On Metaphysics

“For in Him we live, and move, and have our being…”

Acts 17:28

Subsections

Particular Issues
God: Pure Act
Divine Ideas
Perception
Hylemorphism

Order of Contents

Start Here
Articles 6+
Books 6+
Anthology 1
Quotes 2

Need for 1
Need for Technical Language 1
Is the First Science 1
Metaphysical Necessity 1
More Foundational than Epistemology 1
First Principles 5+
Realism 3
Aristotelian, Thomistic, Scholastic & Neo-Thomist
. On Suarez
Muslim 5
Historical
Latin 12+
Biblio 1

Start Here

Articles

Fulford, Andrew – ‘The Metaphysics of Scripture’ (2014) 16 paragraphs at Calvinist International

Feser, Edward – ch. 2, ‘Metaphysics’ in Aquinas: a Beginner’s Guide (Oneworld, 2009), pp. 16-58

Book

Feser, Edward – Scholastic Metaphysics Buy (Editiones Scholasticae, 2014) 290 pp. ToC

Feser is a Romanist professor of philosophy. By ‘scholastic’ is meant high medieval scholasticism up through 1600’s Romanism, but specifically the viewpoint of Thomas Aquinas. Feser is a neo-Thomist, that is, one who defends as true the basic outlook and categories of Thomas’s metaphysics (generally derived and amplified from Aristotle), but with some updates according to natural knowledge in the modern context.

The first chapter of the book refutes ‘scientism’, the belief that all knowledge can only be derived through the scientific method. The book is highly recommended for the topic, and gives a very persuasive exposition (at the beginning of each of the chapters) for the necessity of the basic, traditional distinctions and categories of Aristotelian and scholastic metaphysics.

Traditional, natural metaphysics is so commonly used by reformed theologians in their writings, especially in Latin, in the Post-Reformation era, that understanding this subject is a necessity for both historical theology and for the truth of the matter itself.

Here is a review of Feser’s book by Andrew Fulford at Calvinist International.

Articles

1600’s

Voetius, Gisbert – ‘On the Natures of Things & Substantial Forms’, pp. 369-76 in Select Theological Disputations, vol. 1, pt. 2 tr. by AI by Onku (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberg, 1648), ‘On Creation’, pt. 8 Latin

Voet, Paul – First Philosophy Reformed tr. by AI by Onku (Utrecht: Johann Waesberg, 1657) Latin

ch. 1
ch. 2, pt. 1, 2

Paul Voet (1619-1667) was the son of Gisbert Voet and a professor of metaphysics, logic and law at Utrecht.

“1. Concerning metaphysics to be produced by the Reformed, long before me the most learned men from all sides have thought much; and who, if even the least leisure had been theirs from their affair, would here easily have borne off the prize. [William] Twisse pities the fate of Christianity that until now the students of our [reformed] academies have used no other instructors but Jesuits: and they hope to be able to aspire to the arduous progress of things where it lies open by natural light by such masters.

Yet who would have been more fit than him to undertake this labor for the sake of the theological youth? Who would have more suitably cleansed that Augean stable of the Jesuits; and thus through natural reason would have paved for us the royal way to the innermost parts of sacred theology? lest the enemies of the Orthodox religion through first philosophy, defiled and polluted by them, should make a straight attack on pure and sacred theology.

But that most famous man has departed; and what others would have not undeservedly demanded from him, he in vain desired in others. Must therefore so great a work be put off to the coming of Elijah or of Christ the Savior? Not indeed. Provision must especially be made for those who will one day propose the mysteries of God to the people. Provision must be made as quickly as possible, lest like the Israelites the students be perpetually compelled to borrow arms from the Philistines, the enemies of divine truth. I designate the writings of the Jesuits, which certainly are not traversed safely enough by studious youth, because they prepare the way to Pelagianism, Skepticism, Libertinism and many other things.” – ch. 1

Burgersdijck, Franco

The Idea of Natural Philosophy, or a Method of Definitions & Controversies in Physics tr. by AI by Onku (1622; 1645; Amsterdam, 1657) 55 pp.

Burgersdijck (1590-1635) was a reformed Dutch professor of philosophy at Saumur and Leiden, also working in logica and ethics. He was a mentee at one time of Gisbertus Voetius. This was his first book.

Wikipedia has characterized his work as being “the efficient adaptation of the Corpus Aristotelicum to the standards of the humanistic method” and says he followed the methods of Peter Ramus.

Dedicatory Epistle 8
Preface to Students 9

1. Nature of Philosophy & Physics 10
2. Principles of Natural Body 12
3. Nature 14
4. Quantity & Quality of Natural Body 15
5. Place & Vacuum 17
6. Motion 18
7. Time 20
8. World 22
9. Heaven 23
10. Various Orbs of the Heaven & the Stars 25
11. Generation & Corruption 27
12. Elements in General 29
13. Individual Elements 31
14. Mixture & Temperaments 33
15. Putrefaction 35
16. Meteors 37
17. Soul, Life & Death 39
18. Vegetative Soul & its Affections 41
19. Sentient Soul & its Affections 43
20. Sight 45
21. Hearing, Smell, Taste, Touch 47
22. Internal Sense & its Affections 49
23. Sensitive Appetite & Locomotive Power 51
24. Essence & Origin of the Intellective Soul 52
25. Intellect 54
26. Will 56-57

A Physical Compendium, completed in 32 Disputations, concisely setting forth the entire Natural Philosophy, Disputations 1-11 2nd ed. tr. by AI by Onku (1637; Leiden, 1642) 50 pp. Latin Full ToC

Preface 1
1. Constitution of Physics 1
2. First Matter of Natural Things 6
3. Form & Privation 11
4. Nature, Efficient Cause & End of Natural Things 15
5. Magnitude of Natural Body 19
6. Place & Vacuum 23
7. Motion in General 28
8. Species of Motion 33
9. Time 37
10. Nature & Affections of Heaven 41
11. Ordinary & Extraordinary Stars 45

Maccovius, John – ch. 23, ‘A Division of a Hundred Most General Distinctions’ in Scholastic Discourse: Johannes Maccovius (1588-1644) on Theological & Philosophical Distinctions & Rules (1644; Apeldoorn: Instituut voor Reformatieonderzoek, 2009), pp. 289-363

Maccovius (1588–1644) was a reformed, supralapsarian Polish theologian.

Baron, Robert – General Metaphysics… All to the Use of Theology Accommodated (London: R. Daniel, 1658) at ReformedOrthodoxy.org

‘To the Reader’
‘Index of Sections & Authors’
‘On Disciplines in General & on Metaphysics in Particular’
‘Whether Being as Being has what may be called true and proper properties…’
…

Gale, Theophilus

Bk. 1, ch. 3, ‘The Vanity of Metaphysics, or Natural Theology, & Divination’ in The Court of Gentiles, Part III, The Vanity of Pagan Philosophy Demonstrated from its Causes, Parts, Proprieties & Effects… (London, 1677)

Bk. 2, ch. 1, ‘Of Metaphysic or Prime Philosophy in General’ in The Court of the Gentiles, Part IV, Of Reformed Philosophy, wherein Plato’s Moral & Metaphysic or Prime Philosophy is Reduced to an Useful Form & Method (London, 1677), pp. 210-14

Gale (1628–1678) was an English educationalist, nonconformist and Independent theologian of dissent, who tutored Ezekiel Hopkins and was an ally of Thomas Goodwin.

“…to disabuse the minds of men, who have been so long imposed on by false ideas, collected out of Aristotle’s supposed Metaphysics.”

2000’s

Duby, Steven J.

“Reformed Catholicity & the Analogy of Being” in ed. Joseph Minich, Reforming the Catholic Tradition: The Whole Word for the Whole Church (Davenant Press, 2019)

“Further Thoughts on Natural Theology, Metaphysics, & Analogy” in Pro Ecclesia, vol. 30, issue 3 (2021)

Fulford, Andrew & David Haines – “The Metaphysics of Scripture” in ed. Joseph Minich, Philosophy & the Christian: The Quest for Wisdom in the Light of Christ (Davenant Press, 2018)

Haines, David – “Biblical Interpretation & Natural Knowledge: A Key to Solving the Protestant Problem” in ed. Joseph Minich, Reforming the Catholic Tradition: The Whole Word for the Whole Church (Davenant Press, 2019)

Books

1600’s

Alsted, Johann H. – A Most Concise Delineation of Metaphysics tr. by AI by OmegaPoint99 (Herborne, 1611) 85 pp. 18 chs. Latin

Intro 4
1. Nature of Metaphysics 9
2. Essence & Existence 14
3. Unity 20
4. Truth 24
5. Goodness 27
6. Same & the Different 31
7. Whole & the Part 38
8. Simple & the Composite 45
9. Perfect & Imperfect 48
10. Natural & Artificial 51
11. Finite & Infinite 53
12. Necessary & Contingent 55
13. Uncreated & Created, & their Synonymous Divisions 60
14. Non-Local & Local 65
15. Act & Potency 67
16. Possible & Impossible 73
17. Cause & Caused 75
18. Substance & Accident 82-84

Senguerdius, Arnold – The Idea of General & Special Metaphysics 1st ed. tr. by AI by OmegaPoint99 Buy (Utrecht, 1643) 138 pp. Latin

Senguerdius (1610-1667) was a reformed professor of metaphysics and physics at Utrecht and later a professor of philosophy at Amsterdam. Senguerdius was Voet’s most recommended author on metaphysics.

Bk. 1, General Metaphysics

1. Constitution of Metaphysics 1
2. Subject of First Philosophy 3
3. Principles of First Philosophy 8
4. General Affections of Being 10
5. One 14
6. Kinds of Distinctions 22
7. True 24
8. Good 34
9. Causes in General 37
10. Matter 41
11. Form 44
12. Efficient Cause 47
13. End 50
14. Caused 52
15. Necessary & the Contingent 54
16. Potency & Act 58
17. Simple & the Composite 61
18. Divisions of Being 63
19. Substance 66
20. Accident in General 71
21. Quantity 74
22. Quality 78
23. Relations 83
24. Action and Passion 85
25. Where, When, Situation & Having 87

Bk. 2, Special Metaphysics, or Pneumatology

1. Nature of the Pneumatic 90
2. Principles of Pneumatology & General Properties of Spirits 93
3. That God Exists 97
4. Divine Attributes in General 101
5. Necessity of Divine Existence 104
6. Divine Perfection 106
7. Infinity of God 107
8. Unity of God 111
9. Simplicity of God 112
10. Immutability of God 115
11. Knowledge of God 117
12. Will of God 121
13. Power of God 125
14. Creation 127
15. Preservation 129
16. Concurrence 131
17. Angels 133
18. Rational Soul 138-40

1700’s

Sergeant, John – Transnatural Philosophy, or Metaphysics: Demonstrating the Essences & Operations of All Beings whatever, which gives the Principles to all other Sciences, and Showing the Perfect Conformity of Christian Faith to Right Reason & the Unreasonableness of Atheists, Deists, Anti-Trinitarians & Other Sectaries… (London, 1700) 483 pp.

Sergeant (1622-1707) was an English Romanist priest, controversialist and theologian.

Krisper, Crescentius – The Whole of Metaphysics, based on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Books 211 pp. tr. by AI by OmegPoint99 in The Theology of the Scotist School (1728)

Krisper (c.1679-1749) was a German Franciscan.

Intro 1: On the Nature & Object of Metaphysics 1
Intro 2: On the Adequate Object of Metaphysics 14
Distinction 1, On the Nature of Being 20

1. Does real being express a single concept, both formal and
objective? 20
2. Is the concept of being just as unified with respect to God and creatures as it is with respect to substance and accident? 31
3. Does the concept of being perfectly prescind from all its inferiors? 38
4. Is the concept of being rigorously distinct from all of its inferiors, namely God, creature, substance, and accident, by the nature of things? 46
5. Is a being formally and adequately included in its immediate
contractions? 57
6. Is being contracted to its inferiors through differences or intrinsic modes? 68
7. Is the concept of being truly univocal with respect to God and
creatures, substance and accident? 73

Distinction 2, On the Essence & Existence of Finite Being 80

1. In what do the essences of finite beings consist as distinct from existence? 83
2. How is existence distinguished from essence? 90
3. Is the possibility of creatures the very omnipotence of God? 102
4. From eternity, is the first diminished being of creatures something truly real and actual, or something in between real and logical, or something solely logical? 110

Distinction 3, On the Divisions of Real Being 126

1. How is real being well and primarily divided? 126

Distinction 4, On the Properties & Attributes of Being in General & Particular 131

1. Whether & how many simple positive properties does real being have? 126
2. In what does the first property of being, namely unity, consist? 136
3. What does the second property of being, namely truth, consist of? 140
4. What does the third property of being [ens], namely goodness, consist of? 142
5. What are the complex, or disjunctive properties of being [ens] in particular, namely to be in potency, or act, necessary, or contingent, the same, or distinct? 146

Distinction 5. On Subsistence, or the Supposite of Being 148

1. What is the formal effect of subsistence: or what is subsistence, or supposite in respect to being? 148
2. Does subsistence consist of something positive or negative? 155

Distinction 6. On the Inherence of Accidental Being 182

1. Whether the same accident can, at least supernaturally, inhere in multiple subjects or multiple accidents can inhere in the same subject 189
2. Whether a spiritual accident can be subjected in a corporeal
subject, and a corporeal one in an incorporeal subject? 196

Distinction 7, On immaterial beings, namely Angels & Intelligences 196

1. Are Angels incorporeal or composite? 196
2. Are Angels or other spiritual substances in place through their operation? 199

Distinction 8, On the First Being, namely God 202

1. Whether it can be demonstrated naturally that God
exists? 202-211

1900’s

Wolter, Allan B. – Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958) 109 pp.

Wolter was an American Scotus scholar. The work is very well organized. Here is a review in a Thomist journal.

“…it is a fine introduction to key concepts, ideas, and questions in metaphysics… Worth noting, though, is how remarkably ecumenical it is in its use of Scholastic and non-Scholastic materials. For while it tends to follow the Scotist position, it does not ignore, or entirely eschew, the positions of St. Thomas Aquinas or other great Scholastics, past and present, nor does it ignore, though it hardly endorses, later and non-Scholastic thinkers and theories.

Distinctive of it is the way it lays out and defends in direct and pleasingly summative ways such doctrines (marginalized or opposed by others in the Scholastic tradition) as the disjunctive attributes of being, the univocity of the concept of being, multiple proofs based on the disjunctive attributes for the existence of God (running at a tangent to the famous five ways of St. Thomas), among others. The work is historically as well as metaphysically informed and informative…” – Peter Simpson

Short ToC

Preface 4
Intro: Nature & Method of Metaphysical Science 7

Pt. 1, Transcendental being & its attributes considered in general, specifically on the attribute ‘one’ 13

1. Transcendental Being 13
2. Attributes in General & on ‘One’ 20

Pt. 2, On the Disjunctively convertible Attributes of Being 32

3. On Transient, Permanent, Temporal, and Eternal Being 32
4. On the Caused and Uncaused 38
5. On the Contingent and Necessary 47
6. On Act and Potency 50
7. On Substantial and Accidental Being 56
8. On Some Other Disjunctive Attributes 69

Pt. 3, On Simply Infinite Being 77

1. On the Existence and Nature of the One Infinite Being 77
2. On the Divine Life Internally 95
3. On God’s Operation Externally 101

Pt. 4, Remaining Attributes convertible with Being 106

1. Ontological Truth 106
2. Ontological Goodness 108-9

Hasker, William – Metaphysics: Constructing a Worldview in Contours of Christian Philosophy (IVP, 1983) 125 pp. ToC

2000’s

Dolezal, James – All that is in God: Evangelical Theology & the Challenge of Christian Theism (Reformation Heritage Books, 2017)

Duby, Steven J. – God in Himself: Scripture, Metaphysics, & the Task of Christian Theology (IVP Academic, 2019)

ed. Haines, David, Without Excuse (Davenant Press, 2020)

See the articles by B. J. Mauser, Nathan Greeley, J. T. Bridges, Andrew Payne, and others.

Anthology

Drennen, D.A. – A Modern Introduction to Metaphysics: Readings from Classical & Contemporary Sources (NY: Free Press, 1962) 765 pp. ToC

Quotes

1600’s

William Ames

Medulla theologica (Amsterdam: Janson, 1634), bk. 1, ch. 2, ‘On the Distribution of Theology’, section 6, pp. 4-5 trans. Charles Johnson This section has been omitted from most English translations (e.g. London, 1642).

