“For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for even… [they] did change the natural use into that which is against nature…”
Rom. 1:26
“Doth not even nature itself teach you that…”
1 Cor. 11:14
“Children, obey your parents in the Lord: for this is right.”
Eph. 6:1
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Subsection
Scripture Upholds Nature’s Light & Law
Scripture: Rule of Faith over Nature
Reformed vs. Aquinas
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Order of Contents
In Scripture
Westminster Standards
Best: Owen
Articles
Books
Quotes 15+
Grace Perfects Nature
History
Reformed Natural Law vs. Aquinas
Aquinas
Presuppositionalism
As Divine-Right
Natural Inclinations
. Reason may Override
Specific Natural Laws
. Most Fundamental Law
. Stronger Guides & Protects Weaker
Biblio
Latin
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Natural Law in Scripture
Fulford, Andrew
‘An Exegetical Case for Natural Law: the Hebrew Scriptures’ 35 paragraphs (2013) at CalvinistInternational
‘An Exegetical Case for Natural Law: the Christian Scriptures’ 35 paragraphs (2013) at CalvinistInternational
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The Westminster Standards
Webpage
The Westminster Standards on Natural Law
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Articles
Fesko, J.V.; Richard, Guy – ‘Natural Theology & the Westminster Confession of Faith’ 43 pp. being a chapter in The Westminster Confession into the 21st Century Buy (2009), vol. 3, pp. 223-266
“Stated simply, the Westminster Confession and the divines that composed the document accept natural theology to a greater degree than present-day Reformed theologians. In order to demonstrate this claim, we will trace the trajectory of natural theology through the thought of Aquinas; the Reformation (1517-1564) – Calvin, Musculus, and Vermigli; Early Orthodoxy, or the post-Reformation (1565-1630/40) – Perkins, Polanus, Du Moulin, and Ussher; and High Orthodoxy (1630/40-1700), during which the Confession was written.” – pp. 224-5
The article also includes an analysis of the natural theology of the Westminster divines: William Twisse, Samuel Rutherford, Anthony Tuckney and Thomas Goodwin.
Saunders, Benjamin B. – ‘Hidden in Plain Sight: Natural Law & the Westminster Confession of Faith’ WTJ 84 (2022), pp. 177–202
Saunders’s focus for a main theologian is on Anthony Burgess, though he also quotes or references: Aquinas, Calvin, Vermigli, Ursinus, Althusius, Andrewes, Ames, Perkins, Gillespie, Twisse, Maynard, Leigh, Cawdrey & Palmer, Westminster minutes, London Presbyterians, Sedgwick, Marshall, Burroughs, Durham, Gouge and Baxter.
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The Best: John Owen
The Reason of Faith… (Glasgow, 1801), ch. 6, pp. 114-116, 118-120 Also in Works, 4.82 ff.
“1. And in the first place we, may consider that there are three ways whereby we assent unto anything that is proposed unto us as true, and receive it as such.
1. By inbred principles of natural light, and the first rational actings of our minds. This in reason answers instinct in irrational creatures. Hence God complains that his people did neglect and sin against their own natural light, and first dilates of reason, whereas brute creatures would not forsake the conduct of the instinct of their natures, Isa. 1:3. In general, the mind is necessarily determined to an assent unto the proper objects of these principles; it cannot do otherwise. It cannot but assent unto the prime dictates of the light of nature, yea those dictates are nothing but its assent. Its first apprehension of the things which the light of nature embraces, without either express reasonings or further consideration, are this assent. Thus does the mind embrace in itself the general notions of moral good and evil, with the difference between them, however it practically complies not with what they guide unto; Jude ver. 10. And so does it assent unto many principles of reason, as that the whole is greater than the part, without admitting any debate about them.
2. By rational considerations of things externally proposed unto us. Herein the mind exercises its discursive faculty, gathering one thing out of another, and concluding one thing from another. And hereon is it able to assent unto what is proposed unto it in various degrees of certainty, according unto the nature and degree of the evidence it proceeds upon. Hence it has a certain knowledge of some things, of others an opinion or persuasion prevalent against the objections to the contrary, which it knows, and whose force it understands, which may be true or false.
3. By faith. This respects that power of our minds whereby we are able to assent unto anything as true, which we have no first principles concerning, no inbred notions of, nor can from more known principles make unto ourselves any certain rational conclusions concerning them…
And this assent also has not only various degrees, but is also of diverse kinds, according as the testimony is which it arises from, and rests on; as being human if that be human, and divine if that be so also.
According to these distinct faculties and powers of our souls, God is pleased to reveal or make known Himself, his mind or will three ways unto us. For He has implanted no power on our minds, but the principle use and exercise of it are to be with respect unto Himself, and our living unto Him, which is the end of them all. And a neglect of the improvement of them unto this end, is the highest aggravation of sin.
It is an aggravation of sin when men abuse the creatures of God otherwise than He has appointed, or in not using them to his glory; when they take his corn, and wine, and oil, and spend them on their lusts, Hos. 2:8… But the height of impiety consists in the abuse of the faculties and powers of the soul, wherewith we are endowed purposely and immediately for the glorifying of God. Hence proceed unbelief, profaneness, blasphemy, atheism, and the like pollution of the spirit or mind. And these are sins of the highest provocation. For the powers and faculties of our minds being given us only to enable us to live unto God, the diverting of their principal exercise unto other ends, is an act of enmity against Him, and affront unto Him.
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He does not reveal Himself by his word unto the principles of natural light, nor unto reason in its exercise. But yet these principles, and reason itself, with all the faculties of our minds, are consequentially affected with that revelation, and are drawn forth into their proper exercise by it…
And concerning these several ways of the communication or revelation of the knowledge of God, it must be always observed that there is a a perfect consonancy in the things revealed by them all. If any thing pretends from the one what is absolutely contradictory unto the other, or our senses as the means of them, it is not to be received.
The foundation of the whole, as of all the actings of our souls, is in the inbred principles of natural light, or first neceflary dictates of our intellectual rational nature. This, so far as it extends, is a rule unto our apprehension in all that follows. Wherefore if any pretend in the exercise of reason, to conclude unto anything concerning the nature, being, or will of God that is directly contradictory unto those principles and dictates, it is no divine revelation unto our reason, but a paralogism [fallacious reasoning] from the defect of reason in its exercise.
This is that which the apostle charges on, and vehemently urges against the heathen philosophers. Inbred notions they had in themselves of the being and eternal power of God; and these were so manifest in them thereby, that they could not but own them. Hereon they set their rational discursive faculty at work in the consideration of God and his being. But herein were they so vain and foolish as to draw conclusions directly contrary unto the first principles of natural light, and the unavoidable notions which they had of the eternal being of God, Rom. 1:21-24. And many upon their pretended rational consideration of the promiscuous event of things in the world, have foolishly concluded that all things had a fortuitous beginning, and have fortuitous events, or such as from a concatenation of antecedent causes are fatally necessary, and are not disposed by an infinitely wise, unerring, holy Providence. And this also is directly contradictory unto the first principles and notions of natural light, whereby it openly proclaims itself not to be an effect of reason in its due exercise, but a mere delusion.
So if any pretend unto revelations by faith which are contradictory unto the first principles of natural light , or reason in its proper exercise about its proper objects, it is a delusion. On this ground the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation is justly rejected, for it proposes that as a revelation by faith, which is expressly contradictory unto our sense and reason in their proper exercise about their proper objects. And a supposition of the possibility of any such thing, would make the ways whereby God reveals and makes known himself, to cross and interfere one with another; which would leave us no certainty in anything divine or human.
But yet as these means of divine revelation do harmonize and perfectly agree one with the other, so they are not objectively equal, or equally extensive, nor are they co-ordinate, but subordinate unto one another. Wherefore there are many things discernible by reason in its exercise, which do not appear unto the first principles of natural light. So the sober philosophers of old attained unto many true and great conceptions of God, and the excellencies of his nature, above what they arrived unto who either did not or could not cultivate and improve the principles of natural light in the fame manner as they did.
It is therefore folly to pretend that things so made known of God are not infallibly true and certain, because they are not obvious unto the first conceptions of natural light, without the due exercise of reason, provided they are not contradictory thereunto. And there are many things revealed unto faith that are above and beyond the comprehension of reason, in the best and utmost of its most proper exercise. Such are all the principal mysteries of Christian religion. And it is the height of folly to reject them, as some do, because they are not discernible and comprehensible by reason, seeing they are not contradictory thereunto.
Wherefore these ways of God’s revelation of himself are not equally extensive, or commensurate, but are so subordinate one unto another, that what is wanting unto the one is supplied by the other, unto the accomplishment of the whole and entire end of divine revelation; and the truth of God is the same in them all.”
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Articles
Introductory
Barth, Paul
‘Natural Law & Divine Positive Law’ (2017) 23 paragraphs
‘The Propriety of Natural Law’ (2018) 16 paragraphs
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Anthologies: The Ancient World through History
ed. Hall, Jerome – Ch. 1, ‘Natural Law’ in Readings in Jurisprudence (NY: 1938), pp. 3-86
Provides selections from: Plato, Aristotle, Windelband, Cicero, Maine, Aquinas, Germain, Suarez, Grotius, Hobbes, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, Blackstone, Lorimer, Miltner, Hill.
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1200’s
Aquinas, Thomas – ‘A Treatise on Law’ being Questions 90-108 Buy of his Summa, Second Part, Part One
Aquinas (1225–1274). Here is a blogger’s outline of Aquinas’ treatise.
