm 44: "God is everywhere secret, everywhere public, whom it is permitted to no one to know as He is, and whom no one is permitted to be ignorant of." The same, tractate 106 on John: "For this is the power of true divinity, that it cannot be altogether and utterly hidden from the rational creature now using reason; for, with the exception of a few in whom nature is too depraved, the whole human race confesses God to be the author of this world. In this, therefore, that He made this world, conspicuous in heaven and earth, etc., God is known to all nations." Compare also Aristotle, On the Heavens, book 1, chapter 3; Seneca, epistle 117; Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, with the commentaries of Xystus Betuleius. There is no need for us to pursue natural acquired knowledge here, since few deny it. More deny connate knowledge, and those who concede it do not explain or prove it in one way. The papists commonly add to the testimonies adduced by us Psalm 4:7, and that from the interpretation of Jerome, Augustine, Nicholas of Lyra, etc., but we do not see that this is solid. Matthias Flacius Illyricus, disputing for natural corruption against the pretended free will, sometimes so speaks that he nearly seems to deny ἔμφυτον and impressed notions. Molina, in his treatise On the Knowledge of God, page 62, thinks that this axiom "God exists" does not seem to be of such evidence and ἀξιοπιστία that its truth is perceived without demonstration, in the way of other principles, such as "The whole is greater than its part"; he adds the reason, because there have been those who, with the knowledge of the terms having been perceived, have nevertheless denied that there is a God. But it is one thing to outwardly deny the truth of some axiom, and another to not feel it in the inner mind and conscience, or to not be convinced by it. You may also find vertiginous Skeptics who from mere vanity and malice of mind call into doubt by external disputation the truth of the very first principles: "Nothing can simultaneously be and not be"; "Contradictories cannot be true at the same time." So that the young may extricate themselves from the objections of the Aristotelians, Socinians, and the doubts or ἐνστάσεις of others, we suggest these conclusions as the fountains of solutions. 1. There is a certain connate or innate knowledge of God, which they call natural theology, ἔμφυτοι, impressed notions, κοινὰς ἐννοίας, natural light, the dictate of nature, and synecdochically the law of nature or synteresis, metonymically natural reason. 2. Not that there is any actual knowledge of God, or that it is elicited by an infant recently born; or that intelligible species have been placed in it along with the intellect and memory, so that the μαθήσεις of adults are only ἀναμνήσεις (learnings are only reminiscences, as Tertullian translates it), which Plato wanted. Not at all; for with respect to actual knowledge Aristotle rightly said that the human mind conducts itself in the manner of a blank tablet. 3. Nor that those notions are plainly the same thing as the natural

power of reasoning, or as the intellective potency itself. 4. But that they are something distinct from it, conducting themselves in the manner of a disposition, or habit of principles, indeed a general part of the habit of principles. But if anyone thinks that the notion of habit is less accurately adapted to it, let him call it a natural faculty, in the way the Scholastics with our philosophers are accustomed to philosophize about conscience in common. 5. Moreover, this faculty, or power, or aptitude of the rational faculties, or natural light, consists in this, that the intellect can comprehend the truth of principles without any labor, previous study, or reasoning, and with the things needing to be posited having been posited (namely the knowledge of the terms), it thus comprehends in fact, having been borne and inclining to this sense and assent of the truth from a certain natural necessity and weight implanted in itself; not otherwise than as the will, from a certain natural necessity without previous choice, seeks the good as such, or the ultimate end. And as the healthy and open eye cannot not see the light or any visible thing brought in or presented to it. And certainly the nature of first principles requires this, that they not be proved, but assumed. 6. That habit of principles, or that natural power of the intellect (if indeed someone prefers with Durandus on Sentences 3, distinction 33, question 1, and other more recent authors, to deny a superadded habit, since the natural power of the intellect itself suffices, both practical and speculative, which he thinks should be established with Thomas Aquinas on Sentences 3, distinction 23, article 2, reply to objection 1), includes the truth of principles to be perceived without discourse or demonstration, by a sort of simple intuition, principles partly theoretical, partly practical. The former are either universal: "Nothing can simultaneously be and not be," etc., or particular, first of the first: "God exists." Second of the first: "He is the creator, He is the governor, He is the judge." The latter are universal: "Good is to be done, evil is to be shunned"; particular, first of the first: "God is to be rightly worshipped"; second of the first: "What you do not want done to you, do not do to another," etc. The power of perceiving, and according to it the actual perception without previous study of the particular principles both theoretical and practical, properly and formally constitute the connate natural theology. 7. But if it happens that some infant is educated in solitude, and the terms of that axiom "God exists" are never explicated to him by another, we think that he will nevertheless elicit that actual knowledge "That there is a God" by his implanted ὀξυνοία, but not without previous, although not so laborious, observation, induction, and reasoning. 8. One thing is ignorance of pure negation, another of depraved disposition, about which 1 Thessalonians 4, 1 Corinthians 15, Ephesians 4, etc. 9. One thing is salutary and effectual knowledge, by which, namely, we are changed, so that we may endeavor to express in the work itself the things which we know; another is not salutary and ineffectual, and cold, by which we are rendered no better, about which 1 John 2:4. 10. One thing is pure knowledge without error, and another impure, contaminated by doubts, errors, etc. 11. Problem: Whether there are atheists, that is, men who believe that there is no God? I respond: That there are atheists, no one doubts. But what the nature of that atheism is, is to be explained more closely, with this table having been set forth:

An atheist can be called

Indirectly or interpretively, and that 1. practical, 2. speculative | about which above
directly, externally, 1. contradicting and disputing, 2. denying
internally 1. ignorant, 2. doubting, 3. opining, 4. affecting certitude

Now we explain our opinion with these conclusions: 1. There can be, and are, practical atheists, who do not worship God, about whom Psalm 14:4, 2 Timothy 3:4-5. 2. Atheists speculatively interpretatively or indirectly, who attribute such things to God, or deny such things about Him, so that by a necessary and proximate consequence against the light of nature, they deny God. About whose grades and species we have acted above. 3. Those externally disputing, indeed even maliciously and against their own sense denying. 4. Internally ignorant, with the ignorance, of course, of a depraved disposition concerning God as to the questions of what He is and who He is; indeed even with ignorance of pure negation, as to the question of whether He is, or that He is; and that for a time and in the case of a solitary education, where they hear from no one that there is a God; and constituted in a state of solitude and investigation, while groping for Him they seek Him, in that moment before actual cognition and finding (for we easily concede that here some little delay of inquiry and reasoning intervenes), by reason, I say, of the absence of that actual cognition and finding, which is the terminus ad quem of the motion and intellectual discourse, such ignorant ones could be called atheists improperly; not otherwise than as the faithful who in infancy had the seed, root, and spirit of faith, can be said to be infidels negatively or contradictorily, because they do not have actual faith. 5. Inwardly doubting, who for a time is vexed by doubts whether there is a God, and sometimes succumbs to them, so that he himself can formally be said to doubt, excluding or arresting sometimes actual faith, or certain knowledge. 6. Inwardly opining, when, of course, sometimes from an uncertain and probable collection of verisimilitudes they think they can attain, or have now nearly attained, the apex of their impiety and wicked wish, which is, that they may be freed once and for all from all sense and fear of the deity. 7. Inwardly studiously affecting a total ἀναισθησία of the deity and thus the πληροφορία of their ἀθεΐα, that is, the certitude and evidence in their mind of their desired atheism. And this is the sum of his impious thoughts (Psalm 10:6, 14, Job 21) and endeavors; for those beam-like nails of the natural light and dictate, and of the eternal divine law do not allow him to go further, as we hope will be easily persuaded to any fair judge of these matters by the following reasons. First: then it would follow that no φῶς has been engraved by God on every man coming into this world in and with nature - which is against Romans 1:18, taken together with 2:14-15. For that connate theology can no more be absent from man than rational intellect. See the commentators on Romans 1 and the other authors soon to be cited, especially Mersenne on Genesis 1:1, where from page 235 to page 279 he pursues this argument about impressed notions at length. Second: it would follow that some man is without the law of nature, synteresis, and natural conscience, which is absurd; and that that law cannot be completely erased from the minds of men is taught by experience, and is excellently disputed by the Scholastics on I-II, question 94, article 6, especially Suárez in his treatise On Laws, book 2, chapter 13, and from our side Willet on Romans 2:14. Compare Arminius, disputation 14, thesis 8; Tilenus, volume 1, disputation 10, theses 6-7; and the writers of whatever order and profession, on the law of nature, on conscience, especially on the seared conscience. Third: then men would be inferior to devils (add also the damned in hell), in whom those sparks of knowledge are not extinguished, according to that saying of James 2:19; but the consequent is absurd. Therefore. Fourth: our opinion is proved by universal experience and the common consent of all nations, which is alleged by the natural theologians to be cited below, and all the writers of common topics, among whom Vorstius, On God, Disputation 1, thesis 10; Arminius,

Private Disputations, disputation 14, thesis 4, etc. See our Thersites Heautontimoroumenos, section 2, chapter 4. These four reasons I opposed to the Socinian-Remonstrant darkener there for asserting our thesis: Speculatively there are no atheists who are certainly persuaded that there is no God. But because the same man, as it seems, has not ceased to add other ineptitudes to his unlearned and inept exceptions, let a fifth reason be added: if all knowledge of the deity and all law of nature, and natural conscience, could be completely cast off, then no light would remain in man which, with conscience aroused, would render him ἀναπολόγητον; but the latter is absurd from Romans 1:19-20. Sixth: because the contrary opinion greatly favors the atheists, and in great part undermines the arguments against them. Mersenne in the cited place shows that the first and principal argument of the atheists is drawn from the denial of notions naturally and ἀκρίτως impressed on the human mind. Seventh: the same contrary opinion colludes with the Socinians, and especially helps their exception to the hypothesis of the argument which the orthodox are accustomed to adduce for the deity of Christ from the work of creation as proper to deity (since indeed from it by a certain demonstration of the natural light the eternal deity and omnipotence of the creator is concluded, Romans 1:20). Compare our Disputation On Creation, part 1, thesis 4. Finally, there is added the consensus of theologians, especially of those who dispute against the atheists, among whom Mersenne everywhere, and explicitly on page 246; for the rest, see the fathers, Scholastics, and more recent authors cited below. Here now add the commentators on Romans 1 - Martyr, Pereira, Cornelius a Lapide - and those who have refuted the Socinian exceptions - Pareus and Willet - to whom add the other antagonists of Socinianism, among whom Johannes Junius in his Refutation of the Prelections of Socinus, chapter 2, and Rivet's commentary on Psalm 19, as well as commentators on Psalms 19, 10, 14, and 53. You will see that no one asserts, whatever the atheists may blaspheme and outwardly deny, whatever they may try to persuade themselves inwardly, that they are nevertheless certainly persuaded that there is no God, or that they have been able to accomplish this, since indeed their own mind cries out against it and their conscience struggles against it, as Mersenne says on page 246, and Tilenus graphically depicts this, volume 1, disputation 10, final thesis, and the acute epigrammatist Owen briefly [expresses] this whole controversy, book 3, epigram on the atheist:

"The fool says in his heart, 'There is no God,'" he said;
But no fool has believed this.
If no fool denies that there is a God, who then
Is an atheist? One who wishes there to be no God.

Let us now consider the most recent and interpolated exceptions and objections of our Remonstrant adversary, so that the truth asserted by us against the atheists may be more illustrious, and so that the readers, whose interest it is, may have a specimen of the erudition, candor, conscience of those men. It is to be noted first that when he has disputed everything, he at last concludes on page 180: "I confess that even some most learned theologians out of piety toward God incline to that opinion which establishes that the knowledge of God is so fixed in individual men that it is never completely eradicated, etc. It is a plausible opinion and commendable by the very zeal of piety; from which, however, prudence ought to deter any preacher of the divine word from publicly asserting it, lest mockers who perhaps for some time,

or for whole years, think of God only in mockery, even confirm them in evil through imprudence. For I do not judge it to be secure and firm that this faith, that God exists, is so certainly put into the minds of all mortals." And on page 187: "So that it should not be rashly asserted that there is no one among mortals who does not acknowledge God. Perhaps it will be called into doubt by more than we ourselves fear." And again a little later: "It is uncertain, if not false, that there are no speculative atheists." It is to be noted secondly that the antithesis of our assertion can be defended either [by saying] that there never was a natural knowledge of God in man, or that it indeed exists in all, but in some is completely lost. In the former way Socinus defends it. In the latter way the Remonstrant adversary seems to want to defend it, who indeed does not manifestly reject the error of Socinus (as neither do his allies in the Apology, chapter 1, folio 25), but nevertheless distinguishes it from his own assertion on page 179, having adduced this similitude: "For can I not establish that there is some natural knowledge of God, and yet that some fall away from it, just as we are all men by nature, and yet some put off all humanity?" Therefore, let this be the controversy: Whether the theology which all theologians (except the Socinians) have hitherto called natural and acknowledge, partly connate (of course, a habit of principles superadded to the intellect or a natural power of the intellect impressed by God), partly acquired, is completely lost or abolished in some men, so that a contrary knowledge succeeds it, and the mind of those men (the atheists) is informed by such a speculative knowledge and certain persuasion that, with the things needing to be posited having been posited, that is, when someone proposes God to them, or thoughts about Him arise in them, then their mind would certainly elicit this act of its knowledge or perfidy and acquiesce in it: that there is no God - not otherwise than as Thersites and I are directly and speculatively Apapists, since indeed we are certainly persuaded that there is no Pope-Monarch instituted by Christ. And in the way that the Socinians are speculatively A-homoousians, since indeed they are certainly persuaded that there is no homoousios of the Son of God. We deny it, led by the arguments set forth in the preceding thesis. If anyone seriously rejected the Socinian opinion, and undertook to defend only the total loss of all knowledge naturally impressed, and besides acquired from the book of nature through reasoning, he would nevertheless be urged by the inconveniences and arguments posited above: and that firstly because it separates that natural habit of principles, or that power of the human intellect, from man, since proper natural things, especially intrinsic and absolute ones, cannot be separated from their subjects and their own without implicating a contradiction - just as liberty from the will, risibility from man, to be extended or to have part beyond part from quantity and body, etc. But that aforementioned power of the intellect is such a proprium. Therefore. Secondly, because from the hypothesis of the adversary, page 118, if someone does not apprehend God from any testimonies, both the internal ones of conscience and the external ones of the book of nature (through which God can be found by groping), he can easily be demonstrated from a man to have degenerated into a beast, either through negligence or through malice; but the latter is absurd, and implicates a contradiction, that a man retaining the species and essential form of man has been changed into an irrational animal. Whence it is clear, even by the confession of the adversary himself, that that natural light impressed by God cannot be separated more from rational nature totally than liberty or the appetite for good (whether true or apparent) from the human will. But if he says that he takes "beast" metaphorically, rightly, and it is not repugnant to metaphorical beasts to be subject, whether they want to or not, to some sense of the deity by the goads of natural reason, even

when they oppose God the most, and live in a beastly way. Thirdly, if men came to that state that by a certain false faith or atheistic ἀθεΐα they believe that there is no God, it would follow that this false faith or speculative error, even in its own way, must also be said to be harmless, and thus its confession is to be tolerated publicly and privately, insofar, of course, as it would not be against the natural and proper sense, and the goads of conscience - at least insofar and as long as they professed that they did not feel thus against their knowledge or conscience, but from a mere and certain persuasion and conviction of their intellect, and therefore that they could not or ought not believe, receive, or profess any axiom against this persuasion. But if their adversaries say that they err, they would respond that they think and say the same thing about their accusers, and thus that the same thing is said on both sides, according to the apologetic method of all fanatics and heretics, which the Remonstrants pre-formed for them in the Vindications Against Vedelius, book 1, chapter 1, pages 10, 14, 16, and chapter 3, page 13, and book 2, chapter 2, page 104, and chapter 8, page 148, and chapter 9. For that pretended speculative atheist will say that he should no more be excluded from that new apologetic method than Servetus, Francis David, the Socinians, and other heretics, or than the Libertines or atheists of the second kind, about whom the Remonstrants speak in the cited place - unless they prove: 1. that by his profession, uttered according to his innermost sense of mind, he sins more against nature and the natural light than Socinus by denying God's foreknowledge of future things; 2. that this heresy of his is more against conscience and from mere malice than other blasphemous heresies, libertinisms, atheisms - or thus, that atheisms of the second kind, that is, practical or indirect ones, and other blasphemous heresies do not derive their origin from the proper negligence or malice of men (as long, of course, as they themselves do not confess this), but his own does; 3. that Libertines and atheists of the second kind have not degenerated from men into beasts, but he himself has degenerated. Against which implanted seeds, principles, natural notions, eternal law of nature has he sinned? Indeed, he will add that he is rather worthy of pardon and commiseration, and of less persecution, hatred, and punishment than any other heretic or Epicurean, or atheist of the second kind, that is, a Libertine, because they have not yet degenerated to the bestial state from human reason, but he himself is now constituted in that state. These and similar things conformable to the secrets and dictates of the Remonstrants would have to be shown to some Vanini condemned to the stake, if indeed they want to contend with him without the principles and impressed notions which we, with the antagonists of the atheists (among whom Mersenne is exercised in this arena on account of such a great frequency of atheists in France), so studiously defend. For that dreadful Vanini, up to the last moment of his life, did not cease to oppose his knowledge to all his antagonists, and to demand and defend its liberty. For when it was imposed on him as usual by the judges that he should seek pardon from God, the King, and justice, he denied that he could do this: not from God, since it was not certain that He existed, nor did he himself believe it; not from the King, because he had not sinned against him at all, indeed the King had no more faithful subject than him; not from justice or the judges, because he had not sinned against them, and they were afflicting him with the greatest injury; and if there were devils in hell, as indeed this is wont to be believed and said, he would rather devote the judges, so that they might be taken away by them. Others add that he said that he would rather pray to God to avenge him; but because it was not certain that God and devils existed, he left this in the middle - that is, he would neither seek pardon from God and the judges, nor implore vengeance. These things, related to me thus

by trustworthy people, it seemed good to report here, so that I might show that the truth of the eternal natural theology (not to be abolished even in hell itself, no more than human reason) is to be retained and urged against such atheists (whatever they may pretend and protest). The French Mercury relates the tragic history of Vanini a little differently. But about this below. As for the trivial and volatile reasons, or rather suspicions, conjectures, interrogations of our Skeptical Remonstrant, so that the young may dissolve them, and may see the solidity of our reasons all the more evidently, we suggest these fountains of solutions. 1. That the exterior negation of God, and the malicious and hypocritical protestation, which is wont to be carried out by verbal contention, is not the same as the interior negation of knowledge and conscience, indeed the latter is not included in the former or necessarily and ἀκριτῶς conjoined with it. Which is taught by the examples of atheists and Epicureans everywhere cited by the authors, among which are that of the anonymous man in Calvin, on Psalm 115, cited above, and of Caligula in Suetonius, Life of Caligula, chapter 51, taken together with the observation of Philo the Jew, and Tilenus, which we cited in our Thersites. Add what the theologians comment on Peter's Denial, and on the distinction of heresy into external and mental, which are to be applied here analogically. 2. It is one thing to be certainly persuaded by interior knowledge and conscience (but erring) at some time that God is not the governor of the universe, or the creator, or foreknowing of future things, or immutable, or infinite, etc., and another to be certainly persuaded inwardly, against that impressed particular first principle "God exists." If the former persuasion is established somewhere after all convictions have been applied (which I do not easily admit from the affirmation of an Epicurean, or Deist, or Socinian pretending the conviction of his conscience, without other proofs), it certainly must be said to deny and take away God Himself indirectly and by consequence; but it does not follow from this that such a man inwardly sees speculatively, and is certainly persuaded: "There is no God." As we will clearly teach the Remonstrant himself below in response to his objection by several instances. 3. It is one thing for there to be a temptation, a suggestion of the devil and the flesh, and another for it to be received; likewise one thing for there to be a struggle and fight with atheistic thoughts, and another for there to be victory; one thing for there to be a flighty thought, another for there to be a fixed and constant persuasion and certitude of contrary knowledge or faith (or rather ἀθεΐα), by which the human mind is informed, and as a blank tablet, now empty and stripped of all sense and natural notion of the deity, is inscribed. We do not deny the former, because it is not repugnant to the Scriptures or to reason, so that we may give credence to the testimonies and experiences of men here. Mersenne, page 280, relates that a certain man consumed by grief complained that he was doubtful about the existence of God, and that by 80 reasons, by which the devil was striving to take it away from his mind; but he returned to a saner mind. We deny the latter, whatever certain atheists from their experience or affirmation, and with them the anonymous Remonstrant, relying too much on the veracity of atheists in giving testimony, may here contradict. The reason is, because it is repugnant to the Scriptures and the reasons adduced by us, especially to this one: that the power and light of the intellect impressed within prohibits the human intellect to be informed by such certitude - unless they solidly prove that it is plainly abolished in those men, that rational mind of course remaining; which, however, they would not dare to affirm, at least they have not undertaken to prove, about the devils and the damned in hell. We will complete the rest of the fountains of solutions in the following part.

ON ATHEISM, PART THREE

Respondent: GUALTERUS de BRUYN of Amersfoort
For the 6th of July, 1639

1. The fourth fountain of solutions is: it is one thing for there to be the uncertainty of doubt and suspicion; another for there to be a certain persuasion of ἄγνοια of knowledge or faith. How much doubt and certitude differ, the beginners of philosophy know. 5. Again, it is one thing for there to be opinion, whose assent is weak and vacillating - for opinion is, as it is taken by us here, the acceptance of one part with hesitation about the other, as Bonaventure says in his commentary on the Sentences, book 3, distinction 24, question 5 - another for there to be certain persuasion, which expresses the explicit conviction of the mind, quieting or acquiescence; whether it be faith or knowledge. For a firm and certain assent requires that the mind assent to this or that enunciation in such a way that it does not doubt the truth of it, nor in any way fear that by assenting to that enunciation it errs. But the beginners of philosophy will teach these things to our anonymous man, or let him himself learn the distinctions of those terms from philosophical and theological lexicons, Ruvius' treatise On Habits, the commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, book 5, and Alsted's Hexilogia in the Precognitions of Philosophy - or if he so prefers, from Bellarmine's disputation and that of his antagonists On the Certitude of Faith, and Baronius' Ancillary Philosophy, Exercise 3, and the Scholastics on Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, question 2, article 1. 6. The knowledge of God is habitual or actual. The former ought never to be absent, nor is it ever totally absent; the latter is often contingently absent, indeed in some case it is absent without sin - for not all men are bound at every moment to elicit an actual and formal knowledge, or to exercise thought, of that enunciation "God exists," by apprehending and judging. Therefore, it is one thing for actual thoughts, or actually elicited knowledge about God, to be absent for a time from the mind of an atheist, and that through negligence and malice, and another for the knowledge of God, which is conceived in the manner of a disposition, or of a permanent habit first impressed and then formed through observation and reasoning from the macrocosmic book, to be absent. The distinction between the privation of an act or partial privation, and of a habit or faculty or total privation, is well known. In one sleeping or laboring under ophthalmic affections there is a privation of sight in the former way, in a blind man in the latter way. When we dispute about a speculative atheist, and one certainly persuaded, the position of a contrary form (if it is permitted to speak thus) and the privation of a permanent habit or faculty are understood - not otherwise than as it is wont to be asked whether someone is unjust, impious, blasphemous, an apostate, a Jew, an Epicurean, etc. We are not dealing, for example, with one or another transient and flighty thought by which someone does not firmly assent to this truth about Christ, "Christ is homoousios with the Father," so that he may thereby be called an internal, mental, and speculative heretic, who is certainly persuaded that Christ is not homoousios. 7. It is one thing for actual cognitions of that enunciation "God exists" to be actually absent at some time, that is, not elicited, or for its thought or certain assent not to be present, and another for a contrary actual assent to be present in addition, and indeed a certain one, without the intellect kicking back, without the struggling of the dictate of conscience, without hesitation about the opposite part, whenever, of course, either the admirable works and judgments of God daily rushing into

our eyes, or the admonitions and convictions of others, give occasion for thinking about God. The authors would concede that the former can happen, but by no means the latter. For whatever occurs in them about the suffocation, obliteration, obfuscation of the light and natural theology for some time, namely in a paroxysm of their fury and impiety; whatever about the cauterization of conscience, about stupor, about lethargy, about ἀναισθησία - that is by no means to be referred: 1. to the total extirpation and abolition of natural theology; 2. nor to the certitude of a contrary assent and persuasion by which their mind would be informed and active; 3. indeed, not even to the equal process, without offense and disturbance, or the long continuation, of that stupor, eclipse, and sleep, whenever occasions press upon them of arousing and plucking the lulled conscience. Thus Tilenus and others cited by us. To whom add Calvin, Institutes, book 1, chapter 4, section 3. Of the more recent authors, Weemes expresses the vicissitudes of lucid and turbulent intervals by no inelegant similitude. "Just as," he says, "letters written with onion juice are not seen or read, but when moved to the fire are read, so also," etc. In his treatise On the Four Degenerate Sons, section 1, On Atheists, chapter 1, let the authors themselves cited by us be read, I pray, and whoever prove that there is a God against the atheists. For the nature of theses does not allow us to describe the words of all theologians and philosophers everywhere obvious in a matter so manifest. But so that the mind of this sixth distinction of ours may be better perceived, the actual ἄγνοια of God can be viewed in three ways: negatively, privatively, and contrarily. The negative or contradictory ἄγνοια is when someone does not actually think about that enunciation "God exists," and consequently does not elicit, or feel in himself, the assent to its truth. Such is in infants, even adults, when without their own fault their mind is intent on some other useful or necessary thought. The privative and culpable ἄγνοια is twofold. One is when some adult for the most part, or exceedingly frequently, or for some continuous time does not think about that proposition "God exists," and that by his own negligence or malice, and consequently does not exercise his intellect and memory, nor procure the germination and increase of the implanted seed through any offered and sought occasions. The other is when he now and then thinks and remembers that proposition, but does not always elicit a firm assent to the thought of it, and consequently, by multiplied acts of assent, does not confirm the habit of natural theology. The contrary ἄγνοια is considered in two ways, either externally or internally. The external is when someone directly and openly denies the truth of that principle "God exists" in words. The internal can again be viewed in two ways: one is as an inquiry, or an act of the inquiring intellect, and unformed thought; the other is as a formed thought, and perfect intellection through the certitude of vision. The former is an act of the deliberating intellect, and consequently formable as a motion, way, and tendency to a terminus; the latter is a terminus or thing made by motion, a formed intellection, and firm assent. Refer the endeavor of those who, willing and knowing, deny and reject the knowledge and assent of all things, conclusions, principles, and thus affect and aim at a universal vacuum of their mind, so that in this way they may arrive at true knowledge, to the contrary ἄγνοια. 7. It is one thing for there to be a will, zeal, struggle, endeavor to formally and firmly assent, another for there to be the effect of a formed consideration and firm assent. The authors concede the former, and we with them; the latter by no means, on account of the reasons adduced above. But lest anyone think that some seem to concede even this, or at least leave it in the middle, when they say that if one or two such monsters existed, it could not prejudice the whole nature and human species, it is to be noted that they speak only of an external negation, and indeed against the internal

sense and natural dictate of conscience, but not of an interior certitude or persuasion, as will be immediately apparent to anyone inspecting their words. As for those few monsters externally denying, we say that if their names are betrayed, and their life and morals are diligently examined, something can easily be shown from which it would be clear that they were not entirely immune from internal goads and testimonies, whatever they externally pretended - as indeed man is a vain, ambitious, and most mendacious animal. In Caligula this was proved above. Concerning Julius Cæsar Vanini (who otherwise above all others would seem to pierce our universal axiom), it can be responded that he, first bound in chains, by fear, tergiversation, and simulation of theology, not obscurely betrayed that he was not without goads and the kicking back of his own mind, certainly persuaded and securely [acquiesced]. If someone objects that he, out of love and zeal for preserving his life, only externally simulated a sense of the deity, but inwardly was in fact not simulated, it will be easy for me to retort that he also, so that he might consult at least the honor of his pretended and affected insoluble subtlety, and fortitude and constancy among his surviving associates (with whom he had entered into a pact) and the whole posterity of atheists, Libertines, and Skeptics, only externally simulated as if he felt nothing [divine] inwardly, or otherwise than he had spoken. For it cannot be said how profound is the vanity, ambition, and deception of the human heart. This also could have been a cause for him of continuing his atheistic doubts and disputations, because perhaps he thought that on account of that miserable state, his punishment, to which he saw himself liable according to the laws, would be deferred. Whatever the case may be with one most mendacious and desperate man, who in this tragedy had already often deceived, his furious endeavor ought not here to make a sufficient testimony from which this κοινὸν μέτρον, this axiom, may be constructed to the prejudice of human nature, and all the reasons adduced by us be simultaneously burst, along with the universal experience of other men. The other example, which above all would seem in some way to call our assertion into doubt, I have observed in Henri Estienne, in his French treatise titled Introduction to the Preparatory Treatise to the Apology for Herodotus, chapter 14, page 105, where he relates that a certain Italian nobleman, shot through with a firearm in the French civil war, commended himself to the King (in place of what other dying men do in commending themselves to God), and wanted them to tell him that he was making the loss of a faithful minister. The same man often confessed to his familiars during his life that he indeed desired to believe in God along with others, but could not. Moreover, he amused himself by vomiting blasphemies against God and the histories of Scripture when given the occasion. Of which he relates these two examples. One is that God acted unjustly because He subjected the human race to condemnation on account of a morsel of an apple. The other: that he had learned nothing in the New Testament, except this one thing, that Joseph was a great beast, who labored under no jealousy, etc. But if we examine this whole history more closely, we will find not one jot in it which subverts our thesis. This man was an atheist of the second kind, or a Libertine; to these also a practical atheist, as well as an Epicurean, who did not believe in God in life, and so in death neither dared nor could approach Him. He did not therefore seek Him in his agony, because perhaps stupor and lethargy had not yet been shaken off; and in the last moment, if it was in some degree shaken off, the use of speech was lacking, by which he might relate his internal goads to others - or hypocrisy and a profound and desperate ambition taught him to cover this wound. Concerning that Italian whose horrible epiphonema of the dying man Mersenne reports on page 674 from Sabellicus, Jovius,

and Johannes Baptista, dialogue 2, "Chi più può, più tiri" - "Let him who can do more, draw more to himself," that is, "Let the stronger one draw to himself," by which he commended himself to the demon or to God - concerning him, I say, it must be said that he belched these things out, swollen with blasphemies and furious desperation, like many blasphemers belching out their soul with blasphemies (about whom elsewhere), and Julian the Apostate: "You have conquered, O Galilean!" - whom, however, we will not therefore say was certainly persuaded in life and in death that there is no God. The example of Selius in Martial, book 4, epigram 16: "There are no gods, heaven is empty," etc., if anyone brings it forward, must be responded to with the same distinction. Bellarmine, in his treatise On Death, makes mention of a certain atheist, as does Samuel Ward in a sermon on John 13, of a certain woman in England, but brought back to a saner mind. But the same distinction must be applied. The case is the same with the example of Diagoras, whom Theodoret, in book 6 of the Cure of Greek Afflictions, and some others, seem to make a crass and direct atheist. We conclude, therefore, that there are no speculative atheists properly so called, who are certainly persuaded that there is no God: 1. neither as to the habitual or customary ἄγνοια τοῦ εἶναι or θεότητος, and that either negative, or privative, or contrary, which alone suffices to confirm our assertion; 2. nor even as to the actual ἄγνοια and ἀθεότης (which I add out of abundance), if not merely privative, at least contrary interior, that is, through a formed thought and certitude of assent.

2. It now remains for us to summarily exhibit the Remonstrant objections and illustrate them with notes. 1. Because I myself concede that there are many speculative atheists indirectly, who assail the immortality of the soul, who do not believe that God is just, or the governor of the world, who posit multiple gods. But all those, with conscience as witness, know that they are directly atheists, nor will they deny that consequence. He adds this reason on page 183: "For what does 'God' signify among all men, except some sublime nature, which it behooves men to worship as judge? He who denies that such a nature exists, he alone, he, I say, and no one else directly denies God, and knows that he denies God; for he alone attends to what the word 'God' means for him. To acknowledge the first cause of things is not enough for someone to be said to confess God," etc. I respond: If there is no distinction between affirming or denying something directly and indirectly or by consequence, and between the question of who or what kind of being God is, as indeed this darkener far departing from Remonstrant hypotheses (in the Apology, chapter 1, folio 25) contends, let him certainly respond to these points. The Socinians deny God's foreknowledge; they posit two gods; they deny that the true and eternal God (namely, the Holy Spirit) is a substance or person, but make Him some accident; they do not want to adore the true and eternal God (namely, the Holy Spirit) - therefore they are speculative atheists, who are certainly persuaded that there is no God. For if they feel from the soul that God does not foreknow future things, since he is a philosopher and theologian, who will be able to persuade himself that they are so stupid that they do not recognize that they deny God by consequence - so that I may tie this knot with his own words, page 176. From the atheisms of the Socinians and Vorstius about the quantity and finitude, composition, mutability of God, etc., imputed to them through solid consequences by Becanus and Eglisem (in the judgment of all Christendom), let him elicit a similar judgment, if it pleases him, and compare it with the Apology in the cited place, and Vorstius' Apologetic writings, so that the readers may see how, in the skeptical and Socinian manner, he here at least clamors against his adversary, lest the more

unskilled so clearly perceive that he himself has been driven to no obscure confession of temerity, ἀπαιδευσία, and vain contention. Concerning the atheisms of the David-Jorists, which their antagonists impute to them by consequence, let the darkener conclude the same thing, and concerning the atheism of the Skeptical-Libertines of the second kind, and concerning similar things let the judgment be similar. When he will have apprehended them in the same kind and order of atheists, let him subjoin the advice about entering into Syncretism with the Socinians and David-Jorists, which he has shown well enough that he has not been able to repudiate so far, chapter 17, page 144. We add that, by Remonstrant consequence, and indeed a most solid one in their judgment, the Reformed doctors with their followers, who understand those controversies, are akin to the Manicheans, Turks, atheists, since they pertinaciously hold and defend those dogmas from which it follows that God is the author of sin, a deceiver, unjust, a tyrant, etc. - that is, that God is not God. Now conclude that they directly take away God, and therefore are speculative and direct atheists, who are certainly persuaded that there is no God. He now sees what a web out of mere and ambitious contention he has woven for himself to cover his ignorance and temerity; let him unravel it, if he can, but agreeably to his own hypotheses, and those of his allies in the Apology, Vedelius the Rhapsodist, the Response to the Professors of Leiden, The True Remonstrant Theologian, and the medley of Vorstian apologies, etc., especially the Apologetic Exegesis, chapter 1. 2. It is against sacred Scripture. Does not the prophet (in Psalm 14:1) gather from the impious life of the wicked, etc., "There is no God?" By what right does he so gather, unless he presupposes that it can happen that men lapse to that point of foolishness? In his latest infamous writing he adds this defense: "The sense is that the prophet absurdly posits, to the detestation of certain impious men, that they say in their heart, 'There is no God,' if we rightly posit that they cannot even say this in their heart." He adds in the same place that I dissimulate this argument and ascribe a sense to it which he does not acknowledge as his own, and cites in the margin page 182 of my little book. I respond: 1. I did not dissimulate this argument, but indicated its solution there - namely, that that place of Psalm 14:1, as neither Ephesians 2:12, cannot be understood of direct and speculative atheists, who are certainly persuaded, etc., nor does any interpreter (except our darkener, with the Socinians) take those places in that way; for otherwise it would follow, since they speak universally of all the impious living described in that whole psalm, taken together with Psalm 94 and Romans 3, and of all the Gentiles described in Ephesians 2, that all of them were such speculative and direct atheists, which is absurd; and to that end I pointed a finger to the commentators, especially to Cornelius a Lapide on Romans 3, page 55, and to the authors cited a little before - Willet on Romans 2:14, Arminius, Tilenus, etc. Thus I then censured this argument, by no means dissimulating it. The adversary himself, contradicting himself, testifies that I did not dissimulate it, because he adds that I ascribe to it a sense which he does not acknowledge as his own. Here would be an opposite in an apposite, the sons of the logicians would say. But because some, like a blank or rather badly scribbled tablet, have neither learned nor even now want or are able to be taught true and solid wisdom, although someone may offer them guidance, let us therefore repeat the response, and the solutions of the authors to whom we pointed a finger. 2. We say that atheists are implied in Psalm 14, indirect ones, not direct ones, and practical, not speculative; it implies atheists there saying, seeking, and doing this so that they can quietly believe that there is no God - not truly such as have achieved this, at least it does not imply those who are certainly persuaded that there is no God. Thus the

commentators take those texts. See Lorinus, in whom several others are cited. Genebrardus, Jansenius, Muis, etc. explain it of indirect atheists who deny God's providence, and His justice avenging evil and rewarding good. And thus the Chaldean paraphrase: "There is no power of God on earth." To this end the cited authors urge that the word אֵין is used here, which denotes God as governor and judge. Rabbi Arama expounds it of Nebuchadnezzar, others of Sennacherib, or similar persecutors of the church. Rabbi Arama is followed by Nicholas of Lyra, who adds: "He did not deny all deity, but the God of Israel." Mersenne speaks of direct atheists, who are such by endeavor, page 246. You may add that there have been some so impious that they have endeavored to persuade themselves that there is no God, and although they have not been able to accomplish this, their mind crying out against it and their conscience struggling against it, nevertheless Scripture pronounces according to their endeavors, and thus says that they have not known God. Augustine, Cajetan, Salmeron, Toletus, Cornelius a Lapide on Romans 3 expound and prove from the circumstances of the text that it must be taken of an impious life, or practical atheism, which is a state of corruption common to all men, as long as they are not illuminated by the grace of God. "For they so live, and at last arrive at this point, that they say either explicitly or implicitly, 'There is no God'" - these are the words of Cornelius a Lapide. Who nevertheless admits the exposition of Salmeron: "Every foolish man, that is, impious man and sinner, by this very fact that he sins, implicitly and virtually says in his heart, 'There is no God,' because he so freely and impudently sins against God, as if God did not see his sin, but could not or would not punish it," etc. And Lorinus comments thus on Psalm 14. Moreover, let him gather the distinction between practical and speculative atheism analogically from those things which the Remonstrants philosophize about practical and speculative error in the preface to the Apology, page 8, and thence let him explain that saying of his, page 182: "For to be practically impious proceeds from this, that one indulges speculative impiety." About which in problem 3 next, in three words. 3. To the place Ephesians 2, we responded in our Thersites, page 183, from the notes of Camerarius. But if those are not at hand, let them consult the notes of Beza, lest we transcribe everything here. 4. He will never prove that calumny with which he aspersed us, as if I had posited that the impious cannot say in their heart, "There is no God." I posit the contrary. See how above I distinguished deliberating and unformed thought from formed thought, that is, the mental word (Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II, question 2, article 1), and from intellection or vision of that word with certainty, and firm assent. 3. How do you know that there are no such atheists, when no one knows what is in man, whether in other men, except the spirit of man, which is in him? I respond: We refuted this inept objection in our Thersites by saying that Scripture, and universal experience, and the reasons deduced from them, support us here. But he excepts: 1. that here we are dealing with the free thoughts of men, which God alone knows; but that the philosophers dispute about the faculties of human nature, which they demonstrate from arguments of those things about which there is no controversy. I respond: What if some man protested that he knew nothing, understood nothing, indeed had no docility in himself; that he did not perceive the truth of that principle, "Nothing can simultaneously be and not be"; that he never understood any discourse in either a signate or exercised act; that he had no law of nature, nor a conscience accusing or excusing; that there was no motion of the will in him, no choice of good or avoidance of evil proposed by the intellect - and similar things; would not the philosopher judge about those free actions, and oppose to that lying Skeptical monster protesting against his interior sense, universal experience, reason, Scripture? Moreover, it can

be taught by philosophers, and by Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, question 10, articles 1 and 2, that there are certain actions or passions in the intellect and will which are hidden in the inner sanctum of human thought (as he himself speaks), which nevertheless are not free. We do not have leisure to inculcate the elements of the arts and sciences to any theological questions. 2. To my instance that the Remonstrants would pronounce that all of our people from their faith about predestination and perseverance can conclude nothing else than despair or security, although they do not know what is in the heart of each Reformed person - he thus excepts: "I respond that we conclude not what is in their soul, but what follows from the doctrine itself, if they want to speak consistently." I respond: Since all and each Reformed person who so understands that doctrine, and so believes, and is certainly persuaded that it so holds itself and not otherwise, protests that neither can they nor do they want to feel any security or despair from it, either theoretically or practically, but rather all the contrary things, if they want to speak consistently and conformably to their interior sense and conscience - the Remonstrants nevertheless oppose to all and each that universal axiom: "Faith, sense, and such an application of predestination and perseverance produces or can produce nothing else in you than despair," etc. 3. To my instance: "Object also to the theologians, who accurately discourse on repentance, the acts of faith, etc., on the anatomy of conscience, etc., and yet have never seen anyone's conscience besides their own," he thus excepts: "If the theologians pronounced that penitence, faith, hope, and the rest of those things (which I do about atheism) were in all or in none, he would say that they sinned with equal temerity." I respond: Therefore say that they sin with temerity, who from the Scriptures, Galatians 5, James 2, and universal experience posit that in the heart of no man ever was there a living and salvific faith which was destitute of charity - whatever the carnal and poorly believing, taught by Thersites, may protest to the contrary. "You rashly assume for yourselves to know those things which God alone, conscious to man, knows." That no believer, who felt a living desire of grace and sorrow according to God over his sins, as well as zeal for good works, is in a state of despair, or truly despairs (from Matthew 5:3, 4, 6; Psalm 51:19; 2 Corinthians 7:10-11; Romans 6:6, 8:14), although in the middle of a struggle with despair, and in a paroxysm of Satanic temptation, he himself exclaimed that he despaired.

4. To my instance: "Object also to yourself, who peremptorily judge that all my piety is hypocrisy, and yet do not know what is in my heart, etc.," he thus excepts: "Many simulated things can be detected and reproved, although we rashly pronounce nothing about what lies hidden in another's soul." He adds besides: "that he has not condemned all my piety of hypocrisy, etc., nor does he posit that all are diabolical whose hypocrisy is in some way refuted, etc." I respond: It could have happened that conscience, or at least human shame, admonished him here. How much he otherwise would have rashly prated, our Thersites compared with his Accurate Examination, pages 36, 60, 62, shows sufficiently. How he rashly judged about the thought and intention of my heart, I showed in our Thersites Heautontimoroumenos, section 3, chapter 4, and chapter 2, pages 262-263. What there is about my unjust exaggeration, by which I draw this consequence from his sayings: "Therefore I am judged by him, that I am with the devil, and not with Christ, etc." - let him see, if he has leisure, Thersites, section 2, chapter 7, page 205, where I refute this assertion of the adversary: "If a believer commits sin, in the present, insofar as he does it, and while he does it, he is said to be of the devil, etc., he has wandered from salvation,

he has defected from God to the devil, etc." Which he even now endeavors to defend in his latest writing, or rather to involve and soften with miserable subterfuges, chapter 32. But let us dismiss these things, and reserve them for another occasion. It will have sufficed to reply to this exception: Whatever I may profess, driven and compelled by these or those thoughts of my mind, motives, right and simple intentions, nevertheless I do not cease to profess, propagate, defend, etc., such a truth and cause of God; he nevertheless does not cease to judge otherwise about my interior intention, piety, devotion toward the cause and worship of God; and yet he does not know what is in man. Let him see therefore how the saying of the apostle is not to be applied to this business. But the solution of the following argument will contribute to this. 4. "Many have said and done all those things by which they could demonstrate themselves to be speculative atheists." He adds in his latest writing to the defense of this argument: "For how can we come to the knowledge of what lies hidden in souls, except through words and deeds?" I respond: Deeds prove practical atheism, which we concede, about which above. To the sayings the antagonists of atheism respond that if among men such a monster is sometimes found, which fractiously denies God, it does this against the interior sense and dictate of conscience, which it previously felt in the very act, or will feel again after the paroxysm and lethargy of impiety, whether it wants to or not. And so from the testimony of one most impious and mendacious man by no means perpetual or constant, an axiom cannot be constructed against the common theology and philosophy, Scripture, reasons, and universal experience, and thence the constant testimony of individual men, Gentiles, Jews, Christians, learned, unlearned, upright, wicked, supported. The heart of man is perverse, Jeremiah 17, and man deceives his own heart, James 1 - Why should man not deceive by a hypocritical and false ostentation and boasting of internal persuasion and certitude, by saying that he has never on any occasion felt or believed anything about God, or that he now no longer feels or believes anything, indeed that he does not even in any way doubt the opposite part? I do not believe it. The reason is, because it is not necessary that whatever someone says, these same things he also supposes, according to the testimony of the philosopher in Metaphysics, book 3, chapter 3. But our adversary believes the furious and most mendacious atheist, who otherwise believes almost nothing, who does not give credence to myriads of faithful souls concerning their own interior sense and practice regarding their corruption and the entire grace of God, who does not give credence to all Christians concerning their sense and practice regarding the doctrine of the Trinity of Christ's person and satisfaction, so that he may make today's Pelagians and Socinians far more pious than them. 5. You make your temerity plainly attested against the universal experience of all nations, religions, ages (to use your word) - I will add also, what is more serious, against Scripture. For does not the prophet gather from the impious life of the wicked that the fool thus resolves in his soul, etc.? I respond: He proves that there are atheists; thus it is - indirect and practical ones, but not of that kind and form, such as the Socinians imagine, who are either plainly destitute of the knowledge of God, or speculatively and certainly persuaded that there is no God. And thus for all voluptuaries, their God is their belly, and for the avaricious, their treasure - Philippians 3, Colossians 3. All of whom, however, we do not believe are speculatively and certainly persuaded, etc. You also opposed in Thersites Heautontimoroumenos, pages 180 and 182, the universal experience, whence it is necessary, when we hear that there are many atheists, to accurately distinguish and explain atheism. The adversary, seeing himself reduced to straits, and that the universal experience and Psalm 14

are alleged in vain for this controversial atheism, since they only teach, in the judgment of all the erudite and those accurately weighing these things, that there are many atheists, whose kinds we ourselves had explained there - by a wonderful interpretation of his own words, seeks a poultice for his ἀπαιδευσία and temerity in his latest writing: "What I meant for myself by universal experience, he does not seem to have understood: I meant this, that everywhere and always there have been found those who would fear that there are such atheists, who would even persuade themselves that there is no deity." I respond: Let the reader judge concerning the gloss. When we, after all the antagonists of atheism, allege the universal experience, it is demanded that we prove concerning individuals (whose hearts, of course, we do not know) this which we say: namely, that no one among the Ephesians (and thus among the rest of the Gentiles) was ever speculatively an atheist, page 181.

Let the philosophers be consulted about Induction and Experience. And here our man exclaims against me about the universal experience, which nevertheless does not proceed beyond certain ones who feared or thought, along with our anonymous Remonstrant, that there are perhaps (for he expressly adds this limitation again and again) speculative atheists certainly persuaded, etc. And this, of course, is the universal experience. But how does he prove this experience of the fear or doubt of some whether there are speculative atheists? 1. "Because theologians laboriously prove against atheists that there is a God, not only so that they may restrain their tongues, but more so that they may instruct their souls, as well as those of others, against their quibbles." I respond: And philosophers prove in whatever way they can the universal first principles, both theoretical and practical, enumerated above; from which, nevertheless, it does not follow that there is anyone speculatively ἄνους who is certainly persuaded of the opposite part. Then reasons are adduced so that we may turn men away not only from a certain assent to the opposite part, but also both from an exterior assertion or disputation, and from an interior temptation, doubt, opinion, will, and zeal. 2. "Because Erasmus, in his paraphrase on Matthew 6:31, says that the pagans either do not believe that there is a God, or do not believe that He takes care of mortals." I respond: Neither Erasmus, nor any mortal, nor you yourself believe that the pagans were such atheists about whom the question here is. The contrary is proved by the ancient writers against the Gentiles, and from the more recent ones, Eugubinus in his book On the Perennial Philosophy, and Mornay On the Truth of the Christian Religion. And no one could know this better than Erasmus, who had spent the greatest part of his life perusing the books of the pagans. He meant nothing other than that they did not know the true God, according to 1 Thessalonians 4, or did not know Him with an effectual knowledge to the practice of trust (about which in that place, Matthew 6). In this way they are generally said to be so in Ephesians 2. 3. "Because Acontius affirms this in his Satan's Stratagems, book 1." I respond: Let it be so; what then? You also affirm it, and the Socinians with you, whose authority is not admitted here, against whom I disputationally argue. Moreover, how far Acontius was from a hidden Socinianism, or at least Syncretism with it, can be learned because he precisely excludes the heresy of the Sabellians, but by no means that of the Photinians; indeed, he not obscurely includes them in his creed (book 7, page 341), about which we have warned elsewhere. 4. "Because the very appellation of 'atheist' and the propriety of the word makes plain what was the opinion of the ancients." I respond: We have already said that "atheist" signifies one who in some way denies God, whether speculatively or practically,

whether indirectly or directly, just as "heretic" denotes one who denies the articles or an article of faith. But this is nothing to the internal certitude and persuasion of the mind, to the extirpation of natural theology. Calvin on Ephesians 2:12, cited by the adversary, has nothing for his opinion. Reader, I pray, consult him. 6. "What? Can it not happen that sometimes the impious are involved in that error, that, etc.?" I respond: I responded in Thersites. To which he replies nothing in his latest writing that requires or deserves examination or note, except that he rehashes that I concede doubt, fluctuation, and disputation for a time, by which he thinks the matter is finished. But this by no means follows, as the distinctions set forth above show. 7. "If God, according to our opinion, gives some men over to a reprobate sense, why can He not by this very sin harden them so that they have a thoroughly seared conscience, and no longer believe that there is a God?" I had responded that the consequence is not valid from possibility to actuality. He retorts in his latest writing: "Most ineptly; for I argue not from possibility to actuality, but from actuality to possibility, in this way: He who gives men over to a reprobate sense on account of antecedent sins can also sometimes harden men by this very reprobate sense, etc." I respond: Sharply indeed. As if your rhetorical prosyllogism and syllogism, if they were to be proposed logically in full form without cryptic statements and enthymemes, should not be such: If there can be some atheists who do not believe, etc., therefore there are some atheists. But there can be; therefore. You now see that your conclusion is directly opposed to mine, which runs thus: Speculatively there are no atheists who are certainly persuaded that there is no God. This major premise, therefore, is denied, and this whole argumentation is cut off; for the consequence is not valid from possibility to actuality. But if you say, "I am content with this syllogism and conclusion, as I have now expressed it in form," I respond: 1. I now reject that conclusion, because the fallacy of ἐνστάσεως τῆς ἀρχῆς is committed, and the terms are changed in making the opposition. Here I could stop. 2. But this fallacy having been pardoned to him, the habit of which he seems to have contracted for himself by depraved custom, let us out of abundance also expose his other ineptitudes. The major of your syllogism, which would serve to prove the minor of the syllogism expressed by me before, is denied. You prove it, and bring forward the reason for the consequence. Here he is silent, and in his usual manner imposes the proof on me: "Give me a solid reason, etc." This, of course, is an accurate examination, this is a refutation of my theses. But let us oppose to him a twin: When you teach that God makes men mad (for so Thersites in his examination, which in his latest writing, chapter 58, he wanted to miserably plaster over with a fabricated commentary), give me a solid reason why He cannot by this very thing deprive them of the intellective faculty. You will say, because this implies a contradiction, that a remaining man should be without reason. The same thing I also say: it is repugnant and contradictory to the justice and divine law, the law of creation, and rational nature that man not be subject to God (compare the disputation On the Law and Justice of God), that there be no eternal law in him, no synteresis, no conscience, that he depend on God the supreme Lord by no thread however thin, that, whatever machines and convictions having been applied, without any sense of deity, without any fear of judgment and the judge, he sweetly acquiesce in that certain persuasion of his, "There is no God," and thus formally be a speculative atheist directly. The reason for this reason is that not even the devils or the damned in hell arrive at that state, whose worm never dies. Then add also this reason, because those men who are said to be given over to a reprobate sense, Romans 1:24, and to be blinded, hardened, past feeling, having their conscience seared, Ephesians 4:18-19, Exodus 9, taken

together with Romans 9:17-18 and 11:7, are not deprived of all sense of deity, so that the contrary form is put on their mind, and in it they certainly and securely acquiesce; but the contrary is expressly asserted about them, Romans 1:30, where they are called θεοστυγεῖς, and verse 32, τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιγνόντες, etc., and 2:14-15, 1 Timothy 4:1-2, where superstition is ascribed to them, which Calvin on Ephesians 2:12, cited by you, rightly notes must be distinguished from ἀθεΐα. And so let the judgment about the atheist Pharaoh be the same. 8. "Can it not happen that for some time the impious are involved in that error, that they do not believe that there is any God, and that all things exist by chance?" I respond: The question is not properly what can be, but what is. He retorts: "On the contrary, it is asked by me what can be; if I were to affirm with certainty that some are speculative atheists, I would be rash, etc." I respond: He could have proposed a thousand other questions; but by that very thing he does not refute my assertion. If I defend this thesis, that Christ is homoousios and has made satisfaction for our sins, and my antagonists, putting forward an accurate examination and refutation of my thesis, in place of arguments cast forth these questions into the middle: "Could not Christ have assumed something other than human nature? Could man not have been freed in another way, etc.?" Certainly the direct and apposite response would be: "The question is not properly what can be, etc." But what he subjoins: "Now I accuse him himself of temerity, who denies that there are any speculative atheists, when he is compelled to confess that such can exist," I respond: the consequence is not valid, which could be proved by many instances. Besides this, the antecedent is far from the truth. I have neither confessed nor am I compelled to confess. For he who cuts off the adversary's disputation by denying the major premise does not thereby prove the minor. Then I expressly denied the minor, by saying that those who attribute all things to fortune are not without all sense of deity; I added that the atheists who are usually so called are not immediately said to be such in the sense that the adversary wants; to which end I cite Camerarius (now add Calvin and Beza) on Ephesians 2, and Vorstius, disputation 1 On God, theses 19-20, and other authors cited above in part 1, theses 1 and 3. Finally, I was adding: "And if by error he understands fluctuation and disputation for some time, we do not object, and it is nothing against us." Our man retorts: "I say that by error I understand error, that is, an opinion addicted to error. I also say that it makes no difference to the matter whether they err for some time or perpetually, etc. Therefore, what you concede for some time makes excellently against you." I respond: Thus he plays games in a serious matter, and imposes on his reader, truncating in bad faith the words of my response and distinction which make the other member, which immediately follow: "But if [he understands] the ignorance of a depraved disposition, which in its own kind is held as a speculative and certain knowledge, by which the mind of man, having been informed, is inclined and easily elicits such an actual conclusion, 'There is no God,' we deny it." Now the reader sees how apposite his response is. 9. The conjectures which he accumulates in his peroration, pages 186-187, we do not pursue here, because he himself does not trust them, which he indicates by those formulas: "Do we not commonly believe?" and, "For what is more likely?" and, "But as these things hold themselves, nevertheless they seem such that it should not be rashly asserted, etc." and "Perhaps it will be called into doubt by more than we ourselves fear," and, "Since our nature is so corrupt, as some (namely, against the Remonstrants) testify, that it can scarcely persuade itself with certainty that there is a God."

3. Let us examine his exceptions to our arguments. 1. He excepts to our argument from connate theology and common notions: 1. "Ineptly, I say, natural knowledge can be extinguished." I respond: By the same work, the faculty of understanding, and the connate knowledge of principles, and conscience not only can be extinguished, but also have been extinguished in fact in not a few (your universal experience proving it). Bring forward one (so that you may break our induction and the conclusion of the antagonists of atheism hitherto supported by experience, the Scriptures, and the reasons alleged) in whom it was extinguished. Prove this either by some reason, or by divine revelation, or by human testimony - but do not ask of me (which you do on pages 185 and 181) to prove that among all and each of the impious there was no such person. The customary formula of induction suffices for me: "Nor can any dissimilar example be given." And by this method all the axioms and theorems of the sciences have hitherto been constructed. For since singulars are infinite, they neither can nor ought to be traversed by the one affirming. But the opponent is bound to give an instance. But so far you have deserted your bond; for neither divine testimony nor any reason has been able to be adduced by you. The ultimate analysis is in human testimony. But that is nothing other than of one or another impious and hypocritical atheist - how detestable such infamous men ought to be to us, you may teach us. And yet where that atheist is, and who he is, and what kind and how constant his testimony is, is not indicated so far. Now let the readers judge what accurate disputants our Neo-Skeptics are, and how justly they chant this epiphonema to themselves: "For you see here, Christian reader, on what miserable arguments their temerity rests, how easily the Remonstrants, who are more circumspect estimators of things than they themselves, exclaim that they are nothing other than Skeptics." 2. To our argument, "Then there would be no synteresis and natural conscience," he excepts: 1. "The connection is marvelous. If Peter is a speculative atheist, therefore there is no synteresis or natural conscience in Paul." I respond: If he had not truncated my words, he could not under any color have mocked me and the reader. For thus I was immediately adding: "which rests on the knowledge of the deity implanted by nature in every man, against Romans 2:14-15, with John 1:9, Acts 14:15-16 and 17, etc., 17:22, Psalm 19:1-2-3-4, and all the commentators, except Socinus. For where there is no knowledge or γνῶσις of the lawgiver, there no work of the law is written in hearts. But now conscience is in all rational creatures, as Arminius rightly says, disputation 14, thesis 8, and Tilenus, volume 1, disputation 10, theses 6-7, nor can the law of nature be completely extinguished or deleted, as the commentators observe on Romans 2:14, among others Willet, page 121." Let those things which Mersenne disputes about common notions and the innate and natural knowledge of God in his commentary on Genesis against Raymond de Sabunde be compared. Add the authors cited above. But our man proceeds, conscious that that game is only a game: "For if," he says, "he wants to conclude nothing other than that then in Peter himself no synteresis or natural conscience remains, I will confess it to be true, etc. He rashly presupposes that the conscience of the impious is never extinguished." I respond: Then by the same work let him also concede that the faculty of understanding and reasoning can be extinguished in man. For that law of nature is not only an actual judgment, but also its light, which as it were permanently contains that law first inscribed, and can always represent it in act. Let the Scholastics on I, question 79, articles 12, 13, and II-II, question 94, be seen. But perhaps our man plays with the ambiguous in the word "synteresis" and "conscience." We understand something permanent, which we deny can be completely extinguished, and its contrary introduced and inhere, unless someone says

that humanity and the natural power of the intellect, both theoretical and practical, are extinguished. And he himself, page 185, fluctuates or involves the matter, when he denies that he concedes that the sparks of knowledge are extinguished; but those sparks, as appearing within, would prohibit the extraneous, that is, would not permit that their contrary should occupy the subject, and indeed totally. But if he retorts that a contrary act (if not a permanent habit) can exist there at least for a time, I respond: 1. Such an act of the mind, which a certain persuasion expresses, cannot exist there where the natural principle of the contrary act persists. 2. Our thesis does not deal with a pure, transient act, but partly formally implies something permanent, whether a habit or a custom, partly presupposes the same, when it says: "There is no speculative atheist who is certainly persuaded, etc." For no one is called a speculative atheist from a flighty thought, just as neither is anyone called such and such from a transient action as from an inhering form. Bonaventure rightly says, on Sentences 2, distinction 38, number 39: "Those things are said to be in the soul which are in it by way of rest; for such things are said rather to be from the soul than in the soul." The adversary adds: "If any conscience sometimes remains in the impious, it does not follow, however, that it is necessarily conjoined with any knowledge or fear of God. It is not so; the scourge of conscience can also remain from the fear of men, although none of men may be conscious of the crime; for experience has taught that the things which are hidden often become manifest through the imprudence of the perpetrators, from which no one understands himself to be entirely safe. Often also through obscure indications, which, since they leave a suspicion in the mind, must also leave fear." I respond: Here indeed he signally helps the atheists, and teaches them to except to the argument of the antagonists (whom we cite everywhere, and below). But let him say, I pray, when no man is conscious of the crime committed by man βαυκοπανούργῳ [with wicked craft], does the sense and fear of no higher cause agitate him than of his own talent and mouth, lest he be betrayed through it, or of his hands, lest he lay them on himself, or of any irrational creatures whatever, lest they take vengeance on him? I have hitherto thought that here something divine lies under, and the finger of God, since conscience is said to be the vicar of the supreme judge. But lest we always inculcate terms and elements, let the antagonists of the atheists to be indicated below be seen; indeed, Arminius himself, private disputation 14, thesis 8; also the disputations on synteresis and conscience to the places of Thomas Aquinas just cited. Or from our side, Perkins, treatise On Conscience, chapter 1; Ames, book 1, chapters 1 and 2. And the fathers, as well as the philosophers, etc., a great part of whom the Polyantheas indicate. 4. To our argument, "Then all men would be far inferior to the devils, and all the sparks of knowledge (about which the Belgic Confession, article 14) would be more extinguished in them than in the devils, who are not speculative atheists, James 2:19, etc.," he excepts: "A subtle logician, who thus argues: If some are speculative atheists, therefore all men are inferior to the devils. Likewise: If knowledge is extinguished, therefore also the sparks of knowledge are extinguished." I respond: As to the former consequence, it is valid for my thesis against the antithesis of Socinus (whose opinion I had indicated this to be at the beginning of that chapter, page 147), who denies all natural knowledge of God. The anonymous Remonstrant, taught by us in Thersites Heautontimoroumenos, and compelled by the force of truth, whatever he had skeptically disputed against us for speculative atheists and the abolished natural knowledge, at last was compelled to conclude thus in his latest writing titled Gymnasium Ultrajectinum, page 187: "Hence we will also most firmly demonstrate (note well) that there is a God, who, with no

one denying, has so intimately insinuated Himself into the consciences of countless men that even very many of the impious, some reluctantly, others unthinkingly, have given Him testimonies beyond all exception." And later, page 188: "But if, besides the testimonies of conscience which appear in very many, although they cannot appear in individuals, whence there is no need to dispute about the conscience of individuals - if, I say, besides these we also want to seek other testimonies, by which God is never destitute, and through which He can be found by groping, soon they will occur so infinitely that he who does not apprehend from any of them will have degenerated from man into a beast, etc." And thus, after the writers of natural theology, the antagonists of the atheists, philosophical booklets, and the writers of common topics, he discourses through the heaven, moon, air, etc., and at last concludes: "Who will not understand that they themselves (namely, men) were created rational not so much to live ungrateful as to seek by groping such a great benefactor, etc., especially since to this very end they have within conscience sitting as if before a tribunal in His name and threatening just things, etc." If he can reconcile these things with the dictates of his allies in the Apology, and his own things effused before, he will be a Great Conciliator to us. 5. What the allies pretend, that they propose those things which the rude and unlearned easily perceive without any labor - this does not free them from prevarication and syncretism with the Socinians, if not also with the Skeptical Libertines, that is, atheists of the second kind.

The question remains, however, whether the dictates of theirs just now reviewed are true and useful for refuting the atheists. If they are, let them not blame and disdain them, and at the same time the universal consensus of all the wise. If not, now they vainly put forward the intellects of the more rude. For whether they grasp or do not grasp, whether with labor or without labor, the truth nevertheless in itself is one and the same. Then I add that they here, in their usual manner, make games. When the question is whether there is a God, not only the rude but also the talented and learned, indeed those especially, must be satisfied; for of the former there are fewer atheists, of the latter more, about whose conviction the theologians should labor. Indeed, that the Theses of Episcopius (where there is nothing about natural theology) were written for the learned, no one, I think, will deny. That the whole Apology of the Remonstrants treats of almost nothing other than the metaphysical rhetoric or declamatory Socinianism, those know who have only lightly inspected it, and indeed for the sake of the literate, not the rude. Which they themselves show sufficiently when they have not been able to prevail upon themselves even to this day to translate it into the vernacular language for the sake of their hearers, and to oppose it to the Censure of their confession published in Latin and the vernacular by the Professors of Leiden. But let the most erudite philologist and jurist Grotius, beyond all exception greater among them, take away this ludicrous and inept pretext, who dedicates his Demonstration of the Christian Religion, written in Dutch verse (in which, by the customary method, from philosophical principles drawn from the book of nature and conscience, he proves the deity), to his Dutch countrymen, especially the more rude - to sailors, evidently, and naval allies, who on account of commerce with the Indians and other barbarians often have to deal with atheists and infidels. 12. Problem: Whether so far a genuine and certain reason of defending the divinity or deity and its providence, and at the same time the common principles of knowing, against atheists, skeptics, Epicureans, and other fanatics, has been found and applied by the wise, so that they have been solidly and evidently convinced, if not passively, at

least actively? I respond affirmatively, with all of Christendom, with all the schools and wise theologians and philosophers, ancient and more recent, of whatever profession in the Christian religion - to say nothing of the pagans, Mohammedans, Jews. We will indicate the classes and titles of the proofs below in thesis 4. We would not want this universal wisdom of all ages to be idly derided and exploded, and this well-worn and safe way to be removed, so that a new one not yet found, not yet explored, but still remaining in mere potentiality and chaos, or if you prefer, in imagination and the vanity of promises and great hiatuses, may be substituted for it. For those who do this, or favor those rash endeavors, prostitute the cause of God and truth among the atheists and skeptics too much, and (whether prudently or imprudently, God knows) confirm the hands of the impious not a little; moreover, they are injurious to right reason, the natural light, and the gifts of God - indeed, even to the Holy Spirit Himself, who Himself taught and applied this method, Isaiah 40, Psalm 19, Acts 17, Romans 1, etc.

ON ATHEISM, PART FOUR

Respondent: GUALTERUS de BRUYN of Amersfoort
For the 13th of July, 1639

Problem 1: Whether the distinction of atheism into speculative and practical is legitimate. I respond affirmatively. For the members do not coincide, and therefore are not to be confused, no more than theoretical and practical knowledge. For as there is no practice which does not presuppose knowledge, and no knowledge which cannot be directed to some utility, so there is no practical atheism which does not presuppose some corruption of theory or judgment of the mind, and no speculative atheism which does not proceed to the corruption of practice; for they are mutual causes to each other, as in all other things the intellect and will - see the Scholastics on I-II, question 135, articles 3 and 5, and on question 9, article 1. Nor is there faith, or error in faith, without an act of the will - about which in the Disputation on the Practice of Faith, and Thomas Aquinas, II-II, question 2, article 1. Although, therefore, those atheisms are not separated from each other, they can nevertheless be distinguished, and according to the predominant element, or the ultimate specifying act, be so denominated and distinguished. Where, therefore, it consists and subsists more in the boasting of words and blasphemies, or in the interior doubt of the mind, it is called speculative; where more in the impiety of deeds, it is called practical. Compare the distinction of speculative and practical idolatry. And thus nearly heresy could be distinguished into theoretical and practical, so that the former consists more in the profession of errors against the articles of faith, the latter more in moral errors against the Decalogue, or in works against the same, or in both. That famous saying of Augustine: "The heretic disputes against the faith, the bad Christian lives against the faith." But if someone explains speculative heresy as an error which is not against conscience, and practical heresy as an error which someone tenaciously defends against knowledge and conscience, we will not object, provided that he does not make the former harmless, or a figment of the theologians, with some skeptics, against 1 Timothy 1:13, 15, Romans 10:3. For anyone could easily make the atheisms of the Sadducees and the like harmless by the same color. 4. Problem: Whether it is permissible to prove by disputing that there is a God. I respond: 1. Where there is danger

from the madnesses of atheists, this must be done sparingly, cautiously, compendiously, and perspicuously; where there is not, it can be abstained from, especially in the presence of the more rude and infirm, and in catechetical instructions. It will have sufficed there for the most part to presuppose and assume this principle. 2. The treatment is to be instituted σκευαστικῶς rather than ἀνασκευαστικῶς, that is, arguments are to be brought forward rather for the truth than the objections of the adversaries are to be refuted, lest while such things are said, they may be taught, and the devil with corrupt flesh may take occasion to disturb the minds of men with horrendous thoughts of this kind. 3. The case is different, however, with books that are published than with instructions that are done by the living voice. In the former, especially if they are dogmatic or polemical, this demonstration can scarcely be passed over; in the latter, it can be according to circumstances. 4. The case is different with academic instructions and disputations, and different with ecclesiastical ones. There theologians ought to be armed against antagonists of every kind. This, however, is to be done with such caution and reverence that it may not seem that a dialectical problem is being ventilated. With these distinctions having been applied, we admit that among Christians it ought not to be disputed (if indeed the importunity of the impious does not make necessity for us) whether there is a God. To which the prudent admonition of the Philosopher is to be applied analogically, Topics, book 1, chapter 11: "But it is not necessary to call into question every problem or every thesis, but that about which someone of τῶν λόγου δεομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως [those needing reason, not punishment or sense] might doubt. For those who doubt whether it is necessary to worship the gods and love one's parents or not need punishment; but those who doubt whether snow is white or not need sense." 5. Problem: Whether all men, on account of the corruption of their nature, can be called atheists, as long as they are not converted. I respond: With the word "atheism" taken broadly for indirect speculative atheism, I affirm it at least of the Gentiles and outsiders from Ephesians 2, taken together with 1 Thessalonians 4, because they do not acknowledge the true God. Can it also be affirmed of those who, educated in the people of God, are imbued to some degree with the true knowledge of Him? I affirm it of practical atheism, from Psalm 14 and 53, and taken together with Romans 3. 6. Problem: Whether someone can be converted from the atheism described by us, and consequently whether any grade of it, especially the highest, can fall upon the elect not yet actually called and converted. I respond: I affirm the former, because we read of no sin from which it is impossible to repent, and for which one should not pray, except the sin against the Holy Spirit, Hebrews 6, with 1 John 5. As to the latter, I do not see why it cannot be affirmed of the elect not covenanted in infancy, and consequently destitute of all seed of regeneration and sanctification of the Spirit. Concerning the covenanted, as to indirect atheism, it is likewise conceded, and the example of Augustine teaches it, who not only was elect and endowed with internal grace and the seed of federal holiness, but besides was actually initiated into the rudiments of faith and piety, and fell into Manichaeism, which is rightly reduced to indirect atheism. Although I would not want to say that Manichaeism inhered in Augustine as a habit - it will have sufficed to say as a certain disposition. But concerning the supreme grade of this evil, that is, concerning direct speculative atheism, it will perhaps seem crude to affirm this. The example of a certain woman in England is memorable, who (as Samuel Ward relates in a sermon on John 13:17, page 515, English edition in octavo), when she had lived for some years in the profession of atheism (namely, of doubting whether there was a God), was at last convicted, and then could scarcely admit consolation over this sin of hers. 7.

Problem: Whether the Antichrist will be an atheist. I respond: Cornelius a Lapide affirms it in his commentaries on Daniel 11:37, and on 2 Thessalonians 2:4, and on 2 Peter 3:4, namely, that he will directly deny every God, and will want to be worshiped alone as God. We deny it. That Antichrist would indeed be ridiculous and stupid who thought that he would seduce the world in this way. Therefore, the place 2 Thessalonians 2 is to be understood of practical atheism, and indirect speculative atheism, but not of a constant and direct profession and doctrine: "I alone am God." 2 Peter 2 does not deal with the Antichrist, but with all carnal mockers in general. The things which are contained in Daniel 11:37 are fitting for Antiochus. But this is professedly dealt with in the controversy over the Antichrist. We impute to the Roman Pontiff both Antichristianism and atheism, both speculative, because he partly openly, partly by consequence, attributes to himself those things which are fitting for God and Christ the mediator, and practical, on account of his morals and rule. See this proved by the author of the Brutum Fulmen at the beginning, where he treats of the impiety of the popes, and by Daneau, Powel, Whitaker, Downham, Vignier, Beumler, Tilenus, Gomarus, and others disputing about the Antichrist. There were also those in that see who are to be reckoned among atheists and impious men not only in this common respect, but besides by a certain peculiar one, for example, Sylvester II, Benedict IX, John XIII, Gregory VII, Alexander VI, Leo X, Paul III, Julius III - about whom the historians are to be consulted, and the writers just cited, along with Mornay's Mystery of Iniquity, and his defender Rivet. 8. Problem: Whether δεισιδαιμονία is a lesser evil than ἀθεότης. I respond: Plutarch indeed thus disputes in his book περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας, where he describes it as that according to which man thinks that there are gods, but that they are βλαβεροὺς καὶ κακοεργούς. Johannes Bodinus states the same thing in his Politics, book 4, chapter 7, page 759. The Deists in their impurities (in Mersenne, in the French book cited above in part 1) exclaim that the Bigots believing the infernal punishments of sins are worse than atheists, who openly deny God. We deny it, for although superstition strictly taken according to the mind of Plutarch is nothing other than indirect atheism (for thus near the end of the little book: ἡ δεισιδαιμονία τῇ ἀθεότητι συνάπτει), nevertheless it is a lesser evil than ἀθεότης as Plutarch describes it near the beginning. He says: "Ἡ μὲν ἀθεότης κρίσις ἐστὶ φαύλη τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, εἰς ἀπάθειάν τινα δοκεῖ τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ τοῦ θείου περιφέρειν, καὶ τέλος ἐστὶν αὐτῇ τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι." And near the end of the little book: "Ὁ μὲν ἄθεος ἀκίνητος, ὁ δὲ δεισιδαίμων κινούμενος ἀδικεῖ. Ὁ μὲν οὐ πιστεύει θεοῖς, ὁ δὲ καὶ δοξάζει τοιούτους εἶναι οἵους οὐ βούλεται. Ἀμφότεροι φεύγουσι τὸ θεῖον, ὁ μὲν διὰ φόβον, ὁ δὲ διὰ μῖσος." At least as that word commonly signifies any superstition (in which way also in Acts 17, and Plutarch himself at the end, where he makes ἀθεότητα and δεισιδαιμονίαν the two extremes of εὐσέβεια lying in the middle), there is no doubt at all that superstition is a lesser evil. Compare the disputation On Superstition. 9. Problem: Whether injections purely diabolical into the mind of man about the question "Whether there is a God" should be called atheisms. I respond: Yes, objectively, of course, insofar as they proceed from the devil. But in no way are they so subjectively with respect to man, who only unwillingly suffers those buffetings of Satan, and in no way cooperates with them, or gives them any assent. But we have touched on something about injections in the Disputation on Spiritual Desertions, and perhaps we will treat of them more fully in the Disputation on Temptations. 10. Problem: Whether the first motions in the faithful, and other thoughts and suggestions of the flesh about atheisms, are formally evil, and whether atheism is to be attributed to them from there, and they themselves are to be denominated atheists. I

respond: I affirm the former, and thus far sin and guilt are to be attributed to them. I deny the latter. For just as on account of temptations to despair, and the struggle with it, indeed not even on account of certain thoughts of despair (unformed, of course, and of the fluctuating and struggling intellect or mind), and consequently the voices of the desperate having been emitted, despair is formally attributed to none of the faithful, or he himself is called desperate, so neither on account of temptations of this kind are they to be called atheists; for the oppugnation of atheism is not victory. 11. Problem: Whether the most excellent, most expeditious, most sufficient, and only reason of proving deity against atheists, and among men, whoever they may finally be, provided that they are not devoid of judgment and a sane mind, is from the revelations made in the Old and New Testaments. I respond: The Remonstrants indeed think so in their Confession, chapter 1, section 2, and Apology, chapter 1, section 2, folio 25, where they seem to hand over to the adversary atheists the whole cause of natural notions and the internal testimony from the conscience of each man, as well as of arguments from the book and principles of nature, and thus nearly the whole method of proving God, with this ἐφύμνιον besides having been added: "The Remonstrants love to follow the plain, easy, and brief things which the rude and unlearned immediately perceive without any labor, and all the most learned are compelled to admit, unless they want to play the part of cavillers and manifestly prevaricate, such as this is: 'Those signs, prodigies, powers, etc. were done; therefore, God exists, and He who did them is the true God, and the religion which He prescribed is the true and divine religion.' This argument can be felt at first sight. The rest, which are deduced from philosophical principles, are so laboriously elaborated, involved in so many exceptions, entangled in so many definitions, hypotheses, postulates, that the unlearned often cannot follow them, and all the most learned not infrequently find something which they desire in them." I respond: 1. Thus is blown away and proudly despised whatever the intellects of all theologians, philosophers, and philologists have hitherto gathered against the wanton and impious skepticisms of the atheists. The Remonstrants alone, of course, are men here; the rest are ἀφημένην ἄγραν. 2. Specifically, natural notions and synteresis and conscience are relegated from this armory, which those who treat these things think should be tenaciously retained, and through which we contend that atheists are most felicitously oppugned - indeed, without which principles we contend that no demonstrations against them can be constructed. Let all the authors be seen who prove that there is a God, especially Mornay, On the Truth of the Christian Religion, chapter 1; Mersenne on Genesis 1, cited by us before; Lessius, Against the Atheists. From the philosophers, all the metaphysicians whose disputations or systems are today worn by the hands of students. From the philologists, Lipsius, epistle to Berchemius, Century 2, to the Belgians. Indeed, even from the Gentiles, Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, book 8, chapter 1, and Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, book 1, and Dio Chrysostom, oration 12. To whom let them add their own Grotius, in his Demonstration of Religion, at the beginning; especially also Vorstius, in his book On God, and their preceptor Arminius, private disputation 14, from thesis 4 to the end. Even the Socinian Völkel himself, with Crellius, in the Institutes, book 1, chapter 5, where he does not reject the instinct of nature. We will soon cite more authors, among whom are fathers and Scholastics, for the universal consensus. 3. How they may oppose this argument of theirs, taken from the history of the Old and New Testaments, to those who deny all the authority of Scripture, or call it into doubt, which atheists do, especially if there are any educated among the Gentiles or Turks - here hands will have to be given, and arms cast down by these new and

compendious disputants, as long as the adversary atheists do not agree with them in that supernatural principle (namely, of Scripture). No escape lies open, because they explode, or do not make so much of, the natural light and principle common to all men. 4. Finally, the anonymous Remonstrant himself, taught by us in Thersites Heautontimoroumenos, and compelled by the force of truth, whatever he had skeptically disputed against us for speculative atheists and the abolished natural knowledge, at last was compelled to conclude thus in his latest writing titled Gymnasium Ultrajectinum, page 187: "Hence we will also most firmly demonstrate (note well) that there is a God, who, with no one denying, has so intimately insinuated Himself into the consciences of countless men that even very many of the impious, some reluctantly, others unthinkingly, have given Him testimonies beyond all exception." And later, page 188: "But if, besides the testimonies of conscience which appear in very many, although they cannot appear in individuals, whence there is no need to dispute about the conscience of individuals - if, I say, besides these we also want to seek other testimonies, by which God is never destitute, and through which He can be found by groping, soon they will occur so infinitely that he who does not apprehend Him from any of them will have degenerated from man into a beast, etc." And thus, after the writers of natural theology, the antagonists of the atheists, philosophical booklets, and the writers of common topics, he discourses through the heaven, moon, air, etc., and at last concludes: "Who will not understand that they themselves (namely, men) were created rational not so much to live ungrateful as to seek by groping such a great benefactor, etc., especially since to this very end they have within conscience sitting as if before a tribunal in His name and threatening just things, etc." If he can reconcile these things with the dictates of his allies in the Apology, and his own effusions before, he will be a mighty Conciliator to us. 5. As to what the allies pretend, that they propose those things which the rude and unlearned easily perceive without any labor - this does not free them from prevarication and syncretism with the Socinians, if not also with the skeptical libertines, that is, atheists of the second kind.

The question remains, however, whether the aforementioned dictates of theirs recently reviewed are true and useful for refuting atheists. If they are, let them not blame and scorn them, and along with them the universal consensus of all the wise. If not, then they vainly put forward the intellects of the more unlearned. For whether they grasp them or not, whether with labor or without labor, the truth is nevertheless in itself one and the same. Besides, I add that here, according to their custom, they play games. When it is a question of whether there is a God, not only the unlearned but also the talented and learned, especially those, must be satisfied; for there are fewer atheists among the former, more among the latter, about whose conviction the theologians should labor. That the Theses of Episcopius (where there is nothing about natural theology) were written for the learned, no one, I think, will deny. That the whole Apology of the Remonstrants deals with almost nothing other than metaphysical rhetoric or declamatory Socinianism is known to those who have only lightly inspected it, and indeed for the sake of the literate, not the unlearned - which they themselves show well enough when even to this day they could not prevail upon themselves to translate it into the vernacular language for the sake of their hearers, and to oppose it to the Censure of their confession published by the Professors of Leiden in Latin and the vernacular. But let Grotius, that surpassingly erudite philologist and jurist, beyond all exception greater among them, take away this ludicrous and inept pretext - he

who dedicates his Proof of the Christian Religion, written in Dutch verse (in which, following the customary method, he proves deity from philosophical principles drawn from the book of nature and conscience), to his Dutch countrymen, especially the more unlearned - sailors, clearly, and naval associates, who on account of commerce with the Indians and other barbarians often have to deal with atheists and infidels. 12. Problem: Whether so far a genuine and certain method of defending the divinity or deity and its providence, and at the same time the common principles of knowing, against atheists, skeptics, Epicureans, and other fanatics, has been found and applied by the wise, so that they have been solidly and evidently convinced, if not passively, at least actively? I respond in the affirmative, with all of Christendom, with all schools and wise theologians and philosophers, ancient and more recent, of whatever profession in the Christian religion. To say nothing about pagans, Muslims, Jews. We will indicate the classes and titles of proofs below in thesis 4. We do not want this universal wisdom of all ages to be idly ridiculed and rejected, and this worn and safe path to be removed, so that a new one not yet found, not yet examined, but so far remaining in mere potency and chaos, or if you prefer, in imagination and the vanity of promises and great chasms, may be substituted for it. For those who do this, or encourage those rash attempts, prostitute the cause of God and truth too much among atheists and skeptics, and (whether prudently or imprudently, God knows) confirm the hands of the impious not a little; moreover, they injure right reason, natural light, and God's gifts - indeed, even the Holy Spirit Himself, who Himself taught and applied this method, Isaiah 40, Psalm 19, Acts 17, Romans 1, etc. as will soon be said. I hope that those who have a drop of piety will withdraw from this rash and dangerous opinion, lest they be implicated in blasphemies, as if, for example, the Holy Spirit in Scripture had handed down to us and employed an uncertain and less evident and safe method of convincing Epicureans or atheists, so that his own concepts must now be aided, perfected, or corrected by some petty philosopher. XIII. Problem. Whether in this method, the proof or consequence from effect to cause, or from works to the maker, which they commonly call the way of causality with the saying of Dionysius the Areopagite, and the proof from the book of nature, makes a part and indeed the principal one.

Resp. Affirm. and it is proven 1. by the authority and example of the Holy Spirit. Romans 1:19-20, Acts 14:15-17, 17:27-28, Psalm 8:2-4 and 19:1-3, etc., Job 38 and 39, Isaiah 40:21-22, 26, Jeremiah 10:10-11.

These passages should be carefully considered, in which you will hear God himself, the prophets, and the apostles disputing by this method.

Secondly, this method is defended against all objections, as can be seen among the Scholastics in Part 1, Question 2, Articles 2 and 3. Thirdly, it has been felicitously employed and applied thus far by all the wise men of all ages. Those who object to this method today are one or another inept petty philosopher, or certain idle Athenians eager for novelty (Acts 17), or men who are scarcely semi-literate, especially in metaphysics and natural theology, to the point that they have never even learned the terms or heard of them in conversation. But there are those who have already exposed, and will further expose, the ineptitudes and vertigos of those men. Meanwhile, on this occasion, let the following be considered and compared:

1. From the Fathers: Lactantius, Book 1, Chapter 2; Eusebius, Book 1 of Preparation for the Gospel; Theodoret's Discourses on Providence, and on the Cure of Greek Affections, Oration 3; the aforementioned Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names, Chapter 17; John of Damascus, Book 1, On the Orthodox Faith, Chapter 3.

2. From the Scholastics: Thomas Aquinas, Opusculum 6, and Book 1, Against the Gentiles, Chapters 12 and 13, and Summa, Part 1, Question 2, Articles 2 and 3, with Cajetan and other commentators. The Master of the Sentences, Book 1, Distinction 3, and all his commentators there.

3. From the natural theologians and antagonists of the Atheists, Epicureans, Gentiles, etc.: Savonarola in The Triumph of the Cross, Book 1, Chapter 6; Raymond of Sabunde in his Natural Theology (which was translated into French by Michel de Montaigne), Chapter 1; Steuchus in The Perennial Philosophy, Book 7, Chapter 22; Luis Vives, On the Truth of the Christian Religion, Book 1, Chapter 9; Mutius Pansa in The Kiss of Christian and Pagan Philosophy; Mornay on the truth of the Christian religion, Chapters 1, 11, 12; Thomas à Jesu, On Procuring the Salvation of the Gentiles, Book 11, Chapters 6 and 8; Possevinus, Book 10 of the Select Library, Chapter 2, Section 414; Charron, Book 1 of Truth, Chapters 6 and 7; Pierre Du Moulin in his little book On the Knowledge of God; Alsted in his Natural Theology; Grotius in his book On the Truth of the Faith; Guillaume de Rebreviettes in his Atheomastix. Add also the French tracts against the Atheists: Alexandre Cappe's in 12mo; Baruch Canephe's Atheomachus in 8vo; the three tracts of Infanticus Hotman, where in the first On Providence, Chapter 2; and the English ones: Smith's The Quiver Against the Atheists, which was published together with his sermons; John Weemes of Lathokar in his tract On the Four Degenerate Sons; Meredith Hanmer in his Atheomastix, Tract 1.

4. From the writers of common places, at least those who are intimately known to me or currently at hand: Philip Melanchthon, Wolfgang Musculus, John Calvin, Peter Martyr Vermigli, Andreas Hyperius, Stephen Szegedinus, Lambert Daneau, Daniel Tilenus, Amandus Polanus, in the common place On God. Compare also the same authors in the common place On Providence, and other writers who have defended providence ex professo, such as Leonard Lessius against the Atheists; Andreas Gorrutius On Providence; Ulrich Zwingli On Providence.

5. From the commentators on the aforementioned passages of Scripture: Juan de Pineda, Cornelius a Lapide, Juan de Lorinus, Andrew Willet, André Rivet, David Pareus, etc.

6. From preachers, practical and ascetic writers: Bonaventure in The Mind's Journey to God; Robert Bellarmine, On the Ascent of the Mind to God, etc.; Jean Taffin, On the Amendment of Life; John Preston in his sermon on 1 Thessalonians 1.

7. From the Metaphysicians: Francisco Suárez and others commonly.

8. From learned Jurists, Politicians, Physicians, Philologists: Innocent Gentillet in his Anti-Machiavel, Part 2, Axiom 1; Justus Lipsius in his letter to Berchemius; Hugo Grotius On the

Truth of the Christian Religion; Christoph Besold in his Specimen of Common Places, Part 2, pp. 19 and 363 in the 16mo edition; François Vallès, Chapter 58. Philosophical sacred 9. From the heterodox or suspect, the above-mentioned Arminius and Vorstius, especially Volckelius the Socinian in Institutions book 1, chapters 2, 3, 4, 5. John Trithemius in the book Eight Questions, question 8 which is about providence. 10. From the Gentiles, such as Aristotle book 8 of Physics, Sextus Empiricus, Maximus of Tyre dissertation 1. See many others cited by Plessis chapter 2.12 against the Mathematicians pages 317, 319. Cicero book 2 On the Nature of the Gods. Seneca On Providence. Galen book 3 On the Usefulness of Parts, which illustrious passage Beza described in the notes to Romans 1:19. 11. From the Jews, Maimonides in the constitution on the fundamentals of law chapter 1.

xiv. Problem: Whether the knowledge of the senses serves and is presupposed for this proof of divinity; and whether this means of knowing divinity is rightly used both for our own conviction and confirmation, and for the confounding of adversaries, and defended against ancient and new Sceptics? Answer: Affirmative, from Isaiah 40:21,26, Acts 17:27, Psalm 19:1-5 and 8:4, Romans 1:19-20, and the authors cited in the preceding problem.

Nor can the pseudo-philosophy of those who rashly reject this principle of knowing and investigating divinity be entirely purged of scepticism or at least semi-scepticism; and consequently they silently accuse the Holy Spirit, because in recalling men to the testimony of the senses in these and other questions in Scripture, it has led them away from the truth and deceived them. Compare also John 20:27 and Luke 24:39-40. Let these things suffice for advising those who profess the Christian name and the divinity of Scripture.

See the objections of the sceptics against the testimony of the senses refuted among the philosophers.

xv. Problem: Therefore, can some dangerous philosophical notions, partly manifestly false and absurd, partly uncertain, involved, and contorted, especially concerning Metaphysics and Natural Theology, by which this well-worn and safe way of investigating divinity shown by the Holy Spirit himself is removed, not only be rejected but also pressed by the affinity and consequences of scepticism, libertinism, atheism, in order to show the danger and forewarn incautious men? Despite the fact that their authors profess knowledge of God and even some religion. Answer: Affirmative. For although someone does not openly deny God but on the contrary constantly professes knowledge of him, and even defends against atheists (which was also frequently done by the ancient Epicureans and Sadducees, and today's Deists, to say nothing of the Socinians, Vorstius, Taurellus), nevertheless dangerous and rash philosophical notions can be urged by those consequences.

But if he gives place to the conviction of truth and sounder counsels, he must certainly desist; if not, such pseudo-philosophical notions must not be absolved by the pretext and protestation of a peculiar opinion and pure mental error (if indeed it is judged an error). This seems to turn to that semi-Libertinism, Socinian-Remonstrant, about speculative heresy, which Vedelius learnedly and solidly detected in the Mysteries of Arminianism.

This opinion of ours is proved: 1. From Scripture, Psalm 14:1, Ephesians 2:12, 1 Thessalonians 4:5, 1 Corinthians 15:32-34, Psalm 94:7 and 59:8 and 10:11, Job 21:14-15, where they are burdened with the consequences of atheism or Epicureanism, who nevertheless did not openly attack all knowledge of divinity or divine providence. 2. By analogy, of idolatry either coarser or subtler, direct or indirect, which is burdened with similar consequences, whatever men are accustomed to protest against the consequent. Refer here the greedy, the voluptuous, etc. Ephesians 5:5, Colossians 3:5, Psalm 106:19-20, Isaiah 44:15-17, 1 Corinthians 10:7,20-21.

3. By analogy of indirect or interpretive magic, by which are burdened the infinite actions and empty observations of those who protest that they are most alien to any diabolical pact and nefarious magic. See what we have noted in the disputation on Magic. 4. By analogy of other errors about the merit of Christ, free justification, and the observance of the ceremonial law, which the apostle pursues with rigid consequences in the very faithful and brothers, Galatians 2 and 5:2,4. Compare questions 30 and 80 of the Belgic Catechism. 5. From daily practice and common consent of any theologians and wise men, who impute the consequence of atheism to grave or capital errors about divinity and the attributes of God, also about the word of God, promises, worship. See above part 1, theses 1, 3, 4, where the examples of Taurellus and other philosophers are especially to be noted, also of writers about God, such as Vorstius, and also of Politicians and courtiers; though it is clear that they professed knowledge of God and some religion, some of them true religion. 6. From the sense and practice of orthodox Theologians, who are accustomed to impute Libertinism or Epicureanism, atheism to the Papacy, Popes, and especially the Roman curia, Jesuits and their scales, both on account of dogmas and on account of morals and arts little Christian, as we will indicate below in its place.