“From the remains of these two parts (faith and observance), two theologies sprang forth among some philosophers: metaphysics, and ethics. For metaphysics is the faith of the Aristotelians, and ethics is their observance. Hence, both these disciplines present that which teaches the supreme good of man. This is known to all concerning ethics.

Moreover, concerning metaphysics, which they also call “theology,” this is what Suarez says, Disp. 1, Sect. 5, #43: “The blessedness of man consists in the most perfect act of metaphysics. It contemplates the supreme good and the last end of man simpliciter. Divine contemplation belongs to this science formally, or elicitively.” Therefore, when theology is rightly taught in these parts, their metaphysics and ethics disappears without hesitation, after brilliantly testifying to its distribution.”

Richard Baxter

The Nonconformists’ Plea for Peace, or an Account of their Judgment in Certain Things in which they are Misunderstood… (London, 1679), sect. 6, p. 97

“We must still repeat that the esse is before the scire, and the being of the case and truth, before the judging of it.”

On the Need for Metaphysics

Quote

2000’s

Edward Feser

The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism (St. Augustine’s Press, 2008), ch. 5, pp. 172-73

“And this distinction [between actuality and potentiality] is metaphysical, not scientific (in the modern sense of “scientific’”). That is to say, it is a description of reality that is more general and basic than any scientific theory, resting as it does on facts (about change) that science itself takes for granted.

Hence it is valid whatever the empirical scientific facts turn out to be; and (to repeat what was said earlier) while that doesn’t mean that it cannot be subjected to rational evaluation or criticism, such criticism can only come from some alternative metaphysical theory, not from empirical science…

Aristotelian metaphysical ideas are, as I keep saying and as will be established by the end of the next chapter, unavoidable, whether the early modern philosophers thought so or not…

the distinction I am making, between metaphysical ideas and scientific ones, is just an obvious one to make. As noted before, empirical science must take many things for granted, such as the existence of patterns of cause and effect. Thus, while it might be able to establish whether some particular causal relationship exists, it cannot possibly establish whether causation as such is real or not, given that its method presupposes its existence.

Nor, at the most general level and for the same reasons, can it tell us what causation per se is or what kinds of causation exist. And so on for notions like actuality, potentiality, substance, attribute, form, and so on. Empirical science of its very nature cannot give us the full story about these matters; but metaphysics just is the rational investigation of them. Hence metaphysics is obviously different from empirical science.”

On the Need for a Technical Language for & Distinct to Metaphysics

Quote

2000’s

Edward Feser

The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism (St. Augustine’s Press, 2008), ch. 5, p. 170-71

“…views like Ockham’s prefigured themes that would come to define modern philosophy, and modern civilization more generally. The idea that only particular individual things exist and share no universal natures in common…

Aristotelian metaphysics involves a number of complex distinctions which require for their expression an equally complex technical vocabulary; and this complexity only grew as Aquinas and other Aristotelian Scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages developed Aristotle’s views further. This is unfortunate for the student of philosophy, but unavoidable given that the real world just is, Aristotelians would say, as complex as the vocabulary needed to describe it.

But suppose that we interpreted this vocabulary in terms of a nominalist or conceptualist metaphysics, rather than a realist one. Then all those complicated technicalities would reflect, not objective reality, but only our subjective ideas or the way we decided to use words. The Scholastic philosophy that inherited this terminology would come to seem an exercise in mere wordplay and irrelevant hair-splitting, rather than a serious investigation of the real world.

And that is exactly what happened as views like Ockham’s started to proliferate within Scholasticism. The early modern philosophers who rejected Aristotle and his Scholastic successors as mere sophists…”

Metaphysics is the First Science

Quote

2000’s

Allan B. Wolter

Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), Intro, pp. 7-8

“Metaphysics is defined as the science of being qua [as] being…

Metaphysics can, therefore, be described as the first real speculative science. It is a science because it is a body of demonstrated truths about a single formal object… Insofar as it is a science, metaphysics differs from sacred theology because the latter is not a science in the strict Aristotelian sense for its principles are not evident but revealed.

Metaphysics is a real science, as is plain from its definition. For being signifies the same as thing or what actually exists or is at least capable of such existence. Therefore metaphysical notions are first intentions, or concepts that are predicated immediately of things themselves. So metaphysics differs from the logical sciences which deal with second intentions, that is, with concepts that are predicated immediately of other concepts or of beings of reason.

Metaphysics indeed is the first or supreme real science, and so differs from other less universal real things, as physics, cosmology, psychology; for it does not just consider one or other part of reality, as these sciences do, but with the totality of things. Therefore, by reason of its material object, metaphysics is equivalent to all the real sciences taken together. Further, it is first by reason of its formal object; for the other sciences consider real things in some narrower respect, as physics considers things as changeable, cosmology things as bodily, etc. But metaphysics considers them precisely as they are real. Hence other real sciences, as cosmology, philosophy of man, presuppose metaphysics and use its conclusions as their principles. But metaphysics does not use the conclusions of any other real science, physics or natural philosophy, as principles.

Metaphysics is a speculative and not practical science, because it does not tend toward any other operation but speculation. Hence it differs from ethics, which is practical.”

On the Certainty of Metaphysical Necessity

Qutoe

2000’s

Allan B. Wolter

Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), Intro, p. 12

“This way of proceeding [in metaphysics] from what is simply posterior, namely from real being as we experience it, namely as contingent, caused, transient, etc. to things that are necessarily required as conditions sine qua non of its existence, can be called a sort of metaphysical reduction. It is called ‘reduction’ because the mind is as it were led back from the data of immediate experience to the conditions and hidden causes on which they depend. ‘Metaphysical’ is added because this reduction seems to differ from the reduction that the natural sciences use.

For a reduction is found in these [sciences] too, namely to theories and hypotheses from which, as from conjectured conditions and causes, the effects that are empirically observed can follow. This method of the natural sciences, which is called hypothetico-deductive insofar as it regards the verification of theories, is also called ‘inventive induction’ insofar as the cultivators of the sciences create a certain theoretical law or explanation from their own mental fertility.

But none of their theories is so certain that no other theory or hypothesis can be thought up, and so all such theories, although they are often not far distant from at least a practical certainty, do not go beyond probability. In metaphysics, on the contrary, when once it is conceded, for example, that some finite being is not sufficient to itself for its existence but requires some explanation outside itself, then it follows that no other theoretical explanation can be found save in something non-finite.

Likewise, a caused being can be explained only by an uncaused being, a transient being by something permanent, a contingent being by something necessary, and so on through the other disjunctive attributes that are contradictorily opposed with respect to being. For although ‘caused being’ and ‘uncaused being’ are not contradictories (for there could be a third between them, namely ‘non-being’), nevertheless ‘caused’ and ‘uncaused’ are mutually contradictory in respect of the same subject, just as ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ are mutually contradictory in respect of the same man.

Hence to deny that all beings are caused is the same as to assert that some being is uncaused. And in this sense there is given by metaphysical reduction not just one theory among many possible explanations, as is the case with the natural sciences, but rather, once the necessity is conceded for some explanation of the existence of observed things in something other than themselves, metaphysical reduction gives, by virtue of the law of contradiction and excluded middle, only one possible theoretical solution.

And in this sense metaphysical conclusions exceed the probability found in the theories of the natural sciences. So the certitude that the metaphysician can have seems to be the highest that the human intellect can naturally achieve in any theoretical science about real [i.e. non-mental] things.”

That Metaphysics is more Foundational than Epistemology

See also Samuel Rutherford on ‘Possibilities & Hypotheticals’.

Quote

1600’s

Gisbert Voet

Disputation on the Ways of Knowing God, pt. 1 tr. Michael Lynch (1665)

“Among the particular theoretical first principles, I place first and formost: ‘God exists’;”

On First Principles

Order of

Articles
Quotes
Latin

Articles

1900’s

Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald

‘The Derivation of First Principles’ in ed. D.A. Drennen, A Modern Introduction to Metaphysics: Readings from Classical & Contemporary Sources (NY: Free Press, 1962), pp. 214-17; originally in Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1950), pp. 31-36

Garrigou-Lagrange was a Neo-Thomist. He here elucidates the first principles of metaphysics, and how they are known and derived in accord with the perspective of Aristotle and Aquinas.

20) ‘Intuition of First Principles… Principle of Identity’ in God: his Existence & his Nature, vol. 1 (B. Herder: 1945), pp. 156-63

Geisler, Norman

‘First Principles’ in The Big Book on Apologetics

A concise summary.

ch. 6, ‘The First Principles of Knowledge’ in Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal (Bastion Books, 2013; 2022)

See also Geisler’s audio lectures on the topic.

Quotes

Order of

Augustine
Bonaventure
P. Voet
G. Voet
Wolter

400’s

Augustine

City of God, bk. 11, ch. 26 in NPNF1 2.220

“For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it. Moreover, in these three things no true-seeming illusion disturbs us; for we do not come into contact with these by some bodily sense, as we perceive the things outside of us—colors, e.g., by seeing, sounds by hearing, smells by smelling, tastes by tasting, hard and soft objects by touching—of all which sensible objects it is the images resembling them, but not themselves which we perceive in the mind and hold in the memory, and which excite us to desire the objects. But, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am, and that I know and delight in this.

In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, ‘What if you are deceived?’ For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if l am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know.

And when I love these two things, I add to them a certain third thing, namely, my love, which is of equal moment. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; though even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. For how could I justly be blamed and prohibited from loving false things, if it were false that I loved them? But, since they are true and real, who doubts that when they are loved, the love of them is itself true and real?

Further, as there is no one who does not wish to be happy, so there is no one who does not wish to be. For how can he be happy, if he is nothing?”

1200’s

Bonaventure

About

In the quote below Bonaventure is referring to God. Cameron Lugo:

“The quaestio in which this quote appears is ‘whether the divine being is so true that it cannot be thought not to be.’ Bonaventure believes that a condition for the possibility of any intellectual cognition is knowledge of divine esse [being], which is first in the order of concepts. Bonaventure rehearses the below argument not in his own voice, and, in his respondeo, he distinguishes senses in which it is impossible to think that the first truth does not exist.”

In Sententiarum 2.8.1.1.2 (d. 1274; Quaracchi 1:153)

“Our intellect understands nothing except in virtue of the first light and truth, so every act of the intellect involved in thinking that something does not exist obtains in virtue of the first light. But it is impossible to think in virtue of the first light, that the first light or truth does not exist. Therefore, it is in no way possible to think that the first truth does not exist.”

1600’s

Paul Voet

First Philosophy Reformed tr. by AI by Onku (Utrecht: Johann Waesberg, 1657), ch. 2, sect. 2

“2 …but the metaphysician proves the principles of the inferior sciences in as much as if those principles are obstinately denied by anyone, he explains their terms, which having been declared and perceived by the adversary, he cannot but assent to the truth of the proposed principles, unless he be completely stripped of reason in the manner of a brute. For nothing conduces more to the confirmation of principles than the perception of the same: and nothing more helps the intellect, that it perceive principles than the understanding of the terms from which the principles are composed.

Furthermore, he proves those principles a posteriori [from those things that follow], and indeed by leading the adversary through the impossible, in as much as unless he acknowledge the truth of the principles it will be necessary for him to have acknowledged the greatest absurdity resulting from the denied principles.

Thus to one denying that the whole is greater than its part, it will be explained what part, what whole. If he be not yet sufficiently moved, it will be inferred from that negation, the acception of the terms having been presupposed according to the explained way, that the whole would not be whole, nor would the part be part; and thus the same would be and not be at the same time. Which, as most absurd, will not be to be admitted.

5. …All principles, of whatever genus they be, can be called first; and in what way first, in that way also they are indemonstrable. They are therefore first in as much as they do not recognize others through which they are demonstrated a priori [from things prior]. Then they are first in as much as in that science of which they are principles, they do not recognize others prior to themselves through which they are demonstrated. But what principles in their science are first can still in the order of another science be posterior and thus demonstrable, at least a posteriori, if not also a priori.”

Gisbert Voet

Disputation on the Ways of Knowing God, pt. 1 tr. Michael Lynch (1665)

“Among the particular theoretical first principles, I place first and formost: ‘God exists’;”
…

“5. …And certainly, the nature of first principles requires that they not be proven, but taken for granted.

6. That habit or natural intellectual power (…since the natural power of the intellect itself, both practical and speculative, suffices [for the innate knowledge of God]; which is to establish its necessity with Thomas Aquinas in his 1st book of the Sentences, dist. 21, ad 1) comprehends the truth of principles immediately, without reasoning or proof, by a kind of simple intuition. It grasps partly theoretical principles and partly practical ones. Among the particular theoretical first principles, I place first and formost: ‘God exists’; and among the practical first principles, first and foremost: ‘God ought to be worshipped.'”

Disputation on the Ways of Knowing God, pt. 3 tr. Michael Lynch (1665)

“I do not think he [the Romanist Leiden philosopher, David Stuart] wanted to stop our theologians, whether his or ours, from dealing with any questions that can be demonstrated not just from God’s Word, the first principle, but also from the light of nature and right reason, the second principle…

Our [reformed] theologians should not be excluded from dealing with these same questions, since they never set aside the sciences and arts, especially logic and metaphysics, which they intensely studied in school and at home. Nor do they, above the Papists, become dull to the use of reason and the knowledge of first philosophy out of reverence for and study of the Scriptures.”

Richard Baxter

Catholic Theology (London: White, 1675), sect. 1, ‘Of our Knowledge of God as here Attainable’, p. 1, margin note

“Bradwardine, bk. 1, ch. 11, p. 198. The first, necessary, incomplex principle is God, and the first, complex [necessary principle] simply is of God: Deus est [God is], etc. But yet it is not to us the primum cognitum [first thing known].”

2000’s

Allan B. Wolter

Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), Intro, p. 9

“The Starting Point: Every science takes its beginning from some principle or principles that are both evident and necessarily true (Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora
1.2). The given datum from which such principles are drawn by the metaphysician is the fact or experience of something real. Such experience is inseparable from the
conscious life of man, for whether we think or will or feel or experience some motion of spirit, we are always conscious that our experience is a fact or something
real.

This fact of experience is expressed in this proposition: ‘Something is’.

This very evident proposition, although it is in itself a necessary one (as will be shown later), is yet a proposition that for us is purely contingent. Hence, in order to preserve the condition of Aristotelian science that the principles be necessary, we can infer something necessary from the contingent proposition ‘something is’,
namely the proposition that ‘the existence of something is possible’ or that ‘there is no repugnance between something and existence’. For as Scotus well observes
(Lectura 1),

“I say that although things other than God are in fact contingent in respect of actual being, they are not so in respect of potential being. So things that are contingent with respect to actual existence are necessary with respect to possible existence, as that although it is contingent that man exists yet that his existence is possible is necessary.”

Likewise from the other givens of experience we can infer conclusions that are both evident (evident, that is, from principles about their inherence) and necessary, and we can use these givens as principles in constructing our metaphysical science, as for example the principles that ‘something that is not eternal is possible’, ‘something that is contingent, transient, changeable etc. is possible’.”

Latin Book

1600’s

Voet, Paul – Prime Philosophy Reformed (Utrecht: Waesberg, 1657) 655 pp. ToC

Paul Voet (1619-1667) was the son of Gisbert Voet and a professor of metaphysics, logic and law at Utrecht.

Arguments for Realism that universals, abstract objects and forms are real apart from the human mind

See also ‘On the Divine Ideas’.

Articles

Feser, Edward

’10 Arguments for Realism’ in The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism (St. Augustine’s Press, 2008), ch. 2, pp. 42-49

Feser, a Roman catholic and a professor of philosophy, is an analytical Thomist. These ten arguments are resembled in the ten below, but are slightly different treatments.

’10 Arguments for Realism’ in Five Proofs of the Existence of God (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2017), ch. 3, ‘The Augustinian Proof’

Quote

1600’s

Gisbert Voetius

‘On the Natures of Things & Substantial Forms’, pp. 369-76 in Select Theological Disputations, vol. 1, pt. 2 tr. by AI by Onku (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberg, 1648), ‘On Creation’, pt. 8 Latin

“1. We do not introduce these things to the students so that they will all now immediately necessarily believe in forms with their appendices, or contend tooth and nail for them, but so that they may at least for a time abstain from a peremptory judgment and its execution, by which the miserable and innocent beings are cast down from their ancient possession, until they have learned thoroughly, if not most accurately, at least moderately the philosophy of the schools, specifically logic, metaphysics, physics and these few notes which we subjoin, having been solidly determined, and they see that they are satisfied in them.

