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Subsections
Passive Obedience
Cooperation with Evil
Unjust Taxes
Implicit & After the Fact Consent
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Order of Contents
Intro
Articles 8+
Books 8+
Quotes 4+
Historical Context 1
Conforming Sooner than Later 1
May Petition for Good 4+
Take Oaths to? 4
Holding Office under 3
Latin 1
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Intro
Coming in the Future
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Articles
1600’s
Ascham, Anthony
A Combat between Two Seconds: One for Obeying the Present Government, the other, the Second Part, of a Demurrer undeservedly called Religious (London, 1649) 18 pp.
A Reply to a Paper of Dr. Sanderson’s, containing a censure of Mr. A.A. his book of the Confusions and Revolution of Government (London: 1650) 22 pp.
“The state of the controversy: Whether in order to public obedience in civil government, the consideration of the things commanded (as they are not in themselves bad) be above the circumstantial qualification of the persons commanding? As to do the offices of a judge or justice of the peace by virtue of commission derived from any governor whatever.” – p. 2
Sanderson, Robert – A Resolution of Conscience (by a learned divine) in Answer to a letter sent with Mr. Ascham’s book, treating how far it may be lawful to submit to an usurped power. Out of which men may satisfy their scruples concerning the present Subscription and Engagement [to Cromwell’s regime] (London: 1649) 6 pp.
“Upon perusal of Mr. Ascham’s book you left with me, I find not myself in my understanding thereby convinced of the necessity or lawfulness of conforming unto, or complying with an unjust prevailing power further than I was before persuaded. It might be lawful or necessary so to do: viz. as I paying taxes and submitting to some other things (in themselves not unlawful) by
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3. Without any explicit or implicit acknowledgment of the justice and legality of their power: I may submit to the [Greek] (to the force), but not acknowledge the [Greek] (the authority), or by any [of] my voluntary act give strength, assistance or countenance thereunto.
4. Without any prejudice unto the claim of the oppressed party that has a right, title; or casting myself into an incapacity of lending him my due and bounden assistance, if in time to come it may be useful to him towards the recovery of his right.
5. Where I may reasonably and bona fide [with good faith] presume the oppressed power (to whom my obedience is justly due), if he perfectly knew the present condition I am in together with the exigence and necessity of the present case and all of circumstances thereof, would give his willing consent to such my conformity and compliance.
So that upon the whole matter and in short, I conceive I may so far submit unto the impositions or comply with the persons of a prevailing usurped power unjustly commanding things not in themselves unlawful, or make use of their power to protect one from other’s injuries, as I may submit unto, comply with or make use of a highway thief or robber when I am fallen into his hands and lie at his mercy.
As for Mr. Ascham ‘s discourse, though it be handsomely framed, yet all the strength of it (to my seeming) lie’s upon two principles, which (if he would speak out) would be in plain English these:
1. That self-preservation is the first and chiefest obligation in the world, to which all other bonds and relations (at least between man and man) must give place.
2. That no oath, at least no imposed oath, at what terms soever expressed, binds the taker further than he intended to bind himself thereby; and, it is presumed, that no man intended to bind himself to the prejudice of his own safety.
[These are] Two dangerous and desperate principles which evidently tend:
1. to the taking away of all Christian fortitude and suffering in a righteous cause;
2. to the encouraging of daring and ambitious spirits to attempt continual innovations, with this confidence, that if they can by any ways (how unjust soever) possess themselves of the supreme power, they ought to be submitted unto;
3. to the obstructing unto the oppressed party all possible ways and means, without a miracle, of ever recovering that just right of which he shall have been unjustly dispossessed; and (to omit further instancing)
4. to the bringing in of atheism with the contempt of God and all religion, whilst every man, by making his own preservation the measure of all his duties and actions, makes himself thereby his own idol.”
Rutherford, Samuel – A Treatise on the Nature of Obedience to a Usurped Power
This treatise by Rutherford has not been published in modern times. The occasion for it was the English, Oliver Cromwell’s invasion of Scotland. The Protesting party of the Scottish Church had the decision before them, in light of inevitable subjugation, whether they should cooperate with this illegitimate civil power or not.
Rutherford “argued it was lawful to give [limited and qualified, material] obeidence to an usurped power.” He gives the analogy of a highjacking of a ship, and persons helping the highjacker to safely navigate the ship, for the preservation of all. That is what the Protestors did: while openly rebuking Cromwell and showing him his great immorality, they yet cooperated with him and counselled him unto the glory of God in governing Scotland during the inter-regnum period (the period between the kings, namely Charles I and Charles II) in the 1650’s.
This topic, of being taken over by an illegitimate foreign power, was commonly treated (with different answers, by different parties) in England in that time, though it will take some time to collect the resources on it. For further information on Rutherford’s Treatise and what he had to say, see the podcast by Reformation Scotland, ‘Conscience, Obedience & an Unwanted Government – Dalkeith Palace – SFH076’ at 4:42 ff.
Gee, Edward – A Plea for Non-Subscribers to the Engagement (1650)
Reynolds, Edward et al. – The Humble Proposals of Sundry Learned & Pious Divines within this Kingdome concerning the Engagement intended to be Imposed on them for their Subscriptions (London, 1650) 6 pp.
This was responded to by Dury below.
“We ministers of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, who have all of us from the beginning faithfully served the parliament and have in pursuance of those great and honorable ends of just liberty and reformation suffered many and grievous things in our names and estates from the common enemy: and to this day have adhered to our first principles and do still promise in our places and stations to maintain the peace of this nation, and to pay obedience to the laws thereof; conceiving it our duty in such a time as this, in all ways of meekness and humility to endeavor the preservation of our inward peace and outward safety, being straightened in conscience upon the case of the present Engagement, do humbly offer these ensuing particulars:
1. That although we hold ourselves bound by our former solemn covenants and engagements, in that sense of them wherein they were by public authority imposed on us, yet being convinced of the necessity of civil government in a land, for the preservation of human society and prevention of all those evils which the outrages of wicked men unrestrained would produce, and upon mature deliberation considering that when the wise and holy providence of God (whose judgments are unsearchable and ways past finding out) shall at any time so shake the foundations of states and kingdoms as to disable one government from affording protection and preservation and to admit any other to obtain it; it is not then strange to the will of God, light of Nature, judgment of the learned and practice of Christians in former ages, nor to our own principles or former engagements, to live quietly and peaceably in our places and callings and to submit to such things as are imposed upon or required of us by the powers which are in actual possession, being things in themselves lawful and necessary to the preservation of ourselves and others (for this we conceive may be done without disputing the right or title of those that are in place of magistracy): we do upon these premises declare that we will accordingly behave ourselves.
2. That we do humbly conceive that there is a great difference between these things and a subscription to this Engagement, in the words wherein it is required, and that in diverse respects:
First, this subscription (as to our consciences) does imply an approbation of the present establishment, as effected by a full and a free authority.
Secondly, an active concurrence, and as it were a ratifying consent of the people thereunto, it having been declared that the original of all just power is in the people.
Thirdly, an obligation, to act in all times, in all places and capacities to the promoting and strengthening of it, and not only of it (but by a parity of reason) of any other, which by the possible advantage of power, may at any time hereafter, even to the prejudice and ruin of this, set up itself, and then require of us the like subscription.
3. Being by this Engagement bound up to these particulars, as the words seem to import, we further conceive that we shall by this subscription violate those former engagements, in oaths, protestations and in the Solemn League and Covenant [1643], wherein we were by the former commands of parliament obliged, in which last particular, if the time we entered into it be considered, viz. In the day of our extremity, or the religious solemnity, with hands lifted up to the most high God; or the matter of it, which is comprehensive of things sacred and civil, and particularly of the rights and privileges of parliament, and the liberties of the kingdom: or the sense wherein we then took it; or the asseveration, that we would never be drawn from it, by any terror or combination whatsoever; or the durable obligation which we brought upon ourselves by it, even all the days of our lives; or the considerations which we had before our eyes in the taking of it, namely the glory of God, the advancement of the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the happiness of the king and his posterity.
These things being duly considered, do leave such an awful impression on our consciences, that unless the consistency thereof with this Engagement be made unquestionably clear unto us, it cannot but render our consciences trembling and doubtful, and so the act of engaging, by the apostle’s rule, to us unlawful, as by a parity of reason it would have been undoubtedly inconsistent with our covenant to have subscribed an Engagement to the king and lords without the commons of England, if it should by their agreement and authority have been required of us.
4. These things being considered in the nature of the Engagement, and in the full relation to which it stands to former engagements, cannot in our judgments but minister matter of general scandal and offense to multitudes of men, both good and bad, many of whom being not able to make, or happily so much as understand subtle distinctions whereby guilt may either be evaded or palliated, will look upon us as breakers of our oaths and covenants, as prevaricators of the most sacred and solemn things, as men of ductile spirits, and prostituted consciences, led by principles of fear or interest: which prejudice (though we would grant, were more founded in the ignorance and mistakes of these men than many solid and just reasons) would yet grossly wound the Gospel, expose our ministry to scorn (the honor whereof ought to be dearer to us than our lives) endanger the reputation, and so weaken the power of it in the consciences of our hearers (who though through fear or other private ends may themselves have subscribed, yet retain low thoughts of us, as if we acted on the like principles) as that we cannot but believe, but Christ would be a greater looser by our subscription than the state can any way be a gainer by it; we desire always to keep in mind the noble resolution of the apostle, who would not in case of scandal use his own just power, but chose rather to suffer all things, lest he should bind the Gospel of Christ, and concluded it was better for him to die than that any in that behalf should make his glorying void.
Upon these and such like grounds, purely conscientious, and not out of any private interest or design, contrary to the peace of this commonwealth, we are 〈◊〉 to forbear subscription, until either by solemn debate of the Engagement (as of the covenant) or otherwise, our consciences shall be cleared of important scruples.
So we humbly crave leave further to represent that our former governors (not duly considering that men even in highest authority as well as others are by the doctrine of the Scriptures concerning scandal, bound to avoid the laying of snares and stumbling-blocks in the way of their brethren) 〈◊〉 not only attempted (as in their late canon • to impose an 〈◊〉 oath, but also enforced subscriptions on many godly and learned ministers, to the utter undoing of themselves and families, and that with such vigor that the beginning of king James’s government was with the deprivation of 3 or 〈◊〉 of them: and though we shall not take upon us to charge upon that severity of theirs the consequences which have followed, yet we may offer this observation, that sundry examples may be given of governors who have laid the unhappy foundation of ensuing evils to themselves and their people, in the beginning of their government.
And therefore we do presume that those in present power (according to their professed principles and resolutions, to have respect to tender consciences) will not 〈◊〉 us to the sad dilemma of choosing either sin or affliction, and hope that the many years’ experience of our quiet behavior and faithful service may give them a better assurance and security for our peaceable conversation than the feigned subscriptions of very many who profess themselves not engaged by this Engagement, but use •• s a protection of their estates and a cover under which they hide and keep warm their former malignity, and who certainly would rejoice at, and take the advantage of that sad division which is likely to ensue amongst those who have co-operated in the common cause of reformation and just liberty.
We being at present shut up under such considerations as these, do humbly beseech those in present power not to compel us (whose reputation is as necessary for others as a good conscience for ourselves) to draw reproach upon religion, and vilify the reputation of the ministry, by which the service of Jesus Christ is advanced, and cause others to think we esteem oaths as changeable as opinions; and so brand us with the odious mark of 〈◊〉 and prevarication, subject us to the contempt 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of all, as men of loose and uncertain principles, lay foundations to ourselves of subscribing anything hereafter upon the same grounds, and that unto these things we may not be enforced by so high and heavy a penalty 〈◊〉 to be outlawed of our birthright, which is a punishment too heavy to be inflicted for no crime, and as we conceive, can hardly be exampled to have been inflicted on any but persons of infamous note, with whom (we may speak without vanity) we have not deserved to be numbered, until by willful violation of the laws, we deprive ourselves of their protection, [and] forfeit the benefit of them.”
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Dury, John
Considerations Concerning the Present Engagement: Whether it May Lawfully be Taken, Yea or No? (London, 1650) 25 pp. Dury’s answer is ‘Yes’.
Just Re-Proposals to Humble Proposals, or an Impartial consideration of, and answer unto, the Humble Proposals, which are printed in the name of sundry learned and pious divines, concerning the Engagement… (London, 1650) 30 pp. ToC
Dury was for taking the Engagement of allegiance to the usurping Commonwealth, contra the royal line.
These two above works by Dury were responded to by: A Pack of Old Puritans maintaining the Unlawfulness & Inexpediency of Subscribing the New Engagement, Professing the Dissatisfaction of their Judgements & the Unresolvedness of their Consciences with Mr. John Dury’s Considerations & Just Reproposals concerning it & Answering the Most Material Allegations that are Urged by Him or Others for Subscription (London, 1650) 35 pp.
Baxter, Richard – Five Disputations of Church-Government & Worship (London, 1659)
15. ‘Reasons for obedience in lawful things’
Hammond, Henry – Dr. Hammond’s Brief Resolution of that Grand Case of Conscience (necessary for these times) concerning the Allegiance due to a prince ejected by force out of his kingdoms; and how far the subjects may comply with a present usurped power (London, 1689) 4 pp.
