

CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING THE EUCHARIST

William Whitaker¹

Question 1: On the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist

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Chapter 1: On the State of the Question, What the Papists Hold, and What We Hold

"I received from the Lord what I also delivered to you." The Apostle Paul severely rebukes the Corinthians for corrupting the Lord's Supper. For they had greatly deviated from that form of administration which Paul had prescribed to them. It is not necessary to recount all the kinds of corruptions in detail, since the Apostle is dealing with the matter in general, so that what had deteriorated through Satan's deceit and human negligence might be restored and corrected by his argument and admonition.

Now he commands nothing else but that they return to that order which the Lord instituted and which Paul had delivered to them from the Lord; for he delivered nothing other than what he himself had received from the Lord. From these words of the Apostle we learn three things:

First, nothing is to be delivered to the Church except what the Lord commanded.

Second, how prone men—indeed, even whole churches—are to error. For this church did not long preserve the order established by the Apostle, but immediately followed multiple aberrations.

Third, all corrections and reforms must be derived from the institution of the Lord. Thus Paul sets forth the Lord's command to the Corinthians and admonishes them to obey it.

But the errors of the Papists concerning the Lord's Supper and the Eucharist are far more serious than those of the Corinthians were. For their corruptions were certainly slight compared with those horrible sacrileges by which the Papists have defiled the sacred institution of the Lord's covenant.

Not like the Corinthians, who merely celebrated the supper at an inappropriate place and time with offense and injury to their brothers, they have utterly changed the form and fabricated from the most salutary Sacrament of the Lord a certain abomination, most foul and worthy of all detestation—an idol. Thus they have departed most widely from the Lord's institution and converted the most holy Supper of the Lord into a most shameful idolatry.

Nor do they allow themselves to be corrected or confess their error, but they defend that monstrosity of theirs—than which this world has never seen anything more detestable or more injurious to the blood of our Savior—with the greatest zeal.

Therefore, our contest with them concerning the Eucharist will be great and long-lasting, but the magnitude of the matter surpasses all our diligence and ability. There is nothing now that is placed in a minor controversy. But we will distribute the whole controversy into its chapters, and because we are refuting Bellarmine, we will follow his order.

Now there are four principal Questions concerning the Eucharist between us and the Pontificians:

First, whether the body and blood of Christ are really and substantially present in the Eucharist.

Second, what is the mode of this presence—whether it is present through transubstantiation or in some other way.

Third, what is the nature of this Sacrament? This one question embraces many particular questions: namely, concerning the matter, form, use, effect, integrity, adoration, reservation of this Sacrament, and some other minor questions.

Fourth and last is concerning the Sacrifice of the Mass.

Concerning the first Question, there is no agreement between us. But Bellarmine, before he proceeds to explain the state of the Question and the conflict of opinions, inquires about our authors, so that he may call them heretics. Although there is no need to seek authors—for Christ is the author of our doctrine, and its nurse and witness is the ancient church, insofar as it was not oppressed by Antichrist and did not lose its liberty and truth.

He attempts to ascribe to us the insane opinions of certain ones with whom we have nothing in common. He says that he considers the first authors to have been Simonians and Menandrians, and he proves this from Theodoret, who says from Ignatius's Epistle to the Smyrnaeans that those men did not confess the Eucharist to be the flesh of Christ. But I reply: Grant that these words are not found in the Epistle of Ignatius as he cites them. Theodoret indeed says that they are in that Epistle; therefore, he had a different Epistle to the Smyrnaeans than we have.

Second, Bellarmine admits that those ancient heretics were not the authors of our view—for our view is not that old. Thus he first grants this: those heretics denied that Christ had true flesh; therefore they denied that the Eucharist was his flesh—that is, the sacrament of his very flesh—just as Theodore and others infer the reality of Christ's flesh from the sacrament.

But we confess that Christ had true flesh and that the Eucharist is the flesh of Christ, not because the flesh of Christ is really present in the Eucharist, but because the Eucharist is the mystery and sacrament of Christ's flesh, just as the names of things are commonly attributed to the sacraments in Scripture and the Fathers.

Certainly, if the Simonians and Menandrians held that the flesh and blood of Christ are not really in the Eucharist, then they held the same view as we do. Yet they were not censured by any of the ancients who wrote about heresies—not by Irenaeus, Tertullian,

Philastrius, Epiphanius, Augustine, Theodoret, or Damascene—as Bellarmine himself admits. And yet all of these wrote extensively against the heresies of those men.

Therefore, after the first proponents of our view, he makes the Iconoclasts—gathered in a certain Council at Constantinople after the seven hundredth year of the Lord—the authors of our opinion. They said that the bread and wine in the Eucharist represent the body and blood of Christ, and that this is the only image of Christ instituted by Christ himself.

I reply: We need not be ashamed of these supporters, for they were pious bishops and the most learned men of the whole world at that time, who under a pious emperor in council condemned the worship of images which had then begun to invade the church. And this was a true ecumenical council, rightly called the seventh general council. This council taught that no images of Christ should be made, because the Eucharist is the best image of Christ instituted by Christ himself; therefore it prohibited all other images. And certainly the authority of this council is very weighty.

Although the Council of Nicaea, which followed soon after, condemned this council’s opinion concerning images, it did not censure that other opinion concerning the representation of Christ’s body and blood through bread and wine in the Eucharist—though this seems a much graver heresy to the Papists.

As a second author of our opinion he names John Scotus—not the one who wrote on the Sentences, but an older one—who is read to have disapproved of the opinion concerning real presence. His book does not survive, but a certain Papist synod at Vercelli condemned it.

He makes Bertram a third author—a man indeed of distinguished judgment, who published a learned and pious work on the Eucharist. He did not compose this treatise out of his own brain, but from the perpetual doctrine of Augustine. Whoever reads this book would think he was reading Calvin or Peter Martyr; and yet he lived almost eight hundred years ago.

Fourthly, he names Berengar, whom antiquity testifies was a very good and most learned man. He openly contradicted this error of transubstantiation, which then began to spread everywhere, and suffered many calamities on that account. He was forced at Rome to sing a recantation; but afterward he repented and died in confession of the truth. Hence some say he was almost the first teacher of our opinion; but he held nothing except what Scripture and the Fathers teach about the Eucharist.

Afterward he mentions some others, and it is most true that there have not been lacking some in every age who openly professed the truth; but such was the tyranny of the times that the truth could not openly prevail.

At length he comes down to Wycliffe the Englishman, who dared in England to revive the ancient sound doctrine of the church concerning the Eucharist, and he had many disciples here and in other regions. Then he comes to Luther, whom he says sowed the seeds of this error, although he never openly taught it. Indeed I confess that Luther held real presence, though differently than the Papists; but his opinion is full of error, as is that of the Papists.

But at the same time Zwingli of Zurich very strongly defended the ancient doctrine concerning the sacrament; and after him Oecolampadius, Bucer, Peter Martyr, and most learned of all Calvin—whom Bellarmine calls a distinguished patron of the Berengarian error. And among these there was no difference of opinion. For Bellarmine says that Calvin differed in nothing from Zwingli's opinion; in vain, therefore, do some Papists contend that Calvin opposed Zwingli.

And our view—not our church's doctrine—is the same as that which, from Scripture and the common agreement of antiquity, Calvin has illuminated. Bellarmine begins to explain next what kind of thing it is.

First, we say that the external Sacrament of the Eucharist exists only on earth, while the body of Christ exists only in heaven; therefore, there is no real conjunction of the body of Christ with the Sacrament—that is, no union of one substance with the substance of the other. Hence Beza rightly said that the distance between the body of Christ and this Sacrament is as great as that between heaven and earth. Not only the Papists but also the Lutherans were offended by these words; yet this is most true as far as the natural position of places is concerned. For Christ is not on earth with respect to his body, but with respect to grace and spiritual presence, Christ is most present.

Second, we say that the things and signs are joined sacramentally—that is, these are true sacraments of those things, and therefore Christ is given with these signs, and we receive not only the power and grace of Christ but Christ himself; that is, we receive the very substance of Christ by faith unto eternal life. Therefore, Bellarmine slanderously says a little later that Calvin somewhere states that only a certain power is derived from the flesh of Christ to us—which Calvin denies: that the flesh of Christ is mingled with our soul, or that there is a transfusion and transfer of the flesh of Christ into our soul. For he understands that there is no carnal and physical communion of ours with the flesh of Christ; meanwhile, he affirms it is spiritual, nor does he contradict himself, as Bellarmine commonly claims. But either Bellarmine does not understand Calvin, or he knowingly misinterprets him. Indeed, we receive Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, but this reception occurs in a spiritual, not carnal, manner when we are united with Christ by true faith, as members with their head. Yet this true union is mystical, not physical, which takes place by the Spirit and faith.

Third, therefore, we say that this spiritual union is truly mystical and cannot be grasped by reason but by faith. For how things that are separated by the greatest distances can be united and joined together can only be perceived by faith; therefore, it is truly a mystery. Hence we do not say that there is a mere representation of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper, but that there is there a reception and wonderful union of the things themselves: for Christ himself to be given and received with the Sacrament is a mystery and surpasses our grasp and reason.

Fourth, we say that Christ, as to his real presence, dwelling and remaining in heaven, is received by us through faith and becomes ours when we receive the Sacrament. But from this Bellarmine infers that this union exists only through thought. I reply: Certainly it is not real; if therefore by "thought" he means it is not carnal, I grant it; but this is not mere thought. For many think about Christ who nevertheless do not commune with Christ but are alienated from him. Faith is more than thought, because by faith we lay hold of the thing which we believe; for faith is "the substance of things hoped for," as the Apostle says, "and the evidence of things not seen." Thus faith so thinks about Christ that it meanwhile receives him and enjoys him. There is indeed, I confess, in the Eucharist an intellectual, not an oral or bodily or carnal, eating. But from this Bellarmine infers that there is no mystery or difficulty of understanding—which Calvin wants. For who does not most easily grasp (he says) that Christ can be received by faith? But it is the greatest mystery that the saving flesh of Christ is offered to us with the Sacrament: remove faith, and will you understand? But things which belong to faith are difficult and beyond the grasp of our intellect. "Whoever believes in Christ will be saved"; yet to obtain salvation and eternal life is not easy but difficult. Just as there is a great mystery in the union of Christ with the Church, so also in the reception of the body of Christ in the Sacrament.

Fifth, we teach that Christ is received in the Sacrament of the Eucharist by none except the pious and faithful, because since he is not present carnally, he cannot be received by any impious persons. For the flesh of Christ is not food for dogs or swine but for holy men and angels.

Sixth and last, we say that in this Sacrament faith is not given to one who does not have faith, nor is Christ given to one who does not have Christ; but faith is increased and confirmed by this Sacrament, and this Sacrament testifies that we have Christ, and by its true and legitimate reception we are more closely joined with Christ and united more

I am joined with him. But from this, Bellarmine gathers three points against us.

First, he says that in this way the Eucharist does no more than an image of the crucified, which stirs up the memory of the Lord's suffering endured for us.

I reply:

We affirm that the Eucharist not only rekindles the memory of Christ's passion for us, but also presents to us Christ who suffered for us—something no images do.

Second, he says that according to our view nothing remains in the Eucharist except a bare symbol of something already possessed.

I reply:

Who does not see that this is a bare falsehood? For although none receive Christ in the Eucharist except those who are members of Christ and have faith, nevertheless this faith and union have many degrees and increases. The Eucharist confirms and increases faith and unites us more closely with Christ—which is certainly a very great benefit.

Third, what Bellarmine objects is this: from our opinion it follows that to administer the Lord's Supper is nothing other than to testify that the one to whom it is administered has already previously partaken of the Lord's Supper and eaten Christ's body.

I reply:

This is to slander maliciously. It does not testify that you have previously partaken of the Supper, but that Christ truly died, and that by the faith by which you have embraced Christ as already dead, you will obtain eternal life. Besides, can they not be partakers of Christ without having been partakers of the Eucharist? I ask, for otherwise it would have been over with those who depart this life before they become partakers of the Eucharist. Therefore, the Eucharist truly testifies that you (provided you are faithful) were previously a partaker of Christ, nor does it profit any others except those who are already partakers of Christ. But our adversaries invent nothing but empty and foolish slanders.

This is the opinion of our churches.

Now let us see what our adversaries say about the presence of Christ's body in the Sacrament of the Eucharist.

The Council of Trent decreed that in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, after the consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and man, is contained under the species of sensible things, truly, really, and substantially. But these words contain only a general conclusion; they are not sufficient for discussing all the difficulties concerning this matter. Nor did the Fathers of that Council dare to touch on particular decisions which they saw were inexplicable.

But so that we may see the absurdity of this opinion, let us explain it in a few words so that we may better understand it.

First, then, they say that the flesh and blood of Christ are present in the Eucharist after the consecration. Therefore, either they descend from heaven or rather they come into being from external creatures—a horrible monstrosity, about which we will speak later.

Second, they establish a certain consecration in the pronouncement of these words: “This is my body,” and “This is my blood,” and by the power of this consecration and these words they assert that Christ is present. But this is plainly magical—that he who was absent before should suddenly be present there by the force and murmur of certain spoken words.

Third, they say that the whole Christ is present there: flesh, bones, blood, soul, God. And we acknowledge by faith that the whole Christ is spiritually present in the Eucharist; for Christ ought not now to be divided: either he must be taken whole or wholly lacked.

Fourth, they say that Christ is truly in the Eucharist; we too say that he is truly there. But then they explain what they mean by “truly,” namely, not only in sign or figure—and so they set these two in opposition. In this they do not act rightly; for we do not speak thus. For although we distinguish the sign from the thing itself, yet when we say that Christ is received with the sign: external things are only signs and figures; nevertheless, Christ is truly taken in the reception of these.

Fifth, they say that Christ is really and substantially in the Eucharist—which we say is false because we do not agree with them about the mode. For although Christ is present in the Supper, yet not according to a real and substantial mode of presence; therefore he is present only spiritually. And Bellarmine himself says that he is not present corporally, yet really and substantially; therefore those two terms—“really” and “substantially”—signify a proper presence of the body, but not a bodily mode of presence; because here there is no extended body, nor does it occupy a place or have magnitude, but exists without extension—and yet there is due magnitude. But due magnitude is proper and natural magnitude; yet they deny that Christ has natural magnitude in the Sacrament.

They say that Christ has His own form and His own color in the Eucharist, but that these in the Sacrament do not possess the mode of quality, but of substance. Thus here is substance with quantity and quality, but without the mode of quantity or quality—a matter which will be discussed more fully later.

And from this they conclude that Christ in the Eucharist is to be adored and is received even by the impious.

Sixth, they say that Christ is contained under the species of sensible things, which certainly has produced very great difficulties, as we shall show later.

They hold that Christ's body in the Eucharist is contained, surrounded, hidden—not as in a vessel, or in a place, or under a veil, but as the bread was before: for the consecration removes the substance of the bread and leaves the accidents.

But not as the species inhered in the bread, so now do they inhere in Christ's body; therefore they hang per se without a subject—and this is a miracle. But more on these matters later; concerning them there is no greater disagreement among them than among us. We will explain their disputes later; for now let us have a summary of their opinion.

Chapter 2: In which Bellarmine's first argument for the real and substantial presence of Christ in the Eucharist, taken from the figures of the Old Testament, is refuted.

Bellarmino confirms the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist by four kinds of arguments:

The first kind is taken from Scripture;

The second from the testimonies of the Fathers;

The third from the consensus of the Church;

The fourth from reasons.

From Scripture he proposes four kinds of arguments:

The first kind is taken from figures;

The second from promises;

The third from the institution of the Lord;

The fourth from the use of the Sacraments.

We will show how much Bellarmine errs and is deceived in these.

The first argument, taken from the figures of the Old Testament, runs thus:

Figures must necessarily be inferior to the things figured. But if in the Eucharist there is simple bread, the figures of this Sacrament are either more excellent than it or at least equal to it; therefore the Eucharist is not simple bread.

I reply: We concede this conclusion. For the Eucharist is not in reality simple bread; it consists of two natures, as Irenaeus says—namely, earthly and heavenly. Therefore the Eucharist is not only common bread, but a Sacrament, with which, when received by faith, Christ is at the same time spiritually received. But this is what we say: that what we

see with our eyes in the Eucharist, handle with our hands, and take with our mouth, is nothing but bread and wine; for Christ is received not with the eyes, hands, or mouth of the body, but with the mind.

But let us not dwell longer on this; let us see then how Bellarmine confirms his argument.

First, he proves the major premise from the Apostle Paul, who compares the figures of the Old Testament to shadows, and their fulfillment to the body; and elsewhere he compares those same figures to shadows, and the truth to the image. Now a figure is more solid and expressive than a shadow; and it is clear that a figure serves the truth and perishes when it is fulfilled.

I reply:

1. It is indeed necessary that a figure yield in all things to the truth. But Scripture in these passages compares the figures of the Old Testament not with our Sacraments (which are also figures), but with Christ. This is clear from the Apostle himself: for when he had spoken of the figures of the Old Testament as shadows of things to come, he immediately adds: “But the body is of Christ.” To that people shadows, to us Christ offered Himself—not now hidden as formerly, but openly He came forth when those shadowy coverings were removed. Therefore he compares those shadows with Christ, not with our Sacraments.

2. If the ancient shadows are compared with our Sacraments, the ancient figures will be neither more excellent than nor equal to our Sacraments. And I confess indeed that the ancient Sacraments were figures not only of Christ Himself but also of our Sacraments; but I say that ours are simply better, even if there is no real presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

But he proves that unless we posit a real presence, there would have been in the Old Testament not only equal but even better and more expressive figures of the things figured—that is, of our Sacraments—which is absurd. Therefore (he says) we must posit a real presence; for then our Sacraments surpass the figures of the Old Testament by infinite degrees.

Therefore, he first proposes equal figures, then more excellent ones. 4.18. He proposes four equal figures in number, namely: 1. the bread which Melchizedek brought forth, 2. the showbread, 3. the bread of the firstfruits, 4. the bread with which Elijah was fed in the desert. He says that these four figures would have been equal to our Sacrament of the Eucharist if Christ were not really present in it. I answer briefly: The argument does not follow, because those figures were of bread, and our Sacrament is of bread, that our Sacrament is not more illustrious than those; for the dignity of the Sacraments must be judged from the kind of doctrine and the dignity of the Ministry; moreover, the doctrine

and ministry of the New Testament are more illustrious than those of the Old Testament. Therefore, because these figures were of the Old Testament, they cannot be equated with ours, which, because they are of the New Testament, must necessarily have greater clarity on account of the diversity of the Ministry in the New Testament from that which was in the Old. But a fuller response will be given shortly.

He then mentions three more excellent figures, namely: 1. the Paschal Lamb, 2. the blood of the covenant, 3. Manna; and first he deals with the Paschal Lamb. He says that the ceremony of this Lamb was placed not so much in its immolation as in its eating; and thus he concludes that in the New Testament that Lamb who takes away the sins of the world corresponds to it insofar as He is eaten; which happens only in the Eucharist. I answer: this reasoning is mere blasphemy, that Christ takes away the sins of the world insofar as He is eaten. For it was not necessary for Him to be immolated because He was eaten by the Apostles before He was immolated: and thus He could be eaten by others; for as the Apostles ate Christ before He died, so also others can eat Him without His death, if He took away the sins of the world insofar as He is eaten in the Eucharist. And then Christ fulfilled that figure of the Paschal Lamb when He instituted the Eucharist, rather than when He shed His blood on the cross, if that Paschal Lamb was a figure of Christ not so much offered as eaten, and if the ceremony of the Lamb was placed more in eating than in slaughtering; which Bellarmine wants. But Christ did not take away our sins by His eating at the supper, but by His death on the cross, because He took them away only by His blood. Thus the Apostle Peter says we were redeemed τιμίῳ αἵματι ὡς ἀμνοῦ ἀμώμου καὶ ἀσπίλου, by the precious Blood as of a spotless and unblemished Lamb: namely, of Christ: he does not say βρώσει ἀμνοῦ, that is, by the eating of the Lamb, but αἵματι ἀμνοῦ, that is, by the blood of the Lamb: and he also says that Christ Himself bore our sins on the cross, ὃς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον, Who Himself bore our sins in His body on the tree: therefore He did not take them away before. Therefore Christ took away our sins not because He is eaten in the Eucharist, but because He was immolated on the cross: otherwise He would not have procured our redemption once, but as often as He is eaten at supper: therefore the ceremony of the Paschal Lamb consisted more in slaughtering than in eating, because the slaughter of the Lamb prefigured the sacrifice of Christ on the cross, by which alone we are redeemed.

But Bellarmine says that the Paschal Lamb of the Jews was a thing more excellent than our Eucharist if Christ's body is not truly contained in it; and that it signifies the flesh of Christ better than our bread signifies. I answer: Our bread now, after Christ's death and passion, and after the promulgation of the Gospel, expresses Christ's sacrifice better than the Paschal Lamb in the Old Testament, when Christ had not yet been exhibited in the flesh. Therefore a thing is not to be compared with a thing simply, but things must be

considered from the different rationale of the Testaments: because our Testament is infinitely clearer: therefore our Sacraments must necessarily be clearer.

The second more excellent figure is the blood of the covenant, about which we read in Exodus 24 and Hebrews 9. This blood, he says, better represented Christ's blood than wine. But here also Bellarmine vomits forth another blasphemy against Christ's blood: for he says that this figure was fulfilled in the institution of this Sacrament. But this is false and blasphemous: for then Christ consummated the covenant with His blood when He instituted the Eucharist. But Bellarmine tries to prove this by four arguments.

First, because Christ said expressly about the cup in the Eucharist, "This cup is the new testament in my blood." I answer: The cup is said, that is,

Now, in the cup is the new Testament, because it is the Sacrament of the new Testament, which Christ sealed in His own blood—not that the Testament itself is there. For there is one Testament of Christ, ratified once by the death of Christ; but if He instituted the Testament in the Supper, then as often as the Supper is celebrated, Christ institutes the Testament—which is blasphemy.

Second, he proves it because Christ used almost the same words as Moses, which He seems to have done deliberately; for Matthew the Evangelist says that Christ said, "This is my blood of the new Testament," and so did Moses almost. I reply: Christ meant the Testament which was to be confirmed by His blood, of which He gave the Sacrament to His disciples. For He did not say this as if He now wished to establish the Testament itself, but because He wished to institute a symbol of the Testament. Indeed, Christ wished to turn the eyes of His Apostles to His sacrifice, in which alone human salvation consists—not to have them fixed on those external symbols.

Third, then God, he says, also set forth a law, as Moses had done before, when He says, "A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another"; and His blood was sprinkled on the breasts of the disciples—neither of which we read was done in the Passion. I reply: Christ in the Supper did not institute a new Law, but a new Sacrament of the sacrifice to come the next day, by which the new Testament is contained; nor did He sprinkle blood on the breasts of the disciples—Christ's blood had not yet been shed. For if the disciples were sprinkled with Christ's blood in the Supper, then Christ Himself was also sprinkled with His own blood—for He drank what they drank. But it is horrible that either Christ Himself or His disciples should then have been sprinkled with His blood. Rather, not a drop of Christ's blood was shed in the Supper, but on the cross; and then He sprinkled not the breasts of the disciples with blood, but His own breast.

Fourth, a Testament, he says, ought to be made by a free person before death, in the presence of witnesses, and by some public instrument that remains for remembrance; all these things, he says, we see were present at the Last Supper, but not in the Passion. I

reply: these are impure and blasphemous sacrileges of a profane mouth. These men can truly be called enemies of the cross of Christ, because they take everything from the cross to give to the Supper. But:

1. Christ on the cross was most free, because He offered Himself willingly; for He could have escaped all violence from His adversaries if He had wished—but He did not wish to.
2. The Testament was made on the cross by a public instrument, which remains just as much as the instrument of the Supper: Christ's death was public, because He died in the sight of all, and His death pertains to all.
3. Even if a Testament is made before death, yet it receives its force from death; and Christ proclaimed this Testament from the beginning of the world but consummated it by His death.
4. There were more witnesses of Christ's death than of the Supper; for all Judea—indeed, almost the whole world—was His witness. Nothing more can be required in a Testament.

But these blasphemies are refuted by clear Scriptures, which teach that this Testament was accomplished on the cross. Paul says that Christ reconciled us to God through the cross—therefore not in the Supper; and elsewhere he says that God made peace through the blood of His cross—that is, of Christ—reconciling all things to Himself; and still elsewhere he says that we are redeemed through Christ—but how? Because God set Him forth to be a propitiation through faith in His blood. Thus Paul attaches the new Testament to Christ's blood—that is, to His death on the cross. But if Christ consummated this Testament in the Supper and fulfilled the figure of the blood of the Testament mentioned in Moses, there was no need for Him to go to death. Therefore it is absurd that Christ redeemed us in the Supper, because then His death was unnecessary.

But now let us return to the argument taken from this second superior figure, which goes as follows: Blood represents Christ's blood better than wine does; therefore it was better for Moses' figure if true blood itself was there, whereas in our Eucharist there is only wine. I reply: Representation is made more illustrious not because of similarity but because of divine institution, for figures are to be judged by the will of Him who instituted them. Therefore blood by itself would not represent Christ's blood at all except by reason of divine institution. And although that blood of Moses, by God's institution, represents Christ's blood, it does not represent it as clearly as our wine, which represents the blood of Christ already shed. There are also more illustrious figures on account of the light of doctrine, and so our wine has a more illustrious signification because of the declaration of Christ, and of the Apostles, and other ministers of Christ.

The third more excellent figure is Manna; and it proves that Manna was a figure of our Eucharist, which we do not deny. However, we say that it was primarily a figure of the

body of Christ, and secondarily of the Eucharist. Now indeed, if the true body of the Lord is not contained in the Eucharist, then Manna was a thing much more excellent than the Eucharist. He proves this from the fact that Manna was made by the hands of angels, but the bread of the Eucharist by the hand of bakers; Manna rained from heaven, but this bread is supplied from the oven.

I respond: Manna indeed had many prerogatives which our bread in the Eucharist does not have; for it was a miraculous bread. Nevertheless, it shadowed forth Christ more obscurely than our bread does, not from any defect in itself, but because of the greater obscurity of doctrine at that time than there is now. For sacraments are to be judged by doctrine. Manna was bread from heaven and signified and prefigured the bread from heaven; but that true bread was less known then than it is now. From this it follows that our bread is a more evident sacrament of Christ than Manna was. Christ had not yet been exhibited; therefore, there was need for more evident signs then. Now that Christ has been exhibited, our signs, although not so miraculous, nevertheless signify Christ more expressly because of the power they have from Christ's ἐπιφανεῖα, that is, his appearance or manifestation in the flesh.

But now we will respond a little more distinctly to the primary argument. The argument went thus: It is necessary that the Eucharist be more excellent than all the figures of the Old Testament, because it was prefigured by them; but it will not be more excellent unless the flesh of Christ is contained in it; therefore, it is necessary that the flesh of Christ be contained in it.

I respond: First, the figures of the Old Testament were instituted properly to represent not the sacraments of the New Testament, but the reality of the New Testament, namely Christ. Christ is far more excellent than all the shadows. Therefore, they shadowed forth Christ primarily, and consequently our sacraments, which were instituted to represent Christ. Nevertheless, I admit that the Apostle Paul compares the old and our sacraments among themselves, as the Red Sea and the cloud with our Baptism, and the rock with our Eucharist; not so much because those were figures of our sacraments, but so that a similarity might be shown. They can indeed be similar, and yet those will not be figures of ours, no more than ours are of theirs. Therefore, it cannot be proved from this that ours ought to be so much more excellent.

Second, I respond: That he places the excellence of our sacraments in this—that Christ is really and substantially present in ours, but in no way in the old ones—is false. For as regards the reality, the sacraments of both Testaments are the same; for the reality of the sacraments of the Old Testament was the same as that of ours. The Apostle teaches this when he says that the Israelites of old ate the same spiritual food and drank the same spiritual drink as we do; for there is no spiritual food or drink except Christ.

Bellarmino observes two faults in this response. The first is that Paul says the Israelites of old partook of the same spiritual food and drink with us. He says that particle "with us" is nowhere found in the Apostle, but that the Apostle means that they partook of the same spiritual food and drink among themselves, not the same with us.

I respond: The Apostle indeed does not expressly say either, but only that they partook of the same food and the same drink; yet he expressly calls this food and this drink spiritual. There is certainly nothing such except Christ, and he expressly says that they partook of Christ: "They drank," he says, "from the spiritual rock that followed them; and the rock was Christ." This was that spiritual drink and food of which they were partakers. If they received Christ in their sacraments, then it is the same Christ whom we receive in our sacrament—unless there were two Christs. And this is clear from the Apostle's purpose, who wished to deter the Corinthians by the example of the Israelites, lest they abuse the sacraments as those did and likewise perish as they did. Therefore, there is no difference in

And the Apostle's argument would not hold unless the reality of those Sacraments and ours was the same. For if our realities were more perfect, the Corinthians could have hoped for impunity. Therefore, the Apostle's argument is of this kind: They abused Sacraments that were the same as ours in regard to the reality; therefore, we will be punished similarly if we sin similarly.

Secondly, Bellarmine says that our previous response errs when we say that the reality of those Sacraments was Christ; for Paul never says this, but when he calls Christ the rock, he means this of the invisible rock. I reply:

1. Paul says that they drank from the rock, and by the rock he means Christ; therefore, they ate and drank Christ. To drink from water is the same as to drink water; to drink from the rock is to drink the water flowing from the rock, which was a Sacrament of Christ.

2. If they did not drink Christ, as Bellarmine says, then all perished; for it has always been true that all perish eternally unless Christ feeds them with His flesh and blood and makes them partakers thereof. But among them there were many holy and faithful—Moses, Aaron, Joshua, Phinehas; therefore, these were nourished by Christ through faith in those Sacraments. But what Bellarmine says about the invisible rock is false; for it is clear that this cannot be understood of an invisible rock, because Paul says that all drank the same spiritual drink—that is, they all drank the same spiritual drink. But not all partook of that invisible rock; for then all would have been saved. Therefore, all received the Sacrament of that invisible rock, which, when received with faith, was spiritual food and drink.

3. Augustine expressly agrees with us; for he says that their food and ours was the same in mystery. And elsewhere he says: “What is ‘the same’ unless what he openly declares—how could the Apostle say that they ate the same food unless he understood that they ate the same as we do?” But most clearly of all, in a certain tract on John, he says that many of the Israelites understood what they ate and did not die; and that their Sacraments and ours differ in signs but are equal in the reality signified. And he proves this by the authority of the Apostle in this passage: “They all ate the same spiritual food.” “The same spiritual,” says Augustine, “for bodily it was different, since they had manna, we something else.” And a little later: “They all drank the same spiritual drink.” “They one thing, we another,” he says, “but in visible species indeed, yet signifying the same thing by spiritual power.” Therefore, Augustine refutes Bellarmine, who denies that they had the same Sacraments and that they ate and drank Christ; for unless they had done this, they would all have perished, if we believe Augustine.

3. To the main argument I reply: If our Sacraments are not more excellent than the ancient ones unless Christ is really present in them, then Christ ought to be really present not only in the Eucharist but also in Baptism and in all the rest of their fictitious Sacraments. Since they themselves do not hold this opinion, it is inept to estimate the dignity of our Sacraments from real presence. For not only the Eucharist had a figure in the Old Testament, but Baptism also: the figure of the Eucharist was manna, so also of our Baptism were the water of the Red Sea and the cloud. Therefore, if manna excelled the Eucharist unless Christ is really present in the Eucharist, so also the water of the Red Sea and the cloud would excel Baptism unless Christ is really contained in it. But just as our Baptism excels the Red Sea and the cloud by many degrees, however miraculous those were, so does the Eucharist excel manna, even though it came down from heaven—however much in neither is Christ really present. And hence the absurdity of this argument is clear, because it would have to conclude concerning all Sacraments what they wish to be true only of one; and although it is instituted concerning the Eucharist in particular, yet it ought to hold for all Sacraments in general.

4. I reply: Our Sacraments are more excellent than the ancient ones in many ways: first, because they are more lasting and unchangeable, and because they pertain to a more numerous people. But Bellarmine says that this is not in the nature of the signs but happens to them accidentally. God could also have endowed the ancient Sacraments with these prerogatives; these (he says) are no dignity of

It is not to be ignored, as the signs are. But I reply: however our Sacraments may have this dignity, it is agreed that they are more worthy than those in this way. It is no small privilege that our Sacraments will last until the end of the world, nor will they ever be changed, and that they were prescribed not for one people, as the old Sacraments, but for all. Circumcision and the Paschal Lamb lacked this privilege, because they pertained to a few and have ceased in our time.

But secondly, our Sacraments also excel in significance: for they show a thing accomplished, and not future. But Bellarmine says that when the Lord instituted the Eucharist, his death was future, not past. I reply: This refutes us no more than Augustine, who very often says that our Sacraments represent a thing done. Indeed, the death of Christ was future when the Eucharist was instituted by him, but on the following day; and those who were partakers of the Supper were to be spectators of his death, because Christ was about to die before their eyes. Therefore, he wished to represent to them in bread and wine the breaking of his body and the pouring out of his blood, which were immediately to follow. Therefore Luke says of the body of Christ in the Eucharist, "which is given for you," and of the blood, "which is poured out for you," and Paul says of the body, "which is broken for you," because the time had now come when this ought to be done. But the Paschal Lamb was instituted to signify a thing to come many centuries later; whereas Christ did not institute the Eucharist except at almost the same hour in which he was going to his death.

But thirdly, our Sacraments are also clearer than the old ones, not indeed by external representation (for that was not necessary), but by the clarity of the words which are pronounced there, because they announce a redemption already accomplished, and excite greater faith, and produce more abundant fruit. Bellarmine now does not know where to turn, but as usual, he brings forth some futile words which do not touch our response. He admits that on account of the words of consecration ours are clearer, but he says that we reject this kind of words as incantation and magic. I reply: We do not deny all consecration; for there is a certain consecration, that is, a separation of creatures for this use, that they may be Sacraments; and it is done indeed by words, but not in the way they wish, but by the whole command of the Lord concerning the celebration of the Eucharist. But when we say that our Sacraments are better on account of the words, by words we understand the preaching and doctrine, which in the New Testament is clearer and more perfect than it was in the Old. This makes our Sacraments clearer, even if the signs themselves are not as expressive as the old ones.

But Bellarmine says that even if the words of promise are clearer in the New Testament, it does not follow that the Sacraments are also clearer, because a clearer document can be sealed with a more obscure seal, and conversely a more obscure document with a clearer seal. I reply: Sacraments are to be judged from the words of promise, of which they are the seals; therefore when these are clearer, then the Sacraments are also clearer. If the seal were very clear, but applied to an obscure document, it will certainly be of less value, because the seal cannot make the document clearer; but if the document were clear, then almost any seal, provided it is established to be from him who composed and granted the document, will suffice. Therefore ours are clearer by infinite degrees, not by their own nature, but on account of the promises which they serve. In the Old Testament the document was obscure, but it had more manifest signs, such as the Paschal Lamb, the

blood of the covenant, and Manna; our document is more manifest, and although the seals are more obscure in themselves, yet on account of doctrine and promises they are more open. Therefore real presence does not make our Sacraments clearer, because then no Sacrament will be clearer except only the Eucharist; but our Baptism is also clearer than the circumcision of the Jews; and this ought to be true also of those five supposed Sacraments; therefore it is a most foolish argument for the dignity of the Sacraments of the New Testament, which holds only in one out of seven Sacraments.

But Bellarmine says that Scriptures and Fathers teach that our Sacraments excel the ancient ones, not because they signify, but because those were figures, and ours are the things figured, it is said that Christ makes this comparison between Manna and the Eucharist when he says that Manna was not truly bread from heaven, as it is compared with the bread of the Eucharist.

But this is most false, because in that chapter Christ does not have even one word about the Eucharist, as we will show later, but only about the spiritual eating of Christ's flesh, which takes place through faith. There Christ compares Manna with his flesh, not with the Sacrament, as when he says: "I am that bread of life; he who comes to me shall never hunger, and he who believes in me shall never thirst." These words cannot be understood about the Eucharist, for it does not remove hunger and thirst. And later: "I am the bread which came down from heaven"—but the Eucharist did not descend from heaven. And further: "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you." Yet it is not necessary for all to receive the Eucharist; for then all the ancients before Christ would have perished, and all infants and non-adults now would perish. But more will be said about this chapter later.

Therefore, our Sacraments are clearer on account of their signification; not because they are things figured by the old ones. For he did not say that Baptism is a thing figured: it figures the blood of Christ, by which the stains of the soul are washed away—but it is not the blood of Christ, nor is the blood of Christ in it.

Afterward, Bellarmine cites certain Fathers, first Cyprian, because he says: "When the Lamb was consumed, the Master sets forth for his disciples an incorruptible food." I reply: It is fitting that the Eucharist is called an incorruptible food because we receive Christ in the Eucharist; and yet Christ is not really contained in it, but by faith we spiritually receive Christ in the Eucharist. Cyprian himself calls it "the nourishment of immortality" and says: "No multitude consumes this bread." But someone may object: "So in the Paschal Lamb, Christ was spiritually eaten." I admit it, but as Peter Martyr says, very obscurely, because the reality was still to be fulfilled and was held only by promise. If their reception is compared with ours, it was in a certain way nothing; for they had not received Christ in reality, but only by faith they were expecting him; we have him both by faith and in reality, because Christ is now born and given to us. Therefore,

what Bellarmine chatters about a bond of donation sealed with one rougher seal and another more beautiful one—as if Peter Martyr said only the latter is valid—is foolish.

The Lamb was consumed; our food in the Eucharist is incorruptible. Here Cyprian compares the Lamb with Christ, whom we receive by faith in the Eucharist but do not consume—not with the Sacrament, because the Sacrament is a consumable thing, as the Lamb was, just as the Fathers most clearly teach, and specifically Origen, who says that this food according to its material goes into the belly and is expelled into the privy—therefore it is consumed; but Christ is not consumed. And so when the Fathers extol our Sacraments and as it were diminish and empty out the old ones, they do so to lift our minds to Christ and teach what we ought to consider in those Sacraments—namely, not the food that perishes with eating, but the eternal one.

The ancients used those Sacraments, but many of them did not understand their right use because they savored only carnally; and hence it is that the Fathers attribute to them only symbols, but to us the thing itself. We, however, ought not to cling to these earthly things but to have our minds raised up to Christ. But Bellarmine says that many Christians also do not understand what the symbols signify. I reply: Yet no one fails to know that our Sacraments are not instituted for nourishing bodies (for they are not sufficient for that use), and therefore no one approaches them as common food. But Manna was common food for them, and by it they were nourished as by common food; few understood its spiritual use; most looked only at the external things themselves.

Many among the ancients did not know that Manna was spiritual food or that water flowing from the rock was spiritual drink, but judged it only to be some common food and drink. So Augustine says: “The ancients celebrated figures of a future reality—many knowing, but more ignorant. The Prophet and holy Patriarchs knew what they celebrated; the rest of the multitude clung carnally to visible sacraments.”

Although many do not approach our Sacraments with the proper disposition, nevertheless the Sacraments themselves declare that they were not instituted to feed the belly.

Chapter 3: In which Bellarmine’s argument drawn from the sixth chapter of John is refuted.

Bellarmino now proceeds to his second argument from Scripture, which is taken from the Lord’s promise found in the sixth chapter of John. Here he makes three points:

First, he disputes whether the Lord is speaking about the Eucharist in that chapter, and concludes that He is.

Second, from this he deduces an argument for the truth of the Lord’s body in the Eucharist.

Third, he solves the arguments of his adversaries, who suppose that the chapter does not treat of the Eucharist.

Concerning the first point, he proves by four arguments that Christ is speaking of the Eucharist in this chapter:

First, from the very passage of Scripture.

Second, from the testimony of the Church.

Third, from the Fathers.

Fourth, from the absurdities that would follow if what is said in this chapter were not understood to refer to the Eucharist.

Thus he constructs a great argument from this sixth chapter of John. Yet nothing can be adduced from it for a real presence; for here the Lord is not speaking about the Sacrament or sacramental eating, but about spiritual eating, which takes place through faith. Therefore all this labor is spent in vain.

But because Bellarmine says that it is undoubtedly most true that this chapter treats of the Eucharist and sacramental eating, let us briefly examine his arguments, and first scrutinize the passage itself.

Bellarmino gathers many arguments from the passage. The first is of this sort:

The Lord speaks of the future when He says, "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." Here, he says, the second "I will give" cannot be explained except as referring to something truly and properly future; therefore neither can the first. This bread, he says, does not signify Christ as He is received by faith outside the Sacrament; for thus the Fathers of the Old Testament ate Christ. Therefore, he says, Christ promised His flesh not absolutely, but to be received in the Sacrament—a promise He fulfilled at the Last Supper.

I reply: Christ said "I will give" because He had not yet given His flesh over to death, but was going to give it afterward. The Fathers, however, received Christ by faith, but as a victim and sacrifice; thus their faith was founded in Christ's death. He did not give Himself in the Eucharist for the life of the world, but on the cross; therefore that future time, and no other, is what Christ signifies. He could not say "which I give," because He was not yet giving it, but was going to give it. And although by its power Christ's death belonged to all ages (for He was the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and all the godly from the beginning of the world have eaten Him), nevertheless He died only once.

But Bellarmine objects that Christ speaks of the Father in the present tense—"My Father gives you that true heavenly bread"—but of Himself in the future—"The bread that I will give."

I reply: This is to twist Scripture. The Father gives and the Son gives, but Christ speaks of Himself in the future because He wished to turn and direct His disciples' minds to His death. If anyone prefers to interpret it of Christ without such a relation, it can be understood just as when Christ elsewhere says of Himself: "The water that I will give him will become in him a spring of water welling up to eternal life." He had given this water before, and was then giving it, and yet He says "I will give." Therefore that "I will give" does not always signify a future act, but a certain perpetual act. So here: "The bread that I will give," that is, which I have given, I give, and will give forever. For if we ask, Christ will continually give us that heavenly bread which will enliven us.

The second argument that Bellarmine gathers from the passage is taken from a comparison of these words with the words of the Supper:

For here it is said, "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world"; but there it is said, "Take and eat, for this is my body, which is given for you for the remission of sins." So great is the similarity, he says, that divine Scripture seems clearly to proclaim that what was promised here is rendered there.

I answer: Christ at the Supper calls the bread His body, and the wine His blood, not because they truly were so, but because they were sacraments of His body and blood. Therefore, what He says about His body, that it is given for you, ought not to be referred to the present action of the Supper, because it was not then being given; for He was sitting among the Apostles. Therefore, that word "is given" must be referred to His death; but He was not then dying. For Christ at the Supper was not giving Himself as the life of the world; because He gave Himself in this way only once; and if He did this at the Supper, then there was no need for Him to die the next day. But Christ says "is given" because His death was imminent: for immediately after the Supper He was arrested. Because Christ's death was then at hand, He speaks of it as a present thing.

The third argument, which Bellarmine gathers from the same passage, is taken from the following words: "The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us his flesh to eat?" and from those words of some disciples a little later: "This is a hard saying; who can hear it?" Therefore, Christ here proposed something new and marvelous; and Christ, when He proposed something obscurely, used to explain it afterward; which He does not do here; therefore He truly meant that His flesh was to be given to them. I answer: We ought not to labor greatly over what either the carnal Capernaïtes, or the foolish Jews, or those disciples who were offended, understood, but what Christ taught. For the Capernaïtes were carnal, and understood Christ's words in a

carnal manner, just as the Papists do today; and it is clear that those who were offended by Christ's sermon had misunderstood Christ's words, since they took offense: for if they had understood correctly, they would not have taken any offense from Christ's doctrine. But they truly did not understand Christ's meaning: they thought He was speaking of flesh in a carnal way, and that is why they strove, because it seemed to them in no way possible; nor did Christ truly mean any such thing, but another kind of eating, through faith. As for the claim that Christ does not explain Himself, that is false, for afterward He explains Himself sufficiently when He says that He will ascend bodily: therefore not that He was to be devoured by them; and when He says that flesh taken in the way they and the Papists want profits nothing: for thus even the impious could eat His flesh; but that His words are to be understood spiritually. He therefore removes all offense and obscurity, both that of the Capernaïtes and that of the Papists.

The fourth argument from the same passage is taken from these words: "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life;" and, "my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed." This frequent distinction, he says, of flesh and blood, and of food and drink, clearly indicates that Christ is speaking of the communication of Himself under the species of bread and wine: for the spiritual reception of Christ through faith does not need this distinction, since it happens in one way; but Christ expresses a diverse mode of eating His flesh and drinking His blood. I answer: If this were true, then those are wicked and sacrilegious who have taken away the blood, that is, the cup, from the people, since Christ wished to signify a diverse mode of receiving His body and blood. But there is another reason for these words: for Christ accommodates His doctrine to the nature of things and to our usage, so that it may be better understood: He wished us to understand from this that all our life is placed in Him, that He is both our food and our drink. We need both food and drink: Christ is both to us; His flesh is food, His blood is drink. He did not wish us to understand that each is to be taken separately, for now His flesh cannot be separated from His blood, nor His blood from His flesh; therefore the Papists, who have fabricated a real perception, have devised their Concomitance. Hence Christ does not always use this distinction: elsewhere He mentions only eating, as when He says, "As the living Father has sent me, and I live by the Father, so he who eats me will live by me," and a little later, "He who eats this bread will live forever"; but sometimes, for greater emphasis, He also mentions drinking. But that the mode of eating is spiritual is clear from these words: "I am the bread of life; he who comes to me will never hunger, and he who believes in me will never thirst." First, He declared that He is the food of souls; then He showed how He becomes food and how He is eaten and drunk. "He who comes to me," He says, "will never hunger." But what does it mean to come to Christ? Is it to devour Christ? By no means, but to believe in Christ. For He adds, "He who believes in me will never thirst." Therefore, this eating is spiritual; for to believe is to eat, as Augustine very often says. The blood of Christ does not quench bodily thirst,

nor is it drunk for any bodily purpose; nor is the flesh of Christ suitable food for the body, nor is it taken to satisfy bodily hunger. Therefore this flesh must be eaten spiritually, and this blood must be drunk spiritually.

Bellarmino's fifth argument is taken from the same passage, from these words: "Not as your fathers ate manna and died." Here Christ compares the manna with his body, not as it is received by faith alone, he says, but as it is received in the sacrament; because in this way the crossing of the Red Sea is compared by the Apostle with baptism, and the manna with the Eucharist; and the Lord's body, as it is received by faith alone, was not lacking to the ancients.

I reply: This passage argues that Christ is not speaking of the Eucharist; for just as many ate the manna and died, so many receive the Eucharist and die; but those who eat this bread, of which Christ speaks here, do not die. Therefore, Christ contrasts his body spiritually eaten with the manna, because those who eat it do not die, whereas many ate the manna who died; so also many receive the Eucharist who nevertheless die eternally. Nor does it follow: The Apostle compares the manna with the Eucharist in the Epistle to the Corinthians; therefore now Christ similarly compares the manna with the Eucharist; because the purpose of the Apostle and of Christ was different. It is indeed true that Christ was not lacking to the fathers as received by faith; but there were few who looked upon Christ in the manna, as we have taught earlier from Augustine.

Bellarmino's sixth argument is taken from the same passage, from the miracle of the loaves, which is recorded at the beginning of this chapter. This multiplication of the loaves, he says, was a notable figure of this sacrament; therefore Christ joined this discussion to that miracle.

I reply: This argument is utterly absurd. For that miracle was performed in the wilderness; and afterward Christ crossed the Sea of Tiberias and came to Capernaum, where he delivered this sermon on the occasion of those who were seeking him because of the loaves. He preaches, therefore, about the heavenly bread, which is itself grasped by true faith, so that he might call their minds from carnal food to spiritual. But this argument is weak: Christ delivered this sermon immediately after the miracle of the loaves; therefore he is speaking about the Eucharist, because those loaves were a figure of the Eucharist. But first, those loaves were not a figure of the Eucharist; second, even if they were, the argument does not follow.

The seventh argument from the same passage is taken from the words "eating the flesh" and "drinking the blood," so often repeated and confirmed with an oath: "Amen, Amen." Therefore Christ meant a literal eating; for it is not permitted, he says, to confirm with an oath except the most open and certain statements, which cannot be twisted to another

sense; lest occasion be given for perjuries. Now "flesh" properly signifies flesh, and "to eat" signifies a bodily action by which food passes from the mouth to the stomach.

I reply: If you take the words so rigidly, then Christ's flesh must be chewed with teeth; and thus after being chewed it must be digested in the stomach and afterward converted into another nature; for that is what eating means: and properly what is eaten is ground and crushed by the teeth, and what is ground is corrupted, and what is corrupted is converted into another nature. Must all these things be said properly of Christ's flesh because Christ says "Amen, Amen"? This is prodigious and monstrous. But let us refute this and show that speech is not always literal where such an oath is used.

Christ himself says in this chapter: "Amen, Amen, Moses did not give you that heavenly bread; but my Father gives you the true bread from heaven." Here we have "Amen" repeated.

Similarly, elsewhere Christ says, "Amen, amen, I say to you, he who does not enter by the door into the sheepfold, but climbs up another way, that man is a thief and a robber." And yet Christ is speaking there of the sheepfold and the door metaphorically. And a little later, "Amen, amen, I say to you, I am the door of the sheep." He speaks not of a literal door, but of a metaphorical one, and yet he repeats "Amen" twice. Who therefore does not see how ridiculous Bellarmine's sophisms are? This oath, "Amen, amen," therefore confirms the truth; it does not always argue for the literal propriety of the speech. It proves the truth of what is said, but does not always indicate that the speech is literal.

The eighth argument, drawn from the passage itself, is taken from a comparison of this chapter with the third chapter of the same Gospel. There, they say, Christ alluded to Baptism; and here he alludes to the Eucharist. There Nicodemus wondered how that regeneration ought to happen, and here the disciples wonder how this eating can be possible. I reply: this is a foolish invention. Nor in that chapter does Christ allude to Baptism, but to spiritual regeneration; otherwise, no one would be saved except the baptized. Nor, if he were alluding, would this argument follow. For what kind of argument is this, I ask? Christ in the third chapter of John speaks about Baptism; therefore in the sixth chapter of John he speaks about the Eucharist. Is this not an outstanding argument? And Bellarmine has these arguments from the very passage, all of which he has drawn from Sanders.

Bellarmino's second and third arguments, by which he proves that Christ in this sixth chapter of John is speaking about the Eucharist, are taken from the testimony of the Church—that is, from Councils and from the testimonies of the Fathers. He cites only one ancient Council, but many Fathers—indeed, almost innumerable ones. I reply: The Fathers indeed apply this sermon of Christ, which is contained in the sixth chapter of

John and its doctrine, to the Eucharist. This we admit; for the matter is very clear. Yet we say that the Fathers did not think that Christ in that passage spoke words about the Eucharist. For the use and nature of the Eucharist can be explained from those things which are contained in this chapter, even though Christ, when he said these things, did not expressly understand the Eucharist. Therefore there is a twofold reason why the Fathers referred those things to the Eucharist: first, because there Christ speaks expressly about the eating of his body; and because afterwards Christ instituted the sacrament of this eating and explained it by an external sign in the Eucharist; for that reason the Fathers compare these things among themselves. For the reception of Christ in the Eucharist ought to be such as is described here. The Fathers therefore teach from this chapter with what spirits we ought to approach the Eucharist and become partakers of it—namely, that we should approach not as to a bodily food, but as to a spiritual food.

Secondly, the Fathers accommodate this sermon of Christ not to teach that Christ spoke here about the Eucharist, but to teach that there is no other eating of Christ except a spiritual one; wherefore Christ is taken not by mouth, but by spirit and faith. Therefore there is no such eating of Christ in the Supper as the adversaries imagine, but it is entirely spiritual. For even if this sermon of Christ does not pertain to the sacramental rite of the Supper and its external symbols, yet Christ commended to us this spiritual eating in the Supper by this sacramental rite. And thus we are taught that although in the Supper we receive external symbols, yet Christ in the Supper is not set before us to be eaten or drunk in any other way than he himself previously taught in John—that is, spiritually. And this is why all the Fathers understand this sermon of Christ concerning the Eucharist: because Christ commended to us in the sacrament of the Eucharist that spiritual reception of Christ which is explained in this sermon.

Therefore this does not work against us at all, but rather for us; for the manner of eating the flesh of Christ in the Eucharist was first explained by Christ. Wherefore even if Christ did not speak about the sacrament of the Eucharist in this sixth chapter of John, yet because he wished this eating—which is treated in this chapter—to be afterwards commended in the sacrament and signified by some external rite, those things which are said in this chapter are rightly applied to the sacrament.

The Fathers. And that this was the mind and opinion of the Fathers is clear from Chrysostom: “How,” he says, “were the disciples not troubled when they heard this? namely, ‘Take, eat, this is my body, which is broken for many for the remission of sins.’” He answers: because Christ had already previously discussed many great things about this—that is, he had earlier taught how his body and blood ought to be received. And lest they should think they were drinking blood, Christ drank first. For thus Chrysostom says a little later in the same place: “He himself also drank from it, lest upon hearing those words (namely, ‘This is my blood,’ etc.) they should say, ‘What then? Are we to drink blood and eat flesh?’ and so be disturbed.” And he adds: “Indeed, even when he first

spoke about these things, many were scandalized merely because of the words. Therefore, lest that should also happen then, he himself did this first, so that he might lead them with a tranquil mind to the communion of the mysteries.”

Christ did not eat himself or drink his own blood—for that would have been a monstrosity—nor did he need to do this to obtain remission of sins and eternal life. Yet he partook of the Eucharist with his disciples so that they might understand that Christ is to be taken not corporally, but with the mind and faith, so that through him we may live.

The fourth argument of Bellarmine, by which he proves that Christ in the sixth chapter of John is speaking about the Eucharist, is taken from the absurdities that would follow if he were not speaking about the Eucharist. And here he mentions three absurdities.

The first is that it would follow that John wrote nothing at all about this sacrament, because he nowhere touched upon this matter except in this place. I reply: it is not absurd for one evangelist to omit what is taught by others. The three evangelists before him—Matthew, Mark, and Luke—explained sufficiently and clearly the first institution of this sacrament and all things pertaining to it, and after them Paul also; so that it was not necessary for John to explain it. But as Augustine says, John omitted it because others had already written much about it. For although in the sixth chapter of John there is no word about the sacrament, yet how Christ is to be received in the sacrament is explained there; for the mode of eating Christ in that chapter is demonstrated. For when Christ said, “I am the bread of life,” he immediately adds: “He who comes to me shall not hunger, and he who believes in me shall never thirst.” There he first says that he is that bread which gives life to men, so that those who wish to have life must necessarily eat this bread; second, he teaches how this bread ought to be eaten—not with the mouth, but by faith; for he says, “He who comes to me,” that is, “He who believes in me, shall not hunger nor thirst.” And the whole subsequent discourse deals with explaining these things; for the Jews murmured about him because he said he was the bread that came down from heaven. Since therefore the sacrament of the Eucharist is only an external symbol of this eating by faith, it is no wonder that John omitted it.

The second absurdity is that it would follow that Christ never explained the fruit and excellence of this sacrament. I reply: We say that the fruit which we receive from Christ is explained in this place; for although we receive Christ outside the sacrament, yet we also eat him in the sacrament. However, in the Supper itself the excellence of this sacrament is explained, because Christ says there, “This is my body,” “This is my blood”; and by these words also the fruit of the sacrament is declared, because to those who have faith it is the body and blood of Christ. It is therefore false what Bellarmine says: that Christ only instituted the sacrament now and did not explain its fruit or excellence; for Christ clearly declared how excellent and fruitful this sacrament is when he said, “This is my body,” and “This is my blood.”

The third absurdity is that it would follow that there is no divine precept about receiving this sacrament, because the other evangelists only present the institution. I reply: In the institution of this sacrament there is a precept about receiving it and about celebrating this sacrament hereafter in perpetuity, when Christ says: “Τὰῦτα ποιεῖτε,” “Do this.” Not only, as Bellarmine says, “As often as you do this, do it in remembrance of the Lord’s passion,” but simply: “τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν,” “Do this in remembrance of me.”

Do this in remembrance of me: it is therefore a simple precept. And the Papists say that Christ at that time instituted the Eucharist, or before he instituted it; therefore he now commanded the celebration of the Eucharist. And the Apostle Paul, when speaking about the Sacrament of the Eucharist, says clearly that he received from the Lord what he handed on to them, and he recounts this institution of the Lord at Cana, not some precept in the sixth chapter of John.

But if Christ in the sixth chapter of John gave a command about celebrating and receiving this Sacrament, why did he not celebrate it before the hour of his death, especially since the necessity for salvation of eating Christ in the way he commands in the sixth chapter of John is so great that no one can be saved otherwise? But it is clear that Christ did not command the reception of the Eucharist in the sixth chapter of John: first, because what is commanded to be received in the sixth chapter of John is absolutely necessary for all, both adults and infants—yet many who are saved do not receive the Eucharist. For John the Baptist was killed before he could receive the Eucharist. Secondly, if Christ had then given this command, why did no one do what he commanded? For no one celebrated or received the Eucharist before Christ’s death.

Now Bellarmine adds to this, about which he promised to speak in the second place when he first began to discuss this sixth chapter of John—that is, he teaches how from this chapter an argument can be drawn for the real presence. And indeed it is a unique argument, and quite weak, in this manner: The Lord, speaking of the bread which he would give at the Supper, says clearly, “The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.”

I reply: Christ is not speaking here about the Sacrament which he was about to give to his disciples at the Supper; for the Sacrament was not given for the life of the world. Rather, he is speaking absolutely about his flesh: for Christ is the true bread, that is, the author of life for all who believe in him. It is therefore inept and absurd to drag into the Sacrament what Christ spoke most clearly about himself simply and apart from the Sacrament.

But Bellarmine says that this exposition is overthrown by all the arguments which he brought forward above. But those arguments prove nothing; we have already refuted

them; nor can any argument be brought which proves that Christ in the sixth chapter of John said even one word about the Eucharistic bread.

But he asserts another exposition, and it is this: if we admit that by bread there is understood the Eucharist, but say that that Eucharistic bread is called the flesh of Christ not properly but figuratively—and against this he brings forward certain feeble little arguments. But I reply: We do not admit that exposition, because we constantly affirm that Christ in this chapter was not speaking about the Sacrament.

Moreover, as to the meaning of the words, "This is my body," from which he promises later to refute this exposition more fully—we will respond to those in their proper place. Now those few inept arguments brought forward by Bellarmine against that second exposition are not to be refuted by us, because we do not approve of that exposition. But nevertheless I affirm this: granted that this discourse of Christ pertains to the Eucharist, still no argument for the real presence can ever be gathered from it.

But it is certain that Christ did not do this, and that must now be demonstrated by arguments; and since Bellarmine promised to fulfill this in the third place, let us see how he has performed it.

Now therefore we will show by a few arguments that the sixth chapter of John does not pertain to the Eucharist—not however that the teaching of that chapter is entirely foreign to this institution. For most beautifully in this chapter we are taught what kind of food is offered to us in the Eucharist—namely, Christ to be received by faith. Nor is it the case, as Bellarmine would have it, that we have nothing with which to answer their argument drawn from this chapter unless we deny that that chapter is to be understood about the Sacrament; for nothing will follow against us even if these words are understood especially about the Sacrament: "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." Because we too say that in the Sacrament there is the flesh of Christ; therefore the bread is said to be the flesh of Christ, as Christ says, "This is my body." We cannot be pressed more by them.

Concerning the words which He spoke at that time, we will later explain more fully, and therefore these matters are far less significant. But indeed, when Christ said, "The bread that I will give is my flesh," He did not understand it to mean the Eucharist, but rather Himself absolutely, who came down from heaven to free us from eternal death.

Bellarmino brings forward certain arguments on behalf of our side, which it is not necessary to consider here; we will only touch upon those which contain the substance of the case and directly conclude it.

Our first argument is of this kind:

The Lord here speaks of that eating which gives eternal life. But Christ alone, when spiritually eaten by faith, gives eternal life. Therefore, Christ here speaks of that eating.

Bellarmino denies the assumption, for he says that sacramental eating also gives life.

I reply: But not because it is sacramental—for then all who ate the sacrament would live. Yet many eat the sacrament to judgment and destruction, and many eat the sacraments unworthily, because they are utterly estranged from eternal life. Spiritual eating, however, is always necessary—indeed, by necessity—and such eating Christ most clearly delivers and commends in this chapter as a certain and necessary cause of salvation.

Bellarmino confesses that sacramental eating does not give life without faith, but he says this happens because of the indisposition of the recipient. But in that eating of which Christ here speaks, there can be no such indisposition, because Christ says plainly: “This is the bread which came down from heaven, that if anyone eat of it, he may not die,” and “I am the living bread which came down from heaven. If any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever.” And often in the same chapter Christ says that those who eat this bread will have life and will not die. Indeed, Christ adds that without this eating one cannot obtain life: “Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you.”

But without sacramental eating, life can be had; otherwise all infants would perish, and all who are prevented by some necessary cause from communicating—even if otherwise baptized and justified—would be lost.

Yet Bellarmine says these words pertain only to adults, because either in fact, if they can, or at least by desire, they are held to receive this sacrament at some time.

I reply that this is a mere evasion. For Christ requires the eating itself, not a vow or desire of eating; for He says, “Unless you eat.” Therefore, that we may live, this eating of which Christ speaks is simply necessary—by necessity of means—and it does not suffice to eat by vow or desire; rather, the eating itself is required.

And this is clear from Bellarmine’s own argument, because the Lord there says, “Amen, amen,” from which elsewhere Bellarmine contends that the words must be taken properly, lest otherwise they be taken in a distorted or figurative sense—since here Christ swears. Therefore, Christ speaks of the actual eating itself; hence, from Bellarmine’s own admission, to receive the sacrament by desire alone is not properly to eat—unless one who seeks food is said properly to be fed by food.

Then he says this is necessary for all adults: to eat the Eucharist either in fact or by vow—a necessity for the Eucharist similar to that of Baptism for obtaining life. But from this they usually acknowledge a necessity of means in no sacrament except Baptism.

Here, however, from Bellarmine it can be gathered that adults perish if they do not receive the Eucharist either in fact or at least by desire.

Let him say, then, when this so necessary vow began—that all at least by vow ate the Eucharist? Was it immediately after Christ delivered this sermon? Yet no one then approached the Eucharist before Christ instituted it on the day before His passion. In the meantime, John the Baptist was killed, and he did not receive the Eucharist either in fact or by desire, because he had heard nothing about the Eucharist. Yet John ate this bread because he believed in Christ. Therefore, Christ is not speaking about the Eucharist.

But Bellarmine continues and finally offers this response:

These words, “Unless you eat,” either sound forth a precept or a necessary means to salvation.

Rightly so! For if it is a precept, then either it does not pertain to infants (since they are not capable of it), or certainly they are excused because they cannot fulfill it.

I reply:

To these, we can respond concerning Baptism and the passage found in John 3: “Unless one is born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God.” If this is a precept, then either it was not given to infants because they are not capable of it, or they are excused because they cannot fulfill it themselves—others must fulfill it for them. Therefore, they will not lose salvation if they die without baptism. For certainly that strict decree found in the third chapter of John—“Unless one is born again of water,” etc.—is no more severe than this one found in the sixth chapter of John: “Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man,” etc.

But Bellarmine says that this sacrament was not instituted to give life to those who do not have it, but to preserve it in those who do have it. I reply: Here Bellarmine refutes himself. For from this I prove that Christ is not speaking here about the Eucharist, because the food and bread of which Christ speaks here gives life to those who do not have it, not only (as he confesses) to those who have it. Thus Christ himself says: “That bread of God is he who comes down from heaven and gives life to the world.” And on account of this quality he compares it to the manna, of which those who ate died; but this bread, he says, comes down from heaven so that whoever eats of it may not die. Therefore, it gives life to the dying. All who do not eat this bread will die; therefore, it not only preserves life but also provides it. And so Christ is not now speaking of the sacrament of the Eucharist, because that does not give life but causes those who have life to retain it.

But what if the words "Unless you eat," etc., signify a means necessary for salvation? Then, he says, it is only a necessary means for those who can lose life—who are not, he says, those lacking the use of reason. I reply: Let him consider the same answer regarding that passage found in the third chapter of John: "Unless one is born again of water," etc. If these words signify a means necessary for salvation, then not for infants who lack the use of reason. But Christ says that this means, of which he speaks in the sixth chapter of John, is simply necessary for all, because no other food gives life to the world; and he says that this food which he gives "endures to eternal life." Therefore, those who do not eat this food cannot attain eternal life—whether adults, infants, or whoever they may be. Therefore, just as what is found in John 3—"Unless one is born again of water," etc.—is simply necessary for all, so what is found in John 6—"Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man," etc.—is similarly necessary for all by necessity of means. Even infants eat the flesh of Christ because they are redeemed through him, and they share in this redemption through the working of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the argument is necessary that Christ is not speaking here about the sacrament of the Eucharist, because no one in the Old Testament received this sacrament, nor do all who are saved receive it in the New; but simply, those who do not eat Christ, Christ declares will never attain life—which has always been true for all.

And so much for the first argument.

Our second argument runs as follows: The food of which Christ speaks here is taken by faith alone; therefore, he is not now speaking of sacramental eating but of spiritual eating, which occurs through faith. The antecedent is proved from those words: "Work not for the food which perishes, but for that which endures to eternal life"—that is, prepare for yourselves this food; and from those words which follow a little later: "This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent." For when the Jews asked how they could do the works of God—that is, by what kind of work they could prepare this food—Christ responds: "This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent." Therefore, to believe is to eat this food; and so Christ speaks of that eating which consists in faith.

Bellarmino here responds triflingly: for he says that by these words nothing else is understood than that we ought to apprehend Christ incarnate by faith, and he says that Christ came down from heaven through the incarnation. I reply: Christ is our food not only as incarnate but also as having died. This bread came from heaven through the incarnation, but it was made salutary for us through death. For the incarnation is useful to us through death, nor would it have profited us at all that Christ was incarnate unless he had died for us.

We draw life from death, not from the incarnation of Christ, because Christ, insofar as he is dead, is the food by which the world lives. Here Christ teaches that to believe in him is

to eat him, since he says, "This is the work of God: that you believe in him whom he has sent." Therefore, this is what he requires of us: that we believe in him whom the Father has sent; for thus we shall live eternally. Now, those who have not received the Eucharist can still believe in Christ and so live; therefore, Christ here speaks of a spiritual eating, which takes place through faith, not of a carnal eating, which can occur without faith.