However they will finally judge, we will not have wasted our labor if in the meantime we will have recalled them from a fierce contempt and flight of the philosophical study, moreover from an idiotic rustic and proud ignorance, so that at least it could sometime be said concerning those dissenting elsewhere what is boasted among the Arabs: A wise man when he errs, errs with learned error.

Moreover our notes are threefold: 1. Certain prejudgments which I [approvingly] suggest to the disputants. 2. Reasons for forms, which are to be clearly solved. 3. Reasons against forms and for those vicarious accidents which certain more recent [mechanical] authors wish to be substituted for forms, which forms and their doubts, with their principles and consequences, are fittingly to be defended.

2. The notes of the first kind are:

I. Let them consider whether they satisfy themselves in the reconciliation of this opinion [of forms] with sacred scripture. For it indeed harmonizes with truth: and Christian philosophers will profess learned ignorance a thousand times rather than that they bring even the least appearance of prejudice to divine truth. See Gen. 1:11, 21-22, 24-25; Prov. 30:24-27, where we think permanent natures, faculties and distinct species of things are implied.

II. It is to be seen whether from the denying opinion there would be at least an easier lapse than from the affirming into doubt. [Put the question forth:] Whether there are any substantial forms which actuate the body of man and constitute one composite with it? But if someone denies this, and substitutes the krasin of Galen, or a particle of divine breath or soul of the world, or the universal intellect of Averroes, or the mind of Plato, thrust into the workshop of the body as a genial pipor and bound to it, as Prometheus the Caucasian, if someone I say substitutes such a thing, by what reasons would you more successfully and safely rebut him than [those by which] the assertors of forms [do].

III. It is to be seen how with this opinion standing the distinction between the being of substance and of accident can be conveniently explained and defended. For there would be, according to them, no substantial difference between a wolf, a sheep, a whale, an elephant, a serpent, a stone, a monk’s hood, aconite, wheat, the sun, the moon, the earth; add also a clock, the wooden Trojan horse, the bronze bull of Phalaris, the flying dove of Archytas, the bronze head of Pope Sylvester, the speaking statue of Albertus Magnus, a house, a chair, a garment etc.

But perhaps they would retort that those substances differ essentially through those five accidents motion, rest, position, figure and quantity.

I respond: Granting this to be so (about which we do not now dispute), the difficulty is nevertheless not removed by this escape. It nevertheless remains [on this view] that substances are distinguished from substances in no other way than accidents from substances and accidents among themselves, for both the former and the latter are distinguished by accidents.

IV. It is to be seen whether from here there is not an easier lapse, when someone is pressed by reasons and consequences into this absurd [occasionalist] opinion: ‘Secondary causes endowed with their own causality are not given, but only the first and universal cause acts in the presence and disposition of secondary causes.’ See the absurdity of this opinion shown by the Scholastics and more recent metaphysicians and theologians in the topic on Providence, on the concourse of God with creatures. Let the consequences [of their position], by which they could be pressed, be these:

1. That the concourse of God is not given, nor the motion of the first mover accommodated to the natures and properties of secondary causes, whether they are necessary or contingent.

2. That there is not in created substances an intrinsic mover and a substantial principle of internal and proper motion: for the disposition of the mobile thing to motion from quantity, figure, position is not the activity or causality of the efficient cause, but only a required condition, and a cause sine qua non (‘without which nothing’).

3. Consequently, since no mobile thing can move itself in potency to act or determine itself to motion, it remains that some external mover is to be sought which may lead the potency into act. But what will they give here? The Platonic-Virgilian soul of the world, or intelligences, or God, or atoms, or celestial globules. Here something will have to be said [by them].

V. It is to be seen lest the negation of proper qualities, which internally emanate from the form and substance of a thing (the negation of which follows the negation of forms, just as one error drags another), drive us into these absurdities:

1. That created substances are the immediate principle of their own operation, since there are no active qualities by which substances operate as a means: which see shaken out by the metaphysicians and theologians when they treat of the simplicity of God and of the distinction of the divine attributes.

2. That there are no qualities altogether, as neither of the second, or third, so also not of the first species; that is, there are no habits, against the common school of philosophers and theologians. I would like to see how those who deny natural faculties or powers will vindicate habits against the atheists, skeptics and infidels (the necessity of which Scripture and reason persuades), lest they be likewise shut up in that pentagon-workshop of motion, rest, quantity, position and figure.

VI. From this opinion it follows that no definitions of substances are given, since there are no forms or proper first and internal essentials from which the difference can be taken. How this may savor to the sons of the logicians of whatever sect, and to all acroamatic minds, and to the professors of whatever disciplines, they themselves will see.

VII. This absurdity also follows: That all created substances, even man himself (and why not angels and separate souls?), are beings per accidens [through accident], collective and aggregate: but not essences or natures, one per se [through itself]. So that no essence seems to be per se, except perhaps atoms, or ethereal globules, or insensible particles, or Platonic ideas (which he called αυτοάνθρωπον, αυτοίππον, etc.) or chimeras buzzing in the void, etc. But that man ought to be called a being and one per se, we will teach below.

VIII. It would follow that there are no proper and intrinsic faculties, nor are their principles in animals of another kind than in automata or Daedalean statues; and consequently the works of God and nature produced through creation or generation are essentially and univocally the same with works of art: which how it may agree well enough with Ps. 104:29; 7:14-15; Num. 16:22; 27:16; Heb. 11:9-10; Hab. 2:19, I confess I do not see the knot.

IX. It would follow that there is no generation or corruption of natural things. But more on this in Thesis 4 [below].

X. Since efficiency and motion, which is usually attributed to forms and their active qualities, is attributed to quantity and figure, it is to be seen lest young men at some time imprudently admit through consequence that magical axiom rejected by all Christian theology and philosophy: “There is some efficacy of quantity and figure, and it either per se or with others things concurs as an active principle of transmutation.”

XI. This doubt is to be solved: How is it not a process to infinity, or a circular demonstration nearly similar to the demonstration which that chanted-off black faith of the Papists pretends? So it may amount to the same as to that: Why is the earth moved ex. gr. R.? Because its site, position, figure so move it. And why do they so move, and whence is this? whether from atoms, or from ethereal globules etc. But if you say this, I ask again, the world of atoms, or globules, how is it moved, and why? You bear so far and it returns to the [same] way.

XII. The reproach of this [mechanical] opinion, as if it is omniscient, is to be removed: “That it [the theory of forms] explains or solidly demonstrates much less than the opposite [mechanical] opinion, indeed nothing in the secrets of nature.” In general indeed and indefinitely it says that natural effects are from that five-fold reason of accidents which any dancers could be taught in the space of one or another little hour: but it explains or proves neither in species nor in an individual determinately about celestial things and motions, about those which are in the bowels of the earth, in the depth of the sea, in the internal motions of bodies, about those, I say, which have thus far lain hidden from other investigators of nature. But more on this in Thesis 4 following.

3. The reasons which are usually brought forward by the assertors of forms must first be thoroughly known, then clearly and solidly solved. To this end some one of the more recent physical or metaphysical disputators should be read accurately by the juniors, such as [Francis] Suarez, [Benedict] Pererius, [Jacob] Revius, [Francisco de] Toledo, the [Jesuit] Conimbricenses, the [Spanish] Complutenses [at Alcala], [Rodrigo de] Arriaga, [Francisco de] Mendoza, etc. Out of all these Suarez most fully and most subtly pleads this cause. For the present we will defend these three reasons:

The first reason is taken from the proper actions of natural things, which emanate each from their distinct perfections and qualities: Moreover those perfections perfect some nature and substance. Hence it is inferred that in any composite there is given one principle and root of all powers and operations, which is not matter (which is common), nor accidents, which cannot be the ultimate principle; therefore it remains that it is nothing other than the form.

The second reason: There is given some first root and first concept of each entity, e.g. of humanity, equinity, etc. which constitutes the thing in its proper being and distinguishes it essentially from others. But that is not matter, since it is common, nor any accidents, because they cannot compose or constitute a substance and give entity to it: Therefore it is that which we call form, eido, tò** en eina* entelekeian, ‘I hold the perfected nature according to [Greek]’ (since it actuates and informs matter, and with it constitutes the composite).

The third reason: We gather this from substantial corruption. The essence of man, horse, dog, etc. is taken away [in death], so that according to Scripture and natural reason they are said not to be. But here matter has not ceased to be, since it is ungenerable and incorruptible: therefore form [exists], by which it happens that [without it] the composite is dissolved, and becomes a non-being, namely, this thing, e.g. horse, dog, etc. But if someone says that through destruction only a change of accidents happens, we retort: then a dead man, lion, dog, etc. differs accidentally and not substantially from a living one, no more than a sick Socrates differs from a healthy one, a sitting one from a standing one, a learned one from an unlearned one, an old man from a boy. We will dissolve other objections which [Sebastian] Basson [d. 1621, an anti-Aristotelian], bk. 3, opposes in the presence of the disputation.

4. The reasons which are usually brought forward against forms must be demonstrated philosophically in such a way that they compel the intellect desirous of truth and make it rest. That this has by no means been done thus far we will now defend according to our ability:

I. The reason, and indeed the chief and Achillean one [of opponents] is: Because the origin, or mode of origin of forms cannot be explained or so demonstrated that no difficulty remains.

I respond: I do not repeat our response to the major of this argument and its consequence, which we intimated in the corollary, but I again take it up to be defended, with this caution added: If the more imprudent young men do not cease to wander on that string and support the overthrow and mockery of the whole sound and sober philosophy with such a ruinous and rotten prop, they are to be driven at last through solid consequences to that point that they become either beasts or atheists. But see our corollary.

Moreover that this was the Achillean argument of the denying opinion is clear from Gorlaeus, Exercit. 14, p. 267 and Basson, bk. 1, intent. 3-4, where having premised this argument, he concludes (p. 159, line 3, p. 161 compared with the index under the word ‘form’) that there are no substantive forms and the ancients could have easily shown in what way, from which and out of which forms are made, for they said that the soul and form of each thing is an instrument and consists in a certain composition and proportion of the parts of the thing.

Furthermore on the difficulties and manifold disquisition of the philosophers, so that they may explain the mode of origin of forms, consult besides Basson, bk. 3, loc. cit., especially Sennert, Hypomnem. physicor. 1. ch. 3; Suarez, disp. metaph. 15.

II. The second reason is that which Gorlaeus intimates: That beings are not to be multiplied without necessity, when the effects of natural things can be sufficiently explained through other principles and reduced to them. But they do not explain those principles in one way. For the ancients, whom Basson praises, and Aristotle refutes l. 2. Axpo, explain it otherwise, the more recent authors otherwise: although very many opinions agree in some one common thing, which being denied or refuted, they themselves also fall.

We will not now dig up the rancid and long exploded opinions of both the ancients and the more recent Paracelsists, Hermetics (which Dornavius has tried in vain to reconcile with the sacred Scriptures), but we only ask that it be demonstrated: that which emerged today or yesterday [the mechanical philosophy], stating that all things are derived from quantity, figure, site or position, motion and rest, and that all the secrets of nature can be best explained and demonstrated through them; which we deny. These reasons are brought forward:

First, as a clock is moved by the mere disposition of its parts, through quantity, figure, etc. so also natural things: But the former is true; Therefore also the latter.

We deny the major and the minor. To the proof of the minor and other instances besides we say that a clock well disposed and fitted nevertheless is not actually moved without an external mover, namely the hand of a man, or its vicar, the depression and traction of a weight: in the way a harpsichord, lyre or cither optimally disposed and fitted for song does not actually sing without an external moving accident, namely the hand of the artist, as also mills optimally disposed do not actually grind without the external impulse or traction of water, wind, horse or ass, etc.

We add now that hydraulic organs or harpsichords do not actually sound without the motion or pulse of water in subterranean tubes; and yet that water cannot be said to be a part of the organ, much less its internal mover.

The second reason: Because the heart of an animal is moved by the mere disposition of the parts R. it is moved by the soul or informing form, by means of qualities as quo principles, and other instruments required for animal motion.

Instance: but the motion of the heart can be diminished, nay even completely cease or be taken away, even with the animal living [or moving for a time]: therefore it is not from the soul. For if indeed the heart moving were from the soul, assuredly with that soul present [in the body], the motion would be present.

I respond: The consequence of the major is denied. It is a reasoning from the rational soul, and yet it is absent from the infant recently born, although the rational soul is not absent. Thus granted that the motion of the heart ceases in a living animal, nevertheless it does not follow from that that the soul or form is not the principle of that motion. For the fact that the motion is either diminished or ceases, that is from the organs and from the impeded faculty.

Instance 2: If that form were the principle of motion, and used qualities and instruments for it, then it would follow that that form uses reason or ratiocination.

I respond: The consequence is denied, because forms operate through natural faculties without ratiocination; thus animals by natural instinct, nay even vegetables, flee harmful things and pursue what is agreeable to them; thus e.g. the swallow without the use of reason, with applied celandine, heals the eyes of its chicks; and our stomach, liver, etc. concoct, nor are they subject to the direction of reason.

We add that a stone falls downward, stars rise, finally all natural things perform their motions without reasons, for thus they have been created by God and tend to their ends according to the faculties impressed on them, just as an arrow to the target. See the Metaphysicians disputing on the final cause.

To the minor of the syllogism it is responded: Concerning the diminution of the motion of the heart it is conceded that it happens, but then there is no species of consequence, since a diminished motion is also [by degree] a motion. A total cessation of motion is not conceded, but this is deferred to the experience of physicians. But who has experienced this, is not clear. And what if someone at some time perceives none of its motion extrinsically; for that reason it must not be said that there is no motion within or without. For it can easily be retorted that the motion is insensible, as some state concerning the systole in the pulse.

And indeed these reasons have been aired thus far. That the same may be urged so much the better anew, and others may hereafter be added, we have written this appendix.

5. In place of a consectary, we add something about all hidden [or obscure] qualities: That the opinion of philosophers and physicians is not to be rashly rejected:

I. Because it agrees better with learned ignorance (about which we will sometime, God willing, treat professionally): than the opposite opinion, which seems to breathe and promise pansophy [complete wisdom], and indeed without difficulty, which cannot fail to be suspect. See meanwhile the sayings of Scripture Job 38-39; 26; 42; Eccl. 1; Ps. 29.

II. Because the hidden qualities, which sagacious investigators of nature have objected to them to be explained, have not yet been explained by them. See I pray Sennert on the consensus of chemists with Aristotle, ch. 8, especially Hypomnem Phys. 2. And if they try to explain any (which however rarely happens), they bring forward inept and ridiculous reasons, or deny those things which have even been confirmed by experience, as the most erudite Sennert speaks of in the same place. But although they are not properly of our forum, yet because they spread the train of consequences too much to the exploding of the whole philosophy, we will now for our capacity and for the sake of exercise defend that poisons, hydrophobia, the contagion of plague, nay not even the magnet can be explained by them through motion, rest, position, quantity and figure.

Problem: Why are certain men so affected [with allergies] by the presence of cats (which they themselves are unaware of), that they almost suffer syncope, others, if they unknowingly eat a particle of cheese [with unseen mold], are so moved that from it they sometimes contract a serious and dangerous disease for themselves?
…

7. In Corollary 1 I had said that the opinion of Taurellus and Gorlaeus about man as a being per accidens stumbles in many ways. The argument by which they are moved is such. Two beings or complete substances make one per accidens and not per se: but the body and soul of man are two complete substances. Therefore.

I respond: The major is not universally true; and the minor is denied. That in the presence of the disputation itself it may be aired to many and to the end, we now cursorily indicate these hypotheses:

1. That man is a species of substance and animal created into one essence or nature from soul and body, we think is implied in Gen. 3:7, 1 Cor. 15:45, compared with Gen. 1:26-27.

II. Christ-Theanthropos [God-man] (in whom there are two natures or complete substances) is one per se and not per accidens: for the union of natures was made into one suppositum, [Greek]. See the theologians on the person of Christ: Much more therefore substantially and per se the union was made between the soul and body of man, which indeed are not so far distant, nor are they such complete substances as divinity and humanity.

III. The true human nature of Christ would not be more one substance through itself than in the death of the same
…
[These articles are about Christ, man, the soul and angels]
…

IX. This opinion even impinges on many metaphysical dogmas…

1. Concerning being, essence and existence, nature and suppositum.

2. Concerning one, composition by union, whole, and concerning per se and per accidens.

3. Concerning principles and causes, specifically concerning univocal and equivocal cause, concerning internal and external principle, concerning informing and assisting form.

4. Concerning the distinction between substantial and accidental, concerning the distinction of a natural thing from an artificial one, concerning the distinction of a monster (which as such is a being per accidens) from human nature duly constituted according to the laws of nature.