Hammond (1605-1660). This was originally written in reference to Charles II fleeing to a foreign country in light of Cromwell’s usurpation, but was republished at the Glorious Revolution, after king James II fled and William of Orange came to occupy England, with the consent of the English parliament, etc.
Hammond’s treatment presupposes his royalist presuppositions.
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Books
1600’s
Ascham, Anthony
A Discourse, wherein is Examined what is Particularly Lawful during the Confusions & Revolutions of Government, or How far a man may conform to the powers and commands of those who hold kingdoms divided by civil or foreign wars, whether it be 1. in paying taxes, 2. in personal service, 3. in taking oaths… (London, 1648) 170 pp. ToC
Of the Confusions & Revolutions of Governments… (London: 1649) 210 pp.
This is the same as Ascham’s A Discourse above, with nine additional chapters.
This work was most likely Ascham‘s, though attributed by EEBO-TCP to Rouse.
Rouse, Francis – The Lawfulness of Obeying the Present Government & Acting Under it with Some Other Additions to a Former Edition, by One that loves All Presbyterian Lovers of Truth & Peace & is of Their Communion (London, 1649) 22 pp.
This work was replied to by The Grand Case of Conscience below.
Wiki on Ascham: “His [Antony Ascham’s] first published work was A Discourse, wherein is Examined what is Particularly Lawful during the Confusions & Revolutions of Government: or, How far a Man may Conform to the Powers & Commands of Those who Hold Kingdoms Divided by Wars… This appeared in 1648, probably in July at the height of the political uncertainty engendered by the second Civil War. The previous month the Army [of the English Parliament] had shown that it wielded both political and military power and Ascham’s Discourse was widely seen as a defense of the Army as the conquering power, and as a plea for ‘the rank of the people’ to adopt a position of political quiescence.
Parliament’s ultimate victory [over King Charles I] and the establishment of the Commonwealth [of Cromwell] posed a problem for those who felt unable to accept the legality of the new government but were now being required to give it their allegiance, and also for those who regarded their oath of allegiance to King Charles I… as a solemn oath to God that could not be broken. One argument, provided by a group of political theorists variously called the Engagers, or de facto theorists, was to argue that an individual could give their obedience to the de facto government in being simply because it was in power.
For many such a theory was deeply shocking since it emphasized power at the expense of authority, and subordinated allegiance to self-interest. The debate was initiated by Francis Rous who published a brief pamphlet in April 1649 [The Lawfulness of Obeying the Present Government] in which he argued that allegiance could be given to the Commonwealth even though it were acknowledged to be an illegal power [there was no provision in England’s laws for anything but a monarchy]. It was a radical shift in the basis of the argument that was to be followed through by theorists engaged in the debate on de facto government.
In the debate that followed Ascham [(c. 1614–1650), a reformed, puritan, British academic, political theorist, Parliamentarian and diplomat] played a major part in developing a theory of political obligation to the de facto power…”
This replies to Rouse’s work and de facto philosophy.
Gee, Edward
An Exercitation concerning Usurped Powers: wherein the Difference betwixt Civil Authority & Usurpation is Stated. That the obedience due to lawful magistrates, is not owing, or payable, to usurped powers, is maintained. The obligation of oaths and other sanctions to the former, notwithstanding the antipolity of the latter is asserted. And the arguments urged on the contrary part in diverse late printed discourses are answered… (London, 1650) 88 pp. ToC
Gee (1613–1660) was an English Presbyterian minister. This was written defending the rightful rule of king Charles II in the context of Oliver Cromwell’s usurpation.
Gee argues that one ought not to swear allegiance to Cromwell in that context (as the bindingness of one’s previous oath to the king and his progeny continued), though one might perform necessary actions in concurrence with the usurpers’ commands, including paying taxes (in ch. 3), though not acting as a public official in the usurpers’ regime. Gee argues for the continuance of the SL&C (which uphold’s the king’s authority) in ch. 4, against others who thought it had expired or become non-applicable in the context.
This work has also been attributed to Richard Hollinworth (1607–1656) and Charles Herle (1598–1659), English presbyterians, “but there can be little doubt that Edward Gee (1613–1660) was the author,” according to the DNB on Hollinworth.
“Usurpation is an intrusion into the seat of authority, a presuming to possess and manage the place and power thereof without a lawful calling, right, or title thereunto.” – p. 1
“When our Saviour Christ (who being such an extraordinary Person, might have warrant to do what would have been presumption in any other) was appealed to in a cause that appertained to the civil magistrate’s decision, He refused to deal in it with these words, ‘Who made me a judge or a divider over you?’ according to which words of Him who was the truth, he that may rule must be placed in that office by some body and may not undertake it of himself: no man may take this honor to himself or be his own advancer to the throne; but he must be installed by another: and what other creature, besides the nation itself can challenge a power to appoint over it its rulers is not to me imaginable. Angels are not of this economy, do not intermeddle in this business, and for other people, or foreign states, they are but in an equality, and have no partnership in this matter; they have no more to do to impose governors over their neighbors than they have reciprocally over them…
A calling from the people who are to be subject, being so necessary and essential to a humanly constituted magistracy, it is easy to discern what is usurpation, viz: that which is opposite to it, or privative thereof, which is a snatching hold of the scepter and wresting it out of the hands of those who are to dispose of it or have it committed to them…” – p. 3
“In regard of the justness and necessity of some things which may be the subject or matter of the usurpers’ command and the arbitrariness of others, and the lawfulness of either, not depending upon the command or warrant of a superior, but resulting out of the nature of the action itself; so that a private man might do it, were there no magistrate to command it, or no command from the magistrate for it.
We must needs grant there are things which may be done upon the usurpers’ command or injunction (though not because or by virtue of it) for the command of him that unwarrantably assumes power cannot, by itself, make that unlawful which were lawful if that were not. For instance, the performance of acts of common equity, charity, order, public utility and self-preservation is requisite: suppose it be in concurrence with a usurpers’ command, and in thus doing we do materially, but not formally obey him; the ground of acting in such things being not at all any relation or principle of subjection to him, but conscience of obedience to the will of God and due respect to others and our own safety and good. Under this sort of actions I comprehend:
1. Taking up arms for the preservation of ourselves and the country against a common enemy, upon the usurpers’ summons; the which we might do of ourselves, were there no authority; or if a just authority were in being, yet if it could not, or did not, maturely enough call us forth to it.
2. Payment of taxes and bearing other impositions for the usurping power, where, and while we are under his compulsive power, because such contributions may, and will be taken whether I will pay them or not; and I yield them under his enforcement, as a ransom for my life, or liberty, or somewhat else that is better to me than the payment; and consequently I am to choose the parting with it as the less evil, rather than with that which is better, which to loose is to incur a greater evil for the avoidance of a less…
3. Complaining, petitioning or going to law before the magistrates or courts authorized by the usurpers provided you give not the usurpers to whom you petition such titles as you give to the lawful magistrate).
(“…excusantur à peccato inducendi tyrannum ad actum, et opus illicitum petentes ab illo iustitiam, quia non petunt actum illicitum, sed justitiam illius actus illiciti…
pie interpretandae sunt petitiones tam iustitiae quam honestae gratiae quae offeruntur tyrannis, s. si vis, seu ex quo vis detinere, et exercere hoc dominium, utere illo iuste, utere honeste, utere pie, utere ad utilitatem publicam, et privatorum, prout deceret dominium…
nec intendunt, nec petunt actum usurpatum, sed qualitatem sanctam inactu usurpato exercendo.” Cajetan, Summula [Venice: Carampellum, 1596], title: Rempublicam tyrannice occupare… [pp. 411-12])
In thus doing, I seek my necessary self-preservation; neither do I yield or ascribe to them to whom I have recourse any just power of judicature or participate in their sin of usurping it; only I acknowledge they have might and ability in their hand to right me; which, though they ought not to assume, yet I may take the benefit of their unjust use of it; as a poor man may receive relief at the hands of him that has gotten those goods he distributes unjustly; and I may receive my money, with a good conscience, from the hands of a thief that is willing to return it to me though he took it by robbery from another thief that robbed me of it; and if the party, with whom I have a controversy for my right will agree to refer the matter betwixt us to a private person as an arbitrator, and stand to his arbitrement; that is a lawful means of coming by my own, though by his help and award that has not claim of authority over me…
But, in granting liberty of concurrence with some commands of an usurped authority, we neither yield any obedience at all to be due, or performable to it; nor can we allow a correspondence with it in diverse things, and therefore we are to put a difference:
First, betwixt things that are in themselves necessary, and those that are of a middle or an indifferent nature in themselves considered…
2. Betwixt moral, or prudential acts competible [competent] to private men or subjects, and political acts or judicial proceedings that flow from power and authority inherent in the person that acts them, or are the issues of distributive justice, and either come forth from a person clothed with government, or unto which is requisite a stamp of authority to make them lawful, and justifiable: as to bear the office of a magistrate, or commander in civil or military affairs, or to be any under agent, or servant in carrying on, or assisting the government.” – pp. 22-25
A Vindication of the Oath of Allegiance in Answer to a Paper Dispersed by Mr. Samuel Eaton, Pretending to Prove the Oath of Allegiance Void & Non-Obliging, wherein his Positions Against it are Examined & Confuted (London, 1650) 48 pp. ToC
Eaton (1596?–1665) was an Independent minister whose thought and political philosophy reflected and defended the populist, Cromwellian regime. Eaton responded to Gee below. Gee’s perspective reflects a more traditional English political philosophy.
The Divine Right & Original of the Civil Magistrate from God, (as it is drawn by the Apostle St. Paul in those words, Rom. 13:1, ‘There is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God’) illustrated and vindicated in a treatise (chiefly) upon that text, wherein the procedure of political dominion from God, by his ordination … is endeavored truly and plainly to be laid open (London, 1658) 371 pp. ToC
William Vilant (a Scottish presbyterian minister) called this work “excellent”.
Dury, John – A Second Parcel of Objections Against the Taking of the Engagement Answered. Or the Doubts which Some Godly Ministers in some Neighbor Counties Entertained Upon that Subject; as they were Proposed in Several Letters to, & Resolved by J.D. Whereunto is occasionably Annexed a Discovery of the Weakness of the Plea of the Cheshire & Lancashire Ministers for Non-Subscribing (London, 1650) 106 pp. ToC
Eaton (1596?–1665) was an English Independent divine.
Previously the population had taken an oath of allegiance to King Charles I, his heirs and successors. The king was put on trial and beheaded (1649). The radical republican regime (later to be headed up by Cromwell) instituted an Engagement oath to their government. The question was whether one could morally take this new Engagement oath given their previous oath of allegiance to the royal line. Eaton argues, amongst other things, all such oaths of allegiance are conditional in numerous ways, and not absolute.
In the first paper Eaton briefly sets out two positions on the subject. The English presbyterian Edward Gee, who reflects a more traditional English political philosophy then responded. The third paper is Eaton’s response to Gee, which reflects and defends the political philosophy of the Cromwellian regime.
“National Covenant” in the title refers to the fundamental political ideas and bonds of the English nation, not to the Scottish National Covenant (1638).
Sanderson, Robert – Bishop Sanderson’s Judgment concerning Submission to Usurpers (d. 1663; London, 1678) 45 pp. ToC
Sanderson (1587-1663) was a royalist bishop, theologian and casuist. His writes from the side of the king when either the parliament or Cromwell was in charge, holding them to be usurpers. The main issue is his desire to continue the Anglican Liturgy when it had been put aside by the then current laws. While his episcopalian, royalist perspective is difficult to sympathize with, yet much may be learned from him regarding principles.
“Sir, whereas you desire to know what my judgment and practice is concerning the using or forbearing the established liturgy (either in whole, or in part) in the public service of God and office of the Church: If it be any satisfaction to your friend, I shall fully acquaint you what my practice is (whereunto if my own judgment be not conform, I am, without all excuse, my own condemner) and upon what considerations I have, according to the variation of the times, varied from myself therein.
So long as my congregation continued unmixed with soldiers, as well after as before the promulgation of the ordinance of the two Houses for the abolishing of the Common Prayer, I continued the use of it, as I had ever formerly done in the most peaceable and orderly times, not omitting those very prayers, the silencing whereof I could not but know to have been chiefly aimed at in the ordinance (viz.) three for the King and Queen and bishops; and so I did also though some soldiers were casually present, till such time as a whole troop coming to quarter in the town (with a purpose to continue a kind of garrison or head-quarter among us) were so enraged at my reading of it the first Sunday after they came, that immediately after morning service ended, they seized upon the book and tore it all in pieces. Thenceforward during their continuance there for full six months and upwards (viz.) from the beginning of November till they were called away to Naseby Fight in May following, besides that for want of a book of necessity I must, I saw that it also behooved me, for the preventing of farther outrages, to wave the use of the book for the time, at least in the ordinary service; only I read the confession, the Lord’s Prayer, all the versicles, and the psalms for the day. Then after the first lesson in the forenoon Benedictus or Jubilate; and in the afternoons, Cantate. After the second lesson also, sometimes the Creed, sometimes the Ten Commandments, and sometimes neither, but only sang a psalm and so to sermon. But in all that while, in the administration of the sacraments, the solemnization of matrimony, burial of dead, and churching of women, I constantly used the ancient forms and rites to every of them respectively belonging, according to the appointment in the book; only I was careful in all the rest to make choice of such times and opportunities as I might do them with most secrecy, and without disturbance of the soldier. But at the celebration of the eucharist I was the more secure to do it publicly, because I was assured none of the soldiers would be present.