And Bellarmine admits that this bread is apprehended by faith, but he claims that Christ immediately passes over to the Eucharistic bread when he says, "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." But Christ understands the same bread in both places. Meanwhile, Bellarmine acknowledges that some things here must necessarily be understood as referring to spiritual eating; and indeed the reasoning is the same throughout. For Christ persists in the same metaphor: earlier he called it food, now he calls it bread; and just as above he requires faith for that $\beta\rho\omega\sigma\iota\nu$, that is, for that food, so he requires faith for this $\alpha\rho\tau\omicron\nu$, that is, for this bread. For he says, "He who comes to me shall not hunger at all," and "He who believes in me shall never thirst." Therefore, he is not speaking of the Eucharistic bread, because that bread can be eaten and yet not satisfy hunger; for when Christ says, "shall not hunger," "shall not thirst," it is the same as if he said, "shall not perish eternally"—for our life is sustained by these things. And Christ says plainly concerning this bread, "He who eats of this bread shall live forever." Therefore, he is not speaking of the Eucharistic bread.

Bellarmino says that Christ's words are to be understood with the condition that this bread be eaten rightly; for this bread, as far as it is concerned, can always give life, but the effect can be hindered from elsewhere, namely from the unworthiness of the recipient; and he cites similar Scriptures: "Everyone who asks receives," that is, who asks rightly; and "Whoever calls on the name of the Lord shall be saved," that is, whoever calls rightly. I reply: Whether Christ can be eaten unworthily is not the point here to discuss; it is certain that the Sacrament can be taken unworthily, but the reality of the Sacrament cannot be received except unto salvation. For if this bread, which is the flesh of Christ, could be eaten in such a way that those who eat it do not live forever, it would not differ from manna. To take away this effect from Christ's flesh is to make Christ's flesh nothing but common food; for just as common food cannot free from death, however often it is taken daily, so the external Eucharistic food, however frequently received, will not drive away the death of the soul; therefore it does not surpass common food. But Christ very often in this chapter says that those who eat this bread and this food will not die. For as often as words occur which signify this concerning him who eats this bread—"shall not die," "shall live forever," "has eternal life," "abides in me," "shall live because of me"—he says they will not die; they shall live forever; they have eternal life; they abide in me; they shall live through me. But we will treat this controversy more fully later.

Our third argument is this: If those words, "The bread that I will give is my flesh," pertain to the Sacrament of the Eucharist, why do they not have bread in the Eucharist? For the

accidents of bread are not bread. Bellarmine wants "bread" to be understood as food in the manner of the Hebrews, as if Christ said, "The food that I will give is my flesh." I reply: They contend that Christ in this chapter spoke about the Supper because he so often makes mention of bread, and because Christ instituted the Sacrament in the form of his flesh under bread. Therefore Peter Martyr rightly asks why they do not retain bread in the Eucharist if this bread is to be understood as referring to the Sacrament. And Christ compares manna with this bread, and manna was true bread. But afterward Bellarmine says that Christ sometimes calls his flesh bread to indicate that it is to be eaten by us under the appearance of bread; but perhaps he says this correctly: for if that is true, then "bread" does not signify every kind of food, because Christ's flesh is not eaten under the appearance of every kind of food.

Our fourth argument is as follows: In that sixth chapter of John there is no mention of material bread, nor of a cup, nor of consecration, nor of breaking, nor of distribution, nor of a testament, nor of remembrance, nor of thanksgiving, nor of proclaiming the Lord's death; therefore

There, the matter of the Eucharist is discussed. This is also the argument of Peter Martyr against Gardiner. Bellarmine says that this argument rightly proves that this Sacrament had not then been instituted, but does not prove that it had not been promised.

I reply: nothing is found here from which we can understand that this Sacrament was promised, because no circumstance of the Sacrament is present here. For as far as the flesh and blood of Christ are concerned, these can be given to us without a Sacrament. Therefore, Christ promised the flesh and blood openly, but did not promise the Sacrament, as is evident from any of the words here.

But Peter Martyr has another argument in the same place, to which Bellarmine gives no reply, and this will be our fifth argument: Either Christ spoke in the sixth chapter of John about spiritual eating, or He speaks of it nowhere else. For He does not speak of it at the Supper; for there He instituted only the Sacrament itself: not elsewhere, because we have no such place; and yet the Adversaries concede that there is a spiritual eating of Christ; but it will not be established from the sacred Scriptures that there is any such unless it is treated in the sixth chapter of John. But they plainly remove spiritual eating from the sixth chapter of John, and wish that Christ there promised a bodily and natural eating; but at the Supper He provided it: thus, according to their opinion, both passages pertain to real eating: where therefore do they say that spiritual eating is found?

Our sixth argument is taken from those words: "I am that bread of life: he who comes to me shall never hunger; and he who believes in me shall never thirst." Therefore, the bread of which Christ speaks is eaten by believing: wherefore He speaks of spiritual eating, not

sacramental. Bellarmine admits that this is the argument of certain Catholics, and that these words do not pertain properly to the Sacrament, but those which follow afterward.

I reply: Therefore we have from Bellarmine's confession that certain things here do not pertain properly to the Sacrament: therefore they must necessarily be understood concerning spiritual eating through faith. Let him produce one word that must necessarily be understood concerning the Eucharist, if he can: but nothing follows that pertains properly to the Eucharist: for that saying, "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world," must not be understood concerning the Supper: Bellarmine admits earlier that it can be understood otherwise: indeed, it is necessary to understand it otherwise, because Christ did not give His flesh at the Supper for the life of the world. Therefore Christ speaks of His flesh, and teaches how it is our bread, because namely it was given for the life of the world, as Bellarmine admits a little earlier, to be slain and crucified: but at the Supper it was not slain or crucified: and otherwise it is not food or bread for us. At the Supper there was no cross: therefore Christ does not speak of eating the Sacrament, but of the spiritual eating of His flesh, which insofar as it was slain and crucified gives life to the world.

Our seventh argument is taken from those words: "Amen, amen I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink His blood, you do not have life in you." If these words are to be understood concerning the Eucharist, then how can the practice of the Roman Church concerning communion under one kind be defended? For Christ says, "Unless you eat and drink." And Bellarmine says that by this argument some Catholics have been persuaded; but they ought not to abandon a known truth on account of the difficulty of the matter: therefore he replies that the force of the precept does not consist in the mode of receiving, but in the thing which is received; but the whole thing, that is, Christ, is received entirely under one kind.

I reply: this response of Bellarmine is a mere evasion: for the precept will be about the mode of receiving, no less than about the thing, if indeed Christ speaks about the Sacrament. For Christ says, "Unless you eat," and so, "Unless you drink": if therefore He speaks about the Sacrament, He urges equally the necessity of drinking as of eating. And although they say that the whole Christ is received under one kind, yet they cannot say that Christ is drunk in the species of bread. And Bellarmine said earlier that Christ does not speak about spiritual eating, because He so often distinguishes eating and drinking; flesh and blood; food and drink, so that He might express a different mode of receiving the flesh and blood: now he says that the mode is not prescribed, but

Now, as stated above, Christ expressed this manner: therefore Christ expressly commanded the manner; and hence they act contrary to the express command of Christ, if here Christ is speaking about the Sacrament. Let us proceed.

It now remains for me to bring forward some testimonies of the Fathers. Therefore, our Eighth Argument is taken from the testimonies of the Fathers and other authors. The first, both in dignity and in order, will be Augustine. He often says that infants eat the flesh of Christ and drink his blood, which is done spiritually; therefore Christ is speaking about spiritual eating. For if infants do these things, then they do what Christ commands in the sixth chapter of John.

Bellarmino responds that Augustine not infrequently says that infants ought to eat the body of the Lord if they are to be saved, but he does not mean that this must necessarily be done in reality. In this, he most openly slanders. For just as Christ speaks about the necessity of the means, without which no one can aspire to eternal life, so Augustine says that it is simply necessary for all, even little ones, to eat Christ.

How ridiculous this response is! Augustine says that infants ought to eat the body of Christ if they are to be saved—that is, it is necessary for infants to eat the body of Christ—and yet he does not mean that it must necessarily be done? Surely, unless it must necessarily be done in reality, it is false that infants ought to eat the body of the Lord if they are to be saved; for they can be saved even if they have not eaten, unless it must necessarily be done in reality.

But infants cannot eat Christ carnally and properly; for this very act of eating belongs to those who use the necessary instruments for eating. But sucking is more proper to infants than eating. How can they eat the flesh of Christ in the Sacrament, when they cannot even eat the Sacrament itself?

But again Bellarmine says that Augustine attributes eating to infants not in reality but by implicit desire; indeed, he denies that infants communicate spiritually—which is contrary to Augustine, because he says it is decreed that infants cannot have life unless they have eaten the flesh of the Son of Man. Certainly, the Sacrament of the Eucharist itself is not simply necessary, especially for infants. If therefore the Roman Pontiff decreed (for Augustine is speaking about Innocent's decree) that little ones cannot be saved without the Sacrament of the Eucharist, then he decreed an error and a heresy, even by their own judgment.

Therefore it is safer to understand it as referring to spiritual eating, which is necessary both for adults and infants; for no one can be saved except through communion with Christ, not even infants—which Augustine asserts elsewhere. Thus therefore I frame the argument: If no one at all can be saved without spiritual eating, not even infants, and Christ is speaking about this eating, then the latter is true because the former is true. For without the Sacrament of the Eucharist both infants and adults can be saved.

Again, the same Augustine in his commentaries on this sixth chapter of John is very full on this point, teaching that this eating is to believe. “Believe,” he says, “and you have

eaten,” and “To believe in him is to eat the living bread,” and “Why do you prepare tooth and belly?” But if here Christ were speaking about proper and carnal eating, we would need to prepare tooth and belly.

Bellarmino wittily replies that these things were not said by Augustine about the Sacrament because he had not yet reached the passage of the Gospel where the Sacrament is treated. I reply: Augustine interprets the mind of Christ as concerning spiritual eating because he not only said that Christ is eaten by faith but also removes carnal eating. “Why,” he says, “do you prepare tooth and belly?” And afterward he says that these words of Christ must be understood spiritually. And he says, “This bread was signified by Manna; this bread was signified by the altar of God,” where in the Sacrament he means nothing else to be received than what was received in Manna. The Eucharist therefore in itself was nothing but a sacrament, like Manna; therefore one must eat this bread, about which Christ here speaks spiritually.

And afterward he says, “the thing itself about which Christ here speaks,” that is, this bread, “is not taken by anyone to destruction, whoever shall have been a partaker of it.” Therefore Augustine understood that Christ was not speaking about carnal eating. And he had already come to that passage of this chapter which Bellarmine refers to the Eucharist.

And elsewhere Augustine says about these words...

Speaking: “Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man,” etc., he says, if these words are understood literally and carnally, they command sin and wickedness in those who do so.

Therefore, Christ must be understood to have spoken of spiritual eating, which consists in the remembrance of the Lord’s death.

Bellarmino labors over this passage and tortures himself remarkably, inventing I know not what sophistical fabrications. He says that Augustine does not speak of Christ’s flesh being eaten tropically, but truly and really; and that Augustine places the trope in the manner of eating, because it is not an ordinary manner: for, he says, Christ’s flesh is not visibly cut into pieces, nor taken in parts, but the whole flesh of Christ is taken invisibly, without any injury. I reply: Augustine does indeed place a trope in these words, but Bellarmine leaves no trope at all. It is no less improperly said that we do not see what we see; otherwise the blind, who do not see what they eat, would not be said to eat properly. Therefore, the trope cannot be in this, that Christ’s body is eaten really by our mouth, but differently from other foods; because whatever we eat by mouth in any way, we eat properly. But Augustine wants the words to be understood figuratively concerning spiritual eating, which is not eating unless improperly.

Moreover, it is no less a crime to eat the whole Christ than if we were to eat him piecemeal and limb by limb; for to devour a man or a human body in any way is a

horrible crime. The Papists sputter that no crime is committed because Christ is eaten invisibly and without injury. But I reply: this is not properly to eat a whole man, to devour bones, flesh, blood; for in eating, chewing and breaking down of food is necessary. But to send a whole human body into the stomach is a new kind of eating; this is rather to gorge than to eat. For what kind of throat is it that swallows a whole body? And he who sends flesh into the stomach unharmed ought not to be considered as eating; and certainly it is more horrible to devour a whole human body than to eat it limb by limb.

Next, Augustine shows how we ought to understand Christ—namely, what it is to eat Christ and in what the trope consists. He does not explain it in the way Bellarmine does—namely, that to eat Christ is to receive the Eucharist—but he means that to eat Christ is to share in the Lord's passion and to recall his death sweetly and usefully and to store it in memory. This, however, is spiritual eating and can take place without the sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore, we have Augustine favoring our exposition.

Clement of Alexandria says that Christ intended these words, "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man," etc., ἀλληγορεῖν τῆς πίστεως καὶ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τὸ πότιμον—to allegorize the sweet or drinkable water of faith and the Gospel—that is, these words of Christ are to be understood concerning allegorical and spiritual communion, which takes place through faith. And he understands Christ's teaching in John in this way; and he says this word is ἐναργές—that is, clear or without controversy. Therefore, the Fathers formerly understood this doctrine as we do.

He says: "Christ in his word has become spiritual nourishment for the prudent." And: "That milk by which the Church is nourished is λόγον βρεφώδη"—that is, the word of God by which the children of God are fed unto eternal life. Therefore, he does not understand a carnal reception but interprets all these things concerning the word of God and the preaching of the Gospel.

Origen, his disciple, speaking of those words, "Unless you eat," etc., says: "Recognize that they are figures, and therefore examine them as spiritual, not as carnal, and understand what is said. For if you follow this very saying according to the letter—'Unless you eat,' etc.—this letter kills. But the Papists understand it according to the letter; therefore they follow the killing letter."

Basil, than whom no one had greater authority in the Eastern Church in his time, expounding those words of Christ, "He who eats me will live because of me," says that we τρώγειν—that is, eat Christ's flesh—and πίνειν—that is, drink his blood—when we are μετέχοντες τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ—partakers of his word and wisdom. For he says that Christ called his ἐπιδημίαν μυστικὴν καὶ τὴν διδασκαλίαν—mystical presence and teaching—his flesh and his blood; and he says that τὴν διδασκαλίαν ταύτην

τρέφεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν—the soul is nourished by this teaching; and he says this διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἡμῶν—through our mouth.

It is said to be indicated: therefore, he wishes this sense of these words to be not only allegorical but also literal. Therefore, when we perceive the doctrine of the Gospel by faith, we then perceive Christ by faith and live through Christ.

Jerome says, when Christ says, "Unless you eat my flesh and drink my blood," although it can be understood in a mystery—that is, referred to the Sacrament—that we spiritually eat the flesh of Christ and spiritually drink his blood in it, yet more truly, according to the language of the Scriptures, the body and blood of Christ are the divine doctrine. Therefore, Christ speaks properly about spiritual eating.

Bernard, explaining those words, "Unless you eat," etc., says: "What is it to eat his flesh and drink his blood, except to share in his sufferings and imitate the way of life which he led in the flesh?" And he says that the Sacrament of the altar signifies this: that just as the form of bread is seen to enter into us, so we may know that through the way of life he had on earth, he himself enters into us to dwell by faith in our hearts."

Therefore, Christ speaks of spiritual communion, for the purpose of signifying which he later instituted the Sacrament. But these words of Christ are understood not about sacramental but about spiritual eating, when we recall his passion with faith.

But why pursue the ancients? Even among the Papists themselves, those who are somewhat more learned and fair openly agree with us and defend our opinion.

Gabriel Biel expounded the Canon of the Mass in many readings. He says that in this chapter it is not about the sacramental eating of Christ.

Cardinal Cusanus wrote letters against the Bohemians. He says that to believe and be baptized is to eat the flesh of Christ. And he cites Bede on the sixth chapter of John, that this bodily bread is not to be understood literally. And he says that it is the opinion of all Doctors that Christ in this chapter does not speak about the Sacrament. And then he refutes those who argue that these words are explained about sacramental eating. And it was necessary for him to say this because he was dealing with the Bohemians, who from these words urged communion under both kinds.

Cardinal Cajetan is entirely on our side in many places. He expounds this chapter as we do. And elsewhere he also says that Christ speaks about spiritual participation, where he says that to eat and drink spiritually is the same thing, but sacramentally to eat is one thing and to drink another. However, Cajetan asserts only one fruit of spiritual eating. Indeed, he says that Christ describes this fruit in three ways: for he calls it life, eternal life, and dwelling in Christ; but nevertheless these three are only one thing. Therefore, he

asserts that Christ speaks about that reception which occurs through faith, which procures eternal life for all who thus receive Christ—which sacramental reception does not do.

The same Cajetan proves the same point elsewhere: because Christ in this chapter speaks about faith and trust in himself, and because it is said there, "Whoever eats my flesh and drinks my blood remains in me, and I in him." But many receive the Sacrament who do not remain in Christ through faith. Yet he contends that spiritual eating which occurs in the Sacrament is not excluded; to prove this he brings forward those arguments which are here adduced by Bellarmine to prove that Christ here deals with sacramental eating. But Cajetan says that by those arguments it cannot be proved that Christ in the sixth chapter of John speaks about the Sacrament; but only that those who approach the Sacrament usefully ought so to eat and drink Christ as is prescribed in the sixth chapter of John—that is, to cling to him through faith formed by charity.

Therefore, the words of Christ according to their genuine sense are not to be understood about the use of the Sacrament; indeed, they cannot be so understood without harm to the Catholic faith, because then the sufficiency of Baptism for salvation would be taken away, and it would be equally necessary to receive the Eucharist as to be baptized. Therefore, Bellarmine defends what takes away Christian faith.

Indeed, the same Cajetan says that this sense introduces heresy; therefore, it is heretical to expound this chapter as Bellarmine expounds it.

Similar is the opinion of Tapper, who explains Cajetan's opinion; and also John Hessels of Louvain, who wrote a book on communion under one kind, asserts the same.

In the same manner, Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ghent, says that Christ in this chapter is speaking not of sacramental eating but of spiritual eating, which occurs through living faith; and with this he answers those who ask how those who eat can live. Since Christ said that those who eat of this bread will live, yet many receive the Sacrament and do not attain life, Dominic Soto—although he argues in one place that Christ in this chapter is speaking of sacramental eating—elsewhere, forgetting himself, asserted on his own conjecture that the Sacrament of the Eucharist had never been heard of until Christ gave His body and blood to His disciples at Cana; therefore Christ did not speak of the Sacrament in the sixth chapter of John. Bellarmine, however, holds that Christ at that time prescribed the use of this Sacrament; but if that is true, then Christ spoke of this Sacrament beforehand, and it was heard of by the disciples beforehand, and then it will be false what Dominic says, that this Sacrament had never been heard of before. Matthias Doring, a not obscure Papist, says concerning a certain saying of Christ in this chapter: "This word directly pertains nothing to sacramental or bodily eating." Therefore, we conclude by arguments taken from the chapter itself, and from the testimonies of the Fathers and most learned men, even of the Papists themselves, that that sixth chapter of

John is not to be understood concerning the Sacrament of the Eucharist. And so much for the second argument of Bellarmine.

Chapter 4: In which the third general argument of Bellarmine, taken from those words, "This is my body," is examined and refuted.

I now undertake the disputation concerning the words of the Supper, "This is my body," which words are found in the three Evangelists—Matthew, Mark, Luke—and also in Paul. When Christ instituted His Supper, He took bread, and when He had blessed it, He broke it and gave it to His disciples and said, "This is my body," where Christ plainly said that it was His body which He gave to His disciples. For thus Bellarmine expounds the words, and says that this is the opinion of the Catholic Church: that the words are to be taken simply and properly in this manner: "This," that is, what is contained under these species, "is my body," that is, the true and natural body, truly and properly. But the ancient Church did not think this to be the meaning of these words, as we shall show later; nor is this the simple and proper sense of the words. For it is one thing to say, "This is my body"; another to say, "What is contained under these species is my body." For the former ought to be understood not only concerning what is contained but also concerning what is seen; for "this" properly demonstrates something to the eyes. And it is one thing to say, "This is my body"; another to say, "This is transubstantiated into my body," or "From this becomes my body." Therefore, either the bread or the species of bread is the body of Christ, and the words are taken properly; but this sense is false, whether the bread properly or the species of bread is the body of Christ. Therefore, whoever expounds "this" as "that which is contained under these species" makes an open synecdoche. Thus while the Adversaries wish to press the literal meaning and sharply defend the propriety of speech in these words, they unwittingly fall into a figure. Which also the Lutherans do, who expound the words thus: "In this, with this, under this bread, is my body"; for Christ calls the bread itself—not what lies hidden in the bread—His body. And both Papists and Lutherans press the literal meaning, yet their opinions concerning the Sacrament are conflicting.

Moreover, Bellarmine recounts various expositions of these words, of which however most do not differ in substance; some are conflicting, but these are not many. He says that a book has lately appeared in which two hundred expositions of these words are numbered. I have not seen this book, but nevertheless I say that all are false except one.

Bellarmino enumerates only nine of the principal ones; where however it must be observed that he has omitted the opinion of Luther, which is especially controversial. Andreas Karlstadt wrongly understands by "this" the very body of Christ which the Apostles saw and which sat among them; for he thinks that Christ designated His own body and self when He said, "This is my body."

Mine, not what He gave to them; but Christ clearly called what He gave to them His body. The Papists disapprove of this exposition, but without any right, for they want the very body of Christ, which was among the Apostles, to have been eaten by the Apostles. For Christ has only one body; therefore, if the body of Christ is said to be in the Eucharist, that is eaten which the Apostles were looking at, unless they can produce another body of Christ. But Carlstadt did not think that the body of Christ was eaten, and so he devised a new exposition, which neither asserted that the bread is changed into the body of Christ, nor that the body of Christ is in the bread; for he said that Christ was speaking not about the bread, nor about what is contained in or under the bread, but about Himself, and that He showed the Apostles His own body. Ridiculously: for why would He say that His body, which they saw, was His body? Why would He declare about His own body that it was more a body? We by no means admit that opinion, and no one has embraced it after Carlstadt. He was indeed a learned man, but too fond of contention.

As for Bucer, Zwingli, Oecolampadius, and Calvin, to whom Bellarmine ascribes differing opinions, all these men felt and taught the same about this Sacrament, as is clear from their great agreement and Bellarmine's own confession, who first said that Oecolampadius agreed with Zwingli in fact, and that Calvin really differed nothing from the opinion of Zwingli; but here, so that he might attribute conflicts of opinions to us, he makes their opinions different.

Bucer indeed sometimes understood "this" as the whole action, and thus interpreted these words, "This is my body," that is, this action signifies the body of Christ, or, Christ's body is exhibited in this action; for he wanted our minds to be turned from the signs to the things themselves; and this action is not profane, but represents Christ's death. But afterward in his retractions, by "this" he understands not only the bread and cup, but at the same time and chiefly the body and blood of the Lord: for there is a double demonstration—one to the senses, another to the understanding—as always happens when an invisible thing is shown and exhibited by a visible sign; as when a bishop gives holy orders, he hands over a book; one thing is shown to the eyes, another to the mind: and Christ, when He breathed on the Apostles after the resurrection, exhibited two things—to the senses His breath, to the mind the Holy Spirit: so by these words, "This is my body," He demonstrated and exhibited to the senses bread, to the intellect and faith His own body. Therefore Bucer teaches nothing different from Zwingli or Oecolampadius, whose opinions he indicates he does not disapprove of. Nor do these two disagree entirely: for the expositions of both come down to the same thing.

Zwingli placed a trope in the word "is," in this manner: "This is my body," that is, "This signifies my body": for thus the bread is called the body of Christ, just as the Passover Lamb is called the Passover; and he says this passage was offered to him in a dream, which many afterward reported: but many things occur in dreams about which they were not thinking when awake. Zwingli objected many other passages to his importunate

adversary, such as these: “I am the door”; “Christ is the rock”; “I am the shepherd”; “I am the vine”; in these the adversary did not acquiesce, because these are not said about Sacraments: when indeed he had objected these and many other passages, and the adversary had not acquiesced in these, he says it was said to him in a dream: “Object this passage: ‘The Lamb is Passover,’ that is, ‘the passing over.’” This indeed could be true, but I do not contend greatly about it.

Oecolampadius placed the trope in the predicate: “This is my body,” that is, he says, “the sign or Sacrament of my body.” Nor does it matter much whether you say one or the other; for who does not see that the sense is the same whether you say “This signifies my body” or “This is the sign of my body”? Calvin does not labor about these things, but admits both: for he says there can be a trope, namely metonymy, in the noun “body,” or even in the verb “is”; for it makes no difference. But Bellarmine says that Calvin adds that the bread of the Eucharist is not a mere figure of the body of Christ, but a figure that exhibits the reality itself; therefore Christ did not say, “This is a figure of my body,” but, “This is my body.” In this he agrees with those who say that in the Supper the true body of Christ is spiritually present. And thus Bucer, Zwingli, and Oecolampadius are of the same mind. He correctly explains Oecolampadius’s view—that they taught that Christ’s body is not absent from the Supper, as some supposed—and he declares that he agrees with them, praising both Zwingli and Oecolampadius. Therefore, this is an invention and slander of the Papists concerning our disagreement in this matter: for there is no disagreement among us, because we agree among ourselves and disagree with the Papists. We approve this opinion and explanation of Bucer, Zwingli, Oecolampadius, and Calvin, but we reject that of the Papists, and we say that these words are not to be understood literally. The question, then, is whether these words are to be understood literally, as the Papists wish, or figuratively and tropically, as we do. We say there is in them an easy and clear figure, one used in Scripture, namely metonymy; not that there is any trope in the words themselves considered separately (for the bread is true bread and the body is a true body), but if they are considered together and in relation, so that the predicate is attributed to the subject: for the true body of Christ cannot be predicated of the bread except figuratively, nor the blood of the wine: therefore, the body is predicated of the bread not simply but figuratively, and so the blood of the wine. There is therefore a trope and figure not in the words taken separately, but in the attribution.

But from the very words of the institution we deny that a real presence can necessarily be concluded, and with Cajetan we say that it does not appear from the Gospel that there is anything compelling to understand Christ’s words literally. Concerning this saying of Cajetan, Domingo de Soto objects; it could have been passed over, and it would have been more prudent to do so. Thus they conceal things so as to serve their own cause. But Bellarmine proves by four arguments that there is no trope in these words: the first is taken from the matter about which Christ speaks; the second from the persons with whom

Christ was speaking; the third from the place and time in which he was speaking; the fourth from the consensus of the Fathers; and a fifth from the rule for interpreting Scripture. We will respond to each in order.

He frames the first argument as follows: The matter dealt with here is a covenant, a sacrament, a testament, a law, and a doctrine; therefore, the speech is literal, not figurative. We will reduce it to a syllogism: Wherever such matter is dealt with as a covenant, sacrament, testament, law, and doctrine, there the speech is always literal and there is no figure; but here Christ deals with such matter; therefore here he uses literal, not figurative speech.

I reply: The adversary must prove two things here: first, that such matter is dealt with here; second, that it follows from this that the speech is not figurative. Concerning the first we do not greatly contend: for we do not deny that Christ here instituted a sacrament, testament, and covenant, and promulgated a law and doctrine; but the consequence is weak: therefore there is no figure in the words. For a sacrament can be instituted even with figurative words.

Now let us see how he proves the consequence. 1. He says: Sacraments are usually instituted by God with literal words, so that in their use one may not err. He proves this from the institution of circumcision, the Passover lamb, and baptism. Who then would believe, he says, that Christ in instituting the primary sacrament of our religion wished to speak so figuratively and ambiguously that not even the doctors of divine law themselves can agree among themselves what this sacrament is—whether it is bread or the Lord's body?

I reply first: Not everyone who speaks figuratively speaks ambiguously; indeed many figurative expressions are just as plain and clear—and indeed more meaningful and emphatic—than those that are not figurative. For a trope does not conflict with clarity; rather figures often illustrate things and declare them much more expressively. He who speaks in a common manner, even if he speaks figuratively, does not speak ambiguously; therefore not every speech is ambiguous on account of figures, but sometimes more illuminating. So when Christ says, “I am the good shepherd,” it is a figure; yet no one fails to know what he means, and this speech influences the mind more expressly and better than if he had said, “I am like a shepherd.” Christ uses such metaphors when he says, “I am the door,” and “I am the way”; “the seed is the word”; “the field is the world”; “the good seed are the children of the kingdom, the tares are the children of the wicked one”; “the harvest is the end of the world”; “the reapers are angels”; “I am the true vine, you are the branches”; “Into your hands I commend my spirit.” The Scriptures are full of such figurative expressions, and there is the greatest clarity in them; there is no ambiguity.

Therefore, a figurative expression is always hostile to clarity. That the Doctors disagree is due to the fault of contentious men, not the words themselves.

Secondly, I respond: it is false that God uses only proper words when instituting the sacraments. For when Scripture instructs us about the sacred mysteries, it uses figures and tropes; therefore, a trope is not at odds with the sacraments. Rather, it is fitting that it speaks sacramentally about the sacraments. Examples in Scripture are sufficiently abundant.

After God commanded the males to be circumcised, He said, "Thus shall my covenant be in your flesh," where circumcision is called a covenant, although it was only a sign of the divine covenant; thus, it is a clear trope. Similarly, the lamb is called the Passover, that is, the passing over; yet it was not the passing over itself, but the sacrament that signified that passing over. That night, God passed over the houses of the Israelites and harmed no one in them, but invaded the houses of the Egyptians, killing someone in each; the lamb was the sacrament of this event, and therefore it is called by the name of the event itself.

Nor does this occur only in the Old Testament, but also in the New. Our adversaries want those words of Christ, "Unless one is born again of water and the Spirit," to be understood concerning baptism; but to be born again is metaphorical. Bellarmine says that this phrase is explained by the words "of water and the Holy Spirit." But for us it suffices that Christ spoke metaphorically; therefore, a figure is not inconsistent with a sacrament.

But Bellarmine further says that this phrase does not pertain to the essence of the sacrament, but to signify its effect; and thus we could say that by these words, "This is my body," the effect of this sacrament is signified—namely, that we become partakers of Christ's body if we receive this bread with faith—just as bread is called body, so baptism can be called παλιγγενεσία, that is, rebirth or regeneration.

Elsewhere, baptism is called συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεόν, "the pledge of a good conscience toward God," that is, the sacrament of the pledge by which we promise to live and serve God. Thus Paul says, "As many as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ"; and elsewhere, "We are buried with him through baptism into death."

Nothing is more common than for the doctrine of the sacraments to be expounded in figurative words. Thus Christ says, "With desire I have desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer," that is, this sacrament of the Passover; and the apostles say, "Where do you want us to prepare the Passover?" that is, the paschal lamb.

But in the very words of the Eucharist it is necessary to recognize a figure: "This cup is the new testament." Surely Christ does not mean the cup itself, but something else; yet He speaks only of the cup: therefore it is a figure. And these are essential words of the

sacrament. Then if blood is understood by the cup, it is not the blood that is the new testament, but that by which the new testament is ratified and contained. Therefore there is a double trope: namely in the subject and in the attribute.

Even our adversaries are compelled to resort to tropes: for when Paul often uses the word "bread" even after consecration, they explain it thus: it is called bread because it was bread before; therefore it is a trope, because it is said to be bread and yet bread is absent. Why then should bread not be called the body of Christ by a similar trope, even if Christ's body is not really present?

And yet Bellarmine says that sacraments are usually instituted by God only with non-figurative words—that is, proper and clear ones. He says the same about testaments: namely, that nothing is usually explained more properly, simply, and precisely than a testament, so that no occasion for disputing about the testator's will may be given. Thus he says the Old Testament was instituted in the most proper and clearest words, as the Apostle relates its institution; and he proves that the Supper is Christ's testament because Christ says, "This is the blood of the new testament," or as Luke has it, "This cup is the new testament in my blood."

Thus Jacob, David, Tobias, and Mattathias composed their testaments in very clear and simple words; and here too it is a human custom from which the Apostle draws an argument, saying that a man's testament is so ratified that no one dares to add or take away anything; and he says human laws command that testaments be understood in the proper sense of the words—so that if someone gives a house to someone in a testament and someone quibbles that it was not a true house but

If a mother, having given a painted image, were to be convicted before any judge: Christ therefore did not obscure the New Testament with figurative expressions, but set it forth in proper and clear terms. I reply: Christ called the Supper not his last will, but a covenant, that is, the reconciliation of all believers with God; for διαθήκη signifies a covenant and pact no less than a testament. But suppose it were a testament: it does not follow that the words are to be understood literally, because a testament can be established with figurative words, yet without any ambiguity about the testator's intention; for not every figure obscures speech, but rather is employed to illustrate it. But let us respond to each of Bellarmine's examples.

The blood of bulls and goats is called the blood of the Testament: but a testament properly does not have blood; therefore there is some figure in the words. He who says, "This is the blood by which the Testament is confirmed or represented," speaks properly; but he who says that the blood of bulls or cattle is the Testament, or the blood of the Testament, speaks figuratively; and indeed that blood was only a sign and type of that

blood by which the eternal covenant is sanctified, which is the blood of Christ alone: therefore in these words there is a clear figure.

So also the testament of Jacob is full of figures: "Reuben, my strength"; "you are poured out like water"; "Judah is a lion's whelp"; "Issachar is a strong donkey"; "Dan is a serpent in the path"; and nearly all are figurative. But Bellarmine says these are prophecies, and that Jacob used various figures while prophesying; but when he comes to the Testament itself, he uses very clear words. I reply: But now the Patriarch made his testament, and in a way distributed his goods to his sons; for he set forth what inheritance each would have; but those words, "Bury me with my fathers in the double cave, which is in the field of Ephron," etc., in which alone Bellarmine wishes Jacob's testament to be contained, prescribe only the place of burial. A fine testament, in which nothing is given or bequeathed, but only provision is made about the place of burial! Who ever made such a testament? Therefore what precedes contains the testament rather, where he says to Joseph, "I give you," etc. These are the words of one making a testament. And here there is a figure: for he says he gives him one portion above his brothers, which he took from the hand of the Amorite with his sword and bow. He does not seem to speak of the city of Shechem, because its inhabitants were Hivites, not Amorites, as Jerome affirms from Oleaster; and Jacob did not yet possess that field—indeed, he was forced to flee in fear—and he curses that slaughter of the Shechemites; therefore he would never ascribe it to himself. Nor did he give this field to Joseph himself but to his posterity, because he had not yet taken it from the Amorites, nor had he overcome them by any victory; but he speaks of a future thing as if present or past, on account of the certainty of the matter: for he knew that Joseph's posterity would most certainly take that field from the Amorites, and that it would come into their hands as surely as if possession had then been acquired. Mention of this victory is found in Joshua 24, where Joshua in God's name thus addresses the sons of Israel: "I brought you into the land of the Amorites who lived beyond the Jordan, and when they fought against you I delivered them into your hands, and you possessed their land and killed them." Therefore here there is a clear figure, because Jacob took this field from the Amorites in his posterity.

And David in his testament speaks many things figuratively: "Behold," he says, "I am going the way of all the earth," that is, I am dying; and by "all the earth" he understands all men. So also afterward, when he speaks about Joab and Shimei, he speaks figuratively: concerning Joab he says, "You shall not let his gray head go down to the grave in peace"; and concerning Shimei, "You shall bring down his gray head with blood to the grave," that is, you shall punish him with capital punishment.

So Tobias in his testament orders his son not to turn his face away from the poor: for so it will be that the face of God will not be turned away from him: this is said figuratively; for God does not properly have a face. And afterward he says, "Set your bread and wine upon the burial of the just"; by which words he literally orders his son to place food upon

the graves of the just; which some were accustomed to do, and Augustine reproves it; others understand it as referring to magnificent and sumptuous feasts at the burial of the pious; certainly the words cannot have a pious sense without a figure.

Similarly Mattathias, addressing his sons, orders them not to fear the words of a sinner, because his glory is dung and worms.

These things cannot be understood or explained without figures of speech. But what he cites from the Epistle to the Galatians is neither against us nor relevant to the matter: for one who explains figuratively what was expressed figuratively does not add or take away, but interprets according to how the one who established the Testament understood it. And it is certain that testaments are to be understood in their proper sense; as the laws prescribe, that if someone bequeathed a house or a field, he is understood to have bequeathed not the symbols of these things, but the things themselves. Yet the proper sense is taken in two ways: either as the words sound natively without figure or trope, or the proper sense is what the words convey according to common reasoning and the understood intention of the testator.

There is a rule of law that in testaments it is best first and foremost to scrutinize what the testator intended to demonstrate. Thus, a figurative sense can be the proper sense, and Testaments, like other writings, are to be understood according to the rules of speech. If someone in a Testament gives to another his Cicero, Plato, Aristotle, or Livy, everyone knows what he means; yet these are not the very books that bear those names: therefore it is a figure. And we can scarcely make a testament or speak at all without figures.

I have read the Testament of Francis Petrarch: he bequeathed his library to Saint Mark—that is, to the Church of Saint Mark, which is in Venice. Therefore the argument is false that there is no figure in these words because Christ composed the testament. Christ addresses his Apostles in this manner: "I appoint to you" (as the Vulgate edition has it), as if to say, this is my last will, that you should eat and drink at my table: it is a manifest trope; for in that kingdom of which he speaks there, there is no table, nor do we eat or drink there.

Now let us speak about pacts.

3. Bellarmine says that pacts or treaties are of that kind of things which are explained by the most precise and proper words, so that no room is left for quibbles: but Christ's Testament is also a pact, because it is (he says) a conditional Testament. I reply: That Christ's Testament is a pact is not in doubt; but the Sacrament of the Eucharist is neither the Testament itself nor the pact itself, but its symbol: for the pact concerns the forgiveness of sins and reconciliation through the blood of the mediator; the Sacrament of this covenant is the Eucharist. The argument from pacts to the symbols of pacts is poorly drawn.

But indeed, pacts are not always made with proper words. God made a covenant with Adam with these words: "The seed of the woman shall crush the head of the serpent": there is a figure in these words. Similarly, he made a covenant with Noah that he would not thereafter destroy humankind with waters, and as a sign of this pact he would place his bow in the clouds, so that whenever he saw the bow, he would remember this pact: here is a figure; there is no bow in heaven, nor does God need a visible sign for remembering.

Laban and Jacob agreed that neither would cross that heap which Jacob had erected: without doubt he could cross the heap, but not to inflict harm; and harm could be inflicted even if the heap itself was not crossed: therefore the words are not to be understood so meticulously and precisely as they sound literally. What each intended was sufficiently clear, but the words are not as precise as Bellarmine requires in pacts. And if someone is of such a mind as to wish to deceive, no words suffice.

The Romans made a treaty with Antiochus about surrendering half of his fleet. The words were open enough; nevertheless, the Romans deceived Antiochus; for they cut all his ships in half. The maiden Tarpeia made a pact with Tatius about betraying the hill if the soldiers would give what they wore on their left arms: they, having taken the hill, crushed her with their shields; but she hoped for bracelets. With similar fraud acted he who plundered fields by night, because truces had been agreed for days, not for nights.

Pacts indeed ought to be made with clear words, so that the meaning may be agreed upon and so that they may be piously kept; but it is not necessary that no word in a treaty be figurative. The very tablets of the Decalogue—that is, of the covenant—have their figures. "I brought you out," says God, "of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage": certainly in Egypt there was not only one house. And if God addresses us in these words, it is necessary that he speaks figuratively: for we were never in Egypt, nor in that bondage, but we were delivered from the power of Satan and his servitude.

But: And this covenant also pertains to us, or certainly the Decalogue has no reference to us.

Yet Bellarmine could produce no testimony by which he removes the figures from the covenants.

4. In the next place, he contends concerning precepts and laws, namely that the words of laws ought to be clear and proper, lest an occasion for transgression be given. All the precepts of the Decalogue (he says) are explained in proper words; also other precepts by which certain rites are instituted in the old law. And here too something is commanded.

I reply: Whatever is commanded to be done, it is false that it is commanded in proper words: for many precepts are figurative, as "Do not harden your hearts," and "Wash

yourselves, be clean," and other such things, which occur everywhere. The sense of these precepts is sufficiently manifest, but the words command something other than what they present. For hearts are not hardened, but the will becomes more perverse; and it does no good to wash the body, but the soul must be cleansed. Similar to these is that in the prophet Joel: "Rend your hearts."

Moreover, indeed all the precepts of Christ in the Supper lack a figure, even according to their opinion: for in these words, "Do this," they establish a figure. "Do this," (they say) that is, "sacrifice this." Then there are also precepts placed there in proper words, such as "Take, eat": but Bellarmine says this is not enough, unless it is also properly and openly signified what it is that ought to be taken and eaten: for otherwise (he says) a piece of bread is to be taken in one way, the body of Christ in another.

But I reply: It was sufficiently clear to the Apostles what Christ commanded them to do: for he gave them bread and wine, and ordered them to eat and drink; but he gave this bread and wine now not as common food and drink; for they were now Sacraments: therefore they did not receive it as a piece of bread, but as a Sacrament of Christ, with which Christ himself was spiritually consumed.

5. Lastly, he says that dogmas are usually delivered in divine writings only in proper words, especially the principal ones, which must be precisely believed or observed: but in these words (he says), "This is my body," one of the principal dogmas of the Christian religion is contained; no one has denied this hitherto.

I reply: This does not always happen: for Christ says, "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you do not have life in you": in these words Origen and Augustine establish a trope, and in these a dogma is contained. Thus Christ, when he taught the Apostles, proposed many parables: and he says to them, "I am that true vine, and my Father is the farmer: you are the branches." What need is there for examples? There is almost no place where such things are not found.

And this was Gardiner's argument, to which Peter Martyr replies that it is not lacking in Scripture for Sacraments, dogmas, and precepts to be explained by tropes. Concerning precepts, Peter Martyr adduces these examples: "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep's clothing"; "Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees"; "Do not grieve the Holy Spirit"; "Do not be anxious about tomorrow." Of figurative dogmas he adduces these examples: "Our God is a consuming fire"; "We all are one bread"; and those where Christ is called a rock, a lion, a vine, etc. Of Sacraments he adduces examples: "The rock was Christ"; and "The lamb was the Passover"; and "Circumcision is a covenant"; and "The cup is the new testament."

Now let us see how Bellarmine replies to Peter Martyr. He says that Martyr did not reply to the argument taken from the words "Testament" and "covenant."

I reply: This was not objected to him; if it had been, without doubt he would have replied: but I have now replied sufficiently concerning these things, as I think.

Bellarmino replies in order to those things which are adduced by Martyr, and first concerning precepts, of which he fabricates a certain distinction from his own brain. He says that peculiar precepts, and those properly so called, are to be distinguished from exhortations; those are to be expressed in proper words, tropes are most fittingly mixed with these: the reason is because exhortations are about very well-known things.

I reply: This response is absurd and inept. First he says that precepts ought to be expressed in proper words; afterward, pressed by examples, he says that those are not peculiar precepts because they are about very well-known things, as all know that false prophets are to be avoided, that one must beware of hypocrisy and false doctrine, that nothing is to be done which displeases God, that superfluous cares are to be avoided: therefore Christ used tropes when he exhorted to these things. But what then? Are these therefore not precepts because they are very well known to all? That God is to be loved is known to all:

Therefore, is it a precept? But even if it is known to all that false prophets are to be avoided, not everyone knows how false prophets are to be discerned. Christ teaches this figuratively: He says, "They come to you in sheep's clothing," that is, they appear gentle and simple, but they are cruel and bloodthirsty. And this is not only an exhortation but also a precept, and indeed a special precept concerning avoiding false teachers.

Of such a kind is what Christ says: "Do not call anyone on earth your father." It is a special precept, and yet it is presented figuratively, unless one wishes to take it literally that no one should be called father. And what the Apostle says, "Purge out the old leaven," is a special precept concerning the excommunicated fornicator; and yet it is figurative. Therefore, this rule is most false: that figures are absent where there is a special precept. For this precept, "Do this," is no more special than that one, "Sacrifice the Passover."

As for dogmas, Bellarmine says that not just any statements about God are called dogmas, but only those which have a special difficulty. But who is the author of this distinction? Who invented this rule? Dogmas are whatever sets forth some doctrine, whether difficult or less difficult. That statement, "We all are one bread," teaches that there is a supreme and indeed mystical union among the faithful, which in the Creed is called the communion of saints. Therefore, if the communion of saints is a difficult dogma, then this too is a difficult dogma, and yet it is presented figuratively.

But Bellarmine responds again: if these dogmas are presented tropically in one place, they are explained literally in another. Yet this dogma concerning the Eucharist is nowhere else in Scripture expressed in other words; for nowhere is the bread of the

Eucharist called a figure of Christ's body. I reply: If that were true, then certainly the Fathers misunderstood the Scriptures. But Scripture most clearly says that this bread is true bread; thus Paul often says so. And here he says that by this sacrament the death of Christ is signified and proclaimed; therefore he implies that it is a sign, as we will later teach more fully. And since Christ was already sitting at the table with the Apostles, they could easily understand that these words, "This is my body," were not to be taken literally.

Then how can those words be excused from a trope: "This cup is the new testament"? Concerning the sacraments, about the examples brought forward by Martyr, Bellarmine promises to respond later. Now he says much about that passage, "The rock was Christ," which we have considered above; yet something must now be answered. He says that Paul is speaking not of a material rock but of an invisible one, which is Christ as God; therefore this passage does not pertain to the point. I reply: Paul is speaking of a material rock; which is apparent from these four arguments.

First, he says that this rock followed the Israelites because it emitted waters which followed them through the whole desert; but Christ did not follow them; rather He went before them in a cloud. Second, the Apostle says that all drank from that rock; but not all drank from the invisible rock, which is Christ according to His deity. Third, the Apostle does not say, as Bellarmine explains, "Christ was the rock," but "that rock from which they drank was Christ," that is, it was a sacrament of Christ or signified Christ; it was not Christ Himself in substance. Thus Augustine: "The thing which signifies is accustomed to be named by the name of the thing which it signifies; as it is written, 'The seven ears are seven years,' and many such things. Hence it is said, 'The rock was Christ.' For he did not say, 'The rock signifies Christ,' but as if it were that which indeed by substance it was not, but by signification." Fourth, the subject here is sacraments; for he compares the old sacraments with ours; therefore from this a most fitting example of sacramental preaching is drawn. That the subject here is sacraments and that the old and new sacraments are compared here, all admit, and we have sufficiently demonstrated before.

Bellarmino's second argument is taken from the persons to whom Christ was speaking when He instituted the Supper, that is, the Apostles. Christ did not speak with the Apostles as He did with the Pharisees; for the Pharisees were unworthy of the knowledge of such sublime mysteries; but the Apostles were unlearned and simple and were being instructed so that they might be teachers of others.

To the future teachers of the whole human race: therefore, he either set forth all things very clearly to them, or immediately explained what was spoken more obscurely. I reply: the argument does not follow—that the Apostle was not like the Pharisees; therefore, these words are not to be understood figuratively, namely, "This is my body." Nor is the argument valid from parables to tropes, nor from the Pharisees to the Apostles.

Parables were obscure enough and could scarcely be understood without an interpreter; although it is clear that some parables of Christ were sufficiently understood by the Pharisees, such as that parable of the head of the household whose son was killed by the farmers to whom he had leased the vineyard—the Pharisees recognized that it was spoken about themselves. But tropes, such as that of these words, are so easy that anyone can understand them. Therefore, when Christ wishes to explain parables, he uses tropes, as is clear from the explanation of the parable of the sower. For after he had narrated how the farmer went out to sow his seed—which was a parable—afterward explaining this parable, that is, teaching what it signifies, he says, "The seed is the word of God," where a trope is manifest. Therefore, the nature of parables and that of tropes are different; there is much difference between these two.

And although Christ rarely speaks to the Apostles in parables, yet he speaks figuratively everywhere, as when he says, "Blessed are the poor in spirit," and "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness," and when he says, "If your right eye causes you to sin, pluck it out and cast it from you," and similarly when he says, "If your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and cast it from you"—no one except Origen would say that this speech is not figurative. So also when he says, "The lamp of the body is the eye," and "Did I not choose you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" he used no explanation anywhere. Likewise when he says, "On this rock I will build my Church," and "I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven," and afterward in the same chapter, "If anyone wishes to come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me"; and elsewhere, "In my Father's house are many mansions"; and "I am the true vine, and my Father is the vinedresser; you are the branches." We read that the Apostles, however unlearned, were not offended by these words. Indeed, in those words of Christ, "Feed my lambs and my sheep," there is a double metaphor—one in the word "feed," the other in the words "sheep" and "lambs"—and by these words the adversaries contend that Christ gave Peter primacy, which he had previously promised with those words, "I will give you the keys." The words in both places are figurative, and yet the adversaries wish them to be most plain. Why then in these words, "This is my body," should there not be a trope, and yet the words be perspicuous? They affirm that those words, although figurative, are very clear; these, because they are figurative, they say are so obscure that they cannot be understood by the Apostles—what could be more foolish?

But Bellarmine uses this argument: Christ (he says) here instructed the Apostles as future teachers of the whole human race; therefore he did not use tropes. I reply: As if one who uses figurative speech cannot instruct; or as if Christ had not promised the Apostles the Holy Spirit, who would suggest all things to them and lead them into all truth. Therefore this argument is childish and weak: "Christ speaks to the future teachers of the whole human race; therefore he does not use figures." For they wish that by these words, "Feed my sheep," Christ not only instructed a teacher but also made him pastor of the universal

Church—which cannot happen unless there is a sense in those words—and yet it cannot be denied that the words are figurative.

Thus Christ says to the Apostles, "He who is bathed does not need to wash, except for his feet," where he speaks parabolically, and yet the Apostles did not know what he was saying, nor were they offended by his words. Therefore Bellarmine's argument fails.

But now he proves by two arguments that Christ did not explain the trope at the Supper. But what if he did not explain it at the Supper? For they did not need an explanation because the Apostles already knew what Christ meant; nor if they were obscure was it necessary to explain immediately—he could explain either before or after, even if he did not explain at the Supper. Yet he does not always explain tropes and things spoken figuratively: for to the two sons of Zebedee he said, "Can you drink the cup that I am about to drink, and be baptized with the baptism with which I am baptized?" He does not afterward explain what he means because the sons of Zebedee understood immediately. So when Christ said to his mother Mary about John the disciple, "Woman, behold your son," and afterward to John, "Behold your mother," they did not ask what

He would have wished it, because they soon understood. But let us hear his arguments.

The first is that there is no trace of an explanation.

I reply: There is some trace. For although the words are sufficiently clear in themselves (who among the Apostles could have taken that bread for the very body of Christ, which was before their eyes?), yet afterward He revealed His meaning when He twice said, "Do this in remembrance of Me." By these words He teaches that these symbols are memorials of His death—that is, as it were, pledges left by Him, by which we recall His death to memory. He commanded that this be celebrated repeatedly, so that we might call to mind the memory of Christ's death—not so that we might chew His flesh with our mouths and thus either slay Christ again or punish Him wrongly. And Christ had refuted this absurd and fanciful opinion about real eating even before, when He disputed with the Capernaïtes.

Bellarmino's second argument is that all the Evangelists, and also Paul, use the same words, although they wrote at different places and times.

I reply: Even if this were true, it would not affect the matter; but it is plainly false. For not all use the same words. Matthew and Mark have only, "This is My body," and "This is My blood." But Luke has, "This is My body, which is given for you," and Paul, "which is broken for you." And in Luke it is written, "This cup is the new testament in My blood." In these words there is a most manifest trope, so that those who slander tropes may be silenced. The Canon of the Roman Mass changed the words of Christ; for instead of "This cup is My blood," there is placed in the Canon, "For this is the cup of My blood,

of the new and eternal testament." And they say this is the form of consecration of the wine; but these are not Christ's words, nor those of any Evangelist. Yet the words of consecration ought to be Christ's. Moreover, Luke does not have the words "Take, drink," nor does Paul have the word "drink." Mark, concerning the bread, has "Take, eat," before the Apostles ate; concerning the wine, on the contrary, after they had drunk, He said, "This is My blood." If, therefore, the wine was changed into blood, it was changed only after being drunk. Since this is so, with what face does Bellarmine assert that all writers of this history use the same words?

Bellarmino's third argument is taken from the agreement of interpreters: "No interpreter," he says, "has said that this passage ought to be understood tropically, although many have written commentaries on the Gospels and on Paul."

I reply: Nothing more false could be said. All ancient interpreters acknowledge a figure in the words, and this could not have been unknown to Bellarmine; and yet he treats this passage with a bare repetition of names. But so that all may understand how outstandingly false this is, I will here adduce a few examples and testimonies of the Fathers who have interpreted these words figuratively.

Tertullian says: "Christ did not reprobate the bread by which He represents His own body." Therefore here is bread—not merely a figure of bread or the accidents of bread—and this bread represents the body of Christ; it is not the body of Christ. And the same author elsewhere says: "Having professed that He desired to eat the Passover as His own, having taken the bread and distributed it to the disciples, He calls it His body by saying 'This is My body'—that is, a figure of My body." Indeed Christ made His body from bread—but not really, because Christ's body was made from the substance of Mary, not from wheat; but Christ made the bread a sacrament of His body. And Tertullian says openly that Christ, when He said "This is My body," meant nothing else than that this is a figure and sacrament of His body.

Chrysostom has these words: "If Jesus is not dead, whose symbol and sign is this sacrifice?" And elsewhere: "In the sacred vessels there is not the very body of Christ, but the mystery of His body is contained." The same author further says elsewhere: "It is carnal to doubt how Christ can give us His flesh to eat, since this must be understood mystically and spiritually." Therefore the bread is not the very body of Christ, but its sacrament.

Basil in the Liturgy (if indeed it is his) calls the bread ἀντίτυπον—that is, a figure and exemplar of the body of Christ—and that after consecration. So Nazianzen calls bread and wine ἀντίτυπα; and elsewhere he calls them τύπος—that is, types or figures of our salvation. Similarly Macarius: ἄρτος καὶ οἶνος ἀντίτυπα τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ αἵματος—

"Bread and wine are exemplars of His flesh and blood." So Theodoret: "The divine mysteries are ἀντίτυπα"—that is, exemplars.

Of the true body. Augustine says that the sacraments are signs, being one thing and signifying another. For they are bread and wine, but they signify the body and blood of Christ. Elsewhere he says, Christ included Judas at the meal in which he entrusted to his disciples the figure of his body and blood. Again elsewhere, the Lord did not hesitate to say, "This is my body," when he gave the sign of his body. Ambrose has these words: "As you have received the likeness of death, so also you drink the likeness of the precious blood; therefore, just as the death of Christ is not really present in the Eucharist, so also the blood of Christ is not." And elsewhere he calls this sacrament a figure of the body and blood of the Lord. Cyril writes thus: "Christ gave the fragments of bread to the believing disciples." Fulgentius says, "This cup is the new Testament," that is, this cup signifies the new Testament; Haymo cites this. In Gratian's gloss these words are found: "The heavenly sacrament is called the body of Christ, but improperly; it is called the body of Christ, that is, it signifies the body of Christ."

What more do we desire? We have the Fathers agreeing in this cause, and all antiquity as well, as we will later teach, God willing. The Scholastic Doctors confess that a bodily presence cannot be inferred from the words of the Supper unless they are understood in this order and sense: "Take, eat; this is my body." For what Christ says, "Take, eat; this is my body," is a *hysteron proteron*, as Innocent and Thomas say, or a *husterologia*, as Bellarmine wants. Durandus says that by these words, "This is my body," nothing else is expressed except the presence of the body, which can happen without transubstantiation. But the Papists want the literal sense to be that which necessarily infers transubstantiation.

But Bellarmine says that many Fathers expressly warn that these words are not to be taken tropically but properly; and he bids us look at Chrysostom on this passage and certain others. I reply: Some Fathers also warn that we should take the words properly. Origen says that this letter kills if anyone says that Christ's flesh is to be eaten really. Augustine says that unless the words which affirm that we ought to eat the flesh of the Lord are taken figuratively, they command crime and wickedness. Chrysostom says that Christ himself drank with the apostles so that they would not be disturbed and think they were drinking blood; but they did drink blood unless the words are understood mystically and figuratively. Therefore, lest they receive such a scandal as some had received before, he himself did this first to lead them with a tranquil mind to the communion of the mysteries; and afterwards he says that Christ, when he handed down this mystery, handed down wine. Therefore Chrysostom thought that there is bread and wine in this sacrament, not mere appearances of bread and wine.

They themselves are angry with us on account of figures, and yet in the Eucharist they say that only figures of bread and wine remain. Moreover, Chrysostom there calls this Supper a mystery, a symbol, a sign; therefore he thought the words are not to be understood properly. For if they were understood properly, the thing itself ought not to be called a sign. So far is Chrysostom from warning that the words are not to be understood figuratively that he teaches they are to be taken entirely figuratively.

But Bellarmine bids us consult Ambrose also. But whoever examines that passage of Ambrose which he himself cites will find that this sacrament is said at the very beginning of the chapter to be a figure of the body and blood of the Lord. But what he subjoins afterwards—that before consecration it is bread, but when the words of Christ have been added it is the body of Christ—we freely acknowledge: by consecration it becomes the body of Christ, but not the real body itself, but the sacrament, which in a certain way is the body of Christ. It is no longer common bread, as Ambrose says in the preceding chapter, where he also abundantly teaches what kind of consecration he establishes—not one that changes the nature and substance of the elements, but one that changes their use. For he says both that they remain what they were and are changed into something else. Therefore they are what they were—that is, bread and wine—and are changed into something else—that is, into the body and blood of Christ—yet not really, for they remain what they were; but sacramentally. And this is clear from the example which Ambrose uses afterwards: "You yourself were," he says, "an old creature; after you have been consecrated, you begin to be a new creature." Yet there is no transubstantiation in our bodies or minds; nevertheless we are new men and new creatures by a certain divine consecration.

They are changed not in substance, but in qualities; and thus the creatures of bread and wine in the Eucharist are changed in use and qualities, not in substance; because from common things they become Sacraments. Ambrose therefore says nothing that teaches the words are to be understood without a trope; indeed, they cannot be understood otherwise than with a trope, if we rightly understand Ambrose. Bellarmine also bids us consult Cyril, where Cyril openly writes that we receive the flesh and blood of Christ in the bread and wine: he therefore acknowledges that the bread and wine remain, and although the body of Christ is there, it is not in itself, but sacramentally; and thus it is necessary to explain the words figuratively. But because the Fathers write that faith is needed here, Bellarmine from this proves that the words are not to be understood figuratively; for if they were understood tropically, there would be no difficulty of faith. For what difficulty, he says, if we only had to believe that the bread signifies the body of Christ? I reply: although Christ is not present really, nor is the bread really changed, yet faith is necessary, because no Sacrament profits without faith. And is not faith required to understand those things which are said figuratively? How else shall we understand what Christ says: "I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman; you are the branches,"

and "If you abide in me, you shall bear fruit; otherwise you shall be cast forth"? What? Was not faith needed to understand the nature of the old Sacraments? No one denies it. And without faith we cannot understand how in Baptism our sins are washed away, and we put on Christ, and are taken into the communion of the Lord's body.

Therefore, although there is no transubstantiation, yet without faith we will not understand that the bread and wine in the Eucharist differ from these common creatures by which our bodies are nourished; but we receive these Sacraments as nourishment for the mind and as being the body and blood of Christ—that is, we understand them as Sacraments of the Lord's death, so that as often as we approach, we may in a certain way behold Christ as having died for us and his blood shed, and by faith we may eat and drink Christ. Remove faith, and nothing but a vain and cold ceremony will remain. But the transubstantiation of the Papists is a shipwreck of faith: for it fights against all faith that Christ's body, blood, and soul are made from bread and wine; this monster, heresy, blasphemy, is not faith. But we will speak in due place about the testimonies of the Fathers and interpreters. You will not find one who denies that these words are to be understood tropically and figuratively.

The fourth and last argument of Bellarmine is taken from the common rule for explaining Scripture, which is that the proper sense of the words is never to be abandoned unless compelled by some other Scripture, or by some article of faith, or by the common explanation of the whole Church. I reply: I acknowledge that the sense which the words bear in their proper signification is to be retained, unless some necessity compels us to take the words otherwise than they sound properly; for otherwise it will happen, as Bellarmine says, that certainty will perish, and nothing but opinion about divine things will remain, and a door will be opened to infinite errors. Bellarmine tries to prove this by our example: for he says that we do not have faith but mere opinion about this Sacrament. But how does he prove that our faith is nothing but mere opinion? Because our opinion, he says, does not rest on an express word of God. I reply: our opinion does rest on an express word; for certainly it is necessary that faith rest on the word of God, and that not ambiguous or perplexed, but express; otherwise it will be opinion, not faith. But Bellarmine says that the express words do not mean "This signifies my body," but "This is my body." I reply: words are said to be express in two ways: first, when the words themselves are in their form express—which the Scholastics call formed words—and in this way "This signifies my body" are not express words. Second, those words are called express which have a manifest sense and are minimally involved; and in this way these words are express because "This is my body" openly offers this sense to anyone: "This signifies my body." For it is not because the words are figurative that they are therefore not express: for those words "I will give to you the keys" and "Feed my sheep" are figurative, yet Bellarmine thinks that the primacy of Peter is expressly contained in these words.

But primacy is one thing, the keys or feeding the sheep another. Therefore, I can say the same about them that Bellarmine says about us: that their opinion concerning primacy is not faith, but mere opinion, because it does not rest on an express word of God. For the express words are not, “I will give you primacy,” or “I make you the ordinary pastor of the universal Church,” but “I will give you the keys,” and “Feed my sheep.” But Bellarmine says that we do not rely on any other word of God, since nowhere in Scripture can it be found that “This is my body” must be interpreted figuratively.

I reply: Nor can they prove their primacy by any other word of God. For Bellarmine confesses that there are only these two passages by which the primacy of the Roman Pontiff can necessarily be proved; others may be referred to this in some way, but do not prove it necessarily. Thus I frame the argument: An opinion which does not rest on an express word of God is mere opinion. But the primacy of Peter does not rest on an express word of God. Therefore it is nothing but mere opinion.

I prove the minor in the same way that Bellarmine refutes our opinion concerning this sacrament—because the express words are not, “You will be the prince of the Apostles,” but “I will give you the keys,” and “Feed my sheep.” If these are express, then also these words, “This is my body,” can be express, even if they are figurative. But we rely also on another word of God, by which we teach that the word “is” must be taken not properly but metonymically. It would be most foolish to interpret words literally. Many testimonies have been brought forward by us; for nothing is more common in Scripture than to use the word “is” figuratively, as in: “The seven beautiful and full ears are seven years of plenty; the seven thin and blasted ears are seven years of famine”—that is, they signify seven years. So also: “The vineyard of the Lord is the house of Israel”; “These bones are the house of Israel”; “You are the salt of the earth, you are the light of the world”; “He who sows the good seed is the Son of Man”; “We, being many, are one bread”; “The bread which we break is the communion of the body of the Lord.” But I would be endless if I enumerated all the passages.

But Bellarmine says that although we bring forward some passages where the word “is” is taken figuratively, yet we confess that it is not always so taken. I reply: This indeed we must necessarily grant; for there are many literal statements in Scripture. But in this place we affirm that the word “is” is not to be taken literally, not only because it is so taken in many places of Scripture, but because there cannot be a Catholic sense of the words unless it is taken figuratively. For Christ said of the bread, “This is my body.” But it is absurd and heretical to say that the bread is Christ’s body or is converted into Christ’s body. Therefore, the very necessity of Catholic faith and the best rule of interpretation compel us to establish a trope in these words; because a disparate thing cannot be truly predicated of a disparate thing without a trope.

Moreover, the very nature of the sacrament demands this, because every sacrament consists of a twofold nature: the sign and the thing signified. But the sign must always be distinguished from the thing itself of which it is a sign. Therefore, it is most foolish for Bellarmine to say that we cannot solidly conclude from the word of God that these words must be taken figuratively unless we produce a passage where it is expressly said in particular that these words are to be explained figuratively—a passage which he says we can never find. For Scripture does not usually propose rules in particular for interpreting Scriptures; but here the matter itself demands that we apply a trope. Let Bellarmine produce some passage where it is expressly said in particular that those words, “The rock was Christ,” are to be understood figuratively; or those, “The seed is the word of God”; or others of that kind, which are infinite—and yet it can be solidly concluded from the word of God that these are to be understood figuratively. Therefore, it is a foolish argument that these are not to be understood figuratively because nowhere is it expressly said in particular that these are to be understood figuratively.

Moreover, Bellarmine says that we do not have an article of faith to which the literal meaning of these words is expressly repugnant; indeed, we usually urge the article of the ascension, but he replies that this article is not repugnant, because they believe both—that Christ truly ascended and is in heaven, and at the same time is in the Eucharist.

I reply: What they believe there matters little, because their faith is not faith, but mere opinion, or rather a chimera; and as Christ...

To the Samaritan woman He said, "You worship what you do not know"; likewise we can rightly say to them, "You believe what you do not know." For these things are utterly absurd: that Christ ascended into heaven and remains in heaven, and yet is in the Eucharist—unless they wish, with the Lutherans, to equate the Ascension with disappearance. For Christ's body has the nature of a true body, and when He ascended into heaven, He left the earth, and He must remain in heaven until the end of the world. Therefore, it conflicts not only with the article of the Ascension but also with the article of the Descent and Christ's coming to judgment. For if Christ is on earth, and in so many places, there is no need for Him to descend and return to earth.

Christ, in the sixth chapter of John, makes mention of His ascension and in this way refutes those who thought His flesh was to be eaten. "What then," He says, "if you were to see the Son of Man ascending to where He was before?" As if to say, "Even from My ascension you will understand that My body is not to be eaten in a gross and carnal manner." Therefore, the real presence conflicts with Christ's ascension.

But what they say about Christ's presence in the Eucharist in an invisible manner does not suffice. For if Christ is present invisibly and is eaten, certainly His body is not in heaven—unless He has a double body: one visible in heaven, and another invisible on

earth. And to be invisible and uncircumscribed—that is, not bounded by space—conflicts with the truth of a body.

But Bellarmine says that the Scholastic Doctors know the rules of contradiction better than all the Lutherans. I reply: They pervert all these rules in defense of Transubstantiation. For no one fails to recognize that these are contradictory and involve a contradiction: that one and the same singular body, which is consubstantial with our bodies—that is, of the same essence as our bodies—should be both visible and invisible; quantitative and not quantitative; circumscribed and not circumscribed; in a place extensively and not extensively; in heaven and not in heaven; and moved by contrary motions at the same time, because it is simultaneously elevated by one priest and lowered by another.