5. That man is not a substance nor does he directly pertain to the predication of substance: but only indirectly, and per accidens is referred to it, since he is a being per accidens and collective.

6. That one man is no more one per se, than an army, a city, etc. where there are many men collectively.

7. That consequently man cannot be defined by an essential and perfect definition.

8. That the matter and form of a composite are properly matter, and its form is the union, that is an accident, or pure mode, namely a relation. See Gorlaeus, Exercit. 14, p. 266.

9. That the union of the human soul with its body is to be sought in some mere accident from those five, and indeed in position or posture: as some seem to concede.

10. That the body is not the nature of man, but only his instrument, through which the soul existing in the body operates.

…
9. In place of an epimeter, let these notes be about the invention, constitution and augmentation of the sciences:

I. Not to want to use and enjoy things well invented and well constituted, but to want to invent them anew per se or other things in their place is to multiply beings without necessity, and to do injury to talent and erudition: since art is long, life is short, experience is fallacious.

II. Students in the academic course are not so much occupied with observations and experiences as with the perception and impression of things invented: And thus with Aristotle, Metaph. 1. ch. 1. I would prefer a learned and non-expert student to an unlearned and expert one. If however experience [Greek] can be joined to doctrine [Greek] (which happens here), I would certainly judge that academy most happy.

III. Fallacious and useless is that method of inventing and constituting the sciences, so he:

1. unlearns, forgets, rejects and as it were abjures all universal experiences, all inventions, all dogmas examined and proven through so many ages by the whole chorus of the wise, through new and repeated experiences, through the most subtle reciprocations of arguments: with the hope in course of a new and better philosophy to be invented by himself or others.

2. Perpetually adheres to one or another experience about one thing or about one natural effect of one thing, and sells such a tiny particle for genuine philosophy: the whole philosophy and common experience, at least by far more frequent than his own and indeed about all or most natural things, beening held in contempt.

3. Often builds such unhappy consequences upon that narrow experience and is compelled to fabricate uncertain, slippery, insufficiently proven principles, axioms, definitions and demonstrations from it, or to desert security.”

Aristotelian, Thomistic, Scholastic & Neo-Thomist Metaphysics

Articles

Feser, Edward – ch. 2, ‘Metaphysics’ in Aquinas: a Beginner’s Guide (Oneworld, 2009), pp. 16-58

Lowe, E.J. – ch. 10, ‘Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics: a Brief Exposition & Defense’ in ed. Edward Feser, Aristotle on Method & Metaphysics (Palgrave, 2013), pp. 196-205

Galluzzo, Gabriele – ‘Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics [of Aristotle]’ in A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 43 (Brill, 2014), pp. 209-54

Books

Coffey, P. – Ontology, or the Theory of Being: an Introduction to General Metaphysics (Longmans, 1914) 450 pp. ToC

Preface: “…an English text-book on General Metaphysics from the Scholastic standpoint… the Moderate Realism of Aristotle and the Schoolmen is assumed throughout.

…few if any serious attempts have yet been made to transpose these [historical, scholastic, metaphysical] questions from their medieval setting into the language and context of contemporary philosophy. Perhaps not a single one of these problems is really and in substance alien to present-day speculations. The author has endeavored, by his treatment of such characteristically ‘medieval’ discussions as those on Potentia [Power] and Actus [Act], Essence and Existence… to show that the issues involved are in every instance as fully and keenly debated–in an altered setting and a new terminology–by recent and living philosophers of every school of thought as they were by St. Thomas and his contemporaries in the golden age of medieval scholasticism.”

Grenier, Henri – Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 2 (Metaphysics) 2nd impression (Charlottetown, Canada: St. Dunstan’s University, 1948-50)

Anderson, James F. – An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas: Texts Selected & Translated… (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953) 150 pp. ToC

Gardeil, H. D. – Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 4 (Metaphysics) trans. John A. Otto (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1967) 345 pp. ToC

The second half of the book contains organized, topical selections from Thomas’s writings.

Doig, James C. – Aquinas on Metaphysics: a Historico-Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972) 425 pp. ToC

Oderberg, David

Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000)

Oderberg is an analytical Thomist.

“for an outstanding full-length defense [of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics]” – Edward Feser

Real Essentialism (Routledge, 2007)

ed. Feser, Edward – Aristotle on Method & Metaphysics (Palgrave, 2013) ToC

Feser, Edward – Scholastic Metaphysics Buy (Editiones Scholasticae, 2014) 290 pp. ToC

Here is a review of Feser’s book by Andrew Fulford at Calvinist International.

Bibliography

Olivero, Mark – ‘Moderate Realism & Christian Theology, with a Beginner’s Guide to Thomistic Thinking, Compiled by Mark Olivero’ (2021) 3 pp. 10 steps

Olivero is reformed.

On Franciscus Suarez

Intro

Suarez (1548–1617) was a Spanish Jesuit priest, philosopher and theologian, one of the leading figures of the School of Salamanca movement, and is generally regarded among the greatest scholastic, metaphysicians after Thomas Aquinas.

William Ames below has a short work broadsiding Suarez; on the other-hand, Jacob Revius reissued Suarez’s main work on the topic, his Metaphysical Disputations, mostly approvingly, with his own continual comments and corrections (or purgations). Rutherford, in his Latin works, often disputes against Suarez where the matters touch on theology and theological paradigms, that is, where philosophy and theology meet.

Select Secondary Works

eds. Salas, Victor M. & Robert L. Fastiggi – A Companion to Francisco Suarez (Brill, 1999) 385 pp. ToC

Ch. 9 is on ‘Suarez’s Influence on Protestant Scholasticism: the Cases of Hollaz [Lutheran] & Turretin’.

Interpreting Suarez: Critical Essays Buy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012) 228 pp.

Daniel Heider – Aristotelian Subjectivism: Francisco Suárez’s Philosophy of Perception in Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, #28 Buy (Springer, 2021) 315 pp.

Translations of Suarez

A Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics… trans. John P. Doyle (Marquette Univ. Press, 1950) 420 pp. ToC

The Metaphysical Disputations

On Various Kinds of Distinctions trans. Cyril Vollert Buy (Marquette Univ. Press, 1947)

Metaphysical Disputation I: On the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics in Early Modern Catholic Sources Buy (Catholic University of America Press, 2021) 464 pp.

Francis Suarez on Individuation: Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity & its Principle trans. Jorge J.E. Garcia in Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation Buy (Marquette Univ. Press, 1982) 304 pp.

Metaphysics of Good & Evil According to Suarez: Metaphysical Disputations X & XI & Selected Passages from Disputation XXIII & Other Works (Analytica) Buy (Philosophia Verlag, 1989) 294 pp.

On the Formal Cause of Substance: Metaphysical Disputation XV in Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation Buy (Marquette Univ. Press, 2000)

On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18 & 19 trans. Alfred Freddoso in Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy Series Buy (Yale Univ. Press, 1994) 448 pp.

On Creation Conservation & Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20-22 trans. A.J. Freddoso Buy (St. Augustines Press, 2002) 368 pp.

The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God: Metaphysical Disputations 28-29 Buy (St. Augustine Press, 2004) 240 pp.

On Real Relation: Disputatio Metaphysica XLVII: a Translation from the Latin, with an Introduction & Notes trans. John P. Doyle in Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation Buy (Marquette Univ. Press, 2006) 431 pp.

Francis Suarez on Beings of Reason, Metaphysical Disputation LIV in Medieval Philosophical Texts in Translation Buy (Marquette Univ. Press, 1994) 170 pp.

On Muslim Metaphysics

In Middle Ages

On Avicenna

De Haan, Daniel D. – Necessary Existence & the Doctrine of Being in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing in Investigating Medieval Philosophy, vol. 15 Pre (Brill, 2020)

Zamboni, Francesco Omar – At the Roots of Causality: Ontology & Aetiology from Avicenna to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in Islamic Philosophy, Theology & Science. Texts & Studies, vol. 124 Pre (Brill, 2024)

After Avicenna

Adamson, Peter & Fedor Benevich – The Heirs of Avicenna: Philosophy in the Islamic East, 12-13th Centuries: Metaphysics & Theology in Islamic Intellectual History, vol. 12.1 (Brill, 2024)

Shihadeh, Ayman – Doubts on Avicenna: A Study & Edition of Sharaf al-Dīn al-Masʿūdī’s Commentary on the Ishārāt in Islamic Philosophy, Theology & Science: Texts & Studies, vol. 95 (Brill, 2016)

Lala, Ismail – Knowing God: Ibn ʿArabī & ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī’s Metaphysics of the Divine in Islamic Philosophy, Theology & Science: Texts & Studies, vol. 109 Pre (Brill, 2020)

Historical

Aristotle through the Middle Ages

Bradshaw, David – Aristotle East & West: Metaphysics & the Division of Christendom Pre Buy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004)

“This book traces the development [of] thought about God and the relationship between God’s being and activity from Aristotle, through the pagan Neoplatonists, to thinkers such as Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas (in the West) and Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas (in the East). The result is a comparative history of philosophical thought in the two halves of Christendom, providing a philosophical backdrop to the schism between the Eastern and Western churches.”

eds. Galluzzo, Gabriele & Fabrizio Amerini – A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition, vol. 43 (Brill, 2014) 665 pp. ToC

On the Post-Reformation

On the Reformed

Muller, Richard – 3. ‘Supernatural Theology, Natural Theology, & Metaphysics–Relation & Distinction in Reformed Thought in the Era of Orthodoxy’ in A. ‘Knowledge of God & the Divine Incomprehensibility’ in PRRD, vol. 3, pp. 167-70

On Ramus

Articles

Johnson, Charles – (2021) at Reformed Theology Delatinized

‘Understanding Ramus (1): General Remarks on Metaphysics’ 6 paragraphs

‘Understanding Ramus (2): Aristotle’s Biggest Error’ 23 paragraphs

On Lutheranism

Haga, Joar – Was there a Lutheran Metaphysics?: The Interpretation of Communicatio Idiomatum in Early Modern Lutheranism Pre (V&R, 2012) 295 pp. ToC

Latin Articles

1600’s

Ames, William – A Theological Disputation Against Metaphysics (Leiden, 1632) 18 pp. 19 theses

Ames (who was a Ramist) himself used metaphysical categories and distinctions. This work is a broadside against the abuse and subtleties of metaphysics. He frequently counters the Romanist Suarez’s metaphysical teachings.

Geiger, Hans Rudolf – Miscellaneous Physical-Metaphysical Questions (Zurich, 1654) 27 pp.

Geiger (d. 1662) was a reformed professor of physics at Zurich.

Lavater, Johann – A Philosophical Dissertatiom on Metaphysics, its Nature, the Distinction of it from other Discipines, its Necessity & its Utility (Zurich, 1677) 39 pp.

Lavater (1624-1695) was a reformed professor of rhetoric and philosophy at Zurich.

Latin Books

Order of Authors

Medieval Church

John of Damascus
Bradwardine

1500’s

Goclenius
Riolan

1600’s

Alsted
Keckermann
Baron
Combach
Jacchaeus
Revius
Burgersdijck
Maccovius
Rutherford
P. Voet
Heereboord
Greydanus
Grebenitz

Medieval Church

700’s

John of Damascus – Philosophical Chapters in his work on Orthodoxy

1300’s

Bradwardine, Thomas – Of the Cause of God, Against the Pelagians, & on the Power of Causes, to those of Merton [College in Oxford], in 3 Books… (London, 1618) ToC

Bradwardine (c.1290-1349) was an English clerical scholar and theologian, known as Doctor Profundus. He was a favorite of Rutherford. For an English survey of this book, see the section by Heiko A. Oberman, ‘Thomas Bradwardine: The Cause of God Against the Pelagians’ in Forerunners of the Reformation… (1966), and the book by Gordon Leff, Bradwardine & the Pelagians in Cambrdge Studies in Medieval Life & Thought, New Series, vol. 5 (rep. 2008; Cambridge, 1957).

“…famous… for his… vigorous attack on what he perceived as a revival of Pelagianism in Ockham’s thought regarding divine foreknowledge and future contingents… Bradwardine became interested in formal theology when investigating Ockham’s account of how God knows created actions as contingencies. His De causa Dei is a compendious refutation of every imaginable species of reasoning that denies God certain, necessary knowledge of all created action, representing the high watermark of Augustinian determinism in pre-Reformation western theology.” – Stephen E. Lahey

Table of Contents

Prefatory Epistle
Book 1

Ch. 1, First is premitted two suppositions, the first of which is that God is the highest perfection and the highest good, so that nothing else is able to be more perfect or better. The second is, Nothing infinite has proceeded into entities, but is in whatever genus, the first one. 1

Corollaries

1. It has a moral corollary containing 40 parts, contra 40 errors, of which the first is against the Protogorean doubt that God is. 3
2. Contra Diagorus and those who foolishly deny that God is 3
3. Contra the those who doubt or deny that God really, equivelently or supereminently has all virtue… 3
4. Contra those who deny that God is simply of all infinite virtue and goodness whatsoever 4
5. Contra those who say that God is not fully sufficient of Himself, but is otherwise in need 4
6. Contra those who believe that God is not necessary, but is only contingently the highest perfection, and is Himself newly mutable, irascible, placable, distressable, able to be made glad or passible, and whatever other passion; and those of the opinion also that God is an accidental name and is not essentially simple 4
7. Contra those who deny that God is actively omnipotent and passively of no potency, that is, He is not able to be acted upon by any other creature whatsoever 5
8. Contra those of the opinion that God is not a rational substance and power actually having an intellect, a free, knowing will, and a willing; and those also who think that the divine will is not universally efficacious, that is, is not impedable, not frustratable and not defectable in any way 5
9. Contra those who believe that God is ignorant of anything 6
10. Contra those who construct God out of human members, other things or whatever other diverse things conjoined together, and against those who deny Himself to be a most simple substance, indivisible, without having composition, partability or size, namely, a body. 7
11. Contra the Zabians & the wise of them which worship the heavens for God 8
12. Contra the worshippers of the sun or the moon, Mars or Jupiter, whatever heavenly signs, or of any signs, or whatever parts of the heavens altogether 8
13. Contra those who fabricate to themselves temporal gods: men, animals, trees, fire or whatever such thing 8
14. Against those vain and trifling persons who worship that onerous multitude of equal gods, of the same species or nature 10
15. Against those who fabricate many equal gods, differing in species or nature 11
16. Against those who lay down the confusion of many gods of unequal power and disparate dignity, or of the same species or diversity 12
17. Against those who deny that God is one and not many, affirming it to be possible that there be many, and against those who deny that it be simply necessary that there be one and not many, affirming that it be possible that there be many 12
18. Against those who set down many first principles simply contrary to each other, of which none is reducible to another, nor everyone to any, one thing being common to them, whether good or evil; and consequently, further, against those who dream up two gods, or many, of the same variety 13
19. Against the deceiving poets that cause prejudice against God by human studies and other things 14
20. Against those who fabricate dishonest and foul gods eating and drinking, commingling with women or in dishonest or foul things or games, or dramatic pleasures 14
21. Contra idolaters 15
22. Contra the Arians 19
23. Contra the Donatists 19
24. Contra the Sabellians 19
25. Contra those who do not distinguish, but withdraw from God being simply of infinite virtue and infinite power, even intensively 19
26. … 20
…

33. Contra the philosophers that deny the possibility of creation, annihilation and recreation 65
34. Contra the philosophers that deny the possibility of the creation of the world 66
35. Contra the philosophers and heretics which deny the possibility of the conception and birth of the Virgin, and say that Christ never born of the holy, always virgin, Mary
… 72
40. … 119

Ch. 2, That God is the necessary conserver of all other things 146

1. That nothing created is sufficient to conserve another thing
2. That it is necessary that God of Himself and immediately saves whichever creature He pleases
3. That it is necessary that God save whichever creature He pleases immediately by whatever created cause

Ch. 3, That God is the necessary efficient cause of whatever a thing does

1. That no thing is able to do anything apart from God
2. That no thing is able to do anything except God per se and immediately does that same thing
3. That no thing is able to do anything except that God immediately does that same thing in which another works

Ch. 4, That any moving creature, God necessarily comoves

1. That nothing whatever is able to move except by God, of Himself and properly, comoving the same
2. That nothing whatever is able to move except by God immediately moving the same
3. That nothing whatever is able to move except by God immediately moving the same by some other mover
4. That no principle is provided that any creature, with respect to any created cause, is caused simply immediately

Ch. 5, That God is not mutable in any way

1. That God essentially and by presence is necessarily everywhere, much more in the world and in all its parts
2. Whether, further, He is outside the world in a place, or in an imaginary, infinite, void?
3. Hence, immense and uncircumscribed He is able truly to be called
4. Hence a response is seen to be manifest to the old questions of the gentiles and heretics, ‘Where is your God?’ and ‘Where was God before the world?’
5. Hence, similarly it is clearly manifest that there is able to be a void from a body, but by no means is there able to be a void from God

Ch. 6, That God has a distinct knowledge [scientia] of all things

1. That God has a distinct knowledge [scientia] even of all present, past and future things; indeed, and of possibilities and impossibilities, imaginables and cognizables in every way; and hence is truly able to be called all-knowing, as also omnipotent

Ch. 7, Objects agianst the 6th and solves.

