“As for God, his way is perfect.”
2 Sam. 22:31
“Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?”
Job 11:7
“Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.”
Mt. 5:48
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Order of Contents
Articles 10+
Books 6
Quotes 6
What Perfection Is 1
Historical 1
Latin & French 8+
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Articles
500’s
Boethius – The Consolation of Philosophy III, 10
Here Boethius states an axiom stronger than Augustine’s (below), that God is such that nothing greater than Him is even conceivable.
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1000’s
Anselm
Monologion, chs. 1–3, 15
Anselm “at first based his perfect-being theology on Augustine’s axiom, that God is the greatest actual being (Monologion, chaps 1–3). To fill out the concept of God, Anselm directed, ascribe to God all attributes F such that whatever is F is better than whatever is not F (Monologion, ch. 15). Thus Anselm’s Monologion recaps Zeno’s theological programme. In his Proslogion, Anselm switches to Boethius’ axiom, and suggests filling out the concept of God by many arguments of this form:
(10) Nothing greater than God is conceivable.
(11) If God is not F, something greater than God is conceivable.
(12) So God is F.” – Leftow, ‘3. Perfect-being theology’
Proslogion
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1200’s
Aquinas – Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1
ch. 28, ‘Of the Divine Perfection’
ch. 29, ‘Of the Likeness of Creatures’
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1500’s
Viret, Pierre – ‘Of the Creation & Fall of the Angels, & how that God in the same has declared the difference that is between the Creator and the Creature, and how it is only He that is perfect and unchangeable’ in A Christian Instruction… (d. 1571; London: Veale, 1573), The Exposition of the Preface of the Law
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1600’s
Becanus, Martin – Summa Theologiae Scolasticae (d. 1624; Leiden, 1683), First Tract on God & the Divine Attributes tr. Michael Lynch
ch. 3, ‘Divine Perfection’
ch. 5, ‘Infinity of God’, pt. 2
Becanus (1563-1624) was a Romanist Jesuit and professor of theology.
Ussher, James – ch. 2, ‘Of God & his Attributes, Perfection, Wisdom & Omnipotence’ in A Body of Divinity, or the Sum & Substance of the Christian Religion Buy modified by Hastings Robinson (1645; London, 1841)
Le Blanc de Beaulieu, Louis – ‘On the Perfection & Infinity of God’ in Theological Theses Published at Various Times in the Academy of Sedan 3rd ed. tr. by AI by Colloquia Scholastica at Discord (1675; London, 1683), pp. 194-99 Latin
Le Blanc (1614-1675) was a French reformed professor of theology at Sedan.
van Mastricht, Peter – 21. ‘The All-Sufficiency or Perfection of God’ in Theoretical-Practical Theology ed. Joel Beeke, tr: Todd Rester (RHB, 2018), vol. 2, Faith in the Triune God, pt. 1, bk. 2, pp. 453-69
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1700’s
Venema, Herman – Translation of Hermann Venema’s inedited Institutes of Theology tr. Alexander W. Brown (d. 1787; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1850)
5. God (Names of, Names of Essence, Proper Names, Appellatives, Aleim, Jehovah, El-Shadai, Adonai, Jah, Nature of God, Perfect, Spiritual, Independent Cause of All, Attributes of, Essence & Life, Simplicity) 119
6. Attributes of God (Independence, Eternity, Immutability, Understanding, Knowledge, Object of, Extent, Manner, Will, Object of, Acts, Perfection) 138-61
Abernethy, John – Sermons 6-7, ‘The Divine Perfections Incomprehensible’ on Job 11:17 in Discourses concerning the Being & Natural Perfections of God, vol. 2 3rd ed. (London: Whitridge, 1757), pp. 219-81
Abernethy (1680-1740) was reformed and was an Irish, presbyterian minister.