Augustine says, "Take away space from bodies, and they will be nowhere; and since they are nowhere, they will not exist at all." From this it can be concluded that Christ's body exists only in one place. Indeed, Transubstantiation destroys almost all the articles concerning the truth of Christ's humanity. For the article of the Incarnation teaches that Christ's body was born of the Virgin Mary; they fabricate a certain body of Christ from bread. Other articles of faith teach that Christ's body grew in stature and has the proper size of a human body; but they remove magnitude from Christ's body and wish it to be scarcely of the size of an atom—for it does not exceed the appearance of bread, which can be so small as to almost escape the eye. This is contrary to the nature of a true and proper body. Nor can we suppose that all the members of the body are present there—indeed, not even one member.

Finally, Scripture, from which all articles of faith are drawn, teaches that Christ's body was never in more than one place at a time: when He was in Galilee, He was not in Jerusalem; when at the Supper, not in the garden; when on the cross, not in the tomb; when on earth, not in heaven. Thus Augustine says, "According to His bodily presence, He could not be at once in the sun, and in the moon, and on the cross." And elsewhere: "Unless He had departed bodily, we would always see His body carnally." But the Papists say that Christ's body is both here and yet not seen—indeed, they ascribe to Christ such a body that it can be always in heaven and yet on earth, and in infinite places—indeed, everywhere—for that is the consequence.

Which even Occam, the most acute of the Scholastics, acknowledges. And certainly it is as contradictory to the truth of a body to be in many places as in all places.

But Bellarmine says that when Christ gave this sacrament to His disciples, He was not in heaven but on earth—for He had not yet ascended into heaven. "At that time, therefore," he says, "this truth did not conflict with the article of the Ascension." I reply: But now Christ has ascended; therefore now it will conflict.

But besides the Ascension, many things prevented Christ's body from being really present in the Eucharist at that time. For Christ was then sitting on a bench with His disciples; therefore He was not in the mouth of the Apostles. And if He was in the mouth of the Apostles, then He was not on the bench—unless Christ had a double body: one on the bench, and another in the mouth of the Apostles.

Not only did the Apostles really eat the present Christ, but they also killed Him at the Supper; for nothing living is properly eaten, because this is horrible and savage; and if it is wine, when it begins to be eaten, but after it is eaten, it must die. But Bellarmine says that this truth no more contradicts the article of the Ascension than the truth of the Trinity contradicts the article of the divine unity.

I reply: there is no contradiction here at all, because God is not one and three in the same respect, but in substance He is only one, while in relation He is three; unity is spoken of with respect to essence, trinity with respect to persons: here there is a hidden mystery, but no contradiction: therefore it must be believed because Scripture so determines. But that Christ is really present under the species of bread, Scripture nowhere affirms: and there is a manifest contradiction, that the same body is at once in heaven and not in heaven; for the body in the Eucharist is not in heaven, because then we who receive the Eucharist would be in heaven; therefore this body is not in heaven, because then the Eucharist would be administered in heaven: but Christ's body is in heaven: therefore the same body is in heaven and not in heaven: and one part of a contradiction is always true, the other false: but that Christ's body is in heaven is true, which is one part of the contradiction: therefore that Christ's body is in the Eucharist, that is, that it is not in heaven, is false, which is the other part of the contradiction.

Finally, Bellarmine says that we cannot produce the common exposition of the Church. I reply: We can show that Councils and Fathers interpret these words no differently than we do, as we will explain more fully later: and by "the Church" they usually understand Councils and Fathers. Therefore it is false what Bellarmine says, that we rely only on the authority of one or another Doctor and on slight conjectures; because we use very solid arguments, and those necessarily concluding the case, as will be clear later. Thus we have examined and refuted those four arguments of Bellarmine by which he wishes to prove that these words, "This is my body," are to be understood properly and that there is no trope in them: now it remains that we come to the very words of the institution and examine them one by one individually.

CHAPTER V

In which are examined and refuted those things which Bellarmine gathers from the individual words of the institution and urges against us.

Nothing so inflates our adversaries and the Papists as the article concerning the Lord's Supper and the Sacrament of the Eucharist: so that what Christ willed to be a bond of love and concord has for many years now been a torch and tinder of very bitter contention. Nor is there any hope that these disputes will ever be settled; so we are torn apart by opinions and contend with deadly hatreds. To this it is added, that we who have rightly withdrawn from the Pope and condemn the madness rather than the error of the Papists have not yet agreed among ourselves: for it is plain that our doctrine concerning this Sacrament is not that of Luther and those who boast themselves to be genuine disciples of Luther. A sad discord, which the malice of Satan has brought into the Church, he fosters and confirms daily as much as he can. Thus we are now almost as the Jews once were, with the people divided into two kingdoms: and they distrusted each other and had less strength to resist the common enemy. May God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ crush Satan under our feet, and in due time heal these wounds of His Church, and remove scandals from His kingdom, and restrain the insolence and clamor of our adversaries. But with the Lutherans we have no separate business yet: all our dispute now is with the Papists, to whom when we reply, at the same time we also refute the Lutherans, using almost the same arguments; for both establish a real and carnal presence and eating of Christ in the Sacrament, the Lutherans together with external symbols, the Papists with a certain empty appearance of symbols. We acknowledge Christ's presence, not bodily as they do, but spiritual, which both Scripture teaches and the ancient Church always understood.

Bellarmino attempts to demonstrate his real presence by four kinds of arguments.

The foundation, which is first taken from the Scriptures, is fourfold: first, from the figures of the Old Testament; second, from the Lord's promise in the sixth chapter of John; third, from the institution of the Sacrament; fourth, from the practice described in the Apostolic Scriptures. The first two have been discussed, and we have now entered upon the third, which rests on the authority of the Lord's institution. In this, Bellarmino first contends that the words, "This is my body," are to be understood literally, not figuratively. How weak and inept his arguments are, we made clear in last year's work. Now we must come to the very words of the institution. But before I examine each word individually, Bellarmino's argument must be refuted—an argument drawn from the fact that Christ, when instituting this Sacrament, is said to have given thanks and to have blessed the bread.

Now, the Evangelists use these terms—*εὐλογεῖν*, which is "to bless," and *εὐχαριστεῖν*, which is "to give thanks"—variously and almost interchangeably. In Matthew 26, after speaking of the bread, it says *εὐλογήσας* (though many manuscripts have *εὐχαριστήσας*), and concerning the cup, it says *εὐχαριστήσας*. Similarly, in Mark 14, concerning the bread it says *εὐλογήσας*, and concerning the cup *εὐχαριστήσας*. Luke, both when Christ

took that solemn cup before the Sacrament and when he celebrated the Sacrament, uses εὐχαριστήσας. So Paul has only εὐχαριστήσας.

But how does this relate to the transubstantiation of the Sacrament? Some Papists assert that from this they can deduce something—namely, that εὐχαριστεῖν in this place does not mean "to give thanks," but "to bless," so that it is the same as εὐλογεῖν. But Bellarmine says this is very forced. Yet even more forced is the interpretation of those who conclude from Christ's εὐχαριστία or εὐλογία a real presence and transubstantiation. And if Bellarmine wishes to prove anything, he must swallow this interpretation, however forced it may be. For he wants to prove transubstantiation from the fact that Christ gave thanks; but giving thanks does not prove transubstantiation. Therefore, this εὐχαριστία is not simple thanksgiving but a blessing—if indeed a blessing accomplishes what they please.

But Bellarmine says that we take both verbs as meaning "to give thanks" or "to bless," not to the bread but to God, so that the blessing is not to be referred to the bread. Indeed, we say that both words signify the same thing; but then we affirm that εὐχαριστεῖν is taken synecdochically—not only for simple thanksgiving but also for such thanksgiving by which we supplicate God and ask for something. And although prayers are directed to God, yet this is done for these gifts; for when we celebrate the Eucharist, we not only give thanks to God but also pray and ask that this bread and wine may be salutary sacraments for us.

Therefore, Jansenius rightly says that both are to be understood in each—εὐλογεῖν in εὐχαριστεῖν and vice versa—as that passage of Paul teaches: "Everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is received with thanksgiving" (1 Timothy 4:4). Then Paul adds that it is sanctified by the word of God and by prayer (ἐντεύξεως). Thus ἐν τῇ ἐντεύξει, "in prayers," includes εὐχαριστία, that is, thanksgiving. So also elsewhere in Paul, εὐλογεῖν and εὐχαριστεῖν are confounded, as when he says: "If you bless with the spirit, how will the one who occupies the place of the uninstructed say 'Amen' at your thanksgiving (εὐχαριστία)?" (1 Corinthians 14:16). In this place, there is no doubt that the prayers of the Church, and public ones at that, are understood. So here εὐλογεῖν and εὐχαριστεῖν are taken for the same thing.

Therefore, when Paul says: "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ?" (1 Corinthians 10:16), he calls this cup "the cup of blessing" because this Sacrament is consecrated by prayer and thanksgiving. Chrysostom excellently teaches why this cup is called ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας, "the cup of blessing," and how we bless the cup—not by making I know not how many signs over the cup or by murmuring certain words silently into it, but because holding this cup in our hands (μετὰ χειρῶν ἔχοντες), we thus praise God (ἀνυμνοῦμεν), admiring and blessing (θαυμάζοντες καὶ εὐλογοῦντες), and being astonished at the indescribable gift (ἐκπληττόμενοι τῆς

ἀφάρτου δωρεᾶς), and because we give thanks over the cup (τῷ ποτηρίῳ ἐπιτιθέντες τὴν εὐχαριστίαν).

When we take the cup, we recall the ineffable blessings of God and thus give thanks as we partake. This is what Justin calls the Eucharist: food sanctified by prayers and thanksgiving, or food for which we give thanks to God in prayer; and Irenaeus calls it bread over which thanks have been given. Thus we see what these Fathers understood—namely, thanksgiving. Cyprian means the same when he speaks of the blessed cup and the cup consecrated by solemn blessing. Juvenius the poet renders it as “having prayed in holiness” and “sanctifies with words of grace.”

Therefore, the Evangelists and Fathers interpret it so, and both actions—prayer and thanksgiving—were directed toward God in the celebration of the Sacrament. Bellarmine himself inadvertently concedes this when he says that “blessing” in this context is nothing other than prayer: prayer directed to God, not to the elements, except in a subjective sense. Therefore, it is not understood as by magical incantation, or the murmuring of certain words, or signing, as the priests use in their sacrifices, but as prayer—which, because it chiefly contains thanksgiving for our redemption (since, as Chrysostom says, Christ freed the human race from error and made us partakers of His blood), it is called Eucharist.

But now let us come to Bellarmine’s argument. He says here that he takes his argument for the truth of the Lord’s body in the Sacrament from this: The Lord, he says, was not accustomed to give thanks unless He was about to do something great and wonderful. For, he says, He is only recorded as having given thanks when He was about to multiply the five loaves and the seven loaves, and when He was about to raise Lazarus, and in this Sacrament. Similarly, He was not accustomed to bless inanimate things unless He was about to perform some miracle: for He is only recorded as having done this, he says, when He blessed the loaves to be multiplied and here in the Eucharist.

I reply:

1. What he says—that Christ only gave thanks when He was about to do something great and wonderful—is false. For in Matthew 11, He says: “I thank You, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because You have hidden these things from the wise and understanding and revealed them to infants.” What is this but giving thanks that You willed these things to be done? For so Theophylact says: “I confess,” that is, “I give thanks.” Here Christ did nothing miraculous but gave thanks for a miraculous work.

2. I say that Christ at this time did a great and wonderful work: for He instituted the Sacrament, which no one else in the whole world could do. Therefore it does not follow that because He did a great and wonderful work, the substance of the bread was changed into the body of Christ.

3. I reply: neither εὐχαριστία nor εὐλογία proves transubstantiation. Christ blessed the loaves (although some manuscripts read “over them,” and then He did not bless the loaves but over the loaves). This indeed was a great miracle, but different from transubstantiation. For He did not change the nature of these loaves; He did not change them into fish or into another substance; rather, they remained loaves, though multiplied by divine power. But when Christ truly transubstantiated water into wine, He is not recorded as having given thanks or blessed. And concerning the children who were brought to Christ, we read: “And taking them into His arms, laying His hands on them, He blessed them.” Yet all understand that no change was made in their bodies. And Matthew the Evangelist expressed this by “prayed,” for these children were brought to Christ that He might lay hands on them and pray. So εὐλογεῖν means nothing other than to pray. Christ, about to ascend into heaven, blessed the Apostles; yet He did not change their substances. So also when He reclined with the two disciples who were going to Emmaus, “taking bread, He blessed it”—which is not to be understood of the Sacrament, as Jansen rightly says, because those two disciples who recognized the Lord in the breaking of bread were not present at the Supper; therefore they could not have known that breaking of bread from Christ’s Supper.

Therefore it is false what Bellarmine says—that Christ did not bless inanimate things unless He was about to perform some miracle in them—for

He performed no miracle or wondrous deed here; but as Christ was accustomed to do when taking food, he gave thanks, and by this act of blessing he was recognized. Therefore, that breaking of bread was such as Christ used to do when he took common bread, not as he did in the Eucharist. Thus God blessed Adam and Eve, and the sons of Noah; yet he did not change their substances. And because Bellarmine speaks of insensible things: God blessed the earth, the sea, and his other creatures, in which we read that no transubstantiation occurred.

But Bellarmine says that God gave fertility to living creatures when he blessed them, because God’s blessing is not an imprecation, like ours, but an effecting. I reply: that blessing of Christ which we read about in the Gospel, by which the loaves were multiplied, was nothing but an imprecation; and all the Fathers interpret that εὐλογίαν of Christ as referring to prayers; and Bellarmine himself also takes “benediction” for prayer. For although Christ multiplied the loaves, he did not do so ἐν τῷ εὐλογεῖν, that is, when he blessed, but during the meal in the distribution, and that not by the power of that blessing, but by his own and his Father’s divinity. And although God’s blessing is operative, it is not always for transubstantiation. God imparted fertility to creatures by blessing, that is, he implanted a certain natural power in creatures for procreation; but transubstantiation is contrary to nature.

But Bellarmine further urges that Christ is nowhere read to have blessed water, which he wished to be the symbol of Baptism, because no change occurred in the substance of the water. I reply: Nor is Christ read here to have blessed the bread; for εὐλογήσας is not understood of the bread, but is plainly referred to God: λαβὼν τὸν ἄρτον, εὐλόγησας ἔκλασε — “He took the bread, and having given thanks, he broke it.” Thus Chrysostom and Theophylact interpret εὐλόγησας as referring to the giving of thanks; but he did not give thanks to the bread, but to God; nor did any Father dream that such a blessing consisted in anything other than prayers made to God. Moreover, the water of Baptism is not without Christ’s blessing, even though Christ is not read to have blessed it, because he is not read to have baptized anyone; but their priests in baptizing bless the water: for they say over the water, “I bless you, creature of water, by the living God, by the true God, by the holy God; I bless you through Jesus Christ his Son.” If this blessing of the priest does not change the substance of the water, neither will it be able to change the substance of bread or wine; for if it is operative, it ought to be operative in both Sacraments. For although they say that in the Sacrament of Baptism they bless in their own person, but in the Eucharist in Christ’s person — this is false: for every blessing is divine and is done by divine power. And if Christ blessed — if he had blessed the bread — what does this have to do with the priest, who does not bless except by signing the bread? And if the priest were to bless with the same words as Christ, nevertheless his blessing cannot effect as much as Christ’s blessing: otherwise let them by blessing make five loaves suffice to feed two thousand men. If they cannot do this, however diligently they bless; will the priest’s blessing avail for transubstantiation because Christ’s blessing availed for it? But it is most false that in every blessing of Christ a change of substances was made, as we have previously taught with many examples: for Christ blessed children and Apostles; and because Bellarmine speaks of insensible things: Christ blessed common bread in an inn, and yet transubstantiation did not follow. Although a blessing might have such power as to convert the substances of bodies, there is no reason why this should happen more in insensible things than in sensible ones.

But although all Papists urge this blessing of Christ, yet what kind it was, and whether the consecration of this Sacrament is placed in it, they do not know, and they conflict among themselves with opinions and have nothing certain. Our Alan affirms that Christ blessed by saying, “This is my body,” and that the blessing and consecration were the same: for Christ blessed when he consecrated the things set before him. This is plainly the same opinion as that of the Tridentine Catechism. Claudius Sanctes proves transubstantiation from the blessing; which cannot happen unless Christ consecrated by blessing. But from the three Evangelists and Paul it is established that Christ blessed and gave thanks before he consecrated, that is, before he uttered these words, “This is my body,” by which alone they wish that Christ consecrated. For first Christ took the bread, second he blessed, third he broke it, fourth he distributed it, fifth he said, “Take, eat, this is my body.” Alanus confuses what Christ did second with what he did last, and says they are the same, and

here he affirms a hysteron proteron and proves it because it is not to be thought that the Church ever broke the bread before consecration. But Christ broke it after the blessing and before he said, "This is my body": therefore Alanus was forced to invert the order of the words, and not only that, but also to say that the blessing, which all the Fathers understand as a prayer, is nothing other than the utterance of these words, "This is my body": whence we understand into what straits he has been reduced.

But this openly conflicts with Scripture, because "he blessed" is the same as "he gave thanks"; but "he gave thanks" cannot be entirely the same as and nothing other than the pronouncement of these words, "This is my body." And this also conflicts with the Canon of the Mass, where the priest prays thus: "Who, the day before he suffered, lifting up his eyes to heaven to you, God the Father, giving thanks to you, he blessed, broke, and gave to his disciples, saying: Take and eat all of you of this, for this is my body." Where we clearly read that Christ, before he broke and said, "This is my body," lifted up his eyes to the Father, and gave thanks to him, and blessed, that is, prayed.

Bellarmino does not dare to affirm openly that transubstantiation is proved from the blessing, although he sees his own side drawing their argument from it; nor does he dare to say that Christ consecrated and transubstantiated by blessing, but he twists the matter another way and says that Christ never gave thanks, that is, blessed (for we have shown these two to be the same), except when he was about to work some wonderful thing: which could be true even if the blessing itself did not transubstantiate. And yet if what he says is true, that God's blessing is to do good, and if God's blessing is an effecting, then when Christ blessed, he effected this, that is, he consecrated; and then either he did not consecrate by saying, "This is my body," or he did not bless except when he said, "This is my body": which conflicts with the Evangelists.

Our Rhemish interpreters explain this passage more perplexedly: for they say that Christ by blessing consecrated the bread and made it his body; what then did those words, "This is my body," do? They add: by blessing with the following words. Therefore they seem to conflict with Alanus because they think the blessing is not the same as the following words, but that Christ by blessing together with them consecrated; and so they seem to understand a certain secret blessing joined with the following words. How then does the priest now consecrate? For he does not use the same blessing that Christ used: because it is not known what Christ said when he blessed; the Evangelists only say that he blessed, but do not explain what he said.

Thomas says that the order of words was not preserved by the Evangelists: for Christ, while taking the bread and breaking it and giving it, said, "This is my body," and so there was no blessing except when he uttered the words of consecration. Dominic Soto disagrees with Master Thomas, and deservedly so: for he brings forward many reasons against his opinion. First he says that in so grave a matter it is not likely that the

Evangelists wished to change the order in narrating the event; and all the Evangelists agree. Second he says it was not fitting that Christ should be intent on the breaking when he wished to consecrate; for then his intention would not be wholly occupied in the consecration. Third he says that the distribution required a longer space than the utterance of the words required. Therefore he determines that by the blessing something other than consecration is signified, because it was Christ's custom, as often as he ate bread, to give thanks, indeed as often as he performed any miracle; which custom the Evangelists did not express because it was familiar: therefore this blessing preceded the consecration, and so no transubstantiation is proved from the blessing.

Bonaventura says that Christ did not bless by the words of consecration.

Scotus held that the words "Take, eat" are necessary for the consecration, and not only these, but also the preceding words in the Canon: "He took bread, blessed it, broke it, and gave it to His disciples," etc. He said it is not necessary for us to know what the precise form of consecration is in this Sacrament; therefore, he advises that the priest should attentively read the entire Canon and not intend to consecrate with the words "This is My body," or with any specific words, but only with those which Christ instituted as the form of consecration.

Thus, Cajetan says that Christ blessed with a blessing of praise, not of consecration. Catharinus says that Cajetan was uncertain with which words Christ consecrated; for he never said that "This is My body" is the form of consecration; and he himself thinks that Christ consecrated by blessing.

Jansenius in his "Concordia," and Marcus, Bishop of Ephesus, and Nicholas Cabasilas, who edited the Greek liturgies, say that the consecration is not effected by the words "This is My body" without the addition of prayers. Indeed, what they think about this blessing is not found; moreover, how Christ consecrated and with which words is a most heated dispute among the Scholastics.

For, as Thomas says, some think that Christ used certain words—not these, "This is My body," but others unknown to us; some hold that Christ uttered these words twice: "This is My body"—once secretly and then consecrated, and afterward openly when He gave His body. But Innocent III says that Christ consecrated not with these words, "This is My body," but by divine power; yet He expressed the form afterward, under which later generations would bless.

It is inept, however, that Thomas says Innocent spoke these things opinionatively rather than determinatively; for he determines quite clearly: "Certainly it can be said," he states, and immediately adds: "For Christ blessed by His own power through Himself; but we do so by that power which He placed in the words." And he offers no other response but acquiesces in this. Thomas rejects this determination and says that the words of the

Gospel are expressly contrary, because Christ blessed; therefore He used some words, and they are "This is My body." Yet this is false because Christ blessed before He uttered these words, as both the Evangelists teach and many Scholastics whom I have cited, and many others.

Therefore Erasmus wisely and truly writes that it could not be known with which words the priest consecrates except by the authority of the Church; and yet the Church has nowhere defined this matter. And he says it should not be stubbornly asserted with which words Christ consecrated or the priest now consecrates; for these words, "This is My body," are rather those of one offering the consecrated bread than of one consecrating. But Lessius reproves Erasmus for this.

Finally, Bellarmine says that the Fathers gather from this passage an argument to prove the same thing which they strive to prove, and he cites Ambrose as one among many, who says: "Here it is not what nature formed, but what the blessing consecrated; greater is the power of blessing than nature, because by blessing even nature itself is changed." I reply: This bread was changed by the blessing of God—not as bread, but so that it ceases to be common bread and becomes a Sacrament, that is, food for the mind. But the blessing of God signifies the command and institution of Christ, which we confess brings about a change—yet not a substantial change, but a sacramental one.

But because Ambrose mentions blessing, it does not follow that he thought Christ consecrated when He blessed—which not even Bellarmine dares to affirm—nor that he established transubstantiation because he says nature is changed; for he understands a sacramental change. This is clear from the same Ambrose elsewhere, where he says that man after consecration—that is, after regeneration—is not the same as he was before; yet his substance afterward is the same as it was before. But Ambrose brings forward this example to teach how God changes the institutions of nature. Therefore, that word "nature" is not to be pressed so rigidly; for it is certain that man after regeneration is not changed in this way; nor is bread changed as to its substance, but from ordinary bread it becomes a Sacrament and a pledge of divine grace—and this change cannot occur without the blessing of God.

Great mystery! Great change, surpassing the powers of all creatures. Therefore, from the blessing there follows no such transformation as the Papists imagine. The doctrine of transubstantiation is not convincingly established. Now let us turn to the words that are called the words of consecration and the form of the sacrament—or rather, of consecrating—by which transubstantiation is said to be effected. Bellarmine examines these separately and in order.

First is the word Hoc: we must see what Hoc signifies and denotes. It is a demonstrative pronoun, and it points to something present either to the senses or to the understanding—

otherwise the statement would be false. Bellarmine reviews four interpretations, three of which are rejected by our side. For we do not say, with Karlstadt, that Hoc means “this man” or “Christ,” as if when He said Hoc He was indicating His own body sitting among the apostles; nor do we hold that Hoc signifies the whole action—for the whole action is not the body of Christ (which Bucer once thought, but later retracted, as we have shown before); nor do we take Hoc to be the predicate in a proposition, so that the sense would be “My body is this”—which was the opinion of a certain Langius. All these interpretations are inept; they are used neither by Luther, nor Calvin, nor Zwingli, nor Oecolampadius, nor any Reformed Church. Yet Bellarmine spends much effort refuting these three interpretations—but let us leave him to beat the air.

We steadfastly affirm that by Hoc the bread is denoted, which Christ had taken, broken, and given. Therefore, Christ was pointing to the bread which He held in His hands and offered to the apostles to eat. This is the opinion of all of us, and it was also Luther’s opinion at first, even if he did not afterwards remain in it. We maintain that we must remain in it. Now let us hear how Bellarmine rejects this opinion.

He says it can easily be refuted—but I am surprised he brought such trivial arguments; from his own easy refutation it will be clear that it cannot be refuted at all. He argues thus against our interpretation of this word:

“Hoc is taken either adjectivally or substantivally, not adjectivally, since it does not agree in gender with panis (bread), but with corpus (body). For panis, both in Latin and Greek, is masculine; but Hoc and Corpus are neuter in Latin and Greek: the Lord said not ὁτος but τοῦτο.”

I reply: We admit that Hoc is not taken adjectivally; for the Evangelists have not ὁτος but τοῦτο—so there is no point insisting on this. Grammar does not allow it to be taken adjectivally; therefore it is taken substantivally—and they also think so.

But if it is taken substantivally, he says, then the sense will be: “This—that is, this thing—is my body,” and then, he says, it will be a most absurd proposition. Earlier he said that of the four opinions and explanations of this word Hoc, this one was less absurd than the others; now he says the opposite.

But why would it be a most absurd proposition? We say that by Hoc this thing is understood—and that thing was bread. How does he refute this?

He says: “Hoc cannot be said of a thing which is seen and openly known unless that thing is of neuter gender. For no one would say ‘This is my brother’ or ‘This is Caesar’—that is, ‘This image is Caesar’—so also of the bread which the disciples saw, one could not rightly say ‘This is my body.’”

I reply: There is no absurdity in someone speaking of a thing of masculine or feminine gender using a pronoun of neuter gender. It is most customary that when someone offers another bread, or money, or wages, he says: "Take this." "This which I give you is your wages, is bread, is drink, is a book." Nothing is more common and customary in all languages.

Certainly no one would say "This is my brother," because a human being is being indicated—for this manner of speaking is observed rather with insensible and inanimate things; then, when what is demonstrated can be expressed in this way—"This thing"—no one would say "This thing is my brother"; therefore "This is my brother" is not correct—for Hoc, taken substantively, means "this thing." But if someone were offering coins of various images to another, it is not absurd if he says "This is Caesar," or "Caesar's," "This is Tiberius," "This is Constantine."

So Christ, having taken bread and distributed it to the disciples, could no less appropriately say: "Take, eat; this thing is my body," than "this bread is my body." It is not absurd that Hoc should be said of bread. Therefore, even if the apostles saw that bread and knew it was bread, nevertheless Christ could no less properly and customarily say "This is my body" than if He had said "This bread is my body."

He said, "This, as this bread": for "This" signifies a more universal thing, "this bread" a definite and particular nature; and although the thing which we demonstrate, especially an inanimate one, as I said, may be demonstrated either by a universal or by a particular name. Therefore, the examples which Bellarmine adduces are of a different kind. When you see some thing and show it to those who do not know what it is, you can say, "That is a man"; when he sees that it is a man, but does not know which man it is, you do not say "that," but "that man is Peter"; doubtless because a man is a person, and no one would say of a man, "That thing is a man." But when "that thing" can conveniently be used, then also "that"; so when "this thing," then also "this." No one would say it is absurd for someone handing bread to another to say, "This is the nourishment of our bodies," or, "If you eat this, you will not die." Therefore, this objection is plainly ridiculous and is not strongly pressed by the Papists; but Bellarmine did not have a better one. As if it were not permitted to say, "This is an oak," or "a pear tree," or "a stone," or "a fishpond," or "a river."

But Bellarmine next promises that he will bring forward a very strong argument from Scripture; let us see what sort it is. If, he says, "This" pointed to the bread, then similarly also in the consecration of the wine, "This," in Greek, would point to the wine; which we concede: for "This" points to the cup in which the wine was; wherefore Luke says, "τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον," "this cup," clearly pointing to the cup. But Christ, Bellarmine says, did not point to the cup, because he adds, as it is in Luke, "τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνόμενον," "which is poured out for you," which is connected with "ποτήριον," not with "αἷματι," that is,

with the word "cup," not with the word "blood"; but the vessel or the wine was not poured out for us: therefore it is the blood: therefore the cup, he says, does not signify the cup of wine, but the cup of blood.

I reply: If "ἐκχυνόμενον" refers to "ποτήριον," as the grammatical construction seems to require, yet it does not follow that Christ did not point to the wine; for we can say that the wine is poured out for us, just as the bread is said to be the body of Christ which is given for us, i.e., sacramentally: so the wine is said to be poured out for us, as the wine signifies that blood which Christ poured out for us. But not badly does Beza say that there is either a solecism in the words or a change of case, or it should be read as "τῷ ἐκχυνόμενῳ," as Basil reads: and certainly otherwise the sense will not rightly stand or cohere: for what sense can these words have: "This blood is the new testament in my blood"? But here the best sense is: "This cup," that is, the wine in this cup by synecdoche, "is the new testament," that is, the sacrament of the new testament by metonymy, "in my blood, which is poured out for you." Therefore this passage confirms our opinion, namely that "This" signifies the bread, because "This" signifies the cup, that is, the wine in the cup; for Luke says clearly, "τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον," "This cup."

Thus Cyprian reads, "Hoc est sanguis meus," as Erasmus has in his Cyprian, and the codex of Renaboldus; but the Papist editions have, "Hic est sanguis meus." Therefore that the bread is pointed to is manifest from the words: and although Christ did not say, "This bread," yet he meant it, as is clear from Paul, who says, "The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?" And so the Fathers understood Christ's words. Thus Irenaeus: "Christ confessed the bread, which is a creature, to be his body"; and elsewhere: "The bread over which thanks have been given is the body of the Lord"; and still elsewhere: "Taking bread he confessed it to be his body." Thus Tertullian: "Christ," he says, "called the bread his body"; and elsewhere: "Christ took bread and made it his body by saying, 'This is my body,' that is, 'This is the figure of my body.'" Thus Cyril: "To the believing disciples he gave fragments of bread"; and elsewhere: "He distributed broken bread saying, 'This is my body.'" Thus Cyprian: "We find that there was wine which he said was his blood." But now we will not bring forth more examples. From these it is clear that our interpretation is confirmed by the authority of Christ, and of the Apostle Paul, and of the Fathers.

But now let us ask Bellarmine what Christ pointed to if not the bread: he says he did not point to the bread, but to the thing contained under the species of bread, which although it was previously bread, yet at that time, he says, it was Christ's body. But when was it then? Was it when Christ said, "This"?

Christ consecrated with these words, "This is my body." Could it be his body before all the words were spoken? But when Christ said "This," he had not yet uttered any other word; therefore, he could not yet point to his own body; hence, he pointed to the bread.

For at that moment the consecration was not yet complete and finished, but only just begun.

Now, what was that thing contained under the species of bread? Was it bread? Then we have what we want; for then Bellarmine follows our exposition. Or was it Christ's body? Then the sense of these words will be, "My body is my body," which is a trivial and ridiculous exposition, as Thomas himself concedes. And then this statement would not be (as they wish) practical, but merely indicative; for when someone says, "Christ's body is Christ's body," it only indicates. But they want this statement of Christ to be operative.

Then "is" signifies "becomes." Christ's body does not come from itself, but from something else; therefore, "This" does not point to the body, but to the bread from which Christ's body comes. Or perhaps "This" points neither to the bread nor to Christ's body, but to something else—for they do not agree among themselves, and it will not be superfluous to observe their conflicts.

Guirmundus, who was almost the first to write against Berengarius, explains these words thus: "This," that is, "This body, is my body," or "This, which I give you, is my body." But that body which Christ broke and gave to the disciples was either Christ's body or bread. If it was Christ's body, then no conversion was made by the words, because Christ's body existed before the words were spoken; but this is against the mind of all Papists, who want transubstantiation to occur only when these words are spoken, and immediately after the words are spoken, at the last instant of the utterance of the words, Christ's body to be there. If, however, "This" points to and signifies what Christ gave, then he pointed to the bread; for it is established from the Gospels that he gave bread to the disciples, because after giving it he said, "This is my body."

Innocent III says that Christ consecrated when he blessed, before he uttered these words, and that the priest uses the words "This is my body" not enunciatively, but only recitatively. But then "This" points neither to bread nor to the body, because then the priest points to nothing, but only recites Christ's words. If this is true, there is no reason why we should labor so much over the pronoun "This." Similarly, the Glossa in Gratian and William Widford against Wycliffe, and many ancients are of that opinion, as Durandus testifies. But Thomas refutes it, and now almost all follow Thomas; and indeed it is not known by which words the consecration is accomplished unless by these.

Bonaventure says that Christ's body is not pointed to, but the substance of the bread, because the intention of the priest is directed upon the bread so that it may be converted into Christ's body; therefore, Christ pointed to the bread when he said, "This is my body." Therefore, it did not seem absurd to Bonaventure that by "This" bread is signified. And similarly Gerson is also of this opinion. But Innocent and Thomas and others do not

approve, because then it would follow that the substance of bread is Christ's body; which cannot happen without a trope.

Scotus, the subtle Doctor, whom Peter d'Ailly follows, says that "This" points to nothing at the time of the utterance of the words of the Supper, but after the whole statement is completely pronounced, it points to Christ's body itself; therefore both Christ himself formerly, when he first said "This," pointed to nothing, and now the priest does so—but after each has ceased speaking; than which nothing is more ridiculous. And Thomas refutes this exposition because thus nothing else is said but "My body is my body."

Durandus says that these words are pronounced by the priest only recitatively, and that from this: because he recites "which is shed for you"; but Christ's blood was shed only once. Yet afterward the same Durandus says that by this word "This" an indeterminate individual is pointed to—what sort of thing that may be cannot be conceived; for "This" signifies something certain and singular—τόδε τι, as the logicians say—which cannot be an indeterminate individual.

Gardiner embraced this comment about an indeterminate individual in the book which Peter Martyr refutes; although in his English book, which he titled *The Devil's Sophistry*, he frankly admits that by "This" bread is designated.

- Richard of Mediavilla says that by "This," something present under this appearance or soon to be present is demonstrated; therefore, according to his view, it demonstrates the body of Christ: for the body of Christ, as they wish, is either present or will be present immediately. Yet this is in doubt: for what if the priest does not intend to consecrate?

Ockham interprets these words thus: "This is," that is, "This will be my body." He was very subtle and interprets differently from others; but he attributes force to Christ's words, since Christ did not say, "It will be," but "It is." And "This" demonstrates the bread: so Ockham, than whom no one among the Scholastics was more subtle, saw that "This" cannot be understood otherwise than of the bread.

Marsilius expounds the words in this way: "This," that is, "that into which this is converted, is my body." But then this statement is not practical and convertible.

What then of Thomas, whom the School follows as master? For it would be long to review the differing opinions of these men. He understands by "This" the content under the species of bread and wine: "This," he says, that is, "This substance without determination." But "This" ought to signify something certain: let him show what that substance is. An indefinite and indeterminate substance cannot be contained under definite and determinate species. And this opinion of Thomas his disciples either do not understand or cannot explain. For Pantheologus, interpreting Thomas, says that "This"

demonstrates the content under the species, namely the very body of Christ, and not the substance of bread. But Thomas expressly rejects this opinion.

Cajetan, who wrote commentaries on Thomas, thinks that Thomas says the pronoun "This" demonstrates this substance, namely the bread, which afterward is the body of Christ. But Dominic Soto refutes him; and indeed Thomas says that something is demonstrated which relates commonly to both, namely both bread and the body of Christ. But what, I ask, is this singular thing that is equally either bread or the body of Christ? Nothing singular is of that sort; but "This" demonstrates something singular. If the pronoun "This" were indifferent to two things, then this proposition, "This is my body," would not be singular but an indefinite proposition. And what can be thought to be contained under the species except a singular substance—either of bread or of the body?

Alanus, although he wishes to appear a Thomist, does not adhere to Thomas's exposition, nor does he leave us either more certain or more learned. He says the pronoun "This" is taken vaguely and indefinitely and does not demonstrate exactly either this or that until the statement is completed, and then it is determined to refer to the body. But this is a most foolish exposition: for "This" demonstrates something exactly either to sense or to intellect; here, however, he says it demonstrates nothing exactly to either but is taken vaguely and demonstrates neither bread nor the body. But what is contained under these species is something exactly singular; and that ought to be demonstrated exactly.

Wherefore he was compelled at last to say that this statement is singularly admirable and not to be subjected to the rules of the Sophists—as if grammarians and philosophers were Sophists! Indeed, those Sophists are by no means to be listened to who have devised a thousand sophisms to obscure a clear sense—and those same most insane ones.

Jansenius says that "This" demonstrates a certain individual substance which is clothed with those species; and yet he denies that this substance is either bread or the body of Christ. Let him therefore teach what individual substance can be contained under those species except either bread or the body of Christ? For these species are shown either before consecration or after: if before, then it is bread which is contained under the species; if after, then it is the body of Christ, as they wish; but never is there any substance under those species except the substance of bread or of the body of Christ—and this no one has ever asserted.

And he acknowledges this immediately when he says: If it is further asked what that individual substance is, it must be said that before the complete consecration—which is perfected and occurs in the instant terminating the utterance of the words—that substance is bread; but after the consecration it is the body of Christ. Therefore, "This" signifies the substance of bread because there is not there the substance of the body of Christ except after the utterance of all the words; but all have not been uttered when only the first has

been uttered. Indeed, the words are uttered successively, but the change occurs in an instant, as they wish, at the end of the words. Therefore when "This" is said, it is not the body—and consequently...

If the statement were false, it would demonstrate this body. But Jansen, to remedy this inconvenience, says that the truth of this proposition does not depend on the existence of the thing at the time it is referred to, but at the moment the statement is completed: so that one truly says, "I am silent," if after speaking one does not speak again. But Thomas rejects this explanation and gives an example used by Jansen; because then the sense of these words would be nothing other than "my body is my body." But this statement is the conversion of bread into the body of Christ, as Thomas holds; therefore, "this" signifies something other than body, because it signifies that which is converted into the body of Christ.

But Jansen uses another example: as if a craftsman, while suddenly shaping a nail by motion, says, "This is a nail." But the example is dissimilar: for the craftsman does not convert the substance; he only gives to this iron the form of a nail, which is artificial. Therefore, this proposition is true: "This iron is a nail," because the same substance remains after the new form as was there before. Therefore, what he says—that in this proposition, "This is a nail," "this" does not signify a determinate substance—is false: for it signifies that determinate substance of iron; for "nail" signifies not the matter but a new form.

But he brings forward yet another example: Christ at the wedding, when He changed water into wine, could have said, "This is wine"; yet, he says, the pronoun "this" would not have demonstrated either water or wine, because it would have been false that water was wine, and that expression "This wine is wine" does not suit the agent. Indeterminately, therefore, he says, it would have demonstrated a substance which was not wine at the time the statement was uttered, but which was wine once it had been uttered. But I reply: this example is fictitious; for Christ did not change water into wine by words, but by hidden power. But if water had been brought into Christ's sight so that He might change it into wine, Christ would not have said, "This is wine," but "Let this water become wine"; for "is" signifies what a thing was before, not what it will be afterward. Thus Christ, if He wished to transubstantiate bread, would not have said, "This is my body," but "Let this become my body."

Claudius Sanchès contradicts himself: for he says that "this" demonstrates or signifies neither bread nor the body of Christ distinctly; but soon he says that Christ's speech could enunciate a thing made rather than being made. He says that "this" signifies that what was previously bread is the body of Christ. But what was previously bread cannot be something unless it is the body of Christ. But he says that this is not distinctly signified or demonstrated. Yet "this" demonstrates something distinctly in particular. Thus neither

those who acquit the Pope, nor those who follow the very acute Thomas, nor those who speak considerably after weighing the errors of their predecessors can bring forth a probable explanation—indeed, not even one that is not openly absurd.

Bellarmino settles everything in one word because he dares not stir up this Camarina: for he says that "this" demonstrates not bread but the thing contained under the species of bread. But what thing? He does not explain it; which thing, even if it had previously been bread, yet then already was the body of Christ: therefore, according to Bellarmine's opinion, "this" demonstrates nothing other than the body of Christ: for he says it then already was the body of Christ; and it had previously been bread; but bread gives way to body, as they wish. Therefore he falls into that opinion which Thomas refutes, so as to say that the sense of these words is "My body is my body." Thus they can devise no interpretation that serves their purpose.

EST: We have spoken about the pronoun "this," and we have taught that nothing else but bread is demonstrated by it. Now something must be said about the verb "is," which Zwingli interprets as "signifies"; so also sometimes do Calvin, Martyr, and Beza. Thus they place a trope in the verb "is," so that these words, "This is my body," have this sense: "This signifies sacramentally my body." For whether we say "this"—that is, this bread—is the body of Christ, or we say "this" signifies the body of Christ, there is no difference in sense—which is clear to all.

Bellarmino contends that the verb "is" must be taken properly and signifies nothing except "is," about which we would not greatly labor if he conceded a trope in the attribute; but he leaves no trope in any word. And although our side place a trope in the predicate in this manner—"This is my body," that is, a sign, figure, sacrament of my body—

Of my body, not in vain, but effective, unless there be fault in us; yet more correctly the seat of the trope will be placed in the copula, that is, in the mode of attribution. For the extremes are disparate; therefore one cannot be predicated properly of the other: so there is a trope, namely metonymy, in the verb "is," so that it is put forth as signifying beforehand.

The sense therefore is: "This is my body," not properly, but in sign and mystery; that is, "This signifies my true body." But Bellarmine proves that the verb "is" must be taken properly, and cannot be taken otherwise except in its proper signification; and to this end he asserts certain arguments, of which the first is of this sort:

This verb "is" has the simplest and most common signification, so that all other words are resolved into this and something else; as "Man walks," that is, "Man is walking." I reply: it does not follow, because other words can be resolved into this and something else, that therefore this is always taken properly. "Man is walking" is taken properly, because to

walk can be said properly of man; but in this predication, "Man is flying," if "is" is taken properly, then man properly flies—which is impossible. Therefore the signification of the verb "is" must always be measured from the nature of the things which it joins.

The second argument goes thus: This verb "is" in every proposition is a copula, joining the predicate with the subject; therefore it is necessary in every proposition; therefore it can never lay aside its signification so as to take on another. I reply: indeed the verb "is" cannot lay aside its signification, but it always has it, though not always a proper one. However, it does not follow: "This verb is a copula in every proposition and joins the extremes; therefore it is always taken properly." For it joins and connects the extremes in whatever way they can be joined—things that are consistent properly, things that are disparate tropically, not properly; for one disparate thing cannot be predicated properly of another. It sometimes signifies likeness, as when Christ calls Herod a fox. This proposition is true: "Herod is a fox"; but these two, Herod and fox, are not joined properly; therefore in the verb "is" there is a relation, and thus Herod is said to be so on account of likeness, so that the sense is: "Herod is of a fox-like character."

Thus Christ says, "John is Elijah," not because he was the real Elijah, but on account of a certain likeness, namely because he was similar to Elijah in zeal. For as the logicians say, such predicates are as they are permitted to be by their subjects. Therefore the verb "is" does not always signify existence, but sometimes a relation.

The third argument is this: The verb "is" signifies nothing except the conjunction of one thing with another; therefore there cannot be any trope in it. I reply: by denying the argument. For even if it signifies nothing but conjunction, yet that conjunction can be not proper but tropical, and so there will be a trope in the verb. Paul says, "The bread which we break is the communion of the body of Christ": here the verb "is" is not taken existentially but relationally; and yet it joins the extremes, so that the communion of the body of Christ is predicated of the bread, which cannot be a proper predication. For here the sense of these words is: "The bread is the communion of the body of Christ," that is, "The bread is the pledge or sacrament of the communion of the body of Christ."

Bellarmino's last argument is of this sort: No rhetorician ever wrote that a trope can be formed in the verb "is"; therefore this opinion has arisen from mere ignorance. I reply: on the contrary, this argument proceeds from mere ignorance; for all understand that in parables and metaphors and improper expressions the verb "is" cannot be taken properly but has a parabolic and improper signification, as in these propositions: "Circumcision is a covenant," "The lamb is the passing over," and such like. Truly it is marvelous and pitiable that the Jews rightly understood these propositions, but we in such great light of the Gospel are so blind that we do not understand that proposition, "This is my body."

We never read that the ancient Church disputed about the sense of these propositions but always acknowledged it to be tropical; it did not think that either circumcision was really a covenant or the lamb was the Passover; but the Papists take a proposition plainly similar to these, namely "This is my body," properly.

They contend that these should not be understood literally. Similarly, when we read: "The seven cows are seven years"; "The seed is the word of God"; "The rock was Christ"—in these and similar propositions, the word "is" does not signify existence, but rather a figure and relation. Thus, a scepter is said to be a kingdom—that is, the wood and symbol of the kingdom. So the law is called a mute magistrate, not in a literal sense, but figuratively, on account of resemblance. In this way, sacrifices are often called expiations; so the Ark of the Covenant is called Jehovah more than forty times in Scripture; likewise, the bread is symbolically and sacramentally the body of Christ. And all rhetoricians acknowledge and teach this.

Indeed, even the Scholastics themselves sometimes explain these words in the same manner. Thus Gratian says: "The heavenly bread, which is the flesh of Christ, is in its own way called the body of Christ, although it is truly the sacrament of the body of Christ." Here the Gloss notes: "It is called the body of Christ—that is, it signifies it." Therefore, the sacrament is said to be the body of Christ improperly, whence it is said "in a manner." And this is what Augustine so often says: "The sacraments are one thing and signify another." So Ambrose: "Before the blessing of the heavenly words, it is called by another name; after the consecration, it is signified as the body." And likewise elsewhere: "Because we have been freed by the death of the Lord, in remembrance of this fact, in eating and drinking we signify the flesh and blood which were offered for us." So Augustine: "The sacrament of the blood of Christ is in a certain way the blood of Christ." It is, but in a certain way—that is, figuratively. So the same elsewhere: "It is customary for the thing which signifies to be called by the name of the thing which it signifies; therefore 'is' is the same as 'signifies'."

So Tertullian: "Christ did not reject the bread by which he represented his body." And for this reason Durandus says that some interpret these words, "This is my body," as follows: "What is signified by this is my body," which is the same as if he had said, "This signifies my body." Therefore, nothing can be brought forward to deny that a trope resides in the word "is." However, it makes no difference to us whether the trope is placed in the verb or in the attribute; and indeed, the Fathers tend to place it in the predicate.

Thus Tertullian: "This is my body"—that is, "This is a figure of my body." So Augustine: "This is a sign," and elsewhere, "This is a figure." But the arguments and calumnies of our adversaries can be better avoided if we interpret "is" as "signifies." For the sacrament consists of an earthly and a heavenly element; there is a conjunction of these, but it is

sacramental, not natural; therefore the word "is" ought not to be explained naturally here, but sacramentally.

Moreover, that the word "is" cannot be taken literally in this sentence, "This is my body," as our adversaries wish, is certain, and that from the very opinion of our adversaries. For our adversaries themselves assert that transubstantiation occurs through these words—that is, the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ. But if the word "is" is taken literally, as Bellarmine wishes, then by these words there is no conversion. For "is," taken literally, does not convert a thing but declares the nature of the thing as it is in itself; nor does it signify any change or conversion in the very pronunciation of the words, but declares what the nature of the thing was before the pronunciation of the words. But the Papists imagine that there is some effective power of conversion in the words, as Thomas says; therefore the word "is" is not taken literally.

They say that from bread it becomes body; and it was bread before these words; now by these words the bread is changed into body (as they wish). By what word, if not by this word "is"? For it is much more reasonable that the power of conversion be attributed to the verb than to the pronoun or noun. Unless, therefore, the body of Christ is present before the utterance of the words, this predication cannot be true: "This is my body," unless "is" is taken otherwise than literally and has more than a natural signification.

For this reason, some Scholastics interpret "is" as "will be" in this manner: "This is my body"—that is, "This will be my body," as Ockham does; others interpret it as "becomes" or "is transubstantiated," which however Bellarmine does not acknowledge and for which he rebukes Calvin. But otherwise their transubstantiation collapses unless there is some power of transubstantiating in the word "is," which for that reason is called by the Scholastics an imperative word. For otherwise there will be transubstantiation before transubstantiation; and so there will be no transubstantiation at all.

The substantiation will be, and thus the false opinion of those will be, who place the force of transubstantiation in these words. Therefore, I argue against Bellarmine thus: If the word "is" is taken properly, then it signifies a thing existing and present (as if someone says, "This man is learned," in this proposition the word "is" is taken properly, because it signifies what that man has been and is, which is demonstrated, not made learned by it). But in these words, "This is my body," the word "is" does not signify a thing already existing (as they wish), unless this is not the form of consecrating; which all affirm. Therefore, the word "is" is not taken properly; it is therefore taken for "is transubstantiated," or "is made," or for something of that sort.

What follows here in Bellarmine pertains to refuting Boquin, who interprets the word "is" concerning the communication of idioms: which opinion is very far from the truth and does not need refutation; it is certainly not ours.

CORPUS

Now let us come to the third word, which is "body." Although in the Canon of the Mass the particle "for" is inserted by them—for thus the words are read in the Canon, "For this is my body"—yet this particle is found in none of the Evangelists; nevertheless, they say it must by no means be omitted by the priest. But if perhaps it has been omitted, most think the consecration is not hindered, but nevertheless a great sacrilege has been committed.

Bellarmino disputes much here about the word "body," which things are entirely foreign to the cause. He refutes three opinions, of which the first is that the word "body" signifies the mystical body of Christ: about which none of us has dreamed; the second is that it signifies a sign of Christ's body; the third, that it signifies an effective sign. And we very often understand by "body" a sign, but an effective one, not a bare one. Those who understand a bare, empty, void sign, we abhor no less than the Papists.

The words can truly be explained if we say the bread is Christ's body, that is, the Sacrament and effective sign of the body, so that together with the sign the body is offered and taken by the Christian people. This is not the opinion of Calvin or Martyr, but of the ancient Church Fathers. Let us hear how Bellarmine disapproves of it.

Therefore, according to the mind of Calvin and Martyr, the body is an effective sign; and therefore Christ called the bread "body," not "a sign of the body," to declare that it is an effective sign. And here Bellarmine wishes to recall to memory that Calvin does not think Christ gives us His very body with the bread: which all can remember is most false. For Calvin thought that Christ Himself is given to us with the bread, not that Christ is compelled to descend from heaven as often as this Sacrament is celebrated, but because in the legitimate use of the Sacrament we perceive Him sitting in heaven with all His goods, of which perception faith is the organ.

This most true opinion Bellarmino calls a fiction and tries to refute it with two arguments. His first argument is taken from a certain principle of Calvin himself: for he says that from Calvin's opinion it follows that to eat Christ is nothing else than to believe in Christ; and to believe in Christ, he says, is not truly to eat Christ. For bread would not be said to be Christ's body if to believe were to eat. And he proves this from certain words of Calvin, in which he contends that to eat Christ is more than to believe in Christ: for it is the fruit of believing and a certain closer union with Christ; meanwhile he says there is no other than this eating by faith.

But what Calvin says—that to believe in Christ and to eat Christ are just like seeing food and eating it—he does not say this so that he wishes those who believe to partake of Christ no otherwise than as those who look at food by which they are not nourished, but so that he may teach that to eat is more than simply to believe. For certainly we are

partakers of Christ if we believe the Gospel, even if we have not yet approached the Sacrament; but when we believers approach to eat Christ in the Sacrament, we are more deeply implanted in Christ. Therefore, Calvin does not wish there to be a difference in reality, but in degree and manner.

Now, as for what Bellarmine infers from this against Calvin—namely, that he wishes to prove that to eat Christ is nothing other than to believe in Him—according to Calvin’s view, to believe in Christ is one thing; but even if that is so, what does it matter? He should have proven that by “Body” is not meant an effective sign, which is precisely what Calvin affirms. Does it follow from this that Calvin says eating is nothing other than believing? But how does he prove from Calvin’s view that it is nothing other? Namely, because there is no other action of the person eating except believing. But this is false: for he who receives Christ in the Sacrament does more than he who simply apprehends Christ by faith in the Gospel; for he eats the Sacrament, which is itself the body of Christ for his faith; and in this way a closer communion is contracted with Christ—and this is what Calvin intended. Therefore, what Bellarmine demands—that we explain what action a person performs after the act of faith to bring about union with Christ—betrays his ignorance. For a person embraces Christ by believing, but after this act, in the Sacrament, he takes Christ as food, and in this way a certain bond between Christ and us is more firmly tied. And Calvin taught this by example: the Apostle says that Christ dwells in our hearts through faith; this dwelling of Christ is not faith itself, but the fruit and effect of faith. Therefore, Bellarmine ineptly and unskillfully says that Christ dwelling in a person is not distinct from the action of faith; for Christ dwells in us even when we are exercising no action of faith. Thus Christ is eaten so that, like food, he may nourish, invigorate, and preserve us; and this signifies a more illustrious and express union. For the oral eating of the Papists is useless: Christ’s body is eaten by them, but it does not dwell in them—indeed, it does not even remain with them, but immediately slips away without effect, certainly from their teeth, nor does it pass into our nature, and so there is no union; therefore, in reality it is not even an eating. For who would call that eating when food is placed in the mouth but does not pass into the stomach, but flies away? And this is what they assert.

According to Bellarmine’s argument, this is the case: bread cannot be called the body of Christ because it is an effective sign, since the old Sacraments had the same power, and in the New Testament, Baptism, the Word of God, the image of the Crucified, have the same efficacy; and yet these are never called the body of Christ. And here he brings forth an outstanding falsehood: for he says that he previously taught that Calvin attributes nothing else to the Eucharist except that it is a symbol recalling the memory of Christ’s passion and thus arousing faith. But he could have understood that Calvin attributes far more to this Sacrament, since, as we have learned from the preceding words from Calvin, to eat Christ in the Eucharist is more than simply to believe. For even those who do not

believe at all can recall the memory of Christ's passion, and faith can be aroused in those who never approach the Sacrament; but in this Sacrament, Christ himself is truly received spiritually, and for this reason this Sacrament was instituted. Therefore, what he says about the image of the Crucified is foolish: for Christ nowhere instituted or commanded looking at such images to arouse faith; indeed, it does not so much arouse as oppress faith, nor is it an effective sign, but a scandal; and yet by customary speech the image of Christ is called Christ: how much more can the bread be called the body of Christ, since by Christ's institution it is an effective sign.

As for the old Sacraments and sacrifices, they were indeed signs, and effective ones of Christ: for Circumcision signified the righteousness of faith and remission of sins; and the Paschal Lamb signified the passing over; and that passing over was a sign of liberation from the hand of Satan. But those Sacraments are not called Christ or the body of Christ, as Peter Martyr rightly says, because Christ's passion had not yet been accomplished; now, however, it has been accomplished. Bellarmine says that when Christ said, "This is my body," his passion had not yet been accomplished; but he did not dare to present Martyr's full response. For Martyr says that those Sacraments foreshadowed Christ who was to come and his body given on the cross; ours signify what has been accomplished. And although Christ's passion was known to be accomplished, it was still future; because immediately after the Supper he was arrested, and the next day crucified. And Martyr says that the old Sacraments are not called the body of Christ.

For, there were signs of the coming Christ, but Christ had already come when the Supper was instituted. Moreover, certain sacraments of the Old Testament are called Christ: for Paul says that the rock was Christ. But what if Christ did not call those sacraments His body? Does this prove that our Sacrament of the Eucharist cannot be so called? I speak in the same way that Scripture speaks: for it called the bread the body of Christ; so do we. But Bellarmine presses his point about Baptism: "One would be laughed at," he says, "who said that Baptism is the very body of Christ." Absurdly so; for we do not say that the bread is the very body of Christ, but its effective sign. One would not be laughed at who said that Baptism is the effective sign of Christ's blood, which Peter calls the appeal of a good conscience, and Paul calls the washing of regeneration, and says that we put on Christ in it—certainly not really; for then Christ would be no less enclosed in the water of Baptism than in the Supper. So also we do not eat Christ really in the Supper, but this happens in a spiritual way; yet this way is effective and true. Certainly we no less put on Christ in Baptism than we eat Him in the Eucharist. Thus there is nothing ridiculous in this, that the bread is called the effective sign of Christ, and in its own way Christ, because it is the Sacrament of Christ's body: for as Augustine says, it is customary for the names of things to be attributed to the sacraments.

MINE. The last word is "Mine," about which Bellarmine says nothing, except that he presents and refutes a certain exposition which interprets "Mine" as "created by me":

"This is my body," that is, "a body created by me"—an interpretation which Luther devised for ridicule. But this is nothing to us. Yet the Scholastics labor to interpret "Mine" in such a way that the body of the priest is not understood, because these words are pronounced by the priest. For they ask whether the preceding words are necessary, because otherwise it would not be understood that these are the words of Christ, or that the priest is speaking in the person of Christ. Then, even if the priest were speaking most certainly in the person of Christ, it would not follow that the bread which the priest holds in his hands is the body of Christ, but rather that which Christ held, because the priest only recites what Christ said and did. So concerning the individual words of institution we have said enough; from which Bellarmine can extract nothing to prevent a trope from being in them, which the Church Fathers always understood.

Chapter 6: In which Bellarmine's fourth argument is refuted, taken from those passages of Scripture which contain the use of this Sacrament, and first from 1 Corinthians 10, then from 1 Corinthians 11.

Now we come to Bellarmine's fourth and last argument from Scripture, which is deduced from those passages of Scripture that declare the use of the Eucharist in the time of the Apostles. There are two such passages. The first passage is found in 1 Corinthians 10, in these words: "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a communion of the blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not a communion of the body of Christ?" From this he draws three arguments.

His first argument is that consecration is necessary for this Sacrament; but it would not be necessary if this Sacrament contained only a figure; therefore, there is the true body of Christ there. I reply: εὐλογίαν indeed, that is, blessing, is necessary for this Sacrament; but by εὐλογίαν Calvin rightly understands not simple thanksgiving, but consecration through prayers applied for that purpose, so that it may be for us a symbol of the body and blood of Christ. This happens by the word of promise, when the Christian people according to Christ's command celebrate the memorial of this sacrament, the minister celebrates and, in admiration of divine benefits, bursts forth into thanks and prayers. Oecumenius interprets this word as "ὁ εὐλογῶμεν," that is, he says, "ὁ μετὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντες εὐλογέω τὸν χαρισάμενον ἡμῖν τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ," which means "holding in our hands, we bless him who gave us his blood," that is, we give thanks. But soon after, more correctly, "ὁ εὐλογέοντες ἐτοιμάζομεν," which we prepare with an act of thanksgiving. Thus Thomas says, "Whom we bless," that is, which we the faithful exalt by believing and giving thanks.

Therefore, what Bellarmine says—that consecration is not necessary unless there is transubstantiation—is false. For consecration is necessary, although not of the kind they imagine, by which these creatures, bread and wine, become symbols and sacraments of the body and blood of Christ. Unless we apply this bread and cup with that rite and for

that purpose which Christ instituted, it will not be a sacrament at all; hence, consecration is necessary.

But Bellarmine objects concerning the Passover Lamb and Manna: because these were only figures, they did not have consecration; therefore, if our Eucharist is only a figure, it too has no need of consecration. I reply: neither in our Eucharist is there only a figure, nor in those was there only a figure. For although the bread and cup are a figure, they are not only a figure, but truth is joined with it. So the Lamb and Manna were not a simple and bare figure: for the Apostle says concerning the devout who were then, "All ate the same spiritual food, and all drank the same spiritual drink," and "that rock was Christ." A bare figure could not be spiritual food or drink; and if the rock was Christ, it was not there only as a figure. So neither Manna nor the Passover Lamb was a bare figure.

This is what Augustine says: "With faith remaining, the signs were changed," and "they ate the same food and drank the same drink," that is, the same spiritual one, not the same physical one.

But Bellarmine objects that there was no consecration in those sacraments. I reply: Concerning Manna indeed, because it was also common bread, nothing of the sort is read; but the devout undoubtedly looked for more than bodily nourishment in it. And that consecration is to take it for that purpose with thanksgiving. So also the devout ate the Passover Lamb to commemorate the heavenly benefit, not to fatten their bodies; and this was to consecrate. And then they became spiritual food and spiritual drink for them when they were intended for spiritual use.

Therefore, although we do not read, "The Lamb, which we bless," and "Manna, which we bless, is the body of Christ," yet it is beyond controversy that the devout looked to Christ in these external things. Manna indeed was not only a sacrament but also common bread which they ate daily; and that water which flowed from the rock was common drink which they drank daily. But the devout used them for another purpose than the crowd; for in these they fed not only their bodies but also their souls, and so they were sacraments to them.

But Bellarmine refutes this exposition of Calvin: for he says, "If common wine ought to be consecrated to become a sacrament, this would be either because a sacrament is a sign by convention, or because there is some analogy between the thing signified and the sign from the nature of the thing." I reply: This is said ignorantly by Bellarmine, because although all sacraments have some analogy with the things of which they are sacraments—as water in Baptism, bread and wine in the Eucharist, the Passover Lamb, Circumcision, Manna—nevertheless they are signs by convention from Christ's institution.

But then he says: "If they are signs by convention, the first institution would suffice; but it does not suffice; for afterward the Apostle blessed when he said, 'The cup which we bless'; therefore some consecration beyond the first institution is still needed." I reply: As to the form of the sacrament, the first institution of Christ suffices; for as Augustine says, "The word is added to the element, and it becomes a sacrament." For we do not institute a new sacrament but celebrate the sacrament instituted by Christ. That we may do this, we consecrate these creatures for that use.

The first institution directs us to celebrate this action; but the first institution did not make every bread and every wine to be sacraments; rather, consecration separated these creatures for that use. Therefore a special sanctification and separation of creatures is necessary.

Of the things for this use. And natural analogy does not suffice: for bread and wine had that analogy before they were sacraments; yet they would not have been sacraments unless Christ's institution had been added. Moreover, that he says there is no necessary blessing in baptismal water, he condemns the custom of his own church: for among them the priest diligently blesses the water before baptism, and in baptism a consecration is also necessary—not such as they apply, but so that this creature may be, as it were, a certain heavenly washing of souls, not one that merely washes away common bodily filth. For when infants approach baptism, it is not done so that their bodies may be washed, but so that they may be partakers of spiritual grace. This is the legitimate consecration of baptism.

Therefore, even if there is no change in the creatures in these sacraments with respect to substance, yet a blessing in the use of these sacraments is necessary. Therefore, since such a blessing is required in every sacrament, no transubstantiation can be inferred from this.

According to Bellarmine, from this passage of the Apostle an argument is taken from those words: "The bread which we break." Here "we break" (he says) signifies "we immolate." But what is immolated is not wheaten bread, but the body of Christ. From this, however, it is clearly proved (he says) that Christ's body is truly present in the Supper. But how does he prove that "to break" is "to immolate"? Namely from 1 Corinthians 11: "This is my body, which is broken for you." Here "is broken" (he says) is the same as "is immolated," as Calvin says in clear words; therefore also in this place the breaking will be an immolation, because it is the word of the same author, in the same epistle, and treating of the same matter. A splendid argument indeed, and such as befits a Jesuit.

But I reply: When Paul says, "which is broken for you," there "to be broken" is taken for Christ's passion and immolation on the cross; but when Paul here says, "The bread which

we break," he understands no passion or immolation of Christ: for then Christ would have to be broken—that is, crucified and killed—when the Eucharist is celebrated. If therefore they break Christ in their masses and sacrifices, then they rage against Christ, as the Jews did when they fastened Christ to the cross and killed him. But the term "breaking" is not taken in the same sense in these passages. Paul says that Christ's body was broken for us: this signifies immolation, because his body was truly immolated for us; but when he says, "The bread which we break," here "to break" is not "to immolate": first, because the Apostle here speaks expressly of true bread, which has not been immolated; second, because if he were speaking of Christ, then Christ would be immolated in the Supper; if he were immolated, then he would be broken (since Bellarmine wants these two to be the same); if he were broken, then he would suffer punishment again and die—which is heretical and blasphemous; third, because the Fathers interpret these words of the Apostle concerning the sacrament—that is, the breaking of the bread—not concerning the breaking of Christ himself.

Chrysostom, when he treats this passage, speaks very emphatically: he says this is true in the Eucharist, not on the cross; therefore he does not explain this breaking as that which was done on the cross: for he denies that Christ's body was broken on the cross, because it is written, "A bone of him shall not be broken" (though with all respect to so great a man I would say: Christ's body was broken on the cross; for his feet were pierced with nails, and his hands, and his side was pierced with a spear, and his heart wounded, even though no bone of his was broken). But Chrysostom says that Christ suffers in the Eucharist, and he did not suffer on the cross because he is broken in the Eucharist—which by the confession of all must be understood concerning the symbols and elements; for no one, not even the most daring sophist, will say that Christ's body is broken again.

Theodoret interprets it concerning the sharing of the same bread: for it is broken so that it may be shared by many. So also the Scholastics. Thomas Aquinas understands it concerning the breaking of the species of bread; so Cajetan and Catharinus concerning the breaking of the species. But the breaking of the species of bread is not the immolation of Christ's body, which Bellarmine here impiously and ignorantly asserts.

Although this absurdity is what these Scholastics say: for the breaking of the species is not the sharing of Christ's body. What breaking Paul means is not obscure: for as Cajetan says, the Church formerly imitated Christ: he took bread, and blessed it, and broke it, and distributed what was broken. This breaking is what Paul speaks of. But our Bellarmine explains "frangere" through "immolare," since Christ broke the bread before saying, "This is my body." But Christ could not have immolated His own body, since it was not yet His body; therefore "frangimus" signifies "distribuimus." Thus in the prophet Isaiah: "Break your bread for the hungry"; so in Jeremiah: "The little ones asked for bread, and there was no one to break it for them"; so in Acts: "And continuing daily with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread from house to house, they took their food with gladness

and simplicity of heart." Therefore, "to break" here signifies not to immolate but to distribute.

But Bellarmine wishes to prove that "to break" is a word of consecration, because concerning the cup Paul says, "The cup which we bless"; here "to bless" (he says) is to consecrate. A truly admirable exposition! Therefore, "to break" will not only be to immolate but also to consecrate. What could the weak man say? That εὐλογία does not, as they wish, signify consecration, or immolation, or transubstantiation, but the sanctification of creatures through the word of God and prayers, for this purpose: that it may be distributed. For Paul says the cup is κοινωνία, that is, a communication of the blood of Christ; there was therefore a distribution there, but distribution followed.

Therefore, what he says—that this argument cannot be answered unless by admitting a double equivocation, one in the word "frangimus," the other in the word "panis"—is invalid. For "panis" is univocal, and "fractio" is proper; but his exposition has the most absurd equivocations: for "to break" is to immolate. But who ever saw or heard "breaking" put for "immolating" when speaking of bread? And "bread" is put not for the substance but for the appearance of bread, or for a special bread, which nevertheless cannot be broken.