Ch. 8, That God has a common and special will and love to everything

Ch. 9, That the divine will is the efficient cause of whatever thing has been made

Ch. 10, That the divine will is universally effectual, insuperable and necessary in causation; it is not imedable, nor frustratable in any way

1. That for God to will to do or for anything to be done through itself or through any other in whichever way, it necessarily follows that it is done in that way; nor in our way is it to be sought, it setting aside other forces…

Ch. 11, That the first, necessary and truly incomplex principle is God; and that the first complex principle is simply of God: God is posited, God knows all, God wills all, or something similar.

Ch. 12, Displays which kind that first principle is, due to the affirmation, God is that which He is, or, God is God.

Ch. 13, From these things a 12 part corollary is inferred:

1. That act is simply before power
2. That being is simply more prior than non-being
3. That is necessarily first by the possibility of contradiction
4. That is necessarily first by the impossibility [of it]
5.
6.
7. That which is necessary is in no way rightly defined through possibility or impossibility
8. That necessary being is simply not able to be defined [or limited]
9.
10. That the first cause of whatever true negation is in God
11. That God is the first cause of all non-being
12. That the first cause of whatever impossibility and repugnance is in God

Ch. 14, That the divine will is the cause of whatever is future and whatever is past; why it is such.

1.
…

Ch. 15, That things known [scitae] are not the causes of the divine knowledge [scientiae]

Ch. 16, Contra those that say known things are a cause sine qua non [without which nothing] of the divine knowledge, but not the cause.

Ch. 17,

Ch. 18, Divine knowledge [scientiam] is distinguished in a certain way into incomplex and complex…

Ch. 19 objects and responds

Ch. 20, The will is similarly distinguished with respect to the divine will into prior and posterior

Ch. 21 objects and responds, and distinguishes reasonable and just by the first divine will, by the posterior and by a mixed.

Ch. 22, That God may have a distinct, actual willing or nilling toward the object of whatever will.

1. God wills every truth and does not will positively or eject every falsehood.
…

Ch. 23, That both the knowledge of God and his will are wholly immutable…

Ch. 24, Objects against the immutability of the divine knowledge [scientia] & responds

Ch. 25, Objects against the immutability of the divine will & looses

Ch. 26, That the whole universe of things is good and no thing of itself is bad; and it had the corollary that good and evil of itself, or goodness and pure malice are not contrary are privatively opposite

Ch. 27, That everything comes about by the divine providence

Ch. 28, Of Fate

Ch. 29. Of chance & fortune

Ch. 30, That voluntary things are governed by the laws of divine providence

Ch. 31, That voluntary actions suppose the divine providence

Ch. 32, That all which comes forth by the providence of God is actually being disposed, not only in a permitting way

Ch. 33, That whatever is in respect of the permission of God, is and is by his actual will

Ch. 34, If and in what way God wills and does not will sin

Ch. 35, Contra Pelagius that free grace is given by God, not comparing preceding merits…

Ch. 36, Contra the procurators of Pelagius asserting that…

Ch. 37, Contra some Pelagians saying man is able from himself only to owingly prepare, and if he does, God will give to him his grace freely.

Ch. 38, Contra some Pelagians saying that God…

Ch. 39, Contra some putting forth that man from himself is only able to merit the first grace by congruity, not condignly…

Ch. 40, That the grace which is a habit of grace given from God, one with the human will, is properly the efficient cause of any good and merit of his act

Ch. 41, That grace is naturally prior to the human will effecting good acts…

Ch. 42, That God effecting naturally any good act of a created will is prior to grace…

Ch. 43,

Ch. 44, Of predestination, as to what is of the name

Ch. 45,

Ch. 46,

Ch. 47 objects and responds

Book 2

Ch. 1, That free choice is, and what it is

Ch. 2, Of the act of free choice and its object

Ch. 3, That no inferior cause is able to necessitate the created will to a reason and its free act unto proper merit, or sin.

Ch. 4,

Ch. 5,

Ch. 6, That that special help of God is his invincible will

Ch. 7,

Ch. 8, On what is perseverance…

Ch. 9, That neither man nor angel before the fall, by any grace, was able to persevere finally, or for the time, without the further special help of God

Ch. 10, Objects & responds

Ch. 11, That perseverance is not some created gift of God really different and distinct from charity and grace

Ch. 12, Objects & responds

Ch. 13, That that help without which none may persevere, and through which any perseveres, is the Holy Spirit, by the divine goodness and will

Ch. 14, That perseverance in grace is given from God, and is not matched by merits

Ch. 15, Of the eternal perseverance respecting confirmation, namely of the blessed and its cause, that it is itself the eternal, charitable, will of God

Ch. 16, Of eternal perseverance, or the obstinacy of evil-doers in evil, and its cause

Ch. 17, That no rational creature is able to immutably confirm or harden by nature

Ch. 18, Against some who say that an act of free choice is nothing

Ch. 19 objects and responds

Ch. 20, That any act of the created will, God is the necessary co-effector

Ch. 21, Rehearses six false responses, the first of which says that…

Ch. 22 Specially corrects the first of these

Ch. 23, the Second

Ch. 24, the Third

Ch. 25, the Fourth

Ch. 26, the Fifth

Ch. 27, the Sixth

Ch. 28, Objects against the 20^th and responds

Ch. 29, That the uncreated and created will, in co-effecting a voluntary act are not coequal, nor coequal in the order of nature

Ch. 30, That in every common action of uncreated and created wills, the uncreated naturally antecedes the created

Ch. 31, Objects & responds

1. That sacred theology requires a pious and prudent reader

Ch. 32,

Ch. 33, Objects & responds

Ch. 34, Per what has been premised, it draws men to fear and love, to confidence, to patience and humility, to prayer and refers to graces

Book 3

Ch. 1,

Ch. 2,

Ch. 3, On contingency unto whichever, according to diverse opinions, and that it is itself

Ch. 4, What contingency to whichever is

1. What liberty of contradiction is, and which is the free act in the liberty of contradiction

Ch. 5, Infers as a corollary 13 parts out of the premises:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. That contingency unto whichever and necessity are not repugnant
7. That contingency is properly said in respect of presence
8. That liberty is properly said in respect of presence
9.
10.
11. That only the act of the divine will ad extra is simply contingent equally
12. That only the act of the divine will ad extra is simply free in the liberty of contradiction
13.

Ch. 6, Objects & responds

Ch. 7, Moves the question, Is there not something in the power of the created will?; and it supplies one response and correction

Ch. 8, Rehearses and emends 6 other short responses

Ch. 9, Responds

Ch. 10, Distinguishes between necessity and liberty

Ch. 11, Objects and responds

Ch. 12

Ch. 13, Treats the opinion of Cicero, saying that God does not know the future

Ch. 14, Treats the opinion saying that many things are future in their nature, but not before God

Ch. 15, Rehearses the 4th opinion, of sophists saying that nothing is future

Ch. 16, Refells the 5th opinion, of the Megarians denying all power to the future

Ch. 17, Corrects the 6th opinion, which adjudges that something is future unto whichever, or not future in a composite (not a divided) sense

Ch. 18, Rectifies the 7th opinion, saying that something is able to begin to be future

Ch. 19 castigates the 8th and 9th opinions, believing that nothing of the lower world under divine providence…

Ch. 20 corrects the 10th opinion that God does not have a willing in respect to any effect of the lower world, and the 11th, that He does not will any voluntary of free effect

Ch. 21 refells the 12th opinion

Ch. 22

Ch. 23

Ch. 24

Ch. 25

Ch. 26

Ch. 27

Ch. 28, Rehearses one erroneous, authoritative gloss

Ch. 29, Objects and responds

Ch. 30

Ch. 31, Revokes the same through the way of the necessity and contingency of the intellect and of the divine knowledge

Ch. 32, Reduces the same through the way of the immutability of the divine will

Ch. 33, Moves the same through the way of revelation in the Word, and sets down 6 responses conceding the revelation in the Word, and argues gravely against them

Ch. 34, Argues especially against the first

Ch. 35, Against the second

Ch. 36, Against the third

Ch. 37, Against the fourth

Ch. 38, Against the fifth

Ch. 39, Against the sixth

Ch. 40, Seizes those denying the revelation in the Word

Ch. 41, Rehearses diverse ways according to diverse viewings in the Word, and objects and solves

Ch. 42,

Ch. 43, Treats another response

Ch. 44, Rehearses a third response

Ch. 45, Ventilates a fourth response

Ch. 46, Against the same opinion and hypothesis through the way of revelation in the proper kind of pure creatures, namely angels

Ch. 47, Against the same opinion and hypothesis through the same way, respecting pure humans

Ch. 48, Rehearses and corrects 4 responses

Ch. 49, Rehearses the twofold opinion saying that in future revelations the necessity is ordained or absolute; in others, however, it is nothing.

Ch. 50, Responds to the opinion of philosophers and theologians that God wills and knows [scit] necessarily. [Rather] Whatever He wills and knows follows the necessity of immutability, immobility, stability, and has not been ordained previously and in an absolute way simply, not of [his] nature, nor violently or unwillingly, nor contrarily, but consentingly with respect to the highest and maximum liberty

Ch. 51, Of eternity

Ch. 52,

Ch. 53,

1500’s

Goclenius, Rudolf – An Introduction to the First Philosophy of the Peripatetics & Scholastics, which is Accustomed to be called Metaphysics; Some Disputations of this Kind are Appended (Frankfurt, 1598) 223 pp. ToC

Goclenius (1547-1628) was a reformed professor of philosophy at Marburg.

Dedicatory Epistle
To the Reader 7
Pt. 1, Metaphysical Precepts

1. Definition of First Philosophy & its Subject 1
2. Affections of Being 23
3. One & Many 25
4. Same & Diverse 44
5. True & False 55
6. Good & Evil 65
7. Being-Act & Potential 69
8. Prior & Posterior 80
9. Principle & that which depends out of Principle 88
10. Simple Being & Composite 91
11. Necessary & Contingent 92
12. Immaterial & Material 95
13. Infinite & Finite 96
14. Complete Being & Incomplete 100
15. Universal & Particular 101
16. Division of Being into Substance & Accidents 109
17. Substance 112 On the Principle of Individuation for the Substance of First Matter 116
18. Accidents 118

Pt. 2, Some Metaphysical Disputations

1. Of Common Being, pertaining to all categories following 126
2. Themes on the Distinction of Beings, out of which flows the distinction of sciences 133
3. Themes of First Philosophy & Logic, that being, as being, is the subject of first philosophy, not logic 137
4. Of Things & their Signs 148
5. Of Absolute & Not Absolute Being, especialy by relation 150
6. Of Simplicity & Composite 156
7. Where are Universals, contra Heiz. Buscherum. 160
8. Whether accidents may have material, from what? 162
9. Whether every accident arises from substance? and whether an accident may have something in itself essential? 168
10. Of the Cause of Evil & Vice 172
11. Whether by reason our capacity for understanding God may be convenient to genus, etc. 184
12. Of the principle of individuation, that is, of an individual constitution 191
13. Of Simple & Composite Being 203
14. An Analysis & Explication of Scaliger’s Exercise on Subtilty 206
15. Assertions on the Majesty & Servitude of Logic, and on the Use of Philosophy even in Sacred Things 212

Riolan, Sr., Jean – Short Metaphysical Works (Paris: 1598) 39 pp. ToC

Riolan (1538-1605) was a French reformed physician and anatomist.

To the Reader
1. Of the Soul of the World [Denied] 2
2. Whether God & Nature are One 13
3. Of each Providence of God, one ordinary, which is nature, the other extraordinary, which is called fortune 17.b
4. Of Ideas & Universes 20
5. Whether God is the First Mover, where is of the Rise & Destruction of the World 28.b
6. Whether Potential is Prior to Act [No] 36.b
7. Whether God is Pure Act 37.b – 39

1600’s

Alsted, Johann Heinrich

General

A Most Concise Delineation of Metaphysics, Simultaneously Publicly Proposed to be Disputed Again… (Herborne, 1611) 18 chs. 68 pp.

Table of Contents

Introduction: the System of Metaphysics will be Given; we will fore-notify the titles and offices of it. The significant titles of it are nine. 5

There are three offices of metaphysics 7

1. On the Nature of Metaphysics 9
2. On Essence & Existence 13
3. Of Unity 18
4. Of Truth 22
5. Of Goodness 24
6. Of Sameness & Diversity 27
7. Of the Whole & a Part 31
8. Of Simplicity & Compositeness 36
9. Of being Perfect & Imperfectness 38
10. Of Naturalness & Artificiality 40
11. Of Finiteness & Infiniteness 41
12. Of Necessity & Contingency 42
13. Of Uncreated & Created, & Synonymous Divisions 46
14. Of Illocalness & Localness 49
15. On Act & Potential 50
16. On Possibility & Impossibility 54
17. On Cause & Causation 56
18. On Substance & Accident 62

Metaphysics Drawn out in Three Books through Methodical Precepts, Select Theorems & Clear, Short Commentaries… (Herborne, 1613) 283 pp. This is the same as his Most Exquisite Method of Metaphysics… (1611) ToC

Table of Contents

To the Candid Reader 3

Metaphysical Precognitions 9

Bk. 1, Of Transcendentals 27

1. Of Being 27
2. Of the Synonymous Attributes of Being, which are Something & a Thing 34
3. Of Essence 41
4. Of Existence 46
5. Of Duration 54
6. Of Unity 58
7. On Truth 78
8. Of Goodness 92
9. Of Order 108
10. Of Number 111
11. Of Perfection 113
12. Of Beauty 115
13. Of Act & Potential 117
14. Of Simplicity & Composition 134
15. Of Being per se & in accidents 139
16. Of Universality & Singularity 142
17. Of a Whole & a Part 148
18. Of Priority, Connection & Posteriority 155
19. Of Infinity & Finiteness 160
20. Of Absoluteness & Respectiveness 164
21. Of Reality & Intentionality 166
22. Of Abstraction & Concretion 171
23. Of Measure & a thing having been Measured 176
24. Of Subject & Adjunct 180
25. Of a Sign & Signifying 184
26. Of Beginning & having Begun 188
27. Of Cause & Causation 192
28. Of Necessity & Contingency 222
29. Of Identity, Diversity & Distinction 232

Bk. 2, Of Predications 248

1. The Number & Utility of Predications 248
2. Of Substance 253
3. Of Quantity 255
4. Of Quality 257
5. Of Relation 258
6. Of Action 263
7. Of Passion 265
8. Of Four Predications Less Principal: Where, When, Situation, Habitus 266

Bk. 3, On Non-Being 269

A Metaphysical Conclusion 275

3 Tables Dividing Metaphysics 276

Appendix on the Nature, Constitution & Special Use of Metaphysics, Comprehending Some Theorems 279

ToC

Bk. 11 of the Encyclopedia, Propounding Metaphysics, in Two Distinct Parts in The Encyclopedia in Seven Distinct Tomes… (Herborne, 1630), pp. 573-630

Table of Contents

1. On Being 573
2. On Essence 576
3. On Existence 577
4. On Duration 578
5. On the Affections [Mode, Attributes & Passions] of Being in General 579
6. On Unity 580
7. On Truth 582
8. On Goodness 585
9. On Number 586
10. On Order 587
11. On Perfection 587
12. On Beauty 588
13. On Being per se & in Accidents 589
14. On Universal Being & Singular Being 590
15. On Being Act & Potential 591
16. On Independence & Dependence 594
17. On Not-Having-Been-Created & Having-Been-Created 595
18. On Being from Itself & from Another 596
19. On Absoluteness & Respectiveness 596
20. On Incorruptibility & Corruptibility 597
21. On Being, Complete & Incomplete 597
22. On Naturalness & Unnaturalness 598
23. On Simplicity & Compositeness 598
24. On a Whole & a Part 600
25. On Priorness, Connection & Posteriority 602
26. On Sameness & Diversity 603
27. On Illocality & Locality 606
28. On Permanence & Successiveness 606
29. On Measure & a thing having been Measured 607
30. On Possibility & Impossibility 607
31. On Infiniteness & Finiteness 608
32. On Being, Real & Rational 609
33. On Abstractness & Concreteness 610
34. On Beginning [Principio] & that Begun 611
35. On Cause in General 611
36. On the Efficient Cause 612
37. On the End 613
38. On Matter 614
39. On Form 614
40. On Causation 615
41. On Necessity & Non-Necessity 615
42. On a Subject & Adjunct 617
43. On Sign & Signifying 618
44. On Communicability & Incommunibility 619

Table of Part 1 620

Part 2, On Predications 620

1. On Predications in General 620
2. On Substance 621
3. On Quantity 622
4. On Quality 624
5. On Relation 625
6. On Action 627
7. On Passion 628
8. When, Where, Situation, Habitus 629

Table of Part 2 629

Keckermann, Bartholomaus – A Compendious System of the Science [Scientia] of Metaphysics, Furnished in Public Lectures in the Danzig Gymnasium, Distributed in Two Parts (Hanau, 1609) 112 pp. ToC This appears to be the same as the 1615 edition.