Here refer the consequences by which both Libertines and Socinians, both neutrals and changelings, Ecebolii, apostates are burdened. I forgot in part 1, thesis 2 to write that for the Jews Epicurus or Epicurean and *minim*, that is, heretic, apostate, are synonyms, as can be seen in Maimonides, treatise on Idolatry, p. 83 of the Hebrew-Latin edition of Vossius in quarto.

xvi. Problem: If those who are sparing worshipers of the Gods and infrequent, or occasionally neutral or nearly neutral in the matter of religion as the case may be, so indulge the vanity of their intellect as to contend that natural theology or the natural investigation and proof of divinity has not hitherto been shown by any of the wiser ones (not even by the fathers and Christian theologians); and on that account rashly substitute reasons thought up by themselves, but false or inept or obscure and involved, for that safe and well-worn way: can their unhappy and vertiginous Philosophy be reduced to absurdity by the consequences of atheism or scepticism, and those precipices be pointed out to the more incautious? Answer: Affirmative, with a distinction, especially if they are not unlearned, or play with themselves in amiable madness. Those affecting the title and practice of a physician, if they bring harm on someone's health or life, are not placed outside of fault, although they protest that they applied with good intention a new and best method of healing in their judgment thought up by themselves and substituted it for the received and well-worn method. Thus the expugners of Atheism and Scepticism, if they betray the cause (albeit through error and imprudence) to the Atheists or Epicureans or

Sceptics, and strengthen their hands by reason of their dangerous philosophy and rash innovation, can be reduced to straits by the consequences of Atheism (at least participative and interpretive or indirect), lest their scandalous opinions spread too much and lead the incautious astray. Those unhappy disputants are justly beat upon with these absurdities and consequences, who imbued with the prejudices of the new Jesuit scepticism against the authority of Scripture, go about persuading the vanity of human intellect of universal doubt about all principles and truths (among which are also these, that God exists, that God is to be worshiped, that there is a distinction between the upright and the base, etc.), so that like a blank slate it may seek for itself an entirely new knowledge anew. But there are not a few disadvantages of this dangerous method, one or another of which we here indicate in passing.

The first is that man is wrongly persuaded to willingly and knowingly strip himself of all natural knowledge, assent, and persuasion of the truth, whether habitual or actual, even of the first principles both theoretical and practical. But an adult man cannot be in a state of ignorance of God and divine worship, that is, in a state of Atheism, without sin even for a moment; he cannot hold back the truth in unrighteousness; he cannot induce or obscure common notions about God and divine things by his doubts or by affected ignorance of pure negation. True knowledge of God is prescribed to us by the first commandment of the Decalogue, as all interpreters commonly teach.

The second is that man thrust down to that state of solitude, that is, to ignorance of pure negation or universal doubt, is too uncertain whether he will ever arrive at true and solid knowledge of principles and truths. Hope therefore is not to be bought at a price, nor are uncertainties to be preferred to certainties. This difficulty is increased by the fact that the way and reason which is obtruded for emerging from this abyss of ignorance and struggling to certain knowledge is too slippery and impassable; at least by the admission of the authors themselves, it is obscure and perplexed, so that it can be grasped by few. What then if someone remains in that doubt and ignorance? What if he always learns and never arrives at knowledge of the truth? What if he is thrust down through the whirlpools of scepticism into the abyss of desperation and Atheism? To whom will we impute this? Will we not impute it to those murmuring flies, who neither understand themselves nor others, nor can be understood by others, especially blank slates and overly patient admirers of ὑπόνοια?

The third is that by this means those are driven more deeply into the mire of ignorance and Atheism, who think less rightly about God and about knowledge of him from both books or principles, both of nature and of Scripture; and that that excellent gift of God, Rom. 1:19, namely sound and sober Philosophy founding natural Theology and serving the supernatural, is despised by this means; and the weapons are snatched from us by which the truth of faith has hitherto been successfully defended against outsiders and heretics. I would like these things to be considered by those who are touched by concern for orthodox theology and piety.

xvii. Problem: Must the lover of wisdom first come to this state of doubt and universal ignorance in order to illustrate and perfect philosophy? Answer: No. Because evils are not to be done so that good may come. But such an affectation of ignorance, and sequestration of all knowledge,

and forgetfulness of the truth, which we have spoken of, is an evil, namely a sin against the first commandment of the Decalogue, and against John 17:3, Philippians 1:9-10, Proverbs 4:5 and 23:23. These men seem similar to the foolish Philosopher who plucked out his eyes for love of wisdom, so that he could philosophize all the more freely. For they deny the external senses, and proclaim that those who use the aid of the senses for the knowledge of God are turning in the abyss of impiety. Moreover, they endeavor to extinguish for a time the internal light of natural principles, namely in order to kindle the light of their affected and admired knowledge. In both respects they seem to me to be silently accusing the Holy Spirit, Rom. 1:19-20, Isaiah 40, Acts 17:27, Rom. 2:14-15, 2 Thessalonians 1:8, James 2:19.

xviii. Problem: Are the philosophical endeavors of those to be looked up to, or rather ought they to be suspect, who hold the authority of Scripture suspect on account of some things that occur there least congruent to their carnal sense; who explode the proven and common principles and axioms in the Christian world shining forth in Logic and Metaphysics, and do not substitute better ones for them; who consequently go about snatching the weapons from us by which hitherto the fathers, scholastics, more recent Theologians and Philosophers have proved natural Theology and defended the supernatural against infidels, atheists, heretics; who teach to doubt all things, and consequently bring back the ancient scepticism; who make so little of Mosaic and Scriptural Physics dictated by the Holy Spirit that they seem to prefer their concepts about the universe and the nature of things to it by far; who dismiss as inept all the demonstrations of Divinity hitherto used in the Christian world by all, among which is also that from works to the maker, frequently used by the Holy Spirit in the Scriptures; and who consequently weaken the divinity of Scripture and silently charge the Holy Spirit with ineptitude and pseudography in the proof of divinity, and thus strengthen the hands of atheists and infidels; who have pleaded the cause of God against atheists and sceptics in the most impeded, most obscure, most absurd, and most inept way of all; who profess that they have not made a vow to preserve a good conscience in all things before God and men; who admire and approve the new Jesuit Scepticism, and the blasphemous sophistry of those precepts against the authority of Scripture, which we have partly detected in the preceding disputation; who are sparing worshipers of God and infrequent, even according to that formula of religion by which they wish to be named. Answer: I do not see a reason why Neutralism, or Epicureanism, or Libertinism, or Scepticism and consequently Atheism (but with a diminishing term, namely indirect and participative, at minimum) should not be imputed to such a philosophy, and those whose interest it is be accurately and maturely forewarned about this.

Judgment is not to be made in one way about the adherents and promoters of that philosophy. It must be seen whence they came forth, how long and with what constancy and by what machines they rolled this stone; how they accepted the admonitions made to them by others; whether the fish being struck have begun to be wise in some way, and to beware more of certain precipices for themselves; what means of instruction they enjoyed; whether idiot ignorance of the elements of philosophy, especially of the art of logic and the science of metaphysics, as well as of theology, drove men into this vertigo; whether intervals of melancholic delirium or amiable madness do not suffer their speculations. Meanwhile, while they sweetly applaud themselves in their vertiginous and dangerous philosophical notions, they are

to be plucked with absurdities and consequences, albeit ungrateful and harsher ones, if perchance they can be aroused from their lethargy. We have the example of the Apostle, Galatians 5:2,4 and Philippians 3, *Whose God is their belly*, and 1 Corinthians 15:33-34, *Be not deceived: Evil communications corrupt good manners. Awake to righteousness, and sin not; for some have not the knowledge of God: I speak this to your shame.* In a similar way the Papists are urged by our Catechism qu. 30, where they are said to deny in reality the only savior Jesus; and qu. 80, where the mass is said to be a denial of the one sacrifice of Jesus Christ accomplished on the cross. By the Theologians it is commonly imputed to the Pope from 2 Thess. 2 that he exalts himself above all that is called God or worshiped. And thus very many actions and observations of men by no means evil are urged by absurd consequences of idolatry, magic, superstition, who nevertheless seem to themselves to be as alien as possible from those things. Concerning which in the disputation on indirect Idolatry, Magic, Superstition.

xix. Problem: Have the ancient Sceptics and Pyrrhonians, with their fanatical trifles, been solidly refuted as promoters or attendants of the Atheists and Libertines long ago, or is this praise reserved for certain new men? Answer: Affirmative to the first, Negative to the second. From the things that occur in Tertullian, Augustine, Sextus Empiricus, and the more recent Philosophers.

2\. There now follow more practical problems.

i. Problem: Are Atheists, namely those professing and spreading Atheism, to be admitted into the Republic or tolerated in it? Answer: It is doubtful whether the practical have been tolerated anywhere in Christian Republics. But the question is about the speculative, if indeed they harm no one in other respects, render to each his own, and live according to the civil laws. We answer No, if indeed they profess and spread direct Atheism or also that of the Epicureans, Sadducees, and similar indirect Atheism. The reason is: Because evil communications corrupt good morals, 1 Corinthians 15. But it is not to be borne that the morals of the citizens be corrupted.

Exception: What if they claim that they profess those paradoxes neither against knowledge nor against conscience, and have not hitherto been convicted of their falsity; therefore liberty is to be granted to them for the time being, etc.? Answer: We ask our Remonstrants, who are eagles in such things, to respond to them solidly. We deny the reason for the consequence.

ii. Problem: Can and ought such persons to be coerced by the Magistrate, and how? Answer: To the first, Affirmative, namely lest they spread and stick this evil on others. But if they not only simply profess it in the presence of others, but moreover add blasphemies to their profession, punishments are to be inflicted on them. But what sort of coercion and punishment is required, that is left to be determined by the laws and judges. The Canonists and Jurists in the Papacy decree that those who vomit heretical blasphemies (to which external or vocal Atheisms are reduced, as will be able to be established from the description of blasphemy in Thomas, Summa Theologica IIa-IIae, question 13, article 1, and Navarrus, Manual 1, chapter 12, numbers 81, 82, etc.) are to be led out in public conspicuous with an infamous miter, tongue tied and without a cloak, to be whipped with scourges, and sent into exile; namely if they are plebeians, but if nobles, they are led out without a miter, thrust into a monastery for a certain time, or even fined.

Thus Nicolaus Eymericus, Directorium Inquisitorum part 2, chapter 66, and Dialogus in praxi criminali canonica, chapter 110, where he discusses blasphemies. Add Rojas, Bishop of Sergentum, De haereticis part 2, assertion 12, that they can sometimes be condemned to the galleys, namely if the custom of blaspheming is added. They have more particular decisions in the Bulls of Leo X, Julius III, Gregory XIII, about the interpretation of which see Cherubinus in Summa Bullarii tom. 1, p. 137, and especially Quaranta in Constitutiones Pontificum, p. 145. But if anyone has pertinaciously defended his Atheisms, and professed that he thinks thus, they impose on him the punishments of heretics or apostates. But what the punishment of heretics is according to them, and what we judge about their opinion, is to be said elsewhere, in the Disputation on Heretics. Meanwhile the Casuists, Canonists, and Jurists can be consulted under the title On Heresy; among others Jordanus Brunus, Jurist, book 5, On Heretics, chapters 12, 13, 14, etc., who pleads this cause strenuously and at length. Compare also the Bull of Innocent IV in the year 1243, and the Directorium Inquisitorum part 1, p. 149. By the Mosaic Law the punishment of death was decreed for blasphemers, Leviticus 24, which Zepperus also disputes would not be too severe today, On Mosaic Polity book 4, chapter 8. And by civil law it is a capital crime, as they prove from Novella 77.1 and Digest 47.10.15.9, Menochio, Farinacci, Tholosanus, Althusius. Sometimes the cutting out or piercing of the tongue, Boer, Clarus, and with them Althusius, Dicaeologicae book 1, chapter 101, number 30. Richard, King of England, in the year 1258 purposefully established capital punishment for blasphemers. Charles V in the Constitutio Criminalis, chapter 106, according as the blasphemy was more atrocious or lighter, decreed that it can be coerced by cutting off or plucking out a member of the body such as the tongue, or even by a fine. Louis decrees a milder punishment (certainly too mild) in the year 819. The Augsburg constitutions otherwise in the year 1530. See which constitutions of the Empire in Goldast, tom. 3, and cited in part by Zepperus in the book just cited. Compare the next thesis, problem 1.

iii. Problem: What must be done to overcome Atheistic injections of the devil? Answer: The general counsel here is to be followed, that we simply remove them and despise them. But if thoughts springing up from the corruption of the flesh come to them or separately cross the mind, the mind is to be diverted from them to prayers and other salutary meditations and soliloquies. For those thoughts are not usually routed by directly contradicting them or turning them over laboriously and for a long time. Concerning which the Practicians are to be consulted where they treat Temptations and the spirit of blasphemy. We have also noted something strictly in the disputation on Spiritual Desertions.

iv. Problem: Whether every heresy ends in Atheism, as Campanella wants in Atheism Conquered in the preface, and Cornelius a Lapide in his commentary on 2 Peter 2:1, p. 365. Answer: Concerning heresies detracting from the principle of faith, namely the authority, perfection, etc. of Scripture, as well as about the essence and attributes of God, the Trinity, and similar first of the first articles, we do not want to deny that they are easily changed into Atheism. We say the same thing happens next after them to heresies adding, for example when principles of faith, adorable objects, saviors and mediators, etc. are added. Concerning other heresies about articles on the degrees, parts, and means of salvation both obtained and

applied, e.g. about the sacraments, the Church, etc. (unless there are some that take away entire articles about eternal life or the resurrection), this ought not to be so affirmed.

v. Problem: Whether Atheism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism can be most expeditiously detected and routed, and the more unskilled fortified against it, if men otherwise honorable and placed in dignity and professing the true religion use most familiarly, nay most intimately, men commonly suspected of Atheism either direct or indirect and participative; and extol them to the sky, nay even pertinaciously undertake to defend their cause against the zealots of truth and piety. Answer: No. For those who do this seem to labor under crass ignorance and stolid and culpable simplicity in divine matters, and to be lukewarm in the matter of God, truth, religion; καινῷ ὄντι μᾶλλον ἢ πρακτικῷ, 2 Timothy 3. or be stirred by a strong impulse of novelty, curiosity, vanity, ambition; or, what is worst, be carried to this worldly and carnal society by some secret breath of Epicureanism and Atheism; according to the axiom, like seeks like. They ought to be deterred by the fear and love of God, and the danger of their own or others' seduction, the scandal of the pious, the impious neutrals, the weaker ones, etc. And so many paternal admonitions sealed in Scripture by the Holy Spirit, Psalm 1:1 and 16:3-4, 1 Corinthians 5:11, 2 Corinthians 6:14,17, Ephesians 5:6-8,11, 1 Corinthians 15:33-34, 2 John 10.

vi. Problem: If a Reformed theologian or philosopher burdens and urges the absurd and dangerous Philosophy or Theology of some Libertine-Papist or Reformed in name only with the consequences of Atheism, in order to forewarn the more incautious and unskilled all the better, is this a crime to be politically coerced, and on account of which an action for injuries can be instituted? Answer: No; otherwise Voetius, who urged Remonstrantism in this way in his Mysteries, would be condemned, and Sladus, Eglisemmus, and other antagonists of Conrad Vorstius, with the Most Serene King of Great Britain, who attacked the Theology of Vorstius by this method. What also would happen before judges of this kind to Melanchthon, Calvin, and other primary Theologians of the Reformation to be cited below, if the Papists and sons of the Jesuits instituted an action for injuries against them because they impute manifold Atheism to Papism, the Pope, Cardinals, and Papal Clerics and Theologians? What spirit and hope would the Reformed have in Papist kingdoms, Provinces, and Cities, e.g., in France, Poland, the Duchies of Jülich and Berg, Cologne, Aachen, etc.? If someone excepts that these are far dissimilar, because there the cause of religion would be pleaded, and indeed against theologians and prelates of religion, I reply that it is of no less moment to charge a Papist theologian or prelate of sacred things with Atheism or Scepticism, and to attack his theology with such consequences, than some Papist philosopher or politician or philologist or mathematician or musician or jurist or physician or nobleman or merchant. Then, granting that these are far dissimilar (as they are not), by what reason would Zanchi extricate himself, who in his treatise On the Works of Creation called Simone Porzio and other Italian philosophers, although Papists by external profession of religion, into suspicion of atheism; and the Faculty of Theology of Heidelberg, which in the year 1610 in its judgment on the cause of Conrad Vorstius called Taurellus a physician and philosopher, although a Lutheran by profession of religion, an Atheist in form on account of some dangerous philosophical notions in Metaphysics and Natural Theology. The same is to be said about Gentillet and other Anti-Machiavellians and writers against Atheists both political and theological indicated above in the first part, who publicly

charge atheism in their published writings on courtiers and politicians exercising the Christian religion in the communion of the Roman or Reformed church, and complain with tragic clamors (and indeed not undeservedly) about the greatest frequency of atheists among Christians. Mersenne shines forth among them, with some other scourges of the Atheists, cited above and to be cited further.

vii. Problem: If someone were to err by pure error of mind in new, involved and dangerous philosophical notions especially about Natural Theology and Metaphysics to be refuted by absurd consequences of scepticism, libertinism, atheism, so that those consequences either all or some part of them either in reality and in themselves, or in the particular judgment of one or another laboring under prejudice or a theologian not solidly enough, at least not evidently enough, concluded: ought he to be condemned for injuries in a public trial at the instance of a Libertine Papist man and one equally exploded by the Papist and Reformed theologians and philosophers with his vertiginous and dangerous philosophy? Answer: No. 1. At minimum so much is to be attributed to praiseworthy zeal for the truth, that that pure error of mind or defect of subtlety and judgment (if any is thought to exist), if not praise, at least be considered worthy of pardon. For not all theologians and philosophers who defend the cause of truth or piety according to their capacity do this equally dexterously in all respects. 2. The contrary is taught by the practice of political tribunals, for there it is unheard of for defenders of the truth to be condemned if it happened that an action for injuries was instituted by Papist, Remonstrant, Socinian, Libertine, Neutral, Doubting, or Sceptic adversaries. 3. Once this gate is opened to them, I do not see how it can be closed, especially in France, Poland, etc., where Reformed Doctors following in the footsteps of their ancestors do not fear as the case may be to urge Papism, nominally new Jesuit Scepticisms, with the consequences of Antichristianity, Libertinism, Atheism, and the like. Concerning which we will note something in the next thesis. 4. From the lesser to the greater: if in the kingdom of France the theses of Jérémie Ferrier, Professor of Nîmes (later an apostate), on the Antichrist in the year 1605 or 1606 (if I am not mistaken) were exempted from the action begun to be instituted, and the book of the very learned Aubertin on the mass from the trouble begun to be created for him in 1635, how much greater moderation is to be expected from tribunals in Reformed Republics, if indeed in similar theological or philosophical contests the Papists or Libertine-unorthodox move a lawsuit against the defenders of orthodoxy concerning the harshness or bitterness of consequences. The author of the book whose title is Mysteries of the Jesuit Fathers, second edition, in a historical appendix about some deeds against Cyril, the recent Patriarch of Constantinople, reports that the Mufti, i.e., the highest prefect or Pontiff of sacred things among the Turks, by his sentence absolved Cyril, accused by the perfidy of the Jesuits of making himself guilty in a political tribunal by publishing a little book against the Mohammedan religion. 5. That artifice of making controversial or purely Theological and Theologico-philosophical arguments and consequences political, and by this means dragging them to political tribunals, so that the mouth of the defenders of truth may be stopped all the more compendiously, is not new in France, Germany, etc., where the supreme powers are alien to our religion. What remedies the orthodox apply there, see in the Jurists, especially the German ones Reinkingk, Matthias Stephani, Carpzov, Arumaeus, and others cited elsewhere. But it would be unusual and new if it prevailed in Reformed kingdoms and republics, so that Jews, Enthusiasts, and Libertines (especially

Henric-Nicolaitans, David-Georgians, Paracelsus-Weigelians, John Bohemians), Socinians, Francis Davidians, Taurellian Philosophers, Hermetic brothers of the rosy cross, and similar persons, seizing the occasion from the absurd consequences by which the orthodox urge them, instituted an action for injuries and triumphed in court, whatever the orthodox might protest about their zeal and sincerity, and claim the examples and consensus of churches, Academies, most excellent Theologians in this matter. 6. Finally, their own apology could be applied to them against the man, by which they contend that they are to be exempted from the suspicion and consequences of Atheism, although they disputed very badly and betrayed the cause to the Atheists, as indeed they intend to refute Atheism according to their capacity.

viii. Problem: In such cases, especially in the case of an attempt at scepticism or Atheism by consequence (at least participative and indirect), ought not an action for injuries to be equally permitted to heterodox and orthodox alike, as in the case of an attempt at theft or adultery or perjury or homicide or public crimes, e.g., of sedition, treason, etc.? Answer: No. For some accusations are personal (so to speak), others real; the former properly and directly concern the cause of doctrine common with many others, or of a peculiar opinion in supernatural or natural theology or pneumatologico-metaphysical philosophy; the latter concern someone's particular state, life, morals. If the opinions of Taurellus, Conrad Vorstius, the David-Georgians, Weigelians, brothers of the rosy cross, Deists in France, and other fanatics are pressed by the consequences of scepticism or libertinism or Atheism; nay, if Papists and Reformed dispute imposing on each other heresies, idolatry, superstitions, Atheisms, Antichristianity: no action for injuries is granted in Reformed Kingdoms and Republics, or even Papist ones where liberty of exercise or at least of conscience is conceded, as in Germany, France, federated Belgium. But if an accusation of personal, private or public crimes, especially of sedition, treason, rebellion, etc., is instituted by live voice or published books, no one will deny that without respecter of persons an action for injuries should be permitted to men of whatever religion or sect in any Republic.

ix. Problem: Therefore, is Atheism not a capital crime, to be equated with any of the gravest and unspeakable crimes, nay exceeding by far all public crimes of rebellion, treason, etc., and attracting political infamy and capital punishment; and consequently, would those who by reason of their office rendered someone's dangerous theology and philosophy suspect of Atheism, or urged it by those consequences, do as much as if they accused honest citizens or men placed in public office of sedition, rebellion, and disturbed public peace by voice and published writings? Answer: No. For the quality and quantity of some deed in the court of the sun and in the court of heaven and the church must be distinguished. Here Scepticism and Atheism is doubtless a most grave crime and intolerable above all others; there not so. Again, in the court of the sun direct Atheism must be distinguished from indirect and participative Atheism, and again indirect speculative Atheism from practical. The former are less tolerated or more punished, especially when joined with blasphemies or external contention and zeal for propagating; the latter not so, especially if they lie hidden under the profession of a public or permitted religion. Which the common practice teaches in kingdoms and Republics where liberty of consciences obtains, e.g., in our Belgium and in France. For since the frequency of Deists in France is so great as indicated by Mersenne and Tolosanus, and so many commonly marked

atheisms, what fraction of them is it against whom a lawsuit is undertaken before political tribunals? Or which of them ever cited Mersenne and other antagonists of the Deists and Atheists for defamation by law? Who ever saw an action instituted before a political tribunal by the Reformed against the Papists, or vice versa, or by the French Papists of the state against the Papists of the Curia and vice versa, or by the Machiavellians and politicians against the Theologians, although they do not cease to impute Atheisms to each other in published books and by the writing of titles. But the matter would be far otherwise if they imposed on each other the crimes of sedition, treason, rebellion.

x. Problem: Can those whose false and dangerous Theology or Philosophy is urged by the consequences of scepticism or libertinism or Atheism, by the law of retaliation publicly defame their adversaries, especially Theologians and ministers of the word, with the mark of impiety, hypocrisy, atheism, but also of any crimes that render them politically infamous, e.g., sedition, rebellion, etc., as if a Remonstrant or Papist were to impose atheisms on our doctrine, or sedition and rebellion, or homicide, adultery, perjury, without even the least appearance of probability or proof? Answer: No, this is wrong in the court of the sun and heaven. 1. Because it is not permitted to retaliate by lies and calumnies when someone's dangerous doctrine is justly rebuked. 2. It is not even permitted if it were certain that the doctrine had been unjustly burdened by those consequences. For the ignorance or error or malice of an adversary is not to be compensated by sins against conscience. 3. That inequality does not suit the law of retaliation, that an absurd and dangerous doctrine, or one attacked as such by arguments from real topics, be vindicated by arguments from personal topics, or rather purely extravagant and defamatory calumnies; that is, that a Papist in a Reformed Republic publicly revile theologians and ministers of the word with defamatory libels in turn on account of sermons and writings by which they are accustomed to burden Papism with the consequences of heresy, idolatry, magic, Atheism, Libertinism when occasion is given.

xi. Problem: If Reformed theologians are so enormously defamed, does an action for injuries against the Libertine or Papist author of the defamatory libel apply to them, and ought Reformed tribunals to terminate this cause brought before them out of fairness and goodness, despite the fact that the Papist complains that his doctrine was defamed in turn by that Reformed man, or by any other ally of the same religion and companion of the one defamed, and called into suspicion of atheism and scepticism? Answer: Yes. 1. Because on the part of the Reformed man attacking the theology or philosophy of the Libertine-Papist by his consequences, there is truth and justice; on the part of the Libertine or Papist politically defaming his adversary without cause, there is not. 2. Because dangerous errors in theology or philosophy beaten by those absurd consequences of scepticism and atheism differ greatly from political crimes by which the ministry of a theologian is rendered useless and his person infamous.

xii. Problem: Is it appropriate for a Reformed Academy or Academic Senate to condemn an orthodox Professor who is a zealot and defender, and immediately adjudicate the cause against the same Professor to a Jesuit or Libertine Papist complaining to that Senate only by one little letter concerning an injury done to him by that Professor, and to force him to a recantation, by pretending that the new and dangerous opinions of said Libertine Papist have not been

convicted of scepticism or atheism by consequences solid and evident enough? Answer: No. Because that Professor to the best of his ability endeavored to defend common and accepted philosophy and natural theology (which is common to all of Christendom, nay also to the sounder and wiser Gentiles, Jews, Mohammedans) from the principles of the light of nature and of supernatural theology. If therefore he had erred somewhere in the nexus of a consequence or consequences, pardon was due for things omitted, thanks for things found, not blows in return for words. Let them see whether this is not to grieve the hearts of the just and to strengthen the hands of the impious. Then not absurdly or inopportunely (in most cases at least, or as to the thing itself) will all other theological and philosophical schools judge cliffs and dangers of those sceptical vertigoes and involutions to have been shown and pressed by absurd consequences, as some have already begun to judge. To which that four or five Professors oppose and prefer their extemporaneous judgment extorted obreptively and subreptively does not seem to make for Christian unity and concord. Finally, those judges ought to have considered, if indeed in their sense the consequences seemed not solid or evident enough, that that Professor, the defender of common truth and philosophy, nevertheless erred by a learned error, and one common to him with many others. So in him alone an example of recantation and mockery ought not to have been made in favor of all innovators and fanatics. For he could praise great authors, theologians and philosophers, Reformed and Protestant (we indicate some of them in this disputation), by whose example he had burdened the heterodoxies and dangerous opinions of adversaries with the consequences of scepticism, enthusiasm, atheism. But these and other things pertaining to this will perhaps be explained by us or by others ex professo in a hypothesis.

xiii. Problem: Is it appropriate for a Reformed theologian directly and indirectly to vindicate the cause of a Libertine-Papist, who published defamatory libels against a Reformed theologian stuffed with political crimes without any appearance of proof and condemned elsewhere by public authority, by the law, as he pretended, of retaliation and from just revenge, for no other cause than because he bore impatiently that his vertiginous and dangerous opinions opposed to all of Christendom and to all theological and philosophical schools had been refuted and exploded, among other things by arguments and consequences of scepticism and atheism, namely indirect and participative? Answer: No. For that theologian would show not so much that he conspired silently with the Papists, allies of the Jesuits, and Libertines, as that he held and used his theology for mere private contentions and the vanities and rotations of this world.

xiv. Problem: Can a private suspicion and fear about someone's inclination to atheism, which someone discloses privately to a friend for necessary caution or prevention of evil, establish an action for injuries in a political court? Answer: No. For he who suspects and fears does not assert, does not defame. Moreover, he who discloses this suspicion and this tacit anxiety and fear of his mind to his friend, or to a friend of the one suspected, or of both, either in person or by letter, for necessary caution or to prevent evils, or for some other honest purpose, by no means defames or inflicts an injury.

xv. Problem: Whom does it befit to keep watch against atheisms? Answer: All who love truth and piety. But in a peculiar way Magistrates, that they may coerce them by their power; and philosophers; and much more Pastors and Doctors of Theology, that they may detect and refute

them. Therefore in vain do some strive to keep them away from these sacred things as physical secrets or mathematical speculations and other philosophical matters, and bid them mind their own business. For no sane person can deny that commentaries on natural theology, pneumatology, and metaphysics pertain to theological learning and care, no less, nay much more than to Mathematicians, Physicians, Jurists, Philologists, Politicians, practical men. Theologians are also commonly accustomed to be versed not only in theological matters in general, but also specially in logic, metaphysics, and scholastic theology not a little better than many of those whom we have just named.

xvi. Problem: What if new skeptics, Pyrrhonians, and new Academics begin to spread in schools and churches, who under philosophical pretext and title draw all things into doubt or subvert them - would theologians be busybodies or meddlers in others' affairs if they opposed such persons to the best of their ability? Answer: No. Because the youth studious of philosophy destined for theological study is committed to the special, nay even most special care and inspection of theologians. If in the philosophical curriculum those talents are perverted and sown with depraved seeds, for the most part theologians labor in vain for their restitution in the theological curriculum. *As a twig is bent*, etc. And *a small error in the beginning becomes great in the end*. And *Whatever is a sin in the first concoction is not corrected in the second*. And although those unorthodox philosophers (e.g., Taurellus, and philosophers in the Academies of Italy, about whom the council of select Cardinals complains) do not attack Scripture and supernatural theology at the first assault, nay they greatly protest that they do not want to touch it, yet indirectly and by consequences they extinguish or weaken certainty about it in the minds of many. For supernatural theology cannot be dexterously explained and defended without principles, axioms, consequences, and rules of consequences that shine forth from the light of nature in the arts and sciences, especially logic and metaphysics. See what Cano, Pereira, Melanchthon, Hyperius, Keckermann, Alsted, Hornejus, Voetius, Diestius have on the use of philosophy in theology. It is added that by that political or philosophical schema, all certainty of knowing having been shaken off, as well as the mode and method of knowing approved hitherto, a way is prepared for the art of doubting or believing nothing, and weapons are snatched away without which the authority of Scripture and mysteries cannot be defended against fanatics or infidels. Nor do they give satisfaction when they say that they leave theological matters and mysteries of religion to Theologians entirely, provided that Theologians in turn let them philosophize sweetly and freely. For they do as much as if open enemies or suspect neighbors were to occupy all the outworks and all the approaches of a border city with a protestation about the city itself not being occupied or to be occupied. That commonplace is known about the truths or heads of religion, that they are held by faith, proved by reason. And what if under pretext and under cover of philosophical terms and controversies all of natural theology were directly attacked, and together with it some theses or hypotheses of supernatural theology were weakened either directly or indirectly? Ought theologians to be silent here? Ought orthodox philosophers who defend the truth against those new Skeptics to be deserted? I don't think so. *It's your business when your neighbor's wall is on fire.* Let the laws of the Academy of Wittenberg composed by Melanchthon be compared, and his theological counsels inserted in part 1, p. 199.

xvii. Problem: If theologians keep watch in time and resist ejusmodi Neo-skepticisms or unhappy philosophical notions, even by applying harsher but true consequences, are they immediately to be said to accuse those philosophers of heresy or atheism in form? Answer: If the Theologians abstain from those odious terms and do not institute such an accusation in form, certainly the task of accuser or inquisitor is not to be imposed on them against their will through the nexus of odious consequences. Errors are to be detected and dangers and precipices candidly indicated, whatever the intention and docility or pertinacity of the one erring may be. If the error is not grave and indeed in the foundation of faith, and pertinacity is not added, certainly it is not heresy, much less is the one erring to be called a heretic. For besides heresies, there are erroneous, dangerous, scandalous propositions, evil-sounding ones, offensive to pious ears (as is known from the common Casuists and Canonists, and we will sometimes note in the disputation On Heresy), which must be guarded against by those who are zealous for orthodoxy, piety, and peace. I do not touch a modest liberty of dissent in all well-constituted Academies. Add that the Corinthians and Galatians were not heretics or atheists, whom nevertheless the apostle urges and terrifies with the gravest consequences of heresies and atheisms, lest they become such. See 1 Corinthians 15:32-34, Galatians 3:1-2,4,9, 5:2,4.

3. There follow more historical problems, of which the first is:

i. Problem: Was Atheism always restrained and punished among men who did not put off humanity and lived by certain laws? Answer: About indirect atheism, No. About direct, external, simultaneously contradicting and blaspheming atheism? Yes. For neither human society nor civil good consists without the worship and fear of deity. Most nations subjected Atheists to capital punishment. See Cicero book 1 On the Nature of the Gods, Plato Republic book 10, Valerius Maximus book 1. The Athenians destroyed one of the Cyclades islands, his homeland called Melos, on account of Diagoras the Melian. They punished him as well as Theodorus and Protagoras with exile; they condemned Socrates to death because he seemed to deny the Gods. About whom Laertius is to be consulted, On the Lives of the Philosophers. An Epicurean was expelled from Rome, witness Suidas under the entry εἶπας.

ii. Problem: Of which Atheists today in Christendom does the number seem to be greatest: of the plebeians or the learned; of the natural ones or the political ones or Machiavellians, as they call them? Answer: If indeed we consult the experience and writings of those who seem to excel here in observation and experience, the Politicians seem to surpass the rest in number. For Mersenne and Campanella rise up especially against them; against them Lessius also proves the providence of God and immortality of the soul, and the title of the book expressly prescribes them, Against the Atheists or Politicians. Cornelius a Lapide everywhere assails them in his cited commentaries, and Contzen in Politics book 1, chapter 13, and book 2, chapters 14-15. And indeed all those are Papist Theologians, so that it seems least doubtful about Papal Christendom. But one thing must be added which they forgot or do not dare to say: that Politicians (as they call them) or Machiavellians, by their meaning and comprehension, include especially ecclesiastics placed in the higher grades of the hierarchy, such as are Popes, Cardinals, Bishops, Regular Prelates, etc. See below the last thesis. Anyone can easily learn that the Reformed Republics are more infected by the same kind of Atheists than by another

kind, if only he surveys those states of men: 1. of the great men and nobles, 2. of courtiers and political ministers, 3. of soldiers. Next in number to them seem to be from the voluptuous among the common people, nay, in every order. After them are from the slaves of avarice. Least in number are the Naturalists.

iii. Problem: Are the Socinians, Francis Davidians, and similar Anti-Trinitarians to be called Atheists? Answer: 1. Directly and formally they are not such. 2. But because they deny who the one true God is, moreover about most of the fundamental articles of faith, there would be an easy lapse from there into direct Atheism. 3. At least some indirect Atheism can be attributed to them, because against the light of nature they subvert God's simplicity, infinity, immutability, foreknowledge; in addition, the immortality of the soul. Compare Beza's notes on Ephesians 2:14. And thus Wigand is to be taken when in his book against the Arians in Poland he treats of Atheists and proves against them that there is a God.

iv. Problem: Do the Papists everywhere ascribe the origin of Atheism to our religion with any color of knowledge or conscience or the least appearance of plausibility, nay and some even ascribe Atheism in form to it? The former is done by Lessius in the cited book, chapter 10, Mersenne everywhere but more obscurely, but Campanella does it uncontrollably and openly throughout; Cornelius a Lapide in his commentary on 2 Peter 2-3, pp. 362, 365, 374, 380-382, 384-385, and on 2 Timothy 3, and on 1 Corinthians 11:24. The latter is done by Lindanus in Dubitantius dialogue 2, pp. 245, 247, whom Theodorus Petrejus the Carthusian praises in his Catalogue of Heretics under the entry "Atheists"; Prateolus in On Heresies book 1, n. 77, title "Atheists", among many other things to be read (which see there) also asserts this from Lindanus, a marginal lemma being added so that it may be like a purple patch shining far and wide: "The Devil is invoked by the Evangelicals ten times a day." Thus Hosius. Feuardentius book 2 of his Theomachy of the Calvinists, chapter 12, §2, calls our men pimps of the Libertines. And book 1, chapter 13, that they flee to the atheisms of Pliny and openly embrace them; and chapter 14, §25, that they are worse than Satan, because they attribute less to the divine omnipotence than Satan. Johannes Lensaeus in his oration Against the Pseudo-Patriots p. 36 calls the Reformed Libertines. Gulielmus Rossaeus in his On the Just Authority of the Christian Republic Against Impious and Heretical Kings chapters 4-5 (Antwerp edition, Keerberg, 1592) contends that the heresy of the Protestants is worse than Mohammedanism and paganism, and that they believe souls are mortal and live worse than atheists and beasts, and that their doctrine is merely beastly, Epicurean, and full of Atheism, and that they make Satan their God. In chapter 10 he says their doctrine is perjured and Machiavellian, nay far worse than that. Hence William Prince of Orange is called by him a Machiavellian and Atheist. Compare also pp. 688, 783-784, 822, 295. An anonymous writer who wrote animadversions on the history of de Thou, chapter 2, p. 4, makes Melanchthon an atheist. Stephanus Moquot the Jesuit does this ex professo in a thick French book in large octavo consisting of 842 pages, Bordeaux, with privilege and approbation, Jacques Millanges, 1624, whose title is Abridgment of the Examination and Censure of the Bibles and Body of Doctrine of the Pretended Reformed Churches of France, etc., or the Ministers are Combated by Their Own Maxims and Convicted of Leading Souls Straight to Atheism by Taking Away All the Word of God from the World. The masked Jesuit under the name of Theonestus Cogmandolus in Turkish-Calvinist Secrets,

consideration 4: "The religion, or to speak properly, the seditious, restless, cruel atheism of the Calvinists is like that of the ancient Egyptians", etc. The Münster Jesuits in the year 1607 published theses to be disputed under this title: The Creed of the Calvinists, where they accuse the Reformed religion of blasphemy, Turkishness, atheism, and contend that the Reformed are Ethnics, nay worse than the devils themselves, and utterly atheists. Mersenne in his treatise against the Deists, title Rare and Curious Questions, etc., chapter 3, p. 34, imputes to our men that they do not distinguish between moral goodness and badness, so much that he says the Gentiles wrote better about this than Calvin, Luther, Chemnitz, and their disciples, etc. Add Lessius On the Antichrist p. 284 (octavo edition), Arthurus On the Invocation of Saints thesis 91, chapter 4, Possevinus's Bibliotheca book 8 where he discusses the atheisms of the heretics, chapter 6, Gulielmus Assonleville in his Atheomastix, Reginald's and Gifford's Calvino-Turcismus, Perpinianus Oration 8, Claudius Carnin in his Defense of Both Polities pp. 38, 48, Corretus Against the Discourse of La Noue p. 288. Answer: 1. We ask the former to dwell with themselves and decide in their conscience before God, who rather gave occasion to Atheism, the Popes with the Roman curia and unreformable clergy, or our men who, their conscience and the well-being of the church so requiring, detected abuses and corruptions both in public worship and in morals and removed them as much as was in them. 2. We could dismiss the latter with the reply of the archangel Michael: *The Lord rebuke you, even Satan*. But let us consider what piper those accusers of an evil cause and their own conscience seek. To pass over all those cited before, Possevinus alone in the book cited by us labors over this operosely enough, and after him Henry Fitzsimon the Jesuit in his Britannomachy of the Ministers book 1, final chapter, does this briefly and openly. The title of the chapter is: "The Reformation is borne to Atheism as if to the center with great impetus." And at the end of the chapter he thus concludes it: "That Atheism germinates from the very nature of the Reformation, as if from a native root, so that without that fruit, the Reformation is judged by all a worn out, unhappy tree." But by what argument is so horrendous a song supported? "These", he says, "are the causes: 1. because by you God is made the author of sin; 2. because justification by faith alone is asserted; 3. because free will is taken away; 4. because with the removal of the fear of the Last Judgment the immortality of the soul is denied." To 1, I answer: It has been more than sufficiently demonstrated by our writers (whom it would be endless to recount here) that we believe or teach nothing about the providence of God concerning evil which Scripture in six hundred places, and with it the fathers, Scholastics, and the most excellent of the more recent Papists have not handed down. See, after all others, Chamier and Rivet in Orthodox Catholic. To 2, I answer: Here we teach the same thing that Scripture, the fathers, and some more recent Papists teach. See the authors just praised, to whom add especially Davenant On Justification and the Hanau Ministers Against Cosmas Morelles, and the appendix of Balthasar Lydius to Perrin's History of the Waldensians published in our language. And we exhibited a compendious apology of this truth from the Papists' own confession in a peculiar Disputation whose title is The Force of Truth, etc. To 3, I answer: Whatever of free will Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius, Bernard, and others cited in Sylvius's little book whose title is Spiritual Sentences, and in addition Thomas with his followers, especially the Dominicans Cajetan, Bañez, Medina, Zumel, Ripa, Álvarez, the Douai Doctors, and the Louvain Doctors of today (whose apologetic little books against the Jesuits were recently published, etc.) take away in man, the same and nothing further do we take away in him. Let him first prove that they were Atheists; then let him

come to us. Compare our tables in theological problems, and in the catechization of the Remonstrant Catechism by retorsion opposed to those calumnies; and Ferri's Orthodox Scholastic, with his apology against Perrinus; Du Moulin's Vindication of Grace; Rivet's Orthodox Catholic; and letters of the same and others on the Term of Life, published in one volume. To 4, I answer: The insane suspicions and consequences of that man immediately fall when anyone has deigned merely to inspect the confessions of our men and their explications of those chapters about the four last things and the immortality of the soul.

v. Problem: Do the Reformed in turn burden the Papacy with suspicions and consequences of Libertinism, Scepticism, Atheism, and how? Answer: Affirmative, with a distinction - not indeed in the individual members or subjects of the Roman church, but in the head, i.e., the Pope, and his Roman curia, and curialists; in addition, the consistorial church and Cardinals; also the representative church of the unreformable Antichristian Clergy; especially also in the Jesuits, and if there are any locusts of that kind - finally, in all lay slaves of gluttony and ambition who are hired to those architects of evils, namely the head, curia, clerics, Jesuits, in all things promiscuously for the extirpation of orthodox faith and piety, having a form of godliness but denying its power, 2 Timothy 3. Reasons are sought, first, in the general method of handing down Papist theology both in things to be believed and in things to be done, which seems to approach the Academic and Sceptic method. See the more recent commentators on the Summa of Thomas and Bellarmine's Controversies and the varying and uncertain interpretations of the Council of Trent, where most things resound with questions and enumeration of various opinions, and finally end in ἐποχή or probable conjecture or contention. In elenctic theology most things are built on lies, calumnies, contradictions, falsifications. See James Laurence's cauterized conscience, Willet's tetrastyle of Papism, Morton's Catholic Apologies, and others indicated in our library. Second, in the whole of moral theology or Casuistry, where they unteach men piety, honesty, and unoffended conscience in more than one way - both by certain general rules and distinctions about venial sin, ex opere operato, virtual attention, Papal dispensations, custom, the Penitentiary Tax, indulgences, and by many more special determinations through all the precepts of the Decalogue as well as the sacraments and ecclesiastical agenda. Molinaeus and Drelincourt, the minister of Paris, gave a specimen in particular catalogues, but both in the vernacular language. Dorsche, the Strasbourg theologian, recently attempted the same in Latin under the title Moral Theology of the Jesuits Against the Good Morals of Christians, 1645, in quarto. Here must be added the Jesuit Catechism and Mysteries of the Jesuit Fathers, with an apology of the same under the title Stasera Against Sylvester Petra Sancta. Third, in Libertine disputations about the authority, perfection, and perspicuity of Scripture. Here the antagonists of the Papists are to be seen (among whom is Mestrezat against the Jesuit Regourd in the preface, pp. 14-15) who show that the Reformed are attacked here by the Papists with the same weapons by which Christians are attacked by Atheists and infidels. The famous Cloppenburg indicated the syncretism of the Papists with the Enthusiasts and Libertines in a peculiar disputation which is now published with his other disputations in octavo. Compare also our disputation on the new Jesuit Scepticism. For today's Jesuits promote this atheism above all others opportunely and importunely; hence Mestrezat, cited place, thinks their writings are to be called the way to atheism. Fourth, in the new method of Verron, through which Vedelius shows in Rational Theology that a way is paved to Atheism.

Compare our disputation on Human Reason in Matters of Faith. Fifth, in the impious and Machiavellian arts of the government of the Papal Roman curia, and the whole practice of the conclave and curia, and thus also the Epicurean life and atheistic morals of the virtual, consistorial, curial, representative, clerical, lay church, if it has wholly consecrated itself to Antichristian impiety - in which genus some disciples of the Jesuits excel, as well as lay brothers or associates. On account of which practical atheism or Epicureanism is noted by our men, but also is accustomed to be imputed by some Papist witnesses of the truth in the midst of the Papacy. We indicated some out of many above in part 1; your private diligence will supply more from Illyricus's Catalogue of Witnesses of the Truth and Plessis's Mystery. Out of our men are to be read the Magdeburg Centuriators, Bale's Lives of the Pontiffs, Szegedi's Mirror of the Pontiffs, Jacques Cappel's Holiness of the Roman Church, Thomas Naogeorgus's poem on the Papistic Kingdom, Henri Estienne's preparatory treatise for his Apology for Herodotus, Marnix of Saint-Aldegonde's Beehive of the Roman Church, Edwin Sandys's Relation of the State of Europe in English and French, finally our writers on the Antichrist indicated above. Out of Princes, Magistrates, and political writers we indicated above the Brutum Fulmen against the excommunication of Sixtus V, and the Apology of the Prince of Orange against the proscription of the King of Spain. Add now the author of the Turkish-Papist Secrets under the name of Justus Justinus Justinopolitanus, consideration 4: "If you seek Atheists, you will find more nowhere than in Rome itself, etc. How few Cardinals are there in Rome, how few prelates, how few regular irregulars, to whom you will more easily persuade the fables of purgatory from Homer or Virgil than the resurrection of the dead, etc." The same, consideration 49, adduces the witness Erasmus in his adage "War is sweet to the inexperienced": "For how many are there among us who believe neither in the resurrection of bodies nor that the soul survives the body? And meanwhile through those things favor is shown to the poor heretics who doubt whether the Roman Pontiff has authority over souls tortured in purgatory."

Out of the Theologians, Robert Abbot may be seen in his Defense of the Reformed Catholic of Perkins, part 3, preface pp. 5-6; Luther in his Colloquia, Counsels, etc., cited above, pp. 97-98, and everywhere. But lest some refer these things to his hyperboles, let them hear the man of the mildest and most moderate disposition, Melanchthon, volume 2 of his Theological Counsels, p. 376: "Let the pious, even the weak, but teachable, be distinguished from the Atheists and defenders of idols, who, since they determine the whole doctrine of the church to be an empty fable, retain the customary idols only because they see that simulation of superstition brings opulence and is the sinew of power." And part 1, p. 100: "Openly the Epicureans, not atheists, who securely, etc." Calvin, Institutes book 4, chapter 7, §27: "Julius, Leo, Clement, and Paul [Popes], etc., who held nothing else of Christ except what they had learned in the school of Lucian. But why do I enumerate three or four Pontiffs? As if indeed there were any doubt what kind of religion the Pontiffs with the whole college of Cardinals have long since professed, and profess today. For the first head of that secret theology which reigns among them is that there is no God. The second, that whatever things have been written and are taught of Christ are lies and impostures. The third, that the doctrine of a future life and the ultimate resurrection are mere fables. Not all think thus, and few speak thus, I admit; nevertheless, this has long since begun to be the ordinary religion of the Pontiffs. Since this is most well-known to all who know Rome, etc."

vi. Problem: Are the Libertines and Enthusiasts, especially the Henric-Nicolaitans, David-Georgians, to be urged by the consequences of atheism? Answer: Affirmative. Because some of them, as much as is in them, overturn and deny all divinity, since they confuse it with creatures or do not distinguish it from them. And because all attack the divinity or necessity of Scripture, as well as the necessity of external worship and the distinction of the upright and the base in external works. Moreover, they transform angels and spirits, the resurrection of the dead, nay even the whole Christ as mediator, into allegories. Concerning which perhaps we must speak elsewhere. Meanwhile, seek in our Bibliotheca Theologica the authors who teach those things.

vii. Problem: The Socinians, and any who come nearest to them, such as especially all those show themselves to be who contend that anyone is saved in his own religion? Answer: Affirmative. When they say that anyone is saved in his own religion, and that all are thought to worship one God, they pave the way to Neutralism, Scepticism, Libertinism, and consequently to indirect atheism. Stapleton, in the Academic Oration cited above in part 1, affirms that this opinion is the abyss of all atheism. On account of this opinion, Politicians are especially called Libertines and Atheists by Cornelius a Lapide on 2 Peter 1:1 (where on p. 365 he says the number of such is growing exceedingly), Adam Contzen, Lensaeus, Stapleton. Out of our men, Vedelius in Mysteries of Arminianism part 1, book 1, chapter 1, part 3, book 2, chapter 10, and chapter 4, book 2, chapter 10.

He especially proves the precipices of Scepticism and atheism from this source; who is to be seen. It is added that the Socinians deny who the true God is, as well as God's foreknowledge, the resurrection of this flesh, the immortality of souls, and infernal punishments - in which they show themselves to be genuine Epicureans and Deists (such as are opposed in France by Mersenne in the French treatise cited above). From a Socinian treatise translated into our vernacular language by a Remonstrant ally, we detected part of those mysteries in the catechization of the Remonstrant Catechism. Nor will it be able to be said that this determination is too rigid and unusual, since Melanchthon, most moderate among the Protestants, did not fear to call the error of the Antinomians about the necessity of the law and works delirious ravings, sophistic tricks, sycophantic harangues of the Cynics, manifest madness, fury of the Cyclopes and Cynics, scurrility, volume 2 of the Counsels, pp. 361, 358, 357.

viii. Problem: Do the Remonstrants justly and deservedly impute Atheism, whether indirect or participative, to the orthodox and reformed religion, on account of the doctrine of God's infinity, Apology chapter 1 collated with the Response to the Excerpts of the Leiden Professors p. 88; on account of the doctrine of the Reformed about predestination and grace established in the Synod of Dort in the year 1619, see the preface of Tilenus to his notes on the canons of the Synod of Dort. Answer: No. For either they manifestly vomit blasphemy against the doctrine of the Scriptures, or they vainly imagine what is not, or if there is such a thing, they shamefully commit the fallacy of accident. If Christ crucified is preached, by the same consequence he could be called the cause of impiety or a fall into atheism; for he is the ruin of many, Luke 2, and a scandal and foolishness, 1 Corinthians 2. But all this is per accidens.

ix. Problem: Can all satirical derision of foolish superstitions, comets, fables, and human traditions be justly accused of Lucianity and atheism? Answer: No. The more recent Papists accuse Erasmus in his Colloquies of Lucianity for urbanely joking about the foolish superstitions and abuses of men (I do not want to defend his excessiveness, if there is any). Out of our men they also accuse Viret and Marnix of St. Aldegonde. But we defend their deed in the disputation on tears. Kellet in his Theological Miscellanies attributes the title of atheism to a certain vernacular poet, an antagonist of the Hierarchico-Papal regime in the English church; but we do not think a human order introduced to the prejudice of the cause of God and prostituting itself by manifold abuse should be made so much of that we think its rigid examination should be accused of atheism.

x. Problem: Can some Papist by external profession or titularly, and the same a sparing worshiper of the Gods and infrequent, also a slight or doubtful esteemer of Scripture both by the common Papist and Jesuit breath and by his own peculiar sense, in addition openly professing that anyone is saved in his own religion because all living under the Christian name worship one God, moreover the purity and integrity of life and morals according to the law of God having been made light of, since indeed he never made a vow of it, moreover with the principles and general axioms of natural theology, logic, metaphysics, and the whole of ancient and modern Christendom (namely the fathers, scholastics, etc.) received and common having been rejected and exploded by the example of the Sceptics, Atheists, and all fanatics, and also with all arguments having been taken away and denied by which divinity and truth have hitherto been demonstrated against atheists and Sceptics, and no others having been substituted which may defend this cause more certainly and evidently, with many things also about natural theology and the proof of divinity, as well as about Mosaic and sacred physics, having been determined beyond and against the authority of Scripture, finally with the devotion of the faithful Reformed and holy commotion at the word of God having been reduced to the affections and motions of mind which are accustomed to be stirred up from the action of fables in the theater, be suspected of Scepticism or Semi-scepticism or Neutralism and consequently of indirect and participative atheism? Answer: Affirmative. For if each of those things among pious and learned theologians and philosophers makes presumptions (as shown in the preceding problems), how much more all those things taken together and concurring in one subject. To whomever this is additionally a wonder, he will deservedly be suspect to me either of Sceptico-libertinism or be considered the greatest miracle of ignorance and stupor, or a slave of vain contention and pertinacious levity - especially if he has been brought up in the Reformed religion. But whoever moreover condemns for injury some orthodox man faithfully warning against the delirious, dangerous, and scandalous assertions of those perplexed men, in favor of them, because indeed it is not evidently enough established about them - truly he would condemn Calvin, Melanchthon, and others cited above by equal if not greater reason, and would adjudicate the case to the Papists complaining about their lie and calumny. For in both cases it was not personal disparagement or reproach without manifest utility or necessity, but a real and necessary censure, attack, conviction, confutation, reduction to absurdity of some doctrine, so that the authors themselves or at least their followers may be deterred and led away from it. Compare above thesis 1.

xi. Problem: Were Diagoras of Melos and the other Melian (for Suidas distinguishes these two), Protagoras, Theodorus, Euhemerus, Tegeates, Nicanor the Cyprian, Diogenes of Smyrna, etc., who were considered the most celebrated of all Atheists in antiquity, truly such? Answer: Affirmative. This is believed by Plutarch book 1 of Philosophical Opinions question 7, and from him Theodoret Cure of Greek Affections discourses 2, 3 and 6. Yet in discourse 6, p. 86 of the Greek-Latin edition of Commelin in folio, he seems to report this rather from common rumor and the opinion of others than from his own; for he says "as they say". Suidas affirms the same things about them, especially about Diagoras of Melos. Epiphanius in his compendious explication of the faith, about Protagoras and Theodorus. But not undeservedly one may suspect they were commonly called such because they exploded the mythological theology of the gods and the foolish sacred rites of the Gentiles, so that the same thing happened to them when condemned for Atheism as to Socrates, whose apology you have in Xenophon, Plato, Maximus of Tyre. And certainly we see Clement of Alexandria to be of this opinion in his Protrepticus p. 11, where he says he wonders that "men living virtuously and having discerned more acutely than the rest of men the error about the gods absolutely simply, etc." And he reports there some of their sayings and deeds, whence perhaps accused of Atheism, yet more justly to be judged to have opposed the common error. Epiphanius also reports sayings and deeds of Diagoras and Heraclitus the physicist and Eudaemon the Comic at the end of his Ancoratus. Yet the same judges quite otherwise than Clement about Theodorus in his compendious Exposition of the Faith, namely that he thought there was no God and therefore exhorted all to thefts, perjuries, plunderings, etc. And Suidas says nearly the same about Diagoras of Melos, and out of the more recent authors Lipsius in the epistle cited. Athenagoras in his Oration for the Christians says that if he should speak maliciously, the charge of impiety was imposed on him by the Athenians. Cicero says the same thing about the same man and Protagoras in the same sense in books 1 and 3 of On the Nature of the Gods, and Lactantius book 1 of the Institutes chapter 2. The same in his book On the Anger of God chapter 9. Irenaeus book 2 names Anaxagoras; but deceived, as I think, by the similarity of the name. Diodorus Siculus also makes mention of Diagoras in book 13, and Valerius Maximus under those who denied religion. The life of Protagoras is extant in Philostratus, Suidas, Laertius, Aulus Gellius book 5 chapter 3. Arnobius also mentions him in book 8, Lactantius On the Anger of God chapter 9, Theophilus To Autolycus book 3, where he makes the Academic Clitomachus and Critias partners of the same impiety.

xii. Problem: In what sense did Maris, Bishop of Chalcedon, call Julian the Apostate Ἄθεον when he was sacrificing to Fortune in Constantinople? In Sozomen book 5, chapter 4. Answer: 1. Because he is either an Atheist or a beast who falls back from the faith of Christ to Gentilism; for he called him there πρόβατον, that is, a deserter of the faith. 2. Because Christian writers are accustomed to traduce the theology of the Ethnics and idolatrous worship or superstition by the name of Atheism; for to worship so many and such gods, and in such a way, by proximate and necessary consequence is as much as to acknowledge and worship no God. Thus Theodoret Cure of Greek Affections discourse 3: "Not only Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene and Euhemerus of Tegea, etc. say there are absolutely no gods, etc., but also Homer and Hesiod and the mob of the philosophers, etc." See the rest. Clement of Alexandria in his

Protrepticus p. 11 thus about the Theology and religion of the Gentiles: "These are the mysteries of the atheists. But I deservedly call them atheists who have been ignorant of the God who really exists, etc., having been held fast by atheism, first in that they do not acknowledge as God the God who really exists, not recognizing him, but in another and second mold thinking that those who do not exist, exist as gods, etc."

xiii. Problem: What is to be determined about the celebrated philosopher Pomponazzi? Is he to be referred to the class of Atheists? Answer: The Papists (in whose Church and Academy he lived) seem to judge thus everywhere - Delrio in his Magic Investigations, Mersenne p. 395, and some of our men agree. Augustinus Niphus, an Italian philosopher contemporary with him, proved the immortality of the soul in a particular treatise against him. And Pico della Mirandola in Eversion of Single Combat from book 21 to 30. Out of our men, Zanchius in his treatise On the Works of Creation pleads the same cause against him, unless I am mistaken, and also Simon Porta. Keckermann in his Praecognita of Philosophy assails him because he attacked the miracles of Christ, the providence of God, and similar mysteries of faith. See also Wier book 5 On the Impostures of Demons. But on the other hand, Gulielmus Grataroli, an Italian physician (whom his own writings published in one volume in octavo at Basel and the testimony of Beza in his epistles as well as in the dedication of a certain little book and moreover the votes of other learned men whose familiarity he enjoyed at Basel and elsewhere commend for his zeal for piety) defends him against calumniators and writes that he piously exchanged life for death at that time, in the dedicatory epistle prefixed to the Works of Pomponazzi published at Basel in 1567. He confirms his apology by the eulogy of Paulus Jovius. But that, to confess the truth, is not of such importance; for it is not sufficiently evident how far Jovius himself was from Atheism. That should be considered more deeply which he responds: that he [Pomponazzi] denied the immortality of the soul from the mind of Aristotle; which, as it was common to him with other philosophers and Theologians so judging (Plutarch, Galen, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Justin Martyr, Theodoret, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, Cajetan on the third book of On the Soul), so it ought not to be fraud in him here - unless it could be proved that he wished under this figment to sow this Atheism into the minds of his hearers craftily and safely. Unless therefore another more certain demonstration from his sayings, writings, deeds is at hand, certainly those things which he wrote according to his capacity and condition about Fate, the Providence of God, and predestination are to be taken in a more benign sense, nay in the best sense; in which if he does not satisfy the dignity of the matter and solid Theologians in all respects, at least he accomplishes this, that the black mark of Atheism is not so peremptorily branded on him. These things I say in a doubtful matter, after it befell me to see all his little works, especially those just named; I who many years ago from reading his treatise On Incantations alone (where adhering too much to the views of Avicenna and Averroes, he fluctuates quite wretchedly in some supernatural matters) and from the common judgment of others had conceived a more sinister opinion of him.

xiv. Problem: Is Cardano to be exempted from the number of Natural Atheists? Answer: He is quite suspect because he favored Magic, nay was not alien to the practice of it. See him On the Variety of Things book 8, chapter 43, and Delrio everywhere imputes this to him in his Magic Investigations, and after him Mersenne on Genesis p. 602, who also contends on pp. 533 and

1830 that he favors the Atheists. Whatever may be the case about his sense or intention, it is at least evident that as a most learned man, he so indulged certain absurd philosophical notions of his own that whether knowingly or unknowingly, he conceded too much to the new Sceptics, Lucians, and Atheists. See book 12 On Subtlety, chapter on the Nature of Man, where he seems to refer all human actions to the temperament and nature of the body. Mersenne adds on p. 251 that he reports there the summary of the book On the Three Impostors. Which however I have not yet been able to see. Scaliger noted more dangerous things everywhere in him (although not rarely an unfair critic), which he did not wash away in his Apology published afterward. What is to be determined about the man's Atheism, let it be left in the middle; only let the more immature be advised to read through his learned writings with judgment and to learn from him only mathematics and particular physics. For in divine and spiritual matters he speaks like πάρεργος, and is devoid of the Scriptures and of all internal and spiritual practice, in short of all solid Theology, nay of scholastic and Metaphysical theology itself.

xv. Problem: What is to be judged about Bonaventure des Périers? Answer: Hondorff in the book cited above on the 3rd commandment numbers him among the Atheists. And thus Henri Estienne in his preparatory treatise for his Apology for Herodotus chapter 26, p. 364, where he calls him the author of the detestable book whose title is Cymbalum Mundi, and says he transfixed himself with his own sword in despair. Mersenne in his Genesis p. 669 calls him Bonaventura de Perez and describes him as a monster, a most impious scoundrel; he adds: "whom very many assert to have been an Atheist, etc., and they noted that he was most impious in life and perished in death." He reports in the same place that he was not the author of the Cymbalum Mundi (which Hondorff and Henri Estienne have) but translated it into French, and thus it was published in the year 1538. Moreover, that book consists of four dialogues and includes very many fables about Jove, Mercury, etc., through which he seems to want to deride the Catholic faith and reject those things which we say and believe to be most true about God. But if he rejects what is revealed by God about heaven, hell, the sacred letters, certainly we subscribe to the judgment of Mersenne; but if only fables about purgatory and other fabrications of men, certainly he is not convicted of Atheism from this. But there will perhaps be those who except that he was the greatest orator and poet, and that he described these things only in the manner of the common poets and men of letters at that time (how laudably and Christianly I will not now dispute). To whom it can be replied: nothing prevents one from instilling Atheism, Epicureanism, Gentilism into the minds of men by imitating Lucian and all the profane and impious poets and ancient literati in a crafty way, although he so moderates his style with playful ambiguities and jokes, also mimicry, personification, etc., that if anyone calls these things to examination, he can elude and slip away with some color. How we remember that among the Sceptico-Libertines and Epicurean scoundrels somewhere in Belgium all piety and the Christian faith was everywhere traduced to men by any witticisms - for example, a Tragedy is written and exhibited in the theater under the title Iphigenia, in which those Ethnic notions about the triform Hecate, about the gods having to be placated by human blood, and that by the counsel of the priests, are assailed. If some pious man fears (as indeed he knows those authors) that they want to propose for derision the mystery of the Trinity and of our redemption through the blood of Christ and thus pave the way for Epicureanism, Deism, or Turco-Socinianism - how will he prove this, when the refuge is always ready at hand that only the fables of the Gentiles are

being derided? To return to Bonaventure, while writing these theses, as I inquire about him, I conveniently obtained from some auction his treatise whose title is New Recreations, etc., published anew at Rouen in the year 1606 by Raphaël du Petit Val, who calls himself Royal Typographer. Rapidly running through it, I found it to be nothing other than evil communications, that is, narrations and disquisitions filled with mere fooleries, vanities, obscenities, abuses of the divine name, by which indeed it can please no one except the Epicureans (to whom pleasure is the highest good). And yet whoever prefixed the preface extols the book together with the author to the sky. But lest I greatly fatigue myself by a fastidious reading of his book and the reader by a relation of the things which are contained in it, it will suffice to have noted from the first novel, which is like a preamble, that he says he opportunely published that little book then, so that in the midst of civil wars and public calamities they may have whence they can delight themselves, especially the matrons and virgins, whom he contentiously invites to the reading of the scurrilous things that occur there. But that the highest and most suitable doctrine to this life of ours is: *Live well and be merry*, which he afterward interprets: laugh. But as the means leading to the end are instituted by him, I do not see that he was anything else, or at least wanted to form there, than a fat and sleek *pig from the herd of Epicurus*, or if you prefer a Menippus or Diogenes.

xvi. Problem: Why did the Heidelberg Theologians some years ago call Nicolaus Taurellus, a philosopher of no mean note, an Atheist Physician in the letters written to the Deputies of the Synod of Holland about the book and cause of Conrad Vorstius? And did they not send a sickle into someone else's harvest and unworthily traduce the discoveries of him and other similar great men for illustrating and perfecting philosophy? Answer: I think they had regard to not a few paradoxes which he especially intersperses in his Compendium of Metaphysics and Triumph of Philosophy, and everywhere applies to divine and Theological matters; by which it is to be feared, not undeservedly, that the limits of Theology common to modern Christendom are overleaped and some dogmas are shaken, and to that extent the cause is betrayed too much to the Sceptics, Libertines, and other fanatics and Atheists of the second kind. We do not want to judge of that man's intention, nor do we inquire into his other things. We also judge differently about his ingenious disputations in natural matters against Piccolomini, Cesalpino, and other physicists, where we would not want to take away all Socratic liberty; nor is this the province of theology, but of medicine, physics, mathematics - just as vice versa, metaphysical, pneumatological, and natural theological matters are not so much, much less solely, the province of the physico-medical and mathematical as of the theological. Let the more immature see therefore that they read his philosophical notions which transcend natural things with judgment.

xvii. Problem: What is to be thought about Campanella's new discoveries, as he thinks, and disputations against the Atheists? Answer: This indeed rightly, that he intends to prove that the sense of deity is natural, and that there is some natural worship according to right reason, and that the Christian religion nowhere fights against it. But it must be considered whether he attacks the Atheists happily enough, while he attributes so much to nature and reason that he summons from it and demonstrates supernatural Theology, as it were, and while, with the axioms of the Theologians and Philosophers and all methods of philosophizing received in

Christendom and among the Theologians having been spurned, he substitutes certain inventions of his own (as he boasts), either less solid (being not rarely propped up by his own affirmation) or involved in new terms and ἀκυρολογίαι in the manner of the Stoics and Paracelsians, so that they bring so much more trouble and confusion to talents in place of a compendium; which if they are looked into more deeply, we will find that they bring nothing solid or admirable beyond the sayings of the wise so long used and approved. Thus for example, in his Atheism Conquered chapter 2, he lays this foundation for his whole demonstration of religion: "There are three primalities or preeminences, power, wisdom, love, about which he treats ex professo in his Metaphysics; the first Being is made essential through those three, but second beings by participation in them, and they are, exist, live in their own grade insofar as the rays, participations, of power, wisdom, and love persevere in them, to each according to its allotment, etc." In the same place: "If anyone follows and keeps the law of nature and right reason in pure natural things, he lives to Christ the highest reason and author of nature, from whom we are rational by participation, and thus he can be immune from damnation as to the punishment of sense and enjoy natural goods and God as his natural end, etc." Chapter 11, he says: "From the incarnation the personal distinction of the Father and the Son was made patent and explicit, which was not known among the philosophers except in a shadow and in some compact, or according to reason only. But afterward in the appearance of the Holy Spirit the distinction of this one from them also lay open, etc." He adds in the same place: "See also by subtly inquiring that every single thing, such as heat, is constituted or integrated by participations of power, wisdom, and love, etc., and a thing is only as much as it can be and foreknows to be and loves to be." Chapter 9, he distinguishes religion in a fourfold way: "natural, which is the worship of all things according to Psalm 19:1-3; animal, which beyond natural worship adds that obedience which the brutes offer to superior causes beneficent to them; for they naturally love God, as St. Thomas says, but in an animal way every beneficent principle; therefore the elephant genuflects to the moon and baptizes itself after coitus, and the birds sing to the sun in the morning, etc.; rational, which is the same as natural Theology and thence the worship and fear of deity; supernatural, which God reveals in Scripture." By these and six hundred similar things which Campanella hawks in his Atheism Conquered, in his Metaphysics, books On the Sense of Things, and other works, we think that the cause is betrayed to the Libertines, and religion is prostituted for derision to the Sceptics and Atheists; nay, proud and curious men sometimes fall into scepticisms and atheisms on this occasion - although Campanella would have intended nothing of the kind willingly and knowingly. Whether these things are to be attributed to infirmity of brain and intervals of maniacal or melancholic deliria, or to an itch for innovating and overturning all things, and indeed under the pretext of zeal and fight against the Epicureans, Atheists, heretics (namely the Calvinists, whom he calls Atheists in the preface), I will not say, as I cannot look more closely into that man's life and studies. His companions, who detained him captive and enclosed for 30 years in Italy, seem to have marked one or the other at least in him, as he complains in the preface to his Metaphysics. He also seems to have suffered attacks and illusions of demons (which I prefer to say than to call him into suspicion of direct magic); for thus in book 12 of his Metaphysics, chapter 3: "I have often driven away depraved angels by divine invocation, and have suffered persecutions from them." In the same place: "Someone - I know not who - of various and horrible countenance appeared to me in tribulations more than once, and is put to flight by the name of God." And chapter 12,

article 4: "I asked whether God could change fate and the evils of men. That demon, who pretended to be God, responded that he could abbreviate and alleviate evils, and accelerate or retard them, not take them away, if they are decreed by fate and predestination. Then I said to him: If God predestines by immovable fate, then also the time and mode of a thing. He predestines things by immovable fate; therefore also the time and mode of a thing. Therefore he cannot accelerate or alleviate evils. He did not understand this argument of mine, although written by me, and responded that I was a fool, as if I had not perceived his response."

xviii. Problem: What about Julius Caesar Vanini? Answer: He was a most celebrated and consummate Atheist, if he is compared with many others. Mersenne p. 156 calls him the Caesar of the Atheists, "who once gave his name to a most holy congregation of the religious, but which immediately vomited him out as a true monster"; p. 673, "and who was sent with thirteen others to propagate those furies." The things which I wrote about him in the first edition of this disputation I had from Mersenne's commentaries on Genesis and the apology of the sons or heirs of Étienne Paschase against the Jesuit Garasse, and from reading Vanini's book whose title is Amphitheatrum Aeternae Providentiae Divino-Magicum, etc., Lyons, 1615, finally from the adversaria and observations of the most erudite and friendly Andrew Colvius, minister of the Gallo-Belgian church of Dordrecht. I had not yet then seen Vanini's physical Dialogues under the title On the Admirable Secrets of Nature, the Queen and Goddess of Mortals, Paris, 1616, nor compared the tragic histories of Rosset published in French, nor volume 5 of the Mercure François. From the two latter I now add these things. "He made that wicked and abominable book relive which they entitle The Three Impostors, which they print in the sight and to the great scandal of Christians. He composed a book on natural causes and dedicated it to Monsieur de Bassompierre; he gave to nature what properly belongs only to the creator of the universe and of nature itself. The Sorbonne of Paris condemned this book to the fire, etc." The Mercure François published in the vernacular language, volume 5, for the year 1619, pp. 63-64: "In the month of November of last year, an Italian was arrested as a prisoner in the city of Toulouse, a Philosopher and greatly learned, who went from house to house to teach the children of houses who wanted to know Philosophy perfectly. He held and taught that our bodies are without a soul, and that in dying all is dead for us, just like the brute beasts; that the Virgin (O execrable blasphemy) had carnal knowledge like other women; and other words much more scandalous, altogether unworthy to write or to recite. By his eloquence he slipped his pernicious opinion so into the understanding of his particular auditors that they began to waver in the belief of this false doctrine; which having come to the knowledge of the Parlement, it decreed against this new Minister. And being taken and interrogated, he maintained his instructions to be true. Whereupon his trial was made, and the judgment given, carrying condemnation to make honorable amends naked in his shirt, torch in hand and dragged on a hurdle, tongue cut out and burned alive, which was executed at the beginning of February, in the place called the Place du Salin. He died with as much constancy, patience, and willingness as any other man that one has seen; for leaving the Conciergerie as joyful and cheerful, he pronounced these words in Italian: 'Let us go, let us go to die cheerfully as a Philosopher', but much more to show his constancy in death, and a despair in his soul, when they told him to cry for mercy to God, he said these words in the presence of a thousand persons: 'There is neither God nor devil, for if there were a God, I would pray to him to launch a thunderbolt on the Parlement as altogether unjust and

iniquitous, and if there were a devil, I would also pray to him to engulf it in subterranean places; but because there is neither the one nor the other, I will do nothing of it.'" There are also others who mention him - the Continuation of the Mercure François-Belgique and Gramond in the life of Louis XIII - but they seem to feel and pronounce more mildly about him, as a man of erudition now indicates to me of most ample reading; for the books are not now at hand, nor is there leisure to inquire. Let Vanini therefore be among the erudite atheists like some eagle, or a Homer, from whom all the others can be named, or to whom all atheisms can be reduced - as hitherto Epicurus, Lucian, and similar ones have rendered this service. Where nevertheless the proportions and laws of similars and differences of grades are to be observed. For not every similar is equally similar, much less is the similar the same. Sayings similar to the sayings of the desperate can be uttered by someone who nevertheless is not formally a desperate person. Thus things similar or related to Lucianic or Epicurean things sometimes fall from someone who nevertheless is not a Lucian in form. As we will say soon about Erasmus.

xix. Problem: What about Paulus Jovius the historian and Bishop of Nocera? Answer: That man speaks too ethnically everywhere, as Delrio not undeservedly notes in his Magic Investigations, cited elsewhere by us, namely in The Desperate Cause of the Papacy. How little distinction of the upright and the base was made by him, gather from his own Epicurean judgment about the sodomy of Leo X. For thus in his life, book 4, pp. 192-193 (octavo edition): "He was also not free from infamy, because he seemed to love some of his chamberlains (for they were of the most noble from all Italy) too little honorably and to joke with them too tenderly and freely. But what most excellent and most holy prince in this most slanderous court has avoided the stings of the livid? And on the other hand, who is so malignly wicked and consumed by the wasting of envy that, having searched out the secrets of the nights, he could truly object? But if renowned virtue could be criticized in some part on that account, Leo certainly, when compared with the reputation of previous princes, will bear off the praise of continence by most correct estimation. But if falsely marked (as it is proper to believe) he underwent unjust ill will, I would certainly think the condition of princes pitiable, when their morals receive a sinister rather than benign interpretation at the judgment of a few wicked men. But who does not know that some things are vices of the prince, others of the man? The latter, since they harm in a private condition, perhaps also benefit some; but the former bring both grief and calamity from dire power to all mortals - and it is agreed that this is most true by a certain illustrious testimony of the Roman people, who wished for themselves no better prince than Trajan, although they had marked him with the censure of illicit desire and drunkenness. But let us grant something to the humanity of Leo as in the highest license most hardly sustaining the heat of a fervent age and prosperous health, after he easily merited the cognomen of best and most beneficent in great and salutary virtues." But it is no wonder that these things are so displayed to sheets that will be publicly long-lived, since sodomy does not make one irregular, as Quaranta operosely defends in the Constitutions of the Pontiffs under the entry "Irregularity".

xx. Problem: I ask on the same occasion about Giovanni della Casa, Archbishop of Benevento and legate of the Pope to the Venetians. Answer: It is certain that he published an Italian poem under the title Il Forno, in which he commends and extols the horrendous sodomitic vice as a divine and holy work, mestier divino, mestier santo. Thuanus reports in his history that this stood

in the way of his being made a Cardinal. Petrus Victorius in his dedicatory epistle prefixed to the Greek edition of Aristotle's Politics at Florence, 1552 (which Andreas Wechelius reprinted together with that dedicatory epistle in 1577 at Frankfurt in quarto), profusely commends him for his erudition (which his Ethical little book entitled Galateo, or On Manners, teaches is by no means to be denied) and extraordinary virtues. "But those solid and firm virtues of yours which are celebrated by the united voice of all and daily find wondrous lovers of themselves, although they have decorated you with no small honor and dignity, still seemed worthy of a higher grade, so that upright men have often complained not without cause (behold the Roman probity and sanctity) that that honor has not been bestowed on you to which others perhaps commended with lesser praises have easily arrived. Not however that Alexander Farnese, a most excellent and most illustrious youth and most loving of you, who once could do much in this and always thought egregiously about your probity and doctrine, did not labor greatly for you, as he himself often related to me when he stayed with us; for he favored with his whole soul both you and your honor, and understood that this matter would be for the praise of his grandfather the supreme Pontiff. But often the iniquity of fortune and fate itself overcomes all the zeal of all, which has now befallen you not without loss to the highest order; to which, although most ample and shining with very many most honorable and upright men, you would have brought something of splendor and dignity by your virtues; yet the true praise is to show oneself worthy of the highest honors, not to obtain the highest place of dignity. But you will pardon me if I have now reopened this wound; for as I gladly see you equipped with the rest of the goods, so I incredibly desire to see you also increased by this appearance." That this poem was published by him, Thuanus admits out of the Papists, volume 2 of his Histories, pp. 621, 642-643. Harding against Jewel admits it but tries to extenuate the Epicurean crime, as if he had not so much praised as extenuated the sodomitic vice. Which is most false. Not a few out of our men have cast this stain on Roman sanctity - Sleidan in his history, Beza in the preface to his poems published in octavo, etc., some of whom I think were eyewitnesses: Petrus Paulus Vergerius, Jewel, Marnix of Sint-Aldegonde, who cite the Venetian edition by Pompeius Nave. Carolus Molinaeus in Wolphius's Memorable Readings Century 16 says the book was published at Venice while Casa was acting as the Pope's legate there. But because it is often wont to be denied by the Papists and our men are therefore accused of lying, I indicate that by the beneficence of a most ample Senator of this Republic there recently fell into our hands the edition of some Italian poems at Florence in octavo in the year 1548 by Bernardo Giunta under this title: The First Book of the Burlesque Works of M. Francesco Berni, M. Giovanni della Casa, Varchi, Mauro, M. Bino, Molza, Dolce, and Firenzuola; Corrected and Diligently Reprinted. Where after folio 132 is contained this wicked poem under this title: Capitolo of Messer Giovanni della Casa on the Oven, consisting of 6 pages, 166 lines. I brought that copy into the public library so that a perpetual monument of Roman sanctity might exist under public custody and could be shown to those denying it stubbornly. On this occasion I advise and call to witness all lovers of truth that both here and elsewhere they commit such books, which the Papists are now ashamed of or otherwise wish to be abolished or expurgated, to the public custodies of libraries and locked chests, so that the sight of them can be granted by the librarians to those whose interest it is. If this is not done, with private libraries having been dispersed by public auction, the adversaries will drag all copies into their net through emissaries at any price and abolish them; and afterward they will accuse our men of falsehood.

xxi. Problem: What about Pietro Aretino? Answer: He was a great teacher of atheism and is thought the author of that famous book On the Three Impostors, as Mersenne reports p. 1830 from the indication of a friend who had read that book and judged it to be in the style of Aretino. What the book contains (for I have never seen it) you will learn from Mersenne in the cited place. Aretino's epitaph in Jovius's Elogia of Learned Men and another in Giuseppe Passi indicate what and how great a herald of atheism he was. For thus Passi in his book whose title is Continuation of the Monstrous Flour-Mill, Venice, 1609: "Here lies Aretino, the Tuscan poet, who spoke ill of everyone except God; but he excused himself, saying, 'I do not know him.'" Otherwise thus: "Here lies extinct that bitter Tuscan who, living, pierced everyone by cursing. It is true that he never spoke ill of God. For he excused himself, saying, 'I do not know him.'"

xxii. Problem: What about Cremonini, a Peripatetic philosopher of no mean note in the Academy of Padua, who died a few years ago? Answer: Before, an epitaph which he was said to have made for himself had been communicated to me by a most erudite man and friend: "The whole Cremonini lies here." But afterward, advised by the same man, elsewhere informed from another source, I revoked that in the first edition of this disputation. As it is easier to suspect about him than to assert, I exhibit only these words of the most celebrated philosopher Fortunio Liceti from the history of his own works, chapter 16: "Always having my mind intent on cultivating the immortality of souls, noticing that the opinion of Alexander (namely of Aphrodisias) about the immortality of the rational soul was taking great increase daily (N.B.) to the greatest harm of Peripatetic talents, I continually urged the work begun long before on the immortality of the soul in accordance with Aristotle." A little later in the same place: "And although Caesar Cremonini my colleague and Aloysius Albertus the public interpreter of Holy Scripture, both disciples of Lord Federico Pendasio, both older than I, both cultivators of the doctrine of Aphrodisias, said more than once that they would contradict my volume, they yielded to fate, dying and leaving no contradiction."

xviii. Problem: What is to be determined about the things that are reported about Poliziano, Ermolao Barbaro, Muret, Lipsius, and not a few other men of letters or poets - whether they render them suspect of Lucianic neutralism or semi-ethnicism or Epicureanism? Answer: About Poliziano, Plessis reports in his book On the Truth of the Christian Religion that he said he had never spent his good hours worse than in reading Scripture. About Ermolao Barbaro (although Patriarch of Aquileia), Monlorius reports in his treatise On Entelechy that having by chance obtained a colloquy with a demon, he asked it what Aristotle's entelechy was. What end they had, and whether they were afterward changed, is not evident to me. At least, as their studies were, they seemed not dissimilar to most if not nearly all professors of philosophy in Italy, or to the Arab Averroes who, having spurned the Christian religion, said he preferred his soul to be with the philosophers. That Muret was sufficiently suspect of impiety and Epicureanism in his life is hinted at by the words of Lipsius in his preface to his book On the Pronunciation of the Latin Language, and the epigram of Beza (which see in his poems): *The monster which Gaul brought forth, Gaul expelled - Whom the Venetians, a fugitive, could not bear, etc.* Yet the Jesuit Bencius in his funeral oration, which is published with Muret's orations, proclaims that toward the end of his life he became exceedingly devout, nay even was made a priest. That

Lipsius was either a Semi-Ethnic or a Libertine and turncoat and used religion as a coin is contended by not a few arguments by Thomson in his Refutation of the Blessed Virgin of Halle and by the very erudite Anonymous writer in his dissertation on the Idol of Halle. Yet that he was afterward converted to extraordinary devotion (but superstitious, alas!) is greatly proclaimed by the writer of his life Carolus Scribanius.

xxiv. Problem: Whether something similar can be suspected about Erasmus, and therefore the more recent Jesuits justly accuse him of Lucianity, and before them Luther in his Colloquia, under the title The Learned. Answer: I would not want him to be compared with the above-mentioned men of letters. For in him there was another kind of zeal for religion, sacred reading, and divine matters, as his works abundantly testify. I admit that he seems too political and equivocal in the business of religion and reforming the church, also too much like a Sceptic at times in the doctrine of the Trinity, too similar to the Ethnics in the doctrine of the grace of God, free will, the salvation of the Gentiles, too similar to Lucian and the profane mockers in certain witticisms and jokes about God, divine things, and the word of God. But nevertheless it must by no means be concluded from this that he was an atheist or a Lucian or an Arian or a despiser of all religion. The contrary is evident from the history of his life and death and from the various apologies of our men which they institute against the Papists in polemical writings when occasion is given. See the apology of Paulus Merula prefixed to the two centuries of Erasmus's letters published by him at Leiden in quarto. The judgment of Possevinus in his Sacred Apparatus is also a little more moderate, where he describes the man's talent not badly in some respects, in which nevertheless I would say he suffered something humanly; but that infirmity was not the predominant element in him.

xxv. Problem: What about François Rabelais? Answer: Calvin assails him in his treatise On Scandals for his profane license of ridiculing sacred things. And his Lucianic and celebrated writing which is extant sufficiently convicts him. He had been a Franciscan monk; afterward, having shaken off the cowl, he devoted himself to medicine. Scévole de Sainte-Marthe has some things about him in his Elogia, and de Thou in his book On His Own Life, p. 23 of the Geneva folio edition. There is also extant a Greek epistle of Budé to Rabelais. Hondorff has in his Theater that he died drunk and laughed at those who set God and his mercy before him.

xxvi. Problem: I ask about Epicurus: did he openly deny either God or the worship of God both in words and in deeds, and if not, can he nevertheless be called an atheist, and can all atheists and despisers of deity be named from him? Answer: As to the first, No; for he acknowledged deity, as is evident from Laertius and the poem of his follower Lucretius. Nay, he even admitted and himself practiced a form of religion or worship, and wrote a book On Piety Toward the Gods, as Laertius, Cicero in book 1 of On the Nature of the Gods (whose latter words I would like to be seen worthy of note), and Plutarch in his book Against Colotes the Epicurean attest. See Piccart's Historical-Political Observations and Lambinus on Lucretius p. 9. As to the second, Affirmative, namely on account of his denial of providence and his placing of the highest good in pleasure. That the word "atheist" has a broad meaning and extends widely was shown in part 1 of this disputation. To these we could ask about many others, both ancient and more recent - for example, about Lucian; about Etienne Dolet, whom Prateolus mentions in the cited book and

title; about Boccaccio, whom Campanella makes an Atheist in chapter 2 and joins with the author of the book On the Three Impostors, yet about whose purpose François Du Jon judges far otherwise in his notes to the Refutation of the Italian Pamphlet Avviso Piacevole, etc., published by Bellarmine and subjoined to his Controversy on the Pontiff; likewise about Guillaume Postel; finally, about Paracelsus, Weigel, the brethren of the rosy cross; but we do not want to institute a prosopography ex professo.

The use of this is twofold: 1. for thanksgiving, that by the grace of God (by which we are what we are) we are not such; 2. for endeavor, that with all our strength we may flee from, avert, and prevent those madnesses, detest them with our whole heart down to the least appearance or occasion of them; on the other hand, that we may be more zealous for the true and salutary knowledge, faith, and worship of our God. The motives for this exhortation are not lacking, which can be applied here from the topics on the knowledge of God, Faith, Repentance, the sanctification of the divine name. Let the means be these: 1. Assiduous prayer, that the Holy Spirit may guard our senses in Christ, make our minds certain and confirm them, persuade us of all things to be believed. 2. Reverence for Scripture, to which we submit ourselves, take our talent captive - for if anything occurs which we cannot grasp, the straitness of our reason must stop somewhere. 3. The use of the light of nature and of sober and sound philosophy, as far as it can reach. Beyond those boundaries it is true that the simplicity and faith of the laity is best. 4. Love and honor of the truth known, lest that happen to us in 2 Thessalonians 2:10. The rest of the means, partly to be avoided, partly to be employed, let them be sought from the causes and opposites of Atheism designated in the first part of this Disputation. Especially piety and conscience and integrity of life must be cultivated, both that we may preserve ourselves and others from atheisms or call them back. For those living badly, while they strive to avoid punishment, fabricate for themselves or suffer to be obtruded on them atheisms, Psalm 10:9. That English woman whom Samuel Ward mentions in his sermon on John 13:1, after her conversion from atheism often protested that the greatest occasion was given to her doubt by the dissolute life of a learned man (a Preacher, as I think) living in that city. Francis Junius ascribes the same to the vanity of Theologians in his book On Theology chapter 17. See, I beg you. The use of Consolation is that the admirable benignity and power of God preserves that little flock and some true worshipers of his name against so many and so great machinations of the Atheists, and will further preserve it.