Bellarmino's third argument from this passage is taken from those words: "It is the communication of the blood of the Lord," and "the communication of the body of the Lord." Here he proposes a threefold meaning of κοινωνίας, that is, "communication": for he says first that it sometimes signifies distribution, as when the Apostle says, "Communicating to the necessities of the saints"; second, that it sometimes signifies fellowship or confederation, as when the same Apostle says elsewhere, "They gave to me and to Barnabas the right hands of fellowship"; third, that it is sometimes put for participation in the same thing, as in those words of the Apostle: "Communicating in my tribulation," that is, made partakers of my tribulation.

But there is no need for us to labor greatly over the meaning of the word. Paul commends to us the participation and sharing of the body and blood of Christ, and that a true one. Bellarmine says that the whole difficulty lies in whether the blood and flesh are taken corporally or only spiritually. So be it: we maintain that we receive the body and blood of Christ only spiritually and sacramentally, not corporally.

But Bellarmine says that this can be proved by all the arguments by which he earlier proved that these words, "This is my body," are to be understood properly. But we have proved that those arguments prove nothing. Therefore, Bellarmine, omitting those, uses three new arguments.

The first is because the proper and literal sense is always to be chosen unless the contrary is evidently proved. I reply: The proper sense of these words is that we communicate in

the body and blood of the Lord. Do we deny this? Certainly never; therefore we hold and admit the literal sense. For this sense does not require that this communication be corporal, because spiritual communication is true and proper communication; otherwise those who never approach the Eucharist would have no true communion with Christ, because they have only spiritual communion—which all know to be false.

His second argument is that the ancients expounded it thus, and especially Chrysostom, because he says that what flowed from Christ's side is in the cup. I reply: Who does not acknowledge Chrysostom's vivid expression, "In the cup is what flowed from his side"? But is there not a trope here? There must be. For the Papists themselves do not wish Christ's blood to be in the cup apart from His body, and they hold that the same blood which flowed from Christ's side did not remain outside the body but was received by angels and is preserved in certain places. But if Chrysostom's words are pressed too strictly and taken crassly and carnally, there would be a separation of Christ's blood from His body in the Eucharist—which the Papists deny. Who, therefore, does not see that Chrysostom's words must be understood figuratively?

So afterward in the same passage, Chrysostom writes: immediately after those words, he says that we ought to τὸ θυσιαστήριον, that is, the altar of Christ, φοινίσσειν, that is, to make bloody with His blood. If this were done truly and properly, it would be horrible. Therefore, just as the altar is φοινίσσεται τῷ αἵματι τῷ Χριστοῦ, made bloody with the blood of Christ, so the blood which flowed from Christ's side is in the cup. Who does not see that these things must be understood according to the manner and custom of speaking which Chrysostom uses, who often employs such figures?

But Bellarmine insists that Chrysostom says Paul does not say μετοχίῳ, that is, participation, but κοινωνίαν, that is, communication; for Chrysostom says we communicate ἐν τῷ ἐνέοθαι, in that we are united to Christ, not ἐν τῷ μετέχειν καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν, that is, not in participating and receiving only. And I confess that through this Sacrament we are united to Christ—who ever denied it? For we are not only μετέχομεν, that is, partakers of His gifts and benefits, but κοινωνοῦμεν, that is, we are most closely joined with Christ, just as members are joined with the head. No one can imagine a better συνάφειαν, that is, conjunction or contact.

But he presses that Chrysostom says this is such a communion or conjunction as is between the Word and the flesh. Yet this similitude should not be pressed too hard; for in reality it does not agree in all points: there is a hypostatic union between the Word and the flesh, but not between us and Christ. But by these words Chrysostom wished to signify that our union with Christ is true, mysterious, and close—which we grant. And this, I think, is what Bellarmine wants.

And so it is most true what Cyril says: that Christ is united to us in the Eucharist not only through charity, but also truly and corporally; that is, not only is there a conjunction of affections between us and Christ, but also of natures: for we are members of His body, of His flesh and of His bones, as the Apostle says.

The third and last argument of Bellarmine is taken from the intention and purpose of the Apostle, which was (he says) to turn the Corinthians away from Gentile sacrifices and from eating meats offered to idols; and he turns them away by showing a better table. But according to the opinion of our Adversaries (he says), the Apostle would have accomplished nothing if on the altar there were only a figure and sign.

I reply: this is not our opinion, but it is falsely ascribed to us by our Adversaries. For we say that in the Eucharist there is the very body of Christ, but it is received not with the mouth. Therefore the Apostle's argument is excellent: we receive in the Eucharist the body and blood of Christ, and between Him and us there is κοινωνία, i.e., a most true and closest communion or conjunction; therefore we ought not to approach the table of demons.

And this Chrysostom illustrates with a most elegant similitude: "When lovers," he says, "see those whom they love desiring what belongs to others, they give them their own things, and thus persuade them to abstain from those others; but they do this," he says, "in money, or clothes, or possessions; no one ever in his own blood. But Christ showed His care and vehement love toward us even in this—that He gave even His own blood to us."

Therefore Bellarmine disputes ineptly against us, as if we said that the pious and faithful in the Eucharist are not partakers of Christ Himself, but only receive a figure of Him. But this must be attributed to his error or malice.

Enough has been said concerning the first passage; now follows the second passage, which is found in 1 Corinthians 11: "Whoever eats and drinks unworthily eats and drinks judgment to himself, not discerning the Lord's body." And above: "It is the body and blood of the Lord." From this Bellarmine draws an argument in this manner: Some receive the body of the Lord unworthily and draw judgment from it; therefore the body of Christ is truly present in the Eucharist; for these do not receive by spirit and faith (for then they would receive profitably); therefore they receive only with the body; but by bodily mouth the body of Christ cannot be taken as it is in heaven.

I reply first: The Apostle does not say that some receive the body

To eat the bread and drink the cup of the Lord unworthily—and what follows afterward, "Whoever eats and drinks unworthily, eats and drinks judgment to himself"—must be understood not concerning the very body and blood of Christ, but concerning the bread

and cup, as is clear from the preceding verse, where the Apostle commands that each one examine himself, and so eat of that bread and drink of that cup. Then follows: "For whoever eats and drinks unworthily, eats and drinks judgment to himself." Therefore, the meaning of the words here is: Whoever eats of this bread and drinks of this cup unworthily, eats and drinks judgment, or damnation, to himself.

Bellarmino wants it to be understood concerning the body and blood of Christ what the Apostle understands concerning the sacraments; and yet the Apostle says that those who unworthily receive these sacraments will be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord, because they unworthily receive these symbols. But if the Apostle had meant as the Adversaries do, he would have said, "Whoever eats this body and drinks this blood unworthily"—for who does not see that this would have been much more emphatic?

Secondly, what Bellarmine says—that the body of Christ cannot be received in a bodily manner as it is in heaven—overturns his own cause and removes all bodily presence in the Eucharist. For just as Christ's body itself is in heaven, so it ought to be received by us as it is in heaven. Therefore, we must ascend to heaven in spirit to partake there of Christ's body, not to call down his body from heaven so that it is devoured here indiscriminately by swine just as it is taken by children. And indeed, whoever receives Christ's body otherwise than as it is in heaven receives no benefit from it. Christ ascended into heaven and sits at the right hand of the Father in order to draw us to himself, not so that we might draw him down from there and receive his glorious body in a manner other than as it is glorious. For wherever Christ's body is after the ascension, there is glory and the highest glory. But the nature of a glorious body does not allow it to be enclosed in a sacrament or pressed by our hands and teeth; indeed, this is utterly contrary to Christ's glory, and Christ's glory cannot be separated from his body. Yet the Jesuit separates them—which is to do the greatest injury to Christ. For the greatest degradation of Christ is to thrust his glorious body into a sacrament. Therefore, the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist takes away Christ's majesty and glory.

Thus we argue: The Papists do not receive Christ's body in the sacrament as it is in heaven; therefore they do not receive it at all, because Christ has no other body except that which is in heaven and as it is in heaven—that is, glorious.

Thirdly, therefore, I respond that those who unworthily receive the sacraments of Christ's body and blood are guilty of the body and blood of Christ, and this for two causes which Bellarmine mentions here, though not fully. I will therefore set them forth more fully.

The first cause is that to handle unworthily the sacraments of the Lord's body and blood redounds to the injury and insult of Christ himself. So if anyone dishonors a prince's statue or diploma, or adulterates his seal or coin, he is said to dishonor the prince and do injury to his person, and for that reason he is guilty of treason and punished with capital

punishment. Theodoret relates how indignantly Theodosius took the injury which certain men inflicted upon the image of his wife. So also in former times those were said to be guilty of treason who had insulted the dignity or glory of the Roman name; and whoever mishandles the insignia of the empire or of any king is not immune from the crime of treason. Therefore, those are guilty of the body and blood of Christ who unworthily receive and handle their symbols and sacraments otherwise than they ought, even if they do not eat Christ's very body with their bodily mouth nor drink his blood.

But Bellarmine diligently tries to weaken this response, and first from this he indirectly draws an argument for images—because then those who demolish the images of Christ and the saints do them injury. But the case is dissimilar: for images of Christ and the saints, because they are made for worship by the superstitious, are to be demolished by God's command; but images of princes, because they are not made to be worshiped, are not forbidden.

But Bellarmine adds that an injury is not considered done to an image unless someone violates the image with the intention of doing it harm; yet they will be guilty of the Lord's body even if they do not yield to that mindset so as to violate the Eucharist. I reply: Each person ought to approach with the intention of worthily receiving this bread and this cup; therefore, one should examine oneself and approach properly, because this is the table of the highest King. Thus, if someone does not consider where they are coming or what they are doing, they approach the Sacrament unworthily, violate the Eucharist, do injury to Christ, and are guilty of the body and blood of Christ.

Therefore, the rationale of this Sacrament is different from that of images, because we have been commanded by the Lord not only not to despise or violate this Sacrament, but also not to approach it otherwise than is fitting for us—that is, that we bring true faith, repentance, a purpose of serving God, and living well. Those who do not do this are guilty of the body and blood of Christ and violate His majesty, even if they do not approach with the intention of violating it.

He who carries the image or crown of a prince, and unwillingly lets it fall into the mud or breaks it, is not punished; but if he had received a command that he should in no way allow this to happen, on account of neglect of the command he is guilty of a great crime. So it is when Christ commanded us to handle this Sacrament with all reverence: if we neglect this command of Christ, we will be guilty of the body and blood of Christ—not on account of contact with them, but on account of contempt for Christ's command.

Thus Jerome says: "When the sacraments are violated, He whose sacraments they are is Himself violated." But we violate not only when we approach with contempt, but also when we do not bring such minds as we ought.

A prince's image can be violated without injury if there is no malicious intent toward the prince; but the Eucharist cannot be handled unworthily without injury to Christ, because we have been commanded to take care lest we receive unworthily—as if someone were to violate or allow to be violated a garment or statue of a prince which he had been ordered to keep unharmed.

But Bellarmine goes on and brings up another objection: “If,” he says, “those who receive the Eucharist unworthily sin because it represents Christ, then it would not be lawful for a sinful man to look at or handle a painted image of Christ, because it represents Christ.”

I reply: The sacraments not only represent but also offer Christ; and there is no such command about looking at an image of Christ as there is about receiving the Eucharist. Christ says, “Do this”; nowhere does He say, “Look at images.” Nor is one said to be guilty who has not looked at images, but who has eaten and drunk unworthily.

But he objects further: “Then it would not be lawful for an impious person to hear the word of God.”

I reply: Those who hear the word of God and despise it or do not profit by it are guilty of eternal death, because they spurn so great a grace and make God a liar.

But again he says: “Why were those who ate the manna unworthily and drank the water from the rock not said to be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord?”

I reply: Christ and Paul say that those who received these unworthily were guilty of the body and blood of the Lord. “Your fathers,” says Christ, “ate manna in the desert and died”—because, namely, they ate unworthily. For as Augustine says, “Some did not die,” that is, those who ate worthily; therefore those who died did so because they ate unworthily. “Moses ate manna,” he says, “Aaron ate manna, Phinehas ate manna; many there ate who pleased the Lord and did not die.” Why? Because they understood the visible food spiritually, they hungered spiritually, they tasted spiritually, so as to be filled spiritually. And a little later: “Your fathers ate manna and died; not because the manna was evil, but because they ate evilly.” And Augustine interprets this concerning eternal death.

Indeed, all received the external elements and symbols, but the pious received besides another thing—that is, spiritual food. For the Apostle says: “All ate the same spiritual food and all drank the same spiritual drink,” but “God was not well pleased with most of them,” for they were overthrown in the desert—which indicates that God was most grievously offended with them because they used these sacraments unworthily.

And so in the Old Testament it was not lawful for anyone unclean to approach the sacrifices, and they were forbidden to eat the Passover lamb with leaven. Therefore in those things it was required that they approach worthily—not only because those sacrifices were types (and these are not merely physical gifts), but because God commanded that His sacraments be handled with reverence.

According to Bellarmine, it was not only because of wealth, but also because they were obliged to bring spiritual purity, and because God required such purity; and those who were not such were not only injurious in their sacrifices, but also toward God himself, for God was not playing games. Yet Bellarmine does not believe that the body of Christ was present in those sacrifices. Similarly, in the water of Baptism there is not the blood of Christ or the Holy Spirit, and yet those who approach Baptism unworthily sin against the Sacrament and against Christ.

Bellarmino admits this is true of every Sacrament, but because such persons place an obstacle to grace, not because that matter signifies or represents something sacred. Correctly so: that is, they are guilty because they despise the grace offered. But here Bellarmine betrays either his ignorance or his thoughtlessness. For he said above that an obstacle is placed when someone brings a will for mortal sin; for even if someone does not have faith or any good impulse, yet if there are no evil impulses in him, the Sacrament will be for him a cause of grace, as he wishes. But from the Apostle's teaching, not only atheists and those who have only historical faith, but even true Christians who have lived more carelessly and given themselves to lighter sins—even if endowed with true faith—take unworthily; for many are punished on account of unworthy reception, who nevertheless are not condemned, as is clear later in this very chapter. Therefore not only those who place an obstacle to grace—that is, who come in mortal sin—but also those who approach without due examination and correction of their life, take unworthily, even if not in the highest degree.

And Augustine says that those who use Baptism unworthily receive judgment, and similarly those who do so with the Eucharist; thus he speaks no less honorably about Baptism than about the Eucharist. But Bellarmine says that in the Eucharist a singular purity is required; and certainly a singular purity is also required in Baptism, nor is it greater in the Eucharist. For it is foolish for him to say that nothing of the sort is read about any Sacrament like that statement, "He will be guilty of the body of the Lord"; for this is nothing else than that he will be guilty of the death of Christ, as if they had killed Christ; and so those who misuse Baptism are guilty of the Lord's death, because they do not put on Christ, and so do not have the remission of sins which Christ obtained by his death.

But Bellarmine also proves this from the punishment which the Apostle says falls upon those who have unworthily received the Eucharistic Sacrament: "For this reason," he

says, "many among you are weak and sick, and many sleep." Bellarmine says such things are nowhere found concerning Baptism. But that does not follow; because the Apostle does not say this about Baptism, therefore those who use Baptism unworthily are not punished by God. For those approaching Baptism unworthily reject Christ, and therefore sin gravely. How grave their sin is, is clear from Simon Magus, who immediately after Baptism rushed into all wickedness. And Scripture commands that believers be baptized; therefore adults who pretend faith and do not approach Baptism with true faith must necessarily be guilty of great sin and great punishment.

But Bellarmine further says that it has always been a care in the Church that no particle of the Eucharist should fall to the ground, and for this purpose he cites a passage from Tertullian: "We anxiously suffer if anything of our cup or bread is shaken onto the ground." Certainly I do not doubt that those who have allowed the Eucharistic bread to fall to the ground or wine to spill from the cup are worthy of great reproof; yet it does not follow that the body of Christ is there. So also the Papists not only treat the Eucharist but also the sacred vessels, the altar, and all other things pertaining to the Mass with utmost reverence, and do not allow them to be handled by the people, and yet they do not think that Christ is in all these things, or at least not always present.

Although Beatus Rhenanus thinks Tertullian is not speaking of the Eucharist but of common bread, because he says "even our bread." Nor was there such great care among the ancients about the Eucharist as our Adversaries wish: for they used to carry it home and take it daily before common food. Thus Tertullian says that he had it at home and ate it before any food. Indeed, they even used to send it to absent ones through deacons, sometimes even through women and children, as Eusebius testifies: "A boy," he says, "carried it in his hands to a sick person." Certainly if it were the true body of Christ, the Church would never have entrusted so great a thing to a boy.

Cyprian said that a certain woman carried the Eucharist in her box. Jerome said that Exuperius, Bishop of Toulouse, carried the Lord's body in a wicker basket and His blood in a glass. And Augustine said that he who carelessly hears the word of God would be no less guilty than he who, through his own negligence, allows the body of Christ to fall to the ground—but Augustine would not have said this concerning the true body of Christ.

The second reason why those who do not actually receive the real body of Christ are nevertheless guilty concerning His body and blood is this: they do not receive the Lord's body offered in the Eucharist with the reverence and faith that is fitting. It is as if someone, when a king came to him, either shut him out entirely, or despised him, or did not receive him honorably. So also are those guilty who spurn so great a grace offered to them. For Christ comes to us in the Eucharist; if therefore we spurn Him, do we not in so doing despise Christ?

But Bellarmine refutes this and says:

1. The Apostle does not say that they sin because they do not receive, but because they receive unworthily.

I answer: It is not that they receive the body of Christ unworthily, but that they receive the bread and wine unworthily. And they receive these unworthily who do not receive the things themselves along with the sacraments, but only the bare symbols, or who do not receive them with due preparation.

2. Bellarmine says that those words, “He eats and drinks judgment to himself,” clearly indicate that what is received by the unworthy brings death to them, while to others it brings salvation.

I answer: This sacrament, which is salutary to the godly, is indeed deadly to the impious; but it does not follow that the body of Christ is there. For then the body of Christ would be in the preached word, since the Gospel is to all either a fragrance from death to death, or from life to life, as the Apostle says.

3. Bellarmine says that in those words, “Not discerning the Lord’s body,” the eating of the true body is not denied, but rather affirmed.

I answer: The Lord’s body is indeed offered in the Eucharist—not to the mouth, but to faith. But those who come unworthily do not distinguish the sacrament from common food, and thus make a sacred thing profane—not by contact, but by contempt. Therefore we ought to approach the Eucharist with such reverence as if Christ Himself were present—as indeed He is present to the faithful—and if we approach otherwise, “not discerning the Lord’s body,” we receive the sacrament as common bread, though it is in its own way called the body of Christ.

4. Bellarmine says: If the impious did not wish to receive the body of Christ, they would not come to Communion; therefore they do not sin in this, that they will to receive the Lord’s body, but in this, that they will it although they are unworthy of it.

I answer: Many come rashly to the Eucharist, merely out of custom, unprepared, who do not will to receive Christ, even though they receive His sacrament. Not all who come to the Eucharist will to receive Christ; for many come who think little either of what great good they would receive if they came worthily, or what great evil if unworthily. Therefore many do not sin because they will to receive Christ though unworthy, but because coming to the Eucharist with profane minds, through their own fault they do not receive Christ in it.

So Chrysostom says: “How is it that not all from the Eucharist have obtained health, you ask? This certainly happens not through His fault—that is, Christ’s—who greatly desires

this, but through the fault of those who are unwilling to receive Him.” These therefore act just as if someone did not admit a king or some nobleman coming to him, nor deemed him worthy of any conversation or honor.

Lastly, Bellarmine urges testimonies of the Fathers, whom he says always understood this passage in this way, and placed the sin in this: that the unclean and filthy dare to receive the most pure body of the Lord.

I answer: The sacrament is called by the Fathers the body of Christ—not because the body is really present there, or because they thought that the unworthy receive the very body of Christ—but on account of the sacramental conjunction of the thing with the sign, by which it comes about that in the legitimate use the thing is received with the sign. And although the impious break this conjunction, yet it does not on that account cease to be a sacrament, because it is considered as it is in its own nature. Thus both Scripture and the Fathers attribute the name of the thing to the sacrament. Nor has any Father said anything else or more.

Hesychius says that in this sacrament the true body of Christ is represented, and therefore there is need for careful discernment on our part.

Chrysostom says that we eat the body of Christ—and this concerning all who

He affirms: I confess; but his meaning is not obscure. For he says, "I will show you the very body of the Lord lying on the earth," and soon after, "It is permitted to see the King's body on the earth," and later, "Not only do you believe, but you touch; not only do you touch, but you eat, and having received it, you return home." Thus, the ungodly eat the King's body in such a way that they touch, see, and carry it home with them; and they only touch, see, and carry home the Sacrament.

And Chrysostom uses a simile: "If a royal child adorned with purple and a diadem were entrusted to you to carry, would you not, casting aside all else, receive him? But now when you receive not a human king's child, but the only-begotten Son of God, tell me, do you not tremble and cast away all love of worldly things?" And the same elsewhere more plainly explains his mind and opinion when he teaches how one eats and drinks judgment to himself who unworthily receives this Sacrament. "Just as," he says, "the presence of Christ, which brought us those great and hidden goods, brought greater condemnation to those who did not receive him: so also these mysteries are a matter of greater punishment for those who partake unworthily." Therefore, the sin is not that the unworthy receive, but that they reject Christ's body; unworthily receiving the Sacrament, they bring destruction upon themselves. Christ came into the world bringing salvation to some, destruction to others who rejected him; so in this Sacrament, those who do not receive the offered Christ bring destruction upon themselves.

Thus, they are said to trample the Son of God and count his blood profane who despise the Gospel; and yet no one would say that Christ is bodily present in the Gospel. Therefore, Christ can in the same way be either received or rejected in this Sacrament, even though he is not bodily present there.

Bellarmino also cites Chrysostom elsewhere, where he has these words: "I would sooner give up my own soul than deliver the Lord's body to anyone unworthy; and I would rather allow my blood to be shed than grant that most holy blood to anyone except the worthy." This he says concerning the Sacrament; and this indeed is true, that this Sacrament ought not to be given to the unworthy; indeed, princes and magnates, as the same says a little before, if they are unworthy, must be kept from this Sacrament. But what then? Did Chrysostom therefore think that Christ's body is really in the Sacrament? By no means: for in the same homily he shows that he was of another opinion when he says that Christ ate and drank with the Apostles lest they be disturbed and say, "What then? Are we to drink blood and eat flesh?" Therefore Chrysostom means that Christ ate and drank with the Apostles to remove from their minds the suspicion that they were to drink his blood and devour his body.

Theodoret, Oecumenius, and Theophylact are also cited; but since a reply has been given to Chrysostom, the same reply suffices for them also, because they say almost the same thing.

But Cyprian is cited, who says that the sanctified bread enters the mouth of a wicked person. I reply: Cyprian speaks openly about the Sacrament; for Christ is not sanctified bread, but sanctifying. Does the priest, I ask, sanctify Christ? But Cyprian speaks of that bread which is sanctified by the prayer of the Church; this indeed can enter the mouth of a wicked person, but Christ's very body cannot. This will appear more clearly from Cyprian later: for he says, "Those who are dry in body and arid in mind, though they are present at the sacred rites and even partake of the gifts, they indeed lick the rock, but from it they draw neither honey nor oil"; that is, they receive only the external Sacrament. He seems to say that those who receive unworthily receive as much, with respect to the reality of the Sacrament, as those who were present at the sacred rites but did not partake. And indeed, as it defiles nothing, so it sanctifies nothing in a person that enters the mouth.

But Augustine is also objected because he says that the Eucharist is the body of the Lord and the blood of the Lord even to the unworthy. I reply: He says that Judas gave place to the Devil in himself not by receiving evil, but by receiving good evilly; so he who unworthily receives the Lord's Sacrament does not cause it to be evil because he is evil, or to be nothing because he does not receive it unto salvation. Then he says it is the body of the Lord to those eating unworthily—namely, as he spoke before, that is, the Lord's Sacrament, namely the Sacrament of the Lord's body. From this Augustine concludes

that those who have once received Baptism are not to be baptized again; for it is not because they are evil that they did not receive Baptism; he proves this from the fact that the evil in the Eucharist do not receive nothing.

They receive, but the Sacrament of the Lord. Elsewhere he says again that the unworthy receive the very body of the Lord, understanding it as the Sacrament of the Lord's body, and that they receive the Lord's body only sacramentally: so what he adds, "the one sacrifice for our salvation," he understands as the Sacrament of that one sacrifice.

Another passage is also cited from Augustine, where he says that the proud receive and adore the body of Christ, but are not filled, because they do not imitate him. I reply: Bellarmine omitted something here; for Augustine says that Christ poor is eaten by us in the Eucharist. Who then does not see that he is not speaking of a real eating? For if we now ate Christ with our mouth, we would take him not poor but rich, not humble but glorious. Therefore Augustine means that Christ is so received in the Supper as he suffered for us; that our faith is to be directed toward his death, and toward him hanging on the cross, in which Christ was truly poor. But Christ cannot be received in this way except by faith; therefore Augustine does not mean a bodily eating. And this is what Cyprian says, that we ought to cling to the cross, that is, to seek remission of sins in the blood of Christ shed for us on the cross, and to drink him by faith.

But still another passage is cited from Augustine where he says that Christ permitted Judas to receive among the innocent disciples what the faithful know as our price. I reply: The Sacrament is called our price, as it is called the body of Christ; therefore Judas received our price because he received the Sacrament of our price: therefore he received the body of Christ not really but sacramentally. For if he had really received that price itself, he would not have perished: for no one with that price can perish, but whoever shows this price to God is absolved from death; for God would be unjust if he condemned anyone who has this price. Thus Christ called the cup the new covenant, i.e., so that they would be participants of the new covenant who are partakers of the cup; it would be dealt with excellently with them. But it is called the cup of the new covenant because it is the Sacrament of the new covenant, and because through the impious it stands so that it is not a covenant for them.

Rightly Ambrose says that it is unworthy for the Lord that anyone celebrate the mystery otherwise than as delivered by him; and a little later: "Those who approach without the discipline of tradition and conduct are guilty of the body and blood of the Lord." What is it to be guilty except to pay the penalty of the Lord's death? And afterward he says: "The Lord drinks his own blood in the mystery, who is a witness of God's benefit." Therefore the impious do not drink Christ's blood, but only the pious, because they alone are witnesses of God's benefit; and the impious are guilty of the body and blood of the Lord not because they receive it, but because they reject it and make void Christ's benefit, as Ambrose says there.

But what Bellarmine contends—that Christ’s body is received by the impious—is as full of horror and blasphemy as it has always been refuted by the Fathers. Augustine says that the impious receive only the Sacrament of so great a thing; for the thing itself is received by no one unto destruction. Bellarmine says that Augustine does not deny that the impious receive Christ’s body, but not justifying grace; for he does not distinguish between the Sacrament and its virtue and reality, but between Christ’s body and his grace. I reply: Nothing more impudent could be said by Bellarmine. For Augustine clearly distinguishes between the Sacrament and the thing of which it is a Sacrament, and says that the Sacrament is received from the Lord’s table by some unto life, by some unto destruction, but that the thing itself brings destruction to no one who partakes of it. Now the thing itself, which is distinguished from the Sacrament, is Christ’s very body, because they want the external Sacrament to be the visible species: therefore whatever else there is, is the reality of the Sacrament, which no impious person receives, because it cannot be received unto destruction. Therefore Augustine by “virtue of the Sacrament” understands not only spiritual grace but especially Christ’s very body, which can never be separated from his grace; and he makes a clear opposition between the Sacrament and the body and blood of Christ: he says, “the Sacrament of this thing,” that is, of the unity of Christ’s body and blood. Is Christ’s body the Sacrament of the unity of Christ’s body and blood? No one would say so. Therefore by “Sacrament” he understands not Christ’s body, as Bellarmine would have it, but external creatures, which the impious receive and nothing else.

But what he objects—that the Fathers of the Old Testament did not receive

To have taken the body of Christ, as Augustine says that they received the reality of the Sacrament in the manna, is false: for in truth the body of Christ, although not yet born, was nevertheless present to their faith. And for this reason Christ is called the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world: a Lamb with respect to his body, slain with respect to his death. Therefore, Christ was to the Fathers of the Old Testament a Lamb and indeed slain, on account of his death; but death necessarily requires a body. Therefore, they received that same body which we do; and this is what Augustine meant when he said that those Sacraments and ours are equal in the reality which is signified.

But why use many words? Augustine says, "He who does not abide in Christ, and in whom Christ does not abide, does not eat spiritually." Bellarmine admits this, but says that such a one eats the body of Christ sacramentally. Yet Augustine says that such a person only receives the Sacrament of the body of Christ; for he says, "Although he carnally and visibly presses with his teeth the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ." Where Augustine says that the ungodly receive only the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ. But the body and blood is not the Sacrament of the body and blood, but the reality itself, which is distinguished from the Sacrament. And Augustine says that

the ungodly visibly eat nothing but the Sacrament; but the body of Christ is not eaten visibly.

But Bellarmine says that the body of Christ is included under the name of the visible sign. This is false: for the body of Christ is not seen in the Sacrament; and that which is not seen cannot be called visible. Then, if the body of Christ were visible, Augustine foolishly always distinguishes the body of Christ from the Sacrament, that is, from the visible sign. For he says that the ungodly visibly press with their teeth the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ; but the body and blood of Christ is not the Sacrament or visible sign of the body and blood of Christ. This whole thing is what the ungodly receive, namely, the Sacrament.

Augustinus cannot include the body of Christ under the name of a visible sign, because elsewhere he says that "the visible elements of the Sacraments are corrupted." Therefore, the visible element of the Sacrament is not the body of Christ, because the body of Christ is not corrupted. And elsewhere he says, "The Sacrament is only outwardly; but the reality, of which it is a Sacrament, is held inwardly." Therefore, nothing but the Sacrament is received outwardly.

But Bellarmine bids us consider that all the Scholastics say that the body of Christ is received by the ungodly only sacramentally, although they teach that the very body of Christ is truly received by them. I reply: Why does he bring the Scholastics against us? These things are inconsistent and contradictory. For if they receive the body of Christ only sacramentally, certainly they do not receive the very body of Christ really. And the Scholastics plainly teach against Augustine, who says that the ungodly receive only the Sacrament, and as much as is visibly pressed by the teeth; and he opposes the Sacrament to the reality of the Sacrament, and says that the reality is not grace, but the very body and blood of Christ.

Again, Augustine says that "the other apostles ate bread with the Lord; Judas ate the bread of the Lord against the Lord." That is, he did not eat the Lord together with the bread, but ate only the Sacrament, not the body of Christ. But if Christ is really present in the Sacrament, and Judas really ate the very body of Christ, as they wish, then he would have eaten bread with the Lord—although Hilarius writes that Judas went out before, because he was not even worthy of the communion of the Sacraments. Since therefore he was much less worthy of communion in the body of Christ.

Bellarmino says that it is not called "the body of Christ" which is taken by the ungodly, because it does not have the effect of Christ's body—just as one is said to have eaten nothing who eats so little that it does not suffice to sustain his life, or who does not retain what he has eaten. I reply: This is absurdly said by Bellarmine. For Judas ate no less with his mouth than the others; therefore if they ate Christ with their mouth, then so did he.

Those who eat much, or as much as others, and it does not suffice them—no one will say for that reason that they have eaten nothing because they are not nourished or it does not profit them.

Moreover, the body of Christ cannot fail to be life-giving, because it is the body of the Son of God, and it is truly food, and it is never without its effect nor can it be separated from its fruit: you will sooner separate brightness from the sun than saving grace and effect from the body of Christ. That life cannot be separated from the body of Christ Augustine teaches; and it is also found in Gratian: "When..."

Christ is eaten, life is eaten: when He is eaten, He nourishes and does not fail. But a very clear passage of Augustine is found in a certain book of the City of God, where he says that not only heretics and schismatics do not eat the body of Christ, but not even Catholics persisting in sins, however much they may receive the Sacrament.

Bellarmino says that the body of Christ is taken by Augustine to mean the mystical body of Christ—than which nothing is more absurd: for the mystical body of Christ is the Church; but who would say that either the pious or the impious eat the Church? But Augustine is speaking of the very body of Christ: for he explains those words of Christ, "I am the living bread, which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever." Hence some were promising themselves eternal life, even if they lived wickedly, provided they received this Sacrament. But Augustine refutes their opinion, because (he says) such persons are not to be said to eat the body of Christ, because they are not to be counted among the members of Christ. Now that they are not in the members of Christ he proves: first, because they are members of a harlot; second, because they do not abide in Christ. This indeed he proves because Christ does not abide in them; therefore he concludes that they do not truly eat the body of Christ, but only sacramentally. For he who does not abide in Christ, and in whom Christ does not abide, let him not say or think that he eats the body of Christ: he does not say the virtue or grace of Christ, but not even the body of Christ.

So Hilary: "The bread which came down from heaven is received only by him who has the Lord and is a member of Christ"; but the impious neither have the Lord nor are members of Christ. So Ambrose: "Every soul that receives that bread coming down from heaven is the house of bread, that is, of the bread of Christ, which is nourished by the inhabitant in the bread of heaven and strengthened in heart"; and a little later: "Every faithful soul is Bethlehem." So Jerome: "Those who are not holy in body and spirit neither eat the flesh of Jesus nor drink His blood, of which He Himself speaks: 'He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath everlasting life'; but all know that the impious are not such."

Chapter 7: Our arguments for the figurative interpretation of the words of the Supper.

It now follows that we defend the figurative interpretation of the words of the Supper and refute the real presence. Bellarmine's responses and evasions in resolving some of our arguments must be discussed first, then those arguments which he put forward must be added.

Our first argument is of this sort: In these words, "This is my body," "this" points to the bread; but "body" cannot be predicated properly of bread; therefore the words are not to be understood properly but figuratively.

Bellarmino first says that the pronoun must be explained adjectivally: "This is my body," that is, "This food is my body"; "This is my blood," that is, "This drink is my blood." Most ineptly indeed and most foreignly. For:

1. "This" necessarily refers to that which Christ gave to His disciples and concerning which He said, "Take, eat"; therefore it is taken substantively in the neuter for this thing, that is, for this bread.
2. When Christ said "this," if He was pointing to this food, He was pointing to no other food than bread; for it is inept that "this" should refer to a more general thing when it points to a singular thing.

Thus we better interpret τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ αἷμά μου as "This is my blood" than as "This is my blood," because it points not to blood but to wine or drink. So Cyprian has it; and so Beza; and so Jansenius says that "this" is used better than "this." Now since "this" in both cases points to a singular thing which is not properly the body and blood of Christ, the predication is figurative, not proper.

Second, Bellarmine says that Catholics agree about the thing which the pronoun "this" points to, but not about the manner of explaining it. But in truth they agree neither about the thing nor about the manner, as we have taught before. For others wish it to be the very body and blood of Christ; but this now the Papists following Thomas do not hold; yet so most of the older Pontifical writers interpreted it, and many recent ones, as Alanus and Jansenius; and the reason is that in propositions which signify what then is when it is said "this,"

One demonstrates not what is, but what will be; as if someone, while drawing a line or a circle, were to say, "This is a line, this is a circle." But Bellarmine does not approve of this explanation for two reasons.

The first is that if someone points to a thing with a finger while uttering the pronoun, it seems very absurd to say that by that pronoun the present thing is not demonstrated. For

Christ took bread, and offering it, said, "Take, eat; this is my body." Therefore, it seems (he says) that he demonstrated the bread. I reply: On the contrary, Christ truly demonstrated the bread with this pronoun, or Bellarmine overturns his own argument. For nothing else was present except bread; but Christ demonstrated something present; and to think otherwise, Bellarmine says, is very absurd. For demonstrative pronouns immediately indicate something definite, even before the other words follow; but there is no transubstantiation unless after all the words have been spoken; therefore Christ could not demonstrate anything else by this pronoun except bread.

The second reason why Bellarmine does not approve of this explanation is that if "this" demonstrated the body, the sacramental words would be speculative, not practical; which is contrary to all Catholics. For it is always true (he says), when Christ's body is demonstrated, to say, "This is the body of Christ," whether it is said before consecration or after, whether by a layperson or by a priest. But the sacramental words, because they are operative (he says), are not true unless spoken by one who is a legitimate minister. I reply: Then the sacramental words accomplish nothing unless they are uttered by a priest; but they think differently about the sacramental words in Baptism, which they affirm are valid even in the mouth of a layperson, indeed even of a woman.

But what if the priest does not understand the words? What if he does not think about transubstantiation? What if he utters the words without the intention of consecrating? Indeed, what if he holds a mind contrary to Transubstantiation? What then? Will these words be true? Indeed, according to their opinion, then they are not practical, because they say no consecration occurs without the priest's intention. Therefore at that time this proposition will be false: "This is my body." But that can in no way happen, because these are Christ's words, which no one's negligence can make less true.

1. Thus I argue against the Adversaries: That exposition from which it follows that Christ's words can be false is not to be admitted; but this exposition of the Papists is such; therefore it is not to be admitted. I prove the minor premise because it will not be Christ's body if the priest so wills, although Christ says, "This is my body"; which is necessarily always true of the Sacrament in its legitimate use, since we do what Christ wills us to do, even if the priest intends something else; otherwise the Sacraments will depend not on Christ's institution but on the will of the priests.

Furthermore, if Christ endowed these words with that power which they claim, so that immediately after the utterance of these words Christ's body is present, then this power is not in the mind of the priest but in the words themselves.

Therefore Bellarmine follows another opinion and approves another exposition of these words, which holds that the pronoun "this" demonstrates neither bread nor Christ's body, but the common substance which is under those species. And yet he says that the

demonstration properly pertains to the species, but indirectly; not so that the sense is "This, that is, these species are my body," but "This is my body," that is, under these species is my body.

This is that famous exposition in which he acquiesces and which he prefers to all other expositions. But I reply first: this is not proper predication when someone says of a thing which is properly demonstrated, "This is," that is, "what is contained under this is what I mean"; as if someone offering a purse in which there is gold were to say, "This is gold," and properly demonstrates the purse; or if someone holding a cup full of wine in his hand were to say, "This is wine," while properly demonstrating the cup. Who would say that one who speaks thus speaks properly, and not rather tropically? Such indeed is what Bellarmine says here: for he affirms that the demonstration properly pertains to the species; therefore either the species are properly Christ's body, or the predication will not be proper.

Second, Bellarmine says that "this" demonstrates some present thing as soon as it is uttered.

Therefore, he shows the bread because no other substance is immediately present. For that term "food" or "content" under these species signifies not a singular substance, but substance in common. Yet no substance except a singular one can be contained under those visible species, for genera and species do not subsist. Therefore, what Christ demonstrated must be not a common substance, but an individual of substance, because under singular species nothing except what is singular can be contained. Hence I argue as follows: The content under those species is either something singular or universal; not universal, because the universal exists only in the intellect, and Christ's body is made not from common or universal matter, but from singular matter. Therefore, it must be singular. If it is singular, it is either the body of Christ or the body of bread; not the body of Christ by Bellarmine's own admission; therefore, it is bread.

Third, what Bellarmine says—that our argument can be very well resolved by saying that "this" demonstrates not bread precisely, but the content under these species—I reply that "this" must demonstrate something precisely. For such is the nature of a demonstrative pronoun, and that by Bellarmine's own admission, who affirms that by it a present thing is demonstrated; but a present thing is something precise. Moreover, "this," that is, the content under these species, supposes something either before consecration, or after, or during consecration. Before consecration it is precisely bread; after consecration it is precisely the body of Christ; therefore during consecration it is either bread or the body of Christ or some third nature, which unless it is singular, is a monster. Therefore "this" always demonstrates something singular: either bread, therefore, or the body of Christ.

Finally, concerning that content he says that although it was bread before consecration, yet by the force of those words it begins to be the body of the Lord. But what is this "begins to be"? For in transubstantiation they do not posit a before or after; for they say it happens in an instant, at the moment finishing the utterance of these words. Therefore when it begins to be the body of Christ, in that same moment it is the body of Christ. If, therefore, it begins to be the body when "this" is uttered, then it is the body of Christ as soon as "this" is uttered; if so, then it would be there even if the remaining words did not follow; but no one would say that. Therefore "this" signifies something which neither is the body of Christ nor begins to be the body of Christ, because beginning and completion are not distinguished in transubstantiation. Wherefore this solution of our argument is either very bad or really none at all.

Bellarmino follows the exposition of Guitmund, who wrote against Berengar, which is of this sort: "This is my body," that is, "this hitherto bread now is my body"; namely, from this time it is my body. But he does not notice that in this proposition, "This hitherto bread now is my body," there is either a trope or a falsehood. For "hitherto bread"—what was it except bread? But bread is not the body of Christ. If these words are understood: "This hitherto bread now is," that is, becomes the body of Christ or is changed into the body of Christ; then there is a trope in the words; for then "is" is put for "becomes" or "is changed." Thus Bellarmine will not escape either a trope or an absurdity.

Similarly, Bellarmine's own exposition does not lack a trope: "is," i.e., begins to be; but in transubstantiation there is no succession. How much better is our exposition, which admits no absurdities of this kind.

But that our exposition is true is further evident from the other part of this sacrament, when Christ says, "Drink from this, all of you." That pronoun "this"—what does it signify? And what does it demonstrate? Certainly nothing else except wine. Bellarmine says that Christ did not command them to drink wine, but what was contained in the cup under the species of wine, i.e., Christ's blood. But when Christ said, "Drink from this," it was not blood; for Christ had not yet uttered those words in which the force of transubstantiation consists, i.e., by which they say wine was changed into blood. For afterward Christ said, "This is my blood"; but it was not blood before these words were uttered; yet Christ said earlier, "Drink from this"; therefore that "this" demonstrated wine.

Thus therefore I frame the argument: What the Apostles were commanded to drink, that they drank; but they were commanded to drink wine; therefore they drank wine. I prove the minor premise because Christ before

He said the consecration: "Drink from this." Therefore, it was wine, because when the words of consecration had not yet been pronounced, the wine had not yet been changed. And the Evangelist Mark says that the Apostles drank before Christ said, "This is my

blood." Therefore, if the wine was changed into blood, this happened in the Apostles' stomachs. But Bellarmine says that it was wine before the consecration, but after the words of consecration were finished, it was not wine but blood. Yet when Christ commanded them to drink this, he had not finished the words of consecration; indeed, he had not uttered any word of consecration. Therefore, it was wine, not blood. If Christ had commanded them to drink wine and immediately removed the wine from their midst, the Apostles could not have done what they were commanded. But Christ willed that they do what they were commanded; therefore, he offered them wine to drink.

Similarly, concerning the other part of the Sacrament, he said, "Take, eat." What? Namely, "This." Therefore, they took and ate what Christ commanded them to take and eat. But he commanded them to take and eat bread. And this argument is *ἄλυτον*, that is, insoluble.

Likewise, in these words, "This cup is the new testament," τοῦτο refers to the cup, not to the blood; similarly, the other τοῦτο refers to the bread, not to the body. Bellarmine says this works in his favor because "cup" generally signifies whatever is contained in the cup. But this works for us, for we do not merely assert that τοῦτο should be understood as referring to the bread and the cup, but we teach that there is a trope in these words. They cry out against us because we establish tropes in Christ's words; but in these words, "This cup is the new testament," there is a double trope: first, "cup" is put for what is in the cup; second, "new testament" is put for the instrument of the new testament or the new covenant by which it is ratified. For even if Christ's blood were placed in the cup itself, still Christ's blood could not be the new testament, but rather that by which the new testament is ratified. What of the fact that the new testament was ratified not properly by the blood but by Christ's death? Why then are they angry with us and contend so much with us because we establish a trope in those words, "This is my body," when they establish a double trope in these: "This cup is the new testament in my blood"? And indeed these words are no less consecratory than those.

Luther has another reason, which however does not conclude: namely, that Christ spoke in Hebrew; the Hebrews are said not to have a neuter gender in the pronoun; therefore Christ did not say, "This is my body," but "This [masculine] is my body," and accordingly pointed to the bread, not to the body. But there is no doubt that the Evangelists understood Christ's meaning correctly, and the Hebrew pronoun can agree with the noun "body." And from this it appears that Luther at first interpreted "this" as referring to the bread, as we do, and did not so abhor tropes as later he pronounced an anathema on those who did not interpret it as referring to the bread.

But Calvin and Martyr draw a very strong argument from the order of the words in this manner: What Christ took, blessed, broke—that he gave to the Apostles; for all the words "took," "blessed," "broke," "gave" govern the same case. But Christ took bread, blessed

it, broke it; therefore he also gave it. Bellarmine admits that Christ took and blessed bread but gave not common bread but blessed bread, changed by the blessing. I reply: Neither do we say that he gave common bread, but blessed and changed—yet not with respect to substance. For sacramental bread is true bread by nature, differing only in relation or quality. But Christ gave no other nature or substance except bread. The Papists, however, wish that he took and blessed one substance but gave another—which is against the order and arrangement of the words.

But Bellarmine says that the word "blessed" intervenes between "took" and "gave." What then does this do? He says it means that not all these words govern the accusative in the same way. I reply: εὐλογεῖν, that is, "to bless," can govern the same case as λαβεῖν, that is, "to take." And although it is not necessary that the accusative in all verbs have the same referent, still it ought not to be changed into another nature.

Therefore, the same nature must remain.

But if he wishes that the word εὐλογεῖν changed the nature of the bread, then Christ transubstantiated the bread when He blessed it, not with those words, "This is my body." And Bellarmine adds that this is not unusual: as if someone were to say, "Someone struck Peter, killed him, buried him"; all the words govern the same case, but not in the same manner: for Peter was struck alive, but buried dead.

I reply: But first, Peter dead and alive is of the same nature: he who kills a man does not change his substance; for he kills the body, not the soul; he strikes the body, not the soul; he buries the body, not the soul. Therefore, he does not strike, kill, or bury the whole Peter, but the body of Peter. Therefore, since all those three verbs (struck, killed, buried) are understood concerning the same substance—that is, concerning the body, not the soul of Peter—so all these words (took, broke, gave) must be understood concerning one and the same substance.

Second, in those words—strike, kill, bury—an operation pertaining to the destruction of the thing is signified: for death arises from a blow; a blow is the cause of death; but death brings about a change, even if not transubstantiation. Yet in these words—took, blessed, broke—there is no word that implies either transubstantiation or destruction. Therefore, the example does not fit.

But Bellarmine says that the bread was changed by the blessing; by which words he signifies that Christ consecrated by the blessing: for he is driven by such zeal and vehemence in disputation that he places the consecration in the blessing. But in this he both contradicts himself and conflicts with others whose opinion has long prevailed in the schools.

First, with himself: because he contends that the pronoun "this" demonstrates a substance which is not precisely the body of Christ; but after consecration, there is precisely the body of Christ there; and they admit that after consecration it can be said, "This is the body of Christ," precisely. If therefore Christ consecrated by blessing, then "this" demonstrated precisely Christ's body: but Bellarmine denies this; therefore he openly contradicts himself.

Next, he admits that these words, "This is my body," are operative—that is, they effect what they signify; but if Christ had already consecrated by blessing, they effect nothing but only signify. For what need was there for any operation if it was already Christ's body beforehand?

Second, he manifestly conflicts with others who place all the power of consecrating in those words, "This is my body." But perhaps I do not grasp Bellarmine's meaning: for perhaps he holds this opinion—that Christ blessed with these words, "This is my body," and did not use another blessing—and indeed this was Thomas's opinion. But Bellarmine, being crafty, conceals his own opinion.

Yet if this is his opinion, it can easily be refuted. For he contradicts himself because earlier in the tenth chapter of this book he proves transubstantiation easily because Christ blessed: for it is never read that He blessed except when He was about to do something great and wonderful, as when He multiplied the loaves and fishes and raised Lazarus. But all those blessings were uttered with conceived words before the miracle: therefore there ought similarly to be here a certain blessing before transubstantiation—that is, before Christ worked the miracle. And otherwise certainly Christ would not have kept that order which He was always accustomed to keep, which was namely this: to use blessing before He undertook a great matter. Therefore the blessing was other than the utterance of these words.

Next, all the Evangelists make mention of this blessing and place it before the words of consecration. In a matter of such importance it is incredible that all used an inversion of words. For it is a rule among theologians that where all Evangelists narrate alike, there is no controversy about it; but all Evangelists say that Christ immediately when He took the bread blessed it, and then broke it, gave it, and said, "This is my body": therefore it is necessary that that blessing was different from the utterance of these words, "This is my body."

Moreover, this εὐλογεῖν (to bless) is nothing else than εὐχαριστεῖν (to give thanks), as we have taught before: therefore in this εὐλογία there ought to have been an act of thanksgiving; but these words, "This is my body," contain in themselves no act of thanksgiving: therefore Christ blessed with other words than these.

Bellarmino says that in that εὐλογία there was a speech and thanksgiving, and εὐχαριστίαν, that is, thanksgiving to be taken in its proper meaning. And so Chrysostom refers this very εὐλογῶν to God and interprets it as concerning thanksgiving. Moreover, he says that Christ gave thanks for three reasons: first, to instruct us how this mystery ought to be celebrated, namely with thanksgiving; second, to declare that he went to death of his own will and came into this world of his own will in order to undergo death; third, so that we may learn to bear all things we suffer with equanimity and with thanksgiving. Therefore, Chrysostom interprets it concerning the solemn blessing, which cannot be understood of those words, "This is my body." Therefore, the opinion of Thomas is most false, who says that Christ blessed by pronouncing these words, "This is my body," when Christ blessed immediately after taking it, before he broke it, or gave it, or said anything. Thus Thomas accuses the Evangelists of having changed the order of the words—which in no way ought to be imagined concerning them. So Thomas and Bellarmine cannot defend their conjectures unless they impose force upon the words of the Gospel.

But even if we grant that Christ consecrated by blessing and blessed by pronouncing these words, "This is my body," nevertheless our argument follows just the same: for then we argue thus: What Christ took, concerning it he said, "This is my body."

If indeed this opinion of Bellarmine stands, then it conflicts with other Papists of great name, especially with Innocent III, the Roman Pontiff, whose authority ought to outweigh all the minor Scholastics. He says that Christ indeed consecrated by blessing, but he interprets this blessing concerning a hidden power, not concerning the utterance of these words, "This is my body," as Thomas foolishly does and many today following Thomas.

Bonaventure judges that Christ did not consecrate by blessing. Thus Cajetan says that it was a blessing of praise. And Dominic Soto disapproves of that exposition of Thomas and says that Christ now did what he was always accustomed to do when taking food, namely, that he blessed God. And so we read in the Canon of the Mass that Christ blessed with his eyes raised to heaven; but when he said, "This is my body," he did not raise his eyes to heaven but lowered them to the bread, because he indicated the bread—unless we wish to say that he raised his eyes to heaven and pointed his finger at the bread. Therefore it is false what Bellarmine says, that Christ took bread but changed it when he blessed; for no change was made except by these words, "This is my body," and Christ blessed with other words, as we have already proved.

And this is established from all the liturgies of James, Clement, Basil, Chrysostom, in which it is said that Christ blessed and gave thanks to God with his eyes raised to heaven while he held the bread in his hand, and afterward broke it and gave it and said, "This is my body." And certainly it is absurd for us to say that all the Evangelists were ignorant of

the order of Christ's words and provided an occasion for such great controversies in the Church of God.

Nevertheless our Alanus says that this is the common opinion of all the Scholastics: that Christ blessed with these words, "This is my body."

But now let us return to the argument: Christ when he said, "This is my body," with the pronoun "this" indicated the bread; for "this" refers to that which Christ took, blessed, broke; but that was bread; therefore "this" indicated not a new thing but the same thing; because it ought to indicate a present thing by Bellarmine's own confession above.

But Bellarmine denies that the bread or the body of Christ is precisely indicated, but rather the substance contained under those species; but that substance is none other than bread—which can be established from Bellarmine himself. For he uses this example and says it is a fitting example: If Christ (he says), when he changed water into wine, had pointed to the water-pots of water and said, "This is wine," and by those words had changed the water into wine, this statement could not be explained thus: "This is wine," that is, "this water is wine," nor thus: "This wine is wine"; for wine was not present when "this" was said, but the sense would be: "This is wine," that is, "in this vessel there is wine."

From this I argue thus: When Christ said, "This is my body,"

My body, I had not yet been present in his body; but the bread existed before it was the body of Christ, because the body of Christ succeeds the bread. Therefore, he indicated this bread. Then who does not see a trope here: "This is wine," that is, "in this vessel is wine"? And similarly it would be here: for the sense of the words here would be, "This is my body," that is, "here is my body," or "in these species is my body." But the adversaries explain "this" as referring to the substance; they do not wish it to be taken as "here" or "in this." Therefore, no substance can be understood unless it is either the body of Christ or the bread; for a vague individual can be thought and conceived in the mind, but it cannot be pointed out.

And here Bellarmine, while wishing to accuse Peter Martyr, a most learned man, of ignorance—because he makes Scotus the first author of the vague individual, although Scotus says nothing about it—himself reveals his own ignorance no less, in wanting Dominic à Soto to be the first to mention it. For before him, Durandus mentions the vague individual, because he says that by the pronoun "this," not a designated individual but a vague one is indicated, so that the sense is: "This substance," not a specific one, but in general, without determination either to the body of Christ or to the bread. And this is Bellarmine's opinion.

But "this" necessarily indicates some designated and determinate individual, because what is contained under those species is a certain individual; for a common substance cannot lie hidden under those accidents, which are singular. But here Bellarmine advises that one should say not "this substance," but "substance under these species"; for there is a great difference between those two: "this," that is, "this substance," and "this," that is, "substance under these species." Oh, wonderful and pure trickery! But come, tell me, I ask you, what the difference is. He says: "We do not say 'this,' that is, 'this substance,' or 'this being,' but 'this,' that is, 'substance under these species.'" Why so, I ask? Because if you say "this," that is, "this substance," it is necessary that that substance be present when "this" is said; but the body of Christ is not yet present. But if you say "this," that is, "substance under these species," it is not necessary that that substance be present then; it is enough if the species are present, which are indicated by the pronoun "this." Therefore, the sense here is: "This is my body," i.e., "substance under these species is my body," or "Under these species is my body."

But I reply: First, this explanation is figurative, so that "this" properly indicates the accidents, although the accidents are not the body of Christ either properly or improperly. Roffensis denies that the pronoun "this" indicates accidents, but says it indicates the body of Christ. Second, "this" always indicates something determinate, even precisely. Thus Cajetan says that "this" indicates an individual of substance, i.e., this substance. So I argue from Cajetan: If "this" indicates this substance, then it indicates a present thing; if a present thing, then the bread, because the body of Christ was not yet present. Third, who does not see that it is most absurd for the substance contained under those species to be indicated and yet not be present? These are plainly contradictory: to be contained under those species and not to be present. "This" does not signify a present substance; and yet it is contained under those species. What kind of monster is this? As if it were not necessary for the substance contained under those species to be present. And Bellarmine himself admits that it is necessary for the pronoun "this" to indicate a present thing and immediately to signify something certain. Certainly, as truly as those species are present, so truly is the thing contained under those species present. Fourth, either there will be no operation in these words, or "this" ought to indicate the substance from which the body of Christ is made; but the body of Christ is not made from a vague individual, but from bread (as they wish), unless the body of Christ itself is a vague individual. Therefore it follows that "this" is understood of the bread, which Christ took, blessed, broke, and gave; and therefore it is a trope. Those who think otherwise certainly do not know what a trope is. A singular thing can only come from a singular thing; but the body of Christ is a singular thing; therefore it comes from a singular thing. But there is no other singular thing when the pronoun "this" is uttered except the bread; therefore it must be made from bread, if it is made at all.

And this is clear from the fact that the adversaries are driven into infinite absurdities when they explain it otherwise. Dominic à Soto says about the exposition of these words that there are as many senses as there are heads; let them stop.

Therefore, they raise an objection against us. Indeed, there is no other meaning of these words ("This is my body") after the consecration than when the priest approaches to consecrate or is engaged in consecrating; namely, "This is the Sacrament of my body," or, "This signifies my body."

And that the pronoun "this" points to the bread is proven from the reasoning of our adversaries. For Cajetan proves that by "this," the body of Christ is not indicated, because the body of Christ does not come from the body of Christ, nor is it converted into the body of Christ. Therefore, he rightly concludes that by the pronoun "this," the bread is indicated, because, according to their opinion, the bread becomes the body of Christ.

We have spoken about our first argument; now let us come to the second, which is taken from the verb "is." The Papists are compelled to take the verb "is" figuratively for "becomes"; therefore, in these words there is a trope. The antecedent is proven in two ways.

First, otherwise this proposition would be false: "This is my body." For a thing must exist before we declare it to be, especially if these words are the cause of the conversion; for the cause is always prior to its effect.

Second, these words are operative according to the opinion of the Papists, just as those words, "Let there be light"; therefore, the verb "is" ought to be taken for "becomes." Bellarmine, along with Thomas, responds that these words do not have a complete signification except in the last instant; for the understanding is suspended until the end is reached. And he says this happens in any other opinion.

I reply:

1. It is necessary that the verb "is" be taken differently in this proposition than in others, because it is agreed among men that this is a singular proposition. In others, however, the truth of the statement follows the truth of the thing: for such is the truth of the statement as is that of the thing; as if I were to say, "Bellarmine is a Jesuit," this proposition is true if he is a Jesuit; if not, false. And therefore, although in every statement the understanding is suspended until the end is reached, yet the truth in the thing exists either before or after; and the understanding suspended is not that of the speaker, but of the hearer. For while I am speaking, your understanding is suspended until I have fully pronounced the statement; but my understanding has conceived and formed the entire statement in mind before I begin to speak. Similarly, when Christ uttered these words, "This is my body," indeed the understanding was suspended, but that of the Apostles, not

of Christ, until the end of the last word was reached; for this meaning was previously conceived and formed in Christ's mind. Therefore, it must always be that the thing is as it is declared to be, even before all the words are uttered, if the speech were proper.

2. The conversion does not occur except in the last instant, as they wish, and these words are the cause of the conversion; therefore, the conversion is posterior to this utterance. When therefore "is" is uttered, the conversion has not yet occurred, because two words, namely "my body," have not yet been uttered; and not only is the understanding suspended until all words are spoken, but also the truth of the thing, as they wish. For thus Bellarmine admits here that these words, insofar as they are the cause of conversion, precede the conversion; on the contrary, insofar as the truth of the proposition depends on the essence of the thing, the conversion precedes the signification.

Therefore, the verb "is" does not have its proper signification: because in other propositions it follows the nature of the thing, it does not precede; but in these words, the conversion precedes the signification; therefore, until the conversion has taken place, either it signifies nothing, as Scotus says, or not properly. The conversion, as they say, follows the utterance of these words; for they say that the utterance is the cause of conversion: therefore, while the statement is being uttered, there is no truth in it; but there ought to be truth in the statement when it is uttered; or else the matter stands differently in this statement than in others.

3. What he says that he follows Thomas is most false: for Thomas places this opinion among those which he refutes; for then, he says, "This" would indicate nothing other than the body of Christ, and so this would be the meaning of these words: "This my body is my body." And this is also evident from Bellarmine, who according to Thomas wishes "this" not to indicate bread, but substance in common before the utterance of all words. But what need is there for these ambiguities if the truth of the statement depends on the last instant? For in the last instant there is substance not in common.

Therefore, it is determined. Hence Bonaventure says that "is" should be taken for "is made," as Domingo de Soto does. Therefore, this objection is not that of Peter Martyr or Calvin, but of the Papists. Meanwhile, let us observe that Bellarmine says the understanding of these words depends on the last instant, and yet he anxiously inquires what is demonstrated by the pronoun "this." Therefore, let us say with Scotus and others that the pronoun "this" demonstrates nothing until all the words have been uttered.

As for our second reason, by which we prove the antecedent of this argument, Bellarmine says the words are operative even if "is" is not taken for "is made," because when God, who cannot lie, says something is, it is necessary that it come to be. I reply: since it is false, as they claim, that the truth of the proposition is suspended until the end of the utterance of all the words—for Christ's body is not present, as they say, until the end of

speaking—therefore, what God says is does not yet exist. But God never said that something exists which did not exist. Therefore, the word "is" cannot be taken properly so that the true sense of the proposition holds, because all the words have not yet been uttered.

Our third argument follows, which is of this kind: This phrase, "This is my body," is sacramental; therefore it must be understood sacramentally, so that the sense is: "This is," that is, "This signifies my body sacramentally," or "This is the sacrament of my body." This indeed is our argument, which Bellarmine either did not understand or pretended not to understand; therefore he gives some reply, but it is irrelevant. For he anxiously proves by these words that the sacrament was instituted, not merely explained. And we too affirm that by these words the sacrament was instituted; and because Christ now instituted the sacrament, therefore the statement must be expounded sacramentally. For Christ instituted a sacrament; he did not convert one nature into another or produce a new creature. But sacraments do not require that external signs be changed into the things signified, but that, with their natures preserved intact, they signify something else. Therefore, when Christ said, "This is my body," because he instituted a sacrament of his body, he did not change bread into his body, but made from bread a sacrament of his body. For in no sacrament is the sign changed into the thing, because then the sign would not be a sign but the thing itself signified, nor would any analogy remain between the external sign and the thing which is declared by this sign. And Calvin truly said concerning this argument: "Let this be a wall of bronze." For the truth of the sacrament is utterly destroyed if there is a conversion of the sacrament into the thing. Bellarmine replies with nothing at all to the point, and yet he says this wall has been found to be made of clay. But by what argument, I ask? That Christ instituted a sacrament; therefore he made his body from bread because he said, "This is my body"? Then when he instituted circumcision and said, "Circumcision is my covenant," did he convert circumcision into a covenant? And when he similarly said that the lamb was the Passover, did he change the lamb into the Passover? Indeed, because he wished to institute a sacrament of his body, he ought to have given the name of his body to the sacrament, as is customary in every sacrament. And let this be a wall of bronze against the clay arguments of the Papists. Concerning this argument, therefore, we have said enough; now let us come to the fourth.

Our fourth argument stands thus: The apostles received Christ's words as we do and did not doubt that Christ spoke figuratively; and they understood Christ's mind; therefore our exposition is true. That they so understood Christ is clear from this: otherwise they would have been vehemently troubled and astonished by Christ's words; but they heard calmly and tranquilly and did what they were commanded by Christ. Therefore they understood no transubstantiation but judged that Christ spoke figuratively, as was his custom. If they had believed that Christ spoke properly, certainly this statement would have disturbed

them. For they asked perplexedly about much lighter and smaller matters—as when Thomas said to Christ, "Lord, we do not know where you are going," though Christ had said they would know; and when some of them said, "What is this that he says to us: 'A little while, and you will not see me; and again a little while, and you will see me'?" and "Because I

Do I go to the Father? They were saying, therefore: "What is that which he says, 'a little while'? We do not know what he is speaking." So in many other places, when the matter itself did not demand such great doubt, they were troubled. But now when Christ says, "This is my body," none of them is moved, marvels, doubts, or asks. Therefore, it did not occur to them that Christ's words were to be understood literally.

Bellarmino assigns two reasons why they were not troubled. The first is that they had been previously instructed and forewarned, as Chrysostom teaches. I reply: we do not reject that reason. Indeed, the Apostles were forewarned by Christ about the eating of his body, which would take place in faith, about which Christ spoke at length in the sixth chapter of John, and there he said many things about his flesh and blood and delivered a long discourse. And they were taught by Christ that all these things were to be understood spiritually. Therefore, when Christ now instituted the Sacrament of this spiritual eating, this did not seem new to them.

Although the Apostles were often admonished about one and the same matter, and from almost any occasion they questioned Christ—so that Christ once said to them, "Are you still without understanding?"—nevertheless this reason does not satisfy the argument. For even if Christ had forewarned them, yet if they had understood these words carnally when Christ instituted the Sacrament and said, "This is my body," without doubt they would have proposed many questions.

But Bellarmine adds a second reason, namely because the same Christ who was handing down the mysteries was enlightening their minds with faith so that they might believe simply. For (he says) they had heard many other more wondrous things and were not troubled—for example, that the man whom they saw eating, drinking, sleeping, growing weary, was true God, and was already then in heaven while he was speaking on earth. I reply: this is not so marvelous. For the Apostles knew Christ to be God both from his works and from the Scriptures of the Prophets. Therefore, it could not seem wondrous to them that he said he was then in heaven while he was on earth as to bodily presence. For it is not absurd that he who was on earth as to the flesh was in heaven as to the Godhead. But that the body which they beheld, and which sat there whole, should be invisibly in the bread and be eaten by each one of them—this would have brought to them not only wonder but also horror, and that for a double reason: first, how could it invisibly be present there? second, how and why would they eat the body of their Lord? Certainly the

Apostles would never have passed over this without many and curious questions. But they raised no question.

Zacharias, when the angel said to him that a son would be born to him, immediately said, “By what shall I know this?” So Mary, when she heard that she as a virgin would bear a child, said, “How shall this be?” This was much more marvelous, and yet none of the Apostles asks “how,” that is, how this would happen. Indeed, the Apostles do not doubt either about the thing or about the manner because there is no difficulty in spiritual eating.

Peter, when Christ wished to wash his feet, refused until Christ said to him that unless he permitted it, he would have no part with him. Now certainly he devours his whole Lord and sees him devoured by each of the Apostles—and yet he is silent.

But besides these two reasons, Chrysostom mentions another which Bellarmine cunningly suppressed and deliberately passed over. For he says the Apostles were not troubled because they saw Christ eating and drinking beforehand. Whence they understood that Christ had spoken sacramentally, because it could never come into their minds that Christ would eat his own body—for why would Christ eat himself? And what would be the manner of this eating? But Bellarmine asks why today thousands of simple Catholics are not troubled—is it not because they are enlightened by faith? I reply: first, this is not faith but a crude and brutish opinion born from their error and perverted understanding of Christ’s words. Then too, today the Papists are not troubled because the matter is not new to them; but the Apostles ought to have been troubled, to whom this was new and unheard of.

I see in the sixth chapter of John we read that many withdrew and said, “This is a hard saying,” and many of them afterward turned back. But they were offended when Christ spoke only about spiritual eating.

Let us speak about the eating: What would we believe the Apostles would have done if they had thought Christ was speaking about a bodily eating? When Christ said He was going to Jerusalem and would suffer many things there, Peter either did not understand or thought it unworthy of Christ; certainly, he advised against it. Yet we now do not marvel at these things, nor are we offended by them. Therefore, many things were wondrous and new to the Apostles which are not so to us because of familiarity, since we have not heard them for the first time. For this reason, this argument of Bellarmine is of no force.