Table of Contents

9 Tables of the Metaphysics

Bk. 1, On Substance 17

1. Metaphysics in General, in which is Precognitions 17
2. Principles of Substance 22
3. Unity, Truth & Goodness 29
4. Perfection & Beauty 36
5. Order of Priority & Posteriority 38
6. The Order of Things which Simultaneously Are 43
7. Order of Universality & Singularity 45
8. Order of Dependence 52
9. Possibility, Necessity, Contingency, Facility & Difficulty 66
10. Duration, Extension & Place 73
11. Measure & that Having Been Measured 73
12. Order of Cognation & of Union 75
13. Order of Diversity 81
14. Relation 84
15. Division of Substance 92

Bk. 2 98

1. Nature of an Accident 98
2. The Division of an Accident 100
3. Being having been Clasped 103
4. Cognate-ness, or the Image of Being 104
5. The Opposite of Being, or Non-Being 108

Baron, Robert

Philosophy being a Handmaiden to Theology, that is, a Pious & Sober Explication of Philosophical Questions Occuring from Time to Time in Theological Disputations (1621)

Baron (1596–1639) was one of the Scottish Aberdeen doctors who had been a teacher of philosophy at the University of St. Andrews.

Note that ch. 1 is on Being & Essence. Numerous of the other chapters contain philosophical themes as well.

Table of Contents

Exercitation 1, On Being & Essence 1

1. The 1st Division of Real Being: it is displayed that God alone is a necessary being 1

2. The 2nd Division of Real Being: it is proved that God alone is being through essence [his being is identical to his essencel] 3

3. The 3rd Division of Real Being: it is explicated in what way God is pure act 8

4. The 4th Division of Real Being, which is sought from the modes of existence 12

5. The explication of these terms: being, essence, existence, subsistance, suppositum & person 20

6. Whether in creatures the suppositum and the singular nature of it differ in the thing 28

7. What is the cause why in created substances composition from essence and existence, and likewise from essence and subsistance, are yet not attributed to God in philosophy 34

8. Whether this having been posited, that every perfection is of the essence of God, it follows that personal subsistence is of his essence; and whether God, insofar as that is communicable to the three persons of the Trinity, may be a person, as Cajetan states. 41

9. Whether God is so common to three persons that He may be a single substance; and whether the three persons of the Trinity are three singular substances 47

10. Whether Christ, insofar as man, is a person; likewise, whether Christ, insofar as man, is everywhere 51

11. Whether the arguments of the Ubiquitarians sought from the personal union are valid 56

12. Whether the personal subsistence may be communicated to his human nature; and whether they rightly speak, who say that the humanity of Christ subsists everywhere through the subsistence; likewise that it exists everywhere according to his personal being. 64

Exercitation 2, On the Origin of the Soul & the Propagation of Sin 77

1. Of the Diversity of Material & Immaterial Forms 77

2. On the Double Causality & Power of Matter; further, on the Stretching forth of Forms out of the Power of Matter 82

3. Whether the Rational Soul is from being Handed Down [traduce] 88

4. Whether & in what way a Man is Truly Said to Beget a Man 95

5. Whether Generation has been Posited in the Production of Form, or Rather in the Conjunction of Form with Matter 101

6. Whether the Preceding Doctrine may Support the Propagation of Original Sin 109

7. Arguments are Solved which are Customarily Brought Against the Preceding Doctrine of the Propagation of Native Corruption through the Seed of the Parents 114

8. Some Questions are Propounded & Solved on the Propagation of Original Sin 121

9. Lighter Arguments are Dissolved which are Customarily Brought Against Creationism & the Infusion of the Soul 125

10. Whether anything better explains or expedites an account of the handing down of concupiscence, or the propension to evil, than what we say is the third explanation of Original Sin 128

11. Two other judgments on the handing down of sin are considered 136

12. The many dissensions among themselves which impugn the creation of souls are displayed, and three of the chief judgments of them on the origin of the soul are confuted 143

13. A fourth judgment is refelled, that of Balthasar Meisner 147

14. A fifth judgment is confuted, that of Timothy Bright of Cambridge 155

15. All of the judgments of traducianism have already been confuted; further, no one out of this number is able to better maintain or more easily explain the propagation of sin than we who defend the creation of souls 162

Exercitation 3, On Faith, Knowledge [Scientia] & Opinion 173

1. On the Firmness, Certainty & Evidence relating to the Consent of our Mind 173

2. In what way to know, to believe and to have an opinion may differ between themselves 178

3. Whether faith may always be 183

4. Whether faith may be able simultaneously to be with knowledge [scientia] respecting the same proposition, in the same intellect 188

5. Of the division of faith into explicit and implicit; and whether the lack of evidence that we give to faith makes anything for the blind and implicit faith of the papists 194

6. Of the Triple Light, namely, of Nature, of Faith of Grace, and of Glory 198

7. Whether there may be given to pilgrims [viatoribus] some light more clear than the light of faith 204

8. Three Questions are Solved 209

9. The judgment of Nicholas Grevinchovin is refelled, who says that the principle [habitum] of faith is not infused, but acquired 215

10. Whether faith, whether acutal or in principle [habitualis], may be, or is able to be, in infants 219

11. Whether Faith may be in Demons? 230

12. Whether in the Soul of Christ there was Faith? Whether it may be in the Saints which have already been Translated to Heaven, they having the Face-to-Face Knowledge of God, as the Scholastics Speak 235

13. Whether the Remonstrants Rightly Deny that Adam Before the Fall had Power to Believe in Christ 240

14. Whether the Object of Faith is able to be False 249

15. In what way may be Solved that Argument of the Remonstrants that, ‘Whatever everyone is required to believe, that is true. [But even all reprobates are required to believe that Christ died for them. Therefore it is true that Christ for them.]” [Baron was a hypothetical universalist.] 253

16. Whether Faith may be a Discursive Assent? and whether the Papists use Circular Reasoning in establishing the faith? 262

[Their circular syllogism is: “That which is able to be known by sola Scriptura, by that order of knowing, is not more known, but is more unknown by Scripture itself. But the Church and its infallibility is able to be known by sola Scriptura. Therefore, etc.]

17. Whether knowledge [notitia] may be an elicited act from the principle [habitu] of faith? 273

18. Whether trust [fiducia] may be an act of faith? 276

19. Whether trust is an intellectual act, and in what way it differs from assent? 284

20. Whether the object of saving faith may be the remission of sins already accomplished [impetrata]? or, on the other hand, whether it may be the remission of sins to be accomplished and to be obtained? Where, in the way, is solved the chief arguments of Bellarmine against the object and nature of justifying faith. 291

21. Whether and how far faith pertains to the will 296

22. Whether love [charitas] may be the form of faith 300

23. Whether religion may be a theological virtue distinct from faith 304

24. The theology of pilgrims [viatorum], in three ways taken, is displayed; and the theology in the first way accepted is proved not to be a habit from faith, distinguished in the thing. 310

25. The second way accepted is proved, contra the theologian Anthony Ruvius, not to be knowledge [scientiam], but a divine trust 317

26. Theology the third way accepted, that is, scholastic theology, is proved to be an accumulated habit from faith and philosophical disciplines 320

27. That theology is similar to all the Aristotelian habits, especially, indeed, to prudence 324

28. Whether theology is a speculative discipline, or practical? 327

29. Whether the theology of pilgrims is able to be called speculative, from speculation [viewing] or vision, by which the future is in the Father 332

30. Whether theology, truly and properly so-called, is able to be in an impious man, or the unregenerate 334

General Metaphysics… All Accommodated to the Use of Theology… (d. 1639; London, 1658) 479 pp. ToC 1, 2 Outline Indices: Scripture & Authors

To the Reader

Part 1

1. On Disciplines in General & in Specific on Metaphysics 1

Pt. 2, The Definition of Metaphysics & its Explanation 5

2. Whether Being as Being may have Truly & Properly Called Properties, & Likewise, True Principles through which those Properties are Demonstrated 8

3. In What Consists the Principle [Ratio] of Transcendental Unity & What are its Species 14

4. On Truth in Being, or on Truth according as it is an Affection of Being 28

5. On Transcendental Good, which is an Affection of Being 39

Disputation on Evil 49

6. On the Divisions of Being Broadly Accepted, into Being per se & Being per accidens, Being Negative & Positive, Real & Rational 67

7. On the Division of Being into Act & Power 76

Disputation on Act & Power 84

8. On the Efficient Cause 96

Disputation on the First Efficient Cause, & in Specific on its First Operation, namely Creation 107

Disputation on the Second Operation of the First Cause, namely Conservation 121

Disputation on the Third Operation of the First Cause, namely the Concursus of it with Second Causes 107

9. On the Material Cause of Substances & Accidents 169

A Disputation on the Prime Matter of Substance 188

10. Of the Formal Cause, Substantial & Accidental 202

Disputation 1, On the Origin of Forms, & in Specific, on the Origin of the Rational Soul 210

Disputation 2, On the Multitude of Forms in the Same Composite 255

Disputation 3, On the Generation of a Composite Substance 276

11. On the Final & Exemplary Cause 286

12. On Necessity & Contingency 291

Disputation 1, On the Liberty of Choice in Man 299

Disputation 2, On the Foreknowledge & Providence of God, & on the Concord of them with the Contingency of Things & the Liberty of Human Choice 340

13. On Sameness & Diversity 378

14. On Absoluteness & Respectiveness 390

15. On the Whole & Part 400

Part 2, The Special Part of Metaphysics

Section 1

Whether Being may be Univocally Predicated of its Species & how far Metaphysics may Descend to Consider Species of Being 419

Section 2

On the Division of Being into Created & Uncreated, & to whom it Adheres 427

Disputation 1, On Essence & Existence, & of the Composition of Creatures out of Being & Essence 427

Disputation 2, On the Composition of a Creature out of Existence & Subsistence 447

Disputation 3, On the Simplicity of Uncreated Being 459

Combach, Johann – The 3^rd Edition of the Metaphysics, in Two Books, Comprehending the Universal Doctrine of First Philosophy by the Most Brief Theorems, Illustrated with Necessary Comments… (Frankfurt, 1630) ToC 628 pp.

Combach (1585-1651) was a professor of physics at Marburg.

Dedicatory Epistle
Dedicatory Epistle 2
Epigrams

Bk. 1

1. Definition & Subject of Metaphysics
2. Being & Essence
3. Metaphysical Principles
4. Passions or Affections of Being in General
5. Oneness
6. Truth
7. Good
8. Division of Being, so equivocal in equivocation
9. Divisions of Being, from intrinsic modes and select passions; and in specific of potential and act
10. Abstraction
11. What is ucnreated and created being
12. The Division of being: from itself and from another
13. Necessary and contingent
14. Infinite and finite, also illocal and local
15. Independent & Dependent
16. Absolute
17. Incorruptible & Corruptible
18. Beginning & having Begun
19. Causes & Effects
20. Order of the Ends [Terminorum] of Division
21. Universal & Singular
22. Identity & Distinction
23. Simplicity & Compositeness
24. Whole & Parts
25. Natural & Artificial
26. Perfect & Imperfect
27. Complete & Incomplete
28. Substance
29. Accident

Bk. 2

1. Separate Things according to Essence
2. Angels
3. Human Soul

Jacchaeus, Gilbert – Institutions of the First Philosophy, or of Metaphysics, in 6 Books (Leiden: Elsevir, 1640) 391 pp. ToC

Jacchaeus (c.1578-1628) was a reformed professor of philosophy at Herborn and Leiden.

Dedicatory Epistle
Epigrams

bk. 1, Of the Constitution of Metaphysics

1. Its Object 1
2. Limits of Metaphysics 5
3. In what way metaphysics may pertain to other sciences 8
4. Ends of Metaphysics 12
5. Concept of Being 17
6. Analogy of Being 28
7. Division of Metaphysics 31

bk. 2

1. Transcendental Unity 33
2. Numerical Unity 37
3. Individual Unity 39
4. Principle of Individuation 42
5. In what way accidents, different by number only, are able to be in the same subject 45
6. Formal Unity 46
7. Universal Unity 48
8. What is a universal 52
9. On various kinds of distinctions 57
10. Truth 61
11. Falsehood 69
12. Origin of Falsehood 73
13. Goodness 75
14. Evil 80

bk. 3

1. What is a cause 86
2. Material Cause 89
3. Formal-Accidental Cause 95
4. Efficient Cause 99
5. Proximate Efficient Cause 103
6. Free & Necessary Agent 113
7. In what way the will is determined by the judgment of reason 122
8. Creation 127
9. Conservation 132
10. Cooperation 136
11. End 142
12. Ultimate End 158
13. Exemplary Cause 161
14. Comparison of Causes with their Effects 165
15. Comparison of Causes amongst themselves 171

bk. 4

1. Divisions of Being 175
2. Infinite Being, or of God 179
3. Divine Perfection 183
4. Divine Infinity & Simplicity 187
5. Divine Life 196
6. Divine Knowledge [Scientia] 200
7. Divine Will 204
8. Divine Power 209

bk. 5

1. Finite Being 213
2. Causes of Existence 223
3. How many fold is existence 227
4. Separation of existence from essence 232
5. Of what quality is composition from being and essence 236
6. Division of being into substance and accident 238
7. Prime substance or supposite 242
8. Divisibility of substance 248
9. Immaterial substance 252
10. Essence of intelligences 258
11. Intellect and will of angels 264
12. Power of acting of intelligences 273

bk. 6

1. Material substance 278
2. Essential rule of accidents 282
3. Quantity 286
4. Line points and surfaces 295
5. Place, time and motion are not species of quantity 299
6. Discrete quantity 303
7. Quality 308
8. Natural potential 310
9. Habits 318
10. In what way an act effects habits 322
11. Distinction of habits 335
12. Contrariety of qualities 338
13. Intension of quality 342
14. Real relation 345
15. The subject, foundation and end of relation 351
16. Three kinds of relations 355
17. Action 360
18. Passion 364
19. Of the predication when 367
20. Species of duration 370
21. Successive duration 376
22. Where 379
23. Of the predication position 383
24. Of the predication habit 384
25. Rational beings 386
26. Division of rational being 389

Senguerdius, Arnold

A Collection of Metaphysics, in which General Metaphysics is Briefly Propounded in 16 Disputations publicly ventilated in the illustrious Academy of Utrecht 2nd ed. (Utrecht, 1640) 245 pp. ToC

Senguerdius (1610-1667) was a reformed professor of metaphysics and physics at Utrecht when this was written, and later a professor of philosophy at Amsterdam. Senguerdius was Voet’s most recommended author on metaphysics.