5\. The counsel for routing and extirpating atheisms is that prophylactics and antidotes be employed, both public and private. The former are: 1. that the children of Christians be faithfully instructed from infancy in schools, families, churches in the truth of the faith. About which more in the passage on Catechization. 2. That there be no place, at least no honor, for the impious and areligious in the Republic; on the contrary, that the truly pious and religious be promoted to dignities. Especially this must be done lest they be made so much of in courts and be held and said to be "gens de service" before all others or at least most others, as they were called in the style of the court in the French court or courts in his time, as the author of the Anti-Machiavel (Gentillet) attests, part 2, axiom 1, p. 233 of the French edition in 16mo. 3. That their books be prohibited. 4. That especially in schools and Academies pious and religious men be put in charge, which is to be specifically observed in the professorships of faculties and arts outside of

Theology, where to some this ἀκρισία seems something indifferent, if not ridiculous and beyond decorum. Hence it has happened that Atheists, Epicureans, whether Machiavellians or Naturalists, have not rarely occupied the chairs of Law, Politics, Medicine, Mathematics, Philosophy, Letters, who professed absolutely no form of piety or religion. Memorable are the laws which the Academy of Wittenberg fixed for the faculty of arts on the counsel of Melanchthon, which see in volume 1 of Melanchthon's Counsels. And compare his preface to his Physics, where he speaks thus: "And thanks is due to all who rightly and simply show some part (of physics), and especially to those who, when many have most boldly corrupted the simple doctrine, like Democritus, the Epicureans, Stoics, Pyrrhonians and those similar to them, are advisers to the more immature to avoid monstrous opinions and seek true views by the straight way of the arts, and not think it the glory of talent to play with the tricks of opinions, but acquiesce in the truth and give thanks to God that in this darkness of the human mind he nevertheless wants some sparks of his wisdom to shine, etc." And a little later: "But there is much more evil in the very habit of petulantly contradicting true views. Here truly is, as Euripides says, ἀκόλαστος πᾶσα δύσκολος φορά. Therefore it is of the greatest importance to fortify more recent talents and as much as can be done to accustom them to love moderate views handed down by weighty authority and not overturn the boundaries of the arts." Hence let all authors and books redolent of Epicureanism or ὀλιγωρία toward piety be kept away. And what occurs in Aristotle, Ptolemy, Pliny, Seneca, Plato, Avicenna, Averroes, Hippocrates, Galen, Justin, Tacitus, Horace, Homer, Lucian, Aristophanes, Pindar, etc. (whom they are accustomed to interpret there or to the standard of whom they shape their commentaries) that is alien to piety and true religion, let that not be urged and defended from their mind (as has often been accustomed to happen hitherto in the Academies of Italy by those following their Aristotle and Averroes), nor let it be left in the middle when related historically and paraphrastically and thus barbs left in the minds of the more unskilled; but rather let it be solidly and piously refuted, so that the knowledge of our God and the Christian religion may always triumph. Since this is not rarely neglected both in schools and Academies, hence it happens that the tender minds of adolescents are imbued little by little without feeling with Atheism, Epicureanism, Gentilism. For such things when said are taught. Nay, they scarcely report without danger in the presence of any hearers, even with the greatest detestation applied and the most solid refutation. 5. That conscience and prudence be applied in handing down the arts and disciplines, nor petulant talents be permitted, with the principles of the sciences having been overturned, to introduce an Academic-sceptical method of philosophizing. To this pertain the pious admonitions of Melanchthon just cited. In these, that is, in antidotes, we consider Preparation and application. Preparation contains by whom and by what means the equipment itself. By whom: by men of letters and skilled in the sciences and those of firm brain, lest they fall into melancholic or vertiginous thoughts. The unlearned and those of infirm brain, although sufficient for retaining their own faith, are nevertheless not so sufficient for refuting Atheistic sophisms. For here a peculiar διάνοια and knowledge of many things is required. By what means is, first, accurate knowledge of the sacred writings, especially of difficult passages and ἐναντιοφανῶν (with the sifting of which the adversaries are for the most part occupied). Then universal knowledge of universals, especially Metaphysics, Pneumatics, Physics, to which refer general Astronomy, Geography, Optics, and speculations on sounds, weights, etc. Finally, knowledge of particulars or History, ancient and modern. Without this equipment, arguments against them cannot be

constructed, their objections and exceptions dissolved, nor the histories and dogmas of the Scriptures defended against their cavils. Which the more immature will learn where they consult some more excellent commentators on Scripture, or at least interpreters of difficult passages, in addition antagonists of the Atheists, Epicureans, etc. soon to be named. To this equipment pertains the library against the Atheists, which ancient and recent writers, philosophers and Theologians constitute. The ancient Theologians are those fathers who defend the truth of religion against the Gentiles, such as Athenagoras, Justin, Tertullian, Minucius, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tatian, Theophilus, Lactantius, Arnobius, Julius Firmicus, Eusebius, Theodoret, Cyril of Alexandria, Augustine, where there is often occasion to prove divinity and its unity, wisdom, justice, creation, providence, also the immortality of the soul, the resurrection. Among the ancient Philosophers are Plato, Plotinus, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero On the Nature of the Gods, Seneca Why Evils Befall Good Men with the commentary of Muretus, and others whom the fathers cited and among the more recent Eugubinus, Du Plessis-Mornay, Mutius Pansa exhibit. The more recent philosophers are the commentators on book 8 of the Physics and on book 12 of the Metaphysics and any Metaphysical writers whose catalog I need not weave here. Add to them Marsilio Ficino, both Picos della Mirandola, and Mutius Pansa just cited. Out of the Theologians of the intermediate age are the Scholastics and especially Thomas Aquinas Against the Gentiles and the same in his Summa with his commentators; after him Savonarola in The Triumph of the Cross, Raymond of Sabunde in his Natural Theology. Out of the more recent Theologians are, besides Eugubinus and Du Plessis-Mornay already cited, the Natural Theology of George Pacard; Charron's Three Truths in French; Juan Luis Vives in his Royal Work; Petrus de la Cavalleria in The Zeal of Christ; Leonard Lessius Against the Atheists; Pierre Du Moulin On the Knowledge of God; Campanella's Atheism Conquered; Postel in his treatise On the Concord of the World. Wigand in the treatise cited above; Henry Smith Against the Atheists in English, which treatise appeared with the last edition of his sermons; Alsted's Natural Theology; the Symbolic Demonstration of Zacharias Boverius Against the Atheists; and after all Mersenne in his commentary on Genesis, who operosely and learnedly dissolves the exceptions of the Atheists. Out of the Philologists, Juan Luis Vives did this in his book On the Truth of Religion; Lipsius in his Epistle to van Berchem cited page 2 to the Belgians and in his Stoic Physiology discourse 1, dissertations 13-16; Grotius in his Demonstration of Religion. For blunting the attackers of the Scriptures among the Atheists, Sixtus of Siena books 6 and 7 of his Bibliotheca will be useful, and the writers who expound the doubts, apparent contradictions, and obscurities of Scripture, and who ex professo explain philosophic, historical, chronological, topographic, architectonic matters, whom see in our library. The political or Machiavellian Atheists are refuted by the Antagonists of Machiavelli who attack him ex professo, such as Gentillet, Stephanus Junius Brutus (that is, Mornay), and Possevinus, the latter two of whom are printed with his Prince. Those who touch on these things in political or theologico-political treatises, such as Ribadeneyra On the Prince, Stapleton in his Academic Oration Against the Politicians, Thomson Against Lipsius. To which refer some things that occur in Corretus and Possevinus Against the Discourses of Monsieur de la Noue, Burchard in his Autonomy, Pamelius On Diverse Religions Not to be Admitted, and many similar ones, together with the most excellent political compendia and systems already indicated in the Theological Library, partly to be indicated in the repeated edition of the disputation On the Freedom of Conscience. Our disputations On the Law and Justice of God can be compared, and the writers on natural

law and on common notions, such as, besides the scholastics on Thomas, Hennig in a particular treatise, Selden On Natural and Gentile Law chapters 7-9, Suárez On Laws, and many others to be named elsewhere. If the more immature prefer to apply some selection in the Academic curriculum and to study in compendium, I advise them to seek reasons familiarly and perspicuously set forth in Mornay or Alsted, more subtly and scholastically in the commentators on Thomas or some Metaphysical author, but the Authorities and consensus of peoples and sages in the same Mornay or Eugubinus. As for the special disputations for the providence of God, the immortality of the soul, etc., they will find them not only in the cited authors but also in their ordinary Theologians and philosophers. Peculiarly, Leonard Lessius and Antoine Sirmond, both theologians of the said Society of Jesus, vindicated the immortality of the soul against the Atheists. Application consists in those three things: 1. in detection, 2. in conviction, 3. in flight or coercion. Detection, how it is to be carried out by all, especially by learned men, can be taken from the signs and pretexts noted in parts 1 and 2 of this Disputation. Conviction has assertion and confutation. Here only the method or titles and classes of arguments of the former are to be indicated. Leaving all others aside, I will exhibit here only those of Mersenne (who embraces all). 1. is that all creatures in some way affirm the existence of deity; 2. that all men have that thought; 3. because it is necessary that something be from itself; 4. from the eternity of truth; 5. from the best entity and goodness; 6. from the axiom "Whatever has the power of moving has it from another"; 7. from the grades of Beings; 8. because God is the light manifesting the rest, and it is known through itself that God exists; 9. because a creature is a being produced by another from nothing; 10. from the beauty of each creature; 11. from the immutable natural law; 12. from our appetite; 13. from the concord of dissonant things; 14. from the government of things; 15. from Metaphysical science, its object, etc.; 16. from Arithmetic and Algebra, namely from the monad, the principle of number, and other admirable things of numbers; 17. from Geometry, namely from the abstruse and admirable things of figures and dimensions; 18. from Music, where he discusses the harmony of the Macrocosm and microcosm and the comparison of mundane music with human; 19. from Astrology, namely from the ordered revolution of the stars, especially the swiftness of the diurnal motion from east to west; 20. from Mechanics, especially the crane which lifts the greatest weight by the least force; 21. from any sciences and arts; 22. from other inferior sciences; 23. from all species of divinations; 24. from the six determinations of things which are indeterminate by their own nature - they are of quantity, disposition and parts, duration, figure, multitude of individuals and species, intension of grades, and existence; 25. from moral matters; 26. from all artifacts and from the stars; 27. from the collection of all beings; 28. from Geography and Hydrography; 29. from poverty, from the diversity of faces, voice, writing, states, gaits; 30. from the end to which all things tend; 31. from this, that an object ought to be assigned which can terminate and satiate our love; 32. from various absurdities and disadvantages and from the advantages which follow from the opposite or varying opinion; 33. from Optics; 34. from Gnomonics; 35. from architecture; 36. from Nautical science. And this is a most diffuse assertion. Its confutation occupied in the solution and attack of Atheistic exceptions, which, 26 in number, I do not exhibit here because the reason of the Theses does not bear refuting them. Let Mersenne himself be consulted, p. 234, and Valesius, Mornay, and others cited above in part 1. You have the marrow of them in Mornay and those who defend the Providence of God. In the course and repetition of the common topics which we complete in this Academy about every year and a half, we have hitherto set forth

those classes of arguments to our students and to the best of our ability deduced and defended them. The arguments are either intrinsic or extrinsic. The former are more as if a priori or more a posteriori. The former are drawn from certain principles and axioms of the light of nature:

1. There is not given an infinite regress in causes;
2. Nothing is from itself, or nothing is the cause of itself;
3. Whatever is moved is moved by another, and so finally one must come to an unmoved mover;
4. In order there is something first. The latter are drawn:

1. from the adornment, perfection, order, actions, powers of the creatures or universe, Psalm 8 and 19, Isaiah 40, Romans 1;

2. From the intellectual nature of angels, devils, and their appearances, operations, ἐνεργήματα;

3. From man the microcosm considered both in his nature and essential, integral parts, etc., and in the symbiotic economic, political, ecclesiastical, scholastic order, with the changes, rewards, punishments in this life, Psalm 8 collated with Isaiah 40 and Ecclesiastes of Solomon; 4. From miracles and prophecies, Isaiah 64. The extrinsic arguments or testimonies are:

1. Internal, of synteresis and conscience, Romans 2 - here about the common notions;

2. External, the consensus of all Nations, and the doctrine of all sages. But with all reasons having been subtracted and repeated thoughts more often recurring, we have found that the order both of nature and of our better knowledge is rather to be observed and more safely served in this way, that the demonstration from effects to cause, from works to maker and governor, be put first as preeminent and universal, which embraces all others in itself; since indeed all others depend on it and are derived from it and all presuppose it. For no one doubts that the law of nature and of implanted common notion, and hence the acknowledgment and profession of deity, in addition miracles, prophecies, political order, are to be referred to the works of God. As for those axioms about causes, about motion, about order, those complex principles would not exist unless those things from which induction and finally complex theses and principles arise had been observed in the works of God or creatures; there would not be observation nor induction about and from creatures unless there were creatures. But that this method is safest, most expeditious, and most evident, the doctrine and example of the Holy Spirit persuade Christians, Romans 1, Psalm 19, Acts 17, Isaiah 40, etc. To accuse him of ignorance or pseudography is atheism lurking under the cloak of a Christian. But if anyone having been advised persists in playing the fool and involving himself and the truth in mere begging of the question or obscure or uncertain consequences - such as *I think, therefore I am*, and *That of which the idea is in me, that very thing, etc.* - scepticism having first been inducted and all natural, innate and acquired knowledge having been erased or sequestered by doubt, and also all principles and demonstrations hitherto customary to all of Christendom and indeed agreeably to the Scriptures having been denied and snatched away, certainly to those proud betrayers or corrupters of the cause it must be suggested what Tertullian said, "Evidently

the truth was waiting to be liberated by the Valentinians and Marcionites." To the same men and their favorers all students and masters of all sciences, especially of theology, could say, "Render the legions. For easy is the descent to Avernus, but to retrace one's steps, etc." Where all knowledge, even about God and the worship of God, about the upright and the base, about harming no one, rendering to each his own, has once been cast away, and the principles of the light of nature and the rule of consequences together with all logic and metaphysics put to flight, whence will anyone restore natural and supernatural theology to himself or others according to his pleasure, whence will weapons be at hand by which he may defend both against infidels, fanatics, Sceptics, heretics, Libertines? Since these are not matters of the geometric or optic or mechanic court, they must be seriously pondered by theologians and consorts of true religion and piety. God is not mocked. Woe to that man by whom one of the least is scandalized. What if ruder or flighty or distorted talents, having been entangled by the perplexed, ambiguous, uncertain, obscure inanities and phantasms of those men under the appearance of newly invented or illustrated philosophy (for the inventor himself admits that his inventions are grasped by few) or driven to desperation of obtaining knowledge, are cast into the dangers of scepticism and libertinism - to whom will this be imputed? And what will we say about those ingrates who want to be blind with petulance in the very midday of truth, always seeking, never arriving at the knowledge of the truth? The truly pious soul Melanchthon was presaging sad things for our Belgium from a river of blood and the petulance of talents, as Henry Antonides reports in the preface to his System of Theology. But about the fecundity and dangers of atheism in our Belgium we will advise below in three words. Moreover, the method of disputing with Atheists is either general or special. We have now delineated the former. The special method is chiefly fourfold according to the nature of the adversaries: 1. against practical Atheists and pigs of Epicurus, to whom almost none of the noted arguments are to be opposed, but conscience is only to be plucked by the daily judgments of God and the four last things; 2. Deists and naturalists or rather Gentiles, against whom those arguments are not to be constructed (they do not deny God), but only those which first evince the justice and providence of God, then the authority of Scripture and the truth of the Christian religion, which occur in the writers of Common Places and the authors cited above; 3. Against Machiavellians, who hold religion to be a human invention, of whom there is the greatest number. These, because in name and profession they are men of letters or Politicians, but in reality have not penetrated the hidden things of the sciences, ought not to be attacked, nor is it necessary, with the weapons just now proposed. Campanella well observes that Machiavelli was most ignorant of all sciences except human history alone (and that nearly only Roman). And so nearly history alone is to be opposed, and thence the judgments of God on Machiavellians suggested to them, and the natural notions dug out within and appeal made to their own sense and fear. Moreover, the particular axioms of Machiavelli have been sufficiently examined by Stephanus Junius Brutus, Possevino, the anonymous Frenchman (Innocent Gentillet the Jurist) in a prolix treatise which he dedicates to the Duke of Alençon, Molanus in his treatise On Keeping Faith, Campanella especially chapters 18-19, Contzen, Tolosanus, Bodin, Althusius, Keckermann, Thomson Against Lipsius, and other political writers. The rest which are everywhere thrown out to the deception of the Christian religion by the Ethnico-Machiavellians (in which they agree with the Deists), the Apologists for the truth of Religion already cited sufficiently dissolve; 4. Against Naturalists or φιληκόους philosophers, Physicians, Mathematicians, Scripturists, Historians, etc.

For them, although fewer in number, Mersenne's armory is properly constructed. Coercion, what sort it is, was said above.

6\. There remains the Historical part of this treatise, of which we will give some sketch. We distribute Atheism: 1. into that which was before the birth of Christ, 2. and that which was after. 1. The former is either before the flood or after. That there were before the flood Lamech among the posterity of Cain, and similar men, Genesis 4, and the Nephilim and those mighty men (namely Machiavellians), Genesis 6, is not improbable. About Cain himself, see the Jerusalem Targum on Genesis 4. Here the mythology about the Cyclopes is to be referred, who in Homer Odyssey 9 are despisers of the Gods and ἄθεμοι, that is, outlaws, and about the Giants who are described as θεομαχοι in Ovid Metamorphoses 1. See the mythology of Natale Conti book 9, chapter 8, and book 6, chapter 21. Especially also the little book of observations of an anonymous author published with Natale's mythology at Geneva by Crispin in 1612, title Giants. After the flood there appear in sacred history Pharaoh, Sennacherib, and among the Israelites, Psalm 10, 14, 36, 94; in profane history, Antiochus, Critias, Prodicus of Ceos, Diagoras, Theodorus, Euhemerus (about the last of whom we spoke above), Epicurus, Lucretius. 2. After Christ, in the first centuries there were Herod, Acts 12, and those mockers in 2 Peter 3, Lucian, Caligula, Pliny (as is evident from book 2, chapter 7), the Emperor Anastasius (as Paul the Deacon reports book 15). To these add Hermogenes, Phygelus, the Nicolaitans, Valentinians, Arabici, Gnostics, Manichaeans, and similar heretics (about whom Augustine, Epiphanius, Philastrius, etc., are to be consulted), also the heretics or paradoxical philosophers who made the soul mortal. See the disputation On Creation. About the Gnostics and similar heretics Irenaeus says book 2, chapter 58: "Who indeed, emulating the philosophy of Epicurus and the indifference of the Cynics, have Jesus not as master, etc." In the intermediate and following ages up to the year 1500, the Roman Curialists and not a few Popes excelled in this genus, some of whom we noted above. The Papists number the Emperor Frederick II among the Atheists. See Contzen book 2 of his Politics chapter 14. Lipsius in his Political Admonitions and Examples under the title On Impiety 4 says that he often had in his mouth that there were three notorious impostors who seduced the human race: Moses, Christ, Mohammed. The same reports in the same place that Alphonso X, King of Spain, was accustomed sometimes to blame the providence of God and say that if he had been present with God at the beginning of the world, many things would have had to be founded better and more orderly. There were also sometimes in those corrupt ages certain fanatics condemned by the Roman church, whom seek in Alphonsus de Castro, Prateolus, Lutzenburg, On Heretics, and in the annals of Baronius and Bzovius and their Epitomators. From the fifteenth century onward, with superstition having been attacked, atheism of every kind especially erupted or was detected by writings, sayings, deeds. It could be distributed according to the parties or factions of religions or according to nations. In the former way the frequency of atheists could be discovered in the parties, indeed of the Papists, from the manifold complaints of theologians and Politicians of the same profession whom we have cited throughout this whole disputation, where especially those are to be consulted who have written ex professo against the Atheists. To these must be added the Confessional Books, Expurgatory Indexes, indexes of prohibited books. In the parties and polities of the Protestants how great the frequency is will be able to be evident from our writers hitherto cited, among whom especially those are to be consulted who have written against the

atheists, to whom the more excellent preachers are to be added whom we indicate in the theological library, and the political writers and Jurists under the title On Religion, Impiety, etc. But it is better to institute this investigation or indication according to nations. We begin therefore from Italy the citadel of religion and piety (as they pretend), according to the ancient exposition, of course, of the apocalyptic number 666. There that horrible book On the Three Impostors was published by the author Pietro Aretino, as Mersenne wants, cited above, or by Poggio Bracciolini, as Campanella wants in his Atheism Conquered, who seems to have read that book. With the revival of good letters the ancient Lucianic, Epicurean, Horatian, Lucretian things, etc., were recooked, cultivated, augmented. With the resurrection of Greek philosophy, as well as Medicine, Mathematics, some of their Professors propound their atheisms together with those most excellent disciplines, and that under the pretext of antiquity and the authority of the ancients. Thus they sweetly philosophize with Aristotle about the providence of God, about the reduction of supernatural things to natural causes, with Galen about the essence of the soul, with Averroes about the universal intellect and the eternity of the world, with Avicenna about miracles and prophecy through the temperament of the body, etc., especially the philosophers and Physicians in Italy, about which see the complaints of Pereira in the preface to his Physical Disputations, and the Counsel of Select Cardinals given to Paul III, and everywhere Delrio in his Magic Investigations, Mersenne in the cited book, and Fortunio Liceti cited above thesis 5, problem 21. This was the cause that it had to be contended there with so many treatises On the Immortality of the Soul, nay even a decree had to be made in the Lateran Council under Leo X, session 8 (see, I beg you). Compare the treatise of Bishop Naclantus of Chioggia and Agostino Nifo On the Immortality of the Soul, and our disputation On Creation part 10. With the schools in Italy thus constituted, it is no wonder that this poison was strenuously propagated to the Roman Curialists and thence to the ecclesiastics, Politicians, and common people, so much that the Italians are everywhere traduced by the name of Atheists on that account (which nevertheless does not prejudice men of better note). They had there besides Machiavelli a public Doctor of Atheism, Pietro Aretino, Vanini the Neapolitan, with thirteen others of the same mission about whom above. Moreover, about Italian and Roman Atheists and Epicureans, especially also Clerics, the preparatory work of Henri Estienne for his Apology for Herodotus cited in the chapter above is to be consulted. We noted in part 1 about the Italians and Roman curialists the words of Pierre Matthieu, and in part 4 the words of Calvin Institutes book 4, chapter 7, §27. We add from the Apology of William Prince of Orange, p. 66 of the Latin edition in octavo: "In the house of the Prince of Parma atheism and other Roman virtues are held in delight, and you will find that liberty nowhere more abundantly than among the heirs of Pier Luigi." Commonly at Rome and in Italy foolish and stupid men are called good Christians (as experience and Hospinian attest, book 6 On Monks, chapter 66). So that in their language stupidity and Christianity have now become synonyms. Melanchthon once chanted to an Italian theologian: "You Italians want to dispute that God, or Christ, is in the eucharist, whom you do not believe to be in heaven." The same in his Theological Counsels part 1, p. 100: "What if we are oppressed by unjust arms, nevertheless we will accomplish that our letters depict to posterity our adversaries, who when, etc. And among these are certain fine men, openly Epicureans ἀναίδην who securely mock all religions. Such men lay down laws for us about religion. But I restrain myself." I think this to be the cause why the distinguished theologian Zacharias Ursinus in his epistle to a friend (once published by Pareus with his Catechetical Miscellanies) called Italy the

sewer of devils, and Joseph Hall in his Epistles decade 4, epistle 10, calls Italy the dregs or excrements of the world, Rome of Italy. From Italy and the Roman curia as the citadel of impiety and the fecund mother of all atheism, this evil diffused itself into all Europe (as once Gentilism from Egypt into the whole world), especially into France (where, as Tolosanus attests, volume 3 of his Syntax of the Admirable Art chapter 1, the society of Atheists had grown to 60,000, nay one Paris in the year 1623 already contained 50,000, as Mersenne attests in his commentary on Genesis p. 671, where in one house you can sometimes find 12 who vomit this impiety; see the same in his dedicatory epistle and in the preface). Alexander Morus in the preface to his French treatise Against the Atheists says that there are more profane men and atheists now than formerly in the time of Gentilism. In addition to Vanini, thirteen were sent from Naples to propagate this fury and society, according to the same Mersenne p. 673. Among the learned Atheists Julius Caesar Vanini, known by this name from his writings (whom however the apology of Paschase entitled L'Antigarasse p. 30 calls Lucilius Vaninus), Mersenne describes in part p. 156 and p. 671, and another anonymous author he describes in his preface, Rabelais in the said Apology p. 30-31. We already made mention of Geoffroy Vallée burned at Paris. Beza in his notes on John 21:22 reports that a certain companion of Postel was burned at Toulouse who said that he was John the Evangelist. How fertile France is in those monsters daily experience teaches, and Calvin's treatise Against the Libertines, and Mersenne's against the Deists, and various treatises cited above published there in the vernacular language against the Atheists, and Antoine Sirmond's treatise On the Immortality of Souls, and Gentillet's Anti-Machiavel. Yet most of them lurk under the name and profession of the Papists.

That there are very many Atheists in Spain, at least practical ones, experience cries out and the French writers reproach them, out of whom we cited one or two above. Whether after Italy second place is to be attributed to the Spanish, not the French, I leave to be disputed among those companions of the one Pontifical religion. At least the Spanish seem to want to snatch the palm of zeal for the Pontifical religion from all others. Whether on account of this pretext they are less to be called atheists, let others inquire. At least the French of today attribute the palm of impiety to the Spanish, as can be seen in the Vindication of the French Against the Gallic Mars of the Patrician of Armagh chapter 29, and in Jérémie Ferrier's Catholic of State, where he retorts that spear sent from the Spanish and Austrians into the French, onto the same and all French favoring them. Yet it cannot be denied that from the time of Francis I impiety of every kind and atheism more and more inundated the French court and thence the whole kingdom. Which Gentillet does not dissimulate in his Anti-Machiavel pp. 232-233, 235, 286. And de Thou at the year 1572, where he inquires into the causes of the Parisian massacre and makes a judgment about such monstrous perfidy. Antoine Sirmond in the preface of his book On the Immortality of the Soul hints that there are not a few today in France who deny it. Charles Paschal in his treatise On Virtues and Vices chapter 15 complains about the multitude of the sect of atheists. Julius Caesar Scaliger, who lived and wrote in France, testifies that he knew an almost infinite number of atheists. His formal words Clapmarius cites and praises book 5 of his Secrets of Republics chapter 4, where he says that atheism is to veer in matters of faith and to plunder sacred things.

How frequent veering and consequently atheism (taken in this notion) was in France, England, Germany, Belgium (and where not?) from the time of the Reformation is too well known. About the plundering of sacred things, both violent in war and fraudulent in peace, the complaints are infinite, whose authors we indicate elsewhere. But if sacrileges and abuses of ecclesiastical goods come under the name of atheism (as Clapmarius and other authors cited above in part 1 want), it can now be gathered how manifold atheisms reign in this time. To return to France, not undeservedly those also coming from there and fleeing to Batavian liberty, even Politicians and men of letters, although professing and endeavoring to prove deity, can be suspected from due indications and probabilities as men who disturb the order of schools, arts, and studies prudently or imprudently and to that extent either themselves deride the cause of truth and piety against the Sceptics and fanatics or prostitute it to others for derision, according to what Thomas says part 1, question 32, article 1, and question 46, article 2: "When someone adduces reasons which are not cogent to prove the Christian faith, he yields to the derision of the infidels. For they believe that we rely on reasons of this kind and on that account believe." And Melanchthon part 2 of his Counsels p. 202: "If once all knowledge, even about God and the worship of God, about the upright and the base, about harming no one, rendering to each his own, has been cast away, and the principles of the light of nature and the rule of consequences together with all logic and metaphysics having been put to flight, whence will anyone restore natural and supernatural theology to himself or others according to his pleasure, whence will weapons be supplied by which he may defend both against infidels, fanatics, Sceptics, heretics, Libertines?" Since these are not matters of the geometric or optic or mechanic court, they are to be seriously thought on by theologians and consorts of true religion and piety. God is not mocked. Woe to that man by whom one of the least is scandalized.

What if cruder or flighty or distorted talents, having been ensnared by the perplexed, ambiguous, uncertain, obscure inanities and phantasms of those men under the appearance of newly invented or illustrated philosophy (for he himself confesses that his things are grasped by few) or driven to desperation of obtaining knowledge, are cast into the dangers of scepticism and libertinism - to whom will this be imputed? And what will we say about those ingrates who want to be blind with petulance in the very midday of truth, always seeking, never arriving at the knowledge of the truth? The truly pious soul Melanchthon was presaging sad things for our Belgium from a river of blood and the petulance of talents, as Henry Antonides reports in the preface to his System of Theology. But about the fecundity and dangers of atheism in our Belgium we will advise below in three words.

The prudence according to the admonition of the Apostle Ephesians 5:15 ought to teach us this, and even that one treatise of Mersenne whose title is: Questions rares et curieuses, theologiques, naturelles, morales, politiques, et de controverse, resolues par raisons tirées de la philosophie, et de la théologie. In Paris chez Pierre Billaine 1630. Where f. 112 and 146 of the same book it is indicated that the author is Marin Mersenne. This author in his preface to Cardinal Richelieu complains that some years ago impiety under the name of Atheism vomited blasphemies against God which were also expiated here on earth by flames. But that it was reborn in the heart of France from the ashes of that unhappy man (he means Vanini), another sect which under a more specious name set forth a poison more contagious than before. The

accomplices of this sect fabricated the name of Deists, to deceive the simpler and credulous souls par l'opinion qu'ils leur donnent du recognoistre un Dieu, et leur dessein est cependant de sapper sourdement les colomnes les fondemens de la verité catholique. In the book itself he exhibits certain rhymed verses of the Deists with prose by which the reasons of that abominable sect are contained. But if in France they hold suspect all, even the sanest, who come there from Belgium or England or other places where the plague rages, it is no wonder if the curators of souls hold suspect Semi-sceptics or Semi-Libertines or Libertine-Papists coming from there to us who do not exempt themselves from the common lot of the suspect by religion and conscience unoffended before God and men. Compare what the same Mersenne had already advised before in his commentaries on Genesis (published in the year 1623) p. 233, that atheists are growing to such a number in France that there is danger that they may succeed the Calvinist and Lutheran heresies and other atheisms of that kind. The same p. 156 thus forewarns against the tricks of the protestations and simulations of his French: "For thus you can hear them everywhere, when they say that they do nothing against conscience, that they follow the light of reason in all things, that they prefer to die than to perjure, than to want to deceive anyone. But in reality they lie."

Therefore, since the French themselves and indeed the Papists so forewarn us against quite a few French, we would have overly Batavian ears if we did not hold suspect men coming from Italy or France under the appearance and title of the Pontifical profession, sceptically and vertiginously sophisticating about metaphysics and natural theology, having utterly overturned the principles and axioms of the arts, promising better things with great gaping but performing nothing or little, moreover from time to time plucking with doubts about Scripture men with whom they familiarly deal, absurdities, contradictions, insolubilities, never or rarely performing the solution of them, as men who prudently or imprudently go about disturbing the order of schools, arts, and studies and to that extent either themselves deride the cause of truth and piety against the Sceptics and fanatics or prostitute it for derision to others, according to what Thomas says part 1, question 32, article 1, and question 46, article 2: "When someone adduces reasons which are not cogent to prove the Christian faith, he yields to the derision of the infidels. For they believe that we rely on reasons of this kind and on that account believe." And Melanchthon part 2 of his Counsels p. 202.

where he took care that this law was fixed for the faculty of arts and philosophy in the University of Wittenberg: "Let it not allow absurd, false, empty matters to be proposed, but let it order true and useful things for life to be chosen, which is beneficial for many reasons. For first it is conducive to implant true and good opinions in tender minds. Then to accustom youth to the love of truth is much better for the Republic than to the zeal of defending paradoxes and undermining common and honorable views approved by the true judgments of the wise. And because paradoxes are defended not by true arguments but only by the tricks of sophisms, the habit of sophistry afterward disturbs religion (N.B.) and the deliberations of the gravest matters, nay, even privately it rouses great tumults in minds and at last entangles them in Pyrrhonian doubts about religion and many other things. Experience also shows that depraved and seditious natures are those that love absurd and monstrous opinions and the disturbances of the arts.

Therefore, lest some danger be created for the churches and schools by Libertine and innovating talents, especially by those flying together from such suspect and hostile places, namely Italy or France, to places as suspect and hostile, of which kind our Belgium is, as the common receptacle of Libertines, provision must be made by those who know that they will sometime render an account to God. Nor will it be to be feared that we are too solicitous and diligent here. See Galatians 4:11, 2 Corinthians 11:3. But how much matter of suspicion the Belgian or Batavian sky ought to supply, we will soon say.

Nor is it to be passed over that among the French the itch and license of defending any rare, unheard of, new or innovated things contributes very much to the propagation of atheism, for the mere ostentation of talent and sharp eloquence or vain speaking. Among the many affecting this palm in their vernacular language occurs Gaffarel, and indeed a priest, whose Unheard of Curiosities were noted by the censure of the Parisian Sorbonne. Yet he, to defend his Libertine insolence committed by this scandalous kind of writing, adduces the examples of many Clerics in the Papacy who published books against or beyond religion and piety, such as Albertus Magnus, Abbot Trithemius, Roger Bacon, Johannes de Rupescissa, Pierre d'Ailly, Junctinus the Florentine priest and theologian, Aurelio Augurelli, Pantheus, Marsilio Ficino, Bernardo Mirandola, Thomas Cajetan, Johannes Ingegnerus, Abbot Joachim, Cardinal Bembo, Aeneas Sylvius, Poggio Bracciolini, Teofilo Folengo under the name of Merlin Cocai.

About atheism in Poland and the atheist pamphlet published at Cracow in the year 1588 under the title The Religion of Simon by an uncertain author, as well as in Lithuania, Scotland, England, which Mersenne reports from Andrew Philopater, Dureus, Wigand, Henry Fitz-Simon in Britannomachia book 1, chapter 12, book 2, chapter 8. That is to be taken with a grain of salt. We do not otherwise want to deny that the Reformed Republics are also exposed to this plague. The author of the notations on the history of de Thou under the name of Johannes Baptista Gallus, Jurist, Ingolstadt 1614, chapter 11, reports that together with the change introduced by Henry VIII, the island was most miserably deformed by the atheisms of Briand (whom Henry jokingly called his vicar in hell). Who that Briand was and what is to be made of him, there is not leisure now to inquire. Here are to be referred the things that Henry Fitz-Simon reports about atheisms in England from the Reformed theologians of that nation, as from Whitgift in his Defense pp. 31 and 278, Edwin Sandys in his Relation p. 45 of the English edition, King in his lectures on Jonah section 32, p. 442, likewise Parkes, Barlow, Jethro, cited in the same place. Far more could be noted from published sermons and practical pamphlets and commentaries (such as Willet on Jude vv. 10 and 18). Not in vain were treatises written there by the Reformed theologians against the Atheists in the vulgar language, some of which we reviewed above. Nor is it about nothing that the Earl of Essex, about to undergo punishment, protested that he had never been an atheist or a Papist, as the French historian Pierre Matthieu has it, and Camden part 4 of his History at the year 1601, p. 804.

Nay more, John Case, the Oxford philosopher, in the prolegomena to his Physics pp. 14-16 most gravely attests and forewarns students of philosophy against the atheisms then raging, subjoining these words: "I fear", he says, "that I am too long and prolix. But you will easily grant

me pardon (Studious reader) if you consider the decrepit age, or rather the delirium of this world in which I have written this work. It is horrendous to say indeed (and yet it must be said) there are today many incredibly foolish men who dare - the rest who does not know? I shudder entirely to repeat the words - who (I say) dare to say (O the times!) that there is no God. If you press these men with the oracles of divine philosophy, stricken by a certain fanatical spirit and fury, they deny these very things - and certainly no wonder, since they deny God the author of them. If I had not seen, if I had not heard these monsters (I mean that blasphemous Atheist Hacket and other scorpions and locusts furiously roused from hell), certainly I would not have been so copious, vehement, and manifold in this cause. But since I have seen not only those men but the furies and walking satyrs of those and others against God, against the word of God, against faith, against the church and Academies, the asylums of the best letters, I thought it worth the effort to openly declare war on them and to the best of my strength to pierce their insanity, fury, blasphemy with the darts of reason, and to teach God first of all, without the knowledge of whom the whole edifice of human arts and sciences collapses. For philosophy is not philosophy if it does not savor of God."

As for Germany, especially those parts where the Protestant religion obtains, that they are filled with very many atheists is not obscurely hinted at by Hondorff and Lonitzer in their Theater under the title On Atheists and Epicureans. Luther volume 1 of his Meditations, Consolations, Counsels, etc., Frankfurt edition in octavo in the year 1571 by Heinrich Petri Rebestock, where pp. 96-97 he most gravely complains about the manifold Epicureanism in which men professing the Gospel were everywhere immersed. Brenz homily 35 on Luke 20, p. 433 says that there are innumerable followers and successors of the Sadducees among Christians. Some things are also cited by Lindanus in his Dubitantius dialogue 2 from Andreas Musculus and Johannes Spangenberg, but those pertain to practical atheism and corrupt morals, about which very grave and numerous complaints could be observed in the sermons published in Germany. Above in part 1 we noted what is said from Scultetus's sermons on Isaiah. Nor is it about nothing that Clapmarius inserted that consideration about atheism in book 5 of his Secrets chapter 4. I will not say what drew away the most learned man Besold from the Protestant religion to Papism, because I do not know those particularities. I freely confess that I sometimes suspected that that man, not alien to the study of devotion and piety (as his writings testify), was scandalized by the Epicurean morals of many who want to be called Protestants. Speculative and practical atheism in Protestant Germany seems to be promoted not a little by the scepticisms and libertinisms of the said Hermeticists, Paracelsians, brothers of the Rosy Cross, Weigelians, and similar men. About whom see Sennert in his treatise On the Agreement and Disagreement of the Chemists with the Galenists and Aristotelians chapters 4-5, and Libavius's refutation of the Fama and Confession of the Fraternity of the Rosy Cross, Nicolaus Hunnius, Stechmann, Beeckmann, and other antagonists of Weigel indicated elsewhere. Denmark is perhaps to be understood by the words of Hemmingsen in his treatise On the Law of Nature, where he says that there are many atheists today. But about Denmark, Norway, Holstein, Sweden, Livonia there is not now leisure or inclination to inquire in the sermons published there.

That our Belgium, truly the Africa of all Libertines and monstrous fanatics, was and still is very greatly exposed to these plagues cannot be denied. Francis Junius writing in Batavia said that

many were vying in rushing into atheism, book On Theology chapter 17. Nor in vain did Johannes Taffin so operosely assert deity against the Atheists in his celebrated treatise On the Emendation of Life in French and Dutch. About the atheisms of the Enthusiasts and Libertines, see what things the Noble Lord of Mont Saint-Aldegonde, Philip Marnix, advised the Illustrious States of Federated Belgium in his treatise Against the Enthusiasts and in his dedicatory epistle, which he afterward defended against a certain anonymous writer in a particular apology published in French. About the Henric-Nicolaitans and other Enthusiasts we indicate some abominable things in the disputation On Meditation at the end. Up to the present day many of the Belgians, especially the Batavians, too eager for novelty, admire Libertinism too patiently and foolishly; they benignly bear any fanatics sprung up and emerging here, or Libertines, neutrals, atheists flowing together here from elsewhere on account of the liberty or license of sects, and intimately converse with them, have them in delight on account of their customary humanity especially toward outsiders and foreigners. For they are delighted either by civility of morals, or by urbanity and dexterity in witticisms and jokes, or by promptitude or at least ostentation of some talent, or by some eloquence or loquacity of theirs, or by poetic faculty, or by some art and miracles and mathematical and mechanical inventions, or by some exercise of arithmetic and practical geometry alone. These and other things are commonly preferred to solid wisdom and piety, which is too morose and troublesome to delicate and versatile men. Here is the honor of piety. Hence the fertile crop, fury, insolence of atheists, libertines, Lucians, neutrals among us. Lipsius in the cited epistle says that he knew very many who denied God, and there his business was with a friend of van Berchem, a man of letters - but this man was sticking in Papist Belgium.

In Holland there was recently an unlearned and idiotic man, a certain Torrentius, a painter by trade and art. What he could not expect from his brush, he sought from his garrulity, by which he drew incautious and voluptuous little women and certain other insane men into the Epicurean profession (to which they were inclined) and at the same time wrung money from them, so that some went bankrupt. The sum of his Atheism seemed to be: Hell is to live miserably here; but heaven is to live well here and to be of good things. The Senate of Haarlem, with testimonies having been collected on the counsel of seven most excellent Jurists, held an inquest about him; but when he did not confess, he was punished with twenty years of incarceration. Thence dismissed a few years later, he lived in England for some time honored with a public stipend; whence, with civil war having arisen, deprived of his stipend, when he had returned to Holland in the year 1644, he died at Amsterdam and was buried. About his cause and deeds, more things can be collected in the archives and bookcases of the city of Haarlem (if these are of such importance to anyone). There was also a certain other unlearned man, an inhabitant of Alkmaar, by the name of Nachtegael [Nightingale], who in the year 1614 or 1615 (if I remember well), on account of atheistic blasphemies about the three impostors blurted out at The Hague, was driven into exile by the ordinary deputies of the States of Holland. More monsters of this kind could be recensed if a history were to be written and those names not rather to be buried in eternal darkness, which have not become known to the world by the public sentence of judges or by their own writings. At least it is agreed that our Batavia was everywhere considered as the sewer of heresies, Libertinisms, and atheisms; and on that account heretics and fanatics having slipped away or been thrust out elsewhere, enticed by the vaunted liberty or license of the

place, sought an asylum for themselves here. It is known how the Anabaptists and Enthusiasts once nested here, and after them the New Arians and Socinians attempted the same. Whose stratagem in the year 1586 here at Utrecht the most diligent historian of the Belgians, Pieter Bor of Utrecht, reports. And they themselves detect another in the year 1598, namely Ostorodt and Voidovius in their apology against the decree of the States of Belgium, whom we also mention in the disputation On the Necessity and Utility of the Doctrine of the Trinity. A third conceived five years ago, which fell flat, is detected by our little notes on the epistle of the Socinian minister under the name of Sartorius published in Dutch together with the catechization of the Remonstrant Catechism. I find in Socinus's epistles, epistle 3 to Radecius, that there was in Belgium a Council of Peregrine Christians, which was in reality a conflux of monstrous heretics, Libertines, and fanatics. Socinus had there his emissary and pander Cornelis Daems of Antwerp living at Gouda in Holland, whom he mentions in his epistles pp. 97, 105, 348-349. Francis Pucci Filidinus (whom Socinus depicts in his epistles, epistle to Radecius) stayed for a time in Batavia and gave that monstrous fetus On Nature and Grace to be printed at Gouda. About David Joris, Hubert the Physician, commonly called Black, once ejected by the Dordrechtians, who lived and died at Gouda, and about others of that kind of fanatics and many others dishonoring our Belgium there is not now leisure to comment, that I may at last make an end. And this pertains to the history of the Enthusiasts and Libertines. But if the word atheist is taken broadly for one who outwardly professes no religion in the communion of any visible church in Christendom, certainly you will find nowhere a greater number of such than in our Belgium, who are commonly called among us Libertines or Semi-Libertines or neutrals. I think Johannes Maccovius had regard to that lax signification, part 4 of his Common Places, disputation 15, where he says that by the sacraments as a token and public profession the faithful are distinguished from the profane and atheists. But if by atheists you understand Politico-Machiavellians and corrupt courtiers, worldly men, slaves of ambition - certainly such are not few in Belgium, among whom those are not the last who, having abused French and Italian peregrinations, have as it were striven for the height of the atheistic art, and from those schools seem to have gone forth as from the Trojan horse to openly or by mines overthrow the piety, simplicity, faith of their predecessors. If you seek atheists according to the acceptation of Clapmarius cited above, who namely veer in the matter of religion, such the Belgian land also bears. Never did this appear better than from the beginning of the Remonstrant faction in the year 1611 and thereafter up to the year 1619, and after order was now restored and peace given back to the churches. Finally, if you understand practical atheisms and atheists prostituting Christianity by the corruptions of life and morals, you must apprehend very many among us today, to whom has befallen an age and region fertile in religions, sterile in piety. And to this the frequent complaints and exclamations of preachers doubtless have regard. Because there is such a great frequency of atheists and Libertines. For as good works profess God, so evil works in a certain way say: *There is no God, nor is there knowledge on high* - they are the words of Cyprian On the Twofold Martyrdom. *They profess that they know God, but in works they deny him*, Titus 1:16. And here the words of Bernard are to be applied, sermon 33 on the Song of Songs: "Woe to this generation from the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy - if however that ought to be called hypocrisy which now, on account of abundance, cannot hide, and on account of shamelessness does not seek to. Today a putrid corruption creeps through the whole body of the church, and the more widely, the more despairingly, and the more

dangerously the more inwardly. For if an open enemy, a heretic, should rise up, he would be cast out and wither away; if a violent enemy, perhaps he would hide himself from him. But now whom will it cast out, or from whom will it hide itself? All are friends, all are enemies; all are intimates, and all are adversaries; all are members of the household, and none are peaceful; all are neighbors, and all seek the things that are their own. They are ministers of Christ, and they serve Antichrist. They proceed honored from the goods of the Lord, who do not render honor to the Lord. Thence that meretricious splendor which you see every day, that histrionic habitus, that regal apparatus; thence gold on the bridles, on the saddles and spurs, and the spurs glitter more than the altars. Thence splendid tables both in foods and cups; thence feastings and drunkennesses; thence lyre and harp and flute; thence overflowing wine-presses and storehouses full, belching out from this into that. Thence casks of pigment, thence stuffed purses. For the sake of such things they want to be and are provosts of churches, deans, archdeacons, bishops, archbishops. For they do not advance by merit, but by that business which walks in darkness. Long ago it was predicted, and now the time of fulfillment has come: *Behold, in peace is my bitterness most bitter*. Bitter formerly in the slaughter of the martyrs, more bitter afterward in the conflict of the heretics, most bitter now in the morals of the members of the household. It is an intestine and incurable blow of the church, and therefore in peace its bitterness is most bitter. But in what peace? Both peace is, and peace is not. Peace from the pagans, and peace from the heretics, but truly not from the sons. The voice of one lamenting in this time: *I have nourished and brought up children, and they have despised me*. They have despised and defiled me by base life, by base gain, by base commerce, in short by the business walking in darkness. It remains that now the demon of midday become of the middle, to seduce, if possible, those who remain in Christ, still persevering in their simplicity."

Attention must also be especially paid to those who do not profess the Pontifical religion, yet are familiar enough with their hierophants, if they do not show themselves to be their brokers; nor do they so shrink from the Jesuits, as being Machiavellico-political talents; they eat, drink, play, and most sweetly revel with their pseudo-clerics; and thus under those masters they daily advance to the worse. That the coryphæi of the Jesuits, under the pretext of ἄθεης religion, have piety for gain, was long ago shown by our men - nay, the Papists themselves affirm this about the same, namely, Watson in Robert Abbot, 3rd part of the defense of the Reformed Catholic of Perkins, preface p. 6. Let there be compared the Conclave of Ignatius, Jesuit Art, Jesuit Catechism, Mysteries of the Jesuit Fathers, the Jesuit History of Louis de Lugo, the recent writings of the Sorbonnists, and others to be cited elsewhere. The author of the English pamphlet published in 1643 under the title Mystery of Iniquity p. 2 says that the Jesuits were the architects of building Babel there, who took to themselves as allies and helpers certain atheist politicians. Oh would that we may learn and be wise!

ON THE ONE AND MOST SIMPLE ESSENCE OF GOD.

Respondent: JOHANNES ALMELOVEEN of Utrecht, On the 10th of June, 1637.

Since it is dangerous to say even true things about God, his saving knowledge must be investigated by us through certain attributes with all reverence and [Greek text]. These are commonly divided into those of the first and second kind. The former are unity, infinity, immutability. The latter are intellect, will, power - to which all others can be reduced. Among the attributes of the first kind, the first is unity, by which we comprehend those three concepts or notions: singularity, primacy or independence, and simplicity, under which is contained spirituality or incorporeity, as being a species of simplicity. By the notion of singularity or singular unity we exclude polytheism, which is directly opposed to the unity of God. By the notion of primacy and simplicity we exclude all dependence, posteriority, minority, composition, multiplicity, and division, which indirectly subverts unity and consequently implies a certain disunity. We, being about to treat only of simplicity at present from the light and book both of nature and of Scripture, will: I. prove the principal Thesis, II. certain Precognita having first been premised, III. refute the Antithesis together with the reasons of the adversaries, IV. note certain Corollaries and uses.

I. For the easier explication of this matter, these things must be known beforehand:

First, Simplicity in general is a mode by which a being is understood to be one per se, and is opposed to composition or multitude, or both, according as the word is taken strictly or broadly. Let the Scholastics and Metaphysicians be seen concerning Simplicity and composition. If the students seek a compendium, let them go to Combach's Metaphysics chapter 5 and 23 out of the more recent authors, or the Philosophical Lexicon of Goclenius, or the Distinctions of Castaneo. We here understand simplicity strictly, not only comparatively, such as is in angels and separate souls, nor only simply simple, such as is also appropriate to prime matter, form, ultimate difference and ultimate abstractions; but that which they call absolutely and supremely simple, by which it happens that a thing is neither composed in itself, nor something composible with it, nor itself composible with anything.

Second, therefore in this disputation it is not only asked whether God is free from all composition properly so called where the extremes are really distinct, but also from that improperly so called, such as is from Essence and being, from nature and suppositum or from essence and subsistence, from genus and difference, and thus whether he is free from all multiplicity, distinction or division, priority and posteriority in his essence; for the reason of the transcendental distinction and multitude of persons and thus of modes and relations is far otherwise, as will be seen below, thesis 5.

Third, although the word "simple" seems positive, in reality however it is negative, because it formally enunciates that there is not composition or multiplicity in God. Nevertheless its material signification is a positive perfection, by which such negation is appropriate to God, in the way that by "incorporeal" the nature of Spirit is materially signified. It holds in the same way in all the negative attributes of God. Moreover, that we conceive and express those attributes negatively

arises from the relation to creatures, because they are signified by the names of creatures by way of negation, and are conceived in relation to them.

Fourth, of the same kind and import as simplicity are the attributes of incommunicability, infinity, immutability, incomprehensibility, incorporeity, invisibility; nay, they flow from it, or cohere with it by whatever other necessary nexus they are related; so that with this having been taken away, all those must necessarily be taken away or weakened.

2. We prove by these reasons that the Simplicity which we have spoken of is appropriate to God, of which the First is:

Isaiah 44:6, Revelation 1:8 and 21:6 and 22:13, Romans 11:35-36, whence we gather the primacy and independence of God both in being and in operating - I say independence from a subject, from causes both internal and external, from any prior or superior principle; for he is, as Justin Martyr says, [Greek text] (an essence without beginning and uncaused), and as Julius Caesar Scaliger divinely sings, Exercise 365, section 10:

Without beginning the beginning, without end the end,
To whom the past does not depart, nor the future approach.
Before all, after all, whole, one, Himself.

But if God were composed of parts, or accidents, or modes, then he would not be simply first; because parts are prior to the composite, and principles (whence modes or accidents would depend) are prior to the principiated, as is known from Philosophy.

Second, from the all-round and infinite perfection of God, which is pure act without any admixture of potency. For if there were potency in God, it would be something imperfect or perfectible, whose act would be perfective, by which some further perfection would accede to it. The consequence of the major is proved, because every composition, as well as the composite, is from act and potency; for genus, matter, integrated part, essence, nature, subject have the nature of potency; on the other hand, difference, form, integrating part, existence, suppositum, accident have the nature of act. The minor is proved: Both because it is repugnant to the absolute perfection of God that there be something perfectible in him; and because the parts or principles from which it would be composed would be more imperfect than the composite, and thus out of them nothing could be made or composed which would be endowed with absolute and infinite perfection; and finally because there would be passive potency in God, the root of mutability, and God could be resolved into the compounding parts or principles, and be corrupted, contrary to Psalm 102:28, James 1:17, Numbers 23:23, 1 Timothy 1:17, Romans 1:23. Whence it is agreed that God is only what he is, and cannot not be, and be something else. Hence Damascene rightly says, Orthodox Faith book 1, chapter 4: [Greek text], "For composition is the beginning of conflict, and conflict of separation, and separation of dissolution; but dissolution is something altogether alien to God."

Third, because God is most absolutely and most perfectly one and the same, Deuteronomy 6:4, Psalm 102:28, and nothing in his essence is really diverse. But where there is no distinction, there is no composition through the union of distinct extremes. Moreover, it is proved that all things which are in God are God, are one and the same as himself: 1. from the name Jehovah, [Hebrew text] - Gr. [Greek text] - Exodus 3:14-15 with Revelation 1:8 [Greek text], "who is and who was and who is to come". 2. From this, that properly, by synonymous and direct predication, those things which seem to hold themselves in the mode of accidents or adjuncts are predicated of him, as e.g. light, John 1:9 with 1 John 1:5, love, 1 John 4:8,16. He therefore who is what he is, and of whom whatever is in him is himself, has no parts, accidents, modes, or principles which are something other than himself. 3. Because the attributes which we conceive as diverse are predicated of each other essentially, as being essentially one and the same among themselves, as we will explain below. 4. If those attributes, e.g. power, wisdom, are not God, they are either infinite and supremely perfect or they are not. If the former, then besides the one God there will be something infinite and supremely perfect, and thus there will be two infinites, that is, two equal Gods; but if the latter, then God will not know his own essence and infinite perfection adequately, but only to some extent and in proportion, because there is no proportion between a finite cognitive power and an infinite object or end.

Fourth, because given that there are in God extremes so distinct that they can enter into composition, nevertheless they could not be united and coalesce among themselves except through the action of some efficient cause. But where and what is that cause prior and superior to God, which would compose the substance of God?

Fifth, it is proved from the enumeration or removal of all species of composition. Every composition in general is from act and potency, because in it one part out of the compounding parts is in potency to the other, and both are in potency to the being of the whole, which they participate; but it was said above that all things in God are from themselves in ultimate actuality, and there is not some passive or perfectible potency. In species, composition from essential or integrating parts, that is, corporeity, and indeed of a human body (which the Anthropomorphites wanted), does not befall God - we learn this from John 4:24, Romans 1:20, 1 Timothy 1:17, Isaiah 40:18. With this foundation having been laid, various arguments can be brought forth, partly from the nature and properties of body, partly from the nature of God, which see in Damascene's Orthodox Faith book 1, chapter 4, Thomas's Against the Gentiles book 1, chapters 19-21, the Scholastics on Sentences book 1, distinction 8 and on Part 1, question 3, article 1 of the Summa, Alphonsus de Castro under the entry "God", heresy 2, Vázquez Metaphysical Disputations 17, and out of our men Zanchi book 2 On God chapter 2.

Concerning composition from subject and accident, it is proved because God is infinitely perfect in himself, containing in himself all possible perfections either formally or eminently; therefore he cannot be further perfected. But there would be passive potency and defect in God, and he would receive further perfection, if he received real accidents, which are certain real perfections.

Concerning composition from genus and difference, it is most easily proved, because God is not in a predicament, nor does the notion of genus and difference properly befall him, as the

Logicians and Metaphysicians equally with the Scholastic Theologians show. See out of the more recent authors Vázquez disputation 16 and the Antagonists of Vorstius, especially Egisemnius.

Composition from essence and existence, from nature and suppositum, is removed from God, because God is most pure act, because he is supremely perfect, because he is first and independent, because he is what he is, because whatever he is he is through essence and not through participation, concerning which Zanchi in the cited place and Thomas in the said question article 3 and 4.

Sixth, let the consensus of the ancient Church and the fathers accede to these arguments: Augustine On the Trinity book 6, chapter 6, book 4, chapter 1 and books 7, 8, and 10; Irenaeus book 2, chapter 16; Athenagoras in his Legatio for the Christians; Tatian's Oration to the Greeks; Origen book 1 On Principles; Eusebius's Preparation for the Gospel book 8, chapter 2; Athanasius in his Decree of the Nicene Synod; Dionysius the so-called Areopagite On the Divine Names chapter 5; Nazianzen Oration 49 or On Faith and Oration 11 On Theology; Gregory of Nyssa's 1st Oration on the words *Let us make man, etc.*; Cyril of Alexandria's Epistle to Calosyrius and book 10 Against Julian; John Cassian's Institutes book 8, chapter 4; Damascene in the cited place and chapter 17; Aeneas of Gaza in Theophrastus page 91; the author of the work On Spirit and Soul chapter 18 in volume 3 of Augustine; Gennadius of Marseille On Ecclesiastical Dogmas chapter 11; the Scholastics on Sentences book 1, distinction 8 and on Thomas Part 1, question 3 throughout, especially on article 7. Of all the more recent authors in common places and theses, especially the Antagonists of Socinus, Vorstius, and the Remonstrants, among whom out of the Papists Becanus in his treatise against Vorstius, out of our men Broeckerus, Sladus, Egisemnius, etc. Add the Christian philosophers and metaphysicians. Nay even the Platonic philosophers and all extraneous Gentiles and Jews who are at least called Theists could here be called to votes for the one and simple essence of God. Let the writers of natural theology be seen, and those who wrote for the Truth of the Christian Religion. Out of the Jews, Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed part 1, chapters 51 and 52 offers an illustrious testimony to this truth, where he also brings forth not contemptible arguments. To which truth is repugnant that fiction about the Sephirot in Menasseh ben Israel in his pamphlet On Creation, about which we note something in the disputation On Creation part 2. The Mohammedans agree, at least the Philosophers and learned, as can be seen in the Polisher of the Mirror of Achmed the Persian, as reported by Philippus Guadagnolus in his Apology Against Achmed treatise 3 in the preface.

3. With the truth now having been confirmed, it remains that we examine the opinion of the adversaries. There were among the Ethnics those who said God was a body, or the soul of the world, or the whole world, and thus either composed in himself or with another outside himself: Epiphanius Heresies 5, Eusebius Preparation for the Gospel book 4, chapter 6, Damascene in his book On Heresies. Among Christians the Audians (wrongly called Vadians by Prateolus and other more recent authors) attributed a body, and indeed a human one, to God: Epiphanius Heresy 70, Augustine On Heresies chapter 50, Theodoret Fables of the Heretics book 4, chapter 13, the same Ecclesiastical History book 4, chapter 19, Nicephorus book 11, chapter 14,

who were afterward called Anthropomorphites by the Greeks, from Lactantius book 4, chapter 30 Anthropians. Something kindred to that error seems not obscurely to have adhered to Tertullian from Against Marcion book 2, chapter 16 and Against Praxeas, and from the testimony of Augustine On Genesis book 10, chapters 25-26, although in his book On Heresies chapter 84 he hints that it was more a discrepancy in words or abuse of a word than a heresy. In later ages there emerged from time to time those who fought against the simplicity of God, whose errors were immediately suppressed and condemned by the Scholastics and ecclesiastics. See the condemnations subjoined to the Master of the Sentences, in the years 1226 and 1340, etc. Becanus chapter 1, question 1 also makes mention of a certain Walter who really distinguished the essence and attributes of God. In our memory the Socinians again roused these monsters of opinions from hell for no other end than to overturn the foundation of Christianity, namely the one and triune God. Hence in the Racovian Catechism in the passage on the knowledge of God chapter 1, they expunge from the class of God's attributes the spiritual nature of God, simplicity, infinity, invisibility. The Remonstrants in their Confession seem to tend almost to the same place. Nay, in their Apology they assert that not a jot about the simplicity of God is in Scripture, chapter 2, page 41; then that the whole disputation is metaphysical, in the same place; and skeptically enough they stir up this whole doctrine of Christianity in the same place and page 42: "Nearly the whole of metaphysics must be drawn off from the mind before you understand what composition is, then whether and what composition is from being and essence, from act and potency; whether this composition is true composition; whether it is repugnant to the simplicity of God if the free volitions and actions of God are said to be distinct from the essence of God, because it seems inexplicable how, if there is no distinction, the free volition of God can be, nay, how volition can cease and desist, since the essence is not free but always remains entirely the same, nor can ever cease; likewise, since it is expressly said of God that he hates and turns away from the just man whom he loves when he falls from his justice, how that love and the hate following love, with respect to the same subject, is the very essence of God, which always remains the same - and what are the other signs of its mint. And how few mortals understand those questions? There the most acute talents have something in which to exercise their industry. And after they have done it, their altercations are drier than sand. You would say that they have fixed a cross for themselves from which they hang suspended." The Remonstrants therefore leave their decisions to the Doctors of the Academy and to all those to whom it is permitted to struggle and cut their throats in that dry dust.

Third, And why should they do otherwise? It is not necessary that they be understood, according to the very foundation of these Censors, which they laid down in the Synopsis of their purer Theology, Disputation III, Thesis 19: "Whatever is not contained in Scripture, although it does not simply dissent from it, is not a dogma necessary for salvation." See, I beg you, the rest. Nor is it a wonder, since in the year 1611 they made their own by approving the profane disputations of Conrad Vorstius concerning God. For he in his book On God pp. 207, 209-210, 214, 219, 221, 246 had delineated God as corporeal, visible, mutable, subject to accidents, in whom there were multiple things, etc. - which monsters of opinions he did not desist from defending against the whole of Christendom out of exegeses, apologies, and other polemical writings. Let there be seen the Apology of the King of Great Britain, Egisemnius's Crisis and Hypocrisy, the Examination of the Vorstian Response to the articles transmitted from England,

the writings of Sladus, of the Ministers of Leeuwarden, of Piscator, of Sibrandus Lubbertus against Vorstius and against Grotius the patron of Vorstius, and of Bogermann and Sopingius against the same Grotius, finally the judgment of the National Synod of Dort in the year 1619 concerning the Doctrine and writings of Vorstius. Recently also the Socinian Crellius in his supplement to the Institutions of Volkelius described the essence of God in nearly the same way, even citing for the sake of honor and alleging in the margin the book of Vorstius On God.

4. We briefly dissolve the reasons which we know to have ever been adduced by the adversaries already recensed, or which someone might think could otherwise be adduced, thus:

First, that not a jot is found in the sacred writings. Response: If [the doctrine of divine simplicity] is not decided there in the terms of the schools and those used today, or if not explicitly through theses and antitheses, nevertheless this doctrine is gathered from there by consequence, as was shown above in thesis 2. Compare our Disputation On Human Reason in Matters of Faith, and the other On Fundamental Articles and Errors.

Second, the whole doctrine is philosophical, scholastic, metaphysical, therefore has nothing to do with the faith and piety of Christians. Response: We deny that it is materially and in itself philosophical, although formally it could be called such insofar as it is proposed philosophically and scholastically, and is vindicated from the pseudo-philosophical tricks of the adversaries. The same could be objected to the doctrine of all the attributes of God, even those which the Socinians and Remonstrants themselves propose, likewise about the Trinity, the person and natures of Christ against Eutyches and Nestorius - nay, about nearly the whole of Theology.

Third, this whole doctrine is uncertain and inexplicable, therefore it is better here to act, if not as Vorstians or Socinians, at least as Sceptics. The antecedent is proved, because Metaphysicians do not agree in the exposition of the terms of simplicity and composition. Response: It is not [Greek text] of truth that all authors understand it equally. Whatever the Metaphysicians or Scholastic Thomists and Scotists may vary in the explication of the terms and of this controversy, nevertheless all vie in this, that they remove all composition from God. See just now Rada, Controversies between Thomas and Scotus part 1, controversy 4.

Fourth, in the Scriptures members, parts, affections are ascribed to God, therefore there is in him one thing and another. Response: These things are said [Greek text] (figuratively), which are to be understood [Greek text] (spiritually). For if anyone wants those metaphorical things to be understood properly, now by the same method it would be proved that God is a stone, a lion, has wings, is something (far be it from blasphemy) conflated from various animals. For he is called fire, rock, lion, etc., and the members not only of man but also of other animals are attributed to him. Moreover, he is said to sleep, forget, be far away, grieve, repent, be angry, etc. But that these phrases are to be explained metaphorically is taught by Augustine On True and False Religion chapter 50, and epistle 112, and in the book On the Essence of Divinity; Novatian under the name of Tertullian On the Trinity chapters 6-7; Jerome epistle 15; Isidore Etymologies book 3; Gregory Moralia book 14, chapter 22; Damascene Orthodox Faith book 1, chapter 14.

Fifth, because in God there are very many attributes really distinct from him and among themselves - at least distinct in such a way that they are not God himself, therefore... Response: We deny the antecedent. They are God himself, nor do they really differ, e.g. goodness, justice, power, intellect, will. There are some who concede that they are distinguished from the nature of the thing formally, as Scotus with his followers, because although they are the same simple thing, nevertheless from the nature of the thing they are distinct formal notions; for the formal notion and definition of one, e.g. of intellect or justice, is not the definition and formal notion of the other, e.g. of will or mercy - which opinion Rada, Bishop of Patti, subtly defends against all the Thomists out of the more recent authors in the cited place.

But others, such as the Thomists and most of the more recent Papists (with whom I think the Reformed philosophers and Theologians side), more truly and accurately establish here a distinction of reasoning reason and reasoned reason. The former indeed on the part of our intellect, both on account of the most eminent perfection of God which cannot be represented by a single notion, and on account of the finitude and narrowness of our intellect, which cannot adequately conceive the whole perfection of God by a single concept, but needs many inadequate concepts to conceive it - hence it happens that it conceives one and the same thing separately by many formal concepts really distinct, concepts, I say, analogically taken from created things which through many distinct qualities furnish those things which the divine essence [furnishes] through itself. But the latter [distinction] on the part of the thing, because there are various objective concepts not really, actually, in themselves, but virtually or eminently distinct in effects, emanations, and terminations. This distinction they properly call virtual or eminent [distinction] of reasoned reason; or (to adapt it to Scotistic terms) from the nature of the thing formal not in act but in power or eminently.

So that there is some foundation of this latter distinction on the part of the thing, not indeed in God himself, but in the effects of God. For although the divine essence and perfection is one and simple, nevertheless it does not operate according to its adequate notion. Whence we say that God punishes the wicked according to the notion of justice, saves his own according to the notion of mercy, produces Bucephalus to the idea of a horse, not of a man; but Alexander to the idea of a man, not of a horse. The attributes of justice and mercy, as well as the ideas of man and horse, are indeed not multiplied or distinguished in God himself in act; but they are distinguished only virtually in the effects themselves, or in termination to such and such a work or effect. Let the more immature learn the nature of this distinction from the common Metaphysical and Logical authors and apply it to the present matter.

Two examples are usually adduced, of the soul and of solar light. The soul, really one in man, is virtually or eminently threefold: vegetative, sensitive, rational; because that one form furnishes in man what the vegetative [furnishes] in plants, the sensitive in brutes. The light of the sun, although it is one, nevertheless virtually or as to its effects contains in itself a drying and heating force. But when it illuminates or heats or dries, it does not operate according to its whole notion. For by the action of illuminating as such, it does not dry or heat, although the drying or heating force is not separated from the illuminative force, but they hold themselves accidentally to

illumination; because light does not operate according to its whole notion, but only according to the notion of illuminating.

Instance 1: If the persons are really the same as the essence, they are really the same among themselves; the reason is, because things which are the same with one third thing are the same among themselves. Response: This axiom must be limited: Things which are the same with one third singular incommunicable thing are the same among themselves. But the divine essence is communicable to the three persons. Thus Becanus Scholastic Theology treatise 2, chapter 2, question 3. Nothing prevents also adding the commonplace limitation to that axiom: They are the same among themselves with respect to that third thing. And thus the persons are the same among themselves with respect to the one and same essence.

Instance 2, which is Walter's: The attributes are in diverse predicaments, e.g. essence in substance, goodness in quality. Response: Now boys in the schools know that God is in a predicament analogically.

Instance 3: Things which cannot be predicated of each other and of the essence in the abstract, in the nominative case, and by synonymous predication, are not really the same. But the former is true. Therefore... Response: There is a fallacy of figure of speech; for the identical sense is changed into the formal sense. Something is predicated of another either in the identical sense or in the formal sense. The attributes as they are considered on the part of the thing and insofar as they are in God and thus are entirely the same as the essence and among themselves, can be predicated of each other in the identical sense; thus you will rightly and most truly say: The essence on the part of the thing is life, will on the part of the thing is intellect, and vice versa, and so in others. But as the attributes are conceived by us, and as they are in our concepts, they cannot be truly and properly predicated of each other, namely in the formal sense; the reason is, because thus they are not entirely the same but are distinguished by reasoning reason and reasoned reason (namely virtual). For there are many objective concepts virtually distinct which correspond to many formal concepts really distinct. Therefore it cannot be said: The objective concept of will is the objective concept of intellect, or, the attribute of mercy is the attribute of punitive justice.

It must nevertheless be noted that there are some propositions which can be taken in both senses, namely those which consist of the copula "is", e.g. Intellect is will, to understand is to will, mercy is justice - which taken in the abstract and in the identical sense are true, but in the formal sense false. There are also others which are always taken in the formal sense, and thus under those terms are absolutely and always false, in which essential or notional acts are signified. Essential, as, intellect understands, will wills. Notional, as, the Father begets, the Son is begotten, the Holy Spirit proceeds - which are only true when something is signified to be appropriate to God according to that notion according to which it is truly appropriate; but they are false when something is signified to be appropriate to God according to another notion which holds itself accidentally and according to which it is not truly appropriate, e.g. intellect wills, will understands, justice shows mercy, mercy punishes - which nevertheless can be true under other terms, namely taken in the abstract, in themselves, as they are on the part of the

thing in God, but not as they are attended to in distinct effects as principles of diverse productions or according to the diverse emanations of God, as, that thing which is will understands, that thing which is mercy punishes.

6. Sixth, because there are multiple persons in God, who are three things if not more; for the Father is one thing, substance, or essence, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another. Thus Vorstius philosophizes in his treatise On God p. 205, 209, 219, and in his Apologetic Exegesis p. 39, in his Fuller Response p. 11, in his Catalog of the Errors of Sibrandus pp. 2 and 5. And these things seem to favor the Socinians for attacking the trinity of persons. The Jews and Mohammedans urge the Trinity by the same absurdity, as can be seen in the response of Rabbi David Kimchi to the places alleged from the Psalms for the Trinity, and in the Polisher of the Mirror of Achmad son of Zin Alabedin the Persian, in Philip Guadagnolo in his Apology for the Christian Religion in Arabic and Latin against the said Achmad treatise 2, chapter 16, section 8.

Response: The divine persons are considered in two ways: either with the essence or among themselves. In the former way we deny that the divine persons are really distinguished from the essence, but we say that they are really the same as the essence, distinguished only from the nature of the thing eminently. Nearly in the way in which in created things nature and suppositum are distinguished, which although they are really the same, nevertheless not whatever is truly, singularly, and affirmatively predicated of the one is also predicated of the other, but something singular which is affirmed of the one is truly denied of the other. Thus to be communicated is affirmed of the nature and denied of the suppositum, and conversely to be incommunicable is affirmed of the suppositum and denied of the nature. In the latter way, the persons are distinguished really, because Scripture says the Father is one, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another - John 5:23, 6:14,16 - and because they are relatively opposed; but opposites as such cannot be the same. Nevertheless they are not distinguished essentially; indeed every essential distinction is real, but not the other way around. This simile can be adduced: Just as in the creation of an angel the substance of the angel and the creation of the angel are had, and yet these two do not make a composition, because creation is nothing other than the simple substance of the angel with respect to the creator as to him from whom it is - but this respect does not infer another and new entity. Thus in God the multiplication of persons does not infer composition, because it occurs only through relation (for all things in God are the same and one most simple entity); but a real relation coming can make a real distinction without any composition.

Instance 1: The persons as such are either nothing or something; if nothing, now the Trinity is denied; if something, if beings, therefore they have essence, and consequently formally considered are three distinct essences. Response: We deny that whatever is something, or what has some entity or formality, also has essence. For then in creatures existence and supposit, because they are not nothing but something, would have essence, and consequently there would be an essence of essence, and again an essence of this, and so on to infinity - which is most absurd. Thus Egisemnius was pretty much inculcating this to Vorstius in his Crisis pp. 20-21.

Instance 2: Where there are extremes really distinct, there is some composition; but the persons as such are really distinct, therefore... Response: Composition requires not only the distinction of the extremes, but also union. But of the persons as such, as they are taken formally, there is no union, because there is not one person but three.

Instance 3: Where there is communicable essence and incommunicable personality, from which the divine person results, there is composition from essence and mode. Response: We do not want to say, as this objection is commonly solved: Modes do not compose but distinguish; or the composing extremes must be things really distinct (because this would not take away the secondary composition from nature and suppositum, essence and being, genus and difference); but it will suffice to deny the consequence, because essence does not hold itself to mode in the way of potency, nor person to mode in the way of act - which nevertheless is required in every composition whether properly or improperly so called. A person indeed says essence and personality or a certain mode of subsisting, but without any composition which is otherwise wont to be conceived in a created person. But the reason for the difference is that essence in creatures is of imperfect actuality and is divisible through that which contracts it to the being of an individual or person, namely through the individual or personal difference; but deity or divine essence has no potentiality, so that it could be determined, contracted, actuated by the personal properties; for he who of himself is so this one, and singular, and existing through himself that singularity and existing through himself are of his formal and essential concept, also has from himself and of himself ultimate unity and actuality. Hence therefore it follows that it is not contracted, actuated or perfected by paternity or filiation or procession; for although they are proper acts of the person, in no way are they acts of the divine nature itself as such and precisely considered, perfecting or informing it.

Therefore that axiom: Where there are two extremes distinct in some way, which concur to the constitution of a third, there is some composition - must be limited thus: of which one is potency, the other act; or, which are not both in their ultimate unity and actuality. But in a divine person both acts (so let it be permitted to distinguish for the sake of teaching) - both the quidditative, by which it is God quidditatively, and the relative or personal - must be conceived as ultimate and most perfect, of which the former is not actuated or further perfected in itself by the latter, but both those formal notions are in God according to the ultimate unity and actuality proper [to each]. On the other hand, created quiddity and its singularity or personality are two acts of which the latter as ultimate actuates and determines the former. This I think is the genuine solution of this doubt. For the things which are adduced by certain other scholastics do not seem sufficiently expeditious to me, nor do they seem to agree sufficiently with the doctrine of compositions (where the Remonstrants object perplexity and uncertainty to the Philosophers in their Apology in the cited place). Therefore, in a certain more recent Metaphysical compendium concerning the composition of God, it seems to me that too much is conceded by the most erudite author, most friendly to me when he was alive.

Nay, even Becanus himself, otherwise sufficiently subtle and perspicuous in scholastic doctrine, seems to me to waver too much when, moved by this and other arguments, he concedes that there is given in God virtual composition from the nature of the thing, because substantial

components are given which are virtually or eminently distinguished among themselves, such as essence and existence, essence and attributes, nature and personality; moreover, that actual composition is given through the operation of our intellect, because substantial components are given which are distinguished among themselves through the operation of our intellect - chapter 1, question 2, especially in treatise 2 of his Scholastic Theology, chapter 3, question 11, Refutation 1. Response: 1. Because composition of reason or of our mind is no composition - as also that virtual [composition] is unknown to philosophy. By equal right a unity and composition could be established between God and creatures, between the sun and minerals, vegetables, animals, because as universal causes they virtually contain them in themselves. 2. This whole speculation rests on that false hypothesis: Wherever there is distinction, and how great and of what kind it is, there also is composition, and so great and of such a kind. But this is false; in addition, union and transition from potency to act of the distinct [components] is required. An angel is distinguished from a stone, from a man, from heaven, from earth, but is not composed with it. And to come closer, the personal property of the Father is distinguished from the property of the Son, but nevertheless precisely and formally so taken they are not united among themselves and in themselves; for union is in and with the essence in some third thing. 3. Becanus seems to have forgotten his own doctrine posited a little before, where, about to prove that there is no actual composition in God, among other things he also adduces this argument: because things which are actually distinguished from the nature of the thing cannot be united and coalesce among themselves except through the action of an efficient cause; but no efficient cause is prior to God, etc.; and he applies it to composition from nature and personality, essence and existence. But this same argument holds against what he calls virtual composition, if only you add from the same Becanus that every composition is from act and potency. But potentiality and actuation have no more place virtually than actually in God. 4. Briefly, where all the requisites of composition are not found, there no composition, by whatever name it is called, has place. But the requisites are: First, that there be distinct extremes, namely from the nature of the thing, whether really, formally, or modally. Second, that they be united, or be united. Third, that they presuppose and include potentiality or potency. Fourth, that there be some efficient cause of this union. Fifth, from those essential and constitutive requisites these consequential things flow: dependence, multiplicity and division, resolution and change. But those requisites cannot be applied to the divine essence, therefore neither can any composition. Therefore the writers and teachers of metaphysics (which among all the sciences ought especially to serve theology) will do more rightly if they define Composition more accurately and strictly: That it is the distinction of several things of which one holds itself as act and the other as potency. In this way, out of the more recent authors, Meurisse in his Metaphysics according to the mind of Scotus book 1, question 23.

Instance 4: If the persons are really the same as the essence, they are really the same among themselves; the reason is, because things which are the same with one third thing are the same among themselves. Response: This axiom must be limited: Things which are the same with one third singular incommunicable thing are the same among themselves. But the divine essence is communicable to the three persons. Thus Becanus Scholastic Theology treatise 2, chapter 2, question 3. Nothing prevents also adding the commonplace limitation to that axiom: They are

the same among themselves with respect to that third thing. And thus the persons are the same among themselves with respect to the one and same essence.

Corollary 1: Those personal relations are real and really distinct from each other, nay even opposed - opposed, I say, not formally but fundamentally, which pertains to the opposed relations themselves, which are really distinct. 2. Active spiration is not really distinguished in the Father from paternity, in the Son from filiation, lest there be given in God four relations really distinct, as is rightly established by the Scholastics in general against Durandus. 3. Although the persons are really the same as the essence, nevertheless they are distinguished from it by reasoning reason eminently reasoned, namely from the nature of the thing, not in act. For they are so related among themselves that the essence is absolute, the personality relative; the essence is common, the personality not at all. 2. Because certain things are appropriate, e.g. to the Father by reason of paternity which are not appropriate to him by reason of essence, such as to be referred to the Son; and conversely certain things are appropriate to him by reason of essence and not of paternity, such as to be similar to the Son. Therefore essence and paternity virtually and eminently contain formal distinction, because they so hold themselves as if they were formally distinguished. The Scotists seem to me to take care precisely of this, lest from the essence and relations in God one be constituted by unity per se or per accidens according to composition or quasi-composition, nor one by aggregation, lest also the essence of God be said to be properly modified and determined by relation. See Rada Bishop of Patti, Controversy between Thomas and Scotus part 1, controversy 4, appendix 2, pp. 82-84. 5. Therefore Vorstius did the greatest injury to Scotus and the Scotists by advocating them here in support of his polytheism. For no one shrinks more from admitting any even minimal and most improper composition in God, and similar Vorstian absurdities, than Scotus with his followers, as can be seen in Rada just now cited, and Meurisse in his Scotistic Metaphysics book 1, question 23. Egisemnius had already assailed the ignorance of Vorstius in this part in the cited place. 6. The Anabaptist Coryphæus and Predecessor Theodoric Philips says badly in his Enchiridion fol. 4 that in the Old Testament God was named by several names according to his properties and operations, in the New Testament by three: of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. 7. Luther rightly wanted the German word Dreifaltigkeit, i.e. triplicity, although thus used from every age, to be changed into a more suitable and less ambiguous one; and unjustly on that account is he called into suspicion of Arianism by Bellarmine, preface to general Controversy 2 - on which see the notes of Francis Junius. We think that the Belgians and Germans can most safely imitate and express the [Greek text] of the Greeks by their Drie-eenigheydt, or the triunitas of the Latins by their Drie-eenigheydt.

7. Seventh, all the actions of God are objected to simplicity. Which are either ad intra or ad extra. Ad intra are those which are terminated in God himself, and are divided into those common to the three persons - such as the natural understanding and willing of God by which he understands and wills himself - and into proper or personal, such as generation, spiration, procession. Ad extra are those which are terminated in creatures, and are divided into immanent or internal, and emanating or external. The former are indefinite knowledge and definite knowledge or the very decrees of God. The latter are either general, as creation, conservation, governance, or special, as the works of redemption. About the actions of God

which we call decrees, Vorstius and his adherents the Remonstrants especially raise the question. Their reasons are these:

First, because the decrees are many, God is one. Second, because the decrees are free, God is a being simply and supremely necessary. Third, because the decrees have God as efficient cause and are posterior to him. Fourth, because God is from eternity, the decrees not at all. Fifth, because the decrees are mutable, conditioned, dependent, but God is an immutable, absolute, independent essence. These arguments partly fall by themselves and are not supported by any proofs from the adversaries, partly have been solidly and perspicuously enough refuted by the Scholastics and Antagonists of Vorstius, especially by Becanus, as well as Alsted in his Natural Theology, and Dr. Maccovius in his Miscellaneous Collection of Questions in the year 1621, disputations 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26. And so it will suffice to note these sources of solutions.

The first is: The decrees of God as to real existence and according to the perfection which they are said to have in God are necessary, essential to God, and indeed one and simple act, and thus God himself decreeing; but as to species or termination or according to extension to this or that object distinct from itself, they are both free and neither essential to God nor God himself. Briefly, the intellect and intellection, will and volition of God is one and simple, admitting neither multiplicity nor division and distraction, much less opposition, nor before and after or succession, nor dependence of causality and effect or of any other order; but these must all be attributed to things understood and willed really most distinct from the divine essence, intellection and volition - certainly as its objects. And in this sense it is said by the fathers and Scholastics that in God Being, being able, operating do not differ. See just now Rada, Controversies between Thomas and Scotus part 1, page 1.

The second is: In the decree of God three things must be considered. 1. The essence of God signified in the mode of a vital act insofar as it is necessarily terminated at the divine goodness itself to be loved, and at every possible or producible by God according to the ideas in the divine mind. 2. The termination of that actuose essence to creatures to be produced and thus governed, or not to be produced and thus governed - for the sake of better doctrine we will call the former positive, the latter negative. 3. The relation of reason which results from that termination. As to the first, we say that the essence, and indeed as actuose, is simply necessary and is necessarily terminated at the uncreated goodness of God. As to the second, the termination to these or those creatures that they may be or not be, may do this or not do this, is simply free - namely disjunctively, although it is necessary compositely or conjunctively. It is, for example, necessary that God decree something about the existence and such and such action of this possible, whether man or dog or tree; but it is free to decree in this or that part of the contradiction - namely, that it be or not be. As to the third, that relation necessarily results to the future thing, namely from the hypothesis and posited positive termination; nevertheless it can not result if positive termination is not posited but only negative.

The third source of solutions is: The decree of God can be conceived by us according to three moments or instants of reason or nature, but not of time or duration, because the decree is

coeternal with God. In the first we conceive the divine essence signified in the mode of a vital act insofar as it is necessarily terminated at God as primary object and is still indifferent to creatures. In the second we conceive the same insofar as it is freely terminated at creatures to be produced or governed, without any mutation of itself or real addition, because God immediately understands, wills and decrees through essence, and is freely terminated at creatures, and his intellection is at once intellection, love and decree; nor does he produce new actions of intellect and will in himself which are accidents distinct from his substance. Only a certain external denomination and respect of reason accedes by which the essence of God in the mode of understanding, loving, decreeing is referred to the thing understood, loved and decreed. In the third instant therefore we conceive the decree insofar as hence results a respect of reason which on the part of God is founded in the decree itself now freely terminated, and on the part of the creature in the very futurition or existence of it. With these things having been laid down, now it will be easy to apply solutions to the objections of Vorstius. About the external or emanating actions of God, the difficulty is less, nor is this so urged by the adversaries. See Vázquez Metaphysical Disputation 25, and Thomas Against the Gentiles book 2, chapters 12-14.

Corollary 1: With this doctrine of the simplicity and perfection of the essence, knowledge and volition of God having been asserted, all the things which are adduced by the adversaries against the Providence of God and the absolute, immutable, independent decree of predestination fall, together with all the profane novelties about middle knowledge, about conditioned volition, about the order of decrees, about simultaneous concourse, etc.

8. Eighth, all the other divine relations could also be objected.

Response: About the 7 relations ad intra and indeed proper, such as paternity, filiation, active spiration, procession, we have already spoken in the preceding thesis. About the relations ad intra which are common to all the persons - such as identity, similarity, equality, [Greek text] or the mutual presence of the persons among themselves (about which Rada part 1, pp. 320-321) - we say that they are relations of reason, not real, with the Thomists on Summa Theologiae I, question 42, article 1, and Capreolus on Sentences book 1, distinction 31, and Becanus treatise 2, chapter 1, question 2, §7. Although Rada subtly endeavors to defend the contrary for his Scotus, Controversy 26 over Part 1. Hence therefore no even minimal composition arises on the part of the thing. For identity is opposed to distinction and is nothing other than a transcendental relation and denomination founded on the unity of essence, denoting the habitude of the same totally undistinct from the nature of the thing to itself. And thus similarity is founded on the unity of attributes, equality on the unity of magnitude. As for relations ad extra, they are threefold; for they are either founded in God's transient actions, as creator, governor, redeemer; or in immanent ones, as predestinator; or partly in immanent actions, partly in certain attributes which necessarily belong to God from eternity, as idea - Becanus in the cited chapter, question 1, adds [Greek text] or Word, which besides the relation by which it respects the Father is also referred to creatures, about which last perhaps inquiry must be made elsewhere. We say therefore that relations ad extra founded in the actions of God precisely and formally taken are only extrinsic denominations, but not real relations in God. Therefore hence no composition. Because God the

creator, if you do not attend to termination in the creature, is nothing other than God denominated from a vital action. About idea and knowledge of simple intelligence, we say they infer nothing other than denominations; for they are nothing other than the divine essence insofar as it is knowledge of creatures, or insofar as it represents creatures in the mode of actual knowledge of them, whether future or existing. Concerning these two, namely idea and knowledge of simple intelligence, see the Scholastics on Summa Theologiae I, question 15, about ideas, and question 14, about God's knowledge.

9. Ninth, God is in all things, and all things are in God. To which pertain those monstrous statements: that God is prime matter, that man's soul is a particle of divine breath, and that God is the soul of the world; that God communicates himself to us and we are so partakers of his divine nature that men, having been deified and transformed into God, are to be said to be essentially united with him - such as occur in the fanatics and Enthusiasts, the Henric-Nicolaitans, Weigelians, etc., about whom elsewhere. Meanwhile the treatise of the most noble Lord of Mont Saint-Aldegonde against the Libertines can be consulted, and Stegmann in the 2nd appendix of his Photianism, On True Christianity, with which compare Thomas Summa Theologiae I, question 3, article 8, and Against the Gentiles book 1, chapters 17, 20, 26, 27.

Response: Let those of that type briefly take these sources of solutions, thence let them apply them to those petty reasons or rather insanities. 1. God is in all things not as an essential or integral part in the whole, or as the contained in its containing, or as a subject under its accident, or as an accident in its subject, but as a cause is present to that on which it immediately acts. God is present, I say, to all things by essence, not because he is of the essence of things or something of their essence - whether as transient or constituent matter, or as informing form, or as perfecting accident. For he is most one, alone, divided, distinct from all - which also some think can not badly be intimated in Scripture by the attribute of holiness. In addition, if he came into composition with something, that would be more perfect than God, because every composite is more perfect than the compounding parts or principles. See the special reasons in Thomas and his commentator Ferrariensis in the cited place, and Summa Theologiae I, question 8, article 1.

2. All things are in God in three ways: in his power as in an efficient cause, in his idea as in an exemplar cause, in his knowledge as in one knowing. Whence the threefold being of creatures in God: eminent, ideal, intelligible. But this whole being is objective, without any composition or commingling, just as light is in air and air in light. Augustine On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis book 4, chapter 12, and On the Trinity book 14, chapter 12; Cyril of Alexandria on John book 9, chapter 40. See further the Scholastics on Summa Theologiae I, question 18, article 4; Suárez On God book 2, chapter 2; and the commentators on Acts 17:28, 2 Peter 1:4. And the Philosophers explaining that axiom: In a certain way all things are four: God, heaven, prime matter, intellect.

3. God communicates his essence, life, goodness outside himself or ad extra in the genus of efficient, exemplar, final cause, and indeed not naturally but freely, not through essence but through grace, so that for example all things participate of his goodness and are good by it

extrinsically and causally, but by their proper goodnesses formally. Thomas Summa Theologiae I, question 7, article 4. Meanwhile they remain most distinct in individual and in species or univocal genus: the essence or goodness of God, and the essence or goodness produced in creatures to the likeness or image of the divine. But that communication of the divine essence is fivefold: 1. through creation, 2. through the grace of adoption, 3. through glory and beatitude, 4. through love and desire, 5. through incarnation - about which last we will speak presently.

9. Tenth, It could be obtained the composition of the divine nature of Christ with the human in one person. Resp. That union is called composition, just as Christ is improperly called a whole. Otherwise it would follow that the divine nature is a part of something, and from that union exists something more perfect than the divine nature itself. Thus it must be said: the person of the Logos assumed human nature, that is, he united it to himself substantially, and terminated it by his own subsistence or personality, not as a part or accident by which he is perfected; but as an adjoined or ἐνυπόστατον instrument, which he intimately bears in his person, so that he may perfect it and through it redeem man. Because therefore nothing accrued to the divine nature, nor did it coalesce with the human into some third essence, nor were the properties of both natures mixed together, nor did the person of the Logos hold himself in the mode of a perfectable potency, nor did human nature hold itself in the mode of an act perfecting the divine nature: it follows that nothing here detracts from the simplicity of God, nor is any even the least appearance of composition to be admitted. I think this solution is sufficient. The things which Becanus in Theolog. Scholastic. part. 1 tract. 1. c. 6. qu. 3. disputes with Thomas against Bonaventure, Richard, Scotus, Cajetan about the composition of the person, I do not see indeed how they agree well enough with the Metaphysical Doctrine about the Simple and composite, as well as with the opinion about the Simplicity of God asserted by Becanus himself; also how the Anabaptist and Zwinglian concepts can be detected and refuted dexterously enough by a determination of this kind. The Scotists seem to me to philosophize more accurately in Rhada on 3. controv. 3. artic. 3. Eleventh, The Socinian Moscorovius also opposes this axiom in his book on baptism against Scargam: Whatever is in God, is God, the place 1 Timothy 6:16 with Hebrews 12:27. From which he fabricates an uncreated and eternal place of God, which nevertheless is not God. Vorstius was agitating something similar, with the opinion of Steuchus Eugubinus called in for support; whose fabrication see routed by Sladus in disceptat. scholastic. part. 1. p. 50, 51, 52. Resp. We say briefly that it is mere inconsequence, and that inaccessible light is nothing other than the splendor of divine majesty and glory, that is, the infinite God himself, who is and dwells in himself. Moreover, this is a metaphorical description, such as Psalm 93:1, Isaiah 6:2, 57:15, Ezekiel 1, 10.

See the commentators on the cited places, especially Danaeus on 1 Timothy 6:16, and compare the disputations on the Immensity and illocality of God. Twelfth, God is called a whole, therefore he is not simply simple; Also, God is not an individual according to Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 5.1. Finally, God is not only in the category of substance, but also in many categories of accidents; and if there are more subtleties of this kind in the manner of Socinus and Vorstius. Resp. Dialectical novices will solve these from their compendiums, and from the book of terms or philosophical dictionary: therefore there is no reason for us to dwell on them. Meanwhile, whoever has time may see Alsted's Natural Theology, part 1, chapter 5.

10. Now we draw out Corollaries and uses from this doctrine, of which I. The simplicity of God is to be numbered among the attributes or properties of God. It is proved, because it belongs to God alone. Because it immediately follows the nature of God. Because it is distinct from other properties by a reasoned reason, or eminently. II. The unity, identity, simplicity of God is to be vindicated above all, so that we may remove from him imperfection, mutability, finitude, multitude, distinction, and composition; and we may not fall into the deliriums of the Pagans, and of the ancient heretical Valentinians, Marcionites, Manichaeans, etc., or even of the more recent Enthusiasts and Socinians. III. This doctrine, both in itself and also especially as a hypothesis and necessary foundation of the doctrine of the infinity, immutability, eternity, spirituality of the divine essence, knowledge, and will, as well as of the Trinity of persons, is to be handed down in all fidelity and reverence and plainly to practice in the churches and schools, according to the nature of the thing and the capacity of the hearers. IV. From this light is brought in especially to the sublime mystical and pious contemplation; that in the one essence of God subsist three persons, and each one possesses it whole, and one person is perpetually and inseparably in the other and with the other, and embraces, permeates (the Greek Fathers call it mutual perichoresis), possesses, loves, and glorifies it, John 1:1, 5:18, 14:10, 11, 23, and 17:21, Proverbs 8:22, 30. V. The Remonstrants err, who exempt Simplicity from the class of divine attributes; in which they approach so much nearer to the Racovian Catechism and the Socinians, as they recede farther from article 1 of the Belgic Confession, and from the common doctrine of the whole of Christianity. They do worse, in that they add pertinacity to error, and so ferociously insult the Professors of Leiden in the Censure of the Confession, as well as D. Bodecher in Socinian-Remonstrantism, when they faithfully warn them. VI. Let us think spiritually about the most simple and most perfect essence of God; let us put far away all gross and earthly concepts, all sensible images, all phantasms of the imaginative faculty; and let us feel about him what we cannot feel (as Iul. Caesar Scaliger piously says, exercit. 165, sect. 9), let us ascend by the way of negation, causality, eminence. VII. As God is most simple in essence, so also in will, promises, deeds: there is no deceit in him, no hypocrisy: Therefore let us imitate him, and strive for simplicity and sincerity: let us also stand by his words and promises and await their fulfillment with firm hope. He himself will do it, who is true in promises, and powerful in execution. Finally, let us worship God, who is spirit, with spiritual and pure worship in spirit and truth. Let us flee as far as possible from all the choreography of superstitions and vain observances, from all opus operatum. VIII. Other practical uses from the rest of the attributes of the first kind connected with simplicity can be applied here analogically or by consequence. Thus we will see that this doctrine is not merely speculative, Scholastic, metaphysical, or sterile of all confidence and piety. Arminius rightly says, Private Disputation XV, thesis 10: "These modes of supereminence, etc., considered in the life of God and the life of the faculties, have infinite usefulness in Theology, and are no small foundation of true religion." Here it should be noted that he himself also includes those attributes of God, which the Remonstrants exclude with the Socinians. So that from this you may see, how much they have receded, and led away their ignorant or imprudent hearers from the Theology of Arminius, expressed in the theses on God.

PROBLEM.

If someone says that the rational soul is composed of four elements, or is a temperament, or an animal spirit, or a breath and blast of the mouth; also that angels are animals, are stars, or separate souls; moreover that God is a body, visible, the soul of the world, the form of heaven, one with an accidental unity, or analogy, or of species only, but not truly an individual; that the divine persons are only properties of God or diverse denominations; finally that Christ the mediator is made up of one nature or two persons, etc., whether and how the truth of the dogmas can be solidly defended, and the errors just indicated can be convinced from the bare texts of scripture without applying rules of consequences, without Logical or Philosophical terms? And whether all those disputations are to be relegated as useless to the benches of the Scholastics and Philosophers? Whether the Remonstrants' ecclesiastical union and toleration would not labor over these things?

ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

Resp. ENOCHO POTTEY of Veere, Zeeland.
For the 17th of June, 1637.

The divine attributes of the first kind denote perfections in God, which are not operations, but those of the second kind perfections, which are operations. The latter are of two kinds, either which are posited in an immanent operation, which is not a production, or which are posited in an emanating operation, which is a production, whether of power or of intellect and will (for now we do not dispute whether the power of God formally is nothing other than intellect and will distinguished from them only by our reason, as Vasquez wants with Scotus and the Scotists on I, qu. 23, disp. 102, c. 3, and Suarez acknowledges this opinion as probable, Metaphysical Disputations 30, last section, and treatise on God book 3, chapter 9). The perfection of God posited in the operation of the intellect is called Knowledge, which scripture teaches belongs to God when it predicates of him voũς, that is, mind, wisdom, knowledge, intelligence, art, prudence, counsel, omniscience, Romans 11:33-34, Psalm 94:7-11, Hebrews 11:10, with Psalm 139:15, Jeremiah 10:12 and 40:28, Jeremiah 32:19, with Ephesians 1:11, John 21:17. Reasons sought from the light of nature also persuade, which see in the Philosophers in Metaphysics, and the Scholastics, especially Thomas against the Gentiles book 1, chapter 44, and in the Disputed Questions on Knowledge, article 1, and in I, qu. 14, art. 1. We, about to treat of it, will explain: I. What it is and of what kind. II. We will ventilate two principal controversies about it. III. We will subjoin an Appendix on the divine Ideas.

IN the cognition of the knowledge of God, attention must be paid especially 1. to certain distinctions, 2. to properties, 3. to doctrines and Uses, which are drawn out from this attribute. As to the first, it is distinguished in various ways, namely into Necessary and free, into of simple intelligence and of vision, into definite and indefinite, into speculative and practical, into of simple notion or apprehensive and knowledge of enunciables or judicative, into absolute and conditional or middle.