De Moor, Bernard – Continuous Commentary, ch. 4, ‘On God’
14. God’s Spirituality Argued from His Perfection
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18. Infinity & Perfection of the Divine Being, pt. 1, 2
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35. Perfection of God’s Knowledge
35. Perfection of God’s Knowledge Asserted from Hebrews 4:13
35. Perfection of God’s Knowledge Asserted from Romans 11 (by Voetius)
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2000’s
Leftow, Brian – ‘God, concepts of’, version 1 in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy online
Article Summary
1. ‘The logic of ‘God’
2. ‘Data and methods’
3. ‘Perfect-being theology’
4. ‘Limits of perfect-being theology’
5. ‘Intuitions about perfection’
6. ‘Classical theism’
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Books
1700’s
Howe, John – ‘The Attributes & Perfections of the Divine Being in Nine Lectures on Mt. 5:48’ in The Principles of the Oracles of God in The Works of the Rev. John Howe, Complete in Two Volumes, vol. 2 (New York: John P. Haven, 1835), Lectures 17-25, pp. 1,103-1,132
Howe (1630-1705) was an English dissenting minister.
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1900’s
Sontag, Frederick – Divine Perfection: Possible Ideas of God (NY: Harper, 1962) 150 pp.
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2000’s
Rogers, Katherin A. – Perfect Being Theology Pre (Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 163 pp. ToC
Richards, J. Wesley – The Untamed God: a Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Immutability & Simplicity Pre (IVP Academic, 2003)
Nagasawa, Yujin – Maximal God: a New Defense of Perfect Being Theism Pre (Oxford University Press, 2017) 210 pp. ToC
Speaks, Jeff – The Greatest Possible Being Pre (Oxford University Press, 2018) 173 pp. ToC
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Quotes
Order of
Augustine
Becanus
Bates
Baxter
Charnock
Wolter
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400’s
Augustine
Christian Doctrine, I, 7, 7
“When we think of… God… thought takes the form of an attempt to conceive something than which nothing more excellent or sublime exists.”
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1600’s
Martin Becanus
Summa Theologiae Scolasticae (d. 1624; Leiden, 1683), First Tract on God & the Divine Attributes, ch. 5, ‘Infinity of God’, pt. 1 tr. Michael Lynch Becanus is a Romanist.
“3. He [the Arminian Conrad Vorstius] first says that ‘Scripture does not call God infinite.’ This is false. For Scripture thus says in Psalm 144:3: “Great is the Lord, exceedingly praiseworthy, whose magnitude has no end.” And Baruch 3:25: “It is great and has no bounds, immeasurable and highly-exalted.” These witnesses are not able to be interpreted as about magnitude of mass or quantity, which is not in God. But [it must be interpreted] as respecting his magnitude of perfection or virtue. Therefore, this is the sense: God is so great in virtue and perfection that he does not have an end or terminus of his virtue and perfection.
From this, I reason thus: just as the end in virtue and perfection is that which has an end or terminus of its virtue and perfection, so on the opposite side, an infinite in virtue and perfection is that which does not have an end or terminus of its virtue and perfection. But God does not have an end or terminus of his virtue and perfection. Therefore, he is infinite in virtue and perfection. What shall Vorstius say at this point? The major premise is per se known by implication. The minor premise is openly expressed in Scripture. The conclusion is legitimately inferred.”
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William Bates
in The Morning Exercise Methodized… by several Ministers of the City of London… (London: E.M. for Ralph Smith, 1660), Sermon 2, ‘God is’, p. 31
“First, in the Creation; his essence and attributes are clearly revealed, his absolute power, unerring wisdom, and infinite goodness are discovered to every capacity; therefore the apostle urges this as the most proper argument to convince the heathens, Acts 14:15, ‘That they should turn from their vanities, to the living God which made heaven and earth, and sea, and all things that are therein.’
To this they must naturally assent, as shadows represent the figure of those bodies from whence they are derived; so in the world there are such traces of the divine perfections that it is easy to infer there is a Sovereign being which is the cause of it; all the creatures and their various excellencies are as so many beams which reflect upon this Sun, or lines which direct to this Center; nay, the meanest being carries some impression of the first cause, as the image of a prince is stamped upon a penny, as well as upon greater money; the beasts will instruct, and the mute fishes teach the atheist there is a God; and though he is not discerned by the outward sight, yet the understanding will as certainly discover him as it does an invisible spirit in a living body…”
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Richard Baxter
Catholic Theology (London: White, 1675)
sect. 1, ‘Of our Knowledge of God as here Attainable’, pp. 1-3
“3. We neither have, nor can have here in flesh, any one proper formal conception of the Divine nature that is formally suited to the truth in the object, but only metaphorical or analogical conceptions borrowed from things better known.