Dedicatory Epistle
1. Nature of metaphysics
2. Being, and its analogy and concept
3. Principles of prime philosophy and of the affections of being in general
4. Oneness
5. Universals and kinds of distinctions
6. Truth
7. Good
8. Evil
9. Causes in general and of matter in specific
10. Form
11. Efficient cause
12. End and Causes
13. Necessary and contingent
14. Potential and act, simple and composite
15. Divisions of being, and specially of substance
16. Accident

The Idea of General & Special Metaphysics 3rd ed. (Utrecht, 1659) 211 pp. ToC

General Metaphysics

1. Constitution of metaphysics 1
2. The subject of prime philosophy 7
3. Principles of prime philosophy 15
4. Affections of being in general 17
5. One 23
6. Kinds of distinctions 34
7. Truth 37
8. Good 48
9. Causes in general 53
10. Matter 58
11. Form 62
12. Efficient cause 67
13. End 72
14. Cause 77
15. Necessary and contingent 80
16. Potential and act 84
17. Simple and composite 84
18. Divisions of being 92
19. Substance 98
20. Accident in general 105
21. Quantity 110
22. Quality 116
23. Relations 122
24. Action and passion 126
25. Where, when, place and habit 129

Special Metaphysics

1. Nature of pneumatics 133
2. Principles of pneumatics and of general properties of spirits 139
3. To be God 145
4. Divine attributes in general 150
5. Necessity of the divine existence 155
6. Divine perfection 157
7. Infinity of God 159
8. Unity of God 165
9. Simplicity of God 167
10. Immutability of God 171
11. God’s knowledge [scientia] 175
12. Will of God 181
13. Power of God 187
14. Creation 191
15. Conservation 194
16. Concursus 197
17. Angels 200
18. Rational soul 298

Revius, Jacobus – Suarez Repurged, or a Syllabus of the Metaphysical Disputations of Francis Suarez, a Theologian of the Society of Jesus, with the Notes of Jacob Revius… (Leiden: 1644) 1,127 pp. Index

Revius (1586-1658) was a reformed, professor of philosophy at Leiden who was anti-Cartesian.

Table of Contents

Dedicatory Epistle
Introduction 1

1. On the Nature of First Philosophy, or of Metaphysics 5

1. The Object of Metaphysics 4
2. Texts 13-15 7
3. Whether Metaphysics is Only One Science 8
. Metaphysics is able to be Defined 9
4. How many are the offices of this science, what are its ends, its utility; where is of its causes. 12
5. Whether metaphysics is perfectly a speculative science, or rather a wisdom 13
6. Whether out of all the sciences, metaphysics is the most grasped for by man by the natural appetite 18

2. Of the Essential Reason or Concept of Being 21
3. Of the passions of being in common, & its principles 38
4. Of transcendental unity in common 48
5. Of individual unity & its principle 67
6. Of formal & universal unity 75
7. Of general varieties of distinctions 98
8. Of verity, or truth, that it is a passion of being 109
9. Of falsity, or an untruth 123
10. Of good, or of transendental goodness 129
11. Of Evil 140

1. Whether evil may be something in things, & how many kinds there may be? 140
2. How many kinds of evil may there be? 143
3. Where & from where may evil be, or what causes it may have? 147
. What is the end of evil? 148
. What is the subjective cause of evil? 150
. Whether a formal cause may be given to evil? 150
. As far as the efficient [cause] of evil 151
. In what way evil may be from the First Cause 154
4. Why evil is not numbered among the attributes of being 155

12. Of the cause of being in common 156
13. Of the material cause of substance 170
14. Of the material cause of accidents 195
15. Of the formal substantial cause 204
16. Of the formal accidental cause 230
17. Of the efficient cause in common 235
18. Of the proximate efficient cause 242
19. Of causes, necessary & free, or of contingent agents, where is of even fate, fortune & chance 262
20. Of the first efficient cause & its first action, which is creation 317
21. Of the first efficient cause, & its other action, which is conservation 339
22. Of the first cause, & another of its actions, which is cooperation, or concursus with secondary causes 345
23. Of the final cause in common 428
…

Burgersdijck, Franco – Institutions of Metaphysics in Two Books… last ed., largely emended (Hague, 1657) ToC

Burgersdijck (1590-1635) was a Dutch, reformed logician and professor of moral and natural philosophy. He was also earlier a professor of philosophy at the French University of Saumur.

Table of Contents

To the Benevolent Reader by Heereboord
Eulogy by Peter Cuae

Bk. 1 1

1. On the Nature of Metaphysics 1
2. On the Common Account of Being 10
3. On that which is a Medium Between Being & Nothing, in General 20
4. On Privation & an External Denomination 25
5. On Rational Being 30
6. On Relation 34
7. On the Modes of Beings 44
8. On Uncircumscribed Principles, or on Essence & Existence 49
9. On Circumscribed Principles of Metaphysics 57
10. On the Affections of Being in General 59
11. On Unity & Multiplicity in General 61
12. On Numerical & Formal Unity, & on the Principle of Individuation 66
13. On Universal Unity 75
14. On Species & Grades of Unity 82
15. On Diversity or Distinction, & Convenience 87
16. On Opposition 95
17. On Order 100
18. On Truth & Falsity 104
19. On the Adjuncts of Truth 114
20. On Good & Evil 117
21. On Locality, Temporality & Duration 128
22. On a Whole & Part 139
23. On Cause & Causation in General 145
24. On Material Cause 151
25. On Formal Cause 158
26. On Efficient Cause 167
27. On the End 181
28. On Subject & Adjunct 193
29. On that which is Necessary, Impossible, Contingent & Possible 204
30. On Potency & Act 213
31. On being Perfect & Imperfect, or on Perfectability & Perfection 221

Bk. 2

1. On the Division of Being into Substance & Accidents; & on Substance in General 227
2. On Prime & Secondary Substances, & on Subsistence 232
3. On the Distribution of Being in God & the Creature, & other Equivalents 243
4. That God is 247
5. On the Divine Essence & its Attributes in General 255
6. On the Necessity, Unity & Eternity of God 260
7. On the Immensity, Simplicity & Immutability of God 266
8. On the Life & Intellect of God 276
9. On the Will & Power of God 290
10. On Creation & Conservation 296
11. On Concursus, or the Cooperation of God with Creatures 307
12. On Created Substances 317
13. On the Existence & the Nature of Angels 323
14. On the Attributes of Angels 328
15. On the Actions of Angels 333
16. On the Separated Human Soul 345
17. On Accidents 356

Maccovius, Johannes & Adrian Heereboord – Metaphysics Adorned & Applied for the Use of Questions in Philosophy & Theology, the 3rd edition, Explicating, Vindicating & Refuting, by Adrian Heereboord (Leiden, 1658) 293 pp. ToC

Table of Contents

Dedications & Epistle
Preface
ToC
Bk. 1

1. On the Nature of Metaphysics 1
2. On the Principles of External Being 5
3. On the Principles of Internal Being 7
4. On the Modes of Being in General 11
5. On Oneness 16
6. On the Subject 28
7. On the Truth 38
8. On the Good 51
9. On Necessity & Contingency 69
10. On Simplicity & Composition 81
11. On Measure & Something Measured 97
12. On Sign & that Signified 108
13. On Beginning & Having Begun, as well as the Efficient Cause 119
14. On the End 145
15. On Matter 154
16. On Form 164
17. On Priorness & Those Things which are Called Simultaneous 172

Bk. 2

1. On Substance 179
2. On Accidentalness in General, & in Specific on Quantity 198
3. On Quality 215
4. On Action 232
5. On Passion 244
6. On Relation 250
7. On Encompassed Being 270
8. On Cognate-ness & the Opposite of Being 282-98

Index of Theological Questions
Philosophical Index of Terms, Distinctions, Questions & Canons

Rutherford, Samuel – A Scholastic Disputation on Divine Providence (Edinburgh, 1649), Metaphysical Inquiries, that may Perhaps bring forth a Measure of Light to the Doctrine of Providence, pp. 531-620

A Detailed (but not Exhaustive) Outline

1 – Whether being is more simple than non-being? 531

This is the first principle: ‘All the same is the same’… 531

2 – Whether God is the lordly cause of being and non-being? 532

Being is prior to non-being 532
God maintains dominion in non-entities and non-futures 532
Argument 1: Genesis 1, ‘and God said’ 533
Argument 2 533
Argument 3 534
. Non-beings of themselves and out of their own nature are
. not in kind non-beings 535
Argument 4 535
. The reason of creating in which 536
Argument 5 536
Argument 6 537
Argument 7 537

3 – Whether God is the origin and cause of impossibilities and possibilities? 538

God is the cause of possibilities 538
Because God is omnipotent, therefore beings are possible; yet
. it is not the case that they are possible, and therefore God is
. able to create them 538

4 – But the other part of the question is more difficult, namely, Whether anything is impossible, except that it is originally impossible with God? It is responded that nothing is impossible as such. 540 6 points

God is the origin of impossibilities 540
Nothing is impossible simply or incomplexly, but only complexly
. or as it is incompaible is it impossible 540
A hircocervus [an animal, half-goat and half-stag] is able to be
. created by God, and not able to be created in a different
. respect 541
Therefore, that something is not able to be because God is not
. able to make it, is not contrary to: God is not able to make
. this, because this is not able to be 543
Impossibility in the first infinite being is the origin of all
. impossibility in creatures 544

5 – Whether from the hypothesis that there was no first cause, whether possiblity or impossibility would exist in the nature of things? 545

If the impious and execrable supposition be set up that there
. were no first cause, nothing would be possible, nothing
. impossible, and a chaotic contradiction would prevail 546
God, by his positive decree knows all non-futures 548
If God were not, nothing would be true or false, nor would there
. be being or non-being 549
God is the stimulus [actus] of whatever is able to be 550
If there were no first being, there would be no things not
. repugnant to each other, and that from eternity 550
If you suppose there not to be a first being, there would be no
. true, nor false proposition 553
Beings are possible in themselves without the consideration of
. a first being, but if you posit the first being not to be, then
. nothing will be impossible 553
[the page numbering skips from 553-56]
If there were not a prime being, this principle would be
. shattered: ‘It is impossible for the same thing to be and not
. to be simultaneously.’ 556

6 – Whether possibilities are something real [actual]? 557 I respond they are not, as they are called only a name merely extrinsically in relation [habitudine] to Omnipotency.

A possibel thing is not something real. 557
The essences of things are not from eternity. 557
What the future is 559

7 – By what knowledge and will God comprehends possibilities? 559

In what way God knows possibilities. 559
The practical and speculative knowledge [scientia] of God, in
. what way it differs from our knowledge [scientia]. 560
Double Possibilities 560
The twofold approving will of God. 560
How much God may necessarily love possibilities. 560

8 – Whether God exercises providence in all things by a necessity of nature or freely? 561

A hypothetical absolute necessity is able to be in God 561
The necessity of nature in God is twofold. 562

9 – Whether God’s free good pleasure is the cause of essences, of grades of essence and of specific forms in natural things, moral things, supernatural things, and artificial things? 563

What is in potential and what is in any act is by the same mode,
. according to the Scriptures. 563
An act is a prior power. 563
A thing materially creatable and a created thing are distinguished 564
God, having freely made that creature [man], materially took up
. a rational soul 565
It being necessary, we demonstrate the truth of the first thing
. spoken 565
By the same action of God to freely create, God created Adam,
. a human man, etc. 566
The most supreme liberty of the Supreme Worker proves that
. He freely creates a thing out of any agreeable essence
. 567
It is not necessary for God to create things of such an essence
. 567
The ideas of things have been formed in the mind of God
. according to his free good-pleasure, therefore so have the
. ideas of even the essence of things also 568
God is not able to command that men and angels believe God
. not to be, or to believe that contradictory things are
. simultaneously true 569
Subjection and non-subjection to the law may necessarily vary
. necessarily according to the rule of sin 572
Some things are good antecedently to the free good-pleasure
. of God according to a fittingness with God 572
God is not able to command except that it is good and the duty
. of the creature 574
God is not able to command you to do such things as are
. contradictory, out of his own consistency 574

10 – Whether the Creator may be able to require something injurious to the creature [No], and what sort of right does God have in his creatures? 577

‘Right’ is taken in a threefold way, and the sort of right God has
. in the creatures 577
We do not pay regard to syncretism with the Socinians 578
Someone having been created, this of itself founds a relation
. between the Creator and the creature, Lord and servant,
. and someone dependent with an obligation to obedience
. 579
Nor do those things set down for us an absolute necessity for a
. satisfaction being fulfilled by Christ 580 [Quotes Pareus]
The Socinians deny the immutability of the decrees of God 580
To what extent God is able to command his own hatred 582
. [quotes Sibrandus that God need not punish the sinner on
. account of his absolute dominion 583]
Sibrandus and we make the will of God the first rule of his
. righteousness [justice] to that which is outside of Himself
. 584
Beza on the question 584

To what extent justice belongs to God essentially, and what follows.
. 584

How far the justice of God is referred to his free will 584
How far and in what way the corrective justice of God, which is
. referred to the creatures, is not essentially in God 585
God out of grace, not out of justice gives the sponsor
. [Redeemer] 585
The means, how far they are means antecedently to the
. decrees of God 585
The Word of God notates the decree of God 586
Num. 31:16
What sort of law is before the decree 586

Whether the decree of God removes ability from a secondary cause?
. 586

The decree of God takes power [from creatures] by a mode not
. physical 586

Whether the absolute ability to act or not to act is of the essence of freedom? 587

The essence of a free creature is most wretchedly defined by
. Jesuits and Arminians 587

Whether the decree of God also blows [conspiret] in the same
. numeric act which the will elicits itself, if we set down that nothing
. is impossible in the decree of God? 588

I respond affirmatively, because the necessity of the decree and
. the necessity of the free exercise, these same remove the
. indifferent things of freedom.

A table 588

That the decree and created will flow together [conspiret] in the
. same point 588

11. Whether a free action is contingent? 589

By which pact a free act is contingent 589

12. Whether liberty is able to stand with an antecedent necessity? I respond affirmatively… 589

13. In what way, out of an antecedent, absolute necessity, is the consequence not absolutely necessary 589

14. By what sort of power may the good of the glory of God result out of sin 590 [On the part of a sinning creature, by a power merely obediential, not formal]

15. By what sort of knowledge does God look upon a conditional future? 590

18. Whether a creature is able to act without a concurrent primary cause? [I respond in the negative…] Whether God moves a secondary cause by a previous concurrence or a simultaneous one?

It is necessary that God premoves the secondary cause to act, and this contriving of two simultaneous, collateral and independent influences, of God and of the creatures, is impious 592

19-20. Concerning the insanity of the Jesuits in this matter. 592

21. A simultaneous influx of God and the creature everts the dependence of the creature in working by the Creator 594

22. A simultaneous influx of God and the creature brings in two first principles 594

24. These simultaneous influences evert the certain knowledge [scientia] of God 595

25. God does not establish that a secondary cause may work by simultaneous, standing influences 596

26. The influence of God in the second cause is not a permanent quality inhering in the second cause 596

Adam sinned freely though the influence of God was subtracted, without which he was not able not to fall 597

27. Whether or not the substraction in her [Eve] was the penalty of a sin preceding the sin? I respond in the negative.

28. In what way, therefore, had Adam the ability to will, if he willed to stand? I respond: in the greatest way, because he so retained his ability in relation to his free act…

Whether Adam sinned freely because he sinned by the remote predeterminate motion of God? 597

Whether there is such a thing as a contingent future and what it is? from an anonymous debater. 597

The necessity from the decree does not attach to the thing of the decree per se and always 597

The adversaries deny every future thing as they deny the future cause to be the decree of God, or another cause to hold than the cause of the present action 598

The Disputer objects: If a thing is from eternity, it has no cause, for no thing is from eternity except God; and if things were future from eternity, then they were not from eternity… 599

I respond, the Disputer supposes our opinion to be that the futurity of things from eternity is a real being, and that it was created from eternity or is coeternal with God, which we by no means teach…

The future is not a mere nothing. 599

The Disputer denies the future, because he does not know what the future is. 599

The Disputer affirms the future to be present and not future. 600

The Disputer objects: If God has decreed that tomorrow there will be rain, that tomorrow it will rain depends consequently on the decree of God; but a necessity of the consequence in no way depends on the decree of God, even as God is not otherwise able to decree; indeed, He is not able to decree so that what He decree is not, for progress would then be in infinity… 600

The sickly Disputer bears off every necessity of things which arises in the decree from God 601

The Disputer exchanges the cause of the present action for the future cause. 601

30. What truly is the future? 602 I respond it is an ideal and objective thing in the will and decree of God which finally in its time it will be a present act.

31. Is it not absurd to say that the futurity of sin was in God from eternity, or that the futurity of the sin against the Holy Spirit is in God? So the Disputer. I respond, but I have made good that the futurity of all sins is in the decree of God permissively from eternity. 602

32. Whether ordinability to the good comes through [conveniat,or is in accord with] sin per se, or yet by accident… I respond: This is not able to be conceded to the judgment of the Arminian… 604

In what way God in time and from eternity ordains sin. 604

33. Whether the Will of Sign is improperly and metonymically the will of God? [Yes; Rutherford explains that the Approving will that lies behind it in God is properly called his will, though the communication directing that to the creature, by creaturely signs and commands, is not properly God’s will as God has not willed it to be in the event.] 605

How far the will of sign may be a will?