After their departure I took the liberty to use either the whole liturgy, or but some part of it, omitting sometimes more, sometimes less upon occasion, as I judged it most expedient in reference to the auditory, especially if any soldiers, or other unknown persons happened to be present. But all this while the substance of what I omitted I contrived into my prayer before sermon, the phrase and order only varied, which yet I endeavored to temper in such sort, that any person of ordinary capacity might easily perceive what my meaning was, and yet the words left as little liable to exception or cavil as might be.
About two years ago I was advertised (but in a friendly manner) by a parliament man of note in these parts, that at a public meeting at Grantham, great complaint was made by some ministers of the presbyterian gang, as I afterwards found, of my refractoriness to obey the parliament’s order in that behalf. The gentleman told me withal, that although they knew what my judgment and practice was, yet they were not forward to take notice of it before complaint [was] made, which being now done in so public a manner, if they should not take notice of it, the blame would lie upon them. He therefore advised me to consider well what I had to do, for I must resolve either to adventure the loss of my living, or to lay aside Common Prayer; which if I should continue after complaint and admonition, it would not be in his power, nor in the power of any friend I had to preserve me. The effect of my then answer was, that if the case were so, the deliberation was not hard: I having long ago considered of the case and resolved what I might do with a good conscience, and what was fittest for me in prudence to do, if I should ever be put to it (viz.) to forbear the use of the Common Prayer Book so far as might satisfy the letter of the ordinance rather than forsake my station.
My next business then was to bethink myself of such a course to be thenceforth held in the public work in my own parish, as might be believed neither to bring danger to myself by the use, nor to give scandal to my brethren by the disuse of the established liturgy. And the course was this, to which I have held me ever since:
I begin the service with a preface and an exhortation inferred to make confession of sins; which exhortation I have framed out of the exhortation and absolution in the book, contracted and put together and expressed for the most part in the same words and phrases, but purposely here and there transplaced, that it might appear not to be, and yet to be the very same.
Then follows the confession [of sins] itself in the same order; it was enlarged only with the addition of some words, whereby it is rather explained than altered. The whole frame whereof, both for the fuller satisfaction in that particular and that you may conjecture what manner of addition and change I have made proportionably hereunto (yet none so large) in other parts of the holy office, I have here underwritten:
‘O Almighty God and merciful Father, we thy unworthy servants do with shame and sorrow confess, that we have all our life long gone astray out of thy ways like lost sheep; and that by following too much the vain devices and desires of our own hearts, we have grievously offended against thy holy laws both in thought, word, and deed. We have many times left undone those good duties which we might and ought to have done, and we have many times done those evils, when we might have avoided them, which we ought not to have done.
We confess, O Lord, that there is no health at all, nor help in any Creature to relieve us; but all our hope is in thy mercy, whose justice we have by our sins so far provoked. Have mercy upon us therefore, O Lord, have mercy upon us miserable offenders: Spare us good Lord who confess our faults, that we perish not, but according to thy gracious promises declared unto mankind in Christ Jesus our Lord, restore us upon our true repentance into thy grace and favor.
And grant, O most merciful Father, for his sake, that we henceforth study to serve and please thee by leading a godly, righteous, and sober life, to the glory of thy holy Name, and the eternal comfort of our own souls, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.’
After the confession the Lord’s Prayer with the versicles and Gloria Patri, and then psalms for the day, and the first lesson: After which in the forenoon, sometimes Te Deum (but then only when I think the auditory will bear it) and sometimes a hymn of mine own, gathered out of the psalms and Church collects, as a general form of thanksgiving (which I did the rather, because I have noted the want of such a form as the only thing wherein the liturgy seemed to be defective).
And in the afternoon, after the first lesson the 98th psalm or the 67th; then the second lesson, with Benedictus or Jubilate; after it in the forenoon and afternoon a singing psalm. Then follows the Creed, with Dominus Vobiscum; and sometimes the versicles in the end of our litany, ‘From our Enemies defend us,’ if I liked my auditory, otherwise I omit the versicles. After the Creed, and instead of the litany and the other prayers appointed in the book, I have taken the substance of the prayer I was wont to make before sermon, and disposed it into several collects or prayers, some longer and some shorter, but new modeled into the language of the Common Prayer Book much more than it was before.
And in the pulpit, before sermon I use only a short prayer in reference to the hearing of the Word and no more. So that upon the matter, in these prayers I do but the same thing I did before, save only that what before I spake without book and in a continued form in the pulpit, I now read out of a written book broken into parcels, and in the reading desk or pue. Between which prayers and the singing psalms before the sermon, I do also daily use one other collect, of which sort I have for the purpose composed sundry, made up also (as the former) for the most part out of the Church collects, with some little enlargement or variation; as namely, the collects Adventual, Quadragesimal, Paschal, or Pentecostal, for their proper seasons; and at other times collects of a more general nature, as for pardon, repentance, grace, etc. And after one or more of them in the forenoon, I usually repeat the Ten Commandments, with a short collect after them for grace to enable us to keep them.
This has been my practice and is like still to be, unless some happy change of affairs restore us the liberty of using the old way again or it be made appear to my understanding by some able, charitable friend that I therein have done otherwise than I ought to have done: For I may say that I have not yet met with anything in discourse, either with my own reason or others, of sufficient strength to convince me that I have done anything but what may stand with the principles, as well of Christian simplicity, as prudence.
There are but three things that I know of that are of any consideration opposed, viz.:
1. The obligation of the laws.
2. The scandal of the example.
3. The unseemly symbolizing at least with schismatics, if not partaking with them in the schism.
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Objection 1: Law
The first and strongest objection (which I shall therefore propose to the most advantage of the objector) is that which is grounded upon the laws and their obligation: For it may be objected that every human law rightly established, so long as it continues a law, obliges the subject (and that for conscience sake) to the observation thereof in such manner and form as in the same law is prescribed, and according to the true meaning and intention of the lawgiver therein. That a law is then understood to be rightly established when it contains nothing but what is honest and lawful, and is enacted by such person or persons as have full and sufficient authority to make laws. That a law so established continues a law, and is so in force, till it be either repealed by as good and lawful authority as that by which it was made, or else antiquated by a long continued unenforced disuse with the tacit or presumed consent of the lawgiver. That the act printed before the Common Prayer Book, and entitled, An Act for the Uniformity, was such a law, being it was established in a full and free parliament in peaceable times, and ratified by the royal assent, that it still continues in force, and being not yet repealed, but by such persons as (at least in the opinion of those that maintain the dispute) for want of the royal assent, have not a sufficient right or authority to do such an act, nor disused but of late times, and that by enforcement, and as is presumed, much against the mind of the lawgiver. That therefore it still retains the power of obliging in part of conscience, that power being so essential and intrinsical to every law, quatenus [as far as] a law, that it can in no wise be severed from it.
And that therefore no minister publicly officiating in the Church can with a good conscience either omit any part of that which is commanded by the aforesaid law or use any other form than what is contained in the foresaid book, but must either use the form prescribed in the book or else forbear to officiate.
The answer to this objection (granting all in the premises besides) depends upon the right understanding of that which is affirmed concerning the obligation of the laws according to the intention of the lawgiver, which if it should be understood precisely of that particular, actual and immediate intention which the lawgiver had declared by the words of the law (in which sense only the objection proceeds), will not hold true in all cases. But there is supposed besides that, in lawgiver, a more general, habitual and ultimate intention of a more excellent and transcendent nature than the former, which is to have an influence into and over-ruling power over all particular laws, viz. an intention by the laws to procure and promote the public good.
The former intention binds when it is subservient to the latter, or consistent with it, and consequently binds in ordinary cases and in orderly times, or else the law is not a wholesome law. But when the observation of the law, by reason of the conjuncture of circumstances, or the iniquity of the times (contingencies which no lawgiver could either certainly foresee, or if foreseen, sufficiently provide against) would rather be prejudicial than advantageous to the public; or is manifestly attended with such inconveniencies and sad consequents to the observers, as all the imaginable good that can redound to the public thereby, cannot in any reasonable measure countervail:
In such case the law obliges not, but according to the latter and more general intention only; even as in the operations of nature, particular agents do ordinarily move according to their proper and particular inclinations; yet upon some occasions, and to serve the ends and intentions of universal nature (for the avoiding of some things which nature abhors), they are sometimes carried with motions quite contrary to their particular natures, as the air to descend, and the water to ascend for the avoiding of vacuity, etc. The common received maxim (which has been sufficiently misapplied, and that sometimes to very ill purposes since the beginning of these unhappy divisions) in the true meaning of it looks this way, Salus populi suprema lex [The health of the people is the supreme law]: the equity of which maxim, as it leaves in the lawgiver a power of dispensing with the law (which is a suspending the obligation thereof for the time in respect of the proper and particular intention) so he shall see it expedient in order to the public good, so it leaves in the subject a liberty upon just occasions (as in cases of great exigency and for the preventing of such hazards and inconveniencies as might prove of noisome consequence to the public) to do otherwise than the law requires.
And neither is the exercise of that power in the lawgiver to be thought an unreasonable prerogative, nor the use of this liberty in the subject an unreasonable presumption, inasmuch as the power of dispensing with particular laws is such a prerogative as without which no commonwealth can be well governed, but justice would be turned into gall and wormwood: Nor can the supreme governor, without forfeiture of that faithfulness which he owes to the public weal, devest himself thereof.
And he that presumes of the lawgiver’s consent to dispense with him for the observation of the law in such needful cases (where he has not the opportunity to consult his pleasure therein) presumes no more than he has reason to do. For it may well be presumed that the lawgiver, who is bound in all his laws to intend the safety of the public, and of every member thereof in his due proportion, has no intention by the strict observation of any particular law, to oblige any person, who is a member of the public, to his destruction or ruin when the common good is not answerably promoted thereby: Upon which ground it is generally resolved by casuists that no constitution (merely human) can lay such obligation upon the conscience of the subject, but that we may (according to the exigency of circumstances) do otherwise than the constitution requires, provided it be done extra casum scandali et contemptus, i.e. without either bewraying in himself any contempt of the authority of the lawgiver by his carriage, or giving any just occasion of scandal to others by his example in so doing.
I have been somewhat the longer in explaining this point, not only for the better clearing of the present doubt, but also in respect of the usefulness of this consideration for the preventing and removing of many scruples that may happen to conscientious men in such times as these, wherein so many things are (and are like to be) commanded and forbidden contrary to the established laws, and those (as they are persuaded) yet standing in force.
The best rule that I know to guide men in their deliberations and actions in such emergent cases (according to what has been already delivered) is advisedly and impartially to weigh the benefit and inconveniencies, as well on the one side, as on the other, as they stand in relation unto the public good: and if after such examination and comparison made, it shall then evidently (or but in the judgment of probability) appear, that the observation of the law, according to the proper intention of the lawgiver therein, though with hazard of estate, liberty, or even life itself, has a greater tendency to the public good and the preservation of Church or commonwealth in safety, peace and order, than the preventing of the foresaid hazards or other evil consequents, by doing otherwise than the law requires can have; or (which comes to one) if the violating of the law shall then appear to be more prejudicial to the public good, than the preservation of the subject’s estate, liberty or life can be beneficial hereunto: In such case the subject is bound to hazard all he has, and undergo whatsoever inconveniencies and calamities can ensue thereupon, rather than violate the law with contempt of that authority to which he owes subjection.
But if it shall (after such comparison made) evidently (or but more probably than the contrary) appear that that preservation of such a person’s life, liberty, estate would more benefit the Church or commonwealth, than the punctual observation of the law at that time, and with those circumstances would do; it were an unseasonable, unreasonable and pernicious scrupulosity for such a person to think himself in such a case obliged for the observing of the law (perhaps but once or twice) with little or no benefit to the public, to ruin himself, whereby to render himself unuseful and unserviceable to the public forever hereafter.
To bring this discourse home and to apply it to the business now under dispute: Suppose we ten, twenty or one hundred godly ministers well affected to the established liturgy and actually possessed of benefices with the charge of souls thereto belonging, should, thinking themselves in conscience obliged to the use of the whole form of the book, as is by the act appointed, without any addition, omission or alteration whatsoever (notwithstanding the present conjuncture of affairs), resolve to use the same accordingly, it would be well considered what the effects and consequents thereof would be:
Besides other evils, these three are visible, which must all unavoidably follow one upon another if anybody shall be found (as doubtless within short time there will be found one or other) to inform and prosecute against them:
1. The utter undoing of so many worthy persons, fit to do God and his Church good service, together with all those persons that depend upon them for their livelihood, by putting the fruits of their benefices, wherewith they should buy themselves bread, under sequestration.
2. The depriving of those persons of the opportunity of discharging the duties that belong unto them in their ministerial calling, in not permitting them, after such sequestration, to teach or instruct the people belonging to their charge, or to exercise anything of their function publicly in the Church.
3. The delivering over the sheep of Christ, that lately were under the hands of the faithful shepherds, into the custody of ravenous wolves, when such guides shall be set over the several congregations as will be sure to mis-teach them one way or other, viz. either by instilling into them puritanical and superstitious principles, that they may the more securely exercise their presbyterian tyranny over their judgments, consciences, persons and estates, or else by setting up new lights before them, to lead them into a maze of Anabaptistical confusion and frenzy.