4. Yet nothing beyond sense (at least) is so certainly known as God, so far as we can reach, though nothing be less perfectly or more defectively known, or less comprehended. Even as we know nothing visible more certainly than the sun, and yet comprehend nothing visible less.
5. It is not true, which many great metaphysicians assert, that the quiddity of God is totally unknown to us: for then it could not be life eternal to know Him; nor would a mere negative knowledge cause in us a sufficient positive love or joy or trust, etc. But to know that we cannot know Him would but infer that we cannot love Him: for we love not an unknown good.
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7. God is here seen in the glass of His works, with the revelation of His Word and Spirit. And from these works we must borrow our conceptions.
8. Therefore, though the thing intended when we speak of God be transcendently and only in Him, and not in the creature, yet the first use of the words is to signify something in the creature. And therefore the creature is the famosius analogatum [the better known analogue], though nothing to God.
9. In the use of these notions we must still profess that we apply them to God no farther than to signify his perfections. And all words must be as little as may be used of Him in strict disputes which imply imperfection, when better may be had; but the highest are to be preferred.
10. And we must still profess that we take none of these words to be formal, proper, univocal terms, lest the concealed metaphor or impropriety occasion false conceptions of God and unworthy of Him, and also tempt men to run them further by false inferences.
11. God’s nature is most simple, undivided; and so must an adequate conception of Him be. But man can have no such conception of Him, but must know what he can know of this one God by many partial inadequate conceptions.
12. Yet must we be very careful that these inadequate analogical conceptions be orderly, and not—as (I will not say how commonly) it is done by some—a confused heap. For the mind that so conceiveth of Him greatly injures itself and Him; and the tongue and pen that so describes Him dishonors Him…”
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sect. 3, ‘The several inadequate conceptions which in order make up our knowledge of God’, p. 3
“21. By the knowledge of our own acts we know our powers and the nature of our own souls (though imperfectly). And by the knowledge of our souls, we know the nature of other intellectual spirits. And by the knowledge of ourselves and them, and the Scripture expressions of his attributes, we know so much of God as we can here know. And accordingly must speak of Him, or be silent. For we have no higher notions than such as are thus analogical, expressing that which is in God in an inconceivable eminency and transcendency, by words which first signify that which is formally in the soul (as is said).
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28. Though God has no real accidents, we are forced to conceive of Him with some analogy to accidents: where, 1. The universal conception is perfectio [perfection], which comprehends all. 2. The divine principles considered in perfectio denominate God, 1. Potentissimus [most powerful], 2. Sapientissimus [most wise], 3. Optimus [best].”
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Stephen Charnock
Several Discourses upon the Existence & Attributes of God (London: 1682), “Discourse on God’s being a Spirit”
p. 124
“That command which forbade corporeal images would not indulge carnal imaginations, since the nature of God is as much wronged by unworthy images erected in the fancy as by statues carved out of stone or metals:”
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pp. 125-26
“3. Though we must not conceive of God as of a human or corporeal shape, yet we cannot think of God without some reflection upon our own being. We cannot conceive Him to be an intelligent being, but we must make some comparison between him and our own understanding nature, to come to a knowledge of him. Since we are enclosed in bodies, we apprehend nothing but what comes in by sense, and what we in some sort measure by sensible objects. And in the consideration of those things, which we desire to abstract from sense, we are fain to make use of the assistances of sense and visible things: And therefore when we frame the highest notion, there will be some similitude of some corporeal thing in our fancy; and though we would spiritualize our thoughts, and aim at a more abstracted and raised understanding, yet there will be some dregs of matter sticking to our conceptions; yet we still judge by argument and reasoning, what the thing is we think of under those material images. A corporeal image will follow us, as the shadow does the body: While we are in the body, and surrounded with fleshly matter, we cannot think of things without some help from corporeal representations: Something of sense will interpose itself in our purest conceptions of spiritual things; for the faculties which serve for contemplation, are either corporeal, as the sense and fancy, or so allied to them that nothing passes into them but by the organs of the body; so that there is a natural inclination to figure nothing but under a corporeal notion, till by an attentive application of the mind and reason to the object thought upon, we separate that which is bodily from that which is spiritual, and by degrees ascend to that true notion of that we think upon, and would have a due conception of in our mind.