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1500’s
Bullinger, Henry – 1st Sermon, ‘Of Laws, & of the Law of Nature, then of the Laws of Men’ in The Decades ed. Thomas Harding (Cambridge: Parker Society, 1849), vol. 1, 2nd Decade, pp. 193-209
Calvin, John – ‘The Importance of Customs Being Conformed to Nature’ †1564 13 paragraphs from Men, Women, and Order in the Church, trans. Seth Skolnitsky, pp. 55-59
Musculus, Wolfgang – ‘Law of Nature’ in Common Places of the Christian Religion (1560; London, 1563), fol. 29.b
Hemmingsen, Niels – On the Law of Nature: A Demonstrative Method ed. & trans. Hutchinson Buy (CLP Academic, 2018) 256 pp.
“In this treatise Hemmingsen [a Lutheran] argues that all particular rules of ethical conduct can be derived from immutable axioms or first principles. Though moral philosophy works according to its own rules, Hemmingsen shows that its conclusions, far from being at odds with the divine revelation of the moral law, are identical with the ethical commandments of Scripture. Thus Hemmingsen includes a section on the Decalogue, along with a lengthy account of the traditional cardinal virtues, supported by a myriad of quotations from classical Greek and Roman sources. This important treatise looks both backward to classical and medieval philosophy and forward to developments in the seventeenth century and beyond.”
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1600’s
Leiden Synopsis – ‘Concerning the Law of God’, Theses 12-30, from Disputation 18 of Synopsis Purioris Theologiae / Synopsis of a Purer Theology: Latin Text & English Translation: Volume 1, Disputations 1-23 Buy ed. Dolf te Velde (Brill, 2015)
Gillespie, George – Part 3, ch. 9, ‘That the lawfulness of the [English-Popish] ceremonies, cannot be warranted by the Law of Nature’ in A Dispute Against the English-Popish Ceremonies… (1637), pp. 197-202
Walker, George – ch. 11 of The Doctrine of the Sabbath… (Amsterdam, 1638), pp. 60-70
Walker was a Westminster divine. This is excellent.
“…to know and acknowledge God for his sole Lord and Creator, and one only God, to serve and worship Him with such worship and reverence, as his pure reason taught him to be meet for God, to think and speak of God accordingly…” – p. 61
Cawdrey, Daniel & Herbert Palmer – Sabbatum Redivivum: or the Christian Sabbath Vindicated… (London, 1645), 1st part, ch. 1
ch. 1, pp. 9-12
On moral-natural laws and moral-positive laws.
ch. 3, section 5, ‘The law of Nature suffers nothing by this alteration [of the Sabbath Day to the 1st Day]’, pp. 415-17
London Ministers – ‘The Light of Nature’ being pp. 8-11 of Jus Divinum Regiminis Ecclesiastici, or, the Divine Right of Church Government 1646
Baxter, Richard – sections 8-26 in The Unreasonableness of Infidelity (London: R.W., 1655), An Advertisement Explicatory, pp. x-xv
Roberts, Francis – ‘On the Moral Law & the Law of Nature’ PDF (1675) 3 pp. being Book 3, Chapter 4, Aphorism 1, Question 6 of his The Mystery & Marrow of the Bible: God’s Covenants with Man
This excerpt is from the puritan magnum opus on Covenant Theology. Roberts (1609-1675) distinguishes between the Moral Law revealed by God in special revelation and the Law of Nature written on man’s heart since creation. Roberts gives 4 evidences of how they are the same in their substance and 5 evidences of how they are different with regard to their particulars and circumstances.
Turretin, Francis – Institutes of Elenctic Theology, tr. George M. Giger, ed. James Dennison Jr. (1679–1685; P&R, 1994), vol. 2, 11th Topic
1. ‘Whether there is a natural law, and how it differs from the moral law. The former we affirm; the latter we distinguish.’ 1
2. ‘Are the precepts of the decalogue of natural and indispensable right? We affirm.’ 7
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1700’s
Turretin, Jean-Alphonse – Dissertations on Natural Theology tr. William Crawford Ref (Belfast: Magee, 1777)
8. Laws of Nature: they are Demonstrated 268
9. Laws of Nature: Defense of 295
10. Laws of Nature: Duties which we owe God 331
11. Laws of Nature: Duties we owe Neighbors & Ourselves 351
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1800’s
Lorimer, James – Bks. 1-2 of The Institutes of Law: a Treatise of the Principles of Jurisprudence as Determined by Nature (Edinburgh, 1880) 590 pp.
Lorimer (1818–1890) was a Scottish advocate and regius professor of public law at Edinburgh. He was an authority on international law. His legal philosophy was one of Natural law that stood against the prevailing Legal positivism. Lorimer has some respect for God and religion, but does not strongly hold to Christian orthodoxy in this work. From the front page:
“All human laws are, properly speaking, only declaratory.” – Edmund Burke
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2000’s
Oderberg, David – “The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Law” in ed. H. Zaborowski, Natural Law & Contemporary Society (Catholic University of America Press, 2010)
Odeberg is an analytical Thomist.
Feser, Edward
Neo-Scholastic Essays (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2015)
13. ‘Being, the Good, and the Guise of the Good’ 297
Feser is a Romanist professor of philosophy and is an Analytical Thomist. Here he shows how morals derive from what exists, a la natural law.
14. ‘Classical Natural Law Theory, Property Rights & Taxation’ 321
15. ‘Self-Ownership, Libertarianism, and Impartiality’ 357
16. In Defense of the Perverted Faculty Argument 378
Feser here argues against contraception, but lays a lot of groundwork in natural law before hand. To see that Feser is wrong about contraception, see Fentiman, ‘Using Contraceptives may be in Accord with Natural Law & Scripture: a Response to Feser’ (RBO, 2025).
VanDrunen, David
‘Natural Law in Reformed Theology: Historical Reflections a& Biblical Suggestions’ (2012) 24 paragraphs
Note: While we do not agree with VanDrunen’s conclusions on the modern ‘Reformed Two Kingdom’ (R2K) position, his work on natural law is a good introduction to the topic, with which the Westminster divines and puritans agreed. For something faithfully, historically reformed on the topic of how Christ’s two kingdoms (one by divine, natural right, the other as Mediator over the Church) relate, see our section on the Establishment Principle.
‘Why Protestant Christianity Needs a Theology of Natural Law’ (2019) at The Davenant Institute
Feser, Edward – ch. 16, ‘In Defense of the Perverted Faculty Argument’ in Neo-Scholastic Essays (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2015), pp. 378-415
Feser in this chapter (whatever one thinks about his view against contraception, which this chapter is in defense of) has an excellent summary exposition of natural law and how ethics derives from existence and the teleological designs therein.
Haines, David – ‘The Role of Natural Knowledge in Biblical Interpretation as Key to Solving the Protestant Problem’ (2018)
This is the rough draft of the author’s presentation at the Davenant Convivium in 2018.
Abstract: “This, then, is the protestant problem: How can we “infallibly” determine which doctrines are necessary for a person to be considered orthodox if the only authority for Protestant theology is the Bible, as interpreted by the individual reader? I will argue that natural knowledge of man, God, and the universe is necessary for biblical interpretation, and is a key element in a well-rounded solution to the protestant problem.”
Wolfe, Stephen – ‘Correcting Theologians: a Response to Brian Mattson’ (2023)
Wolfe wrote the book, The Case for Christian Nationalism (2022), which was self-consciously grounded by him in the theology of reformed orthodoxy. Wolfe here responds to a neo-Calvinist critic, and very helpfully clarifies and elaborates on reformed orthodox anthropology and natural law as a basis for political theory, quoting many classic reformed theologians on these topics.
Fentiman, Travis – ‘Using Contraceptives may be in Accord with Natural Law & Scripture: a Response to [Edward] Feser’ (RBO, 2025)
While this article treats directly of contraceptives, it goes much into the theory of natural law, and shows differences of viewpoints therein.
Argument 12: “The many ethical gradations of common life arise from the intermix of the natural teleology of our variegated and shuffling circumstances, according to their qualities, weights and proportions, mixed with the same in positive laws.”
Argument 13: “The issue is not simply temptation. Eve ought to have denied her natural appetite for the good in the forbidden tree even if there had been no tempter. The issue lies in the difference between natural versus positive laws of God, and man’s capability to be so contrarily obliged. There can be, as Samuel Rutherford argued, no moral concupiscence against natural law (i.e. as such), because “The Law of God… does require a conformity between all the inclinations and motions of our soul and the law of nature…” However, positive laws of God are above nature, and may be in some ways against nature. In order to obey them, one might need to cross nature, and herein it is not inherently wrong to have desires and partial-willings against positive commands of God,¹ as they require us to put his will before our own.”
Conclusions:
“(8) Human flourishing is a greater and more foundational natural, teleological purpose and good than sex organs and contra-acting them in some way. Hence, so contra-acting, which is not inherently wrong, is right when it results in greater human flourishing, which could not occur (or would not best occur) except through this means.”
“(10) Aiming at a higher good and partially fulfilling it so far as one morally can (though it necessarily involve a partial counter-acting of an essential, facultative end) is good and is not an immoral deficiency.”
“To give a larger view, in short, of some of the differences between Feser and myself (and many others), the following comparisons respect specifically the voluntary exercise of one’s own faculty in regard to the necessity (or not) of the realization of an essential end of that faculty:
1. An essential natural end fixes moral possibility vs. An essential natural end entails ethical weight and a general orientation.