I respond: The will of sign, according as it designates what is the pleasing and acceptable revealed will of God to us, that which is of our duty, so it is called the approving will, contradistinguished from the will of good-pleasure [of decree], and refers to two things:

1. To that which we ought to believe or do, inasmuch as that is obliging of consciences, since we ought to will to please God and will the reward of obedience following.

2. It refers to obedience, and this so far as God displays that to us by an act, either through special grace or a common concursus.

The first will is of complacency and is properly called will, whose object is the duty of the rational creature. In this way God sincerely [serio] approves and wills obedience, and is pleased in this moral good as a rule and norm, and it is not less a will than that which is called of good-pleasure [or the will of decree].

But the latter way is not an executing will as the will of good-pleasure is, nor does God will, intend or decree through grace or concursus, to work in the creatures that which He commands or prohibits, because He commands or prohibits it.

And in this way the will of sign is so far improperly called ‘the will of sign’; indeed, the punishment is called the wrath of God, because assuredly God punishes that which is done, as men are accustomed to do such being angry and in the passion of wrath, being aroused and agitated, although nonetheless, passions do not occur in God.

What sort is that being which a future thing maintains from eternity? I respond that it is not the being of the thing, not a real being or an actual being, because futurity is some mode of being, a mode of being not able to be real or actual… 605

By whatever mode future things have being from eternity, it surely is objective [and potential], not real. 605

Futurity and future things differ 606

The futurity of a thing is eternal and the future thing arises in time 606

Surely it is said then, futurity is in no way real? 606 I respond, futurity passively taken, or the thing which is future, is not real.

Futurity actively and passively taken differ 606

Whether the future from eternity was future from a second cause, or truly from the first cause? 607

Those things having been created in time are not able to be causes why created things were future from eternity. 607

That which is future is determinate and is necessarily future 607

Whether something was future from eternity, out of the desires of the Jesuits? I respond, not in any way [on their terms]. 608 [Rutherford’s reason is that something can only be future as it exists objectively in the decree of God, but they deny that, so their view collapses and nothing can be future.]

Whether the act, or truly the lawlessness or malice of the act may be formally prohibited? 608

Human acts, not the maliciousness or lawlessness of the acts, are formally commanded and prohibited. 608

Whether God properly dispensed with the law when He commanded Abraham to slay his only begotten son? I respond, it is not at all true. 610

God never dispenses with his law. 610

Whether it is certain that God has a positive dominion and rule in non-entities which are never created? I respond: it is most certain. 610

The dominion of God in all non-entities and those things which are never future. 610

Whether the active hardening of God is formally a positive act, or are immanent and transient acts? I respond: The will or decree to harden in God is an immanent and eternal act, but the active hardening of God, as it is the execution of that decree, is what is temporaneous and transient. 611

Active hardening in God, how far it is a positive act. 611

Whether the will of sign & the permitting will may coincide? 611

What the will of sign is in this disputation 611

Concerning decretive will 611

Additions:

Concerning a conflict in God’s will as it is falsely imputed to our side 613

There is no conflict between the wills of God. 613

The poor Disputer says that God approves something, Himself permitting 613

In what way God wills an act He is able to will. 614

Concerning the Will of Approval and the Will of Good-Pleasure, a debater is examined who says that God wills every possibility 615-620

Moreover, indeed, it is queried out of the Disputer, in what way God wills a future thing, and by what mode possibilities? whether by the same will? 615

Whether God wills possibilities. 615

That the will of God from eternity has been determined in intrinsic actions as well as extrinsic. 616

The approving will is in every way rejected by the Disputer in that sense by which it is used by us 617

The Disputer wills men to be able to break the will of God, both of good-pleasure and of sign 618

The permitting will of God does not maintain itself purely negatively around sin 619

Errata 620

Voet, Paul – Prime Philosophy Reformed (Utrecht: Waesberg, 1657) 655 pp. ToC

Paul Voet (1619-1667) was the son of Gisbert Voet and a professor of metaphysics, logic and law at Utrecht.

Heereboord, Adrian – Philosophical Outlines [Meletemata], in which Most Things in Metaphysics are Ventilated, the Whole of Ethics… is Explained, Universal Physics is Expounded through Theorems & Commentaries, & a Sum of Logical Things is Given through Disputations… 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1659) ToC

Table of Contents

Dedicatory Epistle
To the Reader
ToC

A Collection of Logic, or [Disputations of] Logical Positions

1. On Philosophy & the Nature of Logic 1
2. On Predications in General & on Substance in Specific 2
3. On Quantity
4. On Quality
5. On Relations
6. Six Predications Following 8
7. On Predications 10
8. On a Whole & Part, & a Cause & Causation in General 11
9. On Matter, Form & End 13
10. On the Efficient Cause
11. On Subject & Adjunct
12. On Union & Distinction
13. On Opposition & Order
14. On Interpretation, Simple & Composite
15. On the Four Instruments of Knowing

A Collection of Physics

1. On the Principles of Natural Bodies 1
2. On Nature, the Efficient Cause, End, Quantity, Quality & Place
3. On Motion & Time
4. On the World & Heaven
5. On the Elements 19
6. On Generation & Corruption 23
7. On Meteors 27
8. On Mixture & Temperament 30
9. On the Soul 35
10. On the Vegetative Soul 39
11. On the Sentient Soul
12. On Sight
13. On Hearing, Smelling, Taste, Touch, etc. & Internal Sense in General 53
14. On Internal Sense in Specific, on the Sensitive & Locomotive Appetite 57
15. On the Rational Soul 62

A Collection of Ethics

1. On the Constitution of Practical Philosophy 1
2. On the Highest Good 8
3. On the Highest Good, pt. 2 13
4. On the Highest Good, pt. 3 17
5. On Spontaneity 22
[Sic] On the Highest Good, pt. 4 17
6. On Unwillingness 26
7. On Mixed Actions 31
8. On the Practical Intellect & Right Reason 35
9. On the Will 38
10. On the Motive of the Will 42
11. On Free Choice 48
12. On the Affections in General 54
13. On the Affections of Cause & Division 57
14. On Virtue in General & that of the Intellect in Specific 61
15. On Prudence 64
16. On Moral Virtue in General 68
17. On the Causes of Moral Virtue 71
18. On the Conservation, Corruption & Opposition of Moral Virtue 75
19. On the Division of Moral Virtue & the Definition of Fortitude 79
20. On the Division of, Limits of & Some Questions on, Fortitude 82
21. On Temperance 86
22. On Liberality 89
23. On the Limits & Magnificence of Liberality 93
24. On Magnanimity & Modesty 96
25. On Custom[?] 100
26. On Courtesy 105
27. On Veracity 108
28. On Buffoonery 113
29. On Universal Justice 118
30. On Particular Justice 123
31. On Friendship 132

Dedicatory Epistle 1

On the Natural Knowledge of God 21
Counsel on the Reason to Study Philosophy 27
An Academic Sermon on the Right Rule of Disputing Philosophically 29

pt. 1

Preliminaries 1, on Substance 1
Preliminaries 2, on Accidents 4

1. On Person 7
2. On Infinite Being 10
3. On the Natural Knowledge of God 14
4. On a Property [Proprio] 17
5. On Relation 21
6. On the Origin of the Rational Soul 24
7. On the Concursus of God 27
8. On the Concursus of the First Cause 30
9. On the Concursus of God 34
10. On the Concursus of the First Cause 38
11. On the Concursus of the First Cause 41
12. On Angels 44
13. On Angels 2 48
14. On Angels 3 51
15. On Angels 4 55
16. On Angels 5 58
17. On Necessity 61
18. On Contingency 62
19. 1^stpart, Contra the Possibility of an Eternal World 67
20. 2^ndpart, Contra the Possibility of an Eternal World 71
21. On the Immutability of the Divine Knowledge [Scientia] 75
22. On the Simplicity of God 78
23. On the Power of God 82
24. On the Will of God 85
25. On the Will of God Again 89
26. On the Eternity of God 93
27. On the Immutability of God 96
28. On the Immensity of God 100
29. On the Origin of a Rational Soul 104
30. On the Knowledge [Scientia] of God 107
31. On the Mode & Partition of the Divine Knowledge [Scientia] 110
32. On the Communication of Properties [Propriorum] 115
33. On Abstraction 118
34. On the Good 121
35. On Forms, pt. 1 125
36. On Forms, pt. 2 129
36. On Forms, pt. 3 134
37. On Forms, pt. 4 137
38. On the Aristotelian Definition of Form 146
39. On the Law, in Common 149
40. On the Eternal Law 152
41. On the Law of Nature 155
42. On Human Law 158
43. On the Immortality of the Rational Soul 161
44. On Innate Quality [Ingenio] 165
45. On Cognition 168
46. On a Free Cause 172
47. On a Free Cause 175
48. On Real Being 179
49. On Real Being 182
50. On Rational Being 185

pt. 2

1. On the Actual Inhering of an Accident 189
2. On the Identity of Quantity with Matter 192
3. On the Aristotelian Definition of the Highest Good & Virtue, & the Connection of Virtues 195
4. On the Distinction of an Accident from Substance, pt. 1 199
5. On the Distinction of an Accident from Substance, pt. 2 202
6. On the Distinction of an Accident from Substance, pt. 3 205
7. On the Distinction of an Accident from Substance, pt. 4 208
8. On the Distinction of an Accident from Substance, pt. 5 211
9. On the Use of Philosophy in Theology 213
10. On the Abuse of Philosophy in Theology 218
11. On the Use of Metaphysics in other disciplines, especially Theology 222
12. On the Division of the Efficient Cause into Procreating & Conserving, Eminently & Actively 225
13. On the Eminent & Crossing-Over Cause 229
14. On a Free Cause 232
15. On an Efficient Cause, in and of itself, & through an accident 238
16. On the Division of an Efficient Cause into Principle & Less Principle 241
17. On the Division of an Efficient Cause into Primary & Secondary 245
18. On the Division of an Efficient Cause into Primary & Secondary, pt. 2 248
19. On the Division of an Efficient Cause into Primary & Secondary, pt. 3 251
20. On the Division of an Efficient Cause into Primary & Secondary, pt. 4 254
21. On the Division of an Efficient Cause into Primary & Secondary, pt. 5 257
22. On the Division of an Efficient Cause into Proximate & Remote, Total & Partial 261
23. On the Final Cause 264
24. On the Final Cause, Again 267
25. On the Subject & Adjunct 270
26. On the Subject & Adjunct, pt. 2 273
27. On Agreement & Distinction 276
28. On Agreement, especially Simplicity 280
29. On the Distinction of Things 283
30. On the Distinction of Things 286
31. On Ideas, pt. 1 289
32. On Ideas, pt. 2 291
33. On Ideas, pt. 3 294
34. On Ideas, pt. 4 296
35. On Ideas, pt. 5 299
36. On Ideas, pt. 6 302
37. On the Eternal Essences of Things 305
38. On the Ordained & Absolute Power of God, pt. 1 305
39. On the Ordained & Absolute Power of God, pt. 2 308
40. On the Ordained & Absolute Power of God, pt. 3 314
41. On the Power of God 317
42. On the Power of God, Again 320
43. On the 3rd Book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ch. 1, texts 1 & 2 322
44. On Prime Cognition 327
45. On the Liberty of Philosophizing 330
46. On Encyclopedia 334
47. On Man 336
48. On the Reason for Philosophizing 339
49. On the Nature of Material Things 341
50. On Continuous Composition 343

An Appendix of a Certain Few Disputations held in the Theological College in the Ordinary Disputing

On Atoms 347
Contra the Fourness of the Elements, pt. 1 350
Contra the Fourness of the Elements, pt. 2 353
Contra the Same Number of the Elements, pt. 3 355
Contra the Same Number of Them, pt. 4, & specially on Air 358
On Rational Entities 401?
Whether True Philosophy is Contrary to Sacred Theology & Vice-Versa? 363
On the Use of Human Reason in Theology & Questions of Faith 368
Whether God is a Universal or Singular Subject [Thema] or Being 373
On the Origin & Progress of Philosophy 378

Ethical Exercises

1. On the Existence of Ethics & its Distinction from Theology 1
2. On the Essence & Definition of Ethics 7
3. On the Difference, Division & Use of Ethics 11
4. On the Chief Good 16
5. On the Chief Good, pt. 2 21
6. On the Chief Good, pt. 3 25
7. On the Chief Good, pt. 4 30
8. On the Chief Good, pt. 5 34
9. On the Chief Good, pt. 6 38
10. On the Subject or Object of Ethics 42
11. On Some Questions about the Intellect & Will 46
12. On Some Questions about an Act of the Human Will 49
13. On Questions about the Object of the Human Will 53
14. On Objections Against the Determination of the Human Will from the Last Judgment of the Practical Intellect 57
15. On Objections Against the Determination of the Human Will from the Last Judgment of the Practical Intellect, pt. 2 62
16. On Objections Against the Determination of the Human Will from the Last Judgment of the Practical Intellect, pt. 3 66
17. On Objections Against the Nature of Free Choice 70
18. On the Affections in General 75
19. On the Affections in Specific 79
20. On the Affections in Specific 82
21. On the Affections in Specific 87
22. On Questions about Spontaneous Actions, Unwilling & Mixed 92
23. On Good & Evil in General 95
24. On Moral Goodness & Malice 99
25. On Moral Virtue 102
26. On Moral Virtue, pt. 2 106
27. On Moral Virtue, pt. 3 109
28. On the Division of Moral Virtues & the Connection of Them Between Themselves 113
29. On the Connection or Separation of Moral Virtues, whether Equal or Unequal 117
30. On the Difference of Virtues between Gentiles & the Faithful, or Between Pagans & Christians 121
31. On the Various Division of Moral Virtues, & in Specific on the Heroic Virtue 125
32. On Human Virtue 128
33. On Some Questions about Fortitude 131
34. On Some Questions about Fortitude 134
35. On Suicide & Duelling 137
36. On Duelling 142
37. On the Question whether it may be Lawful to Repel Force with Force & to Kill an Invader 145
38. On the Question: On Account of which Things or Causes may it be Lawful to Kill an Invader? 149
39. On War, pt. 1 153
40. On War, pt. 2 160
41. On War, pt. 3 163
42. On War, pt. 4 167
43. On Questions about Temperance 169
44. On Some Questions about Temperance 172
45. On Some Questions about Liberality 177
46. On Some Questions about the Limits of Liberality & Magnificence 179
47. On Some Questions about Magnanimity & Modesty 182
48. On Some Questions about Mildness 185
49. On Some Questions about Social Virtues 188
50. On Moral Cases about Temperance 192
51. On Moral Cases about Liberality 196
52. On Moral Cases about Liberality 200
53. On Various Questions & Morals about Liberality 205
54. On Questions & Moral Cases about Magnanimity, Modesty & Mildness 209
55. On Some Moral Questions about Mildness 213
56. On Some Moral Questions about Veracity, & Specially of Falsehood 218
57. On Some Moral Questions about Veracity, & Specially of Equivocations & Mental Reservations 221
58. On Various Questions about Veracity 225
59. On Some Moral Questions about Courtesy & Bafoonery 229
60. On Some Questions about Universal Justice 233
61. On Some Questions about Particular Justice 236
62. On Some Questions about Justice, Right & Injury 241
63. On Some Questions about Friendliness 245

Greydanus, Johannes – Institutions of Metaphysics, in a Threefold Tract (Franeker, 1660) 434 pp. ToC Index

Greydanus (1630-1668) was a reformed professor of philosophy at Franeker.

Tract 1, Of Precognitions

Intro 1

1. Nature of philosophy 2
2. Nature of metaphysics 25
3. Prerequisites 43

1. Being 43
2. Middle between being and nothing, in general 48
3. Modes of beings 53
4. Relation 63
5. External denomination 74
6. Rational being 78
7. Being in potential 89
…

Grebenitz, Elias – The Metaphysics of Philosophy & Theology (Frankfurt, 1677) 251 pp.

Grebenitz (1627-1689) was a reformed professor of logic, metaphysics and theology at Frankfurt.

Incomplete Table of Contents

Dedicatory Epistle
To the Reader

Summary ToC
General Part

Bk. 1, On Being 6
Bk. 2, On the Principles of Being 25
Bk. 3, On the Affections of Being 27
…

Special Part

Bk. 1, On the Division of Being 152
Bk. 2, [Greek] 222

Errata

Bibliography

Johnson, Charles – ‘Metaphysics’ in ‘A Reformed Reading List’ (2023)

Johnson gives nine suggested works, all in Latin, at the guidance of Voet. Johnson gives some of his own (reliable) thoughts on the usefulness (or lack thereof) of metaphysics as an introduction.

Related Pages

On the Use of Reason in Theology

A Proof for God

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