Our fifth argument is taken from those words: “Take, eat.” The very body of Christ is not eaten properly; therefore, either the body is taken figuratively, or the eating is. Bellarmine replies first that the body of Christ is eaten properly in the Eucharist. But certainly it is not ground by the teeth, which is necessary for eating. But Bellarmine says this grinding is not necessary; rather, consumption and transmission from the mouth to the stomach

suffice. And he proves it because otherwise infants and toothless old people would eat nothing. I reply: In eating, which is properly so called, either grinding or breaking down is required, because it comes from chewing. Therefore, to eat—if we consider the proper meaning of the word—is to consume food with the teeth, or with the mouth and jaws. As for infants and toothless old people, who would say that an infant or a toothless person eats properly? For to suck is not to eat, nor is swallowing properly to eat; otherwise, drinking would be eating. Indeed, to send whole foods down into the stomach without chewing is not to eat properly; for swallowing is one thing, eating another. And decrepit old people usually use spoonfuls or softer foods or fruits that can be easily chewed. But to transfer a human body into the stomach, and indeed whole, is a Cyclopean kind of eating. Indeed, even cannibals—that is, those who feed on human flesh—cut up the bodies of those they devour into pieces. Therefore, it is not to eat or consume properly to devour something whole, because it is not done with those instruments which are required for eating.

But secondly, Bellarmine replies that even if grinding were necessary, still the body of Christ is eaten properly in the Eucharist—not absolutely, but nevertheless properly. I reply: This is certainly strange, that something should be eaten properly yet not absolutely; therefore, this is not absolute eating. But Christ speaks of absolute eating; for He commanded the Apostles to eat as other men eat. He did not say, “Devour this whole; refrain from your teeth,” but “Eat.” Nor is there any doubt that the Apostles, being unlearned, ate the Eucharist as they did other foods. But Bellarmine calls it proper eating, not absolute, when the visible and sensible species are eaten and ground by the teeth, and under them the whole body of Christ is invisibly received and even transmitted to the stomach. He admits, therefore, that the species are ground, and ground by the teeth. Now indeed this must be considered: The whole body of Christ lies hidden under each part of the species; but the grinding of the species is into many parts. From this it follows that it can happen that one person has in his mouth not just one body of Christ, but many—perhaps a hundred or a thousand bodies. For in each even very minute fragment of the species there is the whole body of Christ, because the body of Christ itself is not ground, but only the species. But this is monstrous: that someone should have so many Christs at once in his mouth.

But here it is necessary that there be a trope if what Christ said about His body is understood about the species of bread. Indeed, there is a double trope: first, because the body of Christ is said to be eaten when only the species of bread under which it lies are eaten—for Bellarmine says only the species are ground by the teeth, but grinding is necessarily required for eating; second, because the species cannot be eaten properly—for eating is of some substance and indeed a corporeal one. There must be something that can be eaten; but the species by themselves cannot be eaten because there is nothing thick in

them that can be broken down or ground. Indeed, there is no need to dwell much on the eating of the species—that is, their grinding—for all species of things, if they could

If they were separated from their subjects, they would have nothing solid, thick, or hard in themselves, so that no one need fear suffocation from them. If all the appearances of things were gathered into one, they could easily be swallowed and conveyed into the stomach without any grinding. But Bellarmine would not want the host to be conveyed without the breaking and grinding of the species. And what is ground and, after being ground, is conveyed into the stomach, nourishes our bodies—not so the species. Certainly, if the adversaries were nourished only by the species, they would quickly become emaciated. Therefore, this eating does not refer to the species, which cannot be eaten except in relation to their subjects. But Christ commanded that this be eaten: for that of which it can be said, "This is my body," he commanded to be eaten. But this is not a particle of bread, but either the body of Christ or the bread. Thus I conclude: when we take and eat the sacrament, we grind something solid and thick—but not the body of Christ; therefore, it is the substance of bread. Therefore, what Christ commanded to take and eat was nothing other than bread.

But Bellarmine still proceeds and says that true bread is not ground by those who eat it except by reason of its accidents. What then? Because bread could not be divided and thus eaten unless it were soft and fragile, are the accidents therefore absolutely eaten? Substances cannot be eaten without accidents; therefore, are not the accidents themselves eaten? Certainly, substances cannot be eaten without accidents; much less can accidents be eaten without substances. Therefore, when Bellarmine refers eating to the accidents and not to the body of Christ, why does he not grant that the body of Christ is not properly eaten? Accidents alone, separated from their substances, have nothing in themselves in which teeth can be occupied or exercised; therefore, there is no eating of them. If, therefore, they refer eating to the body of Christ and understand this of proper eating, then the body of Christ must be ground by the teeth because this is necessary in solid bodies that have flesh, sinews, and bones. But this must not be asserted concerning the body of Christ; therefore, proper eating refers to the bread—that is, the external sacrament—while figurative eating is referred to the body of Christ, which is eaten with the heart, not the body; by faith, not by tooth or mouth. And this is what Augustine says: "Why prepare tooth and stomach?" But in proper eating, tooth and stomach must be prepared.

Cajetan says that the true body of Christ is eaten in the Eucharist, but not corporally—spiritually. This is what we say. Therefore, this eating is not proper because spiritual eating is not proper eating except by similitude; but the eating that is proper is corporal.

Our sixth argument is taken from those passages of Scripture—which are certainly many—in which either the word "is" is taken for "signifies," or the predicate is taken

figuratively, as in Genesis 17:13: "Circumcision is a covenant," and innumerable others of this kind, about which we will speak shortly. Why then should one not say the same about this passage and these words: "This is my body"? Bellarmine answers in two ways: first in general, second specifically concerning individual passages. In general, he also answers in two ways: first, that one cannot conclude from a few examples that it is so everywhere. I reply: We do not argue thus: "In many passages the word 'is' is taken for 'signifies,' therefore in all." But from the fact that "is" in many similar passages is taken figuratively and in a similar argument, therefore we contend that it is so taken in this passage as well. And the Papists themselves are accustomed to argue thus: "The word 'is' in many other passages of Scripture is taken properly; therefore also in this passage." Bellarmine says that Klebitius, answering thus, lies against his own head. I reply: Certainly he lies in nothing; for indeed he urges the proper signification of these words because other passages are mostly taken properly.

But Bellarmine says: "We use a general rule and say that everywhere the propriety of words must be preserved unless it is clearly taught that there is a trope somewhere." I reply: Even in these words, unless they were most perversely blind, they would see an evident trope. For when Christ took bread and said of the bread, "This is my body," who would deny a trope? Nor does it matter to the point that "this" is understood of the bread because the word "blessed" is interposed; for if one separates the blessing from the utterance,

Now, concerning these words, he then thinks that Christ did not consecrate with these words, "This is my body," which is contrary to the opinion commonly held by the Pontificians. If he understands the blessing concerning the utterance of these words, then what does he determine concerning that which Christ took into his hands and said "This" about? Certainly, he cannot determine anything other than what we say, namely, that it was bread.

Then, since Christ's body is like ours and is now in heaven, the analogy of faith demands that we establish a trope in the words, lest we call Christ down from heaven and the truth of his human nature be destroyed, since it would be enclosed in such a small space. These are the foundations of the tropical signification.

Secondly, Bellarmine responds in general that no similar example has been brought forward by us. For in the examples brought forward, he says, something disparate is always predicated of something disparate, as is clear from these: "The oxen are years," "The seed is the word," "Christ is the vine," etc. Therefore, we are compelled necessarily to resort to tropes. But in this sentence, "This is my body," he says, something disparate is not predicated of something disparate, at least not in explicit words.

I reply: What does this mean, "at least not in explicit words"? It is sufficient if something disparate is predicated of something disparate altogether. And indeed, it is predicated most explicitly: for the body of Christ is said of bread. But, he will object, bread is not named. However, "This" refers to bread, nothing else; and Christ took bread, gave it, and said, "This is my body."

But Bellarmine says that it is in question what "This" signifies. But they cannot offer any probable signification of these words unless "This" is understood as referring to bread. Yet he demands an example where something is predicated tropically of a pronoun. Certainly, although some examples have been brought forward by others, nevertheless, because he requires one example, I will present to him two, and those from one chapter of the prophet Zechariah: where first it is said of a flying scroll, "This is the curse"; secondly, of a woman sitting in the middle of an ephah, it is said, "This is wickedness," because that woman was a type of iniquity.

But now let us look at the examples brought forward in the argument. It will not be necessary to go through each one; it is enough if I touch upon the principal ones, and especially those in which there is sacramental analogy. For Bellarmine admits that in many there is a trope, namely when a likeness is used, as in these: "The seven cows are seven years," and "I am the vine," and in others of this sort. But we will prove that even in sacramental expressions the matter stands thus: as when it is said, "This is the blood of the covenant." Bellarmine says it is not read, "This is the Testament." I reply: "This blood is of the covenant" has no other sense than "this blood is the covenant," or "the sign of the covenant." For the blood was that of a bull, but by this blood that covenant was represented. "This is the blood of the covenant" cannot be understood without a trope, because a covenant does not have blood.

Therefore, since the blood properly belongs to the bull, improperly to the covenant—namely because by that blood God sanctified his covenant—it must necessarily be that this is not a proper but a tropical and improper expression. Thus sacrifices are often called expiations; yet they were not themselves expiations but only signs of them. Bellarmine says this is false: they are not said thus. But nothing is more frequent than "to sacrifice the victim of expiation" and "the water of expiation," which amounts to the same as if the victim and water were called expiation.

Thus the Ark is called God; which when Bellarmine denies, he openly contradicts Scripture. For when the Ark was lifted up, Moses used to say, "Arise, O Lord," and when it was set down, "Return, O Lord"; but God neither arises nor returns. Thus "to stand before the Lord," "to feast before the Lord," is very often said—that is, before the Ark. The Ark was called "the Lord" because it was a symbol of the divine presence.

But let us come to more manifest examples. The lamb is called Pesah, that is, Passover. And here the audacity of the Jesuit is to be observed. He says that the lamb is indeed called Passover not tropically but properly: as if this were the proper name of the lamb—which no one ever said, nor can it be explained by anyone—indeed, it cannot even be thought how the lamb was the Passover and how it could be called "passing over." For "passing over" is in the category of action; but "lamb" is in the category of substance. How a substance can be called an action no one can conceive.

But Bellarmine says that there is no inherent similarity between the slaughter of the lamb and the Lord's passing over. However, it could be called Passover for another reason than the slaughter. For God commanded it to be eaten in haste, and adds the reason: because it is the passing over of the Lord. On account of this haste in eating, it is called a passing over, because that haste foreshadowed the speed which God used in killing the Egyptians. Therefore, it was a sign of this passing over; and when Bellarmine denies this, what else does he do but openly deny Scripture? For God commands it to be eaten with haste, and gives the reason: because it is the Lord's passing over. Where it is called Passover, it is not because this was its proper name, but because it represented the passing over of the Lord.

A certain learned man holds that Pesah properly means a leap, because God, as if by a leap, passed over the houses of the Israelites, but rushed into the houses of the Egyptians. For although the Israelites lived among the Egyptians, God, as if leaping, passed over their houses. But it must be observed how excellently these Jesuits agree among themselves. Durandus of Scotland denies that the lamb is called the passing over, but only says that a cause is given why it had to be eaten with haste, because God was about to pass over the Israelites while striking the Egyptians. And so do many other Papists, such as Claude de Saintes. And the Bishop of Ross says that the lamb is not called Passover, but that the ceremony in killing the lamb is called the passing over. Although Peter Michael the Jesuit acknowledges a trope in these words.

But all those named above are openly refuted, because the Passover is often commanded to be slain, sacrificed, eaten, and prepared—all of which must be understood of the lamb. Therefore, the name Passover is attributed to the lamb, not to the ceremony; for these things cannot be said of that ceremony. Bellarmine so insists that the lamb is called Passover that he makes this its proper name—than which nothing more absurd or desperate could be said by him.

Moreover, the Israelites are forbidden to break its bone—which must necessarily be understood of the lamb—and Christ is said to be our Passover. Jerome of Oleaster clearly says that the lamb is called Passover because it was a sign of that leap. Thus there is no room for slanders: as the lamb was Passover, so the bread is the body of Christ. So also the rock is said to be Christ—a passage over which Bellarmine labors greatly.

He says that this is not understood of the material rock which signified Christ, but of an invisible and spiritual rock which provided all necessities for the Jews; which rock, he says, truly and properly was Christ as God—and he uses the names of Chrysostom, Theophylact, Theodoret, and Ambrose. But I can oppose Augustine to all these, who teaches the contrary in many places. In his book on Questions on Leviticus he has these words: “The rock was Christ—he did not say ‘signifies Christ,’ but as if it were that which certainly it was not in substance, but by signification.” Therefore Augustine understands it of a material rock; for an invisible rock was Christ in substance. So elsewhere he says that the rock signified something other than what it was: therefore it was corporeal and visible, but it signified a spiritual and invisible rock.

And Jerome says that this rock was a figure of Christ; therefore it was not Christ himself, as Bellarmine would have it. And this can be most clearly gathered from the passage itself: for Paul says that all drank the same spiritual drink—that is, water flowing from that spiritual rock. But not all were partakers of Christ, who was the invisible rock; for then all would have been saved. Yet all received the spiritual rock—that is, the spiritual sign of Christ.

But Bellarmine proves that it must be understood of Christ because Paul says that this rock followed the Hebrews; but this water did not follow them, for immediately afterward they lacked water. I reply: The apostle does not say that this rock followed them through all the wilderness—even if Jewish tradition relates it so—and Tertullian mentions manna as edible rain and the rock as a watery follower; and Jerome says that the rock followed them through all the desert. It could have followed for some distance; and we read that the rock was struck twice by Moses, and a long interval passed between the first striking and the second; for God gave them water from the rock twice. The apostle simply says: “The rock was Christ”—not one or the other, but both; for both were a figure of Christ.

And Bellarmine says that it was

the figure of Christ, but not for that reason is that figure explained by these words, “The rock was Christ.” I ask, therefore, by what other words is it explained? Let him produce other words where that rock is said to be a figure of Christ; but he cannot. What does it matter to us that he says the rock is a figure of Christ, if he cannot prove it? Certainly, if this passage is taken away, he will not be able to prove it. Therefore, we set forth the true meaning of the passage when we say that the Apostle, by “rock,” does not mean an invisible rock, from which not all drank, but that earthly one, or rather the water flowing from it: this was not truly Christ, but it was called Christ because it was a Sacrament of Christ.

Thus the sea was a certain Sacrament of Christ, and the cloud, and the Manna, which were external things; in the same way also the rock. Therefore, the meaning is that the

rock is called Christ because it signified Christ and was a figure of Christ. Thus Innocent III expounds those words, "The rock was Christ," in this way: "The rock signified Christ." So also Cajetan and others. Thus, therefore, the rock is called Christ as the bread is called the body of Christ—that is, figuratively, and on account of this figure the name of the thing is attributed to the sign.

But now let us come to that passage which is found a little later in the same chapter: "The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?" In these words no one can deny that there is a trope; for the bread is not properly the communion of the body of Christ, but its sign and Sacrament. Bellarmine says that there is no trope here that takes away the truth of the thing or obscures the meaning. We also say this: for certainly tropes do not take away the truth of the thing nor obscure the meaning; indeed, they are used for illustration. Nevertheless, we affirm that there is a trope in these words: for the bread is not properly communion; and as the bread is the communion of the body of Christ, so it is the body of Christ.

Paul, therefore, is the best interpreter of Christ in this place, whose words are like a commentary on those words of Christ, "This is my body." When Christ says, "This is my body," what is understood by "this"? The Apostle responds: "The bread." What about "body"? Not, as the Papists wish, the very body of Christ really and substantially; but the Apostle means that we ought to commune with Christ by faith. Therefore, he does not say, "The bread is the body of Christ," but "the bread is the communion of the body of Christ"—which expression certainly necessarily includes a trope.

But Bellarmine says that this is not the meaning: "The bread signifies the communication of the body of Christ." What then is the meaning? The Apostle, he says, is speaking of consecrated bread. Granted; what then is the meaning? Namely: "The communion of consecrated bread in the Lord's Supper is the communion of the Lord's body." But the Apostle does not say, "The communion of bread," but "the bread." But suppose that by "bread" is understood the true body of the Lord: yet whoever says that the true body of the Lord is the communion of the Lord's body does not speak properly. But how absurd is this meaning: "Is not the true body of the Lord the communion of the Lord's body?" Who doubts it? For whoever eats the true bread communicates the true bread. But the Apostle teaches that by that bread the communion which we have with Christ is declared. Most absurd indeed would be the Apostle if he spoke thus: "Whoever eats the true body of Christ communicates the body of Christ." But the true meaning is that with this bread the body of Christ is communicated.

And what the Apostle here says about the bread, he said earlier about the cup: "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ?" where the communion of the blood of Christ is predicated of the cup. If we remove all tropes, how shall we interpret these words? Shall we say that the cup is properly the communion of

the blood of Christ? I think not. If therefore it is necessary to admit tropes here, let us not maliciously slander tropes.

But what then will they answer concerning those words, "Circumcision is a covenant"? Certainly Bellarmine answers nothing else except that an explanation is given there—that is, it is called a sign of the covenant. But because an explanation is given there, it does not follow that that statement is not figurative. Bellarmine therefore admits that there is a trope here; yet Durandus did not wish to: he says that not circumcision but God's covenant with Abraham was called a covenant. But this is absurd: for then a covenant would be called a covenant. Similarly also Sainctes answers as Durandus does. But Abraham is commanded to imprint a covenant in the flesh; yet a covenant itself could not be imprinted in the flesh. And so it is held in the book called Ecclesiasticus, where concerning Abraham it is said, "He established a covenant in his flesh." Therefore, it is clear that circumcision is called a covenant and testament. Bellarmine here concedes this, but he says that in the same place an explanation is given, namely, that it is a sign of the covenant. Similarly, we often bring forward many explanations from the Scriptures, from which we teach that these expressions are figurative. All the words of Christ indicate tropes: Paul calls bread what Christ calls his body. I am not now bringing forward parables, allegories, and similitudes, in which it can be doubtful to no one that "is" is put for "signifies," but only those testimonies in which sacramental language is found.

Now let us come to our seventh argument: we frame it thus: If in those words, "This is my body," body is taken literally, then there is a body without blood, without soul, without divinity. But this is not to be conceded, because there is no division of natures; therefore these cannot be separated. But if "body" signifies the whole Christ, then it is not taken literally; therefore it is a trope, and indeed a manifest trope, because "body" does not literally signify blood, soul, or divinity. Moreover, then it would be equally permissible to say of the bread, "This is the blood," as well as "This is the body"; and of the cup, "This is the body," as well as "This is the blood." But this cannot even be conceived without a trope; for blood cannot be understood with body, nor body with blood and soul, when "body alone" and "blood alone" are spoken without a trope.

Bellarmino boldly replies that the words signify literally, and by the name "body" only body is understood, by the name "blood" only blood; yet the body is not separated from the blood on account of necessary concomitance. I reply: 1. Even if we concede such concomitance, nevertheless it is necessary that we establish a figure in the words and say there is a trope here, because only body is named; but "body" literally does not signify blood with body, but only body. He who shows only body and understands body with blood undoubtedly uses a trope. 2. Indeed, this very concomitance is the greatest trope, or rather a monstrosity of a trope; for it causes not only body but also blood to lie hidden under the species of bread, and thus under the species of wine not only blood but also body. 3. It not only establishes a trope in the words but also destroys the order of nature.

For if true blood is under the species of bread, then we are commanded to eat blood, because we are commanded to eat all that lies hidden under the species of bread. And this perhaps is not strange: for he who eats the whole body easily eats the blood lying in the veins together with the body. But we are also commanded to drink the body (which is impossible and alien to all reason), because through concomitance the body is with the blood, and blood cannot be outside the body; and whatever lies hidden under the species of wine we are commanded to drink. And yet the blood must first be shown by saying, "This is the blood," which cannot happen unless the blood is outside the body. Since therefore, according to the opinion of the Papists, we drink Christ's body in the same way as we eat it, it is necessary that there be a new trope here, which causes human bodies not only to be eaten but also to be drunk.

Thus I argue: If the words of the Supper require that Christ's body be drunk and his blood eaten, then they are taken figuratively. But the former is true; therefore also the latter. The consequence of the major premise is clear, because there is a trope where there is no literal sense; but "to eat" is not literally both "to eat" and "to drink"; nor is "body" literally both "body" and "blood"; nor is "to drink" literally both "to drink" and "to eat." The minor premise is also clear, because we are commanded to drink what is in the cup. If therefore Christ's body is in the cup no less than under the species of bread, then we are commanded to drink it; and if Christ's blood is under the species of bread no less than under the species of wine, then we are commanded to eat the blood.

4. This concomitance conflicts not only with Christ's words but also with Christ's intention: first with his words, because Christ gave body and blood separately; thus concomitance joins what Christ disjoined. Christ first offered the body, then the blood; but our adversaries mix these. And Christ said, "This is my body," not "body with blood"; and "This is my blood," not "blood with body"; and He commanded to eat only the body and to drink only the blood, not to both eat and drink each, as they suppose. Those who posit concomitance thus go against the intention of Christ, because Christ willed to institute the Sacrament of His body without blood—that is, dead; therefore He says, "This is my body, which is broken for you," and, "This is my blood of the new Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." But a broken body, that is, lifeless and dead, is separated from the blood, and shed blood is not in the body. Thus Christ willed to represent his death to us, because our redemption and salvation consist in the death of Christ. But these men with their trope of concomitance overthrow the Sacrament and memorial of Christ's death, because they wish a living body to be represented in this Sacrament, whereas Christ's body is set forth to us in the Sacrament as dead, since Christ obtained life for us by his death, and in this Sacrament we celebrate this benefit.

But Bellarmine still responds to this argument and contends that there is no trope there, because even if the soul, blood, and divinity of Christ are present, yet "this" demonstrates

only the body, and he illustrates this with an example: if someone, pointing to Peter's body, were to say, "This is Peter's body," the body is taken properly, yet it does not follow that it is without a soul. I reply: the example is dissimilar, because he who points only to the body speaks properly in saying, "This is Peter's body"; nor does it affect the truth of the proposition whether the soul is there or not, since he speaks only about the body. But the priest first makes Christ wholly present there, as they wish; then he does not intend to point out only the body of Christ, but the whole Christ. For they wish that whole which is present to be pointed out, and this is clear from themselves, who say that "this" points to the whole content under those species; but that is the body, blood, and soul. Since therefore all these are signified by the name "body," a trope here is necessary.

This beautiful concomitance is such that from it follows not only that the blood is with the body and the body with the blood, but it also makes the blood of Christ from bread and the body of Christ from wine. Indeed, not only that, but also the soul—unless perhaps they wish to say that the body comes from bread and the blood from nothing, and the blood comes from wine but the body from nothing. But then from where comes the soul? It is absurd that the soul should come either from bread or from wine, because a spiritual substance is not made from a material substance.

But now concerning the trope of the words: Only "body" is named, yet the whole Christ is understood; therefore there is a trope. For example, when it is said that "the Word was made flesh," "flesh" is taken synecdochically for the whole human nature; so here they must necessarily posit a synecdoche. Bellarmine says they would not do this reluctantly, because there is a great difference, he says, between intellection (so he calls synecdoche) and metonymy, because the latter takes away the truth of the thing, but the former does not. But metonymy does not take away the truth of the thing, as when Baptism is called "the washing of regeneration"; for it is truly the washing of regeneration and also a sign, because the thing is joined together with the sign. But just as there is a trope in the word "flesh," so also in the word "body," according to the opinion of our adversaries themselves. And certainly in both places there is tropical speech: there the hypostatic union of the Word with humanity is signified; here the sacramental union of Christ with the Sacrament.

Our eighth argument is taken from Luke and Paul, in whom these words are found: "This cup is the new Testament in my blood." Here there is a double trope: first in the word "cup," where the container is taken for the thing contained; second in the word "Testament." Bellarmine admits there is a trope in the first word, but says it is very clearly explained there. But they do not feel how clear the trope is as long as it is a trope. Therefore we are not to be accused because we employ tropes, since Christ's words cannot be understood without tropes, and because Christ himself used tropes. And certainly no less illustrious and perspicuous a trope is in these words: "This is my body." For as a vessel is not drunk, but what is contained in the vessel, so neither is Christ's body

eaten with the mouth; indeed, it is easier to drink all vessels than to eat that glorious body of Christ. Therefore this response—that it is an open trope or immediately explained—is nothing. For from this that Christ commanded to take and eat what he gave, and said this to be his body which

For it to be broken and given for us, it is no less apparent that a trope is involved, because His body was neither given nor broken then, nor now, but once on the cross. And to take and eat that cannot be understood in terms of the actual eating of His true body, because what He commanded the Apostles to do, He Himself did first. Yet He could not eat His own body—indeed, He could not even hold it with His hands, since the whole cannot be taken or held by a part. Therefore, it is clear that Christ took bread with His mouth and held it with His hand, not His own body. Thus all the circumstances, and even the words themselves, testify—indeed, they cry out—that it is a trope.

But it is well that Bellarmine at least acknowledges one trope; therefore, neither Christ nor the Evangelists thought it absurd to speak figuratively. But we will show that there is also a trope in the other term, namely in the word "Testament." For Bellarmine will not say that either the blood or the wine is the Testament itself. Therefore, here is a metonymy, because the sign is put for the thing signified. Calvin and Martyr teach this with the following arguments.

First, because otherwise Christ's Testament would be renewed every single day; for this Sacrament is celebrated frequently. Bellarmine first makes a distinction and then replies. He says there are two things that are usually called by the name "Testament": the first is the will of the testator; the second is the authentic instrument in which the will of the testator is contained. But he ought to have explained what a Testament properly is; for the name can apply to many things, and it is agreed that a Testament properly is the last will of one who makes it. The instrument indeed is called a Testament, but improperly, because it signifies the last will of the testator—just as the Holy Scriptures are called Testaments, because in them the will of God is explained. Therefore, if the Eucharist is a Testament in the second sense, certainly it is a Testament only figuratively and improperly.

Now then he replies that this Testament is not renewed daily, because the celebration of the Eucharist is not a new institution of the Testament, but a repetition of the same one, which is done to apply the inheritance to various heirs. I reply:

1. If the blood here is really the Testament itself, it must be repeated and renewed as often as the Eucharist is celebrated; for just as there are different individual Sacraments, so also there would be different Testaments—if indeed they are real Testaments. But the Testament itself is one and the same, and it was made only once—unless we wish to say that Christ makes His Testament daily. If He were to do that, then it would be new every

day. But it does not need real renewal or repetition, because that one Testament, once made, suffices for all heirs. Just as a man's Testament, once made, does not need repetition, so neither does Christ's; but men's Testaments are not repeated; therefore Christ's Testament does not need repetition. It only ought to be kept in memory, preserved, applied, inspected—not really repeated.

2. For the application of the inheritance, repetition of the Testament is not necessary; one Testament made once suffices forever. Is it necessary for the Testament to be repeated or copied as often as individuals wish to claim the inheritance given to them? By no means. Therefore it is certain that in the Eucharist it is not the Testament itself, but the sign of the Testament. For if the Testament is the will of God concerning the inheritance—that is, concerning forgiveness of sins, reconciliation with God, and eternal life—it is clear that not even Christ's blood itself is the Testament, but that by which the Testament is ratified. Therefore Christ's blood is called a Testament because by it the covenant was confirmed.

The second argument of Calvin and Martyr is this: because then it would be necessary for Christ to die often; for a Testament is not valid without the death of the testator. Bellarmine says that Christ's death was not the Testament, but the confirmation of the Testament; yet His one death suffices to confirm His testament, even if it is repeated infinitely often. I reply:

1. If in the Eucharist there is properly a Testament, there must properly be a death there. As there is Christ's death there, so there is a Testament there; as there was one real death of Christ, so there is only one real Testament.

2. If Christ's death is not the Testament, much less is Christ's blood—which is only a sign of death—the Testament. Yet he wants the blood to be called a Testament properly, while he admits that death is not properly

This is the testament: therefore it is a trope. For blood is taken for death; and death is not the Testament; therefore blood can only be called a Testament figuratively: thus there is a trope in the word Testament.

The third argument of Martyr and Calvin is taken from a comparison of Matthew with Luke. Matthew says, "This is my blood of the new Testament," where the blood is not called the new Testament, but of the new Testament; but Luke says, "This cup is the new Testament in my blood." It is necessary that one of these is speaking figuratively. Bellarmine says that in Matthew's words the word Testament is taken in the first way, that is, for the divine promise; but in Luke, for the instrument of that promise; and thus each is said properly. I reply: Christ did not say both, but one or the other. The Evangelists do not use the same words: one calls the blood of the Testament; the other, the Testament in the blood: both are figurative. For in whatever way Testament is taken,

"blood of the Testament" is not said properly; for a Testament does not have blood; and blood cannot be called a new Testament, because a Testament is a covenant and promise, as Bellarmine admits: so a trope always remains. Certainly the Evangelists would not have used such diversity if there were only as much danger in tropes as the Adversaries wish.

The fourth argument of Martyr and Calvin is taken from the words of Luke and Paul, each of whom says, "This cup is the new Testament in my blood": therefore by "cup" not the blood in the cup is understood; for then the sense would be, "This blood is the new Testament in my blood": but this is absurd, because then the same would be in itself. Bellarmine says it is not absurd, because "blood" in the first place is taken for the blood hidden in the cup under the species of wine; but in the second place for the very blood of Christ visibly shed on the cross, so that the sense is, "This cup, that is, the thing contained in this cup under the species of wine, is the new Testament dedicated and sanctified in my blood." I reply: If by "cup" the true blood hidden in the cup is understood, still it is not properly a Testament, because a Testament properly is a promise and divine will, as Bellarmine admits: this blood is not that. And if "cup" is put for the thing contained in the cup; who does not see that there is a manifest trope? Then Bellarmine now fights with himself: for above he contends that τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνόμενον, "which is shed for you," refers to ποτήριον, that is, to the cup; if therefore "cup" is taken for blood, then it is taken for blood visibly shed on the cross; but never otherwise. Jansenius says that "cup" cannot here be taken for the blood contained in the cup; and it must necessarily be admitted that these words are not to be taken in their proper sense. But if the Testament was dedicated and confirmed by blood visibly shed on the cross, as Bellarmine says, and therefore blood is called a Testament; then the blood in the cup is not a Testament, because it is not visibly shed.

The fifth and last argument of Martyr and Calvin is that Matthew and Mark are to be explained through Luke and Paul. The former say, "This is my blood of the new Testament"; but the latter, "This cup is the new testament in my blood," that is, the Sacrament of the new Testament. Luke and Paul not only used more words than Matthew and Mark, but also wrote after them: therefore they ought to be their interpreters; but they openly call the cup the new Testament in Christ's blood: but a cup cannot be the new Testament properly: and this can be proven by these arguments; first, because if it were the new Testament, then without it none would be saved: for without the blood of the testament there is no salvation: but many were saved without the cup in the Eucharist, of which they wish none of the common people to partake; second, because then all who receive this Sacrament would necessarily be saved: for those who are reconciled with God cannot perish: but those who take the very Testament are reconciled: for a Testament is reconciliation itself, so that those who have a part in the Testament cannot be outside grace.

Now let us see how Bellarmine interprets Luke and Paul. "This cup," that is, the blood in this cup under the species of wine, "is the new Testament," that is, the instrument of promise.

Bellarmino says, "In my blood," that is, visibly, poured out on the cross. Therefore, this sense is that the true blood of Christ is the instrument for confirming the promise, which instrument Christ confirmed by his blood visibly poured out on the cross. Absurd! For it was not the instrument of the promise, but the promise itself that was sanctified by the blood of Christ visibly poured out on the cross. But if the new testament in Luke and Paul is taken for the promise itself of the inheritance, then there is a manifest trope in the words, because the blood is not the promise itself.

Our ninth argument is taken from these words: "Do this in remembrance of me." Therefore, here is not the body and blood of Christ, but symbols of both. Bellarmine explains these words by other words of Paul: "You will proclaim the Lord's death until he comes." The death of Christ is not present, yet his body and blood can be present. I reply: The Lord's death can be proclaimed without his bodily presence; indeed, bodily presence would hinder the remembrance of his death. Since, therefore, the purpose of the sacrament is that we proclaim and commemorate his death, we should not think Christ is present here; for the consumption of a living body is not a commemoration of death. Thus I frame the argument: If the principal purpose of the sacrament is that we proclaim the death of Christ, then it is not that we really consume his body and blood (the reason is that his body and blood are not really consumed so that we commemorate his death); but the former is true; therefore, so is the latter. Luke and Paul confirm the minor premise, who relate that Christ instituted this sacrament so that we proclaim his death; in which there is no doubt about what purpose he wished this sacrament to be celebrated: not that we really consume his body, but that we gratefully recall his death in our minds.

But Bellarmine says that Christ by these words—"This is my body, which is given for you," and "This is the blood, which is poured out for you for the forgiveness of sins"—clearly signifies that the purpose of this sacrament is the forgiveness of sins. I reply: That is not denied; it is indeed the ultimate purpose; for the Lord's death is commemorated so that by this commemoration of his death, by which he obtained forgiveness of sins for us, we may be made more certain of our salvation. And this is what Christ says so often in the sixth chapter of John, that his flesh is to be eaten; but we eat Christ's flesh when we celebrate his death by faithful commemoration.

Our tenth argument is taken from the words of Matthew and Mark: "I will not drink from now on ἐκ τοῦ γεννήματος τῆς ἀμπέλου," from the fruit of the vine, or as the old interpreter has it, "from this produce of the vine"; Columella calls it the progeny of the vine; but the fruit of the vine is wine; therefore, in the cup after consecration there was wine; therefore, it is called blood figuratively. Bellarmine says that Matthew and Mark

did not narrate this alone; for it is clear from Luke that these words were spoken before the consecration and pertain to the cup of wine which Christ offered to the apostles after eating the Passover lamb, before the institution of this sacrament. And he proves this by two reasons: first, because Luke relates that Christ offered a cup to the apostles twice, and concerning the first he did not say, "This is the blood," or "The testament in the blood," but concerning that one and not the other he said, "I will not drink from now on from this produce of the vine"; second, because Luke joins these words ("I will not drink from now on from this produce of the vine") with those, "I will not eat of it," namely the Passover, "until it is fulfilled in the kingdom of God"; therefore those words ("I will not drink from now on from this produce of the vine") are to be understood of the wine which they drank with the Passover lamb.

I reply: First concerning the latter reason: although Bellarmine contends that what Christ said—"I have eagerly desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer"—is to be understood of the Passover lamb, yet it seems otherwise to great theologians, namely that it is to be understood of the new Passover, that is, of this sacrament. So Eusebius, as Thomas affirms in the golden chain; so Tertullian; so Jerome; so Roffensis; and many others—so that if the matter were to be decided by a multitude of testimonies, Bellarmine would not easily prove his point. Nevertheless, I grant this, because it seems to me certainly much truer: for Christ said that He was moved by a great desire to celebrate this Last Supper with the Apostles, to signify that He was going to His death with a joyful spirit.

2. I reply: Indeed, Luke recalls a double cup, which no other evangelist mentions; but whether this was a different cup from the one Christ used in the institution of this Sacrament is doubtful. Many think it was a custom observed by the Jews in these Paschal meals, that the head of the household would offer a cup to all the guests at the end; and that Christ now did so. But others maintain there was only one cup, which Luke mentions twice. Augustine says that Luke anticipated what Matthew and Mark relate in their place; and Euthymius says it was the same cup; and so does Jansenius: for Paul also mentions the cup before the bread. Even if I could press the authority of these, yet I will use it: for I believe it was a different cup from the one Christ used at the Supper, first because Luke would not have mentioned the same cup twice in such a brief narrative; second, because there is strong testimony of that Jewish custom concerning the cup being passed among the guests. And yet our argument suffers no harm from this.

For first, since Matthew and Mark write that Christ said this about what he gave to the Apostles in the cup after the consecration, we must say that he gave them wine in that cup, because "the fruit of the vine" is wine. And Christ says, "I will not drink from now on of this fruit of the vine." Therefore, even if Christ uttered these words after that earlier cup, nevertheless Matthew and Mark, who make no mention of that cup, did not omit

these words and recited them immediately after the offering of the consecrated wine—which they would not have done unless they believed it to be true wine.

Second, Christ is said to have "given thanks" over that cup. Now what becomes of Bellarmine's argument drawn from "thanksgiving" and "blessing"? Certainly, either the wine in this cup was transubstantiated, or Bellarmine's argument from Christ's blessing or thanksgiving for the real presence is worthless. For Christ also blessed this cup or gave thanks over it. If, therefore, Christ's blessing and giving thanks effected a change of natures, then this wine was changed. Let Bellarmine therefore discard the argument taken from Christ's blessing, which was only a common blessing, whose form is found in the ritual books of the Jews—as when a cup was distributed among guests at solemn meals, they gave thanks in this manner: "Blessed are you, O Lord, who created the fruit of the vine." Bellarmine previously said that Christ never gave thanks except when performing a miracle; therefore in that earlier cup there was a miracle. It is not enough, then, for him to say that Christ did not now say this about the consecrated wine.

Third, the Fathers also support us and confirm our opinion. Clement of Alexandria writes thus: "That it was wine which he blessed, he showed by saying, 'I will not drink from now on of this fruit of the vine,'" etc. And earlier he says it was "the blood of the vine," of which Christ said, "Drink from this, all of you; this is my blood." Therefore we rightly conclude from this passage that there is a trope in the words of the Supper, because the Apostles drank wine, and Christ calls it blood. Other Fathers could be cited, but opportunity will be given to bring them forth later.

But Bellarmine says: If Christ said this after the consecration, nevertheless these words should not be referred to the consecrated chalice, but to what was drunk earlier; for Christ did not wish to say that he would no longer celebrate the Eucharist, but that he would no longer drink in a human way for refreshing strength. I reply: Let them say with Matthew and Mark that Christ said this about the wine which was in the consecrated chalice; and it is necessary that they admit it was true wine, because "this fruit of the vine" necessarily demonstrates true wine.

Our eleventh and final argument is taken from those words: "which is given for you," "which is broken for you," and "which is poured out for you." These must necessarily be understood figuratively; for Christ's body was not broken on the cross—as John testifies—nor was his blood poured out separately from his body. Therefore these expressions signify in a sacramental manner what happened in reality on the cross.

The body was given in the Supper or broken, but its blood was not then shed—that happened later on the cross. Bellarmine here offers no reply to this argument, but earlier he said something: namely, that all these things can be said of the body and blood of

Christ as they are in the Eucharist, but not as they were later on the cross. So the sense would be:

This is my body, which is given for you—that is, which is offered and given to God the Father as a sacrifice;

and as to the words about the cup:

This is my blood, which is shed for you—that is, which is poured out and offered to God as a sacrifice for your salvation.

I reply: this exposition is both false and blasphemous.

For Christ's body in the Eucharist was not offered in sacrifice, because it was offered twice—namely, in the Supper and on the cross. By which offering, then, did Christ redeem us? Was it the one He offered in the Supper? But then He did not die. Or was it not in the Supper? Yet He says: This is my body, which is given for you. If He gave it for us, was it not to redeem us? But Scripture also says which is broken for you, which only happened on the cross.

Bellarmino explains “broken” as “given,” as in Isaiah: Break your bread to the hungry. Yet here “to break” does not mean “to give,” but something prior. And if Christ was then offered in the Supper as a sacrifice to God the Father, either this sacrifice was not accepted by God, or it was effective for our salvation—but neither can be said. Therefore, this exposition cannot stand.

Moreover, this interpretation conflicts with the words in the Vulgate, where it reads:

This is my body, which will be handed over for you,

and:

This is my blood of the new testament, which will be shed for many,

and:

This cup is the new testament in my blood, which will be poured out for you—that is, in the future.

And so Augustine says: You are not about to drink the blood which those who crucify me will shed—he says which they will shed, not which I now shed.

But Bellarmine says that if this exposition is accepted, it completely overturns the heretics' opinion about understanding the Lord's body figuratively. But this exposition cannot be accepted except by heretics—indeed, by apostates and atheists—who assert that Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice to God before He suffered on the cross. For if

He offered Himself to the Father in the Supper, there was no need for Him to die the next day. Thus, by this exposition, the sacrifice of the cross—the foundation of salvation—is abolished.

Therefore, what Christ gave in the Supper was not a sacrifice, but a sign and sacrament of the sacrifice.

From this it follows that either there is a trope in the word body, so that the sense is:

This is my body—that is, This is the sacrament of my body;

or in the word is, so that the sense is:

This is the sign of my body, or This signifies my body.

It makes no difference to us in which word the trope is placed. But a trope should not be placed in both; for the sense here is not: This signifies the sign of my body.

Chapter 8: Our Arguments from Scripture Against the Real Presence of Christ's Body and Blood in the Eucharist

Whatever has been argued so far from examining the figurative interpretation of the words of the Supper pertains to this question which we now undertake to treat: namely, refuting the opinion of those who defend the bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist. For if Christ spoke figuratively when He said, *This is my body* and *This is my blood*, then it is certain that those err who infer from this that Christ was bodily present and eaten in the Supper. But Christ did speak figuratively, as has been shown by eleven arguments; therefore those who defend bodily presence are wrong.

Still, other arguments must be used in this case which are proper to this question. Indeed, many are brought forward from Scripture by our theologians; some of these Bellarmine touches on but does not refute. We will treat these first.

Our first argument is taken from the words found in Psalm 113 (or, according to Hebrew numbering, 115): *But our God is in heaven*, and from Isaiah 66: *Heaven is my throne*. Bellarmine says this is Peter Martyr's argument:

Christ, as a man, is in the same state with the Father, and the Father does not dwell in temples but in heaven; therefore, Christ is not to be sought in temples or in the pyx, unless we wish to contain the throne of God and heaven within the pyx. Bellarmine replies that although the throne of God is in heaven, nevertheless God may be found outside the heavens, since He is everywhere; and it is false that God is not to be sought except in heaven, since Paul says in Acts 17 that God can

be sought and found everywhere. Likewise, Christ as a man, although He sits in heaven, is nevertheless outside heaven wherever He wishes.

I respond: First, from the nature of God, which is omnipotent and everywhere present, no argument holds regarding a nature that is finite and created. We are not speaking of the person of Christ, who is God and is everywhere as God, but of Christ's humanity, which cannot be simultaneously in heaven and in the temple. Second, Bellarmine did not correctly present the martyr's argument: for the martyr argues thus: If Christ, insofar as He is a man, sits in the heavens at the right hand of God the Father, then He does not dwell in handmade temples, nor is He to be sought in the host or in the pyx. But the former is true; therefore, so is the latter. The consequence of the major premise is proven because Scripture distinguishes heaven from earth and says that God dwells in heaven, not in temples; therefore, Christ's humanity, having been raised to that sublime throne, is not to be sought in the host or pyx. Although God is everywhere, yet the prophets teach that the throne of God is in heaven; and we believe that Christ's body has been placed on that throne; therefore, Christ does not now dwell on these earths. For if He dwelt here, then the throne and glory of God would be on earth; but Scripture says it is in the heavens; therefore, Christ is there with respect to His humanity. Hence Gardiner was compelled to respond differently than Bellarmine here—namely, that Christ does not dwell in the pyx but is present in the sacrament, not according to the seat of habitation, which is in heaven, but according to dispensation.

But this is inept: First, the time of dispensation, which detracts and takes away something from the majesty and glory of Christ, has now passed. Christ's body cannot now fail to sit at the right hand of the Father—that is, it cannot fail to be glorious. No dispensation may now be admitted that conflicts with this glory. Christ now has no body except a glorious one; therefore, where Christ is, there is glory. Second, we are dealing with real presence, which however you understand it—whether according to the seat of habitation or according to dispensation—must be such as to agree with the articles of faith. But it does not agree that Christ's body should be on earth or enclosed in so small a space; wherever or however it may be, it must be a true human body and therefore cannot be contained invisibly anywhere—for this conflicts with the nature of a true body.

Moreover, Peter Martyr reduces this argument to absurdity in this way: Christ's body is in heaven, and Christ's body is in the sacrament of the Eucharist; therefore, the sacrament of the Eucharist is in heaven. Gardiner replies that there are four terms in this syllogism. Peter Martyr denies this and says there are only three terms—namely, Christ's body existing in heaven and existing in the sacrament. But Bellarmine says it is true what Gardiner replies about four terms: for one thing is the sacrament, another is what is in the sacrament; therefore, the conclusion “therefore the sacrament of the Eucharist is in heaven” is not rightly inferred, but this ought to be the conclusion: “therefore something existing in the sacrament is in heaven,” and that is true. But Martyr says the syllogism is

expository: "This body is in heaven; this body is in the Eucharist; therefore the Eucharist is in heaven." And this argument necessarily follows: for it is similar to this: "Christ was born of Mary; Christ was born in Bethlehem; therefore Mary was in Bethlehem." Who would deny this is a good argument? If Christ had to be born both in Bethlehem and of Mary, then it was necessary for Mary to have been in Bethlehem. So if Christ's body is in heaven and at the same time in the Eucharist—because one body cannot be in places as remote as heaven is from earth—then either heaven must be in the Eucharist or the Eucharist must be in heaven, and this because of the nature of a true body. For certainly it is not so with the divine nature: it does not follow that "God is in heaven; God is on earth; therefore earth is in heaven," for this nature is everywhere; but a body exists only in one place. And Martyr teaches thus: If Christ's body is in heaven at the same time

Finally, concerning the Sacrament, it will be both with the Sacrament and without the Sacrament: but this is a contradiction. Bellarmine denies it, because both are affirmative: to be with the Sacrament and to be without the Sacrament. But to be in the Sacrament and not to be in the Sacrament is a contradiction: yet Christ's body is in the Sacrament and is not, if the Eucharist is not in heaven. For if someone points to that body of Christ in heaven and says, "This body is not in the Eucharist," he would speak the truth: for otherwise the glorious body would be in the Eucharist, which they do not concede; or one and the same body would at once be glorious and not glorious, which implies a contradiction. For "this body" signifies the body with its individual properties; therefore, whatever is in this body must be in the Eucharist, if it is the same body there. Therefore, the Eucharist ought to sit at the right hand of God and be full of majesty.

And by another syllogism, Peter Martyr demonstrates in this manner: Every body of Christ, or whatever is the body of Christ, is in heaven; but the Eucharist is the body of Christ; therefore, the Eucharist is in heaven. I am not now speaking of the mystical body, that is, of the Church militant, which Bellarmine says is not in heaven, but of the proper and natural body of Christ. Whether you say "every body of Christ" or "the body of Christ," it will be a universal proposition, and so the syllogism will be in the first figure: for "every Peter" and "Peter" are the same, if we speak of one man, as Bellarmine concedes; so "the body of Christ" and "every body of Christ" are the same.

Thus I argue: The body of Christ is in heaven; the Eucharist is the body of Christ; therefore, the Eucharist is in heaven. Now Bellarmine denies the assumption: for he says that it is the body of Christ in the Sacrament, but that the Sacrament is not the body of Christ. But this is absurdly and wretchedly said by him. What then is the Eucharist? Is it the species or accidents? But Christ said, "This is my body." Then we object with that saying of Augustine: "Christ did not hesitate to say, 'This is my body,' when He gave the sign of His body"; but they themselves say that the sign and the thing are the same: the Eucharist is the sign; therefore it is also the thing. But the Eucharist is not an external Sacrament, but much more Christ Himself; therefore truly the Eucharist can be called the

very body of Christ. Wherefore, if it is the body of Christ because of real presence, then the Eucharist is in heaven, because Christ's body is there.

But let it be so: let us not say that the Eucharist is the body of Christ, but what is contained under those species. Thus I argue: The body of Christ is in heaven; what is contained under the species of bread is the body of Christ; therefore what is contained under the species of bread is in heaven. They cannot deny any proposition here: not the major, that Christ's body is in heaven; nor the minor, that what is contained under the species of bread is the body of Christ; therefore they must concede everything. Therefore that singular body which lies hidden under the species of bread is in heaven.

If this were so, bread would be in heaven: for that singular thing is not contained under the species of bread if it lies outside its bounds and is outside, unless bread is in heaven where what is contained under the species of bread is. Indeed God, because He is in heaven and on earth at once, is not said to be contained either there or here, because then He would not be in one or the other. Wherefore if Christ's body is contained in heaven, it is not in the Eucharist; if it is in the Eucharist, it is not in heaven. But they say that Christ's body is contained in the species of bread, and His blood in the cup; therefore these things are nowhere except here; therefore what is contained under the species of bread is not in heaven.

Our second argument is taken from the words of Christ in Matthew 15: "Everything that enters into the mouth goes into the belly and is cast out into the drain." But Christ's body is not cast out into the drain, but only bread; therefore Christ's body does not enter into the mouth, but only bread. Bellarmine responds first, with Algerus, that one ought to stop one's ears against arguments of this sort. I reply: If there is anything in an argument which rightly offends pious ears, it is their fault from whose opinion it necessarily follows that men break out into such thoughts and speeches. For since Christ, defending the Apostles because they had not washed before eating, used these words: "Do you not yet understand that whatever enters into the mouth goes into the belly and is cast out into the drain?" it follows that Christ's body does not enter into the mouth and stomach, because it is impious to think such a thing about Christ's most glorious body.

Therefore, it is not taken in by our mouth; for concerning everything that is eaten, Christ declared: "πᾶν τὸ εἰσπορευόμενον εἰς τὸ στόμα" — "Everything that enters into the mouth," or, "whatever enters into the mouth," and in Mark: "πᾶν τὸ ἐξῶθεν εἰσπορευόμενον εἰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον" — "whatever enters into a person from outside does not defile the person," and reason follows, because it does not enter into the heart, but into the stomach. Therefore, even if Christ's body were taken in by our mouth, it could not enter into the heart. We therefore conclude most truly and most sacredly: Christ's body does not enter into the mouth, nor descend into the stomach — the foundation of our reasoning is from Scripture; the minor premise cannot be denied by our adversaries.

And just as what enters into the mouth does not defile or contaminate a person, so also it does not sanctify.

2. Bellarmine says that among Catholics there is a question concerning the species corrupted in the stomach, but that this is not disputed now. I reply: but he ought to have answered concerning those matters now. For it is certain that excrement does not occur from accidents alone, nor can they be emitted into the latrine, because there is no thick matter in them. But in the Sacrament there is something which is expelled; therefore, there is true bread and true wine there, since they show some material substance. Thus I argue: If accidents alone cannot be troublesome to the stomach and require no expulsion, then there is some bodily matter; but the former is true; therefore also the latter. However, this must not be imagined concerning the body or blood of Christ; therefore, it concerns the substance of bread and wine.

3. Bellarmine replies that Christ's body enters into the mouth, but when the species are corrupted in the stomach, it ceases to be there without any injury to itself. I reply: But what then goes into the privy? It is certain that accidents without a subject cannot be corrupted, nor can they pass from the hand into the mouth, from the mouth into the stomach, from the stomach into the privy, because nothing can act upon an accident if it is abstract; only accidents can suffer passively, because what suffers must be substantial.

4. Bellarmine says that the Lord speaks of foods which are taken to nourish the body — but Christ's body is taken for the nourishment of the soul, not for the sustenance of the body. I reply: Christ speaks in general about all food which is put into the mouth, and it does not matter for what purpose it is taken; for those who take it for health, not for nourishment, nevertheless put it into the mouth and enter into the stomach; it is necessary that they pass into the privy. For this is true not only in bodily foods, but absolutely in all things which are cast into the stomach, which cannot remain there perpetually, but seek an exit.

And although Christians do not approach the Eucharist to nourish their bodies, nor is the Eucharist taken for this purpose — that the body be nourished — yet it is most certain that the body is nourished by the Sacrament; otherwise there would be no analogy and likeness between the Sacrament and the thing of the Sacrament; wherefore by the Sacrament the body, by the thing itself the soul, ought to be nourished. And all understand that a person can live on consecrated bread alone and consecrated wine alone, if only he takes as much as suffices to sustain life; which could not happen if there were no nourishment in the Sacrament. If anyone uses only consecrated bread and wine, he will not desire better bread or better wine, provided he takes as much as is enough. And a priest can, if he wishes, consecrate not only one loaf, but a whole bakery; nor only one cup or one draught, but a whole wine-cellar.

Guitmund, who wrote against Berengar, says that certain holy Fathers took no other food, but lived many years fattened by the Lord's communion alone; but accidents would never fatten. Therefore it is manifest that there is something in the Sacrament which nourishes; therefore something which goes into the privy; therefore the matter of the Sacrament is not Christ's body.

5. Bellarmine says that after the resurrection the Lord ate, not to nourish His body, but to testify to the resurrection and the truth of His body; and that nothing was emitted into the privy.

Thus Gardiner tries with many examples to argue that Christ's statement is false: for he says that many eat and cannot expel, and die from it; some, when they wish to send food into the stomach, send it lethally into the lungs; some gargle out what they swallow; some merely rinse their mouth, then spit it out; Demosthenes indeed had pebbles in his mouth.

He spoke in order to correct the pronunciation. But why does Christ speak of foods that pass into the stomach? If they are spit out or sent into the lungs, they do not go into the stomach. Demosthenes' pebbles, which he put into his mouth, if they had been sent into the stomach, would not have helped his pronunciation or health much. But the Sacrament is truly sent into the stomach, and from it something is excreted (as Christ says of all foods) which is cast into the latrine; yet it is blasphemous to cast out Christ's body; therefore it is bread that is sent into the stomach and cast into the latrine.

Moreover, Christ is not speaking of immortal bodies or angels, who are sometimes read to have eaten—for that was miraculous—but Christ speaks of mortal bodies, such as ours are, who approach the Eucharist. If accidents without substance were to nourish our bodies and be cast out, that would not happen without a miracle; but to invent so many miracles is most absurd. Therefore, the example of Christ eating after the resurrection is not apt, for that food nourished miraculously.

Damascene writes thus on this matter: "He tasted food after the resurrection, not by the law of nature, but in the manner of dispensation, giving assurance of the truth of His resurrection." But the Sacrament nourishes, as we have said before. Then why is Christ sent into the stomach, so that He remains there as long as the accidents are not corrupted? Then He vanishes, for He is eaten to nourish; and then He nourishes either bodies or souls. Not bodies, because it is not bodily food, and our bodies cannot truly be nourished by the body of Christ, for then Christ would be changed into us—which is blasphemous—and then our bodies would be better than Christ's body, because what is nourished is always better than what nourishes. If it nourishes souls, then it ought not to be eaten by mouth; for what is eaten by mouth, Christ says, is only sent into the stomach; the soul, which is spirit, cannot be nourished by bodily food. But to eat Christ's body in vain is impious; and it is eaten in vain if neither body nor soul is nourished by it; but

neither is properly nourished: for the soul is nourished spiritually, even if Christ's body is not eaten by mouth.

Nor is this argument Berengar's or ours, but Origen's, because he says that the sanctified food, according to what it has materially, goes into the belly and is ejected into the privy; where he also calls the Sacrament the typical and symbolic body of Christ: therefore Christ's body is not the matter of the Sacrament.

We have overturned the real presence with two arguments: the first taken from that seat where Scripture affirms Christ's body is now located; the second from Christ's own pronouncement saying that whatever enters the mouth goes into the stomach and from the stomach passes into the latrine. Our third argument rests on that prohibition of Christ: "Then if anyone says to you, 'Look, here is Christ,' or 'There,' do not believe it." Therefore we must not believe the Papists lying that Christ is really present in this or that altar, temple, or shrine. For thus they show their sacramental Christ in infinite places; therefore we must beware of them.

Bellarmino (1) says that Christ warned us to beware of impostors who would sell themselves under Christ's name. I reply: there has never been in the world so great an impostor as the Papists' edible Christ. For other impostors deceived few and did not long use their tricks, but were soon understood by clear outcome to be deceivers; but this transubstantiated Christ, though he is nothing but a mere idol, has now for three hundred years and more been held as the true Christ by a very great multitude of Christians and defended with all authority by popes and prelates. So much the more must we beware lest we be caught by this deceit, the more it has prevailed and the greater opportunities it has for deceiving. If therefore Christ commanded to beware of impostors who abuse Christ's name, it is manifest that this Christ hidden in a pyx is nothing but a supposititious Christ.

But Bellarmine (2) says these impostors are described by Christ with two conditions which altogether contradict

Concerning the Eucharist. The first condition is that they will come secretly, not openly and manifestly, as is clear from those words: "Behold, he is in the desert; behold, he is in the inner chambers." Christ's advent was manifest to all, but they come secretly now. Truly, the Eucharist is not consecrated and reserved in the desert or in secret places, but in the midst of cities, in the most frequented churches, on elevated and conspicuous altars.

I respond:

1. Christ does not only speak of deserts and inner chambers, but simply warns that every showing of Christ on earth after his ascension is to be avoided: "If anyone says to you, 'Behold, here is Christ,' or 'There he is,' do not believe it." But the Papists say that Christ

is here and there, so that wherever you turn, you may find one of their Christs. However, Christ warns us to beware of all bodily presence of his on earth after his ascension—neither to seek him on earth, nor to imagine his body to be anywhere on earth—and not to believe those who say he is here or there. For rightly does Gardiner say that Christ understood these things concerning his second advent. For Christ, ascending, left the world; therefore, until the end of the world, no one will find Christ on earth. Therefore, only impostors are those who show Christ on earth and affirm that they have Christ present. Thus I argue: If we are not to believe those who say, "Behold, here is Christ; behold, there he is," since the Papists deceive us by saying he is both here and there, then we ought to believe Christ, not the Papists. For Christ wished to forewarn us, lest we receive a false Christ for the true one; therefore, he warns that all who display Christ on earth are to be avoided. But if Christ's body were on earth, certainly he would not forbid it to be shown.

2. I respond: The Papists' Christ is also ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις, that is, in the inner chambers or secret rooms, and thus clearly fits this condition. For the Papists carefully reserve Christ in their churches in a ciborium, as it is called, or a pyx, so that they may bring him forth whenever there is need and show him to those wishing to gaze upon and adore him. Therefore, Christ as if purposely designated this Papist idolatry ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις—for ταμεῖον is a place where wine, bread, grain, or more valuable furniture is stored, such as a cellar or storeroom. The Papists have their cupboards in which they deposit their Christ and from which they take him out. No other pseudo-Christ has ever been ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις; many have been in deserts; but the Papists keep their pseudo-Christ at home ἐν τοῖς ταμείοις.

Now the second condition of the impostors whom Christ describes in this place is, as Bellarmine observed, that they come visibly and speak with men in a human manner, to deceive them with words and false miracles. But, he says, Christ in the Eucharist is not present visibly, nor in a human manner, but is there as if he were not there, as far as the judgment of the external senses is concerned.

I respond: From this it is certain that he is not the true Christ. For if he were the true Christ, he would be there as Christ and would offer himself to be seen by all, just as when he was on earth. For Christ does not deceive or mock our eyes. Therefore, because we do not see Christ in the Eucharist—but he is there as if he were not there—we are most certainly persuaded that he is not there in the way the Papists claim, that is, really and corporally. For as Augustine says, if Christ were now present on earth, we would see him.

But Christ warns us to beware not only of visible Christs but also of invisible ones; and not only of those who sell themselves as Christs, but also of those who wish to show us Christ anywhere on earth: "If anyone says to you," he says, and "If they say to you." And

although Christ does not speak in the Eucharist—and so their Christ is both invisible and mute—nevertheless their priests commend it to us, preach it, teach it, and wish to persuade us to worship it. But let us beware, because we have been forewarned.

Therefore, from this passage we conclude that we must believe no one at all who points out a place on earth where Christ is. Nor does it matter that the Papists want this to be understood concerning Christ's visible presence, since there is no less deceit nor less danger in an invisible Christ than in a visible one—whether he be visible or invisible—if he is worshipped.

Let us beware, lest we make Christ into a figment. The adversaries say that He comes visibly; we say that He comes in no way—whether in this or that manner. For it is no less a great sin if someone adores bread for Christ—which the Papists do—than if someone adores Bar Kokhba, or Theudas, or Judas for Christ—which the Jews are said to have done. We believe that our Christ, God and Savior, is in heaven, but now in no earthly dwelling; therefore, we should by no means believe the Papists, who show us many Christs everywhere, and those invisible. For even if they could show a visible body, it would not be fitting to believe them; now when they show no body of Christ at all, but only bread, much less ought they to be believed. Then this idolatry is more crass—that someone adores bread for Christ, than that someone adores a man for Christ: rightly therefore the martyr says there is the same danger in a hidden and in an open pseudo-Christ.

But because Bellarmine defends the invisible presence of Christ in the Sacrament, we will prove by another argument that Christ is not here at all with respect to bodily presence. Therefore, our fourth argument is taken from those words of Christ: "The poor you will always have with you, but you will not always have me." A woman had anointed the head of Christ with precious and very sweet ointment; the disciples, at the instigation of Judas, were indignant that so much ointment had been wasted, saying it could have been sold and given to the poor. Christ excuses and defends the woman's deed with these words: she had done this piously to prepare Him for burial; they could have provided for the poor in another way, whom they would always have with them, but Him they would not always have. Therefore, Christ is not now on earth in body.

Bellarmino here responds with many confused points; we will examine each one individually. Thus we argue from this passage: If Christ said, "You will not always have me," then He is now absent from us in body, and so those err who establish His bodily presence in the Sacrament. But the first is true; therefore, so is the second.

Bellarmino first responds that Christ is speaking of a visible presence and of such service as this woman performed—anointing His body, which was weary from labors, to refresh it—and that Christ is not present thus in the Eucharist. I reply: First, Christ spoke simply

and said, "You will not always have me"; therefore He meant that He would not always be with us. The adversaries say that we always have Christ; Christ denies the same: whom shall we believe? Christ does not say, "You will not always see me," but "You will not always have me." The Papists, even if they do not see Christ, nevertheless affirm and believe that they have Christ. Nor does Christ say, "I will not always need such service as this woman showed me," but He simply denies that He will be present: "But me," He says, "you will not always have." This is utterly to pervert Scripture when Christ says He will be entirely absent, to interpret it only of visible absence.

Second, if Christ in the Eucharist does not need such service, why do the Papists adorn the Eucharist with gold, silver, incense, and other precious things, and think these pertain to Christ?

Bellarmino secondly responds that there is a twofold service: of honor and of usefulness; and that service of Mary was both. But Christ now needs no service of usefulness, but is capable only of service of honor. I reply: Christ sets Himself in opposition to the poor: "The poor," He says, "you will always have, but me you will not always have." Therefore He denies not only that He can afterward be honored by a service of usefulness, but also by expense. For the angry disciples were upset not because the oil was not given to the poor, but because it was not sold and its price distributed to the poor. Therefore Christ says there will always be poor people on whom we may lavish great expense when we wish, but He Himself will not be with us forever so that we might spend on Him. But unless they were persuaded that Christ's body is in the Eucharist, they would not offer gold, incense, nor other great expenses on the Eucharist. Therefore let them spend that expense on the poor; for Christ now needs gold no more than ointment. Surely the gold and silver with which they honor Christ in the Sacrament could be sold and given to the poor; for Christ says no expense can now be made on His body which could be suitable for the poor.

But how much do they spend on that imaginary body? And certainly, if Christ were on earth, we would be impious if we did not both follow Him with honor and offer Him ointments and gold. But Christ says that after He has gone into heaven, He will demand nothing of that sort; therefore, He denies that any such expenses can now be bestowed upon His body.

3. Bellarmine says that woman rendered service to Christ when He was visibly present, but we cannot do so now, for nothing can now be bestowed visibly upon Christ. I reply: Christ speaks simply: "You will not always have Me." This Papist presence is of such a kind that it requires those services with which we are accustomed to attend to the poor; but Christ denies that this will be the case; therefore, He has taken away from us all His bodily presence. Nor does it matter that we do not see Christ, if only it is certain that Christ is here; for our duties toward a present Christ ought never to be lacking.

4. Bellarmine says, “If your argument were valid, Christ would not now be in heaven.” Why? Because, he says, we can honor Christ even while He is in heaven with gold, silver, and incense. I reply: I admit that this adornment, which is used in the worship of God, pertains in some way to Christ because it indicates our pious affection toward Christ. Yet we could also piously worship Christ without it; indeed, these ornaments can sometimes be sold to benefit the poor—which could not be done if Christ were present on earth, for Christ would have to be preferred above all the poor. If these things are referred to the present body of Christ, they cannot be converted to another use as long as Christ is present.

5. Bellarmine says that incense is not used to delight Christ’s nostrils, nor gold to delight His bodily eyes. Why then, he asks, do we apply these externally to the species of bread and wine, to testify our pious affection toward Him? I reply: It is absurd to refer incense and gold to accidents, which can neither look upon gold nor smell incense. This is plainly idolatrous—to pay such honors not only to inanimate things but even to the bare species of things. Therefore, it is necessary that all these things be referred to Christ; otherwise, it would be the most insane idolatry to pay this honor to the species instead of to Christ. Who does not see that Bellarmine is in a bad way, since he can only refute our argument by saying that this adornment and expense pertain to the species of bread and wine? But who would spend even a penny on those species and phantoms, except because of the bodily presence of Christ which they imagine for themselves by the error of their opinion? Therefore, Bellarmine is trapped here so that he cannot move.

Thus I argue: If all these things are done by Papists because of Christ’s bodily presence, then this openly conflicts with Christ’s words: “You will not always have Me”—that is, “I will not always be present so that you may spend such expenses on Me as are usually spent on the poor.” But all those things are done because of Christ’s presence; therefore, this openly conflicts with Christ’s words. I prove the minor premise because it would be most insane for these things to be done for the sake of the species; and if they are referred to the species, they are still referred because they contain Christ—so it comes back to the same point: for these expenses pertain to the present body of Christ, which cannot stand with Christ’s words.

But Bellarmine says (6.) that Christ, by praising Mary’s deed, taught that the worship of His body is sometimes to be preferred to alms for the poor. I reply: This is true if Christ is present in body—for Christ must always be preferred above the poor. Therefore, Mary rightly did what she did in bestowing this ointment on Christ rather than on the poor, and the Apostles did wrong in murmuring against it. But Christ says that what she did cannot be done afterward. And here Bellarmine sufficiently shows that this worship is referred not to the species but to the body of Christ; for he says it is worship of the body of Christ. We do not disapprove of ornaments in divine worship; indeed, with Theophylact we say

that those who give such things to the poor when they could provide for them in another way are like Judas.