Necessary is that which precedes every act of the will in the order of nature. And by this God first, by an immediate and most necessary act, knows himself in himself and through himself. Then, all possibles, not in themselves but in his essence as their necessary cause. Moreover, this knowledge of possibles is proved from Matthew 3:9, 26:53. For if God can transform stones into men, and send Christ twelve legions of angels, then he knows he can do it; for God knows himself, and all his power. Then, if Christ according to his human nature, and John the Baptist knew this power of God, and these possibles, then much more does God. Finally, if men know what is possible for themselves or other men, then God knows what is possible for himself. Free knowledge is that by which, after the decree of his will, he knows determinately all existing things, in whatever difference of time they may be, whether present, past, or future. Of simple intelligence is the same as natural with respect to the secondary object, namely possibles; but not with respect to the first object, namely God, for this pertains to the other member of this distinction. By some it is called intuitive (according to Altenstaig in his Dictionary), and in this way God himself could be referred to its object. Of vision, by which he knows determinately himself, and all other things existing besides himself. There are, however, Scholastics who expound this more strictly: about the knowledge only of existing things, or of contingent futures. Thus, among the more recent, Becanus, Theolog. Scholast. part 1, tract. 1, c. 10, I. Arminius, Disputation on the Nature of God held in 1603, thesis 44, takes free knowledge, of vision, and foreknowledge for one. But later, in the private college, Disputation 17, thesis 9, he employs a far different and indeed quite unsuitably and dangerously an explanation of the terms. "Of simple intelligence," he says, "is that by which he understands himself, all possibles, and the nature of all beings. Of vision is that by which he sees his own existence and the existence of all other beings." It is a wonder what he means, and whence he drew such an acceptation of the terms, unless perhaps there is some error of the scribes here. For the Disputations were published by others after his death. Certainly something of this kind seems to be gathered from the next thesis. Castaneus in his Distinctions says that this of Vision is also called intuitive, with respect to which the one opposed to it (of simple intelligence) is abstractive. Certainly Indefinite and definite ought to be extended only to secondary objects, but by no means to God; the former to possibles, the latter to futures; and therefore prescience (so called) is usually properly distinguished into those two. Speculative is the knowledge of God precisely and absolutely considered according to its proper nature in itself without any adjoined act of the will, namely as it acts in itself, and not in another. Practical is that which is considered as conjoined with the will, and as it acts in another; and some call this the knowledge of good pleasure. But it is too narrowly restricted by this epithet of good pleasure. For praxis and practical can be said in two ways. (See the commentators on Thomas, I, qu. 14, art. 16.) For practical knowledge can be of things simply possible, about which there is no decree or good pleasure, as Vasquez has well observed on Thomas, loc. cit., Becanus, tract. and chapter cit., qu. 15, and Castaneus in his Distinctions, among the more recent Scholastic Jesuits. Arminius, loc. cit., makes the knowledge of simple intelligence or indefinite and his Middle knowledge practical, and therefore the cause of things, not indeed insofar as it is precisely considered in itself, but insofar as it has annexed to it a decree of the will; thus the knowledge of simple intelligence would be a cause in first and more remote act, but middle knowledge in second act proximately and properly. We concede this about the knowledge of simple intelligence, and it agrees with the common school; we deny it about Middle knowledge, and we will see below. Of simple notion, which is also apprehensive,

is the knowledge of God, according as it is a simple apprehension of things. Of enunciables, which is also judicative, is the same knowledge, according as it is an evident judgment of them.

They subdivide the former, first, into the knowledge of all things, both possible and present, past, and future, and thus it obtains the general name, namely knowledge of simple notion; secondly, more specifically into the knowledge of vision, which knows those things that coexist with any past, present, or future time; thirdly, still more specifically with respect to futures, which is called prescience. They also subdivide this according to the distinction of propositions affirmatively, negatively, de inesse [of being in], de praesenti [of the present], de praeterito [of the past], and de futuro [of the future], which they call a distinction not of things, but of names. The last distinction into the knowledge of things and the knowledge of enunciables is held by William of Auxerre, Summa, book 1, chapter 10, and Gabriel Biel on book 1, dist. 35. The Absolute and conditional or middle knowledge was thought up by the more recent Jesuits. But it is superfluous, as we will demonstrate below. To consult the juniors we give this little table.

God knows
1. Himself, first, necessarily and intuitively
2. Other things from himself
  2.1 Possibles, by natural or necessary knowledge, of simple intelligence, indefinite
    2.1.1 Precisely in itself, and abstractively from the act of the will, which is called speculative, Conjointly with the act of the divine will, which is Practical
  2.2 Existing things
    2.2.1 Commonly, future, past, present, which is Free, of vision, definite.
    Specifically, existing things, but only in the difference of future time, and is called Prescience

Therefore, to reconcile the distinctions, all prescience of God is knowledge; but not the other way around: for the knowledge by which God knows himself is not prescience. All indefinite knowledge is necessary; but not the other way around: for the knowledge by which God necessarily knows himself is not indefinite. All indefinite knowledge is natural; but not the other way around: because the natural knowledge by which God knows himself is not indefinite.

2. The properties of divine knowledge are: I. that it is one, undivided in itself, and most simple, although we distinguish it according to objects, and therefore is God himself understanding. For God, his intellect, and knowledge or his understanding, are one and the same thing, and he himself understands in one act. II. That it is first and independent; through essence, not through participation; not caused by things; on which all knowledge of creatures depends, properly not improperly: Needing no principle, no intelligible species, no revelation, no elevating light, no experience or observation; because from himself, in himself, through himself he knows all things, Isaiah 40:13-14, with Romans 11:34. III. That it is eternal. IV. That it is immutable, and consequently simultaneous, so that there is no succession in it, no before and after, no addition, no subtraction: although we conceive moments or instants of reason in it in relation to objects. V. That it is perfect, not only through apprehension, but through comprehension; through simple intuition not through discourse from the known to the unknown, immediately and intimately looking into things; not through composition and division, not through inadequate or analogical

or universal or confused or inevident concepts; because he knows things fully and most distinctly, as they are, Psalm 7:10 and 139:2-5, Jeremiah 17:10, Hebrews 4:13. VI. Necessary, determinate, and certain; even when it is concerned with things free, contingent, and most indeterminate in their nature: so that it cannot be liable to any ignorance, or error, or doubt, even through the most remote potency. VII. Actual, not in the mode of a potency or habit: so that it cannot be actuated by any idea or intelligible species, either co-eternal with itself or received from things: for he himself as the purest act is to himself idea, species, exemplar, intellection, intellect. VIII. Infinite, both intensively and extensively, that is, both in itself and by reason of the object; and so nowhere abstract, precise, so that he knows or conceives one thing, another thing not being known, for example, a subject without an accident, a whole without a part or outside a part, a universal abstractively from singulars or outside singulars: about which we have treated in our Thersites Heautontimorumenos, section 2, chapter 6. In short it is Omniscience, so that there is nothing that escapes him; God or creature, necessary or contingent, natural or free, in potency or in act, universal or singular, substance or accident, thing or mode, subject or adjunct and circumstance, cause or caused, real being or of reason, simple or complex, possible or future, excellent or vile, open and hidden, especially the thoughts of the heart, whence he is the knower of hearts, Psalm 139, Jeremiah 17, Hebrews 4, Revelation 2:23, finally evil and simply impossible, which he knows not positively and formally, but negatively and oppositely, the former through the opposite good, the latter through the opposite possible.

Corollary I. By reason of those properties, God is distinctly and comparatively called the only wise one, 1 Timothy 1:17, and the epistle of Jude, verse 25. (In the way in which in Matthew 19 he is called good, 1 Timothy 6:15-16. Powerful and having Immortality)

For all created wisdom is accidental, by participation, through another, by grace, dependent, mutable, from without and ideated, secondary, analogical, finite, imperfect, divided and manifold. II. The errors of Averroes, Avicenna, and Agasel, Mohammedan philosophers, involve blasphemy and crude anthropomorphism, of whom the former in Metaphysics book 12, text 51, denies that God understands vile things, because his intellect would become vile; the latter, as Averroes reports in the same place, denies that God knows singulars according to their existences; but the last one, in Metaphysics book 3, chapter 5, asserts that God understands singulars through universals. Add to these the errors of Cicero in On Divination book 2, and of Socinus, who deny knowledge of contingent futures, about which error we must treat below. Aristotle, whom some of the Fathers and Scholastics accuse of error here, is excused by Thomas in I, question 14, article 11, and in Against the Gentiles book 1, chapter 50, and among the more recent by Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations 30, section 15, article 40. III. God's knowledge conjoined with his will is rightly said by Augustine in On the Trinity book 6, chapter 10, and book 15, chapter 13, to be the cause of things: not because God knows them, therefore they are, but they are, because he knows them. See this opinion explained by Thomas with his followers in I, question 14, article 8. This, however, must be understood about the exemplar and remote cause: for nothing immanent in God is the proximate cause, through which things are posited in their existence; but only God's emanating or external action is the proximate cause, which being posited the thing is posited. IV. The more recent authors speak accurately, when

they attribute practical knowledge to God, indeed not of himself, but of other things, against Scotus; and when they pronounce that all other things are known by God both practically and speculatively; thus the Thomists with whom Vasquez, Suarez, Becanus agree. V. In my judgment, Vasquez, on question 14, article 16, chapter 2, rightly corrects Thomas from the principles of Thomas. Practical knowledge extends even to possibles, namely insofar as it is about the things themselves as they can be made, in the mode of a directing principle.

3. The necessity and use of this doctrine is manifold: I. for understanding the nature of God, so that right faith may be borne towards our God; for the knowledge of God is God himself knowing. Moreover, for the cognition of the doctrine of God's Providence, of predestination (which in a special way is called knowledge, 2 Timothy 2, John 10:14, Romans 11:2), of free will, the aids of grace and the mode of conversion, of Prophecy and prophets. II. It validly serves for the refutation of Epicureanism and all Atheism, Psalm 94:7-8, also of Paganism, Socinianism, etc. III. From this idolaters are also refuted, and the true God is discerned from all idols, Job 38, 39, 40, with Isaiah 42:37. Finally, the errors of the Scholastics are detected, and of the modern Papacy, as well as of the Ubiquitarians about the Knowledge of Christ's soul. IV. It serves for the reprehension and correction of the security and profanity of the wicked, who accumulate sins upon sins, Job 9:3-4, Psalm 10:11. V. For the consolation of the pious, in the labor of piety and in the worship of God, 2 Chronicles 16:9, Revelation 2:9, Malachi 3:36, Psalm 139:1-2, 6, 26:1-3, John 21:17; in calamities, injuries, dangers, persecutions, calumnies, Jeremiah 31:1-2, Exodus 3:7, Nahum 1:7, Psalm 56:9, Revelation 2:9, Romans 9:1 and 11:11, 30, Isaiah 40:13-14, 1 Thessalonians 2:10, 2 Chronicles 24:22. In the necessity and indigence of this life, Deuteronomy 2:7, with Matthew 6:31-32. VI. For exhortation and excitation, so that we may walk in fear and trembling before God, may think and ponder our ways, may attend to our thoughts, words, deeds, even the most hidden, may guard our heart, because God sees all things, his eyes are like a flame of fire, by which he illuminates all darknesses, uncovers all hidden things, Hebrews 4:13, Revelation 1:14, 2:1-2, 18, Jeremiah 16:16-17. Excellently Boethius (if I am not mistaken): "A great necessity of living well is incumbent upon us, who do all things before the eyes of God."

4. Now the controversy about the knowledge of contingent futures must be examined. Among the Gentiles, Cicero in On Divination book 2 denied it, led by this reason, that otherwise contingencies would be taken away. Among the ancient heretics, Theophronius, according to Solomeus, Ecclesiastical History book 7, chapter 17, and Nicetas Choniates in Treasury book 5, chapter 36, and the Gnostics according to Irenaeus book 1, chapter 5. See the writers on heresies, Epiphanius, Augustine, etc. Socinus denies the same thing in Theological Lectures, chapters 8, 9, 10, 11, so that he may defend his Pagan-Pelagianism so much the more easily. Although the Remonstrants do not dare to profess Socinian-Paganism here openly, it is easily gathered that they do not so shrink from it, if indeed they were permitted to enjoy their own sense through their hearers and worldly-political reasons. Episcopius in his Theses says that it seems to be attributed to God everywhere in the scriptures. In addition, he permits it to be investigated, whether it is necessary to know, in order that God may be worshipped, that this knowledge belongs to God. The Remonstrants defend and praise both of these things in him in their Apology, chapter 2, page 44. Hence also, in the Vindications, or Polyglot Voet book 1,

chapter 9, page 54, they intimate that it cannot be proved that the prescience of all ἐσομένων καὶ μελλόντων [things that will be and things that are about to be] is necessary to know and believe, in order that God may be worshipped. The same Episcopius in the Epistolary Disceptation on the Limit of Life, page 81, makes a tumult in the same way for Socinus, asserting: "By that opinion of Socinus, it can occur to many great difficulties concerning divine providence, etc. The Socinians do not deny such prescience because they want to diminish the divine perfection in any way, but only because they believe contingent futures to be such that they cannot be known; therefore no more is detracted from divine knowledge, if God is said to be ignorant of those things which are not knowable, than divine omnipotence is detracted from, if God is said not to be able to do what is not possible, or what implies a contradiction." Finally, "This controversy is involved in so many and such great intricacies of difficulties, that a thirteenth labor of Hercules is required to evolve it, and unless the irrefragable authority of divine predictions stood in the way of all reasons, the denying part would almost seem to preponderate."

5. We overthrow this monstrous opinion, abhorrent from all natural Theology equally and Christian piety, by these arguments. The first is from the open testimonies of scripture, Psalm 139:2-6, 19, Ephesians 1:11, Acts 15:18 and 2:23 and 4:28, 1 Peter 1:2, Romans 8:29, Isaiah 46:10. The second is from those places where God is said to know all things, 1 John 3:20, John 21:17, Hebrews 4:12-13, Daniel 2:22. Moreover, among all those things are also contingent futures; for it is specially asserted about the hearts of men producing contingent things by their free choice, Proverbs 15:11. The third is from predictions and prophecies, to which God appeals above all, and by which he discerns himself from false Gods, Isaiah 46:10. Hence Tertullian neatly says in Against Marcion book 2: "Prescience has as many witnesses as it has made prophets." Consider all prophecies, especially of Daniel and Jeremiah, in which the vicissitudes and eversions of kingdoms and peoples (where there is such a farrago of contingent and free actions) are foretold. Similarly, the predictions about errors, sins, Anti-Christianism, Matthew 24, 2 Thessalonians 2, 2 Timothy 3, 2 Peter 3, etc. The fourth is: Because the knowledge of God is most perfect, immutable, free from succession, increase, eternal, one and most simple; therefore it is concerned with all present, past, future things by an equal and one and the same act. For no difference of time, which some thing connotes, excludes the knowledge of God; for all things are present to God, although in creatures or in the things known they connote a difference of past or future time; however, the knowledge of God does not receive such a connotation, which is not subject to time, but is above all time, and is concerned with time. Fifth, because the Blessedness, self-sufficiency, majesty, glory and excellence of God, and his wisdom, of which there is no searching out (Romans 11:33-34, Isaiah 40:14, Job 41:2, 1 Corinthians 2:19) requires the knowledge of futures. For in what would he excel super-eminently, if not in this part? especially since such knowledge is some excellent perfection, and men are borne by natural appetite to it, and admire the least particle of it in men; but every perfection belongs to God either formally or eminently. Sixth, from the decrees of God: whatever God decreed before they were made and from eternity, those things he also foreknows; but he decreed contingent futures, Acts 2:23, 4:28. Seventh, from the providence and governance of God, by which God provides for all the affairs and actions of men; he also prevents the attempts of evil men, meets their counsels and thoughts; therefore he has all those

things perceived beforehand. The antecedent is proved by many testimonies of scripture, see in common places about Providence. Eighth, because God knows every entity and truth; but there is some entity and truth of contingent futures, Therefore. We proved the antecedent at length in our Dissertation on the Limit of Life, argument 12, pages 269, 270, 271, 272, edition in quarto. Finally, there is added the consensus of the Fathers, above all of Augustine in The City of God book 5, chapter 9, where he disputes against Cicero, who, as Augustine says, in order to make men free, made them sacrilegious: "For to confess that God exists, and to deny that he is prescient of futures, is the most manifest insanity." There read, if you please, a most elegant disputation, and you will see, either that Socinus χριστιανίζειν [Christianizes], or that the pagan Cicero sophisticates σωκρατίζειν [Socratizes] for his Helen of free will. Of the same opinion with Augustine are the other fathers, among whom the leading men who opposed the Pelagian heresy, such as Hilary, Prosper, Fulgentius, Gregory the Great, and those who asserted the Providence of God, Theodorus, Chrysostom, Salvian, etc. Finally, all who defended the Christian Religion against the Gentiles, and who either expressly or on occasion discoursed about true and false predictions. To the Fathers we add all the Scholastics on book 1, distinction 35, and on Thomas I, question 14, and all the more recent Pontifical, Augsburg Confession, and Reformed Theologians. From the pagans could be added Proclus on the First Alcibiades of Plato, Simplicius on Physics book 8, text 408, and other Greek and Latin Philosophers, whose sayings collected see in Plessis, On the Truth of the Christian Religion, Steuchus Eugubinus, On Perennial Philosophy book 6, chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10.

Consectary I. Coccius, Treasury of Catholic Doctrine book 1, article 1, page 1, imputes to the Lollards (that is, to the pious Waldensians) and indeed on the faith of Trithemius in the Chronicle of Hirschau for the year 1315, that they taught that God neither knows nor punishes evils which happen under the earth; whence they committed many abominable and unspeakable things in caves and underground caverns. Resp. But, O good Coccius, is the witness of one historian, whom we have amply proved to have been an infamous Magician and Teacher of Magic in The Desperate Cause of the Papacy book 1, section 4, sufficient for Punic and Papistic faith against innocent men? and your own now are compelled to confess this, especially Delrio, Bellarmine, etc. Besides which, he was their sworn adversary, and a rigid Papist. In addition, the innocent faith and life of those men has been more than sufficiently vindicated from those and other heresies and crimes by the testimonies of Papists themselves. As we showed in The Desperate Cause of the Papacy book 3, section 2, chapter 9. II. It is the customary trustworthiness, candor, conscience and charity of the Remonstrants, that they themselves, suspected too much of Socinianism, in order to avoid odium and throw dust in the eyes of men, dared to reproach our Church, as it strenuously labored and fought for God's prescience, with denying the prescience of contingent futures, in the Apology chapter 2, folio 43, in Episcopius' Dissertation on the Limit of Life, page 72. These games and arts of theirs seem to me not unlike Richeome the Jesuit's Huguonot Pantheon Detected, that is, the treatise on Huguonot Idolatry. III. Although the Remonstrants want to seem not yet to have cast away all orthodox faith about the Prescience of futures, nevertheless, when they dispute the defense of this truth to be so difficult, the reasons of Socinus to be so urgent, this doctrine to be so little necessary, and that sandy foundation about the infinity of divine knowledge to be removed only by the doctrine of predetermination and the decree of the divine will either to operate or to permit: no one does not see what must

be decided about that faith (or simulation?) of the times. When they have declared themselves otherwise with the whole of Christendom against Socinus, we will not further deal with those presumptions.

6. The narrowness of the paper does not allow us to solve the petty reasons of Socinus adduced in the Lectures, cited place; nor is it even necessary, if anyone has only greeted the common places of Theology from the threshold. We have, as I think, sufficiently overthrown the chief argument about the indeterminate truth of contingent futures, and the other Rhetorical amplification of Socinianism, about contingency, liberty, etc. having been taken away, in the dissertation on the Limit of Life. If anyone desires to see someone expressly following in the footsteps of Socinus, and laboriously and solidly refuting his arguments, let him read the Refutation of the Lectures of Socinus by John Junius, on chapters 8, 9, 10, 11.

7. The other principal controversy remains to be examined, about the knowledge which they call middle or conditioned of contingent futures, which they define to be: "Knowledge by which God knew from eternity, not absolutely, but under a condition, what men and angels would do, according to their liberty, if they were placed with these or those circumstances, in such or such an order of things." Moreover, the conditional Doctors disagree among themselves whether this knowledge is to be reduced to indefinite or to definite knowledge. Likewise, whether its object is all conditioned futures, even those which depend on natural causes, or only those conditioned things which depend on free will, as can be seen in Becanus, cited chapter, question 1. If you desire to know the origin of this profane novelty and evanescent speculation, unknown to all antiquity, to all the schools of Theologians, take it thus. After the rise of that novel sect of the Jesuits, there was a great contention everywhere between it and the rest of the Clerics, both secular and regular. The Jesuits went about diminishing the authority of others everywhere, especially of the Dominicans, just as Carthage, the rival of the Roman empire, did. Hence plausible pretexts were sought, all plausible occasions were seized. Among others, they thought that the celebrated controversies about the Conception of Mary, and about the concurrence of grace and free will would especially further their cause, where indeed they hoped that the applause of the greatest part, both of the clerics and of the laity, would not be wanting to them. Those disputations about grace and free will (about the Conception of Mary we must speak elsewhere) were first condemned in Louvain in Leonard Lessius for Pelagianism or Semi-Pelagianism by the Theologians of Louvain and Douay, then also by the Belgian Bishops: about which the Jesuits complain in The Image of the First Century, book 6, page 847, where see. Afterwards, between the Jesuits and Dominicans in Spain they burned so greatly, while the former objected that free will had been taken away and syncretism with the Lutherans and Calvinists to the Dominicans, the Dominicans in turn objected Pelagianism to the Jesuits, that a quadrennial silence was imposed on them by the Pope and the highest Inquisitor of heresy, which could scarcely be dissolved, except under that condition, that they should have the power of disputing and writing about that controversy, without disparagement and censure of the other opinion, as Vasquez reports in the dedicatory preface to his Commentary on Thomas. About that Tragedy, Pierre Matthieu, the French historian, reports some things in book 7, narration 4, paragraph 3. The Jesuits, lest they should seem openly to declare war on Augustine and Thomas with their followers, or to syncretize with the Pelagians, devised the Middle Knowledge,

which up to this day is the asylum of all the Pelagianizers. Some make Fonseca the first author of that νεωτερισμός [novelty], others Molina. Certainly each one boasts about it; and in my judgment, with some distinction applied, the name of each one could be consecrated to eternity in a new edition of Polydore on The Inventors of Things, or Pancirollus on New Discoveries; or if you prefer, in new catalogues of heresies, if they are ever reprinted with some addition, namely Medina, Alphonsus de Castro, Prateolus, Lutzenburger. The matter stands thus: Fonseca in the year 1566 had proposed that way of reconciling free will with grace in public lectures and dictates, and had also communicated his conceptions word for word with his hearers (as he testifies in his commentary on Metaphysics book 6, chapter 2, question 4, section 8), but on account of the appearance of novelty he had published nothing in print before the year 1596, when he published the third volume of his Metaphysical Commentaries. Luis de Molina first brought to light that ursine fetus of Fonseca, perfected by licking and gradually softened (as Fonseca says), in the treatise On the Concord of Free Will and Grace, first published in 1588, then in an enlarged repeated edition in 1595 at Antwerp by Trognaesius in quarto, and in his commentary on I, question 13, where he also expressly professes that this way of reconciling has hitherto been handed down by no one whom he has seen. Where he wants to seem to give hard words, he does not even mention Fonseca. Let us therefore grant that they fabricated this invention driven by the same spirit, although neither knew anything about the conceptions of the other. Francis Suarez followed them, on III, question 1, but especially in a peculiar treatise which was first published among his Theological Opuscula in quarto and separately, then in folio with all his other works. And he, with the contorted and all-torturing subtlety of his genius, promoted this novelty not a little. Nor did Vasquez, after him, comment on I, question 14, or Mendoza in his Quodlibets, recede from their footsteps any less. From whose footsteps many others of that order and ilk, such as Becanus in his Scholastic Theology, Lorinus, and Lapide everywhere in their commentaries, with the Professors of Cologne, Mainz, Ingolstadt, etc., did not recede. They say many things, especially that the series of predestination cannot be perceived without that knowledge. Lorinus in his commentary on Wisdom 4, page 115, and on chapter 11, verse 18, where, however, using the word "it seems," he betrays his own doubt. Molina, On the Concord etc., disputation 53, member 1. But the genuine followers of Thomas keenly opposed it, among them the Dominicans Bañez, Alvarez, Rispolis, etc., and the Doctors of Douay. Among whom Francis Sylvius published Spiritual Sentences in 12mo, and the treatise On the Motion of the Prime Mover in quarto, doing this so that he might overwhelm that novelty by the catholic consensus of the ancient fathers, Scholastics, and more recent authors, and defend the opinion of Augustine and Thomas (that is, of the Catholic Church, as he says). Among other things, in the treatise On Motion part 2, article 9, after recounting these haughty words of Molina: "But if this way of reconciling had always been given and explained, perhaps neither would the Pelagian heresy have arisen, nor would the Lutherans have so impudently dared to deny the liberty of the will, etc., nor from the opinion and disputations of Augustine with the Pelagians would so many of the faithful have been disturbed, have defected to the Pelagians, etc.," he exclaims thus: "Molina therefore thinks that he is the first inventor of that middle knowledge and best way of reconciling the liberty of man with the grace of God, which, since it escaped those holy men Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose, Gregory, Chrysostom, was detected by Molina alone, as if indeed he were either more learned or more holy than those holy fathers. Was not Augustine, given to the Church peculiarly as a Doctor, and stirred up as a

hammer of the Pelagians, as perspicacious as Molina?" etc. That discovery of the Jesuits, scarcely known in Batavia because of its novelty, not to mention examined, seemed most convenient to our Remonstrants for fortifying those insipid and senseless platitudes of Castellio, Coornhert, Coolhaes, Wigger and the like against the grace of God and predestination. Hence Arminius, cited place, intimates this middle knowledge, but only in general terms. After him, Vorstius, in his book on God, in the notes to Disputation 5, page 217, who however on page 253 seems to change Molina's opinion about middle knowledge, and to substitute another opinion not better, pages 253-254. But he involves this matter, either he does not understand himself, or he does not want to be understood. See what he then noted about discourse, conjecture of futures, succession of knowledge, and division through various concepts in him, in Trigland's Judgment page 34, 39, and Hypocrisy page 44, 75. Afterwards Grevinchovius more openly defended this middle knowledge, and applied it to the Five Articles controversy in that unhappy writing against Ames from some things excerpted, as it seems, from the Theological Opuscula of Suarez, although scarcely sufficiently understood or digested. When Ames had reduced him to silence by his most learned response, the Remonstrants nevertheless did not cease to serve up the same old cabbage in their Anti-Synodical writings. Ames routed that last battle line, in his Animadversions on Grace, chapter 5. After whom, however, Episcopius brought back that trodden and exploded invention in his epistle on the Limit of Life. But see against him the disputants on the Limit of Life, published in quarto by the Most Illustrious Beverović.

Consectary I. The ultimate analysis of the Neo-Pelagianism of the Jesuits and Remonstrants is: into that new and fabricated distinction of middle knowledge. From which let the Reader judge by what right they object to our Churches novelties, to those philosophical and scholastic distinctions in this doctrine. II. It is also clear, how great is the unskillfulness of the Papistic sect, when, reproaching us with such absurd opinions, and with such manifold dissension about Predestination and the grace of God, it does not cease to boast of its ancient Catholicism and complete consensus.

8. We have on purpose refuted middle knowledge in the Dissertation on the Limit of Life, argument 15, page 275, edition in quarto, where we showed that it is nothing except purely indefinite or of simple intelligence. Here we briefly oppose those reasons. First, the conditions which are appended, so that it may be called the knowledge of conditionals, either are future, or not. If the former, they are now the object of the knowledge of vision; if the latter, they are now the object of the knowledge of simple intelligence. Therefore, there is no middle knowledge. Second, all things are absolutely preordained by God, and depend on his will. Therefore, independently of the knowledge of conditionals he decreed them; for he also ordained the conditional free causes themselves as the effect of his providence. Which must be proved by many testimonies of scripture, by the consensus of antiquity (especially Ambrose, On Duties book 1, chapter 13, Chrysostom, On Providence book 6, Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter book 5, chapter 22, Homily 23 out of 50, Enchiridion chapter 98, The City of God book 5, chapters 9, 11, and book 7, chapter 9, Prosper, On the Call of the Gentiles book 1, chapter 14), of the Scholastics (Thomas in I, questions 22 and 116, and On Truth question 5, and Against the Gentiles book 3, chapters 17, 64, 76, 97, 28, 102), in the common place on the Providence of God. If anyone excepts that there is some conditioned will of God, he will attempt

to prove an absurdity by a much more obscure and absurd argument. See that fabricated will removed from the perfection of God and other arguments against middle knowledge in the Dissertation on the Limit of Life, pages 276, 277, 278, 279. I see almost no other reasons for middle knowledge adduced from scripture than from Matthew 11:21, 1 Samuel 23; thus Suarez, Becanus, Vorstius, the Remonstrants. To which Ames responded against Grevinchovius, and against the Anti-Synodalia, cited place. Becanus, cited chapter, question 5, adds that among the fathers there is frequent question, why God created the angels and first parents, and imposed a precept on them, when he knew they would sin; that the same fathers often teach that God snatches the just from this world, because he foresees that they would sin, if they lived longer. Hence therefore that conditioned knowledge is drawn out. R. It follows from this that those enunciable truths are known by God, for example: If Titius or Maevius were surrounded without the special help of my subsequent or second grace by such and so great a malice of men and temptation of Satan, he would certainly be seduced. Which enunciation is reduced to this: Every man, even Titius, without special help, etc., would necessarily be seduced by so great a malice; this proposition says, not what would determinately be future, but what would absolutely be possible, or what the consequence of things is. Therefore, middle knowledge is no more evinced from this than from these: If a man discourses he is rational, or, he who uses discourse is rational. And: If Peter is totally deserted by God, he will totally fall from grace, which is the same as that: Peter, totally deserted by God, falls from grace. And this is contained: Every believer totally deserted by God falls from grace. With equal absurdity someone may elicit middle knowledge from Galatians 1:8: "But even if we or an angel from heaven should preach to you a gospel contrary to the one we preached to you, let him be accursed." And from John 8:55: "If I said that I do not know him, I would be like you, a liar."

Consectary. Vasquez on I, question 14, article 13, disputation 65, chapters 1-4, Becanus, cited chapter, questions 6-11, deny that God certainly foreknows contingent futures in the decree of his will except remotely; but they seek certainty both from the infinite power and perspicacity of the divine intellect, and from the determinate truth of contingent futures; whence they say that it proximately arises. It is necessary that they be reduced to this at last, that either with their modern allies Catharinus, Jansen and others (whom Suarez designates, Opusculum on Knowledge chapter 1) they make this knowledge conjectural, since no determinate truth of those futures can be imagined before the act of the divine will; or against the common doctrine of Augustine and the Scholastics they may assert that God certainly knows something because it is future, and consequently that future things are the causes of the knowledge of God. But these things are discussed more fully and on purpose in the next disputation, which is on middle knowledge. Rivet can be read in the epistolary dissertation on the Limit of Life, especially in The Orthodox Catholic, volume 2, page 340, edition in quarto.

On the Ideas in God

1. IT is clear that Ideas are attributed to God, and that they are treated by the Theologians from Augustine, volume 4, Eighty-Three Questions, question 46, and On Genesis according to the Letter book 5, chapters 13-14, and epistle 115, and The City of God book 11, chapters 10-11, and book 12, chapter 26; Justin Martyr, Hortatory Address to the Greeks; Clement of

Alexandria, Stromata book 5; Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, On the Divine Names chapter 5; Ambrose, Hexaemeron book 1, chapter 2; Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy book 3, meter 9 (where the commentaries of Thomas are to be seen); Bernard, in his epistle On the Solitary Life to the brothers of Mont-Dieu; Anselm, Monologion chapter 5; all the Scholastics on Lombard's Sentences book 1, distinction 25, where among and above all others Bonaventure, and on Thomas I, question 15; and our Theologians Daneau on Lombard's Sentences book 1, distinction 35, and in Christian Physics part 1, page 48, edition in octavo; Zanchi, On God book 3, question 2, chapter 3; Polanus, Syntagma book 5; Alsted, Natural Theology part 1, chapter 16; Ames, in his Marrow; and others. To whom add the Christian Philosophers and Metaphysicians, and with them Scaliger, Exercitation 29. From the philologists Rhodiginus, Ancient Readings book 16, chapter 17; Luis Vives on Augustine's City of God, cited place. Gabriel Buratellus wrote a prolix and peculiar treatise On the Ideas, but a copy of it has not yet fallen to me.

2. An Idea in general can be described as a form imitable by an agent through the intellect, or (as Biel on Sentences book 2, last distinction) "It is an exemplar to which an agent looking through the intellect produces the ideated thing." Durand: "It is the reason of a thing existing objectively in the intellect, to the imitation of which something is producible." Thomas, On Truth question 3, article 1: "It is a form, which something imitates from the intention of the agent prestating an end to himself." Bonaventure, cited place: "It is a similitude of a thing, through which a thing is known and produced." Synonyms are, especially if it is understood of divine ideas, reasons, forms, similitudes, wisdom, effective powers, primordial causes, conditions, speculations, exemplars, species, thoughts, natures, quiddities, etc. For the nature of an idea three conditions are required: 1. that it be a form set before the intellect, to the similitude of which a thing is produced ad extra; 2. that that similitude of the thing ad extra be from the intention of the one operating himself; 3. that the effect produced be intended by the particular agent. For when a horse produces a horse similar to itself, there is no idea in the producing horse. Moreover, it can be either really in the intellect, or objectively. It is distinguished from the exemplar, in that the latter either broadly denotes every imitable form, or strictly an external form set before the senses; but the idea denotes only an internal form. Moreover, such an idea is necessary for every intellectual agent: about which see the Philosophers on Metaphysics book 7, chapter 8, and Nicomachean Ethics book 1, chapter 6, and on Porphyry's Isagoge. The Metaphysicians everywhere, where they treat of Causes. The Platonists on the Parmenides or dialogue on Ideas. Moreover, ideas are either in God, or in a created rational agent, namely an angel or man. The term "divine idea" is ambiguous, for it is said either appropriately and personally of the second person, namely the Son, or properly and essentially of the whole trinity. In the former way it is said of the Son, because all things were made through him, as through the exemplar and idea of creatures. See Thomas, Against the Gentiles book 4, chapter 13, Augustine, The City of God book 11, chapter 29, Vasquez on I, disputation 176, sections 40, 46, 47. In the latter way it is properly and as such said of the triune God. Because ideas properly and immediately are in the divine essence as such, and in the divine intellect as understanding. But the essence, intellect, understanding are common and essential to the three persons. In addition, to be a cause through the intellect belongs to God by reason of the essence, which is common to the three persons. But in the perfect nature of a cause ideas are included.

Therefore. Finally, the things which God works ad extra are of the one God, insofar as he has one essence. But this is common to the three persons. Therefore. Augustine, cited place, defines the ideas in God properly accepted as "principal forms or stable reasons of things, which are not themselves formed, and for this reason are eternal and always hold themselves in the same mode, which are contained in the divine intelligence." Theodoret, Cure of Greek Afflictions, sermon 4, explains them as νοητὸν παράδειγμα, intellectual exemplar. Albert the Great, in his exposition of the Celestial Hierarchy of the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite calls them a "divine ray." Ditus and Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names book 4: "the eternal exemplar always present to God, to which God looking, contrived and fabricated all things which are." Now the more recent Scholastics commonly define that an Idea is nothing other than "the divine essence, insofar as it is a cognition of creatures or insofar as it represents creatures in the mode of an actual cognition or expressed species." Thus Becanus, treatise 1, chapter 10, question 8. Scotus, on Sentences book 1, distinction 35, single question: "An idea is an eternal and incommunicable reason in the divine mind, according to which something is formable outside, as according to its proper reason." Fonseca, Metaphysics book 7, chapter 8, question 2, section 6: "It is a circumscribed formal concept, or a peculiar formal reason of each thing makeable by God existing in the divine mind." Polanus describes them thus: "Ideas are forms existing in the divine mind, which created things imitate from the intention of God the creator determining an end to himself." Alstedius: "It is a formal concept, or a peculiar formal reason of each thing makeable existing in the divine mind." To understand the divine Idea, let us conceive it as a relation in God (for it is an exemplar, and every exemplar is a relation), whose correlate is the ideated thing, which are all things besides God, namely makeables. The subject (if it may be allowed to speak thus) is God himself, for ideas are in God; and indeed not as he is conceived as essence, but as intellect, or essence understanding. Its foundation is the imitability of God, or of the perfections of God, which are either formally or eminently in him. Its end, which here has the nature of form or formal, is that it be a principle of knowing and producing. Furthermore, these proper attributes, enunciated about the divine Ideas partly negatively, partly affirmatively, are to be noted: I. That they are necessarily to be posited in the nature of things, even in God himself. Scotus proves this briefly in Sentences book 1, distinction 35: "God causes, or can cause all things rationally; therefore he has a reason according to which he forms; but not the same of all things; therefore he forms singulars by their proper reasons. But not by reasons outside himself, because in effecting he does not need anything other than himself; therefore by reasons in his own mind." Alexander of Hales, on Metaphysics book 7, text 44, thus proves: "God is the efficient cause of all things, either in the mode of art or in the mode of nature. Not the latter, because thus God would necessarily produce ad extra. Therefore the former, that is, in the mode of art. But every efficient in the mode of art requires an exemplar to which it looks and operates. For since the agent is not determined by a natural form to produce this rather than that, it is necessary that it be determined by something else; but that is the exemplar or idea." The Scholastics commonly, and concisely, from them Capullus, propose four causes from Augustine why ideas are posited: 1. because of the reasons of participating; 2. because of the reasons of acting; 3. because of the reasons of assimilating; 4. because of the reasons of knowing. II. That they are in God himself, not outside God (which Plato with his followers wanted not obscurely); indeed not formally, or subjectively, as the form of a seal in wax, but virtually. III. That they are eternal and immutable. IV. That they are not the things

themselves to be produced by God, insofar as they are set before the divine intellect, as Scotus, Durandus, Ockham, Gabriel Biel wanted, who cites Gerson, On the Spiritual Life of the Soul, lecture 2, that is, they do not have the nature of an object, in which as in a known image creatures are known; but they are the cognition itself of creatures, or an expressed species formally representing them. V. That they are effective causes of things, and indeed simply first and principal in their kind. VI. That the essence of God, as it precedes by our consideration every act of the intellect, is not an idea, but as it is a cognition and as it were an expressed similitude of creatures; against Bassolis, Richard and some of the more recent. VII. That not every knowledge or cognition of God is to be called an idea, because the knowledge of vision, by which God knows future things, does not have the nature of an idea, for it is considered as purely speculative; but the idea pertains to practical knowledge, and is the formal reason itself of the creature existing in the divine mind, insofar as it is looked upon by him as to be imitated or imitable in acting. Which is clear from the definitions brought forward above. VIII. That some divide ideas badly and very improperly into speculative and practical; since all are practical, as being of makeable things. IX. Ideas only represent things as to their possible being, and the mode in which they can be made. Therefore, they do not represent things in future being or their futurity and existence; except as possible, and the mode as it can be posited in being in exercised act. This is the reason, because they precede in a sign of reason every act of the divine will, or every decree; but without it there is no futurity of things. X. The distinction into ideas in act and in potency can be rightly explained; just as a cause is distinguished into act and potency. XI. Simply impossible things and evils of fault, privations, for example shadows, death, etc., do not have ideas in God; which see explained not only by theologians, but also by Alcinous in his book On the Doctrine of Plato, chapter 9. XII. All ideas in God are one, and really the same with God; nor can they be really distinguished in God himself, since they say nothing other than the divine concept or God knowing with a relation of passive imitation, and with the foundation or reason of founding such a relation. However, they can be distinguished, by a reasoned reason, and eminently, namely in order to distinct ideated things or makeables, as we said in the Disputation on the Simplicity of God. XIII. The ideas in God and in themselves can neither be understood nor investigated by us, nor ought they. About these and other Theorems, the Scholastics dispute laboriously above cited and Thomas in his Disputed Questions, peculiar treatise. From the more recent Suarez in his Metaphysics, on the exemplar cause; Meurisse in Scotistic Metaphysics book 1, questions 16-17; Vasquez on I, question 15; Fonseca in Metaphysics, cited place; Rada part 1, controversy 29; and Peter Capullus in his commentaries on Bonaventure's Sentences book 1, distinction 35, who seems to me to have explained all questions minutely and learnedly above all others.

3. To this truth about the Ideas in the divine mind are opposed the so-called Platonic Ideas, which are said to be universal natures not only abstracted from singulars by the mind, but also really and in very act separated, and existing apart. Which he says are invisible, incorporeal, supermundane (as Tertullian says, On the Soul chapter 18), perpetual and immobile, participated by individuals, do not exist in the individuals themselves, and are the common or universal natures of the individuals themselves. Hence the Platonists say there is αὐτοαγαθὸν, αὐτοαλήθειαν [the good itself, the truth itself], the universal, that is, and the highest good, in which beatitude would consist, as also about the ideas alone he said there is knowledge; and

the ideas are truths, but the things themselves only images of the ideas. Aristotle everywhere refuted this opinion of Plato, especially in Metaphysics book 1, chapters 6 and 7, and book 7, chapter 14, and book 13, chapter 5, and Nicomachean Ethics book 1, chapter 6. However, many praise his opinion, and take it of the ideas in the divine mind. Augustine, in 83 Questions already cited, and The City of God book 12, chapter 26, and book 7, chapter 28, and Retractions book 1, chapter 3, epistle 58, 56; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata books 4 and 5; Eusebius, Preparation of the Gospel book 11, chapter 1; Plutarch, On the Opinions of the Philosophers book 1, chapter 10; Laertius, Life of Plato; Apuleius, On the Dogmas of Plato; Seneca, epistles 58, 65, 66 to Lucilius; Alcinous, On the Doctrine of Plato chapter 9; Eustratius and Simplicius in Thomas, On the Government of Princes book 4, chapter 4; Philo and Plotinus in Eugubinus book 1, chapter 12; Stobaeus, Physical Selections chapter 12; Scotus, Sentences book 1, distinction 35, single question; Francis of Meyronnes, Sentences book 1, distinction 45; and Pico in On the Examination of Vanities book 6, chapter 1; and the supporters of Platonic Philosophy Ficino, Bessarion, Petrus Crinitus, Sebastian Fox, Piccolomini, etc. From the more recent, the otherwise not Platonists but Aristotelians Peter Capullus, Franciscan Bishop of Conversano, in his commentaries on Bonaventure's Sentences book 1, distinction 35, question 1, point 1; and Meurisse, Scotistic Metaphysics book 1, question 16, conclusion 2. To whom may be added Lipsius, a follower of Stoic philosophy, Physical Selections of the Stoics book 2, dissertation 3. We to the contrary, led by no vain reasons, assert that Plato by no means handed down that true Theology which they ascribe to him, but rather that which Aristotle impugns in him. Reason 1: because, whatever he may declaim in his way about the eternity, separateness and excellence of the ideas, he nevertheless makes them common natures and essences really distinct from God and from individual creatures. In Republic book 6, where he disputes about the idea of the good, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν [which I said, and the beautiful itself and the good itself]. In the Timaeus he attributes ideas to the mind, and assigns them to gods and men, so that they are something common to God and certain men. In the 7th epistle, to the friends of Dion, he says that the idea is an intellective power implanted in men. The same, in the Parmenides, distinguishes the one through these three: sensibles, intelligibles or ideas, and that which is above those ideas, namely God. Which mind of his teacher Marsilio Ficino thus explains in the argument which he prefixed to that dialogue. II. Because it is not credible that Aristotle so perverted Plato's mind, since he had heard him for 20 years, and the disciples of Plato were living, who would have vindicated their teacher from calumny. III. Because they so take his mind and side with Aristotle: Justin Martyr, Hortatory Address to the Greeks, almost at the end; Tertullian, On the Soul chapter 18; Irenaeus, Against Heresies book 2, chapter 19; Ambrose, Hexaemeron book 2, chapter 2; Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 33, and there Elias of Crete; Cyril, Against Julian book 2; Thomas I, question 6, article 4, and elsewhere, as well as Alexander, Averroes, and the other commentators of Aristotle. So also the more recent commentators on the cited places of Aristotle, all of whom to indicate by name would not be worth the trouble. IV. The Platonists themselves, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, and others whom Proclus followed do not so explain Plato that he agrees with our Theology, as Ficino confesses in his commentary on Dionysius, On the Divine Names chapter 5. V. Theodoret otherwise explains Plato, at least thinks that nothing certain is to be established from him, Cure of Greek Afflictions, sermon 4, page 94. And thus the more recent Platonists fluctuate, while some explain the idea as a logical genus, thus Ramus, Scholastic Logic book 3, chapters 2, 6,

7; others as a cause: so that they contend that with Plato ἰδέα and αἴτιον [idea and cause] are plainly synonymous, thus Serranus, argument to the Parmenides. VI. Most of the more recent Peripatetics accede in the controversy about Universals, and in their commentaries on the cited places of Aristotle.

Consectary I. By Roman Papistic faith, the Council of Constance, session 16, refers among the errors of Wycliffe and Hus that they denied the ideas or ideal being of creatures in God, and therefore said that these propositions are true without qualification: Every creature is God, and anything is God. The ecclesiastical historians and the writers on the succession of doctrine and the church, and on the witnesses of the truth, indicated elsewhere, are to be consulted about the doctrine of Wycliffe and Hus. If they conceded any phrase or thesis with a limitation or in a certain respect, it would be unfair to take it absolutely and twist it into a heresy. They ought to have thought that the way of speaking of Anselm, Thomas, and other Scholastics, by which they asserted that ideas are creatures objectively in God, should first be corrected. Second, the Aeons of Valentinus and the genealogy of the Gnostics are opposed to the ideas, which arose partly from the Platonic ideas (according to Tertullian, cited place), partly from the theogony of Hesiod. Third, the Sephiroth of the Cabalists and Rabbis: about which see the previous disputation on the simplicity of God.

THE controversy about middle knowledge, of which we then gave only a taste to our students, was expressly and learnedly treated some years later by one of the disciples, and proposed to be aired in a public disputation under our presidency. It seemed good to insert that Diatribe here, both to serve συζητήσεσι [joint inquiries], and so that from this the exceptional progress of some of our disciples beyond their age in theological matters might be evident.

ON THE CONDITIONED OR MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE IN GOD, FIRST SECTION.

by the Author and Respondent MATTHIAS NETHENUS of Rees,
For the 9th of December, 1643,
Examining the middle opinion of some after forming the state of the controversy.

1. WE have purged the divine will from the soot of Conditioned Decrees, by which the whitewashers of the Pelagian heresy were trying to befoul it; and that according to the faculty and grace which our Creator and Lord had granted to us, his unworthy servants. It is now pleasing, with the same grace of his inspiring, to proceed in the patronage undertaken of so good a cause and to show the most wise intellect of the Creator of the universe free from the monstrous or prodigious foulness of conditioned knowledge. Moreover, what I previously warned in general about those three controversies, which we undertook to examine in these disputations, that almost all the other tenets of the Hypotheticals depend on them, this must be

understood especially about this knowledge, the last refuge of the whole hypothetical cause, which is supposed by its defenders as a necessary foundation for declaring the whole mystery of divine predestination and the efficacy of divine grace in infallibly procuring the entire salvation of sinful man with respect to the beginning, middle and end. The Most Illustrious Twisse also shows this more fully in the preface to his dissertation on middle knowledge. This controversy is recent and not agitated in the ancient books and Theological commentaries of the Fathers, Scholastics or Philosophers; but a few years ago it was first moved in the University of Salamanca by the posterity of Loyola, the architects of lies and primary corrupters of scholastic Theology, against the Dominican Monks, whence afterwards it spread to other Academies of the Christian world. Petrus Fonseca the Jesuit, pregnant with Pelagianism, first secretly brought forth this fetus of conditioned knowledge, with Ludovicus Molina and Francis Suarez, also Jesuits, acting as midwives. Of whom Molina first of all brought it forth in writing in his book on the Concord [of Grace and Free Will] into the sight of all in the year 1588, and defended it against Dominic Bañez, the oppugner of that Concord; from whom his followers were afterwards called Molinists. Hence Fonseca himself also, in his Metaphysics book 6, chapter 2, question 4, section 8, boasts that he was the first author and inventor of this knowledge, the thought of which first occurred to him in the year 1566, when beginning the material on divine Providence and Predestination in his public lectures, he stuck implicated in the difficulties which are usually moved there; but the discovery of that knowledge dispelled the shadows of almost all the difficulties objected, so that a certain new light seemed to rise upon the eyes of his mind, and he therefore rejoices that this his discovery, communicated word for word at that time to some of his hearers, was afterwards more refined, increased and confirmed by reasons by Molina, by Suarez, by Vasquez, by Mendoza and others; whom the rest of the Jesuits then followed to a man, so that this is now the common opinion of the whole Jesuit society. But this controversy was agitated in the beginning with such zeal of the parties, that after Academic contentions it was appealed to the supreme tribunal of the Roman Pontiff. The history is long and the details lengthy, which not even in passing does the brevity of the theses allow to survey. This was the outcome, that the dissenting parties after consulting their Apollo were able to say what once that Terentian Demipho said after consulting the interpreters of the law: "You have done well; I am much more uncertain than a while ago." That is, middle knowledge remains to this day the apple of contention among the Papists; there are some who defend it, there are some who attack it. But at the time when the Remonstrant faction began to raise its head, whose mysteries are sought partly from Socinian, partly from Loyolite boxes; as many of them as thought with Socinus and Vorstius that free contingent futures, because of their uncertain and ambiguous nature, cannot be foreknown by God, either called into doubt the prescience of such futures, whence there is no clear and luculent confession about this matter in their Confession or in their Apology or in their Synodical writings, such as it was fitting for those to have who know themselves to be burdened with suspicions of too much syncretism with Socinianism; or, convicted by the open testimonies of scripture, they said they believed that prescience, were ignorant of the mode, and strove to promote their cause by the help of the conditioned knowledge of the Jesuits, borrowing its certainty from elsewhere than from the divine decree. Among whom were especially the author of the whole endeavor, Arminius, and after him Nicolaus Grevinchovius. In the Synodalia those fifteen disputants make mention of it in passing on articles 1 and 4, but there Ames responded sufficiently in his Anti-Synodalia, article 1,

chapter 1, thesis 29, and article 4, chapter 5, thesis 4. By our Doctors it was exploded as soon as known, as a trifle full of the delirium of the Jesuits, as a fallacious covering of abominable Pelagianism and a mockery of true Theology; except that one or two went against the torrent of the Doctors, whom however, at least two of them, we know to have dissented from the orthodox more in the appearance of words and mode of explaining than in reality, and to have thought nothing of helping or whitewashing Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism.

2. But now let us bring the knowledge itself onto the stage, so that we may be able to understand what monster it is. It is defined by Ludovicus Molina, the first whitewasher and defender of it after the discoveries of Fonseca, in his commentary on Part I of Thomas, question 14, article 13, disputation 17, that it is "knowledge by which God, from the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each free will in his essence, perceives what it would do by its innate liberty, if it were placed in this or that or even infinite orders of things, although it could, if it wished, do the very opposite." Elsewhere he says even more clearly: "The whole certainty of divine knowledge about the acts of created free will comes from middle knowledge, by which before every act of his will he knew to which part the will by its liberty would turn itself, on the hypothesis that he wanted to confer those aids and concursus on it, about to know the contrary if the will by the same liberty were to turn itself to the contrary part." For example, by this knowledge God will know before all his decree that Titius, who now professes the Reformed Religion, will embrace the Papistic religion if the Spanish Inquisition is introduced again into these lands; and on the contrary Sempronius, a partaker of the same Religion, will persevere constantly in it until death, although both the latter could defect and the former remain constant, and perhaps the Inquisition is not to be introduced while either is living. One of the orthodox, in his Disputation on Predestination, thesis 31, says it is "that by which God, from the infinite light of his knowledge, foreknew certain futures, not absolutely, but with a certain condition posited." Similarly another, in his Common Places, says that knowledge is called "that by which things future from a hypothesis are known, even if they are not or not yet absolutely future." By others it is defined otherwise, according as each one either encloses it in a shorter circle or indulges it looser reins, or often proposes the same thing, as is accustomed to happen, in different formulas of words and a different mode of considering. But so that the whole mystery and, so to speak, the quintessence of that knowledge may be exposed to the eyes of all at the same time, it is pleasing to relate it extracted from the tenets of the Molinists by Guillaume Gibieuf, a Sorbonnist and here no unacclaimed Alchemist. Thus he in his On the Freedom of God and the Creature, book 1, chapter 13: "Their (the Molinists') opinion is that in order for God Most High to be able to choose men by an efficacious and absolute will to glory, to be obtained without loss of liberty, or even to some temporary acts of the will, to be exercised with unharmed liberty of choice, he ought, before he establishes himself in that decree of the will, to know at what time and on what occasion the man will be better disposed, by which things he may be more affected, finally by which modes, conditions or circumstances posited the free will of him will do this or that; and when he has foreseen that the man placed under such circumstances will obey such a motion and calling, then at last and not before he can absolutely predefine his consent: I WANT HIM TO WILL THAT; and when by the same kind of cognition he has foreseen under which circumstances he will persevere to the end, then he can choose him to glory by an absolute will. But if he did otherwise, it would be necessary either for God to bring necessity

upon the will, so that it would entirely will what he decreed, or to expose himself to the danger that what he efficaciously intended would not happen."

3. This about the thing; let us see about the name. This knowledge is called by its authors Conditioned, not as if it were not yet in God but to be posited at last with some condition posited (because they want it to be actually in God equally as the knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision), but because it has for its object things future from a condition; that is, to which futurity does not belong absolutely, but dependently on some condition; so that because in that moment of eternity in which they are foreknown by God, the condition is indifferent to futurity and non-futurity, at the same time those things also depending on it have the same indifference to futurity and non-futurity. Whence it appears first: That concerning those things future existence alone is predicated, it does not happen as if present or past existence could not also be predicated (for in Matthew 11 the predication is about a past thing), but because from eternity before the foundation of the world, and therefore before any present or past existence of a created thing, they were considered by God. It appears second: That those things future from a condition, although as they constitute the object of this knowledge they entirely agree among themselves, nevertheless are distinguished by accident, insofar as some of them, a certain act of the divine will afterwards acceding, pass into things absolutely future and therefore become objects of the knowledge of vision; but some remain in this state only and with the condition never to be fulfilled or posited, they themselves are never raised to the state of absolute futurity. However, for the better declaration both of that object and of the present question, it must be noted: I. That all conditioned futures can be reduced to two classes, of which the first contains those which have possible conditions, the other those which have impossible; but each contains three distinct genera, of which the first is of necessary things in which there is a necessary, the second of contingent things in which there is a contingent, the third of disparate things in which there is a merely casual and fortuitous inference of the consequent from the antecedent. It must be noted, II. That of all those conditioned futures only those which constitute the second genus in the first class contain the proper and domestic object of this knowledge, as is clear from the adduced description of Molina, although the definitions of our men just now cited are general and looser. It must be noted, III. That those conditioned futures which are of this place can be considered with respect to free causes either in God or in angels or in men. On which place the disagreement of the sweet authors of the new Concord is again unsweet, some reducing to this only angelic and human acts, as the leader Molina, but some even the acts of the divine will, as Fonseca, who however here opens to us a certain mystery of Jesuit iniquity; with whom Suarez otherwise sides, and almost all the more recent Jesuits. It must be noted, IV. That it is certain that there is prescience in God of conditioned futures not only necessary but also free, and is conceded by both sides, but the foundation of certitude is not established as one. For on the side of the Molinists, Molina the leader asserts that this certitude comes from the supercomprehension of each created will; but Suarez and most of the others derive it now from the altitude of the divine intellect alone, now from the determinate truth of things before every decree; however, in many places they constitute one foundation of that certitude from both joined. Again, on the opposite side, our men bring forth scarcely any other reason for that certitude than from the divine decree, as once Scotus did; others adduce the actual presence of things in eternity, or join certain of these; but in species, when they give a reason to the

adversaries about these contingent futures under a condition, the Thomists recur to certain conditioned decrees actually existing in God. Those among them, however, who deduce the presence of things in eternity from the decree, as Rispolus and others, seem to be compelled to establish a similar conditioned presence of things in eternity. Therefore, on account of the conditioned object expounded by us so far, this knowledge is called Conditioned; otherwise it is usually also called by its patrons and commonly Middle, because it participates something of both the natural and necessary knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision, and must be stabled in a middle place between the two species of each distinction. For the same reason also it is called by Fonseca, its first and genuine parent, In a Certain Manner Mixed, because of course it is such, as we have said, a chimera and a most monstrous mixture of bestiality and humanity, a monster conceived by him, brought forth as a fetus and, so to speak, shut out into the bright air of day. But here again there is disagreement among the Molinists, because, just as the former of our men just now cited reduces it to natural knowledge and that of simple intelligence, so Suarez reduces it to free knowledge and that of vision; but others, being more consistent with themselves, rightly constitute from it a third species of divine knowledge.

4. These things being known beforehand, the main question is this: Is there such knowledge in God as we have seen first invented by the Jesuits and opposed by the Dominican monks? Or: Can God, antecedently to his decree and thus with his determined concurrence and cooperation precisely supposed but not these things themselves, if he were to create a rational creature, place it in these or those occasions and circumstances, and want to concur with it by an undetermined and indifferent concurrence, certainly know to which part of the opposition the free will of that creature would determine itself, according to its innate liberty? The Hypothetical Doctors affirm, the Absolute Doctors deny; for it pleases us now to resume the terms posited at the beginning, so that we may also include those who outside the Papacy assent to the tenets either of the Molinists or of the Thomists. The latter of our men just now cited interposes himself as a mediator between the litigating parties and thinks that with certain hypotheses of the Hypotheticals cast away, that middle knowledge, vindicated from its abuses, will be of great help in theology. He wants therefore in the 3rd place on God, title on God's Knowledge, and 12th place on God's Providential Acts, that God knows what a man placed in those and other circumstances would do; but so that he wants this understood: First, about evil actions, to which God concurs not effectively but permissively; Second, about common actions and those concerning this life, but not about spiritual ones, of which all praise is owed to God alone; Third, about singular actions which, with the order of things now constituted by decree, do not depend or necessarily follow from general decrees and sentences, otherwise to be known by the knowledge of vision from those decrees - for example, that the reprobate would be saved if he believes, because it is the general decree of God that everyone who believes will be saved; Fourth, that he wants that constitution and series of things on which the infallibility depends also to be derived from God's Providence or ordination and constitution, or as he says in other words, that a conditioned decree of God must be supposed lest the thing be thought to be posited either from itself or from Fortune and chance or some Stoic fate; Fifth, that he does not think it necessary to constitute a third species of divine knowledge from it, but that it can be conveniently reduced to the knowledge of simple intelligence, because that is absolutely necessary, that God beheld from eternity all possible modes of secondary causes, whether they

act alone or with others, and therefore what would or would not infallibly happen from any posited hypothesis if he produced those causes, conserved them, and concurred with them in this or that way, or disposed or allowed them to be disposed in this or that way - beyond which this knowledge seeks nothing. What he warns about the abuse of this knowledge is sufficiently understood from the second restriction. For he wants, first, that the way should not be paved through this knowledge to foreseen human merits (the same is the reason of faith) to be established in choosing and saving. He wants, second, that all physical action of God in the conversion of man should not be taken away from the human will through it.

5. But to me, comparing his concepts more diligently both among themselves and with the opinion of the adversaries and our own, the man, otherwise Reverend on account of his distinguished merits towards the Church, seems either not to have understood (pardon what is said) the mysteries of that knowledge, or to have rashly and without more accurate premeditation cast these things onto paper (which I prefer) and argued its cause quite wretchedly. To begin from his definition proposed in thesis 2, I do not know how those words do not sound badly and do not seem to admit a sufficiently suitable interpretation: "even if they are not going to be absolutely, or are not yet." For to whom will it not be ready to deduce from this with evident consequence one or the other of these corollaries: Either that eternity is not all at once but has a threefold difference of its duration like time, which would be akin to Socinian and Vorstian theology, which the Most Illustrious man has quite openly detested; Or that the futurity of things in time and age is not eternal but temporary, and even now new futurities of things are produced daily, which is most alien to all sober reason. In those restrictions and limitations, added with so much care, it happens to the best man as to many syncretists who, adhering certainly to neither side, often do not agree with themselves, but like ships when a storm has arisen, now up, now down, now forward, now backward, now to the right, now to the left, are borne by an uncertain course. For what then? Will middle knowledge have a place in evil actions, in actions of life, in singular actions and examples not depending on some general decree, but not in the rest? Therefore, in certain actions there will be some futurity before every decree, in the rest there will not be. And since that futurity is eternal, there will be something created independent of the creator, there will be something simply eternal besides God, and therefore there will be a creature creator, finite infinite, dependent independent - which, since they have an open contradiction in the adjunct, nothing more absurd can be said than them. And why, if this seems to be conceded in certain genera of actions, does it not seem so in the rest? I know well that however much the Most Illustrious man may labor, he will not be able to bring a cause of disparity in which a man of heart may acquiesce. But does futurity in certain actions seem to him to be from itself, fatal and necessary, but not in the rest? But that does not seem good to seem, nor can it even seem. If you want to concede it in one case, you are also bound to concede it in the other; or if you do not want that, concede nothing - which can also be done for the best reason. For as to the first restriction: although it may be truly said that God concurs to an evil action not effectively but permissively, namely if it is considered formally as evil, or if you precisely consider the viciousness adhering to the act, nevertheless it is also truly said that God concurs effectively to the act underlying the viciousness, in which material sin there is equally some entity in its genus as in the formal of virtues. And although by decree God is not the author of the futurity of the viciousness itself or irregularity in sin, nevertheless even

with respect to it there is a certain futurity of which God is equally the author as of the material in sin, namely the futurity of his actual permission around the viciousness itself. As to the second: although man in the first moment of regeneration, when he lies dead in sins not having in himself any principle of spiritual life, holds himself merely passively to his own regeneration, nevertheless, aroused by God from the death of sins to spiritual life, he also concurs actively with God in the production of a supernatural act - yet so that the internal principle of spiritual life, recently instilled by God, is not so proportioned in all respects to the actions of spiritual life, as they ought to be, as either principle of life is proportioned to the actions of the present temporal life. But from this it does not follow that God can foresee by middle knowledge the actions of this life, but not of that - no more than this reason would obtain in the actions of temporal life which are produced by a healthy and sick man, because all the imperfection of the regenerate in the works of spiritual life is from the inveterate disease of original sin, from which they are not fully freed in this life, although if Adam had not sinned, or if they themselves had not been included under the same covenant with him, they would also have had perfect health in this genus, as our blessed Savior also had it. As to the third, it will suffice to have warned only this, that the things which he intermixes about general sentences and decrees formed by God, from which God immediately sees through the knowledge of vision what will consequently and necessarily happen in singulars, deserve deletion from the things said by us in the preceding disputation, thesis 7, conclusion 2. For these are not rightly opposed to the error of Algasel the Mohammedan philosopher, who thinks that God understands singulars through universals - which error, however, all orthodox both Philosophers and Theologians ought rightly to abominate. As to the fourth, the Most Illustrious man says that in those examples and actions of middle knowledge admitted by him, a conditioned decree of God must be supposed. But if he well explains this, namely so as to will that God already decrees beforehand, if something will be in that occasion, it will be so from his will, which however now in the event itself is not going to be, because he wills nothing to be future in that occasion of things; if moreover he says this from the soul, as we rightly presume of a man of such proven probity, and is consistent with himself, now he is ours and eliminates by this all middle knowledge which he seems to admit by another door. For the question is: Did God certainly foreknow those conditioned things before every act of his will? Which is expressly denied by those words. If he does not want this, he will be compelled, willing or unwilling, from the necessity of evident consequence to admit, as we were saying before, that a creature is the creator, the finite is the infinite, the dependent is the independent - indeed, the Stoic tables of fate, in which the laws of harsh necessity are engraved in adamantine letters not only for creatures but even for the creator himself. As to the fifth: he has placed the boundary to determining his middle opinion about middle knowledge in the last little field as unhappily as all the preceding ones. For if that middle knowledge is admitted, unless someone with rash daring wants to change the significations of terms anciently received without the decree of the more learned or the postulate of mediocre ones, it will necessarily constitute a third species of divine knowledge, because through it something intermediate between mere possibility and absolute futurity is known, which two according to common opinion and received signification constitute the object of the remaining knowledges, where they are referred to other things outside and besides God. I confess indeed that it is necessary that God beheld from eternity all possible modes of secondary causes in solitary or social actions, and therefore that he certainly knew what would or would not be in this or that occasion posited;

but it is asked whether he foreknew this before the inspection of his decree, which God knows to be firm and immutable and to bring certain existence of the future event in execution. But that ought to have been proved by the Most Illustrious man. Which is so far from him doing that he seems again in the following words to deny it and again with a lethal blow to take away that knowledge from the middle. For what else does he mean by that declaration added: "if he produced those causes, conserved them, and concurred with them in this or that way"? For I ask whether the Most Illustrious man does not admit with us the predetermining concurrence of God to all secondary causes even to individual acts? Why not? Therefore, whatever would happen in those circumstances (I am speaking of the positive), it would happen by force of the divine concurrence moving and applying secondary causes as his instruments; and consequently whatever was going to be from eternity in those circumstances, was going to be by force of the divine decree. For the reason of the divine concurrence to present actual being is the same as the reason of the decree to future being. These things about those restrictions. But as for his endeavor to remove from this knowledge, of which, as we shall prove with God's help, there is no legitimate use, those abuses mentioned above, he does the same as if he wanted to reform the Roman Papacy, the Mass, Mariolatry, drunkenness or adultery, since just as the nature of those, so also the nature of this knowledge consists wholly in abuse, and those corollaries are as proper to middle knowledge in the fourth way as risibility is to man.

ON THE CONDITIONED OR MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE IN GOD, SECOND SECTION.

By the Author and Respondent MATTHIAS NETHENUS of Rees
For the 20th of December, 1643

Exhibiting the arguments of the adversaries.

6. BEcause therefore, as the Most Illustrious Man thought, no middle can be found here without that middle knowledge having to be admitted wholly or rejected wholly, let us now see the Hypotheticals fighting for their Pergamums with what forces of arguments they can, with great zeal and contention of their wits and great alacrity. In the beginning, therefore, so that they may show this their figuranot to be thought up or the delirium of some wretched Jesuit vanishing in his jejune speculations and abducted by fantastic illusions outside himself, outside the world and highest heaven, into some Utopia or void of things, I know not where - they are accustomed to bring forward various oracles partly of God himself, partly of Christ the Savior, partly of the Holy Prophets, from the Old and New Testaments, by which this middle knowledge seems to them to be as certainly and manifestly expressed as if it had been written in so many words that there is a middle knowledge in God. But what are they? In Genesis 11:6, God says about the builders of the Babylonian tower that if they are left to themselves, they will not desist from their thoughts until they fulfill them in deed - which however did not happen, even though certainly foreknown by God, because the condition was not posited. Again, in Exodus 34:16 (cf. Deuteronomy 7:3-4, 1 Kings 11:2), God forbids the Israelites to join their sons or daughters in

marriage with the daughters or sons of the Canaanites and foreign men, the reason for which is expressed in the last place thus: "they will certainly incline your heart after their gods," or as the Vulgate version has it, "for they will most certainly turn away your hearts" etc. Which was also fulfilled in Solomon, because the condition was posited, but in the other Israelites in whom this antecedent condition was not fulfilled, neither was that consequent fulfilled, although God had also foreseen that it would be fulfilled if the condition were posited. Similarly, in 1 Samuel 23:11-12, when David had asked the Lord, "If I remain in Keilah, will Saul come to seize me, and if he comes, will the Keilites deliver me into the hands of Saul?" he received the answer that both Saul would come and the Keilites would deliver him into the hands of Saul, if he remained. God certainly foreknew that both things would happen under that free condition, and yet, with David taking flight, neither happened. Likewise, the prophet Elijah, having known the request of his servant Elisha, said to him in 2 Kings 2:10, "If you see me taken from you, it will be so for you; but if not, it will not be." Where, from a twofold event foreknown with the same certitude, depending on the free will of God and Elisha, the former was brought into act, the latter, with the condition omitted, was not. Elisha himself afterwards, rebuking Joash King of Israel, asserted in 2 Kings 13:19, "If you had struck the ground five or six times, you would have struck down Syria until destroying it; but now, because you have struck only three times, you will strike down Syria only three times." The last oracle from the Old Testament is again from God himself, who says to the prophet in Ezekiel 3:5-6, "For you are not sent to a people of foreign speech and a hard language, but to the house of Israel - not to many peoples of foreign speech and a hard language, whose words you cannot understand. Surely, if I sent you to such, they would listen to you. But the house of Israel will not be willing to listen to you, for they are not willing to listen to me, because all the house of Israel have a hard forehead and a stubborn heart." But from the New Testament they adduce the words of Christ in Matthew 11:21, about the Tyrians and Sidonians who would have been converted if such mighty works had been done among them as were done among the people of Chorazin and Bethsaida; and in Matthew 24:22, when he says that no flesh would be saved unless those days were shortened; likewise in Matthew 26:53, when he affirms that the Father would send more than twelve legions of angels if he asked for it. The passage in Acts 22:18 could also be brought forward, where in an appearance the Savior orders Paul to depart from Jerusalem, because they will not accept his testimony about him. God therefore saw in those passages, before any decree of his will, what those free causes would do in this or that circumstance and occasion; in the rest he saw what events would follow from certain previous free acts, in most of which, however, because the condition was posited by neither God nor men, neither did the conditioned thing, then equally futurible as others which, with the condition posited, were afterwards done, so to speak, now fall away from every state of futurity and hope to that state, and just as it was not done, so it will not be done to eternity. When Scripture says these things, what else does it seem to say than that there is a middle knowledge in God? Because from this it is manifest, first, that those conditioned futures were foreknown with infallible certitude, because here are reported not the fallacious and conjectural foreseeings and predictions of men, but divine oracles, promulgated partly immediately by God himself, the first and highest and most true, partly mediately through Christ and his Holy Prophets in the Old Testament. It is also manifest from this, second, that those things were certainly foreseen and foreknown before every act of the divine will, which is shown thus: Because when God here infallibly knew those conditioned futures pending on the free will of

creatures, it necessarily follows one of three things: that he knew their truth either before every actual decree of his, or simultaneously with it, or after it. Not after it, because it cannot be without some real effect which is produced in some difference of time, whence the thing absolutely receives being either future, or present, or past. But now in all those conditioned futures, precisely as such considered, no real effect is produced in any difference of time, which is clear in all those examples where, with the condition posited, something conditioned was infallibly going to be, which now, with the condition having been omitted for that time, just as it was not done, so neither will it be to eternity, which would be otherwise. For example, in those peoples of unknown speech and impeded tongue in Ezekiel, no change was made from the fact that they would have listened to the prophet if he had been sent to them; nor will there be any change in the future, because both they and the prophet are dead and those same times have long since elapsed and cannot be brought back even by divine power. Neither are those conditioned futures known simultaneously with the decree, because although we may establish that conditioned futurity and the decree as conjoined, like the sun and light, nevertheless some priority or posteriority must be conceded, not of time but of nature. Therefore, from those testimonies of Scripture it appears not only that God knows those conditioned futures with infallible certitude, but also that he does so before every actual decree of his will - which is nothing other than that a middle knowledge is given, which can be suitably defined from those two parts.

7. Supported by these bulwarks of the Scriptures and of supernatural Theology, as they think, the Hypotheticals produce the reasons they have from natural Theology with even greater confidence and in the middle with great zeal. For they think that through this knowledge a certain singular wisdom is constituted in God which cannot be in our way. Thus they argue second: If it pertains to the nature of prudence and wisdom to undertake or do nothing except what has been examined beforehand as to the means suited for certainly obtaining the end, and what would or would not follow from applying this or that means in this or that way in that or another occasion, certainly such knowledge cannot be denied to the most prudent and wise God, by which, before every decree of his will, he may know by which means he can or cannot obtain his end in them, with the liberty of men and angels preserved. For example, in order to be able to save man, it is necessary for him to know in which occasion of things he would or would not assent to the divine calling by the liberty of his will, always indifferent to this or that part of the opposition, so that thus thereafter, not by a violent operation snatching away the will, but one accommodated to its character and efficacy, he may infallibly attain the proposed effect and end. But they say the former most pertains to the nature of prudence and wisdom, as Suárez says on conditioned future contingents, chapter 4, or as may be conjectured from human affairs. For, he says, if I desire to persuade something to another, in order to do it prudently, it greatly helps to foreknow at which time or opportunity he is usually better disposed, and by which things he is usually more affected, and so on about other circumstances. If I altogether foreknew what he would do if implored in such and such a way, such knowledge would be most useful for deciding what should be done and for applying suitable means. Indeed, if we believe a Jesuit at all, the Savior himself teaches this in Luke 14:28ff: "For which of you, desiring to build a tower, does not first sit down and count the cost, whether he has enough to complete it? Otherwise, when he has laid a foundation and is not able to finish, all who see it begin to mock him, saying,

'This man began to build and was not able to finish.'" Or what king, going out to encounter another king in war, will not sit down first and deliberate whether he is able with ten thousand to meet him who comes against him with twenty thousand? And if not, while the other is yet a great way off, he sends a delegation and asks for terms of peace. If therefore such great perfection is found in creatures, will it be right to deny it to the highest creator? Will creatures be wise and prudent, but their creator, far be it, imprudent and rash, from whose liberal hand and inexhaustible treasures living and dead men have received that gift, and those yet to be born and live hereafter will receive it?

8. In this way, therefore, the Hypotheticals are accustomed to vindicate the greatest prudence and wisdom of God from the injuries of the Absolute Doctors, and show themselves its most fierce defenders. What the matter may be, we will see afterwards; now they institute the third argument thus: The object of middle knowledge is given, therefore it itself is given, because it is necessary that God know every knowable object through some knowledge; unless we want to say that there is some knowable thing unknown to God and thus attribute ignorance to the omniscient one, which is absurd. They therefore prove the antecedent thus: Every knowable object is known by God either before or after his decree. Before his decree he knows first all things absolutely possible to be done precisely as such, about which there is no doubt; second, future contingents under a condition, which are indifferent to futurity or non-futurity, elevated above mere possibility, depressed below absolute futurity. For example, what this or that rational creature would do by its innate liberty if it were placed with these or those circumstances in such or another order of things. Whence then, according to some, from certain general maxims made by him from eternity, he gathers what he himself wills to do about that action of his creature around it, by rewarding or punishing or conniving - in which way Fonseca also wants God to know first what creatures would will or do in these or those circumstances, before he knows what he himself would will or do in this or that occasion. From which delirium even one of our Theologians was not entirely immune, as is clear from the preceding, although he wants actions depending on general rules and decrees to be exempt from the object of middle knowledge. But now that such a knowable object is given before every divine decree seems to be able to be shown thus: The concourse and proper determination of the created will does not depend on the divine will or the executing power of God, therefore before all his decree God can know what the created free will would will and do if these or those conditions were posited. The goodness of the illation is made clear from this, because what does not depend on the determination of the will or the executing power of God is knowable before every act of the divine will; and the Absolute Doctors deny that it is knowable for this reason, because the future concourse of the created will depends on the divine will. Therefore, if it does not depend, with every act of the divine will having been cut off, it is knowable. But that it does not depend is proved first, because the concourse of God is not an influx into the created will, but with the created will into the effect, as when two horses flow into the pulling of the same chariot, or by a similitude more apposite, when a father and son flow into the pulling of the same ship. For although through the associated concourse of each cause the same action, the same work may be produced, so that here a formal distinction from the nature of the thing may not be given, nevertheless those concourses are distinguished virtually on account of their diverse terms. Because therefore the volition of the will in the present being does not depend on the concourse or operation of God,

neither in future being does it depend on the decree, because in the way God executes things in time, so he decreed from eternity to execute. It is proved second, because the concourse of the created will, as such, imports nothing other than the order of the operation to the second cause. But now that order does not depend on the first cause, because not it, but the second cause is the term of this order, from which precisely the nature of this order must be taken. God therefore knows before his decree both the merely possible and the future under a condition; after his decree he knows all things going to be absolutely in time - which again is beyond doubt. The consideration of that first object, because it is simply necessary in God, seeing that it is in reality nothing other than the consideration of the attribute of the divine omnipotence, which God cannot be ignorant of, will constitute the knowledge of simple intelligence; but the consideration of the third object, because it rests on the intervening free decree of God, will constitute the knowledge which is commonly called of vision. Therefore, the consideration of that intermediate object will give a certain intermediate knowledge in God, unless, with the received terms having been amplified, you want to reduce it to some of the aforesaid species of divine knowledge, in which very little is situated, since from what has been said it is agreed that the thing is given. And that proof so far brought forward could also be instituted more briefly thus: Either the mere possibility of a thing or its conditioned futurity or its absolute futurity is known by God. The first is known by God through the knowledge of simple intelligence, the last through the knowledge of vision. Therefore, that middle also, which is more than mere possibility, less than absolute futurity, will similarly be known through some knowledge, which cannot be other than this middle knowledge.

9. Let us proceed to the fifth argument, by which the Hypotheticals will so drive us resisting into a corner that if we still find even a crack through which we may slip away, we will be able to declare ourselves happy hereafter. In those conditioned futures, they say, before every act of the divine will, there is a determinate truth. Therefore, there is also a middle knowledge by which God may know it. They attempt to demonstrate the antecedent thus: Whenever contradictory propositions can be formed about any thing, it has a determinate truth then, because, as Aristotle teaches in On Interpretation, chapter 7, "Of whatever universal contradictions of universal things, it is necessary for one to be true or false," and "whatever are about singular things, as 'Socrates is white,' 'Socrates is not white.'" Which also all other philosophers acknowledge with Aristotle to be true. They assume: But about these conditioned futures, before every act of the divine will, contradictory propositions can be formed, as: "If Peter is constituted in such an order of things, he will deny his Lord," and "If Peter is constituted in such an order of things, he will not deny his Lord." Therefore, those conditioned futures also in that moment of eternity have a determinate truth. And on those things now brought forward rests also the other proof of the antecedent, usually adduced by some, because just as in contradictories, so also in propositions of necessary disjunction, one part is and was from eternity determinately true, the other false. But such propositions can similarly be formed here before every act of the divine will. For example: "Peter in that order of things will be converted or will not be converted, will deny the Lord or will not deny," and other similar ones. Since therefore in both the contradictory and disjunctive enunciations, before every act of the divine will, there is some truth, it is necessary for it to be understood by God through some knowledge, because otherwise God would not be a God of knowledge (1 Samuel 2:3), whose understanding is

infinite (Psalm 147:5), by which praises Scripture claims for God the most super-eminent knowledge of all truths. But now God will not be able to understand that truth through natural knowledge and that of simple intelligence, because that is only of truth in the merely possible; nor through free knowledge and that of vision, because that is only of truth in the absolutely future, present and past things, and likewise supposes a decree, which is not allowed here. Therefore, through that middle knowledge, which along with natural knowledge is before every decree. Perhaps from both this argument, namely the third and the fourth, one could have been formed more suitably thus: There is given a knowable object which is understood by God neither through the knowledge of simple intelligence nor through that of vision. Therefore, there will be a middle knowledge. But since the proofs of both arguments, although they could have been reduced to the same syllogism, are diverse among themselves, we will not be too scrupulous in that matter.

10. Now the fifth argument will be sought from the way of explaining the certitude of this middle foreknowledge, which since it is not one among the Hypotheticals, they will also be able to argue here not in one way, but one indeed thus, another truly otherwise. Although the Hypotheticals are not usually accustomed to assign their own peculiar place to this way of arguing along with the other arguments when they fight for middle knowledge, perhaps because there is not sufficient agreement among them here - nevertheless, because it touches the foundations of the cause and seems to have its own difficulty, we will propose it from the hypothesis of each one in their own words taken from elsewhere. We will give the first place to Molina, who in Part I, question 14, article 13, disputation 14, conclusion 1, in the second argument speaks thus from his hypothesis: "God, through natural knowledge, comprehends himself and in himself all things which are eminently in him, and therefore the free will of any creature which he can create by his omnipotence. Therefore, before any free determination of his will, from the altitude of his natural knowledge by which he infinitely surpasses each thing which he eminently contains in himself, he penetrates what the free will of any creature, given the hypothesis that he wants to create it in this or that order of things, with these or those circumstances or aids, by its innate liberty would do, although if it willed, it could contain the act or do the opposite; and if it were going to do that, as it freely can, God would foresee that very thing, but not what he foresees will in fact be done by it. For it would be unworthy of the altitude and perfection of divine knowledge, indeed also impious and least cohering with such a comprehension of the free will of each creature, to assert that God is ignorant of what I by the liberty of my will would do if he had constituted me in another order of things, or if in this very one in which he constituted me, he had decided to confer on me greater or lesser aids than he in fact decided to give, or if he had granted me a longer life or permitted graver temptations." From this he then proves against the Thomists that God did not need the existence of things in eternity in order to know which contingent things were going to be or not going to be, but knew from his free decree by which he chose this order of things. But as far as his words posited by us prove, they prove from the intention of the author that middle knowledge is given. Suárez, however, in his disputation on the absolute knowledge of future contingents, chapter 8, explains the matter thus in general about all contingent futures, both absolute and conditioned: "It must be said that God knows these futures only through a simple intuition of the truth or the thing which is going to be in its difference of time and as it is going to be in it and according to all the

conditions of existence which it is going to have in it," that is, as he says in the same chapter, "those are not sufficiently known in the cause, nor known without a cause, or the effect as such is not known in the power of the cause alone or its influx and determination, but by seeing its emanation from its cause." In the next book on the conditional knowledge of future contingents, chapter 7, he says specifically about these conditioned futures: "Although the thing does not actually exist nor is going to exist absolutely, the conditioned proposition has truth through a habitude and conformity to it apprehended under existence with the aforesaid condition, and the divine intuition by reason of its infinity will be able to extend to seeing what would be conjoined to such a thing or what would proceed from it if it were constituted in such a way." Our stout Orator also cites a place of Suárez where, with a comparison having been instituted about absolute and conditioned contingent futures, he speaks thus: "Just as in absolutes it is truly affirmed in the same mind of God about an existing or present cause in the intuition of God as existing that such an effect is going to emanate freely from it, not because God sees this in the power of the cause, but because by his intuition he sees that cause, although free, as influencing that effect - so in these conditionals, about a cause conceived from a hypothesis as present under such possible existence, it can be truly affirmed and known in the mind of God that this determinate effect is going to emanate from that free cause from the same hypothesis, not because such an effect is determinately known in the power of the cause, but because it would truly in itself and in second act be going to be determined to that." Fonseca does not differ from them, who in Metaphysics book 6, chapter 2, question 2, section 7, also says more clearly that "simply and absolutely the truth of enunciations about those futures which depend on free will (whether they are absolute or conditioned) is to be judged not from causes (understand complete ones so that the operation of the first cause is not excluded) but from future events." And he also adduces some arguments in confirmation of this opinion. The first is that "enunciations about any futures do not say that something is or is not in its causes, nor even that it will be or will not be through its causes, as is most clear, but absolutely that it will be or will not be." The second is that "for an enunciation about any future, even a necessary one, to be actually true is nothing other than for it to be now such in signifying as the thing will at some time be in being; but false, on the contrary. But in this consideration no account is taken of the cause, but of the event itself. And since either an affirmative or negative event is in fact going to be, it comes about that simply and absolutely one is determinately true, the other false." The third: because "enunciations about future acts of free agents are determinately true or false in the sight of God, and therefore simply and absolutely true or false. Since, therefore, the will is of itself indeterminate to opposites, even with any circumstances having been supposed, it comes about that from it thus known, the future effect of it cannot be known determinately, and therefore in this genus of things the truth of enunciations about the future must be judged from future events alone." Fonseca therefore wants those free contingent futures, whether absolute or conditioned, insofar as they are contained in their causes, however complete, to be unknowable by any intellect, not even the divine, and therefore to be simply unknowable by us, because we can naturally know futures only from causes; but to be known by God, who also has another way of knowing, from a simple intuition of the event necessarily going to follow thus or thus - in absolutes absolutely, in these conditionals from the supposed condition. The argument therefore so far proposed would be in form such: If a sufficient reason can be assigned as to how God sees a determinate truth in those conditioned futures before every

decree of his will, there will be a middle knowledge by which he may see that truth. But the former is true. Therefore also the latter. There is no doubt about the consequence of the major. Molina proves the minor from his hypothesis, because God can see this in the supercomprehension of any creatable, created, or to-be-created will. Suárez proves it otherwise from his hypothesis, because although God does not see this in the power of the cause, as Molina wants, he can nevertheless see it through a simple intuition of the truth, which is here, because the cause would truly in itself be at some time going to be determined to that act - or as Fonseca says, he can see it from the events, with the condition having been posited, going to be simply and absolutely.

11. Now, the army of the Hypothetical, fighting for middle knowledge, emerging from its hiding places, will show itself in the open fields: which consists of a conglomeration of certain arguments, by which they try to persuade us of the supreme necessity of that knowledge. The whole force of proving is this: that knowledge must necessarily be admitted in God, without which Theological truths, beyond all the darkness of doubt, conspicuous by their light and approved and accepted by all, not only Christians but also those outside Christianity, rightly judging according to the natural guidance of light, cannot be defended, and the most serious absurdities cannot be avoided: about which there is no doubt. But that this middle knowledge is such, can be demonstrated from their mind in this way: First, as to the will of God: Without this knowledge, God cannot wisely make his free decrees, but by a rash impulse, as chance may bring it about, he will decree something. We know that these things are blasphemous and abominable; but how do the Hypotheticals prove what they say? Suarez proves it thus: because, he says, the will is blind and is led by the intellect: and therefore an intellectual agent could not by will establish with itself to absolutely effect such an effect, or to achieve such an end, unless through the intellect it had first judged with infallible knowledge, that in such or such a way that end or effect can be obtained. Which is so true that even concerning those things which God does by himself, he could not have an absolute will to do them, unless he had first known in himself sufficient power to do them. For what is it to foreknow that such means are such that through them such an end can be infallibly obtained, but to know that if such means are posited, that effect will infallibly come about through them. But this, he says, is the conditional knowledge of which we are treating. Thus, therefore, the Wisdom of the divine decrees cannot be saved without middle knowledge: but neither can their immutability be defended without that knowledge, as it seems, according to our most illustrious man cited above. For, according to him, God first decided to propose life to man under the condition of legal obedience, but after the fall under the condition of faith in Christ. Therefore, either this hypothetical knowledge of the fall must be placed before the legal covenant, to which God afterwards subordinated the other, or it must be said that God, by the first covenant having been decreed and foreknown, only then after the fall of man changed his purpose and substituted the other covenant. Thus the most illustrious man, who seems to suggest the same in the preceding, that this knowledge must be admitted, so that it can be explained in some way, how God through his decree is not the author or cause of evil: But I do not see any proof added that shows the necessity of this knowledge for that matter, nor can I, with my slow wit, find a solid one by my own investigation. Secondly, as for the divine intellect, according to the adversaries, God's omniscience, believed and proclaimed even by the pagans, cannot be preserved without

this knowledge; because, as Fonseca contends, the number of the predestined would be uncertain to God, unless God knew for certain that those about whom He deliberated from eternity, according to our way of understanding, to be chosen for heavenly beatitude would persevere to the end in His grace by entirely free acts. But then innumerable doubtful questions can be proposed to God, as once to Apollo giving oracles from the tripod at Delphi, to which God without this knowledge will not be able to respond with anything certain and clear except simply by "I do not know": which would be hard. For example. Let the Patriarch Jacob deliberate with himself, if he were to seek marriage with this, that, or another Canaanite girl, would he obtain consent or not? Although he has firmly decided to himself to ask only Rachel out of all of them to enter into the partnership of marriage. Suppose he obtains her, and does not furthermore solicit any unbeliever for marriage, it will have to be said according to the Doctors of Absolutes, that God has absolutely decreed that he should take Rachel and no other as his wife, that it was not decreed by God that he should solicit or marry any of the others, but that both that solicitation and marriage remained in a state of mere possibility: and therefore, because divine foreknowledge rests on an absolute decree of the will, God will not be able to answer anything certain here according to them, because no free decree of God preceded adding some future existence to mere possibles; none will follow, because all of God's decrees are eternal, none temporal. The reasoning would be similar, if he were to go on to ask; what kind of life would he have with the Canaanite girls whom he never wants to seek? And whether satisfactorily according to his wish, if he were to marry this or that wife? Whether he would have children? How they would live?

who would escape? what offices they would someday hold? whom they would marry? where and when they would die? Likewise if Shechem, the son of Hamor, had pondered similar cases in his mind concerning the affair of Dinah: or if someone wanted to know, if he aspired to this or that public office, whether he would obtain his wish, or what circumstances and outcomes he would have in the administration of it, but never offered his services for that matter to those in whose power it was, and what other infinite things could be added from these and other similar cases. Thirdly, as for God's executive power: unless God (This is Fonseca's fifth argument assigned from the word) foreknew by this conditional knowledge the future free events; divine providence, which uses certain means, accommodated however to the natures of the things themselves, to lead the proposed ends of its actions to their conclusion, would not be certain and infallible, according to that passage of Wisdom 7: It reaches from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly. But that divine providence is not certain, but can be deceived, is clearly entirely impious and impossible. Therefore etc. The consequence is proven from the fact that God intends to bring about many things absolutely through the intervention of the free acts of created wills. And when he had said that it pertains to divine providence, that he foreknew, who and at what times there would be inventors and cultivators of the mechanical arts, who and at what times the authors of republics and the founders of laws and the inventors and professors of the liberal arts and sciences, before this deliberation, as it were, about the founding of this universe of things was approached by his absolute will: he adds: About all of which, however, God, the Best and Greatest, would be doubtful whether he could bring them to pass, unless he first understood with certainty in our way of thinking that it would happen, that the wills of certain men, with the advantages or dignities of those things opportunely set before them, would

comply with him. Fourthly, as for the three aforementioned things jointly: without this knowledge there does not appear to be a way of reconciling the freedom of our will: first with the divine decrees and therefore with predestination and reprobation; second, with the certain foreknowledge of future things; third, with divine providence and therefore with the grace of God in the conversion of man. Because without that knowledge, those absolute decrees bring in a certain determination of the will and the existence and necessity of the future thing antecedent to every free exercise of the will; which directly takes away all freedom of will, as being, with all things required for acting having been posited, still indifferent to this or that part of the opposition. Similarly, that certain foreknowledge also posits the necessary future existence of a contingent thing to be produced by free will, before every act of free will; which is therefore again compelled by antecedent necessity to operate thus and not otherwise. Finally, that predetermining concurrence of God, whether in the works of nature or in the works of grace, breaks and violently seizes, does not sweetly lead, the free will. But on the contrary, once this knowledge is admitted, it can be clearly and visibly demonstrated that all those aforementioned things do not conflict with free will, but agree amicably and sweetly with it; because then free contingencies will not be because God decreed from eternity to determine created wills by his efficacious concurrence to produce them thus; but God will decree absolutely future things, and will foreknow absolutely future things, and by his providence concurring with the will he will bring it about that they certainly happen, because already, before all his decree, foreknowledge, and actual providence, God from the inscrutable height of his intellect surely knew that these free causes, constituted in such an order of things, which he chose out of all others by the decree of his will, approbative and permissive, would act thus according to their innate freedom, about to know the contrary, if indeed according to their freedom, as they could, they had been about to do the contrary. Whence no prejudice at all is brought to the freedom of the will and the contingency of things: but all things remain safe just as if there had been, were, or would be no decree, no foreknowledge, no providence. But here is the place in which the adversaries greatly boast: hence they call their books written on this and related subjects Concords. Indeed it helps to hear the boastful arrogance of Molina the Jesuit in this argument. He in his Concord, question 14, article 4, disputation 1. We, according to our limited ability, (ha! what modesty for a Jesuit!) reconcile the whole matter of reconciling the freedom of the will with divine grace etc. well with middle knowledge and with the easiest effort. If this had always been given and explained, perhaps neither would the Pelagian heresy have arisen, nor would the Lutherans have so imprudently dared to deny the freedom of our will, claiming that it cannot cohere with divine grace, foreknowledge and predestination, nor from Augustine's opinion and disputations with the Pelagians would so many of the faithful have been troubled and defected to the Pelagians, and those remnants of the Pelagians in Gaul, which are mentioned in the letters of Prosper and Hilary, would easily have been extinguished. Do you see how the cubs of the ape please themselves? Indeed, such a charming offspring could not have been brought to light except by such parents.