2. Acting against the given teleological end is morally, metaphysically impossible vs. Acting against the teleological end admits of proportional exceptions (i.e. the greater good).
3. Teleological, moral and metaphysical necessity in such a context are bound up together vs. these three things can function separately.
4. Properly functioning biology determines an action’s moral-kind vs. Rational, moral ordering and reasoning determines moral-kind and ought to (and does) weigh competing goods, proportionality, context and intention.”
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Books
1500’s
Hemmingsen, Niels – On the Law of Nature: A Demonstrative Method trans. & ed. E.J. Hutchinson Buy (Grand Rapids: CLP Academic, 2018) 256 pp.
Hemmingsen (1513-1600) was a Danish Lutheran theologian and “one of the sixteenth century’s most widely read Protestant authors… the “Teacher of Denmark’… argues that all particular rules of ethical conduct can be derived from immutable axioms or first principles. Though moral philosophy works according to its own rules, Hemmingsen shows that its conclusions, far from being at odds with the divine revelation of the moral law, are identical with the ethical commandments of Scripture. Thus Hemmingsen includes a section on the Decalogue, along with a lengthy account of the traditional cardinal virtues, supported by a myriad of quotations from classical Greek and Roman sources. This important treatise looks both backward to classical and medieval philosophy and forward to developments in the seventeenth century and beyond.”
Zanchi, Jerome – On the Law in General Buy 105 pp. being a single chapter from his Tract on Redemption, which has been called an unfinished Protestant Summa.
Zanchi (†1590) examines the relationship of the natural law to human law, church tradition, custom, divine laws, and the Mosaic law, offering a rigorous analysis of the nature of law in general.
Suarez, Francis – A Treatise on Laws & God the Lawgiver ToC in Selections from Three Works of Francisco Suarez… (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), vol. 2, The Translation, pp. 3-645
Suarez (1548–1617) was a Romanist, Jesuit, scholastic.
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1600’s
Grotius, Hugo – The Rights of War & Peace, including the Law of Nature & of Nations… ed. A.C. Campbell (1625; Dunne, 1901)
Grotius (1583-1645) was a Dutch humanist, diplomat, lawyer, Arminian, Erastian and Latitudinarian theologian, and a jurist.
“Grotius’ concept of natural law had a strong impact on the philosophical and theological debates and political developments of the 17th and 18th centuries. Among those he influenced were Samuel Pufendorf and John Locke, and by way of these philosophers his thinking became part of the cultural background of the Glorious Revolution in England and the American Revolution… Both Biblical revelation and natural law originated in God and could therefore not contradict each other.” – Wikipedia
“Grotius has also contributed significantly to the evolution of the notion of rights. Before him, rights were above all perceived as attached to objects; after him, they are seen as belonging to persons, as the expression of an ability to act or as a means of realizing something.” – Wikipedia
“The great writers of all ages are cited [by Grotius] with a superfluous lavishness… as to give a historic catholicity to his doctrine by showing that the laws he is endeavoring to formulate have, in fact, been accepted in all times and by all men.” – Intro, p. 10
Althusius, Johannes – On Law & Power Buy 60 pp. from his Dicaeologicae. See also this excerpt.
Althusius (†1638) addresses such topics as common law, natural law, private or individual (civil) law, the nature of sovereign public authority, and limitations on public power. See the Buy link for the table of contents.
Pufendorf, Samuel
The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature (1691; London, 1735)
Of the Law of Nature & Nations, 8 Books (1672; London, 1729)
Pufendorf (1632-1694) was a German jurist, political philosopher, economist and historian.
“Among his achievements are his commentaries and revisions of the natural law theories of Thomas Hobbes and Hugo Grotius. His political concepts are part of the cultural background of the American Revolution. Pufendorf is seen as an important precursor of Enlightenment in Germany. He was involved in constant quarrels with clerical circles and frequently had to defend himself against accusations of heresy, despite holding largely traditional Christian views on matters of dogma and doctrine…
He occupied himself [in captivity] in meditating upon what he had read in the works of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, and mentally constructed a system of universal law. At Leiden, he was permitted to publish, in 1661, the fruits of his reflections under the title of Elementa jurisprudentiae universalis libri duo [Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, in Two Books]. The work was dedicated to Charles Louis, elector palatine, who created for Pufendorf a new chair at the University of Heidelberg, that of the law of nature and nations. This professorship was first of its kind in the world…
In De jure naturae et gentium, Pufendorf took up in great measure the theories of Grotius and sought to complete them by means of the doctrines of Hobbes and of his own ideas on jus gentium…
As regards public law Pufendorf, while recognizing in the state (civitas) a moral person (persona moralis), teaches that the will of the state is but the sum of the individual wills that constitute it, and that this association explains the state. In this a priori conception, in which he scarcely gives proof of historical insight, he shows himself as one of the precursors of Rousseau and of the Contrat social [social contract theory]…
John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Denis Diderot all recommended Pufendorf’s inclusion in law curricula, and he greatly influenced Blackstone and Montesquieu…
Pufendorf and Leibniz shared many theological views, but differed in their philosophical foundation, with Pufendorf leaning toward Biblical fundamentalism.” – Wikipedia
Pufendorf was Erastian in his understanding of the Church.
Hale, Matthew
Of the Law of Nature, ed. David S. Sytsma Buy (d. 1676; Grand Rapids: CLP Academic, 2015) 295 pp.
Hale (1609–1676) was an influential English barrister, judge and jurist. His early works, including A Discourse of the Knowledge of God, reflect his early Puritan and Reformed background. After ca. 1660 his thought becomes more Arminian.
“This critical edition is the first ever publication of Hale’s Of the Law of Nature, which previously existed only in manuscript form. After discussing and defining law in general, Hale examines the natural law in particular, its discovery and divine origin, and how it relates to both biblical and human laws. Hale’s treatise, which was likely written as part of his personal meditations and was circulated among English lawyers after his death, reveals not only the close relationship between law and theology in his thought, but also the importance of natural law to early modern legal thought.”
The following is the Introduction to the book
‘Sir Matthew Hale (1609–1676) & Natural Law in the Seventeenth Century’ in Journal of Markets & Morality 17, no. 1 (Spring 2014): pp. 205-256
On the Law of Nature, Reason & Common Law: Selected Jurisprudential Writings, ed. Gerald J. Postema (Oxford University Press, 2017)
Rachel, Samuel – Dissertations on the Law of Nature & of Nations trans. John Bate (1676; Washington D.C., 1916)
Rachel (1628-1691) was a German professor of ethics and of natural and international law.
“…Samuel von Pufendorf denied the existence of a positive jus gentium (Law of Nations), distinct from the jus naturale [natural law]. He maintained therein that States were universally subject to the Law of Nature only; in addition there were, of course, rights based upon treaties, and also customs observed between civilized States, but (said he) these treaty rights were valid only between the States that had concluded the treaty, and a State might at any time renounce these customs; such conduct would admittedly expose the State to evils–such as reprisals and censure–but Pufendorf does not seem to attach great importance to these evils, and… they at different times have failed to deter governments and generals…
Accordingly, to attack this doctrine, which favored arbitrariness and based the Law of Nations solely upon the principles of Natural Law established by a priori reasoning, and at the same time to show that by the side of the jus naturae there also exists a positive Law of Nations–this was a signal service. It was left to Rachel to render that service.” – Intro, pp. 7a-8a
For how Rachel’s theory of the Law of Nations differed from that of Grotius, see the Intro, p. 11a.
Towerson, Gabriel – Discourse 1, ‘Of the Law of Nature’ in An Explication of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments, with reference to the Catechism of the Church of England, to which are Premised by Way of Introduction Several General Discourses Concerning God’s Both Natural & Positive Laws (London, 1677), pp. 1-7
Towerson (c.1635-1697) was an Anglican clergyman and theological writer.
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2000’s
Oderberg, David S. – Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000)
Oderberg is an analytical Thomist.
“for an outstanding full-length defense [of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics]” – Edward Feser
Anderson, Owen
The Natural Moral Law: The Good After Modernity (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012)
“Proceeding historically through ancient, modern, and postmodern thinkers, Owen Anderson studies beliefs about the good and how it is known, and how such beliefs shape claims about the moral law.”
The Declaration of Independence & God: Self-Evident Truths in American Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015) 216 pp.
“This book studies the concept of a ‘self-evident’ God in American legal thought from the Revolution to the present.”
Haines, David & Andrew Fulford – Natural Law: A Brief Introduction & Biblical Defense Buy (Davenant Press, 2017) 142 pp.
Paul Helm: “This is a Guide that has considerable depth, indeed two distinct dimensions. The reader is first guided to the philosophical roots of natural law thinking in ancient and scholastic philosophy; then secondly to the Biblical evidence for natural law. The result makes for a first-rate, thought-provoking introduction.”
ed. Doe, Norman – Christianity & Natural Law: an Introduction (Cambridge, 2017) ToC
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Quotes
Order of
Cicero
R. Muller
Musculus
Beza
Polanus
Gillespie
Rutherford
Divine Right
Burgess
Baxter
Witsius
Dalrymple
Mastricht
Peck
Marshall
Feser
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Ancient
Cicero
On Laws (De legibus) 1.17, this is his quotation of Chysippus; tr. Charles Johnson
“Law is the supreme reason, inherent in nature, which commands those things which are to be done, and prohibits the contrary. The same reason is law when it is confirmed and perfected in the mind of man.”
“Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata et perfecta, lex est.”