These consequents are so heavy to the sufferers, so certain to ensue upon the use of Common Prayer, and so much without the power of the lawgivers (in this state of affairs) either to prevent or remedy, that it is beyond the wit of man what benefit to the public can accrue by the strict observation of the act, that may in any proportion countervail these mischiefs. In which case, that man must needs suppose a strange austerity in the lawgiver that dares not presume of his consent to disoblige him (for the time) from observing the same. It would be also well considered whether he that by his own over-nice scrupulosity runs all these hazards, be not (in some measure) guilty of his own undoing, of deserting his station and of betraying his flock, and do not thereby lose much of that comfort which a Christian confessor may take in his sufferings when they are laid upon him by the hand of God and not pulled upon himself by his own hands. And more I shall not need to say as to that first objection.
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Objection 2: Scandal
The next thing objected is the danger of the scandal that others might be ready to take at the example, who seeing the law so little regarded by such men (men that have cure of souls and perhaps also of some eminency and esteem in the Church, and whose example will be much looked upon) will be easily encouraged by this example to set light by all authority and to take the liberty to obey and disobey the laws of their sovereign at their pleasure.
But this objection, after we are once satisfied concerning the former, need not much trouble us, for:
1. It seems an unreasonable thing in cases of great exigence (such as we now suppose) that the fear of scandalizing our weak brethren (which is but Debitum charitatis [a debt of love] only) should lay upon us a peremptory necessity of observing the law punctually, whatsoever inconveniencies and mischiefs may ensue thereupon: when the duty of obedience to our known governors (which is Debitum justitiae [a debt of justice] also, and therefore more obligatory than the other) does not impose that necessity upon us; as has been already shown.
2. Besides, arguments drawn from scandal in things neither unlawful nor (setting the reason of scandal aside) inexpedient, as they are subject to sundry frailties otherwise, so they are manifestly of no weight at all when they are counterpoised with the apparent danger of evil consequents on the other side. For in such cases there is commonly equal danger (if not rather something more) of scandal to be taken from the example the quite contrary way. We may see it in debating the point now in hand: It is alleged on the one side that by laying aside the use of the Common Prayer, men that are over scrupulous will be encouraged to take a greater liberty in dispensing with the laws (to the despising both of laws and governors) than they ought. And why may it not, by the same reason, be as well alleged on the other side, that by holding up a necessity of using the Common Prayer, men that have tender consciences may be induced to entertain scruples (to their utter undoing, and to the destruction of their people) when they need not?
3. But that in the third place, which comes up home to the business and takes off the objection clearly, is this, that in judging cases of scandal, we are not so much to look to the event, what it is, or may be, as to the cause, whence it comes. For sometimes there is given just cause of scandal; and yet no scandal follows, because it is not taken: Sometimes scandal is taken, and yet no just cause given: and sometimes there is both cause of scandal given and scandal taken thereat. But no man is concerned at any scandal that happens to another by occasion of anything done by him, neither is chargeable with it farther than he is guilty of having given it. If then we give scandal to others, and they take it not, the whole guilt is ours, and they are faultless. If we give it, and they take it, we are to bear a share in the blame as they, and that a deep share (Vae homini, Woe to the man by whom the offense cometh, Mt. 18:7). But if they take offense when we give none, it is a thing we cannot help, and therefore the whole blame must lie upon them.
Wherefore, if at any time any doubt shall arise in that case of scandal, how far forth the danger thereof may oblige us to the doing or not doing of anything proposed, the resolution will come on much the easier if we shall but rightly understand what it is to give scandal, or how many ways a man may become guilty of scandalizing another by his example.
The ways (as I conceive) are but these four.
1. When a man does something before another, which is in itself evil, unlawful and sinful. In which case, neither the intention of him that does it, nor the event as to him that sees it done, is of any consideration: For it matters not whether the doer has an intention to draw the other into sin or not; the very matter and substance of the action being evil, and done before others, is sufficient to render the doer guilty of having given scandal, though neither he had intention himself so to do, nor was any other person actually scandalized thereby: because whatsoever is in its own nature evil, is of itself and in its own nature scandalous and of ill example.
Thus did Hophni and Phineas, the sons of Eli, give scandal by their wretched profaneness and greediness about the sacrifices of the Lord, and their shameless abusing the women. And so did David also give great scandal in the matter of Uriah, 2 Sam. 12:14. Here the rule is: Do nothing that is evil, for fear of giving scandal.
2. The second way is, when a man does something before another with a direct intention and formal purpose of drawing him thereby to commit sin. In which case neither the matter of the action, nor the event is of any consideration: For it makes no difference as to the sin of giving scandal, whether any man be effectually enticed to commit sin or not thereby; neither does it make any difference whether the thing done were in itself unlawful or not, so as it had an appearance of evil, and from thence an aptitude to draw another by the doing of that (by imitation) which should be really and intrinsically evil. The wicked intention alone (whatsoever the effect should be, or what means soever should be used to promote it) suffices to induce the guilt of giving scandal upon the doer.
This was Jeroboam’s sin, in setting up the calves, with a formal purpose and intention thereby (for his own secular and ambitious ends) to corrupt the purity of religion and to draw the people unto idolatrous worship. For which cause he is so often stigmatized with it as a note of infamy, to stick by him whilst the world lasts, being scarce ever mentioned in the Scripture, but with this addition, Jeroboam the son of Nebat, which made Israel to sin. Here the rule is: Do nothing, good or evil with an intention to give scandal.
3. The third way is when a man does something before another, which in itself is not evil, but indifferent, and so according to the rule of Christian liberty, lawful for him to do or not to do, as he shall see cause (yea, and perhaps otherwise commodious and convenient for him to do), yet whereas he probably foresees that others will take scandal and be occasioned thereby to do evil. In such a case, if the thing to be done be not in some degree prudentially necessary for him to do, but that he might, without very great inconvenience or prejudice to himself or any third person, leave it undone: He is bound in charity to his brother’s soul (for whom Christ died) and for the avoiding of scandal, to abridge himself in the exercise of his Christian liberty for that time, so far as rather to suffer some inconvenience himself by the not doing of it than by the doing of it to cause his brother to offend. The very case which is so often, so largely and so earnestly insisted upon by St. Paul, see Rom. 14:13, 21; Rom. 15:1, 3; 1 Cor. 8:7, 13; 1 Cor. 9:12, 15, 19, 22; 1 Cor. 10:23, 33. Here the rule is: Do nothing that may be reasonably forborne, whereat scandal will be taken.
4. The last way is, when a man does something before another which is not only lawful, but (according to the exigencies of present circumstances) pro hic et nunc [for the here and now] very behoofful and even prudentially necessary for him to do, but foresees that the other will be like to make an ill use of it and take encouragement thereby to commit sin, if he be not withal careful as much as possibly in him lies to prevent the scandal that may be taken thereat: For, Qui non prohibit peccare, cum potest, jubet. In such case the bare neglect of his brother, and not using his utmost endeavor to prevent the evil that might ensue, makes him guilty. Upon which consideration stands the equity of the judicial law given to the Jews, which ordered, that in case a man dig a pit for the use of his family, and looking no farther than his own convenience, put no cover upon it, and leave it open, whereby it happens his neighbor’s beast to fall thereinto and perish, the owner of the pit is to make it good, inasmuch as he was the occasioner of that loss to his neighbor, which he might and ought to have prevented. Here the rule is: Order the doing of that which may not be well left undone in such sort that no scandal (so far as you can help it) may be taken thereat.
To apply this: The thing under debate, viz. the action proposed to present enquiry is the laying aside the Common Prayer, being enjoined by law, and using instead thereof some other form of Church service of our own devising. And the enquiry concerning it is whether it may be done with a good conscience in regard of the scandal that is given, or at least may be taken thereat, yea or no?
Now forasmuch as in this enquiry we take it for granted that the thing to be done is not in its own nature simply evil, but rather in this state of affairs prudentially necessary; and that they who make scruple at it upon the point of scandal, have not the least intention of drawing other of the laws into contempt, or their brethren into sin by their example. It is manifest that three of the now mentioned cases, with the rules to each of them appending, are not pertinent to the present enquiry. But since the last of the four only proves to be our case, we have therefore no more to do for the settling of our judgments, and quieting of our consciences, and the regulating of our practice in this affair, than to consider well what the rule in this case given obliges us unto; which is not to leave the action undone for the danger of scandal, which (besides the inconveniencies formerly mentioned) would but start new questions, and those beget more to the multiplying unnecessary scruples in infinitum:
But to order the doing of it so, that (if it were possible) no scandal at all might ensue thereupon, or at least wise not by our default, through our careless or indiscreet managery thereof. Even as the Jew that stood in need to sink a pit for the service of his house or ground, was not (for fear his neighbor’s beast should fall into it, and be drowned) bound by the law to forbear the making of it, but only to provide a sufficient cover for it, where he had made it.
The thing then in this case is not to be left undone, when it so much behooves us to do it; but the action to be carried on (for the manner of doing, and in all respects and circumstances thereunto belonging) with so much chariness and tenderness, moderation and wisdom (to our best understanding) that the necessity of our so doing, with the true cause thereof, may appear to the world, to the satisfaction of those that are willing to take notice of it; and that such persons as would be willing to make use of our ensample to do the same thing, where there is not the same necessity, may do it upon their own score, and not be able to vouch our practice for their excuse; which how it may be best done for particular directions, every charitable and conscientious man must ask his own discretion. Some general helps thereunto I shall lay down in answering the next objection, where they would fall in again not improperly, and so stop two gaps with one bush.
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Objection 3: Schism
The last objection is that of schism. The objectors hold all such persons as have opposed either liturgy or Church government, as they were by law established within this realm, for no better than schismatics; and truly I shall not much gainsay it. But then they argue:
That for them to do the same thing in the public worship of God that schismatics do (and for doing whereof especially it is that they avow them schismatics) would (as they conceive) involve them in the schism also, as partakers thereof in some degree with the other: And their consciences also would, from Rom. 14:22, condemn them either of hypocrisy, in allowing that in themselves, and in their own practice, which they condemn in others; or of uncharitableness, in judging others as schismatics for doing but the same thing which they can allow themselves to practice.
For all that such persons as they call schismatics, do in this matter of the Church-service, is but to leave out the Church’s prayers, and to put in their own. Or say, this should not make them really guilty of the schism they so much detest, yet would such their symbolizing with them seem at least a kind of unworthy compliance with them, more than could well become the simplicity of a Christian, much less of a minister of the Gospel, whose duty it is to shun even the least appearance of evil. Besides, that by so doing they should but confirm such men in their schismatical principles and practice.
This objection has three branches. To the first whereof I oppose the old saying, Duo cum faciunt idem, non est idem [Two when they do the same, is not the same]; which, although spoken quite to another purpose, yet is very capable of such a sense which will very well fit our present purpose also.
I answer therefore in short: To do the same thing that schismatics do (especially in times of confusion, and till things can be reduced unto better order, and when men are necessitated thereunto to prevent greater mischiefs) does not necessarily infer a partaking with them in schism, no, nor so much as probably, unless it may appear upon probable presumption otherwise, that it is done out of the same schismatical spirit, and upon such schismatical principles as theirs are.
The other two branches (viz. [2.] that of seeming compliance with schismatics, and [3.] that of the ill use they make of it to confirm them in their schism) do upon the matter fall in upon the aforesaid point of scandal, and are in effect but the same objection, only put into a new dress, and so have received their answer already. And the only remedy against both these fears (as well that of scandal, as this of schism) is the same which was there prescribed, even to give assurance to all men by our carriage and behavior therein that we do not lay aside Common Prayer of our own accord, or out of any dislike thereof, neither in contempt of our rightful governors, or of the laws, nor out of any base compliance with the times, or unworthy secular own ends, nor out of any schismatical principles, seditious designs, or innovating humor; but merely enforced thereunto by such a necessity as we cannot otherwise avoid in order to the glory of God and the public good for the preservation of our families, our flocks and our functions: And that with the good leave and allowance (as we have great reason to believe) of such as have power to dispense with us and the laws in that behalf.
This if we shall do bona fide and with our utmost endeavors in singleness of heart and with godly discretion, perhaps it will not be enough to prevail with either the censure of inconsiderate and inconsiderable persons, or the ill use that may be made of our example, through the ignorance or negligence of some (scandalum pusillorum) or through the perverseness and malice of others (scandalum pharisaeorum) as the schools term them: But assuredly it will be sufficient in the sight of God, and the witness of our own hearts, and to the consciences of charitable and considering men, to acquit us clear of all guilt, either of scandal or schism in the least degree. Which we may probably do by observing these ensuing, or such other like general directions (The liberty of using such meet accommodations, as the circumstances in particular cases shall require, evermore allowed and reserved), viz.:
1. If we shall decline the company and society of known schismatics, not conversing frequently or familiarly with them, or more than the necessary affairs of life, and the rules of neighborhood and common civility will require; especially not to give countenance unto their Church assemblies, by our presence among them, if we can avoid it.
2. If we shall retain, as well in common discourse, as in our sermons and holy offices of the Church, the old theological and ecclesiastical terms and forms of speech, which have been generally received and used in the Churches of Christ, which the people are well acquainted with, and are wholesome and significant, and not follow our new masters in that uncouth affected garb of speech, or canting language rather (if I may so call it) which they have of late taken up, as the signal distinction and characteristical note of that, which in that their new language they call The Godly Party, or Communion of Saints.