ON THE CONDITIONAL OR MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE IN GOD, THIRD SECTION.

By the Author and Respondent M. MATTHIAS NETHENO of Reessen
For the 29th of December, 1643.
Presenting a response to the preceding arguments.

12. BUt having returned from here to serious matters, let us see what should be opposed to those cohorts of arguments of the Hypotheticals rushing against us with such great force. I see that the first line consists of various testimonies of the Holy Scriptures piled up and standing in the first rank is the passage of Genesis 11:6. But I now proclaim to you in advance, Hypotheticals, that soldier will not at all fight against us. You have forcibly conscripted him masked into this fight. For it is said, not from the genuine truth of the Hebrew text, but from the manifest corruption of the Papist version, that the Babylonians will not desist from their thoughts until they fulfill them in deed. The words of God in Moses are these:
לעשות יזמו אשרכלמהם׳יבצרלאועתה
And now nothing will be cut off from them, all that, or all things, which they have thought to do. Therefore, Hypotheticals, if you are wise, do not lead out that soldier into the line of battle against us. If you still want to trouble your Thomists a bit with it and play with the divine word, we cannot prevent this. Let us proceed to the second testimony for middle knowledge, handed down by the Holy Spirit in three parallel places. But here, given the occasion, we warn in general what cannot be warned enough in all these controversies: neither the decrees, nor the foreknowledge, nor the actual providence of God are properly, primarily and immediately about things expressed by hypothetical statements or general propositions, but only about things expressed by proper and singular statements. Whoever imagines something else for himself, he builds mouse nests, about to spring up spontaneously from the rotten remnants of Pelagianism, in his head. We have proven this assertion of ours, as for the first part about the divine decrees, in thesis 7 of the previous disputation; as for the third, we trust no one will object; and the reasoning is the same for the second and the arguments adduced for the first part can easily be accommodated by anyone moderately trained, or rather accommodate themselves, to the second and third also. However, for greater evidence of the matter at hand, we say to this example of divine foreknowledge: If it is stated that the primary object of divine foreknowledge was such: If the Israelites take foreign wives they will be seduced to worship foreign gods; or this: Every Israelite taking a foreign wife will be seduced to worship foreign gods; now divine foreknowledge will be stated to be merely conjectural, fallacious and false, which is absurd and blasphemous. The reason is, because if I bring forward one or two contrary examples, now both the consequence of the hypothetical statement and the universality of that simple one will have collapsed. I do not think the adversaries will be so absurd as to dare to deny that any such examples have ever been seen or read in the Israelite people. Although that prohibition is such that it concerns all Christians no less than Jews; if examples of whom are given, as daily experience itself also suggests in a sufficiently large number, now the matter would be settled. But we will not depart from the sacred writings or the Israelite people. Machlon therefore and Chilion, the sons of Elimelech and Naomi, natives of Bethlehem Ephrathah, when, having fled

from the land of Israel on account of famine, they were living for a time in the fields of the Moabites, took Moabite wives there, the one Orpah, the other Ruth, later the mother of Obed, David's great-grandfather, but were not seduced by them to worship the Moabite gods; which could be shown by many proofs from the first chapter of the book of Ruth, if that matter were of such importance. Indeed, it is so far from those men having been led to the idolatry of the Moabites on this occasion, that even Ruth was led away from it to worship the true God of Israel. Therefore, with the kind permission of the Hypotheticals and without sensible detriment to their cause, (For I have not seen them seek any special defense in this testimony and similar ones beyond the rest) in place of that hypothetical statement speaking universally, we will substitute another, in which that general statement is accommodated to a certain and individual person in this way: if Solomon takes foreign wives, he will be induced by them to idolatry. Although we do not think that this expresses the proper object of divine foreknowledge either, but rather this: Solomon, by taking these and those foreign wives, will be induced by them to this and that certain idolatry. In this way, with all the testimonies of Scripture, speaking of the here and now, reduced to one tribe, it would be necessary to think of some true and sure response, by which all these passages, mangled by the sophistical claws of the adversaries, may be brought back to their native elegance. Indeed, I find the responses here among diverse authors, varying according to the variety of their talents and knowledge, and among the same authors according to the variety of the opposing testimonies. To all of which Theodore Smising the Scotist seems to reproach too much anxiety and care in saving the testimonies of Scripture, who says it is not necessary to respond to them because, he says, they do not say that God has knowledge of future things under a condition before the determination of his will, but only that he has knowledge of them. Which indeed is most truly said, if we only want to shut the mouth of the adversaries, who are accustomed to allege these passages of Scripture for their cause rather coldly in general, but do not seek how we ourselves can satisfy ourselves in explaining that knowledge. Because it is still asked how he can know these things in our way, since it is not proven from the passages themselves that they are known after the determination of the divine will. And here Smising seizes the wedge of the Thomists, whether it solves this knot happily enough, we will soon see. Wherefore the labor and endeavor of those Doctors seems to me by no means to be condemned, although their responses neither totally please nor totally displease me, all of which it does not seem worthwhile to mention in this place. However, by name, because the passage of 1 Samuel 23 from the Old Testament and Matthew 11 from the New are especially urged by the adversaries, there are those who respond to the first, that in his response God did not so much consider what would be future from the condition, as what already was in the present, namely: that Saul and the Kehilites were already of such a mind that with David remaining, the former wanted to approach the city, the latter to deliver David into his hands, and that he did not want to change their wills or to free David by suddenly casting some terror or performing a miracle; to the second, besides the fact that it brings in manifest ruin to that universal grace, that those words of Christ are not to be taken in their rigor, but only as they satisfy the purpose of Christ, which there is to exaggerate the supreme obstinacy and hardness of those Galileans; which indeed he does here by a certain hyperbolic formula, as in Luke 19:40, which however does not bring in a necessary connection of the condition with its conditioned. For also in Luke 11 the Savior says, if these are silent, the stones will cry out, although in stones there was no disposition or power at all except obediential, that with the

disciples ceasing they would have burst forth in praises of Christ. Which solutions many, both of the Papists and of ours also, embrace. Our Amesius also, in order to show in the latter passage that the connection of the parts is divisible and not necessary, opposes a similar hypothetical statement from Luke 17:31, where Abraham says to the rich man feasting, If they do not hear Moses and the Prophets (your brothers), not even if someone rises from the dead will they be persuaded. Whence he concludes: if the Tyrians and Sidonians had believed, having seen miracles, they would also have heard Moses and the prophets. But they would not have done this, because being neighbors to the Jews they could not have been completely ignorant of Moses and the prophets, and if they could have, God ought to have, according to the Remonstrants, necessarily sent some prophet to men so disposed to eternal life, and so they would have been converted. I think those responses can be easily defended against the attacks of the adversaries; although I do not see the reason why in the latter passage we cannot follow the explanation of Rupert, Abbot of Deutz, who says: Therefore such signs were not divinely procured for the Tyrians and Sidonians, because they would have done penance only to escape temporal punishments, but not eternal ones; and to retain earthly goods, but not to obtain the kingdom of heaven, and with that fear dispelled, after the example of the Ninevites, they would have returned again to their former ways; as the Lovanians report these words of his to the illustrious Twisse, p. 169. But according to this exposition the mind of Christ would have been nearly such: if the impious Ahab, the impious Ninevites did external penance only at the external preaching and almost denunciation of punishment, the Tyrians and Sidonians would have done it much more, having seen the miracles that had been done among the Chorazites and Bethsaidites. In which there is nothing absurd, since even an unregenerate man can by the powers of nature do such an external and hypocritical repentance on account of fear of punishment, although otherwise dead to the truly spiritual good, and men are usually moved more by miracles than by the bare preaching of the word. However, there could not be a necessary inference in the words of Christ even so. But with these responses to the aforementioned passages having been admitted, the difficulties that lie hidden in the remaining testimonies of Scripture have not yet been satisfied, in which it cannot be denied that there is a necessary connection of the parts and a consequence of the conditioned from the posited condition; nor can it be said that the discourse is about what already is in the present. The Thomists, seeing that knowledge of such conditioned things cannot be denied in God, place its foundation in a conditioned decree which actually exists in God, from which those things are foreknown. Thus to all these passages of Scripture Diego Alvarez responds in summary in his work on aids, book 1, chapter 7, that the truth of those conditioned contingent futures is founded on the decree by which God determined to put into being the consequent of the same conditioned things, by effecting or permitting it, on the hypothesis that the condition itself were purified in being. Because, however, from the aforementioned conditioned decree the condition would not have been posited in being, therefore neither would the consequent itself have been posited in being. He adds in response to the second argument, that this decree is conditioned on the part of the object willed, and for that reason it is not necessary that it bring in a real change in the creature. In which if there were anything solid, all difficulty would now be removed; but I do not think it advisable for us to entrust our life to that leather boat in this stormy sea. For besides the fact that in those decrees the will of God seems to be suspended from a condition outside of God, for example, if this or that happens, by whatever cause, I will decree

and according to my decree I will bring it about that this or that follows; which however the Thomists would not want; we have also previously proven that the first and immediate decree of the divine will cannot be what is expressed by a hypothetical statement. And in this place I argue against them first thus: if through the decree of the divine will the whole future present and past being of the conditioned or consequent depends on the antecedent; so that with that posited by any cause, in any place and time, the consequent must be posited, and with that not posited it must not be posited; now by similar reasoning they ought to admit ideas concatenated among themselves and the presence of things in eternity. Or to say it briefly, if they want to establish here such conditioned decrees, they will also have to establish such conditioned ideas and presence of things in eternity. The reason is that besides the decree they also establish the ideas and presence of things in eternity as the basis for God's foreknowing, and they ought to derive both from the divine decree. But what in the end will conditioned ideas and the conditioned presence of things in eternity be? How will they themselves properly conceive of that and conveniently explain it to others without hesitation? Secondly: I ask, whether God has decreed anything absolutely about the condition or antecedent or not? If the first, then he has already either decreed that it is to be posited at some time, or not to be posited. If to be posited, then he has also already decreed that the consequent is to be posited, and thus both will most certainly be future. If not to be posited, then neither is the consequent ever to be posited, which therefore can in no way be future. If they say nothing has been decreed about the antecedent, as they wish, that the will of God is determined by prior reasoning about the outcome of the conditioned thing than it decrees anything absolutely about the condition; now nothing has also been decreed about the consequent, whose entire future existence is suspended from the future existence of the antecedent. Nor does it help, if they say that after the decree and through the decree it is suspended, before it was not: because when before the decree the condition is nothing, God will want Being to depend on Non-Being: indeed if we grant that it then immediately depends, when the condition is Non-Being, the event itself will also be Non-Being, and so the same thing will simultaneously be and not be, which is contradictory. Alvarez here seems to posit some absolute and explicit decree about the consequent and an implicit one about the antecedent or condition. For when in the work on aids itself, book 2, disputation 4, number 8. had said that in conditioned futures, which will never be posited in being, God had determined by a conditioned decree that the consequent would come about if the condition implied in the antecedent of the conditioned future were fulfilled, he soon adds: but since by an absolute and efficacious will he decreed that the consequent will not be future, by the same efficacious will he also determined that the condition of the same conditioned thing not be posited in being. But this way of decreeing in the most perfect deity seems to be established thus as rather imperfect. For whichever way you turn yourself, you are compelled to posit frustrated decrees in God and to multiply beings beyond necessity. For if you say that in a prior moment of reasoning, that is, before the absolute decree, the conditioned decree was made, for what use will it be to want a thing suspended from an uncertain condition beforehand, which you afterwards absolutely do not want to be? If in a posterior moment of reasoning, I ask again, for what use, when you already before absolutely do not want the thing to be? Then if an explicit decree were to be formed about one or the other, it seems it should rather be formed about the antecedent condition than about the consequent, because the condition itself is something prior

to the consequent itself and as it were its cause, since the whole basis of the future existence of the latter depends on the former.

13. From our side, William Twisse, to whose most learned lucubrations we are much indebted, although he protests that it is by no means pleasing to him to call the decree of God conditioned; yet he himself does not bring forward an approvable response to the passage of 1 Samuel 23, when in place of the conditioned thing he substitutes some general purpose or decree of God about moving his creatures in a way congruent to their own natures and that God from an inclination of mind in the Keilites and from that general decree predicted those things to David: and that it would not have been fitting for the provident divine administration of things to compel them unwilling to free David from the hands of Saul, book 1, chapter 27. The same thing is noted by the Expurgator of Suárezian Metaphysics, Dr. Revius. But it is clear: 1. because as there is no conditioned decree, so also, properly speaking, there is no general decree of God, which we now more often inculcate. And since a thing cannot pass from the state of possibility to the state of any kind of future existence, except through the divine decree, which pill the most learned man proposes for his adversaries to swallow on almost every page, it seems amazing how he could have persuaded himself that future existence was given to so many distinct things by some one general and therefore confused decree. It is clear 2. because God not rarely moves creatures contrary to their natures and dispositions, as so many miracles and miraculous changes of minds teach. Which could not escape the notice of even that most learned man when he added that this congruence admits an infinite latitude impenetrable to demons or angels: as if, namely, to act above nature or against nature is also to attend to the congruence of nature. It is clear 3. because from that dangerous way of speaking it seems no less possible to gather middle knowledge, in combating which monster, however, that most learned man labored so greatly, than from that opinion of Molina establishing that God, from a supercomprehension of any created free will, sees what it would do in these or those circumstances. For that supercomprehension includes both an inspection of the natural disposition and of the innermost fibers, so to speak, of free will, and of that general proposal about congruent motion, as Twisse says, or as we could say otherwise, a knowledge of certain general maxims, namely: that free will, as eight, would act thus in those circumstances, otherwise in others, another, as six, again otherwise in the same circumstances, and so forth. Except that our Twisse wants that general decree to have been established by God and Molina wants the knowledge of such maxims to be sought from the very nature of creatable and created wills: which, however, takes away nothing from the main point. But with that knowledge posited, it would be necessary for the most learned man to admit a long augue of other Hypothetical opinions and other absurdities no less known than despised by him. With all of which the most learned man would be burdened even more because he thinks the fittingness of divine providence is harmed if God departs from that general decree: and yet, as I at least persuade myself, the most learned man himself would not affirm it was harmed either when he restrained Abimelech, already tacitly preoccupied in thought with illicit embraces of Sarah, as if by a bridle, or when he compelled Pharaoh, most stubbornly wanting to detain the people of Israel in servitude, to release them by so many calamities. And this is one thing that appears in the accommodation of that response to the present example; the other is that the most learned man supposes it was of the nature and natural disposition of the Keilites to have a mind to

deliver David into the hands of Saul: which, however, was plainly free and contingent and variable in a thousand ways with nature unharmed. Here I will adduce no other proof than what the most learned man himself supplies, who acknowledges it is in God's power either to strike with dizziness, or to suggest sounder and never before conceived plans, or to prostitute men to diabolical illusions, or to keep them immune from diabolical tricks, even by suddenly changing the face of external things, to supply material for adopting new plans. But if he does that, will he be said to do violence to nature or to compel men unwilling? By whomever it may be said, certainly it will not be said by the most learned Twisse. So much for his opinion. Our terrible enemy of Pelagianism even after death, Amesius, examined this matter better and set it forth more accurately than he, who in his Rescription against Grevinchovius, chapter 15, says: This too is worthy of accurate contemplation: that the decree of God is conceived either as a formal and explicit statute, or as implicit and virtual, which is included by virtue of another decree: but that it is given as only implicit in conditioned contingent futures, which never exist, because by virtue of an actual decree they would exist if this or that were posited. God would have decreed to free David from the hands of the men of Keilah by means of flight, not by a change of minds beyond the usual order. From this actual decree flows that contingent conditioned thing: if David does not flee he will be betrayed. And in this sense he says he said that a conditioned future rests on a free decree and is therefore understood through the knowledge of vision, which is not only of those things that are absolutely future, but also of those which would flow from an actual decree already made if this or that condition were posited. I do not remember having seen the terms of the distinction, also read elsewhere, so accommodated by anyone to the present business except by Amesius. Which when I had once read related by another according to his mind, I rejoiced that a lid worthy of Jesuit and Remonstrant plates had been found by so great a man, from whose talent nothing but the polished could come forth. For the response seemed to square with the present passage in such a way that nothing could be more apt. But that man, most worthy of eternal remembrance, does not yet seem to have satisfied himself here, when he forewarns that his concept is worthy of accurate contemplation. And so it also seemed to me when I later called it back for examination, that in some examples a place could not ineptly be assigned to it and that distinction could also have its use in other controversies, yet it was not equal to removing the whole difficulty raised here at once and for all. I was stuck, first in this very passage which Amesius cites, because, when it had first been replied that Saul would come to besiege the city, it did not appear how this would flow from that decree. And although I could see that scruple easily removed by positing some new decree, namely: I will not place an impediment, besides David's flight, before Saul when he wants to go to Keilah with the army on account of David, whence it soon follows, if David does not flee Saul will come; yet in very many other examples vast abysses and deep chasms occurred, out of which I could not swim by the bark of that distinction. There occurred to me especially the words of Elisha to Joash, if he had struck the ground five or six times, he would have destroyed the Syrians to extermination. There occurred to me the words of Christ to the disciples: If he asked the Father, more than twelve legions of angels would be sent by him. I thought it a crime to doubt even the truth and necessity of the inference, and yet into whatever forms I turned myself, from those things which were done in time and therefore truly decreed by God from eternity, I could form no decree whence through evident and necessary consequence those implicit decrees could be explicated and brought forth into the open from lying hidden by virtue. For it seemed inept to refer back the

words of Christ to this actual and explicit decree: I will indulge my son Christ whatever he will ask; because it would be an inept decree as being confused and too universal, embracing many as it were vague individuals and for that reason unworthy of God. Finally, when among others our strong Rhatorfortius was also read, he seemed to have responded most accurately of all and to have shown the way to the mind hesitating in doubt, which would lead straight to the citadel of truth. Therefore, from him I suppose this as a most certain and undoubted foundation: That the will of God is not indeterminate, doubtful, or suspended with regard to any beings, either which actually are, or which are in potency whether at some time to be actualized or never to be led into act, or having in itself potentiality, suspension and privation of second act, such as is found in the created will, but that it is, as Scotus says in 2, distinction 27, question 1, through the eminence of its act with respect to every being determined from eternity. Because, as the Prince of the Hypotheticals Suárez acknowledges, Metaphysics, chapter 2, disputation 30, section 9, number 42, when it is said that God can will and not will, that can does not express active or passive potency, but only expresses the indifference of the same act as it is terminated at this object. As in the example: when I say that God can love John and hate Peter, that can does not express potency actualizable in God or indifference of his will itself, but only the indifference of the act or divine volition, as it is terminated at this object and is called love; as it is terminated at that one, and is called hate. By this little verse not only can all those passages of Scripture, with which the leaders of the Hypotheticals have sprinkled and defiled it, be purged of the filth of middle knowledge, but also by this battering ram every Decree in God that is Conditioned, Antecedent, Non-peremptory, Congruent, Disjunctive and whatever is akin to nonsense among the Hypotheticals about the will of God is strongly shaken and overturned. But, to distinctly explain the matter in the present difficulty from this presupposed foundation, as I have conceived it: I consider two states in the object of divine knowledge, of possibility and of future existence, but three moments. The first, when God, by looking at his omnipotence, saw what could be done by him without contradiction. The second, when he predetermined with himself by an absolute decree the modes, connections and concatenations of all things possible to be done, that is, what would or would not be cause, what effect, what means, what end, what prior, what simultaneous, what posterior; but with this caution, if he wanted them to be future. The third, when he made a distinction among those things predetermined under such a condition, with that condition left to some and such a decree added: I do not want them to be future; but removed from others and such a decree substituted in place of it: I want them to be future. In the third moment I establish that a thing is at last drawn out from the state of possibility into the state of future existence; in the first two it remains in the state of possibility, with this difference, however, that in the first he knows them through his nature and before every act of will, in the second after an act of will. Nor should it, first, seem surprising here that I establish an act of the divine will concerning a thing that will never be future but will remain in the state of possibility, because this is also admitted by the Prince of the Hypotheticals, when in the same place, number 49, he wants the change, which he calls objective, to be understood in its way even in things that will never be. For, he says, by this very fact, that God has decreed that they never be, they are understood to have some relation to existence, which of themselves they did not have. For of themselves they were as it were indifferent, but by the decree of God they are determined never to exist. And this change alone is sufficient, that it also fall under knowledge in another way: for now they are known through the knowledge of vision, as never future. Why

therefore should we also not be allowed to say about things that will never be, that God decreed, if he wanted them to be future, that they would happen thus, then, that he does not want them to be future. Nor, secondly, should it seem surprising that I seem to establish in the second of those moments some conditioned decree in God. For example, if I wanted those things to be future, I would want them to be future thus or thus they would be future; because this differs from the conditioned decrees of the Hypotheticals, previously attacked by us, as much as light differs from darkness and heaven from hell. For First, this condition is freely posited by God, is in God and can be freely removed by him, so that his will here is suspended from no other uncertain condition outside himself. Whence, Second, no imperfection of velleity is established in God since there is nothing that can impede his holy desire. Third, because we do not say that the act of the divine will subsists and is terminated here concerning those non-futures, but in the freely supervening decree soon after: I do not want them to be future. Fourth, because this is necessarily demanded by the passages of Scripture alleged by the Hypotheticals, in which there is talk of future time and a firm connection between antecedent and consequent is found from divine prediction, so that we may understand how that connection of both parts was made firm not by chance and fortuitously, nor from the nature of the parts, nor from the congruence of certain circumstances, nor from some Stoic fate, but from the free decree of God. Whence, because afterwards they never happen, it is necessary in that moment for this condition to be understood: if I wanted them to be future. Fifth, because from the common instinct of pious men it seems not badly gathered that there is such a conditioned decree concerning non-future things. For if they themselves ask from God that if indeed he has decreed that they will be of assistance to them in promoting the cultivation of virtue and salvation, he should bestow them; but if an impediment and a snare, he should not bestow them; Likewise, if he has decreed to give them upright sons, whom he himself may rule by his Spirit, he should give them sons, But if otherwise, he should not give; I ask whether those desires of the mind are such that they can be piously presented to the heavenly deity? If they are, then God will give to his sons their heart's desire. If he will give, then out of two contradictories one will happen, the other will not happen, for example: he will bestow wealth or he will not bestow it. If he does not bestow, that non-bestowal was future from eternity, the bestowal was not: and yet the pious man here supposes a divine decree about that non-future bestowal, namely that the bestowal of wealth would be a snare to him. Here therefore I now fix my foot, secure from all Pelagian endeavor and from all the sophistic loquacity of scholastic records, even conceding, if they are anxiously laboring over it, that all those hypothetical statements, brought forward from the Scriptures, speak of what is future and not of what is present; likewise that there is a most firm connection between antecedent and consequent, so that as certainly as God is truthful, so certainly those things would have happened thus or thus, as they were foretold; with the passage of Matthew 11 about the Tyrians and Sidonians also considered before their final perseverance in sins and death. I say that God saw those conditioned futures from eternity and now still sees them, not through some middle knowledge but through the knowledge of vision, in his predetermining decree of the connection and concatenation, not only of all beings that will be at the predetermined time, in the third moment; but also of those possible to be done at any time, in that second moment. So that God in this moment can also know from his decree, if he wanted to create another world, how many angels and men would be in it; also what republics and who would be kings and princes in the

republics, who ministers of sacred things, who inventors and teachers of languages and arts: and what similar things the Hypotheticals want him to know through that middle knowledge. But for this reason no change happens in things in any difference of time, because by the supervening absolute decree God decrees that they not be future. So what have the Hypotheticals now achieved by their quibbles? Have they proved that there is some certain knowledge in God of such contingent futures before every act of will? They would indeed want this, but they will carve out nothing from those passages of Scripture for asserting that middle knowledge: which, snatched from their Sophistic claws, only prove this, that those things are certainly known by God, but not except after the decree of God: which we also gladly grant and utterly overthrows that middle knowledge.

14. Now then, after we have driven the Hypotheticals from every defense of the Scriptures, in which they are accustomed to boast themselves very insolently, it is not to be feared that they will profit much against the truth by certain distorted and sophistic reasonings. They indeed seem by the second argument, which Suárez considers primary, to establish by this figment of middle knowledge a certain outstanding wisdom in God, but in reality a human one, not divine. In men we confess that such middle knowledge would argue a certain remarkable wisdom and perfection, but one which at the same time would note their imperfection as creatures, dependent on another in being made, being, and operating, no differently than eating, drinking, sleeping, walking and other things of that kind. For men, by applying study, foreknow what will follow from this or that, if they undertake a matter thus or otherwise, lest they decree or apply means insufficiently suited for attaining the end, and the more diligently and accurately they do this, the more they are usually rightly considered wiser than others. But in this is now their imperfection, that they must find means suited to ends: but they cannot do what they want, what is suited. Shall we therefore here liken God to miserable little men and the most perfect creator to imperfect creatures? Who just as on account of his omniscience does not have need to exhaust himself with long labor and slow contemplation to know anything, so on account of his omnipotence should not fear that he will decree a means not sufficiently suitable for the proposed end, because means, however humble and abject they may seem, when he decrees them, he makes them apt, makes them lofty, strong, and efficacious for casting down the heights of the world and whatever exalts itself against God and the cause of God by the vain persuasion of its own wisdom, dignity, strength, and virtue. And shall we bind him to explore the nature of means before he wisely decrees anything, who even applies means of a contrary nature to obtain ends entirely contrary to their nature, no differently than if through water he were to heat or through fire to cool? He it is who produces light out of darkness: he it is who makes sins, by their own nature tending to hell and damnation, to be occasions for promoting the salvation of the elect, and for making their dry soul fruitful in the cultivation of faith, hope, and charity, no differently than fields not sufficiently fertile are fattened by dung and manure for an abundant yield of fruits of every kind. But apparently these are those depths of Satan, which it was first given to Fonseca, the most learned diver, to penetrate, whence he extracted for us this gem of middle knowledge, seen by no one before, heard by no one. Let us hear him declaring these things to us in his own words. Therefore, he says in the place cited above, section 8, we believed the matter to be in this way, that just as those who wisely undertake some great work, first think with themselves what will follow from it, before they absolutely and

determinately decide to do it; so God the Best and Greatest, according to our way of understanding (understand of the Pelagianizing Jesuits), before he wanted by an absolute and determinate will to found the world, as if deliberating with himself, thought what would follow, if he were to establish the heavens and the earth and all things which are contained in them in this very way and order in which he disposed them. Indeed it would have been better for this man to have taken a dose of hellebore not at all small to cure that insanely healthy brain, before he conceived of God thus deliberating: it would certainly have expelled a great part of such gross humors, which disposed him to form such gross conceptions about that highest creator. And who are you, Fonseca, who are you, Molina, who are you, Suárez, who are you, other Jesuits, new promoters of the mystery of iniquity, that you dare thus with unwashed feet to invade the secret and fearsome counsels of God and to change his wisdom into the wisdom of the sons of Adam, so that unless he has foreseen all the fibers and little fibers of the human will, he can wisely decree nothing. Hear, if you want to be instructed, the most holy prophet of God thus refuting your deliriums. Who among you has examined the Spirit of Jehovah? So that a man from his counsels has taught him? With whom has he communicated counsel, to instruct himself, and teach himself the way of judgment: teach himself, I say, knowledge and make known to himself the way of highest prudence? Behold, the nations are considered as a drop from a bucket and as the flicker of dust on the scales. ---- All the nations are as nothing before him, they are accounted by him as less than nothing and emptiness. Isaiah 40. Hear, if you know how to be ashamed, that puffed up Monarch from paganism, after a life spent in the field with the beasts, with mind returned blessing the Most High and singing the praises and glory of him who lives forever: that his dominion is an eternal dominion and his kingdom for all generations: But all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing and he does according to his will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth, and there is none who can restrain his hand, or say to him, What are you doing? Daniel 4.

15. And let us, with him himself supplying strength, run without weariness this way of ours and pursue the fleeing crowd of arguments that remain from our face, unwarlike though they be, until none remains any longer. And behold, the third one contends that there is given before every divine decree some knowable object, which can be referred neither to the knowledge of simple intelligence, nor to the knowledge of vision, as those are taken in the schools, namely a future under a condition, in between a mere possible and an absolutely future and indifferent both to future and non-future existence. But do these good men think that we will acknowledge them as Dictators in Theology, like humble subjects, who submit ourselves to their dictates with blind and simple obedience? Nothing less. We are not Pythagoreans, indeed not even Pythagoras himself; we are not Papists, indeed not even the Pope himself. Therefore, let them prove to us, if they are men, that there is given before every decree of God some such knowable object; let them bring forth for us causes besides the divine decree, by whose force and efficacy something merely possible can be raised from the state of its possibility to any kind of future existence. As long as they do not do this, and they will not do it for eternity, let them not think that we can be frightened by those specters and phantoms of arguments. But indeed, although here the adversaries lack the strength to bring any solid proof, yet the will is not lacking to foist a specious one in place of a solid one. For they contend: that there is given such a knowable thing, because, they say, the concurrence of the will with God and its own determination is

independent of the will and concurrence of God: and therefore, abstractly from the will and concurrence of God, that is, before every divine decree, it can be known what the created free will would will and do, these or those conditions having been posited. We acknowledge the consequence, but how do they prove the antecedent? First, because the concurrence of God is only in the effect, not in the created will, and therefore the concurrence of the will is independent of God. But this is to prove a doubt by an equally doubtful thing, because we establish such a concurrence as being in the highest degree injurious to the supreme majesty of God, which makes man not subordinate and subject in operating, but an associate and equal to God. Secondly, they prove it because the order of operation to the second cause does not depend on the first cause. But although it may not depend on the first cause terminatively, because just as there are different terms, so also, with respect to the terms, there are different orders: yet it does not follow that it does not depend effectively, that is, as to its entity and production, or so that it is exempted from that essential and intrinsic subordination which a creature expresses to its creator and therefore to the divine rule, direction, and providence, just as the relation which is between father and son indeed depends terminatively on the son alone, but effectively also on God, on heaven, on the father, on the mother. Indeed, it will not be difficult for us to show that even the concurrence of the created will, as such, is not independent of the divine will and concurrence, by these peremptory demonstrations. First: What is contained within the breadth of created Being cannot be independent of the will and concurrence of the creator, because this implies a contradiction. But the concurrence of the created will, as such, is contained within the breadth of created being: Therefore. Second. No creature in its being made and being can be independent of God. Therefore, neither in its operating; for the reason is the same on both sides. But now a creature would be independent of God in operating if its concurrence, as such, were independent of him. Because therefore the former is false, the latter is also false. This truth dispels all the shadows of doubts by its brilliance and seizes the adversaries into assent even against their will, so that even that political monk from the congregation of the Fulians, I mean, Peter of St. Joseph, in disputation 4, section 2, of his suave Concord, wants it noted at the very beginning: That it is doubted by no one that for the knowledge of futures under a condition the divine decree is in some way necessary (alas how difficultly the truth bursts forth from unwilling hearts!), since nothing can be future either absolutely or under a condition, unless God as first cause wills to concur to it. The words are clear and explicit, although otherwise both in this very section and in the whole book the faithful disciple sings the same song with his Jesuit masters. There are not, therefore, any conditioned futures which constitute a peculiar and new object of divine knowledge, but the following should be established about them according to the truth. First: In which conditioned futures the antecedent and consequent are essentially and necessarily connected with each other, so that that connection has its necessity in first and common principles, from their formal nature, primarily, per se, through all things, necessarily, as, if you join twice two, you will have four, if a stone becomes a man, it will become a rational animal, and similar things, which have an immutable necessity independent of the divine decree, those God knows through natural knowledge and the knowledge of simple intelligence. But those are not contingent conditioned futures, but necessary ones; because although it may be contingent in itself and free with respect to the divine will that man be given, yet it is simply necessary that if he is given, he will be a rational animal: and about these there is no question between us and the adversaries. Secondly, in which conditioned futures the antecedent and

consequent are accidentally connected from their own nature, but necessarily from the divine decree alone, through an extrinsic respect, such as are contained in nearly all the passages of Scripture which the Hypotheticals are accustomed to cite here, those God knows after his decree, through the knowledge of vision, because nothing merely possible can in any way be future, except through the decree of God; about which we already had Peter of St. Joseph as a confessing defendant. Indeed, what is more, we extend this also to those conditioned futures which have a natural necessity from an intrinsic and natural principle, but one that can be impeded, and not entirely immutable, as if there is fire it will burn, because it did not burn in the Babylonian furnace, Daniel 3; if there is iron it will sink in water, because it floated in the time of Elisha, 2 Kings 6; and as there, so in a thousand other places God, if he wanted, could concur with fire, with iron, and with any heavy object. Therefore, with those conditioned futures also revoked in this way to the two received kinds of divine knowledge, no third object remains on account of which some third or middle knowledge in God must be established.

16. The fourth argument of the adversaries is equally as weak as the third. For they say that in those contingent conditioned futures there is given before every act of the divine will both a certain and a determinate truth. Which indeed what else is it to say than that there is given a second truth, which is not from the first truth, that there is given in contingent things certitude and determination to this or that part of the opposition, without a certifying and determining cause. But, they say, before every divine decree contradictory propositions can be formed about them. And what then? Therefore they will have determinate truth, because one part of every such contradiction is determinately true, the other false. Here indeed we not unwillingly concede this to them: that whenever one part of a contradiction is determinately true, the other is determinately false: as also this, in any moment in which one part is determinately true, the other is false: but that the same holds in any moment from which or moment of reasoning; this indeed is what we would want proven by them. For if you consider these contradictory statements in the moment of reasoning which precedes every act of the divine will, that is, before the cause by whose force this part is determinately true and so the other false, neither is determinately true, neither determinately false, but each indifferent to truth and falsity: because, to take the example brought forward by the adversaries, just as before every divine decree the very extremes, Peter, being constituted in such an order, and denial of the Lord, are non-beings, not true, not knowable; so also the relation which we conceive between Peter, as subject, and being constituted in such an order, as adjunct; likewise between Peter constituted in such an order, as efficient cause, and denial of the Lord, as effect, or rather defect, is not a relation, not an entity, but an abyss of nothingness and mere possibility: and therefore neither true nor false, neither knowable nor ignorable. The reason is evident, because as no effect before and without its cause, so also no being in any way future, before and without the decree of God, the highest Being; from whom, as from the font of all Entity, just as the entity of the extremes in those propositions ought to flow forth, so also the connection and mutual respect between the extremes. And entirely the same response holds for that other way of proving of some concerning disjunctive statements, because that necessity of disjunction is founded on the nature of contradictories.

17. In the fifth argument Molina first presents himself, who wants God to be able to know those conditioned futures certainly for this reason, because God most exactly comprehends the nature of any created free will. Against whom we proceed thus: if this is a sufficient reason why God knows those conditioned futures; now he will also certainly know what his will is going to will on any occasion, because he knows his will no less exactly than that of any creature. But the latter is false according to Molina. Therefore, the former also. Again: if that reason is sufficient, there must be given some occasion in which the created will is not indifferent, but is certainly inclined to this part of the opposition rather than that one, because otherwise it cannot be known that it will act thus rather than otherwise. But according to the Hypotheticals such an occasion cannot be given. Therefore, the reason is not sufficient. Nor should his clamors frighten us here, by which he says this is unworthy of the perfection of divine knowledge, indeed is impious and does not at all cohere, because he says it, he does not prove it: nor has he been able to frighten his Jesuits by those clamors thus far, who depart from him in this opinion. When they have purged themselves before him of that crime, we will then see whether something of that sort will be worth the trouble on our part. Let Suárez now succeed, who with Fonseca does not want those things to be known by the power of the cause but from the certainly future event. For if you ask how God can know this determinate effect in those conditioned things? He responds, because the cause would truly be determining itself in second act to that act. I do not now ask how he understands this, that those things are not known by the power of the cause, which he without doubt understands in a copulative sense, when it is true only in a disjunctive sense, that is, as the second cause is considered in itself, the natural subjection to the decree and providence of God not having been considered: if the effect is already determined and the second cause is to be determined to it, I ask this, whence and by what cause is that determination? Here let Suárez unfold his wit, if he has any; this is Rhodes, let him dance here. Certainly it is not from itself, because nothing is the cause of itself: not from the second cause, because that, before the production of the effect, being indifferent and undetermined at every moment, cannot determine it: also not from the first cause, because that too, according to the Hypotheticals, keeps itself indifferent, until it sees to which side the balance of the created will inclines, before it neither certainly decrees nor determines anything. Whence it is made, if God sees such a conditioned future, that he sees a non-being, a non-knowable, and therefore sees nothing. But to Suárez indeed the future determination of the effect seems to be from itself, because he rejects the first and second cause from the future determination. Although we have already closed off this way to him, yet, lest he be able to hope for any exit here, many obstacles and disadvantages can be shown not with difficulty, which render this way entirely impassable. For first, if God sees the effect already before, not by the power of the contingent cause, determined in itself, outside its causes, then he does not see it as contingent, but as necessary: which indeed is a grave ἀτόπημα from the mind of the Hypotheticals. Secondly, there will be something besides God, which has being in itself and from no cause. Thirdly, the second cause will be necessarily determined to it, because out of all possibles this already before and outside its causes had from eternity future and determinate being. This is an inescapable labyrinth of contradiction, from which Suárez will not find an exit, by whatever sophistic quibblings he may also attempt it. But Suárez still forbids his associates to despair here, who acknowledges that a commensuration between this knowledge and the object should not be sought, because it is not certain from the certitude of the object, but only from the eminence and perspicacity of the

divine intellect, which is able to know these objects more certainly than they are knowable. For those things, he says, just as they are not from eternity, so are uncertain of themselves and consequently no reason for such knowledge can be given on the part of them. Nevertheless, God by his infinite power knows them and as it were conquers that difficulty. If you object that those things involve repugnance and contradiction, because just as the divine power cannot make what is not of itself makeable, so neither can divine knowledge know what is not of itself knowable, and that there should altogether be an adequation and commensuration between the certitude and infallibility of the knowledge and the object: He responds that a twofold relation should be distinguished in the object, one of a principle, when there is some entity or reality in the object itself by which it can be the principle of some knowledge; and that such an entity is not given in the object of this knowledge. The other as it were of a term, when it can determine the divine knowledge, even if from eternity it does not have an eternal existence to God, but only for its own times, so that this termination is only an extrinsic denomination coming from the knowledge itself. But such a distinction is nothing but a disgraceful begging of the principle, which perhaps may daub the mouth of boys, but will not satisfy a man of sense. Is it not contradictory for some object to be said to terminate knowledge which does not have terms, except only through an extrinsic denomination, which does not have a foundation in the thing, but in the knowledge? Indeed, just as what is not makeable cannot terminate the divine power, or receive from it an extrinsic denomination of such termination: so also what is not knowable will not terminate the divine knowledge through an extrinsic denomination. And as the one, so also the other expresses manifest repugnance, in which Suárez is constricted with his associates, like a mouse in pitch, whatever he may strive against it to the contrary. The reasons of Fonseca, by which he strives to confirm that the truth of free contingent futures should be judged not from causes, but simply from future events, should also be seen and examined in passing. But it should be noted here that it is a less accurate way of speaking, to say that those things are known from causes. For although as to know is to know a thing through its cause, so to foreknow is to know beforehand, yet the Philosophers from whom that way of speaking is taken, did not extend that knowing and foreknowing this far and by cause they understand that one by whose force alone and with respect to which the connection between antecedent and consequent is necessary, the rest being excluded. But it is clear that in this place that is the divine decree alone extrinsic to contingent things, since no intrinsic one is given. But what then is the necessity to altogether conjoin second causes in themselves without that decree and consequent concurrence, utterly indeterminate, to the first cause in assigning the reason for foreknowledge? We grant to Fonseca, therefore, what is also most true, that from second causes precisely and separately considered those things can in no way be foreknown. But his reasons directed against the first cause also are mere reasonings and rather trivial. To the first we say: although statements about those contingent futures often say absolutely that a thing will be or will not be: yet no one can have certain, accurate and solid knowledge of the truth which is in them, unless the causes and their relation to their effects are known. And why do you trifle with such an argument. Common people, when they speak about those futures, or wise people in a common way, say absolutely that a thing will be or will not be: Therefore the truth of those statements should be judged from the event alone and from it certain knowledge of those futures can be had already before. Even a wise man does not judge that he has certain knowledge of something, unless he knows a certain cause on which that effect is founded. I do

not hope that the Jesuits will want to conform God himself to the dregs of men rather than to the wise. To the second we say: again, what he posits is conceded, but what he infers does not follow. We know a statement about those futures is now true, such as the thing will sometime be in being: but for him to infer from this that the truth of such statements and of the futures enunciated by them should be judged from the event alone, let him prove to us how the future thing will have existence, unless from a certain and determinate cause and therefore how the truth of such statements can be known, the cause not being known whence the future thing has its future and present certain existence. For what he mutters about the event either affirmative or negative that will really be, that has been abundantly refuted in the solution to the fourth principal argument. To the third and last we say: It is not doubted that statements about such futures are determinately true or false before God, but it is doubted whether they are from elsewhere than from the cause whence is the determinate truth or falsity in futures, that is, from the divine decree, the first and infallible cause of all future existence, absolutely deciding about things that will thus or otherwise be. But this is the rock which the Hypotheticals shun and when it comes to proving, the most loquacious Sophists stand more mute than fish.

18. The matter has come to the Triarii, the last refuge of the opposing side, with which removed there will be no cave into which they can withdraw any further. For they try here to persuade us that that knowledge in God is supremely necessary for defending other truths clearer than light. What is to be thought about that knowledge we have already seen enough and in the future, God willing, we will see still more. We say, therefore, that just as in practical matters, according to the admonition of the Apostle, evils should not be done, so that good may come about, so also in theoretical matters false, vain and inept things should not be fabricated so that true things may be defended. Indeed, if some conflict seems to intervene between these true things and other true things, and someone wants us to conjoin those true things, we will respond rather with the most learned Cajetan, that we know that the true is not contrary to the true, but we do not know how to join these true things, just as we do not know the other mysteries of the faith which we believe, than that we want to invent something false for forming a concord according to our intellect or to admit the invention of others. But the most religious Jesuit Fathers seem to care little for these things, for whom as it is not a matter of religion to support the tottering seat of Antichrist by pious frauds and tricks, so neither to defend the Pelagian opinion against adversaries by inept and vain inventions. However, they should by no means be angry with us, because we do not embrace with both arms this middle knowledge, the conciliatrix of Truths, as it seems, so liberally offered by them; which not only among their Dominican Monks, but not even to their thrice Best and Greatest God and Pontiff Clement VIII himself, however crafty Sophists and shrewd promoters of their affairs, could they prove. But indeed we do not see what the Hypotheticals can greatly desire in those received truths, that they strive to persuade us that the use of that middle knowledge is so necessary. For first, how will Suárez prove to us that God cannot wisely decree anything, unless this middle knowledge is presupposed? Is it because the will of itself is a blind power? But let them be ashamed to accommodate these things to the most perfect will of God which are said only of the created will for that reason, because its object is not found in itself, but in things outside itself, of which it is not the cause, so that it must of necessity be led by the intellect to its object; which is far otherwise in the divine will, which, because it is the cause of all future, present, and past existence, itself forms its object for itself,

so that it does not of necessity have to be led to it by the intellect. Nor meanwhile are we so absurd that we want to deny that there is some essential order between the object of the intellect and the object of the will both in the human and in the divine will; but that order is preserved through the antecedent knowledge of possibility in the object to be willed, which the knowledge of simple intelligence provides, through which it happens that understanding precedes willing in God and willing proceeds from understanding. The Hypotheticals cannot urge anything further, without at the same time having to establish the necessity of that middle knowledge even in those things which are not at all dependent on the freedom of the will: which they have not done thus far: except that Becanus mentions that one was of that opinion. But I grieve that a certain Theologian often cited from our side joins himself to that kind of men in this cause. But he does not seem to be going to be so importunate an adversary, whose whole attack consists in that it hardly seems possible for the immutability of the divine decrees to be defended without that knowledge; to whom if you oppose that it seems good to others, I do not see what further the most illustrious man can contend. And so it certainly is. For when God proposed life to the first parents under the condition of obedience, he did not thereby teach what he had decreed would be or would not be, as the words of the most illustrious man must necessarily be understood: but rather to what he obligated his creature, with the unowed promise of retribution of reward having been added: which agrees perfectly well even without that conciliatrix knowledge and consists without a change of the divine will. But what, I ask, is this: that God subordinated another decree to the prior covenant and decree? Does the most illustrious man think that God wanted primarily and principally to save man through works, but at the same time decreed from the foreknowledge of the fall through this knowledge, if he were to fail of that end or that means were to be rendered useless, to save through faith? For I see no other sense in those words. But indeed, if it is not absurd to conceive such things about God, now by the same work, let the whole cause of grace be handed over to the patrons of nature, because this is the basis of the whole of Pelagianism: that the Most High can be frustrated without his own frustration. Indeed, I see from what beginnings those things proceeded, and in what way those fig-leaf coverings of middle knowledge were sought. But those things touch us little, who establish another order of the decrees of God than he himself. For just as in the temporary execution of the decrees God first creates man just and whole, secondly enters into a general covenant of works with him, thirdly permits the fall, fourthly discriminating between men thus far equal, leaves the reprobate in that violated covenant of works under the curse and after temporal death eternally damns them, but with the elect enters into the covenant of grace in Christ the mediator of that covenant, calls them through his Spirit and the preaching of the word to the communion of his kingdom, justifies them on account of the merits of Christ, apprehended by faith, and adopts them as sons: through the Holy Spirit dwelling in them sanctifies them more and more each day, and through death, having been most fully extracted from the state of misery, assumes them into heavenly glory: so in the eternal decree or intention according to the order of the end and means between themselves we establish that it is had in a contrary and inverse way; although otherwise we easily accede to the most learned Twisse establishing that all those things which God does in time around the elect have the nature of one means in the eternal decree, the end of which is the glory of the divine mercy: those which are around the reprobate, likewise of one, the end of which is the glory of the divine justice. These are those fearsome mysteries of eternal predestination to be revered with humble silence, exposed like a

square battle line, consistent with itself from every side, secure from dangers and destruction from every side. Lest we leave anything untouched, the same most illustrious Man thinks, although bringing forward no reason for his opinion, that without that knowledge it cannot be explained how God is not the author of sin by his decree. But we with other Theologians not of the lowest bench have already shown that without that knowledge. But from abundance we also add this, if there is any disadvantage here, his opinion will be equally, not to say more, liable to it as ours. For does he not want, although not consistent with himself, the future existence of those actions, which he both constitutes as the object of middle knowledge, among which he also makes a place for sins, to depend on the conditioned decree of God? But there appears here no reason why, when he establishes that these actions indeed have their being from an absolute decree, but those from a conditioned decree, God is not similarly the author of those actions which receive their being from a conditioned decree, as of those which receive it from an absolute decree. When he himself has extricated himself here, he will have extricated us by the same indeed easier work. Let us see what truth about the divine intellect cannot be defended without the protection of that middle knowledge. Evidently this common voice both of Scripture and of nature, that God is omniscient. For, as Fonseca contends, the number of the Predestined will be uncertain to God. I confess that this must be said in the way of the Hypotheticals, where the divine decrees are suspended from the free will of man, not in that of the Absolutes, where the free will of man is suspended from the divine decrees. But to suppose one's own way as true in disputing, and the contrary as false, is to make oneself a laughingstock to adversaries. Others say that many and infinite questions can be proposed to God by man in those free conditioned futures, which nevertheless, on account of the condition never to be posited, are never going to be, to which God can respond with nothing certain. But we can respond to them with something certain, namely: that there is no such question imaginable by a human or angelic intellect, to which God cannot clearly respond, the condition having been posited if it were thus and so. But how? We have already declared this enough before in the response to the first argument of the opposing side, namely: that God knows those things from the free decree of his will, by which he predetermined with himself from eternity not only the modes and connections of things to be in time, but also of things never to be and only possible to be done, but with this difference, that he wanted the former to be done, the latter he did not want: which nevertheless, if he wanted, would be future just as he had predetermined. Thirdly, without this knowledge the adversaries think that the certain and infallible providence of God cannot be, because without it he cannot apply means accommodated to the proposed ends according to the natures of things. Which is certain if God, according to the opinion of the Hypotheticals, disposes all things sweetly and does not also according to the Absolutes reach from end to end mightily. But since the former is uncertain, indeed false, what is deduced from it is also uncertain and false. Indeed, this is the rock of offense, on which the beaked ships of the Hypotheticals always run aground, that without reason, without Scripture, indeed against reason, against Scripture they think that the creator finds congruity and aptitude in means to the proposed ends, but does not give it through the decree. Finally, however, they object that Gordian knot about establishing a concord of the divine decrees, foreknowledge, and providence with free will, which has exercised the talents of the most learned men for many centuries now, which they think is insoluble without the sword of that knowledge of theirs. But let them have for themselves that suave concord of theirs, which the Spirit of the flesh, swelling with the persuasion of its own

excellence, has taught them, not the Spirit of God sounding the words of humility into the intimate ear of the faithful soul. We do not want that concord, which would subject God to man, the creator to the creature, and if those things could not at all be reconciled between themselves by any powers of the human, I add also angelic, intellect, we would prefer, all freedom having been dismissed, to be slaves, than, the glory having been snatched from God, to be sacrilegious. However, even before the invention of that conciliatrix knowledge, labor was not expended in vain by the most learned men for so many centuries to find such a way of concord, which modest human talents could tread without offense. Behold, so many years ago Thomas Aquinas, a Papist in other respects, here Orthodox, pointed it out with intent fingers in the middle of the papacy: and he still points it out not only to his disciples, but also to the very adversaries of his doctrine on this point, if only they could lift their eyes accustomed to darkness to the light of such perspicuous truth, which our Amesius also teaches from the mouth of Aquinas, Antisynod, article 1, chapter 1, thesis 31. Indeed, to reconcile the freedom of the will with divine foreknowledge does not contain a very great difficulty in itself, since every difficulty about foreknowledge is from the decrees predetermining and the efficacious execution of the decrees, which at first glance seem to touch the very root of freedom. But we have also removed the former difficulty without that middle knowledge in the preceding disputation: on which point others proceeding more rigidly with the adversaries cut off from them every handle for disputing with one word, saying that as foreknowledge in the intellect, so decrees in the will are indeed operations to the outside, but remaining in God and not immediately exercising themselves outwardly. Wherefore, if any difficulty still remains, it should all be referred to the divine power and the actual providence of all things in time according to the eternal decree: about which we will have to deal in the following disputation. Meanwhile, however, lest a response promised for the future perhaps generate a sinister suspicion in the minds of the adversaries, we Say from abundance in this place first: That not even according to their own way is this knowledge necessary to explain the concord of divine providence with free will; because there is not even an apparent discord between those two, if you establish the universal concurrence of God, indeterminate and indifferent to this or the opposite action, but to be determined by the creature both to the exercise and the kind of action; in the way the concurrence of the sun is determined by the one generating to generation, by the sculptor to the making of a statue, by the baker to the making of bread, by the tailor to the making of a garment, by the shoemaker to the making of a shoe: which no one ever dreamed fought with the freedom of the will. But the adversaries teach such a concurrence of God, as can be seen in Bellarmine, Becanus, Molina, Fonseca, and whom not? But how truly they establish such a concurrence is not a matter of the present inquiry. We Say secondly: Granted that through this knowledge alone the greatest difficulties of Theology can be explained with the easiest effort, which cannot be explained in another way, for that very reason it is rightly suspect, because it supplies such an easy response in the gravest theological questions, especially in those which the Holy Spirit himself has sealed as inaccessible to human talent, a seal of inscrutable depth having been attached, as it were, as is the eternal mystery of divine predestination and its execution in time through infallible power. And yet as William Gibieuf also observes with Theodore Smising, most students of Theology among the Papists descend into this opinion about middle knowledge not on account of its reason and foundations, but on account of the facility which it exhibits for explaining that difficult mystery of the concord between the freedom

of the created will and the efficacy of grace, and the certitude of divine foreknowledge and providence: which indeed seemed inexplicable to Augustine and other ancients, indeed also to the Doctor of the Gentiles himself, by human talent. And the same Smising testifies elsewhere that the aforementioned opinion also pleased him at one time, on account of that facility which it exhibits, but, by long consideration of all things which have been written on this question, it finally displeased him. We Say thirdly: Even proceeding from the conceded hypotheses of the adversaries, it is very far from being the case that that delirium of the Jesuit brain, namely, middle knowledge, is of any avail for reconciling the most certain intention, foreknowledge and execution of the divine with created liberty, and for unraveling the difficulties which were accustomed to be moved of old about those points. For first, since in it the action of the created free will is considered, prescinded from every action and concurrence of God; according to the adversaries, there is given between the concurrence of God and the creature a distinction not real, but of reason only. Now I ask: Whether therefore that concord depends on the operation of our mind, or on that fictitious distinction, which is simply a non-being? And what if the mind does not think about the distinction of those concurrences, since the action of both is one and indivisible, will there then, all concord having been immediately dissolved, be discord and conflict? It does not seem likely. Secondly: In the divine mind this way of concord is not valid. Therefore, simply it is not valid nor should it be valid among us. The antecedent is proven, because God does not conceive as distinct, what are not really distinct. But the concurrence of the created will and the divine are not really distinct: which both the adversaries teach. Therefore, God does not conceive one without the other or explain the aforementioned concord through such an abstract concept. What will the adversaries say here? That their seraphic Fonseca, most illuminated Molina, and jubilated professor of sacred Theology Suárez grasp a reason of concord, which not even God grasps? Even if they are most impudent, I still cannot persuade myself that they have rubbed their forehead in this way.

ON CONDITIONAL OR MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE IN GOD, FOURTH AND LAST SECTION.

By the Author and Respondent M. MATTHIAS NETHENO of Reessen.
For the 16th of July and 24th of August at the usual times.
Presenting Our arguments against Middle Knowledge.

19. And now, with all the forces of the adversaries having been routed, what remains but that we give the very citadel of middle knowledge, stripped of all defense, to be plundered at the given sign and overturned from its lowest foundations. Therefore, let our first argument be such: The distribution of divine knowledge into the knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision exhausts the whole nature of the knowable object. Therefore, no middle knowledge is given. The consequence is most evident: therefore, labor must only be expended on the antecedent, which I prove thus: Every knowable object is either in the state of impossibility, which expresses repugnance to existing; or in the state of possibility, which does not express it; or in the state of existence, which can again be distinguished in a threefold way according to the diversity of

existence; the state of futurity, of future existence; of presence or actuation, of present existence; and of past, of past existence. But now whatever is in the state of impossibility, from which God extracts no beings, likewise whatever is in the state of possibility, from which he extracts many to the state of existence, all this, however much it is, which is certainly the greatest, God knows all that through natural knowledge and the knowledge of simple intelligence, before his every decree, because for knowing those things nothing is required besides an exact knowledge of the attribute of divine omnipotence, which is natural to God. Moreover, whatever is in the state of existence, whether future or present or past, God knows all that after his decree, through the knowledge of vision, because nothing can be raised from the state of possibility to any future existence except through the decree of God alone: which even the adversaries do not dare to deny, and if they dared, it has been proven enough before this and is to be proven still more in what follows.

20. Let the second argument proceed thus: Of whatever object is not knowable, no knowledge of it is given in God. But a conditioned future, before every act of the divine will, is not knowable. Therefore, no knowledge of it is given in God. The major is acknowledged: The minor is proven thus. First: Whatever object is of its own nature indifferent to future and non-future existence, or is no more future than non-future, that as future is not knowable. But the object of middle knowledge, which the adversaries do not dare to disavow, is such. Therefore. Again: What object is necessary by no necessity, that is not knowable. But the object of middle knowledge is necessary by no necessity. Therefore. The minor is clear, because since there is a twofold necessity, of the consequent from the antecedent cause of the thing, and of the consequence from the antecedent principle of the conclusion, neither is given in the object of middle knowledge. Not of the consequent, because that cannot coincide and stand with the contingency of the consequent. But to want that removed is the negation of natural free will, which cannot remain unharmed with contingency having been removed. Also not of the consequence; because no principle of infallibility is given in the nature of things, from which without the danger of error this conclusion may be inferred: Therefore that is future, the condition having been posited. Third: What object is true by no truth, that is not knowable. But the object of middle knowledge is such, Therefore. The Minor is proven; in which there is neither first nor second truth, in that there is no truth. But in the object of middle knowledge there is neither first nor second truth. Therefore. Not first, because that is God alone. Not second, because it is not from the first, for example, in this conditioned future: if David remains, Saul will come to Keilah, with every determination of the divine will having been excluded, there cannot be a second truth, because the font is blocked up through which that truth could have emanated from the first truth, without which no second truth is given. Which truth is also so perspicuous by its own light that it draws even unwilling minds to assent, nor does it allow itself to be obscured by any clouds of sophisms. Fourth: it is allowed to argue thus from the concessions of the adversaries: God before his decree cannot certainly foreknow an absolute future free act, as they themselves acknowledge. Therefore, neither an act future under a condition. I do not doubt that consequence seems ridiculous to the adversaries, but it can be confirmed by the best reason, even proceeding from the lesser to the greater. A free act future under a condition is also less knowable than one absolutely future. Therefore, if God cannot certainly foreknow the latter before his decree, much less the former, which is known with more difficulty. The

antecedent is clear because a conditioned free act is more remote from act, therefore from the knowability of act, since each thing is knowable just as it is in act. Fifth: What, in the category of a future thing, is a non-being and nothing, that is not knowable, because knowability follows the mode of being in which it is founded, so that something cannot be determinately known as present, past, or future, unless it has such determinate being. But the object of middle knowledge in the category of a future thing is a non-being and nothing, because when it is not considered here as present and now having determinate being in itself, but only as future and having being in its cause, no cause can be thought out or given before the divine decree in heaven or on earth or in any imaginary spaces whence it would have its qualitative future determinate being. Therefore, it is simply not knowable. Sixth: if in some way the object of middle knowledge were knowable, the futurity of the consequent ought to be able to be known certainly from the apprehension of those statements by which it is usually expressed. But this is false, because since a conditional statement posits neither the antecedent nor the consequent in being, but they only express the connection of the parts, which can be true with both parts false, and false with both parts true, as the schools of Logicians teach: if from the position of the antecedent the position of the consequent ought to be known certainly, the connection between both parts must be necessary. But in those conditional statements, for example, if the Tyrians had seen those miracles, they would have done penance; with every act of the divine will having been excluded, there can be no necessary connection in any way whatsoever, because it is not from that highest and absolute necessity by which alone things contingent in themselves according to future being determinately determines from eternity in a certain way. Therefore, the connection is contingent, fallible, and thus false. They indeed try to evade here by the aid of some distinction; but through an entirely impassable way. For by a new and hitherto unheard-of invention they try to persuade us that there are two kinds of conditional statements, certain argumentative ones, in which by force of the antecedent the inference is formal and necessary; such as those about which the Logicians are accustomed to teach; but others of simple coexistence and affirmation of one thing about another, under such a condition: which therefore have hitherto been unnamed by the Logicians: about which Becanus the Jesuit, treating in On the Knowledge of God, question 6, says: that they are hypothetical as to form and mode; but as to sense equivalent to categorical ones, in which one thing is simply affirmed of another: nevertheless differing from both, from hypothetical ones, because the consecution is not necessary in them, but only conjunction; from categorical ones, because they do not affirm something simply, but under a condition. What a wondrous kind of statements! And the Hypotheticals, I believe, in order to defend the monster of middle knowledge would not hesitate to transform into some monster not only Logic, but even Philosophy and Theology itself. For who in this way would easily allow himself to be persuaded that the logical doctrine cultivated for so many centuries by the most felicitous minds before and especially after Aristotle has hitherto labored under such great imperfection, that only now after the invention of middle knowledge must it be learned from the Hypotheticals how many and what are the species of conditional statements; when the thing itself manifestly shows that they, cast into flight and extreme straits, wanted, by the invention of that second genus of conditional statements, to cast a certain cloud before our eyes, so that they can no longer be recognized, which nevertheless it is very easy to dispel to their even greater confusion by the flashing rays of truth. For first, coexistence is either necessary or contingent, either certain or uncertain, either infallible or fallible; unless perhaps by

dreaming they have also found something middle between these; which because thus far they have not yet declared, we will still indeed argue as from concessions. If therefore the first, the consequence is good in them and the consequent is rightly inferred from the force of the antecedent, because one who proceeds thus will never be apprehended to have argued falsely. If the other, they must confess that no certain knowledge of it can be given, in which there is no certitude. Again, is it not ridiculous to deny that those statements are illative, when they themselves constitute them in the place of a proposition in the discourse through which God is advanced from this middle and conditioned knowledge into the absolute knowledge of things. For first, according to them, God proceeds thus before his every decree: if Peter is called in those circumstances of things, he will assent to the calling. Then making an absolute decree about the condition, he assumes: But he will be called in those circumstances of things. Hence he then infers and understands through the knowledge of vision: Therefore, he will assent to the calling. If it is a good syllogism, now the major will have not a simple coexistence but a necessary connection of the consequent with the antecedent. If they do not admit this, now they make God arguing worse than man. But they not only place these conditional statements in the place of majors in such syllogisms, which is enough to demonstrate the nature of consequence between antecedent and consequent, but they also construct in the antecedent the cause of the consequent, which having been posited the effect infallibly follows. But has the priority of nature between cause and effect also been removed in that new Logic, so that proceeding from the position of the cause to the position of the effect, we make no consequence, but only some coexistence and conjunction? Perhaps copulative statements will also be frustrating in the future and handed down in Logic only to vex beginners, by which we have hitherto been accustomed to express conjoined and coexisting things. At least they will not be necessary. And Logic teachers must be warned in the future, if they want to hand down the discipline entirely, not to forget to hand down a certain new equipollence between these copulative and conditional statements. Finally, if for forming hypothetical propositions only coexisting parts are required having no illative connection between themselves, will he not hereafter prove himself a good Logician who says: if that is an animal, it is a rooster, it is a donkey or something similar: if it is a man it is learned, it is lame, it is blind, it is beautiful: likewise he writes, walks, learns, teaches, and what are the other things of that kind either adjuncts or effects which can ever coexist with man: if a stick stands in a corner, the sky is round, John is in Rome, the Emperor will dance, and infinite things of this sort.

21. But let us now proceed from here to the third argument which is thus: If some middle knowledge were given in God, there ought to be some cause by whose force the will is infallibly determined to this part, not that, in this or that occasion. But there is no such cause. Therefore, neither is middle knowledge given. The consequence of the Major is manifest: first, because since there is some determinate effect of the will indifferent and undetermined of itself, necessarily some cause of it must be assigned; for nothing determinate in created things is without a determining cause: Secondly, because without a cause God cannot understand any effect, because his understanding is most perfect. Whence if they say that God knows those things from the future event, as we heard in the preceding things, I ask whether the knowledge of God will not be much more perfect, the very cause also having been known, which they will not dare to deny. But the Minor is proven thus: If there is some such cause, it will be either the

divine or heavenly concurrence, or angels and men present and instigating, or the will of man itself, or its complexion and individual properties, or the object, or place, or time, or certain of these conjointly, or all at once: for other causes hardly seem to be. And none of all these is it. Not the divine concurrence, because that of itself is indifferent and accommodates itself to the inclination of the will, just as the concurrence of the sun accommodates itself to the natures of sublunary things: indeed, it does not hold itself on the part of the cause, except in some way and in appearance only in the works of supernatural grace, but holds itself on the part of the effect, flowing into it together with the will. Also not heavenly concurrence; because that too is indifferent and acts immediately only on the body and the animal and vital spirits, not on the rational spirit or the soul itself. Not angels or other men, because neither can they do anything in the will by real efficiency, but as the heavens by their influences, so they can dispose our will to this or that by moral efficiency only, not determine it. Not the will of man itself; because since that, all things required for acting having been posited, is and remains indifferent to acting or not acting, likewise to acting this or another thing, it is accidental to it that it is determined to this part precisely, not to the opposite. Not complexion or individual properties, because those too can only induce and dispose, and if the determination were from them, since they are not in our power, man would act from the necessity of nature; which is repugnant. Not the object, because no object proposed to man on the way can efficaciously move or determine his will, but only entice it. Not place, because that is not natural to the will, as the lowest is to a heavy thing, the highest to a light thing; which is said to contain, draw, and conserve what is located in it. Not time, because that has no efficiency, not even in bodies, much less in spirits. Also not certain things conjointly, or all at once, because whatever you posit or compose, the will always remains indifferent to this or that part. Nor will you be able to think out anything in the world which according to the Hypotheticals takes away this indifference from the will and determines it to this precisely, not to that part. It remains, therefore, that either Chance, a certain new God and President of human and angelic wills, determines them, or Fate involves all divine and human things by the hard law of necessity: which indeed we will say afterwards is a necessary consequent of this knowledge.

22. Now let us proceed to the fourth argument which is such: If that middle knowledge is given in God, there will be given some calling congruent, by which God so aptly accommodates the place, time, preacher, words, and all circumstances to the nature and capacity of the one called, that the man in such circumstances most certainly yields assent to the divine call to faith, which he would not yield in other circumstances and occasions. Nor do I think we must labor much in showing the force of that consequence (although I understand that from the flock of the Remonstrants and even from the Jesuits themselves there are not lacking those who by a certain crass ignorance or inadvertence both defend middle knowledge and reject the calling congruent), because it is also most clear to one understanding the terms of middle knowledge and congruent calling that such a calling is founded only in middle knowledge and that middle knowledge having been admitted, this must be admitted as a necessary consequent. The one thing so demands the help of the other and conspires in friendship: which even the greatest part of the Hypotheticals gladly acknowledges. Now let us proceed: But some such congruent calling is not given. Therefore, neither middle knowledge. The Minor denied by the adversaries exhibits a new controversy which could therefore be treated with more arguments and more accurately,

as was done by the most illustrious Twisse in Vindications, book 1, title 2, about Election, Digression 6. We at present confirm our opinion by these arguments 1. Because congruent persuasion, even instituted by the most excellent orator, is not always efficacious in natural things, since Rhetoric is not properly the faculty of persuading, but only of speaking aptly for persuasion. Therefore, much less in spiritual things, which are still of a higher order. 2. Because any Gospel persuasion is not efficacious in the regenerate; which the most grave and not without horror to be named lapses of the most holy men of God testify. Therefore, none in the unregenerate, since no such persuasion is more congruent to an unregenerate man than any to a regenerate one. 3. Because no congruent persuasion can be given or thought out for a man not yet reborn: for, as Scripture testifies, such a one is dead in his sins, Ephesians 2:1, Colossians 2:13, and therefore has no power, more or less proportioned to eliciting acts of spiritual life, with which any external persuasion whatsoever could be congruent: just as a man dead by bodily death cannot be excited or disposed in any way by any powers of Tullian eloquence, by any Demosthenic thunderbolts, to rise again to bodily life. But our Twisse also beautifully shows in this place that nothing can be obtained in the unregenerate by any persuasion whatsoever, whether you try the matter in the category of the pleasant, or the useful, or the honest, because it is more bitter to an unregenerate man than death itself to bid farewell to Satan, the world, and his own flesh, and he holds the utility and honesty of heavenly things in mockery with mind fixed on the earth. 4. Because by the one speech of Peter held on the day of Pentecost about three thousand souls were converted, Acts 2:41, which indeed seems impossible to happen through congruent calling, because as each man differs from others in face, speech, and gait, so also in complexion and disposition. And those hearers of the Apostle also differed in nation, some Parthians, some Medes, some Cappadocians, some Arabs; they differed in sex, some men, some women; they differed in age, some adolescents, some youths, some men, some old; finally they differed in way of life and dignity, some merchants, some craftsmen, some learned, some unlearned; and similar things, which in such a great multitude of men produce an almost infinite variety, to which to so accommodate speech that it is congruent to all seems entirely impossible. 5. Because there will be able to be given some rational creature which through the absolute power of God cannot be saved, another which through absolute power cannot be damned. For if in those circumstances the calling of that man is congruent, in others it is not, it does not imply that some man or free will can be created by God with respect to which no congruent calling is given, or even with respect to which no incongruent calling is given; because a reason cannot be given why it is more repugnant in all circumstances than in some, or in these more than those; likewise why at least for one hour it cannot be given in which no calling incongruent to the former, hence congruent to the latter, can be given? And what is the reason of one hour is the same of a week, a month, a year, and the whole life. The adversaries themselves also acknowledge the absurdity of that opinion and to avoid it are accustomed to reply with this: although indeed here there is no metaphysical contradiction, yet there is a moral contradiction, that is, it does not seem possible that out of so many thousand ways known to God through middle knowledge at least one is not suitable for any created man which can constitute a congruent calling, or even another which can constitute an incongruent calling, but those moral Theologians should know that we care little for that moral non-contradiction, since our metaphysical non-contradiction here drives them into a corner, nor does it allow itself to be constrained or bound in any way by that moral non-contradiction.

23. Now follows the fifth argument and one sufficiently evident of itself for convincing and by its efficacy overturning that middle knowledge from the lowest and first foundations. The object of middle knowledge is simply a non-being and nothing. Therefore, the knowledge itself is not knowledge. We undertake the proof of the antecedent thus. If a conditioned future, before the divine decree, is a being or something, it will have its entity either from its own nature or from another cause outside itself. Not from its own nature, because by its own nature it is indifferent to future and non-future existence and no more future than non-future. 2. Because otherwise it would always be future, never present or past. For what is an adjunct from nature, that is inseparable from its subject at least in generic and specific nature. Also it does not have its entity from another cause outside itself, determining by its force that indifference of nature to future and non-future existence to future existence: because that cause will be either outside or inside God. Outside God there is no agent in second causes of such power and efficacy that it could sublimate things constituted in the state of possibility to any future existence whether absolute or conditioned. Then that future existence was from eternity before the world and times were founded. But from eternity there was no creature, much less that it could have operated anything or operated in very act itself. Therefore, the cause of that eternal future existence must be sought within God. And if you consider the nature of God with his attributes both incommunicable and communicable, you will be able to find no other cause of that future existence, whichever way you turn yourself, than the will and decree of God. We heard that monk Peter of St. Joseph confessing that above. With whom also Penot, convicted by the force of truth, asserts in book 3, chapter 31, proposition 1 of his Bulwark from Augustine, that the Divine decree is the principle of being of all contingent futures. But the words of Augustine himself are these, Enchiridion, chapter 95: Therefore, nothing happens unless the omnipotent wills it to happen, either by allowing it to happen, or by doing it himself. When, therefore, the Hypothetical Doctors remove here every act of the divine will, do they not also take away all entity of the object of middle knowledge? Since with the solitary cause having been removed, the solitary effect is also removed, is the unshaken canon of the Logicians. What, therefore, remains whence the volition of the creature or its effect, of itself only possible, is certainly future for that instant? Or what cause can now be assigned for that transmigration from the state of mere possibility into the state of future existence? Will they say that the volition and effect is future for this reason, because the creature will so will and so act? But this is, with only the words having been changed, to want to foist by Sophistic way of arguing as certain and undoubted what is in question. Because that itself is what is asked: namely, whence it happened that since the creature of itself is equally not going to will as going to will, equally going to do something else and the opposite, it is certainly going to will this and so act in this instant? For to say the creature will in those circumstances, expresses that the volition of the creature of itself merely possible is certainly future for such an instant. The adversaries therefore stick and will stick here, like little birds on branches smeared with birdlime, and the more they will strive to extricate themselves or vibrate their wings by a sophistic motion of talent, the more they will prostitute themselves as ridiculous to all sensible people. But indeed they say that they acknowledge equally with us that nothing in any way can be future except through the divine decree. Meanwhile, they do not think it necessary that some decree actually be in God about those conditioned futures; but it is enough if it were in God, the condition having been posited.

Which they also otherwise express thus: Although here a pre-existing free decree in God is not supposed, yet it is supposed as needing to be posited on the hypothesis, so that the effect could emanate from it. But they will not escape thus: because if the future existence of the effect is from the divine decree as from a cause, it is now necessary that it not follow but pre-exist before, since with the effect having been posited the cause ought not then to be posited but to have been posited already before, lest the wagons draw the horses. If therefore God knows the effect before the cause having been posited, it remains and will eternally remain that he knows a non-being, and thus not a true thing, not a knowable thing. Secondly, do those men not overtly enough overthrow the eternity of the divine decrees, while they suspend them from temporary conditions, which having been posited they are to be posited? Therefore, perhaps the whole plan of administering the world and directing man by his providence is not yet certain enough with God; since it can happen that with various occasions and motions of free will occurring, he still founds new decrees daily. Thirdly: Since they themselves want that free decree needing to be posited to consist in this, that he approves a good thing, or permits an evil thing: do they not by that very fact deny that the divine decree is in any way a cause from which the future existence of things ought to emanate? Because that approbative or permissive decree receives the future existence produced from elsewhere, and who may say whence?, and presupposes it as already antecedent. Fourth: from their own words and hypotheses I form such a dilemma against them: If a free decree must be posited so that the effect could emanate from it: it must be posited either freely or necessarily. If freely, it can not be posited and thus the effect be not future. How therefore will it be or be foreknown as future? If necessarily, now God's freedom in forming decrees about things to the outside is taken away; which is absurd, not to be tolerated in the schools of Philosophers or Theologians. Thus far, therefore, the first proof of the antecedent with its defenses has been a little more prolix: the following will be more contracted and more succinct. Therefore, the second proof is thus: Things have no possibility before and apart from the power of God whence that possibility flows. Therefore, they also have no future existence before and apart from the decree of God whence that future existence flows. Therefore, such a conditioned future existence of the adversaries is a non-entity and the very conditioned future itself before every decree of God is a non-being. Again: between the absolutely possible and the absolutely impossible no middle is given. Therefore, neither between the absolutely future and the absolutely non-future. Therefore, what is imagined as a middle is a non-being. Finally, no idea of those conditioned futures is given in the divine mind. Therefore, they themselves are non-beings, because of all things which God knows, there is some idea in him. The antecedent is proven thus: An idea in the divine mind pertains either to speculative knowledge in God and is a cognitive principle, or to practical knowledge and is an exemplar to be expressed in creatures, as Thomas teaches in part 1, question 15, articles 1 and 3. But the idea of such contingents cannot be referred to either aforementioned genus of idea. Therefore, it is not given. For it does not pertain to speculative knowledge, because such an idea before every divine decree represents the quiddity of things and existence only as possible, in no way as future; also not to practical knowledge, because such an idea after the divine decree represents a thing as actually future according to its actual existence.

24. Just as in fertile soil a great abundance of absurd consequents arises from the most false invention of middle knowledge for the abomination of the pious and of the adversaries

themselves, if any sense remained for them, so that we can without any trouble even measure them out in whole bushels for the exhilaration of the cultivator of grain. For first, this knowledge strikes against Logical truth, handed down even by nature itself, which is: that a connected statement, if it is true, is necessary, and if it is not necessary, it is not true, because here not the truth of the parts but of the consequence is considered, which can be given with both parts false. Thus, if a donkey flies, it has wings, is true: If he is a teacher, he chastises the student, is false: because there the consequence is true, here fallacious and false. Which is manifest, if indeed for constructing the full form of a hypothetical syllogism, you append the assumption and conclusion in each example. For instance, But a donkey flies. Therefore, it has wings. But he is a teacher. Therefore, he chastises the student. If here you suppose the assumption as true, you will have to either deny the consequence of the proposition, which you cannot do in the first example, where it is necessary and true; you can in the second, where the consequence is contingent and false: or you will have to admit the necessary truth of the conclusion: no other escape is open here. But this knowledge denies that a connected statement is always necessary if it is true, but that a true one can be given which is not necessary. For example, if Peter is constituted in such an order of things, he will deny his Lord: and what are others of this kind. Indeed, the adversaries invent, in order to avoid this dart, a certain new genus of conditioned statements from parts having no consequence between them but mere conjunction and coexistence. But that they cannot defend themselves by the futility of that invention was shown enough in the second argument. Another certain interpolator of universal grace and middle knowledge says that that common axiom about conditional propositions is true in the Logic of wretches, but not in the Logic of God. But was that new Logician seized to paradise in this last old age of the world and admitted to inspecting the most high Logic of God, so that he could dictate to us so magisterially that what is truth here among us in the light of nature is falsity there in the light of glory? Indeed, unless he brings forth for us other proofs, we will not easily allow ourselves to be persuaded that God, the author of natural light, has sown darkness for light, falsehood for truth in our minds or a second truth which is not subordinated and agreeable to the first. Vasquez with his disciple Luis Turrianus seeks another escape here, who do not urge coexistence and mere conjunction of one part with the other, nor take refuge in a certain hidden Logic of God, but acknowledging the common truth of divine and human Logic, mint for us a twofold genus of consequences in those statements: one in necessary matter necessary, as can be reduced to some universal proposition: the other in contingent matter, indeed contingent, when a consequent is inferred from a singular antecedent which could have not followed, nor can a reduction be made to some universal proposition, yet true and good, because it should suffice for the truth of that consequence, if the consequent really follows from the antecedent. If you ask how in those contingent propositions there can be any certain connection; for an example they adduce the words of Elisha to Joash, 2 Kings 13:19: If you had struck five or six times, you would also have struck the Syrians to consumption; where they say the connection was from the promise of God: which should be observed for similar propositions. I do not want to say now that they disgracefully beg the question here while they suppose what is in question, namely, whether any such conditioned future existence is given which has a true but not necessary connection; I only say this, that those great Doctors stick here implicated so miserably in thickets of contradictions that they deserve to be laughed at even by beginners. For what? Will the connection of that and similar propositions be from the divine promise, of others

perhaps from a threat; and yet be seen by God before his every decree through the telescope of middle knowledge? But are promises and threats of this kind not from free will but from the divine nature, so that it is not a matter of indifference for him to form them thus or otherwise? Even if the adversaries are blind enough, I still do not think they will lapse this far. Furthermore, if the truth of that connection is from a divine decree, what danger is there in at the same time calling it necessity - but with the decree having been posited can the connection conduct itself otherwise than has been decreed, and if not, why, I ask, will that connection not be called necessary in this respect? Indeed, if it is true from a previous decree, without which a promise or threat cannot be, it will be necessary, not by a necessity following, which the adversaries establish as coming from the divine decree, but by an antecedent necessity, from which they shrink as from a rock. The thing itself compels the Jesuits to confess that they were seized by vertigo when they committed those things to paper and gave such an illustrious testimony, even unwilling, to the truth which they solely strove to obscure and fight against. But if meanwhile there are also certain other propositions here whose connection according to them is not from a promise or threat, that is, from a previous decree of God, the Jesuits ought to give us another cause of it. But if they do, however much the Sophists may scratch their head, they will not be able, we will see then what must be responded further. But enough about this now.

25. This knowledge also denies or overturns very many truths manifest partly from the light of nature, partly from the light of Scripture, which lest we wander through uncertainty for the sake of better order we reduce either to the Will or to the Intellect or to the Power of God or to these three faculties at once. As for the Will of God, therefore; First, this opinion establishes the absurdity of absurdities: That there is given in created things a certain futurity before every divine decree, and that for producing that futurity a decree to be posited, the condition having been posited, or a decree accompanying the object of that knowledge, is sufficient, not actual but in the mode of the possible. As if indeed with the effect having been posited the cause is then to be posited, or as if for certain futurity a possible decree, which can not be, were sufficient; or as if from an accompanying decree a consequent necessity emerges, as they otherwise contend. And not only this but also Secondly in a similar category it establishes another no less serious absurdity; namely that after the determination of the divine will about the complete non-futurity of things, nevertheless some futurity still remains. For example, this order of things having been chosen by God, with all others having been rejected and ordered not to be; that it nevertheless remains true that in another order of things, these or those slippery and uncertain conditions having been posited, this or that, which could equally not happen as happen, would certainly happen. Thirdly: By this knowledge a reason and cause of divine predestination could be assigned on our part. Because since between conditioned and absolute knowledge an essential order and natural dependence of one on the other is found, so that without that previous knowledge through this God can know nothing; such an order will also be found between the objects of those knowledges, so that without a previous conditioned future an absolute future cannot be. Therefore, this will depend on that either as an effect on a cause, or at least as something regulated and conditioned on a rule and necessary condition: for in a prior moment of reasoning Peter is understood in those circumstances of things as going to assent to God calling and going to persevere in grace, before God can make some orderly and rational decree of predestination about him; so that the reason of the order in the means to the

supernatural end, foreseen in the prior moment, takes on the nature of the reason of predestination in the following moment, nor is the latter ever given without the former. Which error is kindred to the ancient error of Faustus Bishop of Riez and the Semipelagians, whether we consider it affirmatively or negatively. Their affirmative opinion Prosper in his letter to Augustine reports in these words: But that those who are going to believe and who are going to remain in that faith which is henceforth to be aided by the grace of God, God foreknew before the foundation of the world; and predestined into his kingdom those whom he foresaw would be called by grace and would be worthy of election and would depart from this life with a good end. That is, to speak briefly: That man was predestined from foreseen faith and good works: which can be understood in two ways, either after foreseen faith and good works or on account of them. That the proposition is true in both senses Becanus openly contends, so that no Semipelagian could more openly. But Fonseca, Molina, Suárez, and others speak more timidly, saying: although the good use of free will, foreknown by God through middle knowledge, is not the cause, reason, or condition on account of which God predestined some, nevertheless predestination was not made without the foreknowledge of the good use of free will that would be: on the hypothesis that man was placed in such circumstances, so that the foreknowledge of the future free will is the condition without which the decree of conferring the means to salvation on adults would not have had the nature of predestination, but would have retained the nature of common providence; which Arminius seems to have learned from them, when against Perkins he says that internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit sufficient is applied from the decree of providence, with certain foreknowledge that it will be rejected: but efficacious persuasion from the decree of predestination, with certain foreknowledge that it will be accepted and will work faith and conversion. But that this follows from middle knowledge is more manifest than that it needs to be proven and the aforementioned authors gladly acknowledge it. Whence Bellarmine indeed truly and rightly establishes that no reason of divine predestination can be assigned on our part, not even the condition without which he who is predestined would not be predestined: yet not congruently either with middle knowledge or with congruent calling. Those authors, therefore, openly defend the negative opinion of the Semipelagians and also the affirmative one, if it is explained from foreseen good works through after foreseen good works. For their negative opinion Alvarez, citing it, expresses thus from Faustus himself, On the Grace and Will of the Human Mind, book 2, chapter 3: Unless foreknowledge has explored, predestination decrees nothing: of which we have a fuller explanation in the same place, chapter 2: They badly understand the foreknowledge and predestination of God who assert that the cause of human acts arises from there; and in the letter of Prosper to Augustine, where he says they teach: That all industry is removed and virtues are taken away if the constitution of God prevents human wills: and that under this name of predestination a certain fatal necessity is introduced, or that the Lord is said to be the founder of diverse natures, if no one can do anything other than what he was made. An egg is not more similar to an egg than the opinion of the aforementioned authors to this negative one of the Semipelagians and also to the affirmative one according to the prior explanation. Indeed, although with Becanus they do not so crassly profess that God also chose men on account of foreseen good works; nevertheless, that they are also not entirely immune from this error can be clear from this; both because they acknowledge no other cause of predestination either within or outside God (For they acknowledge the Good Pleasure and will of God as the cause of placement in such an order of things and also of the decree about that

placement, but not of the decree of election, the immediate object of which is grace and glory, not however such a constitution), and also because they do not establish the good use of free will with respect to grace as the effect of predestination; which they should altogether do if indeed they acknowledged the will of God as the sole cause of predestination, and finally because all the certitude or incertitude of predestination, as to outcome, is founded on this foresight alone of the good use of free will. They must, therefore, either establish an irrational decree of predestination, made rashly and fortuitously without any cause within or outside God, or they must necessarily acknowledge that foreseen good use of free will as the antecedent condition, reason, and cause of predestination, since congruent calling and constitution in such an order of things is only a contingent occasion, in no way a cause of grace accepted and rightly applied, and does not attain to the formal nature of predestination. Add to these another argument from the very hypotheses of the adversaries themselves, who teach that Christ and Mary were predestined to a certain higher eminence of glory before all the rest of the saints, because God foresaw that they would use free will better than the rest. Where they openly establish the better use of free will as the cause of a certain higher and nobler predestination. Which I show thus: because the principal cause of that better use is either grace or free will. Not grace, because if on account of greater grace they had used it better, now they would not have used it better than the rest; as is evidently apparent in a similar case. For if three horses of equal strength draw three hundred pounds, and two of them draw two hundred pounds: those three horses, as to the internal powers of drawing and their exertion, do not draw better than the two: so someone with grace as three, bringing forth the fruit of repentance as three, will not use free will better than another having grace as two and bringing forth fruit corresponding to it. It remains, therefore, that free will itself is the cause of that better use, which now having been foreseen beforehand is the cause of predestination to more excellent glory. Whence I argue thus. As the more excellent foreseen use of free will is related to more excellent predestination; so the less excellent foreseen use of free will is related to less excellent predestination. But the more excellent foreseen use of free will is related to more excellent predestination as cause to effect. Therefore, also the less excellent use to less excellent predestination. Therefore, also every good use to every predestination. Which was to be proven. Fourth: Predestination, therefore, with respect to that knowledge should rather be called postdestination than predestination with respect to the temporary object, because to middle knowledge it expresses an essential order which cannot be absent: to the temporary object, an accidental order, which imposes no necessity for being. Furthermore, and Fifth: In this arduous matter of eternal predestination, as regards the reprobation of certain men, no worse than others and yet passed over, it will not be necessary with the Apostle to take refuge in the absolute power and dominion of God over his creatures and to restrain the foolish reason of foolish man tumultuous against God with this muzzle, saying, O man, who are you to answer back to God? Will the thing formed say to the one who formed it, "Why have you made me like this?" Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for special purposes and some for common use? Romans 9:20-21. Here is a more expeditious and plainer way for such a man: it should rather be said to him: With the decree of your Reprobation standing with God, it was contingent not only with respect to you but also with respect to God himself that you be made a vessel for dishonor. God only placed you in such a state of things in which you also, according to the indifference of your liberty, could have believed, worked well, and been saved, whatever

he had decreed, indeed God could not have reprobated you, even if he had wanted, unless already before his every decree, he had foreknown that you in those circumstances of things would reject the grace and divine calling according to the innate liberty of your will and would finally die in sins. Thus Paul, thus the Hypotheticals? How do bronze coins differ from lupines? Sixth: There will also be no reason why we should exclaim with the Apostle: Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths beyond tracing out! Because now the Hypothetical divers have penetrated to those depths. For they will say he chose this one for this reason, he reprobated that one for this reason, because he foresaw before his every decree that this one in those circumstances of things would believe, would work well, and would persevere to the end, or if at any time he falls from the grace of God, would repent before death, but that one in those circumstances would reject grace, or if he accepts it, would not persevere to the end and would die in sins. I know what they respond here, namely: that the abyss of inscrutable divine judgment consists in this, that although God had known infinite circumstances of things in which even the Reprobate would have accepted grace and been saved, equally as those who are actually elect, and likewise infinite others in which the elect would have withdrawn from the way of salvation and thus eternally perished, no less also than those who are now actually reprobate: he chose the order of things which he saw was congruent for leading the former to damnation and death, the latter to salvation and life. But we have now proven that there is agreement in the opinion of the Hypotheticals about the causes of eternal predestination with the ancient Semipelagians, who leave no abyss here. And lest the adversaries err, thus the choice of this order of things over another perhaps congruent to these for whom the present is incongruent, or incongruent to others for whom the present is congruent, is not some abyss of divine predestination, but rather, if we want to judge according to the Scriptures, some deep thing of Satan recently penetrated by the Jesuits. The reason is because eternal predestination has for its formal and immediate object grace and glory infallibly annexed to it to be conferred on the predestined, which are parts and grades of one and the same divine blessing. Similarly, if we speak of Reprobation, the true and immediate object of which is the denial of grace, a means on the part of God for manifesting the glory of his justice in the damnation of some, to which sin of the creature, the cause of damnation, as an effect, infallibly follows by a hypothetical necessity: as our side sufficiently proves both from the Scriptures and reasons drawn from there, and the Thomists themselves in the middle of the Papacy in their writings on the aids of divine grace. But truly of that decree which they pretend here, if through an external respect it is also compared to true predestination, the proper and immediate object is placement in a congruent order of things; if with true reprobation, in an incongruent one: which is far different. Indeed, not even to that placement does the conferral and reception of efficacious grace or glory in the elect, or the denial of grace and therefore sin in the reprobate and damnation on account of sin, follow by accident and contingently. By what rack, I ask, will the Hypotheticals extort for us such a predestination or such a reprobation from any Scriptures or Fathers who fought orthodoxly and with the Scriptures against the Pelagians? Let them try and do whatever they want, it is certain that by none. And this is one reason: the other is because that Pauline abyss extends to all predestination and reprobation: and all predestination and reprobation contains that abyss, or let them show us an exception. But truly that Jesuitic abyss does not extend to all predestination and reprobation, nor does all Jesuitic predestination and reprobation contain that abyss in itself. For they themselves acknowledge

that it does not imply a metaphysical contradiction that a man be given for whom no order of things is congruent, or another for whom none is incongruent. What if God now wants to predestine the former and lead him to most certain glory, to reprobate the latter and damn him on account of sins; will he say, as if constituted with Hercules at the crossroads? Either the liberty of those men must be violated; or the former must necessarily be reprobated and damned, but the latter Predestined and saved. A hard condition! It is clear, therefore, that neither is that Pauline abyss the same as the Jesuitic one, nor is Jesuitic predestination and reprobation the same as the Pauline one.