Therefore God tempers the declaration of Himself to our weakness, and the condition of our natures. He condescends to our littleness and narrowness, when he declares himself by the similitude of bodily members. As the light of the sun is tempered, and diffuses itself to our sense through the air and vapors, that our weak eyes may not be too much dazzled with it: Without it we could not know or judge of the sun, because we could have no use of our sense, which we must have before we can judge of it in our understanding: So we are not able to conceive of spiritual beings in the purity of their own nature, without such a temperament, and such shadows to usher them into our minds.
And therefore we find the Spirit of God accommodates himself to our contracted and teddered capacities, and uses such expressions of God, as are suited to us in this state of flesh wherein we are: And therefore because we cannot apprehend God in the simplicity of his own Being, and his undivided essence, he draws the representations of Himself from several Creatures and several actions of those creatures: As sometimes he is said to be angry, to walk, to sit, to fly; not that we should rest in such conceptions of Him, but take our rise from this foundation, and such perfections in the creatures, to mount up to a knowledge of God’s nature by those several steps, and conceive of him by those divided excellencies, because we cannot conceive of him in the purity of his own essence.
We cannot possibly think or speak of God, unless we transfer the names of created perfections to Him; yet we are to conceive of them in a higher manner when we apply them to the Divine Nature, than when we consider them in the several creatures formally, exceeding those perfections and excellencies which are in the creature, and in a more excellent manner: as one says, “Though we cannot comprehend God without the help of such resemblances, yet we may without making an image of Him; so that inability of ours excuses those apprehensions of Him from any way offending against his Divine Nature.” These are not notions so much suited to the nature of God as the weakness of man: They are helps to our meditations, but ought not to be formal conceptions of Him.
We may assist ourselves in our apprehensions of Him, by considering the subtilty and spirituality of air; and considering the members of a body, without thinking him to be air, or to have any corporeal member. Our reason tells us, that whatsoever is a body, is limited and bounded; and the notion of infiniteness and bodiliness, cannot agree and consist together: And therefore what is offered by our fancy should be purified by our reason.”
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2000’s
Allan B. Wolter
Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), pt. 1, article 2, pp. 17-18 Wolter was a Scotus scholar and writes from that perspective.
“For it is commonly conceded today that a composition in concepts does not argue to a real composition in the thing. For if the formal notion of one perfection (for example knowing, even if the knowing is omniscient) does not include the formal notion of another perfection (for example loving, even if the loving is altogether perfect), then to be sure this fact does not necessarily imply that both perfections have, in respect of the thing (e.g. God), the idea of parts and so the idea of being mutually perfectible. But this condition would be required for having composition on the part of the thing.
If we were able to conclude anything from the conceptual separability of one perfection from another, then some non-identity on the part of the thing would be proved (as a virtual or so-called formal non-identity, which we will deal with in the treatment of the formal distinction). But such a non-identity implies neither composition nor imperfection in the being that has those perfections.
At most, indeed, a reason is to be sought why one such perfection is found in the same thing along with another perfection not included in the formal concept of the first, but I do not know why the only adequate assignable reason for explaining it must be found in a mutual perfectability (a perfectibility after the manner of parts) that those perfections have on the side of the thing. But if anyone wishes to dispute this question, let him do so.”
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On What Perfection Is
Quote
2000’s
Allan B. Wolter
Little Summary of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), pt. 1, article 1, p. 14
Note. On the notion of perfection: the term ‘perfect’ (from a verb meaning to carry through or bring to finished state) signifies ‘complete’ or ‘fully made’. So perfection is everything that is required for a thing to be called complete or whole.
The complex of all such, whether distinct really or formally or in reason, is called the total perfection of the thing, but singly they are called partial perfections or, simply, perfections of the thing. Therefore whatever it is better to have than not to have is a perfection in whatever has it.
Perfections can be divided into:
1) Positive and negative insofar as what is conceived as perfecting a thing is an entity or being, or a lack of entity or being. So, for example, humanity, capacity for laughter, head, hand, eye, thoughts, affections of soul are positive perfections in man. A hollowed finger (pincers) in an earwig, absence of superfluous weight in a man, and the like are negative perfections.