3. If in officiating we repeat not only the Lord’s Prayer, the Creed, the Ten Commandments and such other passages in the Common Prayer Book, as (being the very words of Scripture) no man can except against; but so much of the old liturgy besides, in the very words and syllables of the book, as we think the ministers of state in those parts wherein we live will suffer, and the auditory, before whom we officiate, will bear; since the officers in all parts of the land are not alike strict, nor the people in all parishes alike disaffected in this respect.
4. If, where we must of necessity vary from the words, we yet follow the order of the book in the main parts of the holy offices, retaining the substance of the prayers, and embellishing those of our own making, which we substitute into the place of those we leave out, with phrases and passages taken out of the book in other places.
5. If, where we cannot safely mention the particulars mentioned in the book (as namely in praying for the king, the queen, the royal progeny and the bishops), we shall yet use in our prayers some such general terms and other intimations devised for that purpose, as may sufficiently convey to the understanding of the people what our intentions are therein, and yet not be sufficient to fetch us within the compass of the ordinance.
6. If we shall in our sermons take occasion now and then, where it may be pertinent, either to discover the weakness of the puritan principles and tenets to the people; or to show out of some passages and expressions in the Common Prayer, the consonancy of those observations we have raised from the text, with the judgment of the Church of England: or to justify such particular passages in the litany, collects and other parts of our liturgy as have been unjustly quarreled at by presbyterians, independents, Anabaptists, or other (by what name or title soever they are called) puritan sectaries.
Thus have I freely acquainted you both with my practice and judgment in the point proposed in your friend’s letter. How I shall be able to satisfy his or your judgment in what I have written, I know not; however, I have satisfied both your desire and his in writing, and shall rest
Your Brother and Servant in the Lord, Robert Sanderson.”
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Sherlock, William – Their Present Majesty’s Government Proved to be throughly Settled, & that we may Submit to it, without Asserting the Principles of Mr. [Thomas] Hobbes, showing also that Allegiance was not due to the Usurpers [Cromwell et al.] after the Late Civil War… (London, 1691) 35 pp.
In 1689 the Glorious Revolution occurred in England where the Dutch William of Orange came into and ruled England, with the English Parliament’s approval and that of most of England, after King James II fled.
Sherlock was of the episcopal persuasion, which party were generally royalists attached to the Stuart royal line (including James II). Many of the episcopal persuasion long held out against allegiance to William of Orange, being known up through the mid-1700’s and later as Jacobites.
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Quotes
Order of
Ames
Gee
Love
Baxter
Wamphray
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1600’s
William Ames
A Second Manuduction for Mr. [John] Robinson. Or a Confirmation of the Former in an Answer to his Manumission (Amsterdam, 1615), pp. 6-7
“The demand was of the same man, who formerly did lawfully preach in a public assembly, if he should [now] obtain a license from the Lord bishop of the diocese, without any unlawful condition for to continue in that his course [of public preaching], whether that leave or license given does pollute the actions, seeing a man may ask leave of the great Turk to preach the gospel within his dominions?
His [John Robinson’s] answer is that the very obtaining and receiving of such a license is unlawful, because it is a real acknowledgement that such a bishop has a lawful power to grant it. Which [in my judgment] is neither so nor so, for:
1. The asking and receiving of leave or license (which are both one) does not always imply an acknowledgement of his lawful authority from whom it is sought.
If any man of violence shall usurp a power to himself, of permitting or hindering the lawful and good offices that pertain unto honest men, so that without his license a man could not buy or sell, or teach any science or trade of life; if an honest man whom these duties concern, should in that case take a license from that usurper (though he were no better than a strong thief) no reasonable man will say that in so doing he did acknowledge such [an] usurped power [to be] lawful.
The rulers of Jewish synagogues had no lawful power over the apostles of Christ in any part of their ministry, neither would Paul ever acknowledge so much: yet he and Barnabas accepted of such license or leave from them sometime as they did usually grant unto those that acknowledged themselves lawfully subject to their authority. See an example, Acts 13:15.
Mr. Robinson himself has granted in the first demand that a man may preach by leave in a parochial assembly: which leave must be given by the parochial minister and church-wardens, whose authority he holds one with the bishops. If therefore leave or license (whether in word or writing, that is all one) may be lawfully taken from them, without acknowledging any authority lawful which is unlawful, why not from the bishop?
2. There is some authority in the bishops derived from the king which may be acknowledged [as] lawful. Such is this of giving license, liberty and civil authority for men to do good. The civil magistrate may do it himself, or appoint others to do it, 2 Chron. 17:7. The abuse of this authority does not make it unlawful.”
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Edward Gee
An Exercitation concerning Usurped Powers… (London, 1650), ch. 4, pp. 47-48
“Mr. Ashcam… lays down four cases wherein he says subjects are freed from their sworn allegiance. His three first (viz: 1. If a prince abandon. 2. If he alienate. 3. If Nero-like through mad fury or folly, he seek in an hostile way the destruction of his whole kingdom) will I presume be taken not to concern our case in hand; the fourth possibly may be judged applicable to it…
Fourthly, (says he) if the prince have part of the supreme right, and the people the other part, then notwithstanding an oath of allegiance to him, he may be opposed if he invade the other part of supreme right… And in the next section he says of all those four cases, and therefore of this, that they show how we are absolved in our own consciences from all oath and contract when one party forfeits his conditions first.
The defensive opposing of a prince, invading his compeers’ part by the party invaded where the supreme right is so shared (supposing the oath of allegiance to be cautioned according to that sharing), I shall not dispute…”
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Christopher Love
A Clear & Necessary Vindication of the Principles & Practices of me, Christopher Love, since my trial before, and condemnation by the High Court of Justice (London, 1651), p. 29
“3… Yet I intend not to handle the case of invasion, to show in what cases only an invasion of another nation in a hostile manner is lawful: I am from all my books, that I cannot consult with casuists in that point…
Had God given me life, I intended a large Treatise concerning the Usurpation of the Government of England, and the unlawfulness of the invasion of Scotland [by Cromwell]; but my collections being lost and taken away, they must die with me; I hope more able hands will write against the invasion, though they cannot fight against the invaders.”
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Richard Baxter
A Treatise of Episcopacy… (London: Simmons, 1681)
pt. 1, ch. 3, pp. 23-24
“49… When a rebel rose up against his prince and got but the stronger party and possession, how quickly did they [degenerate bishops] flatter him and own him. I find but one bishop besides St. Martin in all France and that part of Germany, that disowned Maximus that murdered Gratian: The rest applauded him for their own ends: Nor in that part of Italy I find not any besides Ambrose and one Hyginus that disowned him.
(Not that I think it my part to condemn all the holy bishops who professed subjection to usurpers in possession: Even holy Ambrose could write to the odious tyrant Eugenius (Clementissimo Imperatori Eugenio) concluding, nam cum privato detulerim corde intimo, quomodo non deferrem Imperatori, ‘When I honored thee a private man from the bottom of my heart, how can I but honor thee being emperor?’ And how far have the Roman bishops gone in this, even to Phocas and such as he?)”
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pt. 2, ch. 22, p. 210
“And these were the Halcionian days which Ambrose himself declares and magnifies, even when Maximus had suppressed the Arrians, En tempus acceptabile! quo non hiemalibus perfidiae caligantis pruinas annus riget, nec altis nivis, etc. ibid. Reader was not that time more strange than ours? that Ambrose must be so loyal as to save his prince and country from a usurper; and yet so pious as to be persecuted by his prince, and he and his brethren saved by that same usurper, and openly give praise to God for the great felicity of the Church which it received by that same usurper whom he so resisted?”
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John Brown of Wamphray
The Banders Disbanded (1681), pp. 47-48. This work is commonly attributed to McWard who wrote a preface to it. However, according to Patrick Walker (d. 1745?) Wamphray wrote the work: Biographia Presbyteriana (Edinburgh: Speare, 1827), 1.196 & 271.
“XXVI. …Yet the case may be, and often has been (and whither or no it be ours now [referring to Scotland in 1681], is not mine to determine) that a people may and ought to submit themselves to the government even of such a magistrate who either has injuriously usurped that office, or has so maleversed in the exercise thereof (by violating the main and most of the conditions upon which he was admitted to it) that his government is degenerat[ed] into a manifest tyranny and irreligion, and so has (de jure) fore-faulted his right to rule as a magistrate: I say the case of a people may be so circumstantiate [bound by circumstances], that they ought to subject themselves even to such a tyrant till the Lord clearly point forth to them a way, either from his written Word, or some extraordinary impulse and influence upon their spirits, or from indubitable grounds and persuasives of sound moral principles, or such like, whereby they may emerge from under that yoke.
Hereby I do not yield, nor assert, that it is lawful to give obedience to any unlawful commands, or that it is no ways lawful for a people to shake off the yoke of an unlawful and tyrannical government: but only that there may be some cases wherein it is lawful for a people to yield subjection to a lawless tyrant, and wherein it may be unlawful for them to perpetrate or attempt their own liberation by external force (which abstractly from those circumstances might be both lawful, laudable and a necessary duty), viz. when the thing attempted is either altogether impracticable, the means or manner of effectuating it dubious or unwarrantable, the timing of it inexpedient and unseasonable, or the necessary concomitants or consequents of the cure more hurtful or dangerous than the disease; or the like:
Neither do I affirm that under a tyrannical government it is always or absolutely lawful for the people to give passive obedience (if such a form of phrase may be admitted which many explode as inaccurate and incongruous) but only that there is a time which may be called the proper season of suffering, that is, when suffering (in opposition to acting or resisting) is a necessary and indispensable duty.
XXVII. As a man’s subjecting himself to a private robber assaulting and prevailing against him, is no solid proof of his approving or acknowledging the injury and violence committed by the robber; so in many cases a people or person’s yielding subjection (viz. in matters civil and external, for I always exeem [exempt] conscience and religion from subjection to any creature whatsoever) to a tyrant, i.e. a public robber, does not argue their acknowledging or approving his tyranny and oppression.
XXVIII. As it is one thing to be subject to the magistrate for conscience sake [Rom. 13:5] and a far other to subject our conscience to the magistrate, that is, to be subject for his pleasure sake: So although we may lawfully submit our bodies and estates to the civil magistrate, and in many cases also to a tyrant; yet in no case can it be lawful for us to subject our conscience or religion to any magistrate or mortal, God Himself being the immediate and sole Sovereign Lord of both.”
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Historical Context to the English Engagement, 1649
Order of
Article
Quote
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Article
Wikipedia – ‘Engagement Controversy’
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Quote
1600’s
Richard Baxter
Reliquiæ Baxterianæ (London: Parkhurst, 1696), pp. 64-65
Ҥ98. If you ask what did the ministers all this while, I answer: they preached and prayed against disloyalty. They drew up a writing to the Lord General declaring their abhorrence of all violence against the person of the king [Charles I], and urging him and his army to take heed of such an unlawful act. They present it to the General when they saw the king in danger: But Pride prevailed against their counsels.
§99. The king being thus taken out of the way, Cromwell takes on him to be for a commonwealth (but all in order to the security of the good people) till he had removed the other impediments which were yet to be removed: so that the Rump [Parliament] presently drew up a form of Engagement, to be put upon all men, viz. ‘I do promise to be true and faithful to the commonwealth as it is now established without a king or House of Lords.’ So we must take the Rump for an established commonwealth and promise fidelity to them.
This the sectarian party [of Independents and sects] swallowed easily, and so did the king’s old cavaliers, so far as I was acquainted with them or could hear of them (not heartily, no doubt, but there were very few of them sick of the disease called tenderness of conscience or scrupulosity: But the presbyterians and the moderate episcopal men refused it (and I believe so did the prelatical divines of the king’s party for the most part; though the gentlemen had greater necessities [to preserve by the Engagement]).
Without this Engagement no man must have the benefit of suing another at law (which kept men a little from contention and would have marred the lawyers’ trade); nor must they have any masterships in the universities, nor travel above so many miles from their houses, and more such penalties, which I remember not (so short lived a commonwealth deserved no long remembrance): Mr. [Richard] Vines and Dr. Rainbow and many more were hereupon put out of their headships in the universities, and Mr. Sidrach Sympson, and Mr. John Sadler and such others put in; yea, such a man as Mr. Dell, the chaplain of the army, who, I think, neither understood himself nor was understood by others any farther than to be one who took reason, sound doctrine, order and concord to be the intolerable maladies of Church and State, because they were the greatest strangers to his mind.
But poor Dr. Edward Reynolds had the hardest measure; for when he refused to take the Engagement, his place was forfeited; and afterwards they drew him to take it, in hopes to keep his place (which was no less than the deanery of Christ’s-Church) and then turned him out of all, and offered his place to Mr. Joseph Caryl; but he refusing it, it was conferred on Dr. [John] Owen, to whom it was continued from year to year.
And because the presbyterians still urged the [Solemn League and] Covenant against killing the king, and pulling down the parliament, and setting up a commonwealth, and taking the Engagement, some of the Independent brethren maintained that its obligation ceased, because it was a league, and the occasion of it ceased: And some of the Rump said it was like an almanac out of date; and some of the soldiers said they never took it; and others of them railed at it as a Scottish snare: So that when their interest would not suffer them to keep so solemn a vow, their wills would not suffer their judgments to confess it to be obligatory, at least as to the part which they must violate.