26. As for the Intellect of God, First: middle knowledge makes frustrating in God the knowledge of simple intelligence. For if it is necessary in God, before every act of his will, to foreknow what would be from free will in this or that disposition of things; for what end, I ask, is the knowledge of simple intelligence here? Will not God be able to know something that will be under a condition from the creature, unless he has already before seen that it is simply and absolutely possible? But I say: what from all eternity, even in a moment of reasoning, before every divine decree, was from its own nature future under a condition; that in no moment of eternity could be known as merely possible: because it is of its nature never to have been in the state of mere possibility, but to have been raised above it. Whence if it were known as merely possible, it would be known falsely; which is impious even to think of God. Thus according to the adversaries, but we can optimally defend the necessity and use of simple intelligence and from it also show the vanity of middle knowledge. For when through it God sees that something is absolutely possible, does he not by that very fact see that something in some way will be, his decree having been posited, which alone can extract it from the state of mere possibility and promote it to any futurity? Which having been conceded, I do not think it obscure that that knowledge sufficiently illuminates beforehand the divine intellect for wisely and rationally decreeing something. Therefore, in vain is some other knowledge, such as is middle knowledge, hawked as necessary for this end. Secondly. This knowledge makes the intellect of God depend on an external object, its idea come to it from elsewhere, and thus the eternal reasons of things be in the creature by a priority of nature before they are in God, and the creature here not depend on God as its [creator], but God depend on creatures as his exemplar. Which are altogether most absurd and involve a manifest contradiction. For if the uncreated depends on the created, the infinite on the finite, the eternal on the temporary; neither will the former be uncreated, infinite, and eternal, nor will the latter be created, finite, and temporary; and thus with the creatures the creator also having been removed, there will be given not the small and large about which the Physicists dispute, but the greatest and hitherto unheard-of vacuum, and the whole world will be a space more imaginary than are those outside the world from which God is not yet excluded. Thirdly. This knowledge posits properly called counsel in God: about which Julius Caesar Scaliger rightly says: The word counsel in divine things is as impious as the plurality of Deity. Exercise 365, section 8. For although it establishes that God from the height of his intellect immediately knows which means are congruent to the proposed end, which man rightly attains only after lingering meditation, accurate inquiry, inspection, and comparison with others, yet it establishes that God does not by his will effect and give to means their congruity and efficacy, but receives it from outside, which they have from their own nature, independent of the decree of God. But this is the first imperfection in the creature deliberating and the principle

of all remaining imperfection. Whence also according to the Hypotheticals that other imperfection arises in God, that before he can wisely decree anything about the salvation of Peter, he must first see to which side and how far the balance of his freedom will incline in this or that order of things, namely: if he is placed in that order of things, having rejected all my grace, he will persevere in sins; if in that one, he will indeed believe, but only for a time, and will die in his sins; if in this one, he will believe, will fail, will repent, and will persevere; if finally in this one, he will believe and with uninterrupted course will persevere to the end. But is this not to attribute to God, the most knowing, ignorance, and to the most simple act of understanding, a discourse of the mind? For thus in this whole business they make God reason to us: If Peter is placed in that order of things, he will be saved. But he will be placed in that order. Therefore, he will be saved. Therefore, first an unknown question is established for God: Will Peter be saved? Second, for having certain knowledge of that, God does not, as we do, immediately seek some middle term which can be disposed with the others in various forms of reasoning: but through the spectacles of middle knowledge he learns from a certain chimerical book of non-existent creatures a most unknown proposition, which always constitutes the hypothetical major of the aforementioned argumentation. Whence the syllogism always turns out Hypothetical, never of the first, second, or third figure, never disjunctive. When he has foreknown that major, then at last he can wisely decree something and add the minor from his own, so that from both a certain conclusion may flow: He decrees, therefore, for example, But he will be placed in that order. From which premises this conclusion spontaneously flows: Therefore, he will be saved. In this, therefore, and other similar examples, nothing is lacking of those things which are required for a true and proper discourse of the mind. For 1. God must run outside himself to that chimerical book of possible creatures so that from there he may learn some truth outside himself, which is expressed in the Major: soon run back within himself, to see another truth within himself. From which truth outside himself which precedes, and within himself which follows, arises one common truth of the conclusion, resting on both premises. 2. There is given a moment of reasoning prior by nature to the rest of eternity, in which God knows that major proposition, in which, although vague and uncertain, middle knowledge is terminated, and does not demand that the minor be joined to it for eliciting the conclusion; since it will have a place in God even if no Peter or Paul was preordained to such a placement, or the world itself was never to be founded. Therefore, with this major certain and known, the minor can be unknown and therefore the conclusion resulting from the major and minor, although all three propositions are about something future. In sum, the Creator will be reduced to the order of the creature, will reason in the manner of the creature, will deliberate in the manner of the creature, and perfection itself will lack perfection!

27. As for the Power of God, the executer of decrees; first, through middle knowledge it is established as of itself indifferent, vague, and to be determined, not certain, determinate and determining. Which consequent seems so not absurd to the adversaries that they elsewhere openly teach it as a most certain truth, and judge the contrary opinion rather absurd, indeed most absurd. Wherefore also about it in the following disputation, with good God, we will have to deal ex professo. Second: That this knowledge introduces crass Pelagianism and attributes to man in the state of fallen nature, constituted outside grace, powers and faculty for the supernatural good, which is outside the sphere of his activity: even Clement VIII, the Roman

Pope, saw and acknowledged this from the evidence of the thing. For when in that public Roman disputation in which he himself presided, a certain Monk, if I am not mistaken, a Carmelite undertook the defense of middle knowledge, he asked him: What does God provide through middle knowledge? The Monk responded: The good use of free will. And the Pope soon retorted: Whether from nature or from grace? If from nature? This is according to Cassian. If from grace? This is against Molina. A response learned from the Roman Pope! Which kind of men, to speak lightly, more devoted to other than sacred cares, often see nothing more in momentous heads of Theology, of which kind this also is, than a mole. Nor indeed do we for that reason adduce his testimony here as if our consciences should acquiesce in them. (Far be it: for what have we to do with Antichrist?) But so that we may urge all the Papist adversaries even more by the reason brought forward by him and the Papal authority added, to whom we also leave this to deliberate: whether the Pope said these things as the highest judge of controversies and thus seized by that Papal and infallible spirit? But if it were so, certainly the Jesuits sin very abundantly and without doubt mortally, who even to this day so obstinately contradict that Papal spirit revealing itself through the oracle of the living voice. And although they say this judgment of the Pope is bad, nevertheless, as they are sagacious, they strive to transfer all blame from him to their accusers. For they complain here that their cause was badly presented to the Pontiff because they, equally with the adversaries, acknowledge that every work of salvation depends on the prevenient and accompanying grace of God, and thus God does not foresee by that knowledge the good use of free will which precedes grace: but free will prevented by grace, while it freely consents to the same knocking within the heart, with the same accompanying, first determines itself to the work of salvation, not by a priority of time, but only of reason, before God the author of grace is understood through assisting grace to concur to perfecting the same work of salvation. But that the free determination itself precisely as so considered or distinguished by reason from the determinate divine concurrence, constitutes the proper object of middle knowledge: although otherwise the operation of the author of grace and of human liberty is the same and indivisible. Have the Jesuits thus indeed sufficiently purged themselves of the crime objected? Indeed, whatever they try to stretch out into a specious veil of words, the light transmits the veil in many places and the rays of truth betray the Pelagian snake lying hidden in the grass. Because when their grace does not of itself have a certain power for the conversion of man, but receives from free will what renders it efficacious from sufficient, when God foresees by this knowledge the good use of free will, he foresees the accommodation of fallen nature alone, equipped with no powers of grace, to his indifferent concurrence and grace, by which accommodation the indifference of grace and the power not to convert is removed and the opposite power to convert is brought into act. But truly is that accommodation or that collateral association of itself to grace for simultaneously flowing into producing the work of salvation, which then certainly follows, not a supernatural work? No one but a Pelagian will deny this. And when man in the state of misery does this without the aid of grace? Does he not use free will well by the powers of nature? But the Pope imputed this alone to them as a crime. But do you want to see the agreement here with the ancient Pelagians? There is no need for much investigation. Let Hilary only be heard in his letter to Augustine, who says that the Pelagians of his time established: That faith must be exhibited by him to whose nature it was granted by the will of the founder. But who is such according to their sense? He teaches it in the following words when he thus proceeds: And they think that no nature is so

depraved or extinguished that it should not or cannot of itself want to be healed, on account of which one is either healed by his own [will], or if he is unwilling, is punished with his own sickness. Nor is grace denied if such a will is said to precede, which only seeks a physician, but does not yet avail anything itself. How much does this wanting to be healed differ from that accommodation of free will and association of itself to the indifferent concurrence of grace? Indeed, I cannot see. And yet those men clamored that no man is sufficient for himself for any work, equally as the Jesuits say that every work of salvation depends on the grace of God. But Hilary discloses the true sense of their words and the first font of error in the same place. For, he says, they do not think that the will, frightened and suppliant, of each sick person to want to be healed should be numbered among any work of their cure. Ask some Jesuit about this, ask a Remonstrant, ask an Anabaptist or anyone else from the modern Pelagians? You will find them saying the same thing as the ancient sources of these, infected with the same poison as those. Second: It will no longer be allowed for engendering true humility in the minds of men to ascribe, as once the charisms, so any salutary goods with the Orthodox antiquity and the whole of Scripture to the divine goodness alone and to the efficacious operation of insuperable power, and to say to a man too great an admirer of himself: Who makes you different from others? And what do you have that you did not receive? And if you did receive it, why do you boast as if you had not received it? 1 Corinthians 4:7. The response will be ready at hand: I distinguish myself from the wicked: I made myself a vessel for honor, and I can rightly arrogate to myself also the praise of my conversion and salvation. God only gave the theater and occasion for the good work, often common with other wicked people. I from the proper powers of nature wanted to be freed from disease, embraced God as Physician, grace as medicine: and thus with grace accompanying and assisting, I perfected the work of my salvation with the same grace, no differently than in the daily practice of Medicine medicine helps nature in repelling disease and acquiring health. Some other lazy person having the same or even greater occasion than I, did not seize it nor apply this salutary effort, which I did. Hence I am now discriminated from that wicked one, to me life, to him eternal death is owed by force of the divine promise and threat. Alas, the spirit of pride! Third: So that we may act from the law of retaliation: with that knowledge posited, all callings, all persuasions and dissuasions, exhortations, dehortations, promises, threats, appeals, and whatever means of salvation God applies will be frustrating around those whom he placed in such an order of things in which he saw that they would not be moved or saved: in the same way as they argue against us when we teach that the greatest part of men was reprobated by God from his mere good pleasure. Fourth: the same men on the last day will be able to move various grievances, various complaints not plainly unjust against God. A Complaint of Injustice, as one who did not keep himself indifferent around all, but indeed placed some in congruent, but them in incongruent circumstances of things, although they were equal in merits and worth before God decreed it. A Complaint of Cruelty, as one who saw that they, placed in other circumstances of things, would be equally upright as the rest, and yet did not want to place them in such circumstances, and thus impeded the good which would really be, that placement having been posited or needing to be posited, and promoted the evil which then really was not going to be. As if he had been delighted by their sins and destruction, or had envied them their good works and eternal happiness. Finally, a Complaint of masked Hypocrisy, as one who simulated that he had the intention of saving them, which nevertheless he did not have, otherwise going to place them in another congruent order of things: and thus took care

that the Gospel and his word be announced to them for the aggravation of their own condemnation and wanted this to be acknowledged by them as a signal benefit. We do not proceed here except by Jesuitic and Remonstrant consequences, which if they solve well, they will do a thing most pleasing to us.

28. As for those three Faculties at once: With that knowledge posited, the modes of being, namely contingency and necessity, are exempted from divine providence, which nevertheless is, as Thomas rightly says, the universal provider of all Being. For example, through middle knowledge, before his every decree, God sees that Peter in those circumstances of things from his innate liberty would yield assent to the heavenly calling. Therefore, if he desires him to be saved, it is only necessary for him to provide for him some congruent calling: there is no need for him to decree anything about the mode of consent, to know from the decree, and to execute according to the decree. But not only the modes of beings, but also certain beings themselves will be given as independent of the will, wisdom and power of the first and highest being, because the effect of a free cause, as it is subjected to middle knowledge, must necessarily be conceived as to be produced from the mere will of man and the power subservient to it. To which pertains also that indifferent concurrence of God, to be determined by man to this or that part. Which therefore, although it is included in middle knowledge itself, does not argue the dependence of that being on the first being any more than some other subservient power in man, say the locomotive faculty, which is equally necessarily required as that indifferent concurrence; or than it argues the dependence of the divine will on the human, because God cannot effect without the creature the same effect which he effects with the creature. Which is conceded on both sides, but the consequence is denied. Do you see, therefore, that more independent beings are given than one, indeed hundreds of thousands and thousands of thousands can be added to that one. And that is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος [first falsehood] of the contrary opinion palpable in itself and expressed without great effort, since it flowed spontaneously, not otherwise than, in Ovid's golden age, the earth untilled bore crops of its own accord.

29. Let us rise higher, however. Who is so much a stranger in these controversies, who is ignorant with how much effort the adversaries strive to denigrate our opinion with that invidious corollary of Stoic Fate? And how they protest that they abhor it? Not otherwise than the gates of hell. But truly that very Fate of the Stoics, casting the heavy fetters of a most grave necessity on divine, angelic, and human liberty, is introduced through this knowledge, as if through the main gate? They deny it? But the proof is easy: The object of that knowledge precedes the knowledge itself in the order of nature and reason. For something must be before it is understood to be. But that knowledge precedes every decree in God, and thus also the knowledge arising from the decree and the power executing the decree. Therefore, those conditioned contingencies not only before every act of divine power, which only executes the decrees of the will, but also of the divine will and intellect itself, have their futurity and have departed from the state of mere possibility. But truly whence they received any, that is, that conditioned futurity before, I do not say the decree, but also middle knowledge, which precedes the decree, in whatever way at last, from there they can also receive all, that is, absolute futurity, because those two futurities do not differ in essence or species but only in degree, as evening

and midday light. Then, if from the divine decree those things had received absolute futurity for conditioned futurity, they ought to have received it from that decree by which God decided to place the creature in those circumstances: because otherwise God does not take to himself the will to absolutely and directly decide anything about human and angelic acts, lest, namely, the Most Holy Liberty be offended or harmed. But they did not receive it from that decree, because that decree does not even touch their absolute futurity, much less be its cause: But with the creature already placed in those circumstances, it is still absolutely contingent and in no way whatsoever necessary that it will do this and not another. What? That according to most Jesuits, God also sees through middle knowledge what his own will is going to will on every occasion and to any condition. Which although Molina and Suárez with perhaps a few others deny, yet Rispolis in book 1, question 1, conclusion 2, page 87 strongly proves and sufficiently defends against the aforementioned authors that it ought to be a common hypothesis for the defenders of middle knowledge. This therefore having been supposed, God knew before his decree which order of things he himself would choose. Therefore, he could not choose another. And if the order of circumstances is certain before the divine decree, now with the condition having been removed, the absolute futurity of all those things is also certain before every decree, which are said to be future under a condition. God or rational creatures, therefore, could not dispose their things otherwise than they are disposed; nor can the things themselves be done otherwise than they are: nor will God be able, even by absolute power, to bring it about that they not be, or that they be otherwise. Our Lord God, therefore, whom Scripture asserts inhabits the heavens and does whatever he wills, will be a certain Homeric Jupiter, who will want to snatch his most beloved son Sarpedon from the bloody hands of Patroclus and the pressing necessity of death, but constrained by the fetters of fate will not be able, and the same weapon which will deliver Sarpedon to death, by piercing also his own paternal entrails, will cast the omnipotent into sad lamentations and womanly weepings. Away with a Theology of that kind which imagines for us an omnipotent destitute of power! But indeed because here we seek the jugular of the adversaries, they fight with all the powers of their talent, lest they be compelled to receive the sword. For they contend that God could have willed the contrary of what is done by the created will, or permitted it, if it is evil: because, they say, through the same middle knowledge before every decree God knew that the created will, if it had been placed in another order of things, would have done the contrary, and God could have chosen another order of things by the same liberty by which he now chose that one. But that he cannot now will the contrary, that happens on account of the constancy of the divine will in its decrees, by which what it once absolutely decreed, it never afterwards rescinds. But this is a vain endeavor, they do not thus escape misfortune. For first, from this I infer: one decree about the order of things having been posited, soon other infinite beings about which nothing has been certainly decreed, are absolutely future, independently of every divine will. It will only be for God to think about congruent or incongruent occasions of things and to concur naturally and indifferently with creatures; the determinate acts themselves and the effects to be produced outwardly by those acts will come forth spontaneously. Nothing is sown here by God, nothing is reaped. And do these things not savor of Fate? 2. If God could have willed the contrary of what is done by the creature, he could have willed to have constituted the creature in another order: and if this, he could have rendered his knowledge vain and false, by which he had foreseen that he would choose this order of things. 3. How is it proven that the creature in other circumstances would certainly do the contrary,

since it always retains the indifference of its liberty - does it not imply that the creature in no circumstances would do the contrary, as was said more often before. These things to that exception: Now by a new argument the same Fate can be demonstrated from those things which Fonseca, the father of this knowledge, hands down about the act of the divine will, which in the following moment of reasoning immediately follows the act of middle knowledge. For he wants those conditioned contingent futures to pass into the state of absolute futurity only through an act of the divine will approbative if they are good, or permissive if they are evil, and by those acts they are known by God as absolutely future. Than which nothing could have been said more accommodated for introducing a foolish Fate. For if God does only this for their absolute futurity: therefore, they are already absolutely future before every act of the divine will, which bestows a certain and determinate futurity. The consequence is clear, because approbation in good things, or permission in evil things, does not bestow any futurity on contingents, much less absolute futurity. For when the governor of a city approves the enemies having been bravely repelled by the garrison soldiers: or permits the enemies breaking in by force to plunder the city; he bestows no futurity on that repulsion or on this plundering: or if we prefer to go to the creator: When God in the first creation approved all his works which he had made; or permitted the fall of Adam: certainly he conferred no futurity, add not even actual existence (since futurity is eternal, this in temporals is temporal), on those things or on the fall, but presupposed it conferred. And how in general through that permission, which for them is only a negation and cessation from action, would something be future? But can God by doing nothing and only by ceasing bestow certain futurity on things indifferent to futurity and non-futurity? Wherever they turn themselves, they fall into Fate. I proceed: just as they contend that in conditioned futures before every decree of God contradictory propositions can be formed, in which necessarily one part ought to have been true, the other false; so I will say of the conditioned effect abstracted from the condition, either it was absolutely future or not. If future, then also the condition itself was absolutely future, because, before every divine decree, those two are connected with each other, so that although one can be conceived without the other, yet it can never exist without the other: but so that they must most certainly and infallibly coexist with each other: since otherwise the foreknowledge of God would be fallible. Whence just as the conditioned effect, the condition having been posited, so the condition, the conditioned effect having been posited, must be posited by an inevitable law. God, therefore, could not decree, understand, or operate otherwise about that effect or condition than this fatal futurity had commanded. But if that effect is absolutely not going to be, then neither is the condition going to be. Whence again emerges that Fate hated by the adversaries. This argument could also be instituted otherwise about the condition thus: Either that condition, taken absolutely, was future or not future. If future: then also inevitably the conditioned effect. If not future: then also the conditioned effect necessarily not future. Which way of disputing is both good and introduces Fate by the same force of consequence. However, because the adversaries disputing about middle knowledge have no account of futurity in the condition, but only in the conditioned effect, we can easily here accommodate ourselves to their genius. Although meanwhile nothing prevents forming contradictory propositions separately both about the condition and about the conditioned effect, the relation intervening between them not having been considered. But against those who accommodate middle knowledge also to the will of God itself, as today most Jesuits do and all ought to do by merit, a way of proceeding is also shown easy enough: For if

any condition having been posited God knows what he himself is going to will: now he will know how many angels or men there would be if he wanted to create another world, and what they would do if they were created. Therefore, that one decree having been posited, that he wants to create another world, he could not decide otherwise either about the number of angels and men and their qualities and actions: nor could the angels and men be more or fewer, better or worse, or act otherwise than they act and have acted and are going to act; in which Fate manifestly appears. Furthermore, it must be said about that one decree; although we are ignorant, yet God knows by which condition having been posited he himself wants to create another world, and by which condition having been posited that condition is to be posited. And that seems to be implied by the explanation of Fonseca, when he establishes that God does not know what he himself is going to decree about creatures; unless he first knew what any created will would do in this or that occasion. For such a foresight about the acts of created wills can always be a condition to which God wants something. For example, If those wills constituted in such or such an order will act thus: I with myself will decree that this order be, or that a world be created in which there is such an order. In which things if God foresees the truth, he will not be able to decree otherwise, nor will things be able to be otherwise. And in that way conditions and conditioned effects are perpetually driven in a circle in the sphere of eternity with great variety of orbs and motion, some upwards, some downwards, some to the right, some to the left, some this way, some that way; nowhere will fixed poles or boundaries be given, no place where you may begin, no place where you may stop. No Ptolemaic, no Tychonic, no Copernican hypotheses, whether true or fictitious, would revoke the lawless and extraordinary uncertainty of that motion to certain laws and order, the talent of Regiomontanus, Peurbach, Galileo, and Kepler would grow weak here. And that so wondrous machine of the Fates involves and carries away with itself God and all human things. But since here we have most recently fallen upon Fonseca, who is so wise above his other associates, before we proceed, let us soothe the man's head a bit with only one argument: which indeed may be such: If God cannot know what he himself is going to decree about creatures, except after he saw what the created wills would do in all things: then also he can do nothing to the outside, unless some creature first does something: because there is no reason why in the eternal actions of God and creatures that order is retained less than in the foreknowledge about those actions, since they themselves say that all things happen in that way and order in which they were foreknown through middle knowledge. But the consequent is false. Therefore, also the antecedent. The Minor is proven, it is impossible that when God first began to create, either some creature pre-existed, much less that it did something. But these things about that invention of Fonseca in passing. But that argument about Fate is beautifully expanded and the consequences are strongly urged, no less firm than the words accommodated to the matter, by the most learned Rhetorfortius in the dedicatory epistle to the most noble Lord of Lahu-Varria, where from the families of the Neopelagians he especially addresses the Remonstrants, those docile disciples of the Jesuits, bad teachers, in this way: For tell, by immortal God, nor will I fear to call to witness more candid consciences, what liberty could remain safe for God, your middle knowledge and conditioned decree of contingent acts having been posited as safe. For with this dogma prevailing, conditioned futurity having being antecedently to both the knowledge and decree of God, all the miseries that come to mortals by the ministry of contingent causes, contagious diseases, unexpected death from the ruin of buildings, poverty, exile, untimely and bitter death of wife and

children, indeed axes, nooses, pyres, gallows, wheels, those indeed because they anticipate the will of God and this fictitious knowledge, no hope, no consolation, finally no patience in God can remain. Would not God thus address mortals? The Fatal Fortune that has hurt you must be borne, not lamented (my men). For that having gone before my providence from eternity: I could not prevent it, I could not not subscribe to the fatal wishes of Contingency, it has cast the die, has drawn up the tablets of the Fates, has pronounced the adamantine sentence, the black or white lot, to be established from eternity to eternity, even against my will. And by an entirely equal reason, favorable things, nobility, rule, prosperous health, numerous offspring, abundance of all goods, long life, happy and most peaceful death, golden furniture, which come by the aid and help of causes operating freely and contingently, anticipate the same providence. And what now of hope, gratitude, submission, consciousness of duty to God and due obedience would hold men? For those things happened with God unknowing and unwilling: Believe me, this is to extirpate, expel from the heart, indeed utterly overthrow faith, hope, patience, gratitude, zeal for praying, due submission, finally all consciousness of duty to God, religion, and with grace trampled, providence of God put to flight, indeed God having been cast down from his throne, to institute altars, vows, prayers, and sacrifices to Fortune, or to a new Goddess, Contingency. But the things which moved by just indignation of the matter he subjoins are very pathetic: O the times! O the customs! O the pitiable condition of the spouse of Christ! Yet those things proceed in pulpits, in Academies, in public writings, under the name of moderate Theology, masked and painted. Lord Jesus, do you not see those things? Do you hear what your spouse suffers? As if she were a widow, her husband having died, and had no avenger of reproach. But you see, Lord, you hear, you will require it.

30. From those things which have thus far been disputed against middle knowledge, it is manifest that the whole difficulty of the present controversy falls back on this point: Whether free conditioned futures, from their own nature indifferent to futurity and non-futurity, could have passed from eternity into the state of a future thing otherwise than through the divine decree, which is the cause of all futurity, of whatever kind also? This is the foundation of foundations, on which the whole mass of the cause rests; this is that postulate, which neither can the adversaries concede to us nor they prove to us. This is the center from which are drawn those deformed and absurd hypotheses by which those Hypothetical Doctors miserably defile both Philosophy and also sacred Theology. Namely: That the will of God is a blind power in making decrees, unless the light of middle knowledge shines forth: That means to any end have efficacy and congruity from their own nature, to which God is compelled to attend in wisely forming decrees which indeed are going to have a certain outcome: That the truth or falsity of free conditioned futures is not known from their causes or from the divine decree, but from the very outcome of the thing: That God before every act of his will can see certitude in things thoroughly uncertain from their own nature: in sum, that some being is given independent of the highest being. The absurdity of all of which is both clear through itself and has been shown in the preceding things, where there was need. Let some arguments ad hominem put the finishing touch on the disputation. First: Many are ashamed of the consequences immediately drawn from middle knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge is shameful. The antecedent is clear from what has been said before. For example, very many are ashamed to assert that God before his every decree knows how many angels and men there would be, if he wanted to create another

world. Which evidently follows from their opinion, if God is said to know before every act of his will also what would be, any condition having been posited; because the world will not be able to be without angels and men, or if you imagine that certain unnamed creatures never seen or heard in this world are to be produced there; now the same way of arguing will proceed about them. Which when Grevinchovius wanted to avoid, by saying that that hypothetical is about the necessary future. For he wants it to be supposed that God wants to create a certain number of angels and men, and this having been supposed he says it is necessary that that number of angels and men exist which God wants. But Amesius well shows him that this future is not at all necessary, unless this is supposed, that he already before decreed to create so many angels and men. But with the decree preceding, no place is left for middle knowledge, but only for vision, but here no decree is presupposed, but the essential and proper act of middle knowledge is proposed. But we can also suppose what Grevinchovius wants, and yet this having been supposed it is not necessary that that number of angels and men exist which God wants, namely: before that number has been defined, but which he wants after the number has already before been defined; that is, from this it follows that it is necessary that God afterwards wants that number of angels and men which through middle knowledge, before every act of his will, he saw defined and that he would will. Than which nothing can be said more apt for introducing the delirium of Stoic Fate. Second: With the truth of this knowledge posited, from the very hypotheses of the adversaries and way of arguing against us, we will evidently gather that all liberty of God and the creature is taken away, and God, which is horrendous, is constituted the author of sin. The first thus: What is an impediment lest the divine and human will be able to determine itself to either part according to its indifference; that takes away the liberty of God and the creature. But those conditions and circumstances are thus an impediment to the divine and human will, Therefore. The Minor is confirmed from this, because according to them God infallibly foreknows what he himself or the creature is going to do, the conditions having been posited. But if now at the very moment when the conditions are posited and have been posited each will retained its indifference, God will be able to foreknow nothing infallibly and certainly, where with respect to neither God nor the creature is anything certain. The other thus: if God constitutes man in such occasions in which he sees that he will infallibly sin, God is the author of sin: because they say and continually object to us: he who does something to which another infallibly follows, is the cause of that thing. But the antecedent is true from their own confession. Therefore, also the consequent. Third: There are also given from the confession of the adversaries many free acts absolutely defined and predetermined by God without middle knowledge, where God neither decreed anything unwisely, nor harmed the liberty of causes acting freely. Therefore, that middle knowledge is entirely superfluous and useless for defending either the wisdom of God in forming his decrees or the liberty of our will. For if in certain examples of decrees absolutely predetermining free acts of creatures without middle foreknowledge nothing was lost from divine wisdom, nothing from human liberty, why also in all the rest? But that such decrees and such acts are given from the confession of the adversaries is clear by the example of Christ the man: about whom although Molina says it pertained to divine providence to so dispose things that with liberty preserved in him he would not at all sin, which was also done; nevertheless the same, conquered by reason and the unanimous consent of the Fathers, is compelled to affirm that if Christ is considered as to those things which are in his nature by reason of the grace of union, he could in no way sin, and the contrary implies a

contradiction, part 1, question 14, article 13, disputation 18, section 4. What is this other than violently pressed by the truth to confess that there was no need for God to foreknow by conditional knowledge to which occasions the will of Christ would obey the divine precepts, before he imposed them on him by absolute will: Just as these are the very words of Fonseca, book 6, chapter 2, question 5, section 12, who also adds: For it was certain that he would altogether obey, since he could not sin even in the divided sense. Similar things can be said about the angels confirmed by the grace of God and the blessed souls in heaven. And this is the first: the other is because the adversaries confess that God decreed to save many of those men whom he understood would perish in the conditioned state, and to leave others in their obstinacy: which words Rispolis also cites from Fonseca in book 1, question 1, conclusion 1, page 31, and this having been conceded I do not see why it also cannot be said that God decreed to condemn many whom he saw would be saved in the conditioned state. If, therefore, such decrees of God are not foolish or stolid, if through them the liberty of creatures is not destroyed, but in those to be saved is perfected, as we think the adversaries will easily consent here, we have our purpose. Fourth: The adversaries themselves teach: First, that the concurrence of God and the created will are distinguished not in reality but only in reason: Second, that God does not feign rational distinctions, that is, does not conceive as distinct what are distinguished only by our imperfect reason: Third, that the knowledge of God is proper and perfect which perfectly penetrates and comprehends the whole quiddity of things as they are in themselves. From which hypotheses it is very easy to argue against middle knowledge thus: Between what there is not a sufficient distinction for founding distinct knowledge of them God does not know one without the other, because his knowledge is most perfect, to which one cannot be objected without the other from those things which are distinguished not in reality but only in reason. But between the concurrence of God and the created will there is not a sufficient distinction for founding distinct knowledge, as is clear from the first hypothesis. Therefore, God does not distinctly know them: Therefore, middle knowledge is not given, because its object is established as the concurrence of free will, as such. Nor do I see what the adversaries can except to this argument with reason, their hypotheses having been saved. But we will fix the end of the present disputation here, after, by the benefit of God, we have seen the collapsed as if at the blast of the sacred trumpet walls of that middle knowledge of Jericho and its lowest foundations convulsed and overturned. May God Most High and Best furthermore grant the adversaries to see their darkness and to aspire to the light of divine grace: but to us to walk worthily in his light, until at last after the light of grace the light of glory may arise for us in the other life. May it be, may it be.

ON THE RIGHT AND JUSTICE OF GOD.

Respondent CORNELIUS GENTMAN of Gouda, Zealand.
For the 15th of June 1639.

The Right and justice of God can be treated in Theology in two ways. One, insofar as the divine nature is described through them, in the common topic of God. The other insofar as they are the

sources of divine and human laws, to which the goodness or moral evil of all actions is referred, in the common topic of Good works.

1. TO the explanation of the divine attribute which we call the Dominion of God, pertains the determination about the Right of God, Whether and of what kind it is. We, premising the necessary presuppositions, will respond to certain principal problems. The various acceptations of Right are had by the Jurists on the title of Justice and Right, and the Scholastics on II-II q. 57 a. 1, and from them by the Casuists. There the Scholastics distinguish fas [divine law] from jus [human law], and jus from lex [written law]. And they want fas to properly denote divine law, but jus human law. But (whatever may be the case concerning the Latin phrase) this is not at all proven by the usage of Scripture, where judgment is attributed to God, Romans 1 last verse. Right is distinguished there from law by Thomas, because right is the object of justice; but law the written reason of it. Otherwise Isidore in the Etymologies, where he says right is a general name, but law a species of right. However although the Scholastics and Casuists following Thomas for the most part confuse divine Right with the law of God, we nevertheless think it should be distinguished from it. Because right is conceived as something within God and formally as it were in God; yet with respect to the creature whether existing or possible: but law says a practical rule outside God and effectively from God, for it expresses the rule which God judges must be kept by the creature, and therefore wants to oblige the creature by it, and by actual revelation and command according to that will obliges. And so divine law as such cannot be said to have force to oblige God, but right on the contrary. I know it is commonly distinguished that there is a threefold consideration of law, as it is in itself, as it is in the legislator, as it is in the subject. But the essential definition of law is of that which is considered in itself, as it has force to direct and oblige, the proximate foundation of which is the revelation and command of the legislator. For the eternal concept of a practical rule in the divine mind with the will to oblige does not posit a law nor have any force of directing and obliging according to that passage of Deuteronomy 29:29 compared with 2 Samuel 7 etc., as is explained more fully in the doctrine of the Will of God: where it is distinguished into hidden and revealed. Therefore, divine right is to us here the idea of the rectitude and goodness of God concerning the governance of rational creatures, with the power of diffusing itself into law or precepts and through them of directing and obliging creatures. Therefore, rectitude (Hebrew Yosher), Justice, Judgment, dominion, Authority, what is Necessary, legislative power do not really differ in God. From this description we gather that divine right or power is a relative attribute, and is referred to creatures insofar as they can be governed or are governed by God.

2. As for the division of right, it is variously explained. Thomas I-II q. 91 makes law (which he confuses with right) fourfold: eternal, natural, divine, and human. Other Scholastics divide right into natural and positive; and the latter again into divine and human; the divine into that of the Old and New Testament, the human into the right of nations, civil, canon. The Jurists divide into public and private; into natural, of nations, civil; into common and proper; into written and unwritten; into mutable and immutable. Those distinctions and indeed those alone are treated thoroughly by the Scholastics on Thomas, especially by Valentia and Vasquez on I-II and by Azorius Moral Institutes vol. 3 bk. 1 compared with vol. 1 bk. 6 ch. 1-2, Becanus Scholastic Theology part 2 vol. 1 tract. 3, by Francisco Suárez in a special volume on laws, and by others

to be indicated elsewhere. From our side, Amesius bk. 5 Cases of Conscience ch. 1 contains himself almost within the same terms. But to confess the truth, those distinctions have never seemed to me to exhaust that whole law which Scripture exhibits to us in this part: and consequently to suffice for untying various questions both dogmatic and moral in Theology. Therefore, so that we may if not entirely satisfy ourselves and others, at least suggest the occasion of further meditation, it must be attempted whether these things can be explained a little more accurately and evidently. Therefore, let right be either finite or of the creature, and infinite or divine. The former deals between creature and creature, namely insofar as one is ordered to another, and obliges it or is obliged by it. And it is either angelic or human. Each of these must be said to be immediately and formally such, although it is also called divine from its foundation, which is divine right prescribing or permitting such obligation of creatures among themselves. And thus it is understood to be of divine right that children obey parents, subjects magistrates, that each one possess his own goods, etc. Furthermore, about the right of angel over angel, from the Scriptures hardly anything can be determined; and so learned ignorance must be studied here. But because Scripture is given to men as a norm of actions, all the sources of human right are referred to primarily there, and secondarily in the natural light or right reason; whence necessary conclusions must be drawn: But those things which are free and determinable to either part according to the nature of circumstances, those are determined, and the rules of right and equity for the same are explained, by the legitimate power established by God among men. All determinations of which obtain the force of human right, insofar, of course, as they do not conflict with right reason and Scripture. For all things must always be done and prescribed agreeably to nature, right reason, and Scripture. But we leave this special human right of legislators and Jurists: We must deal with divine Right properly and contradistinctly so called, As any right in general is a right necessity and power adhering to a person for doing, omitting, or permitting something: so also divine right may be said to be a right necessity and power by which God obliges someone, or can oblige. This obligation is said properly or improperly: and so right. Improperly the right of God is said to be that by which he obliges all irrational creatures. Which are God's and are subjected to his will, dominion, use, and natural laws, by the right, of course, of creation, Psalm 24:1 and 50:10, 12. Hence he also subjects them to punishments, which nevertheless properly and ultimately are directed to rational creatures. See Genesis 3:14, 17, Exodus 21:29. Right properly so called is either to the inside or to the outside. To the inside is what is terminated in God alone: by which God is conceived as if to oblige himself, about himself, or to be a debtor to himself concerning himself. But that termination in God is considered either essentially or personally. In that way by right God can and is bound to love himself: in this way the Father is bound to love the Son and vice versa: both the Holy Spirit and vice versa. To the outside is what is terminated in a rational creature, or indeed in God but only in order to the creature. And this most properly and strictly is called divine right: and was defined by us just now. But it can be considered either as it holds on the part of God, or as it holds on the part of the creature. In that way it is again considered both actively and passively, or rather terminatively. Actively God obliges himself in order to creatures, or about the governance of rational creatures: to which refer that passage of Proverbs 16:4, Romans 11 last verse compared with Isaiah 42:8. Passively or terminatively God is obliged by himself, and is a debtor to himself, in those things which pertain to the governance of creatures. That God is obliged and bound by some right which is really God himself (for no being above or

outside God makes a norm, and in some way limits and determines the last and the first: hence God is said to be a law to himself) is clear from 2 Timothy 2:13, Hebrews 6:18, 2 Thessalonians 1:6, Habakkuk 1:13, Genesis 18:25 compared with Romans 3:5-6. Divine right to the outside, as it is considered or holds on the part of the rational creature, is subjectively a necessity and power rightly adhering to a person, so that he can rightly do or omit something; objectively adhering to a thing so that it can be rightly done or omitted. This divine right prescribed to the rational creature is either natural or absolutely necessary; or free or hypothetically necessary. The former obliges absolutely from the necessity of the divine nature both the creature to be subject and render what is due; and God to prescribe and exact, so that the opposite of it would imply a contradiction: Thus for example it is of natural divine right that the rational creature obey God and be subject to law, or that it suffer punishment: that is, that it be obliged to due office; or if it neglects this, be bound to guilt and due punishment. The axioms of this right if they are conceived negatively are these: God cannot deny himself. He cannot give his glory to another. He cannot dismiss the rational creature so that it not be subject or under law to God. He cannot remit sins without satisfaction: or dismiss unpunished an injury inflicted on himself. God cannot command, dispense, or concede to the rational creature to hate him, blaspheme his name. If they are conceived affirmatively they are these: God is bound to seek and promote the glory of his name. God is bound to govern and judge the world, as long as the world is. God is bound to prescribe natural worship of himself to the rational creature. God is bound in the case of a chasm through the intervention of sin to bring back any man who is to be saved to his grace and glory through justification and conversion: for sin remaining man cannot be united with God, 1 John 5:1 compared with Habakkuk 1, Isaiah 1, much less that God could personally unite to himself a sinful nature, as Scotus, Gabriel, and other more distinguished Scholastics have curiously and blasphemously enough disputed. Divine right which is free (which is otherwise called positive) and only hypothetically necessary is such because God freely so willed: who without implication of contradiction could also have willed the opposite. To this pertain, to permit sin, or the fall of angels and men and all sins flowing from there: to reckon in the old covenant all and each men not per capita, but by stock in one Adam, but to estimate angels whether standing or falling one by one and separately, so that in one man all men sinned, but in one angel all angels did not sin - To give or not give first or second grace, conserving or concurring or premoving, to this creature - To transfer satisfaction for sin and obedience due to the law to a mediator or sponsor substituted for us, and thus to accept them from his hand in payment - To propose and promise the reward of eternal and heavenly blessedness to men in the primeval covenant - To subject Christ to those so many and so great special torments which Scripture reports, in soul and body for us. Add to these that symbolic law about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil given to Adam in paradise; and also the whole Mosaic ceremonial and forensic law; a great part moreover of the Decalogue: as in the first table the positive instituted mode of worship, for example through the external preaching of the word, etc.; in the second, about monogamy, about prohibited degrees, about the distinctions of dominions, about the power of the Magistrate, about homicide, etc. For about all those it cannot be said that God was bound to the other part of the contradiction from the necessity of his nature. To this positive right must be reduced what they call permissive divine right. What if we digest these distinctions otherwise in the following table?

1. Divine right is

1.1 Natural or necessary
1.1.1 Improperly, to irrational creatures, as to their dependence and subjection to God in general.
1.1.2 Properly, or terminated to the inside in God himself
1.1.2.1 (οὐσιωδῶς, ὑποστατικῶς.) [essentially, personally]
1.1.3 Most properly or terminated to the outside in rational creatures, and obliging them to duties
1.1.3.1 About God, natural worship namely in general and in particular.
1.1.3.2 About the neighbor, love of him namely etc.
1.1.3.3 About other creatures.
1.2 Free or arbitrary
1.2.1 Positive or determinative
1.2.1.1 Improperly; determining namely the rights and laws of the nature of each irrational thing in particular.
1.2.1.2 Properly, determining the duties of rational nature and expressing them by the light of nature and Scripture.
1.2.1.2.1 Toward God, instituted worship namely.
1.2.1.2.2 Toward the neighbor, particular acts namely of charity, for example almsgiving
1.2.1.2.3 Toward other creatures.
1.2.2 Permissive; by determination namely permitting to rational creatures in duties
1.2.2.1 about the neighbor
1.2.2.2 about other creatures.

3. These distinctions having been premised, we explain the attributes of divine right which must especially be known by the following problems. Therefore let Problem 1 be: Whether right also has a place in beasts. I respond Negatively with the Scholastics cited above. But they play with derivations or homonyms in a very far-fetched way, or forge monsters of new opinions, who seriously defend that some law of nature was implanted in beasts by God, so that God seems to have prescribed to them the general innocence of certain ones agreeable to the nature of each kind to be preserved both among themselves and especially toward men: and therefore that they acknowledge God, Job 12:7-10, sin, Genesis 6:11, deserve punishment, Exodus 21, Genesis 9:5, Leviticus 20:15, have an image and vestige both of reason and of will, as Scripture judges everywhere, Isaiah 1, Jeremiah 8, Job 39 and following, Proverbs 6, etc., and certain Philosophers like Plutarch and others showed long ago. Thus Vorstius book on God p. 7 and in Preparation of Response to Piscator p. 71 and in Friendly Collation with Piscator sect. 1 and 94, which things however he first tries to excuse through "in some way," afterwards through "improperly and tropically" in his manner. Most recently a certain Remonstrant rascal in the book to which he gave the title Gymnasium of Utrecht seriously undertook to defend the opinion of Valesius about sacred philosophy ch. 44, 55, by which he establishes that Reason is inherent in Brutes: to which necessary truth according to piety, or to what good thing these things may move, I do not yet grasp. I find that this opinion pleased also the Manicheans, Augustine being

witness, On Heresies, and that this hypothesis agrees not badly with the theses of Mahumet about the beast Alborach and the wethers which they slay on Passover entering paradise, as the book called Zuna has it; and also with the deliriums of Francis of Assisi and similar melancholy men, who preached the Gospel to birds, fish, a donkey, a wolf, which last robber the same Francis is even said to have converted from his sin. But all philosophers and theologians of today, who should be consulted, ex professo refute this paradox about the reason of brutes; and we criticize it in a word in the Disputation on Creation. Let the consensus of the ancients be added, Basil Oration 3 on Adam, Augustine On the Quantity of the Soul ch. 27-28, the Author On Spirit and Soul 48, the Author On Faith to Peter ch. 24, Gennadius of Marseilles On Ecclesiastical Dogmas ch. 17, Damascene On the Two Wills of Christ. Furthermore, how divine right has a place in irrational creatures the Scholastics teach on I-II q. 93 a. 4, saying that they are subject to the eternal law not through cognition and judgment, but only through natural inclination; not freely but necessarily; hence it is that they are said to be obliged improperly, not properly (for where there is no liberty, there is no obligation under sin); and therefore the eternal law with respect to them does not properly have the nature of law. The philosophical distinction can be applied here, by which irrationals are said to be moved by an end agreeable to themselves, and to tend or be directed to it through destined means materially, not formally under the aspect namely of end and means. The definition of natural right by the Jurists, what nature taught all living things, is explained congruously enough by them, as also by the Scholastics and Casuists, and from them by Amesius bk. 5 ch. 1 q. 3. With whom Bachovius can be compared in his commentary on the Institutes.

Problem 2: Whether the divine natural right proposed by us is the same as the natural right of the Jurists. I respond, Not at all. For the latter is in subject and object merely human (although in origin divine), and symbiotic, pertaining to human society insofar as it regards natural and animal life; and therefore is the right of man over man, or of man over any thing, but not except in order to another man. But the former is first divine right reflecting on God. Second, right between God and creatures. Third, from divine power over creatures the disposition and obligation of rationals to duties toward each other and toward other creatures. And so the latter is comprehended by the former, not vice versa.

Problem 3: Whether our divine natural right is the same as that natural right which the Scholastics, and from them Becanus Scholastic Theology cited treatise ch. 1 q. 2, describe: Which is right whose obligation arises from the nature of the thing, and thence diffuses itself into a precept. And q. 7 he says: The obligation of a law arises from the very nature of things, if the law is natural. I respond, No. 1. because this Member of the Scholastic distinction does not exhaust nor express all that which can be conceived about the naturally necessary right of God according to the Scriptures: indeed, as they explain themselves elsewhere, it does not ascend above the limits of Theology, of the light and law of nature, or natural common notions and synderesis. 2. because it does not show nor distinguish whether that nature of the thing in which their natural right is founded, and whence obligation arises, depends on the nature of God, or on a decree. 3. Because consequently it does not explain or show the font and first root of such or such a nature of things, that is, it does not show the foundation of the foundation of that obligation. But this not having been shown, our mind does not acquiesce, but sticks in the same

question and doubt: Why for example is this or that precept of natural right more than another? If you say, because there the nature of the thing itself expresses the honest or dishonest? If I insist: Why? and whence are you certain? You will respond, because nature abhors that as base and indecorous, and natural reason dictates the contrary. Here the ultimate analysis is in the natural light divinely implanted together with nature in each man: which certainly is a secondary principle, and whence the deduction of conclusions, especially of those which are more remote from the first practical principles, is often most fallacious: unless Scripture expressly attests to such first and second principles and conclusions (which it often does). Therefore, as philosophers with theologians are not content to propose the distinction of necessity and contingency, but further investigate the root and origin of both: so also we think it must be done in this question about natural right and equity. But we think our distinction so explained satisfies all defects and doubts a little more fully if we do not trust, at least we want.

Problem 4: Whether therefore all practical axioms and precepts which are known by the light of nature or can be certainly demonstrated, are of divine natural right and absolutely necessary: so that if God prescribed or permitted the opposite of them it would imply a contradiction. I respond, No, and an example can be given: in marriage between brothers and sisters: the killing of an innocent son, the opposite of which God conceded and commanded: suicide could be added from the opinion of the most excellent theologians, which they think was done by Samson by a peculiar instinct and divine command: which things nevertheless in themselves, per se, ordinarily, and commonly natural reason dictates and perceives to be indecorous, base, dishonest. But you will ask, whence does natural reason deduce unless from the necessity of the divine nature and of simply immutable divine right. It can be said that it deduces this from the revelation of divine right not only natural but also free and positive, and consequently hypothetically immutable, made to man before the fall in Adam; of which some sparks and remnants remained after the fall. Therefore, let it be said that God revealed to Adam these laws of positive right about monogamy, Matthew 19:4, about prohibited degrees etc. And that this knowledge was not entirely extinguished by the fall, as neither was the natural inclination to such a law proceeding from that right and given to man: or the natural flight and aversion from its opposite.

Problem 5: Whether divine natural right is the same as the eternal law so called by the Scholastics. I respond, Eternal law can denote: 1. any practical rule of necessary and eternal truth, to which we are naturally obliged, as for example that God must be worshipped, parents honored, injury done to no one: these rules because they are immutable laws are called eternal. 2. the act of the divine mind by which it conceives and judges that those rules must be kept by the rational creature, with the will to oblige it: in which notion Thomas takes it q. 93 a. 1. I deny it concerning eternal law in the first acceptation: Because there are many practical rules which are indeed of eternal truth and hypothetically necessary, which nevertheless God could have willed otherwise and prescribed to us: and which consequently are not of divine natural right. I deny it likewise concerning eternal law in the second acceptation: because the indifferent will of obliging here intervening and preceding, indeed constituting a good part of this law, shows it to be free right as to that part, but not natural and absolutely necessary from the necessity of the divine nature. Therefore, since all divine natural right to the outside is of eternal law, but vice versa not

all eternal law is of divine natural right to the outside: it follows that this divine right is not reciprocal with eternal law, nor are they synonymous.

Problem 6: Whether all moral precepts which pertain to the Decalogue are of natural right? I respond, the Scholastics commonly affirm it on I-II q. 94 a. 4 and 5, but by natural right they understand immutable divine right if not absolutely, at least on the hypothesis of the divine will and command, the truth of which is known to us by nature: which for that reason they say is immutable in itself, so that it can neither be abrogated nor cease to oblige. We on the contrary Deny it as we explained natural right above. And thus we refer to free divine right the external and instituted worship both common to the Old and New Testament and proper to the New Testament, namely about the sacraments, about the visible and instituted church, also certain special rules about the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th commandments. Which we gather from this, because God can command that someone marry his own sister (which necessarily happened in the first propagation of the human race): and his widowed sister of his brother, Deuteronomy 21, he could also have not instituted monogamy. He can command that someone kill his innocent son, Genesis 22, likewise that a political judge inflict capital punishment on the innocent sons of a transgressing father, Joshua 7 and Numbers 16. He could have in primeval integrity constituted the human race without Magistrates; and certainly not ignoble Theologians dispute that he actually so constituted it. In addition, he could have from the beginning enjoined a community of goods, if indeed he did not enjoin it.

Problem 7: Whether therefore any precept of the law of nature can be erased from the hearts of men? I respond, here we take the natural law in the common notion of the Scholastics, and thus about its common precepts I Deny it (such as are, good is to be done, evil shunned: God must be worshipped, what you do not want done to you do not do to another, and if any are similar to these.) The first principles as to habit are never extinguished: although as to Praxis and exercise or actual cognition and intuition of them, and their exertion and use for deducing practical axioms proximately, nearly, remotely from there, and applying them to deeds and the conscience of deeds, the matter is otherwise. But about particular precepts deduced from there I Affirm it from Romans 1:21, Ephesians 4:18, and universal experience. See the Scholastics on Thomas cited question article 6.

Problem 8: Whether God can dispense from the precepts of natural right? I respond, Here the distinctions of terms must be premised. Dispensation is when in some case in which the law truly has force and obliges, the obligation of the law is removed from some particular man; the rest remaining obliged. Declaration or interpretation of the law is when it is declared that in some case the law does not oblige. Some confuse these but wrongly. See Valentia q. 4 on laws point 6, and Azorius bk. 6 Institutes ch. 1 q. 3, Vasquez on I-II disp. 178 ch. 2. Irritation is when a law is abolished before it perfectly obliges. Privilege is when someone is excepted from the obligation of a common law. Abrogation is when a law which already perfectly obliged is simply abolished and removed. Derogation, when it is removed in part, remains in part. They also commonly distinguish the precepts of the natural law into three orders. So that certain are most universal principles, for example, Evil must not be done, and good must be pursued. Certain are immediate conclusions, and intrinsically conjoined to the said principles, and such are all the

precepts of the Decalogue. Certain are more remote from those principles and from the Decalogue itself, for example about polygamy, about not marrying a brother's wife etc. Thus Suárez, bk. 2 on laws ch. 15. The Scholastics go into various opinions. There are those who state that God can dispense in all the precepts of the Decalogue, as Ockham, Gerson, d'Ailly, Almain; namely because sins against this law are evil only because God prohibited them. Others in all the precepts of the second table as in part in the fourth precept, as Scotus, Gabriel, who therefore exempt those precepts from the natural law rigidly so called. Durandus and John Major make the negative precepts of the Decalogue indispensable. But Durandus excepts the fifth precept, and the sixth with some distinction: so that he makes both dispensable. Thomas I-II q. 100 a. 8 with many others - Altisidorensis, Richard, Paludanus etc. - that all the precepts of the Decalogue are simply and absolutely indispensable, even by the absolute power of God; and Suárez defends this opinion as if common in the cited place. The reason is this, because it contains an intrinsic nature of justice and due, in which, note, not as it proceeds from the law as its effect, but as it comes from the intrinsic proportion between the object and act compared to right reason, or rational nature. For the natural law prohibits those things which are evil in themselves, insofar as they are such, and therefore supposes in the objects themselves or actions an intrinsic due, before every external law, that they not be loved or done; and on the contrary it prescribes good things insofar as they have an intrinsic connection and necessity with rational nature. Whatever things are objected here about the change of precepts from the authority of God, as Genesis 21, Hosea 1, Exodus 12, they respond that God does not properly dispense from the precept, nor change precepts formally so called; but changes precepts materially, that is, as we properly speak, the very matter and thing or action about which the precept deals. And he does this not as legislator, to whom pertains legislative and dispensative right, but as lord, who can change or grant dominions. Thus for example, He did not dispense from the law of theft, nor command theft to the Israelites; but as supreme lord through his dominion he changed human dominion, and subjected the goods of the Egyptians to the power of the Israelites; and thus no nature of theft has place there. But if some authors with Bernard On Precept and Dispensation ch. 5 here posit dispensation, they say they spoke improperly, to be expounded as was just said. And indeed this opinion thus far does not displease. But it remains further to be inquired what may be the foundation of intrinsic due in the acts themselves or of their connection and necessity with rational nature; and whether all the precepts of the Decalogue (to which we refer whatever is moral) are of divine natural right and simply necessary, so that not only is the natural precept implanted in man from the hypothesis of the nature now constituted impossible to be changed, but neither the very matter or acts themselves about which the precept deals? Briefly it must be asked whether acts intrinsically evil, taken materially, can be made honest by the authority of God commanding, and their deformity be separable from them, because namely their honesty or baseness depends on the dominion of God. About the first three precepts of the Decalogue as to their negative, this must be stated absolutely. For neither can God without a denial of himself relax those precepts, or concede to the rational creature for example to hate God, blaspheme, worship another God etc. About the first and third, as to their affirmative and the acts of natural worship, the same must be stated; thus for example he cannot concede or dispense that it not worship God, not love him, not believe in him, not sanctify his name. But about the second precept it is doubted: 1. whether all its negative can be changed in some way by a change of the matter of the precept: for example,

whether God could exhibit some likeness of himself of whatever kind or material sign; through which painted or formed it would be licit for that man to whom he deigned to exhibit it to worship God thereafter. 2. it is doubted whether the affirmative of the same precept if it is expounded to be instituted worship, God could so change without implication of contradiction that someone would be bound by no instituted worship whether of the Old or of the New Testament. We do not see that either, if it is said, implies. And indeed we gather the former both from extraordinary signs or images, as of the dove, Matthew 3, and ordinary ones, as the cherubim and ark of the covenant with the propitiatory. About the Fourth precept, if we say that a determinate and recurring in order species of time is described by it (as indeed I prefer to say) it must be stated without any hesitation that it is of positive divine right. But what Suárez determines for the fourth precept that it does not imply a contradiction if God gave a man license through all the time of life, indeed through all eternity to exert no good motion about himself, nor exhibit any direct and proximate worship, that seems to me crass and curious enough. Indeed if he meant external worship and motion, we could certainly leave it in the middle: but if internal motion is meant, I would prefer to think with some Thomists that this cannot be done, neither by proper dispensation, nor by a change of the matter: Which also seems to be the opinion of Gregory of Valentia disp. vol. 2 disp. 7 q. 4 point 6. About the precepts of the second table it must be inquired whether they are of positive divine right: and consequently whether their matter can be changed without implication. Suárez ibid. affirms it: excepting the ninth about Lying, in which he says perhaps there is a special reason, either because it is evil even with respect to God himself, or because of itself it is not limited to created matter, nor depends on the dominion of God over it or over the person: but in whatever matter and about whatever person it can be said, or finally because its deformity does not depend on another dominion or divine right, but immediately arises from the dissonance of the words to the mind. Thus he. About the Fifth precept there is no small difficulty, namely whether the honor of parents as such can be changed and abolished; so that it would not imply a contradiction if God prescribed to someone the omission of this act or the contrary. Durandus with his followers affirms it; by this reason, because as from the matter of the rest of the second table so also from that of the fifth precept the due can be removed: for the dependence of one man on another is separable from anyone, dependence on God alone is in no way separable. But Suárez opposes that the due of honoring parents is inseparable from a son, the procreation by such parents having been supposed. And certainly I prefer to incline to this part, indeed also to add that it is of divine natural right that a man is bound to love man.

Problem 8: Whether therefore the law of nature is mutable, about which they dispute on q. 94 a. 5 and 6. I respond, 1. it is [mutable] by addition. Thus God could add new special precepts: in which way in fact he added if not a special or explicit precept, at least a new explication, extension, application of the precept: Believe in Christ the mediator: which nevertheless virtually and implicitly, or as to genus, is contained under the first precept of the Decalogue. 2. It is not [mutable] by its own cessation, as to the most universal precepts, also as to particular precepts, so that they no longer universally oblige: nevertheless some things recently recounted can be changed in a particular case and as to some man materially, so that the state of the object or act about which the precept deals is changed: as was just said. 3. It is not mutable on the part of the subject, that is of human nature or natural synderesis, in which it is and remains as in a

subject habitually. That is, it cannot be erased from the human mind at least as to the most universal principles, and as to the root of particular principles and precepts, namely synderesis. Confer the disputation on Atheism part 2 and 3.

Problem 9: Whether the precepts of right are rightly established: to live honestly, not to harm another, to render to each his own. I respond, There are those who deny it; among whom is Amesius bk. 5 of Cases ch. 1 q. 5. See the reasons in him. To me nevertheless it seems this is not badly said: if indeed you understand, as it seems to be understood, the right of man toward man. But about these and other questions in the common topic of Laws: and on the second table of the Decalogue, of Justice and Right, it must be dealt with.

We reject 1. Ockham in 2 q. 19 and D'Ailly in 1 q. 14 who state that an act of hatred of God can be rightly done and commanded by God, as also anything else against the moral law. 2. Panormitanus and some of his followers, who on the last chapter Extra. de Constitutionibus write that natural right can be removed for a cause, namely by human authority. But about the power of dispensing concerning divine right which the Canonists attribute to the Roman Pope, it must be disputed elsewhere.

Problem 10: Whether it is repugnant to divine natural right if it commands sins. I respond, I Affirm, and it was most rightly noted by Cajetan on I-II q. 100 a. 8 that the divine will, although it is not absolutely determined to will something outside itself or that man do something, is nevertheless necessarily determined that if it wills man to do something, it wills him to do it well and agreeably to his nature: for his will is the most right fount and rule of all goodness, indeed it is the first goodness: not otherwise than as God cannot teach what is false, nor will or command that man be deceived by himself or by another, because he is the first and highest truth. But this controversy will be agitated ex professo below in the appendix.

Problem 11: Whether the reward of eternal life is of divine natural right and precedes every act of the will, owed in the old covenant entered into with man before the fall. I respond, I Deny it. For it cannot be proven that it would imply [a contradiction] if God had created man without this promised reward: For God is obliged to no one for a reward, Romans 11:35, except from a presupposed free will and promise.

Problem 12: Whether the permission of sin is of positive divine right; or whether God is obliged to non-permission or impedition by natural right and necessarily. I respond, I Affirm the former, I Deny the latter. And we gather this a posteriori from the very effect. For God in fact permits sins. But he does not do this beyond or against his right and power.

Problem 13: Whether conserving and confirming grace was owed to the angels (who had it) and to men (who did not have it) in the first creation. I respond, I Deny it. The same must also be said about restoring grace, as also about the preparation for grace and glory. All of which are deduced from Romans 11:25-36 with 9:18, 20, 21.

Problem 14: Whether divine natural right requires that God create man with the pretended natural liberty of the will independent [of God], such as the ancient and more recent Pelagians imagine. I respond, I Deny it.

Problem 15: Whether both natural and positive divine right demand the punishments owed to sins, and consequently cannot remit them without satisfaction. I respond, About positive right the Antagonists of the Socinians do not at all doubt: and that is sufficiently clear from Romans 1 last verse, and 2:8-9, 2 Thessalonians 1:6-7, Hebrews 2:4, Isaiah 43, Habakkuk 1, Isaiah 1, Exodus 32. And thus far it suffices to believe that God cannot deny either his truth or his positive right (the sense and knowledge of which he impressed on the human mind together with the law of nature, Romans 1 last verse). Thus stands the argument of our side against Socinus for the necessity of satisfaction according to the eternal and immutable right of God. But whether this right can be called natural and of absolute necessity, and that God could not have conceived and decreed otherwise from eternity, is not equally clear. I prefer to incline to the affirmative part; especially since no reasons compel us to the opposite. But more on this below, thesis 2 on the Justice of God.

Problem 16: Whether divine right either free or necessary demands that the sinner himself suffer the punishments; and thus excludes the giving of a sponsor and his satisfaction? I respond, I Deny it, and the conditions of the new covenant and the outcome a posteriori have demonstrated this. Therefore, on account of the substitution of our sponsor for us, some remission of the right of God, or Dispensation, or relaxation, is vainly imagined, as some speak. Nothing of this kind has a place here; but only the interpretation of divine right and the law given, which the new covenant and Gospel make, according to Romans 3:24-26 and 8:3 compared with James 4:12. And thus nothing was lost from divine right, Romans 3:29. For God declares it to be his right as the highest Ruler and Lord either to punish sin in the sinner himself, or in his sponsor, and thus to dismiss the sinner unpunished. But how much the dispensation or relaxation of right differs from interpretation, the writers about laws cited by us teach. Here there is no intrinsic change of the law either in itself through abrogation, or dispensation made by God as legislator as such; but only extrinsic through the apposition or addition of the sanction and revelation of the Gospel to the revelation of the law of works, Romans 3:29-31, strictly so called, by which we are bound to believe through the subsumption of the law of faith under the law of obedience generally accepted, and its deduction from that: namely with the revelation of the Gospel and God's gratuitous promise having been posited, and consequently a command that man believe it. For in all things man is bound to give faith to God speaking. But a twofold change is presupposed to the change of the law just mentioned, one of the object about which the curse and execution of the law deals, namely of Christ, who in himself, when he was just, was made sin and a curse, and thus most justly was subjected to the penal law; the other change was of us, from whom, reckoned in our sponsor, all debts were taken away and transferred to him. And this act of substitution was of God not as legislator, but as supreme Ruler and Lord. But what some (among whom is Grotius On the Satisfaction ch. 3) call this act a relaxation and dispensation of the penal law, we think is said improperly: in which way Gregory of Valentia, Suárez in the place just cited rightly observe that Bernard and Thomas speak improperly in the question of the Dispensation of the natural law. For this cannot properly be

said: unless it is shown that this is the sanction of the penal law, and that from the natural or positive right of God: Let the sinner himself in person, and no sponsor for him, pay. Corollary: We reject the Socinians asserting the abrogation and derogation of the divine law through the Gospel. Thus Crellius Against Grotius on the Satisfaction ch. 3.

Problem 17: Whether it is repugnant to the right and justice of God that our sins be punished in another, and indeed in an innocent and just one. I respond, I Deny it, against Socinus On the Savior and his Hyperaspist Crellius in the cited book ch. 4. Let the Antagonists of Socinianism be compared.

Problem 18: Whether it was of immutable divine right that our sponsor be God and man. I respond, From Hebrews 2:17 and other passages with our Catechism question 16-17, we prefer to incline to the affirmative part, as safer and more strongly contradicting the Socinian heresy. There are some of the Orthodox who think otherwise, among whom are Calvin and Beza following Augustine in this part. We judge the opinion of our Catechism to be safer. This question depends on the other prior one, whether satisfaction of infinite value was required.

Problem 19: Whether it was of the same right of God that he be a just man. I respond, I Affirm with the same Catechism, which with its commentators brings forward reasons to be read there. To which is also added this, that supposing he was and had to be God or a divine person, that person could not have assumed a sinful human nature. Against which the Scholastics dispute profanely enough, to be refuted elsewhere.

Problem 20: Whether he had to be the second person of the Godhead? I respond, congruities are usually brought forward here: but about the necessity it is not clear. We prefer, therefore, to be silent here and to number this question among the curious ones.

Problem 21: Whether Christ had to bear all the species of punishments which men sustain for sins, or whether adequation and compensation through equivalent punishment sufficed. I respond, I Affirm the latter.

Problem 22: Whether it was of immutable right, or of the free divine will, that Christ intensively underwent so many and so great punishments for satisfaction for us. I respond, I Affirm the latter.

Problem 23: Whether by immutable natural divine right, or by positive right, Christ had to die. I respond, the latter must at least be affirmed with our Catechism q. 40. The former also seems to rest on q. 11. But it is not so clear, and can be left in the middle.

Problem 24: Whether Christ in human nature was subject both to the law and consequently rendered obedience not only for us but also for himself by natural right. I respond, I Affirm. This is disputed ex professo in the topic of Justification, where the imputation of the obedience of Christ is discussed. See Gomarus's disputation On the Matter and Form of Justification, especially Tilenus in Syntagma vol. 2 disp. 4.

Problem 25: Whether in acts of religion formally and properly so called permissive divine right has a place: and whether that suffices per se to impose such acts on man? I respond, I Deny it. About which it must be dealt with in the common topics of Traditions, of the Authority of the Church in dogmas of the faith, of Ceremonies and adiaphora.

Problem 26: Whether God could reprobate someone without the intervention of sin foreseen as the cause or necessary antecedent of his decree. I respond, I Affirm with Augustine On Predestination and Grace ch. 16. But thus state Arminius in 1 dist. 40 and 44, and d'Ailly in 1 q. 12 a. 2, Lavellus vol. 1 q. On the Cause of Predestination, Viguerius Institutes ch. 20 §8, James Andreae in Montbéliard Colloquy p. 508, Flacius Illyricus, David Rungius, George Major on Romans 9. And of the fact that God so reprobated, this is the opinion of any of the most excellent Theologians from our side - Beza, Marlorat, Daneau, Martyr, Whitaker, Perkins, Zanchi, Piscator, Ursinus, Hubertus, Sturm, Gomarus, Chamier, Sharp, Ferrius, and many others to be named elsewhere: whose opinion William Twisse recently explained and defended against Arminius ch. 2 digression 8, whose book William Amesius, the hammer of Remonstrantism, publicly approved. Before Twisse Francis Junius had done the same in collation with Arminius; but with a reconciliation and distinction of negative and positive reprobation having been applied. Maccovius learnedly and perspicuously instituted the reconciliation of absolute reprobation which ascends above the fall, with that which subsists in the fall, part 1 of Common Topics disp. 27. Where see the penultimate thesis. There is one way of speaking about the destination of sin, or of man to sin, which we prefer to change, so that it may be called the destined permission of sin as a means subordinated to the end. See also the reconciliations of Dr. Spanheim and Dr. Revius in the disputations On Predestination proposed in 1644 at Leiden. It is most certain that Calvin with a distinction handed down those two opinions as so subordinated to each other and therefore minimally conflicting: although some learned men contend the opposite, that he did not ascend above the fall. But it must be believed that Beza best perceived the mind of his teacher and colleague; nor do the words of Calvin himself allow us to doubt, Institutes bk. 3 ch. 21 §5, and ch. 23 §7-8, and ch. 24 §12, and in the commentary on Romans 9:18, and in the treatise On the Eternal Predestination of God. And in the response to the calumnies of the Trifler on article 1. The French and Belgian Confession do not circumscribe the object of predestination by the fall of Adam. But what the Pelagian adversaries complain about the horror of that opinion should not move us away from the ingenuous confession and defense of the truth. For you never see anyone of them attracted to our side through a remission or descent or softening in this business; but on the contrary from our side sometimes someone slips to their side through this remission or descent, among whom is Daniel Tilenus (whose first edition of the Syntagma must be compared with the later), and another in Germany whom I do not name here, who does not pass over plainly and openly to the opinion of the adversaries, who before had courageously defended the opinion above the fall against the virulent calumnies of the adversaries; but afterwards induced by I know not what considerations, he descended below the fall, and scarcely stopped there. There are also others for whom on account of the fear and in favor of the calumniating adversaries, the ambiguities and softenings of the hardness (as they speak) of the opinion about predestination first wore away their solidity and erudition, then also their orthodoxy in part, so that they involved

themselves and others in perplexities, contradictions, or at least shadowy logomachies. But that the Neo-Pelagian adversaries proclaim this opinion to be so horrid and odious should not frighten us: for here it must be dealt with by Scriptures and reasons, not by words and clamors. I will posit here the individual moments of this decree, to be conceived according to the order of generating and intending nature, so that the adversaries, if they can, may prove the absurdity of one of them in itself, or of the connection of each one among themselves. God reprobated N.N. negatively and positively, that is, he decreed, willed, established, destined from eternity according to his good pleasure: 1. To create him. 2. To permit the fall. 3. To leave him in the fall and permit his final impenitence and unbelief. 4. Justly to damn him. 5. To show the glory of his justice in him. Why is it unjust or absurd that God by his good pleasure established not to confer grace and glory on this N., but to permit his sin, and most justly damn him on account of permitted sin to the glory of his justice. Not even in the least appearance can it be contradicted here, unless it is first solidly proven from Scripture that God owes grace and glory to man, and cannot according to his absolute and supreme power pass him by and leave him to himself, or permit his sin. Briefly, unless it is proven to be simply impossible and to imply a contradiction if he wanted or decreed such a thing, as to will to create another God, or to make sin, to will to lie, etc. If you ask whether therefore God reprobated those passed over without sin or without any intuition of sin either original or actual, that is, decreed not to save but to damn to the glory of his justice. I respond with a distinction: Without the intuition of sin as the meritorious cause and antecedent of that divine decree, why this one was less chosen and more reprobated than that one: With the intuition of sin as the meritorious cause and antecedent of damnation itself, and as the term or object (for its part) of the divine decree by which or according to which he permits sin and destines to just damnation on account of sin. Sin, therefore, is the cause of the thing willed, that is, of damnation, but it is not the cause of the divine volition or of God willing; no more than faith which is the instrumental cause of our justification and salvation is for that reason the cause of election to salvation. Here the axiom of the scholastics must be diligently noted: God wills this on account of this, But not on account of this does he will this. Thus God wills and decrees to damn N. on account of sin. But if "on account of sin" is joined with "to will," or is placed over "to will" or "to decree" of God, we say it is false: because the decree or will of God considered in itself has no cause, no antecedent, nothing prior to itself; nothing on which it depends, is determined, limited, conditioned: although the thing willed or decreed depends on another as a cause or antecedent condition. But if "on account of sin" is joined with "to damn," we say it is most true. Just as God decreed to save Peter or Paul through faith: so that "through faith" is joined with "to save," as the cause and antecedent condition of salvation; but not with "to decree." In this object of reprobation, therefore, the illustration of the glory of justice obtains the place of the end; the place of the means obtains 1. just damnation on account of sin, 2. and to that proximately subordinated (as most state) or coordinated, as Twisse states, the permission of sin. 3. which precedes, and to which in the order of the decree the creation of man is subordinated. For those who retain with us those axioms: That God wills nothing, and does nothing in vain but for a certain end: That God does not fall short of his intention: That the end is first in intention, and last in execution - they cannot exclude this from the series of predestination. If they do not posit and exhaust all truth, or prefer to abstain on account of the adversaries, by omitting certain parts or moments in the object of predestination, we easily allow them to enjoy their judgment and to stop here: only let the opinion of so many and so great

theologians who ascend above the fall not be rashly condemned; especially since the celebrated National Synod of Dort in 1618-1619 was unwilling to prescind that superior ascent, much less to reject and condemn it together with other heterodoxies and dangerous inaccuracies; although it proposed the common opinion about election from the fallen human race, for the vindication of the common faith (also of the laity) about the solid grace of God and his absolute will against the Hypotheticals and patrons of free will. The Neo-Pelagians, in order to stir up hatred of the orthodox opinion, from time to time substitute the word damnation for the word reprobation: indeed they even contend that it is the same whether you say something about reprobation or about damnation. But to them we reply that by equal reason it must be said that the decrees of God are not distinguished from the execution, and it is the same whether you say something about the decree or about the execution: e.g., the decree of creating the world is from eternity, therefore also the creation of the world: and vice versa the creation was done in time, therefore also the decree of creation. There is not yet any last judgment, actually existing: therefore there is no divine decree of the last judgment. All of which are most absurd. But the juniors will easily see the innocent and holy truth of this supralapsarian opinion (as the Remonstrants speak), never yet defeated by any saying of Scripture, by no axiom or reason of sounder philosophy, or able to be defeated, if only they recall their adversaries from exclamations and rhetorical evils to the strifes and precise points of argumentations. The Reverend and learned editors of the works of the highest Theologian and our teacher Fr. Gomarus will perhaps have the occasion to publish his most accurate conceptions about this question dictated with swan song a few days before his death, and to vindicate them from the impugnations or insultations of a certain malevolent person, if indeed he further betrays himself.

1. ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD.

To the will of God are referred twofold attributes. The former are those which are conceived analogically in the mode of affections, as love, mercy, etc. The latter are those which are conceived in the mode of habits, as justice, patience, long-suffering, etc. Among these justice is sometimes conceived as a universal virtue, and thus is the same as the goodness, holiness, and purity of God. Sometimes as a particular virtue; and thus it is taken here and defined: the virtue of God rendering to each his right. And it is either in words or in deeds. The former is when speech seeking the assent of the hearers is consentaneous both to the mind of the speaker himself, and to right reason, and to the thing: so that in commands there is equity, and in statements, whether dogmas or of promises or threats, truth and rectitude. This justice is also usually called the faithfulness of God, 2 Timothy 2:13, and fidelity, Hebrews 10:23. And by this reason in Hebrew, Syriac, Arabic language, justice, faith, truth are used synonymously; as we have shown elsewhere in passing in the desperate cause of the Papacy. With which agrees the Greek phrase in Romans 3:3, 4-5, 6-7. Justice in deeds is merely distributive (for commutative properly has no place between God and creatures, Thomas I q. 21 a. 1), by which he distributes to each his own, as is fitting. Its object and effect is judgment; its occupying object (which is also the end for which) is both God himself, or the glory of God: and the creature. And this is twofold, either of governance (or of creation and the government of those to be judged), or of jurisdiction, or of judgment. The former is that by which he institutes and directs all his actions in creation

and governance to the norm of his natural right and rectitude with highest equity, Psalm 33:4, so that he is the author of no sin or injustice, James 1:13, 1 John 1:5, nor does he mix any declination from the right and just in his actions, Romans 3:5-6 compared with James 1:17. The justice of judgment is that which renders the reward according to works, Romans 2:6-10, Jeremiah 17:10, 2 Thessalonians 1:5. And this is twofold, either remunerative or rewarding according to gratuitous promise toward those acting well, 2 Timothy 4:8. Or corrective toward those acting badly. Which we can again distinguish in three ways, into castigating or emending toward sons and friends, Hebrews 12:5-11. Into preparing, which we may also call retracting and repressing; toward the elect not yet converted, whether remotely or proximately and in the very instant before conversion, Acts 7:3-4, to which can be referred Psalm 83:17. Finally, into vindicating or punitive properly and strictly so called, which he exercises toward the reprobate. The adjuncts or properties of this punitive justice are: 1. that it is essential and necessary to God (in which way also the rest of the attributes of God), and therefore is really the same with God. 2. That consequently it does not depend on the free will of God: as if, namely, it were some effect of the divine will. 3. That it is a relative attribute: and, as to its egress, hypothetical: for it does not go out into act, except with the creature and its sin having been posited: not otherwise than as mercy regards the misery of the creature, either actual, or future, or possible. 4. That it has no external norm and measure, but only the intrinsic dominion, right, and power of God: briefly God himself, the first, most perfect being and agent. Hence it is also rightly said: God does not will or do something because it is just: but because he wills or does this, therefore it is just. Its effects outside God are both the penal law, and the right or judgment resulting from there, and the punishment. The right or judgment which is considered here must be distinguished from the right which is considered in God, and is as it were the norm of his justice. For the latter is something immanent, not really distinguished from God: but the former is something emanating, and as it were an effect really distinguished outside God from him as cause. The latter precedes every law whether of nature or written: but the former follows it, as an accompaniment or adjunct, or a relation resulting from it. The latter, insofar as it is natural, precedes every will of God, in a moment of reason or in an instant of nature: but the former, however much it is, follows it, as emanating together with the law and command from his free decree. Furthermore, although this penal law, or this punitive judgment, is essentially one and the same, yet on account of the addition or accession of the law of faith, or the new covenant, it is one thing before the fall, another after the fall. The former only deals with the transgression of the immutable moral law, as also of the symbolic law about the tree of life and of the knowledge of good and evil, Genesis 2:17. But the latter deals with the transgression not only of the moral law but also of the new addition about faith and the grace of Christ, which we call the Gospel. Hence results a greater debt both extensively and intensively. For the Gospel has new promises of grace in Christ the mediator: which make a new object of belief, or new part of the object of belief. Hence man is bound by virtue of faith also to tend to this object; or to extend his faith to it: because God reveals that truth to him and by revealing commands his faith; and binds man to this duty of faith. And this latter judgment is again either of the time of the Old Testament, whose formula is Deuteronomy 27 last verse, Exodus 20:5, 7. Or of the New Testament, whose formula is John 3:19, 36 compared with Hebrews 3:2-4, John 15:22-24, 26:8-10. But it must be observed that this amplified judgment (so to speak) from the occasion of the supervening new covenant does not extend to those to whom it has not been revealed: as we gather analogically

from Romans 2:12. The other and ultimate effect of punitive justice is punishment, which is also called wrath by metaphorical metonymy. About which in a peculiar common topic it is dealt with ex professo. Here only in passing distinguish the subject of punishment properly so called and consequently the object of vindicative justice, one being the vessel of love, namely Christ the God-man; others the vessels of hatred and wrath, namely the reprobate and those to be damned or damned both men and angels. The end of vindicative justice, with respect to men, is that they be deterred and admonished, Isaiah 26:9, with respect to God that he acquiesce in the vindication of his glory, See Isaiah 1:24, Ezekiel 5:13, Proverbs 1:26. Problem: Whether as the text 2 Peter 3:9, so also Ezekiel 18:21 and 32:11 are to be understood only about sinners to be converted, or about all and each even never to be converted. Compared, and most closely allied to divine justice is the justice of Christ the mediator as such: which nevertheless accurately distinguish from the essential justice of God which is God himself, lest you fall into the error of Osiander (whom see refuted by Calvin in the Institutes, Conrad Schlüsselburg in the Catalog of Heretics, Meisner in Anthropology). It is indeed called the justice of God, because namely it is from God, Philippians 3:9, Romans 10:3, who sanctioned the new covenant, gave the sponsor, accepted his surety and payment of debt for us, and imputed it to us by faith. That justice considered on the part of God the judge has to Christ the nature of punishment, on the part of Christ to God indeed of satisfaction, but to us of merit; on our part, or as it is terminated in us and we are partakers of it, the nature of grace, or gratuitous gift. The opposite of the judiciary justice of God is προσωπολημψία [respect of persons]: which Scripture therefore far removes from it, Romans 2:10-11.

2. Today it is controversial about the punitive justice of God, whether it is necessary in God, that is, as to egress or exercise: so that God necessarily punishes sin, whenever it has been committed. On which depend the controversies to be determined in the common topic of the satisfaction of Christ and of Justification; Whether the satisfaction and justice of Christ was necessary; either absolutely from the necessity of the divine nature because justice is essential and natural to God, or hypothetically from the supposed decree of God and the threatening of penal law. The Socinians deny all those things. Of the Orthodox there are those who affirm absolutely and simply that satisfaction by the natural right of God is necessary; and consequently that the remission of sin without the intervention of satisfaction is simply impossible, as being repugnant to the nature of God. Others defend that it is hypothetically necessary from the supposition of the decree and penal law given to Adam: and therefore that another mode of redemption was and now is impossible. Others finally seem to acknowledge no necessity of satisfaction; but to suspend the whole work of redemption from the little word or nod of God (as they say). We do not yet see reasons why we should desert the opinion received by many Antagonists of Socinianism, and hand over this hypothesis of the dogma of the satisfaction of Christ to the adversaries. Therefore, let these be the arguments for the affirmative opinion, which if they all do not hold for its first explication, at least they will hold for the second.

Argument 1: From Isaiah 1:14 and 33:14, Habakkuk 1:12-13, 2 Thessalonians 1:6, Exodus 34:7, Psalm 5:5-6, Exodus 20:5, Deuteronomy 4:24, Hebrews 10:30-31 and 12:29, Romans 2:2-3, 5 and 3:6 and 12:19, Numbers 14:18, Nahum 1:3. Which description shows that God naturally

hates sin, that is, sin displeases him; and with the object having been posited he cannot but exert his hatred against it from the necessity of his nature.

Argument 2: Romans 1:32 compared with the common sense of all men, who as they naturally conceive that there must necessarily be some God, so they understand him as governor, just, and avenger. Hence the natural accusation of conscience, Romans 2:16, and in any oppression and injury the appeal to the justice of God; hence also the innumerable expiatory rites devised for appeasing the deity; and the purifications, expiations, hence all the profane ordered to be far from sacrifices. From antiquities Stuckius drew those things out ex professo in his work on the Sacrifices of the Gentiles. After whom Grotius exhibited excerpts at the end of his book On the Satisfaction of Christ. So that I now pass over the axioms engraved on all, for example "The eye of God sees the unrighteous deed": and of the other poet: "The gods above behold mortal things with just eyes," and similar infinite ones together with the mythological Theology about Nemesis, Rhadamanthus, etc. Which certainly seem to indicate something more than the free institution or command of God, the opposite of which could have equally been.

Argument 3: This absurdity would follow: that God could be conceived under the opposite of this attribute, namely unjust. But this cannot be done without a denial of God. For whoever conceives God under the opposite of any divine attribute, for example, knowledge, will, power, etc., he indirectly denies God. The exception which could be opposed here from the attribute of mercy is easily refuted by denying that there is an equal nature of the necessity or liberty in the egress or exercise of divine justice and mercy: because God is not obliged to the creature, but the creature to God: About which more below.

Argument 4: It also seems to be able to be piously gathered a posteriori and to pertain to this, Romans 3:25-26, namely that God gave his only begotten Son, and moved heaven and earth, to accomplish that admirable work of redemption. But if justice did not have to be satisfied, it can scarcely be conceived why, when it would be easy to remit sins with a little word or nod, or in a thousand other ways, he undertook a work of such difficulty. This reason indeed does not suffice per se; yet perhaps it is of no less moment than the reasons of the adverse opinion. I know our reasons are urged by no small difficulties, nor perhaps are they all so evidently removed: yet we will try whether the Antagonists of Socinianism can be defended also in this part, and whether we should not rather remain in their opinion (which otherwise implies nothing absurd per se in God or the faith). At least whatever may be the case concerning the natural necessity of punishing sin, it stands firm from the immutable decree and eternal law of God, also implanted in the nature and mind of all men, that sin by its own nature merits punishment, nor can anyone be absolved from sin unless the deity is placated.

The sources of solutions against the objections both of the heterodox and of the most learned Twisse from the Orthodox, Vindications bk. 1 part 2 digression 8, are these:
1. Distinguish punishment and satisfaction said in general, from this species of punishment or satisfaction, or its special mode.

2. Distinguish the volition or act of the divine will by which it wills something from the necessity of nature or natural right and yet freely concomitantly: from the volition by which it wills through indifference and freely antecedently, whose opposite, namely, it could have willed.
3. Distinguish the turpitude or deformity of sin, from guilt.
4. The egress of a relative divine attribute, which has respect to creatures, is necessary from the hypothesis and with things needing to be posited having been posited. Thus God necessarily acts through and according to omnipotence, it having been posited that he acts something outside himself. Thus he determinately and certainly knows this or that future contingent, namely his decree about that contingent having been posited. Thus the duty of adoration and natural worship is owed to God, namely from the hypothesis or the rational creature having been supposed. Thus God necessarily by his continuous maintenance flows into any creature and conserves it in being, namely it having been posited that he wants it to exist. For without that maintenance and perpetual influx it cannot exist, as neither can it operate without concurrence: since the dependence of the creature on the creator in essence, existence, operation is essential. Thus just governance and judgment necessarily belongs to God concerning sins according to his natural dominion and right, namely a rational creature and the permission of sin having been posited; because every rational being is necessarily subject to God either to obedience or to punishment for defect, to compensation of the injury brought to his majesty and glory. These and other things in the Disputation itself we were leaving to objections to be applied then as the occasion demanded. Now it seemed good in the repeated edition of this disputation to briefly criticize the principal objections and exceptions.

Of which 1. The mercy is an essential and necessary attribute of God; nevertheless its egress or exercise is free; for God has mercy on whom he wills, Romans 9. Therefore, the nature of punitive justice is equal. I respond, I Deny the consequence from the necessary or free egress of one, to the egress of the other. The reason for the disparity is that God is obliged to no one, owes nothing to anyone, Romans 11:33-34, Luke 17:10, therefore he has mercy or does not have mercy according to his free good pleasure. But man is obliged to God, to subjection and obedience, or to vicarious compensation through due punishment. Therefore, he necessarily either renders due obedience to God, or is punished by God, but not freely (antecedently, namely).

2. If in the obedience of man without the intervention of a constitution or free divine will he necessarily and from the necessity of the divine nature merits punishment; therefore, obedience by equal reason merits reward. I respond, I Deny the consequence. Let the reason for the disparity from the solution of the preceding argument be applied here.

3. It would follow that God operates to the outside from the necessity of nature; which is most absurd. I respond, I Deny the minor with a distinction. When God freely operates to the outside, he necessarily operates in a divine mode and agreeably to his nature. For example, when he freely produces this or that man, it is necessary that he produce him endowed with reason: or if he freely wants to reveal something to an angel or man, it is necessary that he reveal the truth: or if he freely produces the world, it is necessary that he govern it. See below in the appendix part 1 thesis 4, Cajetan cited.

4. It would follow that God cannot dispense; that he necessarily punishes when and as much as he can. But this is absurd. I respond, I Deny the consequence. The delay of punishment, or dispensation as to time or mode can be determined to this or that part by the free will of God, although to punish or punishment itself considered in itself and absolutely is necessary. The same can be responded about the degrees or increase of punishments in hell, if indeed the damned never cease to accumulate sins upon sins. About which indeed there is a rather troublesome disquisition. Meanwhile, from the fact that we scarcely or with difficulty attain it, so that we satisfy both our own and others' curious talents, what we can attain and perceive clearly enough must not be subverted.

5. It would follow that God must necessarily conserve damned man in existence: But this seems absurd. I respond, the minor is denied. For it having been posited that man was freely produced by God and sin was freely permitted: it follows necessarily that he must be punished, and consequently necessarily conserved in existence, as long as he is punished or to be punished. But we do not dispute this time whether punishment justly equivalent to any sin must necessarily be eternal, according to the natural right of God, so that God without implication of contradiction could not decree otherwise: since the proposed objection has been satisfied without this.

6. It would follow that the terms "sin" and "not to be punished" are contradictory: But this is absurd? Therefore. I respond, The terms proximately and immediately implying contradiction are, the universal, supreme, and absolute dominion and power of God over man: and that man is not subject or obliged to God the supreme Lord to actual obedience, or that lacking to its vicarious compensation; which happens through punishment. Here is implied a contradiction as crude as if someone were to say that Philip is the father of Alexander, and Alexander is not the son of Philip: that Socrates is the legitimate lord or ruler of Hermachus, and Hermachus is not the servant or subject of Socrates.

7. God can inflict a milder punishment than sin deserves: therefore, he can by absolute power suspend all punishment. The minor is proven: Because God can reward beyond condignity: therefore, he can punish beneath condignity. I respond, Let the consequence of the major be proven perspicuously. 2. The proof of the minor is invalid: for it uses that hypothesis, That the nature of good and evil is equal, in order to conferring reward and inflicting punishment. We Deny it. For God owes reward to no rational creature, nor is he a debtor to himself from the necessity of nature, but only from free grace and promise. But on the contrary a rational creature necessarily owes obedience to God or vicarious compensation; and thus consequently God in order to that is a debtor to himself, or to his absolute power, right and justice. He would therefore deny himself, if he did not render to himself this debt of his natural right: but he would not deny himself, if he did not reward the man whom he does not reward from grace and liberally (without an intervening promise).

8. God can inflict infernal torment on someone without any demerit; therefore, he can also suspend all punishment notwithstanding any demerit. The consequence is proven, because he

is much more prone to doing good than to punishing. I respond, The consequence of the major with its proof could be examined not a little. But let it suffice now to except to the minor. The uncertain is proven through the uncertain, the doubtful through the much more doubtful. Whether that extension of the power and right of God over the creature is proven solidly enough we will examine below.

PART ONE OF THE APPENDIX TO THE THEOLOGICAL DISPUTATION ON THE RIGHT AND JUSTICE OF GOD.

Respondent M. ANDREAS LANSMAN of Amsterdam. For the 21st of December, 1644.

When we previously dealt with the Right of God, we established the distinction of divine right into natural and positive, or into necessary and free. Since the explanation and application of this distinction neglected or not sufficiently refined among the Scholastics and those who follow them we then judged to be very useful, as diffusing itself through so many theological theses, hypotheses and questions: so now we think we will do something worthwhile, if we again treat it more fully on account of the controversy and vindicate it according to our strength from the objections of learned men which have come to light after that time, and subjoin certain other things which will seem to pertain to the illustration of our disputation On the Right and Justice of God. As for the controversy about the present distinction:

I. We will establish its state.
II. We will indicate the reasons for our opinion.
III. We will solve the objections and exceptions.
IV. We will deduce corollaries and determine them by way of controversial problems.

1. The question is, therefore: Whether there is some divine right immanent in God, natural to God, necessary, and immutable; so that God without implication of contradiction through his absolute power and authority cannot will or not want to be able to command or do something which is repugnant to that right. Or thus, Whether there is some right of God in order to the creature, by which he himself is absolutely bound and obliged, so that a suitable subject or object having been posited, namely a rational creature, he cannot in the exercise and egress of that right omit an act and debt and homogeneous to that right, or exercise a contrary act, or command that it be exercised by others. Or thus, whether there is any right of God in order to the rational creature which is indeed apt to diffuse itself into a precept, at whose revelation, command, God conducts himself freely and indifferently to either part of contrariety or contradiction: so that to this or that part without violation and denial of his power, authority, perfection and wisdom, that is, without denial of himself he can first decree with himself, then reveal, command, execute outside himself according to his decree. Or thus, since there are certain things which are said to be done by God from the necessity of his nature, and not according to the antecedent liberty of the will or free decree, whether among them must also be numbered some precepts prescribed to the rational creature and the obligations existing in the rational creature from there. Or thus, Whether every right of God from which and according to

which he commands or can command something to the rational creature, or exacts and demands something from it as owed to himself, is mutable, free, and which could or could have been decreed otherwise by God, and consequently diffuse itself into another or contrary precept: or whether some is simply necessary and immutable, by which God cannot, things needing to be posited having been posited, oblige the rational creature, if indeed he wants to produce and have one exist. Others propose it thus, whether all things among rational creatures in order to God and among themselves are just and right, only because God wills, or whether certain things can be said to be just, which God cannot will otherwise, to which creatures are necessarily obliged, and consequently whether it can be said that God wills and commands them; because antecedently and a priori they are just and right. The Scholastics thus ask, Whether all the precepts of the Decalogue are mutable or dispensable. Sometimes they ask whether all are of natural right. But then they confuse human natural right, insofar as it inheres in and is present to man, with divine natural right, insofar as it inheres in or is present to God in order and revelation to man. The controversy is also usually proposed in certain hypotheses, and is specifically applied to this or that case: which we will criticize below in the disputation itself and in the consequences.

2. Our arguments are:

Argument 1: The dependence of the rational creature on God, insofar as it is rational, and in the genus of morals and in order to right reason is so necessary that its opposite expresses repugnance in terms and implies a contradiction: To this passive dependence on the part of the creature corresponds an active dependence on the part of God, the opposite of which would likewise imply a contradiction. Or thus, Every rational creature ought to be subject to God rationally, and is obliged to obedience, if God commands it something or demands from it: therefore, from the force of relatives, there is in God the right of subjecting to himself and obliging the rational creature to obedience; which he cannot deny, or decree and command its opposite without implication of contradiction. But that such a right is necessarily and immutably in God, that is antecedently to every free act of the will, is proven: 1. because the primacy, independence, perfection, supreme power of God, and similar divine attributes require this, and found such a right. If therefore these attributes precede the will of God or the free decrees of God in a moment of reason, therefore also the right of God, according to which he subjects to himself any given rational creature, and obliges it to obedience. 2. because (to argue from analogy or from equals) necessarily and immutably in God is adorability, indeed a reciprocal attribute of God, nor with any given rational creature through the free decree of God can its opposite be decreed, without implication of contradiction: Therefore some right in God is before the free decree. We think the antecedent is acknowledged by those who defend the contrary opinion. 3. Because (to conclude again from equals), the dependence in act or potency of any given or to-be-given or givable creature on God, in the genus namely of being, and of nature, and of second cause, is necessary and essential to the creature; so that God cannot decree the opposite through free will with himself, or execute it outside himself in time, without repugnance in terms and denial of himself: for another God would be posited, besides God, namely another first cause, another independent being, first, etc. But now the dependence of rational nature, as such, in the genus of morals, of moral goodness, and of right reason, on God and the first being,

most perfect, best, and the first and highest and archetypal truth, goodness, right reason, also the first and highest and absolute power and potency; is no less necessary than the dependence of any irrational nature in essence, existence, connate operation. For neither is moral goodness, and its principle and foundation rational intellect and will, in that higher and peculiar grade of entity and goodness, more independent than any other being. Any rational nature, therefore, is necessarily bound, according to rational acts or of right reason to convert and move itself to God as the first and supreme right reason, and to conform and subject itself to him as principle and exemplar and norm. God cannot by free will decree the opposite, and command according to this decree, without denial of his goodness and power. 4. Because (to argue ad hominem) the adverse opinion establishes that obedience and subjection is also necessary in general; so that man is equally bound to the blasphemy of God as to adoration, if indeed God commanded it to him, as it not obscurely suggests he can command. If therefore obedience and obligation to it, whenever God commands something, is necessary in the rational creature, nor can its opposite be established without repugnance in terms: it follows from the force of relatives, that there is some right in God of obliging to that obedience, which cannot be denied by him, and whose opposite cannot be decreed or commanded without implication. If this is conceded, we have what we want, namely a natural right of God in order to the creature, which precedes the free will of God, so that he cannot lay it aside, or decree its opposite.