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On the Post-Reformation Era
Richard Muller
Dictionary of Greek and Latin Theological Terms 1st ed. (Baker, 1985)
pp. 173-4
“In substance, the lex moralis [moral law] is identical with the lex naturalis [natural law], but, unlike the natural law, it is given by revelation in a form which is clearer and fuller than that otherwise known to the reason.”
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pp. 174-5
“The universal moral law either impressed by God upon the mind of all people or immediately discerned by the reason in its encounter with the order of nature. The natural law was therefore available even to those pagans who did not have the advantage of the Sinaitic revelation and the lex Mosaica [Law of Moses], with the result that they were left without excuse in their sins, convicted by conscientia [conscience].
The scholastics argue the identity of the lex naturalis [Natural Law] with the lex Mosaica or lex moralis [Moral Law] quod substantiam, according to substance, and distinguish them quod formam, according to form. The lex naturalis is inward, written on the heart and therefore obscure, whereas the lex Mosaica is revealed externally and written on tablets and thus of greater clarity.”
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1500’s
Wolfgang Musculus
Common Places of the Christian Religion (1560; London, 1563), The Tenth Precept, fol. 103.a – 104.a
“2. How many sorts of concupiscences there be
Before the sin of our first parents, the concupiscence in our nature was simple, natural, orderly (and necessary, like as other affections were, so that it was subject unto no malice: such as that which is in us yet, as when we be hungry we be desire meat; when we thirst, drink; when we be a cold, we desire warmth; when we be too hot, we desire to be cooled; when we be in prison, we desire liberty; when we be sick, we desire health etc. and this we do by the only course of nature, without any matter of sin. But after that our first parents had drunk of the poison of the Serpent, this strength of concupiscence is depraved in our hearts, and thereby it came that (passing the limits of nature and necessity) it extends itself unto those things which it is not lawful to desire: for that it is not lawful to take things away which pertain to others.
Therefore the affections of concupiscence are of two sorts, natural and corrupt. The natural be set in us by God, and so much not unlawful, but that they be also necessary. Wherefore they do very unadvisedly teach us which do refer the crying of infants when they be hungry and desire meat unto the forbidden concupiscence and do ascribe them unto original sin. The corrupt affections of concupiscence be they when the limits of necessity are exceeded and men follow pleasures, curiosity, glory, ambition and other vices, and that contrary unto the law of charity and the purity of holiness.
This corruption of our concupiscence is gotten of the old serpent, not grafted in our flesh of God… By this distinction we do foresee that we do not deny the work of God in us for the work of Satan, nor attribute the work of Satan unto God.
…I call it the work of God whatsoever is naturally given us. We take of God not only this outward body and soul whereby we do live, and the mind whereby discoursing we do understand and judge, but also the affections of the heart, such as desire is, the power to withstand, love, hate, hope, fear, joy, sorrow, anger, favor and mercy, etc. And these affections be to great use: and there is great cause why they be grafted in our nature. He made us in such sort that we do not receive those things that be necessary simply at his hand without any perseverance of necessity going before, or affection of desire, like stocks and stones, but moved by the perseverance of our necessity we do desire it even as the dry ground does most gladly receive and drink up the moisture that comes by the dews poured from heaven.
The reason of this is that first when we do covet things necessary for us, we must turn to our Creator, the fountain of all goodness and the preserver of all things that be made: and ask of Him such things as we have need of. Secondly, that the gifts of God be so much the more welcome unto us after we have received them the more that we desired and besought them. God grafted in us also a sense of rejoicing, which we feel in the use of his gifts, and an effect of joy which rises in our hearts as oft as we do obtain our purpose. The cause of them is, that rejoicing and pleasantly using the gifts of God, we may be carried up in our minds to God the giver of them and give thanks unto his goodness with all our heart. He gave us also the strength of hope. The use of it is that we must trust and tarry for those things which we do desire and ask of God when they are not given by and by, and that we do travail with earnest endeavoring, devising and working in those things which are to be achieved by our own industry and labor. So these be trimly linked together: to have need, to desire, to ask of god, to hope in faith, to receive with joy, to use with liking, to give thanks to the giver of all good things, heartly to commend his goodness and with affection of love to be ravished unto Him. All these things would be utterly decayed if you take away the desire from them.
Thus far forth desire and concupiscence is good, the rather necessary, and put into our nature by God. Take away all desire and concupiscence and the knot of wedlock shall decay, the desire of issue [children], the multiplication of our kind, the commodity of eating and drinking, the conservation of life, the study of wisdom, justice, humanity, goodness, mercy, the fellowship and company of man’s life, and all things shall be half dead in man. If it cannot be that we may lack all things, and that nothing that we do, see or hear should like us while we be in this flesh, then it cannot be that we may desire nothing. Therefore to desire nothing pertains not to the living, but to the dead.”
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Theodore Beza
The Christian Faith, trans. James Clark (Focus Christian Ministries Trust, East Essex England, 1992)
“The Law is natural to man. God has engraven it in his heart from creation (Rom 1:32; 2:14,15). When, a long time afterwards, God made and exhibited the two Tables of the Law, this was not to make a new law, but only to restore our first knowledge of the natural law which, because of the corruption of sin, was little by little becoming obliterated from the heart of man (Rom 7:8-9).”
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1600’s
Amandus Polanus
‘Analytical Theses on Colossians, containing the Exordium of the Epistle’, pt. 1 (on Col. 1:1-11) $3 Download tr. Jonathan Tomes (Basel: Johannes Schroeter, 1601)
“XXXII… 2. The Gospel differs from the Law because the Law is known to us by nature since it is engraved in the minds of humans through creation, even if no other revelation is added.
Romans 2:14-15 states, “For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts.”
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George Gillespie
A Dispute Against the English-Popish Ceremonies… (1637), Part 3, ch. 9, ‘That the lawfulness of the [English-Popish] ceremonies, cannot be warranted by the Law of Nature’, p. 197
“…what is meant by the Law of Nature. To wit, that Law which God writes and imprints in the nature of man, so that it is as it were connatural and born together with man (Zanchi, bk. 1, Of the Law of God, thesis 8, col. 190). Now if we consider what law was written in the nature of man in his first creation, it was no other than the Decalogue or the Moral Law (Amandus Polanus, System, bk. 6, ch. 9, col. 49; D. Pau. Explic. Catech., pt. 3, question 92, p. 503). But the Law which we are here to enquire of is that law, which after the Fall, God still writes in the heart of every man: which (we all know) comes far short and wants much of that which was written in the heart of man before his Fall…
For that law which is simply called jus naturale is innatum, and lays before the minds of men that way, wherein by the guidance and conduct of nature, they may be led to that good which is in the end proportionate to nature (Francis Junius, On the Mosaic Polity).”
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Samuel Rutherford
Lex Rex... (1644; Edinburgh: Ogle, 1843)
“What is warranted by the direction of nature’s light is warranted by the law of nature, and consequently by a divine law; for who can deny the law of nature to be a divine law?”
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“It is not in men’s free will that they have government or no government, because it is not in their free will to obey or not to obey the acts of the court of nature, which is God’s court; and this court enacts that societies suffer not mankind to perish, which must necessarily follow if they appoint no government; also it is proved elsewhere, that no moral acts, in their exercises and use, are left indifferent to us…”
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Disputation Against Pretended Liberty of Conscience (1649), ch. 1, ‘Of Conscience & its Nature’
“Of this intellectual treasure house [the conscience], we are to know these:
1. That in the inner cabinet, the natural habit of moral principles lodges, the register of the common notions left in us by nature, the ancient records and chronicles which were in Adam’s time, the Law of Nature of two volumes:
One of the first table, that there is a God, that He creates and governs all things, that there is but one God, infinitely good, more just rewarding the evil and the good;
And of the second table, as to love our parents, obey superiors, to hurt no man, the acts of humanity;
All these are written in the soul, in deep letters, yet the ink is dim and old, and therefore this light is like the moon swimming through watery clouds, often under a shadow, and yet still in the firmament.
Caligula, and others, under a cloud, denied there was any God, yet when the cloud was over, the light broke out of prison, and granted, a God there must be; strong winds do blow out a torch in the night, and will blow in the same light again; and that there be other seeds, though come from a far land, and not growing out of the ground, as the former, is clear, for Christ scatters some Gospel-truths in this chalmer [chamber]; as John 7:28, ‘Then cried Jesus in the Temple; as He taught, saying, Ye both know Me, and whence I am.’ John 15:24, ‘But now they have both seen, and hated both Me and my Father.'”
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The Divine Right of Church Government… (1646), p. 76
“What moral goodness nature teaches, that same does the Moral Law teach, so the one excludes not the other.”
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Anthony Burgess **
Spiritual Refining, Sermon 51
“The very heathens, though they had but some few sparks of a true knowledge about God, having no other book but that of nature to learn by, yet in how grievous a measure are they punished by God because they did not live according to their knowledge, neither did they glorify God as they knew Him (Rom. 1).”
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Richard Baxter
The Unreasonableness of Infidelity (London: R.W., 1655), An Advertisement Explicatory, pp. x-xi. For the relations of positive laws added into this mix, see Baxter’s larger discussion.