§100. For my own part, though I kept the town and parish of Kidderminster from taking the Covenant (and seeing how it might become a snare to their consciences) yea, and most of Worcestershire besides, by keeping the ministers from offering it in any of the congregations to the people (except in Worcester City, where I had no great interest and know not what they did); yet I could not judge it seemly for him that believed there is a God to play fast and loose with a dreadful oath, as if the bonds of national and personal vows were as easily shaked off as Sampson‘s cords.
Therefore I spake and preached against the Engagement and dissuaded men from taking it. The first hour that I heard of it, being in company with some gentlemen of Worcestershire, I presently wrote down above twenty queries against it, intending as many more almost against the obligation as those were about the sense and circumstances. And one that was present got the copy of them, and shortly after I met with them verbatim in a book of Mr. Henry Hall‘s as his own (one that was long imprisoned for writing against Cromwell).
Some episcopal divines that were not so scrupulous it seems as we, did write for it (private manuscripts which I have seen) and plead the irresistibility of the imposers, and they found starting holes in the terms, viz. that by “the commonwealth” they will mean the present commonwealth in genere, and by “established” they will mean only de facto and not de jure, and by “without a king, etc.” they mean not quatenus [as far as] but etsi [although], and that only de facto pro tempore [in point of fact for the time], quasi dicat [“as if to say”]: ‘I will be true to the government of England, though at the present the king and House of Lords are put out of the exercise of their power.’
These were the expositions of many episcopal men, and others that took it: But I endeavored to evince that this is mere juggling and jesting with matters too great to be jested with: And that as they might easily know that the imposers had another sense, so as easily might they know that the words in their own obvious usual sense among men must be taken as the promise or engagement of a subject as such to a form of government now pretended to be established: And that the subjects’ allegiance or fidelity to his rulers can be acknowledged and given in no plainer words: And that by such interpretations and stretchings of conscience, any treasonable oath or promise may be taken, and no bonds of society can signify much with such interpreters.”
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On Conforming to Prevalent & Unrivaled Usurpers Sooner rather than Later
Quotes
Order of
Rouse
Ascham
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1600’s
Francis Rouse
The Lawfulness of Obeying the Present Government… (London, 1649) Rouse was a Westminster divine.
pp. 9-10
“And surely whatsoever ill consequences may appear upon obeying, they appear at more distance, but confusion and destruction come in presently upon disobeying. The commonwealth is presently put unto ungovernment and confusion by inobedience, or into sedition, civil war, yea destruction, by striving against a prevalent power. Therefore as that which has the less ill consequences, not ours only, but generally all nations have given obedience to power; and both sought and received laws and government from those that have overpowered them…
And whereas some speak of a time for settlement, they indeed do rather speak for a time of unsettlement; for they will have an unsettlement first, and a settlement after. And whereas like does produce its like, yet they would have an unsettlement to beget a settlement. They would have confusion, distraction, destruction to bring forth order and safety.”
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pp. 21-22
“…[I am] being very sorry to see well meaning and (I hope) pious persons by not obeying swiftly and resolutely to go out of the way of peace, and (as I suppose) of truth; At least it seemed to me a sad thing that those who had not searched the grounds of that which they held to be truth, yet did certainly endanger the loss of peace for that which they had not searched…”
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Anthony Ascham
The Bounds & Bonds of Public Obedience, or a Vindication of our Lawful Submission to the Present Government… (London, 1649) This was mor than likely written by Ascham despite it being attributed to Rouse.
p. 27
“The two Demurrers…: ‘Except[ion] against this our present obedience, because the present power is yet new: neither is there a total cessation of all hopes of recovery.’
Philosophers hold that the definition of a man belongs to an infant as well as to one of many years, because after the organization of the parts, he is informed with the same principle of life and reason as a grown man is; and having the same form, is the same thing. Even so the present power has possessed all the parts of this kingdom, gives them life in the administration of public justice and protection, which are the soul of a State, and the power which preceded this, what did it infuse more vital than this?
And now that that is taken away, if this other did not presently enter into its place, the commonwealth were dead and each man were left in his naturals to subsist of himself and to cast how he could in such a state of war, defend himself from all the rest of the world, every man in this State having an equal right to everything.”
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p. 31
“And yet we conceive another case… wherein this submission to a new power may be called legal. For the end of all law and government is to preserve our persons and estates; and they who are in supremacy of power have power to preserve or destroy both if they please; and therefore have as great a power over our laws, which are less then our lives.
So soon as one supreme power is expelled by another, law, life and estate fall all into the hands of the succeeding power; and what it does not actually take away, stands in effect as deriving from it; and if that supreme power make a sanction for our obedience to it (as always is immediately done) then we may say our submission is legal, or else the supreme power cannot make a law.”
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p. 34
“But I pray you what do people get when wars for recoveries of dubious rights are long and calamitous? What are the people of France or the people of Spain better for the long and hereditary anger of their two kings? Or what was the world better for Alexander’s conquering it? The [English Parliament] Houses which are burnt and the millions of bodies left dead in the field are the peoples; and princes scorning to derive from them [the people] still trample them to dung.”
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pp. 36-37
“For lest we of the people should bogle at coming on the stage to act our late tragedy over again, he [the opponent] would impose it on our beliefs that we are still in the middle act of it and that we ought to finish it.
It is high time for him to consider whether if we run along with him in this we should not shut up compassion from our brethren and shut out a great part of our gratitude towards God; although I confess some scars and haltings may remain yet, after the war itself is ended. Methinks he should find everything both in Nature and Christianity more favourable for our present peace than for our third war, especially seeing all our former wars have ended very contrary to the expectation of those who were hottest to begin them.
But I consider that passion is the last hold out of which we are beaten, of which the fuller men are, the less do they (through a great judgement on their spirits) perceive into what deformities they do transport them, it being the nature of all intoxications that their defects are better perceived by any than by those who are oppressed by them.”
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That a Person may Petition Prevailing Usurpers, calling them by their Usurped Titles if need be, for things Just, Needful, Good & True
Order of
Article
Quotes
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Article
1600’s
English Puritans – pt. 2, Objection 3, pp. 264-68 in A Refutation of the Errors of Separatists (1604; RBO, 2025)
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Quotes
Order of
Rouse
Gee
Love
Baxter
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1600’s
Francis Rouse
The Lawfulness of Obeying the Present Government & Acting Under it… (London, 1649), p. 6
“And hereunto divines and casuists give their concurrence; among them one that is resolute both for monarchy and lineal succession [of royalty], thus expresses his judgment, both for seeking of right and justice from a usurper (whom he calls a tyrant, in regard of an unjust title, not in respect of tyranical oppression [only]) and for obeying his commands. First, that subjects may lawfully seek justice of him…¹
¹ ‘Dicendum est, licite subditos ab eo (qui•y rannus jure et titulo est) jus petere, quia quamvis jus et titulum non habeat, respublica tamen tacite consemit in hoc ut civibus ipsi tyranno, facto, non jure subditis, jus dicat, ac si esset competens judex et legitimus superior’… Juan Azor, Moral Institutions [d. 1603; Hierat, 1608], pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 5 [col. 1675].
‘Non peceat subditus tyranni, qui dominium et jurisdictionem alicujus di•ionis usurpavit, petendo ab eo justitiae administrationem, etc. Si quidem dat operem ut qui pe••at jurisdictionem usurpando, non peccet etiam justitiae administrationem praetermittendo;’ Martin de Azpilcueta Navarro, Manual de Confessores [c. 1557], ch. 1•, n. 41.”
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Edward Gee
An Exercitation concerning Usurped Powers… (London, 1650)
“We must needs grant there are things which may be done upon the usurpers’ command or injunction (though not because or by virtue of it) for the command of him that unwarrantably assumes power cannot, by itself, make that unlawful which were lawful if that were not. For instance, the performance of acts of common equity, charity, order, public utility and self-preservation is requisite: suppose it be in concurrence with a usurpers’ command, and in thus doing we do materially, but not formally obey him; the ground of acting in such things being not at all any relation or principle of subjection to him, but conscience of obedience to the will of God and due respect to others and our own safety and good. Under this sort of actions I comprehend:
…
3. Complaining, petitioning or going to law before the magistrates or courts authorized by the usurpers provided you give not the usurpers to whom you petition such titles as you give to the lawful magistrate [see others who are better on the issue of giving titles]).
(“…excusantur à peccato inducendi tyrannum ad actum, et opus illicitum petentes ab illo iustitiam, quia non petunt actum illicitum, sed justitiam illius actus illiciti…
pie interpretandae sunt petitiones tam iustitiae quam honestae gratiae quae offeruntur tyrannis, s. si vis, seu ex quo vis detinere, et exercere hoc dominium, utere illo iuste, utere honeste, utere pie, utere ad utilitatem publicam, et privatorum, prout deceret dominium…
nec intendunt, nec petunt actum usurpatum, sed qualitatem sanctam inactu usurpato exercendo.” Thomas Cajetan, Summula [Venice: Carampellum, 1596], title: Rempublicam tyrannice occupare… [pp. 411-12])
In thus doing, I seek my necessary self-preservation; neither do I yield or ascribe to them to whom I have recourse any just power of judicature or participate in their sin of usurping it; only I acknowledge they have might and ability in their hand to right me; which, though they ought not to assume, yet I may take the benefit of their unjust use of it; as a poor man may receive relief at the hands of him that has gotten those goods he distributes unjustly; and I may receive my money, with a good conscience, from the hands of a thief that is willing to return it to me though he took it by robbery from another thief that robbed me of it; and if the party, with whom I have a controversy for my right will agree to refer the matter betwixt us to a private person as an arbitrator, and stand to his arbitrement; that is a lawful means of coming by my own, though by his help and award that has not claim of authority over me…”
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Christopher Love
A Clear & Necessary Vindication of the Principles & Practices of me, Christopher Love, since my trial before, and condemnation by the High Court of Justice (London, 1651), pp. 1-3
“…things at which offence is taken, first my petitioning for my life to the [usurped] parliament (so called)… to both which I shall give full satisfaction. About my petitioning, a double offence is taken, first at the titles of my petitions… I shall speak briefly to both, to take away any stumbling block out of the way of any. Touching the titles of my four petitions, they run in this form:
‘To the Supreme Authority, the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England’.
Although I am far from going about to justify their right to this title to whom I give it, yet I shall justify the lawfulness of my practice in giving them this title which they assume to themselves, especially in a case of life [or death] as mine is: for in trivial matters I had rather lose my own right which belongs to me than give them this title which belongs not to them.
The reasons which sway with me why I gave them this title (though I am not satisfied they have a right to it) are these:
1. They would not receive my petitions without giving them their assumed titles; yea to my knowledge they have rejected petitions which have not had these titles.
2. I am upon sure and clear grounds persuaded that giving to men titles they assume to themselves is not a real owning that they have a right to those titles. Titular and real are usually distinguished; by giving them the title of ‘Supreme Authority’ and ‘Parliament,’ I do acknowledge them a titular authority and a titular parliament, but by engaging [by an oath of allegiance] to them (which I have never done and I hope shall never do), I do acknowledge them a real authority and a real parliament.
That I may further evince the truth of this second reason, viz. that giving of titles to men they assume to themselves, is not a real owning that they have a real right to those titles, I shall give sundry instances in Scripture to make it good:
2 Sam. 16, Hushai did call Absalom, that notorious usurper, ‘king,’ saying, ‘God save the king, God save the king,’ (an expression the people gave him), yet Hushai knew that David only was (even then) the lawful king of Israel set over him by God, and Absalom only an intruder, and made king by the tumults of the people; yea David himself did bid Hushai call Absalom (that usurper) ‘king,’ 2 Sam. 15:34, ‘Say to Absalom, ‘I will be thy servant O King.’
Yea further, David himself did call Absalom ‘king,’ 2 Sam. 15:19. David said to Hushai, ‘Return to thy place and abide with the king’ (that is with Absalom), yet he knew himself to be the lawful king and did not acknowledge that his son Absalom had any right to the kingdom, though he did give him the title of a king.
So Athaliah’s usurping is called by the Spirit of God ‘reigning,’ yet the Spirit of God owns not her right to reign, but approved of the killing of her and the setting up [of] Jehoash, the true and lawful heir in her room.
Yea Christ Himself called the Devil ‘the Prince of this World,’ Jn. 12:13 and 16 and 11, yet is it imaginable that Christ thought this title of right belonged to the Devil? Certainly no; Musculus on Jn. 12:31 well observes, non est ille (viz. Satan) Princeps mundi legitimus, sed per rapinam [‘He is not the legitimate prince of the world, but a robber’].
Paul called the devils ‘principalities and power,’ Eph. 6:12, yet none will be so shameless as to say that Paul thought this their rule, dominion and power of right belonged to them, but is merely usurped and intruded into. See annotations on the Bible on Eph. 6:12.
3. Titles are not always approbative, but distinctive; my meaning is that giving of titles to persons or things argues not one’s approving of a just right to those titles, but seems merely to distinguish those persons or things from others that are called by other names or titles, as I call them at Whitehall a ‘Council of State’ to distinguish them from a ‘Council of War’; I call those at Westminster the ‘Parliament of the Commonwealth,’ to distinguish them from the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament.