7. Bellarmine objects with the passage from Luke: "These things I have spoken to you while I am still with you." Yet at that time Christ was with them; but He says He is no longer with them because He was no longer dwelling with them in

Although He was present truly and visibly in a human manner, how much more can we say, he asks, that Christ is not now with us according to that saying, "But you will not always have me," since now He is not only not present with us in a human manner, but is not even present visibly? I reply: Christ does not deny that He was with the Apostles then; indeed, He declared His presence in many ways: for He ate and spoke with them, and offered His body to be touched and handled by them, and they saw Him. But He did not remain with them perpetually and constantly as before His death. Therefore, with Peter Martyr we conclude: If Christ is in the Eucharist bodily, then the contrary statement would be true: "You will not always have the poor, but you will always have me." For we have the poor only in this life, but Christ in both this and the future life.

But Bellarmine says this is not a contrary statement, but both are true if understood of different modes of presence. I reply: Christ does not speak of a different mode of presence, but implies that He will take away all His bodily presence from us; otherwise He would contradict Himself. And if Christ were present in body, we would see His body; for since it is a body, it is visible; and placed before us it could be seen, unless some impediment exists. But what, I ask, is the impediment? Is there an impediment in our eyes? But we see all other things—the table, the priest, the species. What reason is there, then, that we do not see Christ's body? Is there some impediment in Christ's body? But certainly, unless it were a phantom or apparition, it could be seen. Do the species prevent it? But since the species are bare and have nothing dense or thick, they must be more rarefied than air and more transparent than any glass, nor do they contain anything that could obstruct the gaze of our eyes.

They indeed say that Christ's body is clothed with the species of bread. Truly, I would wish them no better clothing in wintertime. But more on these matters later. Now we confirm our argument with the testimony of Augustine, who understands that saying, "You will not always have me," as referring to the presence of the flesh. Bellarmine says that Augustine by "presence of the flesh" means Christ's visible sojourn on earth, living among men in a human manner. I reply: Augustine by "flesh" understands the very human nature, and by "presence of the flesh," bodily presence. For he tries to reconcile these two passages: "Behold, I am with you always, even to the end of the age," and "But you will not always have me," and says that the former passage is to be understood of the presence of majesty, the latter of the presence of the flesh.

But let us hear Augustine's own words, who in interpreting these words in John, "The poor you always have with you, but you will not always have me," writes as follows: He was speaking of the presence of His body. For according to His majesty, according to His providence, according to His ineffable and invisible grace (He does not say according to the flesh), what He said is fulfilled: "Behold, I am with you always, even to the end of the age." But according to the flesh, which the Word assumed; according to that which was born of a virgin; according to that which was seized by the Jews; which was fixed to the wood; which was taken down from the cross; which was wrapped in linen cloths; which was laid in the tomb; which was manifested in the resurrection—"you will not always have me with you." Here he clearly speaks of Christ's corporeal nature. He adds immediately: Why? Because He dwelt according to the presence of the body for forty days with His disciples, and while they watched—seeing but not following—He ascended into heaven, and is not here. For there He sits at the right hand of God the Father, and here He is; for He has not withdrawn by the presence of His majesty. Therefore Christ is both there—that is, in heaven—and here—that is, on earth: there according to the presence of the flesh; here (not according to the presence of the flesh invisibly) but by the presence of majesty, that is, divinity. And Augustine immediately adds: According to the presence of majesty we always have Christ; according to the presence of the flesh it was rightly said to the disciples, "But you will not always have me."

But Bellarmine says that Augustine did not mention the presence of Christ in the Eucharist: for he says Christ is present in three ways—by majesty, by providence, by ineffable and invisible grace—and under this last heading Bellarmine says is included the presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

Moreover, even according to Calvin's testimony. I reply: Certainly Calvin says that Christ is present in the Eucharist for our faith. But Bellarmine refutes this, because Augustine above distinguishes the Eucharist from the apprehension of Christ through faith. I reply: Augustine says that Christ is now held through faith, through the food and drink of the altar; but this is not understood of a carnal presence; for then Christ would be carnally present also in the sign of the cross and in the Sacrament of Baptism, because Augustine says that Christ is held in these as well. But Augustine says these things when he explains the words of Christ metaphorically; afterward, however, he approaches another exposition, and then he teaches differently how Christ is present and absent. Thus the same Augustine elsewhere: "Indeed, by His divinity He is always with us, but unless He departed bodily from us, we would always see His body carnally." And still elsewhere: "He went by that which He was as Man: He remained by that which He was as God." Therefore, there can be no invisible presence of Christ's body: for if it were to occur, it would be visible according to Augustine. Similarly Cyril says that Christ is present by the power of the Spirit, but absent by the presence of the flesh.

Our fifth argument is taken from those Scriptures which make a distinct mention of Christ's ascension into heaven and His remaining there; because these must necessarily be understood of His bodily presence, they prove that He is not bodily elsewhere than in heaven. Mark 16: "The Lord, after He had spoken to them, i.e., the Apostles, was taken up into heaven." Acts 1: "He was taken up while they were looking on, that is, the Apostles." Acts 3: "Whom heaven must receive until the times of restitution of all things," etc. "Our conversation is in heaven, from whence also we look for the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ." And there are many testimonies of this kind which bear witness to His bodily absence, and they establish not only that He is now in heaven, but also that He will return from there. Therefore we rightly cry out that the Papists destroy one article of the Creed; nor will Bellarmine ever bring it about that this is not most true. For if Christ took His body away from the earth, and is believed to return to earth only at the end of the world, then all their opinions about His invisible presence on earth are false: but the former is true; therefore also the latter.

Bellarmino in reply says that he confesses that Christ as to His human nature ascended into heaven and is now there, nor will He descend before the day of judgment: but he denies the consequence, that He is therefore not in the Eucharist; and he gives a reason, because for Him to be in the Eucharist, it is not necessary for Him to descend from heaven or to depart by local motion. I reply: This response contains a manifest contradiction: Christ ascended into heaven, nor will He descend before the day of judgment, and yet He is in the Eucharist. For Christ left the earth; and when He ascended, He did not leave His body behind Him, but took it with Him: I ask therefore by what means it can happen that that body is in the Eucharist: for either a descent or a new creation of the same is required; but Christ's body cannot be newly created: for then it would be created either from some matter or from none. If from some matter—from what matter indeed except from the flesh of the Virgin? For a body created from bread and a body created from the Virgin cannot be numerically the same; but Christ has only one and the same numerical body; however, what is made from diverse matter cannot be numerically the same. If they say that from Christ's body in heaven the body in the Eucharist is made; then Christ's body is made from Christ's body: and then either the whole body must descend, or something must be cut off from it: but both of these are absurd. If they say it is made from no matter, then bread is not transubstantiated into Christ's body: which nevertheless they affirm. But however this may be, He is present by local motion: for a body cannot be in a place where it was not before without local motion; and Christ's body is in a place where it was not before: therefore it must necessarily be there by local motion. For if they posit a new creation, which does not require local motion; then it is necessary that this body be different from that which is in heaven: for as it is distinct in place, and there is so much space between the Eucharist and Christ...

As it is in the heavens, so it is between the earth and heaven: the number is different because different places contain different bodies. The body of Christ is in heaven; the bread that is transubstantiated is on earth. Therefore, if the bread is converted into the body of Christ, which was previously actually in heaven, it must be drawn into that into which it is converted. And so the substance of the bread would be snatched up into heaven—or else there must be a new generation and creation of the body. But a body that has been generated once cannot be generated again.

And this is what the angel said: “He is not here, but has risen.” From this we gather that the body of Christ is only in one place. For the resurrection shows that the body of Christ is not where it lay, and the ascension shows that it is not where it ascended from. The angel said, “He is not here, because he has risen.” Therefore, his body cannot be where it lay. He did not only say, “He has risen,” but “He is not here.” The resurrection therefore caused his body not to be in the tomb; likewise, the ascension caused it not to be on earth. Therefore, just as the angel said, “Because he has risen, he is not here,” so we can say much more, “Because he has ascended, he is not here.” For the distance between the highest heavens and the earth is greater than between the surface of the earth and the tomb. And just as he left the tomb when he rose, so he left the earth when he ascended. And for that reason, he cannot be on earth again unless he were to leave heaven.

Thus Fulgentius says: “Christ is a local man from a man; therefore, he is circumscribed by place. Therefore, he is not everywhere, as the Lutherans wish, nor everywhere in the Eucharist without locality, as the Papists assert.” But perhaps Christ is local and is both in heaven and in the Eucharist. Indeed, Fulgentius adds: “According to his human substance, he was absent from heaven when he was on earth, and he left the earth when he was in heaven.” Note that this is said not about a different mode, but about the very substance. Therefore, if Christ’s human substance is in the Eucharist, it has left heaven.

So Vigilinus says: “When he was on earth, he was certainly not in heaven; and now, because he is in heaven, he is certainly not on earth.” But perhaps he can be in both places. Indeed, Vigilinus says: “One nature does not receive what is contrary and diverse into itself.” But it is diverse, he says, to be circumscribed by place and to be everywhere. If therefore Christ is in heaven as in a place with his body, then his body cannot be on earth, because one nature cannot be both circumscribed by place and be everywhere—that is, not circumscribed by place.

So Augustine says: “He went by that which he was as man, and remained by that which he was as God; he went by that which was in one place, he remained by that which was everywhere.” Here Augustine clearly affirms that the nature of Christ which is not everywhere—that is, the body of Christ—is only in one place.

Therefore, we rightly say that Christ is in heaven with respect to his body; therefore, he is not here. But Bellarmine responds that Christ appeared to Paul and Peter when he said to him, "I am going to Rome to be crucified again," and to other saints frequently, and yet did not leave heaven. I reply: What he says about Peter and other saints is nothing but a mere fable. To Paul indeed Christ appeared, but it is not said that he was then on earth or outside of heaven.

I spoke with Paul. Indeed, Paul was surrounded by a heavenly light and heard a voice, but he neither saw nor heard Christ on earth. Christ could have thundered into his ears from the highest heavens, so that it was not necessary for him to come down from heaven. For Stephen also saw Christ, not in the air or on earth, but standing in the heavens. Then also Christ showed himself to Paul beyond the heavens; certainly then he was not in heaven. But it is more probable that Christ never left heaven, because of those words of Peter: "Whom the heaven must receive until the times of restitution of all things." Thus it seemed to him not to leave the heavens until the consummation of the world.

But Bellarmine, in Book 3, responds that here it is rather a question of the article of omnipotence than of the ascension; namely, that Christ can place himself in many places. I reply: It is pointless to inquire about omnipotence unless his will has first been established. For someone would argue foolishly thus: Christ can place himself in many places; therefore he does this. And yet, since there is a contradiction here, Christ cannot do this. For since his body is finite and circumscribed, for it to be at the same time not finite and not circumscribed is a contradiction; therefore, the body of Christ cannot be in the Eucharist, because it would then be not circumscribed. But Bellarmine says that he wishes to discuss this matter in its proper place.

Now, therefore, I argue with Calvin in this manner: We are commanded to expect Christ from heaven; therefore not to seek him on earth. Bellarmine responds: We are commanded to expect him to come with glory from heaven, to reform our bodies and to judge the world; with which expectation, he says, an invisible presence for refreshing us in the meantime does not conflict. I reply: Invisibility conflicts with glory; for glory is manifest to all. But Scripture, as it acknowledges no body of Christ now except a glorious one, so it decrees that it is nowhere except in the heavens, because we are commanded to expect him to come from there. If the body of Christ is in the Eucharist, it cannot come to earth because nothing can come to where it already is. Thus now another article of faith is endangered, namely the article concerning the advent of Christ to judgment. Moreover, the advent is not to be understood as the manifestation of glory, but as the advent of Christ the man. Indeed, he must come gloriously, because glory is inseparable from him; but the advent belongs to the human nature. For in Acts 1 we read that Christ ascended; but he did not come to glory except after the ascension; yet the angels affirm that he will descend just as the apostles saw him ascending. This must be understood concerning a

bodily advent, because the apostles did not behold him in glory then; therefore there will be a real descent then, and not before; therefore he is not really present here.

But we owe this to Bellarmine, that he understands the words of Peter, "Whom the heaven must receive," etc., concerning Christ's remaining in heaven; therefore the Lutherans are too rash, who affirm that Christ did not receive heaven, but that Christ received heaven; as if the body of Christ were greater than heaven. But meanwhile Bellarmine gives no response concerning the passage which is found in Philippians 3, where the Apostle says not only that Christ is expected from heaven, but that he will make our bodies similar or conformable to his own body; but our bodies will never be immense, or invisible, or in many places at once.

Our sixth argument is taken from the words of Christ in Luke 24: "Handle me and see, for a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see me have." Here the truth of Christ's flesh is proven by the testimony of the senses; therefore the flesh of Christ is not in the Eucharist, because there it is not touched or seen. If therefore the body of Christ is in the Eucharist, it is so subtle that it can neither be seen nor touched; but a human body, such as Christ's is, cannot escape our senses. Bellarmine responds that it is one thing to infer affirmatively: "This is touched and seen; therefore it is a body"; another thing negatively: "This is not touched nor seen; therefore it is not a body." The former consequence, he says, is excellent; for it cannot happen that an incorporeal thing is seen or touched by bodily senses; and this, he says, is the consequence that the Lord makes. But it does not follow negatively, because the Lord does not make such a consequence.

I reply: First, this openly conflicts with Christ's intention. For Christ wished to persuade the apostles that he was not a spirit, but that he was himself whom he said he was: "That I myself am he."

"That I myself am," he said, "is entrusted to the judgment of all the senses. For he was speaking with them, and they heard him; they also saw him; not only that, but he even allowed himself to be handled and examined by their hands and eyes. Now indeed this would have been a fallacious argument unless the senses could judge correctly—that is, if the senses could be deceived. Bellarmine says that it follows affirmatively, but not negatively; but I prove that it follows negatively as well. For Christ proves that he had a true body and was not a spirit from the fact that they could see and touch him; therefore, if they had not touched or seen a true body, certainly they would not have believed, nor would there have been any need to believe. It is just as if Christ had said: 'Unless I show myself to be seen and offer myself to be handled, you have just cause to doubt; but see and touch.' If a human body could not be seen or touched, what is not a body could be seen and touched; Christ entrusts the judgment to the senses. If the senses can be deceived so as not to perceive what is, they can also be deceived so that what they perceive does not exist; and thus the Apostles would not have ceased to doubt and say:

'Perhaps it is a ghost, however much we see.' Therefore Christ not only offered his body to be handled by them but also showed his wounds; for it does not follow: 'It is a body; therefore it is the body of Christ our Lord'; but by showing a body distinguished by properties which could be found in no one except in Christ's body, he removed all doubt. Not only, therefore, if it were not a body, but even if Christ had not shown them a wounded body, they could have withheld their assent.

Secondly, if this argument is true affirmatively, it suffices for us. For if it was established that it was Christ's body because it was seen and touched, then by the same argument it is established that there is bread and wine in the Eucharist; for not only sight and touch, but also taste and smell indicate that it is bread and wine. And just as Christ said: 'A spirit does not have bones and flesh as you see me having,' so we can say: 'Christ's body does not have the appearances and properties of bread and wine as we see this Sacrament to have.' If therefore the argument from the senses holds affirmatively, there must be true bread and true wine there, because all the senses so judge. Thus Augustine, as cited by Bede: 'What you have seen is bread and the cup of Christ; what even your eyes report to you; therefore the report of the eyes must be believed, especially with the agreement of the other senses coming in.' For Christ did not institute sacraments by which to mock our senses; rather, he did this to remove any true persuasion about Christ's body. For who would say that Christ's body is truly human if it is perceived by no sense of that kind?

Bellarmino responds that the senses cannot be deceived about their proper object but can be deceived about what lies hidden under the object of the senses; because painters often deceive the eyes, as that one who deceived birds with his grapes. I reply: we can judge better about objects than birds; nor do we only see, like those birds, but we smell, taste, touch; therefore we are deceived in almost all the senses if what they say is true. The senses indeed can be deceived if there is a defect either in the object or in the sense; but here there is no defect either in Christ's body or in our eyes.

Bellarmino says that those who saw and touched bodies assumed by angels were not deceived when they believed they were touching and seeing bodies, but were deceived when they thought they were touching and seeing human bodies. I reply: those bodies were true and human as regards proportion and substance, not as regards hypostasis. Let them show us something similar in the Sacrament, and we will believe it to be Christ's body; but they show nothing except bread; therefore the senses are deceived if it is not bread but Christ.

But Bellarmino says that the senses are not deceived in the Eucharist when we think we perceive something white, round, solid, but when they announce to us that the substance of bread lies hidden under them. I reply: This overturns and completely destroys Christ's argument. For if so, the Apostles could have replied: 'We see and touch a body, but nevertheless it could be that it is not a body.' But from touch and sight he argues that it is

a true body. And Bellarmine admits that the argument holds affirmatively; whence we conclude thus: it appears and is touched...

The bread is considered: therefore it is true bread; or thus: If this argument holds affirmatively, as Bellarmine says, then it is necessary that the material in the Eucharist be that which is seen and touched. But we see and touch only bread and wine: therefore there is only the material of bread and wine there, not the substance of the body and blood of Christ.

3. When Christ showed his body to the disciples, he had already risen from the dead; therefore his body was then immortal and in part glorious. But if Christ's body, after it became immortal and glorious, could be touched and seen, then in the Sacrament and wherever else it is present—we are speaking of no other body than the one the Apostles saw and touched. There can be some body that cannot be touched or seen, like air; yet we touch the air we breathe. But this one and the same body is that which the Apostles were commanded to see and handle. But if we cannot handle it as the Apostles did, it cannot be the same; indeed, because they show no human body, it is clear that none is there.

Thus I argue: Christ proved the reality of his body to the Apostles by touch and sight. But Papist priests cannot prove the reality of their Christ in this way: therefore their Christ is not the same as the one whom the Apostles saw and touched. For if it were the same body of Christ as that which the Apostles perceived and touched, then it would likewise be touched and perceived by us.

What does Bellarmine assert—why not? He says it can happen that a true body is present and yet not touched or seen. But this cannot happen, since it conflicts with the nature of a true body. If Christ's body in the Eucharist cannot be seen or touched, then it is unlike that body which Christ showed to the Apostles: for that was tangible and visible; it is not so in the Eucharist.

But how can this be? Because, Bellarmine says, it is covered by another body. I reply: But in the Sacrament, Christ's body is covered by no other body; for they say there is no body there except Christ's. For the species are not a body, nor can they cover a body; indeed, they rather make a body appear. Moreover, a human body cannot be covered except by another, larger body; but in the Eucharist there is no body larger than Christ's body.

In this matter, the Lutherans answer more plausibly when they say there is the substance of bread in the Eucharist, which indeed could cover Christ's body if it were of as great a bulk as Christ's body. But the Papists say there is no substance of bread there; and even if there were, yet the Papist host could scarcely cover a fly, much less Christ's body, which has a head, arms, feet, and other members.

But Bellarmine answers again: either because God prevents the sensible species from transmitting to the senses. I reply: This cannot happen without a miracle—that sensible things are perceived by no one—since no impediment except a divine and manifest one can do this. Let him produce some such impediment in the Eucharist, and we will acquiesce. But if the senses are sound and healthy, and the body is true, it cannot happen without a miracle that it is not perceived and touched.

But indeed it is most absurd to say this happens by miracle: for then there would be as many miracles as there are people who approach the Eucharist. But miracles are not to be rashly invented; nor does Scripture make mention of any miracle in the Eucharist. Yet here there would be a thousand miracles: bread changed into body, wine into blood; the body is not seen nor transmitted to the senses; from its first institution, no one's senses have judged there to be a true body there. For if this happened in one or another person, it would not be absurd; but the matter stands similarly in all people, both pious and impious.

But Bellarmine objects with the example of Christ in Luke 4, where Christ is said to have passed through the midst of those who wanted to throw him down from the mountain. I reply: We do read this; yet Luke does not say that Christ passed through their midst invisible. He did pass through, but visibly; where he gave a specimen of his power. For either, as Bede says, he stunned and terrified them, or he bound their hands so that they could not seize him.

But suppose we grant that he passed through—that is, invisibly—because he temporarily blinded their eyes: this happened only once without any...

It has been done in the body: must it therefore always happen this way whenever the Eucharist is celebrated? And must his body then be changed, since it is not contained in a just space?

But the opinion of those is truer who say that Christ terrified them with his majesty, not so that they would not see, but so that they would not dare to seize him. Bellarmine adds that by divine power it can happen that a body exists in the manner of spirits, so that it can in no way be seen or touched. I reply: this cannot happen without a miracle—indeed, not even with a miracle. For a body cannot at the same time be a body and not a body—that is, a spirit. It would be a spirit if it had the properties of a spirit, and it would not be a body if it did not have the properties of a body. But concerning this, he promises to speak later.

Our seventh argument is taken from these words of Christ: "It is the Spirit who gives life; the flesh profits nothing." Therefore, Christ is not to be eaten carnally in the Sacrament, for Christ is speaking about his own flesh. And rightly Zwingli says that this passage is a bronze wall and an unbroken diamond. But Bellarmine says that this wall is not only not

bronze or diamond, but can scarcely be called clay. And this, first, because even if it were established that Christ is speaking about his own flesh and says that it profits nothing, it still would not follow that the true flesh is not in the Sacrament.

I reply: the audacity of these men, cast forth to defend anything at all, is most worthy of all hatred. Does it not follow that the flesh of Christ is not in the Sacrament if it profits nothing when received carnally? They say it is in the Sacrament so that it may be eaten; but for what purpose would it be eaten if it did not profit? Do you suppose the flesh of Christ is in the Sacrament without fruit? If, therefore, the flesh of Christ does not profit by being eaten carnally, it is certain that it is not in the Sacrament to be eaten carnally.

But Bellarmine confirms this response of his with three reasons; let us see what kind they are.

His first reason is that in the same way it could be concluded that there is no bread in the Sacrament, because if the flesh of Christ does not profit, much less does wheat bread. I reply: Truly an excellent reason! For first, most absurdly the flesh of Christ is compared with bread. If bread does not profit, therefore the flesh of Christ cannot profit? It can happen that bread does not profit much, but it is impious to think this about the flesh of Christ. The nature of Christ's flesh and bread is very different; the flesh of Christ is far more excellent than wheat bread; it is therefore absurd to compare the flesh of Christ with bread. But second, I reply: bread profits much. For it is the Sacrament of the body of Christ, represents Christ to us, and serves to arouse and confirm our faith. Therefore, even if bread does not sustain the soul, yet because it is the Sacrament of this sustenance and life, it is not useless; but the flesh of Christ eaten carnally is entirely unfruitful.

Bellarmino's second reason is that if Christ had said this about his flesh absolutely, he would not have meant that it does not profit at all, but that it cannot profit if it is alone, without the Spirit giving it life; for above in the same chapter he said, "He who eats my flesh has eternal life," and "Unless you eat, you will not have life in you." I reply: Christ's flesh is indeed eaten spiritually for salvation; and in these passages Christ speaks about such eating. But our adversaries cannot from these passages teach what fruit there is in a carnal eating. For not all who eat carnally live, nor do all who do not eat perish.

Bellarmino's third reason is that it is the highest impiety to deny that the flesh of Christ united to divinity profits much, since Paul says we are reconciled to God through the flesh of Christ. I reply: It is the utmost folly to argue in this way: "We are reconciled to God through the flesh of Christ because Christ by his death appeased the wrath of God; therefore it profits to eat the body of Christ carnally." But many are reconciled to God who never dreamed of eating Christ's flesh in this way. The ancient Fathers and Prophets were reconciled to God through the flesh of Christ, yet they could not eat Christ carnally

in the Sacrament; and many today are saved without the Sacrament. We can therefore be reconciled to God without a carnal eating of Christ.

But Bellarmine, dismissing this solution, asserts another. Therefore he replies second that by "the flesh of Christ" in this place is not understood the substance of Christ's flesh

He said carnal understanding; and indeed it profited nothing. And here he cites certain Fathers to prove that human and carnal thinking is of no profit. I reply: I admit that carnal thinking and understanding are of no profit, according to that saying of the Apostle, "The mind of the flesh is enmity against God." For who would say otherwise? Not even the Capernaïtes, with whom Christ was now speaking. But what does this have to do with the matter at hand? Previously, Christ spoke about his flesh, which because he commended it to be eaten by us, some took offense. Christ, to counter this offense, said that his flesh profited nothing: that is, says Bellarmine, carnal imagination. But that never profits: and how then does Christ remove the offense? For it does not follow that they were not rightly offended by this teaching because carnal understanding profits nothing. And yet I admit that the Fathers interpret carnal understanding not badly; for by carnal understanding they mean that those who were offended understood that Christ was to be eaten carnally. Therefore, Christ truly says that he is speaking about the substance of his flesh, and that it profits nothing when eaten carnally: therefore, he did not mean what they supposed; hence they were offended and troubled in vain. This is the true meaning.

But Bellarmine confirms his solution and exposition of these words with three arguments.

His first argument is that flesh, when in Scripture it is distinguished from spirit, is taken for weakness, corruption, and carnal thought. I reply: What is to be understood by the name "flesh" can rather be judged from this chapter, in which so many things are said about the flesh, than from other passages: "My flesh is truly food"; "He who eats my flesh has life"; "Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, you do not have life in you"; "How can this man give us his flesh?" Finally, throughout this chapter mention is often made of the flesh: is flesh in these places taken for carnal thought? By no means; but Christ speaks of true flesh and of the true substance of his flesh: for we truly eat Christ's flesh, but spiritually.

Bellarmino's second argument is taken from the occasion which the Lord had for saying these words; that occasion was the error of the Capernaïtes. They supposed that Christ was to be eaten in the same way as other meats are eaten: to this error, he says, this saying of the Lord most aptly responds: for it is the same as if he had said, "The natural man does not perceive the things of God." I reply: The Capernaïtes indeed understood Christ to mean a carnal mode of eating, and so they were offended. Bellarmine wants Christ to be eaten carnally, but not as other foods: what then is the difference? Namely, other foods are eaten in pieces, but Christ whole: and thus he thinks all offense is

removed. But in this way the offense is rather increased: for it is more monstrous to devour and swallow a whole man in one bite than to eat a man limb by limb and piece by piece. But he is eaten whole without injury: so also he could be eaten in parts without injury. In reality there is no difference between the Capernaïtes and the Papists, except that the latter are a little more voracious: for the former thought Christ was to be eaten as other foods are eaten; the Papists hold that he is devoured whole in an unusual way; and yet they think they do not have a gross and carnal thought. There is no doubt that the Capernaïtes understood such a mode of eating as is customary in eating meats, some of which are eaten minced, some needing no mincing. They do not speak about Christ being eaten either whole or in parts, but only ask how Christ could give them his flesh to eat—whether in this way or that. Christ does not answer that he is to be eaten exactly so, because thus it would profit nothing. So he removes that error by explaining the true mode of eating: "It is the Spirit," he says, "who gives life; the flesh profits nothing," that is, spiritual eating brings life, carnal eating profits nothing.

His third argument is taken from the words immediately following, and here he twists Christ's words: "The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life," that is, he says, they are words explaining and handing down divine spiritual things. I reply: On the contrary, they are to be understood spiritually concerning heavenly and spiritual life: for certainly all Christ's words explained divine things.

But Christ disproves their opinion about carnal eating, because what He said must be understood concerning spiritual eating, which brings eternal life. Bellarmine, however, insists on what follows: "But there are some of you who do not believe." He says this does not cohere with the words, "The flesh profits nothing," that is, it is of no use to eat the flesh in the Sacrament.

I reply: It does not cohere with those words, but with the nearest words, namely, "The words that I speak to you are spirit and life." And it coheres very well with them in this manner: "My words are to be understood concerning spiritual eating, which brings life and consists in faith; but many of you do not believe." The sophist refers these to what is more remote.

But here Bellarmine begins to declaim against us and says that the principal reason why we do not believe is that we are led by carnal reason alone, which does not attain to the mysteries of God. But he is an inept declaimer, since he brings forward no Scripture for real eating; yet because we do not believe, he says we do so for no other reason than that we do not attain the mysteries of God. But this mystery of real presence we understand no less than they do: it is certainly a mystery of iniquity, contrary to the Scriptures, blasphemous, and insulting to Christ. Let them enjoy their mysteries: we fight against this mystery not by carnal reason, but by the sword of God's Word.

Therefore, to conclude this argument: If Christ's flesh profits, why has Bellarmine not taught what it profits? He has no word about how it profits. And indeed no one can teach this: for some wish that Christ's body in the Eucharist does not pass through the teeth—so some Lutherans, like Heshusius and others; some say it is not let into the stomach; others that it descends into the stomach but does not remain there long—but then it is not received as food but as a guest, and no fruit is received from it.

The Lutheran Westphal, in his book against Calvin, says that from Christ's body a certain salutary warmth comes to the soul: but that can happen no less from spiritual eating; for how can spiritual warmth come from carnal eating? Certainly it is blasphemous that anyone should receive Christ's flesh without fruit. But Bellarmine cunningly passed over our argument, which we take from verse 62: "What if you shall see the Son of Man ascending to where He was before?" For by these words Christ most clearly refutes that opinion both of the Capernaïtes and of the Papists concerning real eating. "You shall see the Son of Man ascending: then you will understand that He was not speaking of carnal eating." And this is not our exposition, but that of Athanasius, whose words are these:

Διὰ τοῦτο τῆς εἰς οὐρανὸς ἀναβάσεως ἐμνημόνευσε, ἵνα τῆς σωματικῆς ἐννοίας ἀφελκύσῃ.

"For this reason Christ made mention of His ascension into heaven, that He might draw them away from carnal thought, or from bodily understanding."

So Augustine: "They thought He would distribute His body; but He said He would ascend into heaven certainly whole." So the same elsewhere: "The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life (says Christ); understand spiritually what I have spoken. You are not about to eat this body which you see, nor to drink that blood which those who crucify Me will shed. I am commending to you a certain sacrament: understood spiritually, it will give you life."

Now let us come to our eighth argument, which is taken from those words of Christ: "Where I am, there also shall My servant be." But the saints are not in the Eucharist; therefore neither is Christ there. Bellarmine hardly deigns to respond, although the argument is quite correctly concluded. For if Christ promised that wherever He Himself shall be, His servants will be with Him; He cannot be in the Eucharist without His servants. Moreover, I wonder what servants they will assign to Him in the Eucharist.

Bellarmino, however, at length replies in two ways. First, he says that Christ did not say, "Wherever I am," but, "Where I am, there also shall My servant be." It is sufficient, therefore, he says, if the saints are somewhere with Christ, even if they are not wherever He is; otherwise they ought to have been with Him even on the cross.

I reply: This is a wretched and inept response. For first, Christ said ὅπου, which is just as if He had said, "Wherever." So elsewhere: ὅπου ἔαν ᾗ τὸ πτώμα, "Wherever the carcass shall be, there the eagles will be gathered together."

He speaks of himself, that wherever he himself may be, there the eagles ought to be: ὅ ἔαν, wherever. So elsewhere, "These are they who follow the Lamb, ὅπε ἂν ὑπάγη," wherever he may go. Therefore, Christ cannot be removed from his ministers, not even in the Eucharist.

It conflicts with the nature of a true man that someone who is with him in one place should not be in another place at the same time, because a true man cannot be in different places simultaneously. For Christ, even after the resurrection, was not in two places at once: when he was at Emmaus, he was not in Jerusalem; when he was at the Sea of Tiberias, he was not in the upper room; when he was on the Mount of Olives, he was not in the valley. He was always in one place.

What he objects—that the saints ought to have been with Christ on the cross—is a delusion. For it is certain that Christ is speaking about his joy and blessedness; for he promises them a reward. But to be on the cross was not pleasant. Therefore, Bellarmine answers secondly that it is certain that Christ in those words promised the fellowship of the kingdom and glory, because elsewhere he says, "Father, I will that where I am, they also may be with me, that they may behold my glory." I reply: This indeed is true; and if the Eucharist is separated from this kingdom and glory, Christ is not there. Hence it appears that Christ, when he is in the Eucharist, not only lacks glory but is outside his kingdom. But this conflicts with the article concerning the session of Christ at the right hand of God the Father, and with Paul: "He must reign until he has put all enemies under his feet." Therefore, Christ cannot not be in his kingdom, cannot not be in glory.

But Bellarmine says that Christ, when he said, "Where I am, there my minister will be," was speaking about his kingdom; whence he wants Christ in the Eucharist not only to be without glory but also to be deprived of his kingdom; therefore, he is not there attended by his ministers. Who would not detest these Papists, who as often as they consecrate Christ in the Eucharist, so often drag him down from his kingdom and glory? How great a crime is it to call Christ down from heaven to earth, from the kingdom into a prison, from glory to humility?

Thus I argue with Peter Martyr: If Christ is in the Eucharist, then either he is there in glory or not. If in glory, then his ministers are with him. If not in glory, then the priests act impiously who call him down from the glory of God the Father to these lower things. Bellarmine very wisely distinguishes that Christ's being in the glory of the Father in the Eucharist can be understood in two ways. First, that while he is in the Eucharist, he sees God; and thus Christ is in glory in the Eucharist. I reply: This is not what Christ is

speaking about—that he himself sees the glory of the Father—but that he himself may be glorious and that his ministers may see his glory. "Father," he says, "I will that where I am, they also may be with me whom you have given me, that they may behold that glory which you have given me." Nowhere, therefore, is Christ where he cannot be seen in glory.

Bellarmino says most absurdly that Christ is in glory because he saw the glory of the Father. But by that reasoning a guest could be in joy because he saw Lazarus in joy.

Secondly, Bellarmine says that Christ's being in the Eucharist in the glory of the Father can be understood such that being in the Eucharist is for him glory and blessedness; and in this way Christ is not in glory in the Eucharist. I reply: How unworthy of Christ is this? Now Christ in the Eucharist is not only not in kingdom and glory but not even in blessedness. How great an injury they do to Christ who cast him down from his blessedness! For I argue thus: If Christ in the Eucharist is not in blessedness, as Bellarmine wishes, then they are sacrilegious who thrust Christ into a place where his blessedness is not. But the former is true; therefore, so is the latter.

But Bellarmine adds that choirs of angels attend Christ in the Eucharist, and this according to the teaching of the Fathers. I reply: Concerning the teaching of the Fathers we will speak later. But when Christ says, "I will that where I am, there my minister may be," he is speaking not about angels but about the saints whom he had come into the world to redeem.

Therefore, to conclude this argument: If the saints are not in the Eucharist or around the Eucharist, then Christ is not there. But the saints are not in the Eucharist; therefore, Christ is not there. The consequence is clear because where Christ is, there he is attended by a retinue and ministry not only of angels but also of holy men. Therefore, the Papists are blasphemous who depict Christ as forced into such straits that he must be alone without his ministers.

Our ninth argument is based on the words of Christ in various places: "I am going to the Father," and "I leave the world and go to the Father." Bellarmine replies that Christ left the world visibly, with respect to human interaction, but is nevertheless invisibly present in the world.

I respond:

1. This invisible πολιτείαν (citizenship) is a mere imposture. They say Christ is with us, but ἀοράτως, that is, invisibly. But then his body would not differ from a spirit; for invisibility is a property of spirit, not of body. But Christ's body is not a spirit; therefore it cannot be invisible, if this is the case.

2. Christ says he is leaving the world; but this would be false if he remained invisibly in the world.

3. Christ promised that his absence would be compensated by the coming of the Paraclete. But the presence of the Paraclete is invisible; therefore Christ is not present invisibly in body.

Bellarmino says:

1. The Paraclete supplies the place of Christ conversing among men in a human manner.

I reply: The presence of the Paraclete is invisible; this cannot be denied. Therefore Christ is not present invisibly; for there is no need to compensate an invisible presence with an invisible presence. Christ consoles the Apostles with this promise: although he would leave the world, he would send the Paraclete to remain with them, but only invisibly. Therefore Christ was not going to be present invisibly; for then he would be with them in the same way as the Holy Spirit; and he would have made some mention of this consolation, saying, "I go visibly, but I remain with you invisibly."

2. Bellarmine says that the Holy Spirit truly descended and yet also remained in heaven; so Christ truly ascended and yet also truly remained with us, not only as God (as he is everywhere) but also as man in the Eucharist, although in a spiritual and invisible manner.

I reply: This is heretical, blasphemous, and Eutychian; for it destroys the truth of Christ's body. For in this way Christ's body must not only be a spirit but also be God. For the Holy Spirit is God, and therefore can be in heaven while on earth; if Christ's body is likewise, then it must be of a similar nature—that is, divine. Who would not shudder at these blasphemies? But because we have spoken above about Christ's ascension, we will say no more now.

Our tenth argument is taken from those words of Christ: "Do not touch me, for I have not yet ascended to my Father." From this Calvin concludes that Christ is not to be sought on earth; therefore he forbade himself to be touched by women until he ascended into heaven, so that he might show that he was not elsewhere or to be sought elsewhere.

Bellarmino spends much effort in refuting this argument, which I confess does not have much force in itself. For other reasons can indeed be assigned why Christ then forbade himself to be touched. For certainly he not only permitted himself to be touched by women but also commanded the Apostles to touch him, and Thomas especially.

But what Bellarmine infers from this—that Christ wishes to be sought and touched on earth—does not follow. He then wished to be seen and touched by many, to prove his

resurrection; but now he neither wishes nor can be touched, because he has withdrawn himself from us and has lifted his body into heaven.

Does Bellarmine think he touches Christ? But after his resurrection, Christ did not allow himself to be touched by just anyone: some pious women and the Apostles touched him; but by no impious person is he read to have been touched or seen. Now they wish him to be touched indiscriminately by whomever they please. But those who touch Christ are united with Christ; but the impious are not united with Christ; therefore they do not touch him.

But perhaps he will deny that the impious touch Christ spiritually. That indeed is true, and therefore bodily touching avails nothing for spiritual union. For certainly if bodily touching were beneficial, it would benefit no less that which is done with the hands than that which is done with the tongue or palate. If foods are digested in the stomach, and from there nourishment is drawn for the sustenance of our bodies, and that is converted into our substance, they benefit as much as they are. But Christ's body is not digested nor converted into our nature; therefore we benefit as much by touching as by eating.

Thus I argue: The opinion that thus holds that Christ must be eaten...

It is false that eating profits any more than touching; therefore, it should be rejected. But the Papists hold such an opinion; therefore, it must be rejected. The major premise is clear. I prove the minor because they can name no benefit from that eating we have spoken of which is not received from touch. For if they say that Christ, when eaten, suffers something more than when touched—as food is broken down—which is more than being touched, it is certain that Christ is not changed, corrupted, or suffers anything; therefore, not more than when touched. Thus, carnal eating is nothing but carnal touching; therefore, Christ must be touched and eaten by faith, not by hands or teeth. If touching Christ carnally profits anything, the hands can accomplish it as well as the mouth; so it is not necessary for Papists to eat the host, but only to touch it. This follows most absurdly from their doctrine.

Now concerning the passage, "Do not touch me," I will not say much. We do not draw an argument from this passage, which can be explained in various ways; and Calvin's argument is taken from an interpretation which does not seem very fitting. I much prefer the interpretation which Bellarmine gives, which is also that of Peter Martyr: "Do not touch me now, but go without delay and announce to my disciples; you will be able to touch me later, but I have not yet ascended." Thus, I dismiss this argument.

Our eleventh argument is taken from the words of Stephen: "God does not dwell in temples made with hands," and of Paul: "God, who made the world and all things in it, since he is Lord of heaven and earth, does not dwell in temples made with hands." This argument is almost the same as the first; but Bellarmine distinguishes: Christ, therefore,

is not enclosed in temples. Bellarmine says that Christ is in temples, but does not dwell in temples, because "to dwell" signifies need of a place—for those properly dwell in a house who would be badly off unless they were there—and it also signifies comprehension and confinement in a place. Both are repugnant to the true God, and yet both were fitting for the idols of the Gentiles, and thus God is distinguished from idols.

I reply: If God is distinguished from idols by not dwelling in temples, then Christ does not dwell in them. Bellarmine concedes that he does not dwell there, but is there. So also the idols did not truly dwell; for since an idol is nothing, it cannot properly dwell in any place; nor did the prophet mean this, but that God cannot be comprehended by any temples, however large, because he is everywhere. The sense is not that God does not dwell in temples—that is, he does not need these roofs—but he wished to raise human minds higher, so that they might contemplate God dwelling in heaven.

What? Does God need heaven? Yet he is said to dwell in heaven: "He who dwells in the heavens will laugh at them," "Our Lord dwells on high." Then does Christ not need temples and those enclosures of pyxes and capsules? Certainly without them he would be exposed not only to the injuries of men, but also of dogs, mice, and pigs. But Bellarmine says that he is also outside that place.

I reply: So God is outside heaven, and yet he is said to dwell in heaven. But what if he is outside? Yet he is truly inside; therefore, he is truly enclosed and comprehended here, because here Christ is, who in the sacrament is not outside the species of the sacrament. For they would not place him in a pyx if they thought he could not be comprehended in a pyx; therefore, this is a true idol. For an idol was enclosed in a temple; yet idolaters thought it was also outside the temple; so also the Papists' Christ.

But whether the body of Christ can be enclosed in so small a space must be discussed later. For now, we will be content with these points.

Our twelfth argument is taken from the words of Paul: "Our fathers all ate the same spiritual food and all drank the same spiritual drink." Therefore, the ancient Hebrews similarly ate Christ as we do; but they did not eat Christ carnally; therefore, neither do we eat him carnally.

Bellarmino says that all who were then living, both good and evil, ate the same food, but not the same as we do.

I reply: We have above, in the controversy concerning sacraments in general, refuted this interpretation with many arguments and taught that they ate the same food as we do; it is not necessary to repeat the same things now. We have brought forward clear testimonies from Augustine for this opinion.

Concerning Augustine, Bellarmine gives two replies. First, he prefers Chrysostom to him because Augustine did not explain this passage in his commentaries.

But this reasoning is of no account: for one who cites a passage incidentally can explain its true meaning no less than one who sets out to expound it professionally. But Bellarmine says that not all, according to our view, but only the good ate that food. I reply: All ate the same food sacramentally, and so now all do, but only the pious do so by faith and spiritually; that is, they received the reality of the sacrament.

Secondly, Bellarmine says that Augustine states the Hebrews ate the same food as we do, namely in signification; because those sacraments and ours signify the same thing; but not the same reality. I reply: Augustine clearly says the reality was the same, which they received and which we receive. Moreover, he calls the sacraments the same in signification because they signified what ours do: ours signify Christ, and those signified Christ. But in neither is Christ really present: for then they would not receive the same food, but only the signification of this food. But he objects that Augustine says Christ was prefigured to them in the rock, but manifested to us in the flesh. You see, says Bellarmine, Christ is attributed to the Jews in the rock; to us in the flesh, which that rock prefigured. I reply: Augustine says that to them and to us Christ was absolutely the same: therefore they did not have only the signification of Christ. But Christ is said to have been prefigured to them in the rock and manifested to us in the flesh because we believe in Christ incarnate, they in Christ to be incarnate: for the flesh of Christ is not manifest in the sacrament. Therefore Augustine is speaking of the incarnation of Christ, not of his real presence in the sacrament.

Thus what Augustine says elsewhere, "The Passover which the Jews celebrate with a lamb is one thing, another which we receive in the body and blood of the Lord," by the body and blood of the Lord he understands the sacraments of these realities. So therefore I conclude that the Israelites in the desert did not have the same sacraments as we do, but the same reality, that is, spiritual food and drink, namely Christ: yet they did not have it carnally; nor therefore do we.

Our thirteenth argument is taken from 1 Corinthians 10:16–17 and 11:26–28, where the Apostle calls the Eucharist bread five times, and this after consecration: therefore it does not cease to be bread; and so consequently the body of Christ is not there. This argument is valid against the Papists, who will readily grant that the body of Christ is not there if it is established that bread is there; but not against the Lutherans, who do not remove the bread but wish the body of Christ to be conjoined with the bread.

But now let us see what Bellarmine replies. First, he disapproves of the common response of the Papists, that it is called bread because it was bread before, as Eve is called a rib of Adam; rods turned into serpents are called rods; the lame and blind are said to walk and

see; harlots and publicans are said to precede into the kingdom of heaven; Simon is called a leper because he was formerly a leper; the master of the feast is said to have tasted water which had become wine. And this was the response of the old Papists who wrote against Berengar; but Bellarmine does not approve this response. For adversaries could say, he states, that just because something is denominated from that from which it was made in one place, words are not everywhere to be taken in that way.

But we bring forward two other reasons, of which the first is that then the Apostle would be speaking tropically: for a thing is improperly called not what it is, but what it was; and so we by the same right can say there would be a trope in these words, "This is my body"; and so Berengar once replied. Our second reason is that never in Scripture is anything called by the name of that thing which it was, unless the change is manifest to the senses. Thus it was evident that Eve was now a woman, not a rib; and that the rods had now been serpents, not rods; and that the lame and blind had ceased to be lame and blind; and similarly harlots and publicans; so also then the wine was not water, but the master of the feast judged from tasting that it was wine; nor was Simon then a leper, because a little before he had been healed, and all then saw that he was healed. But here bread appears and is so called: therefore it is bread. Nowhere is such a trope used unless things are evident and clearly declare there to be a trope. Therefore the body is not called bread because it was made from bread, since all

Indeed, the body, but let them distinguish the bread.

Secondly, Bellarmine says that Scripture ordinarily calls things as they outwardly appear, as the bronze serpent is called a serpent; so the Eucharist is called bread because in external form it does not differ from true bread. I reply: this too is figurative. For the bronze serpent was not truly a serpent, but only by resemblance; and the senses were not deceived in this case, for all the senses testified that it was bronze, not a living serpent. In the Eucharist, however, unless it is bread, all the senses are deceived. Therefore, we are not to be accused for affirming that the bread is called the body of Christ because it is the sign of Christ's body, if this manner of interpretation is allowed—that bread is so called on account of its external appearance.

Thirdly, Bellarmine says it is called bread by a Hebrew phrase in which by the name "bread" all food is understood. I reply: 1. The Hebrew word "Lechem" does not properly signify every kind of food, but only bread, unless used figuratively and metaphorically; for then it is taken indiscriminately for all food. If it is so taken here, then it is a trope. 2. "ἄρτος" and "panis" are not customarily so taken in good authors. 3. The institution of the mystery teaches that no other food than bread is meant: for true wheat bread was placed on the table, and no other food besides wheat bread can denote this mystery. 4. The Fathers testify that it is true bread, as we shall show later, which is made from many grains of wheat so that by this means our union among ourselves might be signified. That

mystical analogy would perish if it were another food and not bread. 5. The Apostle says, "The bread which we break, is it not the κοινωνία, that is, the communion of the body of Christ?" What sense would these words have if by "bread" food—that is, the flesh of Christ—were understood? 6. The flesh of Christ is only metaphorical food, not true bodily food. But how desperate their cause is, who is there that does not see, who are forced to invent such expositions? Paul calls it bread, that is, they say, food; but what food is on the Lord's table except bread?

Fourthly, Bellarmine says the Eucharist is called bread because it is not only food, but solid, principal, substantial food, such as wheat bread is among bodily foods. I reply: This does not differ from the previous point. But the Apostle clearly testifies that he speaks of bread: for he says, "The bread which we break." This properly refers to bread: for bread is properly said to be broken; the body of Christ is not broken; nor is any other food said to be broken, but rather cut; for breaking indicates what is done by hand.

Fifthly, Bellarmine says that Christ's body is often called bread in John 6, where the adversaries do not understand material bread; therefore, they understand heavenly food. I reply: When Christ's body is called bread, it must be understood of spiritual bread; but when the bread is pointed out, which truly was bread (as they themselves confess) and still is true bread (as the senses declare), then material bread must necessarily be understood. Therefore, we most rightly conclude from the Apostle that bread remains in the Eucharist because Scripture calls it bread after consecration. They cannot reply without tropes; and their tropes are most absurd and unlike other tropes found in Scripture; ours are straightforward.

Our fourteenth argument is taken from Philippians 3: "Who will transform our humble body to be conformed to his glorious body." Our bodies after the resurrection will have the same endowments which Christ's body now has; but it is foolish to say our bodies will be in many places at once or under the small appearance of bread. Concerning this passage we have previously said something. Bellarmine says that Christ's body can be in many places not because it is a glorious body, but by the power of God: for Christ was in the Eucharist before the resurrection. I reply: The Apostle not only says our bodies will be glorious, but σύμμορφα, that is, conformed to the body of Christ. Theodoret argues in the same way as we do from this passage: the bodies of the saints retain the mark or property of their nature; so also the Lord's body similarly has its own immutable substance; but in

Our fifteenth argument is taken from Colossians 3: "Seek those things which are above, where Christ sits at the right hand of God." Therefore, Christ is not to be sought in the Eucharist, but in heaven. And rightly the ancient Church instituted that before the celebration of the mysteries it should be said, "Lift up your hearts."

Bellarmino responds that "Lift up your hearts" does not signify an elevation to a bodily place, but an elevation from earthly things and the cares of this life to God and eternal and divine matters. I reply: it signifies a bodily place separate from this world—not things in this world, but τὰ ἄνω, the things that are above. For if Christ were in the Eucharist, it would be necessary to seek τὰ κάτω, that is, the things that are below. And the Apostle designates a place when he says, "where Christ sits at the right hand of God."

Moreover, what he objects concerning astronomers, who are always occupied in mind and eyes among the stars, is foolish. For they contemplate nothing but the stars; but the Apostle does not wish us to contemplate the stars with our eyes, but that our minds should ascend above the stars and contemplate Christ, who is in heaven.

But he further objects concerning the Magi, who sought Christ in the manger; concerning the Virgin Mary, who sought him in the temple; and concerning Magdalene, who sought him in the sepulcher—all of whom nevertheless had their hearts lifted up because they were seeking him who is God over all, blessed forever. I reply: when Christ was on earth, he was to be sought here on earth; but now he has withdrawn himself from the earth. Therefore, he is not now to be sought on earth, but in heaven, into which he was taken. To this, "Lift up your hearts" pointed. But if Christ were in the sacrament, it would be necessary to direct both eyes and hearts to the sacrament.

Chapter 9: Whether it can be that Christ's body is present in the Eucharist.

That the real presence of the Papists is nothing but a human invention has already been demonstrated by various arguments drawn from the sources of Scripture. But we have not yet completed our whole task, because other arguments remain which are by no means to be omitted in this cause, since they are of the greatest weight against the superstitious opinion of our adversaries. For it is not enough for us to have revealed the truth and to have refuted with a moderate or sufficient refutation the errors which we undertook to refute; but it is fitting to our purpose to embrace all things which are customarily debated among theologians of both parties concerning this controversy.

We come now, therefore, to that argument which is taken from the nature of the body. Although it may seem philosophical, it is nevertheless truly theological. For Scripture teaches that Christ's body is endowed with the same properties as ours, that it is of the same nature, and that it retains this nature and these properties—since it is necessary that Christ's body never cease to be human. From this it follows that whatever is alien to a true body cannot be truly affirmed of Christ's body. Therefore, whatever is affirmed of Christ's body that is repugnant to the nature of a true body is manifestly false.

Now, first of all, it belongs to the nature of a true body to have its own dimensions and consequently to be contained in its own place. But the Papists affirm that Christ's body in the sacrament lacks due quantity and proportion of body and is not circumscribed by

place—which is just as if they take away the truth of the body. For what does it matter whether they do this openly or covertly? And on this supposition, Christ's body would be devoid of quantity and of those properties which are necessary and essential in a body. However many thousand times they say that it is Christ's true body, yet they do not now merely strip Christ of his garment so as to be guilty of theft, but they take away his very body so as to become murderers and heretics.

For just as if someone should concede that God exists but at the same time should confine him to a certain place and not concede that he is infinite, he would take away God; so those who profess to acknowledge Christ's body and yet overturn the properties of a true body leave nothing sound in the body.

Would that this dispute were with the Papists alone! But the Lutherans wallow in the same mire of most absurd error with the Papists—indeed

Here they cling more stubbornly. For it is enough for the Papists that Christ is in all consecrated hosts; but most of the Lutherans bring back a certain monstrous ubiquity, and equality of humanity and divinity, and omnipresence, and all majesty, and prodigies of this kind condemned in Eutyches. But we, following the right thread of truth, hold concerning Christ's body what Scripture has taught and the true nature of a body requires. Taking therefore our argument from the nature of a body, we oppose the real presence. For it is repugnant to the nature and truth of a human body, which has distinct members and a proper magnitude, to be in so small a space. And the Papists say that this cannot happen without a miracle; we on the contrary say first that miracles are not to be rashly invented—but concerning miracles later; second, that we deny that Christ's body is in the Sacrament in the way the Papists wish, not even by a miracle, because it is simply impossible. For it implies a contradiction, because thus it would be at once a body and not a body. We contend therefore that the Papists have come to such madness that they establish such a presence of Christ in the Sacrament as is simply impossible, which does not even fall under divine power.

The question therefore now is whether Christ's body can be in the Eucharist in the way the Papists wish. Bellarmine makes two parts of this question: the first is whether God could have done this; the second, whether He willed it.

Although this argument from the power of God does not conclude for the Papists: it does not follow, "God can do this: therefore He does it"; indeed it works especially for us against them: for if He cannot, certainly He does not do it; but how it may be said that He cannot, we shall say presently. Now concerning the argument of the Papists and Lutherans: "God can bring it about that Christ's body is in many or in all places: therefore it must be so believed"; I reply: it does not follow; for then we would have to hold that whatever can be done has been done. By a similar argument formerly the heretic

Praxeas used to try to prove that the Father is also the Son, because it was not difficult for God to make Himself both Father and Son, just as He made both the barren woman and the virgin bear.

But Tertullian excellently refuted this folly of the heretics. "If," he says, "we use this opinion abruptly in our presumptions, we shall be able to imagine anything about God, as if He had done it because He could do it. But not because He can do all things is it therefore to be believed that He has done even what He has not done; but whether He has done it must be inquired. He could have equipped man with wings for flying; He could have extinguished Praxeas and all heretics at once." Then he says, "By this reasoning something will also be difficult for God, namely whatever He has not done, not because He could not, but because He would not." From these words of Tertullian we gather two things: first, that we must not argue from the power of God unless His will is established. However much therefore God could bring it about that Christ's body is in a thousand places at once, it is not therefore to be believed unless the Adversaries also teach that He willed it; but they will never show that. The second is, that things which God does not will can be called difficult for Him, not simply, as if He could not do them at all, but in a certain way, because what God does not will to do is just as if it could not be done.

Now therefore, even if the Papists prove that what they contend can be done, they have accomplished little, because we ought not by rash presumptions and imagining anything about God, as Tertullian says. But because God does not do what cannot be done, and we say that this is of the kind of things which cannot be done, Bellarmine saw that this point had to be cleared up for himself at the outset.

What then? Is God to be said to be unable to do something? Does this not conflict with God's omnipotence? Do we then deny God's omnipotence or call it into question? Far from it. Yet not only Papists but certain foolish Lutherans babble about us that we deny the omnipotence of God because we do not say abruptly and absolutely, without any exception or explanation, that God can do all things. Thus a certain distinguished author, Conradus Schlusshelburgius, says that God's omnipotence is impiously denied by us because we say that this cannot be done: that a body be not a body; that something actually is and is not at the same time. Ignorantly! For God cannot do certain things, such as sin, lie, die; make past things future; make things that have been done undone.

To do; and Scripture itself affirms that God cannot do certain things, "He cannot deny Himself," and "It is impossible for God to lie." Yet the Apostle does not deny divine omnipotence. Thus, God cannot impel anyone to sin, nor deceive, nor be deceived, nor can He fail to be blessed, eternal, infinite, good: for all these things conflict with the divine nature. Therefore Augustine says, "Therefore God cannot do certain things because He is omnipotent," and elsewhere, "I say how many things He cannot do; He cannot die, He cannot sin, He cannot lie, He cannot be deceived. He cannot do such

things because if He could, He would not be omnipotent." And still elsewhere, "Whoever says such things—if God is omnipotent, let Him make what has been done not to have been done—does not see that he is saying this: if He is omnipotent, let Him make those things which are true, by the very fact that they are true, to be false." Similarly Ambrose: "What is impossible for God is not difficult for His power, but what is contrary to His nature."

Theodoret says, "We have found many things impossible for the omnipotent God," namely those which are "contrary to or alien from the divine nature." But he rightly warns that these things being impossible are not a sign of weakness or impotence, but of power and ability—not of impotence, but of potency. And so Ambrose: "This impossibility is not of weakness, but of virtue and majesty." Jerome says, "I speak boldly; although God can do all things, He cannot raise up a virgin after her fall," that is, make one who has been corrupted uncorrupted.

It is no wonder, therefore, that we say God cannot do certain things: for if He could, either He would not be God, or He would do or suffer something contrary to His nature. Just as it is alien to God to make what is true false, so also to make what is a body not a body: for to do this is to lie—but this God cannot do, because God cannot even be thought of except as true.

Now there are three impossibilities in the Papists' dogma: first, that one body of the host is simultaneously in different places; second, that a body is somewhere and does not occupy a place; third, that accidents exist without a subject and nourish. These are the main ones; but many others also follow from these. They maintain these; we say they are both false and impossible. But before speaking of these separately, it must first be said in general whether these are simply impossible.

Therefore it must be asked what is impossible—that is, what God cannot do. Once this is understood, we will easily grasp whether these things are possible. Therefore a rule must be sought from which it becomes clear what God can do and what He cannot; concerning which, I hope, we will agree among ourselves. Yet theologians have written variously about it.

Bellarmino says this rule can be taken either from God, or from man, or from the things themselves; let us respond briefly to these.

First, he says that Calvin teaches in the Catechism and Institutes that God can do what He wills and does, but that there is no power in God to do what He has not decreed. Certainly no pious person would deny that God can do what He wills; but that there is no power in God by which He could do what He does not do—Calvin never said this, nor is anything of the sort found in Calvin: therefore this is a lie of Bellarmine. Indeed Calvin says that the power of God is not to be imagined as idle and somehow dormant, but as effective,

vigilant, active—lest we think that God has granted all power to secondary causes and Himself now does nothing. Yet it does not follow that God could not do many more things if He willed, even create a new world—indeed many worlds. Nevertheless, because it is useless to dispute about the power of God which never comes into act, theologians sometimes refer God's power to His will, so that He is omnipotent because He can do whatever He wills. Tertullian says, "For God to be able is to will; and not to be able is not to will." Therefore he says, "If you prove that He has done it, then you prove that He both could and willed." So Augustine: "He is said to be omnipotent by doing what He wills, not by suffering what He does not will." And so the Prophet David, speaking of the power of God, says: "Our God is in heaven; He does whatever He pleases." We will many things but cannot do them, and demons will more than they can do; but God can do all that He wills: in this His omnipotence shines forth, which belongs to no creature.

Yet it is certain that God can do many things which He will never do, nor should He be thought to do all that He can. He could have prevented Adam from sinning

The serpent deceived the woman so that the Jews would not kill Christ. He could have brought it about that all, even the demons, were saved.

"Do you think that I cannot now pray to my Father," said Christ, "and He will at once send me more than twelve legions of angels?" But this was not done.

And elsewhere: "I tell you that God is able from these stones to raise up children to Abraham." Yet we never read that He did this.

So again elsewhere: "Abba, Father, all things are possible for You; remove this cup from Me." God could have removed it, but He did not.

Thus Augustine says that in the future age we shall know many things which we do not now know—such as why God did not wish to save many whom He could have saved; why Christ did not perform miracles among those who would believe, but did so among those who would not believe; why He chose these and not those; why He does not do many things that He can do.

So also elsewhere he says that it is possible for a man to be without sin, even though no one ever was except Christ, who is God by nature. Therefore, we must not deny that God can do something because He has never done it or will do it.

On this matter, Damascene has these words: "All things that He wills, He can do; but of the things He can do, He does not will all. He can destroy the world, but He does not will it."

Therefore, simply speaking, the power of God extends more widely than His will—if by His will we mean execution and effect.

It is false and heretical to equate God's power with His effects, as Peter Abelard taught.

But in a certain way, the will and power of God are equal: whatever God can will, He can do. For even the good angels do what they will, because they will nothing except what they ought to will; so in this they are like God. But they cannot do all that they can will.

In God, will and power are the same. But it is no less uncertain what God can will than what He can do; therefore, a better and more certain rule must be sought.

Second, from the human side (says Bellarmine), this rule could be accepted: that God can do all that man can conceive.

Thus some Scholastics say: because the object of the human intellect is being or truth, whatever is being or truth can come to be.

And indeed God can do all things that can fall within human understanding—if we speak of its proper object (for even contradictory things can be conceived, though they cannot come to be).

But the power of God is not to be circumscribed by the narrow limits of the human mind. God can do more than we can think.

For who among us can grasp in his mind the structure of the world? We believe it was created, and we form some idea of it in our mind; but its mode surpasses our understanding.

We see the body of the sun with our eyes, but we do not understand its nature, powers, or all its operations.

What shall we say about the origin of the soul, the generation of the Son, the procession of the Holy Spirit, the Trinity of persons? Are not all these things καλῇ—that is, of such a kind that they cannot be conceived or comprehended by our mind?

And do we not read: "What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has entered into the heart of man, God has prepared for those who love Him"?

And does not the Apostle say that God is able to do "exceedingly abundantly above all that we ask or think"?

Therefore, God can do what has never entered anyone's mind; therefore His power is not to be measured by the grasp of our intellect.

And although what we understand is true, there are infinite truths which we do not understand.

In nature, how many things are there whose reason is unknown to us? Augustine, answering pagans who think our teachings false because they do not understand them, asks why salt from Agrigentum melts near fire as in water, while in water it crackles as in fire; and he says that among the Garamantes there is a fountain so cold by day that it cannot be drunk, so hot by night that it cannot be touched—and he mentions other such things.

Therefore we confess that our thought is overcome by divine power; for our understanding is finite, but God's power is infinite. We do not grasp why God willed to choose this one and reject that one.

Therefore what Bellarmine says—that we refuse to believe what we cannot grasp by reason—is mere calumny.

But we do not believe that Christ's body is in the Eucharist—not because we do not understand it, but first because it conflicts with Scripture; second because it is simply impossible.

that is, the impossible, as we will teach later. Thirdly, a rule can be taken from the things themselves, namely, that whatever does not imply a contradiction can be done. Because nothing is and is not at the same time: if God were to do this, He would contradict Himself: for He would be God and not God: therefore, whatever involves repugnance and contradiction cannot be done, not only because it conflicts with a fixed principle of nature, but because God would then be unlike Himself: for then it could be said that God did not predestine those whom He predestined; did not reject those whom He rejected; did not do what He did. Therefore, we agree on the rule, but the question is whether this implies a contradiction, which we are now disputing. They deny it; we affirm it.

Chapter 10: Whether one body being in many places implies a contradiction.

Arguments of the Papists by which they prove it does not imply a contradiction.

Possevino tries to prove that one body can be in many places with five arguments, of which the first is taken from Scripture, which testifies that nothing is impossible for God. Christ says: "With God all things are possible"; likewise elsewhere: "With God no word shall be impossible." If nothing is impossible for God, then it is not impossible for one body to be simultaneously in many places.

I reply: Since Bellarmine admits that those things are impossible for God which are contradictory, that is, which imply a contradiction, not all things are simply possible. But certainly all things are possible which do not entail a contradiction. If this is of such a

kind, we will grant that it is possible. But it cannot happen without contradiction that one body is placed in many places, because then it would be the same body and not the same body; which cannot even be thought without contradiction. But Bellarmine tries to refute this from our principles. However, he asserts three of our principles. The first is that nothing is to be believed without the word of God: but the word of God nowhere exempts from God's omnipotence the presence of one body in different places.

I reply: If it implies a contradiction, it is certain from his own confession that it is alien to God's power; nor is there need to bring forth testimony from Scripture to prove that one body is not in two places, since it conflicts with the common rule, which is held clearly enough in Scripture. For God cannot lie, nor deny Himself: Scripture affirms this expressly: why? because it conflicts with His nature: similarly, one body cannot be in two places, for then God would make one not one, a body not a body; and so He would lie: then Christ's body would be circumscribed in one place, which is of the essence of a body, and simultaneously be in many places, which is contrary to the essence of a body, and so there would be a contradiction. But since contradiction does not fall within the scope of God, as Augustine rightly says, this must be utterly denied as possible. Therefore we have the word of God: God cannot do what implies a contradiction, because He cannot lie. Bellarmine says that one body being in two places cannot clearly be reduced to this: but it is enough if it is reduced in some way.

The second principle of ours is that the true doctrine is that which exalts God and humbles man, and the contrary false doctrine is that which exalts man and humbles God. But he who says that God can place one body in many places exalts God and humbles man, since he admits that God can do more than we can understand; but he who denies it humbles God and exalts man, since he says that God cannot do what man cannot grasp.

I reply: This is to trifle sophistically. For it is not always true whatever we imagine to amplify God's power, because thus we could imagine that God begat many sons and created many worlds, and yet both of these are false: therefore we do not say that true doctrine is always to be judged in this way. Our principle is that divine matters are to be spoken of according to the prescription of the divine word, not as having overstepped the bounds of the word and dreamed up I know not what fantasies.

Finally, this is of such a kind that it cannot stand with divine glory; for God would be contrary to Himself if He were to make something both be and not be at the same time. The third principle cited by Bellarmine is that being in a place is not of the essence of a body, but something accidental; therefore, it does not imply a contradiction for one body to be in many places, because only those things imply a contradiction which conflict with the essence of the thing. I reply: It is of the essence of a body to fill a place, because it has length, breadth, and depth. These dimensions cannot be so contracted as to be without

space; therefore, a body cannot exist without these; hence, these dimensions are of its essence; and consequently, a body cannot exist without a place.

Bellarmino objects that the outermost heaven is not in a place. Thus, he could give no instance except concerning the outermost heaven; he was compelled to flee to the highest heaven because he could find no example in the world. But I reply: 1. We are speaking of physical bodies, indeed of the human body, which necessarily must be in a place. 2. Concerning the outermost heaven, I reply that it is neither everywhere nor in many places; indeed, Bellarmine says it is in no place; and certainly it can seem so because every place is within the outermost heaven. But even if the outermost heaven is not in a place properly speaking, still it is circumscribed by its surface. It is sophistical, when we are speaking of proper places, to give an instance of a place not properly so called; and when we are speaking of an organic body, to object with the outermost celestial sphere; for the axiom is not about such a body, but about a body composed of elements.

But 3. I reply: concerning the outermost heaven, he did not say that it is in a place and not in a place at the same time; but concerning Christ's body they say that it is at once circumscribed by a place and not circumscribed—which is necessarily contradictory.

I now come to Bellarmine's second argument, which he takes from an example of Scripture. Christ appeared with the Apostle Paul after the Ascension; He was at the same time in the highest heaven and on earth, or in the air near the earth; therefore, one body can be in many places at once. That He was in heaven he proves because, he says, the adversaries do not deny it.