“12. The whole law of nature, which was such to innocent man, did necessarily result from the nature of man, as related to God and his fellow-subjects, and as placed in the midst of such a world of objects; and so is legible in rerum natura [in the nature of things]…
13. There are some duties that are founded in the relation of our very rational nature to the holy, perfect nature of God… and some duties that are founded in the relation of our natures one to another, and some from the inseparable, innocent principle of self-love. All these have their necessary original with our natures, by resultancy therefrom…
14. There are some duties of the law of nature founded in natural, but mutable, accidents, relations, moods. These are indispensable duties, while these relations or other accidents remain, which are the foundation of them;”
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The Catechizing of Families... (London, 1683), ch. 42, ‘Of the 9th Commandment’, pp. 361-62
“2. We must believe none that speak against the Light of Nature and common notices of all mankind: for that were to renounce humanity: And the Law of Nature is God’s first Law. But it is not the sentiments of nature as depraved which is this Law.
3. We must believe no men against the common senses of mankind, exercised on their duly qualified objects. Faith contradicts not common sense, though it go above it. We are men before we are Christians, and sense and reason are presupposed to faith… For if sense be not to be trusted, we know not that there is a Church, or a man, or a Bible or any thing in the world, and so nothing can be believed. Whether all sound senses may be deceived or not, God has given us no surer way of certainty.
4. Nothing is to be believed against the certain interest of all mankind and tending to their destruction; That which would damn souls, or deny their immortality and future hope, or ruin the Christian world or nations, is not to be believed to be duty or lawful: For truth is for good, and faith is for felicity; and no man is bound to such destructive things.
5. Nothing is to be believed as absolutely certain which depends on the mere honesty of the speakers: For all men are liable to mistake or lie.
6. The more ignorant, malicious, unconscionable, factious, siding, any man is, the less credible he is. And the wiser and nearer to the action any man is, and the more conscionable, peaceable and impartial he is, the more credible he is. An enemy speaking well of a man, is so far more credible than a friend: Multitudes, as capable and honest, are more credible than one.
7. As that certainty which is called moral, as depending on men’s free-will, is never absolute, but has many degrees, as the witness is more or less credible; so there is a certainty by men’s report, tradition or history which is physical and wholly infallible: As that there is such a place as Rome, Paris, etc. and that the statutes of the land were made by such kings and parliaments to whom they are ascribed; and that there have been such kings, etc. For proof of which know:
1. That besides the free acts, the will has some acts as necessary as it is to the fire to burn, viz. To Love ourselves and felicity, and more such.
2. That when all men of contrary interest, friends and foes, agree in a matter that has sensible evidence, it is the effect of such a necessitating cause.
3. And there is no cause in nature that can make them so agree in a lie.
Therefore it is a natural certainty. Look back to the sixth chapter.”
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Richard Baxter on Worship & Catholicity against Separatism & John Owen (RBO, 2024), p. 38
“If you mean that nature commands them, then God by the Law of nature commands them, and what greater authority can they have?”
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Herman Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants Between God & Man (1677; den Dulk Christian Foundation, 1990), vol. 1, p. 350
“For, as grace supposes nature, and makes it perfect; so the truths revealed in the Gospel are built on those made known by the light of nature.”
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James Dalrymple, Viscount of Stair 1693
The Institutions of the Law of Scotland, vol. 1, p. 4
“The Law of Nature, as it is impressed upon our hearts, so in the goodness of God, it is expressed in his Word, wherein He has not only holden forth these Sacred Mysteries, which could only be known by Revelation, as having no principles in Nature from whence they are deducible, but also, because through sin and evil custom, the Natural Law in man’s heart was much defaced, disordered and erroneously deduced: He has therefore reprinted the Law of Nature in a viver [more vivid and lively] character, in the Scripture, not only having the moral principles, but many conclusions thence flowing particularly set forth. This analogy of the Law of Nature even in the heats of heathens and as it is set down in the Law of God evidences sufficiently, that both of them proceed from the same Omniscient Author.”
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Peter van Mastricht
Theoretical Practical Theology (RHB), vol. 3, bk. 4, ch. 3, ‘Actual Sin’, section 23, p. 510
“Whatever is committed against right reason, the same is committed against God and divine law (Rom. 2:12, 14–15), insofar as the law of God made known through nature is identical with the law which is published by a living voice or writing, for which reason the law of nature once obligated our first parents to obedience in the state of integrity.”
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1800’s
Thomas Peck
‘Moral Obligation of the Tithe’ (1890) in Miscellanies, vol. 1, p. 146. Peck was an American, Southern presbyterian.
“Moral obligation can be created only by some intimation of the will of God. God alone can bind the conscience. The will of God can be made known to us only in one of two ways: either by the ‘light of nature’ or by revelation.
The light of nature becomes manifest either through the constitution and consciousness of the individual man, or through those of the human race expressed in the ‘consensus populorum.’ [popular consensus] That which has been believed always and everywhere and by all is very apt to be true: and that which has been felt to be binding upon the conscience, with the same universality of times, places and persons, may be concluded to be of moral obligation. The voice of the people in this sense may be regarded as the voice of God.
The moral sense may be undeveloped, or it may be perverted in its judgments by ignorance, prejudice, passion, and habits of wickedness; but where it has a fair opportunity to be heard, and especially upon questions upon which its judgments are opposed to the desires and appetites of man, sinful and selfish, it would seem to speak with the authority of man’s Maker and Ruler. It is conscience, the ‘categorical imperative,’ against what is voluntary in man. It is an authority which man feels cannot be resisted with impunity.”
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2000’s
Wallace Marshall
Puritanism & Natural Theology, p. 14
“Grace renewing and perfecting nature was the Puritan missionary paradigm. As Increase Mather declared, ‘except men give credit to the principles of natural, they will never believe the principles of revealed religion.'”
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Edward Feser
Neo-Scholastic Essays (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2015), ch. 16, ‘In Defense of the Perverted Faculty Argument’
p. 386
“Natural law ethics as a body of substantive moral theory is the formulation of general moral principles on the basis of an analysis of the various human capacities and ends and the systematic working out of their implications.”
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p. 387
“Hence the ‘old’ natural law theory [legitimately] does not… have to appeal to natural theology in order to make obligation intelligible (even if a complete account of obligation—as with a complete account of causality, or of anything else for that matter—will make reference to natural theology). See Feser [Aquinas] 2009, pp. 188–92 for further discussion.” – p. 387
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Grace Perfects Nature
Quote
1600’s
Samuel Rutherford
Lex Rex... (1644; Edinburgh: Ogle, 1843), p. 68 lt col top
“…neither civility nor grace destroys but perfects nature;”
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On the History of Natural Law
In the Medieval Church
Oberman, Heiko Augustinus – ch. 4, ‘Natural Law as Divine Order’ in The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel & Late Medieval Nominalism (Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1983), pp. 90-120
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On the Post-Reformation
Articles
In General
Lang, August – ‘The Reformation & Natural Law’ 42 pp. in Calvin & the Reformation: Four Studies, ed. William P. Armstrong trans. J. Gresham Machen (1909), p. 56 ff.
A study of “the beginnings of natural law on protestant ground.”
Plaatjies van Huffel, Mary Anne – ch. 7, ‘Natural Law in the Reformed Tradition’ in ed. Doe, Norman, Christianity & Natural Law: an Introduction (Cambridge, 2017)
Westberg, D. – ‘The Reformed Tradition & Natural Law’ in ed. M. Cromartie, A Preserving Grace, pp. 103–17
Haakonssen, K. – ‘Divine/Natural Law Theories in Ethics’ in eds. Garber & Ayers, The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 1,317-57
Goudriaan, Aza – ch. 5, ‘Divine & Natural Law: Theological & Political Aspects’ in Reformed Orthodoxy & Philosophy, 1625–1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus Van Mastricht & Anthonius Driessen Buy (Brill, 2006), pp. 287-325
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On Individuals
Raath, A.W.G. – ‘The Origins of Defensive Natural Law in Huyldrych Zwingli’s Covenant Theology’ in Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap 38 (2002, No. 3–4), 1–28
Raunio, A. – ‘Divine & Natural Law in Luther & Melanchthon’ in ed. V. Mäkinen, Lutheran Reformation & the Law (Boston, 2006)
On Calvin & Calvinism
Pryor, C. Scott – ‘God’s Bridle: John Calvin’s Application of Natural Law’ 22 Journal of Law & Religion 225 (2006)
Herdt, Jennifer A. – ‘Calvin’s Legacy for Contemporary Reformed Natural Law’ in Scottish Jounal of Theology, vol. 67, issue 4 (Nov., 2014), pp. 414-435 Ref
Abstract: “A close look at Calvin’s understanding of natural law, and in particular of conscience and natural human instincts, shows that Calvin himself did not expect the natural law to serve as a source of substantive action-guiding moral norms.
First, Calvin held that conscience delivers information concerning the moral quality even of individual actions. But he also thought that we often blind ourselves to the deliverances of conscience. Second, he argued that our natural instincts predispose us to civic order and fair dealing insofar as these are necessary for the natural well-being or advantage of creatures such as ourselves. But he also carefully distinguished the good of advantage from the good of justice or virtue.
The modern natural lawyers eroded Calvin’s careful distinction between conscience as revealing our duty as duty, and instinct as guiding us towards natural advantage. They also turned away from Calvin’s insistence on the moral incapacity of unredeemed humanity. The modern natural lawyers saw their task as one of developing an empirical science of human nature to guide legislation and shape international law, bracketing questions of whether this nature was fallen and in need of redemption…
A science which could derive moral norms from an examination of human instincts, and a conscience which could deliver universal moral knowledge, proved too attractive to decline simply because of the transcendence of God or the fallenness of humankind. Those who wished to preserve an account of natural law which remained faithful to a fully robust set of Reformed theological commitments could do so only by refusing to regard the natural law as a positive source of moral knowledge.”