4. Titles are giving to things or persons sometimes merely by allusion, not approbation, as in Scripture-phrase sin is said to ‘reign’ and the devils are said to ‘rule’, not that either the one or the other has an approved right to rule over man as a lawful prince has to rule over his subjects, but they are said to reign or rule by way of allusion to the reign of princes in their dominions.
5. Titles may be given without sin to persons or things, though of right they belong not to them, where they are generally received or mentioned by such titles by the people where I live. About names and titles much indulgence is to be given to the common usages and customs of the people; I may call things or persons by such names or titles as I know belongs not of right unto them, because they are ordinarily known and generally received by such names and titles. I could give manifold instances out of Scripture to prove this:
David called Absalom ‘king’, not that he thought him so of right, but because he was commonly known and generally received by that title among the people. So Herod was called by the evangelist ‘King of the Jews’, so did the Jews generally call him by that title, yet none but that sect or sort of people called the Herodians did own it as Herod’s right to be the king of the Jews, who were so called because they pleaded for Herod to be the lawful king of the Jews, which the Pharisees and others withstood because he was not one of the Jewish nation as he ought to be, Dt. 17:15. Yet all the Jews called Herod ‘king’, though they did not acknowledge him to be their lawful king; tis manifest giving of titles are but titular acknowledgments and no more.
6. If names may without sin be given to places and things (which belong not to them), I see no reason why they may not be given to persons. There are names and titles given to many places both upon superstitious and idolatrous grounds, yet may without sin be used (I speak not of the first imposers) when those places are so called and commonly known by such names:
Luke that writ the Acts of the Apostles, calls a place in Athens ‘Mars-hill’ (as it was commonly called) and this he might do without sin, though this name was originally imposed on that place in honor of Mars, yet he calls the place as it was commonly called, though called so upon an idolatrous ground, Acts 17:22.
So for things also we may without sin call them by those names which others give them, though they may deal superstitiously or sinfully in the first imposition of such names. Thus Paul mentions a ship of Alexandria whose sign was Castor and Pollux, names originally imposed by the gentiles upon an idolatrous ground, yet being generally received, Paul calls the ship after this name.
7. It was a matter of absolute necessity (as to my life) for me to petition them, I being condemned to die; tis true for a trivial or ordinary occasion I should never petition them, but in an extraordinary case I might lawfully do it:
David in a case of extreme necessity did eat the Show-bread, which in an ordinary case he might not do. Tis true indeed, Cato would not petition Caesar for his life, he had rather die than petition, but that I conceive was rather out of some animosity or height of spirit, or petty discontent, than out of a rectified judgment; for my part I am fully satisfied that I have not sinned in giving them their assumed titles; names and titles do not determine rights, conveniunt rebus nomina saepe suis [‘names often correspond to their things], it is true sometimes, but not always.
8. Titles men assume to themselves, or are generally given by others, may be given them by me without sin or without owning a right to those titles; this I may make appear by sundry late instances:
Henry VIII [initially] had this title given him, ‘Defender of the Faith’, yet he had no right to this title, for he [at the beginning of his reign] defended only the Popish religion; he opposed the Faith rather than defended the Faith, and the true reason why the Pope gave him this title, ‘Defender of the Faith’, was because he opposed the doctrine of Luther and wrote against him [in 1521]; yet none scrupled to call him and the succeeding kings of England ‘the Defenders of the Faith’.
So the king of Spain is called ‘the Catholic King’, yet he has no true right to this title, for he is not a catholic or universal monarch, yet our new State have lately sent to the king of Spain under this title, ‘The Catholic King’; so the king of France is called ‘the most Christian King’; so the Duke of Bavaria having by arms ejected the Palsgrave writes himself ‘Prince Elector Palatine of the Rhine’; so the King of Poland takes this title to himself, ‘King of Sweden’, yet has no right to that kingdom; yet none that ever I heard of scrupled to give these titles to them, considering that titles do not determine rights, and considering also that no addresses to them will be received by them unless the titles they assume to themselves be given them by those who make applications to them.”
.
Richard Baxter
Christian Directory (London, 1673), pt. 4, ch. 19, title 2, p. 116-17
Ҥ13. Question 8: May I give money to a judge or justice or court-officer to hire him to do me justice or to keep him from doing me wrong or to avoid persecution? Answer:
You may not, in case your cause be bad, give anything to procure injustice against another; no nor speak a word for it nor desire it: This I take as presupposed. You may not give money to procure justice when the law of the land forbids it and when it will do more hurt accidentally to others than good to you: when it will harden men in the sin of bribery and cause them to expect the like from others.
But except it be when some such accidental greater hurt does make it evil, it is as lawful as to hire a thief not to kill me; when you cannot have your right by other means, you may part with a smaller matter for a greater.
§14. Question 9. But if I make such a contract, may the other lawfully take it of me? Answer:
No: for it is now supposed that it is unlawful on his part.
§15. Question 10. But if under necessity or force I promise money to a robber or a judge or officer, am I bound to perform it when necessity is over? Answer:
You have lost your own propriety by your covenant and therefore must not retain it. But he can acquire no right by his sin; and therefore some say that in point of justice you are not bound to give it him, but to give it to the magistrate for the poor. But yet prudence may tell you of other reasons a fine to give it the man himself, though justice bind you not to it: as in case that else he may be revenged and do you some greater hurt, or some greater hurt is any other way likely to be the consequent, which it is lawful by money to prevent.
But many think that you are bound to deliver the money to the thief or officer himself, because it is a lawful thing to do it, though he have no just title to it; and because it was your meaning, or the signification of your words in your covenant with him. And if it were not lawful to do it, it could not be lawful to promise to do it: otherwise your promise is a lie.
To this, those of the other opinion say that as a man who is discharged of his promise by him that it was made to is not to be accounted false if he perform it not, so is it as to the thief or officer in question, because he having no right, is to you as the other that has quit his right. And this answer indeed will prove that it is not strict injustice not to pay the money promised: but it will not prove that it is not a lie to make such a promise with an intent of not-performing it, or that it is not a lie to make it with an intent of performing it, and not to do it when you may.
Though here a Jesuit will tell you that you may say the words of a promise with an equivocation or mental reservation, to a thief or persecuting magistrate (of which see more in the chapters of lying, vows and perjury). I am therefore of opinion that your promise must be sincerely made and according to the true intent of it, you must offer the money to the thief or officer; except in case the magistrate forbid you, or some greater reason lie against it, which you foresaw not when you made the promise. But the offender is undoubtedly obliged not to take the money.
§16. The same determination holds as to all contracts and promises made to such persons who by injurious force constrained us to make them.
There is on us an obligation to veracity, though none to them in point of justice, because they have no proper right; nor may they lawfully take our payment or service promised them. And in case that the public good unexpectedly cross our performance, we must not perform it:
Such like is the case of conquerors, and those that upon conquest become their vassals or subjects upon unrighteous terms. But still remember, that if it be not only a covenant with man, but a vow to God, which makes him a party, the case is altered, and we remain obliged.
§17. Question 11. But may I promise the thief or bribe-taker to conceal his fault? and am I obliged to the performance of such a promise? Answer:
This is a promise of omitting that which else would be a duty. It is ordinarily a duty to reveal a thief and bribe-taker that he may be punished. But affirmatives bind not ad semper [to all times]: no act (especially external) is a duty at all times: therefore not this of revealing an offender’s fault. And if it be not always a duty, then it must be none when it is inconsistent with some greater benefit or duty: For when two goods come together, the greater is to be preferred.
Therefore in case that you see in just probability that the concealment of the sinner will do more hurt to the commonwealth or the souls of men than the saving of your life is like to do good, you may not promise to conceal him: or if you sinfully promise it, you may not perform it.
But in case that your life is likely to be a greater good than the not promising to conceal him, then such a promise is no fault; because the disclosing him is no duty. But to judge rightly of this is a matter of great difficulty. If it be less than life which you save by such a promise, it oft falls out that it is a lesser good than the detecting of the offence.
§18. But it will here be said, ‘If I promise not to conceal a robber, I must conceal him nevertheless; for when he has killed me, I cannot reveal him; and I must conceal the bribe-taker, for till I have promised secrecy, I cannot prove him guilty. And he that promises to forbear a particular good action whilst he lives, does yet reserve his life for all other good works: whereas if he die, he will neither do that nor any other.’
But this case is not so easily determined: If Daniel die, he can neither pray nor do any other good on earth. And if he live, he may do much other good though he never pray: and yet he might not promise to give over praying to save his life.
I conceive that we must distinguish of duties essential to the outward part of Christianity, or of constant indispensable necessity, and duties which are alterable and belong only to some persons, times and places: Also between the various consequents of omissions. And I conceive that ordinarily a man may promise for the saving of his life that he will forbear a particular alterable duty or relation: as to read such a commentary, to speak with such a minister, to be a magistrate or a minister, etc. in case we have not before bound ourselves never to give over our calling till death: and in case that the good which will follow our forbearance is likely (to a judicious person) to be greater than the evil.
But no man may promise to omit such a duty as God has made necessary during life: as not to love God or fear or trust Him: not to worship Him and call upon Him and praise Him: nor to do good to men’s souls or bodies in the general: or not to preach or pray while I am a minister of Christ, or not at all to govern while you are a governor. For all these contradict some former and greater promises or duties. Nor may you omit the smallest duty to save your life at such a time when your death is likely to do more good than your life would do without that one duty. Apply this to the present case.”
.
A Treatise of Episcopacy… (London: Simmons, 1681)
pt. 1, ch. 3, pp. 23-24
“49… When a rebel rose up against his prince and got but the stronger party and possession, how quickly did they [degenerate bishops] flatter him and own him. I find but one bishop besides St. Martin in all France and that part of Germany, that disowned Maximus that murdered Gratian: The rest applauded him for their own ends: Nor in that part of Italy I find not any besides Ambrose and one Hyginus that disowned him.
(Not that I think it my part to condemn all the holy bishops who professed subjection to usurpers in possession: Even holy Ambrose could write to the odious tyrant Eugenius (Clementissimo Imperatori Eugenio) concluding, nam cum privato detulerim corde intimo, quomodo non deferrem Imperatori, ‘When I honored thee a private man from the bottom of my heart, how can I but honor thee being emperor?’ And how far have the Roman bishops gone in this, even to Phocas and such as he?)”
.
pt. 2, ch. 22, p. 210
“But this is not all the usurpers that rose up in those days. Eugenius [the usurper] soon becomes more terrible than he (who once was but a schoolmaster). And how does this loyal St. Ambrose carry it? When he had got of Theodosius a pardon for all that took part with Maximus, even his army except two or three, yea and benefits too, yet did not this holy loyal man think it sinful to write thus to the tyrant Eugenius (Epistles, bk. 2, p. 103), Clementissimo Imperatori Eugenio, Ambrosius Episcopus, ‘Bishop Ambrose to the most clement emperor Eugenius.’ And thus concludes:
In his vero in quibus vos rogari decet, etiam exhibere sedulitatem potestati debitam▪ sicut et scriptum est, cui honorem, honorem, cui tributum, tributum: Nam cum privato detulerim corde intimo, quomodo non deferrem Imperatori?
i.e. ‘But in these matters where it becomes us to petition you, we must also give the diligence due to power: as it is written, honor to whom honor, tribute to whom tribute: For when I honored you, when you were a private man from the inwards of my heart, how should I not honor you an emperor?’”
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May One take an Oath of Allegiance or Otherwise to a Usurper?
Order of
Articles 2
Quotes 3
.
Articles
1600’s
English Puritans – pt. 2, Objection 3: ‘Their office’s administration is with vows of obedience to bishops’ in A Refutation of the Errors of Separatists (1604; RBO, 2025), pp. 262-68
Ascham, Anthony – ch. 3, ‘Whether we may lawfully take new oaths for the interest of the unjust party, especially after former oaths of allegiance to another party?’ in A Discourse, wherein is Examined what is particularly Lawful during the Confusions & Revolutions of Government… (London, 1648), pt. 2, pp. 43-56
.
Quotes
Order of
Ursinus
Dury
Baxter
.
1500’s
Zachary Ursinus
The Sum of Christian Religion… tr. Henrie Parrie (Oxford, 1587), 3rd Commandment, 4. ‘Whether all oaths are to be kept’, p. 919
“If it be just to do, which thou through constraint hast promised, it is just also for thee to promise by oath to do it. For what we may lawfully do, the same also we may lawfully promise by an oath to do.
As, if a man falling into the hands of a thief, should be required by the thief to give a piece of money for the redeeming of his life; verily he not only may, but also ought, if he be able, to perform that which the thief requires. And if this be lawfully performed unto a thief, it is lawfully also performed unto him by an oath.”
.