I reply: If Christ was so on earth or in the air near the earth, we deny that He was at the same time in heaven. This had to be proved by Bellarmine—that Christ was at the same time in heaven and present with Paul on earth. But first he proves that He was in heaven because Scripture says, "Whom heaven must receive until the time of restitution of all things." I reply: 1. That "must" is not to be urged so rigidly as if it were not permitted for Christ, if He willed, to go out from the court of heaven even for a time, but that this would be His abode. Christ said to Zacchaeus, "I must abide today in your house"; this was not necessary for Him; and He remained as long as He willed. So elsewhere it is said, "He must needs go through Samaria"; yet Christ could have gone into Galilee by another way. Therefore, it is not necessary to understand this as concerning Christ's perpetual remaining in heaven, as if He could not be elsewhere even for an hour, but concerning His abiding and constant dwelling there, as one is said never to leave home who very rarely goes out. So the father of the prodigal son said to the elder son, "You are always with me"; yet he was not perpetually in his father's presence. So the passage can be explained thus, and thus Christ's body was not at once above and below.

2. If Christ once or twice went out from heaven, it does not follow that He is always in the Eucharist.

3. I say then that Christ appeared to Paul, and Paul saw and recognized Him from the vision; but Christ does not appear in the Eucharist.

4. I deny that Christ was on earth or in the air when He appeared to Paul; and after He ascended, He was never seen on earth.

But Bellarmine proves from Acts 9 and 22, and here he asserts two of our responses and refutes them one by one. The first is that Paul did not see Christ in His own person, but in a species or some likeness, nor did he hear Christ Himself, but some voice made divinely, such as was the voice of God the Father over Christ Himself at His Baptism and on Mount Tabor; and he says that Calvin seems to have understood this passage in Acts 9 thus. But Calvin has nothing of the kind, nor do we acknowledge this response; for we do not doubt that Paul saw Christ Himself, not merely a specter.

Nor is it necessary for us to resort to these conjectures by way of a likeness of Christ. Paul himself saw Christ. "Have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord?" he says, and elsewhere, "Last of all, as to one untimely born, he appeared also to me." And still elsewhere (Ananias says to Paul), "The Lord Jesus, who appeared to you on the road by which you came, has sent me."

Therefore, without doubt, Paul truly saw Christ. The second response that Bellarmine offers is that Paul saw and heard Christ, but existing in heaven, and so it was brought about by divine power that Paul's eyes and ears penetrated heaven—and this is indeed Calvin's view. Let us now see how Bellarmine refutes that interpretation.

First, he rebukes Calvin because, writing elsewhere against the invocation of saints, Calvin says, "Who has revealed that their ears are so long as to be stretched out to our cries? Or their eyes so sharp as to watch over our needs?" If carnal eyes and ears, says Bellarmine, can penetrate heaven, cannot the same power bring it about that the spiritual eyes and ears of glorified souls penetrate the earth? I reply: That this can be done by miracle is not in doubt, as was done in the case of Paul and Stephen; let them prove this miracle concerning the saints in heaven. Indeed, the Papists say that the saints do not see or hear anything by their own power, but either see in God or have things revealed to them by God. But this is by the way.

Therefore, we now repeat our response: that Paul saw and heard Christ does not follow that Christ was on earth or in the air. But why does Bellarmine not object that Christ was also seen by Stephen—which the Lutherans object—since he clearly saw him acting against himself? For Stephen says, "Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing at the right hand of God." Stephen saw Christ, but in heaven, for the

heavens were opened. Now just as it was done by the power of God that Stephen saw Christ in the heavens, so by the same power it could have happened that Paul was able to see and hear Christ in the heavens. And so Augustine says, "He was called from heaven by a loud voice. If Christ stood nearby, he did not call from heaven, nor was there need of a loud voice." Nor is there any passage from which we may understand that Christ was on earth.

But afterward Bellarmine tries to excuse something from the fact that the light which shone around Paul plainly blinded him. That light of the Lord's body, he says, could not have harmed his eyes unless it had been near. I reply: Luke does not say that light flowed from the body of Christ, but from heaven: "a light from heaven shone around him." That could have happened without Christ's body descending; indeed, light could have come from Christ's body remaining in heaven, which not only struck Paul's eyes but overwhelmed him. And certainly if Christ was as near as they wish, why did Paul alone see and hear him? Why did Paul's companions not see this light? Why were they not blinded? It is said that they saw the light and were afraid, but did not hear the voice; and yet elsewhere Luke says they heard the voice but saw no one. I think they heard Paul's voice, but not Christ's, who was speaking with Paul; for then they would have believed. And so Oecumenius not unsuitably. But if Christ was near, certainly they would have both heard and seen; or perhaps such a great brightness would have overwhelmed their sight also, just as we read concerning Paul; but they suffered no harm to their eyes—which could not have happened without a miracle if Christ had been present.

Therefore, concerning what Bellarmine says—that Paul's companions could not have penetrated the highest heaven with their eyes and ears, who nevertheless both saw the light and heard the sound of a voice—I say that was not necessary. For:

1. As regards the eyes, they did not see Christ, but a certain light sent down from heaven; for Christ did not appear on account of the companions, but on account of Paul.
2. They did not hear Christ, but Paul speaking, as Oecumenius holds; or if anyone contends that it must be understood of Christ's voice, then they heard Christ speaking, but did not know what he was saying; they perceived a certain sound with their ears, but did not understand the force and meaning of the words. So we often hear people speaking but do not grasp what they are saying—which happens especially when someone speaks from far off or indistinctly.

It is as if we did not hear at all. Therefore, it was necessary that the companions did not know what Christ said to Paul. But if Christ had been as near as they imagine, undoubtedly they would have heard, since they were sound in their senses. Therefore, it is clear that Christ thundered from heaven and flowed into the ears and eyes of Paul.

But Bellarmine still insists that Paul said, "Who are you, Lord?" and Christ replied, "I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting." These words, he says, clearly indicate the presence of Christ. For if Paul had seen Christ in the highest heaven, as Stephen saw him, he says, he would not have doubted who it was. But because he suddenly saw before him a certain man shining above the brightness of the sun, he therefore said, "Who are you, Lord?"

I reply: There is nothing in this conjecture that carries any weight. Stephen, when he saw Christ in heaven, did not ask who he was, for he knew and believed in him. But Paul was an open enemy of Christ. Therefore, even if he now saw Christ in heaven, it is no wonder that he asked who he was, since he saw in heaven one whom he thought to be an impostor, in whom he did not believe, but whom he persecuted and hated. Moreover, the phrase "Who are you, Lord?" is the utterance of one astonished, and not so much of one ignorant of who it was, as of one marveling and desiring to learn.

But finally Bellarmine says: If Paul had seen Christ in heaven, he would not have been a suitable witness of the resurrection. For people could have said that he was deceived or had seen by mere imagination. I reply: To confirm the truth of the resurrection, it is enough that he saw Christ—whether he saw him in the heavens or on earth matters not, so long as he saw him at all. Yet it follows that Christ rose again if he ascended, just as if he showed himself to be seen on earth. Slanderers could speak falsely no less if Paul had seen Christ on earth than if he had seen him in heaven. What they might slander matters little; indeed, it confirms the resurrection more that Christ was seen in heaven with his own body than on earth, because there are no specters in heaven, but many on earth.

Thus far Bellarmine has reasoned from the Scriptures; now he confirms his argument from other appearances of Christ outside the Scriptures. He writes that Christ appeared to Peter according to Hegesippus and Ambrose. I reply: There is no necessity to believe these testimonies. Hegesippus was the first to write that Peter was in Rome and died there; others drew this from him. Yet there is nothing that compels us to believe that he was there—much persuades us that he was not. Concerning that appearance, there is no human testimony.

As for what is asserted about Saint Anthony from Athanasius—that Christ appeared to him—it is certain that this book is not by Athanasius and contains nothing worthy of Athanasius; for it has not a trace of Athanasius's intellect or piety. Certainly Jerome, who wrote much about Anthony, records nothing of the sort about him. But the appearance could have been imaginary, such as often occurs in ecstasy; for thus we read that Christ sometimes appeared to Paul. For he says that when he was praying in the temple in Jerusalem and was caught up out of himself, he saw Christ saying to him, "Hurry and leave Jerusalem quickly, because they will not accept your testimony about me."

And what is asserted from Gregory's Dialogues about Tharsilla—that she saw Jesus coming to her when she was dying—this too could have happened ecstatically. From such a vision it cannot be concluded that Christ himself came. Nor does the fact that the place was fragrant with wondrous odors prove the presence of Christ; it could have happened by a miracle, so that Christ might show that soul dear to him.

Of the same kind is what John the Deacon affirms in the life of Gregory—that Christ appeared to Gregory—as if whatever either the Deacon wrote in the life of Gregory or Gregory himself wrote in the Dialogues were true. Our faith rests on the Scriptures, not on visions of this sort.

Nor does what is alleged from Paulinus carry more weight at this point; it could have been an angel who appeared in place of Christ.

But now to conclude: concerning examples of this kind we give two replies. The first is that Christ was never seen bodily at the same time in different places. Therefore, if he was on earth, he left heaven; just as when he went into heaven, he left the earth. The second is that Christ showed himself to be seen by those to whom he appeared, and they truly saw Christ.

I understood that he was present: otherwise no one would have said that Christ was there; but in the Sacrament there is nothing of that sort. Wherever Christ was present bodily, there he was seen; but no one sees Christ in the Sacrament. If a thousand examples of this kind could be adduced, such as the Adversary brings forward, and all without controversy, these two responses would suffice.

Bellarmino's third argument is taken from the testimonies of the Fathers, who teach that one thing can be in many places at once. Chrysostom says that Christ sits in heaven with the Father, and at the same moment is handled by the hands of all communicants on earth. I reply from the same passage: Christ is so handled by the hands of communicants that he is seen immolated by the eyes of the communicants. For Chrysostom says that the people see Christ immolated, and the crowd is stained or reddened with his blood: "All do this through the eyes," he says, that is, all these things are by the eyes of those standing by and looking on. Nor indeed is Christ now properly touched; therefore Chrysostom speaks hyperbolically about a certain spiritual handling.

But Bellarmine says that Chrysostom does not speak of handling only in a symbol, because he attributes this to a miracle. I reply: "Miracle" there is taken for a wondrous thing, and one surpassing the common order of nature. But it is a θαῦμα, that is, an admirable thing, that Christ can be so received and handled in the Sacrament as if he were in our midst—which certainly happens by way of spirit and grace, not by nature or carnal presence. The same can be replied concerning the rest of the Fathers who establish the presence of Christ in the Sacrament, but neither as bodily nor as visible.

But these two or three testimonies which follow we will explain in their place: no Father ever dreamed of an invisible real presence. But he asserts something from Augustine, who raises the question whether at the memorials of the martyrs, where miracles occur, the martyrs themselves are present in so many places at one time, or whether these things are done by the ministry of angels; and he answers that he does not know. And from the same author he relates the story about John the Monk, who appeared to a woman in her dreams, though he never left the monastery. I reply concerning John: he lived not in a monastery but in solitude; and as for his being said to have appeared, that could easily happen, for it was in a dream, and it is not unusual for us to dream of seeing those who are absent. Thus blind Paul saw Ananias coming to him in a vision.

Now concerning the martyrs, from Augustine's ignorance no good argument is gathered to prove that it is as Bellarmine imagines. Augustine does not know whether the martyrs themselves are present, or angels or others acting in their place. Augustine does not say that it can happen that martyrs are at one and the same moment in different places, but whether it is so at the memorials of the martyrs he does not dare to assert—not because he did not know that one and the same finite substance cannot be at once in very distant places, but because he thought it possible that God might transfer the spirits of the martyrs very swiftly from one place to another.

But it is certain that not the martyrs but God performed those miracles in those places, to confirm the doctrine which the martyrs both professed while living and sealed with their blood. But Bellarmine proposes a response and refutes it: that the nature of spirits is different from that of bodies; that the spirits of martyrs can be in many places at once, but not their bodies. And then he proves that the nature of spirits and bodies is the same—as indeed it is in this matter. We therefore say that neither martyrs nor angels were ever by themselves in different places at once, nor do we affirm that this can be proved by any example or testimony of Scripture; for angels, even though spirits, are nevertheless of finite nature.

Bellarmino's fourth argument is taken from examples of God and of the rational soul. God is one thing, most simple and indivisible, and yet is at once in infinite places. So also the soul is whole in every part of the body; for if it were extended according to the extension of the body, it would be material and thus mortal.

I reply:

1. Concerning the soul: This question is treated by philosophers—whether the soul is whole in the whole and whole in every part. Some assign it a seat in the head or in the heart, whence it moves the body and commands it. And Scripture indeed seems to place

To place, the principle of thinking and willing is. The Scholastics have treated this question copiously, and all agree on the matter; but some do not think this pertains to

faith—whether the soul is such or not—as Bonaventure and others hold. But others say it must be held, by the same faith by which we hold it to be immortal—that is, by Catholic faith—that the soul is whole in the whole and whole in every part. For if it were divisible or extended, its immortality could not be defended. Moreover, it is the form of the body (as some reason), but unless it were in the whole and in every part of the whole body, it would not be the form of the whole; but the form is of the whole, not of a part; therefore it is in the whole, yet not extensively; therefore wholly—not with a quantitative totality, as Thomas rightly says, but with a totality of perfection of essence. And thus the Fathers affirm that it is whole in the whole and whole in every part of the body. So Augustine: "whole in all, and whole in each member." Similarly Ambrose: "The soul thrives everywhere whole in its own body, giving it life, moving and governing it."

But now let us come to Bellarmine's argument. The soul is indeed in the whole body and whole in every part, but it is not in diverse places; for it is indivisible; nor is it in the body as in a place, but as a form in matter or its subject; it is necessarily in another body only in its own, which it informs, not in another's; nor is it anywhere whole except in one body or in one "where." Therefore, if one member is separated from the body, the soul ceases to be in that member, because it is no longer a member of that body. Therefore the soul always remains undivided; but if it were in several places, there would have to be distance of one soul from itself—which is impossible. A body can be divided; but then it is not the same body; the soul, however, since it has no quantity, cannot be divided: for then it would necessarily perish. For since a body has a divisible nature, it is therefore corruptible; but what cannot be corrupted happens to be such by accident. Therefore the body is wrongly compared with the soul; nor is any soul at once more than in one "where."

But Bellarmine says: although the soul cannot naturally be in a severed limb, nevertheless God can preserve the soul in a severed arm as it was before severance. I reply: God indeed can by miracle preserve life in a severed arm, or create a new soul in the arm; but that the same soul which is in the body should be in the arm from which it has been torn and separated—this He cannot do; for then one singular form would be of two bodies, and the soul would be divided—that is, it would be at once immortal and mortal. But these instances need support when they are used.

As to God: who does not know that God is everywhere whole, since He is of infinite and immense substance? But bodies composed of elements are finite. Yet God is not in diverse places, but everywhere as if in each single place. Further, God is not circumscribed by place because He is spirit; this is proper to a body—to be circumscribed by place: for a body must be enclosed in a place, and different bodies must be distinguished by different places.

But Bellarmine brings forward a remarkable instance. He says: God could create another world which would nowhere touch this present world; and God would be in it; and so He would be in distant places: therefore he concludes that a thing can be in several places at once without contradiction. I reply: 1. God is not properly in a place because He is not circumscribed; but bodies are circumscribed and enclosed within certain limits: therefore the comparison is absurd. 2. Even if God is in places which are distant and thus diverse with respect to Him, still He is not in diverse places: because although places are divided, He Himself is not divided. Therefore even if another world were created, God would not be in diverse places by any division of His substance, but everywhere whole—in the world, outside the world.

But they want Christ's body to be in many places so that it does not occupy the space in between: for they want it to be in all the hosts, but not in the intervening space; but God is in every space.

Bellarmino's fifth and last argument is taken from the mysteries of our faith, which are either more difficult or equally difficult as this which we are discussing. He lists six such mysteries, about which we must speak briefly. But first I reply in general: there are many very difficult things in the mysteries of faith, yet nothing impossible, because there is nothing in them that implies a contradiction.

We deny the presence of Christ in so many places because it cannot occur without contradiction. Now, unless Bellarmine can show that contradictions are found in the mysteries of faith, he labors in vain, for we acknowledge nothing so difficult that God cannot do it if it is only difficult; but this is not only difficult, it is also impossible.

Now let us respond to each of these mysteries in particular.

The first is the mystery of the Trinity, which indeed surpasses the powers of nature to understand. Nevertheless, it is not difficult for God that there are three distinct persons in one indivisible nature. What does Bellarmine infer from this? He says: If one numerically same nature can be undivided from itself, even while being identified with really distinct persons, why could not one body more easily be joined externally to distinct places and yet not be divided from itself? I reply: Because between a body that is in this place and one that is in other places, there intervenes a space that is not occupied by that body; therefore, it will not be one body, because an interval conflicts with the unity of a body. This, therefore, is simply impossible. Now, in divine matters, although there is a distinction of persons, there is no distinction of nature or place; hence the dissimilarity is manifest. Moreover, the persons in God are spiritual, not corporeal essences; many things can apply to them that do not apply to bodies.

The second mystery is that of the Incarnation. It seems more marvelous (he says) for one hypostasis to exist in two natures than for one body to be in two places. I reply: It is most

absurd to conclude from union to division in this manner: Two natures can be united in one hypostasis; therefore, one body can be placed in a thousand places. There is nothing contradictory in the unity of natures, even if many things are marvelous and incomprehensible. We are speaking of contradictions; even if it might seem more incredible for the same being in one hypostasis to be God and man than for one and the same body to be in various places, still it is not so, because the former does not conflict with the essence of the natures—for each nature preserves its own properties—whereas one body being in various places greatly opposes the unity of a body. It is absurd to infer a contradiction from mysteries.

The third mystery is the Resurrection, which has always seemed impossible to philosophers. I admit it, but why? Not on account of contradiction, but on account of other difficulties in nature; but to God nothing is difficult except what implies contradiction. In the resurrection there is no contradiction; nor is it a contradiction for the same thing to be made twice. Moreover, in the resurrection it is not the same thing made twice, but what was once made and perished is restored by divine power above nature. Nor can Bellarmine show that there is a contradiction in the resurrection; for then he would abolish this article of faith. But we say that in the real presence there is a contradiction, and on account of this alone we affirm it to be impossible.

The fourth mystery is creation and annihilation. It seems to imply a contradiction for something to be made from nothing or from something to become nothing. I reply: It seems so, yet it does not imply a contradiction. For if Bellarmine thinks creation truly implies a contradiction, then he destroys the Catholic faith concerning the creation of the world, because it is most certain that God cannot do what implies a contradiction. But for one body to be not one but many is plainly contradictory; therefore God, who can create something from nothing and make something into nothing, cannot do this. In truth, it does not have the appearance of a contradiction for divine power, which is infinite, to make being from non-being; but it is a certain contradiction for non-being to be simultaneously being, or being to be non-being—that is, for something to be simultaneously created and not created, or not created and created at once.

The fifth mystery is eternity: one instant of duration exists in different times; therefore one body can be in different places: one instant of duration coexists with all past and future time—which surpasses our grasp. I reply: I concede that whatever does not surpass our grasp alone can be done. But there are certain things that surpass not only our grasp but also (so to speak) God's grasp and power—namely, to bring it about that contradictories are simultaneously true. For one body to be simultaneously in different places not only surpasses our grasp but is also impossible, because it is contradictory.

The statement implies: for the diversity and separation of places argues a diversity of bodies, and thus one will not be one, and the same will be different.

As for eternity, time in this matter is not like place. For in time there are spirits, in place only bodies; and time does not signify an affection toward a body, but place does signify it. Time depends on motion and is a certain succession of it; but place is a permanent thing. We can remain in the same place, but not in time.

Yet how past and future time are present to God, though it surpasses our grasp, does not surpass God's power—not as if the past were not past, for that is contradictory in reality, but because infinite essence and providence are nothing less than immense. But there is no contradiction here. However, diverse and distinct places cannot belong to one body without contradiction.

God cannot make it so that what is past is not past, or that what is future is not future. For although all things are present to God because God's substance encompasses all, it is not to be thought that past things are future or future things past; rather, past things are present to God as past, and future things as future. Here there is nothing contradictory. But there is a contradiction in this: that one body should be in a thousand places; for then one body would be a thousand bodies, or a thousand bodies one.

A sixth argument is taken from analogy in this way:

One place can contain two bodies at once; therefore, one body can fill two places at once.

The consequence is proved because the located relates to the place as the place to the located.

This question has exercised the Scholastics remarkably. They say that Christ existed through the stone of the sepulcher, entered through closed doors as light through windows, and when He was born did not open the womb. Hence they dispute how two bodies can be at once in one place without division of the place or confusion of bodies; and they hold that two bodies can be at once in one place—yet how this happens they cannot explain.

Most attribute it to glorification and say that a glorified body can be together with a non-glorified one, but not two glorified bodies or two non-glorified ones together; and in glorified bodies they say there is greater subtlety. But Christ's body, when He was born, was not glorified; yet they will have it that He exited the womb miraculously, so that not only was there no difficulty or pain in the birth, but no change or motion in the Virgin's body. And certainly if subtlety is the cause, then two glorified bodies could more easily be together than one glorified with another non-glorified. But these are mere fallacies and illusions: one place does not contain two bodies. This can no more happen than that two places contain one body—for we will speak later about Christ's exit from the sepulcher and other matters.

And the Scholastics, who think two bodies can be together in one place, nevertheless do not think one body can be in two places at once. Therefore Bellarmine's consequence is not valid, because the relation of place to located is not the same as that of located to place. For as Thomas says, since there are two conditions of unity, only the posterior—which is accidental—is removed when two bodies are together in one place; but when one body is in two places, then the prior condition—which is essential—is removed. For Thomas says that for something to be one, it must first be undivided in itself, and second, divided from any other. Now, when two bodies are joined into one place, this posterior condition must be removed—and it can be, because it is accidental, he says; but for one body to be in two places at once, its undividedness in itself must be removed—which cannot happen because this is essential to a body.

But who does not see that what is one cannot be confused with another insofar as it is another, and this is one? And it is no less absurd and impossible for a body to penetrate a body and confuse its dimensions with the other's dimensions than to make one thing divided and remove undividedness from unity. For just as when wine is mixed with water, there are not two bodies but one; so if a solid body could penetrate into the place of another solid body, it would be confused with it, and thus not two bodies but one would be in the place.

What then? According to Thomas's mind, can one body be in diverse places at once? Not locally, he says, but sacramentally.

But this is an obscure and sophistical distinction. First, what does it mean to be in a place sacramentally? This is a new mode of existing in a place. The Fathers often speak of sacramental eating, but never of a sacramental place. And this is a contradiction: to be in a place and not to be there locally; for not to be in a place locally is not to be in a place at all. It is the task of philosophers to explain how something comes to be in a place. Second, if Christ is in the sacrament as in a place, then the sacrament ought to be the measure of Christ's body and correspond to it, and extend to its magnitude—not Christ's body to the sacrament; for the place corresponds to the body, not the body to the place. But if he is not in the sacrament as in a place, then it is inept to say that one body is in two places sacramentally, because it is not in the sacrament as in a place. Third, Bellarmine saw that this doctrine of the Scholastics is inconsistent. For if one body cannot be in two places locally because then it would be divided from itself, neither can it be so sacramentally. For the presence of the body in so many altars, and not in the intermediate places—as Bellarmine says—no less destroys the indivision of the thing than being in many places locally. For if Christ's body is in so many hosts in whatever way, there is a division of these bodies as of places; and so neither can one body be in two places at once, nor two bodies in one place, because it conflicts with the nature of unity and implies a contradiction. Fourth, what of the fact that Bellarmine contradicts himself? For he wishes to prove that one body can fill two places, and yet he thinks

Christ is not locally in the sacrament. Certainly, not even spirits can exist unless indivisible and distinct; much less bodies. Therefore, what is taken to prove the point—namely, that two bodies can be in one place at once—is itself more doubtful than what is to be proved—namely, that one body can be in two places at once. Both are false and ἀδύνατον, utterly impossible. Certainly, before the former could happen, the earth would move—indeed, heaven itself would sooner break apart—than two bodies could be forced into one place. So too, before the latter could happen, the firmest things would break and immovable things be moved. One substance cannot be within another.

Chapter 11: Our arguments by which we prove it implies a contradiction for one body to be in several places at once.

Now let us briefly refute those who affirm that Christ's body is in many places and show the contradiction and impossibility of this opinion.

In Matthew 28, the angel says to the women, "He is not here; for he has risen." Therefore, one man cannot be in different places; otherwise, the angel's inference would not hold. For then it would not follow that he is not here because he is elsewhere; that he is not in the tomb because he has risen. But the angel used a most valid argument: "He has risen from the tomb; therefore he is not to be sought in the tomb." Similarly, we too can say: "He ascended into heaven; therefore he took his body away from the earth."

Bellarmino answers in two ways. First: "He is not here," that is, "he does not lie dead in the tomb, as you believe." For the angel is speaking to the mind of the women, who came to anoint Christ. I reply: The angels not only say that he does not lie dead in the tomb, but that he is not in the tomb at all; and they say, "He is not here"—neither dead, that is, nor alive. If the women had found him alive in the tomb, they would undoubtedly have wished to anoint him with their ointments. In Luke 24, these women are said to have entered the tomb and not found the body of the Lord Jesus there; from which words it is clear that he was simply not there. And when they wondered what had become of him, the angels said he was not to be sought there because he had risen; whence it necessarily follows that the body which had risen from the tomb could not at the same time remain in the tomb.

Second, Bellarmine says this is true morally, not metaphysically speaking; but, he says, Christ could have been there absolutely speaking—as if someone were to say, "Such a man is not sitting at table," because he has already dined.

I answer: One who has dined may sit at the table, but not one who has risen from the table. It does not follow: "He has dined, therefore he has risen from the table"; but rather, "He has departed from the table, therefore he does not sit at the table." And so the angel says: "He is risen; therefore he is not here." He does not say: "He has revived; therefore

he is not here." For he could have been alive in the tomb; but "he is risen; therefore he is not here."

But another very strong argument can be gathered from this, both against the Papists and against the Lutherans. For the angels, to persuade the women of the resurrection and prevent them from dreaming of any presence of his in the tomb, use this argument: "Come, see the place where the Lord was laid." The place was empty, as if they were saying: "Unless you find him here, there is no reason for you to doubt his resurrection and absence." But Christ appears no more in the Eucharist than he did in the tomb after the resurrection. Hence, this reasoning can be concluded: Wherever Christ is, there he can be found and seen. But in the Eucharist, Christ can neither be found nor seen—certainly no more than he could then in the tomb. Therefore, he is not there.

If Christ could have been in the tomb and not been visible, surely the angels would have deceived the women. Therefore, Christ would not have been in the tomb at that time if the women had found him in the tomb; but because they did not find him in the tomb, for that reason he was not there.

Moreover, Scripture also testifies that to be everywhere or wherever without circumscription of place is proper to divinity: Jeremiah 23: "I fill heaven and earth"; Isaiah 66: "Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool"; 1 Kings 8: "Heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee." If Christ's body can be in so many places, by the same reasoning it can be in infinite places—indeed, in all places wherever divinity is—and then it will be equal to divinity; and so a creature will be equal to the Creator.

For that Christ's body is not in heaven in more places than one, and that it is not everywhere in the world, happens not because of the impossibility of the thing or the nature of the body, as they would have it, but because there are not priests everywhere to celebrate Mass. If Mass could be celebrated everywhere, Christ's body could be everywhere. Thus, in the nature of Christ's body there is nothing why it should not be equal to divinity. But it is a manifest contradiction to ascribe such a body to Christ that it can so exceed the nature of a true body as to be equal to divinity. For then a creature would not differ from the Creator with respect to omnipresence—which is not only contradictory and impossible but also plainly atheistic.

Bellarmino replies that there are two differences between God and the body of Christ concerning existence in a place. The first is that God is everywhere in fact and in reality, but Christ's body is not everywhere in reality and in fact; rather, it is in one place locally, in many sacramentally, and in many other places in no way at all.

I respond: 1. To be in a place is to be circumscribed by place and to fill the place—that is, to be located in a place. But this is to be there locally. Therefore, if it is in many places, it is there locally, because to be locally

unless it signifies a mode and condition: by reason of place it is locally; what is in a place is there by reason of place, and so it is locally there. Bellarmine says that Christ's body is in many places, but not locally: but either the name of place is not taken properly, and then it ought rather to be denied to be in many places; or if it is taken properly, then it is locally in many places: for what is in a place properly is there locally. Therefore it is a contradiction to be in a place and not locally, just as if we were to say something is in a place and not in a place at the same time: for to be locally is not to exceed, nor to be exceeded by, that place in which it is: and so Christ's body ought to be in the Sacrament if it is there as in a place: how then is it in a place, if not locally? It should have been said, not as Bellarmine says, that one body of Christ is in several places, but in one place, and elsewhere not as in a place.

But because it is a body, he could not avoid assigning it a place by saying it is in many places sacramentally, which however he immediately takes away when he says it is not locally in the Sacrament: this is a clear contradiction. But just as where the substance is, there it is substantially, so where something is in a place, there it is locally: for place implies locality. An angel is not in a place locally: for it is not in a place properly, because it does not occupy space: it is indeed defined to be in a place, because when it is here, it is not there: it is not circumscribed by place, nor diffused everywhere, but is in one "where": but a body ought to be in space, and if it is not in space, it is not in a place.

But if Christ's body is really in the Sacrament, then because it is in heaven circumscriptively on account of quantity, so it ought to be in the Sacrament. For wherever the same thing is really, there are all its necessary attributes: but quantity is of necessity, indeed of the nature of a body: if therefore on account of quantity it is circumscriptively in heaven, similarly also it will be in the Sacrament. If it has part and part in the Sacrament, then it is circumscriptively there: but it has part and part there: for if it does not have them, then it is not an organic body, and then it is not the same as what is in heaven: but they say it is the same.

2. Because Bellarmine says that Christ's body is in many places sacramentally, I ask what it is to be in a place sacramentally? Is it not to be in a place according to the mode of the Sacrament? And what is this, to be in a place according to the mode of the Sacrament? Is it not to be there where the Sacrament is, and not only that, but also to be in a place as the Sacrament is in a place? At least therefore Christ's body is in a place as the Sacrament is in a place: but certainly bread and wine are in a place locally: therefore Christ's body, which succeeds to the bread and wine, if it lies hidden under the form of bread and wine, must also be in a place locally. For that substance of bread and wine filled some place, however small, and was in a place properly and locally: since therefore Christ's body is there where the bread and wine were, it is in a place properly. But it does not appear: what then? For you do not see the substance of bread, but only the accidents: and yet the bread is in a place.

Christ is not there locally because of the small quantity; but whatever substance it may be, whether large or small, is there locally. The smallness is not the reason why it is not there locally; for there can be a quantity of bread as large as the human body, which, if consecrated, necessarily contains the body of Christ as large as it is in heaven. But you will say it is not there locally; yet certainly it fills a large place, nor can two such hosts be in the same place. They say that two hosts, even if thin and small (such as their spherical hosts are), nevertheless cannot be together in one place; therefore they are in two places, and if in places, then certainly locally, as we have taught before. From this it is clear that to be in a place sacramentally does not conflict with being in a place locally; for they must say that the body of Christ is in such a large host sacramentally, and yet it is also there locally. Therefore, that distinction between being in a place sacramentally and being in a place locally is vain. And you might just as well say something is in a place spiritually as sacramentally; for what has a sacrament to do with the mode of existing in a place? But what is this "to be in a place sacramentally"? A sacrament is either an external sign or an internal grace; signs are properly in a place; if therefore this is understood concerning signs, then the body of Christ is properly in a place; the internal grace in this sacrament is, as they wish, the body of Christ; if therefore this is understood concerning the body of Christ, then the distinction is frivolous, because then this sense will be: the body of Christ is in a place sacramentally, that is, the body of Christ is in a place.

Bellarmino says that the body of Christ is only in one place locally, namely in heaven, and in many places sacramentally; therefore the body of Christ is in a place both locally and not locally; for the division is not good unless sacramentally means not locally: the body of Christ is in one place locally, in another not locally; therefore it is both locally and not locally in a place. Now this is a contradiction: for certainly by no reason can the same body numerically, which is in a place not locally, be the same as that which is in a place locally. For you know what the principle of individuation is: an individual is one numerically, which has certain properties by which it is distinguished not from itself, but from all others. Diverse properties and conditions distinguish individuals; but locally and not locally are diverse properties and conditions; therefore they cannot be said of one individual at the same time, nor belong to one at the same time; nor indeed at all, because it conflicts with the nature of a body to be in a place not locally; for to have dimensions is the principle of individuation of a body; therefore to be in a place locally is an inseparable accident of a body: so nothing here is without contradiction.

He admits that the body of Christ is not in many places; therefore it is only in diverse places. Then the Ubiquitists and Lutherans have preserved themselves much better in this matter than the Papists who say that the body of Christ is everywhere. For ubiquity consists with continuity and indivision; to be in distinct places removes this continuity and individuation: continuous things have a continuous surface; what is in this place does not have a continuous surface with what is in another place; for there is a division

through the space which is between those places; but this is most proper to a body: to have continuous parts. Bellarmine says that the body of Christ is not in intermediate places; but it ought to be, if there were continuity; therefore it is not one and the same body, because it is not continuous. And hence it appears how frivolous it is that Bellarmine says, when one body is in many places, the intrinsic indivision is not removed, because the intrinsic principles which constitute the body are not divided; for it is an intrinsic principle of a body to have continuous parts; but continuous parts are not those between which something intervenes; but between the body of Christ in heaven and in the sacrament intervene the celestial spheres and elements, and many other things; indeed, the bodies on many altars are not continuous, any more than many altars are continuous. All grant that a natural body cannot be in two places; why, except because it conflicts with intrinsic principles? Why does Bellarmine deny that the body of Christ is in many places locally, except because the nature of a body does not suffer it to be so? But to be in a place, he says, is accidental to a body, not of the essence of a body: what then? Why

It is posited in the definition of a body that it exists in a place; therefore, can a body exist without a place? Similarly, the capacity for laughter is not included in the definition of a human, yet a human cannot exist without being capable of laughter. It is in the nature and definition of a body to have dimensions, which it cannot have unless it is in a place. Cardinal Cusanus has these words on the matter: "To be a body," he says, "is to be of perfect dimension," from which he infers that the same body is indivisible and incapable of multiplication. Insofar as it is one body, it necessarily possesses indivisibility and incommunicability. Now, a body that exists in many distinct places is not undivided because it is not continuous. For I argue thus: Everything that is not continuous is divided, and therefore not one. The body that is here is not continuous with that which is elsewhere; therefore, it is not one with it.

A second difference between God and the body of Christ regarding existence in place is this, says Bellarmine: The divinity not only is everywhere but also cannot be confined to one place, whereas the body of Christ was in only one place before the institution of the Sacrament and after the consummation of the world will be in only one place. I reply: This amounts to nothing. For the nature of a body requires not only that it can be reduced to one place but that it must necessarily be in one place; and in all of nature, no other example can be given of one body existing in different places. Therefore, this is contrary to nature. It is also contrary to nature for a body to be extended in such a way that it occupies multiple places. Second, by the same reasoning, it could occupy all places. Third, why cannot the divinity be reduced to one place? Because it conflicts with its nature; similarly, a body cannot be everywhere because this also conflicts with its nature. And here Bellarmine admits that our argument holds against the Ubiquitists, who claim that Christ's body is in fact and in reality everywhere—a doctrine condemned in

Eutyches. But if Eutyches and the Ubiquitists were rightly condemned, then the Papists must also be condemned; for from the doctrine of the Papists it follows that there is no impediment in the nature of Christ's body preventing it from being everywhere. Yet this is no less heretical in itself than if, with Eutyches and the Ubiquitists, they were to say that Christ's body is everywhere in reality. For in this way, the truth of Christ's humanity and body is destroyed—something even the Scholastics saw, and they cannot extricate themselves from this labyrinth.

Now let us take something from philosophy, which, since it relies on true and sincere reason, cannot conflict with theology. I do not speak of adulterated philosophy but of that which is contained within its own certain and necessary principles. We have many arguments against the presence of one body in different places. But Bellarmine at the outset counters all our arguments with a certain testimony of Augustine: "Behold, with what arguments does human weakness contradict the omnipotence of God—a weakness possessed by vanity?" I reply: We say nothing against God's omnipotence but against the contradiction of the Papists. When the Papists teach false and contradictory things that can be defended by neither Scripture nor reason, they then flee to God's omnipotence, as the ancient heretics once did. But it is separate from God's omnipotence to do things that are contradictory. Therefore, we shall briefly set forth our arguments, to which he can only resist by falsely invoking divine omnipotence. But in this way, anyone could defend any monstrosity or absurdity.

Wycliffe, a most acute theologian and philosopher, reasoned thus against the real presence of Christ in the Sacrament: "A thing cannot be in two times at once; therefore, not in two places." Bellarmine says this happens because times cannot be simultaneous—for they flow—but places remain. I reply: Even if places remain, nevertheless different places are not simultaneous any more than different times are; therefore, what exists in different places cannot exist simultaneously. So if something cannot be in different times at once because different times are not simultaneous, then neither can something be in different places at once because different places are not simultaneous. One body exists simultaneously and cannot not exist simultaneously, for then it would not be one. Certainly, just as all things are in one time, so they are in one place—contrary to what some assert.

It is said that one thing cannot be in discontinuous places at the same time; for then it would be both one and not one at once. Something is said to be simultaneous because of the connection of its parts: different places are not simultaneous; therefore, what is in them is not simultaneous, unless we wish, by means of a fiction of real presence, to overturn the principles of nature and confuse everything.

Thus, I argue briefly: What is one must be simultaneous; but what is in different places is not simultaneous, unless those two places are simultaneous. For something to be

simultaneous, a continuity of parts among themselves is required; but an intervening interval prevents this—indeed, an intervening interval makes it so that the thing is not one and the same. Therefore, the reasoning applies perfectly from times to places; for neither different times nor different places can be simultaneous.

Now let us come to that argument which our opponents draw from the unity of a thing: If one body is in different places at the same time, then it will be both one and many at once. The body on the altar is divided from that which is in heaven, and from those which are on other altars; but what is one is not divided; yet it would be both one and not one.

Bellarmino responds that the essential unity of a thing does not depend on the unity of place, but on its internal principles. I reply: The internal principle of unity in a body is the indivision of its parts; but the parts in a whole are distinct, yet undivided—for in unity there ought not to be confusion. Aristotle attributes to a body, as intrinsic and essential, having position and arrangement of parts in a continuum. Now, a body which is in this place cannot be continuous with that body which is in another place, nor have parts joined with it, because of the separation of places and the intervening interval. For things which are not in the same place are divided, since it cannot be that the interval which lies between the places does not divide this body from that one.

But Bellarmine offers a reason: It is prior for a thing to be one than to be in one place; therefore, the essential unity of a thing does not depend on the unity of place. I reply: It is indeed prior by nature to be than to be in a place, and so for a thing to be one than to be in one place—but not prior in reality and time. Properties are naturally posterior to their substances, yet are inseparable from them in reality; so too, being in one place and having unity of place or time, though posterior by nature, is nevertheless inseparable.

Thus I argue against Bellarmine: If one body can be in two places because being one is prior by nature to being in one place, then it cannot be in two places at the same time, because being one and being in one place are simultaneously and inseparably united in time. If unity of place is an inseparable property of one body, it is enough that it is naturally posterior, provided it is not so in time.

But Bellarmine adds that the imagination cannot conceive of one body in different places, but sound reason can. Thus, he says, the imagination errs when it cannot think that God or the soul is in different places. I reply: Reason and imagination conceive that God is everywhere and that the soul is in the whole body; but they cannot conceive that God is in heaven and on earth and not in the intermediate places, or that the soul is in the head and feet and not in the arms and other intervening parts. Yet those others want one body to be in heaven and simultaneously on earth, yet not between heaven and earth—this no imagination or reason can conceive.

But Bellarmine says that if there are many bodies between the body in heaven and on the altar, this proves that the places themselves are discontinuous—namely, heaven and earth. But why? For if heaven is a different place from earth because many bodies are placed between these two, then similarly it necessarily follows that the body which is on earth is different from that which is in heaven, because many bodies intervene—the argument holds on both sides. Furthermore, different places exist because of different things placed; just as the diversity of places is argued from the diversity of things placed, so too the diversity of things placed is argued from the diversity of places. And is it not true that as great as the distance between places is, so great is it between the things placed, and consequently so great the discontinuity?

But what then? Does the interposition of so many bodies between Christ's body in heaven and on the altar prove nothing else than that heaven and earth are discontinuous places? Indeed, Bellarmine says, this also proves that Christ's body is divided from itself with respect to place, but not with respect to its own substance or quantity. I reply: What does this mean—with respect

Bellarmino says that Christ is divided from Himself with respect to place, yet he denies that Christ's body is in the Sacrament as in a place. But this respect is not imaginary or fantastical, but real; therefore, in reality, Christ is divided from Himself. And to be divided with respect to place is to be divided by place; therefore, Christ's body is divided from itself by place. Therefore, since it is in diverse places, it is not the same; for what is divided is not the same. Therefore, this body which is on earth is not the same as that which is in heaven. Thus, if it is divided by place, the substance will also be divided; for it belongs essentially to one body to have parts that cohere and are connected, not separated by any distance. This is not accidental but essential. But the body which is on earth does not cohere with that which is in heaven, because coherence is hindered—indeed, destroyed—by the interposition of many bodies.

But let us press the argument: That which is in a place is circumscribed by the place, or at least so contained in the place that it is not elsewhere—which philosophers and theologians say is to be in a place definitively. For things that are definitively somewhere are nowhere else, because their substance is defined to that “where,” as with the soul and angels. But they do not wish Christ's body to be so in heaven or in any altar that it is not also elsewhere. Here Bellarmine anxiously hesitates, as at a crossroads, and is uncertain which way to turn. Will he say that Christ's body is circumscribed or defined? Or did he not foresee the difficulties on both sides from which he could not extricate himself? At length he follows not reason but chance: “Thomas would answer,” he says, “that Christ's body is in heaven circumscriptively, but in the Sacrament it is not in a place either circumscriptively or definitively.” But Bellarmine will not answer this; therefore he dissents from Thomas—which he certainly does for some cause, namely because he saw that thus one and the same body would be at once both circumscriptively and not

circumscriptively in a place, which is an open contradiction. For if it is not circumscribed by a place, it cannot be the same as that which is circumscribed by a place, because to be circumscribed and not to be circumscribed are contradictory opposites.

But Bellarmine says, following Thomas, that Christ's body is in the Sacrament circumscriptively, not in itself, but by reason of the dimensions of the bread. I reply: First, Christ's body ought to be circumscribed by a place by reason of its own dimensions—and so it exists in heaven—not by reason of alien ones; for a body cannot be separated from its own dimensions. To say that Christ's body is in the Sacrament circumscriptively by reason of the dimensions of the bread, not its own, is to say that Christ's body both is and is not there; for where the body is, there necessarily will be its own dimensions. Since it has its own dimensions, and since it exists, it ought rather to be circumscribed by reason of these than of alien ones. For what will they answer concerning the blood? Certainly it is necessary, since it is contained by them, that it be circumscribed by them, just as marrow by bones and flesh by skin.

Second, what does it mean to be circumscriptively in a place by reason of the dimensions of the bread? Or how does this happen? Do the dimensions of the bread belong to Christ? Then Christ will have a broad and round surface and such thinness as the host has—but this conflicts with the truth of Christ's body; for Christ's body has the dimensions of a human body. Further, it is absurd to attribute the dimensions of bread to Christ's body; for these can vary—not in this Sacrament as in another: slender in this one, thick in another. Thus the same body could be circumscribed both by a round and by a long figure—indeed, at once by every variety of shapes—and so something could be greater and less than itself. Indeed, two dimensional quantities will be at once—namely, of the bread and of Christ's body—but this is impossible.

Thus Aristotle—that is, the voice of nature and reason—says: two solids cannot be in the same place. These monstrosities of contradiction, and others, are infinite.

But enough against Thomas; now let us see what Bellarmine himself answers. He says, therefore, that he thinks a body can not only be in several places but also locally and circumscriptively—and not only this but also visibly and definitively. To this he was certainly led not by his own will and judgment but by necessity. For since he said earlier that Christ appeared to Paul on earth and at the same time occupied His place in heaven, it was necessary for him to hold that Christ was visible in several places, and also locally and circumscriptively. Now he is carried headlong after he has taken this step.

There is nothing so absurd that he does not dare to assert it. But in this, he fights miserably in several ways:

1. He contradicts himself.

2. He conflicts with others, indeed with almost everyone, certainly with the best and most learned.

3. He is abandoned by all admiration and is refuted by the most certain reasons.

First, a little earlier, when he wanted to establish a difference between God and the body of Christ concerning existence in place, he said that God is everywhere in fact, but the body of Christ is in one place locally and in many places sacramentally—where he opposed "locally" and "sacramentally." Therefore, he did not then wish Christ to be locally in many places. Now, on the contrary, he asserts it. But perhaps there he said that the body of Christ is not locally in many places, but now says it can be—yet he does not say it is. But it is otherwise: for here he does not acquiesce in the response of Thomas, who says that the body of Christ is in heaven only circumscriptively. Therefore, he himself says it can be in the Eucharist circumscriptively. If he were speaking properly about the matter, he would say it is there circumscriptively. And the question is how the body of Christ is in the Sacrament, not how it can be. Therefore, he fights with himself and overturns his previous answer. Indeed, he also overturns the following reason: for afterward he says that Christ is in the Eucharist, but not by local motion. But certainly, if he is there locally, then by local motion; and Christ, when he appeared to Paul, came locally, as they wish. Nor is this new, for a thousand times he contradicts himself.

Second, he fights with others, and those the most excellent Scholastics, especially with Thomas. For Thomas says that the body of Christ is in no way in the Sacrament locally; and he also says that for one body to be locally in two places implies a contradiction. Thus Thomas affirms that there is a contradiction in Bellarmine's opinion. Therefore, what Bellarmine says is so false that nothing falser can be. So says Bonaventure, so Durandus, so Gabriel. Capreolus also adheres to Thomas. Although Scotus, from a desire to dissent, thinks otherwise, it is against reason: for he asserts certain miserable little objections which can easily be refuted.

Indeed, thirdly, Bellarmine fights with the most manifest and invincible reason when he says this. Nor will I here bring forward any reasons of our own, lest they think there is little weight in them, but those of the Scholastics.

Our first reason is from Thomas: God cannot make two contraries exist at the same time. But all places are distinguished according to some contrariety of place, such as up and down, left and right. Therefore, God cannot make one body be in different places locally.

The second reason is also from Thomas: Place is the boundary of what is placed. But the boundary of a thing is that outside of which there is nothing of the thing. If therefore one body is at the same time in two places, it will be outside its boundary, and so both placed and not placed—which is contradictory. Rightly! Why then do they make the body of

Christ not placed and put it outside its own boundary, when no thing can be outside its own boundary?

The third reason is also from the same Thomas: Place and what is placed are equal. So says Aristotle. But the Sacrament is much smaller than the body of Christ. Therefore, the body of Christ is not in it as in a place. How then can the body of Christ be circumscribed by reason of the dimensions of the bread, as Thomas wishes? Nor are these objections to which he later responds, but reasons by which he proves his opinion from the heart.

The fourth reason is from Bellarmine himself in this very place: A body of three cubits will occupy a space of six or nine cubits if placed in two or three equal places. But the body of Christ is three cubits. Now if this is placed in three places, it will occupy a space of nine cubits; indeed, because it is in so many places, it will occupy innumerable cubits. Thus it will not be a body but a monster.

Bellarmino responds that this could happen if that body is placed in two or three places; but it cannot happen that a body of three cubits is commensurate with a space of six or nine cubits. This is, however, a miserable evasion: for thus the body of Christ of three cubits, although not equal to a space of nine cubits in one place, would equal it in many places. Indeed, in this way the body of Christ could be three, four, two, one cubit, or none—if it is locally in a place, that is, if it is commensurate with the place.

First, a body of three cubits cannot be in the Sacrament, which is not even one palm in size. I will add a fifth argument: if one body could be locally in two or more places, then Peter could be here in the schools and in the forum at Oxford; he could speak there and be silent here; be warm there and cold here. What if he were placed near a fire there—would he grow warm here even in the midst of ice? What if he were thrown into the fire there—would he burn here? Would he hear people speaking there and see what is done here? Could he dispute here in the schools and there contend with an adversary before the judge? Could he walk toward Oxford and at the same time come from there toward us along the same line without hindering himself in the place where he would meet himself? Certainly he could not hinder himself, because he is only one and the same man; yet he ought to hinder himself, since he is locally in two places, as they claim. For when two men, who are locally in two places, meet each other, they mutually hinder each other; both cannot go along the same line; one must yield to the other. And what a strange greeting that would be when one met himself! What if neither wished to yield to the other (for no one can yield to himself), and so they came to blows? What a wondrous fight that would be! Such absurdities follow from positing one body in two places.

Indeed, Dominic de Soto says that in this way God can place one body everywhere. Now therefore, from Bellarmine's opinion, which asserts that one body can be in several

places at once, the heresy of the Eutychians is inferred—which he earlier confessed is refuted by our arguments together with the error of the Lutherans.

Although therefore it is most certain that neither Christ's body nor any body can be locally in two places at once, as even the Scholastics demonstrate, and for that reason they say Christ is not in the Sacrament locally; nevertheless, other Scholastics say it is no less easy for one body to be in several places at once locally than sacramentally—a view Bellarmine seems to follow—and this better suits the truth of the body. "I indeed confess this to be true," they say, "because both are impossible." But observe how the Scholastics fight among themselves in this matter, which is not defined nor ever will be defined—namely, concerning the mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist.

Some say Christ is in the Sacrament not as in a place locally, but sacramentally; others say He is there also locally and circumscriptively. And the reason is: because God can do the one as well as the other. But that cannot be done on account of contradiction, as they rightly say; therefore neither can this. Therefore our opinion alone is true: that Christ is there, but not really. For a real presence cannot be held and defended without such an involvement of contradictions as you see.

What of our Bellarmine? In this cause he is more changeable than any Proteus. For first he denies that Christ's body is in the Sacrament locally; second he defends that it is there locally; third he says that if anyone contends that for something to be in a place circumscriptively and definitively it is required that the thing be in no way elsewhere (which is certainly necessary), then we can say, he says, that Christ is there by presence alone, as God is in a place. But this cannot be said, because then Christ's body could be everywhere—and thus he defends ubiquity, which he refuted above. Besides, Christ's body cannot be somewhere in that way as God is, because the nature of body and spirit are diverse: for a spirit can be in a place and not fill it, but a body cannot not fill it, because it must be there with its quantity and dimensions.

But what is this "being in the Sacrament by presence alone"? It amounts to saying He is there, but one does not know how He is there. For as Dominic de Soto rightly says, the mode of presence does not require conversion of the bread; but they want Him to be there by conversion of the bread. Such a presence certainly can be of the sort that the Lutherans assert. This mode, exploded by all, does not displease Bellarmine, because in truth he could find no certain mode. Thus they cannot extricate themselves from these labyrinths.

Then this opinion posits a mode of existing in a place which does not belong to a creature: for every creature is in a place either circumscriptively or definitively—circumscriptively as bodies, definitively as angels and the human soul; there is no other mode. For what they say about existing in a place sacramentally is new and fictitious. But if Christ's body is sacramentally

In the Eucharist, the presence of Christ's body is considered accidental with respect to the dimensions of the bread. But what exists in something else accidentally is in place accidentally, insofar as that other thing is in place per se. Now, the dimensions of the bread are in place per se, in a circumscribed manner. Therefore, the body of Christ is in the same place circumscribed accidentally. If it is circumscribed, then one part corresponds to another. But the parts of Christ's body cannot correspond to the dimensions of the bread, because they are neither similar in shape nor equal in magnitude.

Moreover, the arguments by which Thomas proves that Christ's body is not in the Sacrament in a circumscribed and local manner do not prove that it is not there at all. For first, if it were here, it would have an up and a down; second, it would be outside its own boundary, because it has a place in heaven—for place is the boundary of what is placed, and nothing is outside its own boundary; third, if Christ's body is in the Sacrament, then it is either equal or unequal to it: if unequal, either greater or smaller; if greater, then it extends beyond the Sacrament; if smaller, then it is not circumscribed by the dimensions of the bread, nor is it in every part of the bread; if equal, then Christ's body is of equal magnitude with the bread—which is utterly absurd. Therefore, it is not there at all.

But we have not yet reached the point we wish, so that a certain mode of Christ's presence in the Supper may be understood. For certainly the Scholastic sophists do not agree on this matter, and they fight no less among themselves than with us. They are restrained by fear, lest they dare to dispute against the real presence; but some condemn the opinions of others—which ought to be for us a very great argument that they are not defending the truth, but the common opinion of the Popes, established by tyranny.

But let us not pry into these mysteries—indeed, let us not inquire into monstrosities. I hear that Christ's body is in the Eucharist: this all Papists most stubbornly defend. But concerning the mode, I ask you, tell me: how then is Christ in the Sacrament of the Eucharist? Shall I believe Bellarmine and not Thomas? If Thomas, then not many other Scholastics; and who indeed will believe these sophists? The Pope, however, has decreed nothing on this matter. But come, tell me: how is Christ in the Sacrament?

Certainly, if Christ's body is in the Eucharist, it is either newly generated there or comes there by local motion; for when a body begins to be where it was not before, it either comes from elsewhere or is generated. But Christ's body is not generated there: for he was born only once, and what has been generated cannot be generated again, nor can what has been made be made again. It does not come by local motion: for then it would leave its prior place, since things are moved locally in this way.

Bellarmino replies that it begins to be on the altar not by generation or by local motion, but by conversion of the bread into it. I reply: Is not the conversion of bread into Christ's

body a new generation? For from bread comes Christ's body; therefore there is a new production there; and where there is corruption of one thing, there necessarily follows generation of another; it would not have been there except on account of this conversion of the bread. For example, when water was turned by Christ into wine, this was a new generation of wine; so too the rod of Moses was changed into a serpent; therefore the mode of conversion does not prevent it from being a new generation. For a thing is said to be generated in many ways: first by creation, as Adam and the whole world in the beginning; second by procreation, as we are; third by putrefaction, as worms; fourth by conversion of one substance into another, which is miraculous generation—and thus Christ at the wedding filled many jars with excellent wine which before were full of water. Therefore it is an inept distinction to say that there is not generation there but conversion of bread.

And here it should be noted in passing that Bellarmine contradicts what he said before: for a little earlier he said that Christ is in the Eucharist by a mode of presence; but the mode of presence (as Dominic à Soto says) does not require conversion of bread. But let it be so: let Christ be there by conversion of bread. Is not that very body of Christ which is in heaven, by conversion of bread, in the Eucharist? They will not deny this, I think; therefore that body which is in heaven comes from bread—for this comes from bread. But this is impossible. For what exists (as Bellarmine says) cannot be made, much less made from diverse matter; but the matter of bread is diverse from the seed of Abraham; but the body which is in heaven was made from the seed of Abraham; and bread is made from wheat. Thus according to the Papists, Christ is made from wheat—but let them keep that Christ for themselves.

You will not be our Christ. Therefore, we argue thus:

What is, cannot become; but Christ's body is; therefore it cannot become.

If, however, it comes to be from bread, as they wish, then a manifest contradiction arises:

For it becomes what it is, and (as they say) it becomes from bread; therefore the body is equivocal—

for it cannot be univocal if it is made from diverse matter; but Christ is only one.

Next, suppose that Christ does not descend locally, nor is generated; nevertheless, he must be increased.

For since perpetual conversions of bread into him occur, there cannot fail to be increase.

Therefore, they must concede that there is augmentation there, even if they deny generation.

They imagine that the bread is converted; but this conversion of bread either is into nothing—and then it is not into Christ—

or it is into the body of Christ—and then they must grant some mutation in the body of Christ—

or it is conversion and not conversion.

For I argue thus:

Every conversion is into something and produces something;

but this conversion is not into something, nor does it produce anything; therefore it is not a conversion.

I prove the minor:

For if it were into something, then into the body of Christ;

if into the body of Christ, then into that which is in heaven—for there is no other body of Christ;

if into that which is in heaven, then that which is in heaven is changed by this conversion—

for it is impossible that something be changed into another without mutation of the thing into which it is changed;

but that body is not subject to mutation.

If indeed it is changed into the body of Christ which is in heaven, then necessarily either this bread is carried into heaven, or the body of Christ descends from heaven into the Sacrament.

Moreover, if this conversion produces something, then it produces the body of Christ; but what is produced cannot be produced.

But Bellarmine says that examples are not lacking, and then he brings forward examples of the soul and of God, which are plainly heterogeneous—that is, of a different kind—

for we are speaking of a corporeal substance; he could not find a suitable example in the nature of things, for no example of a contradiction can exist.

But the example of the soul does not fit:

For although the soul begins to be in matter which is added to the body by nutrition when it grows, and a new soul is not generated, nevertheless that new matter is not converted into the soul—

but he wants the bread to be converted into the body of Christ.

Certainly food and nourishment bring about a certain new generation, as physicians and philosophers affirm, because what decays is repaired;

therefore there is either generation or mutation in the body; but there is none in the body of Christ, into which they nevertheless wish bread to be converted.

The example concerning God is much more foreign:

God is in all things, but nothing is changed into God; he is indeed also in new things which daily come to be anew; but those things are not converted into the substance of God—

for if they were converted, God would daily become greater; similarly, if bread is changed into the body of Christ, the body of Christ would daily increase.

But I ask him: What is the formal cause on account of which Christ's body is in this Sacrament?

For everything has some formal reason for existing in a place: Is the conversion of bread into the body of Christ the formal reason? But that has passed away; yet the formal reason remains.

Therefore a cause must be assigned which remains with the body: Are the species or dimensions of the Sacrament the formal reason, because the body remains as long as the species remain?

But those are not in the body of Christ, whereas a form is in the matter whose form it is.

Certainly Aristotle says that the form of existing in a place is the quantity of a body—and this is true; because as long as it has quantity, so long it is in a place;

therefore the body of Christ will be in the Sacrament by reason of quantity—either quantitatively or through its terminability, as others say—which our Adversaries deny.

But the quantity of Christ's body cannot be multiplied (as the Scholastics say), because just as the body is one, so its quantity is one; therefore it cannot be in many places, but only in one place.

But they say that other bodies also are in many places: But how? By way of conversion? But what? Then by generation? Therefore what has been generated can be generated anew.

But let us proceed with Bellarmine and see how he resolves the many contradictions which depend on and follow from this opinion.

For if one body were in many places, then many contradictions would follow: for it would be at once up and down,

Smoke, distant and not distant; it will be at rest and in motion; it will approach and recede; here it will be extremely hot, there extremely cold; here it can be wounded and fall ill, there be healthy. How can Bellarmine satisfy these contradictions? He acknowledges the disagreements of the Scholastics in this matter: for some say that relations are multiplied, but not absolutes; others say that even the absolutes themselves are multiplied, so that they can say one man is drunk in one place, thirsty in another, indeed dying in one and living in another. But what does Bellarmine do? He takes a middle path, which he says is the safest.

Therefore, concerning relations, he thinks they are necessarily multiplied so that one body can be up and down, moving and at rest, with respect to different things: for contrary relations can exist in the same subject with respect to different things. I reply: One body can indeed be to the right or left, up or down with respect to different things—as this column is to my right, to another's left—but Christ's body in the Eucharist, according to them, can be up and down with respect to itself: the body in the pyx, or hanging above the altar, is up; the same body lying on the table is down; this body is moved in the hand, that one rests in the pyx; yet it is one body: the whole would be at rest and the whole would be moving, with respect to itself—which cannot happen. And here Bellarmine shows himself an outstanding philosopher, in that he counts motion and rest among relations: for these are absolutes; rest is not a mere relation. Thomas rightly says it is impossible for the same thing to be both in motion and at rest: for then contradictories would be true of the same thing. Therefore, they are not relations but something absolute: such as rest.

Bellarmino admits that absolutes are not multiplied, yet in Christ's body they are multiplied, and contrarily: for here it can be moving, there at rest; here up, there down. But up and down are relations, he says: yet to the same thing: for the right can be up, the left down. Bellarmine does not remove the contradiction when he says “with respect to different places.” For first, the respect that removes the contradiction about up and down is not that one body situated in different places is simultaneously up and down with respect to those places (for then it would be up and down not only in relation but in reality), but with respect to places where it is not: as I am up with respect to the floor,

down with respect to the roof—but I am not in the roof, nor in the floor. For then it would actually and really be in different places, which is impossible: for these places are diverse for one man and one body.

Wherefore Thomas proves that Christ is not locally in the Eucharist, because then two contraries would be simultaneous, namely up and down; but by this reasoning Christ would not be in the sacrament at all: for in whatever way he is there, he will be up and down—and so contraries will be simultaneously in Christ's body.

Second, if the same man could be up and down in different places, then he could fall down in one place and break his neck, while at the same time elsewhere he stands on level ground. And if this could happen (and it can happen from this supposition), then the same body could be killed and simultaneously unharmed—which however Bellarmine here denies. For he says absolutes are not multiplied, so that if someone is drunk or sated there, he will not thirst or hunger here; if he is healthy there, he will not be sick here. But these things would necessarily happen if one man were simultaneously in different places. For at Rome he could be arrested, thrown into prison, and crucified or burned for religion's sake; meanwhile here he would be in no danger. There therefore he would die, because there are all the causes of death; not here, because here there is no cause of death. Therefore, if one can be simultaneously in several places, not only will relations be multiple, but even contrary absolutes themselves—so that one and the same man could be drunk at Frankfurt and sober at London.

And this is what the Scholastics dispute: if the host had remained when Christ was being crucified, Christ would have been dead on the cross and alive in the host. And to this can be referred what Hugh says. But now the Scholastics think otherwise; about which perhaps we shall speak later. But if Christ had died in the host, then he would have been crucified in the host, and then it would be necessary that the cross was in the host and the Jews who crucified Christ—neither of which could happen.

From what we have said it is clear that no body can be simultaneously in different places.

Now let us call upon the Fathers, either as witnesses or as heralds of truth. Augustine says that no body can be everywhere as a whole; and further, that however large or however small a body may be, it occupies a place in space and fills that place in such a way that it is not wholly present in any one part of it. Therefore, the body of Christ is not wholly present except in one place.

Bellarmino says that Augustine is speaking of a body existing in a place naturally, and that it involves a contradiction for a body to remain extended and yet be wholly in every part. I reply:

1. Augustine, in answering Volusianus who asked how God could be enclosed in the womb of a virgin, says that God is not confined to any place but is wholly everywhere; whereas a body is so enclosed and contained in a place that it can only be in one place and cannot be wholly in any part of it. Augustine therefore speaks simply: it cannot be in any way, because this is proper to divinity alone. If, then, the body of Christ is not enclosed in a place, it will be God.

2. Bellarmine admits that a body cannot naturally be wholly in every part of a place, and that this implies a contradiction—that a body remains extended and yet is wholly in every part of the place. But Christ's body remains extended and yet is wholly in every part of the place, as most Papists maintain; therefore, there is a contradiction in their doctrine. Indeed, Bellarmine himself previously said that Christ can be definitively in many places; but certainly either Bellarmine is mistaken (and with him countless others), or to be definitively in a place is to be wholly in the whole and wholly in every part. Now Bellarmine concedes that this cannot be affirmed of Christ's body without contradiction.

If indeed Christ's body is not wholly in every part on account of its extension, then Christ's body has extended parts, and there is a certain order and arrangement of parts: the head, on account of the extension of parts, ought to be in the uppermost part of the body, the feet in the lowest, the chest in the middle. Even if this is granted, then there will be some part upright, some prone; some anterior, some posterior; and then Christ either lies on his back or face down; or he inclines to the right or to the left; now he is turned away, now facing forward.

3. Also in the doctrine of Thomas there will be an implication of contradiction. For he says that Christ's body is not circumscribed by place and yet is quantitative—that is, extended. But if it is not circumscribed by place, then it is wholly in every part; for circumscription alone implies distinction and extension of parts: where there is no circumscription, there the parts are simultaneous. And the Pontificians themselves want Christ's body to be wholly present in every minute part of the Sacrament.

4. Augustine says that there is no body, whether large or small, which does not occupy space and fill a place; and he speaks of any body without exception, even the body of Christ; and he uses the best reasoning: because a body (he says) is a certain substance, and its quantity consists in the magnitude of its bulk; and it has distant parts which cannot be simultaneous.

If he had thought it were otherwise in the body of Christ, he would have made some mention of it, especially since he speaks of Christ enclosed in the womb of the virgin. But the Papists affirm that Christ's body is simultaneously in a thousand places and fills no space or place.

Likewise also Augustine elsewhere says concerning Christ: "According to bodily presence he could not be at once both in the sun and in the moon and on the cross." Bellarmine, in quoting this testimony, omitted those words: "according to bodily presence." He replies, but to no purpose, because he does not reach Augustine's aim.

Augustine asks the Manichaeans how many Christs they suppose: whether one, whom the Holy Spirit begot from the earth as passible, hanging (as they would have it) from every tree and lying in every plant; another, whom the Jews crucified; a third spread through the sun and moon; or one and the same partly bound in trees and partly free. Then Augustine refutes this madness: because Christ (he says) is either spirit or body; according to spiritual presence he could not have been crucified by the Jews; and according to bodily presence he cannot be at once in trees, in plants, on the cross, in the moon, and in the sun—as they most absurdly affirmed. But according to the opinion of the Papists he can be in many more places and things.

But Bellarmine says: If Augustine speaks of Christ's body as it really is, and not according to the opinion of the Manichaeans, then...

It speaks of the body according to the ordinary course of nature, and not according to what the omnipotence of the Creator can do in it.

I reply: If it could be that Christ, according to bodily presence, is in the sun, and the moon, and the cross at the same time, then Augustine would have ineptly refuted the Manichaeans, from whose doctrine such a thing followed. For they could have objected to Augustine with the same absurdity and said: Why do you deny that Christ can be in trees and herbs, when you yourselves assert that he is in countless altars? For the Manichaean did not say that Christ is naturally in so many places and things, but as the Holy Spirit. But Augustine did not fear such a calumny because he knew that Christ is nowhere except in one place.

But Bellarmine proves that Augustine is not speaking of Christ as he is in himself, because he says that the spirit can in no way suffer on the cross; which must necessarily be understood (he says) according to the ordinary course of nature; otherwise (he says) Augustine would be fighting with himself, because elsewhere he says that a spirit can suffer from corporeal fire.