Argument 2: Because punitive justice before every free decree of God or antecedently to the will of God is in God: therefore some right of God in order to the rational creature. The consequence is clear, because justice cannot be without right and vice versa. The minor is acknowledged, especially by today's defenders of the adverse opinion, and other accurate Antagonists of Socinianism, in the controversy about the satisfaction of Christ. And we dealt with it above in the disputation On the Right and Justice of God. Let there also be compared Dr. Maccovius, disputation of Common Topics part 1, disputation 22.

Argument 3: From absurd consequences. 1. because it would follow that there is no atheism, Epicureanism, diabolism, magic, hatred and denial of God, blasphemy, etc. which God could not freely will to command and by that very fact command as morally or spiritually good and pleasing to him, as rendered from due obedience to the divine Majesty. For whatever can fall under precept, by that very fact when it is commanded by God is not sin or evil, but God makes that sin become or be not sin: but all those things just recounted can fall under precept, according to the sense of the adversaries. What if therefore someone were to say that God can freely will and reveal and command: that man know and believe that there is no God; that God the Father, Son, Holy Spirit are not that one true God, that this or that creature; indeed even the devil himself is that one sole true God; that there are Two Gods of the Manicheans; that there are the Aeons of Valentinus, that any creatures, indeed even the devil must be religiously worshipped and adored; that God did not found the world, nor rule it with his providence: moreover if he were to say that God can will and command that man not obey him, not know him, not worship, not religiously honor him as God, but the devil: to trust in him, to love him from his whole heart, from all his strength, but to hate, deny, blaspheme the one and triune God. The adverse opinion is necessarily confined in this labyrinth of absurdities, which cannot be cut off by any color. But now from what so many absurdities per se, necessarily, and evidently follow,

that itself must be held as absurd. 2. because it would follow that God can deny himself, not only indirectly and implicitly, but expressly and directly, namely by commanding man or angel to believe these false things: I am not God, I am not your God to be worshipped, loved, etc. above all things, I am not good, perfect, omniscient, omnipotent creator and governor of the world, just. Or that he externally predicate those things about himself in the third person, or inscribe them inside the heart of man, and propose them to be believed as the object of faith: God is not just, omniscient, creator, etc. Christ is not God, nor the Messiah mediator of God and men, etc. Adam will not die by death, even if he eats of the forbidden fruit: God will not punish the unfaithful or impenitent. No reason can be given why he can propose and command these lies to be believed less than any others: if indeed all those things depend only on the free decree and command of God, so that they are proposed as determined to this or that part by the will of sign and command of God. 3. Because it would follow that God could have freely decreed, and according to his decree created men and angels, who had such a law, which prescribed each sin against the Decalogue both of commission and of omission, and took away the nature of sin or ἀνομία from all human and angelic acts and thus conferred on them the nature of opposed goodness and obedience: so that no sin could exist, indeed not even be conceived, and they all necessarily, and not by the grace of God whether of confirmation, or of restitution, or first or second, would have been immune from every shadow of sin, as if by nature, and from the necessity of nature: almost as God, to whom no law is posited. 4. Because it would follow that God could have freely decreed, and according to the decree created men or angels, without synderesis, conscience, and thus all natural or eternal law: among whom the conformity of right reason with the first and supreme right reason, and consequently the distinction of good or evil in rational acts considered both in species and in individual would have no place: no more than in a brute, or stone, or sun, or tree. Briefly, that a rational creature could be made which would be plainly ἔξω νόμου [outside law], as being either above every moral, ceremonial, any other law, as God; or below law, as a brute, stone, tree. 5. Because it would follow that no human act can be given, even a religious act, e.g., religious invocation of the devil, an oath by his name, divine love of him as the highest good, faith in him as in the first truth, trust and hope in him as in the first goodness, etc., which so has malice conjoined to itself or is so intrinsically evil, that it could not be changed by a circumstance by which the matter sufficient for sin would be changed and thus that act be rendered good. 6. Because it would follow that God could freely decree and make that the rational creature in general and universally not obey him commanding it anything: nor even believe a falsehood when commanding in particular, or do any other sin against the first, second, third precept, since God would take away the nature of malice and ἀνομία from it. I touched on the latter absurdity above, as to the man, to show that the adverse opinion is involved in absurdities and contradictions. 7. Because consequently it would be inferred from here that God, if he wants, can be the author or approver of disobedience, that is, the author and cause at least moral of the sin of sins (according to 1 Samuel 15), as being one who can teach man, or command him, not to obey him commanding or about to command anything. For there is no obligation in man, nor right of obligation in God, which necessarily and antecedently to the will and law of God can impede this according to the adversaries: For God does not command that they obey him their God, because it is just: but on the contrary it is just, because God now so wills and commands, who nevertheless could equally will and command the opposite. Nothing can be excepted here by the adversaries, except that that universal

disobedience of man or of all men, if indeed it were from the presupposed precept of God about disobedience, would not then be sin, but virtue and an act of obedience. But let him see whether and how they can persuade sane men of that labyrinthine disobedient obedience and obedient rebellion or disobedience. I at least confess that I can neither grasp nor digest things so crude. 8. Because it would follow that the hypothesis against the Socinians about the essential and absolutely necessary punitive justice of God, and about the necessity of satisfaction for sin, cannot be defended in any way: which nevertheless the patrons of the adverse opinion have hitherto defended with us. 9. Because it would finally follow that there is no repugnance in terms, no implication of contradiction, nothing absolutely impossible for God. For as some badly make the power of God, the reason and logic of God the asylum of contradictions and absurdities: so it is to be feared lest at last someone from the hypothesis of the adverse opinion and from equals infers that God can freely decree and according to the decree make that man be irrational, and brute rational, and dog be stone or man, and vice versa, and body without quantity, and accident without subject, and the same Peter die at Rome, and live at Utrecht, and rest at Cologne and be moved at Paris, and six hundred other similar things, part of which we noted in the disputation On the Power of God: where see. For it will be easy for those who give birth to or nourish these portents to pretend that they have no necessity and immutable reason antecedently to the will of God, why he, who as a free agent now decreed and made those things thus to the outside in creatures, could not have decreed or decree the opposite: since the free will of God is the sole, first, supreme cause of all things to the outside.

Argument 4: Let it be supernumerary and probable, taken from the consent of wisdom, which considered this matter more properly. For by many (I confess) the question was not proposed in terms and abstractly, and therefore the distinction was not understood, by others it was not sufficiently refined most inwardly up to the end by defending it, and applying it to particulars. Therefore, first those things must be brought together here which the Theologians say about the essential, supreme, and absolute power, majesty, and dominion of God, which God, some creature having been posited in act, cannot deny, and to which all creatures materially, rationals formally and rationally must be subject, as being alone capable of such subjection. But now where there is natural power, necessary, before the free act of the will, there is homogeneous right. Since right is nothing other than a moral quality belonging to a person for having or doing something. Let our students consult on the given occasion any writers of common topics and the Scholastics. Then all those Scholastics and Casuists who expressly establish these things: That malice is so conjoined to some human acts that it is entirely inseparable from them; and on the contrary that goodness, honesty and justice is so intrinsic to others that it cannot be torn away from them: Likewise That some things are naturally just, and therefore commanded, because they are good; but others become just by divine institution, and are good because commanded, the matter of which does not depend on the dominion of God; so that God cannot use absolute dominion to change the matter of obligation; which precepts are therefore natural, obliging in any circumstance. In addition, that the law of nature cannot be changed as to its common things, or be abolished from the hearts of men. Finally, that all the precepts of the Decalogue, at least the three precepts of the first table, are not dispensable. See Thomas with the Thomists, I-II q. 100 a. 8 (where by name, Cajetan II-II q. 57 a. 2 and q. 94 a. 5 and 6, Bonaventure on 1 dist. 47 q. 4, on whom the commentary of Peter Capullo, Scotus with the

Scotists the explanation of Rhada exhibits excellently in Controversies part 3 controversy 16 §2. Of the more recent Vasquez on I-II disp. 97 §3 and 179 §3. Whom Ferdinand de Castro Palao cites and follows in his Moral Work tract. 3 disp. 6 point 3 §6, where about the dispensation of the law concerning the example of Abraham he speaks thus: It must be supposed that there are some natural precepts immutable, and which are commanded in any circumstance. These are considered to be all those, the matter of which does not depend on the dominion of God, such as to lie, to worship false Gods, to hate God. But there are others, the matter of which depends on the dominion of God: These, I say, if God wants to use his absolute dominion, will not oblige; because the matter of obligation will be changed. With these agree all other Scholastics except Ockham, d'Ailly, Gerson, Almain. Azorius contends so rigidly for this part, that he does not fear to say that sin is repugnant to right reason, even if there were no God. How solidly, we do not here inquire. Let the Theologians who distinguish the worship of God into natural and instituted accede, as Amesius and those who prefigured this distinction for him. In addition those who assert that God antecedently to his free decree is a debtor to himself and is bound to something, the opposite of which he cannot decree. Thus Ursinus in his commentary on Isaiah 3:10, For God ought to gratify himself as the highest good, to consult for his honor from the order of his justice: he does not owe to creatures, but gives benefits, whatever he gives, from gratuitous benevolence. Maccovius vol. 2 of Theological Disputations p. 304 rightly establishes that man is always obliged to obedience: which hypothesis does not seem to agree with the adverse opinion, which he elsewhere defends ex professo.

3. Our opinion being now sufficiently established, it remains that we examine the opposite one, which once perhaps came forth in the question concerning the dispensation of the precepts of the decalogue to one or another of the Scholastics just cited; although they did not defend it to the end with all hypotheses and corollaries: but recently on the occasion of the dispute about the object of faith, whether it can be false, a more recent Theologian (as he is very studious of orthodoxy in other matters, so he is subtle and perspicacious) D. Maccovius, in the disputations lately published on the decalogue in 8. and with him a certain most learned disciple of his, while he was still living and approving, in the little book whose title is Vindicia &c. and in another whose title is Mantifa &c. undertook to defend it on purpose; confirmation of that opinion being also summoned from the disputations of today's Antagonists of Pelagianism, among whom the most erudite Twisse and Rutherford, of whom the former in his defense of Perkins against Arminius lib.2.sect.5. criminat.2. the latter exercitat.2. against the Arminians chap. 3. defend, that there is something just, because God wills it not against God to will, because it is just. In piecemeal the same axiom seems to be indicated by Calvin lib. 3. Instit. c. 23. Perkins in the little book on Predestination from Ailly, Polanus syntagm.lib.2.c.26.§.4.

But it will be clear from our solutions to be submitted soon that later authors, outside of the disputation and without any regard for the opposite opinion, said this, and therefore through an added distinction their sayings can be easily reconciled with ours. As for Twisse and Rutherford, I do not think they meant anything other than that there is no rule, measure, reason, or cause of God's will outside of God, or prior to God willing and decreeing, on which He depends in His free decrees (especially of election and reprobation). Also, that no rule, norm, reason and form of justice is to be sought beyond and above the free good pleasure and supreme, absolute and

most free power of God, to which God's preterition, reprobation, decree of not giving grace and glory, but of permitting sin or permitting man to himself and of damning him on account of permitted sin to the glory of His justice, ought to be measured, or from which it can be deduced a priori by us: but it is enough for us, if we are most certain from the word of God about the that, namely that God thus decreed with Himself from eternity between man and man: but the why, why He chose this one, is not to be further sought; because the cause is sought of that whose cause is not, as Augustine says. But the whole foundation of this disputation against the Pelagians is to be placed in this: That there is nothing antecedent to the will of God or of right, or attribute in God (whether it is called justice, or grace, or mercy) according to which God is a debtor and is obligated to a rational creature, to impede its sin, and to destine and prepare grace and glory for it and to confer it in time. From which it necessarily follows that it is not to be sought concerning those decrees of God, namely election and comparative reprobation, whether they are just, whether God could thus decree without injustice and without injury to His justice, because it is falsely presupposed against Romans 11:35 that those decrees of God or immanent actions of God are formally acts of distributive justice, as those emanating acts are, by which God justly renders to each one his own from His antecedent permission, and covenant initiated with Christ and with the members of Christ in Christ, Hebrews 6:10, 2 Thessalonians 1:6-7 compared with Romans 8:18. It will be without doubt to one who has more deeply examined the scope, thread and conclusion of the whole disputation, that this alone is what those most erudite theologians want. And since they themselves by the grace of God are still living, they will be able, when given the opportunity, to declare whether they want their views to be drawn to where they are drawn by the more recent authors just cited.

4\. Let us now come to the examination of the arguments. Argument 1: If some precepts flowed from the nature of God, then the will of God would not be the first rule of justice; but the latter is absurd, because it is the rule of all things external to God. Response 1: The free will is not the first rule of goodness, justice, and right in God; neither in internal actions (which the authors of the opposite opinion directly admit); nor even in external actions, which they do not deny elsewhere outside this dispute; namely in the question of the necessity of punishment and satisfaction for sin, where in the moment of nature and sign of reason, they make the first rule to be the essential punitive justice of God, which the decree follows, and cannot but follow, and from the decree the command, and the threat; according to which God actually punishes. In addition to these, in the question of the adoration due and to be given to God, which God demands from the rational creature, where against the Socinians, they establish the first foundation, not the will of sign, or of good pleasure; but the adorability, or the most excellent and most perfect nature of God, which cannot but belong to God from eternity to eternity, and according to which God antecedently not freely, but concomitantly freely decreed to prescribe and command to the rational creature the duty of adoring. Above we cited Maccovius teaching that the rational creature is necessarily obligated to God.

Argument 2: If something were good and just antecedently to the will of God, then God would be bound by obligation and duty to will and do it. But this is absurd; for God is in no way subject to duty or moral obligation. Response: God is not subject to any moral duty from outside, because He is a debtor to no one, and there is no cause outside of God which can oblige or determine

Him. But He can be obligated (so to speak) from within, but not be subject; because He is a debtor to Himself, nor can He deny Himself. Thus the Father in the divine is obligated to love the Son, for He cannot but love; the Son is obligated from the necessity of the divine nature to work from the Father, for He cannot but work from the Father, whenever an operation outside of God is to be instituted. Thus also in external actions, supposing a creature to be produced, God is obligated to conserve it by His perpetual maintenance and continuous influx (as long as He wills it to be), moreover to move the same as the prime mover, and govern it to His glory, Proverbs 16:4, Romans 11:36. This is immutably good and just, the opposite of which He cannot will.

Argument 3: If something were intrinsically just and good to the good pleasure of God, then the good pleasure would necessarily be regulated to will that. But the good pleasure of God is the first rule, which is regulated by nothing first; otherwise God would not be infinitely just and good, etc. Response: God cannot will to produce something in the creature, or command it to do something against His glory, and the subjection and obedience due to Him from the creature, or against the honor of the Son of God, or against the honor of the Holy Spirit. He cannot command or will to command that all and each man and angel deny and blaspheme the Son and the Holy Spirit and not honor them as they honor the Father; indeed deny, blaspheme, hate the one and triune God, as to the persons, all the attributes and essential and personal works.

Argument 4: It would follow that there would be good and just which would not flow from the first and highest; for there would be an effect which could not be resolved into the first cause. Response: The consequence is denied; I see no connection of it. But the following will explain.

Argument 5: If God wills something because it is just, it would follow that God would not will most freely outside Himself both as to the thing willed and as to the willing, but would necessarily communicate Himself to creatures; but this is absurd. Response 1: We give an instance, and indeed from the mind of the adversary in the question of the punitive justice of God, whose egress or effect is external, and yet so necessary that the opposite cannot happen. About which more below. 2. The consequent is denied. God by absolute necessity ought not to will and produce, for example, this man, this dog; but from the hypothesis, supposing that He now wills to produce that man, say Titius, He cannot but produce him according to His idea, and according to the definition of man; nor can He will the opposite, that is, to produce him irrational, or ubiquitous or immense, or to give him reason without any synteresis and conscience, or to produce him as the first and supreme independent being, not subject to God, nor depending on Him as to natural and moral goodness, nor consequently collateral with God. Thus, supposing that God willed the incarnation and indeed freely, He could not but assume human nature without sin lest those horrible propositions be verified, God is a sinner, God is damned. By which, however, it is not denied that God freely communicates His goodness outside Himself, or works outside Himself. Here Cajetan rightly distinguishes in his commentary on Part 1, Question 19, Article 8: The divine will, although it is simply free to the outside, yet from the supposition of one free act it can necessitate to another, as, if it wills to promise absolutely, it is necessitated to fulfill the promise, and if it wills to speak or reveal, it must necessarily reveal the truth, if it wills to govern, it cannot but justly govern, if it wills to have subjects using reason, it cannot but be their legislator. Ibid, he distinguishes that the divine will cannot be determined from itself to will that

something be or not be; but it can well be determined with respect to complex things, to their rectitude, which are, or which it wills to be. 3. Briefly, if this argument of the opposite opinion proceeds absolutely, then there will be no repugnance in terms and God will be able to will and produce outside Himself freely any absolutely impossible and implying things - which precipice of all absurdities, how it can be avoided while preserving this consequence, I would like to be taught by someone. Compare the disputation immediately following about the Power of God.

Argument 6: It would follow that sin is not lawlessness, nor is there ever sin against the law, without sinning against the nature and will of God, which is like the primitive law. Response: The consequence is denied. Sin is immediately against the revealed law of God, and at the same time sin is mediately and consequently against God the author of the law and the supreme lord, who fixed the law. Psalm 51:6, 1 Samuel 2:25, Daniel 9:8. And everywhere sinners are accused of having sinned against God. Therefore, all the things they argue fall - that nothing is opposed to God either physically or morally but only to the effects of God. Cold is opposed to the sun, the effect of fire, namely heat, immediately; and nevertheless to fire itself mediately or consequently. Which distinction is well-known and frequently used by beginner logicians in the chapter on the category of substance.

Argument 7: The norm of all good and bad actions is the law; for unless God had revealed it to us and enacted it, we would not know the difference between moral good and evil, nor would we sin either, but all actions would be indifferent; therefore nothing is good, nothing is just, no right antecedently to the law of God. Response: The consequence is denied. As for us and our knowledge, or on our part, and as for the right of obeying, there is no right, no just, no form or reason of justice or moral goodness before our existence, and the actual communication and revelation of right reason, synteresis, any divine law; yet there is some goodness, rectitude, justice, before the law is revealed as to God or on the part of God and as to the divine right of obligating and commanding, of having something from or in or through or about a rational creature. Such goodness, rectitude, justice, such right precedes in the order of nature, indeed also in time, all actual revelation of law, which is made to this or that man. It also precedes in the sign of reason in the order to God and in God Himself as to some part of the adjunct or matter of divine laws, it precedes, I say, the decree of God itself. Then the distinction of the Scholastics can be applied here, as cited by Becanus in Scholastic Theology p. 156 in the 8th edition: the eternal law is the remote or mediate rule of human acts; right reason is the proximate rule. Finally, if this argument were to proceed, then an antecedent decree of God should be denied equally as an antecedent natural divine right. For if first and last, per se and absolutely all rectitude and goodness due from creatures only proceeds and depends on the law of God actually revealed, then no goodness and rectitude will be given in the acts of the divine will internal, or in the decrees of God.

Argument 8: God is simply without law to all things outside Himself; and just as He was not bound by His nature to give His precepts to men, so He did not want to be bound by the same to give these or those, such or not such. Response 1: He is without the law which He fixes for man, namely taking the law formally as it is law; but He is not free and absolute from all the matter or content of the law, so that He could either command or do the opposite Himself, for

example, that He believe that He is not God, and command others to believe this, opposite namely to the first precept of the Decalogue. 2. From the hypothesis, when and since He wills to give precepts, He necessarily gives good and just ones; nor in general can He do or will the opposite. 3. In particular also He gives some just things antecedently to His free will, since His will is necessarily terminated at them, namely taken from His intrinsic nature and goodness, as Rada says in the place cited above. Of which sort are in the first precept of the Decalogue: That men know the true God, Father, Son, Holy Spirit; that they love Him, honor Him, obey Him, and subject themselves to Him; on the contrary, that they not have a good or evil angel, or any man, or the sun, or the moon, or a tree, or a stone, etc., for the one true God, nor religiously worship them as God.

Argument 9: If God were to enact a law by necessity of nature, it would follow that He could not but always command and forbid the same things which He commands and forbids. Which is shown to be absurd from the immolation of Isaac, and the despoiling of the Egyptians. Response: We have distinguished in our disputation on the Right and Justice of God that there are many things which God could have willed and commanded otherwise, yet not all things.

Argument 10: If something were good antecedently to the will of God, it would follow that something would be prior to the will of God, and that there would be something good independently of the will of God, and consequently the will would be dependent. Response: It is not absurd if it is said that God depends on Himself, since "to depend" and "to be prior" are taken ἀνθρωποπαθῶς of God, namely in the sign of reason, without composition in God, or real distinction. Thus the indefinite knowledge of possibles, also the divine ideas (which are not internal, nor are they terminated in God, but say respect to something else outside God) are antecedent to the will and decree of God. Indeed, all the attributes of the first genus, as well as the intellect, are antecedent to the will of God. It is therefore enough to avoid this absurdity, by which it would be established that God depends on something outside Himself, or that some good is proposed and revealed to us by God independently of the will of God - independently, I say, as to revelation and command. For there can be a certain ratio of good and right in the order to man, which precedes the will of God in the sign of reason.

Argument 11: If God can permit blasphemy, hatred of Himself, etc., then He can command it. Response: The consequent is denied. By the same reasoning one might infer: If God can permit lawlessness as such or any sin, then He can also do it. For "to command" denotes an agent, an action, and a moral efficiency. He could therefore be the author of sin. This argument is further urged: that a command of blasphemy is much less repugnant to God than permission; because a precept is something external, the permissive will is an internal and essential attribute of God. Response 1: But this or that actual permission, and the termination of the permissive will is not intrinsic and essential to God more than the command of God. For He permits something just as freely as He commands. 2. Someone could argue in the same way that doing sin is less repugnant to God than the permissive will of sin, because the former is something external, but the latter an essential attribute of God. Where the opponent will have dissolved this consequence, he will see his own dissolved by the same work.

Argument 12: If the law and its promulgation be removed, there can be no distinction of just and unjust; therefore blasphemy is not a sin, except on the hypothesis of a prohibiting law. Response: There is no distinction of good and evil for man or as to the knowledge of man, to whom the enacted law has not been revealed; yet there is for God. Where there is no right reason in man, indeed where there is no man, there is no distinction of good or evil, indeed not even of true and false. But it does not follow from this that there is none for God, who is the first right reason, the first and supreme truth and goodness. Indeed, it rather follows that the true and the good and their distinction from the false and the evil precede all revelation and law in the order of nature, insofar as they are the object of law and revelation, but are not only constituted through them. As if someone were to say that two times two is four, the whole is greater than its part, nothing can simultaneously be and not be, good is not evil, God is to be honored, and other axioms of eternal truth both practical and dogmatic, are indifferent to truth and falsity up to the revelation made to this or that man. Analogically, the distinction about the determinate truth of future contingents can be applied here. About which in our dissertation on the Terminus of the Way. And these indeed are the arguments which are usually brought for the opposite opinion. We will briefly address the exceptions to our arguments in the following part.

RELATED COROLLARIES

1. Whether the Mosaic forensic law, immediately divine and handed down by God, and hence most wisely constituted, in no way repugnant to natural or divine moral or perpetual law, has, or at least ought to have, the force of law in all Christian Republics? Response: Negative, by the common consent of theologians.

2. Whether it ought to have the force of law in preference to the Roman law, which commonly obtains among us and in all things, where of course it is not abrogated by special and proper statutes, and which is said not to lack its merits (this being granted, I say, not conceded, for this is not our field)? Negative.

3. Whether it at least obtains or ought to perpetually obtain the force of law in criminal judgments or at least in capital punishments, as Piscator disputes in the preface to his commentary on Leviticus, whom some follow, among whom are Zepperus in the explanation of the Forensic Laws of Moses, and Maccovius in Theological Disputations, volume 2 or common places, disputation 14? Response: Negative.

4. Whether the opinion which wants this forensic law either in whole or in part to obtain the force of perpetual and common law everywhere is sufficiently consonant with the doctrine concerning the state of the people under the New Testament and concerning Christian liberty? Negative.

5. Whether it can be said to have the force of law because and insofar as the judgments of our tribunals in these or those cases, as to the matter and the thing itself, agree with it, or even freely sometimes follow its pattern and example, and according to it form their sentences by their own choice? Response: If someone when he so speaks wants nothing else to be understood, he indeed frees himself from error against theology about Christian liberty, yet not

from impropriety of speech or a manner of speaking that is exceedingly improper and catachrestic, not to say from contradiction.

6. Whether it can be said to have the force of law when and insofar as this or that Republic selects some part or some laws from it and sanctions them as law which contain either a mere repetition and application of natural and divine moral law, or such a determination which not only agrees with divine and natural law but is also judged to be most accommodated to the present state and government of that people? Response: The same as above. For under that formality the Mosaic Law has no more the force of law than the law of England, Norway, Russia, Persia, Turkey, etc., nor the sayings of philosophers, the responses and advice of the prudent whether Jurists or Theologians and Casuists, especially of synods or theological faculties, in addition the decisions of the Rota of Naples, Rome, etc., the Arrests of the courts of Paris, Toulouse, etc., the Chamber of Speyer, etc., wherever they well agree with divine and natural law, or are judged to be most accommodated to our customs and state in preference to other laws.

7. Whether therefore any foreign law which does not have the force of law among us is of equal authority with the Mosaic law? Response: Materially or in the genus of doctrine and discipline and consequently in the genus of a pattern and example to which laws can be made either identically or analogically - Negative, for it is of divine perfection and authority. But in the genus of law as such or formally so called - Affirmative. For God has not positively prescribed, for example, to our Republic the Mosaic law more than the English or Norwegian law.

8. Whether prejudice is brought to the liberty and power of a Republic where the Roman law or the English law or any other wisely constituted law most accommodated to the customs of that people obtains, if it be defended as a theological dogma and a case of conscience that the Mosaic forensic law perpetually has or ought to have the force of law? Affirmative.

9. Whether, because our Jurists ought to acquire an outstanding or at least some knowledge of the Mosaic forensic law, and sometimes allege it in their counsels, because our tribunals judge in conformity with that law whenever it so happens, because finally the Republic sanctions or can sanction a part or some parts of it into law - whether, I say, on account of this it ought not to be said to have the force of law along with the received Roman law and proper statutes? Negative, except improperly and catachrestically.

10. Whether from the same foundation it can be denied that the Mosaic forensic law is abrogated in the New Testament, as still obtaining the force of law, and consequently that Theologians have thus far badly constituted the abrogation of this part of Christian liberty? Negative.

11. Whether from the same foundation it follows that our Jurists are to be adorned with the title of Doctors of Mosaic Law just as properly as of Roman civil law, no less than formerly in the Old Testament among the Levites those called γραμματεῖς and νομικοὶ, Scribes and Lawyers, who were properly consultants, interpreters and Doctors of that Mosaic law, and according to it gave counsel and determinations? Negative. For as it would not be consonant with the truth of the

matter, so also it would somewhat prejudice the theological doctrine concerning the abrogation of the Mosaic law and concerning Christian liberty.

12. Whether the title of Doctors of Theology says and comprehends in itself the doctor of Mosaic forensic law? Response: Insofar as the Theologian knows and teaches the historical and the dogmatic or doctrinal comprehended in that part of the sacred codex - Affirmative, as also concerning the ceremonial law. But not insofar as he applies and imposes the observance of it as a law obligating the consciences of men, and judges according to it in the court of conscience, determines cases of conscience, writes advice. For thus he is a Doctor only of divine moral Law.

But we pursue these things applied to the distinction with and under which our people today can or ought to be called Doctors of canon law, expressly and more fully in the disputation on Canon Law, and perhaps in the disputation on Divine and Human Laws.

3. Our opinion being now sufficiently established, it remains that we examine the opposite one, which once perhaps came forth in the question concerning the dispensation of the precepts of the decalogue to one or another of the Scholastics just cited; although they did not defend it to the end with all hypotheses and corollaries: but recently on the occasion of the dispute about the object of faith, whether it can be false, a more recent Theologian (as he is very studious of orthodoxy in other matters, so he is subtle and perspicacious) D. Maccovius, in the disputations lately published on the decalogue in 8. and with him a certain most learned disciple of his, while he was still living and approving, in the little book whose title is Vindicia &c. and in another whose title is Mantifa &c. undertook to defend it on purpose; confirmation of that opinion being also summoned from the disputations of today's Antagonists of Pelagianism, among whom the most erudite Twisse and Rutherford, of whom the former in his defense of Perkins against Arminius lib.2.sect.5. criminat.2. the latter exercitat.2. against the Arminians chap. 3. defend, that there is something just, because God wills it not against God to will, because it is just. In piecemeal the same axiom seems to be indicated by Calvin lib. 3. Instit. c. 23. Perkins in the little book on Predestination from Ailly, Polanus syntagm.lib.2.c.26.§.4.

APPENDIX TO THE THEOLOGICAL DISPUTATION ON THE RIGHT AND JUSTICE OF GOD, SECOND PART,

Responding M. ANDREAS LANSMAN of Amsterdam, on March 29, 1644.

Against the arguments and solutions produced by us in the first part, these exceptions and instances have been submitted by a friend, which, unless they are solidly and perspicuously removed, are said to stand in the way of his thus far descending into our opinion, who defends the contrary. Let us therefore do this.

Instance 1: If God necessarily wills some things outside Himself thus and not in another way, and that on account of their intrinsic goodness or badness, now the will of God would be

regulated, but the will of God is never regulated, but always regulating. Because rule and regulated necessarily really differ, that is as cause and effect. But in God nothing so differs. Response 1: To the major of the argument, the goodness of the creature so intrinsic to it must be distinguished, that it does not depend on God; but God on it. If this is implied, the whole argument is conceded because nothing against us. But if the goodness in the acts of God about the creature is understood, and formally inhering in the creature itself and effectively or principiatively depending on God: now we distinguish the regulated into that which is properly called such, and into that which is analogically. If it is taken in the latter way, we deny the minor. For there is an eternal law in God, as is taught by all Theologians, especially by the Scholastics on Part 1 of the Second Part, Question 93, Article 1, to which the divine essence is not subjected, because it is the law itself. Ibid, Article 4. There is also in God an idea, which has the nature of art, and of exemplar, and of principle of the operations of God to the outside, as the Scholastics teach on Part 1, Question 15, Articles 1, 2, 3, and our theologians with them, some of whom we indicate in the disputation on the Knowledge of God. If therefore some rule, norm, law, principle in God of the divine volition and of the laws which He enacts for creatures, and of external operations about the creature, is posited, taken ἀνθρωποπαθῶς, it certainly does not at all overturn the essence and will of God as first, independent, ἀναίτιον. We have shown this very thing in the first part of this disputation, thesis 4, from Cajetan. And our theologians commonly teach with the Scholastics, where they dispute that the cause of the divine will is the divine will, namely in the order to things willed, and as to passive attingency. 2. To the first proof of the minor, I respond: the will of command is properly said by the Theologians to regulate our will and our actions and in order to us, and thus in no way is regulated. But for that reason it is not repugnant for the same compared with the will of good pleasure, whose effect it is, to be regulated by it as by a norm. Again the will of good pleasure or the decrees of God are the rule of the command, indeed also of all God's external works; yet it is not repugnant for those volitions and decrees to be regulated (understand this ἀνθρωποπαθῶς) by the first and most perfect essence of God through various attributes, namely primacy, simplicity, immutability, eternity, etc., manifested and described to us in the word of God; so that according to it and not otherwise God wills and decrees whatever He can will or decree concerning creatures, and about creatures. To the latter proof, I respond: That every regulating really differs from its regulated as cause and effect - Denied. In divine things the operation of the Father to the outside is the rule and exemplar of the operation of the Son, John 5:17, 19. Yet the operation of the latter does not really differ from that of the former, as cause from effect. Indeed, the person of the Father is also the exemplar, and the Son is the image, Colossians 1, and He is the character of Him, Hebrews 1. Yet it does not follow that here is cause and effect, although we do not deny that they truly differ. Again, the power of generating in the Father is the principle by which, or according to which He generates the Son; yet generating does not really differ from the power of generating as effect from cause. The Holy Spirit takes from the Son, and reveals and speaks from Him, John 16:13-15. Yet here cause and effect have no place. The egress and acts of the attributes of the second genus (namely knowledge, will, justice, mercy, veracity, power) about creatures are regulated according to the measure and perfection of the attributes of the first genus; so that God simply, independently, immutably understands or wills. Yet the attributes of the first and second genus do not differ really among themselves.

Instance 2 is confirmed by the following Exception or Prolepsis: Nor can it be responded that God is the rule of Himself. For besides that the phrase is unusual: God regulates God, this is added, that here the question is not whether there is something in God which regulates God, but whether there is something outside God that is such. Therefore it will be answered in vain that as to moments and signs of reason it can be admitted in God that there is regulating and regulated. For here the question is about extrinsic regulating, not intrinsic. Likewise, if it is said that that extrinsic thing (for example, to justly swear, etc.) depends on the nature of God, then we respond that this is the whole which is denied, and so is begging the question. Response 1: The phrase is not so unusual, if you compare with it many others which occur in Scripture, which we know are to be taken ἀνθρωποπαθῶς. As when God is said to be judged, Romans 3; to struggle and contend with Himself, as it were, Hosea 11; to deliberate and consult, Ephesians 2, 2 Kings 22. When He swears by Himself and by His soul, Hebrews 6, where we distinguish in some way (yet not at all really) the one swearing, and Him by whom He swears. Thus God moving is distinguished from resting, awakening from sleeping; merciful from just, pitying and sparing from punishing and afflicting; judge from absolute and supreme lord. Not to mention those phrases by which God is said to be from Himself, to work or produce something from Himself, and that the Son is God from God, light from light. 2. It is falsely presupposed and assumed that the question here is not whether God is regulated, measured, or determined by something extrinsic. Because both of us strenuously deny this. But if he proposes the question to me, I will respond by denying; and in the first part of the disputation I have responded clearly enough. And for that reason I have not answered in vain that as to moments and signs of reason there can be admitted in God regulating and regulated. 3. But he urges that we are necessarily compelled to admit something extrinsic regulating, because he himself denies that that extrinsic thing in creatures or about creatures depends on the nature of God, and so is begging the question, when we affirm this. Response: By the same breath all the divine attributes which say respect to creatures would have to be denied, and the whole philosophical and theological doctrine about the implication of contradiction, and about the simply and absolutely impossible would have to be subverted. The fount of error is that those things which are from within, although in order and with some respect to the outside, and which depend proximately and immediately on the very nature and attributes of God, by which He can operate or make them not otherwise than thus - are thought to be from the outside, and to depend proximately and immediately from there, because of course they say or involve respect to the outside and from there receive some extrinsic denomination. Then, that it is wrongly thought that whatever outside God has the nature of term, or object, is the cause or some antecedent on which God depends as posterior on prior, determinable on determining, regulated on rule, effect on cause, passive on active. The first false hypothesis, or false lemma, is refuted by all the writers of common places, and Metaphysicians, when they say that this or that repugnant thing in terms and contradictory cannot be made by God, because of course it is repugnant to the nature, truth, goodness and perfection of God revealed to us in the light of nature and Scripture. For God cannot, by operating outside Himself, deny Himself. But let us declare the matter with examples about which there is agreement between us. He cannot produce an infinite human nature or another God, or a creature morally evil or a motion or premotion in a rational creature to sin as such; He cannot conserve an accident without its substance, nor render what has been done undone, nor change something into preexisting; He cannot so move the will of man and so

concur with it, that in eliciting its action it suffers violence or is violated (about which Vasquez laboriously disputes on I-II, disputation 26, and J. Alphonsus Curiel in the lectures on I-II, question 6, article 4). Here passively in the object and term to which, or on the part of the creature, or of the producible thing, in which it formally is, if the possibility of the sought effect is considered, it is said to be repugnance in terms; but if actively or principiatively in the term from which or on the part of God productive or producer of the possibility of the same thing or sought effect it is considered, it is said to be repugnant to the divine nature and perfection, and this is that into which the impossibility of things is ultimately resolved and reduced, as the first root, reason and measure of all possibility of producing actively, to which consequently corresponds the possibility or impossibility of production passively, and thus of possible existence of things. This constant doctrine, and admitted by all, which when we presuppose here, elsewhere and in its place explained and proved by us in the disputation on the Power of God, part 1 at the end and part 2 at the beginning, and by the authors cited there, we do not at all beg the question; but rather those denying, if they persist, should be said to deny the principles of common philosophy and theology, which have thus far been admitted on both sides. But it makes no difference that not according to our way of conceiving and κατ᾽ ἀνάλυσιν we sometimes understand first to the outside in the term from which or in the object, repugnance and contradiction, for this is to gather and hunt from the posterior what is simply possible, what not. Yet it is according to the order of nature from the prior and κατὰ σύνθεσιν to be fetched from the very nature of God, as from the first and proper root and effective principle as of contingency or necessity, so also of all possibility in creatures, and consequently, indirectly or by opposition, of all impossibility. For absolutely and in general act is by nature prior to potency, and active potency is prior to passive potency, and the latter results from the former. Thus the nature and perfection of God is prior to anything else outside God, whether possible or future, and to any modes and affections of things. The latter false hypothesis, or false lemma is that the perfection of God from within, with respect to the outside to something future or possible, cannot be referred to that, indeed cannot admit that relation of reason or extrinsic denomination, unless it at once depends on that extrinsic thing as a prior principle, or cause, or measure and determining rule. Which figment is most absurd, and plainly ἀναπόδεικτον. Individual believers receive eternal life promised by God on account of Christ; and the opposite is hypothetically impossible to happen, or for God to will and do it. Yet God does not depend on anything extrinsic, namely the word of promise, or the faithful man, or the promised eternal life, but only on Himself (so to speak); for here and not elsewhere is the root and foundation of impossibility, Hebrews 6:18, 2 Timothy 2:13. That the sin of man could not be expiated without satisfaction depends on the punitive justice of God, not the contrary. That there is determinate truth of future contingents depends on the will and knowledge of God, not the contrary. That the world could be produced from nothing depends on the creative power of God, not the contrary. That man is subject to the law of God and is bound to obey God whatever He has commanded him, and cannot be independent, depends on the supreme power and absolute dominion of God, not the contrary. That a creature cannot but depend on God depends on the primacy and perfection of God, not the contrary. The truth of theoretical and practical principles which are naturally implanted in man depends on God as the first truth, not the contrary. The fulfillment of a promise in creatures, or about them, depends on the veracity and perfection of God, Hebrews 6, Romans 3, not the contrary. No being can be metaphysically or by its nature evil, the first root of

which impossibility is found in the nature of God, and depends on it, not the contrary. And thus in all other things the power of God is referred by priority to possibles, and these result from and depend on it, not the contrary, although they are referred to each other by a transcendental relation or habitude. Possibles in terms, therefore, in order to God and His power, have the nature of a correlated term, or object, not of a cause, or principle, or rule; and thus indirectly or by opposition and negatively impossibles and repugnant things in terms have the nature as it were of a correlate whether term or object, if indeed they are compared to the power of God. In a word, they are impossible from within and on the part of the divine nature and power, but relatively to the outside or in order and with respect to something else, which is not God. Another God besides and outside the true God is incompossible, and can neither be nor be produced. And yet God is not rendered dependent, if we say that God cannot will the existence or production of such a God; nor is the question begged when this is asserted. For if someone is so absurd as to deny that there is repugnance in terms, or that God cannot do this, we will evidently refute him from the nature and attributes of God and reduce him to absurdity.

Instance 3: That God can oblige to believing what is false, likewise to the impossible, as Abraham, likewise Isaiah predicting the death of Hezekiah, Jonah predicting the destruction of Nineveh, would have to be more fully discussed. Response 1: To the example of Abraham we respond that it is not at all suited to asserting that μέγα ἁμάρτημα and paradox against all sound Theology: That the divine faith can be under falsity, and that God can command someone to believe what is false. The distinction of the will of God into that of good pleasure, and of command is well-known; which since it is admitted on both sides, there is no reason why we should here recook the proof of it from the elements of common places, or laboriously respond to the rancid objections of the Pelagians. To put it in a word, it is denied that God prescribed to Abraham to believe the death of his son, or the effect and completion of the slaughter. He did not reveal to him either part of the contradiction - whether Isaac would perish by that violent death or not - much less prescribe it to be believed; for thus far the will of God was hidden to him, and not revealed. The contrary will not be proved from the text with even the least appearance. Abraham believed that God would propagate a great nation through Isaac (whether to be preserved in life, or to be raised from the dead; for both were possible) and that from there at last the Messiah would arise. Nor ought he less to believe that God was commanding him to slay that Isaac, and that he was obligated to obedience; just as he was also thus far rendering obedience, so that he offered his son by his decree and will, Hebrews 11:17. But perhaps this will have to be disputed a bit more fully elsewhere, or below in the problems. The Scholastics bring various distinctions here to satisfy this argument; but we think this is the simplest and safest. 2. That about Hezekiah and Jonah we have explained sufficiently in the dissertation on the Term of Life. 3. Whether God can oblige man to the impossible is brought here in vain. For whether it is affirmed or denied, it does nothing to prove the antithesis, that God can command hatred of Himself, blasphemy, and any other sin against the first and third precepts of the Decalogue. But perhaps below in the progress we will touch on this more.

Instance 4: That God can afflict an innocent creature without demerit. But to afflict the innocent is a thing having intrinsic badness, etc. Response 1: The question was whether God, His nature being preserved and without implication of contradiction, can will and command hatred of

Himself, blasphemy, and any horrendous sins against the first table of the Decalogue, some of which we have recounted in the first part of this disputation. For the affirmative this argument is brought, because He can do something having intrinsic badness, namely to afflict an innocent creature. But the consequence is denied. For it does not follow from an unhappy or painful evil to a base or sinful evil that God can afflict, therefore He can sin or will to command sin to man. He can be the author and cause of an unhappy evil; therefore also of a base evil whether physical or moral so that He Himself does it, or commands another to do it. 2. But if he says that it is established and solidly proved by him and by some Scholastics and more recent authors, that God without sin and denial of Himself can afflict even eternally with infernal torments an innocent creature - now at once he establishes that that will and execution of God have no intrinsic badness with respect to God; that it is not repugnant to the supreme, absolute and most free nature, power and Dominion of God, but agrees very well with them, as they are revealed to us from the light of nature and Scripture. From where therefore and why is intrinsic badness feigned here in that act of God? Since whether this hypothesis is given or conceded (about which this is not the place to dispute), God does this most rightly and most justly, not indeed by the right of judgment as a judge according to justice avenging, but as an absolute Lord by the right of dominion according to justice or goodness dominating. 3. But if he prefers to say that there is intrinsic badness with respect to man in such an act, by which He would afflict the innocent, yet that the act can be commanded by God to man - Response: Therefore it is denied that an act of this kind is so intrinsically evil that it can never be made honest. For ordinarily it is commanded to Physicians and Surgeons to burn, cut, etc., and from the force and conscience of their calling to afflict any innocent people who just need their work. Extraordinarily God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son, and Abraham did rightly and piously when he did this by his will, Hebrews 11:17. Here sin was absent, because God who was above the law, "You shall not kill," from the fullness of power without any repugnance of nature, goodness, and His power, subjected to the power of Abraham the creature universally guilty and a debtor of death in order to Himself (Genesis 3 with Romans 5), although innocent in order to Abraham and in particular; and enacted for him a peculiar law, which was as it were an exception from the common law, "You shall not kill the innocent." Therefore, here there was no moral badness which God commanded, because there was no law which prohibited this to Abraham. Similarly, judgment is to be made about the deed of Phinehas, Psalm 106; of Elijah, 2 Kings 1; of Elisha, 2 Kings 2; of the Israelites executing the ban on the Canaanites, and claiming all their lands for themselves. See the disputation on the Right and Justice of God. But what do these do for hatred of God, blasphemy, disobedience, and any sins whatsoever toward the natural worship and subjection of God, which they want to be able to be commanded by God?

Instance 5: That the will of God is related to things willed in the same way as the intellect to things knowable. The reason is, because if the divine intellect is said not to understand things because they are, but that they are because they are understood - because otherwise the divine intellect would be measured. Therefore, also the will, if it wills some things because they are good, will be measured by the things, and consequently posterior to the things because the measured is posterior to the measure. Response 1: The argument is such: The divine will is the measure of things, and is not measured by things; therefore God wills no things because they are good, but they are good because He wills. The antecedent is proved from a pairing -

because the intellect understands things, not because they are, etc. The whole argument could be conceded, with the proof. For nothing against us. For we do not say that any entity, or goodness, or truth in creatures is presupposed to the will of God which is not and does not depend on God. But you will say, it follows therefore that hatred of God, blasphemy, disobedience in general and in particular, etc. can be decreed by God, and according to that decree be commanded to man in time, and be justly and well rendered by man. Response: It is denied that it follows - no more than it follows, therefore God can formally understand in created things, and can will to understand all false and contradictory things, for example: Two and one are four, twice two are not four, four and three planets are not seven, one great luminary and one great luminary are not two great luminaries, part is greater than whole, part of the world than the whole world, of earth than the whole earth, a virgin is corrupted, what has been done is undone, human nature is and can be infinite, omnipotent, etc., and was in fact thus in Christ, a body is or can be without quantity, an accident without its subject, original sin in man is or can be a substance, square is round, even is odd, man is a stone or a wolf properly so called, a horse is rational, the will is violated or can be violated, and infinite similar things. And all these will then not be false but true; otherwise of course the will and intellect of God would be measured, and the truth in things would be the measuring measure. If someone wants to cut off this trail of absurd consequences, it is necessary that he dismiss that absurdity and πρῶτον ψεῦδος, whence they necessarily follow. 2. Of all truth, whether theoretical or practical, as to us, or with respect to our knowledge, the cause and measure is the revelation of God natural or supernatural, so that this is true to me, because God has thus revealed, but not because it was true to me, therefore He revealed it thus and not otherwise; for the first truth revealing is the cause, principle and measure of all truth and knowledge in man, not the contrary. Yet it does not follow that the first root and principle of truth absolutely and in itself considered is to be sought in divine revelation; that is, in the light of nature, or in sacred Scripture; for from this it would follow that God the highest and first truth is measured and depends on some external effect and work of His. Therefore, distinguish in the revelation of God independence and priority, as to us, or to some things outside God; and dependence and posteriority (namely in the sign of reason), as to the very nature and vital perfection of God. And thus God cannot reveal otherwise or anything else than is suitable to His nature and perfection. In the same way as to the nature of good, God by His law prescribes nothing except good; for He cannot be αἴτιον συμβουλευτικόν or moral cause of base evil, any more than physical cause. And nothing has for us, or as to us, the nature of goodness, except because and insofar as God by some law of His as the only measure of our moral goodness or honesty prescribes it to us. But it does not follow from this that all goodness and the idea of goodness which is in God from within but with a relation or communicable extrinsic denomination in order and with respect to the creature, as to God, or with respect to God who is above His law, depends on the law given to men; and therefore it must be said that that goodness is and not otherwise because God thus sanctioned by His law, which is for us the only rule of goodness and justice. The law of God is indeed the first and ultimate root and norm of goodness, as to us or our obedience; for the will of the divine good pleasure as such is not a norm for us, except mediately and consequently, insofar as it is apprehended by us a posteriori and from a sign. As therefore it is not repugnant to the divine law as the first principle (as to us) of moral actions, if it is said to depend on the decree or will of God itself, so neither is it repugnant to the divine will, if it is said ἀνθρωποπαθῶς to depend on

the nature and attributes of God, that is, to go forth and tend outside itself in or about the creature according to primacy, simplicity, immutability, perfection, goodness, sufficiency, knowledge of possibles, idea, indeed also according to essential justice, veracity, power, authority, majesty, dominion. For then God, neither acting internally, that is, willing and understanding, nor acting externally, that is, executing, is limited or measured by anything extrinsic; but intrinsically by Himself, namely by His nature and perfection. Therefore, distinguish God willing something good because it is such, and again something being good because He wills it, as we have just distinguished, and you will see all things rightly reconciled and congruent to the sound and commonly received philosophy and theology among all Christians. And again something being in God from within, not from without, although it is to the outside, or says respect to the outside. For illustration and confirmation of the doctrine about the Possibility of things, and its root, those things can be compared which the Scholastics dispute in Book 1, Distinction 42, especially Henry of Ghent, where he establishes that the possibility of any thing to be made is considered on the part of God, so that a thing is said to be makeable by God, because God can make, not conversely. And Scotus and Bonaventure, who thus distinguish - that the possibility of a thing or creature is from it formally, and is to be taken on the part of the thing or creature; but the possibility of the same is effectively, principiatively and originally from the divine intellect; because objective possibility cannot be taken originally on the part of that which is originated but on the part of that which originates, etc. The same is to be established about impossibility. Which see explained more fully by Peter Capull in the commentaries on the commentaries of Bonaventure in Book 1, Distinction 42, Question 4, Points 1 and 2. Nor can I pass by without indicating how sanely and accurately this opinion which we defend was publicly proposed and explained for disputation in the Academy of Franeker a few years ago with the willing and approving D. Maccovius by his genuine disciple D. Johannes Cluto, Doctor of Theology, in the Idea of Theology, Disputation 4, Theses 20, 35, 36, and Disputation 11, Thesis 18, and Disputation 19, Thesis 19, and Disputation 40, Theses 31, 32. These alone could remove all doubts for moderate and perspicacious minds; and they agree in all things with our concepts now more fully expounded. Our students will not lose their labor if they consult him in this and other matters; he will make for accurate concepts of common places above many others.

On the occasion of the little book published by the most learned D. Zydlovius, disciple of D. Maccovius, in which he had on purpose opposed our opinion about the Right of God, I wrote to the same D. Zydlovius a letter which, because he himself published it in the Mantissa of the aforesaid little book, it seemed good to put here on account of the affinity of the matter.

Most ornate and most learned D. ZYDLOVIUS,

You ask my judgment about the two questions lately treated by you in the little book entitled Vindications of Some Difficult Questions, etc. I cannot refuse your honest request; indeed, I profess myself a debtor to all, especially those of your order. Therefore, you have it thus: that question about the formal object of adoration, for the sake of which your little book seems to have been written most of all, has been treated by you as to the sum of the matter or the thing itself agreeably to the sacred writings, and the hypotheses of our orthodox Theology have been

solidly discussed, whatever could be objected by others or are even accustomed to be; in addition the trail of certain errors has been faithfully detected, which the contrary opinion stubbornly defended seems about to drag with it and introduce into our Theology; about which the premonition of that highest and veteran Theologian D. Gomarus our teacher was not vain, whose words I exhibited in the first appendix to the disputation on the Adoration of Christ as Mediator. Therefore, it is that those loving orthodoxy and abhorring novelty on this account give thanks to you, and gladly use and enjoy your labor in the disputes with the Remonstrants and Socinians. This is my judgment not only, but also of many ministers and other learned men, whom indeed it happened to me to hear. As to the other question - Whether things are therefore just and good, because God wills them, or whether He therefore wills them, because they are just - I confess it seems to be determined in general and in thesis by some Theologians (among whom from ours now occurs to me Polanus, Syntagma, Book 2, Chapter 26, Axioms 3 and 4) just as you determine; by others it is involved, at least not determined clearly enough, when they dispute - Whether God can dispense with all the precepts of the law. See among others Valentia and Sylvius on I-II, Question 100, Article 7 or 8, if I well remember. Yet to say candidly what the matter is, I do not yet see the contrary opinion which I previously proposed in my disputation on the right and justice of God overturned by your arguments otherwise subtle enough. For it can be replied that that axiom about the free decree or will of God as the first cause having no norm or measure prior to itself is to be limited thus from the mind of the Theologians - that it is said that no norm of the divine volition is from the outside or outside God; yet by which it is not denied that a norm and measure prior (namely in the sign of reason) is from within and in God, that is, that God or the nature of God and the primacy, perfection, power or essential, supreme, absolute dominion of God is the norm of the divine volition. By which necessity in a certain way God understands Himself, wills Himself and loves, nevertheless by a free will not indeed antecedently, but concomitantly; for He cannot will not to know Himself, not to love, likewise the Father cannot will not to generate or love the Son. You will say the object of the divine will here is actions and relations to the inside. Let us therefore show actions and relations to the outside. God cannot will not to know by indefinite knowledge all possibles, He cannot but have in Himself the ideas of all things, which are prior measures (namely in the sign of reason) or exemplars of all things to be produced; so that God, supposing that He wills this or that thing to exist, cannot will to produce things otherwise than as each is preformed and preconceived by its own ideas. Again, God necessarily (but from the hypothesis of a rational creature sinning) wills to punish sins according to His judgment (Romans 1:30) and punitive justice, nevertheless freely; yet punitive justice in its egress or exercise is not antecedently free, so that God can will not to punish, namely with sin supposed. But if here you do not want to succumb to the objections of the most learned Twisse against the necessity of justice, as I think you do not want, you certainly see your arguments are not ἄλυτα. But if you prefer to concede to the opinion of Twisse, the responses and exceptions of ours will have to be constructed and applied a bit otherwise. But I leave a more accurate disquisition of these things to your diligence; for I do not have time now to examine your things expressly, and to reread my theses, this must be reserved for another occasion. About the hypothesis or corollary of this question - Whether God can command or will to command sin, for example, blasphemy, hatred of God, etc. - I think thus, that it is not safe and prudent enough from a general thesis which has not yet been put into the light beyond all doubt and difficulty, but rather suggests the hardness and most difficult

consequences of it, to seek some limitation, or at least for the time being to embrace some ἐποχή about the general thesis. It was not infrequent for the Scholastics to discuss freely about this kind of harder questions, for example - Whether Christ could have assumed any other nature whatsoever, or a sinful human nature, etc., as also among them Ockham in Book 2, Distinction 19, asks - Whether God can command to man an act of hatred? Yet we would prefer to abstain from all things which sound of evil. Among other things which recently came to mind on occasion was also this: it seems to follow from your opinion that God by His active providence is the author of sin. For he who commands something is the moral cause or αἴτιον συμβουλευτικόν, as the Philosopher calls it. You have doubtless seen how elegantly the renowned D. Maccovius and the excellent Doctor Cluto have conceived about the moral providence of God. But as I have just said, I leave these and other things to your diligence to consider seriously, and to confer with the Theologian and philosopher D. Maccovius of most subtle and most refined judgment. Let him here be for you an eagle in the clouds, he will doubtless see through and candidly explain what in this cause is clear. I know the contrary opinion is urged by you with a petition of demonstration, without which the whole defense otherwise labors under begging the question. But although that could not be exhibited so evidently, yet it must not be denied but that it is safer to acquiesce in it for the time being with some doubt or fear of the opposite, or at least to concede rather into the asylum of learned ignorance than to run out into that more horrid opinion. Besides that some sparks of truth show themselves in Scripture and the light of nature, from which we seem to undertake a demonstration. For with the necessary dependence of the rational creature on God supposed, not only as the first and highest natural but also moral principle, and consequently the subjection and adhesion of the same according to right reason to God as the highest reason, a law cannot but be enacted for it which obligates to obedience of God in general, and to the worship which they call natural - unless we want to admit an implication of contradiction, that is, a denial of the essential divine dominion and right in the rational creature, that is, a denial of God Himself. For if God can dismiss and absolve the rational creature from the obligation by which it is necessarily bound to subjection and obedience, it follows that God can cast away His right and special dominion in that creature. But this seems absurd; first, because it takes away from us the solution of the capital argument against the punitive justice of God (which is, if God antecedently freely pities the sinner, therefore He also thus punishes sin, so that He can not punish); secondly, because this seems minimally to agree with your assertions about the absolute power and supreme dominion of God, page 144, page 163; thirdly, because it is founded in the production of that creature, not only as generally existing and good along with others, but also as rational, which is capable of obedience and λογικῆς λατρείας, no differently than the power and esteem of a father among men is founded in the generation of a son, which cannot be cast away and denied unless the generation itself is also denied. But if perhaps someone excepts that man in general is indeed necessarily bound to obedience or subjection of God, but not to this or that in particular, I respond - unless some acts in particular and form are designated through which and in which man is necessarily bound to exert his obedience toward God, it would follow then that there is no necessary obedience (for a genus is nothing other than its species, namely really). Then any acts of obedience whatsoever could be posited, it could equally be said that God has Himself to them just as to others freely antecedently, so that He can will or not will them, will to command them or not command them, or command the contrary,

for example, that man not know God, that he have and retain no Theology, synteresis, and natural conscience, that he detain or condemn the truth and cause of God in injustice, that he hate God, that he adore and honor the Devil as God (to which sin Christ was tempted, Matthew 4), that he believe in his heart, teach and profess orally the Aeons of Valentinus, the two Gods of the Manichaeans, that the true God is a pretender, the author of sin, a tyrant, the Devil (which horrendous and abominable things the Jesuit Monasterienses impute to our churches in the Creed of the Calvinistesses), that he despair, that he tempt and blaspheme God, that he love any even the least creature, indeed his vilest and worst cupidities more than God, that he have them for the highest good, but not have God, that he practice all the species and modes of idolatry and magic which were ever in use among the Heathen or Papists. What is objected about permission is nothing; for it is one thing to permit sins, that is, not impede them, and another to command them by a positive and direct act. For there the former is nothing other than a mere negation of act or ceasing from act. But where am I carried? I do not have time, now distracted by other cares, to examine these and other things to be discussed on both sides with a clear mind, and to inquire and confer if anything occurs especially among the Scholastics related to this question, who if they did not bring the desired truth, at least would offer a whetstone and file of it not to be despised. I want you, who now live here, to do this seriously, calling in aid the most perspicacious judgment of D. Maccovius. I do not labor so much with you about the thesis, since after problematic disputations of both parts an agreeable conciliation could easily be found through limitation, as I have indicated above. But I see the minds of many shrink from the defense of the hypothesis all the way to the end, at least of all with whom I have conferred about this matter; nor do you show yourself alien from all dread and ἐποχή, page 143, only you profess to seek light and eagerly await it from elsewhere, so that you can be freed once for all from the arguments brought by you. By which declaration indeed you free yourself among fair judges of matters from the accusation, indeed also from the just suspicion of heresy. But if it will seem good by some appendix, or at least by an Academic disputation to explain the hypothesis further, and to cut off the chain of consequences, and to dispute more pressingly and limitedly about the thesis itself, I do not doubt but that you will satisfy all better. I pray God to bless your studies most abundantly. Greet from me the renowned D. Maccovius, and from my most reverend and most conjoined colleagues D. Schotanus and D. de Maets. Utrecht, May 26, 1643.

An appendix of some problems, which were not published with the disputation.
Problem 1: Whether God can afflict an innocent man with infernal torments?

Response: The question here is about the affliction itself considered in itself and materially; not however formally and considered in the nature of punishment. For no one trifles so as to dispute that God can impose punishment where there is no fault; for this would imply a most crass contradiction. For the affirmative part stand not a few of the Scholastics. And of ours, Twisse, Book 1 of the Vindications of Grace against Arminius, Part 2, Section 4, Digression 4, whom some others follow. We prefer to incline to the negative part, because we have not thus far apprehended the reasons of the opposite opinion concluding so solidly and evidently that we ought to renounce our opinion. And given that equally valid reasons on both sides detain us in

doubt, yet we rather acquiesce in the milder part or at least for the time being we take up ἐποχή about the opposite. The first reason is: If God can inflict on an innocent creature without any demerit some minimal torment, therefore also by some degrees greater, namely bodily, and finally death. And if He can do this, why not torment in soul and body eternal? For who will circumscribe the genera, degrees, duration of torments, and here prescribe anything to God? They seem to prove the minor thus: If God cannot take away from an innocent creature its being with pain and torment, or cannot give to the same any painful being, it would follow that God is bound by justice to conserve the creature in its ἀταραξία and health. But the latter is absurd. For then God could not freely take away health, which He freely gave to man, nor could He kill an innocent man; nor could He annihilate him, and take away from him absolute being, if indeed He were bound to conserve him in well-being. Response: The consequence of the major is denied. For there is one reason for any temporal affliction, and another for eternal death, which necessarily involves not only eternal rejection from the face of God, but also the worm of conscience, and desperation, namely subjectively, if it is considered in a rational creature. But there is repugnance in terms, if it is established that an innocent man endowed with the image of God and conformed to the divine law and will is the same one sustaining infernal death, that is, gnawed by the worm of conscience, and despairing, indeed also blaspheming God; for that torment, worm, desperation, without intermission, is not without blasphemy. And this is the chief argument of the opposite opinion in my judgment; which, since it is not insoluble, we will easily despise the solution of others. Others perhaps will think something must be said to the minor and its proof; but it is not necessary. The second reason is: it will follow this absurdity - that less is permitted to God toward an innocent man than toward His own innocent Son. Response: The consequence is denied. For the Son was just and innocent in Himself; but imputatively and as a sponsor He can be called guilty, namely accursed on account of our sins, which He had taken upon Himself. Third reason: If it is by the right of God that He not afflict an innocent creature, therefore His justice demands this. But the latter is absurd, therefore. The minor is proved: because justice renders to each his own, and takes away from no one his own. But there is nothing of the creature's own to the rendering or not taking away of which God is obligated. Response: God is not obligated absolutely to give something; but He is indeed obligated not to impose on or inflict on the creature such a thing which involves repugnance in terms. Thus, for example, He cannot impose on or command to man simply the impossible, as namely that in power or perfection he be equal to God, or that he be in his essence and its presence, motion, etc. as an angel. The remaining reasons which are adduced there, because they expressly conclude about some bodily torment, but not about infernal death, and seem to presuppose the truth of the consequence of the major in the first reason (which we deny), we pass over here.

Problem 2: Whether and how God has the right of obligating man to something impossible; and whether this is proved by the example of Adam before the fall.

Response: Negative. For perseverance in the state of innocence was possible to him, namely in the divided sense. The distinction between cause in act and cause in potency is well-known, and again between the potency or possibility of the cause, and of the effect. The former is altogether to be attributed to Adam with our Catechism, Question 9. But what is said by some that here intervened the subtraction of grace seems to me to be said a bit harshly or

ambiguously and obscurely. For God did not by a positive and contrary act any more take away from man the first or habitual grace conferred in creation than from the fallen angels. But in both cases only negatively did He cease from the further collation of second and subsequent grace, confirming, exciting, and premoving and predetermining; the necessary concourse of which cannot be denied without dislocation of theology concerning the primacy, knowledge, will, grace, power, providence of God, etc. If you object that the effect was therefore not possible from the presupposition of the cessation or negative deficiency of God, we concede that in that respect the effect was not possible in the composite sense; but we deny that it follows from this that it was simply impossible for Adam. For the possibility was in the order to the second cause, which on its part had sufficient power; but not in the order to the first cause, whose precursion was not going to be present. Therefore, it must be said absolutely that Adam could have done it; with a distinction it must be said that the effect could have existed, and could not have existed - in a different respect, of course, as we have now explained. If someone can bring something else and safer, and does not think the human mind should be stopped here, certainly we will not envy it. Let him only think that things consonant with certain and received theological truths must be brought.

Problem 3: Whether every moral good can be said to be according to nature, and every moral evil against nature.

Response: Affirmative, if the primordial nature as created by God is understood; but not as corrupted, Ephesians 2:3. For God created the nature of man good, and put into it an inclination and faculty to good, Genesis 1:27 and at the end, Ecclesiastes 7:29. He engraved on it the law notifying and obligating, and conferred the power of reasoning and right reason through which it would draw out conclusions from implanted principles, and apply them to any μεθοδικῶς. Which two latter could not even after the fall be entirely abolished as remaining sparks, although they are concealed or corrupted by men in many ways, Romans 2:14-15 with Romans 1:19-23, Acts 17:25-28. Agreeably with this opinion, the placita of the philosophers can be applied which Lipsius collected in the Manual to Stoic Philosophy, Book 2, Dissertations 14 to 19.

Problem 4: Whether every cognition of those things which pertain to human life and morals of living can be called natural, or the law of nature, or of the law of nature.

Response: If we want to speak accurately, the law of nature itself formally, properly, and strictly so called is one thing, which namely contains practical principles (about which in the disputation on Atheism); and a moral axiom or universal and general precept proximately flowing from those principles, or deduced through reasoning, is another; and a special precept, or particular determination of each case deduced from the principles, axioms, and precepts just mentioned through legitimate subsumption or analogical application according to the particular circumstances of actions, is another. That determination and application happens in two ways - either according to positive divine law, or according to permissive. And again either about actions indifferent by their nature, species, and objectively (for in the individual no human actions properly so called are such), or about actions not indeed having intrinsic badness, but sounding of evil, for example, to kill a man, to persecute parents, brothers, children. All these

things, therefore, are of natural right, law, and cognition either eductively or reductively - because they can or ought to be drawn out from it either through necessary consequence and subsumption by reasoning; or because they are reduced to it as agreeing with it, or at least in no way repugnant to it, of which sort are the Mosaic forensic laws, and any positive Political laws (if they have been rightly and justly enacted), and all judgments applying the law to the deed, and the admonitions and precepts of parents, and of all superiors, provided they do not repugn the obedience due to God. Such things indeed in species God has not determined by His positive right, but by permissive right He has permitted the legitimate and rational determination proportioned to the circumstances of things and persons to superior powers by His positive right or law, and has imposed the necessity of obeying on inferiors. Those things which are only reductively of natural right and law are sometimes said to be of merely arbitrary or positive human right in opposition and contradistinction to those things which are eductively such, and are denied to be of natural right and law. These distinctions being well observed, those comments fall about counsels, about admonitions, about excellent and praiseworthy actions, and about the pious or decorous, to which however any man is not precisely bound, and the omission or opposite of which is not sin. If they are speaking about actions in the individual (as they ought to speak), certainly they hallucinate not a little. For man is always bound (presupposing things to be presupposed) to either part of the contradiction according to the dictate and judgment of right reason; and to whichever part he has inclined, he always inclines morally well or morally badly - the former of which he is bound to pursue, the latter to flee.

Problem 5: Whether even to the law of nature and moral law are to be revoked and measured according to it actions in certain externals looking to the animal and civil life of man, as food, drink, sleep, speech, gestures, clothes, care of the body, etc., and whether determinations in species or objectively about those things can and ought to be made and consciences rightly instructed according to the rules of divine and natural right.

Response: Affirmative, from 1 Corinthians 10:31, Philippians 4:8, 1 Corinthians 11:13-14, Deuteronomy 22:5, Isaiah 3:16, 24, 1 Peter 3:2-3. See more things pertaining to this in our disputations on the Heights of the World. There is added that reason from the Epistle of Jude, verse 10 - that men in those things which pertain to animal life are naturally corrupted. Indeed very many and easy sins can and are accustomed to creep in in them - against which we must daily be vigilant. So that they dispute dangerously who send those things away from the care of theology and conscience under the title of minutiae, or vain and sterile speculations, or lighter peccadillos, or civil and political matters, customs and morals. Compare our disputation on Practical Theology.

Problem 6: Whether all that can be said to be merely indifferent, nor determined by the law of nature or moral law, which is not always and absolutely necessary to be observed, so that its opposite can sometimes be commanded by God, and be done by man without sin?

Response: Negative. Natural right, and consequently the law and duty of man into which it diffuses itself, is either absolute or hypothetical. The former is what obligates all men absolutely,

and always, so that the opposite act can never be made honest, for example, blasphemy, adultery, false testimony. The latter is what does not so obligate all men absolutely and always, so that sometimes the opposite act cannot be made honest and done without sin. And of this there are three genera or grades. 1. is of those things which sound of evil, and consequently cannot be done by first, absolute and principal προαίρεσις, but only by succedaneous, namely with things to be supposed being supposed; thus we ought not kill men, but the Magistrate ought in a just war, and to punish criminals, and any private person in the case of blameless self-defense. 2. is of those things which ought not to be done absolutely, commonly and ordinarily, but indeed well extraordinarily, namely by a special or particular intervening law. Which law is notified in various ways, either explicitly and expressly, or implicitly. In the former way again in two ways, either through a law common to many and externally promulgated, to be applied to all individual cases of the same species, of which sort is the law about marrying the widow of a brother, Deuteronomy 25; about shaving the hair of a captive woman, Deuteronomy 21; about nourishing the hair of Nazirites, Numbers 6, otherwise than by the common law, 1 Corinthians 11. Or through a proper and external law proposed to one individual, as about selling all goods, Matthew 19; about punishing the innocent children of Achan, Joshua 7; about taking away the vessels of the Egyptians, Exodus 12. Or through a proper and internal law revealed to one individual, and indeed by internal instinct and motion, as to Elisha, 2 Kings 2, and to Elijah, 2 Kings 1, compared with Luke 9; and to Phinehas, Numbers 25; and to the Levites, Exodus 32, compared with Deuteronomy 33:9; and to Abraham, Genesis 22. In the latter way, when implicitly this is understood to be conceded or excepted by the law itself through a case of absolute or greater necessity. For example, it is an absolute right, and of the law of nature, that no one hate or harm his own flesh, or mutilate it, but on the contrary cherish it, Ephesians 5. And yet the same right and law of nature teaches that in the case and from the hypothesis of most imminent danger, to cut off a finger, or wound the body, so that you may free the whole man from gangrene, or snatch him from present death out of prison or water. Nature teaches that it is base for a woman if she is shaved, and for a man if he nourishes long hair, 1 Corinthians 11. The same nevertheless teaches that the opposite is to be done in both cases in the case of disease or other necessity. The same is to be established about a man putting on a woman's garment where the fatherland is to be liberated, or the life of an innocent is to be withdrawn from tyranny, or the body is to be covered in prison when nothing else is at hand, nor yet to repugn that law, Deuteronomy 22. Nature prohibits marriage with a sister, yet the same persuaded it to the sons of Adam. Not a few of the Pontifical Casuists establish that in the case of extreme necessity someone can take the goods of another, lest he perish by hunger. About which we do not now dispute. To this can be referred the example about the stipends of ministers - which is of necessity and natural right. And yet Paul, things to be supposed being supposed, did not want to receive it from the Corinthian church. Which is to be imitated in a similar case by all ministers. Compare our disputation on the Stipends of Ministers. Therefore, both are of natural right and law - but the former conducts itself as a general law, the latter as a special law. Which distinction under those terms Polanus has, Book 6, Chapter 10. Again, law can be distinguished into ordinary and extraordinary. There are others who call the former law, and the latter an exception from the law. By what name it is called, at least it is agreed that something is permitted in some case or from a certain hypothesis which is not permitted absolutely, commonly, ordinarily, and always. And then right does not repugn right, law does not

repugn law, but they are only distinct and diverse, as integrating parts of one and the whole law sanctioned and revealed by the same legislator God, if indeed the special law is considered as explicitly proposed; for then the special law conducts itself to the general law as a new and additionally adjoined addendum and ampliation, coordinated and collateral to it. But if it is considered as implicitly contained in it, and understood in the mind and intention of the legislator and from the judgment of first and universal laws and principles about the absolute and perfect charity and obedience due to God, it must be said that the special law is subordinated to the general, and drawn out from it. So that judgment should be made about the agreement and distinction of both in almost the same way as Ethicists judge about the agreement and difference of justice and equity. And Casuists and Jurists commonly reconcile particular justice vindicating to each one his own possessions with usucaption, since both are referred to justice as part to integral whole, or as species to genus or universal whole; and both are deduced from its first principles. And all Theologians affirm about the ceremonial precepts that they ought to yield to the moral, about the precepts of the second table, that they ought to yield to the precepts of the first table. From which nevertheless it does not follow that the latter are not of the law of nature, moral, immutable, or that precepts are opposite to precepts, obedience to obedience. All these things, therefore, according to the general law and according to the special law which is an appendix and addendum of the general law (called an exception from the rule, a reserved case, an interpretation, ampliation, or extension of the law, or by whatever other name), are to be revoked to divine and natural right, and not to be numbered among indifferent things, as circumscribed by no precept either absolute or hypothetical, explicit or implicit.

Problem 7: Whether natural right, as it is strictly taken, for what is known by nature alone, and is contradistinguished from the supernatural, repugns the supernatural.

Response: Negative. For it was sanctioned and revealed by God the author of nature; consequently the true does not repugn the true, the good does not repugn the good. Then it does not differ as to its matter from the moral law supernaturally revealed - namely as much and as far as it has matter in common with it. But the Scholastics circumscribe the extension and limits of this right and law of nature by three heads, on Thomas, I-II, Question 94, Article 2. For the law of nature requires some things from man as he is a being, some things as he is a living thing and animal, some things as he is rational. Which are to be seen there.

Problem 8: Whether therefore from natural right, as it is contradistinguished from the supernatural, the reason and mode of worshipping God can be deduced, or subsumed under it?

Response: Negative. Indeed in general and indefinitely it can be shown from it how God is to be worshipped, and negatively how He is not to be worshipped, in many things; but positively and in particular the natural worship of God, as it is now modified after the fall, cannot be deduced from it or definitely and explicitly subsumed under it. Much less instituted worship. These things therefore are to be expected from supernatural revelation. Which, since they are abundantly explained in the common places about the Necessity and perfection of Scripture, and about theology, and about the use of reason in matters of faith, there is no reason why we should subvert with more words that absurd prop of sacred rites in public worship, sought from nature.

There are certain common rites naturally necessary, or civilly decorous, but they are not sacred and mystical. For example, nature teaches that if a preacher wishes to rightly and suitably distribute the Supper, that he do this with uncovered mouth, or that he do it standing and with erect body, if he wishes those agenda to be conveniently seen and heard by the communicants. Civil decorum demands that the minister be decently clothed, without mucus flowing down from the nostrils, without saliva swimming in the mouth, etc. when he has a sermon. But all these things are common in school, in court, in colleges, in the streets, etc., but not proper, mystical or formally sacred.

Problem 9: Whether the right and law of nature is known by all men, and through the contrary sense it can be inferred that that is not of natural right which is not acknowledged by all.

Response: Negative. Indeed it is apt to be known by all, and all ought to know it; but in many ways they extinguish that light by inferring conclusions badly from principles, as can be seen in Romans 1:21-22, Jude 10. But if by right and law of nature are understood only the first practical principles, we confess that they are admitted by all who are endowed with the use of reason, once an explanation of the terms is perceived. See our disputation on Atheism. In which sense the anonymous author of the definitions which were published together with those of Gregory of Nazianzus from the Augsburg library by David Hoeschel, and printed at Heidelberg in octavo in 1591, says: "What are the common notions? Those having credibility of themselves readily, and needing nothing else for demonstration."

Problem 10: Whether and how the honesty of some action can be derived and suspended from human laws and the determination of the Magistrate, so that with that authority and determination posited or removed, the licit and honest in the court of conscience is posited or removed, agreeably to divine and natural right.

Response 1: The distinction of our Theologians between direct and immediate obligation, and between indirect or mediate obligation, is to be presupposed. The former cannot be attributed to human laws and authority in consciences, but only to divine; the latter can. 2. Another distinction is: The laws and determinations of the Magistrate are either only permitting or tolerating, or approving and prescribing. The former are mediately and indirectly concerned with an action illicit in itself and in the court of conscience, immediately and directly with the posited rational and necessary tolerance or permission of that evil which cannot be removed, and that for the sake of avoiding a greater evil. About the judgments, defense, and other acts of the Magistrate about that evil, or over that evil according to permissive law, a similar distinction is to be made. The latter are concerned with actions licit in themselves and in their genus, to which they set a mode and which they limit and circumscribe for the public good, of which sort are successions to inheritances, contracts of buying and selling, and the prices of things for sale, and contracts of loan and usuries, which are not illicit by divine and natural right. 3. There is a distinction: Divine and natural right is either positive or permissive. With these distinctions premised, we say that the authority, laws, judgments of the Magistrate set a mode for things and actions not illicit in themselves and in their genus, nor prohibited by divine or natural right, about which by permissive divine right the power of determining and applying according to the circumstances of

things, persons, places, times has been conceded to them, and necessity of obeying has been imposed on inferiors. And when he rationally and justly determines about them by his laws, they are then constituted in the genus and state of licit things - for example, that coins be counted at that price or value, not greater or less; that at that hour or that time ships set sail; that after that or that hour in the evening no one go out in public without a lamp; that lamb's meat not be for sale in the meat market before the spring month; that fishermen of herring not cast a net before such or such a time, or expose the caught herring for sale; that nautical interest and the common usuries of merchants not exceed such or such a price. Refer here most of the special laws of soldiers. From which a corollary is drawn out against two most grave hallucinations and confusions which are committed by some about various cases of conscience: Of which one is when the mode and determination of the Magistrate about those things which are of permissive divine right, and consequently not illicit in themselves, is extended promiscuously to any other things prohibited and illicit by positive divine and natural right. For example, when it is said that those mercantile and nautical usuries to which the Magistrate has set a mode, and which and because he has rightly and prudently thus determined, are licit; therefore also any others, even biting ones, exacted from an attenuated brother, and indeed with the retention of the pledge of a necessary thing which he cannot lack. The reason of the consequence for them is because the authority of the Magistrate intervenes or can intervene, which can set a mode for all usuries, and thus also for those; and when he has set it, he makes them without any scruple licit in themselves and in the court of conscience. We say that consequence, with the reason subjected, is inconsequent; which they will easily see, as I hope, if someone weaves a similar consequence: The sales of those and those goods are licit, and their just price is that to which and because the Magistrates (to whom this pertains by divine and natural right) have so set a mode; therefore the sales of wives (which are said to be customary still today somewhere in Africa), and indeed at such or such a price, are licit - provided the Magistrate sets some mode for those sales, and determines the price. What will they respond? Will they not say, as they ought to say - Those are not salable goods by divine and natural right, nor can the Magistrate make them salable, although with a great or small price set. And although the Magistrate approved such a sale, yet he would do badly, and the sellers and buyers would also do badly at the same time, because the sale would therefore not be licit to anyone in conscience. For neither is a power to be attributed to Magistrates of determining against positive divine and natural right, which no less prohibits biting usuries, Exodus 22, Leviticus 25, compared with Ezekiel 18, Psalm 15, Proverbs 28, than the sales of wives. For if the power of the Magistrate is extended thus far, now we would relapse into the abominations of the Papist Antichrist, which attribute to the Pope the power of dispensing from right concerning right, and of making sin not sin. For whatever is morally evil in itself and per se by divine or natural right, and is apprehended as such from Scripture or right reason, cannot be made honest and morally good through the laws, interpretations, judgments, contracts, permissions, indulgences, tolerances of Magistrates, nor can positive divine or natural law be abrogated through a contrary law of the Magistrate, or dispensation be made from it. The other hallucination is that they do not distinguish a twofold mode or determination through the laws, contracts, and judgments of Magistrates: of which one is about a thing illicit in itself and per se, the other about a thing licit and good. Examples of this are given by the Mosaic laws about polygamy and the bill of divorce, Deuteronomy 21 and 24, Matthew 19; about the rape of a virgin girl taken captive, Deuteronomy

21. And of Christian Magistrates about Synagogues, and the liberty of the Jewish religion; about the biting usuries of Jews or any others whatsoever who lend at interest; about feastings in taverns; of Reformed Magistrates about private or public profession and exercise of the Papal religion. They presuppose evil here, they do not procure it; they permit it for the sake of a greater good, or for avoiding a greater evil, they do not make it; they tolerate it because they cannot remove it, they do not approve it; they indulge it, or do not prohibit it by law, nor coerce it with punishments, but by no means command or persuade it; they circumscribe, limit, determine, diminish, restrain it as much as they can or remove it in part, but do not remove it in whole, or posit it, but leave it in the middle, so that their laws here conduct themselves neither one way nor the other, which neither prohibit nor command evil. There are therefore two acts in their laws, contracts, and judgments, as in divine providence about sin. Of which the former is bare or pure permission, or non-action, which is called an action improperly and reductively, which is directly and immediately concerned with evil as such, for example, the reading of the rosary, and the invocation of saints, and other superstitions which the Pontificals privately exercise at home in federated Belgium; or the idle and drunken compotations which some prodigals and squanderers of goods exercise daily in taverns. These things Magistrates neither approve nor disapprove, neither prohibit nor command by law or contracts or judgments; but only when they so find them, they permit, or leave them in the middle, and presuppose them for their law about which we will soon speak, as the matter or occasion of the law. The other act (which is properly and directly called an act) is circumscription, limitation, modification, and determination of that evil, lest it go further, or be permitted to be exercised in another way than that certain and determinate one. The power, law, contract, judgment of the Magistrate (which on the part of the Magistrate is in itself and per se good and praiseworthy) is concerned 1. immediately and directly with good, namely the circumscription and determination of the permitted evil; 2. mediately and directly with permission; 3. mediately and indirectly with the evil which is presupposed as the matter and occasion of the government and determination of Magistrates, and to which a mode is set. Let us show this again in the posited example: Titius squanders his household goods, drinking daily or frequently in taverns. If the Magistrate knows or sees this evil, he permits it, that is, he does not impede it by his law or punishments. Yet he coerces, limits, and removes it in part by laws and punishments, lest he or any other tippler protract his compotations in taverns beyond the ninth hour of the evening. When the Magistrate prohibits and does not permit the latter, but permits and does not prohibit the former, he approves or persuades neither; he makes neither licit in the court of heaven or conscience, but only makes the former licit politically, or in the court of earth. And indeed by this example many others of the same genus which are accustomed to be agitated in moral questions and cases of conscience can be promptly and perspicuously explained and expedited. As divine providence about evils is concerned not only with circumscribing and limiting, but also with converting them into good, so Magistrates by their laws and judgments convert evils into good, use them for good, and make it so that others use them well, or at least less badly; from which nevertheless it does not follow that evil is good, or is approved by the laws and judgments of the Magistrate as good. For although evil and good are conjoined there in their existence, and are objected conjointly or ἀχωρίστως to the power, government, care, laws, and judgments of the Magistrate, yet the one is not the other, nor is changed into the other, nor are acts directly concerned with the one acts about the other, nor are the adjuncts and effects of the one the adjuncts and effects

of the other; but they conduct themselves to each other with their causes, adjuncts, and effects per accidens. Thus, for example, for the Israelites to take sons from two wives at the same time was illicit in the court of conscience, yet not in the political court, where this evil was not only permitted, but the evil effects of it were further converted into good by laws, so that they would use them well, Deuteronomy 21. Thus God wanted order to be preserved in and about polygamy, although He did not want the polygamy itself. Many other problems could be treated here; but because most can be referred to the common place about laws (perhaps sometime to be explained by us in a peculiar diatribe), and the narrowness of time now forbids going further, I finish for this occasion.

ON THE POWER OF GOD And on the possible and impossible, *PART ONE.*

Responding, JOHANNES CARRE of Champagne, Gaul, on March 2, 1644.
For the sake of better doctrine we will treat 1. on the attribute of power; 2. on the object of the same, or how far it extends itself; that is, on the possible and impossible.

1. With the explanation of potency and act in general and in actu signato having been omitted (which we here presuppose from logic and Metaphysics), we premonish that the notions of objective potency, that is, of being able to be, or of subjective or passive potency, that is, of being able to suffer or receive, or of defective potency, or finally of any Metaphysical potency which is also and insofar as it is contradistinguished from act, do not have place in God, since He is a being simply and absolutely necessary, perfect, immutable, and most pure act; but only the notions of logical potency, or of non-repugnance in terms, when something can be attributed to God without contradiction, and of active potency, that is, being able to act. The actions of God are distinguished into those which are to the inside, and those which are to the outside, as the understanding and will of God by which He understands and wills Himself, and by which He understands and wills other things from Himself; of which the former is to the inside, for it is terminated in God; but the latter to the outside, because it is terminated in creatures. Again they are divided into notional or personal and into common. Both again into immanent or internal, and emanating or external. Thus to generate, to spirate are personal immanent actions and to the inside; to understand and to will Himself are common immanent actions and to the inside. To understand and to will creatures, or to decree something about creatures, are common actions, immanent or internal and to the outside. Thus for God to so love the world that He wills to give Himself and to be sent into the world for the life of the world, which is attributed to the Son alone, is a personal immanent action, but to the outside. To assume human nature is a personal external action, and to the outside. To create, conserve, govern the world, to save the elect are common actions, external or emanating, and to the outside. From this division of divine actions can result various acceptations of divine power. Thus active power will be distinguished into internal (although improperly) and external; to the inside and to the outside; common or essential, and proper or personal. With these distinctions having been observed, certain

problematic questions will be able to be easily determined, and the sayings of Theologians will be able to be reconciled ἀνθρωποπαθῶς.

1. Whether the power of God has for its object God Himself, or is concerned with God, and is terminated in Him? Response: About power to the outside and external executive power - Negative.

2. Whether power precedes the intellect and will in the order of nature? Response: About power strictly and properly said, or external and executive power - Negative.

3. Whether power is an attribute of the first genus, in the first moment, pertaining to the essence of God; or an attribute of the second genus, in the second moment, pertaining to the life or vitality of God. Response: About power properly said, namely to the outside, external, and executive - Deny the former, Affirm the latter.

4. Whether the notion of divine power ought to be distinguished from His efficiency? Response: Affirmative. For God was and ought to be thought powerful to effect, before He effected or produced anything outside Himself. Besides, power is the reason and principle of efficiency in God, as intellect in the divine essence is the reason and principle of understanding, will of willing.

5. Whether the power of God, as it is considered as simply powerful, but not as executing act, is plainly the same with His sufficiency, and pertains properly to the nature of God, as it is considered under the aspect of being, as Ames wants, Book 1, Marrow, Chapter 6. Response: We do not think this is said accurately about the power of God properly and strictly said, which has for its object and term creatures. For since it says a relation to creatures, as grace, mercy, punitive justice, etc., it cannot be said to pertain to the nature of God, as it is considered under the aspect of being.

2. We will inquire about power strictly said, which says an intrinsic respect to creatures. 1. Whether it is in God. 2. What it is. 3. Of how many kinds it is. 4. What sort it is.

As to the first question, the Scholastics treat of it on Part 1, Question 25, Article 1, and from them the more recent Metaphysicians Suarez etc. There were some who denied it, as Cajetan and Valentia on Part 1, Question 25, Article 1. But they are refuted both from Scripture, which attributes power to God no less than intellect or will, Ephesians 1:19, Psalm 89, 106, and by reason. 1. Because each thing insofar as it is in act and perfect, according to this is the active principle of something; and thus what is most perfect has the most active power, for this active principle is nothing other than active power. But now we here presuppose that God is pure act, and universally perfect, and it is proved elsewhere. 2. Because external actions in fact belong to God, as to create, govern, etc.; but action presupposes the power of acting; for one would not act if he could not act. Therefore, there is in God executive power. 3. Because to act and to be able to act is a perfection simply, nor does it involve any imperfection in its concept; but nothing is to be removed from God which is of perfection simply. The objections moved by the

Scholastics in the cited place are easily removed, the founts of the solutions having been indicated. 1. Active power is not distinguished against act, but is founded in it; but the matter is otherwise in passive power. 2. Power is more noble than its operation, when power and operation or act are distinguished; but this has no place in God, where power is the same as its act. 3. Active power in God is the principle not of its act or operation, which is the divine essence itself (for God is αὐτοουσία, as Justin Martyr rightly says), but only of its effect. In creatures active power is the principle both of its act and effect. 4. The power of God is the cause of things, yet not in the same way as the intellect and will. Intellect is the principle through the mode of directing, will through the mode of commanding, power through the mode of executing, as Thomas rightly says in the cited place. Therefore, the principles of things are not multiplied in God without necessity; for although these three are really the same, they nevertheless differ according to reason. For power is not other than will and intellect, but is the very will and intellect themselves, as they have the nature of effective principle. With these things thus posited, opinions, if there are any, opposed are easily refuted, and it is responded one by one to special questions. 1. Whether the knowledge of God is the power itself operating through command? Response: Negative. 2. Whether knowledge through ideas is the proximate power of acting, through which God operates immediately to the outside, namely through an absolute and efficacious willing that such a creature be at such a time, mode, etc.? Response: Negative. See Scotus on Book 1, Distinction 37. And from the more recent authors, Fonseca in Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 15, Question 8, Section 4. Whether power is distinguished by reason from intellect and will according to their precise formal ratios conceived. Response: Affirmative. About which questions Suarez learnedly and laboriously disputes, Metaphysical Disputations, Disputation 30, Section 17, who can be seen.

3. What the power of God is is clear from this description: It is the essential property of God, by which He can and effects all things in all and each one. By others thus: It is that by which He acts outside Himself by free will, and can do all possible things. You may also not badly draw out the description from the words of Suarez in the cited Section 5.45: It is nothing other than the divine nature itself, which insofar as it is being itself through essence, is through itself the effectrix of any participated or participable being, if will is added, as applying, and knowledge as directing. Others thus describe it: The power of God is the infinite and simple force of doing all those things which are agreeable to His essence and attributes. But there are four things which are contained in the essential power of God, and distinguish it from all other powers, and consequently ought to enter into its definition. 1. that it can operate from itself, and operates, Isaiah 44:24; 2. that all things, Luke 1, Psalm 115; 3. that by the strength of immutable essence, Isaiah 40:26, 28; 4. and that most easily, so that there is no resistance, or can be, Isaiah 14. And such power is said by the particular name omnipotence, which the Apostle in Ephesians 1:19 calls the supereminent magnitude of power. And thus power is attributed to God as proper to Him, 1 Chronicles 29:11, Matthew 6:13, and from it God is said κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν that powerful one, Luke 1:49, the only powerful one and dynast, 1 Samuel 2:2, 1 Timothy 6:15, omnipotent, 2 Corinthians 6:18.