2) Essential and existential perfections insofar as the perfection is conceived as perfecting the thing in what the thing is, for example simplicity, unity, matter, form etc., or as perfecting it in the way it is, for example independence, actuality, necessity, contingency.
3) Pure or mixed perfections insofar as the perfection, in its precise idea, does not or does include some imperfection. So life, intelligence, freedom include no imperfection while, on the contrary, matter, composition, reasoning do include imperfection.”
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Historical
On the Post-Reformation
Bac, J. Martin – Perfect Will Theology: Divine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as against Suarez, Episcopius, Descartes & Spinoza Pre (Brill, 2010) 555 pp. ToC
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Latin
Articles
1500’s
Zanchi, Jerome – 7. ‘Of the Perfection of God’ in Of the Nature of God, or of the Divine Attributes (Heidelberg, 1577), bk. 2, pp. 169-88 irregular page numbering
Zanchi (1516-1590) was an Italian, protestant Reformation clergyman and educator who influenced the development of Reformed theology during the years following John Calvin’s death.
Ursinus, Zacharias – ‘The Father, Son & Holy Spirit are Equal According to Deity, & All Essential Perfections of Deity’ in Theological Places in Theological Works, vol. 1 (Heidelberg, 1612), col. 501-22
Ursinus (1534-1583)
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1600’s
Voet, Gisbert – (4) ‘Perfection’ in I. ‘Of God’ in Syllabus of Theological Problems (Utrecht, 1643), pt. 1, section 1, tract 2, 4. Attributes of God in Specific, 1st Kind Abbr.
“Whether God is in every way perfect? It is affirmed.
Whether God is universally perfect, as having the perfection of all things in Himself? It is affirmed with a distinction.
Whether creatures are able to be similar to God? It is affirmed with a distinction.
Whether perfection may be a natural property of God? It is affirmed.
Whether because God makes all according to Himself, He is imperfect in Himself? It is denied.
Whether because He uses the works of men and from them requires honor, He is imperfect in Himself? It is denied.
Whether the created perfections are in God? It is denied with a distinction. [contrast this with Becanus above]”
Burman, Francis – 18. ‘Of the Infinity & Perfection of God’ in A Synopsis of Theology, & especially of the Economy of the Covenant of God (Utrecht, 1671), vol. 1, bk. 1, locus 2, pp. 107-8
Burman (1628-1679)
van Mastricht, Petrus – 21. ‘Of the All-Sufficiency & Perfection of God’ on Gen. 17:1 in Theoretical & Practical Theology… new ed. (Utrecht, 1724), bk 2, Of Faith in the Triune God, pp. 219-25
Van Mastricht (1630-1706)
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1700’s
Holtzfus, Barthold – 2. ‘Of the Essence, Definition & Perfection of God’ in A Theological Tract on God, Attributes & the Divine Decrees, Three Academic Dissertations (1707), pp. 15-24
Holtzfus (1659-1717) was a reformed professor of philosophy and theology at Frankfurt.
Pictet, Benedict – 3. ‘The One God & his Perfections’ in The Marrow of Christian Theology, Instructive & Elenctic (Geneva, 1711), pp. 19-35 This is in a dialogue, question and answer format.
Pictet (1655–1724)
Stapfer, Johann – 4. ‘Of the Perfections of God in General’ on Mt. 5:48 in Theology Analyzed, vol. 1 (Bern, 1761), pp. 22-28
Stapfer (1708-1775) was a professor of theology at Bern. He was influenced by the philosophical rationalism of Christian Wolff, though, by him “the orthodox reformed tradition was continued with little overt alteration of the doctrinal loci and their basic definitions.” – Richard Muller
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French
Book
1700’s
Naude, Philippe – La Souveraine perfection de Dieu dans ses divins attributs et la parfaite intégrité de l’Écriture… défendue… contre toutes les objections du manichéisme répandues dans les livres de M. Bayle (Amsterdam, 1708)
Naudé (1654-1729).
“But the divines… have endeavored to answer all difficulties alledged by him [Mr. Bayle]… Mr. Naude, a learned mathematician of Berlin, and Mr. Placette of Copenhagen, eminent for his learning and piety [in his Response a deux Objections de Mr. B. 8 vo. 1707], have answered on the principles of the Calvinists…” – Anonymous, Vindication of the Divine Attributes, p. 7
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