1600’s
John Dury
Just Re-Proposals to Humble Proposals… concerning the Engagement which the Parliament hath ordered to be taken (London, 1650), pp. 10-12
“Upon mature deliberation we did perceive that the wise and holy providence of God… has… disabled that [former] way of government and all that depends thereon, from affording any protection and preservation to any of the inhabitants of this land; and has enabled another form of government to afford it; Wherefore we did conclude from the light of nature, from the judgement of the learned, from the practice of Christians in former ages, from our own principles and from our former engagements that it was the will of God we should quietly and peaceably set ourselves in our places and callings to live under this government and to submit to it in such things as are imposed upon or required of us [such as the oath of Engagement] by the powers which are in actual possession, being things in themselves lawful and necessary, or expedient to the preservation of ourselves and others…
Fourthly, because we clearly conceive that there is no difference at all between the submission which the authors of the Proposals themselves rightly acknowledge to be due to the powers which are in actual possession and that which is required by the subscription to this Engagement: for seeing the express words of the Engagement give no ground to interpret the act of subscription beyond that which is a clear and known duty: therefore we think it not (as to our consciences) warrantable to interpret it otherwise; but we rather think it contrary to a known duty to make of a thing in itself lawful and necessary at this time, any scrupulous interpretation beyond what the words import; or to suspend obedience from a duty upon the conjecture of something which may be thought undutiful, when that which is to our conscience a known duty is apparent: Upon which ground we declare that we trouble not ourselves, nor do we think it lawful to stagger others in their thoughts with the inferences which the proposers make upon the subscription of the Engagement with reference to these queries [of theirs]:
As how far it does imply an approbation of the manner of the present establishment, whether as effected by a full and free authority yea or no? whether yea or no, it does imply an active concurrence and a ratifying consent of the people thereunto further than what has been already acknowledged to be due to the powers in actual possession by all that are in subjection under them and depend upon their protection? and whether yea or no, and how far it fastens an obligation to act to the strengthening and promoting of the government which is at present or may be hereafter established by the advantage of possible power?
We say that to trouble our own or other men’s weaker consciences with these or such like doubtful conjectures to color the suspension of our own, or occasion the aversion of other men’s affections from yielding obedience to a clear and confessed duty, is not only preposterous and contrary to the aim of healing breaches, and of advancing a public good in this time of distraction, but inconsistent (as to our reason) with the obvious meaning of the words which are to be subscribed and disagreeing (as to our affections) with the charity due no less to superiors than to other men, which is not to think evil when good may be thought of them.
And lastly, it is opposite (as to our spirits) unto that wisdom which is from above (the rule of our walking) teaching us to have pure and peaceable thoughts in all our actings, to perform duties in godly simplicity and without worldly wisdom, to be gentle and easily intreated, to do good works without partial scrupulosity and without hypocrisy.
And upon these principles of true wisdom (which we humbly conceive are not laid to heart by our brethren in the third paragraph of their Proposals) we professedly wave all those scruples and the stumbling-blocks which they have laid to themselves and wherewith they have puzzled others, upon this clear account: that whenever the consideration of these things, which are said to be implied in the subscription (which we see not) shall come before us, to be circumstantially considered for the edification of others, or the clearing of our own way, we then shall be most ready to declare our sense therein, according to known principles and the circumstances, which God shall offer…”
.
Richard Baxter
A Christian Directory... (London, 1673), pt. 3, ch. 5
title 1, p. 698
§22. Direction 12. If oaths be commanded us by usurpers that have no authority to impose them, we must not take them in formal obedience to their commands. For that were to own their usurpation and encourage them in their sin: If we owe them no obedience in anything, we must not obey them in so great a thing.
Or if they have some authority over us in other matters, but none in this (as a constable has no power to give an oath), we must not obey them in the point where they have no authority.
But yet it is possible that there may be other reasons that may make it our duty to do it, though not as an act of formal obedience: As I may take an oath when a thief or murderer requires it, not to obey him, but to save my life. And if any man command me to do that which God commands me, I must do that because God commands it.”
.
title 2, p. 705
“§25… We must distinguish:
1. between a lawful impose or contracter, and a violent usurper or robber that injuriously compels us to swear.
2. Between the obvious usual sense of the words and an unusual forced sense.
3. Between a sincere, involuntary misunderstanding the imposer, and a voluntary fraudulent reservation or private sense.
4. Between one that I owe something to antecedently, and one that I owe nothing to but by the mere self-obligation of my vow.
5. Between an imposer that is himself the culpable cause of my misunderstanding him, and one that is not the cause, but my own weakness or negligence is the cause.
6. Between a case where both senses may be kept, and a case where they cannot, being inconsistent.
…
Proposition 6. If the imposer be a robber or usurper, or one that I owe nothing to in justice, but what I oblige myself to by my oath, I am not then bound at all to keep my oath in his sense, if my own sense was according to the common use of the words.
Proposition 7. Though I may not lie to a robber or tyrant that unjustly imposes promises or oaths upon me, yet if he put an oath or promise on me which is good and lawful in the proper usual sense of the words, though bad in his sense (which is contrary to the plain words), whether I may take this to save my liberty or life, I leave to the consideration of the judicious: that which may be said against it is, that oaths must not be used indirectly and dissemblingly. That which may be said for it is:
1. That I have no obligation to fit my words to his personal private sense.
2. That I deceive him not, but only permit him to deceive himself, as long as it is he and not I that misuses the words.
3. That I am to have chief respect to the public sense: and it is not his sense, but mine that is the public sense.
4. That the saving of a man’s life or liberty is cause enough for the taking [of] a lawful oath.
[Baxter elsewhere says this: “Lawyer: But as you have said that those great men, [Hugo] Grotius and Bishop Jeremy Taylor were for profitable lying, so you know that worthy Latitudinarian doctor who was wont to say that if false knaves would turn him out of his ministry and living by ensnaring impositions, he would take the words in the best sense he could subdue them to, whatever the authors meant; and it was as lawful for him to defend himself against knaves with his tongue, as with his hands and sword.
…
§32. Rule 18. Though an oath imposed by an usurper or by violence is not to be taken in formal obedience, nor at all, unless the greatness of the benefit require it, yet being taken it is nevertheless obligatory (supposing nothing else do make it void). Man is a free agent and cannot be forced though he may be frightened:
If he swear to a thief for the saving of his life, he voluntarily does choose the inconveniences of the oath as a means to save his life. Therefore being a voluntary act it is obligatory. Else there should be no obligation on us to suffer for Christ, but anything might be sworn or done to escape suffering: See of this Dr. Sanderson largely, Lectures 4, sect. 14-16.
The imposition and the oath are different things. In the imposition, a thief or tyrant is the party commanding, and I am the party commanded: And his having no authority to command me, does nullify only his command and makes me not obliged to obey him, nor to take it in any obedience to him: But yet if I do take it without any authority obliging me (as private oaths are taken), it is still an oath or vow, in which the parties are God and man: Man vowing and making himself a debtor to God: And God has authority to require me to keep my vows, when men have no authority to require me to make them. All men confess that private Vows bind: And the nullity of the imposer’s authority makes them but private vows. This case is easy and commonly agreed on.”
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On Serving, or Holding Office under, Prevalent Usurpers
Order of
Bible Verses 7
Articles 2
Quote 1
.
Bible Verses
2 Kn. 5:2-3
Ezra 7:6, 25-26
Neh. 2:1-2
Esth. 2:17
Esth. 10:3
Dan. 3:30
Dan. 6:1-3
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Articles
1600’s
Ascham, Anthony
ch. 2, ‘Whether we may lawfully serve an unjust party in our persons or no?’ in A Discourse, wherein is Examined what is particularly Lawful during the Confusions & Revolutions of Government, or How far a man may conform to the powers and commands of those who hold kingdoms divided by civil or foreign wars… (London, 1648), pt. 2, pp. 40-43
A Reply to a Paper of Dr. Sanderson’s, containing a censure of Mr. A.A. his book of the Confusions and Revolution of Government (London: 1650) 22 pp.
“The state of the controversy: Whether in order to public obedience in civil government, the consideration of the things commanded (as they are not in themselves bad) be above the circumstantial qualification of the persons commanding? As to do the do the offices of a judge or justice of the peace by virtue of commission derived from any governor whatever.” – p. 2
.
Quote
1600’s
Francis Rouse
The Lawfulness of Obeying the Present Government… (London, 1649), pp. 16-19 Rouse was a Westminster divine.
“Thirdly, it is cleared in this discourse that those who have gotten to be powers (though by force) yet ought to give justice to those whose government they have undertaken. And again, that the people may lawfully demand it. But is it possible that one or a few persons in supreme power can distribute justice to a whole nation without subordinate agents? So that to say, ‘None may lawfully act under the supreme power in distributing of justice, and government,’ were to say upon the matter that he should give no justice, and that the people should have no justice at all. And then how absurd is it to teach that the people may lawfully seek justice of him which they cannot receive? and that he is bound to give justice, but none are allowed by whom he may give it?
Fourthly, this doctrine of not acting is the very doctrine of levelling. For when no man may act to give justice, may not every man take freely from his neighbor what he list, and so level the rich with the poor? unless this make it unlikely, because worse than levelling, that those who have most force will have most; yea some all, and others nothing; and so to avoid acting under a supposed tyrannical government unto justice and order; there shall be tyrants in every place or parish, who shall act to disorder and oppression, and no property, justice, nor government at all left amongst us.
And surely I think David out of his love to Israel would not have wished such an estate to Israel under Absalom, had he the whole in possession and himself no force on foot to recover it; nor would he have desired such an unsettlement to procure his settlement. And hence arises that which they call an interpretative consent of the people; because it is understood and supposed that every rational man does consent, that there should be order, property and right given to every member of a commonwealth under a tyrant, rather than all to be under confusion oppression, robberies and murders.
Fifthly, how could Ezra and Nehemiah justify their acting under the Persian monarch, who had no right to the crown of Judah either by blood or just conquest (Ezra 7:25)? Yet Ezra was authorized by him to set magistrates, fine and imprison and put to death (Ezra 10:7-8); And he exercises authority, in making the people of Israel to swear and to enter into a covenant, and in sending forth a proclamation to all the children of the captivity, that they should gather themselves together to Jerusalem; And that whosoever would not come within three days, all his substance should be forfeited.
Nehemiah also acts as governor, and rebukes the nobles and rulers and sets a great assembly against them because of their usury. He also called the priests and took an oath to perform the promise of leaving that usury (Neh. 5. •. etc.). He acknowledges also that he was governor there about twelve years, and he gave his brother Hanani and Hanaiah ruler of the palace charge over Jerusalem (Neh. 7:2). So he did both act himself and others acted under him. We find also that at that time there were rulers of the people that dwelt at Jerusalem, and Nehemiah contended with the rulers and nobles, made treasurers, commanded the gates to be shut before the Sabbath, threatened to lay hands on the merchants that lay at the gates, smote certain of the Jews and plucked off their hair because having married wives of Ashdod, their children spake half in the language of Ashdod (Neh. 13).
Sixthly, let us hear what before these times and before our case was in being hath been taught in point of acting; and upon what grounds it has been approved. An author eminently learned and skillful in the doctrine of lawgiving says thus:
‘No man may punish or condemn another even with a just punishment, except he have public power, which a tyrant cannot give. But in this there must be a consideration or subdistinction. For in rigor this is true as to the tyrant’s part; yet it so happens that the commonwealth because it cannot resist him, does tolerate him, and suffers itself to be governed by him; and does tacitly consent, and will that justice be administered by him, for the reason already touched, because it is a less evil to be governed by him, than altogether to want just coaction and direction; and then it shall not be a sin to obey even in the things aforesaid, because the consent of the commonwealth does supply the defect of the tyrant’s power.’ (Suarez, De Leg., bk. 3, ch. 10)
Another thus:
‘That his sentences are valid, is proved. Because his sentences, and just commands although they have not force from a tyrannical power, yet they have it from elsewhere.
First, and inchoatively from the law of nature, which such a state of things being supposed, does dictate that obedience must be given for the common good, otherwise all will be full of thefts and robberies.
Secondly, and completely from the commonwealth; and that either because while that state endures, it gives authority to him by a tacit consent, while it will’s that he administer justice, and use his usurped office in a due manner, or rather because it does tacitly approve his commands, and acts being agreeable to the laws and common good, and will’s that his just sentences, whereby the suites of the people are decided, and the guilty are punished, shall be valid and bind the subjects; for except they were valid and did bind, no man would obey, but only in show but every man would secretly do the contrary with a great inconvenience to the commonwealth. Now the commonwealth may give this force to the sentences, and acts of a tyrant, because it is superior to all single persons, though it be oppressed with tyranny, and may account the just sentence of a tyrant as its own.’ (Lessius, De Justitia & Jure, bk. 2, ch. 25, Dubitat. 9)
Thou wilt ask whether a tyrant do sin the sin of murder, and be bound to restitution, if he put to death guilty persons, or deprive them of their goods according to law? I answer negatively; because the commonwealth does tacitly give him authority hereunto, while it does consent and desire that this should be done by him.
Thus is the authority of acting in this case grounded upon a tacit or implied consent, which consent is the very dictate of nature or common reason, because it is better to have some justice than none at all, some coercive power and government than that all be left to disorder, violence and confusion.”
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Latin Articles
1500’s
Cajetan, Thomas – ‘A republic tyrannically occupied is a most grave sin’ in Summula (Venice: Carampellum, 1596), pp. 411-12
Romanists wrote on this topic a fair amount as it often came up for them, more than others, as they believed the Pope may excommunicate a civil governor and therein divest him of all civil authority. Yet many Romanists often remained living in the country, under, in their eyes, a usurping ruler. The reformed often quote positively from such Romanist writers where it was useful.
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1600’s
Alsted, Johannes – ch. 17, 5th Commandment, 8th rule, sect. 9 in Theological Cases, exhibiting the Anatomy of Conscience & the School of Trial… (Hanau, Eifrid, 1630), p. 321
“A tyrant without title, who is an invader, every private man may and ought to destroy, for he is not a prince but a private person.”
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