Youngwon Lee, Constance
‘Calvinist Natural Law & the Ultimate Good’ The Western Australian Jurist, vol. 5 (2014), pp. 153-75
‘Calvinist Natural Law & Constitutionalism’ Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 39 (2014), pp. 1-41
VanDrunen, David – ‘The Use of Natural Law in Early Calvinist Resistance Theory’ Journal of Law & Religion,
vol. 21, no. 1 (2005/2006), pp. 143-167
Kirby, W.J. Torrance – ‘Richard Hooker’s Theory of Natural Law in the Context of Reformation Theology’ in The Sixteenth Century Journal, vol. 30, no. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 681-703
Gibbs, L.W. – ‘The Puritan Natural Law Theory of William Ames’ in Harvard Theological Review 64 (1971), pp. 37–57
Burton, Simon J.G. – ch. 7, ‘Samuel Rutherford’s Euthyphro Dilemma: A Reformed Perspective on the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition’ in d. Aaron C. Denlinger, Reformed Orthodoxy in Scotland: Essays on Scottish Theology, 1560-1775 (Bloomsbury, T&T Clark, 2016), pt. 2, pp. 123-40
The Euthyphro dilemma is a philosophical problem that appears in Plato’s dialogue Euthyphro. Socrates asks Euthyphro, “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” Does God will something because it is right and good, or is it right and good because God wills it? A third option is that rightness and goodness are aspects of God’s nature and therefore He always acts consistently with this, those things telling us something about God’s nature. However, there are more qualified options.
Other theologians who dealt with this issue were:
John Strang, De voluntate et actionibus Dei circa peccatum, p. 88
John Brown of Wamphray, De causa Dei contra Antisabbatarios, p. 27
Voet
“For Rutherford if something is essentially good it cannot be said also to be freely good. This is because everything that God freely decrees he is also able not to decree.” – p. 129
“Rutherford’s position is that God by creating rational creatures… at once creates the common principles of the natural law. Since they are part of the very constitution of the rational creature these are unable to be effaced… However, taking up Menchaca’s own Ockhamist position, Rutherford agrees that it would have been quite possible for God to have created another species of rational creature distinct from man to whom he gave a diverse natural law…
Rutherford’s position is that the love of God and the subjection of the creature to the Creator is an essential part of any kind of natural law. Rutherford therefore concurs with the prominent Dutch Reformed theologian Gisbertus Voetius that the dependency of the rational creature on its Creator in morality and in order to right reason is so necessary that its opposite implies a contradiction… this law… is immutable and antecedent to every act of the divine will [stemming from the divine nature], forming the cornerstone of the natural law. What is left open to the divine decree is simply to select whether a particular act or its omission should be considered as due subjection and obedience to God, or not. Thus while the divine will establishes the moral status of a complex act, it always does so against the backdrop of God’s own nature.” – pp. 132-33
“Rutherford states quite explicitly that it was Bradwardine who provided him with the solution to the philosophical conundrum of the ground of ethics… Bradwardine offered a subtler threefold division…
Bradwardine’s basic distinction was between things which are reasonable naturally prior to the divine will, things which are reasonable naturally posterior to the divine will, and things which are said to be mixed. Within the first category are contained necessary truths about God, such as his being and goodness, which obtain prior to any act of his will… they are able to move the divine will.
Within the second category are contained things which are reasonable posterior to God’s will, and which depend on God’s will for their reasonable status. These are therefore said to be caused by the divine will and can in no way move or determine it… Bradward likens it to the situation of someone choosing between two equal alternatives. For when someone chooses one of these, we say that this was a rational choice even though he could have also chosen the other.
Within the third category are included reasonable things which are said to be conditionally rather than absolutely necessary. Thus while they do not themselves obtain naturally prior to the divine will, their reasonable status is crucially founded on truths which do obtain in this way… the creature’s duty to love and obey God. For althought the creature’s existence is dependent on the divine will, with the supposition that this creature is in existence it is absolutely reasonable that he should love and obey God and indeed this reasonable status cannot be changed even by God himself… Rutherford therefore had no difficulty transposing this into his own theory of moral complexes.” – pp. 134-35
“In summary, for [John] Cameron, as for Aquinas, the fundamental core of ethics chiefly concerned immanent structures of divine rationality. By contrast, for Rutherford, ethics was grounded in both human self-denial and subjection to God and the higher, transcendent and ultimately inscrutable rationality of the divine will.” – p. 138
Sytsma, David
‘Sir Matthew Hale (1609–1676) & Natural Law in the Seventeenth Century’ in Journal of Markets & Morality 17, no. 1 (Spring 2014): pp. 205-256
Abstract: “This is an introductory essay to a critical edition of Hale’s MS treatise on natural law (British Library, MSS Add. 18235, Harley 7159, and Hargrave 485)… An edition of the entire treatise (chapters 1-13) is now available in the Sources in Early Modern Economics, Ethics, and Law series published by CLP Academic (2015).”
‘Matthew Hale as Theologian & Natural Law Theorist’ in Great Christian Jurists in English History (CUP, 2017), pp. 163-186 Abstract & Outline
Abstract: “Sir Matthew Hale (1609-1676) is one of the most celebrated jurists of English common law. This essay introduces the importance of Matthew Hale’s Christian faith for his life in general, as well as his legal thought. It surveys Hale’s theological writings and examines his theory of natural law.”
Richard Baxter & the Mechanical Philosophers (Oxford, 2017)
ch. 4, ‘A Trinitarian Natural Philosophy’, ‘God’s Two Books’, pp. 106-112
ch. 7, ‘From ‘Epicurean’ Physics to Ethics’, pp. 216-248
Baxter & Reformed Natural Law Theory
The Specter of Necessitarianism
The Problem with Naturalistic Natural Law
Conclusion
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Books
eds. Bauer, Dominique & Randall Lesaffer – History, Casuistry & Custom in the Legal Thought of Francisco Suárez (1548-1617): Collected Studies in Legal History Library: Studies in the History of International Law Buy (Brill, 2021)
Jorink, Eric – Reading the Book of Nature in the Dutch Golden Age, 1575-1715 (Brill, 2010)
eds. van Berkel, Klaas & Arjo Vanderjagt – The Book of Nature in Early Modern & Modern History Pre (Leuven: Peters, 2006)
Grabill, Stephen – Theological Foundation for a Reformed Doctrine of Natural Law (2004) 360 pp. Published as: Rediscovering the Natural Law in the Reformed Tradition Buy (2006) 320 pp.
Grabill wrote the foundational modern work establishing that Natural Law was a significant part of the reformed tradition. Here he documents the development of the recent bias against natural law in reformed theology, surveys the continuity between the medievalists through the reformers regarding natural law, and the examines the natural law perspectives of John Calvin, Vermigli, Althusius and Turretin. See the Buy link and then the ‘Look Inside’ link for the Table of Contents.
Wallace Marshall – Puritanism & Natural Theology Buy (2012) 205 pp. being his PhD dissertation for Boston College
This excellent work surveys the natural theology of the puritans, including their views on natural law. See the three paragraph abstract of it here.
Perichoresis, vol. 20, issue 2 (June 2022) The whole volume is devoted to natural law in the Post-Reformation era.
Includes articles by Svensson, Sytsma, Littlejohn, Hutchinson, etc.
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1800’s
On Bavinck
Article
Van Raalte, Theodore – 2. ‘Unleavened Morality? Herman Bavinck on Natural Law’ in ed. John Bolt, Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, A Creator of Modern Dutch Theology (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2011), pp. 57-100
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Reformed Natural Law vs. Aquinas
Grabill, Stephen – pp. 138-39 of Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics (Eerdmans, 2006), ch. 5
On Zanchi and Rom. 2:14-15. Rather than natural law in the heart of man being a left over remnant from Adam and God’s image, Zanchi taught that it was reinscribed immediately by God, “because of his goodness,” upon the heart of depraved man.
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On Aquinas’s View of Natural Law
Feser, Edward – ‘Natural Law’ & ‘Religion & Morality’ in ch. 5, ‘Ethics’ in Aquinas: a Beginner’s Guide (OneWorld, 2010), pp. 155-63
Augros, Michael & Christopher Oleson – ‘St. Thomas & the Naturalistic Fallacy’ in National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, vol. 13, issue 4 (Winter 2013), pp. 637-61
Abstract: “Certain scholars wish to acquit St. Thomas Aquinas of the ‘illicit inference from facts to norms’ commonly referred to as the naturalistic fallacy. Seeing in certain passages his awareness of illegitimate ways to derive morality from natural ends, many have come to read Aquinas as agreeing with the view that knowledge of the moral order does not derive from knowledge of human nature and of the natural ends of its parts and powers. This paper aims to expose the deficiencies of this reading as a way of bringing more fully into view the whole thought of Aquinas on the question.”
Conclusion: “The central philosophical arguments of the new natural law theorists fail to disprove that the natural ends of man, and of his parts and powers, operate as standards for determining right and wrong. They are right to insist that there are self-evident truths about what is right and wrong. They are right again in refusing to say that the deliberate violation of any particular natural inclination or any natural end must be an immoral act. And they are right, furthermore, in saying that Aquinas agrees with them in these points and that he is not guilty of any naturalistic fallacy. They are mistaken, however, in thinking that moral knowledge is altogether independent of understanding natural ends and in thinking that Aquinas agrees with them in this.”