I reply: Augustine indeed says that demons are tormented by infernal fires, either because they have aerial bodies or because even spirits without bodies can be tormented by corporeal fire in wondrous and ineffable ways. I confess this to be true: demons without bodies will be tormented by fire. Therefore, could the Jews have crucified Christ if he had not had a body? Certainly, demons can be tormented by God with flames, but not by men, nor crucified or tormented. But Christ was crucified by the Jews; therefore he was not a spirit; therefore he had a body; therefore he cannot be at the same time in the moon

and the sun and innumerable other places, as the Manichaeans asserted. Therefore it is heretical to posit Christ in several places at once.

But it is inept what Bellarmine says: if spirits can be bound to corporeal fire so that they receive punishment from it, why can they not be bound to a cross? For it is just as if he were to say: demons are definitively in the air; therefore they can be apprehended and thrown into prison. For fire is the place of demons, and the substance of fire is subtle, and they will dwell in fire; but men cannot crucify them, as the Jews did Christ.

Another testimony is brought by our side from Augustine in a certain tract on John, where he has these words: "The Lord is on high, but the Lord is also here as truth. For the body of the Lord, in which he rose again, can be in one place; his truth is everywhere diffused." But what Augustine says, "can be," is just as if he were to say, "ought to be"; for he opposes the body to his truth. He says, "truth is everywhere diffused," that is, spiritual grace; but the body itself "can be in one place," that is, it is in one place; otherwise there will be no opposition. But Augustine says "can be" because it is where it wills, by no necessity in this or that place.

Our theologians sometimes are accustomed to allege this testimony thus: "The body in which the Lord rose again ought to be in one place." The adversaries cry out. But in Gratian it is read thus: where a ridiculous Glossator explains what Augustine says—that the truth of the body is everywhere—thus: "the true body of Christ is in the form of bread on any altar"; as if this were to be everywhere? But Augustine opposes the body and the truth of the body; but they are not opposites if the body is both in one place and in all places. Immediately therefore the Glossator says: "or truth is divinity"; but this too is absurd, because Augustine says "his truth," that is, of the body; but divinity is not the truth of the body.

Similarly, many Fathers prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit from the fact that it is everywhere; if therefore Christ is everywhere according to his humanity, then that humanity is God. Ambrose has these words: "Who would dare to call the Holy Spirit a creature, who does not have circumscribed and determined virtue? For to be in all things and everywhere is proper to divinity." And thus throughout the whole chapter he beautifully circumscribes creatures within their limits, but the Holy Spirit by none; and from this he proves that the Holy Spirit is not a creature. Therefore they take away Christ's humanity who posit it either in all things or in several places.

Similarly Basil says: "It belongs to other faculties (he means angels) to be in a circumscribed place, as the angel who spoke with Cornelius and who stood by Zechariah was not then in heaven; but the Spirit of the Lord filled all things."

Therefore, he concludes that God is that which is ἀχώρητον τῷ μεγέθει, immense in magnitude—that is, so immense that it cannot be contained in any place.

If, therefore, Christ is bodily present on earth and in heaven at the same time, his body is not of a finite nature; therefore, it is God.

Jerome has these words: “From this we understand that he is God, who is wholly everywhere.”

Didymus likewise proves the same thing.

Augustine says that he marvels at the hearts of the Arians—more than he can express—because, although they grant that the Holy Spirit is present everywhere to sanctify the faithful, they dare to deny that he is God; as if to say it is utterly insane to deny that he is God who is everywhere.

Therefore, if the body of Christ is everywhere, it is God.

Similarly, Cyril says: if this good argument of the Fathers holds, then the body of Christ is not everywhere, because then it would be God.

But Bellarmine will perhaps concede all these points, because they do not say that Christ’s body is everywhere; and he sets aside these arguments when dealing with the Lutherans.

Thus they admit that the Lutherans are very well refuted by these and similar testimonies.

Would that the Lutherans might at last acknowledge their error and absurdity!

But are the Papists thereby excused? By no means.

For by the same power by which Christ is in so many places, he could be in all places; for they say this does not happen naturally, but by reason of God’s omnipotence.

Now by his omnipotence God could make Christ’s body be everywhere just as easily as he makes it be in so many places; and thus he could communicate his nature to a creature.

But this is impossible: for God cannot make many gods; therefore he cannot communicate his properties to created things.

But to be everywhere is a property of God; and this God can no less communicate to the body of Christ than to be in many places at once.

Furthermore, Eutyches, who asserted the ubiquity of Christ, was condemned by the Catholic Church—either rightly or not.

If not, then those who condemned him at the Council of Chalcedon acted wrongly; but that cannot be said, because Scripture most clearly condemns his heresy.

If Eutyches was justly and deservedly condemned, similarly the Papists also ought to be condemned—not only the Lutherans—because the Papists lay the foundations of the Eutychian heresy by affirming that from which ubiquity necessarily follows.

The Lutherans say without ambiguity that Christ's body is everywhere; Bellarmine admits that they are refuted by ubiquity, which is a property of God.

But the Papists are no less absurd, who grant that it is possible for Christ's body to be everywhere by the same power that makes it be in many places; and from their tenets it necessarily follows, because since the cause of its existence is God's omnipotence, it can no less be everywhere by this cause.

But perhaps they will say that it is in one place circumscriptively, but according to a different respect it is in a thousand places.

But this is not to make a distinction but to beg the question and affirm the predicate.

We deny that Christ can be in diverse places without circumscription; for it is contrary to the nature of a body to be in many places at once.

Thus the Papists answer as if they were to say: "The sun shines by its light and is dark by its darkness"—but who would say that darkness is in the sun?

What of the fact that many Papists expressly assert that Christ's body can be everywhere?

Thus Rosensis expressly says that Christ's body can be everywhere.

And Ockham, from the fact that Christ's body is in any part of one small place, infers that it can also be in any part of one large place; and because it is in four places, therefore it can be in more and all places where God is.

And in my opinion the opinion of the Lutherans is less absurd, because from it there does not follow a discontinuing of one and the same body, as does from the opinion of the Papists.

Chapter 12: The arguments of the Papists by which they prove that Christ's body does not occupy a place in the Sacrament are refuted.

Now let us come to the second contradiction of the Papists, which consists in this: according to their view, the body does not occupy a place.

For they say not only that Christ's body is in infinitely many places, but also that it occupies no place.

We say this cannot be, because it necessarily implies a contradiction.

And here we must first consider the state of the question.

Bellarmino...

There are two points to be observed. First, there are two false opinions of the Scholastics, which, he says, have given heretics the opportunity to raise more subtle arguments against the truth of the faith. The first is that of Durandus, who held that the body of Christ is in the Eucharist without quantity. Indeed, Durandus could not see how quantity could be in the Eucharist, but he thought it easy to understand how substance could be without quantity. For if the substance of a body could be separated from quantity, it would be better to affirm that in the Eucharist there is substance without quantity, because substance is not extended except through quantity. This approach pleased Durandus.

The second opinion is that there is quantity and magnitude there, but no distinction or order of parts; rather, each part is penetrated by each other part. This seems to be the opinion of Ockham and the Alliacensian. These opinions are heretical because they destroy the nature of a body, yet they cannot be refuted by the Papists, who hold the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist—since with that presence, neither the distinction of parts nor any aspect of quantity can in any way be maintained, as we will show later.

But what, then, is the opinion of Bellarmine and the Papist Church? It is this: that the body of Christ is in the Eucharist with its own figure, and has order and distinction of parts as in heaven, and has all accidents except the relation to the heavenly place. But:

1. We will later prove it impossible for the body of Christ in the Eucharist to have the same distinction and order as in heaven.
2. In excepting one accident—namely, the relation to place—he refutes himself most plainly. For the same thing cannot fail to have all relations with respect to itself and to the same thing. But the body of Christ is always the same and one; therefore, it cannot differ from itself by relation. Yet it would differ if it were really in the Eucharist. But it is impossible for anyone to differ from themselves with respect to themselves; one can differ with respect to other things—for example, I can be above and below at the same time; or as John can be both father and son; or one can be teacher and student at once under different respects. But according to Bellarmine's opinion, the body of Christ would differ from itself with respect to itself. The same thing cannot be referred to itself by opposite relations, as the Scholastics say. Similarly, near and far are opposite relations; but if the same thing were in different places, it could be both near and far to the same thing.

But Bellarmine asserts certain arguments by which he proves that the body of Christ is in the sacrament with quantity and distinction of parts.

The first argument is taken from the Council of Trent: The universal Church teaches, he says, that not only the body and blood but also the soul and divinity—and thus the whole Christ—are in the Eucharist. But it is certain, he says, that the soul and divinity are not there by virtue of consecration but by concomitance. Yet magnitude and figure, he says, are united to the body of Christ naturally and inseparably. But here he conflicts with Thomas, for Thomas says that quantity too is in the Eucharist not by virtue of consecration but because of concomitance. The substance is there, he says, by virtue of the sacrament; quantity by real concomitance; therefore, there is quantity in the sacrament, but through concomitance. According to this opinion, then, quantity could be separated from substance, as blood from flesh and soul from body. But let that be as it may—it does not affect the matter.

Bellarmino's second argument is this: Christ said, "Take, eat; this is my body, which is given for you." But his body was not given without magnitude and figure and other accidents founded in magnitude.

I reply: In this way Christ would be visibly in the Eucharist and with his proper magnitude—not with this mathematical and Papist magnitude—for when he was given, his body was visible and had its proper magnitude.

Third argument: In the Eucharist, the flesh of the Lord is given; but substance without quantity and a certain complexion of accidents cannot be called flesh.

I reply: Then bones ought to be here too—and bones cannot be without quantity and the complexion of bones. But in the Eucharist there is no distinction between flesh and bones; therefore, there is no complexion of flesh there.

Fourth argument: The soul is also in the Eucharist; therefore, there is a disposed and organized body there; therefore, not without its quantity.

I reply:

But certainly, there is no disposition of the human body in the Eucharist; therefore, there is neither quantity nor soul there. If, then, a soul cannot exist except in a disposed and organized body, surely there is no soul in the Eucharist, because in a proper disposition, there must be a position such as organic members require. But it is necessary that if the substance of Christ's body is there, both quantity and soul should also be there at the same time, for they are inseparable. But since neither quantity nor soul is here, neither can the body be here.

According to what Bellarmine says must be observed here, three things belong to magnitude, one of which follows from the other. The first is essential, namely, to be extended in itself and to have part outside part, and consequently intrinsic position, order, and disposition of parts—and these are perpetual in magnitude. For what is a line, he says, except extension in length? What is a surface except extension in length and breadth? What is a body except extension in length, breadth, and depth? Therefore, if extension is removed, magnitude is removed.

I reply: These things are said by him most correctly; for magnitude cannot even be conceived without extension. Since there is a threefold magnitude in a body, a threefold extension is also necessary. This necessity makes it so that Christ's body cannot be in the Eucharist, as we will show later.

The second thing that belongs to magnitude is to be coextended with place, or commensurate with place, and to have an extrinsic position in relation to place. This, he says, follows from the first and therefore can be separated from it. I reply: But if it follows, and follows necessarily, it cannot be separated. For either it follows necessarily and inseparably, or it does not. If necessarily, then it cannot not be coextended; if not, why does he say it follows? Indeed, it follows necessarily that a body, because it has extension, fills a place, because extension is in length, breadth, and depth. And it follows not as an effect from a cause—for God could prevent a cause from producing its effect—but as what is formed from its form; for extension is the formal reason for existing in a place and occupying a place. But a form cannot be separated from the thing formed while the thing exists without contradiction. And certainly there cannot be extension of parts without occupation of place; therefore, if this is removed, the former will also be removed, as we will show later.

For what he objects concerning the highest heaven, we have replied above: although it is not properly in a place, nevertheless it has a position of parts in extension and is circumscribed by its surface. The example does not apply: for the highest heaven on account of its immensity is not in a place; but Christ's body is thought not to occupy a place not on account of immensity but, on the contrary, because the place in which it is put by them is not of such magnitude. There is nothing in Christ's body why it cannot be extended to a place; but in heaven there is something why it cannot be contained by a place. He could give no instance of a body within the sphere of the world.

The third thing that belongs to magnitude is to expel another body from a place and not to allow that it be together with it; and this follows from the second. Therefore he says this can be separated from the second and first because it is posterior to them. And therefore Catholics, he says, hold that a body can be in a place and not expel another—which is called penetration of bodies. And thus the body will be in a place circumscriptively with another. But his reasoning fails: for what is posterior in time is separable; not what is

posterior by nature always and necessarily. No more is filling a place posterior to body than being sentient is posterior to animal or being risible is posterior to man. If God were to separate risible from man, he would no longer be man; this therefore is a contradiction.

Now we have the opinion of the Papists: that Christ's body is truly in the Sacrament with its magnitude, yet not commensurate with place or coextended with place, and able to penetrate another body. This favors the Lutherans: why then do they destroy the bread to make room for Christ's body, since Christ's body can be in the Sacrament together with another body? Therefore the Papists contend with the Lutherans in vain.

We, on the contrary, say that in this opinion there is impossibility and contradiction, and that the first condition can no less be removed than the second and third. But Bellarmine has forgotten himself: for he who earlier said that Christ's body is in the Eucharist circumscriptively now, with changed expression, says it is not circumscribed but exists without filling. Thus one thing at one time...

Standing, he says one thing; sitting, another. Then previously he said that the body of Christ is visibly in the Eucharist, and that any body can be visibly in two places; now he says a body can penetrate a body—which if true, then we can see two bodies in one place, indeed infinitely many: for if one body can be in two places, it can be in a thousand; likewise, if two bodies can be in one place, so can a thousand, and visibly too, as Bellarmine says—which no one has ever seen.

But now let us come to the arguments. Bellarmine uses a twofold kind of arguments: the first is taken from the omnipotence of God; the other from examples. Concerning the omnipotence of God, he adduces certain Scriptures, to which we have already responded. The omnipotence of God is proclaimed in the Scriptures, from which we, along with the Scholastics, exclude nothing except what implies a contradiction. Now indeed, for a body not to occupy space, not to fill a place, not to expel another body—this cannot but imply a contradiction.

Now therefore he wishes to prove that there is no contradiction in these things; if he proves it, then we concede it can be done. And to prove this, he asserts four little arguments.

1. The first is: "To occupy a place is posterior to the body, and nothing posterior pertains to the essence; but to imply a contradiction is to be repugnant to the essence."

I reply: Place is posterior to the body in nature, not in time; but the extension of parts is not even posterior in nature: for the extension of parts belongs to the essence of magnitude, even by Bellarmine's own admission. Place, I grant, is not of the essence of a body, but disposition to place is of the essence on account of essential magnitude: for as soon as a body exists, it is located; but to be located is simultaneous with place. And as

the Scholastics hold, corporeity is the formal reason for existing in a place: therefore a body cannot but be in a place, because a body cannot exist without corporeity. Therefore place is not posterior to the body, even if it is something external to the body.

2. The second argument is this: “Magnitude can be defined without place or repletion of place; therefore to be in a place is not of the essence of magnitude, and then there is no contradiction for a body to have magnitude and not occupy a place.”

I reply: Not everything that is not put in the definition can be separated from the defined thing; otherwise risibility could be separated from man. I grant that place is not put in the definition of a body; yet those things are put which necessarily imply place and which are properties arguing that it must be in a place: for being long, wide, and deep necessarily argue the filling of a place. Concerning the outermost sphere, it has been answered that it is not in a place because there is no larger place within which it could be; although if it moves, it is in some way in a place. Nor because place is not put in the definition of a body or magnitude does it follow that a body or magnitude can exist without place: for in the definition of spirit, “being in a place” is not put, nor in the definition of God; yet those things are put from which it follows that neither God nor a spirit is in a place. Indeed, immortality is not put in the definition either of God or of a spirit; yet just as immortality, so also “not being in a place” belongs to the essence both of God and of angels. If what is put in the definition cannot be separated, then a body cannot but fill a place, since it is defined by long, wide, and deep: but “deep” would not differ from “wide,” or “wide” from “long,” or “long” from a point, if a body did not fill a place. Thus the body of Christ would not be a true body, but a monogrammon body—that is, only outlined, without the remaining attributes which complete a true bodily magnitude.

3. The third argument is of this sort: “Function or office is not of the essence of a thing; but to fill a place is a function of a body; therefore it is not of the essence of a body, and consequently for a body to be somewhere and not fill a place does not imply a contradiction—since nothing implies a contradiction except what is repugnant to the essence.”

I reply: Function and essence are indeed not the same in created things; but in God they are the same: for God is perpetual act. So if by “function” he means to act perpetually, then indeed function belongs only to God’s essence. Man does not always reason, yet this is an essential faculty of man: so too for a body to fill a place and not penetrate another body. The function of fire is to burn—not always indeed, because this can be impeded—but its essence

Fire is heat, which is not a mere function but a form, and it cannot be separated from fire. Similarly, the act of reasoning can be hindered in a human, but reason itself cannot be taken away from a human. Likewise, concerning the body: its functions can be impeded,

but extension is not a function of the body, but a form, which itself cannot be hindered or removed.

The fourth argument is as follows: Extension relates to magnitude as gravity relates to a heavy body; but to weigh is not of the essence of a heavy body. I reply: Extension is in a body in such a way that it constitutes its nature and definition. For thus Bellarmine previously said, "What is a body if not extended in length, width, and depth?" But gravity is not of the essence of a body; rather, it is a secondary quality. Therefore, without contradiction, a heavy body is not borne downward.

Now follows the second class of arguments, which is placed in the enumeration of examples—and yet other Papists say this is unique. Hässlius responds from Augustine in another case: "If we seek an example, it will not be unique." Thus Dominic de Soto: "This indeed is a singular mode, having no example." But Bellarmine thinks this can be illustrated by examples; let me therefore see the examples by which he proves that a body can be in a place without occupying or filling the place.

The first example is taken from Matthew 19, Mark 10, Luke 18: "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven." When the astonished apostles said, "Who then can be saved?" Christ replied, "This is impossible with men, but all things are possible with God." Therefore, God can make a camel pass through the eye of a needle, because if He can do what is more difficult, He can do what is easier. But a camel cannot pass through the eye of a needle unless it does not occupy space; otherwise, the greater would be less than its lesser. If God can do this, why can He not similarly cause Christ's body to be in the Sacrament and yet not occupy space?

I reply:

1. There are various interpretations of this passage. Augustine explains it allegorically: by "rich man," he says, is understood one who is desirous of temporal things; by "camel," Christ, who submitted Himself to burdens; by "needle," pricks; by "eye," the narrowness of pricks. Thus, according to Augustine, the sense is: "It is easier for Christ to suffer for the lovers of the world than for the lovers of the world to be converted to Christ." If we interpret the passage in this way, then Bellarmine's argument about the camel fails.

Similarly, Gregory says that the camel passed through the eye of the needle when the Redeemer underwent the narrowness of the passion. Others understand by "camel" a ship's rope; thus Theophylact says: "Some understand not the animal, but that thick rope which sailors use for casting anchors." And so also Elias of Crete. Bellarmine says it should be κάμilon (a ship's rope), not κάμηλον (camel). I admit that Suidas in his Lexicon and the scholiast of Aristophanes have κάμilon—a word nowhere found in any ancient author. But it is certain that a ship's rope was called "camel" on account of its

thickness and twistedness. And in the Gospel it is written κάμηλον; which word Theophylact says is taken by some for a ship's rope.

But whether "camel" or "rope" is understood, it makes no difference in the impossibility of the thing, though it does in proportion: for a rope is more similar to thread than a camel is. But simply to draw a thick rope through the eye of a needle is impossible.

As for the needle, others think it refers to a certain gate of Jerusalem that was so narrow that camels could not pass through it unless their loads were removed and they stooped down. So says Cajetan. And this interpretation also undermines Bellarmine's reasoning. But nowhere is such a gate mentioned by any ancient author; I will not therefore use this response.

And it is certain that this was παροιμιώδες, that is, proverbial among them when speaking of something very impossible—as when we say, "It is easier for an ox to fly than for this or that to happen," or when we say of very bitter enemies, "Sooner will water agree with fire than these be reconciled." Therefore, Christ speaks of a camel and of a needle.

But now let us respond to the argument: although it is taken from a needle, it does not prick.

An argument of this kind: It is no less contrary to nature for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for the body of Christ to be contained in a small piece of bread. But the former can happen—why not then the latter?

I reply: Christ does not say it is possible for a camel to be led through the eye of a needle, but that for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven is as impossible for men as for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. Yet, Christ says, God can bring this about—not that a camel passes through the eye of a needle, but that the rich enter the kingdom of heaven.

Now, is it impossible for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle? Certainly—otherwise the Apostles would not have been astonished. And can God do this? Certainly, what is simply impossible God cannot do; but many things that are impossible for men, He can do. However, for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle is impossible for men in two ways: first, with respect to the camel's size—that is, if the camel retains the same bulk and magnitude and passes through the eye of a needle; second, if this proportion is changed—that is, if the camel is made slender enough to pass.

In the first way, it is simply impossible—that is, if neither the camel nor the needle undergoes any change, and yet the camel passes through the eye of the needle. In the second way, it is not impossible, because God can do what men cannot—namely, make the camel slender or enlarge the needle's eye.

Similarly, God can bring a rich person into heaven—not one who trusts in his riches, but after He has taken away that trust and given him a different mind; then He can save him. But just as it is simply impossible for a camel with its hump and twisted body to pass through the eye of a needle, so it is impossible for a rich person with his pride and vain confidence to enter the kingdom of heaven. The meaning is not complicated.

Therefore, what Bellarmine proves from Augustine—that the rich can enter heaven even if they do not cease to be rich—is true and does not contradict us. For Christ does not say we must cast riches away, but that we must not trust in them. So it is not necessary that, like that foolish philosopher, we throw riches into the sea, but that we place no confidence in riches.

In Mark's Gospel, Christ teaches whom He means by "the rich"—namely, "those who trust in riches." Indeed, many people can be rich, as were Abraham, Job, and others, who nevertheless did not place their hope in riches.

As for what the Fathers say—that God can lead a camel through the eye of a needle, as Augustine, Nazianzen, Origen, and others affirm—no one denies it; but this would not be while preserving the essence and nature of each. For God can change the nature of things, just as He can turn a greedy rich man into a generous Christian.

A second example is taken from John 2, where we read that Christ came twice to His disciples when the doors were shut. Therefore, either Christ's body did not occupy space, or one body penetrated another. This example is also used by Lutherans.

I reply:

1. The phrase "the doors being shut" is in the past tense, and the sense is that Christ entered after the doors had been shut—not while they were still being shut. For the Evangelist does not say this. Therefore, Berengar could rightly deny that Christ entered with the doors shut; not that they were not shut before, but that they were known to be shut when Christ entered. Guitmund reproached him for this—refuting him not with arguments but with insults.

That Christ entered after the doors were shut—while the disciples were inside and suddenly—was a miracle, even if He opened the doors Himself.

2. Suppose the doors were shut and remained shut after Christ entered: the Evangelist does not say He entered through the doors—whether shut or open—but that He suddenly entered while they were shut. He could no less enter through walls or the roof than through doors. Indeed, if there were windows and they were open, Christ could have entered that way. For Christ moved His body suddenly from one place to another through the air; why then, if any place was passable, could He not enter through it?

3. Let us imagine everything was shut and they were enclosed on all sides by bronze walls: Christ could still have entered among them without two bodies penetrating each other—either so that...

He occupied the place in the interim. For by his power he could either make large cracks and immediately repair them, or open and close doors without anyone noticing, so that in the meantime he retained the proper size of his body and did no harm either to his own body or to any other thing. But although there are a thousand ways by which Christ could have entered to his own, none of them pleases the Adversaries except one, which is both impossible and the most incredible of all. And the Fathers also thought this. Hilary, whose long testimony Bellarmine cites, says that by his power all things were penetrable to Christ; therefore, the house was penetrable to him. Thus Augustine says that when Christ passed through the door and walked on the waters, the weight and measure of his body receded for a little while. Augustine says it receded: thus he does not admit contradiction; but if Christ had remained with his body in both states, there would have been a contradiction. The same Augustine elsewhere attributes to a certain subtlety, to which Christ reduced his body in a moment, that he entered in this way. However the matter stood, Christ was not inside and outside at the same time; but the Adversaries want Christ to have been in heaven and outside heaven at the same time. Thus Amphilochius says that Christ entered through closed doors after the resurrection, not before, to show that he had a body of such a kind, not of the sort he had before the resurrection. Whatever he meant, he certainly thought that there was some change in Christ's body, otherwise he could not have entered. Thus Jerome says that the creature yielded to the Creator, that is, gave way, whether the doors or some part of the building; therefore it is not necessary for us to imagine penetration. Durandus agrees with us most clearly, saying that it must be stated absolutely that Christ entered with the doors closed, but not through the closed doors, because he could have entered through windows or another place; and if through the doors, they could have been suddenly opened and closed so that it escaped the disciples' notice; and because what is hidden is not thought to have happened, therefore the doors are said to have been closed. Bellarmine is angry with Durandus, but Durandus could have been angry with Bellarmine. But Bellarmine asserts some weak conjectures against us. The first is: It would not have been a miracle if he had entered through windows or by any entrance with the doors closed. I reply: It was a miracle because no one else could enter in this way; and it would have been a miracle for the doors to have been suddenly opened with no one inside opening them. The second reason: The apostles, terrified and frightened, thought it was a spirit; therefore he entered without any noise. I reply: Christ could have opened the doors without noise; for what proves that the whole house was unmoved because there was no noise does not follow, because God can cause motion without noise. The third reason: The Fathers acknowledge a miracle. I reply: We also do; and it was a true miracle for Christ to have made a way for himself. The fourth reason: The Fathers would have used this response against the Marcionites, Valentinians,

and Origenists, who denied the true resurrection of the body and argued from this passage; for from this they inferred that Christ's body was phantasmal. I reply: But it does not follow; because Christ could enter with a true body by opening a way for himself and making hard bodies yield to him, just as Jerome replies to John the Origenist. But it is not for the Lutherans to press this, who say that Christ is everywhere; for why would Christ pass through the doors to enter if he was already inside? But Christ entered, says John; therefore he was not there before. Thus the Lutherans' cause falls. The third example is concerning the Lord's nativity: Christ came out from the closed womb of his Mother. I reply: That Christ was born of a virgin, faith persuades; but whether he came out in that manner is held neither in the Creeds nor in the Scriptures, nor does it pertain to faith. But they are commanded to believe many things about the Blessed Virgin which in no way pertain to faith. It was fitting for Christ to be born of a virgin, lest he be born with sin, says Basil; but whether she remained a virgin afterward does not pertain to the reason of the mystery of our faith; and Basil says, "Do not disturb the account of piety if, after she bore Christ, she did not refuse the lawful works of marriage." Thus Basil did not think it proper to teach this in a sermon. But for the Papists it is on their lips as if it were of faith.

Before birth, during birth, and after birth, she was a virgin; and we grant that she was a virgin before birth and during birth, and even after; but this is not an article of faith. Nor does what Bellarmine says about the closed womb apply: for she was a virgin in childbirth, even though Christ was born according to the common law, because virginity is violated by nothing except carnal intercourse. Bellarmine objects concerning the closed gate through which the Lord alone enters. I reply:

1. This is allegorical, and the Prophet thought nothing less than about the virgin's womb; for the Lord did not enter the virgin's womb, but went out from it.
2. The virgin's womb was also closed because it was open to no one except the Lord going out.

As for what pertains to Jovinian, Augustine objects to him that he asserted Mary was corrupted in childbirth. Certainly she was never corrupted, nor would anyone say so except rashly; yet she could bear a son in the common manner without corruption of virginity; and after Christ was born, the parts could return and in a way be restored so that no sign of childbirth remained.

Moreover, what he objects from Jerome—that carnal virginity once lost cannot be repaired—he knowingly deceives. Jerome indeed says that a virgin after ruin cannot be repaired; but he does not say that integrity and incorruption of all parts cannot be restored to a virgin—which no one says cannot be restored. But he relates a long story from Augustine about a certain noblewoman of Carthage, Petronia, from whose bound hair a

ring miraculously fell out: as if it were difficult for God to draw a ring from a bond as He wished, so that neither the ring was broken nor the bond torn. Even Christ could be born with the virginal parts intact, as Augustine says, so that it was not necessary for Him to pass through another body, but to divide or dilate that body without pain.

But let us hear what Durandus says on this matter: he says that by divine power there was a dilation of the members and passages in the virgin's womb without rupture or breaking; this he proves from Augustine; and he says this would have happened in all women—that is, all women would have given birth in this way if the state of innocence had lasted. Certainly there is no reason why Bellarmine should be ashamed either of this opinion or of Durandus's; but there is indeed something for Durandus to be ashamed of in Bellarmine.

Durandus therefore concludes, and cites Ambrose and Gregory, that in Christ's nativity there were not two bodies at once. What then? The Fathers stand no less for our opinion than for Bellarmine's? Indeed, none stand for his opinion that there were two bodies at once. Ambrose plainly says that Christ opened the womb, and says that He alone opened the womb for Himself. Bellarmine says He opened it not by dividing, but by miraculously penetrating. I reply: But he who opens, divides; there cannot be an opening without division. Nor does Ambrose say otherwise elsewhere: for elsewhere he says nothing else except that the signs of integrity remained unviolated when He went out from the virgin. So Origen says the virgin's womb was unclosed when Christ was born. So Tertullian says of Mary: "A virgin as regards a man; not a virgin as regards childbirth. A virgin she conceived; in childbirth she married: and afterward she properly opened the womb." Similarly Fulgentius.

Jerome has these words concerning Christ: "He waits in the womb for new months to be born, He endures discomforts; He comes forth covered with blood, is wrapped in cloths, is soothed with blandishments." What could be said more plainly? Therefore Christ was born as others, and suffered similar things as others. And Jerome proves this from Luke 2: "Every male that opens the womb"; and from Genesis 49: "Until Shiloh comes," that is, his son.

But it is not necessary to labor over this matter: surely he will never prove from the Fathers that there were two bodies at once in Christ's nativity.

The fourth example is Christ's going out from the tomb. For it can be gathered from Matthew 28 and Mark 16 that the stone was removed only after the resurrection, by an angel, so that the women might see the empty tomb. I reply:

1. From these Evangelists nothing else can be gathered except that the stone was rolled away: which could have happened before the resurrection. And indeed it is not incredible that Christ rose again in the earthquake which occurred when the angel descended. And it

is contrary to the history that Christ rose again before the guards saw the angel and were struck unconscious and turned to flight. The same angel who terrified the guards removed the stone and made a way for Christ.

He opened to the one knocking. There is nothing in the Evangelists that contradicts this; and shall we be forced to believe that Christ passed out through the stone and mingled His body with the substance of the stone?

2. What if the angel came after Christ was already resurrected? And what if the stone was not rolled away until after Christ had risen? Is it necessary that Christ passed through the stone? But it could have happened that either Christ by His own power moved the stone aside without rolling it away, or the stone yielded to Christ and afterward returned. Therefore, this does nothing for our adversaries, even if the tomb were completely sealed.

But, they say, we cannot prove this except by our own authority. I reply: It is enough for us to show the manner in which Christ could have exited, even by penetration, and they cannot by any reason or Scripture teach the contrary.

Then they cite the Fathers—and quote Justin, Nazianzen, Jerome, and others. I reply: Justin says the stone was removed after the resurrection, but he does not say Christ passed through the stone. He who could create could also divide and join it again; nor does any other Father say otherwise.

For Nazianzen indeed says He rose with the tomb closed. But why does Bellarmine, who refutes Martyr and Calvin, omit what is found in Leo? For he expressly says that Christ rose on the third day when the stone of the monument had been rolled away. If we believe him, the stone was rolled away before Christ rose. But what? Does no Scholastic agree with us? Indeed, Durand says that in no text of Scripture is it held that Christ rose with the tomb closed; that when the Fathers sometimes say so, they speak by opinion; and that if the Church so holds, then the tomb was opened by Christ's power and afterward closed; he will by no means grant that Christ penetrated the stone with His body—this is as absurd as what is most absurd.

And here the Lutherans are openly refuted, who say that Christ's body is everywhere; for then how could He be born, enter to the Apostles, or leave the tomb?

The fifth example concerns the ascension of Christ and of the blessed into heaven. We hold by faith that Christ ascended and that the bodies of the blessed will ascend after the resurrection; but, he says, there is no door in heaven, no window, no crack. I reply: This argument arises from sophistical curiosity. But what? Is there no door, no gate in heaven? Then certainly the impious Papists, who have persuaded the people that Peter is the keeper of the heavenly gate and the doorkeeper of heaven—for which reason those famous keys were also given to him—and this opinion has spread among the common

people. Now Bellarmine says there are no doors or windows in heaven, so that we must fear lest with him and other such sophists there be no entrance to heaven open.

But Bellarmine proves this from Job, where these words are found: “The heavens are as if made of solid brass.” What then? Are the heavens made of brass? This is to return to fables and poets. Indeed, Homer assigns to Jove a house of brass—that is, a house having a foundation of brass or resting on foundations of brass. Yet I do not think the poets raved so as our sophists do; rather, they called the heavens brazen on account of their eternity and duration—they meant, namely, that those heavenly dwellings are not like ours (that is, ruinous) but durable; but the sophists want them to be of matter as hard and solid as brass—which never entered the mind of any poet. And here in Job they are said to be firm on account of their stable motion, and are compared to bronze or a mirror because they are splendid and translucent, not because they are hard.

How would the planets move in their spheres if the celestial spheres were of brass? For the planets and other stars are dense substances, not penetrable—as is clear from the moon, which would always shine if it were not solid; likewise in an eclipse of the sun, sunlight does not shine through the moon; and I have read that Mercury appeared in the middle of the sun like a spot; therefore they have well-compacted and corporeal matter. But what remains in heaven—and I think there is no vacuum there—is not hard but ethereal and as if airy, pure, incorruptible; yet such that it can be divided and yield even to a hard body. It is no wonder, then, if Christ ascended into heaven with His body.

But Bellarmine argues in his own manner—that is, Jesuitically: It is not probable, he says, that so many openings should be made in heaven as there are bodies of the blessed ascending—lest heaven suffer some harm, I suppose. But this

It is less probable than that a human body would pass through brass. We see birds flying daily in the air and cleaving it, yet no inconvenience befalls the element. Can the heavens be divided without destruction or danger? Who has ever heard a more delirious sophist?

Indeed, some philosophers thought that comets are generated in the heavens—thus Cardanus—which, even if false, does not therefore follow that the heavens are as solid as brass. In our age, there appeared an unusual star near Calliope, not among the number of the celestial stars, for it has now vanished. If it was a comet, how could its matter penetrate the brazen spheres? But if the celestial spheres were truly made of brass, how could we see the stars or the sun? For brass is not transparent. If all the heavens were of brass, then there is something in heaven denser and more impenetrable than air; for certainly the wandering stars are denser than their orbits. The moon takes away the sight of the sun by the interposition of its own body, and restores it when it moves away.

But let us dismiss these trifles. That celestial matter is not of brass or lead, but subtle and permeable. Yet Bellarmine brings forward Scripture, where Christ is said to have

penetrated the heavens. And what then? Did He so penetrate as philosophers understand the penetration of bodies and dimensions? Rather, διελήλυθε—that is, He passed through—He brought His body into the heavens. Could this not have been done otherwise than by penetrating dimensions? Then we would deny that the air yielded to Christ when He ascended into the heavens.

After this, he foolishly chatters much about the division of heaven, because in Scripture we often read that they were divided—as at Christ’s baptism, in Peter’s vision, in John’s vision, and elsewhere—and he says this was done only in imagination and understanding. But what will he say about Stephen? He said, “I see the heavens opened.” Bellarmine says that heaven is perspicuous and diaphanous. But then certainly it is not brazen; for not even the sun’s ray can be transmitted through the thinnest plate of brass—unless celestial brass is different from ours, and then it could be soft so as to yield easily.

What then is it that Stephen says he saw the heavens opened? It was, he says, not a cleavage, but a new illumination, by which there appeared to the eyes of the martyr what before did not appear. But surely if the heavens are so perspicuous and rare that there was no need of an opening to see what is in them, but only an extraordinary illumination; and if eyes divinely illumined can see within that veil, much more can glorious bodies divide and penetrate it.

But let us hear the sophist responding. Durandus says: “Let us suppose heaven to be divisible—which can happen either by nature or by divine power. Whichever is supposed, there will not be two bodies at once, but one body will yield to another. Nor does this argue that heaven is corruptible; for division does not argue corruption.” And this he says must be supposed, because otherwise it would follow that the glorious bodies which are in heaven would always be with another glorious body—which some, he says, would consider absurd enough. And this is the absurdity of Bellarmine’s argument.

The sixth example concerns the punishments of the damned, in which many miracles occur—which has no relevance to the matter: for we are not speaking of miracles, but of impossibilities and contradictions.

The first miracle is that bodies are tormented and not dissolved. I reply: There is no contradiction here. This happens by divine power, which inflicts tormenting but not destroying punishment.

The second miracle is that a spirit is held and impeded by a body from passing wherever it wishes. The spirits of demons and of the damned in Gehenna are bound to certain places and bodies, and the soul in man is enclosed as in a prison. I reply: Spirits are of finite nature; they cannot be except where God wills; therefore it is not impossible for God to enclose these natures in places and bodies. God can easily contain demons in their places.

The third miracle is that souls and demons are afflicted and tormented by corporeal fire—which Augustine attributes to a miracle. I reply: Let it be a miracle. God can work many miracles in the punishments of the damned. Augustine could not discover the causes of these things; he marvels therefore; but he did not dare to posit any contradiction in these matters.

There is no need to refute these things at greater length; they fall of themselves by their own weakness.

The seventh and last example...

It is affirmed by many similar things, and yet others say that nothing is similar. "It is no more fitting for a body to occupy a place," he says, "than for a heavy thing to weigh." I reply: This is false. It is much more fitting for a body to fill a place than for a heavy thing to weigh, because gravity is a quality, but dimensions are quantities and essential properties. A quality can be separated, as gravity can; for a body that was heavy can be made light. But dimensions cannot be separated from a body.

Bellarmino then recalls Christ and Peter, who, while they still had mortal bodies, walked upon the waters. I reply: I acknowledge the miracle. The bodies were suspended for a time by divine power. There is no contradiction in a heavy body being suspended in the waters and not submerged, but there is in its being simultaneously heavy and not heavy.

Thus he objects from Joshua 3 concerning the waters of the Jordan, which not only did not descend but even ascended and were raised up like a mountain. I reply: But the waters remained and retained their weight, yet by divine power they were gathered into a mountain and lifted up, so that for a time they did not flow downward. But here there is no contradiction, for these waters were not simultaneously heavy and not heavy, although they did not descend, because their gravity was suspended for a time.

But he objects that Christ made himself invisible. I reply: Christ could have hidden himself or dazzled their eyes; but the Evangelist does not say that he was then invisible: he held them constrained so that they would not lay hands on him. I admit that Christ sometimes withdrew and disappeared, yet he always retained all the properties and dimensions of a true body, even when he passed through the midst and when he walked upon the sea.

Similar is what he asserts about the fire that did not burn. I reply: Yet the fire was fire, and hot, and retained all the essential properties of fire; but God restrained it so that it would not touch his servants; he did not extinguish it or take away its heat.

Therefore, all these examples are dissimilar. For first, there is no contradiction in them—not even Bellarmine himself would deny that. But we deny that Christ's body is in the Sacrament because of contradiction.

Second, God can impede the operations of things—that water should not flow, that a heavy body should not sink, that fire should not burn—but he cannot take away their essence while preserving the things. But if Christ's body is in the Sacrament, its nature is taken away, and so it is not what it is said to be.

Bellarmino replies that this is the argument of the Fathers, not his own—which is false. The Fathers only say that Christ entered through closed doors, as he walked on the sea—that is, that he did both by divine power.

But Bellarmine again objects that the examples are similar, because the reason why God can make a heavy thing not weigh, a bright thing not shine, a hot thing not heat, a colored thing not be seen, is that the cause is prior to the effect, and therefore it can be without it. I grant this. But he says the same reasoning holds for magnitude and occupation of place, because magnitude is the cause, occupation of place is the effect; therefore by divine power magnitude can be without place.

I reply: The effect of an efficient cause can be separated from the cause, but not the effect of a formal cause. The reason is that what is made is outside what makes it; therefore it is necessarily separated—as a house from the builder, and as the heat which fire produces is outside the fire. But what is formed is not outside the form; rather it is contained in the form. Therefore Bellarmine speaks most absurdly when he says it does not matter much whether it is a formal or efficient cause.

And here a monstrous contradiction in Bellarmine must be observed:

1. He says a formal effect cannot be separated from its form—not even by God.
2. He says a formal cause can be without its effect.

But if this is true, then a formal effect can be separated from its form—which he denied before. For if a form can be without its formed thing, then the formed thing can be without its form—which he denied could happen.

But perhaps he means that a form can subsist before being formed, as the soul before the body. I reply: But not as a form; it can exist before being formed, but it cannot be a form. Now magnitude is the form of existing in a place and occupying a place; therefore it cannot be separated.

But he adds that gravity is in the same genus of cause, yet it can be separated. I reply: Notice how subtly he speaks! Gravity is not an essential form of any body; therefore no body loses its essence through gravity being removed.

It is defined: but it is nevertheless in the same genus, because it depends on form. Therefore, a huge marble stone could be lifted by two fingers, indeed by one finger, and could be tossed here and there by a miracle without violating the nature of the stone, because heaviness is only an accident and a quality of the stone: but marble, as long as it is a quantum and so great, cannot lack its own dimensions. All these arguments fall into ruin: Qualities can be separated or restrained from bodies: therefore dimensions can be; since these belong to the essence, but those do not. Therefore it does not follow: Fire can not heat: therefore a body can not occupy a place; for fire is called hot because it can heat, not because it always heats: it can do nothing unless it heats itself, and be hot in itself, if it has not found matter suitable to be heated: but a body is large, not because it can be extended and have dimensions, but because it has in itself the form and essence of its magnitude. And these are the wretched sophistries of Bellarmine. The Lutherans urge and object with these same examples, but they are less foolish than the Papists in this matter: for those who defend that Christ's body is everywhere after the hypostatic union, how do they say that Christ either exited from the tomb or entered into some place, since he is everywhere? What need was there for him to exit or enter, if he was everywhere? Their blindness, therefore, is deplorable.

Chapter 13: Our arguments, by which we prove that Christ's body, if it is in the Sacrament, necessarily occupies a place.

The opinion about the sacramental presence of Christ's body consists of two parts: one is that Christ's body in the Sacrament is endowed with its own quantity; the other, that nevertheless this magnitude occupies no space: which defense is entangled in a most shameful contradiction. Let us therefore set forth the reasons which Scripture and right reason abundantly supply us in this cause. For we dispute about a body, which if it lacks the properties of a true body, will lose the true nature of a body.

Our first argument is as follows: It is of the truth of a body to be contained in space, to consist of its dimensions, to have its own face: therefore that body, which the Papists place in the Sacrament without space, without dimensions, without its own face, is not a true and solid body, but imaginary and phantasmal. Bellarmine tries to refute this argument, and says that Christ's body indeed has its own dimensions and its own face, but does not for that reason occupy space. I reply: By face we understand the just proportion of the body, which cannot escape the senses: for it consists in dimensions; and dimensions are judged by the extension of parts: wherefore if there is no extension of parts, there are no dimensions, and thus no face of the body will remain. Bellarmine's entire evasion is that Christ's body in the Eucharist has these dimensions and extension in

itself, but not with respect to place: which is nothing else than to affirm in words what ought to be demonstrated by reason. But it is utterly impossible that a body should have in itself position and dimensions and all that is required in a body, and yet not have respect to place. For the Philosopher, to whom much must be granted in this matter, rightly says that it belongs to the intrinsic nature and definition of quantity that a body extends in order to place: and this is simply necessary. For there must be distance between parts: the eye must be distant from the ear, the hand from the feet, the head from the feet: which distance cannot be without respect to place: the eye cannot but be in another place than the ear, the face must be broad, the nose long, the eyes round. But the straight and circular line, and breadth, and thickness indicate order with respect to place. What then? Is not Christ's body in the Sacrament in a place? If it is in a place, then it is contained by place. And indeed the Sacrament is in a place, small in a small place, large in a large place; nor can any body be where the Sacrament is not: therefore it has order to place. And the Sacrament could be as large as Christ's body is: who then would deny that Christ's body is truly in a place?

Since the senses report that a place is filled and a space is occupied, perhaps the body of Christ does not fill a place in the large Sacrament any more than in the small one. What then would fill so great a space? Certainly either the body of Christ, or the bread. Not the bread, because it does not remain; but the quantity of bread remains. Will then the dimensions of the bread, which remain without substance, fill the place? Then much more will the dimensions which are present with their substance, as those who speak about the body of Christ say, fill the place. Something certainly fills the place; if it is quantity, then quantity cannot but fill it. Therefore, the body of Christ, since it has its own quantity, will necessarily fill the place.

If one denies that the body of Christ is in a place in the Sacrament, then contradictory statements about the body of Christ will be affirmed—namely, that it is in a place and that it is not wholly in a place. Nor can this happen by a different respect; for no whole can by a different respect be in a place and not be in a place. For the reason why the body of Christ is in a place in heaven is its magnitude; therefore, if it has the same magnitude in the Sacrament (which our adversaries wish), then it is necessarily also in a place in the Sacrament, since the reason for existing in a place remains—namely, magnitude. Either, therefore, it does not have in the Sacrament that magnitude which it has in heaven (and then it is not the same body), or just as it is in a place there on account of magnitude, so also here.

But Bellarmine proposes an elegant supposition: "If God," he says, "were to remove all the air from this hall (I believe he was reading in a hall) and not permit any other to enter, we would all retain our dimensions and faces; yet we would not be contained by space, nor would anyone see another's face." But who will grant him either that God would ever do such a thing so that there would be a vacuum, or that if such a thing were done, it

would follow that one person would not see another? This is not agreed upon among philosophers; many think motion through a vacuum is possible; why not also sight? But however the matter might be, bodies would retain their proper magnitude, and even if not by air (because there would be none), they would nevertheless be bounded by their extremities.

But if this were done in a vacuum, could such a thing happen where there is no vacuum? Unless they say that the Sacrament always introduces a vacuum. For why does he thrust a vacuum upon us when there is no vacuum in the Sacrament? But this supposition is most frivolous and foolish.

Our argument is of this sort: Essential faculties cannot be separated from their subjects; therefore much less can form. The faculty of reasoning cannot be separated from man; therefore neither can occupying a place be separated from body—for the form of occupying a place is magnitude. Bellarmine says that to fill a place is an act, not a potency; but the faculty of understanding is a potency; and an act can be more easily separated than a potency. I reply: The act of a form can be impeded and separated, but not the form itself. To reason is an act, but the rational soul is a form; a man can not reason, but he cannot be non-rational. Now magnitude is the form of body; therefore it is not posterior to body, as reasoning is posterior to the rational soul. Although therefore to fill a place seems to be posterior to body, it is nevertheless simultaneous and cannot be separated, because it is in the definition of body. For what is body but magnitude—that is, extended in length, breadth, and depth? This form indicates an order to place; therefore to be in a place cannot be separated from body any more than magnitude can.

Next, Bellarmine says that the faculty of understanding can be separated from man, as in infants and fools. But they are deprived of act, not faculty; for who would say that an infant does not have the faculty and potency of understanding, and similarly even a fool? But they lack act and use. And Bellarmine himself, contradicting himself, admits this when he says that they lack the use of understanding no less than if they did not have that faculty at all; therefore they have it, but on account of impediments they cannot exercise it. But nothing can prevent an essential form from being in a thing while the thing is safe; therefore body cannot not be in a place, because it cannot not have extension of parts in order to place, since this is the form and definition of body.

But Bellarmine says that quantity and substance cannot be disjoined naturally, but yet can be without contradiction. I reply: First, therefore substance can be without quantity; but this cannot happen. For they wish it to be so

In the Sacrament, there is the quantity of the body, because it cannot be separated from the substance. If quantity could be separated from the body without contradiction, certainly all would say with Ockham and Peter d'Ailly that the body of Christ is in the

Sacrament without quantity. But perhaps Bellarmine means that quantity can exist without substance; for thus all speak concerning the bread. Yet bread could more easily be without its quantity than the quantity of bread without its substance, because for an accident, to be is to inhere. Therefore, the first is much more reasonable.

Second, if quantity could be separated from substance, still it could not be from the body; for body is continuous quantity from three dimensions; and they say that not only the substance of Christ but the body of Christ is in the Sacrament.

Third, Bellarmine contradicts both Thomas and himself, and utterly overturns his own cause when he says that quantity can be separated from substance; for then either here is the quantity of Christ without His substance, or His substance without quantity, or certainly he says nothing to the point; but neither can happen. Although here equally could be the quantity of Christ without substance, as the quantity of bread without any bread; and then there would be no substance in the Sacrament, but only a bare quantity. But if a definition cannot be separated from the defined either naturally or at all, then quantity cannot be separated from body, or body from quantity, without contradiction.

Our third argument is this: Substance cannot exist except substantially; therefore neither can quantity except according to the mode of quantity. So a line cannot be without the mode of a line, and breadth without the mode of breadth, and depth without the mode of both; therefore it is false that there is here a quantum not quantitatively. Bellarmine says that substance cannot be separated from its essential mode, so that it cannot inhere in a subject in the manner of accidents. I reply: Therefore certainly an accident cannot not inhere in a subject, because this is the essential mode of an accident; but they say that an accident does not inhere in a subject; which they can equally say of substance, that substance inheres in a subject in the manner of an accident.

But Bellarmine adds that substance can be separated from its intrinsic non-essential mode. What is this mode? To exist through itself, he says. Therefore this can be separated from substance, so that substance does not exist through itself; and yet he admits that to exist through itself is intrinsic to substance. But this is more essential to substance than not to inhere; for not to inhere does not posit something but denies; but to exist through itself posits, and it posits that which makes it not to inhere in the manner of accidents, which do not exist through themselves.

He objects concerning the humanity of Christ, which does not exist through itself. I reply: It exists through itself with respect to its substance, but it does not subsist outside the divinity; it has being through itself, but it does not have a hypostasis except in the Word; so our body exists through itself, insofar as it is a substance, but it is united with the soul in the unity of person. The body of Christ has existence in itself no less than the deity of Christ, but it does not have, nor can it have, a hypostasis except with the divinity.

Therefore, to exist through itself and to support accidents cannot be separated from substance, because it is placed in the definition of substance; but that which supports another primarily exists through itself; substance supports and sustains accidents primarily and through itself; therefore to exist through itself is of the essence of substance.

But now Bellarmine responds more strictly that quantity cannot be except quantitatively—that is, without extension and distinction of parts in itself—but it can be non-quantitatively in relation to place: that is, it has its quantity in itself, but it does not occupy place. How frivolous this is we have often said; and this opinion does not please other sophists.

Durandus demonstrates the contrary by such an argument: What belongs to something through itself by intrinsic reason from its own nature cannot by any power be separated from it: a human cannot be unless it is rational and capable of laughter; therefore since it belongs to bodily substance to have part outside part in relation to place not through substance but through quantity—if the body of Christ has quantity, it cannot not have parts distant in situation in relation to place—which is also Ockham's reasoning: therefore these two [arguments show] that Christ is not here quantitatively or has any distinction of parts.

They exist in themselves. Bellarmine says nothing else except that there is a distinction in themselves, but not with respect to place; which cannot be: for distance in itself necessarily requires that it have a distinction in place. For there is no distinction, but a most foul confusion of members, unless there is a distinction with respect to place, because then the eye would be in the nose, and the nose in the arm.

Dominic de Soto says that, truly, to a pure philosopher this argument is not weak, and he attempts to borrow a response from Thomas, which I wonder our Bellarmine did not use. And this is it: that the substance of Christ is in the Sacrament by the power of consecration, but the quantity by the power of concomitance; therefore the quantity is here in the manner of a substance, not of a quantity—which however is said most absurdly: for by whatever reason the quantity is there, whether through consecration or through concomitance, it ought to preserve its own mode, as Scotus says. But the mode of substance does not conflict with being in any small quantity: the whole nature of a substance is in any part of the substance; as the whole specific nature of air is in any part of air. But Bellarmine here abstained from this distinction, which certainly is Thomas's, and Dominic Soto wonderfully praises it: but truly it takes away all his subterfuges from Bellarmine and cuts the throat of the Papal cause.

And this can be taught thus: "Quantity is present in the manner of substance," says Dominic de Soto: "but the mode of substance is without any distinction of parts not only

to an external place, but also internally in itself: for where there is a distinction of parts in themselves, there the whole is not in the whole, and the whole in any part: but the mode of substance is to be whole in the whole, and whole in any part.” Whence they conclude that Christ is not only in the whole Sacrament, but wholly in any part: therefore He is here not quantitatively, not even in Himself; indeed, Christ’s body will not be here at all, or Christ’s body is changed into a spirit; which the Manichaeans and many heretics say. And Dominic Soto says that thus Christ is wholly in the Sacrament, as the soul is in the whole body and in any part of it: if this were true, then it passes into spirit; which is heretical: for to be whole in the whole and whole in any part is proper to spirit; and substance cannot be wholly in any part unless separated from quantity. For these two modes are diverse: to be according to the mode of quantity, and to be according to the mode of substance; for the mode of substance is without quantity. If therefore Christ in the Sacrament exists according to the mode of substance; therefore He is without quantity in Himself: which all deny.

Next, that the whole substance is in any part of the substance is true of a homogeneous substance, but it cannot be true of a heterogeneous one: for the whole specific nature of an eye cannot be in any part of a nose; and hence it appears that they remove the nature of an organic body; since they wish Christ’s body to be in the Eucharist according to the mode of substance, they wish it to be there whole in the whole and whole in any part: therefore the whole eye is in the ears and in the fingers. They say both: first, that Christ is in the Sacrament with quantity; second, that He is whole in the whole and whole in any part: which two destroy each other mutually. And they say that Christ is wholly in any part not only after fraction, but also before. So Thomas and Innocent [say], and to think contrary is an error, indeed next to heresy: but this removes every mode of quantity both intrinsic and extrinsic: for no quantum is whole in any part, because it has part outside part in itself; and they themselves also grant this.

Then, to be whole in the whole and whole in any part is to be somewhere definitively: so this mode coincides with the sacramental mode; but above it was distinguished by Bellarmine, and Thomas says that Christ is in the Sacrament neither circumscriptively nor definitively, but sacramentally. But by this mode Christ’s body will be as the soul is in Christ’s body and in the Sacrament: therefore not according to the mode of a corporeal substance, but of a spiritual one. But if so, then when there is a division of the Sacrament, Christ would not be in each most minute part: for certainly the soul is not in a severed finger or arm, because the soul does not have extension; for then it would be material and mortal: therefore since Christ’s body is material and divisible, it cannot be wholly in any part; yet they wish it.

That the whole is in every part of the Sacrament not only when united, but also when broken, they say is there according to the mode of a soul. But on this matter the sophists do not agree. That the whole body of Christ is in every part of the Sacrament, not all

consent: for many think otherwise, whom Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure mention; and they do not disapprove of this opinion; namely, that the whole Christ is in one host, but when it is divided, then the whole is in every part, by the example of a broken mirror: for when the priest approaches for the consecration, he intends only to consecrate one host, that is, that the whole bread passes into the whole Christ, not that any part passes into the whole Christ: but the multiplication happens from this, that the body of Christ is indivisible: but the soul is indivisible, yet it is not wholly in a severed part, and if it were, then it would be divided: therefore the body of Christ is divided, because it is in the particles and fragments of the divided Sacrament.

But if the body of Christ is indivisible in the Sacrament, and for that reason is in every broken or divided part, what is it that is divided? Is it the species of the Sacrament? But if there is a real division of the species, then also of the substance which is contained under those species. And certainly if the whole and entire Christ is in every part, then before the fraction there are infinite Christs in the host: for quantity is divisible into always divisible parts, and every part of the quantity of the species is the whole Christ, until it comes to the smallest particle; therefore there is Christ infinitely: and then when we take one part of the host, we take not one Christ, but as many Christs as there can be parts of the Sacrament, and then Christ ought not to have said, "This is my body," but "These are my bodies": therefore any man receives at least a thousand Christs, if the whole is not only in the whole, but also in every part. And this now is the opinion of the School and the Thomists.

But Pope Innocent first says that he does not know whether the whole Sacrament is changed into the whole Christ, or a part into a part: he says, "He knows who does it." Secondly, he says that he thinks, if pressed more closely, that under the whole species is the whole Christ, and that he is in each of the parts. He gives a reason, or rather a conjecture: for he says, "I conjecture this from the fact that into however many parts the species are divided, the whole Christ is in each." He does not think that Christ is multiplied by fraction, as an image in a mirror: therefore there is a great mass of bodies. But he gives another reason: because if one whole Christ is in the whole Sacrament, then a part of the bread would be converted into a part of Christ's body: but because this can hardly be understood, they prefer that any part be converted into the whole: if this were true, then in every point of the Sacrament is the whole Christ—head, feet, hands, and the other members: and thus there will be no distinction of parts: for what distance of parts can there be in a point?

Now indeed whether Christ lies down, or sits, or stands in the Sacrament, Innocent does not dare to state: but yet if he has a position of parts, then this is necessary: for there is no body which has in itself a position and distinction of parts that does not either lie down, or sit, or stand, or have some such posture: whatever they state will be absurd. And although I am unwillingly engaged in refuting such foolishness of the Scholastics, yet it

greatly contributes to the illustration of the truth to know their monstrous comments which have sprung from real presence.

Our fourth argument is as follows: A spirit cannot exist in the manner of a body divisibly and extensively: therefore a body cannot exist in the manner of a spirit indivisibly. Bellarmine concedes the antecedent but denies the argument: he says that a spirit cannot be in a place extensively, but a body can exist not extensively. For to be extended in place (he says) is the formal effect of extension in itself: but a form can be separated from its effect, not an effect from its form: because that is prior, this posterior: but if a spirit indivisible in itself were extended in place, then a formal effect would be without a cause, and a posterior without a prior, which cannot happen.

I reply: 1. Bellarmine concedes that extension in itself (which pertains to every body and belongs to every body) is the formal cause of extension in place: which was said by him: for the reason why something is extended in place is that it has in itself magnitude and extension of parts: now

But the body of Christ has extension in itself; however, extension in itself is the reason and form of extension in place: therefore, the body of Christ cannot fail to be extended in place. Thus, this completely overturns the non-local presence of Christ in the Sacrament.

But Bellarmine says that form can be separated from its effect. I reply: the effect of a form, insofar as it is a form, cannot in any way be separated from the form. For example, the rational soul is the essential form of man: it cannot exist without its formal effect, which is to have reason, and by that form to reason. Although it is by the power of reason and the form, it is nevertheless not the effect of the formal cause, but of the whole man from his form, or by reason of his form, so that it is rather the cause of an efficient effect than a formal one. Otherwise, man would always reason, because not even Bellarmine would say that the effect of a formal cause can be separated from the form without a miracle. But man does not reason without a miracle, because it is within the power of reason to produce this syllogistic act; yet if it were not in man, which the form of man effects, man would not even exist. Therefore, to separate the form from its proper and true effect is to establish an impossible contradiction, just as if someone were to posit a man without a rational soul.

I reply, therefore, secondly: extension in place cannot in any way be separated from extension in itself, because the latter is the form of the former, and the former is the formal effect of the latter. Moreover, what he says—that form is prior to its effect and therefore can be separated from it—is first false in its premise: for they are simultaneous in nature, like definition and the thing defined; and secondly, not everything that is posterior in nature can be separated, as gravity cannot be separated from earth, nor risibility from man.

Thirdly, therefore, the argument rightly follows: Angels cannot be extended in places; therefore, bodies cannot fail to be extended in places. For what he says—that spirits cannot be extended in places because they have no extension in themselves—he fails to notice that he is saying something that works most strongly against himself. For if spirits are not in place because they have no extension in themselves, then necessarily bodies are in place because they have extension in themselves. For if form can be separated from its effect in a body, then also in a spirit; but a spirit is such a form as does not permit extension in place. Let us suppose that form can be separated from its effect in a spirit; then a spirit could be in place.

Fourthly, if it is contradictory for a spirit to have extension in place when it has no extension in itself, and it cannot happen that this occurs, as Bellarmine concedes; then it is no less a contradiction for a body not to be in place when it has extension in itself; because form cannot be separated from its effect any more in a body than in a spirit. For the reason why a spirit cannot be extended in place is the nature or form of the spirit; so too the reason why a body is extended in place is the nature or form of the body.

Our fifth argument runs as follows: It belongs to the essence of quantity to have part outside part; therefore, where one part is, there another is not; therefore, the whole quantity of the Lord's body cannot be in every particle of the host. Bellarmine admits that this is the most difficult of all arguments and replies that a quantitative body has part outside part if that "outside" has reference to the subject, not to place; and he says that this is what the Philosopher means in the category of Quantity. But this is most absurdly said, since the Philosopher never dreamed of a body without place; and our adversaries attribute this to a miracle; but the Philosopher did not consider miracles: therefore he attributes to a body quantity, whose essence is to have part outside part—which is simply necessary, since division belongs to continuous quantity.

The body of Christ is divisible by its nature; therefore it has part outside part, not only with respect to subject but also with respect to place, because there is no division without reference to place. It is not indeed divided because it is immortal and glorious; and our bodies will be indivisible in that mode, yet they will be of the same nature as those which are divisible; therefore with respect to place there will be part outside part. And in a body one part coexists with one part of place, another with another; therefore with respect to place there must be part outside part. For unless this is so, there is not part outside part either in the subject or in the whole.

Bellarmino most impudently replies that two parts of a body

The same part of space is coexistent. But what does he mean concerning two parts? For this ought to be true of all parts and of the whole body: otherwise a part will be outside a

part with respect to place. Therefore, the whole body of Christ is in any part of space, that is, a part is not outside a part in any minimal portion of space.

But suppose it is so: therefore, the whole body is in each particle of space: hence it is in space; for each part of space is a place. But if it is in space, it ought to be in an equal space; if it is not in space, why does he say that two parts of the body coexist in the same part of space? He speaks inconsistently in both cases. For if he grants that any part of Christ's body is in any part of space, then the remaining parts can also be in space, and then Christ's body is in space; for if all parts are in space, then the whole is in space. And then he refutes Thomas and others who say that Christ's body is not in the sacrament as in a place.

But without doubt he understands not a proper place, but a fictitious and mathematical one. But let us proceed thus: If Christ as a whole is in any particle of the host and of space, then any part of the host and of space has the whole Christ; if the whole, then any particle has Christ's body, complete with head and other members; if so, then either there is some division of the bodies of the host, or not; if not, then there is only one body in the whole host, because in indivisibility only one can exist; if there is division, then the same thing is divided—which they would not say. Perhaps they would say it can be divided with respect to place, but they posit no body in the sacrament with respect to place; they say Christ's body in the sacrament has all the properties of Christ's body in heaven except relation to place.

But we understand that in the sacrament there is not only one body of Christ, but the whole is in any particle; if this is true, then either all bodies are only one whole body in the whole, or if here there are more bodies than one, then there will be some division; but there is no division by any thing, since there is no division between the body in heaven and in the sacrament; nor by relation, because there is no relation to place in the sacrament; and thus from every side they are shut out from any reply.

Now let us set these things aside and come to Augustine. He refutes all these fabrications; for speaking about Christ's body and humanity, he says that Christ's body has parts which cannot be at the same time, and if spaces of places are taken away from bodies, they will be nowhere, and because nowhere, they will not be at all. Thus, if Christ's body does not occupy space, it will be nowhere, and not at all, and so it is necessary to destroy the nature of Christ unless space is given to him.

Bellarmino replies: first, this testimony refutes ubiquity—which is true; I wish they would at last see it; second, it does not refute them, and that for two reasons. The first is because Augustine requires only that every true body be extended in itself, but not necessarily coextended with space. But Augustine speaks distinctly about space and place, and says that if you take away spaces of places from bodies, they will be nowhere.

But he says that Augustine makes mention of place because he proves a posteriori that a body is extended in itself from the fact that it occupies a certain space of place; but it does not follow from this, he says, that it cannot be extended in itself unless it occupies space.

But first Augustine wishes to prove that Christ is not everywhere according to humanity because he has a body; but it belongs to a body to be in a place. The aim here is not that a body is extended in itself, but that it is not everywhere or in different places because it belongs to bodies to be in certain spaces of places. Second, how does it follow a posteriori that Christ's body has extension in itself because it occupies space of place, when the Papists say that Christ's body does not occupy space of place in the sacrament? For if Augustine argues thus, then he proves truth from falsehood. Third, Augustine refutes Lutherans no more than Papists; for he contends not only that Christ according to the flesh is not everywhere, but that he cannot be at once in the sepulcher and on the cross and in paradise, because this conflicts with the nature of humanity and body. If Christ could not be at once on the cross and in paradise, then not at once in heaven and in the sacrament.

The second reason which Bellarmine asserts why Augustine does not refute them is that Augustine speaks about bodies below heaven—which is also most false. For Augustine speaks about Christ's body and generically about every body. "Christ as man," he says, "is there whence he is to come."

Moreover, those who say that Christ is present elsewhere, he says, take away the truth of the body. And he says that immortality was given to the flesh of Christ, not that his nature was taken away; and that he is everywhere through his divinity, in heaven through his humanity. And afterward he teaches that bodies are bound to a place; therefore, certainly there will not be a body unless it is in a place.

But most clearly, when he says that quantity in a body is one thing, quality another: quality, such as health, can be equally present in all parts; but quantity is in distant parts, which cannot be simultaneously present. But why? Is it because they cannot be simultaneous in themselves? Augustine adds, because they each occupy their own spaces of places, smaller ones smaller spaces, and larger ones larger spaces. Therefore, the head of Christ ought to occupy a greater space than the eye; but according to the opinion of the Papists, it does not.

Similarly, Augustine says elsewhere: every body, however great or however small, occupies a space of place and fills a place. Nothing more open could be said, so that those who resist are very unjust. But recognize the wretchedness of the sophists: Bellarmine says that Augustine in the former passage is speaking about bodies below the heaven; and above he said that Augustine says this only: a body has extension in itself because it is in

a place. But they want the body of Christ in the Sacrament under the species not to have extension in a place; therefore, Augustine proves nothing from Bellarmine's response.

Then why does he object concerning the first heaven, if only bodies which are below the heaven are so in a place that they depend on the place? And Augustine adduces certain testimonies of Scripture, such as that of the angel: "He is not here; for he has risen," and that of Christ: "I rejoice for your sakes (that you may believe) that I was not there," and that of Martha: "Lord, if you had been here, my brother would not have died." From these things which we have said, it is manifest that the Papists defend false and contradictory things.