4. The power of God is divided according to reason into many, not indeed in itself (because it is in itself formally one and most simple), but in order to various actions. That it is in reality

altogether simple is proved both from the simplicity of the divine nature and from the universality of it and its object, which is participable being as such. That it can be distinguished by reason through inadequate concepts is proved from the analogy of finite or created power, in the way in which, for example, we variously partition the human intellect. Therefore, let there be a division 1. into creative, and generative or effective through the eduction of form from matter. 2. Into active power through the mode of proximate cause, or through the mode of universal cause only. 3. Into effective power, and conservative power. But that the latter is not distinguished except in name from effective power, the Scholastics prove in Part 1, Question 104, Article 1, and Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, Disputation 21, Section 2. 4. Into productive power, and annihilative power. But the latter is not so much a power of acting as of not acting; nor does it add even according to the intellect or concept a proper ratio of power, but only connotes the liberty or subordination of power. 5. Into natural and supernatural. Which distinction is not with respect to God Himself (because to Him all power is most connatural), but in order to actions which are above the nature of created things. 6. Into Physical and moral, which denomination is from the actions or Providence of God Physical and moral. About which in its place. 7. Into absolute or necessary and free. The former is that by which God acts powerfully within Himself, from the necessity of nature, which is also called natural, intrinsic and immanent. The latter is that by which God acts outside Himself, which things He has decreed to do, and can do more than He wills; which is also called voluntary, extrinsic, and transient. Alsted has this division in Natural Theology, Chapter 13. But this division can better be omitted. Because the power of understanding and willing is improperly called the power of God, Suarez not badly observes, Disputation 30, Section 17. Compare also Thomas Aquinas, On the Power of God, Book 2, Chapter 10, and Book 1, Chapter 82. And the power of the Father is not comprehended under the omnipotence of God, as Gabriel notes on Book 1, Distinction 20, and Themesvar in the Rosary, Book 1, under the word "power", from William and others cited there. Indeed Alsted himself in the cited place, page 124, in the solution of the first objection: "The power of God is here considered not widely but strictly, insofar as it is called executive and executing, which is opposed to intellective and volitive power." 8. Into absolute and ordinate. Others distinguish into extraordinary and ordinary. About which division, from the Scholastics, Lychetus the Scotist on Book 1, Distinction 44, single question: "When power is said to be either absolute or ordinate, it is not said to be some power, but more a certain mode of acting, namely absolutely or ordinately, that is, which is not bound to that order posited in nature, or in supernatural things according to the Scriptures." Ordinate power, which you could also call limited, is that which follows the laws posited by the will of God; or it is Power, insofar as it is the principle of executing other things conformably to right law, according to the order prefixed by that law. Thus Scotus in general and abstractly, in Book 1, Distinction 44. Where he also explains it by a similitude taken from the Emperor, who acts according to the laws posited by himself according to ordinate power. But if he acts from things reserved, or from the right of majesty, or even de facto, above, or beside, or against the laws, he acts according to absolute power. Moreover, when order is said here, and absolution from order, it is to be rightly and θεοπρεπῶς accepted, as Scaliger not badly admonishes, Exercitations 365, Section 8, lest it be conceived that any ἀταξία can fall in God, or limitation from some extrinsic cause or agent. Absolute power is that which abstracts from those laws, and by which God can do what He can simply and absolutely. Others thus: it is that which simply respects everything not implying contradiction; that is, which

is not bound to a certain order either in nature, or in supernatural things according to the sacred writings posited, and accustomed to be observed by God. Moreover, the order according to which and within the terms of which God can act and acts can be considered in two ways, either according to the bare will of God or immanent decree, or also according to external execution, revealed and signified either through the laws of nature fixed in the first creation of the world and things and thus inscribed in the book of nature, or through the revelation of Scripture or any other supernatural revelation. But perhaps this whole distinction could be more conveniently revoked to these terms, so that one is called the power of doing future things, the other the power of doing non-future things; or rather the power of things willed and not willed, so that between them the divine will alone, whether revealed, makes a formal difference. For when ordinate power is said to be according to the laws posited in nature, it makes the division too narrow. Furthermore, the will of God discriminating between ordinate possible and absolute possible is either pure decree or the will of good pleasure, or the perpetual and certain order posited in nature, or any other will of sign, namely command, promise, threat. Problem 1. What is to be thought about that distinction of Lombard and certain ancient Scholastics: God can do certain things by Power, which He cannot do by justice? Response: If the justice of positive and revealed divine right is understood, it is certainly to be admitted; but if it is about the justice of natural divine right, we deny that He can do anything beside, or above, or against it, because it implies a contradiction. Compare our disputation on the Right and Justice of God. Problem 2. Whether the actual or efficacious and operating omnipotence of God coincides with ordinate or ordinary power? Response: Polanus indeed wants this, Book 2, Syntagma, Chapter 24. But it is said less accurately; for ordinate power extends more widely than actual. By ordinate power God can, for example, extract this boy falling into a pit, succor this one hungering, stanch the blood of this one wounded, extinguish this fire, etc., namely through the ordinary work of men, and according to the laws of nature, and yet He does not do it. Problem 3. Whether the power and will of God extend equally widely? Response: About ordinate power - Affirmative; about absolute power a distinction is made. For if to will not to do, or indirect will, or nolition, is reduced to the will - Affirmative; otherwise - Negative. But someone may object: nolition extends itself to simply impossibles; power does not extend itself to the same; therefore they do not extend equally widely. Response: Let nolition be resolved and reduced to the will, and let it be said that the divine will does not extend itself to simply impossibles, nor power either; therefore in this point they extend equally widely or narrowly.

5. What sort the power of God is is explained through these attributes. 1. It is unique and most simple. The reason is because it is really the same as God, who is unique and most simple. Nor do the distinctions just now brought forward stand against this simplicity, as was said there. 2. It is infinite, 1. by reason of the divine essence; 2. by reason of duration; 3. by reason of the objects in which it can act, and the effects which it can produce; 4. finally, by reason of the action by which it acts or can act, which action is never so intense and strong that it cannot become stronger. Here a distinction is to be observed between the infinite in act and in potency, and between the possibility or potency of the cause and of the effect. 3. It is immutable, although it can move and change all things. 4. Consequently, it is invincible, irresistible, inimpedible. 5. It is the immediate cause of things, Jeremiah 32:27. 6. It is incommunicable, as also the other divine properties. Here the Ubiquitarians raise a controversy, establishing that

through the personal union of the human nature of Christ with the Λόγος, omnipotence, omniscience, immensity, glory have been communicated to it by the divine nature. Which error see professedly refuted by Benedict Thalmann, Matthias Martinius, and their other Antagonists, and by the more recent writers of common places, on the power of God, and on the Incarnation and person of Christ, among whom Polanus, Book 2, Chapter 29, and Book 6, Chapter 16.

6. We now come to the object of power, where three things occur to be treated. 1. On the possible and impossible, and on contradiction. 2. On things implying contradiction in general. 3. On the same in particular. As to the first, the Possible in general is described as that which, when it is not, can be. It is distinguished from the contingent, which, when it is, can not be. The Impossible is that which cannot be, or of which there is no objective or passive potency. But as potency is twofold, logical and physical, so the possible and impossible are twofold, namely naturally or according to quid, and absolutely or logically, when there is no repugnance in terms. What contradiction is and of how many kinds, both of simple terms and of enunciations, is to be learned from the Logicians. This most certain principle of the light of nature is here and everywhere to be presupposed in a man endowed with reason: Two contradictories cannot be true or false at the same time. Which, if any skeptical and vertiginous minds sometimes pluck at, yet they cannot deny in their inner mind. About which Aristotle is to be seen, Metaphysics, Book 3, Chapter 3 and following, and the common Philosophers, where they treat of Truth, of principles, of contradiction. When, therefore, it is asked what God can do, it is accustomed to be responded: Whatever does not imply a contradiction. In the phrase of Scripture the same could be expressed thus, from Luke 1:37: God can do every thing or every being, namely what has essence. But the simply impossible or contradictory can in no way be reduced to thing or being. Thus it is said that God cannot do impossibles. Here, therefore, these problems are to be determined. Problem 1. Whether it can be rightly and piously said according to the Scriptures that God cannot do certain things? Response: Affirmative. 1. Because Scripture speaks thus in explicit words, 2 Timothy 2:13, Hebrews 6:18. Refer here those attributes which are expressed in privative terms, as that God is immortal, invisible, immutable, ἀμεταμέλητος, etc., which are equivalent to these: God cannot die, be changed, repent, etc. 2. Because by this reason there is denied of God not some power but impotence and imperfection, as Ambrose, Augustine, Thomas rightly say, about to be cited soon. 3. Because after the Fathers the Scholastics and more recent authors consent on Part 1, Question 25, and thus all Christian Logicians and Metaphysicians of whatever profession, even the Lutherans themselves, Jacob Martini, Scheibler, etc. So that it is to be wondered at that our churches have so often been attacked by the Neo-Lutherans with odious outcries about the denied power of God. But lest there be place for calumny, distinguish with the Scholastics between impossibles of nature and impossibles by nature, and again between impossibles to someone and simply, in addition to these according to quid and absolutely, in some respect and in themselves, hypothetically and absolutely. The former we say God can do, from Matthew 19:26, Zechariah 8:6; the latter not at all, because they are contradictories. Problem 2. Whether God can make contradictories, or that two contradictories be true at the same time? And whether He can will this? Response: The Papists and Ubiquitarians affirm this everywhere, if not in thesis, directly, explicitly, in actu signato, at least in hypothesis, indirectly or by consequence, implicitly, in actu exercito, as will be clear below. Some of the Ubiquitarians previously seem to have philosophized so crassly that they

openly affirmed that contradictories can be made by God, and thus can be true at the same time. Which is objected to them not obscurely by Alsted from our side in the cited place, where he reports that a certain one distinguishes between divine and human Logic. And Keckermann in his Logical System, in the chapter on the Opposition of propositions. And above and beyond all, Nicolaus Vedelius, Book 3 of Rational Theology, Chapter 8. But they are refuted by the common consent of the Fathers, the Scholastics in the cited place, the more recent Philosophers and Theologians, even the Lutherans. The reasons are these: 1. Because non-being cannot be the effect and term of divine power; but the contradictory is non-being. 2. Because God is truth itself and first truth, therefore falsity does not fall in Him; but one part of a contradiction is false. Augustine rightly says, Book 26 Against Faustus, Chapter 5: "Whoever says, 'If God is omnipotent, let Him make it so that the things which have been done were not done,' does not see that he is saying this: 'Let Him make it so that the things which are true, by this very fact that they are true, are false.'"

ON THE POWER OF GOD, And on the possible and impossible. PART TWO.

Response by JOHN CARRE' of Champagne, France. On the 9th day of March, 1644.

1. Let the same Augustine be seen in book 5 of The City of God, chapter 10, and book 15, chapter 15, and book 1 of The Symbol of Faith to the Catechumens, chapter 1, and Against the Arians, chapter 14, where he explains how it is not contrary to the power of God that He cannot be changed, deceived, sin, deny Himself, etc. On which Thomas also speaks with his own in question 1, article 25.3. Where also to our first reason he perspicuously explains and deduces; The same is done by Suarez from the more recent ones in Metaphysical Disputations 30, section 17, paragraph 10. We conclude with the saying of Ambrose in book 6, epistle 37. What is impossible for God? Not what is difficult for power, but what is contrary to His nature. This impossible is not of weakness, but of power and majesty.

And this is what Thomas meant when he said in the cited place: Hence it is more fittingly said that those things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. What are usually brought forward to the contrary by the more recent Lutherans, Nicholas Vedelius solidly refutes in the cited place. It follows, Problem III. Whether a circle is committed, or the same thing is explained through the same, when it is said that the power of God extends to everything possible. For the possible is denominated from either passive or active power. Not from passive: because no power is presupposed to active power. Therefore, from active, and indeed of God, because no other is prior. And thus the same thing is explained through the same in a circular way. Response: The possible is taken either positively, and thus it is denominated from power: or negatively or through non-repugnance.

If it is taken in the former way, the obscure is explained through the equally obscure, the same circularly through the same; in the latter way, not at all, for the infinite power and capacity of

divine power is explained, so that whatever is not repugnant of itself, is possible through it. But whatever involves a contradiction is repugnant of itself; (for contradiction alone makes true repugnance in a thing); because outside the latitude of being or in the notion of non-being it includes, as Thomas speaks in book 2 against the Gentiles, chapter 22, reason 2, which Ferrariensis teaches there to explain and distinguish. It follows, therefore, that divine power has for its formal object, the simply and absolutely producible, but this cannot be non-being. The reason is, because non-being most strongly, nay, and only is repugnant to being as such, or in the notion of being. Compare Thomas and Suarez in the cited place. Problem IV. Whether Calvin denied the absolute power of God, as it is contradistinguished from ordained power? Response: The papists commonly object to this, according to Gregory of Valencia, disputation 1, question 25, point 3. And according to Becanus, book 1 of the Manual, chapter 17, question 6, and in Scholastic Theology, where chapter 17 on the power of God, question 4. Whether God is omnipotent, Whatever the Calvinists may say, it is certain that God is truly omnipotent. This cannot be denied with sound faith. etc. And question 6. Whether God can do more than what He does? Catholics distinguish a twofold power of God, ordinary and absolute. For they teach that through ordinary power God cannot do more than these things, which He does; through absolute power He can. The Calvinists ridicule this distinction, asserting that God cannot do otherwise than what He ordinarily does; that absolute power is a profane fiction and an execrable blasphemy. See Calvin, book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 23, paragraph 2, and book 2, chapter 7, paragraph 5.

The same thing is also attributed to Wiclef by Waldensis in book 1 of On the Doctrine of Faith, chapter 10. Screiblerus refers to both in book 3 of Metaphysics, chapter 3, page 148, where however he neither accuses nor excuses Calvin. But another certain Lutheran, Eckardus in A Bundle of Controversies, chapter 2, question 7, openly determines that the Calvinists do not sincerely believe in the omnipotence of God, and he proves this from Martyr, Beza, Zadeele, Piscator, Keckermann. But they are mere slanders. For if anyone inspects the authors, he will see that they, with the reasons, instances, and authorities which they adduce, wish nothing other than what Erasmus does, who in his notes on 1 Timothy 1 (where see) reproves the dangerous, foolish, absurd, rash, nay, and sometimes blasphemous disputations of the scholastics, in which they endlessly and without limit inquire whether God can do this or that. Some of which Erasmus reviews in his annotations on 1 Timothy 1, and we below. They therefore wanted to call men back to the revealed will of God, from fictions and false consequences about possibility. In the same way Tertullian also says against Praxeas, chapter 10: Nothing is difficult for God. But if we use this saying so abruptly in our presumptions, we will be able to make up anything about God, etc. Let the rest be seen. Or it must be said that they want that no one should rashly establish from the light of nature a priori concerning the objects of divine omnipotence; since not all things can be certainly demonstrated from there a priori, nay, nor even a posteriori so evidently known, unless they are firmly held from the revelation of God and faith. On which Suarez also advises something from the papists themselves in Metaphysical Disputations 39, section 17, paragraphs 13-14, who should be seen. Finally, they wished nothing other than to call back the power of God, which is too much extended by the papists and Lutherans to those things, namely, which imply a contradiction, to the terms and conditions of perfection, truth, and true divine power, and thus to render God immune from all

impotence, falsity, and denial of Himself. In which they differ in nothing from the fathers, scholastics, and all the more recent ones cited before. Which seems to be able to be sufficiently gathered from the words of Becanus himself in the cited chapter, question 9. Where, when he said that two things are necessary for the omnipotence of God, one of course on the part of God, the other on the part of the object, namely that it be evident in the object that there is no contradiction, or that it is not against the nature and essence of the object: he adds, hence it follows that when we dispute with the Calvinists, who contend to prove that this or that is impossible, and cannot be done by God; they will effect nothing against us, unless they show an open repugnance in the object. For example, if the Calvinists cannot show that it is against the intrinsic nature of quantity for the same body existing somewhere, etc. And in question 4, paragraph 3: The whole difficulty is in this, what we call possible, what impossible. For there are many things which the Calvinists say are impossible, but not possible, as for example, the same body to be at the same time in different places. Accidents to remain without a subject. Problem 5: Whether the root, origin, foundation, and first principle of possibility and impossibility or contradiction is to be sought elsewhere than in God. Response: No. For the same thing must be established here as concerning the root and first principle of contingency and necessity. Although by priority of cognition as to us, it is often first apprehended and taken by us from the thing itself subjected or not subjected to divine power. The priority of origin, therefore, is from God and out of God, and thence it diffuses itself into the thing, so that possibility and impossibility are originally and initiatively of God; terminatively and formally of the thing. But cognitively as to us, sometimes it is first apprehended and taken a posteriori from the thing; since it is repugnant or not repugnant to its nature, or the repugnance is in the terms: sometimes it seems to be able to be apprehended first as more a priori from God Himself, whether from His absolute and perfect nature, or from His will revealed to us through the will of sign. But that revelation or will of sign is sixfold: 1. through the work of the creation of the universe and the general and immovable laws placed in nature. 2. through the very event of all and each thing, for each thing, while it is, is necessarily; and what is done cannot become undone. 3. through prophecy or simple prediction, as Isaiah 6:9 compared with John 12:30, 40. 4. through precept. 5. through promise. 6. through threat. Problem 6: Whether the adequate and first principle of all impossibility is the will of God alone, or His free decree: so that nothing is impossible, except through the free and antecedent will of God. Response: Some indeed seem to want this in the controversy concerning the right of God, namely, whether He can command hatred of Himself, blasphemy, etc. and for this purpose Bradwardine is alleged. But whatever may be concerning their opinion, we deny it. And we distinguish impossibles or contradictories into those absolutely such, and those such only from the hypothesis of the will or free divine decree. The former God wills freely concomitantly, not antecedently; so that He could not will their opposite, for example. Thus it is impossible absolutely and indeed from the necessity of the divine nature so that God cannot will them: another God, an independent creature, sin produced by God, a rational creature not subject to God or subjected, a lie produced by God (Hebrews 6:18, 2 Timothy 2:13), a sinner as a sinner pleasing and acceptable to God. The latter God wills antecedently; for He could have willed the opposite, for example, the son of Abraham from a stone (Matthew 3), the sending of twelve legions of angels for the liberation of Christ from that captivity (Matthew 26). So that for them to exist is impossible and would imply not absolutely,

but from the hypothesis of the divine decree. See and compare the disputation On the Right and Justice of God.

2. Now follows the second point, concerning those implying a contradiction in general, namely, what those are which, affirmed or denied of something, make a contradiction which they call in the adjunct, or the opposite in the appositive, or what implicitly and indirectly or by consequence contradict, which the scholastics commonly say imply or involve a contradiction. But that we may felicitously and dexterously investigate and circumscribe them, we set down these conclusions. Whenever from the posited it follows that:

Conclusion 1: Whenever from affirmative or negative predication there results a contradictory enunciation of the logical and metaphysical axioms which are and are held to be of necessary and eternal truth, it is most certain that a contradiction is implied. Those axioms are both the first and general principles and theorems, and the rules of consequences, for example, the species being posited and affirmed, the genus is posited. The genus being removed, the species is removed. One of relatives being posited, the other is posited. Privation presupposes a habit, and a capable subject. A cause is prior to the effect, etc. But concerning the signs of contradiction, below.

Conclusion 2: Necessary predicates are all those which, joined with the subject, make a true predication or enunciation pertaining to some of the degrees of the necessity of propositions, namely, per se, and universal first. If the contradictories of these enunciations result, so that those predicates are denied of their subjects, now a contradiction is implied. For example, if it follows from the posited, Man is not an animal, or rational, or docile, or risible, a human body is not quantitative, finite, commensurable and coextensive with space and place, etc.

Conclusion 3: The existence of modal entities or modifications cannot be affirmed without the absolute essence, or without the subject of which they are modes. Thus, substantial modes, the union of matter with form, and subsistence, and also necessary dependence on a superior cause, and accidental modes, figure, action, passion, relation, where, cannot be without their absolute, or subject, or term. The reason is, because they are really the same with the thing of which they are a mode. Thus Baranzanus wrangles concerning most of the modes just now indicated in New Opinions, digladiation 2, theorem 12. We say the same thing concerning duration, causality, one, true, good, perfection, contingent, potency, act, identity, and other transcendental modes and relations, which the metaphysicians treat as affections of being. It is disputed whether quantity ought to be referred here, as an intrinsic mode of corporeal substance, or of body, and really the same with it. On which see the opinion with the reasons of the nominalists in Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations 40, section 2, paragraph 2. We therefore reduce this predication implying contradiction to the third mode of necessity per se, as to its opposite.

Conclusion 4: The existence of common accidents, and thus of all accidents in general, affirmed without inherence in some subject, or the inherence of them in a subject denied, implies a

contradiction. And we reduce this through the mode of the opposite, to the third mode of necessity per se. But here the papists stir up a controversy, on which perhaps below.

Conclusion 5: The origin of accidental modes, whether natural or supernatural, through eduction denied, or their becoming or origin without eduction from the potency of matter affirmed, implies a contradiction. The reason is, because they essentially depend on the subject both in becoming and in being. Thus the papists themselves determine in Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations 15, section 1, paragraph 16.

Conclusion 6: Affirmed predication (we speak of proper predication) of an opposite of its opposite through all species of opposites, and also the reciprocal predicates of opposites (namely, definitions, forms or differences, and proper adjuncts, and also proper modes whether specific or individuating and singular, finally the proximate, internal and emanative causes), affirmed of whatever opposite of it, imply a contradiction. For example, in contradictorily opposites, man is non-man: non-man is man, or rational, docile, risible; in privatively opposites, disease is health, and the other way around, or health is impaired action, and the συνεκτική cause of this disease, likewise a symptom, is the συνεκτική cause and symptom of health; in contrarily opposites, heat is cold, and the other way around, or heat gathers together heterogeneous things; in relatively opposites both abstractly and concretely, father is son, and paternity is filiation, and father is begotten by son; in disparately opposites both in species and individuals, horse is dog, Bucephalus is Melampus, neighable is barkable, the soul or form of a horse is the soul of a dog. Here I refer all really distinct things, which cannot be predicably affirmed of each other without implication of contradiction.

Conclusion 7: I add for the sake of greater evidence of what has been said, the proper existence, or principle of individuation or of existence, or the individuating properties, cannot be denied of some existent or individual, or even predicably affirmed of whatever other really distinct individual, without implication of contradiction. For example, the apostle Peter did not have existence: This man whom I see there, does not have existence or is not: Peter, or this man did not have or does not have his principle of individuation, his individuating properties, Petreity. Again, Peter has the existence of Paul, and Petreity is Paulinity, and the principle and individuating properties of one are the principle and individuating properties of the other. The same thing must likewise be said concerning individuals of accidents, modes, privations among themselves opposed or really distinct from each other.

Conclusion 8: If the essential or necessary dependence of any specific effect on its particular, proper, and univocal cause is denied, or if that effect is attributed to any other proper and particular cause really distinct, a contradiction is implied. For example, this or that thing begotten without its univocal generator, a ray, or light or heat of the sun without the sun, celestial heat or that of the sun produced by fire, the light of the sun produced and emanating from the moon or any other subject whatsoever, man created through generation from parents, or begotten through creation. Of the same sort is: A creature not depending on the creator in becoming, in being, in operating. It is also asked concerning a rational creature not depending on the first and supreme right reason, and not necessarily subjected to it for exhibiting

obedience, honor, love. Where we follow the affirmative. On which in the disputation On the Right and Justice of God. Thus it is asked concerning the generation of man by the devil: where also we prefer to follow the negative, as has been said in the disputation On Demons.

Conclusion 9: All the divine attributes, although they are really the same and can be predicated of each other in the identical sense, and also the proper effects and determinations of any one attributed to any other attribute, yet in the formal sense they are not predicated of each other without implication of contradiction. For example, the mercy of God formally is His anger or corrective and punitive justice, God hates sin, and condemns and afflicts the sinner with eternal punishments through mercy. But the reason for this implication is because the divine attributes are virtually distinguished, and insofar as they are distinguished they cannot formally be one and the same thing, because their formal effects, for example, to hate and to pity, to save Peter, and to punish Judas, are not formally the same.

3. For the more ample cognition of this doctrine we will indicate certain signs and vestiges, from which one may apprehend that a contradiction is implied.

1. If anyone, by rashly denying, affirming, and defending the compossibility of repugnant things, is driven to this, that he strikes against or is dashed upon those first metaphysical principles, Nothing can at the same time be and not be, contradictories cannot at the same time be true, and the saying of the logicians concerning all and none, and likewise that ἐκθετικόν [expositive] principle, Whatever things agree in a third, agree among themselves. An aid to this investigation is the indirect argumentation of the logicians or that leading to the impossible, and the conversion of enunciations through the impossible; to which add the reduction of syllogisms of the second and third figure to the first through the impossible.

2. The second sign or criterion is when the assertions of anyone fall back to this, that they strike against or are dashed by the adversary upon the logical and metaphysical axioms most certainly deduced from those first principles just now indicated, which cannot be contradicted as rules of consequences, without violation or denial of the natural light, and right reason, and consequently without the subversion of all natural and supernatural theology; for the former ought to be demonstrated from the principles and axioms already mentioned, the latter defended against atheists, skeptics, Epicureans, libertines, infidels, heretics. But what those general theorems, and axioms and rules of consequences may be, must be learned from the common little books of logic and metaphysics: which are commonly received by all philosophers and theologians, and thus by all the erudite and wise (in the number of whom I do not place fanatical skeptics and shameless idiosyncratists and obscurantists) with compelling truth and interior conscience without contradiction.

3. A sign and criterion is when the thetic principles, or theses and necessary conclusions duly deduced from the principles and axioms just now indicated, are denied, which Aristotle calls συμπεράσματα ἀΐδια [eternal conclusions] (Posterior Analytics 1, chapter 7, paragraph 7). See here Pacius, Zabarella and other commentators, and Pereira, Physical Disputations, book 12,

chapter 8. For they are so true, that they can never be false; and their opposites are so false, that they cannot be true for eternity.

4. A sign is when the opposite is established to exist, or not to exist of that which necessarily exists by necessity whether of consequence or of the consequent. And although perhaps these signs may not appear to some to be more known than the thing signified, we have wished to indicate them for the sake of more abundant caution.

4. Since some of our determinations are controverted today, we will have done useful work if we briefly inquire about them. Therefore, let Problem 1 be controverted: Whether necessary and essential predicates in themselves, that is, whether proper adjuncts can be denied of their subject, and not be in it, without implication of contradiction: or whether this should be affirmed only concerning essential predicates in genus, namely, difference and definition, which are referred to the first mode of perseity, and which are of the formal nature of the thing. Response: The former is commonly denied, the latter affirmed by the papal and Lutheran theologians and philosophers, driven by the erroneous necessity of their theology: by which it happens that they do violence to their own philosophical axioms and principles. But we affirm the former, deny the latter.

1. Because those predicates in the second mode of necessity per se have a necessary and essential connection with their subjects and are reciprocal with them: so that they cannot be absent from them or denied of them without contradiction. It is proven, because they essentially and necessarily flow and emanate from the essence of the subject, and are posited with the subject posited, and removed with it removed. Hence the Philosopher defines them, that the subjects are of their definition.

2. Because we give an instance in certain particulars; where the adversaries themselves are compelled to admit the truth. For example, intellect, will, or the power of understanding and willing, likewise the liberty of the will, are proper predicates in the second mode per se: but they can neither be absent from man or angel nor from the human or angelic will, nor be denied of them without implication. I say the same thing concerning the sensitive and appetitive faculties which cannot be absent from an animal or be denied of it; as neither can divisibility from quantity. We can give a similar instance in a created or finite being, from which ubication, terminated and successive duration, finite power, dependence in its causalities on the first being, mediate causality through qualities as principles quo, and other proper adjuncts and attributes cannot be separated or denied. But now the reason is similar for all other predicates in the second mode per se, as for example, of quantity (supposing that it is really distinguished from body), divisibility, and also locality and location with respect to the human body. To this some refer the inherence of accident in a subject. From which hypothesis the reason is the same for this proper adjunct, as for the others: for no disparity can be shown. But if however it can be shown, as we think we can, that inherence is the difference and formal nature of accident, no less than to subsist through itself is of substance, to be extended of quantity, now from the very confession of the adversaries, it cannot be denied of accident without contradiction, as being its essential predicate in the first mode per se.

3. Because essential and intrinsic modes, both the more absolute ones such as the subsistence of substance, and the general transcendental modes one, true, good, cannot be denied of a subject without implication; although they are not in the first mode of perseity nor are they the intrinsic formal nature, or essence or quiddity of the thing: and also the more respective ones, as for example the dependence of a creature on the creator (for example, of man, angel, dog, horse, sun, tree, etc.) in being and in operating is essential to it, and yet it is not the essence, quiddity, formal nature, or of the formal nature of man or horse. Again, the dependence of a rational creature on God as the first right reason in moral being and of right reason, is necessary and essential, so that it cannot be denied of it without implication, nor can God by absolute power will or produce its opposite as simply impossible, and repugnant in terms. And yet that moral dependence for example of man or angel is not of its essence (constituting, namely), or of its intrinsic formal nature; it is not its genus, or difference, or essential part, or definition, or any necessary predicate in the first mode of perseity.

4. Because conclusions immediately and necessarily following from first practical principles cannot be separated from them or removed or denied without implication, and yet those conclusions are in the second moment and degree of the light and law of nature, and posterior to first principles and necessarily following from them; but not equal to them in order and degree, much less prior to them or of their formal nature, or essentially constituting them. See this deduced by Bishop Rada of Patti in the controversy between Thomas and Scotus, part 3, question 16, pages 453-454, etc. This necessary ἀνακολουθία [following back] and reciprocation of the first principle and first conclusion, as well as of God and the providence of God, should be considered and applied analogically; with the former of which posited or removed antecedently, the latter is posited or removed, and with the latter posited or removed consequently, the former is posited and removed, in both cases however so necessarily that the opposite affirmation would imply a contradiction. Thus man and docility or the faculty of understanding or willing are necessarily and essentially so connected, that with one posited or removed, the other must be posited or removed, yet with that distinction which we just mentioned.

5. Because it is confirmed by the common consent of Peripatetic philosophy, which the adversaries admit. See the testimonies cited by philosophers of our religion, where in metaphysics and logic they deal with proper accident. The objections and exceptions, which for recent adversaries are like a sacred anchor, are reduced especially to these.

Exception 1: Proper accidents and certain predicates which can be reduced to the second mode per se (for example, location, quantity) are not the formal nature, or of the essential nature of the thing, but only in the second moment of nature: therefore without implication they can be absent and be denied of the thing, for with them removed or denied the essence of the thing is not removed. To this tends what Suarez has in Metaphysical Disputations 37, section 2.

Response: But this is a mere begging of the question. For this is what the question concerns and is assumed by the adversary, not proven. Whether, namely, with the predicates of the first mode per se alone denied, and not also of the second mode, the essence of the thing is

removed, and contradiction is implied. We proved our opinion a little before: on the other hand, Suarez in the cited place demonstrates nothing, but only holds out the truth of faith concerning transubstantiation and the mass: which is none, nor is it proven in any way from the principles of faith. Next, we deny that proper accidents are not of the essence of the thing. For they are essential consecutives, although not constitutives (to use the distinction of Zabarella here), and of the second moment of nature or essence, to this extent therefore they are of the essence.

Exception 2: That properties necessarily are in their subjects, and subjects are not without their properties, should be understood concerning aptitudinal inherence not actual, or that it is fitting for them to be in that subject, and they are apt to be in it, and the subjects are apt to receive them. And this is the last refuge of the most recent ones, of Ruvius in Physics, book 4, question 5, on place; of John of St. Thomas in Thomistic Philosophy in Logic, question 11, article 1, page 178. Response: But 1. they excellently beg the question here: for the whole difficulty is about this, namely whether a true body can actually be or can exist without actual coexistent quantity, and man or angel without intellect or will, will without liberty, and creature without actual dependence on the creator, and God without omniscience or omnipotence, and quantity without divisibility. 2. Next, with this exception and distinction admitted, it would follow that no implication of contradiction can be or be thought which cannot be eluded by this reason. For it will be easy to conceive subjects under the negation of any attributes both in the first and in the second mode per se. Man will not actually be rational, nor an animal, again an animal will not actually be sensitive, nor an angel actually endowed with intellect or will; nor will actually free, nor God actually infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, nor will a triangle actually have three angles etc.; but it suffices for avoiding contradiction, that they are said to be fitting for those subjects, and the subjects can be such: All which things are exceedingly absurd. 3. Finally, we presuppose that there is no true essence, except an actual one: therefore, since it is asked concerning actually existing things, and their actual essences, it should also be understood to be asked concerning their actually coexisting things, or concerning individual and actual accidents. Therefore, as in the question concerning the purely possible or concerning the objective potency of a thing and form or difference of a thing and essential mode, of a subject and essential property (which cohere by a necessary and reciprocal connection) one should not pass over to existence or actual essence, and apply it to either reciprocal, with possibility or futurity left to the other reciprocal: so neither here in the question concerning two reciprocals actually coexisting, should one pass over to the possible, or the being able to be fitting or to inhere, or the aptitudinal.

ON THE POWER OF GOD, And on the possible and impossible. PART THREE.

Response by JOHN CARRE' of Champagne, France. On the 9th day of March, 1644.

1. Exception 3, which in the controversy concerning the penetration of bodies through the absolute power of God against Durandus the more recent philosophers hold out, in Physics on

place Toletus, Ruvius, the Conimbricenses, Arriaga, Oviedo, Mendoza, and those who are the most recent after all the others, the authors of the Complutensian college of discalced Carmelites, and John of St. Thomas. Add the more recent theologians on the third part, question 76, article 5; also the philosophers cited by those just now named whom I have not all seen or compared. Nor was it even necessary; since some for the most part copy the dictations of others, and add nothing or little of their own. The sum of the exception is this: A property which is a secondary formal effect of something, but not a primary one, can in fact be absent, and that through the inhibited divine concurrence and consequently the impeded efflux or actual emanation of that effect from its subject or form. For example, it is a formal but secondary effect of quantity to extend situationally and locate the parts of a quantified body in order to place, that is, to order them in place, and extend them in different spaces and terms. But this effect of quantity can be totally removed, yet with quantity preserved, as is clear in the sacramental body of Christ, where its quantity is, as well as its remaining accidents, without extension to place. Much more, with quantity preserved, can a more secondary effect be impeded, which naturally follows upon that actual extension, namely the mutual contact of bodies and parts along the extremities or indivisibles and terms, and consequently the expulsion of another body from the same place, in which the body, or part is, so that one, namely, does not enter the other, nor is penetrated under the same place. For God can, with the secondary effect of quantity standing, namely the occupation of place and the contact of the located body to another circumscribing and locating body, impede the contact of the same located body to another body approaching it, and thus admit that it may be at the same time in the same place. I see no other proof of this hypothetical exception, from which a thetical one is constructed directly opposed to our determination concerning the implication of contradiction, except a twofold one. Of which one is a posteriori, because it was thus done, in the nativity of Christ, who came forth from the closed womb; and in the resurrection, because with the tomb closed etc.; and he entered to the disciples with the door closed; and he penetrated the heavens with no division made in them. But to this twice-cooked cabbage there is no need to reply anything here, since solutions are prepared for beginners. The other proof is a priori, because it is a property and secondary formal effect of quantity only; and consequently can actually be absent, and be denied of the quantified subject: for the opposite or the affirmation of the opposite is repugnant naturally, not divinely or essentially (thus John of St. Thomas speaks in these terms in part 2 of his Thomistic Philosophical Course, question 16, article 4, page 273, column a, page 274, column b): because extension in order to place is naturally owed to quantity, and the mutual [contact] of bodies or parts around the extremities, and the resulting expulsion of another body, and impenetrability of dimensions. Response: All the false and absurd or uncertain things which are here presupposed and assumed, not proven: which being denied the whole mass of the exception collapses. 1. That what is affirmed or denied of a thing against the property of the thing, which is naturally owed to the thing, implies a contradiction, we proved above: therefore the antithesis of that thesis of ours should not here perform the role of a peremptory proof at the same time as an exception or solution. 2. If impenetrability or the presence of two bodies in the same place is naturally repugnant to the property of quantity (as he himself asserts against those who dispute that impenetrability is naturally possible, from vessels filled with ashes or water, of which the former receive ashes, the latter gold: likewise from glowing iron), certainly it is essentially repugnant, because a property is essential to the subject. Therefore he scatters smoke with this

distinction. For it is as much as if someone should say, the will is a natural cause, or acts from a necessity of nature, or does not act with pre-election, or acts to the extreme of potency is naturally repugnant to its property, namely liberty; but it is not essentially repugnant; consequently it can be supernaturally impeded so that the will acting something does not act with pre-election or with an antecedent judgment. In short, with this nugatory distinction admitted, it will follow that any opposites of properties can be affirmed of a subject because, namely, it is not essentially repugnant: and the reason will be, because properties are not of the formal nature or of the essence of the thing. Thus an ass will be able to dispute, cognitively know, because this is not essentially repugnant to asininity, but only naturally; and because supernaturally the proper formal effect of an ass insofar as it is an animal, to know, namely, sensually and materially with a sensible object posited and which it actually knows, can be impeded by God not offering concurrence to the actual emanation of that formal effect. Again by the same nugation it can be said, that a creature can operate without the concurrence and predetermination of God (contrary to what the Thomists truly and constantly dispute, as can be seen in the Thomist theologians, Zumel, Rispolis, Bañez, Alvarez, Sylvius etc. and the philosophers John of St. Thomas, and the Complutenses in their Thomistic Philosophy), because, namely, this is repugnant only naturally not essentially to the proper of a creature, which is dependence in operating on the first cause; and because that dependence is not of the essence or formal nature of, for example, man, nor does it intrinsically constitute man: for it is not his genus, or difference, or matter, or form. 3. Property, or proper formal effect, is not accurately enough distinguished into primary and secondary: which terms are played with. It should have been said, that one property is first or immediate, as the intellect and will of man, another is mediate or arisen or second, as the liberty of the will, risibility, docility. Thus the immediate property or formal effect of body is quantity or extension; the mediate and thence arisen divisibility; likewise finitude, and internal termination; also the relative property in order to space and where, locality; hence the resulting hypothetical property (namely, with places and contiguous bodies posited, or at least real intervals and spaces) actual location, and extension and commensuration to place or space; and hence the consequent quantitative contact of bodies or parts along the extremes, and thus mutual impenetrability and exclusion from the same place or space. All of which properties whether first or second or absolute or hypothetical are truly properties, and consequently their opposites are repugnant whether mediately or immediately to the subject. And the reason is, because by whatever name or diminishing term second and mediate properties (which they call secondary) are distinguished from first and immediate properties, they are nevertheless predicates: First, necessary in some of the modes per se. Second, they emanate necessarily from the essence of the subject, and have an essential connection with the subject. Third, they do not really differ from the first properties of quantity, namely finitude, and internal termination, and divisibility, but only modally. Fourth, nor do the shadows and absurd contradictories about physical place, which the papists and Lutherans seize from the badly understood Aristotelian doctrine, help the opinion about the absence or negation of the properties of body and quantity. For first, an imaginary space could be opposed, from the opinion of very many ancients and more recent ones: which the Conimbricenses cannot disapprove of in Physics 4, chapter 5, question 1, article 2. Second, or real space or interval; which opinion after some ancients and more recent ones Masius most willingly professes that he would embrace in book 4, chapter 4, section 1, question 3, if it were

permitted by the authority of Aristotle and Thomas. Third, the distinction of place into surrounding and sustaining could be opposed, by reason of the latter of which the adversaries are compelled to confess that some body is in place at least relatively and partially. See John of St. Thomas, Physics book 4, question 16, article 1. The necessity of this distinction from Aristotle is proven and defended ex professo by Reckermann in his Physical System, and a peculiar little book On Place, and Wendelin in his Physical Contemplations. And Timpler in his Physics. Fourth, the distinction concerning internal and external place could be opposed by certain more recent philosophers of our religion not so much invented, as drawn forth anew into the light and refined. Which among the papists themselves Toletus in his Physics book 4, chapter 5, question 8, inculcates ex professo: whom see, I beg you. Nor does Suarez in Metaphysical Disputations, 1st edition, disputation 51, section 4, think it improbable. John of St. Thomas also uses it but in another sense, in the way cited in question 16, article 2. In our sense Simplicius once handed it down in Physics 4, digression on place: as Sleker admits and refers from him in his Refutation of the Physics of Keckermann. Gilbert Porretanus tacitly acknowledges the same, in his explication of the category Where, saying that the place of the outermost heaven is its convex surface. Nicephorus Blemmidas, an excellent Aristotelian philosopher in his Epitome of Physics written 430 years ago, which John Wegelinus of Fugau, by profession of religion, unless I am mistaken, a Lutheran, first published in Greek in 1605, necessarily employs the same or a similar distinction, when about to correct or perfect Aristotle, whom he is otherwise found to have converted into his own juice and blood. Where he thus speaks: ὁ μὴν ὖν ἐιρημένῳ τόπῳ ὁ κατὰ τὼ περοχῴ' ὅτι κὶ ὑποδοχὼ' καὶ γὰρ ἕκαζον τῶν περιεχόντων γίνεται τόπον τῷ περιεχομένῳ καὶ ὡς περιεκτικὸς αὐτὸ κὶ ὡς ὑποδεκτικόν. κὶ ὐτός ἐζιν ὁ πλατυκῶς λεγόμενος τόπος ὅς καὶ ἀκίνητός ἐζι καὶ χωριζός. ἔοικε δὴ κατὰ λόγον ἀκριβέζερον ὁ τόπος, μέτρον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων θέσεως' ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος, μέτρον ἐζὶ τῆς τῶν κινεμένων κινήσεως. διττὴ δὴ ἡ θέσις. ἡ μὲν οὐσιώδης, ἡ δὲ ἐπείσακτος. διττὸς ἦν καὶ ὁ τόπος, ὁ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ οὐσιῶδης θέσις διττή. ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ἐνθετισμὸν καὶ τὼ εὐταξίαν τῶν οἰκείων μορίων ἑκάζου πράγματος, ὡς ὅλου θεωρεμένου, καθ' ὃ κεφαλὴ μὲν καὶ χεῖρες καὶ πόδες καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν μορίων ἐπὶ ζώου τοιῶσδὲ κεῖται πρὸς ἄλληλά τε κὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ζῶον, κὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μέρη. ῥίζαι δὲ κὶ ζελέχη κὶ κλάδοι ἐπὶ φυτῶν, ὁμοίως. ἡ δὲ, κατὰ τὼ τοῦ ὅλου ὡς μέρους πρὸς τὸ ὁλικώτερον ἀναφοράν. διττὸς ἦν καὶ ὁ κατὰ φύσιν τόπος. ὁ μὲν τῶν οἰκείων μορίων ἑκάζου ἐνθετισμός. ὁ δὲ ὁ ἀφορισμὸς κὶ κλῆρος εἰς κατοχὼ ἐνὶ ἑκάζῳ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου μερῶν, καθὸ λέγεται τόπος τῆς γῆς τὸ μέσον τοῦ παντός. See, I beg you, the rest on pages 74, 75, 76: for the narrowness of the page does not bear that all things otherwise most worthy to be copied out be copied out. These things it seemed good to indicate on this occasion, lest some of ours should be called innovators on account of this distinction, by which they want some light to be brought to physical and theological doctrine. Let Hooker be seen among the Lutherans in his Diatribes against Keckermann, Sleker in his Physical Animadversions on Keckermann, Finkius in his Schediasmata, Meisner in his Sober Philosophy, Jacob Martini in his peculiar treatise On Place cited against Keckermann. Fourth, although the adversaries are unwilling to acquiesce in the conceptions and distinctions of their own or ours just now indicated, let them know however that after those reed beds about Aristotelian place they cannot hide: both because those impugnations of internal and sustaining place end only in a nominal disputation about the use of the word 'place,' as Suarez not obscurely admits in the cited place. Not to say that the use of

Scripture in John 14:2-4 stands on our side. And because the philosophy about the quantitative and circumscriptive or circumscribable where and ubication of bodies suffices for eliminating their pantopia and polytopia. Let the doctrine about where be repeated from the papist and Lutheran logicians and metaphysicians. For whatever they may quibble about the acceptation of the word 'place,' as if from the usage both of those speaking exoterically and popularly, and of those philosophizing acroamatically, it cannot be extended either to the external underlying place, or to the internal situation and location both of the whole thing to its space and of the parts in the whole to themselves and among themselves and to the whole and together to the space and place, to which it is coextended; yet this real philosophy remains, concerning each created or finite substance, that it is not only locable and ubicable, but supposing that it actually exists and while it exists, that it exists somewhere, that is, is also actually ubicated and located either definitively (as angels and separated souls) or circumscriptively, as bodies. And the reason is taken from the analogy of duration which likewise should be distinguished into internal and external, with the latter of which posited it is necessary that the former be posited, lest a contradiction be implied: but not the other way around. For God could have created only one angel or one body, without any other creature, especially without the first movable or heaven: And who then would have been the surrounding place, what the number and measure of motion taken from the motion of the first movable or heaven. Yet that body would not have been altogether outside of space, and time; nor would it have ceased to be distinguished from God the inhabitant of immensity and eternity; for it would not have been like God absolute from quantitative terms and extremes, and from the extension and coextension of the middle. In short, let it be remembered, to what extent they conceive a human body to be able to exist actually without quantity or without the proper adjuncts and both concomitants and consequents of quantity, to the same extent and by equal step, the same must be conceived as existing without duration and time. But this cannot be done without implication: therefore neither can the former. There are added also the sparks of truths and distinctions among the adversaries themselves: to which if they want to speak consequently and conformably, they will not be able to remove our philosophemes. That quantity is the intrinsic measure of corporeal substance, thus Thomas in On Truth, question 1, article 5, and in Sentences 1, distinction 2, question 1, article 1, and with him today's Thomistic philosophers against Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations 40, section 3, paragraph 7, number 11. That quantity by intrinsically measuring the substance in which it is, makes it at the same time measurative so that it can be assumed to the extrinsic measure of others, and measurable, so that it may be passively measured or can be measured by an intrinsic measure: so that any quantity in a different respect is at the same time actually the intrinsic measure of its subject, and can be the active measure extrinsic to any other quantity; and can be measured by any other quantity. Thus the Complutensian college in Logical Disputation 13, question 2. That the extension of quantity in order to itself and by reason of its parts is radically local and situational or quantitative, from which the extension in order to place flows, and to which it is connaturally owed. Ibid. That extension is the root, whence the divisibility and measurability of quantity proximately arise. Ibid. And that the extension of parts in order to themselves, is the formal nature, and essence of quantity. Ibid. And Thomas in Summa Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 65. And that position of parts signifying the order of parts in the whole (so that one of course is after another and one is from another really distinct according to quantity) is of the nature of the quantified thing as such. Ferrariensis on Summa Contra Gentiles

4, chapter 87. That local motion can be made in a vacuum. Thus the common school of the more recent ones. That angels are definitively in place. That two bodies cannot be circumscriptively in the same place, etc. That place is the located thing itself. Baranzano in digladiation 13, theorem 11. These, and other things cognate to them suffice for attacking the said errors in theology, the bald evasions about place notwithstanding.

2. But the adversaries urge for their exceptions. Instance 1: Just as with the power of burning or aptitudinal burning of fire remaining, actual burning could be absent and impeded through the absolute power of God, in the Babylonian furnace: so with the quantity of a body and its primary formal effect remaining, namely extension in order to parts and aptitudinal or radical extension in order to place, the property or secondary effect of quantity can be absent and impeded, namely actual extension in order to place, and consequently the subject can be without a secondary property. Response 1: To burn is a second act, or a transient action; consequently it is not a property in the fourth way inhering in the subject, in the second mode of perseity: about which alone the question here is. Therefore this instance is nothing to the point. For the intrinsic finitude or termination of a quantified body, by which it is contained by its own terms and extremes and its parts are extended and situated in the whole and in order to the whole and to its internal terms, and consequently extension to space, and thus circumscriptive commensuration to place (from the hypothesis of a contiguous body and surrounding place), is not an action of quantity (for it has no action or efficacy), but its affection or proper, or if you prefer, essential affection. But a subject existing in act can in no way be, unless an essential mode or proper affection coexists with and inheres in it. To an aptitudinal subject an aptitudinal affection, to an actual subject an actual [affection], to an existing potency a coexisting potency, to an actually existing [subject] an actually coexisting [affection] must be attributed. Just as with the potency of prime matter existing in act not the potency; so the extensive, situative, and terminative mode of the quantified [subject] in order to its own parts and proper internal terms is absolutely and actually in the quantified [subject], nor with the quantified [subject] remaining can it be absent through divine power: Which the adversaries in the cited place confess. And this suffices for refuting the opinions about an ubiquitarian body, or [a body] in many places, or the presence of two bodies in one place. For here the radical extension of the quantified [subject] to place is had, as they themselves speak. As for the circumscriptive mode by another surrounding body, and the commensurative [mode] to another contiguous body, or the extensive [mode] to a surrounding place, it is always actually present, namely from the hypothesis when a contiguous body or surrounding place is present. Of which sort are many hypothetical proper affections, for example, the actual necessity of the concurrence of the first cause with the second, the actual [necessity] of divine justice avenging and punishing sin, the actual [necessity] of the repletive presence of God in all places and in all creatures, namely from the hypothesis or with the positing of the action of the second cause and the sins of the creature, and places and creatures. For here someone would absurdly except, a contradiction is not implied if there is no divine concurrence, or repletive presence of God, because in fact it was not before the foundation of the world; and consequently it suffices to assert an aptitudinal concurrence or repletive presence, without an actual one. Or if someone should except that to be adored is not proper to God, or if it is, it follows that proper [attributes] can be present or absent, because in fact there was no adoration before the creation of a rational creature. 2. The distinction between

a secondary and primary property is added in vain, which is as action with respect to a proper active or emanative power. For they do not doubt (whatever they may seem to want to beware of in the controversy concerning the penetration of bodies) to draw a consequence from a secondary property to a [primary] property. Thus John of St. Thomas, part 1 of his course, question 11, article 3: 'Is fitting' does not say to exist or to be present to the subject, but the same as is owed, or is connected, and is demanded by the subject, although it does not always actually exist in it. And thus is understood St. Thomas when he says in the question On the Spiritual Creature, last article, to the 6th, that for the subject to be without a proper passion, is not even intelligible, that is, for a proper passion not to be fitting or not to be connected to it. Let him see how this philosophy and torture of Thomas is in agreement with what they concede elsewhere, that man or angel cannot actually be without intellect or intellective power. Instance 2: Visibility is a proper affection of body, but it can actually be absent and thus be denied of body, according to Luke 24:31. Therefore it suffices to say that body is necessarily visible in potency, and consequently that aptitudinal visibility denied implies a contradiction, but not actual [visibility]. Response 1: Visibility is not a property in the fourth way either of body in general or of the human body. Not of the former, because there are many bodies in themselves invisible per se, as heaven, air, natural, vital, animal spirits in the human body. Not of the latter: because it is also fitting to many other bodies besides human ones. 2. If visibility denotes the same as to be actually seen by a seer I deny that this is a property in the fourth way of the human body; no more than to laugh actually is a property of an animal endowed with sight. Therefore let it be granted that some human body here and now was not seen, and from the hypothesis of things posited that should be posited, or not posited that should not be posited it could not be seen (with a possibility, namely, or potency of the effect), so that an active potency of vision is denied: nevertheless it does not follow from this that an absolute passive and intrinsic visibility, which necessarily belongs to the human body insofar as it is colored, by which it is even distinguished from spiritual substance (not otherwise than by tactile qualities, Luke 24:39), should be denied to have been actually; for light visible per se, as well as colored [things] visible through light, very often cannot be actually seen by animals endowed with sight, because all the conditions required for actual sensation are not present, or impediments are posited either through a natural, or through a human, or through a diabolical, or through a supernatural and miraculous power, in the removal of the visible object or of the radiance and species of the same [object] present, or in the medium, or in the organ of sight. On which [see] the common physicists and opticians. Whose usage we have touched upon together with our own, especially with the papal theologians in the disputation On Specters, and On Demons. 3. To the Greek phrase ἄφαντος ἐγένετο, it can be responded that it is not well translated by the Vulgate, he vanished from their eyes, as Erasmus observed in his notes (whom see); and from among the papists Arias Montanus thus translates it, so as to remove this argument well enough: and he himself was made not appearing from etc. But far more evidently from among the Lutherans Hutter in his Hebrew translation: that is, and he himself went or departed from their eyes. | And thus the Syriac ܗܘ ܐܬܢܣܝ ܡܢܗܘܢ that is, he was taken away from them. And the Arabic فاختفي عنهم that is, he was hidden from them. Let the explication of this Greek phrase be seen in Pindar, Olympian Odes 1, antistrophe 3, verse 1, where concerning Ganymede seized and transferred into heaven ἄφαντος ἔπελες, that is, you are nowhere seen. And in Homer's Batrachomyomachia, concerning the legate of the mice departing, ἀφάνη. Furthermore, I reply that the intrinsic and

passive visibility of the body of Christ cannot be concluded from this, and consequently the denial of properties of their subjects, any more than from any other impediments or fallacies of actual vision whatsoever, Genesis 19:11; 2 Kings 6:17-18 and John 9:7 and Luke 24:16. For although in the alleged places the impediment was not in the organ, it suffices if it was or could have been elsewhere either in the object of course or in the medium. At least in 2 Kings 6 it cannot be proven to have been in the organ, and not about the object, or in the medium. Therefore it is easy to respond to Luke 24:31, that Christ was no longer seen, or no longer appeared there, because his body was suddenly withdrawn from their eyes and transferred elsewhere, as in Acts 8:39 and 1 Kings 18:12, whence however it does not follow that the bodies of Elijah, or Philip were then actually deprived of their properties. But if someone wants to say that Christ was still present there, and yet could not be seen any more by the disciples, we will say then and indeed without any danger or appearance of contradiction, that some impediment to vision was miraculously placed about the visible object and its visible species or images, or about the medium. Whether therefore it is said that the body of Christ was locally transferred thence; or it is said that in that same place an actual sight of it was impeded (in what way in verse 16 and John 20:14-15, or in whatever other way as in Genesis 19:11; 2 Kings 6:17; Luke 4:30 and 18:67, where see the commentators), the argument and refuge of the adversaries is removed in this controversy of ours. Instance 3: The subject is naturally prior to its proper affection, and in no way depends on it: therefore it is not implied, if through the absolute power of God it is found without that affection. The antecedent is proven as to the former member: because that affection flows forth from the subject through natural resultance, and consequently the subject is prior, just as a cause [is] prior to its effect. It is proven as to the latter member, that it depends in no way on its proper passion; because it is neither a part of it, nor a necessary disposition of a part, but presupposes the whole constituted in its perfection. Thus Ferrariensis on Summa Contra Gentiles 4, chapter 65. Response: This whole instance applied to the proper passions of angel and man, namely to intellect and will, which are really distinguished from their subjects, will not at all extricate man or angel not intellective (if it is posited) from repugnance in terms. For although Ferrariensis, against Thomas in the question on the article On the Spirit, 11, to the 7th, and in the question On the Soul, article 12, to the 7th (whatever he may endeavor to draw him into his opinion with opposing footsteps), dares to assert that there is no repugnance of intellects, if the rational soul were made by the power of God without its proper powers: yet I do not see the man, otherwise most subtle, defending it almost otherwise than from his own affirmation, page 728, article b, in response to the 2nd reason for the doubt raised to the third saying of Thomas. A little after on page c, column b, in response to the fifth he indeed distinguishes the intellective and angel or man destitute of a principle and faculty of understanding. In the former way he thinks it should be called intellective, because human nature, or the rational soul is such that it is fitting for it to be the root and essential principle of understanding. But the question is first whether that man or angel existing in act, is formally and actually intellective, or not; but not whether it is such radically or in potency, or whether a man in act or a rational form, could be destituted of that formal effect of the angelic or human essence. Here therefore in the response of Ferrariensis either the question is begged; or abstraction of precision (by which human essence or the form of man is understood and conceived and not at the same time the power of understanding) is confused with abstraction of negation, nay with real separation, and with the former abstraction granted,

the latter is also granted without reason and against the mind of Thomas in the place just now cited. Add that with the subject posited in act as matter from whose potency the intellective principle or intellect is apt to emanate and result, yet no formal effect in act is posited and consequently that subject is not actuated and informed by that accidental form as a proximate principle quo or of understanding for producing its connatural intellectual operations: as is clear from the words of Thomas, article 4, cited there for this evasion of his: But if, he says, the soul were without its powers, yet nevertheless it would be called intellective or rational, not because it would actually have those powers, but on account of the species of such an essence from which such powers are apt to flow forth. So that with that distinction something may seem to be said to the proposed difficulty, in reality nothing is said. For this doubt always remains: How it can be understood without implication, that there is a rational soul in man, or an essence of an intelligence in an angel, so that a principle quo, or a faculty of understanding does not actually exist in it. I on this occasion object this doubt to them in addition to the other things said thus far. Whether by equal reason it can be understood without implication that a canine soul in which intellect actually exists, and a rational soul or intellective substance, in which intellect does not actually exist. How therefore will they refute those who dispute for the communication of properties in general, and in particular of the properties of the divine nature of Christ. But if he should say that the reason is far different: because in the canine soul or essence there is no root or first principle of intellect. Someone may retort; First, that it can no less be imagined that there is an obediential potency to having intellect there by the absolute and miraculous power of God, than in man to not having [it]. In what way some of the theologians thought (among whom Francis Junius on Numbers 22 from our own) that reason was given for a time by God to the ass of Balaam. The same thing concerning the serpent in Genesis 3 is thought by Ephrem in Bar Cepha, book on Paradise. Which things nevertheless, in my judgment imply [contradictions]: and the papal doctors reject them as implying [contradictions]. But I would like to see how from their hypothesis they are going to solidly refute [them]. Next, someone may also retort and imagine that for intellect to inhere in or be present to the canine soul, this is repugnant naturally not essentially or supernaturally: just as Ferrariensis, the Complutenses, John of St. Thomas, etc. in this controversy distinguish concerning quantity without extension to place.

Thirdly, someone may retort and imagine, that the first cause supplies all the effects and operations of second causes, at least efficient ones. As in the disputation on accidents without their subject, they are accustomed to take refuge in this. Why therefore can God not elevate the canine soul to receiving intellect? Just as according to them He elevates material fire to torturing demons: and souls, in hell; and the water of baptism to the physical production of grace in the soul. Why [can He] not subjectify the faculty of understanding in a dog, just as He subjectifies the accidents of bread after transubstantiation has been made as it were in Himself, conserving it outside its subject, and supplying the defect of the subject, on which they otherwise naturally depend in being and in being conserved? These and similar absurdities they could be urged with, so that at last they may see that the negations of philosophical axioms are absurd, and the paradoxical assertions, from which it is necessary that those absurdities follow. The other things which Ferrariensis there disputes for the negation of properties, subtly and readily, above many others whom I have seen, I will not now examine in detail: because they almost coincide with

the exceptions and instances alleged above, and their solutions can easily be taken from those things which have now been said by us.

Problem 2: Whether the inherence of accident in a subject can be absent without implication, and thus that formal nature or property, to inhere, to be in substance, or to be in a subject, can truly be denied of it.
Response: The papists commonly affirm to the third part, question 77, articles 1 and 3, and their philosophers in logic and metaphysics where [they treat] of accident. For according to them the quantity of bread remains in the Eucharist without the substance of bread, and the remaining accidents of bread, namely color, figure, odor, flavor etc. are subjectified in quantity. The reason is adduced a posteriori from faith (namely concerning transubstantiation), because supernaturally it is not repugnant for an accident to exist outside its substance, and to be an ultimate subject with respect to other accidents; although according to the natures of things it is repugnant: as Suarez distinguishes, Metaphysical Disputations 11, section 4, paragraph 1. Nay, in disputation 37, section 2, he frankly confesses that it cannot be demonstrated by natural reason. He therefore endeavors to solve objections, both there and in his commentary on the third part of Thomas, tome 3, question 77, article 1. Which that most subtle man does so absurdly, so timidly, so frigidly that you may thence not obscurely gather the repugnance and dread of interior conscience, mixed with Roman credulity, and blind obedience of implicit faith. We here only set down our objections, which we will defend in the disputation itself as solid reasons for our opinion. Reason 1: The definition of an opposite cannot be attributed to the opposite, without contradiction: Therefore neither can the definition of substance in the Aristotelian sense, hitherto received by all philosophers, especially the papists, be attributed to accident. But this is done, when accident (namely quantity) is said to subsist per se and to substand accidents. Reason 2: Through the absolute power of God the definition cannot be absent or removed from the thing defined: therefore neither can the definition of accident from accident. But this is done when some accident (suppose the quantity of bread) is denied to be a being which is in a subject; or, which inheres in substance; or, which affects substance. Reason 3: A thing cannot be without actual entity: therefore an accident cannot be without actual entity; but it has that from the subject. It is proven, from what accident has individuation, from that it has actual entity: Accident (for example, quality and consequently much more quantity) has individuation from the subject. Therefore. I do not add the proof of the minor: because the adversaries acknowledge its truth, as can be seen in the more recent theologian and philosopher Lobkowitz, book 4 of Metaphysics, section 4, in the epilogue. All the exceptions of Suarez, and of Thomas there and of the commentators, as well as of Ferrariensis on Summa Contra Gentiles 4, chapter 65, can be reduced to these. Exception 1: Aptitudinal inherence is of the nature of accident, but not actual inherence. Response: It is as much as if someone should except, man actually existing is not actually a rational animal, nor does actual animality or rationality belong to him, but only aptitudinal; and this suffices for avoiding contradiction. Ferrariensis' instance: It is confirmed, he says, because although aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of accident, nevertheless actual inherence is its proper passion, naturally and necessarily accompanying it if it is left to its own nature, and yet through divine power accident is without a subject in the sacrament of the altar. Response: an excellent begging of the question. Next, let actual inherence be nothing other than a necessary and essential

concomitant or property of accident: yet it cannot be denied or separated from it, as was shown in the preceding problem. Suarez most ineptly amplifies the same instance in the third part, question 77, article 1, first by denying the definitions of substance and accident: To quiddity of substance it is fitting to have being not in a subject, and to quiddity of accident it is fitting to have being in a subject. But in this sacrament it is not given to accidents, that from the force of their essence they are in a subject, but from divine power sustaining [them]. And for that reason they do not cease to be accidents, because neither is the definition of accident separated from them, which is aptitude to a subject, which always remains in them, not actual inherence: nor is the definition of substance fitting for them. Response: an accumulation of absurdities and stupidities. 1. What is in question is assumed: it is not proven. 2. They quarrel exceedingly among themselves, whether inherence is in any way even aptitudinally of the essence of accident; As Suarez refers there. How slippery therefore and miserable this refuge; in which they do not satisfy themselves. 3. It follows here that the definition through divine power can be absent and denied of the thing defined; or at least that the definition, essence, and quiddity of a genus or species is not actually fitting to an existing thing, or to an individual contained under that genus and that species. As if someone should say the quiddity and definition of man is to exist rational, and consequently through the absolute power of God rationality will be able to be actually absent from that man walking there, not because from the force of his essence man is without rationality and without intellect, but from divine power sustaining [him]. And for that reason man does not cease to be man, because the definition of man is not separated from him, which is aptitude to rationality and intellect, which always remains in him, not the actual presence of rationality and intellect: nor is the definition of brute fitting for man. This is a parody of the words of Suarez. I could institute a similar one concerning matter, concerning form, concerning efficient, concerning effect, concerning dog, concerning horse, concerning earth, concerning water, concerning God the first being, and creature, or second and finite being, and concerning all other things, adapting to them the definitions of disparates, and denying their proper definitions of them in the singular or in some individual.

ON THE POWER OF GOD, And the Possible and Impossible. PART FOUR.

Refp. JOHN CARRE, a Frenchman from Champagne. Added on the 22nd of June, 1644.

1. By divine power, an accident can be preserved without a substance, because it can supply the causality of the subject. Thus, Thomas Aquinas in part 3, question 77, article 1. Ferrariensis amplifies this in the same passage: Divine power can produce the effects of any secondary causes, without the secondary causes themselves, which is true of efficient causes, but not of material and formal causes. Response: Therefore, God cannot rightly supply the power of a corporeal substance which is the subject and material cause, as well as the formal cause, of its own proper accidents. But Suarez addresses this difficulty in the same passage: That God cannot supply the material or formal causality, which consists in the intrinsic composition of

subject and form (for this includes both imperfection and repugnance), but that he can supply a certain causality which consists in an extrinsic influx or adhesion of one thing to another, etc. The latter kind of causality is the mutual causality which matter and form have towards each other: for neither composes the other, and each in some way depends on the companionship of the other, which God can supply through his active and creative power. Response: Mere teratology, which to indicate is to refute. Therefore, there will be a twofold causality of matter and form, one intrinsic which respects the composite, the other which respects the internal causes themselves among each other? The former will be called intrinsic composition, the latter only extrinsic adhesion. But how will the intrinsic causes then not become extrinsic, and their essences and formal reasons not be confused, or not be attributed to each other, and that without contradiction? Likewise, it could be said that there is snubness without a nose, limping without the progressive motion of animals, privation and any evil, whether sad or shameful, without a good subject in which it is founded. But what effective dependence from God can be imagined here, which would supply the defect of the subject and the subjective dependence on that subject? By the same reasoning, let there be imagined a relative, e.g., the filiation of Alexander, without the correlative paternity of Philip, and upward without downward, a husband without a wife, a master without a servant, etc., so that God may supply in all those cases the defect of the subject, the relative or correlative, or the formal relation or correlation. Add also to the heap of absurdities, sight or the secondary power of seeing without an eye and organs, tactile qualities without a body, corporeal or material qualities without a body or matter, and why not divine properties (e.g., infinity, omnipotence) without God or the divine essence; because, of course, God can supply in them the causality of the subject. Moreover, it could be affirmed with the same right, along with Ariaga, that there could be an intellective living being which is not volitive. Which, however, Thomas disapproves of in part 1, question 19, article 1. And with him Vasquez, Suarez, Molina, Hurtado Mendoza, etc. Moreover, I do not see why by equal reason it should not be affirmed that a modal entity or essential modification can exist without an absolute entity; if, for example, God supplies the defect of the absolute entity to which the modal entity adheres. This is denied by Baranzanus in Diglad. 2, Theorem 12. Finally, I say the same about relation without its proper foundation, e.g., Hermachus the son of Titius without the active generation of Titius and the passive generation of Hermachus. Indeed also about every whole and part, about any subject and adjunct, about principle and what is from a principle, about cause and what is caused: between which any mutual nexus and respect is necessary, yet one can exist without the other without implication, with the first cause everywhere supplying the reason of the coordinated part or whole, or principle or what is from a principle, or what is caused, or subject or adjunct. Especially it must also be said that indivisibles can exist per se and separately without and outside a continuum: which, however, more recent authors commonly deny, and with them Ruvius on Physics 6, in the treatise on the composition of the continuum, whatever Suarez may say to the contrary in Disputation 40, Section 5, Paragraph 46. Indeed, by equal reason it must be said that a formal effect can be preserved without a formal cause, and a union without the extremes of the union; and a line without the indivisibles continuing it, and in turn the collection of all points in a line without the line: all of which, however, Suarez proves to be implicated in Disputation 40, Section 5, Paragraphs 45, 46, 47. How will the adversaries show all these things to be most absurd and implicated, if indeed the exception of Suarez posited above must be admitted?

Problem 3: Whether what is proper to one subject can be communicated to another really distinct subject. The Ubiquitists affirm, as can be seen in their philosophical writings, such as the Exercises of Heizon Buscher, the Schediasmata of Caspar Finck, the Sylloge of certain controversial articles by Hoocker, the logic and metaphysics of Jacob Martini and Sceibler, in the Philosophia Sobria of Meisner part 1, and especially in the peculiar treatises of Thomas Rhadus Scotus (whom, however, I do not think was a Lutheran by religious profession), Schroder, and Jacob Martini on the communication of what is proper. But from our side, Goclenius strongly and rightly defended the negative in his Adversaria to the Exoteric Questions of Scaliger from the beginning up to page 50, and in his Prodromus Spongiae of the errors of Buscher, and in his Theologico-Philosophica; Timpler in his Metaphysics; Keckermann in his Gymnasium Logicum, first edition; Gutberleth in his disputations opposed to the Schediasmata of Finck, and in his vindication of the same disputations; Combach in his Antidote against Hesselbein, chapters 15, 16, 17. The arguments and testimonies of the philosophers for the truth are evident, which we do not repeat here, lest we do what has been done. All the instances and exceptions of the adversaries do not touch the controversy: for they speak either of non-proper properties, or of non-communication, that is, of such a kind as is not asked about here. It is therefore a mere "fallacy of the bore", and of homonymy, and mere games in the various or perverse acceptance of terms.

Problem 4: Whether a contradictory predicate or one implying a contradiction can be reconciled to a subject through some distinction. The view of the papists is that they make a non-contradiction out of a contradiction, e.g., whether something can be changed into what preexists, namely bread into the body of Christ; so that it is said at the same time that one and the same Christ in number exists and does not exist, actually exists and is to exist and to come to be; is present and is not present. They distinguish presence into natural and sacramental. Again they distinguish that he actually exists or exists personally and essentially and in a personal and essential mode; but does not exist, but comes to be sacramentally or in a sacramental mode. But in this way they distinguish and limit actual existence, which is the principle of a thing and an intrinsic mode, by the sacramental, that is, by a certain relation and extrinsic denomination, or by an accessory mode which is not of the essence of the thing, nor of the intrinsic principles of the existing thing, nor is an extrinsic principle by which the thing is constituted outside its causes. As if someone were to distinguish concerning the absolute being of an entity, e.g., of Peter, that he actually exists, namely, by Petreity; and yet does not actually exist, but is finally to exist; or that Peter, who actually exists and actually has the Petrine essence, yet is now in coming to be or in potency (consequently does not now actually exist) of that human essence or Petrine being, and that through and according to the consulship or doctorate (if, for example, he is created or to be created consul or doctor today).

So that what is said to be related to some effect and accessory, for example, what is said to become or will become Peter according to the consular mode or the being of a consul; and not to actually exist: according to the absolute being of Peter or according to Petreity, it is said to actually exist, or to be Peter.

Similarly, it is said of some accident (e.g., quantity) that it does not exist in a subject, according to the mode of substance or non-accident; and that it exists in a subject according to the mode of accident. Or that according to essence (precise from existence) it exists in a subject, and according to existence it does not exist in a subject. As if, for example, existence or the mode of essence would remove essence or essentials, and not rather presuppose them: and as if it were asked about attributes belonging to a subject in reality, in species, abstractly, and considered in idea; and not rather considered in an individual here and now.

Similarly, it implies a contradiction, does not explain, the distinction which Alagona has in the compendium of the Summa of Thomas, page 3, question 77, article 3. The species of bread, which remain, have being, albeit divinely, and thus they act and are perceived, and can change something extrinsically. And again, question 75, article 6. The form of bread is converted into the form of Christ, as it gives corporeal being, not as it gives animated being. God gives some operation of form to the accidents of bread, such as to miraculously strengthen the heart, not on account of form or matter. And question 76, article 4. The quantity of Christ in the sacrament is not according to its proper mode, but according to the mode of substance, that is, so that it may be whole in the whole. All of which teratologies of distinctions imply contradiction in terms, and beg the question; not otherwise than this, the human body of Christ is infinite according to the majestic or infinite mode, and is finite according to the mode of nature or body, and man is rational according to the mode of humanity or as man, and is an irrational animal according to the mode of bestiality, or as a beast. And man operates omnipotently, not as man, nor on account of human form, but insofar as he divinely has omnipotence. And man, or Angel, or any other substance whatsoever, is in a subject, or essentially inheres, not according to the mode of substance but according to the mode of accident. And white is black not according to the mode of whiteness, but of blackness. And this philosopher or theologian is most stolid, not according to the mode of wisdom, but according to the mode of most stolid foolishness. Infinite portents of this kind could be accumulated, and proposed from imagination alone, and from our affirmation alone.

3. We now proceed to the enumeration of all in particular, which implies a contradiction. In which we follow the order of disciplines: and first in Theology. 1. Whether a created intellect can be elevated to seeing God immediately and intuitively.
Response: The Scholastics affirm with Thomas, part 1, question 12, article 1. We deny. 2. Whether God can supply the activity of the light of glory? Response: The Scholastics argue among themselves. See Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disputation 30, section 11, paragraph 46, and Becanus, Scholastic Theology, part 1, tome 1, chapter 9, question 4. 3. Whether the light of glory can be connatural to the created intellect? Response: The same argue: although most incline to the negative. Becanus, ibid., question 5.

4. Whether God can be seen by the bodily eye?
Response: Conrad Vorstius affirms in his book On God, pages 200, 237, 251.

We with all the orthodox and Scholastics to the 1st question, 12th article, 3rd deny.

5. Whether any creature can see God so that it perfectly comprehends Him.
Response: Here some Scholastics fluctuate: yet most with Thomas deny. See them to the 1st question, 19th article, 7th and Becanus' Scholastic Theology, cited volume, chapter 9, question 11.

6. Whether God can absolutely pass over and reprobate certain rational creatures without antecedent and foreseen sin?
Response: We affirm against the Remonstrants, and others ancient and recent Pelagianizers.

7. Whether God can deny His own right, which He has in rational creatures; namely so that He may be obliged to obedience, or to penal compensation? Or whether He can command man to believe falsely, to hate God, etc. We deny. See our disputation on the Right and Justice of God.

8. Whether He can remit from His right, and not punish sins according to His punitive justice.
Response: We incline to deny, against the Socinians, and some others. See the disputation on the Right and Justice of God.

9. Whether God can do more than He has done.
Response: We affirm with all the Orthodox and Scholastics, against Becanus' calumny, which attributes the opposite opinion to us in chapter 17, question 6.
10. Whether those things which God does, He can make better.
Response: We affirm with a distinction, namely accidentally better, and with an exception, certain creatures excepted, which in a certain genus cannot be made better, such as the humanity of Christ personally assumed by God, and the Blessed Mary made the mother of God, and the beatific vision. See the Scholastics to question 25, article 7.

11. Whether it implies that the three divine persons are of one most singular essence; and that God is infinite and eternal without quantity or extension?
Response: We deny, against the Socinians.

12. Whether without any revelation through the natural light alone from the book of nature one can be led into the knowledge of the Trinity, or of Christ the mediator, and the new covenant.
Response: We deny with all the orthodox. See also the Scholastics to the 1st question, 32nd article, 1st.

13. Whether any divine person can be sent by any other.
Response: The Scholastics deny with a distinction to the 1st question, 43rd article, 1st. We do not see why this opinion may not be safer, if anything must be said. However, we prefer to abstain from questions of this kind.

14. Whether angels or blessed men can fall from the state of blessedness.
Response: We deny; for hypothetically this is impossible. Compare the Scholastics to the 1st of the 2nd question, 5th article, 4th.

15. Whether a wayfaring angel can sin against natural and supernatural precepts.
Response: The Scholastics to the 1st of the 2nd question, 48th article, 2nd fluctuate, and distinguish. See Becanus part 1, treatise 3, chapter 4, question 1, 2.

16. Whether a blessed one can cease from the beatific vision?
Response: We deny with the Scholastics to the 1st of the 2nd question, 5th article, 4th. For hypothetically this is impossible.

17. Whether, with the beatific vision remaining, one can cease from the love of God?
Response: We deny with the Scholastics to the 1st of the 2nd question, 4th article, 4th.

18. Whether the punishment owed for sin can be infinitely intensive?
Response: We deny with Thomas, 1st of the 2nd question, 87th article, 4th.

19. Whether God could have instituted the covenant of works or of creation with man otherwise, namely through heads, just as with the Angels.
Response: We affirm.

20. Whether charity can be increased to infinity.
Response: The Scholastics argue among themselves to the 22nd question, 24th article, 7th; the more recent follow the affirmative. See Becanus, 2nd part, 2nd chapter, 22nd question, 4th.

21. Whether it implies that God commands someone to kill an innocent, or to kill himself?
Response: We deny by the examples of Abraham and Samson.

22. Whether God can concede that a creature may be adored or worshipped with any religious cult?
Response: We deny against the Papists.

23. Whether the Church, or the Pope, or a Bishop can annul vows made to God, or dispense in them. I ask the same concerning an oath?
Response: We deny against the Papists to the 22nd question, 88th article, 10th, 11th, 82nd, and question 89, article 9.

24. Whether the incarnation is possible?
Response: We affirm with the whole of Christianity, against the Socinians and infidels. Although a demonstration of the incarnation through the natural light alone is not possible. See concerning both Becanus, part 3, treatise 1, chapter 1, question 1.

25. Whether the redemption of the human race could have been accomplished through someone else, or something else, than through God incarnate?
Response: The Scholastics commonly affirm to the 3rd question, 1st article, 2nd, and some of the orthodox. We do not dare to defend this opinion. If anyone does not want or is not able to rigidly defend its opposite, we are the authors to him, so that at least.

26. Whether any divine person could have assumed human nature.
Response: The Scholastics affirm to the 3rd question, 3rd article, 5th. We do not want to contradict them: although we prefer not to dispute about it.

27. Whether several divine persons could assume one nature in number?
Response: The Scholastics affirm to the cited question, 6th article. We prefer not to dispute about it.

28. Whether Christ could have assumed or supposited any nature whatsoever, even irrational or inanimate?
Response: We flee the profane and curious disputations of the Scholastics to the 3rd question, 4th article, 1st.

29. Whether He could have assumed sinful human nature?
Response: Some Scholastics affirm to the 3rd of Lombard, 12th distinction, among whom Durandus, to the said distinction, 2nd question, and the Remonstrants fluctuate indecorously enough in their Apology, chapter 17, folio 190. We absolutely deny as implying a contradiction. And thus Anselm, there cited by Durandus, and others, whom he does not name; whose reasons, however, he does not at all dissolve: although he may strive and contend that devout words more resist his opinion than efficacious reason. Moreover, these are the reasons which he objects to himself: First, actions belong to supposita; therefore every action according to any nature existing in Christ ought to be attributed to the divine suppositum. But it implies, if it is said that the divine suppositum deviates from the rectitude of reason. Second, an action is imputed more to the principal agent than to the instrument: but the humanity in Christ was the instrument of the deity, therefore the action of the humanity of Christ (even a vicious one, if it is conceded that such can fall to Christ) ought to be imputed to the divine suppositum. The third is from Anselm, The least inconvenience is impossible for God: to sin is inconvenient, and indeed the greatest: Therefore. The fourth from the same: If He could sin He could be damned: But the latter is absurd; Therefore. But Thomas to the said distinction more rightly holds the contrary, and Lombard himself: whom Becanus follows in Scholastic Theology, part 3, treatise 1, chapter 12, question 3 and 4. Moreover, it must be observed that in this controversy the impeccability of Christ is considered by the scholastics in a threefold way, as Thomas observes in the cited place. The first is, because His soul was united to its end through the glory of comprehension. The second, because according to the state of a wayfarer, through the grace of perfect sanctity, He had to be the infallible rule of all actions. The third, from the force and necessity of the personal union: because human nature in Christ was as a certain instrument of the divine nature moving it and operating in it, which cannot move to sin. Durandus denies the impeccability of the third mode: the first mode, namely from a conceded hypothesis: because He could, he says, assume human nature not glorified, but constituted in pure naturals without habitual grace: in which He could have sinned. In the same place Durandus concedes, that Christ could have been damned, and that it is not a greater inconvenience than that Christ could have died: nor does he say that he sees why a divine person cannot assume the nature of a damned man.

30. Whether He could have assumed separately matter or form, or even accident?
Response: Becanus affirms, part 3, treatise 1, chapter 5, question 4, 5. But one should rather abstain from curious disputation. 31. Whether created nature existing with its own personality could have been assumed? Response: The Scholastics commonly deny as more probable. See Suarez on the 3rd, disputation 14, section 1.

32. Whether a divine person could have assumed several human natures; and whether He would then have been several men.
Response: The Scholastics affirm the former to the 4th question, 3rd article, 7th. They deny the latter in the same place.

33. Whether the human nature of Christ through the communication of idioms could have been made infinite, and omnipresent, and also omniscient, omnipotent, supremely majestic, adorable, the effecter of miracles?
Response: We deny against the Ubiquitists.

34. Whether it would imply, if it is denied that the formation of the body of Christ and its union with the soul was made in one instant.
Response: They seem commonly to affirm this to the 3rd question, 6th article, 5th. See especially Suarez on the 3rd, disputations 16 and 17. Some of ours, whom I have seen, follow. But I frankly confess that the contrary opinion both concerning potency and concerning fact does not seem to me to rest on any solid reason. For what prevents simply following the texts of Hebrews 2, verse 14, with Luke 1, verse 31, and 2, verse 7, where no distinction is brought between the conception and natural gestation of other men, and of Christ, except as to the other generating principle, namely the father, Luke 1, verse 33, 35, and as to the consequent or adjunct per accidens, the propagation and stain of original sin, Hebrews 4, verse 15, and 7, 26. And that hypothesis of the Conimbricenses and of other Pontifical Philosophers more confirms me, by which they state that the generation of Christ was univocal.

35. Whether the grace of Christ could have been increased?
Response: They commonly deny to the 3rd question, 7th article, 12th. We affirm with the orthodox.

36. Whether He could have redeemed us in another way than through passion and satisfaction?
Response: They affirm to the 3rd question, 46th article, 2nd. We incline to deny with a distinction. At least we will oppose the affirmative opinion as uncertain.

37. Whether the sacraments operate physically when they do not exist.
Response: Some Scholastics affirm in Becanus, part 3, treatise 2, chapter 2, question 6. But we with him in the same place deny; indeed we reject this whole disputation as absurd and nugatory.

38. Whether it implies, to posit actual faith in infants destitute of all use of reason.

Response: We affirm. Unless it is said that God can miraculously cause acts of reason to be elicited there, and with them and in them acts of faith.

39. Whether transubstantiation, and the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist implies?
Response: We affirm against the Papists. Becanus, cited treatise, chapter 17, question 11, demonstrates that this mystery is possible; that it cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, with faith and revelation set aside; which pertains namely to those three miracles, the existence of accidents without a subject, the existence of quantity without local extension, the existence of a body in different places at the same time. He should have added, the conversion or substantial mutation of something into something pre-existing.

40. Whether consubstantiation implies?
Response: We affirm against the Lutherans: because a human body cannot be either in many or in all places, and because a body cannot be in a body in the same place, and quantity penetrate quantity.

41. Whether the body of Christ in the Eucharist can be moved locally, act and suffer physically, exercise immanent actions, be seen by the bodily eye, or by the glorified eye, be known by the created intellect; furthermore whether the whole is under each species of the sacrament, and under any part of the species. Whether the remaining accidents of bread can remain without a subject. Whether these accidents can act and suffer. Whether from these accidents some substance can be generated or nourished?
Response: We find these and other disquisitions in Becanus, cited treatise, chapter 19 and 30, and the common school to the 3rd question, 76 and 77.

We reject as absurd and inept. 42. Whether it implies to posit a bloodless expiatory sacrifice? Response: We affirm against the Papists. 43. Whether it implies to posit the remission of sin yet with the penalty retained? Response: We affirm against the Papists. 44. Whether sin can be remitted by the mere pardon of God, with no real change made in the sinner? Response: Becanus denies, chapter 21, question 5, against Scotus, Gabriel, and others cited by Suarez in the 3rd of Thomas, volume, disputation. We affirm. 45. Whether one mortal sin can be taken away and remitted without another. Response: Becanus denies, ibid., question 6. We deem this disputation absurd and inept. 46. Whether polygamy, divorces, certain marriages in the prohibited degrees of Leviticus 18 could have been permitted by God, if indeed He had so willed? Response: We affirm. 47. Whether it implies that the same body in number which fell through death, be restored? Response: We deny against the Socinians. 48. Whether it implies that the souls of the impious and demons are tormented by corporeal fire? Response: We affirm against the Papists. 49. And that the souls of the impious perish, and of the pious sleep, or at least do not exist outside God? Response: We affirm against the Socinians, and Anabaptists. From the hypothesis of the creation of souls intrinsically and by their own nature incorruptible, it is impossible, and has a repugnance in terms.

4\. In Metaphysics and physics it is asked concerning these things whether they imply: 1. Whether the dependence of matter on form is so great that it cannot exist or be conserved

without it by divine power? Response: The Scholastics dissent: yet the more recent commonly hold the negative, and show the mode how this can happen. See Ruvius to the 1st book of Physics, treatise on matter, question 5. We are not compelled to assent to them. Much less to Baranzano, who contends that it can exist naturally without form, volume 1 of New Physical Opinions, duel 4, theorem 6. 2. Whether several substantial forms can inform the same matter in number? Response: Some more recent find a repugnance in terms here, in Ruvius. Ruvius however defends the contrary, book 2, treatise, question 7, and Suarez, disputation 15, section 10, paragraph 62, where nevertheless he proves at length that it cannot happen naturally. 3. Whether the same form can inform many subjects quite distant? Response: Baranzano affirms, and proves from the ubiquity of the body of Christ, and of certain saints, who were in different places at the same time. We deny. 4. Whether it is repugnant for something to be produced from nothing? Response: We deny with the whole of Christianity. 5. Whether it is repugnant for something to be produced from nothing through a creature? We affirm. See the disputation on creation. 6. Whether it is repugnant for a produced creature to exist or be produced from eternity? Response: We more safely incline to the affirmative, against most of the more recent Pontifical Theologians. See the disputation on Creation. 7. Whether an angel could now be created, who would be eternal from the part before? Response: Baranzano affirms, duel 14, theorem 1. We deny. 8. Whether it is repugnant to grant separable forms, not produced from the potency of matter? Response: We deny. 9. Whether a material form alone can be created independently of matter. Response: Baranzano affirms, duel 5, theorem 4. We prefer to incline to the negative, and think it implies. 10. Whether a created person can assume an alien nature? Response: Some affirm, Paludanus, Durandus, Henry, and with others Becanus, part 3 of scholastic theology, treatise 1, chapter 4, question 5. See also Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disputation 13, section 4. But it is safer to deny with Thomas, part 3, question 3, article 1. 11. Whether an actually infinite quantum can be granted, whether continuous or discrete? Response: We deny with Thomas, Quodlibet 9, article 1, and the 1st question, 7th article, 3rd and 4th. There are nevertheless not a few who hold the contrary. See Ruvius to book 3 of Physics, treatise 2, question 2. 12. Whether a return is so given from privation to habit, that even what has been done can become undone? Response: We deny with the Theologians, Augustine, book 26 against Faustus, chapter 5, whom the scholastics follow. With civil law, Novels on the Equality of Dowries, paragraph 1, law "in war" 12, paragraph "deeds", Digest, "on capture", law "the words", Code, "on testaments", law "but", Digest, "on rules". With canon law, chapter "If Paul" 32, question 5, where the words of Jerome are cited: "I will boldly say, although God can do all things, yet He cannot raise up a virgin after her ruin." With the philosophers, Plato, book 2 of the Laws, and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book 6, chapter 2. 13. Whether, this hypothesis standing, it can be said without implication that lost virginity can be repaired by God. Response: We deny with the distinction of the Scholastics to the 1st question, 25th article, 4th, which is wont to be applied here. We deem it idle and inept, and think it must be denied absolutely. For virginity consists formally in the privation or absence of conjunction and intercourse with a man. See Luke 1:34-35, 36, 37, 38; Judges 11:37, 39; and 21:11, 12; Numbers 31:19, 18; Genesis 24:26; not truly in the absence or lack of the opening of the womb, or in the lack or absence of the divulsion of the parts, or of some dilation: whether that opening or divulsion, or dilation happens through disease, and medicine, or through any other chance whatsoever, apart from intercourse with a man. Concerning those cases, see the Physicians

and anatomists, where they treat of the parts of the human body, and the diseases of women. 14. Whether an infinity in potency or syncategorematically according to essential perfection can be made by God, so that any given species, of whatever perfection, He can produce others and others more perfect to infinity without any limitation of perfection or number? Response: Some deny, such as Henry, Durandus, Scotus. The common school affirms to the 1st question, 25th article, 6th; and on the 1st distinction, 44th; and the philosophers to the 3rd book of Physics, where they treat of the infinite; and Suarez, disputation 30, section 27, paragraph 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, along with disputation 35, section 3, paragraph 25, etc. 15. Whether the same body in number can be in different places? Response: The more recent Pontifical Theologians now commonly affirm to the 3rd question, 76th article, 5th; and the Philosophers to the 4th book of Physics, the Conimbricenses, the Complutenses, Arriaga, Mendoza, etc., Suarez, Metaphysical Disputations, disputation 48, section 4. Not a few nevertheless deny, such as Thomas, Bonaventure, Durandus, etc., whom see cited in Ruvius, in Physics, on place, question 7, where he himself judges both opinions probable. Becanus, part 3, treatise 2, chapter 17, question 14. We deny. 16. Whether the same body existing in two places has in both places the same forms, not only relative, depending per se on local presence, but also other absolute forms not depending? Response: Scotus denies. But they now commonly affirm. See Becanus, ibid., question 15 and 16. So that here it is moved locally, there not; here it becomes hot, there cold; here it grows, there not; here it dies, there it lives; here it would elicit vital acts both sensitive and intellective, there not. He only exempts that a man cannot here love God, and be just through grace, but there not. We detest these fanatical deliriums. Nor are there lacking from among the Papists, who confess that it implies: as to the forms or mutations of the second genus, such as Ruvius, with Thomas, Scotus, Bellarmine. 17. Whether two or more bodies can be in the same place, and penetration of dimensions be granted? Response: The Papists commonly affirm to the 4th book of Physics, and in the disputation on the Eucharist. We deny. 18. Whether indivisibles of the continuum can be separated from the continuum, and subsist and remain separately per se? Response: The more recent commonly deny according to the testimony of Ruvius, to the 6th book of Physics, treatise on the composition of the continuum: and indeed rightly. Suarez however concedes, disputation 40, section 5, paragraph 46. But I do not see how for this reason it must not be said: A modal entity or modification can be without the absolute entity, of which it is a mode. Which nevertheless he himself with other philosophers denies. 19. Whether God can conserve a line without indivisibles continuing it, or a collection of all points in a line? Response: He denies both, ibid., paragraph 45, 47, and rightly. 20. Whether a formal effect can be conserved without a formal cause, or union without the extremes of the union. Response: He rightly denies, Suarez ibid., paragraph 45. 21. Whether motion properly so called or successive mutation between positively contrary terms, can happen in an instant. Response: Scotus, Durandus, Gregory, Baranzano affirm, duel 12, theorem 4, and Suarez inclines to this, disputation 30, section 4, paragraph 27. But Ruvius more rightly denies, to the 6th book of Physics, chapter 3, sole question. 22. Whether a body can be transferred from place to place, not passing through the medium. Response: Ruvius concedes, loc. cit. We think it is a repugnance in terms. 23. Whether God can reproduce the same motion in number, which preceded, so that it may happen again; and produce the same time in number, which passed by? Response: Suarez concedes both, disputation 50, section 9, paragraph 14. We say it crassly implies. 24. Whether motion and succession could have been from eternity? Response:

Suarez rightly denies, disputation 29, section 1, paragraph 9; Ruvius to the 8th book of Physics, treatise 1, article 3, and others cited there, against Thomas, and many others cited there. 25. Whether the generations and corruptions of natural things could have been from eternity? Response: Some Scholastics affirm with a distinction. But most of the more recent rightly deny, and with them Ruvius, cited treatise, question 4. 26. Whether it implies that some principal or instrumental cause can do something, where it is not present per se, nor through its power? Response: The Conimbricenses, Suarez, Vega, Bellarmine deny. Soto adds that in principal causes it can happen naturally. But Thomas, Molina, and with them Ruvius to the 7th book of Physics, chapter 2, question 1 and 2, rightly and agreeably to theology deny. 27. Whether the form of man can inform the body of some brute; and conversely the body of man can be informed by the soul of a brute; and whether lycanthropy, as it is commonly conceived, is possible? Response: We deny. See the disputation on Demons. 28. Whether a creature can be granted, which operates immediately through its own substance. Response: Some of the more recent deny in Ruvius, book 2 On the Soul, treatise on the power of the soul, question 3. 29. Whether any created being can be granted, which in its essence, and all sufficiency, and its causality does not depend on God. Response: Suarez rightly denies with the common school, disputation 22, section 1. 30. Whether vital powers can be separated from the soul, and consequently, any passions whatsoever absolutely proper from their subject by the power of God? Response: Ferrara affirms, book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 69; Bañez to the 1st question, 77th article, 1st; Ruvius ibid., question 2. We deny with Cajetan to the 1st question, 54th article, 4th. 31. Whether a vital power separated from the soul and any accident whatsoever separated from the subject would be per se, namely through some mode of superadded supernaturally to it, which is either a substantial mode or actual substantial existence or an accidental mode, but as it were substantial as to office or through the negation of actual inherence in a subject, and divine efficiency sustaining it without a subject through its own actual existence, which it has, and through which it is outside causes. Response: See the Andabatae fighting about portents of contradictions in Suarez, in the 3rd of Thomas, volume 5, disputation 56, and Ruvius in the 2nd book On the Soul, cited treatise, question 3. 32. Whether a proper sensible existing in an indivisible mode (e.g., the body of Christ in the Eucharist) can be perceived through sense, by the absolute power of God. Response: Some affirm absolutely, others with a distinction, others even that it can happen naturally: in Ruvius, cited book, treatise on the sensible object, question 12. We reject these deliriums. 33. Whether sense can elicit sensation about an absent object, or one not existing even without its species? Response: Ruvius affirms, and others cited by him. But the Conimbricenses more rightly deny, to the 2nd book On the Soul, chapter 6, question 5. 34. Whether intellection or volition can be produced by God alone, without any effective concurrence of the intellect or will? Response: From among the Papists some state that they can be produced in the same powers, even according to the formal notion of cognition and appetition; others and more rightly with Thomas deny both. See Ruvius in the 3rd book On the Soul, treatise on the passive act of the intellect, question 1. More questions of this kind occur among the Metaphysicians, physicists, and Scholastic theologians, especially very many inept ones in Baranzano. But it will have sufficed to indicate these now, so that from the discussion of each one, the young may learn so much the better, what is the repugnance in terms and how it must be investigated; furthermore hence they may see how

strenuously the Papists contradict themselves in contradictions about the Eucharist, and to one another and their own hypotheses.