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Natural Law in Relation to Presuppositionalism
Article
2000’s
Mauser, Bernard James – ‘A Tale of Two Theories: Natural Law in Classical Theism & Presuppositionalism’ in ed. David Haines, Without Excuse: Scripture, Reason & Presuppositional Apologetics Buy (Davenant Institute, 2020)
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On Natural Law as Divine Right
Quotes
Order of
London Presbyterians
Stillingfleet
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1600’s
London Presbyterian Ministers
The Divine Right of Church Government… new ed. (1645?; NY: Martin, 1844), pt. 1
Ch. 2, ‘Of the Nature of a Divine Right in General’
“For the first—viz. What the nature of a divine right is—consider both what a divine right is in general, and how many ways a thing may be said by Scripture warrant to be of divine right in particular.
‘Right’ is that which is most proper, just or equal; or that which is prescribed or commanded by some statute law, and is just to be received in virtue of said law.
‘Divine’ sometimes points out a divine warrant or authority from God, engraven or enstamped upon any thing, whereby it is exalted above all human or created authority and power. And thus, all Scripture is styled divinely breathed or inspired of God. Hence is the divine authority of Scripture asserted, 2 Tim. 3:16-17…
So that divine right, according to this interpretation of the terms, is that which is either just, meet, and equal; or commanded and enjoined by any divine warrant or authority. And generally, a thing may be said to be of divine right which is any way divinely just, equal, etc.; or divinely commanded by any law of God, or by that which is equivalent to a divine law…
…for what is of divine right, is held of God, and not of man; and to oppose that, were to fight against God…”
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Ch. 3, ‘Of the Nature of a Divine Right in Particular. How many ways a thing may be of Divine Right. And First, of a Divine Right by the True Light of Nature’
“Thus we see in general what a divine right is: now in particular let us come to consider how many ways a thing may be said to be of divine right by scripture-warrant…
A thing may be said to be of divine right, or (which is the same for substance) of divine institution, diverse ways:
1. By the true light of nature.
2. By obligatory Scripture examples.
3. By divine approbation.
4. By divine acts.
5. By divine precepts or mandates.
…
I. ‘By light of nature’. That which is evident by, and consonant to the true light of nature, or natural reason, is to be accounted of divine right in matters of religion. Hence two things are to be made out by Scripture:
1. What is meant by the true light of nature.
2. How it may be proved that what things in religion are evident by, or consonant to this true light of nature, are of divine right.
1. For the first: What is meant by the true light of nature, or natural reason? Thus conceive. The light of nature may be considered two ways:
1. As it was in man before the Fall, and so it was that image and similitude of God in which man was at first created, Gen. 1:26-27, or at least part of that image; which image of God and light of nature was concreated with man and was perfect: viz. so perfect as the sphere of humanity and state of innocency did require; there was no sinful darkness, crookedness or imperfection in it; and whatsoever was evident by, or consonant to this pure and perfect light of nature, in respect either of theory or practice, was doubtless of divine right, because correspondent to that divine law of God’s image naturally engraved in Adam’s heart…
2. As it is now in man after the Fall. The light of nature and image of God in man is not totally abolished and utterly razed by the Fall; there remain still some relics and fragments thereof, some glimmerings, dawnings and common principles of light, both touching piety to God, equity to man and sobriety to a man’s self, etc., as is evident by comparing these places, Ps. 19:1-2, etc., Acts 14:17 and 17:27-28; Rom. 1:18-21 and 2:12, 14-15; 2 Cor. 5:1, in which places it is plain:
1. That the book of the creature is able (without the Scriptures or divine revelations) to make known to man much of God, his invisible Godhead and attributes, Ps. 19:1-2, etc.; Acts 14:17 and 17:27-28; yea, so far as to leave them without excuse, Rom. 1:18-21.
2. That there remained so much natural light in the minds even of the heathens, as to render them capable of instruction by the creature in the invisible things of God; yea, and that they actually in some measure did know God, and because they walked not up to this knowledge, were plagued, Rom. 1:18-21, 24, etc.
3. That the work of the law (though not the right ground, manner, and end of that work, which is the blessing of the New Covenant, Jer. 31:33; Heb. 8:10) was materially written in some measure in their hearts. Partly because they did by nature without the law the things contained in the law, so being a law to themselves, Rom. 2:14-15; partly, because they by nature forbore some of those sins which were forbidden in the law, and were practiced by some that had the law, as 2 Cor. 5:1; and partly because according to the good and bad they did, etc., their conscience did accuse or excuse, Rom. 2:15. Now conscience does not accuse or excuse but according to some rule, principle, or law of God (which is above the conscience) or at least so supposed to be. And they had no law but the imperfect characters thereof in their own hearts, which were not quite obliterated by the Fall.
Now so far as this light of nature after the fall, is a true relic of the light of nature before the Fall, that which is according to this light may be counted of divine right in matters of religion, which is the next thing to be proved.
For the second, how it may be proved that what things in religion are evident by, or consonant to this true light of nature are of divine right. Thus briefly:
1. Because that knowledge which by the light of nature Gentiles have of the invisible things of God, is a beam of divine light, as the apostle, speaking of the gentiles’ light of nature, says, ‘That which may be known of God is manifest in them—for God hath showed it to them. For the invisible things, etc.,’ Rom. 1:19-20. God Himself is the Fountain and Author of the true light of nature; hence some not unfitly call it the divine light of nature, not only because it has God for its object, but also God for its principle; now that which is according to God’s manifestation, must needs be of divine right.
2. Because the Spirit of God and of Christ in the New Testament is pleased often to argue from the light of nature in condemning of sin, in commending and urging of duty, as in the case of the incestuous Corinthian: ‘It is reported commonly, that there is fornication among you, and such fornication as is not so much as named among the gentiles,’ (who had only the light of nature to guide them) 1 Cor. 5:1.
In case of the habits of men and women in their public church assemblies, that women’s heads should be covered, men’s uncovered in praying or prophesying, “Judge in yourselves, is it comely that a woman pray unto God uncovered? Doth not even nature itself teach you, that if a man hath long hair, it is a shame to him? but if a woman have long hair it is a glory to her,” etc., 1 Cor. 11:13-15. Here the apostle appeals plainly to the very light of nature for the regulating and directing of their habits in church assemblies; and thus, in case of praying or prophesying in the congregation in an unknown tongue (unless some do interpret) he strongly argues against it from the light of nature, 1 Cor. 14:7-11, and afterwards urges that women be silent in their churches, from the natural uncomeliness of their speaking there, for it is a shame for women to speak in the church, 1 Cor. 14:34-35.
Now, if the Spirit of God condemn things as vicious and commend things as virtuous from the light of nature, is there not divine right in the light of nature? May we not say, that which is repugnant to the light of nature in matters of religion, is condemned by divine right; and what is correspondent to the light of nature is prescribed by divine right? And if not, where is the strength or force of this kind of arguing from the light of nature?”
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Edward Stillingfleet
Irenicum: a Weapon-Salve for the Church’s Wounds, or the Divine-Right of Particular Forms of Church-Government: Discussed & Examined according to the Principles of the Law of Nature, the Positive Laws of God… (London: Mortlock, 1662), pt. 1, ch. 1, pp. 14-15
“Now then, so many ways and no more as a thing may be known to come from God with an intention to oblige all perpetually, a thing may be said to be of an unalterable divine right; and those can be no more than these two: either by the Law of Nature, or by some positive Law of God. Nothing else can bind universally and perpetually but one of these two, or by virtue of them, as shall be made appear.
I begin with the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature binds indispensably, as it depends not upon any arbitrary constitutions, but is founded upon the intrinsical nature of good and evil in the things themselves, antecedently to any positive declaration of God’s will. So that till the nature of good and evil be changed, that Law is unalterable as to its obligation.
When I say the Law of Nature is indispensable, my meaning is, that in those things which immediately flow from that Law by way of precept, as the three first Commands of the Moral Law, no man can by any positive law be exempted from his obligation to do them, neither by any abrogation of the laws themselves, nor by derogation from them, nor interpretation of them, nor change in the object, matter, or circumstance whatsoever it be.
Now although the formal reason of man’s obedience to the precepts of this Law be the conformity which the things commanded have to the divine nature and goodness, yet I conceive the efficient cause of man’s obligation to these things is to be fetched from the will, command and pleasure of God: Not as it is taken for an arbitrary positive will, but as it is executive of divine purposes, and as it engraves such a Law upon the hearts of men.
For notwithstanding man’s reason, considered in itself, be the chiefest instrument of discovery what are these necessary duties of human nature (in which sense Aristotle defines a natural law to be that which [Greek] has everywhere the same force and strength (Ethics, bk. 5, ch. 10), i.e. as Andronicus Rhodius very well interprets it, [Greek], among all that have the free use of their reason and faculties), yet I say it is not bare reason which binds men to the doing of those things commanded in that Law, but as it is expressive of an eternal Law, and deduces its obligation from thence.
And so this Law, if we respect the rise, extent and immutability of it, may be called deservedly the Law of Nature (V. Selden, De jure Nat. apud▪ Ebrae, bk. 1, ch. 7-8); but if we look at the emanation, efflux and original of it, it is a divine Law, and so it is called by Molina, Alphonsus à Castr••, and others (Mol., De Just et Jur., p. 1, Disputation 3; Alphons., De leg. pur▪, bk. 2, ch. 14). For the sanction of this Law of Nature, as well as others, depends upon the will of God, and therefore the obligation must come from Him, it being in the power of no other to punish for the breach of a law, but those who had the legislative power to cause the obligation to it.
It appears then from hence that whatever by just consequence can be deduced from the preceptive Law of Nature, is of divine right, because from the very nature of that Law (it being indispensable), it appears that God had an intent to oblige all persons in the world by it.”
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On Natural Instincts, Dispositions & Inclinations as Moral Warrant for Actions
Quotes
1600’s
Samuel Rutherford
Lex Rex... (1644; Edinburgh: Ogle, 1843)
“What is warranted by the direction of nature’s light is warranted by the law of nature, and consequently by a divine law; for who can deny the law of nature to be a divine law?…
All civil power is immediately from God in its root; in that, 1st, God has made man a social creature, and one who inclines to be governed by man; then certainly He must have put this power in man’s nature: so are we, by good reason, taught by Aristotle.
2nd, God and nature intends the policy and peace of mankind, then must God and nature have given to mankind a power to compass this end; and this must be a power of government…
As domestic society is by nature’s instinct…”
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“…and it is most true, no man by the instinct of Nature gives consent to penal Laws as penal, for Nature does not teach a man, nor incline his spirit to yield that his life shall be taken away by the sword and his blood shed, except in this remote ground: a man has a disposition that a vein be cut by the physician, or a member of his body cut off, rather than the whole body and life perish by some contagious disease; but here reason in cold blood, not a natural disposition is the nearest prevalent cause and disposer of the business [in making such a penal law].”
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“so then, the aptitude and temper of every commonwealth to monarchy, rather than to democracy or aristocracy, is God’s warrant and nearest call to determine the wills and liberty of people to pitch upon a monarchy, hic et nunc [here and now], rather than any other form of government, though all the three be from God, even as single life and marriage are both the lawful ordinances of God, and the constitution and temper of the body is a calling to either of the two;”
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“The making of a king is an act of reason, and God has given a man reason to rule himself; and therefore has given to a society an instinct of reason to appoint a governor over themselves.”
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“Learned politicians, as Bartholomeus Romulus, (Defens. part 1, n. 153, and Joannes de Anania (in c. fin. de his qui fil. occid.) teach that “the father is not obliged to reveal the conspiracy of his son against his prince; nor is he more to accuse his son, than to accuse himself, because the father loves the son better than himself,” (D. Listi quidem. Sect. Fin. quod, met. caus, et D. L. fin. c. de cura furiosi) and certainly a father had rather die in his own person, as choose to die in his son’s, in whom he affects a sort of immortality, in specie, quando non potest in individuo [in kind when not able in the individual]; but a king does not love his subjects with a natural or fatherly love thus; and if the affections differ, the power which seconds the affection, for the conservation either of being, or well-being, must also differ proportionally.”
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Samuel Otes
An Explanation of the General Epistle of Saint Jude… (London: Purslow, 1633), Sermon 30, p. 394
“There is a difference between blasted trees and barren trees [Jude 12, 19]. And yet St. Jude condemns not nature utterly, as though there were no goodness in it, for many excellent things are done by the light and instinct of nature, though not available to salvation:”
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On Taking Natural Instincts Too Far
Historical, on Calvin
Quote
Jennifer Herdt, Abstract of ‘Calvin’s Legacy for Contemporary Reformed Natural Law’ in Scottish Jounal of Theology, vol. 67, issue 4 (Nov., 2014), pp. 414-35
“A close look at Calvin’s understanding of natural law, and in particular of conscience and natural human instincts, shows that Calvin himself did not expect the natural law to serve as a source of substantive action-guiding moral norms.
First, Calvin held that conscience delivers information concerning the moral quality even of individual actions. But he also thought that we often blind ourselves to the deliverances of conscience. Second, he argued that our natural instincts predispose us to civic order and fair dealing insofar as these are necessary for the natural well-being or advantage of creatures such as ourselves. But he also carefully distinguished the good of advantage from the good of justice or virtue.
The modern natural lawyers eroded Calvin’s careful distinction between conscience as revealing our duty as duty, and instinct as guiding us towards natural advantage. They also turned away from Calvin’s insistence on the moral incapacity of unredeemed humanity. The modern natural lawyers saw their task as one of developing an empirical science of human nature to guide legislation and shape international law, bracketing questions of whether this nature was fallen and in need of redemption…
A science which could derive moral norms from an examination of human instincts, and a conscience which could deliver universal moral knowledge, proved too attractive to decline simply because of the transcendence of God or the fallenness of humankind. Those who wished to preserve an account of natural law which remained faithful to a fully robust set of Reformed theological commitments could do so only by refusing to regard the natural law as a positive source of moral knowledge.”
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Reason may Morally Override Natural Dispositions & Inclinations
Quote
1600’s
Samuel Rutherford
Lex Rex... (1644; Edinburgh: Ogle, 1843),.p. 2 rt col mid
“…and it is most true no man by the instinct of nature gives consent to penal laws as penal, for nature does not teach a man, nor incline his spirit to yield that his life shall be taken away by the sword, and his blood shed, except on this remote ground: a man has a disposition that a vein be cut by the physician, or a member of his body cut off, rather than the whole body and life perish by some contagious disease; but here reason in cold blood, not a natural disposition, is the nearest prevalent cause and disposer of the business.”
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On Specific Natural Laws
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On the Most Fundamental Law of Nature: To Pursue Good & Avoid Evil
Quote
2000’s
Travis Fentiman
“…the most fundamental law of nature is to pursue good and avoid evil¹ (Ps. 34:14; Amos 5:14; 1 Pet. 3:11). This natural law, inherent to us, falls under moral obedience to God in the First Commandment.
¹ So Aquinas, Commentary on Matthew, on Mt. 6:9, §585, “naturally man desires two things, namely,
to seek good and avoid evil.” “naturaliter homo duo desiderat, scilicet consequi bonum et vitare malum.”
Idem, Summa Contra Gentiles, ch. 90, “Because just as good and evil apprehended are the object of the sensible appetite, so are they the object of the intellective appetite. For it belongs to both to pursue good and to avoid evil, whether so in truth, or in the estimation.” “Sicut enim bonum et malum apprehensum sunt obiectum appetitus sensibilis, ita et appetitus intellectivi. Utriusque enim est prosequi bonum et fugere malum, vel secundum veritatem vel secundum aestimationem.”
Idem, Summa, pt. 1 of pt. 2, q. 23, art. 4, “I answer”, “in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.” “In passionibus autem irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae absolute respicit bonum vel malum.”
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That the Stronger Guide & Protect the Weaker, & the Weaker Look unto & Submit Thereto
Quotes
1600’s
Samuel Rutherford
Lex Rex (1644), Question 13, pp. 50-1
“2. The degree or order of subjection natural is a subjection in respect of gifts or age. So Aristotle (1 polit., ch. 3) says, “that some are by nature servants.” His meaning is good,— that some gifts of nature, as wisdom-natural, or aptitude to govern, has made some men of gold, fitter to command, and some of iron and clay, fitter to be servants and slaves…
It is possible Plato had a good meaning, (dialog. 3, de legib.) who made six orders here:
“1. That fathers command their sons; 2. The noble the ignoble; 3. The elder the younger; 4. The masters the servants; 5. The stronger the weaker; 6. The wise the ignorant.”
Aquinas (22, q. 57, art. 3), Driedo (de libert. Christ, bk. 1, p. 8), following Aristotle (polit. bk. 7, ch. 14) hold, though man had never sinned there should have been a sort of dominion of the more gifted and wiser above the less wise and weaker; not antecedent from nature properly, but consequent, for the utility and good of the weaker insofar as it is good for the weaker to be guided by the stronger, which [principle] cannot be denied to have some ground in nature.”
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Greater Gifts amongst Equals are a Superiority to be Submitted to
Quote
1600’s
Samuel Rutherford
A Careful Review of Arminianism, trans. David C. Noe (RHB, 2023), ch. 27, ‘Synods’
“All friends, brothers, and equals that are endowed with greater grace, experience and knowledge – to the extent that they provide us with good and just counsel from God’s Word – must be acknowledged as our superiors.
If David had rejected Abigail’s advice and suggestion in pushing him away from disproportionate vengeance, he would have also rejected God’s counsel and sinned against the fifth commandment of the Decalogue no less than if the supreme priest or prophet of God had commanded that same thing, according to his prophetic authority, which Abigail had only urged privately.”
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Bibliography
Bretzke, James T. – ‘Research Bibliography on the Natural Law’ (2018) 75 pp.
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Latin
Articles
1500’s
Oldendorp, Johann – A Judicial Disputation on Law & Equity in A Collation of Civil & Canonical Law… (Leiden, 1547)
Oldendorp (1480-1567) was a German, Lutheran, jurist and reformer.
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1600’s
Voet, Gisbert – Of Sin Contra Nature in Syllabus of Theological Problems (Utrecht, 1643), pt. 1, section 1, tract 4 Abbr.
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1700’s
De Moor, Bernard – ch. 11, sections 22-40, ‘Of the Natural or Moral Law’ in A Continuous Commentary on John Marck’s Compendium of Didactic & Elenctic Christian Theology (Leiden, 1761-71), vol. 2, pp. 586-687
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Book
van der Marck, Frederik Adolf – Academic Readings [Lectiones], in which Selections of Practical Philosophy, Heads of the Law of Nature & Principal Offices Respecting God are Investigated (Groningen, 1771) ToC
Marck (1710-1800) was a Dutch professor of law at Groningen in the reformed tradition. Marck was initially dismissed in 1773 from Groningen over charges of heterodoxy, for subordinating Scripture to the laws of nature and reason. He was restored in 1795 to his professorship.
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Commentary on Romans, Chapter 1
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